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X
Industrial Stagnation & Economic Retrogression
(i) Massive Unemployment
(ii) Threat to Small-scale Sector
(iii) The Home Market
(iv) Backwardness, Inevitable Product of Globalisation
There is a misnomer that foreign capital that enters the
country leads to growth, development and modernization of production relations.
In this period of globalisation there has been much hype that India will achieve
an 8% growth rate and that unemployment will be a thing of the past. But, this
has not happened, though the politicians keep dreaming of it even now. In fact,
the growth rate in the 1990s actually dropped when compared to the earlier
decade. But this is only one aspect of the impact of globalisation here. The
other factor is that with the type of ‘development’ promoted by globalisation,
even a high growth rate will not lead to the development of the country and its
people. On the contrary, what we see is de-industrialisation and economic
retrogression in the Indian economy.
Unfortunately, this reality gets hidden by a powerful media
that focuses only on the lives of the elite, the newest in consumerism, the
info-tech and telecom sectors, the computer and communications revolution, and
the glitter and glamour of the world of films, sports and life-styles of the
upper crust. Let alone the masses, not even the middle-classes have a space in
this artificial world, creating expectations, longings and desires that are
unrealizable for the bulk of the viewership and readers. But the real world lies
elsewhere — in the vast backward countryside and in the slums and one-room
tenements in the urban ghettos.
What then should be the real measure of real progress for
this country? It is not the hi-tech imported gadgets owned by the few that can
be a measure, but the only real measure can be the pulling out the vast masses
from their existing stagnant semi-feudal relations and bringing them into modern
production relations — whether capitalist or socialist. Given that socialist
relations are inconceivable within the existing system, growth of modern
capitalist relations within the womb of semi-feudalism is the maximum that can
be expected. But, globalisation has even retarded this when compared to the
earlier three decades in India. Let us see how.
i) Massive Unemployment
Greater and greater employment in the organized sector —
whether public or private — is the major factor for drawing the masses into
modern production relations. This not only results in a better standard of
living, but also brings the people in touch with modern industry and evolves
social relationships based purely on the work-place, thereby breaking free (to
an extent) of the thousands of petty ties linked with the semi-feudal relations
of the past. Marginalisation of the work force has exactly the opposite impact.
Now, what do we see in this period of globalisation? The
percentage of those employed in the organized sector dropped from around 10% in
the 1980s to about 7% by the late 1990s. 1
What is even worse, through the 1990s the rate of growth in the
organized sector has been systematically declining (except for a year or two)
and turned negative in the two years 1999 and 2000. Infact, in the last four
years of the century from 1997 to 2000, the cummulative growth rate in the
organized sector was a mere 0.1% — i.e. while about 2 to 3 crore new faces came
into the labour force in these four years, a total of 28,000 were absorbed into
the organized sector.
Looked at from another direction, of the 20 crore students,
about 5 crore are in middle level education, 2 crore in secondary level
education, 1 crore in senior secondary education, 50 lakhs in graduation, 5
lakhs in post-graduation and 5 lakh in professional education. Where are they
getting employed? Most of them are first generation students. Where are they to
go? In the 1980s employment generation in the organized sector grew at 1.6%,
while in the 1990s it halved to 0.8%2.
It is now stagnant. In fact, for the last two years it has already turned
negative — shrinking by 0.15% in 2000 and 0.4% in 2001. In the next decade this
negative growth is likely to increase, given the stagnation in the manufacturing
sector and the mass lay-offs in the public sector. Over the last four years
though the service sector has been growing by 7 to 9% the job growth has been
zero. A nightmare haunts the youth of today.
Forget the future, even for the present, CSO (Central
Statistical Organisation) data shows that in fact more than 7 lakh jobs have
been shed in the factory sector in the two years from 1998 to 2000 — i.e. a drop
of a huge 8% of the total employee strength in the factory sector.
3
Let us then take a brief look at the extent of job shedding in both private and
the public sector. Though the process began with the ‘economic reforms’ in 1992
itself it has picked up since 1997, since the economy has been in a continuous
slowdown.
To take some example of the extent of retrenchment:
* The Textile Commission says that
almost 3.5 lakh of the total 10 lakh in the industry remained unemployed as of
Jan.30, 2001.
4 Of these 37,000 have
lost their jobs in the 18-month period to Dec. 2000.
* Tisco has in the 5 years to 2001 cut
its workforce by 30,000, from 78,000 to 48,000. it plans a further cut of 6,000.
* Over the 5 years to 1999, Phillips
cut its 10,000 strength by half.
* Seimens shed 2,000 of its employees
(20% of its total) in the 18 months to Jan. 1999.
* Tata Engineering shed 9,375 of its
workforce between 1998 to 2000; Bajaj Auto axed 4,785 in the same period;
Hindustan Motors cut 1,500 in two years; and LML downsized by 15% in 2000.5
* ACC shed 6,000 in the 3 years to
2001; Grasim reduced its workforce by 1,350; the three major cement companies —
ACC, L&T and Grasim — plan to shed 6,000 more.
6
* In just the one year of 2000/01
Bombay dying reduced its strength by half — it outsourced most of its work.
7
* BILT (Ballarsha Paper Mill) to axe
3,000 in 18 months, out of a total strength of 16,000.
8
* 5-Star hotels removed 3,300; Taj
plan VRS for a further 1,200.
* Mahindra and Mahindra cut 1,400 of
its workforce — 8%. NIIT cuts staff by 6%.
9
If we turn to the Public Sector the situation has been even
worse:
* The banks shed 1-lakh employees or
11% of its total force.
10
* 162 PSUs shed 1,20,000 of its
employees from 1993/94 to 1998/99.
11
* By Sept.30, 1999 the Central
Government had given 1.07 lakh employees VRS (Voluntary Retirement Scheme). The
Expenditure Reforms Commission has proposed to cut a minimum of 5 lakh of
Central Government jobs from a total of 32 lakhs — about 16%.
* Lakhs of posts have not been filled
by all state governments, and each have big retrenchment plans — e.g. UP plans
to remove 2 lakhs, Bihar 75,000, the MP government has already removed 16,600
daily wage employees appointed after 1988. The Center tells the States to
downsize by 30% within 5 years!
* The railways plan to cut 3 lakh of
its staff over a period of 10 years, at the rate of 30,000 per year, to bring
its total strength down to 12.5 lakhs.
So, we see that not only has the organized sector been
declining, but there are plans afoot to further cut it drastically. The reasons
for this are many, the prime factor being maximization of profits by the
moneybags. As we have seen the vast amounts of FDI that come into the country go
chiefly to buy up existing business, and so, not only do they not add to the
employment, but actually reduce it through ‘rationalisation’ and use of hi-tech
machinery imported. The second most important factor is the contractualisation
of the labour force in both the public and the private sector. Here, instead of
having permanent workers much of the work is done through contract labour. For
this even the Contract Act is being amended. The third important fact for its
decline is the increased outsourcing of work, where the same jobs are done in
sweatshops at a fraction of the wage-rate of the permanent worker.
The gains from contract labour and outsourcing can be
understood by a few facts.
In August 2001 the Supreme Court gave a judgment upholding
the right of contract labour in the PSUs. The massive use of contract labour can
be understood from the fact that a negative judgment would have meant a yearly
cost of Rs 817 crores to them. Table X.1
12
gives a picture of what it would have entailed to them:
Table X.1
|
No. of contract labour
|
Annual Cost of
Regularisation Rs Crores
|
FCI
|
1,30,000
|
303
|
IOC
|
7,571
|
137
|
SAIL
|
11,144
|
98
|
BHEL
|
7,500
|
76
|
ONGC
|
6,769
|
137
|
NTPC
|
7,923
|
35
|
HPCL
|
1,812
|
32
|
Total
|
1,72,719
|
817
|
If we take just one example of outsourcing, we find that in
textiles, the share of the organized mill sector’s share in total cloth
production has dropped from 80% in 1950 to 5% today; with power looms accounting
for 75%.
If the organized sector is thus shrinking, a large section
of the population is being pushed into the unorganized sector, where the bulk of
India’s population already exists. Here, working conditions are mostly medieval;
wage-rates are a pittance, insufficient even for survival; and the relation with
the employer is slave-like with his authority being the final word in all
matters. Here too, caste, communal and patriarchal (where women are employed)
relations often dominate, to keep better control and exploit to the maximum. No
laws apply in practice, and the total lack of any democratic environment makes
life a suffocating hell. Even the smallest forms of union activity are not
tolerated and brutally crushed. Insecurity of job and life is generally, the
rule. It stands in direct contrast to the sphere of modern industry with its
organized labour force. The two worlds are far apart, with little in common.
About half the Indian population can be counted as the
working population between the age of 20 and 60 (Census figures). In
other words the working population in 2001 should be roughly 50 crores. But
based on the same percentage of the 1991 census the number of ‘main workers’
(i.e. actually those employed in work) in 2001 would work out to about 35 crores.
In other words 15 crore of the working people are unemployed. But even of those
employed, a large proportion would be under-employed, as a ‘main worker’ is
defined as any person who works for just half the year. In other words the real
unemployment rate would work out to about 35% of India’s labour force. Of these
18 crore unemployed people, just over 4 crore are registered on the employment
exchange, the bulk of whom would comprise the educated unemployed. This amounts
to a massive destruction of the productive forces of a country.
Not only that, such a vast populace left out of the
productive process, the bulk of whom live in the backward rural areas, comprise
the most extreme end of India’s marginalized population. Unlike what is seen as
the ‘reserve army’ of the unemployed in a developed capitalist society, this
mass of humanity are the products of backwardness and the semi-feudal conditions
prevailing here — they are not a displaced force, held in reserve, but a product
of lack of development itself. They have no social security whatsoever and are
forced to eke out an existence in sub-human conditions. Many just die
prematurely of small illnesses to which they become easily prone due to
malnutrition.
But, such conditions are not confined to merely the
unemployed. The bulk of those working in the unorganized sector, live a life in
semi-starvation. With no regularity of work, with wages well below what is
stipulated as minimum, with no benefits at all, and with long hours of work. In
the book ‘Working in the informal Sector’ by Jan Bremen (1996), the
author portrayed the situation thus: "The informal sector is dominated by
simple and obsolete technology. Most employers face uncertain markets and are
dependent on traders and merchants for orders. By keeping their fixed costs low,
and the size of their labour force variable, they can easily pass on the risks
of production to this class. In the workforce, few workers come in touch with
machines, but those that do, and possess some skills get a higher wage. Few
women enter higher paid jobs, and even in the low category jobs they are being
steadily replaced by male migrants. The labour regime in the informal sector
with work hours extending anywhere from 10 to 16 hours in most industries, seems
to have further intensified in recent years. Working conditions are extremely
difficult and degrading, more so for women and children". An estimated 50%
of labour in this sector lives below the poverty line.
With globalisation this marginalisation of the workforce has
increased. In a semi-feudal economy like India, imperialist sponsored
development creates a warped and distorted growth, incompatible with any
genuine, over-all, healthy, dynamic progress. It does not unleash an internal
dynamics of self-generating growth. What is actually achieved is a few oasis of
development in a desert of backwardness. Even this is sustained through infusion
of funds and thousands of links (dependencies) with the foreign market, which
can crumble overnight. This is best brought out by the fact that while
‘development’ has phenomenally reduced the share of agriculture in the national
income, while that of manufacturing and particularly services has increased, the
proportion of the population employed in agriculture continues to be the same.
Such warped and distorted development has now got magnified
ten-fold in this period of globalisation. While in 1993/4 agriculture
contributed 30.2% to the GDP; today it contributes a mere 25%. Yet the
percentage of people employed in agriculture continues to be over 60% of the
workforce. In fact, if anything the percentage dependent on agriculture has been
increasing in the 1990s, due to the declining availability of non-agricultural
activities. So we see, in the period from 1991 to 1998 employment in agriculture
increased by 1.8% yearly, while that of non-agricultural activity declined by
2.15% yearly. 13 Overall, the 1990s
saw the lowest rate of growth of rural employment since 1947 — a mere 0.67%.
14
The main reason for this is the huge drop in government investment in
agriculture and in the funds allocated for the various employment-generating
schemes. The number of man-days of work generated by these schemes has fallen
drastically from 123 crore man-days in 1995/96 to a mere 49 crore man-days in
2000/01. 15 This was so, inspite of
the fact that the latter year was hit by severe drought in a large number of
states. Naturally such distorted growth, whereby a growing agricultural
population has to be supported by a dwindling share of the GDP, is not only
unviable, it is a charter for a rural calamity of unimaginable proportions.
Overall unemployment rates in the rural areas have increased
(for males) from 56 per 1000 in 1993/4 to 72 per1000 in 1999/2000. Also the
number of days worked in the year dropped in the same period from 331 to 327.
16
In addition there has been a drop in wages of agricultural labourers. For
example in West Bengal the rate fell from Rs 16.6 per day in 1992/93 to Rs 15.2
per day in 1994/95 (at constant prices). In fact according to a study
17
while real wages of agricultural labourers rose by 2.9% annually in the
1993-2000 period, it grew by 4.9% in the 1983-1988 period. In other words what
we find in the period of globalisation is the shifting of labour from the
organized sector to the unorganized sector; but within the unorganized sector
itself we find further marginalisation and a growing unemployed sector. This
huge (and galloping) unemployed and under-employed sector is a bomb ticking away
under the backside of the moneybags, all set to explode, once the revolutionary
spark is flashed.
The main reason for this growing unemployment is the lack on
industrialization of the country, which is unable to absorb the labour displaced
from agriculture, as happened in countries that went through an industrial
revolution. As Lenin once said, it is industry that is the main motor that turns
a backward economy into a modern capitalist one. Here, in India it is not
playing that role, because comprador capital thrives on its dependence on
imperialism and not on the expansion of the Indian home market. Growth of the
home market, would act as the engine for industrialization of the country. So,
now let us look at this factor, generally, and in the specificity of
globalisation.
ii) Threat to Small-scale Sector
Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha himself had provided the
epitaph for India’s small-scale industry. According to the Statesman,
April 22, 2000, in a briefing to the BJP Members of Parliament, Sinha revealed,
"the country’s small scale sector is likely to be wiped out".
Because of WTO commitments, he said, "The Government might not be able to
provide any protection to the country’s small scale sector and they would have
to face competition. It would not be possible for the Government to raise import
duty or extend the time period for the small-scale sector to gear up for the
competition. Either they prepare for the competition or are phased out by 2001."
Though the small-scale sector in the country is huge, it
receives step-motherly treatment. This has become more pronounced in this period
of globalisation. While big business and their associations (CII, FICCI,
Assocham), find representation in hundreds of policy-making bodies of the
government, we find the small-scale sector represented nowhere. They have their
independent associations, but these have hardly any voice. Besides, due to their
huge numbers and with each having limited capital, they are dispersed and
disorganized.
There is a dual aspect to the small-scale sector in India in
this period of globalisation. First, that section of it that has an independent
market of its own is sought to be killed through a flood of cheap imports,
de-reservation of the sector and the opening out of this sector to big business
in general, and foreign capital in particular. Second, with the promotion of
outsourcing by big business, and the greater contracting of work out (both
production and services), there will be a spurt in this aspect of the
small-scale sector.
As a result of this we will soon see the total
ancilliarisation of the small-scale sector, with the winding up, (or take-over
by big business) of those that have an independent existence. This sector will
exist only to service big business, the TNCs and also the Public Sector , giving
the latter the benefits of, not only cheap labour, but also their ability to do
away with all social security expenditures like provident fund, DA, bonus, ESIS,
etc. This will result in enormous savings to them, but will push the entire
labour market into a hell-hole.
The size of India’s small-scale sector can be seen from the
fact that, in 2000/01 it comprised 3.3 lakh units, had 1.8 crore employed in it
and had an output of Rs 66,250 crores. 18
Of the total units 96% are in the tiny sector, which has a capital of under 1
crore. The small-scale sector (SSS) accounted for around 40% of gross turnover
in the manufacturing sector and 34% of the exports. This does not include the
handloom and village industries sector (HVIS), which employs another 58 lakhs
and has a yearly turnover Rs 5,113 crores. 19
Both the SSS and the HVIS have been under consistent attack
during the period of globalisation.
First, the government de-reserved 14 key production lines,
in 1997, which were specifically meant for the SSS. This was in line with the
Abid Hussain committee recommendations which suggested withdrawing reservations
for 836 items, including ice-creams, biscuits, rice/dal mills, etc. Finally, the
new Textile Policy of 2000 removed the huge garment sector from the reserved
list. It also increased the cap on FDI in this sector from 24% to 100%. It thus
opened the floodgates for the take-over of the garment industry by foreign
capital. Already US TNCs, like Corells Oversea’s Ltd, with an annual turnover of
Rs 50 crores has entered the garments sector. 20
Second, with the removal of Quantative Restrictions on all
imports the flood gates have been opened, that will crush that section of the
SSS that has an independent market of its own. The export-import policy of March
31, 2000, removed the restrictions on 714 such items, and on the remaining 715
were removed in 2001. It, defacto amounts to the de-reservation of the
entire SSS, as cheap imported goods can enter any and every sphere. The Commerce
Minister openly stated, "to shape up or ship out". But, with the huge
reductions in import tariffs, the importers paid less in taxes and duties, than
the indigenously produced goods. Small enterprises are faced with the age-old
problems concerning availability of adequate and timely credit, uninterrupted
power supply, provision of basic infrastructural facilities, and also the taxes,
excise duties and bribes to be paid the numerous officials and bureaucrats. With
no level-playing fields, what the Commerce Minister actually meant was " ship
out and let TNCs take-over". According to Rajiv Dixit, of the Azadi
Bachao Andolan, by 1999 itself, 3,000 products had entered the Indian market
since ‘liberalisation’; he added that on account of the EXIM policy over 8,000
products would flood the Indian market.
Against the excise duty of 16 per cent paid by SSIs and the
high cost of raw materials in the country, imports are enjoying a clear edge in
the market.... Market sources said large-scale import orders have already been
placed in segments like plastic articles, writing instruments, process control
equipment, various motors and computer-related items like floppy disks and
printed circuits... The basic customs duty for stepper motors used in computers
(now largely manufactured by SSI units in Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad and
Chennai) has been slashed to five per cent from the earlier 40 per cent... So is
the case with plastic/printed bags, belts, labels, buttons and hangers, imports
of which are attracting zero customs duty. Various spare parts supplied with
outboard motors now attract a basic customs duty’ of five per cent against the
earlier 40 per cent. Sources said another segment that is hit badly is units
manufacturing greeting cards, diaries, and calendars."
In another report of April 26, 2000, the same newspaper
reported that "While multinational giants like Hindustan Lever Ltd and
Procter and Gamble are turning towards imports aggressively, Indian cosmetics
manufacturers and suppliers of MNCs, mostly small scale units, are crying
foul...." According to the All-India Small Scale Cosmetics Manufacturers’
Association, many units are already on the verge of closure. Business
Today (May 7) reports that Indian small-scale toy makers are being displaced
by imports in the Rs 500 crore Indian market. An Indian institute of Foreign
Trade study concludes that "As and when QRs on textile products (apart from
handloom), including, readymade garments, are phased out, it be a tough task for
the SSIs to compete."
Third, with the increased privatization of banking and the
policy to cut-down on lending to the priority sector at lower rates of interest,
the capital starved SSS has been pushed to the wall. This has particularly hit
the tiny sector, where, in just the course of one year, loans to the tiny sector
dropped from 27% of the total to the SSS in March 1998, to 20.7% in March 1999.
Thus, against a target of 60% of SSS credit to tiny units, the actual flow was
one-third of that amount.
Though, till now, there has been an overall growth in the
SSS, sickness in this sector is reaching epidemic proportions. It is obvious
that the overall growth recorded reflects the booming ancillary industries,
while the rest are languishing. Some facts give a picture.
As on March 1999, 3.06 lakh SSS units were sick entailing
bank credit of Rs 4,313 crores 21
This is the official figure; a BJP MP put the figure at 6 lakhs. In addition, a
DCSSI census of 1998 said that a total of 41% of the SSS units were either
closed or non-traceable. In other words, already by 1998/99, some 20 lakh SSS
units have been killed. Madhusudhan Khambte, president of the Small Scale
Association of Maharashtra, stated 22
two years back: "Imports should be in the hi-tech sector and
not in consumer goods. As a result of government’s policy, 40% of SSIs have
already closed down. Now (after removing all QRs) more units are likely to get
affected. This is like an invitation to the East India Company to come in
through the back door. Already, Indian manufacturers of hosiery are on the road.
How many more have to be driven to such desperation before the government wakes
up?"
The danger of more deaths is getting compounded by the fact
that, in this liberalized atmosphere, a large number of ancillary industries
have even been closed down with big business shifting production to China, where
labour is even cheaper. Even a company like Bajaj Electrics is sourcing home
appliance products from China, as they claim it is cheaper than manufacturing
here. So, the death knell of the SSS is sounding. The ancillaries that remain
will themselves be squeezed by big business, utilizing the competition between
them, thus forcing the further deterioration of labour conditions.
As for the HVIS sector for long it has been surviving on
oxygen — except for those involved in the export market. With the cut in
government concessions and the raising of the bank interest rate on credit to
this sector from 4% to 12% in 1997, the government has sought to consciously
kill it. The plight of the over two million weavers is an indication of the
state of affairs here. The recent report of the 10 lakh handloom weavers of
Tamil Nadu, teetering on the edge of starvation gives the picture of what exist
throughout the country. With the Tamil Nadu government winding up the free saree/dhoti
scheme in the 2002/03 budget, over 10 lakh sarees and dhotis, worth more than Rs
9 crores are piled up at 1,414 primary weavers cooperatives societies. Weavers
have not been paid wages for six months since the beginning of this year and are
in a state of starvation. Such a condition is not only confined to TamilNadu, it
exists in the handloom sector in all parts of the country.
So, with globalisation hitting the SSS and HVIS badly, the
already marginalized workers are being further hit; and from a state of
semi-starvation they are being pushed to starvation. The numbers involved are
not small, they amount to a large proportion of the 2.4 crore (24 million)
employed in these two sectors. Such policies can only lead to further de-industrialisation
of the country and extensive marginalisation of its population from the modern
productive forces and production relation of the country.
iii) The Home Market
The so-called great Indian middle class is a misnomer. Of
course given the huge size of India, with a population of one billion, compared
to most other countries, it is bound to have a sizable market. But, as it has
turned out, the hype in the earlier stages of ‘economic reform’ did not quite
turn out as expected. Firstly, with the mass impoverisation, 80% of the
population was anyhow written off as they had little purchasing power. The focus
was on the top 20%, and more particularly the top 10%. After all, official
estimates said that the population that lives on less than one dollar a day was
52.3% of the total, while that on less than $2 per day was 88.8%.
The bulk of our population continue to live in the rural
areas, whose market continues to be extremely limited due to the prevailing
semi-feudal relations in the countryside. Added to this are the backward
productive forces in these areas reducing productivity and yields in this vast
hinterland. , The current size of the market is miniscule. The total size of the
market for packaged goods is estimated at around Rs 2000 crores. This is a mere
1.14% of the total net rural income of Rs 1,84,277 crores in 88/89. Moreover,
the current market size translates to a mere per capita expenditure of Rs 35.6
per annum or about Rs 3 per month. The major market for consumer products in the
rural areas, are the rich peasants, the white-collar workers followed by the
agricultural labourers. 23 As during
the 1990s there has been severe retrogression of the rural economy, in the
sphere of production, employment and pricing of agricultural commodities, the
rural market would have shrunk further in these last nine years.
So economic policy was geared to enrich the top, whose
growth will widen the market for their commodities. Table X.2
24 brings this out
clearly:
Table X.2
The Middle Class
Income (Rs per annum)
1992/93 rates
|
Number of Households in crores
|
1989-90
|
1993-94
|
1997-98 (projection)
|
Upto 36,000 (A)
|
12.2
|
13.1
|
13.3
|
36,000 to 56,000 (B)
|
1.4
|
1.8
|
2.6
|
56,000 to 78,000 (C)
|
0.4
|
0.7
|
1.3
|
Above 78,000 (D)
|
0.2
|
0.4
|
0.8
|
Total
|
14.2
|
16.0
|
18.0
|
The figures projected for 1997/98 was at the peak of the
boom; since then there has been six years of industrial stagnation and
continuous decline in employment, which will get reflected in all but the last
(>78,000) category. Anyhow let us first take the figures as presented above.
What we see from above is the richer categories have been growing at a much
faster rate. (D) has grown four-fold in the 8 yeas represented; (C) has grown
three-fold; (B) has just less than doubled; while (A) has barely grown. The
income of (A), though middle-class, is barely sufficient to make two ends meet,
and is hardly likely to be able to afford anything more than the bare
necessities of life. (B) & (C) too would be able to mostly afford only the mass
consumer goods, with incomes of less than Rs 6,500 per month. (D) alone could
purchase consumer durables in any significant quantity. Those of the more
expensive kind would only be affordable not to the entire category, but the top
section within it. In 1997/98 this comprised less than one crore households.
In fact, compared to most other backward countries, except
Sub Saharan Africa, the commodities per household is a small fraction of what it
is elsewhere. To take for example an item of somewhat mass consumption — the
radio; according to a World Bank study, in 1995 there were 120 radios for every
1000 Indians. The equivalent figures were 124 in Cambodia, 163 in China, 168 in
Mali, 398 in Tanzania and 469 in Malaysia. Comparing China and India : China has
125 million telephone lines to India’s 30 million; 70 million mobile phones to
India’s 2.5 million; China has 4 million fridges to India’s 0.75 million; China
has 19.8 million coloured TVs to India’s 1.1 million; 22 million internet
subscribers to India’s 1.5 million. India’s IT industry is one-fourth that of
China’s; while India has 149 scientists and R&D personnel per million of
population to China’s 454. Only in the sphere of passenger cars does India have
more — China’s 60,000 to India’s 2 lakhs. In fact, Thailand, Singapore
and Malaysia have a market as proportion of population of 50 to 60 times to
India’s. 25
Now, given that the market in India is extremely restricted
and confined to a few, since the period of globalisation, and particularly since
the huge cut-backs in jobs, a reduced purchasing power is shrinking the market
even further. This is further aggravated with the massive hike in the basic
necessities of life, the increased expenditure on health, education, transport,
electricity and even water and other municipal charges. Not only that, the
recent attacks on the middle-classes, through a reduction in interest on savings
and provident funds, the huge scams that have swallowed up crores of people’s
savings, bringing all-and-sundry into the tax net, the removal of a host of tax
concessions, etc. has had a debilitating impact on the middle-classes’
purchasing power. And coupled with all this has been the total stagnation in the
rural economy, which has been further aggravated each year by series of droughts
and floods, reducing an already impoverished mass to utter destitution, with
purchasing power not even to buy the huge stock-pile of foodgrains at the
hiked-up PDS rate. Even the middle peasant and a section of the rich peasantry’s
purchasing power would have shrunk.
So, what we find is that, in this period of globalisation,
the unheard of phenomena of an absolute drop in consumption of many of the daily
necessities of life — that too with a population growing at 2%!! For example,
expenditure on clothing to total consumption has dropped from 5.36% in 1993/94
to 4.9% in 1998/99; and for footwear from 0.7% to 0.63% in the same period.
26
Worse still, in the year 2001 the shaving blades market shrunk by 2%, detergent
cakes by 9%, toilet soaps by 12%, refrigerators by 1%, washing machines by 9%,
and audio systems by 5%. 27
Not surprisingly, with the increased privatization of health
care, it is the pharmaceutical market that has been booming, having witnessed a
massive jump in sales of 65% in the 5 years from 1993/94 to 1998/99. Their sales
have jumped from Rs 19,543 crores in 1993/94 to Rs 32,293 crores in 1998/99, and
is still growing. Peoples’ expenditure on medicine has increased from 3.4% of
their total expenditure to 4.25% of the total in the same period. More spent on
medicine, doctors and hospitals, means less on other item of basic consumption,
and in some cases even food.
The trend is clear; even the limited market in the country
is shrinking further, and if employment trends seen in the last section are to
materialize, the drop in consumption will be substantial. Looked at from the
point of employment generation an added factor to this shrinking market, is the
flood of cheap imports that is killing local industry and adding to the
unemployment. In such a dismal scenario, with industrial growth fallen to its
lowest level in the last decade, quite naturally the ruling elite is looking to
exports as the only means to survive. But, with worldwide recessionary
conditions, this too is a gamble.
So, it is quite clear, globalisation has further restricted
the home market, which was already pathetic due to the semi-feudal,
semi-colonial character of the economy. Without the growth of the home market
there is no question of any significant development of industry and the country
as a whole.
iv) Backwardness, Inevitable Product of Globalisation
Globalisation has merely aggravated all the aspects of
neo-colonial exploitation in India that had existed for the earlier four decades
after the British left. Though it is a continuation of the past, there is also
the aspect of a quantum leap in the level of its destructive capacity. East Asia
of 1997 was witness to it; today Argentina and now Uruguay are witness to it;
Africa is experiencing its horrors; and now so is India. Except for the top 5%
elite, devastation will hit one-and-all. The process will only get catalysed by
the impending drought in the country. But, unlike East Asia and Latin America,
which has greater resilience due to a much higher per capita income and human
development index, in India the results will be even more horrifying. Already,
since the last few years there has been a veritable epidemic of suicides of
agriculturalists, of the retrenched, of the unemployed and even of bankrupt
petty businessmen. Worse is to come.
Exactly one year back an article in the July 29, 2001 issue
of EPW (Reviving the Economy, Some Explorations, by S.L.Shetty) gave a
picture of the depressed industrial scene in the country It said: "The
depressed state of the Indian industry has reached crisis proportions. Apart
from the persistently low level of industrial growth for the sixth year in
succession with the average annual rate working out to 5.7 per cent for the
five-year period 1996-97 to 2000-01 and the actual rate further dipping to a
meagre 2.8 per cent during April-May 2001 against the 10 to 12 per cent target
rate per annum that was hoped for following liberalisation, there are now other
all-round signs of deep industrial recession. Every indicator of corporate
performance in the non-financial sector shows a setback after a flicker of
improvement during 1994-95 and 1995-96 in the post-reform period. The annual
growth of company sales has slipped from about 20 to 24 per cent during those
years to 10 to 12 per cent and now further to 5 to 8 per cent. Profit after tax
on net worth has slumped from over 14 per cent to a range of 6 to 8 per cent.
Above all, the business environment has been so adversely affected that there is
not only curtailment of current output growth but also persistent postponement
of investment projects in the pipeline and slowdown in the flow of proposals for
fresh investment. The year 2000-01 has been the fifth year in succession when
the quantum of proposed investment as revealed by the industrial entrepreneurs
memoranda (IEMs) and letters of intent (LoI) has dropped rather drastically.
After attaining a peak of Rs 1,39,774 crore worth in 1995, such investment
proposals in nominal terms have steadily fallen thereafter to Rs 1,03,210 crore
in 1996, to Rs 61,907 crore in 1997 and further to Rs 60,663 crore in 1998. Due
to a major project proposal, the proposed investment was higher at Rs 1,28,892
crore in 1999 but it again slumped to Rs 73,374 crore worth in 2000".
In the last year and the current one the situation has
deteriorated further. The CMIE has predicted a meager growth for the
current year (2002/03) of 3.1%. 28 In
other words, even officially the stagnation is to continue.
In fact, the Reserve Bank of India’s Currency and Finance
Report of 2001, has clearly stated that the economy is in the grip of a
structural stagnation that makes a revival of industry and investment almost
impossible.
This structural stagnation has been reflected in a decline in
the investment rate in the 1990s. Starting at 26.3% in 1990-91, the ratio of the
gross domestic investment to GDP fell to 23% by 1998-99. This occurred not only
because public investment fell continuously from 8.7% of GDP in 1994-95 to 6.4%
in 1998-99, but because simultaneously private investment fell from its peak of
18.9% to 14.8%. This, inspite of a range of investment incentives.
29
There are a number of ways in which the decline in public
investment is related to liberalization. To start with, the latter involves
substantial reductions in customs duties and cuts in direct taxes and excise
rates, aimed at providing incentives to the private sector. Second,
liberalization has involved the abolition of government access to low-interest
borrowings from the central bank ……. Thirdly, liberalisation has involved the
emphasis on reduction of the fiscal deficit of the government and so reduction
on investment projects. Fourthly, with increased impoverisation and threats of
revolt, vast sums have been diverted to the police and armed forces. And lastly,
with liberalization, even the limited controls have ceased to exist on the
profligate expenditure, both legal and illegal of the top politicians and
bureaucrats.
Exports, for the first time in the past decade, recorded a
negative growth of -0.1% in fiscal 2001/02. It was not surprising that
manufacturing recorded the poorest growth rate since the last decade, of a mere
2.7%. This figure is to be compared with a 12.3% growth rate in 1995/96. In
fact, the decline since then has been continuous — to 6.1% in 1996/97 and 4.1%
in 1998/99. 30 The situation last
year was so bad, that the capital goods sector (i.e. production of machinery,
tools, etc.) recorded a negative growth of as much as -4%. In addition, the six
core infrastructure industries (which account for one-third of industrial
production) growth was just 3% (compared to 5.1% in the previous year), with
crude oil recording a decline of -1.2%.
Now if one takes all major indicators for the period of
globalisation they are worse than that of the 1980s. The following tables will
give a rough picture:
Table X.3
|
Decade of 1980s
|
Decade of 1990s
|
GDP Growth Rate
|
5.6%
|
5.9%
|
Growth Rate of Commodity
Production
|
5.0%
|
4.3%
|
Growth Rate in Agricultural Production
|
3.84%
|
1.24%
|
Growth
Rate in foodgrain Production
|
3.46%
|
1.22%
|
Increase in Employment in organized sector over the Decade
|
16.8%
|
5.8%
|
Growth rate of Industry
|
7.7%
|
5.8%
|
Rate of Capital formation
|
7.3%
|
4.2%
|
Growth of electricity generation
|
12.4%
|
3.5%
|
Growth of imports per annum
|
4.5%
|
8.0%
|
Growth of Exports per annum
|
8.3%
|
8.4%
|
Drop in value of the Rupee vis-à-vis $
|
Rs 10 drop
|
Rs 30
drop
|
Table X.4
|
In Early 1990s
|
At End1990s
|
Government’s capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP
|
4.4%
|
2.6%
|
Exchange Rate : No. of rupees to the Dollar
|
Rs 18
|
Rs 48
|
Gross savings as % of GDP
|
22.5%
|
22.3%
|
Gross Investment as % of GDP
|
23.1%
|
23.3%
|
External Debt in billion dollars
|
83.8
|
100.3
|
Trade Deficit in Rs crores
|
10,645
|
55,478
|
Fiscal Deficit; Center +State (95/96)
|
6.5%
|
10%
|
Purchasing power of rupee (1960=100 paise)
|
9.6 paise
|
4.4 paise
|
Interest payments as % of total exp. of Central Government
|
23.9%
|
29.9%
|
Development expenditure Center + States As % of total expenditure
|
17.7%
|
13.9%
|
Total subsidies of Central Govt. As % of total Expenditure
|
11%
|
6.7%
|
Numbers Below the Poverty Line in crores
|
30
|
34
|
Foodgrain availability per capita in gms/day
|
510.1
|
484.1
|
Defense Expenditure as % of total expenditure
|
14.7%
|
17.3%
|
With imperialism in general and globalisation in particular,
foreign capital swamps the economy, leading to a massive drain of the wealth of
the country. This continuous drain retards growth.
In order to extract super-profit foreign capital enhances
exploitation ten-fold. This results in the impoverisation of the vast masses,
with a few crumbs falling to a small elite section. On the one hand this
enhances the rich-poor divide, while on the other it results in a drop in
peoples’ purchasing power and shrinking of the home market. Economic
retrogression is inevitable.
Notes
1. Alternative Economic Survey 2000-2001
2. Seminar 507; Nov. 2001
3. Economic Times; March 24, 2002
4. Business Standard; Aug. 31, 2001
5. Business Standard; Aug. 23, 01
6. Business Standard; Aug. 28, 2001
7. Business Standard; August 31, 2001
8. Business Standard; Aug. 6, 2001
9. Economic Times; July 29, 01
10. Business Standard; Sept. 2, 01
11. Economic Times; May 31, 1999
12. Business Standard; Aug.31, 2001
13. Alternative Economic Survey 2001-02
14. The Hindu; Aug. 11, 2002
15. Times of India; Aug. 11, 2002
16. Alternative Economic Survey 2001-02
17. EPW; March 4, 2000, p. 830
18. Alternative Economic Survey 2000-01
19. Tata Year Book; 2000-01
20. Business Sphere; July, 2002
21. Alternative Economic Survey 2000-01
22. Outlook; Feb. 7, 2000
23. Financial Express; Sept. 22, 1993
24. Economic Times; Feb. 2, 1995
25. Economic Times; May 5, 1995
26. Economic Times; Dec. 25, 2000
27. Business Today; May 26, 2002
28. The Hindu; Aug. 14, 2002
29. Frontline; June 22, 2001
30. Hindustan Times; May 10, 2002
|