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Opportunism and Ruling Class Politics
The first U.F. Govt. in West Bengal fell through intra-party squabbles
and the second U.F in 1969 like the first one was too heterogenous and
short-lived. By this time the CPI(M) had learnt how to manage the
government in a reactionary state system. Yet it should be mentioned
here that many an effort was made by the militant peasants to implement
the government land reform decisions. Against the rising tide of
Naxalbari politics it was necessary to implement many old and new
policies to avert a peasant upsurge. What the Congress leaders with the
domination of landlords at every step failed to translate the Govt.
policies taken to avoid a red revolution, the CPI(M) middle ranking
leaders at that stage could implement them with some success. It must be
stated the measures were not against the state itself. The CPI(M) leader
Hare Krishna Konar writes about the second U.F Government that, "…
The Land Revenue and the Home Departments with their mutual cooperation
have undoubtedly played an important role. But it was the unprecedented
upsurge of the poor peasants, their broad imitative and active
performance which formed the real basis." 39
We have already noted the alarm sounded by the Central Home Department
about the need for the implementation of land reform measures.
Indira Gandhi emerged with a big roar in 1971 with her so-called "Garibi
Hatao" programme, of which the very important element was the
redistribution of farmland held in excess of the prescribed ceilings to
tillers of substandard holdings. She set up the Central Land Reforms
Committee to adopt a ceiling on land holding, tougher than the past
ones, i.e. twenty-seven acres for a family of five on land irrigated for
a single crop. But she failed for the big land owner party leaders. The
actual transfers were even more miniscule than before: 25,000 hectares
nation-wide from 1972 to 1975.40
What the CPM did was to implement the that policy in a situation when
the restless peasants themselves were participating in their thousands,
when the possibility to go the Naxalbari way was very much in the air.
The CPI(M) documents of that tumultuous period record the fear and the
need for "disciplined" movement with all its legality. Bhabadeb Mondal,
a peasant leader of the Debra peasant struggle in Midnapore reminisces
how on the request of Chief Minister the then state leaders shot off
directives against the peasant movements getting increasingly militant.
Bhabadeb and two other leaders were called for explanation at the
district party office and then came the diktat: "Halt this movement.
The land seizure shall be done by the administration; no type of
blockade shall be allowed anywhere. Even for the moment stop all street
meetings. Because, by this time the atmosphere of terror that has been
created, the activities that have been performed by gheraoing police
station, B.D.O and J.L.R.O offices and the barns of jotedars have
tarnished the tradition of our party, particularly the prestige of the
United Front Government."41
What the district CPI(M) leaders emphatically sounded was on the
maintaining of the legality of the movement and the positive role of the
state administration. The gains that came to the peasants were through
their struggles, and the CPI(M) played the twin role of activising the
administration (where the Congress failed) and of disciplining the
peasants’ and workers’ struggle within the limits of law. The CPI(M)
documents of this whole period (1967-70) are replete with the call to "Defend
Parliamentary Democracy" and save the U.F governments. The All India
Kisan Sabha in its 19th session at Madurai in
January 1968 tried to alleviate the fear of the reactionary forces with
such lamentations: "They are dubbing every struggle of the peasants
for even partial economic demands as Naxalbari liberation struggle."
(Resolution of the 19th Session of the AIKS, supplement
to People’s Democracy, Feb. 11, 1968. p. vi) The CPI(M)
from the early 1970s concentrated all fire against the CPI (ML), killing
and handing over to the police hundreds of its dedicated activists. It
made a clandestine understanding with the Congress butchers aided by the
C.R.P and Calcutta Police forces to brutally kill hundreds of activists,
sympathizers and their family members in Kashipur – Burranagar in
Calcutta in 1971. The CPI(M) help was not necessary by the year 1972 to
stem the people’s movement directly and the reign of white terror that
was unleashed particularly in West Bengal by the Congress regime did not
even spare some of the militants in the CPI(M).
People killed in elections in West Bengal
1972 |
Assembly |
5 deaths |
1977 |
Assembly |
1 death |
1982 |
Assembly |
1 death |
1987 |
Assembly |
0 death |
1991 |
Assembly |
1 death |
1996 |
Assembly |
1 death |
1998 |
Panchyat 6 |
deaths |
1999 |
Perliament |
2 deaths |
2000 |
Assembly |
7 deaths |
2003 |
Panchyat |
47+20= 67 deaths (official
figure) unofficial more than 150 |
(Anand Bazar Patrika, 12 May, 2003)
The accommodative politics of the CPI(M) with ‘left’ speechifying
yielded place to direct attacks like any ruling class party. The CPI
under the directive of Moscow already started eulogizing the Indira
Gandhi govt. as an ally of the Soviet Union. Some prominent CPI people
directly joined the Congress led by Indira Gandhi. Mohan Kumarmangalam
received the plum post of the Union Minister for planning, K.R. Ganesh,
Union Minister of State for Revenue and Expenditure, Nurul Hasan, Union
Minister of State for Education and Social Service and so on. The CPI(M)
lost a rigged election in 1972 in West Bengal and the timidty of its
leadership was all too evident when it preferred to remain in political
wilderness till the next election in 1977. Its militant cadres too were
not spared, yet there was no resistance, no struggle of any significance
was made against the white terror.
The Internal Emergency declared by Indira Gandhi in 1975 betrayed the
supine position of the entire CPI(M) leadership. And as a prize the
cruel S.S Ray ministry in West Bengal "did not take action against
the ageing leadership of the State cadre"42
The CPI Central Executive Committee Resolution captioned "National
Emergency And Our Party’s Tasks" gave unstinted support to the
repressive measures with despicable political statement that, "…
the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India is of
the firm opinion that the swift and stern measures taken by the Prime
Minister and the Government of India against the right reactionary and
counter revolutionary forces were necessary and justified."43
This was from the clearly revisionist CPI directly echoing the
revisionist masters in the social imperialist Soviet Union. And what did
the cunning as well as timid CPI(M) leaders do?
In their inter-party squabbles the CPI leader Mohit Sen lambasted the
hypocritical left phrase-mongering CPI(M). We quote below the clear
charges. "Where were the struggles against the Emergency and action
calling it to be lifted by CPM? What and where did it do anything
against sterilization and the savage demolition operations aimed at the
urban poor? What did it do to battle against the caucus and the
repulsive Sanjay built-up campaign? What is its answer to P.C. Sen’s
public statement that the CPM turned down his proposal to launch a
Satyagraha against the Emergency in West Bengal?…"44
The period 1972-1974 at least gave the right lesson to the CPI(M) that
it should gradually shed much of its militant phrase-mongering, it had
better forget all possibility of militant resistance, even economic ones
under its parliamentary organizational set-up and it was pragmatic
enough to appease and welcome the big bourgeoisie, MNCs, IMF, land
owning sections with the discreet policy of "Live and let live."
The 1977 electoral victory, absolutely unexpected even to the CPI(M),
which was in a state of disarray and decay, in West Bengal and Kerala,
and then in Tripura riding on the crest of a wave of massive discontent
through the rejection of the Indira regime and its repressive politics,
provided a new beginning for open and repressive revisionist
parliamentarism in Indian politics in the name of Marxism.
The Marxist dictum that the state is an organ of class rule has been
rejected completely in favour of maintaining ‘law and order’ to
perpetuate and legalize the oppression by imperialist powers and their
allies, the comprador big bourgeoisie and landlords. What E.M.S.
Nambordiripad told at a press conference in 1968 as to how to combat
revolutionaries wedded to Naxalbari polities has been faithfully
followed by the CPI(M) bosses in West Bengal in the post-1977 period.
The Blitz editorially commented on December 14, 1968 that he spoke like
a social fascist: "It is gratifying to see agreement on this basic
point in quarters which otherwise are wide apart. At his Trivandrum
Press conference Mr. E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Chief Minister of troubled
Kerala clearly reaffirmed the need for a combination of police and
political measures. Two days later, Mr. Y.B. Chavan told the Home
Ministry’s Informal Parliamentary Consultative Committee that the
extremists could not be tackled by police action alone."45
Such unity of thought and action with the twin policy of killing
revolutionaries as well as doling out so-called welfare measures or
carrying out so-called political struggle was found in Namboodiripad,
Y.V. Chavan and now heard in the fascist voices of L.K. Advani,
Chandrababu Naidu and Buddhadeb Bhattacharyee. It is downright
revisionism and accommodative mainstream politics in the Marxist
movement in India that has led to this disastrous end. The Indian
revolution has to fight this dangerous parliamentarism, standing in the
way of people’s democratic revolution in India.
The post-1997 insitutionalized revisionist politics after the exit of
the Indira regime at the Centre and the whole of north and east India
through a massive madate against the terror raj, the subdued and
thoroughly inactive CPI(M) jumped onto the band wagon of the anti-Indira
Janata Party for an alliance. It was like a period of a sweeping wind
against the Indira regime. The Janata Party was a hotch-potch
combination of extreme right bourgeois landlords with the reactionary
Jan Sangha (now BJP) a prominent constituent.
Home Minister L. K. Advani informed Parliament that some officials had
sought to advise him before J and K assembly poll last October to take
steps to "direct the result in a certain manner". This is the most
authoritative acknowledgement yet that the rigging of elections had
become a common feature of politics in that sensitive state…. Not
unexpectedly, national interest has been cited as the reason for using
the democratic instrument of elections as a plaything.
(Editorial, Hindustan Times, April 25, 2003)
It is true the basically pro-Russian regime of Indira cracked down on
the pro-U.S constituents of the Janata Party while the CPI(M) leaders
chose to avert jail life or any trial of strength to the satisfaction of
the Congress Governments in the Centre and states. It is an utter lie
when the CPI(M) leaders cry hoarse that it had faced repression during
the Emergency period. It was a sheer windfall or in other words,
peoples’ desperation that clicked and CPI(M) led "Left Front" was voted
to power in the 1977 general elections in West Bengal.
In the words of the CPI(M) C.C. member Benoy Konar: "The left
approached the Janata Party for unity. They even offered to be a junior
partner. But the Janata declined …"
46 The CPI(M) leaders had not
without reason preferred to be a junior partner. The organization was in
complete disarray with desertion of many of the middle level leaders and
activists, and reduced to a totally inactive, non-functioning state of
its grass-roots organizations.
The Janata Party, on the other hand, misread the West Bengal people’s
disgust with the erstwhile Congress, P.S.P, and such reactionary leaders
without grassroots base among the deprived people. It was the demand for
‘political prisoners’ release’ that became a rallying cry in West Bengal
as in many other states. It goes without saying that predominantly
Naxalites in their thousands bore the brunt of repression, murder and
regular torture in all the jails of West Bengal. A small number of CPM
militant cadres were also put behind the bars.The CPI(M) Election
Manifesto while making false promises on checking MNCs, World Bank,
punishing the guilty of torturing people in the Indira regime, etc.
incorporated in it the people’s demand for the release of political
prisoners as it was the vocal demand of the people. In any case, the CPI
which wholeheartedly supported the Emergency and all other draconian
measures of the Congress regime suddenly did a topsy-turvy and expelled
its Chairman, the wretched revisionist S.A. Dange, for his pro-Congress
position while maintaining in the CPI National Council a fourth of his
pro-Congress (I) supporters.47
The CPM led so-called left parties were voted to power, the CPM alone
unexpectedly secured 178 out of the 294 seats. From then on the Left
Front in West Bengal has been highlighted as a model, an alternative to
the class rule of capitalists and landlords. The CPM Finance Minister
Ashok Mitra, who served Indira Gandhi as advisor a few years ago, wrote
glowingly that the "communist experience" in West Bengal "Would act
as a great pursuader; by example, it would captivate the imagination of
the millions who constitute India’s exploited majority and pulsate them
into an all encompassing drive for social revolution."48
And this revisionist anti-Leninist model supposing to be the driving
force for social revolution is like the magic lamp of Aladin.
The pragmatic CPM leadership did three major things to stay put in power
after the stagnation of even economic movements through trade unions and
peasant front. First it released political prisoners, second it betrayed
the repressed people’s anger against the culprits of white terror by
gradually chanellising their pent-up indignation through the ballots of
Panchayats and other such constitutional ways. Third the vocal sections
were mellowed by economic rewards in various ways. On the other hand the
henchmen of the Congress regime were rendered practical assistance by
cunningly evading any measure against them for their crimes. Rather
notorious police officers like Runu Guha Niyogi got promoted in the
police department. Instead of a ‘Social revolution’, in the early days
of the Left Front, people’s militant mood was watered down giving a call
for discipline and saving the Left Front from the allegations of
inspiring militancy.
With all such measures the power-hungry CPM in no time used the
administration, and rural rich, job opportunities to create a cadre of
thousands of disgruntled, careerist people to save and propagate the
revisionism of the CPM. This created a modest earning middle class party
elite in the villages and cities engaged in blunting the militant edge
of any movement.
The third thing it did, learning from the inactivity and failure of the
earlier Congress regime, was to implement land reform measures as per
the Land Reform Acts of 1955 and the amendments made in 1971 by the
Congress Chief minister S.S. Ray’s government. In the Words of Benoy
Konar "In 1978 ‘operation Barga’ started, by which administrative
measures and initiatives for recording the rights of the share-croppers
were coordinated with the peasant movement. This was initiated by Com.
Benoy Chowdhury, the then Land Reforms Minister, and Land Reforms
Commissioner Sri. D. Bandhopadyay. To begin with, land revenue officers
went to selected villages on a pre-fixed date after Kisan Sabha workers
had conducted a campaign among the share-croppers to assemble there, and
their barga rights were recorded on the spot. Earlier a share
cropper had to prove that be was a bargadar; now the onus of
disproving one’s claim as a bargadar was laid upon the owner. At
the next stage, the share-croppers themselves went to the land revenue
officer in an organized way to record their rights…"49
In any case it must be stated that the Indira regime or the Nehru regime
could not effectively put into practice the legally accepted measures
adopted to avert a Red Revolution in India or, at least, the massive
anti-landlord outburst in some parts of the country. The CPI or the CPM
with their long history of presence in the villages with movements on
various types of economic demands against the landowning sections could
use the administration and peasants’ participation for implementing, to
an extent, the land reform acts within the constitutional framework. And
it must be added here it had twin results: spreading its mass base,
projecting the L.F. Governments as an alternative model and second,
undermining the revolutionary spirit for making thorough land reforms
through the efforts of establishing parallel Soviet type administrations
through a violent class war. It should be added here that when the
zamindari abolition demand in the post 47 period spread throughout
India, it was the Nehru-led Congress Government which perceived the
threat from the tenants to go in for at least doing away with the big
zamindari estates.
It is the tragic history of Indian revisionism that except in Telengana
and in certain pockets under the Tebhaga struggle the CPI did not resort
to any direct action for striking at the zamindars. The U.P zamindari
Abolition Committee pointed to the age long simmering discontent of the
tenants everywhere that might "develop into revolt and our social
security may be threatened by the out-break of violence."50
What the non-Marxists feared and what they suggested as constitutional
measures to direct the discontents captivated the revisionist leaders
from E.M.S Namboodiripad to the Jyoti-Buddha opportunists, who chose the
cosy way of avoiding the hardships in the tortuous path of revolution by
Fabian type social reformism. It is obviously not our argument that all
movements even within the constitutional boundaries are revisionism.
What is wrong with revisionists like Bernstein, Khruschev variety and
their Indian followers is to project the exploitative class state and
its administration as serving the have nots in our society averting the
bloody path of revolution. No state or central government with even real
Marxists’ participation can be projected as an alternative as the CPI/CPM
and such revisionists do in India expecting a peaceful change.
Before coming to what the CPI(M) Polit Bureau member Anil Biswas
glorified as "West Bengal: Towards an Alternative Form of Governance
in the Indian Union" in The Marxist, the CPM theoretical
journal,51 celebrating
its 25 years’ stint in state power, we take a look at the worst type of
parliamentarism at the national level in this period. From a three-state
organization in electoral politics and the taste of legislative power,
the CPM, and in a smaller way the CPI, have been opting for central
seats of power, shedding all past tall talks against bourgeois landlord
parties, and shifting from this or that boat of reactionaries, out of
sheer opportunism, the hallmark of parliamentary power politics. A few
examples, we think, will suffice to grasp the basic intention and trend
of current revisionist parliamentarism. The CPM supported the Janata
Government, a hotch potch combination from the present BJP to the Lok
Dal. Again an election came through which Indira rose to power again in
1980.
The CPI in 1978 was found attacking both the Janata Party and the
Congress (I). It also vehemently criticized the CPM for pulling down the
CPI-led government in Kerala.52
During this mud-slinging the CPI leader Bhupesh Gupta reminisced in an
angry mood the blatant fact that if the CPI(M) would not stand by Indira
Gandhi’s minority government, it would not have survived the crucial one
and half year after the first split of the Congress in 1969.53
However, differences were only skin deep. The CPI National Council
wanted a so-called left and democratic unity stressing "our party and
the CPI(M) as a nucleas for a left front."54
Like the CPI(M), the CPI National Council too in that meeting declared
that "The CPI will support whatever progressive steps this government
(Indira-led government) might take…"55
This die-hard revisionist policy of criticizing the "utterly
reactionary" government, with a simultaneous eagerness to discover and
lend support to its "progressive steps" in order to appease it has
always remained the crude form of capitulation to the comprador
bourgeoisie and landlords and their political representatives in India.
It is necessary to remind here that when the Dalit peasants had
consistently burst into revolts in united Bihar since 1973-74 under the
CPI (ML) groups both the CPI and the CPI(M) painted the massive
repression on them and murdering of Dalits as a consequence of Dalit
awakening and simultaneously vented all their ire against the Naxalites.
This duality is a part and parcel of revisionist vote-bank politics. As
the CPI National council strongly criticized Naxalite elements in Bihar,
who were charged with utilizing the deep discontent among "the
poorest and the downtrodden".56
When Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984 both the CPI and the CPI(M)
went into mourning. The CPI(M) Polit Bureau considered Indira’s
assassination was "part of a …dismemberment plan" of the
imperialist agents and other reactionary forces.57
The CPI had long abandoned the rightful demands of various nationalities
in India, so also did the CPI(M). We have referred to the CPMs founder
leader Namboodiripad’s early ‘left’ retort against the CPI’s stress for
national unity. With maturity in Paliamentary constitutional politics
the CPI(M) too joined the chorus for national unity. In its prepared
statement before the meeting of opposition parties in Srinagar in
September 1983 it oozed out its nationalistie sentiments like the
Congress (I) or the BJP. It announced "Our Party stands for the unity
of the country and fights all forces of disintegration; we definitely
stand for an effective and efficient Centre capable of defending the
country, organizing and consolidating its economic life, and adequately
armed with powers to discharge its other jobs like foreign policy,
communication, foreign trade etc."58
With all this stress on national unity, the common refrain of all
bourgeois parties, while rejecting the question of self determination of
nations, the above statement has been calculatedly moderated by vague
utterances, that without the sense of equality and autonomy in the state
sphere, "Indian Unity will not be strong and the feeling of being of
one people and one country will be weakened……."59
When Rajiv Gandhi assumed prime ministership after a favourable mandate
the CPI(M) ideologue B.T. Randive analysed the Victory with the same
perspective in mind regarding Rajiv’s victory as "concern for
National Unity (that) swayed the electorate."60
Comrade Lenin reminded us that the Marxist definition of the state as an
organ of class oppression "has never been explained in the prevailing
propaganda and agitation literature of the official Social-Democratic
parties. More than that, it has been deliberately ignored, for it is
absolutely irreconcilable with reformism, and is a slap in the face for
the common opportunist prejudices and philistine illusions about the
‘peaceful development of democracy’.61
The Indian revisionists perfectly toe what their forefathers in the
official Social Democratic Parties did in Lenin’s time. After Rajiv
Gandhi’s Victory in the election matching Randive’s pro-statist analysis
in that years’ May Day appeal to the workers, the CITU too brazenly
reasoned out that "Had the organized trade Union movement unitedly
taken the question of defending national unity, had it with one voice
exposed imperialist plots and simultaneously thrown all its weight to
defend the economic interests of the workers, the election would have
shown better results for the country and the people."62
What a piece of argument to mislead the workers in favour of joining
with the state power more unitedly and devotedly to strengthen the state
unity. It should be added here that the CPI and the CPM during the
tenure of Indira Gandhi as prime minister even in the dark days of the
Emergency and later eulogized her as a stubborn fighter against
imperialism on the national and international fronts through her
supposed role in the unity of India against imperialist efforts at
provoking and abeting forces of instability and secessation from the
Indian Union some parts of India.
Lenin wrote in a crystal clear way about the modern state. He rebuffed
the revisionist constitutional ‘Marxists’ to drive this Marxist concept
home that "The centralized state power that is peculiar to
bourgeois society…….. Two institutions most characteristic of this state
machine are the bureaucracy and the standing army. In their works Marx
and Engles repeatedly show that the bourgeoisie are connected with these
institutions by thousands of threads……… From its own bitter experience,
the working class learns to recognise this connection. That is why it so
easily grasps and so firmly learns the doctrine….." a doctrine which the
petty-bourgeois democrats ignorantly and flippantly deny, or still more
flippantly admit "in general" while forgetting to draw appropriate
practical conclusions."63
Notes
39. Hare Krishna
Konar, Agrarian Problems of India, Ganashakti Publication, Calcutta,
1977, pp. 64-65.
40. Henry C.
Hart, Political Leadership in India, Ibid. p. 33.
41. Aneek,
September – October 1992, p. 16.
42. Saroj
Chakraborty, with West Bengal Chief Ministers, Ibid p. 483.
43. Stress in
original, New Age, July 6, 1975.
44. Mohit Sen
and Bhupesh Gupta, CPM’s politics X–Rayed, Communist party of India, New
Delhi, 1978, p. 8.
45. Quoted by
Partha Choudhury, Phrases And Facts: a bout Kerala, Liberation, January
1969.
46. Benoy
Konar, peasant movement, Land Reforms and the Left Front: An Outline of
Growth in The Marxist, April – June 2002, p. 46.
47. The Times of
India, 5 September 1978.
48. Social
Scientist, January / February 1978, p. 9.
49. Benoy Konar,
Ibid pp 47
50. "Report of
Zamindari Abolition Committee, U.P", Vol. I, p. 358, quoted in
Communist, Vol. II, No. 3, March – April 1949, p.3.
51. April – June
2002
52. New Age,
January 8, 1978.
53. New Age,
January 28, 1978.
54. Reports and
Resolutions by the National council of the Communist Party of India, New
Delhi, 12-15 of July, 1980 p.13.
55. Ibid p.37.
56. Review of
Political Development and Party Activities since 11th Party Congress
(draft for the 12th Party Congress adopted by the National council), 16
to 19 December 1981, p. 10
57. People’s
Democracy, November 11, 1984.
58. People’s
Democracy, September 4, 1983.
59. Ibid.
60. People’s
Democracy, February 3, 1985
61. V.I. Lenin,
"The State And Revolution", In Marx Engels Lenin, On Historical
Materialism, Progress Publishers, 1984, p. 539.
62. People’s
Democracy, April 21, 1985.
63. V.I. Lenin, The State And
Revolution, Ibid, p. 543.
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