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The Central Committee
has time and again issued directives regarding various specific policies; only a
few points are given here by way of a summary.
The organization of
political power. We must resolutely put into practice the "tripartite
system". Communists should make up only one-third of the personnel in the organs
of political power, so as to draw a large number of non-Communists to
participate in them. In places like northern Kiangsu, where we are just
beginning to establish organs of the anti-Japanese democratic political power,
the number of Communists may even be less than one-third of the total. Whether
in government organs or in people’s representative bodies, the representatives
of the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the enlightened gentry
who are not actively anti-Communist must be induced to take part; and those
Kuomintang members who are not anti-Communist must also be allowed to take part.
We may also allow a small number of right-wingers to sit in the people’s
representative bodies. We must definitely avoid the monopolization of everything
by our Party. We seek only to destroy the dictatorship of the big comprador
bourgeoisie and the big landlord class, and not to replace it with a one-party
dictatorship of the Communist Party.
Labor policy. The
workers’ enthusiasm in fighting Japan can be aroused only when their living
conditions are improved. But we must by all means avoid "Left" deviations; we
should not go to extremes in increasing wages and reducing working hours. Under
China’s present conditions, the eight-hour working day cannot yet be universally
introduced, and in certain branches of production a ten-hour working day should
still be permitted. In other branches of production, the working day is to be
fixed according to the circumstances. Once a contract is drawn up between
capital and labor, the workers must observe labor discipline and must allow the
capitalists to make some profit. Otherwise factories will be closed down, and
this would be detrimental not only to resistance to Japan but also to the
workers themselves. In the matter of raising the wages and improving the living
conditions of the workers in the rnral areas, we must especially not make
excessive demands on their behalf, or the peasants would protest, the workers
would lose their jobs, and production would decline.
Agrarian policy.
We must explain to our Party members and the peasants that it is not yet the
time to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution, and that the whole set of
measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution are inapplicable under present
circumstances. Under the present policy, it ought to be laid down that, on the
one hand, the land-lords should reduce rent and interest, so that the basic
sections of the peasant masses can be aroused to resist Japan actively; and, on
the other, the reduction must not be excessive. The general principle as regards
land rent is to carry out a 25 per cent reduction; if and when the masses demand
an increase of the percentage, we may allow 60 or 70 per cent of the crop to go
to the tenant farmer while allowing the rest to the landlords, but we must not
exceed this limit. The rate of interest must not be reduced to the point of
making credit transactions in the community impossible. On the other hand, we
should lay it down that the peasants are to pay rent and interest, and that the
landlords still retain their ownership of land and other property. The reduction
of interest should not be such as to make it impossible for the peasants to
obtain loans, nor the settlement of accounts be such as to enable the peasants
to get back their mortgaged land gratis.
Tax policy. The
rate of taxation must be fixed according to income. All people with an incom
except the poorest, who ought to be declared exempt-in other words, more than 80
per cent of the inhabitants, including workers and peasants, must shoulder the
burden of the taxes of the state, a burden which should not be laid exclusively
on the landlords and the capitalists. The practice of securing provisions for
the army by means of detaining people and imposing fines must be forbidden. As
to the methods of taxation, before we have decided on new and more suitable
ones, we may make use of the old methods of the Kuomintang with appropriate
amendments.
Anti-espionage
policy. We must resolutely suppress inveterate collaborators and
anti-Communist elements; otherwise we cannot safe-guard the anti-Japanese
revolutionary forces. But we must not sentence too many people to death, and
should take care not to incriminate any innocent person. We must be lenient in
dealing with those reactionaries who are wavering and those who act under
coercion. In the treatment of criminals, we must resolutely abolish torture and
attach weight to evidence rather than uncritically believing depositions. In
dealing with captives from the enemy troops, the ‘puppet troops, or the
anti-Communist troops, except those who are bitterly hated by the people and
deserve nothing less than capital punishment and whose death sentence is
approved by higher authorities, we must adopt the policy of setting all of them
free. We should win over to our army as many as possible of such captives as
have been compelled to join the reactionary forces and are more or less
revolutionary; as to the rest, we should release them, and if they are captured
again, set them free again; we should not insult them, search them for their
personal effects, or exact confessions, but treat all of them sincerely and
kindly. We should adopt this policy toward them no matter how reactionary they
are. This is very effective in isolating the reactionary camp. We should give
renegades, the most flagrant ones excepted, a chance to reform themselves on
condition that they stop opposing Communism; if they can turn over a new leaf
and rejoin the revolution, we shall accept them but not readmit them into the
Party. We must not identify the ordinary intelligence personnel of the
Kuomintang with Japanese spies and Chinese collahorators, but must draw an
essential distinction between them and handle them accordingly. We should put an
end to the state of confusion in which any office or organization is free to
make arrests, and we must lay it down that, for the establishment of
anti-Japanese revolutionary order, only a judicial or a public security organ of
the government is empowered to make arrests, and an armed unit may do so only
during combat.
The rights of the
people. We must lay it down that all landlords and capitalists not opposed
to resistance to Japan are to enjoy the same right of personal inviolability,
and the right to vote, and the same freedom of speech, of assembly, of
association, of thought, and of belief as the workers and peasants ; for the
government only interferes with those who organize sabotage or stage uprisings
in our base areas, but gives protection to all others and does not interfere
with them.
Economic policy.
We must positively develop industry and agriculture, and promote trade. We must
induce those capitalists outside our base areas who are willing to come here and
start industries. We should encourage private enterprises and regard
state-operated enterprises only as a part of the sum total of enterprises. All
this is for the sake of achieving self-sufficiency. The destruction of any
useful enterprise should be avoided. Both tariff policy and monetary policy
should fit in with our basic policy of developing agriculture, industry, and
commerce, and not run counter to it. To achieve self-sufficiency, we must
organize the economy in the various base areas conscientiously and with minute
care, rather than in a crude and sketchy way that is the main link in
maintaining such base areas over a long period of time.
Cultural and
educational policy. This should center on promoting and propagating arnong
the great masses of the people national self-esteem, as well as the knowledge
and tactics for resisting Japan. We should allow bourgeois liberal educators,
cultural workers, newspaper-men, scholars, and technological experts to come to
our base areas and cooperate with us, to start schools and newspapers, and to
participate in our work. We should draw into our schools all intellectuals who
show any activity in resisting Japan, give them a short-term training, and
assign them to work in the army or government, or among civilians; we must throw
off all reserve in drawing them in, assigning them work, and promoting them. We
should not be overcautious, or afraid that reactionaries may sneak in. Some such
persons will inevitably creep in, but there will be ample time to get rid of
them in the course of their study and work. In every base area we must set up
printing shops, publish books and newspapers, and organize distribution and
transport agencies. In each base area we must, as far as possible, open
large-scale schools for training cadres — the larger and the more numerous the
better.
Military policy.
We must expand the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in every possible
way, because these are the Chinese people’s most reliable armed forces in
maintaining the national resistance to Japan. Toward the Kuomintang troops, we
must continue to adopt the policy of "we will never attack unless attacked," and
develop to the utmost the work of making friends with them. We must do our best
to draw those Kuomintang or non-Party army officers who are sympathetic with us
into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, so as to strengthen the
building of our army. The situation that Communists, by sheer weight of numbers,
have exclusive control of everything in our army should now also be changed. Of
course, the "tripartite system" should not be introduced in our main forces, but
so long as the hegemony in the army remains in the hands of our Party (which is
completely necessary and inviolable), we should not be afraid of drawing in
large numbers of sympathizers to take part in a military or technological
capacity in the building of our army. Now that the ideological and
organizational foundation of both our Party and our army has been firmly laid,
to draw in sympathizers (of course, not disrupters) is an essential policy
because it is not only harmless but also indispensable for winning the sympathy
of the whole people and expanding our revolutionary forces.
The various tactical
principles in the united front mentioned above and the concrete policies
formulated in accordance with them should be resolutely carried out by the whole
Party. At a time when the Japanese invaders are intensifying their aggression
upon China and when the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie at home are
carrying out their anti-Communist, anti-popular, high-handed policies and
military attacks, it is only by putting into effect the abovementioned tactical
principles and concrete policies that we can maintain the resistance to Japan,
develop the united front, gain the sympathy of the whole people, and bring about
a favorable turn in the situation. In rectifying mistakes, however, we must
proceed step by step, and not with such undue haste as to occasion discontent
among the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counterattacks from the landlords,
and other undesirable developments.
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