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In the present
anti-Communist upsurge, the policy we adopt has a decisive significance. But
many of our cadres still do not realize that there is a great difference between
the Party’s present policy and its policy during the Agrarian Revolution. It
must be understood that throughout the Anti-Japanese War, whatever the
circumstances, the Party’s policy of an Anti-Japanese National United Front will
never change; and that many policies pursued during the ten years of the
Agrarian Revolution should no longer be applied uncritically. In particular, we
must adopt none of the many ultra-Left policies of the latter period of the
Agrarian Revolution, which are not only totally in-applicable today in the
Anti-Japanese War, but were erroneous even at that time and resulted from the
failure to realize the two basic features of the Chinese revolution-its being a
bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semi-colonial country and its protracted
nature. Such policies included: the notion that the struggle between the
Kuomintang’s fifth campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" and our counter
campaign against it was to be a decisive engagement between what is known as the
revolutionary line and the counterrevolutionary line; the economic elimination
of the bourgeoisie (the ultra-Left labor policy and tax policy) and of the rich
peasants (allotting poor land to them); the physical elimination of the
landlords (allotting no land to them); the persecution of the intellectuals; the
"Left" deviation in cleaning up the counterrevolutionaries; the Communists’
complete monopoly of government work; the inculcation of Communism in
citizenship training; the ultra-Left military policy (seizure of big cities and
rejection of guerrilla warfare); the adventurist policy in the work in the White
areas; and the organizational policy of victimization within the Party. These
ultra-Left policies, the very opposite of the Right opportunism under the
leadership of Ch’en Tu-hsiu in the latter period of the First Great Revolution,
are manifestations of the mistakes of "Left" opportunism. In the latter period
of the First Great Revolution, the policy was one of all alliance and no
struggle; whereas in the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution, it was all
struggle and no alliance (except with the basic section of the peasantry). These
are striking examples illustrating the two extremist policies. And both these
extremist policies caused very serious losses to the Party and the revolution.
The present policy of
the Anti-Japanese National United Front is neither one of all alliance and no
struggle nor one of all struggle and no alliance, but is a policy which
integrates alliance and struggle. Specifically speaking, it means the following:
(1) All the
anti-Japanese people unite (or all the anti-Japanese workers, peasants,
soldiers, intellectuals, and businessmen unite) to form an Anti-Japanese
National United Front.
(2) The policy of
independence and autonomy in the united front-there must be at one and the same
time unity and independence.
(3) In military
strategy, an independent and autonomous guerrilla war is to be carried out under
a unified strategy; guerrilla warfare is basic, but mobile warfare should not be
neglected when conditions are favorable.
(4) In the struggle
against the anti-Communist diehards, we must take advantage of their
contradictions in order to win over the majority, oppose the minority, and crush
the enemies separately; it is a line of justifiability, expediency, and
restraint.
(5) The policy in the
enemy-occupied areas and in the Kuomintang controlled areas is, on the one hand,
to develop united front work to the greatest possible extent and, on the other,
to conceal our crack forces; it is, in the matter of organization and of
struggle, a policy of concealing our crack forces, lying long under cover,
accumulating our strength, and biding our time.
(6) The basic policy
as regards the class relations at home is to develop the progressive forces, win
over the middle-of-the-road forces, and isolate the forces of the anti-Communist
diehards.
(7) A revolutionary
dual policy toward the anti-Communist diehards, i.e., a policy of uniting with
them insofar as they are still willing to resist Japan, and of isolating them
insofar as they are determined to oppose Communism. In their resistance to
Japan, the diehards are again of a dual character: we adopt a policy of uniting
with them insofar as they are still willing to resist Japan, and a policy of
struggling against them and isolating them insofar as they vacillate (as in
their secret dealings with the Japanese invaders and their lack of activity in
opposing Wang Ching-wei and other collaborators). In their antiCommunism the
diehards also reveal their dual character, and our policy should be one of a
dual character too; i.e., in so far as they are still unwilling to bring about a
final breakup of the Kuomintang-Cotrwnunist cooperation, we adopt a policy of
uniting with them, and insofar as they pursue a high-handed policy and make
military offensives against our Party and the people, we adopt a policy of
struggling against them and isolating them. Such people of a dual character are
to be distinguished from collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements.
(8) Even among the
collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements there are people of a dual
character, toward whom we should also adopt a revolutionary dual policy. That
is, insofar as they are pro-Japanese, we adopt a policy of dealing blows to them
and isolating them; insofar as they are vacillating, we adopt a policy of
drawing them nearer to us and winning them over. Such people of a dual character
are to be distinguished from the determined collaborators like Wang Ching-wei,
Wang I-t’ang, and Shih Yu-san.
(9) We must, on the
one hand, distinguish the pro-Japanese section of the big landlords and the big
bourgeoisie, which is opposed to resistance to Japan, from the pro-British and
pro-American section of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, which stands
for resistance to Japan; and we must, on the other hand, distinguish the big
landlords and the big bourgeoisie who, being of a dual character, stand for
resistance but vacillate and stand for solidarity but are anti-Communist, from
the national bourgeoisie, the middle and small landlords, and the enlightened
gentry whose dual character is less pronounced. We should formulate our policies
on the basis of these distinctions. The diverse policies mentioned above are all
based on the differences arising from the class relations.
(10) The same is true
of our way of dealing with imperialism. Though the Communist Party is against
all imperialists, yet we must, on the one hand, distinguish Japanese
imperialism, which is invading China, from other imperialist powers which are
not invading China; and, on the other, distinguish German and Italian
imperialism, which has formed an alliance with Japan and recoguized "Manchukuo,"
from British and American imperialism, which stands in opposition to Japan.
Furthermore, we must distinguish the Britain and the United States of the past,
which adopted a Munich policy for the Far East and undermined our resistance,
from the Britain and the United States of today, which have abandoned such a
policy and changed to the position of supporting China in her resistance to
Japan. Our tactical principle remains one of exploiting the contradictions among
them in order to win over the majority, oppose the minority, and crush the
enemies separately. In foreign policy, we differ from the Kuomintang. The
Kuomintang alleges, "There is only one enemy, while all the others are friends";
apparenfly treating all countries other than Japan on an equal basis, it is
really pro-British and pro-American. But we should draw certain distinctions:
first, there is the distinction between the Soviet Union and the capitalist
countries; secondly, there is the distinction between Britain and the United
States, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other; thirdly, there is
the distinction between the people of Britain and the United States, on the one
hand, and the imperialist governments of Britain and the United States, on the
other; and fourthly, there is the distinction between the Anglo-American policy
during the Far East Munich period and that of the present period. We should
formulate our policies on the basis of these distinctions. Our basic line,
contrary to the Kuomintang’s, is to utilize foreign aid to the fullest possible
extent while upholding the principle of independent resistance and regeneration
through our own efforts; and not, as the Kuomintang does, to rely upon foreign
aid or sell our birthright to any imperialist bloc by giving up that principle.
The one-sided views
of many cadres in the Party on tactical questions and the resulting deviations,
now to the left and now to the right, cannot be overcome unless these cadres are
enabled to have a comprehensive and unified understanding of the changes and
developments in the Party’s policy, past and present. The main danger in the
Party at present is still the mischief done by a "Left" stand. In the
Kuomintangcontrolled areas, many fail to carry out seriously the policy of
concealing our crack forces, lying long under cover, accumulating our strength,
and biding our time because they do not take the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist
policy seriously; at the same time, there are many others who fail to carry out
the policy of developing united front work, because, regarding the Kuomintang as
utterly rotten, they are at a loss what to do. A similar state of affairs exists
in the Japanese-occupied areas.
In the
Kuomintang-controlled areas and in the various anti-Japanese base areas, some
people, caring only about alliance and not about struggle and overestimating the
Kuomintang’s determination to resist Japan, have blurred the difference in
principle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, denied the policy of
independence and autonomy within the united front, become accommodating to the
big landlords, the big bourgeoisie, and the Kuomintang, and, docilely letting
themselves be bound hand and foot, have not dared freely to expand the
anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and wage a resolute struggle against the
Kuomintang’s policy of opposing and containing Communism; such Right viewpoints,
which once existed to a serious degree, are now basically overcome. However,
since the winter of 1939, "Left" deviations have appeared in many quarters as a
result of the Kuomintang’s anti-Communist friction and the struggles we waged in
selfdefense. Rectified to a certain extent, these deviations have not yet been
thoroughly eliminated and still manifest themselves in various specific policies
in a number of places. It is therefore necessary to study and clarify various
specific policies.
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