

THIRTY YEARS OF STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY

BOOK ONE

HANOI
FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE

1960

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EDITOR'S NOTE

« THIRTY YEARS OF STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY » was written in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, now the Viet Nam Lao Dong Party.

The present English translation has been made from the Vietnamese text composed by the Central Committee of Propaganda of the Viet Nam Lao Dong Party and the Committee for the Study of the Party's History.

CONTENTS

	Pages
Foreword	7

I — FIRST PERIOD

BIRTH OF THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE PERIOD OF ILLEGAL STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY AND THE AUGUST REVOLUTION (1930-1945)

— Vietnamese society under French imperialists' rule ...	11
— Preparation for the founding of the Party. The Party's revolutionary programme	17
— The 1930-1931 revolutionary upsurge of the Nghe-Tinh Soviet	31
— The low ebb of the revolution and the struggle to restore the movement	39
— The Party founded the Indochinese Democratic Front against fascism and war, against colonial reactionaries, for freedom, food, clothes, and peace (1936-1939)	49
— In World War II, the Party founded the National United Front against aggressive fascism, directed the spearhead of the revolution at the fascist imperialists and Viet- namese traitors	63
— The Party launched the high tide of the Anti-Japanese Movement for National Salvation, prepared the general insurrection and brought it to success	83

Our Party came into existence in early 1930 and is just thirty years old now. Through thirty years of heroic struggle our Party led the Vietnamese working class and people to carry out the revolution with great success. In August 1945, under the leadership of the Party, our entire people launched the general insurrection and seized State power throughout the country. But French imperialists invaded our country once more. To safeguard and develop the achievements of the August Revolution, our Party called for an all-out long term Resistance war waged by the whole people and successfully ended the stage of national people's democratic revolution in the North of our country. Since the restoration of peace, the Party has been leading the people to carry out the socialist revolution and build socialism in the North, and at the same time to struggle for national unification and completion of the national people's democratic revolution in the whole country.

The victory of the Vietnamese revolution is the victory of Marxism-Leninism applied to the practical conditions of a colonial and semi-feudal country.

On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Party, let us turn the glorious pages of the history of the Vietnamese working class and people under the Party's leadership and review the experiences of the Vietnamese revolution. Let us see how our Party has correctly combined the general truth of Marxism-Leninism with the realities of the Vietnamese revolution to overcome all difficulties and obstacles, and to go from one victory to another. Such an examination will give us still greater confidence in our people's unbending spirit and in the clear-sighted leadership of our Party headed by President Ho Chi Minh and inspire our struggle for the building of a peaceful, united, independent, democratic, prosperous and strong Viet Nam.

I

FIRST PERIOD

**BIRTH OF THE INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY, THE PERIOD OF ILLEGAL STRUGGLE
OF THE PARTY AND THE AUGUST REVOLUTION
(1930-1945)**

VIETNAMESE SOCIETY UNDER FRENCH IMPERIALISTS' RULE

The birth of the Indochinese Communist Party, now the Viet Nam Lao Dong Party, was the result of the combination of Marxism-Leninism with the working class movement and the struggle for national liberation in Viet Nam. The founding of the Party in early 1930 was not accidental, but was determined by the historical conditions of Viet Nam.

Viet Nam was invaded by French colonialists in 1858. The feudal landlord class whose representative was the Nguyen dynasty surrendered to the enemy. The 1884 Treaty is obvious proof of this. But the Vietnamese people struggled undauntedly, rising against the aggressors and the traitors. Only by the end of the 19th century, did French colonialists succeed in completing their machinery of domination in Viet Nam.

After ending the stage of armed aggression, French monopolists began to exploit Viet Nam.

In the economic field, they carried out a policy of heavy taxes coupled with the setting up of banks to lend money at interest and appropriation of land, thus impoverishing a great number of peasants and creating a market of cheap labour.

In the industrial field, textile, alcohol, paper, match, brick and tile and cement factories, electric power stations, water plants, etc... were built one after the other. It is noteworthy that heavy industry was not

developed. Mining industry developed very slowly while monopolies for metallurgy, engineering, and the key branches of heavy industry, were given to the 'mother country'. Only some branches of light industry, not competing with those of the 'mother-country' were developed to yield the French capitalists the most profits.

In the commercial field, monopoly for both imports and exports was in French hands while Vietnamese capitalists played only a subsidiary role. Customs duties built a tariff wall around Indochina turning Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos into their private markets. As a result, goods from France were sold in Indochina at high prices earning them colonial super-profits.

In the agricultural field, feudal forms of exploitation were kept up and encouraged, and the policy of settlement carried out. As much as one-sixth of cultivated land in Viet Nam was appropriated by the French to set up plantations under industrial or rice crops. A number of French capitalists became planters at the same time.

In the political field, the name Viet Nam was wiped off the map of the world and the policy of 'divide and rule' was carried out systematically. Viet Nam was divided into three parts with different political regimes: South Viet Nam was a colony, Central Viet Nam a protectorate and North Viet Nam a semi-protectorate and semi-colony. Discord was sown among the people of Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, and between minority and majority nationalities in each of these countries. In Viet Nam as well as in Cambodia and Laos, the whole administrative, military and technical machinery was in French hands. The Vietnamese feudal landlord class only played the part of puppets, working as the ruler's henchmen. The other classes had no political rights whatever.

In a word, the whole programme of exploitation by French imperialists in Viet Nam aimed at turning the

country into a market and a source of supply of raw materials for the 'mother-country'. Vietnamese feudal society was transformed into a colonial and semi-feudal society while class relations also underwent changes.

The Vietnamese feudal landlord class worked hand in glove with the imperialists to maintain its selfish interests. French imperialists leant on it to oppress and exploit the Vietnamese people. From the class viewpoint, the landlord class was the object of the Vietnamese revolution. But when the spearhead of the revolution was mainly directed at the oppressive and aggressive imperialists, in the landlord class there were also a number of persons who stood up against French rule, most of them small landlords, intellectuals and students of landlord stock. But they could not represent the whole landlord class.

The Vietnamese bourgeoisie took root right in the heart of the feudal society. Since French invasion of Viet Nam, this class gradually took shape and developed, but due to French oppression it became a class only during and after World War I. Born in a colonial and semi-feudal society, the Vietnamese bourgeoisie developed to some extent then split into two parts: comprador-bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. The Vietnamese comprador-bourgeoisie included big capitalists whose interests were closely connected with those of the imperialists. They worked as the imperialists' sole agents buying local products and selling manufactured goods for them, investing money in their industrial and commercial enterprises or building big projects for the colonialists. Like the feudal landlord class, the comprador-bourgeoisie was an anti-revolutionary force in our country.

The Vietnamese national bourgeoisie, composed of middle-sized capitalists whose number and economic force were small, due to the oppression and restrictions of the French imperialists and the feudalists, was unable to withstand imperialist competition. The

national bourgeoisie's interests were in contradiction to those of the imperialists and the feudalists. At the same time they had economic relations with them to a certain extent (the majority of the national bourgeoisie were merchants selling goods for the imperialists and a number of them were landlords at the same time) and waxed rich by exploiting the working class. Therefore the national bourgeoisie had a two-sided nature: on the one hand they were against the imperialists and the feudalists, approving of national independence and democratic freedoms, but on the other, their attitude was unstable, wavering and hesitant. When the imperialists were strong they easily compromised and advocated reforms, but tended towards the revolutionary mass movement when it was on the upsurge. For this reason the national bourgeoisie could not lead the Vietnamese revolution.

The Vietnamese peasantry embraced almost 90 per cent of the population and was very heavily oppressed and exploited by the imperialists and the feudalists (heavy taxes, high land rent and interest, corvees, beatings, land-grabbing from them, etc...). In consequence the peasants were rapidly impoverished.

Those who became bankrupt were driven out of the countryside into the factories, mines, and plantations, and became workers. Others had to go as labourers to the New Hebrides or New Caledonia. Others were unemployed and led a very miserable life. Those who were still able to cling to their rice-fields were continually threatened by the imperialists, the feudalists and natural calamities. Short of land, the peasants, first of all the poor and landless peasants, very energetically opposed the imperialists and the feudalists. The liberation wars in Vietnamese history up to this time were, in essence, peasant wars. In the national people's democratic revolution, the peasants were the biggest force of the revolution and the most reliable ally of the working class.

The Vietnamese petty-bourgeoisie included people of different walks of life: craftsmen, petty and itinerant traders, small traders, owners of small industrial concerns, civil servants, intellectuals and students. Although their living standards were more or less different from each other, their life was in general unstable and always threatened by bankruptcy and unemployment. They usually wavered with the upsurge or ebb of the revolutionary movement, but generally speaking they very enthusiastically took part in the revolution. They were an important force of the revolution and the reliable ally of the working class.

The Vietnamese working class came into being with the development of French capitalism in Viet Nam. After World War I, with the French imperialists' policy of 'increased colonial exploitation', the Vietnamese working class developed fairly quickly and soon became an important social force. The working class were toiling people with no means of production, having to sell their labour power to live and being exploited by means of the wages system. They worked in factories and lived in the towns and industrial areas. They represented the most progressive productive force of the society. For these reasons, the working class was the most revolutionary force whose political consciousness, organizational ability, discipline and creativeness were higher than those of other classes. Besides the above-mentioned qualities common to the international working class, the Vietnamese working class had the following characteristics: born in a colonial and semi-feudal country, the Vietnamese working class had to endure a threefold oppression and was heavily exploited by the imperialists, the feudalists and the national bourgeoisie. Therefore, to liberate itself, it had to fight for the emancipation of the whole nation from all oppression and exploitation. Within the Vietnamese working class there was no section of reformist aristocratic

workers compromising with the bourgeoisie. Its blood ties with the peasantry provided it with favourable conditions to realize the worker-peasant alliance. From outside, it was not under the influence of the reformist ideology of the Second International. On the contrary, being under the powerful influence of the Communists' and workers' movements in the world, especially the influence of the Russian October Revolution, and of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and that of the French and Chinese workers' movements, they soon succeeded in assimilating Marxism-Leninism.

Owing to the above-mentioned characteristics the Vietnamese working class though small in number, soon became the leading force of the revolution.

On the basis of the above analysis of the situation in Viet Nam prior to the founding of the Party, it can be seen that the Vietnamese society had two basic contradictions: the contradiction between the Vietnamese nation and oppressive imperialism and that between the broad masses (mainly the peasants) and the feudal landlord class. The Vietnamese revolution had to solve these two contradictions otherwise the Vietnamese society could not move forward. History set the Vietnamese working class the task of leading the revolution in Viet Nam in order to solve these basic contradictions and push the Vietnamese society forward.

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PREPARATION FOR THE FOUNDING OF THE PARTY — THE PARTY'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMME

From the day Viet Nam was first ruled by French imperialists to 1929, our people constantly rose against the aggressors and their henchmen: armed uprising in South Viet Nam (1801 — 1868), the Royalist movement (1885 — 1895), the Yen The guerilla movement (1887 — 1913), the Bai Say armed uprising (1885 — 1889), the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc movement (1907), the campaign against taxes in Central Viet Nam (1908), the Thai Nguyen armed uprising (1917), the patriotic movement for Phan Boi Chau's amnesty and Phan Chu Trinh's memorial service (1925 — 1926), and the Yen Bai armed uprising (1930). So many heroes sacrificed their lives for the country but the result was still a failure. The main cause of this was that the Vietnamese revolution in that period was not yet led by a Marxist — Leninist party of the working class. The revolutionary parties did not as yet put forth a correct political programme aimed at solving the two above-mentioned basic contradictions.

Facing successive failures, several Vietnamese patriots went abroad in search of a path for national liberation, the right path for the revolution in Viet Nam.

One of these patriots, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, our beloved and respected President Ho Chi Minh, was

the first to find this path. He went to Europe at the beginning of this century, prior to World War I. Soon after his arrival in France the world-shaking October Socialist Revolution was successful. That great historical event opened the era of proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries; at the same time it also opened the revolutionary era in the colonies and semi-colonies. It inspired the working class and the oppressed peoples of the world with boundless confidence in the prospect of their liberation. The October Revolution had a very strong influence on Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc's political activity. It led him to the conclusion that to liberate his country he had to study Marxism-Leninism and to follow the Russian example.

At Tours Congress in 1921, he took part in the founding of the French Communist Party and joined it because he realized clearly that only Marxism-Leninism, only the Communist Party could liberate the oppressed peoples. He thus became the first Vietnamese Communist and began to struggle for the founding of a Marxist-Leninist party in Viet Nam. In the newspapers *l'Humanité*, *La vie ouvrière*, *Correspondance internationale* and particularly, *Le Paria* of which he was the editor, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc courageously denounced the crimes of imperialism and discussed the question of colonial revolution from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint. Together with a number of revolutionary fighters from other French colonies, he organized the League of Colonial Peoples in Paris. His revolutionary activity and his articles, especially his book *Procès de la Colonisation Française* encouraged the revolutionary movement in the country and enabled many Vietnamese to get an understanding of Marxism.

In 1923, he went to the Soviet Union to attend the International Congress of Peasant Delegates, and the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in 1924.

In December 1924, he returned to China. In 1925 he set up the Union of Oppressed Asian Peoples and established relations with **Tam Tam Xa**, which was at the time the revolutionary organization of Vietnamese residents in China, using it as a basis for the founding of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association. At the same time he organized the Communist league in the latter to carry on the preparation for the establishment of a genuine Communist Party in Viet Nam. Training courses were opened in the Whampoa Military Academy (Canton) for youths who came from Viet Nam to study. Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc was one of the lecturers at these courses. The magazine **Youth**, organ of the General Committee of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association, introduced to the Vietnamese workers and people the rudiments of Marxism-Leninism. Numerous progressive magazines and books from France and China were then secretly distributed in Viet Nam. The book **The Revolutionary Path** which was written by Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc and published by the Propaganda Committee of the Union of Oppressed Asian Peoples had a great effect on the revolutionary movement in Viet Nam and in other Asian countries. French imperialists tried to hoodwink the people by all means to prevent them from hearing of the Russian October Revolution and the Soviet Union. Great efforts were made to check the influence of the French Communist movement, the Chinese Revolution, and the Canton Commune from spreading to Viet Nam. But all their schemes and tricks were ineffective. The propaganda work of the members of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association enabled the Vietnamese people to get a clear understanding of the world revolutionary movement and gain more confidence and enthusiasm in the future of the nation.

For the first time, Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of class struggle, the role of the people in history, etc...

were disseminated in Viet Nam. Despite its wrong policy 'national revolution first, international revolution after' it was this revolutionary organization which was the first in our country to popularize Marxism-Leninism among the masses of Vietnamese people. Thanks to this propaganda, a Communist group took shape in this organization. The first followers of Marxism in Viet Nam began to be armed ideologically in order to clearly see the true revolutionary path and the flattering and deceitful reformist theories of the imperialists and their henchmen, and at the same time to defeat the tendencies of national reforms and chauvinism of the national bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie.

In December 1927, the workers in Canton (China) rose to seize power and set up the Canton Commune for three days. In spite of its failure, the Canton Commune had a very strong effect on the working class and people in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Its influence spread to our country and powerfully inspired our working class to struggle. In this situation, the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association developed quickly, and became the most influential revolutionary organization in Viet Nam, while the Viet Nam Nationalist Party and Viet Nam Youth's Highest Aspiration Party which were political organizations with bourgeois tendencies gradually lost influence among the masses of people.

Wherever the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association spread, Marxism-Leninism was disseminated among the masses. But propaganda of Marxism-Leninism only, without the struggle of the workers and toiling people in the country to serve as a social basis for that ideology, could not give birth to a Communist party nor could this propaganda be deeply and widely spread.

The Vietnamese working class became more mature, and the workers' movement of struggle was

increasingly stronger. Many members of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association took up work in factories, mines and plantations to popularize Marxism-Leninism and lead the workers in their struggles. Thanks to this, the workers' class consciousness was further heightened. First cells of the Association in industrial enterprises were set up and, coupled with them there were trade unions and workers' mutual aid organisations. Workers' struggles broke out in economic centres all over the country. One after the other, workers of the Cement plant (Haiphong), Textile plant (Nam Dinh), Aviat repair workshops (Hanoi) Truong Thi Railway workshops (Vinh), Ba Son factory (Saigon), Phu Rieng plantation (Nam Bo), etc..., went on strike to claim improvement in living conditions: more wages, a shorter working day, abolition of beatings and fines, etc.

The struggle between the working class and French imperialists grew fierce. Workers in many factories began to co-ordinate their struggles. Coupled with the workers' strike movement were the peasants' struggles in some localities. Secret police, country constabulary and armed forces were used by the imperialists to repress the mass movement.

This situation demanded a Communist Party to guide the revolutionary movement of the working class and of the people in general.

By the end of 1928 and in the early half of 1929, there was a campaign for the founding of a Communist Party in Indochina in the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association in North Viet-Nam. On hearing news of the convening of a national congress by the General Committee of this Association abroad, the Communists in the Association in North Viet Nam and northern part of Central Viet Nam actively discussed the question of dissolving the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association to formally establish a Communist Party in Indochina.

In many meetings of the Association at all levels, their proposal met with complete success. In January 1929, following the Preparatory Meeting of the National Congress of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association, in North Viet Nam, a Communist group of seven persons — among them Ngo Gia Tu, Nguyen Duc Canh, Nguyen Phong Sac, Do Ngoc Du, Trinh Dinh Cuu, etc. — was set up to guide the campaign for the founding of the Communist Party. Why was this campaign begun first in North Viet Nam? Because of two reasons : first, North Viet Nam was the place where the working class was most concentrated, consequently the Communists in the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association in the North were the first to realize the necessity for an independent revolutionary party of the working class to lead the revolution in Indochina. Second : the powerful influence of the Chinese Communist movement spread to North Viet Nam, and the Vietnamese Communists in the North saw clearly the urgency for the founding of a Communist Party in Indochina.

On May 1, 1929, at the National Congress of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association held in Hong Kong the delegation of North Viet Nam proposed the dissolution of this organization in order to set up the Indochinese Communist Party. In this delegation were Comrades Ngo Gia Tu, Quoc Anh and others. The proposal was rejected by the majority, and the delegation of North Viet Nam left the Congress and returned home. In June 1929, the Indochinese Communist Party was formally founded and its **Manifesto** distributed among the people. The first members of the Indochinese Communist Party were Communists who were members of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association in North Viet Nam. In spite of its political and organizational shortcomings, the birth of the Indochinese Communist Party met the demand of the objective

situation and the aspirations of the worker-masses. That is why, following the issue of the Manifesto of the Indochinese Communist Party the best members of the Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association enthusiastically joined it. The **Hammer and Sickle**, central organ of the Party, and the **Red Trade Union magazine**, central organ of the Trade unions, were published and widely distributed among the masses.

Facing the ever expanding influence of the Indochinese Communist Party, the General Committee of the 'Viet Nam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association' decided to re-organize what remained (most of it was in South Viet Nam) into the Annamese Communist Party.

Nor could the New Viet Revolutionary Party in Central and South Viet Nam maintain its former organization. It re-organized itself into the Indochinese Communist Federation.

Thus in 1929, three Communist organizations came into being in Viet Nam, all claiming to be genuine political parties of the working class and trying by all means to win the recognition of the Communist International. In their activity, propaganda and admittance of new members, these first three Communist organizations indulged in invective against each other and disputed for influence among the masses. It is noteworthy, however, that all three organizations did their best to penetrate the industrial enterprises to agitate among the workers. At the time, there was a proletarianization movement in the Communist organizations in Viet Nam. Numerous Party members who were intellectuals or students of petty-bourgeois stock took up work in factories, mines or plantations to agitate among the masses and at the same time to steel and temper themselves.

Confronted with this situation, the Communist International sent a letter to the Communists in

Indochina pointing out the necessity of ending division and sectarianism and of fusing into a united Communist Party. To implement the instructions of the Communist International, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc went to Hong Kong to convene the delegates of the Communist organizations in Indochina to discuss the question of unification of the Party. On January 6, 1930, the Unification Meeting presided over by Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc was held in Hong Kong. Present at the meeting were delegates of the Indochinese Communist Party and Annamese Communist Party. The Indochina Communist Federation did not have time to send their delegates to the meeting*. After hearing the reports of the delegates and studying the policy of the Communist International, the meeting criticized narrow-mindedness and discord and unanimously approved the unification of all three Communist organizations in the country into one organization named the **Viet Nam Communist Party**. At the same time the meeting adopted the political programme, strategy and shortened rules of the Party, of the Indochina Anti-imperialist Alliance and other mass-organizations. Although they were still rudimentary, these documents laid down a basically correct line for the Vietnamese revolution, that is bourgeois democratic revolution led by the Vietnamese working class, aimed at overthrowing imperialism and feudalism and securing national independence and freedom.

* At the time of the holding of the Unification Meeting, there were in all 211 Vietnamese Communists ranged as follows :

Indochinese Communist Party	85
Annamese Communist Federation	61
Indochinese Communist Federation	11
Vietnamese Communists in Hong Kong and abroad	54

211

This figure shows that it was ripe for the founding of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

The meeting worked out the plan for the unification of the Communist organizations in Indochina into a single party and elected the provisional Central Executive Committee to guide the whole Party.

The meeting also decided on the development of mass-organizations such as Red Trade Unions, Red Peasants' Association, Communist Youth League, Liberated Women's Association, Assistance Association, Anti-imperialist Alliance (the then National United Front).

The Unification Meeting was tantamount to a Congress and had an extremely important political significance: it succeeded in unifying the working class' revolutionary forces, enabling the working class to have its own genuinely revolutionary party to lead the Vietnamese revolution to victory.

Like all Communist Parties the world over, the Viet Nam Communist Party was a new-type party of the working class armed with Marxism-Leninism. It was the most advanced, most politically enlightened, and at the same time the highest organization of the Vietnamese working class, fully able to lead the other organizations of the Vietnamese working class and people. The Vietnamese Communist Party was, in addition, an organization having close contact with the masses, regarding the masses' interests as its only interests and drawing its strength from the masses. It was a single-minded organization with united action, strict discipline and without sects, using the method of criticism and self-criticism to overcome its shortcomings and promote its strong points.

After studying the documents of the Unification Meeting, the Communist International immediately sent a letter with instructions to the Viet Nam Communist Party amending a number of points in the line and tasks of the Vietnamese revolution and with suggestions about the question of changing the Party's name to Indochinese Communist Party.

In April 1930, Comrade Tran Phu returned to Viet Nam.

To carry out the resolutions of the Communist International and to strengthen the leadership of the seething revolutionary movement, the Central Committee held its first Session in October 1930 to discuss the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution in Viet Nam, the immediate tasks of the Party and the question of changing the Party's name.

The meeting adopted the Programme of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution (that is the Political Programme) drafted by Comrade Tran Phu, the first Secretary General of the Party. The Programme outlined the outstanding characteristics of the Indochinese situation at the time as follows : « Indochina is a colony whose economy is dependent on the imperialists and could not therefore develop independently. The class contradiction between the workers, peasants and suffering labouring elements on one side and the imperialists, feudalists and bourgeois on the other grows sharper. Owing to this feature, the nature of the Indochinese revolution is 'Bourgeois Democratic Revolution'. The tasks of this revolution are to wipe out feudal remnants, to distribute land to the tillers, to overthrow imperialism and to make Indochina completely independent. Only by defeating imperialism can feudalism be wiped out and only by abolishing feudalism can imperialism be overthrown. The main driving-power of the revolution is the workers and the peasants. The essential condition that ensures the success of the Indochinese revolution is a Communist Party having a correct political line, discipline, close contact with the masses and having matured through revolutionary struggle. To seize national independence and distribute land to the tillers, a « peasant-worker soviet power » must be set up. Once power is won, Indochina will pass over the stage of capitalist development to advance

straight to socialism thanks to the assistance of the proletarian dictatorship in the countries where proletarian revolution has been successful. »

This is the fundamental content of the October 1930 Political Programme. It amended the Shortened Programme of the Unification Meeting passed on January 6, 1930. Like the Shortened Programme, the Political Programme is of great historical significance. For the first time the working class and the Vietnamese people had a relatively overall anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary programme. The Political Programme laid down the general line of the bourgeois democratic revolution in Viet Nam and henceforth gave light to the revolutionary agitation in our country.

On the situation and immediate tasks of the Party, the Session assessed that the economic crisis in the world and in Viet Nam brought the Vietnamese masses to extreme misery; the masses' struggle against imperialism and feudalism had developed into a deep and broad revolutionary movement which was more and more under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party and divorced from 'nationalist' influence. The Party's immediate political task was to guide the masses to oppose white terrorism, taxes and land rent, capitalist Taylorism, deceitful reforms, imperialist wars, and to support the Soviet Union. Struggle had to be waged against adventurous, dare-devil tendencies and rashness.

Following the Communist International's instructions, the Session decided to change the Party's name to Indochinese Communist Party because 'the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian proletariat have politically and economically to be closely related in spite of their difference in language, customs and race'.

The Session also decided: «The whole Party should take the resolutions of the Communist International and the Party's policy as the basic document for the

Party's internal re-organization, bolshevization of the Party, setting up of Xu* Executive Committees to lead the movement in each part of Viet Nam, increased admittance of workers into the Party, increased proportion of factory workers in the leading organs of the Party and, once the Party's work goes smoothly the National Congress of Party Delegates should be held ».

The resolutions of the October 1930 Session of the Central Committee had the important effect of unifying and strengthening the Party a step further.

1929-1930 were years when the class struggle and national struggle developed to such a point that all revolutionary and anti-revolutionary classes in Viet Nam had to advance their political programmes to win over the masses. The Manifesto of the Indochinese Communist Party distributed in June 1929 succeeded in putting forth the main aspirations of the Vietnamese working class and people.

In 1930, the Shortened Programme of the Unification Meeting and the Political Programme of the first Session of the Central Committee mapped out the revolutionary line in Indochina and highlighted the aspirations of the working class and peoples in Indochina. These important documents armed the Indochinese Communists to oppose the national revolutionary programme of the national bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. (Viet Nam Nationalist Party, Viet Nam Independence Party and Viet Nam Youth's Highest Aspiration Party). At the same time they were the working class' effective weapons to smash to pieces the deceptive reformist theories of the feudal landlord class and comprador bourgeoisie (Pham Quynh's theory of 'the King and the people are both masters'. Nguyen Van Vinh's theory of 'direct rule', the programme of Bui Quang Chieu's Constitution Party, and Ngo Dinh Diem's advocacy to come back

Each of the three parts of Viet Nam : North, Centre and South.

to the 1884 Treaty) and to oppose the national reformism of the national bourgeoisie. (Vu Dinh Di's theory of autonomy and programme of industrialization of Indochina and the theory of 'Constitutional regime' of a number of deputies in Central Viet Nam, etc...). The Political Programme and the above-mentioned documents of our Party made an important contribution to the mapping out of the Party's line and policy in the strengthening of the Party's unity and also in the building and consolidation of the leadership of the Vietnamese working class.

The newspaper **Tien Len** (Forward), central organ of the Viet Nam Communist Party played an important part in the propaganda and organization of the masses of people and in the struggle against the reactionary and erroneous political tendencies in 1930-1931.

THE 1930-1931 REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE AND THE NGHE TINH SOVIET

Our Party was founded at the time when Indochina as well as the whole capitalist world had stepped into the period of general crisis (1929-1933). The Indo-chinese people were leading an extremely hard life. Factory and office workers were thrown onto the pavement, those who were still at work found their wages cut. The peasants suffered from famine. Paddy was their only resource and its was sold at very low prices. They had, in addition, to pay high taxes and go on corvee. From 1929 to 1933 natural calamities often occurred in our country: droughts were followed by floods, increasing the number of ruined peasants. Numerous petty-bourgeois and national bourgeois went bankrupt. The livelihood of people of all walks of life was under constant menace. This was the material basis of the revolutionary upsurge in 1930-1931. However, correct leadership was essential. Mobilization of the masses into a broad revolutionary movement, took place under our Party's correct leadership in 1930-1931, a deep and broad movement of struggle of the peasant-worker masses, clearly illustrating the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class.

On February 9, 1930, the Yen Bai armed uprising broke out under the leadership of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party. Soldiers in garrison at Yen Bai rose and shot at the French colonialists. Peasants at

Hung Hoa and Lam Thao (Phu Tho province) rose on February 10, 1930, and those at Vinh Bao (Hai Duong province) and Phu Duc (Thai Binh province) on February 15, 1930, in support of the armed uprising of the soldiers at Yen Bai. Within a short time these uprisings were drowned in blood by the imperialists.

Our Party immediately mobilized the masses of the people to oppose white terror, to demand the release of the insurgents and at the same time to advance economic slogans for an improvement of the people's livelihood.

Opening the mass movement led by our Party in 1930-1931 was the strike of 3,000 workers at the Phu Rieng plantation (February 1930) followed by that of 4,000 workers at the Nam Dinh Textile plants (March-April 1930) and that of 400 workers at the Ben Thuy match factory and saw-mill (April 1930). The struggle gradually spread from the factories to the countryside and particularly from May 1, 1930, the high tide of broad revolutionary struggle broke out at the industrial enterprises in Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Hongay, Vinh, Saigon, Cho Lon, etc..., and rural areas such as Thai Binh, Ha Nam (North Viet Nam), Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Ngai (Central Viet Nam) Gia Dinh, Cho Lon, Vinh Long, Sadec, Ben Tre, Thu Dau Mot and My Tho (South Viet Nam).

The surging movement of workers and peasants' struggle which started in early 1930 temporarily calmed down at the end of 1931. (There were in 1930 98 workers' strikes and 400 peasants' demonstrations and in 1931 31 workers' strikes and 135 peasants' demonstrations).

The peak of the movement of mass struggle in 1930-1931 was the Nghe — Tinh Soviet.

On May 1, 1930, under the leadership of the provincial Party Committee of Nghe An, workers at the Truong Thi Railway workshops and Ben Thuy match factory, together with tens of thousands of peasants

in the districts around Vinh town went on strike and demonstrated for increased wages, shorter working day, lower taxes, restitution of appropriated land, and against white terror. From then on the movement developed all over the two provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh. The movement was under the direct guidance of Comrades Nguyen Phong Sac, Nguyen Duc Canh and Le Viet Thuat.

In collusion with the feudal landlords, the French imperialists carried out an extremely barbarous policy of terrorism. More troops were moved to stations throughout these two provinces. Armed forces and aircraft were used for the repression of the demonstrations. Thousands of people were shot down during the struggle, tens of thousands of people arrested and thousands of houses burnt down.

But under the Party's leadership, the Nghe — Tinh people did not flinch. When one man fell down, hundreds of others rushed forward. By September 1930, the imperialists' ruling machine in many communes and districts in the two Nghe An, Ha Tinh provinces disintegrated. In many localities canton heads and village mayors handed over their seals to the revolutionary cadres. In others, heads of districts took to their heels. The Nghe An Provincial Party Committee gave instructions for setting up of Soviets, a local form of revolutionary power of the workers and peasants. This power carried out democratic freedoms for the people, distributed communal land to the peasants, encouraged the people to learn Vietnamese script and fight bad customs, etc.

Realizing that the use of armed forces alone could not crush the fighting spirit of the Vietnamese people, the imperialist and feudal Court implemented a new policy: on the one hand, repression and persecution were carried on, and on the other, treacherous manoeuvres were used to break the movement. Leaning on the landlords, first of all the mandarins, and

notables, they set up 'The Party of Men of Reason' with the object of 'fighting Communism and stirring up hatred for the Soviet Union'*, digging a gap between the Party and the people, hoping that the people would turn away from the Party. At the same time orders were given to reactionaries under religious cloaks 'to write in newspapers, publish books and do their utmost to carry out reactionary propaganda among Catholic masses aiming at sowing discord among us in order to divide our forces' **.

Other tricks were used to deceive the people : organization of 'Yellow Flag processions', 'Receiving of rallying cards' to play on the minds of the less determined people in an attempt to disintegrate the movement.

Reformist policies were also carried out to undermine the revolution : Relief to the poor, celebration of sacrifices for those who were shot down during the demonstrations, digging of canals, building of dams, etc.

While the movement was thus fiercely assaulted, the Nghe — Tinh area was hit by a grave famine. The fighting spirit of the people fell gradually. The Provincial Party Committee on the one side launched a movement against terrorism and punishing the traitors, and, on the other, led the peasants to claim for loans of paddy from rich families in order to cope with immediate famine. The movement entered a more complicated and more difficult period. Not only had it to stand up against French imperialists and the feudal Court, but also against traitors among the people and inside the Party. At that time, the Committee of Central Viet Nam put forth an incorrect slogan 'to root out all intellectuals, landlords and

* Excerpt from handbills of the Viet Nam Communist Party that gave explanations of the 'Party of Men of Reason', in 1930, in Nghe An province.

** Excerpt from the newspaper **Forward** number 26, on December 17, 1931.

notables', aimed at strengthening the Party, but in practice it brought about more difficulties for the movement.

The Party's Central Committee launched a nationwide movement of struggle in co-ordination with the Nghe — Tinh movement, opposing white terror and supporting Red Nghe — Tinh. At the same time it sent out instructions on the question of purging the Party and the Peasants' Association. The Central Committee laid stress on the Party's class line in the countryside as follows : « To strengthen by all means the landless and poor peasants because they are semi-proletarians in the countryside ; to unite with middle-peasants because they are for the time being a big revolutionary force and a labouring force which will, together with the working class, build socialism once State-power is in the workers' hands. Rich peasants should not be members of Red Peasants' Association, in particular members of the Executive Committee of this Association. But the Permanent Bureau of the Central Committee disapproves of the raising of the question of purging the Red Peasants' Association. It should only speak of readjusting the Red Peasants' Association to conform with its principles. Explanations should be given to rich peasants to convince them to withdraw of their own free will from the Red Peasants' Association and shift to the mutual aid teams * . »

The Central Committee's instructions corrected the deviations of the Nghe — Tinh Party Committee and reflected the Party's correct class line in rural areas in the bourgeois democratic revolution. Besides, the Central Committee gave instructions for the organization of self-defence units to defend the masses in

* Excerpt from the Central Committee's instructions on 'Development of Red Peasants' Associations' on January 20, 1931.

their struggle. Therefore, from the Nghe—Tinh Soviet movement emerged the seed of the people's armed forces led by our Party.

Nghe — Tinh Soviets could be set up in a number of localities only. Though there was co-ordinated struggle throughout the country it was not simultaneous and not strong enough. The enemy could still concentrate forces for the repression of the Nghe — Tinh Soviet movement but this was not the only cause of the failure of the movement. It was also due to subjective and adventurous thinking, lack of a thorough understanding of the policy of an Anti-imperialist national united front and neglecting to carry out the strategy of 'more friends and less foes'; and when then movement was at a low ebb, « a withdrawal in good order was not effected ».

However, Nghe — Tinh Soviet had a very important historical significance. It affirmed the leading role of the Indochinese Communist Party towards the Vietnamese revolution. Indeed though new-born, our Party was already fully able to launch a broad mass movement, and especially succeeded in mobilizing and leading the peasant masses. The heroic spirit of the fighters of Nghe—Tinh Soviet further strengthened the tradition of undaunted struggle of the Vietnamese people. During and after the Nghe — Tinh Soviet movement, although it suffered heavy losses, our Party was steeled and tempered in the fire of revolutionary struggle and accumulated experiences in seizing revolutionary power for the people.

While the Nghe — Tinh Soviet movement and the revolutionary movement throughout the country met with many difficulties, the Central Committee held its second session at Saigon in March 1931. The meeting had as its objective the struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology within the Party, for propaganda and education of Marxism-Leninism and working out of plans for the consolidation of the

movement. The session paid particular attention to the struggle against the following erroneous thoughts and viewpoints :

— That the Party is the party of the toiling people as a whole, and not the party of the working class.

— That the working class is divided into blue-blouse workers and brown-blouse workers, saying that the former were technical workers with high wages, thus having no revolutionary spirit ; and only the latter had revolutionary spirit as they were paid low wages and suffered most.

— The idea of ceasing to struggle in order to strengthen the Party internally.

Besides the criticism of the above-mentioned erroneous viewpoints, the session also laid emphasis upon the necessity of struggling against « leftist » and rightist tendencies in the Party. Concerning « leftist » tendencies, the struggle was mainly directed against adventurous dare-devil tendencies, rashness and premature uprising. As for rightist tendencies, the main struggle was turned against the idea of holding back the struggle of the masses or of tailing after the masses, etc.

Following the winding up of the second session of the Central Committee, all the members of the Central Committee were arrested. Numerous Party-members at all levels fell into enemy hands one after the other. The resolutions of the session, however, reached a number of localities, and erroneous viewpoints were corrected.

THE LOW EBB OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE TO RESTORE THE MOVEMENT

After the end of 1931 the revolutionary agitation in Indochina reached a low ebb. The French imperialists continued repressing and terrorizing, with particular concentration on the Indochinese Communist Party, under the belief that the revolution would be annihilated only after its destruction. Scores of thousands of Party members and revolutionary cadres were arrested, killed, jailed, or exiled. Many villages having communist cells or sheltering communist cadres were burnt down. Any family having connection with the communists was surrounded and closely watched. All disturbances were imputed to the communists and mercilessly repressed and terrorized. Together with the policy of terrorism went that of deceitful propaganda and demagogy. The French imperialists encouraged the development of religious organizations, allowed the founding of «Buddhist Associations» in North and Central Viet Nam, which were put under the control and management of reactionary mandarins. In addition to the religious books and those slandering communism published by the Catholic Mission, a series of books of superstitious character such as books on «physiognomy», «soothsaying», «horoscopy», «evil spirits», «hypnotism», etc..., were published and widely circulated. The French imperialists even organized the «return

from France » of Emperor Bao Dai and put out noisy propaganda for the Bao Dai so-called « reformed programme ». At the same time they sowed depraved customs and habits, built more gambling-houses, night clubs, opium-dens, brothels, etc..., with a view to corrupting our youth, and intensifying propaganda of the decadent culture of the French bourgeoisie in our country.

The years of low ebb of the revolution were also those of economic crisis which weighed heavily on the Vietnamese people. Trade in all kinds of goods was in stagnation, rice was unsaleable; meanwhile taxes and State loans of all kinds were increasing. The French imperialists squeezed hundreds of millions of piastres out of Viet Nam to subsidize the French monopolistic capitalists in the years of economic crisis. Many peasants went bankrupt, land and fields were concentrated in the big landlords' hands. Scores of thousands of workers were unemployed; the already low wages decreased more and more. Many civil-servants lost their jobs. Small traders, owners of small industrial concerns and members of the national bourgeoisie went bankrupt one after another.

Facing this situation, the feudal landlord class had to cling all the more to imperialism, being aware that without imperialism their interests could not be safeguarded. The Vietnamese comprador-bourgeoisie still co-operated with the imperialists to ask and beg them for whatever they would give. As for the Vietnamese national bourgeoisie, though suffering heavy handed treatment they were bewildered, confused, and also compromised with the imperialists. The feudal landlord class and comprador-bourgeoisie put forth political « theories » and deceitful « reformed programme » to praise the imperialists and embellish their domination, at the same time to maintain or

extend their own interests under any form. As for the national bourgeoisie, they availed themselves of the mass movement to beg for various reforms*.

The petty-bourgeoisie was pessimistic, and had little confidence in the revolution; a number of them fostered an adventurous spirit or became superstitious. During this period, in the cultural field, there was some similarity in the attitude of the national bourgeoisie and that of the petty-bourgeoisie: not daring to struggle against the French imperialists in the political and military fields, they struggled in the cultural field against the feudal power. That is why the humorous and satirical literature was developed attacking in a negative manner the ludicrous and out-of-date acts of the feudal landlord class (See the weeklies **Phong Hoa, Ngay Nay**). Besides the humorous literature was the development of the bourgeoisie romantic literature (**Tu Luc Van Doan**, etc.)

Though in a difficult situation, our Party always believed in the future of the revolution. In 1932, the Party put forth the **Programme of action**, recalling the Party's « Programme on the bourgeois democratic revolution » in 1930, and three immediate practical requirements:

1 — To demand democratic freedoms for the toiling people, freedom of assembly, of organization, of speech, of movement, and of going abroad.

2 — To protest against the policy of terrorism and reprisals against political detainees, to demand immediate cancellation of the policy of repression and death sentences, abolition of the special criminal Court and military courts, etc.

3 — To demand cancellation of the monopoly of salt, alcohol, opium, etc.

* See « The preparation for the founding of the Party, the Party's revolutionary Programme » above.

Based on these requirements, the Party's **Programme of action** put forth itemized claims for workers, peasants and soldiers. It was approved by the Communist International in 1932.

In 1931-1932, our Party also waged the struggle against erroneous political tendencies. First of all, the struggle against the revolutionary line of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party in the Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi (1931). The leaders of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party jailed there bitterly criticized our Party's revolutionary line and opposed the « Programme on the national democratic revolution » of our Party. Our comrades detained in the prisons of Hanoi and Pulo-Condor, used illegal newspapers to contend with the leaders of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party and defend the Party's revolutionary line and its methods of mobilizing and leading the struggle of the masses to win the practical daily rights leading to the insurrection to seize power. At the same time they brought out the errors of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party in the doctrine of Three People's Principles, in the theory of « National existence », in the bourgeois democratic viewpoint, etc. These discussions brought victory for the Party's line and policies, and won the agreement of many prisoners who were not yet communists and of a number of left-wing members of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party. After these discussions the differentiation within the Viet Nam Nationalist Party became more clearly evident.

A number of radical members of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party passed over to our side; others became inactive, resigned to their lot, while a number of reactionaries worked in the service of the imperialists.

In 1932-1933, a number of Party members availed themselves of the legal newspapers to debate on « materialism or idealism », and struggle against Phan Khoi's ideology, a kind of defeatist and shame-

less ideology which denied the revolutionary potentiality of the Vietnamese people. Though limited because it was confined in the framework of the legal newspapers, this struggle won victory and exerted to some extent an effective influence for Marxism among the population.

In 1935, a number of the Party members opened a debate in the legal newspapers on the problem « art for art's sake or art for life's sake » in order to struggle against the bourgeois viewpoint of pure art divorced from the masses. This polemic also exerted a good influence among the intellectuals and youth in the towns.

These polemics defeated the ideas of compromise and reformism, pessimistic and hopeless thinking, and the political and artistic viewpoints of the bourgeoisie. They consolidated the confidence of the Party members and revolutionary masses in Marxism-Leninism and in the only correct revolutionary line.

During the period of low ebb, the great part of the Party members were jailed, but they never ceased struggling. In the prisons they organized Party cells to disseminate the Party's line and policies, continually led the struggles for the improvement of their living conditions, combined or connected their struggle with the revolutionary movement of the masses on the outside, and protested against the French imperialists' ruthless policy. Moreover, the Vietnamese Communists transformed the prisons into revolutionary schools. It was thanks to the courses of theoretical study, the discussions on questions of the day, on policies, and the educational classes in the prisons, that the communists in jail could raise their own theoretical, political and cultural level and improve themselves in order to become the Party's activists later on.

From the end of 1931 to the first half of 1932, the mass movement subsided. But from the middle of

1932 onwards, it began to recover gradually. Workers' struggles broke out again, first of all in South Viet Nam where workers in many enterprises went on strike (those at the Testalin printing-house, the women workers of the towel-mill, the rickshaw men in Saigon, the workers of the Dau Tieng plantation, etc.). Noteworthy was the demonstration against famine of thousands of peasants flocking from Ha Tien to Saigon in 1932. The struggle gradually extended, including people of all walks of life: workers, peasants, small traders, owners of small industrial concerns and even national minorities in the Western highlands (Central Viet Nam), in Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces. The movement extended to Cambodia and Laos. The restoration of the movement of the masses was due mainly to the close link between the Party members and the masses, their care of the people's livelihood, and Party leadership in the people's struggle for daily rights and interests.

From the end of 1932, after their return, the Party members from abroad created the Party's primary organizations on the border areas of Indochina and in the mass national minorities. Those in activity outside the prisons together with those released from prisons made full use of the legal and semi-legal means, used the general forms of mass organization, such as the Associations for mutual aid in case of death or marriage, for rice-transplanting, harvesting, roofing houses, football associations, reading-rooms, etc., to re-create the Party's primary organizations. However, a number of localities, instead of bringing into effect the above-mentioned tactic in the period of low ebb, still used such forms as distribution of leaflets, sticking up bills, hoisting red flags, thus showing their force, and creating for the enemy the opportunity to repress and terrorize, so that the Party's primary organizations newly restored there, were destroyed once again.

During this period, a number of comrades knew how to utilize the legal means to publish newspapers and books, disseminate the Party's policies, participate in the election of the Saigon Municipal Council, and winning victories, skilfully availing themselves of the debate during the election to disseminate the Party's minimum programme and educate the masses. But it is to be regretted that some errors were committed. Some comrades, lacking principle, co-operated with the Trotskyites who utilized this co-operation to influence the masses and win over a number of our sympathizers in South Viet Nam. Moreover, this co-operation sowed confusion among the masses, so that they could not see the sabotaging and anti-revolutionary nature of the Trotskyites, could not differentiate between the latter and the communists, could not distinguish the true from the false.

The struggle to restore the movement in the years 1932-1935 was mainly due to our Party's and people's subjective effort, but it was also partly due to the help of the Communist International, especially that of the French and Chinese Communist Parties.

The French Communists strenuously struggled against the French imperialists' blood-thirsty policy. In the Parliament, in the newspapers, everywhere, the French Communists protested against the repression of the revolution in Yen Bai, Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces by the French colonialists. The French Communist Party also led the French workers and working people to combine their struggle with the Vietnamese people. These acts, imbued with proletarian international spirit, encouraged the Vietnamese people very much.

During the years of low ebb, the Chinese Communist Party always followed the Vietnamese revolution and strove by every means to help the Vietnamese revolutionary movement to recover. The letter sent by the Chinese Communist Party to the Indochinese Communist Party in 1934 said: «For

many years the Chinese and Indochinese Communist Parties have had close connection because of the brotherly love in the struggle against the common enemy »...

In that period, the Soviet Communist Party trained many leading cadres for our Party. Comrades Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap and many others were trained in the Soviet Union, and they returned to China and France, seeking means to contact the comrades at home to restore the movement.

According to the policy of the Communist International, in early 1934, the Overseas Leading Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party was officially founded in Macao (China), headed by Comrade Le Hong Phong. Its task was to unify the Party's organization in the country, train leading cadres and prepare for the first Congress of the Party. It published the **Bolshevik** to criticize the errors and guide the mass movement at home and practically did the task of a Provisional Central Executive Committee of the Party.

The first Congress was held from March 27 to March 31, 1935, in Macao. Ten comrades, representing the Party's organizations in Viet Nam and Laos, attended it.

The Congress adopted the following lines of action:

1 — To consolidate and develop the Party, strengthen its forces by developing the Party membership in the enterprises, plantations, along the communication lines and in the enemy's army, by increasing the number of élite Party members in the Party's leading organs and of reserve cadres for these organs.

2 — To win over broad masses, especially to pay attention to the national minorities, women, soldiers in the enemy ranks, foreign residents, and to build and consolidate the Communist Youth Association, Red Trade Union, Red Peasants' Association, Red

Assistance and Self-Defence Unit ; to found the Anti-Imperialist Unified Front. To utilize all the legal and semi-legal forms in our activity.

3—To struggle against imperialist wars, to support the Soviet Union and Soviet China. To make our people consider these problems as those related to their own rights and interests.

The Congress elected the Party Central Executive Committee comprising nine comrades, among them Comrades Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap, and Phung Chi Kien.

The Party Congress in Macao as well as the activities of the Overseas Leading Committee succeeded in unifying the Party's organizational system and the Viet Nam revolutionary movement under the leadership of the new Central Executive Committee. The Congress resolutions brought confidence to the Party members and revolutionary masses in the country, and prepared the conditions for the Indochinese revolutionary movement to rise to a new, higher and stronger stage.

The shortcoming of the Congress was its failure to clearly analyse the fascist danger all over the world, the urgent task to safeguard world peace, struggle against fascism, war and colonial reactionaries, and urge for democratic freedoms, and improvement of livelihood, etc.

and found a broad front with the other classes and
strata of people in order to struggle against fascism
and war.

The Communist International's resolution had a
strong line and strong tone throughout the world.
Fascism is exposed, but the movement against fascism
and war was also strong. The Spanish Popular Front

**THE PARTY FOUNDED THE INDOCHINESE
DEMOCRATIC FRONT AGAINST FASCISM AND
WAR, AGAINST COLONIAL REACTIONARIES,
FOR FREEDOM, FOOD, CLOTHES, AND PEACE
(1936-1939)**

The economic crisis in 1929-1933 and the distressed
situation following it in the capitalist countries made
the existing contradictions in the capitalist system
more acute. A number of imperialist countries which
could no longer maintain their domination by the
parliamentary democratic regime established open
dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinist and
imperialist elements of capitalist financiers. They
aimed at high handedly repressing the revolutionary
movement in the country, unloading the heavy weight
of the crisis on the working people's shoulders,
provoking the war to redivide the world market, and
attack the Soviet Union, the citadel of the world
revolution. Two hotbeds of war began to be kindled
in Europe (Germany) and Asia (Japan).

Faced with this situation, in July 1935, the Com-
munist International held the seventh Congress in
Moscow. In its resolution as well as in Dimitrov's
report to the Congress, the Communist International
assessed that the most dangerous immediate enemy
of the world's people was not imperialism in general
but the fascist imperialists; the task of the interna-
tional working class was to unify their own ranks

and found a broad front with the other classes and strata of people in order to struggle against fascism and war.

The Communist International's resolution had a deep, wide and strong echo throughout the world. Fascism developed, but the movement against fascism and war was also rising. The Spanish Popular Front, the Anti-Japanese Unified National Front in China and particularly the French Popular Front had a great influence on Indochina. On May 3, 1936, the French Popular Front won a resounding victory in the general elections in France, and afterwards a government of the Popular Front came to power in France. This event greatly encouraged the peoples in the French colonies.

In Indochina, it was due to the consequences of the economic crisis and of the French imperialists' policy of repression and deceit that the various strata of people, including the national bourgeoisie and the democratic prominent personalities, could hardly breathe, and hoped for necessary democratic changes.

In this situation, the Central Committee held a Session in July 1936, convened by Comrade Le Hong Phong. Basing itself on the resolution of the seventh Congress of the Communist International and starting from the concrete conditions of Viet Nam at that time, the Session temporarily decided not to put forth the slogans « To defeat French imperialists » and « To requisition the landlords' land and distribute it to the peasants ». It advocated the founding of the broad « Anti-Imperialist People's Front »* « embracing all classes, political parties and religious organizations, and nationalities in Indochina, in order to struggle together for elementary democratic rights: freedom of association, of organization, of speech, of publication, of movement, and of travel

* Afterwards it was changed into: « The Indochinese Democratic Unified Front »

abroad, general amnesty for political prisoners, eight-hour work-day, labour law for workers, enlargement of economic and financial services, colonial councils, Chambers of People's representatives. » *

The Session stressed : to enable the Front to have a broad mass basis, the forms of mass organization must be changed to legal and semi-legal ways ; we have to make full use of the legal and semi-legal means to educate the masses, creating a strong movement of struggle to gain democratic rights.

While struggling legally, the Party had to consolidate its own illegal organization, and carry on its illegal work ; in the mass organizations the Party had to pay attention to the admission of new Party members, etc.

The Session criticized the « leftist » and conservative ideas which paid attention to the illegal work only, and protested against the legal work, which only took into account the worker and peasant masses, and were unwilling to co-operate broadly with the allied forces, the revolutionary national and reformist national parties. But on the other hand, it also took precautions against rightist tendencies : not to educate the Party members and masses on the revolutionary aim that is to liberate Indochina from imperialist yoke and wipe out every feudal vestige in Indochina ; to give up class stand ; to hinder the workers in their struggle against the bourgeoisie and the peasants in their struggle against the landlords, etc.

The Central Session held on July 1936 had an important significance ; it opened a new period of development for the Vietnamese revolution. Its correct resolutions amended those of the first Party Congress. From this Central Session, our Party brought into play a flexible strategy, broadly winning over the

* Excerpt from the document « Around the Indochinese Communist Party's New Policy » published on October 30, 1936.

allies, however small and wavering, to struggle together temporarily against the colonial reactionaries, and utilize all legal and semi-legal means to make propaganda, educate the masses, and launch them in struggle. If in the 1930-1931 upsurge attention was devoted to the agitation of only workers and peasants by our Party, now, beside the workers and peasants who are the basic revolutionary forces, the Party also won over broad allied forces to set up a front. If in the 1930-1931 upsurge only illegal forms of struggle were used, now, our Party skilfully used the legal and semi-legal forms of struggle and combined the illegal with the legal work. This showed that our Party had developed a step further.

In this period, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc was in China. Relying on the Communist International's resolutions and basing himself on the documents printed in the legal newspapers published in the country, he sent letters to the Party. His leading ideas were composed of the following points :

1. At present the Party (i. e. the Indochinese Communist Party) should not put forth too high claims (independence, Chamber of Deputies, etc.). To do so is to fall into the Japanese fascists' trap. The Party must lay claim to the democratic rights, freedom of organization and meeting, freedom of press and speech, general amnesty of political prisoners, and struggle for the legality of the Party.

2. To achieve these aims, the Party must strive to organize a broad national democratic front. Not only should this front be composed of Vietnamese but also of progressive French, not only must it include various strata of working people but also the national bourgeoisie... *

Owing to the Party's correct line of action, the mass movement grew very strongly. Opening the

* Excerpt from Nguyen Ai Quoc's letter to the Communist International 1939.

democratic movement was the agitation for the organization of the Indochinese Congress in Autumn 1936. On the one hand, the Party constantly made appeals to the parties, political organizations, and classes to combine their action; and on the other, the Party mobilized the masses, organized meetings, handled petitions, and claimed democratic freedoms. The movement extended from towns to countryside; from South Viet Nam it spread to the whole country. 600 Committees of action were set up in South Viet Nam alone. In North and Central Viet Nam, the movement also soared to new heights. At that time, the imperialists' lackeys plotted to turn the movement in another direction, but they met with an energetic opposition from the masses.

Faced with the strong development of the mass movement in Indochina and the resounding victory of the French Popular Front in the general elections of May 1936, the French rulers were obliged to yield. The government of the French Popular Front was in power for some months when, under the pressure of the strong movement of struggle of the French and Indochinese peoples, it had to decree the shortening of working days for workers, to grant the workers paid annual holidays, amnesty of the political prisoners in Indochina, etc. But on the other side, it connived at the colonial reactionaries who dissolved the Committees of action.

The Indochinese Congress was forbidden, but the mass movement, far from dying, developed further. In Autumn-Winter 1936, owing to the amnesty from the Government of the French Popular Front, thousands of political prisoners in Indochina were released including on this occasion many Party leading cadres. Our Party had thus more cadres to work among the masses, and lead the mass movement.

At the end of 1936 and in 1937, there was in Indochina a mass upsurge demanding the improvement of living standards, democratic freedoms, freedom to

set up trade unions, decrease of poll-tax and other taxes, etc. From August 15, 1936 to January 15, 1937, there were in Indochina 339 mass struggles with 62,620 participants, which included 242 strikes of 54,625 workers in industrial or handicraft enterprises. The most important struggles were the general strikes of Hongay and Campha miners and that of Ba Son workers (Saigon). In 1937 there were nearly 400 strikes, the most important being the general strike of railwaymen. At the same time, there were hundreds of demonstrations by the peasants and the various strata of people. In the same year, the Party utilized the reception to the Investigation Commission of the French Popular Front government headed by Justin Godard, and the reception to the new Governor General Brévié in Indochina, to gather thousands of people from all over the country to demand the carrying out of democratic reforms, etc. These receptions were in fact mass mobilizations on a large scale, and were a terror to the French rulers in Indochina. They tried by every means to stop the movement but in vain.

While the movement was soaring, the Central Executive Committee held a Session in March 1937. The Session stressed that every legal means should be made wide use of, the forms of organization to be mobile and suited to the circumstances; not too rigorous. It was decided to dissolve the trade union and the peasant's Association, and found the Assistance Society, and Friendly Society; to dissolve the Communist Youth Association, and found the Indochinese Democratic Youth Association*; to dissolve the Red Assistance and replace it by the Popular

* In the movement, the forms of mass organizations in general, the Youth Organizations in particular, were very flexible. In some places the « Vanguard Youth Associations », and in others the « Democratic Youth Associations » were organized. But the name « Indochinese Democratic Youth Association » was more generalized.

Assistance Society. The Session decided that «every situation must be utilized to organize all the mass associations under legal or semi-legal forms. Where the Popular Front could not yet be founded..., Democratic Fronts, Committees of Joint actions or Committees of Support for French Popular Front could be founded according to the local situation...» *

After the Session of the Central Committee in March 1937, the mass movement took a further step forward. The primary Party organizations and mass bases were strongly consolidated and developed. Party leadership at all levels was reinforced, membership increased. By March 1938 the Party membership had increased by 60 per cent. Concerning the mass organizations, in the towns friendly organizations of workers, small traders and owners of small industrial concerns were founded everywhere; sports and physical training Associations, and reading Societies were also organized on a large scale. In the countryside, the various forms of mass organization were widely and rapidly developed: harvesting teams, rice-transplanting teams, teams for roofing houses, burial societies, hunting clubs, feasting societies during the New Lunar Year Festival, mutual assistance associations, tontines, etc. These multi-form organizations gathered broad masses under the Party's leadership. On the Party's initiative, «the Association for the Popularization of National script» was founded and rapidly developed; the movement against illiteracy became an organized mass movement.

Parallel with the development of people's organizations, struggles successively broke out putting forth more practical and concrete slogans. The workers struggled for the increase of wages, implementation

* Excerpt from the communiqué of the Central Committee on March 20, 1937.

of labour laws, and freedom to set up trade unions *; the peasants struggled for the decrease of poll-tax and other taxes, against new taxes, appropriation of land, corvee, etc. Many struggles resulted in great victories. Besides the struggles for economic interests, there were the important political struggles, (such as the general strike of the railway workers in 1937) which had an influence all over the country.

The Party thoroughly utilized the legal books and newspapers as weapons for its struggle. **Dan Chung** (People's Mass), Party's central organ, **Tin Tuc** (News) and many other newspapers of the Party and Democratic Youth Association, either written in Vietnamese or in French language, laid bare the rotten colonial and semi-feudal regime. They reflected the working people's poor life, pointed out the aspirations of the various strata of people, and demanded improvements in living standards and democratic reforms.

Besides the newspapers, many progressive books were published by the Party, aimed at bringing Marxism-Leninism and the Party's policies to the widest sections of the people. The book **The Peasant Question** written by Comrades Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, courageously accused the imperialists and feudalists of cruelties towards Vietnamese peasants. It faithfully reflected the Vietnamese peasants' life, and pointed out their important role in the Vietnamese revolution. Influenced by the Party, many writers wrote good works, and contributed to the struggle against various kinds of reactionary and prostitute literature. To Huu's poems began to conquer the hearts of the masses.

Moreover the activity of the Party in the matter of books and newspapers was the link in the relation between the legal and the illegal work of the Party,

* On the one hand the illegal organization of trade union was cancelled, but on the other, the freedom to set up trade unions must be claimed.

and played the role of liaison between the Party members and the masses. It had an important part in the work of propaganda and organization of the Party at that time.

In this period, the Party worked to found the Indochinese Democratic Front. In this Front, besides the groups of Communists working openly, there were the Franco-Vietnamese group belonging to the French Socialist Party, the « Tu Luc Van Doan » group, the friendly organizations of workers, small traders, owners of small industrial concerns, etc. Thanks to its work, the Party won victory in the elections of the Council of People's Representatives in Central and North Viet Nam.

In Central Viet Nam, the Party was able to enlarge the Front, winning over even « the 1884 group »*. Therefore in the election of the Council of People's Representatives in 1937, the Democratic Front won victory and held the seats of chairman, vice-chairman and first secretary.

In North Viet Nam, thanks to the Party's correct Front policy, the Democratic Front held 15 seats in the election of the Council of People's Representatives in 1938.

Although the election was very limited and sabotaged by the French rulers, in 1938 the Democratic Front won victory even in the Indochinese Economic and Financial Council, the highest organ « elected by the people » in Indochina in this period.

But the Democratic Front did not win victory in the election of the Nam Bo (South Viet Nam) Municipal Council in 1939. The Trotskyites sabotaged and distorted the Party's policy, utilized Daladier's surrender to fascism at Munich and the delay in the carrying out of suitable democratic reforms in Indo-

* Political group claiming the return of the 1884 Treaty signed by the Nguyen dynasty and the French colonialists in 1884.

china by the Government of the French Popular Front, to sow doubt in the masses about the Party's policy. On the other hand, we were subjective, did not lay bare the Trotskyites' schemes, and tended to belittle the work of agitating the grass-root masses. In the book **Tu Chi Trich** (Self-criticism) (published on July 20, 1939), Comrade Nguyen Van Cu, correctly analysed the causes of defeat and drew lessons from this election. At the same time he criticized the « leftist » tendency which wanted to « overthrow the constitutional party », and the rightist tendency which wanted to « rally all parties and classes of the population, except the reactionary elements », making no distinction between progressive and reactionary elements and parties. In this book, Comrade Nguyen Van Cu also explained all aspects of the Party's strategy in the period of the Democratic Front. Therefore not only had it the effect of correcting the immediate shortcomings within the Party, it was also a document summing up the Party's experiences in carrying out agitation inside the Front in this period.

In 1936-1937, the Party won successive victories, and its influence rose steadily. To develop these victories further, the Central Committee in its March 1938 Session decided to give the All-Indochina Front a unified name, the « Indochinese Democratic Unified Front » (briefly « Indochinese Democratic Front »).

The Session emphasized the Party's principle of democratic centralism :

« Either open or underground, all organizations must obey the Party's leading organ. Organizations operating openly are not on an equal footing with the Central Committee or at other respective Party levels. It is only a part of the Party's organization. » *

* Excerpt from the resolution of the Central Committee on March 29 - 30, 1938.

The Session also set the whole Party the task of carrying on the struggle, so that it could act legally, and strengthen the relation between the Party and the masses.

Implementing this resolution, our Party continued to develop every ability to act legally, and further to enlarge the Democratic Front. Thanks to that, the movement developed stronger and stronger. Not only workers and peasants, but also small traders, owners of small industrial concerns, students, civil-servants, etc. participated in the struggle in increasing numbers. Worker-strikes, school-strikes and market-strikes followed one after the other. Most noteworthy was the meeting on May Day 1938 during which 50,000 people, including people of all strata in Hanoi, put forth slogans claiming democratic freedoms, the freedom to set up trade unions and the improvement of the people's livelihood, and in support of the French Popular Front. It was a demonstration of the huge force of the masses under the Party's leadership which sowed terror among the colonial reactionaries. The meetings and demonstrations of scores of thousands of people combined with the struggle in the Trung Ky (Central Viet Nam) People's Representatives Council on September 16, 1938, succeeded in cancelling the draft on head-tax put forth by the French. The close combination of the struggles of the masses with those waged in the press and the council was the condition for victory of all the struggles from 1936 to 1939.

While the democratic movement in our country was developing, the danger of a world war was increasing. The Japanese militarist imperialists launched a large-scale aggression against China and directly threatened Indochina. The Party launched the movement to support the Chinese people in their resistance against Japan. This movement was enthusiastically welcomed by the masses. In many places subscription and fetes were organized to get money, clothes and medicines to help the Chinese army resist Japan.

At the same time the Party put forth the slogan «To defend Indochina», and demanded that the French government decree every democratic freedom, improve the people's livelihood, grant an amnesty to all political prisoners, and give allowances to the soldiers' families, etc. At that time, there were two wrong tendencies within the Party: «To defend Indochina with conditions» and «to defend Indochina without conditions».

The first was: if France is unwilling to implement the Indochinese people's democratic claims, they will not defend Indochina together with France.

The second was: if the fascists attack Indochina, the Indochinese people will certainly have to fight against them, without demanding France make concessions to them.

Both tendencies were negative, did not start from the Indochinese people's interests and from the necessity to defend the Indochinese people's life and property against the blood thirsty fascists. The Party's correct policy of the moment was: as France was not yet turning to fascism, the Party must lead the Indochinese people to struggle to force France to defend Indochina together with the Indochinese people; to compel France to implement democratic freedoms and to improve the people's livelihood so that the people would actively defend Indochina. The Indochinese people must arm themselves to resist the aggressive fascists; they must defend Indochina on their own initiative, and not passively support the defence of Indochina with or without conditions. The Party struggled to unify the ranks of the Party on this question.

To maintain the Party's line and policy in this period, it was necessary to struggle against the «leftist» narrow-minded tendency which opposed co-operation with the national reformist parties; and the conservative thinking which was against the use of legal and semi-legal methods to propagandize,

educate, organize the masses, and lead them in struggle. At the same time, the Party had to struggle against the rightist tendency, the unprincipled cooperation with the Trotskyites, and the tendency to lay bare all our forces, and not pay attention to illegal work.

In the same period, besides the internal struggle, the Party had to struggle permanently against the policy of repression and demagoguery of the colonial government. It had to struggle against the Trotskyites who were trying by all means to sabotage our Party's line and policy. When the Party called for the founding of the «Democratic Front», they advanced the slogan for the setting up of the «Worker-Peasant Front». When our Party founded the «Democratic Youth Association» they advocated the setting up of the «Communist Youth Association». When our Party put forth the slogan «To defend Indochina», they issued the slogan «To turn the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war», etc. Concerning these problems, the Party had to expose the Trotskyites' schemes in order to make the masses clearly realize that they were saboteurs and imperialists' lackeys.

In a word, during the period of agitation for democracy (1936-1939), our Party scored many achievements and drew many rich experiences from the use of every legal and semi-legal means to disseminate Marxism-Leninism, agitate the masses to struggle for immediate demands, develop and consolidate the Party and mass organizations, and closely combine legal and illegal work to fulfil the revolutionary task.

However, during this period the Party also had some shortcomings. Firstly, while supporting the government of the French Popular Front and the defence of Indochina, the Party did not consider the national problem thoroughly. Secondly, the Party did not put forth the problem of rent and interest reduction as slogans of struggle for the improvement of the peasants' livelihood.

**IN WORLD WAR II, THE PARTY FOUNDED
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AGAINST
AGGRESSIVE FASCISM, DIRECTED THE
SPEARHEAD OF THE REVOLUTION AT THE
FASCIST IMPERIALISTS AND VIETNAMESE
TRAITORS**

In September, 1939, World War II broke out in Europe; as imperialist France was one of the countries involved in it, Indochina was also thrown into this conflagration. The French rulers ordered general mobilization in Indochina. The number of taxes, loans, subscriptions and lotteries increased day by day; vehicles and boats were requisitioned. In the enterprises, working hours were increased and wages decreased and many youths were conscripted into the army. But the problem which drew the French imperialists' particular attention was that of consolidating their rear, of annihilating the revolutionary force in the country so that they could carry on the unjust war with an easy mind. The elementary democratic rights gained by the workers and peasants in the period of agitation for democracy (1936-1939) were abolished. All democratic organizations, friendly societies were dissolved; freedom of propaganda and of meeting were abolished. The premises of the Party's legal newspapers were searched, their personnel arrested, and their property seized. Persecutions

and massacres were carried out everywhere. In September 1939 alone, there were 1,051 police raids and arrests in North Viet Nam.

After the outbreak of war the French Communist Party was outlawed. Our Party ordered the organs and cadres working legally or semi-legally to rapidly withdraw to underground work. That is why, generally speaking, its force was kept intact. However, due to the enemy's policy of terror, our Party suffered heavy losses.

Faced with the enemy's offensive and after the signing of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression, a number of Party members and non-Party members became confused and wavering. To overcome this state of mind, on September 29, 1939, the Party issued a communique on « The present political line » and the Party Committee of Bac Ky (North Viet Nam) published the book, **The Soviet Union is Always Faithful to Peace** to explain the Soviet Union's policy of peace, to unify the ways of thinking and looking at the situation and immediate tasks of the Party. At the same time, it was decided to transfer the central point of activity from the town to the countryside. This policy was very important, because the countryside was the place where the enemy's machinery of rule was relatively weak. The Party had more opportunity to come into close contact with the peasant masses to make propaganda, organize them, and transform the countryside into a revolutionary base. It was thanks to this change in the direction of work that, despite the enemy's frenzied repression, the revolutionary force was not destroyed as in 1930-1931, but on the contrary, it struck roots among millions of toiling peasants, making the revolutionary movement firmer and stronger.

With the outbreak of World War II political lines and policies suitable to the new conditions were needed. In November, 1939, the Session of the Central Committee sponsored by Nguyen Van Cu, third Sec

retary General of the Party, Phan Dang Luu and Le Duan, decided to found the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist National United Front in order to unify various strata of people, social classes, and Indochinese nationalities, and directed the spearhead of the revolution against fascist imperialism.

The Session assessed that the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks were two basic tasks of the Vietnamese bourgeois democratic revolution. But at the moment the national danger was the more serious. « From the standpoint of national liberation, considering the national interest as supreme, all the problems of the revolution, even that of land, must be solved according to this aim. That is why, while advocating the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist National United Front, the bourgeois democratic revolution only confiscated the lands of the landlords who betrayed the national interest. » *

The Session also assessed that the imperialist war and the fascist rule would anger the people, and the revolution would break out. Of great importance was the political line of the Session to advance to the founding of the Indochinese Democratic Republic and suppress the slogan « To found the Soviet power by the workers, peasants and soldiers. »

It also decided to consolidate the Party in every aspect, making the Party unified in mind as well as in action.

The November, 1939, Session of the Central Committee marked a turning-point in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement.

The Vietnamese people were struggling to implement the Party's new political line, with matters moving swiftly at home and abroad. In June, 1940, France was occupied by the German fascists. In September, 1940, Indochina was invaded by the

* Excerpt from the Resolution of the Central Session on November 1939

Japanese fascists. The French colonialists surrendered to them, conniving at their occupying Indochina. But thanks to their longstanding undaunted struggle and to their education by the Party, the Vietnamese people rose to fight the French and Japanese. On September 22, 1940, Japanese troops attacked Lang Son. Defeated, the French army withdrew and passed by Bac Son district on their way to the delta. On September, 27, 1940, the Bac Son people, under the leadership of the local Party branch rose up, putting forth the slogan «Against the French-Japanese imperialists», and disarmed the defeated French troops to arm themselves. During the insurrection the Japanese and French were leagued together in order to give the French colonialists freedom to repress the Vietnamese revolution. Comrade Tran Dang Ninh was sent to Bac Son by the Party Committee of North Viet Nam to lead the insurrection. The Bac Son people held a meeting at Vu Lang to set up the revolutionary power, but because of their lack of experience and vigilance, they were surprised by a French attack. The insurrectionists withdrew to the forest and founded the first Vietnamese guerilla units led by the Party.

In support of the Bac Son movement, upon receipt of the Party Central Committee's directive, a number of localities combined their struggle, especially at Ngoc Trao (Thach Thanh district, Thanh Hoa province). The struggle led to the organization of armed forces, that afterwards had to disperse among the population.

In spite of its defeat, the Bac Son insurrection laid bare the Japanese and French fascists' schemes and gave birth to our first people's armed force under the leadership of our Party. This armed force gradually developed and became the «Viet Nam National Salvation Army». The Bac Son insurrection opened a new historical page of armed struggle for the Vietnamese people. It broke out while the people through-

out the country were not yet prepared, hence the insurrectionary forces had to fight alone. But the lesson drawn from the Bac Son insurrection was very useful and served as a basis for preparation for the August general insurrection later.

Simultaneous with the inrush of the Japanese army in North Viet Nam, the Siamese army attacked Cambodia. The French colonialists forced the Vietnamese people, first of all the people of the South, and the Cambodian people to go to the front as cannon-fodder. Boiling with hatred for the French colonialists and refusing to be slaves of the Japanese and French imperialist, and at the same time strongly encouraged by the spirit of the Bac Son insurrection, our people in South Viet Nam were ready to strike back.

At that moment, a number of the Central Committee members such as Comrades Nguyen Van Cu, Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap, and Le Duan, were arrested. The Central Committee members remaining in South Viet Nam and in the Nam Ky Committee intended to lead the people in Nam Ky to rise up in order to turn the Franco-Siamese war into a revolutionary civil war, and sent Comrade Phan Dang Luu to North Viet Nam to attend the seventh Central Session of the Party and ask for directives about this question. On October, 1940, the Session was held in Bac Ninh. Comrades Phan Dang Luu, Hoang Quoc Viet, Hoang Van Thu, Truong Chinh, and Tran Dang Ninh attended it. (Some members of the Central Committee did not attend because they were occupied in South Viet Nam.)

The seventh Central Session analysed the situation at home and abroad, clearly pointed out the danger for the Indochinese people to face two enemies; affirmed that the Anti-Imperialist National United Front was the Anti-Japanese-French Fascist National United Front, and decided to temporarily withdraw

the slogan of the sixth Central Committee Session « To confiscate landlords' land and distribute it to the tillers ».

The Session assessed that a revolutionary upsurge of the Indochinese people would certainly break out, therefore the Party must lead them to prepare the armed insurrection to recover freedom and national independence.

It also heard Comrade Tran Dang Ninh's report on the Bac Son insurrection and decided on the maintenance of the Bac Son armed force, the founding of guerilla groups operating separately, and the setting up of guerilla bases the centre of which was the Bac Son — Vu Nhai region.

Concerning the proposal of the Nam Ky Party branch, the Session assessed that because of the failure of the Bac Son insurrection and the fact that conditions were not ripe for an insurrection in Nam Bo and throughout the country, the insurrection should not be launched at this time. The immediate task of the Nam Ky Party branch was to use the forms of political and economic struggle against the French colonialists and Japanese fascists, and protest against the Franco-Siamese war. At the same time it was necessary to intensify propaganda, educate and organize the masses of people, first of all the workers, peasants and army men. It was necessary to prepare the conditions, and wait for a favourable opportunity when conditions were ripe throughout the country, to launch an armed insurrection to defeat the French and Japanese. If the insurrection was launched immediately it would be isolated and annihilated by the joint French-Japanese army.

On his arrival in South Viet Nam, Comrade Phan Dang Luu learnt that the order for the insurrection was already issued and everywhere all was ready. It could not be withdrawn. On the night of November 23, 1940, the Nam Ky insurrection broke out. The

Revolution did not yet prevail in the whole country. As the main revolutionary force was composed of only a number of soldiers in the enemy army, and upon the plan of the insurrection being discovered by the enemy, the Nam Ky uprising failed. The French imperialists repressed it savagely. But the Vietnamese people did not flinch. The fire of the Nam Ky insurrection had not yet been extinguished, when the soldiers at Do Luong (Nghe An province) rose up.

The Bac Son, Nam Ky and Do Luong insurrections did not bring victories as yet, but they upheld the Vietnamese people's undaunted heroic spirit. So many heads fallen and so much blood spilt gave our Party and people an invaluable lesson in armed insurrection.

This lesson could be summed up as follows :

First, to gain success, an insurrection to seize power must break out at the right time, that is, when the conditions for revolution are ready viz.

a) when confusion and discord in the enemy ranks have reached a climax ; when they are facing difficulties, and are quite at a loss and cannot overcome them ; b) when the middle-of-the-road strata are sick of the enemy, side with the revolution or sympathize with it, and are ready to follow the vanguard Party ; c) when the vanguard Party is determined to make sacrifices and lead the whole people to fight to the end in order to annihilate the enemy, liberate itself and the nation.

Second, in an agricultural colony such as ours, the line of armed struggle to seize power is : the insurrectionary forces must seize and occupy the enemy's most exposed places in the countryside, set up bases there, gradually spread their activities, and when the conditions are mature, take action in the towns to destroy the enemy's leading organs, and reconquer the whole country.

Third, to be successful, the insurrection cannot rely only on the force of the enemy's soldiers won over to our cause. We must chiefly rely on the force of the

great masses of people, first of all on the worker and peasant masses. At the same time, we must strive to propagandize among the enemy's soldiers to awaken them, so that they don't shoot at the revolutionary troops; we must persuade them to go over to our side, and use the enemy's guns to shoot at the enemy. Army rebellions can only have a practical effect on the revolution if the broad masses in the rear actively support it and respond to it.

Matters were moving more and more swiftly both at home and abroad, necessitating a closer leadership by our Party. On February 1941, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc returned from abroad and convened the eighth Session of the Central Committee. The Session was held from May 10 to May 19, 1941, at Pac Po (Cao Bang province), close to the Chinese border. Comrades Nguyen Ai Quoc, Hoang Van Thu, Truong Chinh, Hoang Quoc Viet, Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, etc. were present at the Session.

The Session assessed that from the day Indochina was under the double oppression of the French and Japanese fascists, the contradiction between the Indochinese people and the aggressive imperialists had become the main contradiction, because « the oppression was too heavy, the Indochinese people could not endure it; the French and Japanese imperialists oppressed not only the worker and peasant classes, but also the whole people... The classes' interests were robbed, the fate of the nation was threatened more than ever. » That is why the Session emphasized : « For the moment the partial and class' interests must be subordinated to the national problem. If the independence and freedom of the whole nation could not be recovered, not only the whole nation would be further condemned to slavery, but the partial and class' interests would be lost for ever. » *

* Excerpt from the Resolution of the Central Session on May 1941.

To rally the different strata of people and the national revolutionary forces in the struggle against the main enemy of the nation, that is the French and Japanese fascist imperialists, the Session advocated the founding of the **Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi** (Front of the allies for the independence of Viet Nam) that is the **Viet Minh Front**, a name full of significance which facilitated the mobilization of the masses' national spirit.

The Session highlighted the slogan of national liberation; therefore the chief aim of the mass associations was to save the country, and they were uniformly called **National Salvation Leagues**.

As for the land question, the Session assessed that: to further differentiate the ranks of the landlord class, it would still be necessary to temporarily put aside the slogan « To confiscate landlords' land and distribute it to the tillers », and to put forth the following slogans: « To confiscate imperialists' and traitors' land and distribute it to poor tillers »; « to reduce land rent and interest »; « to divide the communal fields », and to proceed to the realization of the slogan « land to the tillers ».

The Session decided to accelerate every field of work to prepare the **armed insurrection**, strengthen the leadership of armed organizations and build guerilla bases.

These tasks advocated by the May, 1941, Session of the Central Committee had a particular importance. These decisions marked a strong shifting of the Party towards directing the spearhead of forces against the fascist invaders. They stimulated the whole Party and people in their struggle to expel the French-Japanese fascists and brought the Vietnamese revolutionary movement to the victory of the August, 1945, Revolution.

The Session consolidated the Central Committee and elected Comrade Truong Chinh as its General secretary.

After the Session of the Central Committee, the Viet Minh Front was officially founded (May 19, 1941).

The central task of our Party and of the Viet Minh Front was then national salvation, national liberation. Therefore the mass organizations rallied in the Front were re-organized into associations for national salvation: «Workers for National Salvation», «Peasants for National Salvation», «Women for National Salvation», «Youth for National Salvation», «Self-defence units for National Salvation», «Pioneers for National Salvation», «Old people for National Salvation». Besides, «The Viet Nam Association for National Salvation» was founded to attract those elements from the bourgeois or landlord classes who approved of our anti-French and anti-Japanese struggle.

In order to strengthen the leadership of the armed forces, the Central Committee appointed Comrades Phung Chi Kien, Le Van Chi né Huy, and Comrade Chu Van Tan, as the commanding committee of the guerilla units in Bac Son — Vu Nhai, gathered under the name of the «Viet Nam Army for National Salvation». In Autumn, 1941, «The National Salvation Army» was divided into two sections: one, commanded by Comrade Phung Chi Kien stationed in Bac Son (Lang Son province); the other, commanded by Comrade Chu Van Tan, stationed in Dinh Ca, Trang Xa (Vu Nhai, Thai Nguyen province). Late in 1941, the section of «National Salvation Army» stationed in Bac Son, passing by Na Ri (Bac Can) on its way to Cao Bang, fell into an ambush and suffered heavy losses. The section stationed in Dinh Ca — Trang Xa waged guerilla warfare during eight months on end (from July, 1941, to February, 1942), fighting in extremely hard conditions. It succeeded in maintaining our forces and wearing down the enemy. At last, owing to difficulties of supply, it scattered into armed groups which carried out propa-

ganda and agitation work, creating revolutionary bases among the masses all over Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang provinces and part of Bac Can and Ha Giang provinces.

From these eight months of guerilla warfare in Bac Son, Vu Nhai, we can draw the following lesson on armed struggles: under the double French-Japanese fascist yoke, with the Party's leadership, our people could establish revolutionary bases and wage protracted guerilla warfare to wear down and defeat the by far stronger imperialists, but that broad mass bases are needed for the activities and development of our guerilla units. The principles of guerilla warfare are: reliance on the masses; continual growth, extreme mobility and constant adaptation. If the guerilla units stand on the defensive and coil themselves up, divorcing themselves from the masses they will be crushed. When the situation requires it, they must disperse, be able to stick to the masses and identify themselves with them, overcome difficulties, build bases, and when the situation is favourable, gather again and wage the struggle.

Guerilla warfare was a new form of struggle of the Vietnamese Revolution against the French-Japanese fascists, under our Party's leadership.

The patriotic war waged by the Soviet Union against the German fascists had had a very strong influence on the revolutionary movement in Viet Nam and in the world. The Vietnamese people considered each victory gained by the Soviet Army as their own. Towards the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943, the Soviet Army smashed 330,000 German fascists at Stalingrad and switched firmly over to the offensive on all fronts. This historical victory was a very great encouragement for the Vietnamese people. It was at the same time a strong blow to the French-Japanese fascist imperialists. Though living in poverty under

the double fascist yoke, thanks to the Party's leadership the Vietnamese people, always confident, were all the more confident of their liberation.

At that time, the Japanese were encroaching further and further on the French interests. The French-Japanese contradictions became sharper and a conflict between the two cliques of rulers was inevitable. The contradictions between the Japanese and the French, between the French De Gaullists and the French fascists, between the pro-Japanese and the pro-French, etc., were becoming more and more acute.

In view of the new situation, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee in its session held from February 25 to 27, 1943, decided to consolidate and enlarge the National United Front (Viet Minh Front). It decided to agitate for the foundation of the Indo-chinese Democratic Front, rallying anti-fascist foreign residents in Indochina, mainly resistant French and anti-Japanese Chinese residents. At the same time, all efforts were to be exerted to prepare the insurrection. As the Session emphasized, «the preparation for the insurrection is the present central task»*.

After the Session, the whole Party struggled to carry out these decisions.

On August 29, 1942, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, while on duty in China, was captured by the Chiang Kai-shek government and only released on September 16, 1943. Out of jail, he immediately got in touch with the «Liberation Association», a branch of the Viet Minh Front in Yunnan. At the same time, he established relations of co-operation with «the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionaries», an Anti-Japanese and Anti-French organization of Vietnamese residents in China, functioning legally in Kouang-si, under the clique of Nguyen Hai Than, Nguyen Tuong

* Excerpt from the Decisions of the February 1943 Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee.

Tam and Vu Hong Khanh. Thus began the alliance between the Viet Minh Front and the « Association of Vietnamese Revolutionaries ». Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc took the name of Ho Chi Minh to carry on his activities.

At home, implementing the decisions of the February, 1943, Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, our Party increased its activities to broaden the Front, in rallying as many students, intellectuals and national bourgeois as possible. At that time, there was a division in the ranks of these strata. Some were pro-Japanese, others, pro-French while others were pro-Viet Minh. The pro-French were growing fewer and fewer; those who had wrongly believed in a possible use of the Japanese, realized more and more clearly their imperialist fascist nature and became disappointed. The Viet Minh gained increasingly greater influence. Our Party deemed it opportune and necessary to help the Vietnamese national bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals found a revolutionary party in order to draw the Vietnamese national bourgeoisie and the Vietnamese intelligentsia into the Viet Minh Front; on the one hand to check the « Great Asia » deceitful policy of the Japanese imperialists in Viet Nam, on the other to further broaden the National United Front against the French-Japanese fascists. Therefore, our Party helped Duong Duc Hien's group of students and the **Thanh Nghi*** group found the Viet Nam Democratic Party which joined the Viet Minh Front.

Furthermore, our Party carried on agitation among anti-fascist democratic foreign residents, including French De Gaullist elements in Indochina, to take part in the foundation of the Anti-Fascist Democratic Front. At the same time, it strove to rally the Vietnamese soldiers in the French Army, the legionaries and French soldiers to our cause.

* Name of a progressive magazine with a national bourgeois tendency.

Due to these correct policies of the Party, the Viet Minh's prestige grew, its influence increased more and more, and the Vietnamese revolutionary movement developed with every passing day. The French-Japanese fascists realized that they could not quench the fire of the Vietnamese revolution by repression and terrorism. So they revived depraved old customs, spread reformist and reactionary ideology, tried to draw the youth into the so-called « Strong to Serve » movement, to keep them from the revolutionary path and at the same time to create favourable conditions for their recruitment as soldiers. The Japanese imperialists used the « Dai Viet » clique as their spokesmen to propagate the « Asian Union » theory and win the masses.

In the legal press there appeared an overflowing romantic, debauched pessimistic and dispirited literature. The Trotskyite Han Thuyen publishing house issued books with a « research » character to slander Marxism, making use of « materialism » and the « theory of class struggle » in an attempt to « defeat theoretically » the national democratic ideology and patriotism advocated by the Viet Minh Front, and at the same time, blemishing the whole history of the war of liberation waged by the Vietnamese people.

In order to oppose this kind of literature, in 1943 the Party put forth the « Viet Nam Cultural Programme », clearly setting out that the new culture of Viet Nam should bear a triple character : national, scientific, mass character, and should be led by the Party. The programme set forth the immediate task : « To struggle against the fascist, feudal, retrograde and enslaving culture, an obscurantist and deceptive culture. To develop the culture of new democracy in Indochina ». Not only did the programme set forth the immediate task, it furthermore mapped out the long-standing line of struggle of the whole Party, aimed at building a new culture for Viet Nam according to the methods of socialist realism.

In the period of World War II there was a host of illegal books and papers from the Party and the Viet Minh Front: **Co Giai Phong** (The Banner of Liberation), central organ of the Party; **Cuu Quoc** (National Salvation), central organ of the Viet Minh Front; **Viet Nam Doc Lap** (Independent Viet Nam), organ of propaganda of the Viet Minh Front in Cao-Bac-Lang zone; **Be Xieng Sat** (Breaking our chains), organ of propaganda of the Party Committee of Trung Ky (Central Viet Nam); **Giai Phong** (Liberation), organ of propaganda of the Viet Minh in Nam Ky (South Viet Nam) etc. Besides, the Party and the Viet Minh Front published books of general propaganda and training books on news and information, policies, guerilla warfare or experience in work. These books and papers played an important part in the political and ideological struggle against the enemy, in the ideological struggle within the Party and the Viet Minh Front, thus bringing the line and policies of the Party and the Front to a successful realization.

In particular, concerning **Party work**, the question then was to consolidate the Party ideologically and organizationally, liquidate separatist and factionalist tendencies, maintain the homogeneity and strength of the Party organization, increase its membership with care and prevent the A. B. clique * from worming themselves into the Party and sabotaging it from inside.

The May, 1941, Session of the Central Committee emphasized: « The training of cadres has now become an urgent task, not to be delayed one hour, even one minute; leading committees of the Party at all levels should pay particular attention to it ». Relatively regular short term training courses were opened to form and train cadres. Experiences were drawn from

* A. B.: anti-bolsheviks, name of an anti-communist organization founded by the French imperialists.

underground work, organization of offices, liaison and communications, to be disseminated among all cadres and Party members.

In 1943, after Comrade Hoang Van Thu had been arrested and executed by the French fascists, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee decided to promote to the Party a number of new members, called «the Hoang Van Thu promotion» drawing a great number of elite elements to the Party, and increasing the leading power of the Vietnamese Revolution.

As a counter-action against the A. B. clique in Bac Bo (North Viet Nam), the Party unmasked the sabotaging activities of one named Cong, who attempted to win a few dissatisfied members of the Party North Committee against the Central Committee, and creating factions within the Party.

The greatest harm was caused by Dinh Van Di's A. B. clique in Central Viet Nam. The Central Committee called the Party members in Central Viet Nam to heighten their vigilance, to fight the A. B. clique, and pointed out: «Under the cloak of the Revolution and communism, the A. B. clique in Central Viet Nam deceives our compatriots, spies on patriots, sabotages revolutionary organizations. Besides, they strive by every means to sow doubt and discord in the ranks of the Revolution.»* To eliminate the A. B. clique was to cut open the ulcers of the Party and disinfect the Party's organism.

Beside the counter-action against the A. B. clique, in this period, our Party had still to wage an inner-Party struggle against partitionism and factionalism. In Bac Bo (North Viet Nam) after the Eight Session of the Central Committee, the Party had to liquidate individualist tendencies and factionalist ideology, which were cropping up among the

* See The Banner of Liberation № 8, August 26, 1943.

Party Committee of Bac Ky (North Viet Nam 1941). In Nam Bo (South Viet Nam) the Party struggled to unify the two groups «Tien Phong» (Vanguard) and «Giai Phong» (Liberation) (1945). Our comrades in Trung Bo (Central Viet Nam) had also to struggle to overcome factionalist ideology originating from opposite points of view in Banmethuot jail.

It is beyond doubt that through these inner-Party struggles, our Party was further steeled and strengthened.

Concerning **the work of the Front**, on the one hand the Party saw to it to broaden the Viet Minh Front, to unite all classes and strata of the people, even to win a number of landlords and neutralize others. On the other hand, the Party attached much importance to the development of the workers' and peasants' organized forces, so as to turn the worker and peasant alliance into the firm basis of the Viet Minh Front. Intensified propaganda work was carried on among the enemy soldiers. Through the realization of **unity of action** against the common enemy of the nation, the Party broadened the Viet Minh Front. Many struggles launched by the workers for raising of wages, reduction of working-hours, against wage cuts, drew even overseers and clerks into action. The peasants' struggle won even rich peasants and a number of small landlords who either took part in or supported it in such struggles as fighting against the requisition of large quantities of paddy; against crop destructions for the cultivation of jute and castor-oil seeds; against the pillage of markets by the Japanese who either robbed goods or bought them at an extra low price, against forced enlistments and conscription of labour. In localities where the mass movement was powerful, there appeared irregular armed forms of struggle such as: fighting predatory Japanese soldiers, suppressing Vietnamese

traitors...etc. Here and there appeared mass struggles or harangues by shock propaganda units supported by armed self-defence groups.

As for the **building of armed forces**, the Party strove to develop self-defence groups for national salvation, while making efforts to maintain the « Viet Nam Army for National Salvation » sections, founded armed propaganda groups and took care of the question of securing arms and preparing material conditions for the insurrection.

At that time, the Soviet Army had victoriously launched the counter-offensive against the German fascists on numerous battlefields. The annihilation of the fascists was only a question of time. On May 7, 1944, the Central Bureau of the Viet Minh Front, relying on the line laid down by the Party Central Committee, issued the directive « Let us prepare for the general insurrection », to give a further impetus to the movement.

On August 10, 1944, The Party Central Committee launched an appeal to « Secure arms and drive out the common enemy ». The mass organization in the Front warmly answered it and pooled their resources to buy arms. At the same time, the Central Bureau of the Viet Minh issued « bonds » to raise the funds necessary for the preparations for the insurrection. A feverish atmosphere of revolution was prevailing and gaining in all the provinces.

Particularly keen were the preparations in Bac Son — Vu Nhài and Cao Bang bases. People from all walks of life took an enthusiastic part in them. On the night of November 13, 1944, the local Party branch led the people of Dinh Ca (Vu Nhài, Thai Nguyen province) to launch the insurrection. This insurrection broke out without the knowledge of the Central Committee. While the French and Japanese were increasingly divided, and the Japanese fascists successively defeated in many battles in the Pacific

Ocean, we should have reserved our forces, waited for a good opportunity and the general order to launch the insurrection in the whole country. But the local Party branch had launched the insurrection locally, on its own initiative, thus revealing its forces and condemning itself to isolation. At the news of this insurrection, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee timely criticized it and decided to switch the insurrection to local guerilla warfare using the forms of ambush and attacks by surprise to check the enemy's foraging and mopping up plans. However, the Dinh Ca insurrection and the subsequent guerilla warfare had an echo in the country, encouraging the « Secure arms drive out the common enemy » movement in the provinces and increasing the confusion in the enemy ranks.

In Winter 1944, like the Vu Nhai people, the people in Cao Bang, Bac Can and Lang Son provinces, whose hatred against the imperialists had reached its climax, were ready to launch the armed insurrection. The order to launch it was about to be sent out when Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, coming back home from China, issued a directive to delay it, for the following reasons :

« 1 — The decision to launch the insurrection was only based on the situation in Cao Bang, Bac Can, Lang Son provinces, and not on the situation in the whole country, therefore denoting a partial, not comprehensive evaluation of the situation.

« 2 — In the conditions prevailing then, the launching of the guerilla warfare on a scale decided by the Inter-provincial Committee was doomed to failure because the imperialists will concentrate all their forces to repress it. More flexible armed forms should be carried out, political activity should be given more

attention than military action, in order to promote the movement and consolidate the political basis first.» *

Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc proposed the founding of the «Viet Nam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation» on December 22, 1944, on the basis of the armed forces in Cao Bang, with a view to launching the armed struggle from the Cao Bang base down to the delta. The «Viet Nam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation» commanded by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, right from the beginning of its activities, successfully seized the two posts of Phay Khat and Na Ngan (December 24 and 25, 1944), opening a new stage of development of the Vietnamese people's armed struggle.

The clear-sighted plan advocated by Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc avoided great damages to Cao Bang and greatly helped to raise and consolidate the movement in the zone of Cao Bang, Bac Can and Lang Son.

1 - The decision to launch the insurrection was only based on the situation in Cao Bang, Bac Can, Lang Son provinces and not on the situation in the whole country, therefore denoting a partial and comprehensive evaluation of the situation.

2 - In the conditions prevailing then, the launching of the guerrilla warfare on a scale decided by the Inter-provincial Committee was doomed to failure because the imperialists will concentrate all their forces to crush it. More flexible armed forces should

* Excerpt from «The Free zone» by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap.

**THE PARTY LAUNCHED THE HIGH TIDE
OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT FOR
NATIONAL SALVATION, PREPARED THE
GENERAL INSURRECTION AND BROUGHT
IT TO SUCCESS**

Exactly as our Party had forecast the death-conflict between the Japanese fascist and French colonialists broke out *. On March 9, 1945, by a coup d'état the Japanese ousted the French colonialists, and became the exclusive masters of Indochina. Within less than forty-eight hours, the French Army throughout Indochina either surrendered to the Japanese or fled to China or Thailand. The more arrogant and cruel the French colonialists had been formerly towards the Vietnamese people, the more cowardly and mean they were now in face of the Japanese bandits.

On the contrary, the Vietnamese people, under our Party's leadership, waged a heroic struggle against the Japanese. Right in the heart of the French-Japanese conflict, Vietnamese Communists and the Vietnamese people had carried out bold activities worthy of admiration. Our guerillas seized the posts of Cho Chu, Cho Don, Son Duong, Dai Tu and others, very quickly. A number of « Youth for National Salva-

* See « The Boil Shall Burs' Open » — The Banner of Liberation — No. 7.

tion» and «Peasants for National Salvation» captured the Ban Yen Nhan (Hung Yen province) post without having to fire a single bullet. The political prisoners in Nghia Lo Camp revolted, broke open the doors of their jails and dispersed in various localities to resume their revolutionary activities. Political prisoners in Son La and many other jails, availing themselves of the French-Japanese antagonism, succeeded in liberating themselves peacefully. The political prisoners of Ba To (Quang Ngai province) in joint action with enemy's soldiers rose up, capturing the whole of the enemy's arms and organized themselves into the Ba To guerilla unit, the embryo of the People's Army in the Fifth Interzone.

A few days before the Japanese **coup d'etat**, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee which was then seated in Hanoi suburbs, was informed by our Intelligence Service that the Japanese Army had received orders to get ready for an imminent battle, and that Decoux, Governor General of Indochina had just been summoned by the Japanese to Saigon and forced to surrender.

On the night of March 9, 1945, an enlarged session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee* was held in Dinh Bang village (Tu Son, Bac Ninh province) to evaluate the situation and put forth the urgent and immediate tasks.

The Session clearly analyzed the causes of the **coup d'etat**, foresaw the defeat of the French Army, the temporary victory of the Japanese Army and clearly stated the impossibility of the Japanese fascists consolidating their power and that of the pro-Japanese puppets in Indochina. On the contrary, the

* The Central Committee could not hold a full session because a number of its members, on duty in Cao Bang province or in China, could not come back home.

coup d'etat had created an acute political crisis, which speeded up the ripening of the conditions for an armed insurrection.

The developing favourable conditions for insurrection were :

a) the political crisis being acute, the enemy's hands were tied, preventing them from dealing with the revolution ;

b) the terrible famine then prevailing, hatred of the masses for the aggressors was at its climax ;

c) the war was entering its decisive stage, which decided the fate of the Japanese fascists.

The Session estimated that it was a **pre-insurrectionary period and that the direct task of our Party at that time was to lead the whole people to move to the general insurrection.**

The Session evaluated further : the ranks of the enemy and the allies of the Revolution had undergone changes : the Japanese fascist imperialists were « the main, and sole immediate enemy » of the Indo-chinese people ; the French imperialists who had been overthrown by the Japanese, and had lost their ruling power in Indochina, were no longer the immediate enemy of the Indo-chinese people, although, the latter still « had to be on their guard against the manoeuvres of the De Gaullist group who are trying to restore French rule in Indochina »*. The French who were conducting a Resistance to the Japanese were for the moment objectively allies of the Indo-chinese people.

Therefore the Session decided to replace the slogan « Drive out the Japanese and French fascists » with « Drive out the Japanese fascists » and upheld the

* Quotations in this paragraph are excerpts from the Directive of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee : Our Tactics in Relation to the Franco — Japanese Conflict. March 12, 1945.

slogan « Establish the revolutionary power of the Indochinese people » in the struggle against the Japanese power and the puppet government of the pro-Japanese traitors.

The Session also decided to change to forms of agitation, propaganda, organization and struggle which were best suited to the pre-insurrectionary period, especially leading the people to take arms and storm the imperialists' paddy stocks in order to relieve famine. It called for the masses to get on to the streets, to hold demonstrations tending towards general insurrection; where conditions were favourable, to develop guerilla warfare and take power locally. The Session decided to « launch a powerful high tide of anti-Japanese movement for National Salvation, as a prerequisite of the general insurrection, » and, « to be ready to switch over to general insurrection when the right conditions existed (e. g. after the Japanese capitulation or when the Allied troops had established a firm position and were advancing firmly on our territory) ».

These clear-sighted and important decisions were clearly pointed out in instructions of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, entitled. « Our tactics in relation to the French-Japanese conflict ». These instructions were a compass guiding all activities of our Party and of the Viet Minh Front in the period from March to August 1945. It could be said that the Enlarged Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, held from March 9 to 12, 1945, and the instructions of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee issued on March 12, 1945, had a decisive influence on the victory of the August Revolution.

Basing itself on the March instructions of the Party Central Committee, on April 16, 1945, the General Committee of the Viet Minh also issued instructions on the organization of Liberation Com-

mittees « pre-governmental » forms at all levels: enterprises, communes, districts, provinces, towns, zones, Xus. On a national level the All-Viet Nam Liberation Committee, that is the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Viet Nam was to be set up. According to the directive of the General Committee of the Viet Minh, the Liberation Committees would function only in the pre-insurrectionary period. When the insurrection broke out, the Liberation Committees would be dissolved, and Revolutionary Workers' Committees set up in enterprises, and Revolutionary People's Committees in all localities. The instructions dated April 16, 1945, of the General Committee of the Viet Minh had effectively built the revolutionary power and prepared the people to seize power after the victory of the insurrection. These instructions reached the various localities. Liberation Committees sprang up, with the enthusiastic support of the masses. At that moment, in regions where Liberation Committees could be set up, two forms of administration prevailed side by side, the Liberation Committee and the local puppet administration.

From April 15 to 20, 1945, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee convened the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Conference, decided to define the limits of the resistance zones,* and to unify the armed forces — the Viet Nam Army for National Salvation, the Viet Nam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation and other armed organizations — into the Viet Nam Liberation Army.

* They were :

The Le Loi Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)

The Hoang Hoa Tham Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)

The Quang Trung Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)

The Tran Hung Dao Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)

The Phan Dinh Phung Resistance zone (Central Viet Nam)

The Trung Trac Resistance zone (Central Viet Nam)

The Nguyen Tri Phuong Resistance zone (South Viet Nam)

It decided to develop the armed self-defence and fighting self-defence units, to intensify guerilla warfare, and open a Political and Military College for Anti-Japanese struggle to train cadres for the general insurrection. The Session elected the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Committee which comprised Comrades Vo Nguyen Giap, Chu Van Tan, Van Tien Dung and others. The resolution of this Session entitled « Ahead towards the General Insurrection » was approved by the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee.

From the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Conference onwards, military action grew increasingly. Propaganda by armed units and suppression of puppet officials and traitors, paved the way for the setting up of revolutionary power from the commune to provincial level in some regions. On June 4, 1945, the Free Zone, comprising six provinces: Cao Bang, Bac Can, Lang Son, Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang and Ha Giang was founded officially, with People's Committees at all levels, where the Viet Minh policies began to be implemented. The Free Zone became the main revolutionary base for the whole country. At the same time it was an image of the **newborn Viet Nam**.

The activities of the Viet Nam Liberation Army and fighting self-defence units were growing increasingly. The ambushes laid at Cho Chu, Deo Khe and the attack of Tam Dao post had a resounding echo throughout the whole country. On June 8, 1945, under the leadership of the local Party branch, the people of Dong Trieu rose up and disarmed the enemy troops at Dong Trieu, Chi Linh, Mao Khe, Trang Bach. They suppressed the puppet administration, founded the Revolutionary People's Committee, set up the Dong Trieu Resistance zone and the Anti-Japanese guerilla unit.

In Central Viet Nam, the Ba To guerilla unit was carrying on and developing its activities.

In South Viet Nam the movement was developing at My Tho and in the region of the Bassac (Western arm of the Mekong).

At this time, the Party paid particular attention to the press and other forms of propaganda to combat the Japanese influence, defeat all thinking aimed at cooperating with or making use of the Japanese and to dispel the fear of them among the people.

The Party energetically laid bare the deceitful schemes of the Japanese and the pro-Japanese clique: the Phuc Viet (Recovered Nation), Dai Viet (Great Viet), Nationalist and Trotskyist parties. These gangs of toad-eaters upheld the slogan of a false independence and deceived the people with the Japanese « Great Asia » programme: « Joint diplomacy, military alliance, economic co-operation, cultural exchange, political independence ». The Party pointed out clearly to the people: ...« to believe the Japanese is to commit suicide. To follow the pro-Japanese traitors is to snap at the Japanese venom. As regards the Japanese bandits there is only one way: the whole people united as one, arms in hands, to fight them ».*

The Party criticized the erroneous thinking of a number of intellectual cadres who advocated a reshuffling of the Tran Trong Kim government, hoping « to win independence » by means of peaceful negotiations with the Japanese, or through the pro-Japanese puppet government, to promulgate the « Constitution of the Constitutional monarchy ». The Party held this tendency a dangerous one, because it embellished the Japanese fascists with a false veneer, misled our people, created illusions about the Japanese and gave our people vague conceptions of the Japanese and the clique of pro-Japanese puppets.

* Excerpt from the article « The Japanese Policy Towards our People » in Communist Review № 3.

Further the Party Central Committee criticized the « rightist » tendencies of the comrades of the paper **Tien Phong** (Vanguard) — region of the western arm of the Mekong, Nam Bo — who had by themselves withdrawn the slogan « Against the French fascists » prior to the March 9, 1945, **coup d'etat** (and after that day, planned to rely on and make use of the Japanese to « seize power »). At the same time, the Central Committee criticized the « leftist » thinking of the comrades of the paper **Giai Phong** (Liberation) — region of the eastern arm of the Mekong, Nam Bo — who still put forward the slogan « Drive out the Japanese and French fascists » after the success of the Japanese **coup d'etat** when, in fact, the French no longer had power in Indochina. Both papers had wrong viewpoints but they attacked each other in very hot terms. The Central Committee pointed out the errors of both parties and called on the comrades in Nam Bo to follow the watchword of the Central Committee and put an end to factionalism and partitionist tendencies and unite in order to correctly implement the Party line and policies.

All these above-mentioned propaganda and ideological struggles were aimed at uniting the whole Party and people, concentrating all forces on one immediate goal : **general insurrection to seize power.**

While preparations for the general insurrection were being made, North Viet Nam and the North of Central Viet Nam suffered a terrible famine threatening millions of lives. This was a consequence of the exploiting and war-provoking policies of the Japanese and French fascists. The Party put forth the slogan of struggle « storm the rice-stocks, relieve the famine. » The Party considered it the central slogan to mobilize the masses, bring millions of people on the streets to hold demonstrations and train them for the coming general insurrection. It called for bold development of the organizations for National Salva-

tion of the Viet Minh Front, to develop « the political guard of the masses » and prepare the decisive assault — the general insurrection to seize power. This slogan entirely conformed to the vital and immediate interests of the masses who supported and heartily took part in it. Attacks on rice stocks broke out continually and spread to numerous communes in North and Central Viet Nam. In daily struggles, the Party did not neglect to link economic slogans with political ones, including slogans for the overthrowing of the Japanese fascists and the wresting back of power for the people.

Those struggles were interrelated with repression of traitors, puppet notables, and ruffians, warnings to mandarins and puppet officials of villages and cantons, opposition to requisition of rice and refusal to pay taxes to the Japanese, public speeches by shock teams and armed propaganda units in markets, landing-places, enterprises, schools, theatres. Leaflets, placards, gold-starred red flags appeared everywhere, right in some Japanese barracks and offices of the puppet administration. The Viet Minh reputation echoed throughout the cities and countryside, the delta and the mountainous areas. The movement included not only workers, peasants, small traders, students and public servants, but even national bourgeois and a number of small landowners. Organizations for national salvation, particularly the self-defence units, developed at an unprecedented speed. In many localities, the enemy administrative machinery was paralyzed. The primary Liberation Committees came forward to organize the maintenance of security and order, the building of revolutionary order and safeguarding of the people's lives and property. In many places, the people, slighting the puppet power and ignoring them, went to the Liberation Committees and asked them to settle their disputes and disagreements in their every day life.

The fever of the insurrection was boiling throughout the whole country.

The great World War was entering the last stage. The German and Italian fascists had surrendered. The Japanese fascists were also nearing their end. In July, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union decided to participate in the war on the Eastern Front.

In Summer 1945, Comrade Ho Chi Minh* arrived at Tan Trao (Son Duong, Tuyen Quang province) the headquarters of the Revolution in the Free zone. The Central Committee, headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, decided to convene the National Congress of the Party and the People's Congress.

The National Congress of the Party opened on August 13, 1945, at Tan Trao, comprising representatives from all Party branches and a number of representatives in activity abroad, decided to **launch the general insurrection** and put forth three principles: **centralization, unification and timeliness**, to guide the insurrection.

The Congress stressed that « forces must be concentrated upon the essential tasks », « unity of action must be realized in the military and political fields » and that we must « demoralize the enemy and induce them to surrender before fighting them. »

Besides the main question which was that of the general insurrection, the National Congress of the Party took many important decisions on domestic and foreign policies to apply when power was in our hands.

As regard **domestic policy**, the Congress emphasized that great attention should be paid to propaganda and education and to the organization of the masses into the organizations in the Viet Minh

* From now on Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc is called Comrade Ho Chi Minh.

Front. Attention should be given to agricultural production, first of all to food production. The Congress defined the national flag and national anthem of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam ; endorsed the great ten-point Viet Minh policy as the fundamental and immediate policy of the whole Party, and entire people.

As regards **foreign policy**, the Congress pointed out the policy of making full use of the contradictions between Britain, France, the U. S. A., and Chiang Kai-shek, to by all means avoid being alone in face of many enemies at the same time ; to strive to win the approval and support of the Soviet Union and the world people, especially the French and Chinese peoples ; to shatter the French imperialists' schemes of coming back to our country and Chiang Kai-shek's plots of turning our country into a vassal.

The resolutions of the Congress guided the whole Party in the leadership of the Vietnamese people to rise and win back power. At the same time they pointed out to the whole Party and people the guiding principles and policies to be implemented after the victory of the insurrection.

Immediately after the winding up of the National Congress, on August 16, 1945, the People's Congress met at Tan Trao. Present at the Congress were 60 representatives from political parties, people's organizations, various nationalities and religions, including representatives from the North, Centre and South and a number of Vietnamese residents coming from abroad. For the first time, the representatives of the Viet Minh Front in the whole country and representatives from various nationalities in Viet Nam saw Comrade Ho Chi Minh, their respected and beloved leader.

The People's Congress wholeheartedly approved of the policy of general insurrection advocated by the Indochinese Communist Party and the General Committee of the Viet Minh. Representing the Party at

the Congress, Comrade Truong Chinh made it clear that : **We must wrest power from the hands of the Japanese and their stooges before the arrival of the Allies in Indochina, and, as masters of the country, we shall receive the Allies who come to disarm the Japanese.**

The Congress adopted the ten-point Viet Minh policy and elected the Viet Nam National Liberation Committee, which was tantamount to the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh.

The news of the Japanese capitulation spread throughout the whole country. The order of general insurrection was given everywhere, exalting the masses and the people.

The whole people rose up like one man. The indomitable spirit of the nation surged up stronger than ever before.

The Liberation Army starting from Tan Trao marched on Thai Nguyen town which was then still in the Japanese hands. In the whole country, the armed organizations, self-defence units, national salvation organizations, the entire people rose up to carry out the general insurrection and seize power.

Because of difficult means of liaison, many localities had not received the Central Committee order of general insurrection, but, basing themselves on the Central Committee's instructions « Our tactics in relation to the Franco-Japanese conflict », they led the people to rise up and seize power. The people in Ha Tinh province rose on August 12, 1945, the people in Quang Ngai, on August 13, 1945. On the 14th and 15th, many Japanese posts standing in the proximity of the Free zone were seized by our forces.

But it was in the three big cities : Hanoi, Hue and Saigon, that the August general insurrection won victories of a main and decisive meaning.

In Hanoi, while our Party was actively preparing for the insurrection, the reactionaries set up the « National Salvation Committee » with a view to beguiling the masses and opposing the Revolution. On August 17, 1945, the General Association of Functionaries held a meeting in favour of the Tran Trong Kim puppet Government. Answering the Front's call, the people of Hanoi protested energetically and turned this meeting in favour of the Viet Minh Front. The revolutionary effervescence was prevailing. Many enterprises, offices and shops closed down, the general political strike broke out.

On August 19, 1945, more than one hundred thousand inhabitants of Hanoi, under the leadership of the Party, displayed their forces in a huge demonstration which quickly turned into an insurrection for the peaceful conquest of power in the capital city.

The victory of the insurrection in Hanoi gave a strong impetus to the movement in other towns and the countryside. This victory greatly influenced the victory of the August Revolution as a whole.

Following the insurrection in Hanoi was the successful insurrection in Hue (August 23, 1945). On August 25, 1945, the Delegation of the Central Government headed by Comrade Tran Huy Lieu went to Hue to receive Bao Dai's abdication.

In Nam Bo, on August 25, 1945, more than one million people, under our Party's leadership, held a huge demonstration and won power in Saigon.

Within ten days, the August General Insurrection was successful in the whole country. From the Central down to the village levels, the people's revolutionary power was established. On August 27, 1945, the Viet Nam Provisional Government was re-shuffled, and included non-Viet Minh and non-Party personalities.

On September 2, 1945, 500,000 people of Hanoi and from other provinces gathered in Ba Dinh Square,

Hanoi, to hold a meeting to acclaim the first Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

On behalf of the Provisional Government President Ho Chi Minh read the **Declaration of Independence**, declared that the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was born, inaugurating a new glorious page of the history of the Vietnamese nation.

The **Declaration of Independence** affirmed the role of the masses as the creators of history, and the authors of the Revolution. The August Revolution was the work of the people under the leadership of the Party.

September 2, 1945, will for ever remain one of the most glorious days of the Vietnamese people.

Combining their action with the Vietnamese revolutionaries, the Laotian people, under the leadership of Laotian democrats and patriots, headed by Prince Souphanouvong, rose to seize power. Simultaneously, the Cambodian people rose up too, to wage the revolutionary struggle.

The Vietnamese Revolution influenced the revolution in our two neighbouring countries and had a resounding echo on Southeast-Asian people and French colonies in Africa.

The victory of the August Revolution put an end to more than eighty years of imperialist and thousands of years of feudal oppression, and brought the Vietnamese people from the condition of slaves to that of masters of the country. « It is the first time in the revolutionary history of colonial and semi-colonial people, that a party of only fifteen years of age has led the revolution to success and won power in the whole country ».*

This great victory was due first to the united forces in the struggle of our entire people, to the heroic

* Excerpt from President Ho Chi Minh's political report at the Second Congress of the Party, in February 1961.

sacrificing spirit of all cadres, Party members and members of National Salvation associations, and particularly because our Party had successfully applied Marxism-Leninism to the Vietnamese conditions.

On the other hand, the success of the August Revolution was due partly to the victory gained by the heroic Soviet Army over the aggressive fascists, including the Japanese fascists, which created extremely favourable conditions for our people to rise up and seize power.

From the August Revolution we have drawn the following experiences :

I. CAREFUL PREPARATION :

« The success of the Revolution does not come by itself, it must be prepared and won*. The August Revolution took place within the span of only fifteen days but it had been prepared through fifteen years from the first days of our Party. The struggles launched by the people from the birth of our Party until 1945 were so many drills on a great or small scale to prepare the August Revolution. From the May, 1941, Session of the Central Committee to the August, 1945, National Congress of the Party, many instructions and resolutions of the Party had directed the work of the Party and the Viet Minh front towards the preparations for general insurrection and seizure of power.

On the ideological field, the Party combatted and smashed all pessimistic and defeatist ideas, the tendency to surrender to the French-Japanese fascists, to collaborate with and make use of them, and other erroneous thinkings ; united the whole Party and

* Stalin : The Principles of Leninism.

entire people to reach the aim of the struggle, the general insurrection for the seizure of power.

On the organizational field, the Party strove to train cadres, build up the bases of the Resistance, organize the armed and semi-armed forces, seize local power, and found the Free zone. At the same time, the Party united all people's strata into the Viet Minh Front and organized «the political army of the masses», ready to struggle under the leadership of the Party.

Thanks to the long and careful preparations of the Party, our people throughout the country availed themselves of the opportunity which was given to them by the capitulation of the Japanese fascists to the Soviet Union and the Allies, to rise up as one man, seize power, and found the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

2. SEIZE THE RIGHT OPPORTUNITY

In an insurrection «if we seize the right opportunity, our victory will be ensured».*

Our Party decided to launch the general insurrection at a time when the objective and subjective conditions were most favourable. In the world, the democratic forces led by the Soviet Union had crushed the German, Italian and Japanese fascists. In Viet Nam, the enemies of the Revolution, the French imperialists, had been ousted and sent sprawling by the Japanese fascists who were also defeated and reduced to a state of extreme confusion. The Japanese troops in Indochina were completely demoralized, the imperialists' stooges had lost their support, and the broad masses of people were feverishly struggling for their right to live. The middle strata were tending towards the Revolution and the vanguard-our Party-

* Lenin : *Left Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder.*

was resolved to sacrifice to the last in leading the masses to smash all chains of slavery and secure independence and freedom. Though the opportunity was most favourable it only lasted a short time. If we had launched the general insurrection immediately after the March 9, 1945, **coup de force** or before the Japanese surrender to the Soviet Union and the Allies, we would have suffered great losses and would not have been able to seize power in the whole country. On the contrary, if we had not launched the insurrection after the Japanese capitulation to the Soviet Union and the Allies, before the British and U. S. A. Armies (or the army of Chiang Kai-shek) had entered our country and the Tran Trong Kim puppet government had got in touch with them, or before the French colonialists came back and restored the old power, the favourable opportunity would no longer have existed. To seize the right opportunity to launch the struggle was an important successful experience of the August Revolution.

3. LAUNCHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY HIGH TIDE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE :

« To win success, the armed insurrection must rely on the people's revolutionary high tide. »* This is a Marxist-Leninist principle.

The August Revolution had drawn the great majority of the people to rise up. Our whole people from North to South, from the countryside to the town, belonging to all classes, nationalities and religions were closing their ranks under the banner of the Party. In this high tidal wave, the workers and peasants were the greatest force with a decisive influence on the victory of the insurrection. Scores of thousands of workers, poor people and students

* Lenin : **Marxism and the Question of Armed Insurrection.**

in towns, millions of peasants in the countryside, under the Party leadership, held demonstrations followed by displays of force in the streets, and by direct action took power into their hands. The high tide of the anti-Japanese struggle for National Salvation was indeed an unprecedented revolutionary high tide of the whole people in our national history.

It was precisely thanks to this revolutionary surging tide that the August Revolution had rapidly gained victory, though Party cadres and members were few and the armed forces of the people were small...

4. SKILFUL COMBINATION OF FORMS OF ARMED STRUGGLE WITH FORMS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

The August Revolution was a creative combination of forms of armed struggle with forms of political struggle.

Since the Bac Son insurrection (September 1940), the Party's policy was to maintain armed forces, build bases and by means of armed struggles, to promote the political struggle in the whole country.

After the March 9, 1945, Japanese **coup de force**, the general form of struggle was armed demonstrations, and the particular form of struggle then was guerilla warfare where the conditions were favourable with the use of «units of honour» to repress traitors in towns and countryside.

After the Japanese surrender to the Soviet Union and the Allies, the National Congress of the Party held at Tan Trao decided to «combine military and political actions» in order to launch the general insurrection.

During the feverish days of the August Revolution, the widespread and main forms of struggle were general political demonstrations by the masses closely combined with local armed struggles, and armed demonstrations with displays of force turning into local armed insurrections. All these forms of struggle paved the way for the general insurrection for the seizure of power in the whole country.

5. MAKING FULL USE OF THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S RANKS AND SPEARHEADING OUR FORCES AT THE MAIN ENEMY

From the November, 1939, Session of the Central Committee to the May, 1941, Session, our Party conceived of the foundation of a broad National United Front in order to aim the spearhead of our forces at the enemy of the nation, the Japanese-French fascist imperialists.

After the February, 1943, Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, the Party recognized the necessity to broaden the Front further, to unite with national bourgeoisie and intellectuals; to carry on propaganda among the enemy soldiers and functionaries, win over anti-fascist foreign residents, and differentiate between the ranks of the French in Indochina and thoroughly isolate the Japanese-French fascists.

After the Japanese **coup de force** (March 9, 1945), the Party replaced the slogan «Drive out the Japanese and French» by the slogan «Drive out the Japanese fascists», concentrating the fire of revolutionary struggle on the Japanese fascists and pro-Japanese traitors.

The August Revolution broke out. While the Japanese fascists who had surrendered to the Soviet

Union and the Allies were demoralized and practically did not fight us any more, our Party advocated the neutralization of the Japanese in order to concentrate our forces to disintegrate the pro-Japanese puppet administrative machinery. Even the puppets were in a confused vacillating situation, therefore our Party worked to win over as many forces as possible, neutralize others, thus isolating the most stubborn reactionary elements to overthrow them. Thus, our Party availed itself of the least contradictions among the enemy ranks, to paralyse the opposition of counter-revolutionary forces and dissolve the ranks of the pro-Japanese clique.

To make full use of the contradictions among the enemy ranks and take good aim at the main enemy was a feature and also a good point of the August Revolution.

The lessons and experiences of the August Revolution have a practical influence on our people's struggle to achieve the task of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country. At the same time, they make a contribution to the enrichment of the treasure of revolutionary theory in a colonial and semi-feudal country, in an epoch when imperialism is in decay and socialism is victorious.