

A. A. Grechko

MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION

***THE ARMED
FORCES
OF
THE SOVIET
UNION***

The Soviet Armed Forces, the army of emancipated workers and peasants, the shield protecting their revolutionary gains, were created simultaneously with the formation of the world's first socialist state. Since their inception, the Soviet Armed Forces have fulfilled their mission with honour and dignity.

Marshal Grechko (1903 – 1976), a prominent figure of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces, was born in Rostov region into a peasant's family. He joined the Communist Party in 1928. He fought in the Civil War and later graduated from the Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Academy. During the Great Patriotic War against nazi Germany Andrei Grechko successively commanded a division, a corps and an army eventually being promoted to second-in-command of a front. The troops under Grechko took an active part in the defeat of nazi forces in the North Caucasus, in the Western Ukraine and in the Carpathians. They also liberated parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

After the end of the last war Andrei Grechko was at different times commander of the Kiev Military District, Supreme Commander of the Soviet Forces stationed in Germany, Supreme Commander of the Soviet Land Forces, Deputy Defence Minister and Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact Forces. From April 1967 to April 1976 Marshal Grechko was the Soviet Union's Minister of Defence. In recognition of his services to the country in time of war and peace Marshal Grechko had the title of Hero of the Soviet Union conferred upon him twice. He was also decorated with many Soviet and foreign orders and medals. His writings include works on military theory and books of memoirs, namely *The Battle of the Caucasus* and *Across the Carpathians*.



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А. А. ГРЕЧКО

**ВООРУЖЕННЫЕ СИЛЫ
СОВЕТСКОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА**

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PREFACE

The history of the Soviet Armed Forces, although relatively brief, is packed with momentous events. The combat record of the Soviet Armed Forces is festooned with epic victories which have conferred immortal glory upon their colours. The Soviet Armed Forces have earned the affection and gratitude of the Soviet people and all progressives throughout the world by their humane devoted service and loyalty to the socialist Motherland and the lofty ideals of communism. The Soviet Army and Navy have confounded repeated attempts by world imperialism to try the strength of the Soviet state by force of arms, and having scored an historic victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, they are continuing their fine traditions and adding to them daily in their intensive combat training and exercises and as they stand vigilant guard over peace and the building of communism in this country.

The Soviet Armed Forces' long record of brilliant victories and successes is no accident. It is the logical consequence of the entire course of social development and is organically linked with the historic achievements and exploits of the Soviet people who have blazed the trail towards the new world of socialism and communism, the goal which eventually all mankind is bound to attain.

Today there are many armies with centuries-old histories celebrating military victories. But these victories were but temporary upsurges like sparks which eventually died away. In the decades and centuries following the periods of upsurge, these armies' military records degenerated and were unmarked by anything worthy of note, and some of these armies finally suffered ignominious defeats. Further, it has mostly been those armies waging just wars that have achieved victories. There are, of course, examples of a different kind: it sometimes happened that armies waging reactionary, unjust wars, also displayed valour and gallantry which enabled them to win major victories. In these wars, however, the soldiers did not brave mortal danger because they followed their own hearts, but rather because they were tempted by the prospect of good pay or were victims of fraud and misinformation, or they were forced into battle under

threat. The victories they won were not the result of conscious mass heroism for just ends, nor did they further the interests of social progress. Far from advancing the cause of progress, they helped the exploiting classes implement their aggressive schemes. Sooner or later, through the prism of time, the truth about these wars came to light and when it did the exploits and feats of the so-called "invincible" armies faded even though they did leave an imprint on world history and contributed to the development of military science and the art of war.

There are also armies with many victories to their credit who incurred eternal disgrace in the eyes of the world. This has been true of armies from the distant past—the armies of slave-owning and feudal states, and of some contemporary imperialist armies. The Nazi Wehrmacht holds pride of place among these. It was a tool of war in the hands of the most reactionary forces of imperialism and was used to oppress, plunder and kill. Hitler's hordes in their marauding campaigns across Europe left ghastly examples of barbarous treatment of unarmed civilians, mass shootings of innocent old folk, women and children, vandalic plunder and the destruction of unique historical monuments and cultural shrines, and devastated towns and villages in their wake. In more recent times the US armed forces, during the Vietnam war, used methods and tactics that were no less cruel and barbarous. The Israeli aggressors and the troops of other capitalist countries have also committed many brutal acts.

But there has never been an army in any exploiting society whose sole purpose has been to struggle for a just cause, whose record has been succession of victories and whose actions have brought about progressive changes in all areas of military development, strategy and methods of warfare, operational art and battlefield tactics.

Only a socialist social system is capable of creating a fundamentally new type of army, whose purpose is just and lofty—the steadfast defence of the working people's revolutionary gains. An awareness of this purpose has been the motivation for socialist armies to display mass heroism and it is this purpose that has enabled them to be victorious. The Soviet Armed Forces are just such an army. Their history is full of heroic exploits for the sake of the socialist Motherland. Today too the Soviet Army and Navy stand vigilant guard over the borders of the Soviet Union and over the peaceful labour of the Soviet people who are building communism. As L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, put it in his address to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "The Soviet people may rest assured that our glorious Armed Forces are prepared to repel an enemy attack at any time of the day or night from any quarter. Any possible aggressor is fully aware that in the event of attempting a nuclear-missile attack on our country he will be dealt a devastating counterblow."¹

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 98.*

Many books have been written about the Soviet Army. Its historic victories are well known to the whole world. Nevertheless, even today there are people in the West who often speak of the Soviet Army as of an enigma yet to be unravelled. They are unable to see where the roots of Soviet Army's fighting power lie, and thus make erroneous assumptions and draw wrong conclusions. There are military ideologues in the imperialist countries who deliberately spread lies about the Soviet Army and Navy in an attempt to belittle their historic mission and victories, to play down their services to mankind and to distort their present-day role. But no one and nothing can ever obscure the truth about the Soviet Armed Forces, or shake people's faith in their great mission of liberation. No amount of slander will ever succeed in throwing the historic victories of the Soviet Armed Forces into doubt. The glory with which they have covered themselves will live forever.

This glory is eternal because the Soviet Armed Forces are an army of a new type, the army of a people who is creating a new history, the history of mankind's socialist era. The entire Soviet people share the Soviet Armed Forces' glory. The glory of the Soviet people's and their Armed Forces' exploits will never fade with time.

The glory of the Soviet Armed Forces' heroic victories will live forever because their leader, the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that guiding and organising force of the Soviet socialist state and of the Soviet people, will live forever. The CPSU mustered, trained and educated the new, people's army and inspired it along with the entire Soviet people to unprecedented feats so as to achieve freedom, peace and socialism. It was the Communist Party that in the grim years of the last war led the Soviet people and their Armed Forces into battle and together with them performed heroic deeds, routing the nazi hordes which had invaded the sacred Soviet soil. The best sons and daughters of the Communist Party were always in the front ranks of the fighters, where the battle, at the front line and on the labour front, was thickest. They provided the examples of valour and courage, firmness and self-denial; they were the ones who displayed utter devotion to their people and to the lofty ideals of communism. Today the Communist Party, wiser because of the wealth of historical experience, is leading the Soviet socialist state, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, guiding the building of communism and constantly concerning itself with enhancing the country's defensive might.

The glory of the Soviet Armed Forces will never fade with time because they have always fought for a just cause. By defending the Soviet Union from all enemies they honourably discharged their internationalist duty which was to defend the socialist Motherland, the hope of the world's working people, and to bring freedom and independence to other peoples. The Soviet Armed Forces have continually stood guard over peace and socialism, and over the building of communism.

The heroic exploits and feats performed by the Soviet Armed Forces are not merely a part of history: they are the living reality of the present-day activities of the Soviet Army and Navy and of the activities of the armies of other socialist countries. The invaluable experience the Soviet Armed Forces gained in battle is like a beacon, which, in these days of peace, spotlights the armies of fraternal socialist countries onto the right road leading to the summits of successful combat training and service and onto the road leading to victory on the battlefield.

Finally, the glory of the Soviet Armed Forces will live forever because, apart from safeguarding the Soviet people's peaceful labour they are reliably acting as guarantor for world security.

The Communist Party, with a sense of undeflectable purpose, has consistently implemented the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The men of the Soviet Army and Navy together with the entire Soviet people whole-heartedly support the principled class-motivated foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, a policy aimed at promoting detente and cementing the unity of the socialist countries and at extending all-round assistance to peoples fighting for their social and national liberation. It is a policy of promoting co-operation among the nations of the world for lasting world peace and security.

At the same time one should remember that despite the ongoing process of detente, brought about by the peace-oriented policy followed by the USSR and other socialist countries, the reactionary quarters in the imperialist countries have not yet given up their aggressive designs. They are trying to obstruct the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems and are trying to isolate the socialist countries from the rest of the world with a cordon of lies and slander, by distorting the truth about the new society. They stoop to any means to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria and push the peoples of the world back to the era of the cold war and the arms race. All this shows how wise was the reminder given by the Communist Party to the effect that the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed and as long as it exists, the danger of a new world war is still with us. There is no real guarantee against a new world war breaking out other than further strengthening the economic and defence potential of the USSR and of all the other socialist countries, and building up the might of the Soviet Union's and fraternal socialist countries' armed forces. Mankind will always be grateful for the noble mission of the socialist community of nations and its armies.

The present work is not a comprehensive history of the Soviet Armed Forces that has already been sufficiently covered in other Soviet literature. Rather, the historical background is used by the author as a basis for presenting the essence of the book, namely the sources of the inexhaustible fighting power of the Soviet Army and Navy, to reveal the secret behind their victories and the mechanism of the laws governing the invincible nature of today's Soviet Army and

Navy should the reactionary imperialist quarters force a war upon this country in future.

The basic factors behind the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces include the country's socialist social system, its economic potential, politics, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the ideological and political unity of Soviet society, Soviet patriotism and the friendship character of the Soviet peoples, as well as the popular and internationalist character of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Communist Party's guidance in all areas of military development.

The Communist Party makes full use of the opportunities inherent in a socialist system so as to ensure that the Soviet Army and Navy are supplied with everything necessary in the way of weapons and equipment, to promote the further progress of Soviet military science and the art of war, to improve personnel training in the Army and Navy and to inculcate high moral and combat qualities in the officers and men, giving them unshakable faith in the final triumph of communism.

The author has endeavoured to show the noble character of the Soviet Armed Forces, their high level of combat preparedness, boundless devotion to the people, the Communist Party and the lofty ideals of communism, and their readiness at any moment to staunchly rebuff any enemy, should he dare encroach upon the territorial integrity and inviolability of the sacred borders of the Soviet Motherland, or upon its national interests. It has also been the author's aim to help the reader gain a better insight into the purpose of the Soviet Army and Navy in order to be more acutely aware of the close bonds linking him with the country's armed forces, to feel still greater respect for the none-too-easy combat work performed daily by the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy and for their responsibility for the defence of the socialist Motherland and the entire socialist community.

It is the author's hope that the present book will also help our friends abroad gain an insight into the sources of the Soviet Armed Forces' high moral and combat qualities and gain a better understanding of what lies at the source of their military might and their invincibility in their battles against the imperialist aggressors.

Chapter

THE ARMY BORN OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

The Soviet Armed Forces, the army of emancipated workers and peasants, the shield protecting their revolutionary gains, were created simultaneously with the formation of the world's first socialist state. Since their inception, the Soviet Armed Forces have fulfilled their mission with honour and dignity.

In less than 30 years—from their inception to 1945—the Soviet Armed Forces spent 10 years in battles and campaigns. They were only able to withstand the pressure and score historic victories because they were the flesh and blood of the people, because they earned their affection and whole-hearted support. The officers and men of the Soviet Army and Navy have excellent ideological and political training, based on advanced Marxist-Leninist theory. They are boundlessly devoted to the people and the socialist Motherland and are guided by the great Communist Party—that well-tried and tested combat vanguard of the country's working class and other working people, well steeled in the inferno of class battles. Throughout their history the Soviet Army and Navy have waged just wars in the interests of the working people, defending their socialist gains and safeguarding socialism, that most just and profoundly humane social system.

The birth and subsequent development of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic combat record are inextricably linked with the titanic work of the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin, its founder and leader. Lenin worked out and scientifically substantiated the military programme of the proletarian revolution. He developed a doctrine on the protection of the socialist Motherland and worked out the fundamental principles underlying the formation of the victorious proletariat's military organisation. Lenin, as leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, personally guided the build-up of the Red Army, defining its tasks with utmost clarity and mapping out ways of further improvement. Lenin made a seminal contribution to the military science of socialism. In so doing he did an invaluable historic service to the Soviet people and to the entire world revolutionary movement.

1. The Defence of the Revolution as an Objective Necessity

The proletariat's armed defence of its socialist gains is central to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the revolutionary transformation of society. Marx and Engels, when working on the theory of proletarian revolution in the era of pre-monopoly capitalism, concluded that the socialist revolution was capable of victory simultaneously in all or at any rate in the more developed capitalist countries. At the same time they looked upon a proletarian revolution not as a one-shot, short-term affair but as a fairly long period of bitter struggle between the working class and its exploiters.

The founders of scientific communism warned that the exploiting classes that had been toppled and the external counter-revolutionary forces in countries unaffected by the revolution would join forces to resist the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and in so doing they would not hesitate to suppress revolution resorting to reactionary violence using their military organisation with its well-trained standing armies. In the event of this happening the revolutionary working people would be forced to defend their socialist gains with arms in hand.

Marx and Engels stressed that the working class would have to tackle the question of the armed defence of its socialist gains immediately after the victorious revolution. In a series of their writings Marx and Engels demonstrated that if the proletariat was to carry out a successful socialist revolution, to consolidate its dictatorship and to create favourable conditions for building a socialist society it would have to set up its own military organisation. The founders of scientific communism taught that in order to achieve victory over its class enemies the working class must be well armed, well organised and must develop a high sense of discipline. Any bourgeois attempt to disarm it had to be countered with a determined rebuff.

The experience of the Paris Commune and all the subsequent revolutionary struggles of the international proletariat have borne out Marx's and Engels' arguments to the full. At every turn of its campaign for a radical socialist transformation of society the working class has been confronted by the combined forces of the world's counter-revolution which formed a common front to strangle the proletarian revolution physically destroying its fighters and using every form of violence. This historical evidence made the creation of a working-class military organisation an urgent and vital task for the revolution along with the wholesale arming of the working class itself.

Marx and Engels, however, did not examine the problem of defending the proletarian revolution in the event of its victory being initially confined to one country. This problem arose later and was successfully tackled by the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin.

Lenin developed the arguments of Marx and Engels, adapting them to the requirements of a new historical situation and evolved a neat

and comprehensive doctrine on the defence of the socialist Motherland. In doing this he made a signal contribution to Marxism. In this doctrine Lenin developed the ideas of the founders of Marxism on the essence and substance of war, on its relation to politics and the economy, on the need for the armed defence of the socialist state and on the creation of its military organisation. Lenin provided answers to many other military questions that arose during the struggle of the working class and all working people against the aggressive forces of the old world.

Lenin's scientific substantiation of the need for the armed defence of the state of the proletarian dictatorship against the capitalist states' military onslaught was based on one of his major scientific discoveries: the possibility of breaking the chain of world imperialism at its weakest link and socialism winning initially in one or several countries. Lenin wrote: "This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state's victorious proletariat. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie."¹

Lenin's substantiation of the need for the armed defence of the socialist Motherland is noted for its utmost clarity, logic and unassailable argumentation. As long as imperialism, by its very nature aggressive, has military forces at its command, its aggressive aspirations and designs would have to be curbed and resisted, and to defeat it in the event of war the socialist state would have to maintain sufficiently powerful armed forces. People who have risen to liberate themselves have a sacred right to use revolutionary violence as a retaliatory measure against counter-revolutionary violence.

Lenin, by basing himself on the theory of scientific communism and the practical revolutionary activity of the masses, worked out the socio-political and organisational principles underlying the military organisation of the socialist state. Lenin's doctrine on the defence of the socialist Motherland formed an integral part of his overall plan for the building of socialism and communism by the victorious proletariat. This doctrine was the cornerstone of the Communist Party's policy on organising the country's defence, its military development and the formation and guidance of its armed forces.

As Lenin had foreseen, from its early days the young Soviet Republic had to fight for its freedom and independence in bitter and uncompromising battles with the numerous external and internal enemies. In organising the country's defence the Communist Party has invariably been guided by Lenin's doctrine on the defence of the socialist Motherland. The entire history of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people's victorious struggle against their class enemies in the October Revolution, in the Civil War and later in the Great Patriotic War, and the success scored on the labour front during peaceful

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 79.

construction, combined to bear out completely the validity of Lenin's propositions and ideas and have shown what a genius he was.

Thus, Marx's and Engels' conclusions about the probable need for victorious socialism to wage defensive wars coupled with Lenin's doctrine about the defence of the socialist Motherland equipped the Communist Party with science-based premises on the need to form an army of a new type which would be called upon to serve the interests of the proletariat in its struggle against the overthrown exploiting classes in its country and to repel the onslaught of the external imperialist aggressors. The formation of just such an army — the army of the October Revolution — was a concrete example of the operation of the general laws governing the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.

In its early days, the young Soviet Republic developed a variety of internal economic, political and cultural forces that were to ensure that socialist military organisations would be superior to the bourgeois models. Lenin with his perspicacity of a genius brought these forces to light and indicated a realistic way towards strengthening the defence capacity of the state. On the eve of the October Revolution Lenin emphasised that nothing short of abolishing the dominance of capital, nationalising the banks and industry, handing over the land to the peasants and making a clean break with imperialism in domestic and foreign policy, nothing short of overthrowing the bourgeois government and following this by the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship could make Russia capable of defending itself. The way indicated by Lenin was a true revolutionary way entailing fundamental economic and social transformations, turning an imperialist war into a civil war, abolishing the domination of the capitalists and transferring power to the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The Party's first Programme, along with the transfer of power to the working people, called for the country's standing army being replaced by the wholesale arming of the people. In practical terms this meant setting up militia-type armed forces.

Engels, in his elaboration of the fundamental principles underlying the military organisation of the proletariat, noted that considerable military experience had been gained in the formation and combat employment of two basic systems of armed forces. One was a regular army (composed either of mercenaries or recruits) and the other a militia (homeguard) based on general military conscription. Engels favoured the militia system as better fitted for coping with the task of scrapping the bourgeois state machine, of destroying the old army and replacing it with the military organisation of the victorious proletariat. Engels believed that the victory of socialist revolution in the principal capitalist countries would dispense with the need for a professional standing army.

Later, however, when he analysed the experience of the Civil War in the USA and the drawbacks of the militia system which became

particularly glaring with the rapid advances in weapons and tactics, Engels concluded that under certain circumstances the proletariat would have to rely on a massive army based on standing regular armed forces if it were to successfully defend itself against the bourgeoisie. Engels wrote that "every rational military organisation cannot be but a compromise between the Prussian system (a regular army.— *Author*) and the Swiss system (militia.— *Author*), but exactly what? This depends on a special set of circumstances. It is only a society organised and *educated* in a communist spirit that can most closely embrace the militia system, but even in that case it would not accept it completely."¹ Therefore, the proletariat would have to decide on which military organisation to adopt in the light of the given historical situation.

Lenin carefully analysed Engels' proposition about the socialist state's army, developed its further and later put it into effect in brilliant style. Lenin believed that to scrap the military and bureaucratic machine of the bourgeoisie, the socialist revolution had to arm the working class and set up a workers' militia based on Red Guards detachments. To make the workers' militia militarily credible, the soldiers and sailors of the old army and navy had to be won over to the proletariat. With this in mind, long before the October Revolution, Lenin and the Communist Party had proposed that the standing army be replaced by a mass army of the people in the form of a workers' and peasants' militia, something that would speed the complete emancipation of the working people from the oppression of their exploiters and would consolidate the gains of the revolution. The militia, of the people and for the people, was to undertake a combination of military and state administration functions.

When Soviet power won in Russia the Communist Party intended to implement its plans and form a militia. Decrees were issued for the arming of all the working people and for the disarming of the propertied classes which meant abolishing the imperialist bourgeoisie's monopoly in the military field. For the first time in human history a national military organisation was being set up to defend the fruits of the working people's social and national liberation struggle rather than to oppress them.

The formation of the young socialist state's military organisation occurred in an extremely complex situation. The capitalist states' intervention coupled with the Civil War that had been forced on the Soviet people was a threat that immediately assumed dangerous proportions and continued to grow. The Communist Party was quick to see that the young Soviet Republic's numerically weak and poorly armed and trained volunteer and militia units were no match for the combined forces of the internal and external counter-revolutionaries. These units had been set up in the early days of the revolution to beat down the resistance of the landlords and bourgeoisie of old Russia.

¹ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 32, S. 21.

The changed situation demanded a new approach to forming an army. Lenin and the Communist Party concluded that a massive, regular army, well-trained and organised, was an imperative necessity. The young Soviet Republic had to form an army which was capable of defending Soviet power and of dealing with the imperialist states' numerically strong armed forces. The volunteer principle on which the workers' militia was based could not promote the formation of a massive regular army. A quick change had to be made to introduce military conscription for the entire male population backed up by universal military training for the working people. This decision was a new approach in Marxist theory to the formation of an army of the victorious proletarian revolution.

The elaboration and implementation of Lenin's doctrine on the defence of the socialist Motherland and of the basic guidelines for the formation and development of the Soviet Armed Forces occurred at a time of bitter armed struggle against the enemies of the Party, both open and covert, and in particular against the sabotage of the "Left"-wing Communists¹ and their supporters.

The "Left"-wing Communists, led by Bukharin and supported by Trotsky, under a cover of high-sounding rhetoric about the alleged "revolutionary way" and "determined class-motivated foreign policy", advocated a policy that was dangerous for the young Soviet state because they urged a continuation of the war against German imperialism. On the eve of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when the Soviet Republic had nothing but the inefficient and often demoralised remnants of tsarist regiments with which to withstand the impressive military power of Kaiser Germany, the position of the "Left"-wing Communists jeopardised the very existence of Soviet power. Had their policy, which Lenin correctly called adventurist, been adopted it would have helped the imperialists strangle Soviet Russia, and pushed the country into a trap. In this complex situation concluding the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a form of defending the socialist Motherland.

The "Left"-wing Communists blindly embraced the spurious slogan about the inadmissability of "defencism" and "the defence of the fatherland", ignoring the historical situation which gave rise to that very slogan and turning a blind eye to the fundamental changes that had been introduced into that slogan by the progress of the October Revolution. It will be remembered that this slogan had been put forward by the Russian Communists in the early stages of the First World War. At the time the slogan exposed the falsity and bogus nature of the bourgeois interpretation of the fatherland. The Communist Party explained to the masses that the capitalist state was not their fatherland in the true sense of the term. As the bourgeoisie interpreted it, it was a tool for the establishment and maintenance of

¹ A Left-wing opportunist group within the Russian Communist Party, which had its own, petty-bourgeois revolutionary approach to the Soviet Government's and Communist Party's foreign and internal policies in January 1918.— *Ed.*

the bourgeoisie's domination over the toiling masses. Therefore, in a predatory war waged by a capitalist state, it is not incumbent on the proletariat of that state to defend such a fatherland. Only by toppling the domination of the exploiters and by winning political power could the working class create its own truly socialist Fatherland whose defence would then be an objective historical necessity. Lenin wrote: "Since October 25, 1917, we have been defencists. We are for 'defence of the fatherland'; but that patriotic war towards which we are moving is a war for a socialist fatherland, for socialism as a fatherland, for the Soviet Republic as a *contingent* of the world army of socialism."¹

After the victorious revolution, in which the proletariat became the country's ruling class, it was necessary to defend its socialist Motherland, with every means at its command—that was both just and legitimate as it promoted the establishment of a new and advanced social system and not only accorded with the interests of the country's working people but also with those of the international communist and workers' movement, and with those of the progressive people throughout the world. Lenin wrote: "If war is waged by the exploiting class with the object of strengthening its rule as a class, such a war is a criminal war, and 'defencism' in *such* a war is a base betrayal of socialism. If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the bourgeoisie in its own country, and is waged with the object of strengthening and developing socialism, such a war is legitimate and 'holy'."² Lenin went on to say that the defence of the revolutionary gains and of the socialist state was to be taken most seriously, and thoroughly prepared for, taking account of the existing alignment of forces.

Soviet history has thoroughly vindicated the argument that the armed defence of the revolution and the strengthening of the defence potential of the socialist state and the fighting power of its Armed Forces were an objective necessity springing from the laws governing social development and from the special features of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism. Following the victorious October Revolution the Soviet people did not have just to build a new society but to defend it arms in hand from the counter-revolution, fighting off repeated attempts by world imperialism to destroy it. The Communist Party was constantly concerned with ensuring that Soviet economic, scientific and cultural achievements helped strengthen the country's military potential, making it better able to defend itself. Lenin's ideas on the defence of the socialist Motherland have always been a reliable guide for the Party in working out the best ways of forging its military might and strengthening the country's defences.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 162-63.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 332.

2. Lenin and the Communist Party as the Architects of the Red Army and Navy, and of the Victory in the Civil War

The Communist Party, led by Lenin, made a brilliant success of building up the socialist state's armed forces. In creating the first workers' and peasants' army in the world and in improving its combat efficiency the Communist Party was guided by Marxist-Leninist theory about defending the state of the victorious proletariat from encroachments of the capitalist predators. The theory enumerated the forms and methods of this defence: the economic, moral, military, scientific and technical preparations and the ways and means of building up the new socialist military establishment.

The Soviet Union is a profoundly peace-loving state. Aggressive aspirations and unjust wars cannot be more alien to it. Significantly, the very first legislative act of the Soviet Government was the Decree on Peace drafted by Lenin which contained appeal to all the belligerent countries to lay down their arms and start immediate negotiations for a universal just and democratic peace. This honest and consistent peace-oriented foreign policy inherent in a socialist state opened the way to justice and equality in international affairs and to world peace.

However, the peace initiative of the Soviet Government brought a hostile response from reactionaries throughout the world and from internal counter-revolutionaries. They did not want peace because it ran counter to their overriding goal of restoring capitalism in Russia. The clouds of war gathered over the young Soviet Republic as a real threat of foreign military intervention arose and the internal counter-revolution reared its ugly head.

In late October 1917, Kerensky, the former Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, and the tsarist general Krasnov were the first to start a mutiny, ordering troops to advance on Petrograd. Inside the city a counter-revolutionary organisation was knocked together by the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks with the high-sounding and misleading title of the Committee for the Salvation of the Country and the Revolution. This organisation inspired and guided a mutiny by the military school cadets. The establishment of Soviet power met armed resistance from the White Cossacks, officers and cadet units stationed in the Don area, in Moscow, in Baku, in the Ukraine and elsewhere. They all made common cause with anti-Soviet riff-raff of every hue and shade and were backed by the imperialist Entente powers. The particularly dangerous White Cossack mutinies were the ones in the Don area led by General Kaledin and in the South Urals led by Ataman Dutov because they were generously subsidised by the United States, Britain and France. The White Cossacks were joined by the bourgeois nationalists of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Bashkiria and Kazakhstan. This anti-Soviet

alliance of counter-revolutionary forces hoped to march on Petrograd and Moscow.

The Communist Party, led by Lenin, while continuing the Soviet Republic's foreign policy of peace, lost no time in adopting vigorous measures to defend the socialist Motherland and to defeat the forces of counter-revolution. The Red Guard detachments played a crucial role in this effort. The Communist Party formed them in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Voronezh, Tsaritsyn, the Donbas coal-mining area, the Urals and other industrial centres. From the early days of the revolution, these detachments formed the battering ram of the proletarian dictatorship for winning power for the working class and overthrowing the domination of the bourgeoisie and the landlords. These detachments were the prototype of the future regular workers' and peasants' Red Army.

The Red Guardsmen, revolutionary sailors and soldiers, with the active support of the entire working people of Russia, eliminated the principal foci of counter-revolution by their determined and self-sacrificing actions, thereby creating favourable conditions for Soviet power's triumphal march across the country. The internal counter-revolutionaries had to grudgingly concede that without help from abroad they would be unable to stem the mighty revolutionary tide that rolled from Petrograd across the whole of Russia.

In December 1917 the Soviet Government, after strenuous efforts, succeeded in concluding an armistice agreement with Germany and her allies. As a result, the Soviet Republic could look forward to a breathing space which could be turned into a long and stable peace, enabling her to disentangle herself from the war, consolidate Soviet power in the rural areas and initiate economic reconstruction which would lead to a rapid upturn of the country's economy.

But this prospect irritated and indeed terrified international imperialism which could not tolerate the existence of a workers' and peasants' state, the existence of a new social system. Russia's withdrawal from the war was a further blow to their hopes. David Lloyd George, the then British Prime Minister, wrote: "If Russia remains at peace then the Revolution will become one of the greatest factors in fashioning the destiny of the masses in all lands which mankind has ever witnessed or experienced."¹

Fearing that the October Revolution would set an example for the working people of other countries to follow, thus placing in jeopardy the very existence of the capitalist system, the imperialists increased their assistance to the counter-revolutionaries inside Russia. It was also very likely that Germany would resume military operations against the Soviet Republic despite their armistice agreement.

The Communist Party and Lenin evaluated the military danger with sober realism and pointed out the only correct course of action for the people to take in dealing with the danger and this was to mobilise the whole of the country to defend the revolution. On January 28, 1918,

¹ David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, Vol. V, London, 1936, p. 2528.

the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. On February 11, the Council passed the decree on the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy.¹ Up and down the country military units were formed without delay. This activity was particularly intensive after the German troops, in violation of the armistice agreement, resumed their offensive all along the front and threatened to march on Petrograd.

On February 21, the Soviet Government issued an appeal drafted by Lenin and entitled "The Socialist Fatherland Is in Danger!". Martial law was introduced in Petrograd and the army units and the Baltic Fleet were placed on full alert. On February 23, a series of meetings were held throughout the country as part of a general mobilisation drive. To mark the beginning of the revolutionary forces' total mobilisation to defend the socialist Fatherland and as a tribute to the Red Army units' valorous and sturdy resistance to the German invaders February 23 went down in the annals of Soviet history as the birthday of the Red Army. Lenin wrote: "The week from February 18 to 24, 1918, has been one that will be remembered as a great turning-point in the history of the Russian—and the international—revolution."²

At inception the Red Army was built around the Red Guard units and the units of revolutionary soldiers and sailors so as to form a class army having unbreakable links with the people, a tightly knit army with great political awareness and cast-iron military discipline. This army stood up for the young Soviet Republic blocking the path of the Kaiser troops.

In the spring of 1918, shortly after the German offensive, the imperialist Entente powers launched their own armed intervention against Soviet Russia. The intervention began in early March with the landing of Anglo-French troops in the north of European Russia with the aim of occupying the Murmansk area. In the middle of March the London Conference attended by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Britain, France and Italy adopted a decision on the "allied intervention in Eastern Russia" with Japanese participation. From then on the situation deteriorated rapidly. The German forces occupied much of the Ukraine, seized the Crimea, the Donbas coal-fields and continued to advance towards the Caucasus. In May 1918, the Czechoslovak Corps started its counter-revolutionary mutiny in Siberia and the Far East. The mutiny was instigated and backed by the imperialist Entente powers. The British moved their troops into the Transcaucasian area and Turkestan. The young Soviet Republic found itself besieged.

The odds were heavily stacked against it. Shortly after the October Revolution the victorious Russian proletariat had only to overcome the armed resistance of the toppled exploiting classes; in the spring of

¹ The Soviet Army and Navy today.—*Ed.*

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 62.

1918, however, the main danger emanated from the foreign troops of the interventionists who enabled the remnants of the internal counter-revolutionaries to make their play. From the spring of 1918 onwards the Civil War became widespread and was marked by particular bitterness. Without help from the interventionist troops the internal counter-revolutionaries would not have been able to survive for long and the Civil War in Russia would have ended much sooner. Speaking at the Eighth All-Russia Conference of the Russian Communist Party Lenin said: "World imperialism ... in reality brought about the Civil War in our country and is responsible for protracting it...."¹

Reactionary forces of every hue rallied under the banner of anti-Sovietism. The counter-revolutionary forces were a mixed crowd but were united by a common goal—to crush Soviet power in a blood bath and to restore capitalism in Russia. Militarily the counter-revolutionaries presented a serious danger. The principal capitalist countries of Europe took part in the intervention and they were later joined by the USA and Japan. In 1918 there were more than 150,000 interventionist troops operating in Siberia and the Far East. In the South Ukraine, in the Crimea and in the Transcaucasus the imperialist Entente powers landed some 130,000 troops. In the North of European Russia the White Guard army under General Müller was backed by over 31,000 foreign troops.

The areas seized by the interventionist troops were converted into a supply and logistic base for the White Guard *scum*. World imperialism gave the armies under Admiral Kolchak and Denikin everything necessary in the way of arms and equipment. At some periods their numerical strength reached 400,000 and 110,000 men, respectively. As early as May 1918, the combined strength of the White Guards and interventionist troops reached some 700,000 officers and men. All the Red Army had at the time was a force 300,000 strong.

To fight off the onslaught of its numerous enemies the Soviet state had to mobilise every resource it could find and rely on the revolutionary enthusiasm and energy of the entire people. At that difficult period Soviet power was established in 28 provinces of European Russia with a combined population of 64.5 million. The principal industrial and food-producing areas were in the hands of the interventionist troops and the White Guards. Wide sections of the population as well as regular troops were drawn into the Civil War. Another point to be borne in mind is that the country's industry, agriculture and transport had been devastated by four years of imperialist war. All this created incredible difficulties for the young Soviet Republic.

The Communist Party, led by Lenin, guided the Red Army's heroic struggle at the front and simultaneously continued the army's build-up. The country was turned into a single war camp and its economy and whole way of life was geared to the war effort.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 171.

Although the country's economy was under great strain, war production had to be expanded at all costs. Measures were taken to build up and improve the Red Army's corps of commanders and political workers, to organise partisan warfare and clandestine underground organisations in the areas seized by the interventionist troops and the White Guards.

A series of decisive battles were fought between the Red Army and its enemies in 1918. That year, the Red Army scored its first victories on just about every front. In the autumn of 1918 much of the Volga area was cleared of the enemy and Red Army units reached the foothills of the Urals. In the north, following a series of bitter battles, Soviet troops checked the advance of the interventionists who were trying to break through into the central part of the country and link up with the counter-revolutionary forces in Siberia. At the same time the Red Army frustrated the insidious designs of the White Cossack Ataman Krasnov and General Denikin. They operated on the Don and the North Caucasus and tried to launch a combined march on Moscow together with the White Guard forces advancing from the east. The Red Army units, local proletarian detachments and workers' units from Donetsk played a crucial role in foiling these plans by their heroic defence of Tsaritsyn. Their determined and self-sacrificing actions tied down the bulk of the Denikin army, thereby warding off its planned strike against Moscow. The counter-revolutionary White Cossacks in the Urals and Astrakhan failed to link up with Denikin. By the end of 1918 the German occupation troops had largely been expelled from the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic area.

The successes scored by the Red Army were of tremendous importance not only militarily and politically. They gave a tremendous moral and psychological boost to the revolutionary forces, as they inspired confidence among the workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors in the strength of Soviet power and in its capacity to repel all enemies and defeat them. This helped win over more and more sections of the population to the revolutionary cause, particularly working peasants, and this meant that the ranks of the Red Army could be reinforced with numerous conscious defenders of Soviet power. Lenin said in October 1918: "...Nearly six months were required before a turn in the tide. This turn has now come; it is changing the force of the revolution ... new people are joining the army and laying down their lives by the thousand."¹

At the same time the brilliant victories won by the Red Army caused increasing disarray among the counter-revolutionary forces and the interventionist troops, eroding their confidence and striking terror into their hearts and thus spreading panic.

The Party's Central Committee and Lenin, after analysing the military and political situation and the Red Army's operations, adopted measures to improve the mobilisation principles, to form military units, set up standing reserves, reorganise supply operations,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, pp. 124, 125.

restructure the troop control organs at the front, build up Party organisations in the Army and Navy and to increase their influence on the troops. All this helped make the Red Army stronger and improve its combat efficiency and power.

The Red Army's important victories and its steadily growing battleworthiness did not fail to influence imperialist policy. The imperialists initiated feverish preparations for an even wider intervention and stepped up their assistance to the White Guard armies. At the meeting in Jassy, to which USA, Britain, France and Russian White Guard organisations sent representatives, and also at the headquarters of the allied forces' high command in Paris, decisions were taken to start vigorous operations against the Soviet Republic on all fronts. The main blow was to fall on Moscow, to be struck by forces moving from the south.

This Entente campaign got on the way in November 1918 when French and British warships entered the Black Sea and landed interventionist troops at Novorossiisk, Odessa and Sevastopol. The German occupation troops who had been chased out of the country were replaced by troops from France, Britain, Greece, Rumania and other countries. The Russian White Guards were kept supplied with large quantities of artillery, small arms, ammunition, clothing and other items.

At the same time General Yudenich in the Baltic area and Admiral Kolchak in Siberia made preparations for their campaigns. Kolchak, who commanded the White Guard forces in Siberia, proclaimed himself "the supreme ruler of Russia". The counter-revolutionary directorate in the Ukraine sided with the Entente powers. Once again the revolutionary gains were in jeopardy.

Faced with this new threat the Soviet Republic concentrated its main efforts on Denikin. Lenin proposed that the Southern Front be declared the principal one. He insisted: nothing to the west, something to the east, *everything* (almost) to the south. Strategically, this was substantiated by the fact that the imperialists, by using their navies in the Black Sea, were able to maintain a steady and fast flow of supplies to their own troops and to Denikin's army. To prevent this the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to defeat Denikin's army and the interventionist troops in the south before they could be strengthened by the Entente powers. Following that the Red Army could deal with the enemy on the other fronts.

This correct choice of the decisive front and the concentration of effort on it turned the tide. Between January and February 1919 the Red Army routed Denikin's troops and liberated the Ukraine east of the Dnieper.

The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party held in March 1919 adopted the second Party Programme drawn up under Lenin's guidance, which mapped out clear-cut proposals for the Soviet people to build a socialist society. One policy played a crucial role in rallying the Soviet Republic's resources and manpower for struggle against its external and internal enemies and consolidating Soviet power. This

was the policy whereby the alliance between the working class and the middle peasants was strengthened and accent placed on the poorer peasants who were to be guided by the working class. This policy was worked out by the Party and approved by the Eighth Congress. The Congress also approved Lenin's military policy aimed at forming a class-motivated regular army with a centralised chain of command and a high sense of discipline. Lenin defended the Party line in bitter political struggle against the "military opposition" who opposed the creation of such an army and advocated the continuation of partisan methods for troop control and the conduct of the war.

Lenin's ideas about the alliance with the middle peasants and the formation of an army based on a centralised chain of command were particularly timely in view of the prevailing military and political situation. In the spring of 1919 Soviet Russia still found herself in a grave situation despite the impressive success achieved in the south. Active military operations were being conducted along some 8,000 kilometres of front. However, there was now a switch in concentration from the Southern Front to the Eastern Front where Kolchak's army operated armed to the teeth by the Entente powers. In the first half of 1919, the US alone supplied over 250,000 rifles, hundreds of artillery pieces, thousands of machine-guns and large quantities of ammunition and equipment. Kolchak's army was a serious military menace threatening the Volga area and indeed the entire Soviet Republic.

Therefore, the Party concentrated its main efforts on dealing with the situation on the Eastern Front so as to organise sturdy resistance to Kolchak's forces without delay. The Central Committee, guided by the decision of the Eighth Party Congress, adopted an action programme to deal with the Kolchak menace. The guidelines of the programme were set out in Lenin's Theses of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the Situation on the Eastern Front, which expressed firm confidence in a quick and final victory over Kolchak. The Theses ended with the appeal: "We must exert every effort, display revolutionary energy, and Kolchak will be rapidly defeated. The Volga, the Urals and Siberia can and must be defended and regained."¹

Lenin, in an address to the workers of Petrograd, said: "We request the Petrograd workers *to do everything possible, to mobilise all forces* to help the Eastern Front ... there the fate of the revolution is being decided."²

The whole of the Soviet Republic strained every nerve and sinew to fulfil the Party's and its leader's appeal. Red Army units on the Eastern Front were reinforced by fresh units and supplied with the additional equipment and ammunition. The Party, Komsomol and trade unions launched mobilisation drives. The Party sent over 15,000 of its members to the Eastern Front to act as commissars,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 279.

² *Ibid.*, p. 275.

commanders and rank-and-file Red Army men. The Komsomol sent over 3,000 of its members to the Front and the trade unions mobilised over 60,000 workers. The Communists infused revolutionary enthusiasm into the battle-weary Red Army units operating on the Eastern Front, they introduced truly Bolshevik organisation and the spirit of proletarian discipline. Having thus been replenished with fresh forces, the political bodies and Party organisations within the Red Army units on the Eastern Front initiated an intensive drive to defeat the Kolchak forces.

As a result of the Party's and Lenin's huge efforts the tide was soon turned on the Eastern Front. By the middle of summer 1919, the Red Army defeated Kolchak's forces, liberating the Urals and reaching West Siberia.

Kolchak's defeat failed to deter the enemies of Soviet power. The imperialists once again placed their bet on Denikin, an ace that had already been beaten. They stepped up war supplies to Denikin's forces as a matter of urgency. In the summer and autumn of 1919 Denikin's forces captured a large area in the south of Russia, seizing Tsaritsyn, Voronezh, Orel, Chernigov and Kiev. They presented a real threat to the central areas of Russia and Denikin planned to capture Moscow. The Central Committee of the Communist Party led by Lenin appealed to the nation to rise up and defeat the new threat.

The letter of the Communist Party's Central Committee written by Lenin and entitled "All Out for the Fight Against Denikin" was an impassioned appeal to Communists and to all the working people of the Soviet Republic and a political directive to the Red Army. The letter formulated the political and strategic directive: "All the forces of the workers and peasants, all the forces of the Soviet Republic, must be harnessed to repulse Denikin's onslaught and to defeat him, without checking the Red Army's victorious advance into the Urals and Siberia."¹

The Soviet Republic responded to the Party's appeal and mobilised every resource to defend the great gains of the October Revolution. The best units of the Red Army were rushed to the Southern Front and the more experienced leading officials of the Party and commanders from other fronts were sent to the south. This had a favourable effect on the direction of military operations in the south. The Red Army units were better supplied with arms and ammunition, food, clothing and other essentials. Thirty thousand Communists, 10,000 Komsomol members and scores of thousands of trade union members swelled the regiments operating on the Southern Front.

By the end of 1919 Denikin's army was routed and the Red Army reached the shores of the Black Sea. Yudenich was defeated near Petrograd.

Having defeated Denikin in the south, Kolchak in the east and Yudenich in the north-west the Red Army secured a respite for the country which the Party lost no time in using to overcome the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 436.

wholesale economic dislocation, to rehabilitate industry, transport and communications, and to revive agriculture. But the breathing space proved short-lived. In April 1920, White Polish militarists were instigated by the Entente powers into attacking Soviet Russia. In June of that year General Wrangel struck out from the Crimea to support them.

The Red Army, which had passed through the crucible of bitter battles, was now over three million strong. Its troops were steeled in battles and boundlessly devoted to the cause of the revolution. The difficulty, however, was that by this time the Soviet forces were scattered over a large area and were overstretched on some fronts. The situation demanded a quick concentration of efforts on the Western Front and this was no easy matter in view of the disrupted transport system. Nonetheless, thanks to the measures adopted by the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet Government, Red Army forces operating against the White Poles and Wrangel's troops were considerably reinforced in a short time. They quickly regrouped and launched an offensive defeating the White Polish troops and then dealing with Wrangel.

Thus the Entente powers' last trumpcards were beaten by the end of 1920. This marked the end of the Civil War in terms of major military operations, although for some time afterwards the Red Army still had to conduct mopping-up operations in the country's fringe areas. After the successful completion of operations against the Japanese interventionists and the White Guards in the Far East at the end of 1922 and the elimination of the Basmach forces in Central Asia in early 1923 Soviet power had finally triumphed in every corner of the vast Soviet Motherland and military operations ceased everywhere.

For three years the country had been in the flames of civil war. Those years saw the birth and growth of the young Soviet state and its army amid incredibly difficult conditions whilst receiving blows from the enemy and with the old tsarist army demoralised. In an unprecedentedly short time, without the benefit of military experience, the Party of Lenin had to create a new army and direct its combat operations. Speaking at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party Lenin stated: "We undertook a task which nobody in the world has ever attempted on so large a scale.... We proceeded from experiment to experiment; we endeavoured to create a volunteer army, feeling our way, testing the ground and experimenting to find a solution to the problem in the given situation. And the nature of the problem was clear. Unless we defended the socialist republic by force of arms, we could not exist. A ruling class would never surrender its power to an oppressed class. And the latter would have to prove in practice that it is capable not only of overthrowing the exploiters, but also of organising its self-defence and of staking everything on it."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 152, 153.

The Red Army men had fought in an incredibly difficult situation, experiencing a shortage of arms and equipment, often half-starving, poorly equipped but always full of revolutionary spirit and confidence in the justness of their cause. They had fought with self-sacrifice against the well-equipped and well-trained interventionist troops and White Guards. The Red Army's victories were above all victories for the ideas of the socialist revolution, victories for the forces of progress and peace over the forces of imperialist reaction.

The Red Army grew up and matured during the battles of the Civil War, became steeled and acquired considerable experience. Its military operations covered vast areas and were marked by determination, boldness and resoluteness. To this day our friends are lost in admiration for the Red Army's operations which led to the defeat of the White Guards and interventionist troops; dislodging them from their footholds in the Urals and Siberia, on the Volga, Don and Kuban rivers; storming Perekop and Volochayevka. This applies no less to the fine exploits of the revolutionary navy during the defence of Petrograd. Our enemies have been amazed at the Red Army's ability to do the impossible.

The Red Army gained its historic victory because it fought for a righteous cause, the liberation of working people from capitalist slavery. It won because its operations were guided by the Communist Party and the great Lenin. The Party and Lenin mapped out the principal ways in which to carry out military tasks and they were literally the architects of the new army giving it revolutionary enthusiasm, militancy and a dedication to the cause of the revolution.

The Central Committee of the Party, headed by Lenin, was the general headquarters organising the country's defence. Its orders and directives laid down the principal directions for the main blows and for the plans of military operations. The Central Committee co-ordinated the efforts on the different fronts; it formed strategic reserves and used them with great flexibility. It gave a lot of attention to the vital task of keeping the troops well-supplied with everything necessary. Lenin was constantly concerned with reconstructing and organising munitions and arms factories, with keeping the Red Army supplied with food and with improving transport on rail and inland waterways. He paid particular attention to developing new weapons and equipment. He kept the development of the first Soviet tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains under personal review and he followed with interest the first operations by the Soviet air force and the employment of radio communications equipment.

Lenin was always at the centre of political and military events, having an intimate knowledge of the situation on the different fronts and skilfully using the Marxist dialectic method in solving military problems. He conducted the day-to-day direction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic and kept the fulfilment of the strategic plans and the military directives of the Party and Government under constant review and personally supervised the preparations for and the conduct of major operations.

The following facts can be cited to illustrate the extent of Lenin's titanic activity in directing the armed defence of the Fatherland, and building up the Red Army and Navy during the foreign intervention and the Civil War. From December 1918 to December 1920 Lenin chaired as many as 143 meetings of the Defence Council (from March 1920 known as the Labour and Defence Council). During 1919 alone he directed the proceedings of 14 plenary meetings of the Central Committee and 40 meetings of its Political Bureau which decided vital military problems. During the Civil War Lenin wrote over 600 letters and telegrams dealing with military questions, sending them to a variety of bodies and agencies.

The list of those who worked side by side with Lenin in the formation and strengthening of the new army and in organising the struggle against the interventionists and White Guards includes prominent leaders of the Party and the Soviet state. Lenin's closest associates were A. S. Bubnov, S. I. Gusev, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, M. I. Kalinin, S. M. Kirov, S. V. Kosior, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, V. V. Kuibyshev, A. F. Myasnikov, G. K. Ordjonikidze, G. I. Petrovsky, N. I. Podvoisky, Y. E. Rudzutak, Y. M. Sverdlov, J. V. Stalin, M. V. Frunze, A. D. Tsyurupa, Y. M. Yaroslavsky and many others. A large group of gifted military leaders and commanders was educated under Lenin's leadership. They played a major role in the subsequent development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Thus, the first attack by world imperialism, the first attempt by the enemies of the revolution to topple Soviet power by military means ended in utter defeat. The Red Army formed and guided by the Communist Party and the great Lenin covered itself with unfading glory in its many battles and campaigns. It passed through a crucial stage of its history with honour—its formation and maturing in the struggle against the internal counter-revolution and the forces of armed intervention. Our victory was a shining example of the invincibility of the Soviet state, of the durability of the militant alliance between the workers and the peasants, and of the powerful military organisation of the victorious proletariat.

3. The Leninist Principles Underlying the Formation of the New Army

One of the reasons for the brilliant success in defending the country and in forming the army of the world's first socialist state was that the Communist Party was able to implement Lenin's ideas on military affairs; evolve and substantiate the basic organisational principles governing the armed forces, their training and the education of their personnel; and work out the forms and methods for the working people to conduct just, progressive wars against internal and external reaction. These ideas and principles were tested and refined during bitter battles and eventually formed the basis of the military doctrine of the proletarian state. By following this doctrine the Red Army was

able to win the unequal battle against the enemies of the socialist Motherland.

In broad terms Soviet military development is a combination of economic, political and properly military measures implemented under the guidance of the Communist Party. It is intended to ensure that the country has reliable defences. The principal component of Soviet military development is the formation and further strengthening of the country's Armed Forces.

Lenin first formulated the basic principles upon which the Soviet Armed Forces were to be organised and built. These were contained in his writings most of which were completed on the eve of the October Revolution and during the foreign intervention and Civil War. Lenin did not separate these principles from the overall principles concerning the development of the Party and the state or from the general tasks of building socialism. On the contrary, he regarded them in an indissoluble and organic unity. Lenin said: "The development of our army led to successful results only because it was carried on in the spirit of general Soviet organisation..."¹

The permanent and enduring significance of Lenin's principles about the development of the Armed Forces lies in the fact that they were based on an in-depth analysis and a generalisation of the working people's military experience of revolutionary struggle against their exploiters, of the experience of proletarian revolutions and civil wars, and of the experience of building socialism. They followed from the objective laws governing social development and wars. If military cadres have a good understanding of the essence of these principles it gives them a firm footing in a variety of military and political situations and allows them to correctly solve a variety of complicated problems involved in military development in peace-time and to successfully solve combat tasks and missions in war-time.

The major Leninist principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces include the following:

- Communist Party's guidance of the Armed Forces;
- a class approach to the development of the Armed Forces;
- a unity of the army and the people;
- a devotion to proletarian internationalism;
- cadre organisation;
- centralised direction of the Armed Forces;
- one-man command;
- a high sense of military discipline;
- the Armed Forces' constant readiness to repel any aggression.

These principles are closely integrated with one another. They embody the socio-political and organisational basis of Soviet military development and constitute fundamental premises for the guidance and direction of the country's Armed Forces.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 309.

Let us now briefly consider each of these principles.

Communist Party's guidance of the Armed Forces is the basic principle of Soviet military development. Lenin believed that Communist Party's guidance was a decisive factor in the might of the Red Army and the basis of all its victories. Questions of military policy and the guidance of the Armed Forces always received unflagging attention from Lenin and the Central Committee. The Party's and Lenin's dynamic and many-sided activities in this area during the foreign intervention and Civil War meant that the objective prerequisites and potentialities of victory over the enemy could be translated into reality. Lenin stressed: "It was only because of the Party's vigilance and its strict discipline, because the authority of the Party united all government departments and institutions, because the slogans issued by the Central Committee were adopted by tens, hundreds, thousands and finally millions of people as one man, because incredible sacrifices were made — it was only because of all this that the miracle which occurred was made possible. It was only because of all this that we were able to win in spite of the campaigns of the imperialists of the Entente and of the whole world having been repeated twice, thrice and even four times."¹

The Party's leading and guiding role in military development was clearly in evidence in the Central Committee's prompt and purposeful solution of all major questions relating to the country's defence, to the formation of the Red Army and Navy, their equipment and supply, and to the conduct of military operations. The Central Committee, headed by Lenin, analysed the military and political situation in the country and abroad in depth, mapped out basic measures to strengthen the defence potential of the Soviet Republic, worked out strategic plans leading to the defeat of the forces of external and internal counter-revolution, provided full support for the military operations, and skilfully mobilised the people and the army to defend the socialist Fatherland.

It is also much to the credit of the Communist Party that while organising the country's defence and building up the Armed Forces' fighting power, it was able to find the most efficient structure, and flexible forms and methods of political and military leadership to respond to any situation, however complex or difficult.

The entire Soviet history, the historic victories of the Soviet state over the enemies of socialism, combine to provide a striking and convincing demonstration of the validity and viability of the principle of Communist Party leadership of the Armed Forces. This principle has remained unchanged to the present day. The CPSU Programme states in this connection: "Party leadership of the Armed Forces and the increasing role and influence of the Party organisations in the Army and Navy are the bedrock of military development. The Party works unremittingly to increase its organising and guiding influence on the entire life and activity of the Army, Air Force and Navy, to

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 446.

rally the servicemen round the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, to strengthen the unity of the Armed Forces and the people, and to educate the soldiers in the spirit of courage, bravery, heroism and comradeship with the armies of the socialist countries, of readiness at any moment to take up the defence of their Soviet country, which is building communism.”¹

This principle requires military cadres to implement the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government undeviatingly, to always have the interests of the Soviet people at heart and to place the defence of the socialist Fatherland above all else.

The Communist Party’s organising and guiding role in efforts to strengthen the country’s defence potential can be seen in the unity of political, economic and military leadership. This unity springs from the very nature of a socialist society, from the conscious and purposeful character of its development, which is based on knowledge and the utilisation of the objective laws governing social development. The precise and strict co-ordination of the Party, state and military apparatuses’ work with the Communist Party playing the leading and guiding role has meant that at all stages of Soviet history it has been possible to purposefully and promptly solve all national tasks that have arisen, to concentrate the country’s political, economic and military efforts on solving urgent problems relating to its defence and to create a highly efficient army and navy.

The viability and effectiveness of this unity spring from the fact that it reflects the dependence of strategy upon politics and economics: the dependence of strategic tasks upon the political aims of war, upon the country’s economic potential and upon their close interconnection.

Maintaining a united political, economic and military leadership is effected by the entire system of socialist social relations and by the Soviet state system. The implementation of this principle allows the advantages offered by socialism to be used in a planned way in the struggle against the enemies of our state and in the strengthening of the defence potential of the Motherland.

The consistent and unswerving maintenance of this unity at all the levels of the guidance system was instrumental in achieving victory over the interventionist troops and the White Guards. The Red Army’s successes would have been impossible without the tremendous organising, ideological and educational work the Party and its Central Committee carried out to mobilise the people to throw back the counter-revolution.

The observance of this principle was of tremendous importance in achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War. The concentration of the main directing functions in a single body—the State Defence Committee—enabled the country’s leaders to make the most efficient use of the Soviet people’s varied resources to keep the country alive and to defeat the enemy.

¹ *The Road to Communism*. Moscow, 1962, p. 558.

In solving the complex and many-sided tasks involved in strengthening the defence capacity of the Soviet state, the Communist Party has unswervingly implemented Lenin's instructions on the scientific approach, objectiveness and competence of those in charge of military development at all levels and on the precise and strict supervision over the fulfilment of directives and instructions.

A scientific approach to military development is determined by the essence of leadership as a process directed at the most efficient and fullest use of the objective laws governing social development, and of the laws governing war. Lenin taught that science "reveals the operation of fundamental laws in a seeming chaos of phenomena".¹ The successful direction of military development presupposes that the reliable base of Marxist-Leninist science is constantly drawn upon.

During the foreign intervention and the Civil War the Party's implementation of the principle of scientific guidance of military development proceeded amid the bitter struggle against the "Left" oppositionists' and Trotskyites' subjectivism, spontaneity and anarchism. In overcoming their resistance the Party was building its military policy on a genuinely scientific basis, taking the young Soviet Republic's real military, economic potential into account.

The unswerving implementation of the Leninist principle of scientific leadership in military development was a major factor in the Red Army routing the interventionist troops and the White Guards during the Civil War and a crucial factor in the steadily growing defence capacity of the Soviet state during the peaceful socialist construction, and in the victory the Soviet Armed Forces won in the Great Patriotic War.

This principle is of paramount importance today. It orients the military cadres towards a profound mastery of military science and the art of war and enables them to gain an insight into the laws of warfare and to master the art of controlling troops. The scientific principle in tackling military development requires all commanding officers at all levels, staffs and political bodies to make a thorough and objective analysis of the factors influencing the troops' combat effectiveness and operational and political training and when taking decisions they should weigh up all the elements of the situation carefully, reviewing the political, military-technical, moral and psychological capabilities of their own troops and those of the enemy.

The scientific principle in the art of warfare manifests itself in the unity of theory and practice; in the commanders' ability to seek and find every opportunity and resource to heighten the troops' combat preparedness; in their ability to find the most efficient course of action when carrying out a mission; in the flexibility of operational and tactical thinking; in their ability to choose correctly the most effective forms and methods of warfare in the given situation; and in skilfully drawing on historical experience and the latest achievements of science and technology.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 201.

The scientific approach is unthinkable without the leaders being objective, without them being able to see clearly and take the facts of life into account as they are, with all their complexity and dialectical contradictions. When sorting out military problems it is essential to approach the matter in hand "in the light of factors of the war and of class relationships..."¹

Objectivity is closely bound up with a leader's competence. Lenin noted: "All administrative work requires special qualifications ... management necessarily implies competency ... a knowledge of all the conditions of production down to the last detail and of the latest technology of your branch of production is required..."²

Military leaders' objectivity and competence are even more important in this day and age what with the troops being equipped with new sophisticated hardware and weapons, and the increased complexity of organising and conducting military operations. Without an intimate knowledge of modern weapons and equipment, their characteristics and methods of employment it is impossible to organise an engagement or an operation or to exercise efficient troop control.

Verifying that orders and instructions have been fulfilled is all important if the military development is to be smooth running. The Communist Party and Lenin, when directing the Red Army's successful operations against interventionist troops and the White Guards, always stressed that skilful supervision over the fulfilment of directives and orders was a crucial component in overall military leadership. They insisted on the strictest and most meticulous fulfilment of missions and assignments set to different army groups, armies, divisions, regiments and warships. Objective, well-organised and prompt supervision meant that the weaknesses, drawbacks and mistakes could be brought to light and this helped in ascertaining the requirements of the different army groups and in responding to these needs in good time.

Improving the methods and forms of supervision and control continued during the Great Patriotic War.

The Communist Party is developing Lenin's proposition on the organisation of control in present situation and is working to make it more efficient and to improve verification techniques. The Communist Party teaches its military leaders to make assessments based on actual results. Control and verification over the fulfilment of orders is not only a matter of exposing drawbacks and flaws, it also implies a profound study, generalisation and active implementation of positive experience and the dissemination of advanced methods and techniques.

The most important principles include a *class approach towards building up the Armed Forces*. The class principle is used in the armies of all countries. But bourgeois military theoreticians try to mask the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 288.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 428.

class essence of the imperialist armies because it is thoroughly directed against the people's interests. By contrast we proclaim the class principle openly, thereby emphasising the genuinely popular character of the socialist army and its close links with the people.

The class principle in developing the Soviet Armed Forces expresses their qualitatively new essence, their new content. This principle is diametrically opposed to the class character of the imperialist armies. Whilst the army in a bourgeois state is used to maintain and consolidate the dominance of the exploiting classes, the Soviet Armed Forces safeguard the interests of the entire Soviet people and defend their great socialist gains.

The class essence of the Soviet Army was clearly in evidence in one of the first legislative acts issued by the Soviet power, Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which stated in part: "To ensure the sovereign power of the working people, and to eliminate all possibility of the restoration of the power of the exploiters, the arming of the working people, the creation of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants and the complete disarming of the propertied classes are hereby decreed."¹ As was indicated in the Declaration, the honorable privilege of defending the socialist Fatherland with arms in hand was granted to working people alone. The non-working elements of the population were to perform other military duties associated with the Soviet Republic's defence organisation.

In the early years of Soviet power the Communist Party and Lenin approached the organisational forms of the Army dialectically, and looked upon the class limitations imposed on conscription as temporary. With the victory of socialism in the USSR, the need for the limitations disappeared. The principle of full equality in the rights and duties for all citizens to serve in the Red Army and Navy started to be universally implemented directly, since the exploiters as a class had been done away with. This was based on the community of interests among the workers, peasants and people's intelligentsia which gave Soviet society an indestructible socio-political and ideological unity. The defence of the socialist Fatherland became the sacred duty of every Soviet citizen. However, even after this our army continued to retain its class socio-political content. It is still a loyal and reliable protector of the gains of the October Revolution and of communist construction. But its class nature is now directed exclusively outwards.

The determining socio-political principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces include the *unity* of the *army* and the *people*. This unity is based on the fact that Soviet power is the flesh and blood of the masses: there is a close organic and inextricable link between Soviet power and the workers, peasants and the people's intelligentsia. Lenin wrote: "The Soviets are a new state apparatus which, in the first place, provides an armed force of workers and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 424.

peasants; and this force is not divorced from the people, as was the old standing army, but is very closely bound up with the people. From the military point of view this force is incomparably more powerful than previous forces; from the revolutionary point of view, it cannot be replaced by anything else."¹

The revolutionary character and the close bond linking the Soviet Armed Forces with the people are major reservoirs from which springs their fighting power and invincibility. The Soviet people love their army and do everything in their power to continue to heighten its battle worthiness.

The Communist Party educates the Soviet people in the spirit of constant readiness to defend the socialist Fatherland; it inculcates respect for their Armed Forces. The officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces return the love and affection of the people. They are boundlessly dedicated to the people and will sacrifice themselves to safeguard the people's interests from imperialist encroachments.

The fundamental principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces include *loyalty to proletarian internationalism*. From the very first, the Red Army and Navy, in keeping with Lenin's ideas on the equality of all nations and nationalities, were formed as a single multi-national military organisation of the socialist state. Educating the Armed Forces' personnel in the spirit of friendship and fraternity among the peoples of the USSR and in the spirit of boundless devotion to the Soviet Motherland is a major condition for the monolithic strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.

On the international scene, the Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism can be seen in the community of social aims and goals, in fraternal cohesion of the socialist countries, in their armies' militant alliance and in their solidarity with the working people throughout the world. In safeguarding the class interests of their own people, the Soviet Armed Forces are safeguarding the interests of the working people of the socialist community and standing guard over their peaceful labour. Together with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries, they ensure the inviolability of the borders of the socialist community which is a major gain for the international working class. The armies of the socialist community stand vigilant guard over world peace and the people's security: their noble activity furthers the aims of all progressive mankind.

The principle of a *cadre organisation* in the Armed Forces implies that the functions of defending the socialist gains of the Soviet people can only be performed efficiently by a regular army, well trained and with a high sense of discipline. This principle was substantiated by Lenin during the foreign intervention and Civil War, and was developed further at subsequent stages of Soviet military development. Today it underlies the entire Soviet military establishment. The need for this principle is dictated by the international situation, by the responsible tasks tackled by our Army and Navy, by the sophisticated

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 103.

military hardware with which land forces and the Soviet Navy are equipped and by the associated high demands made on the quality of personnel training.

As long as the danger of war exists, including the danger of a nuclear war, the professional cadre organisation of the Soviet Armed Forces allows them to be maintained in constant combat readiness and in the event of an attack by an aggressor this means that the forces can be strategically deployed in a short time.

The principle of *centralised leadership* springs from the specific nature of the military establishment and the tasks fulfilled by the army. Its essence lies in the fact that the commanders are guided by the decisions of the Communist Party and its Central Committee and the Soviet Government and unite the efforts of their troops, orienting them towards a steady building-up of the country's defence potential, heightening the Army's and Navy's combat preparedness in peacetime and orienting them towards victory in a possible war.

The principle of centralisation can be seen in the precise delimitation of functions performed by the different bodies of military leadership, in the unconditional subordination of the lower echelons to the higher echelons, and in the maintenance of a high level of organisation and cast-iron discipline in the Army and Navy. Lenin wrote that only "a single command for all contingents of the Red Army, the strictest centralisation of the command of all the forces and resources of the socialist republics"¹ prepared the ground for the final rout of the White Guard armies and interventionist troops.

Lenin saw the principle of centralisation in the leadership of the Armed Forces as the principle of democratic centralism which underlies the Party and local government system adopted to fit the requirements of a military organisation.

Observing the principle of centralisation during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars guaranteed the effective and at the same time economic employment of the available forces and resources enabling the commanders to influence the course of military operations, using reserves flexibly and co-ordinating the actions of large and small units.

In firmly and unswervingly implementing the principle of centralisation in building up the Armed Forces the Party never let this principle run counter to creativity and initiative of military leaders, on the contrary, it welcomed boldness and independence in looking for the most efficient ways of tackling combat missions and of using available forces and resources to achieve the common goal—the defeat of the enemy.

Centralism in the organisational structure and leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces at the present stage springs from the complexity and multi-faceted nature of their present tasks. The Party is aware of this and, as the CPSU Programme states, is doing everything possible to ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-organised and a

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 404.

strong body, with a high degree of discipline and are capable of fulfilling the missions assigned to them by the Party, Government and the people, promptly and efficiently. They must be ready at any moment to administer a crushing rebuff to imperialist aggressors.

The principle of *one-man command* is closely bound up with the principle of centralism. This important organisational principle underlies the building-up of the Soviet Armed Forces. This principle took some time to become established in the Soviet Army and Navy. At the time of the foreign intervention and the Civil War, there was a shortage of commanders from among the people, trained adequately both militarily and politically, so the organisation and control of the Red Army units was based on equal responsibility of the commander and the political commissar¹—these two were responsible for the combat efficiency of the unit they were in charge of and responsible for the fulfilment of its combat missions. At the time this form of control was justified. The commissars played an important role in enhancing the combat efficiency of the Red Army and Navy.

Subsequently, with the commanders' role in the armed forces growing and with their level of political awareness rising along with their knowledge of military science and the art of warfare, military commissars were no longer necessary. Lenin drew on the experience of the Civil War concluding that the Red Army and Navy had to change to the principle of one-man command. Lenin provided convincing proofs that such a step would be both logical and, in fact, essential.

The Trotskyites and "Left" opportunists made a great fuss in opposition to this principle. Under the guise of an ill-defined collegiate principle, they were trying to establish a system of responsibility sharing in the Red Army and Navy, which, if adopted, would disorganise the military leadership. Lenin took a strong stand against the Trotskyites and "Left" opportunists. He wrote: "To refer to collegiate methods as an excuse for irresponsibility is a most dangerous evil, threatening all who have not had very extensive experience in efficient collective work; in the army it all too often leads to inevitable disaster, chaos, panic, division of authority and defeat."²

Lenin's works show up the untenability of the petty-bourgeois assertion that one-man command, as a form of organisation and leadership, ran counter to socialist social relations, that it was an attribute of the past. Lenin wrote: "...Large-scale machine industry — which is precisely the material source, the productive source, the foundation of socialism — calls for absolute and strict *unity of will*, which directs the joint labours of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity

¹ Representative of the Communist Party and Soviet Government in Army and Navy units during the period 1918-1942 (this post was abolished several times during this period).— *Ed.*

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, pp. 437-38.

of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it as one of the conditions of socialism. But how can strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to the will of one."¹ "The will of tens and hundreds of thousands of people can be expressed by one person. This composite will is achieved in the Soviet way."²

While advocating the principle of one-man command, Lenin at the same time warned against a narrow and one-sided interpretation of this principle. Leadership must not degenerate into a matter of issuing orders and edicts or into high-handed administration based on fear which could lead to an abuse of power. Lenin argued that the principle of one-man command was the basis of a system of military leadership, both politically mature and professionally competent.

The Leninist principle of one-man command rests on a Party basis. It implies that the commander represents the Communist Party and the Soviet state in his unit, that he implements the Party line and observes Soviet laws and military regulations strictly and unswervingly. The commander is personally responsible for the combat efficiency of the unit and for the successful fulfilment of the military missions assigned to it.

The Soviet commander combines power and responsibility. He is a professional, with an intimate knowledge of his particular field. He is also a skilful organiser, a leader with foresight and thoughtful educator of his men. Only when the commander combines the qualities of a political and a military leader is he able to perform his functions properly, is he able to unite and express the will of many people. In undeviatingly implementing the decisions of the Party the commander relies on the support and authority of the political organs, on the Party organisations and on all Party members in his unit.

Using the one-man command principle by no means denies collegiate forms of leadership and troop control. In the Soviet Armed Forces one-man command and collegiate leadership are found in dialectical unity at different levels thus forming an integrated system of military leadership that has thoroughly justified itself historically. Examples of this include the military councils set up in every branch of the Soviet Armed Forces, every military district and in fleets.

The principle that there must be a *high sense of military discipline* is one of the most prominent features in the Soviet Armed Forces. Lenin attached enormous importance to military discipline, seeing it as a major factor in the troops' combat efficiency. He insisted that commanders and commissars maintain a high level of order and organisation in the units in their charge. Lenin's words from his "Letter to the Workers and Peasants Apropos of the Victory over Kolchak" are well known: "He who does not unreservedly and

¹ Ibid., Vol. 27, pp. 268-69.

² Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 511.

selflessly assist the Red Army, or support order and discipline in it with all his might, is a traitor and treason-monger...."¹

Lenin showed the class content of Soviet military discipline, indicating that it was based on a high level of political awareness among the personnel of the Red Army and Navy. He wrote: "The Red Army established unprecedentedly firm discipline—not by means of the lash, but based on the intelligence, loyalty and devotion of the workers and peasants themselves."²

One of the chief reasons for our victories over the forces of external and internal counter-revolution during the foreign intervention and Civil War, and for our victory over nazi Germany and militarist Japan in the Great Patriotic War was the fact that Soviet officers and men had a high sense of discipline, moral staunchness and understood their duty and responsibility for the destiny of the socialist Motherland.

Today the importance and role of discipline have increased. The nature of a possible war, the growing complexity of military organisation and the entire military field require a strict and unconditional fulfilment of military regulations and commanders' orders, a high degree of organisation and prompt and well-coordinated action by individual troops and units.

The principle of the Soviet Armed Forces' constant readiness to repel aggression and to defend the Soviet people's socialist gains stems from the continued threat of war emanating from the imperialist states. Lenin repeatedly emphasised the exceptionally great role played by this principle and warned the Soviet people and their Armed Forces of the vital need to follow the enemy's every move, maintaining a high level of revolutionary vigilance, so as not to be caught off guard. The Communist Party, in strictly fulfilling Lenin's instructions, has been doing everything necessary to maintain the Soviet Army and Navy at a high level of combat preparedness. Today the importance of this has grown immeasurably.

Those are then the basic principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Some of them, in form at least, are similar to the principles underlying the organisation and design of capitalist armies. These include, for instance, the principles of one-man command and centralisation. But this similarity is more apparent than real. The class basis and mechanism of these principles in a bourgeois society could not be more different—they embody a system of relations inherent in capitalism which is based on the exploitation of man by man. In bourgeois armies one-man command is based exclusively on the mechanical, blind submission of lower echelons to higher echelons, and this submission is maintained by a special system involving the indoctrination of enlisted personnel. In the Soviet Armed Forces one-man command is based on all officers and men understanding their military duty, on men respecting their comman-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 553.

² *Ibid.*, p. 250.

ders who express the interests of the entire people and who enjoy the full confidence of their subordinates, on officers having authority and prestige and, finally, it is based on the inviolable principles of communist morality.

The social nature of the principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces stems from socialist social relations existing in the USSR. These relations are based, in turn, on the Soviet social and state system. These principles express the scientifically based and purposeful work of the Communist Party and its Central Committee in military development. They embody Lenin's ideas on the defence of the socialist Fatherland and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army.

The Leninist principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces convincingly demonstrated their effectiveness during the foreign intervention and the Civil War. They were later tested in military operations in the Great Patriotic War. Leninist principles are the quintessence of military experience and have fully retained their importance and relevance to this day. They are in the nature of a lodestar for the Soviet Army and Navy. They form an invaluable scientific fund.

The wealth of socio-political, military and technical experience accumulated by the Soviet military establishment indicates that the correct way to further strengthen and improve the Soviet Union's defence potential is to consistently implement Lenin's ideas about the defence of the socialist Fatherland and observe the principles underlying the development of the Armed Forces. These ideas and principles are the methodological basis for working out effective ways of preparing the country and its army to crush any aggressor. They orient one towards solving the problems involved in the most efficient use of resources of the Soviet state for its better defence.

Lenin's ideas on the defence of the socialist Fatherland, the principles underlying the development of the new-type army have been further refined and elaborated in successive CPSU congress decisions, plenary meetings of the CPSU Central Committee and in other Party documents, and these principles are used as our Party's guide to improving and strengthening the country's defences.

Chapter

II

GUARDING SOCIALISM

The strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces that occurred after the Civil War is associated with implementing Lenin's ideas on the defence of the socialist gains, with implementing by the Communist Party the Leninist policy in the field of military construction. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces continued on their heroic path. They foiled the insidious designs of imperialists who tried to transgress the inviolable Soviet borders in an attempt to destroy the Soviet state. Later, in the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces scored historic victories, thereby covering their colours with unfading glory.

**1. From the Civil War
to the Great Patriotic War**

After the end of the Civil War the young Soviet Republic entered a period of peaceful construction. However, the hard-won peace was precarious, since imperialism had not given up its plans to destroy the Soviet system. It was held back from realising its insidious schemes by the inter-state and class contradictions within the capitalist camp, which were aggravated by the economic crisis of 1920. Lenin analysed the prevailing international situation and considered there to be an equilibrium of forces albeit a precarious one which nevertheless enabled the young Soviet state to live on and grow. Relying on Lenin's conclusion to the effect that "we have ... won, not only a breathing space but something much more significant ... we have entered a new period, in which we have won the right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states",¹ the Party set about tackling the task of building socialism.

By self-sacrificing efforts, the Soviet people were attaining more and more impressive successes in the economic transformation of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 412.

their country. This enhanced the international prestige of the USSR. Between 1922 and 1925, the Soviet Union was recognised by 21 states, including Germany, Britain, Italy, France and Japan and by almost all other countries having a common border with the USSR. The Soviet Union concluded trade agreements and treaties with most of these countries and this prepared the ground for the Soviet state to breach the economic and political blockade which the imperialist reactionaries tried so hard to impose. The Soviet Union established good-neighbour relations with most contiguous countries. These relations were formalised in treaties of friendship and co-operation.

The aim of the Communist Party's policy of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states was to secure favourable external conditions for the successful construction of socialism at home. At the same time the Communist Party's international activities were permeated by ideas of internationalism, based on the community of interests between the Soviet people and the working people of all countries, and on expanding relations with the international proletariat and the progressive forces of the national liberation movement, which by their struggle gave considerable assistance to the young Soviet state.

The Communist Party's consistent drive for peace strengthened the Soviet Union's position on the international scene and frustrated imperialist attempts to isolate it and launch a new crusade to strangle the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants. The Soviet people's victories over the forces of imperialist reaction during the bitter struggle against the interventionist troops and the White Guards, the achievements of the Soviet Union on the labour front, and the Party's peace-loving foreign policy heralded a period of peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the capitalist camp which created favourable conditions for fulfilling the five-year economic development plans — a major prerequisite for strengthening the country's economic and defence might.

In pursuing its foreign policy, the Communist Party unswervingly followed Lenin's instructions to the effect that "the measures we take for peace must be accompanied by intensified preparedness for defence, and in no case must our army be disarmed".¹ Lenin saw this above all as a real guarantee against the imperialist powers encroaching on the country's independence and as the basic condition for a transition to co-operation and normal relations on a businesslike and mutually advantageous basis.

The main military task after the end of the Civil War was to effect a well-organised and orderly transition of the Army and Navy to a peace-time routine. Despite the cuts in strength it was not only necessary for the Armed Forces to maintain their battle-worthiness and combat preparedness, but also for them to be strengthened and for the country's mobilisation potential to be increased.

Basing themselves on the strategic task of defending the building of socialism, the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 453.

worked out the main guidelines at every stage of the socialist state's development. The guidelines covered the efforts to build up the country's defence potential and elaborated measures to enhance the combat efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces, and directed the activities of all state and public organisations and the entire Soviet people's efforts to establish reliable defences for the socialist Motherland. Party congresses and plenary meetings of its Central Committee discussed ways of improving the country's defence potential. The Party paid particular attention to technical equipment, improving the organisational structure of the Army and Navy, training and educating the Armed Forces' personnel and further developing Soviet military science.

The 10th, 11th and 13th Party Congresses held in 1921, 1922 and 1924 and the plenary meetings of the Central Committee held in February, March and April of 1924 played a particularly important role in fulfilling these tasks in the years that followed the end of the Civil War. These Congresses and plenary meetings mapped out ways for further developing the country's defences, laid down guidelines for a military reform so as to bring the country's Armed Forces into harmony with the prevailing military and political situation, and with the country's economic potential and the state of science and engineering. The resolution of the Tenth Party Congress on the military question noted that "in the immediate future our Armed Forces are to be based on the present Red Army, reduced, as far as possible, at the expense of the older age groups, and having a higher proportion of proletarian and communist elements".¹

A major object of the military reform was working out a suitable system of recruitment to ensure that the country had a small professional army for peace-time, requiring minimum spending, and proper military training for draftees without diverting them away from production and labour in the economy.

The result was a mixed system of recruitment that combined professional troops and territorial militia-type formations. A large proportion of the units in the border areas were professionals as were the technical and specialist troops and the Soviet Navy. The territorial troops were made up of local formations, maintained in military districts in the hinterland. As a rule, they consisted of infantry and cavalry units with a hard core of professional officers and men, amounting to 16-20 per cent of the total strength, while the rest were conscripted from neighbouring towns and villages. The combat training for the conscripted (temporary) personnel was given at annual assemblies lasting for one-three months and covered a total period of five years. Later, the territorials were put into the reserve.

This system, introduced in 1924, played a great role in strengthening the country's defence capability. It ensured that troops in the border

¹ *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of Its Central Committee* (further referred to as *The CPSU in Resolutions...*), Vol. 2, 1917-1924, Moscow, 1970, p. 264 (in Russian).

areas were in a permanent state of combat readiness, and that the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole could be quickly mobilised because the territorial formations were able to quickly reach their full war-time strength. The drawback of this system was that it did not guarantee a uniformly high level of combat training for the entire Armed Forces, which was essential for smooth combat co-ordination among the various territorial units.

The mixed system of raising an army was a forced and temporary measure. At that time the Soviet state could not afford to have a full regular army. Tsarist Russia had left the onerous legacy of an extremely backward economy that had been badly damaged by the First World War and the Civil War. In the early twenties the country's total industrial output was less than a third of what it had been in 1913, with the output of heavy industry and railway freight turnover amounting to slightly over one-fifth of their pre-war levels. In 1913 Russia held between 5th and 8th place in the world in terms of basic industrial output. The young Soviet state had to overcome enormous difficulties in order to win in the economic confrontation with the capitalist world and to restore and rehabilitate its economy as the foundation upon which to build socialism and to strengthen its defence potential.

The Communist Party decided to adopt a mixed system for raising the Armed Forces because at that time there was no direct threat of military attack on the USSR by the imperialist powers. Many of them were in the clutches of a deep economic crisis, which aggravated their internal contradictions. The Communist Party skilfully exploited the favourable situation to quickly rehabilitate the country's economy, reorganise its Armed Forces and enhance their fighting power.

The command structure was reorganised along with the transition to a mixed army. A clearly defined procedure was laid down governing service in the Armed Forces and the training of enlisted personnel. Training procedures were also improved. Standard organisation patterns were introduced, technical equipment improved, all weapons and equipment were standardised and old equipment was replaced by new.

Army regulations and instruction manuals were drawn up in line with the new tasks and level of development of the Armed Forces. These reflected the fundamentally new social basis of military development, which was radically different from that of the bourgeois armies. The regulations and instruction manuals incorporated the experience of the First World War and the Civil War as well as the requirements of Soviet military science.

There was daily concern to steadily improve the standard of Party and political work among the soldiers. The Party Rules adopted by the 14th Congress of the Communist Party contained a special section "On Party Organisations in the Red Army", which defined the rights and duties of political organs, the tasks of Party organisations in the Army and Navy, and the procedure for maintaining close ties with local Party committees. The Congress thus

formalised the results of the reorganisation of the political organs and Party bodies in the Army and Navy carried out as part of the military reform and made Party organisations in the army more responsible for the standard of political education among soldiers and for improving the quality of Party and political work among the troops.

The military reform was comprehensive in character, embracing every sphere of the Soviet Armed Forces and contributing to their gradual transformation into a modern army and a reliable defender of the socialist gains of the Soviet working people.

It should be emphasised that the complex tasks involved in further strengthening the Red Army and Navy were solved amid an acrimonious struggle with the Trotskyites, who opposed the creation of a regular army, played down the role of Party and political work among the troops, and attempted to discredit the leading role of the Communist Party in military development. The Trotskyites were given a fitting rebuff. The Communist Party's Central Committee upheld the Leninist policy in military development as the only correct and scientifically sound policy in organising and designing a defence system for the socialist Fatherland.

By the late twenties and early thirties, as a result of the Communist Party's defence measures, the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces had substantially improved. Technically, however, they continued to lag far behind the armies of the developed capitalist countries. The international situation in the meantime continued to deteriorate and the imperialist military threat to the Soviet Union, above all from German nazism and Japanese militarism, grew. The armies of capitalist countries were continually supplied with the most modern weapons and equipment.

All this accentuated the need for the Soviet Army and Navy to undergo a radical technical re-equipment to enhance their combat efficiency.

The Communist Party realised that to strengthen the country's defence potential and to successfully re-equip the Army and Navy with new weapons and hardware, it was essential to take full advantage of the Soviet state's economic success, to improve its efficiency, and build up its potential in arms production. The 17th Party Congress, held at the beginning of 1934, discussed this question as a matter of urgency. The Congress laid out a plan for expanding the mobilisation potential of Soviet industry and the whole economy. It stated that industrial facilities must be built and used in such a way that in the event of an attack by an imperialist state industry could be quickly placed on a war footing, so as to supply the Soviet Armed Forces with everything necessary to repel the aggression.

The Communist Party pursued this policy with determination and consistency. Its far-sighted policy of industrialising the country and collectivising agriculture, the planned nature of the socialist economy and the self-sacrificing dedicated labour and inexhaustible creative activity of the Soviet people enabled the Soviet Union to become a major industrial power in a short time, to lay the foundation for

further economic and technical advancement, to raise the country's military and economic potential, to create necessary conditions for a steady improvement in its defence capability and to technically re-equip the Red Army and Navy.

Thanks to the socialist transformation of its economy, in 1937 the USSR moved into first place in Europe and second in the world (after the USA) in terms of industrial output. A powerful defence industry grew up on the basis of the socialist economy, and the Soviet Armed Forces were re-equipped with new weapons and hardware. The development of new aircrafts, tanks and artillery systems, the launching of powerful surface vessels and submarines, the development of other types of weapons and equipment, including equipment for the engineers, chemical and other specialist troops were major advances in this field.

With the victory of socialism in the USSR complete, the exploiting classes disappeared from the scene and by the end of the Second Five-Year Development Plan those who remained employed in the private sector had fallen to slightly over 5 per cent. On the basis of socialist state and co-operative ownership, the alliance between the working class and the collective-farm peasantry was strengthened, as was the moral and political unity of the Soviet people and the friendship among the peoples of the USSR, who had shaken off national oppression and inequality for all time. As a result, the social composition of the Red Army improved. During the first two five-year economic development plans the number of workers among the servicemen grew 2.5 times.

The cultural revolution in the USSR was of major importance in strengthening the country's defence potential. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government consistently strove to eliminate illiteracy and to expand the network of general education schools and institutions of higher learning. The vocational and technical training of working people likewise improved. Special attention was given to instilling communist ideology and moral principles in the minds of Soviet men and women, to educating them to be conscientious towards their duties. All this meant that within a short time young workers and peasants enlisted in the Army and Navy could be turned into skilled soldiers, loyal to Party and to the people, and that the personnel of the Armed Forces were capable of gaining full proficiency in handling military equipment and weapons quickly and efficiently.

Thus, thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government a favourable situation was created for steadily building up the combat efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces and converting them into one of the world's most powerful armies.

Between the two world wars, as the Communist Party had rightly foreseen, the imperialist reactionaries did not cease their provocations and scheming. The enemies of socialism used every opportunity to try and disrupt the constructive labour of the Soviet people and to

impede the construction of the new society. Having failed to destroy the revolutionary gains of the working people during the foreign intervention and Civil War and fearful of the Soviet Union growing stronger and increasing its prestige and authority in world affairs, international imperialism repeatedly staged military provocations and armed clashes on the Soviet borders.

A case in point is the seizure in 1929 of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Chinese militarists. The Soviet Government's strong protests fell on deaf ears and the rampaging Chinese reactionaries did not take heed. The Soviet Union was obliged to set up a Special Far Eastern Army and re-establish the situation with a series of quick blows which routed the Chinese-Manchurian troops.

That was international imperialism's first attempt to try the strength of the Red Army since the foreign intervention and Civil War, and it ended in favour of the Red Army, whose troops displayed great morale, gallantry, heroism and a high standard of combat training and readiness to defeat any aggressor. At the same time it was clear that the enemies of socialism could not come to terms with the continued existence of the USSR and that a major armed clash with them was inevitable sooner or later. The Communist Party drew the right conclusion from these events and from its analysis of the international situation. It made new efforts to increase the country's defence potential and improve the combat efficiency of the Red Army and Navy. The issue of new weapons and hardware to the army units and navy vessels was stepped up.

In the late thirties international imperialism undertook yet another attempt to try the military might of the Soviet Union—this time using Japanese militarists as a cat's-paw. Japan was pursuing an anti-Soviet foreign policy and moved its forces stationed in China close to the border with the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. Their intention was to capture the Soviet Far East. In 1938 Japanese militarists invaded Soviet territory at Lake Khasan. However, the Japanese aggressors were soundly dealt with. Within a short time the Soviet Army had completely defeated the invaders, and had quickly ejected them from Soviet soil.

In May 1939, the Japanese militarists launched a second, larger attack, falling upon the USSR's friend and ally, the Mongolian People's Republic, in the area along the Khalkhin-Gol River. The Japanese aggressors had intended to reach the Soviet border and cut off the Soviet Far East from the rest of the country, eventually seizing it. The Red Army acting in co-operation with Mongolian troops once again defeated the aggressors and drove them out.

The Red Army demonstrated its high level of combat efficiency and unflinching readiness to defend the socialist gains from aggressive encroachments. But the reactionary forces of world imperialism failed to learn their lesson. They went ahead and prepared new provocations against the Soviet Union. The threat of military attack on the USSR grew especially in connection with the aggressive actions of nazi Germany.

The ruling quarters in the USA, Britain and other capitalist countries saw German nazism as a shock force in the struggle against the Soviet Union and pinned their hopes on it. They aided and abetted nazism in every way, helped nazi Germany to re-arm and tried every means to direct the aggressive aspirations of the Hitlerite clique against the USSR. The storm clouds of a new imperialist onslaught against the Soviet Union were gathering. The Communist Party closely followed the deteriorating international situation. It pursued a Leninist peace-oriented policy and made great efforts to ensure that the fascist aggressors were curbed in time and prevented from starting a war.

The Communist Party's and the Soviet Government's endeavours to ensure collective security in Europe and throughout the world were a major step in this direction. The USSR had worked out a series of effective measures and proposed that they be discussed at an international disarmament conference. The Soviet Union proposed that a clear-cut definition be given to the concepts of aggressor and aggression. Soviet delegates to the League of Nations exposed the aggressive designs and schemes of the imperialist powers and advocated that the League of Nations be converted into an effective instrument to maintain peace and to ensure the security of peoples. The USSR proposed that an Eastern Pact in Europe and a regional pact in the Far East be concluded. The drafts of these pacts detailed measures to preclude aggression, to limit aggression where it had already begun and contained a provision whereby every assistance, including military assistance, would be given to a state that was the victim or could be the victim of attack.

However, the imperialist powers, above all the USA and Britain, obstructed the conclusion of these pacts, thereby torpedoing the opportunity for joint action in curbing the war-mongers. Faced with this situation, the Soviet Government was obliged to adopt a different course of action. It concluded bilateral treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. These acts could form the basis of an all-European collective security system, but the double-dealing ruling circles in the Western countries did their best to reduce the effectiveness of these treaties, so as to preclude them playing a decisive role in the maintenance of European peace.

Through the fault of the imperialists the Soviet Government's vigorous efforts to unite the military and political efforts of the USSR, Britain and France to check the start of nazi German aggression failed. The first victim of nazi aggression was Austria, which was occupied by nazi troops in March 1938. A year later they seized Czechoslovakia. To curb the aggressor in Europe, the Soviet Union was ready to put a substantial force into the field, including 120 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, 5,000 heavy artillery pieces, 9,000-10,000 tanks and from 5,000 to 5,500 war planes.¹ Had a powerful Soviet-British-French coalition been created in a good time it

¹ See *History of the Second World War 1939-1945*, Vol. 2. Moscow, 1974, pp. 144-45 (in Russian).

would have been able to curb the rabid nazi beast. But the British and French governments, which had earlier capitulated shamefully at Munich and which had no serious intentions to check nazi aggression, torpedoed the talks held in the summer of 1939 in Moscow on a tripartite pact.

The passivity of the imperialist powers which at times degenerated into direct connivance with the aggressors only served to whet the appetite of German nazism in Europe and of Japanese militarism in the Far East. As a result mankind was plunged into the Second World War which was unleashed by nazi Germany. The war was a consequence of the uneven development of the economic and political forces of world capitalism and stemmed from the contradictions and the general crisis of that exploitative system. The war began in a way the governments of some imperialist powers had not expected, or wanted. Before undertaking his "Drang nach Osten" Hitler decided to establish a "new order" in Europe and force the countries of Western Europe to their knees.

On September 1, 1939, nazi Germany attacked Poland, thereby unleashing the Second World War. In 1940, Hitler troops overran Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, invaded France and defeated the British expeditionary force. In the spring of 1941, nazi forces seized Yugoslavia and Greece.

The Soviet Union was obliged to adopt a series of measures to ensure its own security. With the nazi attack on Poland and the collapse of the Polish bourgeois-landlord state, the nazi armies approached the Western borders of the USSR. The country's defence demanded that the nazi forces be stopped as far away as possible from the vital areas of the Soviet state: they had to be prevented from strategic deployment close to the Soviet border. It was impossible to ignore the fate of the fraternal peoples of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia who were threatened with nazi enslavement. On September 17, 1939, the Soviet Government ordered Red Army troops to enter Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. The local population gave an enthusiastic welcome to their liberators. As a result of the free expression of popular will, these areas proclaimed Soviet power and were reunited with the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia. In the summer of 1940 socialist revolution won in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. At the request of the working people of these Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were incorporated in the close-knit family of the Soviet peoples of the USSR as constituent republics. That same year, Bessarabia, an area torn away from the Soviet state in 1918 by royalist Rumania, and Northern Bukovina, whose Ukrainian population were ethnically close to their brothers and sisters in the Soviet Ukraine, were incorporated in the Soviet Union.

As a result of these measures, and also after the defeat of Finland in an armed clash with the Soviet Union, provoked by imperialist circles, the Soviet state's frontier was pushed westwards by 200-350 kilometres. That improved the strategic situation for the part of

Murmansk, for Leningrad and for the economically important areas of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. In the south-west, a bridgehead prepared by Rumania for an attack on the Soviet Union was eliminated.

Apart from advantages, the border changes created added difficulties in ensuring its reliable defence. It was essential to quickly construct fortifications, re-equip the railway network in the border areas, replacing the narrow gauge with the wider gauge adopted in the Soviet Union, to improve communications and to redeploy forces. And although this programme failed to be fulfilled in its entirety, the newly liberated areas played an important role in checking the nazi onslaught. This is where the first major battles between the Red Army and the nazi hordes took place, where the "blitzkrieg" plans of nazi Germany started to come unstuck.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government saw the full danger of the policies of the fascist states and continued to fight for a restoration of peace in Europe and in the Far East, for curbing the aggressive aspirations of fascism. At the same time everything necessary was being done to build up the Soviet Union's defence potential. The decisions of the 18th Party Congress were energetically translated into action. The 18th Party Congress laid down priority tasks for the Third Five-Year Development Plan: a rapid build-up of the major defence industries, the creation of large power and fuel reserves, and the construction of many factories and plants in the east of the country which would duplicate their counterparts in European Russia. During the three and a half years of the pre-war five-year development plan about 3,000 new industrial enterprises were commissioned, many of which turned out war supplies during the war. The Central Committee of the Communist Party had a direct hand in guiding the defence industry, sending its more experienced Party functionaries to work there and responding flexibly and without delay to the requirements and needs of war production. Thanks to the Party's constant concern, the output of the war industry grew by an average of 39 per cent annually, while the corresponding increase in the country's industry as a whole amounted to 13 per cent. All this strengthened the Soviet Union's economy and provided a reliable material basis for conducting the prolonged and difficult war that was in the offing.

At the same time a series of measures were carried out to raise labour discipline and productivity throughout the economy, and to expand training facilities to keep the country's industry supplied with skilled workers. The Soviet Union was obliged to increase defence spending. Thus in 1940 it was 56,000 million rubles, compared with 23,000 million rubles in 1938.¹ The main defence efforts were directed at stepping up the output of new weapons and equipment.

The need to introduce a series of technical improvements in the Army and Navy, dictated by the experience of the Second World

¹ See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 41 (in Russian).

War, meant that the Soviet state was faced with many important and difficult tasks. At no other time was the country's political and military leadership faced with so many major challenges and problems, especially military, for whose solution there was so little time. The formation of some twenty mechanised corps was planned for the spring of 1941. However, this plan was frustrated primarily by the inadequate industrial facilities for manufacturing the new tanks and by the extremely short time in which it was to be implemented. Equally difficult problems arose in implementing the programme for speeding up the formation of new air force units equipped with improved aircraft, and the construction and modernisation of air-fields. The development of the armoured troops and the air force was top priority on the eve of the war, and the Communist Party spared no effort in solving this problem.

Apart from re-equipping the Army and Navy, their numerical strength was increased. With the victory of socialism in the USSR and thanks to the consequent economic and political changes, it was possible to go over to a standing army organised on the basis of an officer corps. This system was adopted by the extraordinary Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on September 1, 1939, and was formalised in the Law on Universal Military Conscription. In this way, between 1939 and 1941 it was possible to boost the strength of the Soviet Army and Navy threefold, to form 125 new divisions and to improve the Red Army's combat preparedness. The Navy's power grew noticeably. Within eleven months of 1940 alone a total of 100 new warships were commissioned. The anti-aircraft defences were improved as were the airborne troops.

The command structure of the Soviet Armed Forces was substantially reorganised. In particular, because of its wider functions and increased role, the Headquarters of the Red Army was reorganised into a General Staff. The guidance of the country's Armed Forces became more flexible and competent.

The Communist Party's Central Committee paid close attention to improving the combat and operational training of troops and the co-ordination between different units and formations on the battlefield. The Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee held in March 1940 demanded that the People's Commissariat for Defence effect a radical restructuring of the training and education system for the Army and Navy, that all exercises and games be made as realistic as possible and that the training of commanders be improved.

The decision of the Plenary Meeting helped strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces, raising the troops' combat and operational training and improving their combat efficiency. The entire training process, including games and exercises, was conducted on a higher level.

Soviet military science made impressive progress. Soviet military experts drew valuable conclusions aiding military development, improving the technical equipment of the Armed Forces, and further developing the Soviet art of war.

The educational work among the troops and on warships improved, and the political steeling of the Armed Forces' personnel rose accordingly. The Communist Party put through a series of measures to improve the activities of Party organisations in the Army and Navy and to increase the proportion of Party members among the commanders. In early 1941, there were over 500,000 Communists in the Army and Navy, over three times as many as in early 1938.

The titanic efforts of the Communist Party and of the whole of the Soviet people resulted in an impressive improvement in the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet Army and Navy were a match for the most powerful capitalist armies in terms of combat efficiency and as far as morale was concerned they were far superior. A durable foundation had been laid for the defence of the Soviet state. Today, when we can judge the significance and importance of each pre-war event on the basis of historical experience, it becomes quite clear that the decisive prerequisites for repelling imperialist aggression had been created by the economic, political and cultural successes of the pre-war five-year development plans, and by the might of the Red Army and Navy, which was a direct result of the successful progress in building socialism in the USSR.

2. A Victory of Historic Importance

Nazi Germany's sneak attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, interrupted the peaceful and constructive labour of the Soviet people and meant that all the country's resources had to be mobilised immediately so as to repulse the invader. This very complex task was successfully fulfilled by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party.

The Soviet Union was dealt a stunning blow. By the time of its attack on the Soviet Union Nazi Germany had built up a military and economic potential that drew on the resources of the occupied countries of Western Europe as well as on its own economy. On the eve of its attack on the USSR, Nazi Germany produced 2-2.5 times more metal, electric power and coal than the Soviet Union. In 1941 German industry manufactured over 11,000 combat aircraft, over 5,000 tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, 30,000 artillery pieces, and large quantities of other military equipment and weapons. The Nazi army fully mobilised and deployed for the attack had a numerical preponderance over the Soviet forces in the border areas and fleets of 90 per cent in manpower, 50 per cent in medium and heavy tanks, 130 per cent in combat aircraft of the latest models, and 20 per cent in artillery pieces and mortars. Most of the Nazi units had gained battle experience in the West and had made careful preparations for the war of aggression. The Soviet Union had to take on a very powerful and well-organised military machine.

The enemy armies, well-trained and armed to the teeth, drove hard to reach the country's vital centres. The Soviet state found itself in an

extremely difficult situation. However, the enormous difficulties did not break the spirit of the Soviet soldiers, nor did they shake the staunchness of the people or their boundless faith in the victory of their righteous cause. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, the Soviet people, both in the front line and on the labour front in the country's interior, defied the most unfavourable conditions and displayed unprecedented mass heroism, self-sacrifice and almost super-human staunchness and courage.

During the Great Patriotic War, the organising and guiding role of the Communist Party in the defence of the socialist gains was once again demonstrated with new force. The Party had firm belief in the inexhaustible energies of the Soviet people, in their loyalty to the cause of communism and in their capacity to defeat the aggressor, despite the difficulties and privations.

On the day war began, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government issued a patriotic appeal to the nation. By exposing the criminal aims of the nazi aggressor, by showing nazi aggression's threat to the country's very existence and by demonstrating the just character of the Soviet Union's part in the war, the Communist Party and Government led the people in a sacred war against the enemy.

The Communist Party's Central Committee clearly defined the tasks for the Party and Soviet bodies in converting the country's economy to a war footing in the shortest possible time in order to supply the Armed Forces with everything they needed. The Party and Soviet organisations in areas adjoining the front line were induced to start partisan warfare behind enemy lines. The Communist Party consolidated the unity of the people and their Armed Forces. The frontline troops and the people on the labour front joined forces to form a single mighty fist. The directive of June 29, 1941, issued by the USSR Council of People's Commissars and by the Central Committee of the Communist Party demanded "a relentless struggle with the enemy to defend every inch of Soviet soil, a fight to the last drop of blood, defending our towns, cities and villages, a display of the courage, initiative and ingenuity so typical of our people.... In enemy-occupied areas partisan detachments and sabotage groups are to be formed to fight enemy troops ... to harass the enemy and its henchmen in every way, to pursue and destroy them at every step and to foil its actions and plans".¹

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces responded to the Party's and Government's appeal with enthusiasm and gave their full backing to the programme for defeating the enemy. The Soviet soldiers and sailors, aware of their responsibility for the future of their country, stood as one man to defend their Homeland. They displayed high moral and combat qualities both in the course of heavy defensive battles and during offensive operations. The reverses of the first days of the war did not break their will. Workers at factories and plants and

¹ *The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents 1917-1968.* Moscow, 1969, p. 300.

collective and state farmers in the country's interior were self-sacrificing in discharging their duties honourably and in giving their best to supplement the country's war effort. A grassroots movement was launched under the slogan "All for the front! All for victory!"

When the war began, the Communist Party took the war-time conditions into account and regrouped its membership, changing the forms and methods of Party work to fit the exigencies of the war effort. This can be seen above all in the tightening-up of organisational centralism and in a certain curtailment of the Party's collegiate organs, and in the redistribution of resources and forces in the interests of a successful war against the enemy. The Communists' responsibility for maintaining Party discipline, and fulfilling the decisions and assignments of the higher Party bodies with dispatch and without deviation was raised. Extraordinary forms of Party guidance were introduced everywhere. To unite the efforts of the rear and frontline troops and to direct the activities of all state bodies and Party and public organisations in repelling the aggression and defeating the enemy, an extraordinary agency was set up — the State Defence Committee under J. V. Stalin. The Committee was vested with supreme power in state administration. It guided the economy's switch-over to the war effort and the mobilisation of every resource and means for the war. The State Defence Committee laid down guidelines for the utilisation of the country's Armed Forces and defined the military and political tasks of the Supreme Command and of the Red Army and Navy as a whole. It acted to improve the structure of the country's Armed Forces, took decisions on their strength, the procedure and delivery dates for equipment, weapons and ammunition in the light of the military situation and the potential of the Soviet economy. The Committee also took decisions on every other major question.

In the areas adjoining the front line, defence committees were formed in cities and towns. Party organisers from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, from the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and from the regional Party committees were assigned to the major industrial enterprises. In the initial, most difficult, period of the war, Party organisers from the Central Committee worked at a total of 1,170 factories and plants. Extraordinary Party bodies were set up in the form of political sections at machine-and-tractor stations and at state farms to strengthen and improve Party leadership in agriculture. A network of political bodies was set up to guide the activities of the political sections: political departments that were responsible to the People's Commissariats of Farming and State Farms of the USSR and the Union Republics, and political sectors that were subordinated to territorial and regional agricultural authorities. All told, over 14 political departments, more than 200 political sectors and 7,200 political sections were set up.¹

¹ See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, p. 166.

In the Armed Forces themselves the posts of military commissars was re-introduced. Military commissars were assigned to all the regiments, divisions and warships, to the headquarters, military academies and military schools, and to the Red Army and Navy agencies. Political instructors were assigned to companies and batteries.

The Communist Party, by relying on a centralised and flexible system of leadership, brought every area of national life under its firm control and concentrated the energies of the Soviet people, directing them to the paramount goal of defeating the nazi invaders. The Party guided the nation's struggle with confidence and determination.

As in the years of the foreign intervention and the Civil War, the Party mobilised its best forces to strengthen the army. Many members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties in the Union Republics, territorial and regional committees and other governing Party bodies, were sent to the front line in the early days of the Great Patriotic War to work as members of military councils, heads of political bodies, as deputy commanders of units for political work. Under a decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces were supplemented with 8,800 prominent Party functionaries in the first six months of the war. All told, the Red Army and Navy were joined in this period by over 1,100,000 Party members.¹ By setting an example of personal courage, staunchness and heroism the Party members inspired the rank-and-file soldiers to feats of courage and gallantry, and cemented the ranks of those defending the socialist Motherland.

Under the guidance of the Central Committee, the country's economy and the whole of the national life were re-gearred to the war effort. The basic branches of the economy went over to military production. In the incredibly difficult and complex situation prevailing at the time, a large number of industrial enterprises were evacuated and moved to the eastern areas. During the period from July to November 1941, a total of 1,523 industrial enterprises were evacuated from areas adjoining the front line. These included 1,360 large plants which were of a predominantly military character. Production was quickly resumed at their new location. There had never been anything before remotely resembling the Soviet people's labour exploit in those grim days. As a result, the country was able to neutralise the enemy's preponderance in the output of military equipment and weapons and later to exceed his war production.

Military mobilisation measures were one of the most important areas of Party work from the first days of the war. As a result of an express instruction from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, homeguard divisions were formed along with volunteer units. A total of 5.3 million men were mobilised for the Armed Forces with the active support of the local Party organisations. These swelled the

¹ Ibid., pp. 171-72.

ranks of the regular army within the first eight days of the war.¹ These impressive manpower reserves meant that many new units could be formed and these later played an exceptionally important role in the war. The army in the field was supplemented by 291 divisions and 94 brigades within the first five months.² The mobilisation proceeded amidst tremendous patriotic uplift.

The Party and Government took the experience of the first battles with the enemy into account, and improved the military machine so as to bring it into line with the changed situation. Measures were taken to speed up the developments of new types of tanks, combat aircraft and artillery systems. The Armed Forces' organisational forms were improved. The Army and Navy units were given increased fire power, mobility and manoeuvrability.

Everyday one could see more and more results of the Party's strenuous work, and the enthusiasm and patriotism of the Soviet people who had risen to a man to wage a sacred war against the nazi invaders. The resistance to the invaders continued to stiffen. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government having turned the country into a single military camp, as Lenin had taught, mobilised tremendous material and manpower resources, the entire forces of the Soviet state, to throw the enemy back and thereby create the essential conditions to defeat him.

Even in the opening months of the war the Red Army dealt more and more powerful blows at the nazi invaders, scored quite a few victories, and above all gained valuable time. In the bitter defensive battles the Soviet forces destroyed and wore down the elite divisions of the strong and experienced enemy, inflicting losses upon him which he could not make up. The first tank engagement near the towns of Lutsk, Brody and Rovno; the valiant defence of Brest, Kiev and Odessa; the defeat of nazi forces near Tikhvin and Rostov; and the tenacious defence of Leningrad and Sevastopol dispelled the nazi High Command's illusion of easy victories of the sort it had won in the West, while the battle of Smolensk frustrated its plan to break through to Moscow in its stride.

The historic Battle of Moscow was a decisive hallmark in the first year of the war. This is where the main army groups of Soviet and nazi forces clashed in life-and-death combat. This is where the enemy was defeated in the bitter fighting and eventually hurled westwards from the Soviet capital. Hitler's adventurist blitzkrieg plan had fallen through.

Our victory in the Battle of Moscow was of tremendous military and political significance, as it marked the beginning of the turning of the tide. German nazism suffered its first major military setback in the Second World War. The myth that the nazi Wehrmacht was invincible was dispelled. The peoples of the world regained their belief in the

¹ See *Fifty Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR*, Moscow, 1968, p. 257 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, p. 273.

real possibility of crushing the aggressor. The defeat of the nazi forces outside Moscow came as a grim precursor of the ultimate defeat of nazi Germany. The Hitlerite clique was faced with the prospect of a protracted war, something it had not bargained for.

In the summer of 1942, bitter fighting flared up on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front where a major nazi army group had breached the front. This fighting developed into two major and interconnected pivotal events of the war—the great battle of Stalingrad and the battle of the Caucasus.

Having created a heavy preponderance in manpower and equipment, particularly in heavy weaponry, such as tanks, aircraft and artillery, the enemy had succeeded in breaking through to Stalingrad and the Main Caucasian Range. The nazi invaders had planned to cut off the Volga, the country's major transport artery, to capture Baku and to overrun the Caucasus, thereby forcing the Soviet Union into an impossible economic position so that it would have to capitulate.

However, the nazi offensive in the South came up against the unconquerable staunchness of the defending Soviet forces at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. The nazi command's strategic plan fell through in the same way as the blitzkrieg plan did in 1941.

The battle on the Volga ended in the encirclement and complete rout of a 330,000-strong enemy group. The Red Army displayed unparalleled heroism and excellent combat skill in the epic battle of Stalingrad. The city came to symbolise the staunchness, courage, valour and gallantry of Soviet soldiers. The victory at Stalingrad was a crucial military and political event. The battle was a major contribution to the turning of the tide in the Great Patriotic War and indeed in the whole of the Second World War.

In the North Caucasus, the Soviet forces wore down the attacking nazi troops in bitter defensive operations. The enemy had been trying to break through to Baku and the port of Tuapse. Soviet forces later launched a counter-offensive and inflicted a decisive defeat on the enemy after bitter battles at Novorossiisk and Taman, in the Salsk steppes and outside Rostov.

The destructive wave of nazi aggression that had reached the banks of the Volga and the Main Caucasian Range had petered out and was turned back. In January 1943, the Red Army dealt a new blow at the Hitlerite armies as a result of which the blockade of Leningrad was run and the city's siege, which had begun in September 1941, ended. The Soviet Armed Forces were dealing the enemy more and more blows of mounting force. The Soviet forces launched an offensive almost along the entire front from Leningrad in the north to the Caucasus in the south in a series of successive operations in the winter of 1943. At some points along the front they threw the enemy westwards as much as 600-700 kilometres and liberated an area of some 500,000 sq. km. These victories had implications far beyond the Soviet Union.

The blows the Red Army dealt the enemy caused dissension within the fascist bloc and aggravated the internal political and economic

situation inside Germany and its allies—Italy, Rumania and Hungary. Japan and Turkey were forced to have second thoughts about joining Germany in her war against the USSR. In most nazi-occupied European countries the national liberation movement gained ground and resistance to the nazi regime stiffened. The prestige of the Soviet Union in the world kept mounting.

During the third year of the war in the great Battle of Kursk, nazi Germany made its final attempt to wrest the strategic initiative and lost. In the opening stage of the battle the Soviet forces assumed deliberate defensive positions on favourable terrain unlike their defensive tactics in 1941 and 1942. The object was to bleed the advancing enemy grouping white and wear it down. The rout of the enemy was completed when the troops of the Soviet fronts launched a determined counter-offensive which later developed into a general offensive from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. In the Battle of Kursk as many as 30 nazi divisions (almost one-fourth of them armoured divisions) were destroyed along with over 3,700 combat aircraft. As a result, the Soviet Air Force won total superiority in the air which it retained to the end of the war.

After the Battle of Kursk the nazi command failed to build up an equally powerful attacking force in any of the subsequent operations. The nazi army was forced to adopt defensive tactics which was shown by the creation of the Eastern Wall and the "scorched-earth" zones. This was the outward sign of the agony of the mortally wounded beast. The barbarity of the nazi occupation troops reached its ugliest forms. In his blind fury the enemy burnt and destroyed everything that could be destroyed and burnt. At home the nazis carried out a total mobilisation. Fearing the inevitable day of reckoning, they now sought to drag out the war in order to play on the contradictions among the members of the anti-Hitler coalition and to conclude a separate peace with Britain and the USA.

But this insidious plan was foredoomed to failure. The Soviet forces' large-scale offensive operations to liberate the Ukraine east of the Dnieper and the Donbas area, and to force the Dnieper on a broad front, their offensives outside Leningrad, in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and in Byelorussia, in Moldavia and in the Baltic republics resulted in the nazi enemy being ejected from Soviet soil. A new stage in the war had begun. In 1944 the Red Army began liberating the peoples of other European countries from nazi bondage and completing the defeat of nazism.

In the grim opening days of the Great Patriotic War J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the State Defence Committee, stated, on behalf of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, that the aim of this war was "not only the removal of the danger hanging over this country but also assistance to the peoples of Europe groaning under the yoke of German nazism".¹ The Red Army in its successful offensive

¹ *The Communist Party in the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-1945)*. Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1970, p. 149 (in Russian).

operations outside the Soviet Union gave disinterested assistance to the peoples of a number of European countries in liberating themselves from the nazi yoke.

The final act of the Second World War in Europe was the gigantic Berlin operation which culminated in the complete rout of a million-strong enemy grouping. Nazi Germany was vanquished and its representatives were compelled to sign the act of unconditional surrender, which marked the ignominious end of Hitler's military gamble which cost mankind scores of millions of victims.

With the defeat of nazi Germany the principal seat of the Second World War was eliminated. But the flames of war continued to rage in Asia and in the Pacific. In fulfilment of its commitments to its allies, on August 8, 1945, the USSR declared war on imperialist Japan. The country was forced to take this measure. For over 20 years the Japanese militarists had hatched plans to attack the USSR so as to seize the Soviet Far East. On repeated occasions they had attempted to turn their plans into reality. During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union had to keep up to 40 divisions covering its borders in the Far East to discourage a possible Japanese invasion.

In the space of 23 days the Red Army units acting in co-operation with the armed forces of the Mongolian People's Republic routed the Kwantung Army, the main striking force of Japanese militarism. Imperialist Japan surrendered. Thus, the last seat of the Second World War was stamped out in the Far East.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War had historic repercussions of world-wide significance as it exercised vast influence on mankind's entire post-war history. The gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution were upheld and consolidated. The Soviet Union's prestige in the world grew immeasurably. The Soviet Armed Forces not only performed their national mission but a great international mission as well. They saved mankind from the nazi "new order" and liberated the peoples of many European countries from nazi bondage. The Red Army played a decisive role in liberating Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia from nazi occupation. The Red Army's operations in these countries were backed by their population. And if Europe has had the longest period of peace since the beginning of the century, and if mankind is now looking into the future with confidence then the peoples of our planet know that they are largely indebted to the Soviet Union for this, and to its victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In the Far East, the Soviet Armed Forces cleared the Japanese imperialists from areas of North-East China and North Korea, extending selfless fraternal help to the peoples of those countries.

The defeat of fascism and militarism coupled with the intensified activity of the democratic forces prepared the ground for victorious socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries. This eventually resulted in the formation of a mighty world socialist system.

The Soviet Union's victory in the last war set off a powerful wave of national liberation movements in colonial and dependent countries. Imperialism's world colonial system has collapsed.

The influence of the Communist parties increased greatly. Their number grew from 61 in 1939 to 76 by September 1, 1945, and their membership increased several-fold.

The Soviet Union had won a war which in its scope, intensity and impact on post-war world development exceeded past wars in every respect. History knows few examples when such traumatic setbacks early in a war were so dramatically reversed and where the aggressor, having scored fairly impressive success in the opening stages, eventually suffered complete defeat.

After their victory in the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union had every reason to repeat Lenin's prophetic words to the effect "our cause is strong; that no matter what attempts are made to invade Russia and no matter what military moves are made against us — and in all probability many more will be made — all these attempts will go up in smoke as we know from our actual experience, which has steeled us".¹

3. The Soviet Union's Decisive Contribution to the Defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperialist Japan

The Second World War drew 61 countries into its orbit. Their combined population was 1,700 million, three quarters of the world total. Military operations raged on three continents — Europe, Asia and Africa. The war had been prepared and unleashed by international imperialism, of which German nazism was the main striking force. The victory over nazi Germany had far-reaching implications for the subsequent course of world developments. Many countries contributed to the final victory over nazism, but it was the Soviet Union which bore the brunt of the nazi aggression. The Soviet Union waged the sacred Patriotic War not just to maintain its own freedom and independence, but to secure the triumph of progress and democracy throughout the world.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people merged with the liberation struggle of many other peoples who had been subjected to the yoke of nazi occupation. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" stated that an important contribution to the struggle against nazism was made by the Resistance movement which developed on a large scale in the enemy-occupied countries. The annals of the anti-fascist struggle contain a chapter devoted to guerrilla warfare and to the national liberation forces' armed uprisings and heroism. The Communist and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 329.

Workers' parties were in the front ranks of the struggle against mankind's most dangerous enemy. The Communists showed themselves to be true patriots and internationalists and consistent fighters for the freedom and independence of their nations. The peoples and armed forces of the states members of the anti-Hitler coalition made a great contribution to the common victory over the enemy. At the same time we in this country take legitimate pride in the fact that it was the Soviet Union that was the main force that blocked the path of German nazism towards world domination and that the Soviet Union bore most of the burden of the war and made the decisive contribution to the rout of nazi Germany and later to the defeat of militarist Japan.

Before it attacked the USSR, nazi Germany had not encountered any serious resistance from anyone and had scored easy military victories. All that was changed when the nazi Wehrmacht invaded the USSR. The centre of gravity of the Second World War immediately shifted to the Soviet-German front and the armed struggle assumed a particularly intense and uncompromising character.

From the first to the last day of the war the Soviet-German front tied down the bulk of nazi Germany's armed forces. The nazi command committed 55-77 per cent of its land forces, over half its air force and its best armoured divisions to the Soviet-German front. Thus, on June 22, 1941, out of a total of 217.5 nazi divisions¹ the nazi command concentrated 153 divisions on the Soviet-German front; on November 1, 1942, out of the total of 268.5 nazi divisions, 193.5 operated on the Soviet-German front. After the allied landing in Normandy in the summer of 1944, the importance of the Soviet-German front did not become any less. The Red Army was confronted by as many as 235 enemy divisions which was 70 per cent more than the nazi force opposing the allies in the West.

For 1,418 days of the war between the Soviet Union and nazi Germany bitter battles raged without stopping for a moment. No other front or theatre of the Second World War knew anything like the intensity of military operations that unfolded on the Soviet-German front. Nowhere else, did this occur, neither in Western Europe nor in Africa, nor in South-East Asia, nor in the Pacific.

The Soviet Armed Forces' victories in the crucial battles and engagements of the Great Patriotic War decisively influenced the entire course and outcome of the Second World War. There is incontrovertible evidence to prove this, evidence we have already mentioned in the previous section of the book. Let us now consider a few of the more telling examples.

Before the Battle of Moscow, the nazi invaders believed themselves to be invincible and concentrated on offensive operations. That was the situation during the first two years of the Second World War. However, in December 1941, five and a half months after nazi Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union Hitler was compelled

¹ To obtain the number of divisions, two brigades are assumed to be equivalent to one division.—Ed.

to order his troops to assume strategic defence on the entire Soviet-German front. For the first time the whole of the nazi army halted its advance not because the nazi command wanted to, but because it was compelled to in the face of the stiffening resistance and the steadily mounting blows struck by the Soviet Armed Forces.

As early as May 1942, less than one year after the start of the Great Patriotic War, President Roosevelt praised the Red Army's contribution to the defeat of nazism when he said: "...I find it difficult this spring and summer to get away from the simple fact that the Russian armies are killing more Axis personnel and destroying more Axis material than all the other twenty-five United Nations put together."¹

There were new and crucial battles on the Soviet-German front in 1942. The nazi command still refused to believe that its aggressive plans had suffered a complete fiasco and planned a new offensive so as "to finally destroy the remaining forces at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them as far as possible of the principal military economic centres. To this end all the Wehrmacht's available forces and the armed forces of our allies are to be used".

As Hitler's directive indicates, the nazi command was again concentrating its main efforts on the Soviet-German front. It was here that the nazi command planned to reach its basic objectives in the Second World War. However, this new plan, like the ill-starred blitzkrieg plan, was foredoomed to failure. The Red Army's victory in the Battle of Stalingrad played the decisive role in foiling this plan and in inflicting a new major defeat on the nazi aggressor. This victory resulted in the destruction of a huge nazi force.

Some people in the West have tried to belittle the importance of the Battle of Stalingrad and play down its part in the Second World War. Some Western historians and memoir writers would have us believe that the Red Army's counter-offensive on the Volga depended on the victory of British troops at Alamein in North Africa for its success, or they seek to equate the importance of the two battles. But nothing could be farther from the truth. For one thing planning and preparation for the Soviet counter-offensive on the Volga started in mid-September 1942, over a month before the British 8th Army launched its offensive at Alamein. Hardly anyone at that time could predict the outcome of the British offensive with confidence. Therefore, in planning to defeat the enemy at Stalingrad, the Soviet command reckoned exclusively on its own forces and resources.

Secondly, the North African theatre and the Alamein operation simply cannot be compared to what happened on the Soviet-German front and at Stalingrad in terms of the numerical strength of the forces involved and in terms of the implications of the defeat inflicted on the nazis. The German and Italian forces operating in North Africa totalled a mere 14 divisions and one brigade. Of this only four German and eight Italian divisions were involved in the Battle of Alamein

¹ *The New York Times*, October 20, 1955, p. 10.

proper. The Nazi forces operating on the Soviet-German front totalled 258 divisions and 16 brigades, with over 50 divisions concentrated in the Stalingrad sector.

The battle of Alamein resulted in the destruction of four Italian divisions and even that largely because they were left to their fate by the German command. The rest of the Italian and German forces, although badly battered, retreated in good order along the Mediterranean coast to the west. Unquestionably the Alamein operation influenced the course of events in the North African theatre and created favourable conditions for a subsequent series of successful operations by the Anglo-American forces and navies in the Mediterranean. Herein lies its local significance which had little or no effect on the subsequent course of the war.

By contrast, during the great battle on the Volga the Soviet forces routed 48 enemy divisions and three brigades, twelve times more than the British 8th Army did in the battle of Alamein. The Hitlerites' losses in killed and prisoners of war at Stalingrad were almost twenty times greater than their losses at Alamein. During their offensive operations in the area between the Don and Volga rivers alone (July-November 1942) the Germans lost up to 700,000 officers and men in killed and wounded, over 1,000 tanks, over 2,000 guns and mortars and more than 1,400 aircraft. During the Red Army's counter-offensive from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943, the German army's and its allies' losses amounted to over 800,000 officers and men, about 2,000 tanks and assault guns, over 10,000 artillery pieces and mortars, up to 3,000 combat and transport planes and over 70,000 road vehicles. The enemy's total losses in the Battle of Stalingrad exceeded one quarter of the total strength of the German army operating on the Soviet-German front.

Wehrmacht General Westphal wrote later: "The disaster at Stalingrad profoundly shocked the German people and armed forces alike.... Never before in Germany's history had so large a body of troops come to so dreadful an end."¹

Their losses were so great that the Nazi forces were obliged once again to assume the defensive all along the Soviet-German front just as they did after their defeat outside Moscow in 1941. After the Battle of Stalingrad the German forces failed to achieve any significant success anywhere on the Soviet-German front. At the same time the stage was set for a steady build-up of Soviet forces and resources which enabled the Soviet Army to launch large-scale offensive operations to throw the Nazi invaders from Soviet soil.

The next crucial event of the Second World War was the Battle of Kursk. Some writers in the West have attempted to belittle its importance, while others pass it over in silence. Here it will be timely to remind them of the importance Hitler himself attached to the Battle of Kursk. On the eve of the German offensive he issued an order of the day which stated in part: "This ... operation will not only fortify

¹ *The Fatal Decisions*, London, 1965, p. 184.

our own people, not only impress the rest of the world but will above all inspire the German soldier with new faith. The faith of our allies in the final victory will be strengthened, while the neutral states will be obliged to exercise caution and restraint. The defeat which Russia is bound to suffer at the end of this offensive is bound to wrest the initiative from the Soviet leadership for the near future if it does not have a decisive impact on the subsequent course of events generally ... the success of this first great battle of 1943 will play a greater role than any other, ordinary victory.”¹

The foregoing indicates that Hitler counted on victory in the Battle of Kursk hoping it would boost the waning morale of his army, buoy the drooping spirits of the German people still reeling from the shock of the Stalingrad fiasco, and at the same time bolster up his own standing in the world, which rested exclusively on a barbarous employment of armed force. However, the outcome of the Battle of Kursk brought the Hitlerites to the brink of catastrophe. Yet another traumatic defeat for the nazi forces shook the aggressive bloc as well as the Whermacht and Germany to the foundation.

After the Red Army's victory at Kursk, the USA and Britain clearly saw that further procrastination over the opening of a second front would be against their own interests, and that the Soviet Union was able to defeat the enemy and liberate the peoples of Europe single-handed, without the Anglo-American forces. Whilst our allies only decided to open a second front against nazi Germany on paper before the Battle of Kursk, afterwards, in the summer of 1943, they were compelled to give serious thought to landing their forces in Northern France. This is how President Roosevelt assessed the situation after the Battle of Kursk: “At that, by next spring, the way things are going in Russia now, maybe a second front won't be necessary.”² The military situation compelled the United States and Britain to change from talking about a second front and making promises whilst in fact employing dilatory tactics and a strategy of “minor actions” to practical action.

The Second Front was opened on June 6, 1944. However, by that time the defeat of nazi Germany was on the cards anyway. By the spring of 1944, according to the nazi command, it had lost over 5.5 million officers and men, scores of thousands of artillery pieces and mortars, tanks and aircraft in bitter fighting on the Soviet-German front. These losses exceeded the strength of the nazi army that invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. To replace these losses, the nazi command rushed troops from Western Europe and other nazi-occupied territories to the East. From the start of the war to 1944, a total of over 200 divisions were transferred to the East. According to Zimmerman, the former Chief of the Operations of the Western Front's Army Staff, “In fact it would be no exaggeration to

¹ Quoted from *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short History*, 2nd Edition, Moscow, 1970, p. 242 (in Russian).

² Elliot Roosevelt. *As He Saw It*. New York, 1946. p. 156.

say that the Western Army was steadily drained of all its able-bodied manpower and of all its supplies for the Eastern Front."¹

The Red Army dealt the enemy crushing blows during 1944, knocking Germany's satellites, such as Rumania, Finland, Hungary and Bulgaria out of the war and clearing the invaders out of Soviet territory. Thus Germany remained alone, the only warring country in Europe,² opposing the anti-Hitler coalition. The Second Front which the Soviet Union's Western allies opened very late in the day could not exercise the same influence on the course of the Second World War that it could have done had it been opened at the start of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War.

The principal role that the USSR and its Armed Forces played in defeating nazi Germany is also proved by the fact that during the war a total of 607 enemy divisions were destroyed on the Soviet-German front, whereas the Anglo-American troops operating in North Africa, Italy and Western Europe defeated and took prisoner only 176 enemy divisions and most of them in the concluding period of the war when nazi Germany was on the brink of surrender. In the war against the USSR nazi Germany lost 10 million in killed, wounded and POWs which was three quarters of its total losses in the Second World War.

The Soviet Armed Forces made a decisive contribution to the victory in the Far East. The entry of the Soviet Union in the war against militarist Japan made the latter's further resistance far more difficult. A new front was opened, stretching for over 5,000 kilometres. One of Japan's most powerful land army groups operating in Manchuria, Korea, in the south of the Sakhalin Islands, and in the Kuril Islands was engaged by the Soviet forces. On August 9, 1945 within hours of the start of the Soviet offensive, the Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki was forced to concede in an address to a meeting of the Supreme Military Council that "the entry of the Soviet Union into the war this morning places us finally in an inescapable situation and makes the further continuation of the war impossible".

As in its war against nazi Germany, the Soviet Union pursued resolute aims in its confrontation with Japan: routing the Kwantung Army, the core of Japan's land forces, and forcing Japan to surrender unconditionally. The resoluteness of aims and the fast rate of the Soviet Army's offensive are the reasons behind the short duration and high effectiveness of the operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces. Before the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, the USA did not count on a speedy conclusion of the war. It planned for military operations to continue into 1946. The conclusion of the Second World War was nowhere in sight. The war, if it had continued, would have taken thousands of lives more. It was only through the intervention of the Soviet Armed Forces that further slaughter was averted.

¹ *The Fatal Decisions*, p. 194.

² Italy was forced out of the war in 1943.—*Ed.*

Against the background of these historical facts the Western press' assertions that it was the US atom bombs on Japan that clinched its defeat do not hold water. These assertions contradict the experience of wars. To be sure, atom bombs are a powerful weapon, but it is common knowledge that a new weapon can only have a decisive influence on the course of a war if it is used on a mass scale. The US only dropped two atom bombs on Japan, and these could not have had a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. Military history shows that the greatest effect in a war is achieved by the defeat of the enemy's principal grouping. The US Command did not use the new weapon against enemy manpower, but against cities, which did not have any major strategic or economic importance.

In assessing the Soviet Union's fulfilment of its allied commitments in the far East and its decisive contribution to the defeat of militarist Japan, we cannot but recall the grim days of 1941-1943, when the Soviet Union found itself in incredibly difficult circumstances, while the USA and Britain were in no hurry to extend effective assistance to their ally locked in a life-and-death battle with nazi Germany. The USA and Britain were looking for victory in North Africa and in the Mediterranean, but never in a determined struggle against nazi Germany's main forces. This made the war more protracted and bloody. The main burden of the war effort fell on the shoulders of the Soviet people and their army. The USSR could not allow a similar situation to develop for its allies in the Far East. The Soviet Union used its available forces and attacked Japan's powerful grouping of land forces, thereby speeding up the victorious conclusion of the Second World War.

Thus, the Soviet Union's participation in the war against nazi Germany and militarist Japan was of a resolute character which excluded any compromise. This country made the principal contribution to the victory and no inventions of bourgeois falsifiers of history and no amount of juggling with facts and events can belittle the decisive role played by the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in achieving victory over the aggressors.

4. The Lessons of the War

The Great Patriotic War, the bloodiest war in history, ended in victory for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Armed Forces covered themselves with immortal glory. They carried aloft the victorious Red Banner in the bitter struggle, which was unparalleled in scope and intensity, against a powerful and cunning enemy. They carried it through the inferno of sanguinary battles and eventually raised it over the lair of vanquished nazism as a symbol of the triumph and invincibility of socialism. The Soviet Army carried out its historical mission as the defender of everything progressive and advanced from encroachments by the forces of aggression and reaction. The Soviet Armed Forces continue their noble mission as a powerful factor for

maintaining world peace and tranquility in a fitting manner today.

The experience of the long and grim Great Patriotic War is of tremendous importance. This experience is priceless because it is the brightest chapter in the annals of the entire world revolutionary and liberation movement.

What are the lessons of the Great Patriotic War?

First of all, it should be said that the Soviet Union's victory was in no way a matter of chance, something the bourgeois falsifiers of history would still have us believe. They seek, for instance, to explain away the defeat of the nazi army by referring to the unfavourable natural and geographic conditions prevailing in the USSR, by the fact that the nazi forces were ill prepared and by referring to the blunders committed by the Wehrmacht Command. But neither the cold, nor the snow, nor the boundless expanses of the Soviet Union nor even the blunders of the nazi command (which were many as a matter of fact), had a decisive impact. *The Soviet people's victory and the defeat of the forces of nazism and militarism were both natural and historically predetermined.* Herein lies the first and the principal lesson of the Great Patriotic War. A good knowledge and consideration of the laws which enabled the Soviet state to secure victory in the most savage and trying of all wars ever fought by this country are of tremendous importance for a correct understanding of history and equally for the successful solution of present-day problems involved in military development.

It should be noted above all that the Soviet Union's victory had deep-seated social roots. It had been prepared by the entire course of the Soviet state's historical development, by the objective opportunities inherent in socialism and by the advantages of the socialist social and state system over the capitalist. Marxism-Leninism teaches us that in reality in the struggle between two polarised tendencies, between two fundamental principles, that which is new, advanced, developing and to which the future belongs always gains the upper hand. The last war was an acid test of the *socialist social system* on all levels, and this system emerged from all trials with flying colours to prove its viability and unquestionable superiority over the capitalist system in all basic areas: in the economics, politics, ideology and in the military field.

The war provided a convincing demonstration of the mighty power of the *socialist state and political system*. One of the Soviet state's distinguishing features is that it has the publicly owned basic means of production as well as the instruments of political power at its disposal. That is why the Soviet state was in a position to influence the war effort more flexibly and efficiently than any capitalist state could.

History shows that the ability of a state to win a war depends above all on its social nature, class and political principles and equally on the popular masses' attitude to the state and the war.

The Soviet Union as the mainstay of the working people of the world pursued just, liberation aims in the war and defended socialism, the most advanced state and social system. The Soviet socialist

system called powerful motive forces of the new society into being and set them in motion. These included the ideological and political unity of the Soviet people, resting on the indestructible alliance of workers and peasants; ardent Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism; and the friendship among the peoples of the USSR and their cohesion around the Communist Party. This enhanced the power of the Soviet Armed Forces several-fold, it gave them unprecedented staunchness and faith in the justness of their cause.

The experience of the last war confirms that the strengthening of the Soviet state and the socialist social system is a crucial condition for maintaining peace in the world. The imperialist reactionary circles have always relied on force in pursuing their policy and force is the one thing they respect. It is from this position that they build their relations with other countries, trying to decide their destinies as they see fit, and to further the interests of the capitalist monopolies. In this situation if the Soviet Union's defence potential or the combat efficiency of its armed forces slacken or weaken the imperialists can exploit this to further their aggressive aims.

The Soviet Union's victory was only to be expected because *the entire economic might of the Soviet state was behind the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces during the war*. This victory was a victory for the Soviet economic system as a whole, and for its war economy in particular. The Soviet system created the most efficient economic organisation not only for solving national economic tasks in peace-time, but also for mobilising all available economic resources and opportunities in war-time. Overcoming the incredible difficulties of the war years, the Soviet economy kept the army in the field supplied with everything necessary for victory, maintaining a steady flow of weapons, ammunition, equipment, food and clothing.

During the Great Patriotic War Soviet industry produced 137,000 aircraft, 104,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 488,000 artillery pieces — more than was produced by Nazi Germany.¹

The Soviet economy not only replaced the army's losses in weapons and equipment, but by steadily stepping up war production created adequate stocks for meeting the growing needs of the army in the field.

Public ownership of the means of production, socialist relations of production, planned economic management, the masses' labour heroism and the leadership by the Communist Party combined to enable the Soviet economy to win the dramatic and tense economic battle with the capitalist economy of Nazi Germany and of almost the whole of Western Europe.

The post-war economic successes of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries were possible because of socialist relations and mutually advantageous co-operation, which enabled the socialist states to increase their share in the world economy. This creates

¹ See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, p. 644 (in Russian).

favourable conditions for increasing their economic influence on the world scene and for winning the economic competition with the capitalist system. It is also one of the basic conditions of the steady strengthening of the defence might of the socialist community of nations.

Our victory over nazi Germany and imperialist Japan was also attributable to the fact that *the whole of the great Soviet people was its architect*. It was the Soviet people who decided the outcome of the war and who demonstrated their revolutionary staunchness, their dedication to socialism, their loyalty to the Communist Party, their ideological monolithic unity, their moral and political cohesion and their unbending will and mass heroism for the world to see.

The victory of socialism in the USSR cemented the Soviet people's unprecedented moral and political cohesion, their identity of interests and the unity of the Party and the people and of their will and actions. It elevated the conscious creative activity of the working people to a new level. The Soviet people decisively influenced the course and outcome of the war by fighting on the battlefield, working with self-denial on the labour front in the rear and by giving the army in the field every help and support possible.

The Great Patriotic War showed once again the truly unlimited power of the popular masses when they are organised and inspired, providing their energy is channelled into the achievement of a lofty goal and providing these masses fight a sacred war to maintain their freedom and independence, for the great ideals of communism.

The people's role as the makers of history is growing. It is the people who create material and cultural values. But only under socialism are the people united; only under socialism do they act as one man. Under socialism the people generate a high moral and political spirit in the firm knowledge that they are full masters of social life, the architects of peace and military victories, and the reliable defenders of their country. For only under socialism do the interests of all classes and social groups blend. Therefore, the people of a socialist state are unconquerable. The steady strengthening of their unity and cohesion, the rising level of their creative activity and consciousness, the education of the Soviet people to have a communist attitude to labour and military duty, and their unshakable loyalty to the socialist Motherland have been and continue to be the cause to which the Communist Party and the Soviet Government devote their unflinching attention.

Another major source of our victory in the last war was *the friendship among the peoples of the USSR*. The Soviet system guaranteed genuine equality of all nations and nationalities inhabiting the USSR. It guaranteed economic progress and a flourishing of the national cultures in the Union republics. It united and enhanced several-fold the potential and strength of the great multi-national family. Every Soviet people contributed to the rout of the nazi aggressor.

In the post-war period this country scored signal successes in building communism. The friendship among the Soviet peoples has become stronger and the relations between classes and social groups and between nations and nationalities have become closer and more harmonious.

The Soviet Armed Forces are an integral part of the Soviet people. They epitomise our society, concentrating its best features in themselves. During the Great Patriotic War, the men of the Soviet Armed Forces displayed exceptionally high moral and combat qualities. Engels' prophetic words to the effect that the victorious proletariat would form an army whose men would operate with tactical competence and skill on the battlefield and would leave the soldiers of the capitalist society far behind in terms of power and dexterity have been vindicated.¹

The Soviet people fought the imperialist aggressors to maintain the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution and then went on to build the bright edifice of socialism. In this process of historical rejuvenation the people themselves changed. The personnel of the Red Army and Navy had no match anywhere in terms of their political, moral, psychological and combat qualities. The men of the Red Army and Navy fought against the enemy with deep conviction in the justice of their own cause. The mass heroism and self-sacrifice was a daily occurrence and a quite conscious act. Their deep love for their Motherland and their boundless devotion to the Party and the people inspired the officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces to display heroism and were a crucial factor in their victorious march.

In the first three years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces had to wage a gruelling struggle, practically single-handed, against the most powerful army in the capitalist world. The Soviet people had to strain every nerve and sinew to win this struggle. No other state would have been able to survive in the face of the unfavourable conditions that existed in the opening stages of the war and no other army in the world would have been able to maintain its morale and ability to deliver crushing blows to the enemy, no matter what the odds. Far from wavering before the nazi onslaught the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces withstood the attack and went on to completely rout enemy.

Contrary to the expectations of our enemies the Soviet Armed Forces emerged from the war stronger and more powerful. While preparing the attack on the USSR, Hitler boasted: "It is to be expected that the Russian Army upon the German forces' very first blow will suffer a greater defeat than the French army in 1940."² He was echoed by the nazi General Jodl, who even predicted exactly when the Red Army would be routed. He said: "Within three weeks of

¹ See Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 7, S. 482.

² Helmuth Greiner, *Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung 1939-1943*, Wiesbaden, 1951, S. 326.

our attack this house of cards will collapse.”¹ The course and outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet Armed Forces’ victory over the nazi army made nonsense of these adventurist expectations and boastful predictions and showed the spurious nature of their military theory.

One of the basic prerequisites of our victory in the last war was the fact that *the Soviet people and the men of their Armed Forces were educated in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology.*

The war was a life-and-death struggle between two polarised ideologies: socialist ideology, the most humane, and nazism, the most reactionary and misanthropic. The Soviet people won an ideological victory as well as a military, political and economic one.

During the war years Marxist-Leninist ideology asserted the noble ideas of a sacred war against nazism, for a durable peace and security for all nations and for a bright future for all mankind. From these ideas the Soviet people drew inspiration for a titanic exploit: for heroism on a mass scale.

The chauvinism and racialism of nazi ideology were closely linked with the most rabid anti-communism, frank social demagoguery and the worship of the cult of force. By preaching the alleged “superiority of the Aryan race” and by calling for the enslavement of other peoples the nazis succeeded in befuddling a sizeable proportion of people. But the fighting spirit of soldiers brought up on such “ideals” could not be strong and indeed it broke down when it came up against the mighty fighting spirit of the socialist army whose mission of liberation was the historic task of defending mankind’s progress.

The defeat of nazism was a triumph for the humane and life-asserting socialist ideology, was a demonstration of its indisputable advantages over the corrupt and wicked ideology of nazism.

One other major factor of the Soviet people’s victory in the last war was *the Leninist internationalist policy of the CPSU which ensured the cohesion of all anti-fascist forces.* The task of defending the socialist Motherland and defeating nazi Germany and imperialist Japan was regarded and tackled by the CPSU in close association with providing help and support to peoples fighting for their national independence and liberation from the yoke of nazism and militarism. For their part, these peoples helped the USSR by tying down a proportion of the enemy forces and by weakening the fascist bloc from within and on the front lines.

Having routed the shock forces of world imperialism, the Soviet people had discharged their internationalist duty to the full.

In its present foreign policy the Communist Party is consistently abiding by the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism. Herein lies one of the reasons for the Soviet Union’s steadily growing prestige in the world. Historical experience has shown that the stronger the unity of peace-loving forces and the greater the economic

¹ Quoted from *The Nuremberg Trial. A Collection of Materials*, in seven volumes, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 597.

and military might of that bulwark of world peace, the socialist community, then the more reliable is the guarantee of security for all freedom-loving peoples.

Our victory in the Great Patriotic War was only to be expected because *the Soviet people's struggle against the imperialist aggressors was led by the Communist Party, that tried and tested political leader of Soviet society.* The Communist Party purposefully guided the country's defence preparations. The Party's strategy rested on the granite foundation of Marxism-Leninism, on taking full account of and using the laws of social development and the laws of war. The Communist Party ensured that the economic, moral, political, scientific, technical and defence potentials of the Soviet state were made the most use of to completely rout the aggressor.

During the war the organisational genius of the Party showed itself with special force. The Party roused the Soviet people to a war of liberation. It defined its objectives and tasks, and inspired the Soviet people to great deeds on the battlefield and on the labour front. It geared the country's economy to the war effort and guided military operations with competence and skill. The Soviet people had implicit faith in the Communist Party and won through following its leadership.

One of the most important conditions for the victorious conclusion of the war was the correct and efficient organisation of state administration and conduct of military operations. The concentration of political and military leadership in a single organ—the State Defence Committee—meant that the efforts of the Soviet people and the activities of all Party, Soviet, military, economic and trade union bodies and organisations could be geared to achieving the paramount goal—victory over the enemy.

The guiding role of the Communist Party is the immutable foundation of state administration and military development today. The Communist Party develops military science on the basis of a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation and the alignment of military and political forces in the world, taking the laws of social development and the achievements of science and engineering fully into account.

The Soviet Union's victory over the imperialist aggressors showed everyone the indestructible strength of the USSR's economic and political foundations, the unprecedented cohesion and unity of its peoples, their unshakable will to win and staunchness in struggle. The outcome of the war shattered the expectations of imperialist reaction which had first banked on the Soviet state being defeated and later, when this did not come to pass, on the Soviet Union's exhaustion in the protracted and bloody struggle. The reactionary quarters wanted to see the Soviet Union weakened into a second-rate power by the end of the war so they could dictate their will in deciding on the shape of the post-war world.

After sustaining losses similar to those of the Soviet Union, any bourgeois state would have been unable to get back on an even keel

for a long time and would have inevitably found itself dominated by the major imperialist countries. The Soviet Union escaped this fate. Despite the tremendous losses in manpower and economic wealth, it continued as a major power, was able to heal the wounds of war quickly and in addition provide assistance to the forces of democracy and progress throughout the world. The USSR's international position and contacts were strengthened substantially as one can see from the fact that at the end of the war 49 states maintained diplomatic relations with it against 25 before the war.

As the CPSU's Theses on the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution emphasised: "The Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War most convincingly demonstrated that there is no power on earth capable of crushing socialism, and bringing to their knees a people dedicated to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, loyal to the socialist Motherland, and united around the Leninist Party. These results are a stern warning to the imperialist aggressors, and a harsh and unforgettable lesson of history."¹ The lesson here is that any military gamble the imperialists care to take against the USSR is doomed to failure. All potential aggressors would do well to learn this lesson from the Great Patriotic War.

The second lesson the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War as a whole taught is that *world imperialism is the real aggressor and this makes preventing a new and even more sanguinary world war even more urgent. The aggressive forces of imperialism must be curbed in good time to ensure lasting peace throughout the world.*

Now that we have access to nazi Germany's secret archives we have found sufficient evidence confirming that the nazi aggression against the USSR was the result of more than twenty years of careful planning by international imperialism, particularly by its German contingent. For all the chequered pattern of international events in the thirties, for all the contradictions within the capitalist world, one fact remains indisputable and that is that the powerful nazi army which attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, had benefitted from the contributions, direct and indirect, by other imperialist states. Between 1924 and 1930 not less than 63,000 million marks were funnelled into German industry. Over 30,000 million marks came in the form of foreign loans, mainly from the USA.²

Without these loans and technical assistance provided by the USA and Britain, without the policies of Versailles and Locarno, and without the Munich deal, the rulers of nazi Germany would have been unlikely to unleash the Second World War and the nazi army would have been unable to build up the formidable potential it had when it attacked the Soviet Union. The nazi army was the mailed fist of world imperialism.

¹ *50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Moscow, 1967, p. 22.*

² Albert Norden, *Lehren deutscher Geschichte*, Berlin, 1950, S. 74.

The rulers of nazi Germany succeeded in knocking together a bloc of imperialist states united under the black banners of aggression. These included fascist Italy, monarchic Rumania, Horthy's Hungary, and Mannerheim's Finland in Europe and militarist Japan in Asia.

Nazism and militarism—those two most reactionary imperialist forces were a very great danger to peace and socialism. Their aggression could have been prevented if they had been countered by a common front of peace-loving and progressive forces within the capitalist countries and on the world scene. But this did not happen.

The war which the aggressive imperialist states unleashed did not assume a global character immediately. For over a year and a half it smouldered as a series of local campaigns which the aggressors waged to conquer individual countries. Many countries declared war on Germany and Japan, but refrained from active military operations against them. Their impunity encouraged the aggressors and whetted their appetites. Their aggressive actions failed to unite all the anti-Hitler forces. Unfortunately, this unity did not come about until much later, when nazi Germany had already attacked the USSR and when the nazis had occupied almost the whole of Europe and when the men in Berlin were hatching their plans for world domination.

These days the globe is covered by a web of imperialist blocs and a network of crippling treaties. The arms race is continuing and in the major regions of the world armed forces equipped with up-to-date weapons and hardware are placed on full alert. In such a situation the imperialist reactionaries' aggressive actions may trigger off a world war much sooner and lead to far more disastrous consequences than was the case in the Second World War. On repeated occasions the reactionary imperialist quarters have pushed mankind to the brink of a new world war by launching numerous military conflicts. In this situation all peace-loving forces must be very vigilant, united and close-knit in their struggle to foil the schemes of the aggressive imperialist quarters. That is why the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, in close co-operation with the fraternal socialist countries and other peace-loving states and supported by progressive forces everywhere, are following a policy of maintaining peace and strengthening international security. The Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU is the hard core of this policy.

The third lesson from the last war is that *it exposed the most dangerous and characteristic method imperialism uses to unleash wars*. In preparing an aggressive attack the German General Staff staked all on the overwhelming power of the first surprise attack with massed tanks, aircraft and motorised infantry and on swift operations to seize vital centres. Hitler's strategists based their plans on a lightning war. They banked on achieving an easy victory to be followed by the total plunder of the resources and national wealth of the conquered countries and the physical extermination of millions of people.

Perfidy and invading other states without declaring war were the norm for the imperialist aggressors. Japan followed the example of

nazi Germany and launched a surprise attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbour. In more recent times the Israeli aggressors exploited the element of surprise to conquer Arab lands.

By launching a surprise attack, the imperialist aggressors present all people, including their own, with a *fait accompli*. People find themselves drawn into the vortex of bloody events in spite of their will, and this makes it almost impossible for them to curb the aggressors from within. A surprise attack places the victims of aggression at a disadvantage. On no account should we ever forget this.

When the threat of aggression arises it is vital to closely watch the potential enemy's military preparations and to expose his plans and intentions so that necessary and timely measures can be taken to repel any attack. Failure to do this enables the aggressor to seize the initiative from the start and makes it very difficult for the victim to wrest it back later. Vigilance is all the more important now that far more powerful weapons of war than ever before are at the command of the belligerents.

One can count on a favourable outcome of the first engagements provided the country which is attacked knows what is about to happen in advance and has been able to master adequate armed forces and is fully mobilised and ready to conduct military operations on the basis of a well-designed system of contingency planning.

The experience of 1941 is very indicative in this respect. Before invading the USSR, the German Command deployed its forces in good time. By relying on several powerful army echelons, the enemy was able to build up overwhelming superiority in manpower, artillery, tanks and aircraft along narrow sectors of the front. The Soviet forces in the border areas were deployed late, lacked a fully deployed operational and strategic order of battle and were distributed excessively in depth. This allowed the nazi army to deliver the first blow with overwhelming superiority, to seize the initiative and to attack the Soviet forces in the border areas one by one as they moved up to meet the enemy.

This unfavourable situation meant that in the first few weeks of the war the Soviet Command could not build up a single strike force and was compelled to commit forces to the battlefield successively and at long intervals.

Today a high level of preparedness is more important than ever before. The nature of modern war is such that should the imperialists unleash it, very little time will be available for organising a counter-attack. This means that the element of surprise has acquired a new dimension and added urgency. Therefore, the element of surprise had become more important. To the same extent the importance of assessing the situation on the eve of a war correctly and in good time and of adopting suitable plans to deal with the situation has grown.

It is also essential to co-ordinate planning procedures and the rates of war production so as to place the armed forces on full alert when this is warranted after a careful assessment of world events and the

degree of the danger from imperialist aggression. Perfecting the weaponry and military hardware available and replacing old weapons and equipment with new types must be based on a correct assessment of the situation, and be in line with the country's military policy and strategy. In this connection the Communist Party's and the Soviet Government's timely measures to strengthen the country's defence capacity and augment the fighting power of its Armed Forces are quite understandable and justified.

Finally, we should mention one other important lesson from the last war. This is that *Soviet military science and the art of war, being products of a socialist social system, have indisputable advantages over the military theory and the art of war as it is in the moribund capitalist world.* This was one of the major conditions of our victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Indeed, Hitler's armies were not saved from their ultimate defeat either by their overwhelming preponderance in manpower and material on the eve of their attack on the Soviet Union, or by the tremendous economic resources from almost the whole of Western Europe, which were placed at the service of the nazi Wehrmacht, or the element of surprise or the social and class demagoguery which poisoned the minds of the German soldiers with chauvinist and nationalist ideas.

The war brought out the most characteristic features of Soviet military science, including its commitment to Party ideals and principles, its class-motivated approach, its creativity and dynamism, its broad research, its speedy introduction of the latest achievements, its bold and flexible use of operational, tactical and strategic solutions, and the strict objectivity and depth of its scientific predictions.

Soviet military art was outstanding because of its high level of combat activity, its singleness of purpose, and its flexibility in varying the forms and methods of operations to suit the requirements of a fluid situation on the battlefield. Soviet strategy solved the complex problems involved in deploying the Soviet Armed Forces simultaneously with conducting strategic defensive operations in the unfavourable conditions prevailing in the opening stages of the war. Soviet strategists wrested the strategic initiative from the Germans in brilliant style and proceeded to conduct strategic offensive operations on a broad front which culminated in the complete rout of the enemy.

Soviet operational art and tactics involving all the arms and services of the Soviet Armed Forces were raised to a high pitch of perfection in the course of the war.

Tremendous creative organisational work went into the many successful preparations and the many outstanding generals exercised efficient troop control, including A. I. Antonov, I. K. Bagramyan, S. S. Biryuzov, A. M. Vasilevsky, N. F. Vatutin, K. A. Vershinin, N. N. Voronov, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, S. G. Gorshkov, A. I. Yeremenko, G. K. Zhukov, M. V. Zakharov, I. S. Isakov, I. S. Konev, N. I. Krylov, N. G. Kuznetsov, R. Y. Malinovsky,

K. A. Meretskov, K. S. Moskalenko, A. A. Novikov, F. S. Oktyabrsky, I. Y. Petrov, M. M. Popov, K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin, V. F. Tributs, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, V. I. Chuikov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, I. S. Yumashev, and others. An important contribution was made by S. M. Budyonny, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. K. Timoshenko, whose names were well known to the Soviet people from the days of the Civil war.

Maintaining the socialist gains required that Soviet military science and the art of war be developed further and perfected in accordance with the overriding need to prepare the Soviet Armed Forces for repelling potential aggression.

The major lessons of the Great Patriotic War which we have examined above do not, of course, exhaust the full value of the tremendous military experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces, an experience which is of great significance for further efforts to enhance their military might, strengthen the country's potential and develop military science. The task now is to carefully study this experience and use the lessons of the war in the struggle against the enemies of socialism. The Communist Party tells us that the practical application of historical experience is not the same as blindly copying or mechanically applying that experience to the exigencies of the present. Only a sensible combination of the conclusions drawn on the basis of historical experience and the problems of today can bring success. Assimilating historical experience, particularly the experience of a complex social phenomenon like war, can be of great practical help when it is based on the principles of the Marxist-Leninist Party spirit and on a comprehensive, objective and creative analysis of historical events.

We must bear in mind that there is a different alignment of military and political forces in today's world and that the weapons of war have undergone vast qualitative changes. Therefore, the present task is not to look for outward similarities in events or recurrent pattern of historical situations, but to grasp the undercurrents and the historical laws, and to study the major factors and root causes which determined the course and outcome of the last war. Only through an analysis of the dialectical interconnection of historical events, only by indentifying the cause-and-effect relationships between them, can we establish a logical sequence of continuity and the successive stages of the ongoing historical process, and on this basis advance contemporary military science in a creative spirit.

The heroic combat record and evolution of our Armed Forces from a poorly equipped army based on a mixed system of personnel recruitment to the mighty army it is today, which has triumphed over the most powerful imperialist armies, is eloquent testimony to the correctness of Lenin's behests and the Party's line on the defence of the socialist Motherland and on organising an efficient military establishment.

Chapter

III

THE NEW STAGE

The Soviet Union's victory over nazi Germany and militarist Japan, imperialism's main striking force, in the Great Patriotic War resulted, on the one hand, in a weakening of the entire capitalist system, and, on the other, in an expansion and strengthening of socialism. Radical changes have occurred throughout the world because of this historic victory and the Soviet Union's increased prestige. Socialist revolutions have triumphed in a number of European and Asian countries, as a result of which a mighty community of socialist countries has emerged. The workers' movement in the capitalist countries has gained momentum and expanded as Communist and Workers' parties have grown and become stronger. The tide of the national-liberation movement has continued to rise and the infamous colonial system of imperialism has collapsed under its pressure. Capitalism has finally ceased to be the unchallenged dominant force in the world.

This does not mean, however, that the danger of new wars has been removed. Even though imperialism has proved unable to regain the vantage points it lost and obstruct mankind's march along the road of progress towards socialism, it still has the power to plunge the world into a new world war. Therefore, we should be vigilant every day and every hour. That is why the Communist Party is constantly concerned to strengthen our state's defence capacity and improve our Armed Forces' fighting strength. Their high level of combat preparedness is an important guarantee of peace and security in the world, a guarantee that the constructive labour of the Soviet people will not be interrupted by the schemes and intrigues of imperialist reaction.

**1. The Further Growth
in the Soviet Armed Forces'
Fighting Power**

Having maintained the freedom and independence of their country in a life-and-death struggle against imperialism, the Soviet people were able to resume their peaceful labour. They had the tremendous task of

rehabilitating the country's war-torn economy and of stepping up the pace of economic development so as to strengthen the socialist gains and confidently build a communist society in economic competition with capitalism.

The following statistics indicate the size of the problem and the extent of the damage caused by the Hitlerites. Over 20 million Soviet people perished in the war. The Nazi invaders destroyed and burned 1,710 towns and urban settlements and over 70,000 villages. They destroyed over 32,000 industrial enterprises, put a total of 65,000 kilometres of railway track out of commission, plundered and sacked thousands of collective and state farms, machine-and-tractor stations, hospitals, schools, research establishments and cultural institutions. The direct and indirect damage was estimated at 2,600,000 million rubles (in pre-war prices). The output of basic industrial products after the war was only two-thirds of its pre-war level.

In these incredibly difficult conditions, the Communist Party set the people the priority task of rehabilitating and developing heavy industry and transport facilities, restoring agriculture and the industries producing consumer goods, stepping up technological progress in every economic field and on this basis strengthening the Soviet Union's defence capacity and equipping the Soviet Armed Forces with the latest weapons and military hardware. The solution of this task depended upon the internal and external conditions in which the Soviet Union found itself in the post-war period.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people set to work with great enthusiasm. The conversion of the country's economy to civilian production and its further progress was facilitated by the measures the Party and the Government adopted to cut military spending, so as to increase investments in the economy, and to convert a large proportion of the industrial enterprises previously engaged in military production to civilian output. The country's industry, agriculture and other economic spheres received many skilled workers as demobilised officers and men rich in practical experience and organisational skill returned to civilian occupations.

The Soviet Union's increased prestige in the world enabled the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to pursue consistently and firmly a peace-oriented foreign policy, and at the same time to give a more vigorous rebuff to imperialist reaction. The Soviet Union emerged victorious from the Great Patriotic War and was no longer alone. The USSR was joined by new states which were energetically building socialism and which, together with the USSR, presented a common front on foreign policy issues. Not a single question of importance on the world scene could now be decided without the participation of the USSR and the other socialist countries. The influence of Soviet proposals to reduce world tension increased, and the endeavour to check imperialism's aggressive actions against the socialist community became more effective.

In the meantime the general crisis in the capitalist system continued to deepen. A powerful national-liberation and anti-imperialist movement developed in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Many peoples could now look forward to real possibilities of winning freedom, independence and social progress.

However, despite the sharp weakening of capitalism's position in the world, the reactionary quarters of the imperialist powers continued to think in the old categories of dictation and violence. They refused to reckon with the objective course of historical development; they would not see that in the changed situation any attempt to solve international disputes by force of arms was an extremely dangerous line of action. Right after the end of the last war, imperialist reaction launched a barrage of hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union, thus starting the cold war. The imperialists began openly calling for a new crusade against this country, demanding that a pre-emptive strike be made with nuclear weapons. Under the spurious hypocritical slogan of defending the "free world" from the "communist menace" the aggressive forces of imperialism stepped up their arms race, created "defence zones", set up military bases and equipped their armies with up-to-date weapons and hardware. The US and British imperialists were particularly zealous. Under their pressure a series of aggressive military blocs were feverishly set up, including NATO, SEATO and CENTO. A far-flung network of military bases and bridgeheads was created around the Soviet Union and the young socialist states.

It is quite understandable that when faced with this situation, the Communist Party and Soviet Government, while continuing its policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems, were obliged to see to it that the defence capacity of the Soviet Union and the fighting power of its Armed Forces were continuously increased and enhanced. The Soviet Armed Forces' weapons and military hardware continued to be perfected and improved on the basis of an in-depth study of the lessons of the last war and the wealth of their accumulated experience. The organisational structure of the Army and Navy was improved, as was the troops' combat and operational training. The USSR's development of missiles and nuclear weapons was of tremendous significance for increasing its defence potential. This measure was made necessary to deprive the United States of its monopoly in nuclear weapons. It knocked the main weapon of blackmail and threat out of the militarists' hand and in the end they were obliged to reckon with the growing might of the Soviet Union.

The Party congresses and plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee held in the post-war period played an important part in building up the Soviet Union's defence potential as they mapped out ways for further economic advance, creating the material and technical base of communism and educating the new man, the builder of communist society. While answering these important questions, the Party never lost sight of the country's security, of increasing its

defence potential and heightening the fighting power of its Army and Navy. The resolution of the 24th Congress of the CPSU on the main report of the Central Committee to the Congress, states: "The Congress notes with satisfaction that the Party and its Central Committee constantly focus their attention on questions of developing the Soviet Armed Forces, of strengthening their might and combat capability. The utmost enhancement of our country's defence might and the education of Soviet people in the spirit of keen vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great gains of socialism must remain one of the most important tasks of the Party and the people."¹

The life of the Soviet Armed Forces, the training of their personnel and their political education are the centre of attention for the Central Committee of the CPSU and its Political Bureau. Meetings of the Political Bureau and plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee discuss defence matters on a regular basis and review the state of affairs in the Army and Navy. The Central Committee of the CPSU closely follows the military and political situation in the world; identifying the possible sources of war and defining what must be done at different historical stages so that the country's economy is properly organised and that everything necessary is being done to prevent the technical equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces from lagging behind.

Party and Government leaders meet the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces during exercises, games, conferences and during receptions in honour of the graduates of military academies and on other occasions. This plays an important part in guiding the Army and Navy in their day-to-day activities. These meetings symbolise the unity and unbreakable links between the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, on the one hand, and the Communist Party, the Government and the Soviet people, on the other. They reflect the daily concern shown by the Central Committee of the CPSU for constantly improving the ideological level and fighting skill of the officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces, for improving the training of commanders, political officers, and military engineers and technicians, for keeping the Armed Forces' technical equipment and logistical support up to date, and for strengthening the militant alliance between the Soviet Army and the armies of other socialist countries.

At the present stage in our military development the leading role of the Communist Party in guiding the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces is being further heightened. This is an objective law which springs from the conditions in which efforts are being made to steadily strengthen the country's defence potential, including the complexity of the international situation which necessitates a profound analysis of the political and military strategic situation in the world; the essential military, economic, social and political problems of military development which demand that the whole range of available

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU. p. 228.

opportunities and prospects of the further progress of the Soviet state be taken into consideration; the need to continuously develop the creative activity of the Soviet servicemen and to improve their communist education; the increased dimensions of the international tasks facing the Soviet Army and Navy and heightened responsibility for their fulfilment. All these problems can only be successfully tackled under the guidance of the Communist Party, which influences every aspect of life and work in the Soviet state and in its Armed Forces. Only a Party equipped with a Marxist-Leninist theory is capable of keeping the full range of political, economic, social and military phenomena and events under careful review, subject every aspect of the country's socio-political life to an in-depth analysis, and map out the correct road in building communism, in defending its righteous cause and in strengthening world peace.

In enhancing the country's defence might and improving its Armed Forces' combat preparedness, the Communist Party is faithfully following Lenin's behests, and its own scientifically sound policy of directing the country's Armed Forces, a policy which is adequately supported by the Soviet Union's political, economic and military resources and fully meets the exigencies of building communism.

The Soviet Union's high level of economic development enables it to tackle any defence task with success and to develop up-to-date means of modern warfare. The fulfilment of successive national economic development plans ensures a steady improvement in the Soviet Union's defence capacity, making it possible to safeguard the Soviet people and the socialist community from the danger of imperialist aggression, and improve the standing of peace-loving and liberation forces throughout the world.

The steady progress of the socialist economy, the brilliant achievements of Soviet science and technology and the dedicated work of the Soviet people have combined to change the face of the country's Armed Forces. Truly revolutionary changes have occurred in the technical equipment of the Soviet Army and Navy which are being supplied with up-to-date weapons and military hardware. Their organisational structure is also improving. The art of war, the theory and practice of training and educating the troops and Soviet military science as a whole, have all shown marked improvement.

Notable changes have occurred in every arm and service of the Soviet Armed Forces, changes which have altered the relative importance of each. The backbone of the fighting power of the Soviet Army and Navy is the *Strategic Rocket Forces* which have absorbed the latest advances in science and technology to a greater extent than any other single arm or service. These forces are equipped with ICBMs and intermediate-range missiles, with fully automated control facilities, and they are on full alert round the clock ready for an instantaneous retaliatory strike at an aggressor.

The Land Forces are numerically the largest single arm of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their fire power and shock force, mobility and manoeuvrability are most impressive and continually rising.

Operational and tactical missiles which are continually being perfected are the main component of the land forces' fire power. At the same time conventional fire power such as rifled and rocket artillery, anti-tank weapons and mortars, all of which will be widely used in the event of a new war, are being further improved.

Soviet motorised infantry and armoured forces have changed considerably. The basis of their shock force is their armoured component. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers are well protected with armour plating, mount rapid-fire machine-guns and other guns, and are fitted with efficient instruments for safe navigation and accurate fire. They also have increased mobility, manoeuvrability and a long service life. The fire power of the motorised infantry and tank forces has increased greatly through the personnel being equipped with automatic small arms and a variety of anti-tank and other weapons.

The performance of the Land Forces' anti-aircraft defences are improving all the time. Considerable advances have been made in perfecting anti-aircraft missiles and the associated radar equipment; advances which have increased their range of action, their resistance to enemy electronic interference and their mobility. Anti-aircraft artillery continues to be improved. It continues to be an effective weapon against enemy aircraft operating at low altitudes. The air defence forces are well able to protect the ground forces from enemy air strikes under all circumstances, day and night, from stationary positions and while on the march.

The communication troops have advanced radio, radio relay, communications and electronic equipment available to it, making it possible for efficient troop control to be exercised in any situation despite enemy electronic counter-measures.

Soviet engineers are equipped with a variety of highly efficient earth-moving machinery and vehicles capable of carrying out a wide range of labour-intensive jobs involved in providing adequate engineering support for the Land Forces and other arms of the service. The engineers are also equipped with a diversified array of landing craft, bridge-laying equipment and pontoon bridge facilities, all of which helps troops to cross wide rivers and other water obstacles quickly and in good order. The engineer troops have every facility and equipment available to them for setting up anti-tank, anti-personnel and anti-vehicular obstacles and for laying minefields.

The Soviet Union's airborne forces are specially trained for operations behind enemy lines and have been developing at a particularly rapid rate. The airborne troops are equipped with air transportable, self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, armoured personnel carriers, automatic weapons and reliable communications and troop control equipment. The airborne forces have parachute and landing equipment making it possible to drop men and materials under any weather conditions, on any terrain, by day and by night and with great precision.

The country's *Air Defence Forces* have acquired added capabilities. These forces have to provide reliable protection against enemy attacks by air to the country as a whole, and also to the Army and Navy. The Soviet Air Defence Forces are being constantly perfected to counter the efforts of aggressive imperialist blocs to improve their aerial attack weaponry and to continually build up their air strike potential.

The USSR's Air Defence Forces are constantly on full alert. Even in peace-time they are expected to maintain a level of combat readiness enabling them to go into action instantly to counter enemy air strikes against the country's population, administrative, political and economic centres and concentrations of friendly ground troops. The country's Air Defence Forces are equipped with up-to-date warning systems, advanced surface-to-air missiles, supersonic interceptors and sophisticated radar installations capable of detecting and destroying airborne targets at different altitudes, in any weather and despite strong enemy electronic counter-measures, at near and distant approaches to the installations and centres being protected. A feature of the Soviet Air Defence Forces is the superior performance of their weapons and equipment, large-scale automation of troop control.

The Soviet *Air Force* is a formidable arm. Many fundamental break-throughs in science and technology, notably the development of new jet propulsion systems and aerodynamic configurations for aircraft and helicopters, coupled with the use of improved materials and sophisticated radio and electronic equipment, have greatly increased their capabilities.

The Soviet Air Force can operate in any weather. Bombers carrying air-to-surface missiles make up the backbone of the Soviet Air Force. These can hit any target on land and at sea with nuclear or conventional warheads from points well away from enemy air defences. The Air Force is also equipped with missile-carrying supersonic jet fighters, transport planes and combat helicopters.

Soviet war planes possess supersonic speeds and can fly up in the stratosphere. They are equipped with missiles, rapid-fire canon and sophisticated radio electronic devices. There are also all-weather swing-wing, VTOL and STOL aircraft. These also have supersonic speeds and are long-range aircraft. The helicopters in service with the Soviet Air Force can accomplish a wide range of combat missions in support of land forces on the battlefield, as well as close support for friendly forces operating behind enemy lines. They can also fly reconnaissance missions, land troops and material, and help maintain reliable communications and troop control.

The Soviet Navy is a powerful force. The progress in rocket technology, weaponry and the use of nuclear power plants have combined to increase the role of atomic submarines carrying nuclear-tipped missiles. Soviet atomic submarines, equipped with missiles and homing torpedoes and sophisticated navigation, fire control and communications systems, are the main component of the Soviet Navy's fire power. They can hit targets both on land and at sea

over great distances. Naval missile-carrying aviation is another major component of the Soviet Navy's strike force.

Apart from this the Soviet Navy also has missile-carrying surface ships, submarine chasers, mine sweepers, landing craft and other types of surface vessels. Then there are missile and artillery shore batteries and marines. The Soviet Navy has now entered the world ocean and Soviet nuclear-powered submarines and surface vessels are cruising in different parts of the world. The Soviet Navy is fully equipped with everything necessary for conducting lengthy operations in all seas a time.

The Logistical Services of the Soviet Armed Forces are being constantly improved, just like the Army and Navy. They have now been fully motorised to increase their manoeuvrability and mobility. The railway, motor, road-making and pipeline-laying troops have all improved their capabilities. Supply operations have become more efficient, what with the increasing mechanisation, and so have the medical and other services providing support for the Land Forces. The Logistical Services are now well equipped and organised to accomplish the highly responsible missions assigned to them.

Much has been done in recent years to improve the country's *Civil Defence* whose role in modern warfare is steadily growing.

The Frontier Guards and Internal Security Forces, which are an integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces, have been further developed.

For all their impressive technical arsenal and combat capabilities the chief weapon of the Soviet Army and Navy is still their officers and men. Rallied around the Communist Party, boundlessly dedicated to their socialist Motherland and to the great cause of communism, these patriots and internationalists provide a model of the socialist army. The things that make the officers and men of the Soviet Army and Navy stand out, from the rank and file to the commanding officers and admirals, are a wide political awareness, a high sense of discipline, organisation and efficiency in carrying out orders and the missions assigned to them, excellent specialist knowledge and complete proficiency in handling their weapons and equipment. The Communists among the Soviet military personnel cement the ranks of the Soviet Army and Navy men. Together with the Komsomol members they make up an absolute majority of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Summing up, it can safely be said that in terms of their fighting and technical capabilities, in terms of their ideological and political maturity, and their moral and fighting qualities, the Soviet Army and Navy are right on the mark as far as the requirements of modern warfare are concerned. They are capable of conducting rapid and energetic operations with deep penetration into enemy territory under a variety of conditions, using both nuclear and conventional weapons to achieve decisive success in accomplishing tactical and strategic missions of any magnitude and importance.

2. A High Level of Combat Preparedness — the Command of the Times

The main indicator of the Soviet Armed Forces' fighting efficiency is their constant combat readiness. "Everything created by the people must be securely protected," these words from the main report of the CPSU Central Committee to its 24th Congress succinctly sum up the main task facing the Soviet Army and Navy. These words inspire the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces to try harder to improve their combat training and political standard and achieve complete proficiency in their particular combat jobs; to a high sense of discipline, smooth co-ordination and co-operation among the various units; and, in the final analysis, to raise the level of the Armed Forces' combat readiness. The officers and men of the Soviet Army and Navy are mindful of these words every day and every hour, during practice at firing ranges and training grounds, during cruises and flights and, especially so, while on patrol.

The Soviet Armed Forces are discharging their patriotic and internationalist duty to protect the socialist gains of the working people from the aggressive intrigues of imperialist reaction. They are doing this with honour and dignity as they keep a vigilant watch on land, in the air and at sea.

In recent years, thanks largely to the energetic foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, there has been a definite turn in international affairs away from hostile confrontation towards peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and towards sensible rational co-operation between them based on mutual benefit and equal security. The combined efforts of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist community have resulted in a further strengthening of the unity and all-round co-operation among fraternal socialist countries. The standing of world socialism is becoming stronger as is the influence of its peace-oriented policy on the entire international situation.

The all-important goal of preventing a nuclear world war which would visit untold misfortunes upon mankind if the imperialists unleashed it is uppermost in the minds of the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. In this context it is clear what an important step was made towards achieving this goal when the USSR and the USA signed an agreement in 1973 of indefinite duration on the prevention of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union, in consistently and unswervingly following a peace-oriented foreign policy, is at the same time intolerant of the aggressive aspirations of imperialist reaction in whatever guise and supports the struggle of freedom-loving peoples against social and national oppression. Solidarity with our class brothers, with liberation and anti-imperialist movements in no way runs counter to our struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence between states. As L. I. Brezhnev put it in his address to the World Congress of Peace Forces in

Moscow on October 26, 1973, "By promoting the principles of peaceful coexistence, we are working for something which billions of people all over the world cherish most of all: the right to life itself, and deliverance from the danger of its destruction in the flames of war. At the same time, we are thereby also working to ensure favourable international conditions for the social progress of all countries and peoples. This means recognition of each people's right to choose the social system it wants. This means simple and clear rules of intercourse between states."¹ This policy enjoys the invariable support of other socialist countries, fraternal Communist parties and progressive-minded people everywhere for it accords with the interests of all peace-loving people.

However, the international situation, despite a measure of relaxation, is not as yet sufficiently favourable for the Soviet Army and Navy to relax their vigilance and combat preparedness or for any let-up in the country's defence capability. The reactionary imperialist circles are still sufficiently strong, have impressive forces at their command and continue to poison the international climate. They are resisting international detente, advocating a step-up in military preparations and an acceleration of the arms race and an increase in military spending. There are still adventurists who, to further their egoistic ends, are still capable of plunging the world into a new war.

Militarism has always been the hallmark of imperialism. Today it has assumed unprecedented scope. The fruits of the labour of millions of people, the greatest, most brilliant triumphs of the human mind and the talents of scientists, research workers and engineers are used by the imperialists to further their barbarous and reactionary ends, to prepare new predatory wars. The military budgets of the NATO countries increase by 2,000-3,000 million dollars annually.

The bellicose forces of imperialism have not yet given up their aggressive designs and aspirations. They are waging a non-stop war against the world's socialist system in a variety of forms, trying to hamper the socialist countries' economic growth, weaken their influence in world affairs, disarm them ideologically and split and isolate them politically.

The more reactionary imperialist circles are attempting to find a way out of the contradictions of capitalism through aggravating the international situation by acts of aggression and brigandage. These circles have been responsible for over thirty wars and military conflicts in the post-war period resulting in millions of people killed and crippled and vast economic damage. However, the aggressors are encountering growing opposition from the freedom-loving peoples and progressives throughout the world. Having unleashed a war in Indochina, imperialism was unable to break the will of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian peoples who were fighting for their freedom and independence, and was forced to cease its

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Moscow, 1974, p. 173.

aggression. The Israeli extremists perfidiously attacked the peace-loving Arab states, seized part of their territory and are trying to hold on to it. They have created and are maintaining a tense situation in the Middle East. But here too, the aggressors are finding growing resistance as the Arabs fight back.

In Europe there are influential imperialist circles trying to obstruct detente. The revenge-seekers in West Germany are still making a great fuss peddling ideas about a revision of the outcome of the Second World War. The ring-leaders of NATO are advocating a further step-up in the arms race and an increase in military spending.

There are some among the reactionary politicians in the imperialist countries who are still calling for a tough policy from position of strength towards the USSR, despite the fact that it has always misfired. The Soviet Union has repeatedly taught the imperialists object lessons to the effect that solving international disputes does not go hand in hand with pressure and blackmail but rather with peaceful coexistence, equality, mutual respect and trust. But it seems everyone has not yet learnt the lesson and the more reactionary of the imperialist circles are trying their best to drag the world back to the days of the cold war. Therefore, as long as the danger of war exists, the Soviet Armed Forces are duty bound to keep a vigilant watch, to be on full alert and to maintain their combat preparedness at a suitable level to meet any eventuality.

Combat preparedness is no slogan, nor simply high-sounding words. They have a precise meaning. They mean that the Soviet Armed Forces must be in that state which enables them at any moment and in the most complex situation to repulse and thwart aggression from whatever quarter it may come and whatever weapons and methods may be employed, including nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Army's and Navy's high level of combat preparedness is the focus, the result of the tremendous efforts and expenditure in equipping the Soviet Armed Forces with up-to-date weaponry and hardware; the result of all officers' and men's conscientiousness, fighting skill and sense of discipline; the commanders' skill in exercising efficient troop control and in the use of available weaponry and equipment. It can safely be said that the Soviet Army's and Navy's high level of combat preparedness is the summit of their combat skills, a guarantee of victory in war.

The basic components of their combat preparedness include profound communist conviction; utter dedication to the cause of the Communist Party and to the Soviet people; a high sense of military discipline; excellent training and physical fitness; equipping the Army and Navy with up-to-date weapons and hardware; maintaining the weapons and equipment in good working order; a high level of military and specialist training for the commanders; the latter's ability to exercise efficient troop control, to organise and ensure an uninterrupted flow of material support to the troops, and the readiness of the political organs, Party organisations and all

Communists to set a personal example to inspire the rank and file to carry out their mission.

Combat preparedness affects every aspect of the multi-faceted activities of the Soviet Armed Forces and reflects their level of combat and operational training, the level of combat co-ordination between units and the level of the rank-and-file's ideological and political education. All the components of combat preparedness must be regarded as an integrated whole. Just as it is impossible to pull a link out of a chain without breaking it so in combat preparedness it is impossible to relax one's attitude towards any of its components without affecting the rest. To a military man a high level of combat preparedness and its maintenance is a natural state which is his duty.

A high level of combat preparedness can only be achieved by hard day-to-day work, through intense training of the entire personnel, through constantly improving the proficiency standards of commanders and staffs, political organs and Party organisations, logistic services and establishments, and through purposeful Party and political work aimed at steeling the men ideologically and raising their moral, political and psychological qualities. The more intensive the troops' combat training and the more realistic the simulated battlefield situation, the higher their level of combat preparedness.

In the final analysis, a steady improvement in the level of combat preparedness is the main aim of combat, operational and political training and of the entire Party and political work among the men. Working for the best results in training is a direct contribution to raising a unit's level of combat preparedness. This work should be continuous and consistent with a steady improvement. This work is irreconcilable with outdated obsolete forms and methods of training and educating the troops; intolerant towards obsolete methods of tackling combat missions, obsolete battlefield tactics, and outdated methods of using weapons and equipment. Everything here is in constant motion. What was good enough yesterday is a thing of the past today.

Maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces' combat preparedness at a suitable level depends, above all, on the troops' strictly fulfilling their tasks in combat, political and operational training; on continually improving techniques for the personnel's training and education; and on daily work to achieve new heights in improving combat skills, forms and methods of operations, and use of weapons and equipment. This work is carried out in the class room and on training grounds, on firing ranges and tank ranges and on stand-by duty.

The Soviet Armed Forces are fully abreast of the latest advances in science and technology. The Communist Party, the Government and the Soviet people are doing everything necessary to strengthen the country's defence capacity and to enhance the fighting efficiency of the Armed Forces. The USSR has a powerful economy and specialised defence industries, which keep the Army and Navy supplied with sufficient quantities of up-to-date weapons and equipment.

The latest weapons and military hardware necessitate radical changes in strategy, operational art and in tactics, as well as in the methods and techniques of operations. The important thing here is that all the weapons and military equipment be maintained in good working order at all times, ready for instant action. It is vital to ensure that every part and component of the missiles, tanks and aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, radar and other electronic systems are in faultless working order, and that those manning sophisticated weaponry and hardware be well versed in their capabilities, be fully proficient in handling the weapons and equipment, be able to get the most out of them under a variety of conditions, particularly under unfavourable critical battlefield situations. The paramount task for every officer and man is to achieve this goal.

At the same time one should remember that weaponry and hardware, however perfect, can only have their fullest effect if their superior technical performances are blended with superior tactics, operational art and the art of war generally. The experience of past wars indicates that new weaponry and hardware are only used to the full when they are backed up by advanced strategy, operational art and tactics.

Commanding officers, political officers and military engineers play the decisive part in raising the level of combat preparedness in the Army and Navy, because the combat readiness of units and ships depends entirely on the standard and quality of their military, political, specialist and technical training.

The maintenance of constant combat preparedness in the Army and Navy involves certain difficulties. But members of the military profession are well accustomed to overcoming privations and difficulties. The outcome of an engagement depends, above all, on the actions and skills of the rank and file who handle the weapons entrusted to them and who confront the enemy on the battlefield. In this connection I should like to mention the role of non-commissioned officers and men and ratings. To win an engagement they must be completely proficient in handling their weapons and equipment, and adept at using them to full effect under any situation. These qualities are developed and perfected during intensive combat and political training in peace-time. Taking an active part in class-room sessions, in exercises, cruises and in stand-by duty enables the men to concentrate their efforts on overcoming difficulties; to develop *sang-froid* and staunchness, the ability to act on their own if need be, resoluteness, a high sense of discipline, efficiency, concentration and an unbreakable will to win.

Soviet military science and the study of the experience of past wars make a major contribution to securing a steady improvement in the combat preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces. Science is increasingly becoming a direct productive force in the Army and Navy just as it is in the country's economy. Military science is becoming a more active and effective motive force driving the Soviet art of war. It is one of the basic instruments in improving the troops'

combat and operational training and their education, in heightening their combat preparedness in peace-time and guaranteeing victory during a war.

The Soviet Army and Navy have everything they need to maintain a high level of combat readiness. The task now is to direct the efforts of the entire personnel, commanders and Party organisations at fulfilling their tasks in combat, operational and political training; at further improving organisation and order among the troops; and at securing smooth combat co-ordination between the various components of the military organism.

3. The Combat Preparedness of the Armed Forces and the Country's Defence Capacity

The combat preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces, their numerical strength and especially their quality and combat capabilities are the basis of the Soviet Union's defence capacity. However, it is true to say that a country's defence capacity is not just a matter of the fighting power of its armed forces. Other major factors include the country's economy, science and technology, the size of its population and their cultural attainment and their readiness to fight a possible war.

Consequently, efforts to strengthen a country's defence capacity and the Army's and Navy's fighting power and readiness must rely on successful economic development in every branch of the economy, in industry, agriculture, transport, communications; and also on preparations for ensuring that in war time the Armed Forces and civilian population are reliably supplied with everything necessary. This involves creating strategic stockpiles and other essential measures. In other words, strengthening a country's defence capacity requires above all the creation and maintenance of its economic potential at a level sufficient for repelling and thwarting any aggression.

The Communist Party and its Central Committee are devoting daily attention to the all-important task of ensuring a steady improvement in the Soviet Union's defence capacity. This attention shows itself above all in their efforts to raise the might of the Soviet Armed Forces, to keep them supplied with the latest weapons and hardware and to raise the level of combat preparedness and battle worthiness. The Communist Party's concern to strengthen the country's defence potential is also seen in the balanced progress of the Soviet economy so that it is able to keep the Soviet Armed Forces, the Soviet population and the entire economic structure fully supplied in the event of war. The fulfilment of every five-year economic development plan is an important contribution to economic growth which means a direct contribution to strengthening the country's defence potential and to enhancing the might of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Ensuring that the country's economy is impervious to any massive enemy attack and that the country's military economic potential is able to rapidly change into a tangible military force has gained added urgency today.

A country's economy is the material basis for its fighting ability and is increasingly becoming the target of armed attack. In the Second World War the belligerents tried to disrupt each other's economic activity by bombing each other's industrial centres and communications and in this way trying to disrupt enemy supply lines, making it difficult, if not impossible, to keep the army in the field supplied with weapons, ammunition and equipment, to transfer reinforcements for the frontline troops and manoeuvre with reserve forces. However, the bombers' limited strike power during the last war made it impossible for them to achieve the desired effect. Not even the allies' saturation raids against Nazi Germany, which lacked vast hinterland areas and whose key industrial facilities were concentrated, achieved their aim in its entirety. Bombed-out industrial installations and road junctions were restored and back in service comparatively quickly.

The situation is quite different today. Unless appropriate measures are taken in good time to increase the economy's stability and capacity to survive and to protect the civilian population from enemy attack, the result, even in the opening stages, may be a dramatic drop in industrial production; the disruption of economic links between different areas; complete chaos in transport, control and management facilities and power supply systems; the destruction of cities; and the prohibitive loss of life and property. Without efficient logistics and industry no one can hope to sustain a successful war effort. That is the plain crux of the matter.

Modern warfare does not only mean that individual objectives have to be reliably protected, as was the case in the past, but also that a carefully thought-out and well-designed body of measures have to be taken to ensure that the entire economy operates normally and that the civilian population throughout the country is protected. Civil defence must play a special role in ensuring the fulfilment of this all-important task. Civil Defence is now a factor of strategic importance in securing the country's survival.

Above all, Civil Defence must train the civilian population to take organised action in difficult conditions, train them in fire-fighting techniques to deal with massive fires, in rescue techniques during floods, in administering first aid on a mass scale, in clearing rubble and building roads, in methods of restoring the water and power supply networks, in bringing disrupted production and management systems back into service and in some cases training them in hand to hand combat.

The country's Civil Defence gained certain experience of this nature during the Great Patriotic War. At that time, however, its role was mostly confined to local anti-aircraft defence, tasks which were simpler and more manageable in terms of their magnitude and nature

than the requirements of today's Civil Defence. But even then the entire able-bodied population—from schoolchildren to old-age pensioners—contributed to the Soviet Army's victory by guarding factories and plants, collective farms, power stations, mines, collieries, and railways. The people of Leningrad, Odessa, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and other industrial centres remained at work, maintaining a steady flow of weapons, ammunition and equipment for the men in the trenches despite the incredibly trying conditions and enemy air raids and artillery bombardments. And whenever the need arose they repelled enemy assaults arms in hand.

A possible future war will place the logistical services in a far more complex and difficult situation than ever before. Hence the need for the country's economy and population to be carefully and thoroughly prepared in advance, and for regular and systematic special training sessions and exercises to be conducted which should be patterned on the system adopted in the Army and Navy.

The Communist Party's unflagging concern for strengthening the country's defence potential can also be seen in the organisation of military and patriotic work among the population. The importance of this activity has been confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet people's unparalleled exploit, their mass heroism, unprecedented fortitude and endurance, contempt for death and readiness to lay down their lives in the name of their socialist Motherland, are qualities of the Soviet people which have surprised the world. They did not come about by themselves but were the result of the outstanding achievements in building socialism, of the Communist Party's titanic work to educate the Soviet people ideologically and politically, and the result of the well-organised military patriotic work in the pre-war years and during the war.

Today military patriotic work has acquired even greater importance. A possible future war, should the aggressive circles of monopoly capital unleash it, will be a war of unprecedented brutality and destruction. It will strain the moral and physical powers of our people, to the utmost, require great endurance and staunchness, and a capacity to overcome the incredible war-time difficulties and hardships at the frontline and in the interior. Hence the need for thorough contingency planning to prepare the population for any eventuality.

The Communist Party treats military patriotic work as an integral part of the Soviet people's overall communist education. The Party is, therefore, making use of the full complement of mass political measures: the ideological impact of Soviet art, literature, news media and cinema. This work is being conducted on a regular basis and embraces every social stratum and age group. The foundations of military patriotic education are laid at an early stage in the family and in the school. Later it is continued at industrial enterprises, at collective and state farms and during military service. Millions of workers and collective farmers, office workers and students belong to the Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy.

The Party, Komsomol, trade union organisations and the various sport societies join forces in conducting large-scale military patriotic work and defence-oriented sporting activities among the masses.

Today, military patriotic work is being conducted in a two-pronged way. The first prong is represented by moral, political and psychological conditioning to educate the Soviet people in a spirit of revolutionary vigilance. This is to turn them into dedicated fighters for communism and convinced patriots capable of coping with the trials and privations of war time and of honourably discharging their duties as Soviet citizens under difficult frontline conditions and on the labour front. It is essential to help the country's would-be defenders develop unshakable psychological stability to ensure that they are able to keep their heads and poise in the most complex situations, to display courage, fearlessness and self-sacrifice. These qualities depend on a high level of moral staunchness, political awareness and commitment to the Communist Party and loyalty to their Motherland and the people. The second prong of military patriotic work is exemplified in the population's military training. Emphasis in this work is placed on training the population in methods and techniques of surviving enemy nuclear attacks and in eliminating their effects, in providing timely and effective assistance to the victims of such attacks and in ensuring that the country's economy continues to function. The two prongs of military patriotic work are closely interconnected and complementary and are geared to the achievement of a common goal — the training and education of efficient defenders of the Soviet Motherland.

Making the fine revolutionary, combat and labour traditions better known and propagating the heroic past of the Soviet people and their experience in the Great Patriotic War are of great importance for the successful military patriotic education of the Soviet population. The Communist Party looks upon this activity as a crucial contribution to moulding the character and make-up of the young builders of Communism and defenders of the working people's revolutionary gains.

The fine revolutionary combat and labour traditions which are founded on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism reflect the continuity of different Soviet generations and their continued patriotism. The younger generation is continuing to carry the torch handed to them by the older generation; they are carrying on the priceless heritage of the Soviet people's heroic past. The moral code of the builder of communism incorporates the best features of the Soviet people, including dedication to the cause of communism; love for the socialist Motherland, for the socialist countries; conscientious work for the benefit of the whole of society; a high sense of one's social duty; friendship and brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR; intolerance of national and racial hostility; team spirit and comradely mutual assistance; irreconcilability with the enemies of communism, of peace and of the freedom of nations; fraternal solidarity with the working

people of the world and with all the nations, and other high moral and political qualities.

Education based on the revolutionary combat and labour traditions of the Soviet people is at its most effective when combined with efforts to propagate the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, with a careful explanation of the international situation and the present role of the Armed Forces, with an explanation of the need to strengthen constantly the Soviet Union's defence potential and when it is combined with a graphic demonstration of the achievements of the Soviet people in building communism and in successfully training the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces in fighting and politics.

The various public organisations which are preparing young people for service in the Armed Forces are making a weighty contribution to strengthening the country's defence capacity and the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of its Armed Forces. Military service is an honourable duty and is not without romanticism. But above all it is hard work for which one has to prepare oneself morally, psychologically and physically if one is to cope with it.

The Soviet Army and Navy are joined by fresh recruits twice a year. As a rule, they are well-educated young men with a good theoretical knowledge, but lacking in experience. For these young men military service is a time of maturing, it is their chance to become soldiers in the true sense of the word. Every condition is created in the Soviet Army and Navy to enable the fresh recruits to master their particular military jobs in the shortest possible time, to help them to honourably discharge their duty as defenders of their socialist Motherland, with honour and dignity, and above all, with consummate skill. To speed up this process it is necessary to provide suitable training for the young men before call-up. This training is provided by public organisations and, in the first instance, by the Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy. This patriotic society helps hundreds of thousands of young men to master defence-related technical specialities and acquire the rudiments of military knowledge and introduces them to military service.

Apart from the Voluntary Society much is being done by the Komsomol, schools and other educational institutions and industrial enterprises to prepare young men for their military service. The constant contact youth organisations maintain with military units and warships, as well as the continuing expansion in the scope of the Komsomol's voluntary assistance to the Soviet Navy, the Air Force and the frontier guard troops are of great importance for the patriotic education of future servicemen. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War are making a major contribution to the education of Soviet young men.

The more essential components of their preparation for military service include physical fitness and the systematic promotion of different kinds of sport, especially those with a clear defence orientation. The recently adopted physical fitness courses known in

this country as PWD (prepared for Work and Defence) have quickly won popularity among all age groups, particularly the younger generation. Training for passing PWD physical fitness tests is in the nature of springboard into "big-time" sport and, at any rate, it promises a healthy life. After improving their physical fitness, when the young men join the Soviet Army and Navy they are better able to acquire complete proficiency in their particular military jobs more quickly and are better able to cope with the difficulties of service life, thus becoming efficient defenders of the Motherland.

In this way, under the leadership of the Communist Party the efforts of the Soviet people to thoroughly develop the country's economic potential; the work of the Soviet officers and men to enhance the Armed Forces' combat preparedness; the activities of the Civil Defence system, and the military patriotic work of the Voluntary Society, Komsomol and other public organisations, are brought together to form a single stream which is channelled into the flood of efforts to strengthen the country's defence capability so as to ensure that should any aggressor dare attack this country he will receive a crushing rebuff.

In the final analysis, all this is crystallised in the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces and in their high level of combat readiness. The efforts of the Soviet people to enhance the country's defence capacity are bearing fruit. Everything they have created and are creating is being securely protected by the Soviet Army and Navy.

Chapter

IV

**THE POPULAR CHARACTER
OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES**

One of the principal sources of the unconquerable power of the Soviet Army and Navy is the fact that they are the flesh and blood of the people. The people love the Soviet Armed Forces and hold them in high esteem. The two are closely linked to form an inseparable whole. The Soviet Armed Forces derive their strength, courage and staunchness, and their readiness to give their lives in the name of the people and to display mass heroism, from the inexhaustible reservoir of Soviet people.

Lenin in his address to the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies emphasised that the new socialist army was outstanding because of its popular character, which sprang from the very nature of the Soviet socialist state as a state of working people; from the class essence and purpose of the Soviet Armed Forces, as a weapon with which to maintain the gains of socialism; and from the identity of interests of the Soviet state, its people and the personnel of the Army and Navy.

**1. The Soviet Army and Navy
as the Armed Forces of the State
of the Whole People**

Historically, the army as a special organisation of armed men came into being at a stage in the historical development of human society which saw the emergence of private ownership of the means of production when society developed different classes and when it became necessary to protect the private property of the exploiters and ensure their domination over the exploited. Thus, the army was set up as a means of violence, as a tool of the state, as a major instrument of the ruling classes' domestic and foreign policy. Under all pre-socialist socio-economic formations, the army has served and continues to serve the interests of the oppressors. It has been used and is still being used for aggression and for subjugating peoples.

The Soviet Armed Forces, in common with the armies of other socialist countries, are radically different. Having been called into being by the new historical conditions, they represent a qualitatively different military organisation diametrically opposed in their essence to all previous armies and to all existing bourgeois armies.

Whereas the armies of capitalist states are a tool in the hands of the exploiting classes, which use them to further their interests and to keep the working masses in submission, the Soviet Armed Forces are a weapon in the hands of the socialist state and its truly popular power. They express the identity of class interests between workers and peasants; the friendship of peoples; and the moral and political unity of Soviet society, of socialist patriotism and of internationalism. Their aims and tasks reflect the character of the socialist social and state system and the motive forces and advantages of socialism over capitalism. The ideological foundation of the Soviet Armed Forces is Marxism-Leninism. By its very nature, the Soviet military establishment is designed to be used in the interests of a just and progressive cause. This determines the fundamentally new and genuinely popular social role, meaning and significance of all the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet Army and Navy are of the people and for the people and this fact determines their place in the political organisation of Soviet society.

The essential difference between socialist and capitalist armies can best be seen by examining their functions.

Lenin's analysis of the class essence and purpose of the armed forces of capitalist states indicates that the armies of all, even of the more democratic, bourgeois republics remain a tool for oppressing the popular masses. These armies have always performed two basic functions: domestic and foreign. The first involves the desire of the government and the exploiting classes behind it, to establish and maintain a domestic order suiting the bourgeoisie. The second function is one of conquering foreign territories with the aim of redividing the world, seizing new markets, extending the exploitation of people in other countries and struggling against national-liberation movements.

Today, the Armed Forces of bourgeois capitalist states continue to perform these two functions. They are being used by the imperialists to quell demonstrations and other mass actions by the working people at home who are fighting for their rights and social emancipation. At the same time, the bourgeois armies are the principal instrument for subjugating and plundering other peoples, for putting down national-liberation movements and for exporting counter-revolution. They have been and continue to be a force in the capitalist state which is hostile to the working people, the same force which in 1905 Lenin called "the weapon of reaction, the servant of capital in its struggle against labour, the executioner of the people's liberty".¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 56.

Western theoreticians try to conceal the true essence of bourgeois armies, their purpose, functions and social role, and present the armed forces of capitalist states as supposedly extra-class organisations standing aloof from politics. In reality nothing could be further from the truth. Developments have long since given the lie to these falsehoods. Lenin wrote: "The armed forces cannot and should not be neutral. Not to drag them into politics is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie ... who in fact have always dragged the forces into reactionary politics...."¹

In their essence, the bourgeois armies are reactionary and directed against the people. That this is so has been demonstrated with clarity in the imperialist era, particularly after the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution, and in the contemporary era which is witnessing the transition from capitalism to socialism. One manifestation of this was the ruling imperialist circles' use of their armies against the world's first socialist state. They committed atrocities and mass shootings during the foreign intervention after the 1917 Revolution and during the nazi invasion. More recently this was demonstrated by the merciless way in which the bourgeois armies suppressed the anti-imperialist movements of the peoples in colonial and dependent countries.

The reactionary role of the bourgeois armed forces directed against the interests of the people has been particularly in evidence since the end of the Second World War. Cases in point include the aggressive actions of the US Army against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea between 1950 and 1953, against Guatemala in 1954, against Peru and Honduras in 1956, against the Lebanon in 1958, against Panama in 1959-1964, etc. It was not until 1973 that the USA was finally compelled to stop its protracted and dirty war against the people of Vietnam, in the course of which thousands of civilians were killed, and a large number of towns and villages were burnt and destroyed.

There are cases, of course, where one capitalist state attacks another and the weaker of the two has to defend itself. In the ensuing war its armed forces may accomplish a national task of fighting the aggressor to maintain the country's independence. However, the antagonistic contradictions and class struggle between the working people and the exploiters persist and even grow as the ruling classes attain their political aims of the war. The social essence of the bourgeois army remains unchanged: it continues as a weapon in the hands of the exploiting classes. In the final analysis, the armed forces of the capitalist states suffer from all the defects of the capitalist system which assumes a more pronounced militaristic character as time goes on.

Numerous facts show the use of capitalist armies to suppress anti-war demonstrations by the working people; and to deal with striking workers fighting for their political and economic rights, or

¹ Op. cit., p. 56

with the Black population fighting to abolish race discrimination. According to the military journal *National Guardsmen*, between early 1965 and May 1970, US troops went into action on more than 290 occasions to put down "civil rights disturbances". The bloody actions of the British forces in Northern Ireland are yet another example of how present-day bourgeois armies are used against the interests of the people.

At the present stage in the development of capitalism when it has reached an unprecedented level of capital concentration and when the monopolies are merging with the state apparatus, the bourgeois armies are falling under the increasing influence of a handful of monopolist tycoons and are becoming politically dependent upon them. In the more advanced capitalist countries the military-industrial complex has come into being, which represents a close alliance between the biggest monopolies and the military top brass in the state apparatus, something that has exposed the anti-popular essence of the imperialist armies for all to see. The military-industrial complex is, in effect, the country's ruler, fostering militarism, creating an atmosphere of military psychosis and hysteria at home and whipping up tensions on the international scene.

The reactionary nature of bourgeois armies has become more intensified as a result of imperialist, aggressive military and political blocs being set up, spearheaded primarily against the socialist countries, against the national-liberation movement of oppressed and dependent peoples, and against the revolutionary actions of the working class inside the capitalist countries.

In order to separate the army even further from the people, to mask its essence which is directed against the interests of the people and to make it an obedient tool carrying out the will of the imperialists, many capitalist countries are changing over to a new system of raising armies based on mercenaries. The militarists believe that for their pay professional mercenaries will be willing to kill their fellow-workers and peasants fighting for social emancipation as well as unarmed women, children and old folk in other countries.

In accordance with the purpose and essence of bourgeois armies, their training is designed to fit their reactionary objectives which in the imperialist countries have a pronounced aggressive, anti-communist and misanthropic character. The basis of the ideological indoctrination of the military personnel is made up of anti-communism; slander against the Communist parties and a distortion of their aims and policies; the spreading of lies about the alleged "growing communist menace", the threat of "communism being imposed by force of arms", and a falsification of the Marxist-Leninist teaching. The imperialists are careful to ignore the real state of affairs in the USSR and the other socialist countries, and at the same time to laud the capitalist way of life, and to foster and encourage private-ownership aspirations and instincts.

The entire system of training and ideological indoctrination adopted by the bourgeois armies is designed to erode class consciousness in

the minds of the soldiers who are, for the most part, working people and to portray the armed forces of the capitalist state as an instrument fulfilling the will of the people. Imperialist ideologists try to prove that the capitalist armies are to maintain peace and justice. To achieve this, bourgeois propaganda is not above capitalising on the anti-Soviet fabrications of the Trotskyites, anarchists, traitors, revisionists, and Maoist "theoreticians" and their kind.

Imperialist propaganda finds a particularly favourable breeding ground among the members of the officer corps of the bourgeois armies and primarily among their generals and admirals. In the USA, for instance, the bulk of the officer corps have strong Right-wing reactionary political leanings, strongly supporting the policy from the position of strength, and are an obedient tool in the hands of their masters. The functions of the officer corps go beyond the performance of purely military duties. This military elite makes common cause with the class and corporative interests of the monopolies and has long since been a well-organised social group exercising growing influence on state policy, playing an important role in its socio-political life and in the activities of the military-industrial complex.

The record to date, however, shows that the military personnel's ideological indoctrination often produces results far from what the imperialists want. The personnel of the armed forces of the capitalist countries, and above all their rank and file, under the impact of the steadily growing attractiveness and authority of socialism are coming to see the unjust wars waged by the imperialists. The leaders of the bourgeois world are having to admit that no amount of propaganda, however subtle, can hope to prevent the infiltration of progressive ideas into their armies or to prevent growing disillusionment with the capitalist system. This is a major reason for the numerous instances of disobedience by enlisted men to their officers, instances of desertion and refusal to use force against unarmed civilians. Far from being accidental, these developments indicate the operation of deep-rooted processes inherent in the imperialist armies. They are a product of the internal weakness and the essential contradictions rending capitalist society, a product of the existing social and racial inequality.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the Soviet Army also had to fulfil two basic functions: internal and external. However, since the inception of the Soviet Armed Forces the content and social trend of these two functions have been radically different from those of the bourgeois armies.

The Soviet Armed Forces performed their internal functions at a time when survivors of the exploiting classes were still about and when they were struggling against the new system. At that time the Soviet Army was a weapon in the hands of the dictatorship of the proletariat and was used to defeat the exploiting minority and protect the interests of the working classes. Herein lay the fundamental difference between its internal function from the internal function of the capitalist armies.

The internal function of the socialist army is relatively short-lived. In the Soviet Union, a country of victorious socialism, there are no oppressed peoples, or antagonistic classes, there is no political struggle reflecting antagonistic class contradictions and, this being so, there is no call for the Soviet Armed Forces to exercise their internal function. In other words, the socialist army's fulfilment of its internal function was limited to a definite historical stage in the emergence and growth of the new society, namely, the transition from capitalism to socialism as the first phase of communist society.

Needless to say, the internal function can only die away in the case of a socialist army. In a capitalist society, the army not only maintains, but in fact intensifies its internal functions, which is to suppress the growing revolutionary movement of the working people.

The fact that the Soviet Army performs no internal function today does not mean, of course, that the servicemen in the Soviet Armed Forces stand aloof from the mainstream of social life. On the contrary, they take an active part in carrying out a variety of national economic tasks; they are involved in political, social and cultural life; and make a fitting contribution to the construction of the material and technical base of communism.

As for the socialist army's external function it is designed to protect the country from an attack by aggressive imperialist states whose aim is to destroy the revolutionary gains of the working people by force of arms. This danger existed in the early days and is still to be reckoned with. As the CPSU Programme puts it, "In terms of internal conditions, the Soviet Union needs no army. But since the danger of war coming from the imperialist camp persists, and since complete and general disarmament has not been achieved, the CPSU considers it necessary to maintain the defensive power of the Soviet state and the combat preparedness of its Armed Forces at a level ensuring the decisive and complete defeat of any enemy who dares to encroach upon the Soviet land."¹

Compared with the pre-war period the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has further developed. With the emergence of the world socialist system the Soviet Army's function of defending the socialist Motherland has acquired a wider international character, as it has indeed for the armies of other socialist countries. At present this function is not only a matter of defending one's own Motherland from imperialist attack, but a matter of each socialist country helping to repel aggression against the community of socialist nations.

The external function of the Soviet Armed Forces is inextricably bound to the major directions of the Soviet Union's foreign policy activity. The USSR has been actively opposing the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression. It has been supporting the peoples' national-liberation struggle, and firmly blocking the imperialist policy of aggression. In this activity the Communist Party and Soviet Government are relying on the country's

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 557.

economic and defence potential. The working people throughout the world and progressives everywhere see the Soviet Union's economic and defence might and those of other socialist countries as a reliable bulwark in the struggle for freedom and independence, for the security of nations and for social progress. The might of the armed forces of the fraternal socialist countries is a deterrent against the reactionary imperialist circles, keeping them from the brink of unleashing a new world war and new local military conflicts. This is in accord with the interests of all the world's nations.

Under socialism the army, which was an instrument of destruction throughout the history of antagonistic societies, is becoming a major factor for maintaining world peace. The development of socialist armies' external function is a legitimate and logical process. This development will continue as long as the danger of war from imperialist countries exists.

Bourgeois ideologists fly in the face of the facts and try to portray the Soviet Union and its army as a militarist force. They are spreading groundless inventions about the alleged "aggressiveness of communism". However, the truth of the matter is that there has been nothing in the history of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces to cast a shade on the colours of the Soviet Army. The wars the USSR has waged have all been thrown upon it and this country has prosecuted war for the sole purpose of repelling imperialist aggression and maintaining the socialist gains of the people. The victories won by the Soviet Army were more than victories of one army over another, they were the triumph of the new and the advanced over the old and the reactionary, a triumph of true humanism over imperialist brigandage. These victories embodied the noble spirit and loftiness of the communist ideals cherished by the Soviet people, and the indestructibility of the Soviet system borne of the Great October Socialist Revolution and its superiority over the capitalist system.

Following the final and complete victory of socialism, the Soviet state became a state of the whole people, ensuring an identity of the aims and objectives among the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia—among the whole people. The state of the whole people symbolises the social unity of Soviet society. It succeeded the proletarian dictatorship when that principal instrument of socialist construction had fulfilled its historical mission and Soviet society had embarked upon the period of communist construction. With the emergence of the state of the whole people, the Soviet Armed Forces became the army of the whole people.

The socialist state of the whole people and the proletarian dictatorship represent two stages of one and the same socialist state. The state of the whole people is a logical continuation and development of those basic elements that the dictatorship of the proletariat contained from the early years of Soviet power, namely the leading role of the working class, socialist democracy, the common goal of the Soviet people, the building of a communist society as the common goal of the Soviet people, the people's free

creative initiative, their discipline, organisation and consciousness and responsibility for the future of the Motherland. At the present stage of building communism, the importance of these factors, in strengthening the might of the Soviet state, in developing the Soviet economy and enhancing the country's defence potential, is steadily growing. The state of the whole people is a stage on the road to communist social self-government.

At the present time the Soviet state has embarked upon a period of developed socialist society whose characteristic features include powerful productive forces; fully mature relations of production; a high level of welfare for the people; the full development of social consciousness; the establishment of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook and communist ideology in the whole of society; Soviet socialist culture based on uniform aesthetic principles in tune with communist ideals; collectivism; socialist patriotism and internationalism. Developed socialist society is characterised by a further community of interests among the working class, the collective-farm peasantry and the intelligentsia, by closer co-operation between them, and by a steady improvement in the moral and political unity of the Soviet people.

The construction of a developed socialist society in the USSR is enhancing the popular character of the Soviet Army. The continued improvement of socio-political relations in the USSR under developed socialism has resulted in a significant expansion in the Armed Forces' social base. The systematic growth of the proportion of working people in the social composition of the Soviet Armed Forces is having a beneficial effect as is the increasing share of the working class of the country's total population. The growing proportion of young men with worker backgrounds among the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces is heightening the level of organisation and order in the Army and Navy and is improving the morale of the military personnel, their fighting efficiency and combat readiness. At the same time, the continuing convergence between the classes and social groups of Soviet society is creating a situation where it is hard to tell servicemen with worker and peasant backgrounds from those coming from the ranks of the intelligentsia in terms of educational level, political awareness and cultural attainments. The switchover to universal secondary education in the USSR and the fulfilment of the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU in the field of higher and secondary education and vocational training have resulted in the Soviet Armed Forces enlisting young men with a still higher level of ideological and political steeling and possessing a higher level of intellectual and physical development.

The thorough-going socio-economic and cultural transformation of Soviet society have made each Soviet citizen to show a higher sense of responsibility in discharging his sacred duty to the country and in serving in its Armed Forces. The increased level of general education and Soviet young men's technical competence, and their high moral, political and physical training enable them to master military jobs

more quickly and to gain complete proficiency in handling their weapons and equipment more quickly. The new legislation "On Universal Military Conscription" passed by the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on October 12, 1967 took these changes into account and formalised them. The new legislation incorporates a series of fundamentally new provisions on the procedure for the Soviet citizens to discharge their honourable duty to serve in the country's Armed Forces. The changes include shortening the length of active duty for the rank-and-file soldiers, sailors and NCOs, introducing a single draft age for all Soviet citizens, abolishing some of the grounds for call-up deferment and intensifying primary military training for young people. All this has contributed to a further increase in the fighting efficiency of the country's Armed Forces, and to an improvement in the training of the entire population so that they can give any aggressor a fitting rebuff.

On the social plane the Soviet Army and Navy have a tremendous educational impact. The Soviet Armed Forces, as an integral part of Soviet society, are closely involved in the mainstream of Soviet life. Military service in the USSR is not just a school for acquiring combat skill but also a school for ideological and physical training, a school for discipline and organisation. The Soviet Army and Navy are in the nature of a nation-wide university which practically all young men go through.

Achieving a fully developed socialist society has created favourable conditions for further improving the Soviet military establishment. This is a thoroughly logical step as military development in the USSR is an integral part of the overall process of building the Soviet state. The greater the achievements of the Soviet people in building communism, the greater the fighting efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces. The country's impressive material and technical basis, the great achievements of Soviet science and technology, coupled with the moral and political unity of the people, enable the Communist Party to further improve the organisation and fighting efficiency of the country's Army and Navy and to provide it with adequate material support and scientific back-up. The USSR's level of socio-political and economic development means that the central task facing the country's Armed Forces can be successfully tackled—to keep improving their combat readiness in every way. Today, it is of even greater social importance that the Army and Navy achieve a high level of combat preparedness. That is why the entire Soviet people are vitally interested in ensuring that the Soviet Armed Forces have everything they need to meet modern requirements.

The establishment of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook in every sphere of Soviet life coupled with the vigorous growth, on this basis, of social consciousness and a higher cultural level combine to have a tremendous impact on the moral and political make-up of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel. Unlike that of bourgeois armies the moral and political make-up of the Soviet Army is noted for by the fact that every officer and man intimately understands his social and military

duty. It is noted for its men's collectivism and comradely mutual assistance. Lenin emphasised that the strength of the Red Army was a derivative of the awareness of its fighting men, for "every mobilised worker or peasant knows what he is fighting for and is ready to shed his own blood for the triumph of justice and socialism".¹

Soviet officers and men are convinced patriots and internationalists: they are proud of their country and of the entire socialist community, are confident of its might. They respect the peoples of the other fraternal countries and treasure their unbreakable friendship. There are many examples of Soviet soldiers coming to the help, often at the risk of their own lives, of the peoples of the GDR, Hungary, Poland and other socialist countries. In Yugoslavia Soviet Armed Forces personnel joined in the effort to eliminate the traces of the violent earthquake at Skopje. One of the Soviet officers' and men's fine traditions stemming directly from the character of the Soviet Armed Forces, is class solidarity with the workers of the world.

Relations between officers and men in the Soviet Armed Forces could not be more different from those existing in capitalist armies. Whereas in the capitalist armies the officer corps and the rank and file are divided by social discord, in the Soviet Army the officers and men are united and exhibit internal monolithic cohesion. It cannot be otherwise, since Soviet officers and men are above all working people. Relations existing between different categories of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel are based on the identity of class interests and goals in the defence of the revolutionary gains of the Soviet people and are noted for mutual understanding, respect and comradely co-operation. What the French General Ernest Petit, former chairman of the France-USSR Society, wrote about the relationships between Soviet officers and men is very indicative in this connection. In regard to the Soviet officers he wrote that they treated their subordinates "with affection and when they addressed their men as comrades to them the word 'comrade' was always imbued with a feeling of brotherly loyalty and a high sense of responsibility for the fate of their subordinates. This inborn feeling of fraternity in no way undermined and does not undermine the officers' authority as leaders. On the contrary, it served to enhance it."²

The Soviet officer is always mindful that his subordinates are Soviet citizens in army uniform, brought up in the world's freest society, on the noble principles of the moral code of the builders of communism. These principles not only underlie the sense of honour and dignity of every non-commissioned officer and man but also underlie their attitude to their military duty, to their assigned missions, to their fellow-servicemen.

The Soviet Armed Forces as a new type of army embody the basic features of the most progressive socialist social system and the best

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 137.

² Quoted in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 19, 1963.

traits of the heroic Soviet people. The Soviet Armed Forces were formed and are now developing on the basis of the Leninist principles of full equality and friendship among all the nations and nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union, on the basis of proletarian solidarity with the workers of the world and a high sense of responsibility for the fulfilment of their duty to defend socialism.

2. The Army of Friendship Among Peoples

The Soviet Armed Forces' historic victories during the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars demonstrated the inexhaustible possibilities of the socialist social system in the matter of creating and strengthening a genuinely popular military organisation and in the armed defence of the multi-national socialist state.

The formation and subsequent development of the Soviet Army and Navy, as the multi-national army of internationalists, have passed through several basic stages. *The first stage* covers the period when the new type of army was formed in individual socialist republics, their first steps in organising joint defence against the onslaught of international imperialism and internal counter-revolution.

Soon after the victorious Great October Socialist Revolution, the Communist Party announced that one of its internal policies would be to strengthen the new socialist society in every way and to free it of economic, socio-political and national inequality: this it proceeded to do. On the international scene it pursued a policy of peace and friendship with all peoples.

Lenin's teaching on the nationalities question which he developed on the basis of the seminal ideas of Marx and Engels, and the scientific principles of the Communist Party's nationalities policy were of critical importance in mobilising the working people of every one of the country's nationalities for building the new society. The most crucial of the Party's principles is the need for the working class and all working people to be united and educated. The ideology and policy of the working class are expressed in proletarian internationalism the basic principle of which was summed up in Marx's and Engels' famous slogan "Workers of All Countries, Unite!"

In tsarist Russia the indispensable prerequisite for uniting the workers of different nationalities and nations was the overthrow of the exploiters' domination, abolition of social and national inequality and the granting of the right to self-determination to each nation. Lenin believed that the proletarian party was duty bound to proclaim the freedom of secession for all nations and nationalities. He wrote: "Complete freedom of secession, the broadest local (and national) autonomy, and elaborate guarantees of the rights of national minorities — this is the programme of the revolutionary proletariat."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 73.

The Leninist principles underlying the solution of the nationalities question formed the basis of "The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" adopted by the Soviet Government on November 15, 1917. This historic document proclaimed: "1. Equality and sovereignty for the peoples of Russia.

"2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, up to and including secession and the formation of an independent state."¹

The establishment of sovereign Soviet socialist republics in the territory of the former tsarist empire was a clear sign of the equality of all nations and of their right to self-determination. This historic act coupled with the abolition of every form of social and national oppression enabled the Communist Party to win the confidence of the once oppressed peoples.

The Soviet Government's proclamation and implementation of full equality for the nations and nationalities of Russia in every area of social life ensured their full equality in the military field as well. Proletarian internationalism and the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet peoples were the all important principles underlying the formation of the Red Army.

The armed foreign intervention and the Civil War were acid tests of the soundness of the Leninist nationalities policy. The Communist Party succeeded in forming a proletarian army whose organisation was based on Lenin's ideas on the unity of all the peoples in defending the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

To begin with the Red Army was an agglomeration of armed detachments of revolutionary workers, sailors and soldiers which had been formed by the Party prior to the October Revolution of 1917 to overthrow the power of the landlords and capitalists. Subsequently, they formed the nucleus of a unified army of sovereign Soviet republics that emerged in the territory of the former tsarist empire. The formation of such an army was made possible by the strengthening of the military and political alliance between the Russian people and other peoples of the country. Lenin said: "... Faced by a huge front of imperialist powers, we, who are fighting imperialism, represent an alliance that requires close military unity, and any attempt to violate this unity we regard as absolutely impermissible, as a betrayal of the struggle against international imperialism... We say: unity of the military forces is imperative; any deviation from this unity is impermissible."²

Lenin taught that "a foundation — socialist production — is essential for the abolition of national oppression, but this foundation must *also* carry a democratically organised state, a democratic army, etc."³ Thus, Lenin regarded the formation of the new type of army capable

¹ *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. I, p. 40 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, pp. 325-26.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 325.

of maintaining the revolutionary gains as a crucial condition for the building of socialism and communism.

The tsarist autocracy was careful not to entrust many peoples with weapons and subjected them to discrimination in the military field. Thus, almost 40 nationalities of the Russian empire were debarred from army and navy service. In contrast to this policy of discrimination the Soviet state, always loyal to the Leninist nationalities policy of brotherhood, friendship and equality of all peoples, guaranteed the right of military service for every nation and nationality. The right to defend the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution was granted to every working man of the multi-national Soviet Republic.

The special decree adopted by the Soviet Government on January 28, 1918 stated: "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army shall be formed of the more conscious and organised elements of the working masses.... Everyone prepared to dedicate his energies and give his life to defend the gains of the October Revolution, the power of Soviets and socialism shall have the right to enlist in the Red Army."¹

The Red Army was a new type of army with a clearly pronounced proletarian character and formed exclusively from among the working class and working peasantry of every nationality. In contrast to the soldier of the tsarist army, who was a tool of oppression, the armed worker and peasant, revolutionary soldier and sailor became the symbol of the bulwark of Soviet power, they were the defenders of friendship and peace among peoples.

The Communist Party consistently implemented the principles of the Leninist nationalities policy in the military field. The successful solution of the nationalities question in this area meant that the Soviet Armed Forces were being formed as a single, efficient fighting organism guaranteeing the security of the socialist Fatherland.

Most units of the Red Army were formed between 1918 and 1920 as multi-national units, the people of many different nations and nationalities serving and going into battle side by side with Russians. But the Party's nationalities policy in the military field went beyond guaranteeing the unimpeded enlistment of working people of every nation in the Red Army, beyond setting up units of mixed nationality. Lenin and the Communist Party, while working out ways of ensuring the active participation of non-Russian peoples in the armed defence of the socialist Motherland, believed it essential to form units consisting exclusively of men of one nationality apart from forming multi-national units. In so doing they took into account the special features of every nation and nationality. Thus, independent national formations were set up from nationalities with military experience. For instance, in the Ukraine there were three national divisions which conducted successful operations against Petlyura's gangs and the foreign interventionist troops. In Byelorussia, the Vitebsk and Polotsk regiments and some other national units fought against the enemy with self-sacrifice and bravery.

¹ *Decrees of the Soviet Government*, Vol. 1, p. 356 (in Russian).

The Lettish rifles covered themselves with unfading glory during the Civil War. In early 1918 they were brought together to form a Lettish Soviet Rifle Division.

The national units formed from among the peoples of Central Asia, the Transcaucasia and other areas proved the best form of enlisting the working masses of the national fringe areas of the former tsarist empire for the armed defence of socialism and they contributed greatly to the struggle against internal counter-revolutionaries and the foreign interventionist troops. They were also a good school for training Party cadres and the personnel for Soviets. Many of the commanders, political workers and rank-and-file soldiers were later to be promoted to managerial posts in their own republics and worked in the Party apparatus, in the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in a variety of economic management organisations and other bodies. The Leninist nationalities policy in the military field was instrumental in strengthening the friendship of Soviet peoples and in enhancing the defence capacity of the Soviet socialist republics.

The early military units formed in the Russian Federation, in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and in other Soviet republics, however, had no centralised command structure, no single system of personnel enlistment and supplies and no unified system for training command personnel; even though these units were formed on the common principles and with the assistance and supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the central military bodies. Frequently these units did not properly co-operate during operations, their commanders on occasions displayed parochial nationalistic tendencies. The fragmentation of the armed forces of the various Soviet republics did irreparable damage to the common effort against the foreign interventionist troops and the White Guards.

Maintaining the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution demanded the utmost centralisation of the military command structure. Bearing this in mind Lenin, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of People's Commissars, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the All-Russia General Staff and, from November 1918, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence step by step implemented a unified Party policy in the military field by issuing instructions, directives and through individual Communists with ministerial responsibilities in the governments of the Soviet republics.

The logic of armed struggle, the common goals and objectives combined to prepare the ground for setting up a military and political alliance of the various Soviet republics and led to the unification of their armed forces into a single organisation resting on the principles of proletarian internationalism and the full equality of all nations and nationalities.

Lenin, in a number of his writings, fully substantiated the need for such an alliance. In his "Draft CC Directives on Army Unity" he stressed: "The RSFSR, in alliance with the fraternal Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Byelorussia, is

compelled to wage a war of defence against the common enemy, world imperialism and the Black-Hundred, whiteguard counter-revolution which imperialism supports."¹ The draft directive went on to emphasise that "an essential condition for success in that war is a single command for all contingents of the Red Army, the strictest centralisation of the command of all the forces and resources of the socialist republics, especially of the entire army supply apparatus and also of railway transport which is an important material factor in the war, being of primary importance both for the conduct of operations and for the supply of munitions, equipment and provisions to the Red Army...."²

Lenin taught that apart from its crucial domestic significance a strong alliance of Soviet socialist republics had an important international significance. To Lenin the maintenance and strengthening of this alliance was imperative and in his own words was "necessary for the world communist proletariat in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its defence against bourgeois intrigues"³

The identical interests of the working people of every nationality have provided a reliable class basis for a military and political alliance of the various Soviet republics. The creation of this alliance, however, proceeded amid fierce battles against internal and external counter-revolutionaries and was a very complex and responsible task. Simultaneously with the conduct of military operations on the various fronts to fight off the frenzied onslaught of the enemies of Soviet power it was necessary to overcome the incredible difficulties and problems stemming from Russia's economic backwardness. This was made worse by the counter-revolutionaries' continuous attempts to capitalise on the survivals of national discord and bourgeois nationalism.

That is why as far as military development was concerned, and indeed this applied to the entire task of creating a voluntary alliance of nations, it was necessary, in Lenin's phrase, to work "with the greatest patience and circumspection, so as not to spoil matters and not to arouse distrust, and so that the distrust inherited from centuries of landowner and capitalist oppression, centuries of private property and the enmity caused by its divisions and redivisions may have a chance to wear off".⁴ It was only Lenin's genius and his truly titanic energy and the Party's collective wisdom and colossal organisational work in many different fields that allowed a workable programme for setting up a new type of army capable of defending the world's first socialist state to be worked out and quickly put into effect.

The policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government commanded the support of the working people. The experience of the Civil War convinced them that they would only be able to defend the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 404.

² *Ibid.*, p. 404.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 36, p. 609.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 293.

revolution and build a new socialist state by joint efforts. The idea of creating a military and political alliance was acclaimed wholeheartedly by the country's peoples. Thus, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee in a resolution on the unification of the armed forces of the Soviet Republics, adopted on May 18, 1919, stated: "The struggle against the common enemy makes it incumbent upon the Soviet republics to pool their efforts and create a centralised command structure."¹ The Ukraine's example in placing her armed forces under the unified command of the fraternal republics was followed by Soviet Byelorussia.

This and other decisions set the stage for a military and political union of the Soviet republics, and went a long way towards completing the formation of mass regular forces under a unified command of the Soviet republics and guaranteed unity of command and operations at the battle fronts.

On June 1, 1919, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee met in Moscow in special session attended by representatives from every Soviet republic. The meeting adopted a decision to conclude a military alliance and form a unified command structure as well as to unify the various National Economic Councils, transport services and commissariats of labour of the Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Byelorussian Soviet republics. Subsequently, this union was joined by other Soviet republics as they came into being. The military union of the socialist republics allowed the management of the available military and material resources to be centralised and to be mobilised for the struggle against the enemies of Soviet power, thereby augmenting the country's defence potential.

Much credit for the formation and strengthening of the military and political union of the country's various nations and nationalities goes to the Russian working class and to the Russian people. Their revolutionary energy, self-sacrifice, internationalism and disinterested assistance to the working peoples of the country's national fringe areas earned them the respect of all the people of all the fraternal socialist republics and their confidence. The resolution of the 12th Party Congress on the nationalities question stated in this connection: "There is hardly any need to prove that without this confidence the Russian proletariat would have been unable to defeat Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the oppressed nationalities would have been unable to win their liberation without the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in the centre of Russia."²

The Leninist nationalities policy in the military field played a crucial part in stepping up the fighting efficiency of the multi-national

¹ *The Communist Party—the Inspirer and Organiser of the Movement of the Ukrainian People Towards the Formation of the USSR*. A Collection of Documents and Materials, Kiev, 1962, p. 129 (in Russian).

² *The CPSU in Resolutions...*, p. 436 (in Russian).

Red Army. In the struggle against the enemies, the mighty strength of the friendship of the peoples of Russia, free at last from social and national oppression, was demonstrated for all to see.

The Red Army was formed as a truly international army both in spirit and in terms of its personnel composition. Soviet reality gave the lie to the slanderous assertions of Western ideologists about the alleged inability of many peoples of Russia to become good soldiers and about their being unfit for military service. During the foreign intervention and Civil War Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Estonians and other peoples fought side by side in the ranks of the Red Army. They fought with courage and skill. Towards the end of the war the personnel of the Red Army were 77.6 per cent Russians, 13.7 per cent Ukrainians, 4 per cent Byelorussians, and 4.7 per cent Latvians, Tatars, Bashkirs and men of other nationalities.

History knows other examples of the formation of multi-national armed forces. Troops of conquered countries have been pressed into the armies of the conquerors. Cases in point include the armies of Cyrus II of Persia and Alexander the Great, the armies of ancient Rome, Byzantium and Arab caliphate. The armies of the Frankish empires, of Chenghiz Khan and the Ottoman empire, the armies of Napoleonic France and Austria-Hungary. While being an impressive force initially, they disintegrated fairly quickly either upon collision with a serious enemy or because of the collapse of the empire. The basic reasons for the ephemeral strength of those armies are to be sought in the unjust aims for the achievement of which they were put together and fought, class antagonisms and the lack of a cementing force in the shape of the ethnic groups and nationalities having identical social interests.

Napoleon, for example, was only able to win victories as long as his army was fired by the ideals, albeit illusory, of the French bourgeois revolution 1789-94. At that time Napoleon skilfully capitalised on the enthusiasm and high morale of his army and on the military traditions then existing. However, after the big bourgeoisie had seized power and after Napoleon had instituted a dictatorship the masses came to realise more clearly the predatory and unjust character of the wars France was waging at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. Once Napoleon's hordes, which the Russian people aptly called "an army of a dozen of languages" (for apart from Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Austrians, Swiss, Dutchmen, Poles, Spaniards, etc. served in it), had invaded Russia they were unable to bring the war to a victorious conclusion. In the end, Napoleon's army collapsed under the shattering blows of the Russian army. The fiasco of Napoleon's wars of aggression had been predetermined by the predatory character of the war which, as Lenin put it, "*in turn* led to wars of national liberation *against* Napoleonic imperialism".¹ The patriotic war of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 309.

peoples of Russia against Napoleon's army in 1812 was just such a national-liberation war.

The mercenary armies formed by the kings of West European countries in the 15th-16th centuries, when feudalism was disintegrating, were inefficient and internally weak. As a rule, these armies were made up of the *déclassé* elements of different nationalities. The mercenaries did not share the national interests of the countries in whose armies they served for money. They were an extremely indisciplined lot, cruel, with low moral and fighting qualities, base instincts and attracted only by the prospects of enrichment and unimpeded marauding. The mercenaries served those who offered the most money. Frequently on the eve of decisive battles they even crossed over to the enemy in a body, thereby placing the army of their former masters on the brink of defeat.

The nationalities problem in the tsarist army, which had always been an instrument for oppressing the working people, was extremely complex and acute. The soldiers were called upon to defend tsarist autocracy, strike terror in the hearts of the masses and suppress everything that was progressive and revolutionary in the country. Tsarist autocracy deliberately encouraged chauvinism and nationalism and played one people off against another. The massacres of Armenians, pogroms against the Jews, the deportation of non-Russians to remote areas—everything was used to fan national strife and discord. This system was maintained in the tsarist empire with the full backing and blessing of the church for hundreds of years.

The imperialist countries today are also permeated with the spurious spirit of nationalism, chauvinism and racialism. National inequality is the order of the day in every imperialist country. All this cannot but leave an indelible imprint on their armed forces.

The situation in the United States of America is typical in this respect. Although race discrimination in the US army is formally banned, there are race conflicts in the US Armed Forces, the same as there are in US society as a whole. In the face of incontrovertible evidence, even the Western press has to admit that in recent years the clashes between white and black servicemen in the US army arising from race discrimination have become dramatically more frequent. The American journal *Military Review* reported that in 1969 alone as many as 129 major race-related disturbances occurred in the US army in the continental USA. The West German newspaper *Deutsche Nachrichten* wrote that in the first nine months of 1971 as many as 1,002 cases of group fights and armed clashes between white and black servicemen took place in the US Armed Forces. Between October and November 1972 there were mass protests by black servicemen against race discrimination on the US aircraft-carriers *Kittyhawk* and *Constellation* and on the *Hassayampea* tanker. After the *Kittyhawk* left Pearl Harbour naval base a clash between black and white sailors broke out, as a result of which 46 men were injured and over 20 black sailors were court-martialled. In November 1972,

about 120 black sailors on the aircraft carrier *Constellation* refused to return to the ship which was headed for Vietnamese waters after accusing the aircraft-carrier's captain of provoking race incidents among the crew. In June 1974, over 300 of the crew of the US carrier *Midway* demonstrated when their aircraft carrier anchored at Yokosuka (Japan), in protest against the arbitrary attitude of the commanders and against the race discrimination flourishing aboard. After this incident over 100 sailors failed to return to the aircraft carrier.

In the Israeli army, Zionist propaganda is constantly being stepped up, particularly among the younger soldiers and officers. The Zionists encourage racialism and cultivate aggressive expansionist aspirations among the personnel of the Israeli army. The young men of Jewish origin have the spurious idea of their supposed racial and intellectual superiority over the Arab nations dinned into them.

The nationalities question in the military field under capitalist society based as it is on social, racial and national oppression is an insuperable problem. In a socialist state which has proclaimed and given reality to equality among peoples, there is no such problem. The Soviet Armed Forces do not have a problem of this nature since from their very inception they have been multi-national and welded together by their personnel's identity of class interests and their common national and international tasks.

The utter devotion and dedication of all nations and nationalities of the socialist Motherland form the basis of the fighting strength of the multi-national Soviet Armed Forces. Their militant alliance expresses the organic fusion of the vital interests of the entire Soviet people with the noble national traditions of every nation and nationality. This indestructible unity has provided fertile ground on which the Soviet officers' and men's socialist patriotism and internationalism has arisen.

Following the victory of the Red Army over the foreign interventionist troops and the White Guards the young Soviet Republic had to further strengthen the unity of its people. Rehabilitating the country's war-torn economy, tackling the grand tasks of building socialism and defending the gains of the socialist revolution against external and internal enemies demanded that every economic, political and military resource of the Soviet republics and their diplomatic efforts be pooled.

The establishment of the military and political union of the various Soviet republics during the foreign intervention and Civil War was a major step towards forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a new type of state. The decision of the CPSU Central Committee on preparations to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR states in this connection: "The military-political union which was formed in the course of the Civil War, the close co-ordination of foreign-policy activities, joint efforts in the rehabilitation of the national economy, economic development and the strengthening of the country's defence capacity naturally facilitated the

transition to the unification of the peoples, on the basis of full equality, within a single socialist family.”¹

Lenin attached exceptional importance to the various Soviet republics being united into a single state. In his message of greetings sent to the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets, he wrote: “One of the most important problems which the Congress has to solve is that of uniting the republics. The proper solution of this problem will determine the future organisation of our machinery of state....”²

The Communist Party consistently translated into reality the Leninist nationalities policy and Lenin’s ideas about the Soviet republics being united in a single allied state. The decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted at its plenary session in October 1922 on the creation of a fraternal union of equal and sovereign republics was acclaimed enthusiastically by the working people of the entire country. The plenary sessions of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia held in October-December 1922 and the Seventh All-Ukraine, Fourth All-Byelorussia, First Transcaucasian and the 10th All-Russia Congresses of Soviets favoured the formation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The declaration adopted by the Seventh All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets states: “The Seventh Congress of Soviets, responding in full agreement with the wishes and will of the working people of the Ukraine, appeals to the workers and peasants in Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with the fraternal proposal to immediately initiate the formalisation of the Union of Soviet Republics which already exists in actual terms and thereby present a common socialist workers’ and peasants’ front against the common front of the world bourgeoisie.”³

The First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met in Moscow on December 30, 1922. The 2,215 delegates from the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Republic attending the Congress adopted the historic decision to unify their republics into a single state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Congress was also attended by 206 military delegates representing the rank-and-file soldiers, commanders and political workers of the multi-national Red Army.

In its Declaration on the formation of the USSR, the Congress emphasised that only with the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship in Russia had it been possible to abolish national oppression, create a climate of mutual trust and lay the foundations of a fraternal co-operation among the peoples.

The voluntary unification of the Soviet republics to form a single state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—was a triumph for

¹ *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Resolution of the CC CPSU*, Moscow, 1972, p. 10.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 454.

³ *Formation of the USSR. Collection of Documents 1917-1924*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1949, p. 299 (in Russian).

Marxism-Leninism, and the nationalities policy of the Communist Party. This gave all the country's peoples the possibility of economic, political and cultural development. The whole of mankind was shown to the right road towards solving the nationalities question, towards ending the inequality of nations and nationalities, and they were shown the way in which peoples could come together to form a single fraternal family of nations to build a new society.

Lenin's ideas on the unity of peoples in defence of the socialist gains underlie the formation of the Soviet Armed Forces. The formation of the USSR meant that the controlling function over the country's Armed Forces was now vested in a single centralised body. Originally this function was exercised by the All-Union People's Commissariat for Army and Naval Affairs (later known as the People's Commissariat for Defence) which was set up in fulfilment of the Declaration and the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, documents which were approved by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR on December 30, 1922.

The formation of the USSR meant new ways of strengthening the defence capability of the Soviet state. The fraternal co-operation of the country's nations and nationalities increased several-fold the opportunities for building socialism and for defending its gains, and supplied fresh strength enabling the country to tackle its historic tasks.

Lenin said that the experience of the Party's nationalities policy during the proletarian revolution and the Civil War demonstrated that the best method for strengthening the fraternal alliance of working people of different nationalities was joint work to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power in the struggle against the landowners and capitalists of all countries and against their attempts to restore their omnipotence. This instruction of Lenin's has a direct bearing on military development. Our army is an instrument of the Soviet state. Mikhail Frunze¹ wrote: "The USSR is a union of working people of different nationalities. The Red Army is its reflection. It is not a national army, it is a union, a military union to which every Soviet Republic contributes her sons to enable them to learn the art of war and, to stand guard, shoulder to shoulder with their counterparts from other Soviet republics, over the peace of the Soviet land."²

The formation of the USSR ushered in *the second stage* in the evolution of the Soviet Armed Forces. This stage saw their further development and strengthening as a unified multi-national Soviet Army. This stage spans the period of building socialism, the Great Patriotic War and the immediate post-war economic rehabilitation and construction up to the mid-fifties. During this period the Soviet

¹ Mikhail Frunze (1885-1925), a prominent figure in the Communist Party and Soviet Government, a disciple and follower of Lenin's, a gifted general and organiser of the Soviet Armed Forces.— *Ed.*

² M. V. Frunze, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, p. 194 (in Russian).

Armed Forces were supplied with new weapons and equipment, their organisation underwent significant changes, and the standard of personnel training in new methods of warfare rose, as did the level of their moral and political unity, and significant progress was made in other fields of military development. There was hardly any aspect of defence work where significant changes for the better did not occur. The Soviet Army and Navy made a tremendous leap forward. This was the result of the Communist Party's science-based guidance and direction of the Armed Forces, the result of its constant concern to enhance the country's defence capability.

Following the founding of the USSR, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, led by Lenin, implemented the principle of full equality and fraternal co-operation between peoples in every area of social life, paying great attention to further developing the national base of the Red Army.

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party, held in April 1923, adopted a series of fundamental resolutions on this question. In particular, the Congress pointed to the need for stepping up educational work among the personnel of the Red Army in the spirit of the brotherhood and solidarity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the need to form national units. In June 1923, guided by the Congress decisions, the Central Committee of the Communist Party in conjunction with high-ranking officials in the national republics and regions worked out measures to form fighting units and open military schools in the republics and regions for training command personnel from among the local population.

In March 1924, the Red Army had four Ukrainian, two Georgian, one Byelorussian, one Armenian and one Azerbaijanian territorial rifle divisions. In addition, there were Daghestan, Yakut, Bukhara and Khorezm national units and elements. In late 1924, a plenary session of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR approved a five-year plan for the formation of national military units which envisaged an increase in the number of national units stationed in the Uzbek and the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics, in the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Republic, in the Tajik, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Buryat-Mongolian, Yakut, Tatar and Bashkir Autonomous Republics and in other areas. The centre of gravity in developing the national base of the Red Army shifted to the East, to the republics of Central Asia and the Volga area.

The Third Congress of the Soviets of the USSR, held in May 1925, approved the activities of the Revolutionary Military Council in building up the national base of the Red Army and instructed the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "to ensure the execution of the planned programme for the formation of national units, which met the interests of all the peoples of the USSR in the matter of defending their common socialist Fatherland".¹ The resolutions adopted by the Congress

¹ *All-Russia and USSR Soviets in Decisions and Resolutions*, Moscow, 1935, p. 352 (in Russian).

stressed the need for a carefully phased time-table for implementing the programme in order, in the words of the resolution, "to ensure that the national units to be set up are just as efficient as the existing units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army".¹

As was the case during the Civil War, the national fighting units continued to be a good school for training of competent well-educated and politically aware military cadres, devoted to Soviet power, who were so badly needed at the time.

During the pre-war five-year development plans, the fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR went from strength to strength. Their close co-operation in state, political, economic and cultural development, the unprecedented progress of the productive forces in the Soviet socialist republics, the abolition of most of the actual inequality existing between nations and nationalities as a legacy of the old regime and the elimination of the persisting elements of mutual distrust combined to change the face of all the peoples of the USSR. The significant changes that had occurred in the economic and social structure of the Soviet state were reflected and formalised in the new Constitution adopted by the Extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets on December 5, 1936. The new Constitution proclaimed service in the Red Army as the honorary duty of every Soviet citizen. The Law on Universal Military Conscription passed on September 1, 1939, laid down a uniform military service procedure for all the citizens of the USSR irrespective of race, nationality, religion, educational level, social origin and status.

The victory of socialism in the USSR, the liquidation of the capitalist and feudal elements, the levelling-up of the economic standards and cultural attainments of the peoples of the USSR, and the formation of socialist nations sharing features common to all Soviet society necessitated a new approach to the formation of national units and the establishment of military schools and training centres. The national units had fulfilled their positive role in strengthening the military and political position of the USSR, and in training and educating military personnel for the once backward republics. It had been an important way in which the armed forces of the multi-national Soviet state were built. Experience showed that further strengthening the friendship of the peoples, the militant alliance of all the nationalities of the USSR, and the Red Army's mastery of the art of war, was better served by a mixed system of personnel enlistment.

The need for a mixed system was dictated by a number of other major factors. In the late thirties the Red Army had completed the transition to an extra-territorial system of personnel enlistment. National units, by contrast, were inevitably bound to their particular territories, which made it impossible to train national military personnel in operations under different climatic conditions, in areas with different terrain and battlefield situations. The training and

¹ Ibid.

education of the personnel of the national units was seriously hampered by the need to conduct training sessions in two languages simultaneously, in the local tongue and in Russian. Considerable difficulties were experienced in drafting and publishing regulations, manuals and instructions in many local languages to make them usable by the personnel of the national units.

The foregoing was the main reason why the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution in March 1938 entitled "On National Units and Formations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" which contained a proposal to re-form national units and military schools into all-Union ones, based on an extra-territorial system of personnel enlistment, with an appropriate re-dislocation of units. The resolution also pointed out that "citizens of the national republics and regions shall be called up for military service on an equal footing with citizens of the rest of the nationalities of the USSR".¹

Joint service in mixed units widened the opportunities for improving the training of national military cadres.

During the building of socialism, the strength of the multi-national Red Army was repeatedly tried in the armed clashes with reactionary imperialist forces which attempted to probe the USSR's defences by force of arms. The men of the Red Army stood vigilant guard over the peace of their socialist Motherland and displayed fine moral and fighting qualities, and their ability and competence in employing new weapons and equipment and new tactics on the battlefield.

The victory of socialism strengthened the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the ideological and political unity of Soviet society and friendship among the peoples of the USSR. The bonds of fraternity within the country's Armed Forces linking officers and men of different nationalities and nations became stronger as did Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. These features found graphic expression in the Soviet people's solidarity with the peoples of other countries fighting for their emancipation from social and national oppression.

The Great Patriotic War came as an acid test of the strength of the multi-national Soviet state and its Armed Forces. During the heavy fighting outside Moscow and Stalingrad, in the North Caucasus and the Ukraine, in Byelorussia and the Baltic area, the entire Soviet people to a man defended the socialist system with determination and courage. Soldiers of every Soviet nationality fought to maintain the honour, freedom and independence of their Motherland, and to defend the cause of communism against the onslaught of the nazi hordes. They realised full well that the Soviet Union was their Motherland and with equal self-sacrifice and courage they went into battle against the common enemy. This was graphic proof of the soundness and correctness of the Leninist nationalities policy, the

¹ *The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents 1917-1968*, p. 294 (in Russian).

best proof of the strength of the socialist system, the ideological and political unity of all working people, and of their cohesion around the Communist Party, which was their vanguard.

Anyone in this country who has fought at the frontline can quote thousands of examples of the courage displayed by Soviet fighting men of different nationalities, examples of their friendship and brotherhood. Thus, soldiers of thirty nationalities defended the Brest Fortress. The 28 heroes from the famous division of General Panfilov who stopped a nazi panzer thrust outside Moscow, included sons of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia. Every nation and nationality of the USSR took part in the great Battle of Stalingrad. The identity of thoughts and actions of the sons and daughters of the different Soviet republics was a major factor in our victory on the Volga. The personnel of the units of the Transcaucasian Front were of a varied national composition. There were up to twelve formations composed almost wholly of Caucasian peoples.

It is with a feeling of deep emotion that today, three decades later, I read letters written by many courageous patriots from different Soviet republics in which they ask permission to fight the hated enemy arms in hand. Here is a letter from Rakhmat Nazarov to the call-up station in Dushanbe: "...Komsomol has taught me to be loyal to my country to the end. I am ready to discharge my military duty and I am not deterred by any privations and trials. I'm still young and love life to the full. But I love my country and want to see it forever free and happy. Should I fall on the battlefield it will be in a good cause."¹

National units set up in the course of the war helped rout the nazi hordes. These included three Kazakh divisions of the Guards, a Latvian and an Estonian corps, a Lithuanian, an Azerbaijanian, a Bashkir, a Georgian, an Armenian and other national divisions. People of different nationalities fought the enemy as members of partisan detachments. Thus, the Ukrainian partisan formation commanded by S. A. Kovpak who operated in the Ukraine included people of forty nationalities.

All the Soviet peoples take pride in the fact that their sons and daughters displayed heroism and gallantry during the fighting in the Great Patriotic War and were decorated by the Government. Those who have had the title of Hero of the Soviet Union conferred upon them include: 8,160 Russians, 2,069 Ukrainians, 309 Byelorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordovians, 44 Chuvashes, 43 Azerbaijanians, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossets, 18 Maris, 18 Turkmen, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tajiks, 13 Latvians, 12 Kirghiz, 10 Komis, 10 Udmurtians, 9 Estonians, 9 Karelians, 8 Kalmyks, 7 Kabardinians, 6 Adygeis, 5 Abkhazians, 3 Yakuts and members of many other nationalities.²

The heroic exploits performed during the war by the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy from the rank and file to the generals and

¹ *The Army of the Peoples' Brotherhood*, Moscow, 1972, p. 224 (in Russian).

² See *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short History*, p. 581 (in Russian).

admirals were convincing proof of their loyalty to their military duty, of their readiness to give all their energy and, should it be necessary, to lay down their lives to defend their socialist Motherland. Heroic deeds are not merely the result of an impulse or an upsurge of moral and physical strength; they are, above all, the result of cast-iron discipline and hard work. This simple truth must be assimilated by the young people of today who continue to carry the torch representing the fine traditions developed by the older generation. The younger generation have inherited the duty and honour of defending their socialist Motherland. They are duty bound to prepare themselves for new heroic deeds.

The Great Patriotic War went down in the annals of history as a war of the whole people. During the four years of the war there was no Soviet man or woman who would fail to contribute his or her share to the common effort that defeated the nazi aggressor. Soviet people everywhere, whether in the frontlines, attacking the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, or saving lives as medical personnel, whether fighting as part of a partisan detachment or working at a tank factory, or growing grain for the army in the fields and the civilian population contributed to the ultimate victory over the enemy. The thoughts and actions of the Soviet people were focussed on one and only one goal: to speed the day when the sacred Soviet soil would be freed from the nazis, when the hated enemy would be routed completely.

The victory in the last war over a powerful enemy demonstrated the great unconquerable power of the friendship and brotherhood of peoples and the power of proletarian internationalism. Our victory fully vindicated Lenin's ideas on a new type of army — an army of the people, for the people; the army of a multi-national socialist state.

In preparing their aggression against the USSR the nazi ringleaders looked upon the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces as an artificial conglomeration of many nations and nationalities. They intended to disarm the multi-national Soviet people morally, to break their will to win, to extinguish their faith in victory, to destroy the friendship of the Soviet peoples and to foment anti-Russian sentiment among the non-Russian members of the Soviet Armed Forces. To do this the nazis used a variety of filthy tricks ranging from ideological subversion against the civilian population and Soviet Army personnel to using the remnants of the White Guard rabble and bourgeois nationalistic riffraff as a cats-paw.

But the enemy miscalculated badly. Instead of rupturing the unity of the peoples of the Soviet state and their Armed Forces, instead of breaking their faith in ultimate victory, the mortal threat hanging over the socialist Motherland brought them closer together as never before. There is no other example of patriotism assuming such a nation-wide character as was the case during the Great Patriotic War. The main hero of the war was the multi-national Soviet people cemented together by common bonds. Every nation and every nationality inhabiting the USSR contributed its own share to the victory over the enemy.

The proletarian internationalism of the Soviet Armed Forces was graphically expressed during the Great Patriotic War. The peoples of Europe and other continents saw the Soviet soldier as a man of the new world and the Soviet soldier came to symbolise heroism and represented a class-motivated fighter for peace and the happiness of working people everywhere.

The repeated attempts by imperialism, including the attempt by fascism, its monstrous progeny, to destroy Soviet power by force of arms have invariably come to nought. The Great Patriotic War demonstrated the indestructible might, vitality and invincibility of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the whole world. The Soviet social and state system and the friendship of the peoples of the USSR emerged even stronger from the crucible of the Great Patriotic War.

The reasons for the defeat of the nazi aggressor in the last war are well known. However, there are falsifiers of history in the West who, to please their imperialist masters, present their own catalogue of reasons for the defeat of Hitler's war machine, in which they enumerate everything except the main factor in our victory, namely, the advantages inherent in the Soviet social and state system and the moral and political unity and friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

Marx wrote: "War puts a nation to an acid test.... Just like a mummy instantly disintegrates upon exposure to the air so a war passes a death sentence upon social institutions which are no longer viable."¹ Our victory in the Great Patriotic War put an end to fascism, a regime directed against the people, and the most reactionary and aggressive ever to have existed. Our victory demonstrated the invincible life-asserting power of the socialist system.

Since the end of the last war, the Soviet Union has scored signal success in every area of communist construction. The socialist social relations and Soviet democracy have been developing successfully. With every passing year the moral and political unity of the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals becomes stronger as does the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR. This creates a good basis on which to improve the defence capability of the Soviet state and strengthen the Soviet Army and Navy.

The third stage in the development of the multi-national Soviet Armed Forces began in the mid-fifties. This stage has seen, on the one hand, the emergence of the world socialist system and the steady strengthening of the Soviet Union's economic and political might, and, on the other, the growing aggressiveness of international imperialism.

The imperialists' intensification of the cold war against the USSR, the dangerous hotbeds of tension they created in different parts of the world, coupled with their acts of naked aggression, meant that the Soviet people had to be constantly vigilant and look to their defences. The Soviet Union was faced with a new priority task, namely, to

¹ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 11, S. 522.

ensure the reliable defence, security and sovereignty of the entire socialist community together with the other fraternal countries, leaning on the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Strengthening the unity of the Soviet socialist nations and the closer friendship and fraternity between the soldiers of different nationalities help the country's Armed Forces cope with this task successfully. As a result of social, political, economic and cultural progress, Soviet society has advanced to a new stage. At the same time all the socialist republics have continued to draw closer together and the process of internationalisation of Soviet life has become ever more pronounced. The achievements of individual Soviet republics are complemented by the achievements of the other sister republics and become their joint property. The peoples of the USSR have a common economy which meets the requirements of each republic adequately and equally. They have a common political organisation of society guaranteeing every nation and nationality equal rights and duties, equal access to and benefits from a culture which is national in form and socialist in content and international in spirit and character and a common Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The Soviet Armed Forces make a weighty contribution to educating Soviet youth in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism. The Soviet Armed Forces are a close-knit family and a school of internationalist upbringing and education.

The Communist Party's guidelines for educating Soviet military personnel in the spirit of fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR are formulated in the decisions of Party congresses and plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee and in the Statute on political organs and the instructions for CPSU organisations in the Soviet Army and Navy and in other Party documents. They are also reflected in the regulations and manuals issued for the guidance of the Armed Forces personnel.

The appeal entitled "To the Peoples of the World" issued by the joint anniversary session of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on December 22, 1972, to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR is a programme document in the internationalist education of Soviet military personnel. The text of the Appeal is like the text of an oath of allegiance to Lenin's banner, to the Communist Party and the great Soviet people, to the sacred ideals of communism, to the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and to the principles of selflessly defending the socialist Motherland. The message of greetings sent by the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy to the anniversary meeting contains the following words: "We shall spare no effort to defend our Motherland and are prepared to lay down our lives if need be. Our heroic people may rest assured that the Soviet Army and Navy are always on the alert..."¹ The friendship of the peoples of the USSR is an

¹ *Pravda*, December 23, 1972.

inexhaustible source for the monolithic unity and cohesion of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces.

The commanders, political officers, and Party and Komsomol organisations in the Army and Navy have been working unflinchingly to systematically improve the content, forms and methods of educating the men of the Soviet Army and Navy in a spirit of internationalism. The experience of the leading units indicates that the internationalist education is at its most effective when the soldiers' and sailors' needs stemming from their special national features are carefully studied and taken into account and where progressive national traditions and customs are treated with respect. Everything possible is done to ensure that military personnel are educated in a spirit of internationalism. The same effort goes into ensuring that a collective team spirit permeates the whole of service life. The men serve outside their native republic or area and are in daily contact with other fraternal peoples, and get to know their culture, customs and traditions. Efforts to spread the experience of the Great Patriotic War, and to study the documents and factual material of the war years are very effective in this context. The latter show the heroism of individual servicemen from different Soviet peoples and symbolise internationalism sealed by blood.

The Soviet Armed Forces form an integral part of the Soviet people, that new historical community which has taken shape whilst socialism and communism is being built in the USSR. They embody features and qualities which are peculiar to the multi-national people of the USSR. The world has never seen a multi-national army with such a close identity of interests and goals, with such singleness of will and action, nor has it seen an army deriving its strength from the moral kinship and cohesion of its men. The Soviet Armed Forces are just such an army. The entire history of the Soviet Army and Navy is a record of devoted service to the socialist Motherland and the fraternal family of peoples — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. The Indestructible Unity of the Army and the People

The popular, multi-national character of the Soviet Armed Forces makes the unity of the army and the people, one of the basic principles in their formation, become more and more clear. The constant strengthening of this unity is an indispensable condition for the steady development and improvement of a socialist army. The unity of the Army and the people is an inexhaustible source of the might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces.

For centuries the notions "army" and "people" have existed side by side but could not merge. They only did so when a state arose where oppression by exploiters was abolished and the working people became the master of their country.

The people's attitude to the army depends on the latter's social nature, goals and tasks, and ultimately on the political and economic system dominant in society. The armies in capitalist states serve the interests of the bourgeois class. The armies in socialist countries are the armed forces of the emancipated peoples and their prime task is to maintain peace, freedom and the independence of the working people's states. Hence people's fundamentally different attitudes to capitalist and socialist armies.

The fact that the majority of the personnel in the armed forces in capitalist countries come from the working class and peasantry does not change much. By resorting to threats, violence and fraud the dominant exploiting classes use their armies to further their reactionary ends which are against the people's interests.

Before the revolution the tsarist army was distinctly used against the people's interests. The autocracy, landowners and capitalists made free use of army units to suppress the revolutionary movement and to shoot workers and peasants. The masters of the Russian empire tried their best to isolate the army from the people, to prevent revolutionary ideas infiltrating the barracks and to stop soldiers from taking a part in the life of the country.

The Soviet Armed Forces have been defending the interests of the working people since their inception. The Communist Party has been consistently implementing the principle of the unbreakable unity of army and people and has been working to strengthen the friendship and mutual trust between them, to ensure that all Soviet officers and men enjoy equal and full rights and are able to take an active part in the country's political and social life.

The unity of the army and the people can be seen in the fact that all working people and the personnel of the Armed Forces share the same interests and aspirations and their energies are channelled into achieving a common goal—to maintain lasting peace, ensure the security of the Soviet state and that of other socialist countries, and to build a communist society in the USSR.

The unity of the Soviet Army and the Soviet people rests on strong objective foundations.

The socio-political basis of this unity is the socialist social and state system, the indestructible moral and political unity of Soviet society, the close alliance of the working class and peasantry, and the friendship among the peoples of the USSR. This determines the identity of class interests between the Armed Forces personnel and the Soviet people in building communism, in maintaining the socialist gains, and in the struggle for peace and social progress. The common social basis allows a steady development in the relations between the army and the people. Myriads of invisible bonds link the soldiers' and sailors' hearts with the hearts of people working in industries, agriculture and transport, in all fields of the national economy. In discharging their honourable duty to defend their Motherland, the Soviet officers and men draw their strength and inspiration from the Soviet people's great successes in building communism.

Every member of the Soviet Armed Forces, just like every citizen of the USSR enjoys full social and political rights, guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution, and is actively involved in the country's political and social life. Every member of the Soviet Armed Forces is educated to put the interests of the state first in discharging his duty to the country.

The common social interests of the various Soviet nationalities determine the trend towards the steady strengthening of their cohesion and friendship, and towards expanding internationalist ties, including military ties. This is because the socialist nations have a common enemy in imperialism which stands for the threat of aggression and this threat hangs over every socialist nation.

The unity of the army and the people, which emerged simultaneously with the birth of the socialist state, is strengthened in the course of building socialism and communism, since the development of socialist class relations results in a further expansion of the social basis of the Soviet Army and Navy. With the victory of socialism this basis is represented by the entire Soviet people. The social structure of socialist society underlies the organic unity of the army and the people and ensures that it comes to the fore.

The Communist Party's guidance of the entire life and activities of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, the Party's closeness to the people and the close blood relationship between the Party and the working people are a solid foundation of the unity of the army and the people. The Party Programme adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in 1919 stated: "The Party has to maintain and develop this unity of workers and soldiers in Soviets, and has to strengthen the indestructible link between the Armed Forces and the organisations of the proletariat and semi-proletariat."¹ The Communist Party has been undeviatingly carrying out Lenin's behests on the armed defence of the socialist gains, and has been doing everything necessary to bolster the defence capability of the Soviet state. This meets with the full understanding and support of the army and the people and takes the form of the powerful political and labour enthusiasm of the entire Soviet people who are striving to fulfil the plans mapped out by the Communist Party with maximum efficiency and to the full.

The CPSU unites the army and the people ideologically and organisationally by implementing a common science-based policy, by carrying on practical activities in many different fields and by giving a new dimension to the essential link between the army and the people.

The economic basis supporting the unity of the army and the people is the socialist mode of production, the public ownership of the means of production, and the socialist relations of production. The people are the master of the country's national wealth, while the Soviet Army forms an integral part of the people.

¹ *Eighth Congress of the RCP(B). Minutes, Moscow, 1919, p. 396 (in Russian).*

The Soviet state and social system which was born of the Great October Socialist Revolution has offered unprecedented scope for the development of productive forces. The successful implementation of Lenin's plan for building socialism has prepared the ground for a rapid development of the economy and for a radical improvement in the material welfare of the entire Soviet people. The country's increased economic potential furnished a solid basis for enhancing its defence capability and ensuring the combat efficiency of its Armed Forces.

The Soviet people's impressive successes in carrying out the economic development plans mapped out by the Party strengthens the socialist social system and raises the country's economic and defence potential. They rally the Soviet people closer and closer around the Leninist Communist Party, advance the day when the material and technical foundation of communism will be laid, create a favourable climate for moulding communist-type social relations, help mould the new man and further strengthen the unity of the army and the people.

Marxism-Leninism provides *the ideological basis* for the unity of the army and the people. The minds of all Soviet people are inculcated with the communist world outlook, ideological conviction, communist morality and loyalty to the ideals of socialism and communism, class solidarity and devotion to the socialist Motherland, to the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and with a profound understanding of their duty to defend their Motherland. This ensures that the people are well motivated in building up the country's Armed Forces and in raising their fighting efficiency.

The unity of the army and the people rests on a solid objective basis and can be seen in many different forms, especially in Soviet citizens' military service as soldiers and sailors and in their discharging their honourable and sacred duty to defend the socialist Motherland. It can also be seen in the way the country's Armed Forces are equipped with first-class weaponry and hardware and in the steady supply of everything the Army and Navy need in the way of clothing, food and equipment. The moral support of the whole people is invaluable for the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy and it is this support that inspires them to heroic deeds in the name of their socialist Motherland.

The entire glorious record of the Soviet Armed Forces provides a graphic illustration of their unbreakable unity with the people. Since its inception, the Soviet Army has been built as an army of workers and peasants. The men of the Soviet Army and Navy have always felt the help and support of the entire people. Here are a few examples. The workers of the Putilov plant in Petrograd passed a resolution at their meeting on February 21, 1918, which states: "...As part of the universal military conscription we shall join the Red Guard immediately to defend our people's Soviet Power."¹ In a telegram sent

¹ From the *History of the Civil War in the USSR*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, pp. 114-15 (in Russian).

to Lenin on May 11, 1920, participants in the meeting of the workers and Red Army organisations of Voronezh said that "the people of Voronezh are ready at any moment to respond to the first call of the central power to detail their best and staunchest comrades to wage a decisive battle and win victory over the Polish White Guard oppressors".¹ Peasants of the Rovno district attending a special congress of local Soviets held on July 11, 1920, gave a pledge that they would, "support the Red Army by supplying it with essentials and shall energetically conduct a surplus-food requisitioning campaign and where necessary recruit manpower for the Red Army and shall give everything necessary to help the struggle against the bourgeoisie".²

We could cite any number of similar examples of the entire people's love and concern for the Red Army. This popular support was a tremendous morale-booster for the men of the Red Army, it doubled their strength and proved a major factor in their victory in the Civil War.

The Communist Party, in attaching tremendous importance to strengthening the bonds of friendship between the army and the working people, involved the men of the Red Army in the country's political life from the early days of Soviet power. Lenin's ideas on the full equality of working people and servicemen were formalised in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the first Soviet Constitution adopted in July 1918. The very names of the first organs of state power of the Soviet Republic—the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and the Soviets of Workers', Red Armymen's and Peasants' Deputies reflected the indestructible unity of the army and the people. Lenin wrote: "For the first time in history an army is being built on the basis of the closest contact, inseparable contact, coalescence, one might say, of the army and the Soviets. The Soviets unite all the working people, all the exploited, and the army is being built up for the purpose of socialist defence and on the basis of class consciousness."³

In the period of peaceful socialist development that followed the Civil War, the basic ways in which the working people could take a direct hand in the formation of the Armed Forces was service in the Army and Navy, training young people under call-up age, the voluntary assistance given by the trade unions, Komsomol and other mass organisations to the country's Air Force, Navy and Frontier Guards. This period saw the birth of the fine tradition of sending the best Komsomol members and unaffiliated youths to undergo military training at military schools, and air force, navy and frontier guard units. The Soviet people made every effort to supply their Armed Forces with modern equipment and to ensure that their personnel

¹ From the *History of the Civil War in the USSR*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1961, p. 196.

² *Ibid.*, p. 315.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 66.

were fully competent and proficient in handling advanced weapons and equipment.

During the Great Patriotic War the close links between the Army and the people were revealed with particular clarity. Millions of Soviet citizens took up arms. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet patriots volunteered to join the army in the field. The volunteers were formed into combat units, including the Urals Volunteer Tank Corps, the Siberian Volunteer Rifle Corps and other formations which fought with great effect against the enemy. The Soviet people spared neither energy, nor money to help the army in the field. Acting of their own free will, they assumed part of the burden of state expenditure necessitated by the war effort. Many Soviet people contributed their personal savings to the Defence Fund. This money was used to produce military equipment and material. The personal contributions and the money raised through loans and lotteries amounted to the astronomical figure of 118,200 million rubles. To give you an idea of the importance of this contribution, it should be said that this money roughly equalled the average annual expenditure made through the People's Commissariats for Defence and the Navy.¹

The money contributed by the population was used to build over 2,500 combat aircraft, several thousand tanks and artillery pieces, over 20 submarines and patrol boats, and large quantities of other weapons and equipment.²

In supplying the army in the field with adequate quantities of weapons and equipment despite the incredible difficulties and privations of war-time, the Soviet people performed a truly heroic feat. The steady growth of output in the basic industries was an indicator of the high level of enthusiasm that fired the Soviet people during the war. Thus, whereas in 1942 the country produced 75.5 million tons of coal, 4.8 million tons of pig iron and 8.1 million tons of steel, in 1945 the corresponding figures were 149.3, 8.8 and 12.2 million tons. Oil output in 1945 reached 19.4 million tons compared with 17.9 million tons in 1943. Power production went up from 29,000 million kwh in 1942 to 43,200 million kwh in 1945.

Soviet women, old folk and adolescents, defying the privations of war, worked heroically in the country's interior. Everyone contributed his or her bit to the country's victory over the enemy.

The partisan movement was an important way in which the people supported the army in the field. In Russia this form of voluntary participation by the people in routing the foreign invaders originated in the 13th-15th centuries, when the Russian people resisted the Mongol invasion. Partisan warfare was employed in the early 17th century, when Russia fought against Polish and Swedish invaders and again in the 19th century during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Partisan warfare assumed a fundamentally new form and new

¹ See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, p. 327 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, p. 326.

socio-political features at the time of the Civil War following the Revolution of 1917. In some areas it developed into a popular rebellion by civilian population against the occupying White Guard troops and foreign interventionists. All the principal areas of the Far East, Siberia, the Urals, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Caucasus were the scene of mass partisan warfare.

Partisan warfare assumed exceptionally broad scope during the Great Patriotic War. The enemy was forced to admit the political and strategic effectiveness of the partisan movement. Thus former nazi General Rendulic wrote: "So far in history not a single war had witnessed a partisan warfare of the importance it had during the last world war. In scope, it was an entirely new phenomenon in the history of wars. In its effect on the frontline troops and the problems of supplies, logistics and administration in the occupied regions, it became a part of the total war."¹

The popular struggle behind enemy lines took the form of raids by partisan detachments; underground groups active at populated centres; and mass action by the local population to foil the political, economic and military efforts of the occupying nazi troops. This harassment involved the overwhelming majority of the civilian population in the nazi-occupied territories. By the end of 1943, there was over a million fighters in partisan formations operating in the enemy's rear.

The Party organisations, which formed the nucleus of all partisan formations, cemented the ranks of the people's avengers. In many of them Communists made up as much as 20 per cent of their total strength.

The partisan movement had a definite impact on the course of military operations at the frontline. The partisans killed, wounded or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of enemy officers and men, officials of the occupation apparatus and local collaborators. They derailed many troop trains, blew up bridges, disrupted enemy supply and communication lines, etc. They rescued thousands upon thousands of Soviet people from nazi slavery. The nazis had intended to deport these people to Germany. They prevented the nazis from destroying a great number of factories and plants and other facilities. One important outcome of the partisan movement was the fact that it frustrated enemy attempts to make use of that part of the Soviet economy temporarily under his occupation. The nazis failed to achieve industrial or agricultural production on any scale in Soviet territory. Apart from police and security units the nazi command had to divert a considerable part of its ground forces operating on the Soviet-German front to deal with the partisans. In August 1942 Hitler issued a special directive which recognised that the partisan movement in nazi-occupied territories of the Soviet Union "threatened to place in jeopardy the supply lines and the economic

¹ *Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges. Erkenntnisse und Verpflichtungen für die Zukunft.* Oldenburg/Hamburg, 1953, S. 101.

exploitation of the country". Hitler demanded that most of the partisan detachments operating behind nazi lines were to be wiped out before winter set in.¹ The nazi command launched large-scale punitive operations supported by regular troops with artillery, tanks and aircraft in an attempt to do this. However, the enemy failed dismally. Far from dwindling away, the partisan movement expanded and went from strength to strength and, by co-ordinating their actions with those of the Soviet regular forces, they formed a single mighty torrent of popular struggle against the invaders.

Bourgeois propagandists have vainly sought to prove that the partisan warfare in the Soviet Union flared up largely in retaliation to the "inflexible" policy followed by the nazis. Nothing could be further from the truth. Soviet people, whether they went into battle on the frontlines or behind enemy lines, were motivated by their patriotic duty to the socialist Motherland, by their belief in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and by their awareness of the need to protect the lofty humanistic ideals from encroachments by the black force of nazism. The frontline never divided the Soviet people, either morally or politically, into two different parts. Soviet people living in areas under temporary nazi occupation remained Soviet people despite the privations of life.

In the grim year of 1941 another genuinely popular form of augmenting country's war effort against the nazi invasion spread throughout the country. That was the homeguard. Just like partisan warfare it originated in the past centuries. Volunteer units played an outstanding role in repelling enemy invasions. However in Soviet times the old form of the masses helping to repel the foreign invaders assumed a new dimension in that it contributed directly to the struggle to maintain the honour, freedom and independence of the socialist Motherland.

In the opening period of the Great Patriotic War the homeguard was characterised by two basic types of combat units—anti-saboteur battalions and volunteer fighting units proper.

The appearance of anti-saboteur battalions was preceded by the creation in the forward area of a far-flung network of detachments composed of Party and Soviet activists and workers' detachments which were assigned to dealing with enemy saboteurs and infiltrators operating behind Soviet lines. As early as June 24-25, 1941, in line with a decision adopted by the Communist Party and Government anti-saboteur battalions and auxiliary units to operate in conjunction with them began to be formed from volunteers who were not subject to conscription into the regular army. By the end of July there were a total of 1,755 anti-saboteur battalions with a combined strength of over 328,000 men. Apart from that over 300,000 men were organised into auxiliary units in support of the anti-saboteur battalions.

Members of the anti-saboteur battalions did patrol duty without giving up their jobs at their factories and plants. As the frontline drew

¹ See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, p. 499.

near they were placed on full alert helping to meet the exigencies of the military situation and later either merged with the army in the field or went over to partisan warfare. The enemy tried to disrupt the Soviet forward rear areas by infiltrating saboteurs, demolition groups and by dropping paratroops but they failed. The cunning weapon which had been so faultless and unfailing when the nazis attacked West European countries failed completely in the Soviet Union. Much of the credit for this goes to Soviet volunteer anti-saboteur battalions.

The civilians' patriotic participation in the armed struggle against the enemy is best seen in the formation of volunteer divisions, regiments and battalions. The initiative in this was taken by the people of Leningrad and Moscow, who at the end of June and early July 1941 formed the first mass volunteer units in support of the Red Army. This initiative was approved and propagated in other cities. The largest volunteer units were formed by the people of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and Rostov-on-Don), in the Ukraine (Kiev, Odessa, Zaporozhye, Donbas area), and by the people of Byelorussia (Mogilev and Gomel). Local Party committees organised and guided every aspect of work to set up a large number of volunteer units, including divisions.

About 60 volunteer divisions, 200 separate regiments and many battalions, detachments, companies and platoons were formed during the summer and autumn of 1941. Altogether in the grim opening period of the war some two million volunteer soldiers supported the regular army in the field.¹ They displayed great courage, staunchness and remarkable endurance on the battlefield. This was acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, by the enemy. The nazi General Tippelskirch, in explaining why the nazi forces failed outside Leningrad, wrote: "The German troops reached the southern suburbs of the city, however, because of the stout resistance offered by the defending troops augmented by the fanatical Leningrad workers, they failed to achieve the decisive success expected."² Clearly, the beaten nazi general either could not or would not see the real reason behind the self-sacrificing actions of the Leningrad workers fighting off the frenzied onslaught of the nazi hordes. Far from being propelled by fanaticism they went into battle because of their love for their country and their utter devotion to the Soviet socialist state.

Partisan warfare behind the enemy lines and the working people's entry into battles to maintain their country's freedom and independence as members of volunteer units was just one of the many forms in which Soviet patriotism and the masses' determination to contribute to the defeat of the aggressor, to help the army in the field, to beat the enemy and to maintain the socialist gains manifested itself. This is graphic and convincing proof of the utter devotion of the

¹ See *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, p. 183.

² Kurt von Tippelskirch, *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs*, Bonn, 1954, S. 204.

Soviet people to the ideals of communism. It is proof that the people whole-heartedly approved the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and proof of their unshakable faith in the power and strength of the Soviet socialist state and its army.

Since the end of the last war the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have been giving unflagging attention to further strengthening the unity of the army and the people.

The Communist Party believes that the best way to go about this is to develop and strengthen the country's social and state system and its socialist economy and to augment its defence potential. The Soviet people, guided by the Communist Party, have performed titanic work in all these areas.

In carrying out the decisions of the successive Party congresses, the Communist Party uses powerful aids such as the press, the news media, the cinema and the theatre to strengthen the bonds linking the army and the people. The Communist Party is educating working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism, and of boundless love for their Armed Forces and the armies of the other fraternal socialist countries. Every Soviet citizen feels personal responsibility for the future of his country and is very concerned to strengthen her defence capability and consolidate the alliance among the socialist countries.

The territorial Party bodies constantly keep in touch with the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their representatives sit in at meetings of military councils, Party conferences, meetings of activists and the various meetings held in army units locally. For their part commanders, political bodies, Party and Komsomol organisations and the entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces maintain close contacts with Party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol organisations and with the workers of industrial enterprises, members of the collective and state farms and the staffs of offices and educational institutions. These contacts are a demonstration of the close blood relationship existing between the army and the people who share the same interests. To listen to the people and to take what they think into account is a fine tradition with the Soviet Armed Forces. In maintaining this tradition commanders, political bodies, army Party and Komsomol organisations are better able to tackle their tasks in giving the troops combat and political training.

In recent years local Party and Soviet organisations had a very helpful and interesting idea: they started organising special ceremonies to give young men of call-up age a send-off to the forces. In many villages and towns they have developed special procedures and rituals during which the young men are addressed by local officials; veterans of the revolution, the Civil and Great Patriotic wars; and by representatives of the working collectives. All have something useful and helpful to say and have words of advise and encouragement. These ceremonies include trooping the colours which are brought to the scene of the ceremony from war museums, and these ceremonies develop into moving demonstrations of the love and respect the

people have for their Armed Forces, demonstrations of the indestructible unity between the army and the people.

Extensive and varied work is done within the Armed Forces to educate the men in the spirit of unity with the people. Special visits are organised to towns and cities which were liberated by the units where the young soldiers are now serving. These visits are very popular with the men, as are their meetings with old Bolsheviks and veterans of the revolution, the Civil and the Great Patriotic wars; their meetings with prominent people, and with veteran soldiers who are now front-ranking production workers. Corresponding with production collectives, public organisations and parents is also of great educational value. The exchange of lecturers and readers, and talent groups between units, warships and industrial enterprises and offices is also of great use.

Wherever Soviet officers and men happen to serve in the vast Soviet Union they are always aware of their high patriotic duty. The personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy follow the life in their home parts with interest: the successes of the factory, collective or state farm where they worked before going in to army. Their fellow-countrymen's successes at home inspire the men to discharge their daily duties in a model fashion.

The commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organisations work untiringly to inculcate a sense of organic unity with the people into the minds of the personnel. Evidence of the effectiveness of this work can be seen in the numerous examples of truly heroic deeds performed by Soviet soldiers while on leave of absence from their units. They have risked their lives to rescue men, women and children from drowning or fire or saved public property from destruction. Nothing could be more foreign to the Soviet soldier than disrespect for the local population, to his fellow-man of a different nationality, to a woman, or to the traditions and customs of other peoples. Where rare cases of untoward behaviour by individual servicemen do occur they are severely denounced in no uncertain terms by the entire personnel of the Army or Navy unit concerned as damaging to the good name of the Soviet soldier.

Commanders, political officers, Party and Komsomol organisations are constantly concerned to ensure that the efforts to give the men a sense of their indissoluble unity with the people help everyone gain a clearer understanding of their duty to their country and a more positive attitude to military service. To be a member of the Soviet Armed Forces is a great privilege and honour. The Communist Party, by entrusting powerful weapons to the men of the Soviet Armed Forces, is showing its complete confidence in them. This confidence places upon the officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces the responsibility for keeping a vigilant guard over the constructive labour of the Soviet people.

Giving the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces a sense of their indissoluble unity with the people is ultimately geared to achieving a twofold goal: to mould *a builder of the new society* with a high degree

of consciousness and to help the men develop high combat, moral, political and psychological qualities indispensable to *the armed defender of the socialist Motherland*.

Many military units take a direct hand in building industrial enterprises, blocks of flats, roads and railways, in land reclamation and in building irrigation facilities. They take part in farm work, in campaigns to collect scrap, and in forestry, including planting trees. They carry out rescue operations together with the population of towns and villages during natural disasters, thus saving lives and state property.

The direct contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel to the building of the material and technical basis of communism, their help to advance scientific and technological progress, and their efforts to strengthen the country's economic potential and to improve the standard of living—all consolidate further the unity of the army and the people, giving this unity a new dimension and content.

Every year, upon discharge from the Armed Forces, scores of thousands of young men are sent by Komsomol to work in the various branches of the economy. Having acquired a trade during their service in army, having matured in this stern school of service, yesterday's soldiers and sailors help strengthen the spirit of team work and mutual assistance within the working collectives they join. They help maintain a high level of discipline and develop socialist emulation movement. Many former servicemen transferred to the reserve continue to maintain contact with the units and warships they served with while on active duty, corresponding with them and telling their former fellow-servicemen about their personal plans, their successes in production and in private life.

The voluntary assistance given by the working people to military units stationed in their localities is constantly expanding. Today voluntary assistance of this type is an important contact between the army and the people. This voluntary assistance helps educate the military personnel in the spirit of the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Party and the people through fine examples of dedicated work by workers, collective farmers and members of the intelligentsia.

Party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol organisations constantly show concern for the servicemen's families, trying to improve their living conditions and social facilities. It has now become a fine tradition with many working collectives in town and country to do everything necessary to help the families of workers and collective farmers whose members have joined the army on active service. The families of soldiers who gave their lives during the Great Patriotic War, and war invalids and veterans of the Army and Navy also receive special attention.

The Soviet Armed Forces are actively involved in the country's social and political life. Soviet officers and men are very active during the election campaigns and they take part in voting to a man. At the

beginning of 1974 over 17,000 Army and Navy men had been elected deputies to local Soviets or members of Party bodies at local and higher levels. The best of the officers and men are elected delegates to Party congresses.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government attach great importance to mass defence-related work among the population. Emphasis is placed on improving the patriotic education of the younger generation in the spirit of the heroic traditions of the Soviet people so as to prepare young men for subsequent active service in the Army and Navy.

Many Soviet men and women work as civilian personnel at a variety of military enterprises and construction projects, as part of the clerical staff of military units, at institutions, military schools and at other training establishments. In so doing they help solve defence tasks. Many of them have become an integral part of the Armed Forces personnel, rendering help and assistance to them. The trade union organisations do a lot to help the command personnel improve production organisation and efficiency at military enterprises and institutions. They help spread socialist emulation campaigns and educate the workers and office employees in the spirit of communist attitude to work. The reliable defence of the socialist Motherland demands that military leaders, political bodies and Party organisations in the Army and Navy strengthen their contact with trade union organisations and with workers and office employees, and do everything to help them improve the daily labour productivity and fulfill socialist emulation undertakings. Well-organised co-operation between the men of the Soviet Armed Forces and the workers and office employees of military enterprises, and construction projects, the military units, institutions, military schools and training establishments is a major way of strengthening the unity between the army and the people, and of educating Soviet people in the spirit of communist ideals.

Civil Defence has an important part to play in strengthening the unity between the Armed Forces and the people. In the event of war, Civil Defence units will be acting in smooth co-operation with the Army and Navy. Members of the Civil Defence units will give invaluable help to the regular forces in their efforts to achieve victory over the aggressor. They will do this by ensuring reliable protection for the rear areas and by keeping the country's economy going. For their part the Army and Navy will be helping Civil Defence units cope with their responsible tasks.

The army and the people, acting together, are rallying ever closer around the Communist Party. They are working with dedication and enthusiasm to step up the building of communism, and to enhance the country's economic potential and the fighting efficiency of her Armed Forces. This dedicated work is evidence of the political maturity of the Soviet people and of the men of the Soviet Army and Navy, and of the high sense of responsibility the Soviet people have in fulfilling their duty to their socialist country.

The aims and purposes of the Soviet Armed Forces, which fully accord with the vital interests of the working people of the USSR, in no way run counter to the interests of the peoples of other countries. The Soviet Army, in acting as a credible deterrent against the forces of imperialist aggression, is a shield and guarantee of the security of all mankind. It makes the peoples' struggle for social progress easier and more successful. At the present time the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is to reliably guarantee peace and enable the Soviet people to build communism in a situation of secure peace. Another task of the Soviet Armed Forces is to protect, jointly with the armies of fraternal socialist countries, the security of the whole of the socialist community, to serve as a reliable bulwark for the peoples fighting against the imperialist export of counter-revolution and to serve as an indestructible mainstay of peace and security throughout the world. All this indicates the truly popular character of the Soviet Armed Forces as the most progressive military organisation in human history.

Rallying close around the Communist Party, surrounded by the affection and love of the entire people, the officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces are discharging their historic mission with honour and dignity. They are keeping vigilant watch over the intrigues and scheming of the enemies of peace, democracy and socialism and at the same time they are working steadily to improve their fighting efficiency so as to be able at any moment to go into action to maintain the peoples' socialist gains.

Chapter

V

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE ARMED FORCES

A major indication of the Soviet Army's and Navy's fighting efficiency and power is the sophistication of their equipment. They have every type of up-to-date weapons and material and this ensures that they reliably defend the socialist gains. The Communist Party pays close attention to this all-important aspect. The Party is doing everything necessary and indeed possible to ensure that, in terms of weaponry and equipment, the country's Armed Forces meet the most exacting requirements imposed by modern warfare.

It is common knowledge that the country's economy has a decisive impact on the quality of weapons and equipment available to her Army and Navy. Scientific and technological progress is speeding up the development of the country's productive forces, improving production efficiency and opening up new possibilities for progress in every economic field. At the same time scientific and technological progress is one of the chief factors in improving the country's defence potential and in advancing the art of war and military work generally. The fruits of scientific and technological progress allow new types of weapons and military hardware to be developed more quickly and efficiently and this in turn augments the fire power, striking power and manoeuvrability of the Armed Forces and gives rise to new methods of military operations. A well-directed and skilful exploitation of the latest developments and advances in science and technology in the military field prepares the ground for a high standard to be achieved in the training and education of the Armed Forces personnel, for the fighting efficiency of the Soviet Army and Navy to be steadily enhanced.

1. The Impact Scientific and Technological Progress Has on the Power of the Armed Forces

No war in human history has been started without the necessary material and technical preparations. To achieve success on the battlefield the troops of the belligerents are equipped with suitable

weapons hardware and other essentials. The experience of many wars bears out that the armies' fighting power depends directly on the condition of the country's economy, the quality of the productive forces and on the timely and efficient application of the results of scientific and technological break-throughs and advances to military needs.

The impact of scientific and technological progress in the military field is greatest in the matter of improving the quality of weapon systems and military hardware. This is because these are the most mobile elements of the material basis of war and the area in which the fullest possible use can be made of the latest scientific achievements and new ideas.

New weapons and equipment inevitably give rise to changes in tactics, strategy and in the organisation of the Armed Forces. These changes do not come about at once. They occur gradually as the new weapons are further perfected and supplied in quantity to the troops, whereupon they become a principal means of warfare.

Thus, during the First World War the appearance of a small number of low-performance and primitive tanks on the battlefields did not introduce any fundamentally new elements into tactics and still less into strategy. The early tanks were used basically within the framework of traditional tactical operations. However, a short 20 years later the performances of tanks were developed to a very high pitch of perfection and began to be mass-produced and widely adopted as a major weapon. This necessitated substantial changes in troop organisation and in the wherefores of operations. During the Second World War tanks were organised into large formations, even into armies, which immediately became the chief striking force for the land forces. This, together with the employment of other weapons, conferred a highly dynamic character on military operations which now involved a high degree of flexibility and manoeuvrability. The military employment of aviation followed a similar course. During the First World War, aircraft did go into action but had no decisive impact on the course of operations on the ground. Aviation began playing a steadily growing role between the 1930s and 1940s when the armies had been supplied with thousands of advanced combat planes.

Historical experience indicates that changes new weapons bring to the military field may take a long time to come about, as was the case, for instance, with the introduction of smooth-bore and later rifled firearms, or they may burst onto the scene as a result of sudden revolutionary break-throughs affecting every area of the military field, as was the case in more recent times when nuclear weapons were developed and adopted. The gap between development and application is becoming shorter all the time. Thus, whereas centuries passed before smooth-bore firearms were replaced by rifled ones, it took 15 to 20 years for automatic small-arms, tanks and aircraft to establish themselves as the principal weapons in war, and it took just a few years for nuclear-armed missiles to become adopted.

The catalyst of all changes and transformations in the means and methods of prosecuting war has always been scientific and technological progress which is quickening the renewal of weaponry and military hardware and exercising a direct impact on the military power of a country, and on the condition of her Armed Forces. It can be said that every area of military work has always depended heavily on scientific and technological progress and this dependence is acquiring a new dimension and becoming greater still as science and technology advance and scientific discoveries and technological break-throughs are applied to practical needs. Today it is not just individual discoveries and advances but the entire front of the scientific and technological revolution that is exercising a growing impact on the perfection and development of weapons and hardware. It is stimulating an unparalleled growth in the technical equipment of the Army and Navy, forming a kind of a chain-like connection between science, technology, research and development and the application of the results to military needs. Herein lies the main point which makes the present-day connection between scientific and technological progress and military practice so different from the similar connection in the past.

It is to be emphasised that this connection is of a mutual character, since changes occurring in the military field as new weapons are developed and adopted constantly influence the same scientific and technological progress which brought them about. This process of interdependence and mutual influence is realised in different ways in different countries depending on government policy and the country's social system. In the imperialist countries, in the ultimate count, this process degenerates into an unrestrained arms race. Faced with this situation the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are forced to give constant attention to the development of improved weapons and military hardware, to equip their armies with the most advanced weaponry and to ensure that the country's defence industries keep abreast of modern requirements. All this guarantees that the country's defence capability is at the required level.

Lenin stressed that to conduct a modern war one should have an advanced economy, especially a giant industry capable of producing the required quantities of weapons, war materials and equipment. On the basis of an analysis of the history of war Lenin concluded that, "those who have the greatest technical equipment, organisation and discipline, and the best machines, will gain the upper hand...".¹ Lenin believed that if a country is to meet its economic and defence needs its material basis of socialism must rely on the achievements of advanced science and technology. This alone can ensure adequate facilities for developing advanced weapon systems and military hardware which is the basic material component of the country's military power. That is why Lenin saw overcoming Russia's economic backwardness as critical for strengthening the country's defence capacity.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 195.

Lenin mapped out definite ways for economic development to turn Russia, once a backward agrarian country, into the powerful, highly industrialised USSR. The State Plan for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) drawn up under his personal guidance, laid emphasis on developing new industries on the basis of powerful electricity-generating facilities, the all-round utilisation of the country's mineral wealth, the introduction of advanced technology and industrial processes and the improvement of production organisation. Lenin taught that a diversified economy must have links with a decisive impact on the country's economic and defence might. These links were heavy industry, the power industry, an efficient agriculture and up-to-date transport and communications facilities.

In developing the defence industry of the world's first socialist state, the Communist Party, led by Lenin, realised that this process had nothing in common with the militarisation of life in the capitalist countries. There it served the interests of the monopolists and was against those of the people. Building up the USSR's defence potential was in response to external challenges and was exclusively geared to safeguarding socialism from imperialist aggression.

Lenin attached great importance to mass technical ingenuity and improvement activities and to the organic fusion of science and production. He saw science as an area of state importance. Lenin believed that one of the main objectives of Soviet science was to build up the country's economic defence capacity. The great leader of the socialist revolution recommended that a careful study be made of the dominant trends in science and technology, notably, in military technology in the rest of the world, and that every type of weaponry and military hardware which potential enemies had available to them or could develop be mastered.

The Communist Party followed Lenin's instructions undeviatingly. Thus, the decisions of the 15th Congress of the Communist Party emphasised: "In view of a possible attack by capitalist countries on the proletarian state, it is vital during work on the five-year development plan to devote the closest attention to developing as quickly as possible those branches of the economy as a whole, and those industries in particular, which play the principal part in ensuring the country's defence capability and economic stability in war-time."¹

In July 1928, the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee approved a policy of stepping up scientific and technological progress, of forging close links between science, technology and industry, and of gearing scientific research to the practical needs of industry and other branches of the economy, including the military. Subsequent congresses of the Communist Party and plenary meetings of its Central Committee adopted decisions developing this main policy course and these decisions were consistently carried out during the first five-year development plan periods.

¹ *The CPSU in Resolutions...*, Vol. 4, p. 33.

To appreciate the sheer magnitude of the tasks the Party set in re-equipping the Red Army with new weaponry and hardware, it should be remembered that in the mid-twenties the rifle and the Maxim machine-gun were the main infantry weapons, while the cavalry depended on the sword, the carbine and the machine-gun cart. The army had a limited range of artillery pieces, most of which were light, small-caliber guns. Such tanks and armoured cars as there were, had a low performance and were poorly armed and slow. The country's rudimentary air force only had obsolete, foreign-made planes available to it.

Intensive research and development got under way in the country and led to the development of new weapons and equipment in keeping with those of the time. In the late twenties and early thirties many types of Soviet-made small arms, tanks, armoured cars, artillery pieces and aircraft were superior, in terms of performance, to the best ones abroad. However, to move from the development of prototypes to mass production it was essential to step up industrial development, to create an industry backed up by advanced technology and equipment and adequately supplied with the necessary raw materials, some fundamentally new, and for the industry to be manned by skilled personnel. Unless this was done, there was no hope of quickly re-equipping the country's Army and Navy.

The Communist Party did everything possible to solve these problems. Thanks to the titanic work of the Party and the entire Soviet people, a reliable scientific, technological and industrial base was developed by the thirties to support the country's diversified defence industry. Progress was particularly rapid in the tank- and aircraft-building industries and in those producing new types of small arms and artillery systems, ammunition, surface warships and submarines, and engineer equipment. This made the start of a fundamental technical re-equipment of the Army and Navy possible and for them to be supplied with the best weaponry and military hardware available anywhere in the world at the time. The general trend in the development of the country's Armed Forces was towards increasing their fire power and raising the proportion of mechanical power. All this enhanced their striking power, mobility and manoeuvrability. Particular attention was given to supplying the Army with new types of aircraft, tanks, armoured cars and artillery systems. The country's defence industry significantly expanded the range of weapons available to the Armed Forces, which improved their fighting capability.

The country was prevented from completing the Communist Party's programme for the re-equipment of the Army and Navy by Nazi Germany's perfidious attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. But the impressive scientific, technological and industrial base created in the thirties was powerful enough to serve as a springboard for further progress of the country's defence industry in war-time. Its viability was not curbed by the difficulties and privations of war-time, although it inevitably slowed down the transfer of the coun-

try's economy onto a war footing for a time and made the supply of weapons and equipment to the army in the field more difficult.

There were a number of problems involved in the Soviet economy keeping the country's Army and Navy supplied with weapons, equipment and ammunition. Firstly, the country's young industry defying the incredibly difficult conditions of war time had to compete against the military-industrial potential not only of Nazi Germany but of almost the whole of Western Europe which had been enslaved by the Nazis. Secondly, this country had lost many enterprises and industrial capacities in areas temporarily under Nazi occupation in the Baltic area, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and parts of the Russian Federation. Thirdly, the country's defence industry experienced an acute shortage of fuel, electricity, metal and other materials essential for producing weapons and military hardware. Fourthly, it took time for factories and plants evacuated from the western areas to the east to start producing war materials and weapons in the required quantities. To enable them to do so, it was necessary, as quickly as possible, to deploy the essential production facilities, to restore the disturbed pattern of co-operation between allied factories and plants, to establish a new pattern of co-operation, and to supply adequate quantities of raw materials and components. Finally, the Soviet defence industry was chronically starved of skilled specialists, as many experienced factory managers, engineers, technicians and workers had joined the Red Army when the war broke out or were fighting behind enemy lines as members of partisan detachments.

The foregoing shows the difficulties involved in placing the country's economy on a war footing. The entire national life was geared to the war effort. To set every available economic lever in motion, to make full use of every available resource, to organise and channel the initiative of the masses into achieving a single goal, it was required to restructure the various Party, Soviet and economic bodies, and to reorganise the activities of scientific institutions, trade union and Komsomol organisations from the highest to the lowest level.

The Party's dynamic and well-directed organisational, ideological and educational effort coupled with the Soviet people's titanic self-sacrificing work enabled the country to overcome the formidable difficulties. From mid-1942 onwards, the country's defence industry began to steadily increase war production and subsequently fully supplied the needs of the army in the field. It thereby laid a reliable foundation for the subsequent victory over the enemy. Throughout the war, except for its opening stage, the Soviet Union firmly retained its superiority in military technology and war production.

Indeed, on average the Soviet defence industry annually produced 40-100 per cent more field guns (75-mm calibre and above), tanks, self-propelled guns and aircraft, than Nazi Germany, while its output of mortars and submachine-guns was almost five times greater than

that of nazi Germany.¹ And this at a time when the latter was far ahead of the Soviet Union in the production of the basic strategic materials, notably in the output of steel and coal. It is also to be remembered that the Soviet defence industry exceeded nazi Germany's in the quality of the weapons it produced. This was particularly true of the automatic weapons, anti-tank guns, medium- and large-calibre artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled guns, tanks, attack planes and long-range bombers, and was also true of some types of engineering equipment, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, etc. Significantly, the T-34 tank, the 76-, 100- and 152-mm artillery pieces, the BM-13 and BM-31-12 multiple rocket launchers continued to be superior, in terms of basic performances, to similar types of weapons developed in other countries for years after the end of the war.

Thus, from the standpoint of scientific and technological progress, the Great Patriotic War was a close race between the science and technologies, the economies and the skill of the workers and managers of two opposing social systems: between that of nazi Germany, which drew on the combined economies of nearly all the countries of Western Europe and exploited the element of surprise when it perfidiously attacked the Soviet Union, and that of the world's first socialist state, which was at a disadvantage because of the nazi aggressors' sneak attack, and which lost sizeable territories with their manpower and economic resources in the opening stage of the war.

The Great Patriotic War fully confirmed the well-known Marxist-Leninist proposition to the effect that when evaluating the economic potential of the belligerents, it is essential to take the ability of the belligerents to mobilise their economies in the event of war, as well as the quantitative characteristics of their respective economic potentials on the eve of the war into account. The ability to mobilise depends above all on the social and political organisation of society, and on the political and labour enthusiasm of a country's people. The Soviet Union confounded the forecasts of world reactionaries and dashed their hopes. The USSR was able to gear its economy to the war effort within months. The Soviet defence economy proved to be more powerful than the military economy of the Axis powers. The socialist system of economic management based on planning demonstrated its unconquerable vitality and efficiency.

Thanks to this and despite the incredible difficulties the Soviet people had to contend with, they emerged victorious from all the trials. This was a victory for socialism over capitalism, a victory for Soviet military technology over nazi Germany's. The war proved the maturity of the Soviet production apparatus which was augmented by rapid scientific and technological progress just before and during the war. The Great Patriotic War provided yet another convincing proof

¹ See *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short History*, p. 571.

of the indisputable fact that one of the crucial factors in winning a war is superiority over the enemy in the economic organisation of society, in the level of economic development and in science and technology.

2. Scientific and Technological Progress and the Soviet Armed Forces in the Post-War Period

The last war provided a powerful impetus to the further development of weapons and military hardware throughout the world. After the war, instead of curtailing the output of weapons and hardware, the military-industrial complexes of the principal capitalist countries continued to expand their production, initiated a frenzied arms race, and geared scientific and technological progress to preparations for a new world war.

In this situation the Communist Party and Soviet Government had to increase the country's defence capability, and strengthen its Armed Forces on the basis of the latest achievements in science and technology.

In the fifties, scientific and technological progress took the form of a scientific and technological revolution which ushered in changes within the productive forces in general, and within the material means of warfare in particular. History knows many revolutionary upheavals and leaps in science, but never before have scientific achievements exercised anything like the impact they have today on social life, never before have they caused such a radical upheaval in engineering and in production. The prime reason for this is that today scientific research covers the whole of the world around us and has gained important insights into the essence of just about every phenomenon. Secondly, in all areas of knowledge the dominant trend now is towards pooling the efforts of many sciences which study a particular process from different angles, and by joining forces they are able to achieve effective results. Thirdly, science has now reached a level of maturity which enables it to develop its own ways of improving technologies and production processes. Fourthly, it is now becoming more possible than in the past to advance science in a purposeful way and to apply research results to the solution of concrete problems.

It can safely be said that modern science is passing through a period in which obsolete notions and methods of research are being scrapped. We are witnessing an upheaval in ideas on a variety of phenomena and in theory. All this steps up the development of science, making it a very effective instrument in the hands of man.

One major result of the scientific and technological revolution is the practical application of discoveries and break-throughs in physics and mathematics, in nuclear physics, solid-state physics, electronics, radio physics, cybernetics and metallurgy, to name but a few areas. The application of the latest achievements of science to the economy has vastly accelerated the progress of power engineering, particularly

its nuclear power component, the progress of space exploration; the development of novel materials, sophisticated machines and mechanisms, installations, ways of mechanisation, automation and control equipment. The steadily growing use of mathematical methods of research and the perfection of computers have combined to produce a steep rise in the importance of quantitative methods of exploring not only technical phenomena, but also social, economic, biological and military problems. It is now possible in some areas of production to replace manual operations with automatic equipment and comprehensive mechanisation, and to develop machines capable of helping the human operator solve complex problems in logics.

The scientific and technological revolution has now spread, in varying degrees, to all countries. It is occurring both in socialist and in capitalist countries. However, its socio-political and economic goals and effects under socialism could not be more different from those under capitalism. Actually, the scientific and technological revolution is an important arena for the struggle between the two opposing social and economic systems, and an important way in which the advantages socialism has over capitalism can be shown.

In capitalist countries the development of science and technology is uneven and involves contradictions. Capitalism is desperately trying to adapt to the changed situation in the world, and to this end is making wide use of the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution to consolidate its class position and to resolve its peculiar contradictions through the militarisation of society, through preparations for and unleashing of new wars, and through attempts at exerting military and economic pressure on socialism.

In the socialist countries the achievements of science and technology are used for the benefit of man. These achievements are taken advantage of to accelerate the development of socialist society and its economy, to improve the socialist relations of production and the living conditions of the working people and to raise their cultural attainments. Under socialism, scientific and technological progress promotes the full development of the human personality, helps give man a more responsible attitude to his world and to be more active. Soviet people have no reason for misgivings about scientific and technological progress. They do not share the pessimism and anxiety of many people in the Western world, who believe that the accelerating torrent of scientific and technological discoveries and inventions may result rather paradoxically in reducing man to the humiliating status of an appendage to the machine. The Soviet people are using the achievements of science and technology as a potent lever and weapon in their dedicated work to fulfil their historic mission of building a communist society.

In a socialist country, scientific and technological progress serves constructive ends. Naturally the threat of imperialist aggression compels us to exploit the fruits of scientific and technological progress to strengthen our country's defence potential. This objective need for a steady improvement in the defence power of the socialist

state forms the political basis for the radical changes now occurring in the Soviet Armed Forces. While supplying its Army and Navy with the latest types of weaponry and military hardware, the Soviet Union is unflinchingly working to prevent a new war, to maintain the peace and security of all the peoples, and to establish peaceful coexistence among countries irrespective of their social systems.

Favourable conditions have been created in the Soviet Union to direct the efforts of scientists and researchers in a planned and purposeful way towards solving key and promising theoretical and practical problems of vital importance to the construction of communist society and the defence of the revolutionary gains of the working people.

The enormous advantage the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have in the matter of scientific research organisation is that our scientists, being a part of the people, rely on the sound scientific and methodological basis of Marxism-Leninism. They derive inspiration for their work from the knowledge that it is conducted in the name of their country, for the benefit of the people, and that their work is guided by the Communist Party. As the CPSU Programme states: "It is a point of honour for Soviet scientists to consolidate the advanced positions which Soviet science has won in major branches of knowledge and to take a *leading place in world science* in all the key fields."¹

The spectacular development of science and technology has brought about revolutionary changes in the military field and has had an enormous impact on the weaponry and Army and Navy organisation, on methods of warfare, and on the training and education of the military personnel.

Perhaps the most important and decisive factor characterising the revolution in the military field is the development of nuclear weapons and their adoption by the Soviet Armed Forces. Other factors include the development and adoption of various types of missiles, ranging from tactical to strategic ones, with intermediate and intercontinental radii of action. Nuclear-tipped missiles have now given rise to a fundamentally new weapon system—the nuclear missile arsenal. These powerful weapons have the enormous destructive capacity of nuclear warheads, and the unlimited range and relative invulnerability of ICBMs.

Nuclear missiles could not be developed without a powerful scientific and economic potential. The high standard of development of nuclear physics, mathematics, electronics, cybernetics and other sciences in the Soviet Union, together with the successful development of the Soviet economy, the creativity and enthusiasm of the working people and the guiding role of the Communist Party meant that the complex problem of developing missiles and nuclear warheads, and their adoption by the Soviet Armed Forces could be

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 576.

solved. This resulted in the birth of a new arm of the Soviet Armed Forces — the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The advent of nuclear-tipped missiles required a radical reappraisal of every area of the military field and at the same time presented the Army and Navy with a variety of unprecedented pressing problems. The appearance of nuclear missiles radically changed the old concepts of the speed and processes of war, and fundamentally changed the traditional role and significance of time and space.

Conventional means of warfare have been further developed alongside the development of nuclear-tipped missiles. The land forces have been equipped with new advanced types of automatic weapons; with tanks having improved armoured plating, increased fire power, higher speed and manoeuvrability; with new medium- and large-calibre artillery systems; with mortars; multiple rocket launchers; recoilless rifles; and with new anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons for use by the ground troops. The Soviet Air Force has been equipped with new types of advanced aircraft — jet planes and helicopters. The country's Air Defence Forces have been supplied with new types of surface-to-air missiles, jet fighters, rapid-fire automatic anti-aircraft guns and radar systems. New types of projectiles, including air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, have been developed and adopted, being very accurate and having deadly effect, which is possible through the use of radio-electronic fire control systems. The Soviet Navy has been supplied with new types of submarines and surface warships with improved weapons and an array of advanced equipment. In recent years scientific and technological progress has led to the development of new types of weapons, whose use cannot but influence the character of possible military operations.

The fire power of conventional weapons is far greater than that in the last war. For instance, in terms of fire power today's multiple rocket launchers are far superior to the famous Katyusha rocket launchers which were used with great effect during the last war. The armour piercing capacity of today's anti-tank shells is far greater than ever before. The rate of fire and accuracy of automatic weapons and artillery have increased considerably. Thanks to the qualitative improvement in conventional weapons and their increased supply to the land forces the latter's fire power and manoeuvrability have increased, enabling ground troops to carry out bold missions without resorting to nuclear weapons.

One feature of contemporary scientific and technological progress is that it rapidly makes existing weapon systems and military hardware obsolete. At the beginning of this century it took 20 to 30 years to develop and adopt a new weapon. Today this "lead time" has been cut by a factor of two or three in the major countries. Over the past 10 to 15 years alone the Soviet Union and other major powers have replaced two or three generations of missiles, a sizeable proportion of their combat aircraft, surface warships and submarines, and the available anti-aircraft missiles and supporting radar equipment several times, along with the fire control and communication

equipment. This trend is gaining momentum despite the fact that the development of new types of weapons entails increasing scientific, research and development effort, and despite the growing technical sophistication of weapons and equipment and the steadily growing expenditure on their production.

An important feature of contemporary scientific and technological progress is that it is not only making itself felt in the development of fundamentally new weapons and hardware, but is also improving the performance of existing weaponry. That is why another urgent trend in military scientific and technological progress is the on-going modernisation of weapons and hardware that have been in service with the army for a long time, so as to give them a new lease of life, as it were, providing this is consistent with efficiency and expediency both from the military and economic standpoints.

Scientific and technological progress has greatly sharpened the competition between offensive and defensive weapons. The advent of new types of powerful offensive arms in the past has sometimes caused problems and difficulties in the development of sufficiently effective defensive weapons. A case in point is the appearance of nuclear-tipped missiles, against which there is as yet no effective and reliable defence. It should be emphasised that the nuclear missiles possessed by the Soviet Union are a powerful means of defence, a deterrent discouraging a potential aggressor.

Scientific and technological progress is not only having an enormous impact on the qualitative characteristics of weapons and equipment, it is also affecting the attitude of military personnel to the weapons and hardware they handle, and indeed the character of military work. There is increasing need now not just to adapt weapons and equipment to the personnel that handle them, but also to help the men keep abreast of the weapons and hardware they have to operate.

The new weapons insistently demand a new approach to the training of personnel so as to equip the latter with excellent knowledge of their particular specialised fields, stimulating an independent, imaginative and creative approach to solving practical problems, and in general to stimulate their all-round intellectual and physical capacities. The responsibility each member of the Armed Forces personnel carries for the accomplishment of missions assigned to his crew, platoon and unit has increased. The latest weapons and military hardware, with their enormous fire power and superior performance, have made the demands on the moral and fighting qualities of the personnel more exacting. In other words, scientific and technological progress inevitably increases the role of the human element in modern warfare.

Certain types of weapons and equipment have become so sophisticated and complex that their employment and maintenance very often demand the direct participation of scientists. In turn, many officers, including generals, while acquiring complete proficiency in the handling of new weapons and equipment, delve deeply into many

different fields of science and technology and in the process become experts with an intimate knowledge of the scientific aspects involved.

On-going scientific and technological progress affecting the military field has meant that it has been possible to largely mechanise and automate troop control procedures and the training and education of the personnel. The main aim of introducing automation into the Soviet Armed Forces, unlike the situation in capitalist armies, is not to exclude the human element, but rather to improve the fighting qualities of the troops and raise the standard of combat training.

Advances in science and technology as they are applied to the military field have an increasingly greater impact on the methods of warfare. The advent of fundamentally new, and vastly more powerful, types of weapons and their adoption on a mass scale necessitate changes affecting battle orders, the size and depth of missions, speed of offensive operations, forms of manoeuvre, defensive tactics and other aspects of warfare. Whereas formerly these changes were of a distinctly evolutionary character and were not particularly visible, today they often come about suddenly, acquiring an explosive character, and sometimes effect full-scale revolutions in methods of warfare. There is a distinct tendency towards new shifts and radical changes in tactical operations and battlefield tactics as new types of weapon and equipment are developed and adopted.

Scientific and technological progress is changing the organisational structure of armies in significant ways. The radical leap in the perfection of the means of destruction and delivery vehicles has produced fundamental changes in the development of existing and new armed forces, and has changed their role, place, and relative importance within countries' military establishments and has set up a more effective ratio and pattern of relationships among them.

As this problem is being solved by the Soviet Army and Navy, a unified system of weapons and equipment is emerging accompanied by an optimal distribution of combat and supporting means among the various arms. In effect the on-going improvement of the military organisation is nothing less than continual scientific search to create more rational combinations of manpower and military hardware in a single military organism. The more rational the distribution within this organism, the more efficient the control and support organs, the better they are able to employ those methods and means of warfare which guarantee the most effective use of available weapons and equipment, swift offensive operations, tenacity in defence, wider and more dynamic manoeuvre and quick switching from one action to another.

Scientific and technological progress is having a profound effect on military science, on the solution of pressing problems of modern warfare and is providing new means and methods of military research. Relying on the steadily growing combat power of the Soviet Army and Navy, Soviet military science is studying the impact of the military

and technological factor on the character of modern warfare and on the conditions governing the cause and duration of a war.

Unlike many Western military experts, Soviet military science does not see nuclear-tipped missiles as the ultimate weapon despite their formidable destructive power. Soviet military experts believe that placing a particular arm of the Armed Forces above all the others in modern warfare is an unsound concept. They believe that, should the imperialists unleash a new war, all services of the Armed Forces will have a part to play, their actions being co-ordinated with regard to objective, time and place. Every arm will have its own mission and will make its contribution to the achievement of the overall war aims. By elaborating these and other military questions, Soviet military science is influencing progress in military technology in a well-directed and purposeful way.

The Communist Party and the Soviet people are doing everything necessary to strengthen the country's defences, develop her Armed Forces and to ensure that they are abreast of the modern requirements in terms of technical equipment on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology. Today's material and technological basis of the Soviet Army and Navy is far superior to what it was at the end of the Great Patriotic War and in the immediate post-war years. The Soviet Armed Forces are being supplied with adequate quantities of advanced weapons and military hardware which enable them to maintain their combat efficiency at the required level, to raise their level of combat readiness and to be able to accomplish any missions on land, in the air and at sea.

Today, as we look back along the path traversed by the Soviet Army and Navy since their inception, we cannot but be proud of the tremendous changes that have occurred in their technical equipment. The dedicated labour of the Soviet people and their creative genius have enabled the country's Armed Forces to make a giant leap from the three-inch field gun to the ICBM, from the machine-gun cart to the powerful tank, from the biplane to the supersonic jet aircraft, from primitive submarines to nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines capable of circumnavigating the globe without surfacing.

3. Trends in Weapons Development

Historical experience indicates that in strengthening the defence potential of a socialist state it is vital to keep abreast of the requirements of the time. L. I. Brezhnev emphasised in his summing-up at the end of the Dvina exercises in March 1970: "Today we have excellent weapons. But in this day and age of the scientific and technological revolution, when weapons and equipment undergo a rapid process of improvement, new models and weapons systems often take less than a year to come about. Any lag in this area may be fraught with dire consequences. Our scientists, both civilian and military, should on no account ever forget this.

"The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government have always taken timely measures to ensure the modernisation of the Soviet Armed Forces. Needless to say, all this costs a lot of money, but we have to spend part of our national budget to keep the country's defences at the required level and this meets with the full understanding and support of our people."¹

We should always remember that in the frenzied arms race the imperialists have launched they are seeking to shift the emphasis on the qualitative perfection of weapons and equipment, thereby trying to gain an advantage over the USSR and the other socialist countries in this area. In this situation ensuring the Soviet Union's adequate defence capability means that we must allow no let-up in basic research and development in the defence field; we must exploit the fruits of scientific and technological progress; develop new, modern types of weapons and equipment; and reduce the lead involved in applying research findings to the needs of military production.

One of the principal means of applying advances in science and technology in the defence field is a *unified military-technical policy* as a system of scientifically sound views on the development of weapons and equipment, a policy to keep the technical arsenal of the Soviet Armed Forces at a high level thus enabling them to meet modern requirements.

A wealth of experience has been gained in this country in developing powerful and efficient weapons. Measures to further improve the material and production base of the country's defence industry are carried out on a permanent basis. A broad generalisation of the experience gained, and taking stock of what has been done and what remains to be done is a top-priority concern. This can be done provided we approach the problems on the basis of broad sound principles since, as Lenin emphasised, "anybody who tackles partial problems without having previously settled general problems, will inevitably and at every step 'come up against' those general problems without himself realising it. To come up against them blindly in every individual case means to doom one's politics to the worst vacillation and lack of principle".² The search for a broad, systems approach to the solution of military and technical problems is one of the crucial goals of a unified military-technical policy.

Let us briefly examine the main tasks facing the formulators of this policy.

Firstly, a unified military-technical policy must ensure the priority development of those trends in scientific and technological progress in the military field which hold the best promise of meeting the growing requirements of the Soviet Union's defence more fully and comprehensively. Apart from tackling problems on a current basis this policy orients scientists and R&D personnel towards concentrating their efforts on the more worthwhile problems and projects whose

¹ Dvina, Moscow, 1970, pp. 6-7 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 489.

realisation will have a long-term effect. Basic research aimed at discovering hitherto unknown properties of matter, phenomena and natural laws, the development of new research techniques and exploiting them to augment the country's defence capability is of special importance in this context.

Secondly, a unified military-technical policy must secure an alliance between industry and science so as to help the development of efficient weapons and equipment which will not become obsolete for a long time. In other words it must ensure that every type of weapon and piece of military hardware is developed with a minimum of expenditure and at the same time has an excellent performance, especially a high destructive capacity.

Thirdly, a unified military-technical policy concerns itself with the search for rational ways of modernising the weapons and equipment at the disposal of every arm and service of the Soviet Armed Forces with a view to enabling them to keep abreast of modern requirements. It is essential in this connection to make a careful study of the laws governing the development of military science, to study how the achievements of scientific and technological progress are exploited abroad and to keep up with dominant trends in the development of weaponry and military hardware.

Fourthly, a unified military-technical policy should give constant attention to the development of those weapons and equipment which require minimum of maintenance and reduce the amount of manual labour involved in operating them. This is achieved through the comprehensive mechanisation of labour-intensive operations and a gradual switch-over to the thorough automation of the principal maintenance and servicing procedures.

Fifthly, a unified military-technical policy must continuously update existing and develop new techniques of troop and fire control and perfect control procedures and equipment and communications systems. The dominant trend in this area is towards the full automation of troop control procedures and equipment based on the computerisation of both the information collection and the decision-making preceding the issue of specific instructions and orders to the troops in the field.

Thus, we see that a military-technical policy must ensure on-going progress in weapons development. It can cope with its task provided it takes into account the present state and prospects of future economic development, the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, and provided it proceeds from the requirements of a possible future war, and its strategy and tactics.

Should a nuclear war break out it will be waged with ICBMs, both land-based and submarine-based, and with strategic bombers.

The ICBMs are being perfected all the time.

A stable trend in the further progress of strategic bombers is towards increasing speed and range, and improving their strike capacity and their ability to penetrate the enemy air defences.

In recent years missile-carrying submarines have gained in

importance. There is good reason for this since nuclear-powered missile submarines, while being on a par with land-based and airborne nuclear weapons delivery systems, possess a number of advantages, especially their increased ability to survive.

Scientific research and R&D activities aimed at further improving the performance of missile submarines cover a wide variety of problems, including above all the problem of increasing their cruising capacity (without refuelling), their diving depth, and improving their missiles and launching gear. Special attention is given to reducing the noise level and the level of various radiations emanating from the submarine's power plant and her other energy-producing installations. Research that is being done is aimed at re-designing nuclear power plants to prolong their service life and make them more economical.

However, for all their formidable power and vital role nuclear-tipped strategic ICBMs cannot reach every objective of a war. That is why efforts are continuing to develop new and to improve existing types of conventional arms.

The development of conventional arms concerns efforts to improve their performances still further. These include greater universality, a longer range, increased fire power, higher accuracy, increased mobility, higher rates of fire, greater survivability and reliability, more stable functioning in the face of enemy electronic counter-measures, and greater ease of handling and operation. The main areas in which R&D are concentrated are the development of ingenious designs and systems, the use of new materials and explosives, and the development of improved sighting and guidance systems with increased accuracy. Wide use is being made of laser electronics and computers and of fully automated control procedures. To give weapons and equipment greater mobility they are installed on various vehicles (capable of travelling overland, flying and sailing) with increased cross-country capability, greater speed, increased endurance and economical engines.

The fighting in South-East Asia in the late '60s and early '70s provided much to think over and demanded fresh ideas on the further development of air-attack weapons and air defence. It is a fact that in its aggressive "air war" against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the US Air Force lost thousands of tactical, carrier-based and army planes and helicopters. Pilot losses were also heavy. And this despite the fact that the pick of the US Air Force took part in the raids, flying the best planes and helicopters available to the US at the time, including a few experimental planes. Bearing in mind the combat experience of the US Air Force in Vietnam, military scientists and research technologists are now looking for ways of increasing the survivability of combat planes and helicopters, and of increasing their striking power once they penetrate up-to-date air defences. The search for new ideas and solutions is conducted in both technical and tactical directions.

It is to be expected that the combat aircraft of tomorrow will be packed with efficient weaponry and sophisticated means of electronic

counter-action. VTOL planes, and high-speed combat and transport helicopters equipped with efficient navigation equipment and powerful weapons will be an important component in the Air Force. It is to be expected that new types of improved air-to-surface guided missiles will be developed and adopted.

Over the past ten years the fighting in the Middle East has repeatedly flared up at the instigation of the aggressive circles in Israel and this has necessitated a new approach to the correlation of offence and defence in ground warfare and has helped identify a number of new features in the confrontation of offensive and defensive weapons as well as in methods of heavy fire duels.

Significantly, modern defence has become more powerful and tenacious what with the advent of new fire power. The reason here is that tanks, the main striking power of the attackers, have become more vulnerable and their employment on the battlefield more difficult. The on-going perfection of anti-tank weapons has created the need to increase the viability and survivability of the armour and develop more effective ways and weapons for neutralising enemy anti-tank defences.

Today the struggle between the tank's armour plating and the anti-tank projectile is going on in the laboratory, on the tank range and in the factory. A variety of highly complex problems will have to be solved before we obtain the answer to the question "Who will beat whom?". Apparently, the traditional method of increasing the survivability of tanks by increasing the thickness of their armour plating is not the only and by no means the best way out of the situation.

Increasing tank survivability is also a very complex problem because the anti-tank guided missile is still in its infancy and the possibilities of this effective anti-tank weapon are far from being exhausted. Then again traditional anti-tank artillery can still be developed.

The experience of the fighting in the Middle East indicates changes in the methods of ground forces' tactical operations because of the increased role played by long-range fire. Modern long-range artillery and other weapons can inflict crippling damage on enemy tanks from a considerable distance. As a result, the advancing infantry is deprived of adequate tank support and suffers prohibitive losses and its advance runs out of steam or loses its pressure without ever reaching the objective. To provide adequate support for attacking infantry it is vital to neutralise the enemy fire system effectively, particularly his long-range anti-tank weapons.

The experience of recent local wars does not provide grounds for serious generalisations with regard to the employment of surface ships and their armament in modern warfare since so far only the navies of imperialist aggressors have had the chance to conduct operations. Nonetheless, scientific and technological progress has also opened up new possibilities in this area. A variety of trends are in evidence in the development of surface warships and their armament.

Surface ships of different classes are being built and commissioned, including attack, landing, transport, anti-submarine and auxiliary vessels. The search is going on for optimum hull configurations, new power plants and new types of armament for surface ships.

The appearance of new types of weapons and hardware makes new and more exacting demands on a country's economy. To produce modern weapons and military hardware it is not enough to use traditional, long-established industries. It is vital to develop new progressive industries capable of producing fundamentally different materials with a high mechanical strength, increased heat resistance, purity of composition and other improved properties.

The growing sophistication and cost of modern weapons and equipment, coupled with the need to reduce the lead time for their development, for mass production and for rapid adoption by the Armed Forces have given added urgency to the need for a careful scientific substantiation of long-term trends in the evolution of weapons and equipment. Insufficient and unsound substantiation in this area may cause an unwarranted waste of money, and economic and manpower resources. It is axiomatic that there is hardly anything more difficult than to make up for lost time if indeed one can ever do so.

Therefore, problems of scientific forecasting, of detailed long-term planning in every field, of identifying optimum correlations between different types of weapons and equipment are all matters of the first importance. The level of the technical arsenal of the Soviet Army and Navy, as a crucial factor for their fighting efficiency, must at all times be sufficiently high so as to enable them to be equal to their assigned missions.

Chapter

VI

THE MORALE OF THE SOCIALIST ARMY

The Soviet Union's might and the strength of its military establishment do not just rest on a developed socialist economy and on its up-to-date weapons and equipment. This might is also a derivative of the unshakable moral, political and ideological unity of the Soviet people, of the spiritual strength of Soviet society and the vital stake all working people have in building communism and in securing the country's defence. This identity of ideas and goals and unity of action underlie the high moral and fighting qualities of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. These qualities, coupled with the material factors, have played and will play, in the event of a new war, a decisive role in achieving victory over the enemy.

Today, the importance of the moral factor is growing because of the more exacting demands made on the moral and fighting qualities of military personnel in a modern war and the need to look for new ways and methods of conditioning the troops morally, politically and psychologically.

1. The Moral Factor in War

It can safely be said that no other single question has been dealt with in military literature quite so closely and profoundly as the role of the moral factor in war. This is hardly surprising. The decisive factor in war has been and continues to be the fighting man with his moral, political, psychological and fighting qualities which no weapons, however good, can replace. Come to that, the weapons and equipment can only be used to their full effect against the enemy provided they are used by men with excellent morale.

The moral factor depends on men's spiritual make-up and their understanding of the goals and aims of the war, for the achievement of which they go into battle and are ready to sacrifice their lives. In the context of the Armed Forces personnel the moral factor is the morale of the officers and men, a matter of their readiness and

determination to fight and endure any trials and privations to achieve victory over the enemy.

The morale of an army is a direct reflection of and part of the moral qualities of the people. The more the war aims correspond with the interests of the people, the higher the level of that people's morale and, as a consequence of this, the higher the morale of their army.

The moral factor is an integral part of the country's social system, its policy and socio-economic relations. Having a distinct socio-political character, it is justly referred to as the moral-political factor. Often the term "moral and fighting qualities of the troops" is used to emphasise the inextricable connection between the military personnel's morale and fighting qualities.

The best generals of Russia's past invariably set great store by the moral factor in achieving victory over the enemy and used every means at their disposal to boost the morale of their troops. Alexander Nevsky (13th century), and Dmitri Donskoi (14th), Alexander Suvorov (18th) and Mikhail Kutuzov (18th-19th centuries), and other celebrated Russian generals made a point of addressing their troops, appealing to their patriotism, and to their love for their country, knowing full well that their troops remembered the exploits of their fathers and grandfathers before them and revered the memory of their ancestors who had stood on the sacred soil of Russia to protect it from the onslaught of enemy hordes.

But never before had morale been so powerful a weapon as it was in the Red Army of workers and peasants, the army of a new type that was formed to safeguard the interests of the working people. The Communist Party, led by Lenin, in organising the defence of the socialist Motherland always used this weapon, showing constant concern to keep it ready for action.

Lenin often addressed meetings of working people and Red Army men in the grim years of the armed foreign intervention and Civil War. His impassioned appeal that they defend Soviet power, and his references to the revolutionary duty and class consciousness of the men of the Red Army inspired the latter to fight in a self-sacrificing manner against the foreign interventionist troops and the White Guards.

When nazi Germany treacherously invaded the Soviet Union the Central Committee of the Communist Party appealed to the Soviet people to rise and defend their Motherland. The Communist Party roused the people to fight a patriotic war against the nazi invaders, and the Soviet people responded enthusiastically, made great sacrifices and performed feats of unprecedented valour to maintain the freedom and independence of their socialist country.

The ruling circles in the imperialist countries cannot appeal to their army in the same way. They lack lofty goals and aims which could inspire their soldiers to go into battle consciously and enthusiastically. The imperialists will not disclose the true aims of their wars of aggression which are to subjugate other peoples politically and economically and to increase the profits of the capitalist monopolies.

That is why the ruling circles of the West have either to cynically exploit the patriotism of their people or mislead them by indoctrinating the masses with every ideological means possible or to fan base instincts, to induce people to go to war by violence and by offering fat pay, to turn them into marauders and killers, thereby making them accomplices to their criminal deeds.

However, not even the most subtle ideological indoctrination can guarantee high morale among the soldiers in the capitalist armies. The fact of the matter is that morale is not the result of outside influences nor is it the product of the propaganda media on the minds and hearts of the men. The morale of an army, it cannot be emphasised too strongly, is indissolubly bound up with the morale of the people. Its source and basis are the same as those supporting the country's social system, its policies, its socio-economic relations, and the same as those underlying the character and political aims of a war. Modern wars, as a rule, affect the vital interests of states and classes. They involve masses of people who are concerned about why and for what they have to fight and shed blood. A correct understanding of these questions has a decisive impact on the moral and political state of the people and of their armed forces.

Only just wars can generate great energy, enthusiasm and high morale among the people and their army and induce them to mass heroism and self-sacrifice to achieve a great goal. Just wars are alien to the very nature of imperialist states which can only wage aggressive predatory wars to further the interests of a handful of monopolies and which run counter to the vital interests of the peoples. Such wars cannot generate any noble moral stimuli. But compulsion, fraud and fat pay often misfire. The US war of aggression in Vietnam, instead of being supported by the majority of US soldiers, caused a mounting wave of protest despite the fact that US servicemen were paid extra.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the capacity of the militarists to ideologically influence the majority of their peoples in order to involve them in military gambles under the black banner of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. A case in point is the nazi Wehrmacht. The German soldiers' minds were poisoned by the venom of nazism, and by chauvinist propaganda about the supposed "exclusiveness" of the German race and the alleged "inferiority" of other peoples. As a result, at the least sign of protest against the "new order" imposed by the Hitlerites upon Europe, the soldiers of the nazi Wehrmacht committed atrocities against POWs and civilians in the countries and areas they overran during the Second World War. The nazi soldiers were particularly brutal towards Soviet people.

The US army has also committed acts of brutality and barbarism. It is common knowledge that their special forces, including the Green Berets, Rangers and other subversive units, have played an infamous role. The Pentagon attaches great importance to the formation of special forces. The three basic requirements for anyone intending to join them are: strong fists, a minimum of intelligence and a "spotless" reputation as interpreted by the militarists. Members of the special

forces are trained and educated in the spirit of sadism and inhumanity. They have it dinned into them that they belong to an "elite", that they are "supermen" above all standards of morality. These cut-throats later brainwash and condition fresh recruits from the conventional arms and demonstrate how to be inhuman with skill and efficiency.

Regrettably these "lessons" often leave a stamp on the minds of those who take them. The atrocities committed by US troops in Vietnam and the wholesale massacres of villages, including women, old folk and children, have shocked the world. However, the perpetrators of those crimes have got off scot-free and were in fact encouraged by the Pentagon.

Predatory wars are alien to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Their Armed Forces only use their weapons to repel imperialist aggression, to defend the socialist gains of peoples, and to safeguard their freedom and independence. Just wars cement society into a single monolithic camp. This was the situation in all the wars the Soviet Union has been forced to fight against foreign invaders who threatened its freedom and independence. The just character of the war and the vital stake of the whole people in repelling aggression have been the factors motivating the Soviet people, feeding their physical and spiritual forces, generating mass heroism and inducing serviceman and civilian alike to do his duty to his country with self-sacrifice.

The moral factor is indissolubly linked with the material factor; with the Army and Navy having everything necessary in the way of weapons and equipment; with the personnel being well trained; and with close co-operation and co-ordination between the various units. The material and moral factors taken together form the basis of the Soviet Armed Forces' fighting ability. This was the view Lenin took. His instructions in this area stemmed from the history of wars and were put to the test during the Soviet Army's and Navy's military operations. These instructions were the basis for the formation of the Soviet Armed Forces and of their personnel's training and education.

The Communist Party has fulfilled Lenin's instructions at every stage in the development of Soviet state and has paid the closest attention to equipping the country's Army and Navy with advanced weapons and hardware, to keeping the standards of combat training high and to developing high moral and fighting qualities in the officers and men. The Communist Party is implementing its military-technical policy in indissoluble unity with the job of conditioning Soviet military personnel morally, politically and psychologically. The Party attaches first-rate importance to the moral factor on the assumption that ideological steeling and a high level of consciousness among the military personnel enhance their fighting efficiency and turn into a material force. Under certain circumstances this may reduce the enemy's superiority in manpower and equipment to naught. The morale of the troops has a direct bearing on the personnel's performance on the battlefield and in the final count may determine the level of their combat efficiency and preparedness.

From the early days of the Soviet Armed Forces the Communist Party, led by Lenin, exploited the advantages offered by the Soviet social and state system and relied on the objective laws governing the formation of an army of a new type. They inculcated socialist ideology in the fighting men, and educated them in the spirit of communist ideals. They urged them to show greater personal responsibility for the future of their country and to be ready to make sacrifices to defend her freedom and independence. Lenin and the Communist Party saw faith in communist ideals, consciousness and utter devotion to the people as a source of unconquerable power, creativity and inspiration for the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces. This massive task was conducted in peace-time and in war-time. It cemented the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces and inspired them to perform feats of valour and gallantry on the battlefield.

During the foreign intervention and Civil War the young Red Army, while being inferior to the enemy in terms of technical equipment, was far ahead of him in terms of its moral and political qualities. Relying on this clear superiority, it routed the foreign interventionist troops and White Guards and maintained the great gains of the October Revolution and the independence of the Soviet state. In his analysis of the reasons for that great victory Lenin pointed out: "We won because the best people from the entire working class and from the entire peasantry displayed unparalleled heroism in the war against the exploiters, performed miracles of valour, withstood untold privations, made great sacrifices and got rid of scroungers and cowards."¹

During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Armed Forces displayed unprecedentedly high moral and fighting qualities. Everyone in this country and many in the rest of the world remember the exemplary valour and gallantry displayed by Soviet officers and men during the heavy defensive battles in the opening stages of the war; outside Moscow and Leningrad; later during the fighting at Stalingrad, in the North Caucasus, and in the battle of Kursk; during the assault crossing of the Dnieper, Vistula, Danube and Oder; during the fighting for Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna and Prague; during the storming of Königsberg and Berlin; and during many other battles and engagements in the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Army was not broken by the crippling setbacks and losses at the beginning of the war. Despite the perfidious attack by the nazi forces, the Soviet commanders and their men kept their heads, unlike their counterparts in many West European countries which were invaded by nazi Germany, and, having withstood the frenzied onslaught of the military machine of the most powerful capitalist state in Europe, they turned the tide of war and proceeded to win a victory of world and historic importance which maintained the socialist gains in the USSR and saved the whole of mankind from nazi enslavement.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Work*, Vol. 30, p. 437.

Soviet soldiers' main moral and fighting qualities during the Great Patriotic War included their total commitment to communist ideals, their utter devotion to the cause of the Party and the people, their Soviet patriotism and their awareness of their internationalist duty, their implicit faith in ultimate victory over the enemy, their mass heroism, their awareness of their personal responsibility for the future of their socialist country, their cast-iron military discipline, their staunchness, their sense of organisation, their comradely solidarity and the cohesion and co-operation among units and elements.

The men's high moral and fighting qualities earned grudging recognition from our enemies. Whereas during the planning of their aggression against the Soviet Union the nazi generals referred to the Red Army as "a colossus with feet of clay", within the first days of the war they were forced to sing a different tune. The diaries and other documents started to be filled with entries describing the staunchness, exceptional heroism and inexhaustible endurance of the Soviet soldier, and his hatred for the enemy. Thus, nazi General Kleist wrote this about the Red Army: "They were excellent fighters from the first day of the war.... As they gained experience they became first-rate soldiers. They fought with grim determination displaying remarkable endurance.... The Soviet staff quickly eliminated their initial shortcomings and became a very effective body." And here is what Colonel-General Guderian wrote: "It was Friedrich the Great who said about his Russian enemies that they had to be shot twice and then pushed before they fell. He correctly understood the nature of these soldiers. In 1941, we were forced to admit this. These soldiers staunchly defended their positions. Even when most of their positions had been captured, they continued to hold their ground, and had to be killed or captured in hand-to-hand fighting. They rarely surrendered."¹

We can quote any number of similar grudging admissions of the excellent moral and fighting qualities of Soviet officers and men during the last war.

Today's generation of Soviet officers and men are developing high moral and fighting qualities in conditions of peace time, during intensive combat training and the performance of routine service duties in the Army and in the Navy. The personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces are displaying a high level of political awareness. This is seen in the successful fulfilment of pledges and undertakings made by officers and men in socialist emulation campaigns; in the steadily growing numbers of officers and men with excellent results in combat and political training; in the growing numbers of rated specialists; in the smooth co-operation and team-work during exercises and stand-by duty; in the strengthening of military discipline, organisation and order; and generally in the Soviet Armed Forces' steadily rising level of combat preparedness.

¹ H. Guderian, *Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden?* Göttingen, 1950, S. 35.

Today there are numerous examples of soldiers and sailors carrying out their missions and tasks in combat and political training with perfection. Often Soviet officers and men, in fulfilling their service duties, have had to defy mortal danger and display heroism, courage and valour in the true sense of these words. It is not for nothing that an expression has become current among Soviet military personnel which aptly describes the tension and romanticism of life in the Army and Navy. The expression is: "In days of peace, exploits are as in war time."

In modern warfare the role of the moral factor is more important than it has ever been before. There are good reasons why this should be so.

For one thing, there are political reasons stemming from the social essence of a possible war. A new world war, and the imperialist reactionaries have still not given up preparing for one, would inevitably be a giant clash between two polarised social systems on a scale unprecedented in human history. This new quality will determine the ferocity and uncompromising character of the war which will affect every area of social life and impose enormous strain on the moral and physical capacities of the fighting men and of the whole of the people.

One other factor which places a premium on the moral factor in modern war is the changed character of the weapons and equipment available today and in particular the advent of nuclear weapons. Lenin wrote: "War itself is always dangerous. There is not a moment in time of war when you are not surrounded by danger."¹ This danger will be far greater if nuclear weapons are used. It will not only hang over the forces in the field but also over civilians working in the country's interior. The whole nation may be the target of a massive nuclear attack. In this atmosphere it will be much more difficult to conduct operations and keep the country's economy going than was the case in past wars. The constant agonising expectation of a nuclear attack will affect the morale of the army and the people and will require the utmost mobilisation of their spiritual and physical capacities and will call for thorough moral and psychological conditioning.

The moral factor will be especially important in the event of an enemy nuclear attack in the aftermath of which every effort will have to be made in extremely trying circumstances to restore the fighting capacity of the surviving armed forces as quickly as possible and to mobilise the men morally and physically to accomplish the old or a new mission. Long-term and thorough preparations have to be made even in peace time to ensure that the troops are not disorientated by the formidable ravages of a possible nuclear war.

There is no need to deal in detail with the effects of nuclear weapons should there be a new world war. One thing is certain and

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 98-99.

that is that their employment may kill hundreds of millions of people, destroy whole countries and contaminate the earth's surface and atmosphere with radio-active fall-out for prolonged periods. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons is exemplified in the colossal shock wave, intense thermal radiation and invisible radio-active contamination which have a far more shattering impact on human psychology and moral fibre than any type of conventional weapons. This shattering impact will be reinforced by the inevitable massive loss of life, wholesale destruction and conflagration. In these highly unsettling conditions the Armed Forces' personnel and the country's civilian population will have to display exceptionally high moral stability, self-control and unbending will so as not to give way to panic and so as to retain their determination to continue the struggle with implicit faith in the ultimate victory over the enemy.

Finally, the deleterious impact on troops' morale will be reinforced by changes in methods of warfare. The possibility of massive nuclear strikes, the prospect of total annihilation of whole medium-sized elements and even divisions within seconds, irreplaceable losses caused by enemy action, the increased speed and dynamism of operations in every theatre of war, sudden twists in the situation, rapid switches from one type of operation to another and the enormous communication constraints against effective troop control, all this will place great strain on the physical and moral capacities of the Armed Forces, the like of which no war in the past ever knew.

The role of the moral factor in modern warfare will increase even if conventional arms alone are employed. The point is that in this eventuality, too, the socio-political essence of a war, its class motivation and resoluteness of its aims will retain their impact on the morale of the fighting forces. Other factors such as the dramatically increased performance of conventional weapons and the changed methods of warfare will have an enormous influence on troops. In addition, one has to remember that in a possible new war, troops will be operating under double pressure — they will be open to attack from conventional weapons while constantly anticipating a nuclear strike. They will be required to be ready for determined action in the aftermath of a nuclear attack as well.

The importance of the moral factor in achieving victory in a situation dominated by the employment of powerful and highly mobile weapons and methods of warfare has grown so much that it requires a radical re-appraisal of many time-honoured principles and precepts of military science. For instance, efforts to achieve victory by creating a preponderance over the enemy in manpower and weapons at a decisive moment and in a decisive sector will fail to bring the desired effect if we fail to take into account the quality of the troops, a major component of which is their morale. The famous aphorism "You beat the enemy by skill rather than by numbers" will only apply if the troops' fighting efficiency is backed up by a high level of morale.

Modern warfare makes exacting demands on the moral and fighting qualities of command personnel. The commanders are expected to be

able to overcome all difficulties and dangers in the battlefield situation together with their men and at the same time exercise continuous and effective troop control despite the complexity of the situation and, by setting a personal example of staunchness, self-control and *sang-froid*, inspire them to undeviatingly accomplish their missions.

In capitalist countries some military experts claim that man, because of the growing sophistication of weapons and equipment, is being reduced to an appendage of the equipment and that the outcome of a war will be decided by weapons, primarily, by nuclear weapons.

These Western propaganda assertions are designed to belittle the role of the masses in history in general and in war in particular and at the same time to extol the blind power of weapons and military hardware. They hope in this way to convince people of the durability of capitalism, a historically doomed social system, and to convince people of its capacity to rule the destiny of the world by relying on its military, scientific and technological potential. These propaganda efforts indicate that as the aggressive forces of imperialism prepare for new military gambles they are unable to inspire their own people with lofty ideals and provide the moral stimuli necessary to fire them with enthusiasm and thus enable them to perform heroic deeds in war. On the other hand, exaggerating the role of hardware in war indicates that the so-called "educational techniques" employed by the command personnel and propaganda machine in the capitalist armies are losing their effectiveness as an instrument for indoctrinating and conditioning military personnel in desired ways. Finally, by raising military technology to the primary position and worshipping it the militarists hope to continue the arms race they have launched.

To be sure, it would be stupid to belittle the importance of weapons in general and that of nuclear weapons in particular. There is no need to do so. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons speaks for itself. But it will also be a grievous mistake to write off the fighting man with his moral and political qualities. However hard the imperialist ideologists try to belittle the importance of the human element the facts are against them.

This truism has been reluctantly conceded by the majority of military experts in the imperialist countries and by the top-ranking officers in their armies. Thus, the field service regulations of the US Army state that man continues to be the principal instrument of war. The military propaganda machine of the Western bourgeoisie is doing everything in its power to evolve some sort of "prescription" to bolster up the waning morale of the soldiers in capitalist countries. Emphasis is laid on the ideological indoctrination of the military personnel using every means the propaganda machine can muster. The officer corps is using a variety of techniques to influence the rank-and-file in the desired ways; to try and conceal the class divisions between officers and men; and to camouflage the fact that the officer in the capitalist army is a servant of the monopolies and that the bourgeois army itself is a tool in the hands of the imperialists

which they use against their own people, and to further their aggressive policies against other countries.

To condition the personnel of capitalist armies in a way which suits the imperialists and to deceive the masses, the capitalist state's entire propaganda apparatus as well as the military propaganda machine are employed. Bourgeois propagandists spread a gospel of unbridled anti-communism and they peddle lies and slander about the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and about their armies and at the same time laud and embellish capitalism and foster a private-ownership mentality. "The imperialist bourgeoisie maintains its power over their peoples by both violence and deceit. It resorts increasingly to ideological means of enslaving the masses; it has recourse to 'total' ideological mobilisation of all the reactionary forces under the banner of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism."¹

For all the efforts of the imperialist ideologists to conceal the true essence of wars from their own people and from their army, and despite the slander they spread about socialism, truth will win the day. If they have succeeded so far in forcing their armies to do black deeds by lies, bribery and violence they have done so because no really serious test has yet tried their strength. History provides ample evidence that capitalist armies are strong in dealing with weak opponents or unarmed civilians but the moment they find their match or a stronger opponent their confidence evaporates and they are defeated in a war which requires a high morale and involves psychological tension.

The Nazi Wehrmacht, whose morale and fighting capacity were shattered by the Soviet Army, was no exception to this rule. Whereas the Nazi troops were very efficient in the early stages of the Great Patriotic War, when they were still intoxicated by their series of easy victories in Western Europe and whilst they still underrated the strength of the Red Army, after their defeats at Moscow, Stalingrad, in the battle of Kursk and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front their morale and fighting efficiency plummeted and very often they surrendered to advancing Soviet troops.

Today, the role of the moral factor in modern warfare is as important as ever and, indeed, growing. This makes more exacting demands in terms of the moral, political and psychological conditioning of Soviet officers and men. The Communist Party has been concentrating on this matter and has been guiding the command personnel, political bodies and Party organisations in the Army and Navy, thereby helping them accomplish the important task of educating conscious, courageous and competent defenders of the socialist gains. There is no doubt that should the imperialists impose a new war on the Soviet Union its Armed Forces will have a high level of morale, will staunchly defend their country and will write new chapters of military glory in the annals of our glorious victories.

¹ *On the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin. Theses of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1970, p. 53.*

2. Forming High Moral, Political and Psychological Qualities Among the Military Personnel

The dominant factors of social life in the Soviet Union include the emergence of a new historical community, the existence of harmonious relations between various classes, social groups, nations and nationalities, the growing friendship among the Soviet peoples, the rising level of the working people's political consciousness and cultural attainments, and the Communist Party's steadily growing role in leading the building of a communist society. These factors have a decisive impact on the Soviet military establishment and on efforts to improve and strengthen the country's Armed Forces.

The Soviet Army and Navy are a living embodiment of the best features of the Soviet people, their unity, their moral and political cohesion, their socialist patriotism and their internationalism. The officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces are noted for their high-mindedness and utter devotion to the Communist Party and the people.

These qualities, which are so critical in gaining victory over a strong enemy, do not come by themselves but thorough moral and political training and steeling, and by building up a level of combat skill and physical endurance. They are moulded and developed by the entire system of military and political training, Party and political work, military education and by the entire routine of life in the Army and Navy. This is an important task in the officers' and men's moral, political and psychological conditioning, and their combat training.

Moral and political training is aimed at giving the members of the country's Armed Forces a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, communist ideals, convictions and moral principles of behaviour. This training is designed to equip the Armed Forces' personnel with communist ideology, to help them clearly understand the policies of the Communist Party and Soviet Government and to see clearly the country's state interests, and the essence and character of a war to defend their socialist Motherland.

Psychological conditioning ensures that the military personnel develops courage, an inner psychological readiness to perform a heroic deed, including one demanding self-sacrifice; resourcefulness and understanding; and stable, positive psychological reactions and other qualities so essential in war.

The role of psychological conditioning has greatly increased with the growing possibility of nuclear weapons being employed. Nuclear and other modern weapons can have a shattering impact on the minds of fighting men and can dramatise their emotional reactions and experiences.

Moral, political and psychological conditioning help the soldier overcome all the difficulties and obstacles that arise in his path. By contrast, a person without firm ideological persuasions, without

unbending will, cannot cope with the difficulties and in moments of danger and during reverses he is apt to lose heart and panic.

Moral, political and psychological conditioning, while forming a closely integrated whole, is also linked with combat training which must, apart from training personnel in fighting skills, develop in them courage, team-work, a sense of comradeship, mutual assistance and other fine moral and fighting qualities. During exercises and games the officers and men develop their powers of will, self-control and endurance. At the same time the exercises and games test their ability to withstand the enormous physical and moral strain which is imposed by the complex battlefield situation; to retain their combat efficiency for long periods; to keep their heads cool; to co-operate with their comrades and neighbours; and to mobilise every resource and bend every effort to accomplish their missions.

Commitment to communist ideals and a high level of political consciousness are the foundation for the high moral, political, psychological and fighting qualities of Soviet officers and men, and the prime motivation from which Soviet officers and men draw their courage, valour and their readiness to perform heroic deeds for their country. Lenin wrote: "The conviction that the war is in a just cause and the realisation that their lives must be laid down for the welfare of their brothers strengthen the morale of the fighting men and enable them to endure incredible hardships...."

"The realisation by the masses of the causes and aims of the war is of tremendous importance and ensures victories."¹

Thus, a soldier can be considered as fully prepared for combat, in terms of moral, political and psychological conditioning, if he is able to overcome the unnerving impact of negative factors, if he is able to act consciously, if he is able to keep his mind on the job, and if he is able to remain aware of his personal duty and responsibility for the success of the common cause no matter what the situation. Such a soldier possesses a strong moral stability and readiness to go through the grim trials of modern warfare and retain his will to win.

Soviet patriotism and a sense of internationalist duty are the major elements in the moral and political conditioning of the Soviet Armed Forces' personnel. Patriotism and a sense of internationalist duty are inculcated in the Soviet people and the officers and men of the Soviet Armed Forces by the entire Soviet way of life and system of education. Ideological work occupies a special place in this effort.

Soviet patriotism is based on the Soviet people's high level of political consciousness and their faith in the justness of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Patriotism shows itself in moral, political and fighting qualities like loyalty to the Soviet Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, a sense of national and military pride, staunchness, courage, valour, a high sense of discipline, and irreconcilability to the enemies of socialism. Soviet patriotism is the source of the Soviet officers' and men's high level of vigilance. They

¹ V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 137.

are aware of their personal responsibility for the future of their country.

Soviet patriotism is indissolubly linked with socialist internationalism and is an organic unity of the national and the international, something that has become an inalienable feature of the ideology of Soviet society. In the words of the Party Programme: "The Party will untiringly educate Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and will vigorously promote the international solidarity of the working people. In fostering the Soviet people's love of their country, the Party maintains that with the emergence of the world socialist system the patriotism of the members of socialist society is expressed in devotion and loyalty to their own country and to the entire community of socialist countries. Socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism necessarily imply proletarian solidarity with the working class and all working people of all countries."¹

Since the revolution of 1917 a new type of soldier has been developed in this country, a soldier patriot and internationalist educated in the spirit of communist ideals and utterly dedicated to the people, the Communist Party and the Motherland. The source of the Soviet Army's and Navy's invincibility is the high political awareness of Soviet officers and men, from soldier to general, their clear understanding of their noble mission to defend their socialist Motherland, and their legitimate pride in their status as citizens of the Soviet state. Socialist patriotism and internationalism constitute the force which makes our people and their soldiers staunch, courageous and invincible in battles against the enemy. A sense of patriotic and internationalist duty inspires and mobilises the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy to perform heroic deeds in the name of their socialist Motherland and the entire socialist community, and for the cause of the triumph of communism.

The moral and political conditioning of Soviet officers and men also includes educating them in a sense of *class hatred towards the enemy*. This feeling of hatred is based on the Soviet people having a clear understanding of the aggressive aims of imperialism and of their realisation of the class purpose of capitalist armies and the role they play in implementing the reactionary policies of imperialism. But class hatred towards the enemy cannot be equated with hatred towards the peoples of bourgeois countries. The Soviet Army has always been an army of liberation, bringing the peoples of the world freedom and emancipation. The personnel of the Soviet Army hated and destroyed the nazi invaders in the last war not because they were Germans but because they had invaded this country with the intention of enslaving her, because they committed atrocities against the civilian population and Soviet POWs, because they exercised violence and plundered the Soviet people, because they caused incalculable suffering and privations, and, finally, the Soviet Army only destroyed their opponents in the last war when they refused to lay down their arms.

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 567.

There is a good Russian proverb which can be quoted here: "A wolf is beaten not because his coat is grey but because he kills sheep."

Despite the fact that the nazi Wehrmacht brought untold suffering and privations to the Soviet people, the men of the Soviet Army treated the German people in a humane fashion.

Discipline and good organisation are an indication of the military personnel's high level of moral and political conditioning. Today the importance of discipline and good organisation as a crucial factor in troops' combat preparedness is as great as ever. In fact, their importance is all the greater in a war where swiftness, efficiency and timeliness in accomplishing missions and fulfilling orders and instructions are of decisive importance.

Moulding cast-iron military discipline, educating the troops in a spirit of model behaviour, and giving them a stable habit of acting in accordance with the law, oath of allegiance and in line with the military regulations and orders issued by the commander can only be achieved on the basis of a high sense of consciousness among the troops and their total dedication to communist ideals. The legal education of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel and instructing them in Soviet military laws, based on the fundamental principles of the policies pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the matter of military development and communist morality, plays a crucial role in establishing and maintaining order and good organisation among the military personnel and in their moral, political and psychological conditioning.

To strengthen military discipline and order among the troops still further it is essential to keep encouraging the men to show self-discipline, to act responsibly, to display self-control, as well as encouraging their ability to see their own mistakes and to rectify them at once. Self-discipline presupposes the ability of each soldier to set himself a high standard, to submit his own actions to a self-critical scrutiny, and to feel personally responsible for the success of the unit's mission.

The education of the officers and men in a spirit of strict discipline and good organisation is at its most effective where care is taken to ensure that the military collective, be it a platoon, a company or any other larger unit, plays a growing role. Team-work, close co-operation and mutual assistance are now an indispensable element of military service. The new weapons and equipment demand that every officer and men in the Army and in the Navy shows, on the one hand, a high sense of responsibility and a sense of duty to society and, on the other, that a unit as a whole has a sense of responsibility for the actions and conduct of the individual soldier. This is an essential factor which motivates the officers and men to keep strengthening the cohesion within military collectives on a fundamentally new, communist basis.

A high level of military discipline is crucial to the Soviet Armed Forces' success. Without cast-iron discipline no army can be efficient or indeed be called an army.

To improve the officers' and men's moral, political and psychological readiness to accomplish their missions in the conditions of modern warfare, their personal combat and specialist training is of great importance, as well as their intimate knowledge of the performance of the latest weapons, including nuclear weapons, their complete proficiency in handling their weapons and equipment, and their knowledge of ways of neutralising the effects of new mass-destruction weapons and their clear understanding of their contribution to the accomplishment of a common mission on the battlefield.

New weapons and military hardware, their increased ability to kill and destroy coupled with the greater dynamism of operations, combined to place a far greater strain on the physical capacity of fighting men, and on their psychology, all of which demands a strong spirit, unbending will and the ability not only to conquer fear and confusion but to maintain one's poise in order to act with concentration and a clear sense of purpose. These qualities are developed among the military personnel in the course of combat, political, and psychological training.

In stressing the important part training and service routine play in forming moral stability, ideological conviction, a high level of fighting skill and unbending will in the men, we should single out for special mention the educational opportunities offered by exercises, flights and cruises conducted in realistic battlefield environments. As a result, the exercises place an enormous strain on the moral and psychological powers of those participating. It is essential to get the most out of these opportunities.

Moulding high moral, political and psychological qualities among the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces has been the major task of Party and political work in the Army and Navy. The more active and purposeful this work the higher the moral and fighting qualities of the officers and men, and this helps them cope with their tasks in peace time and prepares them for successful operations in a possible future war.

3. Loyalty to Military Traditions

The education of the officers and men on the basis of the rich heritage of military traditions developed by the Soviet Armed Forces is of crucial importance in improving the moral and fighting qualities of the personnel and in strengthening the cohesion of military collectives in the Army and Navy.

Every army in the world has its own military traditions but the role these play varies from army to army. The traditions in some armies have a distinct revolutionary, progressive character, while those in others are of a reactionary, conservative nature. The explanation here is that the specific features and content of military traditions are determined above all by a country's social system, by its political and economic relations and equally by the purpose of its armed forces.

The military traditions of socialism and capitalism are as different as their political and economic principles.

In a capitalist society, rent as it is by antagonistic contradictions and conflicts of interest, there are no and indeed cannot be uniform persuasions and standards of behaviour, because each class in such a society has its own set of views and habits. Lenin wrote in June 1914: "Every social stratum has its own way of life, its own habits and inclinations."¹ The bourgeoisie, using its state and propaganda machines, has always capitalised on the traditions developed by the working people in an effort to adapt them to further its own selfish interests.

Socialism, which is built in this country under the leadership of the Communist Party, has predetermined the progressive character of the military traditions developed by the Soviet Army and Navy, their inspiring influence and noble character and viability, and as a result their beneficial influence on the education and training of officers and men to be loyal defenders of the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Military traditions in this country have arisen on the basis of the fine *revolutionary, labour and battlefield deeds performed by the Soviet people.*

Lenin and the Communist Party, in rousing and leading the people in a struggle against tsarist autocracy and capitalism, cemented the working masses and educated them into being dedicated fighters for a new life. This leadership and education enabled the people here to build socialism and turn this country into an example for other peoples to follow. And this despite ferocious resistance offered by the exploiting classes and imperialism's naked acts of aggression, the repelling of which diverted a good deal of strength and resources from constructive efforts. It was the Communists, members of Lenin's Guard, who were forever in the front ranks of Soviet people on the battlefield and on the labour front performing truly heroic deeds. Soviet people and the men of their Armed Forces have always tried to imitate the great Lenin and all communist fighters who have given their lives to bring freedom and emancipation to the working people, who secured the triumph of socialism and the advance of communism.

The priceless revolutionary heritage of the Soviet people and a mighty source of Soviet military traditions stem from utter loyalty to the socialist Motherland; unflinching staunchness and constant readiness to fight for the triumph of communist ideas without fear; loyalty to the all-conquering teaching of Marxism-Leninism and the principle of proletarian internationalism; self-sacrifice and mass heroism; and withering hatred for class enemies, imperialist exploiters and invaders.

The dedicated labour of the Soviet people is an important factor in moulding the military traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces. Free

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 476.

from the exploitation of man by man and from oppression, the Soviet people are building communism, the most advanced society in human history. They are doing so with enthusiasm and dedication. The Great October Socialist Revolution that ushered in the era of the revolutionary rejuvenation of the world, marked by the transition from capitalism to socialism, made human labour free and gave full reign to the inexhaustible spiritual forces of the masses. The inextricable identity of the interests of society and those of the individual, which is so typical a feature of every citizen in a socialist state, provides a mighty stimulus to the effort to improve labour productivity, step up the country's economic progress and improve standards of living. In the Soviet Union, work is a matter of honour, valour and heroism. In the words of the Programme of the CPSU: "The awareness that they work for themselves and their society and not for exploiters inspires the working people with labour enthusiasm; it encourages their effort for innovation, their creative initiative and mass socialist emulation. Socialism is creative effort by the working masses. The growing activity of the people in the building of a new life is a law of the socialist epoch."¹

The Soviet people's success in constructive labour inspires the officers and men of the Soviet Army and Navy to perform their duties in an exemplary way and to achieve high standards in their military and political training. The entire personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces, from the rank and file to the generals and admirals, as they stand vigilant guard over the socialist gains of the Soviet people, borrow from them a responsible, businesslike attitude to the job at hand, an imaginative approach, a sense of self-sacrifice and other qualities and features so typical of the builders of the new society.

The Soviet people's heroic exploits in defending their socialist Motherland from the encroachments of imperialist aggressors are the life-giving source of the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

During the foreign intervention and Civil War the soldiers of the October Revolution fought the enemy with courage and staunchness. They knew that in defending Soviet power they were discharging their revolutionary duty. They were totally dedicated to the goal of emancipating the people from capitalist exploitation. The exploits of the men of the Red Army and Navy have retained their inspiring force to this day. Soviet people of the older generation have fresh memories of the heroic deeds performed by the 1st Cavalry Army, by the 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk (Iron) and 25th Chapayev divisions, and by many other divisions and larger units which covered their colours with combat glory at the dawn of Soviet power.

The Soviet people's mass heroism was particularly in evidence during the Great Patriotic War. Seventeen armies, 80 corps, hundreds of divisions, brigades, regiments and warships had the title of

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 460.

"Guards" added to their official names. About 11,000 Government decorations were awarded to divisions, regiments and warships in recognition of their collective exploits. Twenty-nine regiments and larger units were awarded five and more orders each. Over 11,000 officers and men of the Soviet Army and Navy had the title of Hero of the Soviet Union conferred upon them in recognition of their exceptional heroism. Over 7,000,000 officers and men were decorated for valour and gallantry displayed on the battlefield. Over 184,000 orders and medals were awarded to members of partisan detachments, while 234 partisans received the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union. Over 204,000 orders and medals were bestowed upon industrial workers, collective farmers and members of the intelligentsia in recognition of their self-sacrificing and dedicated work on the labour front during the war; 199 of them had the title of Hero of Socialist Labour conferred upon them.

The unprecedented exploit of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces during the war provided a graphic vindication of Lenin's statement to the effect that "Russia is capable of producing not only the individual heroes... Russia would produce such heroes ... by the hundreds and thousands".¹ The torch of mass heroism is handed from generation to generation, and this clearly shows that the revolution and its defence is the common concern of all Soviet men and women.

The Soviet Army and Navy have borrowed everything that is progressive from the pre-revolutionary combat past of the Russian people, from the heritage of their struggle against foreign invaders down the centuries. From the men of the Russian Army and Navy they have inherited their valour, courage and staunchness in battle, their comradeship-in-arms and *esprit de corps*, and their utter loyalty to the Motherland, and they have given these qualities a new, revolutionary dimension.

Fed by the revolutionary, labour and military exploits of the Soviet people, and based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces continue to develop. These traditions have a noble and progressive character and a powerfully inspiring impact, all of which makes them a highly effective tool for educating the men of the Soviet Armed Forces. Dear to all the Soviet people, and the Army and Navy personnel, these traditions include: total commitment to the great cause of communism and constant readiness to fight to the last drop of blood for its triumph; boundless love for the Communist Party, for the socialist Motherland and the Soviet people; loyalty to the oath of allegiance and military duty; mass heroism; love for one's unit or warship; loyalty to the regimental Colours and the ship's Flag; comradeship-in-arms; respect for and protection of one's commander and comrades in action; and a striving to improve the standard of one's combat skill, to widen one's

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 400.

knowledge of military and political science, to strengthen military discipline, and to keep the combat preparedness of one's unit or ship at a high level. It has become a tradition with the men of the Soviet Armed Forces to be vigilant over the imperialists' unceasing intrigues and aggressive designs and to resolutely oppose the enemies of the Soviet Motherland, the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, all enemies of peace and progress, and all enemies of democracy and socialism. At the same time, the men of the Soviet Armed Forces are educated to respect the sovereign rights of the peoples of other countries, and to be loyal to proletarian internationalism.

A more recent tradition developed by the Soviet Armed Forces is combat alliance with the armies of other socialist nations. This alliance expresses the class and ideological unity of the officers and men of the fraternal armies, their high sense of internationalist duty, and a complete identity of interests in safeguarding the gains of socialism from the intrigues and schemes of international reaction.

The military traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces, which were born in battles against the enemies of the socialist revolution and multiplied in their subsequent heroic deeds, have become a moral law governing life in the Soviet Army and Navy and a powerful way of developing the officers' and men's high moral, political and fighting qualities.

Marx, Engels and Lenin attached great importance to educating the younger generation on the basis of the rich heritage of traditions developed by the people. They took the view that it was important, for the future of the revolution and indeed for the future of the working class, for the older generation to hand down their experience to the younger generation so that the youth could add to this experience and develop it. Lenin urged the younger generation of Soviet Russia to follow the example of the revolutionaries who fought against tsarist autocracy and who made the Great October Socialist Revolution; "follow in their footsteps and emulate their courage and heroism".¹ About the glorious deeds of the preceding generation, he wrote that "these examples of struggle must serve as a beacon for us in training up new generations of fighters".²

The Communist Party, undeviatingly following Lenin's behests, has been paying unflagging attention to educating the Soviet people and the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy on the basis of the rich legacy of progressive traditions developed by our socialist society, an integral organic component of which is military traditions. The Communist Party sees this as an effective way of raising the level of consciousness among the builders of communism and of training and educating efficient defenders of the country who are utterly devoted to the Communist Party and the people.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 168.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, p. 62.

Military traditions are given to the men of the Soviet Armed Forces during their service and during exercises on land, at sea and in the air, during sessions in the class-rooms and during practice on the firing ranges and tank training grounds. The officers and men are continually developing a high level of political awareness, courage and staunchness and they are acquiring an intimate knowledge of their jobs and improving their fighting skills.

The younger generation's education in the spirit of military traditions is greatly helped by excursions to the scene of past battles during which the men of the Soviet Army and Navy covered themselves with unfading glory. Another effective way of educating the men of the Soviet Armed Forces is regular meetings with veterans of past wars and heroes of labour, during which the veterans share their reminiscences and talk about the heroic deeds performed by the officers and men of different arms and services on the various fronts during the Great Patriotic War; about the exploits of the partisans and underground workers, who operated behind enemy lines; and about the dedicated self-sacrificing work of steel-smelters and oilmen, of building workers and of collective farmers, who forged the weapons of victory and supplied the army in the field with food, clothing and other essentials.

Cultivating military traditions and educating the men of the Soviet Armed Forces on the basis of the rich heritage of fighting traditions is not only a matter of re-creating the heroism displayed by the older Soviet generation during past wars, but also a matter of maintaining the continuity of generations and of reminding the younger generation of their responsibility for adding to their historical legacy. The most important task facing the younger generation is to preserve and multiply what was achieved in the past, and to borrow from that past all that is valuable and useful.

The inspiring influence of traditions is greatest when they are constantly enriched by new exploits of Soviet people and of the Army and Navy personnel. Enriched in this way these traditions retain their relevance and are in tune with the spirit of the times and with the situation in which the Soviet servicemen discharge their duty to their country. Officers and men of every arm and service of the Armed Forces add new traditions to the rich heritage of past military traditions, giving them special new features arising from the changed character of their activities and missions. There are many units and warships in the Soviet Army and Navy whose combat record contains peace-time exploits and successes. Even those units which came into being after the end of the last war have developed their own traditions during their combat training and stand-by duty.

In educating the Armed Forces personnel it is essential to ensure that every soldier or sailor is told all about his particular regiment's or warship's combat record upon joining. He should also be told about its heroes and decorations, about its victories during the war and its successes during combat training in peace time. It is essential to ensure that every soldier and officer takes pride in his particular

regiment or warship, and by his own work and conduct upholds its honour wherever he may be. A good knowledge of the combat record of their regiment or warship improves the morale of the personnel and makes them proud of their particular military collective and helps them discharge their military duty in an exemplary way and be loyal to the regimental Colours or the ship's Flag and their Oath of Allegiance.

Observing military rituals promotes military traditions and enhances their educational role. The taking of the Oath of Allegiance in a solemn and uplifting setting, trooping the regimental Colours, unfurling the ship's Flag, the ceremony of changing the guards, march-past ceremonies and reviews, and evening roll-calls, all have a potent influence on the men's psychology and a great emotional impact. This means a lot to them. Lenin wrote that "there has never been, nor can there be, any human *search* for truth without 'human emotions'".¹

When experiencing a powerful emotional uplift, the young soldiers are more acutely aware of their honourable duty as defenders of the socialist Motherland and they feel that they too must perform feats of heroism, so as to add to the glory of their particular unit or warship, and in the final count to the glory of the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole. Great patriotic fervour is generated during ceremonies and other solemn occasions; during talks given by commanding officers on the combat record of the unit or warship, especially if illustrated by maps; during visits to war museums and memorials put up in honour of fallen heroes and during meetings with war veterans and heroes of labour. This consolidates the men's commitment to communist ideals and helps them develop a high standard of behaviour.

In their routine service, the men of the Armed Forces consolidate old traditions and develop new ones. Striving to imitate the veterans of past wars, to borrow their courage and combat skill, and to be worthy of the fine memory of the heroes who fell in the struggle against imperialist aggressors helps the servicemen of today to master their respective military jobs, to become rated specialists and to achieve high standards in combat and political training. Many units and warships have attained the high distinction of "excellent" several times in succession, and have achieved stable excellent results in training and service. It is the duty of every commander, political officer, and Party and Komsomol organisation in the Armed Forces to develop and consolidate these fine traditions on a permanent basis.

The correct use of military traditions as a means of training and educating military personnel goes a long way towards achieving an organic coalescence of high moral, political, fighting and physical qualities in the officers and men which helps them become skillful and courageous defenders of socialism.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 260.

The Soviet Army and Navy are developing on the basis of revolutionary continuity between generations. The younger generation of today are the sons and grandsons of those who fought for the Motherland with self-sacrifice and heroism, and who spared no effort in forging the weapons of victory during the last war on the labour front. The younger generation is learning from the experience of the older generation and adding to this experience as they carry the torch with honour and dignity. The glorious combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces induce the soldiers and sailors of today to perform their duties to the best of their abilities, continually improving their combat skills and knowledge so as to be better able to create the new and to add to the old.

THE SOVIET OFFICERS

The victories scored by the Soviet Armed Forces and their present fighting power have in large measure been a derivative of the high standard of their officers. It is impossible to build and develop an army without a sufficiently large number of well-trained commanders, political officers, engineers and technicians. This goes without saying. The officers form the basis, the backbone, of the Army and Navy. A lot of the combat preparedness and fighting efficiency of units and warships depends upon the standard of the officers' training, their moral and political qualities and their efficiency. The Communist Party is aware of this and has been concentrating on training and educating its officers.

**1. The Soviet Officer
Is the True Servant of His People**

To be a member of the Soviet officer corps is a high privilege and honour. The Soviet officer's duties are highly responsible and his noble work is very essential. The Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people greatly value this work. The Soviet people hold Army and Navy officers in great esteem for their dedicated service to the Motherland and for the self-sacrificing way in which they discharge their military duty.

Soviet officers are a reliable mainstay of the Communist Party and Soviet Government in the Army and Navy as they are the custodians of the forces' class, revolutionary and military spirit, and combat traditions. They are the treasury of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Communist Party and Soviet Government guide every aspect of life in the country's Armed Forces through the medium of military councils, commanders, political bodies and Party organisations and through all the officers. The officers educate their men in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism and of commitment to communist ideals. They instill in the servicemen a love for military service, train them to operate sophisticated weapons and hardware and teach

them battlefield tactics. They mould fine moral and fighting qualities in their men and help them develop a high sense of discipline, and in so doing maintain strict order and good organisation in their units and warships. The meaning of the commanders', political officers', engineers' and technicians' work in the Army and Navy is, in the final count, to continually enhance the fighting efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces and keep their combat readiness on a high level.

The Soviet officer corps was created by the Communist Party under Lenin's guidance. It has emerged from the trials and crucible of battles against imperialist aggressors with flying colours. Throughout the Soviet state's history, the officer corps has retained its total commitment to the ideals of communism and its loyalty to the people and its socialist Motherland.

In the incredibly difficult conditions prevailing in the formative years of the Soviet state, in the struggle against foreign interventionist troops and White Guards, the Communist Party steadily built up the Red Army and trained commanders and political workers. This work was made more difficult by the fact that the young Soviet state had to do several things at the same time: train, educate, select and deploy a large number of cadres for the Party, Soviet and economic management apparatus and do so quickly and at once. Emphasising the crucial importance of training skilled personnel and cadres, Lenin wrote: "The success of the Russian and world socialist revolution depends on the degree of energy the workers display in running the state and commanding the army of working and exploited people fighting to overthrow the rule of capital."¹

Lenin taught that cadres given proper training are the decisive force at the command of the Party and the Soviet state in building socialism and strengthening the country's defence capability. Without well-trained and dedicated personnel, no policy, however good and sound, no solutions and answers, however timely and fortunate, will ever have the desired effect in terms of accomplishing tasks and goals. Success in any sphere depends above all on the capacity and skill of the managers in putting a Party programme across to the masses and in organising them in carrying it out.

Lenin's principles on the decisive role played by managerial personnel fully apply to the officer corps of the Soviet Armed Forces. These principles have been borne out by the entire experience of Soviet military development.

The Soviet officer corps grew and developed together with the Armed Forces. Depending on concrete historical conditions, the state of the Army and Navy, the level of their technical arsenal, and the organisational structure and quality of the military personnel, different approaches were employed to train commanders, political officers, engineers and technicians, and to establish their service, duties, rights, privileges, and pay. The record of the Soviet Armed Forces is a history of continuous qualitative improvement in the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 95.

officer corps, its growing maturity and an increase in its ideological and fighting qualities. In the fierce class battles against the White Guards and the foreign interventionist troops, the Red Army units gained combat experience and steeling, as the Red officers,¹ who had just been assigned to command them by the Communist Party, learned the art of war. Most of the latter had no previous experience of things military and no military education. To them, the field of battle was at the same time a school offering basic training and a military academy.

Quite often battalion and regimental commanders and even divisional commanders were young men aged 20-25. The commanders of whole armies and even fronts were not much older. Their lack of command experience was made up by their boundless loyalty to the revolution, their personal courage and staunchness on the battlefield, and the active support they had from the rank and file.

In the early stages of the formation of the Soviet Armed Forces commanding posts in the Army and Navy were often held by Party workers and politically advanced industrial workers who had gained rudimentary military and combat experience in the ranks of the Red Guard, and also by the limited numbers of officers who were members of the Communist Party. At the same time revolutionary soldiers and sailors—privates, seamen, ensigns and petty officers—were promoted to commanding posts. But this was not enough for building a really mass army. The mobilisation of former NCOs failed to meet the need for commanders as did the influx of hundreds and thousands of patriotic officers and generals from the old Russian Army who volunteered to serve in the revolutionary army. What was required was a well-organised system of centres for training new commanders from among workers and peasants. In his address to the participants of a march-past of students of military courses on November 24, 1918, Lenin said: "Most of the old officers were the spoiled and depraved darling sons of capitalists, who had nothing in common with the private soldier. So in building our new army now, we must draw our officers solely from among the people. Only Red officers will have any respect among the soldiers and be able to strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible."²

And so the Communist Party chose this way of training officers for the new army as the only correct and sound one in the circumstances. In December 1917, on Lenin's instructions, the First Moscow Revolutionary Machine-Gun School of Command Personnel was set up. Later in different cities of Russia a far-flung network of courses and schools for the training of commanders and political workers for the Army and Navy began to be set up. In Petrograd a military school for the training of naval command personnel opened in 1919. The Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasised in the

¹ Name given to Red Army officers in the years following the October Revolution.—*Ed.*

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 195.

information sheets setting out the conditions for enrolment at military courses and schools which were distributed to local Party organisations that "only workers and working peasants dedicated to Soviet power can train as Red officers for it was their power and their Red Army and Red officers should be of the workers and peasants".

New military academies were set up, while old ones were restructured. The General Staff Academy, later renamed the Frunze Military Academy, was the first top-level military institution to come into being. Shortly afterwards, other military academies were opened in quick succession, including artillery, engineer, naval, medical and logistics academies.

At the same time as efforts were being made to establish a network of military training centres within the country's interior, command personnel training centres were opened in the areas where Red Army units operated; these took the form of front, army and divisional courses.

The graduates of the Party's early military training centres made a weighty contribution to the achievement of victory over the foreign interventionist troops and internal counter-revolutionaries and later helped in the subsequent development and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In training commanders from among workers and peasants, the Party drew heavily on the experience of military specialists of the old tsarist army. Many of them, on Lenin's initiative, were recalled from retirement and joined the Red Army. This measure fully justified itself. In his address to the First All-Russia Conference on Party Work in the Countryside, in November 1919, Lenin said: "You have heard of the series of brilliant victories won by the Red Army. There are tens of thousands of old colonels and officers of other ranks in that army and if we had not accepted them in our service and made them serve us, we could not have created an army."¹

The majority of the officers from the old army honestly served the Soviet Republic of workers and peasants upon joining the Red Army. Much of the credit for winning them over to the side of Soviet power goes to the military commissars who, working in close collaboration with the old officers, helped them gain a correct understanding of the great events, overcome their vacillation and hesitation, and in the end find their place in their people's struggle for social emancipation.

Thus, the Party, in the incredibly difficult circumstances created by the armed foreign intervention and the Civil War, solved the problem of quickly training command personnel of a new, socialist type by making use of every available opportunity: mobilising Party workers, promoting advanced workers, revolutionary soldiers, sailors and NCOs to commanding posts, training workers and peasants to be commanders through command and political schools and enlisting the services of officers from the old tsarist army. In so doing, the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 147.

Communist Party proved for all to see that the people were an inexhaustible mine of military talent, that they were fully capable of providing gifted commanders to lead the army of the victorious workers and peasants and to successfully defend the socialist Motherland. From among the people came commanders and political workers who, as they matured and gained experience, developed into outstanding military leaders and excellent organisers of Party and political work among the troops. Their names are well known: M. V. Frunze, S. M. Budyonny, K. Y. Voroshilov, V. K. Blukher, S. S. Vostretsov, P. Y. Dybenko, A. I. Yegorov, S. K. Timoshenko, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, Y. F. Fabricius, I. F. Fedko and I. E. Yakir. The Soviet people revere the memory of heroes from the Civil War whose names have since become legendary: V. I. Chapayev, G. I. Kotovsky, N. A. Shchors, A. Y. Parkhomenko, S. G. Lazo and others.

The new commanders and political workers of the Red Army were noted for their revolutionary enthusiasm and fervour, their total commitment to communism, their original military talent, boldness, self-sacrifice, their firmness in fighting to accomplish the goal, and their close identification with the rank and file whose interests they shared. These features, typical of commanders and political workers during the Civil War, were developed and enriched between the wars and during the Great Patriotic War. These features are typical of the moral and fighting make-up of the Soviet officers of today.

Following the victorious conclusion of the Civil War, the training of command personnel for the Armed Forces continued to be an overriding preoccupation with the Communist Party and its Central Committee. The training of command personnel was a subject of discussion at the 10th and 11th Congresses of the Communist Party and at many plenary meetings of its Central Committee and meetings of the Political Bureau. A series of resolutions were adopted by the Central Committee and the Soviet Government on expanding the network of military training institutions, on improving the training of command personnel, on increasing the number of Party members and those with worker backgrounds among the commanders, on improving their Marxist-Leninist education and their military and special training and on other matters.

The implementation of these resolutions amounted to a restructuring and re-organisation of the entire network of military training institutions. Crash courses for future command personnel were eliminated and replaced by a unified network of schools, training medium-level commanders for the Army. The network of naval schools was expanded. Study programmes and curricula were improved and refined, and the teaching staffs at military training institutions reinforced. To improve the qualification of command personnel, a variety of refresher courses were opened. Political instructors were trained from among platoon commanders who had graduated from military schools. Commanders and other leaders went to military academies where they received higher military and

specialised education. Political workers in the top echelon began attending the Military Political Academy which was set up in 1925.

These measures improved the standard of military and political training for command personnel of the Army and Navy and improved their social composition. In 1928, 72 per cent of all commanders in the Army and Navy had worker and peasant backgrounds and about 53 per cent were Party and Komsomol members. Over 90 per cent of the commanders had specialised military education.

In the thirties, because of the deteriorating international situation and the increased threat of military attack from the imperialists, the Communist Party had to increase the numerical strength of the Armed Forces, with emphasis on the armour, artillery and Air Force and, therefore, adopted a policy aimed at re-equipping the Army and Navy with new weapons and material. This involved more complex tasks in training command personnel. There was an increased demand for commanders and political workers with a good knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, with complete competence in the military and technical aspects of military work and who were capable of training and educating the rank and file with skill and efficiency in the changed conditions prevailing at the time.

In view of the more exacting requirements and demands made on the standards of command personnel, the country's military academies were restructured, and the network of middle-echelon military training institutions and refresher training courses for command personnel was expanded.

Military schools offering two- or three-year training were set up on the basis of existing military training centres. To improve the training of command personnel and engineers with a higher education, a number of military academies were opened, including a Military Mechanisation and Motorisation Academy, a Military Electrical Engineering Academy, a Military Chemistry Academy and some others. In 1939, the country had a total of 14 military academies and 109 military schools.

The Soviet Government's decision to introduce personal military ranks to be awarded to members of the command personnel was of great importance in further strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces. For them the military profession was a life-time occupation. In the new situation military ranks were expected to reflect the level of qualifications possessed by commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians and to provide more attractive opportunities for promotion. This enhanced the prestige of command personnel, made them more stable and provided new incentives and inducements for them to improve their level of competence and military knowledge. It had a beneficial effect on the entire system of training and educating military cadres. Military ranks were awarded to members of the command personnel in 1936.

When the Second World War broke out and as the flames of war approached the Soviet Union's borders the Party adopted new measures to improve the training of military cadres. The network of

military training institutions was expanded, enrolment quotas were increased, and forms and methods of training and education were improved.

In 1941, the Soviet Union had a total of 203 military schools with a student body of about 240,000. In addition, military training was offered by 19 military academies, 10 military training departments attached to the country's higher educational institutions and by seven higher naval schools. This was of tremendous importance for strengthening the country's defence potential and for raising the Armed Forces' level of combat preparedness.

By the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Army and Navy had enough commanders, political workers and technical specialists, who had high moral, political and fighting qualities and who were utterly dedicated to the socialist Motherland.

The Great Patriotic War was a grim test of the quality of the Soviet officer corps. In the trying and extremely complicated conditions prevailing during the opening stages of the war, the command personnel, in directing the defensive battles against the nazi invaders who had superiority in manpower and equipment, displayed courage, heroism and self-sacrifice. They had a will to win and used skill in exercising troop control in the highly complicated and unfavourable battlefield conditions.

Subsequently, during offensive operations, the Soviet officers displayed their full professional skill and high moral and fighting qualities. As they gained fighting experience, they controlled the troops with steadily growing confidence and firmness, their decisions and solutions were marked by a growing degree of maturity and soundness which enabled them to carry out operations with greater skill and in some cases resulted in the encirclement and rout of large enemy groupings.

During the war, the Communist Party continued to do a great deal to train military cadres, and to educate them and deploy them efficiently and sensibly. The Party sent its best sons to do important jobs in the Army and Navy. Within a short space of time the number of military training institutions was increased and the entire system of military training was restructured to meet the exigencies of the military situation, training programmes and curricula were revised, a number of new disciplines were added, and the length of training changed.

Apart from training middle-echelon commanders and political workers in the army and naval schools, they were also trained at special courses offering crash programmes for junior lieutenants and junior political instructors. These were attached to the fronts, armies and military districts. There were also refresher courses for the command personnel. Certain fronts set up military political schools.

In the army in the field, the more deserving and better trained NCOs and enlisted men who displayed heroism and an ability to command their particular elements were commissioned. Towards the

end of the war many of them were in command of units as large as regiments.

The training of top-echelon commanders, political workers and engineers in the Army and Navy took place at military academies and on higher-level courses.

To raise the authority of military cadres and to give them a high sense of responsibility for the performance of their military duty, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued decrees on July 24 and on August 10, 1943, introducing a new procedure for the award of ranks to the military personnel. The command personnel of the Army and Navy began to be called officers.

The measures taken by the Communist Party and Government helped to solve the problem of training adequate numbers of military cadres, and starting from late 1942 the Soviet Army and Navy did not experience an acute shortage of officers. What is more, by the autumn of 1943 it was possible to begin transferring a proportion of the commanders, political workers and engineers to the reserve and send them to do jobs in the country's industry. The availability of an officer reserve made it possible to lengthen the term of training at military schools and academies and to enlist the services of commanders, political workers and engineers with a wealth of fighting experience to work as teachers.

During the war years the Communist Party trained and educated a brilliant galaxy of military leaders and thousands of courageous and efficient officers who subsequently performed heroic deeds that immortalised them. The Soviet people and the Communist Party thought very highly of the military skill, courage, heroism and self-sacrifice displayed by Soviet officers. Hundreds of thousands of officers were decorated with orders and medals, while 6,437 of them had the title of Hero of the Soviet Union conferred upon them.

The major factors which enabled the Soviet people to win victory over Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan included traits in members of the Soviet officer corps such as their organising talent, their political maturity, their utter devotion to the socialist Motherland and their high standard of professional training.

The Great Patriotic War was an acid test of the soundness and validity of the system of training and educating commanders, political workers and engineers adopted in the Soviet Armed Forces. The country's military schools, courses and academies successfully coped with their respective tasks.

During the war, the various military schools and academies trained some two million officers of all ranks for the Army and Navy. These officers fully justified the confidence of the Party and the people. On the field of battle they proved their clear superiority over the officers of Hitler's Wehrmacht.

The Soviet officer corps emerged from the crucible of the last war stronger, more mature and wiser with a wealth of fighting experience. The officers of the Soviet Army and Navy fully mastered the theory and practice of planning and conducting engagements and operations

of any size and on any scale. They demonstrated a high level of skill in leading troops in both offensive and defensive operations, during hot pursuit of the retreating enemy, whilst wiping out encircled enemy groupings, during manoeuvring and during assault crossing of major rivers. By setting a personal example of bold action and by passionate word they fired their men with enthusiasm, mobilising them to accomplish missions and led them into battle with confidence.

The wealth of fighting experience gained by Soviet officers during the Great Patriotic War has been placed at the disposal of subsequent generations of Soviet officers and is an invaluable asset in officer training.

The titanic work done by Lenin and the Communist Party in creating an officer corps for the army of a new type, their daily concern for training and educating ideologically mature commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians, who were competent in the military and technical respects, have borne rich fruit.

Total commitment to the proletarian revolution, devotion to the socialist Motherland and the Soviet people, the ability to exercise skilful troop control in peace-time and on the battlefield, these and other fine qualities have been displayed by members of the Soviet officer corps throughout its entire history. The same qualities are typical of Soviet officers today. The Soviet officers' constant striving to dedicate their knowledge, experience and energies to further improving the Army's and Navy's combat preparedness and to strengthening the country's defence potential have earned them the Soviet people's affection, respect and complete confidence.

2. Modern Requirements for Officer Training

The system of officer training which was set up by the Communist Party continued to develop in the post-war period. A number of new top-echelon military schools for training command and political personnel have been opened. The network of military engineering schools has been expanded substantially to increase the strength and proportion of engineers among the Soviet Armed Forces' personnel. The length of training has been revised at all military schools, their curricula and specialisation profiles have been refined and modified. Uniform requirements have been introduced for the upkeep and accommodation of the students. The conditions for enlisting the services of teachers for military schools have been improved and refresher courses for teachers opened at military academies. A large number of textbooks and manuals have been published and various technical aids introduced.

Military schools and academies have been coping with their tasks well and have been training competent commanders, political workers and engineers for the Army and Navy.

At the moment the Soviet Armed Forces have officers who are

politically mature, totally committed to the Communist Party and the people and who have an excellent knowledge of every aspect of military science and technology. They are well trained to perform their highly responsible functions and duties. Significantly, about 90 per cent of the officers in the Soviet Army and Navy are Party and Komsomol members. Almost all the brigade commanders, and commanders of larger units, over 90 per cent of regimental commanders and a hundred per cent of captains commodores have a higher military education. On the whole, some 50 per cent of all officers have a higher military or a specialised military education.

Members of the Soviet command personnel are well trained in every aspect of battlefield tactics and strategy and have a good deal of experience. A more recent feature of the officer corps is its increasingly younger average age. Many of the officers who were born after the Great Patriotic War are in command of companies, batteries, Air Force squadrons, battalions and warships.

The officers of the Soviet Army and Navy are the flesh and bone of the Soviet working class, collective-farm peasantry and intelligentsia. They are fully alive to the great importance of what the country, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have entrusted them with, and they are discharging their military and civic duty with honour and dignity. Soviet commanders, political workers and engineers realise that military theory and practice never stand still and so they work unflinchingly to keep abreast of the latest advances and developments in the military field which make more exacting demands on the officer. Modern warfare, with the employment of sophisticated weapons and military hardware, is a war of manoeuvre and dynamic operations which impose great strain on human endurance and moral fibre. It is an acid test of the morale of the entire military personnel.

In a possible future war, should the imperialist reactionaries unleash it, the formidable military and economic potential of the belligerents will be brought to bear, a variety of weaponry will be employed, both known and hitherto unknown types which may yet be developed. Military operations and engagements will involve sharp changes from one type of action to another, a vast scale, sudden twists in the situation, rapid deterioration of crisis situations and a need to accomplish missions and tasks that arise suddenly without warning. The time factor will be far more important and troop control will be more difficult to exercise. These and other new qualities of modern warfare are all taken into account during the training of Soviet officers.

The Soviet officer is primarily a leader and military specialist. And so the entire process of officer training is designed to develop those qualities which fully meet the general requirements set by the Party for managerial personnel.

L. I. Brezhnev, speaking at a nation-wide rally of students in October 1971, gave a graphic description of the qualities every Soviet specialist must strive to acquire, when he said: "The Soviet specialist

of today is one who has mastered the basic Marxist-Leninist theory, who clearly understands the Party's and the country's political objectives, has a solid scientific and practical grounding and is highly proficient in his field.

"The Soviet specialist of today is an able organiser, capable of applying the principles of scientific organisation of labour in practice, who can be co-operative with his subordinates, appreciative of collective experience and of his colleagues' views, and critically appraising the achievements made.

"And, above all, the modern specialist has a high cultural level and broad erudition; in short, he is a full-fledged intellectual of the new, socialist society."¹

The Soviet officer is expected to acquire the same qualities. But military service is a very special kind of work. It is subject to strict regimentation, and involves great responsibility, risk and hazards. Besides, it makes very special demands on the officers. Generally speaking, we could summarise the general and specific requirements to be met by Soviet officers as follows.

Above all, Soviet officers must be *totally committed to communist ideals and be utterly devoted to the Communist Party and the Soviet people*. A Soviet officer is an active exponent and implementer of Party policy and as such he must propagate the ideas of the Communist Party among his men, conduct political education work, meet his men on a systematic basis to give talks on topics of the moment and conduct political education sessions explaining in plain terms the decisions and policies adopted by the Party. He is expected to set an example of an honest and conscientious way of serving the country, to be loyal to his military duty and be ready at any moment to dedicate all his strength, knowledge and energy to fighting for the Party's cause and, if need be, to sacrifice his life.

Secondly, the Soviet officer is expected to *show a high sense of discipline, and be efficient in carrying out the orders of his superiors*. In either peace or war-time, no Soviet officer can be up to mark without powers of concentration, and a readiness and ability to carry out his superior's order to the letter and with dispatch, honesty and integrity. A well-disciplined officer can concentrate his will, be courageous and be persistent and act under any difficult circumstances with determination to bring an engagement to a victorious conclusion.

Thirdly, the Soviet officer is expected to *display initiative and be able to act on his own*. These qualities are of particular value to all servicemen but especially so to officers. Any engagement inevitably requires the fighting officer to make decisions on his own and to act accordingly. Without initiative one cannot hope to win. Initiative implies readiness to take calculated risks and to be courageous in the true and finest sense of the term which is more than just derring-do.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1972, p. 429 (in Russian).

Initiative and an ability to act on one's own have maximum effect when combined rationally on the basis of a high sense of responsibility and consciousness, an intimate knowledge and an imaginative approach to the task in hand. An officer's freedom to act on his own when carrying out his mission is naturally circumscribed by the framework of his rights and duties. But there is unlimited scope for reasonable initiative and energy in the Soviet Armed Forces.

Fourthly, the Soviet officer must *exercise his will as commander and be a good manager of his men*. In the complex conditions of war-time, the commander's firmness in taking decisions and acting upon them is of first importance, as well as his ability to organise his men and make them act with determination in the way he considers best for accomplishing the mission, however difficult the battlefield situation may be.

A strong will, good organisation, a businesslike attitude and persistence in reaching the set goal — these qualities are indispensable to a Soviet officer. No flabbiness, vacillation, indecision and bungling inefficiency can be tolerated. Once he has received an order, a really efficient commander will do his utmost to carry it out and no difficulty and obstacles will shake his will. Apart from a strong will, an efficient commander possesses good organising abilities and an ability to evaluate a mission, find the best ways of accomplishing it, deploy the available manpower and material rationally and co-ordinate and provide adequate support for his troops on the battlefield.

The fifth requirement is that the Soviet officer should have *the benefit of highly qualified professional training, have a good general education and an intimate knowledge of military technology*. Profound changes are taking place in the military field. Most young men joining the army today have a good general education. They have to master sophisticated weapons and military hardware in a short time which means that the officers must have a good general scientific grounding and be versed in every aspect of military science. An officer must be proficient in battlefield tactics, and he must have complete mastery of weapons and equipment. It is essential to help young officers develop their operational and tactical thinking, their ability to analyse the situation in depth, predict the course of events, foresee the outcome of engagements and develop the ability to plan to meet any contingency and any twist in the battlefield situation.

Finally, the Soviet officer *must be fully versed in educational techniques*. The country entrusts officers with its most valuable asset — its young men. The officer is duty bound to educate and train them in peace-time and in the event of a war to lead them into battle. Therefore, young officers must be equipped with sound efficient methods of working with the rank and file. Only those officers who have mastered Marxist-Leninist methodology, who have an intimate knowledge of the principles and methods of political and military education, who have a good knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology, who take each of their men's personal characteristics into account, and who are able to competently organise training

sessions and practice at a level which accords with the precepts of military art will successfully cope with their duties. Such officers are genuine mentors for the rank and file, they are wise and sensitive counsellors in dealing with the complex problems of life. Such officers show a considerate attitude to their men but at the same time they are exacting and strict as officers should be.

The ability to train and educate the rank and file is all important because the Soviet Army and Navy are not just training military specialists but above all they are training courageous and conscious men, strong in body and spirit, and capable of discharging their civic and social duty in any sphere in the building of communism. Those who have gone through the school of military service can be fully relied upon in constructive labour in peace-time and in the event of war. The Soviet Armed Forces, in assuring the security of the USSR, are creating conditions for the successful building of communism in this country and are contributing to this great cause by educating and training the country's younger generation and by helping them acquire qualities that are indispensable to the builders of communism.

Thus a combination of ideological conviction, commander's will, a reasonable but strict exacting attitude to oneself and one's subordinates, organising ability, general cultural attainments, and a good knowledge of tactics, a broad outlook in the technical field of military art is indispensable to every Soviet officer if he is to cope with his responsible duties.

There is only one way to ensure that one acquire these qualities and that one is well prepared for performing the responsible and complex tasks facing one in the Army and Navy. It is to remember and follow undeviatingly Lenin's behest to the effect that one should learn the art of war and study military science in a serious way. Soviet officers are undeviatingly following this behest of the great leader and are working hard mastering the art of war wherever they may be: at military academies, with the troops in the field, on firing ranges and tank-firing ground, in the air during flights and at sea during cruises. When they graduate from their military schools and academies Soviet officers do not stop their education. Throughout their subsequent service with the troops they keep on studying and perfecting their knowledge. Today, with the continuous improvement in weapons and military hardware and when new forms and techniques of military operations are being developed, only those officers who continually study hard, who add to their stock of knowledge and who apply that knowledge are able to keep abreast of the times. The Soviet Armed Forces give officers every opportunity to do this.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government have elevated the status of officers, entrusted them with the training and education of Soviet soldiers, given them the right to issue orders to subordinates, to lead them into battle and to send them on the most difficult and hazardous missions. The rank and file obey their officers implicitly and are very aware of their military duty; they follow their officers

and are prepared to give and do give their lives to ensure the triumph of the cause of the Party and the Soviet people.

The right to issue orders does not just imply power, it also implies a high sense of responsibility. To have power is not everything. The point is to use it sensibly. This is where the officer's exacting attitude to himself comes to the fore. Without a keen sense of his responsibility, without a high sense of inner discipline, without a critical attitude to himself and constant self-control, no officer can hope to become a real commander, capable of educating his men with skill and consideration. In issuing orders and instructions to his subordinates a Soviet officer must himself be ready to carry out any order of his superior.

The Soviet people mostly regard the officer's high level of training as a guarantee that the Soviet Army will reliably protect the socialist Motherland. But it is not enough to be well versed in military art. A commander, political worker and technical specialist are expected to provide good examples of moral purity, probity, faultless discipline, good organisation and a high level of general cultural attainments. Unless an officer sets a personal example for his subordinates to follow he loses the moral right to expect respect from them. The officer's personal example is the chief instrument and major condition for his discharging his own duties and for influencing his men. One other factor of major importance in this context is that the officer is able to build proper relationships, to establish good rapport with his men, and is able to cement his particular unit by relying on Party and Komsomol organisations.

The point here is to continually combine, on the one hand, an exacting attitude to one's men and persistence in working to accomplish one's mission with, on the other, a considerate attitude and friendly treatment towards one's subordinates. Those officers who are able to issue well-defined orders or instructions and see to it that they are carried out to the letter and at the same time are able to listen to the arguments of his subordinates and take their opinion into account win the respect and affection of their men.

There are so many different and subtle facets to the relationships between the officer and his men that his skill as an educator is a matter of knowing these facets and feeling them keenly. This alone guarantees that exactingness and strictness in dealing with his subordinates is not replaced by rudeness while good fellowship does not degenerate into a hail-fellow-well-met relationship. Constant contact with his subordinates enables the officer to keep his hand on the pulse of their changing moods, to influence his men in desired ways and to give them patriotic motivations and a sense of friendship and comradeship-in-arms.

To be sure no one can provide "prescriptions" to cover every event and every situation that may arise in this highly complex field of army life. What we can do is identify dominant trends. And one of the dominant trends here is the spiritual kinship between the commander and his subordinates.

Soviet officers and men share the same ideology and aspirations. They are cemented by their Marxist-Leninist world outlook into a single close-knit family and they have a common aspiration and goal in the triumph of communism. The overriding preoccupation of every officer should be correct relations between officers and the rank and file based on the relevant regulations, on political maturity, on class unity, on deep respect for one another and on common aspirations and desire to discharge one's military duty to the best of one's ability.

The fact that an officer is a commander does not mean he does not make mistakes. The important thing, however, is to be able to see where one has gone wrong and to have enough courage to admit the mistakes and to rectify them. This in no way detracts from the commander's prestige and authority. There is nothing humiliating in being able to admit that one has made a mistake. On the contrary, this shows that one takes a very human and responsible attitude to one's job. Only those who do nothing do not make mistakes. The important thing is to ensure that one does not go wrong too often and when one does that one is able to act quickly to rectify one's mistakes.

The relationships between commanding officers and their subordinates in the Soviet Army and Navy are based on high-mindedness and honesty. Soviet officers are intolerant towards any attempts at eye-wash, and any attempts to embellish the real state of affairs. Every Soviet officer must have communist intolerance towards shortcomings and indifference; a strict sense of Party responsibility for the job one has been assigned; an intimate knowledge of the state of affairs among the troops; an ability to react quickly to changes in the situation and to adopt appropriate decisions quickly; an ability to work with the masses; close contact with the men during exercises, practice on firing ranges and sessions in the classroom; an ability to make a systematic check-up and analysis of what has been done; an ability to take immediate action to rectify mistakes that have come to light; and an ability to look ahead.

The Soviet officer corps is continually rejuvenating itself through the regular influx of "fresh blood". This is fully in line with the Party's Leninist principle of selecting and deploying personnel. The Report of the Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU stated: "The aim of our cadre policy is to promote young, promising functionaries while maintaining a considerate attitude to veteran cadres and making the maximum use of their experience and knowledge. This is a mandatory condition of the consistency of the Party political line and of its revolutionary traditions."¹

The Communist Party is implementing this policy in the Armed Forces as well. Apart from drawing on the wealth of experience and expertise of the older generation of Soviet officers, especially of those who went through the crucible of the Great Patriotic War, many young officers who have distinguished themselves in practical work are promoted to positions of leadership on a regular basis. Needless to

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 119.

say a young age in itself is not the principal criterion for assessing an officer's ability and performance. The important thing is his efficiency as a professional and his moral and political qualities.

The replacement of generations, the influx of young officers and the retirement of those who have attained maximum age are an immutable law governing life in the Armed Forces. That is why it is important for young commanders, political workers and engineers to assimilate the experience of their older colleagues more quickly and for officers of the older generation to share their experience with the young ones, meet them more often and introduce them to the subtleties of the commander's job.

Initially, the young officer encounters certain difficulties and problems and may not always have a clear understanding of every aspect of his work. Naturally, these problems and difficulties worry him and he looks for answers but is not always able to find them on his own. Such an officer must be helped by his senior colleagues. Every care should be taken, however, to avoid rushing to extremes: the lack of any control over a young officer's activities is just as harmful as keeping him in tight rein amounting to petty tutelage. Combat training and the whole army routine create an atmosphere which stimulates young officers to use their initiative and to adopt a creative and imaginative approach to the job in hand and to make bold decisions and to act on his own if the situation demands it.

Initiative, boldness and a sense of independence—these qualities are imparted throughout the life-time of any adult. Military schools and academies, which train junior officers, play an important role in moulding these valuable qualities in the would-be officers.

The decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU and the resolution passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet session in July 1973 defined the goals in further improving the Soviet education system. Special attention was given to scientific forecasting in training cadres. New and more exacting requirements have been introduced for the country's colleges and universities. This applies to the military educational institutions. What is more, the highly complex character of officers' duties means that military academies and schools have an especially responsible task. They have to train well-educated officers who must have an intimate knowledge of their fields, broad erudition and be dedicated to the military profession.

The training of officers is organised so as to meet the requirements stemming from the dominant trends in the work of officers in the Army and Navy.

These trends include: firstly, daily work to keep the level of combat preparedness of units and warships at a high level and to organise a vigilant stand-by duty.

Secondly, to educate the subordinates in a purposeful way, to direct their combat and political training, and Party political work. The rank and file must be trained in the new techniques and introduced to new weapons and military hardware and systematically familiarised with the latest advances in the art of war.

Thirdly, to work to improve one's own political, tactical, technical and specialised knowledge, to widen one's horizons and to improve cultural attainments, in other words, to prepare oneself in every way so that one is able to accomplish today's tasks and those which may arise in the event of war.

The solid foundation for the entire work involved in training officers is Marxist-Leninist education, and the ideological and political steeling of students at military schools and academies. This calls for the teaching staff at academies and schools dealing with social sciences to be highly qualified. The departments of social science are to guide the ideological and political aspects of the training process and other aspects of the officer training.

The military academies' and schools' job in equipping Soviet officers with a good professional knowledge is varied and is becoming increasingly complex. An in-depth study of mathematics, physics, chemistry and other general disciplines is the solid basis necessary for mastering a military speciality. Officers' professional training is based on the requirements set out by the regulations and manuals and also on the specific tasks set in annual orders-of-the-day on combat, political and operational training.

Attention must be given to helping officer cadets and students at military schools and academies develop the habits and techniques of applying theoretical knowledge to practical problems. This is something they will have to do when discharging their duties with the troops. This especially concerns skill in organising practical operations, troop control and in guiding the actions of units and warships. As Lenin emphasised, "no school or university is worth anything without practical knowledge".¹

One responsible aspect of the military training institutions' work is training officer cadets and students to direct the military and political training of the rank-and-file personnel and equipping them with efficient methodological techniques and methods of conducting study sessions with their subordinates. A major factor in this work is to encourage the officer cadets and students to think creatively, to adopt an imaginative approach to solving practical problems, to develop their all-round abilities and to add to their knowledge and widen their horizons. This can only be achieved if the training process involves the students and officer cadets in original independent work.

The task facing the country's military educational institutions and the officers they train is to keep abreast of the latest advances in military science and in the art of war.

3. The Officer's Closest Helpers

While we are on the subject of the officer's work we must mention his closest helpers: the ensigns, midshipmen, and sergeants and petty officers. Being the most numerous single contingent of the command personnel, the NCOs play an important part as they are closest to the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 458.

rank-and-file soldiers and sailors on a daily basis. The battle-worthiness and combat preparedness of units and warships and the cohesion and standard training of any military unit mostly depends upon the NCOs' training and organising ability.

Until 1972, the junior command personnel were active and re-enlisted servicemen: sergeants in the army and petty officers in the navy.

For a long time the re-enlisted servicemen performed highly responsible and helpful duties. Many re-enlisted NCOs who had gained a wealth of experience in training and educating the rank and file and having fully mastered their jobs joined the Armed Forces on a permanent basis. The re-enlisted NCOs held jobs as company sergeants, acted as deputy platoon leaders, crew leaders, chiefs of radio and radar installations and filled other important posts and were able educators of their subordinates. As they gained advanced experience they dedicated all their energies and skill to maintaining the order prescribed by the regulations and to keeping the combat preparedness and battle-worthiness of their elements at a high level. But as time went by life gave rise to new challenges and their jobs began to require a better education and competence in military science and technology, a thorough grounding in political science and a higher proficiency in methods and training techniques. All this required the length of service for NCOs to be extended and their specialised training further improved.

The reduction in the length of active service for the rank and file in the Army and Navy made the training and education of enlisted personnel more difficult, as less time was available for turning them into efficient fighting men. However, the draftees in recent years have shown a marked improvement in their general educational level and in their cultural and technical competence. But a recruit does not automatically become a fighting man just by being in the Army. He is trained to be a fighting man by his commanders at all levels, including the NCOs. What is more, weapons and military hardware and the entire routine of army life become more and more complex with every year and it takes a good deal of painstaking hard work to ensure that the fresh recruits become efficient soldiers and sailors.

The junior commanders, NCOs on active duty, have been doing a good deal of useful and important work in training and educating the rank and file in the Army and Navy, in maintaining military discipline and order, and in keeping the weapons and equipment in perfect working condition. The NCOs on active duty are well trained in every aspect of their jobs and have a certain amount of practical experience of service with the troops. They are fully capable of coping with their duties. But the rather short period of their active service with the troops does not allow them to gain the sort of experience and obtain the level of professional skill that are absolutely essential today for them to perform their more responsible duties.

To keep the combat preparedness of the Soviet Army and Navy at a high level some jobs traditionally held by NCOs were taken over by members of a qualitatively new category of command personnel.

What was necessary were men with a high level of general education and specialised training, who were proficient in training methods, possessed an intimate knowledge of sophisticated weapons and military hardware and who were willing and prepared to dedicate themselves to Army and Navy service for a long time. Naturally, such junior commanders had to be trained in a special way using special facilities.

In 1972, to solve these problems the Ministry of Defence re-introduced the grades of ensigns and midshipmen and decided to set up a special network of schools offering basic training to be followed by periodic refresher training. Thus, ensigns and midshipmen are a new category of trained professional junior commanders one step removed from the officer corps.

The re-introduction of ensigns and midshipmen was a measure of major state importance and demonstrated once again the Party's and Government's concern to further strengthen the command personnel in the Army and Navy so as to enhance the country's defence capability. This matter was carefully considered by the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and by the Council of Ministers.

The grades "ensign" and "midshipman" had existed in the Russian Army and Navy for a long time. In fact ensign, as the first junior officer grade, was introduced by Peter the Great, when a regular Russian army was being formed. In 1884 the grade of ensign was abolished for peace-time and retained for reserve officers. In war-time it was awarded to graduates of ensign schools and to those who finished the crash courses offered by military schools, as well as to the more deserving members of the lower ranks so as to make up the shortage of officers.

Midshipman was the first officer grade in the Russian Navy.

Today the grades of ensign and midshipman are filled with new content. Above all, Soviet ensigns and midshipmen, are people of the new, socialist formation. Just like members of the Soviet officer corps, they are active builders of communism and staunch defenders of the Soviet people's revolutionary gains, they are utterly devoted to the Communist Party and to the Soviet people. They are fully aware of their duty as military men and citizens, are intolerant towards our class enemies and are always ready to perform a heroic deed in the name of this country. Soviet ensigns and midshipmen have already developed fine traditions of their own. These traditions are based on all that is good and typical of the Soviet officer corps, including unshakable ideological conviction, political awareness, socialist patriotism and internationalism, excellent professional knowledge, courage and gallantry and mutual assistance. The younger generation follow the example of those who fought heroically on to death against the Soviet country's enemies during the Civil and Great Patriotic wars.

The ensign and the midshipman are, of course, highly qualified specialists, past masters in their field.

The on-going rapid technological progress affecting the weapons and hardware available to the Army and Navy makes it absolutely essential for Soviet career officers, including ensigns and midshipmen, to be fully proficient in the handling of existing operational weapons and equipment, and to be sufficiently well versed in scientific and technical fields so as to be able to master new weapons and equipment in a short time. This goal can only be achieved through constant efforts to improve one's knowledge of military science and technology and one's political awareness. Without systematic study, no ensign or midshipman can hope to become an efficient commander who is respected by his subordinates and there are bound to be slip-ups and oversights in their work. It should be remembered that however well-thought-out and substantial the system of commander training may be, and no matter to what extent it is backed up by ideological and theoretical training, it cannot provide sufficient education unless those who undertake the course work on their own. No time should be lost that can be devoted to political and military self-education. It is essential to regularly read political and military literature, newspapers and magazines, to follow the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and to keep abreast of the events and developments at home and abroad. A profound study of Marxist-Leninist theory is of special importance for ensigns and midshipmen, and this enables them to gain a correct perspective of events and helps them in their important jobs of training and educating the rank and file.

Ensigns and midshipmen are expected to set a good example of cast-iron military discipline and efficiency in carrying out orders. Observance of the established order, self-control, strict compliance with the military regulations and the direct carrying-out of instructions, orders and injunctions to the letter and with dispatch, these and other qualities are indispensable to any Soviet commander. The important thing for an officer is not only to set a personal example of military discipline and efficiency, but to educate his subordinates in the same spirit.

The growing sophistication of weapons and military equipment places a premium on good discipline, organisation, efficiency and order, and these rest on the strict observance of military laws, the Oath of Allegiance, regulations and orders. A firm order prescribed by regulations is a guarantee of cast-iron military discipline and an indispensable condition for efficient training and education of the rank and file.

To be able to discharge their military duty well, ensigns and midshipmen must possess a variety of commander's skills, including primarily organising ability, which is a matter of guiding and controlling the actions of one's subordinates in any situation; and the ability to train and educate rank-and-file personnel and to get them to fulfil their duties strictly and to the letter. It is obvious that a true commander is one who not only issues orders, but who is able to convince his subordinates, who can explain to them what has got to be

done and why, and who can carefully prepare for and conduct classroom sessions with his men, and who can establish good rapport with them and combine reasonably exactingness with consideration, in other words, who can be a good educator and teacher.

The Communist Party has always attached major importance to education which is becoming more important than ever before now that the country has entered upon building the communist society. The Party insists that members of the managerial personnel train and educate their subordinates in inextricable unity.

To be able to cope with their tasks, commanders, including ensigns and midshipmen, need to be able to pass their political and military knowledge to their subordinates and set an example of moral rectitude, integrity and honesty.

Ensigns and midshipmen have already established themselves as an essential contingent of the command personnel in the Army and Navy. They are active in educating and training the privates and seamen, sergeants and petty officers. Advanced soldiers and sailors with excellent results in military and political training, Party and Komsomol members were the first to be promoted to the rank of ensigns and midshipmen. They have an intimate knowledge of their military jobs and transmit this knowledge to their subordinates, training them to become efficient fighting men utterly dedicated to the Communist Party, their Motherland and their people.

A landmark in the formation of the new commanders — ensigns and midshipmen — was the nation-wide conference of ensigns and midshipmen held in January 1973. This was seen as a new indication of the Party's and Government's concern about strengthening and improving the command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The conference reviewed the work done and generalised the experience gained by ensigns and midshipmen, most of whom had almost immediately shown themselves to be able and reliable helpers to their superior officers. Their fine work and their encouraging results in training and educating the rank and file became the common property of the Soviet Armed Forces. The conference helped increase the ensigns' and midshipmen's role and prestige and stimulated them to improve their performance.

There is little doubt that the role of ensigns and midshipmen will continue to grow, as will the importance of special schools for ensigns and midshipmen which are to arm the future commanders with the necessary knowledge and skill. These have to find better training techniques and develop and propagate the positive experience as it is gained.

The training of ensigns and midshipmen, coupled with the steadily rising standards of training for sergeants and petty officers will help solve the problem of providing adequate numbers of commanders for the Soviet Army and Navy, both in peace-time and in the event of war.

The Communist Party is doing everything necessary to ensure that members of the officer corps, ensigns, midshipmen, sergeants and

petty officers fully meet the requirements of modern warfare and military science and are able to educate and train troops in peace-time and, should it be necessary, lead them into battle.

The CPSU Programme states the following in this connection: "The Party will work indefatigably to train Army and Navy officers and political and technical personnel fully devoted to the communist cause and recruited among the finest representatives of the Soviet people. It considers it necessary for the officer corps tirelessly to master Marxist-Leninist theory, to possess a high standard of military-technical training, meet all the requirements of modern military theory and practice, strengthen military discipline."¹

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 558.

Chapter

VIII

**THE DIRECTION OF THE ARMED FORCES
AND TROOP CONTROL**

The Communist Party has always attached prime importance to improving the direction of every link in the Soviet state apparatus' chain of command and insists that Soviet managerial personnel fully and profoundly master the science of management. The 24th Congress of the CPSU emphasised that the improvement of management is a major component of the Party's entire efforts to run the country's economy. These fundamental instructions fully apply to the Soviet Armed Forces.

Equipping the Soviet Army and Navy with modern weapons and hardware and the resultant changes affecting their organisation and the conduct of military operations have a direct bearing on the forms and methods of directing the country's Armed Forces and controlling the troops.

The country's defence demands that the command personnel fully master the techniques of troop control, that they work unflaggingly to keep abreast of the latest developments and the progress in military science and technology, and that they look ahead and find effective ways of dealing with the problems that confront them.

**1. The Direction of the Armed Forces
and Troop Control Taking
Into Account the Experience
of the Great Patriotic War**

Directing the country's Armed Forces and perfecting control are a crucial area of Soviet military development. Soviet military science has paid unflagging attention to this.

The terms "direction" and "control" as they are used in Soviet military literature are close in meaning. The former is generally used with reference to the political and strategic guidance of the Armed Forces, while the latter refers to guidance on the operational and tactical levels. These two terms correlate in much the same way as the general and the particular do. And this being so, their spheres are

different. However, they have this in common. Dialectically both terms imply the bringing of a particular process and event occurring in the military field into correspondence and conformity with the requirements imposed by the objective laws of war and the prevailing situation.

The direction of the Armed Forces embraces every aspect of their manifold activities. Its prime task is to ensure, after careful consideration of the political and economic situation and of the emerging military strategic situation, that, in peace-time, the country's Armed Forces are in a state of full alert, and, in the event of war, that the country's resources, Army and Navy can be mobilised for repelling aggression and defeating the enemy with a minimum loss of life and property.

Troop control is a matter of the commanders, staff and political bodies thoroughly organising and providing adequate support for the combat operations of their units and focussing their efforts, with an undeflectable sense of purpose, on the successful accomplishment of their missions. In peace-time, managerial activity is concentrated on keeping the troops ready for possible combat operations, maintaining them in a good state of combat readiness, and maintaining strict discipline, established order and good organisation among the troops.

Directing the country's Armed Forces and troop control are both based on the Leninist principles of military development. Both are based on sound scientific principles which stem from Marxism-Leninism, the most progressive theory of social development, as well as on good knowledge and strict observance of the laws of war and on the recommendations and conclusions of military science and the skilful application of the principles of the art of war.

The Soviet Army's and Navy's fighting experience, particularly in the Great Patriotic War, fully vindicated the soundness of the Soviet view on the direction of the Armed Forces and troop control. At the same time, the war demanded further efforts to refine and improve the structure, forms and techniques of guiding the country's Armed Forces taking into account the combat experience gained, the changed conditions of warfare, and the changes in weapons and hardware available to Soviet and enemy forces.

Nazi Germany, in launching its perfidious attack on this country, was out to throw the system of state and military administration out of gear, to disrupt the direction of the Soviet Armed Forces, to deprive them of their battle-worthiness and to spread fear and panic among the people. To this end, every method and resource was used, ranging from sudden massive air strikes against the country's major administrative and political centres, to sabotage and commando raids, the psychologically damaging assaults by motorised infantry, deep panzer spearheads, misinformation and slanderous propaganda.

Using this strategy, the Hitlerites had been able to score a series of impressive victories during their campaigns against a number of West European countries. The element of surprise, despite initial success in the opening stages of the war, failed to bring the results Hitler had

expected when launching his sneak attack against the USSR. The fundamental inherent advantages of socialism helped this country win the upper hand. This was possible because of the endurance and unexampled staunchness displayed by the Soviet people who were led by the Communist Party, their implicit faith in the righteousness of their cause and the Soviet soldiers' heroism and fighting skill.

As early as the end of 1941, the Soviet Army forced the enemy to give up active offensive operations simultaneously all along the Soviet-German front. Soon afterwards the enemy was to experience the humiliation of military defeat. The skilful direction of the Soviet Armed Forces and troop control were an important factor in this.

The Great Patriotic War provided many examples of the brilliant skill of those who directed the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet leaders displayed their clear management superiority over the nazi leadership. The Soviet military and political leadership in the person of the CPSU Central Committee, the State Defence Committee and General Headquarters throughout the war worked out and implemented the plans of operations with greater flexibility and skill, were more far-sighted in working out their plans, more resolute and determined in putting them into effect and more economical in committing the available material resources than their nazi opponents.

During the war the forms and methods of directing the Soviet Army and Navy continually improved as combat experience was gained and their material and technical support was augmented. The wealth of experience gained by the Soviet Army and Navy in this respect is not only of great historical significance, but much of it retains its practical significance and value to this day.

The Soviet political and military leadership also displayed their management skill in the effective way they used the advantages offered by the socialist state, its economic, moral, political, scientific, technological and military potentials, to defeat the aggressor. This military and political direction was noted for its singleness of purpose, flexibility, utter realism in planning operations and the war effort as a whole, for its innovative approach to forms and methods of conducting operations, its great skill in marshalling manpower and material resources, its able exploitation of the element of surprise, its timely and sensible employment of the reserve forces, its combat forces' energy, determination and manoeuvrability, the good organisation of co-operation between the various forces and its provision of adequate logistical support. These Leninist principles of management were further developed during the Great Patriotic War and their application was a major factor in victory over the powerful enemy.

One can clearly see *the singleness of purpose, flexibility and the realism of the strategic, operational and tactical planning*, which were the salient features of the direction of the Soviet Armed Forces and troop control, in all major operations of the Great Patriotic War.

In planning operations, the Soviet Command implemented the Leninist principles of scientific soundness and objectivity of leadership in a creative way. In evaluating the operational, strategic and

tactical situations, the General Headquarters, front and army commands, commanders of units tried to follow the enemy's thinking; they tried to spot his weak points and strike at them at a decisive moment and in this way to achieve decisive success. A good knowledge of the enemy's potential, of his strategy and tactics was a great help. It was especially important to take the moral, political, military and technical factors of both friendly and enemy forces into account when planning operations.

The experience of the last war has fully borne out the truism that planning and troop control should be completely based on the decision the commanding officer adopts for a particular operation or engagement, in the course of which his art or lack of it in preparing operations and engagements and his troop control skill will be fully demonstrated. The quicker the decision is taken, the more sound it is, the more purposeful the flexibility and realism of planning, the greater are the chances of success.

These features of operational planning found their concrete expression in a profound and all-round evaluation of the battlefield situation; in a precise definition of objectives, tasks and concepts of combat operations; in substantiating the plan and making it known to those who were to put into effect in good time; in the careful organisation of close co-operation of participating forces, and in the efficient and quick way in which questions relating to the provision of adequate logistical support for combat operations are dealt with. Soviet commanders did not treat plans for operations and engagements as immutable dogma, but as a basis for an imaginative approach to troop control. During operations, commanders at all levels closely followed the changing battlefield situation and responded immediately to the slightest change, adjusting their plans accordingly, and getting their troops to accomplish their combat missions, thereby implementing the previously prepared plan of operation.

Soviet strategy, operational art and tactics were enriched with *new forms and methods of military operations* on every scale during the war. This was the direct result of the Soviet commanders' creative and innovative approach to troop control. In planning and organising operations, they followed Lenin's instruction that the method one uses to deal with the enemy should be warranted by the situation. Proceeding from this fundamental premise, Soviet commanders took strategic, operational and tactical decisions that came as a complete surprise to the enemy, putting him at a disadvantage and forcing him to change his plans in a hurry. We could cite any number of examples to illustrate the point.

Thus, in the extremely unfavourable operational and strategic situation that arose in the opening stages of the war as a result of Nazi Germany's perfidious attack, the Soviet Armed Forces had not just to check the aggressor's advance, but also to turn the tide of war, wrest the strategic initiative from him, and then proceed to rout him.

In these trying circumstances the Soviet Supreme Command went over to active strategic defence. In the bitter defensive battles, the

Soviet forces inflicted irreplaceable losses on the advancing enemy, wore him down and bled his principal army groups white, and checked their advance. In doing this they were able to change the balance of forces in their favour and gain time thereby making it possible for adequate reserve forces to be trained and for the other preparations necessary for the Soviet forces' subsequent offensive operations to be carried out. From the standpoint of the art of war, this strategy was the most expedient way of accomplishing the strategic tasks the Communist Party set the country's Army and Navy. The active and tenacious defence came as a complete surprise to the enemy, who had not expected to encounter such stout resistance from the Soviet troops.

When the tide of war began to turn, an effective form of strategic operations was a counter-offensive which allowed the ground to be prepared for wresting the strategic initiative from the enemy. When the tide of war turned and favourable conditions arose for the Soviet forces to go over to vigorous and resolute attack along the entire Soviet-German front, the operations conducted by the Soviet forces were based on strategic offensive which was carried out as a series of consecutive and simultaneous offensive operations finally culminating in Nazi Germany's unconditional surrender.

The creative and imaginative approach adopted by Soviet commanders of all echelons and by Soviet staffs, and political bodies were geared to the all-important goal of accomplishing missions strictly on schedule and with the minimum loss of life in any situation. Soviet top and medium-level officers persistently looked for new ways of beating the enemy, new troop control techniques, and new ways of employing weapons and equipment. Many new ideas were developed: on how to injure the enemy by firepower; on identifying the directions of the main effort; on forms of operational and battle formations; on forms of manoeuvre with forces, weapons and fire; on defensive tactics; on organising fire systems and obstacles; as well as on other aspects of planning and conducting military operations in dynamic and fluid battlefield situations.

The Soviet commanders displayed great skill in *massing forces and weapons on decisive sectors of the front*. Lenin attached great importance to this ability. In 1917, in his article "Advice of an Onlooker" dealing with the prerequisites for achieving success in an armed uprising, he insisted: "Concentrate a *great superiority of forces* at the decisive point and at the decisive moment..."¹ In 1920, Lenin said: "The whole art of government and policy-making consists in being able to assess and know in good time where to concentrate your main forces and attention."²

By skilfully applying the principle of massing manpower and weapons, Soviet commanders, despite the fact that sometimes they had no superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment in a

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 180.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 42, p. 164.

particular strategic sector, were nevertheless able to conduct highly successful operations. The secret here was that they were able to choose the right direction for the main effort which was usually against the weakest spot in the enemy defence line and they attacked this particular spot with overwhelming manpower and equipment, using more weapons of a higher quality. Significantly, during the Soviet Armed Forces' operations in 1944 and 1945, the fronts and armies concentrated from 50 to 80 per cent of all their infantry, from 60 to 80 per cent of their artillery and from 80 to 100 per cent of their armour and aircraft on break-through points which were roughly 7-12 per cent the length of their overall line of advance. This heavy concentration of manpower and equipment on narrow break-through points guaranteed overwhelming preponderance over the enemy on the main axis of advance. This preponderance involved the following ratios: 3-5:1 in infantry, 6-8:1 in artillery and armour, 3-5:1 in aircraft in favour of the attacking troops.

In defence, the main efforts were concentrated on tightly forming infantry units, which defended the principal sectors, using concentrations of anti-tank weapons, and flexible manoeuvre with artillery and aircraft, for counter-preparation fire and for launching crucial counter-strokes against enemy forces that had become wedged into the defensive lines.

The skill with which Soviet commanders *surprised the enemy in offensive operations* was an indication of the high level of their art as military leaders. The element of surprise in offence enabled the attacking Soviet forces to gain the advantage and place the enemy at a disadvantage. Surprise was achieved in a variety of ways, in particular by keeping one's intentions secret; by blunting the enemy's vigilance with skilful misinformation; by creating an inaccurate impression about friendly forces to be used in a particular operation or engagement; by misleading the enemy as to the main axis of advance and the zero hour; and also by employing unexpected methods of warfare and new weapons. During some offensive operations the Soviet commanders exploited the element of surprise by choosing rough and often inaccessible tracts of terrain as their main line of advance, including swampland, forests and mountainous areas, where the enemy did not expect Soviet forces to attack and where he, therefore, defended them with limited forces. Bad weather and night-time were also used with great effect to achieve surprise.

Timely preparations and the skilful employment of strategic and operational reserves demonstrated the far-sightedness and shrewd long-term planning of the Soviet military and political leaders. This was of major importance in beating the enemy who had considerable strategic resources and possibilities at his command.

In offensive operations the availability of adequate reserves enabled the Soviet Command to quickly and efficiently concentrate strategic and operational groupings where required, exploit initial successes achieved by attacking forces and create an external front of encirclement, beat off enemy counter-attacks and consolidate their

gains upon reaching captured strategic objectives and solve many other tasks.

In defence, the reserves were most often used to restore the disturbed order of battle, for creating operational formations or for increasing the depth of defence lines in sectors where the enemy had succeeded in breaching friendly defence lines. The reserves were used for determined counter-strokes, for the quick regrouping of forces, for shifting the line of the main effort and also for building up attacking forces when switching from defence to offence.

During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Command succeeded in resolving what is universally acknowledged as one of the more complex problems in troop control, namely, *to organise continuous co-operation*. Whenever and wherever smooth co-operation was disrupted action was taken to quickly restore it. The commitment of large numbers of troops and large quantities of weapons and equipment to the battlefield required special precision in co-ordinating their actions on the battlefield. The organisation of close co-operation and its maintenance during a particular operation or engagement were critical to efficient troop control.

When working out the concept of an operation, the commander provided guidelines for a pattern of co-operation to be observed during the planned operation, and he refined and adjusted this when taking the final decision and assigning specific missions to the troops. To work out the pattern of co-operation to be adopted in great detail, the commanders, together with their staff officers, usually went to the site of the future battle to reconnoitre and discuss the co-ordination between the different units and examine alternative ways of accomplishing the missions. When it was impossible to visit the site of a future battle the pattern of co-operation was outlined using situation maps or relief maps and was finally adjusted later on the spot.

For those troops which were assigned the principal missions, the pattern of co-operation was worked out in the greatest detail. In attack, special attention was given to securing the co-ordination of infantry, armour, mechanised, artillery and engineering units, the operations of the air force and anti-aircraft defences during artillery and aerial bombardments preceding the attack, when friendly forces were making their way through the engineering obstacles, fighting in the depth of the enemy defence, attacking his strongpoints or manoeuvring with forces and firepower. Co-operation among front forces and armies in sending mobile groups into the gap in the enemy defence lines was carefully planned, as was the pattern of their co-operation for the first-wave formations.

In defence the goal of co-operation was to repel the attacking superior enemy infantry and tanks by joint efforts in front of the main line of resistance, while in the event of the enemy penetrating friendly battle formations the aim was to ensure growing resistance to enemy attacking forces as they moved deeper into the second and third defence lines, and to organise determined counter-attacks and counter-strokes to eliminate the enemy grouping where it had

penetrated friendly defence lines and thus restore the situation and, given favourable conditions, to launch a counter-offensive.

Operations conducted by the Soviet Army were provided with *adequate combat security and logistic support*. In so doing the Soviet Command took into account Lenin's reminder to the effect that "every battle bears within itself the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no way of *reducing* this possibility except by organised preparation for battle".¹

The organisation and conduct of active and continuous reconnaissance, careful camouflaging, the provision of engineer, chemical and logistic support, and effective Party and political work, were major components in the work of commanding generals, commanders, staffs and political bodies in guiding the troops in offensive and defensive operations and they were critical in achieving victory. The development and improvement of the various forms and methods of directing the country's Armed Forces and troop control during the war did not follow in a straight line and was not a smooth ascent from the simple to the complex. Rather, it was a persistent search for new ideas and solutions and proceeded amid the struggle between the old and the new. The stony path towards victory had its quota of mistakes and setbacks but in the end the new and progressive carried the day. The wealth of fighting experience the Soviet Armed Forces gained during the Great Patriotic War is taken into account today in organising efficient command agencies.

2. The Direction of the Armed Forces and Troop Control in Modern Warfare

The changes occurring in the means and methods of warfare, the advent of new weapons and equipment, and the significant changes in the alignment of military and political forces on the world scene have left their mark on the ways the Armed Forces are guided and the troops controlled and means that experience has to be evaluated with a critical eye and applied skilfully to training and educating the troops.

If one is to imaginatively apply the principles of military management, which were thoroughly tested on the battlefields of the last war and which retain their relevance to this day, then many other factors have to be taken into account, including: the vastly increased scale of employment of manpower and equipment; the increased spatial scope of military operations; their more determined character, intensity and fluidity; the possible increase of losses in manpower and equipment; and the increased complexity of co-operation and troop control which may often be disrupted as a result of enemy counter-action.

One must bear in mind that, in a modern war, if the belligerents employ powerful long-range weapons of destruction, with their high

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 476.

level of technical readiness and rate of fire, then they are enabled to quickly destroy whole components of each other's battle formations—units, control posts, communication centres, and logistics bases as well as individual targets and objectives. They are also able to destroy much of the communications network, creating at the same time vast zones of radioactive contamination, fires, impassable wreckage and flooding. As a result the troops' position and the battlefield situation as a whole may change sharply and unexpectedly.

In addition, the increased mobility and manoeuvrability of combat forces, the heightened dynamism of the battlefield situation, and the frequent switches from one method of warfare to another, make it essential to cut the duration of preparations preceding operations and engagements as far as possible. Whereas during the last war each major operation was usually preceded by several days and sometimes weeks of preparations, and five to seven days were usually allotted for organising an offensive battle by a division or regiment, today no one can count on so much time for preparation. It is more than likely that a new operation and engagement will have to be organised while the preceding operations are still in progress in unclear and often contradictory situations.

This means that each commanding general, commander and staff officer will have to introduce progressive methods of control into their practical activities, and rely on new ideas and techniques, in fact, on everything new that has been introduced into the military field by the scientific and technological revolution. The task is to improve efficiency in every way, to widen and improve the operational and tactical thinking of commanders and staff officers, and to perfect their techniques and habits in tense and highly fluid situations so that they obtain the most out of the available control equipment.

The prime problem in control is to *gain time*. The famous statement by Suvorov,¹ a great Russian general in the late 18th century, to the effect that "one minute decides the success of a battle, one hour, the success of a campaign, and one day the outcome of a war", is now to be taken literally. Victory in a modern battle will go to the commander who is better at organising troop control and more energetic and more far-sighted in his plans and decisions. The time spent on a particular measure is a basic criterion of the efficiency of the staffs and of their ability to cope with the complex problems of troop control in a highly fluid situation.

Whilst rapid action is an important sign of the efficiency of commanders and staffs they must not take precedence over the *quality of control*, a matter of no less importance.

The quality of control depends above all on the ability of the commander to keep his bearings in any battlefield situation, to adopt an expedient plan of action, to assign combat missions in good time

¹ Alexander V. Suvorov (1730-1800), a generalissimo in the Russian Army, one of the founders of progressive Russian art of war.—Ed.

and with competence, and get them down to the combat forces, to organise smooth co-operation, provide adequate and comprehensive support for the troops and to get them to accomplish their mission with firmness and persistence. Success goes to those commanders and staff officers whose skills and techniques in troop control are based on an in-depth analysis of the situation and scientific forecasting.

The increased scope of operations and engagements one encounters in modern warfare and the greater intensity and diversity of military operations combine to have a significant influence on troop control. Indeed, whereas during the Great Patriotic War, commanders and staffs had to guide troops which were operating in compact battle formations covering relatively limited tracts of terrain, today the situation in many respects is quite different. Units will be dispersed both along the front and in depth. The troops will be forced to fight in varying directions, often at great distance from one another, with considerable gaps between their battle formations. The complexity, intensity, dynamism and flexibility of operations will grow vastly.

This will affect the system and techniques of troop control. Command posts will have to be located at a far greater distance from one another and in addition they will have to be moved about far more often than was the case in the last war. For the most part, commanders and staffs will have to guide the troops from mobile control posts; they will have to rapidly organise engagements while continuously manoeuvring over the battle zone and they will have only a limited time to take in the situation, adopt decisions, assign combat missions and organise co-operation.

It should be remembered that those commanders and staffs who do not have the benefit of extensive combat experience may be literally overwhelmed by the vastly increased flow of information on the situation. Therefore, all command echelons and staffs must be able to analyse the situation quickly, and identify the most important elements in the torrent of incoming information if high efficiency is to be achieved.

Various exacting demands are made on communications networks, demands on their reliability and endurance, if the stability and continuity of troop control is to be ensured.

Modern warfare increases the vulnerability of command posts and troops to enemy firepower and this seriously complicates both the overall guidance of the Armed Forces and troop control. A massive bombardment can seriously disrupt the troop control system within minutes and cause prolonged interruption in communications. The troops may find themselves in an extremely difficult situation as a result. It cannot be ruled out that units will sustain heavy losses in manpower and equipment and thus lose much of their battle-worthiness. In such a situation, the staffs may only receive disjointed and often conflicting bits of information, from which it is extremely difficult to gauge the overall situation at the front and in the rear. Success in this case will be heavily depended upon the speed and

efficiency, with which the commander and staff are able to restore disrupted troop control and ensure continuous operations by their troops.

The radio-electronic situation, that is, the belligerents' use of powerful radio-electronic counter-measures, will have a tremendous impact on troop control in that it will make stable and uninterrupted communications far more difficult.

Thus, the conditions amid which the Armed Forces will have to be guided and troops controlled in a modern war have become far more complex than at any time in the past and hence the more exacting.

Every link in the command chain of the entire system of control and communications must be at a high level of combat preparedness. This is of exceptional importance today for the simple reason that any measure adopted during an operation or battle whether the preparation of troops, the provision of adequate support, or the co-ordination of actions in carrying out a mission or effecting a manoeuvre, is initiated by the commander and staff. They clarify and work out the mission in detail, collect information on the situation, analyse it and adopt an appropriate decision for an operation or engagement and plan operations in detail.

This shows that the level of troop control agencies' preparedness and efficiency is a major factor in the troops' combat preparedness. The control and communications system should always be one step ahead of the troops to be controlled in terms of combat readiness; it should always be better and more mobile. This can be achieved through the control agencies' timely and adequate provision with well-trained competent personnel; through the science-based and sound organisation of staff work; through skilful location, dispersal and careful camouflaging of control posts; through adequate provision of the full range of technical equipment for staff work; and through the efficient employment of troop control automation equipment. Other important considerations include the communication systems being very flexible and durable, and being protected from enemy electronic interference; efficient organisation of stand-by duty; and the personnel in the control agencies being completely proficient in their respective functions and being able to perform just as efficiently in complex situations, and being able to quickly restore the disrupted pattern of co-operation and troop control.

In the fierce fighting characteristic of modern warfare it is vital to ensure *firm troop control*. Troop control should be exercised with clockwork precision and be uninterrupted no matter what the situation and despite any difficulties and interference the enemy may create.

This means that the command personnel of all echelons must take bold but nevertheless sound decisions and ensure that they are carried out to the letter and on time. Firmness is a faithful sign that troop control is at a high level, that the commanders and staff officers are skilful in planning and carrying out dynamic operations in complex situations and are able to ensure clockwork precision, good

organisation and efficiency. Only those commanders who are well versed in every aspect of military science and who are well trained professionally can exercise firm troop control.

To ensure firm troop control, officers of all ranks must develop high moral and combat qualities, such as personal courage, strong will-power, self-control, resourcefulness and initiative. Sound operational and tactical decisions based on accurate calculations and computations, an in-depth and comprehensive evaluation of the battlefield situation are indispensable prerequisites for firm and efficient troop control. This gives the commander confidence in the soundness of his decisions.

It is especially important for any commander to be firm in a crisis situation, when sudden twists in events may confuse and disorganise some of his subordinates. In such critical situations the commander must display maximum concentration, *sang-froid*, precision and neat organisation in issuing orders. Everyone knows that the commander's personal example of courage, self-control and presence of mind means very much to his subordinates.

But firmness is not to be confused with obstinacy and willfulness. Obstinate trying, against logic or common sense, to implement a previously adopted decision when the situation has changed making this decision irrelevant can only bring harm and lead to unwarranted losses. Firm troop control implies *flexible troop control*. To be flexible means adjusting and modifying troop control in good time to allow for changes in the battlefield situation. The commander and his staff can only do this if they thoroughly know and are constantly abreast of the prevailing situation at the front line and in the rear, and provided they closely follow the enemy's behaviour and are able to comprehend his plans and intentions.

The need for flexible control stems from the nature of modern warfare, which is full of surprises, frequent crisis situations, a high tempo and the rapid change-rounds in operations. Faced with a very fluid situation, experienced commanders and staff officers feel an acute need to "keep their fingers on the pulse" of the battle and, instead of simply reacting to events, try to anticipate them and, whenever possible, avoid complications in good time.

Flexible control is unthinkable without rational organisation and maximum simplicity in control procedures, without a skilful distribution of available manpower and equipment or without the information service and communications with the troops being well organised and smoothly functioning.

Flexibility, however, must not be replaced by indecision. When the commander changes previously adopted plans without good reason this only confuses the troops. Flexible control is based on an intimate knowledge of the battlefield situation and a careful analysis whereas indecision stems from diletantism and amateurishness, and can be traced to lack of organisation and lack of confidence. The experience of past wars shows the harm done to troop control by frequent and unwarranted changes in plans and by indecision and lack of

confidence when issuing orders to subordinates and when assigning missions to the troops.

Continuous and uninterrupted troop control is another major requirement. A well-trained commander and his staff keep a grip on combat operations during the fighting. They give continuous guidance to their troops, orienting them and co-ordinating the efforts of individual units and elements thereby ensuring that they accomplish their missions.

In modern warfare, which places a premium on surprise and where the technical readiness of weapons and equipment has grown immeasurably, the struggle for seizing the initiative is a major criterion of success or failure. It is vital to avoid any disruption, however slight, in the smooth functioning of the troop control system.

Apart from a good knowledge of and prompt responses to changes in the situation continuity of troop control depends upon the commander's ability to predict the course of events. This enables him to provide for contingencies in good time which makes it easier to overcome difficulties and obstacles. In other words, victory goes to those commanders and staffs whose troop control is based on an intimate knowledge and skilful use of the laws governing the progress of military operations rather than on accidental factors. Continuity in troop control is also ensured through active and well-directed reconnaissance operations, through a stable communications network, and through the control posts being very mobile and durable. The experience of the last war indicates that mobile control posts operate best when manned by a compact team with reliable communications equipment and when well protected from bombardment.

Keeping troop control secret is now very much at a premium. Keeping secret all measures relating to planning combat operations and troop control when fighting is in progress has always been a major factor in victory. Any neglect of and departure from this principle inevitably leads to setbacks and heavy losses.

Today, the heightened importance of complete secrecy in troop control is attributable to the fact that the belligerents in a modern war have highly sophisticated and diverse equipment available with which to monitor each other's communications networks and conduct electronic reconnaissance. Any oversight in this matter, any weakness in the organisation of secrecy in troop control will be used by the enemy to find out the intention of our forces in order to frustrate the planned manoeuvres in an operation or battle. To avoid this it is essential to maintain strict restrictions and security clearance and a strict procedure for operating communications equipment, especially during conversations over the radio and telephone. Experience teaches us that it is important to limit the number of persons involved in working out plans for operations and battles; to keep the location of control posts secret; and to make extensive use of decoys. These are then some of the principal requirements for troop control in modern warfare. The undeviating application of these principles in an

imaginative and creative way by the commanders of all echelons, staffs and political bodies guarantees effective guidance and direction of the troops.

The commander plays the leading role in troop control. The success of every aspect of troop control heavily depends upon his organising ability and efficiency as a military leader. The commander must be able to take his bearings quickly in any complex situation, be able to think clearly and logically, and express his decisions in clear language since the quality of troop control depends upon this. This ability can be acquired through a good knowledge of military science, all-round specialised training, and complete proficiency in military management techniques, all of which can even be acquired while controlling troops in peace-time.

Soviet commanders have creative initiative and are able to act on their own. Without these qualities success in modern warfare would be impossible. Soviet officers' creativity is a faithful indication of their combat skill. This is expressed in a striving to get the most out of the troops' combat efficiency, to find effective ways of accomplishing missions, to achieve surprise in carrying out an operation and to look for new tactical devices which will come as a surprise to the enemy and enable the commander to see further ahead than the enemy, impose his will upon him and rapidly defeat him.

Speaking of troop control we must mention the steadily growing role of *staffs*. The experience of past wars clearly demonstrated that a commander can only solve the wide range of complex tasks facing his unit by leaning on his staff. Smooth collaboration and a creative collective effort between commander and his staff guarantee flexibility, efficiency, speed and clockwork precision in assuring efficient troop control. Today the functions of the staff are more responsible and varied than at any time before. Without exaggeration, the staff is the brain behind the troops supporting the entire engine of troop management and control. Needless to say all this makes exacting demands on the smooth co-operation, efficiency and standard of staff work.

3. The Role of Scientific Forecasting in the Direction of the Armed Forces and in Troop Control

Outstanding generals and military leaders throughout history have always tried to discover what the future held for them so as to anticipate coming events, and foresee what military dangers, trials and "surprises" were in store for their armies in future battles. Their desire to look into the future was motivated by military necessity rather than by ordinary human inquisitiveness. Peoples and armies had to pay a heavy price in lost lives for the mistakes and miscalculations in war preparations.

However, the importance of anticipating the future went beyond this. It was just as important for commanders of all echelons to

foresee the possible course of events on the battlefield. Each decision adopted on the eve of an operation was based on what is expected to happen. The better the commander anticipated the course of the battle the better his decisions, the quicker the victory and the lower the losses.

Lenin took the view that scientific forecasting was a complex and creative process, something indispensable for understanding the essence of social events and for unlocking the laws governing their development. He wrote: "Miraculous prophecy is a fairy-tale. But scientific prophecy is a fact."¹

Lenin was able to anticipate events. His predictions during the Civil War were instrumental in sound and timely strategic decisions being adopted about manoeuvring with manpower and weapons to defeat the counter-revolutionary forces. Relying on a precise and comprehensive knowledge of every aspect of a military and political situation and the state of affairs at the front, Lenin was able to identify the sources and internal interconnections of events and make sound scientific predictions of the possible ways in which they would develop.

The Communist Party made good use of Lenin's methodology for predicting complex social events, including those taking place in the military field, during the period of peaceful construction, which followed the end of the Civil War. Scientific forecasting of the war which was being prepared by the imperialists enabled the Party to take the necessary measures to prepare the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces for repelling the aggressor. Thanks to this, the Soviet people were able to win the long and desperate, life-and-death struggle against nazi Germany.

It is essential for the formation of the armed forces that the relative role and importance of their various arms and services be correctly determined in line with the correlation of forms and methods of warfare. Unlike capitalist theoreticians, who worshipped individual weapons, Soviet military experts had, from the very beginning, advocated a policy whereby a variety of weapons and military equipment have been developed in a balanced way. Soviet military science was quick to appreciate the importance of promising weapons like tanks, aircraft, submarines, rocket launchers, automatic weapons, and anti-tank weapons.

The CPSU Central Committee was concerned to improve Soviet military science and directed the military experts' efforts towards an in-depth elaboration of specific problems of military science and theory, and urged them to look boldly ahead. This produced excellent results.

During the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Command demonstrated its consummate skill in orienting itself quickly in very complex situations, in carefully analysing the military and political situation,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 494.

and in making long-range and sound forecasts, on the basis of which plans were drawn up and large-scale operations executed. The scientific basis for forecasting was the Leninist principles underlying the direction of the country's Armed Forces, a good all-round knowledge of the laws of war, the Marxist-Leninist methodology of analysing military operations and the ability to draw sound conclusions and guide the Armed Forces with vision and an eye to the long term.

The Soviet Command displayed its skill in looking ahead and making sound forecasts with particular force when working out estimates of the enemy's moral, political, economic and military potential with a view to identifying his weaknesses and strengths. Correlating these conclusions with estimates of this country's moral, political, economic and military potential made it possible for the likely course of the fighting to be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy and the main efforts against the enemy to be concentrated on the key sectors of the strategic front, thus ensuring his defeat. There are many examples of this. Take the Battle of Kursk. General Headquarters made a careful, in-depth analysis of the situation and correctly anticipated the enemy's intentions in time, thereby enabling the Soviet forces to take all the necessary measures to repel him and counter-attack.

In offensive operations the Soviet military leaders showed their forecasting skill in their choice of the main axis of advance, in their choice of flexible battle formations and in their decision to deliver powerful artillery attacks against the vulnerable spots in the enemy defences. They also showed this skill in executing bold manoeuvres with manpower and weapons, in their purposeful employment of strategic reserves and in assuring adequate support for every kind of military operations.

In defence the Soviet Command was usually able to understand the enemy's intentions well before he could ever act. On the basis of sound forecasting, strong defences were built up in depth, and advantageous positions and defence lines, fire systems and obstacles were set up and preparations made for manoeuvring with manpower and weapons.

Sound forecasting was to be found in the Soviet operational and tactical echelons of the military leadership as well as in strategic military leadership. Naturally, the depth and the process of forecasting the course of the fighting differed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Scientific forecasting in the military sphere is of particular importance today. Because of the increased complexity of modern warfare there is a greater danger of making mistakes in decision-taking and this is made worse by the fact that it is increasingly difficult to rectify them during the fighting and more difficult to neutralise their harmful effects on the troops.

Today it is impossible to guide and control troops efficiently or to prepare them purposefully for repulsing the aggressor without a clear

idea of the strategic character of a possible war. That is, without knowing its scale, duration and methods of prosecution. The importance of sound forecasting at the operational and tactical levels is increasing, too. Today the commander simply must know more and be more far-sighting, more calculating and judicious in his actions and decisions.

Forecasting in the military field has its own difficulties and many different aspects. It is not easy to sort out the salient features of a modern war in any detail. A variety of interconnected factors affect the substance and character of modern warfare, including the political, economic, ideological, diplomatic, military and others. It is not always possible to take their impact fully into account or to foresee the highly dynamic pattern of their interaction and the complex intertwining of events. Nevertheless, by using the Marxist-Leninist dialectical method, by analysing the social and political processes occurring in the world and by extrapolating current trends in scientific and technological progress it may be possible to identify the basic trends in the development of the theory and practice of guiding the country's Armed Forces and controlling troops.

Soviet military forecasters concentrate their attention on finding solutions and answers to the above problems.

The first set of tasks in this area has to do with the extrapolation of current trends in the improvement of the military leadership structure at all levels, including strategic, operational and tactical. It is essential to understand as accurately as possible the interrelationships between the military guidance and the character and demands of modern warfare, the economic, scientific and technological potential of the state, the growing might of the country's Armed Forces, the on-going improvement of their technical equipment and the progress of military science. It is important to identify the direction and way in which the structure of troop control may be improved, how the control agencies can be made to function more efficiently, and under what conditions and how the commanders, staffs and political bodies will have to work in guiding and controlling the troops. The problem then comes down to trying to identify how the nature of the tasks and the content of troop control will be affected in the changed situation.

The findings of scientific forecasting in this area will help improve the Armed Forces' direction and troop control at all levels, and bring them into line with the requirements of modern warfare and with the objective laws governing the development of military theory and practice in good time.

The second set of tasks concerns further improving the commanders', staffs' and political bodies' style of work and finding new, more effective ways to guide the country's Armed Forces and control the troops.

Sound forecasts in this area will help re-appraise the importance of the time factor, the increased technical readiness of weapons and equipment, and the conditions influencing the combat preparedness of troops and ways of heightening that preparedness.

The third set of tasks in military forecasting has to do with the search for more progressive methods of decision-making and operational and technical planning. The commander deciding when and how to fight has always been central to the guidance of the country's Armed Forces and troop control. These two factors heavily depend on sound forecasting and, in fact, spring from it. Today, it is impossible to overemphasise the importance of scientific backing for decisions and plans for operations. These must be based on an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of available data, accurate strategic, operational and tactical calculations and an intimate knowledge of the laws of war. Therefore, scientific forecasting, decision-making and planning are a single integral whole, an indispensable condition for the successful guidance of the country's Armed Forces and for troop control.

The use of scientific forecasting to solve this set of tasks helps the commander and his staff identify the basic trends in the improvement of decision-making techniques, in planning operations and engagements, in improving the methods of making operational and tactical calculations, in comparing the belligerents' combat possibilities, in analysing the dynamics of the fighting, and in deciding the importance of moral and psychological factors in achieving success in an operation or battle. Simulating military operations and the use of mathematical methods in analysing operations and operational planning techniques are of great help to the commander and his staff. To develop a sound model of an operation or battle is to develop a clear, detailed picture of the sort of preparations necessary. Careful consideration must be given to the manpower and equipment available to the belligerents, and to the special features of their tactics and possibilities for manoeuvre.

Elements of forecasting are contained in an evaluation of the operational and tactical situation and calculations on which decisions are taken to launch an operation or battle. The old-established practice whereby the commander follows a thoroughly logical procedure in working out preparations for a battle, starting from defining the mission in greater detail and ending in drafting an overall plan of actions, issuing an operations order, organising co-operation and adequate support for the troops, is fully up to modern requirements. The thing is to ensure that the commander employs up-to-date analysing methods of military-scientific research in this and skilfully uses the available troop control equipment which makes it possible for a great variety of factors to be allowed for, the merits of alternative solutions to a particular problem to be weighed and that which offers the greatest benefit to be chosen.

In this context *the automation of troop control procedures* is of major importance.

In recent years there has been a rapid and extensive introduction of computers and other sophisticated devices into the troop control systems in capitalist armies and in the Soviet Army. The principal aim of automation is to improve efficiency in troop control, make the

employment of weapons and military hardware more effective, keep the combat preparedness of troops at a high level and at the same time substantially cut the amount of effort commanders and staff officers expend on purely technical functions. The use of computers and other sophisticated devices to carry out a growing amount of operational, strategic and tactical tasks opens up great possibilities for further improving the entire troop control system and easing the creation of small compact, mobile and highly efficient staffs. This seems to be the main line of advance in resolving the conflict between the more exacting requirements on troop control and the existing possibilities of commanders and staffs to carry out complex and diverse operational and tactical calculations. This is why it is essential to continually improve guidance methods and communications systems, and to continue introducing computers into the staffs along with other types of automation equipment and to get the most out of them.

Of course, it would be inadmissible to make a fetish out of computers and mathematical methods. There is no point in pitting man against technology, commander against machine. Whoever does that fails to grasp the Marxist-Leninist proposition to the effect that man with his creativity and genius plays the decisive role in war. One can see the validity of this proposition with the greatest clarity within the context of overall organisational activity in the military field and in troop control. The commander alone is capable of evaluating every facet of the battlefield situation and of finding the way to beating the enemy. The commander fully retains his importance as the central figure, however high the level of automation, and his staff remains the principal troop control agency. The commander takes decisions and plans action. The technical equipment at his command only makes his job easier and helps his staff officers perform troop control functions more quickly and with a minimum of physical effort.

Thus we see that forecasting as a method of scientific cognition is playing an important role in guiding the Soviet Armed Forces and controlling the troops. The data developed by forecasting form the scientific basis of any decision and act as a guideline for strategic, operational and tactical guidance. A high level of control efficiency implies control based on sound forecasts.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that the general demands made by the Party on the country's economic management personnel, which were summed up in the documents of the 24th Congress of the CPSU as "to learn the new management techniques based on a thorough knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, the theory and practice of management, scientific organisation of labour, new methods of planning and economic stimulation, economico-mathematical methods and modern computing techniques",¹ fully apply to the direction of the country's Armed Forces.

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 188.

Chapter

IX

**TRAINING AND EDUCATING
THE TROOPS**

Training and educating the troops is an important component in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. This is a twofold process, the object of which is to train conscious and efficient defenders of the socialist Motherland, give them high moral and fighting qualities, develop smooth co-operation and team-work between units, and, in the final analysis, to keep the battle-worthiness and combat readiness of the country's Armed Forces at a high level.

The unceasing improvement of weapons and equipment, the development of new and the improvement of existing methods of warfare combine to make the process of training and educating personnel more complicated and make more exacting demands on the officer corps, necessitating constant efforts to improve teaching and educational techniques, upon whose quality depends the success of combat, political and operational training and, as a corollary of this, the might of the Soviet Army and Navy.

**1. A High Standard of Personnel Training
Is a Crucial Component of the Might
of the Soviet Armed Forces**

Sometimes the military might of an army or navy is claimed to be a matter of their weapons and hardware. This view is unsound for the simple reason that weapons and equipment in themselves do not decide the success of combat action. It depends on the men who operate them. It is universally acknowledged that man remains the decisive force in war. Neither a missile nor a combat aircraft nor a tank can inspire greater terror in the enemy than a soldier with high morale and consummate combat skill, who is capable of getting the most out of his weapons and equipment and able to hit the enemy where it hurts most and defeat him.

Thus, apart from equipping the troops with weapons and hardware and improving them, the moral and political qualities of the troops and

their level of combat preparedness and training are a crucial component of the might of this country's Armed Forces. The better these components the higher the fighting strength of the country's Army and Navy and the more reliable their combat efficiency and preparedness. Neither of these components can be weakened without prejudicing the military might. Only if these components are combined do they result in a strong amalgam which expresses the qualitative aspect of the Armed Forces and the defence potential of our Soviet state.

Two of the crucial components of an army's fighting strength concern man directly, the level of his moral, political, psychological and physical training. Only a soldier possessing the well-developed qualities mentioned above can use his weapons and equipment with maximal effect. The soldier's decisive role in war springs from these qualities, and for this reason Soviet military experts place the training and education of personnel on the same footing as the equipment of the forces with up-to-date weapons and hardware.

The record to date indicates that poorly trained armies have always sustained heavy losses and often been routed by numerically weaker opponents. By contrast, well-trained troops with high morale often beat numerically stronger enemies. The importance of a unity between material and structural factors, which was always important in the past, has grown immensely today.

In past wars, flaws in the training of the rank and file could to some extent be eliminated during lulls in the fighting and also when personnel were transferred to the active reserve. But even then a price had to be paid in unnecessary losses of men and equipment. In a possible future war, should the imperialists unleash it, military operations will assume an active and determined character within hours, irrespective of what weapons, nuclear or conventional, are used. There will be long periods of high intensity, dynamism and tension. The forces committed to the battlefield will be continually switching from one type of action to another. In this situation it will be difficult to organise the training and re-training of personnel. Therefore, to avoid unwarranted losses it is essential even in peace time to ensure that the personnel of the Army and Navy are kept at a high standard of combat and political training.

This does not mean, of course, that in a possible future war there will be no chance of improving the troops' efficiency during the fighting. Each war introduces its own amendments and modifications in the methods and techniques in operations and develops new experience in employing manpower and weapons. In a possible future war every chance that comes one's way will have to be taken advantage of for improving the standard of personnel training, including while the fighting is in progress.

In preparing the troops for a possible war we take its very special character both on the socio-political and military-technical planes into account. Each Soviet soldier and sailor in this war will have to show unflinching ideological stability, good military knowledge, and high

proficiency in handling weapons and equipment, be skilful and consciosus and be capable of enduring intense moral, psychological and physical stresses. The military personnel's readiness for active operations must be based on a thorough foundation, including training in military and technical subjects, in physical fitness, and moral, political and psychological training. The importance of this grows as the Army and Navy are supplied with more and more powerful and sophisticated weapons and hardware.

Today, *the prime object of training and educating the troops* is to ensure that each Soviet soldier and sailor and each army unit and warship is helped to develop high combat, moral, political, psychological and physical qualities, and are able to cement themselves into a single whole and, on this basis, attain a high level of combat skill, mental stability, constant readiness to endure the trials of war, however terrible, and are able to maintain a high level of activity no matter how complex the situation and, most important of all, to retain an unconquerable will to win.

Moulding these qualities is a complex and labour-consuming process which is organically linked with the entire life of the Soviet state, the Soviet people and with the system of combat and political training, military education, and with the overall life in the Army and Navy, which is maintained throughout the length of military service.

Tactical, fire, technical and specialised training is of prime importance in personnel training. Today, some take the view that the role of tactics is diminishing in modern war and everything will be decided by strategy and operational art. We believe that this view is wrong. Irrespective of whether conventional or nuclear weapons are used, tactics retains its role as the basis for operational and strategic success. The higher a commander's tactical skill, the broader his range of tactical manoeuvre the greater the chance of victory. Any operational and strategic manoeuvre originates with a tactical device. Operational and strategic designs and concepts begin and are brought to a conclusion with tactical devices.

Let us take a time-honoured tactical device known as assault. This is the most responsible stage in operations. The men participating directly in an assault are its true architects. War veterans know well that an assault takes a good deal of courage and valour. The assault lays the foundation stone of victory. It does not just concentrate the united will and determination of the attackers, but their skill, the result of the careful search and creative effort put in by the commanders and staffs, the striving to foresee everything, to avoid chance happenings, to find a new method of employing manpower and equipment unknown to the enemy. If successful, the assault develops into a stunning blow which leads to victory. On the contrary, if an assault is poorly organised and performed by ill-trained troops it inevitably fizzles out and along with it the overall concept of attack is frustrated.

Thus, despite the increased importance of operational and strategic weapons of war, and of strategy and operational art, tactics of small

elements, including platoon, company, squad, crew, etc., plays an important part in success. To maintain their co-operation and team-work at a high level and to maintain their combat preparedness under complex conditions it is essential to pay greater attention to improving the quality of tactical training, sparing neither time nor effort in this, having an exacting attitude and fostering initiative. Tactical training must be kept at the centre of Soviet commanders', political bodies' and Party organisations' attention, because it is a critical component of combat training for military personnel.

The troops are expected to work hard learning to act with determination and persistence in both attack and defence; they are expected to show staunchness and grit. Both attack and defence call for precise and neat organisation, reliable troop control and close co-operation between units.

It is unthinkable to attain a high standard of tactical training without gaining complete proficiency in handling weapons and equipment. This alone can enable the men to get the most out of their fire power. In this context the importance of fire practice and technical and specialised training is seen with particular clarity.

Fire from all types of weapons is the main medium of operations. It precedes an assault and goes with the advancing troops, and in defence it is the backbone of strength and insuperability. Without neutralising the enemy manpower and fire power it is impossible to either attack or defend oneself. The high dynamism of modern warfare calls for an ability to hit the target with the very first shot or missile in aerial or naval engagements. It follows then that training personnel to deliver accurate fire from individual and crew-served weapons is a major objective in combat training.

The soldier, if he is to shoot at the enemy accurately, must, apart from being competent in fighting tactically, be completely proficient in handling the weapons and equipment available to him. The high standard of technical competence, which the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy have, is a basic indication of their combat preparedness. Therefore, emphasis is placed on helping the military personnel to completely master their weapons and equipment and to find more effective ways in which they can be employed in the fighting.

Tactical, fire, technical and specialised training are the basis of combat training in the Army and Navy but there is more to it than that. To be able to fight successfully the soldier has to be physically fit and well drilled. He also has to be capable of protecting himself from enemy weapons as well as of using his weapons; he has to know how to build reliable shelters and installations, how to camouflage himself and see through the enemy camouflage; he has to know the enemy's tactics and the performance of enemy weapons and equipment; and be adapt at pitting his own tactics, weapons and equipment against them. The training of enlisted personnel is made up of a whole complex of specialist knowledge and practical habits and skills. Enlisted personnel acquire these step by step as they undergo combat

training. A high standard of training for enlisted personnel is one of the basic prerequisites of the Soviet Armed Forces' high level of battle-worthiness and combat preparedness.

The training of enlisted personnel is an integral part of the entire process of military education which is based on the general principles underlying the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and is effected in close co-ordination with ideological and political education and this takes precedence over military education proper.

The ultimate goal of military training and education is to train efficient soldiers and sailors with high moral and political qualities, a high degree of consciousness, totally committed to the cause of the Communist Party and the Soviet people. The men of the Soviet Army and Navy are true patriots and at the same time internationalists capable of overcoming all difficulties and obstacles to defend their socialist Motherland without sparing any effort nor life itself, if need be.

The officer corps together with the ensigns and midshipmen, sergeants and petty officers, the whole of the command, political, engineer and technical personnel play the decisive part in educating and training the enlisted personnel and in helping them accomplish the various tasks facing them in their combat and political training.

The commander plays the leading role in educating and training enlisted personnel. He trains his subordinates in methods of armed struggle and it is he who leads them into battle. If the commander is well educated and versed in every aspect of general and military science and technology, if he has good grounding in political science, if he has mastered the principles of planning engagements and operations, if he himself has complete proficiency in the handling of weapons and equipment available to his men, if, finally, he is capable to win the hearts and minds of his men and inspire them by personal example to perform heroic deeds, his men will always win success both in the days of peace and in war.

It is said with good reason that the commander is the leader and initiator of everything. It is indeed so. The commander organises the training and education of his subordinates and upon his own all-round training and knowledge depends the accomplishment of combat training missions by his men on time and with high quality of performance. The commander's highly responsible duties require him to systematically improve his own knowledge of political science, operational art and tactics, military-technical aspects, to perfect his skill in organisation and troop control in complex conditions, in any weather, by night and by day. The commander must have an intimate understanding of the nature and character of war, of individual operations or engagements; he must know well his own troops and those of the enemy, both their weak and strong points, their weapons and equipment, he must know how to get the most out of the weaponry and equipment at his command and how to act in such a way as to put the enemy at a disadvantage and ensure victory for his own troops with a minimum loss of life. Nothing but a good

knowledge of the art of war and proficiency in methods of organising the training process, initiative, high cultural standards and efficiency will help the commander to cope with his tasks in combat and operational training and ensure smooth co-operation between individual elements, units, warships and formations.

Every commander must be thoroughly conversant with the requirements for training and educating his troops and have a clear idea of how to meet them. His prime duty is to look for new ways of organising practice sessions and of improving training methods. This can be achieved by systematic commander training based on a detailed plan, and through instruction and demonstration sessions conducted by those who are completely proficient in training methods. The officer is expected to go beyond these sessions contained in the official plan. He is expected to do original work and to evaluate his results with a critical eye. This enables the commander to keep abreast of the latest advances in military science and to apply his knowledge and competence in a creative fashion to training and educating his subordinates.

The personal example set by senior commanders as well as close working contact between commanders and their men are of tremendous importance in making personnel training successful. The direct participation of experienced military leaders in educating and training the troops is of fundamental importance and is required by the logic of events. In recent years, the command personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy have become substantially younger. Many officers, who have recently graduated from military schools and academies, now serve as company, battalion, and air squadron commanders and as captains of warships. Some of the command posts are held by officers who have been brought out of the reserve. Needless to say they need supervision and control. The senior commanders of the older generation are best placed to do this. They must share their experience with the young commanders and help them be more successful in their day-to-day work of training and educating their men. This is a very complex business which calls for profound military, political and specialised knowledge, a broad cultural outlook, and subtle pedagogic tact.

We should emphasise the role played by regimental commanders and warship captains in training and educating the enlisted personnel. A regiment or a warship, taken as a basic unit is better suited to accomplishing independent tasks in either peace time or in war time. These units originate and carry on combat traditions. The military pride of soldiers and sailors is largely identified with the regiments and warships in which they serve. The more efficient these units are the higher the level of combat preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces as a whole.

The heart and soul of a regiment or warship is its commander. His men's successes in combat and political training and their level of military discipline directly depend on his efforts and style. The commander is vested with great power so that he can perform his

complex and varied functions. He is duty bound to act in a way meeting the requirements of life in the Army and Navy; to show daily concern for improving his own knowledge and that of his subordinates; and to improve the standard of staff work. The commander is expected to look for new ways of raising the level of his regiment's or warship's combat preparedness and efficiency; for ways of improving the training, especially the field, sea and flying training of his subordinates and for ways of improving the commander training of officers, ensigns, midshipmen, sergeants and petty officers.

We associate the most noble moral qualities of the Soviet man — his high ideological awareness, his exacting attitude, integrity, and responsiveness; his sense of justice — with the regimental or warship commanders. The regimental commander and the warship commander share everything they have in the way of experience and skill with their subordinates. They set an example for others to follow, they are constantly at the centre of everything: everything they say is listened to with great attention; and everything they do carries special significance for their subordinates. The regimental or warship commander must never forget this and must see to it that his prestige in front of his subordinates is always at a high level as that of the commander of a regiment or warship should be.

Every facility is provided in the Soviet Army and Navy for training and educating the servicemen. This twofold process is based on the class unity, identity of interests and aspirations of those who train and those who are being trained and on the unity of their honourable and responsible duties as defenders of the socialist Motherland. The Soviet Army and Navy have experienced officers who maintain strict military order and discipline and provide every training and material facility to ensure model military service. All this creates a favourable situation in which to train and educate the troops and to help them fulfil their combat training tasks.

The socio-political unity of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy, the high standard of the troops' training and education and the high quality of the weapons and hardware available to them, coupled with the all-round training of the officer corps, are the foundation supporting the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and their combat preparedness and battle-worthiness. Under no circumstances can this foundation be disturbed either as a whole or in part without prejudicing the USSR's defence capability.

2. Principles for Training and Educating the Troops

Commanders, political bodies and staffs can only be successful in training and educating personnel if they observe the principles elaborated by the theory and practices of the Soviet military development, which means that the troops can be consistently and skilfully trained to carry out their combat mission. These principles

stem from the laws governing the development of the socialist social system and the laws of war, and objectively take into account the high consciousness of the Soviet officers and men. They are marked by a socialist class trend and radically differ from the principles guiding the training of capitalist armies.

Inherent principles in training and educating Soviet servicemen include moulding the most noble human qualities, such as humanism, comradeship, love for one's Motherland, solidarity with the working people of all countries, and a desire to perform feats of arms in the name of the people. If one discards the imperialists' verbiage about the bourgeois armies' "lofty mission" to "safeguard the Western world", it is clear that in capitalist armies training and ideological indoctrination are intended to implant brute instincts such as self-seeking, attaining one's goals by any means, contempt for other people, outrage on the defeated and money-grubbing. The entire system of training in capitalist armies is aimed at securing the soldiers' blind subordination to their commanders who express the will of the ruling exploiter classes.

Soviet principles of training and education are founded on Lenin's and the Communist Party's ideas about defending the socialist Motherland, and they objectively mirror both the need to train the personnel for modern warfare, and the basic specifics and regularities of changes in these requirements at every new stage of the Armed Forces' development. They also determine the overall trend, content, ways and means of training the Soviet Armed Forces personnel.

The basic principles of training and educating the Armed Forces are the following: communist ideological content and adherence to the Party's ideals; unity of training and education; training the troops to fight in the most realistic possible combat situation; training and educating the personnel in a spirit of attack, persistence and resoluteness in achieving goals; and a combination of individual training and training with units and warships.

Communist ideological content and adherence to the Party's ideals in training and education determine *the political trend and the class character* of the entire multifarious process of training the personnel. This principle reflects the guiding role of the Communist Party in the development of the Armed Forces, including the progress and improvement of the whole system of training and educating Soviet soldiers.

In moulding a Soviet fighting man's personality one must not just give him special combat qualities and make him a specialist in a definite military field; one must also make him a staunch, politically conscious fighter, a fiery patriot of his socialist Motherland, and an internationalist utterly devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and to the Soviet people.

Adherence to the Party's ideals in training and education means the purposeful and consistent implementation of the Communist Party's line in everything that the Army and Navy do; it means unswervingly putting into effect the Leninist principles of ideological work, i.e.,

high communist ideology, connection with the life of the Soviet people, implacability to hostile ideology; and it means improving vigilance and combat readiness. It is vital, therefore, during studies, military exercises, lectures, and reports, and in the Army and Navy press to vividly demonstrate the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in building communism; the magnificent economic achievements of the Soviet people; and the Party's concern to constantly raise the working people's living standard, to educate a new type of man, and to strengthen the defence capacity of the USSR along with the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Each soldier is to be made aware of the urgent Soviet foreign policy issues and the significance of the struggle waged by the Communist Party to further develop friendship and co-operation between socialist countries, and to achieve peaceful coexistence among states with differing social systems. At the same time, it is necessary to expose the aggressive intrigues of the imperialist quarters, which are directed towards preparing and unleashing a new world war.

Soviet soldiers' high communist morality and consciousness serve as an important indicator of their combat and political training. The level of combat readiness of units and warships is higher if the personnel, when discharging their military duty and tactical and combat missions, do so in a more conscious and lively fashion.

Communist morality and adherence to the Party's ideals are closely intertwined with the principle of the *unity between training and education*. This predetermines the indissoluble nature of training personnel and their political and military education, the latter being achieved through joint effort by commanders, political workers, military engineers, Party and Komsomol organisations, and all Army and Navy organisations, which purposefully educate and influence the personnel during their studies, service and everyday life, including during military exercises, stand-by duty, and during equipment and weapons maintenance. There is a rule: educate while training, train while educating. This obliges officers to see to it that all training and educational measures are carefully co-ordinated with one another and pursue a single aim.

The unity of training and education rests on Soviet servicemen's thorough understanding of their mission as armed defenders of their socialist Motherland, and on their strict observance of the requirements of the Oath and the manuals. The unity is attained by employing interconnected and mutually preconditioned forms and methods of combat training, and political and military education, as well as through the psychological hardening of the personnel. All knowledge and skills are inculcated on the ideological foundation of Marxism-Leninism, and their political importance is being made clear. During theoretical and practical studies, the combat, moral, political, psychological and physical qualities of the personnel are moulded and later consolidated in the course of independent work and exercises.

In the course of the dialectically single process of training and educating the Armed Forces, communist ideas become a firm

personal conviction for the officers and men, they become a standard for their behaviour, and a guiding principle in their everyday life.

It is vital in training and educating personnel to teach them *how to act in a war situation and in a situation very closely resembling this*. This principle reflects the *practical tendency* in training servicemen, and it was also a favourite of many prominent military leaders in the past. However, the content of the principle is constantly changing, embracing wider and wider spheres in which the troops are involved, and is penetrating into all aspects of their preparation for war.

In our day and age, the principle of teaching troops what is required in war has become much more versatile than ever before. This is due to the fact that, firstly, training is conducted when units and ships are in high combat readiness, and much attention is given to carrying out stand-by duty. Secondly, this principle presupposes not only the military training of the personnel but also cultivating lofty moral, political, psychological and physical qualities in them which in the past were never demanded of all servicemen on such a broad scale. Thirdly, the volume of military and technical information has increased, and the interrelations and mutual dependence between man and weaponry have become more complicated. Fourthly, there is a more urgent need to study the potential enemy, his armaments and tactics.

The necessary skills and habits are best cultivated in the troops when exercises are conducted in complicated and tense conditions closely resembling the real combat situation, and when combat training is indissolubly linked with the personnel's moral, political and psychological training, when they are being taught how to be morally and physically staunch and purposeful in overcoming the hardships and privations of war.

Indulgence and simplification have a very adverse effect on the personnel's training. Soldiers gain the wrong impression of modern combat and this prevents them from developing the necessary fighting abilities and undermines the very essence of the principle whereby the troops are trained in conditions closely resembling the combat situation.

The principle concerning the *unity of training personnel and their high combat readiness* is of great importance. In the final analysis, all efforts to develop the Armed Forces, including training and educating the personnel, are aimed at ensuring that the Armed Forces are at a high level of combat readiness and that this is maintained. This is necessary because of the complicated international situation, which can suddenly deteriorate, and a war can be started by the aggressive imperialist circles. It is also necessary because of the very character of modern war which may be unleashed suddenly with all the available means of combat used at once.

As has already been pointed out, combat readiness is a combination of many factors. The level of the personnel's military and political training ranks high among them. High combat readiness is inconceivable without well-organised, intense training; without cultivating the

servicemen's political awareness and personal responsibility for the state of affairs in their units; and without cultivating many other qualities in them which are indispensable to an armed defender of socialist Motherland. In its turn, high combat readiness is a major factor contributing to the successful solution of tasks pertaining to the troops' training.

The unity of the troops' training and their high combat readiness includes giving the troops their initial training and education in the briefest span of time, bringing them quickly into action and achieving excellent combat co-ordination among units. It further involves constantly improving their practical skills and ability to use weapons and keeping them always ready for use; training every serviceman in other military specialities as well as his own, this being necessary to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of crew-served weaponry; combining educational activities and stand-by duties; and cultivating the soldiers' high political vigilance and their sense of personal responsibility for high combat readiness of their unit.

The principle of *training and educating the troops to have a vigorously offensive, persistent and determined spirit when achieving their goals* stems from the general propositions of the Soviet military doctrine, the requirements set forth by Soviet manuals and regulations, the character of modern warfare, and the destination of the Soviet Armed Forces.

According to the Soviet military doctrine, the offensive has always been regarded as the main form of military operations, whereas defence has been and continues to be considered a forced type of action, which is fallen back on when the enemy is numerically superior and when the situation is in clearly his favour. Only a decisive offensive can ensure victory.

Modern warfare entails high manoeuvrability. That is why the part an active offensive plays in winning a victory grows in importance. Training the troops to do this, as well as moulding and cultivating their initiative, persistence, resolution and striving for victory is a decisive requirement in military and political training and is the corner-stone of the entire process of training and educating the personnel.

An offensive spirit, vigorous action and resolution in attaining their goals are all inherent in the revolutionary spirit of the Soviet Armed Forces, are typical of them, and conform with their high combat capabilities. The latter, however, cannot be developed all by themselves but are cultivated and improved during training and other strenuous efforts.

Training and educating the personnel is becoming more and more complicated, thereby requiring a strict *combination of individual training and group training in units and ships*. This principle determines both *social and methodological trends* in training servicemen with other factors taken into account, like their educational level, physical and psychological qualities and cultural standard, and a military collective being strengthened in conformity with its combat destination.

Combat training and political education are such that individual military specialists are moulded simultaneously as a combat-ready Army or Navy collective is formed. Military effort is of a collective nature, and its results depend on the activity of each serviceman and the unit at large. That is why all specialists, without exception, have to be thoroughly educated, inasmuch as their training ensures that they are exact, quick and accurate in carrying out their individual missions and co-ordinated combat missions within the framework of their unit. In addition it is of paramount importance to ensure that all crew or team members are morally and psychologically compatible as well as being co-ordinated to the maximum possible extent. Each unit should be a well-knit collective, with all its members acting efficiently and together, trusting one another and helping one another.

Each private, seaman, sergeant or petty officer, though a member of a military team, remains an individual: he has his own experience, demands, interests, and a peculiar way of thinking. There are also differences in educational levels and cultural attainments.

Giving a serviceman individual training means that it is possible to study his disposition, world outlook, interests, abilities, strong and weak points, and his attitude towards combat training and his comrades more comprehensively. It also provides a chance to learn whether a soldier possesses will, resolution and an ability to carry through his mission.

In analysing his subordinate's actions, the officer tries to detect soldierly qualities and develop them, as well as overcome negative features. He tries above all to find an ally in his subordinate, and encourages him to rid himself of his faults and set a good example. A soldier masters combat skill, when he vigorously displays creative energy, independently tries to sort out problems and find best ways of using the weapons at his disposal. Servicemen must not only understand the point of the exercises but also be given more opportunities to make a good showing in practice and during combat training. This will help them acquire solid habits and correct convictions leading to their behaving properly during their Army service and everyday life.

The individual approach to training and educating the personnel is conducted in such a way that each serviceman is regarded as a member of a definite military team: a squad, crew, detachment, platoon, company, battery, etc.

A Soviet military collective has a tremendous educating role. It is very well organised, co-ordinated, all its members have united interests. An officer, therefore, tries to gain a better understanding of the military collective's psychology, and skilfully use the influence it has on the training and education of the personnel. The officer supports useful initiatives of his subordinates, helping them consolidate and develop positive features and overcome their shortcomings.

The firm and solid nature of a military collective is not just based on organisational and administrative forms and requirements. Such a collective would be a formal association of individuals with differing

interests and needs. It would lack firm inner unity and mutuality in its work. The inner cohesion and monolithic nature inherent in Soviet Army and Navy collectives are maintained and supported above all by the prestige and skilful guidance of the commanders, who are plenipotentiaries of the Soviet Government; by comprehensive educational work; by a unity of class interests among the personnel; and by the collective consciously fulfilling all tasks assigned to it.

A serviceman should have perfect command of his speciality and also be ready to replace a wounded or killed member of his team, crew or unit. It is in such a situation that comradely assistance and a sense of collectivism are of special value. Interchangeability presupposes mutual training whereby each specialist, while mastering his own profession, teaches his comrades and learns other specialities. Mutual training is closely linked with further enhancing the leading role of a commander in training and educating his subordinates and, at the same time, with consistent and purposeful work from the subordinates themselves, especially re-enlisted servicemen, with the men helping each other and helping younger soldiers, and with everyone helping to sort out problems as they crop up.

Cultivating genuine collectivism does not mean that it replaces an individual's typical features, or best qualities. On the contrary, a Soviet collective contributes in every possible way to the development of vivid individual features, and to the removal of shortcomings, vices and bad habits. A Soviet serviceman's awareness of his affiliation to the common cause multiplies his vigour and consolidates his spirit of militant comradeship, and his ability to correctly combine his personal strivings with his public duty.

A reasonable combination of an individual approach with reliance on a collective in training and educating personnel helps prepare individual servicemen and whole units to discharging their combat missions, and ensures their speediest combat co-ordination.

In training and educating the troops, officers rely on the *serviceman's high consciousness and activity* and this is common for the Soviet Armed Forces.

Lenin attached paramount significance to the masses' consciousness and activity in building socialism, including the military tasks involved in this. He greatly appreciated the "ability to explain to the masses why it was necessary to devote all energies first to one, then to another aspect of Soviet work at a given moment; ... our ability to arouse the energy, heroism and enthusiasm of the masses and to concentrate every ounce of revolutionary effort on the most important task of the hour".¹ Soviet officers are being guided by this proposition of Lenin's. They employ those forms and methods of organising and conducting exercises which enable soldiers to learn their skills and habits quickly and well and which promote and develop consciousness and activity. In the course of combat and political training, personnel improve their abilities to understand,

¹ V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 139.

because the tasks are constantly made more difficult, and providing servicemen use their initiative and adopt a creative approach they are able to learn everything well. Servicemen's activity and their urge to perfect their combat skills independently are encouraged in every possible way.

Socialist emulation, which the commander uses to develop the activity of a military collective and to encourage it to further strengthen combat readiness, is an important way of cultivating these qualities.

Since weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated, the volume of knowledge required to master them is growing. It is extremely difficult to learn everything in detail within a short span of time, though it is imperative that specialists are trained without weakening the combat readiness of a unit even for a brief period. This aim can only be achieved through studying first separate units and parts and later going on to a more comprehensive study of the weapon as a whole and cultivating skills in using it. A major methodological rule in training high-grade military specialists is to start from the simple and go to the complicated, that is, going from the particular to the general, ensuring that training and educating is *systematic and consecutive*.

In carrying this out it is of great importance that combat and political training is carefully planned and that it takes into account the organic interdependence and interconnection between various disciplines, that definite skills are acquired on the basis of other aspects of knowledge and are aimed at the complete and high-quality implementation of all measures for the personnel's training and education. Lenin saw that this organisational principle embodied the immense force which perfects any kind of work done both by the individual and by the collective. Lenin's instructions that can be applied to the military leaders were to constantly pay attention to "the theory of organisation of the work they intend to devote themselves to..."¹

The essence of regularly and consecutively training and educating troops is training the individual soldier and sailor, drilling separate items and subjects with a subsequent transition to special training, combat co-ordination between units, and ensuring that they constantly improve their knowledge, skills and habits in fulfilling combat missions.

The creative employment of scientifically substantiated and time-tested principles of training and educating means that one can be sure of the personnel's comprehensive and firm knowledge, skills and habits. The training of servicemen has its own specific features, differing from all the other types of training and educating in that it is being carried out in tense, sometimes even dangerous, conditions resembling the combat situation. The complicated conditions of modern warfare are taken into account in training and educating the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 494.

personnel. Some of the conditions in which servicemen have to make decisions during combat are as follows: the resistance of the enemy; the highly dynamic nature of military operations; hindrances; insufficient information on the enemy's manpower and equipment; unfavourable terrain, climate and weather conditions; and profound emotions stemming from their responsibility for carrying out the order, and for the lives of their comrades. Despite the complicated conditions, there should be an immediate response: assessment of the situation, decision and action. This is inconceivable without solid knowledge and skills. Besides, soldiers need these skills and habits even after their service in the army is over and they are transferred to the reserve because they may have to join the Armed Forces again to defend their Motherland. Military knowledge and skills must always be ready for use.

Profound knowledge, skills and habits are worked out through a thorough and all-round explanation of their practical significance, their systematic deepening and improvement, as well as their conscious consolidation by the trainee independently, when the serviceman gets more solid skills and habits, acquires confidence in his own abilities and in the performances of the hardware.

Improving the troops' training and their attainments largely depend on the officers skilfully using the favourable influence exerted on the education of the Soviet people by the socialist social system and the entire entity of the socio-political conditions in which they study, work and discharge their public and service duties. Lenin emphasised that if one is to carry out successful work with the masses one must understand as well as see the changes occurring among them, and make the indispensable corrections and amendments in the content, forms and methods of influencing the masses and of training and educating them in good time.

Young Soviet men, even before they are called up into the Soviet Army, are infused with profound communist convictions and awareness and with a sense of personal responsibility for the destiny of their Motherland. Our young people have inherited from older generations lofty moral and political qualities, selfless loyalty to and love for the Communist Party and the Soviet people, and a readiness to give all their strength, knowledge, experience and even life to defend their socialist Motherland.

Educating the youth is continued with an increasing intensity and purposefulness in the Army and Navy. The lofty moral and political qualities acquired by the young men prior to their service in the Armed Forces are uninterruptedly extended and skilfully directed towards solving the tasks of combat and political training.

From the very first day of their military service, the young men enthusiastically start studying weapons and mastering the science of the armed defence of their Motherland. Commanders, political bodies, Party and Komsomol organisations support, develop and skilfully direct their enthusiasm towards raising the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces. They take into

account the high general educational and cultural level of the youth. The majority of the young people have higher and secondary education, many of them have mastered various technical trades which are sometimes akin to military specialities, this enabling them, within a short span of time, to study the theoretical principles of military science and to acquire reliable practical skills in mastering weapons.

Everybody more or less knows the principles and requirements of training and education, but this knowledge is insufficient since it must be combined with the ability to apply the principles in practice, in a specific situation, to creatively enrich their content, and extend their impact on the entire process of combat training and political education.

It is of particular importance that the content of the principles always takes into account the changes in the character of modern warfare, weapons and art of war, as well as in the advance made by the Soviet people, including their views, interests, cultural level and working conditions. The outcome of putting the training and education principles into practice should be subjected to a thorough examination, generalisation and analysis based on Marxist-Leninist methodology. The principles governing the training and education of the personnel are supposed to help find the most efficient ways of training the troops.

3. Improving the Methods of Training and Educating the Troops

The volume, content and sequence of training and educating personnel are laid out in the orders, programmes and plans for combat training and political education and are worked out on the basis of these orders. The clearer and more definite the plan of combat training and political education is and the more thoroughly the conditions have been studied, then the more purposeful the training of each specialist and unit will be.

However, this is only one aspect of the problem and concerns the organisational part of combat training and political education. Programmes and plans, however well-elaborated, cannot bring good results all by themselves, if the commander has no knowledge of the methods of training and education, if his lessons are dull and monotonous, or if he is unable to arouse in the trainees a thirst for mastering and considering the material they are being taught. The studies will only be of use if some new, advanced information is given to the trainees, arousing their interest and giving them an urge to acquire skills and habits.

An important part in training and education is played by the forms and methods commanders use in training, i.e., the system of interconnected and mutually preconditioned ways and means which

help give definite, clear-cut and comprehensible knowledge, impart the necessary skills, and mould moral, political, psychological and physical qualities, thus promoting the units' combat co-ordination.

In actual fact, the problem of the forms and methods of training and education of troops is a problem of whether the acquired knowledge is profound, and whether the practical skills and habits accumulated in the course of combat training and political education are solid enough. If a correct choice is made of the forms and methods of training and education, and all the requirements and conditions of training taken into account the personnel will be sufficiently well trained to successfully carry out their combat missions.

The Soviet Armed Forces have a vast arsenal of forms and methods of training and educating the personnel both in peace time and during war. Various troop exercises — from tactical, involving small units, to strategic, including all the service arms of the Armed Forces, are used as the basic forms of training and educating, in addition to theoretical and practical studies conducted in classes and on the firing ranges. Lectures, talks, practical demonstrations of techniques, trainees' training independently or under the guidance of the commander, studying materials, teaching aids, and so on are used.

The forms and methods of training and educating are far from immutable, they improve along with the development of the Armed Forces and primarily depend on the requirements related to the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of the Army and Navy, and the level of the servicemen's training and education. The special and typical features inherent in the training and education of specialists in each armed service and fighting arm, as well as general educational competence and technical skilfulness, all have an influence.

The training and education of Soviet servicemen are organically linked with all their everyday activities and official duties. This extends their opportunities for training and education, making it possible, in the course of practical activities, to enrich their knowledge and improve their skills, gain an all-round assessment of the work done, reveal shortcomings, and raise the level of their training standards.

This does not mean that the personnel are able to acquire all their knowledge and skills along practical lines. Theoretical training, too, plays an important part in mastering new, sophisticated weapons and modern ways of conducting military operations, which cannot be successful without profound theoretical knowledge. Vivid and picturesque narration, a well-reasoned and well-illustrated lecture accompanied by a demonstration of the correct way of doing the thing mean that a clear-cut idea about the hardware they study, and a conscious approach to mastering the necessary combat skill can be cultivated in the servicemen.

One should bear in mind that, in the present-day situation, the amount of knowledge needed by the personnel is growing in proportion to the development of weapons and to their increasing

sophistication. This means that a search has to be made for new forms and methods of training so that the servicemen are able to acquire more knowledge within a shorter span of time. This goal can be attained by choosing optimal theoretical material which is necessary for cultivating practical skills; excellent methods of teaching must be used by the commanders; the teaching and material basis must be constantly improved; and programmed teaching must be used on a wide scale enabling theoretical knowledge to be combined with acquisition of practical special skills.

Well-organised military-theoretical propaganda in units, get-togethers devoted to technical know-how, competitions on theoretical problems; lectures; schools of advanced experience; military-technical societies; clubs and exhibitions contribute to the development of the personnel's theoretical training.

Theoretical knowledge should be consolidated through exercises with weapons and during practical training and maintenance of equipment. This sort of training perfects the knowledge, skills and techniques which the trainees have to be able to apply automatically. Practical actions are, so to say, a touch-stone, a criterion of the correctness and vitality of the military theory.

The present-day requirements for the troops' combat readiness have a strong influence on the forms and methods of training the personnel, and on a close interconnection between theory and practice. They lead to a succession in training personnel, under which the acquired theoretical knowledge is being immediately complemented with the skills in handling weapons and equipment in the course of practical training. This is a *sine qua non* ensuring a high level of field, naval and flight training of personnel, and their readiness to make immediate use of their knowledge in a combat situation. In training and education, theory and practice always accompany each other and are constantly interdependent.

When an instructor or an organiser of combat training and political education chooses methods, a system of education and training, his skill shows itself in his ability to find the most important element or method, a concrete sum-total of knowledge ensuring the shortest possible way to train a serviceman, forge combat skills, as well as give a unit high combat efficiency and combat readiness. Scores and hundreds of military specialities, servicemen's differing dispositions and inclinations, their different backgrounds make it impossible to express the diversified process of training and education in a single methodological formula. A decisive role here is played by a specific approach to the choice of the most efficient ways and means of training and educating the personnel, the commanders' painstaking efforts, and their creative endeavour in elaborating new and improved ways to train the troops.

When we speak of training and educating individual servicemen we imply enlisted men and officers holding key posts in any unit. It would be erroneous to maintain that officers do not need everyday studies and training, inasmuch as they are trained and experienced people.

Genuine skill, however, depends on the man who sets the tone. That is why an officer cannot do without all-round training, the constant enrichment of his knowledge, and the purposeful polishing of his skills, otherwise he will be unable to give a profound and comprehensive theoretical explanation of the problem in question, or show his men what is required of them, or demonstrate how to do a thing. He will also fail to notice shortcomings in his men and in the performance of the equipment.

It is a specific feature of military training that it is not just the individual training of a soldier, or a sailor, but the forging of whole Army or Navy collectives: units, headquarters and departments. Each of them requires specific methods of training and succession of studies, and a different approach to forging their necessary cohesion and readiness to perform combat missions. Practical studies aimed at combat co-ordination among units, tactical and marching drill, as well as tactical special exercises, exercises involving field firing, practical launching of missiles and bombing, and Army and Navy exercises are of great importance here.

Tactical and marching drill and tactical special exercises constitute the initial stages in forging units for combat, and are the first steps along the path leading to collective combat skill. This is no easy goal to attain. In a collective, difficulties may arise because of the soldiers' different attitude towards service and training, and the specialists' uneven level of competence and skill, even though they may have served in the Army or Navy for the same period of time. For example, crew members understand the combat mission, try their utmost, and carry out all their duties but their efforts are uncoordinated because they have not yet mastered the skill of acting together and in unison, i.e., the crew has not acquired collective skills. This results in nervousness and setbacks. If a crew member fails to do something his diffidence passes on to the others, which inevitably leads to errors in the work of the whole of the crew.

Collective skills are inconceivable without arduous work. Shortcomings should be patiently brought to light and the reasons for them revealed; each crew member should be shown the role he plays and his contribution to the final results which are achieved by the performance of the whole collective. The efforts of all specialists should be channeled along the same lines. It is equally important to correctly select members of the crew, equip their working places, create most favourable conditions for the commander to control his unit, and apply the technical means and devices for objective control over the personnel on a larger scale. But the most important thing, perhaps, is to do everything possible to make the studies and exercises resemble, to the maximum, a modern combat situation. All tactical and marching drill and tactical special exercises and training are to be carried out in complicated conditions.

Forging a collective is not drill by rut; it should not involve techniques acquired in one situation being applied mechanically in another. Tactical and marching drill and special training are called

upon to develop trainees' initiative, creative approach and resourcefulness in accomplishing their combat missions.

Various *exercises and games*, as the supreme form of training and education and the most important measure to improve the personnel's field, air and naval training, are of immense significance to the training of Army and Navy units for action under the complicated conditions of modern warfare. They are performed on different kinds of terrain and in various seas and oceans, using standard weapons and equipment. During the exercises, cruises and flights, the servicemen improve their combat skills and acquire the solid habits needed to carry out active and resolute operations and make a fast switch from one type of action to another. During this time officers polish their skill in troop control. It is on the proving range, in the air and at sea, that genuine specialists emerge and their combat efficiency is forged.

During the exercises, it is important to create new situations, and choose the terrain and areas of operations properly so that each field exercise, each flight and naval cruise, every tactical and operational exercise is well organised and resembles the combat situation to the maximum. The operational and tactical thinking of commanders, their creative endeavour, and desire to make use of diverse and the most efficient ways and means in carrying out combat missions will develop provided they are not watched over but encouraged to act independently and to display their initiative. This means that elements of vulgarisation and hackneyed techniques can be eliminated from the way in which combat operations are drawn up thus ensuring that the manuals are observed, that an indomitable drive forward is inspired, and lofty moral, combat and psychological qualities forged.

Each exercise should promote the servicemen's vigour, determination and urge to pounce upon the enemy until the latter has been crushed. Going over to the defence is unnecessary even in order to repulse the enemy's attack. An offensive is the best way of rebuffing the enemy. The initiative should always be maintained. The troops must be trained not to beat off the enemy but to search him out, impose their will and tactics on him, forestall his deployment of forces and destroy him. However, active operations should not verge in recklessness but proceed from the given situation, with a skilful application of the principles of the art of war, precise calculations, and the thorough organisation of combat.

The experience gained in combat training demonstrates that the more real the situation for the troops, the more frequently complicated tasks are set and the more diverse the terrain on which they are trained then the more useful is the exercise. If troops are in constant action, resolving the tasks that suddenly emerge and overcoming the resistance from a strong and active "enemy", and if the dynamics of the combat is made complicated, then this is precisely what the servicemen may come across during a war.

Operational and tactical training plays an especially important part in cultivating the officers' ability to control troops. This training is designed to improve theoretical knowledge and practical skills of the

commanders, political workers and engineers. The officers' organisational abilities are forged, and their skill in controlling troops improved during operational and tactical training and day-to-day activities. During the theoretical and practical studies they enrich their knowledge and skills in organising operations.

The entire content of personnel training is directed at giving them practical skills in conformity with the tasks they will have to do, as well as the terrain or the sea, in which they will have to act. At the same time, it would be erroneous to carry out practical training and exercises every year in one and the same area under favourable weather and time conditions, without altering the topic and concept. This would lead to a hackneyed approach; it limits the outlook of the trainees and cuts short their chance for independent action.

A lot of attention in the operational and tactical training of troops is given to training staffs as troop-guiding bodies. In guiding the troops, they have special functions performed by them alone, which, as military theory and practice develop, become more and more complicated. Their main tasks are linked with planning and organising operations and ensuring uninterrupted and reliable control over the troops. They receive this training during command and staff exercises, war games and staff drills. During the exercises mentioned above, commanders, staff officers, political workers, engineers and technicians undergo training to make practical use of their theoretical knowledge.

The Army and Navy need skilful, active and resolute officers capable of creatively accomplishing each combat mission, thoroughly preparing the battle, and capable of using troops and weapons with a high degree of efficiency. This can be successfully achieved if, during the exercises, a well-thought-out and instructive situation is created, which corresponds to the object of training and is full of diverse, and often critical, combat episodes. Commanders and staffs should not only learn to work out correct decisions but should also take them in good time. The best decisions are useless if they are taken with delay and if the troops have no or little time to put them into effect.

Exercise directors should thoroughly analyse the decisions taken by the participants in the exercises and take them into account in the course of further exercises, as far as changing the situation. It is inadmissible to impose decisions in accordance with the preliminary plan of the exercises, inasmuch as such tactics results in the trainees losing the initiative, and leads to a superficial assessment of the situation and attempts to learn the viewpoint of the commanders. In the final analysis, this lightens responsibility for implementing the decision and slows down the growth of the subordinates' skills.

During the Second World War, the headquarters never obtained generalised data on the situation. The information was fragmentary, and sometimes contradictory, and it was necessary to cross-check and verify it, and that was a painstaking and complicated job. During present-day exercises, too, it is necessary to intensify the situation so that the headquarters continuously collect data, using different

channels and various sources. It is imperative that the headquarters are aware of the way the situation is developing during the exercises, and this means they have to work hard and adopt a creative approach.

An important element in training the commanding bodies is improving the efficiency of staffs, which implies not only correct, visual and quick handling the combat documents, but also and above all the staff's thorough and all-round knowledge of military problems; well-organised work; complete and efficient use of modern technical means of control and computers; their ability to timely assign combat missions to the troops and naval forces through various communication channels; and their ability to control the troops, providing security from observation and organising constant control over their activities.

The simultaneous conduct of command and staff, troop and special exercises on the terrain, using real means of control and troops helps raise the level of the commanders and staff officers' training. Organising comprehensive exercises extends the range of the problems to be tackled, making it possible to create a complicated and instructive situation, thoroughly master control techniques over heterogeneous forces and combat means, secure co-ordinated activities of the headquarters and their exact co-operation with the other guiding bodies. Comprehensive exercises like these also help in a practical check-up of operational and tactical schemes, and are a reliable basis for examining urgent and complicated questions envisaged by the programmes of combat training and political education.

At the same time, while conducting large-scale exercises and practical training on the ground, one should avoid any attempts to solve too many tasks at a time, since, in the final analysis, this gives trainees no solid skills in carrying out their duties in combat and disperses their efforts, thereby leading to haste and a lack of organisation. On the contrary, when the number of tasks necessary to achieve the aims of the exercise is strictly limited, one observes a tangible increase in the skills of the officers at all levels from one exercise to another. During any exercise, the chief task is to emphasise the main idea of the subject and draw the attention of the trainees to it.

Each exercise or training session, however good and instructive, does not complete the training of a specialist or unit, but is only a next stage in their development. Here, critiques are a kind of a bridge. They not only sum up the results of the exercises but also make theoretical generalisations from fresh practical data. Conclusions can be drawn and ways towards enhancing combat skills charted. Critiques are a continuation of the training; they reflect a living connection between science and practice, and serve as a valuable source of theoretical thought. At the critiques, unanimous understanding is reached of the theory pertaining to the topic in question, and of different aspects of the art of war. As a rule, at the end of a critique new tasks are set, and definite measures aimed at eliminating the existing shortcomings are specified. A well-organised and

scientifically substantiated critique is of paramount importance to the troops' training and education.

As military theory and practice develop, the traditional forms and methods of training and education are improved, and new ones emerge. However, no form or method of training and education taken separately can ensure the all-round training of a specialist or unit. Forms and methods of training and education should be combined, and new ways of cultivating the necessary knowledge and skills in the servicemen should be found. A more efficient methodological system must be elaborated, serving as a major lever of ensuring constant qualitative growth of combat and political training.

Commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians have to boldly introduce and purposefully search for scientifically grounded forms and methods of training, which promote a comprehensive training and mirror, to a greater extent, the specificities of the present-day organisation in the Army and Navy, and take into account the features inherent in each arm of the Soviet Armed Forces. Today "pedagogic intuition" is not enough if the necessary forms and methods of training are to be put into effect. A scientific approach to personnel training is needed. The commanders should not only know what to teach but also how to teach, taking into account the situation in which a serviceman is or might be. They should also bear in mind the factors which influence him during the combat. The commanders should also know what qualities are to be cultivated in a serviceman's nature and psyche so that they can prepare him to overcome any difficulties and successfully accomplish his combat mission. In other words, the directors of the exercises are in urgent need of a profound knowledge of the art of war, military pedagogics and military psychology. They should also be able to foresee real combat situations and make exercises resemble them to the maximum. All this is inconceivable without an all-round scientific analysis of the nature of modern combat and military operations, as well as of moral fighting and psychological qualities which are to be cultivated in the servicemen during training and education.

Scientifically improving the methods of training and education is connected with studying and using advanced experience, as well as with its generalisation and practical implementation. It is presupposed that commanders are able to support and further develop all that is new and progressive in the troops' theoretical and practical training.

The spirit of innovation plays an exceptionally crucial part in the whole of our activities, including the methods of training, education, and the ways and means of conducting combat and operations. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the CPSU 24th Congress has stressed: "...the Party has always highly valued a feeling for the new. To have this feeling means to visualise the prospects for development, to look into the future and find the surest ways of resolving problems as they arise."¹

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 119.

Of course, in doing this momentous work one may come across difficulties. The positive features of the new forms and methods of training and education may not make themselves felt at once. However, one should not stop half-way but should boldly march farther and always be on the alert. The unswerving establishment of the new is an earnest of a successful accomplishment of the tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces.

It should be pointed out that, while speaking of innovations, we in no way mean to discard all that is old without good grounds. The experience of the past serves as the foundation for the progress of today and the foresight of tomorrow. The younger generation is only able to know more, see farther and grow higher because it takes in all the progressive achievements of the past. The combat experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War is our invaluable treasure. No army in the world possesses such experience, and this is to our advantage. It is necessary to study all the best that we have accumulated to the full, to choose the most rational methods or their components and, drawing on them, to elaborate new, improved ways and means of training and educating the personnel in the light of modern problems.

A specific analysis of the requirements vis-à-vis training the servicemen, and enhancing their abilities, as well as their cultural and educational level means that it has been possible for technical means and programmed methods of training to be widely used. This also means that the material can be more thoroughly mastered, energy and independence in the trainees cultivated, and practical skills thoroughly learnt. A significant part is played by the use of various simulators which sharply reduce the amount of time spent in training specialists and which give tangible saving in efforts and resources.

It is imperative to make wider use of technical means in the training and combat practices, for them to be used during the exercises in order to create a situation resembling the real combat situation.

The uninterrupted development of the teaching and material basis helps in a scientific approach to improving the forms and methods of training and education. High-quality field, air and naval training can only be attained with the help of well-equipped testing ranges, training centres, tank training grounds, naval training areas, firing ranges and when all of these are equipped with modern means of communication, computers, various mechanical and optical devices, and with simulation means.

If the teaching and material basis is constantly improved, this allows a situation to be created and periodically changed in accordance with the nature and aims of the exercise. A situation that has been prepared once and has remained unchanged for a long time, though the latest scientific and technological achievements have been applied, will, in the long run, become a routine and vulgar simplification in training and educating the troops and will lead to a slackening in the activity and creative endeavour of training leaders and trainees.

With the period of time assigned to train skilled specialists being unchanged or even reduced and the growing amount of knowledge and skills needed, the time factor is becoming increasingly important, and every effort is exerted to rationally use literally every minute. Saving time and using it in the most rational possible way for training means that attention must be concentrated on solving the major problems and in most promising directions, which above all lead to a high quality in training and education. The entire process of training and each discipline are to be thoroughly analysed, while everything unnecessary and insignificant, which the troops can be successfully trained without, should be decisively discarded. This will make it possible to make a more specific choice of forms and methods of training and educating the troops, and elaborate the most expedient methodological system of training in the Army and Navy in accordance with the tasks and requirements of combat readiness.

All attempts to improve combat training and political education as well as to improve the forms and methods of training and educating the personnel are inconceivable without excellent organisation and the commanders, staffs, political bodies, engineers and technicians having a precise and businesslike manner in their work.

The success of the servicemen's combat and political training is largely determined by the officers' knowledge of the methods of training, their ability to teach with clarity, inculcate in the servicemen's minds the need to exactly perform the necessary techniques and actions, to correctly show individual elements and the entire action and to demand the same from the trainees and to patiently and persistently train them, expose, explain and remove the personnel's errors and shortcomings and to repeat the demonstration of any action.

The guidance of the units' combat and political training should be businesslike, specific and effective, while the missions should be clearly formulated. In organising the training and education of the personnel commanders, headquarters and political bodies must see in detail the entire process of training the servicemen from the individual soldier and sailor to close-knit units and ship crews. Proceeding from a scientific basis, they should determine the aims, amount and content of general and specific measures of training and education, chart the ways towards their realisation and ensure their exact implementation. The officers' aspirations should concentrate on a creative search for fresh opportunities and reserves and in order to unflinchingly enhance the might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

This brief account of some of the most important principles, forms and methods of training and educating the personnel apparently fails to demonstrate their full content and specific features, and that was not the aim of the author. The most important thing has been to show the basic features inherent in the training of personnel. The skilful application of various principles, forms and methods of training and education in specific conditions will make it possible to achieve the given aims.

Chapter

X

THE SOVIET SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR

The Soviet science of war is the military leaders' total experience in this field: it is a system of knowledge on war, the latter's character, objective laws and patterns, military development, the preparation of the army and country to repulse aggression, and the means of warfare. In its research, the Soviet science of war bases itself on the theoretical and methodological tenets of Marxism-Leninism and also makes use of other sciences.

The theory of warfare, which embraces the problems pertaining to the preparation of the army for war and the conduct of military operations, is a major component of the science of war.

The Soviet science of war is a science of war of a new, socialist social system and a momentous factor in the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its role in military affairs is constantly growing, subject to the development of the Soviet Army and Navy. The main sources on which Soviet science of war draws are as follows: Marxism-Leninism, the practices of the revolutionary struggle waged by masses, the military operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, the experiences of the troops' combat and operational training, and the successes of scientific and technological progress. The Soviet science of war has also absorbed the best achievements of military and theoretical thought of the past, having critically readjusted them to the obtaining conditions. All this has enabled the Soviet science of war to equip the army of the first socialist state with a treasure-house of knowledge.

Since its very inception, the Soviet science of war has tackled the military problems in its own specific way, which differed basically from the bourgeois science of war in its class aims and methods of research. The bourgeois science of war serves the interests of the exploiters' social system, and is based on various idealistic and metaphysical philosophical concepts, whereas the Soviet science of war serves the interests of socialism, an advanced social system, and is based on materialist dialectics, a truly scientific method.

The application of dialectical and materialist methods enables the Soviet science of war to reveal the laws governing military developments, foresee the character of possible military clashes,

determine major directions in the development of the Armed Forces and in their preparation for the armed defence of the socialist Motherland.

1. The Emergence and Establishment of the Soviet Science and Art of War

The emergence of the science of war, as well as the theory and practices of the art of war dates back to the ancient past. However, only after Marx and Engels had evolved dialectical and historical materialism, were there opportunities for the establishment of a genuine science of war. It is the objective laws of human society's development, discovered by Marx and Engels, that made it possible for the reasons for the rise of conditions, driving forces, the character and the specific forms of the development of wars and the art of war to be revealed, and a thorough scientific analysis of the phenomena of war to be given. They helped work out a materialist interpretation of war as the continuation of politics by violent means, determine the dependence of war on the social structure of society and its economy, and the impact exerted by weapons, equipment and man on the organisation of troops and the methods of military operations. The founders of Marxism proved that after the triumph of the proletarian revolution a new army, a new science of war and a new means of warfare would come into being.

The experience gained by the Paris Commune has had a definite impact on the development of the military and scientific thought and the military practice of the proletariat in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. Even at that time, some aspects of a new art of war could be discerned. A thorough examination of both the positive and the negative aspects of that experience made it possible for important military and political conclusions to be drawn. These included, for example, the concept of the proletarian party guiding the struggle waged by the popular masses; the class nature of the armed forces of a socialist state; a determined fight against the enemies of the revolution; and others.

Marx and Engels foresaw the historical law governing the emergence and establishment of the science of war in a proletarian state. For instance, Engels wrote in this connection that the emancipation of the proletariat "will find its own, specific expression in the military field and produce its specific, novel military method".¹ He stated that "the new military science will be as much an indispensable product of the new social relations as the military science created by the revolution and Napoleon was the inevitable result of the new relations brought to life by the revolution".²

These thoughts were further developed by Lenin. Even prior to the

¹ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 7, S. 480.

² *Ibid.*, S. 481.

October Revolution, Lenin expressed his brilliant ideas concerning the essence and character of wars, the part played by the working people, the role of weapons in winning a victory, the formation of the revolutionary army of the working class, the way to conduct military operations, the correlation between the offensive and defence, and many others.

Lenin's bright and creative military thinking stood out in especially bold relief during the trying years of the foreign intervention and the Civil War, when the newly created Red Army had to throw back the fierce attacks of the interventionist and White Guard hordes, though it was poorly equipped and lacked well-trained commanders. However, it possessed unparalleled revolutionary awareness and an unshakable trust in the righteous cause of the Communist Party. Lenin's instructions to the troops, and his articles and speeches on military affairs actually played the role of the Red Army's manuals and regulations which were non-existent. They were in full conformity with the Red Army's character and tasks. Lenin's words inspired Red Army men to perform feats of valour, and exerted a great impact on the winning of victory.

One of Lenin's historic services is the elaboration of a wide range of urgent military problems and basic military-theoretical questions. By drawing on the scientific foundations of Marxism, the fundamental propositions of the theory of Marx and Engels pertaining to war and the army, and the war experience of the past, and by carrying out a comprehensive analysis of the economic and political essence of imperialism, Lenin was able to reveal the specific features of war in the new historical situation and was able to disclose the major factors determining the outcome of military conflicts.

Lenin pointed out that victory is won by that belligerent power which has superiority in the economic, socio-political, scientific, technical, moral and military spheres. These advantages find their concentrated expression in the armed forces, a definite socio-political type of an army, and its combat potential. In his works Lenin gave a clear-cut description of the dependence of the art of war and of its theory and practice on the social system of a state, its economic level, the spiritual forces of the people, the army's morale, and on other circumstances.

Lenin stressed the increasingly expanding and deepening link between politics and war; he further developed the materialist interpretation of the essence and content of war, and made a profound philosophic generalisation of the new features brought about by the wars in the epoch of imperialism. He explained the role of wars in the history of social development, and substantiated their division into just and unjust, progressive and reactionary. Lenin revealed basic laws governing wars, their close connection with the social system and military organisation of a state, demonstrated the decisive part played by the masses in the war, and the leading role of the Communist Party in consolidating the country's defence capacity and in rebuffing aggression.

Lenin's definition of the essence of war serves as a clue to a correct understanding of the socio-political content of past and modern wars. Lenin wrote: "With reference to wars, the main thesis of dialectics ... is that '*war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i.e., violent] means*'. ... it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded any war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned—and the *various classes* within these countries—in a definite period."¹

Bourgeois ideologists allege that Lenin did not introduce anything new in revealing the essence of war. They claim that Lenin simply "repeated" the words of Karl von Clausewitz, a prominent bourgeois military ideologist. This is an obvious falsification, since Lenin and Clausewitz held basically different views concerning the interpretation of the essence of war.

Firstly, Clausewitz only considered war to be the continuation of foreign policy, whereas Lenin viewed foreign policy as an integral unity with the home policy. Lenin emphasised that the determining role in this relationship belongs to home policy.

Secondly, according to Clausewitz, politics is an expression of an impersonal "highest reason of the state" whereas, according to Lenin, it is of a definite, class, character. It serves the aims of the ruling class and is carried out by this class in order to consolidate its position.

Thirdly, the formula elaborated by Clausewitz which is underpinned by an idealistic interpretation of politics, cannot serve as a methodological basis for determining the class essence of wars, and their just or unjust character. Lenin's definition, however, is materialistic, comprehensive, more profound and richer. This means that the class essence, character, causes and sources of any war can be fully revealed. The content of Lenin's definition exposes the bourgeois lie about war as being an allegedly eternal and inevitable companion of human society. It shows that wars and armies came into being because of the exploitative system. They emerged when society divided into classes, and since then wars and armies have been used by the exploiters as a means of establishing and strengthening their domination.

One will never find anything of this kind in Clausewitz or in the works of any modern bourgeois military ideologists. All their reasoning is aimed at hiding the real essence of the exploitative classes' aggressive and predatory wars and the essence of the working classes' liberation wars from the people.

In his works Lenin devoted a lot of attention to the part economics played in war. He wrote: "In modern war ... economic organisation is of decisive importance."² In further developing the ideas of Marx and Engels about the impact exerted by the mode of production, and by

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 219.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 194 (in Russian).

the economic and political structure of society on winning a war, Lenin convincingly proved that, in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, this impact grows more and more.

For the first time in history Lenin revealed the influence the socialist states' economy has on its defensive capability. He demonstrated the socialist economy's immeasurably greater potential compared with the capitalist economy, in terms of its ability to enhance the defensive might of the state. As Lenin pointed out, "the defence potential of a country that has thrown off the yoke of capital, that has given the peasants land and has placed the banks and factories under workers' control, would be *many times* greater than the defence potential of a capitalist country"¹ Moreover, Lenin stressed that the new social system will win its final victory "only when the country has been electrified, and industry, agriculture and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry..."²

Since the very first days of Soviet power, the Communist Party has been guided by these propositions and has concentrated the efforts of the state on creating an economic basis able to ensure the reliable defence of the socialist Motherland. In order to keep the fronts supplied during the foreign invasion and Civil War, the Communist Party launched a major campaign to improve the work of industry, transport and the other branches of the economy, and supplied the Red Army with all it needed.

In carrying out these exceptionally important tasks, the Communist Party proceeded from Lenin's instructions on the unity of the front and rear, on mobilising all the state's resources so as to attain victory, and from the fact that a solid and well-organised rear is necessary to wage the war successfully.

Lenin assigned an important role to the moral factor: "In the final analysis, victory in any war depends on the spirit animating the masses that spill their own blood on the field of battle."³

Drawing on the analysis of the Red Army's victories during the foreign intervention and Civil War, Lenin disclosed the sources of the high morale shown in war defending socialism. He stated that it was not national feelings as such but people's political motives, their views and convictions that underlie the spiritual enthusiasm without which victory is inconceivable. The just and lofty aims of the war give rise to mass heroism and creative energy among the masses, and engender firm morale in the army and among the people.

Lenin fought for the viewpoint that people and military hardware, men and weapons, and the role they play in war should be considered in an interconnection and dialectical unity. However perfect the military equipment is, whatever destructive properties a weapon has, it is the people possessing high morale who are capable, in the final

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 129.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 516.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

analysis, of winning. At the same time "the best of armies, even people most sincerely devoted to the revolutionary cause will be immediately exterminated by the enemy, if they are not adequately armed, supplied with food and trained".¹

Lenin made a major contribution to the development of the art of war. Lenin's comprehensive and profound knowledge of Marxism and of the most complicated military problems, and his immense experience of the strategic and tactical guidance of the political struggle waged by the proletariat enabled him to solve many basic problems of Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics.

Lenin left a great number of carefully elaborated theoretical propositions pertaining to the organisation and conduct of operations and battles. He repeatedly stressed many key principles for conducting operations, which were of great importance to the emergence and development of the art of war. These include, for example, Lenin's conclusions about determining the main danger and the direction of the main thrust; concentrating forces and equipment at decisive places and at decisive moments; the use of various forms and methods of operations in conformity with the given situation; mastering all the enemy's possible ways and means of fighting; the decisive role of the offensive; the necessity of creating war reserves; making an objective assessment of the enemy and the inadmissibility of overrating or underrating his fighting potential; seizing and holding the initiative; courageous and decisive actions; delivering unexpected strikes; consolidating successes in good time; and persuading the enemy until he is completely destroyed.

The fundamentals of the Soviet art of war, which were evolved during the foreign intervention and the Civil War, were tested in the life-and-death battle with the enemy of the revolution and fully demonstrated their vitality. Even at that time the characteristic features of the Soviet art of war were clearly expressed: revolutionary creative activity; an irreconcilable attitude towards routine and hackneyed principles; the use of those ways and means of military operations, which the enemy did not expect; reliance on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the fighting men, who are completely devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and the October Revolution; the ability to unmistakably determine the direction of the main thrust, making use of the enemy's miscalculations and routing him piecemeal; fast and unexpected thrusts; a reasonable combination of offensive and defensive operations; flexible manoeuvring with reserves; a sparing commitment of manpower and weapons and achieving victory with small forces.

Lenin elaborated a scientific methodology for analysing and assessing wars. He demanded that a Party-motivated stand should be taken in the research, that wars should be viewed historically, in

¹ Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 76.

connection with politics, economics and other factors influencing wars.

Lenin attached a lot of importance to the study of military history. He thoroughly took into account the objective laws and the given situation and he brilliantly made use of the experience of past wars in building the Armed Forces of the first socialist state and in guiding their military operations. At the same time, Lenin warned against a mechanical application of past experience. When the historical situation changes and a need to solve different tasks arises, one should not look back and try to tackle the problems according to yesterday's methods: "A Marxist must take cognisance of real life, of the true facts of *reality*, and not cling to a theory of yesterday."¹ It is imperative to persistently master the Marxist theory and creatively apply it in everyday activities so as to be able to confidently look into the future and discharge the mission in accordance with the new conditions.

Lenin's ideas on the problems of military development, the guidance of a new, socialist military organisation, as well as his instructions to rely on the working masses, on economic and political might of the country, and on scientific achievements, are a model for the creative and scientific solution of vital problems connected with the defence of the socialist Motherland.

Lenin left a truly inexhaustible military-theoretical legacy and brilliant patterns for the theoretical and practical solution of basic issues of strategy, operational art and tactics. Lenin's contribution to the art of war is so great that he is rightly regarded as the founder of the Soviet science of war. As the time when Lenin elaborated his theoretical propositions and carried out practical military activities recedes further into the past, the depth and significance of his ideas as they apply to the further development of the Soviet science and art of war become greater. M. V. Frunze was absolutely right when he said: "Comrade Lenin is giving brilliant models of strategic and tactical art both to us and to the future generation of revolutionaries."²

The science of war and the theory and practices of the art of war as they apply to the socialist social system have been developing on the fertile soil of Lenin's military and theoretical legacy. Lenin's propositions and conclusions in the military sphere make it possible for the main trend in the further development of military and scientific thought to be determined, as well as for military practice to be adjusted according to the changing situation, for the possible course and outcome of hostilities to be foreseen and for the build-up of the Soviet Armed Forces to be correctly carried out.

In the course of its development, the Soviet science of war was enriched by fresh data, its content was constantly expanded, and its characteristic features became increasingly evident. There was a consistent search for efficient solutions to the problems connected

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 45.

² M. V. Frunze, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 198 (in Russian).

with the armed defence of the socialist Motherland and the organisation of the new army; and the laws in all spheres of the art of war were revealed along with internal interconnections and correlation with other social phenomena, with the state's social system, with its politics and economics, and with the moral strength of the people.

As early as the foreign intervention and the Civil War, *Military Affairs*, a military theoretical journal, began publication and other journals were also published which summed up the Red Army's fighting experience. They carried military-theoretical works by the top commanders and by teachers at military academies, who helped in the emergence and development of the Soviet science and art of war.

The discussion about a single military doctrine, which occurred in the military publications between 1918 and 1921 was of particular importance. M. V. Frunze took an active part in the discussion, publishing his article "A Single Military Doctrine and the Red Army" in *Army and Revolution*, a new military and scientific journal. In this article M. V. Frunze, for the first time, gave a most correct definition of a military doctrine as "a teaching adopted in the army of a given state, and establishing the character of its development in the given country; the methods for the troops' combat training; and their guidance according to established views on the character of the military tasks facing the state and the methods by which they are carried out, stemming from the class essence of the state, and determined by the level of development of the country's productive forces".¹

Later M. V. Frunze further elaborated his concepts on a single military doctrine in his report, "Military-Political Training of the Red Army", which he made at a meeting of troop commanders and commissars of the Ukraine and the Crimea on March 1, 1922, and also in his report, "The Present Basic Military Tasks", which he delivered at the meeting of military delegates to the 11th Congress of the Communist Party.

The discussion was important because at that time it was imperative to work out a single approach to developing the Armed Forces in a socialist state and to organising its defence. For the first time in the theory and history of wars and in the science of war, Soviet military-theoretical thought approached the problem of a military doctrine.

The basic elements of the military doctrine were systematised in the 1930s. The results of this work were mirrored in the manuals and regulations of the Red Army and Navy.

The Soviet science of war not only developed together with the Armed Forces but also looked courageously to the future. It revealed the combat capabilities of the new army; the sources of the unparalleled moral and combat qualities of its servicemen; and the main ways in which to improve weapons and equipment and their use. The Soviet science of war involved an analysis of the future

¹ M. V. Frunze, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 8 (in Russian).

conditions in which the Armed Forces were to defend the socialist gains of the Soviet people and contained the methods for solving strategic tasks.

The years of peaceful respite were especially fruitful for the Soviet science and art of war. That period was marked by tremendous creative efforts from the Communist Party and the whole Soviet people to restore the economy which had been dislocated by the two wars and to build a socialist society. Considerable attention was then devoted to strengthening the defensive capability of our country, building up the might of the Armed Forces and developing the science and art of war.

When the period of peace started, the Soviet science of war faced a great number of pressing problems, the most urgent of which were as follows: the way in which the Armed Forces would be built up; methods of training and educating the personnel; uniting ideas on tactics, operational art and strategy, and training commanders, as well as many other questions to which there were no ready answers. The Soviet science of war successfully tackled the problems it faced.

The problems pertaining to the formation of the Red Army were solved along basically new lines. As was already noted, the mixed territorial and regular system of enlisting the Armed Forces' personnel, which was adopted, was in full accord with the conditions prevailing at the time. It ensured that the troops' battle-worthiness was maintained at the necessary level with the lowest possible cost, which was important at the time when the country's economy was beginning to regain its feet. It is to the credit of military and theoretical thought that, in this highly important matter, it succeeded in finding flexible ways in which to develop the army of a new type and to consolidate the Soviet Union's defence capability taking the home and international situation into account.

Research and theoretical generalisations about the art of war were carried out on a large scale, making it possible for new manuals and regulations, determining the day-to-day life and fighting of the troops, to be elaborated for the Armed Forces. They reflected that military experience of the past which retained its significance together with the Red Army's and Navy's combat experience, the experience of the way in which they had been developed, the experience of combat and operational training, and the tasks connected with the defence of the socialist state. That was the first and most important result of Soviet military research, which laid the foundations for the theoretical and practical solution of the problem of a single military doctrine for the Red Army.

As the Armed Forces were equipped with modern weapons and their organisational structure was improved, the fighting capability of the troops increased and their fire power and manoeuvrability grew. The boundaries and scale of military research expanded, making it possible for a new approach to be taken to solving the problems of the art of war, and for the necessary changes to be made in the ways and

means of conducting military operations, and in the manuals and regulations.

The Soviet science of war entered the stage of maturity. A tangible contribution to its development was made by M. V. Frunze. Apart from elaborating the problems of the Soviet military doctrine, he arrived at important conclusions on a number of other urgent issues associated with Soviet military development. In his works *Front and Rear in a Future War, Results and Prospects for Military Development, Lenin and the Red Army* and other theoretical writings, as well as in reports and speeches at Party congresses and plenary meetings of the Party's Central Committee, M. V. Frunze developed his ideas about the character of a future war; the ways to conduct military operations, improve the arms of the service and their organisation and role in the war; and the correlation between man and weapons. He also dealt with problems concerning strategy, operational art and tactics, the Party's political work, training and educating the personnel, and so on.

At that time the Soviet science of war brought forth a whole galaxy of military scholars who adhered to Marxism-Leninism, and B. M. Shaposhnikov was the first among them. His three-volume work *The Brain of the Army* was published in the late 1920s. In this book, B. M. Shaposhnikov, on the strength of his analysis of a great amount of historical data, and his examination of the possible nature of a future war, demonstrated the role and functions of the General Staff and expounded a number of ideas about military strategy, about elaborating plans for an armed defence of the state, and about strategic guidance.

M. N. Tukhachevsky also devoted much attention to analysing the problems of war and military strategy. His works, such as *National and Class Strategy, Problems of Modern Strategy and The Nature of Border Operations* revealed the content and scale of a future war, expounded its strategical principles and contained a thorough analysis of the initial stage of war, the opportunities for new types of fighting services and arms of the service and their use, and also a number of other problems.

A considerable contribution to the development of the science and art of war was also made by V. A. Alafuzov, N. Y. Varfolomeyev, K. I. Velichko, L. A. Govorov, V. D. Grendal, A. I. Yegorov, I. S. Isakov, K. B. Kalinovsky, D. M. Karbyshev, A. K. Kolenkovsky, S. N. Krasilnikov, A. N. Lapchinsky, S. A. Mezheninov, V. K. Triandafillov, I. P. Uborevich, Y. A. Shilovsky, I. E. Yakir, and others.

In years between the two world wars, the Soviet science of war, on the whole, correctly solved the problems connected with determining the nature of the impending war, with the ways and means of its conduct, and with the development of the Armed Forces. In particular, it was assumed that a war against the Soviet Union would be waged by a coalition of imperialist powers, and the two sides would pursue decisive ends. Military operations would be very mobile. At

the same time, a chance for positional warfare was also presupposed in some theatres and operational sectors. Hence, an offensive was regarded as the main type of military operations; defence was considered to be a forced type of action whose chief aim was to create conditions for a subsequent transition to the offensive.

Operational art was further improved. It began to be regarded as an independent part of the art of war, together with strategy and tactics. This is an important achievement for Soviet military and theoretical thought which correctly discerned the tendencies in the development of military affairs and profoundly revealed the interconnection and interdependence of the components of the art of war.

On the whole, in elaborating the key problems of military theory and practice, the Soviet science of war was not inferior to the bourgeois science of war in the developed capitalist states. Moreover, in many aspects it was even superior. It gave a more correct and objective assessment of war phenomena and confidently and far-sightedly solved the vital issues of strategy, operational art and tactics.

For example, the theory of fighting in depth, elaborated by the Soviet science of war in the mid-1930s, mirrored the qualitative changes that has occurred in technical equipment of the troops. In the West where one-sided concepts such as "air warfare", "tank warfare", which overestimated separate types of weaponry, were in the vogue, military theorists were unable to achieve such generalisations. The Soviet theory of fighting in depth was a basically new theory about waging war by mass, highly mobile and well-equipped armies. The main idea was to strike a simultaneous blow into the entire depth of the enemy's defence, destroying his main grouping through decisive offensive by infantry and the mass use of aircraft, artillery, tanks and airborne troops.

The fundamental propositions of this theory exerted a tangible impact on the course of combat and operational training in the Red Army, and later they underlay its offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War. To a certain extent, the propositions contained in the theory of fighting in depth have retained their significance even to this day.

The Soviet theory of fighting in depth radically differed from the concept of "total war and blitzkrieg" which dominated in Nazi Germany and was erroneous and could not stand the test of time. The blitzkrieg concept did not correspond to the combat capacity of Hitler's army, was designed for use against a weak and unprepared enemy and involved adventurist methods of warfare.

The theoretical propositions of the Soviet science of war were tested in exercises, and some were even tested during the Red Army's fighting near the Khasan Lake, the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the Soviet-Finnish military conflict. Some conclusions were drawn from the experience gained in this fighting, making it possible for definite problems of military theory and the further training of the Armed Forces to be specified and developed. For example, it was vividly

demonstrated that a rapid and uninterrupted advance is a decisive guarantee for success in an offensive operation; the troops must not only be ready to conduct mobile action in the operational depth of the enemy's defence, but also to break through well-organised defensive lines; tactical success should be immediately developed into operational success, for which purpose it is imperative to prepare large mobile formations; the defence line should be deep and capable of repulsing large masses of tanks and withstanding a massive attack from enemy aircraft and artillery. Theoretical conclusions were drawn and practical measures taken to improve the organisational structure of the troops, better their technical equipment and material supply, and to enrich the content, forms and methods of training and educating the personnel in accordance with the requirements of a future war.

At the same time, the Red Army's lack of fighting experience and of the necessary spare time to think over and sum up the experience of the Second World War, which had just started, resulted in some erroneous theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations. In particular, it was wrongly assumed that large-scale fighting would always be preceded by a period of mobilisation and strategic deployment; the possibility of the enemy secretly deploying and unexpectedly attacking was not fully taken into account; and the importance of the Soviet troops going over to strategic defence was underestimated. On the basis of a one-sided approach to studying the limited experience of the war in Spain, an unsubstantiated conclusion was drawn about the inadvisability of having large tank formations.

Despite these shortcomings which, in the main, were of an objective nature and were subsequently removed, the research done by the Soviet science of war, on the whole, in the inter-war period provided the Red Army with a solid theoretical basis for successfully conducting military operations in the forthcoming battles with the fascist aggressors.

2. Test of Maturity

The Soviet science and art of war were shown to be very mature during the Great Patriotic War. They successfully withstood the test of fire, and were shown to be superior to the bourgeois science and art of war. This can be seen from the Red Army's outstanding victories in the complicated military-political situation, when the alignment of forces was sometimes unfavourable to us.

The leaders of the USA and Britain at the time were compelled to admit the unquestionable superiority of the Soviet science and art of war. US President Franklin Roosevelt noted: "Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that has skilful leadership, sound organisation, adequate training and above all determination to defeat

the enemy....”¹ Winston Churchill wrote that “future generations will acknowledge their debt to the Red Army as unreservedly as do we who have lived to witness these proud achievements”.²

Our enemies, too, paid a tribute of involuntary respect for the Soviet art of war. H. Guderian, a Nazi General, noted that during the Second World War Soviet Command were very able in the military field. He wrote: “During the Second World War it turned out that in the military sphere the Russian leadership was good and their technical and tactical achievements were at a proper height.”

The war was not only a test of the maturity of the science and art of war, but also an important stage of their accelerated development.

The Soviet science and art of war went through their first tests under exceptionally complicated and unfavourable conditions, created by the enemy’s perfidious attack. When the war broke out, the Soviet Armed Forces had to solve two difficult problems simultaneously: strategically deploy and throw back the enemy, and this whilst they lacked time, forces and equipment. From the start, the Soviet Army encountered many unexpected factors, operational and tactical novelties, and numerous technical “surprises” which the Nazi troops used on a large scale, hoping to quickly break the Red Army’s resistance. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was attacked by overwhelming forces, the Soviet troops stood fast and displayed valour and tenacity, thereby frustrating Hitler’s blitzkrieg plan.

Alongside the unparalleled heroism of the Soviet soldiers and sailors in the fierce battles during the initial period of the war, the top command of the Armed Forces, the commanders at all levels, the staffs, political bodies and Party organisations showed their profound military knowledge, skill and high organisational abilities. Our commanders correctly and profoundly assessed the operational and tactical situation, putting up powerful defence and, by skilfully manoeuvring, launching counter-attacks, harassing the Hitlerite invaders and halting their offensive. The Soviet Command and the Soviet troops quickly saw through the enemy’s incidious schemes, thwarted his plans and, in the final analysis, wrested the strategic initiative.

In these difficult conditions, the Soviet science and art of war had to solve the problems posed by the war.

The complicated nature of the battle situation made exceptionally great demands on Soviet strategy, operational art and tactics, which constantly developed, improved and became more viable in the defensive battles and particularly during offensive operations. In this respect the Soviet troops’ counter-offensive outside Moscow was a major stage, as a result of which a big group of the German troops was defeated and the front line was moved westwards for hundreds of

¹ *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1957, pp. 57, 58.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, pp. 305, 306.

kilometres. It is indicative that this victory was achieved when the forces were equal in general with the German troops having some superior equipment to the Soviet troops.

The Red Army's decisive transition from a long defence to the offensive proved unexpected. The group of Nazi troops which was defeated was the very one, on which the political and military leaders of the Third Reich had pinned their main hopes for a victorious consummation of the war in the East.

Such a radical turn of events, which decisively influenced the entire course of the Second World War, naturally, was not accidental. It was anticipated and systematically prepared by the General Headquarters, who created strategic reserves in advance, moved them up on the flanks of the enemy forces by-passing Moscow, and who skilfully committed them to action. The moment of transition to the counter-offensive was determined with a high degree of accuracy. The blow was delivered when the enemy, bled white in the protracted and difficult offensive, had had no time to regroup his troops to defend or consolidate their captured ground.

The counter-offensive at Stalingrad, which also started with a parity of forces and equipment, resulted in the encirclement and rout of a big enemy grouping, and was a genuine triumph for the Soviet art of war. For the conduct of that operation the advantages of our outflanking position were effectively utilised. The enemy had moved far eastward and had been worn down in the previous fighting. The fact that the enemy's flanks were poorly protected was also taken into account. A skilful choice of directions for the main thrusts, a secret concentration and deployment of strategic reserves, thorough planning and provision of material support for the operation, the concentration of forces and equipment at the chosen jump-off points, surprise, rapid advance using tank and mechanised formations, and, finally, the valour and heroism of the Soviet officers and men resulted in the great victory for the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad.

The history of the art of war knows many examples of an army encircling large groupings of the enemy. However, the feat performed by the Soviet troops during that historic battle surpassed all the previous examples. Today, it is the Stalingrad encirclement and not the classic Cannae that became a model for the art of war.

The Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk also demonstrated their good knowledge of the art of war. Here the ability of the Soviet Command to profoundly and thoroughly assess the situation, draw well-grounded conclusions, foresee the possible development of hostilities, and creatively solve strategic and operational problems demonstrated itself with fresh force.

The achievements of the Soviet science and art of war were multiplied in many other brilliantly conducted offensives. They were characterised by creative and purposeful planning, corresponding to the given situation, a crafty choice of time and direction for the main attack, bold concentrations of forces and equipment at the main jump-off points, broad scope, flexibility in choosing ways to conduct

the fighting and wide manoeuvring with forces and equipment so as to smash the enemy. The operations were completely supported and conducted with exceptional determination and all-out effort.

The successes of Soviet fighting technique were immediately summed up and developed in military-theoretical thought. The scope of war-time research grew rather than diminished. This was promoted by the fact that the top commanders of the Armed Forces, commanders and headquarters of fronts, armies, fleets, as well as commanders and staffs of small formations skilfully applied the ideas worked out in the science of war, creatively developed them, and came up with fresh, often unusual, solutions to the problems pertaining to the art of war.

The science of war proceeded from the general aim of the war—completely routing the aggressor—and research was carried out, having in mind the specific enemy and the specific conditions of the battle situation. Military and scientific thought resolutely and boldly discarded everything that did not correspond to the nature of the war, specified and further developed propositions formulated before the war, whose correctness had been confirmed by the fighting. Simultaneously the new problems brought by the war were theoretically substantiated.

The conclusions drawn within the framework of the science of war during the war years were in conformity with the character of the war and contributed in every possible way to the development of the art of war, to the improvement of weaponry and military hardware and to the development of the Armed Forces.

The art of war made an especially weighty contribution to *strategy*, in particular, to the summing-up and elaboration of the problems relating to a strategic offensive. During the Great Patriotic War, one form of strategic offensive to emerge was an operation on several fronts with the participation of all services of the Armed Forces. This was given wide theoretical substantiation. Its most characteristic features are as follows: the determined nature of its aims, its broad scale, the use of masses of troops, rapid advance, and its achievement of palpable military, political and strategic results. As a rule, these operations ended in the defeat of large enemy groupings, and the seizure of important political centres and economic and strategic areas. At the concluding stage of the war, as a result of these operations, some countries, which were allies of nazi Germany, ceased to be belligerents.

In the science of war a lot of attention was devoted to elaborating the counter-offensive. There is every reason to regard it as an efficient way of acting in the struggle to win the strategic initiative. A skilful application of this method at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk resulted in the defeat of large enemy groupings and the development of a counter-offensive into an overall offensive of the Soviet troops. The solution of the new problem—the consistent and simultaneous conduct of strategic operations by groups of fronts united under a

single GHQ plan—was an outstanding success for military and theoretical thought.

Carrying out successive operations made it possible for the most advantageous directions to be chosen and, during the fighting, for surprise strikes on the enemy to be carried out, to pin down his reserves, impose our will on him and to hold the strategic initiative. By manoeuvring, an overwhelming superiority over the enemy was created in the chosen directions and he was defeated piecemeal.

In the final stage of the war, due to the growing fighting strength of the Soviet Armed Forces and the accumulation of strategic reserves, an opportunity emerged for the simultaneous and uninterrupted conduct of large-scale offensive operations almost all along the Soviet-German front. That was a very effective way of carrying out military operations and resulted in a deep breaching of the Nazi troops' strategic front in several sectors, deprived them of the ability to manoeuvre with their reserves, or to take other counter-measures to restore the situation. All this, in the final analysis, accelerated the defeat of the enemy.

Various types of operations were used: encirclement, with the enemy troops either destroyed or taken prisoner, through a two-pronged attack meeting at one point and with the enemy's groupings being further divided, and the development of the offensive in depth; striking one or several frontal blows whilst dividing the enemy's groupings and developing the offensive on the flanks and in depth; striking one blow and subsequent pressing of the enemy's groupings up against a natural obstacle and there destroying them or taking them prisoner.

The Soviet Armed Forces brilliantly mastered the sophisticated art of encirclement. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad, 22 enemy divisions were encircled, routed or taken prisoner. Out of 130 Nazi divisions smashed in 1944 alone, over 50 per cent were destroyed or taken prisoner, as the result of encirclement. The Soviet troops' Berlin and Prague offensive operations ended in gigantic encirclements in which the Nazi Wehrmacht ceased to exist.

The success of encirclement largely depended on the exactingness and co-ordination of the troops, flexibility of strategic guidance, and continuous logistic support. The Soviet science of war also made a tangible contribution to solving these and other problems.

The war showed that under some conditions the Armed Forces have to resort to strategic defence as well as to the strategic offensive. Because little attention was unfortunately devoted to the creative elaboration on this type of operations in the pre-war period, this had to be done during the fighting.

The characteristic features of the Soviet troops' defence were as follows: a big depth; the large number of defensive positions; a flexible fire system; careful preparation of the positions; consistent efforts by firm adherence to the prepared defensive lines, artillery and aircraft counter-strikes in the critical sectors; decisive counter-attacks

and counter-blows by the second echelons and reserves, and manoeuvres to shift the efforts from one direction to another.

Such a defence system made it possible to wear down the enemy, inflict big losses on him, gain time to accumulate our forces and equipment, and prepare for a counter-offensive. The Red Army's defensive operations at Moscow, Stalingrad, in the foothills of the Caucasus, and at the Kursk Bulge are good examples of this.

Much that was new was introduced to *the operational art and tactics* of all arms of the services during the war. In the Land Forces, the pre-war views on the conduct of offensive and defensive operations by armies or groups of armies were developed. The problems of destroying the enemy by fire in the course of an offensive were given new thought. Efficiency in bombardment was achieved through skilfully and consistently organised artillery and aircraft strikes, ensuring uninterrupted fire attack against the enemy, who is on the defensive, along the entire depth to which the friendly troops are committed.

These pre-war ideas of deep-thrust operations underpinned the offensive operation concept. This was enriched by new ideas, particularly those connected with the conduct of in-depth operations by an army or an army group. The problems of breaking through the enemy's defences were fully resolved, and this was achieved through a skilful concentration of forces and equipment on the main axis of advance, a deep operational order of battle of armies and fronts; surprise attacks; powerful aircraft and artillery strikes; and reliable neutralisation of the enemy by fire over the entire depth of his defences. The creation of mobile forces within armies and fronts out of tank and mechanised units was a qualitatively new element which ensured a gradual stepping-up of efforts in operational depth, more rapid advance so that the attack was more resolute and flexible, and had greater efficiency.

The problems pertaining to the stability of operational defence, especially anti-tank defence, were further elaborated. The system of anti-tank areas, anti-tank artillery reserves, mobile obstacle-setting detachments, anti-tank mine-fields extending in depth, above all, in tank-hazardous sectors, operational defence in depth fortified in advance gave our troops an opportunity to repulse the enemy's tank offensives and frustrate his schemes.

The new theory of using tank armies in the second echelons of the fronts to deliver powerful counter-blows and to independently conduct defensive operations considerably helped in raising the efficiency of operational defence, improved its stability, and created opportunities for an immediate transition to the counter-offensive and helped in the latter's development into a general offensive.

Tactics were also enriched by a number of new principles. The fundamentals of the offensive combat were mainly developing along the lines of concentrating forces and equipment at narrow sectors, a deeper order of battle, a reduction in the time assigned for artillery

bombardment with a simultaneous increase in its fire power, continuous artillery and aircraft strikes against the enemy immediately followed by an attack, flexible manoeuvring with the forces and equipment, and securing interaction from the beginning to the end of the battle.

The Soviet troops' improved tactical skill could be seen in the constant growth of the speed and depth of their break-throughs of the enemy's defensive lines. In the course of the operations conducted between 1944 and 1945, the main defence line was usually penetrated on the very first day of the offensive. Frequently, although additional mobile forces were also committed to action, it proved possible to overcome the entire tactical zone of the enemy's defence within the first twenty-four hours, and this favourably affected the further course of the offensive.

Much attention was also devoted to the theory and practice of the meeting engagement, whose share was steadily growing because of the overall increase of the dynamic character of military operations. Some principles of defence were also elaborated anew, for example, defending a wide frontage with limited forces. The aims of this sort of defence were achieved by concentrating on preserving the key positions and objectives, skilfully organising the fire system from all types of weapons, large-scale use of artificial obstacles, flexible manoeuvring with forces and weapons, and high activity of the troops.

The "island" defence which was used at the initial stage of the war did not justify itself. The evolution of the defence was accompanied by an increasing growth in its depth, fire power, anti-tank resistance, activity and manoeuvrability. Soviet troops met massive attacks of tanks and infantry with a deeply echeloned defence which proved impassable. In the most important sectors the depth of the tactical zone reached twenty kilometres. The defences were based on the combination of strong-points, a well-equipped and ramified network of trenches, communication passages, well-organised fire systems, artificial obstacles and a concentration of anti-tank weapons on the path where the tanks were expected to appear.

On the whole Soviet tactics was marked by flexibility, determination, new forms and means of operations, manoeuvrability and dynamism.

The problems of the tactics and operational art of the Soviet Air Force, Navy, Air Defence Forces were further developed and theoretically elaborated.

The war demanded of the science of war theoretical substantiations and practical recommendations on the improvement of *technical equipment and the organisational structure of the Armed Forces*. When tackling these problems, military and scientific thought based itself on the real economic potential of the Soviet Union, on the level of training of the servicemen, the character of war, and also on the conditions in which the enemy found itself, i. e., the strength of his Army and Navy and the state of the art of war.

Analysing and creatively studying the use of various types of weapons and hardware in battlefield situations, and also taking into account the achievements of the scientific and technological progress, military theory was concentrated on finding out the tendencies and prospects for the development of the means of warfare. This helped the war industry create more perfect types of weapons and equipment, increase their production, and ensured military and technological superiority over the enemy. Proceeding from this principle, the technical equipment of the troops and their organisational structure were constantly improved.

The war demonstrated that the Soviet Armed Forces have mastered all means, forms and methods of combat and the skill of correctly combining them and of the transition from one method to another on a tactical, operational and strategic plane.

The commanders of the Army and Navy and the Soviet military theorists creatively solved major problems of the theory and practice of the art of war and contributed to its development. Soviet commanders used the experience of war, drew correct theoretical and practical conclusions, displayed innovation in accomplishing combat missions, and defeated the enemy according to the principles of the Soviet science and art of war.

The war convincingly showed that the Soviet science of war correctly understood the nature and essence of the art of war. Bourgeois military theorists often take an idealistic and subjectivist approach to this problem. Many of them underestimate the laws governing the art of war, and overestimate the part played by personality and fortuity—"war luck"—in the war. The formula of Clausewitz to the effect that in war "talent and genius act out of law" is still current among them. These obviously anti-scientific theories were also current among Hitler's generals. This is borne out by many facts, primarily the collapse of the nazi strategy against the Soviet Union.

Tackling the problems of the nature and essence of the art of war, the Soviet science of war has always proceeded from the fundamental principles of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. The talent and abilities of a commander are, of course, of great importance during a war but a commander does not act "out of law". He must take into account and skilfully use objective conditions, laws of war and principles of the art of war. Only then will a commander be able to display all his creative abilities and win.

Thus, the Soviet science and art of war were developed actively and fruitfully during the war years. They were steadily built up during the hard battle with the strong enemy, and were enriched by new principles and conclusions. Their aim was to ensure the complete defeat of the enemy.

Military and theoretical thought developed on a solid objective basis. It took the improvement of the troops' weapons and technical equipment into account along with their high morale and fighting skills, the constant improvement in organisation, and also the changes

in the organisation, armaments and the character of the operations conducted by the enemy troops.

In many respects the fighting experience and theoretical ideas from the war have not lost their significance to this day, and their study, creative mastering and use is a major task for the Soviet science of war.

3. A New Upswing

The Soviet science of war was greatly developed in the post-war years. This was a continuation in the summing-up and creative analysis of the experience of the Second World War. At the same time this involved a study of the basic trends in improving modern weapons and military hardware, an examination of their impact on the methods of military operations and organisational structure of the Army and Navy, an analysis of the character of possible wars in the future, and the solving of basic problems relating to the development of the art of war, and other problems of the development of the Armed Forces.

Military and historical research plays an important part in elaborating the problems confronted by the science of war. Whilst summing up the fighting experience, it makes a tangible contribution to the understanding of the essence and character of modern warfare and the art of war, and to the studying of the basic military problems. Proceeding from the fighting experience of the past, Soviet military and theoretical thought has successfully examined the problems of strategy, operational art and tactics, of training and educating the troops, and logistic support. It has also determined the prospects for improving weapons and hardware and studies other problems pertaining to the development of the Armed Forces.

It is self-evident that as the Army and Navy are developing and being equipped with new types of weapons, especially nuclear missiles, and the methods and forms of military operations, and the organisational structure of the troops, have changed, the experience gained in past wars has proved insufficient. Life itself demanded that, alongside the studying of historic experience, the problems of modern warfare, the impact of the scientific and technological revolution on the military theories and practices, and the radical changes in the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as in the armies of probable opponents and in the world's military-political situation, be studied more carefully and thoroughly. Soviet military theoretical thought has increasingly looked to the future.

The CPSU Central Committee has taken constant care of the further development of the Soviet science of war. It permanently and timely urges the commanders and military scholars to master the Marxist-Leninist methodology in their research of war, to creatively solve the pressing tasks relating to military methods, and to fully use the growing fighting potential of the Army and Navy.

Critiques and the theoretical studies of major exercises and games, military scientific conferences and meetings held in the central guiding bodies, military districts, groups of forces and in the fleets, military educational establishments, as well as the experience of combat and operational training make an important contribution to the development of the science of war.

Soviet military theoretical thought pays a lot of attention to studying the modern military and political situation, the character of wars and military conflicts unleashed by imperialists, and foreign military theoretical thought. It firmly and confidently upholds the Marxist-Leninist theory on war and the army, and exposes the falsifiers of history, above all of the history of the Second World War, who try to belittle the part played by the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the rout of nazi Germany and militarist Japan, and spread lies and slander about the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army and Navy.

Soviet military theoretical thought has scored considerable results in further examining the problems of military doctrine, the main trends and directions in the development of the Armed Forces, and in their preparations to counter aggression.

What is the essence of the Soviet interpretation of *military doctrine*?

Generally a doctrine means a teaching, a scientific or philosophical theory, a system of guiding principles and views. Hence, a military doctrine means an officially adopted system of views on the character of war, the methods of warfare, and the given country's and army's preparations for war.

A military doctrine answers, at least, the following basic questions:

- what kind of enemy will the country have to deal with in a probable war;
- what is the character of the war in which a state and its armed forces will have to take part, and what will be the aims and tasks in the war;
- what forces will be necessary to fulfil the tasks and what direction military developments will follow;
- how should the preparations for war be carried out;
- what will the means of warfare be.

These questions constitute the main content of a military doctrine. Their correct solution gives a definite, purposeful nature to the country's and army's preparation for a possible war, and provides for the armed forces to be in high state of readiness.

A military doctrine is the outcome of a sophisticated process of development of state ideas pertaining to the solution of military tasks. All these basic propositions stem from the real situation, primarily, from the home and foreign policies, the socio-political and economic system, the level of production, the state of the means of warfare, and the geographical situation both of a given state and the probable enemy. In the final analysis, the entire content of a military doctrine is determined by the character of the social system of the state, and by

its policies. Military theoretical thought reveals and sums up separate elements of a military doctrine, and brings them together into a harmonious system, which is in conformity with the conclusions of the science of war and the requirements of the art of war. In its turn, a military doctrine also influences military theoretical thought, making the latter's efforts to solve the problems of great practical significance.

In a capitalist state, where relations of private ownership dominate and where there is a dictatorship of bourgeoisie, a military doctrine is reactionary and anti-communist. It is based on the urge of the imperialist aggressive forces to destroy the world socialist system and to subjugate other countries economically and politically. Military doctrine in socialist countries is based on the progressive ideas of defending the socialist gains of the working people, peace and the security of nations.

Each state has its own military doctrine. Neither in the past, nor in the present has any country or a group of countries ever started a war without a military doctrine of their own or without adhering to the doctrines of their more powerful allies.

During the Second World War, Hitler Germany's military doctrine overtly expressed the reactionary, racialist and predatory policies of nazism, sought world domination and was spearheaded, above all, against the Soviet Union.

In the Second World War, the military doctrines of the USA, Britain and France mirrored their social systems, and the interests of the capitalist monopolies. The ruling quarters of these states were not interested in a complete rout of nazism. Their main aim was as follows: to defeat Germany and Japan as their economic competitors; to weaken the Soviet Union in every way possible; and to ensure for themselves world domination. Their military doctrines bore an imprint of the Munich policy of connivance. Hence, their strategic plans and actions were dual and contradictory.

It is the doctrine of the United States of America that should be mentioned first among the present military doctrines. Its main idea is to establish US world hegemony. This idea was proclaimed by US President H. Truman who in his message to Congress in 1945 stressed that "the victory which we have won has placed upon the American people continuing burden of responsibility for world leadership".¹ Later on this proposition was more than once declared by other US Presidents.

In order to translate their schemes into reality, US Government stationed considerable armed forces in key areas of the world, and, in particular, in Europe and Asia. Moreover, it has no intention of bringing them back to the United States.

In recent decades the aggressive essence of the US military doctrine remained unchanged. However, its content was amended from time to time because of the constant shifts in the alignment of

¹ *The New York Times*, December 20, 1945.

world socio-political forces, occurring, primarily, under the impact of the growing might of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist community. This finds its expression in a regular change of US strategic concepts.

In 1950s, US military doctrine was based on the strategy of "mass retaliation" which presupposed the conduct of nuclear war alone against the Soviet Union. In 1961, because of the USSR's increased nuclear strike force, the USA adopted a strategy of "flexible response" which was subsequently imposed on the other NATO countries. This strategy provided for a "limited" use of military force, depending on the "scale of the emergent danger". A provision was made for waging a war against the socialist states, first, by conventional weapons for a short span of time, then with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and later with strategic nuclear weapons, if a critical situation arose.

In 1971, the USA adopted another variant of the strategy of "flexible response"—the strategy of "realistic deterrent". The latter is based on the following three main principles: superiority in strategic arms; partnership with a considerable increase in the allies' military commitments; and negotiations based on force. According to US leaders, this strategy improves the "flexible response", in particular the latter's dependence on possible efforts by the enemy and, providing for pre-emptive actions, gives an opportunity to constantly intimidate the enemy by the use of all forces and means at the disposal of the USA and its allies. The aim of the "realistic deterrent" strategy is to consolidate the leading role of the USA in the military blocs it has created, to mobilise the economic and military potentials of its allies for the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and against the national liberation movement and the working people in the capitalist countries who support social emancipation. Militarily, the "realistic deterrent" strategy presupposes the creation of forces which can guarantee the destruction of the enemy. Thus, this concept, when compared with the "flexible response" strategy, is even more aggressive.

Another strategic concept, the "selected target" strategy, recently emerged in the USA. In essence it boils down to the following: to use strategic nuclear weapons chiefly against our strategic missiles, nuclear weapon dumps, airfields, troop concentrations and other important military objectives so as to frustrate the Soviet Union's retaliatory attack as well as using them against Soviet cities.

Soviet military doctrine differs sharply from the military doctrines of the capitalist states. It is a system of scientifically substantiated views of the essence, character and means of waging a war which may be imposed on the Soviet Union, and also of the requirements for military development and the preparation of our Armed Forces and the country to defeat the aggressor. It is not by chance that we consider the Soviet military doctrine to be scientifically substantiated. Its propositions are based on the laws of dialectical and historical materialism, Lenin's teaching on the armed defence of the

socialist Motherland, and the laws of the Soviet science of war. In this aspect it radically differs from the military doctrines of the capitalist states, which express the aggressive ambitions of imperialism, and attempts to hold back the objective process of historical development of human society on the path towards socialism and communism.

The entire content of the Soviet military doctrine can be divided into two mutually connected groups of problems: political and military. The political content of Soviet military doctrine stems from the USSR's socialist social system, the policies pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and the vital interests of the Soviet people. In general, it boils down to the following; the Soviet Union, as a socialist state, has nothing in common with predatory war; it does not need any expansion of its borders, but what belongs to the Soviet people and has been created by it will be defended with determination.

The military content of the Soviet military doctrine is fully reflected in our manuals and regulations. They all are permeated with a spirit of high energy and decisive action in order to completely rout any aggressor who may encroach upon the socialist Motherland.

The entire development of the Soviet Armed Forces—their technical equipment, organisation, and methods of training and education of the personnel—is permeated by the ideas about active offensive and defensive, and of the decisive and complete rout of the enemy. This ensues from Lenin's instructions. He wrote: "... hegemony in a war goes to him who fights most energetically, who never misses a chance to strike a blow at the enemy."¹

The Soviet military doctrine, particularly its military part, adapts itself to the times. It is being amended and developed according to the alignment of political forces in the world and the policy pursued by the state. It depends on the state of the country's economy, the improvement of weapons, and the growth of the combat potential of the Armed Forces. However, its class essence is preserved. The Soviet doctrine is a doctrine of a peace-loving socialist state, a doctrine of the armed defence of the socialist gains of the Soviet people and the state interests of the USSR aimed at guaranteeing favourable external conditions for the building of communism in the Soviet Union, wherein lies its vitality and strength.

The Soviet military doctrine attracts increasing attention in the capitalist states. Numerous books and articles are being published and many lectures delivered on the subject. Some authors falsify events and facts and try to discredit the Soviet military doctrine and give a false notion about it. Other authors, who are more sober-minded, try to understand the Soviet doctrine, study the general fundamentals of Soviet military development and the principles of the Soviet art of war, and, as bourgeois authors themselves put it, reconstruct "the anatomy of the Soviet Armed Forces" and the causes of their

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 79.

invincibility. They regard the Soviet military doctrine as dynamic and realistic and corresponding to the Soviet Union's potential.

We have never concealed the basic, principled propositions of the Soviet military doctrine. They are clearly expressed in the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and in the state of our Armed Forces. One should understand the consistent peace-loving policy of the Soviet state and its full conformity with the vital interests of the Soviet people and with the whole of progressive mankind in order to understand its vitality and strength.

Interpreting the essence of war is the cornerstone of military doctrine in any state. In this matter the Soviet science of war is guided by Lenin's definition of the essence of war as the continuation of the policy by other, violent, means. He wrote: "The policy which a given state, a given class within that state, pursued for a long time before the war, is inevitably continued by that same class during the war, the form of action alone being changed."¹ In order to understand war, it is necessary, as Lenin taught, to "examine the policy pursued prior to the war, the policy that led to and brought about the war."² That is why if one is to have a correct understanding of the essence of modern wars, one should take into account the content of the policies pursued by different states, and their influence on the international situation.

Bourgeois military theorists propagate quite a different viewpoint. They mostly try to gloss over the basic issue in understanding of the essence of war: its political content, causes and aims. They regard war either as a "mere" armed clash between the sides, and rivalry with the use of weapons, or reduce it to the urge of one side to impose its will on the other by force of arms. In other words, they emasculate the political content of the concept of war.

There are also some other bourgeois military theorists, who mention the political essence of war but gloss over the class character of politics, thus trying to show that wars unleashed by the monopoly reactionaries allegedly meet the interests of the entire people in the given capitalist state. Acting in this way, bourgeois ideologists, to please their masters, try to conceal the true essence of imperialist wars from the working people, and make them shed their blood for interests which are alien to them.

The Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and its fundamental propositions on the essence and causes of wars have constantly been attacked by bourgeois ideologists. Distorting the Leninist interpretation of the essence of war as the continuation of politics by violent means, they resort to gross falsification about the correlation between war and politics, and try to belittle Lenin's role in elaborating the teaching of the essence of war. They have created and feverishly support the myth about the "Soviet menace" to the world, spreading lies to the effect that the sources of wars in our age spring

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 400.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 33.

not from the aggressive nature of imperialism, but from the ideology of communism and the imaginary urge of the Soviet state to "export revolution" to the capitalist countries. In spreading these concoctions, bourgeois ideologists go out of their way to inculcate in the minds of the peoples in capitalist countries a distorted concept about the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union.

However, they find it more and more difficult to lead the masses astray. The people are increasingly coming to realise the true causes of wars, and understand who is the genuine culprit, who tells lies, and who tells the truth about war. And the truth is that the source of wars lies in the aggressive nature of imperialism.

Melvin Laird, a former US Defence Secretary, in his testimony to the Congress in February 1972, listed the wars which, as he saw it, were possible in this day and age. They are as follows: a strategic nuclear war, a nuclear war on the theatre of war, a conventional war on the theatre of war and a conventional war on the theatre of operations or within a limited area of that theatre. However, M. Laird made no mention of the political and class essence of these wars. There is no doubt that the unleashing of any of these wars by an imperialist state would have been the continuation of their aggressive politics. Moreover, according to the "Guam Doctrine", the USA should not necessarily take a direct part in these wars. The US strategy of "realistic deterrent" places the main emphasis on "partnership", on its allies taking a more active part in aggressive blocs (NATO, SEATO, CENTO and others) in the implementation of the US military political schemes, including the struggle against the national liberation movement.

The world has already witnessed some of the wars mentioned by M. Laird. These are the wars waged by the USA against the peoples of Korea and Vietnam, the war against the Arab countries waged by Israel which is supported by US reactionary circles, and the war of fascist Portugal against the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, whose peoples were enslaved by her. All these wars, unleashed by aggressive imperialist powers, were unjust and predatory. However, for the peoples and states who were victims of aggression, and who were upholding their right to independent development, they were just wars of liberation.

The situation in the world, the confrontation between the forces of progress and reaction, socialism and imperialism, and the fact that the armies of a number of countries possess nuclear weapons means that various wars may be waged which may differ from one another in their socio-political content, scale and weapons used.

Proceeding from the basic contradictions of the contemporary epoch, one can distinguish the following types of war, according to their socio-political character: wars between states (coalitions) of the two opposed social systems, capitalist and socialist; civil wars between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie or between the masses and the extreme reactionary forces supported by imperialists from other countries; wars between imperialist states and peoples of

colonial and dependent countries struggling for their freedom and independence; and wars between capitalist states.

Depending on their scale, modern wars can either be local, confined to two or more countries, and world wars, i.e., between the two opposite social systems; a considerable part or even all countries of the world will be drawn into a world war.

The problem of nuclear weapons is of special significance in describing wars from the viewpoint of the use of modern weapons. An agreement on averting a nuclear war was concluded between the USSR and the USA. However, the other nuclear powers have not acceded to the agreement and, which is very important, an agreement on unconditional prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons has not yet been achieved. That is why the threat of nuclear war has not yet been eliminated.

The Leninist principle of dividing wars into just and progressive wars, if they pursue liberational ends, on the one hand, and unjust and reactionary, if they are based on imperialist goals of seizing land and enslaving other peoples, on the other, has fully retained its significance. Any war which may be imposed on the Soviet Union or other socialist states by the imperialists, will, in all cases, be an unjust and reactionary war, the continuation of the predatory politics pursued by imperialist powers. As far as the Soviet Union and other socialist states are concerned the war will be just and progressive and will constitute the continuation of their peoples' revolutionary policy of defending the freedom and independence of their Motherland, ensuring the great cause of building socialism and communism.

Such are our views on the essence and character of modern war. These views naturally ensue from the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, from an objective assessment of the international situation, and the existing alignment of socio-political forces in the world, and fully refute bourgeois theories on the essence of war, revealing their false nature and complete untenability.

The Soviet military doctrine finds its concrete theoretical and practical implementation in the development of the Armed Forces, in strategy, operational art and tactics, methods of warfare, of conducting operations and combat, and in training and educating the personnel.

Strategy is a component of the art of war and is its supreme sphere. It embraces the questions of theory and practice of preparing the Army and Navy for war, the planning and conduct of war, the use of the arms of the services and their guidance. Strategy is based on the military doctrine and rests on the country's economic potential. At the same time it directly stems from the policy of the state and is subordinated to it.

In general, Soviet military strategy can be regarded as an expression of the policy of the Communist Party in defending the USSR. This has been embodied in the plans for preparing the country, the Army and Navy to rebuff the aggressor's attack and to rout it with all the forces and means available.

Strategy emerged together with war. In any war, each belligerent party pursues its strategic ends, and follows its strategic line which greatly influences the character of the war and the methods of operations. If strategy does not correspond to the military potential of a state and to the given situation, then the army suffers a defeat. Correct strategy, taking into account the country's potential and that of its armed forces and also the objective character of the prevailing situation, is a key prerequisite for victory. The Great Patriotic War involving a contest between two opposing strategies—nazi and Soviet—is a case in point.

In planning their aggression against the Soviet Union, Hitler's leadership based their military strategy on the blitzkrieg concept. It was planned to deliver surprise blows by large groupings of troops simultaneously in all strategic sectors in order to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the western part of the Soviet Union and then, by a swift thrust into the Soviet hinterland, to seize Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga line, thereby forcing the Soviet Union to surrender.

This initial strategy of the Hitler leadership, in conditions unfavourable to us, was opposed by the Soviet strategy of stubborn resistance combined with counter-blows struck back by armies and army groups, frequent offensive operations and large-scale guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy. In the fierce battles during the summer and autumn of 1941 the nazi troops were worn down and bled white. Hitler's blitzkrieg strategy was a failure, and, after the Soviet troops started their counter-offensive at Moscow, it proved a complete fiasco.

After their defeat at Moscow, the leaders of nazi Germany were forced to go over to a strategy of achieving their goals one at a time and only striking blows in separate strategic sectors. The operations to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus, which were planned for the summer of 1942, were an expression of that strategy.

The Soviet Command first chose active defence against this strategy and then conducted pre-emptive operations in a number of sectors. When that strategic line did not justify itself, a strategy of active defence with a subsequent switch to a counter-offensive was again adopted. The Soviet Command proceeded from the guiding principle of the Soviet art of war which demands that there should not be an offensive at all costs but the forces should be economically used, while inflicting the highest possible losses upon the enemy. The Soviet art of war does not counterpose force to art but secures a complete use of the two factors to achieve victory.

As a result of the stubborn resistance put up by the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, the enemy's striking forces were bled white and in the course of the subsequent Soviet counter-offensive completely routed. Hitler's strategy of achieving his war aims step by step, as well as the entire offensive strategy of the German army was a failure. After the victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, the Soviet Command firmly and finally took the strategic initiative in its hands. The subsequent

operations by the Soviet Armed Forces were based on the offensive strategy which brought complete victory over nazi Germany.

The German Command responded to the Soviet offensive strategy with stubborn resistance and "scorched-earth" tactics. The nazis thought that by destroying Soviet cities and villages, devastating its economy and deporting Soviet people to Germany they would deprive the USSR of economic and manpower resources, wear it down and secure a favourable end to the war. However, this strategy, too, proved a failure. The Soviet troops, by their consecutive pressure, thwarted the attempts of the nazi command to use defensive lines at the Dnieper, the Vistula, the Carpathians, the Oder, and to pin down our forces by the stubborn defence of various cities and thereby protract the war.

In the struggle between the two strategic lines during the Great Patriotic War Soviet military strategy, based on an objective assessment of the military and political situation and the real alignment of forces, always gained the upper hand.

During the post-war years, Soviet strategy has developed in full conformity with the policy of the Communist Party and on the basis of the technical re-equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces.

We distinguish between a strategy of waging war as a whole, i.e., its main line and key strategic aim, and a strategy of waging war in certain sectors to fulfil definite strategic tasks and achieve individual strategic aims. There exists a close dialectical connection between these two kinds of strategy, as the whole and its constituent parts. This connection consists, above all, in that the general strategic aim of war is achieved, as a rule, fulfilling separate strategic tasks. For example, the Soviet Armed Forces achieved separate strategic military goals when they forced Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the south-western strategic sector, and Finland in the north to stop hostilities. However, this weakened the whole of the fascist bloc and ensured us favourable conditions for achieving the general aim of the war, i.e., the defeat of the Wehrmacht and the unconditional surrender of nazi Germany.

The same can be said about the part played by the Byelorussian, the Vistula-Oder and some other operations, conducted by the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War.

The link between the strategy of war as a whole and the strategy of war in individual sectors is manifested in their mutual influence. The strategy of war cannot be of a stable nature. It usually changes according to the military and political situation, successes or defeats in the war, i.e., on the achievement of individual strategic goals. Changes in the strategy of war, in their turn, compel the introduction of amendments in the strategic actions of troops in certain sectors, and necessitate adjustments in the individual strategies in the war and ways of carrying them out.

A number of examples illustrate this point. For instance, at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, nazi Germany's chief strategic aim was to defeat the Red Army and capture key areas of the

Soviet Union. The vigorous offensive operations of Hitler's troops in several directions were subordinated to the attainment of that goal. However, later on, in particular, after the defeat at the Kursk Bulge, Nazi Germany fought only for an advantageous outcome of the war. Naturally enough, this affected her individual strategic aims. At that stage of the war the Nazi army was seeking to consolidate itself at the most important lines of the captured territories and secure peace terms which were honourable to Germany. However, this attempt proved a failure, inasmuch as Nazism did not achieve individual strategic aims and its general strategic military aim was also a fiasco.

Nuclear weapons have introduced radical changes in strategy, having enhanced its role in attaining military ends. In previous wars, as well as during the Second World War, the strategic leadership had at its disposal relatively limited means of directly influencing the enemy's objectives deep in the hinterland. After the adoption of nuclear weapons it became possible to directly fulfil large-scale strategic tasks, thereby exerting a decisive influence on the entire course of the war.

Operational art, too, was also further developed during the post-war years. It occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and serves as a link between them. Operational art directly follows from strategy and is subordinated to it. Strategy embraces problems pertaining to war and the actions of the Armed Forces in general, while operational art is concerned with solving problems relating to the preparation and waging of joint and independent operations by large formations of the Armed Forces in definite areas. Operational art is superior with respect to tactics. It determines the tasks of tactics and the role played by the tactical actions of units, aimed at achieving the goals of the operations.

The emergence of nuclear weapons has resulted in new methods of conducting operations and operational use of all arms of the Armed Forces.

As for operations conducted by the Land Forces, taking into account the increased performances of armaments, a wider scope, a greater depth of objectives, more rapid advances, high speed of operations, fast transition from one type of action to another, from the offensive to the defensive and, vice versa, from the defensive to the offensive and meeting engagements, the possibility of big losses and a consequent need for quick reinforcements, all these are characteristic features.

New hardware has also introduced many basic changes in the operational art of the other branches of the Armed Forces. For example, the increased combat potential of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces enable them to resolve major operational tasks independently. At the same time the greater role played by aircraft in achieving operational and strategic aims and the Land Forces' increased vulnerability from the air require joint operations by all branches of the Armed Forces so that the Land Forces can discharge their mission. Moreover, the Soviet Air Force and Air Defence Forces

must be ready to conduct operations both independently and together with the other branches of the Armed Forces, especially with the Land Forces.

Naval operational art has some features all of its own. The qualitative changes in the Navy's equipment led to a rapid development of the old and emergence of the new forms of operations at sea. New types of sea operations have emerged, which presuppose fighting missile-carrying atomic submarines and the enemy's carrier-based strike forces, as well as anti-submarine forces, and also fighting to control sea communication routes. This enriches naval operational art and requires its profound examination and theoretical elaboration.

Tactics plays a very important role in the art of war. It encompasses the theory and practice of combat waged by subunits, from company to army. It is subordinated to operational art and strategy and stems from them.

Compared with strategy and operational art, tactics is more flexible and responsive to all changes in the material basis of warfare — manpower and weapons. It is men and weapons that directly influence tactics and the methods of operations. Every engagement is unique. That is why a hackneyed approach is out of the question. The tactics used by all branches of the Armed Forces are diverse. The richer and wider their arsenal, the more probable their success. Tactical operations in all kinds of fighting result in victory, provided they are marked by activity, valour, skill and determination.

The Land Forces' offensive tactics consists in reliably pinning down the enemy by fire throughout the entire depth of his order of battle, decisive infantry and tank drives on the major axes of advance, fast penetration of the defences, and a rapid advance combined with landing operations for a successive defeat of the enemy's forces and reserves, and the capture of the most important lines and areas on his territory. The main requirements for offensive tactics are as follows: surprise and a fast attack, a skilful combination of fire and movement, superiority over the enemy at decisive points and key moments during the fighting, flexible manoeuvring of forces and equipment, the need for attacking forces to step up their efforts quicker than those on the defensive, encirclement and the piecemeal destruction of enemy groupings, an uninterrupted pursuit of the enemy day and night, and the consolidation of all successes. It is of particular importance that superiority is maintained over the enemy at key points, and for him to be pinned down by fire and for an uninterrupted offensive until he is completely routed.

The Soviet art of war also considers the defensive to be very important. It is possible to inflict serious setbacks on the enemy, even if he has larger forces, provided there is well-organised defence, a skilful use of firepower and providing the terrain is favourable.

Contemporary defence involves great activity, and an ability to withstand a penetrating and powerful blow and the use of all weapons. At the same time defence is organised in such a way that it can be used as a starting point for a transition to an offensive.

Meeting engagement holds a prominent place in tactical operations. It involves a variety of an offensive fighting when the two sides are trying to fulfil their tasks by attack. Meeting engagement typically involves mobile forms of combat, and it emerges both during the offensive and the defensive. The tactics of meeting engagement are meant to rout the enemy with the help of aircraft and artillery strikes at long distances from the battlefield before he manages to deploy his forces and launches decisive action involving infantry and tanks, and also provides for fast blows at the flanks and rear of the enemy's main forces.

Troop marches play a big role. In the course of modern war, troops have to march considerable distances and be fast about it; they have to quickly switch from one type of movement to another, suddenly change direction, deploy and enter battle from the march, and be well-controlled both on the march and on the battlefield.

The tactics of the other branches of the Armed Forces are also developed with the emergence of new weapons and hardware both in the Soviet Union and abroad being taken into account. They are based on the use of methods of fulfilling the task, which are tactically more effective than those used by the enemy; an excellent knowledge of the equipment; and full use of its performances when waging independent and joint operations.

Naval tactics has some features of its own. Today, it cannot be confined only to the formation of groupings of homogeneous forces and the taking by them of advantageous positions for striking missile, artillery and torpedo blows. The Navy cannot do its job properly unless its operations are skilfully organised and naval action is conducted with the participation of mixed forces and various types of weapons in close tactical co-operation.

Precise and co-ordinated action of mixed forces presupposes that the crews of the surface ships, submarines and naval aircraft can correctly use their weapons and military hardware, and are able to manoeuvre, escape the enemy's blows and suddenly attack him.

The basic requirements for the tactics of Land Forces are as follows: valour, determination and consistence in the offensive, and stubbornness and activity in the defensive. These equally apply to the tactics of the other branches of the Armed Forces.

These are some of the major propositions of the strategy, operational art and tactics, to which Soviet military doctrine adheres, and which underlie the training of the Soviet Armed Forces.

4. Urgent Tasks for the Soviet Science of War

The results achieved so far by the Soviet science of war are not the final word. The changes occurring in the world military and political situation, the military and technical revolution which is under way, and the constant improvements in the military field in the USSR and abroad pose fresh tasks and problems for military theoretical thought.

The general task of the science of war is the conduct of simultaneous fundamental and applied research in the interests of all-round provision of the development and operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in accordance with the character of a war which imperialism may impose on the Soviet Union. Fundamental research is aimed at solving major military problems, revealing basically new trends in the development of weapons, hardware and their use, while applied research is connected with the fulfilment of current tasks and is directly linked to the way in which the Armed Forces are being developed. The applied aspect of the science of war is the more dynamic. It sensitively responds to new developments in armaments. It is always in use and immediately yields palpable results, whereas fundamental research is connected with those prospects for military development which are more distant and gives no immediate results. However, it is the basis for applied science and for everyday practice. Applied research cannot be carried out without fundamental research.

That is why it is imperative to continue a thorough elaboration of those fundamental theoretical problems which are linked with revealing the content and character of war, its objective laws, the forms of their manifestation and the ensuing laws governing the principles of the art of war, and to creatively examine the emerging problems of strategy, operational art and tactics. At the same time, it is necessary to permanently specify, in view of the changing conditions, the tasks faced by the Armed Forces, the trends of their development and training, and the ways to improve those armaments already existing and to create new types of weapons and equipment.

Military theoretical thought must study and sum up the experience of combat and operational training, particularly troop and operational exercises, draw theoretical conclusions, and put all that is positive into practice.

It is also necessary to attentively watch military developments abroad, profoundly analyse the changes occurring in the armies of the capitalist states: in their organisation, armaments, political and moral conditions, military doctrine, strategy, tactics and in other issues linked with the preparations for war, and the combat readiness of the imperialist armies.

In our age, the importance of studying the history of war has grown. This is predetermined by the following factors.

Firstly, through studying the history of war it is possible to understand processes and changes occurring in the theory and practice of military development and in the evolution of forms and methods of warfare, and it helps solve modern problems in the correct way. It reviews the laws and tendencies of military development, warns against unrealistic schemes and extreme objectives, introduces the element of practical experience into theoretical reasoning, and furnishes a wealth of material for theoretical considerations.

Secondly, the study of the history of war is important as a way of constantly improving military thinking and expanding the officers' military outlook. In this case it possesses considerable opportunities.

The history of war shows the far-reaching consequences of the way in which a war is guided, and operations prepared and conducted. It also shows the motives underlying various important decisions, and teaches how to assess them in a comprehensive way. It reveals what had to be used to win and discloses the causes of failures and defeats, thus helping one reach an understanding of the mistakes made in the past.

Thirdly, studying the history of war is valuable as a way to ideologically educate the personnel. It not only promotes the servicemen's cultural attainments but also helps mould their disposition, and their moral and psychological qualities. The history of war is indispensable for cultivating socialist patriotism and internationalism. A future world war, if the aggressive imperialist forces unleash it, will inevitably acquire a coalition character. The servicemen of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries will fight shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers. It is useful to study the history, traditions and experience of the allies' armed forces on a reciprocal basis so as to know each other better.

The science of the history of war has to thoroughly analyse the problems relating to the history of war, primarily the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, and to demonstrate the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its Army in the victory over the fascist coalition. The history of war has become the scene of an increasingly fierce struggle between communist and bourgeois ideologies. There is no reason to expect this struggle to subside in the future. On the contrary, one should expect it to become more intense and the imperialists to continue their subversive ideological activities against the USSR and its Armed Forces, and for these activities to become more and more refined. Lenin wrote: "When the bourgeoisie's ideological influence on the workers declines, is undermined or weakened, the bourgeoisie *everywhere and always* resorts to the most outrageous lies and slander."¹

It is imperative to demonstrate in full the driving forces of Soviet society in the war years, and the factors which determined the defeat of the imperialist aggressors.

It is necessary to more vividly and completely show the Communist Party's implementation of Lenin's ideas about the defence of the socialist Motherland. Works which demonstrate the mobilising and organising role of the Communist Party during the war are of special significance in the history of war. They examine the principles of the Party guidance of the Armed Forces; the activities of the CPSU aimed at strengthening the unity of the army and the people; the efforts to educate the Armed Forces' personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism; the guidance by the Party of the guerrilla movement; propaganda work among the troops and population of the enemy; and other problems. All this comprises a boundless field of activities for war historians, and an inexhaustible source of interesting problems for researchers.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 85.

The issues pertaining to Soviet military development, and to strategic, operational and tactical guidance during the Second World War ought to be dealt with at greater length. It is an important task to show how the victory was won under difficult conditions, when the enemy had superior forces and equipment, and to demonstrate how the efforts at the front, rear, in the guerrilla movement, and the troops on the battlefield were co-ordinated.

The problems of switching the USSR's economy to a war footing, the creation of the Soviet war industry and its development, both in the pre-war years and during the war, should also be analysed more thoroughly. In this respect it is also of paramount significance to demonstrate the part played by the economic preparation of the Soviet state for rebuffing aggression, the specific features inherent in creating and developing the Soviet war economy, and also the steps taken to prepare the theatres of operations on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

In recent years a growing number of monographs and articles on the history of comradeship-in-arms of the armies of the socialist countries have been published in the Soviet Union. It is only natural that there is interest in this topic. The sources of the comradeship-in-arms of the fraternal peoples date back to the Great October Socialist Revolution and the defence of the young Soviet Republic from foreign invaders and White Guards. This comradeship-in-arms went through the ordeals of the Great Patriotic War and was cemented by the blood shed in the joint struggle against fascism. There are a number of problems requiring a more thorough examination and further elaboration. These include, for example, the problems pertaining to joint actions, troop control, the co-ordination of combat effort, all-round support for operations, logistic activities, and the problems of internationalist education.

Apart from studying the history of the wars waged by the Soviet people in defence of their socialist Motherland, it is imperative to analyse the experience gained by other peoples in waging revolutionary, liberation and progressive wars.

Comprehensively improving the efficiency of the science of war is a momentous task. The science of war has constantly developed. Its job is to yield the greatest results with the least outlay of time and material, to quickly solve pressing problems pertaining to military matters, to courageously conduct research, not to lag behind in social, scientific and technological progress, and to purposefully work for the implementation of its achievements. To attain these goals it is necessary to raise the level of research in the headquarters, troops and fleets even higher, to invigorate the activity of all research institutions under the Ministry of Defence, improve the contents of the theoretical journals and perfect the organisation of military scientific and technical information.

Research should not be limited by any dogmas which might have been established once and forever. Dogmatism and attempts to bring new theoretical conclusions into conformity with the established

views adversely affect the results of research. This sort of thing inevitably limits thinking, impoverishes it and leads to an endless repetition of the universal truths in different ways. Military and theoretical thought should be free of obsolete propositions.

Of course, elaborating military theoretical problems is not an easy task. It requires a lot of time and effort. Moreover, often unusual usage, outside the accepted framework of thinking, is frowned upon. This, however, is to be expected, inasmuch as the development of military theory and practice always takes place through the struggle of old and new concepts. Those who keep up with the demands of the time, have a sense of the new and adhere to progressive principles are bound to win.

The main task of the Soviet science of war is to keep ahead of the practice; to look into the future; to discover the possible ways for the development of military affairs; to pave the road towards the future, thereby accelerating and improving the training and education of the personnel; and to contribute to the unswerving enhancement of the Armed Forces' combat readiness.

At the same time the science of war should continue to carefully study, sum up and use the experience of wars and the practices of training and educating the troops, and draw the necessary conclusions for its further development. It is imperative to be constantly guided by Lenin's proposition to the effect that "the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory and knowledge".¹

In the present situation, as never before, broad opportunities are being created for the development of the science of war. By making use of the achievements of mathematics, physics, cybernetics and other sciences, it is possible to objectively and precisely assess the prospects for improving military theory and practice and to work out more substantiated practical recommendations concerning various problems of military development.

Radical changes in military matters and the elaboration of fresh problems relating to the art of war require an even more profound mastering of Marxist-Leninist methodology. It is impossible to successfully develop the science of war and solve the urgent issues of training and educating the troops, developing weapons, and organising the Armed Forces without using Marxist-Leninist dialectical method.

It is imperative to be well aware of and to consistently follow the basic requirements put forward by that method, i.e., the Party spirit in science and an objective approach to examining any phenomenon, as well as a comprehensive grasp of scientific cognition. One must appreciate the need for a definite historical approach to the problems in question. This in no way means that the new supersedes all that has already been achieved in military practice and theory and that today everything should be started from scratch. Lenin spoke of the need to

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 142.

combine the continuity of military experience gained in the past with the raising and solution of new problems. Lenin's works are a model for the use of past experience in the interest of the present and future.

Of course, past experience should be assigned a place in proportion with its significance. A revolution in military affairs requires, above all, movement forward, bold thought and courage in raising new problems. When we emphasise the significance of accumulated experience, we mean the need for skilful use of historical conclusions in solving present-day tasks. A correct assessment of the historical process does not involve turning back, but it is vital to draw lessons from the past for the future.

In the Soviet Union there are all the necessary prerequisites for the steady development of the science of war: the most progressive social system, Marxist-Leninist teaching, and the Party's constant concern for the consolidation of the USSR's defence capability. The Soviet science of war reveals the real world of warfare, its laws and regularities. It needs no distortion of objective processes of social life and military affairs, and this is evidence of the successful solution of the tasks faced by Soviet military scientists.

**PARTY-POLITICAL WORK
IN THE ARMY AND NAVY**

In guiding the Armed Forces, the Communist Party uses different ways and means of influencing their development and of solving all questions relating to military development. It devotes great significance to Party-political work which embraces all spheres of life and activities of the Armed Forces, rallies Soviet servicemen round the CPSU and mobilises them to continuously enhance the fighting might and readiness of the Army and Navy.

Lenin attached exceptionally great importance to Party-political work. He regarded it as an integral part of Party work in general and insisted on carrying it out without fail at all times. He said that "where political work among the troops ... is conducted most thoroughly ... there we have no laxity in the army, there its organisation and morale are best, and there we have the most victories".¹ At Lenin's initiative the Communist Party has been constantly directing the Party-political work in the Armed Forces towards the successful solution of the tasks they face, and improving its content, forms and methods, taking into account the historical conditions, and using it as an important instrument for guiding the Army and Navy.

**1. Party-Political Work—
a Powerful Instrument of the Party**

In creating an army of a new type, the Communist Party and Lenin were aware that its strength could lie, primarily, in the high consciousness of its fighting men, their boundless devotion to the cause of the socialist revolution, and their unshakable confidence in the correctness of the ideas for the sake of which they shed their blood. That is why, from the very first days, cultivating high political awareness among the personnel and mobilising them to carry out their combat missions have always been under the close supervision of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 448.

Party, and have been the main task of the entire Party-political work in the Army and Navy. The servicemen's ideological and political education has a decisive influence on all processes taking place in the Army and Navy; it encourages their personnel to achieve fresh successes in combat training, in political education, in strengthening discipline and order among the troops, and it determines the behaviour as well as the mentality of the Soviet servicemen, and their readiness to fight boldly for their Motherland and to crush the enemy.

Party-political work in the Armed Forces is exceptionally fruitful. Developing and strengthening the personnel's lofty qualities, which are moulded by the Soviet way of life, has made it possible to train a Soviet soldier, so that he is unparalleled in the strength and lofty nature of his human spirit, a mature patriot and an internationalist fully devoted to the Party, the people and the Motherland. A Soviet soldier has a profound Marxist-Leninist, general education and military background. He adheres to a firm world outlook, has a high cultural level, and a clear understanding of his duty to defend the gains of socialism and the building of communism.

The Party's strong influence on the personnel was more than once proved by the unparalleled feats of valour from Soviet servicemen during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. It is the fighting men's lofty consciousness, profound love for their Motherland, sound optimism, and boundless courage and selflessness which they gained from their Party education, that enabled them to go through the ordeals and to win.

During the foreign intervention and the Civil War the unflinching propaganda from the political bodies and Party organisations in the Army and Navy brought the truth of the Party to the Red Army men and Red Navy sailors, explained the just character of the war waged by the Armed Forces of the young Soviet Republic and their lofty aims. Rallying the servicemen, sons of the working people, they strengthened the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, consolidated them, and educated the soldier in the spirit of the ideas of the Great October Socialist Revolution. They cultivated hatred for foreign interventionists and White Guards in the servicemen, along with high vigilance, selfless courage and staunchness in battle, and a resolve to defeat the enemy. Much attention was devoted to the struggle against sabotage by some of the old military specialists, laxity and lack of discipline, as well as the struggle to ensure a truly revolutionary order among the troops.

Political bodies and Party organisations constantly controlled the activities of the old military specialists recruited to the Red Army, and took an active part in training workers and peasants so as to make them military specialists completely devoted to socialism. They also took a considerable volume of administrative and everyday work upon themselves, helping commanders guarantee the troops an uninterrupted supply of arms, equipment, ammunition, food, uniforms and other materials.

Political bodies and Party organisations in the Armed Forces also rendered substantial assistance to local Party organisations in the military training of the working people. They mobilised servicemen to rehabilitate the economy which had been dislocated by war, when the Army units were assigned to that kind of work.

When speaking of the victory won by the Soviet Republic over the joint forces of external and internal counter-revolution, Lenin pointed out: "Never before, under any political regime, has there been even one-tenth of the sympathy with a war and an understanding of it as that unanimously displayed by our Party and non-Party workers and non-Party peasants (and the mass of the peasants are non-Party) under Soviet power. That is the main reason for our having ultimately defeated a powerful enemy."¹

During the Great Patriotic War, the political bodies and Party organisations in the Army and Navy inspired the officers and men to defeat the nazi invaders. They consolidated the servicemen's socialist ideals and morale and their responsibility for the destiny of the Motherland and cultivated a sense of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism in them, along with a sense of friendship among nations and socialist humanism. They also inculcated hatred towards the enemy, and laid bare the ideology of imperialism, especially that of fascism which is its extreme manifestation.

Ideological conviction has become a nutrient medium and an inexhaustible source of the massive heroism of the Soviet officers and men and their unbreakable morale and staunchness. It guaranteed the offensive upsurge of the Soviet Army and its striving to rout the invaders early and help the Soviet people in the territories temporarily occupied by the Hitlerites, as well as helping the peoples of other countries seized by fascist aggressors to throw off the enemy yoke. The high awareness of the Soviet servicemen became a vital factor which ensured the great victory for our Motherland.

Today, too, Party-political work in the Armed Forces has a tremendous role to play. It moulds communist awareness among the personnel along with implacability to bourgeois ideology and pride for their Soviet Motherland, and it cultivates their sense of socialist patriotism and internationalism. Party-political work is a decisive way of influencing the minds and hearts of the people. It multiplies the moral and combat qualities of the officers and men, promotes a transformation of their spiritual force into a material one, and enhances the fighting capacity of the troops.

The high moral and political state of the personnel, their right understanding of, and active support for, the domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU, the servicemen's monolithic cohesion around the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, and their readiness to fulfil any mission to protect the state interests of the Soviet Union, are a vivid manifestation of the efficiency of Party-political work.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 498.

Political bodies and Party organisations, together with the commanders, consolidate discipline, order and organisation among the troops; constantly raise the prestige of the commanders; work to improve the combat, operational and political training of the personnel, and the servicemen's mastering of new types of weapons and hardware, which the Soviet people supply them; and, in the final analysis, guarantee the Armed Forces' high combat readiness and battle-worthiness.

The exceptional effectiveness of Party-political work during the war and in peace-time is explained primarily by the fact that it is carried out under the direct guidance of the Communist Party. The CPSU Central Committee and its Political Bureau have constantly directed the activities of political bodies and Party organisations in the Armed Forces, taken care that the personnel have a deeper understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory, laid down the most important tasks connected with the servicemen's moral and political education, and have given them a communist world outlook, loyalty to the Motherland, the Party and the people, and devotion to their Oath of Allegiance and military duty.

The political bodies and Party organisations and the entire contingent of Communists in the Army and Navy serve as active vehicles for the CPSU's policy in the Armed Forces. They are educators of the servicemen and a support for the commanders in strengthening the combat readiness of Army and Navy units.

Primary Party organisations and their secretaries play a key role in carrying out the Communists' tasks in the Army and Navy, and this is by no means accidental. Primary Party organisations carry on day-to-day work among Communists and all the personnel who directly handle the weapons and military hardware, and they pursue other major tasks linked with the steady strengthening of the troops' combat readiness.

The secretaries of primary Party organisations are the political leaders, organisers and educators of the servicemen, and should permanently encourage their creative endeavours and serve as an example of honesty, industriousness, Party spirit and principled approach. It is of special importance that they adhere to communist ideology, are able to consolidate the collective, inspire the servicemen and lead them in implementing their tasks.

The CPSU Central Committee regularly convenes Armed Forces conferences of secretaries of Party organisations, which serve as a school for their education, and are a very efficient way of mobilising Party organisations, the Armed Forces' Communists and all servicemen in the Army and Navy to fulfil specific tasks at the given stage of their development.

The Fifth Armed Forces Conference of secretaries of the Party organisations, held in March 1973 in pursuance of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee, was of great importance to the Communists of the Armed Forces. Its preparation and conduct was influenced by the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU,

the December (1972) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, and the nation-wide celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Conference considered the state of and the necessary measures to further improve Party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy, and charted the tasks of the Party organisations to ensure high combat readiness among the troops and ways and means to solve these tasks. The Conference was a great political event for the Communists of the Army and Navy, that militant and time-tested contingent of Lenin's Party. The work of the Conference and the decisions it adopted helped further build up the activity and militant spirit of the Party organisations in the Army and Navy; intensify the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas; and educate Soviet servicemen in the spirit of unshakable loyalty to the behests of the great Lenin, of patriotism and internationalist duty.

Thanks to the unflinching care taken by the CPSU, Party-political work in the Armed Forces is now on a new upswing. It has become more vivid and rich in content. The creative initiative of Communists has increased. The Communists, who are commanders, political workers, staff officers, engineers and technicians, have come to take a more active part in the work of the Party organisations. The Party organisations in the services have been consolidated ideologically and organisationally; their links with the servicemen strengthened; their impact on the life, training and service of the troops intensified; and they have begun to take a more concrete, purposeful and profound part in the troops' combat training and to show more concern with the service record of Communists. The fact that there are active primary Party organisations in all Army and Navy units is of importance. Inner-Party work in them has been invigorated, inner-Party democracy has extended, and criticism and self-criticism are being further developed.

Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces is being improved on a firm social basis. Its content mirrors the steady spiritual growth of Soviet society along with the increase in cultural attainments and the better education of the entire people.

All the necessary conditions are present for conducting efficient Party-political work and for cultivating high morale and a good fighting spirit among the servicemen. The most important thing is that the personnel in the Army and Navy have been educated on the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and on the historic deeds of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Confidence and respect for the cadres, improving the style and methods of Party work, and the strict observance of the Leninist standards of Party life are having a beneficial influence on Party-political work and on the entire activities of military councils, commanders, political bodies and Party organisations.

Party-political work in the Armed Forces is being conducted by a big contingent of hardened and well-trained Communists. A harmonious Party-political mechanism exists among the troops. The very

specifics of the Army and Navy promote the organisation of an uninterrupted Party-political influence on every serviceman, as well as facilitating efficient work by political bodies and Party organisations.

2. The Cementing Force of Military Collectives

The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces is convincing evidence of the decisive part played by Communists in enhancing the might of the Army and Navy. Communists are the cementing force of the military collective. That is why the CPSU, both in peace-time and during wars, constantly takes care of the high efficiency of the Armed Forces' Party organisations. During wars the Party sent a great number of Communists to the Army and Navy from territorial Party organisations. Lenin wrote: "How did we act in the more critical moments of the Civil War? We concentrated our best Party forces in the Red Army; we mobilised the best of our workers; we looked for new forces at the deepest roots of our dictatorship."¹ Suffice it to say, for example, that in August 1920 about 300,000 Communists — almost half of the entire membership of the Party — were in the Army. During the Great Patriotic War over 1,640,000 Communists, half of the entire number of the territorial Party organisations in the summer of 1941, were sent to the Army and Navy.

During the Great Patriotic War, as during the foreign intervention and Civil War, the Party grew and consolidated itself mainly because of the enlistment of servicemen from the Army and Navy, who fought at the front. Thus, from July 1, 1941 to July 1, 1945, 3,788,000 officers and men became Party candidates, and 2,376,000 servicemen became Party members. These were almost 75 per cent of all those admitted to the Communist Party, and 66 per cent of those admitted to candidate membership.²

It is self-evident that the strength of military collectives does not just depend on the number of Communists. The most important thing is that they always and everywhere are in the van and are at the places where difficulties are the greatest. This immeasurably enhances and consolidates the prestige of Communists, giving them the moral right to educate servicemen who are not Party members, mobilise them for excellent service, and, during the war, to lead them in battle and inspire them. The personal example set by Communists multiplies the Party-political effect on the servicemen.

The CPSU attaches immense significance to the vanguard role of the Communists. As early as at the Eighth Party Congress it was stressed that "affiliation to the Communist Party cell gives the soldier no special rights, but obliges him to be the most selfless and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 481.

² See *The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 5, Book 1, p. 370 (in Russian).

courageous fighter".¹ The *Instructions for Communists at the Front* published during the Civil War and approved by Lenin made it the duty of Communists to be in the van everywhere, in every important affair, to be the first to start the battle, and the last to withdraw from it.

Indeed, Communists have justified the confidence of their Party by their deeds. They were in the front ranks of the fighting troops, were and have always been the soul of the soldiers. Addressing the servicemen on behalf of the Party, Communists consolidated the servicemen's trust in the triumph of our ideas, and cultivated courage, will and valour in millions of fighters. At the most difficult and dangerous moments they inspired their comrades-in-arms to perform heroic deeds by their own personal example. A fiery appeal: "Communists, forward!", was like a law governing their actions.

Communists laid down their lives, realising that they were saving the lives of thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants. According to an approximate estimate, about 50,000 sons and daughters of the Communist Party gave their lives in the struggle against the enemies of the revolution during the foreign intervention and Civil War. About two million Communists, i.e., more than half the Party membership in the summer of 1941, died as heroes in the war against nazism. Out of more than 11,000 people awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, for their feats of arms in the Great Patriotic War, about 74 per cent were Communists. It is not accidental that the Communist Party is called a fighting Party.

The example set by Communists, and their self-sacrifice to protect the revolutionary gains of the working people determine the entire aspect and feats of arms of the Soviet Armed Forces. The world admires the mass heroism and selflessness of the Soviet servicemen, their readiness to lay down their lives and withstand any hardships for the sake of victory in the right cause. Communists have always been among the best in the army and have made a weighty contribution to our victories. Summing up the results of the Civil War, the Central Committee of the Communist Party had every reason to declare: "Every one knows that this victory only became possible thanks to the tremendous political work done by the members of the Communist Party, their staunchness, devotion to the revolution, their heroic example which led hundreds of thousands and millions of fighters."² Another good example is the following extract from a document issued by the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic: "A future historian will note with amazement that, when estimating the chance of victory, those in charge sometimes counted the number of Communists more carefully than the number of rifles and machine-guns."³

¹ *The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union*, p. 44 (in Russian).

² *Pravda*, April 28, 1921.

³ *The History of the Civil War in the USSR*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1960, p. 79 (in Russian).

During the Great Patriotic War, too, the Communists were among the servicemen in the field, as well as among the working people in the rear. They strengthened the peoples' confidence in victory, inspired them to wage a selfless struggle for the honour and independence of their socialist Motherland and were the force which ensured the rout of nazi Germany and imperialist Japan.

Looking back on what we have gone through, we can better realise the grandeur of the fighting during the Great Patriotic War. Present and future generations will always bend down before the mighty spirit of the Communists and the valour of the Soviet servicemen and of the whole Soviet people.

In peace-time, too, Communists in the Army and Navy set an example by the way they fulfil their duties. It is not by chance that all excellent regiments, battalions and air squadrons, as well as the majority of excellent companies, are commanded by officers who are Communists.

The Party makes high demands on the Communists. The resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress on the Report of the CPSU Central Committee points out: "The strength of the CPSU lies in the high ideological level, activity and dedication of its members. The Party does not tolerate passivity, indifference and political apathy. Every Communist must be a conscious political fighter and be worthy of the lofty title of member of the Leninist Party always and everywhere."¹

The Armed Forces Communists regard it as their sacred duty to fully implement these instructions. They are in the front ranks of socialist emulation, they set examples in their ideological hardening, combat training, discipline, organisation, high political vigilance, morality and cultural attainments. Communists back up what they say by what they do. Communists thoroughly explain to their comrades Marxist-Leninist theory, the home and foreign policies of the CPSU, the impressive achievements of the Soviet people in building communism and in steadily building up the defensive capability of the Soviet Union, and the role that capability plays in consolidating the entire socialist community. The ideological and educational activities of the Communists are in full accord with the life of the servicemen, thereby enabling the personnel to more consciously resolve the tasks of combat training and political education, strengthen military discipline and observe manuals and regulations.

The Communists have been actively propounding ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism among the servicemen. They consistently and firmly adhere to the principles of the moral code of the builders of communism, cultivate high moral and political qualities in unaffiliated servicemen, and struggle against any manifestations of past prejudices. Communists take an interest in all aspects of the life of servicemen, boldly reveal the shortcomings, and oppose self-conceit, carelessness and negligence.

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 233.

When speaking of Communists one should place special emphasis on the role of military commissars. Their unparalleled feats during the trying years of the struggle against imperialist aggressors will be forever engraved in the memory of the people.

By relying on Communists, political bodies and Party organisations, the commissars consistently pursued the policy of the Communist Party in the Army and Navy, cultivated high awareness and discipline and raised the morale of the troops. They forged the soldiers and sailors into a single whole with one united will and pitted them against the enemies of socialism. They gave the personnel boundless loyalty to the socialist revolution, the Party and people, and developed their vigilance against the intrigues of imperialism. They took an active and direct part in controlling military operations, took care of the material provision of the troops and considered it their direct duty to satisfy the needs of the personnel.

Political workers have done a lot of work in the Army and Navy to strengthen their combat readiness and to keep the morale among the personnel high. They are giving the troops a political awareness, consolidating their order and discipline, and cultivating the servicemen's valour, courage and energy.

In war-time, political workers were in the front ranks of the defenders of the Motherland; conducted multifarious organisational and ideological work; cultivated the personnel's courage and valour, intense hatred of the invaders, and firm confidence in our victory; and, by personal example, inspired the servicemen to defeat the enemy. *Pravda* wrote: "The figure of a political worker with a submachine-gun in a camouflage suit and a helmet, who is in the van and leads the soldiers towards the achievement of the lofty and noble goal—the rout of German nazis and the liberation of our Motherland—will go down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as a glorious and honourable figure."¹

Even now, during peace-time, the activities of political workers are complicated and multi-faceted. They are in the front ranks of the struggle for a higher level of the military might and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Together with the commanders, Party organisations and all Communists, they consistently carry out the Party's policy, educate the personnel on the basis of Lenin's ideas, unfailingly rally them around the CPSU, strengthen military discipline in every possible way, improve combat training and carry out many other important tasks. Political workers are highly skilled specialists educated by our Party and possessing a profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, military theory and practice. They enjoy deserved respect and prestige among the servicemen.

Thus, the Communists in the Army and Navy are active fighters for our Party. They fully devote their knowledge and energy to the cause of serving the Party, people, socialism and to building communist society.

¹ *Pravda*, March 22, 1942.

3. The Communists' Militant Assistants

The members of our Komsomol are always, together with Party members, in the front ranks of the fighters for the triumph of communism. The Communist Party rightly regards Komsomol as its natural, devoted and reliable assistant. Lenin emphasised: "We are the party of the future, and the future belongs to the youth. We are a party of innovators, and it is always the youth that most eagerly follows the innovators."¹

The Party and the Soviet people have every reason to be proud of Komsomol. In the Soviet Union there is no sphere in which Komsomol would not display its high qualities. Komsomol helps the Party educate the Soviet youth on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and draw them into the practical building of communist society. It fulfils very important tasks set by the Party, which are of nation-wide significance. Komsomol members have always been among the pioneers of the untrodden paths in creating a new society, and among the reliable defenders of the Soviet Motherland. Komsomol educated whole generations of active fighters for communism. About 100 million people have gone through the school of its ideological education, the school of labour and struggle. These include noted workers, collective farmers, scientists, designers, writers and servicemen.

The Komsomol members in the Army and Navy—the militant contingent of the Leninist Komsomol—are a tremendous force. In the main, our Armed Forces consist of the young people, most of whom are Komsomol members. Many officers are also young men. The youth and the Komsomol members vigilantly guard the socialist Motherland, thereby successfully fulfilling one of the most honourable and important tasks of our time. They can have no dearer feeling than their affection for their Motherland, and they can have no greater concern than that for the well-being of the people.

The Komsomol members in the Armed Forces are a truly advanced and most active part of the Army and Navy youth, its militant vanguard and closest reserve for the Party organisation. Together with the Communists, the Komsomol members occupy the most important positions. They are responsible for the combat readiness of their units, and make a tangible contribution to fulfilling the most pressing tasks in all spheres of the Army's and Navy's activities. Those servicemen who are Komsomol members are everywhere, ensuring the military might of the Armed Forces: they discharge their difficult but honourable mission at the control panels of missile complexes, at the levers of fighting vehicles, at radar screens, and in the cockpits of jet planes; on the ground, in the air, on the water and under it. The fighting efficiency of Army and Navy units largely depends on the level of military, technical and specialised training of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 354.

the Komsomol members and of all young servicemen, as well as on their ideological conviction, attitude to their duties, morality, creative enthusiasm and efficiency.

The history of Komsomol abounds in feats of valour which are examples for contemporary young people. The first generation of the Soviet youth went through the fire of the Civil War and the ordeals of the battles against the foreign interventionists and the internal counter-revolutionaries. The Komsomol members were steeled in the unprecedentedly difficult conditions of blockade, dislocation and famine, their political awareness growing in the fighting. Their class consciousness became sharper with every battle, and so did their ideological staunchness and fighting skill. Their nerves became stronger and their revolutionary eyes became more vigilant.

The Komsomol members and young people took an active part in defending Soviet power. They fully realised that this was their own power, that they were fighting for the interests of the workers and peasants and for the whole of the working people against the oppressors and enemies of freedom and democracy. The Komsomol members of the town of Vyatka in a resolution they adopted on April 16, 1919, wrote: "It is better to fall with honour than to find ourselves once more under the bloody heel of the bourgeoisie. Let us consolidate our ranks, take a firm hold of our rifles and give a fitting rebuff to the enemy!"¹ These words expressed the aspirations and emotions of the Soviet young people at that time.

The Komsomol declared several mobilisations over the whole of Russia during the foreign intervention and Civil War. Whole Komsomol organisations went to the front to defend the Soviet Motherland. In those days one would find the following sign on the doors of the Komsomol committees, a sign which became legendary: "The Komsomol Committee is closed, all gone to the front." About 200,000 Komsomol members, or almost 50 per cent of the entire membership, fought at the fronts during the Civil War. They joined the Red Army and selflessly fought against the enemies of Soviet power, and gave the whole of their revolutionary ardour, their energy and the heat of their young hearts to the cause of the Leninist Party. The young soldiers, who were poorly armed and sometimes hungry and in shabby clothes, despite all difficulties and hardships, courageously routed the White Guards and foreign invaders. The people of the older generation well remember those young men tightly laced with cartridge belts, in peaked caps, and pea-jackets which sent panic through our enemies.

History will always remember the mass feats of arms of the Soviet youth. The names of Vitaly Bonivur, Vasily Alexeyev, Nikolai Rudnev, Alexander Kondratyev and many, many other young defenders of the October Revolution, who became a symbol of

¹ *In the Circle of Fronts. The Youth in the Years of the Civil War.* Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1963, p. 77 (in Russian).

courage and patriotism, will be forever engraved in the heroic chronicle of Komsomol.

During the foreign intervention and Civil War, many capable commanders, political workers and leaders of the guerrilla movement were recruited from among the Soviet young people. Accumulating fighting experience and becoming more courageous and hardened in battle, the Party and Komsomol members made a weighty contribution to the development of the art of war. The enemies of the revolution were unable to understand where and in what academy the younger generation of the Soviet Republic acquired such brilliant qualities as commanders, when and where they became skilful tacticians and far-sighted strategists.

M. N. Tukhachevsky was 25 when he became an army commander. A number of brilliant operations, which resulted in the defeat of the interventionists and White Guards, were conducted under his leadership. The most noteworthy features of his commanding abilities included courageous thinking, sober assessment and a thorough understanding of the situation. Nikolai Shchors was 23 when he commanded a brigade and a division. Even now stories are told about the raids of his units, and about the valour and courage of the young commander. There are songs devoted to Anatoly Zheleznyakov, a brave sailor. The Danube Flotilla and later a regiment of the Red Army, a guerrilla detachment and an armoured train, which he commanded in succession, performed excellently in battle. Arkady Gaidar was 16 when he was appointed commander of a regiment. He, like many other young people of his age, proved a brave warrior of the revolution.

The spiritual force of Komsomol—a genuine treasure-house of military talents and heroism—is truly inexhaustible!

Recollecting the Civil War, S. M. Kirov said: "Those of us who were then at the front remember what tremendous, I would say, exceptional role the Komsomol played. It must be said point-blank, comrades, that we, Bolsheviks, who, generally speaking, are the sort of people able to struggle without sparing our life, still sometimes looked 'with envy' upon the heroes from the Komsomol."¹

The Party and the people greatly valued the immense contribution of the Leninist Komsomol to the defeat of the foreign interventionists and White Guards, and in 1928 it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Over 5,000 Komsomol members were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for their courage, valour and heroism in the battles against the enemies of the revolution.

During the peaceful socialist construction, the Komsomol gave substantial assistance to the Party in consolidating the defensive capacity of the Soviet state. It was with the Komsomol's active participation that the voluntary OSOAVIAKHIM society,² which

¹ S. M. Kirov, *On the Youth*, Moscow, 1969, p. 176 (in Russian).

² The Society for Promotion of Defence, Aircraft and Chemical Construction, a voluntary society of Soviet citizens between 1927 and 1948.—Ed.

trained technical specialists for the Army and Navy, was developed. Komsomol members took the initiative in developing mass applied military sports and other important defensive measures.

The Komsomol's patronage over the Navy became a massive patriotic movement aimed at cultivating a love for the Soviet Armed Forces among young people. The decision on the patronage was adopted in 1922, at the Fifth Congress of the Komsomol. The youth heartily responded to the appeal issued by the Congress, and thousands upon thousands of young patriots went to serve in the warships and coastal units. Between 1922 and 1923 alone the Komsomol sent more than 8,000 young men to join the Navy.

The Air Force was rapidly developed as well as the Navy. Here, too, the Komsomol played an outstanding part. In January 1931, at its Ninth Congress, the Komsomol adopted patronage over the Air Force. The militant appeal resounded throughout the Soviet Union: "Komsomol members must become pilots! Let us build the Red Air Force!" Thousands of young men became pilots.

The Komsomol's patronage over the frontier forces had a positive influence on the protection of the Soviet borders.

In the years of peaceful socialist construction, the danger of war more than once threatened the Soviet Union, and the young servicemen, together with their elder comrades-in-arms, gave a crushing rebuff to the impudent enemies of socialism. The army Communists and Komsomol members continued the feats of arms performed by the heroes of the Civil War at Lake Khasan, the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the snow-covered woods of Karelia. Discharging their internationalist duty, Soviet volunteers, together with the Spanish people, courageously fought against the fascists.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Komsomol made an immense contribution to the defeat of nazi Germany and imperialist Japan. Responding to the appeal of the Communist Party, over 3.5 million Komsomol members joined the Armed Forces during the war. Thousands upon thousands of the Komsomol members joined guerrilla detachments and underground organisations in the enemy's rear.

There was not a single clash with the invaders in which Komsomol members and young people did not participate. There were many Komsomol units at the front: the 930th Komsomol Mortar Regiment, the 85th Red Banner Komsomol Guards Mortar Regiment, the Assault Smolensk Komsomol Engineers Brigade, the 46th Guards Taman Women's Komsomol Light Night Bomber Regiment, and others.

Both in defensive battles and offensive operations, the Komsomol members and young people, following the example set by Communists, their elder comrades-in-arms, displayed unparalleled courage, staunchness, bravery, heroism and readiness, at any moment, to uphold the honour, freedom and independence of the Motherland. When they attacked the enemy, blocked embrasures of pill-boxes with their bodies, engaged in a deadly clash with enemy tanks, rammed enemy aircraft and waged a stubborn and unequal struggle in

the rear of Hitler's army, they did not think of glory or honours. Hatred of the invaders and boundless love for the Motherland, and confidence in the correctness of the Communist Party's cause brought about the mass heroism of the Soviet servicemen. Thousands of names of glorious heroes, among whom there are many young Komsomol members, have forever gone down in history. Wonderful books, songs and stories have been written about them.

The names of Komsomol members, such as Alexander Matrosov, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, Victor Talalikhin, Marite Melnikaite, Noi Adamiya, Mekhti Gusein-zade, the Krasnodon heroes and many others who gave their lives for the Soviet Motherland are immortal. They continue to live in our thoughts and deeds, in the names of streets, towns, and villages, young people's industrial teams, schools, and Pioneer detachments. Their heroic feats of arms will forever be remembered by the peoples of the world.

For the outstanding services during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Komsomol was awarded the highest award of the Soviet Union—the Order of Lenin. Out of the total number of servicemen who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in the war years, the Komsomol members account for 11 per cent. More than 3.5 million Komsomol members were awarded military orders and medals.

Neither will the labour exploits of the young people who replaced their fathers and elder brothers in industry and agriculture be forgotten. They withstood the hardships of the war-time stoically and spared no pains to help those at the front.

Today's Komsomol members are the direct successors and continuers of their predecessors' heroic exploits. Their lodestar is Nikolai Ostrovsky's words: "Only forward, only to the fighting line, only overcoming difficulties and marching towards victory and victory alone—and nowhere otherwise!" In the Armed Forces, the Komsomol members constitute a reliable support for commanders, political bodies and Party organisations in strengthening military discipline, strictly observing manuals and regulations, achieving impressive results in combat training and political education, maintaining weapons and hardware in constant combat readiness, helping in the sports and physical training of the young people, and organising socialist emulation. They persistently work towards the implementation of the basic task set before the Komsomol by the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "...To educate young people in the spirit of communist ideology, Soviet patriotism, internationalism, efficient organisation and high discipline, actively propagate the achievements and advantages of the socialist system among young people and work towards making every young person an active builder of the new society."²

¹A prominent Soviet writer, the author of the book *How the Steel Was Tempered*.—Ed.

² 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 228.

The Komsomol members in the Army and Navy are characterised by helpful fervour, inexhaustible energy, a truly militant spirit, and creative endeavour and initiative, which, combined with the rich fighting experience of the officers of the older generation, comprise a reliable basis for skilful control of the troops.

The activities of the Komsomol in the Army and Navy are not confined to units and ships alone. The Komsomol maintains close contacts with its organisations in factories, plants, state and collective farms, schools, higher educational establishments and organisations of the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force and Navy. The Komsomol members of the Armed Forces make their contributions to the military-patriotic education of Pioneers, school-children and youths subject to military service. Taking an active part in this important work, the Komsomol organisations in the Army and Navy try to ensure that the initial military training of the young people is of high quality, cultivate a turn for military service in them, and to prepare them for it.

The work of young Komsomol servicemen is responsible, multifaceted and sometimes difficult. Army service is not an easy task, but a serious activity for a young man. At the same time, military service in the Soviet Union opens up great opportunities for his creative development and spiritual growth. It educates in him courage, will, energy, initiative, organisation, industriousness and stoicism, hardens him physically and morally, and trains him to discipline and order.

When a young man joins the army he becomes a member of a single family, which is a consolidated military collective. He faces not only the romanticism of training, marches and cruises but also the chance to learn much that is new and interesting, as well as a useful profession which is equally important in the army and at home. The Army and Navy train highly qualified specialists, including mechanics, radio operators, radar operators, drivers, builders and electricians.

Military service is an important stage in every young man's life. Much of what he acquires in the Armed Forces will remain with him for many years to come. The most important thing, however, is that the young man feels deep satisfaction and realises that his service in the Army is useful and necessary. The years spent in the Army and Navy are very important. They cultivate in the young man the ability to correctly assess a situation, and educate in him a conscious attitude towards labour, whatever mission is assigned to him, and improve and consolidate all the positive qualities which he needs both as a serviceman and as a worker in industry, agriculture, culture and science. This is why the servicemen who retire from the Armed Forces and are sent by the Komsomol to the most significant construction sites of the Soviet Union, are so deeply respected. They are welcomed everywhere and they are in the front ranks at factories, plants and collective and state farms.

The Komsomol's strength stems from the Party leadership. The CPSU concentrates on the problems of educating the younger

generation as active builders of communist society and consistent defenders of socialist gains. The Party guides the Komsomol's activities and works out colossal programmes aimed at the communist education of young people. All the wonderful and heroic features, all its successes and accomplishments, have been achieved by the Komsomol thanks to the Communist Party.

Contemporary youth has not gone through the hardships of revolutionary struggle and has not experienced the privations of war. That is why the main emphasis is placed on educating the young people in the rich experience of the Communist Party in the revolutionary, military and labour traditions of the Soviet people, and in the glorious deeds of the older generation of Communists and Komsomol members. Political bodies, and Party and Komsomol organisations cultivate in young people a feeling of love and respect for the Armed Forces and a constant readiness to defend their Motherland.

Following the Party's instructions, the Komsomol members of the Army and Navy purposefully study Marxist-Leninist theory, the decisions of the CPSU, the heroic history of the Soviet people, and its struggle for the triumph of socialism and communism.

The young people highly appreciate the heroic deeds of their fathers and grandfathers. The well-decorated rooms of the battle glory, the units' chronicles, alleys and parks named after heroes, and school museums of battle glory testify to the sincere love and deep affection for those who have died for the people's happiness.

Recent years have been marked by a new manifestation of concern and care for Soviet youth. The Party's programmatic documents, the decision adopted by the CPSU Central Committee On the 50th Anniversary of the Komsomol and on Tasks of the Communist Education of the Youth, and the Message of Greetings sent by the CPSU Central Committee to the 17th Congress of the Komsomol elaborate the problems of Party guidance of the Komsomol, the Leninist ideas on the continuity of generations, the revolutionary and class maturing of young Soviet people, and their contribution to the building of communism.

The Armed Forces Conference of secretaries of Komsomol organisations, held in March 1974, was an important event for the Armed Forces Komsomol. The Conference summed up the results of the activities conducted by the Army and Navy Komsomol and charted the tasks for the near future. The Armed Forces Komsomol paid special attention to improving ideological work, mastering up-to-date military hardware and the most efficient methods of using it in combat, and steadily improving the combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

It is imperative to consolidate all the positive features in the work of the Armed Forces' Komsomol organisations, support and develop the Komsomol members' useful initiative in every possible way so as to constantly raise the ideological level of undertakings meant for young people, strengthen Komsomol organisations, converting them into

militant collectives full of energy and capable of rallying youth around the Communist Party, increase the ideological tempering of young servicemen, and develop their creative endeavours. The primary Komsomol organisations in companies, batteries and other units of the same size are close to each individual soldier, know his needs, and can exert systematic and purposeful influence on Komsomol members, which means that such organisations are of growing importance.

The Armed Forces' Komsomol is multifarious and fruitful in its activities, and has scored considerable successes in combat training and political education. However, the Komsomol members are never satisfied with what they have attained. Under the guidance of Communists, they firmly and confidently march forward with fervour and enthusiasm, to fresh successes in their studies and military service. The strengthening of the Party leadership of the Komsomol is the main source of the further growth of the latter's activity and militant spirit, and a guarantee of the fulfilment of any tasks it faces.

4. Raising the Effectiveness of Party-Political Work

Constant concern for the strengthening of the Army and Navy's combat readiness and for maintaining it at the most modern level constitutes the major task of the political bodies and Party organisations in the Armed Forces. In organising and conducting Party-political work, account has to be taken of the complex and contradictory nature of the international situation, and of the military and political position of the Soviet Union. One should also bear in mind the changes in the technical equipment of the Armed Forces, their organisational structure, methods of training the personnel and using the weapons in combat, as well as the high cultural and educational level of the new servicemen.

The need for the Armed Forces to maintain constant combat readiness presupposes the maximum exploitation of the immense mobilising influence of the Party-political work on the servicemen. Each Communist in the Armed Forces should be well aware of his personal responsibility for the state of affairs in his unit, actively support all useful initiatives, and set an example of excellence in his performance and the mastery of his military speciality.

Life itself requires a steady improvement in the Party-political work, a search for new, more efficient ways and methods of its conduct. Here *ideological work and the ideological and political education of the personnel* are most important.

The Party has been paying increasing attention to the problem of ideological work, ideological and political education of the masses, and raising their cultural level, which is determined primarily by the need to mould a new man, the builder of communist society.

The significance of ideological work in the Armed Forces is growing as well, because with every coming year the tasks faced by the Army and Navy are becoming more complicated, the demands of the moral, political, psychological, combat and physical training of the personnel are raised, and the intellectual requirements of young people joining the Armed Forces are constantly growing.

As was stressed at the Armed Forces Conference of ideological workers in January 1975, when organising and conducting ideological work in the Armed Forces, one should bear in mind a number of its peculiarities. These are, above all, the tangible increase in the volume and significance of the ideological work, which in the Army and Navy constitutes a major factor predetermining a successful solution of all problems, including the elaboration of new methods for military operations, the introduction of new troop organisation forms, the development of the science of war, and the solution of specific problems relating to the training of military cadres. In all these cases ideological work plays the leading role. Combat and political training, further strengthening of the discipline, socialist emulation, patriotic and internationalist education and many other aspects of everyday life in the Army and Navy largely depend on the state of ideological work, the skill of propagandists and the extent to which all our cadres participate.

The second specific feature of ideological work consists in the fact that it is now conducted in conditions of the constant ideological struggle being waged by imperialist reactionary forces against the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole. Definite trends towards international detente, far from weakening the battle of ideas, have even imparted to it a fresh impulse. Certain bourgeois circles are stubbornly seeking to derive ideological "benefits" from the very fact of detente, to legalise their ideological subversion and to create additional channels for exerting hostile influence on the spiritual world of socialism.

The battle of ideas has always been the front line of the class struggle. While there are opportunities to establish contacts and settle conflicts by peaceful means in inter-state relations between socialist and capitalist countries, in the sphere of ideology there can be no peaceful coexistence. No compromises are possible between the communist and bourgeois ideologies and the struggle between them is inevitable. Lenin wrote: "...The *only* choice is — either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course ... to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology."¹

Imperialism has been constantly bringing massive ideological pressure to bear on the Soviet Union and the whole of the socialist world. The enemies of socialism resort to the most refined forms of ideological subversion, attacking the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and trying to discredit the experience of socialist and

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 384.

communist construction. Rabid, gross and overt anti-communism is being replaced by increasingly camouflaged forms of opposing Marxist-Leninist ideology. Apologists of capitalism have been coining new concepts and "theories". They issue appeals to "neglect the belligerent ideologies", find ways towards "spiritual co-operation" which, they claim, will make it possible to put an end to animosity and wars between peoples. Anti-communist and opportunist propaganda has been especially active of late in talking about moral and ethical problems, including personality and society, the destiny of democracy, human rights and freedom, and the social consequences of scientific and technological revolution.

The Soviet Armed Forces are an object on which imperialists would like to exert their ideological influence. Bourgeois propaganda tries to distort the Soviet Armed Forces' character, destination and great historic mission to defend the gains of socialism. They falsify the basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism on the essence and causes of wars in the present epoch, and to undermine the morale of the personnel, thereby inflicting damage on the might and combat readiness of the Soviet Army and Navy. To achieve these ends imperialist reactionaries make wide use of the mass media, the ramified system of intelligence, and diplomatic activities.

Our task is to skilfully disclose the methods of bourgeois propaganda, carry on an active struggle against the ideological opponents in all directions, and prove convincingly the untenability and, at the same time, the dangerous character of the military ideological concepts of imperialism.

The third specific feature of ideological work is that scientific achievements and recommendations are being used in it on a greater scale. The well-known Leninist proposition "...that learning shall not remain a dead letter, or a fashionable catchphrase ... that learning shall really become part of our very being, that it shall actually and fully become a constituent element of our social life"¹ is being increasingly translated into reality. In ideological and educational work it finds expression in regular analysis of the current processes, the use of specific scientific recommendations as the most convincing arguments, and skilful use of the mass media.

These specific features of ideological work should be constantly taken into account, especially in the spheres where it makes itself felt most distinctly.

This relates above all to cultivating in the Armed Forces' personnel the *Marxist-Leninist world outlook and profound communist conviction*. The Party pays attention to the importance of the all-round development of Soviet man, the builder of communist society. Communism is equally impossible either without a high level of consciousness, culture and education or without a corresponding material and technical basis. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress noted: "*The formation of a*

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 489.

*communist world outlook in the broad mass of the people and their education in the spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are the core of all ideological and educational work by the Party."*¹

This principle also covers the process of training and education of the Armed Forces' personnel. The education of Soviet servicemen in the spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism is the main step towards the formation in them of high moral, political and fighting qualities. They say that no storm can rip out a tree with firm roots. It is the Marxist-Leninist world outlook and profound communist conviction that act as such roots for the Soviet servicemen. It is the communist world outlook that constitutes the foundation underlying the entire process of combat training, political education and the formation in the personnel of selflessness in the struggle for the lofty communist ideals. Political conviction and ideological tempering serve as the cornerstone of the staunchness, self-reliance, resolve and unswerving will for victory, their ability to overcome any difficulties and concentrate all moral and physical powers on the fulfilment of the tasks set.

Firm and profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and the ability to use it in practice enable the military cadres to take the Leninist approach in the analysis of situations, to determine the essence of the complex Army and Navy life, to draw correct conclusions in everyday problems concerning troop guidance, and the training and education of personnel, seeing the prospects for the future, and giving a principled assessment of their work in the interests of the Party and the state.

The propaganda of Lenin's military theoretical legacy, the decisions of Party congresses, of the Central Committee plenary meetings, and of Party documents, play a primary role in the ideological and political education of the Armed Forces' personnel. They contain an all-round analysis of the social shifts in the world, reveal the basic issues involved in the development of the Soviet Union on the road to communism, make valuable generalisations and conclusions relating to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, the theory of scientific communism, the practices of communist construction, and the organisation of the ideological and political education of Soviet people. A thorough study of the Party documents enables each serviceman better realise his place in the struggle for communism and the vital necessity to strengthen the Armed Forces in every possible way.

In conditions of acute ideological struggle in the international arena, our ideological propaganda must always be vigorous, militant, implacable and concrete. It should not only protect the Soviet people from being touched by bourgeois and revisionist ideas but also expose more convincingly the ideological subversion conducted by bourgeois propaganda, Zionists and revisionists of all shades, the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, and show that the capitalist system is his-

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 100.

torically doomed. While demonstrating the progressive nature of communist ideology, its scientific substantiation and conformity with the vital needs of the working people, it is imperative to cultivate a class approach to reality in Soviet servicemen, and strengthen their love for the socialist Motherland, the Soviet way of life, and hatred towards enemies of socialism.

In present-day conditions, it is necessary as never before to conduct vigorous and purposeful ideological and educational work, to have the ability to conduct the offensive and win on the ideological front, the front of the struggle for the minds and hearts of people. As the Party points out it is necessary to expose the ideological subversions of imperialism and establish the ideas of Marxism-Leninism convincingly, comprehensively and vividly. It is of importance that each time the most expedient and effective ways and methods of ideological work should be chosen inasmuch as this is a sphere of activity where hackneyed methods and formalism are out of the question, since it deals with the consciousness of the people. Acting as direct organisers of ideological and political education, the propagandists must display more initiative and creative endeavour.

The ideological and political education of Soviet servicemen produces the most tangible results when it is closely linked with the pressing problems of communist construction in the Soviet Union, the life and tasks of the troops, and the military and political situation prevailing in the world, when vivid examples are used to demonstrate the inexhaustible opportunities and advantages of the socialist system and the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and when the personnel are educated in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, and the great responsibility for the defence of their socialist Motherland and of the socialist community as a whole.

There are many forms and methods in the ideological education of servicemen. Of major importance among them are the Marxist-Leninist political studies among officers, ensigns and midshipmen, and political talks with enlisted men and NCOs. The work towards a high level of political education for the entire personnel is a decisive sector of the work conducted by commanders, political bodies, and Party and Komsomol organisations.

The tasks of combat and operational training and of increasing the combat readiness of Army and Navy units were and remain an important aspect of ideological and Party-political work as a whole. The entire methodology of ideological and organisational work is designed firstly to ensure each serviceman's clear-cut realisation of the need to be vigilant and constantly prepared to repulse aggression, wherever it might come from, and secondly to educate servicemen in the spirit of a well-understood responsibility for the uninterrupted raising of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. This is the cornerstone of the entire ideological and educational work in the Armed Forces.

High qualitative results in combat readiness are achieved only when commanders, political bodies and Party organisations, all ideological

workers, through applying different ways and methods of ideological influence on the minds of the servicemen, secure the fulfilment of combat and operational training plans, mobilise the personnel to master the latest achievements in military theory and practice, consistently work for the intensification of training, the scientific organisation of military service, a more efficient use of every minute of training time, as well as of the opportunities offered by the educational and material basis to get the best results out of each lesson.

Achieving high results in combat and operational training and combat readiness of the Army and Navy presupposes a more complete taking into account of new phenomena engendered by the technological revolution in the military sphere, the development of the science and art of war, the struggle against any manifestation of conceit and complacency, hackneyed methods and formalism in conducting studies, helping the commanders to solve their tasks creatively, searching for new methods of conducting operations, for rational methods of teaching, and bold use of more progressive methods of control.

Special attention should be paid to ensuring a high level of field, air and naval training, and to army and command-and-staff exercises. Of great importance in this connection is the planning and conduct of Party-political work in strict conformity with the operational and tactical plan of exercises, taking account of the specific features of the theatre of operations, the probable enemy and possible nature of military operations.

The goal of Party-political work will be achieved if its forms, methods and means are in accordance with the specific features of the complicated field situation, while the main efforts are shifted directly to the units and ships. In all cases, especially during field training, individual and differentiated work with servicemen of various specialities, explaining them the content of and methods to be used in accomplishing the tasks, and the high responsibility of each serviceman, is of great use.

Commanders, political bodies and Party organisations devote much attention to the moral and psychological hardening of the personnel, inculcation of determination, courage, initiative and adroitness in the field, on firing and testing grounds, in the air and at sea.

Close contact between political workers, Party leaders and all Communists, on the one hand, and rank-and-file soldiers and sailors, on the other, makes it possible to be well aware of the positive and the negative aspects of their studies and service, to raise their morale, inspire them to accomplish their functional duty with excellence, to popularise quickly their advanced experience and help use it creatively in varying conditions.

Political bodies and Party organisations realise full well that modern warfare demands mastery of military equipment, its rapid preparation and its use with maximum efficiency, and they carry out tangible work aimed at improving still further the maintenance and operation

of weapons and equipment, perfecting a system of regular maintenance and overhauls, mobilising servicemen to reduce the period of mastering new weapons, thoroughly know the potentialities of each type of weapons, cultivating in the personnel love for the weapons at their disposal and the ability to get the most out of them.

Strengthening military discipline as a major factor of the Armed Forces' combat readiness is an object of constant concern among political bodies and Party organisations.

In their activities, political bodies and Party organisations are guided by Lenin's instructions that we need conscious discipline which "must be built on entirely new principles; it must be a discipline of faith ... a discipline of comradeship, a discipline of the utmost mutual respect, a discipline of independence and initiative in the struggle".¹ They base themselves on the premise that military discipline is a complicated social phenomenon embracing the many aspects of relations between servicemen: relations between equals, between subordinates and commanders, juniors and seniors, and the attitude of the servicemen towards the collective and society. Political bodies and Party organisations are assigned to work together with the commanders to constantly strengthen discipline in each and every sphere, including training, service and stand-by duty, to see to it that discipline combines unconditional obedience and reasonable initiative, and that it serves as the launching pad from which servicemen rocket to the peak of exploits in the name of communism.

The basis of the Soviet serviceman's discipline is his ideological and political tempering. The higher the ideological conviction of the personnel and their understanding of the policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, of the aims and tasks facing the Army and Navy, the requirements of Soviet civil and military laws and the Oath of Allegiance, the more conscientious their attitudes towards service duties.

Party-political work provides each serviceman with a profound realisation of the part played by firm military discipline — the fact that it ensures organisation among the troops, multiplies their strength and turns them into a single well-knit collective capable of acting quickly and precisely in the most complicated situations. Party-political work also secures the realisation that the conscious Soviet military discipline and the personal responsibility of each serviceman for the defence of his socialist Motherland constitute a great force and invincibility of the Army and Navy.

Today the ability to influence man on the basis of a thorough analysis of relations existing in a collective is acquiring increasing importance to the strengthening of discipline. Officers should get to know the servicemen well and enter into that sphere of unofficial relations between them, where conditions sometimes emerge for misbehaviour and other negative phenomena. This demands that political workers and Party leaders be closer to the people, study their disposition,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 515.

motives, everyday life, needs and requirements, and display constant concern for the servicemen, consolidating relations of mutual respect, exactingness, assistance and support with them. Such relations strengthen the collective, develop a feeling of association and attachment among the personnel, and give them a stronger sense of responsibility towards the collective and society for the fulfilment of their military duty.

In establishing a conscious military discipline there are several tasks of substantial importance: the further strengthening of the unity between word and deed, support for mass enthusiasm of the servicemen, encouragement of their creative initiative, inculcating in them a sense of pride for their unit.

Propaganda and explanation of the meaning and content of manuals and regulations are an important aspect of the Party-political work. Manuals and regulations are basic documents determining the entire life and activities of the troops. They express the policy of our Party in military development. They contain a concentrated and generalised synthesis of many years of experience in this field, and the latest achievements of the Soviet military scientific thought.

Regular and purposeful Party-political work, conducted by political bodies and Party organisations, ensures strict, precise and timely fulfilment of orders and instructions, and observance of the order and organisation envisaged by manuals. This kind of work in no way replaces the activities of the commander who plays the chief role in maintaining firm discipline. In his activities, the commander uses Party-political work as a most important means of influencing personnel.

One-man command and Party-political work are the organically linked unshakable foundation of Soviet military development. That is why, working to strengthen the principle of one-man command, the Communist Party and its Central Committee are constantly ensuring further improvement in Party-political work.

The indissoluble link between one-man command and Party-political work is secured by the fact that the commander is not only a military leader but also a political leader, and an educator of his subordinates. He personally takes part in Party-political work. The overwhelming majority of Soviet commanders are members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As defined by the Instructions for the CPSU Organisations in the Soviet Army and Navy, commanders rely on Party organisations in their work and direct their activities at the successful implementation of combat tasks, combat training and political education plans, and strengthening discipline.

Our Party has always regarded the joint friendly activities of commanders, political and Party leaders as an indispensable condition of the continuous improvement of the process of training and educating troops. Their businesslike and creative co-operation, mutual respect, co-ordination and unity of action are based on Party foundations.

Political bodies and Party organisations consistently consolidate one-man command, enhance the prestige of commanders, watch over their ideological and political progress, arm them with knowledge and the skills of Party-political work, cultivate respect in the servicemen for their commanders, actively support the commanders' actions aimed at improving combat readiness, and do not allow criticism of their orders. In the commanders they cultivate the Leninist manner of guiding troops: communist conviction, efficiency, purposefulness, a principled approach, a deep sense of responsibility towards their duties, intolerance towards shortcomings, self-criticism, and a correct attitude towards their own mistakes, i.e., all those properties which are the chief signs of the military and social maturity of a commander. If a commander makes mistakes, separates himself from the mass of servicemen, ignores or underestimates Party-political work, he is subjected to just Party criticism. Party criticism in no way undermines the prestige of a commander. Lenin wrote: "It is not those who point out harmful excesses and strive to rectify them but those who resist rectification that undermine the prestige of the military workers and appointees."¹

Present-day conditions insistently demand that political bodies and Party organisations, together with their commanders and headquarters, channel their efforts *into further improving training and education of officers*, and work even more purposefully towards a proper discharge of military duties.

Commanders, political bodies and Party organisations play a particularly great part in the education of young officers. The Armed Forces are annually joined by graduates from military schools, who are all ready to devote their knowledge, abilities and energies to the cause of constantly raising the combat readiness of the Army and Navy. It is only natural, however, that many of them lack practical experience. This places special responsibilities on senior commanders, political bodies and Party organisations to give young officers ideological, theoretical and methodological training, and develop their commanding abilities.

It is common knowledge that *military science* is steadily becoming more significant in strengthening the defensive capability of the Soviet Union and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Military science can be vital and efficient only provided it relies on the practical experience of the troops, and provided political bodies and Party organisations take part in the research, elaboration and practical testing of scientific propositions together with academies, research institutions, military districts, groups of forces, fleets, commanders, operational and army headquarters. It is the duty of political bodies, Party organisations and all the Communists in the Army and Navy to render assistance to commanders, scholars and headquarters in the all-round development of the military theory, in selecting people

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 52.

suitable for research work, in creating the necessary conditions for their research, and in educating them as military scientists, actively supporting all that is new and advanced.

Organising socialist emulation on a wide scale among the personnel constitutes a major aspect of the Party-political work in the army. Socialist emulation is a powerful instrument of mobilising servicemen for the fulfilment of tasks set by the Communist Party for the Armed Forces. At the present stage of the Armed Forces' development, the significance of emulation is constantly growing, and for the following reasons.

Firstly, the growth of political awareness and social activity of servicemen makes it indispensable to improve the methods of guiding the military collective. Account should be taken of the fact that in the Armed Forces there are young people with a highly developed sense of the dignity of Soviet citizens, and masters of the Soviet country, and it is their Motherland and the Party that have educated them in such a way. After joining the army, young men undergo important training in building up their political awareness and courage. It is imperative to bring out the patriotic impulse of youth in every possible way, thoroughly analysing the inner motives and aspirations which drive them to patriotic deeds. Emulation helps commanders, political bodies and Party organisations to develop the activities of the military collectives, directing them to improve the combat readiness of units.

Secondly, the growing role of socialist emulation in the Army and Navy is determined by the tremendous impact exerted by the scientific and technological revolution on military progress. Personnel must exhibit initiative and a creative approach in mastering the sophisticated equipment and weapons, and skilful use of the potentialities inherent in socialist emulation can do a great deal to help here.

Thirdly, the reduced terms of service for enlisted men and NCOs stipulated by the new law on universal military service demands that the period of time assigned for training specialists also be reduced, and that more active assistance be given to young servicemen by skilled specialists. These factors also presuppose the all-round development of socialist emulation.

Fourthly, the sphere of emulation has extended. Apart from enhancing the quality of combat training and political education, socialist emulation is also used to improve the moral qualities and combat abilities of personnel, bettering the service and order, and raising the cultural level and outward appearance of servicemen.

In the light of these factors, it is imperative to improve the organisation of socialist emulation constantly, to improve its guidance, intensify its influence on the enhancement of the troops' combat readiness, consolidate communist conviction, and high moral and fighting qualities in the personnel, raise the level of their fighting skills on land, in the air and at sea, help the servicemen fulfil stand-by, guard and internal duty with excellence, and strengthen discipline and cohesion in military collectives.

Emulation is organised by commanders together with political bodies and Party organisations and with the active participation of staffs. The quality of emulation is raised if commanders and political bodies determine its purpose for the period of training, stand-by duty, exercises, flights, cruises, missile launchings, shooting exercises and other training and combat tasks. Commanders and political bodies do their utmost to make emulation an integral part of the entire process of combat training and political education. Important assistance is given by staffs to subordinate units in fulfilling their socialist emulation targets, efficient organisation of training, rational use of training period, teaching and material basis, and in carrying out constant supervision over the course of training and state of service. Staffs not only take into account the fulfilment of combat training and political education plans but also the implementation of pledges made in socialist emulation.

Comparing results achieved in the emulation and making them public is of great mobilising and educational significance. That is why it is of importance for commanders, helped by political bodies, headquarters, and Party and Komsomol organisations to regularly sum up the results.

It is imperative to put the Leninist principles of socialist emulation consistently into effect and, as Lenin taught, cultivate a striving in the whole personnel "*under all circumstances to go on, under all circumstances to strive for something bigger, under all circumstances to proceed from simpler to more difficult tasks*".¹ With this aim in view it is necessary to continue to enhance the part played by emulation, extend the spheres of its influence on all aspects of the training and everyday life of troops, guide the emulation, eradicate elements of formalism, create an atmosphere of creative endeavour in the units, propagate and introduce the experience of advanced commanders, political workers, and Party and Komsomol organisations. Here, too, our political, Party and Komsomol workers have a great deal to do, inasmuch as the scope of emulation and its efficacy are determined, above all, by the degree of awareness in the personnel's attitude towards their duties.

The efficiency of Party-political work depends directly on its *scientific level*. This primarily means that it is based on the granite foundation of Marxism-Leninism, the Leninist principles of Party development. The basic principles for army life are as follows: high communist ideological spirit; class approach to training the personnel; close connection between ideological and educational work and troop activities, practices of communist construction in the Soviet Union, and the activities of local Party organisations; specific Party-political work, which must be purposeful, businesslike, continuous, truthful, clear and comprehensive in character. The scientific nature of Party-political work also presupposes wide use of the conclusions drawn by military pedagogics, psychology and other sciences. Lenin

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 192.

pointed out: "There is and always will be an element of pedagogics in political activity."¹

An essential role in constantly improving the quality of Party-political work is played by analysing new experiences, exchanging information on a large scale and disseminating all information which is positive and can contribute to the strengthening of the Armed Forces. This makes it possible to assess the results of work correctly, find ways of eliminating the shortcomings, combine more closely the tasks of Party guidance in the Army and Navy with the general tasks of continuous improvement of the Soviet military organisation and the strengthening of the country's defensive capability.

Party organisations are designed to give constructive criticism of achievements up to date, and to initiate the struggle to raise standards, for the cultivation of high responsibility of servicemen who are Party members to the Party and people, and for ensuring their vanguard role in all spheres of the multi-faceted activities of the Armed Forces.

The army press serves as an efficient means of Party-political influence on the broad masses of servicemen. The Party regards the press as a strike force at the ideological front, as its most potent ideological weapon, which must always be on the alert, in constant action, unflinching accurate, keep abreast with the times and bear the standard of all that is new and progressive, struggling actively against everything outdated and obsolete.

The press brings to the Armed Forces the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, explains the policy of the Party and the Government, and, on that basis, helps servicemen fulfil their duties concerning the defence of the socialist Motherland. The press considers it to be its honourable duty to extol the wise Leninist policy, our powerful people, heroes and heroines, educated by the Party.

The press promotes the creative development of military theory and serves as an all-army rostrum for propagating advanced experience in training and education of servicemen. Being aware of all aspects of military matters, the press tackles the complicated problems of combat training and combat readiness of the Armed Forces, and unflinching works for an all-out consolidation of the one-man command principle, and the intensification of the Party organisations' impact on all aspects of activities in the Army and Navy.

It is taken for granted that the new tasks which emerge in Party-political work must be completely and fully mirrored in the army press. Of special importance is the steady enhancement of the ideological and theoretical level of published material, concrete demonstration of the course of socialist emulation, active support to patriotic initiatives by soldiers and sailors at all ranks.

Party enthusiasm, a vivid manner of narration, forceful character, an appealing and mobilising tone should mark each article in the army press. Its efficiency greatly increases if the press does not merely expound facts from Army and Navy life and reality but gives them a

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 454.

thorough analysis and summing-up, and puts forward practical recommendations for the troops. The noble function of the press consists in developing the activity of the personnel, consolidating in them the sense of military duty, and directing the mind and will of each serviceman to performing patriotic deeds, and enhancing the vigilance and combat readiness of the troops.

The duties of political bodies and Party organisations, of all Communists in the Armed Forces are diverse and responsible. The CPSU Central Committee teaches that purposeful and consistent implementation by the army Party organisations of the CPSU policy in the Army and Navy is a decisive prerequisite for a successful carrying out of the tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces. Of special significance here is the enhancement of the militant spirit of Party organisations and activity of all Communists.

Where the further raising of the efficiency of the ideological work is concerned, political bodies and Party organisations are facing momentous tasks, which can be subdivided into three main groups.

The first group concerns the problems of *raising ideological maturity and skill of the ideological workers, and improving their selection and placement*. It is common knowledge that the quality of ideological work depends, above all, on the training of propagandists and all ideological workers, as well as on their competence, prestige, theoretical background, ideological maturity, military knowledge, moral qualities and methodological skill.

A propagandist is primarily an ideological fighter for the Party. All his thoughts, deeds and accomplishments are aimed at acquainting everyone with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the Party and evoking a thirst to put them into practice.

A propagandist is a well-versed specialist in theoretical, military and specialised fields. He must have depth of thought dialectically combined with a practical approach, and argumentation with enthusiastic narration. This is a well-trained specialist with profound knowledge which he is ready to generously share with others. He plans his entire work in close connection with the requirements of life and the complex activities of the Army and Navy.

A propagandist is a fighter on the ideological front, who comes out against indifference, formalism and red tape. He is characterised by a striving for creative activities, persistence and purposefulness. A true propagandist constantly works at setting an example of self-education, an urge to achieve goals and of moral integrity to officers and men.

The second group of tasks at improving ideological work is linked with *comprehensive carrying-out of ideological and educational measures*. This means that all spheres of military activities — combat training and political education, service, everyday life and leisure time of the servicemen — should be covered by an ideological influence. Only wide-ranging and regular ideological impact on all aspects of life and training of the personnel yields stable and positive results. Of specific importance is the close interconnection between political

education and combat training. Life has shown that only in practice do concrete propositions of Marxism-Leninism and political conclusions successfully turn into firm communist convictions of the personnel as they are solving the tasks directed at raising combat readiness.

The comprehensive nature of the ideological and educational work requires skilful use of all methods of ideological influence: political lessons, lectures, talks, rallies and meetings with prominent people, and all opportunities now offered by the mass media. An organic combination of mass forms of work with individual education tangibly raises the efficiency of all ideological and educational work.

Finally, when speaking of a comprehensive approach to ideological and political education, one should bear in mind the specific nature of the activities of each branch of the Armed Forces and of every unit.

The third group of tasks pertains to a further *improvement of the quality of guiding ideological work*. To achieve this task it is necessary to make fuller use of the elaborated and time-tested principles of Party guidance, above all, collective leadership, close contacts with the masses, unity of political and organisational activities, correct selection and appointment of ideological workers, supervision and check-up of carrying out set tasks. It is important that the content of ideological work more fully corresponds to the tasks performed by the Armed Forces as a whole and each fighting service taken separately, and that the forms and methods of ideological and political education of servicemen correspond to their training standards. Improvement of guidance in ideological work presupposes that all undertakings are sufficiently provided for materially and technically. The efficiency and results of the ideological work conducted by commanders and political workers decisively depend on the level of their guidance.

The great victories won by the Soviet Armed Forces over the enemies of socialism and the impressive successes scored in strengthening the defensive capacity of the Soviet state today convincingly prove that the Communist Party has taken the correct path towards implementing its leading role in military development, and found expedient forms and effective methods of instilling high moral and combat qualities in Soviet servicemen, and in the organisation and conduct of Party-political work in the army. Party-political work has been and continues to be a powerful and efficient weapon of the Party, whose might has more than once been tested in battle. This weapon continues to frighten the enemies of socialism.

Chapter

XII

THE MILITANT ALLIANCE OF THE ARMIES OF SOCIALIST STATES

The Soviet people, for the first time in the history of mankind, have paved the way towards a new life. Thanks to selfless efforts, they have scored an epoch-making victory: they have built a developed socialist society and are now constructing the bright edifice of communism.

Today the Soviet Union is no longer the sole socialist state in the world. The peoples in a number of European, Asian and Latin American countries are following in its tracks. The world socialist system—the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle—has emerged and continues to develop. Close co-operation and mutual assistance in all spheres of social life, including the military sphere, where interrelations of the fraternal armies have assumed the form of militant alliance, are increasingly being established between socialist states.

1. The Essence of the Militant Alliance of Socialist Armies

The essence and content of the militant alliance of the armies of socialist countries stem from Lenin's proposition on the need for a cohesion of all anti-imperialist, progressive and revolutionary forces. Inside the Soviet state the joint effort of the peoples who had thrown off the social and national yoke of capitalism found its concrete embodiment in the formation of the unbreakable Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose firmness has been time-tested. In the international arena, it manifests itself, above all, in close friendship and co-operation among socialist states. These relations, unparalleled in history, are based on the principles of equality, sovereignty and all-round fraternal mutual assistance of socialist countries.

The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR", emphasises that "the relationships of the socialist countries are being increasingly

characterised by continuously growing political, economic and cultural contacts, by the development of economic integration, the active exchange of experience and knowledge, and by close co-operation in foreign policies".¹ Similarly close and fraternal relations continue to develop in the military sphere in the interests of strengthening the defence of the socialist countries. The comradeship-in-arms of the armies of socialist countries does not just take the form of a military alliance between several states and their armies, of which history has been witness more than once, but as a qualitatively new socio-historical phenomenon which has naturally emerged as a result of the development of the world socialist system and as a consequence of new socio-political and economic relations between equal socialist countries.

Historical development convincingly proves that the *militant alliance of armies of socialist states is an objective necessity*. The conclusion in 1955 by the European socialist countries of the Warsaw Treaty, a fraternal defensive alliance, created to defend the socialist gains of the working people from aggressive imperialist encroachments was one of its manifestations. That was the response of the socialist countries of Europe to the formation of NATO, an aggressive military bloc, and to the growing military threat on the part of imperialist reaction. It is not by chance that in subsequent years the Warsaw Treaty members have repeatedly proposed to disband their alliance, provided NATO is dissolved simultaneously.

The whole of humanity is well aware that the socialist states threaten no one and have no intention to attack anyone. Socialist and communist construction needs peace, not war. However, the socialist countries are compelled, nevertheless, to maintain their military might at a proper level, not due to the internal causes of their development, but to the conditions of the international situation and the existence in the world of such forces which would be glad to make an attempt to reverse the course of history and restore capitalism in the socialist countries by force of arms. In order to protect the socialist gains of their peoples, the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties take constant care of a steady growth of defensive capability of the socialist states, and of their close co-operation in the military sphere.

The class, political essence of the defensive military alliance of the socialist countries consists in the fact that it constitutes an implementation of Lenin's ideas of proletarian internationalism. It is directed against the forces hostile to the cause of peace and socialism and in no way infringes upon the interests of other states and peoples. The chief aim of this alliance is, with the existence of two opposite social systems, to ensure complete security to the socialist countries, reliably protect our most progressive social system from aggressors' attacks, and guarantee the necessary external

¹ *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Resolution of the CC CPSU*, p. 21.

conditions for the successful building of socialism and communism. The militant alliance of the socialist armies constitutes a part of the general economic, political, military and cultural co-operation between the fraternal states.

Historic experience has demonstrated the vitality of Lenin's proposition on the drawing together and uniting of the class forces of the proletariat both on the scale of separate countries and internationally. Today, when the threat of a new world war has not yet been eliminated, the need for a close alliance of the working class of all states, and joint efforts by the socialist states is still of great importance. The most important task facing the whole of progressive mankind is to avert new military conflicts.

The community of the socialist countries plays a major part in preventing a world war. These countries' monolithic cohesion, unbreakable friendship, and powerful military and economic potential are the most reliable earnest of their own security and of peace being preserved throughout the world. That is why the concern for a steady strengthening of unity and security of the countries of the socialist community has constantly been a major element of the foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state. As is noted in the Programme of the Communist Party, "The Soviet Union sees it as its internationalist duty to guarantee, together with the other socialist countries, the reliable defence and security of the entire socialist camp".¹

Thus, the establishment, development and consolidation of the militant alliance of the armies of the socialist countries is an objective necessity predetermined by the conditions of the international situation and the aggressive nature of imperialism. It is the embodiment of the Leninist principles of internationalism, and the most vivid and supreme manifestation of the unity of the international tasks and efforts by the socialist states in the defence of their revolutionary gains from the intrigues of world reaction.

The implementation of measures aimed at a further consolidation of the militant alliance of the armies of the socialist countries and raising their combat readiness does not run counter to the peace-loving foreign policy of the CPSU and other fraternal countries, which is directed at developing and strengthening the positive results achieved in setting up good-neighbourly relations with all countries regardless of their social system and political structure, since these measures are of purely defensive nature. The Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist community have been consistently favouring an end to the arms race, a general reduction of armed forces, peaceful settlement of outstanding international issues, and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 557.

2. Principles and Foundations of the Militant Alliance

Socialist states develop in accordance with the laws and regularities of the socialist social system, including their Armed Forces. That is why the principles and foundations of the community of socialist countries, characterising their inter-state and inter-Party relations, remain unshakable principles and foundations underlying the militant alliance of their armies.

The most important of these principles is the *class proletarian solidarity of the socialist states*, which rests on the unity of interests and aims of the working class, the working people of all countries in the struggle against the imperialism to defend the socialist gains of the people, and for peace on earth. This principle finds its expression in the revolutionary solidarity of socialist countries, their close co-operation in all spheres, joint struggle against imperialism's encroachments, and collective actions aimed at strengthening the defensive might of socialist countries. In respect to the socialist states, the principle of the class proletarian solidarity is simultaneously the principle of militant alliance of their armies.

Close cohesion and unity of action of the working class and all the working people in socialist states in the common struggle in defence of revolutionary gains are carried out on the basis of proletarian solidarity. In their lifetime Marx and Engels stressed the importance of observing this principle. They noted that a fraternal alliance, unity and cohesion should exist between workers from different countries. Marx wrote that it was necessary "to ensure that the workers of different countries not only *felt* but *acted* like brothers and comrades fighting for their liberation in one army".¹

This proposition was elaborated by Lenin. He saw a manifestation of the essence of internationalism in close unity and monolithic joint action of the working people. Emphasising the need for the unity of the proletariat, Lenin stressed: "Capital is an international force. To vanquish it, an international workers' alliance, an international workers' brotherhood, is needed."²

In present-day conditions, when world imperialism regards the consolidation of its ranks against socialism as its major task, cohesion and unity of action amongst the socialist countries are of vital importance. The combined military might and a close-knit alliance of the socialist countries should be counterposed to the joint military forces and aggressive blocs of capitalist states. Life itself determines the need for joint collective efforts of the socialist states and, consequently, a close militant alliance of their armies. The Programme of the CPSU reads in part: "The combined forces of the socialist camp are a sure guarantee for each socialist country against

¹ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 16, S. 191.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 293.

encroachments by imperialist reaction. The consolidation of the socialist countries in a single camp, its increasing unity and steadily growing strength, ensures the complete victory of socialism and communism within the framework of the system as a whole.”¹

Mutual relations within the world socialist system are also developing in accordance with the principle of *sovereignty and equality of the socialist states and their armies*.

The observance of state sovereignty does not mean counterposing the interests of some socialist states against the interests of others. Sovereignty of a socialist state implies not only the right to independence, but also responsibility to the community of the fraternal countries, the international communist and working-class movement for the destiny of socialism. Joint defence of the great achievements of socialism is the internationalist duty of Communists and, consequently, the primary task of the armies of the socialist community. It is based on the principle of proletarian internationalism, and is put into action on the strength of voluntarily pledged obligations and observance of democratic norms and principles of international law.

The principle of the sovereignty of states, members of the Warsaw Treaty, is embodied in legal status, guaranteeing complete equality of members of this defensive alliance, and respect for their independence. It is clearly expressed in the composition, powers and procedures of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the organisational structure of the Command of the Joint Armed Forces.

The principle of *mutual assistance and mutual support* is closely linked with the aforementioned principles. It serves as the cornerstone of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as other agreements and commitments on defending socialist gains. The forms of co-operation between the socialist countries' armies are diverse, but they have a single aim: to enhance combat readiness of the Armed Forces in every possible way, and ensure peace and security for the peoples of the socialist countries. The militant alliance of the armies of the socialist countries is characterised by closest possible unity, mutual trust, all-round assistance and mutual aid.

The principle of *unity of the national and the international aspects in the defence of socialism* is also of importance.

The world socialist system is the great achievement of the international working class, and a powerful accelerator of social progress of entire humanity. It is only natural, therefore, that the working people of the socialist countries and their armies are responsible to the international proletariat and the whole of progressive mankind for the destiny of socialism.

Life has shown that the strength and efficiency of proletarian internationalism directly depend on the way the working class of each country discharges its internationalist duty. Lenin taught “*not think*

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 465.

only of one's own nation, but place *above it* the interests of all nations"¹ and always remember that "the interests ... of world socialism are higher than national interests".² This principle comprises the dialectics of unity of national and international aspects in defending socialism. The CPSU Programme points out: "The experience of the peoples of the world socialist community has confirmed that their fraternal *unity and co-operation* conform to the supreme national interests of each country. The strengthening of the unity of the world socialist system on the basis of proletarian internationalism is an imperative condition for the further progress of all its member countries."³

The day-to-day guidance by Communist and Workers' parties of socialist and communist construction, and their purposeful, consistent and concerted policies in inter-Party and inter-state relations, and co-operation in defence, are a life-giving source of the steadily developing and strengthening unity of the fraternal countries and their armies.

Such are the fundamental principles underlying the relations between states of the socialist community and their armies. They all are closely knit, and their might and efficiency lie in their dialectical unity. Expressing qualitatively new forms of links between the Armed Forces of the socialist states, they present a firm basis for the fraternal militant alliance, cement it, raise the moral and combat standards of the personnel, and extend the combat capabilities of the Joint Armed Forces, consolidating the defensive power of the socialist community as a whole.

History has witnessed quite a few examples of military co-operation between states and armies. Their character, forms and content were very different in various historic epochs but the political aims of the war waged or planned by allied armies were always the chief criterion. It is this particular circumstance that determined and now continues to determine the political content of military co-operation, both advanced and progressive or, on the contrary, reactionary.

In our day and age, the military blocs built up by imperialist states are reactionary, and they are directed against people's interests and are aggressive in their essence. Mutual relations within such alliances are determined by dictation by the stronger to the weaker. A bourgeois state, possessing the greatest military power joins the imperialist coalition and usually seeks to derive for itself the maximum economic and political benefit and attempts to ensure special strategic advantages at the expense of its weaker partners.

Military co-operation among the socialist states is based on different, absolutely new conditions. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is a voluntary alliance of truly equal and sovereign socialist

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 347.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 378.

³ *The Road to Communism*, p. 468.

states. Unlike NATO with its aggressive trends, it does not pursue expansionist goals. Its aim is to guarantee reliable defence of countries of the socialist community, their freedom and independence from the encroachments of imperialist aggressors. This aim is equally vital for all the socialist states, it consolidates their military alliance and strengthens the comradeship-in-arms of fraternal armies.

The principles of co-operation between socialist states and of militant alliance of their Armed Forces are not temporary or transient. They are determined by the very nature of socialist society, and have solid social, political, economic, ideological, and military-strategic foundations.

The similarity of political power, of state and social system, and common goals of the socialist countries, i.e., the building of communism, serve as a *socio-political basis* in co-operation between the socialist states and their Armed Forces. All this exerts a decisive impact on the nature of military development, and acts as a firm foundation for the moral and political unity of the fraternal peoples and armies, and creates common interests in defending socialist gains.

The unshakably established socialist mode of production serves as the *economic foundation* for the co-operation among the peoples and armies of countries of the socialist community. Public ownership of the means of production and socialist relations of production consolidate socialist states and create broad opportunities for the international socialist division of labour, and the co-operation and specialisation of production on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit. Economic integration is a natural way towards further cohesion of the socialist countries in the economic sphere. On the one hand, it is a natural continuation of the results achieved by the fraternal states in economic, scientific and technological co-operation, while, on the other, it testifies to a new historic stage of their drawing closer together, and the intensification of the tendencies towards the internationalisation of their economic activities. Common features of economic relations in socialist states, and the economic integration of socialist countries create objective prerequisites for an uninterrupted development of friendship and mutual assistance between their armies.

Marxist-Leninist ideology, socialist patriotism and internationalism, unity of aims in the task to ensure, by joint effort, reliable protection of the socialist gains serve as the *ideological basis* in co-operation among the socialist states and armies. Socialist countries have a common enemy—imperialism, and their armed forces face a single and common task, i.e., to guarantee peace for the fraternal peoples.

A common social aim in the education of servicemen in the spirit of the principles of socialist patriotism and internationalism, friendship among nations, comradely mutual assistance, and class implacability to the enemies of socialism and to bourgeois ideology can be seen as the spiritual force that consolidates the personnel of the allied armies,

and serves as the source of their high moral and fighting qualities, and a guarantee of might and invincibility.

The military-strategic basis of the militant alliance of the fraternal socialist countries and their Armed Forces is predetermined by the unity of their aims and tasks directed at ensuring reliable protection for the socialist gains by joint and collective effort. Of primary importance are common military-strategic views, and similar understanding of the laws and regularities of war, principles of the art of war and military development. The common Marxist-Leninist scientific approach to the appraisal of military phenomena and processes is expressed in concerted decisions on the key problems of defending the socialist countries.

Marxism-Leninism profoundly reveals the laws and regularities governing the development of society and serves as a methodological basis, which enables the military-theoretical thought of allied armies to correctly orient itself in the military and political situation, and take account of the influence exerted by economic, political, moral and military factors on the course and outcome of a war. Proceeding from this, the military science in the socialist countries determines general military principles, the direction of development and the character of the strategic use of the armed forces, the ways and methods of preparing the country, the Army and Navy for a probable war, material and technical support for the military operations, and also the methods of guiding the armed forces and controlling the troops.

Of decisive ideological, political and methodological significance to the formation and development of the military-strategic conceptions of the socialist countries is the theory of scientific communism, which embodies all achievements of science and social progress, the whole wealth of revolutionary experience. It profoundly and fully reveals the chief laws governing socialist revolution, the building of socialism and communism in their inter-connection and inter-relation. One of such laws is the defence of socialist gains from imperialist aggressors by joint effort of the countries of the socialist community.

The social make-up of the armies of the socialist states is in conformity with their lofty and great mission—protecting the security of their peoples and guarding peace throughout the world.

The socio-political, economic, ideological and military-strategic foundations of the unity of the socialist countries and their armies are realised thanks to the fruitful activities of Communist and Workers' parties which play a decisive role in developing and strengthening the socialist social system. It is the Communist and Workers' parties of the socialist states, which, drawing on the objective principles of co-operation between the socialist countries, determine the forms of militant alliance of the fraternal armies, take constant care of maintaining their high combat readiness, and mobilise the people and armies of their respective states for a purposeful strengthening of the defensive power of the militant alliance of countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

Thus, Lenin's ideas of unity and close alliance of socialist states, consolidation of their economic, political and military efforts aimed at protecting the revolutionary gains of the working people are embodied and further develop in the Warsaw Treaty.

The Political Consultative Committee, in the work of which the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and heads of government of the fraternal states take part, plays an important role in consolidating comprehensive fraternal co-operation between the socialist countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The Committee examines general political problems. Within the framework of the Political Consultative Committee exchange of opinion takes place on the most pressing international issues bearing on the vital interests of the allied socialist countries, including defence. It also co-ordinates the efforts of the socialist states to consolidate the entire world socialist system. The decisions of the Political Consultative Committee are an important contribution to the struggle for peace and security of nations, detente and normalisation of the situation in Europe and elsewhere.

The defensive power of the fraternal countries is embodied in their Joint Armed Forces which are guided on the basis of the decisions jointly taken by Communist and Workers' parties and governments of the states, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

All the fraternal Communist and Workers' parties pursue a common internationalist foreign policy and jointly strive to constantly develop mutually beneficial economic and political ties between the Warsaw Treaty countries, and consolidate the militant alliance of their armies in case of a threat of aggression on the part of imperialist states.

The need for this co-operation is substantiated in the documents issued by the Communist and Workers' parties, in the decisions of their congresses and the plenary meetings of the Central Committees and the documents of the international communist and working-class movement. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR" stresses: "The CPSU conceives its priority task to lie in working persistently for the closer cohesion and strengthening of the friendship of the Soviet people with the peoples of other socialist countries, and the comprehensive broadening of political, economic, ideological and cultural relations between them."¹ Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, stated: "Our people and our Party will be loyal to the end to their internationalist duty, and will unfailingly and jointly continue to march in the consolidated ranks of the countries of the socialist community, shoulder to shoulder with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the fraternal Soviet people."²

¹ *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Resolution of the CC CPSU*, p. 21.

² *Pravda*, November 14, 1972.

A truly internationalist stand in defending socialist gains was reflected in the documents of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which declared: "We live on the border with the imperialist world and cannot forget for a minute that, together with our allies, we must be ready to defend national and state independence and the socialist system. We are fulfilling the task within the framework of the joint effort of states, members of the Warsaw Treaty, relying on our solid unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union."¹

The importance of further strengthening the militant alliance of the socialist countries is also emphasised in the guideline documents of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Polish United Workers' Party and the Rumanian Communist Party. All the fraternal Communist and Workers' parties take constant care of the steady consolidation of their multilateral ties, including those in the military sphere. Unity and cohesion of Communist and Workers' parties are the main source of the invincibility and indestructible power of the militant alliance of the socialist states.

3 Emergence and Development of the Militant Alliance

The comradeship-in-arms among armies of the fraternal countries dates back to the first years of Soviet power when the young Soviet country—the symbol of hopes and aspirations of the oppressed peoples in the world—was ever more confidently and firmly developing, and when internal and external reaction sought, by force of arms, to frustrate the establishment of a new, socialist society on one-sixth of the world's territory. In the trying years of foreign intervention and the Civil War the insistent demand of the working class, "Hands of Soviet Russia!" was heard throughout the world. About a quarter of a million fighter-internationalists—Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Finns, Chinese, Koreans and representatives of many other peoples joined the Red Army to struggle against the common enemy. Lenin and the Communist Party highly appreciated the contribution made by those courageous people to our country's struggle.

Fighter-internationalists fought on the fronts of the Civil War shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers. The Red Banner of the Soviet Republic, the first socialist state in the world, was their banner. Upholding together with the Soviet people the gains of the Great October Revolution, they imbued with the spirit of proletarian solidarity and class fraternity. It was at that glorious time when the firm foundation of the future new type of militant alliance of armies

¹ *14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*. Moscow, 1971, p. 67 (in Russian).

unprecedented in history, was laid. This proletarian militant class alliance was cemented by blood jointly shed for the bright ideals of communism.

Lenin saw in the proletarian solidarity of workers a guarantee of a final victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In August 1918, addressing the servicemen of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment, Lenin said: "It is your great privilege to uphold sacred ideas arms in hand, and to make international brotherhood of nations a reality by fighting together with your frontline enemies of yesterday — Germans, Austrians and Magyars.

"And, comrades, I am confident that if you muster all your military forces and set up a mighty international Red Army, and hurl these iron battalions against the exploiters and oppressors, against the reactionary thugs of the whole world, making your battle cry 'Victory or Death!'— no imperialist force will be able to hold us!"¹

The proletarian solidarity of the working people and support on the part of internationalists throughout the world were important factors in defending the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The Soviet people will forever keep a feeling of sincere gratitude to their class brothers, to all who jointly with our people defended the sacred cause of proletarian Fraternity, Equality, Freedom and Independence during the hard years of foreign intervention and Civil War in the Soviet Republic. Several thousand citizens of the socialist states were awarded Soviet orders and medals for their active participation in the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Civil War, the establishment of Soviet power in 1917-22 and in connection with the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

Accepting with gratitude the fraternal assistance given by the working people of other countries, the Soviet people have always fulfilled their internationalist duty with credit. However complicated a situation arose for the USSR, whatever hardships our people went through, they always found a chance to render assistance to and express fraternal solidarity with the working people of other countries in the struggle for their rights and liberation. Such has been the case in the past, this is what happens now and will continue to happen in future.

Here are some examples from the history of our militant alliance.

In March 1919 a socialist revolution took place in Hungary, and the Hungarian Soviet Republic was formed. On behalf of the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party Lenin heartily welcomed the victory won by the Hungarian people, and this inspired the Hungarian working people to a decisive struggle against the enemies of the republic. They regarded the Soviet people as their reliable friends. The Hungarian Communists' programme pointed out that "in order to ensure the power of the proletariat against the imperialists of the Entente, a complete and sincere military and ideological alliance

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 40.

with the Russian Soviet Government must be concluded"¹. And they were not mistaken. The young Soviet Republics, despite the complicated situation on the Civil War fronts, did its utmost to render assistance and support to the Hungarian revolutionaries. Responding to the Party's appeal, former Russian POWs who were still in Hungary joined their efforts to those of the Hungarian revolutionaries to uphold the revolutionary gains. Although the imperialists succeeded in stifling the Hungarian revolution, proletarian solidarity and the working people's internationalist friendship left a deep impression in Hungarian and Soviet hearts.

In 1921, flames of revolutionary struggle enveloped Mongolia. The Mongolian people fought heroically against their foreign invaders, the tsarist baron Ungern's White-Guard gangs and internal reaction. The Soviet people came to the aid of their Mongolian brothers. By decision of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, Soviet troops took part in the struggle against the enemies of the Mongolian people. The joint action of Mongolian revolutionary troops and the Red Army routed the counter-revolutionary forces. This victory exerted a beneficial influence on the socio-economic and political development of Mongolia. The Mongolian working people, under the guidance of their People's Revolutionary Party and following the example of the Soviet Republic, embarked on the road of building a new life, and the Mongolian People's Republic was formed.

In 1939, when the Japanese militarists invaded the Mongolian People's Republic, the Soviet Union again set an example of how to discharge one's internationalist duty. In close co-operation with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the Soviet troops smashed the Japanese aggressors at the Khalkhin-Gol River.

All the time the Chinese people were struggling for national independence and freedom, the Soviet Union rendered them exceptionally great political and moral support, as well as military and economic assistance. For example, during the first revolutionary civil war in China (1924-27), a team of prominent Red Army commanders, headed by V. K. Blyukher—an outstanding Soviet military leader—was sent to assist the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Army of China. China's revolutionary forces also received the arms, food, ammunition, and medicines indispensable for a successful struggle.

Soviet aid was given on an even greater scale during the anti-Japanese national-liberation war and in the Second World War when Soviet troops routed the Japanese Quantung Army. Mao Tse-tung once had to admit that the Soviet Union was the only state which had supported the Chinese people's struggle for liberation during the first revolutionary civil war, and was the first state to help defend China against the Japanese invaders. When the People's Republic of China was formed, the Soviet Union rendered it all-round assistance—economic, technical, cultural and military. Today in

¹ Quoted from M. F. Lebov, *The Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919*, Moscow, 1959, p. 88 (in Russian).

China these facts are being passed over in silence, and the Soviet Union, the first socialist power in the world and the birth-place of the October Revolution, is declared by the nationalists in the Peking leadership to be "Number One Enemy". This is nothing but class betrayal.

The Soviet people's fraternal solidarity was also vividly demonstrated during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), when Soviet people without hesitation joined the Republicans who upheld the Spanish people's sacred right to freedom and independence in the struggle against fascism. Soviet volunteers courageously fought in Spain with anti-fascists from other countries. The USSR sent weapons, military hardware, ammunition and food to Republican Spain.

The glorious revolutionary traditions of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity were multiplied during the Great Patriotic War, in the course of which the Soviet people organically combined their national tasks and internationalist duty with respect to the other peoples suffering under nazi oppression.

The Soviet people's militant alliance with the fraternal peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Albania was developed and strengthened in the anti-fascist battles. In building a new society and its armed defence qualitatively new internationalist ties started forming.

The peoples of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe united to meet their internationalist tasks, their militant union expressing the vital interest of the peoples under the heel of nazi occupation. The fighting people regarded military co-operation with the Soviet Union as the only real way towards national liberation.

This was not only military, but also political co-operation. The liberation struggle was led by Communist and Workers' parties. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people rendered multifarious assistance to nazi-occupied Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. A number of national units from those countries were formed, armed and trained on Soviet territory, and with the USSR's direct participation. All in all, during the Great Patriotic War, 19 infantry, 5 artillery and 5 air force divisions, 6 infantry and airborne, 8 tank and motorised infantry, 12 artillery and mortar, and 5 engineer brigades, and many other units of the allied states were armed and trained thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union. A total of 555,000 troops were equipped with Soviet aid in this way. Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and later Bulgarian, Hungarian and Rumanian national units struggled together with the Soviet Army against the common enemy—German nazism.

The Soviet people highly appreciated the militant contribution of the fraternal armies to the common cause. Many units were named after the towns which they helped to liberate. Twenty-three Polish and ten Czechoslovak units and one Rumanian infantry division were awarded Soviet orders.

The struggle against a strong and well-armed enemy was a genuine school of militant solidarity among peoples' armies. Officers and men

in these armies demonstrated a true militant fraternity. The servicemen matured in the fierce battles, their fighting skill and political awareness grew, and their alliance with Soviet servicemen developed and consolidated. The very fact of the allied armies' co-operation with Soviet troops exerted tremendous revolutionising impact. They were even deeper imbued with the lofty ideas of socialism and proletarian internationalism, and learned fighting skill from Soviet officers and men. The Soviet people's fraternal co-operation with the peoples of Central, East and South-East European countries served as a source of the might and invincibility of the allied armies, and the mass heroism of its servicemen.

The multi-national Soviet people played a decisive role in routing Nazi Germany and her satellites. They performed an unparalleled internationalist feat of arms during the war and saved the peoples of Europe from Nazi enslavement.

The Soviet Army's victory over Japanese aggressors made the possibilities of national liberation of Asian peoples much stronger.

Thus, in the course of the war, relations of co-operation and friendship were shaped in countries where people's democratic transformations were being carried out with the aid of Soviet Armed Forces, and deeper international ties were formed in the sphere of state defence.

Military co-operation among the socialist countries was further developed in the post-war years. A study of the background, nature and tasks of this co-operation can be subdivided into two stages, each having specific features.

The first stage of military co-operation among fraternal states covers the period from the end of the Second World War up to the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (1945-55). It is characterised by deep social transformations in Central, East and South-East European countries, and fiercer struggle of the working people, headed by Communist and Workers' parties for democracy and socialism. As a result of this struggle, the working people's power was established in all the countries of people's democracy. In such conditions a radically new basis emerged for relations between the USSR and these countries—their common socio-political and economic systems, and the unity of Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

At the first stage, the countries which embarked on the socialist road almost completely solved the problem of forming national armies. Each socialist state needed armed forces to defend the working people's socialist gains against the overtly hostile and aggressive policies of imperialist states in respect to the new progressive social system. The complicated and multi-faceted processes of forming armies proceeded differently in the various socialist countries, but the fundamental principles of their construction were the same: community of political aims and tasks, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and of the interests of the people and the army, and the principles of organising political education and training of the armed forces. As regards their class nature, these were truly people's

socialist armies, the armies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The establishment of armed forces in the young socialist states was facilitated by the great assistance and support of the Soviet Union, and drew on the wealth of experience gained by the Soviet Armed Forces. The development of armies in the young socialist states was based on Leninist principles tested in the course of the Soviet Army's development: guidance of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party; class approach to army development; unity of the army and the people; loyalty to proletarian internationalism, and other key principles. The Soviet Armed Forces shared their rich experience with their comrades-in-arms, assisted them in training officers, and rendered them diverse material and technical aid.

The growing international tension, for which imperialism was to blame, naturally brought about the need for the young socialist countries to co-operate even more closely with each other and with the Soviet Union in the defence field. Imperialism thought to find ways and means to thwart socialist construction in those countries, and restore capitalism. In response, socialist states were compelled to establish and consolidate a militant alliance which began to be implemented in the form of bilateral agreement. Beginning with the late 1940s, capitalist states started forming aggressive military blocs: NATO (1949); ANZUS (1951); SEATO (1954); the so-called Baghdad Pact (1955) which in March 1959, after Iraq withdrew from it, was called CENTO; and ASPAC (1966). The imperialists did not hide their anti-socialist nature. The establishment of these blocs, as well as a number of other aggressive acts, increased military tension.

The threat to the European socialist countries became especially strong after the admission to NATO, in the spring of 1955, of West Germany, whose state policy at that time was openly based on revanchism, the policy of revision of state borders with the socialist countries and a policy of capturing foreign territories. In such conditions the bilateral treaties of the USSR with the socialist countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance no longer met the new and urgent need for military co-operation on a multilateral and collective basis. European socialist countries could oppose the aggressive NATO military bloc only by uniting into a single military-political alliance, relying primarily on the military power of the Soviet Union. In May 1955, in response to imperialist intrigues, the defensive Warsaw Treaty was formed, the aim of which was to ensure the security of each fraternal socialist state and of the socialist community as a whole. The participants in the Treaty declared that they would continue to take "the concerted measures necessary to consolidate their defensive capability so as to protect the peaceful labour of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories, and ensure defence against possible aggression".¹

¹ *The Warsaw Meeting of European States on Ensuring Peace and Security in Europe*, Moscow, 1955, p. 139 (in Russian).

The formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in May 1955 marked *the second stage* of military co-operation among socialist countries, characterised by a more active participation of each socialist state in strengthening the common defensive might of the fraternal alliance.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is a new and deeper form of the collective defence of socialist countries against imperialist aggression. During the first stage, military co-operation was based on bilateral agreements, while after the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty, as is pointed out in Article 4, each member state is bound to render immediate assistance to the state under attack, "with every means it deems necessary, including the use of armed force"¹.

The period of time that has elapsed since the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty demonstrates how necessary and correct it was to form the organisation as an instrument ensuring the inviolability of the borders of European socialist countries, and their security against possible imperialist aggression.

The militant alliance of the Warsaw Treaty states is of immense revolutionary significance. Internationalist solidarity, all-round selfless assistance to peoples struggling for their freedom and independence, and the firm stand taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the struggle against imperialist intrigues, have more than once been a decisive force in thwarting the aggressive plans of the monopoly reaction.

The defence of Warsaw Treaty states rests partly on their common economic and military power, but above all on the military, economic, scientific and technological potential of the powerful Soviet state. The vast fighting experience of the Soviet Armed Forces, the great skills and moral and fighting qualities of their personnel constitute the basis of socialist countries' security, and a mighty means for averting a new world war. At the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, stated: "The Soviet Union is bearing the brunt of the struggle against the forces of imperialism and war on a global scale. The USSR is the guarantor of the security of the socialist system, and it is decisively supporting and providing aid to the peoples fighting for their liberty. The great historic service of the Soviet Union is that it has opened up a realistic prospect for the prevention of world wars. During the whole of man's history full of conflagrations, this has been but an unrealisable dream. Now the dream can become reality thanks to the power of the socialist camp and especially the Soviet Union, the power which has lent both meaning and force to the concept of 'peace'."²

The Soviet Armed Forces, together with their class brothers — servicemen of the armies of states, members of the Warsaw Trea-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

² *Our Friends Speak. Greetings to the 24th CPSU Congress*, Moscow, 1971, p. 80.

ty—vigilantly watch over aggressive imperialist schemes, and are ready at any moment to stand up in arms and defend the socialist gains of the peoples of the entire socialist community.

The militant alliance of the socialist countries is relatively young, but its history is rich and impressive. The militant alliance of the socialist armies is firm and unbreakable because it is based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

4. For a Further Strengthening of the Militant Alliance

The imperialist reactionary forces are stepping up their military preparations, and thus compelling socialist states to take measures to enhance their own defensive might and to strengthen the militant alliance of the fraternal armies.

Both within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and in the relations with the armies of other socialist states, efficient forms of co-operation have been elaborated on the strength of long experience, forms directed at steadily raising the combat readiness of each army and consolidating the militant alliance of the socialist countries in general. The character and forms of military co-operation among socialist countries are diverse, but are all based on the Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army, on common aims and tasks in defending socialist gains, and on common principles of building up the armed forces.

The leaders of each national army exhibit great initiative and creative efforts in combining the theoretical and practical issues of military development, thereby contributing to the common cause of strengthening the defensive might of socialist states.

Common views on basic problems in the theory and practices of military development which rests as it does on the unshakable foundation of Marxism-Leninism, and on a complete and all-round analysis of the current military and political situation and the changes in the character and methods of warfare constitute a major factor in the militant alliance. The elaboration of problems in present-day military theory has arisen as a result of the close co-operation among the military scholars of the allied armies.

The treasure-house of fighting experience possessed by the Soviet Armed Forces, their first-grade material and technical basis, and their well-trained military cadres ensure the Soviet military scholars a vanguard role in tackling the tasks of military science. Military scholars of the other allied armies also make a tangible contribution to the development of this science. The results of their research become the property of all fraternal armies, who regularly exchange military scientific information. Therefore, the socialist armies have reached a high level in the art of war, and their mastery continues to improve

under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution and the changes in ways and means of military operations.

Joint troop and command-and-staff exercises play an important part in strengthening the militant alliance. In the course of the exercises officers and men of the fraternal armies solve general tasks, come to know each other better, learn the art of modern combat together, come to a deeper understanding of their internationalist duty, and become even more strongly imbued with feelings of friendship, respect, mutual trust and mutual understanding. There is every ground for saying that joint exercises are genuine schools of solid friendship and comradeship-in-arms between the fraternal armies' servicemen. They demonstrate the growing defensive might of the socialist states and mobilise the allied armies' servicemen to defend the revolutionary gains of the peoples. At the same time the exercises enrich the theory of the art of war, promote the improvement of the operational training of commanders and staffs, raise the level of troops' combat training, and make it possible to organise the co-operation and control of the troops in the most efficient way. Exercises test the combat readiness of the allied armies, the reliability of their equipment and weapons, the organisational abilities of their commanders and staffs, and the fighting skills of their personnel.

Among important ways for strengthening the militant alliance is the *regular exchange of experience* gained in military development, combat and operational training, education and training of servicemen. Conferences and assemblies for the high commanders of the Warsaw Treaty national armies are held with those aims in view. They sum up the results of combat and operational training, examine the achievements in military development, training and education of troops and expose shortcomings. Simultaneously they chart new educational tasks and measures for training armed forces, and in particular maintaining their high combat readiness.

Exchange of delegations, consultations between specialists on the most important and complicated matters of the art of war, the mastering of new types of weapons and equipment, and exchange of opinion on their maintenance and combat use are being organised in the interests of studying the experience of each other's combat and operational training systems.

Military-technical co-operation also gives tangible and mutually advantageous results. It is directed at ensuring the high technical equipment of socialist armies. Uninterrupted modernisation of weapons and military hardware is required, as well as the creation of new, improved weapons. Here the Soviet Union has a leading part to play. Possessing a powerful military and economic potential and a scientific and technological basis, it renders necessary assistance to the fraternal countries in strengthening their defensive capabilities. The USSR not only directly supplies new types of weapons and military hardware, but also hands over licences and technical documentation for their production. Joint research and design work is

done, and scientific and technological consultations are widely used.

The Soviet Union plays an important part in creating and developing the defence industries of the fraternal countries. An important way of co-ordinating military-technical policies is through unifying the weapons and military hardware of the allied armies. This simplifies their maintenance and supply in case of hostilities.

The productive forces of socialist states, especially those who are members of the Warsaw Treaty, have reached such a level of maturity that in recent years the features of socialist integration can be increasingly discerned both in military industry and in the economy as a whole. This relates both to the sphere of direct scientific and production activity in the elaboration and production of military hardware and also to the problems of planning and realising a programme of scientific and technological progress in the interests of extending and strengthening the material and technical basis of the Joint Armed Forces in every possible way.

Mutual assistance in training cadres constitutes a key factor in further strengthening the friendly ties between socialist armies. The Soviet Armed Forces make a particularly weighty contribution to this: in many Soviet military educational establishments highly skilled commanding, political and technical military cadres for the fraternal armies have been trained for many years. They are educated in the spirit of selfless devotion to the ideals of socialism and communism. Successfully mastering diverse ideological, theoretical, military and technological informations in Soviet military academies, the officers of the fraternal countries are imbued with deep respect for the heroic past of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces, the spirit of friendship and comradeship-in-arms. Today a large number of officers who graduated from the military educational establishments of the Soviet Union successfully serve in the armies of the fraternal countries.

Soviet military specialists also render much assistance in creating and organising training in the military educational establishments of the other socialist countries.

Close businesslike ties among the political bodies of the fraternal armies play an essential role in strengthening the militant alliance. Exchange of experience in Party-political work aimed at educating the servicemen in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and training the ideologically convinced, staunch and hardened servicemen—patriots and internationalists—is regularly held. All this consolidates and cements the militant alliance of the fraternal armed forces, and makes them even more prepared for combat.

Forms and methods of educating servicemen in the spirit of socialist internationalism are multifarious and are based on Lenin's ideas of class unity in socialist states, on studying the history of the international working-class movement and the heroic past of the peoples of socialist countries. Servicemen in socialist armies are

educated in the spirit of militant alliance and their motto is: "Class brothers are comrades-in-arms".

Soviet troops stationed abroad always acquaint newly arrived servicemen with the traditions, state system, laws and customs of the particular friendly socialist country, as well as with the combat history of the unit where they will undergo their service. Meetings with Party leaders and statesmen of the fraternal country are of great significance in the internationalist education of the Soviet servicemen.

The propaganda of the noble feats performed by Soviet servicemen, who sometimes risk their lives to help the people of fraternal countries during natural calamities and accidents, rescuing people and state property, exerts considerable influence on the education of personnel in the spirit of socialist internationalism and comradeship-in-arms.

The Soviet Union continues to develop and consolidate military-political co-operation with the fraternal states, thereby strengthening the militant alliance of their armed forces, whose aim is to ensure the security of the socialist community as a whole, and of each of its member-states. At the same time the friendship and militant alliance of the socialist countries objectively contribute to international detente and to strengthening peace and security on earth.

The communique of the April 1974 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member-states stresses: "Member-countries of the Warsaw Treaty will continue to strengthen their inviolable friendship in the interests of socialism, progress and peace, raising even higher the prestige of socialism by setting an example to other peoples of inter-state relations of a new type, a truly democratic society, an example of the socialist way of life. They will continue to work for detente and for the triumph of the ideals of peace, security, economic and social progress."¹

The fraternal countries highly appreciate the friendship among them, which is growing even stronger, and they also value highly the great political, economic and military assistance rendered to them by the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro said of this assistance: "... the Soviet people helped us repulse the imperialist aggression and the imperialist blockade. Without the assistance of the Soviet Union our revolution would have been doomed to defeat. At the moment when the question of the survival of our country was at stake, decisive assistance arrived from the Soviet Union."²

Thanks to the all-round assistance and support given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the heroic Vietnamese people succeeded in defending their country against the imperialist aggressors. The militant alliance of the socialist states is firm and indestructible. It came into being as a result of the victory of the ideas of the October

¹ *Pravda*, April 19, 1974.

² *Pravda*, February 8, 1974.

Revolution, was inspired by the fierce battles in the hard years of the Great Patriotic War and cemented by the blood jointly shed by officers and men of the fraternal countries. Soviet people do all that is necessary to consolidate it to an even greater degree. The steadily developing and strengthening militant alliance of armies of socialist states constitutes a vivid expression of the indissoluble nature of the fraternal unity. The Soviet Armed Forces occupy a deserved place in their close ranks. Soviet servicemen fulfil their patriotic and internationalist duty with a sense of great responsibility.

CONCLUSION

Defending his socialist Motherland and upholding the freedom and independence of his people, the Soviet soldier always dreamed that his blood shed on the battlefield would be the last blood shed on earth. Today this dream may come true, insofar as humanity is now capable of averting war as a means of settling outstanding inter-state issues. Our advanced socialist society, free of exploitation and ensuring the blessings of life for everyone who honestly works in the name of the triumph of communism, needs a lasting peace, a world without wars and bloodshedding.

In this book the author has been striving to demonstrate that the army, an instrument of violence and war during the entire history of humanity, has acquired new properties in the person of the Soviet Armed Forces, to become a liberation army, an army which defends peace and security of peoples.

Since the very first day of their existence, the Soviet Armed Forces were built as armed forces of a new type, indissolubly linked with the people and their ideals and aspirations, permeated with the spirit of fraternal friendship among Soviet peoples and the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism. They are totally devoted to their socialist Motherland and to the Communist Party. The Soviet Armed Forces were created and nurtured by the great Lenin and the Communist Party to defend the socialist gains of the working people, and they fulfil their historical mission with credit.

The Soviet Armed Forces, which vigilantly guard socialism and communist construction, have more than once carried on a fierce struggle against a strong and dangerous aggressor. All the difficulties notwithstanding, they always emerged victorious, demonstrated unprecedented heroism, staunchness and selflessness. Soviet servicemen matured in those battles, and their fighting skill increased. The organisational structure of the Soviet Army and Navy, their weapons, the art of war and the system of training and education have been successfully baptised by fire and tested by time.

The battle successes of the Soviet Armed Forces are determined by the wise leadership of the Communist Party, its correct decisions on state security, the scientific character of military development, the purposeful educational and organisational work carried out by the Party, and the titanic efforts of all Soviet people. The sources of victories scored by the Soviet Armed Forces are rooted in the peoples of our multi-national country, the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist one, Soviet politics and economy, the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the alignment of socio-political forces in the world arena, which has been constantly changing in favour of socialism.

It is good, when thinking about the past, to also contemplate the future — new tasks and accomplishments. In casting a glance at the path we have travelled and expressing profound respect for the glorious deeds of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, we are looking into the communist future.

The building of communist society has become an immediate practical task for the Soviet people. The Party has charted a colossal programme for the further development of our country and armed the Soviet people with a clear-cut political line and the correct Leninist course. Looking after the interests of the people, raising its standard of living, strengthening the might of the Soviet Union and the whole of the world socialist system, struggling for peace and international security are in the centre of all the Party's deeds and plans.

The Communist Party has been firmly and consistently translating the Peace Programme announced by the 24th CPSU Congress into reality. The active foreign policy of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, aimed at ensuring the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, has been exerting immense impact on the entire international situation. With every coming year the international position of the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community is being consolidated. The Soviet Union's economic tasks are being successfully fulfilled. The moral and political unity of the multi-national Soviet people is constantly being consolidated.

The successes scored in communist construction, the constantly growing international prestige of the Soviet Union, its impact on the political climate in the world and tremendous revolutionary transformations on our planet, give imperialist reaction no time to rest. The weakening position of imperialism and the doom of the capitalist system tend to intensify the aggressiveness and adventurism of the reactionary monopoly circles. Here and there they provoke military conflicts spearheaded against the Soviet Union, the entire socialist community and the forces of national liberation. Resorting to political subversion, blackmail and aggressive wars, militarists vainly seek to resolve the insoluble internal social, economic and ideological contradictions of the capitalist system, weaken the world socialist

system, and put down the international working class and national liberation movements.

Despite the international detente, there still exist forces in the imperialist camp, who act in the spirit of the cold war, seeking to swell military budgets and step up war preparations.

Our Party vigilantly watches over the actions of the enemies of peace and social progress. Pursuing a policy of strengthening peace, international co-operation and the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, it is always aware of the fact that imperialism remains a threat. There is no doubt that imperialists would long ago have tried to fulfil their sinister plans but for the huge economic and military might of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The Soviet Union as a socialist country has nothing to do with wars of plunder. However, we shall use the whole might of our state and all our resolution to defend the socialist gains of the Soviet people. The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress states: "We have everything necessary—a genuine peace policy, military might and the unity of Soviet people—to ensure the inviolability of our borders against any encroachments, and to defend the gains of socialism."¹

We struggle for peace, because such a policy is inherent in socialism. We struggle for peace because imperialism still exists in the world. It has not given up its struggle against socialism and, by virtue of its class nature, creates a constant threat to peace, above all, to socialist countries. That is why the Communist Party combines its active and peace-loving foreign policy with constant vigilance towards imperialist states and their aggressive blocs, and takes care to strengthen the defensive capability of the Soviet Union and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Communist Party's leading and guiding role in organising the armed defence of the Soviet state is constantly growing.

Now, as always, combat training and political education, Party-political work in the units, the everyday life and activities of personnel, are all subordinated to the preservation of high vigilance and strengthening the combat readiness of the Soviet Army and Navy. The Armed Forces are always ready to defend their Motherland and rebuff any aggression, wherever it may come from.

Thanks to the care taken by the Party, the Government and all the people, our Army and Navy are being equipped with up-to-date weapons and military hardware. The latest models of missiles, aircraft, naval, armoured, artillery and other types of armaments are being sent to the Army and Navy units. These powerful weapons are in the skilful and reliable hands of Soviet servicemen. Their motto is as follows: "Perfectly to know the weapons, to maintain them excellently and skilfully to use them".

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 36.

Soviet servicemen are cordially grateful to the people, the Party and the Government for providing the Armed Forces with first-rate weapons, military hardware and everything necessary for combat training, service and everyday life. The growing upward trend of the economy as a result of the fulfilment of national economic plans, the acceleration of the scientific and technological progress and the large-scale introduction of its achievements in all spheres of life, including the military sphere, ensure a strengthening of the defensive capability of the Soviet Union, and an improvement in the combat readiness of the Soviet Army and Navy. This makes it possible to protect the whole socialist community even more reliably against the intrigues of the aggressive forces.

Soviet servicemen, however, are not just outstanding and powerful in terms of arms. They possess high moral and combat qualities. The Communist Party has armed them with invincible revolutionary Marxist-Leninist teaching which constitutes an inexhaustible source for the ideological maturity and communist conviction of the entire personnel. Our people can be sure that the current generation of Soviet servicemen are worthy heirs and continuers of the revolutionary, combat and labour traditions of their fathers and grandfathers, a loyal guard of the Party and people ready to stand up in arms in defence of the socialist Motherland.

The aims and tasks of our Armed Forces are lofty and noble. Soviet servicemen are well aware what they are assigned to protect and from whom. On testing grounds, in the air, at sea, protecting the land, air and sea frontiers of our Motherland, they consistently improve their skill, and consolidate their organisation and discipline.

When one contemplates the destinies of our socialist Motherland and its Armed Forces, the following thought always comes to mind: what a great and heroic path they have traversed! The Soviet people, in particular the older generations, who witnessed and took part in the Party's and people's glorious accomplishments during the years of foreign intervention and Civil War, the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic War, and the post-war period, clearly see to what heights our country has risen, following Lenin's course, under the guidance of the Party. We are all proud of the fact that socialism has completely and finally triumphed in our country. A developed socialist society has been built, and today the talented and industrious Soviet people are successfully building communism. Our great Motherland stands as a powerful bastion of peace, evoking the admiration and respect of all progressive mankind. We take pride in the fact that the Soviet state is part of the community of socialist countries, the greatest gain of the international working class and a prototype of the future world community of free peoples.

Every Soviet citizen and every friend of our Motherland is well aware that the Soviet Armed Forces constitute a reliable and solid foundation to the defensive might of the Soviet socialist state, and guard the land of Soviets vigilantly while it is building communism. No ordeal in past wars has crushed their unprecedented spirit. In the

fieree struggle against the enemies of our Motherland, the Soviet Armed Forces have matured, strengthened, cognised the laws of the struggle, and emerged victorious. They look into the future with full confidence. There is no force in the world that could shake their combat might and confidence in the triumph of communism. The growing economic and defensive might of the USSR, the strengthening unity of the army and the people, and the wise guidance of the entire cause of communist construction and defence of the socialist Motherland by the CPSU are a guarantee of this.

REQUEST TO READERS

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In this book Marshal Grechko deals with some of the topical aspects of the development of the Soviet Union's Armed Forces. The sources of Soviet military might are well demonstrated and analysed.

The author focuses on showing the guiding role of the Communist Party in tackling questions associated with the strengthening of the Soviet Union's defence potential, in the exploration and solution of problems involved in the development of up-to-date weaponry and military equipment for the Soviet Army and Navy, in improving the moral, psychological conditioning and combat training of the Soviet Armed Forces personnel, and the direction of the Soviet Armed Forces and troop control. Other topics covered include the ongoing progress of Soviet science and art of war, and the growing combat alliance of the armies of the socialist community as a guarantee of world peace and security of nations.
