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The struggle of ideas in the contemporary world

**Chasing the chimera
of military superiority ●**

The truth about lend-lease ●

Trotskyism today: whom it serves ●

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I'm delighted at your efforts to tell the truth about the Soviet Union, which bourgeois propaganda keeps from us so skilfully, and to expose the dark sides of capitalism.

T. Madubuko,
unemployed, aged 30,
Nigeria

Your materials help the reader gain a correct understanding of the situation in the world today.

Orlando António Sebastião Brás,
book-keeper, aged 37,
Mozambique

I think that the material aid rendered the Soviet Union by its Western Allies and, particularly, by my country, the United States, under the Lend-Lease Act, was decisive for your country's victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. This selfless and generous aid was given, I might say, to the detriment of the US, at the most difficult time for the USSR, the beginning of the war. It was this aid that helped you win the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, wasn't it?

John Dick,
USA

Anatoly YAKUSHEVSKY, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), senior researcher at the Institute of the History of War under the USSR Ministry for Defence, answers the letter. (See p. 29).

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PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE

CHASING THE CHIMERA OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY

by Valentin BEREZHKOV

There are several myths which have time and time again been revived by US propaganda over the forty postwar years. And, perhaps, the most tenacious of them all is the story directly linked with US nuclear diplomacy which has it that right after the Second World War (1939-1945) Washington, then the atomic bomb monopolist, proposed establishing international control over nuclear energy, sharing its expertise with other peoples, stopping the production of atomic bombs and destroying its atomic bomb stockpiles. This story is presented to the Western reader as something self-evident. Such claims are nothing farther from the truth. We give you the real facts.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is first of all necessary to retrace, even if briefly, the history of the development of the US atomic bomb and look at the political combinations which the US ruling circles contemplated then in connection with this weapon of mass destruction.

The atomic bomb began taking predominance in the US political course in early 1941. In his letter addressed to the US President Roosevelt the world famous physicist Einstein warned that unless the Western democracies got down to the problem right away, Nazi Germany could be the first to manufacture atomic bombs.

The work of developing the atomic bomb, first started in cooperation with the British, was gradually monopolized by the United States. Great Britain was carefully being pushed out of the Manhattan Project (the code name of the organization concerned with A-bomb

● V. BEREZHKOV is Chief Editor of the journal *The USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology* published in Russian.

development—*Ed.*). In step with the growing likelihood of success, US and British political leaders pondered over the possible impact the appearance of the weapon would make upon the international situation and the role of the countries possessing the secret of its manufacture. They were faced with the alternative of either concealing the secret from the third partner in the anti-fascist coalition—the Soviet Union—or of sharing the discovery with Moscow.

The option crystallized gradually, in line with Washington's growing confidence that the atoms would be successfully harnessed. Two points are worthy of note here. First, way back in October, 1941, when the Political Priorities Group was established in the USA to deal with the development and production of atomic energy, the American leadership was in no doubt that if the bomb were manufactured in time it would be used in combat operations. Second, assuming that the atomic bomb monopoly would give the United States unprecedented military superiority after the war Washington politicians thought how to use this advantage for exerting diplomatic pressure. Eventually, the idea of the new weapon as a means of pressurizing the Soviet Union and other countries prevailed.

The development of the bomb was pursued in an atmosphere of deep secrecy. In August, 1942 all laboratories doing nuclear research were placed "under one umbrella". Also, it was then that, for reasons of security, the new organization was code-named Manhattan Project. US Defence Secretary Henry Stimson was to supervise the work. Brigadier General Leslie Groves was made project chief.

With World War II raging on, when nazi agents were actively engaged in espionage and subversion on US territory, when there were fears that nazi Germany would be the first to develop the atomic bomb, stringent security measures were only natural. Significantly, from the very outset, strenuous efforts were made to conceal the atomic secret from the USSR.

In the summer of 1943 President Roosevelt and Britain's Prime Minister W. Churchill signed the Quebec agreement on cooperation in the field of atomic energy development for the duration of the war. The US President had no objection to the British Prime Minister's intention to use the bomb as a trump card in relations with the Soviet Union. But, in this agreement, Britain was made the junior partner. It was stipulated that since the heavy burden of production was carried by the USA, the British government must acknowledge that any questions linked with possible postwar industrial and commercial benefits should be settled between the USA and Great Britain on terms formulated by the US President.

Thereby, long in advance, Washington reserved the right of exclusive benefits accruing from atomic energy development. Still, London was elated. British politicians believed the atomic bomb would become a decisive factor in the postwar world. The fact that, in the

Quebec document, the sides undertook not to transfer "without mutual agreement" any information about the bomb to a third party shows that they meant, first of all, barring the Soviet Union from atomic secrets and using atomic weapons to attain their aims in the post-war period.

Some people knowing the atomic bomb secret had a sense of historical perspective. They could not fail to see that the course being shaped would inevitably arouse suspicions in Moscow and complicate any postwar settlement. Quite a few scientists engaged in the Manhattan Project pointed this out. They insisted that the USA and Britain share the secret with the Soviet Union so that the parties could map out a joint course for the utilization of atomic energy and control over atomic weapons. This would prevent a nuclear arms race. But Washington and London decided differently. Captive to the illusion that they would retain the atomic monopoly for a long time to come, US and British politicians started a dangerous development which has since turned the globe into a nuclear powder-keg. The problems facing mankind today originate from the US-British "atomic collusion" during World War II.

THE TRUE ESSENCE OF THE BARUCH PLAN

Basic to the causes of the "cold war" was the decision to oust the Soviet Union from the atomic bomb development project and the plans for using this unprecedentedly destructive weapon as a means of pressurizing Moscow. Soviet leaders listening to the Western politicians' statements on their adherence to the idea of "postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union" could not but query why the US and British leaders, if they were sincere, should keep their Manhattan Project secret from the third ally, why they were clinging so tenaciously to the bomb monopoly.

Naturally, in that situation the Soviet side was obliged to take measures to buttress its security.

The USA assumed at the time that it would take the Soviet Union years, if not decades, to develop its own atomic weapons. For instance, General Groves said in October, 1947, i.e. only two years before atomic weapons were developed by the Soviet Union, that fifteen to twenty years would elapse before the Russians could make such a bomb. During that period, Washington expected to forge far ahead in the development of its atomic weapons and build up significant stocks which would assure its dominance over the world. The Baruch plan was a logical outgrowth of the US striving for nuclear hegemony.

The then US President Truman appointed banker Bernard Baruch, 75, to the post of US chief representative at the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Baruch was to impress upon the US and world pub-

lic the idea of US dominance over the planet under the guise of a "philanthropic" and "disinterested" plan for international (actually American—*Ed.*) control over atomic energy.

The US-proposed plan was overly inclusive and detailed. It encompassed such aspects as relationships between the prospected international control body and the UN Security Council (it stipulated, for example, that in matters of atomic energy utilization, the UN Security Council, with its principle of consensus of the great powers was to be overridden); the functions and privileges of the international control body (the Americans believed it would be able to amass all information about world sources and available stocks of nuclear raw materials and have the right of unlimited access to the territories of particular countries); the assets, ownership and control over the atomic industry (meaning that the control body would exercise overall control and have ownership rights over major atomic energy enterprises); research (research and experimental work by individual countries was to be limited, should the international control body find this "dangerous").

Besides, the international control body was to be granted the exclusive right to do research and experimental work in atomic weapons development using its own personnel and equipment. This reduced to naught the idea of banning atomic weapons. Further, it envisaged the accountability of states to the international control body, the conduct by this body of ground inspections and aerial photography of regions either known or suspected to contain deposits of uranium and thorium ores. It provided for military occupation of countries, for "guarding" atomic enterprises and regions where nuclear raw materials were found or mined. Formally, such an occupation was to be carried out by the armed forces of the international control body but actually—by the US army. With the UN Security Council standing aside and, consequently, in the absence of the principle of consensus of the great powers—permanent members of the Council, Washington could railroad through any resolution it wanted by using the mechanical majority at the UN General Assembly dependent upon it.

The Baruch plan also gave the international control body the prerogative of the "strategic siting" of nuclear industries. It would seem at first glance that all activities "endangering security" were not to be permitted in any one area. In reality, however, something different was meant, namely, the "threat of seizure", while an attempt by a particular country to build its own nuclear industry with corresponding enterprises would be regarded as an "act of seizure". This applied to countries making such attempts after adoption of the US plan and refraining from the transfer of their nuclear raw materials to the control body. Thereby such a country would be guilty of seizure and this would be qualified as preparation for atomic war. An atomic bomb was then to be dropped on it for "disobedience". On the

other hand, a state which had, by then, already had a nuclear industry and appropriate stocks of nuclear raw materials (the United States was the only such state at the time—*Ed.*) was beyond the "seizure" accusation and, so, could go on producing atomic bombs on "legal grounds"—at least until some remote future time, when, according to the Baruch Plan, all atomic weapons stockpiles would be destroyed.

Here, the "stages of control over atomic energy" had a special role. The essence of this section of the US proposals was that control was to be established not at once but on a step-by-step basis. Such a plan, the document said, ensured the possibility of its gradual implementation beginning with the transfer of control over the production of raw material, then control over industrial production and, finally, control over explosives to the organization.

The Baruch Plan submitted for UN consideration in 1946 said, rather bluntly, that the time-limit for replacing the current situation by a status of international atomic equilibrium would be determined by a special schedule. It was also indicated that upon the plan's complete implementation the degree of security against a surprise attack would be enhanced. Therefore, the plan envisaged distinct "danger signals" which gave the USA the time needed to prepare for atomic war. The plan said further that throughout the transition period all nuclear industry enterprises would still be sited in the United States.

As for the "period of transition" itself, under the US project it could last for an indefinitely long time. This can be seen, for instance, from the way the Americans envisioned the first stage of control during which all countries were to be inspected. The international body was empowered to selectively conduct aerial photography, within every two years, either over a region not exceeding 5 per cent of a state's territory, or over a region whose area totalled no more than 2,000 sq. miles (5,180 sq.km); the larger one would be chosen then. It is easy to calculate that the procedure for an aerial photographic survey of the entire territory of an average-sized country would take years to complete.

Consequently, the first stage of control, let alone stage two, could drag on for a whole century. And it was utterly impossible to foresee the onset of the last stage, the banning of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile the United States would retain its monopoly over the production of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

Obviously, the objectives pursued by the Baruch Plan had nothing to do with the prohibition of this mass destruction weapon; neither were they concerned with a genuine international control over atomic energy.

Basically, the plan was the following:

—to have the nuclear industry and nuclear raw materials exclu-

sively on US territory or in countries aligned with the pro-American group of states;

— to deprive the Soviet Union and other countries, “objectionable” to the USA, of the right to use nuclear energy, to any appreciable degree, not only for defence purposes but also for their economic needs;

— to prevent the establishment of control over the US military nuclear industry and, simultaneously, to counter any demands made on the USA to ban the production and storage of atomic weapons;

— to establish international law prerequisites that would enable the United States to take over all stocks of nuclear raw material existing in the world.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union resolutely repudiated the US plan.

HENRY WALLACE'S LETTER

Many serious Western analysts admit that the Baruch Plan had the aim of enabling the United States to achieve its hegemonistic ambitions. British politologist Evan Luard notes that whatever their motives the US proposals purported to put the Soviet Union in a permanently subordinate position.

US scholar Greg Herken formed a similar conclusion. He pointed out that the Baruch Plan was, in effect, an US ultimatum to Russia telling her either to do without nuclear weapons or risk destruction.

The monopoly press extolled the Baruch Plan in every way as an “altruistic”, “noble” and “disinterested” US proposal. But many political leaders, aware of the true essence of the plan, voiced their concern over its possible consequences in private conversations. Thus, a member of the US delegation Ferdinand Eberstadt feared that one day the American public would blame the authors of the Baruch Plan for putting forth proposals patently unacceptable to the USSR and for the intention to build an atomic alliance against the Soviet Union.

However, at that time few Americans openly opposed those proposals. Of the top-line leaders Henry Wallace alone had the courage. He was Vice President of the United States under Roosevelt and Secretary of Commerce in the initial period of Truman's Presidency. Deeply worried over Washington's course of plotting war against the Soviet Union Wallace sent President Truman a letter in late July, 1946 in which he advised him to understand the Soviet position. Wallace wrote: “How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000-mile bombers and air-bases within a thousand miles of our coast-lines and we did not?”

Wallace called attention to one “fatal defect” of the Baruch Plan, i.e. its demand that Russia cease nuclear research and disclose its uranium and thorium reserves while the United States would retain

the right to continue having the benefit of its atomic energy expertise until the establishment of international control and a system of inspection, all operating on behalf of the USA. “In other words we are telling the Russians that if they are ‘good boys’, we may eventually turn over our knowledge of atomic energy to them and to the other nations. Is it any wonder that the Russians did not show any great enthusiasm for our plan.”

Trying to clearly explain the situation to Truman Wallace put the following analogy: “The Soviet Union had only two cards, which she can use in negotiating with us: 1) our lack of information on the state of her scientific and technical progress on atomic energy and 2) our ignorance of her uranium and thorium resources. These cards are nothing like as powerful as our cards—a stockpile of bombs, manufacturing plants in actual production, B-29s and B-36s and our bases covering half the globe. Yet we are in fact asking her to reveal her only two cards immediately—telling her that after we have seen her cards we will decide whether we want to continue to play the game.”¹

This appeal which proved to be the voice of one crying in the wilderness had but one consequence: Henry Wallace was retired soon afterwards.

Documents opened for research over the last few years contain a lot of evidence showing why the White House ignored Wallace's considerations. Thus, in one of his letters to Baruch President Truman exhorted him: “We should stand back on our programme. We must have assurance that the raw materials from which atomic energy can be released are controlled at the source and I am of the opinion that we should not under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can't arm against us. I think we understand each other on this subject.”²

ATOMIC BLUFF

Fred Searls, member of the US delegation to the UN headed by Baruch, informing the US Chiefs of Staff in May, 1946 of the US Administration's position at the negotiations on atomic energy control, specified that, according to the Baruch Plan, the member states of the proposed international body would conclude a treaty outlawing the use of the atomic bomb. They would also agree that should any country, whether a signatory to the treaty or not, violate it, the other parties to the treaty shall automatically and immediately use an atomic bomb against the violator. Proceeding from this, Searls proposed setting up five key bases, each provided with four or six atomic

¹ *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace*. Boston, 1973, pp. 589-601.

² *Truman to Baruch. July 10, 1946. Correspondence on Atomic Energy*. Baruch MSS.

bombs—on the Azores, in Cairo, Karachi, Burma and the Philippines. The commanders of the said bases would be issued sealed instructions containing orders for delivering “retaliatory” strikes against a violater country. The generals and admirals to whom Searls related these details grasped what he was driving at. In their comments on his information they disclosed what Searls had kept silent about, namely, that the bases were located so as to be “clearly directed against the USSR”.

Typically, at the time no one knew exactly how many bombs the USA had. Wallace wrote about bomb depots; Searls in his talks with the Chiefs of Staff believed, to all appearances, that the Americans had at least 20 to 30 bombs ready for the said bases. In either event, both the opponents and the advocates of the Baruch Plan thought that Washington had built up a substantial nuclear arsenal. It is precisely on this that the US nuclear diplomacy of intimidation was based. Later, this was found to be brazen bluff.

Stimson, a former US Defence Secretary, reported in the February 1947 issue of Harper's Magazine that the US had but two bombs and the manufacture of new bombs proceeded very slowly. Besides, the USA did not have appropriate delivery vehicles to carry warheads to targets in Soviet territory.

This exposes another myth of US nuclear diplomacy, to the effect that Washington did not take advantage of its atomic bomb monopoly and did not drop an atomic bomb on the Soviet Union because, you see, America is a peaceable country and, consequently, US military superiority did not hold (nor does it hold today) any danger for anyone but, on the contrary, serves as a guarantee of peace. This is far from the truth. Although the United States was the only country having the bomb at the time, it did not have sufficient nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles to give it decisive superiority and guarantee its victory over the USSR.

The nuclear arms buildup being pursued by the United States for forty years now is directly linked with Washington's chase after the chimera of military superiority over the Soviet Union.

History has shown many times the illusory nature of such calculations. By 1949, while the US atomic bombs were being stockpiled, the Soviet Union had developed its own atomic weapons. And the process has been going on ever since: no matter how sophisticated the American systems, the US has never succeeded in retaining the monopoly.

The development of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union radically changed the situation worldwide. But it did not lead to a revision of US policy towards recognizing the need for a mutually acceptable accord with the USSR. Worse still, Washington replied by developing an even more destructive weapon—the hydrogen bomb. Although the Soviet hydrogen bomb appeared almost simultaneously with the Ame-

rican one, there was no change in Washington's policy. The Soviet side proposed time and again, that all weapons based on the release of nuclear energy be scrapped. But the hope of gaining “superiority” and “victory” in a war with the USSR never faded with the US militarists. They believed it would be possible to win, given “substantial superiority” and “acceptable” losses (the Dropshot plan for war against the USSR to be started in 1957 envisaged a 10-fold US superiority in nuclear weapons). General Groves, mentioned earlier, was fairly optimistic in his assessment of a “nuclear duel” with the Soviet Union at Congress hearings in 1945. He informed the legislators that such a war might cause the death of 40 million Americans (!) but this, he said, would not prevent the United States from eventually winning the war.

Today, Washington politicians also “accept” the loss of 20-40 million Americans in a nuclear war.

ALTERNATIVE

Was there any alternative to the nuclear weapons race? Yes, there was. It was proposed in a Soviet plan for settling the nuclear problem through the effective implementation of a decision to eliminate atomic weapons and prohibit the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. On June 19, 1946, the Soviet delegation submitted the following proposals for the consideration of the UN Atomic Energy Commission:

1. On concluding an international convention banning the production and use of weapons based upon the utilization of atomic energy for mass destruction.

2. On organizing a working commission for control over atomic energy.

Simultaneously, the Soviet delegation tabled a draft convention. Its first article proposed that the contracting parties declare their determination to prohibit the manufacture and use of atomic weapons and assume the following commitments to that end:

- a) not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances;
- b) to prohibit the production and storage of weapons based upon utilization of atomic energy;
- c) to destroy all stockpiles of atomic weapons, both operational and those being produced within three months.

The Soviet Union offered a clear-cut programme of categorical and immediate prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Washington's striving to go on building its atomic arsenal was countered by a proposal that all existing atomic bombs be destroyed within the shortest possible time.

Article II of the Soviet draft convention said that the high contracting parties shall declare that a violation of Article I of the convention constitutes an heinous crime against humanity. Article III

demanding adoption, within specific time-limits, of legislation against violators of the convention.

Further, the Soviet draft stated that the convention was to be permanent and that any state could accede to it, whether a UN member or not.

The Soviet proposals indicated the way towards a successful settlement of the nuclear problem in the best interests of all of mankind. Had they been adopted then, the world would have been spared the wasteful nuclear weapons race and it would not be now faced with the horrible danger of nuclear war which may kill all life on our planet. But the US government declined the Soviet draft and continued chasing the chimera of nuclear superiority and victory over the USSR. Thus it took upon itself the severe responsibility for all possible consequences of this course.

The architects of the Baruch Plan were captive to the same wild dream which the USA cherishes today: to upset the military-strategic parity between the USA and the USSR and create conditions which would enable the United States to "prevail" in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

How tenacious are these delusions harboured by the US ruling elite! For almost forty years now Washington's successive administrations have been trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR so as to force the Soviet people to bow to the United States under the threat of its nuclear might. All these attempts have invariably flopped, as they inevitably will in the future. It is high time the US policy-makers realized that it is only on the basis of equality and equal security and on the basis of mutual benefit and full parity that relations between the two world powers and, indeed, between all states can be built. This will assure a peaceful future for mankind. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries express their readiness to reach mutually acceptable accords on the strength of these principles.

The possibility of crushing atomic death in the bud was missed forty years ago because of Washington's ambitions. As a result of an unprecedented buildup of nuclear weapons today, an unexampled danger is hanging over mankind. But it is still possible to stop the world's downslope to nuclear catastrophe. For this, Washington must part company with its myths.

SShA: *Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (The USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology)*, No. 10, 1984 *

IDEOLOGY AND POLICY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

by Yuri KRASIN

Scientific communism has arisen and is developing as generalization of the international experience of the proletariat's struggle for liberation under the leadership of its vanguard. Revolutionary working class policy is based on scientific theory which determines the programme aims, as well as political strategy and tactics of communist parties. How are theory and policy connected in the revolutionary practice of our time?

INDISSOLUBLE TIES

Scientific theory is necessary for the working class movement, since success in dealing with practical issues can only be achieved on the basis of scientific knowledge of society and the objective laws of its functioning and development. Marxist-Leninist theory, as a totality of its component parts—philosophy, political economy and scientific communism—provides the theoretical basis for revolutionary working class policy, giving it objective social bearings and historical orientation, something without which an accurate analysis of political situations or adoption of proper decisions would be impossible.

If a political working class party is indifferent to theory, it lacks scientific approach, an instrument enabling a concrete analysis of the situation, and its policy loses stability and principles, turning into a kind of a weathercock.

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Revolutionary policy also needs theory in a more narrow meaning. It rests on the knowledge of both the general laws of history and specific laws of society's political life and development.

The relationship between ideology and policy is not confined to the fact that the latter needs theoretical grounding. Though theory as a definite system of views is the main content of ideology, the latter is broader in volume and functions. It would be oversimplification to treat it merely as a specific reflection of social reality in social consciousness. The real picture is much more complex than that. Ideology is an inalienable component part and aspect of socio-historical practice in which it performs a number of diversified and manifold functions.

First of all, it is the cognitive function of ideology which enables the respective class and its political leaders to sift a host of facts and events of real life and forecast the further course of historical development. Its another function is social, i.e., the expression of the interests of a class, coordination and mobilization of its forces and those of its allies for attaining the set class goals. No system of social ideas can exist outside the social or class context. It loses all real meaning if it does not rest on its foundation of social and class interests.

Ideology also provides the ideological basis and motivation for the political actions of a class or a party, and predetermines its programme. Also important is the axiological function of ideology which sets the social guidelines for the fighting class. Equally important is the function of popularizing and defending the ideology and ideals of the class and the confrontation with other ideologies which also seek to win over the broadest possible sections of society.

In its close interaction with ideology policy plays an exceptionally important role. It is safe to say that political practice powers the ideological development. It determines the direction of theoretical thought and the main content of it. Through a policy the class interest becomes transformed into an idea and, conversely, the conclusions of theory are materialized through practice. Policy lies at the interface between the objective and the subjective, between practice and theory. Theory can be a guide to action only when it is organically linked with practice.

The mechanism of this connection is very involved and comprises many intermediate, interconnected links. In its conclusions and forecasts policy cannot be guided by general theory alone. It must also be guided by social and class interests, as well as political realities. Theory and policy link up on the basis of reality. They organically combine in a concrete analysis of a specific situation elucidating the position, dynamics and potential of social, class and political forces. This analysis itself is never a purely empirical search which each time begins anew with no axiological premises. It implies the presence of general methodological principles and general ideological gui-

delines enabling one to grasp the logic of a particular situation and assess it as a stage of the historical process and a link in the complex system of worldwide ties.

Theory gives guidelines to policy. But each time its principles must be freshly applied to reveal the inner logic in the development of a given phenomenon. Otherwise theory reduces to a sum total of examples and ceases to be an effective instrument for cognizing and transforming reality. Theory reflecting reality is surely an aspect and component of life. By virtue of its specific nature it generalizes facts, phenomena and events which inevitably leads to simplification. Practice is therefore always richer than any, even the most consummate theory.

New phenomena and processes in political life today and, consequently, in the modern political practice of the working class movement in the capitalist countries imperatively demand a creative approach to theoretical problems. One-sided interpretation of these new phenomena and processes brings a threat of revision of the ideological legacy of Marxism-Leninism. This danger is clearly visible in the theoretical concepts of a "third way" to socialism, in different "models" of socialism. These hypothetical, if not rather dubious ideas which have never been put to a practical test, are often advanced as an alternative to the experience of real socialism, to the gains won by the international working class in an uphill and grim struggle for the socialist ideal.

This position leads in fact to the renunciation of the revolutionary heritage of the working class movement, to its theoretical disarmament. In the final count all talk about a "third way" to socialism is just talk without any positive concept to back it up. It cannot be otherwise, since today one cannot speak about a concrete content of the socialist ideal, of socialist "models", without contemplating the practice of real socialism. Those who negate real socialism, which implements socialist ideals in practice are most rhetorical when they speak of socialism as it "should not be" and are most nebulous about socialism as it "should be". Developments show that those who distance themselves from real socialism and render a blind eye to the historical experience of the international communist movement spirit away the very content of the socialist social ideal.

In short, political practice is mobile, highly dynamic activity which does not allow theory to rest on laurels. It makes it imperative not only to apply theory to the surrounding reality, but constantly to assess and re-assess scientific theses and conclusions in the light of concrete historical development of practice. Only then does policy turn into a living source of new experience, a basis for the evolution of theoretical thought and provides material for the generalization of particular phenomena and processes arising during the revolutionary struggle.

SOCIAL AND THEORETICAL FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY

In the process of social development contradictions often arise between the theoretical cognitive and social functions of ideology. The nature and acuteness of these contradictions depend on the position of the classes in the system of social relations. If it concerns the ideology of a class whose interests coincide to a certain extent with the march of history, the contradictions may not be acute. If the interests of this class are at variance with the prospect of social progress, the contradiction assumes a conflict form and ideology warps reality to suit these interests. Such a feature was clearly demonstrated by Marx through the example of bourgeois political economy which remained scientific until an acute class antagonism developed between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. When this moment arrived, "it sounded the knell of scientific bourgeois economy... In place of disinterested inquirers, there were hired prize-fighters; in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetic."¹

Playing up the real contradictions between the social and theoretical cognitive functions of ideology, bourgeois critics of scientific communism hasten to proclaim them insoluble, above all as regards Marxist-Leninist ideology. They try to spot a crying contradiction in Marxism between its scientific theory proving the historical doom of capitalism and its philosophy of practice which proceeds from the class interests of the proletariat and mobilizes the masses for attaining socialist aims. Some opponents of Marxism-Leninism regard it as a synthesis of science and religion, claiming it has elements of religious faith, and identify it with mythology. However, it is precisely the advocates of capitalism who have to resort to social mythology because of the deep contradiction between their theories and reality.

The ideologists of the exploiting classes distort social reality whenever it enters into conflict with the aims and objectives of these classes. Marxism-Leninism is the only ideology not needing mythological camouflage. Since the interests of the working class conform to the progressive march of history, its ideologists do not have any social or class motives for distorting the existing situation or spreading illusions about it.

Marxist-Leninist ideology has no insoluble contradiction between its social and theoretical cognitive functions. Contradictions between them may arise now and again in the real practice of the revolutionary movement when for some reason ideology lacks scientific generalization of the experience of the working class movement. Thus, the current technological revolution sometimes gives rise to the mood of technophobia in the working class movement of some capitalist countries because scientific and technical progress under capitalism is caus-

¹ K. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 25.

ing further unemployment and ever deeper alienation of man in the labour process. This mood is sometimes reflected also in theory. But such contradictions are overcome quickly when ideology rises to the level of theoretical generalization of the totality of scientific and technological progress and ascertains its connection with the prevailing relations of production and the class interests of the working people. On this basis it is possible to work out a democratic alternative to the policy of state-monopoly capitalism. This alternative envisages far-reaching democratic changes ensuring the use of the achievements of the technological revolution for the benefit of the working class and broad sections of the population and, in particular, for solving the employment problem. Such an approach ensures full harmony of the scientific aspect of ideology with its social, class aspect.

On the other hand, contradictions may arise when theory is turned into a dogma. If it is divorced from the practice of class struggle, from the revolutionary process, and withdraws into the sphere of abstractions, contradictions arise between the social, class and theoretical cognitive aspects of ideology. In this case the class interests of the proletariat revolt, sooner or later, against this lag of theory from life and impel it towards creative development and rejection of dogmatic abstractions.

Such contradictions are overcome in the course of development of theory and social practice. In Marxism-Leninism there are no insoluble conflicts between the social, class and theoretical functions of ideology. When contradictions arise, they are solved in the course of social development through a deeper understanding of the interests of the working class and creative enrichment of theory. In general, these two functions are in close unity in Marxism-Leninism. They are identical in the dialectical meaning of the word, since properly understood interests of the working class are in line on the whole with social progress.

THE STRATEGY OF CLASS AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES

What has been said above about the relationship between ideology and policy applies to problems which today confront the international communist movement. The growing range of the social and political forces participating in the general democratic and anti-imperialist movements requires of Communists an open-minded, non-sectarian approach to the strategy of class and political alliances.

Where does ideology stand when pursuing a policy for the unity of revolutionary and democratic forces? Two extremes are evident here. The first is doctrinarian sectarian line which undermines the foundation of the policy of alliances since it treats ideological differences as an insuperable barrier dividing one class or party from other classes and parties. As a matter of fact, this approach leads to the

renunciation of any policy of alliances. Sects of like-minded people withdraw within themselves.

The second extreme is pragmatic opportunist typical of Social-Democracy, in particular. It is a line for the de-ideologization of policy in order to twist it to suit the situation. Significantly, the theoretical platform of Social-Democratic activity is the philosophy of "critical rationalism". This well fits the pragmatic course of Social-Democracy, for it calls for special theoretical instrumentation for each particular situation. In other words, policy is released of all principles or commitments to theory thus opening broad scope for subjective arbitrary actions to bend each concrete situation.

The Marxist position is to avoid these two extremes and, while remaining true to the principles of scientific ideology, to be flexible in relations with other political forces which may become allies in the struggle for common aims. The Marxist-Leninist approach means that to achieve unity of social and political forces on a revolutionary platform, emphasis should be laid on what really unites these forces and not on appraisals and differences parting them.

The documents of the 26th CPSU Congress point out that the struggle for peace is a powerful factor uniting the world communist movement, a political platform for the broadest alliance of the democratic and progressive forces of our day and age. At the same time, the very concept of peace and ways of safeguarding and strengthening it is the object of an unceasing ideological struggle. Different ideas are held on this point. Some cold warriors pay lip service to peace. In such cases deciding criterion is political practice. It helps a hard and fast line to be drawn between those who are really working for peace and those who indulge in sundry ideological subterfuges to distort the substance of this concept.

Most important politically is the Marxist-Leninist attitude to other democratic and progressive ideological and political trends of our time. It is very important to thoroughly assess their ideological views through political cooperation with them. This, too, is a form of ideological struggle. A constructive dialogue reveals ideological, theoretical and political weaknesses of the democratic and progressive allies of the working class. It also enriches Marxist ideology as it sheds light on some new aspects of experience in the activity of other social movements.

Such dialogue surely has nothing in common with so-called ideological pluralism, an eclectic confusion of different viewpoints. Marxist-Leninist ideology expresses the fundamental interests of the working class, and this is the prism through which one should view the relations of Marxists-Leninists with other democratic and progressive forces.

More and more people in the world are coming to realize that a new world war would have fatal consequences and that peace is indispensable for mankind's progress. One can hear more and more talk about "planetary", global consciousness. Evidence of shifts in social consciousness is also the growing realization by an ever greater part of mankind of the opposition between their interests and the narrow class-oriented selfish policy of monopoly capital and the very essence of the outgoing capitalist civilisation. At the same time, these shifts do not mean that the struggle between ideologies is coming to an end, giving way to some "general human", "supra-class" consciousness. The same can be said of the supporters of so-called technocratic ideology, so widespread in the West. They claim that the present development of technology, the technological revolution, imperatively requires some uniform rational knowledge instead of a "one-sided class" approach.

The technological revolution, the vital need for a lasting peace and the acuteness of global problems are evidence of the community of the historical destinies of mankind as a whole in face of the looming danger and peril. But realization of this does not remove deep-seated social and class differences, the opposition between the social systems coexisting on Earth and, consequently, the ground for the struggle of ideologies. It will be so till all peoples, each through its own experience, choose the most advanced form of social organization meeting the requirements of the modern productive forces and modern culture. Before this happens, the only reasonable thing is to take the differences between ideology and policy into account. If the ideological struggle is a clash between principles and is therefore uncompromising, in politics one is obliged to reckon with the prevailing conditions and possibilities, assess the actual balance of social and political forces and, accordingly, display the requisite flexibility for attaining the set aims.

The general human aspiration for peace does not lead to an "end of ideologies" or their convergence. But it does demand that all avenues to peace should be explored despite ideological differences. However important is the growing realization of the perilous consequences of a nuclear war for all mankind, for all sections and classes of modern society, it is necessary to understand perfectly that to believe in the possibility of developing some "supra-class social consciousness" which would end the confrontation of ideologies is an illusion.

It is not that some "planetary consciousness" is emerging to replace opposite ideologies. The crux of the matter is that, despite differences in class backgrounds and ideological views, ever broader sections of the population are realizing that peace is the most vital requirement of all people today. The international working class, the ad-

vanced class of the epoch and a vehicle of scientific ideology, has the great historical mission of most adequately expressing this general interest of mankind and of heading the movement of the peoples for preservation of peace on Earth.

* * *

So there is unity between ideology and policy. Expressing class interests in a theoretically systematized form, ideology inevitably affects policy which is connected with classes and their attitude to state power—the main lever for attaining class aims. In policy and through policy, ideology becomes a means exerting real influence on social development. Policy, too, needs ideology for substantiating the action programme of a class or a party. Whatever aspect of the relationship between ideology and policy we take, we always find close ties between them. The study of these ties is essential for the conscious fusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology with the revolutionary policy of the working class and its political vanguards. This is one of the conditions for the working class to successfully discharge its historical role of leader of the present-day world revolutionary process and builder of a new society.

Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, No. 5, 1984 *



I read your publications with interest and they are, moreover, of great use to me. They give me a better understanding of the Soviet way of life, of your problems and achievements. You touch upon the most important subjects and explain them convincingly.

Claudio Fabian Grabiell,
student, aged 20,
Argentina

Your publications are a real source of pleasure. They contain a great deal of interesting and useful information, especially on the USSR's role in the rout of nazi Germany and the importance of the Soviet peace initiatives.

Michael H. Malin,
lawyer, aged 51,
USA

DEVELOPED SOCIALISM: FACT AND FICTION

by **Alexander KRUKHMALYOV**

Bourgeois ideologists and their supporters are seeking to distort the historical significance of mature socialism, its economic, social and political features and objective laws. What are the root causes of these distortions and in what way do they paint a false picture?

THE STAGES OF SOCIALISM'S ESTABLISHMENT AND PROGRESS

Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, proceeding from Marx's thesis, distinguished three stages in the establishment and progress of the communist formation: (I) "long birth pains", (II) "the first phase of communist society", (III) "the highest phase of communist society". He pointed out on more than one occasion that transition from capitalism to communism meant transition precisely to the first phase of communist formation, that is, socialism.

Most of the time, non-Marxist literature either totally ignores the transitional period from capitalism to socialism as an indispensable stage in the establishment of socialist society, or fully incorporates the first stage of the communist formation in this period. This results in a serious distortion of the dialectics of the transitional period.

Socialist construction has graphically demonstrated that in the transitional period political and state power is in the hands of the working class led by a Marxist-Leninist party, that a new mode of production arises and develops and that the working people are educated in

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a spirit of science-based ideology. All this goes to prove that the transitional period and the ensuing first phase of the communist formation have important common features typical of socialism as a social system. However, in the period of transition to socialism, non-socialist structures continue to exist and uncompromising class struggle goes on. Its underestimation is fraught with grave consequences.

Socialism begins to function and develop on its own foundation only after the completion of the transitional period, with social antagonisms and class struggle gradually disappearing from the life of society.

In its advance towards its highest phase—communism, socialism passes through two basic stages: (1) consolidation of socialism, construction of a mature socialist society; (2) advancement of developed socialism and gradual transition to the highest phase of communism.

Ignoring this scientific conclusion, anti-communists keep saying that the concept of developed socialism has appeared because of the need for “another postponement in building communist society”, and for explaining the difficulties and delays in this respect, etc. Some Sovietologists believe that the development of this concept is the result of the CPSU’s “departure” from the course for communism.

What can be said on this score? First, developed socialism is not an artificial theoretical construction, as anti-communists are trying to make it out to be, in a bid to explain socialism’s “prolonged” existence, but a real, consecutive stage of social development on the way to communism, characterized by qualitative factuality and its criteria.

Second, the CPSU does not depart from its ultimate aims of communist construction. This is borne out by the documents of the Party’s 26th Congress and the subsequent plenary meetings of its CPSU Central Committee.

Anti-communists are unwilling or unable to comprehend the dialectics of the relationship between developed socialism and the highest phase of communism, which consists essentially in further advancing mature socialism and gradually establishing communist principles in social life.

SOCIALISM’S ECONOMIC PROGRESS

Bourgeois ideologists are picturing the process of advancing developed socialism as a process of surmounting some sort of “crisis” of the social system, trying to make people believe that state ownership of the means of production is “conservative” and “backward”, that it is typical of only economically backward countries and does not lead

to socialism. Anti-communists counterpose the views of Marx and Lenin on social ownership under socialism, which is totally groundless. It is well known that Marx was decisively for the nation-wide centralization of the means of production,¹ i.e. their conversion into state property, as stated in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.² Lenin clearly defined his concept of socialization under socialism: “The aim of socialism is to turn all the means of production into the property of the whole people, and that does not at all mean that the ships become the property of the ship workers or the banks the property of the bank clerks.”³

The practice of socialist construction in many countries has confirmed the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist view on state property belonging to the entire people as the basis of socialism. It is precisely this form of property that makes it possible to turn the economy of mature socialism into an integral complex embracing state-run and collective farm enterprises, all sections and links of production. As it develops according to a plan, the national economic complex tackles complicated economic and social tasks. Certainly, there are difficulties and outstanding problems in the country’s economic development. But these are not due to social, collective ownership. On the contrary, its advantages help obstacles to be surmounted and problems to be solved.

Speculating in every way on problems of economic development in the USSR anti-communists claim that the Soviet economy is in a state of “stagnation” caused by “super-rigid” centralized planning. They recommend a return to the “market economy”, that is, to “free enterprises” as a cure for this “ailment.”

Facts refute the myths about the USSR’s “economic backwardness”. It is common knowledge that the Soviet economy is developing steadily and more rapidly than the US economy, for instance. The national income has increased 19 per cent over the past five years in the USSR as against 6 per cent in the USA. Industrial output went up 18 per cent, compared with a mere one per cent in the USA. Labour productivity in industry increased 14 per cent in the USSR, and 3 per cent in the USA.

As for the “recommendations” to renounce centralized planning and to go over to a “free play” of prices and other attributes of the “market economy,” it would be appropriate to recall that, in the 1970s, the capitalist economic system, much-lauded by bourgeois ideo-

¹ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, vol. 18, p. 57 (in Russian).

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works in three volumes*, vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 126.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 42, p. 63.

logists, was hit by its worst crisis in the postwar period. Its aftermath is still making itself felt. According to specialists, the tendency will continue in the future.

One of the main defects of the "market socialism" model, proposed by bourgeois and revisionist ideologists, is that it ignores the specific features of socialist commodity production and the operation of the law of value under socialism. It will be well to recall, by the way, that this law, however important it may be, plays a limited and subordinate role with regard to the basic laws of socialism (the laws of planned and balanced economic development, distribution according to the quantity and quality of work done, etc.), which reflect the essence of socialism more fully.

Economic management under developed socialism is based on economic planning, coupled with such factors as commodity-money relations, cost accounting, the principle of material incentives, labour discipline and production activity of the masses. The economic mechanism under socialism is based on the principle of democratic centralism. Essentially, it combines democracy, notably the working people's initiative, with scientifically-based centralized management.

Whatever bourgeois ideologists may say, it is the centralized and democratic planning that ensures a steady economic growth and saves developed socialism from the crises, the cyclic fluctuations in the economy that shake capitalist society. Over the period 1981-1982, national income in the USSR (in comparable prices) increased 5.3 per cent, or 23.1 billion roubles, and industrial output went up 6.3 per cent, or 43 billion roubles. Over the same period, no industrial growth was recorded in many developed capitalist states.

Bourgeois authors allege that, in socialist society, "people serve production". This assertion, which enjoys wide currency in anti-communist publications, is completely groundless. Meeting man's constantly growing material and intellectual requirements is the basis of the CPSU's social and economic policy and the ultimate goal of production under socialism. Large-scale, nationwide measures—raising wages, pensions, allowances, etc.—have been implemented in the USSR over the past ten years. In the ninth (1971-1975) and tenth (1976-1980) five-year plan periods, the population's real incomes increased 1.5 times. In the eleventh five-year plan period (1981-1985), 16 billion roubles have been earmarked for a centralized increase in the population's wages and other payments and allowances.

The capitalist system constantly demonstrates its inhumane nature and hostility to the working man. Capitalist governments seek a way out of crisis situations at working people's expense. In recent years, real wages have shrunk in the USA, Britain, the FRG, Sweden, Nor-

way, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia and other capitalist countries. Social spending is also cut, thereby swelling the ranks of the army of the underprivileged. In the USA, for instance, they number 35 million. As many are totally jobless in developed capitalist states. Their numbers have almost quadrupled over the 1970 figure.

Marxists-Leninists are, of course, far from painting a rosy picture of economic progress under socialism. The socialist economy develops, surmounting difficulties. The CPSU concentrates on many top-priority tasks. These include a substantial rise of labour productivity, better economic management and a wider application of an effective system of moral and material incentives encouraging people to work with maximum efficiency and improve the quality of the output.

THE SOCIAL CLASS STRUCTURE OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

The bourgeois ideologists' interpretation of the development of the social class structure of Soviet society contradicts objective reality. They claim that Soviet society is becoming "markedly differentiated". Capitalist ideologists believe that inequality and social differentiation are "functionally essential" and "eternal" under any social system. Accordingly, the Marxist prevision of a classless society is described as mere utopia.

The real state of affairs is fundamentally different. During the period of developed socialism, changes coming about in the social, economic, cultural and other spheres under the profound influence of the working class and the CPSU policy, lead to the intensive elimination of social class distinctions. This is manifested in the following: (1) Features common to workers and peasants, especially their relation to the means of production, are growing even more evident; (2) The classes and the intelligentsia, rural and urban residents, are coming closer together as regards the nature and conditions of work; (3) Their general educational and cultural levels, steadily rising under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution, are also drawing closer together; (3) Distinctions between classes and social groups in the level of incomes, the quality of life, etc., are being erased; (5) All sections of the population are coming closer together as regards their intellectual requirements; (6) More and more common features are appearing in their life-style. Further progress in this field will be characterized by the development of a classless structure of society. As was stated at the 26th Congress of the CPSU (1981), this "will take shape mainly within the historical framework of mature socialism".⁴

⁴ *Documents and Resolutions of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, APN Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 69.

This conclusion has far-reaching implications. First, it means that the two friendly classes—workers and peasants—will cease to exist before communist construction is completed since class distinctions between them will disappear within the historical framework of mature socialism. Second, this conclusion orientates social and economic policy and all practical activities towards bringing the working class and the collective-farm peasantry closer together, which involves economic cooperation between farms and factories and agro-industrial integration, as well as gradual transformation (with the maturing of objective conditions) of collective farm and cooperative property into socialist property of the entire people. Third, the attainment of a classless structure “in the main and basic aspects” will signify the establishment of a structure conforming to the type of socialist public property prevailing countrywide in all sectors of the national economy. At that particular stage of development society will not yet achieve complete social homogeneity and complete social equality. In other words, it will not yet be communist. Two stages can thus be distinguished in the long and involved process of the attainment of complete social homogeneity: the overcoming of class distinctions “in the main and basic aspects” and the final obliteration of these distinctions, when not only division into classes but also the old-type division of labour will no longer exist. Such are the prospects for the social progress of mature socialist society.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Under developed socialism, major changes are taking place in society's political life on the basis of economic and social progress. Marxist analysis brings out the following typical features of the political system of developed socialism:

— Political power is no longer the dictatorship of one class but the power of the whole people, led by the working class and its Marxist-Leninist vanguard;

— The state of the whole people expresses the will and interests of workers, peasants and intellectuals—working people of all nationalities and ethnic groups in the country;

— Public and political organizations and work teams take an active part in running state and public affairs and tackling political, economic, social and cultural issues;

— The Communist Party—the vanguard of the entire nation, is society's leading and guiding force, the nucleus of its political system;

— Democracy is democracy for the whole people; it secures work-

ing people's effective participation in running state affairs and combines citizens' real rights and freedoms with their duties to society;

— The further advancement of socialist democracy.

In guiding the development of socialist democracy at the present stage, the CPSU is tackling the task of strengthening socialist and gradually establishing communist self-administration. The system of Soviet democracy is functioning and improving. Ever new forms and methods of extending the rights and opportunities of working people's participation in production management and social and political activities are coming into being. This involvement ranges from deputies' commissions of the Soviets and people's control to standing production conferences. This is people's self-administration which develops in the course of communist construction.

In its historical development the socialist state passes through the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat and then, in the conditions of victorious socialism, as K. Marx put it, through the stage of statehood of communist society. The CPSU, thoroughly analyzing the processes of social development under socialism and proceeding from the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, has come to a theoretically and practically important conclusion on the development of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a socialist state of the whole people. This is laid down in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR.

The CPSU's scientifically grounded conclusion on the nationwide nature of the state of advanced socialist society is a target of furious attacks by bourgeois ideologists, reformists and revisionists. As an “argument” against the socialist state of the whole people they point to the fact that Marx, Engels and Lenin opposed, on more than one occasion, the misuse of the word “people” in characterizing a state. But they ignore the fact that the classics of Marxism-Leninism meant the bourgeois state. As regards the socialist state, Lenin considered the use of this concept was possible and absolutely necessary. In his work, *The State and Revolution*, Lenin associated the need for the state's existence under socialism not with suppression of hostile classes, for they do not exist, but with the implementation of the functions of protecting public property, educating people and exercising control over the measure of work and consumption, etc. Lenin foresaw that in socialist society the state would carry out the will of the whole people.

The experience of building new society shows that the system of socialist democracy, while developing and improving, does not cease to have a class nature. The fact that under developed socialism, socialist democracy is a democracy of the whole people goes to prove that the positions of the working class in society are getting stronger and

that the basic interests of this class and of all other groups of working people objectively coincide.

In attacking and slandering developed socialism, anti-communists seek to caricature it as a society "thinking alike".

What can be said on the score?

In this case, the laws of capitalism are transplanted, as it were, into a different, a socialist medium. The point is that in capitalist society, with its semblance of free-thinking, of "pluralism" of ideas and views, the bourgeoisie manipulates the consciousness of the masses and imposes rigid control over their frame of mind by using a giant propaganda apparatus and the information media which serve the ruling class. As for socialist society, its mass media and propaganda apparatus are in the hands of the people themselves and serve their interests.

In developed socialist society, different views are voiced including in the press, during discussions, of say, specific problems of the economy and policy. This is one of the ways various opinions are expressed. A graphic example of this is the discussion, in 1984, of the Guidelines of the Soviet School Reform, in which some 120 million people took part. As a result, the final document incorporated about a hundred additions, corrections and amendments.

Unlike capitalism, socialism is characterized by the ideological and political unity of all members of society, by the community of views on key issues of communist construction and cardinal problems of our time.

*Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 8, 1984**

DIALOGUE WITH THE READER

IF ONE KEEPS AN OPEN MIND...

(Concerning the Lend-Lease Act)

Dear Mr Dick,

The aid rendered by our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition in the shape of armaments, food and other supplies did, of course, play a positive role in the war waged by the USSR against Nazi Germany and its satellites. However, this aid accounted for a small proportion of the overall volume of the material and technical means used by the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). Foreign deliveries to the USSR accounted for only about 4 per cent of the Soviet overall volume of production. Take, for instance, US deliveries of arms and hardware, and the corresponding figures for those items produced by the USSR. Throughout the Great Patriotic War, the US lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union amounted to 7,509 artillery pieces, mainly anti-aircraft guns; 14,018 air planes, most of them fighters, 6,903 tanks and self-propelled guns including many light ones. Meanwhile, Soviet industry produced 112,100 combat planes, 102,800 tanks and self-propelled guns and 482,200 artillery pieces of all types and calibres. Consequently, the US deliveries made up 1.6 per cent of the artillery, 12.5 per cent of the aircraft and 6.7 per cent of the tanks and self-propelled guns produced by the Soviet Union itself.

Even smaller was the proportion of US aid in the form of other arms and munitions. The total Allied deliveries to the USSR accounted for 1.7 per cent of all sub-machine guns, 0.8 per cent of all pistols, 0.6 per cent of all artillery shells, and 0.1 per cent of all mines in the Soviet arsenal then. Uniforms and footwear sent in for the servicemen did not play a decisive role either. Imports of leather footwear made up the bulk of such deliveries; 3.1 million pairs of boots were supplied to the USSR in 1943 accounting for 5.7 per cent

Our reader's letter is on p. 2.

of all those produced by this country itself. If one takes into account the combat materiel and munitions the Soviet Union had by the outbreak of the war, the military aid rendered by the Western Allies would account for an even smaller proportion of the Soviet produced total. US food deliveries were not decisive for the Soviet war effort either. Throughout the entire war, about 70 mln poods of US grain (one pood is equal to 16 kg) were shipped to the Soviet Union; the country itself produced 4,312 mln poods. Thus, US aid made up 1.6 per cent of our own domestic production. The proportion of other food deliveries relative to the total Soviet output was slightly higher.

All told, the US lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union made up 3.5 per cent of the US military expenditures during World War II. You say that the US sent material aid to the Soviet Union at the period most difficult for this country, and this enabled it to hold out at the beginning of the war and to win the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad. This view does not square with the facts, to put it mildly. What was the real state of affairs?

In 1941, i.e., in the most difficult period for the USSR, the US lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union amounted to 545,000 dollars, or under 0.1 per cent of all US lend-lease aid to the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in that year. In addition, the USA sent 41 million dollars' worth of arms and war materials to the USSR, for cash. This aid was so insignificant that it could not appreciably influence the course of the Battle of Moscow, much less predetermine its outcome. In 1941, when the nazi forces scored temporary successes on the Soviet-German front, the US ruling circles, in view of their class limitations, did not believe that the socialist state could hold out against the then most powerful war machine. So they were in no hurry to help us. Moreover, in the autumn of 1941, the US top military leaders, headed by Secretary of War, H. Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy, F. Knox, even publicly came out against aid to the USSR on the plea that combat equipment "hastily sent" to Russia "might fall into Hitler's hands".

The volume of US deliveries in 1942, when the nazi army mounted an offensive in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, was also small. Worse still, Allied shipments headed for the Soviet Union via the northern seas were held up. President Roosevelt admitted that this happened at a time when the Russians had to fight their toughest battles. Consequently, Washington failed to carry out its earlier commitments to a large extent. Only 1,311 out of an agreed 1,800 aircraft were sent to the USSR. But an even smaller proportion found their way to the Soviet front for most of the planes were left at British ports till conditions were "favourable" enough for naval convoys to take them to their destination. Only 2,010 out of 4,500 tanks made it to the USSR, and only 36,881 out of 90,000 lorries actually arrived.

All this shows that there were influential forces in the USA which hindered aid to the Soviet Union.

By July 1943 the USA had delivered to the USSR only 70 per cent of the total tonnage of goods and materials pledged under the second protocol on mutual deliveries. The Soviet Army turned the tide of the war against nazi Germany without any substantial material aid from the United States. The Allied aid to our country was of little effect in comparison with that which the Soviet Union rendered the Allies by engaging the bulk of the nazi forces in combat.

The facts clearly show, Mr Dick, that your claims about US aid to our country as a factor decisive for the outcome of the war against nazi Germany are unfounded. For all the importance of the lend-lease aid deliveries, especially of motor vehicles and some types of strategic materials, this aid is incomparable to the colossal efforts of the Soviet people and its immense sacrifices in the name of common victory over nazism. Americans themselves acknowledged this during the war. President Roosevelt pointed out that the United States never considered lend-lease deliveries to be the main factor in Hitler's defeat. This, he said, was to the credit of the Soviet Army servicemen who laid down their lives and shed their blood in the struggle against the common enemy. It would be appropriate to recall another statement here. In late May 1945 during the talks with Soviet statesmen, H. Hopkins, President Roosevelt's personal envoy, said that the USA had never considered its lend-lease aid to be the chief factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was won, he continued, by the heroism and blood of the Russian Army. These are just words! Unfortunately, today the Western press passes over such statements in silence.

And lastly. You write that the lend-lease system reflected US selflessness and generosity and that aid was even delivered to the detriment of the United States itself. I don't think your words reflect the true picture. They do not square with the facts. In providing aid, the ruling circles in Washington were furthering the interests of the US monopoly bourgeoisie.

Aid under the Lend-Lease Act defended US interests by shifting the brunt of the armed struggle onto the other members of the anti-Hitler coalition. *The New York Times* wrote in 1941 that US aid to the Soviet Union was not a friendly gesture. It merely confirmed the fact that Germany presented the greatest danger and that any measure leading to Hitler's getting bogged down in Russia would benefit the United States. Political and military leaders in Washington and London were not ashamed to speak about this openly. At the Anglo-American conference in Casablanca (January 1943), President Roosevelt stressed that the deliveries to Russia were a "profitable capital investment" for the United States. British Prime Minister Churchill, in substantiating the necessity of increasing material aid to the Soviet Union,

claimed that no other form of capital investment could better secure military dividends.

At the same time, the USA received goods and services worth 7.3 billion dollars in the form of so-called reverse lend-lease from the Allies, including the USSR. During the war, the Soviet Union supplied the USA with 300,000 tons of chromium ore and 32,000 tons of manganese ore and also a large amount of valuable products, including platinum and furs. US Secretary of Commerce, J. H. Jones, noted that the USA not only fully recouped its money, it also earned profits from Soviet deliveries.

The selflessness of US aid during the war years is also disproved by the fact that the USA did not spread the Lend-Lease Act to the USSR immediately after Nazi Germany attacked our country, on June 22, 1941, but almost five months later. Right up to November 1941 the Soviet Union repaid US deliveries on a cash or credit basis, security for the latter being our foreign exchange or strategic raw materials. The US monopoly circles sought to weaken the USSR economically. US Secretary of the Interior H. Ickes said, in this connection, that the USA should make the Russians pay for the US deliveries in gold until their gold reserves had completely run dry. Whereupon the Lend-Lease Act would be spread to Russia. The same policy of exhausting foreign-exchange reserves, was also pursued by the US ruling circles vis-a-vis Great Britain and the other allies, US trade rivals after the war.

Lend-lease was profitable to the US monopolies. The US government granted corporations state subsidies for the unprecedented expansion of military production and used lend-lease allocations to purchase from them, at inflated prices, arms, munitions and other war materials which were then delivered to the allied countries. This gave the monopolies a free hand in marketing their products, and assured them super-profits. Whereas, in the pre-war years of 1936-1939 the US corporations annually made net profits of 3.4 billion dollars; their annual profits for 1941-1945 stood at 8.7 billion dollars.

The enrichment of the US monopolies promoted their growing influence both in the USA and the other capitalist countries. The war industry corporations exacted 26 billion dollars from the budget allocations for the construction of new enterprises and the modernization of old ones, at the tax-payers' expense. War-oriented production in the USA mushroomed at unprecedented rates. With the aid of lend-lease the US monopolies conquered new markets for their products.

The US government used lend-lease in the attempt to reduce the USA's human and material losses in the war and to secure for the USA the most favourable conditions in the post-war period in order to exploit the fruits of the war to the utmost. Former US President Truman wrote in his memoirs that the money spent on lend-lease un-

questionably saved many American lives. Every Russian, British or Australian soldier, he said, accounted under the Lend-Lease Act and sent into battle, reduced the war danger for the youth of the United States accordingly.

The USA lost 400,000 people in World War II. The Soviet Union lost over 20 million lives. Talk about the "selflessness" of lend-lease is contrary to the historical truth. Even some bourgeois scholars admit this. The US historian, J. Herring, writes that far from being the most selfless act in human history lend-lease was an act of calculated egoism, and the Americans always clearly saw the benefits that could be gained from it.

Lend-lease was primarily used by the ruling circles of the United States in the bid to achieve their military and political goals. Aid rendered by Washington to the other members of the anti-Hitler coalition helped it win time and enabled it to fight the enemy far away from US territory, with the minimum human losses and material inputs. The lend-lease deliveries also provided a strong incentive to the US war economy and were used by the US monopolies and ruling circles to strengthen their influence throughout the world, increase their interference in the internal affairs of other countries and harness their economies to serve the interests of the US economy.

Such are the facts about lend-lease, and there is no getting away from them.

Anatoly YAKUSHEVSKY,
Cand. Sc. (History)

IN LEAGUE WITH REACTION

(Trotskyism on War and Peace)

by **Nikolai VASETSKY**

Trotskyism is the most active of the pseudo-revolutionary trends and groups which oppose international detente and the peace policy of the socialist community countries.

Its "theory" pivots around reckless adventurism, around spurring on revolution by war.

UNTENABILITY OF THE "EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY" THESIS

At the basis of the activity of the Trotskyist Fourth International¹ lies Trotskyism's traditional hostility to the cause of peace and, most of all, its rejection of the very idea of international detente. The dubious credit for the thesis that there are more important matters than the struggle for peace and detente goes to the Trotskyist leaders. Gloating over the current difficulties in international relations, first and foremost, Soviet-American, the Trotskyist leaders declare with satisfaction that they anticipated such a turn of events.

To back up this obviously defeatist line, Trotskyism distorts the real causes of the aggravation of the international situation. It deliberately confuses the issue and subscribes to the notorious theory of the USSR and USA, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO bearing equal responsibility for the deteriorating international climate.

¹ Since its inception in 1938 the Fourth International has known several splits and today there are seven groups, each claiming to be the sole representative of the Trotskyist International. Its "national sections" are active in practically all capitalist countries and in many developing countries.

● N. VASETSKY, Cand. Sc. (History), specializes in modern-day Trotskyism.

This plays into the hands of the reactionary circles which are eager to lay the blame for the mounting tension at the wrong door, to point an accusing finger at the Soviet Union. There is nothing accidental or unexpected about this coincidence of the ultimate aims of Trotskyism and imperialism. Nor should it be seen as a result of Trotskyism's "fall from Grace". It is a natural element in its political biography, the upshot of its long-standing hostile activity against the Soviet Union, a consequence of its betrayal of the interests of the international working class, the forces of peace, socialism and social progress. This was bound to happen to Trotskyism, for it acts contrary to the spirit of the times and the facts.

And these facts show that the USSR and the other socialist countries have a vital interest in peace. The Soviet Union's dedication to peace stems from the very nature of the socialist system, from the operation of socialism's objective laws. In the Soviet Union, there are no classes or social groups interested in war, in the pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy. There is no private ownership of the implements and means of production, that economic foundation for unleashing wars. There is no basis for aggressive policy in the shape of exploiting classes and social strata with an interest in wars. The Soviet Union has eradicated the causes of economic crises to which the exploiting classes generally seek a solution by unleashing aggression.

Imperialism has always been and remains the main source of the war danger. The economic basis for armed conflicts exists so long as imperialism does. It is imperialism that is to blame for unleashing two world wars. It is responsible for the cold war policy in the post-war period, for trying to build its relations with other countries, socialist countries in the first place, from positions of strength. Today, Washington's foreign policy is geared to meet the interests of the military-industrial complex.

The positive shifts in international politics in the '70s did not suit the military-industrial complex. It initiated imperialist reaction's switchover to an open counter-offensive, which greatly exacerbated the world situation. In whipping up international tension, imperialist reaction tries, first of all, to erect a barrier in the way of social and political changes and, first and foremost, in the way of tipping the balance of world class forces in favour of socialism. Second, by its unchecked escalation of the arms race it compels the socialist countries to increase their military expenditures. This cannot but adversely affect their economic development. Third, US imperialism is furthering its own interests, hoping that international tension will help it to maintain its leadership in the capitalist world.

By equally blaming the USSR and the USA for the aggravation of the international situation, Trotskyites deny the fundamental

antagonism between the class essence of their foreign policies. They would like to weaken the appeal of real socialism as a reliable bastion of peace and the security of peoples.

THE "THEORY" OF THE FATAL INEVITABILITY OF A WORLD WAR

Trotskyism, in fact, considers it impossible to avert the threat of a world thermonuclear conflict. Its ideologists do not bother to analyze the international situation, drawing on Trotsky's theoretical heritage, dating from the times of WWI. They very often quote his claim that the main cause of that war was the revolt of production forces against the yoke of the national state. Latter-day Trotskyites say the same thing, making some adjustments to suit the present conditions. From their viewpoint, a modern war objectively means the destruction of national economic centres in the name of world economics.

These views are rather close to, if not fully identical with, those of Western technocrats who justify the cosmopolitan ambitions of monopoly capital, for whose activities the boundaries not only of individual states but also of regional economic groupings are too narrow.

Guided by the principles of technological determinism, Trotskyites practically see the development of modern production, the progress of world productive forces as the main sources of the war danger. They treat the process straightforwardly and one-sidedly, without considering the relations of production which determine the main direction, character and content of the development of a particular mode of production and, along with this, of world productive forces.

Equally unfounded is the Trotskyites' reference to imperialism's "limited" counter-revolutionary wars as proof of the inevitability of a world war.

There is no doubt that imperialism, chiefly US imperialism, is to blame for the overwhelming majority of war flashpoints which flare up today, make the international situation more tense and prolong the crisis situation which may escalate into a regional and even global conflict. But is such a development inevitable?

The concept of the fatal inevitability of war was untenable even at the time of imperialism's undivided domination, prior to the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917, when the world was split into two mutually opposed social systems. For a war and, more so a world war, to break out, there must be also subjective prerequisites apart from objective ones. This is why Communists call for assessing the relationship between war and peace in a concrete historical context, taking account of economic and political relations, the acuteness of contradictions between the sides, the degree of organization and consciousness of the masses, and the level of armaments.

When socialism became a world system, the real possibility arose for the successful struggle against a thermonuclear war.

The most important contributing factors were as follows.

First, a radical change in the balance of class forces in the world. As stressed in the documents of international meetings of communist and workers' parties, imperialism has lost its historical initiative. It can no longer dictate its "rules of the game", disregarding international conditions. Of course, in some sectors of the class struggle, including the foreign policy sphere, imperialism is capable of counter-offensive, of bolstering and expanding its positions. However, if we take the general trend of the historical process, forces without any vital interest in war are growing and more prominent in its development. The mounting aggressiveness of world imperialism is confronted with the resolve of the peoples and countries to stop the irreparable from happening. The resistance of the participants in the anti-war movement is rising. Far from all influential politicians in the West, including the United States, support the adventurism of the US Administration.

Second, the military-strategic balance between socialism and imperialism. This balance, one of the major gains of the last decades, was achieved through the mobilization of vast resources and efforts by the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries. They are therefore doing all they can to prevent this balance from being upset.

Mankind can put a barrier in the way of imperialism's aggressive designs and prevent a thermonuclear holocaust. To deny this, as Trotskyism does, means not only to misrepresent the alignment of world class forces. Quite definite political and practical conclusions are drawn from the arguments of Trotskyites and theoreticians like them about the inevitability of a world war. Since war is a foregone conclusion, they argue, it is useless to try and prevent it. This position benefits imperialism. It ideologically disarms people who want to safeguard peace and dooms them to passivity in face of the bellicose circles of imperialism and its overt and covert accomplices.

FROM "REVOLUTIONARY" PHRASE-MONGERING TO ADVENTURISM

Analyzing the nature of petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionism, the founder of the Soviet state V. I. Lenin highlighted, above all, its futility, instability, its rushing from one extreme to another—from dejection, apathy, indifference and passivity to a frenzied infatuation with "revolutionary" phrase-mongering and reckless adventurism. These features have become even more prominent since then. Present-day Trotskyism is graphic proof of this.

Trotskyist theory embodies the typical features which distinguish the petty-bourgeois strata in practice—their contradictory and dual

position in capitalist society, their constant casting about between the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the Trotskyist stand on the problem of averting the threat of a world war pessimism, the tendency to retreat in the face of difficulties that are inevitable in the struggle for peace go hand in hand with a show of fighting spirit and the stake on solving this problem in one fell swoop. Since war is inevitable, they declare, let us prepare for a revolutionary war. This war, in their view, is bound to become a powerful catalyst of the revolutionary activity of the masses and prompt them to take resolute action against capitalism and bureaucracy in "workers' states" (as Trotskyites call the socialist countries—N. V.). "War," wrote J. Posadas, the leader of the Fourth International, "will bring an end to the capitalist system and bureaucracy. (This will not come of itself. But such is the logic of history)." ²

Indeed, any war under capitalism means a shake-up of the existing order of things, aggravation of social antagonisms, a profound crisis of the entire social system; it may awaken revolutionary sentiments in the masses. This was the case during the First World War (1914-1918). And it is with good cause that Lenin spoke of using the crisis brought about by the war for accelerating the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. But at the same time he stressed that this crisis and these sentiments of the masses appear only "on the basis of an objectively revolutionary situation". ³

It is the height of adventurism when Trotskyites call for implanting socialism in other countries with the help of arms. Exposing the authors of such projects, Lenin wrote: "Perhaps the authors believe that the interests of the world revolution require that it should be given a push, and that such a push can be given only by war, never by peace, which might give the people the impression that imperialism was being 'legitimized'? Such a 'theory' would be completely at variance with Marxism, for Marxism has always been opposed to 'pushing' revolutions, which develop with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions." ⁴

Being the result of the internal development of each country, the socialist revolution also matures in peace time. This creates the most favourable situation for the transition from capitalism to socialism. Contrary to the Trotskyite assertions that only war can lead to revolutionary changes, the current, third stage of the general crisis of capitalism did not originate from a world war. This stage is developing in peaceful conditions, in the course of the struggle between the two antagonistic social systems, against a background of an increasing change in the balance of forces in favour of socialism and

the deepening contradictions between imperialism and developing countries, between the monopolies and the interests of the overwhelming majority of a nation.

The Trotskyite slogan of a "revolutionary war" is at odds with reality. With the development of thermonuclear weapons even the very posing of the question of socialism and capitalism settling their old scores through war has become quite problematic. In this context, the slogan is not only an empty phrase when it comes to mobilizing the masses for the struggle against imperialism; it is also rather dangerous and provocative from the standpoint of the struggle for peace.

It cannot be a "mobilizing factor" either. For the Trotskyites, the very concepts of "world proletariat" and "world bourgeoisie" are abstract symbols rather than real categories denoting definite social forces and relations. Small wonder that the countries of the world socialist system, which is the main offshoot of the international working class, do not figure in their concept, that this concept discounts the revolutionary and anti-war potential of the national liberation movement and considers that the working class of capitalist countries alone confronts the militarist circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie. And so, the Trotskyite slogan of a "revolutionary war" is actually aimed at dividing the anti-war front, at disrupting its unity. The concept of a nuclear "revolutionary war" boils down to the preaching not so much of struggle against world capitalism, for the triumph of the ideals of world revolution and socialism, as of struggle against these ideals and real socialism.

A SUICIDAL FORMULA

The lengths to which Trotskyism goes in advancing its provocative theses are also shown by its leaders' persistent search for the "theoretical" justification of their scheme for solving the global contradiction between the two mutually opposed social systems through war. They do not stop short of crude attacks on the leaders of the international communist movement and, especially, of socialist countries. In their view, in coming out against thermonuclear war, the communist leaders betray their "fear" of imperialism and infect the masses with this fear. Meanwhile, they say, the people fear neither imperialism nor war. Of course, the Trotskyites add, every war has its losses. Some people will perish, but others will survive.

This suicidal formula is passed off as the "latest achievement" of revolutionary Marxism! There can hardly be anything more inhuman than these attempts to justify the admissibility of a world thermonuclear war as a means of "pushing on" the world revolution. Communists are, in principle, opposed to this kind of "revolutionary" struggle which spells death for hundreds of millions of people, the

² J. Posadas. *La guerre, la paix et le socialisme*. 1977-1981. Paris, 1981, p. 16.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 21, p. 313.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 27, p. 72.

destruction of productive forces and of the great achievements of the human intellect. Even if civilization is not wiped out, mankind would be thrown hundreds of years back by such a war.

The Trotskyite concepts are fully consonant with the views of the reactionary and bellicose circles of world, including US imperialism. There are those among Trotskyites who try to set the public "at ease" by listing what and who would survive, should it come to a mutual exchange of nuclear strikes.

It is most unlikely that the Trotskyite leaders themselves do not know that they are objectively fulfilling the social mandate of the militaristic circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

THE LUNACY OF THE "BALANCE OF FEAR" DOCTRINE

The cause of peace is not furthered by the Trotskyite "balance of fear" or "balance of forces" doctrine. They say, that it is only due to the development of nuclear weapons that a world war has not broken out so far, despite recurrent serious conflicts in the world. These weapons, the Trotskyites hold, help to maintain a fragile and unstable system of relations between states based on a certain mutual balance, a "balance of fear", in the face of possible annihilation by the opposite side in the event of a military conflict.

In the view of Trotskyite theoreticians, the "balance of fear", safeguarding the world from the outbreak of a thermonuclear war, is not at all based on a naive faith in "human rationality". This "balance of fear", they argue, has deeper roots than reason—the instinct of self-preservation. Trotskyites earnestly believe that war can be avoided if mankind is confronted with the following dilemma: socialism or barbarity. The international Trotskyite movement offers mankind the global alternative: either world-wide socialism or nuclear destruction. The realization of the hopelessness of the situation, combined with the urge for self-preservation are, in the Trotskyites' view, a stimulus and "organizing element" of a world revolution which alone can deliver mankind from the nightmare of self-destruction.

This shows that present-day Trotskyites try to interpret the problem of war and peace from a biological point of view. According to their "balance of fear" concept, international security depends on man's biological qualities, on the instinct of self-preservation. As a result, they preach social irrationalism claiming that the social causes of war cannot be identified. This rules out the very possibility of working out and adopting anti-war measures. Thus, people's fear of the threat of a nuclear Apocalypse is turned into an ideology.

The Trotskyite conception also has one more aspect—it advocates reckless, adventurist actions. In the Trotskyite view, the Soviet Union does not make effective enough use of its nuclear potential. In order to revolutionize the masses, it should, now and again, resort to a

policy of "deterrence" towards imperialism. In this way, the Trotskyites contend, the Soviet Union would foster pacifism and revolutionary feelings among the masses and this would decisively influence the development of the world-wide class struggle.

The Trotskyite advocates of a show of military strength are not bothered by the fact that their calls contradict the demands of the time, the vital interests of the peoples and the political principles, morality and ethics of real socialism. The Soviet military doctrine is purely defensive. This means that the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons and military might. At the same time, the Soviet Union emphatically rejects and denounces the policy of "power pressure" as practised by US imperialism. The USSR does not seek nuclear superiority. Nor will it allow anyone to upset the military-strategic parity.

The idea of military-strategic parity is above all a political category. It means that the more reliable the world security the greater the security of each particular state. Therefore the road to peace lies not through the whipping up of mutual fear and blackmail, but through broader mutual trust.

Trotskyism, on the contrary, tries to push socialist countries to taking actions which are alien to their class nature: to pursuing a policy of dictate, intimidation and blackmail. This benefits those with a vested interest in inciting hostility and mutual suspicion between peoples and countries, in stoking up international tension fraught with a world thermonuclear conflict.

Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, No. 7, 1984 *

DO THE RUSSIANS WANT WAR?

*The Russians and We*¹ is the title of a new book by Gerhard Kade, a West German journalist and peace fighter, who was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and was expelled from it for participating in an anti-war demonstration, unauthorized by the party leadership. His book discusses the topical problems of relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union, and in broader terms—between Europe's socialist and capitalist states.

These relations, the author writes, have reached a particularly dramatic point with the implementation of the US plans for deploying the new US lethal missiles in Western Europe, primarily the FRG. The guaranteeing of European security and international peace depends largely on the extent to which

the Soviet Union and the FRG, the socialist and capitalist countries are able to correctly understand each other, he says.

In this connection, G. Kade gives a comprehensive analysis and well-grounded criticism of false notions about the Soviet Union, its people and foreign policy.

"What do the Russians want?" G. Kade asks. "What is their attitude to us, Germans? What conclusions have they drawn and are drawing from the tragic past?" (The author means the war waged by Nazi Germany against the Soviet people in 1941-1945—*Ed.*) Ever since the inception of the Soviet state its policy with respect to Germany, the author points out, has invariably been aimed at ensuring peace, cooperation and friendship.

On a historical plane, he deals specifically with the 1922 Rapallo (Italy) Treaty between

Soviet Russia and Germany, and gives the full text of that document (pp. 141-142). The actual Rapallo Treaty had nothing in common with the later ill-intentioned myth about a "bloc alliance" allegedly designed to isolate Germany from the West. In exposing this myth, G. Kade points out that in actual fact Soviet politics had never set out to embroil Germany with its western neighbours. Today too, the USSR is striving not to isolate West Germany from the USA, but to normalize relations with it.

A whole chapter in the book is devoted to the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy. By its very nature, the author writes, the Soviet socialist state cannot be interested in war preparations. But for external forces, it would have channelled all of its resources solely into the peaceful development of the new society. The Soviet Union needs peace to implement its long-term social and economic programmes, G. Kade notes. It is only in the conditions of peace that socialism can and wants to show what a social system concerned only with the people's welfare is capable of. Contrary to widespread allegations in the West, the author writes, in the Soviet Union there are no sections or groups of the population, nor can be any, which would have an interest in profits from war production orders. The military-industrial complex, that has

developed in the leading NATO countries and has become a sort of non-stop arms conveyor, does not exist in the Soviet Union. In fact, it is inconceivable in a socialist state.

In briefly reviewing the post-war Soviet foreign policy acts G. Kade points out that all of them were of peaceful nature. Even K. Adenauer, the former FRG Chancellor, consistently hostile to communism, admitted the following shortly before his death, shocking the "cold war" advocates: "The Soviet Union is among the nations which want peace, for Soviet Russia itself needs peace." (p. 125)

The view of C. Krause, ex-Brigadier-General of the Bundeswehr, the SDPG leading expert in military strategy, is also worth noting: "It may be assumed that the Soviet leaders see the Soviet state's top priority as preserving the communist social system, and they will not risk taking actions which might jeopardize these values. The allegation that Moscow is seeking to spread world revolution by force of arms is totally groundless." (p. 116)

The author positively assesses the period of detente that set in in international relations during the '70s, largely due to the actions of the Soviet Union. The Germans, he stresses, gained the most from detente, and they are bound to lose the most, should this process be reversed.

¹ G. Kade. *Die Russen und wir*. Köln, 1983.

The author points to the rapid and, in every respect, healthy development of Soviet-West German trade, as well as scientific and technical cooperation as a direct consequence of detente. He feels that West Germany cannot afford to neglect either importing highly critical commodities, including natural gas, or filling export orders for socialist countries, providing jobs for at least 500 thousand people in the crisis situation. A very important positive social aspect of Soviet-West German trade, economic, scientific and technical ties is the growing involvement of medium and small-size firms. These account for 90 per cent of the firms cooperating with Soviet foreign-trade and economic organizations.

The present relations between the two countries are based on the treaty of August 12, 1970. Its signing was strongly opposed by the FRG conservative circles. Today, hardly anyone would dare to deny the benefit the treaty has brought the FRG and its citizens, enjoying normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The treaty is of benefit not only to the two sides. Along with subsequent agreements between the FRG and other socialist states, it has promoted detente as a whole.

The author believes that neither the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, nor the signing on August 1, 1975, of the Helsinki Final Act by 35 heads of state and government

of Europe and North America, would have been possible without the agreements between the FRG and socialist states. The Conference, he writes, inspired Europeans with fresh hopes and confidence that peace and cooperation would ultimately gain the upper hand over strife and animosity.

The book quotes from a document issued by the SDPG press service in 1982. It formulated the party leadership's standpoint on the treaties with the USSR and Poland. "Along with these two treaties," it said, "the Federal Republic has gained freedom of action in foreign policy with regard to states with which it had no relations until recently. This enabled it to rid itself of some of the negative legacy of World War II and to consolidate its sovereignty." (p. 120) Emphasizing his basic agreement with this view, G. Kade expresses profound anxiety over the present West German government's course for undermining relations with the socialist world. In the author's opinion, this course, while making it easier for the overseas strategists to turn the Federal Republic of Germany and Western Europe as a whole into their nuclear hostage, is fraught with losses for the FRG and, moreover, with a still greater danger—the mounting threat of a global nuclear war.

In view of the enormous danger looming over mankind, particularly Western Europe, and

the FRG above all, it is impermissible to ignore the position of the great world socialist power offering the hand of peace, the author says. He believes that the FRG has more than enough grounds for coming up with a matching initiative.

The relations between the Russians and the Germans, G. Kade concludes, are the mainstay of peace in Europe and the whole world for that matter. This is borne out by developments in our age. "So, let's, at long last, draw the right conclusions from

history for the benefit of our life, our country, for the benefit of European and global peace! Together with the Russians, we can set the world a good example. This is what the Russians want. And the important thing is for us to demonstrate the same desire." (p. 140)

Leonid ISTYAGIN

*Mirovaya ekonomika i
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No. 9, 1984 *

FROM POSITIONS OF MUTUALLY-BENEFICIAL COOPERATION

"Is Siberia Far?" This is the title of a book recently brought out in Finnish by the Kirjuityma Publishing House to mark the 35th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Finland. It was written by Soviet journalists Sergei Ostroumov and Boris Ivanov, of the Novosti Press Agency, and their Finnish colleague Seppo Sarlund, Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper Suomenmaa (The Land of Suomi).

The authors had firm ground to build upon. Economic rela-

tions between the USSR and Finland are a good example of long-term, equitable and mutually-beneficial cooperation between countries with different social systems. Trade with the USSR accounts for a quarter of Finland's overall foreign trade turnover. Among advanced capitalist countries Finland is second only to the FRG, in the volume of trade with the USSR.

The geography of Soviet exports to Finland, be it goods, services or technology, has been expanding due to the eastern regions of the USSR. The authors

name the sites of this cooperation: Bratsk, Ust-Ilimsk, Norilsk and the Arctic area. They focus on concrete facts and figures. For example, they describe the construction of the iron and steel works in Nadezhdino and of the lumber-mills in the middle reaches of the Angara. By way of generalization they detail the social, economic and scientific-technical programmes of Siberia's development. The journalists take the reader along on their trip, retracing the rou-

tes of the economic expeditions sponsored by the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the past few years.

"Is Siberia Far?" is written for Finnish readers. But it also gives a good idea of Soviet expertise and know-how that could be of interest to firms and specialists in other countries seeking to gain access to the Soviet market.


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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ № 3 К ЖУРНАЛУ
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