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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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Perestroika and the Party

905B0025A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 10, Jul 90 (signed to press 20 Jun 90) pp 3-4

[Text] The material contained in this entire issue was written before the opening of the party congress. It will be published while the congress is in session and obviously will reach the majority of subscribers outside Moscow after the party forum. For the first time since the 1920s, this time the proceedings and outcome of the congress have not been predetermined. It is only the party congress—the highest party authority—that alone has the right to make its decisions. Nonetheless, at this point, when these decisions are still unknown, expressing some thoughts concerning results and lessons from the period between congresses seems pertinent.

The party came to the present congress not with victorious reports, as in the past. It came in the course of sharp discussions and the dissonant noise of fierce debates within a society to which there no topics and opinions are forbidden. It came in an atmosphere of social tension in the country and an obvious aggravation of problems in all areas. Today the most frequently used word is "crisis," applicable to virtually all areas of social life.

Crisis of what?

A crisis of perestroika, answer those who see in perestroika the source of all difficulties. The most consistent supporters of such views speak of a crisis in the policy of reform in general, and believe necessary to return to the way we lived until 1953. They do not recall that even Stalin had been unable to establish his repressive system with the use of naked force, for in addition to force he was forced to use deceit, presenting himself as a revolutionary fighting against the "enemies of the people." In contemporary society any attempt at returning to such methods would no longer mislead anyone. It would require the type of open violence which society would not tolerate and in which the defeat of the neo-Stalinists in such a confrontation would be inevitable. This is perhaps the reason why the open supporters of this view in society and the party are few. However, given the recent aggravated difficulties, they have begun to speak more loudly and aggressively and to organize. They are actively appealing to the feelings of the people in the hope of benefiting from the social, economic and psychological difficulties they are experiencing. Outbreaks of violence, a growing criminality and social discontent,

against the background of a variety of weaknesses displayed by the state authorities, give them the opportunity to operate as the "party for order." To underestimate the danger of their actions would be an unforgivable error.

Far more numerous are others, who speak of the "crisis of socialism," the "mistake of October," and the need to abandon Marxism and the Leninist legacy. Paradoxically, the supporters of such views quite willing criticize the extreme ideologizing which imbued the social sciences and politics in previous decades; however, their own views today are also ideologized to the extreme. This, however, is a different, a so to say reverse, kind of ideologizing: anything which was praised in the past is now being rejected and vice versa. As in the past, facts are arguments are given short shrift. Everything is determined by preset concepts and evaluations. Such methods rely on emotions instead of common sense. In practical policy ideologizing cannot be a true compass. If the error of those who made the October Revolution was their excessive "rejection" of the achievements of past culture (and of the bearers of that culture), why would the same not be an error today? Is it possible, if one respects one's people, to assume that in 7 decades of intensive efforts these people created nothing worth preserving?

No, today's crisis is not a crisis of socialist ideas in general or of reforming socialism in particular. It is a crisis of the bureaucratic system, of "state socialism" with its command-distribution economy and anti-democratic and illegal political system. Naturally, in the age of such crises not only the creators, the rulers and supporters of a crumbling system find life difficult. The severe trials also afflict the lot of the entire people, for all of us lived under that system, obeying its laws, and the breakdown of daily life around us cannot leave anyone unaffected. However, the result of all trials should be a beneficial change in the life of the people.

Will our reformist revolution be able to deal with these dangers? Would we lose our latest historical opportunity, as was the case after the 20th Congress, when the initiated reforms became mired in the swamp of stagnation? To a large extent this depends on the party of perestroika, on its forces and the success of its actions. The conservative-bureaucratic opposition to perestroika and the destructive criticism which rejects the idea of socialism are all proof of the great need today for such a party. Such a party is needed not in order to block the criticism of shortcomings. Conversely, a sharper criticism of bureaucratism and incompetence, in all their manifestations, is needed. Such a party is needed not for the sake of suppressing social activeness by the broad social strata awakened by perestroika but, conversely, for increasing constructive social activeness. The party is needed today for the sake of rallying the healthy forces in society and for helping every supporter of perestroika find his place and apply his forces.

It would be useful today to turn to the lessons of the great poet and citizen whose 80th birthday was noted marked

before the congress, Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy. He was a highly party-oriented man. That precisely is what explains his dislike of leaders who, as they headed the party during the years of stagnation, were greatly alien to its cause. Let us recall his lines, which are relevant today:

"The years make strict demands, Do no regret past outbreaks. It is no joke to be young, and is even more difficult to be mature."

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PERESTROYKA'S IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

'CPSU History Outlines:' Concept, Approaches, Contours

905B0025B Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 10, Jul 90 (signed to press 20 Jun 90) pp 5-25

[Materials prepared for publication by S. Khizhnyakov]

[Text] Two years have passed since the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Drafting the "Essays on CPSU History," the purpose of which is to restore with maximal accuracy the party's historical experience in its entire complex and conflicting nature, was set up. At its October 1988 Session, the commission decided to use for this purpose the services of a broad circle of scientists and to publish the so-far drafted parts, for the purpose of subsequent public discussion.

In what areas is this research taking place? What is the scientific novelty of the concepts and approaches? Taking into consideration the readers' sharp interest in these matters, the journal will be presenting a cycle of articles concerning future "Essays....," as perceived by the authors.

This cycle is prefaced by an introductory article by A. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Commission for the Drafting of the "Essays on CPSU History".

Aleksandr Yakovlev: A Time of Creative Daring

History cannot be deceived. It can be reached only with the truth, and only lies can soil it. In this context, I see the particular difficulty facing the authors of the "Essays..." in the fact that the interpretation of the history of the democratic, liberation, social democratic and communist movements, founded in recent years, in as much as they were not scientific-historical but circumstantial-apologetic, created a strong feeling of mistrust and rejection, which are becoming total and exceeding all sensible limits.

I consider therefore that the purpose of this work is, above all, the filling of the huge, unforgivable and inadmissible gaps in the facts. First, history must include facts and people. Second, we must trace the spiritual,

political and practical sources of the socialist movement in Russia. We must recall and, in the case of the majority of our contemporaries, restore many of the most important pages of this movement. We must give its heroes their proper due, name all of them, regardless of how their political destinies ended. Third, we must restore scrupulously, truthfully and honestly, in the greatest possible details, the real development of our society in the post-October decades.

Generally speaking, we must truly master the facts. This presumes the following: a. Subject to a healthy doubt all that is already known; check for our own sake, again and again, what is the real fact and its significance, and what is myth, legend, fabrication and bias; b. Delete from history anything which was introduced in it in order to justify various actions, or to promote self-praise and self-aggrandizement; c. Study those segments of the past which were previously simply ignored. Anticipating, let me say that, as I see it, in this case progress has been particularly obvious and substantial.

Knowledge of the facts, however, is no more than a road, down which we must as yet make our way across wind-fallen trees and landslides, in order to understand ourselves, our revolution, our very difficult and very tragic destiny, our place in the present world and our future opportunities. We are still not free from the emotional impact and the ideological entrapments of the past. The past is still close to us, nervously breathing down our necks. All too frequently, in discussing the acute problems of our time, we seem to be dragging on the old quarrels and taking the side of Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotskiy, Bukharin, and so many others. This is probably inevitable and must be done in order to better understand the past.

It is time, however, to rise above our subjective views on various problems, solutions and approaches. Lenin himself tirelessly emphasized that the subjective intentions of politicians, classes and movements are one thing; their objective thoughts, motivations, results and consequences are, sometimes, something entirely different. The full and maximally detailed knowledge of the history of the socialist movement is needed not only because it is the truth about oneself or merely to satisfy an understandable curiosity. It is needed today, more than ever before, in order to answer the most vital problems of life, those of the party and society as a whole. Who are we? What are the threads and how do they link our lives with the universal, the general development of civilization? Have we reached an impasse in climbing that ladder, as some people claim? Are we on the high road about which we spoke for so long? Or is this a totally different situation?

The feeling which arises is that this aspect remains to be done.

Naturally, in prefacing my own opening remarks with a discussion, I in no way lay a claim to covering the entire

topic, and even less so that my assessments are unquestionable. I intend to discuss only a few problems, even among the main ones. My statements are no more than my personal views, expressed in the context of our comradely discussion. Furthermore, it is entirely obvious that the history of our party includes many problems and periods the study of which will require extensive scientific work.

All in all, we should probably acknowledge that to reject, to set aside the previous aids and level of knowledge of CPSU history (or, rather, ignorance of it) was much easier than to reach a higher level. The "dead" keep "trapping the living," in the areas of general plans and the baggage of quotations accumulated over decades, and even in terms of basic ignorance or obvious prejudice which gives birth to many "phantoms of the past" or to "new chimeras."

In a way, this could be legitimate: One cannot rise to a new understanding without fully mastering the facts and without restoring the pages which were torn out of history with blood. This is clear. However, nor should we yield to the temptation to resume the old quarrels. Even the most bitter regret in itself will not enhance the theoretical interpretation of the past and, therefore, the ability to predict the future.

On the one hand, the sociopolitical and spiritual background from which scientific creativity cannot abstract itself stimulates analysis and frees the mind; on the other, it includes the danger of tendentiousness but with a minus sign. The background which has now been created is typical of the transitional status in which society finds itself. It is typical in its contradictory nature. The very formulation of the task of achieving a qualitative renovation makes inevitable both a profound critical analysis as well as doubt. The socioeconomic crisis which was the result of previous developments leads us to engage in decisive actions but also shapes our disappointment with the past. Glasnost is healing society from all severe illnesses. However, it also immediately identifies previously concealed problems, contradictions and difficulties and makes it possible to express publicly a great variety of views and assessments, including some which are clearly reactionary.

The existence within society of sincere and honest doubts not only about whether the path we chose was the right one and questions concerning the accuracy of the very idea of socialism and its logical and moral substantiation is an objective fact of our present life. One could feel differently toward this fact which, however, can neither be denied or ignored.

In this case, it is a question of doubts which are sincere and honest and always involving investigations, mental work and the aspiration for the individual to establish his own stance. It is precisely such doubts and not speculations that can move society forward, for science, morality and the individual are enhanced and advance by surmounting inner doubts and contradictions.

We should not regret the rejection of the old interpretations of the history of socialist thought and practices.

Not only during the period of the "*Short Course*," but also in the "Histories of the CPSU" of the 1960s and 1980s historical science was used as a means of shaping an illusory and, therefore, a largely irrational social consciousness. It is only now that we have truly become aware of the fact that among the objective obstacles to democratization, the surmounting of the economic lack of freedom and the establishment of a new way of life the weeds planted in our social consciousness and the lack of habit for a realistic and rational way of thinking play a noticeable role. That makes particularly relevant the task of scientifically interpreting the distance covered by society. If we resolve this problem the science of party history will be able to make its contribution to helping the party assume a vanguard role in a renovated society. Otherwise the paths of science and social consciousness could diverge. The Soviet people will not tolerate deviations from the study of the real and contradictory processes within society and with concealing or ignoring the true problems and the application of Marxist methodology and theory to whatever one may like other than to reality. The time of craftiness in science is a thing of the past.

Glasnost began to deal crushing and by no means painless blows at the fictitious forms of social consciousness. Frankly, this not only failed to diminish the interest shown in historical-party subjects but even sharply increased it. At the same time, however, it converted this interest from dogmatic formulations to a reassessment of figures and dates and brought to light differences in the impersonal reports dealing with the most complex and most pressing problems which affect all generations of Soviet people.

What was the real significance of Marxism in the 19th century and to what extent did it change by the end of the 20th? Was the historical division of the socialist movement into social democracy and communism the result of Lenin's "intransigence" or, conversely, "defects" in the doctrine of Marx and Engels, and did they play a pernicious role in the establishment of the historical phenomenon known as "state socialism?" Did the command-administrative system contain something borrowed from the theory and practices of Leninism or Trotskiyism, particularly during the period of "war communism" of 1918-1920? Was the creation of a one-party system instead of a two-party system a fatal error, for the latter would have ensured a natural reciprocal control? Why is it that Lenin's fellow workers ignored his "political testament?"

What kind of historical system resulted from Stalin's "revolution from above?" How did the party and state apparatus merge? Did processes unforeseen by Marxism begin after World War II, such as the "convergence" between the two opposite social systems? Did socialist practices abandon universal standards of morality and

accept violence as the swaddling nurse of history? When and why were these standards lost?

Most difficult general theoretical problems have begun "popping," both specific and quite substantial: What were the actual results of Russia's "Stolypin Reform," and did the bolsheviks oppose it without a reason? Would it not have been more sensible to stop with the February events in 1917, with their "freedoms," rather than push the country toward the October Revolution with its "dictatorship of the proletariat?" Could the "Stalinist collectivization" have been avoided? Did Stalin indeed implement it according to the "Trotskyite model?" What were the origins of the monstrous tragedies deliberately organized by the authorities? How did it happen that a permanent crisis in the political and governmental leadership developed within the country and the party, and so on, and so forth. Recent publications have provided answers to many difficult questions. Articles have been published in PRAVDA, KOMMUNIST, VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, the mass journals RODINA, OGONEK, GORIZONT, EKO, NOVYY MIR, ZNAMYA, and ZHURNALIST, the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, etc. A number of interesting books have come out.

In expressing the hope that the publication of these "Outlines..." will help systematically and convincingly to work on all the main problems of CPSU history (and, with them, of the history of our country), I wish to express some remarks on the very method of research and the task of avoiding superficial, tendentious and dogmatic writings which are still inherent in party history science and the mass awareness, supported by various publications which are not all that strict methodologically or are even simply unscientific, and which fail to provide a suitable idea of the real historical facts taken in their specific sociopolitical context.

During the Leninist anniversary days of 1990, the participants in the dialogue quite aptly entitled "Without Ceremonious Colors," sponsored by the editors of ZHURNALIST recalled the familiar passage on the mug, in the debate between Lenin and Bukharin held at the end of 1920 and beginning of 1921. At that time, Lenin said that if we change our angle of sight we could alternately see in a simple mug either an instrument for drinking or an object to be hurled, a paperweight or a device for trapping butterflies. In order to assess a mug accurately, we do not need Bukharin's eclecticism but a precise Marxian method which would require "the comprehensive consideration of the correlations in their specific development and not taking a bit from one aspect and a bit from another" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 286).

However, even such an extremely simple object as a mug could be quite successfully converted into an inaccessible "thing within itself" by confusing some of its lines, what then could we say about tremendously complex events in the history of our party such as, for instance, Lenin and the Russian Revolution, or else Stalin and the

"revolution from above?" In this case the variety of opinions will inevitably be huge and the answer cannot be based simply on some viewpoint or another but also on the basis of political and even politicking considerations or unbridled passions. To this day some political writers or poets cross easily and fearlessly all scientific barriers in an effort to make a variety of historical facts fit circumstantial home-grown concepts.

During that period one could note the following: strange accretions would appear in the consciousness consisting of myths, speculations and structures, alien to science, and supposedly already things of the past. Let us classify among them not only the fabrications of amateur journalists like Henry Ford, which even he eventually rejected, but also attempts at instilling negativism toward the entire Russian revolutionary thinking and Russian Marxism in all of its shades.

The goal of the honest writer is not only to sympathize, like a fellow human being, but also to help people to understand how and for what reason did any given turn or coup occurred and was it the result of people "striving to power" or merely the unwillingness of the old regime to respond to the people's needs.

Actually, in noting the negativism which has appeared in the attitude toward the revolutionary thoughts and actions of various historical forces in Russia in the 19th or the first quarter of the 20th century, we cannot fail to see that it was a reaction to the one-sided approach of historians which, for decades, could not even allow a thought about the rightness of nonrevolutionary ways of thinking and acting, and failed to see on the historical arena in Russia the entire range of progressive, democratic and revolutionary forces and personalities. Historians were totally unwilling to see the shaping within Marxism of a reformist trend, the same trend which Lenin began to develop in Russia starting with 1921. Rejecting the idea of the rightness of and preference for the nonviolent way of thinking and acting was to our science, in its time, as pernicious as its constant aspiration to qualify all opponents of the bolsheviks as "renegades," "turncoats" or "revisionists," and the unwillingness and inability to see even the slightest possible validity in their criticism of bolshevism, added to which was the promoting to the level of infallible or never mistaken the "pope of the revolutionary church."

The truth lies in splitting the entity and familiarity with its contradictory parts; truth is always specific; a step considered virtually inevitable at one point, becomes actually harmful at another; what was utopian at the turn of the 20th century (such as Bernstein's reformism or Kautskiy's theory of ultraimperialism) looks different by the end of the 20th century. Such dialectical paradoxes did not bother in their time the minds and hearts of party historians.

Regretful though this might have been, the point at which the history of socialism crossed that of Russia proved to be dramatic and much more tragic than, let us

say, that at which the Enlightenment crossed French history. This was due to the limited nature of socialism itself at the start of the 20th century in both of its hypostases: the bolshevik and the menshevik; Russia's backwardness in terms of civilization and socio-economic development, greatly worsened by the World and then the Civil War, turning a backward country wild, throwing into political action millions of lumpens, the awareness and behavior of which becomes particularly dangerous at turning points in history. In itself, the translation of a socialist plan which was universal and had no precise space or time boundaries into the language limited by the practical tasks of a backward country thrown into a civil war triggered by necessity a clash between awareness and reality, difficulties, contradictions and impasses. Their resolution was achieved by the leadership not at all immediately, forcing the party (and, with it, the country) to follow a twisting and, in some cases, cyclical path of development. Along that path Lenin himself, and not only his opponents, saw the Jacobin phase or, more precisely, the phase of proletarian Jacobinism, which provided the general vector of the movement but which was legitimately replaced by the "self-Thermidorization" phase which, unfortunately, remained incomplete and did not extend to the political area.

The criticism of the erroneous structures of the "sociology of the revolution," which was mechanically superimposed the model of Jacobin France on the October Revolution and vice versa did not, unfortunately, lead to the creation of a scientific sociology of the revolution which would include (taking into consideration qualitative differences) the necessary relative-historical comparisons between Jacobinism and Stalinism, Bonapartism and Stalinism, Hitlerism and Stalinism, etc. Had that been done, one could also have seen a certain applicability of the old categories to the new realities and, at the same time, the need for their enrichment and refinement such as, for instance, **proletarian** Jacobinism instead of **petit bourgeois** Jacobinism. One could have seen not only the similarity of realities such as the omnipotence of the state and the Fuhrer principle but also their qualitatively different economic foundation.

The alienation of the country and the party from the general civilization process also played its own adverse role. Marxist theory, in its dogmatized variant, carefully protected itself from all social theories. Furthermore, all of them were proclaimed antisocial. The result was a freezing of theoretical research and a ban on free thinking. The idea of "chastity" and "purity" of orthodox doctrine was instilled through moral terror. Doubts were eliminated and the thus created vacuum was solidly filled with dogmatism which was religious in form but destructive in content.

The same system was used by the state. The concept of "hostile encirclement" was actively cultivated in the interest of ideological survival. Isolation from the outside world cost the Soviet people dearly, both materially and spiritually.

World development advanced rapidly, bypassing us. Under the pressure of a variety of social forces operating within capitalist society, substantial changes were taking place. Lenin's words on the Western world acquired a new meaning: "This is not as yet socialism; however, this is no longer capitalism either." Laying the foundations of socialism was interrupted by the abandonment of the NEP, commodity-monetary relations and the search for the possibilities of a "state capitalism," which Lenin considered an operating factor until the full victory of communism. I could only describe this as capitalism organized in a socialist manner, the pivot of which was a socially based market. Actually, here as well no universal dogma applies. Progress may be multiple but essentially it is universal.

What should the prehistory of the party's history be? Arguments on his topic started virtually the moment V.I. Lenin began to correspond with A.N. Potresov, by the end of the 19th century, and continued in the 20th, as both successes and failures of the proletarian movement in Russia increased, encompassing a widening range of personalities and problems.

Should this history be a tale about the **internal life of the party organism itself**: the prerequisites leading to its appearance, ideological concepts and groups, structure, principles governing that structure, evolution, arguments among the leadership, resolutions, work of the "higher" "middle" and "lower" echelons, and so on?

The answer appears to be yes. Without the consideration of such topics there can be no history. They are important in order to know how the political instrument known as the RSDWP and, subsequently, the RKP(b), VKP(b) and, finally, CPSU developed, functioned and who controlled it; what ideology and what stipulations were governing the party and how were they implemented?

Nonetheless, the answer must be no. The content of party history is much richer.

Methodologically one could agree with historians, both in our country and abroad, who pit the **sectarian** against the **scientific** understanding of the subject of "party history." "The sectarian," A. Gramsci wrote, "becomes inspired by insignificant facts of internal party life which to him acquire a secret meaning and fill him with mystical enthusiasm." As to the scientific interpretation of the subject, according to Gramsci "it is only the comprehensive picture of the entire set of social and governmental (and, frequently, international) relations that can provide an accurate idea of the party's history" (A. Gramsci, "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya" [Selected Works] in three volumes, vol 3, Moscow, 1959, p 138).

Writing a scientific history of the party means, consequently, considering through the lens of party topics the history of a given country "as a whole," in its "international relations," with a view to establishing the real influence which the party has on the country's history

and on the acceleration of some processes and the slowing down or elimination of other.

Some of the problems which need more profound work include the problem of the appearance of Marxism in Russia, which was so greatly vulgarized subsequently. In this case a number of questions remain. For example, why did it turn out to be so difficult for Marxism to cross the border of a huge empire and become one of the trends of social thought in Russia? Why, what happened in Western Europe, did the familiarity of Russian revolutionaries (Lopatin, Lavrov and others) with the founders of scientific socialism not trigger the intellectual need of converting to Marxism? Why was it that the tremendous interest in the works of Marx and Engels, such as the "*Communist Party Manifesto*," "*Bylaws of the International Association of Workers*," and the "*Civil War in France*," and the translation into the Russian language of the first volume of "*Das Kapital*," the ideas of which were extensively discussed among populist and even worker circles, failed to create any variety of Russian Marxism, but instead nurtured for nearly 2 decades Russian populist and liberal thinking through the 1880s-1890s?

Naturally, at that time Russia did not have a developed capitalism and a correspondingly developed labor movement. The problem, however, is apparently deeper: shifting Marx's doctrine from European to Russian grounds presumed removing the limitations (naturally in the universal-historical sense) of the Western European aspects of the historical process.

The introduction of large industrial capitalism in a precapitalist structure triggers, unless preceded by a profound upturn of the social soil, not simply a more complex uneven development but a different path, unknown to history, unstudied and fraught with catastrophes, impasses and difficulties in leaving them behind. The 1917 October Revolution and the events which followed it indicated the tremendous difficulties for the historical process to become progressive in countries such as Russia.

Obviously, it is in this sense as well that we should view the thought that Russia experienced Marxism by investing in this concept an almost century-old "Russian search for a formula for progress," until the appearance of the Marxist "Liberation of Labor" Group and the process of formulating alternatives, suitable under Russian conditions, to "October capitalism" and Asian autocracy.

Incidentally, it is usually accepted to qualify the October Revolution as proletarian and socialist. This is clearly an expression of the wish to emphasize that in 1917 a structural change occurred. This statement, however, is nonetheless excessively general, for which reason it is not entirely accurate. The point is that in terms of its political form and the means of struggle used, this was also a proletarian-Jacobin revolution of the 20th century. The "Jacobin workers" of the 20th century (Lenin)

turned out to be the only party in the Russian Revolution which actually expressed the wish for a revolutionary transformation of society. The internal contradiction, however, remained. The proletarian aspect coincided with the socialist aspect only in its potential, in terms of a distant future. In immediate and specific historical terms, it was proletarian-Jacobin.

The NEP, as Lenin conceived it, should have become the foundation for a "self-Thermidorization" of the proletarian revolution. It was precisely with the help of the NEP that a consistency could be attained between Russia's political thrust into the future and the existing economic and cultural conditions and an end be put to the 20th century proletarian Jacobinism, the policy of "war communism." Under Lenin, however, the NEP remained unfinished so that there was no radical restructuring of the superstructure and of the supercentralized militaristic system which appeared during the Civil War. Lenin's death, the death of the only person who, of all the party leaders, had begun to realize the meaning of the changes related to the NEP and the meaning of this "self-Thermidorization," stopped the future changes in the country's "political structure." In the field of economics, Stalin and his circle restored, starting with 1928-1929, many of the "war communism" methods, and forcibly carried out the "deruralization" of the countryside by resettling some of the "manpower" into kolkhozes and sovkhozes, other to construction projects in the city and others again to concentration camps. This made it possible to complete the unfinished process of initial accumulation and to create an industry. All of this was accomplished at the cost of huge casualties, which discredited the very purpose of development. The unique formation of a "state socialism" type, with the total alienation of the working people from ownership and power, an Arakcheyevist regime in ideology, and unparalleled illegality was to be described by Stalin as "socialism in a single country." Actually, the illusion that not only the "lower phase of communism" but even its "higher phase" could be built in a couple of 5-year periods, was accepted and became the foundation of Khrushchev's CPSU Program, although it was precisely he who, in fact, exposed at the 20th Congress the true nature of the regime, hiding under the cover of "socialism," with an economic base such as "universal private property," and a bureaucracy representing a "universal capitalism" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 42, pp 113-127). It was only as of April 1985 that the legitimate collapse of this fictitious awareness began. It is a rather painful process not always understood by everyone.

Here is another consideration. The intellectual need for an anti-doctrinaire social science which had developed, generally speaking, along with the appearance of Marxism assumes, we believe, exceptional significance in our century, when the blind following of obsolete schemes and unwillingness to take into consideration the realities of historical development triggered major critical phenomena in global socialism. Today errors made

by politicians are particularly crucial and fraught with generally irreparable consequences. The very course of history forces all of those who can still reason and who think of the future of society to strive for a compromise, a consensus, and to seek more civilized and more human and humane forms of life and ways of acting compared with the past. In our time no other ways of solving the problem exist.

The founders of Marxism repeatedly stated that the principles of a universal human approach to history and social progress is initially inherent in the socialist ideal and is superior to its transitional historical form (the theory of the class struggle). "In principle, communism stands above the hostility between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; it strictly acknowledges its historical significance for the present but rejects its need for the future; it sets precisely as its objective the elimination of this hostility. As long as this hostility exists, communism considers the fierce opposition of the proletariat to its enslavers a necessity, as the most important instrument of the **starting** labor movement; however, communism goes beyond this hatred, for this is a problem not only for the workers themselves but for all mankind" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 2, p 516). Only subsequent ideological interpretations and corresponding practices gave the socialist idea its sectarian and confrontational aspect.

The new interpretation of contemporary realities is not only a reaction to the global challenges of life. Its long-term strategic value lies in the integration of Marxism with the processes of global development and global social thought. It removes the fetters of sectarianism, offers new intellectual and moral strength and qualitatively broadens the horizon of opportunities. However, in return it demands a capability for creative daring, the courage of realism, humaneness, trust in man and faith in man.

Igor Pantin, doctor of philosophical sciences, and **Yevgeniy Plimak**, doctor of historical sciences: At the Sources of Russian Revolutionism

Traditionally, the old "*History of the CPSU*" courses began with the section "Predecessors of Scientific Socialism in Russia." This was followed by a detailed description of Plekhanov's "Liberation of Labor" Group, which initiated the dissemination of Marxist ideas in Russia, and the efforts of Lenin's ISKRA to "combine" scientific socialism with the labor movement, followed by a description of the history of the creation of the RSDWP which, almost immediately after it was created, split into bolsheviks and mensheviks.

The first edition of the "*Essays on CPSU History*," which is under preparation, breaks with this system in a number of important aspects. Above all, we are interested not simply in the "predecessors of scientific socialism," which came closer to Marxism to one extent or another. The problem is much broader: the birth of the revolutionary idea in the Russian search for a "formula

for progress." This idea was tested in the course of the alliances or confrontations among various trends in social thought and problems formulated by political journalists, fiction writers, literary critics and philosophical and religious research.

The authors must surmount a rigid and absolutized opposition in all of these areas. We find concealed in such confrontation at least a double untruth. An untruth concerning revolutionary thinking and revolutionism in general, which were offered as being the "only" accurate ones; it was deemed preferable not to describe their tremendous immaturity and errors, crises and collisions and pseudorevolutionism in detail. Another untruth dealt with the attitude toward the enemies of revolutionism, who were "comprehensively" qualified as wrong, for which reason they were "justifiably" criticized by their opponents.

Our historians frequently forgot that the protagonists were engaged in resolving a **common**, an essentially important task to all: how to leave the Middle Ages (and, subsequently, its vestiges) behind, and how to establish the basic conditions for civilizing the country (it was no accident that in his "political testament" Lenin used precisely this definition). The means of resolving this national problem were **different** and sometimes even **conflicting**. Neither side, however, possessed the full truth and it took decades for such truth to become the material prerequisite for progress and the aggravation of various political conflicts in a society of ideological confrontations, involving an entire series of interruptions in the tradition of liberation, due to the harshest possible tsarist repressions. This search for a "formula for progress" was made even more difficult by the fact that, in our view, a **special type** of development of capitalism was established in Russia (the accretion of the latest forms of capitalism, growing at a tremendous speed, upon a remaining despotic autocracy and archaic socioeconomic forms, particularly in the countryside, which hindered the country's progress). It was precisely such specific circumstances that the Russian theoreticians tried to master almost since the age of the Decembrists and the philosophers of the 1840s.

The analysis of the initial attempts made by the Russian revolutionists to create their own organizations brings to light (at the Raznochintsy stage of the movement) the influence of Russian revolutionism, triggered by the breakdown of the traditional structures of the lumpen element which occasionally produced Nechayev-type "leaders" or, more accurately, of the type of political criminals, as described by Marx and Engels by the turn of the 1870s. Russian fiction reflected this type and that period in Dostoyevskiy's novel "*The Demons*." Subsequently, as we know, "Nechayevism" would be reproduced in "Stalinism" but a thousand times stronger.

Particular attention in the analysis of the search for a Russian "formula for progress" has been paid to the "spiritual dramas" of outstanding Russian revolutionary thinkers, who concentrated on the "sensitive spots" of

the Russian and international revolutionary movements engaged in solving a most difficult problem: how to think and act in a historical situation in which the country's own political forces had not as yet matured enough for decisive action, while similar actions in the West were not yielding the desired results. The fear of revolutionary change in the country (and in the world as a whole) and the difficulty of the problems of human life, the search for a "meaning of human life," and the dangers of tremendous complications and accelerated progress triggered "spiritual dramas" in many writers and supporters of the ideological reformation of orthodoxy. One could notice a clear consistency between atheistic and religious apocalyptic warnings issued by Chernyshevskiy and V.I. Solovyev, the similarity in the interpretation of the roots of "Demonism," and the results of the spreading of revolutionary ideas "on the street" in the writings of Dostoyevskiy and Chernyshevskiy, etc. This is not surprising: "The clash of extremes, which appeared within a certain state of unity, creates the possibility for synthesis" (Goethe). Let us note, however, that that same problem of the synthesis of religious and atheistic morality, sharply separated in Russian thinking, was resolved more fruitfully in European philosophy (along the lines of the New Testament, Kant, Neo-Kantian and "ethical socialism"); Russian Marxism showed no indication of understanding this problem.

The study of the origins of Marxism in Russia is preceded by an expanded description of the political concept and basic organizational views of Marx and Engels (and of the German social democrats). Unlike the previous "History of the CPSU" courses, the emphasis here is on the historical framework and inner contradictions within Marxist theory itself. Great attention is paid to the process of the development, in the 19th century, of two trends within the proletarian movement: revolutionary and reformist. It is indicated, something which is a new feature in our historiography, that the origins of both trends may be traced to the works of the Marxist founders themselves. It is emphasized that although the revolutionary trend was not implemented in the 1848-1849 and 1871 events in Europe, the layers of the then "exposed" theoretical problems (the possibility of the proletariat seizing the power at the ascending phase of development of the bourgeois system, the so-called theory of the "continuing revolution," etc.) would pass into the 20th century, above all in revolutionary Russia, which had entered the age of profound social revolutions under the new conditions of imperialism; here these problems would become the objects of the fiercest possible arguments between bolsheviks and mensheviks and between bolsheviks and Kautskians.

On the other hand, we see that, starting as early as the 1830s-1840s (in England) but particularly the 1860s (in the progressive European countries) a reformist trend would begin to be implemented in the policies of the ruling classes (so-called "revolutions from above"). Already in "Das Kapital" (vol I, 1867) we find the exceptionally important statement made by Marx, which

corrects the hasty conclusions included in the "Communist Party Manifesto," on the inability of the bourgeoisie to "remain the dominating social class." "The ruling classes themselves" in Europe and Asia are making "radical changes in existing relations between capital and labor" or, in terms of relations between capital and land ownership, are "beginning vaguely to sense that the present (bourgeois—authors) society is not a hard crystal but an organism which can change and which is in a constant process of transformation" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 4, p 435; vol 23, pp 10-11). Engels' 1895 idea of the preference of legal forms of struggle through parliamentarianism is emphasized; unlike the reformist Bernstein, Engels does not reject the slogan of a "big revolution," anticipating clashes in the future age of monopoly capital and global wars. Taking into consideration the arguments which are raging in our periodicals on "doctrinal excesses" in Marx's "Plan for the Future," we have included in our edition the section "K. Marx's Ideas at the Turning Point of Human Civilization."

Moving on to the history of Plekhanov's "Liberation of Labor" Group and Lenin's ISKRA, the authors note the different directions followed in Marx's theoretical studies of the 1870s and beginning of 1880s, which had been little noticed in our country (revealing a certain inapplicability of the European model of development of capitalism to Russia's peculiar reality) and Plekhanov's studies in the 1880s-1890s (who based precisely on the European "model" his forecasts concerning Russia's future). At the turn of the 20th century, Lenin essentially followed Marx's line of thought. Correspondingly, the Leninist stage in the development of Marxism, in our view, originates not in 1893, as was argued earlier (for almost 10 years Lenin followed Plekhanov and Akselrod), but sometime between 1902-1905, when Lenin formulated his organizational-tactical ideas, combining the traditions of the then progressive German social democracy with the traditions of Chernyshevskiy and, partially, the Narodovoltsy and Tkachev (Lenin's work "What Is to Be Done?"), also when, on the eve of the decisive events of the 1905-1907 Revolution, he was to formulate the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

In describing the history of the creation of the militant revolutionary proletarian party in Russia (the First and Second RSDWP Congresses), the authors single out the reasons for the appearance of and the split between bolshevism and menshevism, which include the following: 1. Reliance of both on different layers of the legacy of Marx and Engels; 2. Differences in the assessment of the socioeconomic and political situation in Russia; 3. The aspiration to apply the methods of the decisive Jacobin Montagnards or the irresolute Gironde.

Valentin Shelokhayev, doctor of historical sciences: The Party in the Pre-October Period

Many people believe that it is much easier to write about the pre-October period in the party's history than about

events after 1917. Unquestionably, in a certain sense this is the truth: at that time the party was purer, more inspired and more dynamic; it made fewer errors and was closer to its social base—the working class. Its course was charted in an atmosphere of sharp but quite free and democratic debates. Furthermore, the very status of an opposition party was essentially different from the status of a ruling one.

It is entirely obvious, however, that the roots of many contemporary problems of internal party life may be traced to those distant years. We are referring, above all, to the complex dialectics of democratic and centralist trends in matters of party building and relations between “committee men” (as the leading party workers were known at that time) and the rank-and-file party members. The relationship between the party and the mass nonparty organizations of the working people, such as soviets, trade unions, the various professional-political unions of the intelligentsia, the all-Russian railroad men, the peasant unions, and so on, developed in a rather complex manner, especially at first. Another sharp conflict was the one between the sincere and understandable wish of the revolutionaries maximally to accelerate the movement toward the socialist ideal and the historically developed economic and cultural backwardness of Russia, the underdeveloped nature of its democratic institutions and the low political standards of the people.

However, the old Soviet historiography, although it did a great deal of useful work, had also so “glamorized” the pre-October period of CPSU history, created so many legends and deleted so many essential and circumvented so many “delicate” problems that it will take many years before, eventually, we could get to the truth. That is why today we must go back to the prime sources and look without prejudice at the old heroes and “demons” of the revolution and abandon the viewpoint according to which the bolsheviks, at least in theory, invariably provided the only accurate and optimal solution to all problems, while their ideological opponents were always wrong and were betraying the people.

We have tried to interpret party activities aimed at the revolutionary transformation and renovation of Russia in the broad historical context, for the program and tactics of the bolsheviks were merely one of several realistic alternatives which became available to Russia at the beginning of this century. In the final account, in this case the choice depended on the real correlation of political forces in the arena of the social struggle. That is why in the corresponding sections of the “*Essays...*,” a very thorough study is made of the menshevik and S.R. models of the revolution, Trotsky’s theory, the liberal concept of the establishment of the “law-governed state” and the Stolypin plans which remained unimplemented. Naturally although we could not discuss the activities of each of the 50 parties which had appeared during the period of imperialism in Russia, in the sections we wrote the bolsheviks are presented as engaged in a dialogue with their real political rivals, every one of whom had his

own variant for a solution to the national crisis. Whether these variants were successful or unsuccessful is a different matter.

The special theme in the work is the process of building a proletarian party, the main landmarks of which were the years 1883, 1898, 1903, 1905-1907, 1912 and 1917. This approach enables us to avoid the dogmatic interpretation of the Leninist thesis of the immediate and definitive founding of the Bolshevik Party as early as 1903, although the Second RSDWP Congress was indeed the most important historical landmark in party building. The experience in restructuring party work in 1905 is of great interest (introduction of a broad electoral principle, a significant increase in the number of workers in party committees, increasing the rights, including financial, of the local organizations, and so on). Let us emphasize in this case that at that time the bolsheviks found within themselves the strength radically to change the style and methods of their party activities, which quickly brought tangible results. Another important aspect was that the party abandoned its command-administrative style in relations with mass social organizations, which had been its initial fault, acknowledged the need for joint work with dissidents, and decisively condemned sectarianism. This initial and, furthermore, successful attempt at party restructuring could come in useful today as well.

An equally essential problem which is being resolved concerning the pre-October period in party history is the sober and considerate study of Lenin’s theoretical legacy. We know that in a number of cases, such as, for instance, the theory of imperialism or proclaiming the slogan of a global revolution, Lenin clearly anticipated events. However, historians have always tried somehow to diminish the importance of these errors. Historical truth demands that things be called by their proper names. In this connection, let us note something else as well: today historians are not avoiding “closed” topics, be they the formerly notorious “exes,” the question of the bolsheviks’ funds, the Malinovskiy affair or the case of the Russian Masonic movement.

We also tried maximally to “humanize” history by “populating it” with a great variety of historical characters, many of whom in the past were, in the best of cases, merely mentioned in passing. Thus, we openly say that in 1905-1907, alongside Lenin there also were outstanding bolshevik leaders, such as L.B. Krasin and A.A. Bogdanov. The various activities of N.I. Bukharin, G.Ye. Zinovyev, L.B. Kamenev, L.D. Trotsky and their future main opponent, J.V. Stalin, are described.

Vladlen Loginov, doctor of historical sciences: Russia
From February to October

If we were to sum up the overall results and the old and many of the latest assessments of the events of 1917, we would see their meaning in the following: February opened to Russia the opportunity for free democratic development. However, bolshevik “extremism” and,

finally, the "October coup" led to the loss of these prospects. In other words, the October alternative allegedly was reduced to the choice of either democracy or "bolshevik dictatorship."

Nonetheless, the more we study the documents of that time, the more convinced we become that the real historical alternative of 1917 was different. The pressing problems which led to the creation of a national crisis on the eve of February failed to be resolved, as it were, in the subsequent months. The bloodshedding war continued. Economic dislocation worsened further and inflation grew unchecked. Hunger appeared and by October all of these calamities became tangled in a tight knot which could no longer be unraveled but could only be cut.

Now that the documents of the counterrevolutionary organizations of that time have become accessible, we can define more clearly the "slashing" element which originated from that camp.

According to the reactionaries, the root of the evil was the revolution itself. They claimed that it had led Russia into an impasse, for which reason the solution was considered to be a return to the "good old days." When others reminded P. Struve, the former liberal, of his enthusiasm during the days of February, he expressively replied: "I was a fool!" To the shame of the Russian intelligentsia, even people who belonged to it, such as P. Milyukov, believed that bloodshed was inevitable and that Russia needed a "surgical intervention." All of them considered a military dictatorship a solution to the crisis. As to General Kornilov, the candidate-dictator, he was ready to "slice Russia in half" or "flood three-quarters of Russia in blood" for the sake of "rescuing Russia from the revolution."

Could it be that Kerenskiy's coalition government, which constituted the bourgeois bloc with the S.R.-menshevik conciliationists, been able democratically to prevent Russia's sliding toward a national catastrophe? The documents prove that this option as well had become totally exhausted by the post-February experience. Guided by the best possible wishes and justifiably fearing a civil war, the "conciliationists" were seeking a national consensus. Kerenskiy as well swore that he will fight to the very end for the "renovation of Russia" and "defend the only thing which the authorities could do now—reconcile that which could be reconciled and lead everyone toward the same objective."

However, to reconcile the prolongation of a bloody war with the general popular demand for peace and to reconcile the interests of the workers with those of the capitalists and of the peasants with those of the land-owners was impossible. The path of "semi-reforms," "halfway measures," which would have pacified "everyone" merely increased the pressure on the government, applied from the right and from the left.

In the final account, a situation resembling a paralysis of power developed, in which any government resolution

became a meaningless piece of paper. That same Kerenskiy reached the conclusion that this extreme situation demanded extreme measures, the use of armed force and reliance on that same military dictatorship. In revolutionary Russia there was no reformist solution to the impasse.

Inevitably, everything was limited merely to a "bureaucratic playing at reform," which preserved "that same stagnation and that same hatred shown by workers and employees of the exploiters, that same breakdown on the same basis and that same robbery of the people's toil as had been the case under tsarism," Lenin remarked. "All that had changed had been the **letterheads** of incoming and outgoing papers in 'republican' offices!" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, p 170).

However, by leaving everything "as it was," the government intensified both extreme right extremism and left-wing maximalism. The result of this policy was not a consensus but the worst possible differentiation within a society which had split into two uneven parts: the "rich" and the "poor."

The inability of the bourgeois government to resolve the problem of peace, bread and land and efforts to establish with the use of naked violence a military dictatorship provoked in the masses the type of storm of hatred and bitterness which, at any moment, could lead to a spontaneous explosion.

In letters to the RSDWP Central Committee, the party committees noted with concern the tiredness and despair of the masses and, on this basis, a beginning trend toward anarchism, manifested in the "savage hatred which, at any minute, could trigger unheard of wild actions." They wrote that in the provinces the people were "seething," that they "could take it no longer," and that "the masses are turning to the anarchic left." The Saratov bolsheviks bluntly said: "If we do not wish to seem like a spontaneous movement possibly doomed to failure, we must assume its leadership."

Lenin acutely felt this danger. He noted the "concentrated-desperate mood of the broad masses which **feel** that nothing can be saved today with half-way measures, that no one can exert any "influence," and that the hungry "will blow everything, smash everything like anarchists" **unless** the bolsheviks manage to lead them into the decisive battle" (*ibid.* p 413).

It was not at all a question of the ambitions or doctrines of individual political leaders or parties. "The course of events," Lenin said, "and the dislocation of life and hunger are the motivations for revolution" (*op. cit.*, vol 31, p 379). Therefore, when the bourgeois newspapers accused the bolsheviks of "instigation," giving them the example of what seemed to them the sensible "socialist ministers," Lenin answered: "...The side of the workers and the poorest peasants... is 1,000 times more to the left than Chernov and Tsereteli and 100 times more leftist than we are. Wait and see" (*op. cit.*, vol 32, p 35).

By October it was no longer possible to wait. The activities of the extreme right, aimed at establishing a bloody military dictatorship, became increasingly clear. The danger of a spontaneous, of a wild explosion on the lower levels also increased. "...A wave of real anarchy," Lenin cautioned, "could become stronger than us..." (op. cit., vol 34, p 340). Consequently, "there is no solution, objectively, other than a dictatorship by Kornilov or a dictatorship of the proletariat..." (ibid., p 406).

Such was the real historical alternative of October 1917.

Pavel Volobuyev, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member: On the Legitimacy of the October Revolution

Was the socialist revolution in Russia premature? Could the Russian historical ground become a base for the creation of a new democratic and socialist society? How was the humanism of the October Revolution expressed? If such a humanism existed, why was it that our society was unable to apply the humanistic potential of the October Revolution? Did the people's masses make an entirely conscious and voluntary choice in October 1917, aware of the fact that it was precisely a socialist choice? Was the October Revolution initially oriented toward democracy or dictatorship? Why was it that so tragically its objectives and historical results failed to coincide? Did the menshevik turn out to be wrong on all points of discord in the assessment of the October Revolution and could bolshevism, as the winner, claim to have been absolutely right?

The answers to these questions demand the reinterpretation of our previous methodological and theoretical approaches and specific historical views on the prehistory of the October Revolution and of the revolution itself.

Naturally, one can criticize the Marxist-Leninist classics for having overestimated the maturity of the capitalism of their day and the material prerequisites it had created for a transition to socialism, which they viewed as a noncommodity social system. Nor were Lenin's assessments of imperialism as the final stage of capitalism confirmed, i.e., as a stage at which it could and should be replaced as a result of a global socialist revolution. The October Revolution took place under the conditions not of a descending but an ascending developments of capitalism which, incidentally, was one of the main reasons for the impossibility of a global revolution despite the existence of a general European revolutionary situation between 1916 and 1921, and the likelihood of the victory of a proletarian revolution in several European countries (other than Russia).

Nonetheless, it is obvious that the Marxist forecast proved to be theoretically and practically accurate in the main. Capitalism is not the final stop in the historical development of mankind. Sooner or later the social civilizing progress is bound to take it to a higher level of social organization. Socialism comes to replace capitalism as an answer to the crisis in capitalist relations

during one of the rounds in the historical spiral. The destructive nature of such a crisis was manifested with particular emphasis during World War I, when the antihuman trends within imperialism became a fact clear to all. "The war took all mankind to the brink of the precipice, to the destruction of all culture, to savagery and to the death of endless millions of people. There is no solution other than the revolution of the proletariat," Lenin wrote in 1917 (op. cit. vol 31, p 182). Incidentally, one of the facets of the humanism of the revolution is found in the idea of withdrawing from the war through a proletarian revolution, a withdrawal which would be the most advantageous to millions of working people.

Taken in its Russian context, the October Revolution is the third revolutionary wave, the peak of the revolutionary process experienced by the country in the short 10 to 15 years since the beginning of the 20th century. Its roots may be traced to the turn of the 20th century, when Russia became a capitalist country. It was precisely then that the variety of social contradictions became entwined in a tight knot, which turned the country into a revolutionary center in which a conflagration could take place for any reason at all and fan into a universal fire (considering the European-Asian scale of our country). Whereas in the Western European countries the development of capitalism and the social changes organically related to it occurred in a certain sequence (with the decisive impact of revolutions, such as those of England in the 17th century and the French in the 18th), by the 20th century in Russia basic problems of social development proved to be unsolved. This made any further societal progress either impossible or obstructed. Here, by virtue of a delayed secondary type of development of capitalism, which was trying to catch up, a variety of historical periods became superimposed, compressed in terms of time and space. Because of this, it was necessary simultaneously to resolve the agrarian problem, which was basic to a country where the peasantry was in the majority of the population, the problems of capitalist industrialization, the enhancement of the cultural and educational standards of the people, the national problem, the problem of democratization of sociopolitical life, which meant replacing the absolutist-bureaucratic order with a bourgeois-democratic one, etc. In short, as it entered the 20th century, Russia had to drastically accelerate capitalist modernization and, in order to survive in a rapidly changing world, catch up with the progressive Western countries.

The scale and gravity of these historical tasks and contradictions, on the one hand, and the narrow-minded unwillingness of the ruling circles to seek ways of resolving them which would be acceptable to Russia, on the other, led the country into an open durable crisis. In practical terms the revolutionary solution to the crisis became not only necessary but inevitable. The reformist alternative proved to be quite problematical. Since the beginning of the first Russian revolution history, which hastily pushed Russia along the path of progress, suddenly accelerated its course as though in a hurry to

resolve immediately and once and for all all problems which had taken decades and centuries to accumulate.

October fell on Russia like a huge snow avalanche. Was it premature? In a certain sense, it was. To begin with, until 1917, in the eyes of both Russian and foreign Marxist theoreticians, the concepts of "Russia" and "socialism" were believed incompatible. Second, Lenin himself, as the author of the socialist plan for the reorganization of Russia, assumed that had there been no World War I, our country could have lived for years and decades without any revolution against the capitalists. Furthermore, he also pointed out the approximate period of acceleration triggered by that war: 30 years (see op. cit., vol 32, p 31; vol 34, p 113). However, it would be no exaggeration at all to claim that our people made a relatively easy revolution the moment the clock of history struck. There was no coercion of history any more than there was a "fatal error," although our revolution was a particularly difficult case, as Lenin said, as it marked the birth of the new society (see op. cit., vol 36, pp 476-477). Equally wrong is the view that the revolution itself is to be held responsible for the subsequent distortions of its values and ideals and for Stalin's betrayal of the cause of the October Revolution.

In substantiating the urgency of a socialist revolution in Russia and the country's conversion to socialism, Lenin was not guided by the letter of Marxism (the need for higher level of production forces and the proletarianization of the majority of the population). Instead, he relied on the Marxist analysis of the specific historical circumstances which had developed in Russia in 1917. The war had aggravated all social contradictions. As a result of the country's backwardness, compared to other countries at war economic dislocation assumed a scale which took Russia to the brink of national catastrophe. Essentially, Russian capitalism was breaking down as a social system. Therefore, Lenin saw in the socialist revolution not a leap into the unknown but a specific answer to specific problems and pressing needs. In that context, the October Revolution should be considered as our own Russian variant leading to a contemporary industrial civilization, distinct from the Western European, and chosen in accordance with the accelerating overall social development. It was also an attempt at a whole-hearted daring breach leading from absolutism to democracy in its proletarian, its socialist aspect.

Yes, this was a deviation from the usual, the "normal" Western European way of development, assuming that we accept the latter as the standard. Lenin considered that Russia had not attained a level of development of production forces at which socialism was possible. In this he agreed with the mensheviks. However, he saw in the country, thanks to contemporary industrial sectors, transportation, monopolies and banks, the existence of a **minimum** of material-production prerequisites for a **gradual** conversion to socialism. In 1917 it was precisely not in terms of the immediate "introduction" of socialism in Russia but of a gradual transition to it through a series of revolutionary-democratic measures

and steps, that Lenin formulated the question. Above all, the country had a tremendous revolutionary potential and the insurmountable aspiration of the people's masses, which had joined the movement after February, toward radical changes, toward the renovation of their lives and social justice.

It is in this light that we should abandon two stereotypes: the old, according to which the October Revolution won thanks to the maturity, the readiness of our country for socialism; and the new, that we had no objective prerequisites whatsoever in our country for a revolution other than the desire of a handful of bolsheviks to seize the power for purposes of socialist experimentation.

The mensheviks approached their assessment to the prerequisites for the October Revolution dogmatically, proceeding from the Western European experience in the development of capitalism and bourgeois democracy. They exaggerated the backwardness of the country and failed to understand the historical dialectics by virtue of which "our backwardness moved us forward." Equally unjustified was their charge that the bolsheviks had unleashed the Civil War. We must admit, however, that to a certain extent the mensheviks had accurately sensed the tragedy of bolshevism which was heading a socialist revolution in a ruined and poor country, which was far from being mature, and to a transition to socialism, a country with had a small industrial conscious proletariat. The latter circumstance proved to be fatal to the fate of our revolution: subsequently the working class proved unable to retain the state power, having entrusted it to the party which, in turn, allowed it to pass into the hands of its leader, Stalin. The mensheviks were also right when they warned the bolsheviks that under the conditions of a petit bourgeois country they would frequently have to resort to violence, harming democracy and freedom. Obviously, they accurately anticipated the trend of development of our revolution in terms of the correlation between democracy and dictatorship and the danger, if not the inevitability, of a bolshevik preference for dictatorship to the detriment of democracy.

Despite all this, let us not ignore the humanistic values and impetus of the October Revolution. The humanism of October is that it acted in the name of the oppressed and the poor, making the defense of their interests and their freedom, democracy and culture the cornerstone of a revolutionary policy. N.A. Berdyayev was right when he wrote that "the Russian Revolution awakened and released the tremendous forces of the Russian people. That is its main meaning!"

Genrikh Ioffe, doctor of historical sciences: *The Socialist Parties in 1917*

Today, in retrospect, we can see quite clearly that the basic social forces which became "involved" in the political arena in 1917 were guided by strictly class-oriented reasons, showing little concern for efforts to compromise for the sake of the common, the national

interests. It is fully admissible that they could not act otherwise, sincerely believing that their actions, their "political line" were consistent with the interests of Russian society and the Russian state. One way or another, the ruling circles (the authorities, tsarism), maneuvering and using the pendulum tactics ("left-right"), as a whole blocked the pace of progress which the country needed; in encouraging tsarism to engage in ever more decisive reforms, the liberal-bourgeois parties nonetheless did not dare to take sufficiently active steps, fearing "anarchy," and the toiling masses (the proletariat and the peasantry), finding no kind of tangible support on the part of the rulers and the liberals, steadily became radicalized. The liberals and, naturally, the revolutionary parties (the social democrats, the S.R.) in particular, intensified the radicalizing with their propaganda.

After February, a great deal depended on the socialist parties represented by the most popular people's authorities—the soviets and the other democratic organizations. Had they found from the very start the opportunity of forming a strong political bloc, something similar to a people's a democratic front would have appeared in Russia and would have unquestionably benefited from the support of the broad social strata (from the proletariat to some progressive bourgeois circles). However, partially for theoretical (dogmatic) considerations and partially because of "fear of power" in a country ruined by the war and the revolution, mensheviks and S.R. stubbornly stuck to a bloc (coalition) with the bourgeois parties (the Cadets), which had lost their reputation among the masses because of their probourgeois policy and ties with the right-wing forces (Kornilovites). In turn, the bolsheviks (or at least some of them) fiercely attacked the mensheviks and the S.R. for their "treacherous coalition course" (in terms of the bourgeoisie) although it must be acknowledged that the so-called "soft bolsheviks" (and even Lenin) had shown at some point a certain inclination to cooperate with the right-wing socialists.

As we analyze today the division within the socialist ranks in 1917, we conclude that the party interests and political ambitions of virtually all socialist parties and groups played, as a whole, a negative role in the fierce political struggle of those times. Not a single one of them had the sufficiently strong desire and ability to seek a way to a salutary compromise and, as Lenin admitted, the ability to protect the country from the horrors of a widespread Civil War. This danger was generally realized by all. However, efforts were made to avoid it in different ways: the mensheviks and S.R. through coalition with the bourgeois elements; the bolsheviks through the intensification and taking the revolution "to the end," and satisfying the most basic interests of the masses. To a large extent, however, mensheviks and S.R. tried to preserve a "balance of forces." Psychologically and politically, the bolsheviks displayed a steady decisiveness and readiness to struggle with the help of most radical methods.

The September "democratic conference" was perhaps the last chance for a peaceful development of the revolution. Once again, however, mensheviks and S.R. did not find in themselves enough strength to "separate themselves" from the bourgeoisie and to make a "left" turn to meet the demands of the masses. In all likelihood, this was what finally determined the resolve of the "left-wing bolsheviks" (Lenin, Trotskiy and others), taking into consideration the full bankruptcy of the Provisional Government which had brought the country to a point of collapse of anarchy and created a division in the right-wing socialist circles, to seize the opportunity for a power grab in the interests of meeting the demands of the people (peace, land, etc.). This resolve was backed by the fear that the rapidly mounting anarchy would, in the immediate future, lay a basis for the consolidation of the extreme right-wing forces, the purpose of which was the routing of the revolution and democracy. The masses, which were now following the bolsheviks ever more actively, would have rejected them had they remain inactive, the way they had rejected and separated themselves from the mensheviks and the right-wing S.R.

However, even on 25 October 1917 (the armed uprising was already under way) the opportunity to create a multiparty homogeneous socialist government had not been lost as yet. In this case the mensheviks-internationalists, headed by L. Martov, could have played an important role. However, their attempts to "build bridges" among socialists failed. The right-wing mensheviks and right-wing S.R. walked out of the Second Congress of Soviets, hoping that the bolsheviks would not remain long in power and would "collapse." Actually, the bolsheviks were forced to form their own bolshevik government (the left-wing S.R. were still maneuvering). Subsequently talks on the creation of a multiparty government, it would seem, neither stood nor could have stood any big chance. The power was already in bolshevik hands and in the course of discussions with the mensheviks (under Vikzhel's aegis), the advance of Kerenskiy-Krasnov forces toward Petrograd had a negative influence. The failure of this "campaign" became one of the reasons which forced the bolsheviks to adopt an intransigent position in the talks. Naturally, certain ultimatums formulated by the mensheviks also had an influence on these events.

The bolsheviks won. However, this victory soon showed its negative consequences. The attempt of the right-wing S.R. and the mensheviks to remove them from power with the help of the Constituent Assembly led to its disbanding. The announced peace led to the actual spontaneous demobilization of the army, thus resulting in the Brest "unfortunate peace" as Lenin said. The difficult economic situation forced the bolsheviks to engage in "requisitioning," which was described as "war communism." The alliance with the left-wing S.R. proved to be of short duration and, soon afterwards, let us admit, that which many people had predicted before the October Revolution, happened: the bolsheviks found themselves isolated and forced, in their struggle against

the political forces and organizations which opposed them with increasing fierceness, to use the methods of coercion and terror. Local arbitrary behavior considerably increased these trends. This important circumstance cannot be ignored.

(To be continued in subsequent issues.)

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Thoughts About Socialism; Debate in Letters to the Editors

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[Compiled by K. Grigoryev]

[Text] This is the third time in the past few months that our readers have the floor in the discussion about socialism and the ways leading to its qualitative renovation. The survey of the letters to the editors (No 17, 1989) dealt with the socioeconomic nature of our society and the origins and reasons for the command-bureaucratic distortions of the principles of the new system and the ways for its transformation. The reactions were published under the heading "Socialism. Present and Future" (*KOMMUNIST* No 3, 1990). However, the flow of letters discussing the basic problems of improving the society built in our country has not abated. The strong impetus of readers interested in problems of the socialist renovation of our country and their desire actively to participate in their discussion is unquestionably provided by the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress "For a Humane, a Democratic Socialism." Although not all letters contain direct references to this important document, we believe that it could be included in the discussion of the draft party platform. The letters reflect the new and sometimes contradictory processes occurring in the social awareness under the conditions of perestroika. By no means do the editors share all the expressed views, evaluations and judgments. The publication of these materials will contribute to the better clarification of existing viewpoints and the search for answers to the difficult problems of history and contemporary life.

Some Results and Lessons

There is probably nothing more bitter and more insulting to a person than the result summed up in the letter by Muscovite Ye. Pererva, born in 1908, CPSU member since 1942, war and labor veteran: "Believe me, as I approach the end of my life, I find it hurtful to see the result of the road we have walked for more than 70 years after the Great October, an event which shook up all civilized mankind. The result is disturbing, bitter and even pitiful: we not only failed to catch up with capitalism but, to our shame, fell decades behind it." The author of this letter, as the absolute majority of the readers, links his hopes for the better to the process of the qualitative renovation of the society we have built,

initiated by the party's leadership in April 1985. The people are convinced that the failures which we experienced along in the course of our "fast" movement to a "bright future" do not prove in the least the unviable nature of the socialist idea itself; they are not an indicator of the fact that the dedicated and sometimes heroic labor of the Soviet people and faith in the ideals of the new system and even the sacrifices of our fathers and grandfathers were in vain.

What type of society did we build? What errors did we make? As we know, there are different answers to these questions which by now have become almost rhetorical. They can also be seen in the letters we published. However, again and again, the readers of *KOMMUNIST* return to that topic....

V. Turnayev (Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast): When the October Revolution won, its makers undertook to implement plans which were in the nature of projections. The objective content of the revolution—its limits and possibilities—was to complete the implementation of the tasks of the February Revolution and, if possible, go beyond them. The first thing which the bolsheviks should have done after they seized the power was to transfer the nationalized property to the people. The property, the supreme owner of which are the people and which is given to the people—to individuals, collectives, organizations and so on—without the right to sell it, to transfer it, to gift it, is, most obviously, the kind of strange social property which should constitute the future communist society. However, this was not realized immediately and did not become the target of practical actions.

S. Berdnikov (Leningrad): At the end of the Civil War, in converting to the NEP, Lenin intended to restructure the governmental administration and to free it from bureaucratic elements and distortions. This would have laid the necessary foundations for the building of socialism. Illness prevented him from implementing these intentions and he was able only briefly to present his ideas and plans in writings which were subsequently described as his "political testament."

V. Turnayev: The NEP was a step in the right direction. However, as we know, it was not followed to the end. As a result, we lost not only that which in the future could have helped to achieve communism but even the gains of the February Revolution. Private property—the foundation of capitalism—was destroyed in Russia but the property did not become public. It became the property of the administrative-managerial apparatus. In my view, the people found themselves in the position of a sulking simpleton: it was they who made the revolution but its results fell into other people's hands. This was something worth despairing about and then, enthusiastically, storming the assignments of the first 5-Year Plans: it was through them that efforts were made to recapture the fruits of the lost victory. The "shining city" of socialism and an ideology mixed with dogmatism were all that Russia obtained as a result of the October Revolution.

P. Zhilyayev, worker (Kishinev): Today it is frequently asked, what did the October Revolution give us, considering that in other countries even without revolutions the people lived better. The revolution saved us from being degraded by factory owners and landlords, and kulaks and the nobility which ruled over them. This in itself was substantial.

Many people say that we consume less than the citizens of many capitalist countries. Yes, this is indeed so. However, not only the administrative-bureaucratic system, which to some means socialism, is to be blamed for this. We cannot demand of a country which, 45 years ago, was ruined, which lost tens of millions of essentially young people killed and millions maimed, to have a present level of development consistent with the richest countries in the world. In the postwar years as well we by no means functioned under equal conditions. Expenses on defense, the need to achieve nuclear parity and free aid given to many countries were heavy burdens on us. Naturally, there were also other problems, the solution of which accounted for and still accounts for a great share of the "pie" of the simple working person. The main reason for stagnation, however, for which all of us are to be blamed, from the rank-and-file worker to the high leadership, is the fact that most of us are not conscientiously contributing our toil to the common cause.

Ye. Pererva: In my view, the main problem is that the real working person has simply become tired of claims that he is earning according to his labor. Who believes this? After being paid, the person goes to the store and sees the bare shelves. Therefore, we do not receive money but simple pieces of paper. For more than 70 years there was talk about concern for the person. Meanwhile, in homes for the aged we spend a few pennies to support labor veterans who dedicated their entire strength to the country.

N. Gavrilov (Arzamas, Gorkiy Oblast): I am quite amazed at the "shyness" displayed by many of our scientists and political leaders, who keep silent on the question of the crises under socialism. If ups and downs are inherent in an economy, why should they exist under capitalism only? I believe that it is precisely economic reasons that are at the foundation of the crisis which has hit our country in which the economy is most closely interwoven with politics.

G. Grishchenko, military serviceman: Our error was that we hastened to proclaim the elimination of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The strike committees which were set up in the course of last year's miners' strikes, once again displayed the power of that dictatorship. In short, however regressive I may be considered, I believe that we must go back to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Today the power is shifting to the soviets and the majority within them should consist of workers and peasants. Furthermore, we need the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to establish order.

G. Vorobyev, CPSU member (Solotcha Settlement, Ryazan Oblast): In the past the idea of the accelerated creation of a classless society based on the total statification of all economic sectors and the total alienation of the direct producers from the means of production and the products of labor prevailed in our country. The winner was the state-monopoly form of production, based on universal hired labor. It was on the basis of such a deformed economic base and the removal of the producer from production management that the command-bureaucratic apparatus developed, omnipotent and endowed with unlimited power. As a result of the deformations in the economy, deformations appeared also in the political superstructure and in social awareness.

B. Klim (Moscow): My feeling is that I will wake up one morning and will find out that the October Revolution has been "canceled." I have been told by some Soviet scientists that I am living in some kind of feudal or barracks socialism, and that Stalin wanted the defeat of the country during the Great Patriotic War but that the Soviet people managed to win despite him. There are those who have gone so far as to claim that the main opponents of perestroyka are... the war and labor veterans. I am greatly concerned when sometimes even managers are trying to justify our present problems with the events of the 1930s. I do not consider this serious. Nearly 40 years have passed since Stalin's death and we still keep persistently talking about him and focusing our entire energy on malevolent criticism and not on the creative renovation of socialist ideals. How can we move ahead if our heads are turned backward?

A. Semenov, CPSU member since 1926 (Gorki City, Mogilev Oblast): Today all errors in economic activities and not only they alone, are ascribed to the administrative-command methods which were allegedly introduced in our life by Stalin. Stalin is accused also of excessive centralization of economic management and excessive production socialization. Any interference from above and any arbitrariness are similarly classified. It is being said that everything comes from there, from those times. However, as a rule, such claims are wrong: the centralized management of public production began from the very first days of the revolution.

A. Potemkin, CPSU member since 1941 (Odessa): Speaking of crisis phenomena in our society, we must give priority to the crisis in ideology which, for a long time was treated as Cinderella while ideological workers were classified third-rate people. They were accused of anything that went wrong.

A. Makarov, economist (Barnaul): The negative phenomena in our life would not have been all that terrible had they been the result of errors or the simple inability to govern the country: they could have been corrected. The trouble is that they were the result of a deliberate abandonment of Marxism-Leninism, socialism and communism by the leadership. With their own hands the communists did to Marxism-Leninism, something which

for an entire century the entire world bourgeoisie, together with a large army of revisionists of all sorts, had been unable to accomplish.

T. Devyatkovna, docent (Perm): For the time being, we have no theory which could be used as a manual for action. The absence of such a theory is confirmed by the very fact that to this day we do not know the type of socialism we are building or, in general, if what we are building is socialism.

B. Pogorelov, CPSU member since 1945 (Kiev): The answer to this question would help shed some light in the minds of simple people. Today a great deal is being said and written about socialism, but no full clarity exists. Ask anyone you wish what he means by socialism, and his answer will not be straightforward. To the common man socialism means that which he observes every day: bare shelves in stores, ever growing scarcity, poverty.... Articles written about socialism sin by their vagueness and erudition which is inaccessible not only to simple people but even to scientists.

T. Devyatkovna: The theoretical vacillations, which were quite numerous throughout the post-Leninist period, and which are continuing to this day, unquestionably puzzled many communists. Their confusion does not let us speak of any kind of ideological cohesion, without which the party as an organization of like-minded people cannot exist. As to revolutionary theory, in my view, it should be based on a scientifically substantiated and organically integral concept of the development of socialist society, capable of answering the most important question: How to combine our real life, in its most complex manifestations, with the idea of building a new society, as formulated and substantiated by Marx?

So far the Soviet people, including the communists, are kept in a state of confusion: on the one hand, they hear that we shall continue to be loyal to the ideals of communism and, on the other, that increasingly the country is creating the type of "socialism" in which to mention the ideals of communism becomes inappropriate and unseemly, for faith in these ideals no longer exists in many people.

R. Oshurkova, docent (Perm): We should not fear the shouts of some philistines that "for more than 70 years we built socialism but what we built no one knows!" Perhaps we should take a new, a more realistic look at our past experience and recall the many objective difficulties which we had to surmount. This will help us to get rid of anticipations in our theory. I believe that there is no sense to abandon the humanistic ideals of socialism and communism. What is important only is to understand that the establishment of the new system is a lengthy process.

Ye. Kulaga, doctor of technical sciences (Moscow): Today matters can no longer be helped with unsupported claims that we are not abandoning socialism but are merely eliminating some of its deformations. We need not only to criticize Stalinism but also a scientific

analysis of the distance we have covered, in order to develop the ideological principles for our further advance. Unless we do this now, at the end of the 20th century, ideologically we shall be thrown back to the turn of the century. We must begin with the basic principles. For example, we must acknowledge that the age of proletarian revolutions has ended and that the time of nonviolent social changes, based on scientific knowledge, has come. This became possible, above all, thanks to the appearance of the USSR and its achievements within a short historical period, as well as the global influence it exerted on mankind with its ideals, slogans, and victories in the Civil and Patriotic wars. Postwar capitalism adopted the latest achievements of the scientific and technical revolution in the economy, largely combining them with the principles of socialism in the social area. A new society was created, which is closer to socialism than to capitalism.

It is necessary once again to defend the concept that socialism is not the fabrication of visionary theoreticians but objective reality which is replacing capitalism, and that this process is irreversible. The system which has developed at the present time in the countries of real socialism, under the influence of certain internal and external factors, is not as yet the best that it could be. However, this does not mean in the least that socialism has no future and has no right to exist.

[Editorial note] The need for a profound creative development of our theory and for correcting distortions in the social sciences is another important task of perestroika by **V. Davydov**, CPSU member (Rostov-na-Donu), **V. Dyakonov** (Alma-Ata), **B. Yelizarov**, CPSU member (Kalinin), **N. Korabelnikov**, CPSU member since 1944 (Ulyanovsk), **V. Leonov** (Orel), **N. Sumenkov** (Kemerovo), **N. Shulayev**, CPSU member (Vladimir), and many other readers. **V. Koveshnikov**, candidate of historical sciences, and **Ye. Koveshnikova**, candidate of philosophical sciences (Rubezhnoye, Kiev) note with concern that occasionally we hear today calls to abandon Marxism on the grounds that it was allegedly unable to pass the test of time and led our society into a crisis. "It is not the theory of the new society," they believe, "but the dogmatizing of its individual concepts during the years of Stalinism and stagnation that are the real reasons for many of our contemporary problems."

A. Voytolovskaya, doctor of economic sciences and candidate of historical sciences (Novosibirsk): The existence of omissions and even misunderstandings in the interpretation of individual concepts expressed by the classics is, to some extent, natural, for the mastery and, to a large extent, also the reinterpretation of their tremendous ideological legacy is a most difficult but relevant task, unquestionably requiring collective efforts. At this point we can only be pleased with each new discovery. We should be saddened by a snobbish arrogant attitude toward this great legacy as being a "past" stage and by the continued use of chosen selection of quotes, aimed at supporting personal views.

Ye. Yegorov, docent, candidate of historical sciences (Vladimir): Of late our theoretical and political publications have been quoting Lenin on the "change of our entire viewpoint on socialism." These words have become a kind of cornerstone for the theoretical substantiation of perestroika. Ignoring the great variety of shades in their interpretation, we can single out the main idea which the authors of such works would like to ascribe to these words: after the Civil War Lenin, it is claimed, totally abandoned the Marxist understanding of socialism, along with his own views held during the prerevolutionary period and the first postrevolutionary years.

Here is the way this Leninist thought may be presented in its full meaning: "Now we have the right to say that the simple expansion of the cooperation is to us the same (with the "minor" exception we already indicated) as the growth of socialism. Nonetheless, we are forced to acknowledge the radical change in our entire viewpoint on socialism. This radical change is that in the past we emphasized and had to emphasize the political struggle, the revolution, the seizure of power, and so on. Now the center of gravity shifts to peaceful organizational "cultural" work. I am prepared to say that the center of gravity to us would have been a shift to cultural work, had there not been an international attitude and the obligation to struggle for our own position on an international scale. If we set this aside and limit ourselves to internal economic relations, in our country now the center of gravity in the work is indeed reduced to the promotion of culture" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 376).

A. Voytolovskaya: The "birthmarks" of the circumstantial approach can be noticed not only in connection with the legacy of the classics. How else can we explain the sad occurrence that all of a sudden the concept of "communism" has virtually disappeared from training courses. Obviously, the reason is that some people have feared the skipping of stages. It is a very good thing that it is precisely young students who heard quite clearly the words of M.S. Gorbachev on the reality and scientific substantiation of the communist ideal as the supreme spiritual value, progress toward which must go through the revolutionary renovation of socialism as the first phase of the new society. Such a formulation of the question is of great moral significance and demands an understanding of the fact that, based on the theory of Marxism-Leninism in the understanding of communism, it should be considered not an abstractly structured ideal but a process for the transformation of the individual and society. The communist ideal is an objective historical necessity, for the struggle for the true combination of ownership and labor and that very combination demand the participation of the entire nation in the management of all economic and social processes. In turn, this substantiates the development of the creative capabilities of one and all.

'How To Make Socialism Attractive?'

[Editorial note] That is how L. Sorokin, CPSU member since 1958 and candidate of technical sciences (Moscow) headed his letter. Like many other readers (such as Muscovite B. Sapozhnikov, CPSU member since 1955), he proceeds from the fact that the command-bureaucratic and deformed socialism has lost its attractiveness to the working people not only in our country but abroad as well. "I recall," he goes on to say, "that 15 years ago, in a private conversation, I was told by Swedish people that they do not need our socialism. My indignation and feeling of insult had no limit. I tried to prove the advantages of our socialism, as we used to do then, and its attractiveness to them. I was obviously short of arguments and facts and I was unable to convince them. Only now has it become clear that this was impossible for a number of reasons, above all because already then our socialism was of no interest to them. They lived better than we did, socially they had better protection and had more real freedoms, including political.

"I suggest that the following be added to the USSR Constitution: 'The socialist state guarantees to all citizens a minimal living standard.' The socialist principle of social justice, expressed by securing for the citizens a minimal living standard would be more humanistic compared to the usual statements concerning the social protection of the citizens in our society. Such a social protection, exclusive to socialism, would be attractive also to citizens of capitalist countries."

V. Khvostichenko, CPSU member since 1968, pensioner (Donetsk): Today some of our theoreticians call for building a "humane and democratic socialism," a "socialism with a human face." I immediately recall the events of 1968, when several Warsaw Pact countries introduced their forces into Czechoslovakia and interrupted the building of a "humane and democratic socialism" in that country. Why do I mention this? Clearly, the time has come to abandon high sounding definitions of socialism. We must return to its initial meaning.

V. Maglysh, pensioner (Slutsk): I believe that it is precisely the term "socialism" itself that frightens many people from active participation in perestroika, for it recreates in the mind the feeling of grievance for the persecution of the kulaks and repressions, Chernobyl and incoherent stagnation.

V. Khvostichenko: What matters is not the form but the content. Today as well we are marching toward building a "simple" socialist society which will be based on universal human values and the achievements of civilization. It is only the real shifting of the power from the party to the people, i.e., real popular rule and the equality of the party with all other social organizations, that could contribute to the success of perestroika, for any kind of monopoly inevitably leads society into an impasse.

Yu. Kiosev (Norilsk): We must apply more fully the basic principle of socialism: to each according to his labor. Understandably, there will be rich and poor. Unquestionably, those who are better educated, more talented, harder working and more enterprising will be the first to become richer. This will not harm society.

G. Minakov, junior scientific associate (Rostov-na-Donu): Marx's writings clearly indicate that a socialist society is distinguished from a capitalist society by the absence of exploitation of man by man and, consequently, the elimination of the buying and selling of manpower. It is possible to put an end to exploitation only when all members of society have an identical attitude toward the means of production. This means replacing private with public ownership. The moment manpower stops being a commodity the further existence of commodity-monetary relations will become impossible.

G. Kirlichenok, CPSU member since 1943 (Leningrad): Under socialism people should not appropriate by whatever means the results of someone else's labor.

A. Bocharov (Kursk): What to do? Should we abandon money and try to introduce straight barter? No, for an attempt was made in our country during the period of "war communism" to eliminate commodity-monetary relations. Nothing came of it. That is why we were forced to resort to the new economic policy which, once again, created a market, freed the hands of private initiative, etc. In other words, socialism is possible only in theory. In practice it is impossible, for it is incompatible with exploitation which directly stems from commodity-monetary relations.

Ye. Kulaga: If we are forced today to develop commodity-monetary relations and grant freedom of action to the law of value, the only reason for this is that thanks to "Comrade Stalin's wise leadership" the social principles in our country became distorted to such an extent and social morality has become corrupt to such a degree that there is no way other than to go back to the period of the NEP and to begin everything from almost scratch, as though there had been no 70 years of building socialism in our country. We neither strengthened nor developed the changes which occurred in the 1920s in social morality. We did not suitably assert within society the socialist principles, particularly among leaders of all ranks and levels, on whose "instructions" our entire practical activities in building socialism were carried out. That is why it is necessary to begin again with the help of the age-old words "yours" and "mine."

B. Khorev, professor (Moscow): In restoring the Leninist concept of the building of socialism in a backward country with Russian features, as one could describe it now, based on historical experience, it would be useful to remember that the modern peasant has long become a member of a cooperative and that whatever one may say about the kolkhoz system, it is an organic part of our real socialism (with all its weaknesses and shortcomings).

The new lessee and even the family farmer could hardly work without any contact with this system as a whole. Furthermore, it makes no sense whatsoever to destroy what we have created with so much work. Nonetheless, we must point out that today's new "cooperative farmer" is by no means a peasant but an urban resident and, in terms of his actual status in society, quite frequently is in the position of a private entrepreneur. Let us call things by their right names. It is a question precisely of a private sector: the press has begun to depict the private entrepreneur as just about the vanguard of socialism!

V. Chebanov (Stavropol): Today eliminating the alienation of labor does not mean the development of petit bourgeois forms of ownership which, incidentally, because of their limitations, cannot raise the production forces to a qualitatively new level. The solution is to combine the elimination of exploitation of labor with the development of a joint interest in labor and upgrading its effectiveness. In other words, we must free labor both in terms of the choice of its forms (individual, cooperative, leasing, state) as well as in terms of the appropriation of its results. The results of labor should benefit every person and not be appropriated through noneconomic methods. This is a decisive aspect in developing a real interest in labor in all of our fellow citizens and promoting true competition for the growth of labor productivity.

B. Khorev: Without a well considered course the petit bourgeois element which creates private ownership feelings, nationalism and anarchy would simply overwhelm us. It is already doing this. In NEP Russia it was countered by the dictatorship of the proletariat. If we are following a development course, even with the domination of socialist structures, private farming and the private sector, we must also be prepared for the display of petit bourgeois features in their worst aspects (I am not discussing the fact that today class terminology is being hastily rejected). In a country in which the main social strata consist of yesterday's peasants and their children, a country in which to this day it is difficult to eliminate low standards, the danger of the reanimation of petit bourgeois ideology is quite significant. Its influence is strongly felt in literature and, obviously, exists in political circles, including in the high power echelons. We are also experiencing the influence of bourgeois ideology with its characteristic stratum of shady dealers which has developed in our country, and the ability to create semi-legal political structures and to seize the power.

V. Toporov (Lvov): In order to prevent this from taking place we must restore the dictatorship of the working class which will mark the continuation of the transitional period to socialism, which was interrupted in the mid-1930s. Naturally, today everyone would have liked to see our society as being socialist. Why present our wish as reality? Why speak of some kind of "class socialism" and its "renovation?" This way we can even talk ourselves into believing in "class communism."

V. Vasilyev, docent, candidate of philosophical sciences (Moscow): The theoretical discussions and actual practices in which a number of socialist countries are engaged provide rich data for a radical reform of the command-administrative system based not on dictatorship but on political pluralism. This democratizes the political regime and makes possible the development of a variety of forms for the exercise of power. The democratic nature and purpose of political pluralism are establishing the type of governmental and social mechanisms which would make it possible to identify and take into consideration the variety of interests and political views, to surmount the excessive centralism of the authorities and to assert popular self-government.

I. Folomeykin, CPSU member (Kuvandyk, Orenburg Oblast): Democratization must be combined with strong party, state and production discipline. Lenin emphasized that "dictatorship means iron power, revolutionary-daring and fast, merciless suppression of both exploiters and hooligans. Our system is excessively soft, frequently looking more like kissel than iron" (op. cit., vol 36, p 196). This view is consistent with the present situation prevailing in our country.

[Editorial note] As we know, usually terms such as "democratic socialism," "humane socialism," and "socialism with a human face," triggered a negative reaction in Soviet science and the social consciousness, being identified with the opportunistic and reformist line in the worker and communist movements. We must frankly say that the turn taken in the course of perestrojka toward the principles of democratic socialism proved to be too sharp for some of our readers, such as **A. Bespyatko**, CPSU member since 1942 (Moscow), **O. Prutchikov**, CPSU member since 1948, candidate of technical sciences (Moscow); **G. Sayakin** (Moscow) and **A. Stolyarov**, war and labor veteran (Fanipol Settlement, Minsk Oblast). The principles of pluralism demanded that we listen to their doubts and arguments, which are expressed in a most concentrated manner by Moscow Professor **Ye. Lemeshko**.

"I totally disagree," he writes, "with the social democratic slant in the editorial "For a New Face of Socialism" (KOMMUNIST No 13, 1989). "It offers us little that is new. It indicates a collection of views borrowed from different social democratic and right-wing revisionist concepts of 'democratic,' 'market,' 'humane' and 'cooperative' socialism and the views expressed by some bourgeois sociologists. This is first.

"Second, something new is not necessarily something better. For the time being no one has tried in our country to determine why the directive-executive system yielded positive results in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and not, in recent years, in the USSR? A system does not function unassisted: it is managed by people. Perhaps it is precisely in the leading cadres on all levels that we should look for shortcomings, while in socialism the traditional values must simply be improved. It is important to

understand all this without 'circumstantial illuminations'. All of this should become the topic of a public discussion. It would be fruitless to discuss how to renovate socialism standing on the positions of bourgeois liberalism and social reformism. Please do not label me, however, a Stalinist. I ache not for Stalin but for the socialism of traditional values."

This letter was written on the eve of the events in Eastern Europe, which unequivocally proved that the "directive-executive system" had become totally discredited there as well. However, in order not to suspect us of "circumstantial illuminations," we shall not comment on this letter but let a Moscow reader speak.

V. Sukhorukov, engineer: Lenin always took the positions of Marxism, and that was precisely why in the most crucial historical moment he made the only accurate decision to introduce the NEP. He did not violate any principles. Today many people exclaim: What is it, are we going back to capitalism? One cannot go back to the past in the same way that one cannot go into the same water of a river twice. Since the times of the NEP the world and, consequently, capitalism have changed unrecognizably. In the present circumstances it is impossible to duplicate the NEP "in its pure aspect," despite our greatest wishes.

Is there today an alternative to the rapprochement between the two socioeconomic systems? For example, there are those who suggest that we continue our progress on the basis of "parallel" courses. However, that is the way we advanced for more than 70 years. How many more decades do we need to realize the total futility of this path? In short, there are no alternatives to rapprochement. Today such rapprochement is taking place on different levels and in different forms: there are long-term intergovernmental agreements, joint enterprises are being created and political, cultural, scientific and other contacts are developing. These are the fine shoots of new relations. So far, however, they are not very strong: any step away from rapprochement would break such relations. I believe that one of the most substantial arguments in favor of such rapprochement is that it is the only real way to save mankind from the nightmare of a new war. Disarmament is possible only if the peoples of all countries unite within a single family.

[Editorial note] Many of us, unfortunately, find it very difficult to accept this complex truth, to the effect that the shoots of socialism can grow in a variety of ways, including somehow circuitously, surreptitiously, even in foreign "fields." This was the topic of a letter to the editors by **P. Skripkin**, nonparty member (Mama Settlement, Irkutsk Oblast). This dialectics of history was expressed by Brest Engineer **M. Zavadskiy** as follows: "The October Revolution forced exploiters of all types to study and even partially to apply some socialist ideas. It was precisely the 'socialist orientation' of capitalism that contributed to prolonging its existence and to its quite successful economic development."

Nonetheless, it is important to note that today in Sweden there is more socialism than in countries traditionally describing themselves as socialist. Both are different ways of the practical implementation of the same, of the age-old dream of mankind for a just and good world. Naturally, each variant has its own pluses and minuses. Unquestionably, what we can see is what N. Bukharin surmised in 1924 as to the possibility of having "different types of socialism." However, to quote him once again, Soviet theoretical thinking was unable to catch up with the stream of history. More precisely our science, the creative development of which was interrupted in the second half of the 1920s, was simply unable to catch up with historical development. In particular, that is why today we must once again study a number of features and principles of the new system. For example, many readers justifiably include among the insufficiently clarified theoretical problems the question of the various forms of ownership under socialism, and the suitability and possible consequences of the use of some of them under the conditions of perestroika. A separate discussion among the readers has also developed on the question of ownership....

A. Bocharov, CPSU member, locomotive engineer (Voronezh): In October 1917, for the first time in the history of mankind a foundation was laid in our country for building a society of social justice. This applied to public ownership of the means of production and the soviet system.

P. Kabanov, docent, candidate of economic sciences (Moscow): Unfortunately, for a long time public ownership in our country was stultified. It was not common but, somehow, nobody's. Today, in the course of perestroika, we are eliminating this excessive centralization of ownership. The necessary prerequisites are being created for equal economic competition in its various forms: state, cooperative, individual-labor and mixed, and ownership by public organizations.

In my view, the main difficulty lies in the renovation of the inner content of public ownership which, until recently, was mistakenly identified with state property, which led to the alienation from it of both individual workers as well as entire labor collectives and even regional population groups. Now, by applying economic methods, we must restore to the working people their rights and feeling of full owners of enterprises and regions.

V. Mayevskiy, jurist (Orel): The need for the extensive use of economic management methods is unquestionable. However, this includes a "but" which is of essential importance to the communists. The expansion of economic methods in no case should remain uncontrolled, relying on the self-regulating function of the market. Consequently, the main task of socialist society in the use of economic methods should be the conscious and purposeful formulation of socialist production relations.

Without this the extensive use of economic methods will soon end in the creation of an ordinary bourgeois economy.

G. Rebrova, engineer, nonparty member (Moscow): It is possible to renew socialism with the help of the free market all the way to its conversion into capitalism. The people are against millionaires, for they see in them the legalized threat to socialist values: social justice and protection, for which the best people of our country struggled and gave their lives. Generally speaking, how is it possible to impose upon a society which has already covered a difficult and long way models alien to it? It is precisely this that is now being done by our entire "left-wing" press. Who if not KOMMUNIST, the party journal, should defend the truly socialist principles?

V. Palladiy, propagandist, CPSU member since 1950 (Kazan): Public property is our "military secret." It was thanks to it that the country was able to withstand in the war, restore the national economy and suffer the unskilled leadership of the period of stagnation. Today as well it is opposing attempts to weaken it. The introduction of private ownership would start a long cause and effect chain and would require just as much time and sacrifices as were needed for the assertion of public ownership. The result would be neither capitalism nor socialism but simply trouble without a future.

I. Guryev, CPSU member, fitter (Rostov-na-Donu): Perhaps, nonetheless, in some economic sectors state ownership could be replaced with private ownership. It is one thing to be the full master and another to work in a collective consisting of different people, some of whom are honest workers while others are loafers to whom "public" means "nobody's."

N. Osipenko, CPSU member since 1961, engineer (Kiev): The development of petty commodity production and the scattering of public ownership among various private owners is frequently motivated by the need to restore the means of production to their owners. Usually, it is those who are fighting for the decollectivization of agriculture who are particularly zealously encouraging ownership feelings. They consider as true heroes the lessees who have totally separated their farms from kolkhozes and sovkhozes, while those who continue to support collective forms of organization of labor are scornfully labeled "daily laborers." However, the tempestuous seething of passions, heated by "attorneys in charge of the affairs of Soviet farmers," does not provide an answer to a number of serious questions. For example, why is it that, above all, there is such a great rush to return the land to its owners? Do our factories, plants, mines, subsoil, forests, rivers and seas have actual owners and are they suffering any less from negligence than the land?

What will happen with the tens of millions of "day laborers" employed at state enterprises, establishments and organizations, who are forced every day to listen to orders issued from above and to work strictly according

to blueprints, technologies and instructions issued by the various "offices?" Why should these "day laborers" as well not acquire personal ownership of their machine tool, part of their lathe, or a piece of railroad track or a drafting board, so that they too can feel that they are owners?

Why is it precisely the petty owner that should be given the means of production? Do we not know that today one does not go far with small-scale production and that petty private ownership provides scope for economic development only when it is allowed, without restrictions, to turn into large-scale ownership and generate capitalism "every day and every hour?" If we artificially postpone or interrupt the birth of capitalism and if, for the sake of preserving socialism, petty ownership is retained with some limitations set in advance, the economic results will be equally petty and distorted. Could it be that our domestic promoters of "market" socialism seriously believe that petty private ownership will not obey the overall laws governing the dynamics of production relations only because it will appear with their permission and be labeled Soviet made?

A. Kaygorodtsev, candidate of economic sciences (Ust-Kamenogorsk, East Kazakhstan Oblast): The possibility of legalizing private ownership, in my view, does not conflict with the principles of socialism. The main thing is for public ownership to remain the basic form of ownership of the means of production. In that case the restoration of capitalism is impossible. As to its advantages over private ownership, they cannot be implemented by passing decrees or publishing monographs by political economists. The advantages can be proven only through economic competition. If public ownership, even with the comprehensive support of the state, is unable to win in such a competition then, that will be too bad.

R. Oshurkova: I believe that it would be a good idea to quote more frequently the following thought expressed by Lenin: "...Everything possible must be done to revive turnover in industry and farming, at all cost. Anyone who achieves the best results in this area, whether through private capitalism or even without any cooperatives and without any transformation of such capitalism into state capitalism, would be more useful to the cause of the all-Russian socialist building than anyone who "thinks" of the purity of communism and writes regulations, rules and instructions concerning state capitalism and cooperatives but does not, in practical terms, enhance trade.

"This may seem paradoxical: private capitalism in the role of aid to socialism?"

"However, this is no paradox at all but economically an entirely indisputable fact" (op. cit., vol 43, p 233).

In my view, we are at the stage of conversion to socialism when, in addition to the socialist there may be other forms of ownership, providing that they have not

exhausted their progressive possibilities and could yield the main result: increased labor productivity.

Kravchuk (Kharkov): It is frequently said today that we shall be facing a transitional period. Transition to where? To a mixed economy in which the state sector will keep only part of industry while the rest will belong to group and individual owners as is the case under capitalism? Who then will hold the real economic and, consequently, the political power?

Today our defenders of "common sense" subject to withering criticism anything in which, for many decades, our people invested their forces and their hearts and to which they dedicated their lives. Impatiently, we are called upon to "abandon the principles." This is not at all a matter of principles. Deeply instilled in the Soviet person are the concepts of goodness, freedom and justice. A great deal of speculations exist about concepts, such as "equalization," "laziness," and "degradation." However, these are different things and one should think of whether our people would be willing to accept a new master-capitalist.

A. Nikitayev, war and labor veteran, CPSU member since 1944 (Yefremov City, Tula Oblast): I too feel no special hope in the matter of this packet of laws on land and ownership, this "experiment" in the partial introduction of capitalism within socialism. Thinking about this, I am unable to find an answer to the following: From whom should we take and to whom should we give the land? What will be the result of "dekolhozing and "desovkhizing?" Have the possibilities of these forms of farming become exhausted? I believe that it is rather thoughtless to "promote" in our life private ownership which leads to the exploitation of man by man and to proclaim all of this as being "humane socialism."

L. Kozorez, docent (Rubezhnoye City, Voroshilovgrad Oblast): It would be senseless to draw an uncrossable line between socialism and capitalism, above all in terms of the various types of ownership although, naturally, the main distinction of socialism should be real social ownership of basic means of production as well as a series of guarantees against any possible stratification of society into excessively rich and shamefully poor. As to all the rest, in my view, the achievements of capitalism, as a system which gave birth to socialism, could be used.

T. Koychuyev, academician, Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences (Frunze): Naturally, in a socialist country public and, above all, national property of means of production is the economic foundation and guarantor of its existence. However, it would be a mistake to reduce social ownership to state ownership, for this leads to the alienation of the working people from it as manifested, in particular, by the lack of the necessary interest in its thrifty and efficient utilization. Therefore, under perestroika a search is under way for specific forms of manifestation of the social ownership of means of production which would steadily develop in the working

people responsibility and interest in their efficient utilization. Nonetheless, there are entire sectors and individual enterprises of tremendous importance to the development of the national economy and to strengthening the country's defense capability. After a conversion to self-financing it would be expedient to keep such enterprises as the property of the whole people.

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OUR COMMENTARY

The Way Out Lies Ahead

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[Article by Otto Latsis, KOMMUNIST special correspondent, Washington-New York-Moscow, June 1990]

[Text] The following detail was reported by the American press in June, at the latest meeting between the presidents of the USSR and the United States: In Camp David the guests were greeted with the ringing of a bell taken from the ship on which Franklin Roosevelt traveled to Yalta to meet the leaders of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. The name of the U.S. president who established diplomatic relations and, subsequently, signed a military alliance with the USSR, was heard in the past few days repeatedly, not only when M.S. Gorbachev was presented with the "Franklin Delano Roosevelt Freedom Medal" but also on a great variety of seemingly unrelated circumstances. However, if we consider the nature of such events it will become clear that this was no accident.

Franklin Roosevelt was the American leader who realized that his country's social system was in a state of a profound and dangerous crisis which could not be surmounted only by providing better solutions to current problems. He realized that the society needed a radical restructuring. After World War II major sociopolitical changes in Western Europe and other parts of the capitalist world broadened Roosevelt's "New Deal" in the United States. As a result, Western society became different. It became much more viable and open to progress. The threat to the existence of capitalism as a social system, which was quite real at the turn of the century, was pushed back thanks to the fact that the system itself substantially changed compared with early capitalism. A great role here was played by its ability to make use of the greatest gains of socialism: social guarantees and social control of the production process.

Today perestroyka is topical for socialism. Here it is a question not only of our internal affairs but also of a restructuring of international relations. The center of such changes, once again, as in Roosevelt's time, is the new relations between the USSR and the United States. From confrontation through rivalry to cooperation is the way the present leaders of the two countries define the

essence of the changes. The "Washington-1990" Meeting has assumed a special place on this path of change. Whereas in Malta, 6 months previously, it was announced that the cold war had ended and that the era of cooperation had begun, in Washington the mechanism of the new relations was put to a practical test and everyone clearly realized that it is working and can work even under more difficult circumstances.

From a sensation, meetings between the heads of the USSR and the United States have become the norm and mass awareness accepts as self-evident results the reality of which, only recently, would be unbelievable. Once, the agreement on the elimination of a single class of missiles carrying a small share of nuclear weapons became a sensation. To many people M.S. Gorbachev's appeal for a nuclear-free world, which was made in January 1986 (quite recently!) appeared utopian. Now, assertions in Washington of the resolve to reach an agreement on reducing strategic nuclear weapons and eliminating chemical weapons is taken as something ordinary.

The matter of the results of each individual meeting is gradually losing its former significance. Specific results do exist, and at the Washington Meeting they were quite substantial. However, the results of the meetings do not end with the concluded agreements. Soviet-American contacts have become a constant process of increased reciprocal understanding, refinement and rapprochement of positions. This is a process of tremendous importance to our two countries and to the rest of the world.

In that sense, the Washington Meeting is particularly indicative. On the eve of the meeting, a number of American mass media, including such an influential and well-informed newspaper as THE WASHINGTON POST, argued that George Bush is meeting with a partner weakened by domestic difficulties and unsolved problems. The basic purpose of such comments could be easily detected, for no effort was made to conceal it: an appeal to the American leader not to yield on the most contentious point of the forthcoming talk, the question of the NATO membership for a united Germany. In support of the thesis of the "weakness" of the Soviet partner, a variety of very different problems, in terms of scale and the attitude toward them by the Americans, were put on a single list.

However, during those days not once, neither by word nor action, did George Bush indicate that he would react to such appeals. Conversely, his entire behavior proved that the confrontational style of relations is a thing of the past. Both sides remembered their national interests and their global responsibility but did not try to seek their partner's vulnerable spots in order to weaken his positions in the talks. Most likely, both sides reached the conclusion that in a changing world a weakened partner is not consistent with their own national interests. The very result of the meeting confirmed this: not only agreements, the signing of which was confidently expected, but also, for instance, an agreement on trade

on the subject of which, even on the previous day, a great deal of doubts had been expressed, were concluded. It is true that such doubts were reinforced subsequently, after members of the U.S. Congress suggested that the ratification of the agreement be linked to the solution of the "Lithuanian problem." This fact does not change the assessments of the views of the American president, who rejected such a linkage.

Equally sincere appeared the aspiration on both sides to find mutually acceptable approaches to the German problem. As both presidents announced, its discussion was useful and contributed to making some progress although neither did a radical change occurred nor was it expected at that time.

One of the main lessons of the Washington Meeting was the opposition to dwell on the quarrels and the difficult legacy of the past but, instead, to quickly identify the new opportunities which the future could offer. From this viewpoint it would be of interest to look also at some of our internal problems and the way they are seen from the other side of the globe.

The three problems most extensively discussed in various articles were aimed at proving the "weakness" of the Soviet side: Lithuania's separatism, the election of B.N. Yeltsin as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and the buying panic after the government's plan for a conversion to a market economy was made public in Moscow.

After the meeting, I had the opportunity to discuss the Lithuanian problem in greater detail with a group of rather influential people. This took place in New York, at the Conference Board, which is a research organization of American businessmen. My interlocutors politely listened to my views: the fact that there are no constitutional obstacles to Lithuanian independence for, conversely, our Constitution is one of the few constitutions in the world which guarantees to the republics the right to secede, and that one should act in accordance with the Constitution; the fact that, instead of citing the Constitution, an appeal to historical circumstances which occurred 50 years ago, would lead to an impasse. In adopting such an approach one could also recall the by no means impeccable legal circumstances which led to the appearance of the independent Baltic countries. One could go even farther back and recall the circumstances of the unification of Northern Ireland or Wales with England and of California, Texas and Alaska, with the United States. With such an approach there would be no border throughout the world not subject to revision. My listeners smiled at these analogies and did not answer. Nor did they have to, for President Bush had already said it all: to begin with, the United States had never acknowledged *de jure* and nor does it now acknowledge the unification of the Baltic states with the USSR. Second, he does not link the Lithuanian problem to the present talks. This meant that the United States had made a choice based not on our but on its own arguments. The view of the majority of Americans was

known: Gorbachev's new thinking was an opportunity for all mankind, the success of his initiatives was needed by the United States and he should not be blocked.

It was precisely from this viewpoint that they also showed an interest in the nature of the future relations between M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin: What could be the consequences of his election to such a high position in the Russian Federation? What could the Soviet experts say, having learned about this new development in Washington, based on American television reports? The answer to this question, which was repeated dozens of times, was roughly the following: a rival in the struggle for electoral victory and an already elected governmental leader to a high position are not one and the same. This was received with approval and was considered proper.

However, the most thorough and most numerous questions dealt with the state and prospects of our economy. The buying fever in the Soviet Union puzzled and concerned the Americans. In a period of 3 or 4 days at least 20 times the same shot of a report from Moscow was shown on television: customers in stores fighting with each other for the last sticks of butter on a tray. However, the sharp television topics were not what mattered. The United States has sufficient specialists who are thoroughly and accurately familiar with our economy. It was unnecessary to convince them that a conversion to a market economy is the right choice: unlike us, they had always known this. It was useless to try to prove, however, that a specific program for a conversion, as submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet, would be successful and reliable. Not one of my interlocutors in the United States thought so. Therefore, the next series of questions was logical: Will this program be adopted by the Supreme Soviet? Will it be submitted to a referendum and why was a referendum needed under such difficult circumstances? What would happen to the government if the program is rejected? Why is it that the government cannot see its obvious shortcomings?

At times it may have seemed that the Americans were more concerned with the success of perestroika than ourselves, particularly when we compared some of the publications in their press and ours. Well, from a distance it is easier to abstract oneself from the daily exhausting concerns. It is easier to suppress the irritation caused by someone's inappropriate statement. From afar one can see only the big picture. To us, Soviet experts and journalists, who were far from home for a few days, it seemed that the news coming from Moscow sounded differently compared to the short statements in the newscasts on American television. Cleansed from details and explanations, they were either frighteningly puzzling or, conversely, unexpectedly clear in their strangeness, when given to the people of a different world.

Here, for example, is a report on which the Americans did not particularly comment: Landsbergis and Yeltsin had announced their decision to establish direct ties between Lithuania and the RSFSR. Unwittingly we

thought that there could be nothing more logical than this. Was it absolutely necessary to separate oneself from Moscow to establish relations with it?

Here is another report on the subject of which we were asked a number of questions by journalists from different countries: a restriction had been imposed in Moscow on selling goods to out-of-towners. Yes, anyone outside the USSR would find this strange. In this outside world a great deal has been heard about the protection of markets, a great deal has been written about it and there have been many clashes on this subject. In general, it is usually believed that a progressive policy involves a market open to all; a backward policy means a market closed by protectionist barriers. In both cases, however, it is merely a question of defending (or not defending) one's market from foreign sellers. To defend a market from purchasers in peacetime had occurred to no one other than to us. Indeed, it would be useful to look at ourselves from the side to realize that we live in a world of an economy which is upside-down and have a largely upside-down mentality.

Let us go back to the questions which were discussed at the Washington Meeting itself. The German problem, it seemed, appeared to be most resistant to showing any progress. However, new opportunities for a rapprochement in the views appeared several days later. They were made public with an announcement coming not out of Washington but out of Moscow where, immediately after M.S. Gorbachev's return, there was a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Members. The agreement to review the nature, functions and activities of the Warsaw Pact, giving it a new image, and shifting the emphasis from the functions of a military bloc to the functions of a political community were what provided extensive opportunities for Europe. This logic of the new thinking is not limited to sorting out combinations within limits but an effort to broaden those limits. If the Warsaw Pact would become different and if NATO would become different, our attitude toward the membership of any given country in such organizations would also become different, the more so under the conditions of the consolidation of the new structures of European security.

Ensuring conditions for a long-term peaceful development of civilization assigns to all participants in the global community the task of acting jointly and exerting a stabilizing influence on the course of the powerful processes of change, whether in Europe or in other continents. This makes even greater the responsibility for a conflict-free development of such changes on the global scale, borne by the two most powerful countries of our time, enhancing the feeling of satisfaction which was felt by those who had the opportunity to observe from a close distance the course of the visit and directly feel its impact on the various social circles in the United States.

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ECONOMIC POLICY

The Oil Resources of Politics

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[Article by Irek Amirov, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources]

[Text] The dependence of politics on the petroleum market has long been one of the main components of the global mechanism which determines the fate of countries and nations in the world community of the 20th century. Why is it that petroleum, which is only one variety of raw material, so frequently acts as a political factor? Petroleum remains irreplaceable as the basic energy carrier and as the most valuable starting material for the chemical industry. Petroleum is being consumed on a huge scale and, on the other hand, its reserves are limited and are distributed quite unevenly. Possession of oil has always been a universal means of attaining economic and sociopolitical objectives. Until very recently, whenever the smell of oil would become strong, governments and presidents would be overthrown and petroleum monopolies would make domestic and foreign policy. All arguments, including military, force were good in the international rivalry for access to petroleum, and although of late oil passions are no longer so sharp as in the past, this does not mean in the least that petroleum has stopped being a target or instrument of policy. It is simply that the forms of the political game surrounding it have changed and become more refined.

Petroleum has played a special role in the history of our country as well, especially in recent decades. Whereas the global energy crisis of the 1970s was, in the final account, an excellent catalyst for structural economic changes in the majority of industrially developed countries, in the case of the Soviet Union the result was the exact opposite. Thanks to petroleum exports, the administrative-command system was able to defeat the economic reform which had been started in 1965. Today we are painfully experiencing the political and economic consequences of this fact.

The seemingly isolated problems of the Soviet petroleum sector were intertwined with a number of difficulties and deformations in a great variety of national economic sectors, state policy, interethnic and international relations, local self-administrations and ecology; they triggered a severe and protracted illness, the symptoms of which could be defined as the "petroleum syndrome."

What are its main characteristics?

1. The amount of petroleum we are extracting significantly exceeds the country's real needs.

2. because of technical backwardness and the use of energy-wasting technologies, most of the extracted petroleum, this most valuable chemical raw material, is used as ordinary fuel.

3. A substantial share of petroleum is exported to CEMA countries under economically unprofitable conditions, as a result of our former political and ideological priorities. Is it worth mentioning that their groundlessness has long become obvious. As to the economic side of the matter, in such deals the Soviet Union fell \$4 billion short of revenue in 1988 alone.

4. A substantial portion of the extracted petroleum is exported against convertible currency. However, such revenue is used to support and prop an obsolete and deformed import structure which the country inherited from the period of stagnation.

5. The cost of maintaining such a high level of extraction has increased sharply. Equipment and technology have become hopelessly obsolete. The exploitation of deposits is following an accelerated regime to the detriment of the environment and, sometimes, without even basic living conditions for the petroleum workers.

These and other factors led to the fact that in 1990 the negative trends which had been increasing in petroleum-related sectors developed into a general crisis.

Unfortunately, we have become accustomed to live according to the principle that "unless lightning strikes the muzhik will not cross himself." This time, however, even the initial indications of the approaching storm, which could be heard in the as yet "jocular" threat made by a people's deputy from Tyumen Oblast of shutting off the pipeline, made no impression on the government. The alarm was sounded only when the socioeconomic conflict was on the verge of turning into a strike. This was no longer a crisis but a catastrophe.

What is being done by the managers of the sector and the government to surmount such negative trends? Actually, so far nothing other than the reflexive reaction of the meeting between N.I. Ryzhkov, the Council of Ministers chairman, and the directors of petroleum and gas extracting production associations and the reaching of short-term compromise decisions which met the demands raised by the Tyumen oil workers. Such "fire fighting" measures can hardly contribute to improving the situation in the sector and, in any case, this does not result at all in solving the petroleum problem for the entire national economy. Indeed, for the time being, it is not a question of reviewing (naturally, on the side of reducing) the planned figures, the state orders and the share of exports. Conversely, incentives are being provided to petroleum and gas extraction workers as a result of which extraction will be oriented toward increases essentially based on labor intensification and the use of the equipment and the intensive and predatory exploitation of the deposits. As was reported by L. Ryabev, chairman of the Council of Ministers Bureau of the Fuel-Energy Complex, "starting with this year, for the

first time they (the petroleum workers—author) will receive regular foreign exchange withholdings from exports. If the country were to sell 98 million tons, 5 percent of the foreign currency earned will go to the producers; 10 percent will go to them for the next 90 million and, should they add another 8 million tons of fuel exports, 20 percent. It is thus that the petroleum workers would be able to earn in 1 year 300 million rubles in hard currency, in addition to several hundred million in CEMA transferable rubles. The gas extraction workers will receive foreign currency as well."

It is thus that, for the time being, the government is following the simple and unoriginal logic: it tries to increase exports for convertible currency and, at the same time, tries to satisfy the social demands of petroleum extraction workers. All of this is at the expense of the even stronger "linking" of the latter to the process of a growing consumption of petroleum reserves. The government's program of measures to improve the economy, which was approved at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, stipulated an array of measures directly affecting future petroleum availability. The program called for reducing (by roughly one-half) purchases of products for the manufacturing of which real possibilities exist in the Soviet Union. It was thought that such measures would make it possible to ease the pressure to import and thus to break the fuel-raw material export trend. Within CEMA, starting with 1991, a conversion will take place to a system of trade relations based on current world prices, and accounts will be settled in freely convertible currency. The government's plans call for the stabilization and even a certain reduction in the output of the fuel-raw material sectors; as compensation it calls for lowering the material-intensiveness of the public product by no less than 4-5 percent, energy consumption in the national income by 12-13 percent and metal-intensiveness by 20 percent (which, nonetheless, by no means makes such indicators reach the global levels).

The problem, however, is that in the course of converting to market relations the previous system of rigidly centralized planning is destroyed quite rapidly without, for the time being, having normal markets for goods, labor and capital. Naturally, this triggers a growing disorganization in the petroleum business as well. Thus, for example, reducing petroleum extraction in 1989 by 3 percent (compared to the previous year) led to a decline in petroleum exports by 12 percent and of petroleum products by 6 percent. We could surmise that this was due to a disruption in the rhythmical work of the railroads and, correspondingly, the increased consumption of fuel in automotive and air transportation. Under "neither plan nor market" conditions, even a minor disruption in the functional interconnections within the national economic system leads to the destabilizing of the entire chain, for this process is not countered by equal stabilizing factors. It would suffice, in order to disrupt our already stressed petroleum balance, to have a short-term breakdown in deliveries. Therefore, this

increases the likelihood of a substantial decline in petroleum extraction and, consequently, insufficient deliveries of raw materials to petroleum processing capacities and major disruptions in deliveries to domestic consumers. Finally, also possible is a decline in petroleum exports paid for in convertible currency. In turn, this would trigger a reduction in food imports and a corresponding rationing of food products. The latter could lead to mass political troubles, political extremism and a further dislocation of the economy.

It would be very difficult at this point to make a more or less accurate forecast concerning petroleum extractions and exports even for the next 5 years, for the situation essentially depends on the dynamics of changes in the petroleum and gas complex and in the entire area of the national economy, in the course of the economic reform. The scenarios on the development of the power industry, formulated by the USSR Academy of Sciences, stipulate that the variants of high, average and low levels of extraction by 1995 could equal, respectively, 610, 600 and 575 million tons. If we consider as adequately substantiated the hypothesis of possible structural changes in the extent of petroleum refining, and increased fuel economy by transportation facilities, we could assess the country's overall needs for petroleum by 1995 at 576 million tons, including 100 million tons for export.

During that period of time the actual revenue from petroleum exports would drop significantly. But then petroleum exports or, as a whole, the export of energy resources have become fully comparable in terms of effectiveness to exports of other goods. Starting with 1985, the higher extraction costs coincided with a sharp drop in world oil prices. Under these circumstances the effectiveness of selling petroleum for convertible currency, computed as the ratio between the respective export prices and the cost of extraction and transportation, dropped by a factor of nearly seven. The effectiveness of exports to CEMA members declined substantially as well, as a result of the repeated increases in the prices of their goods we import.

I believe that the trends which became apparent in the mid-1980s will continue in the future. Most world experts assess quite skeptically the possibility of any major increase in petroleum prices during this 5-year period. Possibly, there may be a certain increase reaching \$25 per barrel by the year 2005-2010. Within the same period, however, national economic outlays for petroleum extraction in the USSR will reach 120 to 130 rubles per ton. Therefore, the effectiveness of exports will continue to decline.

Furthermore, the very possibility of exporting petroleum and petroleum products after the year 2000 becomes unlikely in the main, for the deposits in the already developed areas are being rapidly exhausted. With the existing equipment and technology, extraction in those areas will not be economically justified. The exploitation of the reserves in Eastern Siberia, the areas of the

Extreme North and the continental shelf would require a substantial increase in specific outlays. Even specialists who support the views of the sector believe that it would be much more expedient to be prepared on time to undertake the large-scale production of synthetic fuel from the inexpensive coal of the Kansk-Achinsk and other basins.

The extent and gravity of the contradictions which have currently accumulated in the petroleum complex demand immediate strategic decisions. The main problem is the "depoliticizing" of petroleum, which is long overdue. This means that, to begin with, petroleum should not be exported to CEMA members under the previous conditions. Second, earnings from petroleum exports in convertible currency should no longer be the "magic wand" for the conservative segment of the leadership, as was the case during the time of stagnation, when the "well-being" of the people was maintained only with the help of substantial petroleum-dollar doping. Third, is it worth it now to tie the republics to the center with the help of exceptionally low petroleum prices? In addition to everything else, this worsens the already difficult economic situation of the RSFSR.

The most promising way of modernizing the petroleum complex would require an essentially new approach: integration with the global petroleum supply system. Its main prerequisites are sensible economic profitability now and extensive opportunities for broad internationalization of areas of profitable business activities on a long-term basis.

I believe that the best solution would be the creation of one or several vertically integrated petroleum corporations, which would include all stages of the reproduction cycle, from the survey of deposits and extraction of raw materials to marketing petroleum products domestically and abroad. The form and structure of ownership for such companies should be such as to create a kind of "most favored country" status for foreign capital investors (i.e., multinational petroleum corporations) which would be prepared to allow the use of their technology, and experience in diversification and internationalization of the oil business and grant access to their structures and markets. When domestic petroleum reserves become exhausted, such companies could act as established multinational structures which would service the country with products procured from foreign petroleum product suppliers.

Another trend would be a structural reorganization of the petroleum procurement area. As a result of its vertical integration, the competing companies would acquire the possibility of controlling the entire cycle, from petroleum extraction to gas stations. Only under such conditions could we hope for the accelerated application of progressive technologies and raw material savings on all production levels. For considerations of a general systemic order, such enterprises should be established not along the traditional lines of already existing

fuel-energy and chemical complexes but as their competitors. With a higher technical standard of exploitation of deposits and petroleum processing, these newcomers would be able gradually to broaden the scale of their activities, thus improving the economic indicators of petroleum procurements and favorably influencing the overall economic climate in the country.

In order for petroleum to become a real and not a fictitious wealth, we must rise to the contemporary level of efficient utilization of petroleum resources. When will this become possible? So far, our main difficulty is that the present economic management system forces all of its participants to behave inefficiently, in the "by the force of circumstances" style. If we were to track all the stages of petroleum dynamics: extraction, conversion into a range of petroleum products and their distribution among the end consumers, we would see that all of these processes observe the rules of a complex technogenic system. In turn, its activities depend on a number of objective and subjective factors. The former imply technologically and conceptually backward production facilities which are both inertial and incapable of positive change. By the latter I understand the administrative and political structures which appeared and strengthened in the course of the lengthy use of petroleum as a political instrument: sectorial departments and ministries, Gosplan and Gosstab departments, MVES, and others. Today the specific executors of our oil policy find themselves in an unpleasant twin status. On the one hand, naturally, neither the managers nor the organizations themselves have as their objective the fastest and most inefficient exhaustion of the resources of their own country with the help of obsolete technology and concepts. On the other, however, each one of them, on its own level in the hierarchy of governmental structures, is forced to try to implement specific production assignments and objectives based on the plan and social priorities, as understood at the present moment by the management system. This leads to something similar to an administrative collapse.

Yet the situation demands immediate action. The essence of our time is that our society has entered a narrow borderline area located between two essentially different forms of life. The old social priorities have clashed with the economic, political and ecological stability of our state. We can neither go back nor stop. The only option left is that of crossing the Rubicon and finding and assuming our place within the system of global economic relations. Only thus would we be able to formulate a coordinated concept for the further development of our petroleum resources, a concept which would satisfy not only us but the global community as well.

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A Farewell to Arms? View on the Economic Aspect of Soviet Arms Exports

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[Article by Sergey Kazennov, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations]

[Text] Of late the problem of Soviet arms trade has been the subject of the closest possible attention from political-strategic and economic aspects. Materials have been published which treat armaments as our only competitive commodity on world markets and arms exports as the main trump in economic perestroika and a basic source of foreign currency.

Indeed, over the past 20 years the USSR has been the leading exporter of arms and military ordnance. By the end of the 1970s, in terms of value it accounted for as much as one-half of the global volume of such exports. It is true that by the end of the 1980s this share had dropped to less than one-third. In the last decade, according to American estimates, the USSR was exporting weapons worth an average of \$16 billion annually.

Let us immediately note that to this day there is no public domestic statistical and referential information on this problem. As to foreign sources, despite their high volume and quality, we should show a certain caution in using their data. To begin with, such data are collected and processed on the basis of different methods. Second, by no means do they always take into consideration the specific nature of the deals, their financial conditions, etc. Therefore, we must not absolutize them but use them as quite reliable guidelines.

The situation on the global arms market has radically changed in the past 10 to 15 years. As in the past, the USSR and the United States remain the leading arms exporters. However, they now account for no more than one-half of all exports (as compared to three-quarters in the past). Meanwhile the share of the other NATO countries has increased substantially. Combined, they have outstripped the United States and approximately equal the Soviet volume. An important element in their military-economic policy is the aspiration to ensure the self-financing of the defense industry by exporting armaments and military ordnance. China has become one of the leading arms exporters in the world. Many countries in the so-called "South" (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, and many other) and in Central and Northern Europe have become large-scale arms producers. Many of them have very liberal views on arms procurements and the choice of partners, being exclusively guided by their commercial interests. The black market in weapons also plays a significant role. Some years it has accounted for as much as 15 to 20 percent of the value of all deals.

That makes control over the arms trade (the sellers market) increasingly difficult. Exceptions to this case are

only the markets for the latest technologies and mass destruction weapons which are the monopoly of the leading military-industrial countries and, for the time being, are still controllable.

Essentially, control over the arms race in the area known as the geostrategic periphery, has become hostage to the confrontation between East and West, the overall conflict situation, confrontational thinking and the weight of contradictions and regional conflicts.

Under those circumstances, the most promising, in my view, is influencing not the market of producers and sellers but the market of consumers and the creation of conditions which will lead to a reduction in the demand for weapons as a result of a weakened confrontational situation in the world.

Of late a great deal is being said about the moral aspect of the matter. What, actually, would the "withdrawal" of the USSR from the global arms market "for moral considerations" yield? To begin with, some demand would be quite quickly met by the other suppliers in filling the vacuum. Second, the one-sided ending of arms deliveries by the USSR to many of its partners could lead to a disruption of regional balances of forces and the destabilizing of some areas. For the time being, the regional conflicts are being actually resolved with much greater difficulty than anticipated in the concluded agreements.

It is to be hoped that as the third world will play an increasingly lesser role as an arena of confrontation between East and West, in the course of the erosion of the bipolar military-political structure in the world the political significance of supplying these areas with weapons and their utilization as a political instrument will also decline, the more so since both the USSR (in Egypt and Somalia) and the United States (in Iran) acquired negative experience in their efforts to make and maintain "weapon alliances." Let us also not forget that frequently in the past arms deliveries and granting military credits or other forms of military assistance determined the use by the Soviet side of military bases on the territory of arms recipients in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and many other areas. It is clear that reducing the presence of the USSR abroad (both direct and indirect) could introduce substantial changes in the nature and purpose of Soviet arms exports.

As a whole, as has been noted in the West, in recent years the Soviet Union has displayed noticeable restraint in the use of the arms trade as an instrument of politics. This has applied both to new agreements as well as the execution of previously concluded ones. Incidentally, let us note that, on an average, it takes several years between the signing of an agreement for the procurement of weapons and their actual delivery and, taking into consideration the "life cycle" of the weapons, the need for spare parts, etc., the period of a deal could stretch over a substantial amount of time. This is standard practice for both Soviet and Western procurements. Therefore,

agreements on a number of deals for arms exports concluded by the USSR in the second half of the 1980s were signed significantly earlier, during the "ice age" of international relations.

The new political thinking also leads to a new understanding of the essence of arms procurements: it is not "aid" or a means of securing our military or ideological presence but commerce. In this connection we shall consider the economic aspect of our arms exports. It is hardly necessary to explain that a number of recipients of Soviet weapons are experiencing substantial economic difficulties which affect their possibility for making prompt payments and, consequently, the economic effectiveness of the arms trade. Occasionally the West experiences similar difficulties (as is the case with the delivery of French weapons to a number of Arab countries). However, the range of recipients in this case is much broader. Furthermore, the clients of the Western countries include a much greater number of quite solvent countries.

To the Western countries (and, even more so, the third world) the arms trade is an important element in the self-financing of the defense industry, and in upgrading its volume and economic efficiency. The implementation of some projects becomes possible (or impossible) only because the portfolio of orders includes the likelihood of exports. For example, the manufacturing of the latest French Rafale fighter aircraft could become commercially successful only if the number of airplanes ordered by foreign purchasers exceeds the order for this model placed by the French armed forces themselves. Incidentally, one of the major incentives for improving the form of foreign military-economic relations is their diversification and participation in international plans for the joint development and production of military hardware. Furthermore, many Western companies have specialized production lines for the manufacturing of weapons exclusively for foreign sale, with no orders for such military equipment placed by their own armed forces.

Arms exports exceed one-third of arms production by the Western European NATO members (Italy, more than one-half; France, as much as 40 percent; Great Britain, 30 percent); in the case of Brazil, Israel and China, it reaches 60 percent or more. The indicator for the United States is 10-15 percent. For the USSR, it averages some 20 percent, ranging from 10 percent for armor to 25 percent for aerospace technology (let us repeat that in this case, as in many other cases, we are forced to use foreign sources). Therefore, the Soviet military-industrial complex is dependent on arms exports no more than are its main competitors. It depends, to a greater extent, on its "domestic" orders.

There is yet another aspect of economic significance of the arms trade: its role in the foreign economic activities of the state. Arms exports account for an incomparably greater share of all Soviet exports compared to other leading suppliers of weapons. In terms of value, it

accounts for about 6 percent for the United States, 5 percent for France and, as a whole for the Western European NATO members, no more than 2 percent. This figure is significantly higher for the USSR (more than 15 percent). Armaments are the main item of Soviet machine building exports.

However, it would not be very accurate to interpret this as proof that the USSR is commercially interested in the arms trade, considering its specific clients. These clients cannot be classified as regular payors. The "military debts" owed to our country for weapons procurements are in the many billions of rubles, the payment of which is quite problematical.

It is no accident that it is precisely the main recipients of Soviet weapons who are also our main debtors. The 20 leading recipients account for 97 percent of the value of Soviet weapons imported by the third world and for 96 percent of the foreign debt of developing countries, owed to the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that about 25 percent of such debts are owed by countries such as India, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Algeria, countries which could in no way be classified as insolvent and which reliably pay for American or French deliveries.

Perhaps, in this connection, the assessments of some journalists may be accurate. They have estimated the tens of billions of dollars we could additionally obtain from deals involving armaments had we channeled the latter into the commercial rather than the "credit-free" market. In my view, this is problematical. To invade already occupied markets would be possible only by providing higher quality goods or services. We are unable to do so. Naturally, what is left is the well-tried means, such as dumping and sales at greatly discounted prices. But does this concur with the principles of commercial efficiency? To say the least, the matter is arguable.

In this connection, we would like to take objection to the statement made by A.S. Systsov, USSR Minister of Aviation Industry (IZVESTIYA, 27 March 1990) on the subject of the allegedly high economic efficiency of foreign sales by the defense complex. Above all, by no means is anything that is good for the sector good for the country. Is it possible to speak of the dizzying rate of profits from possible sales of military aircraft abroad without taking into consideration the fact that the cost of labor (norm/hours) for the production of defense industry goods, even on a serial basis, is several hundred percent higher than in the production of civilian goods? Furthermore, the defense industry sectors enjoy priority procurements of raw materials, materials and equipment by no means on the basis of market prices. Consequently, the concept of "production cost" in the defense industry was, until recently, in general of an abstract-nominal nature.

The conversion to market relations in this sector would quite accurately indicate arms production and exports

efficiency. In this case, possibly, it may be more advantageous (for the defense complex itself as well) to practice the alternate use of funds and material resources, highly skilled manpower and the scientific potential for the resolution of other problems. Naturally, it is a question not of demanding of the enterprises of the Ministry of Aviation Industry to undertake the manufacturing of utensils.

Overall, we must not make a one-dimensional assessment of the economic aspect of Soviet arms exports. Clearly, such an assessment should be quite thoroughly weighed and the various aspects of the problem, considered.

Under the conditions of a bipolar power confrontation and the relatively underdeveloped nature of Soviet foreign economic relations, their military-economic component was being artificially "overemphasized." This equally pertains to our economic aid to foreign countries. In the case of the USSR, in the mid-1980s, the military component accounted for as much as 80 percent of the aid, compared to slightly over 20 percent for the FRG and 50 percent for the United States. It is necessary to point out in this connection that a number of recipients of armaments have made quite skillful use of the conflicts among superpowers in getting good deals.

Unquestionably, the "selectiveness" of arms procurements, based on economic, military-political and moral considerations, must be enhanced. We must also take into consideration the fact that in the future the international arms market by no means promises an easy life for the USSR as an exporter. A transformation of our military-economic relations with Central and Eastern European countries is inevitable, both in terms of scale and types of cooperation. In particular, this applies to a reduction in Soviet arms procurements (although by now they do not exceed 10-15 percent of the overall volume of Soviet exports of armaments and military ordnance). As we revise Soviet foreign policy, above all toward third world countries, obviously, corresponding changes will occur in our military-economic relations. Arms sales will become more selective and will be essentially aimed at attaining economic efficiency. This is by no means a simple matter. The point is that the "capacity" of the arms market of the developing countries and the financial possibilities of our traditional customers are diminishing. We could expect that many of them will be less inclined to waste funds on arms to the detriment of economic development. Finally, the "procurement market" has increased sharply. An increasing number of countries (including developing ones) are offering arms for sale at relatively low prices. Furthermore, some traditional recipients of Soviet weapons are currently reorienting their policies toward cooperation with the West, above all in the area of obtaining technologies and arms manufacturing licenses, as they implement their new military programs.

All of this, taking into consideration a reduction in Soviet purchases of armaments for domestic needs, faces

our defense industry with the need for a profound conversion, for a restructuring of the entire system of planning and managing the defense sectors and foreign military-economic activities.

One of the possible aspects in improving such activities could be the widening of their range. Increasingly, throughout the world and, above all, in the West, it is not simply sales of ready-to-use arms (off-the-shelf) but the sale of licenses, industrial equipment and participation in joint projects for the development and production of military equipment that are assuming an increasingly great place in arms exports. The USSR is significantly behind the leading Western countries in this area of military-economic activities (with the exception of a division of labor with Warsaw Pact members in the production of military hardware and cooperation with India).

Changes in the political climate and the development of economic relations between the USSR and the Western countries could contribute to the development of cooperation with Western partners in the area of contemporary technologies, particularly against the background of the conversion of the Soviet defense industry. Thus, agreements have already been concluded with Canada and the United States (for the joint development of some types of aerospace technology) the FRG (cooperation in the field of aerospace engines), etc.

The huge stocks of weapons, including some morally obsolete or scraped, are a major reserve for the implementation of conversion in the Soviet Union and upgrading the efficiency of military-economic activities. At the present time thousands of tanks are being withdrawn from Soviet armaments. Should the production of such items for export by tank manufacturing enterprises be mandatory? The sale of tank "surpluses" on the foreign market would make it possible to reduce such output. That is what is being done throughout the world, actively selling on foreign markets the withdrawn combat ordnance and, in frequent cases, its updating.

Finally, the economic reform enhances the autonomy of enterprises in the defense complex. However, this does not mean a "free search" for foreign partners. It is precisely in this area that a quite strict state control is necessary, the purpose of which would be to avoid causing economic and political damage. It would be useful to study Western experience. The press, the public and the legislative and judicial authorities in the West play a major role in preventing illegal and undesirable deals in the area of arms trade. In a number of countries all relatively major deals concluded by administrations or companies for supplying weapons abroad must not only be based on licenses but also be approved by the parliament, which could either veto such sales or revise them, even despite persistent requests by heads of state. Since arms procurements are both an economic action and an instrument of foreign policy, such control over arms exports could have a "regulatory" influence also on

various aspects of foreign policy—its regional trends, scale of involvement and means of implementation.

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Social Aspects of Informatization

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[Article by Dzhermen Gvishiani, academician; Georgiy Smolyan, doctor of philosophical sciences; and Dmitry Chereskin, doctor of technical sciences]

[Text] "That which we must do greatly depends on that which we must trust." J.-J. Rousseau

There have been a variety of assessments concerning the readiness of our society for informatization and the prospects for integrating it with the information structure of the global economy. What are the integral features of this new sociopolitical reality which we have casually, without thinking too much, begun to describe as the "information society?" What are the information needs of our population and is the concept of such needs not distorted when we look at the Western (or Japanese) "informatized" societies? Finally, do we consider the process of informatization of our society only as the application of the latest achievements of computers and the information industry in the national economy, the social area and political and cultural life, or do we link it to the profound phenomena of perestroika in our social life? Hardly anyone would view as simple the answers to these questions. Indeed, we are dealing with a complex social phenomenon, a process the nature and scale of which far exceed the boundaries of the "trends of scientific and technical progress." This makes entirely understandable the polemical nature of the views expressed by numerous authors writing on this topic and their current vocabulary which abounds in concepts, such as "paradoxes," "myths" and "mirages" of information.

The reader may point out that this picture offers nothing unusual, for this is a typical situation in discussing any scientific or practical problem, in the course of which a variety of views appear and in which there is a search for the truth. All of this is so. However, time makes substantial corrections. To begin with, informatization is already a reality, and today we need a consensus in our concepts concerning the nature of this process, the optimal forms of its organization and its social and economic consequences. Second, our concepts and practical policies must take into consideration the fact that in the future the process of informatization will occur under the conditions of the establishment of a market economy.

It is from this viewpoint that we shall try to depict the prospects which await us, and some practical steps for their implementation.

The Starting Point

According to a widespread concept, informatization means the development and utilization of technologies, computer facilities, and systems for data communication and transmission, ensuring the full and prompt utilization of information and knowledge in various areas of human activities.

A question which is important in terms of subsequent discussions arises. Is the use of "social" or "civilization" vocabulary natural and necessary in describing informatization processes, or are these nothing other than attempts, encouraged by fashion, at drawing the attention of the public to informatization, without which one could do?

A great deal of features determine the answer to this question. It is a question of whether essentially we have retained the policy of traditional concepts concerning information support processes of economic and social development or else other solutions have become necessary, presuming the creation of new economic, social, political, cultural and other social structures, institutions and mechanisms, not simply supported by computer, telecommunication and information equipment but which could neither function nor develop without it.

The basic position in this case is the following: one cannot predict matters as though the processes of restructuring the social organism, issued from above or else naturally developing and self-developing today, would advance by themselves, while informatization will merely support them on the organizational-technical or technological levels. In that case economic projects, management agencies, power institutions and centers of cultural life, recreation, and daily needs and services to the population will remain virtually unchanged in terms of their social functions and status and will merely update means of activities, making them consistent with present requirements. Market relations would be hardly possible in an economy without specialized information targets such as, for example, labor, capital, resource, equipment, commodity, securities, marketing and advertising services, and other types of exchanges.

In recent years the domestic market for information products and services has been expanding rapidly. Naturally, it is experiencing the same type of difficulties of the transitional period as the other economic structures. Nonetheless, it is having a certain destructive influence on obsolete, rigid, regulatory and monopoly forms of organization of information interaction and relations in a number of economic sectors, science, technology, and management. Furthermore, this market, which develops essentially uncontrolled and is supported by the still adolescent experience in foreign economic activities on the part of a number of cooperatives and governmental and joint enterprises, to a certain extent stimulates the social progress toward informatization.

The production of computer and informatization facilities is growing, encouraged by the requirements of a

number of governmental programs. It would be unnecessary at this point to cite the frequently published data on capital investments in such sectors, the planned production of personal and other computers, the production volumes of software, etc. Let us note the very fact of progress in this area or, one could say, of a new round, in the production of computers and, something particularly important, a certain improvement in its operational parameters. Although today one could hardly judge accurately the scale and efficiency in the use of available computer facilities in the national economy, nonetheless we have a certain amount of technical equipment needed for starting the informatization process.

However, this is insufficient. We are as yet to realize that the choice of general trends in informatization and the setting of priorities based on actual resource possibilities is a difficult problem. The point is that the information requirements of the people, which are an important part of their social needs, are experiencing rapid changes. Furthermore, such changes develop in the course of the actual use of computers. The operative formula here, particularly at the initial stage, is that "supply creates demand." This means that informatization should have a major impact on a wide area of socioeconomic life.

The mechanisms of such an influence should be determined. To begin with, this could take place directly in the course of the shaping of the different elements of the market for information products and services. On this basis we could fully test and provide the optimal conditions for the consolidation of a market-oriented economic structure in general, on different levels: individual consumers, enterprises, societies, associations, sectors, commercial banks, and central economic authorities. Second, the information sphere could indicate the way to shaping a new progressive structure of the national economy through the real expansion of the sphere of services and the conversion of a significant portion of it to a commercial base. Third, it is precisely on the market of information products and services that, given a sensible credit and tax policy, capital could be acquired for direct investments in the social area. The market for information products and services, computers and informatics could be used as an instrument for the consolidation of social interests and the stabilization of the social system.

The growing volume of economic information (which, in the broad meaning of the term, includes production-technological, managerial, statistical and planning-financial), and which requires increasingly faster processing and transmission, creates an essentially new economic situation. Data processing is the tangible foundation of a structural perestrojka in industrial production, and integrative processes in the domestic and world economies. Information processes are an intrinsic part of this economic reality, ranging from high technology to population services. Modern technology and science-intensive production are based on intellectual products, such as program support, patents, licenses, know-how, etc. It is precisely they which move in the space of the

global information market, concentrated in numerous consultation, intermediary and advertising companies and organizations and included in the foundations of data and knowledge. Informatization acts as a new and essential factor which ensures new developments, the updating and reconstruction of production facilities and which maintains the viability and flexibility of national economies in the international markets and the internationalization of production forces. Actually, it is a question of transferring to a new "information" launching pad many mechanisms which activate material (commodity) and energy, financial and manpower resources. This is something significantly greater than simply providing "information support" to industry and management.

What is the main feature of this new reality? It is the fact that control of information and its use sharply increase the potential of free behavior. It widens the room for choice and thus ensures the best economic functioning under specific conditions. Naturally, favorable conditions must be created for this potential to be included in broad economic practices. Economic freedom must be socially and politically advantageous. At the same time, it is real only when it is used. It is possible to find an optimal or an acceptable correlation between the expected social effect and conditions for the present economic life only through the maximal development of collective and individual initiatives. It is only this way that illusions and conversion of the ideas of informatization into a magic wand and computers into a fetish, a panacea for all of our economic troubles, can be avoided.

The appearance and penetration into social life of new information structures which provide direct or indirect services in all circumstances¹, essentially depend on computer facilities for the processing of economic and social information, systems and networks of communications and data transmission. These structures, strictly speaking, are institutionalized as information targets. They also contribute to surmounting, in the course of perestroika, the rigidity of our pyramidal planning, management and supply structures.

Social Spheres of Informatization

Now as to the practical contribution of informatization to the various areas of social life. Above all, it is substantial in the making of radical changes and shifts in employment and the social status of workers. Does this concept seem speculative? Here we rely on data from extensive sociological studies of situations in the developed capitalist countries. To begin with, in connection with the structural reorganization of the economy, the need for manpower in the basic industrial sectors is declining at an increasing rate. Meanwhile, however, in the developed countries demand for intellectual workers has not diminished noticeably. Nor is the need for office workers diminishing. Second, the importance of skilled labor, professionalization and mastery increases. This applies also to mental labor in which the number of people engaged in data processing is rising. Third, the

current stage in informatization has not become a turning point in social life. The same processes which were initiated 20 years ago may be noted in the employment structure, although in a number of Western European countries, they are developing faster. Crisis phenomena appear, for the new sectors of science-intensive production and the service sector cannot absorb the workers released from industry, construction and agriculture. Furthermore, the existing social insurance systems, oriented toward traditional forms of employment, are inconsistent with the new economic processes.

The situation in the labor and employment areas determines the parameters of the quality of life. Hence the main tasks which demand accurate and prompt processing of major information arrays: managing the processes of the redistribution of labor resources in accordance with the territorial and sectorial mobility of the population and actual migration processes; the creation of compensatory mechanisms for such redistribution, including insurance; organization of mass training and retraining, oriented toward progressive changes in the professional-skill structure; consideration of changes in the social status of the workers, women in particular, as a result of the automation of office work.

Archaic information technologies, based on the use of the telephone and the typewriter, would be unlikely to ensure the solution of such problems. This is a question of mass processes of informatization of daily life, aimed at meeting the interests of millions of people. It is the base, the foundation for a turn of social awareness toward informatization and the effective and accelerated shaping of information needs directly in the course of their satisfaction and a way of accustoming the broad population strata to a way of life in an information surrounding. The mass informatization processes must, above all, extend to areas of ordinary life on which the daily concern of the people is focused: jobs, pensions, social security, exchange of housing and control over its registration and distribution; settling accounts in trade and communal services; consumer and transportation services (referential services, communications, systems of service requests, etc.); communication with the official authorities and mass communication means, even if only on the level of recording and following up suggestions and complaints and providing legal services; in the immediate future, introducing (on an ever broader scale) of new instruments within the system of cashless payments (credit cards, checking accounts, etc.), as well as means for supporting a new, flexible and widespread taxation system.

Mass projects and services are the first, and, clearly, the basic social component of informatization. The other component is a sociocultural environment and the information standards of the people. This concept is by no means so abstract in the case of our society as may seem. Technological and communication structures are inherent in any culture. However, the level of their development characterizes the support which society gives to its own intellectual potential. This support has

many components, such as the high cost of skill, creativity, intellectual labor, the high moral status of man, and the possibility of making use of leisure time for self-development and enrichment of the spiritual world as well as conditions for reciprocal sympathetic professional and personal intercourse. Information technologies cannot ensure social and spiritual progress unless based on culture and contemporary education and considered part of the fabric of daily spiritual life.

However, an informatized daily life and information standards are not parallel realities. They interpenetrate and become interdependent of each other. Unfortunately, we can judge of this process essentially from the travel impressions of writers and journalists who have visited the United States, Japan and the Western European countries. National communication network for research and training, electronic goods catalogs in libraries and archives, and full-text database found in the editorial premises of newspapers and journals and electronic printing facilities are all the elements, the material skeleton of the information standards of developed countries in the last decade of our century.

Naturally, this topic is extensively reflected in publications. The thought is persistently repeated that the purpose of informatization is to ensure the access of specialists to professional knowledge and the population at large to the wealth of global culture. However, today we must reach, as quickly as possible, the level of formulating the relevant sociocultural problems of informatization.

Here is one group of such problems: What are the possibilities of adapting people to or even, in general, their acceptance of a new informational cultural environment, if we treat people not as an abstract community but in terms of cross sections of age, sex, ethnic, national, religious, professional and educational features?

Here is another group of problems: How is informatization of culture or, in general, of the spiritual sphere, linked to various models of computer training, the individualization of training processes and the meaningful aspects of continuing education from childhood to the VUZ and, subsequently, to a retraining system? In this context, what is the nature of computerizing recreation and the mass dissemination of video games? In connection with mass informatization of the areas of culture and education, what changes are introduced in the traditional concepts of the people concerning the values and the meaning of life, work, and so on? It would be naive to hope that in this case there will be a presumption of reasonability and that the involvement of the people in the information environment of culture and intellectual relaxation will take place by itself. It seems to us that this stratum of problems has been totally ignored by our social science.

Without considering the trend and nature of steps taken for the vitally important reconstruction of the educational and health care systems (which are separate topics), let us merely emphasize that the benefit to the educational system lies in the high professional training of workers through exposure to the high-level knowledge and skill of specialists, computer support of creative capabilities and intellectualization of the labor of teachers and students. In the case of the health care system, this substantially upgrades the quality of medical help, based on data of a computer functional diagnosis, medical expertise systems, etc.

There is yet another social area in the process of informatization: the system of political evaluations and political actions. It includes the systematic and varied information materialization and support of the democratization of social life, and conversion to a qualitatively new and significantly higher level of the activities of political institutions of society: the soviets and their executive committees, party and social organizations, mass information media, law enforcement authorities, services for the study and analysis of public opinion, the wishes and demands of the voters, etc. The policy of glasnost and democratization is based on the free exchange of information, and in order to exercise the right to free obtaining and dissemination of information within the country and abroad, we need a certain mechanism and material facilities. It is important in this connection to realize that what matters most is not information support of traditional stereotypes and ways of drafting political resolutions but ensuring the fast and competent reaction on the part of such institutions to the situation at home and throughout the world and to crises caused for political, ecological and other reasons. Although the social benefit of upgrading the quality of forecasts on the development of the country and the efficiency of political decisions would be difficult to overestimate, even more substantial will be the information support provided for shaping a new moral and political atmosphere, an atmosphere of glasnost, freedom and strengthened individual dignity.

A strong and deep reciprocal tie and interdependence exists among informatization processes in the fields of economics, culture and politics, for it is only on an integral basis that they can serve perestroika and the growth of the main social wealth—the broadening of individual initiative and the free and creative development of the spiritual world of the people, not bound by artificial ideological or political restrictions.

Toward an Information Society. Prerequisites and Forecasts

Today we are only formulating the social request for informatization and can only see its outlines. Outlines, precisely, for we do not have reliable initial statistical data characterizing the present scale and productivity of the application of computers and new information technologies in the economic, social and other areas, however few they may be. Therefore, it is not easy for us to

determine whether it will become necessary at any given time to have, for example, 1 million or 5 million personal computers in the national economy or in any one of its individual sectors.

We have still not created the necessary conditions in which any professional activity is bound to rest on a firm information base. The lack of a mass social base for informatization is accompanied by the resistance of the bureaucratic apparatus, which either does not need information and could do without it or else is uninterested in supplying such information to superiors or subordinates on the various levels of economic or political management. Clearly, dynamics in this area will follow the same pace as decentralization in planning and economic management and the democratization of social life.

In a huge country, with an exceptionally great variety of national traditions, levels of education, general culture, and intelligence it would be, to say the least, hasty simply to speak of the "informatization of the entire society."

The prerequisites of the advance toward an information society must be thoroughly studied. The experience of other countries and the possibility of borrowing it must be assessed through special studies. The problem of adopting the experience, the "we and they" concept and changes in the way of life in the light of the initiated elimination of equalitarian socialism, including under the influence of the processes of informatization, involve today above all scientific and not ideological problems.

Specialists have been discussing quite extensively the possible negative consequences of informatization. Let us admit that most of the views are not based on the study of specific situations but, essentially, on popular science publications in the English language. Futurological writings and social forecasts by Western authors are having a noticeable impact on the outlook of the people, settling in the mass awareness in the guise of contemporary cybernetic myths and illusions. That is precisely why the theses of negative consequences should be approached with a great deal of caution. For example, we are discussing the dangers threatening us, such as "the infantilizing of the population" (increased enslavement to machines), the "drugging of recreation, typical of consumer societies," "psychological instability," caused by the growth of requirements for skill and unemployment, and possibilities of manipulating the social consciousness. We do not believe that under the present circumstances it would make any sense to discuss the problems of "infantilizing the population" or its "psychological instability," seeking the origins of such phenomena in the informatization of social life (and even more so in the future).

Yes, there are reasons to take seriously forecasts and assessments of possible or expected (the extent of the possibility or expectation is as yet to be determined and substantiated) consequences of informatization. This, however, applies to those which are already acquiring

visible features. This applies, first of all, to the possible increase in the country of significant structural unemployment. This is a legitimate process and we should discuss not its avoidance which, most likely, would be impossible, but the formulation of measures for social amortization of the shock. Second, the danger is quite real of the use of means of informatization against the individual. Its elimination or reduction is possible only through the establishment and strengthening of a law-governed state. These two social negatives deserve our greatest attention. Let us emphasize that there should be no place for carelessness, which is so typical of our social outlook, when it comes to the discussion of such problems.

Initial Practical Steps

Currently an active search is under way for new approaches to the organization of informatization work. A great deal has been invested in the concept, a generalized variant of which was approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Transportation, Communications and Information. Naturally, the essential and rapid changes in managing the country's economic life direct this search toward market mechanisms. However, in this area by no means is everything all that simple.

Plans, suggestions and assignments concerning informatization should be directed toward specific social applications. However, our concepts of the latter remain largely undefined. One hindrance here is that of the existing forms of state-monopoly management of the industry of means of informatization, for like other sectors, it works for its own sake. That is why we must correct the assignments included in many interdisciplinary scientific and technical programs being implemented currently (the development of computers, communications systems and networks, and other), based on the situation of the developing market for information goods and services. Hence the first consequence: we should not formulate a strict informatization program based on 5-year periods and on resources allocated to the individual sectors. If we use a "program," it should be flexible, open-ended and offering maximal possibilities for the implementation of various initiatives, the efficiency of which, in the final account, will be determined by the market. Naturally, such projects must be based on competition, taking into consideration the results of nondepartmental scientific expert evaluations. State control should be exercised only through a flexible credit, tax and price policy, the lifting of obsolete administrative restrictions, the legal protection of intellectual property and the distribution and consumption of information goods and services. The state should play the role of incubator of new information technologies, creating the most favorably possible conditions for their development and implementation and supporting basic research in this area. In the course of such work new and progressive forms of interaction among governmental

planning and management authorities and highly independent industrial, scientific research organizations and VUZs and intermediary agencies and associations will develop.

Another practical suggestion applies to the financing of the projects. Clearly, it should be based on commercial investment banks, whose capital comes only partially from state budget funds, allocated for specific purposes, but mainly funds provided by the customers of different projects, selected on a competitive basis. Special methods for economic incentive must be developed and tried, including facilities for withholding from profits, contractual prices for individual types of information products and services, granting licenses based on barter, a sensible customs policy, etc. Clearly, we must also develop an organizational-legal foundation for the functioning of the object of informatization, which would ensure the gradual and systematic increase of integration components of informatization under the conditions of the renovated federative structure of the country and would help to include individual projects within international information pools, networks, etc.

The temptation is to start informatization projects on the basis of testing targets (support points, experimental areas). It is precisely there that it becomes most convenient to develop the priority variants in the use of new information technologies. In such support areas the real socioeconomic and sociocultural changes, the efficiency of which would be obvious, must be determined and demonstrated. Test projects must be created above all in the areas of health care, social security, education, culture, trade and monetary circulation, ecological monitoring, etc. This is an important prerequisite for developing a favorable social climate and concepts within the social consciousness concerning the unconditional need for informatization.

Full use must be made of already acquired experience, and the rapidly growing intellectual potential of informatization, above all in the guise of software products, must be comprehensively utilized in the creation of base projects. It is necessary thoroughly to consider the level of development of the base projects from the viewpoint of the already functioning computer equipment, and a gradual conversion to new generations of technologies.

We must not underestimate the importance of the study of socioeconomic and sociocultural prerequisites for informatization and the conditions governing the creation of base projects in the different republics and areas. To this effect we must develop special methodological ways and means based on accurate social knowledge—on the results of psychological surveys and public opinion studies. The result should be data characterizing the attitude both of specialists participating, to one extent or another, in informatization processes, and of the broad population strata.

In conclusion, let us point out an aspect, such as scientific support of informatization work. We shall need a

systemic analysis and continuing refinement of selected priority trends, forecasting possible socioeconomic and cultural consequences, developing suggestions on alleviating expected negative phenomena and evaluating the current impact of informatization on social life. It would be impossible for such work to be done exclusively by specialists in computers and information technologies, even with the help of expert social scientists. This requires the participation of both scientific establishments of the USSR State Committee for Computer Equipment and Information Industry, the USSR Academy of Sciences Departments of Information Industry, Computers and Automation and the humanitarian academic institutes, the All-Union Interdepartmental Center of the Sciences of Man, the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and universities and leading VUZs in the country. Such a unification of scientific potential would make it possible successfully to resolve the most complex problems related to the informatization of our society.

Footnote

1. This could apply to organizations which produce, distribute and consume economic information and, above all, which provide information support to wholesale trade and establish direct economic relations among enterprises, intermediary agencies specializing in providing information services (such as seeking consumers, sources of financing, available production capacities, advertising, etc.), and special information services of banks, and associations which sponsor social and private initiatives (foundations, societies, etc.).

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THE STATE AND SOCIETY

Ethnic Minorities: Theory and Practice

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[Article by Lev Malinovskiy, doctor of historical sciences, Barnaul]

[Text] CPSU documents and the platform "The Party's Ethnic Policy Under Contemporary Conditions" substantiate democratic methods for establishing interrelations among people of different nationalities and democratic ways to ensure the joint economic, social and cultural progress of different groups in an ethnically heterogeneous population. Yet, currently such heterogeneity has become the rule and therefore requires better interpretation.

Internationalization of the economy and other spheres of social life is increasing the mosaic-like nature of the population's ethnic structure, as is especially noticeable in large cities and the urban settlements that form around industrial and transportation centers. Numerous,

diverse ethnic minorities which do not have states of their own are appearing in a previously ethnically homogeneous environment. For the most part, as historical experience shows, they are gradually integrated into the nation's structure, being consistently included in its economic, political and cultural life. For a certain segment of representatives of ethnic minorities, this means assimilation: they completely accept the culture, language and, finally, ethnic self-awareness of the one or predominant nation. This process can take centuries and encompass many generations; it can be accelerated by international or domestic political events, or it can be slowed down by the influence of various, above all, domestic political factors. For other segments of the population of different nationalities, inclusion in the structure of one nation or another does not mean losing its ethnic features. These are the ethnic minorities.

The existence of ethnic minorities is a historical fact. However, only recently is the concept of the ethnic minority finally returning to party and state documents and to scientific or journalistic literature. So, we should elaborate on this issue. An ethnic minority, in our opinion, is a historically specific form of ethnic community, formed during the detachment of part of the original community (nation, nationality) as a result of a change in borders, as well as the migration of part of the population of said nationality to another location or abroad, where it lives in a different ethnic surrounding and under the corresponding political, geographic and social conditions.

It follows from this definition that it is wrong to include the native people of a given country among the ethnic minorities (such as the Indians in the U.S. or the Chukchi in the USSR), even though they comprise a minority in the population of the given state, or even the remnants of former large native peoples (such as, for instance, the Kety in Siberia or the Vepsy in the Northwest European area of the USSR), for all these people live in the land of their distant ancestors (the article by M. Guboglo, "Ethnic Groups in the USSR," published in No 10, 1989, does not make this distinction). It is clear that peoples who have their own national statehood, even if they comprise a minority of the population in their own republics (or autonomous oblasts or okrugs), cannot be included among ethnic minorities in the exact meaning of the term. Moreover, an ethnic minority is not always a small group of people: they also include relatively large groups, for instance, the Jews, Germans, Bulgarians and Greeks in the USSR, who number in the several hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. Their common feature is the absence of an integral territory, with a historical connection (by origin) to foreign peoples or to the native peoples of other republics. An ethnic minority usually does not have its own (separate) national economy: it lives among another people, making up part of a multiethnic community.

This is not a static concept. With a certain minimum of population living in a compact area, an ethnic minority can form a nationality (for instance: the appearance of

nationalities among the Volga Germans during the 19th-20th centuries) or even constitute a nation (for instance, the South Africa Boers or the U.S. North Americans, who originally were visiting colonists on a foreign continent, but later formed a nation).

An ethnic minority is often characterized by a "truncated" class structure. After all, it was usually the representatives of the lower, oppressed strata of society, predominantly those who were not making a good living, who migrated from their former homeland. It takes a long time to form the social structure inherent to a nationality or nation in a new location. There is a question in this regard: Which will happen faster—the process of forming classes and appearance of a new nation (or nationality), or the process of integration and then assimilation of the ethnic minority within the native people who have accepted it (or may even have been conquered by it)?

Let us note that, in discussing the nature of an ethnic minority, we are abstracting from arithmetic considerations, viewing it above all as an ethnic community. However, there is a connection here: the smaller its share in the population and the more scattered it is among the "aboriginal" people (German ethnographic literature uses the term "host-people"), other conditions being equal, the more rapidly it dissolves and the fewer chances it has to form an independent nation or nationality. The stability of the existence of an ethnic minority as an ethnic community in a new location depends on various circumstances: on the compactness of settlement (Germans in the U.S. have basically been assimilated, yet German peasants in Pennsylvania still retain their customs and dialect from the 18th century), on the size of the difference in the cultural level of the native and of the arrived population, on the similarity of the languages of both peoples, on the ethnic and religious policy of the ruling classes, etc. Thus, the Germans in Russia were not assimilated because of high linguistic and religious barriers; the Negroes in the U.S. were preserved as an ethn racial community due to the presence of a social and racial barrier (skin color did not enable them to dissolve into a new community, while racial discrimination raised this barrier even higher); yet the French Huguenots and the Czech Protestants in Prussia were completely absorbed within 200 years—there was a language barrier, but no racial, social or religious barriers: they were white Protestants in a Protestant country. Minorities may sometimes join together: a large one may attach smaller ones to itself. Such cases have been observed in the U.S. and, for instance, the Swedes and the Swiss in Russia were assimilated by the Germans—they switched not to Russian, but to German (the Swiss switched from their own dialect to the literary German language).

The concept of ethnic minorities as a special type of ethnic community corresponds to the positions of A. Kozing (GDR) in his book "*The Nation in History and Contemporaneity*" (Berlin, 1976; Russian translation, Moscow, 1978). The author of this book interprets the

concept of "nationality" as a feature of a nation or people, incorporating common origin, ethnic self-awareness, language and culture, as a category not dependent on a common territory, economy or social order: peoples possess it who are territorially, economically and sociopolitically isolated from each other and who live in different states.

The theory of ethnic minorities has been developed in relative detail by Western, especially American sociologists. However, for now it is not yet the center of attention for Soviet historians and sociologists. Our ethnographers also avoid this term, wide-spread throughout the world, due to the incorrect identification of all non-Russian peoples as "ethnic minorities" [natsmen] in the 1920s and due to the incorrect consideration of all non-Russian peoples in the USSR as minorities, as practiced by many Western scientists, including the Uzbeks, the Turkmen and even Ukrainians within the USSR in this category, when in fact the people of these nationalities are minorities only when they live beyond the borders of their own republics. Therefore, only a few scientists have decided to study this concept, despite its practical necessity and scientific prospects.

The insufficient attention to the theoretical development of the problem of ethnic minorities is also explained by the fact that, during the time of Stalinism and the subsequent stagnation, the party resolutions on ethnic issues which were made in V.I. Lenin's lifetime and, in part, later in the 1920s as well, were utterly forgotten. All forms of administrative ethnic units—the rayon and rural soviets—were abolished under the slogan of "strengthening unity," but actually for the sake of universal unification, standardization and centralization. The study of local lore was eliminated even in the Russian oblasts, and local museums were turned into primitive illustrations of the "Short Course" in the 1930s. Gross distortions of Leninist ethnic policy, such as the forced resettlement of entire peoples, the "doctors' case," the campaign against "cosmopolites," etc. were able to appear under such conditions.

In our society, returning to democracy not only relates to reviving Leninist, genuinely internationalist views and to further developing the appropriate standards for state and party life, but also to strengthening the development of history and the theory of the ethnic development of all peoples in our enormous country. We must also take into account that certain aspects of the theory of the ethnic problem and of self-determination of nations were drafted in their day by Lenin as applied to the conditions of a unitarian bourgeois republic, in accordance with the former RSDRP program. Naturally, there was a logical turn, evoked by historical necessity, especially after October, from the idea of a unitarian state to the more democratic idea of a federation of autonomous and, later, also of Union republics. The idea of federation and local autonomy was further developed in the system of national okrugs, rayons and rural soviets, where small ethnic, largely peasant groups which had not yet been assimilated were basically concentrated.

The errors and distortions in handling ethnic matters, permitted after Lenin's death, including the above-mentioned abolishment of the entire lower system for ethnic self-management, and other anti-democratic measures determined the narrow-mindedness and apologetic inertia of official science. Even nationality "fell out" of researchers' field of view. The ethnic issue was reduced only to a matter of nations and was declared definitively solved; under the slogan of "inviolable unity," all local and separate ethnic interests were suppressed and smoothed over; any dissidence, declared "nationalism" with the corresponding conclusions, was persecuted.

Anti-democratic practices in ethnic matters led to the complete neglect of public opinion and of the actual situation in local areas, and all research on the sociology of nationalities was curtailed. Even the population censuses were performed with great gaps (1926-1939-1959), and their results were not published in full. In some cases, they were falsified outright: small nationalities were appended to big ones and the existence of entire peoples was hushed up, not to mention the fact that the census affidavits of the citizens themselves were produced under the influence of administrative pressure and of public opinion distorted by this pressure. Everything was equalized and adjusted into the existing system of republics, which has acquired an official, ostentatious nature.

Hence, a definite tradition was formed in the study of history and theory of the ethnic question and ethnic problems in Soviet historical science: "ethnic" was understood to refer only to a nation whose characteristics included features of antiquity and immobility, in full accordance with the Stalinist definition of nation. True reality increasingly diverged from dogmatic schemes.

Where are the active ethnic processes, the processes of consolidation, integration and mixing, the processes of establishing new features and new ethnic (polyethnic) communities occurring in our time (and occurred in the past)? Unquestionably, they are developing most intensively in areas where there is a mixed population, small groups and scattered settlements of various nationalities, where there are more than just a few large and, therefore, completely stable ethnic masses. This fact was established by ethnographic science long ago, but even today theoreticians on ethnic issues continue to devote most of their attention only to nations.

This one-sidedness has objective roots in the past. In the pre-revolutionary period, the main issue of the national liberation movement in Russia during the bourgeois-democratic revolution was the problem of eliminating the oppression of nations, of their cultural revival, and of establishing national statehood for them. Hence, the heating of discussions on self-determination of nations: it was a question of Poland, the Ukraine, and established and developing nations in the Baltic and the Caucasus.

Lenin repeatedly remarked that the capitalist development of a number of regions in Russia is occurring more

rapidly than development in the center of Russia, still burdened by remnants of serfdom. However, the outskirts of European Russia were not Russian, but mainly other national groups, and the national bourgeoisie there had developed more rapidly than the Russian, rising to oppose the autocratic-feudal center. Thus, the slogan of self-determination of nations advanced to first priority. It was actually implemented during the revolution in the establishment of national states on the outskirts of Russia—in Poland, Finland, the Baltic and the Caucasus. That is why national development related, above all, to organizing nations into national states.

This interpretation of the national question was also one of the reasons that in our multiethnic state and after the revolution the position of one or another nationality could end up being unequal from the start: it depended on the presence or absence of the features of a nation, set by the well-known Stalinist definition thereof—the presence of a continuous territory, a developed economy and a common language. Whereas, as noted above, the theory of nationality was scorned for a long time, even less attention was devoted to the position and rights of scattered ethnic groups or to the rights of the separate individual. The rights of nations and the rights of citizens were constitutionally reinforced, yet the middle link between them—the rights of national groups which do not possess statehood and the corresponding organizations which would support their national interests—was missing.

Meanwhile, in the history of Soviet national statehood, in the history of resolving the ethnic problem in the USSR, attempts have been made to solve it not only at the level of nations, but also at the level of ethnic minorities.

Establishment of the rights of ethnic minorities was stipulated, above all, with the aid of a special law in the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia (1917). It seems improbable, but in fact no such law appeared, although in its day the People's Commissariat on Nationalities [Narkomnats] also worked with ethnic minorities (the existence of the corresponding departments in its structure indicates this).

After creation of the Union SSR and abolishment of the Narkomnats (also remarkable, as though "the Moor had finished his job" and the ethnic problem had already been solved at all levels), the Council on Matters of Nationalities under the VTsIK, in parallel with the national sections of the RKP(b), continued this work. It had its own Institute of Nationalities and published the journal ZHIZN NATSIONALNOSTEY (which previously existed as a newspaper).

The VTsIK council and its institute not only worked on problems of large nationalities, of future republics, and with peoples of the North, but also on problems of ethnic minorities in different Union republics in the West and East. They helped establish an integral system of administrative ethnic units: national rayons and rural soviets

and various ethnic groups, living more or less compactly, which were formed in local areas. A policy of indigenization was implemented, i.e., the conduct of the social and cultural life of these groups in the native language, which was used not only in school and in culture, but also in official business. The national sections and ethnic minority departments of the soviets worked in parallel in the same direction.

However, this work had one specific feature to which it is now hard to reconcile ourselves. The above-named organizations, the Soviet press and even scientific literature of that time combined phenomena which are not comparable within the term "ethnic minority:" the strictly ethnic minorities of the East and West, as well as the small native peoples.

Later, as a consequence of collectivization, the local ethnic specific features of various peoples were ignored and all their lower national units were gradually eliminated and, along with them, so were the national sections, the Institute of Nationalities, and many printed organs. The ethnic issue, predominantly related, as it was believed, to the individual peasant, was considered definitively resolved, due to the absence of the latter. The Stalinist repressions, when the publication of literature in numerous national languages was reduced to naught and the national intelligentsia, which has already formed in time of the soviets, was persecuted under the slogan of the "struggle against nationalism," led to the further decline of ethnic culture in local areas.

In the period of the Great Patriotic War, entire peoples became "scapegoats," were deprived of all civil rights, and were sent to the East: the Kalmyks, Ingush, Chechen, Germans, Crimean Tatars, the Meskheti Turks and others, not only deprived of their own "little homelands," but also of the institutions of their own ethnic culture, including schools and the press in their native language. In the subsequent period, under the slogan of the "convergence and confluence" of nations (in the near future!), a policy of ignoring national needs and, in some cases, even of compulsory assimilation was in fact implemented.

Thus, the theoretical distortions and violations of the principles of Leninist national policy led to the fact that actually only the upper part of the system for national-state bodies remained and, of this part, later even the genuinely national content was also "successfully" emasculated, which contributed to the assertion of super-centralization, the restriction of national languages and schools in republics, etc.

In order to restore the Leninist approach to solving national problems in their full volume and diversity, in our opinion, we must study the experience of the 1920s and restore and develop the democratic approach to national problems in local areas. Above all, this should be expressed by increasing attention to "small forms" of national statehood, to small national communities, and to the rights of separate individuals. We must pay

attention to everyone, right up to the "one Georgian child" in Peterburg, to whom Lenin called for giving not only the right to exist, but also the right to retain his ethnic culture" (see *Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, pp 142, 221).

However, we should note that local autonomy and the formation of national rayons and rural soviets will only solve the problem of national requirements and needs for that part of an ethnic minority which has settled in a more or less compact area, mainly in a rural location. How will it be for those who, for various historical, economic and other reasons, live alone, in small groups, or in separate families among the population of a different nationality, i.e., with the so-called dispersed or scattered ethnic minorities? What should we do if these people do not want to re-settle in "their own" autonomous or national rayon, yet at the same time do not wish to be completely assimilated and convert to the language and culture of the numerically predominant population? After all, ethnic problems are sometimes aggravated to the extreme for these scattered minorities, as the interethnic conflict proved.

The solution suggests itself: creating ethnic unions and societies for these people and their families, just as they exist for scattered minorities in many other countries. The Poles in Germany, the Russians in France, the Lithuanians in the U.S., etc., have thus united themselves in their day. In Russia as well, such societies have organized clubs, dances, meetings and libraries, have published their own newspapers, and have had their own theaters and amateur shows, albeit on a modest scale. So it was in the first 15 years after October, and it would have been wrong to identify this practice with "cultural and ethnic autonomy," which presumes the state and legal separation, a sort of "exterritoriality" of small groups and even of individual citizens according to nationality. Only those who do not see any difference between this practice and the "cultural and ethnic autonomy," which Lenin opposed, can fear the "isolation" of representatives of separate nationalities in such societies. At that time, it was a question of the independence of workers from "their own" bourgeoisie (and from other exploitative classes) in the form of the struggle against tsarism. That is why V.I. Lenin wrote, for instance, the following: "The German community of colonists in Saratov Guberniya, plus the German suburbs of workers in Riga and Lodz, plus the German settlement under Peter, etc., form a 'nationally unified union' of Germans in Russia. Obviously, one cannot demand such a thing or reinforce such a union..." It should be noted that in the early 20th century the initiators of such plans for a Russia-wide German union were not workers or peasant-colonists, but the Baltic baron-landowners! Really, the idea of such a union could in no way be included among the tasks of the social democrats.

However, in this regard we must not forget that this quotation from Lenin's "Critical Comments on the National Question" continues as follows: "...Of course, they (i.e., the social democrats—L.M.) by no means deny

the freedoms of all unions, including the union of any communities of any nationality in a given state" (ibid., line 24, p 137). Ethnic unions, clubs, cooperatives, etc. exist in democratic states.

Now, under entirely new conditions for socialist society, it is a question of satisfying people's sociocultural needs. The existence of such ethnic requirements and needs, which neither the current, nor even a future system of territorial autonomies by itself is in any condition to satisfy, is completely obvious.

We must realize that it is no simple matter to address the realities and review ethnic policy, making the appropriate changes in theory. It is a question of changing the approach to the national existence of significant popular masses. After all, this affects the national way of life, self-awareness, cultural development, etc., of roughly 55 million people in the USSR alone, including 24 million Russians living in national republics, 5.5 million Ukrainians, more than 2 million Jews and 2 million Germans, 1 million Poles, 357,000 Koreans, and some 100,000 people of various other nationalities, all of which have a full right to consider the USSR their homeland.

The solution to this big and painful problem is an important component part of the overall process of democratization of our society, which is called on finally to heal the old wounds and return to ethnic minorities an awareness of their value and equality among all Soviet peoples. This also has great future significance. The problem of excessive population in Central Asia and the Caucasus with, at the same time, a shortage of manpower and simply of population in the regions of the Black Earth Zone, the Urals and Siberia, Kazakhstan and the Far East is common knowledge. The ministries and departments are trying to solve this problem with the help of "organized recruitment" (predominantly of youth) for large construction sites, but without creating the corresponding cultural and national structures in the new locations. This false "economy of resources" becomes a nearly 100-percent turnover and the need again and again to "settle" the industrial centers of the East and West with a supposedly inexpensive young work force, bearing incommensurate material and moral expenses in this regard.

What should be the solution to these problems, considering the theory of national minorities? In our time, these minorities are being formed basically as a result of the migration of able-bodied population to other countries (within our country—to other regions). Thus, in our time Spanish, Greek, and Turkish minorities and representatives of the peoples of Yugoslavia have appeared in the FRG and in Austria; a Ukrainian national minority has formed in Siberia and other regions of the USSR, there is a Korean minority in the Northern Caucasus, and Estonian and German minorities in the Caucasus, along the Volga and in Siberia (until 1941).

During this process of resettlement (always for social and economic reasons) and formation of ethnic communities

in new areas, one specific feature calls attention to itself: the individual person is rarely bold enough independently to plunge into a new environment, be it in his own or in another country. At first, he looks for fellow countrymen or kin, people from the same district, in order to settle into the new place with their help and support.

American sociologists use the term "decompression chamber" for this phenomenon, in an analogy to devices that are used in order to acclimate divers who have come up from the depths. In the U.S., ethnic communities of immigrants in cities on the East Coast, where the ships from Europe arrived, served as these "chambers." Here, an immigrant could live "among his own people" for a while, and later set out into the American interior.

For our country, the theory and practice of the "decompression chamber" could be of considerable significance: the organization of such ethnic communities helps to strengthen newly arriving cadres of various nationalities, giving them an opportunity to acclimate themselves in the course of two-three generations and to adapt completely not only to the economic, but also the cultural and social life of their new "little homeland." Then they will not feel like "strangers." Naturally, such a community in a new place should incorporate the representatives of all generations, entire extended families and even local collectives. It should have the opportunity to preserve and develop its ethnic customs, native language and culture, so that switching "to new tracks" will occur not through compulsion or force, but naturally, as a result of gradual habituation.

Incidentally, in this regard we vainly underestimate societies of people from the same area: after all, these are entirely normal, currently existing unofficial communities of acquaintances and fellow countrymen which make life easier for newcomers to the cities, to "different" republics or to new places in general. Of course, this is more than just an ethnic problem. You cannot take your homeland with you on the soles of your boots, Danton said in his time. However, nationality, its traditions, language and customs—all this is subject to recreation in a new place, for the sake of strength and consolidation and for overcoming the difficulties which a "marginal individual" experiences in a new place. The communities, ethnic organizations, societies of countrymen, etc., that are now actively springing up, especially in large cities, for instance, in Moscow, should help with this.

So, let us draw the following conclusions: scientific study of the problem of ethnic minorities, their recognition as equal in terms of rights and even as a future ethnic community, and the implementation of a corresponding law to protect the rights of ethnic minorities may not only help us eliminate the substantial gap in the theory and practice of ethnic issues, but also interpret the actual, existing category of communities which exists along with nations and nationalities, comprising roughly one-fifth of our country's population.

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SOCIAL PRIORITIES

The Housing Program: A New Stage?

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[Text] After a tempestuous start in the beginning of the 5-year period, housing construction is obviously at a standstill. It is also clear that it is impossible to achieve a tangible shift in this area using old methods. Fulfillment of the program goal—providing every family with a separate apartment or house by the year 2000—is being called into doubt. Although some progress seems to have been made, the housing problem continues to remain acute: in a survey conducted in the Russian Federation last year, 42 percent of the citizens named it as one of the most important problems and the one causing the most worry.

The President's May Ukase, which soberly assesses the state of affairs, notes the need for new approaches to solving the housing problem and for steps toward their practical implementation. Under the new conditions of conversion to a market, different strategic principles and different housing legislation clauses should also operate in this sphere. It stipulated drafting a system for them by this autumn.

Understandably, everyone who hopes to receive an apartment in the near future has been waiting for such qualitative changes. The interest with which specialists are discussing possible variants of the housing strategy is also natural. Without examining the problems related to the housing market in detail, let me dwell on a few questions, the development of which I work on in my own professional activity.

A Realistic View

The last USSR Goskomstat summary reported that almost 1.9 million families and single people in our country improved their housing conditions last year. Is this many, or few? Of course, the figure is inspiring, the more so if you consider for how many people new apartments, received after long years of waiting and hardships, have become a turning point in their lives. However, let us acquaint ourselves with the data on those still standing in this line: there were 46 million of them at the start of 1989! In the last year, the number of people waiting in line has increased by 335,000 families and more than 1 million single people; 1.7 million families have been waiting for an apartment for over 10 years.

The amount of housing provided for a Soviet citizen today comprises an average of 15.8 square meters,

including housing space of 10.6 square meters. At first glance, the situation does not seem so dramatic. However, these are the "average" indicators! Although the results of the population census have not yet been summed up and we do not have the complete picture of housing distribution, selected studies and existing statistics confirm that the supply of housing differs substantially in each region and in each settlement. Indeed, it is distributed very unequally in the relatively well-to-do oblasts and cities. Thus, on the whole among citizens in the RSFSR in the mid-1980s, about 12 percent of families had less than 7 square meters of space, correspondingly no more than 5 square meters of housing area per capita, while at the same time roughly just as many families had more than 20 square meters of total space per capita. More than 4 million people live in dilapidated and dangerous housing and need urgent resettlement.

Housing conditions in the Central Asian republics which, aside from the unsatisfactory scales of construction, are aggravated by the tendency of the native families to have numerous children, and housing conditions in the Eastern rayons of the Russian Federation, where until recently the residual principle for allocating resources to the social sphere was displayed most clearly, are especially bad.

The speech by N.I. Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies indicates that the government is worried about this situation and intends to take energetic steps to augment the volumes of housing construction. It has planned to increase the commissioning of housing in the 13th 5-year period by 40 percent. The question is formulated even more decisively in the President's Ukase: "we must create conditions for a sharp, at least doubled expansion of housing construction..."

The changes that have occurred in the last 4 years, it would seem, inspire hope. Be this as it may, after the many years of stagnation in construction, the commissioning of new homes and apartments has increased considerably. However, by my observations, a curious situation is coming to light. "Acceleration" on paper is achieving fantastic dimensions in a number of places, while real efforts, as a rule, are inversely proportional to the amount of "hot air."

Consider, for instance, Chita Oblast. Its population is worst of all supplied with housing in the Russian Federation. Therefore, the need and desire to universally accelerate construction there are understandable. In the years remaining until the end of the century, the oblast plans to roughly double its housing stock. In this regard, let us not forget that some of it consists of dilapidated wooden buildings, barracks-type premises ill-suited for normal residents, which have to be demolished. The possibilities of the oblast's construction complex are quite limited, to which attests the fact that in 1976-1985 the growth of housing comprised only 0.12 square meters per capita here annually, while at the same time

throughout the RSFSR on the whole it was 0.2 square meters. Construction capacities in most of its peripheral rayons are virtually nonexistent. Knowing the inertia of the construction complex, any person with common sense can realize that this is nothing other than "playing with figures," the deception of the population with groundless promises. The more so, since the list of measures to develop the construction base in Chita Oblast is far more modest.

It is necessary to realistically assess the situation, not to entertain either ourselves or others with groundless projections. According to existing calculations, the fulfillment of the planned program for housing construction would make it possible on the average throughout the country to provide each citizen with 18-19 meters of overall space, and rural residents with somewhat more by the year 2000. Let us assume that this is fulfilled: Will this be enough to solve the problem? After all, due to the new construction, the requirements not only of those urgently in need will be satisfied, but also of people who have housing space above the guaranteed minimum. Thus, in the 1980s in the Russian Federation the number of citizens with more than 7 meters of space decreased roughly just as much as the number of people who had more than 20 square meters per capita increased. This basically is explained not by subjective negative phenomena in the distribution of housing, but by complex natural redistribution processes (moving part of a family to a new place of residence, death of relatives, etc.). On the other hand, even sometimes small changes in the structure of a family often throw it into the category of those urgently in need.

There is yet another important aspect. Today, "extended" families are considered a whole or, as specialists usually say, one economic unit. From a scientific viewpoint, such an approach in the development of a housing program for the distant future is entirely unwarranted, since it distorts the real need for the number of apartments and their structure and even now leads to incorrect practical solutions. Let us note that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, adult children who have reached the age of 21 have the right to separate housing, and at the age of 18 in the GDR, and this is regardless of how much space their parents have. Of course, the level of provision of housing is significantly higher there, and we cannot completely copy these principles, the more so consider their implementation a realistic task. Our possibilities for solving this problem in the coming years are very limited. However, even under such conditions to consider several families, related to each other, living together to be one is to deceive ourselves for the sake of idealizing the statistical picture. Most of them would like to live separately and this should be taken into account both in the statistics, as well as in the decisions that are made.

What To Build?

One of the most important questions today is what kind of housing we need. Taking into account the difficulties

of fulfilling the planned program in the time periods originally called for, many designers and planning workers see the solution in significantly increasing the number of small apartments. Thus, the set task can be implemented with the least volume of construction. For instance, designs for three-room apartments with a housing area of 38 square meters are being proposed for the future. Here, it seems, it is a question of relapses of an old disease: having promoted the slogan, let us put it into practice at any cost. After all, such apartments are "closets" by modern standards and intended to meet only the most modest needs of a person. However, this housing will function for more than a decade and must meet people's needs for a least 25-30 years. Meanwhile, the outlays per meter of housing space are significantly less reduced than the area of the apartment itself. So, it has the worst qualitative characteristics, and we really do not save all that much.

Let us recall the fate of the 5-floor buildings, which the people at one time sarcastically christened "roach hotels." Having economized to the utmost, and in places where this should not have been done, we discredited the idea, correct at the time, of rapidly solving an urgent problem by building inexpensive housing. Right now, even despite the extremely difficult conditions under which a significant share of the population now lives, people do not want to live in these buildings.

In recent years in our country, the quality of housing on the whole has improved. The average overall space for a two-room apartment has increased by 1.7 meters over 1981-1988, for a three-room—almost 4 meters, mainly by increasing the kitchen and auxiliary premises. There are no reasons to go backwards; obviously, we must further improve the qualitative characteristics of housing.

The main thing, in my opinion, is to completely reject the designs of the 1960s, which are entirely unsuitable today, even for our undemanding population. It is gratifying that Gosplan and Gosstroy have finally realized how important it is for a family to have a large kitchen, which simultaneously serves as our dining room. They have promised that it will be no less than 8 square meters in new buildings. In coming years, it is proposed to raise the ceiling heights and increase the floor space of auxiliary premises. As a result, new housing is starting to better meet not only contemporary, but also future requirements.

At the same time, it seems to me, right now it is hardly worth beginning the mass construction of cities with buildings of the so-called fourth generation (with improved planning of apartments), which have appeared, for instance, in the capital microrayon of North Chertanovo. Given the present shortage of housing, the fairly substantial outlays of material and labor resources for the additional conveniences that these apartments are unjustified for the next 5-7 years. Is it not better to build new housing with these resources for those urgently in need? It goes without saying, this

does not mean that such buildings should not be built in general. As the urgency of the housing problem decreases, they will begin to appear in every region or city, but for now, most likely, it is expedient to erect them for ZhSK [cooperative apartments].

In considering the strategy for housing construction, we should pay special attention to improving the existing inventory, which cannot stand up to any criticism at all, above all in the countryside, where most individual homes have no plumbing, sewers or central heating. Therefore, the immediate development of municipal services is extremely important, even if this raises the cost of housing and somewhat restrains the achievement of the planned goals. It goes without saying, this requires solving a whole complex of mixed problems: pipelines, plumbing hardware, natural gas, etc. are needed. Alas, all this is scarce right now.

It is gratifying that the President's Ukase stipulated "a sharp increase in production capacities for finishing materials, sanitary hardware and other specialized equipment, and stimulating the creation of new and the expansion of existing enterprises and organizations in this sphere." Thus, if we are not left only with good intentions, as with much of the previously drafted housing program, conditions will be created in several years for a real leap forward.

Otherwise, we will be able to speak only of quantitative increases in the scales of housing construction. After all, here one can rely only on one's own forces. Importing linoleum, wallpaper, plumbing hardware, ceramic tile, paints and other necessary construction components will not solve the problem. The need is too great and it is foolish to spend hard currency for something that any civilized country is capable of producing.

A very important aspect of the problem is bringing the structure of the housing inventory into accordance with the population's family structure. It may seem paradoxical, but under conditions of a planned economy we have not, in practice, considered what kind of housing people really need, which has intensified the crisis situation.

In most cities with "European type" families, there is an acute shortage of one-room apartments which, after all, are needed by single people, as well as by the elderly or by young people who want to live apart from a large family, by incomplete families (mother with a child) and by young families in the early period of their lives. Everyone knows this, if even only those who engage in the exchange of housing. However, it would seem, the professionals stubbornly fail to notice that which is common knowledge.

In 1981-1987, about 20 percent one-room apartments were built. Yet, the objective need for them according to our criteria for providing housing in regions with "European-type" families is at least 10 percent more than our real possibilities. However, these are the average figures. Each area has its own specific demographic features, which must be taken into account when selecting the

structure of the housing to be constructed. For instance, in Leningrad, where the average family consists of three people, the need for one-room apartments is significantly higher than in the Central Asian republics. When the opportunity appears to provide people with apartments, such that the number of rooms would equal the number of people living there, the demand for one-room apartments will decrease sharply. However, right now the need for them is acute. Only by the end of the 1990s, by our estimates, will the situation change.

In order to strengthen young families and create normal conditions for them, in my opinion, it is expedient to build special buildings with hotel-type apartments, leasing them for a payment, compensating for the construction and use expenses, to all who desire, regardless of what housing their parents have. Thus, the financial situation for young families will be eased. After all, at first many of them rent an apartment or a room from private owners, spending a significant part of their modest budgets.

In most cities, there is a shortage of three- and four-room apartments. In regions where families with many children predominate, there are obviously not enough multi-room apartments; this not only leads to the low provision of housing for the citizens, but also curtails the influx of young people from rural areas, regardless of the rapidly growing unemployment there.

In the housing inventory structure, clear preference is given to two-room apartments. In the 11th 5-year period, the share of these was 42 percent, and it only recently decreased to 36. In the opinion of experts, this share should be reduced even more in the 13th 5-year period.

Right now, the accelerated conversion from building cities of multi-story buildings to building comfortable cottages is being actively propagandized in scientific and periodical literature. This question is very important from the viewpoint of selecting a strategy for housing construction. What are the arguments "for?" There can be no doubt that one's own home, if it has all the conveniences, provides great comfort and diverse floor plans which conform to individual needs, and creates a feeling of closeness to the surrounding environment. It is no accident that in countries with a high provision of housing, for instance, Australia and the United States, cottages are popular not only for the well-to-do, but also for average population strata. A real "boom" in individual construction is occurring in certain Eastern European states: Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In our country, many citizens would also like to have such housing, and right now this process is actively developing here. Unquestionably, the Baltic republics and the Western Ukraine are in the lead, but increasingly comfortable, more tastefully built homes are appearing even in cities of other regions.

However, aside from the virtues, there are drawbacks here as well, to which we must open our eyes. Individual

cottages are significantly more expensive than apartments in multi-story buildings. To construct a building in the European area of the country, it costs, on the average, from 25,000 to 40,000 rubles. A square meter of housing in a multi-apartment building costs, as a rule, considerably less: 230-260 rubles. Right now, building cottages in the cities on a large scale means to delay solving the main problem, providing every person with a guaranteed minimum of housing, for a long time. Moreover, people need not simply a building, but a completely improved, separate residence. Under conditions of small-story construction, the expenses for municipal services increase sharply, which is a bottleneck for the housing program.

Of course, this problem should be approached in a differentiated manner. For instance, the appearance of entire rayons of individual homes in large cities will aggravate transportation problems. Considering, moreover, that this has a negative influence on the ecological situation, the charms of small-story construction immediately fade. However, such a solution is more expedient in small cities. Foreign experience cannot serve as a good argument: it is one matter to be oriented toward individual cottages in the U.S., where per resident there are about 64 square meters of overall space, with higher quality characteristics, and entirely another here, where millions of families live under poor conditions. This should convince us that it is premature to convert to mass individual construction in cities, especially big cities. Above all, we must expand such construction in the countryside. Our surveys show that rural residents unquestionably prefer individual houses. To formulate their needs in brief, such a house would be a spacious, improved cottage with a garden plot and areas for cattle and fowl. Cardinal shifts in the solution of this problem are already occurring. However, a still greater, visible acceleration is required, or our Russian countryside will soon be completely empty.

At Whose Expense?

In the current 5-year period, as before, the basic share of housing is being built at the expense of state capital investments (70 percent). The share of ZhSK was small, less than 7 percent; 16 percent of housing was built at one's personal expense and with the help of state credit; and about 6 percent, at the expense of kolkhozes. The situation is somewhat different in the countryside. The share of individual construction is significantly higher than in cities and makes up one-third.

The existing system of leasing housing as an almost free benefit conformed to conditions of the 1920s-1960s. However, we have now outgrown this stage. The supply of apartments, although far from our needs, is considerably higher than it was, for instance, in the 1950s. It is common knowledge that our country has been forced to carry ever greater expenses for housing construction and maintenance, in connection with improved quality characteristics and increased cost. This is expanding the gap in the deficit budget. Meanwhile, the possibility of

getting an apartment from the state lessens people's aspiration to work more intensively and earn more, in order to make enough for an apartment.

The income level of a significant share of the population makes it possible (under conditions of a long pay-back period, as well as with grants for the poor) to convert from predominantly free distribution of housing to the purchase of it. The proposed solution to the problem makes it possible, in my opinion, to unite the country's economic and social interests (they currently disagree, since the more housing that is built, the higher the uncompensated state expenses are). It will conform to a great extent to the principle of social justice. After all, today some people get housing at the expense of social funds, while others work for years to acquire it, sometimes denying themselves the most necessary things, especially in the countryside, where the share of individual construction is significant. There will be fewer machinations with the allocation of apartments, which has favorable soil beneath it right now.

All this indicates the possibility and necessity of a gradual (let me emphasize, precisely gradual) conversion from the free acquisition of housing to its sale as private property, its conversion to a full-valued commodity. A housing market will overturn many things in our economic concepts. Unquestionably, this subject requires separate discussion. Let me note only that the current situation hardly enables us to implement such a revolutionary about-face immediately. In the near future, it seems, we should stick to the principle of allocating apartments to those urgently in need at the socially guaranteed minimum level (i.e., apartments with modest quality characteristics and a number of rooms $n-1$, where n is the number of people in the family). Improvement of conditions beyond this minimum should be done only at the expense of the future resident. The use of the population's funds for these purposes has, in my opinion, unquestionable advantages over the alternative programs for stabilizing monetary circulation in the country, in particular for mass provision with automobiles.

Today, a noticeable turn has already been observed in the solution of this problem. By the end of the last 5-year period, it was planned to nearly double the share of ZhSK and, by the end of the 1990s, about 30 percent of the housing being built will be attributed to them. So that cooperative apartments end up being within the population's strength, a number of privileges are stipulated. The first payment was reduced from 40 percent of the cost to 30, and to 20 percent in rayons in Siberia and the Far East. The time periods for repaying credit have been raised to 25 years and enterprises and organizations have been given the right to cancel part of the original loan or credit. This, unquestionably, makes the ZhSK more accessible for the population.

A significant share of housing will be built at enterprises' expense. This also has a kind of logic. Right now, the plants and factories are accumulating considerable social

development funds and we must give them opportunities to turn these funds into commodities, including by allowing them to build houses for their employees.

However, there are elements to which I would like to direct special attention. Everyone knows that young families and single, elderly people who live in "communal apartments" are the most in need of better housing conditions. Many of them cannot find the funds to obtain an apartment through the ZhSK, even under privileged conditions. They also have few or no hopes at all for assistance from enterprises.

Employees in the social sphere are another category of people, rather poorly supplied with housing. Their prospects are not promising either. The wages in these sectors are small, and the organizations make no profit, so they cannot build homes at the expense of their own funds. Should not these groups of citizens be granted additional privileges? For instance, we could establish a first payment at a purely symbolic level for young families and introduce a privileged line for people employed in the social sphere. Clearly, we should think about this.

In accordance with the President's Ukase, the system of payment for housing will be changed. This step long ago became imminent. After all, the foundations for the present system were laid in the 1920s. Occupancy at that time was per room, and amenities were provided only at a rudimentary level. Naturally, the apartment payment was for living space only, not taking into account premises for common use. The situation has changed since then. Our apartments, as well as the principles of occupancy, are different. Right now, the quality of housing differs sharply, but often people living in the five-floor buildings with minimal amenities and people in luxurious apartments with large kitchens, enormous halls, auxiliary premises and other modern improvements often make identical apartment payments: after all, the living area of these apartments differs insignificantly.

Unquestionably, the amount of the apartment payment itself needs to be reconsidered. It should at least compensate for the cost of using the housing. In my opinion, however, we cannot separate this question from other changes in the country's financial mechanism. Such a measure would be justified only within the framework of a comprehensive financial reform and with appropriate compensation to the population.

The possibilities for improving housing conditions should also change. In practice today, a person who has the minimal level of housing has no way to do this legally. Yet, imagine a system in which any citizen, having paid for the difference in quality and additional space, could improve his living conditions within certain limits. Given the present shortage, of course, the number of those who desire to do so somewhat exceeds the state's real possibilities: once again, we will be unable to avoid the lines to which we are so accustomed. However, in the future such a system could operate on a purely market basis. The apartments that are thus freed could be

granted as the socially guaranteed minimum to those urgently in need. Meanwhile, the state budget would receive additional funds.

There is another argument in favor of this. If we proceed from the present situation, the suggestion of providing those waiting in line only with the minimum may evoke serious objections: after all, they may have to live in these apartments for decades. However, if there are real conditions for rapid improvement of housing conditions—just work—the attitude will change immediately. It goes without saying, there should be exceptions here as well. It is hardly expedient to apply this principle in young, rapidly growing cities in the pioneer territories and the Far North, where the permanent residence of people is inexpedient, or in priority development regions, including depopulated rural rayons.

The system that has taken shape over the decades for distributing housing reflects the old principle of solving social problems on the whole: a low wage was compensated for by state obligations to provide the population with a certain level of benefits via social funds. However, life has shown that this path is ineffective; it is impossible to enter a market economy with it. Paternalistic distribution relations are incompatible with the goals of radical economic reform. If we want to implement reform, including in the area of construction, we must change the housing policy principles themselves, so that the state's role is ever more reduced not to providing apartments, but to creating real possibilities for earning them through honest labor.

New Expectations And... Old Doubts

We have started solving the most important social problem, providing every Soviet family with separate housing. However, this will be only the first stage. Having implemented the plans, we will be meeting the needs of the basic mass of the population at a very modest, minimum level. Calculations show that it is realistic in the near future to speak of granting each urban family a standard apartment with a number of rooms one less than the number of people in the family.

A person's reasonable needs are significantly higher than this standard and are determined, in the opinion of many scientists, by the formula $n+1$ (a room for each plus one common room). It goes without saying that this is no limit. For instance, is it really bad to have a game room for children, and who of the creative people would refuse an office or studio? However, for everyone this still remains in the scarcely foreseeable future.

Reality, alas, dictates other arrangements. In particular, it will be necessary to re-direct capital investments and the capacities of contracting organizations from the production to the social sphere, above all, away from numerous industrial projects which we knowingly will be unable either to build in reasonable time periods from positions of sensible economy or to supply with manpower. We must redistribute not simply money which, as everyone knows, at present we have far from supported

with resources, but the resources themselves. It remains to create equipment and instruments, enabling us to sharply raise labor productivity and work quality on construction sites, to increase the output of modern designs and of construction and finishing materials, and to introduce progressive technologies. This task is extraordinarily difficult, since we have not formed the material base, needed for such a sharp leap, in the current 5-year period.

At first, expanding the independence of enterprises under conditions of converting to a market economy may slow down this sharp re-orientation of the construction complex. A system of special privileges is necessary so that the construction complex itself rejects the customary practice of "burying money" in long-term industrial construction projects and start erecting residential buildings.

All these considerations enable us, in my opinion, to draw certain conclusions regarding the solution of the housing problem in our country. First: in order to provide each family with a separate apartment or home by the year 2000, we must build substantially more housing than was initially proposed, thereby compensating for the creation among part of the population of a population excess (in the contemporary understanding, of course).

The second conclusion: calculations show that even with fulfillment of the program, we are only solving the problem in regions and cities where the housing situation is more or less favorable right now. Under what conditions can we speak of this with regard to territories where, at present, there are an average of 10-12 meters of overall area per capita? We must look the truth in the eyes and take this difference into account when developing housing policies in each separate region.

The third conclusion: in the near future, it is important to choose a strategy for the construction and distribution of apartments which would, in the first place, provide the guaranteed minimum of housing to all who are in need. However, the existing methods for solving this problem, described above, should be changed. Otherwise, even if the scales of construction grow sharply, an enormous line will nonetheless remain.

Housing is the most important social benefit. Without exaggerating, one could say that the keys to new apartments are the keys to solving many of our society's economic and social problems.

Not much time remains to draft an integral system of measures to review housing legislation, yet the usual fears are appearing: Will the many serious problems which specialists are speaking of today be taken into account? One would like to hope that the new strategy will be created not in the style of the worst old traditions, but on the basis of broad discussion among professionals and society, taking into account the prospects for developing other spheres and the potential of the construction

complex. And, what is very important, it should take alternative solutions into account.

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THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS

Delight of the Mind: Thoughts About a Book on Music

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[Review by Georgiy Gachev of Andrey Zolotov's book: "...Listopad, ili V Minuty Muzyki. (Improvizatsii. Otryvki. Obrazy) [Falling Leaves, or in a Moment of Music (Improvisations. Excerpts. Images)]. Sovremennik, Moscow, 1989, 398 pp]

[Text] It is an amazing paradox: great art, above all, Music, has grown in the soil of the great sufferings of Soviet history: Shostakovich, Prokofyev, Myaskovskiy, Sviridov, Mravinskii, Neygauz, Rikhter...

Of course, there is also an external reason for this, about which, even in the time of Beethoven, in the period of the Metternich reaction, it was said: "Words are chained in irons, but, fortunately, sounds are still free." So it is that ideological control, which raged in the more comprehensible spheres of literature and in painting (in terms of subject, it is immediately obvious: "What is it about? Is it about "ours" or "not ours," is it "our way" or "not our way?"), had weakened somewhat, due to the incomprehensibility of the language of this art. Therefore, the artists could create more freely. Although, the ideological Chekists dug in even here; the editorial article "Chaos Instead of Music" in PRAVDA, 1936, denounced Shostakovich's innovative opera "Lady Macbeth of Mtsenskii Uyezd," and the infamous 1948 resolution on anti-people's formalists, which listed the entire highest flower of our music).

However, there was also an aesthetic reason for the flourishing of music. The psyche of the people, or of a person, cast into boundless suffering, rises to surmount the troubles, evil and horror of material, bodily life and death. Precisely the language of music is capable of catching this dynamic: the inner life of the World Spirit and the era are its soil; there are upsurges, fadings, raptures, dreams, despair, love, sacrifice, happiness, melancholy and exultation. Out of all this, configurations of melodies and rhythms are woven.

As our eminent music critic Yavorskiy thought, music has to do with the dynamic systems of an era and expresses the mood of society or of an individual.

The spirit groaned and sang. The tempestuous rhythms of revolution and building excited the spirit; it glowed and exulted in the hope that "there will be a city, the gardens will blossom!" However, the GULAG was built instead of a city, and a polluted nature was achieved

instead of a "garden." Yet, after all, when a construction site was organized and people went there, the spirit dreamed. The dream was real, and this is enough for the spirit to truly sing out: great music was created. There were the songs of the Revolution and the Civil War, the dynamic songs of the 1920s and 1930s: Belyi's "Eaglet," Koval's "Youth," Dunayevskiy's sparkling choral works and, later, the miracle of the songs of the Patriotic War. The spirit sang out musically, not with noise and gnashing: it responded with melody, not just with rhythm, with mechanical meter.

Well, the main point is that great classical music was composed. The World Spirit always sings (there is still the Pythagoreans' "music of the spheres;" the Cosmos in sound, the revolutions and rhythms of movement there), even now: its rhythms and noises, which may seem like "cacophony" or "chaos" to us (as Zhdanov perceived the melodies of Shostakovich and Prokofyev), but after a while their relations and harmonies will be heard and understood by the public ear, and harmony will be revealed where only chaos was heard.

Whence Happiness? How can this art from the spirit sincerely declare: "Life is good, and it is good to live!," with poverty and unemployment, immorality, arrests and executions, the camps, exhausting labor, and one trouble after another in our country's historical development?

Indeed, because action is equal to counteraction! The invasion of hell's forces from without, in history, was resisted: everything lofty and good which exists in human hearts, in the people, in individuals, accumulated over the millennia of mankind and the centuries of Russia and its great culture, drew up to its full height! They were mobilized internally into a great resistance. Let us fight! Get the "weak ones"! In this single combat, evil and hell turned out to be weak: they retreated shamefully, while the fighters and marchers of art and thought, the heroes of these feats shine brilliantly: Platonov, Chayanov, Pasternak, Vernadskiy, Sholokhov and Vavilov, Petrov-Vodkin, Filonov and many more.

The outcome of these battles is the touching, magnificent works of art of the Soviet era, which is its contribution to the treasure-house of world civilization.

Everyone knows Marx's justifiable idea that times when art flourishes do not coincide with times of political and economic flourishing (although this also happens: the time of Pericles in Athens or the Renaissance in Italy, as well as the turn of the 19th-20th centuries in Russia...). However, this is fully confirmed under Soviet conditions. The Crucible of Creativity has functioned remarkably: the uncounted calamities, sweat and blood, executions and terror, the burnt taiga, contaminated fish, exterminated peoples, ruined families and the Lumpenization of the entire country went in as the raw materials. What came out, as the quintessence of existence in our century, were "flowers of unusual beauty."

Who made these? Who are these magicians and makers of miracles? Andrey Zolotov's book ("*...Listopad, ili V Minuty Muzyki (Improvizatsii. Otryvki. Obrazy)*") [Falling Leaves, or in a Moment of Music (Improvisations. Excerpts. Images)], Sovremmenik, Moscow, 1989, 398 pp) is about them.

It is about great works of art in the 20th century, above all, the works of musicians. Its characters are the composers Shostakovich, Sviridov, and Gavrilin; the directors Mravinskiy, Karayan and Yurlov; the pianists Rikhter and Neygauz—father and son, Arturo Mikelandzheli and Gorovits; the violinist Menukhin; the singers Zara Dolukhanova, Vedernikov and Reyzen; the directors Valter Felzenshteyn and Irakliy Andronikov, who created their own professions... The book is edged with "The Phenomenon of Stasov" and the "Voice of Musorgskiy." With these thoughts, the author somehow leads our tempestuous, lively present day to eternity, to the traditions of Russian art. It blesses new devotees and gives energy for the mastering of new realities, for overcoming the torments of vital, creative pangs, and announces: "Hold it!" In Gogol's voice, it warns our very utilitarian time: "If music abandons us, what will we do with our world then?... Oh, do not leave us, our deity!"

In the trying to understand what the charms of this book are, besides masses of thought, the artistic brilliance of his descriptions, and many other merits, I realized that he, the author, was there, among these demigods. He lived with them and talked to them in their homes. He is an initiate: "The anointed ones have invited him, as a participant in the feast."

Thus, he is worthy of them and an adequate vessel, to whom they have entrusted their intimate creative problems, that which is concealed in the finished work, when it is subjected to the fires of the footlights of the hall and the maestro appears in his tail-coat. No, Mravinskiy speaks to him in his own cottage, in his muddy fishing boots... "No man is a hero to his servant"—how often in memoirs does showing a creative person's daily life serve the self-satisfaction of the petty: ah-ha, so he is just as weak and pitiful as I, "the gods do not fire pots;" this means that I can sink more deeply into myself, as I am, and justify my pettiness. ...A correspondent (Andrey Zolotov has spoken in precisely this role, in the newspaper IZVESTIYA and on television, at homes and in concerts, to the minds and hearts of artists) is also a kind of "angel:" a messenger, a transmitter who translates the celestial into the earthly, the language of music into the language of words, intelligible to our reason. However, he does this such that we become infected, initiated to the great secret, and are increasingly drawn there. Thus, the personality and wealth of the spirit, even our health, are uplifted. Yes, yes: music also helps the body, cleansing the spirit and inner world of our essence, as is telling in the long lives of Mark Reyzen, Ivan Kozlovskiy, Yevgeniy Mravinskiy, Vladimir Gorovits and others, especially performers. After all, the composer spends more of himself, he gives birth, sacrifices, and thus burns up more rapidly...

Yet, the thesis "the gods do not fire pots" acquires the reverse meaning in Zolotov's interpretation: the humanness of the gods of art signifies that you too, a simple person, are potentially divine, and the world of Music, the World Spirit, sounds within you. You must listen within yourself to the beauty surrounding you and, through the magic wand of a musical work, a brief conjunction of the Heavens and the Earth, of the celestial with the earthly, occurs within you, and you become inspired and filled with the Holy Spirit.

"I was inspired!" rejoiced the spirit of the hero Gleb Uspenskiy during contemplation of the Venus de Milo. Such is the effect of great art: the growth of the free individual within a person. This is also the point: the "incarnation of god" also produced the high art of the Soviet era, despite the monstrous pressures on the social mind from without, as well as the fears and weakness of the man within, who is inclined to submit and bend. "In this thing," wrote Rikhter about Korin's portrait of Igumnov, "I see the conflict between the artist's inner world and the external, official circumstances in which he finds himself. Igumnov was a person with a tender, lyrical spirit, hidden behind an outward restraint, which sometimes gave his image a certain dryness and illusory nature" (p 253). Zolotov sees this as the involuntary "self-characterization" of Rikhter himself.

"Man creates his resistance to the environment," Gorkiy declared against the "materialistic" theory of the "environment," by which environment determines people's behavior, such that the complaisant groan in servility: "the environment ate him up..." The measure of this resistance is great art, having poured out like lave from its creators, from these amazing conduits, crucibles and foundries in which the ore and slag of the "environment" are re-smelted into pearls of creation.

This is presented in particular relief in the essay "Music of an Inspired Time," devoted to music composed during the Great Patriotic War, which is a genuine miracle. Despite the saying "when cannons thunder, the muses are quiet," under Soviet conditions in those 4 years simply a kind of outburst of musical creativity was observed, as though a swan had sung the people's spirit in the songs of the war years, in masterpieces such as Aleksandrov's "Holy War," Zakharov's "Oh, My Mists," Mokrousov's "Hidden Stone," Blanter's "In the Woods By the Front," and Solovyev-Sediy's "Nightingales" and "Night of the Raid"—one cannot count them all. At the same time, the highest flight of symphony also occurred: Shostakovich's 7th and 8th symphonies, Prokofyev's Fifth and his opera "War and Peace," Myaskovskiy's 22nd, 23rd and 24th symphonies, and others. Life fought mightily against Death. "Joyous, healthy, happy, peaceful, past and future life was simultaneously identified in the people's awareness with music, independent and regardless of the war... All of them, these people, heroes of the anonymous peaks of their own lives (this is the leitmotif of Zolotov's book: the potential and real heroism and divinity of each life and individual, which is why each has his own music—

G.G.), is each in his own way filled with his own music, but they sensed, they heard one thing, their own spirits, smelted with the spirit of the time..." (p 62).

Something which Gordon and Dudorov discussed in the epilogue to "*Doctor Zhivago*" is also very important for the flourishing of music in war: the war brushed away the lies, falseness and darkness, in the atmosphere of which people had been suffocated during the satanic 1930s. Once again, people were faced with genuine and primary values, with the undeceptive and the simple—Life, Death, Love, Sacrifice, Devotion, betrayal, etc.—and the air of life was washed clean of this social and spiritual threat.

The words of Blok, uttered in the fatal days of the Revolution and Civil War, taken as an epigraph, also sound as mighty and truthful: "The work of the artist, the obligation of the artist... is to hear the music that shakes the very air." Even more topical for our time are the words: "Only a spirit can fight against the horrors... and this spirit is music" (p 51). Here, in Zolotov's aesthetic, is his original contemplation and equation: Music is the Air-Spirit of Being, the atmosphere of genuine Life; we all live in it, but the composers and performers know this—they bring us this knowledge and familiarity with the Ocean of Music around and within us... Zolotov's studies on the great interpreters of music are even more penetrating than his stories on composers. In them lies the talent of Chekhov's Dushechki: he nestles up to his new object of love, re-performs it almost to the point of identification, and speaks of it as though from inside it itself.

Of course, Zolotov's tender, feminine and receptive nature and heart—in this, similar to the all-responsiveness that was noted in the Russian persona by Dostoyevskiy, whose words our hero also quotes: "Incorporate in oneself the idea of human-wide unity, of fraternal love, of a sober view, forgiving the hostile, distinguishing and excusing the dissimilar, removing the contradictions" (p 267). Oh, how topical this is in our time of national disputes, suddenly flaring up, and "mutual pains, troubles and insults" (the words of Mayakovskiy)! In Music, as in Christ, "there are no ancient Greeks or Jews," but only one criterion—Excellence. In Zolotov's book, the Russians Shostakovich, Sviridov and Gavrilin, the Germans Neygauz, Rikhter and Felzenshteyn; the Jews Menukhin, Gorovits and Reyzen; the Armenian Dolukhanova; the Georgian Andronikov, and many other depositors in the treasure-house of world international art are hailed equally.

The talent of serving other talents—that which Zolotov singles out in Andronikov, the "gift of great portrait artists"—is indeed a description of his own vocation, his own profession!

Each text in this book (which is subtitled "Improvisations. Excerpts. Images") is a unique musical novel, a genre of artistic literature which has its tradition in the musical novels of E.T.A. Hoffman and, in our country,

in the essays of V.F. Odoyevskiy and the articles of V.V. Stasov, whom our author also sees as a patron of his own work. "Everything that he wrote is a special kind of literature... Stasov's criticism arouses activeness in the artist, viewer, reader or listener who perceives this criticism. It organizes an opinion surrounding art, it penetrates the atmosphere surrounding works of art with its rays, it shapes this atmosphere, becoming an extension of the work being interpreted by the critic" (pp 18-19). This reminded me of words from a personal manifesto in Zolotov's early work "*Your Life In Art*" (1967): "Our musical impressions are shaped not by the hearing of music alone, but also by our thoughts about it. Thoughts and the process of thinking itself 'animate' that which is heard, as though music is extending life for us" (p 382). Zolotov's texts are these extensions of music's life to us. By including rational and conceptual capacities, they hold on to the precious minutes of music's temporary art: "Oh, splendid moment, go on forever!" This is the sought-for condition, which Faust dreamed of experiencing.

Music is heard and then goes away, and we are orphaned, abandoned... No! A living spirit arises in us, we become enriched and filled by it up to the impossibility of living, breathing and going about our daily business, as claimed in Gorkiy's essay about Lenin upon hearing the "Appassionata."

Meditation on music develops into a special artistic work, and Zolotov has put together his own kind of literary genre; an analogue to it might be Andronikov's "oral stories" which, through some kind of magic, draw figures who have departed, like spirits, out of non-existence... Our author resurrects these "moments of music," of which the following command itself is reminiscent: "When the music is sad, say nothing..." which was stated in the epigraph to a book of poetry by Nikolay Rubtsov.

So there is a paradox here: to speak of music, without frightening it off, without littering it with strumming, vainglorious or learned, but retaining the Spirit of Music itself, in its purity and chastity, in one's heart and before the mind's eye. In this lies Zolotov's talent and many years of skill in artistic criticism. Here a refined taste and ear is required, a sensitivity to playing out of tune...

Incidentally, the word "critic" also seems inappropriate as applied to the genre of Zolotov's literary and musical studies. Alas, in the term "critic" one hears "criticize" and "he criticizes:" he scolds and judges. No, the main point here is not to judge, not to make an assessment, but to understand, which is a good and positive undertaking. "When you read Stasov," writes Zolotov, "you does not get the feeling that the critic presumes himself more important than the art itself, that he is the 'judge!' He speaks of complex things and often speaks in a complex manner, but he does not emphasize these complexities, being sincerely concerned about reaching the reader, having preserved the entire beauty of the art for him" (p 20).

However, I am dragging out the explanation of the literary genre in which Zolotov writes and rolling everything into the "about what" (this is easier), when the **what** is really a function of the **how**. This is so in a work of art, in thought, and even in labor and economics. Why are the forms of our cities, factories, the cut of our clothing, all these "whats" and "facts" that make up the substance of our lives, this "objective reality, given to us in sensation," so nauseating? Indeed, because they were made by unwilling, alienated, unloving labor on the command of Gosplan and the leadership (and not work which one originated oneself, in one's own trade, which is one's own property). The apparatus also creates the apparatus, not life, love or favorite playthings; now we live among these horrific monster-boxes of our barracks-like living spaces, cheerless wastelands from microrayon to microrayon—in this inhuman infrastructure!.

Here, art has remained the only oasis and well-spring for free, creative labor, and in it there is music, which is a **game!** How embarrassed we are by this concept! We ourselves are especially dull and serious. In his Marxist aesthetics, how Kant took people to task for such degradation of the "cognitive role" of art, for non-seriousness!.. Well, now we are the witnesses and victims of this arch-seriousness, in which our history has spent an entire century, having subjected everything to linear reasoning, pushing everything aside like a battering ram, seeing neither life nor nature, sweeping everything away for the sake of one idea and goal which is suddenly exposed as illusory and false.

Really, is it in vain that the people say: when the heart sings, the work goes well and everything comes easily, like playing? After all, happiness with life is the substantiation of such labor.

In this lies the might and joy of Shostakovich's most serious classical music and tragic symphonies: even the horrors of war and human suffering become frolicsome and are overcome by play. (After all, we hum the grotesque "invasion" theme like a march). There is "catharsis" in this, a cleansing and overcoming through co-suffering, as well as co-nsience and co-thought, jointly with eternity and the Truth of existence.

With our excessive Russian-Soviet seriousness, Zolotov guardedly describes Gorovits' piano playing: as opposed to our conceptualists Neygauz and Rikhter (that certain high ideas uplift and inspire them), they say, this is simply playing, which is probably a matter of lesser value. Nonetheless, one cannot help but fall under the spell of this exotic, wonder-working Siren bird.

"Here Gorovits sits down at the grand piano, looks at the hall, comfortably arranges his hands on the keyboard and, as though feeling the keys, begins to 'speak' with the instrument, precisely through his 'seeing fingers.'

"One gets the impression that the fingers "see" farther than the artist himself.

"Having begun to hear him, you forget about the pianist's age. Not at all because he 'becomes young' in playing, but because, in playing, he opens up to his own love of music.

"And of himself as well (oh, how degraded a person's love of himself has become in our social consciousness: "Self-love!," "Egotism!" Yet, after all, this is precisely the mutual love of the creator and his work in the process of creation, and hence the item seems more beloved and favorite—and it will love you, when you purchase it as a thing or good!—G.G.), but (Zolotov also has to justify everything for the serious Russian-Soviet consciousness and mentality, and here I must justify this love of a person for himself. Indeed, after all, it is nonetheless Love! This is a virtue, not an evil: it means that one knows love. When a person dislikes himself, can he really make things that are pleasant for others? Really, he will torment them, so that they will hate everything!.. I think that all tyrants, in the bottom of their hearts, hated themselves: both Hitler, as well as Stalin. And then there is the self-intoxicated, sanguine Stiva Oblonskiy—kind to others, wanting to do good for everyone!—G.G.) Gorovits' love for himself, as well as for the instrument, dependent on the music, becomes an organic part of his love for music, a spontaneous living feeling.

Genrikh Gustavovich Neygauz once remarked that amateurs, if they know how to play, can play the piano better than anyone (p 366-367).

Indeed, Gorovits is like a stray bird from a civilization marvelous to us—from the sphere of service, from the "society of consumption." Yet, we have the snobbery of a society of production (it is incomprehensible what for: Do! Give-give! And it will be obvious!). Even in our musical art, we prefer the giants of heavy industry, the production of the means of production, the "A" sphere. Shostakovich—well, he is like all the 5-year periods. And Rikhter is like the entire power system, the whole plan for GOELRO. The "B" sphere was also fairly well represented in the 1930s by Dunayevskiy's songs. However, in the 1960s-1980s, somehow there were no more songs: the spirit stopped singing and started doing something else—drinking...

Now, conversely, we are being smothered in cheap entertainment which only imitates the happiness that exists in societies of abundance, which comes from their surplus of forces and resources; yet here, the weak and imitative bend over backwards and make themselves out to be jovial fate or a Bakhtin "carnival."

On this, Andrey Zolotov expresses his pain: "...A 'window' was cut through to Europe, to the World Cosmic Ocean, and through this 'window' the Ocean injects into the low-lying atmosphere of our spirit, our self-awareness and world-consciousness, the fatal fumes of the elements of unrestrained entertainment, raging up to the force of the Ninth Wave, triumphantly calling to

the body, but not the spirit, and inflicting its "delighting" blows below the belt (even our author's accusations are elegant, expressed gracefully!—G.G.).

Sometimes one can show directly that the case for great music has been lost. Whatever the day, whatever the hour—the names of all the new, arbitrary "non-composers" rain down upon you, loudly persuading the credulous public that their works—in all aspects borrowed and in any case second-hand—are something "independent" and even "developed on national soil!" Laughter, sin and tears are inconsolable...

Of late, I often hear that "entertaining" and "serious" music are equivalent... However, we should not deceive ourselves... These "systems of feeling" are different. The stages of culture are different—in short, these are different worlds, non-intersecting "orbits of the spirit"...

Nonetheless... true art will not bow its head under the pressure of mass forgeries and mediocre, wretched words—in any genre! Sergey Prokofyev spoke truly: the masses want big music...

"Great, life-saving music is preserved here, even when we do not hear or are not listening to it" (pp 267-279)—as God, Nature or mother—their disobedient child, deaf.

Indeed, in the midst of those enjoying the favor of power and among the butterflies of pseudo-art, in his book Andrey Zolotov gives communion with the eternal energies and beauties.

However, the intonation is melancholy to the spirit: is it not the swan song of high art that we are hearing (it, most splendid, sounds in dying)? In a side-altar of the cathedral of this book, we encounter epigrams at the gates: "The last moments of happiness!"—from Bunin's "*Falling Leaves*" (which also gave the title to the book). Yet, after all, leaves fall during the "magnificent fading of nature:" the limit of beauty, in golden autumn and Indian summer... In the same way, there is also Rubtsov's poem-leitmotif: "When the music is sad, As though the hour of parting is forever..."

In this there is not only mood, but also thought! After all, the giants of art, who translated our bloody and passionate life in this century into music, converting passion and terror into pearls of creation, were not, after all, brought up by us: Shostakovich, Prokofyev and Neygauz; Pasternak and Mravinskiy, Ulanov and MkhAT—they are products of the highest level of culture and art developed by mankind and Russia in the 20th century. In this inertia and tradition, there are still present-day creators: Sviridov, Gavrillin and Vedernikov... However, in our Soviet era we have only done that which tried to lower the level, that which destroyed schools in science and in art. Thus, the situation here is menacing now, both in this regard, as well as regarding human material and genotypes.

However, a modulation here at once: to the memory of live meetings, the words of the person, his contemporaries' opinions about him; we learn about his path toward art; comparisons begin between him and similar artists, the working of his mind is ascertained and, in analysis, as though by chance, unpretentiously refined considerations are expressed about this person's art, which turns out to be a profound glimpse into the essence of music in general. Once again, the story of the direct impressions from the person, words from his memoirs, like a kind of confession... Thus, line by line, the image of the musician and the pathos of his music are depicted. Thus, both the story and the musicological research, and the lyrical confession of ideas and thoughts dear to his mind and heart—from all this, the artistic work of a musical novel is put together. The author's style of thinking is associative, rational thought imperceptibly turns into an image, a concept, into metaphor and back. Gorovits' arrival after a 60-year absence is seen as "the return (as though on leave) of a mischievous son, paradoxically as a lucky man, the favorite of fortune, a 'wunderkind for all time' who appeared in his native home 'incognito' (p 361). Arturo Benedetti-Mikelandzheli 'somewhat reminded me of the hero of Fellini's film "Eight and a Half"—of the talented director Guido. He is a strange person who was able to accomplish a great deal and did accomplish much. Today, he can hear only himself... His professional inexhaustibility and his human exhaustion" (p 352). Yet, his study of Zara Dolukhanova begins in free verse: "At first there was a Voice... The Voice of a woman. With the richness and color of the spicy wine of the Caucasus... The name of the Voice... The Voice did not have an ordinary name—soprano, mezzo, coloratura or contralto. The Voice was named ZARA DOLUKHANOVA" (p 283). Thus, the writer-musician acquaints us with the artist's uniqueness. The playing of Stanislav Neygauz "inspired a sensation of immersion and freedom, of personal liberation under the rays of Neygauz's music" (p 276).

This is not just pretty eloquence, as is often the case with art critics, such as Turgenev's "friend Arkadiy," speaking eloquently in ritual phrases about lofty artistic subjects: Zolotov has his own thoughts and aesthetics on these subjects. He perceives existence as an Ocean of Music. We inhabit it, we walk and move in it, in harmony or dissonance with its rhythms and correlations. In this regard, each person (even non-musicians) has his own variant of the world's Music. Just as each personality is part of the universe, so Music is personal. Zolotov expressed this basic intuition of his, like a tuning-fork for world-sensation, back in his early essay-manifesto "*Your Life in Art*." We have grown accustomed to the fact that only a noted maestro like Stanislavskiy has the power to write: "my life in art." No! It is also your life, the reader's, the listener's and viewer's: everyone has his own path here. There is no brilliant music without a brilliant listener. The highest culture of domestic music in Germany in the 18th-19th centuries was the soil and atmosphere in which Bach, Hayden,

Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Shumann, Brahms and Wagner were able to develop... Perception is also a creative activity.

Zolotov says that each person has his "own music." It includes not only a few favorite compositions by classical and contemporary composers, but, above all, the sounds of life, great overall life, which are sometimes like a person's private property. Maybe they are the songs of the street, or the songs of one's mother. Or the factory whistle, the sounds of the forest, the scent of grass in a meadow, the songs of the sky, heard one day. Or the first seriously felt grief. Or the first great joy or passion.

A kind of Music of the Spirit is born in a person at every moment of strong emotion... This is a kind of special burden, full of splendid and strong secrecy...

Some people have the gift of expressing "their music." There are very few of them, far fewer than there are composers in general, but we must listen precisely to them, above all, because their music will bring many people the feeling, incomparable to anything, of knowing oneself, while the music of the others does not.

"There is nothing more remarkable or necessary than that moment of self-realization through art—through art, which is life" (pp 382-383).

In this lies Zolotov's educational ambition, precisely as a maker of art. "I want to tell you..." These words (Lermontov) expressed the overflowing of the spirit which, naturally, carries over into interaction. Zolotov detected this formula in Andronikov, and it operates fully in his many years of work in the press and on television, where he tirelessly acquaints the broad masses with high art. It is also important that he is never already prepared: he hears the music anew with you, as though for the first time, and he sometimes makes discoveries unexpected even for himself. In the same way, I have extracted many fresh interpretations of already familiar works by reading Zolotov's book. For instance, in Khachaturyan's waltz to Lermontov's "Masquerade," heard hundreds of times, being presented by Zolotov in the context of prewar times, I suddenly discovered the "tragic intonation of farewell and of implacable, fateful, tragic and romantic whirling—an intonation which suddenly became close to many, many people" (p 80).

The book takes us into the world's "musical matter." It teaches us to read "a book of music with the heart," as Galileo read the Book of Nature. Or, as scientists observe the noosphere, as a musician hears the music of the spheres: the "litho-," the "tropo-," the "atmo-," the "geo-," and the "bio-" spheres, the most subtle intellectual "matter"... consonance, dissonance and harmony... All this is made by the will of the artist, the will of the composer, into a Creation.

There is special concern for the thread of Russian music, since its soil—the peasantry and folk melodies—were subjected to a most horrible extermination during the revolution, collectivization, 5-year periods, war and

drunken stagnation. Entire villages and towns, round dances and ceremonies disappeared, and in the "urban-type settlements" a vulgar "mass culture" is taking the upper hand...

That is why Zolotov gives especially intent attention to the works of contemporary Russian composers Sviridov and Gavrilin, in whom there is hope for the resurrection of tradition and flourishing of Russian music in the future. Incidentally, they both admired Shostakovich. On Sviridov, he said: "There are few notes, but much music" (p 30). On Gavrilin's "Russian Notebook," he said "...it seems to me that this is an exceptionally talented and interesting work" (p 189).

One of the essays on Sviridov is entitled "Music of the Spirit." "His songs are the music of inner states, music which, having been heard, one must absorb and not sing to oneself on the streets, but preserve, in the way that we guard personal secrets from the eyes of others" (p 27). The quiet intonation of Sviridov's canticles is secluded and humble. There is the shyness of the Russian spirit, but also its downtrodden nature and its fear.

However, Sviridov is broader: it is interesting that, born in 1915, he absorbed the entire path of Soviet history in his heart. "Sviridov has the strength to elevate and creatively smelt great intonation layers: of peasant and everyday urban melodies, revolutionary and mass songs, the layers of ancient music, the inner poems, the ceremonial incantations..." (p 25).

The main thing is the connection of melodies to the voice, in the tradition of Musorgskiy who, in his words, "reached for the melodies created by human speech" (ibid.). As opposed to the previous stage of Soviet music, the masterpieces of which were instrumental (Shostakovich, Prokofyev, Myaskovskiy and others), Sviridov and Gavrilin were predominantly vocal composers. Gavrilin, who is also a music critic and thinks intelligibly about music, gave a clear explanation for this: "...vocal music is the great-grandparent of all music, and the human voice was the first instrument for music. It is hard to imagine how musical art could be preserved from century to century, if people did not have this remarkable instrument ready at all times, an instrument that need not be acquired, whose use generally does not have to be studied for a long time, and which is always ready to use" (p 197). The voice is this instrument, the pipe of the spirit, like a trachea, and it is full of life. Even without a tongue, a person can sing or hum. Even at executions, people sang... The last private ownership of a tool of production, when even one's hands are tied... The most sensitive Russian lay brothers, Sviridov and Gavrilin, resorted to the "natural master" of music: the voice of a person who has nothing more, everything else being nationalized. And from it comes a revival of the pure tone of Russian music, after its century of distortion in various force (and forcible) fields.

In this regard, Sviridov unites voice with the Words of Russia, with great Russian poetry. He has seized hold of

this Heaven of the Spirit (cycles in the poetry of Pushkin, Blok, Mayakovskiy, Yesenin, Pasternak and others), while Gavrilin has seized ancient folklore and the airy space where bells and chimes reside and call to one another over the cities, in the fields, in Russian villages and expanses... Despite variety-show yelling, there is attentive listening. One cannot express the Credo of this direction better than Gavrilin himself, in his article on Sviridov: "...restraint in the expression of feelings, in the application of means, the absence of extreme states, of ecstasy (Shostakovich expressed this powerfully—G.G.), or of hysterics, the absence of purely musical exaggerations; there is no obtrusion or pressure whatsoever on the listener's awareness; in general, there is no vanity or luxury whatsoever, no artistic waving of fists or 'culturism' whatsoever. As many times in my life as I have listened to the most tragic peasant songs, they have never contained violent expression of emotions, never a disfigured spirit. Conversely, they took a direct, open look at tragedy, yet this look did not wallow or freeze in it, but went further, through it: life must go on" (p 198-199).

Zolotov's musical stories help with the process of realizing oneself by listening to music. He is the most necessary guide, a Vergilius, through the world of Music, joy, love, happiness and freedom. After all, these are interrelated ideas and values. At the place where they join, one need only find the magic words, wise and eloquent, and the doors will open into a new world of splendor. Zolotov's texts, although they begin with music, are studies of art in general. Associations are subtly made with painting, the theater, literature and architecture, and the reader ascends into the cathedral of the arts, which turns out to be brightened by life, and helps to brighten up our humdrum lives.

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SOCIAL THOUGHT ABROAD

Revolution, Democracy, Socialism

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[Article by Jean Elleinstein]

[Text] Jean Elleinstein is an independent French historian and left-wing political journalist and author of a number of works on the history of the Soviet Union. He is the author of a biography of K. Marx and J. Stalin. Currently he is writing a basic work on the global history of socialism. Nonetheless, until recently the name of this Sovietologist was familiar in our country only to a narrow circle of specialists. The reason was simple. Elleinstein's ideological and historical concepts, despite their left-wing socialist nature, were for a long time poorly related to the views on the past of Soviet society as accepted in our country. That is why his works were simply ignored by Soviet historical science and mass information media.

Even today we cannot agree with all the thoughts and conclusions expressed by Elleinstein on turning points in the history of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, his analysis of previous stages in the history of Soviet society and evaluations of our present activities and further prospects are of unquestionable interest. Most important is the fact that the views held by Elleinstein in his analysis of the past and present of the Soviet Union are those of one who sincerely wishes to comprehend our revolution, socialism and perestroika.

Following are Jean Elleinstein's answers to questions asked by V. Bushuyev, *KOMMUNIST* contributor.

[Bushuyev] Soviet science and political journalism are formulating today extremely disparate assessments concerning the historical role and significance of the October Revolution and the most complex processes which developed in our country in the postrevolutionary years. Among others, we hear claims that the October Revolution was an accident not dictated by historical necessity and that it gave the people's masses virtually nothing. What is your viewpoint on these matters?

[Elleinstein] Indeed, today the Soviet people assess differently the results of the October Revolution. It seems to me, however, that its significance should be judged not only from the viewpoint of what it yielded directly. We must also recall what it was that made it necessary.

We must remember that after the February Revolution, Russia experienced an entire democratic period which, among others, also contained the inevitable threat of anarchy and chaos. Let us recall that the war against Germany continued, various ethnic groups and peoples in the country had mutinied, the peasants were not farming the land, and there were comprehensive shortages in the country. The provisional government proved unable to resolve a single one of these problems. Discontent throughout the country increased; moods became radicalized both on the right and the left. Russia faced the real threat of a coup d'etat which could have been entirely likely as a result of General Kornilov's actions. Essentially, at that time it was a question of choosing between bolshevik power and military dictatorship.

The bolsheviks rallied all forces to oppose the military coup d'etat and seized the power which, essentially, did not fill the vacuum. The difficulties began after they assumed power. The bolsheviks tried to rule alone. Only for a while did they cooperate with the left-wing SR.

Meanwhile, the situation in Russia worsened. On the one hand, the aspiration of the various peoples to gain their independence increased. On the other, soon afterwards the foreign intervention began, the German and the Turkish in particular. In the face of these difficulties, the new regime was forced to take the harshest possible measures. The bolsheviks had to act very decisively, frequently yielding to the development of the dynamics of events themselves.

For example, the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly yielded entirely different results than could be initially expected. Civil war broke out. Like all civil wars, it was horrible. We must admit that both sides resorted to terror in the course of the war. Neither side can be considered blameless. We must only try to understand the conditions under which all of these events took place. It is entirely obvious that had extreme measures not been taken, this would have meant the end of bolshevik power. Many hundreds of thousands of people fell victims of the war and the terror, in addition to the tremendous number of people who had died in World War I. The foreign intervention, initially started by the Germans and the Turks and followed by the British, the French, and the Japanese, produced more casualties.

Today the point is not to argue whether the Bolsheviks were right or wrong. Possibly, had they failed to keep the power then, a bloody military dictatorship of the Chilean Pinochet variety would have been instituted in Russia. It is entirely likely that had they failed to defeat their enemies, they would have been swept off the stage. There is absolutely no doubt that the leaders of the Whites—Denikin, Vrangel, and Kolchak—wanted to restore the old pre-revolutionary order. Not only the bolsheviks but also the representatives of all other socialist trends and even the liberal bourgeois democrats were subjected to White persecution and reprisals.

In my view, the main problem is that, faced with the need to defend their power, the bolsheviks monopolized it totally. On the one hand, under the existing circumstances, naturally, they could not act otherwise. On the other, however, this inevitably led to very serious consequences. In the final account, the civil war led Russia to the brink of catastrophe. It caused the 1921-1922 hunger which cost millions of human lives. Let us add to this the tremendous number of people who died as a result of epidemics, the essential interruption of all industrial activities in the country and the tremendous reduction in the volume of agricultural output.

Naturally, if one wishes, all of this could be interpreted as the result of bolshevik actions. However, in undertaking historical studies one must be honest and one must see all the features without exception of the reality as it was then. Therefore, we must take into account also the economic blockade applied by the Western powers and the tragic results of the long years of war against the Whites. In their totality, those were the facts which determined the conditions and reasons for the catastrophic situation in which the country found itself. That is why Lenin instituted the new economic policy in 1921. On the purely economic level, the NEP meant a bolshevik acknowledgment of the need for a market. In the 1920s the economic progress achieved by the Soviet Union after the introduction of the NEP was quite rapid.

The new economic policy, however, was not accompanied by steps of political democratization. The bolsheviks remained in power. They failed to show even the

slightest intention of sharing it with anyone else. Furthermore, in the most difficult conditions of the civil war democratic life within the Bolshevik Party itself was, essentially, reduced to naught. Factions were banned and the reins of government remained in the hands of a small stratum of leaders, as eventually Lenin was to point out in his letter to Molotov. During the period of the NEP, therefore, obvious conflicts broke out between economic freedom, regulated by the state, and the total absence of political freedom.

[Bushuyev] In this connection, how do you interpret the views expressed by Lenin and his supporters on the correlation between revolution and democracy? Do you see, in the circumstances which developed in post-October Soviet Russia, conditions for the shaping of a political democracy?

[Elleinstein] I believe that all of them—Lenin, Trotskiy, Stalin, and Bukharin—proceeded from the fact that political democracy is bourgeois in nature, for which reason it should be abolished. A great variety of sources for such views can be found. They are rooted, among others, in Russia's past.

Political democracy was not a tradition of the Russian state. It was only as a result of the 1905 revolution that some forms of democracy appeared, related to elections for the Duma; a certain, albeit quite limited, freedom of the press was introduced. Naturally, this played an extremely negative role. Although, unquestionably, this circumstance cannot be used as justification for all the actions taken by the bolsheviks, it is necessary to take it into consideration in order accurately to understand the reasons for the subsequent events which took place in Soviet Russia in the 1920s.

I believe that the main error which the bolsheviks made at that time was precisely the fact that they did not consider democracy a category of universal significance. In itself, the practice of democratic freedom would have allowed a successful struggle against authoritarian power and any type of corruption. This would have been entirely consistent with Marxist theory. As early as 1849, Marx repeatedly discussed this topic in the NEUES RHEINISCHES ZEITUNG. Banning the freedom of the press would be very dangerous, he cautioned, because without a press God knows what could appear and exist.

In the broadest possible way, if we were seriously to consider what occurred in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1920s, we could conclude that the bolshevik approach to political democracy took only one of its aspects into consideration. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie was able to make use of all aspects of democracy, as confirmed by historical developments.

Unquestionably, during the civil war the ideas of the bolsheviks gained particular strength. The bolsheviks were forced to maximally limit all freedoms, motivated by the necessities of the civil war. Naturally, one could argue this point as one could argue also the question of

whether disbanding the Constituent Assembly was justified or not. There was, however, a kind of infernal logic, I would say, which led the Bolsheviks to go much farther than where they originally intended. Starting with 1921 they changed their line. Nonetheless, the structures which ensured the stability of their dictatorship were preserved. Probably it would have been very difficult to abolish them.

I believe that one must profoundly study the transition from the theory of the bolshevik criticism of bourgeois democracy, which existed until the revolution, and the practices of the dictatorship, made necessary by the civil war and its consolidation after the victory in that war. In this case no simple explanations are possible and not everything is simple.

History is based on facts. It is a fact that during the revolution millions of human lives were lost and a stubborn and lengthy confrontation between political forces took place. Having won, and confident of their rightness, the bolsheviks did not show even the slightest intention of yielding or sharing with anyone the power which they had won at such a high price, acting, as they believed, in the name of the superior interests of the masses. In my view, the bolsheviks tried to give happiness to the people, sometimes ignoring the people's real feelings and wishes.

In my view, here is what is essential in this connection. Even before Lenin fell ill and became paralyzed, both he and a few other bolshevik leaders, Trotskiy in particular, began to realize the danger stemming from the total sovereignty and significant strengthening of the bureaucracy. However, it was already too late. By then the very structure of the dictatorship had become quite strong. Lenin simply had no time to take all the problems which concerned him to the party and the people. He was unable basically to substantiate the tasks of the struggle against bureaucracy, i.e., essentially a struggle for political democracy. Nor was he able to take this struggle to its logical end and submit it to nationwide debate and make everyone aware of the need to wage such a fight. He started the fight but was unable to finish it.

After Lenin's death, Stalin who was a very dexterous politician, was able to promote a division among all of his obvious and potential enemies. Very skillfully used the fear of Lenin's fellow workers of the possibility of the establishment of a personal dictatorship similar to that of Napoleon Bonaparte during the French Revolution. In the eyes of the people around Stalin, Trotskiy was viewed as the danger of such a dictatorship. He had been people's commissar for army and navy affairs and had played an outstanding role in the civil war. To many he seemed a candidate for the role of a Bonaparte in the Soviet Revolution. The historical paradox was that although an attempt on Trotskiy's part to establish his personal dictatorship was expected, in fact it was Stalin who made it and thus achieved his objectives. Trotskiy yielded under those circumstances. Initially allying himself with Kamenev and Zinovyev and, subsequently,

Bukharin, Stalin also relied on the peasantry to whom he promised land and the preservation of a free market. He presented himself as a leader who could guarantee to the country's population future prosperity.

All of this clashed with Trotskiy's theory. Trotskiy continued to support a permanent world revolution. In fact, however, as we know, the other countries did not follow the bolshevik path of revolution and Russia found itself alone, in the position of a besieged fortress. It was this circumstance that Stalin used in order further to strengthen the dictatorial nature of his rule.

Relying on this unlimited power, he led the country on the path to accelerated industrialization, using to this effect the funds extracted from the peasantry. Under the pretext of the struggle against the kulaks, millions of peasants were exiled or sent to concentration camps. However, it was not only the rich peasants who were subject to reprisals. Members of all strata of the rural population were subject to persecution and detention. Kolkhozes were created on a mass scale through coercion. In the final account, the concentration of power became practically total and the market was subjected to destruction. The virtually entire economy became statified. Private trade was eliminated and the role of the cooperatives, which had extensively developed during the period of the NEP, was reduced to zero.

The conditions which had developed at the start of the 1930s in the country stimulated the further development of the policy of repressions. In Stalin's eyes this policy was necessary, for in real life he increasingly encountered opposition within the Communist Party. Such opposition had particularly increased by 1934. For that reason as well Stalin decided to follow the path of terror further, to eliminate any bolshevik opposition both on the part of the old Leninist cadres as well as his potential enemies.

Unlike the policy of terror which was practiced during the civil war, this time such a policy was totally inconsistent with the conditions which had led to it. There was absolutely no political need for such a policy. It was motivated exclusively by the political will of Stalin and his immediate circle, who tried at all costs to remain in power.

I am absolutely convinced that the profound reason for such a policy was the basic lack of political democracy. It was precisely this that enabled Stalin to unleash mass terror against those party members who did not share his concepts of socialism.

[Bushuyev] Bearing in mind this entire dialectics of political democracy and socialism, where do you see the basic problems in the history of Soviet society in the postwar period? How do you see the prospects of the radical changes currently taking place in the USSR?

[Elleinstein] After World War II the nature of the Soviet state did not experience any major changes. Stalin, in particular, continued to maintain his theory of terror and tried to isolate the Soviet Union from the rest of the

world. Although the Red Army had liberated the peoples of Europe from Hitlerite domination, the Soviet people continued to live not only under the conditions of economic autarchy but also in a state of cultural and ideological isolation. This contributed to the increase of chauvinism which, since 1948, was accompanied by an openly anti-Semitic policy concealed behind the struggle against so-called cosmopolitanism. This was particularly striking, bearing in mind that World War II had just ended and the Nuremberg Trials had been held.

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev and most of the Communist Party leadership found within themselves the strength to break with Stalin's bloody policy. However, the roots of the essentially totalitarian state remained. Therefore, one could say that a transition was made from "bloody totalitarianism" to its "mild" variant. Naturally, there were changes, quite significant at that. In my view, it was precisely then that the beginning of perestroika and glasnost was laid. Unquestionably, at that time conditions were not ripe for the further development of this trend. In the final account, Khrushchev fell victim to the contradictions within his own policy. He was removed from power and replaced by a group of leaders who imposed the idea of achieving superiority with the military factor playing a decisive role, to the detriment of the development of the civil sectors in the economy. The reasons for the deformations which appeared in this connection are easy to detect.

In the civilian areas of the Soviet economy, under the conditions of total statification, there was total lack of any competition. The defense sectors invariably clashed with foreign competition provided by the United States. This invariably dictated to them the need to implement an entire array of steps to improve production structure and technology. These steps, however, did not apply in the least to the civilian economic sectors. Little by little these sectors increasingly declined, facing ever more serious problems. The excessive development of the war industry, the role of the bureaucracy, and the lack of a domestic market were all factors which led to gradual decay and the accumulation of unresolved problems.

In my view, in this context political democracy should be considered a structural component of the entire process of economic development and not only as an ethical or political aspect of this process. Naturally, it is necessary as such as well, protecting the rights of citizens from arbitrariness and a monopolistic attitude on the part of the state. Nonetheless, let me particularly emphasize its economic role. It seems to me that today it is particularly important to consider it also from the viewpoint of the development of new technology. If we look more closely at the economically developed countries—the United States, France, Britain, the FRG or Japan—we would see that after World War II all of them underwent a transitional period toward new technology in electronics and communications and in all areas related to contemporary industrial sectors. Let us note that virtually all economically developed countries are also democratic.

This is in no way accidental. Under contemporary conditions political democracy is nothing other than a vital necessity. History has convincingly proved that no country can become economically developed without political democracy. One could say that political democracy is, in addition to everything else, economically advantageous. This is a law of development in contemporary economic and political life.

If we need the development of an information industry and mass communication media, without which no modern economy can exist, political democracy is extremely necessary. I do not say that it is perfect, not at all. We have an entire array of internal contradictions. Nonetheless, it could be used to help in solving problems which are not strictly political. Although, naturally, they too triggered new problems and lead to the appearance of new contradictions.

I am absolutely convinced that the lack of political democracy in the Soviet Union, particularly over the last 20-25 years, largely explains its economic lagging. Let us add to this the virtually total absence of a market. The existence of a market economy, naturally, does not mean that the market is absolutely free. However, it is unquestionable that the development of production on a modern level in today's conditions vitally requires the combining of perhaps even a minimum market with maximal political democracy. Political monopoly and the monolithic nature of a society which, at any given period of development could ensure order and meet some, usually miserable, needs, also create a mortal threat to future economic development. The situation in which the Soviet Union found itself starting with the mid-1960s, and which required the fastest possible implementation of radical changes, was what triggered, it seems to me, the crisis phenomena which are poisoning your country's life today.

Naturally, it is very difficult to develop democracy in a country without corresponding traditions, a country which had lived for decades of political life under the conditions of a totalitarian system. This is another reason for today's difficulties.

It can be said that today the USSR finds itself in an entirely new historical situation. The totalitarian state is being rapidly dismantled with the help of currently developing processes and it becomes a question of encouraging further change and avoiding hasty and drastic actions. More than anything else we, the people in the West who sympathize with the Soviet Union, would like to see this transitional period develop smoothly.

Let me especially note that the reputation of the USSR in the West has never been higher than it is now, after the Soviet Union courageously admitted the errors and crimes of the past and the existence of the gravest possible problems in its present life, and truly adopted a disarmament policy. In the past, on the one hand, the people in the West feared the military might of the USSR

and, on the other, seemed to respect it for that might. Today, despite all obvious internal difficulties experienced by the USSR, the people see the development of democracy in your country and a clear abatement of the threat. For that reason fear is vanishing while respect is sharply rising.

Unquestionably, today Soviet society is experiencing a most difficult time. The old order has virtually broken down while the new one has still not been established. It is precisely this that explains the confused nature of the present situation. The current period, therefore, is raising a great deal of questions, doubts, and fears. This is indeed a most difficult time for Soviet society.

However, as I closely follow the events in your country from the outside, from the side, it seems to me that there have been such periods in the past as well, and that the present should be considered not as isolated but precisely as a process in the country's development. Under our very eyes new and very important changes are steadily occurring and developing. I am confident that they will lead the Soviet Union to a democratic socialist society. Naturally, all problems cannot be resolved within the hour, quickly and painlessly. I believe, however, that the very development of political democracy and the appearance of some forms of a market economy will create conditions for the success of this initiated project and will guarantee its irreversibility.

It is important to emphasize that invariably what is most difficult is to begin, to break the deadlock. Unquestionably, new contradictions and difficulties will appear, and one must be prepared for them. However, they can be surmounted, providing that the country does not abandon its chosen path. Otherwise the situation is doomed to further worsening which, in the final account, could lead to another drama. The path chosen by your country is not among the easiest. However, it is the only path which will allow the Soviet Union to emerge out of a difficult situation and to speed up its economic development, upgrade the level of production and the life of the population, and resolve the problems which are poisoning the present life of the people. Let me repeat that this path is not easy but even the path which the country followed in the past was by no means believed to be easy. If we look at the entire history of the Soviet state, the present path, despite all of its difficulties, path may even turn out easier than the old one.

Naturally, neither I nor anyone else has the right to give any kind of advice to your country. I am merely considering its present experience from the viewpoint of a historian, comparing it with the past and looking at the future of your society. Under contemporary conditions, in my view, it can be none other than democratic-socialist one, naturally taking into consideration all the features of historical development not only of the Soviet Union but of pre-revolutionary Russia as well.

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Capitalism in the 1990s

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[Article by Hans Mottek, member of the GDR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] As a historian of economics, studying the path of developed capitalist countries in the postwar period, I want to share with readers of *KOMMUNIST* my thoughts on the changes that may begin in these countries, in connection with the fact that the struggle for mankind's survival is moving to the forefront, crowding out all remaining issues. These changes will have important significance for all other countries.

1. Man's realization of the threat of thermonuclear war, which led to the first practical disarmament steps in the 1980s, for the time being has not yet been expressed in an all-embracing movement for a complete ban of nuclear arms. The danger of ecological catastrophe, which is becoming increasingly tangible, has not yet been understood by everyone. The demands for radical steps in connection with the destruction of forests, the spread of deserts, the hole in the protective ozone layer, and the greenhouse effect has not yet advanced to a serious practical level. The demographic explosion is having a negative effect on the ecological situation in developing countries. Population growth is increasingly prevents overcoming the gap in the economic level between the developed countries and most developing countries, where it threatens to reduce the achieved successes to naught. As far as the reduction of irreplaceable natural resources is concerned, this danger was recognized even less in the 1980s than in the previous decade. The temporary drop in prices for oil and other raw materials created an illusion, as though this problem no longer exists. The 1990s will dispel this delusion and the processes which began in the 1970s will accelerate. The intensifying moral crisis, which in a narrow economic sense could be defined as the exhaustion of mankind's moral resources, will contribute to reverse trends in the 1990s. The interaction of all these deadly dangers (precisely the interaction, not just the aggravation of individual dangers) will lead to qualitative changes in people's behavior; their attention to society's problems at the turn of the century and of the millennia will become even more pointed.

2. These qualitative changes mean that the struggle to save mankind from global and local catastrophes will become a factor which increasingly determines the status of the economy, politics, technology and all aspects of life in general. However, as opposed to World War II or, for instance, to the struggle between socialism and imperialism or to the scientific and technical revolution in electronics and information, this struggle characterizes the entire epoch. It, moreover, presumes the participation of all states and the planet's most important socio-political forces. Thus, the urgent task of creating a planetary community appears on the agenda.

3. A planetary community is an arrangement of interstate relations which has the nature of an alliance. In other words, the urgency of these tasks requires the replacement of relations, determined only by considerations of profit or by the status of immediate or potential enemies, with relations of solidarity among states and peoples, even going beyond the framework of the United Nations.

Social thinking will also work in the same direction, even within the boundaries of individual states. It will be necessary to overcome strong resistance there coming from national egotism, nationalism and economic groups whose direct interests will especially be offended in connection with the need for changes.

In capitalist constitutional republics with parliaments, the interaction of various political forces will evoke an aspiration to reduce the sharpness of states' confrontations and of opposition in favor of a consensus. In the developing countries, however, such an aspiration will apparently encounter special difficulties.

In developed capitalist countries, making the analogy of politics to economics, certain trends will also make themselves known which, in terms of their procedures and mechanisms, will be outwardly reminiscent of the phenomena of a war economy as revealed during World War II, above all, in the United States.

4. However, their actions will be fairly limited. They will be reduced to state orders which have an influence on the market on the whole: precisely this is an important feature of a war economy. After all, during World War II it was a question not so much of orders to state enterprises, as of orders from the state (the armed forces) to private enterprises. However, the volume of orders precisely in the state sphere has been decreasing considerably in the course of the disarmament so vitally important for mankind. At first, perhaps, it may be difficult to compensate for this reduction through orders for the protection of the surrounding environment, for instance, of the water basins, but to make up for it the situation will improve.

Improvement of the system for state regulation, if we see orders as part of this system, will occur quite differently in the remaining part of the economic complex. This concerns the intensiveness of processes more than the mechanisms of regulation or even of planning, applied quite successfully in the U.S. during World War II.

So, a contradictory interaction between the market regulation of free competition, on the one hand, and state regulation, on the other, will begin to operate in the new stage, since as of the late 1970s it has been characterized by a counterattack of economic liberalism, which began a decade earlier and reached a high point approximately by 1975, against the role of the state and, above all, on the state share in the national income. In addition to this, we should not overestimate the successes of this counterattack in terms of implementing the motto "less state, more market" and the conversion of enterprises to

private ownership. After all, there has been no rejection of active economic and monetary policy and of influence on capital investments, especially in the energy sector. Finally, we should not close our eyes to the fact that neither the successes in postwar economic growth, nor the preservation of internal stability would have been possible without an increase in the intensiveness and efficiency of state regulation, as compared to the period between the two world wars.

Above all, the growing acuteness and broad scale of problems with the surrounding environment speak in favor of a new reinforcement of the role of state regulation. Attempts to rely predominantly on market mechanisms in general have suffered defeat here, although they have had certain results that are also of interest for all other countries. The failure relates to the combined influence of external manifestations of production and consumption, which cannot be ignored (especially reductions in the share of social outlays).

Also, the ever more obvious shortage of non-renewable production resources, which will make itself known in the 1990s, attests to the possibility of a new increase in the state's role. Phenomena can be expected similar to those of the mid-1970s, when decisive political steps were made regarding power engineering. The same also relates to obstacles on the path of economic growth in the developed capitalist countries, caused by the shortage of natural resources, and in developing countries which are poor in raw materials, as well as to the danger of increased unemployment which arises in this regard. Not in the least part due to the moral crisis and also as a consequence of the appearance of new political forces, it will no longer be possible, as opposed to the 1970s-1980s, to resort to raising the number of the unemployed in the name of a struggle against inflation, in which the "liberal" anti-Keynesian counterattack against the state's positions played a role. In view of the strains on employment expected in the 1990s, it should be taken into account that full employment was achieved only in periods of highly favorable states of the market, which were very short-lived at all times except in the war years. Only due to the brevity of such periods of favorable market conditions was it possible to overcome the accompanying danger of growth in inflation and to avoid the tension that is inevitable in connection with turning a buyers' market into a sellers' market and, thereby, into a monopoly of producers which, like any other monopoly, in the words of Marx, requires state interference. Under conditions of the 1990s, the goal of the social movement directed against unemployment could be full employment without a highly favorable state of the market and without inflation phenomena, and precisely this goal requires more intensive and effective regulation with elements of planning.

As opposed to the previously predominant Keynesian philosophy, which encouraged wastefulness with regard to natural resources, an economic policy that will no longer rely on the extreme individualism of neoliberals is more suitable. Conversely, it should take into account

the need for solidarity on a national and international basis, as well as the decisive significance of external influences.

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PAGES OF HISTORY

An Ardent Defender of Freedom: N.K. Mikhaylovskiy's Legacy in the Context of History
905B0025M Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 90 (signed to press 20 Jun 90) pp 93-101

[Article by Anatoliy Slinko, professor, Voronezh State University]

[Text] "They say that the Russian people have never been in a hurry to recognize and study their own domestic luminaries of science, knowledge and social reform. It even happens that the great people of Russia are first recognized outside the borders of their homeland and only later, slowly, slowly, do they gather glory and significance in their native land."

Much of this bitter rebuke is true, but maybe it is even more shameful that there are "enough" justifications for Russian society here, all concealed under the same "special conditions" of Russian life and society...

N.K. Mikhaylovskiy also did not escape this common fate.

Thus began an article 75 years ago, "N.K. Mikhaylovskiy (On The 10th Anniversary of His Death)," published on 28 January 1914 in the newspaper TEREK by a young journalist of Marxist persuasion, S.M. Kirov. It is worth nothing that, under the oppressive conditions of "Russian life and society," nine volumes of his *Complete Collected Works*, including the basic part of Nikolay Konstantinovich Mikhaylovskiy's legacy, were nonetheless successfully published in 1914, overcoming the resistance of government reaction, although not without some gaps. The moral authority of the dominant influence on the Narodnik generation of the Russian intelligentsia was, as before, fairly high. The same S.M. Kirov, who like any educated Marxist, was well familiar with the polemic works of G.V. Plekhanov and V.I. Lenin, shattering the foundations of the Narodnik doctrine, calls Mikhaylovskiy an "apostle of the teaching of the virtues of the human individual, a champion of its rights and a defender of its endless improvement," emphasizing that "N.K. Mikhaylovskiy had an irresistible influence on Russian social thought." On the other hand, the opponent "from the right," D.S. Merezhkovskiy, the "literary enemy," a sharp debate with whom holds an important place in Mikhaylovskiy's articles, also gave tribute to the "ardent subjectivity" of Narodnik journalism and noted: "...in the selflessly pure and splendid literary life of people, such as N.K. Mikhaylovskiy himself, there is something heroic." Merezhkovskiy

acknowledges that the unique aesthetic fascination of Mikhaylovskiy's journalism was evoked by its ideological and moral content: "I know, our aesthetics pass by such people with a scornful smile. Aesthetics! The goddess of beauty could have told them, as the Teacher once told the Pharisees: "These people honor me with their lips, but their hearts lie far from mine." In Mikhaylovskiy's chivalrous service as well, just as in Nekrasov's "pale, whip-lashed muse," there is a higher beauty of love, and dead and cold are the hearts of those who have never known it."

The silence, distortions and scornful attitude toward the legacy of Mikhaylovskiy in the 1930s-1950s, up to the era beginning with the 20th Party Congress, makes it possible to sense a kind of sad presentiment in the young S.M. Kirov's words. However, even to the present day, shamefully few works by the outstanding Russian journalist have been re-published and they are essentially unknown to the Soviet reader.

Let us note that neither the sharply polemic perception of Mikhaylovskiy's sociological ideas by Lenin in the 1890s, nor, the more so, Lenin's assessments of the strong and the weak points of Mikhaylovskiy's social and literary positions in his last article in 1914, if one does not regard it dogmatically, can be obstacles to recognizing the merits of the Narodnik journalist, to publishing his works, to recognizing the topicality of Mikhaylovskiy's spiritual searches in the context of contemporary history. Even 76 years ago, having scathingly criticized the pretensions of Narodnik doctrine concerning the expression of socialist ideas, Lenin noted Mikhaylovskiy's "great historical merit" in the Russian liberation movement, "his sincere and talented struggle against serfdom, 'bureaucracy'... etc." (Lenin, *Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, pp 333, 336). In terms of the objective content of his sociological theories, of course, Mikhaylovskiy was a bourgeois democrat. However, under conditions when in Russia, above all, the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution had been resolved and the success of subsequent transformations depended on the consistency and depth of solution of these tasks, the inability to assess the progressive content of the ideology of revolutionary bourgeois democracy (in Lenin's definition, the "historically real and progressive historical content of the Narodnik movement."—*ibid.*, vol 47, pp 228-229), in the heart of which concepts were formed concerning the sovereign significance of the human personality, its inalienable rights and freedoms, for which N.K. Mikhaylovskiy was a talented voice on Russian soil, seemed like pedanticism and doctrinarism.

Let us recall that in his first work, where Lenin's mighty intellect is fully displayed in a debate with Mikhaylovskiy, important stress is placed on the fact that "in Russia the remnants of medieval, semi-serfdom institutions... are still endlessly strong (as compared to Western Europe)" and therefore the Russian followers of Marxism should "never forget in their work the tremendous importance of democracy" (*ibid.*, vol 1, p 300).

Lenin also senses the shortage of democracy in the Soviet period as one of the most acute problems, which advanced to the forefront after the Civil War. Again and again repeating the idea that our state has suffered a bureaucratic misinterpretation, he emphasizes: "When they tell us of insufficient democracy, we say: this is absolutely true. Indeed, it has been implemented here insufficiently. We need help in this regard and instructions on how to implement it. We need real implementation, not talk" (*ibid.*, vol 43, p 38). In the very same sociopolitical situation, V.G. Korolenko, Mikhaylovskiy's junior contemporary, having experienced the fruitful influence of his spiritual quests, notes that the principles which took shape in the era of the bourgeois democratic revolutions, those of freedom of thought and speech, of free meetings and a free press were not simply "bourgeois prejudices," but a "necessary weapon for the future, a kind of palladium that mankind has achieved via long, fruitful struggle and progress."

During a period of democratic renovation of Soviet society, of recognition of the priority of common human values over class values and of overcoming the deformations of socialism, the sources of which lie in medieval and bureaucratic stereotypes that came from the old Russian reality, we need a new interpretation of Mikhaylovskiy's journalism, an understanding of his ideas in the new turn of history.

N.K. Mikhaylovskiy, as Lenin put it, being a "ardent supporter of freedom and the oppressed peasant masses" (*ibid.*, vol 24, p 334), thought about the conditions under which the democratization of society would become reality and glasnost will be turned from "bureaucratic expression" (as Chernyshevskiy ironically rated this concept in the mouths of the "enlightened" Russian administrators) into an immutable prerequisite for sociopolitical activity: "If we in fact find ourselves on the verge of a new era, then we need light above all, and this light is the unconditional freedom of thought and speech, yet unconditional freedom of thought and speech is impossible without personal inviolability, and personal inviolability requires guarantees. We must remember that the new era will soon become worn out, if it makes people neither hot, nor cold."

From contemporary positions, consideration of the whole set of Mikhaylovskiy's sociological ideas, comprising the foundation of his literary and critical work, is topical and instructive: the denial of fatalism, which absolutizes the infamous "historical necessity," his concepts of law as the unity of truth and justice, his unique ideas about conscience and honor, growing out of a protest against the pressure on the individual by the social mechanism, against belittling the individual to the position of a "valve" or "a toe on the foot," and his revulsion toward any form of advocacy of national exclusivity, national intolerance, limitation, etc.

Let us consider on the latter. In certain articles about "heroes" and the "crowd," we see a level of undeveloped mass awareness in which the "monotony of impressions,

poverty of life, narrowness of interests, and one-sidedness of spiritual activity... unbalances individuality and makes a slave of it, hungrily seeking someone to bow to, to whom to hand over one's will." Researchers on Mikhaylovskiy's sociological legacy usually do not mention the journalist's statements to the effect that the theme of "heroes" and the "crowd" had been developed since the early 1880s "under the impression of the ugliness and horrors of the Jewish pogroms." In evaluating Mikhaylovskiy's position in the 1880s, V.I. Zasluch wrote: "After March 1, a whole orgy of the most shameless persecutions and the greatest cowardice immediately sprang up in literature, which sparked the instantaneous turning inside-out of all their views. Even now, it is impossible without sympathetic emotion to read Mikhaylovskiy's articles, written "in this time of horror... and voluntary espionage," when, not yielding even a step, not taking even one false note, he defends himself against entire packs of "wild patriots, who, like good hunting dogs, sniff every bush to see whether it smells of a Jew, a Pole, a Russian traitor, or generally not Russian." The journalist's field of view included more than just anti-Semitism. Here is what Mikhaylovskiy wrote in the 1890s about the attitude toward the Finns: "...A certain part of our press, calling itself patriotic for the most part, has for many years been speaking of Finland with foam on its mouth. The 2.5 million population of this harsh country has never caused Russia even the slightest disturbance, yet nonetheless we seize on every, even an utterly inappropriate opportunity, in order somehow to establish the guilt of this small, hard-working, well-organized population. If someone in Finland sneezes, people are already sounding the alarm in Moscow, apparently seriously assuming that this is a patriotic deed for which one ought to demand the title of savior of the fatherland. I could understand this, if the guiding feeling in this regard were envy, because for us, really, there is something to envy in Finland, if even, for instance, the fact that there is less poverty and greater literacy there than here. Of course, this is not a good feeling, yet it nonetheless can be linked to a love of one's homeland and, under this condition, would at least demand concern for decreasing poverty and strengthening literacy and the feeling of dignity in one's home. However, a certain segment of our press in most cases considers literacy harmful... Therefore, it is not at all disposed to envy Finland. However, precisely so, it is not thinking about acquiring or strengthening Finland's good relations toward and Russia and all Russians. For its part, it is doing everything to generate a hate for Russia in Finland. Thus, its pretension not only to a monopoly on patriotism, but even to the most simple, natural love of the homeland is not justified from any viewpoint whatsoever." National intolerance, in the journalist's conviction, signifies only the vulgarization of a patriotic feeling as a school in which, in Saltykov-Shchedrin's words, "the person is developed toward perception of the idea of mankind," a vulgarization of "common human, humane ideas."

Mikhaylovskiy's concepts about the literary process of his time (on the works of L.N. Tolstoy, F.M. Dostoyevskiy, I.S. Turgenev, M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin, G.I. Uspenskiy, A.P. Chekhov, A.M. Gorkiy, et. al.) in recent decades, beginning with the opening article by G.A. Byaliy to the one-volume work of critical articles by Mikhaylovskiy, published in 1957, have been the object of literary study more than once. However, as before, in our opinion, they require special illumination of the critic's excursion into the history of literature for the purpose of using the classical heritage for social and journalistic purposes. In Korolenko's words, Mikhaylovskiy "knew how to seize the basic vital nerve of the intelligentsia, to define its right to an independent role and its great significance in social life..." This idea also fully relates to the artistic intelligentsia, to the "basic vital nerve" of literature. "I love literature," Mikhaylovskiy wrote, "as the sole organ for the expression of Russian thought, loud enough that it can be heard in the North and the South, in the East and the West; in remembering, what color literature has and will have in our poor, gray life, crawling lower than grass and flowing more quietly than water; it pains the heart when this sole organ of Russian thought sounds hoarse and strained: I hate that current in literature which, in foolish blindness or blind malice, suicidally threatens the freedom of the printed word and shouts out: 'Arrest! Catch! Pursue! Kill!' I also hate that other current, which carries it knows not what, it knows not why, today one, tomorrow another, and shames the sacred banner of literature with its criminal thoughtlessness or thoughtless criminality. I revere the memory of those who carried this banner to the end. I can remember all the nuances of sadness and malice, hope and disillusionment, triumph and despair, that the people who take this great, but difficult path encounter..."

In the critic's opinion, the images created by past literature retain journalistic topicality not only due to the breadth of artistic vision, but also due to the extraordinarily slow progress of morals, the retention of old ways of life with an unusual tenacity. Thus, in particular, the image of Griboyedov's Chatskiy is organically included in Mikhaylovskiy's writings. In the article "Everyday and Artistic Dramas," written in 1879, at the very start of the second revolutionary situation, Mikhaylovskiy directly emphasizes that Chatskiy "still lives and has the right to live, because the "enemy of books, who was placed on the scientific committee and who, with a shout, demanded oaths that no one will know or study grammar" also lives; Molchalyn still lives and has not yet "broken the silence of the press;" those "fathers of our fathers, whom we should take for models" and those "rich from robbery, who have found protection from the court through kinship, through the magnificent structure of the palace, where they are drenched in feasts and in extravagance..." also live; Repetilov and Zagoretskiy live, Famusova and Skalozub live; Skalozub's threat still lives: "Let Voltaire's sergeant major form you up into three columns, let him calm you down in an instant." Therefore, in the critic's conviction, "those readers and

viewers who believe that 'Mad With Grief' is just a funeral epitaph, adorning the grave of the past, are naive: 'blessed is the believer, warm is the world for him,' but to make up for it, how cold it is for he who does not believe!"

Mikhaylovskiy remarks that "many of those who view 'Mad With Grief' as a great classical work, a model of accuracy and well-aimed satire, do not even suspect that the scourge of this satire mercilessly plays along their own backs." The proud faith in the "current century" is corrected by skeptical thoughts about the recent past. The epoch of hopes for social renovation—the 1860s—brought very modest results: "The sun rose. Then the sun set. The owls and eagle owls fluttered their wings and struck up their gloomy, funereal song." At the turn of the 1860s-1970s, Mikhaylovskiy, still a beginning journalist, recalling recent times, wrote: "Everything vulgar and dirty, everything which until now had crawled and hissed like a snake has proudly raised its head, everything honest has died away and literature has turned... I do not know, reader, what it has turned into; I cannot find a name for this monstrous mixture of denunciations, lies, stupid misunderstandings and loud words... It is terrible to look back on the time that we recently endured, to such an extent everything in it is shameful..."

Now, in the 1880s, in the journalist's opinion, the bitter experience of recent history, attesting to the brevity and zig-zag nature of Russian progress, must not be forgotten. The morals and customs which sparked the noble protest have not yet gone to their historical grave and contemporary reality gives no fewer grounds for "a million torments" than past times: "Dreams of freedom and liberation have been smashed to bits by the whip and the military genius of Skalozub, by the servility of Molchalyn, by Famusova's ideas, by Repetilov's unforgivable lies, and by the effrontery of Zagoretskiy." However, some fragment of "Chatskiy's wounded spirit" exists and lives on in every decent Russian person.

Two and a half years later, when Russia was lashed by the next wave of political reaction that began after the defeat of "Narodnaya Volya," Mikhaylovskiy once again turns to the image of Chatskiy. In the journalistic review ZAPISKI SOVREMENNIKA, he includes the commentary "Three Misanthropes." Veselovskiy's work "Studies on Moliere. Misanthrope," which compares Shakespeare's Timon Afinskiy, Moliere's Alceste and Griboyedov's Chatskiy, served as its subject. In the critic's opinion, the basic motif on the grounds of which these persons were compared, the encounter with baseness, has profound contemporary meaning: in Mikhaylovskiy's interpretation, Chatskiy is an intelligent, well-developed and exceptional person who is unfamiliar with the baser qualities of people in the "moral gutters:" "He does not understand that the Moscow Baroness Sofia Pavlovna Famusova can in no way recognize his god as her own. For him it is incomprehensible that the repulsive Molchalyn, precisely because he is repulsive, may end up being his happy rival. He sees nothingness and considers it dangerous for himself, for he cannot

accommodate the thought of how despicable it is and to what methods it resorts to achieve an intended goal." Not Chatskiy himself, but random, incidental circumstances reveal to him the surrounding baseness. Only one thing can explain this: "...there are spheres, in which an exceptional mind in itself can be saved even in the face of nothings, if only they are scoundrels as well." The point is not only that the personal lives of Timon Afinskiy, Altstest and Chatskiy are ruined: "...suddenly before them, just as in a fairy tale, as if by magic, except not at their bidding, opens up an entire repugnant world, new for them, an abyss swarming with hideous vermin, along the very edge of which they have been walking to this day, not knowing where they are going or what they are dealing with."

"To understand is to forgive." However, is it possible to forgive the foulness that lies beyond the limits of the understanding of decent people? Mikhaylovskiy emphasizes that one of the unquestionable rights of man is the right to revenge: "Pain for pain." "Personal wounds heal over in the course of time," and the acute pain from personal insults drowns in the chronic pain from the "flaws of the time," in the struggle against which the sufferers will find their only possible satisfaction. People like Chatskiy "go with the light of truth in their hands against the common substrate of baseness and... baseness will recede ever further, writhing in spite and pain..." In the critic's opinion, only such people deserve to be called the intelligentsia under contemporary conditions.

The question of the meaning of Chatskiy's personality acquires special significance under conditions of political reaction. Mikhaylovskiy expressively characterizes modern Rome, which "is built entirely in the national style, entirely decorated with carved figures, horses and cocks. There is no intelligentsia at all in this Rome, or it has been brought to the quantity and quality that are needed, such that the police are not left without educated leaders, the landlords—without agronomists or managers, the factory owners—without engineers. In this Rome, the muzhik enjoys unusual respect: he sits in the main corner, extraordinarily happy because the lords respect him. In this Rome, freedom has been granted to profit and thought has been locked in the dungeon. This Rome, finally, is thoroughly steeped in hypocrisy in general and in sanctimoniousness in particular..."

The intelligentsia, in the meaning that Mikhaylovskiy gives to the concept, has no place here. Under such conditions in an environment of Chatskiys, the principle "pain for pain" cannot help but be asserted and, in the critic's words, "somewhere about us more than a million torments are seething." Mikhaylovskiy indicates that hypocrisy is a form of this baseness, to the struggle against which he summons contemporary Chatskiys: "Hypocrisy is a characteristic feature of the present day. Predatory instincts are shrouded in hypocrisy, all the graves of the fallen are decorated with hypocrisy, and hypocrisy hangs over all of Russia like a leaden storm cloud. You hear business-like speeches whose creators themselves know that these speeches are idle. You see

poseurs, wringing their hands over the fact that they themselves were almost literally burned up yesterday, yet burning that which yesterday they bowed to in prayer. You read invitations to merge with the people and easily discover that there is nothing behind these fiery invitations but mercenary motives and a hate of light. You see people, beating their breasts with their right hands in the name of an ideal, at the same time clutching forgeries or betrayals in their left hands."

When hypocrisy and baseness become the main springs of social life, the Chatskiys "having one way or another finished their personal accounts, vent their pain in the struggle against baseness in general." Here the most difficult tests await them, because baseness and hypocrisy rely not only on the patronage of power; they also rely on the support of philistine social opinion, strong routine, sluggishness and moral laxity. As the critic emphasizes, "baseness is strong through its general accessibility for the majority, it can permeate the whole atmosphere, settle into institutions and social groups, and grow into whole walls which, perhaps, no battering ram whatsoever can handle."

It is easy to see that Mikhaylovskiy uses Griboyedov's image in order to formulate the questions of the position of contemporary revolutionaries, of their right to revenge ("pain for pain"), and of the inevitability of persecutions ("intensified obstacles") that await them on this path. He keenly senses the social drama, because he himself is experiencing it. Perhaps the secret of Mikhaylovskiy's charm as a journalist and critic lies in this lyricism of spiritual exploration. Essentially, the critic has foreseen his own fate: a year later (after his speeches to students at a technological institute and the Bestuzhevskiy Women's Courses), he himself was forbidden "to come within gunshot of the capitals" and was exiled from Peterburg.

In the second half of the 1880s, Korolenko, at that time still a young writer, was working on the story "Shadows." It was centered around the breaker of belief in the gods, the great Socrates, who "was for Athens what a gadfly is for a horse." The philosopher told the Athenian people: "I am your gadfly, I painfully disturb your conscience so that you cannot sleep. Do not sleep, do not sleep! Stay awake and seek the truth, Athenian people."

The concept of "truth" in Korolenko's awareness had a special meaning which Mikhaylovskiy defined for the first time: "Any time the word 'truth' comes into my head, I cannot help but be delighted by its striking inner beauty. There is no such word, it seems, in any other European language. It seems, only in Russian are truth and justice one and the same word, somehow merged into one great whole. Truth, in this tremendous meaning of the word, has always been the goal of my searches."

Korolenko's model of the "breaker," the "scavenger" Socrates, the philosopher whose words made "the faces of tyrants grow pale and the eyes of young men begin to burn with the fire of discontent and honest fury..." also

became a poetic apotheosis of the searches for a "dual truth" by the leading Russian intelligentsia. In Figner's words, Mikhaylovskiy's journalism helped "develop and strengthen a revolutionary attitude toward reality."

Back in the early 1870s, in a letter to P.L. Lavrov, Mikhaylovskiy remarked: "It is hard to prepare people for a revolution in Russia, to prepare them to meet the revolution as they ought to, can and, consequently, should." All his work in the legal and illegal press was, in the final account, subordinate to the goal clearly defined here. The journalist fully realized that the paths of revolutionary process under conditions of the political backwardness of the popular masses are hard to predict and the prospects for a popular uprising are lost in the haze of the distant future. "It is impossible to see all the peripetia of the future struggle," he writes, addressing the revolutionary intelligentsia in "Political Letters of a Socialist." "A Russian popular uprising may elevate a genial, ambitious Caesar, a demigod before whom the unfortunate homeland will submissively bow its head; a European socialist uprising may spark the intervention of imperial Russian troops, which have already established "order" in Hungary and "have saved the kings" in Italy. Who knows what combinations are possible outside the vicious circle of the constitution and the popular uprising on which our political thought revolves." However, the ambiguity of the prospects does not prevent Mikhaylovskiy from confidently formulating the task for the present: the revolutionary overthrow of autocratic power. The logic of the struggle will suggest later steps: "It is a time to live, a time to fight! 'peace and good will' belongs to the distant future. We will not wait for it."

An ideologue of peasant democracy, Mikhaylovskiy was sure that a revolutionary party will receive mass support if it knows how to maintain the unity of principles advanced by its predecessors: "Land and liberty." "The Russian people," he writes, "will champion only that liberty which will guarantee them land." He was doomed to endure the tragedy of the "Narodnaya Volya," to whose leading lights he bowed to the end of his days.

Mikhaylovskiy believed and predicted that a period of hard times and strict reaction will be followed by a powerful upsurge in social struggle, a revival of democratic ideals on a new basis. In 1891, he wrote: "Those who rejoice at the form of peace and quiet which reigns in the gloomiest historical periods of universal depersonalization and persecution of critical thought are greatly mistaken. It is quiet, but a system which raises rams should not, strictly speaking, be surprised when one fine day the entire flock shies to the side."

The idea of sympathy for the working people and the oppressed masses is a common thread running through Mikhaylovskiy's entire journalistic activity of more than 40 years. His thinking was a kind of accumulator for the humanitarian knowledge of the epoch and he, unquestionably, is one of the best Russian journalists of the period which Lenin characterized in L.N. Tolstoy's words: "Everything has been turned over here and is

only starting to sink in" (ibid., vol 20, p 100)—a period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. Feverish searches in theory, attempts to systematize the achievements of contemporary science and to subordinate them to the tasks of liberating the human personality and, above all, the oppressed masses of working people, the ultra-critical perception of reality and the aspiration to link opposition journalism to the practice of the liberation movement are all characteristic features of the social and literary activity of Mikhaylovskiy in all its stages.

A continuation and a part of this activity was his critical literary articles. Therefore, Mikhaylovskiy, as a literary critic, was a supporter of literature's direct and active interference in social life. For him, the way was "bold and honest literature, open, having demanded a report on all phenomena of life, and always ready to account for each of its steps." In addressing the greatest literary phenomena of the time, Mikhaylovskiy substantiated a number of fundamentally important ideas which retain intransigent historical value. Thus, in the article "The Right and the Left Hands of Lev Tolstoy," the critic not only raises the question of the strong ("right") and weak ("left") aspects of Tolstoy's work, but also attempts to reveal the mechanism of this contradiction, relating it to the process of the writer's switch to positions of the "employed classes" and the peasantry. In understanding the evolution of a "great writer of the Russian land," Mikhaylovskiy outstrips not only his contemporaries, but, in a certain sense, Plekhanov as well, for whom "Tolstoy was and, to the end of his life, remained a big landowner." For Mikhaylovskiy, Tolstoy's "right" lay in his "tempestuous and profound democracy," in the fact that the interests of the working people and peasantry were at the center of his attention. In Plekhanov's opinion, the "simple people" in general "had no independent interest in the eyes of the count-writer." In understanding Tolstoy's attitude toward the people, Mikhaylovskiy is far closer to Lenin's point of view, than Plekhanov's. Despite Plekhanov's great theoretical mind, insufficient understanding and an underestimation of the role of peasant democracy in the development of Russian social (including artistic) consciousness is obviously telling in his attitude toward Tolstoy. Lenin's point of view, conversely, was distinguished by a sensitivity to the progressive meaning of the Narodnik movement.

It goes without saying, we should not exaggerate the similarity of Mikhaylovskiy's concepts on Tolstoy to Lenin's concept. Lenin's articles deeply study the objective conditions which generated Tolstoy's views and teachings, and thus the methodological bases are laid for a fundamentally new approach to the study of his work. In Mikhaylovskiy's articles, these views are seen only as a fact of the writer's awareness. However, precisely Mikhaylovskiy approached the understanding of the strong and weak aspects of Tolstoy's world outlook as an expression of his democratic searches, having seen the problem of the people in the center of these searches.

Dogmatic defense of Narodnik ideas was also reflected in Mikhaylovskiy's comprehension of the general laws of the literary movement. Thus, although the critic observed the development of M. Gorkiy with intense interest and sensitivity, he was unable to establish the direction of this development, the writer's convergence with the workers movement. At the same time, one cannot help but see that up to the end of his literary and critical activity, Mikhaylovskiy judged literature from the positions of a democrat and humanist. His solid reputation as a fighter against social and literary reaction, his sharp interest in new literary phenomena and his profound understanding of individual features of talent determined his authority as a literary critic.

His best aspects—his consistent defense of the ideals of humanism and social justice, spiritual passion, remarkable journalistic talent and high philosophical and aesthetic culture, moral exigency and lack of "idolatry"—are N.K. Mikhaylovskiy's legacy to the near and dear intelligentsia of our time. The right of modern readers to complete familiarization with the most significant models of Russian social thinking, including the works of the opponents and the resisters of revolutionary democracy, cannot be questioned. However, this is even more necessary so that the entire wealth of Russian democratic and revolutionary-democratic culture can become the property of the people and enter the context of contemporary sociopolitical consciousness. The legacy of the journalist to whom this article is devoted also belongs to our "golden fund."

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The Stalinist Repressions and Soviet Justice

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[Text] In our opinion, two key themes in articles on the Stalinist repressions remain, as before, insufficiently studied. It is a question, first, of the development of Soviet legislation, justice and statehood in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Precisely at that time, tendencies began to appear more distinctly in state and legal building which, in the final account, in our opinion, led to the mass repressions. Second, the tens and hundreds of cases of opposition to the repressions of the part of the justice employees themselves requires interpretation. Both the one and the other are still insufficiently studied, and this circumstance greatly simplifies historical realities and impoverishes our concept both of the sources of Stalinism, as well as of the events that happened at that time, which means that it reduces our ability to see present-day problems and to understand what still hinders the building of a rule-of-law state.

The NEP and Legality

The Civil War, the foreign intervention and the practice of "war communism" left the young Soviet republic a very difficult legacy in the area of state and legal building. In the early 1920s, this was displayed in many ways, often in very serious and dangerous forms. This refers not only to mass criminality, the homeless children, the extreme neglect of legislation, etc., but also erroneous positions on the theoretical order. For instance, a statement by N. Bukharin relating to 1920, when the practice of "war communism" had already outlived itself, is characteristic: "...Proletarian compulsion in all its forms, beginning with executions and ending with the mandatory labor obligation, is, paradoxical though this may sound, a way to develop communist mankind from the human material of the capitalist era" (*"Ekonomika Perekhodnogo Perioda"* [Economics of the Transitional Period], Part 1. "General Theory of the Transformational Process." Moscow, 1920, p 146). It is easy to see that precisely such views contributed most of all to the ideology of Stalinism, to how it took shape later, and was then taken to arms in practical work with "human material" in a number of countries. It is noteworthy, however, that even in the mid-1920s the situation had begun to change for the better: the favorable influence of the new economic policy and the legislation put into practice by it was telling.

The laws reinforced the democratic institutions inherent in the NEP and substantially expanded the bounds of what was permitted in economic activity and trade. The social and legal protection of citizens was strengthened, legal foundations for the activity of bodies of power were made more solid, and responsibility of officials for the jobs entrusted to them was raised. Legislation in those years and the practice of its application were an important and, moreover, decisive factor in implementing the NEP and contributed (true, not always consistently) to asserting the principles of legality, justice and humanism.

In the mid-1920s, which must be noted specially, the political life of Soviet society was relatively stable. This was displayed, in particular, in the reduction of the number of so-called state crimes in those years. From 1922 to 1926, their share in the overall mass of crimes decreased by a factor of 7. On introducing the NEP, having drafted legislation conforming to this policy and having ensured its observance, Soviet power in a relatively brief period of time achieved the weakening of class hatred and ensured a fairly high level of consolidation of society, creating conditions for the conversion from civil war to civil peace.

We see this as the "secret" of the NEP, the source of its tremendous creative strength in all areas of life in Soviet society. The successes in economic building were so impressive that they were noted abroad. In particular, they attracted the attention of communist and social democratic parties in foreign countries, increasingly confirming faith in the future of socialism. "...The trends of

development are such," wrote Bauer, one of the leaders of Austrian social democracy, in 1925, "that if the Russians are left in peace, they will give us experimental proof that business can occur without capitalists."

Such was the position of the Republic of Soviets in the mid-1920s, and such were its trends of development. Their essence lay in strengthening law and order, expanding democracy, and reinforcing the social and legal protection of Soviet citizens.

Signs of Trouble To Come

In the late 1920s, command-order methods of management began to gain strength and extraordinary measures began to be applied more broadly. In 1927, the USSR TsIK Presidium passed a resolution, aimed, as is apparent from its text, at strengthening the struggle against sabotage, arson, fires and damage of equipment. It goes without saying, it was necessary to fight against such dangerous crimes, including by using criminal and legal means. However, if we take the positions of law, first, only a court can apply criminal punishment. The TsIK Presidium did not take this principle into account, having granted the OGPU (this was in 1927!) the right to try such cases in an extra-judicial procedure "right up to applying the highest measure of punishment." Second, before applying punishment, it is necessary to answer, in particular, the question of whether the accused acted intentionally or carelessly. The USSR TsIK Presidium also erred here, despite commonly recognized principles of law, having prescribed the use of criminal punishment against a culprit who had acted "both with, as well as without malicious intent."

Today, it is hard to answer the question of how such a legislative act could appear 10 years after the revolution by Soviet power, under conditions of the NEP. Which was greater: the ignorance of its authors, or their desire to return to the terror of the first years of Soviet power? Those were the years when the VChK journal KRASNYY TERROR instructed: "In a case, do not seek condemning items of evidence as to whether the accused rose against the Soviets with a weapon, or with words." This "instruction" was criticized by V.I. Lenin.

The USSR TsIK Presidium resolution under consideration, being incompatible with the principles of law, canceled out the norms of the all-Union and Union-republic legislation that existed at that time, based on these principles, and opened a path for a new wave of terror. However, the legal system asserted in the country in the period of the NEP turned out to be rather sturdy. Moreover, young Soviet jurisprudence obstructed the extraordinary measures. Like other social sciences in the first years of Soviet power, Soviet jurists did not immediately come to the idea of a rule-of-law state. However, under the influence of realities that took shape in the mid-1920s in state and legal building, justice, and legality, some of the jurists began to lean toward the idea that a Soviet state ought to be built as a rule-of-law state from the very start. Moreover, in the legal literature of

those years, statements appeared to the effect that the Republic of Soviets was already a rule-of-law state. Of course, from the positions of our present concepts, one can disagree with this rather categorical claim. It is a question in this case of something else. With the shift in the late 1920s toward reviving the command-order methods of management, the supporters of an authoritarian state made haste to strike a blow against the idea of a socialist rule-of-law state and rebuff the efforts by jurists to continue the development of this concept.

A speech by one of Stalin's closest associates, L. Kaganovich, VKP(b) Central Committee secretary, Politburo candidate member, was quite typical. On 4 November 1929, at the Institute for Soviet Building and Law, he gave a speech on "Twelve Years of Building the Soviet State and the Struggle Against Opportunism." "...We reject the concept of a rule-of-law state..." declared the speaker. "If a person claiming the title of Marxist speaks seriously of a rule-of-law state and, the more so, applies the concept of 'rule-of-law state' to the Soviet state, this means that he... is deviating from Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state" (SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I REVOLYUTSIYA PRAVA, No 1, 1930).

Kaganovich's report contributed to the persecution of jurists, not only supporters of a rule-of-law state, but also those who in one form or another in general supported the need to observe legality. Their research efforts were declared attempts to revive bourgeois legal concepts and even "sabotage on the legal front." The consequences of the defeat of jurisprudence are truly enormous. This defeat in the late 1920s accelerated the process of converting the Soviet state into a totalitarian state. Thus, it increasingly strengthened the inevitability of mass repressions in the mid-1930s, 1940s and early 1950s. This was one of the first signs of the troubles to come.

Right after the defeat of juridical science, the break-up of the legal system implemented by the NEP was begun and, along with it, the guarantees of human rights were destroyed and broader scope was created for arbitrariness and illegality. In connection with this, above all let us note the TsIK and the USSR SNK 7 August 1932 resolution "On Protecting the Property of State Enterprises, Kolkhozes and Cooperatives and Strengthening Social (Socialist) Ownership," known among the people as the "law from seventh-eighth."

This "law" was Stalin's child and was passed on his initiative. Regardless of the nature and significance of that which was stolen, the law stipulated execution with confiscation of property. Only given the existence of mitigating circumstances did the court have the right to sentence the accused to imprisonment for a period of no less than 10 years.

Soon after the resolution was issued, it was explained that it should be applied not only to those accused of theft, but also to those who are guilty of slaughtering cattle (in the public sector), as well as to officials who

have tolerated negligence in the use of horses or other work animals, leading their death.

In turn, the resolution obliged the collegium of the RSFSR NKYu to prosecute all persons accused of attempts to deceive the state in the inventory of crops in sovkhozes and kolkhozes (concealing the planted area, decreasing the crop yield, etc.), in the most serious cases using the 7 August 1932 resolution.

The practice of applying the "Law from Seventh-Eighth" in 1932-1933, in many cases monstrous in terms of cruelty, led to a sharp increase in the number of those convicted. Thus, if we compare August-December 1932 to the corresponding months in 1931, the number of people convicted for the theft of public property grew in Western Siberia by a factor of 5, in the Ural Oblast—by a factor of 4, in Moscow Oblast—by a factor of 1.5. In subsequent years, the resolution of 7 August 1932 continued to be used broadly as before.

In some places, people were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for the theft of several cucumbers, a kilogram of bread, or a head of cabbage. The Aksad-bayevskiy Rayon Court (lower Volga) sentenced kolkhoz worker Seyfulina to this punishment because in her absence her 7-year old son stole 1.5 kilograms of potatoes from the kolkhoz field. In some courts in the Ukraine, the matter reached the point that they resorted to this law in cases of the cutting of ears of corn by individual peasant farmers in their own fields.

In the first half of the 1930s, other legislative acts aimed at making the repressions more severe and violating the guarantees of the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings were also applied. In this regard, 1934 is singled out in particular. Precisely the legislative acts passed in this year in the area of criminal law and the criminal process were a legal basis for conducting the mass repressions. On 8 June 1934, the USSR TsIK passed a resolution to amend the clause on state crimes with articles concerning betrayal of the Homeland. According to this law, in the event of the escape or flight of a serviceman abroad, his family members of age, living with him or dependent on him at the moment of commission of the crime, were subject to deprivation of voting rights and exile to remote locations in Siberia for a period of 5 years. Then, on 10 July 1934, a decision was made to form the Special Conference under the USSR NKVD, whose activity was directly linked to the conduct of the mass repressions.

The USSR TsIK resolution of 1 December 1934, which simplified the procedure for instituting cases concerning the preparation for or commission of terrorist acts, called the Law of 1 December 1934, also merits attention. The resolution was hastily drafted on Stalin's order, several hours after the report of S. Kirov's murder. This extraordinary law, which contradicted the principles of justice and humanism, demanded the conclusion of investigations on cases of terrorist organizations and terrorist acts within a 10-day period, the trial of cases in

court without participation of prosecution or defense, the inadmission of appeals or petitions for pardon, and execution sentences had to be carried out soon after their pronouncement.

There are, we assume, no grounds for claiming (as was sometimes done in the press) that 1934 was the most favorable year in the 1930s in the political regard. The year 1934 was extremely ill-starred both in the political regard and from the viewpoint of law, since, first, in that year the guarantees of the accused in criminal proceedings were definitively violated and, moreover, the Special Conference began to function; second, the mass repressions had already become a tragic reality at that time. The arrests of many party, Komsomol and Soviet workers in December 1934, allegedly related to the murder of Kirov, attest to this. According to the Law of 1 December 1934 alone, by our estimates, 6,501 people were repressed in the last month of that year alone.

The 1930s: Opposition to Illegalities

In articles on the Stalinist repressions, the opposition against them in the 1930s often remains in the shadows. Therefore, O. Khlevnyuk, who spoke out against the categorical claims of universal submissiveness and conventional unanimity encountered in articles on the years of the cult of Stalin's personality (see *KOMMUNIST*, No 18, 1989, p 98), was right. He is also right in claiming that this segment of our history is extremely little-known, which is why we are deprived of important moral supports, leaving many important questions unanswered, including questions on the sources of society's viability and on our possibilities for cleansing it of deformations.

As the founders of Marxism wrote, civilization taught people to see their own interests in the preservation of social order and public security. The readiness of society, social groups or individual people to resist deformations in the sphere of state and legal building, law and order and legality is an indicator of the level of civilization of this society. From this point of view, it is difficult to simply evaluate the process of change and then the destruction of the legal system that had been established during the NEP. It was unclear to many people as to where this would lead. However, as the illegalities and absolutely unjustified repressions increasingly became a reality, the resistance to them increased and its forms of manifestation multiplied.

Much has already been said about the peasants' resistance to forced collectivization, which sometimes took the form of armed uprisings. The Stalinist propaganda declared them counterrevolutionary revolts, which were suppressed with inhuman cruelty. In reality, these actions were attempts by peasants, reduced to despair, to stand up for their customary way of life, to not allow the destruction of villages, stanitsas and the countryside, to defend the honor and dignity of the farmer.

In the early 1930s, the stream of workers' letters and complaints about illegal arrests, confiscation of property,

relocation, etc., increased. These complaints were also a form of opposition to arbitrary rule and illegality. For the purpose of alleviating the tension in society, caused by the repressions, the USSR TsIK and the SNK were forced to pass the 25 June 1932 resolution "On Revolutionary Legality." It acknowledged the presence of "a significant number of violations of revolutionary legality on the part of officials and of distortions in the practice of its conduct, especially in the countryside." In reality, this document changed nothing. It was a typical maneuver by Stalin and his associates. Soon, the flow of complaints began to decrease, for already by the mid-1930s their authors had been accused of anti-Soviet agitation and repressed.

Well-argued and, consequently, to one or another extent effective opposition to the deformations of legislation, leading to the free play of illegality and arbitrary rule, could also be expected from specialists in the field of law, above all from lawyers. However, the defeat of jurisprudence in the late 1920s introduced a certain disorganization in their ranks. Some famous lawyers (for instance, N. Krylenko) became supporters of strengthening extraordinary measures, and Academician Vyshinskiy as of the mid-1930s committed mass repressions along with Yagoda, Yezhov and Beriia. Nonetheless, there are grounds for claiming that many lawyers remained true to the principles of humanism, legality and justice. One proof of this is their attitude toward the 7 August 1932 Resolution. Seeing the unconcealed anti-humanism of this document, the legal bodies at first ignored it and continued to classify small thefts of socialist property according to the appropriate articles of the criminal code of the Union republics, which had not been revoked and were considered insignificant punishments. Thus, the courts of Leningrad Oblast applied articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code, not the "Law from Seventh-Eighth," in nine of every 10 criminal cases tried by it concerning thefts of socialist property. Courts in Moscow Oblast applied the RSFSR Criminal Code in one of every two such cases. Essentially, this practice was universal.

However, even in cases in which the courts categorized thefts according to the 7 August law, they often appealed to Article 51 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and the corresponding articles of the criminal codes of other Union republics, which permitted the sentencing of the convict to a punishment below the lowest limit, i.e., to less than 10 years. Such was the position of thousands and tens of thousands of judges and people's chairmen and hundreds of prosecutors of rayons, oblasts, krays, and autonomous and Union republics. It is possible without exaggeration to say that this was a mass opposition by the workers of juridical bodies to the deformation of criminal legislation, a source of which was the 7 August Resolution. This opposition reflected the loyalty to the principles of humanism and justice, inherent in the working class and peasantry, representatives of which tried criminal cases on the thefts of socialist property in the capacity of people's chairmen.

This moral position on the part many employees of the middle and lower links of the legal system and prosecutor's office, their resistance to the increased severity and expansion of punitive sanctions (for the sake of which the 7 August 1932 Resolution was issued) was rebuffed by the "supporters" of this legislative act. Even in 1933, they had begun to drive those employees who had remained true to their civil and professional duty out of the court bodies and prosecutors' offices. They not only began to drive them out: many of them were declared "opportunists," "liberals" and, somewhat later, participants in various kinds of counterrevolutionary organizations with all the consequences hence ensuing. At the same time, the corps of people's chairmen was substantially replenished. Those who had displayed "liberalism" in examining criminal cases were removed and replaced by people ready to unthinkingly agree with a guilty verdict.

However, these measures did not once and for all break the opposition of the legal bodies to illegality and arbitrariness. Even in the time of mass repressions, of which many judges and prosecutors became victims, the courts turned out to be insufficiently subservient to the ruling clique. In the summer of 1937, Vyshinskiy, being USSR Prosecutor, ordered the prosecutors subordinate to him to transfer cases concerning the commission of state crimes, "not yet examined by the courts, to the 'troika.'" On 27 December 1937, he issued yet another memorandum, No 7571, on this question. It contained an order not to send criminal cases to the courts, but to present them for the examination of special commissions, if "the nature of the evidence of the accused's guilt does not permit its use in court procedure." Such evidence included the denunciations of informants, the testimonies of false witnesses and provocateurs, and other questionable sources.

In 1934, when the threat of mass repressions had begun to grow, I. Akulov, a professional revolutionary of the Leninist school, tried to resist this dangerous process. Appointed in 1933 to the post of USSR Prosecutor, I. Akulov consistently supported the Leninist ideas of legality in the work of the investigative, prosecutor's and court bodies. In 1934, seeing the strengthening of the activity of repressive agencies, he, in particular, demanded that the prosecutors intensify supervision over the work of the OGPU. In one of his speeches in the summer of 1934, Akulov criticized prosecutors who had decreased their attention to investigation and had approved everything the investigators palmed off on them. He also spoke out against violations of the time periods for conducting investigations. "In Taganskiy Prison," wrote Akulov, "32 people were discovered, held under guard for 2 months. This is here in Moscow, yet what is happening in the remote provinces?"

However, I. Akulov did not remain in the post of USSR Prosecutor for long: he was dismissed in March 1935. His subsequent fate, like that of many Leninist party members like him, had been predetermined. In July

1937 he was arrested, on 29 October of the same year he was convicted, and on 13 December he was shot (in 1954 he was fully rehabilitated).

The supporters of using force, of strengthening and intensifying the repressions did not immediately succeed in ridding themselves of the jurists who had remained true to their civil and professional duty. Among them was Moscow City Prosecutor K. Maslov. In 1936-1937, when the repressions in Moscow and throughout the country on the whole had acquired a truly mass nature and when many judges and prosecutors ended up among the victims of the terror, Maslov, having convinced himself in each specific case of the groundlessness of the arrest, continued to write his decisions in resolutions on an arrest: "There are no grounds for the arrest," "release from captivity today," etc. On 3 July 1938, K. Maslov himself was arrested without warrant, accused of membership in a counterrevolutionary organization which allegedly included dozens of employees in the prosecutor's office, the court, and the legal profession. On 7 March 1939, he was sentenced by the USSR Military Collegium of the Supreme Court to be shot and was executed on the same day.

We must speak especially of the opposition to mass repressions on the part of military jurists. The point is that the overwhelming majority of cases falsified by investigators from the state security agencies related legislatively to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. This meant that the prosecutor's supervision of their investigation (including the issue of arrest warrants) entered the competence of the bodies of the military prosecutor's office. This circumstance faced each military prosecutor and military judge with a moral choice: to act in concert with the falsifiers of criminal cases and carry out illegalities, or remain true to their civil and professional duty? There were many military jurists who chose dishonor and trampled the principles of legality and justice. They made a career of this, were promoted in the service, and received high military titles and government awards. It suffices to name one of them, Colonel General of Justice Ulrikh, who held official posts in military justice from 1926 to 1951. He was awarded the orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and other high awards. Yet, after all, his signature lies beneath the sentences of N. Bukharin, A. Rykov and many other prominent party and state leaders of the Leninist guard, under thousands of sentences for the victims of Stalinism. In the 1930s-1940s and early 1950s, the hangman's work was rewarded quite generously.

A different fate awaited those military jurists who held to positions of legality and justice. They knew what awaited them, but nonetheless the overwhelming majority of them did not disgrace themselves. Precisely thanks to their efforts, the personal staff of the Soviet Army and Navy to a significant extent avoided mass repressions in accordance with the Law of 7 August 1932. A struggle against criminal infringements on socialist property within the troops, including on military property, was waged in those years and was fairly effective. In this

regard, however, as a rule, it was not the Law of 7 August that was applied, but the corresponding articles of the Union republic criminal codes.

It turned out to be far more difficult to restrain the avalanche of mass repressions in the second half of the 1930s, but here as well many military prosecutors and judges did not falter. Relying on the law, some of them did not issue warrants for arrest, others returned cases for re-investigation, and some judges even had the courage to issue "not guilty" verdicts. However, their resistance did not achieve its goals: it was broken and cruelly suppressed. In the 1930s, two-thirds of the military prosecutors were repressed because they had not joined the cause of the NKVD bodies. Among them were I. Gay, A. Grodtko, V. Malkis, P. Voyteko, I. Sturman, and I. Kuznetsov.

For the resistance of groundless arrests and refusal to issue arrest warrants for suspects without presentation of objective evidence of their guilt, G. Suslov, the military prosecutor of the Zabaykalskiy Military District, an active participant in the October Revolution and the Civil War and a party member since 1919, was repressed. His exigency toward the observance of legality was evaluated by NKVD bodies as opposition to the struggle against enemies of the people. In October 1937, Suslov was arrested "for participating in a Trotskyite counterrevolutionary organization which operated in the Zabaykalskiy Military District." After almost a year, on 2 October 1938, despite the absence of evidence and his refusal to "confess" guilt in court, the USSR Military Collegium of the Supreme Court convicted him to a death sentence after a 10-minute "study" of the case documents. This unjust sentence was carried out on the same day (in 1956, the case against G. Suslov was closed due to the lack of evidence of a crime in his actions).

In those years, many practical and investigative employees of the state security bodies were also repressed for attempts to resist illegal arrests. Several military judges also did not escape this fate.

Stalin's death and the elimination of Beriya's group put an end to the mass repressions. The cult of Stalin's personality was exposed and measures were taken to overcome its most serious consequences. Nonetheless, the legislative and law enforcement spheres in subsequent years did not get by without serious distortions. Ignoring the reality of the struggle against crime, N. Khrushchev forced the transfer of state functions to preserve legality and law and order to society, which had negative consequences. Hastiness, diktat and arbitrariness were tolerated in the drafting and passing of laws. Thus, in June 1961 the Moscow City Court convicted Rokotov and Faybishenko in accordance with the law to 15 years of imprisonment for violating rules on currency transactions. N. Khrushchev, yielding to proposals for the more severe punishment of currency dealers, demanded the death sentence for this crime. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium quickly changed an article of

the criminal code and, violating elementary legal principles "by way of an exception," made the law retroactive, having granted the court the right to apply the death sentence to Rokotov and Faybishenko. On the protest of the USSR General Prosecutor, the former sentence on this case was revoked "for mildness of punishment," and the guilty ones were sentenced to execution in the second trial of the case.

When Brezhnev held the post of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, this body of power often allowed gross violations of legality "by way of an exception." Justice employees know of cases in which, despite the law, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium allowed (or rather, asked) the court to apply the death sentence to people who were not yet 18 years of age, "by way of an exception."

In the years of stagnation, the so-called "telephone right"—the interference of party and soviet bodies in the activity of the courts and prosecutor's office by way of issuing them orders concerning whom and how to judge and whom of the officials who had committed crimes could not be touched—became widespread. There were cases of direct bans of the interrogation of officials as witnesses, which to a significant extent complicated the investigation and trial of criminal cases.

In parallel, on a broad front there was an attack against dissidents and religious activists, fighters for human rights and for the national revival of Soviet peoples. Repressions with regard to these people, although formally relying on the appropriate articles of the Criminal Code, essentially were illegal and amoral. Concerning the great citizen of our country, Academician A. Sakharov, they acted more simply: without an investigation or court, he was stripped of the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and of all state awards and prizes, and later he was administratively exiled from Moscow.

A year later, V. Naydenov was released from the post of Deputy General Prosecutor of the USSR, only because the investigative brigade under his leadership had revealed a number of dangerous crimes committed by high soviet and party officials in Krasnodarsky Kray. During Brezhnev's time and with the coming of Shchelokov to the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the practice of groundless refusals to prosecute criminal cases and concealment of crimes became widespread, and there was a significant increase in bribery, abuses of power, deception of the state and many other violations of the law.

What Will Tomorrow Be Like?

The process of revolutionary transformations occurring in the country is aimed at the future. What tomorrow will be like depends in many ways on which lessons we manage to extract from the experience—good and bad—accumulated in the past in all areas of society's life, especially in state and legal building.

One of the lessons of the past in this area is that it is dangerous to use violence. Being an extremely ineffectual means of managing the economy or achieving ideological and political goals, it inevitably entails deformations of legislation and a weakening of social and legal protection for citizens, and it opens up a path for illegality and arbitrariness. The logic of development of the Stalinist repressions in the 1920s-1930s is convincing proof of this. As the deformations in criminal and criminal-procedural legislation increased, the danger of mass repressions grew as well. It is extraordinarily important to master this lesson. The need for an exceptionally well-considered approach in the drafting and issuing of laws to strengthen repressive measures proceeds from this, whether it is a question of the struggle against drunkenness or against crime. It is vitally important for us to avoid the temptation to solve acute problems using violence.

Past experience dictates the need to restructure the legislative process, which would entirely rule out the passing of laws contradicting the most important common human values—truth, humanism and justice. Much has already been done in this direction in the course of perestroika. Law-making to a significant extent has been taken out of bureaucratic offices and has become democratic and open. Its scientific foundation has been reinforced. All this is extraordinarily important, for only thus is it possible to ensure the high quality of legislation, to reinforce the legal bases of society's life, and to strengthen the legal protection of the individual.

Recent practice, however, indicates that the law-making activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet includes cases of making decisions that can hardly be considered perfect from the viewpoint of law. Let us cite only one example. On 28 November 1989, the USSR Law "On Introducing Changes and Amendments to Article 34 of the Bases of Criminal Court Procedure of the USSR and of Union Republics" was passed. As opposed to the previously existing procedure, which stipulated holding the person being investigated under guard for a span of 9 months, the new law doubled this time period. Thus, in the words of People's Deputy A. Sakharov, the USSR Supreme Soviet had created a "illegal law." Perhaps this was stated too sharply, but essentially it is true. In making his assessment of this law, A. Sakharov proceeded from past experience, in which the long time periods for holding the accused under guard during the preliminary investigation contributed to the issue by them of false confessions, self-denunciations and admission of one's "guilt" for crimes not committed.

What our tomorrow will be like in many ways, if not to a decisive extent, also depends on the cadres which we train for work in the bodies of justice. We need people who are capable in any situation of making a moral choice in favor of legality, justice and humanism. The years of Stalinism left a serious legacy in this sense. Precisely at that time, certain "principles" were formed, which were strengthened in the years of stagnation, even today enabling our contemporaries to claim that we do

not arrest people who are not guilty, enabling them to violate the most important principle of justice—the presumption of innocence, etc. All this comes from that tragic time when excited crowds at meetings and rallies demanded the execution of “enemies of the people, of ‘saboteurs’ and ‘terrorists’ like rabid dogs.”

For the moral improvement of society, it is important to know those who resisted illegality in the years of Stalinism, who remained true to the end to the principles of legality and justice, to their own consciences. It would be expedient to write books about these people, to find other ways to immortalize the memory of heroes who, in the name of saving many thousands of innocent people, themselves became victims of the Stalinist repressions. This would contribute to a more just and objective illumination of our history, to strengthening faith among the Soviet people in legality and justice, and would serve to form high moral qualities in our young investigators, prosecutors and judges, the upbringing of their readiness to resist any illegality, no matter what political goals it may mask.

We must speak of one other thing. It is a question of changing the role of legal science in society's life. Beginning in 1929, when the first blow was made against jurists, Soviet legal science has not developed normally. It lies captive to the political formulations of Stalin and the legal dogmas of Vyshinskiy. Apologetic commenting on existing legislation, avoidance of problems which life has raised, dogmatism and scholasticism have become its lot.

Neither the 20th nor the 22nd CPSU congresses gave sufficient impetus for the revival and development of our jurisprudence. In the years of stagnation, the study of sociolegal realities was persistently avoided: errors in the operation of the economic mechanism, which gave rise to the shadow economy, distortions in the activity of the state apparatus, leading to the formation of castes of corrupted bureaucrats and to the growth of official abuses, and deformations in the social sphere that have contributed to the “flourishing” of criminal clans and organized crime. Even now, it is not yet fully capable of actively influencing the processes occurring in the country.

To bring jurisprudence out of the state in which it has found itself in the course of 60 years and to revive its creative potential is one of the most important tasks formulated by perestroika. Juridical science should in time also actively assist in the passing of new high-quality laws which, in the words of V.I. Lenin, are landmarks on the way to developing new forms of life (see Lenin, “*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*” [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 56), to shaping the legal awareness of the people.

In recent years, Soviet juridical science has moved forward somewhat. The idea of a socialist rule-of-law state has turned out to be fruitful. The development of specific practical methods for ensuring the separation of

powers, the drafting and passing of high-quality laws, the principles of building and supporting the optimum functioning in a rule-of-law state of bodies of justice, and the safeguarding and development of human rights requires great efforts by political scientists, sociologists and jurists.

In our opinion, it is time to decisively change the attitude toward the experience accumulated in pre-revolutionary Russia and by other countries in the area of state and legal building. This especially concerns jurisprudence. For many years we have persistently “not noticed” the useful experience of its organization both in Russia, as well as in other countries, and we have not mastered the truth experienced by mankind, which proclaims that inexpensive jurisprudence costs society a great deal. The tragic 1930s, it seems, have taught us nothing: we have economized and continue to economize on jurisprudence. Moreover, sometimes that which has proven its viability is destroyed. Thus, the Military Legal Academy [VYuA] was created in 1939 for training specialists in the field of law. It educated lawyers for the Army and Navy. A whole galaxy of scientists, famous throughout our country and abroad, have come from behind its walls. In 1956, the VYuA was converted into the Military Legal Department under the VPA imeni V.I. Lenin, and this department was disbanded in 1974. Only a short time passed before the professional incompetence of some military investigators and judges began to reveal itself. Juridical mistakes in the work of military tribunals were permitted ever more often and military jurists began to appear among those convicted. This was payment for rejecting a VUZ which had proven itself.

Another example: the Armed Forces until recently had its own laboratory for military legal research. Its staff included about 15 officers and servicemen. The problems included in its circle of interests are hard to overestimate, especially in light of the recent discussions about the fate of the Army: these include strengthening the legal protection for servicemen, above all young soldiers and officers; strengthening the legal means for the independence of regiment commanders and commanders of military ships in order to lessen the pressure on them from instructions, orders and memoranda coming from above; and improvement of the legal status of servicewomen. Now, the military and legal research laboratory no longer exists: it was eliminated at the start of perestroika.

The path to establishing a socialist rule-of-law state is long and thorny. However, it must be crossed regardless of any difficulties and obstacles whatsoever, for only a rule-of-law state can guarantee the irrevocability of the revolutionary transformations occurring in our country and make it impossible to repeat the arbitrariness and illegality with which our earlier thousand-year history is so rich.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Eastern Europe: Recollections and New Realities

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[Article by Yevgeniy Shashkov, deputy editor, PRAVDA, department for international information]

[Text] East European problems are genuinely undergoing a renaissance in the world press. Quite recently, the seventh Soviet-American Summit Meeting in 5 years was held, and analytical articles on the most important outcomes of the "summit" are already beginning to be crowded out by commentaries devoted to events in our neighboring countries: the elections in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the problems of uniting Germany... This is by no means caused by a loss of interest in Soviet-American relations and, of course, not by attempts to play down the significance of the summit meetings. The point is that as a result of the seven "summits" held in the years of perestroika, Hamlet's ominous question for the USSR and the U.S., "to be or not to be?," was gradually transformed into an entirely ordinary question: "How can we better coexist?" Moreover, definite agreements have already been achieved on this account with our partner across the ocean.

Paradoxical though it may be, today the almost Shakespearean formulation of the question "how to be?" is more appropriate for our relations with some of our neighbors. I am referring to those which only recently were called the "fraternal socialist countries." However, that to which we have grown somewhat accustomed, which was created and reinforced in the course of more than 4 decades, has collapsed like a house of cards. In the East European countries, the dismantling of the administrative-command system of a "party state," based on the contrived postulates of "real socialism," is occurring at full speed. In some this evokes euphoria. Others cannot rid themselves of a feeling of pain and bitterness in connection with the "discrediting" of socialism, the loss of the vanguard positions of the "ruling parties." In my view, that which should have happened has happened. A positive process is occurring, reflecting a worldwide trend. Its basic essence is a conversion from totalitarianism to parliamentary pluralism, to a civil society, and to a rule-of-law state.

Who Put the 'Bomb' Under Our Security?

The political face of the entire continent is changing. In foreign politics, the process of deviating from the postwar split of Europe has begun, a transformation of our Union system is occurring, and the military-strategic arrangement is changing. The armies of a number of states in the Warsaw Pact Organization are ceasing to be allies and, really, only a diplomatic shell may remain of membership in the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet troop trains withdrawing from Czechoslovakia and Hungary are finding "windows" at our border stations with great difficulty. By autumn, the flow of trains full of troops returning to the Homeland will grow even more. All this evokes concern not only among local railway workers and, of course, not because there are certain difficulties due to the different sizes of our tracks and the European tracks. The problem is far more serious.

The removal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary (and in the future, possibly from Poland, and later from East Germany) has evoked genuine mental confusion in some and has created a feeling of confused worry, especially among those who have experienced what war is for themselves. We can speak of inertia of thinking, of customary stereotypes as much as we please, we can persuade people that rejecting compulsory supervision over Eastern Europe is a victory of common sense, a victory of democracy and in the long-term will work to the benefit of our state interests, but a fact is a fact: a large share of the USSR population considered and, as before, considers the presence of Soviet troops in this region as a pledge for the country's security. Correspondingly, any attempt to dismantle this system is perceived quite simply as a casualty for defense, since the defensive doctrine precedes from the current placement of forces, the status quo. The removal of troops means losing control over a space, coming closer to danger and, in the final account, changing parity. In parity, as everyone knows, if someone loses then, naturally, someone else also gains. Such is the "iron" logic. No entreaties whatsoever to not look at today's and tomorrow's world from yesterday's positions will help here: the people's historical memory is at work. A different system of arguments is necessary, based on the new thinking and on analysis of national interests and the components of security, including the role of the nuclear factor.

Unfortunately, for the time being there are no integral, conceptual works on these problems, based on the new approaches. In any case, nothing has been heard about them. Therefore, for clarity we are forced in part to use concepts from the baggage of the old political thinking. So, was the system of "sanitary cordons," of "buffer zones" advantageous for the Soviet Union, and can it be preserved in its original form? Let me state immediately: in my opinion, no. It still remains for economists to calculate what the burden of military and political control over broad territories in Eastern and Central Europe have cost our people. And in what form did the absurd attempt to achieve absolute parity with all opposing forces surrounding the Warsaw Pact, express itself, especially if we consider that the Soviet share in Warsaw Pact expenditures has always exceeded 90 percent (the American contribution to NATO is about 50 percent)?

I predict reproach: it is not worth counting rubles when it is a question of protecting one's country. If we speak of protecting its interests, I agree, but if we speak of vindicating its ambitions—no. Yet, in many cases it was a question basically of ambitions. Precisely as a result of

this, the USSR has been dragged into a long confrontation with the combined forces of the Western states, which significantly surpass it in terms of economic might. Having utilized the hypertrophied attitude of several generations of Soviet leaders toward the military aspects of security, the West played up to us splendidly in the insane escalation of the arms race. It did this in full accordance with the American "strategy of rivalry." The number one item in it was and, as before, is the task of "forcing the Soviet Union to activate all its defensive resources to ensure the development of the most expensive means of waging war... This will substantially undermine the military-economic potential of the Kremlin and deprive it of opportunities to re-orient resources for civil purposes." Lamentable though this may be, the West has basically managed to achieve its goal.

Maybe Soviet military might in the territory of the Warsaw Pact member-states performed the role of a stabilizing political factor and influenced the development of events in these countries? The answer is also negative. The socialist community in the form in which we have perceived it for many years does not exist. The postulate that the East European "sanitary cordon" guaranteed USSR security from the military and strategic viewpoints, although it did play a certain geostrategic role, is also highly questionable. I do not wish to offend our allies, but their armies "do not make the weather" in the global struggle. The watershed of military opposition, like 30 years ago, even now occurs not along the NATO-Warsaw Pact line, but along the USSR-U.S. line.

During the recent 45th anniversary of the Victory, we happened to talk to several participants in the Great Patriotic War. They had liberated Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, I decided to ask them: Where, in their opinion, are the most "underwater stones" hidden for our security today: in the North, from capitalist Finland and NATO-member Norway, or in Eastern Europe, where a number of neighboring "fraternal socialist states," including the GDR, have started along the path of reform? Almost all the veterans, including one participant in the Winter Soviet-Finnish Campaign of 1940, answered: on our Western borders. The former soldiers, who in their day were greeted with flowers in Prague, Sofia and other capitals, were perplexed: How could it happen that Eastern Europe, from an imagined zone of security for the USSR, could turn into a region of worry for us? Who put this delayed-action "bomb" under our security and when?

For decades, we have been persuading ourselves that the main task of NATO is to undermine stability in this region. A great deal of what was said actually took place. However, all these years we have tried to avoid studying the original causes. Not once have we tried to analyze why relations in the postwar period between the USSR and Austria, Finland, and, after 1956, Yugoslavia, i.e., countries that had left the sphere of Soviet influence and from which our troops were withdrawn, caused us

slightly less trouble than our allied states and were more advantageous and stable partners for us.

The whole tragedy of the situation is that the "bomb" under the stability of our relations with Eastern Europe was put there by the Stalinist totalitarian system, not knowing what disruptions this would promise in the future. Simple Soviet lads in soldiers' uniforms liberated the peoples of Europe at the cost of their own lives, but the systems that came after the people, shielding the liberated with its banner, threw the bridle of authoritarianism on them. Under talk of the freedom that our Victory gave them, the prerequisites for the creation of democratic societies in the Eastern and Central European states were destroyed and anti-democratic, totalitarian regimes were foisted on the peoples. Attempts to obstruct the conversion of these countries into Stalinist satellites were cut short in the spirit of the traditions of the Soviet GULAG, and its first victims were the communists who had fought against German totalitarianism and fascism.

Guarding the 'Ideological Egg'

The Soviet Union counted on an East European "security buffer," but in fact received a constant source of sociopolitical seismicity which, beginning in the 1950s up until recently, shook the foundations of command-administrative socialism. Indeed, totalitarianism turned out to be stable, since it was reinforced by blood and devoted to the Victory. However, today those outside our borders who are trying to a share of blame in this for the soldier-victors are profoundly wrong. It seems to me that it is not reason which is speaking in those who believe this, but a giddy feeling of acquired freedom. As Cicero once said, "never does one tear rip things to bits with one's teeth so well, as after having been muzzled for a while." In this also lies the essence of the present changes. Totalitarianism stole genuine emancipation not only from the peoples of Eastern Europe: having appropriated our common victory for itself, it tried to make the Soviet people's dream of freedom impossible as well. Today's perestrojka in the USSR and the reformist "ninth wave" in Eastern Europe are echoes of the unquenchable hopes for the full liberation that should have started 45 years ago. It is sad that this was not fated to be at that time. In the words of the President of Czechoslovakia, V. Havel, "totalitarian power, which brought a bureaucratic 'order' into the living disorder of history" was foisted on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which ended up in the zone of Soviet influence. "As a result of this, history was embalmed."

How can we explain to our neighbors for the sake of what this was done? For their security? Yet they did not ask for this. Those who support the old thinking claim that Eastern and Central Europe were doomed: either the Soviet, or the American sphere of influence. A "vacuum of force" could not be unfilled. (Incidentally, this argument, as noted above, thrives to this day.) If we follow this logic, the countries of Eastern Europe should generally have disappeared from the political map of the

continent as sovereign states. Only thus could a "vacuum of force" be formed. However, the problem did not stand this way 45 years ago, nor the more so does it stand thus today. With the exception of a brief period of history in the one postwar Germany, it was always a question of independent, sovereign states in Eastern and Central Europe.

From a military and political point of view, the following explanation seems the most logical: the creation in Eastern Europe of a massed Soviet tank fist, of a powerful advantage in ordinary arms and forces, aimed at Western Europe, was our asymmetrical answer to the nuclear threat of the U.S. The argument seems convincing, but only as applied to the 1950s. The entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the USSR was one step away from the nuclear missile parity with the U.S. so desired by our strategists, makes this scheme injurious and indicates that originally it was not only, and perhaps not even so much a question of ensuring the security of the Soviet people. Indeed, from a military point of view, it is far from beyond reproach. Even in the 1960s, fears were expressed as regards the vulnerability of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe in connection with their disposition along far-advanced leading borders, considerably isolated from reserves. In recent times, experts have already directly declared: the Warsaw Pact detachments are an awkward, vulnerable and extremely expensive military machine, best suited—with all the corrections for the present day—for repeating the battles of World War II.

Now, when we are no longer seeking streamlined formulations and are switching to strict assessments, it is time to put it bluntly: the deformed, distorted form of military opposition between the East and West was basically stipulated by ideological opposition. The accumulated mountain of nuclear and ordinary arms is a material expression of the battle of ideas. Totalitarianism most of all guarded the security of the "ideological egg" within which its life lay.

Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that as soon as the Soviet Union began casting off the shell of authoritarian-state socialism, military opposition also began to subside. This process, positively perceived in the West, strengthened when, at the end of last year, fundamental changes began in a number of socialist countries. It would seem, the joint cleansing should have favorably affected our relations with East Europeans as well. However, instead of the customary dithyrambs about "friendship and cooperation," ever more information is received to the effect that, in straightening out, these countries are leaning increasingly strongly toward the West. Many people in the Soviet Union are sincerely perplexed: Why is there such mistrust of us in Eastern Europe? Why are our allies turning their backs to us even on the question of unifying Germany? Is historical memory really lost so rapidly?

No, both in Czechoslovakia as well as in Hungary and other countries, they will never forget the suffering that

German fascism inflicted on them. However, both the Czechs and the Hungarians have even fresher memories of how Soviet tanks burst into the squares of their capitals in the postwar years. One does not wish to remember this, but so it was. In the entire 30-year history of the Warsaw Pact, force has been applied not so much against those who opposed us, as against the citizens of the allied countries. I foresee objections: How is this so, after all, the changes there began under the influence of our perestroika, do they really not see that we have changed? They may very well see, but it is not that easy to forget the past. They know from experience what the "Brezhnev doctrine" meant.

Tormented Deliverance From the 'Fear Syndrome'

Five years have already passed since the time when our country declared its adherence to the new political thinking. However, the old fears and stereotypes, which people are trying to apply to the new European realities, are still making themselves known not only at the everyday level, which is especially regrettable, but also at a fairly authoritative political level. Rather, this is explained by the sincere concern of those who believe that the processes of renovation in the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe are leading to a revision of the outcomes of World War II by reducing our country's efforts at postwar regulation to naught, are undermining the national interests of the Soviet Union, and are canceling the overall order of Europe determined at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. What feeds these fears?

In my view, the problem is that people are dominated by the experience and suffering of the last war, from which, regardless of colossal efforts, we have in no way managed to deliver ourselves, although this is vitally important for the future. It is not a question of forgetting about the victims and the serious trials that fell to the lot of the people. This would be immoral and, indeed, impossible. However, we must not bring ourselves to a state in which the frightful memories of the past evoke a "fear syndrome" in the present.

In my opinion, something similar is happening to the Europeans in connection with the unification of Germany. Without going into the details of its foreign political conditions, on which many difficult talks still lie ahead, I would like to note that if we really support the new thinking, it is senseless to act according to the "hold and do not let go" principle. The process of unification is occurring and will occur regardless of us, since it reflects the will of the majority of the German people and is democratic in nature. Right now we should already be setting the foundation for good relations with Germany. They need us, and we should not abandon them. One would like to hope that the people of Germany will assess our support at this turning-point in their history for its merits.

Today, people on the Rhine smile at Tacitus' famous statement that the Germans love to fight. Why is this? After all, they have created one of the most democratic,

economically thriving states in the contemporary world. The sober-minded West, which has achieved somewhat more than the East in terms of providing material conditions of life worthy of man, is not interested in "undermining" our security. We will hope that Western politicians are not so nearsighted that they do not realize that, being concerned about not arousing a "Versailles syndrome" in the new, united Germany, they may evoke it in the super-powers in the East.

Let me remind those who consider this argument idealistic or generally reject it completely of a few of arguments from someone else's arsenal. In his day, in an outburst of pride in our security, N.S. Khrushchev said that seven Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles "are enough" for the FRG. R. MacNamara, head of the Pentagon, stated that world nuclear parity already existed during the 1962 Caribbean Crisis. Yet, after all, by MacNamara's information, at that time the U.S. had 5,000 warheads, and the USSR—only 300 (even after implementing the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms, we still have several thousand warheads). However, regardless of such a tremendous difference, each of the sides could have inflicted a crippling answering blow if it had been attacked. These estimates are from the early 1960s, when the world did not yet have today's quantity of nuclear power plants and big chemical plants. Today, according to specialists from the USSR Military Council General Staff, even using only regular arms, all of Europe, with its 200 nuclear power plants and hundreds of chemical enterprises, would be turned into radioactive, poisonous ruins within 20 days.

Despite all the repugnance toward weapons for mass annihilation, one must acknowledge: one of the main guarantees for the security of our country, as before, is its nuclear potential. Like it or not, to this day, so long as military and force tools for maintaining peace have not been completely replaced by reliable guarantees of security in political, economic, humanitarian and ecological areas, the nuclear factor will exist in man's life. I hope that these opinions are not perceived as a call to reject the politically and morally justified goal—elimination in the final account of nuclear arms on the Earth. This ideal evokes no doubts. The doubts appear in connection with accelerated rhythms in the propaganda of the idea of a nuclear-free world. One gets the feeling that sometimes we "play more quickly than the music permits." Of course, this comment is not related to the Soviet-American treaty on a substantial reduction in strategic nuclear arms, signed in Washington. In principle, it is possible to reduce these arsenals even more radically. Our "nuclear interdependence" with the U.S. will in no way be changed by this.

The problem lies elsewhere. To this day, there are no comprehensive, scientifically substantiated works on the priorities in reducing regular arms and armed forces on the basis of economic and military-political expediency. If we proceed from the goals of perestroika, and we will not get through it without a reducing military expenditures and converting of military industry, the first task

should be the reduction of regular arms. This swallows up the lion's share of military resources. The nuclear arms of the USSR are a relatively inexpensive type of weapon. No more than 20 percent of the Soviet defense budget is spent on them. If the elimination of nuclear weapons occurs at sharply increasing rates, then, it seems to me, this may stir up another arms race, but at a new military and technological level. The process of eliminating nuclear missiles itself is costing us a great deal. In short, excessive haste in this matter may turn into a new, heavy burden for our economy.

It is impossible not to take into account that the USSR is still only entering the transitional period, in the course of which the role of the military component in its policy will decrease. The withdrawal of troops from individual Warsaw Pact countries is only beginning. I foresee a question: Where are the guarantees that the USSR's security will not suffer during the transitional period which, unquestionably, will require a new disposition of forces? Of course, there are grounds for concern. After all, a serious military threat may arise not only because of someone's conscious, aggressive actions to destroy the status quo. The countries of Eastern Europe have entered a phase of inevitable and necessary changes, which nonetheless carry an element of instability. In some of them, outbursts of conflict are possible on religious grounds, in others—on national grounds, and in still others—it is impossible to rule out powerful internal upheavals of a different type. One would like to believe that nothing of the sort will occur there, although I would not risk claiming that the possibility of military conflict, related to the internationalization of one or another conflict, is equal to "zero."

Therefore, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact states should be supported by guarantees of the USSR's security. In particular, by the preservation of the broad zone of "separation of forces." The transformation of the Soviet Armed Forces on a qualitatively different base, aimed at deflecting not yesterday's and not even only today's military threats, should be implemented in parallel with the dismantling of our military system in the Warsaw Pact. This entire set of measures will fully conform to the choice made by our country—conversion from expensive parity to more economical and more reasonable defense sufficiency, ensuring protection of the Fatherland.

The transformation of Soviet armed might into completely defensive structures will take, according to the estimates of specialists, no less than 10 years. Reliance on the nuclear factor at a possible "minimal level" is inevitable in this complex stage. M.S. Gorbachev also spoke of minimal deterrence as a possible compromise between our idea of a nuclear-free world and the Western idea of deterrence in his speech at Strasbourg. It seems to me, this conceptual approach opens up additional possibilities for the development of optimum solutions to the problems of strategic stability for the long term, including in Europe. At least, so long as a decisive breakthrough toward a qualitatively new world, in which

security will be based not only the guaranteed threat of use of nuclear force, but on a non-militarized collective system of security, has not been ensured.

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A New Stage of Economic Reform in the PRC

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[Interview with Liu Guoguang, vice-president of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences]

[Text] Under conditions of conversion in the USSR to a regulated market economy, the role of studying foreign experience and the effective solution of social and economic problems has grown significantly. Naturally, the development of those countries which, in solving problems similar to ours in many ways, previously started along the path of radical transformations of the economy, attracts special attention.

As everyone knows, in September 1988 a new stage of economic reform began in the People's Republic of China: the ordering and improvement of the national economy. The 3rd Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, 13th Convocation, passed a resolution to improve the economic situation and put the economy in order. A new, big step in implementing this course is the resolution of the 5th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, 13th Convocation, to further intensify the reform (November 1989). Taking into account the readers' interests in the processes of economic development in the PRC, the journal turned to Liu Guoguang, vice-president of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences, with a request to talk about specific features of the contemporary stage of economic reform in the PRC.

[Correspondent] What are the main results, with which the national economy of the PRC approached the new stage of economic reform?

[Guoguang] In the years of reform, the economic system previously existing in China with its extraordinary centralization and direct administrative control gradually made a turn toward an open planned commodity economic system. Ten years of reform and outward openness have been a period of most rapid growth of the country's economic might, of obtaining the maximum regional advantages for the Chinese people. The gross national product of the country increased from 342.2 billion yuan in 1978 to 1,369.4 billion yuan in 1988. Calculation with comparable prices shows that the average annual growth in this period was 9.5 percent, having somewhat exceeded the average annual indicator (6 percent) for 1953-1978. A similar indicator for the growth of the incomes of the country's population in 1979-1988 increased to 6.5 percent, at the same time that in the previous 25 years it had equaled 1.6 percent.

The absolute majority of citizens are provided with food and clothing, and some of the population now has a surplus.

With the beginning of the reform, in terms of the extent of implementing breakthroughs into "forbidden zones" of theory, changes occurred in the system of ownership relations. A conversion began toward a structure of relations characterized by the co-existence of different economic structures, with the dominant role of public ownership. From 1973 to 1988, the share of the state sector in the gross output of the country's industry decreased from 80.8 percent to 64 percent, and the share of collective-ownership enterprises increased from 19.2 percent to 32.6. At the same time, 2.4 percent is attributed to sectors of the economy related to private economic management, mixed enterprises and enterprises belonging entirely to foreign capital.

A shift has also occurred in management of the economy. Within the framework of the reform, a switch has begun from the previously existing forms of management, which used only administrative measures, to forms of indirect regulation and control utilizing predominantly economic methods. The share of production subject to directive regulation and the quantity of types of material resources subject to centralized distribution on the part of the state have decreased significantly. A noticeable change has occurred in the share of state budget allocations and of bank credit in the overall expenditures for industrial construction. The share of budget allocations, in the past comprising more than three-fourths, has decreased to one-third; the share of bank credit, which previously reached 25 percent, has increased to almost 70. The role of financing, prices and other economic levers for regulating social supply and demand has increased, which has shaped conditions for establishing indirect control and regulation at a macro level.

The sphere of effect of the market mechanism has gradually expanded. Currently, markets have been formed for the output of agriculture and subsidiary businesses, as well as for industrial consumer goods, the market for means of production and markets for short-term credit have definitely developed, and markets for technology, information and labor services, long-term credit, as well as a real estate market have also begun to appear. According to estimates, in 1988 the share of output, the prices for which were determined by the market, was almost 65 percent in agriculture and subsidiary trades, about 55 percent in the industrial production of consumer goods, and 40 percent in the output of industrial means of production. One can say that, on the whole, roughly one-half of commodity prices are already regulated by the market to varying degrees.

Speaking of the foreign economic aspect of the reform, by the end of 1988 in fact foreign capital in various forms amounted to a sum of roughly 47.7 billion dollars; the number of mixed enterprises and enterprises belonging entirely to foreign capital was roughly 16,000. The overall volume of export-import operations reached

102.8 billion dollars, having exceeded the 1978 level by a factor of 5. The open foreign-trade policy is playing an ever greater role in the development of the economy.

[Correspondent] Regardless of the obvious successes of the economic reform, the resolutions of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee speak of a need to improve the national economy and put it in order. What are the main reasons for such a formulation of the question?

[Guoguang] In September 1988, the 3rd Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, 13th Convocation, was held, marking the start of the economic reform both of the country's economic development on the whole and, in the new stage, of improving and putting the national economy in order, for which a minimum of 3 years is required, possibly even longer.

Why is such improvement necessary? Despite some views that are still encountered, in principle it is by no means related directly to political reasons or, the more so, to the "erroneousness" of the reform. It is dictated by the fact that, along with obvious successes achieved in the last 10 years, various difficulties and problems have also appeared. In these years, both the economic reform and the national economy of the PRC have developed unevenly. Most convincing were the successes achieved in the first 6 years, when the agrarian sector was reformed. Since the second half of 1984, when the center of the reform began to shift to the cities, many mistakes were made. The country's economy in the process of its gradual development ran into a number of difficulties and problems. The main ones are: first, a quantitative imbalance which is becoming ever more serious (i.e., the tremendous excess of total social demand over total supply); and second, sharp contradictions of a structural nature (disproportions in relations between industry and agriculture, the processing industry and the base sectors of industry, the material production sphere and the infrastructure). Since 1984, an "overheating" has occurred in the economy: prices have begun to rise on a broad scale (in 1988, their growth index hit double-digit figures). Inflation went beyond the strength of masses of people. By the summer of 1988, a "flight from savings" had begun, accompanied by mass purchases by the population of goods on the market, which introduced confusion into the previously planned conduct of the reform of prices and earnings. Along with this, phenomena such as corruption and abuse of official position, which intensified on their distribution, were also widespread. All this evoked the people's serious dissatisfaction.

The appearance of such problems in economic life was one of the reasons for the disorder in society which arose in the spring and summer of 1989. In turn, this gave even more political significance to the course toward improving and ordering the economy. After all, it is entirely obvious that the prerequisite for political stability is stability in the economy, and that public order

can be ensured for a long period of time only through consistent, coordinated development of the national economy.

Chinese economists have different explanations for the necessity of the political course of improvement. Some see its grounds directly in the existing economic system, believing that it is inevitable due to the logic of economic transformations itself, while others put the emphasis on political reasons, assuming that today we must correct past mistakes made in the policy of development and macroeconomic management. In fact, in my opinion, both these and other reasons have a place.

[Correspondent] Let us examine their combination from the viewpoint of the basic problems of the national economy, the solution of which dictates the need to correct the tasks, mechanisms and rates of economic reform.

It seems to me that, in analyzing the contemporary economy of the PRC, we must above all keep in mind the fact that at the present time the old and the new system of management coexist within it: the traditional, extraordinarily centralized system of a planned economy, where direct control on the part of administrative bodies is basic—this system has weakened, but has not yet been eliminated completely; and the new market mechanism based on competition, which for now still cannot effectively function, since a reliable system of indirect regulation at the macro level has not been created. Investment hunger and an aspiration to develop quantitative indicators are characteristic of the traditional system. However, this means that it contains a trend toward "overheating" the economy. In converting from the old system to the new, this trend strengthens. The point is that the expansion of the rights of economic management at the level of the basic link has created a new motive mechanism, having increased the number of participants in investment activity and having thereby expanded the diversity of capital investment flows. In turn, this has led to a "removal" of national income. The absence of a mechanism for self-regulation at the level of local bodies of power and enterprises in the process of expanding their independence has to a significant extent stimulated the tempestuous growth of capital investments and the growth of demand in the consumer market, which in the final account led to the substantial excess of total demand over supply, which has become an important factor in inflation.

The appearance of "overheating" phenomena in the economy, accompanied by strong inflationary processes, besides the above-mentioned reasons which are rooted in the specific features of the economic system itself, was generated by the policy conducted at the macro level, as well as by mistakes made as a consequence of overestimating the country's possibilities and of excessive haste in implementing the formulated goals. In principle, back in 1982 at the 12th Chinese Communist Party Congress, when the task was formulated of increasing the output of the gross production of industry and agriculture by a

factor of 4 by the end of the century, as compared to 1980, a course was set which stipulated "relatively slow development in the first stage with a subsequent acceleration." In the first decade (i.e., in the 1980s), the average annual growth rates were intended to be less than 7.2 percent, determined for the entire 20-year period.

At the All-Chinese Party Conference in 1985 on proposals for the 7th 5-year period, once again the idea was expressed concerning the need to reject an increase in development at extraordinary paces, which would enable us to avoid tension in economic life and to create favorable economic conditions for the implementation of reform. All these decisions were correct—they incorporated the results of research and development work conducted in the early 1980s by Chinese scientists. However, at this time a number of Central Committee employees, responsible for economic work, held views counted on for an easy and rapid success: there was no serious attitude toward implementing the essentially correct Central Committee course. Later, an insignificant group of theoretical economists appeared who supported the idea of "the harmlessness of a deficit of finances" and the "usefulness of inflation." These faulty views were reflected in the policy of financial and monetary expansion carried out at that time. As a result, as a consequence of a sharp increase in the rates of economic development, significantly surpassing the previously determined rates, phenomena of imbalance and disproportion appeared in the economy. The strategy outlined by the 12th Chinese Communist Party Congress spoke of reinforcing certain weak links (agriculture, power engineering, transport, science and education). This did not occur. Conversely, the weak links became "bottlenecks," intensifying inflationary processes.

Since the reasons for the "overheating" of the economy and inflation in the PRC proceed from the economic system and economic policy, in order to solve these problems it would be natural, as a most radical measure, to eliminate the coexistence of the old and new systems of economic management, having finally replaced the old system with the new. This would make it possible to eliminate the main reasons leading to the tempestuous growth of demand and "overheating" of the economy. However, it is clear that much time is still required in order to do this. In addition, it is also impossible to delay solving problems related to the "overheating" of the economy and to inflationary processes. Therefore, today it is necessary to slow down the rates of development and, carrying out a strict finance and credit policy, maximally to reduce the needs for capital investments and consumer demand.

[Correspondent] Since the start of the stage of "ordering and improving" the PRC economy, relatively few changes have occurred. Nonetheless, what are the first results?

[Guoguang] This year, the policy for improving the economy of the PRC has already enabled us to reduce

the extraordinarily high growth rate in industrial production: thus, in 1988 the increase was 20.8 percent, in the first half of 1989, 10.8 percent, and for the year on the whole, 7 percent. A trend has been noted toward a slower growth in prices (in 1989—18.5 percent). Although this indicator stayed at the 1988 level, people nonetheless have begun to relate to the increase of prices more calmly. A relatively favorable situation has taken shape for removing money from circulation. For instance, due to special steps to protect the population's deposits from devaluation as a consequence of inflation, their increase by 120 billion yuan is predicted.

In addition, for the time being the signs of stagnation are still being felt in the economy. Unfortunately, radical changes have not occurred in the correlation of supply and demand. As before, the contradictions, structural in nature, are fairly serious. We also have not managed to break the trend toward a decline in the economic efficiency indicators. At the same time, a number of new problems have appeared. Since the second half of 1989, the growth rates for industrial production have dropped sharply, the problem of selling output has been aggravated, a number of enterprises are faced with the need to shut down completely or cut back production activity by half, the size of bonuses for workers and employees has decreased, there are cases of ceasing to pay salaries, and growth in the share of the unemployed has been noted. Naturally, all this has negatively influenced the increase in incomes.

How should we interpret the situation that has taken shape? Most economists in the PRC see it as a temporary, but natural phenomenon. That which ought to have occurred is occurring. It is possible, on the whole, to say that favorable conditions have been created for the further development of economic reform. The overall state of affairs in the economy has a definite influence on enterprises, stimulating them to raise the quality of production, implement technical reconstruction, and multiply efforts aimed at the growth of economic efficiency. State credits are used to decrease the negative pressure of the state of the market, and to support a number of key enterprises, as well as economic entities that are experiencing difficulties.

[Correspondent] The most acute problem of converting to the new system of economic management is the combination of administrative and economic methods of regulation. How is this being solved in the PRC today?

[Guoguang] The center of gravity for all current work to regulate and stabilize the economy should be relocated, with the slowing of growth rates, to the stimulation of structural shifts. Without losing control over volume indicators, it is necessary to use the favorable elements that form in markets, which stimulate the increase of quality and the efficiency of economic management of enterprises. Putting the structure of the economy in order and raising the economic efficiency are inseparably linked to the mechanism for market competition, sifting out the weak and reinforcing the strong. Here, of

course, there are a great many obstacles that we will have to encounter, but without overcoming them it is impossible to intensify the reform.

The contemporary stage is characterized by a complex economic situation. Expanding the rights of enterprises to form funds from the remaining profit in recent years has significantly weakened the opportunities for control from the center. Under these conditions, the conduct of an effective economic policy is inevitably linked to a certain strengthening of centralism in planning and, above all, to the growing control from the center over extraordinarily scattered financial and material resources. This is expressed, for instance, in the freezing of prices for certain types of production, in the establishment of maximum limits for their growth, in special management of the circulation of part of commodity and material resources, in state control over capital investments, over the increase of wages, etc. Some see this as a halting of the reform, or even as backsliding, assuming that a "return to the old system" has occurred. It seems to me that this point of view is wrong. The point is that using the relatively large number of administrative control methods has given us the time, needed for a rest, for a rapid reduction in the temperature in an "overheated" economy, for its "readjustment" for purposes of creating new favorable economic conditions contributing to further intensification of the reform. In all countries, including those where a market economy functions, there are examples of the strengthening of administrative measures in critical situations. However, from the viewpoint of future prospects, we should nonetheless proceed by way of reform, more completely combining the right to macro-control, possessed by the center, with mobilization of the activeness of local authorities and enterprises.

[Correspondent] Is it possible, in principle, to stabilize economic development via strict directive regulation?

[Guoguang] In my opinion, the improvement and stabilization of the economy using only exclusively administrative methods is impermissible. In order to fully solve the existing problems, measures are needed to intensify the reform. For instance, in using state subsidies to maintain a low price level, it is possible to obtain a stabilization effect temporarily. However, this practice threatens to turn into an increase in the financial deficit and, in the final account, into a reduction in the overall volume of production. In this regard, further distortions of prices and complications in the solution of problems of the structural perestrojka of the national economy may continue. In the end, we obtain a result directly opposite to improvement and stabilization.

Obviously, administrative methods cannot be used for a long period of time. Therefore, under contemporary conditions it is important, insofar as it is possible to convert to applying economic methods, to consider measures for further intensification of the reform and for improving the economic mechanism.

[Correspondent] So, does it turn out that a guarantee for stabilization of the economy in the long run is the organic interconnection of active anti-inflationary policy and new steps to intensify the reform?

[Guoguang] Let us look at the contemporary situation in the economy of the PRC from yet another point of view. The successes which are achieved now in the area of improving and stabilization have corrected mainly only the surface problems. For instance, as predicted, we have managed to ensure the consumers' patient attitudes toward the growth of prices, etc. More profound problems have not yet been solved. There has been no noticeable turn-around in the elimination of deformations in the structure of the national economy, or in eliminating the imbalances in the function of different links of the economic mechanism. A number of consumer markets which have appeared already are being curtailed by administrative methods. For the time being, there is no reliable system of control over the macro-economy. We still have a situation in which the enterprise is responsible for profit, yet does not answer for losses. Radical changes have also not occurred in the correlation of supply and demand. If a profound transformation does not occur, the consumer markets that have appeared may disappear at any moment, and the dominance of the sellers' market may again be revived. Therefore, for the success of improvement and stabilization of the economy, a guarantee is needed in the form of further intensification of the reform. In the opposite case, a simple continuation of the financial and credit-monetary policy may, due to various types of pressure, once again lead to the destabilization of monetary circulation, an upsurge in demand and the next "overheating" of the economy.

Of course, at the present time, when the situation in the economy is not yet entirely normalized, the rates of reform cannot be extraordinarily rapid. However, insofar as great results are achieved in improvement and stabilization, in terms of the further improvement of economic balance and reinforcement of the market it will be possible to convert from one or another big step to an intensification of the reform, previously impossible as a consequence of the "overheating" and great inflationary pressure. For instance, it will be possible to convert to a reform of prices, combining "stabilization" and "liberalization," to a reform in demarcating the rights of enterprises (the right of ownership and the right of economic management), as well as a comprehensive reform of the tax system and a banking reform.

[Correspondent] What directions are proposed in the near future for intensifying the economic reform?

[Guoguang] In accordance with the decision on further improvement and stabilization, as well as on intensifying the reform, passed at the 5th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, 13th Convocation (1989), it is deemed necessary: first, to continue the intensification of reforms in the countryside, having provided a stable policy in the agrarian sector on the basis of improving

various forms of rural contract responsibility, linked to the final results, as well as the creation and reinforcement of the infrastructure for agricultural industry. In places where there are conditions for this, we must, proceeding from the voluntary principle on a stable basis, begin broad-scale production and the development of new collective farms.

Second, we must further intensify the reform in the enterprises. It is necessary to seriously summarize experience and improve conditions for contracts in industry, at the same time creating a mechanism of restraint for contracting enterprises. Simultaneously, it is important to conduct further experiments "on the division of taxes and profit," "on the return of credits after payment of taxes" and "on the conclusion of contracts after payment of taxes." We must still continue the search for new types of contracts, properly regulating the relationship between the state and enterprises, including the introduction of a share system in which public ownership plays the main role.

Third, we must organize and set up a system for control and management of the economy at the macrolevel, in which economic methods and administrative and legal measures, conforming to the combination of the principles of a planned economy and market regulation, would be organically combined. For this purpose, it is necessary to straighten out the ties between planning, financial and banking agencies.

Fourth, to stabilize the market and to create a healthy market system, we must seriously work on the reform of prices. We have set the tasks of strict restraint of their growth, of avoiding extreme financial subsidies, of eliminating the prerequisites for new disproportions by way of stabilizing prices for agricultural production and for the means of production in industry.

Fifth, we must improve the system for income distribution in combination with a gradual development of reform in housing and in social support, as well as with the introduction of sensible standards of consumption.

Sixth, we must continue the restructuring and improvement of the system for managing foreign trade and for using foreign currency, and we must even more actively attract foreign capital and import advanced equipment. We must continue to encourage and stimulate the development of special export zones and open port regions.

Intensification of the reform and improvement and stabilization of the economy should be closely interrelated: this is no idle slogan, but an urgent requirement of the current stage. Only thus is it possible for the country's economy to develop continuously, steadily and harmoniously.

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BOOK REVIEWS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Let Us Be Realists

905B0025Q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 10, Jul 90 (signed to press 20 Jun 90) pp 125-127

[Review by A. Ulyukayev of "Ne Smet Komandovat!" [Do Not Dare to Command]. N.Ya. Petrakov, editor. Ekonomika, Moscow, 1990, 349 pp]

[Text] A book becomes an event, when it is born at the crossroads of the author's and reader's interest. How are these interests, the attraction of the reading public to one, and then to another wing of our economic journalism determined? Why do economists, the innovative ideas of whom have not always been on the lists even of their professional colleagues, having abandoned other work, devote their efforts and knowledge to journalism, to popularization, to discussion with the mass reader?

The interest of scientists in the journalists genre, it seems to me, is explained by the fact that in recent years it is becoming ever more obvious that one of the main obstacles on the path of perestroika is the profoundly deformed public economic consciousness, the sum total of concepts, values and habits, which determine the economic behavior of people. Precisely this product of the command-distribution system has turned out to be the most long-lived, generating steady mass opposition to economic innovations.

Economic reforms should be reinforced by the appropriate ideological, cultural, moral and psychological [directions], making them acceptable for society. If they go beyond the "area of permitted knowledge," their fate may be regrettable: their content will not force its way through further into the texts of government resolutions. The social organism does not reject only those innovations which are included in the circle of that which is customary and practical for people and their associations. Precisely in this case, economic ideas have a chance to possess the masses and, thus, become a real force for socioeconomic transformations.

Therefore, theoretical economists are turning not only to their colleagues, not only to representatives of legislative and executive power, but also the most broad society.

The readers also have great interest in the journalism of professionals. First, because now they have been convinced: there are such (professionals). Many of them. Of a good level. Favorable changes have occurred in economic theory itself. To put this more definitely, genuine economic theory has appeared here.

After all, after the Stalinist totalitarian machine rolled over both the economy and economists, it was possible to [verify, ascertain] a "great break" both of the personal destinies of economists, and of the backbone of the science itself. Then, ideological diktat, extremely reduced professional requirements and natural selection

according to the principle of devotion and conformism did their work: economic science departed this life, and its official successor effectively fulfilled its purpose—to be a maidservant of theology and glorification of the authorities. The islets of objective economic knowledge which arose since the late 1950s also remained islets. Indeed, they were unable to connect themselves to the mainland, and it is good that they stood their ground in general under the onslaught of the “ideological tsunami.”

In order for the mainland to be rising from the waters (and there is enough water in our economics publications), several mandatory conditions are necessary: the volcanic activity of scientific exploration, of the inquisitiveness and professional self-assertion of scientists; a demand by society for their knowledge, that which could be called a social order, if this word had not been so strongly compromised (let me remind you of Engels' words to the effect that social need moves science more strongly than dozens of universities); and the formation of a scientific community. For this, the first task is the set up information exchanges, the possibility of expressing oneself (in this case, the “islander” realizes that, besides his island, tens and hundreds of others also exist, and beings to make [crossings, passages]).

All these processes have been occurring tempestuously in recent months and years, and right now, as opposed to 1985-1987, we can firmly say that we have both monetarism, as well as institutionalism, and we also have applied development work, as well as theoretical generalizations. Incidentally, it is typical that the “denouncers” of economists have multiplied precisely when the latter have finally begun to “develop” their knowledge. This is an entirely understandable sociopsychological phenomenon: to put the blame for the calamitous condition of the economy on the scientists who study it. So, in the last century doctors were blamed for epidemics of cholera.

The second factor is the change of readers' expectations: 2-3 years ago, the answers to acute socioeconomic problems were sought in thick and thin literary journals, they were received from the mouths of journalists, art critics, physicians, etc. At first, this was sufficient: it was necessary simply to attract attention to one or another problem. Now, this is far from adequate. Society is growing up, and the exposure of dogmas and myths is no longer enough for it, it is not enough to know, so to speak, that children do not come from cabbages and are not brought by the stork. It is nonetheless interested in where they come from and what the mechanism is for the corresponding processes.

For an answer, it is ever more often turning and ever more often will be turning to professionals.

Therefore, it is logical that a number of articles in the collection (“*Ne Smet Komandovat!*” [Do Not Dare To Command], N.Ya. Petrakov, editor. Ekonomika, Moscow, 1990, 349 pp) is devoted precisely to the study

of how, in the course of many decades, the stereotypes of normal economic thinking in our country were destroyed, and in their place the ideas of equalization, lack of initiative, and state dependency were impressed. In the articles by G. Lisichkin, I. Vasilyev, and I. Lipsits a strict and impartial analysis is made of the kind of mental patterns, which, alas, to one or another extent are inherent in most of us.

Methods of the command-administrative management of the economy to a greater or lesser extent have been used in many countries throughout the world, but here they have acquired, perhaps, the most all-embracing and perfected form. That is why it is possible to say that it is the duty of Soviet scientists to world economic science to give a careful and comprehensive review of all aspects of this phenomenon of social life. Of course, the main, fundamental works on this problem have yet to come: time is needed for their appearance, since the “big is seen in the distance.” However, I think, the articles, included in the collection, by N. Petrakov, “The Economy and the State,” V. Perlamutrov, “Both the Owner, and the Worker,” Ye. Yasin, “A Treatise on the Administrative System” will not be lost in the shadow of future volumes.

For instance, the last article in the collection gives a highly interesting substantiation of the fact that under conditions of command-distribution method of economic management, the appearance of the shadow economy is inevitable, that the shadow economy is precisely a shadow, cast by the total state monopoly, a shadow in which concealed and obvious anti-social elements multiply and thrive. Speculation, for instance, is also not a phenomenon of a market where balanced prices function and the idea of buying up pants and boots for the purpose of reselling them [may come really into the very hot head], but of “absence of a market.” It is not at all private, but anonymous-bureaucratic ownership which is the best nourishing environment for alienation, mismanagement and the rapid propagation of tribes of [nesunov] of everything and all. Therefore, the destatification of ownership, the establishment of normal competitive market relations is a factor not for reinforcing, but of undermining the shadow economy.

To the honor of the authors of the collection, it must be noted that they not only work on scientific-journalistic research of the existing socio-economic order, but also actively engaged in practical battles on the leading edge of perestroika—five of them were elected USSR people's deputies, and three, moreover, have held many administrative posts. Therefore, in their articles they do not limit themselves to analysis of general laws of the system of management which has reigned to this day, but get through, if it is possible to say it this way, to the specific technology of making command-arbitrary decisions. Why and how are projects taken to arms, costing the taxpayers many billions of “kopeks” and not bringing the expected economic results, how the departmental “party system” grounds out the mechanism of rationality and effectiveness, what are the mechanisms

for transforming normal economic interests into obviously mafia-like actions—all these questions are investigated in the articles by Ye. Gaydar, "Ministry Style Economic Management," and by A. Yakovlev, "Economics and Criminal Law."

It is difficult to find such a sphere of our life, which has not suffered from command methods. However, perhaps, they inflict the most painful and slow-healing wounds on nature. One could attempt to write this off on the costs of a modern industrial civilization, referring to the sharpness of ecological problems in many industrially developed countries of the world. However, it is impossible not to see that in our country these "costs" have grown incommensurately precisely due to the genetic properties of departmental economic management: an orientation toward the intermediate, and not the final result, toward the purport, the development of resources and absence of an adequate reaction to negative consequences of our own decisions.

That is why, instead of large-scale (and successful!) projects for improving the surrounding environment, being implemented in industrially developed countries, our departments are ending the 20th century with ecological catastrophes on a global scale: the destruction of the Aral and pollution of Baykal. In articles devoted to this problem by V. Selyunin, "Time for Action" and K. Gofman, "The Price of Not Paying: The Economics of Ecological Security," the essence and mechanism of making administrative decisions which are destructive to nature are investigated in detail.

The exposure of the administrative-command system, as well as practical actions to destroy it today are not [familiar?]. However, right now far more important for us is knowledge about whether it is possible, and if so, how to destroy the system, without perishing ourselves under its wreckage? What should we build in the [cleansed, cleaned-out] spot? Perhaps, on it, as in the Chernobyl catastrophe zone, in general corn will never bear fruit and the homes of people will never stand?

To the credit of the authors of the collection and its scientific editor, they fully recognize this and strive to switch from analysis to constructive proposals, which are contained in virtually all articles.

These are the system of measures on financial improvement of the economy and on conversion to convertibility of the ruble not in "the glorious economic future," but under the socioeconomic [rasklad], which exists today, advanced by N. Petrakov. Or Ye. Yasin's proposals on developing the bases of a contemporary policy for prices and income, of methods for controlling inflation. Or the recommendations by V. Perlamutrov on democratization of economic life and on changing the role in it of central economic bodies.

The structural and investment policy, the renovation of the agrarian system and of the credit and financial system—there are many ideas, good, fruitful ideas, in different economic spheres. Today, one can say that

there is also a political will for their implementation. Therefore, it is extraordinarily important that the constructive dialogue which has finally been established between scientists and the country's leaders not be interrupted, that the joint attempts to find a way out of the economic crisis do not stop for even a minute, to avoid a collapse of the national economy and sociopolitical upheavals.

Strictly speaking, precisely this aspiration has gathered the authors of the collection under one cover. Their views far from coincide in everything, but all of them sincerely want their country to get out of the vicious circle of mismanagement, poverty, shortcomings and errors and to take its proper place in the community of civilized nations. Although the path to the solution of this task will not be rapid or, it is no secret, easy, we have no other way. We can and should take it, but for this we must, above all, learn to see the surrounding world and ourselves in a true light. "Let Us Be Realists" is the title of the concluding article in the collection. This, I think, is also a categorical imperative of the current stage of perestroika.

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Chronicle

905B0025R Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 10, Jul 90 (signed to press 20 Jun 90) p 127

[Text] *KOMMUNIST* held a roundtable discussion on the theme "Russia and the West: Contemporary Trends in Social Development." It examined the questions of the succession and renewal of Russian culture, the problems of Russia's historical development in interaction with the peoples of Europe and Asia, the dialectics of national traditions and common human values under conditions of growing integration processes throughout the world, and the prospects for creating a "common European home." USSR people's deputies, writers, representatives of the church and social scientists participated in the free, creative discussion. Employees of the newspaper PRAVDA and the Politizdat Publishing House attended. The roundtable was covered by Central Television.

Materials from the discussion will be published in one of the next issues of this journal.

A delegation from the Communist Party of Vietnam, headed by Dao Zuy Tong, Vietnamese CP Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, visited the editors and familiarized themselves with the journal's participation in ideological and organizational work in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress. The guests were also interested in new phenomena and trends characterizing the complex process of putting the reform into practice and in the solution of problems with interethnic relations. The delegation leaders talked about switching the Vietnamese economy to market tracks, the functioning of the political system, and the

drafting of the party program which will be submitted for discussion at the 7th Vietnamese CP Congress. The importance of the exchange of experience among parties existing under different conditions, yet solving similar problems, was emphasized at the talk.

Manuel Menendez Diaz, director of the journal MILITANTE KOMUNISTA, and Ramon Suarez Vela, responsible associate of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, were guests of the journal. They were interested in the journal's work to cover party discussions and in the documents being submitted for the 28th CPSU Congress. Moreover, questions were discussed related to the restructuring processes taking place in our country, as well as to the activity of party organizations under the conditions of establishing political pluralism in Soviet society.

A delegation of West German journalists visited the editors, representing the newspapers NIEDERREINICHE ZEITUNG, HANNOVERCHE ALEMAGNE ZEITUNG, and the "German Wave" radio station. The guests were interested in the journal's work to cover the problems of the theory of socialism, interethnic relations in the USSR, and trends in the development of state and political institutions at the Union and republic level. In the course of the talk, KOMMUNIST associates spoke of the basic directions of the pre-congress work developed in the CPSU.

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Vladimir Kuzmich Arkhipenko

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[Editors' epitaph for Vladimir Kuzmich Arkhipenko]

[Text] Our comrade, interaction with whom was so vital for everyone who knew him, has passed away. An experienced journalist, who devoted his entire life to this difficult work, has left us.

Vladimir Kuzmich Arkhipenko was 26 years old when, in 1950, after acquiring his first labor experience at a plant and having graduated from the Moscow State University history department, he began working in journalism, first for the newspaper KRASNYY FLOT and later for the journals SMENA, SOVETSKIYE

PROFZOYUZY, POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE and, finally, since 1967, with us at KOMMUNIST. His journalistic pen, which generated brilliant journalistic articles and essays, responded to the sharpest and most difficult problems. However, in striving to smelt everything new into the burning words which his heart, sensitive to vital events, dictated to his mind, Vladimir Kuzmich retained his devotion to one subject in particular: the military and revolutionary traditions of sailors. His documentary research on the feats of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, his literary notes on the memoirs of old revolutionaries, and his novels on revolutionary events in the navy are the visible fruits of his interest.

The journalistic work of V.K. Arkhipenko has been distinguished by medals and the "Mark of Honor" Order. He has won the USSR Union of Journalists Prize.

Vladimir Kuzmich was flesh of the flesh of our collective. Many beginning journalists owe their professional establishment to his selfless assistance. The friendly parodies, satiric poems and literary cartoons that he wrote lent a unique coloring to the creative atmosphere of the editorial board. His creative presence in the collective was felt constantly, even after his recent retirement. It seems to us, that it would always be there...

The image of Vladimir Kuzmich Arkhipenko remains bright, inspiring and full of optimism in our memory.

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