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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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CPSU Central Committee Resolution on PRAVDA

905B0021A Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 3-7

[Text] The resolution notes that the contemporary stage of perestroyka and the process of radical transformation in all spheres of society's life face the CPSU with a task of unprecedented complexity and scale: the decisive renovation of the party and its style and methods of work. This is particularly important because of the party's rejection of constitutional consolidation of the CPSU's leading position. In connection with this, the problem arises of strengthening the party's vanguard consolidating role and reinforcing its ideological and political influence on the masses in a new way. The most important place in this constructive work belongs to the party press, above all, to the CPSU Central Committee organ, the newspaper PRAVDA.

The CPSU Central Committee notes that until recently the level of PRAVDA's articles did not fully meet contemporary requirements or readers' needs. To fulfill its purpose, PRAVDA, as well as our entire party press, should actively restructure itself, decisively reject elements of dogmatic thinking, stereotypes and conventionalism, and should give vital, real meaning to the Leninist principles of a new type of press—a press of the people and for the people, free and truthful, honest and frank, enjoying the readers' trust and talking to them in language understood by all.

From our newspaper, the readers expect the truth, profound and competent analysis of the practice of restructuring, and clear, accurate assessments of both the positive shifts that have been achieved, as well as the reasons for the socioeconomic difficulties, breakdowns and negative phenomena that are causing social tension in society.

Hence, the growing exigency toward the work of the press. Today, the Leninist mandate to the party press has particular topicality: less political gossip, more practical work, and more education of the masses about vital, specific issues. Our press is called on to play an active, creative, constructive role in uniting and consolidating all of society's healthy forces along the platform of perestroyka.

It is the duty of communist journalists and all workers in the country's party publications to write the truth and only the truth, persistently and consistently supporting the CPSU line, the course toward radical perestroyka and renovation of the party.

As the party's main press tribune, PRAVDA is called on to direct attention to the key directions of implementing CPSU policy.

At the current stage of perestroyka, the leading theme for PRAVDA, as well as for all party journalism, should be to begin the deep, comprehensive coverage of the processes of perestroyka and reshaping the party in the spirit of the ideas of the February and March (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenums. In this regard, we must proceed from the fact that the renovated party is conceived of as a party of the socialist choice which, creatively developing the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, expresses the interests of the working class and all working people. It should not assume state power authorities. Its role is to be the democratically recognized leader, earning the people's trust through its policy and practical work, operating via communists in the soviets of people's deputies and in other agencies and social formations.

The CPSU, in freeing itself of functions not inherent in it, is concentrating its efforts on the development of theory, programs for action, organizational and upbringing work, the consolidation of society and the implementation of cadre policy. The party will be able to successfully fulfill its task under the new conditions, implementing a most profound democratization, which should be based on the power of the party masses.

During preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, PRAVDA and the entire party press must actively contribute to the large-scale and thorough study of the path taken by the Soviet people and the party, to solving the new problems which face its organizations. The party-wide discussion that has unfolded and the discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee pre-congress platform and the new party statutes should be aimed at this.

A constructive dialogue should be developed in the party press, conducted from principle-minded party positions, involving a broad circle of participants representing the whole spectrum of social forces that support the positions of renovation of socialism, and sharply and persuasively opposing any attempts to refute our socialist choice. We must show the profound connection between the devotion of the Soviet people to the socialist idea and their patriotic aspiration to make their Fatherland a flourishing country with genuine justice. In showing the historical continuity of generations, we especially must mark the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory and the tremendous service of the Soviet people to mankind in freeing the world from the fascist plague.

We must more broadly review letters from communists and nonparty members. Carefully considering all opinions, without "smoothing over" the authors' thoughts, the newspaper is called on at the same time to assert the party's restructuring position, to raise issues that have appeared for timely discussion, to seek answers to urgent questions, and to give well-reasoned rebuffs to demagogues of "right" and "left" persuasions, to all who try to

discredit the party and the Leninist principles of socialism. We must support PRAVDA's initiative in publishing "Discussion Pages," which contribute to the development of pluralism of opinions and to revealing the diverse interests and viewpoints of all strata of the population.

The political leaders and members of the CPSU Central Committee should practically and systematically publish explanations in PRAVDA concerning the most urgent problems of renovating the party and society's life.

Important political events, such as reports and elections in the party organizations and their daily activity, as well as work by the soviets of people's deputies at all levels and the work of state agencies and of social organizations, should take the center of PRAVDA's attention.

Complex, contradictory processes in the ideological and political sphere require profound journalistic research and objective reflection in the pages of PRAVDA. We need a careful, competent analysis of our many-layered and multifaceted social life and the various positions of social movements and groups, a constructive dialogue with them, and the utmost increase in the party's intellectual perestroyka potential. In recalling and developing the lessons of truth, it is necessary to clearly distinguish that in our past which was the result of authoritarian-bureaucratic deformations, a consequence of the trampling of socialist principles, from that which is the true contribution by the party and the people to the progress of our country and all mankind. We must resist attempts to cancel out everything genuinely valuable in our historical legacy, to question our moral and spiritual guidelines, the devotion to the socialist choice, and the communist perspective.

The duty of PRAVDA and the entire party press lies in the contemporary interpretation of the Leninist legacy, in its lively connection to the experience of restructuring society, to its ideals. Preserving faith in the Leninist teachings means developing its world outlook and methodology, enriching it with new conclusions and theses, once and for all refuting the canonization of individual formulas, dictated by specific circumstances and on the whole belonging to their own time, and defending against any attempts to distort or discredit the Leninist legacy and V.I. Lenin's personality.

PRAVDA is called on to be an authoritative tribune for our tempestuously developing social thinking, aimed at developing the modern concept of humane, democratic socialism, at enriching the experience of society's social renovation, brilliantly and intelligibly propagandizing everything new and progressive both in theory, as well as in practice, born of mass creativity and development of the social sciences.

Man should be the center of attention for PRAVDA and the entire party press. One of the most important tasks of the editorial board and its journalists lies in implementing the party's active social policy, aimed at the person, his concerns and needs. A society of social justice must live according to humane ideals and should give first priority to comprehensive development of the person and the entire range of his spiritual and material interests.

It should be taken into account that our country's citizens, under the conditions of expanding democracy and glasnost, have received new opportunities to manifest their interests and to make demands, and that the working people's influence and control over the course of perestroyka is strengthening. In this regard, however, we must not forget that socioeconomic requirements can be satisfied only on the basis of better organization of business, steady increases in labor productivity and a new attitude toward work.

PRAVDA and our entire press must more sharply raise the question of the unity of words and action at all levels and publicize the implementation of decisions that are made.

The set of steps to accelerate scientific and technical progress, which should ensure our dynamic movement and the way to new parameters in labor productivity and production quality, merit special attention. We must contribute in any way to developing basic scientific research, the latest technologies and the study of man, and we must illuminate the achievements in mastering space and solving mankind's global problems.

Organizational and political work must be directed toward raising the efficiency of work by labor collectives, accelerating the radical economic reform, and improving the economic situation in the country. The consistent solution of problems related to improving our economic mechanism and management, the structural transformation of the economy, the universal introduction of cost-accounting, raising the quality of production and work on the whole, the struggle for complete utilization of reserves, and the strengthening of labor, production and contract discipline should be the main trends in the work of PRAVDA and other mass information media.

We should in practice and, moreover, thoroughly illuminate the new forms for the organization of production, created by economic exploration, and contribute to the development of economic thought. The transformation of state property into property which is democratically managed by the working people themselves on the basis of leasing, full cost-accounting, contract, joint-stock and other contemporary forms, taking into account the scales of production, the specific nature of regions, and the development of integration ties, is an important task. The party believes that the current stage in the country's economic development does not rule out the existence of individual labor ownership, including ownership of means of production.

The duty of the press is to actively support every innovative person and collective, not only to extensively propagandize the experience of leading workers, but also

to strive for its most rapid introduction, to the utmost assisting in solving urgent problems in the life of the working person.

The future of our state to a tremendous extent depends on how interethnic relations take shape. This requires the PRAVDA editors and all mass information media to take a profound, responsible approach toward reporting on the complex problems of the development of our country's peoples and nationalities, on their multifaceted lives, on active struggle against nationalism and chauvinism in all forms. The key principles of the party's policy are an unconditional observance of the rights of citizens of any nationality throughout the country's entire territory; real meaning for the sovereignty of Union republics and a new level of independence for all types of national autonomies; and preserving the country's integrity as a federation of free and equal republics, voluntarily delegating part of their rights to the Union for the sake of achieving common goals.

PRAVDA and the party press should increase their contribution to the development and cleansing of all spheres of society's spiritual life, and should reveal and multiply the political, intellectual and cultural potential of the people. Logic itself and the essence of perestroyka demand tremendous growth in our world-outlook, political and production culture, in the culture of human interaction and in ecological, artistic and legal culture as an inalienable condition for creating a socialist rule-of-law state.

The entire potential of culture should be aimed at improving the moral climate in the country and asserting the principles of common human standards of morality. A great deal here also depends on paying attention to the family, schools, and the upbringing of children and all youth. These vitally important issues should be reflected most extensively in PRAVDA.

The organ of the CPSU Central Committee is called on to report on the party's foreign political work. Its policy, based on the new thinking, has already yielded positive results: the world is being freed from paths of confrontation and important steps have been made in disarmament and the gradual elimination of nuclear arms. The threat of world military conflict has decreased. This also contributes to solving internal socioeconomic problems. However, a long and hard path remains to be crossed in order to implement the ideal of mankind's peaceful future. The task of PRAVDA and the party press is to assist actively in implementing these noble goals and, in addition, to struggle against forces of reaction, militarism and imperialism.

The resolution notes the need comprehensively to strengthen the connection of the party committees to PRAVDA, to the entire party press. The editors of PRAVDA and all party committees should more actively carry out work to ensure the efficacy of publications. Without great exaggeration, it can be said that the attitude toward PRAVDA's principle-minded articles on the part of party committees and officials in many ways is also a general indicator of how perestroyka itself is going, both in local areas and in the center. An underestimation of glasnost and the restraint of criticism inevitably lead to inertia and stagnation. Places where the party committees display a principle-minded nature, objectivity and attention to the needs and demands of the people are also places where critical articles in the press are valued as an aid, an active means for overcoming mistakes and eliminating shortcomings. Conversely, slogans on the development of glasnost will remain meaningless if critical articles in the mass information media are not reinforced by specific measures taken against those who try to protect themselves from fair remarks, who are convinced of their infallibility and attack people who dare to "wash the dirty linen in public."

Party committee employees should feel like comrades and colleagues in their interaction with party journalists. They should help the press ensure the efficacy of its publications, should expand the writers' aktiv and should assert a comradely atmosphere. Close interaction between party committees and the press in solving the problems advanced by life is a mandatory condition on the way to implementing the humane goals of perestroyka and building a rule-of-law state.

The implementation of these responsible tasks, especially under conditions of political pluralism, requires great competence, thorough penetration into life, keenness of thought, and professionalism on the part of PRAVDA journalists and all party journalism. The processes in society are occurring in a lively manner, in the struggle of passions and interests: we must write about them objectively, in a well-reasoned manner, with knowledge of the issues and, moreover, with interest, with passion, so to speak, with feeling. It is necessary to eliminate cliquishness, economic prejudices and ambitiousness from journalistic practice, which engender a negative reaction to articles in the mass information media and evoke the people's justifiable dissatisfaction.

Service to the socialist Fatherland and its people has always distinguished the finest representatives of the intelligentsia. The editors are personally responsible for the content of publications and the truthfulness of the printed word. No matter in what section a communist journalist may work, he must be an active, contemporary, thinking fighter for the party.

The work of the party organization of PRAVDA's editorial board, the resolution states, should be aimed at activating the creative efforts of associates, raising their journalist skills and political outlook, creating an atmosphere of mutual exigency and party comradeship, and strengthening each communist's responsibility for the fate of perestroyka.

The problems of developing the network of correspondents, the operation of correspondent centers, the organization of an extensive authors' collective unified

around them, the psychological and professional features of a correspondent's work and his place both in the editorial apparatus, as well as in the life of a region or of local political, social and public institutions and organizations, should constantly be within the attention of the editorial board of PRAVDA and the editors' collective.

Local party bodies should offer comprehensive assistance to newspaper correspondents in the fruitful and effective performance of their jobs.

It is suggested that the editorial board of PRAVDA develop new principles for working with letters from the working people. In this regard, we must proceed from the fact that the editorial board is not a state or departmental institution, but a creative organization. The purpose of work with letters is to study public opinion on the basic directions of party and state policy. The editorial board is advised to create special groups to study public opinion and to conduct timely surveys of readers on topical articles in the newspaper, jointly with the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences and on their basis.

Being concerned for growth in the authority and popularity of the party's central organ is an old party tradition. PRAVDA must strive to be a genuine center of attraction for the country's intellectual and creative forces, and the articles in its pages should be considered a matter of honor. The editorial board should do everything possible so that the finest journalistic forces cooperate with PRAVDA. It should relate positively to the creation of "Friends of PRAVDA" clubs throughout the country. Annual PRAVDA festivals, after having been made important political events, should be held.

Work with the local party press is considered the most important task of the editorial board. Reviews of the press and of radio and television broadcasts should be published regularly in the newspaper, internship of local journalists should be organized, and trips by experienced PRAVDA employees for meetings with local colleagues should be practiced.

The newspaper editorial board is given the right to resolve problems concerning the determination of its structure, editorial personnel, the opening and closing of correspondent centers in the country and abroad, within the limits of personnel allocated for these purposes, and the conclusion of labor contracts with editorial associates.

The editorial board of PRAVDA and the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs were instructed to draft proposals and submit them to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, concerning strengthening the material and technical base and the social development of the newspaper editorial board and the publishing house collective.

THE LENINIST LEGACY AND PERESTROYKA

Perestroyka: Our Democratic Revolution

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[Article by E. Arab-Ogly]

[Text] Five years have passed since the day when the course was taken toward radical change in the party's policy, toward the transformation of all social life. We are already approaching the 28th CPSU Congress, called on to summarize that which has been done. On the eve of the congress, it is useful to think once again about the logic of historical development itself, which faced our society with the need for perestroyka, to think about the path taken by our country. Acquired historical experience enables us to better understand the significance of perestroyka and its role in the democratic renovation of our society.

In his concept of radical transformation of the social order in Russia, V.I. Lenin proceeded from the objective dialectics of the correlation of the overall democratic and the social tasks of the revolutionary process. Based on a profound analysis of social contradictions and the positioning of political forces in society, he drew the historically substantiated conclusion that, before accomplishing democratic transformations and asserting a capitalist system in Russia, there is a real opportunity to convert to socialist transformations and then implement urgent general democratic slogans and tasks on a socialist socioeconomic basis.

However, historical circumstances, including both objective conditions, as well as subjective factors, took shape in such a way that, of the two basic tasks stipulated in the Leninist concept of revolution—the direct conversion to building a socialist society in our country and the completion of its democratic transformations—only the former was implemented, and even that with serious deformations. Moreover, since socialism without democracy can only be distorted, not corresponding to its humane ideal, the new sociopolitical order in our country acquired (especially in the years of the cult of personality and the period of stagnation) a regressive and even anti-people's nature in many respects, accompanied by suppression of the freedom of the personality and of human rights, by the alienation of working people from ownership and power.

Precisely the failure to complete the whole series of democratic tasks of revolution and, since the 1920s, even the renunciation of them and movement backwards to all-embracing extra-economic compulsion and political persecutions led to the near-complete absorption of civil society by the totalitarian state, to a repressive authoritarian-bureaucratic system, which not only suppressed any dissidence, but also restricted and regulated the independence, initiative, enterprise and inventiveness of the individual.

It is just as groundless as it is naive to see this development of society, which has caused so many sacrifices by peoples not only in our country alone, as some kind of inevitable "irony of history" or, moreover, the "original sin" of socialist revolution. It is appropriate to remind those who have tried and are trying to question the historical legitimacy of the October Revolution and contrast the February revolution to it that it was just as impossible to restrict the objective logic of the revolutionary process in Russia via the activity of the Constituent Assembly, as it was before in the 17th century to restrict the English Revolution with the "Long Parliament" or in the 18th century to contain the French Revolution in the debates of estates in the Estates General. Are we forgetting that both the English and the French revolutions were accompanied by terrorism and civil war, and that even the United States was unable to avoid civil war?

Given the acute and irreconcilable nature of the social conflicts that tormented Russia, the Civil War was inevitable, of course, and the growing "leftist movement" of the masses and their revolutionary impatience led to the fact that, if the bolsheviks had refused to seize power in October 1917, most likely, other "Montagnards" would have, be they the leftist SRs, anarchists or reactionary forces, with unpredictable consequences for the country in the face of which, possibly, the consequences of the Civil War would have paled.

The social order asserted in our country since the 1920s was by no means the inevitable outcome of the October Revolution, but the result of the forcible propagation of an administrative-command system which had warped beyond recognition both the legacy of the revolution, as well as the Marxist-Leninist ideals of socialism. Moreover, K. Marx, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin, R. Luxembourg and many other later Marxists repeatedly warned revolutionaries of the danger of reducing socialist transformations to an all-embracing state ownership and state power in society, not to mention their rejection of the idea itself of a forced "happiness" for their own and other peoples.

The ideological origins of "barracks socialism," the foundations of which were built under Stalin and lasted (with the exception of a brief period after the 20th CPSU Congress) right up until perestroyka, by no means originated in the basic theses of Marxism, as some people are trying to convince us today, but in so-called state ("Prussian" or "Bismarkian") pseudosocialism, in identifying the socialization of property with the nationalization and state nature of it which, for instance, the Lassallists adhered to, as well as many social utopians like E. Bellamy, who described future society in his anticipatory books, "*A Glance into the Past*" and "*Equality*," as an idyllic state monopoly with universal labor obligation, industrial armies and the regulation of people's behavior. One also cannot deny the definite influence of the successful state regulation of Germany's economy during World War I on the concept of "war communism" (which even Lenin did not avoid at the time).

Marx, Engels and Lenin, were they our contemporaries, would most likely not even recognize the system that has existed here for 6 decades (even if it were called "developed socialism!") as the society of their own social ideals. They would probably recall their own warnings on this subject. Really, F. Engels' statement on "Prussian" state socialism in "Anti-Duhring" is still instructive today: "The contemporary state, whatever its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, a state of capitalists, the ideal aggregate capitalist. The more production forces it takes into possession, the more complete its transformation into an aggregate capitalist will be and the greater number of citizens it will exploit. The workers will remain hired laborers, a proletariat. Capitalist relations will not be eliminated but, conversely, will reach the extreme, highest point" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 20, p 290). Of course, it is wrong, turned 180 degrees, to apply this quotation, which we often cited as a characteristic of contemporary state-monopolistic capitalism, to a socialist system and, the more so, to look for the "aggregate capitalist" here in our country. In the context of this quotation, it is possible to understand that the universal state nature of ownership is not the ideal of democratic, humane socialism, and that nationalization is by no means a panacea for capitalism, for the alienation of ownership from the working people. That is why, even in "The Principles of Communism," Engels contrasts to competition not state ownership, but an entirely different social ideal, namely, a free association of direct producers who own and dispose of their own means of production.

K. Marx also had similar views on the socialization of ownership under socialism: "The capitalist method of appropriation, proceeding from the capitalist method of production and, consequently, also capitalist private ownership, is the first negation of individual private ownership based on one's own labor. However, capitalist production gives rise to its own negation with the necessity of a natural process. This is negation of negation. It does not restore private ownership, but individual ownership based on the achievements of the capitalist era: on the basis of cooperatives and the common possession of land and by means of production produced through one's own labor" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 773). Lenin, in turn, spoke of the need to reconsider the view, widespread among Marxists, of socialism as a state monopoly directed to the benefit of the people, contrasting a system of "civilized cooperative workers" to it. In other words, the socialist nature of production relations is determined, above all, by the conditions of labor interrelations among direct producers, by their labor for themselves, not for monopolistic state departments. Incidentally, it would be naive in any case to turn to the classics of Marxism in order to substantiate the destatification of ownership under socialism, since they proceeded from an assumption that the state would wither away.

According to Lenin's idea, the October Revolution was historically called upon not to end the February Revolution, but to continue it. As Lenin noted, thanks to the

February Revolution which overthrew the autocracy, Russia became the freest country in the world in 1917 in a brief period of time (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 32, p 49). The opposition of the October to the February revolution, which continues so persistently even now, has only limited meaning in the historical context and can be rightly interpreted as two consecutive stages in our society's revolutionary transformation: the October Revolution was called on to negate the social limitation of the February and, in addition, to be the successor to its general democratic content and the common human values and humanistic ideals embodied in it. Lenin considered these very same restrictions on democratic freedoms which followed October, especially during the Civil War (although this does not mean they were justified even then), to be only a temporary phenomenon dictated by circumstance. Therefore, today we have a right to consider ourselves inheritors not only of October, but also of February 1917, and the social renovation of our society in the process of perestroyka is a continuation of both of these revolutions. The Marxists considered democracy not simply a means for the struggle for socialism, but also an independent social value, the historically perpetual property of civilization, without practical implementation of which there cannot be genuine socialism. "The more democracy, the more socialism." This slogan of perestroyka was literally achieved through the suffering of our history.

The creation of a socialist rule-of-law state, which is the basic task of the radical democratic transformations occurring in society, was bequeathed to us both by the October, as well as the February revolutions. The idea of a just state was created by mankind in the course of the millennia. As history attests, it is far from exhausted by the principle of power based on law. Both in the distant past, as well as in our time, there have been many small repressive political regimes that have tried to grant themselves legitimacy, foisting their arbitrary laws on society.

The basis of a rule-of-law state is its legality, proceeding from the recognition of the people's political sovereignty and relying on a social contract between the rulers and the ruled. It is precisely the principle of the social contract that we discover, even in the laws of Solomon or the reforms of Lycurgus in Ancient Greece, in the laws of the Twelve Tablets in Ancient Rome, as well as in many other legally official and unofficial (including common law) interrelations between the rulers and the ruled, which determine their reciprocal obligations. In another time, this idea of the social contract received theoretical substantiation in the concept of the "social treaty," the most famous supporters of which included de Groot, Hobbs, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson and other leading thinkers of the 17th-19th centuries, including in Russia. The founders of Marxism-Leninism, as everyone knows, criticized these theories, not for their democratic content, but for the idealistic explanation of the origin of the social contract, which also determines their inconsistency on this question. Without directly refuting the idea of the social contract itself, they offered a materialistic explanation for it in their early works on the state and civil society.

Unfortunately, the theme of the social contract did not receive its own development in Soviet social science. Of course, its sociophilosophical and legal development can in no way be reduced to reviving the pre-Marxist Enlightenment concept of the social contract. We need a consistently Marxist theory of the social contract which creatively summarizes mankind's historical experience with creating democratic institutions of power, their social functions and their role in society. The problem of the social contract is acquiring not only important theoretical significance, but also urgent practical topicality. It is becoming increasingly obvious that, under conditions of democratization of society, many social, economic and political problems can be resolved only on a contractual basis, whether it is a question of a new contract between sovereign Union republics for the revival of our federated state, or of new property relations that offer various forms for the possession and disposal of property, for economic management and for leasing. The problem of the social contract is also directly related to reaching a consensus in society on the problems of perestroyka, to defining the priorities in the process of the radical economic and political reforms.

One of the most important principles on which a rule-of-law state is based is the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches, protecting civil society from the arbitrariness of political power. However, the separation of powers in society is far from restricted only to state management. After all, along with the political power invested in the state, other forms of power also exist in a civil society: economic, spiritual and religious. The scattering of power among various, relatively independent, autonomous spheres of activity and its reasonable decentralization make it possible for a civil society to preserve its independence, as defined by the social contract, and its autonomy from the state. The democratic nature of society is determined not so much by the procedure for shaping supreme political power, as by the personal rights and freedom of the personality that the civil society retains for itself. That is why, as political practice confirms, constitutional monarchies in a number of cases can be more democratic societies than some presidential or parliamentary republics.

In a rule-of-law state, political power is in the service of society, but is not its master. The citizens are not disenfranchised subjects of the state, on whom arbitrary obligations, albeit declared by law, are placed, but sovereign individuals, the holders of inalienable human rights and democratic freedoms. The broader the field for the independent activity of people, not regulated by the state, in various spheres of society's economic and intellectual life, the more democratic a society it is.

A rule-of-law state, in Abraham Lincoln's definition, which the founders of Marxism also used, is power of the

people, for the people and by the people themselves. In this regard, we should keep in mind that social self-management, no matter how we may have idealized it, does not remove the problems of interrelations between the rulers and the ruled, even in a representative democracy. It only places the former in dependency on the will of the latter. A rule-of-law state can and should be strong, not due to the helplessness of its citizens, to their defenselessness in the face of political power, but thanks to the fact that it relies on the consciousness of the masses, on their profound interest in preserving a democratic system. A rule-of-law state needs not punitive, but law enforcement agencies which protect society and the individual from arbitrariness.

Democracy relies on glasnost, on informing society and on freedom of speech. Thanks to glasnost, two goals are achieved simultaneously: on the one hand, state institutions are deprived of the possibility of administrating in secret and are obliged to inform society of their activity; on the other, the citizens not only receive the information needed to shape their opinions, but are also freed from political isolation, comparing their convictions to those of other members of society, which enables them to make collective decisions.

Revolutions win or lose not because of fatalistic historical inevitability. Revolutionary transformations of a society ripen when the previous social contract loses its strength, both because the rulers are in no condition to fulfill it, as well as because the ruled no longer wish to reconcile themselves to it (Lenin's formula is "those at the top cannot," and "those at the bottom do not want to"). A revolution is not simply a substitution of some rulers for others, but a replacement of the former social contract, which had lost its force under new conditions, with a different one that meets the popular masses' concepts of social justice. The October Revolution was victorious, regardless of many extremely unfavorable circumstances for the socialist choice, mainly because the social contract suggested by the bolsheviks, embodied in general democratic slogans such as "power to the soviets!," "peace for the people!," "land for the peasants!," "factories and plants for the workers!," and "self-determination for nations!" was irresistibly attractive in the eyes of the broad popular masses. The main threat of revolution, as Lenin understood full well, came not so much from the former ruling classes, as from the revolutionaries' inability to fulfill this social contract. This danger really did appear both during the requisitioning of farm produce, in the Kronshtadt uprising, and in other cases.

Lenin's political behest, contained in his last works, was dictated by his aspiration to convince the party to strictly observe its responsibilities to the people. However, since the late 1920s, in the periods of the cult of personality and of stagnation, the authoritarian-bureaucratic system that had asserted itself in our country started on the path of systematic distortion of this social contract, violating the obligations it had accepted: the working people were alienated from power and ownership, the peasants—from the land, the people—from their own history and national culture. The socialist principle of distribution "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor" was replaced by the bureaucratic principle "from each as much as can be squeezed, to each at the leadership's discretion." Only now, in the process of radical perestroyka, has the party taken up the obligation to revive the social contract of the October Revolution, having enriched it with general human democratic rights and humanistic values. This is the historic meaning of the legislative creativity of the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, returning sovereignty to civil society and inalienable rights and freedoms to the individual. Political democracy presumes a certain economic independence and the independence of the individual with regard to the state. Diverse forms of ownership, including individual, and the development of commodity-monetary relations are not only a means for achieving society's economic well-being, but also an important assurance of the independence of citizens, of political and ideological pluralism.

Today, many Soviet social scientists and journalists, striving to understand and explain the tragic periods in the history of our society, see the population's low general culture, especially political culture, as the basic cause of the authoritarian-bureaucratic administration that was asserted for 6 decades. At first glance, this explanation seems quite justified, fully conforming to common sense. However, upon sober consideration, it is easily vulnerable to criticism. Essentially, it only copies the fatalistic aphorism: each people has the rulers that it deserves. Explaining anti-democratic regimes through the population's low political culture is overly reminiscent of justification of them, regardless of the intentions of those who resort to it. This sparks objections the more so, since some politicians who consider themselves confirmed liberals, disillusioned with the slow process of democratization of our society, have recently been calling for accelerating it in the direction of establishing an authoritarian power. Unquestionably, even a stable society needs a "strong hand." However, it is important that this "strong hand" hold not a punishing sword, but a code of fair laws.

Of course, there is no question that the nature of political power is somewhat dependent on the level of a society's culture. However, mankind's historical experience proves that we cannot limit ourselves to this extremely speculative explanation. It suffices to refer to the following instructive examples. As everyone knows, repressive political systems, totalitarian in nature, not tolerating dissidence and enslaving civil society, seized state power in the 1920s-1930s not only in our country, but also in Italy and Germany, in countries with constitutional, parliamentary traditions that had existed since the middle of the last century, in a country, whose cultural level Lenin used as an example for Russia. Really, was England in the 17th century and was France, at least since 1870, all that unattainable in terms of cultural level for other, not only European countries in

the 20th century? Is it possible that India, which acquired political independence after World War II, was more developed in terms of cultural level than the Russia of October? Finally, even in Russia immediately after the abolition of serfdom in the 1860s-1870s, many liberal reforms were made, including the creation of a court of jurors and the introduction of land administration, for which, as some jurists assume, our country supposedly is not yet mature enough for even now!

Even based on these examples, without going into long historical sidetracks, we have the right to conclude: unquestionably, the nature of political power depends on the society's level of general and political culture, but with one important stipulation—it depends not so much on the culture of the ruled, as on the culture of the rulers, on their political maturity and competence. Democracy is not some kind of exotic foreign plant that can only be cultivated in Anglo-Saxon meadows and must be pampered with decades, if not centuries of effort by political gardeners. It is a common human value which should not be denied to a single people at the end of this century.

Perestroyka is a constant test for our our party and state leaders: it places increasing demands on their political maturity, perspicacity and foresight, so vital for the consistent democratization of society. We are also certain that there are many leaders among our parliament members who possess a high level of political culture and are aware of their responsibility to their people, a people who on the whole, as public opinion polls confirm, are ready for a democratic form of rule and support perestroyka. We hope that, as a result of the elections to republic and local bodies of power, these confirmed democrats will take the reins of government into their hands at all levels. Then, although not immediately, the general democratic stage of our revolution, for which we have waited 7 long decades, will be complete.

Lenin, Federalism and the Present Time

905B0021C Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 15-22

[Article by E. Tadevosyan, chief of the Department for the Theory of Socialism, USSR MID MGIMO, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The revolutionary renovation of socialism in our multi-ethnic country is impossible without a radical transformation of the Soviet Federation, without giving it a real meaning which, in turn, is inseparable from the humanization and democratization of Soviet society. This makes revealing the ideological wealth of the Leninist concept of Soviet federalism and its role in the contemporary stage of development of our Soviet multi-ethnic state especially topical. This task has yet another dimension in connection with the fact that for a long time even in this process things were often passed off as the Leninist legacy which in reality were not.

After discovery of the soviets as the general political form for the state system in our country, V.I. Lenin's theoretical conclusion concerning the need for a Soviet federation as a state form for uniting the numerous nationalities into one whole seems secondary in significance to me. Lenin boldly questioned the negative attitudes that had taken root among Marxists toward the federation and thus also provided a graphic example of creative interpretation and application of Marxism on this matter. One of the typical features of Soviet national and state building lay in the fact that its fundamental bases and basic general forms were scientifically substantiated in Lenin's works even in the pre-October and the first post-October periods.

Lenin and Soviet Federalism

The essence of the Leninist concept of Soviet federalism can be expressed in the words of Lenin's draft "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People:" a free union of "free nations as a federation of Soviet national republics" (Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 221). It was aimed at defining the optimum state forms for the correlation and interaction of the international, the Union-wide, the national, and the republic for purposes of guaranteeing the free and comprehensive development of each nation and consolidating the international unity of Soviet society. The Leninist dialectic of the international and the national found its own expression here in the fact that the creation by an individual nation of its own sovereign national state was deemed a necessary condition not only for the expression and protection of specific, ethnic interests and values, but also for the solution of common, international tasks for all nations, their agreement on an international basis. Yet, a federated union of peoples should serve not only to achieve common, international goals for all nationalities, but should also be a source for the dynamic development of each people's economy and culture.

For all peoples of our country who live in a compact area, October opened the way to creating their own national state system. In establishing the independence of the Ukraine, Belorussia and other republics that appeared, in creating dozens of ethnic autonomies, Lenin and the party saw this as an important means not only to satisfy the ethnic aspirations of previously oppressed peoples, but also to overcome distrust of the Russian center, inherited from the past, to increase internationalist awareness and unification trends.

Life confirmed the rightness of the conceptual formulations, by which from the viewpoint of democracy the "recognition of the right to secede **decreases** the danger of 'collapse of the state'" (Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 25, p 285). The 10th RKP(b) Congress had full grounds for claiming that the first acts of Soviet power in the area of ethnic policy had turned around relations among the working masses of the nationalities of Russia, undermined the old ethnic hostility, won for the Russian worker the trust of their

brothers of other nationalities, and prepared them to struggle for the common good. The consistent implementation of the principles of self-determination of nations and voluntary unification made it possible to develop an all-people's unification movement in the country, which first took the form of a contractual federation (with confederative elements) of independent Soviet national republics, and later of a united Union state, the USSR.

Lenin suggested uniting peoples "...not by force of the ruble, nor by force of a cudgel, nor by violence, but by **voluntary consent..." (op. cit., vol 30, pp 73-74), creating and consolidating a multi-ethnic socialist state. After October, he consistently supported careful consideration and the maximum possible satisfaction of the needs of different nationalities, especially smaller ones, the respect and real support for the sovereign rights of independent (Union) republics and the self-management rights of autonomies, the scrupulous observance of national equality and justice in all matters, and the display of caution, patience, courtesy and pliancy in relations with "nationals." Lenin decisively and uncompromisingly condemned attempts to resolve interethnic conflicts via administration or compulsion, no matter from what they may have proceeded. His active support for the legitimate demands of "nationals" before and after the formation of the USSR repeatedly ensured the proper solution of ethnic problems and was an example of internationalism not only in words, but also in action.**

In order to understand the humanistic, democratic and internationalist essence of the Leninist concept of Soviet federalism, in my opinion, that which Lenin said at the end of October 1922 in an interview with some foreign correspondents is of very important significance: the only proper attitude toward the interests of nations in a multi-ethnic state is "their maximum satisfaction and the creation of conditions that rule out any possibility of conflicts on this ground. Our experience has firmly convinced us that only tremendous attention to the interests of different nations can eliminate the grounds for conflict, reciprocal distrust, the danger of any intrigues whatsoever, and creates trust, particularly of the working people and peasants, all speaking different languages, without which neither peaceful relations among peoples, nor any successful development whatsoever of all that is valuable in modern civilization, is absolutely impossible" (op. cit., vol 45, p 240). This was Lenin's behest, mentioned so many times and so seriously violated in the subsequent history of our country.

One of the characteristic features of the Soviet federation is its structure according to the national-territorial principle as opposed to bourgeois federations, whose subjects, as a rule, are not national and state formations. Furthermore, Lenin did not allow the absolutization of the national-territorial principle, considering it necessary even here to skillfully combine ethnic and international elements and factors.

Recently, in my opinion, erroneous attempts were made to question the expediency of the national-territorial foundations for building the USSR, including in the discussions on the eve of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on ethnic problems. Thus, V. Tishkov was against election "as subjects of a federation 'of ethnic states'" (KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1989, p 59), and S. Cheshko complains that we were unable to attain "a different type of federation (built, for example, not according to the national-territorial, but according to a territorial principle, like most other federated states of the world) or even a unitarian state with extensive local self-management" (KOMMUNIST, No 2, 1989, p 101).

In light of the Leninist concept of Soviet federalism, such a position seems fundamentally wrong. It could be said that even in the 1960s certain political scientists mistakenly suggested "denationalizing" the national-territorial autonomies and even the Union republics and converting from centralism to unionism. Willingly or no, this served as theoretical justification for the practice of bureaucratic super-centralization and unionization, now decisively condemned by the party. This position is even more unacceptable under conditions of the increasing ethnic self-awareness of peoples, of the sharp growth in the role of the ethnic factor in sociopolitical life. We have suffered and are suffering not from the federated nature of our state, but from profound deformations in its democratic bases. Therefore, it would be a serious mistake to reject these bases altogether, instead of cleansing them of negative additions and distortions from the past.

In any federated state, the center of attention is held by the problem of interaction between the federation and its subjects. In the Leninist concept of Soviet federalism, this is solved from positions of democratic centralism, incorporating the organic unity of the international and the national, of centralism and democracy in the distribution of rights and authorities between the Union center and the republics. The essence of this principle lies in the simultaneous guarantee of unity and centralized leadership at a macro-level and the broad independence of republics at their own level, as well as in the determination by them of independently specific paths, forms and methods for solving common, international problems. Under Lenin, a decisive, although not always skillful or successful struggle was waged both against regionalism, "provincialism," nationalism and anarchy, as well as against bureaucratic centralism and uniformity.

Recognition of the diversity and flexibility of the forms of the Soviet ethnic state system is our advantage, making it possible not to unify, but to encompass dozens of peoples "through unity in diversity," taking into account the uniqueness of each. It has played a great role in the ethnic revival of many peoples and in asserting the basic values of interethnic interaction. No nation or people is objectively disinterested in whether the form of ethnic state system or federative ties chosen by it forges real possibilities for its own development. As practice shows, it is vitally interested in the free choice of the

optimum national-state form for its own existence, of adequate specific historical conditions.

All this must be stressed in connection with the fact that today the view, by which almost all the problems of our federation and interethnic relations allegedly stem from the "four-step," "multi-level" or "hierarchical" system of forms of the Soviet ethnic state system (Union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and national okrugs), has become fairly widespread today. In it, people see a violation of the sovereign equality of peoples, evidence of the Stalinist approach to national-state building, remnants of the past, a source of interethnic conflicts, etc. This has been noted at the All-Union Party Conference, the CPSU Central Committee plenums, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

However, neither Lenin nor the party perceived the diversity of forms of Soviet national statehood as a violation of national equality. The tendency toward unification of state and legal forms for solving the ethnic problem in our country was not characteristic of the Leninist, but of the Stalinist approach, as eloquently proven both by the infamous plan for "autonomization," as well as by unionist measures in the real post-Leninist practice of Soviet national-state building.

I consider it illegal to identify the equal right of all nations and nationalities to self-determination with a uniformity of state forms for the practical implementation of this right, or with the unification of the subjects of a federation. All nations are sovereign and have equal rights. However, in this regard it is clear, for instance, that a small nationality (a few hundred or thousand people) or even a larger nation (millions or even tens of millions of people) cannot and are in no state to have one or another form of national state system in all fullness, although legally there is such a possibility, since both the one and the other have a right to self-determination.

Understandably, the point is not that the system of forms of national statehood and federative ties which has taken shape must remain unchanged. Its improvement is necessary and inevitable.

The Leninist concept of Soviet federalism was shaped and asserted under circumstances of a keen struggle. On the eve of and directly after October, the concept of national-state nihilism in a socialist system opposed it. So, even at the April 1917 RSDRP(b) Conference, G. Pyatakov and his supporters, having proclaimed the "away with borders" slogan, tried to prove that the creation of national states is a stage of social development that has already passed, having nothing in common with the interests of socialism. An echo of this position appeared at the 8th RKP(b) Congress in 1919 and later, when attempts were made to oppose the international nature of Soviet power and common economic interests, international goals and tasks of socialism against national Soviet republics and the federation of them.

During the creation of the USSR, two extremes appeared in opposition to the Leninist position. On the one hand, there was a proposal to arrange ties not for a solid and strong federation, but for a loose confederation, incapable of uniting its resources, forces and the possibilities of the young Soviet republics for the sake of achieving common goals. On the other, there was the Stalinist "autonomization" project, i.e., converting independent Soviet republics into autonomous units within the RSFSR. The rejection of these extremes and acceptance by the party of Lenin's plan for building a Union federation in the 1920s gave people a possibility, on the one hand, of implementing the right to self-determination and their own statehood and, on the other, of using the advantages ensuing from uniting their forces and from joint development along a socialist path.

Later, especially beginning in the 1930s, the Leninist principles of a Soviet federation were seriously distorted. They were incompatible with Stalinist "barracks socialism," the administrative-command system of management, and authoritarian ethnic policy. For Stalin the federation and autonomy were an external form, a screen which concealed an inhumane and undemocratic line toward the actual assertion of a totalitarian political system.

Toward a Renovated Federation

Today, it is entirely obvious that only the creative and bold application and development of the Leninist concept of Soviet federalism in both theory and practice are capable of being the basis for the party's strong ethnic policy and leading to the long ago imminent radical renovation of the Soviet Federation. Above all, this will be served by the drafting and passing in the near future not only of a new Declaration (as stated in the CPSU platform on ethnic policy), but also a new Treaty on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, called on to reflect the qualitatively new status of national-state relations in our country. Such a Treaty, in accordance with the right of nations to self-determination, should be signed by the fully authorized representatives not only of Union, but also of autonomous republics, and possibly of other autonomous national formations as well. Later, the most important clauses in the Declaration could, it seems to me, be included in the preamble to the new USSR Constitution, and the Treaty could be included in the appropriate section.

It goes without saying that the new Treaty on the USSR can and should be based on the Leninist principles of free and sovereign self-determination of nations, on the voluntary nature of their unification and full national equality. Besides everything else, concluding such a treaty will make it possible to remove many dangers, as well as speculation on the abuses and mistakes of the past.

Life confirms that even very well-reasoned speeches and articles, drawing the general outlines of a future renovated federation, can no longer overcome the existing

distrust in the Union center. It is possible and necessary to eliminate this via bold and consistent practical action, the more so since more than 2 years ago the CPSU proclaimed a policy of serious expansion of republic rights. I am quite certain that active discussion of the draft of the new Treaty, the more so passing it a year and a half ago, would have seriously narrowed the possibilities for the operation of separatist forces. It is clear that today the paths for approach to such a treaty are significantly more complex and difficult, in connection with which it would not at all be justified to drag out its preparation and conclusion. Precisely a forestalling expansion of republic rights would be a powerful means for struggle against separatism.

In the light of today's realities, naturally, a question may arise: What if no consensus of the Union republics on concluding a new treaty is reached? After all, it is no secret that in certain republics decisions were made by various forces and bodies, aimed at creating independent, separate states outside the USSR. Of course, everything possible must be done to convince republic representatives that the practical implementation of said decisions is not only a painful blow to restructuring, but also a rejection of one of the most important sources for their future dynamic development within the framework of a renovated federation, of the advantages ensuing from the inter-republic unification of forces, and a rejection fraught with serious consequences for the peoples of these republics. However, if such an undesirable decision nonetheless is finally approved, taking world experience into account, it would be inexpedient to introduce the status of a sort of "associated" republic, related to the USSR by way of confederative ties. One does not have to be a great prophet to guess the probability that real life will soon convince these republics of the inadequacy of confederative ties, that it will graphically reveal the negative consequences, above all, of breaking or weakening economic relations with the economic complex that these republics have been a part of for half a century.

Today, the problem of the correlation and interaction of the sovereignty of the USSR and the sovereignties of Union republics stands at the center of the process of renovating the Soviet Federation. Since it is a question of a federated state, it is especially important to proceed from the fact that neither the one sovereignty nor the other can be unlimited and absolute. Neither of them exists or can be implemented outside of its ties to the other. In this regard, in a renovated federation the USSR will be just as interested in the real support and protection of the sovereignty of Union republics, as the latter will be in preserving and implementing the sovereignty of the USSR. Unquestionably, without flourishing, strong sovereign republics there can be no strong and solid USSR. However, it is also no less obvious that even well-developed republics, taken by themselves, outside the state unity of the whole country, can scarcely be sufficiently strong and sovereign.

We need to limit the authorities of the USSR and the Union republics, taking into account the overall conditions and needs of all republics and the country on the whole, as well as the needs and possibilities of each republic. It will satisfy interested parties, if it is the result of the coordinated interests of federation members and is clearly reinforced in the Treaty and, later, in the USSR Constitution, so that the Union republics as sovereign states could independently deal with all matters of state and public life, with the exception of those that are voluntarily transferred by them to the auspices of the Union.

In order to harmonize these sovereignties, it is important to expand the participation of Union republics in the solving problems that are under the auspices of the USSR, ensuring their proper representation in Union agencies and introducing special procedures for the drafting and making of general decisions. The CPSU platform on the ethnic problem also states: if a Union law goes beyond the limits of the Union's authorities, a republic has the right to demand its revocation; on the other hand, a republic law going beyond the framework of the republic's authority or contradicting the law of the USSR can also be revoked; the higher representative bodies of power in the Union republics can protest and halt the action of resolutions and instructions of the Union government in their own territory, if these violate the constitutional laws of the Union republic. Mechanisms and clear procedures are being drafted for resolving differences between bodies of the USSR and of republics, as well as between Union republics and other national-state formations. In light of the above, existing concepts to the effect that the peoples of Union republics can restore their independent statehood and ensure sovereign development only by leaving the USSR evoke serious doubts.

It is even more important to emphasize that the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress clearly stated that the principle of self-determination of nations in the renovated Soviet Federation presumes the freedom of national-state formations to choose the form of way of life, institution and symbol of statehood, since our ideal is not unification, but unity in diversity.

In justifiably speaking out against groundlessly strict centralization and for the real sovereignty of Union republics, at the same time it is impossible to cast oneself to the other extreme, without limit narrowing the authority of the USSR. We must not cross the boundary, beyond which the integrity and unity of the country can be questioned, and the country is reduced to a typical confederation. Many questions are already being raised, including at the USSR congresses of people's deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and of the supreme soviets of a number of Union republics, in support of recognizing the full and unconditional priority of the sovereignties of Union republics and their rights with respect to the sovereignty and rights of the USSR. Attempts are being made in this direction to

prove that today it is necessary to reject not only bureaucratic centralism, but also centralism in general, including democratic centralism in its undistorted interpretation, which takes into account the contemporary level of development of our Union multi-ethnic state.

In substantiating the priority of the republic over the Union-wide, they usually refer to the fact that first there were republics, and then later there was the USSR, that the sovereignty and rights of the USSR are secondary, produced from the sovereignty and rights of the Union republics. In itself, this raises no objections. However, it is not a question of the genesis of various sovereignties, but of their correlation and interaction in an already existing and functioning federation. Really, does the fact that the rights of the USSR are secondary and produced mean that the rights of Union republics stand in any case and under all conditions above the rights of the Union? Of course not. After all, Union rights, interests and values are nothing other than the common, basic rights, interests and values of all peoples who have joined the federation of republics.

Today, one can often hear talk to the effect that leadership in regard to the laws of a Union republic should be guaranteed only by the Union-wide law through which federative relations are regulated; as far as the rest are concerned, each Union republic has the right to assert legal force or, conversely, to declare any Union-wide law ineffective in its territory. Really, this would mean that even spheres such as defense and the country's security, foreign policy, hard currency financial and transportation systems and corresponding relations, not to mention the fundamental bases of the political and economic order, the solution of common problems in economics, science and culture, protection of the rights of the individual, etc., would be placed outside the limits of the authority of the USSR. In putting well-founded stress on the democratization of these relations as well, we should not forget that they are by no means identical to the complete decentralization and separation of the country into parts.

The renovated Soviet Federation should also preserve and constitutionally reinforce anew the right of each Union republic to secede from the USSR. As under Lenin, this does not serve disconnection, but guarantees the voluntary nature of cohesion of Union republics and reinforces the democracy of a Union state. We must not let undemocratic antisocialist nationalistic elements and forces utilize this right for their own mercenary interests and purposes. Life shows that under the difficult conditions of the country's contemporary development they may seriously influence the moods of a significant part of the population, using speculative slogans, demagogy, fear, etc. We must also take into account that today, when an integral, unified national economic complex has already existed in the country for a long time, secession from the USSR by any Union republic places extraordinarily great responsibility and high obligations to other republics on it.

Consequently, a law (which is finally being drafted) is needed that clearly defines the mechanism for implementing the right to secede from the Union. It will also ensure the genuinely free expression of the will of the whole people of a republic by way of referendum. The decision should be made not by a simple vote, but by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the voters. The seceding republic should fulfill or take responsibility for obligations, which ensue from the fact of withdrawal itself from the federation and are determined by law. Incidentally, the sovereignty of a Union republic in the event of its secession from the Union cannot serve as an obstacle for implementing the right to self-determination of peoples of autonomous units which join it or of ethnic groups residing in compact areas.

The convergence of the competences of Union and autonomous republics in a renovated federation is very important. Why would a separate large and powerful autonomous SSR (for instance, Tataria, Bashkiria and Dagestan) not have the possibility on the basis of free expression of will to elevate their national-state status, just like individual autonomous oblasts and okrugs? Under the conditions of perestroyka and renovation of the federation, we should not retain the ossified nature of the national-state forms that appeared back in the 1920s-early 1930s.

Today, the real outlines of the new Soviet Federation are only beginning to take shape. Much difficult work remains within the framework of the second stage of the political reform. Establishment of the post of USSR President and, beneath him, of the Presidential Council and Council of the Federation opens up new possibilities for the practical improvement of national-state relations in the country. It is clear that only on the path of democratization, of creating a rule-of-law state and a self-managing socialist society will we be able to achieve the triumph of the Leninist principles of Soviet federalism.

THE CPSU BEFORE THE CONGRESS

The Party As I See It

905B0021D Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 23-30

[Pre-congress survey by KOMMUNIST]

[Text] *We continue the publication of responses to the pre-congress survey by the journal KOMMUNIST (see KOMMUNIST No 5, 1990). However, we would first like to remind you of the questions on it:*

1. What do you envision as solutions to the crisis of the CPSU and what do you see as the party's new image? What should we retain, what should we reject? What goals should a renovated party set for itself?

2. What should intra-party relations be, so that the voices of rank-and-file communists can be heard clearly? How do

you interpret the correlation of democracy and centralism in the activity and life of the party under conditions of renovation? Is it possible to ensure party unity with the free formation of factions and platforms, and how should this be achieved?

3. What is your concept of the party's place and role in contemporary society? On what basis should relations with state structures, social organizations and mass movements be structured? How do you conceive of democratic control over the ruling party?

Nikolay Petrovich Kustarev, USSR people's deputy, smith at the Gorkiy Automotive Plant, "GAZ" Production Association:

1. In answering the first question, I would like above all to emphasize that, in my firm conviction, we need not a new but precisely a renovated party. Today, one often hears and reads that the CPSU, they say, should be some kind of social organization whose members discuss various ideas circulating about the country, elect their representatives to bodies of state management, and nothing more. Here, apparently, one must above all ask: What kind of society do we wish to build and how? We can sell our enterprises and land to representatives of foreign capital, permit them to dispose of the wealth of our mines and, of course, they will change the market situation and fill the stores with goods. However, was the October Revolution accomplished in order in the end for us to be voluntarily deprived of the opportunity to be masters in our own country?

I categorically object to such a deal. I think we must teach ourselves to work productively and to manage skillfully, including with the help of foreign specialists. This is within our capabilities: our country is not really so lacking in talented people. If we are to build a humane society and democratic socialism independently, we cannot managed without a political party that would be the vanguard and would unite progressively minded, civilly active people. In the reverse case, we would slide toward capitalism by no means of the Swedish model, but a far less democratic one.

It is urgently necessary to renovate the party. How? We should turn it into a union of like-minded thinkers, who have voluntarily and consciously joined the ranks of the CPSU. In the new Statutes, we must state that a person has the right to freely withdraw from the party without any consequences whatsoever for himself. Party membership should not affect official position or one's attitude toward a person. It may seem as though many would agree with such a formulation of the question, but it turns out otherwise in fact. In our association, for instance, even today people look askance at those who have turned in their party cards. One wonders: a certain distrust of him arises and suspiciousness creeps into one's heart. How is it that he voluntarily withdrew from the party? Does he want to set himself against the others? What does he have in mind? Often an invisible wall appears between this person and other members of the collective. It seems to me, many of those who joined the party casually and want to withdraw from it are rather afraid precisely of the prospect of such alienation. Therefore, the appropriate note in the new CPSU Statutes is necessary. Let the temporary travelers leave in good will. It is better that way for both them and the rest.

I often wonder: Why in the pre-revolutionary and first post-revolutionary years was the worker-communist a good agitator, and now such people are a rarity among my comrades? What has been lost? Faith in the ideals of socialism? No. Perhaps, we do not have trust? I would not say that either. In the workers' collective, they respect a man who works honestly, who does not try to show wit at the expense of others, and does not set an equal sign between a smith from the neighboring section and a thieving bureaucrat with a party card.

As it seems to me, we do not have sufficient ability to delve deeply into that which is happening, to peer into the essence of one or another social process. There is not enough knowledge, the horizon is narrow. However, after all, it can also be expanded, if even through some kind of political education, only not the kind that we have. What is the use of the narrations written in the newspapers? The intellectuals, of whom there are many in the party, should meet with factory communists more often and carry out this education in the enterprises. Their thoughts and assessments, unquestionably, would help us "educate ourselves," would lend persuasiveness to our attempts to protect the party from attacks, and would help people understand its policy more correctly. For the sake of such meetings, we would be able to open our own political club and maintain it at the expense of the primary organization's funds. Young people would be able to hear intelligent conversations and to debate. Wise words are very valuable today.

The renovated party should learn to critically evaluate itself, to speak honestly to people about its shortcomings. What kind of response did the events in Tyumen, Volgograd and Chernigov receive from us? Only one: the savoring of details in smoke-filled rooms. Yet, why not discuss that which has occurred in the primary party organizations? One wonders: Are not similar things occurring in our oblast as well? Why not speak publicly about the life of our own oblast party organization and include nonparty members in the discussion? People should know the truth about us communists. Trust begins with openness. However, no such discussion has been held here at the factory. It is not easy to get used to choosing the theme of party meetings oneself.

I cannot imagine renovating the CPSU without a marked increase in the professionalism of its leading bodies and employees. The apparatus is not guilty of the present-day party crisis: the "grayness" that has spread everywhere led it to the edge of the abyss. Therefore, for instance, I consider it right to raise the salary of party functionaries. However, this must be done at the same time that personnel is cut back, not half a year later. Then people

would not ask: Where will we get money for the apparatus workers? Really, one must pay a great deal for true professionalism. It would be good to trust the party organizations themselves to determine the size of salary for a specific secretary, such that the person will earn because of his contribution, not his position.

2. Intra-party relations should, in my opinion, be structured only on a comradely basis, on respect for the opinion of a communist, regardless of his post. A new procedure for electing leading party bodies might in many ways contribute to establishment of such relations. It seems, the absolute majority of party members support having direct, secret and alternative elections. The selection not only of secretaries, but also of the leader of the rayon, city and even oblast party organization should depend on the primary party organizations.

The election of a general secretary is a special topic. I am not sure that it is possible in practice to involve simple communists, the whole party in this procedure. However, it is also not right to leave us out, as had been done until now. Probably, it is necessary beforehand to familiarize party members with the candidates for the highest party posts and to talk about them, their program, and what they have done up until now in more detail in the mass information media. In my opinion, it is very important that we see living people before our eyes in all the complexity of their natures, habits and views. Precisely living people, not a gallery of identical portraits with brief biographic data. Then, we would be able more clearly to determine for ourselves which of them we are ready to entrust with this difficult and respected post, and we would send the appropriate instruction to our delegate to the congress.

3. I cannot imagine that the ruling party in any kind of democratic state would voluntarily refuse power. The CPSU should not do this either. Refusal would mean that it has nothing more to offer the people. The draft CPSU Central Committee platform attests to the contrary: the party has a clear goal which is supported by the majority of members of our society. It is no accident that precisely the party leader, for whom I also voted, became President of the USSR. The people's deputies trusted him, although by no means unconditionally.

The task of the ruling party, it seems to me, is reduced to developing a political line and suggesting it to the people, which the people would approve, and to implement it through its representatives in state bodies. In party conferences, it is necessary from time to time to compare the country's course of development to this line.

Relations with other political parties (except those calling for a forced change of the constitutional system) should be structured on the basis of laws and mutual respect. It is no sin, I think, to imitate some of the methods of political competitors and to learn from the good things about them. I remember that when I had just begun to master my trade, I was surprised: why are these old blacksmiths watching me? At the time, my workmanship was nothing to look at. Yet, now I myself, it so happens, stand for hours not far from a young lad. Everything of his seems clumsy, but he has a certain movement that is dexterous. No one taught him this. This is simply part of a person from nature. Why not borrow? In politics as well, most likely, one should not look down on one's opponents.

Shalva Aleksandrovich Amonashvili, general director, Experimental Scientific Production Pedagogical Association, Georgian SSR Ministry of National Education, USSR APN academician, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

1. Before expressing my considerations on the subject of restructuring party life, I wish to consider my own past. Then, the conclusions to which life has led me will seem more understandable.

Why did I join the party?

This happened in March 1953. I, a 22-year old student, was a Pioneer leader in school. My family past had not been ruined by the repressions. My father was a simple worker devoted to the party. He volunteered for the war and died in Crimea. In school, I was raised in a spirit of blind faith in the communist ideals and love for the leader. Indeed, the war itself, the postwar years, and the creative labor of the people also had a tremendous influence on the ideological orientation of my generation.

Then Stalin died.

Can a contemporary 22-year old person imagine what this meant for his then coevals? Overflowing with an intensified feeling of devotion to the Homeland and the party, thousands and thousands of people declared a desire to become communists. I too, striving to strengthen our might, joined the party.

At that instant, could any one of us have assumed that the leading body of the party had already destroyed the fate of both the country, as well as of the party itself, and in subsequent decades would lead all society to the brink of catastrophe? They did not and could not know this. Later, in March 1956, on Rustaveli Prospekt in Tbilisi, I experienced shock for the first time. Is it really possible that the soldiers shot at us young people? Is it really possible that the young people who fell to the asphalt like stones were not performing for the others? At that time, an incurable wound was made in our ideological devotion.

For a long time, it seemed to me that any raykom secretary is the party, any Central Committee employee is the party, and I personally, people like me, were the soldiers of the party, servants to it. I greatly regret that I was in such a delusion, although there was an explanation for this. First, power, which got along excellently with many of those who lacked spirituality and principle,

those who were greedy and arrogant, was concentrated in the hands of party leaders. Second, I had to protect my own professional ideas.

A protest started within me some time in the late 1950s, and I expressed it in my teaching activity. Having rejected fruitless authoritarian-imperative pedagogy, I devoted myself to finding ways to raise a free individual. These paths proceeded from the overall concept of humanizing the pedagogical process. It goes without saying that I was not alone. I ended up in the company of a surprising plethora of "informals" in the pedagogical community: V. Sukhomlinskiy, L. Zankov, D. Elkonin, V. Davydov... In his day, each of them was punished and persecuted, allegedly as renegades of "Marxist pedagogy." I personally was saved by the benevolence of the first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, to whom I am deeply grateful. I think they took risks. When V. Davydov was expelled from the party in Moscow, when they destroyed M. Shchetinin's experiment in the Ukraine and scattered his set of books on the orders of a CPSU Central Committee department, when the USSR APN Presidium closed the laboratory which was continuing L. Zankov's work and, finally, when influential forces in Tbilisi gathered to destroy our pedagogical experiment, the protection of the first secretary in our republic resolved the problem in science's favor.

Now the party's role in the country's life is becoming increasingly clearer and I believe that it will turn out to be fairly fatal. CPSU members are abandoning it and are in fact demonstratively burning their party cards.

No dictatorship whatsoever can justify itself. The dictatorship of the party is no exception, even if it was accomplished in the name of the interests of the proletariat. In a society inhabited by people with various ways of thinking (are human communities, gripped by like-minded thinking, even possible in general?), a dictatorship is evil. We must rid ourselves of this evil, invested in various forms of "democratic centralism" or diktat from the center.

The words of the famous teacher P. Blonskiy, with which he addressed teachers on the eve of the revolution, come to mind: teacher, look, often are not precisely you yourself not the main obstacle to renovation of the school? Let me be so bold as to transform this statement as applied to party employees, who to this day think according to the principle "the party is me:" Look, often are not you yourself precisely the obstacle to renovation of the country?

Now, I am standing at a crossroads: What will I, a party member who was deceived and deceived myself, be now? I did not join it for the sake of profit, nor from a desire to deserve the trust of handfuls of people. They say: I am a communist, you see, which means I am more reliable than a nonparty member.

Right now I cannot say what kind of a decision I will make for myself. Everything depends on how the party will renew itself, whether it will manage to outlast events in this complex stage in the country's life, and whose interests it will express. People could ask: what am I myself doing for this? I am trying to make a strong contribution through my teaching work. I am trying to raise the little boys and girls who step over the school threshold as honest, free-thinking people full of human dignity, people who are capable of infusing spirit in and invigorating both the party and society.

However, the future changes in the CPSU are the sum of aspirations of a number of differently-minded social groups and individual citizens, of political flows and platforms within the party itself. What will this sum total turn out to be? What will the CPSU become after the 28th Congress? If it will henceforth cling to the dogmas that led society to the abyss, if it still has a place for dishonest, greedy, corrupt people, I will have to think about how to protect my honor and my name. Apparently, many party members are also thinking about this.

I have no thoroughly considered plan for perestroyka of the CPSU or of intra-party life. I do have certain expectations, related to the upcoming congress. Here are some decisions that I expect from it:

—The party will stop concentrating state power in its hands and will in fact transfer it to the soviets and the parliament. It will satisfy itself with the role of a political force and will strive to restore authority through practical work in favor of the people.

—The party will acknowledge the existence and rights of other political forces and parties, learn to hold a dialogue with them, and enter a union with other democratic forces and parties.

—The party will reject the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism, absorbing the spirit, not the letter, and it will reinterpret the concept taking existing realities into account.

—The party will not promise to build communism, since this is beyond within power of the present generation of people, and it will refuse to sacrifice a person's or people's life and fate for the sake of goals that cannot be achieved in general or in the foreseeable future.

—The party will change its program in order to promote a real increase in the people's standard of living, enrich its spiritual life, accelerate the process of democratization and humanization of society, and ensure the real rights and freedoms of every member of it.

—The party will recognize the independence of the republic party organizations and will ensure unity, not with the help of a strong center, but on the basis of goals and programs of activity that unite everyone. The center will not adopt the role of indicator and will not interfere in cadre and other decisions in the republic parties, but will become a coordinator and advisor. The party will admit that the proclaimed ideas can be implemented in many variants, and that

any republic party has the right independently to decide which variant of social progress it will suggest for its own people.

—The party categorically will reject the practice of endless plenums, meetings, conferences, assemblies and resolutions, which give the people nothing except disillusionment, empty promises and mountains of words. The main methods for the party's work will be direct communication with the people and democratic participation in its life.

—The party will pursue the truth not in words, but in action: a society that does not care for its children, for the education of its own citizens, has no future.

—Finally, the party will change its name. It should reflect not an idealistic goal (the building of communism), but a real one that will offer people a worthy standard of living and will assert freedom for each person, freeing him from the fear of nuclear, ecological and other catastrophes.

Alim Ivanovich Chabanov, general director, "Rotor" Scientific Production Association, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

1. Discussions of ways to renovate the CPSU, on its position in society and the state again and again encourage us to think about the purpose of the party. It does not exist for its own sake. What is meant by the often mentioned task of serving the people? The search for a new image for the CPSU should probably start with revealing the most negative aspects of its activity and defining the support points for its future difficult work.

I think the current crisis is due, above all, to the hierarchical party-administrative structure of management formed by Stalin. This "command ladder" even now contains an innumerable number of steps, over which one is not allowed to jump. Such attempts almost always end with the "question" rapidly "going down" to the head of the desk that you skipped over. Taking into account the disdain for the individual, instilled in him and those like him by Stalinism, and the instinct for self-preservation and self-reproduction, it is easy to assess the destructive role for society of such an administrative structure.

The self-isolation of the party-bureaucratic system from real life and the needs and concerns of the simple person has also been telling. The special distribution of material wealth, medical services intended for a narrow circle of people, and the developed resort industry did tremendous moral harm to the party and created conditions under which it, essentially, was unable (and indeed did not even try) to resolve its main task, carrying out upbringing work. Right now, one often hears: we do not, they say, need to educate adults. Is this so? Humane, democratic socialism cannot be built without the moral improvement of all members of society, and unfortunately, our current intellectual level is excessively low. The party-bureaucratic leadership has led the country to a decline in morality, discipline and quality of labor, to stagnation in culture and education, to the atrophy of charity, and to the disconnection and embitterment of people. These are the most serious losses and do not even compare to the imbalanced nature of the economy, finances and trade.

Nonetheless, I believe in the reality of renovating the CPSU, in winning genuine authority in society, in the ultimate success of the transformations in our society proposed by it. What gives me this certainty?

Above all, the new political thinking of the party leadership, which has to a great extent removed the dangerous heating of the struggle of two alternative sociopolitical systems in the world, has drawn them closer to solving common human problems, and has made it possible to establish cooperation and mutual assistance in overcoming crisis phenomena and building a new world civilization.

Then, one should say that the ideals of the socialist development of society, proposed by the CPSU and reflected in the draft Central Committee platform, are shared by most representatives of the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia. Both the contradictory Leningrad meetings at the end of last year, as well as our debates in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the extraordinary 3rd USSR Congress of People's Deputies convinced me of this. The current difficult problems in the socioeconomic sphere are causing bitterness, pain and even dismay among some, but not an aspiration to go backward toward capitalism. This kind of appeal basically comes only from people who cannot support themselves through labor, for whom things will be hard even under capitalism. Using the example of our "Rotor" Association, I see how highly both the workers and the engineers value the beauty of collective labor and creativity. Yet equalization and the state support of idlers and slipshod workers will vanish along with the attempts to jump over the objective stages of social development. Enterprises freed of administrative-bureaucratic supervision will finally work effectively, and fill our market with goods. Then, opportunities will open up for society's spiritual development which do not exist in the capitalist world. I tell myself: precisely our faith in socialism gave us the strength during the stagnant period to struggle to shape the idea of perestroyka, or renovating the CPSU and society, of eliminating the deformation of socialist development. This process is invincible. The whole problem is how to accelerate it.

I think, above all, that the party should condemn the command-administrative system within itself and in the state mechanism, and should repudiate it. The party's influence on the life of society and the state should lie, above all, in the shaping of awareness, in enriching the spiritual world of the citizens of its country. It is possible to achieve the necessary specific solution through communists, working in one or another leading posts. I also cannot agree with those who believe that the President or a minister should discontinue his membership in the

party whose policy has received the support of the majority of the population. What is the logic of this?

In the new CPSU Statutes, the section on the moral requirements of a party member should be considered especially carefully. Concern must be shown not only for the moral image of communists, but also for statutorily strengthening a task such as the spiritual emancipation of the individual and the development of culture, art, education and medicine in our society. Here, a reasonable attitude toward religion, a recognition of the human right to profess any faith, regardless of membership in a political party, could play an important role. In my opinion, the moral positions, for example, of the Christian church in contemporary society to a great extent coincide with the humanistic ideology of communism. The primitive interpretation of communism as a social order under which everything is equal for everyone is incorrect and does not reflect its essence. In my opinion, the basis of communism lies in equal initial opportunities for establishing and developing the personality and the need to work that is internally inherent in a person. I believe that the party should not reject the communist ideology under the pressure of philistine ridicule of it or criticism by the opponents of the country's socialist path of development.

The renovated CPSU should try to eliminate incompetence and become a party of true professionals. Nothing can discredit a political organization so well as dilettantes in its ranks. Brilliant individualism is needed! I would suggest establishing the upbringing and support for talented people as a statutory task and would consider strict party penalties for those who "squeeze" intelligent, capable people.

The world outlook of a Communist Party member should include an understanding of the need to strengthen friendship among peoples, to struggle against the opposition of one nationality to another, for create a united world home with a scientifically substantiated, mutually profitable division of labor, united trade and financial systems, and respect for the political choice of the people of any country. The simultaneous existence of socialist and capitalist sociopolitical formations must be considered a positive phenomenon in the historical development of civilization, incorporating alternative choice and competitiveness.

2. We must strive for intra-party relations which would completely rule out the concept of "power" itself and would be structured only on comradely principles. Different views and alternative positions can and should exist in the party, but not factions. Decisions drafted and passed collectively, concerning not only the programs and the Statutes, but also the conduct of party policy and ideological work are mandatory for all members of the CPSU. Democratic centralism should remain the guiding principle in structuring the party's activity. However, it should be implemented in practice not by the apparatus, but by the elected bodies.

Rejection of the former version of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution creates conditions for the formation of different sociopolitical structures. Persons or organized groups of people are receiving freedom of choice. Therefore, the CPSU has a moral right to be more strict and exigent toward its own members. The authorities of the primary organizations should include an unrestricted right to accept people into the party ranks and to expel them, and choice, taking into account the specific conditions of methods of ideological work in the masses in accordance with the Statutes and the CPSU Program. The cadre policy of primary party organizations in labor collectives might consist only of upbringing and persuasion.

Readers' Thoughts, Arguments, Suggestions

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[Articles from KOMMUNIST readers]

[Text]Who Is in the Foundation, What Is in the Superstructure?

V. Pisigin, political organizer, Club imeni N.I. Bukharin, Naberezhnyye Chelny:

Today, as we discuss the new party platform and wish to look into the sources of the CPSU crisis, many are experiencing a temptation to reduce the problem to a few obvious factors. They suppose, for example, that revoking Article 6 of the USSR Constitution will open an opportunity for different political directions, above all represented by the so-called informal groups and associations, to turn themselves into legal parties and make a multiparty system in the country a fact. However, are we taking a purely liberal approach here, which somewhat overlooks many basic categories as "unneeded?"

The essence of the problem, of course, lies not in the presence or absence of a few lines in a document of even the highest status. Where does it lie? No matter how radical a movement may be in terms of its goals or significant in terms of scale, if it is not expressed economically, if it is not based on a sufficiently powerful social stratum, if it does not reinterpret its interests, said movement is not an organized force and not a structure that unites the economy and politics. Therefore, it is no state to include itself in a somewhat constructive dialogue with the ruling party. Sensibly speaking, today the abolition of innumerable restrictions on economic initiative is far more important than meetings and petitions for shaping new economic forces, for forming social strata capable of implementing the ideas of a market economy.

I often ask workers who are party members: "Who can be considered a communist?" They are silent. Then they begin to gather a kind of image of the ideal person with ideal moral qualities: the most honest, most principle-minded, etc. However, if we are thinking in terms of

canons for an ideal, are we not denying that others, other people and even our own dear friends, who are not communists, may also be decent, that they can also stand up for their convictions? I think it is necessary to elaborate on what a communist or socialist is today. In my opinion, he is primarily a person with a political doctrine based on a socialist mixed economy (socialist, because it is a question of diverse forms of social ownership plus humanism). I cannot consider the USSR people's deputies at the congress who applauded the rejoinder against developing cooperatives to be communists or socialists, although they have party cards in their pockets by the dozen. I cannot call a party that has eliminated the diversity of forms of ownership and established a totalitarian regime with all the consequences hence ensuing, either communist or socialist.

Today, the political party is not a declared "vanguard" of one or another class, but an ideologized structure expressing the power interests of a definite method of production, of a specific form of ownership of property. Of course, one may dispute this definition, but it is the outcome not only of much research, but also of analysis of contemporary practice.

Consider, for instance, the following. Recently, when speaking at the KamAZ Casting Plant, I heard a worker say: "We will call the party that will stand up for our interests communist." Whence this interest in politics? The point is that the enterprise is preparing to convert to leasing. Not to the "lease relations" that are now being foisted from above, but to leasing from below, for which this worker, along with his workers' committee, is waging a struggle against the plant administration and the entire administrative system in general. These workers, as well as the striking miners, rapidly realized that they are trying to solve tasks not only of an economic, but above all of a political nature. If this is so, it is possible to solve them by presenting oneself as a political and, of course, organized force. In this situation, the main goal of the party, which the workers are prepared to call communist, is protection of their interests.

So, the most important question in the realm of abstractions and declarations moves into the sphere of daily, minute-by-minute practice. The growing stratum of free producers—the lessors and cooperative workers who are implementing the economic restructuring in practice—need a political force capable of organizing them, of explaining the essence of events occurring in the country, of helping them orient themselves in the complex situation of converting to market relations, and of humanizing this process. This stratum also needs a voice for its political interests at the state level. Today, the workers see that the party leadership apparently supports them, but they know that the initiators of perestroyka have many opponents and, mainly, the workers know where these opponents are concentrated, although, of course, the apparatus also has progressively thinking people and even supporters of radical changes.

We often hear: "Return the mandate of trust to the party!" For this, the CPSU must rid itself of leaders who have compromised it and reject privileges, administrative methods of leadership and the right to the last word in truth. Is the party considering how at the same time to be both a ruling all-people's party and the ideological political vanguard of the working class, to strengthen the state and its structure and, in addition, to hold a partly critical position with regard to it? Can answers to this be found which satisfy not only the requirements of the logic of public speeches, but also of the circle of most urgent problems that surrounds us all?

True, today the CPSU is the only real force capable of leading the political processes in the country. However, the party will be unable despite all its desire to direct at least one "process" and, from our point of view, it is the most important one. It is a question of political support for social forms of ownership. The existing structure of party bodies faithfully serves a mono-economy and was born and shaped along with it. Consequently, the party apparatus is a slave to state monopolism, and is master of it. (In truth, before becoming a slave to things, one must become master of them.) Is a victorious uprising against oneself, not at a personal, but at the party-wide level, even possible?

Cooperative workers have been working for more than a year already and their movement, judging by everything, is advancing regardless of serious obstacles. Lease relations in the city and countryside have also moved forward. The individual sector is becoming stronger. Commercial and cooperative banks are growing. Joint-stock enterprises are appearing. Yet, the party just intends to restructure itself. What will its role be in a future mixed democratic society? Will it be able at the same time to express the interests of both the lessors, and the cooperative workers, and the students, and the intelligentsia? This is a most difficult and important question...

Meanwhile, it is disturbing that most of the organizations being created today, which aspire to be called political, do not say a word in their declarations, appeals or agitation measures about cooperatives or leased enterprises. There is the old talk of "taking power" and sharing this "power" with the ruling party. The lack of understanding that the problem of power is, above all, the problem of redistribution of property is alarming. If the "taking of power" is a substitution of a "good" party for a "bad" one, then only the one who takes the helm can do this. In my opinion, right now we must concentrate on creating political and economic structures of a constructive nature which, in accumulating strength and developing, would in time be able to enter a dialogue with the ruling party. So long as there is no such force, there can be no balance: the center should not share responsibility with a crowd, since the power of a crowd promises terrible upheavals.

As far as the near future is concerned, it seems, the free producers will be able to implement their social policy

with the help of specific organizations: unions, associations, federations, etc. For example, the Union of Writers manages to get by without a trade union. However, it has its own Literary Fund, its own infrastructure, and representatives in political bodies. Does it need any kind of party? Apparently, both the workers and the farmers, having become free producers, will also operate in the same way, but on a far broader scale.

However, this will happen later. Right now it is a question of converting to market relations under conditions of a state, for the time being not sufficiently restricted by the standards of law. In this case, a political force, capable of humanizing the conversion process, is especially necessary. After all, a great many people face serious tests. Business acumen, constant analysis of the state of the market, a sharp increase in the role of professional skills in general—are we all prepared for this? That is, the conversion process may take rigid survival forms, and our obsolete, embittered society risks displaying new excesses to the world. No, we must not cast ourselves out of the frying pan and into the fire: out of the clutches of Stalinism, where the individual was a slave to the state and because of this was guaranteed the minimum means for his own reproduction, into a "freedom" where no one will show any concern for the specific person, including (perhaps, even most of all) the state. That is why, at this historic stage, the party that will be the political voice of diverse forms of ownership is called on to play an outstanding humanistic role.

We are speaking of the crisis of an over-centralized economy, of the decentralization of power, of the development of regions, oblasts and economic zones. In short, we are for economic independence. At the same time, there is a rigid centralized party structure. Is this not a profound contradiction of the economic transformations that are gaining pace? It seems, precisely for this reason the representation of various forms of economic management in the party should become apparent, and in this case need not mandatorily be divided into "cooperative workers," "lessors" or "farmers." However, the corresponding platforms and factions within the CPSU are possible. If our ruling party does not do this, then, unquestionably, each form of ownership will find its own political equivalent independently and in the near future.

From the Viewpoint of a 'Radical'

D. Laletin, candidate of philosophical sciences, member of the "April-85" Party Club, Voronezh:

As everyone knows, at the end this January the "Democratic Platform" was created—an association of party clubs and all party members, striving for democratic transformation of the CPSU. On 3 March of this year, PRAVDA published the text of the program document of this movement and materials from its discussions. The discussions showed that the "Democratic Platform" and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform coincide on a number of basic positions, but they disagree on a few very important theses. The discussion that was begun needs continuation. It seems that the following directions are most topical.

The CPSU Central Committee Platform consistently supports the idea of **perestroyka** of the existing society. In other words, it proceeds from the recognition that, basically, regardless of deformations, it is nonetheless socialist.

In fact, socialism cannot be inhumane and undemocratic. In our country, of course, socialism has not been built. Therefore, it is impossible to "restructure" it: we must create it. Evidently, for this reason the Central Committee Platform does not define socialism, essentially identifying it with democracy and humanism (and identifying socialist ideals with common human ones), nor does it disclose the content and specific nature of this system. The absence of a meaningful definition renders it unable to set meaningful goals. This is one of the most important shortcomings of the CPSU Central Committee Platform.

The "Democratic Platform" also lacks such a definition, but its task is "more modest:" **not the building of socialism, but the democratization of the party.**

The draft Central Committee Platform considers the CPSU itself a fairly homogeneous organization: it does not allow thoughts that the party apparatus, especially the higher levels, may have specific interests of its own. Against this background, the need to focus its efforts on "implementing party cadre policy..." acquires special meaning. This is the main, if not only tool of any party. One could say that parties even create themselves, in order to implement their own cadre policy. The question is: What are its principles and methods? To this day, "party cadre policy" has reliably ensured the monopoly power of the apparatus in local areas. Therefore, a clear and unambiguous statement of the party's cadre policy principles is necessary. It is necessary to determine their correlation to the now existing principle of the nomenclature, of which the "Democratic Platform" demands repudiation, and to the competitive approach proposed by it.

The CPSU Central Committee Platform speaks of the need for genuine democracy in intra-party discussions, pluralism of opinions and the diversity of approaches and platforms. However, here it advances a requirement for unity in the party ranks and speaks of anticipating the appearance of factions with their own internal organization and discipline. Essentially, this is an expression of the principle of democratic centralism in its current standard, Stalinist form.

Are platforms and different approaches in general possible without preliminary discussion, i.e., without corrective discussions, meetings, and regulations, without the corresponding organization and discipline? Hardly. Then where is the border between a "platform" and a "faction?" What criteria distinguish them? Who will determine and how: a faction is **already** taking shape

(which is inadmissible!) or it this **still** just a platform? Finally, in light of the ban on factions, the right of the minority to stand up for its opinion seems problematical. After all, if said minority consists of even two people, it would already be a faction or could be declared such. This contradiction of the CPSU Central Committee Platform requires resolution.

Section 7 of the Draft CPSU Central Committee Platform begins with a series of statements describing the features of the party crisis. Basically, these coincide with the positions of the "Democratic Platform." However, these statements are concluded by two assertions which really do not correspond.

First, there is the declaration that a devotion to Leninist ideals has been preserved in the broad party masses. The authority of Lenin's name has been preserved. In only the past year or so, propaganda has been making an attempt to revitalize the image of Lenin, but the broad party masses are scarcely seriously effected by this. Meanwhile, this entirely ignores the fact that Lenin's ideals of 1917-1918 and his ideals of 1921-1923 far from coincide and are even opposite in many ways. To which ideals are the "broad party masses" devoted?

Second, according to the platform, the CPSU "managed to overcome the inertia of Stalinism and stagnation..." Of course, in some spheres of life inertia is being overcome. However, as far as the everyday practice of management, the transfer of power to the soviets, and the democratization of political and, especially, economic life are concerned, changes here have only just begun.

The claim that the CPSU expresses the interests of all working people also sparks doubt. This is hardly possible in general. Only the general, final interests of all working people coincide: their desires for well-being, freedom and justice. The specific interests, directly determining the motives for action and proceeding from the real conditions of life, are different, just as the ways of implementing the final goals are different.

According to the canons of Marxism, the party is the most developed and conscious part of a class. The main feature of a class is its attitude toward the means of production. This attitude is defined by a specific historical form of ownership of the means of production. Consequently, the planned pluralism of forms of ownership objectively creates prerequisites for the appearance of new parties. Each of these will express the interests of those groups of working people which are related to a certain form of ownership.

So, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress contains a number of important shortcomings, considerably reducing its restructuring potential. Many fundamental positions, which determine the directions of restructuring of the party and society, are merely proclaimed, not specified. This is to say nothing of the mechanisms or guarantees for the transformations being proclaimed. It seems, it was intended more for agitation and propaganda purposes than for the development of a plan for real action.

How will discussions on the pre-congress platforms go? A genuine discussion requires an efficient mechanism, capable of promptly processing large volumes of information. This mechanism should ensure: the establishment of each suggestion; analysis and classification of suggestions in terms of content, their systematization and generalization without distortion of content; expert analysis of suggestions and assessment of them according to sphere of action, possible consequences of implementation, etc.; comparison of all suggestions and the results of expert analysis; publication of summaries of the suggestions and of assessments for comprehensive information and discussion; and information on which suggestions are being included in the draft, which are not, and why.

Unfortunately, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform to a significant extent retains a style of irreconcilability and non-acceptance of alternative positions. The Central Committee Platform would be more realistic, it seems, if the indicated contradictions and shortcomings were examined and corrected in accordance with the "Democratic Platform." I would like to submit these suggestions for discussion.

Both Centralism and Democracy

V. Petrishchev, doctor of economic sciences, prorector, Odessa Higher Party School:

People are speaking ever more often of democratic centralism as a proper form of socialist democracy either in the negative, or only as of combining centralism with democracy. This is understandable, since against the background of the autocracy and bureaucracies that have existed any real elements of civil freedom, for instance, freedom of assembly, pluralism of opinions, and so forth, immediately look like a renovation of socialism. However, such renovation is in fact possible only with the implementation of the principle of democratic centralism.

"We constantly confuse centralism with arbitrariness and bureaucracy. The history of Russia, naturally, has created such confusion, yet this nonetheless remains unquestionably impermissible for a Marxist" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, p 144). Unfortunately, the modern history of our country also supports said confusion, since the practice of social management in all its spheres was and still is based on bureaucratic centralism. Therefore, it is natural that centralism, in most people's opinions on democracy, is considered an evil. Democracies oppose "overcentralization." The only salvation from centralism is seen in decentralization. In substantiating this assumption, democracy is defined as a combination of centralism with independence, centralism with self-management, etc. However, in this regard, they do not

elaborate on precisely what kind of centralism (democratic or bureaucratic) is "combined" with independence. It is understood that in practice one must combine bureaucratic centralism with independence.

The Leninist interpretation of democratic centralism differs from such "combinations." He logically related the need for centralism itself to the scales and depth of division of joint labor activity in society. This necessity exists systematically under capitalism, although historically, centralism appears even earlier in its ties to the implementation of the common interests of the ruling class under serfdom and feudalism. The logical and historical coincide only in a developed capitalist society, where the process of labor requires "the unconditional and strictest **unity of will**, guiding the joint work of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people" (op. cit., vol 3, p 200). Centralism on the scale of individual capital and, especially, on the scale of state capital, is implemented bureaucratically, of course, but under the higher control of a aggregate capitalist.

Socialism is based on broader scales of joint labor. Its establishment begins with the arrangement of democratic centralism on the social scale. This means that unified (central) will should be developed together by the working people themselves. In democratic centralism there is no correlation between centralism and democracy, since the one and the other are found at different levels—the "democratic" forms the content of centralism, its definite nature. Roughly in the way, for instance, that it is impossible to oppose the color and the object in the definition "green grass." The opinion that democratic centralism allegedly has two bases, representing a unity of opposites, distorts the meaning of the principle under consideration. First, given such an opinion, it is necessary to recognize that the one does not exist without the other, yet in life there is both democracy without centralism, as well as centralism without democracy. Second, these two bases can be only **outwardly opposite** and only within the framework of bureaucratic centralism.

The interpretation of democratic centralism as a democratically developed central will makes it possible to see an opportunity for the simultaneous growth both of centralism and of democracy.

Of course, the central will should reveal itself only on general problems of daily life, the solution of which concerns everyone and which everyone will have to execute. Accordingly, the problems of life of part of a community are solved only by this part (by a local community) as its internal affair. An attempt by the entire community, i.e., outwardly democratically, to solve the problem of life of a part of the community is, essentially, bureaucratic centralism, so to speak, interference in internal affairs. True, such an attempt is unlikely with the democratic solution of common problems; the bureaucratic aspiration of individual groups to prescribe the fulfillment not only of common, but also of private problems is another matter.

For example, let us recall the procedure for the so-called approval of cadres by the higher party committee. An obkom, for instance, approves the newly elected first secretary of the rayon party committee, i.e., it interferes in the affairs of the party committee. This characterizes such centralism as undemocratic. Essentially, it is a rejection of internal structural levels in the party organizations. Lack of structure is a principle of leadership within the framework of bureaucratic centralism. The question is who will head the rayon party organization: this, of course, is the business of the rayon communists, and only of them. To make up for it, the results of the activity of the rayon party organization are a common problem and it should be resolved by the communists of the oblast together, i.e., this is under the competence of the center.

The above does not mean that there are no internal contradictions here. All members of a community, functioning on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism, should jointly fulfill two different types of activity: management and execution. The unity of these types of activity is an identity of opposites, mutually exclusive and mutually enriching each other.

Do Not Deceive Yourself With Dogmas

O. Osipenko, candidate of economic sciences, Moscow:

I do not want to be left out of the discussion of fundamental problems of socialism, above all, of the concepts of its economic system, submitted to the public in the publication of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress. I assume I am not the only one who felt a solidarity with the aspiration to reinterpret the orthodox scheme of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical nature of socialism, the rejection of the primitive view of socialist ownership.

Against the background of the fruitful idea of the need for attainment by our society of the unquestionable values of human civilization—as an objective goal and means for its development—the dogmatized postulates that are being preserved and remain in the arsenal of our social sciences to this day are especially noticeable. I am referring, in particular, to theses still repeatedly reproduced, such as "socialism is a system, free of exploitation," and "capitalism is a system, based on the supremacy of private ownership and appropriation of surplus value."

Now, however, even people who are not professionals in political economy have started to realize that economic life is far more multidimensional and complex. Thus, whereas the equalization principle for receiving material and spiritual wealth can still somehow be ascribed to remnants of "early socialism," the value and property principle of distribution, to which we tie our hopes for the success of the economic reform, can in no way relate to "early socialist" features of a new society.

It is time, I suppose, even for theories from newspapers and magazines, which unceasingly shock public opinion

by painting the "nightmares" of the millions earned by cooperative workers, to admit the obvious: market socialism is not free of exploitation relations (although not direct, but indirect, based on the "rules of the game" of the law of value and its modifications—the laws for the establishment of rents, percentage rates, etc.), from relations promising high material status not only to the possessors of a more active work force, but also, probably, to all members of society. Why not examine the dialectics of the social and economic effectiveness of production from this viewpoint?

Socialism, a society with a strong economic center, is not insured against hypertrophy of redistribution of national income through the state budget, which is one of the forms of "disinterested exploitation." This applies to a situation in which the planning and economic center legally expropriates a fairly large part of the income of enterprise collectives for purposes far from their economic interests and, in this regard, enriches no one.

On the other hand, modern capitalism is by no means as banal as would follow from the orthodox scheme. Large monopolistic associations are capable of rejecting traditional relations of ownership, use and disposal in favor of individual-family and cooperative forms of ownership, as confirmed by practice. The "little economy" in the West is developing intensively, outside of connection to the interests of finance capital. For example, in Great Britain the number of enterprises where hired labor is not used increased by a factor of 1.5 in the 1980s, which was one of the sources for its increase in employment. In the United States, as we now know, almost one-tenth of the work force works at enterprises, completely or partially purchased by the workers themselves... Of course, one can repeat that such forms of labor relations do not determine the weather in capitalist economics and that its mixed, multisectorial nature does not eliminate the dominance of big monopoly capital... Yet, is it worthwhile, taking this tendency into account, to deceive oneself?

Mixed economies, as already admitted, are by no means a sign of lack of development. However, as before we are tactically evading the question of the limits to real pluralism of economic relations. We are proposing general criteria for the socialist nature of forms of ownership, such as "inclusion in the system of socialist collectivization" or "non-alienation of the worker." Is this not an attempt simply to sidestep a ticklish question? After all, the USSR remains almost the only socialist country where the institution of private ownership with elements of hired labor to this day evokes a political and ideological allergic reaction.

Meanwhile, the objective economic need for a combination of individual ownership and private property risk with the use of assistants, who do not risk anything in particular and have guaranteed earnings, are making their way despite the official taboo. For example, according to some estimates, for one cooperative member there must be approximately two "contract workers," and ratios of 1:5 and 1:10 would not surprise anyone today. Some complain that the Law on Cooperatives permitted this. However, in prohibiting work by labor contract in the "little economy," one must then prohibit it in the state sector as well.

Deafness to appeals not to ignore this, to interpret this practice is incompatible with the decision made not to restrict the share of foreign capital in joint enterprises in the USSR. Theoretically, it can be as high as you please, even 99.9 percent, which is equivalent to creating a branch of a foreign company here. Meanwhile, one should recall the following fact: the export of capital, traditionally considered a form of exploitation of the working class of the "donor" country, is now considered one of the promising directions for the foreign economic activity of the USSR.

The taboo against entrepreneurial motivations, the more so against entrepreneurial activity to this day remains the most oppressive and obstructive element in the command-management system. Not only as far as classic private enterprise is concerned, but also individual labor activity. Are the incentives included in the corresponding Law good, if by the start of 1990 (i.e., 2 and a half years after the Law entered into effect) only 700,000 people considered it possible to legalize their production activity beyond the framework of state and cooperative enterprises... Yet, 25 million people, by my calculations, as before are illegally engaged in individual labor activity. Under such conditions, for the time being one should not seriously count on competition of the "little economy" with the "big."

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the attempts to find criteria for a socialist nature **within** one or another form of ownership, it seems to me, are doomed to failure. Only the interaction of different forms of ownership—state, cooperative, private, mixed, etc.—is necessary and possible.

The Ideology of Renewal: The Reality of Thought and Action

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[Article by A. Kapto, chief of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department]

[Text] Intellectual ferment and the boiling of rally passions, the conflict of opinions and positions, open opposition of political forces—all these processes, unusual for Soviet society, are occurring in a circumstance of a crisis of the existing state political structure, the possibility itself of which was, not so long ago, a gloomy, provocational prophecy.

Dogmatic faith in unshakable "foundations" and the punctilious observance of the "purity of principles" collapsed so suddenly in official ideology that it produced the impression of a natural disaster. Life itself

confronted society with the questions of where we are, where we came from, and where we are going. It is no accident at all that, in the minds of many, pressured by the gravity of truth, that which was created over the course of decades was perceived as grotesque, reminiscent of the trench described by A. Platonov.

Under extreme conditions of uncertainty, when new truths are sometimes refuted as old lies and the increasing complexity of the contemporary reality surrounding us may engender a nostalgia for the past, a new ideology as a sum total of critically considered concepts, standards of behavior and formulations has difficulty entering social life and awareness.

The reality of the classics of Marxism, distorted by the theoretical speculations of ideologues, were justifiably characterized as illusory, and the basic concepts of this designed pseudo-reality (the absolute Idea, God, etc.) were characterized as ideological fictions, "superhistorical" forces which do not exist in real history. In addition to this, they also surpassed the ideological viewpoint, by which people are slaves to ideas, to egotistical interests and various political doctrines. All social structures, forms of awareness, and ideas "arise from the life process of certain individuals," precisely "people, developing their own material production and their own material interaction, who change, along with their reality, also their thinking and the product of their thinking" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 3, p 24, p 25).

In emphasizing that their teachings are not dogma, but only a guide for action, Marx and Engels set each real step of practical movement above "dozens of programs."

The social theory of Marx and Engels, reflecting the reality of the 19th century, was an answer to the need for a revolutionary workers' movement in their day. It successfully fulfilled their task of explaining reality and the political association of the proletariat. Mass proletarian parties, for which Marxism served as the ideological basis, managed to inspire and organize the workers' movement into an influential and cohesive sociopolitical force. The future fates of the revolutionary process, created by life, and not at all by the efforts of theoreticians, depended on the specific historical conditions under which they took place.

Even during the lives of Marx and Engels, many practical goals of the revolutionary movement were achieved and reinforced in the sociopolitical institutions and mechanisms of state power. As a result of important social reforms, the revolutionary demands to a significant extent lost their radical meaning. So, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat was gradually transformed into a requirement for a democratic republic and universal voting rights, and the slogans of freedom, equality and justice were transformed into conditions for sociopolitical guarantees. This was possible, above all, because rights ceased to be made into law by the will of the ruling class alone.

In the mid-1890s, Engels concluded the possibility of peaceful transformations of the social system. "It is possible to imagine," he remarked, "that an old society could peacefully grow into a new one in countries, where... it is possible to do anything you wish constitutionally, so long as the majority of the people support you..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 22, pp 236-237). For a long time, this fundamental statement by Engels was a stumbling-block for honest analysis of the struggle of ideas in the contemporary world. Many Marxists, trained in a spirit of extreme irreconcilability to the formations that preceded socialism, outright rejected the possibility itself of peaceful transformation on the basis of the principles of democracy.

Two main dogmas obstructed the objective interpretation of reality: the dogma concerning the exclusively class meaning of any ideology, ignoring the fact of the national, generally historical stipulation of ideological awareness. The simplified concept of the indivisible supremacy in Soviet society of the Marxist ideology merely shaded the rather broad distribution of ideas of by no means Marxist content.

Social policies which proclaim democracy an important method for organizing social life cannot, without falling into obvious contradiction with their own initial principles, support an ideology of supremacy, which somewhat expropriates individual awareness, depriving it of its natural right to independence. The norms of life in a democratic society are incompatible with diktat and with spiritual violence against the individual. Each individual is sovereign and his ideological orientation is a matter of free choice.

Precisely the totalitarian approach cultivates concepts of society as a homogeneous mass. An ideologue of such a viewpoint strives to construct social homogeneity, even if there are no real prerequisites for this. The totalitarian method of management presumes a faceless mass, since this is more easily manipulated. Therefore, an ideology that is supreme as a dogma aspires, in the final account, to annihilate the individual in a person, to capture his thoughts and feelings and thrust on him a way of thinking and behavior, such that a minimum of the individual remains. Ideological diktat leads not only to suppression of creativity in people, but also to a hypertrophied ideologization of policy, to dogmatization of all social practice.

For an ideology of renewal, it is fundamentally important to define its relationship to the theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and also to Stalinism. The simple scheme, by which Stalinism is categorically disowned and we "return" to genuine Marxism-Leninism, contains some complex questions. After all, it is obvious that Marxism-Leninism is not immutable, beginning with the "*Manifesto*" and ending with Lenin's last works. Even Lenin's concepts in the period of war communism and in the NEP strikingly differ from each other. Thus, it is not so easy to define to which "genuine" Marxism-Leninism we are returning. It is not clear how to handle

this "return" itself. After all, Lenin's concepts in the early 1920s and the reality of the late 20th century essentially relate to different epochs. Whereas in general the urging on of reality by ideology contradicts the requirements of science, the urging on of one historical epoch by the ideology of a different epoch is really rather absurd. Indeed, should Marxism-Leninism claim the status of the only source of renovation ideology, or is our society capable of using the entire spiritual wealth of mankind, of all world culture?

Marxism, and later Leninism, as soon as it became the property of a complete political movement, acquired a number of nuances among its supporters. Only ardent fundamentalists tried to turn this revolutionary, creative teaching, critical in terms of spirit, into a dead monolith, like some kind of pedestal under one's person.

So, the diversity of positions on many issues within Marxism, which irritated the dogmatists, was always a reality. It is naive to hope that it is possible to eliminate this diversity within contemporary Marxism-Leninism. Unity really is not similar to identity in everything. It lies only in recognition of basic values and principles, although even here it cannot be unthinkingly apologetic. Any modern person, even a Marxist, should be capable of a critical attitude toward his own views or, in any case, tolerant of such an attitude toward them on the part of others.

The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress emphasizes: "In confirming the correctness of the creative spirit of the materialistic world outlook and dialectical methodology of Marx, Engels and Lenin, being guided by it, we decisively discard ideological dogmatism and intolerance of other views and ideas."

It is also natural and, perhaps, inevitable that different people will put the accent on different parts of the historically developing socialist idea. Discussion is needed here as well. Whereas Lenin finally recognized the need for a radical revision of the former viewpoint on socialism, the one he had adhered to in the period of war communism, many subsequent "true Leninists" took the reverse direction. A question arises: What is now considered Leninism? Life convinced Lenin that the concepts of the period of war communism contradicted life and were historically doomed. However, even after this and regardless of the monstrous crimes of Stalinism, there are still "Leninists" who cannot lift themselves to the level of Leninism in the 1920s, not to mention their creative development up to the level of realities at the end of this century.

We all basically agree that the truthfulness of views should be proven precisely in practice. The historical practice of the 20th century offers tremendous material for this. Again and again, it persuades us that theory can be no more right than life itself. We should proceed from this, when we change things in our views according to the requirements of life. This creative attitude toward Leninism is precisely the best method for preserving the main thing: its creative spirit, its devotion to the search for truth and the assertion of human happiness. Precisely this comprises the spirit of Leninism, although many other Leninist ideas also retain permanent value and topicality.

Almost most important is the development of an attitude toward the ideology that reigned in the country in the period of Stalinism and later, up to 1985. Recently, many scientific works, analyzing the nature of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, have been published which make it possible to understand what happened to communist ideology, how the socialist idea managed to survive in the spider's web of Stalinism and finally to overthrow it. Meanwhile, rejection of Stalinism should not lead to a rejection of that which it masked, to the rejection of everything profaned by it. This would be, essentially, a continuation of profanement, which would mean the destruction of Marxism "to its very foundation," discarding it from history, which, by the way, some authors are openly suggesting. However, such "ideological renewal" would lead to a new, far more profound spiritual crisis of society. Progress here lies not in nihilism, but in the preservation and augmentation of the common human content of Marxism.

Renewed socialist ideology should conform to the real intellectual and educational level of the people, which has grown greatly by the end of the century. Yet, after all, it is no secret that many ideological postulates, found in active circulation even now, are intended for people living under entirely different conditions, with a different level of education and political awareness. Naturally, these postulates are now being subjected to sober, critical reinterpretation.

The ideology of perestroyka is essentially a socialist ideology, an ideology of creation of civil peace, social compromise and harmony, the ideology of genuine humanism. It incorporates common human values and specific interests, does not divide society according to a "friends-enemies" scheme, but consolidates it on the basis of respect for morality and law.

The restructuring of the theoretical body of ideology and of the social sciences is proceeding slowly. Placed by the command-administrative system in unnatural conditions, social scientists were forced to adhere to rigid schemes, and to this day many of them continue to think according to traditional categories. Nonetheless, the situation in social sciences is gradually changing: concepts, such as democracy, self-management, social equality and justice, ownership, etc., have been reinterpreted and are being given new meaning. In the political lexicon, the concepts of "civil society," "rule-of-law state," "pluralism" and others, rejected in their day, are returning to their positive meaning. The new thinking, aimed at the priority of common human values, humanism and democracy, is being shaped and approved with their help.

However, at the same time life persistently demands thorough discussion of the basic values of socialism, of the method for their practical implementation, the concept of the party, its ideological and political platform, and unprejudiced analysis of non-Marxist social thought and of its real results. This discussion is actually taking place, but it lacks sufficient thoroughness. The simple reprinting of many previously closed works does not remove the question of the sources for substantiation of socialism and its values, but only makes this question more topical.

In the most responsible stage in the life of society and the party, serious political and ideological research and profound consideration of the essence of the political methods of leadership are required, without which both the party's movement to a new level, as well as the democratization of intra-party life, are impossible.

The confusion of minds is accompanied by the appearance of neodogmatism, conceals ideological traps, and inevitably causes a split in the awareness of the people. Total criticism of the existing, in which, given the shortage of mature, perfected concepts, the tone is often set by people who are not the most competent and responsible, pushes social consciousness toward nihilism. Under conditions of mass politicization and the pluralization of social awareness, unprecedented in our society, where almost everyone is thinking and forming opinions on politics, illusions and fantastic concepts of the moving forces of social development appear easily. Results directly opposite to the goals arise when the sharpest denunciation of Stalinism, stagnation, and their "doctrinal" sources eventually exclude further objective and conscientious analysis. We will never know the society in which we live, if we stand on the side first of one, then of another biased opinion. Only objective analysis of reality provides reliable knowledge for the politician.

Unfortunately, to this day continuity in the party's ideological activity is at times treated as though not specific people operate in the political arena, but theoretical principles, similar to divine foresight. By such logic, modern communists end up being connected to any deed by their predecessors, and on such grounds a collective confession is often demanded from them. Here, people are obviously confusing the concepts of guilt and responsibility, equating the role of the leader and the party masses, and equalizing personalities. It is obvious that if the party had remained unchanged, it would be unable to take the path of decisive renewal today.

Perestroyka is not a mechanical continuation of the Leninist course—it is a reaction to the needs of society, the recognized need for profound socioeconomic and political reforms. The ideology of renewal is not simply the faithful teaching of Lenin's ideas. Ideology in the period of renewal is becoming realistic and no longer depends on the "good intentions" of ideologues. This is not the result of a mystic revival of theoretical formulas, but a result of society's rejection of obsolete ideological concepts.

Unfortunately, by force of dogmatic teaching and habit, many workers in the ideological sphere, at every new case, glance at the church calendar and urge objective reality on by previously given schemes. So, today there are a fairly great deal of debates about the nature and essence of socialism. However, theoretical thought nonetheless spends far more time inventing names for the past and future state of Soviet society, than in the real study of the origins of and prospects for its development.

Life itself persistently requires the examination of socialism mainly as a practical movement, "pursuing practical goals with the help of practical means..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 3, p 203). Given this approach, which does not permit the absolutization of either the goals or the means, social practice is interpreted as a method for changing and developing the conditions of social life based on maximum consideration of the interests and needs of people, of many different objective and subjective factors that make up the essence of people's relations with each other and with the natural environment.

Human activity in is, in the broad understanding, a continuous process in the course of which a constant renewal of the goals and means occurs, a constant search is made for new forms of development. A dialectical paradigm of thinking, in Lenin's words, presumes "rapidly and sharply changing one's tactics, taking into account the changing objective conditions, choosing another path... if the former path turned out in this period of time to be inexpedient, impossible" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 151). For precisely this reason, doctrine and theory are never an end in themselves for dialectical thinking.

The word "scientific," attached to the concept "socialism," means that socialist theory is based, above all, on objective and accurate knowledge. Arbitrary design of the goals of social development and the thrusting of them on society means utopianism and hare-brained scheming. In the final account, the goal of our society's development is specific people—not only in the future, but also in the present. This goal obliges us not to design ideological fictions, but to study life and its contradictions, to reveal the trends of development, revealing the obstacles on the path of progressive transformations in a timely manner.

Meanwhile, the concept "socialism" is nearly always treated as some kind of extra-historical substation which, like the Aristotelian "frame," moves the world of real phenomena and processes. Yet, after all, this is nothing other than a theological interpretation of history, far removed from science, proceeding from an idealistic absolutization of the "goal" category. This naturally leads to dogmatization of specific historical practice and crowds the means for achieving the goal out

of the sphere of analysis. Criticism of theological interpretations of social development, made even in the last century by Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and other thinkers, showed that the actions of people and their goals come from their needs and interests: precisely these should be the object of analysis by social science.

The revisionist label was attached previously to anyone who directed attention to the non-correspondence of the postulates of dogmatized ideology to the real requirements of life. The necessity of radical reforms in the system was considered anti-socialist and absolutely incompatible with the essential nature of the new social order which, allegedly due to its perfection, had no need to renew its "unshakable" foundations and principles.

The entire internal weakness and helplessness of official rhetoric, the attributive property of which was the neglect of real sociopolitical, economic and spiritual needs and motivations of those to whom it appealed, was reflected in this apologetic fetish, as though in a drop of water. Ideologues and propagandists arbitrarily reduced the entire diversity of objectively existing social connections to an ephemeral moral and political unity and the almost primal adherence of the Soviet people to the infallible policy of the leading party and state. Essentially, these abstract principles were deduced from absolutization of an embroidered past, from the sacrifices of previous generations. The independent significance and priority of the present were devalued. The life of the present generation was subordinated first to the past, then to the future.

According to this contrived theoretical scheme, the glorious revolutionary past, as though by itself, should have been transformed into a perfect future. The obvious contradiction between the ideal and reality, between ideology and real life, was explained by a banal phrase about the gap between words and actions. Neither social thought, nor political practice even attempted to reveal the social roots of this contradiction. Real subjects, invested with reason and will and, moreover, distinguished by growing needs, were replaced by faceless production forces, formation laws, insuperable tendencies toward the "advantages" of one social order, of planning and the planned nature of socialist production, etc. Some kind of "extra-historical" ideal, in accordance with which political doctrine sacrificed specific individuals to the "universal," determined the diagram for social development, and did so on a world scale. In terms of its futuristic orientation, this ideology, now conventionally called stagnant, incorporated clearly expressed features of messianism and the officially rejected vulgar religious eschatology.

With this irrational ideology unfortunately instilled in the deep layers of social awareness and our way of life, Soviet society has entered a period of radical social reforms.

Of course, the above does not signify a diminishment of socialist ideals. The noble and bright ideals of the revolution meet the needs of millions of people. It is no accident that the question of whether socialism was built in our country leads many theoreticians into a logical trap, since they are trying to draw a simple conclusion from the results of the path taken by the country. However, is it possible, being a realist, to make judgments about the "building of socialism" as though it were a completed process? Is it not more correct to believe that socialism is a constant movement toward higher goals and constant reforms, an immanent need for the development of socialism?

As a result of informal and, in many ways, even deformed development, we have formed a society that cannot be characterized simply. It is entirely obvious that the sway of bureaucracy, the weak development of democratic social institutions, and most critical social problems all contradict socialism. However, after all, this understanding is only now being asserted in official ideology and mass awareness. Until recently, the question of the nature of Soviet society was not raised on a critical plane. So, what happened? What has changed: society or the concept of it? Apparently, both the one, and the other. Aroused social consciousness is making ever greater demands of society. The social whole itself has started to move, and the reason for this lies in the complex linkage among economic, political and ideological sectors in our society at this stage of its development.

Explaining the radical break of habitual stereotypes as an unmasking of the previous ideological deception is obviously insufficient and superficial. The hypocrisy of official ideology, although at that time it was impossible for society to criticize it directly, did not remain unnoticed even in the years of stagnation. Evidently, the roots that feed the command-administrative system should be sought not only in deception and compulsion, but also in the entire difficult political history of society, in the undeveloped nature of democratic institutions and traditions, and in the low level of requirements in the broadest meaning of the term. On the other hand, one can hardly deny that the new views and concepts are taking root and becoming supreme in social consciousness, above all, thanks to profound social transformations: democratization, glasnost, strengthening the bases of the political system, etc.

The ideological and political orientation of the CPSU under the new conditions cannot be expressed as a simple "command" form, and this is one of the reasons that it has not yet been fully realized by all party members, including by its ideological workers, who are accustomed to obeying only directives from the center. One may expect that even publication of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform will not eliminate all ambiguities. The draft platform rather serves as a basis for a party-wide discussion on reform of the CPSU, on ideological renewal and self-management under the new socioeconomic conditions, when the critical part of perestroyka will acquire the natural scales that ought to exist in a normally developing society. However, if criticism enters the normal track, then out of necessity

will the question arise of what the general values are which make the dialogue and cooperation of different social forces possible, and what are the fundamental positive orientations of a society which aspires to return to the path of creation and progress?

Freedom, social equality and justice are the most important values in any democratic society. The substantiation of these values within the context of a socialist democracy can be most diverse in terms of world outlook. Ideology will fulfill its constructive role in the process of renovation of socialist society only under these conditions. Here, we can single out the following basic aspects:

The first of these is the use of all forms and methods, of diverse means of ideological influence for the support of the radical reforms being implemented within the framework of perestroyka. The qualitative renovation of all aspects of society's life is the common fate for all peoples of our country. There is no justification whatsoever for outdated social structures and relations. The sociopolitical and economic transformations presume a creative, comprehensive interpretation of the country's historical past, of the experience of world development, the achievements of foreign social thought, and of science and technology, and the inclusion of these achievements in the strategy for renewal, taking into account the specific nature of our traditions and our social mentality.

Second: The renovation of society is a task for the people themselves. Here, patterns and diktat which foist universal models, specific solutions and individual strategies are unacceptable. Production collectives, agricultural laborers, etc., have the right to decide for themselves what forms of organization and management of labor activity are preferable for them. Right now there is already an opportunity, despite the numerous opinions on the "collapse" of the economy, to undertake energetic actions on the basis of the laws which have been passed and to set up efficient work to reorganize the economy and management, affirming the spirit of collective and individual independence. Under conditions of democracy and economic freedom, the producers themselves primarily are interested in the results of economic activity. This is important for all ideological and propaganda work.

Third: Stimulation of social and individual initiatives and material and moral support for highly professional labor are becoming the cult of our time. Real achievements are making it possible to objectively assess any practical activity. In the economy, science, education, and social policy, at all levels, only results can be the criteria of success. This orientation of social policy also presumes a constant concern for the assertion and development of high moral standards.

Fourth: The radical reforms, aimed at raising economic efficiency and the people's standard of living, are inconceivable without a mastery of specialized knowledge of modern technologies, regulation of the market, planning, social mentality, and engineering. Specialists and social scientists, who are now seriously studying the reasons for our backwardness in contemporary education and training of cadres for the economy, should move toward an effective solution for the problems that have accumulated here.

Discipline and organization of socially useful labor are becoming a first-priority task and a very important civic duty. Democratic procedure is the very heart of the social system that should replace the old system. Civilized forms of life and material sufficiency cannot be created via appeals and rally emotions. This is a trivial truth, but to this day it has to be proven, or we will not switch from endless discussions of redistribution of social property to the realization of a different necessity, the need to cultivate social wealth on the basis of the contemporary organization of labor and payment for it according to quantity and quality.

One gets the impression that the numerous social movements, which have appeared in the course of perestroyka, have made criticism of the crisis as such their main goal. Everyone knows that the situation in the country is complex and there is no need to convince each other of this. The task lies in jointly finding ways to get out of the crisis: to do this, we need systematic, creative work. Socially useful labor, including labor given gratuitously, has always been a powerful consolidating force, a factor binding people together. On the other hand, there have always been and now are appearing those for whom it is profitable for their ambitious goals to utilize the universal decrease in people's labor inclinations.

The renewal of society is inconceivable without consolidating it, without rallying the population around the basic goals of perestroyka. This does not at all mean blessed unity, concealing contradictions. There are and will be contradictions in any society. The entire question lies in how to carry out ideological work, in order to prevent involving the population in prolonged conflicts, exclude speculation on the difficulties of rallying all democratic forces of society, and expose and remove from our lives dealers in the "shadow economy," social parasites, and criminal and corrupt elements.

The ideology which is renovating itself has already helped society better understand its own problems. This process continues. Concepts of what is real and proper are being made more specific in the course of changing reality and the concepts of it.

The new qualities of the socialist idea, which act as a timely response to the appeals of the time, included realism, the rejection of scholasticism and hair-brained schemes. The new ideology, figuratively speaking, is "setting" the world free, in the sense that for many years the supremacy of the administrative-command system instilled in the masses a procedure, by which decisions were made for them by others, and they operated within the framework of these decisions. However, a new day is dawning now: everyone is receiving the opportunity to think, to make decisions and be responsible for the

unconditional fulfillment of them. The **time of freedom**, as life shows, is an excessive burden for many. It has confused many people. This is understandable. The forced atrophy of independence had gone too far. Now, one must take responsibility for one's own fate.

Taking responsibility for oneself in the political sphere means rejecting the universally widespread opinion that the management of society is the business of those being elected and those already elected. Voting, rallies and discussions are only one episode in the system of popular self-management. It is a question of something more: of the broad practical and constant participation of the population in political work.

Taking responsibility for oneself in the economic sphere means actually being not only a participant in the process of social production, but also its real master. The new economic environment being created in the country, the diversity of forms of social ownership, and the development of new forms of economic management—all these are opening up a previously unforeseen possibility to display enterprise, business acumen and assiduousness.

Taking responsibility for oneself in the social sphere means renouncing dependency, the expectation of benefits from the state and society that has essentially become a social epidemic. No able-bodied person has a right to place his own obligations on another—this is how the question stands today. Each to the extent of his strength and abilities should be concerned for his own well-being and the well-being of his own family. We would advance much more rapidly in solving the housing problem, the food problem, and fulfilling other social tasks (right now, concern for the condition of the surrounding environment, our historical and cultural fund, and others takes first priority), if in our day we had not prohibited, but encouraged the development of personal and collective initiative.

Taking responsibility for oneself in the sphere of interethnic relations means maintaining a clear humanistic position in this sphere, not doing with regard to persons of a different nationality anything that would be undesirable for your own well-being, for the existence of the ethos to which you yourself belong. In interethnic relations, any animosity strikes back at the one who creates insults and injustice like a boomerang. In this sphere, tractability, respectfulness and constructiveness are the strongest personal qualities.

Taking responsibility for oneself in the spiritual sphere means not in words, but in action constantly to cultivate knowledge of the spiritual wealth accumulated by mankind, to struggle against grayness, squalor and crudity. Our mass culture should not become spiritually base by way of egalitarianism, but a field for the real intellectual uplifting of everyone's personality.

Taking responsibility for oneself in the state and legal sphere means consistently observing state laws and moral standards, deflecting attempts at forcible violation of state institutions and the weakening of law and order. The duty and conscience of the citizen are concepts which, under conditions of creating a rule-of-law state, we must still give new meaning. The charging of the atmosphere of opposition and hostility, the logical outcome of which is social tension, conflicts and human tragedies, is profitable for destructive or conservative forces: today, this is more distinctly apparent than it was yesterday. Society has a right to oppose the aspirations of these forces for the country's collapse and the sabotage of perestroyka with a clear understanding of the advantages of universal harmony, mutual understanding and mutual respect, and consolidation in the broadest meaning of the term. It is not a question, of course, of obedient like-mindedness, when one person thinks and everyone else applauds his wisdom. No, we have no need for such obedience and "moral and political" uniformity. Speaking of consolidation, one should have in mind the elimination of everything that hinders movement along the path of progress or, the more so, threatens the existence of society. Everyone should struggle for consolidation as a great social good. Solidarity with perestroyka is the central idea of the moment. In the ideological sphere, we now have an opportunity graphically, with comparative data, to show what the policy of opposition, national narrow-mindedness and confrontation brings society to and what people receive in exchange, when they behave like citizens of a civilized society.

A realistic policy cannot be based on falsified data about real social relations, about the real behavior of the classes, social strata and groups, about their interests. It should be based on a comprehensive analysis and consideration of the entire specific diversity of social ties both within these formations, as well as among them. Such analysis is fruitful, above all, because it gives an objective basis for singling out progressive and conservative elements within classes, strata and groups, and reveals the sources of social conflicts and tension. Furthermore, which is the main point, a society's objective knowledge about itself makes it possible in time to resolve or agree on arising contradictions, taking into account the diverse existing interests. This revival of dialectics and the application of its principles to the real state of Soviet society are becoming an urgent necessity under conditions of a mixed economy, expanding and intensifying the democratization of social life.

The stress on solidarity and social discipline is dictated not by circumstantial considerations and not even by the specific features of the political biography of Soviet society, which is implementing the most complex transition to democratic forms of the social and state structure. The system of generally accepted values comprises the fundamental basis of the Constitution of any civilized state, being the most important prerequisite for the possibility and stability of social progress. Public agreement on the basis of democratic values, reinforced in the laws of a rule-of-law state, is a necessary condition which a society, striving for progress, sets for itself.

On the eve of its 28th Congress, the party is taking a most difficult test before an emancipated people, whose political will is now becoming a decisive factor in social transformation. In rejecting a monopoly position in society, the party is not avoiding social responsibility and active political work. In offering a strategy of profound reforms to society, the CPSU does so under the conditions of glasnost, democracy, and openness to cooperation with progressive social forces. It is entering a broad and equal dialogue with them, which is being carried out on the basis of socialist values, mutual respect and recognition of the sovereignty of the interests of different social strata and groups, regions, republics, nations and nationalities.

The CPSU is struggling for this conversion from monopolism, which creates total arrhythmia in social life, conformity, and apathy, to civil freedoms, a civilized nature and a rule-of-law state, which democratically, building its policy while taking new realities into account, assimilates all fruitful elements of world social thought, civilization and culture, remaining true to its socialist choice.

The CPSU Central Committee Platform does not have the former sectarianism or ambitious claims of infallibility. It sees its role in a democratic society as being a political leader, whose authority is based above all on the strength of ideas, principle-minded and honest policy, and devotion to the democratic and humanistic traditions of all peoples of our great multi-ethnic Homeland.

PAGES OF HISTORY: 1945-1990

A Foot Reconnaissance Platoon

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[Article by S. Freylikh, holder of six battle orders, doctor of art studies]

[Text] When I left regiment headquarters, my Voronok stood alone on his tether. I freed the rein and tightened the saddle girth.

I never bridled Voronok without need, and right now, grateful to me for this, he went without instruction precisely where I needed to go. I went to the northern edge of the village of Yesalovka, where the foot reconnaissance platoon was located.

Wading neatly through the spring mud, Voronok rocked me, as though having a premonition of the problem: 2 or 3 kilometers along the way, I would have to decide for myself to be or not to be.

Of course, I did not imagine myself the prince of the Danes: Voronok's rider was just a technical lieutenant second class. With this title, I came to the regiment in the position of military translator. This was at the very start of 1942. However, January had gone by, February had dragged on even longer, and today was already the 2nd of April, and I had not once, literally not even once interrogated a German. I had not held a single captured document in my hands, and that is why I felt disgusting—I was eating someone else's bread.

We found ourselves in a prolonged, blind defensive position. The Germans and we had shut ourselves off from each other with barbed-wire and mine fields, and under such conditions it is difficult to take prisoners.

Our foot reconnaissance platoon returned each time with nothing. There were losses, but no captives were taken. The regimental command was anxious: they were dissatisfied with us at the division, and in turn, army headquarters was upset with the division. A lengthy defense dulls vigilance. Of course, it is good when dozens or hundreds of people do not die every day. You exchange fire, make yourself known with missiles at night, but no one crawls out of his lair—neither the Germans, nor we. However, it might happen that you wake up in the morning and there is no Fritz in front of you. What, it would seem, is bad about this? Well, after all, he did not go back to Germany: you let him get away without difficulty and he has moved a division from one sector, from another, and from a third, gathered them into a fist, and will strike your neighbor, striking suddenly and turning up at your back, tearing the rear to pieces and dooming you to fight surrounded, without assistance, since communications have already been cut. In order to prevent such a possibility, every day one must know what is happening over there, behind the opponent's line. Of course, there is spying by secret agents, which the command of the upper echelons engages in. They also get information from aerial reconnaissance. We knew nothing about spying with secret agents. As far as aviation is concerned, in all of 1942 I did not see a single Soviet airplane in the sky, but I saw German ones, especially in the summer in July: on the Salskiy Steppes, where we retreated along the entire front, the "Messers" literally terrorized us, sometimes pursuing an individual vehicle, or even (we were quite out of our minds with fear) went after an individual rifleman. It was a going to be a sultry summer, but meanwhile, it was a dank April, our infantry regiment had strongly dug into the land, and only one subdivision lived freely and easily—the foot reconnaissance platoon.

The platoon was at the disposal of regimental headquarters and was directly subordinate to the second deputy commander for reconnaissance. The first deputy commander was with the operative unit, while the second was with reconnaissance and, for short, was called the PNSh-2.

The scouts were a privileged part of the army. As a rule, they were not sent into attacks and, since they were located far from the front line, they were not subject to the opponent's surprise attacks. The rank-and-file scouts were quartered in the same peasant houses as the officers, and their grub was the same too.

The platoon paid a heavy price for its privileges.

There should have been 45 people in the platoon, but it never had more than 15-18.

The platoon melted away like ice, breaking away from shore ice. So what that it was stationed in the district of the regiment headquarters? To make up for this, it appeared on the front not in order to sit in a trench, where it is possible to run into a dug-out to warm oneself by a hot stove. With the approach of darkness, the platoon sneaks around the front line in order to pierce through, and crawls through on their bellies toward the Germans in the rear. One must remember trips made through mine fields and barbed-wire, not returning empty-handed, and everyone knows how it will all end: you either will return or they will take you.

Today we should mandatorily take a prisoner, I thought, rocking in the saddle.

Voronok unexpectedly stopped, lettin three soldiers pass. Two held rifles against a third. The man arrested was none other than a fellow from our platoon, Sviridov, in a great coat with no belt, his leg-wrappings removed.

"What happened?" I shouted.

Sviridov hung his head.

Those accompanying him paid me no attention whatsoever.

I followed them with my eyes, and my anxiety was transferred to Voronok: it sufficed for me to slap him on the side and he broke from place into a gallop.

At the house where the platoon commander, Ivanov, and the political officer, Martsenovskiy lived, I reined in Voronok. It was unusually chaotic here. Soldiers in full kit were seated in three carts.

"The machine-gun! The machine-gun!" senior lieutenant Ivanov commanded with annoyance. I was surprised by his tone, since he had never raised his voice before.

They took a light machine-gun, loaded it into the head cart, and the string of carts set off.

Captain Kolev stood on the porch. He was also the PNSh-2, my direct chief. Kolev waved a hand at me and I, having tethered Voronok, joined him in the house. In a room of the house, he closed the door, behind which the housekeeper fussed with the stove.

Kolev obviously wanted to tell me something important, but first he asked:

"You sent the reconnaissance report?"

"Yes, as usual."

"Things here are..."

"What happened? Why was Sviridov arrested?"

"Sit down..."

Kolev was favorably disposed toward me. I sensed this from the first day I appeared in the regiment. When you relate well to a person, even his weaknesses seem attractive. Seeing with what difficulty I sat a horse, he did not even laugh, but only said:

"We must eliminate this ugliness."

He then procured Voronok for me, under the condition that I would ride him every day. After only a month, he sent me with messages to the division.

Commanders value the honor of their subordinates. I remember, the regiment commander spoke of Kolev: He is my scout. Kolev spoke of me: My translator. He told everyone that I had graduated from the Literary Institute and knew "Yevgeniy Onegin" by heart. He was senior in title, I was senior in age, and we spoke to each other in the familiar.

However, let me return to the moment when Kolev and I remained together in the room.

"What happened?" I repeated the question.

"It seems, we are stuck in a mess..."

Kolev told me what had occurred here 2 hours ago.

That which the platoon intends to scout should be kept in strictest secrecy. So it usually is, when the platoon lives in isolation, but it is another matter now, for instance, in this case, when the scouts have been quartered among civilians and, indeed, have been living here for almost 3 months thanks to the long defense. In war, 3 months is a whole lifetime. The soldiers find girl friends and, be it a romance with a soldier or true love, no one can condemn this feeling, because it appears on the very edge of life.

The moment of departure on reconnaissance was always alarming: someone usually will not return.

The scout himself cannot say a word about the upcoming operation, but thinks about it constantly, and something doomed shows through in the way he cleans his weapon, adjusts the ammunition, and shaves.

Well, private Kazin, reddish-haired and 18-years old, was cleaning his rifle, and could not take his eyes off the housekeeper's daughter, Masha. She was not a great beauty, but a pug nose and a raised upper lip made her strikingly attractive. She was also nearing her 18th birthday and, regardless of the fact that around her people died every day, or perhaps precisely because of this, her feeling of pity and love for a person who was threatened with danger today was piercing. When Kazin finished his work, she drew near the window, knowing that he would approach, blow on the back of her head and embrace her.

He wanted to say something, but at that moment a shot rang out from the opposite building and both fell dead; they were the same age, and one bullet sufficed to pierce two hearts.

An hour later, the authorities arrived.

The authorized representative of the Special Department was in charge. Above all, he interrogated the soldier Sviridov, who claimed that he had shot by accident. He was oiling his SVT [Tokarev semiautomatic rifle] and out of habit looked through the sight notch, but did not remember how he pressed the trigger. An escort soon led Sviridov away. The representative also interrogated platoon commander Ivanov, to find out whether Sviridov had harbored ill will toward Kazin, whether he was jealous of him for the housekeeper's daughter. The matter remained unclear, and the representative hurried away to headquarters to dash off a report to the division Special Department.

The regiment commander behaved differently. Coolly reprimanding the platoon commander, he said confidentially:

"Get a prisoner who will talk, and we will get Sviridov out of their clutches," the regiment commander nodded toward where the representative had rushed off. "If you do not take a prisoner, we will disband the platoon and incorporate it with the main unit. That is it. Understood?"

Ivanov stood at attention and rapped out:

"Yes, Sir!"

Ivanov was a well-built fellow, and a quilted jacket and trousers, tucked into his boots, did not make him, like many others, look like a bumpkin. The quilted jacket, loosely belted around his waist, looked like a sport coat on him. In another time, he would have led the ski team or ardently pursued the ball on a soccer field. Yet, Ivanov had an unnatural job—at night he pursued a different person, whom we called Fritz. By calling every German a Fritz, we did not including any humiliating meaning in this. For the Germans, a Soviet soldier regardless of nationality was an Ivan, and for us any German was a Fritz. We did not start calling the Germans Fritzes right away. At the start of the war, when they chased us like hares, we said "him." We would be sitting in a dug-out, some shells would explode nearby, and someone would say: "He is shelling." Later, we began to call the Germans "red-heads." The scouts would say: "We went after a red-head." We could be less afraid, if it were not a he, but a red-head. At the same time, it was not easy to come to grips with red-heads: the well-fed Aryans were well-drilled, just try and catch one, and then you still have to drag him to your position. When the Germans became weaker and far from all of them were pure-blooded blondes, we christened them Fritzes and so it stayed until the end of the war. And so went the war: in the first half, we were afraid of them, in the second—they of us.

On the day being described, 2 April 1942, we were still afraid of them. Our regiment stood at the river Mius. A great defeat was in store for us, a retreat to the Don, and later even further—through the Salskiy Steppes, to the very foothills of the Caucasus. The leadership knew something, but the reconnaissance platoon knew nothing: it went on its next assignment.

When we were alone (Kolev, Ivanov, Martsenovskiy and I), we would above all drink glasses of vodka. I once happened to note that political officer Martsenovskiy's lower jaw stuck forward, and it seemed like he were pouring the contents of the glass into a funnel.

Martsenovskiy had four bars on his shoulder tabs. If he were in combatant service he would be a ranking NCO, but here he was not deputy commander of the platoon, but the political officer. He was senior to Ivanov both in terms of position and in terms of title, but on the human plane they were equal. In practice this was an ideal example of relations between a commander and a commissar, of course, on the scale of a platoon, albeit a reconnaissance platoon. In the upper echelons of the army, alas, such did not and could not exist. Members of the military councils of the armies and the fronts were personal representatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, as a rule, big party workers who were granted great rights, although they did not understand military affairs. This was left from the Civil War, when communist commissars were attached to "specialists," to the generals and officers of the Russian Army. This had no meaning now and was a manifestation of Stalin's suspicious nature and rigid dogmatism, the negative consequences of which were tremendous. The above does not relate to the lower ranks of the working army. In the regiments, especially in battalions and companies, political officers were the same as commanders. Wartime communists, they joined the party on their convictions, i.e., became communists not in order to receive but, conversely, in order to give. What could political officer Martsenovskiy give, except his life? Running ahead, let me say that precisely this did happen to him in that hot summer of 1942, and happened absurdly, unheroically. Exhausted to the limit, we had retreated day and night, but one day we found lodging for the night and the scouts, sheltered by an elevation, we collapsed into sleep. While we dreamed of pre-war life, a stray shell on a short parabola unexpectedly flew in and exploded between Ivanov and Martsenovskiy. They no longer knew anything, either of their own platoon, or of the fact that they were no more.

Yet before this, we continued to carry out our duties. Each checked his weapon and shoved a grenade into his shirt. Leaving the peasant home, we had difficulty leading the horses away from the trough, where a few oats still remained. Voronok did not complain when I bridled him, I had only to touch his side with my heels and he would take off. Four riders were already scattered across the field.

At that moment, Ivanov's horse whinnied so piercingly that we glanced back: she had no rider.

We turned back, and she led us to the place where Ivanov lay. He lay face down: we thought that he was dead or wounded, but he was simply irresponsible, a consequence of that glass of vodka.

"What will we do?" Kolev asked.

"He will come to," Martsenovskiy answered.

With difficulty, we put Ivanov on his horse and traveled on, but as soon as we went at a trot, he ended up on the ground again.

I do not remember how we made it to Mius, where the platoon awaited us.

Martsenovskiy did not want the scouts to see their commander thus. He dragged him into the bushes and shoved his head in the river. The water was cold, but Ivanov only shook his head and spat.

Yet, the engineers had already set up a concealed crossing.

Ivanov had found the place where we planned to cross the front line now. For several days he had crawled around out there, watching the Germans' front line through binoculars. He noticed a deep ravine. The belated thaw that year had been so tempestuous, that the ravine had been exposed in 3-4 days. The Germans did not consider this, so little time had passed, and they did not put a guard point there, did not secure this place with mines or barbed-wire, which meant that we could get through here, as the platoon commander decided. The main thing was not to let the moment slip.

So, we began to implement Ivanov's plan, at the same time that he himself lay unconscious in the bushes, knocked out by an ill-fated glass of vodka. The point is that Ivanov did not generally drink, but would take a dose, so to speak, for company in an extraordinary situation. Kolev wanted to leave two scouts with Ivanov, since he himself would be a find for the Germans if they, in turn, poked around on our side. Such encounters had happened more than once.

Two more scouts were left with a light machine-gun at the crossing, to cover us in case we were discovered and forced to retreat.

It was night. Like shadows, we noiselessly went through the crossing one after another. We passed the ravine without obstructions, and it took us straight to the enemy's rear. Of course, few of us, only six people, remaind, although we had a seventh—he was not one of the scouts, but a rifleman. He was a lanky boy, fed up with tedious trench life, and here the possibility of risk had suddenly presented itself. He asked Kolev to take him along, and one had to see the enthusiasm with which he threw off his greatcoat—now he, like the rest of us, wore a quilted jacket, in which one could move freely.

After returning from the assignment, we found out that his last name was Solovyev and he was a senior lieutenant, in command of the rifle platoon. Meanwhile, having grabbed a semiautomatic rifle and a pair of grenades, this lanky boy was the seventh of our group.

Having ended up behind the Germans' back, we tried as far as possible to penetrate into the rear lines, where there were better chances of sudden action.

I ended up with Kolev, and he unexpectedly asked me in a whisper:

"Does Ragulin allow it?"

Major Ragulin was head of regimental headquarters.

I evaded a direct answer:

"You are my superior."

Kolev did not answer. He himself would not have gone that day, if not for the tragic event in the platoon. Even after this unexpected event, he was like a taunt string and everyone obeyed him. Martsenovskiy took the tail. Ivanov ususally worked like this, one in front, another behind, since the situation could turn so suddenly, that the rear might end up being the front, and those coming after will be subordinate to him.

We went quickly. At a hill we dropped down into a depression, so that in case an enemy appeared, we would not be in front of him, but he would be illuminated by the wan moon in the sky against a dark background in front of us.

After about an hour, Kolev raised his hand and whistled, which was the signal for danger. We laid low. On the elevation some 30 meters from us, he was clearly visible: the so long-awaited and today simply necessary Fritz. Because we saw only his silhouette, outlined by a helmet, the line of a cape and an automatic, which also was only a guess, he seemed mysterious and inspired fear. Kolev gave the signal and two crawled toward the German while the rest were on the ready. It seemed, everything was almost over when suddenly a shot rang out and the German disappeared, as though he had dissolved into the darkness.

The lanky lad had fired his SVT and, clutching an anti-tank grenade, he started to hit himself over the head with it. Lest the reader be alarmed, so long as the pin is not pulled out of a grenade, it is simply a piece of metal.

"Cut the theater!" Kolev whispered and signaled for everyone to draw close. "Be calm. The Fritz was scared, but he knows nothing about us. Since some fool fired (Kolev looked at Solovyev), he will come back, but not alone. Maybe he is a field guard. Two (he indicted who precisely) go over there again and wait for the capture, and you (he indicated Martsenovskiy and the scout next to him) go off to the right, in case we have to cut them off, to not let them get away. Go!"

With these words, Kolev lay down, having taken his pistol out of the holster. We also readied ourselves. It was terrible, but somewhere in my subconscious I was thinking: I must remember that the lanky boy also fired unexpectedly, and also from an SVT, which means there is a problem with the rifle. This might help Sviridov, who killed Kazin and his beloved Masha this morning.

Kolev peered as though into water. Not half an hour had passed, when three silhouettes appeared against the background of the sky. The Fritzes were talking loudly. Apparently, the one who ran away had told the others what had happened. I heard that these three on the hill were speaking English. How can this be, I thought, if the second front is not yet open? Suddenly, distinguishable German speech began... These were Fritzes. We must act, we must not lose a minute. I jumped up and, as we had been taught, shouted loudly and clearly in German:

"Hands up! Put down your weapons! You are surrounded!.."

The Fritzes, however, could not care less about what we learned in the accelerated one and a half month course for military translators. Instead of throwing down their weapons, they fired with their three automatics, I think, three light machine-guns, and I barely managed to save myself, even with my whole head buried in the ground. Only the breeze of death passed before us like a fan, and on the opposite side bundles of exploded earth kicked up. Then the lanky boy had his say. He raised himself a little and, leaning on his left hand, hurled the ill-fated anti-tank grenade with his right.

There was an explosion of such force that we ourselves were deafened by it.

The explosion aroused the front, and about 10-12 kilometers behind us the soldiers of both one and the other side woke up. Each began to fire from whatever was at hand: each side inspired fear of each other. There was a hidden meaning in this commotion. If you, for instance, were a machine-gunner, and there was a space in front in your line of fire, the mortar men have found the range to their target, and now they are shooting at it. This might seem like chaos, meaningless shooting along the entire front, but in fact they are firing at areas where presumably the living force of the enemy could appear.

Yet, under cover this racket, we rushed about on the hill, searching for the scattered Fritzes using our flashlights. Unfortunately, none of them gave signs of life.

"Documents, get their documents!" Kolev commanded.

However, I already held the soldier's booklet—a soldier's papers—taken from one of the dead soldiers.

"Look!" I shined the flashlight at a note in the soldier's booklet. "The Fourth Mountain Artillery Division, 'Edelweiss'."

We also took the papers from the other two, and read the same thing—the 93rd Grenadier's Regiment of the Fourth Mountain Artillery Division 'Edelweiss.'

Only Kolev and I understood that 'Edelweiss,' the mountain flower, was the recognition sign for the division. It was reckoned to be somewhere in the area of Kharkov, which meant that it had just arrived here, maybe even today. That meant that we had taken them right in time. Alas, we only had documents. What we needed was a prisoner.

Kolev gave the command to retreat, and in the bustle someone brushed against one of those lying on the ground, who groaned:

"Oh, mother..."

We rushed to him. Indeed, he was alive. Martsenovskiy gave him a sip of water and he opened his eyes.

Then something unimaginable happened to us. We were out of our minds with happiness and, having clasped hands, we began to whirl around the captive. Probably, we needed this in order not to go out of our minds...

It was necessary to get out of there before dawn, while the Germans had not investigated and cut off our retreat. In the darkness it was hard to get back to the same hidden ravine. Here, the credit went to Martsenovskiy, who could see in the darkness like a cat and therefore he went first, almost running.

We carried the captive in pairs and changed places every hundred meters. In any case, we split up the soldiers' papers: one for me, the others were with Kolev and Martsenovskiy.

Passing each of us, Kolev told us each:

"If something should happen to us, the one who gets through must remember: 'Edelweiss,' Fourth Mountain Artillery Division. Repeat it."

Each repeated it, realizing that this was serious.

Dawn was already breaking when we finally reached the safety of the ravine.

There was some hesitation at the crossing: we crowded and it began to break. Without thinking, we jumped into the river, so that those who carried the prisoner could get through.

Platoon commander Ivanov met us first. They say that when he came to he wanted to shoot himself, but they took away his pistol. Now, having realized that everyone was alive and had even brought along a prisoner, he embraced everyone and cried.

We did not have the strength to sit on a horse and collapsed into the carts.

We stopped at the company command post, to hand over the prisoner. The company commander, a short senior

lieutenant, reported without pride to the battalion command post: I have a prisoner.

They also kept us at the battalion command post, where a black-haired captain with a Caucasus accent reported to the regiment: I have a prisoner.

They sent a car from the regiment, and now we bumped along in the cabin. The prisoner lay on a litter and groaned when we hit pot-holes.

Along the way, I managed to interrogate him.

The 'Edelweiss' Division had arrived the day before yesterday and was not yet there in full complement, but the 93rd Regiment was already here and tomorrow was expecting the arrival of the 94th Regiment. The captive was in bad shape, so I did not torment him with excessive questions.

To make up for it, I could then study his soldier's booklet.

Pfc Albert Bech was the same age as I. Moreover, he was exactly my age, i.e., he born into the world on 20 February 1920 just like I was. Is it possible that our mothers gave birth to us at the same time, for us to meet in such a manner? The captive was breathing heavily. We had better take him to the regiment doctor, I thought.

First they put the prisoner in a shed on some hay and covered him with hay, until the doctor arrived. However, instead of a doctor, the regimental commander appeared unexpectedly and interrogated Albert Bech. I interpreted. He could barely move his lips, and I also had trouble staying on my feet. As soon as the colonel left, I collapsed right there on the hay and fell asleep beside the prisoner.

They woke me up 20 minutes later. Major Yakovlev, head of the reconnaissance division, had arrived. He accompanied Colonel Petrakovskiy, division commander, Hero of the Soviet Union. By now I knew everything about the prisoner and could, without tormenting him, answer any questions for him, but I only translated, since they wanted to obtain the information of interest to them from the horse's mouth.

They woke us every half hour. Colonel Chechentsev, head of the army reconnaissance department, also arrived and interrogated him. Later the military correspondent for the army newspaper, the journalist Boris Galanov, arrived. I was covered with mud and we did not recognize each other, although before the war we studied in Moscow at the same institute. Galanov wrote an article, "Heroic Feat by the Scouts," about us; we learned from the newspaper that we were serving in the 18th Army. They would overpraise the army and then, as it happens here, disparage it, but let me assure the reader that our foot reconnaissance platoon had nothing to do with these intrigues.

The last attempt to interrogate the prisoner ended in chaos. The front headquarters chief, a lieutenant general, flew in on a U-2. He was so fat that he could hardly push through into the shed. First he demanded that we bring the prisoner to him at regiment headquarters, where he was quartered. They came running for us, and once again woke me up.

I was lying next to the prisoner on the hay, and I reached out to him in order to wake him, but he no longer reacted to anything. He was dead.

They reported to the lieutenant general, who became ill-tempered and visited the shed in person. He wanted to see for himself this prisoner, about whom, perhaps, they already knew in Moscow. He had flown in himself in vain. The general interrogated us: how did we conduct the search, how many of us were there, and announced that we had done everything wrong. Having looked at the prisoner, he suddenly said:

"Maybe you brought in a dead person? Hmm? We know you scouts!"

With these words, he turned and took his pudgy body out of the shed.

Nonetheless, the main point of this story is something else.

When they recommended us for awards, Kolev included platoon commander Ivanov on the list. People might say this is fiction, a deception. No. This was something quite different. No one, no one gave away his commander, to whom such misfortune had occurred. As far as the order was concerned, Ivanov could hardly manage to receive it...

The platoon buried pfc Albert Bech with dignity. Something like a coffin was put together and we carried the deceased in it to the northwestern outskirts of the village of Yesalovka, where we committed him to the earth. No one need have to know of this either, since the war would still go on for another 3 years, and history still has not taken the slogan "Kill the Germans!" off the agenda.

Now, in my old age, I realize that I went through two universities in life. One was the Moscow Institute for History, Philosophy and Literature. For me, the other university was the foot reconnaissance platoon.

The Price of Victory

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[Article by A. Mertsalov, doctor of historical sciences, retired colonel of the guard]

[Text] Illumination of the war period of the history of the USSR suffered to the greatest extent from Stalinism and to the least extent has been restructured in accordance

with the requirements of the time. The price of victory is a knotty problem for war history. However, our historiography still reduces the entire matter only to the significance of victory. For the time being, concepts known in war days have not been eliminated either: "What is war without sacrifices," "the war excuses everything," "no one passes judgment on the victors." Although, it is already hard to convince anyone today that there were supposedly no gross errors made by the USSR leadership on the eve and in the course of the war, no unjustified losses, we often still try to describe the good and the bad in its history with the lofty words "heroic and tragic."

With full grounds, we are writing about the progressive influence of the defeat of fascism on the development of all mankind, emphasizing the decisive role of the USSR. However, the victory, which preserved and reinforced the independence of our country, at the same time reinforced the dictatorship of Stalin; it destroyed the fascist regimes in the Central and Eastern European countries, but spread the influence of Stalinism within them. The imperial tendencies of Stalinist diplomacy, its general professional narrowness, was one of the prerequisites for the appearance of the "Cold War." The tremendous war losses of the USSR, which gave rise to the self-confidence of the ruling circles of NATO, also contributed to this.

Meanwhile, the sources of the victory were interpreted unilaterally. Science has recognized the exceptional role of the idea of protecting socialism which possessed the masses, the new meaning that patriotism had acquired, and the exceptional courage of the army and the people, their ability to surpass the enemy in military arts and engineering. However, historians essentially do not deeply research the counter-source, Stalinism, or the sacrifices of the people which had increased tenfold. Various manifestations of personification of history have not been overcome. The place of the people and the army in our work is still held by Stalin, his close circle, and a hundred or so known heroes. The geographic factor, which had decisive influence in certain periods of the war, was left out of the reasons for victory.

However, the main point is that so long as the cost of victory has not been fully determined, it is impossible to consider the history of the war fully studied. In the whole set of questions here, one inevitably singles out the responsibility for the innumerable sacrifices. Precisely the desire to conceal this in many ways stipulated the falsification of war history.

In the minds of the Soviet people, the thought of the cost of the war arose long ago. Back on 25 June 1945, a day after the parade in Red Square, A. Dovzhenko, for instance, bitterly noted in his diary: In a "ceremonial and severe speech" by Marshal Zhukov, "there were no pauses, no funeral march, no silence." It was as though these "30, if not 40 million victims and heroes... had never really lived. In front of the great monument to them, the blood and torments, the people in the square did not rise up: they did not think, were not inspired, and did not take off their hats."

It should not be said that during the war we entirely forgot about the fallen. Orders contained the phrase "eternal glory to the heroes..." However, a number of them carefully evaded the question with silence, reporting only on the Germans' colossal losses. Even on 3 July 1941, the "great strategist" declared the defeat "of the best divisions of the enemy," and on 6 November, having quite lost all sense of measure, claimed that Germany was pouring out its life's blood, having lost 4.5 million soldiers and officers. Near the end of the war the USSR People's Commissariat for Defense violated the moral tradition of civilized peoples, having demanded the publication of a list of names of those who perished and of prisoners. Initially, 7 million dead were listed. Khrushchev gave a different number: 20 million. In 1965, Brezhnev said: "More than 20 million."

What about the historians? They mindlessly repeated these figures. In certain sections of the 12-volume history of World War II, uncoordinated information was quoted on losses by the Red Army, for example, in operations abroad. However, to this day the exact number of dead servicemen, including prisoners, a distribution of war losses in terms of periods of the war, types of armed forces, fronts, armies and operations, and the correlation of losses of the two hostile coalitions are unknown. As before, one can find primitive attempts to pass the overall losses on the Eastern front by the Wehrmacht off as the number of dead, comparisons of the losses of the Red Army alone with the overall losses by the Wehrmacht and its allies. Recently, when individual Soviet scientists began an intensified study of the problem, it was already a question of 27 million USSR citizens who died. However, it seems, we should not even consider this figure definitive.

The number of our servicemen who died, according to various data, fluctuates from 8 to 14, or even to 22 million. The Eastern front of the Wehrmacht, according to data of historians in the GDR and USSR, lost 2.8 million. The ratio of these losses is not 1:1, as some authors believe to this day (**see, for example** VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1990, p 14-16, 96), but at the very least 3-5:1. One can hardly doubt the rightness of comparing the sacrifices of the two armies, the most active participants of the hostile coalitions.

The material outlays of the USSR were also tremendous. The study of these is also far from complete. Extremely important questions have not even been raised. For instance, how expedient and effective was the economic support for defense up to the beginning of the war, what did the retreat of the army to Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and Stavropol, the moving of production forces into safe regions and other things cost? A comparative analysis of the material losses of the states which participated in the war has not even been made.

Why was the USSR's cost of victory so incommensurately great? In domestic and foreign, along with scientific historiography, apologetic and nihilistic approaches to answering this question can be traced. The silence, diminishing the negative in the Stalinist leadership of the war, and the attempts to explain obvious mistakes and errors through certain external circumstances are inherent in the former. So, responsibility for the tremendous sacrifices among the world population and for other harm on the whole are placed on the occupiers. Of course, the aggressor with his man-hating intentions and man-destroying industrialization is in fact guilty of everything, but only in the final account. After all, it is appropriate to ask direct questions: Who let him into our home, how did he end up in the heart of someone else's land, who let him to exterminate millions of helpless people and seize or annihilate much of great value? The war occurred basically in our territory. Its iron roller passed over some oblasts several times. We must also study whether Stalin's "scorched earth" orders were always justified. Thus, a number of specialists question the expediency of total destruction by the partisans of the railroads at the enemy's rear before the attack of Soviet troops.

In non-Marxist literature, one can find a different approach: the contrast of the "merciless use of human masses by the Soviet leadership... to the cautious use of people in battle and the large use of material resources by the Anglo-Americans." This explains only part of the known facts. It is impossible to deny the direct connection between the enormous losses by the Red Army (the losses of the armed forces of the U.S. and England, respectively, were 405,000 and 375,000) and the level of the Stalinist leadership. It is also necessary to take into account, however, the extremely unequal distribution of military efforts within the anti-fascist coalition. At the same time that the USSR had pinned down the main might of the common enemy, the United States and England amassed the optimally necessary forces and resources, freely choosing the time, way and place of actions. Moreover, the USSR immediately fell into an extraordinarily difficult situation: it entered the war without a single ally. Despite all this, of course, there were also gross errors in the foreign policy of Stalin and his colleagues.

Judgments of the extreme interpretation, which recently appeared in domestic literature, are somewhat sympathetic to the opinion of foreign specialists: allegedly, there was no victory by us in general, since it was achieved at such a loss of life; we should discard the guilt of unjustified losses from history; we finished the war not knowing how to fight, poured out our own blood, and piled the enemy high with our own corpses. However, we could not have won a victory, even at a cost of 1:5, without "knowing how to fight." Incidentally, foreign war historians, emphasizing the Red Army's contribution to victory, do take into account its successful operations, especially in 1944-1945.

Both of the above approaches to answering the question are methodologically similar, since both praise alone or rejection alone are one-sided. Their supporters do not see the opposite tendencies in the development of Soviet society in general and in the war period in particular, and they still identify socialism with Stalinism and the people and army with the "great strategist."

Having refuted both these extremes, let us turn to the causes of the incommensurate losses by the USSR, the main one being, in my opinion, the level of leadership in readying the country's defense and the conduct of the war on the part of Stalin and a number of his closest advisors. It was marked by diktat, incompetence, bureaucracy and cruelty. These features of leadership were also characteristic of the entire period of Stalinism. During the war, their manifestation not only did not become weaker, as some researchers assume, but conversely, grew stronger. Unquestionably, under the absolute personal power of Stalin, with the concentration of all key leading posts in the party and state in his hands, these features cannot help but be and really were widespread in society on the whole. Thus, on the front and at the rear there were many both big and petty dilettantes and much arbitrariness. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for claiming that these features had become utterly overwhelming. In addition to this and despite it, with each year of war the experience and professionalism of the military leaders, commanders and Red Army soldiers grew, and the initiative of workers on the home front developed.

Let us recall that since the end of the 1920s, exerting inhuman effort, the Soviet peoples carried out gigantic defense construction. Almost the entire activity of the government and the country's economy was subordinated to this goal. The best scientific and technical cadres and a huge amount of resources were directed there. In the mid-1930s, the RKKA really was not inferior to any other army in the world. As military historian J. Hoffmann (FRG) believes, the "Red Army in 1935-1936 was in all respects a contemporary armed force." The author is referring to the arms, training, command structure, and level of information about the probable enemy. Let us also recall how accurately Marshal Tukhachevskiy defined the main, anti-Soviet direction of possible aggression, Germany's preparation of a "mighty army for invasion," the basis of which were "air forces and rapidly mobile units," and how accurately he guessed at the intention of taking the military action into the opponent's territory via "sudden, lightening strikes."

However, something completely irrational and monstrous occurred. Before the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, some 40,000 Red Army commanders were groundlessly repressed, predominantly those who had advanced military and strategic views. "If not for the crushing of our military cadres," General A.V. Gorbatov later claimed, "we would never had let the Germans reach the Volga or the Dnepr." "If not for 1937," in the opinion of Marshal A.V. Vasilevskiy, "there might never have been a war in general in 1941."

It has already been repeatedly noted that the losses of the best cadres set the army many years back. Hitler and his advisors gambled precisely on this. According to information from Hitler's propaganda agent, N. von Belov, the Fuhrer spoke of the Red Army on the eve of "Barbarossa" as a "troop without leaders." Depriving the army of leaders had a destructive influence on its morale on the whole, inevitably strengthening the atmosphere of distrust, creating in the commanders a habit of sensitively detecting the moods of the leadership and a preference for embellishment of reality and lack of glasnost. Discipline declined and a distinct separation of the command structure from the rank-and-file Red Army men was noted. In particular, the inclusion of extremely cruel regulations in the military rules, by which a commander had to use force or weapons in order to restore order and, during the war, the official establishment of the institution of orderlies and the introduction of other officers' privileges contributed to this.

War historians have not yet really studied to what extent bureaucratization, dehumanization and the deintellectualization of society, inherent in that epoch, affected the armed forces; did Stalin and his advisors in general have any kind of scientifically substantiated, constructive plan for military building, for the development of armed forces and army and naval party organizations? For example, how do we explain the notorious leap-frogging concerning the abolition and reintroduction of the institution of commissars before the war and at its beginning? It is not clear what Stalin and his colleagues accepted out of the military and theoretical legacy of the repressed military leaders, or whether the latter were armed with what is known as military doctrine. How did the slogans arise: "Take military action into the enemy's territory," "answer the instigator's blow with a threefold strike," or the gamble on revolutionary upheaval in the aggressor's home front, the reckoning on an easy victory with little bloodshed? After all, these slogans were militarily unsupported both quantitatively, as well as qualitatively. It still remains to determine whether this was delusion or a bluff. Right now, it is only known for certain that the production of many types of arms, known before the war, lagged behind or was not well organized in general. These included long-range bombers, air assault equipment and missile systems, including long-range.

The defeats of 1941-1942 led to an irrevocable loss of a significant part of the cadre army, along with a large amount of weapons, and to the occupation by the enemy of a tremendous territory containing the basic centers of the defense industry. In the NKO order of 23 February 1942, Stalin reduced the reasons for this catastrophe to the suddenness of the attack. However, in the very same order, he referred to this factor as "expended" and having already "disappeared." In reality, by February 1942, the suddenness factor had by no means "been completely expended," as Stalin claimed. Its harmful consequences would remain even after 1945. Moreover, the "great military leader" would run into this factor more than once—from the summer (1942) of the Wehrmacht's attack to its unforeseen resistance on the Seelow Heights near Berlin.

It should be noted that military science from time immemorial related to the most important factors of war and time. Suddenness precisely deprives the opponent of the advantages of this factor and, by the same token, extraordinarily weakens him. Characteristically, afterwards Stalin in his five "constantly effective factors of victory" failed to include not only time, but also space, perhaps precisely because it was disadvantageous to remember them: he gave them away to the opponent.

Indeed, the attack was sudden, but in what sense? A great many people, from Stalin to the Red Army men in the border districts, had information about the intentions of the enemy at their disposal. True, they did not let themselves believe it and the spread of it was punished. In any case, the attack was the unexpectedness that they had expected. The suddenness lay, rather, in the fact that our troops were not militarily ready. Stalin prohibited the basically necessary measures stipulated by the rules, and Beriya rigidly observed this prohibition.

The suddenness also lay in the shock that struck the leadership. In the first days, Stalin was, in the opinion of Admiral I.S. Isakov, in a state close to prostration. Entire armies perished, yet he dined in his dacha at Kuntsev. All of headquarters, in the opinion of General A.V. Khrulev, was unable to snap out of a state of paralysis during the first weeks. Something similar was repeated with Stalin in October-November, when he was considering the decision of the surrender of Moscow and of making peaceful probes in relations with Germany. Zhukov, Mikoyan and other eyewitnesses attested to this. The appearance of the enemy's manifold superiority in a central direction was also sudden for the command and the army. This occurred as a consequence of the arbitrary revocation by Stalin of General Headquarters' plan, which on the whole had correctly determined the direction of the Wehrmacht's main strike.

Who is responsible for the suddenness, and consequently, also for the first costs paid for the future victory? The "treacherous enemy," the "placid and carefree" fighters, or the "frightened intellectuals," as Stalin claimed? Or, perhaps, the "invasion" itself did not allow the army to develop, as some authors claim, obviously exchanging the places of cause and effect? Nothing of the sort. Not only the professionalism and treachery of the aggressor, but also the carefree attitude of the object of aggression stipulated the sudden nature. Even at the start of the 20th century, there is the axiom: wars are not declared by imperialists, but begin suddenly. This idea was expressed in the 1930s in the Soviet Army rules and was developed in works by scientists, including on the experience of the Wehrmacht in 1939-1941. Above all, the "leader" and his close advisors were responsible for the suddenness: the army was not brought to military readiness due to the direct fault of

Stalin, Molotov and Timoshenko. The General Headquarters and the command of the Western districts, which did not use the available opportunities (with the exception of the Navy), also bear a certain share of responsibility.

Indeed, the opponent was better mobilized. However, it is not because certain "aggressive nations," as Stalin attempted to prove in 1945, were always better prepared for war than "peace-loving" nations. Such excursions into theory are not viable, since the point here lies not in the properties of the nations, but in the level of their leadership and ability for sober self-assessment. In this regard, the opponent was not at the top. Specialists from the FRG have proven that, in planning the attack on the USSR, the Wehrmacht absolutized the experience of its own "campaigns" of 1939-1941 and overestimated its own strength. This was the main reason for the collapse of Hitler's plan for a fast-paced war, which means, for the entire aggressive program of the fascists. Germany and its allies were incapable of waging a lengthy war against the USSR and its allies. In other words, the Wehrmacht had much experience, but did not know how to use it.

Something similar happened in the Red Army, which had been deprived of its leaders. Soviet memorialists, in particular Vasilevskiy, were witnesses to the fact that we were unable to take into account even the experience of the war in Spain, in which Soviet volunteers participated. All the generalizations by the most perspicacious military leaders, who had been repressed, were declared "hostile." Thus they dealt with the legacy of Tukhachevskiy, with the experience gained by the Red Army in conducting partisan actions. In the summer of 1941, Soviet patriots had to begin a struggle behind enemy lines, having almost no clear concepts of its specific features. In other words, the inability or lack of desire on the part of Stalin and his advisors to maximally utilize both their own and others' experience contributed to the failures and repeatedly multiplied the cost of success.

The Wehrmacht's Eastern campaign did not at all depend at the very beginning on the military and economic potential of all countries, captured by Germany or dependent on it, as is often emphasized here. Such a claim is in fact related to the fascist myths of "the unsurpassed strength of German arms," of the Red Army as a "colossus" on feet of clay, of "the crusade of Europe against bolshevism." In June 1941, the Wehrmacht used the resources of these countries to an insignificant extent: the West German scientist H. Ambrosius and W. Hubbard pointed out that the "complete seizure and effective use of all resources was implemented **only** (bold is mine—A.M.) in the second phase of the war, starting with 1942, when the strategy of fast-paced wars no longer functioned and the economy had to be restructured for a lengthy war." When Germany involved a large part of these resources, it had already started to drop hopelessly behind the USSR in the military-economic regard. Hitler was thus also unable to "absolutely subject everyone to war," as some of our great historians claim. The specific features of the capitalist economy of that time, the actions of antifascist patriots, and the fear of the German authorities for their own home front were also telling.

Repeating the version of the 22 June military and technical superiority of the Wehrmacht, a number of our historians give the overall number of German tanks and airplanes and, concerning the Red Army, give only the amounts of equipment of the latest models. However, as of January 1939 before the start of the war, our industry had delivered to the army about 18,000 military airplanes and more than 7,000 tanks of various designs, both new and old. Equipment which is not the newest, as the war indicated, can be successfully used in action.

According to West German information, the German tanks in 1941 did not meet the demands in terms of armament, armor and cross-country ability that were made of them in the East. This relates not only to tanks and not only to the Germans, but also to captured materiel. The fourth volume of the semi-official 10-volume "*The German Empire and World War II*," published in the FRG, states that all captured equipment, with the exception of some of the French automotive transport and Czech tanks, was used by the Wehrmacht for training, guard and other purposes outside the Eastern front. "...The decision to attack the USSR was not supported by sufficiently energetic measures in the area of arms," this publication emphasizes. "Its production did not conform to the potential of the opponent, since the German leadership proceeded from the assumption that it would be able to destroy the military potential of the Soviet Union in the course of a few weeks with existing resources... On 22 June 1941, the Wehrmacht divisions with the best equipment were concentrated only around tank units, at the same time that less powerful and less mobile divisions were basically used in the breaches and on the flanks. On the whole, the Eastern army of the Wehrmacht gave the impression of a patchwork quilt. This does not conform to the opinion, expressed in postwar literature, that Hitler was able to mobilize a powerful, homogeneously equipped army against the USSR with the help of the maneuverable economy of a fast-paced war and by robbing the occupied territories."

In the years of stagnation, a number of historians and memorialists inflated the thesis: "History left us little time." Outwardly sacramental, it conceals yet another falsehood. On 22 June 1941, the USSR had far from exhausted its possibilities for strengthening defense. Even by the end of 1942, its industry had caught up with Germany's industry, even though it was in an incomparably more serious condition than before the war, and in 1943 Soviet industry had outstripped it both in terms of the quantity, a well as quality of arms. This is despite the fact that the best specialists in the defense industry had been repressed and that pre-war work had been distinguished by complacent attitudes and cases of bungling.

By the end of the war, thanks to huge efforts on the part of the entire country, the Red Army had surpassed the opponent in the professional regard, yet often employed a unique, very unprofessional methodology: "Victory at any cost." "We will pay any price" is by no means an inspiring image. This was the method of operation for Stalin and many of his subordinates. Everyone knows about his constant demand not to come to a halt even in the face of such sacrifices. Orders No 270 (1941) and No 227 (1942) are of the most odious nature.

The first of these declared all Red Army men who had been captured to be "traitors." The families of commanders who had been captured were persecuted. This order, essentially, compromised the Soviet state; it contradicted international law, particularly the principle of presumption of innocence. While not denying individual cases of premeditated conversion to the enemy's side, it is necessary to emphasize that the overwhelming majority of these people were captured at the fault of the high command. It, having honestly fulfilled its duty, should bear responsibility, not these people. The practice that took shape because of Stalin with regard to these people, including depriving them of the privileges of participants in the war, was wrong, since the concepts of "being captured" and "surrendering" are far from identical.

We should also consider the cruel order No 227 to be Stalin's reaction to the defeats near Leningrad, in the Crimea and near Kharkov (as a consequence of his errors). Propaganda called this order "Not one step back!," but many instructions with this meaning had been issued before this. Again justifying himself, Stalin this time essentially accused all commanders and fighters of being "undisciplined," although the overwhelming majority of them displayed courage and devotion to the Soviet Homeland. In this order, Stalin openly declared that he (on the example of Hitler, who rescued his own front from the disintegration of the winter of 1941/1942) is introducing penal battalions and minelaying detachments. In a military respect, this order was harmful. It prohibited any retreat, including one justified by the interest of war maneuvers, leading to senseless new losses.

The displays of dilettantism in military affairs, bureaucracy, and the indifference to the fates of people accompanied us to the end of the war. For instance, the following examples are typical. One of the leaders of the artillery industry, M.Z. Olevskiy, reported that in 1944 its possibilities already significantly exceeded the needs of the front. However, a question arises: Who calculated these needs and how, since in 1944-1945 Soviet troops often went into attack with obviously inadequate artillery training, multiplying our losses? General N.A. Antipenko, in his day the deputy commander of the 1st Belorussian Front on the home front, proudly declared in a report at a 1985 conference that during the Berlin operation they managed to "save" a tremendous quantity of shells. Yet, this was with 100,000 in human losses... Numerous other facts also attest directly or indirectly to such "savings."

It is time to ask ourselves the following: Why do we to this day count the dead and the fallen without accurately counting up the millions? Why to this day have the remains of hundreds of thousands of nameless soldiers, killed in the war, not been buried, yet the Ministry of Defense has shifted this task to initiative groups of Komsomol members and even Pioneers?

Everyone knows that there are virtually no families here, which did not suffer the sacrifices of the war. The USSR lost tens of millions of its most active and able-bodied citizens. Our memory of them is sacred. It does not depend on whether or not the sacrifices were stipulated by military expediency. On the other hand, the high cost of victory cannot eclipse the contribution of the Soviet people to the defeat of fascism. Our armed forces constantly diverted a large part of the enemy's troops to themselves. More than two-thirds of its losses occurred on our front. We can state this without any provisions. Not without reason, many Western researchers identify the collapse of Hitler's "Eastern campaign" with the outcome of all of World War II.

The mass heroism of the Soviet people justifiably takes first priority among the reasons for victory. However, to this day, our books present it through individual feats, accomplished under extreme conditions. While in no way diminishing their significance, it is time to direct attention to the main point, to the collective feat of the units, the formations, the plants and kolkhozes. This is heroism of a different sort, long and difficult. It is the martial labor of millions of Red Army men under conditions of constant deadly danger, the selfless labor of millions of workers, peasants, employees and the scientific and technical intelligentsia under the utmost strain of spiritual and physical forces, often under conditions of hunger and cold. It is the sacred duty of Soviet scientists to finally create a history, worthy of the great Victory, won at such an incommensurately great cost.

MARGINAL NOTES

Editorials on the Back Page

905B0021I Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 64-65

[Article by A. Antipov]

[Text] It is no secret that to this day many journals try to start their issue with the most topical, sharp and programmatic article, whereas the readers start not with the front but, precisely, the back pages. Possibly, this durable reflex developed in us in the course of those long decades when the editors believed the doxology and resolutions of their leadership to be the topical and programmatic subjects.

Be that as it may, the editors of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL wittily reacted to this syndrome by assigning page 96 of each of its issues to the editor-in-chief. After receiving an issue, and glancing at the "Editor-in-Chief's Page," one could feel the mood with which editors and authors faced the readers and one could understand what concerns them today and the interpretation and discussion of the type of problems in which they are trying to interest the readers: all of this which traditionally should be the lead article, was to be found on the last page of that journal.

Let us look at the second issue. "There is talk today of a professional army," the editor-in-chief begins. Who said that? Where? There has indeed been a discussion about the military reform, and about a professional army, relatively small but well-equipped, trained and guaranteeing the country's security and the social protection of the military personnel, above all by the military themselves, at congresses of people's deputies and sessions of the country's Supreme Soviet. That is a fact. It is with interest that society joined in this discussion, unfortunately not always in a dispassionate and thoughtful manner but increasingly in a constructive, meaningful and open way.

The discussion was about a professional army, above all, and not about a hired army! This word "hired" assumes, in our ordinary use, some kind of unacceptably emotional coloring as does, let us say, the word "bloody." If we were to ignore emotions, does the editor-in-chief of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL and most of its readers not imply professional military. Do they not hire out to the state (under unenviable, it becomes clear, hiring conditions)?

"Why did the great and powerful Rome fall?" the editor-in-chief asks. "Because it permitted the existence of a hired armed force. It reassigned the defense of its homeland to mercenaries." Simple! What a simple science history is! How similar are the Roman legions to the modern officers who handle nuclear missile systems, satellite communications, a supersonic air force and a nuclear submarine fleet!

Let me drop this subject, for I risk to draw upon myself charges of dilettantism (although, like millions of other of my fellow citizens, I underwent the required military training and army service): apparently, it is only our professional (hired?) officers who can professionally judge of such problems.

Something else motivated me to react to the content of this "Editor-in-Chief's Page:" the reluctant mention of Adylov, who has spent a number of years in jail (incidentally, so far without a trial), and S. Fedorov, our outstanding ophthalmologist and USSR People's Deputy: apparently these are the people who need a hired armed force.

What a strange style this is for a historian (and a historical journal): to fantasize about the reasons for the activities of real, of living people? Would it not be simpler to deal with documents—articles, speeches and reports on a specific project and, on their basis, prove one's conclusions? In this case, these are conclusions-accusations which could entail loss of deputy plenary powers and criminal charges. "Bigwigs like Fedorov," "one could please one's eyes and, at the same time, maim one's soul;" "no Adilovs and Fedorovs will make them (workers and peasants—author) change their mind to the effect that this will not be their worker-peasant homeland:" statements and assertions such as these abound in this single small page of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

After S. Fedorov was published in KOMMUNIST, one of our readers—a young graduate of a Kishinev VUZ who, because of poor eyesight, had been unable to work in his field, turned to KOMMUNIST editors, with a request for surgery, which was his last hope. "Until now I was not aware of everything around me being so beautiful, so clear and in such relief. Now I am reluctant to go to sleep, I cannot get enough of looking around," he said after the surgery. How did S. Fedorov maim his soul and the souls of dozens and hundreds of thousands of people like him, including military servicemen? Could it be that those who, regaining their eyesight, stumbled upon the "Editor-in-Chief's Page" in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL?

Unfortunately, said "Page" is not the sole example of the abusive journalistic style in this publication. In its issue No 12 for 1989, after an article by V. Bushin in which, in particular, all the fabrications concerning A.D. Sakharov, which had been published in the press over the past 20 years, were zealously retold, there was an editorial note: "This article was signed to press while Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov was in excellent health." That implies that if a person is entirely healthy he can be persecuted in a journal which, incidentally, should propagandize the noble traditions of the Russian officer corps, concepts of military honor, etc. We assume that the editors had secured testimony that S. Fedorov was feeling well.

"It is all right to do away with the army by those who have already bought a car, have foreign currency, freedom to travel abroad and bank accounts.... What about the muzhiks with whom I froze and was lost (?) at the BAM, the Yamal, Kushka and Chukotka; in times of trouble there will be no one on whom to rely except on one's own army and navy," the editor-in-chief writes.

I would like to answer him with the words with which this page ends, in issue No 2 of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL: "Let us not play tricks with the minds of the people." Let us not couple Adylov with Fedorov, let us not pit Fedorov against the muzhiks and the "Komsomol-voluntaries" who laid the Western section of the BAM, earning state wages, and the railroad troops who worked free of charge on the Eastern sector; let us not find, as the hero of A.I. Kuprin said in "The Duel," "internal and external enemies." Let us not frighten the muzhiks with the "year of trouble," for in

the final account all of us, including said muzhiks, military servicemen and members of their civilian families, need a normal, a civilized human life and the guarantee of any sort of trouble lies in its sensible organization, which is the purpose of perestroyka.

"Tranquillity in the army means tranquillity in the country," the president of the USSR noted at his meeting with deputies-military servicemen, on 15 March. We believe that this meaningful formula can define not only the nature of the political and ideological work in the country's armed forces but also the tone and content of press articles dealing with this type of problems, military periodicals above all.

ECONOMICS

Per Capita Independence

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[Article by A. Arbatov, doctor of economic sciences, deputy chairman, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources]

[Text] How do our economic troubles arise, and what is behind them? Explanations to this are numerous, ranging from violations of objective economic laws to ordinary lack of organization and slackness. I believe that, not least, they are related to entirely real interests of very influential groups. Naturally, however, on the surface everything is clothed in absolutely proper and, frequently, even lofty garb, symbolizing ideals of universal human or governmental dignity. Let us consider, perhaps, so-called independence. Why "so-called?" This is a concept considered one of the most important and precious to any person, regardless of the social system under which he lives. However, it is precisely the distortion of such a key term that could lead to a number of losses and excesses. The value of this concept to the people, and their readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of independence makes it possible to "justify" with it all consequences, outlays and losses and also make them socially justified. If such is the case, why not apply this to a purpose, the real content of which does not meet and, frequently, even clashes with the tasks of the majority of the members of society, while serving the interests of individual groups within it? A great deal could be obtained from this society, hiding behind a suitably sounding slogan supported by society.

History is familiar with a variety of types of pseudoindependence, used to serve group and caste interests. It has been colored in national, religious, professional, regional and many other hues. Some such aspirations were short lasting; other, by virtue of developing circumstances and thanks to good camouflage, have lasted quite a long time. We could includ[illegible]

"product" (steel, petroleum, coal, cotton, etc.) independence which was proclaimed in our country many decades ago.

Naturally, this was frequently based on a healthy fear of breakdowns in the availability of various goods, due to conflicts and wars. From that viewpoint the aspiration for economic independence of the young Soviet state, which was in a state of hostile encirclement and political isolation, is entirely understandable. However, as the blockade of the country eased, it began to engage in international trade.

Nonetheless, it is since that time that the attitude toward imports as a forced measure to which we resort in hopeless or almost hopeless situations, has remained. Whenever the possibility of producing something domestically existed, the question of its profitability (in the broad meaning of the term), compared with importing it, was virtually not discussed. Exports were considered an instrument for exerting political influence on possible importers.

That is why such "independences" were proclaimed, providing a reason for the development of the respective sectors at all cost. From a global autarchic idea, caused by the blockade, we gradually converted to departmental "independences," which were primarily related to raw materials. They covered sectors in which production possibilities appeared quite substantial or even infinite. Naturally, the way of involving ever new natural and labor resources seemed the only reliable one under the conditions of an extensive management of the economy, for this required neither sophisticated economic thinking nor complex technical facilities. The labor object was available and the working people flowed like a powerful stream out of the countryside wrecked by collectivization. When this flow began to slow down, the system of using the coercive labor of prisoners was turned on in full force. It was no accident that the biggest gulag camps were directly related to the development of natural resources, securing various independences—timber, mineral-raw material, fuel or hydroenergetic. We could consider that the economic line in the field of industrialization coincided or, perhaps, even stemmed from the political choice which was made by the turn of the 1930s.

Today, after several years of feverish and frequently contradictory efforts at a radical restructuring of the economy, we have finally realized that we should have started with a profound study of accumulated problems and a coordinated plan for their solution. It is possible that the current discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress may make a decisive contribution to this urgent matter. It is on the basis of such views that we would like to consider some aspects of the following stipulation included in the platform: "We reject the attitude inherited from the age of initial industrialization toward nature as an object of unrestrained exploitation." What was at the base of such

Most clearly expressed, both in the past and the present, among the postulates of our departmental independence, stemming from the general concept of relying on our own forces, has been the aspiration to be self-supporting in mineral raw materials and fuel. Appeals to this effect may be found in document after document, including the most recent ones, and virtually never questioned. This situation seemed to have developed historically and has not been a subject of revision. Indeed, as early as the turn of the century, a substantial extracting industry had already developed in a number of parts of Russia. Subsequent geological studies confirmed assumptions concerning the country's tremendous raw material potential. Other contributing factors existed as well, including the specific nature of raw materials as objects of labor and as a commodity. Their quality is virtually independent of the technical standard of the production process, which makes it possible to obtain competitive goods even in a technically backward state.

The development of the extracting sector depended exclusively on the volume of capital investments and the availability of production resources. Since the scale of extraction increased year after year, while natural conditions began to worsen at a certain point, an increasing amount of such investments was necessary. Of late, in connection with efforts to apply cost accounting, the situation has become even more complex, as extracting enterprises have asked for price increases of raw material goods. It was precisely in order to substantiate the steadily rising costs and prices that the idea of raw material independence had been preserved intact since the times of the blockade and the war. It dominated the minds of the superior power echelons; it enjoys a number of supporters and fighting it is exceptionally difficult.

Fighting it is necessary, for its support leads to the destruction of the economy which is, actually, already taking place. The growth of direct investments in the fuel-raw material sectors in the course of the last 20 years, including the 12th 5-year period, has substantially outstripped the growth of investments in the most important social areas, and the amount of such investments has already reached one-half of all industrial capital investments. Furthermore, many heavy industry sectors are increasingly working for the mining complex. Correspondingly, the share of its output spent on the manufacturing of extracting equipment, power supplies and the creation of a production infrastructure are also increasing at a disproportionately higher pace. What kind of observance of proportions could one speak of if the objective law of the exploitation of a quality of resources, which is worsening at an accelerated pace, requires a respective increase of funds spent on production for the sake of production, the way efforts to rescue a person drowning in a swamp can lead only to his sinking into it ever more deeply. In order to present such an approach as inevitable, for decades it was instilled in us that it is only by having a great deal of raw materials at our disposal that we would be able to produce an adequate amount of consumer goods. This was not confirmed by reality. All we find is the opposite example in a number of Western European and Southeast Asian countries. Even the rich resources of the United States do not expand the extraction of raw materials and, in the case of many types of such raw materials there have been substantial reductions in production and imports. By no means is this due to the exhaustion of the deposits.

Countries which aspire toward autarchy should either increase output or reduce domestic consumption. Usually, efforts have been made in both directions. Sooner or later, however, it became clear that such an idea cannot be achieved in its pure aspect and leads to economic stagnation. It became necessary to choose either development through cooperation or backwardness in isolation. In the case of our country, which was inherently tending toward isolation but lacked the possibility of achieving it totally, it was necessary to be satisfied with having raw material independence.

What did this give us? Confidence in our material and energy possibilities prevented the search for efficient solutions concerning the conservation of resources; furthermore, unjustified losses began to be perceived as somehow natural: somehow as much as 20 percent of the cement production and about 40 percent of the glass vanished; the situation involving other materials was no better. Our goods became the most most resource intensive of all industrially developed countries. This is a questionable primacy.

Why worry about the development of high technology, when all that was needed could be produced with good old-fashioned material- and energy-intensive methods? Furthermore, with every passing year there were increasingly fewer funds available for technical retooling, for such funds were being ever more intensively invested in the bottomless budgets of the basic sectors. If something technically complex became needed, it was much simpler and more reliable to invest the necessary billions into petroleum extraction and then purchase this "something" from the West, paying in petrodollars. The same applied to food as well. The cost seemed low, for thanks to the efforts of the OPEC members to increase world petroleum prices, such treatment seemed exceptionally profitable. In the areas with extensive extraction of minerals, the dangerously increasing production outlays and the frequent loss of other natural resources (land, timber, water, fauna and flora) were not taken into consideration.

No one seriously asked why did we need to produce precisely the amounts we were producing. The figure for the preceding year was considered and through simple mathematical transformations, taking into consideration the planned percentage of growth, the planned volume of output which would guarantee us "independence" and would enable us, if possible, to compensate for our backwardness in other areas, was derived. How did that figure appear initially?

A situation developed according to which the need for raw materials was traditionally defined and substantiated by the producing sectors themselves. They held the monopoly and were directly interested in maintaining the highest level of output. It was on the basis of such requirements that investments were requested, which were regularly provided for the sake of ensuring "independence." Naturally, essentially in this case the question of efficiency was not considered. Few people tried to analyze the legitimacy of such requests from the viewpoint of the usefulness and need for the end products obtained from such raw materials, the possibility of finding substitutes for the most expensive varieties and the efficiency of their use. Yet, if we compare outlays for steps taken to reduce need (such as the production of more economical engines and lighter machines or improved heat insulation of homes) with outlays for the extraction of raw materials saved as a result of this, one could have adopted the most efficient correlation between the two. This does not require any kind of burdensome uniform governmental program, of which we have already had dozens, and which have convincingly proved their low efficiency as a result of the impossibility of taking everything into consideration and coordinating it. All that is needed is an economic mechanism which would enable us promptly and efficiently to change the correlation among the different sources of supply (primary and secondary raw materials, substitution, conservation, imports, etc.) and a general strategy aimed at economizing on raw materials and fuel.

Their creation and successful use requires, above all, a change in our view on the role of the extracting sectors in the national economy and abandoning some stereotypes and prejudices. It is important, in formulating the new approaches, to abandon the traditional view that the domestic mineral and raw material base is the fundamental and virtually exclusive source of supply. No single industrially developed country, having exhausted its own economically efficient mineral resources, turns this into a tragedy and undertakes to implement inefficient (or questionably efficient) extremely expensive projects aimed at developing new deposits, as is being done in our country.

If we ignore political reasons, which are frequently found behind appeals for "product" independence, we could see that such independence is an atavism which remains from earlier social systems in which a barter economy predominated. The commodity-monetary market relations which develop subsequently made it necessary to acknowledge autarchy as an unsuitable form of economic management and led to active international and interregional trade. In any case, the idea of self-sufficiency periodically broke out, assisted by a few myths.

One of them is the concept of the important defense significance of self-sufficiency and the threat of being dependent on the outside in cases of incomplete satisfaction of the needs of the extracting sectors. Such fears are quite unrealistic, to say the least. We are being asked to strengthen our defense power essentially through the inefficient spending of state funds for the growth and support of the extraction of raw materials instead of and at the expense of developing progressive high-technology sectors which today determine the economic and, therefore, the military potential of any country.

It is very important also to realize that exporting raw materials creates, to say the least, an equally great external dependence as do imports and, as the experience of the overwhelming majority of raw material exporters indicates, an even greater one. If goods for export remain unsold or if they are sold at prices lower than anticipated, the exporter loses the opportunity of purchasing food, consumer and other vitally important goods. We can perfectly well see the severe consequences of the drop in world petroleum prices to our domestic market.

What possibilities does the exporter have to make use of the so-called import independence of his customers? Usually, the example of an instrument such as the embargo is cited. However, even an attempt to impose such substantial limitations as the interruption of grain deliveries from the United States to the Soviet Union indicated the minor effectiveness of this step. Other procurement sources were found, domestic resources were harnessed while, in the United States itself, a high wave of discontent with the government's policy appeared among the farmers. We should also take into consideration that restricting procurements leads to enhanced steps aimed at reducing the dependency of importers which, in the contemporary world, with its great variety of foreign economic relations and alternate technical solutions is not all that difficult to accomplish. What was the result of the intention to apply political pressure on the developed capitalist countries by the Middle Eastern petroleum exporters? All attempts at reducing sales of raw materials or at increasing their prices led to corresponding steps to reduce need, to substitution and diversification.

Our country, displaying particular sensitivity and concern regarding raw material imports, traditionally, without any particular hesitation, purchases vitally important commodities such as food or major components of basic technologies. Given this background, the argument of the danger presented by external dependency seems quite unconvincing.

Today reality itself demands a reduced production of raw materials. Unfortunately, the reason is not because of an awareness of this but because the resources have dried out. They have dried out not in the physical but in the economic sense. Outlays for the development of many new deposits are such that had the idea of raw material independence not survived, the question of their development would not have been raised in the foreseeable future.

It is true that there exists yet another powerful incentive which could make it necessary to consider these deposits: price increases. Today they are unjustifiably low for the majority of types of raw materials compared with increased production outlays. Naturally, this does not contribute either to their efficient use or to restraining exports, not to mention normal cost accounting functioning of extracting enterprises. In considering export efficiency, the foreign trade organizations use as a cost indicator our domestic prices, comparing them against world prices and possible earnings from the sale of imported goods. Considering the acute shortage of any other goods for export, their wishes to increase raw material exports may appear convincing.

On the other hand, raw material producers willingly agreed to increase their production at higher prices, taking into consideration actual production costs. Their demands seem entirely sensible not only from the viewpoint of the theory of price-setting and the currently developed cost accounting relations, but also from the viewpoint of the conservation of nonrecoverable resources, for the more expensive they become, the thriftier their attitude toward them will be.

Is this the case? In a normally operating economy all of this would apply. However, increasing the prices exclusively of raw materials, regardless of the system of existing economic relations and prices, will not yield the desired results. This was clearly proved by the clashes between trade unions and governments as a result of price increases in diesel fuel, electric power and railroad freight tariffs. The solution of this followed the ordinary way of neutralizing the influence of prices on resource conservation through state subsidies to consumers, which does not lead in the least to any efficient utilization of raw materials and energy or to an overall improvement of the economy. The other path is a respective price increase paid by consumers for the goods which, in the absence of competition, makes raw material price increases inefficient and leads to an overall drop in the living standard.

Furthermore, increasing prices of raw materials frees the hands of producers in their efforts to continue their extensive development. A number of enterprises which cannot survive with cost accounting under the old prices could blossom under the new. Is their output needed? This is by no means an invalid question and the most reliable answer to it could be provided by the full market, covering all areas, which could balance need, prices and production costs. Today it is by no means obvious, to say the least, that a simple increase in raw material prices would slow down their production. As is frequently the case, the consequences of this step could yield the opposite results.

New forces have appeared of late, which are tying us still to that same raw material orbit. I am referring to the increasingly loud appeals of enterprises and regions to keep some of their output for their independent export operations. Without engaging in a study of the condition and prospects of raw material markets (which, both now and in the foreseeable future, will remain adverse to exporters), the enterprises have become bewitched by the existing ratios of the purchasing power of the ruble and Western currencies in the areas of electronics, consumer goods and some other commodities. They are amazed at the number of computers, VCRs and clothing which could be purchased in exchange for a few thousand tons of coal, ore, petroleum or cotton.

No question, the Soviet people need clothing and good household goods, and many raw material enterprises need modernization and improved labor conditions. However, this makes it even worse for other working people, who are forced to produce good which are not competitive on the world market but are urgently needed by the country and who invest an equal amount of labor in such work. What could one expect if such demands are met?

To begin with, demands for the right to independent exports speak of above-plan or above-state order percentage of output. Therefore, the aspiration to sell more "by oneself" will in no way contribute to limiting raw material production to sensible limits and, in the immediate future, will worsen national economic disproportions even further.

Second, the marketing of such goods, taking into consideration the specific nature of raw material commodities, and the current and projected condition of the global raw material market, will be significantly less effective than if handled by traditional exporters. Small shipments will require high overhead (above all for transportation), and an excess supply over demand and existence of a number of long-term agreements will force the new sellers to market their goods at lower prices. It is true that under the conditions of a commodity shortage and the already mentioned correlation between the purchasing power of the ruble and the Western currencies, it may be profitable for raw material producers to sell their goods even in that situation. However, the thus stimulated increase in "initiative" exports will lead, in the final account, to an overall drop in global raw material prices, entailing corresponding losses both to the state as well as to the independent exporters. The initial euphoria will soon be replaced by a deep concern caused by growing outlays and declining revenue.

This situation can be explained with the lack of experience in independent economic management on the part of enterprises and imperfect governmental control which is currently manifested through comprehensive licensing. Whereas enterprise exports of finished goods should stimulate improvements in production quality and reduce production costs as a result of increased volumes of output, in the raw material area the opposite trend prevails. In this case the short-term interests of enterprises clearly conflict not only with the interests of the state but also the long-term interests of the enterprises themselves.

Nonetheless, I would not like to question the right of economically independent enterprises to engage in foreign economic activities. It is entirely possible that their coordinated actions, enriched with the necessary skills, collective incentive and experience, may prove to be more efficient than the operations of some of our routine foreign trade monopolists. Taking into consideration the limited capacity of raw material markets, as a rule the foreign trade activities of associated producers could not supplement but replace the least effective foreign trade organizations.

Our economy needs an alternate concept of raw material supplies, according to which we could develop an economic mechanism which would include governmental control measures. Raw material production, we should assume, will play for a long time to come an important role in the national economy. However, perestroyka must be undertaken as of now. The first step should be to make consistent the amount of raw materials produced in the country with the economic possibilities, the ecological potential of the territories and the ability of scientific and technical progress efficiently to compensate for worsening production conditions. Any scarcity of raw materials which may appear in this connection should be surmounted by conservation, reduced losses, efficient use of finished products and other methods.

Furthermore, what kind of scarcity of material resources could there be a question of if there is no real demand for at least one-third of the current domestic output. Some of it settles in the above-norm and unnecessary equipment to enterprises and construction projects, currently worth some 4 billion rubles. The rates themselves are quite flexible, for funded allocation and chronic shortages have led to the accumulation of very high material reserves. In recent years the overall worth of uninstalled equipment has fluctuated on the level of 14 billion rubles. Furthermore, a huge amount of the produced goods is distributed on a coerced-centralized basis, regardless of real needs and is most difficult to keep track of.

Twenty-one percent of consumer ferrous metals is wasted although its use in machine building exceeds the U.S. level by a factor of 1.3 while the overall output is lower by approximately one-third; in other words, the specific structural metal-intensiveness of domestically produced machines and equipment is, on an average, 15 to 20 percent higher than in the United States. If only this entire metal-intensive output could be put to work! Today we have a number of metal-cutting machine tools, approximately as many as in the United States, Japan and France combined. Our production of tractors and grain combines is several hundred percent higher than in the United States. However, neither the amount of machine tools nor that of agricultural machinery has been made consistent with the availability of machine-tool operators and mechanizers and the volume of output to be produced with such equipment. Tractor production has increased by a factor of 17 since 1940, while gross grain harvests and grain crop yields have only doubled. Our metal processing machine fleet, which is the largest in the world, wastes more metal than in the developed countries by a factor of more than 2. Let us add to this our extremely wasteful engines and loss of heat and energy in production processes, for home use and in the transportation system. It would be no exaggeration to say that the volume of inefficiently used and senselessly lost materials and energy would permit the national economy to function for at least 3 months. Including such "hot" reserves is a primary task, which requires decisive organizational measures and an honest and thought-out social policy. We must undertake without delay the closing down and restructuring of enterprises which are bleeding our economy dry and are purposelessly wasting the wealth of the country. In that case we would finally determine our real need for raw materials and fuel.

Freed from the hypnosis of raw material dependence, we could take a different look at importing raw materials. For the time being, major limitations exist here in terms of funds. However, by no means are all opportunities being used. For example, we could as of now lay a foundation for stable foreign procurements of raw materials by organizing vertically integrated (from extraction to the marketing of finished products) mixed enterprises, based on some of our deposits. As they become exhausted, the mixed enterprise could convert to the use of more effective foreign sources of raw materials while continuing to supply the domestic market with finished goods.

Other forms of raw material procurements and the utilization of the country's raw material potential under the new economic circumstances could be suggested as well. Unquestionably, they are bound to show up but only after the elimination of the old stereotypes and once we have become profoundly aware of the aspects of the current situation. As to independence, true independence is that of a country with a high living standard and scientific and technical development, for this alone can ensure meeting the needs of every member of society, regardless of external and internal reasons. The chimerical independence in terms of certain intermediary products can only soothe a twisted patriotic and departmental vaingloriousness but, converted into a self-seeking purpose, could not only push aside real needs but even distort the very concept of such needs.

We should not look far for examples. Many totalitarian regimes were active supporters of this second type of independence. Suffice it to recall Italy's efforts in the 1920s and 1930s, and the efforts made by pre-war Germany to achieve self-sufficiency in most types of products. While the Italians were nonetheless forced to abandon the idea of autarchy, the aspirations of the Nazis found a natural expression in their aggression against other states, a great deal of which was also for the sake of achieving self-sufficiency for the German economy.

Romania is a typical example of contemporary extreme manifestations of the autarchic idea. At the peak of Ceausescu's dictatorship, the dictator's decision to pay off foreign debts was proclaimed. This was accomplished at the cost of drastically curtailing domestic consumption and incredible deprivations by the entire people. After the foreign debt was paid, however, life not only did not become any better but the situation worsened even further, contradictions reached an extreme point and the regime fell.

Obviously, the inclination of totalitarian regimes to autarchy can be largely explained by their unwillingness to depend on the global community. This facilitates the violation of all legal standards and elementary human freedoms. They need independence not in order to achieve a status for the nation and the state, worthy for its own sake, but as one of the prerequisites for illegality. In the struggle for such "independence" the well-being of the people, considerations of the economic management efficiency and other matters related to socioeconomic development are not taken into consideration, for they are not part of the idea of governmental absolutism and, frequently, clash with it. In this case the needs of the people are met on the basis of the residual principle.

In the light of all this, if we go back to the draft platform, I am forced to note a certain inconsistency or even worse—the delayed-action mine built within it. Although claiming that "the party **favors the structural reorganization of the economy** in favor of the consumer sector...," the statement nonetheless ends with a truism which is quite incomprehensible and seemingly innocent: "Nonetheless, we must contemplate the availability of resources for expanded reproduction, without which economic development would inevitably find itself in an impasse." Who would not agree with this? The entire question concerning the structural perestroyka is what volume of such resources do we need, and where and at what cost shall we find them? Without answering this we cannot initiate perestroyka. Having formulated the question thusly, we indicate, by this token, our readiness to accept the latest compromise with the unsinkable departments.

If we intend to build a state turned to man, we must realize that its independence does not consist in the least of self-sufficiency but of the possibility of an active and free choice of partners and forms of international cooperation, unrelated to the need dictated by a difficult economic or social situation. The basic features of such a choice are the fullest possible satisfaction of the needs of the citizens, improving the structure of the economy and increasing the social wealth. In short, in the same way that no "second prime" exists, there be no "inedible" independence, filtered through departmental interests.

Industrial Monopolies and Socialist Competition

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[Article by V. Shteynshleyger, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and doctor of technical sciences, and S. Shteynshleyger, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] How to eliminate obstacles on the way of scientific and technical progress? This question has long excited the public. More than 20 years ago, one of the authors of this article proposed in the central press (IZVESTIYA, 12 August 1966) ways of solving it. Essentially, this involved abolishing the monopoly status of scientific research institutes and design bureaus and converting to economic competition. Although these ideas became quite widespread and were even partially reflected in a party-governmental resolution of the end of the 1960s, neither then nor subsequently were we successful in their implementation.

The problem of monopolies in the USSR is not new: it was discussed in Soviet political economic publications as early as the 1920s. Thus, in 1924 Ye.A. Preobrazhenskiy insisted that "concentrating the country's entire big industry in the hands... of the worker state increases to a tremendous extent the possibility of pursuing, on the basis of such a monopoly, a price policy which will be merely another form of taxation of the private economy." In arguing with Preobrazhenskiy, N.I. Bukharin asked: "what is the result? The monopoly trend **increases**... but does this not lead to an **increased danger of parasitical decay and stagnation**? What is a guarantee **against** such stagnation? ...There is no competition in our country.... Economic managers... are subject to human weaknesses and could slide to a position of **rest**... What is it that moves our production forward? What? Where is the incentive which would **force** (yes, force) any forward motion and would **guarantee** this forward motion? ...Where are the **specific** mechanics and economics of our transitional period?"

In an effort to answer these questions, N.I. Bukharin suggested that the guarantee of progress "is found in the **pressure applied by the broad masses**," which would force "the leading circles of our industry and the state as a whole... to improve, through all possible measures the production process, to expand it and to make it **less expensive**."

Despite the prophetic nature of Bukharin's remarks as to what monopoly could do to the country, although accurate in the general philosophical sense, on the practical level his answer to the basic questions he raised was not specific and did not identify the "characteristic mechanics" which would ensure the "progress... in the economy of our transitional age." This is no accident. Like many party leaders in the postrevolutionary (and subsequent) years, N.I. Bukharin was trapped by a number of theoretical stereotypes (in this case that of competition being

inherent only in capitalism), which V.I. Lenin was so brilliantly able to reject the moment they clashed with practical requirements.

In our view, the proper answer lies in the elimination of all industrial monopolies and the extensive use of competition on the socialist market as a guarantee of progress.

Nonetheless, to this day many components of the administrative-command system remain in the Soviet economy, of which, unfortunately, it is impossible to get rid "as if by magic." This includes the industrial ministries. Their existence, in their present aspect, is a major obstacle to scientific and technical progress.

Let us take as an example the Ministry of Electronic Industry, which does not work any worse than the others but, conversely, is considered among the leading ones. Electronics is the foundation of scientific and technical progress, for which reason it is precisely this ministry that deserves special attention.

The state appropriates substantial funds for the development of electronics, thanks to which, according to official data, this sector has shown quite high growth rates. It employs a big army of highly skilled specialists. Nonetheless, the level of development of electronic equipment in the USSR substantially lags behind foreign developments.

In our view, one of the main reasons for this lag is the lack of competition. The Ministry of Electronic Industry is a huge monopoly which controls the production of virtually all electronic equipment in the country.

This sector's leadership follows a domestic policy of strict specialization by type of output and, in many cases, by variety within a given type, guided in the majority of cases by the "one product-one producer" principle.

We know that specialization is one of the foundations of scientific and technical progress. However, if any item is a monopoly, protected by a supermonopoly, the idea of specialization is taken to a level of absurdity.

Sectorial supermonopoly, as a rule, dictates its own conditions to the numerous customers from other departments, and the latter are forced to accept them.

Let us assume that the customer needs an electronic item whose parameters should be superior to those produced serially. According to the regulations applied by the ministry, having provided accurate references to foreign publications, the customer must prove that he needs an item which is produced abroad, i.e., that there is a foreign analogue. Should the customer "be unlucky," and should any parameters of the required item be superior to items produced abroad, with rare exceptions the development of such an item is rejected. The customer is asked to be satisfied with a serially produced item, the parameters of which are worse, or, at best, the agreement is given of engaging in scientific research, as a result of which the creation of the item is delayed by many years. It is thus that, making use of the "analogue method," a lagging behind global standards is preplanned: that which is invisibly being developed in the laboratories of foreign companies will always be more advanced than the advertised analogues toward which the ministry is oriented.

Yet another substantial negative aspect of monopoly appeared with the conversion of enterprises to cost accounting. The monopoly enterprises tried to protect themselves against possible errors (particularly in the development of new and complex scientific and technical items) and also simply in pursuit of monopoly superprofits, have begun drastically to increase development costs.

The negative socioeconomic consequences of a market monopoly have long been realized by all developed capitalist countries which have also enacted special antimonopoly (antitrust) laws. The purpose of all of them is either to limit or prohibit monopoly activities by individual companies and some types of associations of entrepreneurs who reach agreements among themselves, should such actions lead to a substantial weakening of competition or violations of "normal" market activities.

The purpose of such policies is by no means opposition to any company mergers but is essentially aimed only at "horizontal" mergers, as a result of which enterprises competing on a market unite (i.e., enterprises engaged in the production of identical commodities). Conglomerates (associations of enterprises working in different sectors) are considered legitimate and are even encouraged, for they can increase competition.

Quite instructive, in a number of respects, is the example of the use of antitrust legislation, provided by the worldwide known company American Telephone and Telegraph (ATT).

At the start of the 1980s, in accordance with the antitrust laws, the company was broken up into dozens of independent companies performing roughly similar work and, therefore, with the possibility of competing among each other (the largest among them kept the name ATT). Such a division proved to be quite fruitful and was positively rated by the public: competition forced the companies to "use their wits faster," which resulted in the appearance of a number of substantial innovations (such as a fiber optic transatlantic underwater cable, which sharply increased the information capacity of this important line of communications). Something of particular importance to the consumer was that the cost of services in communications declined while their range increased.

In order to surmount the adverse effect of industrial monopolies on scientific and technical progress in our country, it is necessary, above all, to create a number of independent scientific and engineering companies, concerns and scientific-production associations (including plants manufacturing serial products) of the "horizontal" type, which can compete with each other. Their

autonomy should be combined with a limited economic regulation of their economic activities by the government through taxes, state orders, bank loans and financing out of special funds of priority scientific research and development of national importance, on a competitive basis.

As foreign experience indicates, structures of the conglomerate type (such as, including the head company in the development and manufacturing of finished goods and subcompanies which develop and produce complementing systems and goods) is a very efficient type of association. Such intersectorial associations are capable of solving major and difficult scientific and technical problems.

With a far-sighted scientific and technical policy, motivated by competition and trying to use the latest achievements of science, such an association would develop applied research and investigation. The rich material resources available to the large intersectorial associations offer greater opportunities to this effect (at the present time monopoly departments are frequently not interested in research).

The example of that same ATT is indicative in this respect. Basic research conducted in its laboratories led to the invention of the transistor, which made a true revolution in electronics. This work was awarded the Nobel Prize. Important discoveries in the field of "pure" science were made in the course of applied experimental research, such as the radio noise emanations from the galaxy, which led to the development of a new science—radioastronomy. The discovery of the very weak electromagnetic noise radiation isotopically originating from the universe and described as "relic," are among the greatest achievements in modern astrophysics. This example indicates how right P.L. Kapitsa was, by claiming that the classification of science into basic and applied should be largely considered artificial.

Therefore, the target is the socialist market in which a multiplicity of independent associations and enterprises manufacturing industrial commodities function under competitive conditions. Competition has forced them to produce precisely that which society demands and has made it necessary for the companies to pursue inventions ("their own" as well as "from the outside"), rather than to reject innovations and their authors, as is comprehensively the case currently, under the conditions of a lack of interest on the part of the enterprises. This would ensure real scientific and technical progress. It will no longer be necessary to appeal "for equating the best world models," for the system of socialist competition itself will motivate the enterprises to outstrip such models. It is only by launching competition within the country that we could rely on a broad international market.

What steps should be taken to reach this ideal situation? In addition to the development of a market infrastructure, in our view another efficient step would be the closing down of monopolistic industrial ministries as they are today, above all relieving them of their command functions for, as was emphasized at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the absence of radical changes in the functions of the ministries hindered the establishment of progressive production structures in the basic units and, above all, held back the increased efficiency of their work. That is why formulating the new concept concerning ministries and departments, which would take into consideration changes in their role and functions, is one of the primary tasks of the Supreme Soviet.

Nor should we postpone the solution of the problem of restructuring the enterprises, for otherwise an unwise organizational system of specialization would yield no competition. Such a reorganization can be achieved through several methods.

The first (used in American antimonopoly legislation) is a "split:" a big enterprise which assumes a monopoly status in its area is subdivided into several parts, which are independent companies able to compete with each other.

In the case of smaller enterprises, another method could be applied, conventionally described as "grafting." It means the following: let us assume that two specialized enterprises are engaged in the development and production of goods for different purposes (products A and products B) but, as is frequently the case, share a certain common scientific and technical base. In such a case, a certain percentage of type A developments is transferred from the first to the second enterprise, which develops type B goods, and vice versa. As a result, the enterprises acquire the possibility of competing between themselves without increasing the overall number of workers or engaging in substantial financial outlays.

Finally, the third method is diversification: with a favorable influence of competition, on their own initiative, several enterprises will begin to develop a new item and thus compete with traditional producers. Practical experience will introduce its changes in these systems. However, said steps must be carried out before the ministries have been reorganized.

In our view, these problems must become the subject of a detailed consideration by the respective USSR Supreme Soviet commissions. As soon as possible we must draft special antimonopoly legislation which would ensure efficient and honest competition among scientific and technical companies on the socialist market.

We believe that it is precisely in a socialist society that the possibility exists of providing conditions for a company, which may have lost in a competitive struggle, to adopt the experience of the winning company. Naturally, their relations should be economically mutually profitable. The law on monopolies and competition should, on the one hand, obligate the "winner" to share his experience with the "loser;" on the other, it should make this process economically profitable.

Socialist competition should have a more humane and democratic nature compared to the capitalist. The economic possibility of achieving this is related to the fact that the real (and not barracks) socialism allows every person maximally to display his capabilities and, as Lenin thought, to create conditions for achieving a labor productivity higher than under capitalism.

We believe that competition will enable us to eliminate many of the faults of our economy and lead to the acceleration of the saturation of the socialist market with high quality goods.

On Simple Solutions to Difficult Problems. The 1947 Monetary Reform

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[Article by Yu. Aksenov, candidate of historical sciences, and A. Ulyukayev, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] **"I witnessed the 1947 monetary reform in the USSR (there are still many eyewitnesses) and I can testify to its benefit to the Soviet people. Indeed, there were so-called 'Decembrists' (the reform was carried out in December 1947), who were criminally prosecuted, but with the elimination of the tremendous mass of counterfeit and stolen money, it became somewhat easier for the simple person to live." E. Valiyev, candidate of economic sciences, invalid of the Great Patriotic War.**

"The postwar monetary reform is very strongly imprinted in my mind. At the time, I worked at a plant and lost almost all my, to put it bluntly, insignificant savings, earned through difficult labor.

Now, many are talking and writing about monetary reform, yet I always think: I could not survive on beans again. After all, the swindlers and various shady dealers have probably dealt with their own money long ago." G. Petrenko, labor veteran

These are extreme viewpoints from the letters to KOMMUNIST. Why is there such a difference in assessments from people who know of the 1947 monetary reform not from books, so to speak, and who did not learn its dialectics from Zverev and Malafeyev (authors of well-known works devoted to problems of the history of Soviet finances and price-setting), but from their personal experience? Is this a consequence of the historical distance of events and natural human forgetfulness? Or is it normal pluralism: so many people, so many opinions? Or, let us apply the class approach here: the reform was advantageous for some strata, and not for others—it is these who condemn it?

Let us not be hasty in answering. We rush too much toward assessments and recommendations, simplifying problems and the ways of solving them. Let us not rush. Let us investigate.

If we speak of problems of financial improvement and stabilization of the consumer market, these "simple" solutions often are a monetary reform (by which is meant an exchange of money according at rates, differentiated depending, first, on the quantity of money being exchanged and, second, on its cash or non-cash form) and the introduction of an universal rationing system while keeping socially low prices.

In mythicized consciousness, monetary reform and the administrative freezing or even reduction of prices are considered patented and painless anti-inflation measures. One of the most popular arguments in favor of such schemes is the appeal to the experience of the 1947 monetary reform, which is often presented as a triumph of economic policy aimed at raising the well-being of the population.

We are far from using only black paint, just because the events being described relate to Stalin and Stalinism. The economic measures of that time must be evaluated not only from the viewpoint of our present-day knowledge, but also in the specific historical and economic context. The 1947 reform was conducted under conditions of postwar ruin, the over-filling of the national economy with devalued money (during the war the monetary mass in circulation increased by approximately a factor of 4) and, therefore, was objectively necessary and inevitable.

An acute inflationary situation characterized many countries, which left the war with disordered finances, and even economies in general. Therefore, monetary reforms and conversion to non-rationed trade in 1946-1949 were carried out in England, France, Germany, Austria, Italy and other countries.

The paces of carrying out reform, its methods, readiness, etc., are another matter. Against the background of the reform in West European states, the hastiness and insufficient development of our 1947 reform shows clearly. Perhaps, the main shortcoming of its program was the hypertrophy of the political propaganda component. It was necessary to prove that the main concern of a socialist state, even one which suffered the greatest losses in the world war, was its concern for the well-being of its people. Repeal of the rationing system, monetary reform, and the subsequent price reductions supposedly confirmed the reality of the advantages of the socialist, planned system of economic management in economic competition with capitalism.

Moreover, taking into account that among all the great fighting powers, the Soviet Union was the first to revoke the rationing of the population's food supply (in France, for example, the ration cards, revoked immediately after the war, were re-introduced in 1946), the propagandistic significance of this action was tremendous.

Its economic and, even more so, social consequences were more complex. For example, it is known that one direct consequence of the reform was the increase in state subsidies for industry, since the annual sum of

salaries grew significantly. While preserving the former wholesale prices, the production cost was raised. The state budget suffered greater losses. Whereas in 1944, the subsidies comprised 0.81 billion rubles, in 1945 they amounted to 13.9 billion, in 1947—already 34.1, and in 1948—45.2 billion rubles (in the prices of the time). Only after raising wholesale prices for the means of production and the tariffs on trade transportation in 1949 did state subsidies for industry begin to decline.

However, we cannot say that the economic result of the reform was only a myth. The complete derangement of the monetary and financial system basically was overcome successfully. However, it is necessary to take into account that this was achieved not only and not such much by the reconstruction measures, as by general economic processes: the successful postwar restoration of the economy and the conversion of military industry. As a result, a significant increase began in the supply of consumer output and in the resources for its production, and on the other hand, there was a reduction in the demand from the army and related spheres of production.

The financial improvement was also to a great extent achieved due to the fact that, with an overall reduction of state (above all, military) outlays, a substantial increase in incomes was ensured. Where did the incomes come from? From the countryside. The measures for economic, including tax and extra-economic compulsion, combined with the ban on the peasants against leaving their places of residence and work (after all, the peasantry was still the numerically largest social stratum) made it possible to ensure an increase in incomes. Moreover, the second half of the 1940s was also a second wind for the system of compulsory labor, an increase in the number of imprisoned workers, and the somewhat successful attempts to achieve a large yield from economic utilization of them.

However, as far as the reform's orientation toward ensuring the growth of the population's well-being is concerned, this is pure fiction. The 1947 reform, like any such restrictive measure, including those being proposed now, was socially severe and painful.

Could it have been different? Most likely, in terms of quantity. That is, it would have been painful, but not as painful. In carrying out anti-inflation measures, it is generally impossible to avoid social difficulties, but they can be lessened significantly through well-considered preparations.

The USSR Council of Ministers and VKP(b) Central Committee resolution of 14 December 1947, "On Conducting a Monetary Reform and Revoking Ration Cards for Food and Manufactured Goods," based the need for reform on the following: the population's monetary reserve, which had swelled unusually ("money-boxes"), did not conform to the possibilities for commodity supply; there was a mass of counterfeit money, issued during the fascist occupation; there was a difference in the rationed and the commercial prices for food and manufactured goods.

It is interesting that the arguments of the supporters of monetary reform in its administrative-populist form are the same even now: the surplus of money in the hands of the population, the "dirty" money of dealers, the significant gap between state retail and commercial prices.

The 1947 reform was also attractive to supporters of "simple solutions," in that it essentially was not a reform of monetary circulation, but simply a restriction of money, above all, cash. Money was exchanged at a rate of 10 to 1. Deposits in savings banks were exchanged at different rates: sums of up to 3,000 rubles—1:1, from three to 10,000—3:2, and above 10,000—2:1, and state bonds were exchanged at a rate of 3:1. The bank deposits of kolkhozes and cooperatives were exchanged at a rate of 5:4. It was believed that this was a blow against "speculative elements" and that as a result of the reform the working people would even gain.

The simplicity, clarity, seemingly radical nature, and popularity of a reform of the 1947 type remain attractive for many people. Today, just like 42 years ago, ordinary consciousness to a great extent is guided by the myth that only a restrictive monetary reform offers an alternative to the rationing system under conditions of surplus money in circulation and powerful pressure of demand. The temptation to attribute inflationary difficulties to the "economic enemies of the people" is also great: at that time, these took the form of speculators, and today the are the corrupt apparatchiks, cooperative workers and the infamous "Soviet millionaires."

However, the trouble is that restrictive administrative measures do not distinguish the "clean" or "unclean" money of working people from the money of dealers. The 1947 monetary reform struck a painful blow against the most skilled workers—the workers of the highest ranks, the technical intelligentsia, as well as those employed in heavy and dangerous industries where elevated pay rates were in effect, and in agriculture, where savings rarely took the form of deposits in savings banks. The reductions concerned, above all, precisely the accumulations of these people, which basically were available in cash. On the whole throughout the country, an "overwhelmingly" small part of the working people had deposits in savings banks, and the amount of deposits was rather insignificant relative to current incomes. By our estimates, the sum of deposits was less than the annual wage fund for workers and employees by a factor of approximately 14-15 (for comparison: today these values are nearly identical). Accumulations for significant (of course, by then standards) purchases basically took the form of cash. According to USSR Gosbank data, in 1947 only about 15 percent of the population's monetary accumulations were in savings accounts. The rest was in cash. (Today this share has reached 75 percent.)

How do we explain the privileged exchange rate for deposits in savings accounts? As the interests of the working people? However, the working people used cash on hand to a far greater extent. Then, perhaps, by the need to rapidly and simply put demand in conformity with supply? This is far closer to the truth. In a market situation, cash-in-hand has far more pressure on demand. Therefore, it was necessary to cut back precisely it. It was curtailed. The pressure of savings deposits was less by an order of magnitude. Therefore, the treasury's gain from their privileged exchange turned out to be relatively small, but the propagandistic gain in the sense of the reform's orientation toward preserving the interests of the working people and striking out against dealers was considerable.

The real shadow dealers rapidly converted a large share of their incomes into gold, valuables, antiques, etc., and therefore did not suffer too much from the administrative sanctions. After all, the secrecy and suddenness of the measures that were implemented were not secret or sudden for everyone. As A.G. Zverev, the USSR Minister of Finances at the time, recalls: "The documents on the reform, drafted beforehand, were sent out to local areas, to rayon centers at the same time, addressed to the institutions of the state security agencies in special packages with the inscription: 'Open only upon receiving special instructions.'" "However," he writes, "the curiosity of individual local associates outweighed official duty. The packages were opened prematurely."

There is also evidence that certain employees of party, soviet, economic, and law enforcement agencies in local areas, on the eve of the reform having learned of its conditions, either managed with lightening speed to convert significant sums of cash into commodities, or converted them to savings and divided large deposits in savings banks into several small ones (in order to ensure exchange at the privileged rate). For example, such cases were reported in letters from the working people of Kaluga and Vitebsk Oblasts to the VKP(b) Central Committee Secretariat

In his letter, Comrade Sidornik from Lvov reported to the USSR Minister of Finances that many party, soviet and economic employees before the reform had purchased gold and valuable items and had put large sums into savings accounts. Even on 21 December, influential bureaucrats were making back-dated deposits (the reform was carried out in the night from 14 to 15 December—author). On the black market, money of the old issue was purchased (one ruble was worth 50 kopeks).

Cases of abuses, speculation, mass purchase of goods, feverish manipulations with state bonds, the transfer of huge amounts into savings accounts, the use of the services of substitute persons for this, as well as the registration of back-dated deposits, etc., etc., were cited by hundreds of correspondents to the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, Gosbank and the Ministry of Finances of the time. Their geography is broad: from Vladivostok to Riga, from Batum to Arkhangelsk, from Dzhambul to Leningrad. All regions of the country were represented. However, possibly, these are the especially subjective claims of idle philistines? However, the long list of orders in the State Bank, establishing the violations and abuses by workers in the savings bank and in local departments of Gosbank (basically, the registration of back-dated deposits), fully corresponds to them. Thus, on 15 December the manager of the Yenakiyev branch of Gosbank received deposits of 20,000 rubles each from the secretary of the local KP(b)U gorkom and the city soviet executive committee chairman, having registered them as received on 13 December (i.e., a day before the reform). What is more, there were many such orders.

Analysis of information on the dynamics of deposits to savings accounts in November-December 1947, contained in the report notes of the Minister of Finances A. Zverev to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, I. Stalin, is interesting.

In Moscow before the end of November 1947 (when rumors of a monetary reform began to inflate), 7-8 million rubles were placed in savings accounts daily and approximately just as much as was withdrawn by depositors. The balance was preserved. The panic began on 28 November. The volume of savings bank monetary operations (the sum of receipts and payments) on 28 November increased by roughly a factor of 3 as compared to the usual. On the 29th, it increased by a factor of 7, on the 30th—already by a factor of 10! Processes of such a scale were also observed in Leningrad (the growth of circulation by day, respectively, was roughly by a factor of 4, 7 and 9) and other large cities, for which data was collected.

At first, it basically, so to speak, played at reduction. Significantly more was withdrawn from accounts than deposited. In 4 days, the remainders of deposits in Moscow savings banks was reduced by 90 million rubles (about 3.6 percent of their overall sum). This is probably explained by the fact that, in the first stage of near-reform commotion, rumors spread only on the denominations of money, and therefore people tried to convert them into goods, removing money from their accounts for this. Information on the privileged exchange of deposits in savings banks had not yet spread at that time. This corresponds well to the evidence of eyewitnesses: by the beginning of December, the manufactured goods stores of Moscow were completely empty.

From the 1st of December, when stores were already empty, the second stage of development of events began: the sum of receipts began to exceed the sum of withdrawals. The excess grew with every day, and the overall volume of circulation in savings banks remained approximately at the peak level achieved at the end of November. Evidently, we can link the leakage of information on the privileged exchange of money in savings bank accounts to this date. A massive break-up of deposits into smaller parts began. The fact that basically

large deposits (92 percent of them were over 3,000 rubles) went into movement draws attention.

As of 30 November, the purchase of state bonds by the population had also begun (their exchange for new ones was conducted at the privileged rate of 3:1). On 2 days alone (30 November and 1 December), the Moscow savings banks sold 1938 bonds for 14.4 million rubles net, i.e., they sold them for 22.3 million, but had purchased them for 7.9 million.

The waves of speculative commotion spread throughout the country in surprising synchronization. As of 30 November, a positive balance in circulation of savings banks in many large cities was achieved and continued to grow rapidly. On the 30th in Gorkiy, it comprised 423,000 rubles, and on 1 December—already 1,922,000, in Kiev—15 and 828, respectively, and in Rostov—1,995,000 and 3,409,000.

It is also interesting to analyze the monthly dynamics of deposits to savings banks. In October 1947, the balance was negative (withdrawals exceeded deposits) in all republics except Georgia, Lithuania and Moldavia. Overall, the population's deposits "shrank" by 280.7 million rubles (or by 1.7 percent). In November, the process of appearance of a positive balance gradually began (everywhere except the RSFSR, where as before the tendency to withdraw and convert money into goods was maintained).

To make up for this, at the start of December the situation changed radically. In all republics, a tempestuous influx of money into savings banks began, the balance became positive, and how! In the first 8 days alone, the increase in deposits was 1,271 million rubles (!), or 7.7 percent. The influx of money the next week was approximately the same. Thus, in the 2 weeks before the reform, deposits to savings banks grew by 2.5 billion rubles—more than 15 percent.

Yet, after the "night of reform," when the deposits that had grown so rapidly were exchanged at the privileged rate, the reverse process of converting them into cash began immediately. In Moscow, in the 3 days from 18 to 20 December, the sum of deposits decreased by 22 million rubles (1.2 percent), in Leningrad—by 14.9 million (1.7 percent), in Sverdlovsk—by 3.1 million (2 percent), in Novosibirsk—by 3.3 million (2.9 percent), and in Tbilisi—by 6.5 million (3.8 percent). That is, broad-scale speculative fever, somewhat similar to the exchange game of first increasing, then decreasing deposits, was a fact. Understandably, it was scarcely the rank-and-file workers, kolkhoz workers and employees who participated in this and profited from this hand, but, first, very wealthy people, and second, the well-informed.

Is it possible by way of such purely restrictive measures for revoking the ration system to ensure the growth or even stability of the population's standard of living? The propaganda of the day answered this question in the affirmative. The second part of the above-mentioned resolution ascertains the necessity and possibility of revoking the standard rationing system by the Soviet state for purposes of raising the well-being of the people.

However, in this regard, the prices for many mass consumer goods, including clothing, shoes, and knitted goods increased significantly, compared to ration prices. Let us note that beforehand, in September 1946, the ration prices for food products were raised. Then the contingent included in the ration system was sharply reduced. As a result, according to data from the VKP(b) Central Committee apparatus, the "number of the population being supported in rural areas was reduced from 27 million to 4 million, i.e., by 23 million. In cities and workers' settlements, 3.5 million non-working adult dependents were removed from rationed supply of bread. Moreover, due to putting the ration system in order and eliminating abuses in the issue of ration cards, 500,000 ration cards were revoked in the cities. As a result, the contingent of the population supplied with rationed bread in October was set at no more than 60 million people, instead of the 87 million who were in the state supply system in the month of September... Thus, the outlay of bread in the ration system was reduced by 30 percent."

Understandably, this pursued the same goal: weakening the pressure of demand, bringing it somewhat into conformity with supply. However, even these strongly effective means were insufficient for solving this problem within the framework of the entire country or even of a significant part of it. Therefore, extremely limited zones of saturation of the consumer market were created, which performed the functions of political and propagandistic "visual aids."

It was necessary to win the race no matter what: Who will more rapidly inform the city and the world that for its people the war has ended?

Demonstrations of Moscow (and in part, Leningrad) shops and store windows after 14 December 1947 could have been a kind of second victory parade. This time, the victory was not only over Germany, but the entire Western world. In England, France, Italy and Austria, the same attempts to revoke the ration card system failed and rationing was preserved, but in the Soviet Union—triumphant success.

Yet, how was the abundance of the capital shops and store windows ensured? On 29 November 1947, a special resolution was passed by the USSR Council of Ministers, No 3902, "On the Creation of Unreduced Reserves for Trade Without Ration Cards in the Cities of Moscow and Leningrad." According to this resolution, at the moment of reform they planned to export from other regions, store items in warehouses and prepare for trade without ration cards: in Moscow, there were 500 tons of soap, in Leningrad—200, and henceforth accordingly: vegetable fats—2,000 and 800 tons, sugar—2,000 and 1,000, meat—10,000 and 3,000, sausage—300 and 150, butter—500 and 200, cheese—300 and 150, tea—200

and 75, flour—65,000 and 25,000, cereal grains—11,000 and 5,000, macaroni—500 and 300, fish—5,000 and 1,500 tons, etc.

The supply situation in other cities was far more difficult.

In January 1948, the VKP(b) Central Committee apparatus prepared information addressed to Central Committee secretaries A.A. Zhdanov, A.A. Kuznetsov, M.A. Suslov and G.M. Popov, stating: "The workers and toiling people and servicemen report that in certain regions and cities there is essentially no open trade either in food products or manufactured goods. The issue of produce and bread is strictly rationed, and bread is often given only to workers: dependents and children either do not get any at all, or it is issued in a far smaller quantity. In many stores, passes and ration books have been introduced, and an armed guard is placed at the entrance to the store. Closed stores are kept for officials..." From Dzhambul Oblast: "The situation with bread here is bad. One must stand in line for 1.5-2 days. In general, you can either work or get bread. It is as follows: one person must work, the other must get bread." From Belgorod: "Will we go hungry for long? Today, for the sixth day in a row, my wife stood in the bread line since 2:00 o'clock at night and until 10:00 in the morning, but, alas, she came home without bread all 6 days... For an entire city with a population of 20,000 people, they are bringing only 500-600 kilograms of bread to the stores."

This situation is explained by the fact that the conversion to the non-rationed sale of food was not prepared for (with the exception of Moscow and Leningrad) by an accumulation of the necessary commodity reserves, and conversely, the creation of reserves in the capital cleaned out provincial warehouses and storerooms. Therefore, solvent demand, even substantially reduced by restrictive measures, so exceeded supply that in fact the rationing system was secretly restored in the form of lists, quantitative restrictions, ration booklets and enormous lines. The difference, however, lay in the fact that the prices for many products were now higher than under the revoked "legal" ration card system. Essentially, a situation had taken shape which linked ration card restrictions to commercial trade prices.

In addition to this, instead of the orderly nature of the official rationing system, universally chaotic and uncertain efforts at direct distribution, bearing the nature of obvious arbitrariness, appeared. It is clear that precisely the working people suffered greatly from this. Conditions for food speculation improved.

Here are examples of these direct distribution methods: in the city of Kholopenichi, Minsk Oblast, instead of ration cards, the rayon trade center introduced lists with limited norms for the issue of bread and all food products. The bread ration for workers was 500 grams, for dependents—100 grams. People in the city of Shakhty, Rostov Oblast reported: "The miners are receiving less bread than under the ration card system. Special passes to the store have been issued. They are bringing in very little bread and it is not enough even for those who are registered." From Konstantinovka, Donetsk Oblast: "There is a breakdown in the trade of bread. The stores have tremendous lines, people are standing long into the night. When the store opens, a crush begins and half-dead people are carried out of the crowd. In the lines, people shout: Give us ration cards."

In the kolkhoz countryside, life was even harder. We have hundreds of documents proving their mass hunger and dystrophia in 1947.

In 1948, the situation did not improve, the requisitioning of agricultural produce continued, and the incomes of kolkhoz workers were strictly limited. This contributed to a certain slowing in inflationary processes and created prerequisites for the celebrated price reductions, but only at the expense of worsening the position, already impoverished without this, of the kolkhoz countryside.

In such a circumstance, the "reformed" economy could not get by without extra-economic compulsory labor and new administrative actions, the next of which was the passing of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 2 June 1948, "On the Settlement in Remote Regions of Persons, Maliciously Evading Labor Activity in Agriculture and Leading an Anti-social, Parasitic Way of Life." In practice, this was expressed in the persecution of peasants actively working in personal plots ("spongers," "speculators" and "parasites" in the lexicon of the time).

Later they tried to base financial policy on tightening the administrative screws on the much-suffering kolkhoz peasantry. However, with the absence of economic incentives for labor, the alienation of laborers from ownership, and the extremely low productivity of forced, technically under-equipped labor, it was impossible to amass the financial and material resources needed for the real support of price reductions. Indeed, there was no longer anywhere left to tighten the screws.

The following element draws attention to itself when studying the documented evidence of that time. Positive assessments of the revocation of the ration card system, given in letters from working people, as a rule, are of a general, official nature, while at the same time the dissatisfaction with these measures is specific, directly related to the everyday problems of the Soviet people. This is obvious even in the diction and style of the letters: in one case—smooth and nearly identical phrases and formulas, in the other—untidy, inconsistent stories. It is logical to assume that the positive in the reform was read in the newspapers and heard from propagandists, while the negative came from personal experience of living conditions.

Understandably, popular criticism of the reform did not and could not suggest anything beyond the framework of its principles and approaches. The people merely wanted these principles and approaches not only to be declared,

but also implemented in practice. However, the point is that these in no way conformed to the real economic situation of the country.

Thus, numerous cases indicated that in the post-reform period a significant reduction in the real standard of living of the working people had occurred, especially of large families. This was related, first, to the restriction of their cash savings; second, to raising the average ration prices for food and other goods of prime necessity; third, to the shortage of commodity reserves, which arose after the official revocation of ration cards, to the total and extremely acute scarcity; and fourth, to the disorganization and chaos of the entire system for supply of consumer goods.

Nonetheless, after all, there is something that makes the 1947 model of monetary reform attractive, coloring many eyewitness recollections with a rosy hue. This includes not only the recollections of capital residents, but also of provincial, albeit only urban residents. How can this be explained?

In our opinion, the ruling regime at that time developed its own perfected social mechanisms, in any case, from the viewpoint of achieving political and ideological goals, these were mechanisms with a very high coefficient of useful political and ideological effect. That is, with a minimum of financial and material outlays, they ensured the maximum satisfaction with the regime and support for it.

What is its essence? First, the politically influential part of the population is singled out. Second, the markets for precisely this part are selectively filled. This includes the workers of large industrial enterprises and bureaucrats in the administrative party apparatus. We have already disclosed how the selective filling of the model "display" shelves, where "cheeses are not stale,.. prices are reduced," was ensured for the politically supportive (capital) detachment. Consumption for the provincial detachment was supported basically not through state trade, for which, we repeat, no reserves had been created, but via the city kolkhoz market. In reality, it was saturated and, mainly, it was cheap. For the basic food assortment, its prices were

SOCIAL PRIORITIES

The Type of Employment We Need

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[Text] Not many people would be reassured by the widespread concept that we shall not allow the existence of unemployment. Based on personal experience, many people are realizing that even the absence of mass unemployment in society does not mean total absence of other employment problems. However, an awareness of the comprehensive nature of such problems and the social, economic, ideological and political aspects intertwined with them, have resulted in a nihilism of a new type: allegedly, today society is not ready for radical reforms in the labor area, on the theoretical, practical or psychological levels. To begin with, many people believe, we must introduce order in matters of ownership, territorial autonomy and many other basic problems and only then undertake to resolve problems of the second echelon, one of which is population employment.

The illusion that problems related to ensuring employment are less important has sunk roots not only in the minds of ordinary people. For example, the government's report to the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies did not consider it important enough to describe the approaches to the strategy and tactics of meeting the population's need for jobs as a whole and for the individual stages of the economic reform. Nor do we find an accurate presentation of them in the social program for the 13th 5-Year Plan. The congress' resolution, which was passed after the debates on the report were completed, notes, it is true, the need to draft this year a law on population employment. However, the target concepts for the development of the social area for the next 5 years, as defined in the document, do not even mention full employment or the sociolegal protection of the citizens in the labor area.

Paying less attention to this problem could have been forgiven had our employment been indeed full and had we had a mechanism for maintaining its high social and economic efficiency. Is such the case?

Shortage With Surplus

The existence of profound and widening problems and contradictions is obvious to the overwhelming majority of specialists who have soberly evaluated the present employment conditions. Many of them are the "birthmarks" of the period of stagnation. However, some of them openly surfaced during perestroyka as well. On the surface, the entire variety of contradictions is manifested in the coexistence of three seemingly mutually exclusive phenomena. The first among the problems of jobs, which was quite extensively discussed as early as the 1970s, is the shortage of cadres which, in time, became chronic. The topic of the shortage of jobs has been quite well studied, for which reason at this point it makes no sense to plunge into the study of its reasons and consequences. Let us merely emphasize that, entirely consistent with the then practiced resource approach, the "cadre hunger" was most frequently considered not through the lens of the interests of the individual, who neither wanted nor could fill a vacancy, but on the basis of the principle that if such a vacancy exists, we must mandatorily find someone to fill it.

The aspiration to turn the economy toward man may also possibly change the approach to the scarcity of

manpower. The problem itself, however, continues to irk economic managers. According to information provided by employment authorities (hardly complete), there are as many as 1.5 million vacancies in the national economy. Unofficial estimates show that the number of vacancies is several hundred percent higher. Importing manpower is even resorted to increasingly, in order to cope with the "cadre hunger." Many people believe this problem to be the most important. Characteristic, in particular, is the view of V. Buynovskiy, USSR State Committee for Labor deputy chairman, who claims that "it is still too early to speak of unemployment, for we are unable to supply the enterprises with their required labor resources."

Although we agree that such a problem does exist, it would be nonetheless rash to deny something else: in our country manpower shortage coexists with an obvious manpower surplus. This applies not only to industry (where the manpower surplus equals approximately 10 million people). The fact that in a number of parts of the country (Central Asia, for instance) there is rural overpopulation and there is unemployment has become an officially acknowledged fact. V. Kolosov, head of the Labor Resources and Employment Administration of that same USSR State Committee for Labor, has quoted expert evaluations, according to which "forced unemployment" (to use his terminology) affects 5 to 6 million people in the country, including 1.5-2 million "temporarily unemployed."

A situation in which a job surplus coexists with manpower surplus is not characteristic of our country alone but of other countries as well. Let us look at the example of Switzerland. At the turn of the 1980s, there were two vacancies per unemployed worker. The number of registered unemployed at any given time was approximately 6,000. The explanation is that the available manpower and available jobs are structurally noncoincidental. Under our conditions, when territorial mobility is being restrained by residency permits, the structural disharmony could indeed duplicate the Swiss precedent, but on a different scale.

Unemployment, whatever its varieties (fortunately, for the time being it is not mass unemployment but, unfortunately, nor is it infrequent) is only part of a socially undesirable unemployment. Let us single out as an example the criminogenic aspect: today the number of people without fixed residence and of professional criminals numbers into the millions.

Paradoxical though it may seem, neither job vacancies nor unemployed manpower have prevented us from achieving an overall level of employment close to the demographic limit. Almost 92 percent of the able-bodied population in our country either work or attend school. This is based on the country's balance of labor resources which, it is true, does not include the jobless while the numbers of the other groups of unemployed population are distorted. Such a high indicator gives grounds for claiming that full population employment has allegedly been achieved and that the main task is to maintain it. Major changes in this area could only disturb the balance and lead to unemployment.

As we can see, each one of those enumerated but by no means complete varieties of the problem of unemployment have their supporters, who consider this to be precisely the main problem, if not in the long term at least in the immediate future. Such a selective approach to a most complex socioeconomic phenomenon is quite dangerous. It is fraught with absolutizing partial measures of desperation and ignoring measures of strategic significance. Throughout our history we have repeatedly had the opportunity to see the way exceptional steps eventually convert into "perennial" measures. Today as well, the concern for "surplus people" threatens to trigger a hasty reaction, such as paying unemployment compensations and a cosmetic reorganization of the employment service as the only alternative for the elimination of accumulated contradictions. Once again we are trying to correct the consequences without bothering with identifying and eliminating the profound reasons for negative phenomena.

Could it be that, indeed, it is still too early to sound the alarm, for so far contradictions in the labor area have not become the clear reason for serious mass conflicts? In our view, it would be better not to tempt fate. The specifics of employment are such that any delay or partial change could turn either into insufficiently profound perestroyka processes aimed at preserving social stability, or else into a high cost to society. This can be easily seen by imagining the consequences of any real conversion to enterprise and territorial independence, in which major changes in manpower dynamics and the laying off of people by cost accounting enterprises become inevitable. A rigid course charted toward economic efficiency of each individual job could turn into mass unemployment on the regional and all-Union levels. Aid for forced unemployment would hardly eliminate the aggravation of the social tension and prevent an open confrontation and worsening of the sociopolitical and economic crises. In that case, if we try to restrain the release and, consequently, if we hinder the growth of economic efficiency, the pace of the reform would be lost and regaining it would become exceptionally difficult. The resolution of the crisis would be delayed or, something which is not excluded, the crisis may worsen even further. Therefore, is it worth it to us, as in the past, to intensify the conflicts and test the strength of an already tired society?

In such rather complex conditions, it would be better to address ourselves to the solution of a problem new to us: ensuring full population employment but in such a way that labor becomes economically expedient at each job. In what direction should we make our changes?

Based on the Principles of Voluntary Participation and Free Choice

In our view, the main strategic slogan of the reform in the employment area should be identical to the basic

idea of perestroyka in society as a whole. This means an orientation toward universal human values, real democracy, and acknowledging the priority of individual interests. By supporting such a position, the first basic problem which must be solved is that of voluntary and coercive labor. In this case, I believe, we should proceed from the following: priority in the right to choose between participation and nonparticipation in public labor should belong to the person himself; the area of social labor in a democratic society should be considered one of the equal and equally accessible areas of socially useful activity as is the case with the raising of children, schooling, recreation, household work, etc. There should be only one reason for eliminating voluntary unemployment: having an illegal source of means of existence.

It makes no sense to clash with the opponents of the voluntary nature of labor. Let us merely emphasize that our country is virtually the only one in which the universality of labor is considered a legal obligation. However, this does not rescue society from undesirable unemployment and a rising crime rate.

Another fundamental principle in the future democratic system of employment, we believe, is to work wherever and as much as is necessary to the individual. It is above all a question of choosing a measure of labor, i.e., a system of employment and work favorable to everyone (taking into account the real possibilities as well). Steady, partial, temporary, and sporadic employment, moonlighting, and flexible working hours are by no means the full list of opportunities which must be equally accessible to every citizen, regardless of sex or any other characteristics. An equally essential aspect of a freely chosen employment is the right to an unrestricted choice of profession and area of work in any economic sector, distinguished by the form of ownership (including individual labor). Finally, it is very important to single out the freedom of choosing a geographic location for the application of one's labor (in this context the question inevitably arises of residential permit and housing availability, which are a separate topic the discussion of which, we believe, is also timely).

Naturally, when we speak of a freely chosen employment, we should not equate it simply with the personal expression of the wish of the citizens. Objective restrictions have always existed and will exist. Therefore, what we have in mind is not the right to assume that society has the obligation to meet the wish of every individual, but the right as a possibility of meeting such an obligation. If a person intends to become a member of a cooperative, or engage in private business or in farming, society should not erect on his way any legal obstacles. However, whether an individual becomes a farmer will depend on his personal qualities and on whether there is a social need for a new manager of the land, manifested in the demand for manpower.

An orientation toward democratic principles introduces a great deal of change in the former concepts of full employment. It was believed that this meant the maximally possible involvement of the active population in public production, something with which we could hardly agree today.

The adjective "full," combined with the term "socialist employment" appeared for the first time in the 1930s, when the elimination of unemployment in the USSR was officially proclaimed. As of that moment, full employment was considered as achieved and inviolable, for which reason it became one of the main arguments in proving the advantages of socialism. This monumental conviction of the perpetuity of this accomplishment somehow dropped from the agenda the need to take into consideration the unemployed population, including the jobless. Labor exchanges disappeared and so did the statistical foundations for determining the extent to which the population's need for jobs was satisfied since this need was considered satisfied, the main task was the full satisfaction of the needs of industry for workers, which would establish a balance between manpower demand and supply. In practice, however, the pace of the natural reproduction of manpower could not always meet expanded demand. In the circumstances of an extensive economy based on outlays, having lost, to a certain extent, its final objective, which was the satisfaction of the various needs of the population, and which operated on the basis of the principle of "production for its own sake," it became entirely natural to absorb the increasing volume of resources, including manpower. Full employment with its "total" modification was a kind of side effect of this economic management method. It is true that the result of it was presented as the embodiment of the humane objective of having no unemployment in society.

Today the inability of the administrative-command system to secure a decent living standard on the level accepted throughout the world, which has become obvious, has also developed on the part of the population a characteristic demand for "full" employment. This demand is the forced result of poverty. Having worked throughout their lives without any whatsoever major breaks, the overwhelming majority of the active citizens not only want self-expression but also feel the harsh need to work, which is the only possibility for ensuring a consumption of goods worthy of man. The very accessibility of commodities and services today largely depends less on the quantity and quality of invested labor than on the very fact of the existence of work. The moment the labor rhythm of any member of the family is interrupted, the risk of losing one's place in the waiting line for furniture or a refrigerator or to lose the right to place food orders, which is important today, increases. Despite their size, which runs into the billions of rubles, the population's savings per individual depositor would enable him (by spending exclusively for current needs) to survive no more than a few months. What happens then? ...To stop working under our circumstances means also to risk having an unsecured old age, for establishing private retirement funds ahead of time remains an unreachable dream for the majority of us.

With the democratization of society and the social orientation of its development, the "total" variant of full employment hardly becomes acceptable. The very concept obviously requires a new foundation.

If we accept the principle of the voluntary nature of labor, we can no longer assess overall labor resources as we did in the past. Employment can be full if **anyone who so wishes** has a paying job. In the new understanding of the term, we can consider as full employment one in which the needs of the population are met not simply for jobs but also as regards their quality characteristics (choice of profession, labor conditions, length of time worked, etc.). Full employment in society as a whole is attainable only if individual full employment has been achieved.

Naturally, full coordination of the needs of all individuals for jobs consistent with concepts and social possibilities is unlikely (for example, we must take into consideration jobs with unhealthy working conditions, which cannot be eliminated quickly). However, this does not mean that total employment should not be considered an ideal objective, a desired condition toward which the efforts of society must be directed. Actually, all civilized countries set themselves such a goal.

Unemployment Without Illusions

A by no means academic question is that of the possibility of maintaining a total and constant balance between job offer and demand. As we pointed out, until recently few people doubted that under the conditions of a socialist system, in a society managed on the basis of planning, this possibility was both real and already achieved. To this day the strong conviction remains that the existence of a segment of active population forcibly unemployed is an accidental phenomenon which does not change the picture of full employment on the scale of the entire society. As a rule, the supporters of this viewpoint ignore the obvious fact that, in principle, coordinating manpower demand with supply cannot be achieved without conflict. One of the basic contradictions in securing employment is the impossibility of absolutely synchronizing change within the chain of structural changes, such as job modernization, and changes in the need for cadres, involving the lay-off of workers, and finding new jobs.

By virtue of this fact alone a mechanism for ensuring full employment with a 100 percent efficiency is unrealistic. Therefore, we must consider as entirely legitimate the appearance of a shortage either of personnel or of jobs. Under such circumstances, full employment, in its quantitative interpretation, is a probability figure which allows fluctuations around the point of balance between manpower supply and job supply and only rarely coincides with it. Therefore, our attitude toward the temporary "dropping-out" of economic circulation of some labor resources should remain entirely calm. Actually, this does not justify a policy of deliberately allowing within society the existence even of limited unemployment on a somewhat serious scale. Regardless of the dimensions of any forced lack of employment, this cannot be justified from the economic or social viewpoints.

Unfortunately, we hear frequent statements to the effect that a certain level of deliberately allowed unemployment would be a benefit. It would discipline the population and increase economic efficiency in production. We believe that it would be useful to remind the supporters of limited unemployment that in the modern world there is hardly a civilized country in which such a concept is part of governmental economic programs. Throughout the world it is considered obvious that unemployment must be paid for both by the government and the population. The economic price is paid by those who have lost their jobs (reduced personal income), and by those employed in the public sector (a high level of unemployment could eliminate the growth of their real wages); society is faced with the impossibility of attaining the potential amount of its gross national product, while the government is forced to increase expenditures for social services despite reduced tax revenues. Nor should we ignore the fact that lengthy unemployment is one of the direct reasons for the growth of social tension and political instability.

Unemployment can be justified only if it is considered that it is the price paid for an imperfect system of controlling labor in society, the professional and psychological lack of preparedness by the population for changes in demand for manpower and, on a broader level, the insufficiently high standard of the socioeconomic organization of society. We believe that it is no accident that the level of unemployment is minimal (appearing like an accidental error), as a rule, in countries which are politically stable and economically developed, with a well-organized system for social support of the population. In Sweden, for example, it accounts for no more than some 2 percent.

If unemployment is an evil to be totally avoided, which is exceptionally difficult in practice, the task of the state is to reduce it to a minimum, if not to naught, by pursuing a policy aimed at full employment. Since, nonetheless, the likelihood, small though it may be, of the appearance of unemployment on the individual, regional or Union levels is not excluded, a logical step which would ensure social justice would be a legislative supplement to the right to work: the right to restore a person (should he lose his job) to active work and material compensation for the period of forced unemployment.

On the surface, a substantiation of the criteria on the basis of which a person could be classified unemployed seems simple. We are now quite familiar with the definition of the International Labor Organization, which sums up the practices of many countries: unemployed are people who can work and are part of the active age group, people who do not work but who would like to

work and who are seeking employment. However, the moment this definition is applied to the conditions of a specific country, a large number of fine points arise, related to the characteristics of national statistics and adopted approaches to the interpretation of common criteria.

U.S. practices clearly prove this point. The United States uses in its unemployment statistics a system of respondents, numbering some 60,000 households. The monthly survey indicates the labor status of their members during the controlled week. Unemployed are citizens of active age who, during that period, did not work but who could have worked, given their physical condition, and who have tried to find employment for the 4 previous weeks; also classified as unemployed are people who consider their unemployment temporary and are confident that in the coming month they will either return to their job or find a new job, for which reason they are not seeking employment. Such a seemingly vague and not particularly specific definition of the statistical category of "unemployed" is aimed at reflecting the numerous nuances related to violations of the right to work. Were we to apply this definition in our country, we would have to classify as unemployed young people who have not found jobs after school graduation, as well as those who resigned or were laid off and are seeking work within the legally admissible time (up to 3 months).

Efforts are currently being made in our country to establish a status of unemployment acceptable to the country. However, there is an obvious fear that its application would undermine our country's reputation, would hit the pocket of the state hard (aid will have to be given to an excessive number of people) and could lead to social parasitism. In our view, this fear is related to underestimating the difference between the unemployed, as a statistical category, and the portion of them who have the right to receive aid. In a number of countries this right is granted only to those who had jobs but who lost them. In Hungary, for example, this group includes people who have worked for no less than 2 years, lost their jobs no more than 1 year ago and are registered with the placement authorities. Obviously, we could adopt a similar approach.

Were we to limit the range of people entitled to unemployment assistance, this should not lead to ignoring the other categories of the unemployed population. The unemployed themselves, who would include, shall we say, single mothers, could rely on greater social support. The system of such support should not be limited merely to unemployment aid but should include various types of assistance specifically tailored to the individuals.

The meaning of this idea could be illustrated by taking the Netherlands as an example, although that country is no major exception to the general rule. Let us consider a single unemployed woman who raises a child and takes university courses in the evening. The state pays her unemployment aid, plus aid as educator, and as a citizen with a child (such payments are for all, regardless of their social status); she further receives leave pay (it is considered that even an unemployed has the right to rest), a small amount for medical services (everyone needs health care) and, finally, the full cost of her training while she is unemployed (incentive to learn a competitive skill). Obviously, the sum of these payments will be below a potential salary. However, in this case as well a certain specific policy is pursued: becoming unemployed should not be either economically or socially profitable. The diversified approach also helps to save on funds paid out by the state instead of being wasted on an abstract averaged person but going to those who truly need them.

Let us emphasize that financial assistance to those who have lost their jobs is an important but by no means the main task of an employment policy. Unemployment aid should be considered an extreme measure applied only after the state has found itself, for any given reason, helpless in preventing the loss of a job and rapidly returning a person to active labor. The focal point must be an active preventive policy which would block the accumulation of contradictions raising to socially dangerous levels.

The Market in the Labor Area

Global experience has proved that high results can be achieved in ensuring the right to work only on the basis of combined efforts in various areas. In most countries, four tasks of equal priority constitute the foundations of economic policy: maintaining a moderate pace of economic growth, ensuring full population employment, limiting inflation, and maintaining a balance of payments. Neglect of any one of these components leads to the fact that politics becomes an endless patching process.

Unfortunately, isolationist trends, created by the old sickness of departmental lack of coordination, remain strong in our practices. The main efforts to ensure population employment have been assigned, as we know, to the USSR State Committee for Labor and to similar republic committees. It is entirely natural that such departments concentrates on problems which are directly within their competence. As a result, many initiatives, including the currently drafted USSR Law on Employment, are oriented more not toward the needs of society but the functions of those same committees. Many problems related to employment policy, involving a distribution policy, regional economic autonomy, a policy of deployment of production forces and other problems, the responsibility for the solution of which is that of other departments, are ignored.

Today, when efforts are being made to design the future socioeconomic system, it is important not to make one more error by forgetting to include in it employment relations. The discussion on the economic content of such relations reminds us of the already discussed question of whether we need a market or a nonmarket economy. Once again we have two entirely opposite

views on the admissibility of the market in the realm of labor. However, it seems to us, such debates come too late. It is obvious that employment, as an element of the overall socioeconomic organism, should be based on the same type of relations as the economy as a whole. If we accept the market way of development of the national economy and if most important production factors such as material and financial resources are covered by the market, objectively their effect extends to the labor area.

As a rule, the supporters of the antimarket concept have a simplistic understanding of the labor market. As they imagine it, it is a form of uncontrolled coordination between the demand for manpower and supply, which presumes fierce and comprehensive rivalry which is uncontrollable and which inevitably leads to a strong social stratification and mass chronic unemployment. Hence the conclusion that the labor market undermines the socialist principle, for which reason it is inadmissible. What is forgotten in this case is that our experience in a centralized and strictly planned economy has proved that market relations, which are natural in the case of any developed commodity economy, cannot be entirely eliminated; they may be reduced in the area of informal relations and services rendered by private individuals or else by the more complex aspects of the "second" economy, including the manpower "black market."

Individual elements of the market system can be easily found in the present legitimate economy as well. Let us mention the cadre availability in the cooperative sector, the selective policy of state enterprises in hiring manpower, the practice of differentiating among wages of a number of professional groups, depending on circumstances, etc. The legitimacy of such already established relations is not denied by anyone. Consequently, it is obviously incorrect to ask whether to allow or prevent the establishment of market relations in the labor area. In our view, this question should be shifted to a different level: should we expand the area of action of commodity-monetary forces or reduce them, i.e., return to the practices of rigid administration? The former variant is preferable. It is consistent with the overall logic of economic perestroyka.

The uncontrolled manpower market is frequently viewed as an additional element of the centralized planning system. In our view, this is arguable. In this case, if the market is assigned merely the role of serving the plan, the nature of the administrative management would hardly change radically. To say the least, a new wave of absolutized and direct centralized influence on the manpower reproduction processes and a return to the accompanying methods of an administrative-command order are not excluded. The simplicity and apparent efficiency of such steps, particularly in critical situations, increase the risk of making cosmetic or even regressive reforms which conflict with the democratic trend of perestroyka.

We believe that the new economic relations should be based not on the direct distribution and redistribution of manpower but on an essentially indirect control over manpower dynamics and control not by the objects themselves (enterprises, workers) but by the socioeconomic environment in which they exist. In that case the market will not serve the plan but, conversely, the plan will serve the market with a view to ensuring its optimal consistency with the public interest. In our view, it is precisely this combination that will enable us to abandon the dictatorship of the plan without shifting to the dictatorship of the market.

The most important purpose of the manpower market is, with the help of a set of regulatory instruments, to achieve a relatively stable balance of market forces without suppressing their self-adjustment, and the independent dynamics of supply and demand. For that reason, we should consider as crucial the question of the most expedient combination of such self-dynamics and external control. In our view, we could consider mature only a manpower market regulated by a widespread system of direct and indirect measures, including, within a sensible range, centralized planning methods. In terms of the present situation, it would be preferable to interpret it as a system of socioeconomic and organizational-legal measures and institutions, which would streamline and regulate commodity-monetary relations in the areas of manpower distribution, exchange and utilization.

The market concept of labor relations presumes a substantial broadening of juridical and economic freedom of workers and employers in matters of hiring and firing. As to the freedoms of the individual, they are basically found in the two principles we already mentioned: the voluntary nature of labor and freely chosen occupation. To a certain extent, enterprise cadre policy should be emancipated as well. One of the main stumbling blocks here is that of separating the rights of the state from those of the economic authorities in the area of securing the right to work. Today we have the principle of double responsibility: both the state and the enterprises are responsible for finding jobs to released people. However, for the time being, most of this burden is borne by manpower users. Such a division of responsibility, in our view, hinders structural perestroyka and holds back the modernizing of jobs and the release of workers. This can be easily seen by putting ourselves in the place of any economic manager, particularly of an enterprise with a small number of workers. The director, who must deal with the problem of placing the released workers, paying unemployment assistance and facing conflict situations on this basis, will try, whenever possible, to avoid personnel reductions.

A compromise between the economic interests of enterprises and the social guidelines of society is possible, although this is no simple matter. Let us cite an individual case of such a compromise. Let us imagine that structural changes could sharply disrupt the balance on the local manpower market. Traditional ways of solving this situation are no longer adequate. In order to avoid mass unemployment, obviously, the local soviets should have the right to table for a while a resolution on

releasing workers, which would enable them to formulate special steps to ensure employment. Actually, such a procedure is being applied today as well. However, all the cost of such delays are borne by the enterprise. It would be logical to see to it that the enterprise does not suffer losses (for people are not being laid off because of good circumstances), paying, let us say, the wages of those to be laid off out of a regional employment fund. Such funds will, in all likelihood, be organized in our country. If the economic organization also participates in the retraining of the people, clearly, it should be encouraged, either through tax benefits or through the partial compensation of its costs, paid out of that same fund.

Within the framework of the currently beginning new stage of the economic reform, we believe that it is necessary to stick closer to the line which must be followed by the enterprises in their production activities, based on economic efficiency criteria. The inevitable retraining and new hiring and other types of sociolegal support should be essentially the concern of the state. Its main task remains to maintain the guarantee of employment, but in such a way that labor in all jobs is economically expedient.

Separating the functions of the state from those of the producers does not mean preventing enterprises, associations of producers and ministries from participating in the solution of such problems. It is a question, above all, of setting priorities. We must proceed from the fact that a modern economy, built on the principles of economic democracy, cannot do without a well-organized social policy (including a policy of employment) on the level of the state and of the primary economic units and their associations. Such a policy must become a conscious need although not imposed by necessity.

A labor market provides more equitable but also stricter conditions compared with those currently extant. Such relations do not include an unlimited social philanthropy which automatically guarantees the right to a job regardless of the efficiency of individuals and labor collectives. Since under market conditions each enterprise needs to be properly competitive, it should become one of the leading qualities of individual workers. If the state assumes the obligation of ensuring employment, it becomes the obligation of the individual to keep up his professional standards in order to keep his job or, if necessary, successfully to compete for a new job. It is only in that case, it seems to us, that we could achieve a sensible combination of economic expediency with social protection. The more reliable the latter is, the higher should also be the responsibility of its beneficiaries.

Accepting the fact that we would benefit from the broadening of market relations in the labor area is only half the problem. The other half should consist of developing numerous mechanisms which would harmonize the dynamics of supply and demand and prevent the development of extreme situations. Despite the fact that global practices have developed a number of such mechanisms, it would be rash to suggest today a ready-made system for the functioning of a labor market. Obviously, time is needed for the uncoordinated laws and standards of economic behavior to blend within an efficient system. Many of its elements cannot be stipulated in advance, for they can be brought to the surface by practical experience only. Yet, as we know, experience involves both laurels and thorns.

The new situation demands a most serious interpretation of the nature, the means and the time needed for converting to a market type of employment, with a strong social orientation. In promoting this system, however, let us not become carried away by the latest slice of social utopianism and try to make the idea of a society of universal well-being fit dated plans for socioeconomic development, and present vitally important tasks related to easing negative processes as the total and definitive elimination of the latter.

DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

The Problem of Alienation Through the Lens of Perestroyka

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[Text] The phenomenon of alienation has existed in our society for quite some time, although it is only now that we have begun to talk about it. Furthermore, its negative aspects increased and intensified as the system of command-administrative management "improved." Perestroyka merely shed light on that which, for a long time, was ignored. It identified the aggravated processes which were ignored by ideologues in previous decades. It not only identified them but also introduced in the awareness of the masses a critical frame of mind, as a result of which the alienation which they had experienced in the past as well began to be perceived particularly sharply and painfully.

As we read today numerous descriptions of negative phenomena, we unwittingly begin to think of how and why did the alienation of the people under the conditions of a socialist economic management system become possible. On the surface, it may appear that this was merely the result of an arbitrary socioeconomic and cultural policy of the periods of Stalinism and stagnation, which reduced man to the status of a cog, automatically functioning within a system of impersonal bureaucratic relations. However, if we consider the essence of the problem and take a close view on the history of the establishment and development of our society, we begin to understand that its historical roots and objective grounds are much deeper.

What do we mean by alienation? What is its nature? Why is it, in general, possible in society? What are the origins of the processes which lead to its appearance under socialism? What are the objective mechanisms and subjective errors contributing to this manifestation? How is it expressed? Finally, why is it that precisely perestroyka makes it necessary to take a new approach to the interpretation of this problem?

Let us emphasize, above all, the following: alienation is not such a simple phenomenon as we were inclined to believe. As we begin to discuss it, immediately the concept appeared of some kind of phenomena and processes of a negative order. Basically, this is indeed the case. Nonetheless, it has a dual nature which confirms complex and dialectically interwoven relations and ties which, in their entirety, constitute what we describe as human life.

On the one hand, alienation is a historically natural process of the development of human activities, related to the objective mechanism of its target-setting under the conditions of the social division of labor, materialization and the end results of public production, necessary for the existence and development of individuals. It has its real objective foundations in the social nature of human activities and, consequently, it could be considered a normal, a vitally useful function which, in particular, confirms the potential capabilities of an individual as such (with a view to his creative self-expression and dedication), marching hand-in-hand with the process of the social appropriation and assimilation of labor products. Labor frequently separates people, assuming an autonomous significance and an independent existence, as a result of which the results of activities escape human control, enslaving man. This leads to the appearance of an undesirable aspect; a negative phenomenon becomes an objective process when the creative individual is deprived of the real possibility of benefiting from the fruits of his labor.

On the other hand, alienation is related to a certain mental condition, a conscious pragmatic attitude displayed by man toward his activities and its results, and the world as a whole. It is accompanied by subjective sensations, such as the feeling of satisfaction and suffering, pride and guilt, power and helplessness. On this level, alienation could include both a positive aspect of man's axiological interpretation of his actions, which is of major social significance, for in this case the voluntary self-rejection of something negative, or else a self-denial which, is practiced for the sake of gaining inner freedom and maintaining a way of life worthy of man. However, if dialectical ties and relations between the individual's external way of life and inner world are disrupted and broken up, and if the wishes of the individual and the possibility of their implementation are separated by an insurmountable obstacle, if the legitimate expectations and justified intentions of the individual are crushed against the unbreachable wall of bureaucratic prescriptions, resolutions and instructions, alienation becomes a factor which undermines the moral foundations of the life of the people and triggers within them destructive inclinations.

The social phenomenon we are considering as a historical process related to human activities, and finding its conflicting reflection in the individual's mind, thus assume a variety of forms, depending on the ways of organization of human life. Whether it is paralleled by a positive or a negative trend depends, in the final account, on relations which develop in the real interaction among people, between the individual and the state and between the individual and society.

Joint life presumes the division of human activities. The initial integrity of man and all of his essential forces are disrupted as a result of the historical inevitability of the specialization of his functions and increased complexity of relations between the individual and society, for economic structures, social institutions, legal regulations and ideological structures appear and expand. The results of the creative labor efforts of individuals become universal property. They acquire a social meaning and social significance. The restoration of the integrity of the individual and the integration of his essential forces are possible, therefore, less within a single individual isolated from the people than within the people in their unity. The variety of structures and institutions which man himself has created should perform compensatory functions, ensuring his self-dedication and neutralizing the self-wasting of man through the support of equal values confirming his social recognition and bringing him personal satisfaction.

If economic structures and social institutions not only fail to compensate for self-dedication or self-wasting of an individual in the course of his activities but, conversely, act in the role of supraindividual formations, taking credit for the individual's results and leading a parasitical existence on their basis, while legal regulatory agents and ideological structures are granted the functions of justifying the existing system of relations between the individual and society, some specific objective characteristics of alienation, with their positive intentions, lose their significance while the negative aspects assume a dominant development. Alienation becomes a tapestry of contradictions in life, steadily aggravated in a stagnant society and, one way or another, reflected in the minds of the people and leaving their mark on human activities within the system of dominating depersonalized structures, institutions and relations. It appears in the various areas of life and assumes forms of economic, technological, political and spiritual alienation of man, confirming the appearance of a world of anonymous and bureaucratic social formations, possessing a special status of independent functioning, as well as relations which oppose man and trigger within him confusion and helplessness and the concept of the senselessness of his life.

Those who address themselves to the problem of alienation frequently reduce it to the socioeconomic exploitation of man. It is true that open exploitation is the most typical feature of alienation for, as Marx noted, in this case the means of production become means of extorting someone else's labor, as a result of which "it is not the worker who consumes them as the material elements of his production activities but it is they which consume the worker as the ferment they need for their own survival process..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 320).

However, the phenomenon does not end there. It affects many areas of individual-personal and social life and has a variety of trends of development, depending on the specific historical conditions of human life. Thus, technological alienation which today characterizes the individual's attitude toward the achievements of science and technology, expressed in a one-sided development of scientific and technical progress, unrelated to moral guidelines and universal human values, is fraught, in the case of the individual and mankind as a whole, with no less dangerous social consequences than is economic alienation, related to the exploitation of the people in the course of their labor activities. In the final account, "any progress and any inconsistency within the boundaries of a false system prove to be the greatest possible regress and greatest possible systematic baseness" (op. cit., vol 42, p 22).

The same applies to ecological alienation, and alienation in the areas of morality and national relations. Political alienation as well is a major threat. It leads to the alienation of the people's masses from real participation in sociopolitical life.

Briefly, the comprehensive nature of alienation is unquestionable. Conversely, it requires the comprehensive consideration of this social phenomenon, which presumes not only the interpretation of the variety of forms of its manifestation under socialist conditions but also the formulation of an effective strategy for the elimination of the negative consequences related to it.

Today the processes of democratization and glasnost, which allow us to look at the truth in the eye and frankly to speak of our ills, bring us close to the study of the new features of alienation, confirming the existence of specific contradictions which have accumulated in our society. This applies to those among them which lead to a gross and concealed violation of constructive socioeconomic, sociopolitical and cultural-moral relations linking the individual to the state, and the establishment of bureaucratic structures and institutions which hinder the true self-expression and dedication of the individual, rejecting his features and capabilities as a subject of autonomous action and failing to compensate for his physical and intellectual outlays. They trigger in man a distorted concept of true relations and feelings of dissatisfaction and suffering, justifiably considered by the individual as something alien, imposed from the outside, an obstacle to free manifestation of his will and advancement. There even have appeared as a result of the appropriation of the power of the people by individuals, elements which, as they develop, lead to cultural degeneracy and the self-destruction of the people, as was clearly confirmed by the practices of the 1930s.

The more completely and profoundly we fill the "blank spots" of the period of the establishment and development of our society, the more tangibly we sense the problem of alienation. Today we must openly acknowledge that many people, particularly those who were not involved with the crimes and violations of constitutional rights, as well as those who, in their youth, were not affected by the Stalinist repressive machinery, have found themselves alienated from the past, having grown up in an atmosphere of thoughtless placidity and blind reliance on the infallibility of the leaders. The lot of the majority of the people who, for a long period of time were ignorant of the truth concerning their own country, was **alienation from the true history of our society.**

How can we competently assess the present and predict the future without establishing the truth of the past? Of what kind of continuity of best traditions could there be a question if the history of the building of socialism is described in accordance with the wishes of those who suppressed progressive thinking and did everything possible to instill the stereotypes of unquestionable obedience, formulating all kinds of theories on the intensification of the class struggle as socialism developed, and artificially maintained an atmosphere of intolerance toward imaginary "enemies of the people," looking for them in the midst of the people themselves? What moral values could be transmitted to the subsequent generations if the preceding history turned out to be a period of merciless struggle between evil and good, in the course of which sincerity and charity were considered something obsolete, while cunning, pushing and lack of principles became the customary standards governing the life of many? It is only now, under the conditions of glasnost, when the true picture of the establishment and development of socialism in our country is being redrawn, that we can finally understand the tragic fate of the people during the Stalinist period, interpret the twists of Khrushchev's "thaw," and assess the harm to the cause of socialism during "Brezhnevian blossoming," and the growth of antisocialist phenomena such as corruption and bribery. It is only now that, gradually, the historical ties between the past and the present are beginning to be restored, which makes it possible to surmount the alienation of the people from their own history.

In this respect, perestroyka works for anyone who does not fear historical truth, however bitter it may have been, or the inevitable responsibility for the present and the future of socialism. It triggers the discontent only of those who, one way or another, were part of the machinery for the destruction of dissidence and who secretly dream of the "iron order" of a Stalinist type or

Brezhnevian spinelessness, which provides all possible loopholes for pilfering the national wealth and the people's property.

However, it would be precipitous to assume that the initiated impartial identification of the negative aspects of previous decades and the publication of all cases of violation of democracy, suppression of freedom and violation of the interests of the working people are a sufficient for the elimination of the type of alienation which is associated with distancing ourselves from the past. This is merely the first although, unquestionably, important and essential step on the way to exposing the broad masses to our history, a step which we have taken in the course of perestroyka.

In order truly to surmount alienation from history, we must bring to light all the profound mechanisms of the establishment and functioning of distorted forms of democracy and the process of the shaping of new relations which did not contribute to the establishment of harmonious relations between the government and the individual and between the individual and society. Equally important is information concerning the socioeconomic processes which took place in previous decades and about political leaders who once ruled the state, as well as about contemporaries who have assumed responsibility for the future of socialism and are directly influencing the making of political decisions and state plans and ensuring their implementation.

If we would direct all of our efforts only to filling the "blank spots" of 40-year duration, bypassing the question of the past years of perestroyka, without providing the people with adequate information on the deployment of forces within the leading party authorities, the reasons for replacing leaders and their appointment to new positions, and the ideological atmosphere which assists or hinders the making of corresponding decisions, we would hardly be able to restore the ties linking man to history. Naturally, alienation is not reduced entirely and totally to the lack of necessary information or the disinformation of the people. However, a lack of truthful and total information provides nutritive grounds for the dissemination of all kinds of rumors which create hotbeds of social tension and the appearance and support of a new alienation of people who are poorly oriented in past historical events and are unable adequately to assess events in the country.

Perestroyka should firmly touch upon these still largely restricted areas, opening them to review and discussion by the whole nation. By helping us to surmount the distancing of the people from the leaders, perestroyka stops being a revolution or a system of reforms initiated from above. It becomes a nationwide arena for construction, for efforts of well-informed people who realize the need for radical change and display the creative initiative of real subjects of social action, responsible for the future of our country and of socialism as a whole.

It is important to pay particular attention to the fact that alienation from history is closely related to the development of culture transformed through the lens of a one-sided view on the values of life. The official interpretation of historical events was accompanied by the creation of a variety of social and political myths. The strengthening of the latter in the social consciousness was accomplished to a large extent precisely through the respective cultural media, for culture is an area of human activities within which the world of material and spiritual values, which is external in terms of the individual, becomes his inner possession, acquiring a specific meaning and assuming one character feature or another.

Let us recall that after the 1917 Revolution the establishment of new socioeconomic and political structures was paralleled not only by the breakdown of the old social traditions but also the search for new trends in literature and the arts. For a while there was a natural struggle between the new and the old. Hence, inherent in Soviet culture of the 1920s was a pluralism in the course of which a variety of trends coexisted, with their own style in fiction, theater, motion pictures, etc.

However, as time passed, the fierce repressions which developed in the course of the political struggle for power, spread over all aspects of social life, including culture. The result was that any dissidence on the part of writers, painters and men of the arts was subjected to merciless condemnation and thoroughly uprooted. Monuments of national history, churches and temples were defiled and destroyed. Works of art and plays, the authors of which supported historical truth, were prohibited and anathematized. Actually, as something self-developing and intrinsically valuable, something which enriches the spiritual world of man and maintains his inner freedom, culture found itself in the vice of the administrative-command system, which emasculated its humanistic nature. Values began to be promoted which served the creation and strengthening of the cult of personality. Art became the conduit of all sorts of cults. **Cult-hurrah!** was the price which had to be paid by culture for the possibility of developing during the Stalinist period.

During the period of stagnation as well encouragement was given to the type of development of culture which could be fitted within the strict limits of thoughtless praise of the achievements of socialism and the permitted forms and genres and means of spiritual creativity. The artists who thirsted for the freedom of creative searching and who appealed to the reality of life and depicted it by no means in rosy hues, were not given official recognition and were persecuted. The same approach was applied in assessing the works of contemporary global culture. This triggered isolationism and pitting oneself against all others, and alienation from universal human ideals. One-sided cultural policy led to the alienation of the people both from the world cultural legacy and from domestic spiritual values. The bridge between the past and the present was being destroyed. The future lost its firm foundations.

Naturally, this does not mean that the best traditions were totally eliminated from the country's cultural life and that no works of art which were linked to reality were created within Soviet culture. In the 1920s, for example, works of fiction were enriched with the works of Platonov, Bulgakov, Zoshchenko and Pilnyak; in the postwar period, with the novels of Pasternak, Grossman, Tendryakov, Dombrovskiy and other honest writers. However, many truthful and highly artistic works were kept hidden from the people for long periods of time. Unread, unheard and unseen, they could not plant the good seeds in the hearts of the people and failed to fulfill their humanistic purpose.

It is only today, when numerous readers in our country discover for themselves that which was created by the bearers of culture several decades ago, that the tragedy of the alienation of the artist and the master of speech from the people and of the people from the fruit of their inspired creativity can be understood. It is only today that we are beginning truly to feel the entire perniciousness of the separation of people from real culture, paralleled by the deformation of the values of socialism and the devastation of spiritual life. This makes it necessary to reinterpret our entire reality and not only to reinterpret it but to seek answers to the numerous questions which did not appear in the past, perhaps due to ignorance of that which, now, is becoming increasing clear.

Without involvement with culture and universal accessibility of its true values the free creativity of the people in various areas of their activities becomes impossible. That is why social restructuring is inconceivable without a cultural content. This means that the perestroyka of spiritual-cultural processes, which contributes to the surmounting of alienation, must walk hand-in-hand with the development of **the culture of perestroyka**, the culture of implementing the planned radical socioeconomic and political changes in society.

By no means do the rank-and-file working people who create material goods become always aware of their alienation from history and culture. This alienation becomes most clear to anyone who, in the course of daily life, constantly hears various slogans on the need to intensify individual labor efforts and to upgrade labor productivity, on the one hand while, on the other, encounters equalization in the payment for labor efforts, bare shelves in the stores, endless lines, chronic shortages of foodstuffs and other items of prime necessity.

In his time, in discussing the various aspects of social alienation, Marx provided a brilliant analysis of the capitalist economic management system, exposing the reasons for the appearance of alienated labor and proving how, why and on the basis of what does the alienation of the workers from their product, from the social wealth occur. He profoundly believed that with the destruction of private ownership "this **self-alienation** of man" will disappear and alienated labor which, to the worker in an exploiting society, is "something **external**, not belonging to its essence," coercive, exhausting, drawing from him all vital forces, preventing human production activities "by becoming removed from reality and becoming a self-inflicted penalty," providing nothing in exchange other than the possibility of acquiring minimal subsistence means "to support the individual's physical existence," will disappear (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 42, pp 90, 94, 96, 116).

The establishment of the socialist economic management system in our country was paralleled by the elimination of private ownership. The means of production were proclaimed national property. It seemed as though the sources of alienated labor had disappeared, for henceforth labor would awaken the enthusiasm of the masses. Indeed, the emancipation of the people after the 1917 Revolution triggered a labor upsurge, when the toiling masses, hungry and deprived of material means after the Civil War, not only took the country out of its state of dislocation but also ensured its fast economic growth.

However, with the establishment of command-bureaucratic methods for managing agriculture, industry in the country at large, and with the increased centralization of power and its concentration at the top, the working people began to feel the growing burden of economic alienation. Here, there and everywhere it was claimed that the working people are the true masters of their country. However, having stopped being private, ownership became statified so that, essentially, it did not become public. Consequently, the working people became alienated also from the means of production and the distribution of the products of their labor as well as real power in their own enterprises.

Production without consumption and consumption without production is a metaphor which highlights the distorted alienation, which led to a variety of adverse economic, psychological and moral consequences. In fact, what kind of economic incentive could one speak of if the direct producers of material goods could not purchase with the money they had earned through their sweat, even that which they themselves had created? What kind of psychological stability could there be a question of, if the people constantly faced a shortage of medicines, food products and consumer goods, and social injustice? Therefore, one could hardly hope for a success of perestroyka without implementing radical economic reforms aimed at upsurge in agriculture and industrial production and without implementing radical sociopolitical changes with a view to closing the gap between production and consumption.

Glasnost exposed an unseemly picture in the type of consumption which had developed in recent decades. In this area there were no protective mechanisms which would ensure that the principle of social justice in the distribution of material and spiritual goods was observed. Perestroyka exposed many cases of abuse of power aimed at personal enrichment. It not only revealed the mechanisms of corruption, embezzlement

of public funds and bribery, which proved the degradation of a number of political leaders, managers and officials who dictated the strategy of distribution, but also exposed the entire depth of alienation of the direct producers from the system of managing governmental and kolkhoz-cooperative property, which had dominated the country for quite some time.

Clearly, the alienation of the working people in the production and management areas can be eliminated only when they themselves will actively and consciously participate in the distribution of the values they create, when the intermediary, centrally excessively organized authorities standing between production and consumption have been reduced to a minimum and when the full power is transferred from the bureaucratic officials, themselves alienated from life and frequently creating inflationary figures blocking real objects and processes, to the people, who will delegate their own competent specialists, who would be honest and highly moral, and who would display an enhanced feeling of responsibility.

The April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum marked the beginning of socioeconomic and political reforms, the end purpose of which is not only to surmount the crisis processes but also to assert the true values of socialism. This will enable man to reject historical, cultural, economic and political alienation. In this case, as we pointed out, an essential role is ascribed to profound structural reorganizations of the political system, for the obsolete power institutions are blocking the development of democracy, preventing the working people from becoming the masters of their country and obstructing the mechanisms of self-management related to democracy. That is precisely what was discussed at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

If we look at the essence of the numerous debates at the congress concerning such problems, we can easily realize that, in the final account, the discussion of a variety of Union and regional problems is directly or indirectly related to considerations on the place and role of the party under the conditions of perestroyka, the separation of powers and functions, the rights of the soviets and true popular rule, which presumes the exercise of free judgment and activities by all members of society. Here as well one of the fundamental principles is that of democratic centralism. It defines the organizational structure of activities both within the party and in the country as a whole. It presumes, as we know, the extensive consideration of all problems and freedom of discussion at the stage of the interpretation of formulated suggestions and, at the same time, strict discipline, and unity of action following the adoption of majority resolutions. In practice, however, this was not applied in the course of decades nor does it function today at full capacity.

This was caused by a number of objective and subjective reasons. To begin with, we have actually not become accustomed to and still cannot live under conditions governed by broad democracy and glasnost. We have no experience in true democratic management. By no means are we always ready and able to act not in accordance with instructions from above but as we see things. Sometimes, by inertia, we think of democracy as a way of life in which someone allows, lifts previous prohibitions, or grants freedom from above. However, true democracy is based above all on inner freedom, self-discipline and conscious control of reciprocal relations between freedom from external coercion and the necessary restrictions and freedoms for constructive activities, which presumes an orientation toward moral values, eliminating the alienation of man from himself, and awareness of obligations to other people and readiness to answer to society for one's own actions.

Second, centralism is frequently identified with strict party discipline, and obedience imposed by superiors, violations of which are equated to pitting oneself against the others, the party and the leadership. The point, however, is that many crucial decisions which have had a considerable impact on the development of the country were made not on the basis of an open dialogue but, as a rule, by a very narrow circle of people who claimed to speak in the name of the people. Where is the guarantee that all decisions made by the high levels of authority reflect the frame of mind of the majority of the members of society and not the majority of those who made them? These are not one and the same. In order competently to judge of the frame of mind of the real majority we need national referendums and surveys of the various population groups, which enable us to determine the public opinion on the most important problems of socioeconomic, political and cultural life.

The elimination of political alienation and the manifestation of activeness by the peoples masses aspiring to direct participation in the solution of vitally important problems is a two-way process of social democratization. It presumes the increased trust of the people in political and state leaders and of the leaders in the people. This means that political reform in the area of state building, the reconstruction of the political system and the establishment of a socialist law-governed state should include radical changes which ensure the **power of democracy and development of democratic power.**

Let us note in this connection that the previous history of our society was characterized by two diametrically opposed trends. On the official level, the idea was persistently proclaimed everywhere that everything was being done for the sake of man, for the good of man. In real life, however, there was an economic and moral denigration of people, restrictions of personal freedom, instilling in the minds of individuals different stereotypes of thinking and behavior, which helped to maintain the authoritarian structures and power institutions.

A paradoxical situation developed. The more talk there was of the blossoming of the personality and the comprehensive development of man, the more strongly the people felt alienated from society, aspiring, at the first opportunity, to plunge into their own world, to "turn off" themselves away from reality, using all accessible

means to this effect, including alcoholism, drug addiction, or physical or mental prostitution. In the final account, a profound gap developed between the official concepts of Soviet man in general as being the best in the world, decent, highly moral, and comprehensively developed, and the real state of affairs, according to which quite frequently the negative qualities and features appeared in many people, the public mention of which was unacceptable. Ideology and the general humanistic sciences and literature essentially depicted the Soviet citizen through the lens of an abstract ideal, ascribing to man exclusively lofty thoughts, considering him as engaged in committing only noble actions. Yet economics and justice dealt with a mass of people who had perceived their own base inclinations and were capable of engaging in all sorts of forgeries, machinations and acts of treason.

Today major changes are taking place within our society, confirming the aspiration of many people to break the chains of self-alienation, gain true freedom and live up to their creative capabilities. Facing the possibility of free expression of their thoughts, they have also faced the problem of choice. They have trusted perestroyka and are ready to engage in the full development of their inner potential. Others have interpreted freedom as freedom from any kind of obligations toward society, as an opportunity for the satisfaction of their ambitious thoughts and mercantile aspirations. Others again are still indecisive, mistrustful of the possibilities offered to them.

Do real possibilities exist today and are all the necessary prerequisites available for the manifestation and utilization of the creative potential of every member of society in all areas of life? Are the now developing management and administrative-managerial structures prepared to accept and undertake the practical implementation of self-creativity on a mass level? To what extent has individual and social awareness changed, consistent with the development of constructive activities and the elimination of the negative phenomena of a socioeconomic, political and cultural nature? Is there a profound understanding of the importance of implementing precisely the positive aspect of freedom in the development of constructive activities aimed at the unification of all social strata, nationalities and ethnic groups for the sake of the future common fatherland? Are the people prepared to consider mandatory for a normal civilized life an inner need for moral self-restrictions?

These and many other questions are most urgently facing those who are thinking about the real processes of perestroyka, its objectives and initial results, and ideological slogans and specific actions. It is obvious that public restructuring not only helps to resolve the old but also triggers new problems which, in some cases, are unexpected and difficult. It is equally obvious that without their resolution and without a competent answer to all questions raised by the past and the present, perestroyka cannot hope to be successful. We shall have to answer the challenge raised by life itself if we truly wish for all members of society to be free from the burden of alienation and actively to join in the socioeconomic, political and cultural changes which are taking place in the country.

CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Economic Platform for Interaction

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[Article by O. Rybakov, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Few other problems would trigger within society an interest as great as our foreign economic relations. Today previously hidden information is becoming slightly more accessible. However, the facts reported to society do not reduce but increase the number of unclear areas and questions. For example, recently for the first time information was published on the debts of the Soviet Union to other countries. What do those figures say? Naive people may think that our situation is quite good, for the sum total of our accounts receivable is higher than the published size of our debts. The practical workers know that such debts are of unequal value. They are different in terms of currency, conditions and terms of payment and, finally, reliability. Uninformed people may tend, following the cliches of stupid propaganda, to consider any credit as aid; practical workers know that the reasons for indebtedness are much more varied. They well know that the nature and profitability of relations among countries are determined by no means exclusively on the basis of credits. of almost equal importance are the prices of the commodity structure and the assessments of trade opportunities. The answer to all such questions can be provided only by a comprehensive study.

Today problems of relations with CEMA members are of special interest. This area is closer to us both geographically and politically. It accounts for the highest share of our trade and, at the same time, it is an area within which of late the greatest changes have been taking place.

Will CEMA Be Preserved?

In the course of the debate which extensively developed on the eve of the 45th CEMA Session in the Soviet Union and in the Eastern European countries, the following questions were raised: Will there or will there not be a CEMA; will socialist economic integration be preserved? Will the organization of the collective management of integration processes survive or will centrifugal forces break up interaction in that area?

In the Soviet Union the problem of foreign economic relations, most of which are within the CEMA area, were actively and, in frequent cases, arguably discussed in the mass information media, at the congresses of USSR People's Deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet sessions.

The range of critical remarks is quite broad. Extreme claims have been made to the effect that the raw material and fuel nature of exports are ruining the country, leading to the selling off of natural resources. More moderate assessments proceed from the relatively low efficiency of cooperation in the CEMA area, compared to trade with the capitalist countries. The main target of the critical volleys is the claim that national economic interests in this area have been largely sacrificed to ideological postulates and that the ideologizing of economic relations led to the fact that the country's subsoil and its resources became wide open to our political partners. In turn, the latter occasionally use arguments the purpose of which is to prove that they have not benefited from relations with the Soviet Union.

All of these questions need thoughtful answers free from unnecessary although, in frequent cases, entirely justifiable emotions. The main one them was provided in the course of the 45th CEMA Session. Essentially, it is that good neighborly relations, economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and participation in CEMA remain relevant today to the allied Eastern European countries. Their territorial closeness, and the established system of the division of labor made mutual relations a necessary and a vitally important factor in economic development. To break them means to disturb the course of normal functioning of the national economic complexes.

However, something else is equally clear. Existing relations must be firmly reorganized and freed from noneconomic influences. It is only on the basis of reciprocal interest that they can develop successfully. Furthermore, CEMA does not offer any advantages as an organization of a bureaucratic type. It must be radically restructured. Radical changes have become pressing in the cooperation mechanism as well. The last CEMA session was unable to provide complete answers to the practical problems. Obviously, they should be sought by dispensing with the analysis of existing economic relations and their efficiency or, conversely, their economic groundlessness. The facts are that an interaction of great importance to their national economies developed among the CEMA partners in the course of the years.

Suffice it to say that most countries urgently need Soviet fuel and raw materials, and the vast Soviet market. In terms of resources, such as petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, timber and others, a considerable percentage of the domestic needs of CEMA members are met through imports from the USSR. Meanwhile, many of their industries, machine building above all, developed from the very beginning on the basis of specialized deliveries to our country. It is true that a strong link with the Soviet market had negative consequences as well. The lack of exigency concerning the technical standards and quality of goods adversely affected the work of exporting enterprises, whose output lost its competitiveness. This caused difficulties in selling it in the West. However, we should not ignore something else as well: increased exigency concerning the quality of output and the need to make contractual prices consistent with quality are being painfully accepted by our partners. Therefore, in this area both sides have a great deal of work ahead of them. One thing, however, is unquestionable: preserving economic relations with the Soviet Union, as has been repeatedly stated by the leadership of CEMA member countries, remains vitally important to them, although in the Eastern European countries, of late, problems of becoming part of a general European cooperation and participating in the activities of international economic organizations are being discussed ever more urgently.

What Does CEMA Contribute to the Soviet Union?

Cooperation within CEMA has played and continues to play a major role in the national economy of the Soviet Union, above all by satisfying the need for many resources, including consumer goods. The disruption of existing relations would gravely damage the Soviet economy. The CEMA members account for about 60 percent of Soviet foreign trade. Particularly important to us are the machines and equipment we import. Their share in the overall volume of internal resources in terms of rolled metal and equipment for the food, textile and printing industries accounts for 40 to 50 percent. The Soviet economy cannot do at all without many types of goods. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of deliveries of railroad transportation and shipbuilding items. The share of consumer goods in Soviet retail trade for some items accounts for 15 to 20 percent of the total. About 25 percent of our needs for medicinal drugs are met through imports from CEMA countries.

Should deliveries of such goods be interrupted, the Soviet Union would be forced to import them with free currency or else organize its own production. It would be difficult to accomplish this within a short time and, for economic considerations, it would be simply unjustified to replace importing a number of goods with domestically produced ones. The situation becomes even more complex because of the shortage of free currencies. Could we increase their availability by reducing procurements, shall we say, of petroleum and natural gas to the socialist countries?

The situation concerning procurements of fuel and raw materials is complex. Speaking seriously, we are selling petroleum to the socialist countries at quite advantageous world prices compared with domestic prices. This year we shall sell petroleum to the European CEMA members at approximately 95 rubles per ton, compared to global free trade prices by the end of January, of 86-87 rubles and a domestic wholesale price of 30 rubles. Second, the concept of the possibility of redirecting Soviet petroleum and raw materials from the CEMA market to the capitalist market is purely speculative. A drastic increase in the volume of petroleum procurements to the West would be hardly possible to achieve because of strict regulatory measures and competition. Furthermore, prices would immediately drop. The petroleum boom of the 1970s is a matter of the past. The West quickly learned how to economically use fuel and energy. Furthermore, the economic importance of petroleum is

not eternal. Because of the inevitable exhaustion of its reserves, the world is seeking ways of replacing it and, unquestionably, scientific and technical progress will help to solve this problem. Our foreign economic relations must be built not with a view to present but to long-range developments.

Third, replacing petroleum with machine exports is, naturally, a positive phenomenon. The trouble, however, is that it is precisely such machines that are in short supply in the USSR and an export base is not being laid. Because of the low competitiveness of our machines and equipment and the low prices on world markets, in frequent cases the efficiency of relations with CEMA countries is higher compared to capitalist ones. On an average, for each ruble spent in the production of machines and equipment exported to CEMA countries our earnings are more than triple (in foreign exchange rubles) compared to exports to the West. In recent years, machines and equipment we shipped to the CEMA area accounted for over 10 billion rubles, whereas those exported to the developed capitalist countries accounted for no more than half a billion.

Let us emphasize, again and again, that the task of upgrading the efficiency of foreign economic cooperation is quite complex and we cannot adopt a "simplified" approach to it, for otherwise new illusions may be created. The example with Cuba is indicative in this respect. Statements have appeared in our country concerning the one-sided nature of relations with that country and the fact that huge funds are being wasted without any return and which, it is claimed, could immediately help to improve the economic situation of the USSR.

Were that such had been the case! Naturally, the Soviet Union is providing international aid to Cuba and other developing countries in a variety of ways. For example, Cuba receives credits (of some 5-7 billion rubles per 5-year period) and preferential prices for its goods. If we consider the problem as a whole, in accordance with the recently published data, the overall indebtedness of foreign countries to the Soviet Union totals nearly 86 billion rubles, 44 billion of which owed by CEMA members and other socialist countries. Unquestionably, this is an amount which makes us think, although it also proves that the aid we are providing is by no means free.

The essential question which arises in this connection is the following: Should we, to begin with, provide economic assistance to other countries? Practical experience provides the answer: we must, if we wish to be part of the system of global economic relations and participate in the work of international economic organizations. Indebtedness is a normal phenomenon in global practices. The entire question is how substantiated its limits are. The Soviet Union as well owes some $50-60 billion to the capitalist countries. There are many universal human problems, including that of underdevelopment. Participation in the solution of such problems is a feature of the level of civilization of any country. Naturally, such aid must be strictly linked to national economic possibilities. However, there is another side as well: economic interest. By participating in international economic organizations operating on the basis of "global rules," we obtain substantial economic preferences: loans, favorable trade conditions, and so on, not to speak of direct assistance as we received, for example, in connection with the earthquake in Armenia, or in financing purchases of meat and other goods from the FRG.

Therefore, one is amazed to see in many publications frequent articles emphasizing how much and at what prices we are supplying goods, including in the form of aid, while few articles come out objectively assessing what our country receives in return. Thus, we purchase from Cuba essentially sugar, nickel, cobalt concentrate, and citrus fruits, i.e., goods which we would have had to purchase for convertible currency.

Now as to volumes. Cuba supplies us with more than 4 million tons of sugar. This means, first of all, that one-third of the entire sugar consumed in the USSR is of Cuban origin; second, that in the immediate future the Cuban sugar market will become for us, most likely, the only one (for we have no available convertible currency). Soviet economists have estimated that about one-half of the cobalt which will be used in our country will have to be purchased from Cuba, for in the opposite case we would have to pay in convertible currency. Naturally, these are all conventional estimates and there may be other possible solutions to these problems.

Assessing economic phenomena is no simple matter. Let us consider perhaps the conflicting claim that we are purchasing from Cuba sugar at a price which is 10 times that charged on the world markets. In reality, the situation is as follows: this 5-year period we are paying for sugar 850 convertible rubles per ton. In recent years global prices have averaged 200 or even under 100 rubles per ton. We also know, however, that the United States and the common market countries purchase sugar from their regular suppliers in the Caribbean not at retail prices but at a special price which amounts to $450 or more per ton (about 300 rubles on the official rate of exchange). Such purchases, furthermore, are made in dollars.

Yet another approach is also possible in the case of purchases of Cuban sugar. We sell Cuba free-currency goods, essentially petroleum products and petroleum, at 168 rubles per ton, compared with global prices of 80 rubles (start of 1990). Sugar is a convertible currency commodity as well. Let us imagine that we receive and sell such goods at world prices. We are supplying Cuba with petroleum and petroleum products worth more than 2 billion rubles or $3.5 billion (official rate of exchange). By selling them on the world markets we would earn approximately 1.6-1.7 billion dollars. We purchase from Cuba 4.4 million tons of sugar annually. By purchasing sugar on the world markets at the price of

American purchases ($450 per ton) we would spend about $2 billion, not mentioning the fact that such huge amounts would simply blow up the market and bring about a sharp increase in prices. Let us not pursue such computations to their logical end, for all of them are quite conventional, although in the press a number of CEMA partners of the Soviet Union have been increasingly publishing articles in which efforts are made to prove that as a result of imperfect prices and computations, in the area of foreign trade the Soviet Union has shown and is still showing substantial economic benefits.

Nonetheless, it would be easy to prove that, as a whole, economic relations between the USSR and the CEMA countries are reciprocally advantageous. In the future as well they will continue to be of major economic significance to us. Whatever favorable trends our cooperation may follow with the capitalist world, in no case could such relations compensate for breaking up economic relations with our allies.

Radical Restructuring of Reciprocal Economic Ties

Naturally, we do not claim that everything in this area is as it should be and that one should be satisfied with the state of affairs. Otherwise we would not be facing the question of radical restructuring. The structure of foreign economic relations in which the Soviet Union played the role of the main supplier of fuel and raw material resources and the low technical standard of machines and equipment reflected on the market of CEMA countries, as well as the obsolete mechanism of the cooperation itself which, essentially, has become bilateral and a substantially barter-based exchange of goods with an inoperative collective currency—the transferable ruble—are all factors which are no longer consistent with the contemporary stage of development. Furthermore, cooperation ties in the manufacturing of noncompetitive goods have become unattractive to the various countries. The comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress of CEMA members, on which we relied heavily, did not work out.

Given those circumstances, the volume of trade between the USSR and the other CEMA members has not only not increased of late but is beginning to decline. Imperfect price setting in reciprocal trade and rigidity in the coordination of national economic plans were the reason for the fact that by the end of the 5-year period, as a result of the reduced prices of fuel and raw material goods, a negative balance of trade developed, totaling several billion rubles, and the USSR essentially became a debtor to its partners. This led to their heightened demand for the Soviet Union to correct its negative trade balance through additional deliveries of scarce resources.

Unquestionably, the origins of such negative phenomena lie not only in the imperfect nature of CEMA activities. Cooperation cannot be considered separately from the condition of foreign economic relations as a whole which, for the time being, provides no grounds for positive assessments. Of late, a great deal has been said, justifiably, concerning the need for sharply reorganizing the structure of imports in general and abandoning purchases of many types of investment equipment and of anything which we could do without today, in favor of purchasing consumer goods.

The structure of Soviet exports, with its clearly emphasized raw material aspect, is triggering growing discontent. Machines, equipment and transport facilities account today for 15 percent and, in exports to capitalist countries, for no more than 2 percent. Most foreign exchange is earned from the sale of petroleum and natural gas, despite the fact that world prices for these products have dropped significantly. The hope that the independence of associations and enterprises in exporting in the foreign markets would make them interested in increasing exports of machine-industrial goods was not justified.

To this day, Soviet foreign trade accounts for a very low share of the creation of the national income, no more than 6 percent, compared with 20 percent in a number of developed capitalist countries, European in particular. Our economic potential is equally inconsistent with the share of the USSR in global trade, which is under 4 percent.

The Soviet Union can no longer balance its payments without substantial foreign loans. Soviet indebtedness in hard currency is about 40 billion rubles and exceeds by more than 100 percent its annual revenue from the export of goods and services. The entire revenue from petroleum exports is insufficient to service the debt. Obviously, the reform in foreign economic relations being carried out in the USSR, which radically reorganized their structure, did not affect a number of profound processes in that area.

Above all, we are not developing an export base. Many decisions were made in this area but are not being implemented. A modern export base means, above all, a developed machine building industry, which steadily produces high quality competitive goods oriented toward specific countries and markets. For the time being, we have no such sectors and no one has undertaken to develop them.

Under such circumstances it becomes extremely difficult to restructure economic cooperation with the socialist countries. Production specialization and cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, and developing systems of direct ties as well as joint enterprises, companies and many other are based on the possibility of exporting modern goods. We must realize that a contemporary model of foreign economic relations will become even more real the faster we are able to surmount the crisis in the economy. A great deal remains to be done also in improving the mechanism used in managing such relations.

The necessary legal and organizational conditions for the Soviet enterprises, associations and cooperatives to export on foreign markets have been created. Problems

of the convertibility of the ruble, establishing special economic zones and organizing foreign exchange markets, auctions, marketing services, and so on, are being discussed. More than 10,000 participants in foreign economic activities have already been registered. About 1,500 joint enterprises have been established on Soviet territory.

Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that the new forms of interaction with foreign partners are being established slowly and with great difficulty. Thus, the freedom of enterprises to export in foreign markets was proclaimed. However, as in the past, their real opportunities remain limited because of numerous violations of already adopted resolutions and the fact that a number of problems have remained unsolved. Bartering has been prohibited. We do not know how the transfer of the earnings of foreign participants in joint enterprises will be organized: they do not need rubles and we have no convertible currency.

Distortions in price-setting, the nonconvertibility of the ruble and the lack of validity of its rate of exchange are holding back the development of new forms of foreign economic cooperation. The unskilled efforts of Soviet enterprises on foreign markets lead to price losses and low operational efficiency. Furthermore, extreme lack of discipline is being shown in the implementation of assumed obligations. A paradoxical situation develops. On the one hand, restrictions and excessive organization in some areas and, on the other, total permissiveness granted to many participants in foreign economic relations, cooperatives in particular.

In order to eliminate such excesses, we need a clear legislative foundation regulating foreign economic activities. It is important as of now to restructure the system of cooperation within CEMA. Work in this area has been under way for a few years. It is based on the idea of establishing a joint socialist market. However, a difference in the approaches of the individual countries on this matter have become apparent. This is objectively related to differences in the economic reforms, the different degree of development of domestic markets and so on. The 45th CEMA Session noted that establishing a united market is still premature. At the same time, the possibility of preserving the administrative-bureaucratic nature of CEMA, aimed at an intergovernmental decision-making level, was also rejected.

New Foundations for Cooperation

The Soviet delegation submitted suggestions which, we believe, open the way to laying a firm foundation under cooperation. Essentially, they are aimed at freeing CEMA from ideological ties and converting from intergovernmental and essentially barter operations to free trade based on global conditions, world prices and convertible currencies. The strongest argument in defense of preserving and strengthening economic relations could and should be reciprocal economic interest and reciprocal economic gravitation, rather than the idea of supplying the partners with fuel, raw materials, machines and equipment.

The new approach not only naturally stems from the course charted by the Eastern European countries of converting their economies to market systems but also raises the entire question of reciprocal relations based on economic interest. Heated discussions were held on the principles governing foreign trade price setting. As we know, until recently the CEMA members were guided in this matter by the resolutions of the Ninth CEMA Session (1958), according to which accounts are settled in the collective currency—the transferable rubles. Prices in such rubles were computed on the basis of global prices by recomputing the latter in accordance with the official rates of exchange of the ruble into freely convertible currencies. Considering the unrealistic nature of the rate of exchange, this triggered a number of problems. Essentially being the final prices for the 5-year period, they were then determined by averaging them by the entire preceding 5-year period. During that period the existing mechanism of cooperation had its positive aspects, for it protected the CEMA members from fluctuations in the capitalist market and provided stable figures for a 5-year period.

However, already during the first half of the 1970s, starting with the petroleum boom and the drastic increase in petroleum prices (the price reached 250 rubles per ton or went even higher), the Soviet Union proposed and the CEMA countries accepted the suggestion of an annual price review based on averaging for the previous 5 years. This made it possible efficiently to detect changes in fuel and energy prices, although more than enough problems related to such prices remained unsolved. These prices poorly reflected the economic interests of the partners.

Computations were being made in the Soviet Union to determine how much the country had failed to earn from its petroleum, compared with current world prices. The reason for this situation was that the averaged prices for the five previous years did not make it possible immediately to react to world price increases. The CEMA members as well made computations of their real losses from the increased petroleum prices (although slower compared to the rest of the world). The result was that both, paradoxically, were losing. However, the entire reason was that the computations were based on different parameters. Such differences are of no help to anyone.

Practical experience confirms that mutual trade can be organized only on the basis of current world prices. Prices must be not the result of computations but must be based on the reality of the world market. However, a conversion to global prices is by no means simple. It is not for nothing that in the course of the 45th CEMA Session its member countries unanimously asked for a preparatory period, best of all an entire 5-year period, to

be able to adapt to the new conditions. What was the problem here? Orientational data indicate that the balance in converting to current world prices would change in favor of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, what was necessary in this matter was to not determine who is losing but who was benefiting, for once again one could become involved in arguments based on different systems of coordinates. From some viewpoints the Soviet Union would benefit; from other it would merely be able to eliminate the losses which it is experiencing today because of imperfect prices.

This problem affects not only prices and computations. Conversion to a freely convertible currency will inevitably raise the question of a new type of organization of cooperation. In the past, in the course of the coordination of plans for 5-year periods, the central planning authorities included in their assessments the virtually entire range of reciprocal procurements. With the conversion to the market and exports on the foreign market by enterprises and associations, this mechanism changes. At this point not only the interests of the state as a whole but also the cost accounting interests of production collectives will be based on reciprocal trade. Computations in convertible currency make the situation even more complex.

What will be the basis of reciprocal relations among CEMA countries? Will they be based on foreign exchange clearing operations in which it is only the balance of the computations that is subject to conversion? Or else will these be acts of purchases and sales with real payments in foreign exchange (which, at this point, will be not only nominal, as was the case with the transferable ruble)? These problems as well should be considered. Apparently, there will be no problems in our country concerning the use of freely convertible currency in the sale of fuel and raw material resources. However, will the enterprises use such foreign exchange to purchase goods from their CEMA partners or would they not prefer to spend the currency on the Western European markets, bearing in mind the higher quality of the latter's goods? This could break down foreign trade relations in the area. Hence, incidentally, the aspiration of a number of countries to codify on the governmental level the marketing of their machine building output on the Soviet market.

Without denying such possibilities, the main solution should be to tighten up export sectors in CEMA member countries to the level of competitiveness compared with Western standards and to create an equal economic interest for cooperation within CEMA. This would be a powerful impetus for economic development. Initially there may occur a certain decline in reciprocal trade relations as a result of withdrawal from the market of noncompetitive goods. A transitional period is also needed to amortize the consequences of negative trends.

The participants in the 45th Session agreed that the nature of the transitional period and its duration will be determined by the countries on a bilateral basis. Drafting any kind of rigid and uniform model for all are hardy possible. We need a flexible mechanism within which any partner could find suitable forms of cooperation. Such a pluralistic model will not divide the countries into interested or uninterested in cooperation but will lay a firm foundation for improving the mutual profitability of relations.

Contemporary Mechanism of Mutual Relations

Obviously, a characteristic feature of the next 5-year period and, perhaps, even the one after it, will be the existence of two interrelated blocks. The first will be to define the parameters of cooperation on an intergovernmental level, by achieving agreements among governmental authorities about reciprocal procurements. Obviously, this could apply to the most important strategic goods, such as petroleum, natural gas, metal, and others. These are, essentially, forms of trade related to centralized decisions. The mutual profitability and balance of such mutual relations could be ensured by the fact that Soviet strategic resources will be compensated by other CEMA countries with equally important items, such as high quality food products and industrial consumer goods. Such counterdeliveries should also be guaranteed by the state. This will constitute a foreign exchange clearing operation.

It may be possible for the balance of payments which has developed, whatever its reasons, to be repaid in convertible currency (a conversion balance) or sold for foreign exchange. Naturally, in the course of time, as an adequate volume of commodities appears on the market of the CEMA countries, the field of action of the state authorities in defining the nature of reciprocal procurements will be gradually reduced.

The second block is that of developing ties on the level of direct relations among enterprises, associations, cooperatives, and so on. In this case we must grant production units the freedom to engage in entrepreneurial activities not only in defining the object of their cooperation but also in the areas of price setting, procurements, loans and other financial matters. That is precisely what real trade means. Wherever it will take place on the basis of freely convertible currency, we shall have to observe global conditions, including those governing the quality of the goods.

As the market of the CEMA members becomes increasingly saturated with goods, and as commodity producers offer such goods to its market in increasing amounts, one could presume that a kind of Eastern European free trade zone would emerge. It is difficult at this point to speak of the nature of its possible mechanism of action. In any case, we must not exclude the use in computations of national currencies, should the partners so desire, in addition to freely convertible currency. Naturally, proper conditions to this effect must be established.

It is a question, above all, of establishing realistic rates of exchange for the national currencies and introducing, initially perhaps partial but later total, convertibility of

such currencies. The establishment of a corresponding banking system, including joint banks, will become more necessary. Such banks would assume the obligation of overall balancing of commercial operations among enterprises. This would save them from purely barter relations which limit cooperation possibilities.

Free sales by enterprises not only in convertible but also in national currencies could be promoted by the joint banks. In regulating sales by, for instance, making changes in the rate of exchange ratios and other methods, such banks would ensure a balance in the overall volume of trade in the area of direct relations among enterprises and organizations. All of this will create prerequisites for adopting convertible national currencies. The search for commodities would be the concern of the enterprises themselves, within the framework of their direct relations.

In other words, we believe that the zone of mutual economic gravity of CEMA members and their mutual interests will not only not disappear but, under the new economic management conditions, will become gradually strengthened. With the development and growth of reciprocal interests, a gradual transition will be prepared for a socialist united market in the future.

Such reciprocal relations (which could be described as market relations) will not develop immediately. It is not for nothing today that no more than 1 or 2 percent of the Soviet trade with CEMA members is based on direct relations among enterprises. The free trade zone will develop as proper conditions to this effect are created. Therefore, the correlation between these two types of interaction would develop differently for the partner countries, at a different pace, in accordance with their economic management systems and their readiness to adopt new forms of cooperation.

Under the new circumstances, the center of gravity could shift to bilateral relations. The interested countries are also discussing the possibility of "small-scale" integration such as, for instance, among three to four Eastern European countries sharing a similar economic potential. Other complex problems appear, raised by reality, such as, for example, the developing processes of unification between the GDR and the FRG. A great deal has already been said about the political aspects of this phenomenon. What will it indicate from the economic viewpoint? What will be the attitude of a united Germany toward CEMA? An answer is as yet to be provided to this question, although as of now we can see the aspiration of West German companies to take over the ties which GDR combines had in the past and still do with their Soviet partners. If this would enhance the technical standard and quality of output reaching our market, such phenomena could be rated as positive. In any case, the economic activeness in the USSR-GDR-FRG triangle could be quite useful to our country.

What Should Be the Nature of CEMA?

Obviously, as an organization CEMA will remain necessary, although on an essentially new basis, free from old bureaucratic functions. In order better to understand the need for changing it, it would be expedient to travel into the past. The present structure of the CEMA machinery, which largely determines the nature of its activities, was established by the turn of the 1960s. At that time, on N.S. Khrushchev's initiative, the idea was discussed of turning CEMA into an international state plan. It was on the basis of this idea that the CEMA machinery was restructured, duplicating the structure of the then USSR Gosplan. Functional departments were created, headed by a coordinated system of sectorial departments. As we know, the idea of CEMA's supranationality failed but the structure of the system has been preserved to this day. This structure creates a gravitation toward the old methods and bureaucracy.

Today we need a different CEMA, with other functions. CEMA could and should provide all opportunities for the free discussion by its members of problems of economic and scientific and technical policy in areas of reciprocal interest. Within the framework of this organization we should continue jointly to discuss and develop problems of the mechanism of mutual trade, price setting, tariff systems and the creation of favorable conditions for direct cooperation among enterprises, companies and organizations in the individual countries. Drafting a variety of forecasts, studies of global circumstances and discussions of major joint projects would properly fit the new aspect of CEMA. CEMA could also extensively undertake to provide information activities and help enterprises in search of partners.

CEMA should also concentrate on problems of cooperation and assistance to economically less developed partners, such as Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia. Obviously, it would be expedient to channel increasingly such cooperation into gradual development of reciprocal profitability of cooperation and equal partnership relations.

The time has also come to review many programs adopted by CEMA, including that of production cooperation, and to do something about the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress. A great deal must also be changed in currency-financial and credit relations. Here as well we must coordinate it with global conditions. We believe that the joint banks of CEMA member countries—the International Investment Bank and the International Bank for Economic Cooperation—should be made more consistent with global practices and become more actively involved in the activities of international banks (wherever possible). It is equally necessary to review CEMA standards, which are substantially different from global practices. Most likely, many legal aspects of CEMA activities will be revised in accordance with global standards. Finally, we need new CEMA statutes, which should embody the modern aspect of this organization.

In brief, in the next few years CEMA should become a kind of business club in which interested partners would find the possibility of reaching cooperation agreements. As of today it is clear that CEMA must become an open organization not only in terms of membership but also from the viewpoint of the possibility of its members to participate in a variety of other economic organizations and groups. Naturally, the area of reciprocal economic gravitation of CEMA members should not clash with the implementation of their economic interests such as, for instance, cooperation with the Common Market, the European Free Trade Association, the GATT, the International Monetary Fund and other organizations. It is precisely on the basis of such pluralism of interests that a European economic area will be gradually developed.

This should be a subject of particular attention. Until now many CEMA partners had the idea of a certain incompatibility existing between reciprocal cooperation and the development of relations with the West. Hence the pointed formulation of the question of the reorientation of many relations toward the Western markets. Furthermore, even a certain competitiveness could be noticed in relations with the common market and in signing agreements. The conversion of the CEMA area into a free trade zone would ensure, we believe, the untangling of all such knots. As necessary conditions appear and by taking into consideration all the interests of the EEC and EFTA, they could openly and mutually profitably cooperate and trade with CEMA. It is difficult today to conceive in all details the course of development of such processes. Many problems are closely linked to our economic reform and the development of reforms in other countries.

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Realism Against Dogmas and Myths

905B0021P Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 121-124

[Review by I. Dedkov of the book "*Realizm—Zemlya Perestroyki*" [Realism—Land of Perestroyka] by A.N. Yakovlev. Selected speeches and articles. Politizdat, Moscow, 1990, 544 pp]

[Text] "In the interest of mental health..."

I do realize that the book is about something else—about the changes which are taking place in our country and throughout the world and their social and moral meaning. For some reason, however, also valuable in this book is this incidental aspect, as though, in fact, its purpose also includes such "prophylactic" interests.

And why not?

Debates on socialism, the party, the revolution and Lenin are increasing. Negation, both serious and coarse, unceremonious, and ignorant is spreading. As a reaction—from the other end—excited appeals are being heard to safeguard the ideals and principles, and to watch over the purity of ranks and defend the sacred concepts of State, Party, and Communism.

Indeed, it is not recommended to change ideals and principles in accordance with the political climate. The author of this book is precisely not one of those who, in answer to the question of socialism, playfully and mysteriously raises his shoulders. To him "socialism," and "socialist ideal" are living concepts which have withstood severe trials and have lost neither their attractiveness nor their prospects.

However, the word "realism," which is part of the title of the book, is not accidental but programmatic. We could add next to it other key words, such as "common sense" and "truth."

Indeed, convictions should not be lost even under the pressure of the majority. However, to question them, to test the viability and accuracy of even the most sacred concepts by dropping them on our sinful and real earth is not only a moral obligation but also a requirement of intellectual "hygiene" and honesty.

The longer such an investigation was delayed and prohibited, and the more cowardly we avoided it—for decades—the more inevitable it became and the more upheavals did it create for the country, the people and the party.

"Revolution and evolution," "revolution in ordinary life and the mind," is the way A.N. Yakovlev describes what is happening without, naturally, ignoring the extent to which such a comprehensive revolutionary process may be painful and conflicting, a process which replaced the inviolable stability of the legendary "moral-political unity."

Whereas in the conflict between ideas and passions and the spreading and reciprocal repulsion of extremes the art of politics requires a certain averaging, a balancing, a tightening tactical line, the parallel search for the truth, and the uncompromising aspiration to reach it inevitably are of a less pragmatic nature, retaining a certain autonomy and specific dignity.

The "ideology of renovation," which cannot be conceived outside of the search of and reaching for the truth is not an alien task to the author of this book but a profoundly personal matter, an imperative of conscience and destiny, a categorical demand of life, tired of dogmas and scholasticism and the long and organized simplification and abbreviation of anything that pertains to a live human life. I could have said that the "ideology of renovation" is the main topic of the book. However, it would be more accurate to say that this is its main developing topic which reaches its peak in his speech on the French Revolution and the "preliminary remarks" to the book, dated December 1989. The renovated or

renovating ideology is not presented as something completed, infallible and monolithic. Rather, it is considered, it is expanded and, which is most important and valuable, it is developed within us, expecting not any obedience or subordination of the minds but joint consideration, co-authorship and joint action. Both, naturally, are impossible if the proposed ideas are rejected and if the "ideology of coercion" (A.N. Yakovlev) instilled in many minds is frightened by the air of freedom and simple humanity, and not by any "professional-party" language. It becomes impossible for other reasons as well, such as acceptance of the hateful and inflated way of thinking which, through its extreme simplification of historical mechanics of the revolution and all subsequent events, was compared to the most wretched and low explanations concerning history and man. To expect an understanding in such cases is out of the question, and so are any lofty objections. Nor does this belong to the policy of dissidence but to the basic moral principles, to the attitude toward man who, finally, is being acknowledged as being the "highest value" of socialism, "not only in general but also in terms of extremely specific, individual aspects." According to Yakovlev, the ideology of renovation, without a firm moral foundation and without the priority of the universally human over the class, the national and the regional, cannot bring anything new and good to the people.

Also included in the book is a historical essay the content and specific nature of which are unlike the political-philosophical structure of the book. The characters are the Russian Dukhobors in Russia and Canada, unruly, untamable in their faith, "a purple loosestrife swimming against the current." Their dramatic fate, suffering and fanatical spiritual and moral heroic endeavors and sacrifice as well as love of life, industriousness and loyalty to family amazed the author. Why is it that despite all their suffering caused by the church and the authorities these people did not sink into a "dark despair and universally hating extremism?" Where did this firmness in professing a positive way of life come, protected from any lies, deceit and violence? Does this mean that industriousness and charity are indestructible, despite the best efforts of hostile circumstances? Does it mean that we are underestimating the strength of the human spirit and man's inexhaustible efforts "to reject the heavy burdens of deceit and suppression, and to reach beyond the limits of universally accepted yet hypocritical and unfair standards which depress and belittle man?" Does it mean that one can live in such a way, that there are "strict requirements toward oneself" and a lack of any whatsoever aspiration toward other, and for "labor and charity rather than destructiveness and confrontation to have the upper hand in surmounting evil?"

The explanation is simple: this is a sect and no more than that, a narrow strip of humanity and should they serve as an example?

It is not a question of an example yet an example it is: the example of the great opportunities of the human spirit, not only in defending convictions but also in structuring practical life in accordance with a lofty moral ideal.

If this entire book is viewed as an integral statement, in it the Dukhobors turn out to be more than an incidental mention, having deepened and intensified the feeling of something which could be described as the ethics of perestroyka, its spiritual space and meaning.

I am not referring to ordinary "sets of problems" or "emotions:" I am referring to something which more accurately and more extensively corresponds to an emotional upsurge and stress, which we find in this text.

For all too long and for many people, as the author says, ethics was "burdensome." Elementary morality was taken out of the social sphere as an obstacle to superior political considerations. It is no accident that, again and again, everything that takes place in society—mores and opinions, methods of party work, facts and events, debates in the press, and so on—is subjected to a mandatory moral evaluation. It is by this token that A.N. Yakovlev asserts that the free life of the country outside a moral law and open moral justice, without truth, without self-cleansing and repentance is impossible. He is convinced that socialism will advance "the faster the more consciously we resolve problems of the **morality** of economics, the **morality** of social life, the **morality** of all practical work." Perestroyka "rejects moral double dealing. It restores morality in everything, not excluding politics."

More than any other country, our country has become accustomed to lofty and abstract words, words-slogans, words-incantations and exaggerations. We have become tired of them, including the "holiest" among them. However, the time has come when once again one wishes to believe in words, when one needs to believe in them and therefore, relying on them, change one's life, a time when one would like to repeat after the author: yes, we have begun to live "perhaps a more difficult life but then live more honestly, more openly. We have become intolerant of lies, of denigration of our dignity." This is a time when words of a revived feeling of freedom in a free country are accepted as a formula worth supporting.

Our "humanistic vision of socialism" "is above all the ethics of actively transforming attitude toward life." It may appear that this is once again a coupling of abstractions but what a great new reality in life and opportunity opens behind such boring and memorized words! It is true that words die and are reborn depending on the historical context and to us, who live today in a time of strike committees, people's fronts and a reorganizable party, words such as the "ethics of active efforts," "ethics of initiative," "ethics of a daring invasion into life" no longer seem beautiful sounding abstractions. According to the author, these are structural components of true socialist ethics, which destroy the slavish morality of passiveness, obedience and immobility. "The complex of the small, the voiceless man disappears." He is disappearing but has not as yet disappeared. He could

return and this could be accomplished just as easily and nothing could be easier, but he is disappearing! This is precious to the author, it is his joy. What else is there to be truly happy about if not the gradual "humanizing of life," but so slowly, with such monstrous explosions of accumulated hatred, cruelty, dissatisfaction and aggressiveness....

I believe that this book focuses within itself the hopes, moods and thoughts of many of those who, to the extent of their possibilities and in accordance with the situation throughout the country aspired for the liberation of the socialist idea and practice from the iron clutches of dogmatism, the "administrative rings tightening a living society," and the mind-paralyzing historical and modern myths.

Perestroyka has a collective author. However, a collective means people, names and not something anonymous without a face or expression. Every person has his own prejudices, destiny and area of activities where he knows more, he can do more and understand better. These areas in Yakovlev, to the best of my judgment, are two: international relations and that which is generally described as the spiritual area, implying not only ideology, science and art but anything which, in general, is related to the live, the steady pulsing of human thought and a feeling of morality. That is actually what makes man precisely what he is, establishing the line of his personal and civic behavior and defining the daily moral choices to be made and systems of ethical values. In other words, it is the area of freedom which is narrow, distorted, pressured and persecuted but is insurmountable and, in the final account, unyielding, for which reason the most important changes in the social and economic structure, the very content of the objectives pursued by society and its moral rules and ideals are related to it, begin with and are dependent on it.

To the author the spiritual sphere is, above all, a sphere of the mind, of culture, health, freedom and destiny. Yes, destiny and, therefore, motion which is illuminated or darkened, going up or down, wisely flexible and direct and self-satisfied, scorning tiresome reality....

The "ideology of coercion" relied on prohibitions, suppressing dissidence and teaching people to be "silent." It protected not only the peace of the authorities but also that of the state-party thinking, based on faith, dogmas and myths. It was precisely dogmatism and myth-making that, to the author of this book, are the first and most dangerous obstacles to the free and healthy development not only of socialist theory but also of the entire spiritual life of society. Dogmatism, as defined by Yakovlev, means "authoritarian way of thinking raised to the level of a political, moral and intellectual principle," derived from "a totalitarian political mentality" which contributes to "its preservation and consolidation." For a long time dogmatism served the "regime of personal power." Today it "meets the interests of those who are not interested in social changes, who personally benefit from the status quo, who are unwilling or unable to meet the challenges of our time, ignoring the new phenomena in life."

However, the dogmatic ideology of Stalinist and the subsequent years would have been repulsively dry and entirely lifeless had the uplifting addition borrowed from the latest mythology not existed. "The cultivation of myths," the author says, of "myths-naivetes, myths-errors, and myths-illusions," "was turned into a stream; it became part of the political process."

Without myths how could Stalin and his lackeys have been able to conceal the true expressions on their faces, duplicated throughout the country, down to the last public library? How else could a great nation of a great country have been deceived?!

It is no exaggeration to say that "the reorganization of the work to demythologize the mind and practical activities was a step of tremendous basic significance." "The realism of the perception of myths is the scientific, psychological and moral foundation of democracy." That is what can truly oppose the chronic mirages affecting the human mind.

It cannot be said that despite the successes of glasnost our society is oversaturated with the direct, precise and unequivocal characteristics of our past, whose shadow is "terrorizing" us to this day.

We are familiar with the argument that "the dead will not come back to life but the reputation of the party will suffer." What this means is that one of the holies will suffer. The author answers: "Political, moral and humanistic commitments reject this approach.... A reputation is not acquired and maintained by concealing inconvenient truths."

The answer is simple but the old idea of authority endures. It is the stronger the more the people "yield to bacchanals of artificial enthusiasms and live with the ideology of myth making." In a crowd of religious fanatics this may be explainable but in the party?! In a party which "has assumed responsibility... no such thing is needed."

(If it is not needed it means that it is outside the bounds of morality. Beyond such bounds anything "holy" means nothing.)

It is obvious to the author of this book that the revival of the party and its authority in the eyes of the people are possible only with total frankness and strict and fearless assessment of its path. He deems necessary clearly to say that in 1928 the Stalinist "revision of the very essence of Leninism" was undertaken. Stalin deadened the "principles of socialist humanism with the idea of permanent confrontation," retaining the Marxist "ritual" ("the appearance of faith!"). He asserted the "polarity of words and actions" ("the evil fact!") and ordered a life which "cannot be described" from the human viewpoint: "It is difficult to synthesize concepts such as social

cannibalism, Cainism, Herostratism, the sin of Judas in its completed development, from the betrayal of the teacher to the betrayal of the father, something which cannot be found even in the holy books."

The tremendous trouble was that the Stalinist revision and Stalinist mythological socialism were not only codified after the 1930s but also spread "like fire all the way to most recent times."

In our days the danger of a new "mythologizing" our support of the old has not disappeared. Particularly widespread are becoming the myths of conservatism, the characteristics of which may be found in the book. Legends of the Stalinist "socialism" (unity, order, prosperity, enthusiasm) enter into a strange emotional and tactical alliance with the ideas of a nationalistic and restorative trend. They constitute the latest simplification of history, life and people and, as always, these new but, actually, refined myths are addressed to the trusting, the confused and uncritical minds. As always, they make use of individual and social dissatisfaction and ignorance, and lead a parasitical existence on the back of common difficulties and misfortunes and social and ethnic conflicts.

Let us memorize the warning in the book: if perestroyka and its supporters remain passive in the face of difficulties, the "destructive trends in the economic and moral and political areas could assume some irreparable features." At that point, we shall be threatened not simply by a return to the period of stagnation: we will be facing an "aggressive and vengeful conservatism which will be triumphant in its victory."

No delusions are possible about precisely such qualities of conservatism. The very nature of criticism or, more accurately, the attacks mounted against A.N. Yakovlev in some publications is proof of the fact that he is not forgiven the "different expression on his face," and his belief and accuracy of analysis but, above all, I would think, a clear and talented defense of democracy, the socialist ideal and the free man in a free and humane country.

In a recent discussion on the occasion of 200 years of lessons learned from the French Revolution, the speaker could not remain merely an accurate historian. Behind us is the experience of our own revolution and around us is the alarming reality of our daily life. Wherever we may look, everything demands truthful and accurate judgments: the experience of the dead, the blood which was shed is wasted if they teach us nothing. The current condition of mankind and the level reached by mankind allow us to see and understand a great deal better in a merciless moral light, without one-sidedness and bias.

Among others, in his report "The Great French Revolution and Our Time" the author spoke of the "revolutionary romanticism," which prevents us from "realistically seeing the antihumane aspects of some events" of the revolution and the threat of enhancing both the "social bottom" and the "immorality of pseudorevolutionism," as well as the tragic consequences of the "scarcity of social knowledge," and revolutions which suffered a great deal because "baseness adapted itself to nobility," while "ignorance and cynicism" adopted its slogans....

Perhaps, however, the most important conclusion was the following:

"The idea of violence as a swaddling nurse of history wore itself out, as did the idea of the power of dictatorship directly based on violence.

"In 1,000 years of civilization no one has ever been able to build a society worthy of man through violence, which could create only violence. A moral, free and creative man cannot be made with a whip or a truncheon, a jail cell or fear."

Is it not high time to agree with this?!

The author's "preliminary remarks" with which this book opens (many of the articles and speeches have never been published before), include the following words: "To me perestroyka is not only a social but a personal matter. I deeply believe in its historical necessity. Any turning back would be catastrophic. We can and must surmount everything, all doubts and difficulties, and show maximum endurance and purposefulness but move forward, only forward."

I believe that nothing could be added to this and that this requires no comment. These words are personal but I too share them. They indicate that the choice has been made once and for all.

Short Book Review

905B0021Q Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 124-126

[Text] Li Dazhao. "*Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya*" [Selected Works]. Translated from the Chinese. N.G. Senin, compiler and author of the preface. Nauka, Main Editorial Board for Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1989, 488 pp. Reviewed by Academician S. Tikhvinskiy.

In the course of his short life (he was executed by the Beijing reactionaries in 1927, at age 37) Professor Li Dazhao, the initiator of the communist movement in China, wrote a large number of theoretical and journalistic works, the study of which was made possible to the Soviet readers thanks to their translation into Russian on the occasion of the centennial of Li Dazhao's birth, done by a collection of Sinologists from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and the Far East. More than one generation of Chinese communists was raised on Li Dazhao's works. Many of his works have remained topical to this day; their large editions are being reprinted, discussed and read in the PRC.

In the preface to the "*Selected Works*," we find a detailed presentation of the career and creative work of this Chinese revolutionary; the work also includes Dazhao's

autobiography, which he wrote in jail, on the eve of his execution. In referring the readers to such materials, which describe the character of this fearless organizer of the "movement for a new culture" and the "movement of 4 May" 1919, the head of the first Marxist circle and one of the founders of the Communist Party of China, let us consider a number of aspects of Li Dazhao's theoretical legacy.

A revolution in the outlook of this young Chinese revolutionary democrat occurred under the influence of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary experience in Russia and the upsurge in the national liberation struggle waged by the Chinese people by the turn of the 1920s. Soon afterwards he became a convinced propagandist of Marxism.

Li Dazhao particularly emphasized the humanistic views of Marx who, in his views, believed that "the first page of the real history of mankind begins with its economic organization, structured on the principles of reciprocal aid" (p 193). In connection with this concept, Li Dazhao wrote: "...I am convinced that human life will develop not through wars and aggressions but on the basis of friendship and mutual aid" (p 194). Li Dazhao dealt in many of his works with the description of and comments about Marxist political economy, the materialistic understanding of history and the theories of the class struggle and socialism. He firmly rejected the accusation of the opponents of Marxism according to which Marxism rejects the moral category (see p 221). Socialist morality concepts, such as mutual aid and fraternity, never wither away," Li Dazhao wrote, asserting that "in the transitional period we must intensify moral and humanistic work in order to uproot anything which is base and which was instilled in man in the past" (pp 221-222). In another of his works, he writes: "The type of morality which we need today is not divine, religious or classical morality. It is not the private-ownership or aggressive morality; we need a human morality which is ennobled, a practical morality, the morality of great unity, mutual aid and construction!" (p 254).

Li Dazhao's approach to Marx's theory was specific-historical in its nature; he repeatedly noted that "Marx's doctrine is the product of a specific age" (p 222). In speaking of the ideals of socialism, in lectures to his students in Beijing, as early as the 1920s, Li Dazhao emphasized that "since the new system must include both the general and the specific... since it will have to build under different circumstances at all times and at any place, it will be distinct in China from the one built in England, Germany or Russia..." (p 312). In discussing the specifics of semicolonial China, oppressed by the imperialist powers, the revolutionary scientist deems necessary, for the sake of establishing socialism in the country, to unite with the Chinese middle bourgeoisie in order to get rid of foreign oppression and make China an independent country.

In 1921, in his article "The Past and the Present of the Russian Revolution," Li Dazhao included Lenin's biography and listed 19 of Lenin's most important theoretical works. In addition to the other qualities of the leader of the Bolshevik Party, he pointed out the indivisibility of his life from the Great Russian Revolution. In 1924, in addressing funeral meetings on the occasion of Lenin's death, Li Dazhao described him as "the most noble and most humane of people, who had dedicated himself to the service of mankind," and as the liberator of the oppressed peoples of the world, to whom his death is a great loss, particularly severe in the case of oppressed Oriental nations, such as China.

Li Dazhao welcomed the February and, particularly, the October Revolution in Russia, noting their impact on China. "The hot red blood of the Russians sweeps off today the entire trash accumulated over many years in Russian political life and irrigates the shoots of freedom in our country.... We must follow the example of the Russians, awaken and organize our internal affairs," Li Dazhao wrote (p 105).

In defending the Russian Revolution against the attacks of those who saw in it nothing but chaos, he said that the Russian Revolution marks changes in the awareness not only of Russians but of all mankind in the 20th century. "We must proudly welcome the Russian Revolution as the light of a new civilization. We must closely listen to news from the new Russia which is being built on the basis of the principles of freedom and humanism.... We should not feel depressed by temporary disorder in today's Russia!" (p 147).

In arguing against Hu Shi, the representative of the bourgeois-liberal wing, who had sharply attacked the supporters of Marxism and the October Revolution, Li Dazhao openly asserted his support of "Russian bolshevism." This was an act of the greatest courage under the conditions of colonial China, whose government was an obedient tool of imperialism.

In his lectures, speeches and articles, the scientist called upon China's youth to study Russian literature, the distinguishing features of which, according to him, were its clearly manifested social coloring and the fact that "it is imbued with lofty humanism" (p 148). "The new literature which we support," he wrote, "should be socially significant and not only serve the purpose of glorifying the author; it must be humanistic and not individualistic.... Great ideas and theories, firm principles, a brilliant standard and a spirit of humanism are the grounds, the foundations for the movement for a new literature" (pp 254-255).

Li Dazhao's humanistic convictions were also manifested in his approach to China's place in world history. He was a warm supporter of a rapprochement between Eastern and Western civilizations. He called upon the young to struggle against nationalistic egotism and arrogance and not to boast about how old Chinese civilization was and how large the population of the country was

but work for China to be able, under the new contemporary conditions, to make a worthy contribution to global civilization (see p 144). This Chinese revolutionary sharply condemned the Pan-Asian doctrines of the Japanese military and racial discrimination in Europe and the United States (see pp 165-166).

As the representative of the progressive intelligentsia, Li Dazhao was a zealous defender of the toiling masses of China, of the working class and the peasantry. He claimed that "the purpose of democracy is not only to meet the political requirement of universal electoral rights or the implementation of the economic principle of equal distribution of material goods. It also implies equal rights to education for anyone and equal opportunity to make use of the achievements of culture, meeting the human need for knowledge" (p 177). Based on personal experience, Li Dazhao was well acquainted with the life of the miners in the Tangshan Coal Mines and the railroad workers of Northern China and in his journalistic works called for making their unbearable toil easier. He was the first to acquaint in detail the Chinese public with the history of May Day and to organize the first May Day celebration in China.

Unquestionably, he holds first place in the Marxist development of the agrarian problem in China. As early as 1919, he wrote that China is an agrarian country and that since the majority of its working people are peasants, there could not even be a question of the liberation of the nation without their liberation. Several of his studies were a detailed analysis of the agrarian problem, the contemporary condition and the future of the peasant movement and the formulation of tasks relative to the work of the CPC in the countryside.

Many of the works included in this collection dealt with popularizing the materialistic understanding of history. The reader will be interested in the views of this Chinese Marxist concerning the objectives and tasks of the science of history, the interconnection between history and philosophy, the influence of the science of history on the outlook of the people and the author's profound considerations relative to the concept of time in history.

Li Dazhao's "*Selected Works*" acquaint us not only with his theoretical legacy but also the history of China at the turn of the 20th century and the rich cultural traditions of the Chinese people. Unquestionably, they will be of interest to the readers.

On the Traces of a Letter

905B0021R Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 90 (signed to press 6 Apr 90) pp 127-128

[Report by N. Klyukhin]

[Text] The letter addressed to the editors was quite sharp, containing accusations addressed against the Krasnogvardeyskiy CPSU Raykom, Moscow, and quite unflatteringly rating the party as a whole. The author, Ye. Naumov, a carpenter working for the Moskomplektmebel Association, claimed that "you, communists, think one thing, say something else and have in mind something else again." The letter, however, had a specific topic: violation of the rules of regulations governing itinerant trade in scarce goods and a condescending attitude shown by the raykom toward such cases.

The editors sent Naumov's letter to the Moscow City Party Committee, which answered as follows:

"It has been established that on 4 June 1989 the enterprise's collective was issued by the rayon soviet executive committee 10 vouchers for the purchase of leather jackets from the Belgrad store, which were to be purchased that same day. Together with the women's council, the trade union committee conducted a survey to determine the number of people who wanted to purchase such jackets, mainly among members of the party-trade union aktiv. At a subsequent party bureau meeting, the heads of the public organizations justified this citing the extremely limited time they had to inform the entire collective of the opportunity for such a purchase and the insignificantly small number of vouchers issued. Let us note that the association's working people, workers essentially, were sold 143 jackets in 1987 and 50 in 1988. The first who purchased the jackets on 4 June included N.Yu. Ogurtsova, trade union committee chairman, and L.Ye. Savinov, the party bureau secretary, both of whom had worked at the enterprise for more than 10 years.

"In the course of the sale at the enterprise on 28 September 1989, durable goods which had not been offered for sale were found. The association's administration took immediate steps to sell these goods to the enterprise personnel and to punish those who had violated trade regulations. With association order dated 3 October 1989, a reprimand was issued to Economist N.I. Zinkovskaya and a remark to M.V. Trifonova, trade union committee deputy chairman. A strict warning was issued on 6 October 1989 to V.N. Mosharev, deputy general director, and to V.A. Levin, department chief, by decision of the trade union committee. The investigation of the violation, conducted by the BKhSS [Department of the Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation], Krasnogvardeyskiy RUVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Administration] did not indicate any criminal violations.

"Based on the investigation of the violation of the rules of itinerant trade, made at the expanded party bureau session on 16 November 1989, in July and September 1989 party members M.V. Trifonova and N.I. Zinkovskaya were reprimanded; V.N. Mosharev and V.A. Levin were criticized; N.Yu. Ogurtsova was issued a warning; and L.Ye. Savinov, party bureau secretary, was issued instructions.

"Ye.N. Naumov, the author of the letter, was acquainted with the answers of the commission, the orders of the

administration and the resolutions of the public organizations on the violation of itinerant trade regulations; nonetheless, he deems them insufficient.

"The following resolution was passed at a joint meeting of the technical control service, the trade union committee and the party bureau, held on 11 December 1989, with the participation of senior workers from the AUCCTU and the Moscow City Trade Union Committee and the author of the letter: to accept the steps already taken by the administration and the public organizations of the association, aimed at improving the organization of ambulatory trade and no longer to consider at the meetings of the collective petitions submitted by Ye.N. Naumov, which he signed on behalf of the association's workers (there were 57 votes for, none against and Naumov abstained).

"The claim of the author of the letter that no steps were taken by the party raykom concerning the managers-party members who violated the discipline are inconsistent with the facts. In 1989 alone 107 party members, including 17 managers, were issued party reprimands by the control-auditing commission of the rayon party organization for a variety of violations of statutory rules."

Understandably, many nuances of these events were not included in the overall picture. We made an effort to clarify them in order to provide the full picture.

Ye. Naumov is a person known to the raykom, above all because for the past few years he has been writing letters to various authorities—party, soviet, trade union and law enforcement. To one extent or another the personnel of the rayon committee has had to deal with him. They have met with him frequently without being able to determine precisely the type of person he is: is he a lover of the truth or simply a lover of "exposures." ...He has written letters on different subjects and now he has concentrated on the last two sales. He described them to the rayon prosecutor's office, the party raykom and gorkom, our journal, the Moscow City Trade Union Committee and the AUCCTU. This makes us consider the extent to which, in general, such a trading method is expedient and efficient. However, this is a separate topic. Our present discussion is concerned with the ethical-party aspect of the matter.

Admittedly, the answer of the Moscow City Party Committee amazed us somewhat: there is a general shortage, empty shelves and yet, under such circumstances, those who are able to acquire something for themselves, making use of their official position and party rank, are almost treated sympathetically, while the person who exposes is the one who is blamed. We were also amazed at the attitude displayed by the raykom and gorkom personnel toward this case.

A. Cherkashin, secretary of the Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon Party Committee: "Naturally, bearing in mind the gravity of the current situation the measures could have been stricter. However, the case was discussed at a general trade union meeting, the council of the labor collective, the trade union committee and the party bureau and all of them, on the basis of the specific situation, agreed with its assessment. Our view is that in any conflict we must listen to the opinion of the majority."

V. Kotov, first deputy head of the organizational-party and cadre work department, Moscow City Party Committee: "Yes, the case with the jackets includes elements of moral unscrupulousness. Basically, the party and trade union leaders were only mildly taken to task. The gorkom could have imposed stricter penalties. However, the primary party organization would hardly be able to understand us. A new style of relations is currently developing between the elected authorities and the primary party levels: we try to issue guiding instructions as rarely as possible, to trust them more and not to violate their independence."

We also rang up Ye. Naumov. He refused to meet with the editors (as, previously, he had refused to meet with the personnel of the party raykom and gorkom). On the telephone he said: "I am not interested in their jackets. This is a matter of principle. Generally speaking, I do not trust you. I have reached an agreement with an informal organization which is monitoring the factory. It may take us 1 or 2 years before everything comes to the surface."

Unfortunately, this is one of the many stories described in letters to the editors. In this case, we are presenting the facts as they are. It seems to us that no detailed comments are necessary. The view taken by the author of the letter may even seem extremist. However, could it be that the situation itself and the way it was interpreted are encouraging him to adopt such views?

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