


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15 NOVEMBER 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

***KOMMUNIST***  
***No 13, September 1989***

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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## DISCUSSIONS

### **Toward a New Image of Socialism**

905b0004A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian  
No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 3-24

[Text] *The concept of the renovated socialist society which we are building, with 70 years of extremely rich and instructive experience behind us, is the central point of our present theoretical studies and, simply, civic considerations. Concentrated in them are the intellectual forces of the entire society and the features of that image which combines within itself the ideas of Marx and Lenin, the experiences of the first years of the Soviet system, the experience of our friends in the fraternal countries, the universal human values and the principles of the new political thinking, gradually developing into a specific system of views and a theoretical concept of socialism consistent with the loftiest democratic and humanistic criteria of our time. This work, which was initiated by the leadership of the Communist Party, was continued at the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the CPSU Central Committee plenums.*

*The purpose of this article is not to draw the picture of the new society in its details. It sums up already formulated concepts and points out the new aspects of the problem which have emerged on the foreground today. This is merely the beginning of a discussion, a survey of existing views. In offering the readers this article, prepared by members of the editorial board together with scientists from the social science section of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who discussed said problems at a special seminar, *KOMMUNIST* is hoping for a fruitful discussion.*

### **Socialism and Contemporary Civilization**

There are various ways in which one could conceive of the future of the socialist society and earmark plans for its development. However, the measure of realism and responsibility of such thoughts and projections largely depend on the extent to which they take into consideration the actual interconnection and relations within the contemporary world.

For more than 7 decades the world has been divided into two social systems. However, does this conflict with the already historically completed division within the existing single human civilization? Naturally, it does not, for in preserving the essential systemic, regional and national differences, the outlines of a new civilized community, the growth of its interdependence and reciprocal interests, strengthening and mutually profitable cooperation and peace, and the humanizing of all aspects

of social life are becoming increasingly clear. This is one of the important features of the new age which mankind is entering at the turn of the millennium.

Naturally, it would be difficult at the very start of the new age of the universal-historical process to define its content in its entirety. Nonetheless, the main features and trends have become quite clear, combining continuity in the basic trend of the socialist ascent of mankind, i.e., the transition from capitalism to socialism, with a series of essentially new characteristics of the present historical time. That is why, along with the natural change of systems, also included in the content of our age are the renovation of socialism, the identification of its potential, the historical competition with capitalism under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, the confirmation of the fact that socialism can give man more than any other sociopolitical system. Also included are profound socioeconomic and political reorganizations in the world, related to the struggle waged by the progressive forces against exploitation and all forms of social alienation and national oppression and for the normalizing of international relations and the assertion within them of universal human values and standards of morality.

This is an age of the struggle for the survival of civilization, the elimination of all wars from the life of mankind and the efficient solution of the gravest global problems. Finally, it is an age of growing interdependence within a contradictory world, advancing through a number of levels toward a growing integrity, in which all progress must be part of the universal human interests and in which all countries and nations must seek together its common criteria, based on the freedom of their own political and social choice and peaceful coexistence as the foundation for global community life.

Such a perception of the world is, essentially, a change of paradigms in the understanding and interpretation of the world. It could be said that the tragic increase in the disparity between its real aspect and our understanding has been, to say the least, halted. The acknowledgment of the variety and many-faceted nature of the world, pluralism and social forms, which have a significant self-development potential, has become, along with an awareness of the priority of universal human interests, one of the starting points for the new political thinking. This thinking is aimed at laying the common civilizing foundations of interaction among socioeconomic systems and the joint resolution of common problems which demand investing and multiplying our efforts in the interest of each one of them and, above all, in the interests of all mankind.

Each social system develops in accordance with its own laws but within the limits of a single civilization. Interaction and cooperation do not eliminate in the least competition and rivalry between capitalism and socialism or the objective differences separating them. Despite noticeable changes in the system of its own social relations, capitalism remains a system based on

the domination of private ownership and the generating of added value, with all corollary major threats to the global community. However, we are trying to shift from a confrontational opposition to competitiveness in the search and formulation of forms of social progress which would be better consistent with the interests of society and man. The Marxist belief in the advantages of a socialist organization of society is not a barrier but, conversely, an incentive for the extensive and intensive interaction between the two systems, only in the course of which we can determine the comparative value of the suggested practical solutions, which frequently enrich and supplement each other.

There is no doubt whatsoever that autarchy and a closed system at best impoverish socialism and at worse lead to its decline, for as we renovate socialism we are not developing some kind of "antiworld" but are building a new society, relying not only on its internal and as yet not entirely identified forces, but also on all progressive achievements of contemporary civilization.

As a new social system, socialism can take shape, function and go through the various stages toward its maturity not in a state of alienation but of interaction with all other social structures in the contemporary world. This seemingly elementary truth has become exceptionally topical today.

It has become axiomatic that any social progress in our age is indivisible from the solution of the biggest global problems and that, essentially, it is a universal measure of global integrity. The characteristics of the contemporary age, in the course of which the new civilization is being shaped, is the fact that the interdependence today has assumed a qualitatively different and much more profound and truly global nature. That is precisely why today we must take a new look at the contradictions in global developments and understand them as a global system with its interacting various structural components.

In the first place, it is a question of the inner contradictions within individual societies, which determine the mechanism of their dynamics. Equally important, however, are the contradictions of interrelationships, of interactions and reciprocal relations. The formulation of the question of the system of such contradictions in itself removes stereotypical concepts of the so-called parallel development of socioeconomic systems. As we study each one of them today we can no longer ignore interaction with the historical opponent. The general conditions of our age are manifested within capitalist as well as socialist society. It is precisely these profound changes that were the foundations for the formulation of a number of basic questions: Could capitalism exist without militarism and neocolonialism; could outside influence block the most dangerous, egocentric and narrow-class manifestations of the nature of imperialism? However, that same qualitatively new standard of interdependence and, perhaps, increased intensiveness of interaction among different systems turned out to be

a common background for a self-critical formulation by the Soviet communists of the question of the development of socialism.

After the victory of the October Revolution, it seemed to many Marxists that the universal triumph of socialism would come about relatively quickly. History took a different path, which was more complex and twisted. Lenin's historical merit is that he was able to see and evaluate the trend toward the long-term coexistence and interaction between socially heterogeneous social systems. Based on this approach, Vladimir Ilich spoke out in favor of making use of foreign concessions. He spoke of the objective need of developing economic relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries. He emphasized that this need is stronger than the will and desire of any given class or party. Such a view on global realities around us also largely contributed to the formulation of the new economic policy.

Subsequently, other views prevailed, which grossly simplified global reality. The world was mechanically divided into two parts. Relations between social systems began to be interpreted as a polarized confrontation between independent and autonomous worlds, camps and markets. Such concepts conflicted with the universal nature of global economic relations, the economic interdependence among countries and the process of development of global culture. The new political thinking calls for surmounting such vulgarized views.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that contemporary socialism can develop only within a varied and increasingly integral world rather than by opposing it. The full inclusion of the new social system within the system of international relations is an important facet of the specifically Leninist understanding of the socialist ideal. Therefore, the new thinking justifiably considers the strengthening of the consolidating and integrational principles in the material and spiritual areas of the contemporary world as one of the main motive forces of the renovating socialist society and its conversion to a qualitatively new condition.

The problems of the development of socialism—its variants, stages, distinguishing features, and long-term projections—cannot be understood with sufficient depth without a comparison with capitalism, the historical heir of which it is. The tempestuous and broad changes in the capitalist system in the 1970s and 1980s require reaching a new level of understanding of the major structural changes in the mechanism of its self-development and self-denial. It is clear today that developed state-monopoly capitalism long stopped being a simple modification of the capitalism of free competition, and that it is a qualitatively different form of the capitalist production method, which has preserved the capacity to develop its production forces.

A great deal is being said in support of the conclusion that capitalism has entered a complex stage in its historical evolution, a kind of "transitional period" consisting

of major qualitative shifts comparable (if not even more important) in terms of their scale and consequences to the changes which occurred at the turn of the century. Therefore, we believe justified, as a hypothesis, the formulation by a number of Soviet scientists of the question of a new stage in the development of capitalism. Its features are different in the new stage of the scientific and technical revolution which is gathering strength, in the course of which all the elements of social production forces are being renovated, including the division of labor; the concluding conversion to intensive (resource-conserving) type of reproduction; the contradictory combination of the structural reorganization of the economy with the accumulation of contradictions which cannot be resolved within the range of a single cyclical crisis. Symptoms of changes are manifested in the new level of production internationalization and the multinationalization of the capitalist economy as a whole; the flexibility of production relations, related to changes in the ownership structure; the restructuring of the economic mechanism in the search of a new way of combining the market with the centralized-regulatory principle and the reassignment of priorities in economic and social policy; and noticeable modifications in the mechanism applied in the exercise of bourgeois political power.

Capitalism is a kind of social system against which socialism is constantly being checked as it establishes its originality as a social system. At the same time, within capitalism elements of social relations, which could be used and adopted by socialist society are maturing.

As a whole, the conversion from capitalism to socialism is conceived today not as a straight ascent from a lower to a higher stage but as a lengthy historical period in the course of which a variety of changes take place. This is not simply a question of "moving" countries from one social system to another but an interconnected multidimensional process in which a variety of trends are closely interwoven: the organic surmounting of capitalism on the basis of the latest technological and economic base it creates; the profound revolutionary renovation of socialism itself in accordance with the requirements of the scientific and technical revolution; the interaction among social systems in solving the global problems of our time; the joint struggle waged by all revolutionary and democratic forces for a restructuring of the system of global economic relations with a view to establishing a new global economic order and eliminating neocolonial dependence.

The social revolution of today is a process which extends over many long decades. The bourgeois revolution itself took an entire historical age. Why should the socialist revolution, which is making a most profound change in the very foundation of social life and the social awareness of mankind, and which is voiding a system of private ownership relations, which took millennia to develop, be short? On the contrary, it should be more complex and conflicting and is it not conceivable that it

would be quite lengthy? Did we not adopt as the beginning of this lengthy and comprehensive historical transition the entire process as our model?

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the progress of human society toward socialism cannot be reduced to the sum of socialist revolutions and the building of a new society in countries in which such revolutions have taken place. This movement is a global process in the course of which the socially most advanced capitalist countries are closer in a number of parameters to a conversion to the "mature model of socialism" than are some socialist societies. The social revolution appears, from this viewpoint, as a most complex transformation of human civilization on the basis of humanistic principles, the harbinger of which is the society born of the October Revolution and the continuity of revolutionary processes related to it.

It is in this ascending movement of civilization that the fundamental criterion of social progress is, above all, the humanizing of history, i.e., the conversion of man into the self-seeking target of historical development. Today this is probably the main social content of the nonlinear movement of an interdependent world toward a greater integrity which, in turn, is one of the decisive elements of another historically broader process, the establishment of a communist social system.

Another characteristic of the contemporary age is that the criteria of social progress, which were born and are further developed by renovating socialism, are acquiring an increasingly all-human, an all-civilizing dimension. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and the conversion of their collective and social productivity into public property is something which Marx singled out as a feature of a system which will replace the antagonistic society (see K. Marx and F. Engels "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 46, part I, p 101), legitimately becomes part of the general criteria and guidelines of global social developments.

At the same time, this also broadens our own concepts of socialist criteria and of the characteristics of a qualitatively new condition of socialist society. In this case the starting positions are developed not only on the basis of summing up the practices of real socialism and the experience of the international communist, worker and democratic movements in the struggle for the implementation of socialist values, but also of the comprehensive consideration of the basic trends in the development of all civilization.

Although today we can only speak of the general outlines and although we must substantially concretize them, this level as well is vitally important in the theoretical interpretation of the developing new aspect of socialism. One could say that as a whole a certain understanding is already developing concerning the fundamental features of renovated socialism. This was discussed in the report submitted by M.S. Gorbachev at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the 18 July 1989 CPSU Central

Committee Conference. It is clear, above all, that this is a society of working people and for working people, the ideal of which is the free development of each as a prerequisite for the free development of all. It is a society founded on the principles of humanism, socialist democracy and socialist justice, a variety of forms of social ownership and a self-regulating economic life with a coordinating role played by the economic center.

It is also clear that this is a society of high standards and morality, which ensure the existence of democracy within the framework of the socialist law governed state and the full human rights, based on the best traditions of Soviet democracy and the experience of the democratic development of mankind. An important characteristic feature of the new qualitative condition of socialism is the true equality among all nations and nationalities, which offers all the necessary conditions for their comprehensive development and the harmonizing of relations among nationalities within the framework of the Soviet Federation. Finally, openness to the surrounding world for the purpose of joint creativity in building new international relations on the basis of free choice and equality, safety and universal human values is a feature of a society which is creating and utilizing extensive opportunities for the manifestation of the free self-expression and the initiatives and capabilities of the individual.

Socialism appeared within universal history as the embodiment and continuation of the humanistic ideals formulated by mankind. These ideals were suppressed by its deformations and stagnation. Their revival and creative development today are triggered by the new political thinking which is the nucleus of the theory and ideology of revolutionary perestroika.

Socialism can ensure its comprehensive development only if it interacts with the entire world, and only by increasing its own contribution—all other conditions being equal—to the development of global civilization and as it adopts from the universal human social experience in political, economic and spiritual life anything which does not conflict with socialist ideals and values.

#### **Toward the Economic Freedom of the Individual**

The economic system of renovated socialism cannot, as was traditionally believed, limit itself only to problems related to the forms of ownership of means of production. Along with such ownership, in order to bring to light the essence of social processes, the problems of economic power and economic freedom are becoming increasingly important.

As we know, excessive concentration and centralization of economic power, from control of information to the socioeconomic implementation of authoritarian decisions, under the conditions of the command-distribution system, led to the alienation of the working people from both ownership and power. That is why the renovation

of the economic socialist system is related to the decentralization of economic power and pluralism of all economic forms (and not only forms of ownership), and the creation of a tightly woven fabric of horizontal economic relations, without which real production socialization is impossible. The new image necessarily presumes the economic power of the people as well as the economic freedom of man.

The economic power of the people is determined by surmounting the people's alienation from means and results of production, the development of a variety of forms of social ownership, the elimination of supercentralism and monopoly in economic decision making, and the development of various forms of enterprise and economic activities by the working people and a variety of decentralized institutions engaged in economic activities. This lays the grounds for resolving contradictions between social priorities and efficient economic management.

The growth of the people's social expectations and aspirations has become one of the manifestations of the historical challenge facing all social systems today. Under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, which objectively increase the value of manpower, information openness and which makes the Soviet person aware of contemporary consumption standards, this become entirely understandable. For the time being, however, we do not notice in our country any increase in labor productivity and economic efficiency consistent with this "revolution of needs." An increasingly urgent task, therefore, is the conversion from state paternalism and its opposite—dependency-distribution motivations in society—to the creation of the organizational, economic, social and legal mechanisms of highly efficient resource-conserving economic management.

Many of these mechanisms have been quite well developed in global practices and are the institutional foundation of a competitive market-oriented economic culture. Elements such as commodity market, capital investments, securities, scientific developments, a banking and commercial credit system, multiplicity of investment centers, a combination of large, medium and small enterprises, and so on, can be perfectly well used by a socialist economic system.

Where, therefore, do we find the specifics of the socialist economic system? Above all, in social relations inherent in socialism, which are by no means covered entirely by relations of ownership, not to mention the fact that these relations themselves are today much richer and more varied and complex than was believed not only in the 19th but also in the first half of the 20th century. On the one hand, the socioeconomic upheavals of this century brought about a transformation in the subject of ownership. Its functions are being actually implemented by a variety of social, professional, official, age, national, regional and other groups and strata, whose interests are complexly interwoven. On the other hand, the national economic system has become drastically more complex,

and the very object of ownership has changed radically. In our age, not only the materialization of the means of production are increasingly acting in this quality but so are also technology, knowledge, ideas and information. Finally, in our age absolute appropriation has been reduced and partial and incomplete appropriation prevails; there is a division among the subjects of ownership, distribution and utilization and the various aspects of the rights and prerogatives of ownership are being delegated to various social institutions.

The pluralism of forms of ownership must be consistent with this objective multidimensionality of socialization processes. The trend toward socialization leads to the fact that the one and the same individual or collective subject enters into several different types of relations involving different forms of ownership. The previous clear cut boundaries pertaining to the subject and the object of such different forms are eroded. In this connection, the question of the a priori classification of one form of ownership or another (whether nationalized or individual) as socialist becomes arguable. That is why a more substantial criterion is that of including it in the implementation of the basic objectives of socialism or, according to Lenin, the reaching of total well-being and the free harmonious development of the individual and the inclusion within the system of socialist socialization, i.e., the division and cooperation between labor and materials, and information. Obviously, it is equally unnecessary to draft a formal "register" of forms of ownership allowed under socialism, providing that they do not involve the alienation of the worker. Let us merely note the promising nature of the mixed forms, which combine collective and state with share-holding principles. This makes it possible to highlight most completely the economic motivation of the working people and their initiative and enterprise, together with economic responsibility for production efficiency.

The dialectics of modernization of the socialist economic system presumes that the economic power of the people will be combined with the economic freedom of the individual and the collective. This freedom is ensured, to begin with, by the free dynamics of labor and the demonopolizing of its market. To this effect it is important to surmount the economic (dependency on the departmental social area) and the noneconomic (various forms of restricting the mobility of manpower) assigning of the worker to specific places where he can apply his labor, rigidity and a static condition of the national economic system of labor organization and wages. Labor "according to capability," as the most important constituent feature of socialism, is inconceivable without ensuring for every worker the possibility of choosing the place and way of application of his work efforts.

The economic freedom of man cannot be achieved under the conditions of the monopoly of suppliers and state diktat, which frequently replaces economic expediency with political-ideological analogues, market scarcity and an unhealthy financial system. The natural guideline of

socialist society is the interest of the working people and the consumers, manifested either by the market situation (if it is a question of immediate interests) or long-term priorities set by society and its central regulatory organs. Freedom of the producer means also freedom of choosing forms of organization and management, partners and sources of financing, becoming part of various economic organizations, selling on any market, including foreign, and freedom in the formulation of production and investment programs.

However, the absolutizing of producer economic freedom and pitting it against the freedom of consumers turns into monopoly diktat, departmental and group egotism, falsifying the quality of goods, threat to the ecology, etc. That is why the freedom of the end consumer is no less important. It must be based on the extensive choice of commodities and services, without waiting in line, without restrictions and long searches, the guaranteed quality of consumer goods, implementation of the principle that "the customer is always right," and availability of consumer choices.

A person enjoying freedom of economic behavior chooses his own living standard: if he wants to consume more and better quality goods, he must work more and more intensively; or else, in order to have more leisure time or simply work on a low-intensity basis, he may be prepared to limit his own consumption. The self-realization of man in his economic life presumes a variety of forms of relations between him and society and its members. In this case his active rather than expectant-dependency views are implemented through enterprise and inventiveness. The taboo imposed on enterprise motivations and, even more so, on enterprise activities was perhaps the most oppressing and obstructing principle in the command-distribution system. As a result, the ordinary mind tends to reject elements of an entrepreneurial culture which either appear or are presumed. Yet as a more humane system, free from exploitation, socialism is oriented not only toward meeting the interests of society but also those of the individual and, obviously, should give greater scope to initiative, inventiveness and enterprise, compared to capitalism. In order to manifest them in a socialist economy, every member of society must be guaranteed the possibility of freely uniting for purposes of engaging in joint economic activities.

The guarantees of the economic power of the people and the freedom of man are closely related to the attained efficiency in economic management. However, an orientation toward a linear quantitative growth is not the self-seeking aim of socialist economic management, the more so since it could directly conflict with the real needs of society (orientation toward writing reports, figure padding, an economy based on outlays, threat to the ecology, etc.). Therefore, renovated socialism should be based on a new type of economic growth. Achieving a growing satisfaction of material and spiritual needs with stable or even reduced volumes of utilization of primary production resources presumes a conversion to a



resource-saving type of social reproduction, a dynamism of the economy and its fast reaction to scientific and technical new developments and changes in consumer preferences, as well as readiness to engage in permanent structural reorganizations.

The humanistic potential of renovated socialism largely depends on the nature of interaction between civilization and nature and between economics and ecology. The creation of a harmonious ecological-economic system is a necessary prerequisite in enabling socialism to maintain its historical perspective. The fact that today Western scientists with social-democratic leanings are formulating ideas of "ecosocialism" or "socialism with an ecological face" is of interest to us.

The conversion to a social, consumer and ecologically oriented economy requires a revision of the role and place of the center and its relationship with the periphery (not only geographic but also in its social, professional and other aspects). The point is that in the existing system the power of the center was essentially dispersed among departmental "corners." That is why we need not only a systematic decentralization in making socioeconomic decisions but also a conversion from departmental-bureaucratic polycentrism to the polycentrism of a civilian society in which decisions concerning capital investments are made by investment banks, scientific and technical policy is formulated by innovation funds, social problems are solved by the local authorities, and so on. All of this is a manifestation of objective processes in the increased complexity of the socioeconomic system, economic pluralism and democratization. Furthermore, in addition to differences, integration processes develop as well, for an interdependence grows both between economic units as well as among the problems which are being resolved. Therefore, the concept of a "strong center" is included in the renovated concept of socialism with the clarification, however, that this means, first of all, "strong centers" (financial, crediting, foreign economic, innovational, etc.); second, that the range of their rights is clearly limited and, third, that their method for decision-making is democratic and the implementation of such decisions is controlled by society.

The governmental economy (and not only ownership) must increasingly become a public economy, the economy of the citizens, in terms of its objectives, priorities, decision-making instruments, control and responsibilities. The mechanism governing the function of such an economy is a regulated market, the purpose of which is to ensure that the consumer is properly oriented toward resource conservation, efficient use of public labor, and high standards, flexibility and dynamism of economic management. Market regulation and the projection of its developments and its orientation toward development priorities formulated by society and the prompt elimination or, even better, the prevention of imbalances are the forms within which, under contemporary conditions, planning could properly be implemented, understood in its Leninist sense, as a permanent

and consciously supported economic proportionality. Improving finances, restraining inflation, securing the stability of the ruble, and solving the problems of losing or underprofitable enterprises are mandatory prerequisites for real regulation.

Naturally, the long-term prospects for the development of market relations are related to the essential conversion from a closed to an open economy, included in the global economy. The strict standards and requirements of the global market will become a powerful instrument for upgrading the competitiveness of Soviet producers, the enhancement of competitive principles and the orientation toward today's and tomorrow's scientific and technical progress. Foreign economic openness can radically change both the method of economic management of producers as well as the way of life of the Soviet people. Obviously, in this case we cannot avoid the difficulties of the period of adaptation. However, the broadened possibilities for choice, the degree of economic freedom and the enhancement of managerial activities will significantly compensate for these costs.

#### Orientation Toward Man

According to universal concepts socialism is a system which liberates man from exploitation and oppression, puts him in the center of social life and creates prerequisites for the free development of everyone as a prerequisite for the free development of all.

The priority of the humanistic principle predetermines the privileged status enjoyed by the social sphere where the complex consequences of decisions and practical activities in other areas, such as ideology, politics, economics, and culture, intersect and converge. Thus, the liberation of the working man cannot be limited merely to the elimination of economic exploitation but should include also the elimination of political and social oppression. As long as the civil society under socialism will consist of individuals whose material well-being or simply whose physical existence will depend on official "employers" (managers of enterprises, organizations and institutes, and apparat administrators) and as long as their will or decision determines the economic and social status of the worker, there can be no grounds to speak of socialism as a society meeting its main criterion: true socialist democracy based on the real freedom of the individual. The transfer of power to the workers and peasants, V.I. Lenin wrote, created conditions for each factory and each village to become a "field in which the working person can display his capabilities, can straighten up his back somewhat, and feel himself a man. For the first time after centuries of laboring for others, of slave labor for exploiters, the possibility arises of **working for himself**, doing work based on all the achievements of the latest technology and culture" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 196). "Work for himself" is the core of the essentially new social status of man, above all in public production, and

the foundation on which an essentially different attitude toward labor and toward the means of production themselves is built.

Can socialism, while preserving its own system of values and social guarantees, also ensure a high economic flexibility and efficiency and successfully master the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution? Or is it that economic and technological progress will inevitably require a high social cost, such as an unsecured existence and weak social guarantees? In other words, is it possible to have a path which ensures the firm combination of economic efficiency and social priorities, conceived as the embodiment of social justice?

One way or another, these questions have been present in social discussions conducted of late. The view, based on historical experience, has been expressed that achieving a harmony between the two principles, the economic and the social, has never been successful, for which reason, allegedly, one should accept the harsh alternative of "either-or." According to another viewpoint, morality should be considered the motive force of economics and material incentives should be subordinated to moral ones. There are also those who believe that the growing level of efficiency will in itself enhance social morality and compensate for any lack of humanness and justice. The easiest way of solving this conflict is by claiming that the "eternal contradiction" between social priorities and the efficiency of economic management can be surmounted by developing new and significantly more efficient incentives for man's economic, social and moral activeness. It is much more difficult to build and apply the type of system of incentives and qualitatively new motive forces which alone will make it possible firmly to combine the criteria of economic efficiency with those of social justice.

Each age, social system and class introduces its own content in both concepts, those of economic efficiency and social justice. To socialism the end objective of the production process is man and his well-being. Correspondingly, the economic efficiency of socialist society should be judged above all by the contribution which the development of the national economy makes to the people's well-being and to the satisfaction of human needs. As to social justice, its content is defined, on the one hand, by the fact that the means of production are basically equal in all respects and, on the other, by the fundamental principle of distribution according to labor.

Gains in the area of social justice and very tangible losses in economic efficiency was the way the historical start of socialism appeared. Unquestionably, life demanded of the socialist revolution to observe the mandatory procedure of action in asserting the standards inherent in our system of social justice and, initially, to try to create the minimal conditions needed by anyone to develop his

capabilities and only then, after preserving and consolidating his conditions, thoroughly to undertake the organization of distribution based on the close interdependence between labor results and wages. All of this is true, with one stipulation: the shift of emphases within the system of distribution relations was late by several decades; also late was the elimination of the then inevitable preference for equalization, which was consistent with the former simplistic concept of socialism as a society of full equality, preferring "identical poverty" to income differentiation.

The qualitatively new condition of socialism presumes the strict and undeviating observance of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work," and firmly eliminating equalization trends and other deformations in the distribution area. However, we must take into consideration the fact that the theoretical elaboration and practical application of this principle are encountering a number of difficulties. Let us single out the following, above all: a virtually inevitable clash develops between the "objective" aspect of social justice, based on scientific approaches, and its subjective, its emotional perception which, naturally, has the strongest possible impact on the behavior of man and the enhancement of his creative principles. Understandably, different people have different ideas about justice. How can we find a common denominator? On whose views should a social policy be based? Those of the majority? This could precisely be a case in which it is not a question of counting votes but of considering, if necessary, the deliberate application of suitable antiegalitarian concepts of social justice, which stimulate productive toil. Otherwise, for historical and psychological reasons, social awareness will still tend to identify social justice with equalization and could eliminate the differentiation of income based on differences in actual labor contributions.

The problem of social justice is not limited merely to the distribution area. Social justice also means the aspiration toward creating equal opportunities for people (education and health care), optimizing the processes of their professional mobility in the system of the social organization of labor, and their realization of their capabilities (cadre deployment), and the legislative protection of initiatives, creativity and democratic procedures. It is also a question of social justice in the economic development of the individual areas, national republics and oblasts.

The question of social protection is of essential importance to both the present and the future generations. Its solution requires, among others, the efficient use of nonrecoverable resources, a sensible scientific and technical policy and the assertion of an ecological approach to economic development.

The very enumeration of the problems related to the "human dimension" of socialism indicates the complexity and disparate nature of possible decisions and the

difficulty of including the social principle in the decision-making mechanism, taking into consideration various conflicting social interests. In planning and enacting such mechanisms, a discussion on the social structure of Soviet society is important.

For decades, the main trend in the study of this structure was a substantiation of the concept of the establishment of "social homogeneousness." Today this looks like an impasse, for the inner structure of society is characterized by differences in the status, interests and behavior of the people. All known experience proves that throughout history social progress has never been achieved through primitive simplification. There are no reasons to believe that socialism and communism are exceptions to this rule.

In this case, however, it was a question more not of the desired condition of society but of the one already extant. Under the specific sociohistorical and sociocultural conditions of the USSR, the new system acquired its "early-socialist" features. They included state property, a bureaucratic management system, restriction of democracy, equalization, administratively codified moral values of "social justice," domination of noneconomic forms of labor incentive, alienation of the working people from ownership and power, and suppression of the individual. Hence the conclusion of the relative "simplicity" of sociostructural formations, replacing a civil society with the clash among different social interests and the identification of society with the state, as a result of which the interests of social groups and communities are ignored to the advantage of state interests. This is being done for the sake of the "national interests" or the "interests of the working class."

Starting with the 1930s the "three-member formula" of the socioclass structure began to be asserted in party documents and scientific publications, which included two classes (workers and peasants) and a stratum (the intelligentsia). On the basis of the processes of the erosion of differences among classes which were indeed taking place, the concept of the elimination of class contradictions was replaced by the concept of "social homogeneousness," which was essentially antidialectical and scientifically groundless, for the reason alone that it clashed with the live structure of the social organism in which heterogeneous social formations are mandatorily present. This "three-member" formula does not, naturally, include the various social strata and groups which have their own specific interests and hold different views on a profound socioeconomic and sociopolitical restructuring. The social structure of our society is also experiencing the strongest possible influence of noneconomic, of sociocultural factors. Therefore, under socialist conditions the civil society is based on the variety of social interests not only of classes but also of other large social groups and social communities of different types and levels.

### Society and the State

The correlation between society and the state is one of the basic questions in discussions about the new face of socialism and the structure and characteristics of interaction among the elements of its political system and, therefore, the trend of the political reforms. The solution of this basic problem determines the nature of the concept of the law-governed state, which is justifiably considered by us today as the only suitable democratic aspect of socialism. The conversion of the state from a force dominating society into an agency serving society, social groups and individuals is the main trend of perestroika.

In an effort to put an end to state-monopoly capitalism, we ourselves, as a result, developed a socialist Leviathan state as the sole, the monopoly owner of all means of production, natural resources and manpower and the distribution of produced material goods and services. It is thus that civil society lost its main economic support—ownership.

The purpose of perestroika is to lead to the revival of the suppressed institutions of the civil society. This can be achieved only with a pluralistic economic structure. The pluralizing of economic life with the simultaneous democratization of other areas of society should bring about the separation and structuring of interests in a variety of nongovernmental forms and their codification as respective legal institutions. It is a question of acknowledging the economic autonomy of enterprises and associations, of production and consumer cooperatives, family forms of production of goods and services, voluntary societies and associations, professional and creative unions, youth and religious organizations, etc.

Naturally, here as well social relations need legal streamlining and protection by the state. However, this should be done only to the extent to which it is required by the need harmoniously to combine the interests of society with those of the collective and the individual and the systematic implementation of the principles of social justice and of ensuring public safety. Hence the conclusion that **the socialist law-governed state is, above all, a system of agencies and institutions which guarantee and protect the normal functioning of the socialist civil society on the basis of the law.**

A number of considerations of a conceptual nature stem from this definition.

The creation of a law-governed state means putting an end to the rule of the apparatus managing civil society and the triumph of the principle of "not the people for the state but the state for the people." This restores the state to the civil society from which it came and which it serves. The state machinery and, in general, the functions of state management are reduced to a minimum: under the conditions of the broad development of civil-legal relations, the judicial-arbitration system in solving disputes on the basis of the law assumes a leading significance.

The nature of activities of the law-governed state is determined to a decisive extent by the socialist understanding of justice which is fully consistent with the principles of civil law which establishes reciprocal rights and obligations among the participants in social relations. In distribution relations, justice means consistency between the labor contribution of the individual, according to his capabilities, and his wages based on his labor, on the part of society. However, justice does not stop there, for it includes also social aid by the state to citizens who need additional support (social security in its various forms). In relations based on coercion responsibility justifiably means the consistency between the measure of delinquency and the measure of punishment although, understandably, in this case it is much more conventional. In the field of management relations, justice means establishing restricted and strictly necessary limits of power and guarantees against abusing the managed. Such ideas of justice must then be broken down into details and codified in the laws, thus becoming truly legal.

In the renovated society man assumes first place among all social values. However, he assumes it not as an object of guardianship on the part of the state, deprived of autonomy, but as a subject with real rights and possibilities of securing for himself everything he wants, within the limits of the law. If social and personal interests clash, compromises must be established and implemented. With a noncoincidence of the interest between the majority and the minority, any decision made, whatever the circumstances, should not lead to harming the rights of minorities, as formulated in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and the country's Constitution.

These concepts are the most essential and profound characteristics of the socialist law-governed state as an instrument which ensures the normal functioning of civil society. It would be hardly expedient to try to describe the future in detail. However, we should pay attention to some additional features or juridical principles of the law-governed state. In recent publications, for example, the supremacy of the law in all areas of social life and the fact that the state and its authorities are bound by their own laws is considered the most important among them. These principles are embodied, in particular, in requirements such as observing the required democratic procedures for law making and promulgation; the inadmissibility of replacing a law with departmental instructions; the reciprocal responsibility of the state and the individual based on the law; ensuring and protecting human rights as a priority area in the activities of the state; a juridical codification of democratic principles and mechanisms (glasnost, etc.); greater freedom of behavior, based on the principle that "all that is not forbidden by law is permitted," etc.

We believe, however, that said principles and requirements equally apply to present society; they had been proclaimed earlier as well. Furthermore, they are not free from contradictions. Finally, the most difficult thing is

the practical implementation of these principles and requirements. What does this mean?

First, romantic maximalism, unquestionably dictated by the best of motivations, is present in the overwhelming majority of their present interpretations. Actually, the rule of law is better than the weakness of a law, not to mention the absence of law. However, the expediency of such domination "in all areas of social life" is questionable, perhaps for the fact alone that in many of its areas the effect of other social regulators is much more rewarding—moral standards, customs, traditions (including religious), etc. Furthermore, the aspiration to subordinate all social life to the rule of law inevitably would lead to an even greater statification; excessive regulation (not to mention standards set by the state) of all social activities is one of the first symptoms of totalitarianism. Or else let us consider freedom of behavior based on the principle that "all that is not forbidden by law is permitted." Unquestionably, this is progressive in, shall we say, the area of economic enterprise, democratic activeness and social creativity. However, would it be sensible to extend this principle to the competence of government officials or, in general, to those who represent the authorities? Bitter historical experience dictates in this case the opposite principle: "Anything which is specifically not allowed by the law is forbidden."

All other requirements pertaining to the law-governed state are imbued with a similar duality, which substantially hinders their practical application. Obviously, in the search for the most accurate understanding of what we want for a law-governed state and, as a whole for socialism, it is time to shift the discussion of this problem from the level of "the more democratic the better" to that of "the more rational the better," remembering the economic, political, cultural, psychological, and other legacies which were left to us by the history of prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary Russia (this makes clear that the alternative to comprehensive regulation of life is the development of the tradition of community life and high legal and general population standards, while restricting the state official to what is permitted by the law could paralyze his useful initiative, and so on).

Second, we are heavily influenced by the burden of past legal thinking. Without rejecting it we would be simply unable sensibly to use the proclaimed principles. History teaches us that in the course of revolutionary changes the old law frequently is rejected totally after which, for the sake of justifying the new legislation, the powers present it as the most sensible, democratic and consistent with the expectations of the people. As we know, in the past, in our country as well there have been plenty of such panegyrics. A similar development, although with a great pluralism of schools of thought and within longer time periods, was covered by bourgeois juridical thinking of the 19th and 20th century in which, as conservative moods grew, legal positivism gained the upper hand. In its new "Marxist" clothing it was spread to our juridical science as well.

As we know, positivism rejected the criticism of existing reality and, thereby, justified it. Legal positivism identifies legality with the law promulgated by the state, thus occasionally justifying even the most senseless and antidemocratic act of governmental power, dressed as a law (in our practice, also as a legal act). Legal standards are considered in this case entirely as the product of the manifestation of the will of the state, while the rights of the individual are considered, respectively, as something derived from juridical standards which, under our circumstances, is entirely consistent with the still prevalent paternalistic attitude of the state toward society. It is important to prevent such "traditions" of positivism, fraught with stagnation of the mind and politics, from being inherited by perestrojka and the renovation of socialist society, which we conceive not as an ideal or as a frozen "level of perfection" but only as a **process of transition** toward a higher level of social development, a process free from deformations.

The correlation between society and the state as we described it allows us to develop a better idea of the political system of the new society. The state is called upon to continue, within the foreseeable future, to remain the most important social political institution, but not in an authoritarian-bureaucratic structure which puts under its rule all other social formations but only as an instrument of the power of the people who have been given the right to promulgate laws and to control their implementation. In other words, along with many other political institutions, the state becomes first among equals.

The social organizations are being granted a broad range of real rights, which enable them to express and defend the specific interests of social groups. The legal mechanism governing the functioning of social organizations should, in particular, call for a simple procedure for registration, limited only by a set of universally accepted conditions within the international community pertaining to social safety, human rights, and so on; guarantees of independence from the state; the right actively to participate in various areas of governmental and social life; financial independence; unhindered opportunity to turn to the courts in defense of its rights and the rights of its members. In the future the social organizations should obviously take increasing participation in the formulation of policy and, subsequently, in forming the government.

The democratization of economic, social and political life most urgently raises the question of the place and role of the Communist Party in the new society. The preservation of the basic socialist gains and values, the formulation of a political strategy on the basis of Marxist-Leninist concepts on the logic of social development and the eventual orientation toward a communist future in the development of mankind are what justify the preservation of the Communist Party as the vanguard social force.

The concept of the faster renovation of the party compared to the rest of society, formulated by the CPSU leadership, is extremely important and relevant. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the party, as created by Lenin for work under clandestine conditions and for gaining and retaining the power and building socialism in a backward agrarian country, in guiding defense and other exceptional situations, would be forced, step-by-step, to surrender its positions under the new conditions, when democracy is broadening and the inability of the old party structures to solve the increasingly complex and aggravating problems, while such problems are sometimes quite successfully solved by other structures is revealed with increasing frequency. To preserve and strengthen the vanguard role under the conditions of democratic pluralism, without laying a claim to the monopoly of political power but also without allowing any organizational and ideological amorphousness, is the long-term urgent task of the party members. The solution of this fundamental political problem of our present will greatly determine the fate of the party and the social renovation of our society.

Equally obvious today is the fact that the party was able to preserve its power monopoly regardless of the results of its policies only under the conditions of a command-administrative system, closely linked to the state machinery and imbuing all "pores" of the political system. Under the new conditions, the party intends to abandon some of its former functions and abandon a number of power structures. Who or what will replace them? Are there in society interests and ideas sufficient for the coalescing of the various social forces as political parties? The experience of the new social movements seems to indicate that the answer to this question should be positive. However, nor are there any reasons to deny the danger of a further polarization of society should political structures opposing the CPSU arise. By no means does political pluralism mandatorily presume a multiparty system.

Naturally, the situation does not end with this contradiction. The controversial idea which, nonetheless, has some justification, has been expressed that since the conversion from totalitarian rule to democracy has never and anywhere been peaceful and painless but, conversely, has been accompanied by complications in social life and by the polarization of society into conflicting groups (as confirmed by our recent experience), it would be necessary to preserve for the transitional period a strong authoritarian power which would consolidate the society. Should such a power be in the hands of the state or be left to a party separate from the state but having the "final say" in everything? For the time being, theory is unable to suggest a simple answer to this question. What matters, however, is for this authoritarian power not to turn the country back, for authoritarianism would mean a return to that which we are trying to leave behind us, the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the higher authority.

In the more distant future, when a stable civil society with a law-governed state has developed as a guarantor of the rights and interests of the individuals and associations, the definitive conversion to political democracy will become possible. The entire power in the renovated society should, in fact, belong to the people, who are the owners of the means of production and who exercise such power through their congresses, the soviets of people's deputies and other numerous forms of self-government, as well as directly. The soviets have priority over all authorities of state and economic management. The actual full power of the soviets presumes their economic autonomy based on firm legal guarantees, as well as the interest shown by the citizens in their activities and their personal participation in such activities. Electoral campaigns are called upon to ensure the free election of candidates, elected on an equal basis and with alternate choices, in territorial and national-territorial electoral districts, on the basis of equal representational rights in ensuring proper representation in the authorities of public organizations, associations of producers, voluntary societies, etc.

The democratic principles of the separation of powers and parliamentarianism must become reality in a law-governed state. The existing viewpoint that the idea of combining within a single political structure, centrally or locally, legislative, executive and control powers failed to prove its validity. The question of essential significance is what type of separation of powers should we have, what would be a most efficient system for "checks and balances" acceptable to us?

The law-governed state, based on the principles of a Soviet Federation, should have a reliable mechanism for regulating relations among nationalities. In the first stage, such a mechanism could require the inclusion in the law of the objective features of each national-state formation; defining the areas within which the rights of the different national-state formations are equal (such as the establishment of territorial boundaries) or unequal (such as the number of deputies in the Supreme Soviet); mechanisms and procedures for resolving differences among nationalities and republics. In the more distant future all national-state units (i.e., all territories, however demarcated on the basis of national features) could be considered equal regardless of their level of development, territory and strength of the native population.

#### **A Renovated Ideology for the New Society**

In the headlong pace of social events the mind is by no means always able to determine their true nature and accurately to define the actual trend of changes occurring in the country.

The obvious achievements of democratization and glasnost and mass social activeness, the successes of a developing parliamentarianism, the growth of labor productivity and more energetic financial investments in the social area and in ecology are combined with the growth of social and national stress (here and there

exceeding the maximally admissible standards), strikes, clearly manifested inflationary trends, scarcity of the most important consumer goods, and the danger of loss of control on the part of the governmental and of the party's authority over the development of some negative social processes.

What is the reason for this? A fundamental and detailed analysis is as yet to be made, but the most common (and profound) answer is no secret whatsoever: it lies within ourselves, in the conditions in which our history developed, and which made us what we are. To assess today that which took place in history by seeing, as is sometimes being done, only the social defeats, in the same way in which, quite recently, many people admired endless victories, would be wrong. A tunnel vision along with simple explanations are, in general, unacceptable in history and invariably distort both prospects and retrospects.

But let us recall how frequently, all too frequently, dramatic pages in the chronicle of the life of our people were replaced with tragic parts. In the 20th century alone there have been three revolutions, two world and one civil wars, several other wars, reaction, White and Red terror, innumerable sharp waves of Stalinist repressions, several major hunger periods, mass deportations and immigrations, endless struggle and endless administrative orders. Finally, we had our immediate predecessor, stagnation.

Let us not be sly. In the 20th century stagnation in politics does not ensure stability in life. There was increased military power and the Afghan War, empty store shelves and insignificant leaders, ostentation, inflated figures, an economy based on outlay and corruption. Once again, there was our familiar struggle against culture and the intelligentsia, against independent thinking, against "dissidents," "refuseniks," "petition signers," etc. Society was in a dynamic state and by no means in a condition of anabiosis. We also know the direction of this movement: the possibility of a social crisis was clearly apparent.

There also were in our history people who always saw "different shores, different waves." Masterpieces of science, art and spiritual and technical genius were created, without which world history would be inconceivable. There also were and are social forces which, having crushed Stalinism, at least in its most obvious and extreme forms, are working today on the restructuring of society toward economic efficiency, political civilization and human decency and humaneness.

Therefore, there are no reasons to question the toughness of the people in our state. However, nor should we fail to see the profound marks left in their minds and hearts and clear symptoms of a serious deformation of the initial socialist concept, inspired by the classical models of freedom and humanism. What forces will assume the upper hand and where, in the immediate future, will the political barometer stop rising, so far totally unwilling to

assume a stable position in the area marked "fair weather?" The answer to this question presumes a study of what we have built in 70 years and the turn of the ascending development spiral in which we find ourselves.

From the Marxist viewpoint there are no anomalies whatsoever in the fact that theory is not in a hurry to please us with daring summations or accurate forecasts. At all times academic interest in political processes in social life has largely been inspired by the events occurring within that life itself, rather than by progress in basic science. Theory means the study of a certain range of phenomena and can be competent only when such phenomena have reached the necessary level of maturity. Any effort at an a priori structuring of a detailed "model" of a future social system is futile. The Marxist classics always firmly opposed such projects.

Does this mean that we must abandon any idealized social models and ideals which, as we believe, history could and should attain? No, it does not! This would be the equivalent of abandoning any reason, science, morality and beauty, i.e., abandoning both man and history.

All we must know is that the model always presumes a possibility of correcting it (correcting both the reality and the model). We must only remember that there can be only one ideal while the ways leading to it can be many and that no one has the right to consider his own path as the only true path; that all paths (other than those absolutely prohibited by the standards of morality) are initially of equal value in the court of historical practice. More than anything else, an ideal resides in a rather distant future. Specific objectives are a different matter. It is precisely at this point that a discussion would be appropriate and necessary on substantiated scientific projections and time intervals (quite indefinite for the time being, considering the state of this science), theoretical anticipations and the empirical testing of models. Without concretizing specific objectives, an ideal becomes a symbol without any whatsoever strict content and its bearer—ideology—loses its ability to guide social groups in a changing world, to be an instrument for their consolidation and to provide arguments for rational behavior under circumstances of undefined social situations.

It is both difficult and unnecessary to question the merits of Marxist-Leninist ideology. It led the people during the years of most severe disasters and withstood the pressure of Stalinism. To this day its basic values have not lost their attractiveness. However, we must also see the losses—the consequences of the cult of personality and stagnation. The sliding of society into the social swamp could not fail to be marked by the features of ideological fatigue, cliches and bureaucratic political idiom.

It was this type of ideology that we had until recently, and it would be premature to claim that it has totally

vanished today. Again, as in the case of "precise forecasts," there is nothing shocking in this. Ideology is not fabricated behind a desk, in the quiet of academic offices. It matures in the course of mass political movements in the shape of guided processes of social awareness, as a result of the clash among different interests, the reaction to their suppression or difficult efforts at harmonizing them and reaching a sensible compromise.

Recalling the short history of our perestroika, we can easily note that in April 1985 it was conceived as a sharp acceleration of socioeconomic development, as an intensification of the national economy and democratization of society within the framework of a few renovated administrative and political power structures, virtually unchanged but, so to say, "humanized." Hence optimistic considerations involving the **human factor**. Naturally, had this taken place, this would have been the most preferable way of social progress which would virtually eliminate the threat of sharp conflicts, for it would presume a balance among all social forces. Even the new draft of the party program, aimed at making serious changes, retains many of the previous ideological standards, including the notorious "developed socialism."

To begin with, however, the political leadership lacked the moral right and, therefore, sensible reasons totally to exclude the possibility of the simplest and most painless way of achieving progressive objectives. Second, it was both necessary and desirable for society as a whole (the governing and the governed) to mature sufficiently for radical reforms and to develop the necessary political and ideological standards for their implementation.

It was also very important to realize in practice that the initial facilitated plan was simply unattainable through the contemplated means, ways and deadlines. A great deal of unsolved problems had accumulated and national and regional contradictions turned out to be profound; the bureaucratic state management apparatus is very sluggish; a significant percentage of the party mass remains passive; the people, tired from constant shortages and administrative humiliations, are impatient. It became obvious that we needed more serious changes, truly revolutionary ones, than those we contemplated in basic relations, in the political-judicial superstructure and in the cultural-ideological area.

It became clear that our perestroika was more than anything else a real case of building. It was a case of building new mechanisms for popular rule, economic management and political life and, most importantly, the transformation of 20 million holders of party cards into an active political force which would embody the will of the people and would be aware of the people's hopes and needs. Within such a party, united by the overall support of socialist values rather than depressing unanimity and boring meetings, we would not have to fear either any daily difference within our own ranks or any kind of political competition.



The correctness of an ideology is judged by the achievements of the social system which it shapes and which it services. Our ideology supported basic social relations in which the specific form of common ownership—state ownership—was presented as social ownership.

Fictitious commonality concealed the fact that, let us say, the worker had developed almost as being more proletarian than his Western foreign colleague. He had no property. Did this mean that he had nothing to lose but his chains? The working class is the most revolutionary class. It is not burdened by any illusions. Its class interest coincides with that of the entire society. It cannot free itself without liberating the entire society, and so on. It is precisely such an interest that must be expressed by the ideologue in order to assume the only scientific, party-oriented and revolutionary position. Was this what actually took place?

Not at all. The real status of the worker within the system of production relations was concealed not only by ideology but also by ideological social institutions: official social science—political economy, social philosophy, sociology and jurisprudence; and official art—literature, cinematography, sculpture and paintings, which depicted the monumental image of the master-worker.

It was thus that under the new social conditions the old pyramid of cultural-ideological alienation, reflecting an alienation in basic economic relations, was built. Actually, if the worker is in fact not the master of the means of production, if he is deprived of the right to handle the results of his own work, and if the purpose of his work is defined not by him or even if the labor rhythm does not depend on him (let us recall the notorious “rushing”), such a worker is a “partial,” an alienated producer.

As we know, humanism means the elimination of alienation. Practical—formal and meaningful—humanism also means freedom. Humanism and freedom are the essence of the real person. A person can be defined as a “biped without feathers;” he could also be a “political animal,” and a “reasonable person” (economically, technologically, in terms of suffering, playing, and many others). His main essence, however, is that of his relationship with other people, the only area in which his moral and creative potential can be realized. At one point Jean-Paul Sartre presented the world with the aphorism that “hell is the others.” In the case of Marxist humanism, hell means the lack of others, the lack of freedom.

It is here that we find the most profound definition of man, which should be preserved and developed in the new thinking. The new political thinking will become the dominant ideology in the social consciousness only when it acquires all the necessary social dimensions and will rely on a firm economic foundation.

What type of ideological legacy should we abandon? Unquestionably, scholastic doctrinairism and ideological diktat. Yesterday ideology served politics, aimed at the satisfaction of a minimum of individual needs which

would guarantee the individual his personal his individual existence and society a stability, cohesion and universal accord. Naturally, this was being accomplished with greater or lesser success. For example, unwisely a great deal of material and human resources were invested in the defense system and extremely insufficiently in health care, culture and education. With this the state considered its obligations to the citizens as fulfilled and its mission completed.

Ideology as well was guided by respective concepts. It preached future social homogeneousness, the commonality and unity of interests, the elimination of class differences and the subordination of individual objectives to the interests of the state. However, time passed and the image of thoughtless sacrifice, of unthinking heroism, which were frequently used to conceal strictly selfish interests of the carriers of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system, paled.

Today, when politics is oriented toward variety and development (real development!), an economic breakthrough and the satisfaction not of a minimum but a maximum of material and spiritual needs, ideology vitally needs a new culture. It must contain the ideals and operative principles of a new, nonstandard political activity, and corresponding ways of assessing current policies and efficiency of political leadership; it must be able to see the limits of admissible interference of the state in the private life of the citizens and in the spiritual and cultural life of society and the meaning, trend and ways of ideological and political education.

We need a critical attitude, including one pertaining to our own views. A dialogue cannot be considered successful when we have been able to impose our own views on our partner (this success is ephemeral and very transient) or, even less so, when we ourselves become victims of a power pressure. The true victory is the one which leads to a reciprocal correction, a reciprocal enrichment of views, which broadens the horizons of our outlook and presents new arguments which support our own convictions. A well-structured mind is more valuable than a well-filled mind. This precisely fits with the view expressed by Montaigne. In propagandizing their own outlook, the communists must take into consideration the knowledge of the people and the sociology and psychology of human actions.

Naturally, this also applies to our foreign partners. All too long there has been a reciprocal lack of understanding and it is sad to acknowledge that this has largely been our fault. We overlooked both politically and socially the time when a system of values which rejected the ideological rigorism of the past for the sake of universal human interests began to develop in many traditional non-Marxist ideologies or ideologies closed to Marxism.

There are no grounds for seriously questioning the fact that in a number of ideological determinants of human activities the significance of such concepts will increase.



They are an excellent foundation for dialogue. Our most far-sighted scientists and philosophers realized this long ago. However, it is only of late that such an awareness has been unquestionably accepted in the area of specific activities. Such efforts must be increased.

The time for universal relaxation has gone forever. Traditional, seemingly inviolable political and ideological dogmas, are being revised. An understanding is growing of the fact that we need a broader international consensus in making political decisions. The hour of universal perestroika has struck.

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### Renovation of Society—Renovation of the Party

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V. Samorukov, CPSU member, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics: A Realistic Assessment is Needed

Perestroika has clearly advanced sociopolitical thinking. A confirmation of this fact is the obsolescence of the draft party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress less than 4 years ago. Its introduction stipulates that "after adopting the third program at its 22nd Congress, in 1961, the party made tremendous efforts in all areas of building communism. Soviet society achieved major successes in the development of production forces, economic and social relations, socialist democracy and culture and the molding of the new man. The country entered a stage of developed socialism." If we proceed from such an exaggerated basic point our current most difficult problems cannot be explained. It is obvious that the program must be enriched with the concept of perestroika and imbued with its guiding ideas.

It is vitally necessary clearly to describe the condition of society in which we find ourselves, and the deformations of socialism, which appeared during the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation. It is important to indicate the realistic prospects for the development of the country which could result in a qualitatively new condition of socialism.

Without making a comprehensive analysis of the program, allow me to consider some disparities between some of its concepts and the actual condition of society.

The basic socialist principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work" is being implemented by no means fully in both its first and second parts. A dialectical connection exists between the two parts of this socialist principle. Society cannot take from the individual according to his capabilities because it does not pay according to his work. It is deprived of the possibility to pay everyone according to his labor

because of its inability to take from everyone according to his capabilities. Free medical services are frequently either wretched or have in fact become paid services. Free secondary education has long been supported by hiring tutors. Those who obtain free higher education pay for it with their low skills and, respectively, low living standards.

The path of the young generation into the future is by no means "reliable," as the program stipulates, but is extremely difficult. That is why the young people demand a guaranteed start in life.

The social insurance of labor veterans is indeed not charity but an obligation of the state in exchange for withheld wages, an obligation which is being met on the basis of bankrupting interest rates: the higher the amount of withheld salaries, the less the state pays. A low rate is used in the case of both high and insignificantly small wages. That is why the most ordinary pension does not ensure survival even on the poverty level. The resolution recently passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on raising the minimal pension level will, naturally, ease the lot of the least prosperous population strata. However, in principle, this does not change the situation.

The program notes that "a new social and international community of people—the Soviet people—has developed." We further read that "...The national problem, which was inherited from the past, has been successfully resolved in the Soviet Union." How then can we explain the uninterrupted outbreaks of discord among nationalities? Furthermore, we cannot "assert" the existence of friendship and fraternity among all nations and nationalities, in principle, as was written. They could be achieved but only through joint efforts.

If we speak of democracy, many of its principles were merely proclaimed. It was only on 26 March 1989 that the first real elections were held in the country, i.e., that a real step toward true democracy was taken. Until the beginning of perestroika no truly broad involvement of rank-and-file citizens in the management of production and governmental affairs had been secured.

We are as yet to give a real content to the ideas of freedom, human rights, and dignity of the individual. The unity between rights and obligations is a major indicator of social maturity, which will not be achieved soon. To proclaim that we have in our country uniform laws and standards of morality and a single discipline for one and all means to ignore the real state of affairs.

The word "dominant" grates when we claim the existence of a "dominant truly humanistic Marxist-Leninist ideology." A true humanistic ideology should not dominate but persuade and help in solving vital problems. Our official preperestroika ideology indeed dominated but at all times the concepts of Marxism-Leninism were being dogmatically reinterpreted.

It is obvious that a socialist way of life, based on collectivism, was deformed by the actual lack of social

justice. Such deformations deprived the working person of his confidence in the future and cannot spiritually and morally enhance him as the creator of new social relations and of his own destiny, as the program stipulates.

The system which existed before perestroyka met only one feature of socialism: a peaceful approach in the international arena. Nonetheless, here as well there are disparities. The program emphasizes that Soviet military doctrine is of a strictly defensive nature. However, it was only during the period of perestroyka that the principle of sensible defense sufficiency was raised, which is better consistent with the possibilities of our economy and the realities of the contemporary world, something which should be reflected in the new draft of the party program.

Or else let us consider a target which is so essential to the implementation of perestroyka, such as the creation of a law-governed state. The program does not have a respective section but merely a few sentences to the effect that **"the strengthening of the legal foundations of state and governmental life and the strict observance of socialist legality have been and remain the target of constant party concern...."** Above all, we should have clearly described the legal support given to democracy. The party program and the legislation should include guarantees for the legal protection of political activities. The current text of the document stipulates that **"the most important draft laws and resolutions will be submitted to nationwide discussion and vote."** This is good but not specific. Which laws are "most" and which "not most" important? Who decides?

Therefore, even a very brief analysis of the current party program indicates that this time we cannot do with simple editing. We need a new conceptual reinterpretation of many of its parts, bearing in mind that this most important document includes, naturally, many accurate ideas supported by reality, which are asserting themselves in the process of the renovation of the party and society.

#### **V. Mamonov, candidate of historical sciences, Chelyabinsk: Party Groups in Nonparty Organizations**

The rejection of the command-administrative methods of party guidance of the soviets, trade unions, the Komsomol and economic authorities, makes necessary a conversion to essentially different methods of activities of party groups in such organizations, compared with the past. Nonetheless, our present statutory rules concerning the work of said groups essentially merely repeat the formulations of the old statutes, starting with those which were adopted as early as the 17th VKP(b) Congress, in 1934.

The current CPSU Statutes include three paragraphs which regulate activities of party groups in nonparty organizations. The first (Paragraph 60) formulates the tasks of party members working in state and public organizations; the second (Paragraph 61) deals with the formulation of assignments of newly created party groups in nonparty organizations; the third (Paragraph

62) stipulates that the work of the party groups in nonparty organizations is guided by the respective party authorities: the CPSU Central Committee, the central committees of communist parties of Union republics, kraykoms and obkoms, okruzhkoms, gorkoms and raykoms. It would be difficult to object to these concepts. The trouble is that they are too general, nonspecific and, therefore, allow for different and even conflicting interpretations.

For example, the statutes stipulate that the party authorities, from the CPSU Central Committee down to the party raykom, guide the activities of party groups in nonparty organizations. What about party committees and party bureaus at enterprises? Should they or should they not guide the activities of, shall we say, party members who have been elected to the labor collective council or the Komsomol committee? Could they summon the party members elected to attend a trade union conference of the enterprise to discuss problems? According to the logic of things, they could. This, however, is not specifically stipulated. Yet it is particularly important to ensure the party's influence on the level of the labor collectives.

How to understand the stipulation in the statutes to the effect that the activities of party groups in nonparty organizations are guided by the respective party authorities? Does this mean that they have the right to order the party members in the party groups, on the basis of party discipline, to implement various party committee resolutions?

In the past, during the time of universal and frequently formal unanimity, such problems were of no practical significance. The present situation, however, is different. With the democratization of sociopolitical life the party members working in soviet and social organizations are assuming increasing responsibility. This is gratifying but entails new problems the solution of which will necessarily involve difficulties, contradictions and conflicts, some of them quite sharp.

A characteristic example of this is found in the differences between party committees and some communist deputies, which broke out in the course of approving the nomination of the temporary chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Executive Committee. At the session, these deputies opposed the suggestions made by the CPSU obkom bureau, which had been approved by the party group of the soviet (some people did not even vote). As a result, the motion did not garner the majority vote. It was only on the following day, after a second discussion of the matter was held by the party group within the soviet, that the candidate who had been recommended by the party obkom bureau, was approved at the session as interim oblast executive committee chairman.

A great deal of hurt and reciprocal accusations developed as a result of this. According to some, by insisting that all communist deputies accept its recommendation,

the obkom bureau was violating the law and the standards of internal party democracy. Others just as categorically accused the communist deputies who had voted against that recommendation of the grossest possible violation of the CPSU statutes and party discipline. What do the statutes say on this account? Alas, even the closest possible study of the statutes does not provide an answer to this question. On the one hand, the bureau could and should guide the activities of party groups in the soviets. On the other, there is no clear indication of the mandatory nature of its resolutions (precisely the bureau and not the obkom plenum), or of the resolutions of the party group binding to all party members. Nor are there any instructions as to whether the party group, which disagrees with the bureau resolution, will appeal it to the plenum.

Such situations arise in practical work quite frequently. We read in the press that in one case the party group in the local soviet refused to support the resolution of the party raykom on replacing the rayon executive chairman; in another, the communist deputies voted against a candidacy recommended by the gorkom; elsewhere again, on their own initiative, disagreeing with the superior party authority, they raised for discussion by the soviet the pressing problems of environmental protection and drafted a perhaps questionable but specific resolution with teeth in it.

Such facts are being assessed differently. There are those who tend to see in them a manifestation of democratization, while they frighten others. Setting aside emotions and extremes, however, it is obvious that such situations are by no means accidental. They are related above all to the fact that we are only learning but have by no means learned how to live under the conditions of democracy. Another reason is the imperfect nature of the CPSU statutes and their lack of clarity concerning the rights and prerogatives of party committees toward party groups acting in nonparty institutions. In our view, we must codify the right of the party groups in terms of the superior authorities. The current statutes simply say nothing on this subject. We have become so accustomed to this that even the very raising of the question of the rights of subordinate authorities frequently seems strange.

Yet this was by no means always the situation. We have a splendid model on the basis of which relations among party groups and respective party committees should be structured. I am referring to the Leninist 1919 party statutes. They were, essentially, the first statutes of a ruling Communist Party and regulated most thoroughly problems of the activities of communist groups (which were then known as the party factions) in nonparty establishments and organizations.

Even today we can learn from this document practicality, efficiency and clarity in the formulation of questions. The statutes did not avoid rough spots. They stipulated and, in general, considered entirely normal that there would be differences of opinion among party

members in the consideration of problems. However, that is precisely why they did not remain silent on matters affecting party discipline. The statutes clearly and unequivocally formulated the concept that factions, regardless of their purpose, are entirely controlled by the party. On all matters on which a legitimate resolution of the respective party organization exists, the factions must support such resolutions strictly and undeviatingly.

Nonetheless, these statutes, which were adopted under the conditions of intervention and Civil War, were most thoroughly concerned with the creation of the necessary conditions for a truly democratic discussion and resolution of problems and for preventing party discipline, which was absolutely necessary, from turning into bureaucratic discipline. In addition to the general stipulation that in matters of their internal life and current work the factions are autonomous, the statutes contained sufficiently substantive guarantees to the effect that such autonomy will be implemented in practice.

The statutes noted, for example, that in discussions within the party committee of problems affecting any given faction, the faction should have its representatives attending the plenary session of that same committee, in an advisory capacity. They emphasized that in all most important positions in the establishment or organization which has a faction, candidates must be nominated by the faction alongside the respective party organizations. If the same stipulations had been entered in the present statutes, we could have avoided many conflicts between party committees and party groups in nonparty establishments. Furthermore, resolutions pertaining to the work of the party members in the soviets and mass organizations of the working people would have been, unquestionably, more competent.

The statutes stipulated that in the case of substantial differences of views between the party committee and the faction on any matter whatsoever within its range of competence, the committee must review, in the presence of representatives of the faction, that same item and make a final decision which must be immediately executed by the faction.

This concept was not a "dead" letter. Even the party's Central Committee, which could reconsider a matter for a variety of reasons, did not insist on the mandatory implementation by the faction members of a previous resolution. Here is an example: on 15 March 1920, at the joint session of the communist factions of the AUCCTU and the Moscow City Trade Unions Council, N.N. Krestinskiy, RKP(b) Central Committee secretary, said on behalf of the Central Committee that since the question of collective and single command in industrial management showed a difference between the views of the AUCCTU faction and the resolution of the party's Central Committee, on the basis of party discipline the members of the faction were asked not to speak out at trade union congresses in defense of collective management. The faction appealed to the RKP(b) Central

Committee with a request that this resolution be reconsidered. After considering the request, on V.I. Lenin's suggestion, to begin with, the Central Committee Politburo asserted the accuracy of its former resolution and, secondly, resolved that considering the relatively minor importance of this matter and the immediacy of the 9th RKP(b) Congress, which would resolve it once and for all, the members of the AUCCTU faction would be given the right to speak out at trade union congresses in support of the faction's resolution. In the view of V.I. Lenin and other members of the Central Committee Politburo, this decision was a lesser political evil compared to automatically imposing upon the AUCCTU faction the mandatory resolution of the party's Central Committee.

Therefore, in its very first post-October statutes our party codified the Leninist principles of democratic centralism in solving the specific problems of organizing the work of communist groups in nonparty institutions. These concepts were retained, with minor amendments, in the party statutes until 1934. By then the situation in the party had seriously changed. Under the conditions of the already existing cult of Stalin's personality, the principle of democratic centralism in party building was increasingly interpreted in such a way as to emphasize centralism in its administrative-bureaucratic aspect rather than democracy. The stipulations in the statutes concerning the rights of party groups in terms of superior authorities were no longer acceptable. It was no accident that the party statutes, which were adopted at the 17th VKP(b) Congress contained no more than two short paragraphs instead of the detailed stipulations of the former statutes concerning the activities of communist factions in nonparty establishments. One of them stipulated when party groups can be set up in nonparty establishments, and their objectives; the other stipulated that they must be strictly guided by the resolutions of the corresponding party committees.

The time has now come fully to restore the Leninist concept of democratic centralism in party building. Naturally, it is not a question of mechanically including in the CPSU statutes the formulations of the 1919 statutes. The new times demand largely new decisions.

At this point, I believe, it is particularly important to sum up the experience acquired in the past 2 to 3 years. In the course of the revolutionary perestroika which has developed in the country, major changes are taking place in social life inordinately quickly. Frequently the practice of party work falls behind. For example, the party committees proved to be largely unprepared for such a tempestuous growth of the cooperative movement. In Chelyabinsk Oblast, for example, the number of cooperative members in industry, construction, consumer services, trade and public catering tripled in the first half of 1989 alone. The amount of their output is growing quickly. The cooperatives have already become a major force and, in the near future, their role should increase significantly. For the time being, however, we are merely noting approaches to solving the problem of guiding the

activities of party members working in cooperatives. It is true that a certain experience has been gained. For example, in construction cooperatives such as Niva, Remstroybyt and Raduga, primary party organizations have been set up. In other cases party groups under the party organizations of the enterprises-guarantors have been set up (such as in the cooperative at the Chelyabinsk Time Mechanisms Plant). Unfortunately, however, there have been cases in which party members who have joined cooperatives are reluctantly made members of the party organizations of the guaranteeing enterprises. The result is that some members of cooperatives have unwittingly lost their ties with the party organizations. Party members who do part-time work in cooperatives are virtually never registered. Yet they could and should be, and to the fullest extent, promoters of party policy in the cooperative movement.

Many complex problems are related to the appearance of informal public organizations and movements, some of which are quite influential. Many "informals" include active supporters of perestroika who sincerely try to make their contribution to the democratization of society. They have their own viewpoint and their own methods for achieving objectives, methods which could be considered unusual or worrisome. However, if their objectives coincide with those of perestroika, as was noted at the July CPSU Central Committee Conference, this is a foundation for dialogue and interaction with them.

From this viewpoint as well it is extremely important to organize the work of the party members in the informal associations. The number of such party members, incidentally, is quite high. Anyone familiar with the problem, however, knows that elements of reciprocal lack of understanding and even alienation in relations between party committees and party members working in independent associations are frequently quite strong. I recall last year's meeting in Chelyabinsk of representatives of autonomous organizations in the Urals and Siberia. According to some of its participants, matters went so far that the communists were summoned to the party committees and strongly advised not to attend the meeting. What was this? A recurrence of administrative-command management methods and lack of political standards? Yes, it was. However, it was also due to the fact that no somewhat clear concept of working with party members involved in informal associations existed then, and nor does it exist now.

Another aspect of the problem should be taken into consideration as well. At that same meeting, of the representatives of autonomous associations in Chelyabinsk, even according to the most conservative estimates approximately one-third of the participants were party members or candidate members. Nonetheless, the obvious antiperestroika remarks which were noted in some of the speeches were not given any whatsoever serious response. Yet when the party workers who attended the meeting tried to do so, they encountered the absolutely unanimous objections of the "informals,"

both nonparty members and communists. The latter were sometimes even more active in this respect. The impression developed that to them solidarity within the group they represented at the meeting and group interests and discipline were preferable to party interests and discipline.

Such features can be seen in the activities of many party members who have joined rapidly politicizing independent associations in many parts of the country. In such cases, how should the party committees act? Unquestionably, we must not allow any return to the administrative-command management methods. It is equally unquestionable, however, that we must guide the activities of the party members working in nonparty establishments.

To this effect we must, in particular, restore the Leninist approach to the statutes as a code of standards of party life and not as more or less general principles allowing a great variety of interpretations. That is why it would be expedient to introduce suitable amendments to them. We need not two or three paragraphs about party groups in nonparty organizations but a separate section with quite specific stipulations. Naturally, another variant is possible as well: the adoption by a party congress or the Central Committee of any other special document which would regulate the activities of party groups in nonparty establishments.

In any case—whether it is a question of a section in the party statutes or a separate document—in accordance with Leninist tradition we must not simply state that party committees guide the party groups but clearly formulate the concept of the accountability and controllability of such groups by the party committees. Said formulation should apply to party committees on the enterprise, establishment, sovkhoz and kolkhoz level and not start with the raykoms, as is currently the case. We need regulations on the obligations of party groups as well as their rights concerning the party committees. Only such an approach would make it possible to ensure unity of action among party members working in nonparty establishments and, at the same time, prevent possible recurrences of command-administrative methods in the management of party groups.

**V. Denisov, assistant professor, Department of CPSU History and Political Economy, Novorossiysk Higher Marine Engineering School: Combination of Positions and Division of Functions**

For more than 1 year this question has been a topic of debates. It was argued among the delegates of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and by the USSR People's Deputies. It is a question of combining the positions of party committee secretary and chairman of the soviet.

One may ask the reason for which this should be discussed again after the July CPSU Central Committee Conference, where it was said that the combination of such positions is by no means a strictly mandatory step. It is recommended, but each rayon and oblast could and

should act according to the specific situation. For example, if the majority of the population believes that a nonparty comrade would be the best candidate to perform the duties of a chairman of the soviet, there are no reasons whatsoever not to elect precisely him. Nonetheless, the practice of propaganda work indicates that people frequently fail to understand the logic of the suggestion of combining the positions while nonetheless separating the functions of the party committee secretary from those of the soviet chairman. That is why I would like to share my views on this matter.

The aspiration of the CPSU as a political organization to develop a governmental system which would represent the interests of all working people and maximally influence the system should be considered entirely natural. The party is a political organization and the most essential aspect of politics is the "organization of the state system" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, p 239); politics is "participation in the affairs of the state, directing the state and defining the forms, tasks and nature of activities of the state..." (op. cit., vol 33, p 340). How is the party's influence on the shaping and functioning of the state power authorities exerted? One of the ways is through the party members who have been made deputies. The idea of combining positions is included within such a framework and does not contradict the Leninist concept of the party's leadership of the mass organizations of working people through the communists working within them. "...As a ruling party," V.I. Lenin said at the 10th RKP(b) Congress, "we cannot fail to blend soviet with party 'command,' which in our country have merged and will remain such..." (op. cit., vol 43, p 15).

The fact that both party and soviet authorities share many common objectives and tasks is another feature in favor of combining positions. In particular, they are responsible for the level of socioeconomic development of their region. Could the party remove itself from the solution of such problems which affect hundreds of thousands of people? Naturally, it cannot.

I believe that the combination of positions does not have a direct negative effect on the principle of demarcation of functions. The following situation would be entirely realistic: the first party committee secretary is not the chairman of the soviet and the party committee bureau and departments of its apparat deal with current economic problems and are drowning in petty matters. However, the opposite is possible as well: the first secretary is elected chairman of the soviet but this does not prevent the committee, the bureau and the apparat from discarding current affairs and analyzing long-range basic problems of economic and social development, cadre policy and ideological and educational work. In other words, the division of functions is by no means a guarantee of substitution; the combination of positions as well is not a clear obstacle to the demarcation of functions.

The division of functions between party and governmental authorities applies precisely to the authorities. If we look at this problem from the positions of the communist deputy, it would be pertinent to ask the following: Whose representative is he: of the party or the state? He is a representative of both the party and the state. He acts in a double capacity. Should a communist deputy who is secretary of a party committee and chairman of a soviet deal with the problems of the soviet or would that be a "substitution?" The prime party duty of the communist deputy is to be familiar with the fine points of soviet work. That is why solving the problem of demarcation of functions on the level of the communist deputy or the chairman of a soviet and party committee secretary would be, in my view, nondialectical. It could be considered only in the analysis of the interrelationship between party and soviet authorities.

I fear that in assuming the position of chairman of a soviet, the party committee secretary would make the soviet subordinate to himself and turn it into a subdivision of the party committee. However, has practical experience of recent decades not given us many such examples, although the party managers were not officially the heads of soviet authorities? No, the roots of the evil are not found in the combination of positions but in the nature of the political atmosphere in society and the level of development of its legal foundations. The essence of the matter is clearly to define the functions of party and soviet authorities and to create the necessary conditions for their successful implementation and to closely watch the work of the party committees and the soviets and help them. This entirely depends on us, the rank-and-file party members and voters.

#### Views on the Elections

##### **Yu. Tsukanov, Ulyanovsk:**

Let me share with you some thoughts which give me no respite. Elections for local soviets are approaching. How will my party look at them.... Again and again, I recall the past electoral campaign. At that time, in the spring, more than 30 obkom secretaries were not supported by the voters. There probably would have been more, had some party managers not been the sole candidates, as was the case, for example, in Ulyanovsk Oblast. It would be useless to make us believe that this was the result of a natural selection of candidates. It would be better to consider why did this become necessary in order to avoid competition.

Unfortunately, the party's Central Committee itself did not set the proper example in the course of the electoral campaign. How can I, a rank-and-file party member, consider that there were 100 nominees for 100 deputy seats? Is it like a lottery in which no one wins? Yet on 26 March the people went to the voting booths remembering this "100 out of 100." That is also one of the reasons for which they struck out the party leaders from their ballots.

Many of our party leaders lack the most important art of a political leader: to communicate. They prefer round-about formulas to giving direct answers. It is as though in our country it is not acceptable to engage in a dialogue with the population of an oblast through the local press, for instance, or the oblast television. This would be precisely a dialogue which would include questions such as "how," "why," and "how long." The rare exceptions are merely confirmations of the rule. In such cases, where does trust come from?

The party should not fear an open dialogue with the people and the electoral struggle; it should not artificially provide convenient conditions to anyone. This would only enhance its authority and increase the confidence of the voters in its candidates.

##### **A. Kulakov, doctor of technical sciences, professor, CPSU member since 1946, Kiev:**

The last elections for USSR People's Deputies lead to serious thoughts on the party's authority and on how to proceed in the future. I can understand the concern of the participants in the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum but I cannot understand at all statements such as that allegedly some gorkom and raykom secretaries are unwilling, under the present circumstances, to submit their candidacies for elections to the local soviets.

I would like to address a few questions to those who support such views. Would they support now direct, secret elections of first secretaries of party committees, involving more than one nominee? How do they assess their own chances at such elections? Would such chances not be equal to those of the election of people's deputies? Finally, if they do not like the present circumstances what would they like to replace them with? Should we return to the previous system of "appointments?"

It is time to realize that the voters expressed their lack of confidence not in the party in general but in those among its representatives who had not proven themselves in the least. It seems to me that if all first secretaries had gone through the crucible of true elections before assuming their positions they would have been elected people's deputies as well. The question is for the party managers to be the most worthy. Should we not seriously consider the holding of precisely such elections as we prepare for the forthcoming party congress?

##### **V. Bartashevich, technologist, Minsk:**

I believe that the defeat of some party committee secretaries at the elections for USSR People's Deputies may be partially explained by the helplessness of the propagandists who promoted them. It is as though they did this only because it was "regulated," and prescribed by their official duties. Occasionally, they failed to display even basic conscientiousness, not to mention a creative approach. The electoral campaign was no exception. It simply clearly highlighted something which all of us can see on a daily basis.

Let us consider visual agitation in Minsk. A half-torn slogan, whipped by the rain and the wind, hangs on the high-rise on Gamarnik Street. As early as February I rang up the party gorkom propaganda department on this subject. They thanked me and promised to "solve the problem." Three months later, as I was sending this letter to the editors, the slogan was still hanging there. How can we understand a slogan on Pritytskiy Street, which calls upon the working people of Frunzenskiy Rayon to reach by the year 2000 95 percent of output on a level superior to global standards? What kind of stupidity is that? Is it again a question of "catching up and outstripping?" I tried to convince the personnel of the gorkom that this was idle talk, but in vain. They say that a slogan is a slogan.

Such is their "logic."

#### Letters Followed by a Comment

##### If a Party Member is Pensioned Off

**V. Solovskaya, member of the CPSU since 1945, Khabarovsk Kray:**

We, eight communists-pensioners, were dropped from the rolls of the party organization of the Ulchskiy Rayon Executive Committee in which we had spent decades of work, without our agreement. Especially for us a territorial party organization was created and, in order to make it stronger, six pensioners from another territorial organization were transferred to ours.

This new formation proved to be totally unfunctional. For the past few months we take turns reporting at party meetings on the implementation of statutory obligations. Some report and others keep being bored. Why was it necessary to get rid of retired party members in this manner? Could it be that our knowledge and experience are not needed by anyone?

**R. Rimen, Kharkov:**

By five votes against four, our party organization dropped me and four other comrades from its rolls, suggesting that I transfer at my place of residence. The reason was my age. Yes, we are no longer young although we regularly attend party meetings and fulfill assignments. Some of us work in the people's control group and others are engaged in political information work. Have we lost contacts with our own party organization? In my view, we have not. But then why are we being separated from it without our agreement?

**A. Vasilyev, Moscow:**

Our 8th Territorial Primary Party Organization has on its rolls 450 members. What do we do? In the past we supervised the activities of the few workers of the DEZ. Now, however, they are affiliated with another organization and we are totally out of it. There was a question that we should organize work with the population of the microrayon. Our party bureau secretary, however, said

that this was the job of party members in production party organizations. Is attending meetings all that is left for us?

**A. Naumenko, CPSU member since 1949, Stavropol Kray:**

Everyone knows how difficult it is for elderly party members actively to participate in the life of their party organizations. For a variety of reasons, sometimes they are unable even to attend all meetings. However, many are unwilling to break contacts with organizations within which they have worked for decades. What to do?

In my view, instead of mandatorily transferring them to the party organizations at their place of residence, the following would be better: remove the person from the party rolls, free him from paying membership dues but allow him to keep his party card in which a note of thanks for active work should be entered. If the member was not distinguished by his particular activeness, his card should simply note that he is no longer a member of that organization and that he does not have to pay membership dues. In both cases, however, the veteran should retain his right to attend even closed party meetings and act in an advisory capacity in decision-making. He will not lower the degree of militancy of the primary party organization but nor would he feel himself cut off.

**The editors asked L. Novikov, secretary of the Moskvoretskiy Rayon CPSU Committee, Moscow, to answer these letters:**

To realize the relevance of this question raised by the readers, suffice it to quote a single figure: today the CPSU numbers among its members 3.2 million pensioners. Many of them find it difficult actively to participate in the work of the primary party organizations of the enterprises and establishments where they used to work, because of poor health. This does not make the situation of these organizations easy. I came across one in which 97 of the 128 CPSU members were pensioners. In the summer it was virtually impossible to hold a party meeting, for not even one-half of the members of the organization would attend.

What to do? Paragraph 20 of the CPSU Statutes stipulates that the party is structured on the basis of the territorial-production feature. Primary organizations are created at the place of work of the party members. The moment the production feature is eliminated, the territorial principle is enacted, as stipulated in Paragraph 52. In February 1987, in a special resolution, the Moscow City CPSU Plenum noted that party members who have been pensioned off should be registered at their place of residence. This resolution was energetically implemented. Compared with 1986, in 1987 our Moskvoretskiy Rayon Party Organization removed from the party membership rolls double the amount of pensioned communists.



Many secretaries of primary party organizations breathed a sigh of relief, for finally some kind of definite rule had been implemented. This also pleased the secretaries of the territorial party organizations, for they thus obtained an able-bodied reinforcement. Yet the pensioner-party members by no means unanimously responded to the aspiration to drop all nonworking members of the CPSU from the party rolls. People felt hurt, saying that they continued to be concerned with the affairs of the collective in which they had worked and that everything in the territorial party organization was alien to them. In some cases psychologically difficult situations arose. A feeling of resentment can be sensed in the letters of V. Solovskaya and R. Rimen.

I believe that such a simplistic answer is unnecessary in such cases. The CPSU Statutes should include the following supplement: a party member who is pensioned off will decide for himself in which party organization to be a member: either at his last place of work or his place of residence. In order to see to it that a given party organization does not consist mostly of pensioners, separate shop organizations could be set up for them. For example, physicians who are party members and who have retired could be members of the shop party organization at the rayon health department; teachers could be members of the organization at the rayon public education department.

Finally, the crux of the matter: we must radically change the trend in the activities of territorial party organizations. Today we put increasingly more difficult tasks on the not very strong shoulders of our retired party members, pertaining to their place of residence and economic matters. Are they able to control the chiefs of rayon management administrations? In my view, the main feature in the activities of party organizations at the place of residence is to work with the retired who, today, number more than 58 million in our country. The party members could, together with the councils of war and labor veterans, undertake to organize the daily life and recreation of their coevals and help them. In Moscow and in our rayon territorial centers which provide services to the very old and the disabled are being set up. They should become something in the nature of clubs for the elderly. Why should the pensioned party members not be concerned with the ideological nature of the work of such clubs? The more so since, judging by Vasilyev's letter, there is interest in such activities among the retired party members.

Currently there has been a certain increase in the number of petitions requesting resignation from the CPSU for reasons of age and health. Well, this is the personal decision of the individual party member. Should we include in the CPSU Statutes that a party member who has been pensioned off should be relieved from paying party membership dues and be left his party card as a memento, as is the case of the Komsomol, with an expression of gratitude (or without it) for active work and be allowed to attend party meetings? Many party veterans with whom I have had the occasion to talk

consider this wrong. They do not agree with suggestions of awarding the title of "honorary party member," to people who would enjoy all statutory rights but not obligations. Furthermore, could there be party membership with rights but without obligations?

I know that my views are not shared by some party officials. The readers of this journal may have other suggestions as well. Such suggestions must be voiced and discussed and the most acceptable among them must be identified. It is time, finally, to solve this problem which affects millions of people.

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### **Perestroika: Are Options Possible?**

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[Article by Leonid Abramovich Gordon, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement; and Alla Konstantinovna Nazimova, candidate of economic sciences, leading scientific associate in the same institute]

[Text] Today one of the main problems, in our view, is underestimating the complexity of perestroika and the consequent deployment of social forces. It is usually believed that the main difficulties of perestroika may be reduced to the struggle between the supporters of democratization and profound economic reforms and the conservatives who, consciously or subconsciously, try to preserve the administrative-command system which developed over the past 50 years. Generally speaking, as a whole this description accurately reflects the situation in terms of the long-range historical future. However, in terms of a shorter period of time such as, let us say, the next few years, matters are much more complex. Within such a time frame which, precisely, is the field of actual political life in a revolutionary age, quite disparate development options may exist.

In this connection, it is worth noting one seemingly minor feature in today's political discussions. We find in society people who firmly condemn Stalinist repressions, along with open admirers of Stalin. There are those who approve of cooperatives and leasing and those who consider them a threat to socialism; there are supporters of a federative structure of the country and people who favor the establishing of a confederation. In short, any specific phenomenon within perestroika has its frank supporters and frank opponents. The open clash of opinions at the Congress of People's Deputies proved this with total clarity. But then there are no open opponents of perestroika as such, or else open supporters of preserving the old system.

It seems to us that here, on the surface of social life, we find one of the important features of a deep trend. The present socioeconomic situation indeed suits virtually



no one. In this sense there are no serious social forces within society whose interests would be suited by keeping the current social system absolutely unchanged. The real difficulty of perestroika, however, is that the various social groups and social forces are interested in quite disparate and occasionally clearly conflicting changes. Ignoring this circumstance would make it impossible to understand the contradictions and twists in the actual perestroika process or to assess the attitude toward it on the part of the various social forces, or else to predict their likely behavior. The situation is further worsened by the fact that such multiplicity is by no means always realized by those in charge of making the changes.

The coexistence among different approaches to perestroika is entirely natural. Such multiplicity is the result of the multiplicity of historical processes which made the current changes necessary. The contradictions within Soviet society are caused by at least two quite different periods in its previous development. The disparity of the problems created during those periods naturally leads to different approaches to their solution.

Above all, the need for change is caused by the contradictions which arose as a result of the authoritarian deformations which occurred during the Stalinist period. It was precisely then that the economy became totally stultified, a consequence of which was the rule of departmental monopoly, the elimination of virtually all elements of free competition from the production process and distortions and bureaucratization in the competitive principle in economic life in general. During the scientific-industrial stage of technical development, the deformed socialist production relations of a monopoly-governmental type clashed with the production forces triggered by the scientific and technical revolution. The need is equally urgent of changing the procedures which were established under Stalin in the areas of politics, culture and ideology. In this sense, the source of the contemporary aspiration to reorganize society on the basis of democracy and renovation of economic relations is the objective consequence of contradictions in social developments in the 1930s and 1940s.

Our present situation, however, is also influenced by the changes which occurred in the 1950s to the 1970s. Strictly speaking, the concept of "stagnation" is the end result of the changes which occurred over one-quarter of a century. However, it would be an error to believe that this concept literally characterizes the entire period. Quite tangible changes took place in the USSR, albeit disproportional or internally conflicting. Unfortunately, not one of them was profound enough to enable us to describe it as a qualitative change in social conditions. In the 1930s-1950s, the Soviet economy became essentially industrialized and the lag, wherever it still existed, disappeared as a stage. In the 1950s-1970s our economic growth was reduced primarily to "pumping" those same industrial muscles. Meanwhile, the economically advanced countries had converted to a qualitatively new

scientific and technical production stage. It appears as though once again we are now a full stage behind.

In turn, the slowed-down development of production held back the enhancement of well-being. Although real consumption and real living standards indeed rose in the USSR in the 1950s to the 1970s, the gap between needs and their satisfaction was not narrowed in the least but even widened. Tens of millions of people feel this gap in the direct worsening of their situation.

The despotic Stalinist system was surmounted but not crushed. The new procedures, as a variety of authoritarianism, did not replace Stalinism but somehow superimposed themselves on it. Despite the major changes in the 1950s-1970s, as it were the main social contradictions remained unsolved. In a certain sense they were even further aggravated. In any case, they began to be felt more acutely than in the past.

As a result, by the mid-1980s, a situation of universal dissatisfaction, which we mentioned at the very beginning, developed. Such dissatisfaction extends to virtually all social strata. Those who experienced the difficulties of Stalinism as early as the 1950s and who were objectively interested in the elimination of the authoritarian-despotic system, remained displeased because the changes which had taken place turned out to be insufficient for any qualitative restructuring of the system which was developed in the 1930s and 1940s. Those whose interests were served by the preservation of the system were displeased by the fact that it was surmounted and that their influence had been weakened. People who objectively were totally uninterested in the preservation of Stalinism also frequently showed their dissatisfaction with the changes, for partial and incomplete changes, without creating real democracy and without surmounting the alienation from the system, nonetheless exposed the weaknesses of authoritarianism. Millions of people lost their belief in the perennial rightness and omnipotence of the state without acquiring either the possibility or the readiness actively to participate in social life and to assume responsibility for its course.

The only social group which includes individuals who were pleased with the conditions which prevailed at the beginning of the 1980s were the economic speculators. The environment of the late Brezhnev period was their natural habitat and created a kind of ecological niche which favored the growth of illegal economic activities. Actually, the satisfaction of these people as well could hardly be considered very firm. Under the conditions of a total stultification, in facilitating the blossoming of an illegal economy, bureaucratism also limits free enterprise, the aspiration to which is inherent in the strongest personalities of the economic underground. Therefore, in the final account, the situation at the start of the 1980s was hardly considered ideal even among the corrupted groups.

Legitimately, the aspiration of the people for a further intensification of the reform stem from a feeling of incompleteness and insufficiency of the reform. Conversely, dissatisfaction with the disruptions in the former illusory monolithic condition leads to efforts to restructure society in such a way that such a monolithic unity could be ensured but without the former tyranny and repression. It is self-evident that a number of intermediary approaches to perestroika develop. A clearer idea of such approaches may be found in the suggested options for the solution of the basic problems encountered by our society.

Let us consider above all two of them, which are particularly relevant for most of the country. The first is the problem of the most efficient economic organization which would ensure the highest possible economic and social results; the second is the problem of a political organization which would guarantee society a combination of freedom with order. Public discussions in recent years and the materials carried in the press and on television and at the Congress of People's Deputies prove that a great variety of solutions to such problems are being suggested in contemporary Soviet society.

Ignoring the nuances, in each case matters are reduced to quite clear options, to a kind of opposition dichotomy. Thus, in the opinion of some, economic efficiency can be achieved only as a result of making radical reforms which would lead to the development of a planned-commodity economy and the development of the socialist marketplace. The conversion to a different type of socialist production relations becomes, in this case, a mandatory prerequisite for economic growth. In the view of others, the task is, above all, to ensure the straight acceleration of technical progress, achieve a qualitatively new standard in planning by directive, and perfecting the existing economic mechanism on the basis of the application of contemporary information technology and upgrading planning and performing discipline rather than changing its basic structures.

In precisely the same way, in political life, a segment of society favors systematic democratization, socialist pluralism, surmounting the power of the bureaucracy and eliminating privileges. At the same time, however, there are people who are sincerely convinced that under socialism political power can only be as monolithic-hierarchical. In their view, it is only such an essentially authoritarian political system that could protect the interests of the people and ensure the necessary discipline, social guarantees and social justice.

The possible combinations of these options in solving political and economic problems make it possible to systematize the basic perestroika strategies, the struggle between and interaction among which determine today the actual course of revolutionary changes in our society.

This applies, above all, to the strategy of **democratic renovation** which was formulated at the April 1981 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Its basic elements

began to develop as early as the 1970s, if not earlier. The circumstance noted by M.S. Gorbachev, to the effect that the March-April 1985 change in the views of many party leaders had been preceded by a certain period of analytical thoughts and moral evaluations, was of decisive significance in terms of practical policy. However, the strategy of democratic renovation, in its expanded variety, was formulated in the party documents of recent years, particularly in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. This strategy continues to be developed and the broad social circles are becoming increasingly active in promoting such development. The electoral campaign of 1989 and the proceedings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies were major steps in the development and clarification of the ideas of democratic renovation.

The strategy of democratic renovation presumes profound economic and political reforms, the purpose of which is to apply the planning-commodity type of socialist production relations and to ensure the decisive democratization of social life. The supporters of this strategy proceed from the conviction that production of a scientific-industrial type and, in general, a developed contemporary society need the type of forms of independent activeness of the masses and combinations of discipline, initiative and enterprise which can appear only under the conditions of combining planned control with the market and broad political democracy. In precisely the same way, it is only profound reforms and democratization of the social atmosphere that could make our economy receptive to the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and, correspondingly, raise it to a level which would ensure high prosperity and real social justice. A mandatory prerequisite for this strategy is, precisely, the simultaneous and interrelated nature of economic reforms with political democratization. This simultaneity is its most important advantage. The strengthening of the autonomy of economic units deprives the state of its status of monopoly employer and manager of resources. In turn, political democratization facilitates the implementation of economic reforms and weakens the influence of forces and groups interested in preserving the previous order.

Nonetheless, the simultaneous implementation of economic and political reforms involves major difficulties, for any change inevitably disrupts the ordinary course of life, creating in the transitional period centers of social stress. Understandably, such stress becomes the sharper the broader becomes the area of social life affected by the changes at any given moment. Furthermore, maintaining an even pace of change in such different areas as politics and economics is exceptionally difficult. Differences on the question of the pace could become exceptionally sharp among the supporters of this strategy. In some cases, as was seen at the Congress of People's Deputies, they even eliminated the essential differences in the positions of supporters of democratic renovation (both radical and moderate) and other trends. In the final

account, however, it is precisely the basic difference in approaches that is of decisive importance.

An orientation toward democratic renovation opposes, if one may use this word, the **strategy of order**. Its essence is the confidence that Soviet society does not need any basic socioeconomic or sociopolitical changes and that in order to solve the crisis it is necessary and sufficient to bring efficient order in economic and political management. To this effect, in the view of the supporters of said strategy, favorable conditions have now appeared. The development of computers makes it possible to keep track of and apply mandatory economic planning on any scale. The higher educational standard makes it possible to provide all management sectors with properly skilled cadres. All that is needed is to strengthen ideological and educational work, enhance exigency, strengthen discipline, ensure control and the inevitability of punishment of those who violate the order, and ensure the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, and the qualitatively new condition of society will be attained.

The first public materials on the discussion of the various options of political strategy in the center of power were the documents of the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. They revealed that this approach reflects the views of a number of party and state leaders. Judging by the speeches at the plenum, some of them emphasized not reform but merely increasing the responsibility of cadres and the masses and the struggle against "antisocialist forces," which would involve the help of law enforcement authorities.

The attractiveness of this approach lies in the simplicity, clarity and, above all, customary nature of the steps which were suggested. Added to this are the powerful force of inertia and the belief that the planned changes could be achieved at whatever pace we choose, as long as we admit their need and pass a pertinent resolution. The readiness of a substantial segment of the population to obey command methods and the instilled confidence that such management methods will, as in the past, be adopted by the performers on all levels of the hierarchy and the activeness of social groups whose state of mind was revealed to a certain extent at the April Central Committee Plenum, put together, provide additional support to the reality of the idea of a strategy of order, based on a certain substantial support among the public, the more so since practical experience had already indicated that the elimination of the most excessive violations in production, labor and social discipline repeatedly made it possible to solve a variety of specific problems. The trouble was, however, that efforts to bring order without profound economic and political reforms, although sometimes successful in isolated cases, had never, in recent decades, brought about any improvements in the overall situation. With the development of computers and enhanced cadre skills, efforts of this kind had not become more efficient whatsoever. Furthermore, the strategy of order totally ignored the fact that such an "order" in itself is evil, regardless of whether or not it contributes to economic successes, for however

suitable a streamlined and well-organized administrative system may be, enacted by even the most qualified officials and using the most advanced equipment, the question of the lack of freedom remains unsolved.

In that sense the strategy of bringing order without reforms and democratization is a kind of utopian effort to restructure the Stalinist system in such a way that its essence would remain unchanged, eliminating only its most hateful manifestations. For understandable reasons, the open appeal to Stalinist ideology is hindered, for which reason the neo-Stalinists are increasingly trying to use the least developed and least civilized forms of nationalism. It is noteworthy that the notorious platform of antiperestroyka forces, which triggered such a sharp reaction among the public in the spring of 1988, was a combination of Stalinist with nationalist concepts.

The strategy of democratic renovation and the neo-Stalinist strategy of order, despite their conflicting nature, have something in common: both offer internally noncontradictory "sets" of answers to basic problems of our time. The democratization of socialism suitably agrees with the strengthening of planning-commodity principles in the economy. Conversely, the rejection of the economic reform, naturally, is combined with the preservation of the authoritarian system in political life.

However, political life is by no means entirely framed by logical elaborations. During periods of crises and revolutionary changes this becomes even less valid. In such times, conversely, conflicting political orientations become very popular. In practical terms as well, they could play an important role during the intermediary stages of transition from one consecutive strategy to another.

It is not astounding that within a number of approaches which formulate possible trends of perestroyka, contradictory orientations hold quite a significant position. In particular, especially popular today are views which express the strategy of a **superficial political democratization**, i.e., a democratization without major economic reforms of the planning-market type. This option of perestroyka changes is based on the real contradictions during the transition to an economy of market-oriented socialism. This transition requires a drastic increase in the intensiveness of labor and a restructuring of economic relations on the basis of rivalry and competitiveness, a direct correlation between income and labor results and the establishment of forms of economic differentiation which are unusual to us. A planning-commodity socialism, like a socialism of the administrative-mandatory type, can provide full employment. Furthermore, it can offer to the people incomparably broader opportunities for labor and creativity and enhance their living standards. However, in order to realize the potential of a planning-commodity economy much greater efforts and much greater responsibility are needed. A prosperous life and free labor do not come free. Understandably, by no means does everyone find attractive the prospect of such difficulties.

In a society which, for decades, was nurtured by illusions of primitive equalization and utopian concepts to the effect that free labor and a high living standard can be achieved without any labor rivalry, under the conditions of automatically guaranteed employment, regardless of the quality of the work, in such a society the inevitability of economic reform is accepted with difficulty and not immediately. In any case, it is accepted much more slowly than belief in the need for political democratization or, at least, of its simplest forms (the demand to weaken the power of the bureaucracy, to deprive some social groups of their privileges, to broaden glasnost, etc.). The combination of such aspirations is, precisely, what leads to the strategy of democratization (which, in this case, is inevitably superficial) not accompanied by economic reform.

We must emphasize that the profound internal contradictoriness of this approach is manifested in that, in its pure form, it is rarely extensively expressed in ideological, scientific and theoretical elaborations. However, the mass aspirations toward democratization without the burdens and hardships of the economic reform gain extensive support and popularity. Exceptionally indicative in this respect were statements opposing cooperatives, which were heard at the Congress of People's Deputies. When cooperatives, which account for about 1 percent of the gross national product and for less than 2 percent of trade are ascribed the virtual responsibility for inflation and the unbalanced market, it is clear that it is a question not of any serious theoretical elaborations but rather of an emotional discontent with market forms of differentiation (unless such statements do not conceal an effort to draw the attention away from departmental monopolies which actually determine the situation on the market, or else from the poor work of those who have been assigned with protective functions but who fail to perform them with the necessary efficiency).

Without formulating its own theoretical doctrine, mass awareness, which tries to attain prosperity, equality and democracy without difficult economic reforms, frequently gravitates toward populist ideas. The present crisis is explained in such an awareness essentially with the weakening of the moral foundations and deviation from the "people's truth," or else with the incompetence of individual officials, malicious enemies, grubbers, external forces, etc. Hence the belief that the situation can be quickly corrected. Suffice it to make a democratic order mandatory, to expose the culprits for specific failures, to name the authors of wrong decisions and to apply universal control over the observance of the standards of social justice and everything will fall in place. Alas, the fact that the sterility of such "simple and quick" solutions has been confirmed over the centuries rarely makes them any less attractive. In the final account, the illusions of populism can be abandoned only as a result of practical experience and it would be gratifying if the cost of such experience does not come excessively high.

In a certain sense also internally conflicting is yet another approach to perestroika, the opposite to the strategy of democratization without economic reform. It is the concept of **authoritarian modernization**, of economic reform without democratization or, at least, with a democratization which is pushed to the relatively distant future. It is believed, in that case, that we must begin by making changes which would create conditions for the development of an economy of the planned-commodity type, ensure the qualitative growth of production efficiency and upgrade well-being and only then undertake a conversion to broad democracy, pluralism and a true law-governed state. The lengthy preservation of the authoritarian management system, in the opinion of supporters of such views, guarantees political stability during the period of implementing economic reforms, with their inevitable complications. In the future, the weakening of authoritarian procedures as well would not lead to destabilization, for by then the most difficult period of economic change will have been left behind us and, finally, the economic reforms will begin to yield results. Such a strategy reminds us somewhat of the sequence followed in the sociopolitical changes in Western Europe where, as we know, initially social progress was concentrated primarily in the area of economics and it was only later that democracy began to assume a mass, so to say, character.

Understandably, the strategy of authoritarian modernization, despite the logical nature of its rational-technocratic substantiations, agrees as badly with the principles of democratic socialism as with an open Stalinist strategy of order. However, the technocratic rationality of authoritarian modernization deprives it of its naive sincerity inherent in conservative ideas, whatever cover the ideas of order may adopt—neo-Stalinist or nationalist. Authoritarian modernization, like the aspirations to democracy without economic reforms, is rarely presented in its developed aspect. However, in the substantiation of economic practices and, even more so, in their implementation, the appearance of such approaches is quite frequent. Furthermore, the discussion which took place at the April 1989 Central Committee Plenum confirms that similar trends are characteristic of some political personalities as well. In a number of statements made at that plenum an emphasis on the need "to bring order" in the political area was combined with demands for a more consistent implementation of economic reform.

The correlation among these strategies is, naturally, very schematically presented. Real life is incomparably more complex. Sociopolitical divisions are expressed in reality by no means clearly, so that the various strategies seem gradually to convert into each other, forming a mass of intermediary and mixed approaches.

This presentation of the four perestroika strategies, which reflects the multidimensional nature of the contemporary situation, by no means covers all possible approaches to the solution of the most important problems facing society. We must also take into consideration

the tremendous importance of national and national-regional problems. In this connection, almost all of the approaches we mentioned could be divided at least into two parts, for both politically and economically almost all of them (with the exception of those which are extremely reactionary) will appear entirely different depending on whether they advocate greater or lesser autonomy granted to the individual areas of the Soviet Union, the complete or partial sovereignty of its constituent republics, the greater or lesser rights of the Union center, etc. Economically, furthermore, substantial differences are determined by ecological orientations, the acceptance of the priority of the maximally possible preservation of the natural environment or the priority of maintaining high rates of traditional scientific and technical progress, including replacing the natural with an artificial environment. Correspondingly, the outline we provided should be considered only as part of a wider classification matrix.

Actually, the true complexity of the present situation is determined not only by the large number of likely development options. It is also a matter of the fact that under different conditions different choices become dominant. Let us recall the huge dimensions and exceptional variety of our country. Glasnost and democratization, which are rapidly leading into politics tens of millions of people, are turning this variety into a powerful socioeconomic factor. Two weeks of work of the Congress of People's Deputies revealed this most bluntly and unequivocally. This clearly confirmed the small likelihood of any unitarian restructuring of the Soviet Union and the obvious need for making changes in a country such as ours at a different pace and in different sequences and specific forms, for in the different areas entirely different problems turn out to be the most pressing and urgent. Real social life, in each specific case, turns into an interaction not among all conceivable strategies but into a clash among those of them which are related to solving problems considered relevant at a given time and in a given place.

In some republics, in the Baltic area for instance, economic conditions and political standards matured for a fast conversion to pluralism and a controlled market economy. Clashes between supporters and opponents of the market and even supporters and opponents of democracy in themselves are of little significance. The real struggle is waged primarily on the national application, the national orientation of changes. Virtually everyone in that part of the country agrees with the need for democratization and economic reform. However, a great variety of views are expressed as to the degree of republic autonomy within which they should be carried out, the functions which will be granted to the Union government and the extent to which the state should support any given national culture. In short, the main question here is whether democratic and planned-commodity changes will lead to the preservation of the current federative, in form, yet unitarian, in essence, state or will result in the creation of a real federation or

else, in general, will end by making constitutional amendments and converting to a confederation and turning the Union state into a union of states.

The national question and national characteristics determine the condition at the opposite pole of development in parts of the country in which objective economic, sociopolitical and sociocultural conditions are such that a broad democratization should be preceded by a rather lengthy preparatory period. In these areas we must begin by ensuring the normal development of a civilized life without pogroms, without mass violence and without streams of refugees. Arguments on the options within a developed democracy under circumstances where this would be possible are not all that timely. In situations reminding of those which appeared in Nagornyy Karabakh, Sumgait, Fergana and Abkhaziya, it is more important to decide whether to impose martial law and use the special forces or to cope with the help of local forces. Therefore, in these areas as well (although for different reasons) the various options for the solving of national-specific problems assume prime significance. As to the economy of such areas, the problem of the market does not have priority in this case. Much more frequently one must consider changing the one-crop structure of the economy, and alleviating unemployment or the real consequences (and not simply the threat of such consequences) of an ecological catastrophe, as was the case with the Aral.

A different situation develops also in the relatively more developed areas, above all in most RSFSR oblasts. Here adequate prerequisites exist for immediately undertaking the systematic democratization and a decisive conversion to a planned-market economy. However, contrary to the situation in the more advanced areas, in our view, no conditions have as yet developed here within which such changes would be easy to accomplish and would be obvious to the overwhelming portion of the population. In these so to say median parts of the country, a comparable force is applied both by trends for reform and a leaning toward order without any profound changes. National and ecological problems are also influencing social life here. Nonetheless, its main feature is those same alternatives of a plan-market or improved-administrative economy and democratization or a streamlined authoritarian policy.

In addition to everything else, the concept of the multi-tiered nature of contemporary development, makes it necessary to consider some fundamental principles governing the organization of our social life. The coexistence among different and frequently conflicting approaches to perestroika is merely a specific manifestation of the inevitable coexistence within society—whether Soviet or any other—of different trends, views and interests. Subjectively this inevitability is rooted in the exceptional complexity of current events. Logically and gnosiologically different understandings and various assessments of perestroika processes are based precisely on their internal heterogeneousness and the possibility of their different interpretation.

However, this has also its objective, its ontological, so to say, side. Despite unity in the main points shown by the individual social groups and strata within our society, there also exist specific interests to which one option or another in the solving of social problems or one strategy of perestroika or another correspond to different extents.

For example, the most skilled and educated strata of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia are directly interested in democratic renovation and the simultaneous conversion to democracy and a planned-market economy, and the intensification of labor and sociopolitical competitiveness. This latter circumstance was unusual to us but was quite convincingly confirmed by the events related to the miners' strike, in which workers gave priority to the demand for economic autonomy of the mines. Less skilled groups of working people are also interested in democratization and economic upsurge. However, it is especially workers employed in "dying" production sectors without a future, who find it more difficult to adapt to the conditions of market changes and to abandon the principles of equalization in the social area. Frequently such groups tend to support ideas of superficial democratization without economic reform. Conversely, many economic managers feel a sharp need for enterprise autonomy and the development of a socialist market, although in some cases they consider democracy as the equivalent of weakened discipline and order. Correspondingly, they could like a policy of reform with a postponement of democratization. In a certain sense, a more difficult situation is that of the personnel in the middle rungs of the departmental, the party or, in general, the managerial apparatus. Changes in the functions of departments and state-political agencies and a reduction in the number of their personnel mean that the majority of this category of working people would have to change jobs in the course of perestroika and, perhaps, even their profession. On the other hand, it is precisely managers who most frequently must face difficulties in the establishment of the new economic-political mechanism, and can see more clearly than anyone else the difficulties of the transition. A cautious attitude toward this stratum and the aspiration wherever possible to limit ourselves to streamlining and improving the present system is the legitimate consequence of the objective status of this group. Incidentally, this is one of the important prerequisites for the lagging democratization of the leading party authorities behind this process compared to many other areas of social life (let us recall that by the end of 1988 and beginning of 1989 from one-third to one-half of members and secretaries of party bureaus and party committees of enterprises and establishments accounted for between two-thirds and three-quarters of people's deputies of the USSR but that only less than 10 percent of rayon secretaries and about 1 percent of oblast party committee secretaries had been elected as such).

As we can see, for both subjective and objective reasons, differences in the approach to current social tasks,

including perestroika, cannot disappear. In our view, a situation in which the overwhelming majority of the people will obviously, to one or another extent of activeness, support perestroika will remain. However, the different strata and groups will favor different perestroika strategies.

Actually, a unity of views and approaches in general appears only under particular exceptional circumstances. Under normal circumstances, social development is always a result of the struggle and interaction among different interests. The fact that in recent decades absolute unanimity continued to be considered in our country as the ideal of a political organization only hindered social progress. This officially proclaimed but actually unattainable (and unnecessary under conditions of peace) demand supported the pernicious inertia caused by emergency situations and, at the same time, contributed to the growth of social hypocrisy and double-talk. It did not eliminate differences but made them secret, ascribing to the natural internal struggle in society forms of intrigue and politicking.

The main practical and political meaning of realizing the inevitability of different approaches to perestroika, possibly, consists precisely of the fact that the need for changing the entire process for the formulation and making of political decisions becomes obvious. One way or another, decisions are made in the course of debates and through the clash of opinions and the struggle and compromise of interests. The open and clear determination of such interests is a major prerequisite for successful compromises which lead to the optimal solution of current social problems.

However, such clarity can be achieved best and most easily if people who share common interests and views on various problems have the possibility legitimately to unite and act jointly. It is noteworthy that in our public opinion this idea is gaining increasing support. According to a special study conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Socioeconomic Problems Among the Population of Large Cities, during the proceedings of the Congress of People's Deputies between 55 and 75 percent of the respondents believed that "the most important thing was to provide each group of deputies at the congress with the opportunity to defend its views." Among the deputies themselves, 42 percent of nearly 700 respondents asked by the public opinion service favored a rejection of traditional forms of monolithic behavior.

Despite many of our customs and prejudices, the freedom of groups, platforms and associations within the soviet and the public organizations, including the party, does not destroy social unity in the least. It does not undermine the power and authority of its political vanguard. Conversely, such freedom helps properly to identify and take into consideration the variety of social interests and to promote their best possible coordination, on the basis of which alone a civilized unity of a healthy society can be built. The more completely the

awareness of this situation enters our political culture the farther along we will advance toward a humanistic and democratic socialism.

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**Toward the Central Committee Plenum.  
Discussion of the CPSU Draft Platform "The  
Party's Nationality Policy Under Present  
Conditions"**

**Toward Real Equality**

905b0004D Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 13,  
Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 45-46

[Article by R. Shmidt, economist, Zaporozhye Oblast]

[Text] The party has submitted for discussion its suggestions on matters of improving relations among nationalities in the country and the renovation of national policy. These are problems which we must indeed study jointly and with maximal objectivity for the ultimate purpose of reaching realistic and specific decisions which, for the time being, unfortunately, we are not always able to make. Everyone, I believe, hopes today that the considerations expressed in this connection by individuals and entire population groups and the discussion which will be held at the Central Committee Plenum and the Congress of People's Deputies will eventually result in such substantiated and sensible decisions. I hope for this too and would like to share some of my thoughts on this subject.

Let me start with the attitude toward the current "explosion" of national feelings. Understandably, the situation is quite alarming. Obvious manifestations of nationalism, cruelty and bloodshed are inadmissible and immoral; the losses, both material and moral, which all of us suffer from this are obvious. Nonetheless, in my view, it would be wrong to forget that the very upsurge of the national movement became possible thanks to the democratization of social life in the country and that it can be explained by the entirely natural reaction of national and ethnic groups to a lengthy period of suppression of normal development processes. Grievances which have accumulated and which were caused by the methods of coercive blocking of national aspirations in the recent past are coming to the surface, thanks to the publicity given to the various errors and injustices in economic policy and cultural development and, particularly, in the opportunity of national minorities to exercise their constitutional rights. As a whole, the growth of the national self-awareness and upsurge of the national movement, as one of the elements for upgrading the activeness of the masses is, unquestionably, a positive process, which is necessary if we are to improve our society. The consequences of this process, however, could vary.

It is one thing when in the course of its development society acquires new active first-rate members and when man is free from the heavy daily burden of mockery and insults, mistrust or silent neglect on the part of those around him—the members of the native ethnic group—and no longer feels himself an alien in his own homeland. It is an entirely different matter if as a result of such processes of national movement we, in the 21st century, will live in a fragmented country, similar to that of post-Kiev Rus or Medieval Germany, while the republics will remind us somewhat of the ancient closed Japan or 18th century Tibet. In that case the people we need the most would be not farmers and builders, not scientists or writers, but interpreters, and customs and border officials, and the books which will become most necessary and numerous will be dictionaries for translations from one language to another.

It is obvious that everything possible must be done to assist the development of processes related to achieving true equality among peoples and nations and, conversely, to try to block processes which lead to national exclusivity and egotism. But how can we distinguish between these processes if they frequently go hand-in-hand? How to control them if they are perceived quite painfully by millions of people?

Most frequently and, above all, emotionally, the question of the language appears, along with that of giving the republic's language the status of state language. I believe that the party platform properly notes that this matter is the prerogative of the republics themselves, emphasizing that they must maintain strict equality among languages and the free choice of the language of schooling.

To the Ukraine, for example, this means that in addition to the state language, in places which are densely populated by other ethnic groups on its territory (Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Moldavians, Hungarians, Belorussians, and others) the native language of these national minorities must have equal status. This option does not undermine the foundations of a single state. It does not harm the rights of the native ethnic groups in Union and autonomous republics but, at the same time, creates conditions for the development of the cultures of national minorities.

However pressing the problem of the language may be, it is nonetheless only part of the overall problem, that of achieving real equality among people of different ethnic groups. In our Constitution this equality was proclaimed a long time ago, although in fact we have still not attained it. This, precisely, is the origin of all types of discontent and troubles. What, in my view, are the reasons for a disparity between words and actions, between the stipulations of our Fundamental Law and its actual observance? To begin with, the still low level of international standards of the people and the still extant chauvinistic and nationalistic feelings. Therefore, in our country in particular, it is still possible for the bulk of the population of an area somehow to alienate a person belonging to another ethnic group, treating him like a



"rara avis" (with all stemming consequences). I am a German. I have lived a long time on Ukrainian soil. I have worked here for a quarter of a century as a kolkhoz chairman and, unfortunately, I have experienced this feeling personally.

Closely related to it is the widespread phenomenon of nepotism. The prevalent principle of "why not please one of my own," strikes, above all, at national minorities.

The second reason for the present factual inequality lies in the overt and covert violations of the Constitution in the exercise of cadre policy. By no means has the principle of internationalism been always observed in fact. I shall not mention the mass repressions against small nations, committed during the times of Stalinism. Suffice it to quote examples from our recent past. Was the mandatory indication of national origin in the internal passports, in surveys and in other documents not used for mass, although covert, discrimination against national minorities? A mere glance at the document can already determine whether it is worth accepting such a person for a position which may be "banned" to individuals of said national origin, or training in areas considered undesirable for such outsiders. National affiliation was, until recently, an insurmountable obstacle for thousands of capable people who aspired to self-assertion through their productive work, official or sociopolitical career and professional and intellectual development. This kind of unfair policy has been reflected particularly painfully on members of ethnic groups which lack their own autonomous territories (Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Koreans or Poles) or else who live outside their autonomous territories. I noted with satisfaction that the party platform asserts the need to secure all rights and prerequisites for the preservation of national traditions and the development of the culture and language of such peoples and their representation in the power authorities. It is a question of creating national cultural centers and native sons associations and establishing national rayons and rural and settlement soviets in places densely inhabited by ethnic groups, and legislatively codifying the rights of national groups and communities to self-administration. The possibility is being considered of setting up all-Union councils of citizens of large ethnic groups lacking their own territorial autonomy.

Finally, in speaking of the reasons for the existing inequality, we must point out the fact that to this day many national minorities still simply lack conditions for the actual exercise of their constitutional rights (I am referring to the level of development of their economy, culture, health care, living conditions and the possibility of obtaining first-rate general and specialized training). This is largely the consequence of the erroneous national policy but also, naturally, a result of the inadequate efforts on the part of the peoples themselves.

How can true equality be achieved? In my view, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum should codify the

general stipulations of the platform and the next congress of people's deputies should discuss legislative steps aimed at improving national relations. I would single out the following:

Ensuring (within a 2-year period) the administrative, organizational and cultural establishment of the national territories (rural soviets, rayons, autonomous oblasts and republics) of areas densely populated by national minorities; help ethnic groups lacking their own autonomous territories to organize central cultural-educational societies, giving them the right to elect their deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet;

Formulate a program which would provide for equal opportunities for the creation of adequate economic and cultural conditions and living standards of the Soviet people of different ethnic origins, paying particular attention to conditions for obtaining high quality education;

Providing the necessary conditions for the free mastery of the Russian language in the country's schools;

Developing and applying a stipulation on national languages with recommendations concerning the areas and scale of their oral and written application, conditions for opening schools and theaters in national languages, and the publication of newspapers, journals, books and motion pictures and the organization of radio and television programs. Naturally, in this case we must take into consideration possibilities and problems of economic expediency; it would be particularly important to stipulate in the regulation that the use of any language of a given territory (republic, oblast, rayon, village) should not be such as to harm the rights of the peoples of other ethnic origins living on that same territory.

I believe that it is necessary also to make quality changes in the international upbringing of the population as emphasized in the party platform. In this area as well we need a new political thinking.

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#### Excerpts From Letters

905B0004E Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) p 47

[Text] N. Surzhin, primary party organization secretary, Priezernyy Settlement, Ivanovskiy Rayon, Amur Oblast:

The forthcoming plenum will, naturally, clarify a great many problems. It will assess and formulate strategy. The people are no longer satisfied with simple (albeit extensive) information on occurring events. They are unable to understand the reasons for the aggravation of relations among nationalities as being the result of an accidental fight which can break out at a dance or a quarrel on a playing field. We need a profound study of the facts and a clear strategy and specific actions. In my



view, however, the only thing we must not think is that "there will be a plenum and the plenum will settle our dispute."

It is above all we, ourselves, who must settle our disputes, who must clarify the situation in our big multinational home. Not the erection of impenetrable barriers and not moving from one room to another is what we should be concerned with, but with the creation of normal living conditions for the people of any ethnic origin and the restoration of normal human relations among them. That is why it is difficult to rely on any profound change in the "problem of nationalities" without a major reorganization of the economy.

**Yu. Lyashov, Army political worker:**

Regional cost accounting is, unquestionably, necessary. It will enable the people to feel that their living standard depends on the results of their own work. It will create a market and competition, which is precisely what we are lacking. However, we must retain in the country a unified system for economic control, similar to the one existing in all developed countries. The autarchy of regions and republics is as absurd as total centralization of political and economic life.

**V. Dementyev, Alma-Ata:**

To the best of my knowledge, few countries have retained a vestige according to which nationality, social origin or party affiliation, as recorded, play any role in school enrollment. In our country, despite a proclaimed equality which, essentially, is the kingdom of cadre appointments, on the basis of a single survey citizens were divided into several varieties. Frequently there was not even a question of the capabilities and inclinations of a person.

That which is important to demographers and linguists has become a mandatory part of official papers and assumes the importance, so to say, of a stratum characteristic, nurturing not only the "legalization" of appointments and quotas but also nepotism and favoritism. As an old resident of a multinational city and as a person who has spent his life from the Carpathian Mountains to the Kuril Islands, I have seen examples of this everywhere.

**A. Novikov, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, department of philosophy and applied sociology, Yakut State University:**

Eliminating the alienation of the people from property, the system and culture, the restoration of socialist democracy and the humane principles of socialism and establishing the true power of the soviets in the center and the local areas are necessary prerequisites for the blossoming of nations and for harmonious relations among nationalities.

We also need a new ideological support for national policy. The specific ways and decisions should not, in my view, become a universal mandatory ideological imperative.

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### **Soviet Federalism: Ways of Development**

905b0004F Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 48-49

[Article by E. Tadevosyan, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs MGIMO, Moscow]

[Text] The gross distortion of the Leninist principles of Soviet federalism and autonomy in the past answering the following question particularly relevant: What type of legacy are we rejecting and why; what is the nature of our basic position in defining the ways of perestroika and democratization of national-governmental forms and relations within our country in the light of the new political thinking?

The main, the determining trend in the radical renovation of Soviet federalism and the entire system of national-state relations in our country is their democratization. This stems from the nature of the political system promoted with the reform, the second stage of which focuses on national-governmental problems. This approach is also related to the need to surmount anti-democratic trends in the development of the Soviet federation and autonomy after decades of the cult of personality and stagnation.

The process of democratization finds its specific manifestation in each area of relations among nationalities. In the area of national-state relations, priority is assigned to the correlation between the sovereignty of the USSR and that of Union republics. In any federal state, one way or another, these are key problems of governmental structure. It was above all in this area that the deformation of the Leninist principles of Soviet federalism occurred in the past.

Union republics are sovereign states. Naturally, the fact that a state has joined a federal union means that it agrees to having some of its rights restricted. However, this does not apply to all kinds of restrictions, and even less so to a self-restriction of rights as being an indication of the loss of state sovereignty, which is an inviolable and inseparable feature of the power of the state, expressing its independence in terms of foreign relations and supremacy in domestic affairs. Nor does it mean, however, that the sovereignty of a republic could and should be the same as if it were not a member of the Union. The sovereignty of the USSR and of each Union republic are not separate categories. They are inseparably interconnected. This means an interconnection of related sovereignties. Therefore, it would be inadmissible to treat them separately, and even more so to pit one against the

other. Surmounting of the negative trends of the past and the restoration of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism in management would substantially broaden the rights and upgrade the responsibility of republics and local soviets of people's deputies for the economic and social development of the individual areas and the country as a whole. These are key tasks in the revolutionary renovation of Soviet society. Their implementation will require further improvements in the political-legal status of all forms of Soviet national-territorial formations and the codification of a qualitatively new mechanism of shaping republic and local budgets, developing efficient forms of interaction among territorial administrative authorities and USSR ministries and departments and enterprises under Union administrations, direct relations among republics, etc.

However, the broadening of rights and obligations of republics and local areas not only does not reduce but even strengthens the significance of the guiding and coordinating role of the Union center. A substantial broadening of the rights of republics in some areas and activities not only does not exclude but presumes the retention of broad rights by the Union in other areas and activities. Therefore, in surmounting the negative consequences of a bureaucratic centralization we must not throw ourselves into the other extreme and totally reject centralism, forgetting the organic connection between socialist federalism and democratic centralism. Unfortunately, today we come quite frequently across such trends. This applies both to statements made by individuals in favor of a conversion from federation to confederation as well as to some official documents. Efforts are being made to restrict the sovereign rights of the USSR on the basis of recently popular erroneous views on the priority of interests and will of a Union republic compared with those of the Union.

However, as the draft CPSU platform "National Party Policy Under Contemporary Conditions" notes, "without a strong Union there can be no strong republics and without strong republics there cannot be a strong Union." It is precisely on such a principled basis that relations between the Union center and the republics could and should be achieved. This will require a more clear and definite inclusion in the Constitution of stipulations concerning the respective competences of the USSR and the principle on the basis of which a republic will have the right of solving, on an autonomous and sovereign basis, all problems which do not fall within the jurisdiction of the USSR.

In this connection, it is of essential importance properly to define the correlation between national and international and republic and all-Union factors. However, it seems to me that of late, to a certain extent, we have seen a trend toward refusal to acknowledge the leading role, the primacy of the international, the all-Union factor in this correlation, and the acceptance of some kind of "equivalence," of "balance" among national, republic and international and all-Union factors and even the priority of the former over the latter.

As we firmly reject the negative manifestations of the past, we must fully abandon any underestimating of a national or a nihilistic attitude toward it and ensure the free and comprehensive development of everything that is best in each nation and national culture, guided by the initial idea that national is not the opposite of international, while international should not be conceived as nonnational. It is time not only in words but also in action to ensure the true harmony between national and international factors and between republic and all-Union interests in all areas and on all levels of social life. However, this does not mean the acknowledgment of their equivalents of abandoning the priority of that which is international and all-Union. Today as well, in our view, the familiar Leninist concepts of the primacy of the universal and the international compared to the national retain their general theoretical and methodological significance.

Socialism simply offers the opportunity to harmonize international and all-Union with national and republic interests. In real life contradictions constantly arise between the common and basic interests of all Soviet nations and republics and specific and, occasionally, temporary interests of individual nations and republics (not to mention improperly understood interests). The harmony of such interests is achieved on the basis of the contemporary resolution of contradictions and the coordination of interests, based on the priority of international and all-Union factors. It is only on the basis of such positions that one could understand, for example, our constitutional principle of supremacy of all-Union law and the fact that the acknowledgment of the ineffectiveness, shall we say, of some republic laws which conflict with the Constitution of the USSR is not a violation but, conversely, an assertion of the Leninist principle of Soviet federalism.

Another major trend in the radical renovation of Soviet federalism, obviously, could be the creation of new national-territorial formations for the ethnic groups which are concentrated more or less densely in some areas and which have no territory of their own in the USSR, as well as a substantiated restructuring of existing national-governmental forms. Although on the territory of our country 53 national-territorial units—15 Union and 20 autonomous republics, eight autonomous oblasts and 10 autonomous okrugs—have been established, a number of quite large ethnic groups (German, Polish, Korean, Crimean Tatar, Bulgarian, Greek, Uygur, Gypsy, Gagauz, Hungarian and others) which densely populate one or another area, have no national-territorial formations of their own.

Over the past more than half a century the peoples of our country as a whole have reached a higher level in their historical development. However, this has remained virtually unreflected in the dynamics of the respective national-territorial forms, and the political and legal status of the peoples remained virtually unchanged. Consequently, in my view, no favorable governmental-legal conditions were created for a development and

rapprochement among nations. Therefore, it is necessary to change the national-state and national-administrative forms wherever major reasons to this effect exist. This would apply to some autonomous okrugs (such as Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets) which, not only in terms of territory but also population size and other parameters, far exceed territories of autonomous oblasts and even some autonomous republics.

In the past no proper attention was paid to providing state-legal guarantees for the free development of population groups scattered in different national areas (national minorities), although this applied to tens of millions of people. In order to upgrade the guarantees for the free and equal development of the working people of all national groups on the territory of the Union, taking into consideration the particular relevance of this problem in the life of our multinational country, it would be expedient to draft, discuss and pass a special law on the rights of national groups (national minorities), which would concretize and develop the constitutional stipulations on national equality and codify their political-legal status.

It is particularly important today to enhance the practical-political trend in our scientific work in this area.

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## PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

### The Process of Economic Reform and Its Catalysts

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[Article by Gennadiy Nikolayevich Zoteyev, deputy director of the USSR Gosplan Scientific Research Economics Institute, and Ed Hewitt, leading scientific associate, Brookings Institution (Washington, United States)]

[Text] Perestroika in the Soviet Union is a grandiose and unique historical initiative. Its future specific outlines and consequences cannot as yet be subject to strictly tested scientific projections. Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the sources of perestroika are rooted in the fundamental contradictions within the Soviet economic system and, consequently, that its main material content is the efficient implementation of a radical economic reform.

The economic changes in the country are paralleled by an active process of political reforms which, after the emotional tension which arose at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies, is acquiring its own independent life and logic. The penetration of glasnost in all the cells of the social and individual awareness adds to the flames of perestroika the type of fire wood which creates in the mind of to the outside observer (such as one of the

authors of this article) the impressive image of a burning crucible in which the resmelting of the entire organism of Soviet society has been undertaken.

Looking at this unprecedented "evolutionary" revolution in terms of novelty, one unwittingly is tempted to ask: Will perestroika be crowned by full success or does it await the next sad dampening similar to previous reform efforts? From our viewpoint, in seeking an answer to this question we should proceed from the fact that perestroika is not a one-time act but a lengthy process which, most frequently, is difficult and painful. That is why the criteria of its real dynamics could only be a balance of positive and negative trends and the resultant total of pluses and minuses. The comprehensive nature of perestroika sets a number of criteria in assessing its progress and forcing us, for each aspect, to seek a system of coordinates in order to determine the balanced results. This article is an effort to analyze the course of the economic reform taking place in the USSR and, at the same time, to consider the challenge which will have to be accepted in the immediate future, relative to the further intensification of the process of reforming the Soviet economic system.

In this article the authors have tried to combine the professional advantages of a Western and a Soviet economist. The former can assess the process of reforms, watch it from the outside, and compare its actual dynamics against the criteria of a mature market system. The latter, relying on empirical experience and the specific knowledge of history and the characteristics of the Soviet economy, acts as a filter for simplistic recommendations and mechanical borrowing of experience from industrially developed countries.

In our view, a direct dialogue between Western and Soviet economic thinking is a useful initiative. It may result in a blend of unusual economic concepts and solutions dealing with the transitional stage from a command-administrative to a socialist market system, which would include the potential of catalysts in the process of reforming the Soviet economy, an economy with a difficult past history and a restless future.

### The Dynamics of Reform and the Balance of its Trends

The economic reform, as it develops in time and scope of problems, includes three logical stages: the formulation of concepts, the translation of the overall concept into the language of laws and governmental resolutions and their practical implementation, and the actual manifestations of specific economic and social consequences of the reformed structure of the country. Although closely interrelated, these stages nonetheless have their own autonomous dynamics and, consequently, each one of them has its own balance of positive and negative trends.

The shaping of the concept of reform and its overall noncontradictory theory may, initially, seem like a simple task. However, the lessons of more than 30 years of experience of constant modifications of the Soviet economic system prove that essentially the reasons

which determine the superficial nature of the cosmetic changes in its amendments in the past was based on the political fear on the part of the superior power echelons to touch upon fundamental conceptual economic structures such as ownership, competition, market, manpower and its employment, and the connection between foreign trade monopoly and the low competitiveness of domestic finished goods on foreign markets, as well as a number of other systemic elements.

Meanwhile, painful features in the existing economic mechanism, such as the chronic tendency to develop disproportions, the immune incompatibility between the interests of enterprises and the objective requirements of a continuous technological updating of production and the requirements of the scientific and technical revolution, and the comprehensive irresponsibility and waste of resources, striking in terms of their scale and depth of indifference of economists to the daily needs and requirements of the consumers, became stabilized. Naturally, this annoyed the leadership of the party and the Soviet state and motivated it to make changes in the structure of the existing economic system.

Essentially, between 1957 and 1985 there was no interruption in the partial improvements introduced in the economic management mechanism in the USSR. Each year was marked by new governmental decisions and economic experiments which, actually, yielded no tangible results.

That is why the dynamics of the radical economic reform, proclaimed at the 27th CPSU Congress by M.S. Gorbachev, cannot be accurately assessed without taking into consideration past reforms which act as a scale in measuring the intensiveness of the current reform process. The main theoretical accomplishment of the concept of reform by the end of the 1980s, compared with previous ones, is the understanding of the key role of ownership relations in the fate of socioeconomic progress of the country.

The second indisputable achievement of the contemporary reform is the extent and depth of social awareness of the ideas of changes in the economic structure. As early as 4 years ago it was impossible to conceive of such a scope and intensity of a nationwide dialogue on economic problems. Involved in such a dialogue are essentially all population strata, from workers and housewives to economists-academy members and heads of ministries and departments. Whatever modest influence the results of this discussion may have had on the course of reproduction, in itself such a dialogue is a success of perestroika. The development among the broad toiling masses of an interest in economics, not as boring and trite lectures in "general economic training" classes, but through debates and clashes among viewpoints and

positions and the emotional publicistic nature of economic surveys are gradually introducing into the ordinary mass awareness the fundamental economic principles of the functioning of a market-oriented system and a standard of concepts about real sources of national income and wealth.

This is particularly important in a country such as the USSR, in which the more than half a century domination of the command-administrative system and the propaganda machine serving its needs impressed upon the awareness of some of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia intolerance and a negative attitude toward market forms of economic management, as a rule one-sidedly identified with poverty, inequality, exploitation and unemployment.

Ownership relations became the focal point in the revision of obsolete economic doctrines. Metaphorically speaking, in the administrative-command system ownership did not have a concerned "parent." Economically, it was an "orphan." This unexpectedly makes clear the etymology of the word "irresponsibility" or "ownerless." Therefore, the elimination of irresponsibility from the viewpoint of ordinary common sense presumes the appearance of a real owner, i.e., the owner of the property.

The objective interests of multiplying property as the sum total of accumulated social outlays which can trigger income and the growth of wealth are not implemented because of the lack of specific personified bearers. "Nobody's" depersonalized nature of public ownership eliminates the magic economic property within it—interest. Adam Smith, the scientific predecessor of the labor theory of value, described this, more than 200 years ago, as follows: "We do not rely on the well-wishingness of the butcher, the brewer or the baker for our lunch but on the fact that he will be concerned with his own interests."

The statification of ownership in the USSR and depeasantification [raskrestyanivaniye] of the farmers and the conversion of all working people into a so-called "overall manpower" destroyed the live multicolored fabric of individual and group economic interests in multiplying wealth and the accumulation of property. The reproduction of fixed capital was automatically assumed by the state, which constantly increased the share of investments in fixed and turnover capital in the gross national product. However, in this case the atrophy of interest became even worse. The efficiency with which production resources were used steadily declined. The pace of economic growth declined and the growing share of capital investments was no longer able to maintain the stability and balance of the economic system, for the share of investments in current consumption reached the critical minimal level at which even the strongest possible economic incentive disappears entirely.

The logic of this model of development had long been obvious to many Western economists. Furthermore, a

number of Soviet economists were predicting that an excessively centralized planning system would reach an impasse, and as early as the mid-1960s, were calling for its radical modernization.

The study of long-term macroeconomic trends in the development of the national economies of the USSR and the United States, which has been taking place in the course of more than 40 years of peaceful postwar European order, reveals two vivid empirical contrasts which conceal, in a most general way, the economic and social consequences of the two opposite types of accumulation of property: the primarily "statified" and the primarily private enterprise types.

To begin with, whereas in the Soviet economy a trend toward reducing the share of personal consumption in the gross national product developed, (according to our computations it dropped from 56.5 percent in 1951-1960 to 54.5 percent in 1983-1988), conversely, in the United States there was an increased social orientation in economic growth, and the share of resources directed by the market forces toward enhancing well-being regularly increased (respectively from 58.5 percent of the GNP in 1951-1960 to 65.2 percent in 1983-1988).

Second, in the United States the efficiency of accumulation of material capital, with the exception of the period of dynamic rises in global petroleum prices in 1974-1982, remained stable. This ensured a long-term pace of economic growth of the GNP in the 3-4 percent range. In the Soviet economy, the efficiency of investments declined steadily (compared to the 1951-1960 period, it declined by a factor of 4 in the 1983-1988 period), reaching, over the past 15 years, a critically low mark to such an extent that although maintaining one of the highest rates of accumulation in the world, in the future no more than a 2 percent growth in the level of the GNP could be maintained.

It was thus that in the macroeconomic sense the Soviet national economy found itself in an "economic trap." The point is that, on the one hand, the low share and dynamics of consumption resources do not allow the creation of sufficiently powerful material conditions for stimulating and enhancing the human factor. On the other, the low potential of productivity of the acquired means of production and the aging of the production machinery objectively require high growth rates of capital investments, the share of which in the GNP is already now exceeding any sensible limit. The aspiration of the state to accelerate the growth of investments in fixed capital is clashing with the need to resolve the urgent problem of increasing the share of consumption resources and the lack of order in the investment process which, as in the past, continues to generate an exceptionally low return.

Since the economic determinism of the Soviet economy, which had assumed its definitively shape, starting from its initial historical base, toward the end of the 1980s, rests on a hypertrophied state ownership, unable to

ensure the efficient and socially oriented development of the national economy, the scientific discussion of the stages and specific forms of its "destatification" is the most important catalyst in the reform process. This was concisely stated in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies: "Life has convincingly proved that the economic reform is simply impossible without a radical renovation of relations of socialist ownership and the development and combination of its various forms." Destatification and decentralization were mentioned in other delegate speeches as well.

The economic motivation for the various types of ownership is truly manifested only when they become involved in competitiveness, in a competing economic environment. Therefore, over the past 2 years there has been a major shift in the economic thinking of politicians, economic managers and scientists in understanding the role of competition as a mandatory vivifying basis for the growth of incentives. Naturally, the perception of the competitive struggle among enterprises, socialist concerns, share holding societies and cooperatives, while widely accepted in the USSR is, for the time being, simplistic and preserves a typical mark of infantilism and naivete which ignore the objectively inevitable cost of competition, particularly within the context of the possibility of the closing down or the bankruptcy of participants in production and investment, who have lost in the economic competition.

There is extremely little agreement in the statements by the leading Soviet economists on the positive role of a competing open imports policy and the negative consequences of the greenhouse conditions of the state monopoly of foreign trade in terms of producing within the country commodities for export which would be considered first-grade in terms of global marketplace criteria. The intensity of domestic competition cannot be maintained over a long period of time without opening the national economy of the USSR to the world economy and the inclusion of the first into the second is inconceivable without a strong competitive environment inside the country. No "Chinese Wall" separates domestic from international competition. Therefore, in the future as well, the problem of integration within the global market will become the testing ground of the seriousness of the intention to follow the path of developing a market oriented system in the USSR.

Finally, having mentioned the transformation of ownership and the role of competition as the driving mechanisms of the reform, unnecessary in a centralized system, we inevitably come across the most sensitive problem in the first stage of economic perestroika: the mechanism of social guarantees in the new economic system. Theoretically two alternate scenarios may be conceived with common social consequences in reforming the Soviet system. The first proceeds from the premise that the active segment of the working people will obtain a significant addition to its level of prosperity while the situation of the passive will not worsen; according to the

second, the active segment will have an increment while the passive category of working people may suffer losses.

The history of all postwar reforms (in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and China) proves that the former scenario is unrealistic and that, as a rule, the development of events takes the second path. It is precisely for that reason that we should expect in the course of the reform an opposition on the part of the toiling strata who have been most profoundly contaminated by the bacilli of equalization and social dependence.

One of the most severe consequences of the command-administrative system is the guaranteed wages and bonuses from the material incentive fund, not strictly related to the marketplace recognition of the quantitative and qualitatively social significance of the produced goods and rendered services. It is no accident that in ordinary speech the term "wage" has been replaced by the universally used idiomatic word "pay packet." It perfectly reflects the economic nature of dependency—to obtain something rather than earn it.

The demand for an equalizing distribution, which is the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economic system, along with other of its vulnerable spots, is being heard with increasing frequency in speeches, articles and newspaper publications. Their persistent appeals to the working people to link the growth of wages with an increase in the final significant results of the production process have become a kind of incantation. The point is that from the practical viewpoint the answer to the following question remains totally unclear: How to remove from the balance of limited resources of the national economy the corrupting burden of social dependency and put it precisely on the shoulders population strata which are most militant in their aspirations toward equalization without further shaking the already unstable social stability in society?

In the footsteps of this unanswered question, the outlines of another question appear for the forthcoming discussion: Is the productive functioning of a socialist market a necessary prerequisite for the existence of a "moderate unemployment?" The ideological urgency of this question is due to the fact that the answer to it becomes a kind of reaction to identifying the essential difference between the new aspects of socialism and contemporary capitalism as it exists in the industrially developed Western countries. A group of radical economists does not see a substantial difference between the new concept of employment they suggest for the Soviet national economy and, for example, the Swedish model. The other group of Soviet economists, conversely, insists on accepting a guarantee of full employment as a fundamental feature of the socialist economic management system. Very likely, the theoretical clashes on this key problem of the reform will continue for quite some time and that their eventual result will become one of the decisive characteristics in the establishment of a new type of economic system resulting from the reform.

The comparative analysis of Soviet economic publications before and after the start of perestroika reveals a striking contrast in "color and tonality:" uniformity of thought until April 1985 and a striking variety of opinions and shocking daring after it (if we take into consideration the implied individual statements on the need to restore capitalist production relations). Therefore, the already existing wide range of concepts of perestroika in economic relations in the USSR is facing the Soviet economic scientists with the task not only of formulating new doctrines but also substantiating the choosing of those of them which would be most consistent with the economic realities of our contemporary stage of development, which is dramatic in many of its aspects. Unfortunately, the variety of opinions which remains and the lack of a coordinated position by the Soviet economists on the key problems of the reform and its policies, and the apparent lengthy wait before economic consensus can be reached among the party apparatus, the government and professional economists, create favorable grounds for halting all reforms under the seemingly pretext of cacophony in the song which is being "sung" by the people involved in decision-making.

Another attention-drawing fact, which indicates the vulnerability of the concept of the reform, is the low interest shown by economic scientists and managers in practical problems of the transitional period and the lack of development of the elements of the reform which operate only temporarily, during the period between the dismantling of the old system and the unfinished creation of the new. It is quite simple to proclaim the principle of the reform: under the conditions of the competitiveness of the economic environment and a price balance, all primary units of the economic system function on the basis of self-financing and self-support and full economic autonomy. But what specifically to do with enterprises whose fixed assets have become physically worn out or morally obsolete and which would instantly "sink into bankruptcy" the moment they are dropped into the ocean of market competition? This would not be their fault but, rather, the fault the reason for which is found in previous wrong investment decisions made by the command-administrative system. Therefore, justice requires that in the transitional period such enterprises obtain financing on easy terms or straight subsidies from the state. However, with such an option another danger arises: any extensive and lengthy subsidy drastically lowers motivation for renewal and adaptation to the market.

Within the framework of the transitional period, particularly when the process of reforming expands dynamically, such problems begin to mushroom. Their overall content is understandable: it is a question of a painful exchange of the social guarantees which have become durable and previously accepted by society for increased individual or group economic motivation. At this initial segment of the reform marathon, the state must not only offer the strong the possibility to survive but to prevent the drowning of the weak, for the criterion of their real

strength can be determined, in the final account, only by the development of a market mechanism which, for the time being, is in its stage of establishment.

### **Contradictions of Economic Policy and Their Consequences to the Reform**

Historical experience confirms that in the majority of cases of major social changes, the new reform concepts are not entirely reflected in corresponding political and practical steps. In this sense the Soviet economic perestroika is no exception to the rule. Real life and economic practice indicate that the majority of the administrative apparatus still has a very skeptical attitude toward the new approaches and ideas and, to an even great extent, is cautious in its practical efforts actively to reform the country's economic and political system.

For that reason, when the very bold conceptual suggestions begin to be translated into the language of laws, resolutions, legal acts and instructions, they are the first to begin to lose their revolutionary potential and clear perestroika tonality and, consequently, end up by exerting a low influence on the actual course of the reproduction process. It would be quite pertinent to recall what was said in terms of reform conditions in prerevolutionary Russia, more than 100 years ago, by John Stuart Mill: Even the tsar is helpless in opposing bureaucratic organizations; he could send any one of his officials to Siberia but he cannot run the state without relying on the officialdom surrounding him or despite the wish of that officialdom; for each one of his ukases the officialdom will cast its silent veto by simply refusing to implement it.

Whereas as of the middle of 1989, i.e., precisely 2 years after the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, having analyzed all the laws and resolutions dealing with the economic reform, the purpose of which was to regulate the country's economic activeness in the transitional period of the establishment of the new management system, we could detect a picture of a real combat between the radical elements and the conservative ones within the system. Naturally, the logic of reform is such that during the transitional period sharp clashes between the old and the new economic order are inevitable, even if the intention of the reform is being implemented successfully as a whole. Modern reality, however, is such that in the course of such an uneven struggle (at the initial form of the reform the elements of the old system are always stronger) in a number of sectors there has been a "bogging down," which could not fail to rise social tension.

Without undertaking the detailed analysis of the reasons for the "bogging down" of the reform, let us note the most important among them:

State enterprises and state ownership retain their absolute monopoly power in industry and other nonagricultural economic sectors; the share of cooperatives in the production and services areas and individual labor activeness do not exceed 1.1 percent of the overall

volume of manpower resources (excluding moonlighting). The cooperatives enjoy the greatest independence in decision-making in the areas of production, capital investments, exports, wages and cadre policy. The dynamics of their growth in 1988 were impressive. However, in the first half of 1989 their growth rates began unexpectedly to drop;

Despite the reduced number of industrial ministries, they continue to hold tremendous departmental economic power and to actively interfere in the daily activities of enterprises for, in turn, they themselves are feeling the pressure of the USSR Gosplan, shaped as state orders, control figures, and plan ceilings and rates;

The price-setting reform, which is urgently necessary in order to ensure the real functioning of the new economic system, has been postponed due to the total absence of progress in developing a competitive economic environment and the respective strengthening of the monopoly principles in all areas of the national economy;

The weak and unplanned monetary, credit and financial policy, added to the inability tangibly to reduce the budget deficit, have contributed to the boosting of inflation in the country, which made a "splash" in 1988 and has continued in the first half of 1989.

The half-way and, in some cases, erroneous economic and financial policy not only failed to create conditions for the advancement of the reform but instead only erected further obstacles on its way. Under these circumstances, it has become quite easy for state enterprises and cooperatives to raise their prices with no concern for the quality and variety of finished goods or for lowering production costs.

The increased rates of inflationary growth (according to our estimates, between 4-7 percent in the commodity consumer market in 1988-1989) forced the government to take additional administrative steps to control price-setting. This conflicts with the intent of the reform aimed at the creation of an open market system. Furthermore, price increases and other reasons allowed the enterprises to increase their income and, above all, their wages, the dynamics of which have begun substantially to outstrip increases in labor productivity, with relative ease. The logical result of this sequence has been increased direct state control over wages, which could adversely affect the immediate results of the reform.

Obviously, a certain uncertainty and fear of taking radical steps toward accelerated economic decentralization which, allegedly, would inevitably drive the national economy into chaos, with all of its dramatic consequences, was not the least important reason for the appearance of shifts in economic policy in 1988-1989. For that reason, the pyramid of ministries is merely being merged through mechanical aggregation and reduced to a system of state orders so that the survival of the leadership is guaranteed and will continue to urge on the national economy. The fear of a predictable chaos is nervously being converted into a dual reform policy



which is tearing apart and turning all of its aspects into contradictions: according to some statements, the functions of the ministries are radically changing; in fact, they are being given increasing responsibility; the State Committee for Prices is proclaiming the concept of a new course of sharp democratization in the price-setting system while, at the same time, it is being ordered by superior authorities to provide stricter control over price dynamics. The list of such dichotomies in politics could be extended.

The actual course of the reform is also complicated by the duality in the behavior of the apparat which claims to accept the ideas of reform but which, in fact, is unwilling to assume the full burden of responsibility for the implementation of an entire packet of necessary steps which would systematically lead to energetic progress toward economic perestroika. The majority of leaders of economic departments and ministries unanimously agree with the principle of limiting the amount of money in circulation in the national economy. However, when matters are shifted to the level of practical activities, many of them immediately begin drastically to object to the policy of closing down unprofitable and subsidized enterprises, referring to distortions in price-setting, the general scarcity of resources and difficulties with finding jobs for the released manpower.

To postpone the reform until finances have been strengthened, the consumer market normalized and the above-norm amount of unfinished construction eliminated would be the equivalent of an effort to balance and heal the economy before a reform or instead of it. The nature of the grave problems which have accumulated in the national economy is found not simply in the errors made during the policy of stagnation but also in the generic defects of the economic system of a command-administrative type. This diagnosis makes obvious the fact that there is no choice in the matter of having a radical economic reform.

The fear of reforms and the naive faith put in the next short-term steps to revive a frozen command economy essentially invalidate the entire economic structure of perestroika and impose a tremendous responsibility on the entire body of Soviet economists. To a large extent it is precisely the lack of essential unity and accord among the leading economists in the country concerning the key problems of the transitional reform period that predetermines the shift in current economic policy, which is avoiding the persistent demands of our time which is knocking at its door and hypocritically defending itself by citing existing difficulties.

The Keynesian revolution which took place in the views of Western economic thinking in the 1930s and 1940s could be used as a prototype of the painful reassessment of values which Soviet economic science may expect in the future. However, if Soviet economists continue to ignore the intellectual baggage acquired as a result of Western economic analysis and remain within the narrow framework of their dogmatic political economic traditions, for a long time to come they will continue to speak in different languages and the confusion in their thinking, which is detrimental to the reform, will remain.

This is particularly worth mentioning, for unity of views leads to unity of actions. The remaining differences among the leading Soviet economic scientists encourages the practical workers to be even more cautious. That explains the great urgency of the need for a fruitful dialogue among all scientific schools in domestic and global economic science on the problems of reforming the Soviet economic system, including the active participation of high-ranking politicians and economic managers in this process.

#### The Reform at a Turning Point

The most accurate barometer of the course of the reform are the real changes in the balancing of the national economy. Obviously, improving the situation on the commodity consumer market and the solution of the food problem could be considered integral measures of the immediate success of the radical economic reform in the USSR.

However, it is precisely in these areas of economic perestroika that for the time being the results have been most modest. Essentially, instead of the saturation and balancing of the consumer market it is being turned into a bartering system and feverish trends within it are intensifying. In agriculture, grain production has remained stable for the past 5 years, in the 190-210 million ton range; a stabilization of meat production is expected for 1989 (see Table 1).

Table 1

	(In Million Tons)				
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Gross Grain Harvest	191.7	210.1	211.4	195.0	209.0 <sup>1</sup>
Meat Production (In Slaughtered Weight)	17.1	18.1	18.9	19.7	19.7 <sup>2</sup>

1. Assessment published in the May bulletin of the FAO (the United Nations food and agricultural organization).

2. A projection based on the results of meat production for the first half of 1989.

Table 2

	(In Percent of the GNP)									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
USSR	2.9	2.3	3.1	2.2	2.0	2.7	6.5	8.0	9.1	13.0 <sup>1</sup>
United States	2.8	2.6	4.1	6.3	5.0	5.4	5.3	3.4	3.2	3.2 <sup>1</sup>

1. Estimate



In comparing the scale of budget deficits in the USSR and the United States we must take into consideration that the nonconvertibility of the Soviet ruble does not make it possible to "export" the consequences of the deficit to other countries, whereas the special currency role played by the dollar makes it possible to do so and thus to ease internal inflation generated by the unbalanced nature of governmental finances.

Naturally, strictly speaking, it is still too early to "accuse" the reform of failing to provide a tangible addition to the store shelves or to the technical standards and quality of goods or else in the scale of exports of machine-building output on the Western market. The mass conversion to the new economic management conditions began only as of 1 January 1988 and is continuing. Cooperatives, leasing and the restoration of private farming are still only developing. The reform coincided with a number of objective circumstances which worsened the problem of economic growth. The ambitious program of the struggle against alcoholism was a burden imposed on the state budget. Other errors were also made in governmental economic decision making.

In the years to come the question of choice will become much more pressing, for it is becoming clear that without dynamizing the process of reforming the Soviet economic system the economic situation in the national economy will continue to worsen. The transitional nature of the reform is that either as a result of good planning and fast and radical measures it will become possible to abandon, as much as possible, the old and obsolete economic system and take a major step toward establishing an open market system in the USSR, or else there will be backpedalling and a restoration of the old centralized-command economy. The wish to "sit on two chairs" in the economic sense of the term is the embryo of future economic trouble. The latter will be worsened through the so-called regional cost accounting if new territorial monopolies should arise, protected by parochial and feudal aspirations of the individual areas of the country to find separate solutions to their problems without solving the general problems of the state.

Time alone will determine the path which the reform will take. Whatever the circumstances, however, in our opinion, in the next few months the following practical steps should be taken:

Draft an expanded governmental report for the forthcoming congress of people's deputies on the course of the reform and the ways of its radical implementation;

On a parallel basis, urgently eliminate all lack of clarity and distortions in official economic statistics and review the data on the results of the development of the Soviet national economy over the past 30 to 40 years, including making public data on the growth of prices, the state budget deficit, the balance of payments, the national debt, debts in foreign exchange, etc.;

On the basis of the two governmental "white papers" (reform and statistics), through the efforts of the group of economic consultants (which would include economists working within the party-governmental apparatus and in the scientific organizations) a draft should be prepared of a nationwide program of action for a conversion to a socialist market system and of the nature of policies to be pursued during that transitional period. Such a draft should proceed from the principle of consensus among the leading economists in the country. Should such consensus not be achieved any further efforts at active implementation of the reform would be threatened;

Within the framework of the economic program of actions related to the reform we should specially single out a medium-term program of financial stabilization and anti-inflationary policy, coordinated with the principles governing the creation of a market oriented system.

For the time being, no economic processes doomed to a fatal outcome and a slow extinction, without alternatives, have been found in the laws governing the development of society. If the theory of the reform is scientific and if its policies are daring and thought-out, there should be results. The absence of results is the initial sign either of a contradictoriness in theory or sluggishness and lack of result in politics or else a combination of the two. The unprecedented type of objectives and tasks in the perestroika of Soviet economy requires unprecedented means and efforts, the material carriers of which are found only in the reform of the economic system. The Soviet economy, lulled by promises of advantages and tremendous natural resources, could and should convert to a new type of development based, above all, on the released talent and skill of the people. The Soviet people and all mankind are objectively interested in this.

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## MAN—IDEALS, INTERESTS, VALUES

### In a Situation of Choosing

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[Article by Valeriy Andreyevich Churilov and Vladimir Iosifovich Bakshtanovskiy]

[Text] *Let us abandon the traditional journal form of presenting the authors. Usually, in such cases the enumeration of positions and scientific titles would hardly explain to the reader what has entered the life (and within this dialogue) of the party worker and ethics scientist. The joint practical science investigation began at the time when Valeriy Andreyevich Churilov had not as yet assumed his present position as first secretary of the Khanty-Mansi Okrug CPSU Committee but was working*

at the Tyumen Industrial Institute, while Vladimir Iosifovich Bakshatanovskiy, professor and doctor of philosophical sciences, was head of the ethics and esthetics department of the same institute (he is currently deputy director for humanities of the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Institute of Problems of Development of the North). This search led both of them to undertaking an unusual experiment: business games involving humanitarian expertise and a moral evaluation of decisions. Actually, we shall go back in the course of our talk to the games themselves as a method of "countermovement" of theory and practice. Let us begin with the first question meanwhile: Why did V. Bakshatanovskiy and V. Churilov determine that they needed each other? As I met with them under different circumstances and at different places and times (last and this year in Moscow, Tyumen, Khanty-Mansi, and Nizhnevartovsk and at party and scientific auditoriums and mostly at the games themselves) I asked myself these questions which, to this day, I would like to begin by addressing to my interlocutors [questions asked by V. Dymarskiy]:

[Question] What links today a party worker and a scientist in the field of ethics? What are your respective tasks and what are your objectives?

**V. Bakshatanovskiy.** To me, the key concept which defines the content of my own and our joint searches is that of choice. Man enters the world and lives in it through situations of choice, everyday, like the prince in the legends of antiquity. However, the old stories always include milestones on which it is written what the person can expect as a result and the choice has been reduced to a comparison between the options. In real life the outcome of each one of them is by no means clear and even the options themselves are more than simply "go right," "go left," or "go straight."

Perestroika significantly increased the number of such options, making the very situation one of a moral choice for each one of us and for society as a whole. Finally we have, one would think, the opportunity to be not only actors but also authors of the vital scenario and to choose not only the means for achieving some objectives still unknown to us but also to shape the objectives themselves, aware of the increased degree of freedom and responsibility for social and moral decisions. Need we mention that this role is largely new.

Let us not, however, fall into a state of euphoria. Naturally, the definition of perestroika as a situation of moral choice justifiably includes a romantic feeling. However, it should not turn into moralizing, into a nonhistorical categorical feature, an apology of what must, unrelated to the accurate, the realistic knowledge of the society in which we live. Therefore, perestroika is the **problem** situation of choice, perhaps for the fact alone that a reaction to it is not one of revolutionism or conservatism but an entire range of positions, such as expectation, justification, compromise, etc.

What kind of choice will politicians and ideologues be making under such complex and unfamiliar conditions? I hope that they will turn to science, to the humanities. That is bound to help.

**V. Churilov.** To me, a party worker, it is more a question of the standard of decision-making. A person makes a choice but the choice makes the man. It is in this that I see the main meaning of all changes in social and political life in which we have abandoned dogmatic canons and once and for all given stereotypes or else moving along narrow tracks. Many people have become accustomed to these tracks to such an extent that now they have started to look for points of support. In order to shorten the time needed for the transitional period we must master the rules and the skill of choice making, as people learning a foreign language are asked to do.

I see as my first task that of offering the party workers the opportunity to acquire such knowledge and to develop in them a new way of thinking. They have still not become emancipated. As in the past, they expect instructions and hang on recommendations. Therefore, we must develop in them the ability to make conscious choices. We must help them to surmount the fear of making a choice. If we are indeed on the side of perestroika, we must train the type of people who can make choices and I must help such people even if tomorrow I am not the one they would choose...

A great deal is being said currently about the need for the party to develop political methods. In my view, so far no one has clearly determined what they are, what are their forms and contents. Therefore, we must seek and keep trying. Our experience indicates the following option: the consultation process—individual or collective—will become increasingly important in the party, pushing aside control-command coercive functions: go there, take this, do that. I understand that not everything will come to us immediately and that we shall have to spend further time and effort to procure petroleum, gas, cement, timber, milk and housing.... For the time being, the party is responsible for **everything**. Yet, in my view, it must be responsible for **everyone**. What will our job be when "everything" has been shifted to the soviets? We shall be dealing deal with man! I would very much like to see instead of the usual departments, to have departments dealing with ethics, the humanities, and political economy. We must not collect, as demanded by statistics (there even is an item of this nature) merely "specialists in the national economy," but invite those who would classify themselves as "nonspecialists:" jurists, journalists, physicians, educators, or simply educated people, in the broad meaning of the term, people who, by virtue of their authority would earn their role as leaders and be inspirers and advisors.

Such is the image of the party worker of tomorrow as I imagine it. But such a worker must be trained as of now, otherwise we would be wasting time. But how to train him? It turns out that in our cadre policy we do not even know how to conduct a certification, a discussion or a

test. Naturally, we need individual consultations and lectures. However, in my view, the most efficient method is that of collective consultations in the form of business games. This may be for the reason alone that it ensures the total involvement of the participants in an active rather than a passive process of the interpretation of life and makes it possible to develop the algorithms of the new functions of the party authority.

**V. Bakshantovskiy.** In the past my colleagues were convinced that the main function of morality in terms of politics is a critical, a controlling one. Conscience was conceived as the controller, the restrainer, the brake: not to allow the politician to surrender to an incurable disease or to be tempted to shift objectives and means and engage in manipulations but, in short, to manage in the full meaning of the term. The humanitarian believed that his duty was to make politics—through moral criticism—somewhat less alienated from man.

Today, speaking cautiously, the opportunity has arisen that humanitarian knowledge and morality can act not only as controllers but also as guidelines, as agents which motivate political activeness. They could make a political leader imbued with the moral sense of the decisions he makes. It is true that, at that point, by becoming both a "political person" and "moral person," he will experience a drama: finding himself in a situation of choosing between expediency and conscience, he would be tempted either to despair at the impossibility of finding an ideal solution or else once again assume a rigid or, in any case, a nonhumane stance. What to do? To seek a compromise—not only political—for in our society, as we today realize, various value systems confront each other. Unfortunately, our upbringing has not accepted the word "compromise," which is associated with cowardice and retreat. This is yet another error which must be surmounted.

In my view, the political leader, the man who makes political decisions today must not simply turn to morality ("what would they think of me?") but trust in its values. I recall one business game in a school for managers. They objected to any kind of searches and discussions in the area of morality. What they needed was a person like Carnegie, who was a promoter of practice but not a humanitarian. They were oriented toward technocratic solutions. All of a sudden, however, they heard in the course of the game that morality does not come to them only within a certain framework and that it tells them: "Your aspiration to success is a moral value, it is an entirely worthy moral position. Your aspiration to be efficient is a moral aspiration. Naturally, morality does not wash its hands from it. It would like to control you when you are solving a problem of combining ways with means. However, morality does not condemn personal interest: the person pursuing it is a normal person, an entirely moral one."

Perhaps an analogy could be drawn with a contemporary political leader. After a number of failures and moral catastrophes, one should tell many political leaders:

strive for success, do not limit your careers, aspire to pursue them, fulfill your role as managers, for it is a worthy role providing that you observe two conditions: use clean means and do not distort the objectives, and have your personal interests serve the people.

Having witnessed several business games developed by my interlocutors, I constantly came across one professional difficulty: they were difficult to describe. This was not a roundtable or a debate but an entire action in which a great deal, if not all, consisted of nuances, stage settings and details, which were described in detail in the scenario. More than anywhere else, incidentally, here one applied the familiar formula that "it is better to see once than to hear a hundred times."

I remember the "Samotlor Practical Exercise-1," the full description of which was "Moral Life, Educational Activities and Educating the Educators: Humanitarian Expertise and Consultation." The game consisted of two "acts." The prologue to the main part was consultation in specific situations in life, in which the participants were divided into two teams (in the first most of them were practical workers and in the other, theoreticians) who were asked to answer the questions in the investigation on "touchy areas and growth points in contemporary moral life." The overall conclusion seemed simple and, at this point, unoriginal. However, the practical exercise took place in 1987, when our society was still at the approaches to an impartial diagnosis. The first among the touchy areas named by the participants in the game was the devaluation of moral values; the discrediting of social ideals as a result of the wide gap between words and actions; the bureaucratization of the educational and training system in the schools and the labor collectives....

The overall assessments were based on specific opinions. Following is a typical statement: "What was I taught at the petroleum institute?" one of the practical workers asked. "How to achieve maximal petroleum extraction within a minimal period of time and with minimal outlays and investments. If we were to judge our activities on the basis of such criteria, we would be rated excellent. In our time we cut off everything 'unnecessary'. We did not build housing and kindergartens and proved to be barbarians in terms of morality and civilization. It is particularly important to realize the need to humanize the economic activities of the party leader."

At that time the statement by a high ranking economic manager from Nizhnevartovsk sounded like a characteristic indicator of the result of the business game: "After these 3 days my head was aching in places where it had never ached before."

**V. Churilov.** In recent years, through business games which have made gaining self-knowledge possible and have cultivate a new way of thinking, offering options and in the form of a dialogue, training has been provided to more than 1,000 party activists in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. Many people would like to have me

immediately "report" on the results of this "measure." This is impossible, for it is a question of educational activities, the results of which appear gradually and not immediately after the seed has been planted in the ground.

**V. Bakshtanovskiy.** I too am frequently asked the same question: What are the results?

We developed nearly 20 games. We began with the simplest: "Certification of the Moral-Business Qualities of the Manager." This is a game in which we modeled a seemingly primitive technology: drafting a character reference. Usually, what we find in such a reference is information, such as where the person was born, where he studied, what is his job, is he socially active.... In the case of a scientist we further add his dissertation and the number of monographs and articles he has published.... After that, for everyone, we provide information on family status and, finally, we add the mandatory phrase "morally stable," which notes merely the fact that in the area of normal daily relations of the person we are discussing no "signals" of any immoral behavior have been received. Unfortunately, it is this type of narrow and limited interpretation of morality that has become customary in our society.

I shall not engage in describing the details of the game which we played numerous times but let me single out the main feature. With the help of a joint analysis of specific situations in which the "character" in the game finds himself (a figure, naturally, fictitious), and with the help of the expert evaluation of consultants, gradually the participants in the game go beyond the "black and white" measurement which is unacceptable in evaluating moral activities. The most valuable result in my opinion (it is true that it is by no means always attained) is the conclusion that the right to make such assessments is not assigned to any given individual, a collective or authority; any sentencing in the morality area cannot be the result of a vote, for the question always arises: Who is the judge?

The other game is called "Choice" (Choice of Secretary of a Party Organization). It makes it possible to test a model of humanitarian expertise and consultation in comparison with sociomoral and procedural-organizational aspects in the choice of a manager. The practical exercise "Thesis" (after the publication of the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the 19th Party Conference), which consisted of asking gorkom party secretaries to "live" one day in the role of a city soviet chairman, was a test of the readiness of the cadres for the restructuring of traditional management structures and a rejection of inefficient work stereotypes. In all such cases it is obvious that we cannot determine and compare the effect of the moral standard or administrative culture at the points of "input" and "output."

[Question] The party worker, who considers in terms of moral categories a choice and ethics, who has selected the area of application of his knowledge in politics, is

this a unique, a rare development of circumstances or is it an objective need which has been simply neglected?

**V. Bakshtanovskiy.** I, for example, do not like it when an individual who makes a decision, in preparing for his next step, turns to an official research institute and transfers to its account (which is fashionable today) a certain amount and asks: Please, help us conduct a plenum or a session. In that case an inevitable sequence develops: someone issues an assignment and someone else carries it out. What I consider valuable is the fact that we work together. In other words, I do not sanction the decision made by Churilov but, together with him, I draft it and evaluate it from the position of humanitarian knowledge.

On the other hand, perhaps the politician needs a consultant who does not mandatorily have to be an ethicist (or a sociologist, psychologist or economist) but, in general, a professional social scientist who, above all, would himself not suffer from the disease of technocratism of which, as it were, a politician has more than enough....

**V. Churilov.** The point is that in this case he would be ahead of the practical worker. As a rule, I have a limited amount of time during which to make a decision and, furthermore, under very undefined circumstances. Scientists as well work under conditions of lack of clarity but not with such a limited amount of time. Naturally, they have their own deadlines, periods and agreements. However, these are not the same rigid limits within which we operate. Whether we like it or not, for example, once every 3 months, according to the statutes we must hold a plenum. This is a strict requirement the result of which is that all alternate decisions, their entire possible range, must be willy-nilly developed within a strictly limited time. The result is that science falls behind and that I come up with an already formulated option which has been drafted not with the collective "brainstorming" with the involvement of scientists, but by me alone.

One of the practical games which were organized this year by V. Bakshtanovskiy and V. Churilov (with the support of the Leninskiy Rayon Party Committee in Moscow and jointly with the party committee of the Novosti News Agency) was the "District Electoral Meeting." This was the first application of this method in Moscow. As an eyewitness of this "measure" I can confirm the following. This premiere was successful and, as generally acknowledged, this game was of tremendous benefit to both candidates for people's deputies, who were in the hall, and who tried this new "suit of clothes," this new role and new procedure, as well as to the members of the district electoral commission, who became aware of the many unexpected developments which occur in real life, as well as the "support group" of students participating in the game situation, learning the technology and tactics of the electoral struggle and how to stand up for their own candidate.

For some 2 hours this "district electoral meeting" could not open for a variety of procedural obstructions. There were discussions as to what to do with the "informals" who had invaded the hall or to listen to the accountability commission or else to solve the question of how legitimate was the boosting of the candidates, and how far should it go. V. Churilov, who assumed the role of moderator skillfully pointed out the "petty matters" with the help of which the meeting could become either excessively overorganized or else a working democracy, albeit within some limitations. There was then a contest among the candidates and their programs and a secret vote as well as the lucky "winner," who had most successfully gone through the "sieve" of tricky and by no means delicate or ethical matters. It was precisely then, even before public opinion, having tested the new development in practice passed a verdict of guilty, that the conclusion to which the game led was heard: let us think, dear participants in the district meeting, are we not assuming too much responsibility in making our choice in favor of one or two candidates, for it may be that one of those we dropped out may turn out to be subsequently the one preferred by the voters....

The video recording of the "District Electoral Meeting" game which was then shown to the organizers of the electoral campaign in Moscow enabled them to avoid many pitfalls. It was reality which then faced public opinion with new problems and was as though we began to forget the short stage during which the district meetings, which were introduced with the Law on Elections, had raised a wave of emotions, approvals and criticism. However, this game was recalled once again during the proceedings of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies: what a great deal of time, particularly at first, was wasted in procedural problems and in the formulation of the necessary technology without which, as it became clear, democracy not only cannot defend itself but, in general, could perish.

[Question] This game you, Valeriy Andreyevich, described as "political." You, Vladimir Iosifovich, nonetheless described it as "ethical."...

**V. Churilov.** I believe that both are right but that each one had its own purpose. The party went to the elections by setting itself the task of winning. It meant winning not through the authority of its power but through the power of its authority and organic ties with the interests of the people. However, this task had to be solved only after a long interruption, for it had become unaccustomed to the electoral struggle, to making choices and to an open clash of opinions, options and characters. This must be relearned.

We must learn the procedure of "electing" and "being elected." We must learn self-promotion, for the self-promoters, although they have equal rights with others, are still a novelty and like any novelty they draw attention to themselves and trigger mistrust. We must learn

how to make our choice and assume responsibility for it rather than once again undertake thoughtless exercises in democracy.

**V. Bakshtanovskiy.** And what does the ethicist do in playing such a game? To him such a topic should appear absolutely without any interest and quite vulnerable from the viewpoint of the democracy of procedures; where does humanism come into it? I know that many scientists believe that, in general, they should not interfere in such matters or, at best, they should be in the ranks of the opposition. Yet the philosopher who deals with ethical studies of a situation of choice has always limited the target of his study to the private life of the individual, for beyond it man should not discuss or misrepresent matters in making any kind of selection. All of a sudden, however, it appeared that a real situation had developed, as well as a problem of choice, when citizens as political subjects introduced their own moral ideals not only into personal but also into social relations. Another position became possible for the scientist: let us indicate to those who will participate in that same district electoral meeting, those who will organize it, whether there are alternatives within that same procedure and whether this procedure includes areas of risk, of danger to the voters. For the later may be deceived or else may have merely an embryonic feeling of freedom. Therefore, everything possible must be done to caution both the organizers of a meeting and its participants against choosing the easier option. In other words, we must create a situation of choice which would be more extreme than it happens in real life.

Let us remember that the Law on Elections made it mandatory to set up booths for secret balloting, so that the voters would have to use them. This is a normal technical solution behind which stands a moral norm: do not be inactive, and get yourself into a situation of having to make a choice not because you are forced but because you are able to do so! This is the only case in which I would agree with the word "force:" force a person to get into the booth, to consider the boring procedural problems for which, in our country usually there is neither liking nor interest.

However, I would not like to create the impression that it is merely a question of teaching people the tactics of an election. We must not forget that various ideals have been detected in society and that it is a question no longer of the many roads leading to the same temple but of many temples. Today the system of moral values which, whether we like it nor not, imbues all political values, is by no means monolithic, as we tended to believe in the past.

Furthermore, the situation of choice which we are either artificially organizing or in which we find ourselves in real life is merely a prerequisite, albeit mandatory, for morality but not a guarantee of the same.

**V. Churilov.** We have always worked essentially with a party audience, with the exception of cases when we

invited scientists, who naturally included nonparty people. It was only in the "District Electoral Meeting" that we went to the people, as they say, offering them such a way of training for elections. However, we must not fear this and I am confident that, after having mastered a situation which is new to them, the people will choose the party. Naturally, this will be a renovated party, with extensive internal party democracy and varied and strengthening ties with the masses.

There is a concept of a polygon of forces pulling in different directions. However, there also is a resultant force. If we can find it (which, in my view, is precisely what party leadership means), we have a combination rather than separation of forces. To this effect, we must steadily work under the situation of choices without rejecting from the start, one way or another, but consolidating the variety of forces which allow us to direct the combined vector in a single direction. It is by no means mandatory for everyone to participate in this vector: one of the alternatives should be the right to refuse to make a choice.

On 10 and 11 August, when the materials were already prepared for going to press, the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the North, inhabiting the autonomous okrug, took place in Khanty-Mansi. Its most important resolution was the establishment of a national local self-management authority, to which the okrug soviet of people's deputies would transfer a significant percentage of its rights. Furthermore, since the regional cost accounting system is still in the stage of discussion and development and has not been legislatively structured, in order to ensure financial support of the activities of this new authority, a special Northern fund should be set up....

At the present time, while an intensive search is taking place for optimal variants for surmounting a variety of national conflicts, you will agree that this is quite a noteworthy fact. In the course of our discussion, however, it had another significance as well. The point is that the idea of creating that type of self-managing authority was developed in the course of a 3 day investigative business game entitled "Samotlor Practical Exercise-2," which took place at the very beginning of June, again in Khanty-Mansi. Its topic was "Ethos and Ethnos: Socio-historical Justice as a Target of Political Decision." Three models of solution of the national problem in the okrug and the ethical conflicting positions they created were considered as part of the humanitarian expert evaluation, with the participation of a large interdisciplinary group (economists, jurists, sociologists, ethnographers, medical workers and philosophers) and, naturally, members of the native nationalities of the North. Briefly, it was as follows:

First model: "Noninterference." According to its supporters we are unable to manage national processes or, perhaps, such processes are in general "unmanageable." Consequently, to the subject of a political decision it would be more worthy and humane not to assume

responsibility and avoid making a choice. The counter-arguments are the following: If we accept this model, fearing unknown and enforceable consequences of a management decision, would we not doom the peoples of the North either to self-destruction (low adaptability to the new conditions) or destruction, for sooner or later they would be absorbed by the process of industrial development additionally burdened by the alienation of its ways and means from man.

The second model—the "reserved zone"—presumes the exclusion of some territories in which native populations have traditionally lived from the process of industrial development, so that they can be given such lands for their national settlement or an area with autonomous administration. According to its opponents, such a model would conflict with the aspiration of society toward a single ideal of social justice. The creation of "reservations" could lead to the fact that some of the peoples in the country would have access to historical progress, while others would be excluded from it. Would the erection of artificial barriers in the future not lead to the historical "death" of all the ethnic groups which are unable today to compete with the developed parts of the country?

Finally, the third model—"Cultural Assimilation"—offers as an alternative to the assimilation of culture, controlled by society, a way of "raising" them to the level of contemporary civilization. Such a decision, its supporters claim, would make it possible to "include" the ethnic groups of the Tyumen North within a single contemporary type of awareness. Doubts concerning this model are reduced to the fact that it is a priori immoral: we must not impose upon the native populations urban-industrial ideals alien to them....

Naturally, the participants in the game could suggest or develop any other model, either different or including individual elements of the first three. The following questions could be answered as well: Are, in general, such models possible and is their "adoption without alienation" realistic?

V. Bakshtanovskiy. Incidentally, in addition to expert views, this time we decided to determine the views of the public by publishing the survey in many oblast and okrug newspapers. The results of the survey were both encouraging and cautioning. The overwhelming majority of answers confirmed the diagnosis: the question arose not simply of "harmonizing relations among nationalities" but **surviving**. However, to the question of whose advice should be sought in solving the ethnic problem, the answers were aggravating to the scientists. Their advice was sought in the last place in solving the ethnic problem. Such is the prestige of science and the conditions in which it finds itself. More than one-half of the participants in the survey expressed themselves in favor of "reservations." Therefore, the opinion of members of other nationalities coincided, in this case, with the expectations of the Khanty and Mansi ethnic groups themselves.

**V. Churilov.** The national problems in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug have origins distinct from those which are feeding the familiar conflicts in other parts of the country. Here there are no clashes between ethnic groups on chauvinistic grounds. There is no pitting of one nation against another. The problem is both simpler and more complex: the problem is that the development of large petroleum deposits has put in doubt the very possibility of the survival of these two related Northern popular groups—the Khanty and the Mansi—whose total number today is less than 20,000. Actually, a great deal was said on this subject also at the Congress of People's Deputies and at the 1st Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as in various recent publications, including *KOMMUNIST*. The questions, however, remain. This especially applies to the following: Is it possible to make efficient yet also just decisions which would ensure a life of dignity for the native populations of the North?

The participants in the practical exercise were in favor of a "reservation." This is a very responsible decision which has two aspects. The first is economic. In my view, we should not, although this is frequently being done, rest all the troubles on the shoulders of any given department, on the petroleum workers alone. I view this question in broader terms: we should not exclusively blame the development of petroleum resources but, in general, the aggressiveness, including the ecological aggressiveness, of our economy. For example, in our own district we have deliberately limited (for the time being only limited although we must stop it entirely) logging in order to return these lands to their native peoples. We immediately faced the claims of the departments: "What will the people do?" They are unwilling to leave the area, the pay is good, and as to the rest they show little interest, for after many years of development this area has become a point of transition. We say that the thus released workers should undertake the processing of the timber. "This is hard and economically difficult," we were answered. "Let us do this in the future." Yes but, possibly, by tomorrow there may no longer be either Khanty or Mansi or any forests left.

How to surmount this opposition? I think that we must extend the term "survival" not only to the 18,000 Khanty and Mansi but also to many tens of thousands of native Siberians and to prove that they too are losing their natural habitat. We must say the following: put an end to dipping into this pocket, for the sake of our grandchildren. Let us not ease our conscience with shouts such as "down with!" but let us regulate the machinery. We are dooming nature even without developing the still planned petroleum and gas chemical complex, with our torches and engines which, considering our Northern conditions, must be kept running round the clock, from October to May, for otherwise they can never be restarted....

If we are successful in promoting this idea and expanding the range of people profoundly interested in the preservation of the environment, the other collectives,

although more quietly and more reluctantly, would make a conscious choice in our favor.

The second aspect is moral. We must solve the question (including on the moral level) of the vital space for the Khanty and Mansi although it may seem that we have long "demarcated" it with the invisible lines of their place of birth, roads and petroleum and gas pipelines. However, it is not a question of legitimizing such arbitrarily defined boundaries but, conversely, broadening the habitat of the peoples of the North.

However, it is not a question of any one of my "for" and "against," but of an interdisciplinary expert evaluation which was made of the models at the "Samotlor Practical Exercise-2." Such a comprehensive view is a guarantee that, in the final account, a solution to this problem will be found.

**V. Bakshtanovskiy.** Valeriy Andreyevich must be optimistic by virtue of his job, so to say. I, however, must be more skeptical and doubtful. We would not have had the "Samotlor Practical Exercise" had we not realized that behind our preferred decision there may be not necessarily immorality but consequences close to it. Therefore, during the game it was a question of seeking not only an efficient but also a just political solution. We must not delude ourselves by believing that both truth and goodness can be found always and everywhere simultaneously (and, many people would add, beauty as well). Frequently a single choice was possible, considered the least evil.

**V. Churilov.** In my view, there is justice in the "survival-development-harmony" formula. It is also that, as we take into consideration the specific problem, in the scenario of the game we converted from a dialogue to a three-way discussion, something like creating a "power-science-people" triangle. The peak are the people; this is an autonomous value with the right to self-determination and prevalent in terms of power and science. Characteristically, during all stages of the preparation for the "Samotlor Practical Exercise-2," working with us was Ye. Aypin, the Khanty writer, people's deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

**V. Bakshtanovskiy.** However, this was not simply a discussion of prospects for the solution of the ethnic problem but a search for a real solution to the existing situation. Since there was no one from whom to learn or whose experience to accept (a method of school training—some people know and share their knowledge with others—does not work in this case), we once again turned to game modeling, to the laboratory way of research. The people who participated in the game formulated, if you wish, an experiment involving themselves.

They, the representative of the Northern peoples above all, felt freer, compared to reality, to try out various options in finding a solution based on humaneness and expediency. The practical exercise makes it possible to test whether we could, on the basis of equal partnership



within this triangle described by Valeriy Andreyevich, test our ideas. There were party and soviet workers tempted to enter the game as boot-lickers, and thus earn the support of the Khanty and the Mansi, in circumstances which were not binding in the least. Meanwhile, in part of the native population, a mood of "demanding gifts" could have predominated. This is as unpleasant as seeing scientists who try to please the authorities who, in turn, try to please the people.... Such relations are always false, even in a game, and we were gratified that we were able to avoid them.

**V. Churilov.** Honestly speaking, I expected also to obtain (perhaps as a first approximation) real draft documents which could be a foundation for decision-making such as, for example, statutes for an association of the peoples of the North, a law on the autonomous district, with a juridical, economic and social status of an area of priority use of nature, i.e., documents which, for the time being, unfortunately, have not been drafted but which, in my view, are necessary; and, at the same time, to rally supporters and possible authors of such documents. It was this technological, so to say, aspect of the matter that was less successfully accomplished.

Nonetheless, we do have a few new things already.

First, we have developed the skill of working in the form of a dialogue which I find particularly important today. Second, we tested new structures which, for the time being, do not exist in real life, such as two chambers of an okrug soviet of people's deputies (soviet of territory and soviet of the people's of the North). In my view, this is a realistic way leading to efficiently securing the rights of the native populations. The participants in the games realized that the people are not silent. They demand to participate in the solution of their destinies and are ready to engage in such participation.

Naturally, I could have proposed such an option even without a game. "We heard and resolved" is a method used in party life, which is neither new nor, by any means, forgotten. Hundreds of organizations and committees "listen" without hearing; they "resolve" not relying on execution or success. They do this by inertia, by habit, unconcerned with the consequences. We then wonder why such resolutions do not "work out." But if we model them in situations close to the real ones, we could see possible models of behavior and compromises could be found.

After more than a decade of cooperating with Vladimir Iosifovich, I am now convinced that a party worker who thinks in terms of "business game" risks to be considered, to say the least, not serious. I have repeatedly been criticized for my stubborn support of such "toys," as our opponents describe our experiments, people who do not even wish to look at the essence of what we are doing.

Let me return once again to the start of our discussion. I would say this: we may not need each other (naturally, not on the individual level) but politics needs morality.

We simply need a "human dimension" of its consequences. New strata, new territories are opening here on a virtually daily basis. The ethicist will not help us to master them unless his moral idea is imbued with modern social technologies, or the party worker if his idea of administration is not sufficiently humanized and oriented toward the person who must be helped properly to cope with the burden of a choice imposed upon him.

**V. Bakshtanovskiy.** Let us ask ourselves another "game" question: How would either of us react in the place of the other? My answer is the following: we do not need such a reciprocal shift. The time has come to create a joint scientific-party enterprise. Let us describe it, for example, as a center for humanitarian expertise. Such a center should exist not "under something" (for otherwise it becomes an organization carrying out the assignment of its superior), but have an entirely independent existence.

Therefore, the business games, as I saw them, are tests of new social technologies and their evaluation, not only from the viewpoint of efficiency but morality as well; they are also a means of testing social roles which are abundantly offered by the renovation processes to anyone, from ordinary citizens who, for the first time, have felt their direct involvement in the affairs of society and the state, to the high-ranking political leaders, who are confronting the objective difficulty of managing under the conditions of democratization and increasing possibilities of choice.

However, it is not merely a matter of the method itself (there obviously are other methods). Let us consider the effort of a party worker and a scientist to work "ahead," to go beyond their assigned limits, to try a new form not of a parallel but of a joint existence, despite the objective contradictoriness of their positions, interests and approaches (although in this dialogue they avoided a direct confrontation). This is an attempt to find means of combining politics with morality, an attempt to make practical experience more scientific and theory more practical, and to understand and reassess the content and guidelines of party work and scientific activities; finally, it is an effort to establish, in the process of decision making, an efficient feedback between the authorities and the people, a feedback which would not simply be of informative but also of behavioral value, based on reciprocal trust, upbringing and training, including the art of making a choice.

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### **Controversial Spirituality**

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[Discussion among Pavel Vasilyevich Simonov, Petr Mikhaylovich Yershov and Yuriy Pavlovich Vyazemskiy]

[Text] Izdatelstvo Nauka has published the book "*Proiskhozheniye Dukhovnosti*" [Origin of Spirituality]. As the annotation points out, this book deals with an interdisciplinary analysis of the problem of the origin, shaping and development of the higher requirements of knowledge and altruism. In themselves, the various aspects of this approach to such a currently important concept of "spirituality" is of interest. This is also confirmed by the authors: Pavel Vasilyevich Simonov, academician, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Higher Nervous Activities and Neurophysiology; Petr Mikhaylovich Yershov, candidate of art sciences, theater director and theater educator; and Yuriy Pavlovich Vyazemskiy, writer and candidate of historical sciences. These three authors are representative of three generations.

The very title "*Origin of Spirituality*," provides a very clearly demarcated time frame to the study. The primitive hunters, the priests in ancient Egypt and the brilliant creator of "*The Iliad*" and "*The Odyssey*" ...but then, like any interesting book, this work is interesting not only because of its rich information and original conclusions but also because of the questions which the reader can ask himself, based on his own practical experience and the great complexity of his own fate. In a word, these are very current questions. These are questions which KOMMUNIST correspondent O. Kuprin decided to ask of the authors of the book.

**Correspondent.** For the benefit of those who have not read the book, should we explain what is meant by spirituality?

**P. Simonov.** We define spirituality as the extent to which the two fundamental needs of the individual are represented in the structure of his motivations: the need for knowledge, which is not satisfied only with currently available knowledge, and the social altruistic need ("for others"). To use the expression of Leo Tolstoy, it can be said that a person is spiritual to the extent to which he "lives with his own thoughts and other people's feelings."

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** Spirituality can be defined also in broader terms: it is the spiritual, the intellectual nature, the essence of man, as opposed to his physical, to his body essence" (Russian language dictionary). I support the broader definition, for I set myself the task of describing the process of awareness by mankind of its own spirituality, starting with ancient times. As indicated in the book, this includes "pure altruism" and "selfless knowledge," only in their embryonic aspects.

**Correspondent.** Let us try to consider the changes which took place in the 1920s and 1930s in two types of social needs: "for oneself" (awareness of the subject as belonging to him by right) and "for others (realized as obligations). Despite the entire tragedy of the events which occurred during those years, we should probably admit that a real revolution in social mentality occurred. The enthusiasm of the 1930s was the most vivid manifestation of the need "for others." Is this not true? The

asceticism of that period marked an equally obvious decline in the need "for oneself." To this day even, it is difficult to realize how contradictory such a spirituality was. What should we consider as particularly important within it?

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** I was born much later, for which reason I, naturally, have no personal impressions of this. Our present life, however, encounters such problems on a virtually daily basis.

In each revolution a movement along the path of a class, a party struggle has had priority. The main and inevitable feature of any revolutionary change is the division into camps. To the best of my knowledge, Lenin was quite accurate in this area, as confirmed by his attitude toward political opponents. A clear example of this was Martov who, to Lenin, was unquestionably a major personality, a very intelligent person. A sense of ideological opposition and struggle did not let Lenin abandon a system of morality. Subsequently, with Stalin's advent, an entirely different trend developed: people who either drew away from him or whom he pushed away became "class" enemies, traitors, and found themselves beyond the pale of moral laws. Lenin's "dualism" was replaced by Stalinist malice: "they" were nonpersons, worthy only of destruction. Even later than that the boundary between "we" and "they" became even more flexible: today you were a person tomorrow you were an "enemy of the people." Spirituality at that time was quite strange.

**P. Yershov.** To me the 1930s were a period of entirely conscious life. By some kind of miracle I did not fall in Stalin's millstone: I was the scion of a family belonging to the nobility and this was the worst that could befall anyone.... Let me say, based on my own practical experience, that I would not be so categorical as far as the crossing of the "boundaries" of the moral system. I look at who was affected by it. Was it Stalin and his circle? Yes. However, I do not agree that this was a general trend. In fact, everything was much more complex.

**P. Simonov.** I have a strictly childish perception of the 1930s. Today we know a great deal about that period and we can analyze it.

The mass enthusiasm of the 1930s is an unquestionable fact. Yes, any type of asceticism means a lowered need "for oneself." But was enthusiasm dictated by some kind of altruistic motivations? Such was probably the case for some people. I nonetheless believe that what dominated were ideological needs. These are quite powerful needs which arise as a hybrid of social and ideological facts and are characterized by the aspiration to observe the standards adopted by a given social environment. In speaking of the ideological nature of this enthusiasm, I am referring to the mass faith in the greatness of the task of building a new, a previously unheard of society of universal justice, reason and happiness. This is probably a variety of altruism: if not "for myself," let it be for the future generations.

**Correspondent.** You will agree, however, that the ideology of the 1930s was quite emotional.

**P. Simonov.** Naturally, emotions were clearly expressed. However, they are always related either to incomplete information, which applies above all to negative emotions or, conversely, to increased information. Growth based on already existing abundant information is one thing, while one based on very little information is something else. That is why if I have scant information, information which is not all that rich in terms of content could provide a major advance, a major growth only because the level on which we started was so low.

If I have a rationally and accurately assessed system of concepts and if I can soberly judge of my objectives and possibilities, I can then pursue my work calmly and confidently. When it becomes a question of something which is truly unusual and unknown, an information complex of emotions becomes tempestuously activated and all actions assume a clear emotional coloring. Hence, in my view, the specific nature of the spirituality which distinguished the enthusiasm of the 1930s was quite original.

**Correspondent.** Now as to the cult of personality, from the positions of spirituality or lack of spirituality, as you wish. Did it not have objective prerequisites? Similar things had happened in the distant past as well. The primitive soul was considered as something separate from the individual. Subsequently, man developed myths in order to explain to himself what he could not understand in the world around him. Do you not believe that, starting with the 1930s, myth entered our lives as a reality? If such is the case, although I would rather not believe it, was this not based above all on a universal psychological reaction of confusion and helplessness in the face of the unknown? In a country awakened by a revolution, understanding the nature of the new system and the new way of life (something which to this day we have not understood) was simply impossible, in any case for the overwhelming majority of the population. It seems to me that in such a situation the most favorable grounds existed for any kind of myths. The question is the following: To what extent did we voluntarily fabricate such myths and to what extent were they imposed on us? Were we faced with a necessity or did such a necessity exist objectively?

**P. Yershov.** What separates man from all else that is alive is the many-tiered complexity of his needs. This includes spiritual requirements. How are they satisfied? Religion is the most common way. However, religion turns into a ritual, into form, relatively quickly. At that point a substitution for spirituality develops—superstition instead of faith. However, it turns out that even superstition is needed by the people. The cult of Stalin performed this function. It performed it in a monstrously terrible and monstrously conflicting way. Victory is great... but there also were concentration camps! And what about the murders!...

**Correspondent.** Could the cult of Stalin's personality be described as a myth in the direct meaning of the term?

**P. Simonov.** What is myth? What distinguishes a myth from a fairy tale? A fairy tale is a work of poetry. When I listen to it I know that that is not what happens. It is a metaphor, an artistic image, an allegory. Unlike a fairy tale, people who share this myth take it as a reality. How do myths appear? They appeared at a very early stage in the history of mankind and became particularly popular whenever people clashed with a reality which they had still not accepted rationally and scientifically. The myth is one of the profound phenomena of the soul. Vagueness, strangeness and chaos have always frightened and attracted people even if they are not precursors of any direct evil or trouble. In order to gain confidence and calm, a person urgently needs an explanation of occurrences. This explanation may not be consistent with reality but, nonetheless, is an explanation.

The cult of personality is a myth which was perceived by millions of people as reality. Under the conditions of a conflicting, difficult and frightening life, it was gratifying to think that someone faultlessly had the best solution. Stalin and his circle sensed this objective psychological law and consistently cultivated it. The strangeness, the novelty of the path, the relatively low cultural standard of the population, information hunger and the mass of daily difficulties and privations... and, naturally, if in the social consciousness the image of an omniscient person, concerned with everything, invariably knowing where to go and how to get there, a leader, is instilled, the huge masses accept him as reality, with a sense of relief. I have personal experience in this respect. When Iskovskiy wrote "we trusted you so much, Comrade Stalin, more perhaps than we trusted ourselves," these were my own thoughts as well.

**P. Yershov.** They were not mine. I am older and by that time I did not simply guess about many things but knew quite clearly.... How many of my coevals, friends and acquaintances, whose honesty I did not doubt in the least, were classified as "enemies of the people".... However, the hypnosis of the environment was quite strong. What could remove it? Probably only practical experience such as mine.

**P. Simonov.** My experience is different. I remember how we were evacuated to Tashkent from blockaded Leningrad, by air. I was a little boy, a school student.... In the early autumn of 1942 I was waiting in line for bread and all of a sudden I began to listen to the conversation of the adults. If not today, tomorrow, Stalingrad would fall and then, they speculated, who would take Tashkent: would it be the Germans or the Japanese? Meanwhile, I was listening and thinking: these are mad people! Do they fail to understand that this can never happen? That there is a Stalin, and that Stalin is in Moscow! Even if the fascists crossed the Volga, it made no difference, it was absolutely obvious that we would win. No other way was possible!

In the past we were attracted by bionics. There were many enthusiasts who claimed that "nature is wise!... If only we, engineers, could be as wise...." In trying to instill some sense into such people, M.V. Keldysh said: Do not get carried away! Do not sing hosanna to the wisdom of nature. Nature works on the basis of rough statistics. If it wins in 60 percent of the cases it mercilessly sacrifices the other 40.

This entirely applies, let us say, also to imitative behavior. It frequently turns into mass panic which leads to the death of the herd. However, for centuries animals as well developed a certain practical experience. Obviously, at any given stage in evolution the following rule appeared: "If you yourself do not understand what is what, do like everyone else." Imagine: a danger signal been given by a member of the herd. Then, some kind of highly intellectual and critically thinking deer begins to think as follows: But is the danger real? While he keeps analyzing the situation, he will be eaten by the hunting wolves. Nature has taught us that if you do not understand something do what everyone else does. If everyone starts running, run. Natural selection has indicated that if the advantage is sufficiently great losses can be ignored. Such is the dialectics of evolution.

**Correspondent.** The mechanism of action of the myth is known. But what is the psychological mechanism of its durability? There is a great deal and most terrible information about the period of the cult of personality but many are those who are unable to abandon the myth.

**P. Simonov.** You and I are discussing incredibly complex matters about which the greatest minds have been thinking for at least several millennia. It is naive to hope that you and I will find any somewhat complete answers.

**Correspondent.** Nonetheless, let us try.

**P. Simonov.** But let us not claim to have reached definitive conclusions.... Here is one of the reasons. It is difficult for a believer to abandon his belief. It is shameful. It hurts him. The awareness that he has spent his life as a blind person leads him to seek arguments to the effect that his error was not all that grave. What also helps is a very authoritative advocate: daily experience. "There was a cult but then soap was available. Now we have no cult but neither do we have any soap. There is no order. Here, in the center of Moscow, at 6:00 p.m. yesterday, adolescents coming from Kazan beat up a journalist. Under Comrade Stalin such adolescents.... Nothing would have been left either of them or of Kazan." Such a stereotype is accepted by the mass awareness.

**Correspondent.** But let us return to the main topic of your book—spirituality. You write the following: "The ability of self-sacrifice is a vivid manifestation of spirituality," specifying that not all sacrifices are spiritual. Having analyzed Chekhov's "Uncle Vanya," you conclude that "the sacrifices made to an idol, the falseness, the insignificance and unworthiness of which could have been clear before such sacrifices had been made, become

comical." Is it not clear? Millions of people went to their death with Stalin's name on their lips. How can one assess such a display of spirituality?

**P. Yershov.** But what about spiritual orthodoxy? I believe that it does exist. However, it comes in a variety of shapes. Is this possible? Light a candle, cross yourself three times, make the stipulated number of bows and then go fight. All of this has a certain specific shape. Usually, this shape is the sociohistorical standard needed to meet certain requirements. Such standards, in their totality, are what one could describe as the culture of the age, the environment, the mass, and so on.

And so, J.V. Stalin became the standard for the satisfaction of the very lofty needs of great many people, although he himself was quite remote from all this. Yes, it was a false standard! However, faith in him was, to a certain extent, productive. People went into battle for Stalin and won, while Stalin himself.... I cannot think of new expository descriptions. I think that all of them have already been used.... As to the answer to your question, in my view, it is the following: in this case the adoration of an idol, naturally, is not comical but profoundly tragic and, most frequently, nonspiritual.

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** It seems to me that by dying with Stalin's name on their lips the people not only sacrificed themselves but also did this to enhance the enthusiasm of the soldiers by summoning the power of the name of the living God. Incidentally, Dostoyevskiy has already said everything that is worth saying about the living God. Others could only add specific details.

**P. Simonov.** By no means is any self-sacrifice spiritual. Without thinking of herself, a mother hurls herself to help her child motivated not by spirituality but by the maternal instinct, which is an almost biological need. Mass self-sacrifice could be dictated by the ideological need to observe standards of behavior accepted by a given society. The need to observe the standards, in turn, strengthens the mechanism of imitative behavior, which is sometimes blind. The act of self-sacrifice is the more spiritual the less it is subject to pressure on the part of social and vital ("biological") needs and the more it is dictated by a personal understanding of the situation and the aspiration to help someone else.

**Correspondent.** The fate of spirituality in the history of mankind has never been cloudless. Many of the facts you have quoted in your book lead to sad and entirely contemporary analogies. The study of "The Iliad" gives you the right to formulate one of the commandments of "divine" morality: One can violate even universally accepted moral rules if an instruction from above to this effect has been issued. Quite typical is the order of the period of "developed socialism." The history of civilization reached a stage at which the cult turned into a profession a long time ago. Was something similar not existing in our country until the 1980s?

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** Such analogies could be extended. What, in my view, occurred in our recent history? The

need for religion has been inherent in the individual for quite a long time. Christianity was abolished in our country. However, a holy place does not remain empty. A "new religious thinking" developed. Is that not the reason for which "scientific atheism" (as a rule pseudo-scientific and even pseudoatheistic) dealt so cruelly with the church, being itself a religion? Science cannot fight religion with repressive measures.

Let me remind you of some ancient Egyptian traditions. The dead leader was deified. There was an omnipotent ruling pharaoh, a Living Chorus, the only intermediary between the people and Divine Justice, The Divine Mind, and Himself: this was justice and this was the mind. "Religious Egypt" was based on a very "Egyptian" socioeconomic structure of the command-administrative system: "No single nose can breathe without the permission of the ruler." Is this not a familiar tune? "Cadres decide everything," "man is a cog" are Egyptian "social discoveries."

Is there something which reminds us of the firm primacy of a dogmatic religious awareness, typical of ancient civilization? Let us be frank: for decades ideological pressure was especially aimed at establishing Marx, Engels and Lenin in the people's consciousness rather as deified images than great scientists and politicians. As has frequently been the case in history, free scientific knowledge and free artistic creativity were harmed. What suffered most was, as in the past, philosophy, by becoming the servant of a dogmatic doctrine. History, as was the case with Egypt, degenerated into "white" and "black" magic. Art is traditionally freer than the humanities. However, even art was reduced largely to the writing of hymns. Therefore, a number of analogies indeed exists.

**Correspondent.** Are they not too many? Do they not include any psychological laws? Development, as we know, follows a spiral. Are we not repeating the errors of our predecessors on a new "civilized" level? As long as universal human values exist why should there not be universal human errors?

**P. Simonov.** The evolution of animate nature moves in such a way that "everything has its cost." Maternity is paid for with severe birth pains. For imitative behavior, we pay with mass panic. Myths save us from confusion in the face of a puzzling world surrounding us but prevents us from learning the objective truth. The universal errors of mankind are as durable as universal human values.

**Correspondent.** You end your book with an aphorism by Marx: Mankind happily parts with its past. But for some reason, we are unwilling to laugh at our past. Is it because we find it very difficult to part with it?

**P. Simonov.** Humor arises with the need to acknowledge the falseness of existing concepts, when man begins to sense a superiority over such concepts thanks to his knowledge and skills, when he is free from the pressure of other motivational dominants. Our needs for a just,

sensible and human structure of society are still excessively sharp for us "happily to part with our past."

Humor appears when the need to determine the falseness of existing concepts appears, and when man begins to feel superior to such concepts thanks to his knowledge and abilities and when he is free from the pressure of other motivational dominants. Our need for a just, sensible humane social structure are still too pressing for us to "happily part with our past."

The sum of needs which can be satisfied through humor should not have a competing motivational dominant. As long as the memory of the victims of repressions, of what was terrible and shameful, is still alive, strong negative emotions are triggered. They nip in the bud any type of humor, which always requires a certain contemplative attitude and some distance. Humor cannot exist in the vicinity of something which is very important. One cannot laugh at things that are sacred or at tragedies.

**Correspondent.** You may have seen exhibits of contemporary posters. There were many about Stalin. They were not funny. There were many about Brezhnev. They were. Why is it that in one case we happily part with the past and not in another?

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** Think of Voland, one of the characters in Bulgakov's "*The Master and Margarita*," and the little devil who took Vakula to Petersburg. One is funny while the other.... Who would begin lightheartedly to laugh at Voland? Or take a more distant yet real figure: Ivan the Terrible. Here again it is quite difficult to laugh. I believe that Marx had in mind a heroic laughter, the laughter of the Greek gods. This was a laughter triggered not by amusement but by a feeling of one's strength, of triumphing over a past full of fear. Such is the laughter we find in Bulgakov but not in contemporary literary exposures of the cult of personality.

Remember the scene where "Voland's retinue" is arrested. The people come to arrest them while the devilish characters engage in mockery. They are so strong that they can allow themselves to do so. Bulgakov openly laughs because, I think, having started to write the novel "*The Master and Margarita*," he himself had surmounted his fear like his devilish characters.

**Correspondent.** Spirituality has been present at all times in art and not only in art per se but also in the way art functions. For example, is the fate of the prewar and postwar MKhAT a mirror of the establishment and development of the command-administrative system in society?

**P. Yershov.** The dictatorship of the MKhAT in the theater art was a chip of our society. All of us at that time lived in accordance with the standards set by our superiors. If it has been approved from above, it becomes a model. But speaking of this, what is most interesting in my view is the fate of Chekhov on the Soviet (and not only Soviet) stage.

It is an open secret that it was precisely the Chekhov repertory that made the Artistic Theater an outstanding phenomenon in national culture and brought it universal fame. It is equally well-known, however, that Chekhov was dissatisfied with the staging of his plays: he had written them as comedies while the theater was producing dramas. Naturally, Stanislavskiy and Nemirovich-Danchenko are great theater reformers. However, Chekhov as well was just as great and fine as a playwright. Could he have been wrong as far as his own works were concerned? I am convinced that he was not. However, there was success, and success blinded him and made him tolerant. We speak of the conflicting nature of spirituality. At this point it is the sharpest.

But then if we forget everything that was and soberly analyze matters, what was the genre of the works created by Chekhov.... What was "*The Seagull*?" Read it carefully and try to forget what we presented on the stage. It is a comedy, a comedy of ambitions. Is there in the play a serious discussion about art? No, the discussion is about what position to hold in art. What about "*Three Sisters*?" It is a comedy of delicate feelings. "*The Cherry Orchard*" is a comedy of thoughtlessness, quite clearly expressed. "*Uncle Vanya*" is a comedy of self-sacrifice. It is precisely a comedy and not a sentimental drama: "Ah, Ivan Petrovich sacrificed his life for a fool!" But was it all that difficult to realize this later?

We have become so accustomed to the stereotype of Chekhov's dramas that for many decades no one could even think of Chekhov's real comedies. Naturally, the great obstacle here was the prestige of Stanislavskiy and Nemirovich-Danchenko and the universal acceptance of their staging. However, something else is more important. To attack Chekhov's interpretation of Chekhov means to attack the MKhAT, to offend national pride. Furthermore, it is incredibly difficult to stage these plays as comedies. It is incredibly difficult to surmount a durable stereotype. Such is the situation. However, it is even more difficult to perform. In this genre the plays instantly lose this sentimental morality which is so alien to the nature of Chekhov's creativity; meanwhile, they assume a truly Chekhovian philosophical depth.

It would be splendid if anyone today would resolve to stage such comedies! It would be quite pertinent, precisely now. It seems to me that in such an interpretation Chekhov would help us greatly to become aware of the present paradoxes of our reality. True art projects centuries into the future.

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** And even millennia. Reread the comedies of Aristophanes and study his perception of the difficulties and faults of ancient Greek democracy and you will see there contemporary faces and contemporary characters. There would be demagogy and confusion but there would also be a strong desire for the formulation of public opinion with all complexities, malice and whirling emotions.... To the best of my knowledge, it is not for nothing that currently three theaters are producing Aristophanes and staging his "Horsemen."

**Correspondent.** In terms of art, according to your assertion, spirituality is nothing other than truth and goodness. You write that in life truth frequently conflicts with goodness and demands a choice; in art such a choice is unnatural. To me it even seems arguable. Is the problem of choice alien to the motion picture "Repentance?" Could one ignore that problem if one decides honestly to write about Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan? I believe that a choice in art between truth and goodness is, in some cases, as necessary as it is in life. One may speak of some kind of superior goodness existing in even the most cruel truth; at that point, however, the concept of goodness must be reinterpreted aesthetically, morally and historically.

**P. Yershov.** In "Repentance" the makers of the film synthesized the two. The film does not lie. I think that it is optimistic. It instills faith in man, in the triumph of truth. All works of art are such. Cruelty means a rejection of art. Let me incidentally note that in life as well truth and goodness do not find it easy to coexist. Let us assume that I am ill. A good person comes to me and begins to treat me tenderly and gently but absolutely without any knowledge. Then comes the professional physician who has put me through a great deal of suffering but has healed me. The goodness of the former is greater but is that the point?

The same applies to art. If the audience can realize the real tragedy of the Afghan events this would elevate it, for tragedy as a whole asserts the truth. If the truth does not bring goodness it is not art. If goodness does not bring the truth it too is not art. The difficulty lies precisely in how to combine these two things which are in a permanent state of conflict.

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** In my view, "Repentance" does not deal with repentance but with settling accounts, retribution. As to the "cruel truth" in artistic literature, no high art is possible without it. This truth must lead to purification, to a "catharsis," as was understood by Aristotle, or a purifying and life-asserting repentance, a healing inner restructuring. At that point the "cruel truth" will also be the happy truth of surmounting, liberation, assertion and triumph of what is human in man.

**P. Simonov.** In terms of this question, what was said about humor is accurate. As long as the participants in the dramatic events are alive, the full, the cruel truth about it could be immoral. Actually, the true artist can find a way of embodying the truth in which, without lying, he would not cause unnecessary pain. We need truth not for the sake of truth but so that as a result of knowing it goodness can be served. This is the unquestionable usefulness of goodness and a yardstick of truth. Generally speaking, a feeling of measure is the great and the prime feature of true art. This also applies to the problem of "truth and goodness."

**Correspondent.** Perestroika triggered a sharp upsurge in spirituality. Understandably, each revolutionary action brings to light the old conflicts and triggers new ones. Let

us take as an example something that is striking: meetings. Or, more accurately, the emotionality of meetings. How to interpret it on the basis of your definition of emotions? Usually, information is provided at meetings which you classify as "contributory to reducing the likelihood that the objective will be reached" (such as information of an expository nature). Negative emotions appear, i.e., emotions which the person tries to weaken. As a rule, is it not true that something of the opposite nature occurs at meetings?

**P. Simonov.** A person, unless he is a religious fanatic or a masochist, tries to avoid negative emotions. But how? Negative emotions are created by the unsatisfied need for justice. They could be avoided by three methods: first, by activating a different need which will become dominant and will make the person forget about justice. Second, by blocking information about an existing injustice, i.e., like an ostrich, putting one's head in the sand. However, one could also take actions aimed at the restoration of justice. Such actions require a different type of information and temporarily intensifying negative emotions while the actions are directed at the struggle against injustice, i.e., at the elimination of negative emotions. Therefore, we must distinguish between two different types of information: the one which increases the need and that which contributes to the satisfaction of the given need. Our "formula of emotions" as the "general law of emotions" of Price and Barrell takes into account both types of information and the complex interaction between them.

**Correspondent.** However, the emotion generated at a meeting is a collective emotion. Does it obey the same laws? Here is an example: the correlation between the power of an emotional reaction and the level of the need. Could we apply the "general law of human emotions" to the participants of a meeting? Or does this have its specifics? I have in mind meetings such as those held in the Baltic areas and the Transcaucasus, as well as ecological, electoral and other meetings.

**Yu. Vyazemskiy.** Above all, I doubt very much that perestroika triggered a sharp upsurge in spirituality. It gave freedom of thought and speech. However, thoughts differ as do needs. Now, in my view, socioeconomic needs legitimately predominate. Spirituality holds second if not third place. This was mentioned at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, saying that the people were unquestionably "dominant-spiritual." Meetings are also sociopolitical in terms of releasing unsatisfied needs. In our understanding of high spirituality they carry no such thing. Unfortunately, this reveals a layer of national needs, which was strongly suppressed for a long period of time. The people do not look each other in the eyes in assessing intelligence. They do not ask about a person's profession, social status, etc.

**P. Simonov.** It seems to me that at many meetings a frequent determinant is that which could be generally described as imitative behavior with its inherent imperative: follow the experience of someone else since you do

not have your own as yet. Imitative behavior—and that is its strength—is one of the few direct channels to the subconscious. Incidentally, it is here that we can also find the reasons for difficulties in solving educational problems. The examples which the child finds in his microsocial surrounding are always stronger than the truths instilled in him. In explaining the truth we are appealing to the mind whereas imitative behavior is directly addressed to the subconscious, breaking the barrier of a critical analysis. This is incidental.

Most meetings take place if a need is truly ignored. I go to a meeting to seek the solution of a given problem. I go in a more or less peaceful state of mind and with an express wish for a rational analysis and a search for a rational solution. Immediately, however, those around me begin to infect me with their moods. I then, together with them, run, shout and demand something and the next day take my head in my hands asking myself: How could I behave in his manner?

In all cases, whenever emotions block something, we must remember that emotions are merely the "clothing" of various needs and motivations which clash with each other. Emotions cannot prevent a search for the truth if they have appear on the basis of a need for truth. It is a different matter if they have appeared in connection with the lack of satisfaction of various other needs (social, material, ethnic, etc.). In this case the search for the truth could be quite difficult, for the people are not concerned with it.

**Correspondent.** There is yet another psychological aspect of perestroika. Experiments conducted by scientists have confirmed that a moderate new development attracts while an excessive one repels. Experiments have been made with animals. To what extent is this principle applicable to social psychology? Sociologists recently published very discouraging results of their studies: by no means do all of our fellow citizens want changes. Some of them have been led by new developments even to the search of God, the idealization of what are not the most glorious pages of our past. What could a natural scientist and an art expert have to say on this subject?

**P. Simonov.** The rule according to which a moderate novelty attracts while an excessive one repels has been experimentally proved with children as well. It is also detected in the rejection of works of a new type of art, which subsequently become universally acknowledged masterpieces.

**Correspondent.** How is this correlated to your personal practical experience?

**P. Simonov.** Personal experience.... In my case, for example, perestroika was unexpected. Why? Because I believed that what we lack the most is motivation. I did not see in society forces or groups interested in change. At the top everything seemed to have been good while at the bottom the needs were so modest.... An apartment was available. It may have been on the fifth floor, but it was there. The children were not crying from hunger. On



the television they were showing hockey games. There was also enough money left for a drink on Saturday. More than that no one needed. Then I asked: In general, who is interested in changing anything other than the intellectuals? No one! And when perestroika began I was amazed....

Today, however, I feel a rejection of change among relatively broad population strata. Why? This implies not only fear of novelty and not only the information component.... There are many negative emotions yet there is an obvious scarcity of emotions for building, for social activeness. However, in order for an emotion to appear there must always be a second factor: need-motivational. So far it does not exist. I believe that many among us have still not fully realized the absolute need for change and the depth of the crisis in which our society found itself. The people ask themselves: "Why is everything being turned upside down all of a sudden? Why do I, personally, have to risk anything? Could something worse happen?" There are such fears among the people.

**P. Yershov.** All that you and I discussed can be traced back to the common problem: man always lives with his own needs. But since man cannot be split into parts, how many needs does he have? Yet he does not aspire because the majority—I repeat—is satisfied with the standards. If the standard is disrupted, then difficulties and conflicts begin. If a pipe is not leaking why do we need a plumber?

However, standards apply not only to the way of life but also to ideology. The ideological standards which prevailed in our country for nearly 70 years led to standardization of absolutely everything on a very low level. Art declined. The standard dictated its own rules. Yet art can be art only when it violates the standard, for otherwise it becomes a craft.

Therefore, what happens as far as the standards of satisfying human needs are concerned? How and why do they change, rising or declining? These are matters of the evolution of human needs and the trends of this evolution, spiraling upwards or downwards.

In this case initial auxiliary needs play a major role. What do I mean by this? Specific human interests and activities sometimes depend to a decisive extent on the presence or absence of the means for the satisfaction of one need or another. A need can be reduced to a minimum in if a man realizes the impossibility of satisfying it. The growth of any need in its complex structure as a whole is determined, therefore, by the need for equipment (competence) which becomes the more effective the more closely it is related to the need to surmount obstacles—to willpower.

**Correspondent.** You cite in your book a thought expressed by Tolstoy. Briefly, it could be described as follows: that which we know in history we describe as the law of necessity; that which we do not know we describe as the law of freedom. Tolstoy does not share this

approach, nor do you. Now, however, it is a question of something else. Does it not seem to you that this formula until recently greatly determined our historical awareness? It did not leave a place even for the possibility of alternatives, making entire generations hostages of dogmatism. Was this not the case? The close attention paid to domestic history in recent years has shaken up this stereotype and the turn which took place in the social awareness during the elections and by the Congress of People's Deputies was expressed, in my view, in the concretizing or, perhaps, even the awareness (albeit on the level of the ordinary mind) of the principle of alternate choices. The concept of choice has assumed a new quality. How can we assess the importance of the electoral campaign and the Congress of People's Deputies in terms of the restructuring of social mentality?

**P. Simonov.** The attitude of the people toward freedom of choice is extremely contradictory. On the one hand, many of us try to free ourselves, to quote Dostoyevskiy, from the "terrible burden of the freedom of choice," willingly surrendering it to the leader, to the collective. On the other hand, in predicting the possibility of satisfying any specific actual needs, it is very important to determine whether this forecast depends on my own actions or is determined by others? Hence, the existence or lack of a "feeling of ownership," activeness or passiveness, interest or indifference. That is why the possibility of a choice, as one of the manifestations of democratization, is a necessary prerequisite for perfecting production relations and the ecological system.

All of this is closely interwoven with emotions. If I feel that the possible satisfaction of my needs does not depend on me, a condition arises, described by an American researcher as "learned helplessness" or "learned hopelessness." At that point I am left with one of two choices: either hopelessness and helplessness or myth and faith in the respective authority which will decide everything for me in the best possible way.

**Correspondent.** The situation in the country is extremely complex. A great many things are puzzling to a great many people. In other words, the situation is most favorable for the appearance of myths. Yet no such myths are appearing.

**P. Simonov.** Are you confident of this?

**Correspondent.** Yes. The reason may be a previously unknown quality which has been instilled in us: a passion for alternatives.

**P. Simonov.** A natural scientist draws conclusions only after completing an experiment and not before or during it. Let us keep this question open....

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## PUBLIC OPINION

### Going Back to a 'Sensitive Topic.' Survey of Letters to the Editors

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[Survey conducted by the government-legal department of KOMMUNIST]

[Text] *The article by B. Protchenko and A. Rudyakov "A Sensitive Topic," which came out in issue No 3 of this journal for 1989 triggered—and was clearly bound to do so—abundant mail. Letters were sent by those who were, one way or another, involved with the problem, people who had first-hand information about conditions of treatment in a psychiatric hospital, as well as by psychiatrists. Characteristically, only one of the responses included a criticism of the authors of the article and of its basic concepts. We shall return to this criticism. Meanwhile, let us begin our survey with the letters of those who, agreeing with B. Protchenko and A. Rudyakov, provide an extremely sharp assessment of the state of affairs in this specific area, seek the reasons and, above all, ways of surmounting the existing situation.*

#### From the Medical and Legal Viewpoints

According to M. Nikolayeva, from Moscow, the social protection of the people from extrajudicial arbitrariness is one of the gravest problems facing the country: "During the period of stagnation the situation in psychiatry became socially dangerous. The power of the administrative authorities and the militia increased. People not noted for their honesty and professionalism found themselves working in this sector. All of this worsened its secretive nature. Departmental instructions were drafted in such a way that, if so desired, virtually anyone could be 'dragged' including for writing a complaint or a letter. Unsuitable people began to be taken away under the cover of psychiatry. But what happened to the leadership of the Ministry of Health? It meekly complained of the pressure exerted by the militia and the administrative authorities, of physicians with insufficient skills, and the coercion of 'militia psychotechnicians,' clearly forgetting that psychiatrists were playing the role of executors of frequently illegal or ignorant orders, for which they bore the main legal responsibility. It was acknowledged that gravely ill mental patients, who had to be kept in isolation, accounted for less than 1 percent. As for the 99 percent who were frequently kept in isolation, how many of them had been the victims of 'psychotechnology'?"

"It was natural that under such circumstances psychiatry as well, as a science, was increasingly losing its objective nature. Do we need the legacy of outstanding scientists, such as Korsakov or Sechenov to implement the orders of the militia?"

"The situation with the conditions and procedure for providing psychiatric aid," M. Nikolayeva goes on to write, "should have stipulated radical measures: an

investigation of abuses; a review of cadres and changes in their status; a strict judicial control of coercive measures.

"What must be done above all? Article 9 of the regulation must be radically redrafted. It is inadmissible to identify as mentally ill someone on the basis of 'suspicion by the administrative psychiatric authorities.' There should be a public court standing between the suspect and the psychiatrists, a court which should consider violations of public order (one of the main justifications for concluding the existence of a mental illness and the use of coercive steps—editors), without the consideration of which frequently suspicions were based on ignorance. Criminal liability for psychiatric abuses must be made stricter, above all, by depriving the guilty physician of his diploma.

"We are concerned by the propaganda of the inevitability of mass psychiatric arbitrariness. For reasons of allegedly high levels of mental diseases in their transitional ('covert') forms, which are difficult to identify even by the psychiatrists, nervous disorders could be considered both as normal as well as pathological.

"The situation in psychiatry," the author of this letter concludes, "is more dangerous to the country than was Lysenkoism in biology. Psychiatry must be taken out of the diktat of the administrative authorities. We need an open discussion of the situation in the area of practical psychiatry, with the involvement of the broad scientific public and the witnesses to and victims of arbitrariness."

"Actually, by the end of the 1970s political terror was replaced by psychiatric terror, something which officially people are totally unwilling to acknowledge," writes war veteran D. Sologub (Kiev), who personally experienced this system, referring above all to emergency hospitalization under the direct orders of the psychiatrists. "It is time to eliminate the one-sidedness of glasnost and phenomena in our lives, whatever they may be, and describe them by their right names. Otherwise we shall have to start sounding the alarm, as dictated by 'tradition', in 40 to 50 years.

"The conversion of political into psychiatric terror can be explained with two basic reasons. First, under the conditions of psychiatric terror no compromising material is necessary; it is not necessary to fabricate and present the 'case' in court and try somehow to simulate the appearance of the legality of repressions. Secondly, it is not mandatory for anyone considered 'socially dangerous,' with the help of psychiatrists, to be kept in hospitals for the insane. It is possible to practice the system of 'isolation in liberty,' by depriving such people of virtually all civil rights. In such a case each 'socially dangerous' citizen will always be controlled and, the moment it is stipulated by the local authorities, he could be interned in a hospital for an indefinite time."

"I suggest that a law be passed for the social protection of healthy people who are being kept under psychiatric observation," writes Ye. Stebleva from Groznyy. "Let this law be made retroactive, i.e., let its effects be

extended also to the best among our citizens who, during the period of stagnation, suffered for their principledness and daring in fighting reactionary superiors alone, and who paid for this with years of unemployment, social isolation and unpunished denigration of their human dignity by those who placed them under 'psychiatric observation.' Because of their lengthy hunger (accidental employment not in their field and forced unemployment, for no one wanted to hire someone who was 'abnormal,' 'a slanderer,' or 'a law-monger') the state of health of such people deteriorated. They need funds for treatment in sanatoriums and an improvement in their material status. Let, in accordance with the law, the guilty pay a compensation to those whose civil rights were violated. I ask that the law on psychiatry include a stipulation on the need for a video recording of the talk between the psychiatrist and the patient or the investigated person, in the presence of two witnesses. Only this could eliminate the possibility of disinformation on the part of the psychiatrist. I demand that a physician, whatever his specialty, give a copy of the history of the disease to the patient or the examined person. This will exclude any forgeries by the physician and retroactive additions and deletions. The mentally disturbed, who agree to this, should be treated without their names being mentioned. I ask that a law be drafted which would automatically free from psychiatric supervision anyone who, during the time of supervision, did not undergo a single treatment or was given any kind of medicine, or was not under physician's supervision but was put under supervision, for example, only on the basis of a false reference issued by the administration of the establishment with which the victim had a labor conflict."

"Is it not time to undertake the rehabilitation of the victims of psychiatry?" asks Leningrad resident Kuznetsova. "I believe that a compensation should be paid for the stolen years by adding 3 years for each year lost, taking into consideration the years of disability following coercive 'treatment'."

"The gates of psychiatric institutions have been opened wide throughout the world," writes A. Golovin from Tashkent. "Furthermore, the people who were kept in such institutions have been far fewer. One would think that we have in our country 'the largest number of mentally ill.' However, such is not the case. It is simply that the mechanism of using psychiatry for all sorts of reasons worked 'on automatic pilot'. Progressive foreign experience, according to which the psychiatrist is a sought after healer, must become the guideline in correcting Soviet psychiatry, distorted after years of repressions and stagnation."

"In the period of domination of the administrative system, psychiatry gave birth to thousands of people who were falsely diagnosed as mentally ill. Today, probably, many such people, myself included, will try to submit their bills to criminal psychiatry. For the time being, however, this is difficult. There is nowhere to turn. We do not have in our country an authority which would

deal with the victims of psychiatry, as we have for the rehabilitation of innocent people who were sentenced to prison terms."

"In the study of recidivism among the healthy population and patients who have undergone mandatory treatment," writes I. Kuzemko from Dnepropetrovsk, "I established that in the latter case it is 15 to 20 percent higher; 36.6 percent of the patients, after mandatory treatment, in 85.5 percent of the cases commit dangerous actions for domestic reasons in the first year following their release (lack of supervision, housing and jobs which would support the treatment, and the use of alcohol).

"What do I suggest? First, to close down all close-observation psychiatric prisons. Second, concentrate all forms of mandatory treatment in the oblast psychiatric hospitals, by establishing in them wards for close observation, with a capacity for no more than 100 beds. Under those circumstances, the patients do not lose their social and parental connections; a continuity between treatment and rehabilitation programs is ensured; problems of daily life are resolved more easily, the prevention of recurrent dangerous actions is facilitated, etc.

"Could I have avoided the writing of this letter?" the author asks. "I could have, the more so since I had already sent a report to the CPSU Central Committee on perestroika in mandatory treatment in the country. My note was passed on to the medical administration of the MVD, where it was filed away. Throughout the period of my party membership I was an activist and earned the label of lover of and stickler for the law. The time should now favor people who know their jobs, who love them and who wish to promote the revival of the homeland."

The origins of many of the present problems and abuses may be traced not only to the repressive traditions of Stalinism and stagnation. Not least, the culprit for the present situation is the level of development of domestic psychiatry. Let us look at the letters written by psychiatric specialists.

"It is gratifying that KOMMUNIST provided a frank and businesslike criticism of a truly sensitive topic of the legal status of the mentally ill in our country," write Doctor of Medical Sciences E. Kazanets, Candidate of Medical Sciences Yu. Savenko, Expert Psychiatrist V. Serpilin and Psychiatrist O. Ukhov, members of the Independent USSR Psychiatric Association. "A reaction to the article in the journal by officials from the USSR Ministry of Health and the leadership of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of General and Forensic Psychiatry imeni V.P. Serbskiy is characteristic. For example, the article expresses justified puzzlement at the totally amorphous grounds for certifying someone as 'violinator of the norms of socialist community life.' Apparently, however, such a broad interpretation suits the chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Health. At a recently held symposium on the legal problems of psychiatry, he defended it energetically. Asked about the

nature of such 'norms of socialist community life,' the chief psychiatrist answered by citing the following example: 'Let us assume that your neighbor keeps in her apartment 30 cats....' The Western delegations were shocked: 'but why remove the neighbor and not the cats and why do you do this yourself instead of letting the legal authorities do it?' This was a clear case of using psychiatry in solving strictly legal problems."

The psychiatry of the period of stagnation has not stopped being stagnant merely because last March the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On Ratifying the Regulation on the Conditions and Procedure for Providing Psychiatric Aid" was enacted, Leningrad psychiatrists A. Sibikev and A. Tsymek believe. "The officials at the USSR Ministry of Health," they write, "assess the consequences of this legislative act simplistically: 'Since then major changes have taken place in our service.... In less than 1 year we have freed from supervision about 10 percent of all 'registered patients.'"

The optimistic assessment of the effect of this legislative act would have probably triggered positive reactions had there not been among the psychiatrists people who are confused and who support a variety of frequently entirely opposite views about the diagnosis of schizophrenia. The essence of the problem, however, is found precisely in the fact that putting someone under observation or deleting his name from observation in a mental outpatient clinic should be based on clinical truths and not on a circular, an order or an instruction.

"In our view," the authors go on to say, "this legislative act, which was passed after expository articles were published in a number of newspapers (although even there the emphasis was on the subjective arbitrariness in the diagnosis of schizophrenia as a consequence of its theoretical groundlessness!), this legislative act played its obstructing role and worsened the already complicated life of the practical psychiatrist." The main origin of the diagnostic confusion about schizophrenia remains the concept of Academician A. Snezhnevskiy and his scientific school, described in the two-volume *Psychiatry Manual*, which came out in 1983. This theoretical concept introduced in practical psychiatry the form of "schizophrenia without schizophrenia," i.e., symptoms which did not actually exist: a neurosis-like, a sluggishly developing, a psychopathological-like, a slight gradient development, etc. On the basis of this concept, the diagnosis of 'schizophrenia' could apply to practically any person whose thinking may be somewhat different from low standards and impersonal unanimity of thought.

M. Nikolayeva, with whose letter we began this survey, also believes that "it has become almost commonplace for the various 'schools' and specialists to provide a mutually exclusive evaluation of the status of an individual. It is thus that sometimes the fate of a person is 'decided' without anyone sounding the alarm...."

Indeed, confusion in science is always fraught with gross errors in practice. However, we totally disagree with the last claim made by our respected reader: concern on this subject was expressed by honest psychiatrists and dedicated defenders of the law, many of whom paid for this with their freedom. Now—ever more openly and loudly—the alarm is being sounded in the press and on television and by the public. Unfortunately, however, it is not those who should be hearing such an alarm who are willing to do so....

"By virtue of the specific nature of its range of competence, psychiatry is an institution which is not only medical but also largely legal," believes psychiatrist S. Gluzman from Kiev. "The overwhelming majority of cases of violations of the rights of the mentally ill and abuses of psychiatry by officials, unfortunately, were not recorded by our official juridical institutions. The legal acts of the USSR Ministry of Health, which are not based on the knowledgeable opinion of legislators neither were nor could be any guarantees for safeguarding the rights of the mentally ill. Furthermore, in frequent cases they directly violated these rights.

"It is gratifying that our legislators have paid attention to the problem itself and have made an attempt somehow to solve it. However, let us frankly say, such an attempt has been unsuccessful. Alas, the current regulation on the conditions and procedure for providing psychiatric assistance, as well as the legal-departmental regulations adopted by the USSR Ministry of Health, which also formulates them, do not provide any guarantees whatsoever for the protection of the mentally ill citizens. We need a serious nondeclarative legislative act. The state must give firm guarantees to its mentally healthy citizens as well as to those who, because of mental illness, cannot confidently and adequately protect themselves from encroachments on their freedoms or the violation of other of their natural rights.

"Also substantial is another shortcoming of the current system of psychiatric care and treatment, such as the lack of the juridical institution of 'diminished responsibility'. For this reason, a tremendous number of criminals suffering from so-called borderline mental conditions, are serving their punishment in jails and colonies and not in special institutions of a 'halfway-house' nature where a correction of their behavior and social adaptation could be achieved, perhaps with the help of strictly psychiatric steps. Unquestionably, the development of a system of such institutions would make it possible significantly to reduce crime recidivism.

"One can only regret that the very sad condition of our theoretical and practical psychiatry is discussed wherever one may wish except in specialized medical journals. I hope that, nonetheless, perestroika will reach also these closed bastions and our psychiatry will become the social, legal and medical institution of a civilized country by the end of the 20th century."

### Discussion With Opponents

As was noted at the very beginning, the editors received only one response which criticized the article "A Sensitive Topic." Its author is Candidate of Medical Sciences V. Pervomayskiy, head of a department at the Ukrainian branch of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of General and Forensic Psychiatry imeni V.P. Serbskiy, who entitled his review "A Sensitive Topic Through the Eyes of a Psychiatrist." The review was "sent for publication" to the journal by A. Revenok, director of the branch. It contains quite a detailed analysis of the article by Protchenko and Rudyakov and cites convincing views; in a number of cases the reviewer, like our authors, deals with the rather arguable matters which have as yet not been solved. Nonetheless, if we follow the ancient rule according to which the other side should be heard out as well (even more so being in the minority in this case), let us dedicate to it an entire section of this survey, omitting arguments of a strictly specialized nature, but citing those among them which seem to us, from the juridical viewpoint, essential and which may be considered controversial.

"After the blast in the mass information media of the 'sensational exposures' of the activities of psychiatrists, still fresh in our memory," V. Pervomayskiy writes, "the authors of this publication have drawn, let us hope, the bottom line in the detailed portrait of domestic psychiatry. What type of portrait is it? What concepts are visible as a result of the categorical and peremptory nature of the views expressed by the authors? To what extent could the unknowledgeable reader adopt a critical attitude toward the opinion of highly skilled jurists about psychiatry if their forced nod at psychiatrists is hardly noticeable in the flood of suspicions and open charges which speak for themselves and clearly indicate the nature of the article, and its affective saturation although, as we know, emotions by no means always contribute to the search for the truth. However, they frequently compensate for the lack of arguments, revealing a certain prejudice on the part of the authors."

From the very first lines, our attention is drawn to the assessment of psychiatrists as provided by their legal opponents: "categorical," and "peremptory judgments," "affective saturation of accusations," ...What does this remind us of? But let us go on.

"Above all we must question the concept of the aspiration of psychiatry to put itself above the law and exceed the range of its competence in solving medical problems related to restricting the rights of the mentally ill." According to Pervomayskiy, such accusations are groundless, on the basis that the instructions mentioned in the article are not the result of individual departmental creativity but have been agreed on by the USSR Supreme Court, the USSR Prosecutor's General Office, the USSR Ministry of Justice, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Therefore, he believes, following the logic of the authors of the article, these respected departments "should be at least responsible for encouraging the

efforts (or not opposing) psychiatry which may exceed the limits of its competence."

"The absurdity of such claims is obvious," the reviewer believes. "In this case we need not an indictment but a considerate stance based on understanding the difficulty and contradictory nature of the very object of such regulation. An opportunity to accomplish this is provided by the open nature of 'departmental instructions,' marked as 'temporary' and at least three times discussed by the psychiatric public. The acknowledgment of the great importance of the regulation on the conditions and procedure for providing psychiatric aid should be considered the basis for their constructive criticism; this regulation proclaims, for the first time, the existence of rights and legitimate interests of the mentally ill and defines the procedure for their safeguard."

What is triggering the disagreement? First is the instructions of the Ministry of Health. One can only welcome the fact that one department, in formulating its own special regulations in the area of human rights, is coordinating it with other departments or, in any case, with the higher judicial institutions of the country. In this case it is not entirely clear only what subtext follows from this argument: Are the instructions good or else, having been coordinated with other departments, could they nonetheless no longer be under the control of the Ministry of Health?

Then we have instructions which "have been at least three times" discussed by the "psychiatric public." Let us ask: What kind of public is this, separated from society which, incidentally, consists, 99.3 percent, not of physicians but of their potential patients?

The second is the great significance of the regulation. One of our old diseases is to pass a wish for reality. Rights (or, rather, as aptly stated by the author, their "presence") have been proclaimed in the past as well but had been violated and are continuing to be violated. This is something which, as a specialist, V. Pervomayskiy should be perfectly familiar with.

According to the reviewer, many of the misunderstandings and violations in matters of providing psychiatric aid, particularly in cases related to restricting the freedom of the patients, "arise above all for the lack of reciprocal understanding between psychiatrists and jurists. This same factor hinders the uniform interpretation by them of legal acts and regulations based on them. In this case each side proceeds from its own professional competence, giving it priority and ignoring the arguments of the other side."

However, matters are hardly all that bad: a reciprocal understanding exists among those who wish to reach it. An example to this are the responses we have quoted. Nonetheless, is it worth it to the psychiatrists to remain within the society as some kind of special group sharing some kind of "secret?" The interpretation of legal acts discussed by the reviewer should be not departmental or "professional" but one and the same, based on the law.

"The authors," Pervomayskiy goes on to say, "regret that the regulation does not include 'specific rules which guarantee the patient the real opportunity to make full use of his rights,' and formulate suggestions which do not trigger essential objections. However, let us consider the following situation: a mental patient who is sent to an outpatient clinic, because of the real possibility that he may commit a socially dangerous act, asks for his lawyer, for confidential discussion with him, and so on. Meeting this requirement is simple, the more so if the need for this is stipulated by the law. But who can guarantee the loyal behavior of the patient toward the individual who has been asked to come? The authors of the suggestion realize that this requires the conclusion of the medical commission to the effect that such a meeting will not be prevented by the mental condition of the patient. But how can he prevent it if it is precisely the mental condition that determines the social danger presented by the patient and is the reason for the urgent hospitalization? What if the patient, put against his will in a psychiatric inpatient hospital can, on next day, sensibly have a confidential discussion with his lawyer and is of no threat to society, what type of commission should meet and how would it find grounds for further keeping him in the hospital rather than discharging him immediately? How could the lawyer prevent any anticipated violation of the rights of the patient if the social danger presented by the patient is based on the structure of the psychosis which can be assessed only by a psychiatrist? This means that trying by this token to guarantee the rights of the mentally ill and, consequently, to exclude the possibility of an error or malicious intent on the part of the psychiatrists, the lawyers should turn to those same psychiatrists."

Naturally, if the patient is dangerous, a meeting, not to mention a meeting alone, is out of the question. However, if summoned, the lawyer should have the possibility to become convinced of this. If the patient is not dangerous, there are no reasons to prevent the lawyer from seeing him, even more so in the presence of the physician. Incidentally, to protect the lawyer from dangerous excesses is the concern of the psychiatrists.

Above all, we must not forget that many healthy people are subject to urgent hospitalization. This means that everything possible should be done to prevent this, and to protect their legitimate rights. One could hardly agree with Pervomayskiy to the effect that the question of the possibility of a meeting with the lawyer should be decided by a medical commission. It is less a question of the fact that such a procedure appears like yet one more attempt to protect oneself from legal restraints. What is more important, let us repeat, is something else: the author, it seems, proceeds from the fact that urgent hospitalization allegedly affects only extremely dangerous mental patients whereas, in fact, as even our mail indicates, this is by no means the case.

The dilemma, according to the reviewer, is not whether to summon the lawyer or not but whether to entrust the psychiatrist with the procedure of urgent hospitalization

of mental patients who are a threat to society. "None other than the psychiatrist," he writes, "considering the shortness of time which is involved in urgent hospitalization, is able knowledgeably to determine indications to this effect, based on the connection between the mental condition of the individual and the likelihood that he may commit a socially dangerous act. The decision rests between the possibility of efficiently securing the rights of the mentally ill, which requires time for the gathering of information, and which inevitably leads to an increase in the social menace he represents, and the possibility of preventing the commission of a socially dangerous action within the shortest possible time, allowing for the possibility of an erroneous hospitalization. An error in urgent hospitalization is a legitimate cost of the effort to solve said contradiction and can be fully corrected during the subsequent stage."

As to the exclusive right of psychiatrists to order urgent hospitalization, let us agree that this is no simple matter and V. Pervomayskiy brings forth arguments which, on the surface, seem convincing from the viewpoint of common sense. But let us look at his views more closely: the physician does not need objective data about the patient. All that is required is an initial examination ("lack of time") to assess the likelihood that the patient may commit a dangerous act. In other words, whether the patient had engaged in socially dangerous actions in the past or had not is not important. What matters is that it may appear that the patient could be "capable of anything." But what about the criteria! Furthermore, an accurate determination of the extent to which the action is socially dangerous (from the point of view of the law, naturally) could be hardly established by the physician, for this is rather a matter for a lawyer to decide.

Under those situations, the reviewer admits, "an error in urgent hospitalization is a legitimate (!) cost..." It appears that abuses also become legitimate! Just try to distinguish one from the other, the more so when, judging by Pervomayskiy's views, the psychiatrists are in no hurry whatsoever to accept the participation of the "unenlightened!"

According to the reviewer, "it is difficult to imagine a patient who, because of his mental illness, has committed a socially dangerous act, and remains ill, and needs treatment but nonetheless does not present a threat to society, perhaps for the reason alone that this action has already been committed."

This view is hardly accurate. Socially dangerous actions are committed, for example, also in a state of pathological intoxication. In such cases, as one can easily understand, any recurrence is virtually excluded, for the mental disturbance here is of short duration. Also possible are incautious actions on the part of the mental patient, which by no means prove that he constitutes a threat to society and which should not lead to mandatory treatment. Therefore, to uphold such a criterion in all cases is, in our view, a very weak position which could lead to further abuses.

The review, like the article itself (as we already pointed out) includes controversial concepts. However, the topic of this debate is quite complex itself. Nonetheless, V. Pervomayskiy writes: "What we said above confirms the inadequate substantiation of most of the claims formulated by jurists concerning psychiatry." These are not claims formulated by the jurists but by society! They are not addressed to psychiatry (which, once again, the author protects as belonging to some kind of separate area), but to the entire forensic system which, for the time being, protects neither patients nor healthy people from abuses (it is strange, incidentally, that the protection of psychiatry from criticism has been undertaken by a scientist, whereas in the KOMMUNIST publication no one—neither in writing or by telephone—among official authorities has reacted, including those named in the article). What we need here is not confrontation but a dialogue, an attentive, joint and public consideration of complex and pressing problems of psychiatric practices, for the sake of their fastest possible resolution. Otherwise all that will remain from a "sensitive topic" will be the pain which neither the individual nor society is further able to withstand.

#### **'Do Not Harm?'**

Another sad topic is the conditions in which the patients in psychiatric clinics find themselves, whether sick or healthy, whether guilty or innocent. Unfortunately, the author of the review does not write anything about this although, as a physician, in our view, he should have been bound to pay attention to this aspect of the matter. He does not say a single word about whether or not psychiatric abuses are still committed, although the entire thrust of the article is focused precisely on this matter. Well, let us try to fill this gap by giving the floor to our correspondents. Taking into consideration the sensitive nature of this situation and the possibility of undesirable consequences for them (something they themselves mention) in some cases we do not give their full name or the locale where they are being kept. To an even lesser extent so do we dare to provide or reject diagnoses or refute or else assert the charges formulated against the authors of many letters. However, nor should we leave without attention some excesses which have been reported in numerous responses from various parts of the country and the nature of which coincides in many of their details.

"Your article is one describing the tragedy of our family as well," writes Leningrad resident V.L. "There was a trial but I had neither my lawyer nor my parents present. The expert commission determined that I was paranoiac and that in that case proof of my crime was not needed, nor was there any crime. The physicians threatened to declare my mother a psychotic should she appeal.... I spent 4 years in a mental hospital. Sodium amylal injections resulted in admissions (and I 'admitted' everything). Never, not even in the official papers, could I describe this institution as a hospital. I left it with rheumatoid arthritis. My teeth fell off and so did my

toenails, and immediately after I was released I underwent an examination in a tuberculosis institute. My mother fell ill with cancer and died. My father developed hypertonia and was unable to seek treatment and all he could do was appeal. We were rejected everywhere, with references to the fact that I had been diagnosed a paranoiac."

Here is another letter: "The psychiatric hospital for close observation, where I am being kept, is located on the territory of a former colony for prisoners under general regime, with the features of a functional corrective labor institution (separation of barracks, double bunks, towers with guards, dogs running along the perimeter). The militia guards do not particularly bother to observe the status of a medical institution and have at all times to enter any ward with their unmuzzled dogs. One of the barracks is a ward, while the other barracks stand have their glass panes broken and doors open. The hospital had been planned for 300 beds. One year later there were only 64 patients. Half of the contingent are so-called unsuitable people, i.e., people who are somatically weakened, unkempt, people who have no relatives, the chronically ill, the very old. The personnel of the hospital are in excess of 120. There are no therapeuticians, neuropathologists, dentists, etc. One cannot speak of any social rehabilitation of the patients, for there are no workshops. However, the wards include two labor instructors who are withering away from idleness.... About myself: I have been hospitalized since 1971, as a criminal type. This is my fifth mandatory treatment. All the delinquencies committed by me have never threatened the life and health of the people (petty theft, robbery, alcohol abuse). It will soon be 4 years during which I have been undergoing continuous treatment.... The head of the ward has said that by writing this letter I have tightened the noose around my neck."

Muscovite B.M., who remained jobless a long time for, what he considers, family circumstances, and who has complained to many authorities of the impossibility to find work of his choosing, the result of which was his being prosecuted for parasitism, writes: "The chief of the militia department said that for my complaint I will be rotting in a psychiatric polyclinic. In November 1986, by resolution of the prosecutor's office, I was detained and sent to undergo a forensic-psychiatric expert evaluation. Three days later I was summoned to the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office, where I was told that my case will never be considered by anyone and that I should stop submitting petitions. One month later I was once again detained and taken to the hospital. Finally, in January 1987 there was a so-called commission of forensic psychiatric experts, chaired by the chief physician, who wanted to determine whether I would continue to demand that my petitions be considered. After I answered in the affirmative, the commission considered me irresponsible for my actions and labeled me a psychopathic paranoiac.



"Soon after reading to the patients an article entitled 'Criminal Diagnosis,' which was published in the newspaper SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, I was transferred to a ward where I was given daily three shots of aminazine in horse-size doses, 'for my literacy.'... During those years I perfectly understood the reason for which Soviet psychiatry had been expelled from the international association."

Let us stop quoting at this point, for this is quite a familiar picture, repeatedly described in our press of late. Let us merely add that in confirmation of the diagnosis of B.M., in his words, the physicians added the following characteristics: "Straightforward, persistent, tending toward the search for justice, and intolerant of the violation of his interests." Are these not, truly, stunning features of "non compos mentis?!"

"Under Brezhnev, because I had written to the CPSU Central Committee (as a party member I have the statutory right) that Marx's words on method opposing that of Hegel, in *"Das Kapital,"* should be interpreted dialectically and not in absolute terms, with the blessings of the obkom I was put under psychiatric observation with no hospitalization whatsoever," writes V.S. "In 1986, asking the personnel of the GAI to observe their own resolution, early morning I was unable to reach and awaken the GAI official on duty (although I had already telephoned him earlier). I decided to teach him a lesson as to how one should not sleep while on duty and I removed from the porch of the GAI the holiday flag (the day was 6 November), telephoned the chief of the militia and advised him to celebrate the October holiday not with flags but with actions. In order not to be sentenced for hooliganism, I put the flag on the monument of those who had fallen for the revolution and reported this fact to the head of the party gorkom propaganda department.

"All of this was presented as unmotivated behavior. Psychiatrists quickly realized what was demanded of them and hospitalized me for 'hyperactiveness'. Information about my letters to the Central Committee found itself in the psychiatric outpatient clinic. After that one thinks twice before undertaking to study Marx and Lenin and express one's opinion."

We would readily agree with the fact that removing a holiday flag may not be perhaps the most customary way of drawing attention to a careless official on duty. But then do we have many efficient means of a so-called ordinary nature? In any case, such action should not be a reason for hospitalization.

"For more than 13 years I have been undergoing mandatory treatment, 9 of which in a special type hospital. Think: the article on the basis of which I was sentenced calls for a punishment not to exceed 3 years whereas I have been behind bars for 13!" exclaims Yu.Z. from Smolensk. "According to the law a mental patient has the right to submit petitions to any authority, where a petition must be mandatorily checked or reviewed by the court. However, the moment I address a petition to a

superior authority—a court or a prosecutor's office—I am immediately transferred from a general hospital to a special hospital. This has been repeated on three separate occasions."

The secrets hidden behind the walls of hospitals where individuals who have committed severe socially dangerous actions are kept are described by I. Kuzemko, whose letter we already cited. "I am familiar with this problem 'from within,' for I worked in a special-type hospital for more than 20 years and during that time I studied the organization of mandatory treatment of individuals who had committed particularly dangerous actions. I repeatedly visited similar hospitals in Leningrad and Kazan. Almost all of them are located in former prisons built before the war. There are 2.7 square meters of space per patient. The hospital food block is located in a basement and is flooded with sewage water. There are four toilets and five sinks for 120 patients! There are no lockers in the wards, where one could keep one's toiletries, letters, books, and so on. Everything is kept under the mattress and is periodically confiscated during searches.

"The familiar ukase of 5 January 1988 and order No 225 of 21 March 1988 of the USSR Ministry of Health changed virtually nothing in the situation of the patients and in many cases worsened it. The change of labels from the MVD to the Ministry of Health irks with its haste and lack of consideration. The inmate medics were removed and, starting with November 1988, were replaced by trustees, 'chemists,' who have the right to leave the grounds. Problems of smuggling alcohol and stimulating drugs appeared. I believe that it is unnecessary to describe today the condition of a mental patient who is consuming alcohol...."

Someone may possibly exclaim, in reading these lines: Why are we so concerned with criminals! No, these are not criminals but sick people, whatever they may have done. Naturally, patients in special-type hospitals do include individuals who have committed crimes but who subsequently became mentally ill. Unfortunately, together with them are kept other people who are innocent, people who have committed socially dangerous actions in a condition when they were not responsible for their behavior. Putting an end to keeping those people together and putting all such patients in general type hospitals is an urgent task. Keeping together these two types of patients is both immoral and absurd from the viewpoint of crime prevention as well.

In this connection, we cannot ignore the practice of staffing special-type hospitals with trustees. Understandably, not everyone would agree to work as a medic in a psychiatric hospital. However, in our view the existing practice is by no means the best solution to this situation. Why not consider increasing material incentive for this type of difficult work and involving religious organizations which are proving themselves so beneficial in health care?

As to the patients in psychiatric clinics, like any other patients, they have the right to hope for a normal treatment and corresponding treatment conditions. In this connection, we must quote from two other letters which show how sometimes the professional "coordination" of people in their white smocks is achieved, people who, among others, have sworn the same Hippocratic Oath.

"After heart surgery in 1972, I became an invalid and I annually undergo a cardiological examination by a commission of physicians," writes S.A. from Chelyabinsk. "Despite my severe heart illness which, by law, does not allow my being kept in a mental hospital, although I mentally healthy I have spent a number of years in mandatory treatment in a mental hospital where physicians treat me with psychotropic drugs, which have totally ruined my health." The same bitter topic is discussed by Ye. Stebleva, whom we mentioned: "My mother, second group invalid, suffering from tuberculosis of the lungs, was in the tuberculosis hospital in Groznyy. They wanted to send her home but she asked the lung specialist to extend her treatment in a sanatorium. She was refused. At that point I was incautious enough to tell the lung specialist that I intended to appeal to his superiors. The answer to this was the summoning of a psychiatrist and mother was taken to see him in the ward. On the same day, the following entry was made in the history of the disease: The patient expressed depression thoughts. She is on the verge of suicide. She is socially dangerous and needs urgent hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital." In other words, the psychiatrist wrote a lie on the request of the lung specialist! 'Emergency aid' took the patient to a mental hospital from where she was released the following day by other psychiatrists with the diagnosis that she was 'virtually healthy'."

"Several years ago my mother was diagnosed as 'anorexic' (lack of appetite—editors) and psychiatric outpatient treatment was recommended, although this illness can be treated by a therapist, at home. In the outpatient clinic my mother was prescribed a medicine which made her faint. The nurses did not watch her and refused to take her to the toilet. At night mother alone went to the bathroom, fell, injured herself and ended up with blood on her face. In the mental outpatient clinic she spent no more than 2 weeks and when she returned I immediately removed from her head dozens of lice which she had caught. In a period of 2 weeks the physician did not see my mother even once although it was his duty to talk to her on a daily basis...."

"It was determined at the health epidemiological station that there was dysentery in the hospital, from which the majority of patients were suffering. The psychiatrist, who was the head of the ward, was removed from his position for allowing an internal hospital infection to develop, by order of the epidemiological service. Two days later, on the basis of his petition, he was rehired in that same hospital and in that same position."

The following people have written to us about their tribulations and trials of their relatives, friends or simply acquaintances: N. Yerofeyeva, from Moscow; T. Pokatayeva, from Minsk; the spouse of Volkov from Chekhov, Moscow Oblast; D. Ryzhikov, from Tula Oblast; V. Printseva, from Moscow; Neuropathologist V. Yastrebov from Gorkiy; L. Miroshnik from Moscow; V. Malkina and N. Krylova from Moscow Oblast; and A. Ilchenko from Nikolayev. Labor veteran Ye. Goryunov from Odessa has sent a list of seven individuals of different professions who found themselves in mental hospitals for exposing theft of public funds, bribery and illegal actions by the militia.

It is depressing to read such mail. It is sad and hurtful to think of the condition of our health care, both in terms of the quality of medical health as well as material facilities in this leading social area. It is twice as sad when this applies to mentally ill patients who, as a rule, feel most severe pain, which cannot be compared to any other. However, it is three times as bitter, insulting and angering when helpless patients are being abused and healthy people are deprived of their rights, and their lives are being maimed. All of this must be discussed most openly and tirelessly until something starts changing.

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## SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

### Can We Anticipate? On the Need for Modeling Socioeconomic Processes

905b0004K Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 89-91

[Article by V. Maslov, academy member, head of the Applied Mathematics Department, Moscow Institute of Electronic Machine Building, laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes]

[Text] In looking at recent newspaper and journal publications, one unwittingly reaches the conclusion that good intentions and right ideas, after their practical implementation, occasionally bring about unexpected results.

In fact, we had great hopes that the cooperatives would help to reduce scarcity for, by virtue of direct incentive, they would produce goods for which there was greater demand and they would be more responsive compared to the state sector and react to the demands of the consumer. What happened, however, was that scarcity increased with their development. A number of serious steps were taken in the struggle against corruption and bribery. However, according to the press, bribery and extortion have now assumed an amazing scale, above all in connection with the activities of members of cooperatives. There have even been reports of standardized

bribes which the cooperatives are forced to pay to officials before they can exercise their rights without obstruction.

Such examples are numerous: the struggle against drunkenness and speculation in "Vneshposyltorg" checks, etc. Unfortunately, none of this has yielded the desired results. Finally, major shortcomings were exposed and eliminated in the work of the militia while crime is continuing to grow. Complex problems arise concerning the reaction of the masses to the actions of the leadership and the state of mind of the population in general. Why, for instance, with an accurate and humane turn in national policy has the Armenian-Azerbaijani problem become aggravated and nationalism has begun to appear in other parts of the country? It was lack of understanding of the psychology of the masses that was revealed in the course of the electoral campaign, when various efforts to influence the opinion of the voters led to opposite results.

What is the reason for this? Why are the planned results not achieved? The clarification of this matter is particularly relevant now, when the new deputies are undertaking the implementation of a number of optimistic electoral programs such as, for example, "filling the market with consumer goods," programs which allowed them to take their seats in our Soviet parliament. Meanwhile, new elections are appearing on the horizon, and so is a new electoral struggle.

All of this must be taken into consideration in solving specific local socioeconomic problems as well, as a whole, for unless we consider the entire general situation we could make even worse errors and begin to undermine the roots of the tree on which ripen the fruits which ensure our existence and the preservation of the values gained by the revolution.

The approach to the solution of this problem, in my view, is to take into consideration the fact that society is a very complex organism. Before changing anything in it, we must "practice" with models of all possible consequences of different options of a suggested action. Unfortunately, frequently in our country such experimentation is not based on models but practiced directly on people, using the "living body" of the population. Otherwise we would not have amended options on closing down the "Berezka" stores, limiting the sale of vodka or the taxation of cooperatives. Sometimes the consequences of such experiments are irreversible.

To the best of my knowledge, in formulating one decision or another, not even basic mathematical computations are being made, not to speak of the use of mathematical models. Let me clarify this thought with an example. Individual trips taken by Soviet citizens abroad are economically advantageous, for according to the official rate they exchange rubles for a specific currency in an amount considered adequate for living decently abroad for 2 months. Such currency enables them to purchase electronic equipment and come home

1 day later. This is not prohibited by the rules. Therefore, to predict the lines waiting for tickets for transportation in such a situation could be achieved by using a simple mathematical computation. Naturally, however, we also need to be familiar with the situation on the consumer market, the wishes of the citizens and other sociometric data.

A forecast can be made also on the basis of practical experience, by modeling under contemporary conditions a situation which has already occurred. Experiments with limiting the sale of vodka and wine have been conducted in the past in other countries as well and this question has been comprehensively studied by sociologists. Here is another example: in the transitional period leading to the NEP, it was typical to mix various economic systems and forms of ownership and, among others, it turned out that the possibility of converting cashless into cash currency contributes to inflation and to an unrestrained growth of prices. In my view, it would be expedient for such models to be "played out" to fit present local tasks. This would make it possible not only to anticipate one trend or another but also to estimate the extent of its socioeconomic consequences.

Currently cooperatives are beginning to trade with Western companies. There are many who favor a total elimination of obstacles on the way of converting rubles into dollars and dollars into rubles. Let us go back to mathematics. We know that on the black market the dollar is worth between 10 and 20 rubles. The price of a cubic meter of timber in our country is 30 rubles, i.e., approximately \$2. A subway ticket in New York costs \$1. Therefore, for the price of two subway tickets one could purchase a cubic meter of timber. Just think how expensive their subway appears to be! In reality, such is not the case. Our state is, in the final account, giving the timber for free along with ores and plots for the building of ecologically dangerous plants. The results could also be modeled but in this case simple mathematics will not do. Have there been similar historical analogies and models? Yes. After the ocean was no longer an obstacle between Europe and Africa, European baubles, mirrors and trinkets were exchanged between the two systems for gold and precious stones. In relations between Europe and America as well, when the conquistadors rushed into the American continent, the same occurred. However, could such analogies be applied in our case? Let us consider this question in greater detail.

Mechanical models are frequently used in the study of complex physical-chemical phenomena, i.e., a simplified physical situation is created and a corresponding experiment conducted. For example, in the mathematical modeling of the process of cooling the damaged block at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, the physical model of the breakdown, which was constructed by a group headed by Academician V.S. Avduyevskiy, a "room-sized" model proved to be exceptionally useful. Naturally, in such designing there was a great deal of simplification and differences with the actual block, above all

in terms of scale. However, a number of central phenomena of this model were adequate and quite accurate.

Such man-made models are apparently impossible to develop in the study of socioeconomic phenomena. Unquestionably, the communities created by Owen were not a model for the socialist society. However, historical situational analogues could play the role of such "mechanical" models. For example, the Paris Commune could be considered as a kind of model of socialism. The Petlyura Government in the Ukraine (naturally, quite primitive and rough) could be considered a model of the national socialist systems in prewar Europe.

The Soviet Union is a huge multinational state with a most complex structure, ties and relations with other socialist and capitalist countries. The determination and study of the overall laws governing the development of such a state is a most difficult task (I am referring not to legality but to sociological laws). In physics, when very difficult climatic problems are considered, for instance, a simplified and closed model unrelated to the external world is developed to determine patterns. In this sense, a country such as Albania, which has little interaction with the international community and which hardly depends on it is an important "physical" model on the basis of which interesting conclusions may be derived about simplified patterns of development of countries with a socialist economy.

Furthermore, in my view the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary Regime in Cambodia, where even personal property and money were abolished, could be considered a model of some kind of "national-communist" system which should be studied in detail and historically classified. To consider the temporary victory of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in Cambodia the ill will of two scoundrels would, naturally, would be unscientific.

Unfortunately, such an unscientific view has now literally blossomed in our journalistic publications. As a read about it, I am reminded of the words of the commander of the Petrograd Military District, who said that if in October 1917 he had had a sufficient number of machine guns he would have stopped the revolution. Accidents, naturally, do occur and can be found also in physical phenomena. There nonetheless is a system of mathematical statistics which makes it possible to detect patterns even in a total chaos. However, the social and historical barriers include not only complex models but also analogies and elementary coincidences needed for their structuring, which are rejected by man for emotional or rationalistic reasons. In this case as well the deterministic approach turns out to be a hindrance in the same way that, in its time, it was in the development of quantum mechanics.

Let us recall that at that time the physicists consciously refused to provide a rationalistic explanation to their models, unless such models properly agreed with their experiments. Psychologically, this is a very difficult step. Today we must honestly acknowledge that physicists

were helped by the philosophical concept which eliminated the hindrance of a naive materialistic thinking which, as we know, met with fierce opposition (which included a number of Soviet philosophers). Fortunately, the "irrational" models of quantum mechanics, such as the principle of the identity of particles or the principle of indetermination, proved to be so fruitful that today, for example, even a model of a positron as an electron which moves along with time, does not frighten anyone. Such models, naturally, also reveal laws unfamiliar to us which, in their right time, will make it possible to interpret them entirely rationally and materialistically.

If we were to adopt the "irrational" viewpoint in sociology and history, the range of situational models would become immeasurably broader and it is entirely likely that it would enable us to "understand" some overall diagrams which would cover various phenomena of social development and accurately anticipate all possible events with their help. Let me cite some basic examples of such "irrational" coincidences which, naturally (and even more than anything else), could be random and not part of any overall system.

The situations of the two patriotic wars also had a great deal in common from the viewpoint of a schematic model. There was a preliminary pact of friendship with a potential enemy, an obvious fear of this enemy and an obvious weakness, followed by the advance of enemy forces to Moscow and the defeat of the aggressor; there was no weakening of our state as a result of the war but, conversely, its unparalleled strengthening and growth into a great power with a broad sphere of influence. Forty years after 1812, riding the wave of its prestige, Russia introduced its forces into Wallachia, started a war with the Ottoman Empire, thus irritating the West. This was followed by the defeat in the Crimean War.... Now, fortunately, we have withdrawn our forces from Afghanistan and have thus broken the analogy.

It is equally clear that the familiar events which began with strikes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland and which ended with the intervention of troops have a great deal in common. In my view, it is absolutely necessary to construct models of such a phenomenon, including a mathematical one.

Numerous such examples could be cited. Both I and American scientists dealing with such problems could be accused of primitivism. I accept this criticism. However, without primitivism, without dry schematism and purely superficial analogies, it is impossible to develop a situational model. It is precisely such a process of primitivization that developed in the mind of a peasant weather forecaster. Nonetheless, he frequently does his work with enviable success. Today many methods which are used by such a forecaster can be scientifically substantiated.

Even such grotesque examples would allow the reader to sense that in order to model global problems we must lift psychological barriers in our minds and temporarily

assume an "irrational" viewpoint and look at socioeconomic processes away from standard "sensible" concepts, the way physicists were distracted from the classical foundations of their science by creating the quantum theory. Subsequently, once again they assumed a rational position in order to find the real laws.

In solving specific local problems already now mathematical modeling could be exceptionally useful. We cannot give examples here of complex mathematical models (such as those used in mathematical economics, decision making, expert evaluations, and so on) which could provide fully satisfactory projections. However, unless we use them in solving basic local problems we would get nowhere.

I sincerely hope that scientists, who were given mandates as USSR people's deputies, will actively participate in the drafting of laws and legal acts which will define life in our society. It is their duty to use the entire arsenal of means offered by contemporary science. However, they must also be fully answerable to their electorate, should the scientific level of their developments prove to be lower than the level of the study of natural laws and their technical implementation.

Even this short text clearly shows how difficult are the problems which must be dealt with by our deputies. They alone, whatever their specialty may be, will not cope with such problems. I believe that it will be necessary to develop a mechanism which would make it possible to include highly qualified experts in the humanities, as well as mathematicians, cybernetists, programmers, and so on. They would help them to secure a proper scientific standard of the documents and accurately to anticipate the way their resolutions will influence social life.

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## PAGES FROM HISTORY

### October 1964. Change or Coup?

905b0004L Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 92-101

[Article by Yelena Yuryevna Zubkova, candidate of historical sciences, scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of USSR History]

[Text] The events of October 1964, and the removal of N.S. Khrushchev from the position of CPSU Central Committee first secretary and USSR Council of Ministers chairman, remain wrapped in a kind of mysterious halo. Only recent publications have provided us, for the first time, offered the rare opportunity to roam around the labyrinths of the intrigues related to these events and to glance at the secret behind the screened political games and the mores of their participants. Meanwhile, as in the past, the main question remains unanswered: What was behind the change of leadership 25 years ago:

was it a coup at the top or the beginning of a new turn? Was Khrushchev's resignation the logical consequence of his policies or was there an arbitrary interference by conservative forces in the natural course of the historical process?

It is common knowledge that Khrushchev's policies were by no means consistent and whole: they varied not only under the influence of objective circumstances but also as Khrushchev himself rose in the ranks of political leadership. The higher and the more independent became the status of the first secretary, the heavier became the influence of his own views on political decisions making.

The tendency of dividing his "rule" into "before" and "after" the 22nd Party Congress has been noted in the recently published memoirs of Khrushchev's contemporaries and in a number of history works. Although such a trend reflects, in a certain sense, the actual evolution of Khrushchev's policies, it nonetheless contains an element of major simplification. It is found mainly in the attempts to link the so-called "final period" in Khrushchev's activities with phenomena related to the purely personal features which determined the nature of the leader's behavior at that time. Such considerations are by no means new, for let us recall the interpretation which had been given by the end of the 1950s to the origins of the cult of Stalin, referring to the "last period" in his activities, allegedly also influenced by "character flaws."

Unquestionably, there is a strong temptation to supply a psychological substantiation to the political errors committed by one leader or another. However, if we limit ourselves to this, inevitably there arises the very simple (and just as unconvincing) explanation of the fact that in the life of our political leaders, be they Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev, almost mystical "final years" appear with striking regularity, in the course of which the country finds itself rapidly sliding toward the precipice of crisis. Actually, the "final years" phenomenon is backed by entirely objective processes determined by the exhaustion of the possibility of a specific stage in the life of the country with its specific type of management, a way of thinking and a type of political action. To understand this we must analyze the situation which had gradually developed by October 1964.

In one of his public speeches in 1960, in summing up the main result of the previous 7 years of work, Khrushchev said: "We not only criticized the shortcomings of the past but also carried out the type of restructuring which could be described, without exaggeration, as revolutionary in managing and directing all areas of economic and cultural construction." He also said that "...we, at the Central Committee Presidium, are quite pleased with the situation which has currently developed in the party and the country. The situation is quite good!" Such was the view of the leader of the country. But what did the people think on the same subject?

Unfortunately, we do not always have sociological data which would give us a more or less adequate picture of public opinion by the turn of the 1960s. Nonetheless, although in most general terms, this is both possible and necessary. Knowledge of what the people thought and spoke about—not in official situations but among themselves—sometimes provides incomparably more knowledge in understanding the problems and nature of the age than the text of one resolution or another. It was roughly at that time, while Khrushchev was assuring his countrymen that finally a “very good situation” had developed in the country, that a curious letter reached KOMMUNIST, the author of which (who signed himself K. Gay from Drogobych) described the most frequent critical remarks about the party’s leadership, heard in the course of daily discussions among people. Following is the somewhat abridged text of this letter:

“N.S. Khrushchev... describes our leaders as ‘servants of the people,’ which is the equivalent of calling black that which is white.... It is always the master who pays the servant and it is the master who sets the wages. In our country the situation is reversed. The terribly broad closed circle of government and local leaders, who consider themselves geniuses, opposing the rest of the people, have awarded themselves huge salaries and are afraid of allowing people to set the wages of managers or to choose managers.... Why conceal from the voters the salaries earned by the deputies and what deputy has been in favor of or has disapproved such a salary.... The program of the Yugoslav communists may be freely read by anyone who so wishes, and mystery novels are being translated from all languages. Meanwhile, the publication of the small program of the party members (although erring) is kept hidden.... The courts should have more jurors than assessors. You must trust the people and involve them in the management of the country and the solution of public affairs.... Hold referenda.... The people want a lowering of prices. This has not taken place for a few years.... At least on the surface, our leaders should look more like working people than the bourgeois.... There should be less praising of the present on the radio and in the press and there should be more calls for future developments. There was a cult not only of Stalin’s personality and this was not his fault alone; it was also a cult of the majority of the leaders. Yet it is they who are in the saddle....” (Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism, f. 599, op. 1, d. 211, sheets 1-3).

To one extent or another a characteristic “photograph” of public opinion appears from such scattered views, indicating the “sore spots” of the reality which was felt particularly sharply on the level of the ordinary awareness. Naturally, there have always been malcontents. It is equally obvious that any whatsoever serious restructuring will not result in quick improvements in the situation of the people and, furthermore, at any given stage could result in a temporary decline in the living standard. Nonetheless, the critical assessments expressed in this letter show not only a skeptical attitude but,

rather, a real social problem, and an injured feeling of social justice, which has always been an accurate indicator of the mood in society. It is precisely by taking this into consideration that one must decide the extent to which claims and concern were substantiated and what was merely a simplistic interpretation of the principles of socialist distribution or lack of understanding of the features of the time. Therefore, whose views, those of the “uppers” or of a certain segment of the “lower strata” were consistent with the real state of affairs in Soviet society of that period, and what triggered optimism in some and skepticism in others?

Let us address ourselves to the specific experience of the turn of the 1960s. A major reorganization in the management of the national economy had been completed which, in its first stage, had been unquestionably successful. A new 7-year plan had been approved. Scientific development was being accelerated and preparations were being made for the appearance of man in space. Political life within the country had been stabilized: the critical wave was clearly abating and the question of the struggle against the cult of personality which, in its time, had provided an impetus for social activeness, was being raised ever less frequently. In 1959 preparations for the publication of the secret Khrushchev report at the 20th Party Congress was halted at the imposition stage: if there was no Stalin there was no cult of personality and the debunking of the “antiparty group” could easily be presented as the final note in the struggle against the “Stalinists.”

A new public initiative—the movement for communist labor—was gathering strength in the country. It was “recognizable,” for it was developing within the customary traditions of socialist competition and, consequently, seemed preferable to the spontaneous set of meetings which had preceded it. The organizing principle of this movement was quite soon adopted by the propaganda system and became the foundation for its mass spreading. On the upper levels, however, the new possibilities of this movement failed to be assessed properly: this was one of the reasons for which, following a temporary upsurge, it found itself back into the traditional bed of formalism.

The international situation as well was not as yet instilling any particular fears. Conversely, there had been a certain stabilization of the situation in Western Europe and the world was following the national-liberation struggle in Africa and revolutionary events in Cuba. The scale of the future conflict with China was still unclear to the overwhelming majority of people. In general, the situation both within the country and abroad, at that precise time, could be considered grounds for a certain optimism, although with one condition: providing that this situation could be taken as permanent or able to develop only from good to better.

Meanwhile, any unprejudiced analysis of the situation in the country indicated that it was fraught with serious difficulties. Gradually the forecasts of those who were

warning about the limited nature of the approaches of the apparat to the reorganization of management practices and who had been able to see the errors of the sovnarkhoz reform, were being fulfilled. The restructuring of management had eliminated some of the existing contradictions, but the main among them had remained. The old principle of allocating raw materials and finished products had been preserved and, therefore, so was the nature of relations between producers and consumers: again and again the "abnormal" economic situation of demand being determined by supply was being duplicated. Economic instruments were not functioning. It was impossible to use the traditional pressure from above in ensuring stable economic growth, although specific figures of economic development, as stipulated by the party program, were precisely oriented toward supporting the pace of economic growth which had been achieved by the end of the 1950s, ignoring the fluctuation of events and the possibilities at the basic economic level.

An entire array of economic, social, political and moral problems came to the surface with the discussion of the draft program and party statutes, which developed on the eve of the 22nd CPSU Congress. Most of them were concentrated in the area which determines the relationship between the people and the government. The suppression of criticism and the loss of democratic mood in social life, naturally, did not remain unnoticed. The clear possibility of people losing their positions, made clear at the 20th Party Congress, raised the question of seeking guarantees for the irreversibility of the initiated reforms. Judging by the letters to the editors at that time, guarantees against recurrences of the cult of personality were seen above all in eliminating the alienation existing between the public and the authorities. In particular, to this effect, it was suggested to limit the term of holding leading party and state offices and strictly to control the observance of the principles of social justice. The ideas of party maximum and state maximum were actively discussed. Many participants in the pre-congress debate were seriously concerned with the rising social differentiation in society and the broadening of the social stratum which was clearly living beyond its means. In these signals one could detect a dangerous symptom of a future "diseases," which appeared in their full magnitude later, in the 1970s. However, at that time the danger was still not properly assessed and was conceived in terms of the customary concept of "vestiges of the past." Hence the ways and means of struggle against "vestiges" were kept as a whole within the old traditions of attacks mounted on "private ownership."

The difficulties and problems which existed at that time were to be compensated with the idea of the communist future. What specifically did Khrushchev have in mind by promising that communism will be built during the life of a single generation of Soviet people? "It is not a question of the word 'communism,'" he said in explaining his views. "We are aspiring to a better life, to the most beautiful life on earth, so that man can live

without want and always have the kind of job he likes, and not be concerned about the future.... To live beautifully and nobly and not simply to exist and waste his time."

If we indeed ignore the word "communism," this was a program which would hardly have had any opponents. In this case, however, the "word" was not impartial. The target it set not only attracted but also suppressed, forcing the solution of many problems not from the viewpoint of timeliness and expediency but "in a communist fashion," in accordance with the concepts of communism which had become established at that time. In turn, usually these concepts could not go beyond the level of general discussions of equality, abundance and collectivism. There were those who were ready for the immediate "introduction" of communism through the "collectivization" of the way of life and the struggle against "dacha capitalism" and the creation of various types of "communes." Suggestions were being made of organizing at some plant a "small experimental communist society" and a conversion to a new time count, based on a communist era calendar.... (from a letter to the editors of *KOMMUNIST* of that time, kept at the Central Party Archive).

Such ideas which, one would think, could have been born only in the minds of the characters of Andrey Platonov and codified in the postulates of "war communism," could nonetheless hardly be considered accidental echoes of the past. The link between periods here is closer and clearer: with the help of the "genetic code" of the 1920s, transmitted from generation to generation, the optimism in the first years of the revolution, belief in the immediacy and attainability of major objectives, were inherited along with a specific way of action aimed at implementing these objectives. This was always manifested in the prevalent trend less to build than to establish (or even better, to decree) "the most equitable society," guided primarily by that same slogan of universal equality. Decades later, this trend was still appearing as a major obstacle on the way to constructive political decisions.

The system of such "restrictions" operated everywhere—on all levels of formulation and execution of state policy. Actually, the course toward accelerated progress toward communism indicated the real obstacles which hindered a sober assessment of the situation to a much greater extent than the familiar slogan of "nothing stands in our way." An objective "limit of changes" exists for each period of time, changes which could be made on the basis of the existing conditions for their implementation. However, under the influence of objective "restrictions" they could be conceived as being both significantly reduced or expanded. In the former case, corrections are frequently made in reforms from above. The latter case occurs when the broad masses become involved in the process of social change, carried away by a not entirely realistic but a socially significant objective. However, despite the different trends pursued by the initial concepts, in both cases the danger remains one



and the same: the fact that the potential of social renovation will not be utilized to its fullest extent.

In determining the social experience of the 1950s and 1960s it is important not only to take into consideration the objectively limited nature of the starting level of the planned changes (which, for example, made clearly unrealistic the programmatic deadlines for laying the material and technical foundations for communism) but also the need to see other "restrictions," under the influence of which what was objectively unrealistic was conceived as entirely attainable, based on a particular mental set. If we look at the way of thinking of that period as a whole, we can easily note a type of perception of both present and future which acted as a philosophical or else an artistic principle, as well as an overall system of organization and functioning of social awareness (both ordinary and theoretical). For that reason, at that time we were dealing not with a concept of socialism but rather with an image of socialism which had been impressed in the minds of the leaders and cultivated in the awareness of the masses. Unlike theory, which is both concrete and dynamic, an image develops as a result of the combination of symbols, quite static and practically unchanging.

State ownership, kolkhozes and huge industrial enterprises were conceived as the symbols of socialism and its "recognition marks." The system of socialist social relations and the mechanism of the functioning of socialism as a political system were kept outside the limits of such a structured image. Is it amazing that it is precisely these questions that turned out to be the most unexplainable in the theoretical developments and in practical recommendations? All political and economic decisions and their results were being constantly correlated with the existing model of socialism. The questions of its improvements were necessarily part of the agenda. However, no change was to disrupt the streamline nature of the conceived image. Therefore, whereas commodity-monetary relations somehow managed to make their way (it is true, in the form of a forced concession with mandatory mention that, in any case, they would wither away if not today then tomorrow), it took a long time for the feeling of ownership to earn the right of being "socialist."

Khrushchev was quite impressed by the very idea of changes, reorganizations and improvements. At the November 1962 Central Committee Plenum he expressed himself in the sense that redoing and restructuring would have to be done repeatedly and that organization "will give us a great deal of experience, a large number of steps and frequent redoing." Nonetheless, subsequently Khrushchev acknowledged that neither he nor the party leadership as a whole were ready for radical changes, for which reason they always "sensed their way," feeling the pressure of psychological and ideological factors of the Stalinist legacy. What could the results of a "mass of redoings" be when there was no program for radical action?

As a rule, a new political course does not come ready-made, even less so with its specific developments. A preparatory stage is needed. This stage is always limited and sometimes extremely compressed and in periods of crises, it is frequently entirely absent. However, if history nonetheless offers the opportunity for a "running start," it also gives the right to experiment and improvise, in the course of which the overall concept as well as the details of the future restructuring become apparent. The improvisational nature of politics at that period is more a pattern than an accident or even less so the result of ill will or errors caused by arbitrariness. Arbitrariness begins where the methods of influencing the economy and other aspects of social life, objectively acceptable during transitional stages, become a permanent feature in political leadership. In any case, there always is a threshold beyond which insufficiently conceived and frequently alternating reorganizations bring a major threat of instability, a lowering of living standards and social guarantees.

The realistic time limit based on following the path of partial changes and improvements had already been reached by the mid-1960s. The task which arose then was that of ensuring a radical turn in the organization of the country's economic, political and spiritual life, determined by the dominant feature of social development. Could Khrushchev's policy be consistent with this dominant feature? This question must become the center of the current debates concerning the events of 1964.

Was it necessary to "remove" Khrushchev or not? This question stems from the previous one. Khrushchev had a chance of restructuring his policy, of making it more stable and purposeful. This chance remained unused, reminding of its existence only through isolated efforts of converting to a scientific foundation of management and the initiation of an economic discussion as well as scattered attempts at self-management and the use of nontraditional forms of labor organization.

However, the time limit granted Khrushchev for the "running start," was already exhausted, as had been his own political opportunities and experience. His positive program proved undeveloped, and constructive activities, both in terms of scope and results, yielded to the critical-cleansing process which developed in the mid-1950s. Beyond that decade another time was beginning, a time of different decisions, different approaches to politics, management and economics, for the implementation of which the baggage of old knowledge and previous experience was clearly too small. Khrushchev was unable to cross this threshold which, precisely, was the nature of his personal drama. However, it was soon to become clear that the entire society as well had stopped at that same threshold. At this point we go beyond the framework of the "individual theme" and come across a phenomenon the name for which was found significantly later—"stagnation."

The political course which was inaugurated with the resolutions of 1964 was based on a revision of

approaches to the implementation of the reform, approaches which had failed to prove themselves in the past. It is important to note in this connection that initially the attitude toward previous experience was not based on a position of absolute rejection which, in itself, is quite convenient when it comes to ascribing all "sins" to the "period of arbitrariness" and starting the new project "with a clean slate." The task was formulated differently. "In some cases, when obvious errors were committed," one of the materials published in PRAVDA read, and which, to some extent, could be considered of a programmatic nature, "in order to correct the situation it would suffice to return to the former proven forms. In other cases, however, things are more difficult. It would be erroneous, without studying the results of practical experience, simply to go back to the previous forms of management. Some hasty reorganizations... should not be replaced by equally hasty other reorganizations" (PRAVDA, 6 December 1964).

This position determined approaches to practical policy, based on three main ideas: 1. A turn toward science in the management of society; 2. Development of socialist democracy, which also included social self-management; 3. Relieving the party from noninherent functions while, at the same time, concentrating party work on problems of political leadership. A characteristic detail is noteworthy: the very process of renovation and perestroika even on the level of ideas turned out virtually unrelated to any whatsoever essential basic changes. The concept of renovation, limited to the superstructure, was essentially sterile, for without laying an adequate foundation for restructuring the entire system of production relations, it turned into the usual pious wish. The economic reform, which was initiated slightly later, equally failed to stretch the limits of the existing economic structure, blocked in its development by the dominant paradigm of noncommodity socialism.

The suggested ideas could not be described as radical. Nonetheless, the vector of the movement they defined should have been preferentially directed toward the real implementation of the program. The program turned out to be much more moderate perhaps for the sole reason that a significant part of it was oriented toward the restoration of the old forms of political and economic organization. From almost the very beginning, the "moderate" line became predominant. However, it did not win immediately. The possibility of "further building" on the adopted concept and the intensification of the overall political course was retained for a while.

The implementation of this possibility encountered major obstacles, not only political but psychological as well. The point was that after the failure of Khrushchev's reorganizing activities, a characteristic "fatigue syndrome" appeared in society, caused by the changes, and an inclination toward having stabler forms of life. As a result, when the need for a radical turn arose, society proved psychologically unprepared for it: the emotional "explosion," which usually is the foundation of the initial stage of any restructuring did not take place.

Actually, such an "explosion" had not been "planned," for the new reformers were structuring, as in the past, their program without any whatsoever essential reliance on initiative from below. This situation predetermined the special role of the center in all subsequent events, making the outcome of the reform dependent on the deployment of forces on the higher level of leadership.

What forces assumed power after Khrushchev's resignation? On the higher level of management the members of the "third generation" of Soviet leaders definitively strengthened their positions. The initial upsurge in their careers was, one way or another, related to the "cadre revolution" of the end of the 1930s, when the new apparat took shape, replacing the old, which had become substantially thinned after 1937. These people had crossed the main stages of their establishment within the Stalinist system. They were the backbone of the generation of "apparatchiks," raised as the result of Stalin's purposeful cadre policy. Some corrections in the principles of this policy had been made by the war. However, the cadre purge of the end of the 1940s and beginning of 1950s, which was aimed straight at the "new apparat," quickly came full circle. No profound sociological thinking is necessary to clarify the obvious: the very conditions which governed the shaping of the generation of party leaders who came to power in the country in the mid-1960s already assigned to its radical segment the position of "absolute minority." Together with Khrushchev, the political arena was abandoned by a particular generation of managers who were also apparatchiks but of a special kind. They were "fighters," and "party soldiers," as A. Bek had once described them. The position of the "fighters" was filled by the "performers," people who were almost totally unaccustomed to making independent decisions and assuming responsibility and to whom the double morality standard had become a virtual standard of life, and the contradiction between words and actions a usual condition for their existence. Therefore, when the time for making responsible decisions came, most of the then leadership proved to be simply unprepared to make them. This initially determined the halfway nature of the policy of the new leadership.

The idea of the long term and gradual improvement of socialism and of attaining a new quality on the basis of systematic evolutionary changes became the pivot of the new political course. The policy of social improvisation was to surrender its position to the policy of considered and scientifically substantiated decisions. However, here a contradiction was included: a course toward stability under certain conditions could be easily replaced with stagnation, the more so since the objectively existing threat of such a substitution was intensified by the effect of the subjective factor: the lack of a reliable set of instruments for social management under normal conditions. Having proclaimed at the 23rd Party Congress a conversion from the practice of partial improvements to the formulation of long-term comprehensive programs, the political leadership undertook the implementation of

such programs without becoming seriously concerned with their proper tactical support and specific incentives which would ensure support of the plans from below.

The study of the public mood in the second half of the 1960s reveals a rather variegated picture of interests and orientations. At the same time, let us note the strengthening of extreme positions and radical shades of public opinion, a kind of reaction to the unfulfilled expectations of the previous years and the insufficiently decisive, as it seemed, steps of the new leadership. Increasing support was enjoyed by the promoters of exceptional measures, who called for seeking a solution to the difficulties in a "revolutionary" way. From below there was a revival of the idea of a "party purge;" the latest measures in the struggle against bureaucratism, represented by the apparat (which, as in the past, was conceived as one of the main sources of all "evils") bogged down and once again made the idea of "cadre revolutions" particularly "attractive." Feelings in favor of bringing order in a "revolutionary" way were widespread in the social area as well, where they concentrated in equalization desires for a "great redivision," in terms of income, amount of personal property or housing.

It was thus that in the public awareness of that time (particularly on its ordinary level) a very complex symbiosis of conflicting moods developed. Its dominant was the aspiration toward stability, the achievement of which was considered, however, not through a gradual restructuring of the foundations of political and economic life but a "revolutionary" intervention "from above" into the course of social processes. Such a combination of prevalent moods was inevitably bound to enhance the gravitation toward a "firm hand" which, as many believed, could protect the people from the omnipotence of the bureaucracy and increasing social inequality. The feeling of self-preservation of the administrative-command system and the democratic "base" laid by the preceding reforms did not allow, at that time, this trend to develop to its fullest extent. Throughout the 1960s, however, it nonetheless made itself felt as a political reality, supported from both above and below. Possibly, considering the threat of the restoration of the "firm hand" as the greatest evil, the democratic social forces "lost" the moment when the "moderates" had definitively come to power, people unwilling to engage in any kind of radical changes. As a result of the compromise within the leadership, a situation developed in which the "Brezhnev variant," initially conceived as transitional, assumed features of stability and became an organic part of the power structure of the nomenclatural oligarchy.

A certain turning away from democratic traditions was already noted as early as 1966, when the corresponding corrections were made in the principles governing the organization of political and, above all, party life (the 23rd CPSU Congress made "partial changes" in the party statutes, eliminating even the insignificant achievements which had been reached in 1961). It is thus that actually the "turning back" was structured. The positive inertia of previous changes continued to operate

only in parts of the economic course, marked by the 1965 economic reform. However, the changed political situation in the country substantially narrowed the possibility of the development of the reform which, subsequently, was entirely stopped. A process which could be described as a "sliding reaction," developed, and whose symptoms were gradually manifested in a great variety of areas of social life.

A change in the political course took place by the turn of the 1970s. The period of the balance of forces ended and the possibility of any further progress toward a democratic society, which was one of the trends of the 1964 turn, was actually blocked. The efforts to convert from an authoritarian to a democratic type of management, which had determined the essence of the processes of social development in the 1950s and 1960s, ended as a whole in failure although the impetus provided by the 20th Congress was not eliminated. The political structure of Soviet society, which developed at the end of the 1960s, was not only far removed from real democracy but was also different from the authoritarian system which is crowned by a personal regime. What had actually taken place?

Reality indicated that the "elimination" of a personal regime with its ideological "cult" dressing was significantly simpler than ensuring a real replacement of this regime with another power mechanism which could support a relative political and economic stability. The structure and nature of the power, in the final account, are reflected in the principle of ties between managers and the masses. Under the conditions of a personal regime (according to some researchers) this connection ends with the "leader," who acts as the necessary balance, the "coordinator" of the interests of the administrative apparatus and the masses. This variant of ties guarantees the fast making of political decisions, which is particularly important in coming out of situations of crises. However, the subjectivism of the "leader" in the absence of sufficiently reliable channels through which society can influence realpolitik does not make it possible promptly to determine the "sensitive areas" and to prevent crises (instead of neglecting them), thus increasing the likelihood that the wrong decisions will be made. Such costs of authoritarianism are eliminated only with a conversion to a democratic type of management, in which society gains the opportunity to influence the views of its leaders and to control the work of the apparat.

Despite the vector of advance toward democracy he had chosen, in terms of his political standards and determining way of thinking and acting, N.S. Khrushchev nonetheless gravitated toward an authoritarian type of management. Unlike Stalin, he merely created his own image of the "leader," which may have been accessible and democratic but, nonetheless, was one of a "leader." From the viewpoint of the pragmatic task of the exercise of power, the "people's leader" proved to be weaker than his terrible predecessor perhaps for the reason alone that, having taken a step toward liberalization, he had lost the

function of "supreme controller." He advanced no further, limiting himself to halfway measures in the struggle against bureaucracy and in the implementation of the democratic reform. The "supreme arbiter" became a political middleman, who tried to balance various interests but lacked for this purpose a reliable tool with which to maintain a stable balance. Hence the constant attempts made by Khrushchev to emerge out of his intermediary position either through the latest "tightening up of the screws" or temporarily easing and brief "thaws."

One way or another, with the departure of Khrushchev from our political scene so did the "leadership" model of the regime. The democratic "stratum" in the 1960s needed, in turn, substantial reinforcements before becoming the foundation for the development of an essentially different structure and organization of the system. The vacuum which had formed was filled by the administrative-command system.

Clearly, the turn which was taken in the mid-1960s was not able to ensure to the fullest extent the depth of changes which would have raised our society to a qualitatively new level. The only thing which could have been realistically expected at that time would have been to ensure the "open" nature of the initiated process while retaining the opportunity (using temporary solutions and making the necessary compromises) for "further development" of the society in the future. As was confirmed by the changes which were made in the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, however, it was precisely this task which proved to be the most difficult to accomplish.

Any transitional process with a constantly changing balance of forces and interests demands a complex and flexible management mechanism. If the danger of losing control over it appears (as a result of external or internal complications), the temptation arises to "stretch" the process to a stage of completion or even simply to "close it down," to stop it. The instability itself of the transitional process somehow leads the controlling center toward such actions: at that point the new quality of the turn can be attained by an effort of the will. The stabilization of the process, as a rule, becomes possible as a result of relying not on the progressive but on the conservative trend as being the most stable and economically and politically secured. In that case the outcome of the turn becomes the precise opposite of the officially proclaimed objectives, which leads to its consideration on an entirely different level, as a political coup.

Such type of coups are "made to fit" the objective dominant of renovation, taking place as though under its cover, and sanctified by its objectives and ideas. Speculating on the slogans of social restructuring, it replaces the coup and gives a new form to the conservative content, doing so without the use of visible force or diktat or other exceptional measures. The events which followed October 1964 could be considered a classical example of such a "peaceful" coup.

The result was the beginning of a new stage in the country's life, which took it to the threshold of a crisis which is so clearly felt by all of us to this day.

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## CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### Recovery

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[Article by Sergey Vladimirovich Kolesnikov and Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Shashkov, contributors to KOMMUNIST]

[Text] *The Cambodian people are at a turning point in their history. On the initiative of its leadership, the State of Cambodia is making efforts to lead the country on the path of national reconciliation, tolerance and realism. The problems of settling the conflict which had complicated the situation in the area for quite some time are in the focal point of attention of the International Conference on Cambodia. What is taking place today in this greatly suffering country and what is the life of the people who are now straightening up after the terrible years of genocide are things described by KOMMUNIST correspondents who recently visited Cambodia.*

Here, where 11 or 12 years ago efforts were made to kill anything that lived, to this day any kind of stereotypes and ordinary measures remain unacceptable. Once again women wear brightly colored skirts and blouses, and fashionable hats. Once again there is rice in the peasant homes. Motion theaters and concert halls are packed. A rural holiday will be celebrated by travelers on Route 1—until recently considered very dangerous—with multicolored little pennants, and dances and disguises, and greetings delivered with megaphones. Although it was only in the middle of May that curfew was lifted in Pnom-Penh, in the little restaurants along the Mekong River, until late one could hear music and young people having fun. Once again cities have become cities. At each crossroad in the capital and in other towns and settlements dozens of little tables and stands under canopies, offering the passers-by an abundance of various fruits, pieces of broiled meat and fish, as well as beer, cool beverages and cigarettes from the most famous companies in the world. Next to the booths are more substantial commercial stores: there are stands selling JVC video recorders, competing with stores selling similar goods produced by Sony and Phillips. Dozens of models of watches of brands familiar on the world market are being offered, ranging from Seiko to Omega. They are surrounded by numerous people who, it is true, are mostly not customers but are merely looking over the expensive goods. Most frequently they pass by on their bicycles and Peugeot and Honda mopeds, which are quite fashionable and prestigious. There are large numbers of wide-eyed,

curious and, which is important, well-fed youngsters. Once again families have become families and rarely are there families with less than three children.

Naturally, the situation in the country is far from being idyllic. However, one cannot fail to be amazed at the fast recovery of these people who, the moment they are no longer threatened by the ghost of death by hunger or a blow at the head with the handle of a hoe! One unwittingly thinks of the great vital power of the human species, which can heal even the most terrible wounds and of the tremendous efforts made by the people's regime which was able to revive and already largely direct the country's life into a normal channel.

### Without Anticipating

This year is special to Cambodia. Last January marked the 10th anniversary of the overthrow of the bloody Pol Pot-Yeng Sari Regime. The years of their barbaric rule cost the lives of 3 million people, threw the country several decades back in its economic and cultural development and, essentially, led it on the path of national catastrophe. All of this has been repeatedly described, including in our own journal, for which reason we shall not repeat ourselves. Let us merely point out that the material and spiritual consequences of the arbitrary rule of this barbaric clique and its policy of genocide are being felt to this day. Occasionally, this takes place in most surprising ways.

During the numerous encounters and talks we had in various departments and establishments, a number of women participated on the Cambodian side. Intelligent, talented and nice and, as a rule, unmarried, they did not conceal the fact that they dreamed of having families. Perhaps this may not seem all that serious or worthy of theoretical summations. However, this is only on the surface. A member of our group, a single girl, directly asked Mali Nguon, an official with the international department of the NRPK Central Committee, who graduated from the MGIMO a few years ago, why was it that many Khmer women were not married. It turned out that Mali, who is a beautiful woman, had lost most of her relatives and parents and herself had miraculously survived the years of genocide, had also been unable to find a husband so far. The point is that after 4 years of the Pol Pot experiment 80 percent of the population consists of women and children. It is thus that the genocide of the past prevents the appearance of the shoots of a new life today.

Nonetheless, the Cambodian people survived. The results of the 10 year development of the country, summed up at the 2nd All-Cambodian Party Conference, which was held last April, are impressive. This conference, we were told by Keo Chutima, deputy head of the Department of Propaganda and Education of the NRPK Central Committee, was one of the most important political events of 1989. It was pointed out at the conference that in the past period the problem of the country's defense had been resolved. The First 5-Year

Plan for Cambodian socioeconomic development is being successfully implemented, particularly in agriculture. Whereas no more than 565,000 tons of rice were harvested in 1979, the 1988 harvest totaled 2.7 million tons. The cattle herds have been rebuilt, compared to their highest indicators reached in the 1960s. All of this made it possible to eliminate once and for all the threat of hunger and to stabilize the socioeconomic situation. Already 41,500 of the more than 50,000 hectares in rubber plantations are yielding latex. As a result, last year 31,000 tons of dry natural rubber were produced, which made it possible not only to ensure the country's domestic needs for raw materials but also to export rubber. The production of jute, tobacco and other export crops increased, thanks to which the country earned foreign currency which it needs so urgently for its development. The volume of foreign trade, compared with 1981, had tripled by 1988 and had increased by yet another 10 percent in the first quarter of 1989 compared with the same period last year.

In our view, one of the noticeable features in today's Cambodian development is a kind of "deideologization" of economic policy. The economic managers did not begin to wait until ready-made prescriptions would show up as to what is "socialist" and what is not and what could be done and what could not. Despite the shortage of cadres (the first graduating class of 99 young economists completed their training at the Pnom-Penh Economics Institute only at the start of last June), a daring experiment was initiated here, governed simply by common sense. Naturally, however, this also took into consideration the negative experience and errors, including those committed in foreign countries.

Although not immediately, but nonetheless in time Cambodia reached the view that the vitally important task of feeding the people and saturating the market with foodstuffs and consumer goods had to be solved by all possible means and quickly, and only then consider how to reconcile the old customary systems with the newly developing qualitatively different economic practices. To this effect they had to begin with the renovation of the countryside and the strengthening of the peasant families. Even before the proclamation of the current policy of national conciliation, the country's leadership had taken rather important steps to create prerequisites which would give the public system a multipolar nature in the political area and a mixed economic system. Five years ago, at the conference of the People's Revolutionary Party, a special program was adopted to encourage private enterprise in the economy. Subsequently, on the basis of this resolution the conversion of the land to private ownership was legislatively codified, including the right of inheritance, the privatization of trade and many others.

Four years ago, at the 5th National-Revolutionary Party Congress, the political line of the party was corrected. In particular, an effort was made to eliminate the element of "anticipation," which had been inherent in its previous course. For the sake of fairness let us note that

these elements appeared largely under the influence of the respective theoretical development of Cambodian friends in some fraternal parties, including the CPSU. At its last congress, the People's Revolutionary Party reached the basic conclusion to the effect that the country was still at the stage of a people's democratic revolution. Efforts at immediately "converting to the building of socialism" were considered premature. The growth of the people's democratic revolution into a socialist revolution will necessitate decades, it was pointed out at the congress, for it is necessary to solve the problems of the revival of the nation, the rebuilding of the economy, the elimination of the consequences of genocide and the creation of prerequisites and conditions for a gradual conversion to socialism. At the April 1989 conference these important theoretical conclusions were further developed and expanded, after which substantial changes were made in the Constitution.

**From the interview given by Hun Sen, Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Politburo member and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the State of Cambodia, to the journal KOMMUNIST:**

"The 2nd All-Cambodian Party Conference, which was held recently, passed a number of important resolutions and defined the present stage of the Cambodian Revolution as being people's democratic. Along with a revision of the revolutionary stage, we formulated a new political course, the objectives of which reflect the specifics of the new, flexible and broad struggle waged by the party. Specifically, five targets were set. First, in terms of land use and political objectives concerning the peasantry, the organization of agricultural production on the basis of cooperatives, the development of petty industry and artisan crafts and private transportation. Today we can already say that these targets are being optimistically viewed by the cadre personnel and the members of the party, the public and the entire nation. They are contributing to the growth of confidence in the party's leadership, which has always guided society and the state in accordance with the real situation prevailing in the country, the traditions of the people, the present overall situation in the world, and for the good of the cause of peace, independence, national conciliation, and the justice and happiness of our people.

"As a whole, we can assess the situation as follows: taking into consideration our military potential, we are able to push the enemy into an impasse to an even greater extent both domestically and on the international arena, for all the steps which proceed from our political and economic changes are having a great influence on public opinion in the world and clearly indicate the constant aspiration of the State of Cambodia to achieve the well-being and blossoming of its people and society.

"Unquestionably, the socioeconomic and ideological changes can be successful only if based on political reform. We realize that politics, economics and ideology are closely interrelated and that this connection is unbreakable. Furthermore, the revolutionary process in

Cambodia is in its national-democratic stage and the people themselves determine the need for revising and correcting the political objectives and the various governmental laws which are inconsistent with the real situation, formulated by the party and the government. On the other hand, our society is following the path of national conciliation and it is only the National Assembly that can determine the need for political reform and for a discussion and correction of the basic laws of the Cambodian State, based on the Constitution, and thus contribute to the steady and qualitative development of the Cambodian Revolution in the forthcoming years.

"In this connection, allow me to discuss briefly the nature of the amendments to the Constitution. Chapter I of the Constitution stipulates that the official title of the independent, sovereign, territorially integral, peaceful, democratic, neutral and nonaligned Cambodia is the 'State of Cambodia'. I would also like to quote Article 10, which stipulates that this status is the objective of the foreign policy of the Cambodian State, the government of which is steadily promoting the principle of peaceful coexistence and developing relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries regardless of their political system, on the basis of equality, and respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual advantages, for the good of the defense of peace in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. As you can see, there is no equivocation whatsoever in this case."

The Constitution codifies the role of the National Revolutionary Party as the leading and guiding force of Cambodian society. However, the formulation concerning the progress of the country on the way to socialism has been deleted from the Fundamental Law. Anticipating the questions which our readers may ask in this connection, we asked our friends from the People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee to comment on this change. To begin with, they explained to us, the old formulation was an obvious attempt to present a distant prospect as though happening today. This is the main reason for which it has been deleted from the present Constitution. Second, Pol Pot's throat-cutters, as we know, made extensive use of Marxist-Leninist terminology. Sad though it might be, to this day many peasants, particularly in the remote areas, become fearful when hearing words such as "dictatorship of the proletariat" or "socialism." As they killed others, the Pol Pot people shouted that this was necessary for "the building of socialism." Such is our legacy. What is this, a terrible distortion and denigration of the socialist idea? It is more than that. Above all, it is an insult to human dignity, the denigration of life to suit dogmatic concepts of the ideal of equality in poverty. National accord presumes respect for every citizen, including the possibility of forgiving those who were misled, those who, only yesterday, were hiding in the forests with automatic rifles, attacking peaceful villages. Is this abstract humanism? No, it is rather a very specific, a realistic approach to the rebirth of the nation which suffered so

greatly in the course of a 4-year period of "ideological" genocide. That is what makes legitimate a change in state symbols as well—in the anthem, the seal and the flag. The uncompromising red flag is now "tempered" by a blue stripe and both colors are combined in the golden silhouette of the legendary temple of Angkor Wat.

Taking into consideration the fact that 80 percent of the population is Buddhist, the renovated Constitution includes the stipulation that Buddhism is "recognized as the state religion." This proves that the parliament, the country's leadership and the People's Revolutionary Party, proceeding from the most vital tasks, and displaying readiness for compromise, are energetically working for national reconciliation. It would be pertinent to note at this point that earlier the Council of Ministers had passed a directive on humane policy toward individuals who would stop their struggle against the people's regime. Its essence was the idea which was proclaimed 200 years ago in the Paris Convention: "Mercy is also a revolutionary measure." What was its effect in Cambodia? In 1988 about 5,000 troops from the enemy camp switched on the side of the people's government.

The constitutional amendments aimed at legalizing the mixed state-private sector in the economy have substantially revived private enterprise and opened access to private capital in foreign trade and tourism. The policy of the country's leadership is oriented toward the development of a real market, including a market for capital and labor. Free economic zones are being created, such as the port city of Konpong Som and the coastal Kas Kong Province, which are open to foreign investors.

### Which Cat is Better?

In the past Phnom-Penh was one of the lively crossroads of Asia. To this day one can see tourists and businessmen from all parts of the world on the streets, in the museum complex of the royal palace and, naturally, the offices in the capital city, although the premises of diplomatic representatives of the Western countries in Phnom-Penh are still occupied by other establishments. Relations are being organized with private companies in Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, France and India. Let us particularly note the expansion of economic ties with Thailand. This year commissions were set up in Cambodia and Thailand on bilateral economic cooperation. The possibilities are being studied for Thai capital investments in the Cambodian economy. As Boun Vi, deputy in charge of affairs of the Cambodian Council of Ministers, told us, a law has already been drafted concerning foreign investments, which will make it possible to broaden cooperation with countries in the area and attract foreign capital for rebuilding the national economy. The single conclusion that can be drawn from all these facts is that Cambodia is seriously undertaking to prepare its economic system for participation in economic relations in the Asian-Pacific area.

A green light has been given also for the investment of capital by Khmers living abroad.

On a hot Sunday noon we walked to the grandiose building on the bank of the Mekong, which looks like a multi-storied pagoda. Astoundingly, during this time of "siesta," which is "sacred" in the tropics, work was being done on the project. This hotel is named "The Cambodiana." For the time being it is not on the list of the best hotels recommended by foreign travel agencies to their rich customers but will soon be. The hotel is being completely rebuilt. This is a project financed by Khmers living in Hong Kong. Before that, for nearly 7 years technical documentation had been drafted to rebuild the hotel on the basis of Soviet design and by a Soviet construction organizations. Apparently, in the final account, the local comrades lost patience and they gave the contract to a rich compatriot. Several months later the hotel came to life. Furthermore, this lifted an unbearable burden off the shoulders of the Soviet commercial representatives.

For a variety of reasons, some 500,000 Khmers live outside Cambodia. They keep sending parcels and money in hard currency to the homeland and, of late, have begun to invest their capital in the domestic economy. In the past they were shunned. Now they are not. Instead, efforts are being made to involve them in the national project of the revival of the homeland. As we were told at the Cambodian Council of Ministers, a preliminary agreement has been reached with a group of Khmers living in the United States on building a "five-star" hotel in Phnom-Penh, with 600 rooms. They will be managing it. The term of the lease is 20 years, after which it could be extended.

Naturally, bound by bureaucratic rules, organizations and state enterprises will find it difficult to cooperate with flexible and enterprising private entrepreneurs who, however, are sometimes indiscriminate in the means they use. Obviously, however, it is no accident that today both among theoreticians and practical workers promoting economic reform in Cambodia, the familiar oriental saying has become popular: "Who cares whether your cat is white or black. What matters is if it can catch mice." In other words, the system does not matter, whether it is state, private, family or state-private; what matters is how useful it is to the people and whether it yields income for the state.

The Cambodians do not conceal the fact that they are referring more to foreign capital. We are interested above all for such investments to go primarily into the food industry and the creation of entire complexes for the storage and processing of agricultural commodities, Comrade Boun Vi emphasized during our talk. However, the foreign companies are not particularly interested in this. They are essentially attracted by tourism and trade, i.e., areas in which relatively small investments can yield greater returns and maximal profits within a short time.



It would be unnecessary to explain the reason for the interest shown by the Cambodian leadership in reviving various industrial sectors, particularly food production. Suffice it to remember that after the Pol Pot regime no more than 10 enterprises of the 79 supplying the market with shoes, automobile tires, canned goods, bicycles, agricultural tools and beverages, were left standing. In the past few years the republic's leadership took extreme measures to develop industrial production. Currently the Ministry of Industry manages 54 large and medium-sized enterprises. In accordance with the resolutions of the January 1988 Plenum of the People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, last October the Council of Ministers issued a resolution granting state industrial enterprises economic independence in solving production problems. The objective was significantly to upgrade the efficiency of the production process, increase the volume and improve the quality of output and, later, convert to full cost accounting and self-financing. Starting with last year, experimentally, some enterprises began to be converted to new economic management methods. Although they have been working for no more than a few months under the new conditions, the initial results are encouraging: their economic indicators have improved and so have withholdings for the state budget.

Unfortunately, as was pointed out by Cambodian economic managers, the process of industrial development is encountering serious problems. There are breakdowns in power supplies, delays in deliveries of raw and other materials, including imported ones, a moral and physical wear of machine tools and equipment and a grave shortage of spare parts. The prices of petroleum products have increased, which has led to higher production costs. Furthermore, shortcomings in production management and the slow conversion of enterprises to new economic management methods have had an adverse effect as a result of the support by some enterprise managers of the old approaches. However, the times of "peaceful life" will soon end for them. Today the country's leadership pays particular attention to the development and expansion of the network of industrial enterprises within the framework of the new system of the mixed state-private economic sector, which in the future could seriously compete against the "state monopolies." Furthermore, purely local small industrial enterprises, which number more than 100 in Phnom-Penh alone, are gathering strength.

**From the interview given by Comrade Hun Sen to KOMMUNIST:**

"As I already mentioned, the Cambodian government is encouraging the development of economic activities in all economic sectors. This includes encouraging and use of foreign capital investments, particularly those of Cambodian compatriots living abroad, in the interest of developing the economy. Since the internal factor is determining, the solution of economic problems plays a

very important role in the matter of national conciliation. We must point out that even before the all-Cambodian conference and the National Assembly session, the shoots of the new economic activity were already visible. They blossomed after the adoption of the above mentioned economic targets. This growth, however, has still not reached a size which can no longer be controlled by the state, for its pace is consistent with the managing possibilities of the state, which is simulating the development of the four key economic sectors.

"What has been achieved in this area? Developments in agriculture, industry and the crafts, and in the service industry of cooperative and private structures; contacts have been made in a number of countries in the area of tourism, and preparations are being made to rebuild hotels for foreign visitors to Cambodia. However, we are experiencing certain difficulties in management and in ensuring the development of this area. The main problem in the future may become the question of the competence of cadre personnel, although for the time being we do not have any particular difficulties in this area. The party and the government also rely on strengthening the economy by passing properly considered laws, resolutions and directives on production and economic activities in all economic sectors. The state will not close down any production facility if its economic activities are consistent with the political objectives of the party and the laws."

#### **On a Balanced Basis**

In looking at the numerous proofs of economic revival, we frequently caught ourselves thinking: and all of this is taking place in a country which, only 10 years ago, was starting from the ashes. Today, as we see small enterprises and workshops, which are appearing like mushrooms after rain, few are those who think that this was made possible only after aid arrived from the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other fraternal countries, and after the USSR sent textiles, fabrics, industrial raw materials and petroleum products, although we were frequently told in the course of our meetings with the National Revolutionary Party Central Committee that the Soviet Union is Cambodia's main foreign economic partner and that cooperation with it at the present stage is a mandatory external prerequisite for the restoration and development of the national economy. It was emphasized that the determining feature is less the amount of credit and grants than the fact that the USSR was the only or the leading supplier of key commodities. Soviet deliveries account for 100 percent of imported petroleum products, 99 percent of rolled ferrous metals, 90 percent of trucks and specialized motor vehicles, 95 percent of fertilizers, 92 percent of road building and agricultural equipment, etc.

There is something else as well. Soviet seamen have complained of docking in a Cambodian port carrying trucks and a variety of other equipment, finding the dock empty of people. On the neighboring pier, where a felucca from Hong Kong has moored, carrying radio

parts and other consumer goods, almost half the city has gathered. Yes, we are giving a great deal of help to Cambodia. Unlike other socialist countries, who deal with it essentially on the basis of a balanced trade, in our country even diplomats from the Soviet Embassy in Phnom-Penh would find it difficult to provide an accurate answer to where free aid ends and mutually profitable foreign trade deals begin. But why is it that the ordinary citizens in that country are poorly informed of our participation in the revival of Cambodia? Does cooperation always yield proper results? These are difficult but unavoidable questions. We shall cite, as food for thought, several facts which were reported to us by Soviet missions in Cambodia.

Bilateral cooperation began 10 years ago, essentially from scratch and, in the literal meaning of the term, in total darkness. The electric power plants had been destroyed by the Pol Pot people who had withdrawn into the jungles. Powerful diesel generators provided light in the homes. To this day, zealously humming, they are turning imported fuel into electric power. Naturally, such a solution to the energy problem was forced and, obviously, temporary. One must think, in the long range, of other, less expensive and more efficient sources of energy. In precisely the same way the strategy of Soviet-Cambodian economic interaction requires new mutually profitable solutions. Above all, we must abandon the principle of extensive development of economic relations, which prevailed for quite some time, and the wasteful increase in material and manpower resources. We must define areas of cooperation which would be of priority importance to Cambodia and the USSR, involving maximal reductions in outlays (not detrimental to the amount of aid); possibilities must be found for obtaining convertible currency. The efficiency of both trade and free aid must be improved.

How are economic and technical ties and cooperation developing? Currently work is under way on more than 40 projects. Broadening the power base and, in particular, the building and restoration of electric power plants in the capital and the provinces, play an important role. Soviet specialists are participating in rebuilding the plantations of Hevea, which is a most precious source of true wealth in Cambodia: natural rubber. With their help more than 25,000 hectares of this crop have been rebuilt. Also under discussion is the question of creating a joint Soviet-Cambodian enterprise for the production of natural rubber and rubber goods with an output of 25 million rubles' worth annually. The possibility also exists of creating a mixed enterprise for the processing of valuable tropical timber species, from which excellent furniture and parquet flooring can be made. The expansion of such production facilities is all the more important, considering that foreign trade for the time being is by no means balanced. In 1988 the USSR exported to Cambodia goods worth 88.4 million rubles while it imported from that country goods worth 11.3 million (although according to the specialists the figures may not be absolutely correct, the overall correlation between

exports and imports does not change essentially). With proper business skill, income in hard currency could be earned as well. Thus, the soybean purchased by Soviet foreign trade organizations in Cambodia was reexported to neighboring Singapore with a profit for all parties.

What hinders a more efficient interaction? Here as well first are departmentalism, negligence and bureaucratic red tape. In order to solve any, even relatively "petty" matters, lengthy correspondence is necessary. Taking into consideration the distance and the lack of modern communications facilities, such as Telex, any comment on results becomes unnecessary.

Cambodia as well has its dragging construction projects. We mentioned the case of rebuilding the Cambodiana Hotel which, eventually, was put into the hands of an enterprising Hong Kong businessman. For the past few years the building of a circus has been under construction; the erection of a 1 kilometer long fence around it has been completed. For the 2nd 5-year period work is under way at the Pochentong Airport in Phnom-Penh, handled by the Mashinoeksport Foreign Trade Organization. The printing press for the publications of the People's Revolutionary Party is unable to take off from the ground. Meanwhile, we were proudly told of the completion, within a record time, of the Moscow Motion Picture Theater, which was gift to the Cambodian capital from the Moscow City Soviet. The main construction and installation work was done by local builders, directed by a single Soviet specialist. Everything was completed quickly and qualitatively.

The above example was an exception. For the time being, the plan for the assignment of our specialists to Cambodia is being overfulfilled. Such overfulfillment, however, is not gratifying. It means not only spending foreign exchange by the thousands but also the inadequate efficiency with which the potential of our people is being put to use abroad.

Naturally, to begin with, we must express our sincere respect for the engineers, physicians, educators and workers, all those who, sparing no effort, are working under conditions which, let us frankly say, are difficult for someone coming from Russia. Unfortunately, such conditions are still not safe for reasons which are not only caused by the climate. Nonetheless, the flow of people who are being assigned could not only be reduced, above all by reducing the number of those who come from far away to Phnom-Penh for purposes of "business tourism," so to say, paid by the government. One year ago a group of Gosplan specialists spent 2 weeks in Phnom-Penh drawing up plans for the long-term deployment of Cambodian production forces. Strictly speaking, such materials could have been produced in Moscow as well, for such an assistance was offered by the Soviet Commercial Mission. However, it was rejected and the plans for the sake of which the personnel of this respected department took a long trip, are still not available. Obviously, a new assignment will have to be made, paid for in foreign currency. It also happens that

various ministries, regardless of the cables sent by the embassy or the commercial agencies, would assign, on a long-term basis specialists who simply cannot be used. Or else, people coming from the USSR are trying to teach Cambodians skills which are traditional to that country, such as how to grow tropical timber, catch fish in the blue waters of the gulf of Siam, or grow rice.... We were told that one agronomist, who had seen rubber plantations for the first time in his life, undertook to instruct the local peasants how to produce Hevea. What a way of saving on foreign currency, which is so greatly needed by both countries!

Nor should we ignore the following: the opponents of the People's Regime and national conciliation are trying ever more energetically to link the negative aspects of the Cambodian economy and bureaucratic errors to the socialist "model," and Soviet aid. Insulting though this may be, it is a fact. Economic perestroyka, including the area of foreign economic relations, requires a stricter examination of the state of cooperation.

Specialists and scientists alike believe that in this case priority should be given to the building of projects with quick returns, small processing enterprises with simple equipment (one could also use machine tools and other machinery which become surplus in the course of the reconstruction of Soviet plants), in organizing the production of goods needed by the USSR (consumer goods above all). Other reserves exist as well. The main thing is to seek, to think and to act daringly, with original thoughts and efficiently. At that point, possibly, there will be no grounds for the criticism expressed at the Congress of People's Deputies to the effect that we are assuming an unbearable burden as we "secure our interests" in one or another distant part of the planet.

#### **Protect the Shoots of the New Life**

The reborn people value the changes which are occurring in their ancient land and try to make them irreversible. The people see that this is guaranteed by the people's regime, the political line of the People's Revolutionary Party. Over the past 10 years the party developed as the leading force of Cambodian society. Whereas in 1979, as a result of the Pol Pot terror, it numbered no more than 62 members, today it numbers 25,700. The Central Committee, which summed up the results of party building at the end of 1988, noted noticeable successes in this area. Last year alone the party was joined by some 5,000 people. In terms of its social structure, today the party is as follows: 4.4 percent are workers; 52.2 percent are peasants (agricultural production is the leading sector in the national economy, employing 80 percent of the active population); and 44.4 percent, other population strata.

At the present time, party committees have been organized in 147 out of 168 sites; in the others there are primary party organizations numbering 15 or more party members each, without party committees. In the opinion of the leadership of the party, there already are grounds

for the creation of party committees in those areas as well in the immediate future. Furthermore, in more than one-half of the regions primary party organizations or groups of activists have been created. The local power structure is being strengthened.

We met one of the provincial party workers while traveling on Route 1 from Phnom-Penh to Ho Chi Minh. The province of Svay Rieng, which borders on Vietnam, means, in translation, "mangrove." Its population is 370,000. It has 1,500 members of the People's Revolutionary Party. Our interlocutor, Kim Nang, 46, was deputy secretary of the provincial party committee. Under Sihanouk he was a rural schoolteacher, under Pol Pot, like many rural and urban intellectuals, we was sent to jail but survived. After the liberation he became the elder of the village. In 1980, being literate and educated, he was appointed deputy head of the party committee propaganda department for the province, although he was still not a member of the party. He joined only in 1983. For that time such an unusual road to a position of "command" was not astounding: there was a grave shortage of literate cadres and the new system was recruiting for work all the living forces of the people. He has been party committee deputy secretary since 1988.

"My biography," says Kim Nang, "is typical of most party workers on the provincial level. Nothing noteworthy. Our province itself is most ordinary. We grow rice, jute, yams and soybean. Our crops are good. The situation in the province, since 1988, has been stable. Everyone is safe. We are frequently visited by guests from the USSR. Our people are tremendously interested in you. The perestroyka which is taking place in the USSR is strengthening in our country as well confidence in the justice of our own cause. Incidentally, we have a building in which we would like to open our own provincial center of the Soviet-Cambodian Friendship Society. We turned for help to Phnom-Penh, and to the Soviet comrades. So far they have remained silent...."

By Cambodian standards, the party organization in Svay Rieng Province is quite strong. However, such is not the case in all areas of the country. More than 17 percent of the sites have no party members at all. According to the party's Central Committee data, a particularly unfavorable situation has developed in the following provinces: Siem Reap, where out of 106 sites primary party organizations have been created in no more than 54; Bantei Mienchei (in 5 out of 54) and Kampong Thom (in 14 out of 63). To this day not a single member of the People's Revolutionary Party can be found in many villages.

This year, in connection with the full withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, in September, the party and government authorities must fully take over the task of defending the homeland. This as well calls for increasing the party's influence. In this connection, the party's Central Committee intends to see to it that party members are active in all villages and, wherever conditions exist, create party organizations. Particular attention is being paid to strengthening the party agencies in

the areas around Pnom-Penh and in the provincial centers, as well as near important projects, along strategic highways and in areas where the opposition is active. The emphasis here is not on quantity but on upgrading the qualitative standard of party ranks.

**From an interview granted by Comrade Hun Sen to KOMMUNIST:**

"Starting with its 3rd Congress, the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia systematically developed and strengthened politically, ideologically and organizationally. We consider this the key, the determining factor for the victory of the revolution, regardless of the turn of events. We must emphasize that whatever the situation or the circumstances, the party firmly followed Marxism-Leninism as its ideological foundation and starting point while, at the same time, also proceeding in its political objectives from the country's specific conditions. The fact that the majority of the people have been following the party and the revolution for more than 10 years confirms the accuracy of its political course.

"In speaking of the party's role and possibilities in the process of national conciliation and the unification of all social forces, let us note that under present circumstances as well as in the future, the People's Revolutionary Party of Cambodia will be a Marxist-Leninist party, the vanguard force of society. As such, in implementing its tasks, the party has been guided by the Leninist tactics of the revolutionary struggle, combining science with art. That is why, having considered and thought about everything in detail and scientifically, we revised the definition of the present stage of the Cambodian Revolution and, comparing our forces and those of the enemy both within the country and abroad, defined the ways and means of the implementation of the policy of national conciliation. Nonetheless, in formulating and defining the tasks corresponding to the various revolutionary stages, the party does not ignore historical experience. It also closely follows the state of mind of the public, considering this problem an important factor for the unification of forces and strengthening the party's leading role, broadening the base of the revolution and ensuring its further advance.

"Such is the position of the party, confirming its possibilities in the Cambodian revolutionary process. Although the talks have still not been concluded and no final success has been achieved in implementing the objectives of the policy of national conciliation, the results already obtained instill in us optimism and confirm the ability of the party to continue to lead the country in the future. Our party and government are confident that thanks to their efforts and the support of the fraternal parties, the Cambodian problem will be successfully solved for the good of the people and the well-being of the homeland.

"Speaking on behalf of the party, let me note that in whatever conditions it may find itself, the Cambodian

People's Revolutionary Party will always be a true Marxist-Leninist party, firmly supporting the Leninist theory of the revolutionary process."

During our meetings and talks on many different levels in Phnom-Penh we were frequently told that after there were no more hungry people in the country and that the economic situation had become relatively stabilized, having lost their social base of support the "Khmer Rouge" found themselves unable to regroup their combat order and camps on the Thai border to mount a coordinated action. Nonetheless, the leadership does not deny that the counterrevolution, having realized the entire difficulty of its situation, could resort to a final argument in undermining social reconciliation: the use of weapons and violence, particularly in some border provinces.

For that reason, the people of Cambodia hope that the world community and anyone interested in preserving the shoots of new life in this long suffering land will dedicate maximum efforts to contribute to the fastest possible just and rational settlement of the Cambodian problem through political means. Not blood and violence but the total cease fire and national conciliation should be put on the agenda immediately after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. As the country's leadership believes, the special coalition authority which has been offered to Prince Sihanouk to head, is called upon to prepare for and hold general elections and, on their basis, form a new coalition government. All of this should take place under strict international control without any whatsoever interference in the vote.

Subsequently as well, the country's leadership is ready to see to it that in the new Cambodia various political forces would act and compete on a parallel basis. What stands behind this? In our view, it is a question of far-reaching changes in political life, the objective of which is the establishment of a parliamentary democracy with its inherent system of "checks and balances." This radical approach could open a qualitatively new phase of national conciliation and, in the final account, national accord and even the possibility, in the future, of creating a social coalition. The logical question is whether this could undermine the positions of the party? Similar questions are being asked by our friends as well. However, a party can never become truly viable under greenhouse conditions. It needs an atmosphere in which it can defend its political positions through natural political methods. In Cambodia they are already preparing to do so. While we were visiting the country, almost daily long meetings were being held at the Phnom-Penh stadium between Comrade Hun Sen and secondary and university school students and people of different professions. Party workers and state officials are constantly among the people, explaining the new policy and answering hundreds of questions. The main among them is how to heal the country as quickly as possible from the ulcers of backwardness, poverty and

instability. The people who found in themselves the strength to stand up after most severe trials will find the way.

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### **The Country's Interests: Imaginary and Real**

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[Article by Igor Yevgenyevich Malashenko, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] This is perhaps the first time in several decades that a public debate has been started in our country today on problems of its foreign and military policies. This process is developing both in depth, touching upon the foundations of the course followed by the USSR in the international arena, as well as in width, encompassing a broad range of problems of foreign policy activities. As we critically reinterpret domestic policy toward individual countries and areas and various aspects of military building, we frequently feel the need for a "measure," with the help of which we could soberly and realistically assess our past actions and formulate substantiated prescriptions for the future.

I believe that the concept of **national interests** must become the starting point in undertaking the formulation of a streamlined logical system of foreign policy postulates and in finding a "common denominator" in assessing international phenomena and processes and setting clear priorities in foreign policy. To some this concept may seem self-evident and even trite, for how have we been guided in our actions so far? In reality, however, this problem deserves our closest attention.

### **Whose Interests Are We Discussing?**

The formulation of a concept of national interests requires a comprehensive interpretation of historical experience and evolution of ideological and political concepts which have prevailed in our society and which have had a tremendous impact on the country's foreign policy. As we know, V.I. Lenin emphasized that the bolsheviks began their activities strictly on the basis of an anticipated worldwide revolution, without which the victory of a proletarian revolution in Russia was considered impossible. Under those conditions, the homeland of the October Revolution was considered a bridgehead of the world revolution and a prologue to a universal soviet republic; the RKP(b) was, above all, a structural part of the Comintern while the Red Army was the advanced armed element of the global proletariat. Therefore, during those years the term "Soviet national interests" itself would have seemed, to say the least, strange and inappropriate.

As the prospects of a global revolution became increasingly distant, the targets and tasks of Soviet foreign policy became related to it less and less. In general, J.V.

Stalin gave priority to governmental interests, for it was precisely the comprehensive strengthening of the state that was to become the inviolable foundation of the regime of his personal power.

Let us make some things clear. The concept of national interests genetically goes back to the old concept of "raison d'etat" ("the good of the state") as the main guiding principle in political activities. With the development of bourgeois democratic institutions, the "good of the state" increasingly yielded to "national interest," which began to mean the needs and aspirations of the entire society.

In our country, however, major problems arose in the formulation of such a concept. The existence of governmental interests was unquestionable. Actually, they seemed as no more than a manifestation of the interests of the ruling class. What was underestimated was the fact that the state is not only the instrument of a specific class (or classes) but also a form of organization of the entire society.

Dogmatized ideological concepts prevented us from applying the concept of "national interest" to "the social interest." That is why discussions in the West on the topic of "national interest" were perceived by us as no more than a clever trap set by the ruling bourgeoisie, which was thus presenting its own egotistical interests as those of the entire society. Naturally, there was some of that too. However, any actual normal society mandatorily has common interests as well, for otherwise it would be inevitably broken up by centrifugal forces.

As the Soviet Union developed, reliance on global revolution was replaced by the task of building socialism in a single country; the withering away of the state was replaced by its exaggerated growth, in accordance with the Stalinist stipulations and the familiar traditions of political standards. Consequently, in our country the state took over the entire society, frequently acting against its interests. Common sense dictates that society should impose certain restrictions on the activities of the state and protect its own interests. For a long time we were entrapped by the illusion that the lack of democratic social control can only increase the efficiency of foreign and military policy. However, in this area the command-administrative methods proved to be as faulty as they were in the country's domestic life. As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, even most important decisions were sometimes made without comprehensive and collective consideration and study and, sometimes, without necessary consultation with friends. This led to inadequate reactions to international events or even to drawing erroneous conclusions. This affected the national interests, for "we did not always consider the cost of one or another option to the people or its possible consequences."

In its resolution, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies also pointed out the need "to pay particular attention to the creation of reliable guarantees which would totally exclude in the future undemocratic surreptitious making of foreign policy decisions of vital importance to the country and its peoples." I believe that it was precisely the result of such a decision that led to the sending of Soviet forces into Afghanistan and it is no accident that the congress instructed the USSR Supreme Soviet to make a political assessment of these events and to report it at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies. The Supreme Soviet should also analyze and evaluate the decision of the deployment of RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles, which resulted in the opening of a second strategic front against the USSR.

In the area of national security, the lack of democratic traditions in the discussion of foreign policy and military problems was combined with the readiness of our society to pay any price to protect itself from external threats. In this case the memory of the endless series of wars and invasions which mark our history and, above all, the tragic experience of the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, played their role. The feeling of "global siege," which was firmly established in the people's minds was also triggered by the extremely ideologized approach to the outside world. As a result, in our social awareness all interests were occasionally pushed aside in favor of the task of the survival of the state.

### Threats and Priorities

Always concerned with the outside threat, we largely overlooked the appearance of qualitatively different threats to our national interests. In the 1970s and 1980s, our ability to repulse any threat from the outside increased unprecedentedly: never in its entire history had the country had such a reserve of strategic power. We attained parity with the United States in basic qualitative and quantitative parameters of the nuclear arsenal (and in some we even outstripped our main opponent); the overall strength of the Soviet Armed Forces increased, based on the possibility that our probable enemies would form a single coalition. The Soviet Union became a global power which could influence the course of events in the most remote areas on earth. However, to what extent did this enable us to ensure the implementation of our national interests?

Starting with the mid-1970s, we fell seriously behind the United States in terms of the growth rates of the GNP and, in recent years, also in the growth rates of labor productivity. According to some estimates made by Soviet economists, in terms of its living standard, the Soviet Union is in the 50th to the 60th place in the world, which is totally inconsistent with the potential of our society. We rank 32nd in the world in terms of the average life span and 50th in the area of infant mortality. Alas, such a list could be extended. These facts confirm that today our national interests are being threatened, a threat which is the consequence above all of the internal deformations of socialism.

The elimination of such deformations and the radical restructuring of socialist society are the most important factors in strengthening national security. The basic vital need of our society is to successfully develop and advance the socialist system. The socialist society, as was pointed out at the practical science conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1988 should, based on the tasks of perestroika, "prove that socialism can give man more than any other sociopolitical system. This is our main national interest. It is only in this connection that we could and should consider the category of national security and all of its aspects."

Before perestroika, the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party Conference, the problem of ensuring our national security was virtually not considered in this context and, essentially, could not be. This was hindered both by the "givens" of the social consciousness (above all the substitution of a realistic vision of the world with stereotypes of the "siege mentality"), as well as the command-bureaucratic decision-making system in the area of national security (in which arbitrariness of decision-making was supplemented by the practical omnipotence of the departments). The reliable securing of national interests demands a maximal use of the resources available to our country in meeting the needs of perestroika and the radical democratization of the system itself in the formulation of policy in the area of national security, so that it could truly serve the interests of the entire society.

No single country can "embrace the unembraceable" in its activities, and pay equal attention to all problems and all areas of global politics, and to all regions. The allocation of national resources, which are always somewhat restricted, is taking place in accordance with national and, in terms of our own international affairs, foreign policy priorities. The rating of priorities helps us to avoid unnecessary wasting of funds and the over-stressing of national forces.

It cannot be said that in the past such a system of priorities was totally absent in our foreign and military policies. However, its logic was rarely the subject of serious discussions. In practice, the order of priorities by no means always coincided with general statements to this effect. In frequent cases this led to unjustifiably high expenditures in a number of areas of defense building or to giving priority in foreign policy to areas which were of secondary significance from the viewpoint of national security. As a result, a substantial share of our national resources was absorbed by the arms race which had gathered a headlong pace. Was this consistent with our national interests?

### Is Parity To Our Advantage?

For quite a long time it was considered self-evident that the military power of the Soviet Union should be at least equal to the potential of its main rival—the United States—and, ideally, the combined military power of likely enemies.

Reliance on military-strategic parity as the principal means of guaranteeing our security put us, however, in a position of dependence and reaction. Actually, a situation developed in which not we but our opponents were dictating the areas and scale of our military preparations: they formulated new programs with the full confidence that we would soon follow their example. Let us admit that we rarely disappointed them, for the old understanding of parity led us to a "mirror-image" duplication of the steps and actions of our potential enemies.

The arms race "as equals" with the United States and the efforts to create a counterbalance in the case of all other unfriendly countries became a huge burden for our economy and, thereby, created an immediate threat to the country's national security. The data which were made public at the Congress of People's Deputies indicate that in terms of the share of military expenditures in the GNP we are outstripping the Americans by approximately 50 percent. Conversely, in terms of health care expenditures we are behind the United States by a factor of 2.5. Is this not an indication that it is time for us to correct the system of national priorities?

Trying to match the military power of an imaginary coalition is a useless occupation, bearing in mind that in terms of the GNP we are several hundred percent behind its hypothetical members. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 1986 Conference, the stipulation that the Soviet Union could be as strong as any possible coalition of countries set against it is absolutely groundless and its implementation would obviously mean taking steps detrimental to the national interest.

The concept of sensible defense sufficiency is aimed at making the dimensions of military building consistent with our interests and real national security needs. To this day, however, we share a widespread viewpoint according to which the limits of sufficiency are determined not by us but by the scale of military preparations made by the United States and NATO. However, what is the essential distinction between this understanding of sufficiency and the concept of military-strategic parity as the principal means of ensuring national security? In both cases, it turns out that the most important parameters of our policy in the area of national security are defined not in Moscow but... in Washington or Brussels.

A real hope has now appeared that we shall be able to break out of the vicious circle of the arms race through talks leading to true disarmament. Talks, however, even if both sides have the political will to reach an agreement, are a difficult and protracted process. Meanwhile, a kind of complex has developed in some of us, according to which alone, without talks and regardless of the United States, we can do nothing to ease the burden of the arms race and determine by ourselves the amount of armaments we should have in order to guarantee our national interests. But what is preventing us from rejecting the "rules of the game" imposed by the Americans? Have we considered possible to say that we shall

not duplicate the American "Star Wars" Program, however hard the Pentagon may try to involve us in this adventure?

Should we follow Washington in the so-called "strategic triad," i.e., the tri-component structure of strategic forces consisting of intercontinental ground-launched ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and strategic bombers? Traditionally, the Americans have relied on SLBM and bombers with a view to ensuring the flexibility and invulnerability of their nuclear potential. This is understandable, bearing in mind that the United States is a country with unrestricted access to maritime spaces and a network of bases spread throughout the world for use by submarines and aviation, etc. We do not have such advantages, but have different ones. I believe that we could fully ensure the military stability of our nuclear potential and, abandoning the slogan of "parity at all cost," not invest billions into the building of new bombers and submarine missile carriers which would operate under obviously disadvantageous geostrategic conditions. Our specialists have already expressed many considerations to this effect in the press. In June PRAVDA published a photograph of the latest—and until recently supersecret—TU-160 Strategic Bomber, similar to the American B-1, noting that this is "not a gift to the people." How many such "gifts" have we been given? What has this cost the people?

Should we wait for agreements to be made with Washington also in order to get rid of armaments which have been in service for quite some time and the use of which involves substantial risk? Thus, the Soviet nuclear submarine, which had an accident last June, was built 25 years ago, which is quite a long time. Is it necessary at all cost to maintain the "gross indicators" of parity or would it not be more sensible unilaterally to dismantle armament systems which have become physically and morally obsolete? This would hardly affect our defense capability.

The exceptionally high level of confrontation in the area of conventional armaments is another huge burden for our economy. Talks on this range of problems are even more difficult than drafting agreements in the area of nuclear armaments because, among other things, of the tremendous quantity of ordnance of different types, the complexity of agreements verification procedures, etc.

The Soviet Union's decision unilaterally to reduce its armed forces, including 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks and a significant quantity of other combat hardware, announced by M.S. Gorbachev at the United Nations General Assembly, was a real breakthrough in this area. This decision helps to strengthen both international and national security. Radical proposals were submitted by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact at the Vienna conventional armament talks. We must point out that the West responded with counterproposals by formulating at the May Session of the NATO Council corresponding suggestions which generally coincide with the



Warsaw Pact position and, in some areas, take into consideration its concern with unsolved problems. Naturally, the NATO suggestions have their own "underwater reefs." NATO has still not given up the wish to gain some kind of unilateral advantages. It is already clear, however, that the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet Union have not only not harmed our security but have even become a catalyst in the disarmament process.

It is true that today a viewpoint has also been voiced according to which disarmament and the conversion of defense industry output are, in themselves, expensive and that we still do not know if the game is worth the candle. Naturally, initially the elimination of armaments will be costly. Nor will it be cheap to convert defense industry enterprises to civil production, particularly if this is accomplished with the help of the customary command-administrative methods, which proved their inadequacy in the area of the efficient reallocation of resources. In the long term, however, under the conditions of the radical reform of the economic mechanism and structural perestroyka of the economy, the material and manpower resources released in defense industry enterprises will become a powerful reserve for the development of our national economy and for upgrading the living standard of the people. Whether we shall be able to extract economic advantages from disarmament and conversion is, in the final account, a question of whether we shall be able to complete the economic reorganizations in our country.

The revision of traditional approaches to military building was frequently hindered in the past by our habit of replacing national interests with falsely conceived considerations of prestige, and of reality with symbols. The desire of being equal to the West, the United States above all, at all cost, clearly played an important role in the significance which was ascribed in our country to the concept of "mirror" parity, which largely embodied the concept of reaching superpower status.

#### **Do We Need 'Spheres of Influence'?**

For decades we essentially linked our security to the victory of socialism on an international scale, and the more countries took the socialist path of development the more secure seemed the status of the Soviet Union in the world. In practice, however, this ideological approach was combined with the growth of geopolitical considerations in our policy.

The logic of geopolitics, which is based on geographic realities, military in particular, along with economic, demographic and other traditional power factors, has always played a major role in great-power policy. In contemporary societies geopolitical concepts are a topic of domestic political debates, in the course of which the question is resolved of how far a given country is prepared to go in increasing its military power and in its efforts to secure for itself a favorable external environment. Under the conditions of the domination of the command-bureaucratic system in our country, society

was deprived of the possibility of discussing and clearly defining its own interests and correlating them with the actual deployment of forces in the world arena.

The combination of ideology with geopolitics triggered strange results. During the period of stagnation, the stagnation within the country was coupled with increased activeness in the world arena and with a globalizing of Soviet influence. In foreign policy, however, it was the "gross" approach that prevailed; hiding behind impressive figures, the main question remained: were the national interests of the USSR truly requiring participation in the solution of all problems and all somewhat significant regional conflicts? For all of this involves high political costs and absorbs huge material resources.

Essentially, our country found itself involved in the struggle for spheres of influence. This was considered a counteraction to imperialism which was doing everything possible to suppress the national-liberation movement and to tighten around us a ring of global siege. The black and white vision of the world and the habit of explaining all adverse changes with intrigues launched by "hostile forces" also played their role.

Nonetheless, the destinies of socialism are decided precisely and above all within our own society, and we must free for needs of perestroyka our resources, including those which are absorbed by the rivalry with the United States in the "third world." Naturally, our country is a huge continental power and we cannot remain indifferent to what is happening along the perimeter of our borders. However, we must not yield to the temptation of interpreting too simplistically geopolitical realities or, even less so, to view them through the lens of ideological concepts.

It has become apparent that today we can "remove ourselves" quite painlessly from the struggle for "spheres of influence" which was imposed upon us in areas which are of no real significance from the viewpoint of our security. Our interests would not suffer even if the American leadership is short of political far-sightedness and realism in taking similar steps. The way the Americans spend their national resources is their own business. Our resources are needed, above all, for domestic socialist development and upgrading the living standard of the Soviet people. From the viewpoint of the national interest, this has highest priority.

According to existing assessments, as a whole the aid which the Soviet Union gives to the developing countries amounts to 1.7 percent of its GNP, which is substantially higher than what the most developed countries spend, and is hardly acceptable considering the country's difficult financial and economic situation. In any case, decisions in this area should be made democratically and the final word here must clearly be that of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Giving priority to national interests does not mean sinking into egotism and neglecting our international

duty. The interests of our society are inseparable from the ideals and the cause of socialism. However, the other side should not be forgotten as well: as K. Marx cautioned, "any idea' invariably failed the moment it was separated from 'interest'" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 2, p 89). It is precisely this cautioning that we, I believe, underestimated. Ignoring the objective needs of the socialist society turned, as a result, not only into an aggravation of the crisis trends within the country but also the fact that the Soviet Union began to lose its former attractiveness to other countries as a model of socioeconomic development. Today international duty and the principle of proletarian internationalism demand of us, above all, once again to prove to the entire world the vitality and the tremendous potential of social progress and democracy inherent in socialism. We can give many developing countries much greater and real aid by putting our own home in order. It is no accident that the attractiveness of our ideals has increased so greatly throughout the world as a result of the perestroika in the USSR. Furthermore, our material aid will become at that point, one would assume, more efficient and will be more consistent with the real development needs of those of our partners who are truly trying to lay the foundations for a socialist society and not use pseudosocialist phraseology only for the sake of receiving the latest aid.

#### Is Rivalry Inevitable?

The spending of a significant share of national resources on the arms race, and on efforts related to the developing countries is related, essentially, to the fact that for many long years relations with the United States actually held first place in the list of our foreign policy priorities. Naturally, this has its reasons. After World War II, as a result of the breakdown of the previous international system, a huge "power vacuum" appeared, which inevitably had to be filled above all by the two biggest world powers—the Soviet Union and the United States. To a certain extent also inevitable was the clash of their interests, in Europe above all. This conflict, however, assumed unprecedented gravity because of the superideologization of Soviet-American relations, which exceptionally hindered the search for mutually acceptable solutions and for easing tensions.

The ideological substantiation of the priority of rivalry with the United States was the concept that the Soviet Union, as the leading socialist state must, at all cost, outstrip the leader of the capitalist world. The competition between the USSR and the United States embodied the competition between socialism and capitalism as a whole. Unfortunately, as stagnation trends within our country increased, the center of gravity of this rivalry shifted to the military-power area. This created additional difficulties in the development of socialist society.

Nonetheless, the contemporary structure of international relations does not support the concept of the irreversibility of a Soviet-American confrontation. In the last decade the world has changed radically and trends

toward increased interdependence within it have strengthened; the significance of global problems has increased sharply. All of this objectively reduces the gravity of the conflict between the USSR and the United States. The specific national interests of these two countries rarely actually conflict and the global conflict between them is no longer inevitable. An assessment of all the consequences of this situation in terms of practical policy makes a systematic deideologization of international relations possible.

Naturally, major friction will remain for the foreseeable future between the USSR and the United States (including friction based on differences in socioeconomic systems). However, this is no obstacle to normalizing reciprocal relations. Consequently, it is entirely possible substantially to lower the share of national resources directly or indirectly absorbed by the rivalry with the United States and to use such resources to meet the needs of internal development and implementation of perestroika.

In this matter we should not wait for outside help. Many members of the American ruling elite, for example, limit themselves essentially to positive assessments of perestroika in the USSR, but are in no hurry to support it with practical steps in broadening cooperation with our country.

However, even should a different trend prevail in the United States (as it is apparently prevailing in Western Europe) and should the United States recognize that in the course of perestroika in the USSR an entirely different society is developing, with which it would easier to seek jointly a way leading to a safe world, in that case as well we could rely again essentially on ourselves. Even if we conceive that we will be given unlimited credit by the industrially developed capitalist countries (indeed, Western Europe is willingly responding to us in this matter) or that petroleum prices on the world market would sharply rise and that once again we shall have a rich source of hard currencies, would this money not turn into sand the way the billions of petrodollars earned in the 1970s disappeared? If tomorrow all barriers obstructing our foreign trade would be lifted, what type of competitive goods would we have, considering that the domination of the command-bureaucratic system has still not been eliminated.

The reverse is equally true: if our economy would be radically restructured and begin to operate at full capacity, it is hardly likely that anyone on the outside would seriously succeed in slowing down its development. Today, however, it is already clear that making our national economy dynamic and including it in the system of global economic relations will be a difficult and lengthy process in the course of which setting realistic tasks will be important. Obviously, a great deal of time will have to pass before our economy is ready to engage in full cooperation with the most developed capitalist countries.

Equally unjustified is the somewhat condescending attitude shown toward some countries which we customarily classify as "developing." Terms such as "third world" or "developing country" have long stopped reflecting the tremendous variety and economic differentiation which actually exists in that part of the world. There are countries which have catastrophically fallen behind in their development. However, there also is a powerful group of newly industrialized countries and states which have made a leap based on income from petroleum exports. In short, there are not one but several "worlds." There is something here for us to think about and even to learn from.

### A Concern of the Entire Society

As we formulate the concept of national interests and the system of priorities based on it, a number of difficult problems must be solved, related both to the domestic development of our state as well as the external conditions governing its activities. In this case it is not only the content of this concept and its consistency with the objective needs of our society and the situation in the international arena that are of substantial significance but also the manner in which, with the help of a certain mechanism, this concept is being formulated and, subsequently, implemented.

Particularly important in this connection is the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference of creating an efficient constitutionally authorized mechanism for the practical and qualified discussion of problems of international policy, the initial steps taken in this direction by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and the establishment of a Committee on International Affairs and a Committee on Problems of Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The experience gained in our development also indicates the need for an authoritative nondepartmental authority (in this area an important role could be played, for example, by the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Problems of International Policy), which can direct the formulation of a strategy in the area of national security and set long-term objectives and ways of attaining them, and correlate them without allowing substitutions, which was frequently the case in the past. The final word in determining the procedure for setting national priorities and the percentage of resources allocated for various purposes, as well as instituting overall control over the activities of ministries and departments in charge of the national interests of the country on a daily basis, are the prerogative of the supreme legislative authority—the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It is unlikely that we shall be able to develop an efficient mechanism for securing our national interests before the public has been granted the real opportunity to judge of the state of affairs in this area and to participate in an open democratic discussion of problems of foreign and military policy. It is only at that point that the voters would be able to develop their own views and influence the views of the people's deputies, both at times of

elections as well as in the course of the implementation of their obligations. Inevitably many remaining stereotypes and concepts of our interests and the threats which we are encountering and the ways and means of ensuring national security, which have acquired the power of prejudice, will have to be revised.

Until then, however, the degree of glasnost on such important problems will remain substantially below the level of openness and meaningfulness achieved in the course of discussions relative to internal problems. This is partially due to the entirely understandable fact that the Soviet public is trying to have answers above all to the pressing matters of our internal development related to the crisis condition of the economy, the aggravation of relations among nationalities and adversities in the social area. Furthermore, the concept seems to have developed in public opinion that everything in our country "is in order" in the international area, for which reason no particular interference is required. On the other hand, to this day the aspiration of all departments to keep bureaucratic secrets intact is strengthened in the realm of national security by the traditional "closed nature" of the respective information.

We believe that the Supreme Soviet should discuss even more substantively problems of our national security and military building and "decode" in greater detail individual items in the defense budget. Whenever it is a question of appropriating specific funds for entirely definite programs, it will become clear that many traditional secrets would be entirely accessible to discussion. In an extreme case, if it is indeed a matter of truly secret data, most parliaments practice closed sessions. It is time for us to determine the cost of maintaining our influence in the developing countries, the amount of weapons and other equipment we give to such countries and the conditions under which this is done.

In the final account, it is only society that could and should determine what is consistent with its interests and what is not, and the priorities by which it must be guided. It must have the real opportunity to exercise this right. The profound reform of the political system, the comprehensive democratization of our society and the systematic development of glasnost in all areas without exception are a guarantee for securing the protection of our national interests.

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### CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

#### The Echo of the Russian People

905b00040 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 124-125

[Review by V. Golobokov, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the book by Genrikh Volkov, "Mir Pushkina:

*Lichnost, Mirovozzreniye, Okruzheniye*" [Pushkin's World: Personality, Outlook, Environment]. Molodaya Gvardiya, Moscow, 1989, 269 pp]

[Text] Russian literature is "heavy" with philosophy and has been historically doomed to such a condition ever since Pushkin's time. That is why the study of the work of this great poet must be philosophical. However, the works written by philosophers about this poet are annoyingly few. Each of one of them is an event. That is precisely why we welcome the recently published book by Genrikh Volkov, philosopher and political journalist, a work which is interesting above all for its contemporary interpretation of the role and place of Pushkin's creativity in the history of Russian spiritual culture, as seen through the lens of the poet's personality.

One of the most exciting and unraveled puzzles of history, according to Volkov, is the secret of the manifestation of genius. However, unraveled does not mean unravelable. It attracts the author of this book as strongly as it has many other students of Pushkin.

How to explain the appearance of genius? Could it be a happy combination of genes, the fact that genius is a miracle of nature? A number of people may be fully satisfied with such an interpretation, but not a philosopher. "Naturally," G. Volkov agrees with opponents who are not fictitious in the least, "since his birth Pushkin was generously gifted by nature. He displayed inordinate spiritual receptiveness, responsiveness and sensitivity. He was temperamental and willful, displayed drastic changes of mood, both inconsistency and consistency, and the ability to insist on defending his own views. He had an unusual memory and the ability for unexpected associations and the creation of mental images. Probably, he had many other character features as well" (p 15). To a certain extent, it was this that predetermined Pushkin's fate as a poet. However, this may not have happened had the wind of Russian and world history not blown in such a way as to revive the spark of genius. But then does genius itself not consist of feeling and pursuing this wind of history, and even more so for the sake of increasing it! At this point it is important to combine two elements: those of the individual and of the age, G. Volkov believes.

It seems to us that entirely in accordance with the content of the book, this view could be refined: it is not only the combination but the embodiment of the spirit of the time in the individual, in the personality, and its refraction through it. Such an embodiment, in our view, is important not only for the sake of the appearance of the genius. In general, it is necessary in the development of the human personality, whether we describe it as epoch-making (i.e., social) start of the "wind of history," "spirit of the time," or "universal human interest" or else "social need," differences which, in the final account, will be manifested only on the scale of the individual.

In accordance with his main purpose, the author of the book briefly describes the sociospiritual processes which were taking place in Russia by the turn of the 19th century and which prepared Pushkin's arrival: the spreading of the ideals of the age of enlightenment, the accelerated development of literature and the press, the unparalleled fast involvement with letters of new strata of the reading public, hopes for the reorganization of the rusty governmental mechanism and, finally, the Patriotic War of 1812, which awakened the soul of the Russian people, who realized that they were a single nation, a great nation. "This feeling of confidence in the powerful forces of the people, which appeared in such a powerful and comprehensive way, has never since left our self-awareness, nurturing a belief in the outstanding future of the homeland" (p 19). It was Pushkin who embodied this people's awareness ("...and my incorruptible voice was an echo of the Russian people").

However, the "wind of history" does not apply only the destiny of a nation or mankind. It also means daily relations among people, familiar and strangers, friendship and love, which no one sang better than Pushkin and about which no one but Pushkin has said such bitter words. If the age demands its outstanding spokesman, as a rule, he does not come alone. "The wind of history" rises an entire galaxy of talents and through their reciprocal influence blows the spark of genius. The poet was most closely surrounded by the Decembrists, state leaders, literary workers and philosophers.... Pushkin cannot be understood outside of his environment which, as the author convincingly proves, was both extensive and lofty.

G. Volkov singles out among all that surrounded Pushkin his relationship with Chaadayev, to which he his entire 9th chapter. It appears as the culminating point of the book, forming, along with the three preceding and three following chapters, its conceptual nucleus. It is precisely in these chapters that he discusses the destinies of Russia, its past and its future and the concept of the history of mankind itself. This is nothing other than the most sensitive problem of our social thinking of the 19th and 20th centuries.

It would be unnecessary at this point to describe the events of the friendship between two great people, a friendship which had conceptual and creative consequences affecting both. The reader will find all this in the book. Let us merely note that despite the tremendous influence which Chaadayev had on Pushkin's views ("your enthusiasm encouraged great love..."), in the main feature—the understanding of the past and future of Russia—the poet did not accept the philosopher as a prophet and a messiah and refused to follow him. Why?

Chaadayev's "sharp cooling mind" is full of skepticism. As G. Volkov emphasizes, this was some kind of desperate self-exposure, self-torturing of the national Russian feeling. "We," the author quotes in the book Chaadayev's bitter words, "live only in the present, in its narrowest possible range, without a past and a future, in

the midst of a deadly stagnation." Even "in our blood there is something hostile to any true progress...." Chaadayev's stupefying pessimism included lack of faith in the original forces of the Russian people and it was entirely natural for him to see as the solution only the borrowing of Western European culture, shaped under the influence of the religious and moral ideas of Roman Catholicism.

Could Pushkin, the poet-historian agree with this (as G. Volkov points out, such a combination in itself is unusual), as he pointed out the great past of the Russian people and drew from the heroic accomplishments of the people an ineradicable confidence in their great historical future?

Pushkin's work itself is an example of the tremendous possibilities of the Russian person and the presentation to the entire world of his national character. G. Volkov sums up the profound study of the characters created by the great poet as follows: "Prudence, a positive attitude, dedication, thoughtfulness and caution shown by Savelich, and rebelliousness, fury, 'risk taking,' and refusal to acknowledge the power of circumstances in Pugachev." Here again we have the positive attitude, perfection and spiritual harmony and integrity of Tatyana and the demon of doubt, dissatisfaction and negation which tempt Onegin.... It is with such a broad scope of two powerful wings of the Russian soul and character that Pushkin's genius takes off. He himself is a "combination of these opposites" (p 194). This was such a full and vivid embodiment of the national spirit in a personality that it enabled Gogol to describe Pushkin as the Russian man "in his final development as he will be, perhaps, 200 years hence."

To Russian culture, Pushkin is not simply its greatest poet. Throughout his book, G. Volkov asserts that "this is a historical phenomenon. It is the most important central point in the history of development of Russian culture, when such a culture first emerged from its closed boundaries into the open sea of world art and then, with the wind in the sails of Pushkin's poetry, became a flag bearer" (p 8). In Pushkin's works Russian spiritual processes found their captivating poetic form and, acquiring it, began to influence the subsequent development of Russian culture.

We frequently repeat that philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of the age. There are reasons for this. Embodied in a logical system, in Hegel's words, philosophy is the kingdom of shades, the world of simple essences, the lengthy stay and work within which is a cultural absolute and a need of the mind. The philosophical concept is the result of the entire spiritual life of the age and work on its realization acquires its relative completeness and, consequently, leads to the need to draw a conclusion concerning one's own historically limited range. That is precisely why philosophical thinking, as it encompasses a given stage in social development, at the same time anticipates the next one. It not only needs courage, to reflect the inner drama of

the age and its decline but also draws its optimism in the knowledge of the profound reasons for that drama. As Minerva's owl flies, twilight turns into dawn.

Nonetheless, thinking, in its rationalistic form, in the form of categories and concepts, is only the visible part of a huge iceberg which is man's spiritual world. Thinking in images, which is inherent in art, has the tremendous advantage over mental concepts by virtue of the fact that in the process of the spiritual mastery of reality the incalculable possibilities of the emotional area of the mind become involved. "It has long been noticed," G. Volkov writes, "that thinking in images is the most extensive and the most "economical" form of human thinking, in which the content is as though compressed to the degree of an explosive force and, from the spark in the reader could lead to a firework of associations. A "chain reaction" develops: the image is triggered directly by another image, bypassing lengthy logical transitions and rational classifications, giving birth to amazing analogies, finding similarities within dissimilarities, combining aspects of reality which cannot be combined by a cool mind, allowing us to find out what reality is more profoundly and more accurately" (p 97). This is the reason why poetry is able to concentrate within itself the spirit of the age.

The dispute between Pushkin and Chaadayev is, in addition to everything else, a dispute between a poet and a philosopher. Was the poet right? This too is discussed in Volkov's book which was written by a philosopher. This among many other things.

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### A Common Noun

905B0004P Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) pp 126-127

[Text] In its issue No 6 for 1989 this journal published an essay by O. Kuprin "...For Advice in Resolving Important Matters," which described the experience of interaction among the Yaroslavl Party Gorkom, the social movements, and the new association: the city's Council of Social Organizations ("SOBOR"). Several weeks later, the editors received a letter from A.I. Ryabkov, former chairman of the Yaroslavl City Executive Committee.

"I believe," he wrote, "that the questions raised in this article have been presented basically with accuracy.

"However, the author of the article has made a serious error concerning me, which affects my honor as a communist and a citizen, and morally harms the Soviet system in the city of Yaroslavl. He writes the following: 'A.I. Ryabkov resigned, the more so since his party organization comrades did not elect him delegate to the city party conference; meanwhile, the Public Council was represented there and four members of its leadership were elected members of the gorkom.'

"On 12 November 1988 delegates to the Krasnoperepolskiy Rayon Party Organization, despite the unprecedented persecution organized against me, elected Ryabkov a delegate to the city and oblast conferences; on 22 October 1988 the party conference at the Order of Lenin and October Revolution Krasnyy Perekop Industrial Fabrics Combine recommended Comrade Ryabkov for membership in the higher elective party authorities.

"I request that you consider this matter and properly assess it and inform the readers of KOMMUNIST of the steps which were taken."

Actually, unfortunately, an error was allowed in the essay "...For Advice in Resolving Important Matters:" A.I. Ryabkov was elected to attend the city party conference and, in truth, he did not attend it. This, apparently, is explained with the fact that in the course of the investigation of the facts cited in the essay, this inaccurate fact was confirmed by senior comrades in Yaroslavl. However, the error was made by the journal and the editors apologize to A.I. Ryabkov.

This could have marked the end of the story. We believe, however, that the story which was merely mentioned in the essay, is worthy of consideration because of some situations which are typical in a time of perestroika.

The people of Yaroslavl have been hearing the name of Aleksandr Ivanovich Ryabkov for the past 18 months and thanks to the publications in the central press and the broadcasts of Central Television, this name was heard by more than just the city's population.

This story began on the eve of the new year of 1988. On 31 December, as is usually the practice, hastily several planned projects were completed in the city, including the hospital at the Yaroslavl plant for diesel engines equipment. Again as is, alas, the practice, these projects were accepted although incomplete. This fact and some other were discussed in the all-Union press. The oblast prosecutor's office instigated criminal charges. An essential evaluation of the actions of officials who allowed such gross violations was given by the party obkom and oblast executive committee. In particular, A.I. Ryabkov, city executive committee chairman, was strictly reprimanded by the obkom bureau, with an entry in his official record; the city mayor was reprimanded also by the oblast executive committee. This was a just penalty as acknowledged by Aleksandr Ivanovich himself.

As to the chairman's involvement in "other things," i.e., a criminally punishable action, after a 4-month investigation the prosecutor's office threw the charge out; nor did it confirm that fictitious "bed-places" in the completed hospital had been added to the statistical report. However, the story of the hospital, which was widely publicized, mushroomed in the eyes of readers and television viewers (the people of Yaroslavl above all) as a kind of symbol of a bureaucratic attitude toward the

work, and Ryabkov's name became a common descriptive noun for phenomena which, in the popular opinion, are related to stagnation, bureaucratism and pressure by superiors.

Rarely did a meeting take place without ugly invectives being addressed at him, and the slogan "Ryabkov must resign!" was disseminated in a number of leaflets which were pasted up throughout the city. All in all, according to A.I. Ryabkov, in the past 1 and a half years the mass information media and the various public organizations have spoken against him some 70 times.

He resigned, but then a new topic appeared: the former chairman of the city executive committee was appointed to a senior position within the apparatus of the oblast soviet executive committee. This led to a new outburst of emotions: "The punished mayor is being transplanted to another leading position." These are the strange twists of a tempestuous public opinion, particularly today, when there is a growing politization of the awareness and when everything has virtually reached the limit of social tension, caused by the exhausting scarcity of commodities and foodstuffs. Under these circumstances, the natural aspiration develops to find and charge a culprit, the more so considering that that same person is guilty of entirely real sins. Is this level of anger consistent with the actual actions?

Naturally, the oblast prosecutor's office could have been wrong. However, not even the most emotional accusations of lack of objectivity, can nullify its decision. A legal document exists. It must either be respected or appealed through channels. Although neither is being done, the charges rejected by the prosecutor's office continue to be presented as irrefutable facts. Two processes which, by their very nature, are inseparably linked—the democratization of social life and the creation of a law-governed state—in this case have no contact points. Is this not the reason for many of our social tempests: the fact that a fast democratic stream recognizes no legal shores? It is also true that these shores are still not very strong and sometimes they quite quickly collapse and are washed away. Nonetheless....

Aleksandr Ivanovich Ryabkov addressed himself to the editors with the request, as he said, to defend his honor and dignity as a communist and a citizen. Our advice was to sue those who have insulted him for what is known in legal practices throughout the world as "defamation." He rejected it. The entire psychological make-up of an official of the apparatus rebels against the use of judicial procedures to prove his own innocence. Meanwhile, unrestrained, another mechanism, which has been tested and survived for decades, begins to work: to turn to the obkom and the gorkom with the request or demand to call to order, ...to provide a party assessment, to defend.... To defend against whom? Against public opinion.

Incidentally, following is the answer of I.A. Tolstoukhov, first secretary of the Yaroslavl CPSU Obkom, to a

question asked in the oblast youth newspaper on the transfer of the "penalized" mayor: "Any party member who has made an error is discussed by the party authorities. Comrade Ryabkov was issued a party reprimand. One year later it was lifted. He committed no crime in the course of his activities as chairman of the city executive committee. The session of the oblast soviet of people's deputies confirmed the appointment of Comrade Ryabkov as department head with the oblast executive committee."

In our view, we should also consider the fact that on the crest of a wave of emotions we frequently tend to condemn anyone who may be a member of the leadership. A roughly similar demand was made to the editors by several readers who live far from Yaroslavl but who were familiar with the "Ryabkov case" from television and newspaper coverage. In the legal sense, there is no such "case." In general, in our view, such a formulation of the question is wrong. A person may be a poor plant director but an excellent shop chief. Success in any work, including managerial, depends on whether the person has the corresponding ability and experience.

It is true that there are types of actions in which professionalism, if not taking second place, mandatorily presumes certain human qualities. This applies above all to political activities and in this case the role of public opinion becomes substantially greater. Could public opinion be wrong? It could, the more so since in frequent cases it is still unable to make use of legal methods in the defense of democracy, excessively relying on emotions and intuition. However, a certain positive experience has also been acquired. Now political leaders are judged not only on the basis of official references and their service record; efforts are made to understand the type of human qualities that are present in a given leader and to see whether he has features indicating democracy and openness in his character, rather than as attributes of his position.

The position of chairman of the city executive committee is a difficult one and is in the eyes of everyone; malcontents will always be found. In this case both job and personal life are as though put under a microscope into which thousands of curious and interested eyes are peering. However a person may restrain his irritation or suppress his emotions, eventually his character and habits (even despite his best will) become public. We believe that that is precisely what occurred in the course of our long discussion with Aleksandr Ivanovich. In any case, we clearly saw the essential difference between his personal views and the views of the public opinion in the city on problems which are the most important in political activities (which, precisely, is the nature of the work in a soviet). We do not doubt that A.I. Ryabkov believes with absolute sincerity that the open appeal to the voters to recall him from the position of chairman of the city executive committee has nothing in common with political democratization and glasnost and that this is a "political provocation against the Soviet system" and, in general, a recurrence of the 1937 situation. He

was quite amazed to realize that we did not agree with him (particularly as regards 1937). He was sincerely amazed, and when a person is sincere he reveals his true character.

The oblast soviet deputies appointed A.I. Ryabkov to a responsible position. No one can deny them this right, in the same way that no one can forbid public opinion to consider such an appointment an error and to try to correct it. The means to this effect are a different matter. A very difficult situation has developed, related to different understandings of basic perestroyka processes. However, after the positions have been made clear, it becomes easier to find answers to pressing problems. If this is being done through democratic methods which do not go beyond the legal limits, the decision will be just, honest and unquestionable. Although, alas, many people have still not learned how to subordinate their emotions to reason and to the new realities of life and the law.

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#### Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

905B0004Q Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 89 (signed to press 24 Aug 89) p 128

[Text] A meeting between the party aktiv of the Moscow Machine Building Plant imeni M.V. Khrunichiev and members of KOMMUNIST was held. Problems of the renovation of the style and methods of CPSU activities and perestroyka in the work of mass information media as well as problems of the economic situation in the country were discussed. A number of remarks and wishes were expressed to the editors. Their attention was drawn to the need for systematic publications on the theory of socialism, which would describe the long-term development of Soviet society toward a qualitatively new status and on problems of upgrading the vanguard role of the party at the present stage of perestroyka; making the materials in the journal sharper and more topical; and broadening the genre and stylistic variety of materials.

KOMMUNIST was visited by a delegation of the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, headed by Deputy Institute Director Qin Dixiang. The guests were interested in the ways and means of activities of the CPSU, development of intraparty democracy, problems of improving the political system of Soviet society and the role of the mass information media under perestroyka conditions.

In the course of a talk held between the editors and a delegation of West German journalists, representing the F. Hebert Foundation, problems of the activities of the party press in covering the reform of the economic and political system of Soviet society, and national policy of the CPSU under contemporary conditions were discussed.

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