

JPRS-UKO-89-014
11 AUGUST 1989



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

Soviet Union

KOMMUNIST

No 8, May 1989

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DMC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

19980518 054

Soviet Union
KOMMUNIST
No 8, May 1989

JPRS-UKO-89-014

CONTENTS

11 AUGUST 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

Legal Policy: An Active Part of Perestroyka [V. Chebrikov; pp 3-17] 1

PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Shall We Continue to Live in the Past? Economic Reform and Scientific and Technical Progress
[S. Glazyev, D. Lvov; pp 18-24] 10
Money Is Not Paid for Nothing [Ye. Gaydar; pp 25-35] 14

PUBLIC OPINION

Clash and Hope (Thoughts on the Subject of the April Events in Tbilisi) [V. Keshelava; pp 36-44] . 21
'To Live With Our Eyes Open' [T. Zaslavskaya; pp 45-54] 27
'Two Rubles and 14 Kopeks per Kilogram' [p 55] 33

DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

Problems of Nationalities in the Context of General Laws of Development
[N. Moiseyev; pp 56-66] 33
Letters to the Editors [pp 67-78] 40

PAGES OF HISTORY

Anticipating the Change (F.E. Dzerzhinskiy's Last Letters and Notes) [pp 79-88] 50

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

A Rational-Metaphorical Picture of the World [B. Raushenbakh; pp 89-97] 60

THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

New Thinking in International Affairs [N. Maslennikov, Yu. Molchanov; pp 98-107] 66
The Way to a 'Common European Home': Economic Aspects
[V. Baranovskiy, V. Zuyev; pp 108-118] 74

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Historians Have the Floor [S. Khizhnyakov; pp 119-120] 81
Ethnic Groups in the Contemporary World [G. Starushenko; pp 120-122] 83
Relevance of Ancient Philosophy [L. Golovanov; pp 122-124] 84
ATR: Peaceful Choice [B. Kulik; pp 124-126] 86
Short Book Reviews [pp 126-128] 88
Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors [p 128] 89
Publication Data 90

KOMMUNIST

No 8, May 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

Legal Policy: An Active Part of Perestroyka
18020014a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 3-17

[Article by Viktor Mikhaylovich Chebrikov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary]

[Text] Historical experience in the establishment of socialism and the development of perestroyka processes in our country indicate that a comprehensively tested and active legal policy, consistent with the course of renovation of socialism, taking into consideration the changes occurring in the society, is needed in order to assert the principles of democracy and true popular rule. Its strategic objective was set by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which called for building a socialist rule of law state. In the course of its establishment, we must develop the type of legal mechanisms which would ensure the normal functioning of the renovated society, reliably protect its democratic institutions and safeguard the rights and freedoms of every citizen and the interests of the entire nation.

I

Prerequisites for such mechanisms were established at the dawn of the Soviet system, starting with its initial decrees. The intensiveness and scale of legislative work done during those years were striking: within a short time the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People, the RSFSR Constitution, and codes of laws on labor, marriage and the family and an entire array of other basic legislative acts were adopted. This work was done with V.I. Lenin's immediate participation. Lenin himself wrote and edited many of the decrees, amending and refining them. It would be instructive to turn more frequently to the legal documents of the Leninist period and to the procedure governing their drafting and adoption. They provide a unique experience in the development of socialist democracy and the establishment of the soviets as a new historical type of governmental system.

A new governmental apparatus, the purpose of which was to serve the interests of the working people, was developed under V.I. Lenin's guidance. A legal foundation, which was quite firm for those times, was laid under his innovative and comprehensive activities. Great attention was paid to observing socialist legality: suffice it to recall that despite all the difficulties and hardships of the establishment of a Soviet system under

the conditions of the struggle against the counterrevolution, as early as 8 November 1918 the decree "On Legality" was passed by the 6th All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets. Among others, it stipulated that "in 1 year of revolutionary struggle, the Russian working class formulated the foundations of the laws of the Russian Socialist Federative Republic, the strict observance of which is needed for the further development and strengthening of the power of the workers and peasants in Russia."

It was during that period that the foundations of the party's governmental-legal policy were laid, a policy aimed at ensuring the coordination of the interests of the individual with those of society. The resolutions of the 11th All-Russian RKP(b) Conference of December 1921 indicated the need to establish "the strict principles of revolutionary legality in all areas of life." It was particularly pointed out that the "strict responsibility of authorities, officials and citizens for violations of the laws created by the Soviet system and its order should go hand-in-hand with strengthening the guarantees of the individual and his property." With the advent of the period of peaceful development, V.I. Lenin particularly emphasized that "the deeper we penetrate into the conditions which are needed for a firm and durable system, and the further we develop civilian life, the more urgent it becomes to formulate the firm slogan of observing high revolutionary legality..." ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 329).

As we know, the process of strengthening legality came to a halt and the very idea of legality was rather substantially distorted when Stalin gained power in the party and the state. Authoritarian methods of leadership became dominant. The law was considered essentially as an instrument for exerting command influence on the people. On that level mass repressions as well were given a "theoretical" substantiation. All of this had grave consequences for our society.

In April 1985 the party charted a course toward promoting radical changes, eliminating obstructions in all areas of social life and strengthening the legal foundations of governmental and social life. In the 4 years which have passed since, a great deal has been accomplished in this area. Major steps were taken to ensure the legal guarantees for perestroyka. Amendments and supplements were made to the Constitution of the USSR and major legislative acts were passed, such as the Law on the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR, the Law on the State Enterprise (Association), laws on nationwide discussion of major problems of governmental life, the cooperatives, individual labor activity, procedure for appealing to the court illegal actions by officials, actions which harm the rights of citizens, and others.

The first stage in the political reform is virtually completed. The procedure for structuring the superior authorities and the electoral system and their activities

has been updated. A major step has been taken in structuring an integral system of soviets. There has been substantial progress in the division of labor and the rights of soviets and their executive authorities. Replacing the elected authorities with the apparat has been eliminated. The system of constitutional guarantees for control by the soviets of other governmental authorities and officials has been broadened.

The campaign for the election of USSR People's Deputies, which took place on the basis of the new principles, proved the increased political activeness of the Soviet people and their tremendous civic interest in governmental and social affairs. The overwhelming majority of people spoke out in favor of perestroyka, firmly and unequivocally. This time all of us were witnesses to and participants in a truly democratic and open electoral process. Unfortunately, there were some failures as well. It would be useful to take this into consideration in the future, as we improve our electoral system.

These days the USSR people's deputies are holding their first congress. They will pass resolutions which will lead society on the path of perestroyka and the renovation of our life and to a true rule of law socialist state. A specific embodiment of this will be, in particular, the setting up within the structure of the supreme authorities, a committee for constitutional supervision, the purpose of which will be to ensure the strict consistency between governmental laws and resolutions and the Soviet Constitution. The creation of the committee is a step of essential political significance. All matters related to the organization and procedures of its activities will be regulated by the Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR.

Briefly, important and many-faceted work on strengthening the legal foundations of life in Soviet society is being done. Such work holds a key position in party efforts aimed at the renovation of socialism. It is based on the resolution "On the Legal Reform," which was passed at the 19th Party Conference. As a whole, it is a question of the formulation and implementation of a major set of steps aimed at perestroyka and the improvement of the entire Soviet legal system: legislation, the law enforcement mechanism, juridical science, and legal training and education. The CPSU Central Committee Commission on Problems of Legal Policy, which was created at the September 1988 Central Committee Plenum, has begun to make a certain contribution to this work. With the help of scientific institutions, the public, ministries and departments, a program for action is being drafted and given a specific content and aimed at implementing the major, difficult and long-term project of establishing a rule of law state.

The periodical press, scientific publications and various public fora have been debating the question of what type of state this should be, and what should its criteria and most important features consist of. A number of useful and well argued concepts have been expressed. In the

final account, all of them substantiate ways of organizing and managing society, which would be entirely consistent with our lofty concept of socialism as a system of social justice and real humanism and full rule by the people. Such a formulation of the question is consistent with Marx's idea of the transformation of the state from an authority standing above society into an authority entirely subordinated to that society (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 19, p 26). Currently the practical implementation of this task is dictated by the logic of the revolutionary restructuring of society on the basis of the Leninist concepts of socialism and the implementation of the imperatives of the socialist revolution on the link between socialism and democracy and the strengthening of legality, discipline and law and order.

The essential dimensions of a rule of law state are profound and comprehensive democracy, humanism, glasnost, self-management by the people and reliable legal protection of the entire society and the individual citizen. The range of competence of the state must be clearly established; the limits of the influence of the state on social and private life must be defined and the equality of all citizens and organizations in the eyes of the law must be secured. In a rule of law state the state is responsible to every citizen and, at the same time, every citizen is responsible to the state. In other words, there can be no arbitrary exercise of power. Furthermore, the constitutional state authority is protected from attempts at subverting its foundations. The rule of law state is distinguished by a stable legislation which, furthermore, is being steadily improved in the interests of society and the individual. Such a state must have an efficient mechanism which would ensure the strict implementation of the laws.

"...The main feature of a rule of law state," M.S. Gorbachev has said, "is to actually ensure the supremacy of the law." This is a brief and comprehensive formula. Now it is important to implement it in full in both practice and theory. The latter greatly depends on Soviet juridical science, which is facing difficult and responsible tasks. The new factors of social development originate problems which, in the past, were virtually ignored by our scientists. Reality formulates increased requirements concerning the pace, quality and efficiency of scientific developments. Naturally, the development of problems of shaping the rule of law state could be fruitful only through the combined efforts of the representatives of juridical and other sciences. Basic comprehensive studies must be made of the legal, political, ideological, socioeconomic and moral aspects of this complex many-faceted phenomenon. We must provide a profound interpretation of any valuable domestic and foreign experience in the area of the legal regulation of social relations.

A thorough understanding of the problem of the correlation between democracy and law and legality is very important. The party considers their development as the

solution of the problem of creating reliable guarantees against any distortions in state building and social development. The expansion of democracy in all areas of the political system of Soviet society should prevent negative processes and contribute to achieving a qualitatively new standard in the country's socioeconomic and spiritual development.

A great deal more remains to be done to broaden democracy in the country and, understandably, this process will be quite difficult. The trouble also is that there is a rather widespread abstract understanding of democracy as something protected from the interference of the state and society and as the possibility of doing anything one wishes, total permissiveness and anarchy. In that case the energy is channeled not toward the good of man and society but toward their harm. This is no longer democracy.

The entire course of historical development has proved that democratic institutions must be reliably protected by the law, social morality and culture. The nature of Soviet socialist democracy is defined by the economic, political, social and spiritual factors inherent in socialism. Its economic foundation is the socialist ownership of the means of production in its various forms; its political foundation is the power of the people. On the social level it is based on the socialist choice made by our people and its support of socialist values. In a socialist society the purpose of legal regulation is to contribute to the strengthening of such foundations, to improve socialist social relations, to enhance the individual and to protect and develop human rights and freedoms.

In his time, Marx drew the conclusion that "there are no rights without obligations and there are no obligations without rights" (op. cit., vol 16, p 13). This thought is very important in the organization of our current life, which demands ever more persistently of every citizen his active and conscious participation in the renovation of society, the strengthening of discipline and order and the cleansing of our common home from crime, drunkenness and other ills. The law sets a sensible framework for human behavior and juridically ensures human rights and freedoms. Improvements and intensification of democracy are inseparable from strengthening socialist law and order. Essentially, this is one and the same process.

Naturally, we must take into consideration that the law lives and acts under specific socioeconomic conditions. The elimination of subjectivistic and administrative-command methods and the assertion of democratic self-management principles in state and social life assign to the legal means a decisive role in regulating social relations. Our laws must become a powerful support of perestroika. In order for the democratic institutions to function impeccably and dynamically and for democracy

to work we need strong law and order which would meet the requirements of the contemporary stage in the development of Soviet society and the tasks of socialist renovation.

Democracy deprived of its legal foundation would find itself without a mechanism which could ensure the implementation of its constructive potential. It would face the real threat of finding itself defenseless in the face of anarchy and arbitrariness. Through the use of legal instruments society and the individual gain a reliable protection from bureaucratic centralism as well as departmental and parochial arbitrariness. Nonetheless, without democratic institutions and without the extensive participation of the people in the formulation, adoption and implementation of legal standards, the latter risk to be nothing but a dead letter of the law. It is thus that from the strong interconnection between democratic and legal foundations a mechanism develops which can ensure the activities of Soviet society and the socialist rule of law state. In this case priority is given to the comprehensive expansion and implementation of human rights. It is a question both of fully bringing to light the humanistic nature of socialism as well as the emancipation of its inner motive force—the social activeness of man and the free and conscious creativity of the people's masses. The party considers as its task that of bringing democracy closer to the individual and offering the broadest possible scope for the realization of the civic and constructive potential of the individual.

II

Perestroika formulates major requirements affecting the present efforts aimed at strengthening the legal foundations of governmental and social life. What is being done on this level now, and what is being contemplated for the immediate future?

A specific plan for the implementation of the legal reform in the country is being carried out in accordance with the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference. The most important component on this level is that of perfecting legislation, the judicial reform, and restructuring the activities of the prosecutor's office, the internal affairs and state security agencies, arbitration, the bar, and juridical services in the national economy.

Today the country has entered a period in which real results in all areas can be considered the basic criterion in assessing the state of affairs. Unquestionably, consistent with this criterion should be all activities in the area of strengthening legality and law and order. Political concepts must be implemented through specific actions. The scale and novelty of the task of the legal reform are exceptionally great. The tremendous volume and complexity of their implementation must be constantly kept in sight in order not to be confused and lose control over the situation which will change in the course of the reform. The experience and the lessons of the past confirm that we have not always been ready to act in

accordance with the changes occurring in society in the course of the process of its renovation based on the principles of socialist democracy.

Improving, systematizing and codifying the entire Soviet legislation is a starting point for the legal reform. In this area, proceeding from the stipulations of the 27th Party Congress, as we pointed out, extensive work has already been done. As a whole, however, it can be considered only as the beginning of a major review of existing legislation. The sociopolitical and economic processes triggered by perestrojka indicate that we cannot limit ourselves to partial changes. The time has come for a new codification, for a substantial updating of the USSR Code of Laws. It is very important for this code to become an actual collection of legislative acts, accessible to and understood by all citizens.

In the economic area the Law on the State Enterprise is merely the first step in the legal streamlining of economic relations and the activities of the entire national economic complex. The current laws are still codifying, to a certain extent, not economic but administrative management methods. They include prohibitions and petty regulations which hinder the systematic implementation of the principles of cost accounting and material incentive. That explains the relevance of the creation of a legal mechanism which can ensure the efficient regulation of a variety of forms of economic activities. Particular attention should be paid to the drafting of legislative acts on state planning, the variety of forms of socialist ownership, environmental protection, introducing substantial amendments to civil and tax legislation, etc.

Improving the legislation, such as to ensure the implementation of the party's and state's social policy, is an essential task. We must strengthen the influence of the law on the development of the sociocultural sphere and use legal instruments to surmount equalization trends in the distribution of social benefits and in upgrading the efficiency of control over the measure of labor and consumption, based on the quantity and quality of labor and its results.

A number of important legislative acts must be passed in connection with the radical political reform, enhancing the status of the deputies, strengthening the rights of soviets, developing self-management, strengthening the guarantees of constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens and other problems of governmental-legal building. A major block of draft laws is under preparation, aimed at the further intensification of the reform of the political system. In this case the Law on Local Self-Management and the Local Economy plays a special role.

Extensive work lies ahead in strengthening the legal protection of the individual and the guarantees for the exercise of the political, economic and social rights and freedoms of the Soviet people. Whereas we have

acquired significant experience in the area of the socio-economic rights of citizens, a great deal remains to be done in legally securing the other constitutional rights and freedoms. In a time of tempestuous development of democracy and glasnost, both citizens and managing officials must steadily upgrade their political standards and make skillful use of the democratic institutions.

Legislative regulation requires order in the exercise of the rights of inviolability of the individual, his home and his correspondence, and noninterference in his private life. Today, as a rule, this is based on a variety of instructions and other legal acts which frequently conflict with each other. A substantial renovation is needed in the legal base of civilian activities and in labor, housing, pension and other specific areas of life of the working people. We must radically review criminal, procedural and corrective-labor legislation.

Today particular attention must be paid to the juridical aspect of relations among nationalities. Both in the center and the local areas problems in this sphere must be solved on the basis of the unity among local, national and all-Union interests, through perestrojka and through ensuring its success. In this context anything which hinders the renovation of society and diverts the constructive efforts of the Soviet people is unacceptable.

Extensive and responsible work is necessary in connection with the need for a clear demarcation among the competences of the USSR and the individual republics, and expanding the rights of Union republics and all national formations. In particular, it is a question of undertaking the practical implementation of the ideas of republic and regional cost accounting, and ensuring the national-cultural rights of citizens and the free development and equal utilization of languages. Guidelines in this area will be provided by the resolutions of the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum on problems of improving relations among nationalities.

Our perestrojka has become an international factor. Thanks to the new political thinking and the elimination of many ideological stereotypes we were able to solve major foreign policy problems and to strengthen the authority of the Soviet state. However, this imposes a great deal of obligations upon us in work within the country as well. In this case it is a question of implementing agreements based on the final documents of the Vienna meeting. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo has instructed all departments to draft and implement specific steps based on the stipulations codified in that document. This is a difficult task which applies to an array of problems in the humanities and in the area of human rights and freedoms and, as it has now become clear, which will require improvements and, in some areas, a review of current legislation.

The implementation of the Vienna agreements in the humanitarian-legal area is an extension of the solution of the problems earmarked by the party in the course of

expanding democracy and glasnost. As we know, a certain procedure for holding assemblies, meetings, marches and demonstrations has been defined. The procedure for providing psychiatric help has been improved. Criminal responsibility has been established for illegally committing citizens in a psychiatric hospital. The procedure for the access by citizens to a number of border zones has been simplified, etc. We are close to ending the discussion on the draft Foundations of Criminal Legislation. Draft laws on the press and other mass information media, on the freedom of conscience and religious organizations, voluntary societies, social agencies and independent social associations, the procedure for leaving and returning to the USSR by Soviet citizens and other documents are being completed. Nonetheless, extensive work remains to be done to make a number of laws and administrative regulations consistent with our obligations based on international human rights agreements.

Naturally, it is not merely a question of the scale of legal work. It is particularly important to be concerned with the quality of the laws, bearing in mind that juridical, legal instruments can by no means affect all social relations. Nonetheless, efforts are being made precisely to regulate many aspects in our life instead of making use of the potential of organizational and educational work. Incidentally, one of the main reasons for the flood of departmental instructions, rules, and so on, which "correct" the laws, particularly in the national economy, is the result of the bureaucratic trend of creating an appearance of action and the desire to avoid work by issuing instructions.

In addition to everything else, this attraction for administering has been the result of forgetting and neglecting the Marxist-Leninist concept to the effect that the laws must reflect the needs of social progress and provide opportunities for their implementation. Instead, in the course of the law-making process, the aspiration was developed to cover with regulations as many social processes as possible and to organize human activities with the help of prohibitions and restrictions regardless of their real interests and needs and, frequently, despite them. It so happened that abstract declarative concepts, the implementation of which was either difficult or simply impossible, were promulgated as laws, the implementation of which frequently depended on the good or ill will of various departments and managers. This could not fail to lead to subjectivism and departmental diktat or other equally adverse consequences. Today we must take into consideration these lessons if we truly wish to ensure the quality and stability of the law.

In order for the legislation to work for perestroika, it must fully reflect the variety of interests of the various population strata and groups. It must actively solve arising conflicts with a view to harmonizing private with social needs. That is why it is so important to purge it from the obstructions of departmentalism. Unfortunately, this process is being carried out slowly and with

difficulty. The procedure for the solution of many practical problems should be seen not in instructions but in the very latest laws. Soviet law must become not only stable but also dynamic, simple and accessible to the understanding of nonspecialists.

Naturally, we must take into consideration that the opinions of different people could coincide or be mutually exclusive. Suffice it to consider the results of the discussion of the draft Foundations of Criminal Legislation. The parts of the draft which stipulate as an exceptional measure of punishment "until its total abolition" the death penalty for particularly severe crimes have triggered sharp discussions. In my view, in this case some of the participants in the discussion absolutize the significance of humanism toward criminals, forgetting the victims of crimes and their parents and relatives. This matter requires a comprehensive and realistic view of the condition of crime and the punishment which must be just and consistent with the gravity of the action.

Here is another example. Very categorical views have been expressed on the need to eliminate passports in our country and the institution of residential permits itself. Most frequently and without specific arguments, references are made to the practices of a number of Western countries. Are such references legitimate? Let us consider them. The practice of documentation and registration of the population, as it exists in the leading capitalist countries, is strict and comprehensive. The state authorities explain this with the struggle against terrorism and drug dealers and other criminal elements, which has been intensifying in recent years. An entire set of automated systems has been instituted, which makes it possible to take most fully into consideration the actions of the population and in a few minutes to identify an individual. In the FRG, for example, the main document of the citizen is his identity card and there is a system of home domicile registration. In the United States the main documents certifying to someone's identity are his driver's permit and social security card. Such a card is mandatorily issued to every U.S. citizen at the age of 5 and has its own individual number which is entered in the computer system. This number must be given in applying for a job, entering school, paying federal taxes, obtaining a foreign travel passport and many other cases. A no less efficient control instrument is the Internal Revenue Service. All U.S. citizens, including those living abroad, must file an annual tax return in which they indicate, in addition to their income, other information (place of residence and job, family status, etc.). Therefore, the revenue service acquires annually updated information for virtually all citizens in the country. For quite some time the practice has existed of taking footprints of newly born children, with a view to obtaining additional identification features. All of this must not be ignored when we discuss Western practices, which have both positive as well as negative aspects.

Let us note that draft laws are being prepared thoroughly by special commissions, with the help of the most competent jurists and other scientific and practical

workers. However, experience in law making leads to the conclusion of the need to formulate a clear order governing the development of laws and the active participation in this matter of deputies, scientists and the public, and the application of the rules for the study of practices in the implementation and checking the efficiency of legal norms. It is only thus that socialist law can fully reflect the economic, political and cultural potential of Soviet society and, at the same time, be an effective management instrument in the interest of social progress.

We know that in the past as well many good laws and resolutions were passed but also that not all of them were suitably implemented. For a number of reasons, about which a great deal has already been said, the authority of the law declined. Legal nihilism became widespread. As was noted at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the scornful attitude toward the law was triggered by stagnation phenomena in the socioeconomic and spiritual areas of social life. The result of this was a decline in mores. A state of permissiveness and total forgiveness developed. Exigency, discipline and responsibility declined. This situation was assisted by the administrative-command management style. There were frequent cases in which party authorities applied pressure on the courts, the prosecutor and the investigative authorities. All of this had an extremely adverse effect on the state of law and order in the country. The consequences of such phenomena are still being felt.

Crime is a subject of particular concern. The decline of the crime rate, which was noted after 1985, was replaced by a great increase last year. Substantial changes for the better have not been noticed so far. One of the main reasons for this situation is that party, soviet and law enforcement authorities proved unprepared to act under the conditions of democratization and glasnost. Some officials became confused by the just criticism of shortcomings in the work of the militia, the courts, the prosecutors and the stricter requirements on observing the law in their activities. The conversion from customary administrative measures to new and more advanced forms of work which demand good knowledge and proper application of the law proved difficult. The course toward humanizing criminal legislation is one of the inviolable conditions for the creation of a real rule of law state. It triggered in some personnel of the militia, the prosecutor's office and the court's indecisiveness and the fear of applying the power of the law in the interests of ensuring public order and in the struggle against crime.

Nor did this situation become promptly apparent to many local authorities. Naturally, all of us today are learning how to work in a new way. However, in this case we must not forget the need constantly to study the situation and to keep our fingers on the pulse beat of social life and to closely listen to the views of the working people and promptly exert political influence on occurring processes. Who if not the party organizations and

party authorities should promptly note distortions in the struggle against crime and promote their correction? The humanizing of criminal legislation is by no means equal to indulgence toward dangerous criminals!

The spreading of violations of the rules of trade, hoarding commodities, creating artificial shortages, and speculating can be explained only as the result of the weakening of the efforts of law enforcement authorities and the lowered activeness of the public in strengthening law and order. The struggle against such phenomena is a task not only for the militia, the prosecutor's office and the courts but also for the party and soviet authorities, labor collectives and mass information media.

The strengthening of legality and law and order demands of the party authorities a comprehensive approach. It demands the unification of the efforts of party, soviet and law enforcement authorities, public organizations and labor collectives. Nonetheless, of late the work of the people's units and other social formations has substantially weakened. It is understandable that under the new conditions of economic management the labor collectives try to avoid as much as possible involvements unrelated to their production activities. Therefore, we must more daringly seek new forms of work. Worker control is being restored now and worker detachments are being set up at some enterprises. The labor collectives themselves are showing initiative in maintaining public order in their microrayons. To this effect they use material facilities earned under the conditions of the new economic management system. This initiative must be closely studied and supported taking, naturally, specific conditions and possibilities into consideration.

We must enhance the development of a uniform all-Union comprehensive program of struggle against crime, which must be based on a profound scientific analysis and projection of crime-generating circumstances in the country. Today we are seeing new manifestations of crime, unusual to us, such as organized crime, racketeering, increased cases of acts of violence, clashes among hostile youth groups, manifestations of national extremism, and a sharp increase in black marketeering and "the shady economy." What awaits us tomorrow or in 1 or 5 years? Crime can and must be prognosticated so that the measures taken in the struggle against it be timely.

The vitality of the new course in the struggle against violations of the law will be determined, not least, by the level of social prevention. In this case we need well-coordinated steps and plans for the socioeconomic development of collectives, rayons and cities. We need a thought-out comprehensive program of work involving the participation of the broad public, the labor collectives and the population at home. Such a program must comprehensively include the local soviets, their commissions and the corps of deputies. Without taking over, the party authorities must engage in persistent political work, rallying the efforts of all participants. We must

systematically pursue a line of applying the law wherever necessary and act decisively, and, applying the power of the law, maintain the public order and protect socialist democracy and the rights and interests of the individual and society from whims and arbitrary behavior.

We must not forget that we initiated perestroika not only with the economic reform and not only with democratization and glasnost. We initiated it by strengthening the order, organization and discipline and intensifying the struggle against crime, drunkenness and other negative phenomena. Subsequent to the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a number of decisive steps were taken to strengthen the principle of equality of everyone in the eyes of the law. This had an immediate positive impact on the overall situation. The power of the law was felt by those who had become accustomed indiscriminately to abuse their official status and scorn the interests of society and the public. Those who needed it gained confidence in justice and in the defense of their rights. Order, organization and discipline in production and at home improved. There has been an improvement in the overall moral and psychological climate. Nonetheless, as in the past, perestroika processes are greatly hindered by remaining conservative ideas and views, passiveness and dependency and lack of understanding that the success of the common cause can be ensured only through the personal participation of everyone.

Perestroika highlighted many negative phenomena. It is no accident that in the defense of selfish interests, it is opposed by a variety of antisocial forces which lead a parasitic existence, aided by unsolved problems and difficulties and corrupt elements. In a number of areas a difficult situation has developed along with a rather acute social tension. Emergency steps had to be taken in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here, as is now clear, criminal elements and various extremists encouraged the aggravation of the situation. Their activities encouraged national discord and led to numerous severe crimes, such as murders, pogroms and mass coerced resettlement. Significant material damages were caused to the national economy of these areas. The events in Tbilisi, which resulted in human casualties, must be studied closely and thoroughly, and proper conclusions must be drawn.

Of late forces which do not conceal their hostility toward socialism and who pit themselves against the CPSU have become more active. They are persistently promoting the idea of creating political structures which would act as an alternative to the Communist Party. Attempts are being made to organize them. Appeals calling for the violation of our constitutional principles, disobedience to Soviet laws and commission of crimes against the state and even the overthrow of the Soviet system have been heard at some unsanctioned meetings. It became clear that the instigators are not responding to any sensible arguments and that the failure to take measures of a criminal-legal nature against them is considered a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities, for which reason they are casting all restraint aside.

Steps of a legal nature had to be taken to protect socialism, democracy and glasnost from the encroachments of various types of anti-Soviets and extremists. The adoption of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase "On Amendments and Supplements to the USSR Law 'On Criminal Liability for State Crimes' and Some other Legislative Acts of the USSR" was a major step in this direction. This ukase, unlike the previous laws, is more clear and specific and more humane. It is consistent with the processes of expansion of democracy and glasnost in the country. At the same time, it can efficiently protect individual citizens as well as the entire society from dangerous criminal acts. This ukase, finally, should sober up double-dyed extremists. If none of this takes place, the state security and law enforcement authorities must, acting in accordance with the law, block illegal activities and issue criminal indictments against the culprits.

It is necessary to oppose negative phenomena above all through active and aggressive political and ideological work by the party among the masses. Frequently the social initiative is assumed by individuals who are politically immature but suffer from excessive ambitions and claim to assume leadership positions. In some cases they are indeed able to channel various movements along a false way due to the passive attitude of the party organizations and the party aktiv and the lagging of political work behind processes occurring in reality. In his time, V.I. Lenin wrote with a great deal of concern that "...There is nothing easier than demagogically to lead the crowd which can then realize its errors only as a result of most bitter trials" (op. cit., vol 6, p 123).

Unquestionably, perestroika is possible only under conditions of discipline and organization. Manifestations of extremism, and disrespect for the laws and public opinion are considered by the party as major encroachments on the democratization process and as the danger of a forced retreat. Revolutionary perestroika is a way of renovation of socialism. It was supported by the people, who expressed their confidence in the CPSU as the ruling party and the political vanguard of society. We must not let the institutions of our democracy to be used by antiperestroika forces and by various types of demagogues and adventurists for purposes of weakening the socialist foundations of society and the state. In this case we must display flexibility in the making of political decisions and act strictly in accordance with the law.

III

The law enforcement authorities play a responsible role in the strengthening of legality. Steps are currently being taken radically to improve their work, which is being critically analyzed by the mass information media and is openly and publicly discussed by society, scientists and specialists. For the first time in many decades data on crime in the country have been made public. Nonetheless, perestroika in the law enforcement authorities is experiencing difficulties. Many practical workers in the

local areas still insufficiently understand contemporary requirements, which leads to swinging from one extreme to another in law enforcement practices. The percentage of exposed crimes remains low. Violations of legality in the work of law enforcement authorities are still allowed to occur.

We are trying to correct the situation and to see to it that the law enforcement authorities wage an uncompromising struggle against criminal elements and against attempts on the life, health, dignity and honor of the citizens and act with professional knowledge, decisively and in accordance with the law. Steps are being taken for the prosecutor's office to deal, above all, with monitoring the accurate and firm observance of the law, particularly in the socioeconomic area and in the area of ensuring human rights and freedoms. Proposals have been drafted on the reorganization of the investigative machinery. Their implementation will make it possible to upgrade the responsibility of investigators, to strengthen their autonomy and independence and to enhance the quality of investigations. Suggestions are being drafted on ensuring the legal protection of militia personnel and other guardians of law and order. The elimination of shortcomings in the work of law enforcement authorities is possible only with the active support of party and soviet authorities. We must strengthen the authority of the prosecutor's office, the internal affairs organs and the courts. However, their activities must not be immune to criticism. It is important to take energetic steps to develop the material and technical facilities of law enforcement authorities.

The interpretation of our entire past experience on the basis of the Leninist ideas calls for asserting the priority of courts in strengthening legality and law and order (naturally, not at the expense of paying less attention to the other units in the law enforcement mechanism). It is a question of enhancing the prestige of the courts which bear particular responsibility for the triumph of law and justice. The party's ideological-political and organizational work must be directed toward the shaping of a new attitude toward the courts. We must surmount the view that the courts are only a punitive authority, for they have been entrusted with protecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens. The courts must be accessible to any citizen. The people must respect and trust the courts. It is precisely such a social significance of the courts that is consistent with the interests of perestroyka. Incidentally, not least important are the conditions in which the judges work: What kind of authority could there be a question of if, as a rule, the courts are located in unsuitable premises and lack even basic material and technical facilities?! Understandably, this problem cannot be solved immediately. However, we became concerned with it quite a long time ago.

Particular attention should be paid to strengthening the ties between law enforcement authorities and the people, for without this we will not go far in the struggle against

crime. This is not merely a question of boosting achievements and positive examples. The main thing is relations between people and institutions and officials which enact the laws. How is a person received by the militia, the prosecutor's office or the court and how are his requests considered? What concern is being shown for him? A great deal depends on how this is done, such as the atmosphere in society, the mood of the people and, in the final account, success in the struggle against delinquency.

I would like to mention something else as well. Of late there have been frequent attempts to describe to public opinion as almost immoral the actions of a person who has reported to the militia preparations to commit a crime. Yet without the help which honest Soviet people give to the law enforcement authorities the efficiency of the struggle against crime declines sharply! At the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that "if we wish for our laws to be functioning and to protect us, the democratization process, glasnost and perestroyka, and the law enforcement authorities must feel the steady support of society in implementing their difficult duty."

Under the conditions of perestroyka sociopolitical life indicates that many problems and difficulties are the consequence of insufficient experience and low political and legal standards. That is why merely passing laws and having juridical institutions is insufficient in ensuring the normal activities of society and the state. As V.I. Lenin said, this requires "extensive educational, organizational and cultural work..." (op. cit., vol 38, p 166). This type of approach must set today the scale and content of party activities in the area of strengthening law and order. Its main purpose is for the steady application of the laws to become the daily practice of party, soviet and economic authorities and the inner need of their officials and of all citizens. We need a qualitatively new legal standard, consistent with the new aspects of socialism. It is a question of shaping a new legal awareness and conceiving of the law not only as a system of prohibitions and restrictions but also as sensible norms of behavior in society, functioning in the interest of one and all.

Above all, we must fill many gaps in the organization and content of legal upbringing, which is substantially behind the requirements of life and does not ensure the development of a legal awareness necessary for perestroyka. Legal education, upbringing and propaganda require a unified, a comprehensive nationwide program, starting with teaching in the schools, organization of universal legal training, providing full information to the population on laws which are being passed and are functional, and employing juridical personnel with secondary and higher training. Legal education must be undertaken at an early age. It must be knowledgeable and develop in the individual a profound understanding of

the unity behind rights and obligations, high civic-mindedness, respect for the Soviet laws and rules governing socialist community life and intolerance of their violation.

We must not forget that the legal awareness and legal standards of the people are shaped also in the course of daily life and in mutual relations which develop in the course of dealing with a variety of personal and social affairs. That is why we must upgrade the responsibility of all officials for the efficient and firm observance of the laws and their official obligations, and ensure that high standards are maintained in the activities of the state apparatus. We must also surmount inertia, red tape, bureaucratism, lack of attention to the individual and a bureaucratic attitude toward his legitimate requirements, vital interests, complaints and petitions. Our time calls for perfecting the style and methods of work of state establishments, working persistently and selflessly and with full dedication. As to the personnel of the state apparatus, their juridical training must become one of the main criteria of the professional qualifications of such personnel.

Let us particularly emphasize the role of legal services of local soviets, ministries, departments and economic and public organizations in the interest of strengthening the legal foundations in their activities. It is important to be concerned with the training of specialists for this service and ensuring its autonomy and authority.

Within the framework of the legal reform we will require not only very intensive legislative work and restructuring the activities of juridical institutions, for it is clear that one of the first things to be achieved is its cadre support. And although a great deal has already been accomplished in this area, nonetheless the task of developing an efficient system for the selection, upbringing, training and retraining of legal cadres and upgrading the prestige of their labor remains pressing. The average wage of this category of employees is substantially lower than the national economic average. All of this adversely affects the work quality of the respective specialists and intensifies their dependence on local conditions and influences and greatly hinders the creation of a cadre reserve. We must remember in this connection that we must show identical exigency toward cadres in all sectors of juridical activities. Unfortunately, the attitude that they are of secondary importance has developed toward many juridical services (such as arbitration, the bar, the notary public system, etc.). This is intolerable. In these most important areas as well we must have conscientious workers well familiar with their work.

The Union of Soviet Jurists, which is currently being organized, and the recently established Union of USSR Lawyers must play a major role in the solution of many pressing problems. It is important for such public organizations to be able to rally the legal forces in the

implementation of the party's legal policy, to be concerned with the increased professionalism of their members and with raising them in a spirit of strict observance of the laws and impeccable implementation of their official obligations.

Whatever aspect of the party's legal policy we may consider, the key to its successful implementation is the combative attitude of party organizations and the strengthening of the party and political support of perestroika. In the past the party authorities paid more attention to specific official problems in the activities of law enforcement authorities, frequently taking over their functions and blocking their initiative. On the other hand, the level of party-political influence in the various areas of governmental and social activities kept declining. Changing the work style is not easy. Now, when the entire society has joined the perestroika process, the party organizations are frequently still lagging behind the development of social processes and finding themselves unprepared to deal with unusual situations. This, in turn, influences the situation in the collectives and the social atmosphere.

It is time to learn how to anticipate events and to assume initiative and responsibility and act through political and ideological methods. Attention must be focused on strengthening the party nucleus in collectives working on the legal reform. The party organizations must become sources which feed party committees ideas, information and strength, actively implementing the party's decisions in the area of legal policy.

The party workers and communist managers on all levels must visit more frequently the primary party organizations and labor collectives. They must be familiar with the moods of the people and their concerns and provide more efficient solutions to pressing problems. They must actively participate in discussions on problems affecting the people and firmly support the party's positions and its course toward the renovation of socialism. They must struggle against forces which are trying to hinder the perestroika process and against adventurists who lead the people to unconsidered steps and extremist actions.

Permanent control must be maintained over the observance of party resolutions which ensure the organization of the work and the summation and utilization of positive experience. These and other problems can be solved with the active participation of the respective commissions under party committees. This is a new and a very important aspect in the struggle waged by the party authorities. The CPSU Central Committee believes that the commissions will broaden the realm of party influence in all areas of their activities and will involve to this effect more extensively scientific institutions and specialists and will pay greater attention to the mass information media in the dissemination and interpretation of party resolutions on problems of legal policy.

A great deal of work lies ahead. A great deal of restructuring will be necessary in order to eliminate formalism and excessive organization, and more daringly make nonstandard decisions. Above all, it is necessary to act practically, and systematically, and persistently to advance, in solving problems of perestroika. "In politics," Lenin taught, "as in all social life lack of advance means retreat" (op. cit., vol 12, p 265). We have no right to forget these Leninist words.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Shall We Continue to Live in the Past? Economic Reform and Scientific and Technical Progress

18020014b Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 18-24

[Article by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, candidate of economic sciences, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economic-Mathematical Institute; and Dmitriy Semenovich Lvov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, department head at the same institute]

[Text] The most important feature of today's perestroika in the economy is the combination of two basic tasks: radical economic reform and large-scale reconstruction of the national economy. The main aspect of the former is the organization of a highly efficient socialist market; of the second, making the economic structure consistent with the requirements of scientific and technical progress.

While ensuring the competitiveness among enterprises engaged in economic activities, directing the production process toward the satisfaction of specific consumer preferences and stimulating the reduction of production costs, market relations nonetheless include a number of internal contradictions. The main among them are those between the interests of the enterprise and society, between the current interest in maximizing enterprise income and its long-term interest in surviving despite changing economic and technological surroundings. In countries with a highly developed market economy there functions a constantly renovating network of market control institutions which block the destructive actions of said contradictions and channel their energy toward the interests of society. The role of such institutions is enhanced during periods of structural reorganization of the economy, when, as a result of the mass updating of production based on the fast dissemination of new technologies, ordinary economic relations are disrupted, the economic situation becomes uncertain and the market becomes disorganized.

With our economic structure and the correlation between prices and costs which reflect it, the introduction of market relations is a necessary yet insufficient prerequisite for a major acceleration of scientific and technical progress. Because of the excessive concentration of production and the actual monopoly status of many enterprises, their conversion to full cost accounting will not immediately bring about the development of competitiveness and socialist rivalry, such as to stimulate the renovation of output. As in the past, most enterprises will remain interested in expanding reproduction with obsolete technologies.

Under those circumstances, an active state policy of simultaneous redistribution of national economic resources and the organization of a market aimed at reducing excessive economic activities and stimulating the practical activeness in the latest sectors, becomes tremendously important.

Unfortunately, the restructuring of the management system and that of the national economy appear to be taking place independently of each other. Frequently, mutually contradictory ways and means are being applied. This can be largely explained by the theoretically undeveloped problem of combining market with centralized economic control. A simplified interpretation of contemporary market relations has developed, according to which the market is interpreted as a universal self-regulating system. It is assumed that the elimination of departmentalism and the "involvement" of the socialist market will quickly eliminate disproportions in the technological structure of the economy and ensure a satisfactory pace of scientific and technical progress.

In this connection, it is important to look at economic management practices in the developed countries. Such practices do not resemble the textbook models of a free market. Despite the quite widespread view of the harm of centralized interference in the economy, in recent decades the role of non-market economic institutions has not diminished in the least. Governmental influence is becoming increasingly selective and purposeful, demonstrating its greatest activeness in the area of NIOKR and in high-technology business. Through a variety of ways, such as program-target management, contract and budget financing, and indirect instruments for controlling business activities (interest, foreign exchange, tax, and amortization rates, and so on), the state exerts a substantial influence on the choice and pursuit of technical development trends. A developed network of non-profit scientific research institutes and organizations, universities, and engineering centers and industrial parks is in place, essentially supported by the budget, along with various foundations and nonprofit investments by large corporations. The state actively promotes the development of the social, transportation and information structures and the organization of the education and retraining systems.

Naturally, this does not eliminate the importance of market competition. Nonmarket forms exist not outside the market but on its own basis and under the conditions of actual competition, which sets the imperatives of efficient economic management. Meanwhile, we cannot reduce the successes in the technical development of the capitalist countries exclusively to the effect of the loss of a free market economy.

Nonmarket forms of production organization are an active transforming factor in contemporary economics. The application of many revolutionary new developments, which have become the foundation for large-scale technological changes, has taken place with the support of state or private subsidies not consistent with but despite the condition of the market situation.

The point is that the ratio of prices, interest rates and other economic assessments which determine the profitability of one area of economic activities or another, are largely a reflection of the condition of the economic structure. They change under the influence of scientific and technical progress and, consequently, so does the relative efficiency of various technologies: previously losing (new) become profitable, while previously efficient (traditional) become losing. In this case, even an insignificant specific influence which would stimulate temporarily inefficient new developments could substantially accelerate the process of technological change. Long-term technological forecasting and centralized management make it possible to anticipate spontaneous changes in market circumstances and to ensure a smooth and gradual structural change (having prepared the economic subjects for such a change in advance) which otherwise would turn out catastrophic for many enterprises.

Economic practice provides numerous examples of the various ways of combining market with administrative control. It would be no exaggeration to say that the market economy of contemporary technically advanced countries is controlled on a planned basis.

In our view, the implementation of the present economic reform must be oriented toward the development of contemporary forms of a highly organized market which can ensure an efficient and crisis-free technical and economic development. The specific forms of market control could vary according to the characteristics of the economic, technological and sociopsychological structure of the country and its individual areas.

Naturally, in themselves knowledge of the laws governing the functioning of the market and making decisions on its organization do not guarantee success. The point is that unlike bureaucratic management structures, which could successfully function under the conditions of an uneducated or passive population, an organized market cannot be established by decision from above. It

presumes the extensive initiative of autonomous economic subjects and high-level legal, economic and political standards for economic and state managers and for the entire population. We believe that without the existence of corresponding sociopsychological conditions which have proven their usefulness in global economic practices, the market control institutions will prove to be lifeless and passive appendages to the dominant economic structures.

In our view, the current stage of scientific and technical progress is characterized by the formation of steadily reproducing conglomerates, accompanied by synchronously developing production and technological systems. There are alternating stages in the evolutionary development and the structural reorganization of the economy, in the course of which sets of radically new technologies are applied. In other words, it is a question of a process of replacing and establishing technological systems.

In a market economy, such a cycle assumes the shape of a long wave of economic circumstances. Depending on the phases in the cycle the pace of economic development changes. It rises in the phase of establishment, reaches its peak in the growth phase, after which, as the possibilities of improving the given production system are exhausted, the pace declines, reaching a minimum in its declining phase.

In a market economy changes in technological systems take place through the mechanism of lowering the profitability of goods produced on the basis of the old system, caused by price drops and sated social needs. No such mechanism is found in the administrative-departmental system.

Until recently, in our country national economic resources were distributed, with an increase in the volumes of output, within the framework of an exceptionally strong and stable system of economic relations which regulated material flows among economic subjects. As a result, the volume of resources channeled into the area of technological breakthroughs could not even be compared to investments in increasing traditional output. The active centralized policy was limited essentially to duplicating the technological changes which were taking place in the developed capitalist countries. The development of new technological systems paralleled the continuing expansion of the reproduction of the old.

Today a specific situation of multiple technological systems has developed in our national economy: there is a simultaneous reproduction of three systems operating in different stages. The first existed during the period of industrialization and has long exceeded any sensible limits. Today it is represented by a large number of interrelated and obsolete production facilities which are supported by departmental interests. The second, essentially related to the chemicalization of the economy,

began to develop in the 1950s and is currently in its middle stage of growth. A third is being currently established, based on production automation and computerization.

Their paralleled reproduction has been accompanied by an accumulation of disproportions and growing losses in the national economy. The investment of resources in the obsolete system objectively obstructs progressive technological changes, encourages the overproduction of obsolete commodities, leads to a slow-down in economic growth and increases the country's technological lagging.

Managing the technical development of the national economy on the basis of formal indicators of volumes and growth rates, without understanding the long-term laws of technical and economic progress, led to systematic errors in defining its strategic direction. The problem here lies not in the existence itself of the apparatus of centralized management but in the way in which it is functioning. Unlike Japan or the newly industrialized countries, which used this powerful machinery to organize a breakthrough in leading areas of contemporary scientific and technical progress, in the USSR huge resources are being invested on a centralized basis into hopelessly obsolete technologies, serving the irrational interests of the expanded reproduction of departmental structures (traditional hydraulic reclamation, and obsolete metallurgical and chemical production facilities). Under the conditions of a departmental-bureaucratic economic management system, as it were we were unable to make full use of the objective advantages of a country which is trying to catch up. The reaction to structural changes being made in the developed capitalist countries was greatly delayed. The lagging behind them reached a critical level. According to our assessments, by the middle of the 1980s it averaged between 15 and 25 years, having virtually doubled compared with the mid-1960s.

Taking domestic and international experience into consideration, we can draw the conclusion that the mechanism which is developing for the redistribution of resources should be structured on the principles of a controlled market. To this effect we need the creation of market structures—above all in the areas of labor and means—as well as a radical restructuring of the system of centralized management, reorienting it toward the solution of meaningful strategic problems of long-term development.

We must take into consideration the uneven nature of the technical development of the national economy. Investments in traditional technologies are economically unprofitable, for their returns are of a fast declining nature. Conversely, investments in radically new technologies, although relatively small, could yield significant snowballing results. At the initial stage, however, they are unfamiliar to the potential consumer and do not ensure high profitability. That is why their organization

becomes a primary task in centralized management, the main efforts of which, from our viewpoint, must be concentrated on progressive changes in the economic structure.

The creation of an efficient mechanism for the prompt reallocation of resources from obsolete to new production facilities also requires an organizational restructuring of industry. One of the promising ways for this may be the unification of enterprises linked through production cooperation, in integrated groups, like a variety of concerns, based on commercial mechanisms for joint economic activities, established around common centers for the accumulation and distribution of financial resources. The natural form of such an integrated center is a sectorial investment bank. Its main function would be to credit investments made by enterprises and to supervise the efficiency of their economic activities.

This form of integration is radically different from the traditional ones. In this case administrative responsibility is replaced by the mechanism of economic responsibility. Its reliable foundation is that of separating the management of autonomous enterprises from ownership, the titles of which—shares and other securities—could be distributed, during the first stage, among the enterprises themselves as an object of ownership, and among the sectorial banks providing the loans and other enterprises in the thus established concern and, possibly, enterprises which use its output. In order to ensure competition within each sector it would be desirable for several such concerns to be set up. This can provide the "starting" conditions for activating the market mechanism while retaining the existing economic relations which, at this point, acquire a new economic content.

The methods of indirect control must become the main instrument for planned management: tax benefits, target subsidies and loans on easier conditions. The regulatory steps must not be such as to suppress the market signals regarding the need for the redistribution of resources (such as the traditional subsidy mechanism) but, conversely, to boost them. In this case the creation of a stock market and other market regulatory institutions in the area of the means of production could play an important role.

Production facilities based on new technology are distinguished by their low resource-intensiveness, small scale, and stricter requirements relative to environmental protection, science-intensiveness and the need for highly skilled cadres. In order to ensure their faster development, the existence of an information and social infrastructure and a market of educated consumers are more important than closeness to suppliers or raw material sources, and so on. The experience of countries which have advanced in mastering such production indicates that they are concentrated, as a rule, on relatively small areas, in the vicinity of scientific and education centers. A kind of "growth centers" develop, which ensure the

fast technical and economic development of the entire country without exerting a strong pressure on natural resources and freight transportation.

That is the reason for which we question the suitability of still popular large-scale programs for the development of the huge territories in Siberia, the North and the Far East. The tremendous resources invested in them cannot, under the conditions of the contemporary stage of scientific and technical progress, yield any whatsoever noticeable returns. Conversely, they will preserve structural disproportions, not to mention cause irreparable losses as a result of damages to the environment and the degradation of the population under the extreme conditions of development of uninhabited areas with an adverse climate. Technologically new production facilities should be logically located in the European part of the country, replacing hopelessly obsolete and ecologically dangerous production capacities dating from the age of industrialization. In this case a key role can be played by industrial parks, engineering centers, and technological cities in which scientific, education and production possibilities would create the "critical mass" which is needed for the fast development and assimilation of new technologies.

An active foreign economic policy, aimed at changing the position of the country in the international division of labor, is a necessary prerequisite for the structural reorganization of the national economy and for surmounting its technological lagging. It would be senseless to try to catch up with the advanced countries in the areas of already developed and worked out technologies, in the advancement of which they have reached "cruising" speed. This is the path of duplicating technical achievements with a more or less significant lag. It not only dooms the national economy to chronic lagging but converts it into an area in which the advanced countries find convenient to "dump" obsolete technologies. The Soviet Union has frequently performed the role of "shock absorber" of structural changes in the developed capitalist countries, facilitating their structural reorganization by importing morally obsolete equipment which rapidly depreciates on the world markets.

Global experience, that of Japan in particular, proves that drastic scientific and technical breaks are possible during periods of replacing technological systems. Countries which have been able to concentrate on the production of key items under the new system and to assimilate them at the proper time gain unquestionable advantages. Their monopoly control of most scarce resources and their knowledge and experience in the use of pivotal technologies of economic growth enable them to dictate to their advantage foreign trade conditions.

It would be inexpedient to organize production facilities which have already been developed in other countries and the assimilation of which cannot ensure advantages in the international division of labor. In this case, the use of already depreciated capacities of foreign producers or,

in other words, imports of finished products, would be preferable. This applies, above all, to the industries of organic synthesis, chemical and agricultural machine building and automobile manufacturing. It applies to traditional production facilities, the assimilation of which is needed for the development of new facilities, and expedient imports of technology by purchasing licenses, exchanging specialists and creating joint enterprises.

The thus released scientific and technical potential can be used to ensure the faster development of production facilities in the fourth technological system (systems of artificial intelligence, use of the effect of high-temperature superconductivity, accounting information networks, and biotechnologies), the development of which is already beginning and whose rapid growth on a global scale is expected in 10 to 15 years.

Finally, in our view, the radical technical restructuring of the national economy requires the reorganization of the defense industry sectors. The point is that their priority status leads to a growing technical lag in the civilian industry sectors.

Today the latest production facilities are concentrated almost exclusively in the defense complex. They are locked within the production of defense industry goods and do not make a significant contribution to satisfying national economic requirements. The transfer of technologies from defense to civilian production facilities is currently limited essentially to goods rejected by military customers. This state of affairs leads to a growth of centrifugal trends between military and civilian machine building despite existing experience in mastering high technologies. The concentration of high technologies and high quality resources in the defense complex and, above all, of highly skilled cadres, paralyzes the technical development of the remaining industry which, in the course of time, creates difficulties in supplying that same defense complex and leads to its further "inflation" aimed at achieving total self-support, which is fraught with the danger of a collapse of the entire economic system.

Giving defense enterprises assignments on the production of consumer goods, as is currently practiced, does not solve the problem. We need precisely a mechanism for the transfer of high technologies from the defense complex and their improvement and dissemination in the national economy.

This can be achieved two ways: first, the suggested concerns could include defense enterprises of corresponding specialization or structure of industrial requirements. Second, it is possible to set up concerns specializing in the production of specific types of defense industry goods, having diversified their economic activities and, at the same time, included in them some civilian enterprises and commercial companies. Both ways presume granting defense enterprises economic

autonomy, converting them to full cost accounting and managing the defense complex with the help of state orders placed by the Ministry of Defense and distributed on a competitive basis.

A most important factor which is still obstructing progress in this area is preserving the existing system of keeping secrets "from oneself." Exaggerated secrecy continues to paralyze all activities related to the transfer of technologies, blocking the entire restructuring of the national economy on the basis of the new technological system, for its production facilities require a good information infrastructure for the broad exchange of data among different organizations and specialists, not only among different areas but among different countries. The mastery of new technologies for defense purposes should be paralleled by a simultaneous search of possibilities for their commercial application and transfer to the civilian industry sector.

Today the comprehensive use of scientific and production potential of the defense complex is the only real way of developing a contemporary technical structure in industry and daily life and surmounting the tremendous lag behind the developed countries. This is our historical opportunity which we must not miss. Otherwise we shall remain forever the people of yesterday or even of the day before in technology as well as living standards.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Money Is Not Paid for Nothing

18020014c Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 25-35

[Article by Yegor Timurovich Gaydar, candidate of economic sciences, editor, *KOMMUNIST* political economy and economic policy section]

[Text] At the end of the 20th century, even the country with the richest resources cannot isolate itself from the world market. Bureaucratic obstacles on the way to integration processes and fits of naive protectionism ("rice independence," "cotton independence") can only distort the structure of foreign economic relations and weaken the positions in the competitive struggle. The drop in the prices of the most important Soviet export commodities, which coincided in time with the start of perestroika, clearly highlighted both the extent to which the national economy is dependent on the situation on the world markets and the vulnerability of our positions.

Today the close attention of society is focused on foreign economic activities. It is precisely to this area that many people justifiably link their hopes of stopping the intensifying inflationary processes and stabilizing the critical situation on the consumer market. The question of whether to borrow or not to borrow funds from abroad and to what use to put them has become the topic of a sharp discussion and has essentially assumed a political

aspect. As a rule, both sides proceed in its discussion from unclear premises concerning the national structure of our foreign trade, the impossibility of upgrading its efficiency in the immediate future, and the idea that if the problems of the country are to be solved by increasing imports, this should be accomplished through foreign loans. In the light of the knowledge of the failures of broad foreign economic operations, information which has now become universally accessible, in no case should such a thesis be accepted as axiomatic. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of economic common sense, it is in general difficult to understand the dynamics of our purchases from developed capitalist countries.

It may seem natural to assume that the state, which holds the monopoly on foreign trade, should be particularly concerned with budget revenue. Yet the structure of imports is, from the financial viewpoint, extremely inefficient. A great deal of goods which are either unprofitable or underprofitable to the state are being purchased. Under the conditions of a rapidly growing budget deficit, it is precisely purchases of the most profitable commodity groups that have been curtailed.

One might have assumed that a change in the volume of imports is caused by the acute shortage of a given commodity. However, this hypothesis as well cannot pass the test of logic. It is difficult to believe that uninstalled imported equipment is the most scarce resource in the country and the fact that we have a surplus of medicinal drugs.

The situation is clarified if we think of the various interests, for the objectives of Western corporations and domestic departmental structures can perfectly well supplement each other. The former need a profitable market for their goods; to the latter, considerations related to the prices of such goods and real economic efficiency play a secondary role. What matters to them is to prove the need for a contract and to obtain the necessary foreign exchange for it.

I

The contemporary Western corporations with which we must deal on the world market have little in common with the private capitalist enterprises of the mid-19th century, as described in Marx's "*Das Kapital*." As a rule, these are large organizations with the ability to adapt to the changing requirements of the market and, at the same time, to adapt the market to their own objectives.

The fact that corporations actively shape demand, including demand by their foreign partners, became common knowledge after a number of major political scandals. The Lockheed Corporation, which admitted paying \$106 million to A. Kashogi alone, a well-known middleman in such deals, for his assistance in signing contracts with petroleum-rich foreign countries, is by no means the exception. This forced many countries to seek means of fighting abuses in foreign economic activities

and ways of defending their national interests. The previous firm confidence that in our country such a thing is impossible, at least on a large scale, let us follow the developments of this struggle with a feeling of condescending superiority. Now, when we are trying to understand where did huge amounts of earned foreign income actually go at the time when the prices of our petroleum were high, and why during a period of maximally favorable market situations we came out with a substantial foreign debt, it becomes obvious that we had no reason to display such confidence.

Like any major market, the Soviet Union has long attracted the close attention of Western corporations. In addition to the scale of the country, they find tempting the traditionally low requirements concerning the efficiency of procured equipment and the capacity to pay, guaranteed by extremely rich natural resources. However, particular interest in shown by companies which operate in crisis sectors, for which the world market circumstances are adverse and in which demand for their goods declines. It is precisely in that area that economic and political interests become particularly tightly interwoven and all existing possibilities are used to defend one's positions and to break into new markets.

The study of the interdependence between the development of foreign economic relations of the USSR and processes of structural reorganization of the world economy enables us to understand a great deal about the dynamics of our purchases. The clearest example of a major sector experiencing a protracted (for the past 15 years) crisis is ferrous metallurgy in the developed capitalist countries. Under the conditions influenced by fast structural changes in the global economy, and the increased competition provided by other types of construction materials, the difficulties experienced in this area by the corporations have become chronic. The production of rolled metal goods in the United States and Great Britain, fluctuating under the effect of circumstantial production factors, began to decline at the start of the 1970s; in the FRG, France and Japan, the decline started toward the end of the 1970s. In defense of their companies, the individual countries are restricting competition through imports, encouraging exports and threatening each other with sanctions.

For a long time the Soviet Union has been the unchallenged global leader in the volume of output of rolled metal. Nonetheless, the scarcity of its high-grade varieties led to the fact that imports of rolled metal from the developed capitalist countries traditionally exceeded our exports (the respective figures for 1970 were 0.5 and 0.3 million tons). The change in the situation, starting with the crisis in Western ferrous metallurgy, is typical. While exports have remained on roughly the same level, purchases from the developed capitalist countries increased rapidly: they rose by a factor of 8 between 1970 and 1980.

By the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, structural problems also affected the steel-pipes market. Between 1980 and 1986 the production of steel pipes declined by a factor of 3.3 in the United States, 26 percent in France and 14 percent in Japan. Among the major capitalist producing countries, the FRG alone was able to maintain its previous level of output. The USSR is the leading producer of steel pipes in the world. Nonetheless, their import from the developed capitalist countries rapidly increased, including some paid out of loans stemming from the "gas-pipes" deal. Between 1970 and 1980 such imports tripled and between 1980 and 1986 they doubled again. In 1986 the overall volume of pipe purchases abroad already substantially exceeded their overall combined output by the United States, Great Britain and France. Apparently, the passion shown by our departments for philanthropy is so great that they immediately hasten to help by placing orders companies which have fallen on hard times.

Reducing production under the pressure of public opinion and for considerations of ecological safety is a special case. Here two problems must be solved: to whom to sell equipment and from whom to obtain the necessary goods? Compensation deals are the best solution. Of late, for example, attention has been drawn to accidents related to the production, storage and transportation of ammonia. The developed countries realized quite some time ago that the production of this commodity is harmful and dangerous. In those countries the volume of output has fluctuated, with an overall declining trend. In 1986, compared with 1975, the production of this item was 15 percent lower in the United States, 49 percent in Japan and 22 percent in the FRG. At the same time, efforts aimed at transferring enterprises in this sector to the developing countries were intensified. Thus, the volume of output tripled in India and doubled in Mexico. During that period, our country purchased corresponding equipment on a mass scale, doubled its volume of output and became the world's leader in the production of synthetic ammonia, substantial amounts of which it ships to the world markets.

In two major industrial sectors which, at the beginning of the 1950s, were in their embryonic state in the USSR, subsequent growth rates of output which substantially exceeded average global indicators were ensured. This applied to the production of chemical fertilizers and the gas industry. In the course of their development, the extensive use of simplest technologies which, as we know, can be properly handled by our departments (earth removal, pipe laying operations, moving rock) was combined with extensive purchases of goods, the marketing of which in the West faced difficult problems.

II

Structural changes are a painful process. Frequently, powerful and strong companies with a good business reputation experience difficulties in loading their production capacities. For example, the McDermott Company is a major international corporation employing

more than 40,000 people, using modern equipment and highly skilled personnel. Starting with 1986, however, due to reduced demand for petroleum and natural gas extraction and refining equipment, the financial situation of the company worsened drastically; major losses replaced profits, there were no more new orders, and it became necessary to sell some of the securities owned by the company and drastically to reduce administrative-economic expenditures and the size of the administrative apparatus. The corporation could obtain loans and come out of the crisis only by finding new markets.

As a result of a lucky development of the circumstances, it was precisely at that time that our governmental authorities began to be deeply concerned with losses in well gas. All of a sudden, a problem the solution of which had escaped us for decades became so urgent that the decision was made to start immediately the construction of a series of huge petrochemical and gas complexes, wasting no time to provide technical and economic substantiations.

The fact that our state faced a very grave financial crisis and that, simply said, it had no money (and, in order to make ends meet, it is postponing extending paid leave for taking care of children, prenatal leave, payment of aid for children of low income families, rates of nutrition in children's preschool institutions, and minimal pensions to workers and employees) did not lead to an analysis of whether this project was within the possibility of the national economy. Construction and installation work was initiated and the funds appropriated for this purpose in 1989 are roughly equal to the average annual economy contemplated for 1989-1990 in the social areas we listed.

Active talks are under way on the purchasing of imported equipment. McDermott (together with another big company, Combustion Engineering) signed a protocol with the USSR Ministry of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry for the development of two huge complexes in Western Siberia (Tobolsk and Surgut). The question of its participation in the development of yet another complex (Novyy Urengoy) has not been solved as yet but the company has not lost hope. Active talks are also under way with the USSR Ministry of Petroleum Industry on participation in the development of oil deposits on the Northeastern shelf of Sakhalin and participation in the Tengiz project. At this point the financial situation of the company is no longer hopeless and it can look to the future with confidence.

Powerful bilateral support of big construction projects which stipulate earth removal, concrete lining and pipe laying operations by Soviet departments and major deliveries of equipment by capitalist corporations, items the sale of which face major difficulties on the world market, make the implementation of such projects virtually inescapable.

In substantiating their expediency and related purchases, in addition to arguments that such construction has already been decided by the supreme management authorities or that they are necessary in order to implement such resolutions, the department usually emphasizes the following:

The scarcity of the respective type of resource. As a rule, this is actually true, for under the conditions of a chronic disruption of monetary circulation, the overwhelming majority of production resources is in short supply, at least as far as solvent demand for such goods is concerned. However, even if there is no current shortage it can easily be proved that such a shortage will inevitably appear in the long term unless decisive measures are taken immediately. Considering the existing scale of disparity between actual and anticipated trends, and the arbitrariness of hypotheses concerning the growth of demand and efficiency of the utilization of the funds invested in long-term sectorial forecasts one could, if so desired, prove anything one likes concerning future shortages;

Falling behind by the sector from an arbitrarily chosen analogue (capital investments in other fast growing sectors; level of development in foreign countries; previously made decisions) and the incalculable calamities which will befall the country unless addition resources to correct the situation are immediately appropriated;

The tremendous economic effectiveness of the project. The standard set of methods is used here as well as proof. This includes inflated expected results, ignoring outlays and losses, choice of absolutely arbitrary alternatives to which the suggested solution is compared, etc. As a rule, such computations are not confirmed by practical experience which, incidentally, has absolutely no effect on the substantiation of similar projects in subsequent years;

Finally, the availability of real possibilities of initiating the project.

The most substantial is precisely the last argument. If the department is interested in the project while the corporation is interested in deliveries and there is real possibility of starting the project, no changes which would defeat the arguments on the three first items are of essential significance. They merely make it necessary to restructure the system of proofs.

Securing the support or, at least, neutralizing the counteractions of other agencies whose interests are affected by the project is a much more serious problem. To this purpose the redistribution of the share of resources in their favor is used (transferring some of the foreign currency and assigning design and construction operations in which the related sector is interested, using resources on the territory of neighboring areas, etc.), or providing reciprocal services (the other sectors also need assistance in pursuit of their own projects).

Maintaining utmost secrecy about the prepared resolution is very important. Naturally, under the conditions of glasnost it becomes more difficult to avoid information leaks and discussions. Under the new situation the departments view the instrument of stubbornness (unlike the mass information media and the public, the department does not know the meaning of fatigue in defense of its interests) and accurate knowledge of the rules of administrative infighting, and the possibility of choosing the proper time and form which would make it possible to shift responsibility to the political leadership. Should a discussion prove to be inevitable, here as well well-developed methods are applied. Meaningful arguments, related to the actual efficiency of the utilization of resources in implemented projects are not discussed, as a rule, and the discussion is converted into an obviously senseless form of considerations of the need of the national economy to develop this sector and the "intrigues" of its enemies.

A decision having been reached, subsequent events can be conventionally classified into four stages.

Stage one. On the eve of the extensive initiation of the work and the signing of the contracts with the foreign companies (at the start of this year this was the phase reached for the projects related to Siberian petroleum and gas chemical complexes, the development of which, according to official data, will require 41 billion rubles). The decision has been made, detailed technical and economic substantiations are still absent, and the tone of the polemics is aggressively optimistic. Any doubts as to the expediency of the project are considered a challenge and shaking up the foundations.

Stage two. The project has been started but serious problems have appeared. An example of a project at that stage is the Tengizpolimer Gas-Chemical Complex (estimated capital needed for its completion scheduled for the beginning of 1989 was \$7.2 billion).

This journal pointed out that this construction project, the suitability of which was obvious to foreign corporations and domestic departments but by no means to the country, was initiated without any technical and economic substantiation, which should have been subjected to expert evaluation only by the end of 1988 (KOMMUNIST No 8, 1988). Actually, it was only the preliminary draft that was ready by the stipulated deadline. On a routine basis the document was submitted for consideration by the joint Vneshekonconsult Company. Following are a few excerpts from its conclusion: "One can confidently assume that neither profits nor finished goods would be obtained by the Soviet participant.... In addition to capital investments for the creation of the production facilities, unilaterally the Soviet side will be forced to finance the development of an infrastructure, transportation systems and sociocultural amenities.... Taking into consideration that in addition to the joint Tengizpolimer Enterprise, the USSR will be building an entire series of enterprises the output of which will be

sold on the foreign market in large quantities (sulfur, polyethylene, polypropylene, methanol), one can confidently assume that exporting mass quantities of such on the world markets will inevitably lower prices by 30-40 percent, which would cause a virtually irreparable damage to the profitability of the project, for the TEO does not include a study of the sensitivity of the project to changes in the prices of finished goods.... If we try to prognosticate the development of the situation, taking into consideration the availability of additional volumes of output from the USSR on the market, the amount of the losses may exceed \$5-6 billion.... Making a decision on the Tengizpolimer project without the existence of a full-scale TEO... could bring about unpredictable consequences to the country's economy."

At that point the optimism of the defenders of the project was already more subdued. The tone was calm and roughly as follows: yes, the preliminary variant of the TEO was poor but while the project is under construction we shall draw up another one, a much better one. Let us not halt the already initiated work.

Stage three. Major purchases of imported equipment have already been made, it is being used at a construction site, the country is committed to financial obligations, construction is in full swing, there is no going back. A clear example of this is the Astrakhan Gas Complex.

An idea of the actual situation is provided by a letter sent to the Soviet partners by the Canadian Lavalin Company: "...The work is being carried out at a very fast pace, with the use of inexpensive technologies, without proper quality control. The result has been welding seams, the quality of which is unacceptable in terms of the specifications needed for the production of hydrogen sulfide.... Having analyzed the situation which has developed, the Lavalin management has decided that we can no longer pursue the work at the site under these circumstances.... It is our absolutely clear conviction that the nature of the situation which has developed is so alarming that urgent steps must be taken. Compromise solutions are unacceptable if the problem is such as to endanger the lives of the people, both yours and ours. We can no longer promote the development of the project, which may very likely lead to an accident and the death of people; nor can we, in any case, guarantee the safe operation of any kind of equipment or system which has been assembled under the existing circumstances."

Major deposits of high-sulfur gas are found in Canada, where the Lavalin Company is based, with characteristics similar to those of the Astrakhan deposits. In Canada their development is being held back by the fear of unpredictable ecological consequences and excessive costs for ensuring the guaranteed protection of the environment. Such considerations did not stop us.

Stage four. The failure of the project is obvious, deadlines have been violated and the promised profits have not materialized. The best thing now is that the less said

about it the better, for there are so many new extensive construction projects lying ahead. Furthermore, it is too late to look for the culprits and in any case this would lead to nothing.

Let us consider as an instructive example the history of one such deal involving the transfer of ammonia production facilities to our country: the building of the Togliatti Nitrogen Plant (estimated cost, 862 million rubles).

The work began in 1974. At that time prospects seemed extensive. The plans called for the creation of the biggest enterprise for the production of ammonia (a capacity of 2.7 million tons per year) on the basis of compensation agreements and contracts with U.S., French and Italian companies. The plant's output was essentially to be sold abroad. The annual profit was to total 147.7 million rubles and capital investments were to be recovered in 5.3 years.

The Chemico Company was chosen as the supplier of the basic technological equipment, a company known by the fact that at that time it had been unable to fulfill its contract for the building of a plant in Algiers, had suffered heavy losses and was on the brink of financial collapse.

The fact that construction deadlines in the USSR can be substantially violated is common knowledge and it appears to be a secret only to the authorities which make decisions on large-scale purchases of imported equipment. Such decisions, however, offer extensive opportunities for selling substandard equipment to us. Such was the Togliatti case as well. The completion of the first unit was planned for the fourth quarter of 1977. In March 1979 the period of company guarantees elapsed. Actually, the unit was commissioned on 29 November 1979. Subsequently as well, there were no surprises. A similar story, only with different deadlines, was repeated in the case of the second and subsequent units.

Later, however, substantial structural shortcomings and defects in the imported equipment became apparent. It turned out that the steam heating system, the measuring instruments and the air condensers were inoperative under the climatic conditions of the city of Togliatti (did anyone know that temperatures of -8 degrees centigrade happen in that city), that the unstable work of the ammonia production systems greatly worsens the production of carbamide, which is based on it, and that instead of the profits computed with such convincing accuracy (147.7 million rubles per year) in the first 4 years of its activities the plant lost 170 million rubles. All of this, however, took place after the guarantees had expired and the company had absolutely no obligations any longer to ensure the normal work of the machines.

Following are a few examples of the style of official documents of that time which sum up the results of the failed project, according to which the picture of cloudless prospects is replaced by a search for objective reasons for failures and reciprocal shifting of responsibility:

"The low skills of the technical personnel at the plant during the start-up period and mastery of the individual types of equipment.... led to frequent halts, which made it impossible to develop a steady work system for the ammonia producing units.... Isolated equipment shortcomings, which became apparent in the course of the installation and tuning process, had no essential influence on achieving a stable work by the machines." (From the letter of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade)

"The existing situation is explained not only by the low level of technological discipline and exploitation of the equipment but also defects in the machines and assemblies purchased, as well as inadequate spare parts and repair services support. The letter of the Ministry of Foreign Trade does not emphasize shortcomings in the equipment purchased and does not even mention the reduced productivity of turbocompressors." (From the document of the USSR Gosstroy)

"This was an initial attempt at building four ammonia machine units simultaneously on the same site, unprecedented in global practices.... The work of the ammonia assemblies of the Chemico Company is under steady control by the ministry.... Despite the help and the application of a number of technical measures, assemblies with a capacity for 450,000 tons per year were not completed.... For that reason, the USSR Gosplan, USSR Gosstroy and the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production corrected the capacity of each assembly...." (From the letter of the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production)

Let us note the calm dignity in the tone of the last letter in which the results of the failure are summed up. One can feel the readiness of the ministry to undertake the implementation of other projects, unprecedented in global practices.

Now it is the Siberian petroleum and gas chemical complexes that are scheduled to make their contribution to the further increase in ammonia production. The Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production is the customer for one of them, located in the Uvat Settlement.

III

Companies must be concerned with their business reputation, for this is the most important component of their capital. Even if the credulity or incompetence of the partner makes it possible for the company to impose upon him a clearly unprofitable deal, the idea of how this will affect the prestige of the corporation and its relations with other customers frequently blocks the path of extracting maximal short-term benefits. The experience in interacting with some of our departments proves that in this case one could ignore such petty matters. In frank discussions with Western entrepreneurs it is occasionally acknowledged that the question of whether equipment supplied to the USSR will operate does not worry them. It is common knowledge that even if such equipment

does not work, the Soviet partners would lose their way in the labyrinth of interdepartmental contradictions and would virtually never file claims.

The Denso Company, which is based in the FRG, is known in the Soviet Union. The insulation tape it supplied for pipelines proved to be of such poor quality that the contract had to be annulled. In practices throughout the world this would be entirely sufficient to break relations with a company which has lost its reputation. In this case, however, events developed otherwise. Construction has been started of a plan for the production of insulation tape in Novokuybyshevsk (the estimated cost is 178.3 million rubles). The set of imported equipment provided by the Berstorff Company (FRG) was manufactured on the basis of a technology provided by the Denso Company and has already reached the construction site. In the past as well no shortage of uninstalled import equipment in Kuybyshev Oblast had been noted. In 1988, however, in terms of the pace of increased stocks, the oblast assumed one of the leading positions in the country, with an increase factor of 2.5.

Domestic enterprises have had a long tradition of cooperating with the Lurgi Company (FRG). For example, a rich collection of uninstalled imported equipment has been assembled in the warehouses of the Nitron Association in Saratov and has been added to the equipment stored here for many long years for the production of methyl acetoacetate, supplied by the Lurgi Company (worth 15.4 million rubles). Equipment delivered by the same company for the production of the highly toxic chemical Basudin has been stored in the warehouses of the Kaustik Production Association in Volgograd (worth 91.9 million rubles) since 1984. Is it amazing, therefore, that that same company will be among the leading suppliers of production equipment for the Tengiz project?

Changes in the attitude of the foreign partners at different stages in the implementation of large-scale projects are characteristic. The style maintained before we commit ourselves to purchase the equipment reminds us of Alice's fox, persuading Buratin to bury the gold in the Miracle Field in the Country of Idiots. The economic argumentation is frequently on that same accessible level. In order to understand what exactly we are being offered a serious analysis must be made but no one is concerned with this when the voice which is urging us to conclude the contract as rapidly as possible is so pressing: "At the present time global demand for high-molecular polyethylene equals 9-10 million tons per year and is increasing at a rate in excess of 5 percent annually. Demand is already exceeding estimated production capacities and a shortage of capacities for approximately 500,000 tons will be felt by the year 1992.... This will require the construction of several production enterprises on a global scale.... It is important for the Urengoy project to be completed as soon as possible in order to

make use of the essentially favorable conditions on the market." It is obviously clear that such a construction project should be started immediately.

Later, years later, one does not have even to remember that Soviet market specialists warned of a probable surplus of supply over demand on this market for 1991-1992 and the fact that the capacity load will, in all likelihood, drop from 95 percent in 1988 to 80 percent in 1992-1993, and that the appearance of the Soviet Union on the market as a major exporter would, in that situation, lead to a drop in prices.

At the present stage Soviet participants in the talks are being persuaded that it would be much better to finance the construction project in such a way that the entire responsibility for the success of the project is assumed by the Soviet Union alone (the case of the McDermott Company concerning the Novyy Urengoy Petrochemical and Gas Chemical Complex), which would be quite natural and logical if the Western partners, having recouped their funds with interest, remain co-owners of the joint enterprise while any possible losses are compensated with raw materials supplied by our country (the consortium of foreign companies on subject of the draft regulatory documents related to Tengizpolimer), etc.

Once the financial commitment had been made, it became clear that matters were by no means all that brilliant, and the style of the correspondence used by the Western partners changed radically. We were already reminded of violated deadlines and substandard construction work, the delayed arrival of our specialists abroad, their incompetence and, in general, the fact that no one owes us anything.

Following is an excerpt from the letter sent by the Thompson Corporation to its Soviet partners, typical of that stage in the implementation of the contract: "Enclosed please find a card with a detailed description of the additional outlays resulting from the position taken by the Soviet side.... These additional outlays were caused by the lack of readiness of the project...., which demanded of the Thompson Company additional work to model the project in France, for this could not be done at the site. On the other hand, the delayed arrival of the Soviet brigades in France to accept it.... and the lack of training of some of them also resulted in considerable delays in their acceptance of mathematical support.... We ask you to take the necessary steps to repay us for such additional outlays totaling 101.5 million French francs within the shortest possible time."

This referred to the control system for the Urengoy-Uzhgorod Gas Pipeline, a system which the company had been installing since 1981. The system was to be completed by 1985. It is still not functioning. More than 100 million rubles in foreign currency has already been

paid. As we can see, not only is there no intention of repaying us this expense but we are being told that we should make further payments "within the shortest possible time."

IV

A major factor which hinders the protection of the country's interests in foreign economic activities is the traditional curtain of secrecy. Even now, when restricting information is not the popular thing to do, it is justified by the need to protect commercial secrets in the case of big contracts. This is an unusual situation even for developing countries.

Here is what Candidate of Economic Sciences I.G. Pisarets, who has worked for many years as Soviet commercial representative abroad, wrote to this journal in this connection: "It is worldwide practice that no construction, particularly a large-scale one, is allowed by the authorities of a country before the technical and economic substantiation has been completed. Thus, for example, when Brazil began to consider the building of a huge hydroelectric power plant on the Parana River, the state electrification organization undertook the thorough study of the problem. Several years later alternate choices had been submitted and, subsequently, the final substantiation was adopted. All of this was covered by the press. It is also worldwide practice that after obtaining the permission of the authorities to build the project, which comes after the study of the substantiation and other documents, the organization announces a bid for the work to be done or equipment needed, in which interested domestic and foreign applicants can participate. The bid is announced in the press. In our country, in concluding the agreements for the Siberian project, instead of announcing the bids, based on technical and economic substantiations and the collection of submitted suggestions and their consideration and discussions, the ministry surrendered control to the foreign corporations. It is inconceivable for an agency of any capitalist country to allow itself to act in this manner, for in that case such an authority would be immediately suspected of improprieties and an investigation would be launched."

Naturally, neither preliminary project studies or their extensive discussion and public bids are a guarantee from abuses. Latin America provides an instructive example. When new major oil deposits were discovered in Mexico, during the period of a tempestuous rise in energy prices, people spoke of a historical opportunity which the country had and should use. After the flood of oil income began to abate, it became clear that the uncontrolled use of foreign loans and inefficient use of the funds had put the country in an extremely precarious position. The foreign debt exceeded \$100 billion. The spreading of corruption in the state petroleum industry was realized as being a political problem and the struggle against it is now given priority in the activities of the new

Mexican government. In our country, against the background of the elimination of stereotypical concepts about contemporary capitalism, we seem to be confusing Western companies with philanthropic societies.

The essential question of the country's economic policy is being discussed. An oblast party leader speaks out in the central press in support of a deal which triggers serious doubts. His economic arguments are simple: recovery time is determined not only by the Soviet side but also by the foreign participants in the joint enterprise. In the West no loans are granted if profits are not expected. Who can object to this? Naturally, one could bear in mind that Western banks agree to grant credits only if the loan is guaranteed by the Foreign Economic Bank. If the project does not yield the promised profits, this would affect the interests of our country but would not infringe upon their profits. But need we explain the fact that when one concludes a deal the best thing is to check personally the estimates of the recovery of one's outlays and not entrust one's partner with this?

The structure of foreign economic relations which has developed is benefiting the expanded reproduction of an archaic and resource-intensive structure of the national economy, which dooms the country to backwardness. Unless we abandon this way even the rich resources will not help us.

Let us remember the efforts to make use of the petroleum resources of Western Siberia faster, at all cost, which led to mass purchases of equipment and pipes and the accelerated exploitation of the deposits. Now, when the threat of a drop in yields has become clearly apparent and when this decline can be prevented only by steadily increasing the flow of resources channeled into the sector, the huge networks of gas pipelines leading to the diminished deposits turn out to be unnecessary. The question arises: What to do with prematurely aged cities? At this point a new chain of substantial purchases is in the works. The same situation is repeated with gas reserves. The difficulties encountered by the petroleum workers are used as a justification of the need for boosting this sector as well. Foreign analysts project for the first half of the 1990s a sharp increase in exports of Soviet gas on the Western European market and, correspondingly, a drop in its prices.

A country without a normally functioning domestic market cannot become efficiently integrated in the world market. Our own experience has proved this most clearly. Without a successful economic reform purchasing even the most highly productive imported equipment will not correct the foreign economic situation.

Intensifying inflationary processes are the main obstacle blocking the intensification of the reform. Under these circumstances the most efficient is the type of utilization of foreign exchange which would yield the greatest revenue to the budget and, combined with other anti-inflationary measures, would create prerequisites for

establishing a market control. Although a technocrat would find this difficult to understand, today imports of household electronic appliances or clothing contribute more to the solution of the strategic tasks of the national economy than the purchasing of pipes or chemical fertilizers.

We must abandon as soon as possible the naive faith that our foreign partners, who are concerned with their benefits, will not forget ours and will relieve us of the need to think for ourselves and to make our own optimal decisions, for in any case it is the level of the people's well-being that will be affected by them. That is precisely why the people have the right to an answer to simple questions: Who squandered the oil money? Who drafted substantiations, promised mountains of gold and made decisions on projects which were implemented at that time? Is everything in order with our grain imports? Who is responsible for the set of deals related to the "gas-pipelines" contracts? Who is responsible for the losses of the Astrakhan Complex and the ecological situation which has developed there? Who is responsible for losses caused by the delayed installation of the set of imported equipment which, in 1988, for enterprises located in the RSFSR, cost 902 million rubles to the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizers Industry, 413 million to the USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry, and 446 million to the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry? Who is responsible for uninstalled imported equipment scattered throughout the country, the estimated amounts of which, at the start of 1989, had reached 4.6 billion rubles?

Global practical experience is familiar with the mechanism for establishing political responsibility: parliamentary investigations. Obviously, the newly elected supreme state authority should take this experience into consideration. The money that was wasted cannot be recovered. What is important, however, is something else: to break the vicious circle of irresponsibility which makes it possible, after the failure of one project, to undertake a new one, even broader, with doubled stubbornness.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

PUBLIC OPINION

Clash and Hope (Thoughts on the Subject of the April Events in Tbilisi)

18020014d Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 36-44

[Article by Varlam Varlamovich Keshelava, doctor of philosophical sciences, KOMMUNIST GRUZII editor-in-chief]

[Text] On 14 April the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee held a plenum the topic of which was "On the Political Situation in the Republic." It accepted the resignation of the former top leadership in the republic:

D.I. Patiashvili, Georgian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, Buro members Z.A. Chkheidze, chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, and O.Ye. Cherkeziya, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, who remained in office only until the next session. This case seems unprecedented in terms of our party practices. If we recall that requests for their resignation were submitted by several other members of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Buro, one can imagine the extraordinary nature of the circumstances which dictated this exceptional decision. What are their origins? What preceded the tragic night of 8 April?

As everywhere else, the electoral campaign and the day of elections of USSR People's Deputies, on 26 March, triggered in Georgia an unparalleled increase in the civic activities of all population strata. The point is not only that 97 percent of the voters actually voted. The quality of the electoral campaign changed as well. A live and genuine interest in the nomination of candidates appeared. Support groups were organized, which assumed the still unusual role to us of promoting their candidates among the voters. Here is yet another characteristic feature: like other areas, in Georgia activists from a variety of informal associations participated most seriously in the electoral campaign. Candidates, nominated through the traditional methods and officially supported by the collectives of enterprises, organizations and establishments, behaved, as a rule, passively. Confident of the positive outcome, they did not participate in the tournaments of competitors, apparently considering it inconvenient and out of place to compete with "autonomous" rivals. Although this time they were not too far wrong in terms of the results of the vote, the elections nonetheless proved that this coming autumn a serious struggle will have to be waged for deputy seats in the republic parliament. Before the final results of these elections had even been announced, some of the candidates who had lost had started their new round in the electoral campaign.

It is in this context that we should consider also the demonstration and the meeting, which lasted several days, as well as the hunger strike in front of Government House, as actions which have long-range—autumn—targets. This is because all of this was above all else aimed at enhancing the authority of informal associations, which had declined somewhat in connection with the elections, for which reason we can only guess as to who decided to pit military force against unarmed people exhausted by their participation in the meeting.

However, it would be unfair today to blame the republic's leadership for all the sins. The government made several unsuccessful attempts to prevent destabilization by appealing to the organizers of the meeting to initiate a dialogue. This, however, did not meet with understanding on the part of the participants in the meeting. Why? Above all because several months earlier the government had broken up an exchange of views with

the young people and resorted to threats. Confidence was undermined. The political initiative was lost. Consequently, not only the constructive proposals of the government but also its warnings were not taken seriously. At that point the final argument of the authorities was applied: force!

I believe that it would be wrong to depict the April movement, which spread along the streets and which mushroomed as a mountain, either as an entirely impulsive and spontaneous or an efficiently organized one, directed from a single center. Unquestionably, both elements were present. At the final stage, however, the will of those who inspired this meeting marathon was able to largely rally the chaotic feelings of the crowd around the idea of the national renaissance of sovereign Georgia and subordinate them entirely to that idea.

When the participants in the meeting, like a sensitively reacting instrument string, followed the words of their leaders and were ready strictly to carry out their instructions, the culminating point came which demanded high responsibility to the people who trusted them. Very regretfully however, it was precisely such a responsibility that was lacking. Conversely, the appeal of Catholicos-Patriarch Iliya II, the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church, who had come shortly before the tragedy to warn the people of the the coming trouble, was lightly rejected.

The upheaval in Georgia in connection with the tragic events has been tremendous. The national memory will remember for a long time the bloody wounds and the death of innocent people (the majority of whom were women) in dispersing the thousands-strong meeting which had gathered at Government House. Many of the facts which give an idea of what took place are common knowledge. Others are being thoroughly investigated with a view to obtaining the full and unbiased picture.

There is no excuse for the tragedy and the cruelty, which would include references to the existing threat to the governmental system, or to explain such actions as dictated by a dangerous development of events. The situation in the republic, in Tbilisi above all, starting with the end of March, was in fact developing in a quite complex manner. However, at no stage whatsoever had it assumed a critical nature, for had such been the case, the Army would not have left the city only 1 week later and the curfew would have remained. However, the bitter lessons should be drawn from everything without exception.

The blood which was shed indicated that the parties to the conflict did not particularly care for the opportunities which the initiated process of democratization in the country provide us. Essentially, it was a blow at perestroika as well. It is precisely this circumstance that gives the moral right to claim that the official leadership did not pass the test of power, or the leaders of the informal associations, the test of freedom. Yes, the April crisis

became for all of us a merciless test of political maturity, without the necessary standard of which would make it futile to hope that the delicate fabric of democratic customs and forms of cooperation would be able to withstand sudden overloads.

Having mentioned conclusions, the doubt immediately came to my mind: Are we not being too hasty with them? For we could be blamed for the fact that we do not have all the facts, for which reason we have no right to judge the extent of the guilt of individuals who were the direct participants in the drama played out on Rustaveli Boulevard. It may also be pointed out that the investigation and the representative commission, which consisted of deputies of the republic's Supreme Soviet and members of the public, which was created to assist in the impartial study of all details of the event, has not completed its work as yet. Unquestionably justice, and justice alone, will name those responsible for the death of people by name and establish the degree of responsibility of everyone, whoever he may be: a civilian with power, a military man who issued an order, or individuals who directed during those days and hours the numerous demonstrations. However, we do not encroach in the least on the prerogatives of the judiciary and do not intend to pass our own sentence, different from that of the court, for we are not engaged in an investigation or in assessing the actions of individuals but are trying to determine the typology of a sharp sociopolitical conflict.

Unquestionably, law and politics are not separated by an insurmountable wall. They are closely interrelated. Equally subject to such penetration is public morality which did not wait, even for a minute, the start of the official investigation but immediately after the Tbilisi events became known in the republic, expressed its unanimous condemnation of violence. Nonetheless, the relative autonomy which political awareness has makes its evaluations and conclusions important in their own way, for they establish the profound reasons which determine the specific variety of social processes and phenomena.

The more persistently the mind goes back to the sources of the tragedy and one tries to explain to oneself the combination of reasons which constitute the origins of the confrontation, the more frequently priority is assumed by one of them: the break of the valuable dialogue between, conventionally speaking, the "upper" and "lower" strata. It was precisely this reason that in the course of time led to the disappearance of reciprocal trust and the active rejection of attempts at compromise. This occurred not because the universal role of dialogue as a promising form of cultural-political contacts was underestimated but because of its deliberate rejection. This makes it all the more important today truly to master some rather simple truths.

Above all, we must not fear pluralism of opinion or stubbornly ignore viewpoints we do not share. We must equally not ignore our opponent when his views contain

a truth which he was the first to realize. It is also obvious that although an opinion is the product of the mind, it cannot exist without real carriers. I will not be the last naively to assume that one can force the power of opinion to take into consideration the realities of the opinion of the powers. For a different view would mean that we are still entrapped by the stereotype which does not tolerate any dissidence or dissidents and which tolerates the existence of the latter only abroad. We need a dialogue in the broad sociopolitical meaning and not simply the opportunity to "talk," which has always existed and which is needed in organizing the new institutions in the structures of the political system of renovating socialism. Their functioning should ensure, on the one hand, qualities such as dynamism and variability (such as democratization); on the other, greater resistance on the part of the entire sociopolitical system. It is time to understand that socialism has sunk such deep roots in the socioeconomic flesh of our society, in the political awareness of the people, that fears about its future are hardly warranted. In any case, the prospects and the guarantees concerning the inner foundations of socialism now, at this stage in its development, are not borne by the armed person!

As we look at the phenomena which characterize perestroika and which are accompanying the democratization of our life, we note that not all new initiatives are of equal value or are equally socially significant and acceptable. We must distinguish among them in order not to err in our approaches and in defining essential positions. It is precisely this, however, that was frequently in short supply. In Georgia, for example, the process of establishing informal associations, unions or initiative groups or various foundations encountered hidden opposition and silent disapproval. Anything which was created outside the walls of official offices was considered as almost prejudicial. The latest social formations were considered a potential nursery for dissidence and a probable source of antisocial feelings. Naturally, it is stupid to exclude a priori the possibility of something similar. We witnessed also the fact that the April movement was not free from individuals who, speculating on national feelings, raised anti-Soviet slogans. Nor did we fail to see occasionally, concealed behind democratic speeches, the appeal of "down with the communists!" The political trend of such a "slogan" has nothing in common with the feelings of the working people in the republic. However, we must clearly realize that the revolutionary perestroika of a huge multinational country cannot take place smoothly, in a straight line, without a hitch. The dialectics of democratization is complex. Having firmly taken this path, we must be ready for the pressure exerted from the left and the right, for the opposition of conservative forces as well as the adventurist hastening of perestroika processes, which have their logic and their stages.

Naturally, many difficulties as well exist along this path. Economic, political and psychological contradictions are inevitable. Their resolution will require time, inventiveness and the stressing of all the creative forces of the

people. Consequently, the task is for the local party committees on all levels to master the work methods under the conditions of democratization. It is from this viewpoint that we must review the biased attitude toward the variety of new groups and bearers of social initiatives. We must not rebuff them but, conversely, do everything possible to attract them as natural allies and partners. We must not work for the division and dispersal of forces but set as our objective that of rallying forces and consolidating the socially useful energy for the sake of solving pressing problems, the influence of which is felt by workers, peasants and intellectuals. Obviously, the science of democracy means precisely the ability to find a flexible formula which rallies the public interests. This formula must be fearlessly mastered.

Understandably, on that April night the events heated up the already complex situation in the republic to its extreme. I believe that even had it been possible to avoid casualties, the existing circumstance would not have changed its political essence. Actually, the appeal of the republic's leadership to the Army to bring order indicates the official acknowledgment of the crisis. Having lost control and turned to the use of power, the civilian authorities signed their political bankruptcy. The severity of the crisis was worsened by the fact that it broke out during a time of great difficulty for the country and the party, when the party is making tremendous efforts to surmount economic difficulties and is seeking ways of extracting society out of the clutches of the command-administrative system and return to socialism its humanistic aspect. Despite subjective wishes, objectively, by its actions, the republic's leadership seemed to have admitted that it was unable to carry out perestroika with methods consistent with its spirit, as formulated in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum confirmed this fact through its resolution.

In his speech E.A. Shevardnadze who, together with G.P. Razumovskiy participated in the work of the plenum, justifiably pointed out that had the republic's leadership displayed at the proper time greater perspicacity and made greater collective efforts to surmount the noted split between the public and the party-soviet aktiv, matters may not have reached the point of open conflict and that people would not have trespassed the safety line. To accomplish this they should have had to consider the various informal associations not as an inevitable evil, not as a weed of democratization but as a social force with the help of which one could resolve essential economic, social, demographic, national and many other problems. In turn, this depended on the extent to which the directive-oriented management style could be surmounted, the extent to which glasnost was accepted and the depth to which political and ideological work methods had been mastered.

However, the heart of the matter lies precisely in the fact that yesterday's mentality is still being felt in major and

minor matters. The aspiration administratively to subordinate to party and soviet authorities the broad spectrum of interests of the various foundations and initiative groups deprives their existence of any common sense. We must bear in mind that the need for new forms of organization of the public, the so-called informal associations, is based on the fact that the state cannot pay equal attention to or appropriate equal funds for solving all problems which are of vital significance to the physical and moral health of society. By assuming some of the concern for the preservation of historical monuments, environmental defense and use of ecologically clean technologies, and by creating cultural, children's and other foundations, society actively helps to develop in the individual a feeling of ownership of the reality around him, and not one of "living in a corner." The reform of the political system must reflect the changes in relations between society and the state by limiting the omnipotence of the state and granting society increasing freedom. It is not only society, which comes out of the comprehensive guardianship provided by the state, but the socialist state itself, which becomes a rule of law state, and which acknowledges the supremacy of the law, that returns to its true nature, to its purpose, which is to be the foundation for the free development of man and a guarantor of the inviolability of his rights and personal dignity.

Did people become totally aware of such phenomena as being the result of profound changes directly stemming from perestrojka? The decisions which were made under extreme circumstances are confirmed by M.S. Gorbachev's statement at the recent April CPSU Central Committee Plenum to the effect that "in numerous cases the party organizations and our cadres proved to be unprepared for such a turn in the development of democratic processes in society" in which, on the basis of a full-fledged dialogue, "the people must be mobilized and convinced of the need to carry out perestrojka and remodel our society in the interests of man, of the entire nation, instead of acting on the basis of the system of permissions and prohibitions or allowing and banning. This is in the past. This means nostalgia for authoritative methods!"

Where does this nostalgia come from? Where do we find the roots of conservatism which prevent progress and hinder our development? Are they not hiding in the enduring mechanism for the training of the cadre corps of party workers? Is it a secret that for decades, as though surreptitiously, the choice of cadres was based on personal acquaintanceship and loyalty? Is this not the origin of the tendency toward exclusiveness, not to say "elitism," and a "caste approach!" All of this, combined with the low influx of fresh forces "from the outside" rather than from the "circle of the chosen" or, in harsher terms, people appointed on the basis of strictly subjective considerations, provides the favorable grounds for the growth of such fruits, if one may refer to them in such terms, compared to which conservatism and routine appear quite harmless both socially and morally.

As a result of the extensive, essentially comprehensive dissemination of the faulty practice of staffing the apparatus, ignoring professional training and competence became the norm. It was believed that the management of ideological work, let us say, was essentially very similar to the methods of party management of any given industrial sector. Common sense notwithstanding, quite frequently the pies were baked by the shoemaker and the shoes were made by the baker. And it was under those circumstances that we struggled for both quality and growth of labor productivity and hoped to achieve high end results! This included the area of education....

Perestrojka should take the changes which are taking place within the party and its structures and its ideological and organizational principles to their logical end. The democratization of internal party life, which is the main guarantee for the democratization of society and is based on the reorganization of its apparatus and the implementation of a cadre policy consistent with the objectives of perestrojka, will take the party to the new, wide road. However, no miracles will take place. In order to secure the total restoration of the confidence, the scarcity of which is greatly felt in society, the party must rely not on executives, who are indifferent as to the nature of their job, but on highly professional people who think creatively and are able to make independent decisions. In party work we must get rid faster and more daringly of the mentality of the "cog" which was an ideal component of a system based on absolute obedience.

Today an essentially different situation is gradually developing. The process of releasing the social energy of the masses is intensifying and the power of social awareness is becoming emancipated. With each new step society is becoming ever more open and dynamic. In this connection, unusual situations appear constantly. Obviously, under the conditions of the development of democracy their number will continue to increase, for which reason perestrojka needs a new type of worker and, above all, a new type of party worker, who will display a modern way of thinking and will be able to master political methods, i.e., who will try fruitfully to cooperate with and convince people.

Ever since its appearance, our party has been famous for the brilliant galaxy of talented journalists, speakers, propagandists and agitators, who were able to listen, speak, argue and lead. This was the flower of the party intelligentsia, which accomplished such a great deal to establish the party's authority and to win over on its side not thousands but millions of working people. The high intellectualism established by V.I. Lenin and his fellow workers became one of the most outstanding and distinguishing features of bolshevism. This entrusts us with a heavy liability....

The need for a live dialogue in the republic is tremendous. It is as necessary as are air, bread and water. We need a rich exchange of views and not reciprocal accusations or squabbling, for the price we have paid for the

discussion initiated with the public, with a wide open door, has been too steep to stop it midway. No, it must not come to an end on a tragic note of alienation! We must find the necessary strength to continue it.

The Tbilisi events are instructive in yet another aspect, which must be interpreted and assessed not as a fact of "local significance" but also from a significantly broader viewpoint, i.e., as a factor of upgrading the role of party ethics and the moral responsibility of the party member today. It is a question of the phenomenon of resignation of the leadership, both as a group of officials as well as individually.

I believe that I will not be sinning against the truth by formulating the hypothesis that the idea of resignation appeared in some republic managers even prior to the tragic events. If we look at their decision from the viewpoint of consequences, we could simply say that the step they took plays a positive role and is a factor which stabilizes the political situation. Without linking the resignation to the exceptional situation, but assuming that something similar could take place under qualitatively different and relatively calm conditions, it does not seem to me that we are thus encroaching on the strength of the party or undermining its organizational foundations. I believe that considerations on this topic only broaden the framework of the old and currently obsolete concepts which developed over the past 50-60 years. Why conceal it, frequently, year after year, formulas such as "implements a responsible assignment," or "heads an important work sector" concealed organizational weakness and amorphousness as well as relations which violated party principles for the sake of personal friendships.

As the statement which I.K. Polozkov made at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum proves, he raised the same question only in reference to economic managers. The first secretary of the Krasnodar CPSU Kraykom believes that managers who have allowed a major failure in their work and have thus discredited the party should find the courage to resign. We believe that the institution of resignation, if acknowledged by the party, will help to strengthen democratic principles and contribute to the growth of the party's prestige.

The history of the Georgian Party organization is familiar with yet another act of resignation of the leadership. On 22 October 1922 the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee resigned (with a few individual exceptions). The reasons which led to such an exceptional step included the sharp ideological differences on problems of national-statehood building, which arose between the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee (or, rather, the Budu Mdivani Group and the RKP(b) Zakkraykom, headed by Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who was backed by Stalin).

The ups and downs of this uneven struggle have been frequently described by our historians although, it is true, differently at different times! For many long years the "Mdivani Group" was stigmatized and defamed as double-dyed nationalists, as the ideological servants of the Georgian mensheviks, etc., etc. After Stalin's death, when the science of party history began slowly to emerge from its state of lethargy which had been instilled in it by the "*Short Course*," references to the "Mdivani Group" became more restrained. Nonetheless, as late as the 1980s and until very recently, the position held by that group was still considered "radically erroneous," for it allegedly "hindered the economic and political unification of the Transcaucasian republics and, essentially, promoted the idea of Georgian separation and therefore played in the hands of bourgeois nationalism and the Georgian mensheviks." Today historical science is not only taking the next step but is also radically revising its understanding of the object of that old quarrel. As a result of the new approach to the "Georgian Conflict," historians are showing a tendency to rehabilitate the "Mdivani Group," failing to find in its position a violation of the principles of Leninist national policy.

The merciless persecution of the "Mdivani Group," whose members were executed by firing squad in the troubled 1930s, is explained with the fact that its platform, which supported the idea of granting Georgia the rights of a sovereign Union republic and, correspondingly, allowing its leading authorities to retain a certain independence, conflicted with the actual policy of "autonomizing," authored by Stalin. The "Georgian incident" which had appeared in a new light to V.I. Lenin after a personal talk with Mdivani, who had visited him in Gorki, motivated Vladimir Ilich to intervene in the conflict and speak out quite unequivocally against autonomizing, as an idea which, in his words, was radically erroneous and untimely.

This may have seemed to end the incident. The building of the Soviet state was organized on the basis of Lenin's principle of a federation of Union republics. Stalin did not press his views. Even after Lenin's death, it was as though he did not return to them. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics strengthened, becoming a powerful state. A process of steady economic and spiritual development of the nations, under the aegis of the federation, took place. On a parallel basis, however, as a result of the strengthening of the center and the power of the executive authorities, the sovereign rights of Union republics were vanishing and their status as autonomous units became essentially decorative.

But let us return to the basic topic of our discussion. In another time it would have been impossible to imagine something similar to what is developing today in front of our own eyes on the squares of the cities, when the headlights of tanks and armored troop carriers are trying to illuminate the path to democracy, as was the case in Tbilisi. This historical aside should explain why in the arguments which in the discussions which are taking

place in auditoriums and on the streets, the national problems hold such an important place, along with problems of the rights of nations and their national-statehood sovereignty. It is precisely this range of problems that is the base which rallies virtually all informal groups and associations which, in all other matters have substantially more diverging interests. What is the reason for this?

Perestrojka, which eliminates deformations, takes us back to the Leninist understanding of socialism. In this great process the restoration of the true socialist values and their humanistic nature, today returning to the Leninist understanding of a federation assumes priority, after the administrative system with its omnipotence of the center and suppression of variety had turned it into something almost purely symbolic. I believe that it would be no exaggeration to say that the difference between a federation and autonomization has been preserved only in theory, whereas in practice it has virtually disappeared.

If our attitude toward such facts is light-hearted and lacks proper attention, we are bound to block the way to settling truly important and truly basic problems the ignoring of which triggers instant reaction in various social and national circles. It would be difficult today to name a more important ideological sector. It is here that the sharpest and most impassioned debates take place. Regardless of their national affiliation, the informal associations raise the same question and proclaim the same slogan and voice the same demands: independence, autonomy and sovereignty for Union republics. Their target is the federation, which they consider the main source of difficulties and main obstacle to development.

Unfortunately, scientists—historians, jurists, economists or political experts—are not actively participating in such debates and do not state directly that the federative system of our state should be reviewed both from the viewpoint of its practical reorganization as well as on the level of the theoretical interpretation of its principles. At this point, however, we should emphasize that a nihilistic attitude toward the federation and claims that this principle has exhausted its possibilities and historically outlived its usefulness are theoretically groundless. The implementation of this line would mean, in practice, taking a step backward and obvious sociopolitical regress. The aspiration for isolation and exclusivity does not promise anything good in terms of the harmonious development of nations (even of a big national state, not to mention small nations). Furthermore, this conflicts with the realities of the contemporary world in which the dominant trend is that of integration and consolidation among different countries and aspirations which bring to life new regional centers and communities.

In the light of these global processes and problems, which exclude the possibility of solving them by a single country, however strong its economic potential may be, there is no sensible alternative to the idea of integration.

Awareness of this historical inevitability should also shed light on the principle of the federative system of the Soviet state. No one intends to prove that there is quiet and a problem-free pacification in our multinational home. Perhaps it is precisely here that we find the main tangle of contradictions which cannot be unraveled through force and the solution of which requires the greatest possible political wisdom.

The party is preparing for the Central Committee plenum at which a frank discussion on the problems which have accumulated in the area of relations among nationalities will be held. The CPSU is persistently seeking ways on the basis of which we could hope for major progress in the main area: creating conditions for the truly free and truly voluntary and truly equal and firm Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. One such constructive solution is the program formulated by the party for regional cost accounting, the implementation of which could be a foundation for the economic autonomy of the republics which will function within a real federation as sovereign states.

Obviously, these notes by no means provide a full analysis of the lengthy series of problems the extensive and informal discussion of which is setting the tone in the republic's spiritual life. At best, what was said here could be considered as an initial sketch of the political portrait of the situation which developed last April in Tbilisi. I do not exclude the fact that some people will find a similarity between it and events outside Georgia. This makes it all the more important to emphasize, again and again, that in our days we must not underestimate the high politicizing of the awareness of the public, of the broad masses. These are phenomena to which, actually, we owe democracy.

I would like to conclude my thoughts with the words of M.S. Gorbachev, expressed in connection with the Tbilisi events: "...We must," he said, addressing himself to the participants in the April Party Central Committee Plenum, "do everything possible and use political methods and the power of the law to prevent a repetition of this. The success of the initiated renovation of society and of perestrojka is based on the intensification and broadening of the natural ties between the party and the masses and the working people, and their unity and cohesion."

It is just so: cohesion for the sake of a future worthy of our best hopes.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

'To Live With Our Eyes Open'

18020014e Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 45-54

[Discussion between V. Dymarskiy and Tatyana Ivanovna Zaslavskaya, academician, president of the Soviet Sociological Association, director of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Socio-economic Problems of the AUCCTU and the USSR State Committee for Labor]

[Text] [Dymarskiy] Tatyana Ivanovna, today a discussion on sociology cannot avoid the tempestuous social processes which have lately caused a violent upheaval in our seemingly measured life. The recent electoral campaign, which marked an explosion of political activeness of the masses; the aggravation in a number of areas of relations among nationalities against a background of heightened national self-awareness, and the ecological movements which are gathering strength are all creating the impression that all of these new phenomena and sharp turns in the moods of the public caught many managers unprepared. We realized how inaccurate and simplistic were ideas on public opinion which, at best, was considered as the simple sum of individual opinions but not as a powerful factor which would influence the political and socioeconomic realities of today. This public opinion, however, turned out to be much more complex and stratified and varied and, above all, much more efficient and much quicker to take shape than could be assumed on the basis of the durable stereotypes of "unity of thought" and "universal approval." The natural question is the following: Where was sociological science during that time? Why did we not feel (or almost not feel) its presence? How did it happen that an instrument such as the study of public opinion, which is so commonplace in other countries, remained "under wraps?"

[Zaslavskaya] Unfortunately, virtually no one used the services of the sociologists. This was clearly confirmed by the electoral campaign. Finding themselves in an unpredictable situation and facing the unexpected behavior of the voters, some people became so confused that they did not know how to wage the electoral campaign. But was the situation all that unpredictable and the behavior of the voters all that unexpected? All one had to do was to study ahead of time the mood of the population and formulate a forecast and those who were unable to win their deputy seats could have acted differently by addressing themselves, above all, to the people. Instead, some participants in the electoral campaign, the representatives of the party apparatus in particular, having rejected the help of science, used methods which yielded effects opposite to those desired. Now they accuse their opponents of their own "sins" ("excess democracy") or the mass information media ("too much glasnost").

It is important to master these lessons and to take them into consideration in preparations for the forthcoming elections for local soviets, elections which, I am confident, will take place with even greater activeness by the

population. The people have become aware of their interests, made their statement and seen that this works. Now, unquestionably, they will talk with even greater confidence.

I recall that 15 years ago my colleagues-sociologists traveled to a city in the Urals to study the behavior of working youth. They spent 2 weeks waiting for permission to conduct this study, which was to be given by a local manager. Finally, when their allotted time was already coming to an end and the patience of the scientists had been exhausted, they were told quite frankly: "You think that we do not know what takes place in worker hostels? However, as long as I do not have your report in hand I can claim ignorance. Anyway, I would be unable to change anything. I have no real tools with which to control such a process. Your report, meanwhile, would be around, a commission would come and ask what was done about it.... Better not to have it!"

At that time it was still possible to live with one's eyes shut, more or less carefree, without precise knowledge of what was happening around us. Today such a view is simply unacceptable. You know, if you launch a raft down a big river in the flat parts the raft could float without steering or "feedback:" the likelihood that it would hit an obstacle is, generally speaking, small. With a fast current, however, an uncontrolled raft would present a danger at each turn, for which reason it would need accurate control instruments. Our society is currently in that type of rapids. Yes, society itself decided to put such a sharp acceleration in its motion. In any case, a number of phenomena, be they national or ecological movements, turned out largely unexpected to it. Why? For the simple reason that for a long time afterwards society could not see itself in a mirror (the function of sociology) or even if it looked at that mirror it rapidly turned away, so that no one would guess deviations from the "ideal" image which had been drawn on paper. If one agency or another "summoned" sociologists, in the majority of cases the results of the studies were simply filed away.

It seems to me that the "rapids" of perestroika made obvious to the officials on the various rungs of the political system the significance of sociological knowledge and of the study of the actual public awareness. Although still modest, there is demand for studies on the most pressing problems: What behavior could be expected on the part of one population group or another? How to influence this behavior? On whom could one rely or not rely in various activities? We must live with our eyes open.

Our center was established precisely as a result of the appearance of such an understanding by society: the importance of having precise knowledge of public opinion on socioeconomic problems. For example, we intend to regulate prices; what would be the reaction of

the population to this? Manpower is being laid off and what do people think on this subject? When is one on firm grounds and when is he not?

[Dymarskiy] But probably the sociologists as well should not stand idly by, expecting orders from above. Demand must be actively shaped.

[Zaslavskaya] I agree. When the VTsIOM was formulating its work plan for 1989, we addressed the following questions to the various AUCCTU and USSR State Committee for Labor departments: What specific socio-economic studies were they interested in, above all? Some departments did not answer at all; others politely reported that they were interested in everything. At that point we decided to draw up by ourselves a list of specific topics which would make a selection possible. Today more than one-half of such topics already have customers. This is a characteristic confirmation of the law of increased needs.

Another method for shaping demand was tried as well: it applies to the case when respective agencies draw their own conclusions from studies already completed. For example, to our great amazement, a number of senior officials, as well as our own results of a population survey on the price reform differed from the prevailing view that the overwhelming majority of citizens (no less than 90-95 percent) would categorically reject the reform. The objective picture turned out to be much more complex. More than 20 percent of those surveyed had no specific view on the matter. Among those who expressed their attitude toward the problem, two-thirds were "against" or "somewhat against," while one-third were "for" or "somewhat for." In answer to the question about the conditions in which the price reform would nonetheless be acceptable, the first was the abundance of goods on store shelves. Only 1 percent of those surveyed opposed any price changes regardless of circumstances. Therefore, it is a question of a variable rather than a firm opinion.

To go back to the start of our conversation, let me note that despite all positive changes, sociological knowledge has still not become a social need. To this day a certain snobbery is displayed toward sociology. This is explained by the still rather low level of development of our science and the fact that it is quite closely related to man and to his ordinary life, hence the widespread view (particularly in managerial circles) that here everyone is his own specialist and knows and understands sociology.

Many years ago, during my first sociological expedition, the rules demanded that we obtain permission from a manager on the oblast level. The conversation which took place was as follows: "What is your purpose?" He asked. "We would like," I answered, "to study rural population migration: its reasons, factors, structure, objectives and results..." "None of this is necessary, I can tell you everything about it." I politely said: "You would make our life much easier, for otherwise a large

group, consisting essentially of women, would have to go to remote villages walking in the dust and mud. Naturally, it would be better to record your data. In the migration structure, what is the correlation between men and women? What is their educational level? Where do most people come from, from peripheral or central villages? What percentage of migrants go back from the city to the country and if so why?" "Well, naturally, this I do not know," was the answer....

[Dymarskiy] Nonetheless, Tatyana Ivanovna, you must admit that interest in sociological research has increased incomparably. One can note a kind of "sociological boom:" even nonprofessionals are undertaking the study of public opinion. Clearly, the reason is that there is a shortage of surveys made by specialists. This is confirmed, in particular, by the mail received by KOMMUNIST. Let me quote a small excerpt from a letter sent by L.A. Maslova, from Sverdlovsk: "Changes in the country's life and in the foreign policy of the USSR have begun to affect our very strong enterprise, which is well equipped and maintains a high production standard. Changes in the type of orders, conversion to full cost accounting and self-financing, and the initial manifestation of self-management authorities have drastically changed the stability of the situation and clashed with the interests of various groups. A sociological study at the enterprise would make it possible, in my view, to see the real picture of the depth of changes occurring here, and the deployment of forces in order soberly to assess the situation, formulate a strategy for the development of the enterprise and stabilize the situation on a new basis."

Our reader further asks the question which we would like to readdress to you: "Does the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion have any experience in conducting sociological studies in labor collectives after the enactment of the USSR Law on the State Enterprise? Could it provide methodical guidance in conducting sociological studies at a specific enterprise?... The most interesting survey made by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA "Society-88—Society-89," with the participation of the VTsIOM instills the hope that we shall see ourselves not in a trick mirror and, therefore, that we would be able to correct many of our shortcomings."

How are sociologists answering this need coming from below?

[Zaslavskaya] If we consider "from below" as being the level of enterprises and organizations, the VTsIOM and other similar centers are literally flooded by requests for surveys of public opinion in labor collectives. We have signed a cost accounting contract with the Volga Automobile Plant and received a request from Tyumen Oblast on the study of problems related to the social aspects of gas and petroleum extraction....

I believe that the letter by the reader of *KOMMUNIST* as well is not simply due to a fashionable "sociological trend," but proof of the sincere wish to include public opinion in the decision-making process and to assert the principles of self-management.

Generally speaking, as far as the attitude of the population toward sociological research is concerned, the results of the survey conducted jointly by the VTsIOM and *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, which is mentioned in the letter, indeed exceeded all expectations. No one could even assume that we would obtain such a huge number of filled forms to which, furthermore, short notes and letters with considerations on the most vital topics of social life were added. This means that the people have a need, an unsatisfied thirst to speak out, to be heard but in such a way that the individual opinion becomes part of public opinion. It is no accident that the question of the nature of forms of participation in social life which could affect decisions made by the state authorities most strongly was answered by 38 percent of the respondents as "participation in mass public opinion surveys."

There is another interest as well: to find out what others have said, whether one's personal opinion coincides with the prevalent opinion or not, who do you agree or disagree with. Therefore, a dialogue by correspondence develops, a feeling of involvement and coparticipation in decision-making. Unquestionably, the increased need for knowledge of public opinion also confirms a certain cohesion within society: citizens who, for many long years, had "scattered" among their various cells and only peeked through their curtains, now can and would like to know what their neighbors are thinking. The simple sum of individual opinions turns, as a result of a discussion, into public opinion and a real force which can influence processes under way.

[Dymarskiy] Tatyana Ivanovna, could it be that interest in sociology—both from above and from below—is limited merely to the study of public opinion? On the one hand, the applied aspects of any science (that which one can, as the saying goes, "sense") are always more attractive to practical workers. On the other hand, does this not indicate a rather narrow understanding of the subject of sociology?

[Zaslavskaya] Sociological studies and the study of public opinion are different things but they are indeed frequently confused. What is the difference between them?

If we can describe society as a container filled with liquid, public opinion would be no more than the surface layer. Even with a perfect method for surveys (for example, the famous Gallup Institute applies a "five-dimensional" measurement, studying not only what people think on a given problem but also the extent to which they are informed about it, the arguments, the

intensiveness with which the opinion is expressed, confidence in its accuracy, and viewpoints on specific aspects of the problem) the result is a relatively limited amount of information on a wide range of problems.

To pursue this comparison, a sociological study involves the entire depth of the vessel and not its surface and only as it pertains to a specific point, a specific question. For example, a scientist who is studying rural population migration is interested less in the opinion of the people about it than the set of circumstances governing their life and work and factors which contribute or, conversely, hinder such migration. It is important to him to be familiar with the plans of the individual, with his migration history, and with the reasons, benefits and losses of the change.... With a thorough study of the question, in the final account the scientist could reach, one could say, the "center of the earth."

However, we must not build a thick wall between applied and basic aspects of sociology. Like any other science, it could be compared to a pyramid on the tip of which we find theoretical problems of socialism and at the base specific studies. On the horizontal level, we distinguish among the sociology of public opinion, family, village, city, organization, education, international relations, economics, and so on. Each of these areas has its level of abstraction, theoretical nucleus and wide range of applied developments.

Sociology was born last century. The grain cast on the ground gave a shoot which today has become a wide tree with more than 40 branches. In my view, despite the entire importance of the other social sciences, sociology, which studies a very specific target, which is so far undeveloped in our country, the civilian society, plays today, along with the science of economics, a key independent role.

[Dymarskiy] You mentioned the still low level of development of sociological science. Could you describe its current status in greater detail?

[Zaslavskaya] Unquestionably, after April 1985 the situation changed for the better. Whereas in the preceding 20 years sociology, like the other social sciences, was in a condition not even of stagnation but degradation, today positive trends in its development have significantly compensated for the negative ones. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the level of sociological research in our country is substantially lower than in a number of developed capitalist and socialist countries.

The reason for this is well known: for many years sociology was on our "black list" of "bourgeois" sciences, for which reason we had to recreate it literally from scratch.

One of the gravest problems is that of cadres. We cannot say that we lack specialists, not only in Moscow but also in Tbilisi, Leningrad, Novosibirsk and other cities there

are skilled scientists at work. The fact that there are very few of them is a different matter. Furthermore, unquestionably, without special steps taken to train cadres the situation in sociology would not change in less than 30 years. Naturally, we cannot wait that long. One of the variants in solving this problem is training abroad. The first steps in that direction have been taken. In my view, a promising form of training was offered by the British colleagues: between 1989 and 1991 England will offer 3-month courses for young Soviet sociologists, chosen on a competitive basis, and most of the cost will be assumed by the British Academy and the Soviet-American Foundation for Cultural Initiatives. Also important is the fact that not one but two or three people per scientific institution will attend such courses, see the world, acquire an extensive amount of knowledge and, back home, they will unquestionably become more skilled specialists who will be followed by the young.

Naturally, the network of sociological training in our own country must be expanded: we must additionally open specialized schools, departments and courses. This is stipulated, in particular, in the CPSU Central Committee resolution on the development of sociological science. It is true that so far this part of the resolution is being implemented exceptionally poorly.

[Dymarskiy] If we were to use your "sociological tree," which of its 40 branches, in your view, would be support, basic branches?

[Zaslavskaya] No variety of answers is possible. The hierarchy is determined by the nature of the period we live in: the leading sectors in sociology are those which are more closely than other related to the perestroika processes. I would single out, above all, the sociology of management, which studies the social problems related to the formulation, adoption and implementation of managerial decisions, relations between superiors and subordinates, self-management and other problems which are at the center of the changes under way.

Alongside the sociology of management is the discipline which studies the social patterns and mechanisms governing the functioning and development of organizations. I believe that there is no need to discuss at length the importance of such studies. Suffice it to name perhaps the problem of the departments alone: we are struggling against departmentalism not always aware of the fact that departments live according to laws which have already been identified by contemporary science. No less important is the sociology of labor, which works on topical subjects, such as the redistribution of manpower under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, ways of upgrading the mobility of labor resources and ways of shaping the new type of worker.

The main problem, perhaps, may be that of sociology in general: the study of the social structure. It is impossible to control processes, to predict the consequences of their development and shape an efficient policy without

knowing how society is structured, the elements of which it consists, and what are the relations, interconnections, interests and ways of behavior of social groups. However, we do not have as yet sufficiently specific, complete and reliable answers to such questions.

[Dymarskiy] How do you explain this?

[Zaslavskaya] The reasons are numerous but let me name just one: for a long time studies of the social structure did not rise above a stipulated and rather low level of social hierarchy. By this I mean a situation in which scientists studying the social "body" were deprived of the possibility to determine the nature of its "head." Even an obkom secretary was, in some aspects, an individual outside the reach of sociologists. Therefore, at best they could determine only the existence of the "body," but the way the "head" lived and what it thought about was difficult to determine. The situation is now changing. The minutes of CPSU Central Committee plenums are now being made public. The past electoral campaign provided a great deal of interesting and instructive knowledge....

[Dymarskiy] To go back to the main trends in sociology, could you discuss in greater detail the area which is the closest to you as a scientist, economic sociology. You did not describe it among the priority disciplines....

[Zaslavskaya] Only because I already intended to pay greater attention to it.

Unquestionably, and please believe me that I mention this not because of personal bias, economic sociology is on the cutting edge of contemporary social science. The fact that the general trend in the restructuring of economic relations was clearly formulated by the party, its practical implementation on all levels of management—in republics, regions, economic sectors and enterprises—will require hundreds if not thousands of socially substantiated decisions of a more individual nature: such as what specific management links should be eliminated; what type of economic activities (state, cooperative, individual) deserve support in one part of the country or another, in town and country; what should be the differences in wages for difficult and simple work and what should be considered just in this case? There are many other problems.

[Dymarskiy] Is economic sociology prepared to answer these questions?

[Zaslavskaya] It would be naive to assume that its condition is distinct from the condition of overall social science. Essentially, not one of its disciplines has performed the "forward looking" function which would study ways to be covered in the future and would warn on time society about the likely difficulties and contradictions in development, analyze their reasons and shed light on the possibility of solving them.

All of this fully applies to economic sociology. Here as well there are unsolved basic problems of theory, for the study of areas and processes which require prime attention was essentially vetoed. The infrequent attempts by scientists to revise obsolete dogmas and make individual elements of the theory consistent with social practices met, in the best of cases, with a cautious reaction and, at worse, were qualified as ideological errors.

Respectively, applied sociology of economic life is drastically behind the requirements of the times and is unable to provide the management authorities with accurate information. It is true that most economic-sociological studies are rounded up, as required, with "practical recommendations." Their standard and quality cannot satisfy us, however. The reasons are obvious and we already mentioned some of them. Let me name what I consider to be the main ones: the limited amount of scientific forces; the virtually total lack of governmental social statistics, which shifts the efforts to obtain, process and analyze social information from statistical authorities to scientists; a certain inertia on the part of the scientists, who have become used to a cognitive rather than managerial type of research; the lack of training of management personnel not only for independently promoting a scientific project but also skillfully cooperating with science and making use of the results of research.

Naturally, this tells us on what we should concentrate in order to upgrade the returns from economic sociology. I would particularly emphasize the need to develop an integral scientific picture in the functioning of the socialist economy as a specific social process. Here we could single out four groups of most topical theoretical problems: formulating realistic and unequivocal economic-sociological models of the next stage of socialism; substantiating social strategy and tactics in the conversion to a new status of society, taking social interests of interacting social groups into consideration; comprehensive study of the social structure of the population employed in the Soviet economy; and systematic study of social economic regulators and specific mechanisms of the influence which social relations have on it.

[Dymarskiy] Let us take the first of these problems. The effective long-term management of society (what formulating a model of the next stage of socialism implies) requires much more accurate ideas about that stage. In this connection questions arise: first, what is the correlation between social and economic objectives of development; second, what is the specific content of social objectives?

[Zaslavskaya] I shall answer those questions in order. On a long-term basis, the primacy of the social objectives of socialism over the economic ones would raise no question: upgrading economic efficiency and enhancing scientific and technical progress are, above all, means of achieving social results. But what is it that we see today?

We see a low pace of development of production, shortages and poor quality of most goods. Under those circumstances (one should agree) social objectives yield their primacy to economic objectives and social policy is oriented above all toward the enhancement of the working person. As long as the economic mechanism will not be properly organized we shall be unable to change this situation. However, subordinating the social to the economic objectives of socialism is justified only for short periods of time, not to exceed one or two 5-year periods. Subsequently, this correlation must absolutely be reversed. Unfortunately, we believe that science has not even begun to think of what practical steps should be taken in this direction.

As to the second group of problems, let us consider the way the objectives of social policy are formulated in the CPSU program. The first is improving the living and working conditions of the Soviet people. Unquestionably, the formulation of this task is accurate, if we take into consideration the low standards of material well-being of many social groups and the difficult and harmful working conditions in many sectors and professions. But the moment we try to look ahead and to trace the possible transformation of this objective with the development of socialism, we immediately come across the underdeveloped nature of the respective areas in theory. Let me cite just a few questions which, so far, have not been answered: Should the material consumption of all social groups steadily grow or does it have a certain limit? Could we speak of an optimal level of material consumption for each specific period of time, sufficient to meet the sensible needs of the population and, at the same time, fitting within the limits of the admissible pressure on the environment? If, as we come closer to the optimal standard in the consumption of material goods, distribution relations must change, what kind of changes will this trigger in the organization of the production process, and the correlation between working and leisure time and the way of life?

The second objective of social policy is formulated as the increasingly complete implementation of the principle of social justice. In this case as well the theoretical nature of this concept has still not been adequately substantiated: there are no specific criteria for measuring the extent of fairness; it is true that in this case we must bear in mind that the scientific discussion of this problem could reveal, at best, the "objective" aspect of social justice, whereas the subjective perception is no less, not to say more, important in the creative enhancement of man. The concepts of individuals concerning social justice vary and, as a rule, are "embellished" by their own interests, which makes the search for some kind of common denominator virtually impossible. This leads to the following question: On what (or whose) concept of justice should we base social policy?

The view develops that the most important in terms of social development is the opinion of the largest groups of working people. However, even the few studies which

have already been made have indicated that so far many people tend to identify social justice with total social equality and equalized distribution. Therefore, we need not only a profound study of the opinions of social groups concerning social justice but also the active and purposeful shaping in the working people of accurate concepts about it.

The third objective of social policy, as stipulated in the party program, is a rapprochement among classes, social groups and strata and surmounting the major disparities between mental and physical labor and between town and country. Here again we must mention the underdeveloped nature of theoretical problems. To begin with, the actual progress of society toward strengthening social homogeneity is slow and, sometimes, even backward. Second, along with surmounting social differences inherited from previous stages of development, new foundations and criteria for social differentiation are established: differences between vertically subordinated groups of workers, between individuals employed in material production or services, personnel of "rich" and "poor" departments, residents of small and large cities, the active part of the population and the retired, etc. Hence the need for a more precise definition of the nature of concepts, such as social differentiation, social homogeneity, major social disparities, etc.

Therefore, social policy and its objectives require a substantial scientific approach. Unfortunately, quite frequently everything is reduced to the development of the social infrastructure, to recording what, where, when and how much should be built. Naturally, such programs are needed but they pertain more to the economy than to social policy. We could build new clubs and schools, but who would use them? Who would go to such places to learn something, and if so why? Leasing triggers its own social problems and so does the cooperative; problems are created by the release of manpower as well. Such problems are structured differently for the various population groups.

[Dymarskiy] You painted a picture of a virtually untouched "scientific virgin land." In this connection, if I may, let me ask a personal question: How did it happen that, after dealing for a long time with problems of economic sociology, you abandoned it to head the VTsIOM in which the main concern is not theoretical development but applied studies of public opinion?

[Zaslavskaya] I sometimes wonder at my decision. Although this is not the first sharp turn I have made in my life: in the past, for example, I moved from Moscow to Novosibirsk and then switched from economics to sociology. Naturally, however, this is not a matter of character features. I simply developed the feeling that in my own "thermometer" (you will recall that we mentioned this) I had reached the lowest point. Furthermore, there is the natural desire of a person to see the real results of his toil. For example, a book which summed up the results of 20 years of collective study of social

problems in the Siberian countryside came out in 1987. It was a big volume (30 printer sheets) and writing it was difficult and took a great deal of time. It came out in only 1,000 copies. Who read it? Random people? Was there a balance between the effort and the returns?

Actually, I have not abandoned economic sociology in the least. I intend, together with R.V. Ryvkina, my co-author, to complete a basic work on this problem. For the time being, however, I have had to give it second priority. The first priority remains that same VTsIOM, which is a major professional project which, in my view, makes it possible truly to help perestroika and to make a practical contribution to it. I hope that the results of the study of public opinion will also become a necessary empirical data for theoretical work.

[Dymarskiy] How is the work of the center you head developing now and how do you see its future?

[Zaslavskaya] I think that one can already say that the VTsIOM, which was created last year, is gradually beginning to stand on its own two feet. The number of studies is increasing (the 1989 plan called for 60 topics but, apparently, we shall be able to accomplish more); we have begun to publish a monthly information bulletin. Thanks to the AUCCTU, which is one of the "parents" of the center, we have acquired a good technical base and computers (it is true that we still do not have suitable premises where we could install them). We are developing international relations and requests for cooperation we receive from abroad far exceed our present capacity. An interdisciplinary collective has developed, including economists, sociologists, method workers, psychologists, journalists, computer specialists, etc. Generally speaking, sociology is an interdisciplinary science and each one of its areas demands particular attention, so that no related area could fall behind.

As we see it, in the future the VTsIOM should become, on the one hand, a kind of factory which would regularly produce the high quality reliable information needed by society and, on the other, a major scientific and research center, which could formulate essentially new assignments and engage not only in topical surveys but in strategic studies of public opinion, combined with specialized sociological studies. At this point we may need collective efforts and cooperation with other scientific sociological institutions.

I also believe that the VTsIOM could and should (and I tend to believe this to be my main function as a USSR people's deputy) supply the supreme state authority with reliable nondepartmental information concerning public opinion, which it needs for its efficient work. This is a major undertaking which will require time and effort, for the first body of USSR people's deputies fits in the full meaning of the term the historical mission of ensuring the practical reorganization of the entire system of social

relations in the country. Unless we are able to accomplish this in the next few years, our society could once again sink in the mire of stagnation and degradation. We have 5 years of intensive work ahead of us.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

'Two Rubles and 14 Kopeks per Kilogram'
18020014f Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) p 55

[Letter to the Editors]

[Text] Comrade editors:

Please take a look at my letter (complaint) which is as follows: On 19 September 1988 I delivered to the kolkhoz a bull, weighing 350 kilograms live weight, at 2.14 rubles per kilogram. I have still not been paid for the bull. I am 70 years old and a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. My wife is 60 and we have no children.

We raised that bull ourselves. Please help me to get my money for the bull I delivered.

The address of the kolkhoz is: Mordovian ASSR, Staroshaygovskiy Rayon, Vertelim Village. My address is the following: Mordovian ASSR, Staroshaygovskiy Rayon, Krasnyy Poselok.

Leontiy Yakovlevich Vasyakin.

From the editors: We were unable to telephone Vertelimskiy Kolkhoz, which was the kolkhoz in question. We were able to get in touch with the Staroshaygovskiy RAPO. Its chairman, A.P. Makarov, confirmed that all that was said in the letter was accurate and that this was not an isolated case. The sole reason was lack of money. The rayon farms owe millions of rubles. Vertelimskiy is on the brink of bankruptcy. This fact is known also to the republic administration of the Agroprombank, the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic and the agrarian and socioeconomic departments of the party obkom. Management practices have become more difficult with the conversion to the new conditions; this includes finances and one can no longer rely on the customary bank credit. Through common efforts a search is under way and it is to be hoped that "on an exceptional basis" financial "reserves" will be found. A meeting was held at the kolkhoz and the people were promised that before the May holidays they will receive their money for the cattle they had delivered the previous autumn....

It is a characteristic feature that we are ready to explain everything and that we always find the necessary explanations. In this case as well the explanations seem to be entirely justified. What remains unanswered, however, is this: Will the 70-year old veteran Leontiy Yakovlevich Vasyakin undertake to raise another bull this year?

Today asking the peasant who has lost faith to work calmly, motivated by interest (not the least of it being material interest) and with a feeling of his own dignity is neither easy nor simple. Meaningless words, harassment and shouts are gradually but steadily eliminating reliance on autonomy, common sense and the new legislation, the purpose of which is to establish new economic legal relations and to help the peasant once again become a peasant. This change is difficult to accomplish and occasionally for each step forward two steps are taken backward.

The fact that Leontiy Yakovlevich undertook "through his own efforts" to raise a bull and to deliver it to the kolkhoz clearly indicates that he believed in the changes. What did the kolkhoz rely on, having no money, when it accepted this bull and agreed on the payment in detail, to the last kopek? That a promise meant action?

It would be proper if now, 6 months later, the people are paid what they have earned. However, "emergency steps" could hardly replace firm guarantees. Yet it is precisely this type of guarantees that the people want....

It takes a great deal to gain someone's trust. Such trust could be lost between the autumn and the spring or even within a single day.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

DISCUSSION AND DEBATE

Problems of Nationalities in the Context of General Laws of Development
18020014g Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 56-66

[Article by Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev, member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The solution of national problems is a major component of perestroyka. The search for specific ways leading to such a solution is possible only within the context of the reorganization of society, on the basis of an overall plan for its development. This article is an attempt at such an effort, based on views on the efficient organization of socialist society which I discussed in KOMMUNIST No 14 for 1988.

Some Initial Concepts

The evolution of inanimate matter, organic life and society, i.e., of all three levels of organization of the material world, has certain common laws of development. Their understanding enables us to avoid an entire series of illusions and to create a plausible scheme of trends in the developing world. Such laws must include, above all, stochastic and indeterminable features. We also have the existence of a bifurcation (from the Latin "bifurcus" which means "division into two") conditions

which characterize the possibility of a qualitative change in the features of the system. It is precisely thanks to such laws that the paths of evolution diverge. Each one of them turns out to be unique and it is precisely for this reason that the variety of organizational forms of the material world increases and that they inevitably become more complex. These facts are not empirical summations. They are the strict consequence of general development laws. However, the dialectics is such that the trends are not of equal value: along with the increased variety there always are processes of integrative nature. The solution of this contradiction is what leads to self-organization. In the course of it, naturally, the mind interferes, being capable of setting targets and attaining their implementation.

The mind, however, is also the creation of our world and it too obeys its overall laws. Therefore, in structuring specific systems of a desired future and the way to achieve them, the mind should see the inevitability of the confrontation among these objective trends and use it in selecting the various types of action.

It would be pertinent at this point to remember Boleslav Trentovskiy, one of the founders of cybernetics, who explained in detail, as early as 1844, in his course on "The Philosophy of Cybernetics," that man can achieve a certain objective in social development only when he can make full use of the spontaneous forces of nature and society which rule the world and not by opposing them.

The evolution of ethnic groups, their origins and breakdown are some of the most profound processes which determine the progress of mankind. We cannot handle them as we wish. However, by closely studying their objective characteristics and their links with other processes—economic, scientific and technical, demographic, etc.—we can and must make sensible use of them in formulating ways of achieving various objectives in social development. Above all, we must realize that despite existing integrative trends, which we shall discuss further, the variety of nations, their originality and self-awareness not only do not decrease or level off but, conversely, keep growing and will continue to grow! We must be prepared for this.

When we discuss such problems one clearly hears an objection: what about the United States where, one would think, a single nation has taken shape? Here as well, however, matters are entirely different. In addition to the basic—Anglo-Saxon—group, to this day there are numerous other ethnic groups in the United States—Italian, Polish, Jewish, Chinese, etc., not to speak of Puerto Ricans and Blacks who frequently live in accordance with their own unwritten laws as well. Furthermore, simply no analogy whatsoever could be drawn between the United States and our country. The people went to North America by deliberately separating themselves from their own land and pulling out their own roots; the USSR rallies different nations which have

lived on their age-old lands and in their own homes. Naturally, they try to furnish their homes while remaining distinct even from their close neighbors.

On one occasion, visiting Eastern Latvia, I entered a church and, knowing that the Letts are Protestants, I was amazed to see a Roman Catholic service. I was told that these were not Letts but Latgals and that one should not confuse one with the other. The same situation prevails the world over: the aspiration to retain one's originality is an objective process which demands profound respect and understanding.

New formations bearing ethnic features gradually arise as well. The Canadians living in Quebec, who speak French, are by no means French. This is a new nation which speaks French. The unwelcoming and harsh Quebec became the native land and native home to the ancient population of Brittany and Normandy. Are not the same type of processes occurring in the Soviet Union? A new ethnic formation is developing in the former Novorossiya, the settling of which began during the time of Catherine the Great. One does not have to be an ethnographer to see the extent to which the people themselves, their way of life and their perceptions are distinct from the population and the way of life of "classical" Ukraine, not to speak of Galicia. Regardless of what their passport says—Ukrainian, Russian or Moldavian—they all belong to a certain new community living under a common roof. And are the "Soviet Germans" not a new nation? Is the FRG their home? They lived along the Volga for 200 years, raising grain, giving birth and raising children, developing their own dances, songs and literature....

We must accept such facts as objective reality and, whenever possible, correct that which was criminally violated in our history. We must learn not only democracy but also the ability to live together, the ability to value everything which has been achieved through the toil and intellect of other nations and to sympathize with one another's troubles. Tolerance among nationalities is the most important prerequisite for new thinking and new morality.

All of this does not come easily. It demands efforts and culture. The hypothesis of the merger of nations within the Soviet Union is, in my view, absolutely groundless. Naturally, a feeling of unity develops in the people: all of us are citizens of the USSR. The more democratic our country will become, the greater role will be played in it by man as an individual and not man as a cog, the stronger will our economy become and the greater will become our sense of community. However, the idea of such a community will always be quite different from the concept of national homogeneity.

The world is so structured that national differentiations exist and will remain within the foreseeable future. This is a basic need in the part of Homo Sapiens as a biological species. We are trying to preserve the entire

genetic variety of the world of plants and animals, realizing that each genotype is a priceless and unique product and an object of the creativity of nature. The same applies to culture, language and the self-awareness of each, even the smallest, ethnic group: it is a unique cluster of human creativity. The "bank" of national cultures and the national perception of the world around us is the eternal, the permanent value of mankind which belongs to that same world. The culture of any nation is the property of all people! Such is the reality. If we reject it, we cannot build a single multinational state.

However, along with the law of divergence, which we mentioned, there also are numerous integrative trends. Mixed marriages are an example. This is one of the most important elements of the global process of the self-organization of society, ever since caveman. Without mixing "blood" individual populations and entire nations begin to degenerate. Naturally, to a certain extent mixed marriages reduce the sharpness of national contradictions. However, their role in ethnogenetic processes must not be overestimated. They change little in the structure of national self-awareness. The very next generation of people become aware quite strongly of their national affiliation, regardless of what their passports read.

I know first-hand of people with Jewish names, who consider themselves absolutely Russian. An acquaintance of mine, a pure-blooded Lett but a fourth-generation Muscovite considers himself Russian. I know an Armenian, who lives in Georgia, who even added the suffix "shvili" to his last name. A feeling of belonging to a nation depends above all on the social and cultural environment in which the person was raised: orphans who were raised during the war by an outstanding Uzbek woman consider themselves Uzbeks, although they were born in the Western parts of the country.

Therefore, it should be a question not of national unification but of making use of integrative trends for purposes of mutually profitable and efficient cooperation and for creating opportunities for a sensible life together. Many such trends exist.

Nature of Integrative Trends

Economics and scientific and technical progress are among the most important integrative factors. The entire world is becoming linked through reciprocal relations. Contacts among people, regardless of country, religious belief or racial affiliation, not to mention nationality, are becoming increasingly close. Unification simply turns out to be advantageous to the people. Ancient Rome set the example of this. In fact, the metropolitan population of the Roman Empire barely accounted for a few percentage figures. However, life to the Gauls, the Judeans and the residents of the Iberian Peninsula became easier and safer: towns and roads were built, they were reliably protected, and trade and crafts developed.

The benefits of interrelationship became particularly clear in the second half of our century. Multinational corporations appeared. Their activities led us to question many traditional concepts on the structure of a market economy and planning possibilities, national limitations and the sovereignty and role of the state. On the basis of an increasing interdependence of the global economy as a system, integral features become increasingly clear. A particularly outstanding example of the manifestation of this trend is that of Western Europe, which is reaching new and impressive levels in the economic and political integration of the members of the European Community.

All such examples do not violate in the least the law of divergence, for such an organizational unification does not spoil the multiplicity of national and governmental differences in the least. The national groups do not lose their identity. They preserve their language, tradition and, if you wish, ambitions. Even this does not present an obstacle, as the example of Belgium clearly shows: the French-speaking Walloons have lived for several centuries side-by-side with the Dutch-speaking Flemish. And although they not only speak different languages but have different religions, and the various disputes which break out between them sometimes lead to the resignation of the government, the strength of the state system does not suffer from it in the least: the many centuries of standards of joint life and work do their job!

Let us note that there has never been any narrowly conceived regional cost accounting in Flanders or Wallonia. As is the case with the Swiss Federation of cantons (constitutionally, each one of them is an independent state), companies and production associations are unaware of cantonal boundaries (all they recognize are cantonal taxes and laws), while the market puts everything in its place: those who work more have more to eat. The single currency in Belgium (the Belgian Franc) and in Switzerland (the Swiss Franc) eliminates from production and commercial activities all difficulties related to the existence of borders. The effect of integrative trends on the huge territory of Western Europe is helped by the European monetary system in which, along with national currencies, the developed capitalist countries make active use of the "European monetary unit"—the ecu. All of these are examples the study of which is of great interest in solving our own problems.

Therefore, the acknowledgment of the inevitability (and usefulness) of national variety, combined with integrative trends, economic-organizational above all, allows us to single out two basic trends in the study of national problems in a multinational country such as ours. The first is the moral-cultural, in which I would include numerous problems related to the democratic structure of the state. The second is economic: how to organize the production activities of the state in order maximally to reduce national contradictions and make best possible use of the features of a given nation or ethnic group in the interest of the country as a whole.

'The Russian Problem'

Before we discuss such problems, I would like to illustrate the difficulty which inevitably accompanies a turn from general considerations to the study of specific situations. At that point a number of problems arise, each one of which requires an independent and rather complex study. The difficulty is worsened by the fact that a problem cannot be analyzed independently of the objectives and tasks of perestroika, as it is part of it. Therefore, it is impossible to submit sufficiently substantiated suggestions without having a concept of the type of organization of the society. Therefore, we shall have to pay greater attention to the content of the questions which demand solutions than efforts to formulate more or less complete answers to them.

Most of the discussions of national problems today pertain to Central Asia, the Transcaucasus or the Baltic Area. I would like to violate this "tradition" and, in this connection, discuss the circumstances under which the Russian people live.

It is very difficult to compare among losses suffered by various nations and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union as a result of the nearly 60 year functioning of the administrative-command system. I believe, however, that Russia is one of the most unfortunate of our republics. No statistical figures are needed to prove this. Suffice it to visit the Tver, Ryazan or Kaluga areas. I have traveled a great deal throughout the country but never have I seen such wretchedness and poverty, neglect and a feeling of hopelessness as well as total loss of interest in the work as saw here. Yet I remember the blossoming villages in this part of the state by the end of the 1920s.

Russia lost its virtually entire intelligentsia. It will take generations to revive it: the training of a specialist and the upbringing of an intellectual are by no means one and the same.

It so happened historically that Russia is the only Union republic without its own party organization or Academy of Sciences. This can only hurt the feelings of the Russian person. There is yet another aspect about which it was not deemed appropriate to speak. In other republics Moscow's decisions were frequently identified with the "Russian decision," and all economic and political failures and all injustices were frequently related precisely to us, the Russians. By virtue of our democratic cultural tradition, the reason for the dignity of the Russian person was that of being equal among equals, but not to stand above them! No "elder brothers" of any sort! The use of this term in itself is insulting not only to the other nations but also to the Russians. Above all, what kind of "elder brothers" could we be to the Georgians, Armenians, Tajiks or other peoples whose culture was older than ours by many hundreds of years!

The Russians as, incidentally, all others, need a feeling of equality. Yet this precisely is what is missing, above all in economics. In some areas of the Urals or in the Central Industrial Zone the per capita GNP is as good as that in the leading industrial countries and is significantly superior to many of the Western parts of the USSR. Yet the living standard and social amenities available here are incomparably lower. Naturally, this is the consequence of the underdeveloped nature of the market and the fact that the departments ignored the principles of social justice. However, this is not a valid argument for the population of Nizhnyy Tagil!

I realize that these and other problems are quite difficult and cannot be solved within a short time. It would be important to the population of Russia, however, to know that they have been raised and studied, and that ways to solve them are being sought.

I believe that eventually we shall have to find a place where to build the new capital of the Soviet Union: Moscow will be simply unable to withstand an ever growing load. The time would possibly come to think of the creation of a zone which will not be part of any republic, where the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's government could be seated. Naturally, this is not a decision to be made today or even tomorrow but such an act would have numerous positive consequences.

As to the organization of scientific work, it is time to concentrate it within the republic academies of sciences and to revive the Russian Academy of Sciences. The USSR Academy of Sciences should be replaced by an academic council which would pass on the basic and most important scientific programs, allocate funds for their implementation and provide necessary control. I would imagine such a council as the supreme scientific authority of the country, consisting of representatives of the republic academies and, as experts employed for a specific term, specialists in the individual scientific areas.

This illustrates the fact that, as a rule, national problems lead the researcher to specific questions; various contradictions, based on national relations, will continue to exist and on each occasion their solution will call for taking specific steps in the nature of compromises. Contradictions of this kind can never be surmounted once and for all. We may solve some problems today but tomorrow others would arise. Such is the dialectics of development. Our task is to create mechanisms which would make it possible promptly to see and diffuse developing tensions.

The Social Pyramid

Therefore, I start from the general concept that in order to solve national problems we need a special organization of the society on the level of its social structures and production activities (although more than this alone).

However important the fundamental principles may be, their implementation must always be quite specific. Their essence in Europe will be one, in the Muslim world another, and in America, yet another. In our country, which is distinguished by a particular variety of traditions and cultures, we should probably have to find our own variant for the solution of such problems.

If I understand Marx correctly, his concept of a sensibly structured society was one of a pyramid: individual who formed the civilian society, and a civilian society which formed the state which was controlled by it, not only in principle but in fact. With this approach the state ensures above all a variety of economic relations and an efficient organization of the main areas of production activities, which are the fundamentals in the life of modern man. Such a structure of the social pyramid reduces (and sometimes resolves) many contradictions among nationalities.

For a long time, in our country this pyramid was set upside-down. The state (or better, a kind of elitist stratum) made up the administrative system which virtually replaced the civilian society or else totally suppressed it, while the person was not an individual but merely an object of activities of the administrative system. Within the framework of such a structure national problems were considered nonexistent. Naturally, they appeared but were solved administratively, on the basis of a clear stereotype. The fact that in the course of this tensions developed, as in the earth's crust before an earthquake, was not taken into consideration and, consequently, was ignored.

The situation has now begun to change. Despite its entire immaturity, there is an actually existing civilian society and any power methods applied in solving national problems are not only inadmissible for moral considerations in the developing civilian society but also are mortally dangerous to it. The normal position of the social pyramid is a necessary prerequisite for the potential opportunity of solving national contradictions under contemporary conditions. We must start first with the assertion of democratic relations in the country and glasnost or, more accurately, the freedom of thought and the right to express thoughts.

Therefore, the establishment of a developed civilian society is a most important task. We have taken merely the initial steps in this direction and the mind is still frequently yielding to emotions, paralleled by frequent change of "idols," and the aggressive attitude of extremist elements. That is precisely why national and other social movements occasionally assume distorted aspects. As far as the basic problems of perestroika are concerned, today consensus is particularly necessary, for without it we may have to face not a crisis but a catastrophe.

We are discussing today the multiple party system. I believe that with a sufficiently high level of development of the civilian society, when the administrative-bureaucratic system in its present aspect will be entirely eliminated and the state will be under the total control of the civilian society, political pluralism may become desirable in terms of the further development of the country. Not now, however! Any building in order to be able to withstand the gusts of wind, needs cement. In the present stage in history the CPSU alone can provide the necessary firmness of the structure known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To this effect, however, most profound changes must take place within the party itself.

In my view, in the history of our party, for a variety of reasons, a number of erroneous principles developed, the observance of which was what led us to a precrisis condition. One, perhaps the most important, of them was the principle of "unity of thought:" the inadmissibility of even to discuss alternate ways and means leading to the common target. However, for strategic reasons, the target itself was not formulated in any whatsoever specific and accessible form. Such a "unity of thought," combined with the principle of the "all-embracing role of the party," understood in the administrative meaning of the term, had as its inevitable consequence the fact that the party itself became part of the administrative-command system.

We must acknowledge that all societies need an administrative system of some kind. It is a necessary component, an efficient transmission belt of power. However, the authority, the state must be under the constant control of the civilian society and the party must belong not to the administrative system but to the civilian society. It must influence the state not through administrative methods but on the basis of the civilian society, its formal and informal institutions and its intellectual strength and authority.

Today a number of sharp discussions which influence the process of shaping the civilian society are taking place, unfortunately, outside the party. I am convinced, nonetheless, that they must be the main content of party activities at the present time. Otherwise we shall not achieve the consensus which is so necessary to us on the basic problems of perestroika. It is precisely the party that must assume the most important task of molding the new shape of the socialist society.

The role of intellectual activities increases with the development of scientific and technical progress, the endlessly increasing complexity of the production process and the appearance of the ecological imperative. As a consequence, so does the role of the intelligentsia. Its ability to induce and embody new ideas—scientific, technical and social—characterizes today the level of development of a given country. The new thoughts of restructuring of society and its production activities originate today not in the offices of officials but in labor collectives and among the intellectuals. That is why I

consider including the intelligentsia in the realm of influence of party thinking and the growth of the party's intellectual potential a matter of exceptional importance.

National problems are part of the problems which particularly agitate the intelligentsia today. At the same time, it is precisely the intelligentsia which can rise more easily than other population groups above the narrow understanding of such problems and find reciprocally accepted solutions in difficult situations. I believe that it would be a good idea to set up an all-Union club of the intelligentsia on problems of perestrojka in national relations. This would mandatorily include in the discussions, on an equal basis, leading ideological officials of the Central Committee and other party authorities, the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and others.

Let us turn once again to the example of Western Europe. There too a kind of perestrojka is taking place: a program was adopted for the creation by 1992 of a "single European market." A Europarliament already exists, with a system of direct elections, as well as a common monetary unit. Debates are being held on the possible options for converting the European Community into a confederation, etc. The unification process is developing slowly but nonetheless quite logically. It would befit us to learn from Western Europe the thoroughness with which this project is being pursued. For example, it turns out that Western Europe could be divided into 160 more or less homogeneous areas: 22 in the FRG, 40 in France, etc. In terms of their level of per capita output and, therefore, living standards, they may show differences of up to several hundred percent. It is precisely such differences that essentially bring about outbreaks of national contradictions. Thus, there already exist, although not perfect, mechanisms for equalizing the living standards in the various areas, for which purpose special programs and monetary funds are being established. The people, even those who may have made sacrifices, realize that in the final account the results will benefit all. Not least in this respect is the stabilization of relations among areas and, consequently, the strengthening of the gradually developing confederation, of the need for which all of its participants are convinced.

Let us point out that similar trends (albeit still timidly) are appearing in other parts of the world as well.

Obviously, it is time for us as well to undertake the profound scientific development of alternate regional structures and to make comparisons among them. In this case we should make use as extensively as possible of the idea of cooperation, not only within a given area but, above all, on the interregional level.

Outline of the Structure of a National Economic Organization

The administrative-command style of economic management is one of the main sources of difficulties among nationalities. I do not favor in the least the full elimination of centralized principles and the transfer of all rights

in the production area (as they currently are) to the republics. Judging by the nature of individual discussions, it is quite likely that, in such a case, one administrative-command system may be replaced by another. This would ease some of the stresses but will fail to create the type of economic-organizational base which would automatically reduce many arising contradictions.

To explain my viewpoint on the nature of the organization of production activities, once again let me cite Western experience.

In the postwar years political parties favoring active intervention of the state in the economy achieved substantial successes: they were able to rebuild the dislocated economy, to create a powerful state sector, to solve a number of social problems and to ensure a sufficiently high living standard for the population. Nonetheless, starting with the end of the 1970s, the authority and influence of movements relying on the revival of market forces as the main factor for the self-regulation of economic life have been growing. The reason for this, it seems to me, are the features of the new round in scientific and technical progress. The fast updating of the variety of output and, as a consequence, the frequent change in the structure of production relations, the growing requirements concerning the professional training of the personnel, the conversion of a significant percentage of the working class into "middle classes" in terms of their way of life, etc. As a result, the state sector found itself noncompetitive, and its reduction was initiated in the majority of the countries.

Although state enterprises in such countries had much greater freedom of action compared to ours, in terms of their key characteristics in a number of areas they were similar: excessive centralization, departmentalism, bureaucratism, etc. The main feature, however, is that the current pace in the change of technologies requires a constant reorganization of structures, something which no department, whether socialist or capitalist, can essentially perform.

That is why in the course of perestrojka the organizational structure of socialist industry must be based on principles which would allow it to function as dynamically as do the large capitalist corporations, including the multinationals. This would not be all that difficult to achieve, for models of such organizational structures are available to us. Let me note that although such corporations are private, in the majority of cases, as a rule they do not have a single owner and all responsibility for their activities is assumed by a manager or a board of directors. Furthermore, in frequent cases the state owns a significant block of shares, which allows it to influence corporate policy to some extent.

If we can organize such structures in our country, the fact that in socialist concerns the virtually entire capital will belong to the state will not affect very strongly the nature of their functioning. Since the conversion to a system of

autonomous associations (corporations, concerns) will require a certain commonality in administrative procedures with those used in the Western world, this would substantially simplify our business contacts with the West and our integration in the global economic system. Socialist principles and ideals, such as social protection and justice, democracy, ensuring conditions for the harmonious development of the individual, etc., will not only not be lost or eroded as a result but, conversely, will strengthen.

To this effect, however, it is necessary to eliminate the departmental ministerial system and to organize a single market in the Soviet Union without restrictions. Independent socialist corporations, including interoblast and interrepublic, would make our economy much more efficient and thereby eliminate a number of difficulties among nationalities.

Thus, contemporary highly efficient production is impossible to combine with economic autarchy not only of individual republics but of the country as a whole. No country can develop somewhat efficiently today without being part of the global economic system. Hence, in particular, introducing territorial cost accounting could have certain adverse consequences. The cost accounting of large, including interrepublic, corporations is a different matter, for without it no single all-Union market can be organized and included in the European economic area or the global economy as a whole.

The organizational structure of the national economic organism which should develop in the course of perestroika would be, in my view, a multiple-system of enterprises, organized in independent interoblast and interrepublic concerns, syndicates or corporations (the name is immaterial) based on state capital. From this viewpoint, it is entirely natural and economically justified to combine, for example, two-thirds of the sovkhoses growing fine-staple cotton in Tajikistan, plants for synthetic fiber, located somewhere in Bryansk Oblast, and a weaving combine located in Ivanovo or Riga. The basic feedback mechanism which will ensure the stability of such systems will be the market, while the Gossnab can successfully act as an middleman for cost accounting enterprises.

Under contemporary conditions the economic process must be guided, even with a developed market. To this effect the state will have to have certain possibilities and clearly stipulated objectives, formulated as national programs for health care, education, ecology, defense, etc. Such possibilities are provided by the tax system, state orders (which, incidentally, in the capitalist countries as well play a very important role), and other means of influencing production activities. It is precisely thus that the state or, rather, the civilian society with the help of the state will be able to meet development targets.

Such a structure can be consistent with the ecological imperative and develop the type of unity of interests which would enable us to resolve contradictions among nationalities as well.

Some Concluding Remarks

Of late many publications, including *KOMMUNIST*, have carried numerous articles on national problems in our country. Along with criticizing the deformations which existed in this area, one way or another their authors offered alternatives to the existing situation. Such alternatives are varied and do not entirely coincide with my views about a desirable future. For that reason, I deem it expedient to express my own point of view on two problems which I consider of key importance.

First. National relations are frequently interpreted as relations between republics. In any case, such relations are strongly emphasized. However, these two concepts are entirely dissimilar. National relations and contradictions between nationalities appear above all within republics. Here as well I consider the main task that of creating normal conditions for all ethnic groups living in a given republic or area. The people must be free and have the opportunity to live according to their wishes and, naturally, in accordance with the law. All of this must be developed in its own way without any whatsoever pressure or illegal regulation.

On this basis I cannot understand Academician Ya. Rebane (*KOMMUNIST* No 4, 1989) who complains that nonnationals living in a republic become poorly integrated in Estonian life and in the system of Estonian language and culture. I see in this claim two different matters: language and integration. They are largely independent of each other.

The first and much more important is that of language. If a person is permanently settled within a certain national environment, he must mandatorily master the language of his surroundings. In this case no two opinions are possible. This is less a matter of principle than of pragmatism. Its resolution is reduced to organizational measures: the availability of teachers, courses, etc.

The question of an integration with the life and culture of another nation has an entirely different meaning. This is a complex process which does not always end simply. In some cases integration develops naturally and painlessly, obviously responding to inner spiritual needs. For example, Russians who are permanently settled in Georgia become easily integrated with Georgian culture. They not only rapidly master the language but also begin to speak Russian with the unique Georgian accent. Since Griboyedov's time the Russians have felt at home with Georgian music, poetry and theater. The humor of Georgian movie comedies is quite popular in Russia and we were shaken up by Abuladze's motion pictures.

I thought of the reasons for such a simple and spontaneous closeness. Perhaps a certain role was played here by Orthodoxy which, starting with the 4th century in Georgia and the 9th in Russia, influenced the shaping of cultural traditions. Perhaps there is also something in common in the character of the peoples. Yet Armenians and Azerbaijanis remain virtually unintegrated although they have been living together for centuries and speak their reciprocal languages. This is a fact which is sometimes used for unseemly purposes.

To go back to the question raised by Academician Rebane, let me express the assumption that the integration of Russians in Estonian life and culture is basically difficult and, perhaps, even impossible. A case in point is the fate of the Russian communities in Finland or the Russian villages on the Western bank of Chudskoye Lake. The reasons for this are numerous: different personality stereotypes, and different religious traditions. Lutheranism, which was brought by the Germans, has always poorly adapted to the Russian character.

It seems to me that we should not set integration as some kind of target. Is it all that necessary? I believe that something else is necessary: the culture of the individual himself, his ability to respect the way others live and their priorities. In short, if one lives on the same floor and is always ready to help one's neighbor, it does not follow from this that he should prevent him from cooking the type of food he likes.

The main law of international community life seems to me to be the following: I must learn how to face my neighbor and his attitude toward me with less stricter requirements than I apply in my relations with my neighbor. If everyone is raised in the spirit of such a rule, the lion's share of all difficulties among nationalities will be eliminated.

Second. Quite frequently in discussing the national problem no clear distinctions are made between republic and ethnic boundaries. Yet these are entirely different matters. For example, the ethnic boundaries of the Georgian and Estonian nations are smaller than their republic boundaries, whereas the opposite is the case of Moldavia. Ethnic boundaries are quite loose and republic boundaries are entirely clear, for republic boundaries are, above all, administrative. This must always be borne in mind in discussing relations among nationalities.

I believe that in time the following suggestion, for example, could be discussed: the huge area known as the Far East be made an autonomous administrative unit with some of the rights of a Union republic. There are numerous arguments in favor of this. Its territory is huge—more than 3 million square kilometers; its population is about 8 million people and, above all, there is its distance from the center of the country, of between 7 and

9 time zones. This distance makes extremely difficult all management procedures. For example, it excludes the possibility of telephone communications during working hours.

In recent years yet another argument has appeared, the significance of which has been growing at a headlong pace. The Far Eastern Republic, which was the name given to the Far East during V.I. Lenin's time, is a major part of the Soviet Union bordering on the Pacific. However, it is also a structural part of the extremely vast Pacific Ocean Area, which is exceptionally dynamic and rapidly developing on a global scale. Therefore, we must create all the necessary conditions for the Soviet Far East to become a full partner of the countries on the Pacific Rim. This is very important to the Soviet Union and to our integration with the Pacific economy.

The efficient administrative structure of the Soviet Union also represents a cluster of most difficult problems awaiting their solution. They must be considered without, however, allowing any unjustified haste and the usual clichés and emotional factors must not conceal arguments related to global trends. I believe that in solving many problems it would be expedient to proceed from the fact that eventually the Soviet Union will inevitably become more integrated, more unified and more powerful than it is today. Such ideas should be the targets of understanding and discussion by the broad public, for they will be tangible incentives for the development and growing up of the civilian society.

Under those circumstances, the most important role in the solution of national problems and in finding the necessary compromises is assumed by the personality of the individual, his culture and his ability to see ways of development and readiness to abandon that which would seem to him to be strictly personal. In other words, national problems inevitably convert into problems of shaping not only the new thinking but also the new morality consistent with the realities of the 21st century.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Letters to the Editors

18020014h Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 67-78

[Text] S. Abdullo, candidate of philosophical sciences, scientific associate, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies: Plant the Tree of Friendship....

To what extent did we observe the principles of Leninist national policy? Have we always been loyal to the behests of the great leader? It is sad to realize that we cannot answer this question with a firm "yes!" The creator of a state of a new type clearly realized, better than anyone else, that a multinational society will

require the solution of most important national problems in the approach to which he frequently called for displaying caution and sensitivity, opposing any oppression of one nation by another. V.I. Lenin emphasized the vital need for full national equality and fraternity. "A democratic state," he wrote, "must unquestionably acknowledge the total freedom of native languages and reject any privileges granted to any one language" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 25, pp 71-72).

Of late there has been a great deal of talk, justifiably, about the poor knowledge of the Russian language in some republics, particularly those in Central Asia. This is bad. But why do we not consider the fact that we are fluent in our own native languages poorly, exceptionally poorly! Yet it is precisely knowledge of the native tongue that helps in the study of other languages. When shall we realize this?

As early as 1919, addressing the 8th RKP(b) Congress, V.I. Lenin said: "We have... communists who say: Let us have a unified school, for which reason do not dare teach in any other language than Russian! In my view, such communists are Great Russian chauvinists. Such chauvinism can be found in many among us and we must fight it" (op. cit., vol 38, pp 183-184).

Imposing a training language means deviating from the standards of Leninist national policy, something which became instilled in our life in the 1970s. It was precisely then that in the VUZs even courses in social sciences, such as Marxist-Leninist philosophy, party history, scientific communism, etc., began to be taught to ethnic groups in the Russian language. Is it amazing that their graduates have been unable to write accurately their own curriculum vitae either in their native language or in Russian.

The need to study the Russian language is unquestionable. However, this must not be accomplished at the expense of the native language, at the expense of forgetting it.

How did it happen that in some VUZs in our republic Tajiks are unable to study in their native language? This even applies to VUZs in which knowledge of the Tajik language is a vital need, such as agricultural or medical institutes. The former is a generator of cadres for kolkhozes and sovkhoses, where the bulk of the population is native—Tajiks; the second trains physicians, most of whom go to work in those same areas. Are they going to address the native population in Russian in the course of their work, considering that there is virtually no Russian speaking population in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses?

Furthermore, it is primarily graduates of Tajik schools who enroll in the agricultural institute; frankly, they are poorly fluent in the Russian language but, nonetheless, must master their specialty in Russian. Could such

students become good specialists if they are trained in a language which, at best, they have mastered very superficially? Let us not delude ourselves on this account. Therefore, if we want to be in step with the requirements of life and train highly skilled cadres, we must provide the students with the possibility of learning in their native language. This requires the availability of both Tajik and Russian study groups.

We know that thinking and language are inseparable from each other. This being the case, we acquire our education with the help of the language. The more clearly and accurately we understand the language the faster and easier we can learn the subject as taught to us.

I am concerned by the fact that many local cadres are either totally unfamiliar with their native language or else know it on the level of the local dialect. All too frequently I come across so-called Tajiks who read their native literature in Russian translations, frequently poor at that! They consider themselves well-educated people and teach culture to others.

In the solution of the national problem as a whole as well as in the development of linguistic life in multinational Russia, V.I. Lenin considered "democracy" and "equality" key concepts. "If all privileges are eliminated," he emphasized, "and if we put an end to imposing any one language, everyone... will easily and quickly learn how to understand one another and will not be frightened by the "horrible" thought that speeches in different languages will be heard in the joint parliament" (op. cit., vol 24, p 117). These are not mere words. Better than anyone else Lenin realized that national problems in a multinational society can and must be solved only on the basis of mutual respect and absolute equality among all peoples, big and small.

Yet we frequently encourage the growth of nationalistic feelings by hasty and, sometimes, stupid decisions. Here is a typical example. A meeting is being held in an institution. Ninety percent or even 100 percent of those attending are Tajiks. Nonetheless, the meeting is conducted in Russian. The speakers speak Russian, very poorly, while the members of the collective, who are insufficiently fluent in the language, understand it poorly but obediently listen or, rather, pretend to be listening: "That is the way it must be..." But does it? Who needs it, and why? Such forms of work can only sow the seeds of discord and not of friendship.

Let me describe a case. Last summer, in Dushanbe, I went to see the chairman of the local committee of the Tajik State Philharmonic Orchestra. Several people, sitting around a table, were heatedly discussing something. It turned out that one of the performers had to write a petition for the director, and those who were present were helping him, to the best of their possibilities although they were not all that knowledgeable in Russian and they were clearly in difficulty. I asked: "Does your

director not know the Tajik language?" "He does," they answered. "He is Tajik." "But why not write the letter in Tajik?" "We are being told that one should not."

V.I. Lenin insisted on the fact that in all Soviet establishments in the republics the officials should both know and respect the language and culture of the native population (see op. cit., vol 39, p 335).

How many non-Tajik cadres in our republic are familiar with the language of the local population? I remember how from the rostrum of a writers' congress one very mediocre literary worker was discussing internationalism. I felt ashamed for his sake. He had lived in Tajikistan some 30 years, his entire conscious life, side-by-side with Tajik writers whose works he had translated word for word without burdening himself with learning the language and culture of the Tajik people. The Tajiks themselves are to be blamed for this, for they have made no effort whatsoever to teach their fellow writers their language and to involve them in their national culture.

Here is another example. In the Tajik capital VECHERNIY DUSHANBE, the city newspaper, comes out in Russian only. On whose initiative is it that the native population of Dushanbe cannot have their evening newspaper in their native language? Could this be the work of bureaucrats who themselves are not fluent in their native language? What do they care as to the way people react to this fact! Meanwhile, simple people living in the land of their ancestors, who rarely leave the boundaries of their republic, draw the wrong conclusion that all of this is the policy of the Russians. It is difficult to make them understand that the Russians have nothing to do with it.

The real Russian intellectuals who came here many years ago (let me include among them Lyudmila Vladimirovna Uspenskaya, who linked her fate with Tajikistan as early as the 1930s) were perfectly acquainted with the Tajik language and culture. They brought to this country the light of Russia, the light of the October Revolution and the right to express their views about the republic and its people. Their activities helped to strengthen reciprocal understanding and friendship between the Russian and Tajik peoples. Let us gratefully remember this. The numerous students of Professor L.V. Uspenskaya, who lived in the various cities and villages of the republic, love and value her as a tutor, as a person, as a true Russian intellectual who dedicated her entire life to the rapprochement between our peoples, and who taught them how to love and understand Russian culture and the Russian language. This is true internationalism.

Unfortunately, many are those who today understand internationalism very primitively. Frequently those who have described in their works characters based not only on their own people but also on other peoples, Russian above all, are considered writers-internationalists.

Internationalism cannot be understood on such a "topic" level. It is a profound feeling closely linked to patriotism and which does not conflict with the feeling of national dignity. It is only a patriot who loves his people and culture who can love and respect other peoples and cultures. Academician D.S. Likhachev is right: "True patriotism is the first stage of efficient internationalism."

Not only the fact that it lives within a single united family is important to each nation, big or small. It also faces a serious problem, such as preserving its national uniqueness, customs and traditions, and protecting for the sake of future generations the native language inherited from his ancestors. We must think about this problem, which is common to all of us, and, at the same time, do everything possible for our peoples, while remaining different, to live as a single soul, for, as Dzhalaliddin Rumi, the great 13th-century poet and philosopher said, "a unity of souls is more precious than sameness of language."

The culture of any nation can exist and develop only if it performs its national and international mission, and if it can give something to other nations and itself take something from them.

This pertains not only to literature but also to the science of literature. Several years ago a Russian language and literature department was set up at the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Language and Literature imeni Rudaki, to deal with problems of literary interrelationships or, more precisely, the influence of Russian on Tajik literature. About 100 works have been written on Gorkiy's influence on Ayni's creativity alone and, nonetheless, new dissertations on the subject continue to be written. Yet it is no secret that Ayni was totally unfamiliar with the Russian language and that, in my view, Gorkiy's influence on his works was quite insignificant. Meanwhile, there is no department of the history of the Tajik language, theory of literature and literary criticism!

Unfortunately, for quite some time we pretended that the national problem had been solved in our country once and for all and that there was absolutely no need to discuss it. Events which have taken place of late in different parts of the country confirm the gravity of our error. Obviously, Lenin's warning that we must never treat the national problem formalistically was not always remembered.

In addition to common concerns and problems, our multinational society has problems which are strictly national, related to the fate of national communities. Concern for the preservation of national customs and traditions, national language and the original culture of each nation must be a governmental concern.

Today Soviet society is seriously discussing sensitive problems, national in particular. This is good. Each one of us must do everything possible to achieve mutual understanding and respect among our peoples. To quote A.I. Herten, "...If all of us keep standing idly by, satisfied with sterile grumbling and noble indignation, and if we prudently avoid any danger and, meeting an obstacle, stop without making an effort either to step across it or circumvent it, it will be a long time before any bright day comes to Russia" (A.I. Herten. "*Estetika. Kritika. Problemy Kultury*" [Esthetics. Criticism. Problems of Culture]. Iskustvo, Moscow, 1987, p 287).

Our primary task is to achieve unity between words and actions in solving the national problem and in implementing national policy.

The ancient wise man said that man is a brother to man. Let it be thus!

G. Rezonov, labor veteran, CPSU member since 1945, Tomsk: We are Internationalists

It seemed in the past that the national problem in our country, based on the friendship among the peoples, had been resolved a long time ago. It seemed that the friendship among the peoples, hammered out in the revolutionary battles of the Civil War, during the building of socialism and during the Great Patriotic War required neither proof nor propaganda.

Life teaches us that all socialist values, including the friendship among the peoples, must be constantly reasserted in the course of social development. Hence the conclusion that the advancement of national relations must be one of the main tasks in our party's socioeconomic policy and ideological work, and that the friendship among the peoples requires tireless development and careful attention to its problems.

Each nation has the right to national pride, honor and dignity and love for its homeland. However, we should not confuse national boastfulness with national pride. National nihilism has nothing in common with internationalism which presumes an attentive and respectful attitude toward each national group and its culture, and whose purpose is the blossoming of socialist national cultures, the further upsurge in the dignity of the peoples and, at the same time, strengthening their reciprocal ties and interaction and reciprocal enrichment of national cultures.

The Russian language plays a great and responsible role in the rapprochement among the nations, as a means of communication on the territory of our multinational country. Whereas before the revolution in the minds of many nations it symbolized the domination of alien exploiters, after the October Revolution it became the language of liberation, the language of joint progress and of building socialism.

The popularity of the Russian language has its "reverse" side as well. Individuals of all nationalities (I emphasize all, including the native) who are familiar with the Russian language and who live in Union and autonomous republics, are in no hurry or else are unable to master the national language and culture. This can be explained not only by laziness or a careless attitude but also sometimes disrespect for the language and culture of a given republic and the difficulties (frequently artificial) in mastering them.

I personally have lived and worked in Yakutiya for a long time. Despite my best efforts I was unable to find a self-teaching course in the Yakut language for Russians and to read the works of Oyunskiy, and was able to participate in "ysyakh"—the Yakut celebration of summer—only as a spectator.

But are there many such self-teaching aids or textbooks in Kiev or Tbilisi? Do we have many correspondence schools, study circles or public universities teaching the languages of the fraternal peoples and their national cultures? More textbooks and self-teaching aids must be published in the languages of our republics for Russians and Russian language textbooks for the non-Russian population. The study of national languages in the schools must be improved.

G. Chevalkov, Kishinev: Alien Wave

At the age of 48, i.e., as a quite mature person, and in the 72nd year of the Soviet system I have failed to understand some problems of life.

I studied in Leningrad and I lived and worked in the Altay, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and now I work in Moldavia. I have been surrounded by Russians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Ingush, Koreans, Tajiks, Letts, Lithuanians and Estonians and even a comrade belonging to an extremely rare ethnic group, the Nagaybak (few people have probably met one of them) a Balkarian, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Turkmens, and so on. We never paid attention to origin or tribe. They were collectives of like-minded people. We well understood each other and, frequently, the poor knowledge of a given language was balanced by friendly relations. Our children made friends with each other. Living and working since 1985 in Moldavia, I felt myself at home.

Then a wave of aggravations in national relations rose, particularly in the past 2 years. Even the press has begun to make suggestions such as VUZ training in Moldavian only; television broadcasts, in Moldavian only; special passports for all individuals of nonnative nationality. They call for giving advantages to people familiar with the Moldavian language in enrollment for training and jobs. One even hears the following: "Why have you come here, no one invited you." Some kind of independent groups are going from one apartment to another, taking a census of who works where, ethnic origin and place of

studies. The people have begun to look askance at each other. Groups based on ethnic origin are being set up and even children are no longer making friends with each other.

Who needs all this? What is being undermined is something of which we were always proud: friendship among the peoples, international unity within society. In the same way that we proved to be unprepared to struggle against drunkenness, we are equally unprepared to solve national problems, and this is being skillfully used by nationalistic elements.

I am a peaceful person and I have always disliked nationalism in any of its manifestations. It is sad to see now nationalism under conditions when the unification of all ethnic groups is particularly necessary.

F. Sadykov, head of the department of philosophy, Bashkir State University, professor, doctor of philosophical sciences: Surmounting Disproportions

In my view, it is particularly important today in the area of improving relations among nationalities, to solve the following two problems:

First, the elimination of disproportions between the contributions made by given areas (republics) to the Union Fund and the living standard of the population of that region. Such disproportions are particularly striking in Bashkiriya, which is one of the most backward in the Russian Federation in terms of social development although it is ahead of most oblasts and republics in terms of its economic potential. The contribution which the Bashkir working people are making to the Union fund on a per capita basis is nearly 10 percent higher than the Union indicators. It is true that this is the result not only of the present labor of the republic's population but also the structure of its national economy and the high share of a most profitable sector: the petrochemical and chemical industries, which were created by the entire Soviet people. However, the living standard of the Bashkir working people is substantially below that of the Union as a whole. This has absolutely no justification. Regional cost accounting is the main way for surmounting such disproportions and social inequality.

Second, eliminating the dependence of the conditions for cultural (and not only cultural) development of a nation on whether it is a Union or an autonomous republic. A small Union republic has its own Academy of Sciences, motion picture studio, party journal, etc. In an autonomous republic, even if its population is bigger than the population of a Union republic by a factor of 3 or 4, not only the things I enumerated but many others are considered as "not due because of status." Even in collective works on the history of sociopolitical thinking of the peoples of the USSR, for example, any Union

republic is subject to greater attention than any autonomous republic. The thus created different status among republics is a new, a Soviet-originated inequality among nations which deforms the interpretation of their history as well.

National relations are closely related to regional problems. For example, the excessive concentration in Bashkiriya of ecologically harmful and highly toxic industries and the use of technologies which the industrially developed capitalist countries prefer to develop not in their own areas but in the developing countries, equally affects the interest of all working people in the republic regardless of their ethnic affiliation. However, we are threatened by the interpretation of such a regional problem in a way which harms the national interest. Because of the specific nature of the national structure of the population in the republic, neglecting such a regional problem is fraught with the danger of the outbreak of conflicts among nationalities in the future. The chemical and petrochemical industries in the Soviet Union account for some 7 percent of its overall volume of output; they account for more than 12 percent in Bashkiriya! Furthermore, ever new chemical industry enterprises are being built. The ecological ignorance and technocratic callousness of a number of republic managers are turning into political short-sightedness which can try a man's patience.

In the course of discussing problems of relations among nationalities, some comrades occasionally say that the nation which has given its name to a given republic should have certain privileges compared to the rest of the population. If we follow this path what will be left of socialist internationalism and the constitutional equality among people whatever their nationality? Would an ethnic group privileged in one republic or another not turn into a ruling nation oppressing the other?

Relations among nationalities can be improved only through real equality, friendship, cooperation and mutual aid among nations and not through confrontation, whatever the reason, pitting one nation against another and artificially creating privileged and second-rate nations, nationalities and ethnic groups.

Nationalism is frequently manifested through embellishments, i.e., through the actual distortion of the history of one's nation or ethnic group. Occasionally some members of the intelligentsia consider as harming the national interests, national pride and national dignity any concepts or facts which prove the former backwardness of their people. It is not the embellishment of history but the proper interpretation of the way, under the new conditions created by the October Revolution, one's own nation, within the family of nations, is rising to the peaks of contemporary world culture and contemporary social progress that should be a proper object of true national pride.

The proper interpretation of theoretical and practical problems in the development of nations is very important in controlling national relations. Without it we cannot successfully promote the international upbringing of the working people and convert the ideas and feelings of internationalism into systematized convictions and into principles governing the activities of every individual.

N. Gasanov and K. Zachesov, candidates of philosophical sciences, docents, Dagestan State Pedagogical Institute: Proceeding from the Person

We believe that a starting and entirely necessary prerequisite for the solution of problems of intercourse among nationalities in our country is the proclamation and the actual adoption of the principle of the **free national self-determination of the individual**. In our entire huge state and in all of its republics and regions the entire power of the state must guarantee the right of everyone to independently define his national affiliation, i.e., the right to absolutely freely and without the slightest diktat from the outside on the part of anyone, to register as member of any nationality or else not to do this at all, the right absolutely freely to choose any language for purpose of study or practical use, and adopt any type of culture.

We deem expedient, in general, to delete the notorious "fifth point." It has brought a great deal of distress to the Soviet people. Suffice it to recall how, with its help, entire nations were coercively resettled from one end of the country to another. And, to be entirely frank, is this item not hindering occasionally the development of many talented, thinking and socially active people? Is this not why sometimes people who are by no means truly suitable find themselves in leading positions?

It is not the business of the state scrupulously to determine the nationality of every single citizen, based on the almost primitive characteristic of "blood origin," or the national affiliation of his parents. In this connection, the task of the state is to ensure respect for any choice made by the individual and the absolute inviolability of his national dignity in accordance with his choice, and to contribute to the satisfaction of sensible human needs in mastering the selected language and culture.

Naturally, there should be no diktat on the part of state and public authorities, either central or republic, about what nation is native to the individual and what nationality should be given to him, what language he should study, what culture should he master, where and in what kind of ethnic surroundings he should live, and so on, for this approach actually is a totally unjustified effort at harming and even violating basic human rights.

Of late, changes are taking place in the area of international upbringing. They are based on the obsolete habit of imposing upon the individual from the outside, shamelessly and without any proof, certain postulates

and ideological cliches, showing no particular respect for the person and even for common sense. Thus, whereas in the bad old days the idea that internationalism requires the suppression of anything national was zealously drilled into our minds, today, conversely, some members of the intelligentsia are instilling, with the same type of enthusiasm and zeal, in their suffering compatriots the absolutely opposite idea, that internationalism can be achieved only by involvement with and love for "one's own" ethnic group and "one's own nationality." Which of these two postulates is better? Neither. "Both are worse." The reason is that both are dogmas and, like any dogma, being without proof, they must be accepted on faith, almost as a religion. The point is that they cannot be proved. As practical experience indicates, a person may be a most convinced internationalist even if he especially loves "his own" national culture, if he does not choose for himself any given national culture or even if he prefers a culture which is not "his own" but "alien."

The entire point is how to understand internationalism. Today internationalism means, above all and essentially respect and consideration for man. It makes no sense for an international conviction of the individual to be "hitched" to the national factor or else "unhitched" from it. It is the person who will eventually decide for himself what culture to love and prefer, which one to admire, and which would leave him indifferent. It is only with this kind of approach that there will be genuine respect for the individual rather than one described through lofty statements and pompous slogans.

It is obvious to any unprejudiced person that the proclamation and guarantee of his own personal freedom in matters of national self-determination does not affect in the least his national pride or national dignity for, if he so wishes or deems necessary, the person has the right to declare officially his national affiliation although, it seems to us, such feelings, if they are sincere and profound, do not need to be stamped with an official seal. The rights of the individual equally apply to all without exception and no one, no one (!) should decide for others whether they can exercise their rights or not and how precisely to exercise them.

Today we come across cases in which leading individuals (or those claiming to lead) of some national groups on the territory of which members of other nations or ethnic groups live, try by force and, sometimes with the help of the law, to "include" the latter in "their own" national cultures and languages. This trend can be seen also in some theoretical concepts of national-state sovereignty. By taking as a base human rights we provide the members of all nations or nationalities, whatever the ethnic surroundings in which they live, a guarantee against such "inclusion," for the satisfaction of their freely formulated requirements concerning national languages and cultures must take place exclusively on the basis of their own wishes. In the final account, this will also benefit nations the promoters of which are today trying to promote a policy of such "inclusion" for, as a rule, a

nation on behalf of which claims to restricting the freedom of members of other nations cannot be free and firmly confident in its own future.

Let us note that such a personal approach is consistent with the interests of our entire society, not to mention the fact that it will enhance our reputation abroad where, to the best of our knowledge, most countries have long abandoned any official governmental classification of their own citizens based on national criteria; it would ease relations among some of our national groups as well. A seemingly strictly formal act of mandatory state registration and establishment of national affiliation of every citizen objectively strengthens and codifies the classification of Soviet people on the basis of national characteristics. It contributes to the growth of ethnocentric and, in some cases, nationalistic and chauvinistic feelings. If the rights of man and the individual are the foundations of national policy today we would not have the type of dramatic and even tragic excesses on national grounds, familiar to all.

Naturally, such an approach would be unlikely immediately to solve all the painful problems which have piled up in relations among some Soviet peoples and ethnic groups. However, their objective solution would be unlikely without granting to every individual the real right freely to choose his nationality.

We believe that all basically different and possible options for the solution of problems of relations among nationalities in the USSR, including those presented here, should be extensively debated.

V. Kovalenko, CPSU member since 1970, Kiev:
Without Labels

It seems to me that of late a trend has developed of pinning the label of "nationalism" to any mass movement which the local authorities find unsuitable: ecological, ethnographic, historical-cultural, etc. The scourge of "nationalism" is needed by uncaring officials of various cultural, management and other departments in order to conceal their incompetence and insolvency. This scourge simplifies everything. Yet such prejudices turn into practical actions and distort the thinking of the people.

Let me cite examples from life.

In the 8th grade, after we read plenty of N. Gogol, we began by calling the school "the Host;" the classrooms were named "Kurens," and we called ourselves "Cossacks." This was a children's game. Yet we were severely beaten for showing "nationalism," and so were the teachers. In 1965 I wrote up the minutes of a Komsomol meeting in the Ukrainian language and was labeled "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist." I was reminded of the fact that I had a mustache and a shirt which my mother had sewn for me....

Our tourists return from the Baltic area and most seriously say: "They are all nationalists, just imagine, they keep talking in their own language all the time."

Nationalism presumes the proclamation of the exclusive nature of one's own nation compared to other and the denigration and oppression of other nations. As to separatism and parochialism, as a centrifugal force of economic development of society, along with a tendency toward economic integration, this phenomenon exists in many developed countries, countered by economic and, naturally, political and ideological means.

So far, nationalism has not brought anything good to any given nation. The people realize this and it is unnecessary to disorient them, deliberately or not. We must not thoughtlessly, on all occasion, apply the term "nationalism," for this can only work to the advantage of real bourgeois nationalism.

We must also struggle against separatism. This is a legacy of the time of stagnation which now, in the age of glasnost, has come up as a rust which corrodes the foundations of socioeconomic perestroika and the spiritual development of our common home—the USSR.

Excerpts from Letters

G. Yurin, CPSU member since 1949, engineer, retired,
Pavlovo-Posad, Moscow Oblast:

Why does nationalism arise? It has grounds when the danger of the physical destruction or coercive assimilation of nations appears. If no such danger exists, nationalism is stupid and dangerous above all to the people themselves, for it leads them to alienation and exclusiveness.

What are the psychological roots of the nationalism of those who proclaim its ideas? It is the lack of talent and vanity, when there is a shortage of brains and talent to become the creator, the maker, to do something great and when one wishes to be noted. This reason is characteristic of the brawlers of all types: to denigrate others so that, against that background, to look better themselves.

The division among people is a dangerous and antihistorical idea and those who are loyal to socialism should skillfully oppose trends such as the effort to present nationalistic infections as a fresh wind of renovation of our society.

L. Baranov, labor veteran, Moscow:

The republics do not need duplicates of Union ministries: they need only those which are absolutely necessary and the fewer they are, the better. Their problems can be solved by the supreme soviets of Union republics on the basis of the vital needs of the republic and the interests of the entire Union.

Departmental diktat must be surmounted without regrets. This is a mandatory law of perestroyka of the mind, the foundation of national friendship and reciprocal understanding. Without departmental barriers and squabbles, reasons for promoting national hostility would be reduced to a minimum.

The working people are always united.

Zh. Bulatov, Kustanay:

I was confused and, furthermore, indignant at an expression found in an official text: "Manifestation of Kazakh nationalism." What have the Kazakh people to do with it? Since when have we begun to link nationalism with a given specific nation? Naturally, a certain percentage of people may be contaminated with the bacillus of nationalism. However, to describe such views and feelings as belonging to a nation, i.e., to pin a label on an entire nation is, in my profound conviction, insulting and unfair.

Reactions to our Publications

Ye. Zeymal. "Nationalities and their Languages Under Socialism." KOMMUNIST No 15, 1988

E. Yusupov, chairman, permanent commission on relations among nationalities and international education, Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member: Elimination of Excesses

The article states: "Basic errors were made: Tajiks, who accounted for a significant percentage of the population in the large cities (Samarkand, Bukhara and others), who had settled in the Uzbek SSR, were forced to register as Uzbeks... Alas, this error has remained uncorrected to this day." One fully agrees with the first part of this. Such errors, as the author himself emphasizes, took place in other republics as well. Today, however, Uzbekistan is firmly eliminating the excesses committed against minorities in the 1930s and in the period of stagnation. All possibilities are being provided for the free expression of national affiliation. Many Tajiks, whose parents were forced to register as Uzbeks in the 1930s, have been issued new internal passports in which their national affiliation has been corrected.

In the past year the republic's leaders and scientific delegations have repeatedly gone to Tajikistan for joint work on efficient ways leading to the further strengthening of the friendship between the peoples of the two republics. Today Uzbekistan is expanding the network of schools offering training in the Tajik language. In the 1988/89 school year, eight new schools were opened in Samarkand alone. Groups in which instruction is provided in the Tajik language have been organized in some higher and secondary specialized schools. Such work is being done in vocational-technical schools as well. In the

1988/89 school year, Tajik young people took their entrance examination in their native language in 18 subjects in the VUZs of Samarkand and Bukhara.

A republic newspaper in Tajik has long been published in Uzbekistan. The oblast newspapers in Samarkand and Bukhara have also begun to publish editions in the Uzbek, Russian and Tajik languages. Regular broadcasts in the Tajik language account for a substantial share of the programs of the republic radio and television. In our Writers' Union there is a Tajik section. Exchanges of specialists and education cadres are being intensively promoted.

Schools offering training in the Tajik language are attended by some 120,000 students. In the 1989/90 school year they will receive from Tajikistan 477,000 copies of 62 different books. In the Tajik schools more than 300,000 students are being given training in the Uzbek language. Taking this into consideration, in the forthcoming school year 96 different textbooks and school aids, totaling 1,391,000 copies will be sent to the fraternal republic.

Frankly speaking, the national interests of the Tajik population are being satisfied better than those of other ethnic groups. More than 800,000 Kazakhs live in Uzbekistan. We are currently taking steps to publish a republic newspaper in the Kazakh language.

I have cited no more than a few facts among the broad range of steps which are being taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government of Uzbekistan to surmount the consequences of the period of stagnation in the area of relations among nationalities. Under these circumstances we need the support of the central press in the guise of objective information and the propaganda of the experience we have acquired.

L. Markova, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography, candidate of historical sciences: The native language of national minorities

The question of the significance of the native language in the development of ethnic groups and relations among nationalities in the USSR, raised by Ye. Zeymal, is quite important. The native language is not only a means of communication but also a specific form of national culture which provides rich information drawn from the depths of centuries. Exposure to the native language from the very first years of life, in the family and in childhood, shape the national-cultural characteristics of the perception of the world and an awareness of national affiliation.

To the national groups whose historical homeland is outside the Soviet Union (we have many such people) the significance of the native language is particularly great. Since ancient times their ancestors have lived on

the territory of our country and with full justification considered the USSR (and, in the past, Russia) their homeland. They include large ethnic groups: 1.2 million Germans, 1.1 million Poles, approximately 370,000 Bulgarians and Koreans each, etc.

Under the Soviet system, virtually all ethnic groups without national-state autonomy were given the opportunity to study in their own language in areas where they were densely settled. This was entirely consistent with the requirements of the Leninist national policy. By the end of the 1930s many of their schools were closed down. In the postwar period, in the case of some national groups in the USSR the study of their native language was included in the school curriculums.

The movement which appeared among Soviet Bulgarians to master the literary standards of their national language and their literacy in that language, which appeared in the mid-1980s, is entirely natural. This movement spread in the area where they had settled in the largest numbers—the southern part of Moldavia and the western areas of Odessa Oblast where in many rayons Bulgarians account for 30 to 65 percent of the population. Literature is being developed in their native language. The study of Bulgarian history is being promoted and cultural relations with Bulgaria are being enhanced.

Nonetheless, based on the method used in the all-Union population census in establishing the second language among the languages of the peoples of the USSR in which the respondent is fluent, the languages of the "nonnative" ethnic groups are not taken into consideration and the corresponding space is stricken out. This leaves out citizens of the USSR of Bulgarian, German, Polish, Greek and other ethnic groups who adopted as their native language Russian or any other language of the peoples of the USSR but who continue to be fluent in their own national language. It is this language that is their "second fluent language." The fact that the national languages of the "nonnative" ethnic groups are not entered in this space showing the second language of the peoples of the USSR (fluent) leads to the assumption that such languages are not languages of the peoples of the USSR and, consequently, that the people who speak them are somehow not part of the peoples of the USSR! This stupidity is the result of bureaucratic thinking and must be eliminated. Unfortunately, the existing stereotype in recording this item has been preserved in the instructions on the 1989 Population Census Program.

L. Malinovskiy, candidate of historical sciences, Barnaul:

I read with pleasure the article by Ye. Zeymal: "Ethnic Groups and Their Languages Under Socialism." Unquestionably, it is useful given our lack of works on the national problem and, in particular, on ethnic groups.

The consideration of problems of national minorities lacks an integral approach: the problems of the national minorities in the Western part of our country have been ignored. Such a lack of attention has been traditional in publications: the moment a population group settles in another environment, it is forgotten by science.

Second: the article does not provide a scientific interpretation of the question of nationalities, even as it was presented in the book by Professor A. Kosing (GDR) "*Natsiya v Istorii i Sovremennosti*" [The Nation in History and Contemporaneity] (Moscow, 1978).

V. Koroteyeva, L. Perepelkin and O. Shkaratan. "From Bureaucratic Centralism to Economic Integration of Sovereign Republics." *KOMMUNIST* No 15, 1988.

A. Simonov, communist, engineer, Moscow:

The authors suggest that the budget of Union republics be strengthened through additional enterprise taxation.

Would it not be more sensible to apply another model which eliminates the vestiges of the old "allotment?" Enterprises, kolkhozes and cooperatives pay a strict percentage of their profits only to the rayon budget which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the soviet of people's deputies. The rayon itself withholds a percentage for the city and the oblast and the oblast for the republic and the republic for the state budget. If the percentage is stable and if no other channels for requisitioning (including produce) exist, there would be no discussions whatsoever about contradictions among nationalities or on a territorial basis. To begin with, the soviet will become the true master of its territory without having to refer to anyone else and its responsibility to the voters will be total. Secondly, the real interests of the people in social life will be increased.

V. Reka, worker, Kaliningrad:

The article by V. Koroteyeva, L. Perepelkin and O. Shkaratan cites economic indicators for the development of some Union republics during the 11th 5-year period.

In indicating differences in production efficiency, the authors of this article are puzzled by the "absence of a close interconnection between the effect of labor active-ness of the population of a republic and the benefits they receive."

What results could there be a question of under the conditions of an "outlay" economy?! The growth rates of labor productivity, based on gross output, and the cumulative counting of labor objects cannot be criteria for assessing production efficiency. As long as such an "upside-down economy" exists we shall have no idea of the actual economic situation in our national economy.

O. Meyyer, Tula:

Cases of violations by bureaucrats from the center of "economic sovereignty" are quoted in the article "From Bureaucratic Centralism to Economic Integration of Sovereign Republics" without, however, providing a comprehensive analysis of the reasons.

Yet hardly anyone could provide such an analysis today, for there is no interrelated, scientifically accurate comparable data for all parts of the country and for all indicators for the past 70 years.

In addition to a number of practical recommendations aimed at improving relations among nationalities in the USSR, the authors of the article claim that "national-state formations should be granted the right to subordinate economic to national-cultural decisions." The acknowledgment of such a right is possible but its implementation (such as not to harm others) cannot be.

The state redistribution of material facilities among republics has existed and will remain: it is to this purpose that the Union exists. In order for it to be equitable, we must sacredly observe Lenin's behest on the universal and comprehensive accountability. Without such accountability any redistribution can only be arbitrary.

V. Tishkov. "Peoples and State." KOMMUNIST No 1, 1989

V. Stupishin, doctor of historical sciences, chief counselor, USSR MID Assessments and Planning Administration: Nation and Federation

I would not hasten to delete from our scientific and political dictionary the concept of "nation," as suggested by V. Tishkov (see KOMMUNIST No 1, p 50), the more so since the term "nationality" is frequently used in our country in the strictly official, identification-survey sense.

I believe that we must continue to consider the meaning of the concept of "nation" without aspiring to give it a strict "canonical" definition. In this search for new formulas, consistent with historical realities in our time, it is also obviously not necessary to abandon some customary parameters merely because they were applied by the "Coryphaeus of all sciences:" for he himself borrowed a great deal in his own definition of nation not only from V.I. Lenin but also from some Russian scientists whose works, under his rule, were stashed behind seven padlocks.

Here is the way, for example, V.O. Klyuchevskiy thought: "The primitive family was structured on the basis of the physiological basis of a blood relationship. Families which had a single root formed a clan, which was another blood alliance which already included religious and juridical elements, respect for the ancestor, the authority of the elders, communal property and perimeter self-defense (clan revenge). The clan multiplied and developed into a tribe, the genetic ties within which were

expressed in the similarity of language, common customs and legends; as a result of divisions, mergers and assimilations, a tribe or tribes developed into a people, in which ethnographic ties were combined with moral ties, an awareness of spiritual unity, and a community of historical destinies and interests developed through common life and overall activities. Finally, the people become a state, when the feeling of national unity is manifested in political ties and in the unity between the supreme power and the law. In the state the people become not only a political but also a historical personality with a more or less clearly manifested national character and awareness of world purpose" (V.O. Klyuchevskiy, "Soch." [Works] in 9 volumes. Vol 1. "Course in Russian History." Part 1, Mysl, Moscow, 1987, p 42).

Is this not interesting? Something here reminds us of the "commonality of historical destinies," noted by Klyuchevskiy. This text does not seem to include the word "nation." But what is a people which has "become a state, when a feeling of national unity is expressed....," and so on? This, precisely, is what a nation is.

The efforts to determine what, nonetheless, is a nation are related to thoughts on the state of our federation: rejecting the concept of nation leads to emasculating the meaning of the concept of federation.

Obviously, a mandatory feature for the appearance of a nation is the existence of its own territory as the material base on which human communities developed. There is no nation outside a territory anymore than there is statehood outside territory. Readiness for the creation of one's own governmental structures is the most important feature of such a community as a nation and a factor for its successful struggle for the materializing of its sovereignty.

Naturally, there were nation-city state formations under feudalism as well, as there exist under capitalism numerous nationally heterogeneous states. However, there neither have been nor are there nations without their own statehood or without readiness for their own statehood, while many tribes and ethnic groups do perfectly well without it, satisfied with a kind of collective statehood, as is the case with the majority of countries in Black Africa, Latin America, Afghanistan and some other Asian countries.

Probably no nation can do also without a parameter such as an economic community. The conglomerate of barter economies can hardly become the foundation for national unity. No Russian nation existed before a single Russian market developed: "It was only the new period in Russian history (roughly since the 17th century) that is characterized by the actual merger of all... oblasts, lands and principalities within a single entity. This merger was not based on tribal relations..., and not even on their

extension and summation: it was the result of intensifying trade among areas, a gradual increase in commodity turnover, the concentration of several local markets within an all-Russian market." It was thus, according to V.I. Lenin, that the process of establishing national relations took place in Russia ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 1, pp 153-154). "Nations are the inevitable product and inevitable form of the bourgeois age of social development," Lenin believed (op. cit., vol 26, p 75). In taking the path of building socialism, they do not disappear in the least: it is the nature of their socioeconomic development that is transformed: they become socialist.

Naturally, in addition to all of these parameters, a joint life over a relatively long period of time, joint struggle for survival and their own national history are needed.

The existence of all of these features is what forms the self-identification and self-awareness of a people as a nation. Efforts to ignore the national factor and, worse, to belittle and expel it out of social life, inevitably lead to the aggravation of a national feeling, leading a normal self-awareness as a nation to excesses of a nationalistic variety.

Nonetheless, I consider quite fruitful the efforts of the author to formulate some basic rights of peoples-nations. We can only agree with the concept that "we have retained a limited understanding of socialist federalism." However, V. Tishkov understands this limitation in a somewhat original manner. It turns out that the choice of the quality of subjects of "national states" is the "concept of the sovereignty of a Union state," the all-Union sovereignty "which is expressed in the USSR less strongly than in many other countries," for which reason the "general line followed in ensuring the national development of the ethnic communities within the Union should secure the right of the nations on the governmental level." It is even more important "to ensure such rights through the development and intensification of the individual rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens."

But then was it not that even without it centralization in our country had developed to such an extent that we had come close to the transformation of our federation into an unitarian state? Are we not hurrying the merger among "nation-states?" Incidentally, adding the word "united" in defining our state is quite an open step precisely in that direction. "A single Union multinational state (Article 70, USSR Constitution) is either a federation with elements of unitarianism or an unitarian state with the elements of federalism or, perhaps, both, depending on the stage of development.

I am confident that the path of reform taken by our federation is in an entirely different direction. It has been properly said that strong republics mean a strong center. Let us add that concern for the rights of Union republics alone, which appears in the speeches of some

representatives of these republics, is by no means a solution but, rather, a worsening of the problem of relations among nationalities, for united within the Soviet Union are not 15 nation-states but several dozen nations, big and small, with different levels of autonomy and, therefore, actually and legally unequal which, in my view, conflicts with the Leninist principles of Soviet federalism.

Although I object to encouraging the development of the federation toward strengthening unity, which is dangerous to its future, I fully share V. Tishkov's view on the importance of rejecting unitarian thinking and the naive faith in a single and exclusive concept. Therefore, I do not claim that my assessments are impeccable but I hope that they could contribute to the further search for useful options.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

PAGES OF HISTORY

Anticipating the Change (F.E. Dzerzhinskiy's Last Letters and Notes)

18020014i Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 79-88

[Text] The following documents by F.E. Dzerzhinskiy help us better to understand the events which played a major role in the history of our party and in determining the fate of the country. The letters deal with economic problems (from February 1924 to his death, on 20 July 1926, F.E. Dzerzhinskiy was chairman of the Higher Council of the National Economy of the USSR, while retaining his job as chairman of the OGPU). Furthermore, they also reflect profound processes of political development.

By 1925 the postwar restoration of the national economy had been essentially completed. This did not simplify but greatly complicated the task of those who guided economic development. It is true that by then industry managers had already gained substantial experience. Thus, the settling of the marketing crisis of 1922-1924 helped them to realize that the policy of monopoly high prices harmed not only customers (peasants above all) but industry itself. F.E. Dzerzhinskiy made the greatest possible contribution to the theoretical elaboration and practical implementation of a policy of low prices. Subsequently, facing the shortage of working capital, he demanded of the enterprises to accelerate resource turnover and develop a faster growth of labor productivity compared to wages. The regimen of savings yielded striking results: short of sufficient allocations provided by the state, the metallurgical industry found within itself the type of reserves which enabled it, within a single year, to virtually double its volume of output.

However, the socioeconomic mechanisms which ensured the solution of the problems of the initial stage of the NEP were not adequate for the implementation of the new tasks which arose as a result of the completion of the restoration. Starting with 1926, the problems of industrialization were added to the agenda. The building of a large number of new enterprises required the type of accumulations which were inconceivable even 1 or 2 years previously. They could be obtained only from the population and, therefore, above all from the peasantry.

The market situation as well sharply changed after the prewar volumes of output had been reached and the population's standard had risen. The marketing crisis was replaced in 1925 by a shortage of commodities, which continued to worsen. The former policy of low prices no longer yielded results and, subsequently, became impossible, for it only enriched the speculators and disorganized distribution. A sharp debate broke out as to the methods and mechanisms for controlling the market (it was precisely at that time that V.V. Novozhilov published his article "Commodity Shortage," which has been properly appreciated only now). The People's Commissariat of Trade, supported by the Labor and Defense Council (STO) was instilling a policy of strict bureaucratic planning on the shipment and sale of goods in the various areas, in an effort to prevent industry from independently submitting its goods on the market. Conversely, the VSNKh supported the priority of the syndicates, which were voluntary shareholding associations of enterprises which, under Dzerzhinskiy's leadership, had become powerful collective agencies not only for marketing but also for production management and were agencies not of bureaucratic but of democratic centralism.

These purely economic problems, which are mentioned in the published letters by Dzerzhinskiy also implied pressing political problems of the development of socialism and, above all, the main one among them, the problem of the relationship between the working class and the peasantry.

Since 1921 these relations had been based on Lenin's policy of "linkage." In 1925 this policy experienced a kind of "minicrisis." Increases in grain production were made difficult, for the stimulating effect of the system of relations introduced in 1921 had weakened, a system which included certain economic and political restrictions to the development of the peasant farm. Such restrictions were lifted by the 14th Party Conference and the 3rd All-Union Congress of Soviets. The crisis of relations with the peasantry was resolved by strengthening rather than weakening the "linkage," and by intensifying rather than destroying the policy of the NEP.

The current economic difficulties were surmounted, the tempestuous economic development continued, but the course which had been charted triggered, during that

same year of 1925, a sharp theoretical discussion, followed by a political struggle within the party. Ye. Preobrazhenskiy, the economic theoretician of Trotskyism, published the article "The Basic Law of Socialist Accumulation." He argued that socialist accumulation should be based on the exploitation of the peasant farm, which should be considered a colony of proletarian industry. Preobrazhenskiy believed that the strengthening of the socialist economy inevitably meant the weakening, the "devouring" of the peasant farm, the artisans, the private merchants and other bearers of "presocialist economic forms."

N.I. Bukharin answered this article with his own "A New Revelation on the Soviet Economy or How to Kill the Worker-Peasant Bloc." He categorically stated the following on the theory of "devouring" petty farming: "It is radically wrong." He explained it as follows: "It is not in the least a question of the destruction or devouring (through "exploitation" as was done during the period of initial accumulation) but of a gradual restructuring of the peasant farms on the basis of their economic growth." He also said: "Inevitably, the question of 'accumulation' in the socialist industry becomes a question related to the problem of 'accumulation' in the peasant farm, which forms the market for industry and the sum total of economic units which should be involved in the state economy and gradually restructured."

In December 1925, at the 14th Congress of the VKP(b), the "new opposition," headed by the most noted party leaders and Politburo members G.Ye. Zinovyev and L.B. Kamenev, spoke out against strengthening the "linkage" and, essentially, against the ideas which had been recently developed by Preobrazhenskiy. These leaders who, only a short while back, had actively struggled against Trotskyism, having been defeated at the congress, joined L.D. Trotsky as a single bloc.

One of the most active opponents of the opposition bloc was Dzerzhinskiy. At the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum of 7 April 1926 he sharply criticized Kamenev's and Trotsky's speeches in which "everything... tended toward robbing the muzhik." In his famous speech at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of 20 July 1926, several hours prior to his death, in arguing with Kamenev, Dzerzhinskiy said: "We cannot become industrialized if we fear the well-being of the countryside." Dzerzhinskiy described Pyatakov's ideas, which called for obtaining funds for industrialization by increasing the prices of industrial goods sold to the peasants, as follows: "It is a meaningless anti-Soviet and antiworker program...." It was not only an anti-peasant program, which was clear, but also an antiworker program....

These specific and clear statements by Dzerzhinskiy are well-known and have always been actively used in historical works. But what a great contrast exists between their confident tone of voice and the nervous, tortured intonation of the letters he wrote during those days and

which we are publishing today! In order to improve our understanding of the reasons for this, we must more closely read the documents of that age and not only those which have always been freely circulated.

Particularly noteworthy among that which has now once again become accessible to the reader is N.I. Bukharin's 17 April 1925 report "On the New Economic Policy and Our Tasks." In this case Nikolai Ivanovich continued his answer to Preobrazhenskiy. It is precisely in this report that he formulates the idea the development of which has been considered by our social scientists only of late: "It seems to us that when we converted to the new economic policy Comrade Lenin had a strategic plan for the solution of the problem; when he wrote his article 'On the Cooperative,' i.e., when he left us his testament, in terms of the foundations of economic policy he had a different strategic plan. These two plans are not absolutely conflicting. Naturally, they are interconnected."

In that same speech he voiced the sacramental "enrich yourselves," which subsequently has become the topic of so many discussions. If we read this statement accurately we can appreciate how different is its true meaning from subsequent interpretations. Here is the way Bukharin spoke:

"All in all, we must tell the entire peasantry, all its strata: Enrich yourselves, accumulate, develop your farm. It is only idiots who can say that there must always be poverty in our country; now we must pursue a policy as a result of which our poverty would disappear."

This idea was entirely consistent with Dzerzhinskiy's views. He proved that nothing can be taken for industry from an impoverished peasant farming. Subsequent events, however, assumed a truly paradoxical nature. At the very peak of the struggle against the "new opposition" when, according to the logic of the struggle, each side defends any statement by "its own people," even if it is inept, Bukharin, who was the second leader of the majority after Stalin, was forced to declare on three occasions that he was rejecting the word "enrich yourselves," considering it erroneous.

He reminded us of this admission of his error once again in his speech at the 14th Party Congress as the first speaker for the majority, immediately after Zinovyev's co-report. Superficially, this admission seems a minor event within the text of a big speech in which the opposition was thoroughly criticized. This event appears even less significant against the background of a joint speech of the majority, which Bukharin headed along with Stalin, against the background of the total routing of the opposition at the congress. But let us ignore the vote count and study the content of the speech. We come across an amazing fact: many very authoritative representatives of the majority virtually failed to mention Bukharin's basic ideas, the ideas of their theoretical leader, and virtually failed to refute the basic ideas of the

opposition. The sharpest criticism was addressed at the very fact that there was an opposition, a violation of unity, and the delegates did not go beyond that point.

In this respect, the debates on the main problem—the essence of the NEP—is characteristic. N.K. Krupskaya criticized the call for "enrich yourselves" and, particularly sharply, Bukharin's interpretation of the NEP. She said: "The NEP is actually capitalism allowed within certain conditions, a capitalism which keeps in chains the proletarian state." Krupskaya asserted that Bukharin was wrong by speaking of changes in the article "On the Cooperative," pertaining to Lenin's strategic plan, compared to the beginning of the NEP.

What happened subsequently? G.K. Ordzhonikidze sharply criticized Krupskaya but only for violating unity and for supporting Zinovyev's opposition co-report and for the daring hint at the Stockholm Congress, where the Leninists were in the minority. He spoke equally firmly in defense of Bukharin but, above all, he spoke emotionally: "Bukharin is one of the best theoreticians, our dear Bukharchik, all of us love him and will support him." Ordzhonikidze did not support in the least Bukharin's basic ideas, criticized by Krupskaya and, furthermore, he praised Bukharin for his ability to acknowledge his errors.

Dzerzhinskiy did not address the 14th Congress. The head of industry did not speak at the congress which passed the resolution on industrialization. One of the most outstanding leaders of the party did not participate in the most violent clash with the opposition at the congress. Was he unable to? Was he sick, perhaps? We know that he took part in the proceedings of the congress. He also took part in the 23rd Extraordinary Leningrad Guberniya Party Conference which condemned the position of the Leningrad delegation to the congress and elected a new guberniya committee secretary, headed by Kirov. In his speech at the conference, Dzerzhinskiy made a profound analysis of the economic development which, essentially, totally refuted the views of the opposition. However, he did not say a single word about the opposition itself and the struggle waged against it at the recent congress.

Yet it is a well-known fact that in both 1925 and 1926, Dzerzhinskiy engaged in a most violent debate in opposing the specific economic ideas shared by Kamenev and Pyatakov. Dzerzhinskiy not only did not share the ideas of the opposition but was one of their most convinced and eloquent critics. However, a comparison between the texts indicates that Dzerzhinskiy criticized the opposition differently. He rejected its views for different reasons than those of the other supporters of the majority, reasons which were perhaps even deeper yet different.

Thus, Dzerzhinskiy criticized the politics of Kamenev and others much more decisively than, for example, Ordzhonikidze. Feliks Edmundovich rejected the very

essence of the economic policy supported by Kamenev and others. However, he considered the violation of unity not all that severely, and his personal attitude toward the members of the opposition was much calmer.

His statement at the 1 January 1926 Central Committee Plenum, immediately after the congress, is characteristic: "It would be difficult to demand of Zinovyev himself to speak and say that he has allowed certain deviations and so on, as Comrade Ordzhonikidze suggested. This does not have to be demanded. The party is sufficiently strong to demand of you, Zinovyev and Kamenev, to keep silent on this subject. You must do so if you want to remain within its ranks. Naturally, one must not pressure a person excessively. This, however, must be demanded."

Therefore, the demand of publicly abandoning factional ideas which had become almost universally accepted in the party (incidentally, quite easily by Zinovyev above all) was opposed by Dzerzhinskiy: "One must not pressure a person." He rejected the leftist ideas of the opposition no less but more decisively than other members of the majority. He rejected them on the basis of his own convictions, developed in the course of his arguments with Kamenev even before the congress, before the opposition itself had assumed an organized aspect. However, he rejected them in his own way, clearly not the way many other of Stalin's supporters did. Many members of the majority were concerned, in looking at the actions of the opposition, more with the violation of internal party unity than the threat to Leninist policy of "linkage" with the peasantry. They not only did not follow Bukharin in his efforts to refine the strategic prospects of the NEP but were not particularly worried about preserving that which had already been accomplished in relations with the peasantry.

As the letters which are published here show, Dzerzhinskiy was much more concerned with errors committed by the party's leadership than the errors of the opposition. He reacted much more strongly to the imperfect nature of the actual economic policy than the errors of the rejected ideas of the opposition. Directly involved with industry, quite profoundly at that, he already could sense what others realized later: one could not automatically continue to pursue the policy introduced in 1921. One had to think of its long-term development, as it advanced. He was clearly dissatisfied with the economic policy which was being pursued but did not dare to criticize it openly: he feared to disrupt party unity and to help the opposition. He could not openly speak but nor could he remain silent. He was torn by this contradiction, and it was at that point that his penetrating statement, a foreboding of the future Stalinist change, came out:

"Today we do not have a single line and a firm rule. Each commissariat and each deputy and assistant and member of a people's commissariat is pursuing his own line. There is no speed, promptness and accuracy of

decisions. I most firmly object to that which is. I fight against everything. It is useless." His conclusion: "I too have become tired of such contradictions."

These words are an excerpt from Dzerzhinskiy's letter to Kuybyshev, dated 3 July 1926, the same day as the letter which begins with the words "I am tired of living and fighting."

The following documents were prepared for publication by Zh. Adibekov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and Doctor of Economic Sciences O. Latsis.

To Comrade Pyatakov¹

Yu.L.

The discussions on wages also displayed the danger of showing in the balance sheet a high profit which I, incidentally, have repeatedly pointed out. Such high profits must be maximally reduced **without reducing the balance**. To this effect, based on the balance for 1924/25, we must increase, out of profits, amortization withholdings and formulate new steps. This must be done as quickly as possible and noiselessly. I believe that it will be easy to pass this in the Politburo, for otherwise we would be faced with an uncontrolled growth of wages and the impossibility of increasing our basic capital. Think about it and provide a specific formulation for the suggestions to be submitted to the Politburo.

9 October 1925, F.D.

To Comrade Stalin (noted in pencil on the typewritten copy of this letter: "Not sent. 6 December. F.D."):

In connection with the situation which has developed for industry and in the VSNKh I must submit my resignation to the Central Committee, for considering the developing situation I cannot successfully manage industry. We have neither an accurate plan nor a single plan for the entire Soviet economy or an efficient management in the economic area. There is no interconnection whatsoever among the different sectors. On this basis we are rapidly marching toward partial crises which, increasing in the future, could turn into a most severe crisis unless the party takes the necessary measures most urgently. Not being a politician, I am unable promptly to formulate questions in such a way that they can be considered and resolved by the party on time (I have frequently raised the questions and they have always been submitted for further work, coordination, etc., as a result of which, to this day, they are still being considered); therefore, as chairman of the Presidium of the VSNKh I will become a hindrance to the fast and prompt solution of the problems. Therefore, nothing is left for me other than to resign and I am confident that had Vladimir Ilich been alive he would have met my request.

The main discrepancies in our economy are as follows:

1. The Gosplan errors in the grain procurement plan.
2. Such errors are aggravated by the People's Commissariat of Food's system for the implementation of this plan by the People's Commissariat of Domestic Trade.
3. The erroneous system of strict regulations based on firm quarterly plans for the shipment of industrial commodities without sufficient funds for maneuvering purposes, which disorganizes internal trade.
4. The wrong system of relations between Domestic Trade and the VSNKh, which is creating insurmountable friction. The disparity between firm released prices of industrial commodities with ever increasing retail markups.
5. The increases in retail prices as the result of the first three discrepancies and, therefore, the disorganization of wholesale trade and production and the credit system, and the drop in the exchange rate of the chervonets.
6. The inflated prices of standing timber and, therefore, the disorganization of all production and financial plans of sectors consuming timber and wood, unrelated to the interests of the entire national economy.
7. The high prices of grain compared to industrial commodities but lower in terms of retail trade in the countryside, as a result of the disorganization of the market because of the excessive amount of money spent on grain procurements, compared with the level and pace of possible development of our industry and the amount of possible imports. Hence the artificial increase in the stress caused by commodity hunger.
8. The struggle and antagonism between petty (state, craft and private) industry and large-scale industry caused by raw and other materials. As a result of high retail prices petty industry could prevail over large-scale industry.
9. The danger of the collapse of a number of production facilities (cotton, wool, leather, metal industry, etc.) because of the tremendous reaction on the part of the People's Commissariat of Domestic Trade to curtailing imports of raw materials and semifinished goods and a similar reduction in the imports of equipment to replace the one which has become worn-out.
10. Total lack of coordination between the VSNKh and Vneshtorg. The nonfulfillment of the plenum's assignments,² although 2 months have already passed, the pretext being the replacement of the people's commissar and the merger. Comrade Tsyurupa³ does not call me for purposes of coordination, despite the Politburo resolution, and everything there is proceeding as in the

past. Yet they have extensive opportunities for accelerating the export of other items instead of grain. Without this the accelerated industrial exports would run out of breath (without imports).

11. Disorganization of the credit system. The STO plan for quarterly crediting has been curtailed because the banks are short 84 million (checking accounts have declined and money is being used for speculative purposes), a gap which is not being filled.

12. Budget allocations are being provided with delays and cuts (by 15 percent, according to Comrade Sokolnikov⁴).

13. The loan for economic recovery is being postponed indefinitely.

14. The result is the breakdown of all resolutions issued by the supreme authorities about the control figures and all production-financial plans. The financial situation is extremely stressed in a number of sectors and we are threatened by a lack of working capital for meeting the payroll on time.

15. Furthermore, there is lack of coordination in the processing and consideration of the budget. It is being processed partially by the SNK and the STO. Priority is given to consumer accounts compared to basic economic computations (industry, transportation), without any coordination, which automatically leads to giving priority to consumption over production.

16. This increase in the budget and in wages casts a doubt on the possibility—considering the overall developing situation—of converting such wages into goods, i.e., it could lead to a drop in the value of our currency and to an automatic wage reduction.

17. What makes this threat all the more realistic is that with the increase in wages in recent months, starting with July, labor productivity has not only failed to catch up with this increase but has even reduced to naught the successes achieved in the preceding period in this area. We cannot hope for any change for the better unless we make decisions which would ensure technical improvements in the production process, replacing the old and worn out equipment with new one, which alone could today increase productivity substantially, providing that we have adequate amounts of raw materials. This means that we must find foreign exchange to pay for importing raw materials and equipment and funds for the internal financing of our industry.

18. Furthermore, given such tremendous difficulties, related to the ever worsening situation, our entire governmental apparatus is structured on the basis of the principle of an ever greater strengthening of functional departments and the ever greater weakening of production and operational departments, paralyzing all their initiatives and making them increasingly irresponsible

and helpless. Without coordination they are nothing. Plans, programs, managing finances under their administration and handling their goods, purchases and trade deals, both at home and abroad, are all being regulated, coordinated, halted, and so on, at every step of the way. Therefore, our apparatus is becoming increasingly bureaucratized and alienated from life. Life goes forth and these functional departments are catching up with it while the production departments are helpless, as a result of which they exist without any type of plan and leadership. The only explanation for such a system is mistrust. Today, however, such mistrust is a vestige and, with such a greater complexity of life, even if there were no vestiges, such a method of insurance would be purposeless. Such a mistrust, however, is a vestige. As a result of the NEP and the years of struggle for a strong currency, lowering prices, increasing labor productivity, working in harmony with the trade unions, gaining the trust of the masses, creating a comradesly atmosphere for our specialists and for involving them in Soviet work and, above all, after all these years of efforts on the part of our communists-economic managers to earn and justify the trust of the party, the party obtained and selected thousands of cadres of economic managers who are loyal sons of the party and who listen to and obey its directives and the directives of the VSNKh Presidium as their immediate superior, organized by the party for such purposes. This is precisely the case. In the trusts, syndicates and plants as a whole, the party has put not NEP men, not people who have given up but people who are sensible and loyal party fighters, who can conscientiously and consciously implement directives. They must be given full rights. As to the VSNKh Presidium and its chairman and deputies, i.e., those who represent you (i.e., the party and the authorities) directly, I believe that it depends on you to determine who could be entrusted with leadership. As an association of the entire state industry, the VSNKh is too important a center for the entire life of our republic for you to begrudge giving it personnel. Appoint to the VSNKh those who will regulate and correct it and who will manage it. It would be worth letting go for that purpose Sheynman⁵, Tsyurupa, Sokolnikov or Comrade Kamenev.⁶ It would be worth transferring half of the TsKK-RKI.

19. As the autonomy of the VSNKh increases and as the rights and obligations of the functional departments are reduced, it becomes necessary to end the present dispersal of the central leadership and to establish a single center of economic management for all sectors and for the entire USSR. We must strengthen the STO and concentrate within it the entire economic leadership, organically linking it to our government, i.e., to the Politburo. The present STO is a helpless institution. It means Kamenev maneuvering among various quarreling departments. The structure of the STO must be changed by making the general secretary and other members of the Politburo its members. Economic management is our foundation today, for which reason the general secretary must be part of it.

As to me, considering the state of my health (nerves) I am not able currently to head the VSNKh. I fear that even before the congress I will have to undergo treatment. It would be preferable for my official resignation to take place after the congress.

3 December 1925 (F. Dzerzhinskiy)
(At the end of the letter F.E. Dzerzhinskiy added:
"Typed in two copies")

To A.I. Rykov, chairman of the SNK and STO

I am forced to turn to you with the following statement: considering the conditions of Comrade Sheynman's dictatorship and the failure of the government to take real steps to secure loans to industry and lower retail prices and the total isolation of the VSNKh, despite its efforts to cope with the ever increasing difficulties of our state industry, I reject any responsibility for the condition of our industry and the VSNKh and, in this connection, I ask of you to raise the question of my resignation in the Central Committee. I personally will limit my actions to this letter to you, in order not to increase the difficulties of the party by a speech to the Central Committee. With the present economic policy in practical terms I cannot speak to the state industry authorities and guide them as representative of the government, for I do not share the policy of this government. I do not understand it and I do not see any sense in it. This policy consists of an unparalleled credit pressure on industry, restrictions which strangle it and which force it to object, not to pay wages, to sell out all stocks, to abandon preparations for the autumn harvesting campaign, to reduce procurements of raw materials from the peasants, letting private entrepreneurs do so, and so on. Furthermore, this policy is enhanced by an obvious mistrust in and currently treatment of the VSNKh for its alleged delay in reporting the danger, amateurish attitude, threat of bankruptcy, and so on. The entire personnel of the VSNKh senses a hostility and malice toward it and feels its total helplessness and isolation. All sorts of people are tearing our personnel apart, making them spend a great deal of time in hearings called by commissions, subcommissions, sections, and so on, which investigate and correct our work. Most of our time is wasted in senseless work because of mistrust toward us.

Meanwhile, it is obvious that with someone's blessings, our quarrel (with me at the head) with the cooperatives, on the subject of lowering retail prices, has become a campaign taken up by the Gosplan and EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN⁷ against the syndicates and for the elimination of their foundations—the sections. I believe such policy to be lethal. Instead of reducing loans to industry or abolishing the syndicate bases one must most emphatically attack the high retail prices, the responsibility for which falls on our cooperatives and our improper policy toward the private entrepreneur, both of whom are becoming richer (the absence of any kind of

policy). The victory of the cooperative over us in this dispute would mean its bankruptcy in the near future, which would lead to the bankruptcy of the entire industry.

I believe that we must radically change the entire policy and if a right policy is set I must be immediately removed from the VSNKh and replaced by those nominated by Sheynman and Smilga.⁸ We must have a single policy, something which we lack. Instead, we have procrastination and rumination.

In my view, we must immediately:

Lower the retail prices of industrial commodities surgically, in terms of the cooperatives and the private entrepreneurs, engage in a merciless struggle against speculation, and promote a strict system of economy in the entire commercial system.

Short-term and long-term financing must be adequate to meet in full the minimal needs of our industry.

Steps must be taken to ensure the true accumulation of industrial commodities in our state industry and state trade, needed for marketing the crops in the autumn.

The entire system and methods of management must be radically changed by replacing the system of universal mistrust with one of trust.

The attitude toward the VSNKh must be changed. To this effect its personnel must be changed so that others may trust it. Quarrels with it from all sides and duplicating its work by the Gosplan and different commissions must come to an end.

I repeat again that I do not consider myself responsible for the VSNKh.

2 June 1926. F.D.

To comrades Pyatakov, Kviring, Yulin, Kafengauz, Shein, Mezhlauk, Lobov and Lokshin and the GEU (and departments)⁹

As a result of my trip to the South¹⁰ and the study of the situation of the YuMT,¹¹ Yugostal¹² and others, I have developed the firm conviction of the unsuitability at present of our management system, which is based on universal mistrust and which demands of subordinate authorities all kinds of reports, references and information, operating with average data for a trust, thus depersonalizing our main units—the plants—and creating an endless amount of correspondence and red tape which doom any live project and lead to the waste of huge funds and efforts. Such a system must be rejected. Such a system keeps us actually ignorant about what we actually have, and instead of a plan which would coordinate everything and lead it in the same direction and at the same pace, we have chaos and lack of control. It was

“established” in May that production costs at Glavmetall had risen by 29 percent in the first half of the year. This figure is now being refuted and checked. It has been “established” today that in the first half of the year wages alone the Taganrog plant of the YuMT accounted for 98 percent of the cost of its entire output for that period of time. To this day the plants are unaware of their production costs. Instead of an organizing force, in this aspect our system is running idle.

The only solution is the following: we must sharply turn our course by 180 degrees. We must convert it to a course of trust. One cannot manage industry other than by trusting those to whom we ourselves assign a given project, teaching them and learning from them, helping them and thoroughly developing a corresponding system of trust in the cadres of Soviet industrial workers. This means that there must be greater personal contacts (along the main administration-trust-plant line); correspondence and accountability must be reduced to the necessary minimum; in the management agencies bureaucratic officials must be replaced by people who are personally familiar with the work and who can learn their jobs; there must be frequent visits by leading personnel to the plants; all plants must be converted to the so-called cost accounting, i.e., to adopting plant balance sheets and regulated relations with the trust so that the economic aspect of the plant be made entirely and efficiently clear not only for the sake of the plant, the trust and the VSNKh but of public opinion as well.

In order to introduce this new system as quickly as possible and to make it necessary we must begin, in my view, with a harsh surgical reduction of accountability and its addenda. The VSNKh should receive only data without which one cannot manage and govern industry. Based on the primary data, such information should be processed not by the VSNKh but by the trusts and the plants. We should be receiving only the final data from the trust and not the average for the trust alone but also data for each separate plant. The trust itself should base its work on data developed by the plants in terms of their own operations. We must immediately draw up a list and the proper forms of such maximally concise data, needed by the VSNKh, trusts and plants and firmly reject all the rest, legislatively stipulating that no one (other than the VSNKh Presidium) has the right to demand of the trusts and plants any data whatsoever other than for purposes of special audits and each time on the basis of a special resolution passed by the supreme state authorities. Furthermore, we must strengthen the auditing commissions of the trusts not quantitatively but qualitatively, with the mandatory stipulation that in their activities they would totally reject the currently practiced methods of bureaucratic control and that they would act as the assistants of the managements of trusts and of the VSNKh.

If we do this, our central authorities will have thousands of people without jobs and they could be sent to the plants, to the prime sources. If the data prove to be insufficient in some cases, or if the data set from the trust

to the VSNKh and from the plants to the trust are deemed questionable, incorrect or fictitious, at that point instead of corresponding with the respective manager, one should go personally to the prime source, which would benefit both sides.

All of the questions I raise in this note should be urgently dealt with in order to ensure their specific practical solution. Such work should involve the broadest possible strata of economic managers. The same line should be followed by the campaign of thrift in industrial management. It should result in savings of tens of millions and provide hundreds of millions of rubles in income.

In this connection I instruct the following:

1. Comrade Yulin's commission, monitored by Yu.L. Pyatakov, to formulate within 2 weeks specific suggestions; 2. Comrade Pyatakov to summon a conference to consider such suggestions, consisting of representatives of trusts, interested departments and main administrations of the VSNKh with the mandatory participation of some directors from the basic industrial sectors. The results of the work of such a conference to be reported to the USSR VSNKh Presidium.

1 June 1926. F. Dzerzhinskiy
(Comrade Pyatakov should extract that part of my letter which is to be published in the press and send it to the newspaper editors.)

The addressee of the following letter is not identified.

"I am tired of living and struggling." These words are from the notes of one of the best economic managers, Comrade Danilov (director of the Vyksy), who committed suicide. Shortly before that an RKI audit of his plant had deemed his work satisfactory. Comrade Danilov's words and his mood characterize the present mood of a tremendous number of the best economic managers, not only party members but also many honest nonparty people. Such a mood must not be ignored. If we do not trace its origins we shall not find the means of healing this murderous illness.

What are those origins?

They are found in the situation of our economic managers and the futility of nine-tenths of all their efforts. Everything that is bad and all difficulties are blamed on them. All campaign are aimed at them. All errors or crises are their fault. They are blamed for lack of discipline and the absenteeism of workers; all delays are blamed on their strictness and tactlessness. They are blamed for the poor work of production conferences. They are blamed when surpluses develop as a result of reductions in the plan by the center; they are blamed if they have failed to procure sufficient materials. They are blamed for the fact that the equipment is worn out and for breakdowns. They can be abused and discredited by any correspondent.

Instead of creating new values and promoting the production process, studying it, choosing proper personnel and organizing the work, nine-tenths of their strength and energy go into coordinations, accountability, justifications and answering questions. Economic managers have become dominated by bureaucratism and red tape. No time is left for work. We have become tired of living and fighting.

Our economic management system must be radically changed, from top to bottom.

Today this system is a vestige, a most harmful obstruction to the work. It is based on the formal interdependence of officially equal and not reciprocally subordinated units; it is based on total irresponsibility; it is based on the principle of constant checking all details of the work and an incredibly widespread duplication of work.

The VSNKh cannot manage the property, money or goods it has been entrusted to supervise. Financing is being regulated, even to the slightest detail, by the People's Commissariat of Finance and the Gosbank. The distribution of goods produced by industry and the procurement of raw materials to industry are controlled by the People's Commissariat of Trade. The skill of technical personnel and workers must be rated by the People's Commissariat of Education. All the details in the formulation and implementation of the plans are controlled by the Gosplan, and so on, and so forth.

In order for others to control us and in order for us to defend the interests of industry and meet all its demands, we have had to introduce an incredibly huge system of accountability in which we ourselves have sunk and have radically disorganized the work of all primary units.

Such accountability has developed into a system in all agencies to such an extent that literally all of them exist for the sake of demanding from others accounts, references, information and reports. This includes uyezd executive committees and uyezd party committees. The result has been a real paralysis despite the fact that the machine operates at full speed, a paralysis affecting all units of state administration and economic management.

Thanks to this system, the knowledge of workers and managers has been replaced by portfolio "knowledge." Regulation has turned into universal infighting and universal obstruction. All matters are sent to the STO and, subsequently, the Politburo. Therefore, the system of abandoning all responsibility is sanctioned and developed. There are no people in charge of specific assignments.

Problems which arise at the plant cannot be solved quickly. They must go through all the stages and all types of coordination and, in the case of differences, reach the STO.

This leads to setting up thousands upon thousands of commissions. Under our system they are inevitable, however much they may be abused.

Hence our good workers go crazy and deal with "writings," for they have no time to engage in creative work aimed at creating values. Hence we are unnecessarily supporting hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people with unparalleled losses to the national economy. Hence also the bureaucratic machineries exhaust workers and peasants, those who are creating the real values through their toil; hence we have a wall of a million-strong apparatus separating us, state and economic managers, from workers and peasants.

Furthermore, our pace of development has stopped. We are solving problems and issuing instructions with incredible delays. This can no longer go on not only because the best human material has become worn out, "has become tired of living and struggling," but also because otherwise we shall be unable to cope with the task which history has assigned us: the defense of the socialist state from external enemies (England, as their leader and head, and Poland as their hireling) and the defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat from its domestic enemies (the strengthening of our opposition is a manifestation of the growth of counterrevolutionary forces in the country and of our difficulties).

It is only by simplifying our machinery that we would be able to find additional funds for industrialization and for meeting the needs of the workers. It is only thus that we could really promote a system of thrift.

My suggestions are the following:

1. To acknowledge that full responsibility for industry to the government is borne by the VSNKh; this requires:
2. Merging the People's Commissariat of Trade with the VSNKh and organizing within the joint commissariat the following administrations: foreign trade, domestic trade and procurements, abolishing within the VSNKh the department of trade policy, the trade commission, the raw material conference and the INO.¹³
3. Combining the Bank of Commerce and Industry with the Foreign Trade Bank and using them to finance industry and trade in accordance with the resolutions of the 12th and 13th party congresses.
4. Relieving the People's Commissariat of Finance from the obligation to supervise the authorities of the VSNKh and the VSNKh itself toward the property and funds assigned to it by the government for purposes of management and monitoring.
5. Reorganizing the Gosplan which must become a collegium of scientists who will issue expert conclusions for the STO and will formulate general annual and long-term plans and control figures and nothing else.

6. Transferring the matter of the technical training of workers from the People's Commissariat of Education to the VSNKh, while the People's Commissariat of Education would retain general education and upbringing.

7. Abolishing, from top to bottom, within the VSNKh and the trusts the system of collective management. They should have only elected authorities (such as syndicates, courts, etc.).

8. Decisively and irreversibly reducing accountability by dozens or hundreds of times. A ban on demanding any kind of information, accounts, and so on, not along a direct jurisdictional line, with the exception or requests based on a specially motivated resolution requesting an audit. Organizing official information on the cash flow.

9. Replacing the system of paper correspondence with a system of personal contacts, such as travels, on-site visits, or clubs.

10. Reducing in the course of the year the personnel of all administrative machineries whether supported by the state budget or through cost accounting, by no less than one-half, which is entirely attainable if the suggestions stipulated in the preceding points are implemented.

11. Banning the writing of long reports to the superior state institutions or within institutions. There should be short notes with motivations and suggestions and efficient, short and complete personal reports by people familiar with the work, should this be required.

12. A permanent conference under the People's Commissariat of Labor should be created to formulate measures to promote labor discipline in the plants and to coordinate the work of the People's Commissariat for Labor, the AUCCTU and the VSNKh. Its main task should be to consider specific problems.

These are the most important of my organizational suggestions. Their implementation should be undertaken quickly.

3 July 1926 (F. Dzerzhinskiy)

To Comrade Kuybyshev

Dear Valerian! These are my thoughts and suggestions concerning the management system. The existing system is a vestige. We still have people to whom responsibility could be assigned. However, they are currently drowning in coordinations, reports, papers and commissions. Under capitalism, every capitalist had his own funds and his responsibilities. In our country now the STO and the Politburo are responsible for everything. This is not the way to compete with the private entrepreneurs, with capitalism and the enemies. We do not have work but a comprehensive pain. The functional commissariats with their competences paralyze life and the lives of the bureaucratic officials. We cannot cure this paralysis

without surgery, without daring, without bolts of lightning. Everyone is waiting for such surgery. This will be the words and the actions everyone is waiting for. In terms of our internal party situation this will be a renaissance. The opposition will be suppressed by the tasks which the party will set. We are now in a swamp. There is discontent and expectation everywhere. Our foreign situation as well is quite difficult. Increasingly, England is surrounding us with a net made of steel. Revolution in that country is not about to happen soon. We must at all cost rally all forces around the party. Economic managers as well are of great importance. Today they are depressed and confused. I personally and my fellow workers are already incredibly "tired" from this situation. There is total helplessness. By ourselves we can accomplish nothing. Everything is in the hands of the functionalists—Sheynman and Frumkin.¹⁴ This must not be. We keep writing, writing and writing. This must not be. Meanwhile, we are facing the greatest possible problems and we have neither the time nor the necessary strength. Mussolini has introduced a 9-hour work day and says: I know my Italians, if I call upon them they will work 10 hours. In our country—we know our workers—if they have an 8-hour day they will work 5 or 6 hours. They will loaf as much as 30 percent of the time. Our trade unions as well are asleep. We find no common language. We try to coordinate. How can we quarrel yet at the same time prepare for our defense?

Our cooperatives: we are promoting socialism within them yet they constantly need help. They fleece the consumers and industry. They do not allow us seriously to formulate and resolve the question of the private entrepreneurs, who keep growing and becoming ever richer. The cooperative is rejecting my steps against speculation and the planned supplies of private entrepreneurs, for should they lower their prices they would force the cooperatives to do the same.

In addition to management problems, we must seriously, and not as we do now, formulate and solve problems related to labor discipline, the cooperative, the private entrepreneurs, speculation and parochialism.

Today we do not have a single line and firm authorities. Each commissariat, and each deputy, assistant or member of a people's commissariat is following his own line. There is no speed, promptness and accuracy in decision-making.

I most firmly object to that which there is. I am fighting everyone but uselessly. For I realize that it is only the party and its unity that can solve the problem and that my statements could strengthen those who, in all likelihood, would lead both the party and the country to its doom, i.e., Trotsky, Zinovyev, Pyatakov and Shlyapnikov. But what am I to do? I am fully confident that we can deal with all the enemies if we can formulate and adopt a proper line in the practical management of the country and the economy and if we regain the lost pace which is now falling behind the requirements of reality.

Unless we find such a line and pace our opposition will grow and, at that point, the country will find its dictator—the gravedigger of the revolution—whatever red feathers he may be wearing. Virtually all of today's dictators are former reds: Mussolini,¹⁵ and Pilsudski.¹⁶

I too am tired from such contradictions.

I have repeatedly submitted my resignation. You should decide soon. I cannot be chairman of the VSNKh with such thoughts and pains, for they radiate and contaminate. Do you not see this?

3 July 1926. Yours, F. Dzerzhinskiy

V.V.¹⁷

I cannot be a member of the VSNKh. I beg all of you to relieve me and put your own person, i.e., someone who would not have to encounter such resistance on all matters.

F.D.

I am very tired to be constantly the strict "boss."¹⁸

Footnotes

1. G.L. Pyatakov (1890-1937): party member since 1910. In 1925, deputy chairman of the USSR VSNKh.
2. In reference to the October 1925 RKP(b) Central Committee Plenum at which the question of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade was considered.
3. A.D. Tsyurupa (1870-1928). Party member since 1898. In 1925, people's commissar of domestic and foreign trade.
4. G.Ya. Sokolnikov (1888-1939). Party member since 1905. In 1925, USSR people's commissar of finance.
5. A.L. Sheynman: chairman, USSR Gosbank board, USSR deputy people's commissar of finance.
6. L.B. Kamenev (1883-1936): party member since 1901. In 1925, STO chairman. Since January 1926, people's commissar of trade.
7. EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN: A daily economic newspaper published since 1918.
8. I.T. Smilga (1892-1938): Party member since 1907. Since 1924, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan. Since 1925, rector of the Institute of the National Economy imeni G.V. Plekhanov.
9. This list of names pertains to senior personnel of the VSNKh; GEU: Main Economic Administration of the VSNKh.

10. In reference to the trip made by F.E. Dzerzhinskiy to the Ukraine in May 1926, in the course of which he studied the situation of the metallurgical industry.

11. YuMT: Southern Machine Building Trust.

12. Yugostal: Trust of the Main Metal Industry Administration of the VSNKh (Glavmetall).

13. INO: Foreign Department of the VSNKh.

14. M.I. Frumkin (1878-1939): party member since 1898. In 1926 USSR deputy people's commissar of finance.

15. Mussolini (1883-1945): The fascist dictator of Italy. He began his political career in the Socialist Party from which he was expelled in 1914. Obviously, Dzerzhinskiy had this circumstance in mind.

16. Pilsudski (1867-1935). In 1926-1928, Polish prime minister. Dzerzhinskiy probably had in mind his activities in 1887-1892, when Pilsudski was exiled to Siberia for an attempt on the life of Tsar Alexander III.

17. Note addressed to V.V. Kuybyshev.

18. There is no addressee to this note. Both notes were written on different bits of paper in blue pencil, clearly in the course of some conference.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

A Rational-Metaphorical Picture of the World

18020014j Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 89-97

[Article by Boris Viktorovich Raushenbakh, academician, department head at the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, Lenin Prize winner, member of the International Academy of Astronautics]

[Text] Very lively debates are currently under way in society, in the course of which the qualitatively renovated features of socialism are emerging more clearly. By no means the least important in such discussions, in my view, should be problems related to the world outlook of modern man and the determination of his place in Space, in the universe, as well as, metaphorically speaking, in the space of relations with other people, society and nature on earth, outside of which we shall not be able to exist in the foreseeable future. The extent to which we shall be able to understand such problems and find the proper ways of solving them will determine, without exaggeration, the future of civilization as a whole. And although man since most ancient times has considered such problems, the rapidly changing reality

and surrounding world ascribe ever new content to them, motivating us again and again to turn to them and to seek answers consistent with the realities of the present and, perhaps, the future.

Let me begin with an example drawn from my own life.

In the past I wrote books on graphic art without resorting to mathematics but using my customary logic of rational scientific knowledge. In discussions with readers an amazing pattern emerged: I was perfectly understood by mathematicians, physicists and engineers but totally misunderstood by many artists who, actually, praised the books (possibly unwilling to insult the author). At that point I recalled that I personally "did not understand" some works by our outstanding art experts. It turned out that something similar was felt by other representatives of the "precise" sciences: to us in frequent cases works on art are "streams of words" without any strictly defined rational meaning. Yet the universally known names of their authors unquestionably guaranteed the high quality of such books and it is we who were to be blamed for our failure to understand them.

Thus, I came across the fact that, conventionally speaking, we could divide the Russian language into two components: the first uses the logic of rational scientific knowledge and the other the logic of metaphorical thinking. These are not only two components of the language but also two types of viewing the world, the supporters of which find it difficult to understand one another.

In order to explain this phenomenon more fully, I believe, we should turn to the currently intensively studied fact of the functional asymmetry of the brain. It turns out that the left hemisphere is responsible essentially for the processes of rational thinking while the right one deals with the metaphorical perception of the world. Apparently the fact that a person could be classified as a "physicist" or a "lyricist" also depends on which of the hemispheres dominates in his brain. Naturally, this separation is not absolute. Geniuses such as Leonardo da Vinci and Goethe, for example, were able to achieve outstanding successes in the precise sciences, which require a strictly rational thinking, and in the arts, which demand of the artist particular emotionality and a developed metaphorical way of thinking. As a rule, however, it is one of the types that nonetheless dominates, whether it applies to noted workers in science and culture or ordinary people not possessing any particular talent.

The metaphoric perception of the world is older than logical thinking, which developed later (perhaps that is why dreams which originate in the right hemisphere do not amaze man by presenting the most incredible miracles, for the left hemisphere, the "rational" one, is "disengaged" during that time). There are two different ways for perceiving and knowing the world, as was pointed out a long time ago. In Homer's "Iliad," Hector speaks of the tragic fate awaiting him:

"...I firmly tell myself, talking to myself in my mind and my heart that the day will come when sacred Troy will perish...."

What matters to us is that Hector speaks both of the mind (based on rational thinking) and the "heart" (based on metaphorical foreboding). It is characteristic of latter ancient tradition to separate the "opinion," i.e., that which has been obtained through the senses, from the "knowledge," which has the mind as its source. It is only these two ways that lead to the integral perception of the world. Both are identically essential and neglecting either of them is fatal to the individual as well as to society.

We live in the age of the scientific and technical revolution, which is rich with impressive scientific discoveries which gradually encompass all areas of knowledge. In that case, why do we need some kind of irrational perception of the world based on feelings (such as, for example, the feeling of duty) rather than the mind and, consequently, something which is of indefinite and loose nature? The point is that it does not change what is rational and scientific but supplements it with essentially new elements.

For example, let us consider the problem of man's moral behavior. The results of scientific studies obtained through rational ways of thinking may be true or false regardless of moral considerations. The table of multiplication and now also the art of making computer programs can be successfully applied by a very good person for good and useful purposes as well as by the worst scoundrel for his criminal intents. This situation is well familiar: science serves progress but can be used also by the most reactionary forces. Therefore, the conclusions of rational science do not include a moral principle. However, to the people morality is of vital importance. Concepts of morality, and even more so "a moral feeling," appeared long before science, from the metaphorical and "irrational" (I am deliberately using this word) knowledge of the world as well as in the process of the summation of human empirical collective experience. It is only subsequently, in connection with the establishment of the world religions that, on a parallel basis, rational and ethic substantiations for moral doctrines appeared (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza and Kant).

What meaning do I invest in the concept of the irrational? It is by no means something secret, mystical or, in general, unattainable by the mind. Rather it is a question of what is irrational in the narrow logical understanding: an intuitive accomplishment seems irrational in terms of a discursive one; from the viewpoint of individual unique experience a logical conclusion and evaluation is irrational in terms of experimental proof, etc. Therefore, anything which I will be subsequently calling irrational and illogical, and so on, may turn out to be entirely

rational from a broader viewpoint of the knowledgeable intellect, which explains and evaluates its own experience and metaphorical thinking.

The behavior of the individual in the world around him is based on the knowledge of this world. This knowledge is developed in two interrelated areas: one in which logic has the final word and another dominated by the feelings: compassion, love of one's neighbor and of the fatherland, religious feeling, a poetic feeling (distinguished not only from literature but also from music and graphic arts), etc. Do these feelings lead to knowledge, albeit not logical-discursive but intuitive, sometimes subconscious, yet nonetheless knowledge?

Everything seems to indicate that they do. Indeed, when someone, even a child meets a person for the first time he immediately develops a sympathy or antipathy toward him without any obvious rational reason. This feeling becomes the first (albeit sometimes erroneous) intuitive knowledge (or, if you wish, a "preknowledge") about the person, which largely defines our behavior. Sometimes behavior is dictated by a moral feeling and, in justifying the nature of his actions, the person states: "I cannot explain why but I was unable to act differently." This too is not related to a direct logical analysis (for otherwise it could have been explained) of the knowledge of how one should behave in any give situation.

At the turn of the century such examples, and they are numerous, enabled some poets to claim that there are truths which cannot be described through prose, i.e., truths which are based not on the formal understanding of logic but on the specific logic of the poetic imagery used in the perception of the world. Consequently, the metaphorical, the nonrational perception of the world, is another necessary source of our knowledge. Furthermore, occasionally such knowledge turns out to be more accurate than the rational-logical one in the area of rational science itself. If we ask what will be the aspect of technology in the future, it happens that the projections of specialists are frequently less accurate than those of writers. Thus, as late as the 1930s, many scientists, including some of the most noted ones, claimed that nuclear power can never be used by man, whereas "irresponsible" writers fully accepted it in their works. In his "The Hyperboloid of Engineer Garin," A. Tolstoy described a "death ray" which, at that time, was absolutely impossible according to the scientists. Today, however, we speak of laser weapons as something obvious. In his novel "Doroga na Okean" [Ocean Road] Leonid Leonov described a radar system which did not exist as yet at that time. How to explain this? In all likelihood, the scientists are excessively attached to science and technology and to their present postulates and axioms and, proceeding on the basis of strictly logical conclusions, are unable to anticipate **revolutionary** discoveries, whereas the writer, the artist, who is free from such "prejudices," can obviously "sense" (or anticipate) better the course of mankind's development.

Naturally, this is not a call for proceeding from knowledge to feelings in the areas of science and technology. As we pointed out, the irrational, the emotional component of human knowledge is related, above all, to the moral and poetic factors in human awareness.

In harmoniously developed people both sources of knowledge—rational and illogical—define their behavior and are in some state of balance. Naturally, this is the ideal system. In reality, a great deal depends on the individual characteristics of mental development and on the individual's living conditions.

In contemporary society the volume and significance of rational and logical knowledge are increasing steadily. This is clearly manifested not only in the way computers are taking over ever new areas of life (from children's games to computing the trajectory of space apparatus), but also in human motivations and actions. Today, with increasing frequency the people are seeking optimal solutions to the problems which face them and, as a rule, the concept of optimality has a strictly rational sense, such as how to build a given system at the lowest possible cost, how can an enterprise obtain maximal profits, what is the likelihood that any given event may happen, and so on. This way of thinking is basic in our daily life as well: how to handle our available funds in the best possible way; how to reach our place of work within optimal time, etc. In this case the headlong pace of change in our lives exclude the formulation of "traditional solutions" which would be considered acceptable both today and in 10 or 20 years. All of these problems must be resolved under new circumstances on each separate occasion. Today even professional knowledge and skills cannot remain unchanged throughout a lifetime. Experience proves that many people have to be retrained each 10 or 20 years, for the average "life span" of contemporary technology is much shorter than that of human life.

These are precisely the circumstances governing the fact that the rational component of our knowledge of the world must be used all the time and increased steadily. Man's attention is focused mainly on it while irrational knowledge assumes second priority. However, the latter has a major influence on important aspects of the perception of the world: a moral assessment of events or moral motivation for actions. Yet morality becomes somehow secondary, which is something of increasing concern to the human community. Actually, is it not a matter of concern the fact that a rating such as "successful businessman," or "good production organizer" occasionally proves to be more important than the term "decent person?"

In speaking of the decline of morality, at this point we draw attention to the fact that in the past a rational component of knowledge did not play such an excessive role. Let us consider the life of a peasant in past centuries. The grandson used the same "technology" as his grandfather and this technology of peasant labor was

defined less by strictly rational considerations than the age-old experience passed on from generation to generation in the form of customs, habits and traditions. The brain was not overburdened by the problem of seeking optimal solutions to rationally formulated problems, and man was able to a greater extent to concentrate on problems of morality (naturally, as time passed the assessment itself of what was moral and what was immoral changed; here it is a question only of the trend followed in intellectual activities).

Today, in the time of triumph of the natural science and impressive discoveries in physics, astronomy, biology and other sciences which provide a rational explanation of life in the universe, the tremendous task has appeared of drawing a **scientific picture of the world** and, on its basis, developing a **scientific outlook**. Many people believe that the solution of this supertask will benefit mankind. However this claim is quite arguable.

Mankind needs an integral world outlook based on a scientific picture of the world, as well as an unscientific (including metaphorical) perception of the world. The world can be learned, as Homer said, both by the mind and the heart. It is only the sum of the scientific and the "heart" picture that can provide an image of the world worthy of man in his own conscience and that could be a reliable foundation for behavior.

In speaking of the need and possibility of creating an integral picture of the world, we cannot ignore the question of religion. It is frequently believed that religion is a sum of myths, behavioral rules and ceremonies. Obviously, in that case poetry will be the ability to speak rhythmically and in rime. It is obvious to everyone that such a definition of poetry loses its main feature: the poetic image, the poetic feeling. In precisely the same way failure to mention the religious feeling in the concept of "religion" deprives it of its main feature.

A religious feeling may be inherent in a given person (naturally, however, by no means in everyone) in the same way that people frequently have a sense of beauty. And if such a person is raised in an atheistic family and finds himself in an atheistic atmosphere, he may feel a certain spiritual discomfort, frequently without knowing why. In some cases, trying clumsily to satisfy his mental aspiration toward mystery and miracle, such a person feverishly seeks some kind of surrogate: he becomes attracted to mysticism, begins to believe in "flying saucers" (should such such "saucers" become universally acknowledged by reality, he would immediately lose any interest in them), etc. We know of many cases when such "hereditary" atheists have joined the church and felt a sudden fullness of life and become happy people, in the full meaning of the term. It is difficult today to say at which stage in the history of the human community this need appeared. In any case, the need for some kind of "faith," consistent with the human mentality, including religious faith, became more complex and stronger in the course of the biosocial evolution.

Therefore today the religious feeling of people in developed countries is by no means related to their "ignorance," or insufficient enlightenment (in the sense of sciences based on rational knowledge). The satisfaction of this feeling is a natural need for many people with a strongly developed emotionality. Is this not the reason for which there are more frequently believers among members of the artistic intelligentsia than among engineers?

However, if a religious feeling is a normal phenomenon for such people, no primitive atheistic propaganda can be effective. Some propagandists of atheism proceed from the fact that faith in God will disappear the moment the people are given a "intelligible explanation" of the natural scientific picture of the world and proven that religion is the consequence of the lack of scientific knowledge and that it should yield to the pressure of science. However, in the case of a person in whom a metaphorical thinking prevails, the arguments of rational knowledge will appear secondary and unconvincing (we already cited the example of the reciprocal lack of understanding between "physicists" and "lyricists"). These arguments to him are insignificant compared with the living feeling of the presence of God, which is so strong that he not simply believes in God's existence but, on the basis of his own feelings, he "knows" that God exists. Therefore, any rational proof provided by the atheist can only irritate the person who is certain of the veracity of his concepts.

Naturally, religion cannot be reduced exclusively to the phenomenon of an irrational component of the mind or, even less so, to the belief that one cannot get rid of it as long as the right hemisphere of the brain retains its functions. Unquestionably, the religious feeling is related to features of the human mentality, such as imagination, and so on. However, theology is also the rational substantiation of religion. And whereas scientific atheism can refute more or less successfully precisely such rational substantiations concerning the existence of God (ontological, gnosiological, teleological, etc.) it is unable to do anything with the need of man to believe.

Let us say a couple of words about the meaning which is usually invested in the concept of "God." To the contemporary Christian, for example, faith in God means faith in the supernatural, a transcendental reality with personal characteristics, paralleled by faith in the existence of a meaning to individual human life, exceeding the limits of a limited human life. Belief in the purposefulness of the world and the meaning of history have not been proven scientifically to their fullest extent.

In millennia old human practice, rational knowledge and moral values have always supplemented each other, for which reason the contemporary believer considers his

religious feeling a supplement to his rational knowledge. Furthermore, this feeling does not prevent major scientists from achieving the highest possible peaks in the natural sciences.

Therefore, in itself science is unable to suppress the religious feelings of a sincere believer. A religious faith can be defeated only by another "faith" (or by something of the same nature). In this case the word "faith" should be understood in the broad meaning of the term. It could be some kind of ethical view, such as early Confucianism; in general, it could be any emotional-irrational component of human nature, which makes it possible to satisfy that which was already described as a religious feeling. It could fill but not crush it. In that case, however, the atheists must add to their "scientific atheism" some kind of "atheism of the heart," which is addressed to the metaphorical part of the human awareness (it is true that today the specific forms of the latter, to the best of my knowledge, are unknown to anyone). Naturally, a feeling in itself is not morality and morality is not in itself religion. However, unquestionably there is a tie, a profound one at that, between them.

Let us go back to the question of the correlation between rational and irrational knowledge and consider how to strengthen the moral principle in contemporary life. This has become an urgent need both in our country and in the West. However, the way of restoring to morality its proper place in social life is by no means clear.

Of late there has been frequent talk, in this connection, of the need to humanize contemporary life. In my understanding, this means somewhat to restrain the "rational" and technocratic motivation and give some space to spirituality in shaping the behavior of the individual and of society as a whole. Although the term "spirituality" is being used today even more frequently than is necessary, it lacks a universally accepted definition. Actually, a strict terminology here may be unnecessary, for this is not a concept of rational logic. It was claimed in the past that the spirit is the wedge of the soul. In such a case spirituality implies the highest and most refined aspects of the soul. In my view, such statements could be accepted as a kind of, albeit not excessively precise, indication of the general meaning of the concept of spirituality.

Many are those who are hoping to strengthen the spiritual principles in our life by humanizing it, by turning to the priceless monuments of domestic and global culture which, in the most people, in the course of their daily concerns, have somehow been pushed into the periphery of the mind and no longer participate in shaping human behavior. Familiarity with the history of the fatherland and its heroic pages and the activities of outstanding compatriots (public figures, artists, military leaders) to whom lofty (and by no means advantageous) objectives determined the meaning of their lives would all, unquestionably, contribute to restructuring the mind in the desired aspect.

It would be difficult to overestimate the role of the monuments of history and culture which materialize the past of the fatherland and which make it possible to feel the link of time and to feel that one is a link in the chain going deep into the centuries and to be imbued with pride in the past and awareness of the need to pursue the great cause bequeathed to us by previous generations. It may be useful to note here that "living" monuments yield much more than the "dead" ones. Touring the new building of Leningrad University is entirely different from walking along its old lengthy hall, the walls of which remember Mendeleev. Naturally, erecting new university buildings is necessary. It is important, however, for the old building to remain "alive," i.e., to remain part of the university and not become one more set of offices.

Russian literature, in which problems of morality have always played a key role, could give us no less and, possibly, even more. Suffice it to recall such guiding lights as F.M. Dostoyevskiy, and L.N. Tolstoy and their search for moral ideals.

All of this was justifiably and frequently said and written by many of our contemporaries concerned with the gradual decline in spirituality and the strengthening of narrow-minded and short-sighted practicalism in all areas of life. Humanizing could be likened to a beneficial rain which allows the flowers of spirituality to bloom. I chose this pompous comparison to emphasize the problem. The thorough watering of the rows is, in itself, no guarantee of a good crop. If nothing has been planted nothing will grow. Water is merely one of the components which agriculture needs. This is precisely the case of a humanitarian education and the reading of the literary classics. Had this been sufficient, our writers would have been people of ideal morality. Unfortunately, the history of Soviet literature firmly refutes such an assumption and, consequently, all that we mentioned above is, naturally, a prerequisite which is necessary in order to assert the moral principles in the life of man and society but is by no means sufficient.

In order for humanizing to justify the hopes placed on it a certain starting system of elements of morality must exist, which humanizing could strengthen, refine and channel. In the past this initial system was somehow spontaneously developed by life itself. Today this process has been weakened and distorted. Therefore, it would be useful to turn to the experience of the past.

The child developed the elements of morality in the family which in the past played a significantly greater role in the life of all of its members than it does today. Today the family is no longer the focal point of common concerns and interests of its members. Frequently the father and the mother work in different areas, the children attend the "extended-day" school and everyone has his own interests, which frequently are difficult to combine within some kind of unity. Furthermore, in frequent cases intimate family talk is replaced by joint watching of television. It is not astounding that today the

initial concepts of morality are acquired by the child at best from parental instructions rather than direct observation of their lives and the natural desire to imitate them.

In the past the moral obligations imposed upon man by virtue of his belonging to one stratum or another played a certain positive role. Let us recall perhaps the sense of honor of the nobility which made some immoral (from the viewpoint of the nobility) actions impossible. The unwritten honor code of the nobility was mastered by the individual in childhood by observing the behavior of the adults, listening to their conversions and evaluations of events and becoming the subject of strict remarks if the child committed an error: "a member of the nobility does not act like this!"

We must acknowledge that the church as well played a major role in the development of morality. It would be an unforgivable error to believe that moral behavior can be the result exclusively of any type of education in school or elsewhere. Here again we have the same law as in the other areas of human activity: if you want to do something good you need systematic and daily training. Familiarity with the rules of moral behavior is not enough. One must live according to such rules in order gradually to turn knowledge into habit, into a natural standard. Metaphorically speaking, one should commit a moral act at least once a day. Real daily life is always more complex than beautiful plans and by no means could we classify all of our actions as being entirely moral. In such a case a person who aspires to lead a moral life must feel, as is now usually said, conflicting emotions. He may become sincerely regretful for his failure to cope with a situation which has appeared.

It would be unwise to let a serious matter such as moral "training" develop uncontrolled. Let us give the church its due: it developed a long time ago an efficient mechanism not only for proclaiming morality but also for providing practical education and support of morality. I am referring to the sacrament of repentance. The believer must regularly confess his sins (i.e., his violation of the laws of morality), not only should he commit immoral actions but even should he think about them. Sometimes the penitent would be punished by the church. It is important to note that there are no witnesses to the confession and that the priest does not dare to make this secret public. Therefore, conditions are created for the penitent to be maximally truthful, without which a true moral upbringing is impossible. In principle, it requires a secluded talk with an authoritative person. This circumstance has been well understood not only by Christianity but also by other religious and ethical doctrines in which student and teacher are a constant pair, who talk, as we used to say, heart to heart.

In our present life there is virtually no such mechanism for developing and upholding morality. The sacrament of repentance cannot be replaced by self-reports or by the discussion of immoral actions at large meetings. The

concept of the class honor has virtually disappeared. Some people write about worker's honor but, unfortunately, usually this means nothing (although in the past worker's honor was found everywhere and did not allow a true master to do hack work. Incidentally, I began my own labor career at the start of the 1930s as an apprentice joiner at one of Leningrad's aviation plants, and I well remember the way old hereditary workers were literally pressured into "fulfilling the plan" at all cost. This was accomplished, above all, at the cost of low quality work and loss of criteria of professional honor. Today a great many people, in committing an immoral act, experience a feeling of happiness rather than remorse (such as, for example, pilferers who have stolen with impunity something from their place of work).

I believe that humanizing will yield the desired results only when it is based on already accepted and practiced common moral principles. How to achieve this today? For the time being, there is no specific answer but an answer must be mandatorily found, for it is this, as we mentioned at the beginning of this article, that will determine the future not only of our socialist society but also of civilization as a whole.

Contemporary life, with its exaggerated aspiration to rely above all on rational knowledge and, as a result, with its scornful attitude toward what I described as irrational, intuitive and emotional knowledge, is causing dangerous deformations in the behavior of the human community. As we consider the problems of the optimal combination of rational with other knowledge as guiding impetus in our activities, we unwittingly reach the following conclusion:

The irrational component must be mandatorily taken into consideration in defining the objective toward which we must advance. The rational component calls for suggesting the most sensible ways of solving the problems. In other words, the objective must be moral and the way to achieve it, reliable. It is entirely obvious that not only the end objective but each step toward it must be consistent with the criteria of morality.

This problem has assumed new features in recent years. Until recently, rational science looked at anything "irrational" with a certain feeling of superiority, as though even as an obstruction to progress. However, this was progress conceived precisely from the viewpoint of rational knowledge. Let us consider the unrestrained aspiration of departments to build huge dams, canals and such similar "construction projects of the century." When the humanitarian public was indignant by this, pointing out that this would destroy historical monuments, unique landscapes and the habitats of small nations or, in other words, the immorality of such projects, its arguments were considered secondary, far-fetched and unworthy of attention. The claim that "the country needs metal, electric power, irrigation," and so on was always considered more substantive. The strictly "rationally" oriented "thinkers" undertook to define

what precisely "the country needs," with enviable conceit. In a somewhat different form, this process is also inherent in the West. It is the natural consequence of uncontrolled scientific and technical progress. We now see its results. The entire world is beginning to consider with concern its current condition, and forecasts leave no room for complacency.

Everywhere we note an exceptionally curious picture: the strictly rational knowledge, based on numerous computers, all of a sudden noticed with a feeling of horror, where this had taken mankind. It became clear that a radical restructuring is needed, if one may say so, in human behavior. Continuing the practice of recent decades would inevitably lead to ecological catastrophe. However, even before this had been realized the humanitarians, the creative intelligentsia and a high percentage of the people had already started, with an enhanced feeling of moral responsibility, to struggle against the arising catastrophe: for many long years "red books" for the protection of the natural world from destruction have been kept, ever new movements are appearing for the rescue of unique natural formations such as Lake Baykal, etc.

It would be useful to reemphasize that the feeling, a kind of ache for the fate of the earth and the country, preceded the computations which merely confirmed that which was said initially. Furthermore, the loss of moral criteria in the daily behavior of the people began to alarm not only "lyricists" but also "physicists." The result has been an increased interest in extralogical, in nondiscursive knowledge, the aspiration to achieve an integral perception of the world instead of progress toward the triumph of one-sided interpretation of the "scientific picture of the world." It is precisely thus that an integral world outlook is developed instead of a narrow rationally understood "scientific outlook."

Another important feature of the new world outlook should include asserting the priority of universal human values. But then one of the main universal human values is the planet earth, for which reason the new thinking should encompass not only the political and military areas but also all other areas of human activities, particularly those related to ecology. The primacy of universal human values is becoming increasingly important in relations among people and in the aspiration to unite mankind within a single harmonious family. New thinking is needed everywhere and one of its characteristic features should be the harmonious combination of the mind with the "heart," the rational with the emotional and logical with intuitive knowledge.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

New Thinking in International Affairs
18020014k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8,
May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 98-107

[Survey of roundtable meeting between KOMMUNIST and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy, prepared by editorial associates N. Maslennikov and Yu. Molchanov]

[Text] Foreign policy and diplomacy have become the area of activities of our party and state in which the revolutionary process of perestroika is already becoming materialized in major and truly tangible positive results. The positive changes occurring in the world arena are largely the consequence of the daring and innovative initiatives of the Soviet Union and the practical implementation of the fundamental ideas of new political thinking.

International life does not stand still. It constantly generates new problems and questions. The discussion of a number of such problems, which require a profound interpretation and nontraditional approaches, was the topic of the roundtable debate between KOMMUNIST and the USSR MID Diplomatic Academy. Participating in the lively and frank exchange of views were V. Shustov, head of the USSR MID Science-Information Center; A. Kozyrev, deputy chief, USSR MID Administration of International Organizations; B. Shmelev, pro-rector, USSR MID Diplomatic Academy; Yu. Melnikov, head of the department of the history of USSR foreign policy and international relations, USSR MID Diplomatic Academy; V. Tatarintsev, professor at the USSR MID Diplomatic Academy; O. Bykov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations; E. Pozdnyakov, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO; Yu. Kuznets, professor, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences; S. Karaganov, deputy director of the Europe Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; I. Usachev, professor, USSR MID MGIMO; I. Malashenko, scientific secretary, USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute; G. Vasilyev, PRAVDA political commentator; and A. Bovin, IZVESTIYA political commentator. A. Kolesnikov, KOMMUNIST deputy editor-in-chief was the moderator.

Contradictions or Antagonisms?

All participants in the discussion expressed the conviction that the previous concepts on the parallel movement of the two social systems, never crossing, were inconsistent with the actual situation or the prospects for their long-term peaceful coexistence in the course of the natural changes in socioeconomic systems. The postulate of the autonomous development of the two systems as

well as ignoring the contradictions caused by their interrelationship and interdependence are unproductive today and, essentially, groundless.

The universal prerequisite for any form of social progress today is the preservation and development of the contemporary world, which is contradictory but is becoming increasingly integral. Outside the interrelationship among its component systems, this world appears to lose its real aspects. Intensive interaction with one's social opponent is inevitable in the case of socialism. This determines the strength of its own influence on the content and dynamism of global developments. That is precisely why, in the opinion of all the participants in the discussion, today more than ever before we need an intensified analysis of the true nature of contradictions within such an intersystemic interaction, free from dogmatic accretions.

We cannot peremptorily speak of the antagonism between capitalism and socialism. This has become a rather big dogma, I. Usachev pointed out. Unquestionably, there have been and there still are grave contradictions. Nonetheless, contacts are increasing as well, including cooperation on the intergovernmental level. Cooperation is objectively necessary also on a broad front, be it in the struggle for preventing the threat of nuclear war or efforts to solve ecological problems. Under such circumstances we can no longer speak of total antagonism. In this case we shall require a more thorough study in order better to interpret our attitude toward the capitalist countries as well as our opportunities. Our approach, in this case, must not be the old one, not in "black and white" terms. We must take into consideration the complex and profound changes in the world, use Marxist terminology in a more sensitive way and proceed from the fact that the world has changed. Common interests have appeared, which suppress the strictly antagonistic contradictions. Naturally, under such circumstances we can no longer view the class struggle as jumping from one side to another.

In my view, one should not think in terms of "more antagonism or less antagonism," said A. Bovin, in presenting his viewpoint. What does antagonism mean? It does not mean that we intend to throw missiles at one-another. Antagonism means that we believe that socialism will replace capitalism. If we preserve this classical system of coordinates and if such a sequence in systems is preserved, one cannot avoid antagonism, for it precisely means that one thing replaces another. Whatever we may be saying about peaceful coexistence, within such a system antagonisms are inevitable. Naturally, he went on to say, the situation in the world has changed and, possibly, so has the nature of the historical process, for instead of the consecutive "linkage" of systems (one system replacing another) we have another, a more complex picture. The French Revolution solved a number of basic problems related to the establishment of a civilian society, based on the freedom of the individual. The next stage in universal history was started in

1917. The civilian society should have included social justice. However, this did not quite happen for a variety of reasons. As a result, a parallel movement between the two systems appeared. We can hypothetically surmise that at some point such a movement would result in their merger. If we imagine such a system of coordinates, it will indeed lead to the removal of antagonisms from the historical process.

However, one must be consistent, A. Bovin said, for theory is an organic integrality. We cannot change only parts of it with impunity. The question of antagonisms is posed today both more broadly and more profoundly. One could speak and argue about a crisis of civilization. Obviously, totally unquestionable is the crisis in Marxism or, to be more precise, of a certain Marxist concept. In its development, each science experiences periods of crisis, when it is unable to answer the new questions raised by practical experience and social practice. The new political thinking is nothing other than an attempt to surmount this crisis in the interpretation of the world (as well as of socialism) in which we live. Einstein's physics replaced Newton's classical physics. Are we not on the threshold of something similar in the development of Marxist social science?

Therefore, in the course of the discussion the question was raised of the fact that the scientific solution of the problems of antagonism in international relations is based on the need to surmount the old concepts concerning the mechanisms of social development in contemporary science. All participants unanimously agreed that reducing ideology to a set of cliches, stereotypes and dogmas which hinder the forward development of society played a major role in the establishment of such concepts. Actions based on such a prescription in the area of intergovernmental relations actually turn into their fierce ideologizing, entailing not only a noticeably loss of the feeling of reality but also taking many unfriendly and, occasionally, simply hostile steps by the countries affiliated with different social systems.

In emphasizing the need to reassess the role of ideology in intergovernmental relations, A. Kozyrev expressed the view of the unacceptability of still remaining totalitarian concepts the essence of which, in his view, lies in identifying the ideology of an individual class with that of the state. "We say," Kozyrev noted, "that the United States professes a bourgeois ideology. However, bourgeois ideology means above all lack of a unified ideology. It involves thousands of variants: idealisms and materialisms of different hues and in different combinations. Should we not approach the question otherwise? Intergovernmental relations are not relations between ideologies. The state, as a subject, does not represent any given single ideology. What does a socialist choice mean? It means not a choice of ideology but a choice of a specific sociopolitical system. In our country, for example, we shall not impose by force our communist

ideology on believers and some other categories of citizens. This may help, perhaps, to conceive of international relations not as a confrontation among ideological states."

The sources of the ideologized approach to relations among countries, Yu. Melnikov emphasized, are found in accepting the existence of a primary conflict within the framework of the coexistence between the two systems, even not in the form of a struggle but as competition between them. U.S. foreign policy and its makers and promoters are frequently accused of approaching any local situation in the world from the viewpoint of the East-West conflict. But here is a question: Are we not duplicating that same approach when we consider any event in international life exclusively from the class viewpoint? Naturally, to a greater or lesser extent the class element is always present in relations among countries. The geopolitical interests of the state as well are concealed behind class ideology. In this case the USSR is no exception. Under Stalin Marxism was truncated to such an extent as to become a set of cliches. This adversely affected Soviet foreign policy which became a series of errors and deformations. However, is it possible to have a state without ideology and the exercise of its foreign policy without a certain theoretical foundation? In such a case what should deideologizing of intergovernmental relations mean?

According to A. Bovin, the answer to this question presumes the solution of a very vital contradiction, the essence of which is that if we systematically proceed from the Marxist viewpoint, any ideology is, by definition, a false awareness. From this viewpoint deideologizing is good and leads to the restoration of truth. But then after Marx the conclusion was drawn that Marxism-Leninism is a scientific ideology. What follows from this was the entirely opposite concept: i.e., a course toward maximal ideologizing. For it is only in this case that relations among nations can be properly understood and, therefore, that this is the only way to restructure them. What to do? We are faced either with deideologizing or with science.

One way or another, this problem was touched upon in their statements by virtually all participants in the roundtable. A kind of common platform was established as well: an acknowledgment of the need to combine deideologizing with a scientific approach, based on the formulation of a new paradigm in the Marxist theory of international relations and firmly rejecting many of the old conceptual systems which could not explain and, therefore, which distorted contemporary reality.

E. Pozdnyakov said that the very formulation of the question of a more or less antagonistic confrontation between capitalism and socialism has already become obsolete. The problem now, in his view, lies elsewhere: whether such a confrontation exists in principle. "For it is a question of a system which was developed in the 1920s, after the hopes for a world proletarian revolution

had failed, and the Soviet republic was forced to build socialism alone. It was then that the model of the two camps appeared: the capitalist and the socialist, between which there was a struggle to death. This confrontational concept is still most irreconcilably opposed to the concept of peaceful coexistence. The struggle between systems could take place within the framework of a single society but not on the international arena, for a system is not some kind of abstraction. It always takes the shape of a specific country. As long as we will claim that there is confrontation, we shall be unable to understand the complex tangle of the true contradictions existing between capitalism and socialism."

A similar viewpoint was expressed also by **I. Malashenko**. In his view, capitalism and socialism cannot be considered as subjects of international relations. Furthermore, we must take into consideration that their bipolar structure, which appeared after World War II, largely helped to preserve the illusion of the alleged confrontation between the two systems as being the determining feature of the international situation.

"We mention the crisis of Marxism," noted **Yu. Kuznets**, "above all because practical experience, based on the distorted and dogmatized understanding of Marxism, yielding negative results, let theory down severely. We must as yet thoroughly work and 'read' Marxism without blinkers, in such a way that the logic of its historical self-development become maximally clear." It is extremely important in this case, as we abandon the old stereotypes, not to create new ones, dictated by current political circumstances. In particular, we must not hasten to pit, even based on the best propaganda considerations, the class aspect of Marxism against its universal human potential. At the same time, as we surmount the old dogmas, we must achieve a full understanding of the class interests in foreign policy. We must begin, above all, with ourselves. "We are greatly harmed in foreign political activities," Yu. Kuznets went on to say, "by trying to strengthen our positions with claims that we represent, somehow automatically, the interests of the entire international proletariat: 670 million people. This is simply not the case. The abundance and variety of interests of the working class cannot be expressed by any individual party or movement. Unquestionably, in world politics class interests will always be present. We must try to consider and, to the extent to which this is possible, to express all progressive class interests. We must not automatically ascribe to ourselves alone the ability to represent all the expectations of the international working class, particularly that in foreign countries.

Therefore, the problem of surmounting antagonisms between the two systems is, in the view of the participants in the discussion, most closely related to the process of deideologizing intergovernmental relations and abandoning, on both sides, dogmatic prejudices, going beyond the framework of narrow class approaches, and eliminating the messianic self-confidence or, in

short, demythologizing foreign policy thinking. Furthermore, it is obvious that the contemporary level of knowledge of objective contradictions in the system of international relations and its structure and motive forces does not as yet fully bring to light the nature of the qualitatively new reality: that of an interrelated and largely integral world. Determining the true nature of its contradictions is today the most important area in the enhancement of the study of international affairs.

The Leading Trend

The consistently dialectical approach to the system of contradictions which currently determine the development of the situation in world affairs presumes the identification of the main tangle of conflicts, the unravelling of which shapes the leading trend in international relations. What is their content? What is the essence of the basic contradiction in the development of civilization? What contradictions lay a claim to such a role? These questions drew the attention of many participants in the discussion.

As was already noted, **B. Shmelev** said, the concept that the main contradiction is the struggle between the two systems leads to an impasse. From the viewpoint of the new political thinking it has become obsolete. Probably we can and must speak of antagonisms which remain in relations between the systems. However, we must adopt a new approach to this most important problem, for the solution of the antagonistic contradiction between the two systems in its classical interpretation should mean the elimination of one of the systems. Clearly, today such a formula could hardly be considered consistent with reality. The formulation of a new one is closely related to a more precise understanding of the nature of our age. "I believe that we can radically change the understanding of the basic contradiction in the development of civilization. It is a question of the contradiction between society and the environment, between the needs of man and the possibilities of the ecosphere to satisfy them. It is precisely this contradiction that will determine in their main aspects the future forms of development of inter-governmental relations."

We must also bear in mind, **B. Shmelev** went on to say, that earlier in characterizing relations between capitalism and socialism, we emphasized above all differences between them. Today this approach looks, to say the least, one-sided, not to use a stronger term. We must not ignore the real elements of the common features and universal laws (commodity production above all), which operate in both systems. Such efforts have inevitably led the policy of the socialist countries into dead-end situations and to severe losses. Nonetheless, the really existing commonality on the universal human level cannot fail to influence the development of the socialist economic and political system by triggering changes which greatly coincide in form with the processes which are taking place in capitalist society as well (such as, for example, the establishment and activities of a rule of law

state). Such a development of the socialist countries, Shmelev believes, will determine in the future the greater coincidence between their interests and those of the capitalist states.

Speaking of the contradictions between the two systems, the speaker noted, it is worth considering whether to a certain extent they have reached the global scale of contradictions between specifically understood political interests of the USSR and the interests of the developed capitalist countries, the United States above all. In itself, the difference in ideological postulates, as well as affiliation with different systems does not inevitably presume sharp forms of confrontation which threaten the existence of the sides. According to B. Shmelev, the contemporary revolution in political thinking means that today priority is given to national-state interests which, however, cannot be shaped aside from ideological concepts.

Such a formulation of the problem was supported, in principle, by the participants in the discussion although with some clarifications. I. Malashenko, for example, emphasized the need to distinguish between national and governmental interests, which could be different and contradict each other. A. Bovin suggested that a proper line of demarcation be drawn, based on the classical Marxist concept of the correlation between "civilian society" and the state. National interest stems from "the civilian society," while this does not necessarily apply to the interest of the state.

In arguing with B. Shmelev, A. Bovin expressed his own viewpoint on the matter. In his view, it would be inaccurate to consider the contradiction between society and nature as a source of development of civilization. Such contradictions have always existed, ever since society was "separated" from nature. In the final account, the entire development of production forces, from the ax to the nuclear reactor, "represents" the self-dynamics of this contradiction which, in itself, does not have any specific historical aspect. "By considering it as the main and decisive contradiction, we would not advance anywhere but would simply penetrate an even broader problem. Let us assume that the capitalist system does not exist. In that case, would our perestroika have been what it is now? It would not. This is because our actions are largely based on a comparison between our situation and theirs." There as well, in the nonsocialist world, they are comparing themselves to us. It is precisely on this basis that capitalism has achieved a great deal in production planning, economic control and development of a social infrastructure. Therefore, the main contradiction should be sought in the system of coordinates which express the social polarity of the contemporary world. Its existence is a guarantee of the fact that the systems are developing. It would be more sensible to try to look more thoughtfully at the nature, forms and objectives of relations between the two systems and the countries affiliated with them. Whereas in the past the source and main trend of development were seen within the framework of the "struggle between the

systems," today it should be a question of competition, of comparing the ways of life, political systems, democratic institutions, forms of organization of social and economic life, etc. Obviously, such a foundation for interaction should become in the future a source of self-correction and, therefore, of development of both capitalism and socialism.

It is very important, V. Shustov emphasized, not to fall back into the rut of approaches which, until so recently, dominated our thinking. In determining the essence of events in world affairs, it is inadmissible to make the entire variety of international life fit a single, albeit contemporary, pattern. For the thesis itself of the struggle between systems as the main trend in international relations was largely the result of such an attempt. Naturally, the competition between the systems has been and is based on many things in the world. Nonetheless, this is only one of the factors. If we consider them in their totality, the real results of their reciprocal attraction and repulsion will be that, nonetheless, development is following the pattern of a certain unity in the world. This process does not exclude in the least or replace the fact that the two systems are attached to their own values: national, cultural, historical, ideological, and so on. We frequently say: let the competition show who will win. However, this is not the main thing today. We are facing increased interdependence and interpenetration. It is precisely this process that must be studied comprehensively and without bias, without a priori concepts.

Under contemporary conditions, V. Tatarintsev noted in this connection, priority is given to contradictions in the interconnection and interdependence of the world, which are of a universal human nature. Efforts to solve them are, precisely, the foundation of the main Soviet initiatives in the foreign policy area (such as the prevention of nuclear catastrophe). For that reason the possibilities of foreign policy directly depend on the fullness and depth of understanding of the very nature and content of such contradictions. Unquestionably, antagonisms remain in international relations. It is simply necessary to take them into consideration, for they too characterize the integral nature of the world. I believe, however, that antagonisms must be kept outside the limits of contradictions between capitalism and socialism and of the main trends in the development of international relations. The concept of the increasing significance of the "general contradictions" was supported actively by I. Usachev. In his view, they are related, above all, to the uncontrollable nature not only of international but also internal processes which lead to the aggravation of global problems and, therefore, are equally dangerous to any system.

Yu. Kuznets noted that if the basic contradiction should be sought not in relations between society and nature but within society itself, it is necessary, above all, to take into consideration its multidimensional and complex structure—its division into several independent contradictions or groups of contradictions. At least two of them

(the so-called West-East and North-South relations) could be considered with full justification as determining the course of global affairs until the end of the century.

We should add to this, **O. Bykov** believes, the contradiction between militarism, on the one hand, and economic and social development, on the other. Generally speaking, in his view, the contradiction between capitalism and socialism in its "reduced, intergovernmental aspect," cannot be considered basic to the contemporary stage of global development. To begin with, such a formulation substantially reduces if not entirely eliminates, the problem of survival which is relevant not only to mankind as a whole but to each system as well. Yet we are faced, in its entire magnitude, with the problem of survival as a system, surmounting the lagging of socialism in a number of various central economic and social parameters, and correcting the deformations which occurred in the socialist model. Therefore, the "external environment"—the international, the intergovernmental context within which this survival must be ensured—is extremely important. We need an understanding of the interdependence and integrality of the world which would constantly encourage us to seek common grounds for the interaction among systems and would make its contribution to achieving this objective. Second is the traditional formulation of the question of the basic contradiction in its so to say extremely simple, reduced form, inherited from our difficult history: "Who whom?" simply "no longer works" today: the "center of danger" (with the remaining contradictions between systems) has shifted from the intergovernmental area to within our own system. If we continue to use the "who whom" formula, we must soberly realize that this affects us above all.

The external guarantee of survival lies in the constructive interaction in the international arena which, for a variety of historical reasons, could not be attained for a long time. The idea, however, the very principle was initially part of Lenin's understanding of peaceful coexistence. Consequently, the restoration of this concept today to its full extent, and its implementation in foreign policy practices is one of the central aspects characterizing the leading trend in international relations.

Unless we abandon the old stereotypes in understanding the contradiction between the two systems and its peremptory promotion to the level of the main and determining contradiction, the way to achieving the most important objective of Soviet foreign policy—having a nonviolent and nuclear free world—would be substantially more difficult, **Yu. Melnikov** emphasized. We must go beyond this contradiction. We must seek and acquire points of contact and coincidence of interests and areas of rational and efficient interaction with the capitalist countries. Otherwise our objective situation in the contemporary world will conflict with our basic foreign policy interests.

This question, in the opinion of a number of those present, requires a thorough scientific development. "We always proceeded from the fact that the contradiction discussed here is objective," **A. Bovin** noted. "That makes important the basis on which it is considered or not considered as the main contradiction. For it is a question, I emphasize, of an objective process, regardless of our interpretation. We must clarify the situation. Is the competitive interaction between capitalism and socialism today objective? Is it a source of development of a 'purposeful' civilization? That is what we should be thinking about and not about what we find suitable to consider from the viewpoint of a nuclear free world."

Naturally, no one can eliminate an objectively existing contradiction. One can only reject an erroneous, a false concept of it. That is why, **E. Pozdnyakov** believes, today it is extremely important to clarify the question of whether we are absolutizing the contradiction between capitalism and socialism. Is it not too far-fetched to reduce to it, in the final account, the entire variety of processes developing in international relations? Does this excessively heightened attention not push aside the other contradictions in the world, giving them second priority in our subjective vision? According to **Yu. Melnikov**, scientists will have to do a great deal more work to separate the true image of this and many other contradictions from a distorted perception of reality. The elimination of such concepts is one of the priority tasks of new political thinking.

At the same time, as was pointed out by many participants in the discussion, in no case should we allow the shaping of new dogmas. "When we speak of new political thinking," **I. Malashenko** noted, "we frequently try to set standards concerning the way things should be. However, the new thinking means, above all, making our concepts consistent with the reality around us. Such reality frequently turns out to be quite strict and unpleasant, requiring a specific and a special discussion." However, it is precisely the latter, **S. Karaganov** believes, that distinguishes today the entire foreign policy process. Today it has become much easier to pursue an intelligent and pragmatic policy consistent with governmental interests. "By making our theory consistent with reality we remove the blinkers from Soviet foreign policy."

Is the West Capable?

That is the way the question was posed when it was emphasized, in the course of the discussion, that the good will and constructive efforts of both sides—the socialist and the capitalist countries—are necessary in order to have a radical renovation of international relations, eliminate the gap of alienation and confrontation, and build the bridges of reciprocal understanding and cooperation. In this connection **Yu. Kuznets** noted that in the course of the major positive changes which are occurring today in the world arena the picture which

appears is quite conflicting. The Soviet Union has profoundly reinterpreted the realities of the contemporary world, formulated the concept of a new political thinking in international affairs, undertaken the radical restructuring of its foreign policy and diplomacy, and mounted daring initiative-minded actions which, above all, is what ensured the substantial breakthroughs made in the most important areas of improving our political climate. However, we must recognize that our Western partners are still not all that much in a hurry with responsive and counter actions. Naturally, they are engaged in talks with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, sign new and important agreements, approvingly refer to perestroika in our country and encourage the expansion of various relations. Nonetheless, we see in their steps also a certain slowness and caution and lack of readiness totally to abandon the obsolete stereotypes of cold war times.

Our Western partners, V. Tatarintsev said in support of this thought, frequently emphasize that further positive changes in international affairs entirely depend on the behavior of the Soviet Union and the changes taking place in our country. As to the United States and its allies, they seem to feel that there is no need for them to make serious changes in their policies. Actually, a major part of the key problem of our time is based on the changes which will take place in the West as well. M.S. Gorbachev has frequently pointed out this fact. We are concerned by the recent statements of some highly placed officials on the other side of the ocean to the effect that, as in the past, the cold war goes on and that one should assume a position of expectation toward the USSR and its perestroika and, furthermore, not abandon the implementation of NATO plans for modernizing its armed forces, short-range nuclear missiles in particular.

It is not accidental, therefore, that in the course of the discussion the question arose of the extent to which the West, the political leadership in the capitalist countries, bearing in mind the harsh nuclear and ecological realities of our time, can "rise" to the level of understanding the need for a new political thinking and of revising the guidelines of its former course in international affairs. In discussing this problem, all speakers agreed with the fact that although perhaps not immediately but gradually not only the public but also the political leadership in the capitalist countries will be able to realize the need for a new political thinking, precisely because it is created by the objective realities of our time, would be able to abandon obsolete concepts and stereotypes and formulate a new constructive policy toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

S. Karaganov pointed out the fact that the embryos of the new political thinking appeared historically not only in the socialist but also in the nonsocialist part of the world. Let us recall the Russel-Einstein Manifesto, which came out in 1955, and the documents of the Pugwash Movement of Scientists. A new approach was developed

in the West toward ecology and the problem of the underdeveloped countries. As early as the end of the 1960s and beginning of 1970s, the conclusion that a nuclear war cannot be an instrument for achieving political objectives became widespread in a number of Western European social democratic movements, including the leaderships of some of the then ruling parties. Let us particularly note, the speaker went on to say, that the idea of creating systems of broad global economic and political relations (including the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries) and the improvement of international relations were repeatedly expressed in the West by representatives of the Tripartite Commission which is an influential nongovernmental organization of noted personalities in the political and business world in the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

A. Bovin suggested that in analyzing the problem of whether the West is capable of new political thinking, we must consider the essential problem: Does imperialism continue to exist in its previous "classical" understanding? "I believe that it does not," he emphasized. "The phenomenon which V.I. Lenin analyzed in his work 'Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism' has experienced major changes." This applies above all to a constituent feature of imperialism, such as wars between capitalist countries in the struggle for the division and redivision of the world. It is precisely because the old characteristic no longer exists that we could formulate in our time the task of preventing war and demilitarizing the still extant imperialism. In general, A. Bovin went on to say, "we must make our concepts consistent with present realities. This is demanded by life itself. It is time to abandon endless incantations such as 'the nature of imperialism does not change and it will never change!' Yes, this very 'nature' is changing as does society! The revision of obsolete concepts, cliches and stereotypes will help our foreign policy firmly to stand on the grounds of the new realities of the contemporary world."

According to O. Bykov, the intensive economic development of the capitalist countries, which is taking place of late, based on the extensive use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, the international division of labor and production cooperation, support the conclusion that the political leadership in the West could accept the type of form of coexistence and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which the new political thinking presumes. This does not require any type of extreme or power actions. Naturally, there are many die-hards in the West, who have a major negative influence on the political course of their countries. Nonetheless, despite all caveats, retreats, and so on, as a whole, the West is ready to engage in coexistence and cooperation with the socialist countries and is taking practical steps in that direction. The problem is not only the fact that we have socialism and they have capitalism. A great deal depends on the level of our development and the efficiency with

which we are solving our internal problems. For the time being, unfortunately, we are behind in a number of parameters. This hinders cooperation.

Another aspect of this problem is important as well, Yu. Melnikov noted: the conditions under which the West would cooperate with us and to what extent. It appears as though in our relations with the United States and other Western countries it is not only the historical competition between socialism and capitalism but other factors as well, the geopolitical for instance, that play a role. The impression is created that today the United States and, particularly, Western Europe is concerned less with socialism as a social system than with our military power, the very size of the Soviet Union located astride the European and Asian Continent, its so to say "live weight," as well its possible increase in power. We must not forget that there are influential Western circles who have still not abandoned the hope of somehow "lopping off" the Soviet Union from the North or the South, and breaking it into parts. Therefore, we must analyze the entire variety of factors which determine the foreign policy thinking and actions of the ruling Western circles.

Nonetheless, a great deal will depend on the further development of perestroika in our country, in the Soviet Union, G. Vasilyev emphasized. I recently went on an assignment to the United States, he said, and once again realized that in some circles there indeed exists the opinion of why help perestroika since as a result of it the Soviets could become even stronger. At the same time, there is extensive interest in the success of perestroika and, hence, the desire to help it by developing relations with the USSR. Even people who are showing a certain caution in their attitude toward us have expressed the viewpoint that the failure of perestroika in our country could lead to the restoration, in some form, of the old policy of the "time of stagnation," and unpredictability of behavior in the international arena and even an explosion of expansionism. The West is following processes and events occurring in our country, in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic Area in particular, with very close attention.

What our Western partners value above all is stability, including our internal stability, O. Bykov added. Stability creates confidence and commonality of interests on the strictly pragmatic level as well. "It is important for them to understand us," A. Bovin interjected, and "for us to convince them of the sincerity of our intentions," V. Shustov added.

The basic vital interests of our country and of all its peoples, A. Kozyrev emphasized, and the interests of the socialist social system decisively demand not confrontation in the world arena but a firm and stable peace and comprehensive expansion and intensification of trade-economic, scientific and technical and production cooperation with both socialist and capitalist countries, the

most developed above all. This is not a temporary tactical maneuver, as some people in the West suspect, but a basic strategic concept.

To this effect, we must deideologize and "economize" our foreign policy. At that point, it seems to me, it would come closer to the interests of our people both in the remote areas and in Moscow. We must look at the world market more frequently and more closely. Which social system will prevail in the end? This question today is largely theoretical. On the practical level, the question can be formulated as follows: as a socialist state, shall we be competitive on the global market with commodities, ideas and services? For example, would we be able to compete on the computer market? This would indeed be our true tremendous international assistance to all revolutionary and democratic movements.

Alliance Among Diplomacy, Science and Journalism

The profound restructuring has spread over all areas of activities of our country. It has demanded a new quality, in terms of form and essence, from our foreign policy as well. Delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference particularly emphasized that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, like its domestic policy, should encompass the collective thinking of the party and the people. It should efficiently take into consideration not only current but also future changes. The objective processes in the world and our possibilities must become the object of constant scientific and public discussions with the participation of the public and public organizations.

The participants in the discussion, in noting the tremendous political significance of the tasks formulated at the party conference, emphasized that under the conditions of a rule of law state, glasnost and democracy, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, it is necessary to place under the control of Soviet society all departments involved in foreign policy, defense and state security. Their activities must be subordinated to the opinion and the manifestation of the will of the people and their basic interests.

We are well familiar with Lenin's thought that the state is strong with the conscientiousness of the masses, A. Kozyrev said. The time has come for the Soviet people consciously and actively to participate in the discussion of international problems and in formulating our foreign policy course. In this respect the people's representatives—the deputies to the new higher body of state power of the country, who have the right to solve all problems of its activities—will play a special role. It is precisely in this area that we must comprehensively discuss and consider in advance all possible options and suggestions and only then make final decisions. This applies to, for example, where and to what extent to channel our resources: into providing international aid to one developing country or another or into meeting domestic needs such as, for example, the development of the Nonchernozem. The deputies in our parliament must make

particularly thorough and careful decisions on complex problems such as defense expenditures and build up, implementation of international contractual obligations and use of our armed forces abroad. The lessons of the recent past prove what grave errors, human casualties and material losses could result from "arbitrary" decisions made in an atmosphere of secrecy, lack of glasnost and preliminary competent discussions. This will no longer be admissible. An example of how to organize matters, the speaker went on to say, was clearly demonstrated by the USSR Supreme Soviet last year in the ratification of the Soviet-American INF Treaty. Clearly, in the future such a practice will become standard in the functioning of the constitutional mechanism which is now being established.

It would be useful at this point to take into consideration the extensive historical experience acquired by other countries, both socialist and nonsocialist, I. Usachev added.

Yu. Kuznets, Yu. Melnikov, I. Usachev and V. Shustov discussed the importance of expanding cooperation and the creative integration between science and diplomacy. Thus, Yu. Kuznets expressed the view of the need for totally eliminating the "syndrome of fear of science," which predominated in the past and was manifested, in particular, in the inclination of one member of the diplomatic service or another to engage in research and to write a dissertation that was frequently met with a hostile attitude on the part of his immediate superiors.

"I cannot agree with the claim that the MID, as a strictly departmental institution, suffers, as in the past, from "fear of science," V. Shustov noted. "For quite some time there was a lack of proper interaction between our science and diplomacy and there even was a reciprocal 'allergy.' Currently substantial changes are taking place, although inertia has not as yet been surmounted and it would be self-delusion to claim that the fresh advances of science have already firmly become part of the fabric of our foreign policy." The MID has created a scientific coordination center, the purpose of which is to strengthen cooperation with scientific circles and the public. In turning to the scientists, we emphasize that we need their analysis of the international situation and their recommendations, and that organizing our reciprocally beneficial cooperation is one of the key objectives in the restructuring of the Soviet diplomatic service. It is precisely to this effect that in the past year the MID has held dozens of meetings and conferences with scientists and that 6 months ago, for the first time, a major practical science conference was held with the participation of Soviet ambassadors to virtually all countries in the world and scientists from different cities in the Union. Today the MID has been given the opportunity to sign research research contracts. Some scientific associates frankly told us that they are attracted less by the financial aspect of such cooperation than the opportunity to see the way their ideas are embodied in our practical policies in the international arena.

The desire of the Soviet people to gain a better understanding of world events, to understand for themselves all that is going on and, even more so, to participate knowledgeably in the universal struggle against the threat of war and in international intercourse is natural, A. Kozyrev said. To this effect, they must have reliable information about the amount of aid we give to one country or another, the size of the military budget and of the armed forces (in order, for example, to understand more clearly whether the reduction of such forces by half a million men is a great deal or little). They must be familiar not only with crises, declines, unemployment and increased contradictions in the developed capitalist countries and not only with the new successes achieved by our friends in the socialist countries for, as it is becoming clear, in addition to "decaying," capitalism has achieved substantial results in its socioeconomic development whereas the fraternal countries, despite accomplishments, have developed serious difficulties and problems. In other words, the Soviet people need an objective and truthful information in order to have a realistic concept of the contemporary world.

Naturally, the participants in the discussion noted, of late our mass information media have achieved substantial positive changes in the interpretation of international events. A great deal of work remains to be done, however. For only very recently (something which has still not been totally eliminated) we tried somehow to separate ourselves from the outside world when it did not suit us, said G. Vasilyev. We tried to close the gates more tightly, to block the casement windows and put curtains on the windows. We limited our contacts with foreigners, jammed "radio voices," kept Western journals and newspapers in special sections of the libraries and practiced strict customs inspections.

In our country, he went on to say, what prevailed was a dogmatic vision of the world around us, particularly of life in Western countries. As Tvardovskiy said in his poem "Terkin in This World," "here we have science and there we have dope." Unfortunately, we journalists dealing with international affairs operated on the basis of roughly the same principle. Of the entire variety of topics and problems we selected only those which were consistent with ideological concepts, with the "social instruction." Obviously, it seemed to some that through such methods we are defending our socialist values and countering hostile influence. In reality, by blocking objective information and a comparison among real facts and by providing a distorted picture of the world around us we caused ourselves a great deal of harm, triggering illusions and complacency and, thereby, contributing to stagnation in the country and worsening arising problems, and aggravating the disease.

Today we are taking the initial steps to an open view of the world, G. Vasilyev said. Many publications have already come out objectively interpreting the state of affairs in the capitalist countries. However, we are as yet to peel off entire layers of social life abroad and, in

particular, to analyze the way in which capitalism was able to make use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, the areas in which it has substantially outstripped us, the functioning of the bourgeois democratic institutions functioning, etc. We must describe a great deal of things which so far have not been reflected in our newspapers and journals. This is a major and difficult task for the journalists who must develop the necessary intellectual, moral and professional resources to be able to be on the level of this situation and for the newspaper and journal editors where the old protective reinsurance approaches still occasionally survive.

"As to the rights of the foreign affairs journalist to have his own unofficial view, in my opinion this is good. It is above all useful to society," G. Vasilyev emphasized. "Until recently our journalists, particularly those dealing with foreign affairs, were primarily propagandists, interpreters of official concepts. Ideally, I believe, they should be like the seaman on the crow's nest of a ship, looking ahead and being the first to notice a rock or land on the horizon. His compass must be his civic-mindedness and loyalty to the interests of his country and people."

This viewpoint was supported by other participants in the roundtable. "Does the foreign affairs journalist have the right to express his personal view?" A. Kozyrev asked. "I believe that he must! There is nothing unusual in this. In most countries in the world a clear distinction is made between the viewpoint of the government, the statements of officials and unofficial comments by political commentators, reflecting their subjective views. The rule is that one can publish anything which is not forbidden by law. In our mass information media as well we must make more extensive use of the personal views of journalists, naturally, providing that they display high civic responsibility, professional honesty and decency. It is time for us to convert to freedom of information and to master information standards."

What makes this even more important, I. Malashenko emphasized, is that both science and the mass information media are facing a virgin area of work. Let us frankly admit that we have only begun to explain to the country's population the nature of the new political thinking. A great variety of questions have appeared among the people. Many of them are still preserving their attachment to obsolete concepts and stereotypes. We must perform an important and responsible mission: making use of the creative arsenals of science and journalism and the mass information media and extensive glasnost, we must help the millions of Soviet people profoundly to interpret and perceive the entire historical scale and universal human significance of the new political thinking developed by the party and its exceptional value from the viewpoint of our national interests as well. Understandably, this will demand a great deal of time and energetic and persistent work.

The roundtable with the participation of scientists, diplomats and journalists reasserted the need to reject obsolete views and concepts alienated from the realities of our time.

Naturally, the participants in the discussion neither provided nor could provide complete answers to many of the questions under consideration. The outlines of such answers are being only developed. However, the discussion convincingly proved that the process of strengthening the new political thinking in international affairs and the initiated entrance of civilization in a peaceful period of development are gathering strength. This precisely is today the main result of the initial steps in the formulation of a universal consensus of "joint creativity" and "joint development" among countries and peoples on the way to a new world order.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

The Way to a 'Common European Home': Economic Aspects

180200141 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 8,
May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 108-118

[Article by Vladimir Georgiyevich Baranovskiy, department head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations, doctor of historical sciences, and Vladimir Nikolayevich Zuyev, leading scientific associate in the same institute, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] Although the concept of a "common European home" appeared relatively recently in modern political vocabulary, it has already gained a right to citizenship and become the topic of lively discussions. Increased interest in this idea is based on concern for the destinies of Europe and the aspiration to provide for this continent conditions for a peaceful and stable development and for the progress of European civilization. Nonetheless, the debates on a "common European home" highlighted rather complex problems related to the formulation of the question of a conversion from the East-West confrontation which has developed in Europe to the creation of an integral set of established and reliable mechanisms for constructive interaction among countries.

The building of a "common European home" presumes the definitive elimination of the consequences of the cold war and of reciprocal mistrust and the elements of military confrontation, the rejection of economic division and of reciprocal political and ideological idiosyncrasies.

Although not always quite fast, a quite consistent progress along this way has already been started on the level of practical policy. However, the results achieved in this area—quite substantial if we bear in mind that it is a question of no more than 2 or 3 years—pertain mainly

to the political and military area of relations between East and West in Europe. As to economic relations, the picture changes despite the existing traditional concept of trade and economic cooperation as being the area of least conflict in the system of relations between capitalist and socialist countries.

Politics and Economics In 'Common European Building'

The reasons for the unbalanced nature of positive changes in the military-political and economic areas are quite clear. In the former case the most important role is the rejection of several prevailing stereotypes and dogmas concerning the state of the military balance in Europe and the importance of military power in ensuring security, the scale and nature of the foreign threat, admissible "limits of openness" of the socialist society, etc. The essential and daring political decisions which were made as a result provided the opportunity of shifting East-West relations to a qualitatively new level. Naturally, a certain "reassessment of values" should be made by both us and our Western partners. Soviet perestroika is substantially contributing to this.

When it becomes a question of economic relations, political will alone turns out to be clearly insufficient. Naturally, whereas it was "effective" when the purpose was to curtail economic relations, the lifting of artificial barriers on the path of its development requires politically motivated decisions the purpose of which is to clear the way for normal economic cooperation.

Intensive foreign economic relations, which lead to increasing the economic interdependence among participants, is a distinguishing feature of economic management in all Western European countries. The pace of expansion of trade flows and exports of capital investments is steadily outstripping the growth of the GNP in each one of them. This increases the interconnection among its economies which become integrated, enclosing national economic development, to an increasing extent, within the global context of the universal division of labor, the global market and international production relations as a whole.

The situation which is developing in relations between Eastern and Western European countries is different. Whereas reciprocal migration of capital is one of the basic forms of economic interdependence among capitalist countries, nothing of the sort exists in relations between the USSR and Western Europe. The Soviet Union does not export industrial capital and the role of joint enterprises on the territory of our country, although increasing is, for the time being, extremely insignificant. Interaction in the scientific and technical area as well is on a low level. This is in sharp contrast to the boom noted in Western Europe in joint scientific and technical programs of international nature.

Trade remains the main form of foreign economic relations between the USSR and Western Europe. However, in terms of value, in 1988 our trade with Western European countries was on the 1980 level and, compared with the favorable 1983, had declined by one-quarter (the decline has even been double in the case of some countries). The share of Western Europe in Soviet trade declined by 10 percent in the 1980s. Exports to the Soviet Union account for a miserable share (0.2-0.4 percent) of the GNP of the Western European countries, while exports to Western Europe account for no more than 1.5 percent of the Soviet GNP. Nor does the picture change in this respect if we consider the respective indicators of CEMA as a whole.

Therefore, for the time being we cannot speak of any kind of progress toward the shaping of some kind of economically integral complex "from the Atlantic to the Urals." We are even witnessing the opposite trend. In our view, this is the most serious obstacle on the way to a "common European home." The lack of real interdependence or, perhaps, of sufficiently clear prospects for its development indicate, essentially, the fact that for the time being we do not have a reliable economic foundation for a "common European home."

Nonetheless, interdependence is becoming an increasingly important parameter in the economy of the developed countries, and if we would like to belong to this class of countries, we should not avoid it but, conversely, accelerate it.

This would not be only for the sake of achieving strictly economic results. The latter are of exceptional importance in shaping the political structure of the international community, including the "common European home." The building of this home should be based on the balanced development of all aspects of relations among European countries; a lag in even a single area (specifically, economics) can deprive the entire structure of its necessary strength, the more so since in the long range economic interdependence is the most stable element of relations among countries.

We must bear in mind yet another important circumstance: if a broad economic cooperation with Western Europe cannot be organized already in the foreseeable future, it would become much more difficult to achieve it in the distant future. The establishment of a single internal market is in full swing in the European community, which is a kind of nucleus of the Western European center of capitalism. This will substantially change the political and economic aspect of Western Europe by the end of the century.

The New Outlines of Western Europe

The political and economic realities of Western Europe are determined, to a substantial extent, by the development of integration processes in that area. Substantial results have been achieved.

The members of the European Community (EC) pursue a common foreign trade and agricultural policy. The companies observe the same rules of "fair competition" on the market "common" to the member countries. The system of "European law," which is developing within the EC takes priority over national legal standards. Scientific and technical policy is being enhanced. The community is formulating a unified policy in the area of environmental protection. It has its own budget, the size of which is quite impressive and is comparable to the budgets of some individual Western European countries. The functioning of a European monetary system, with a collective monetary unit, the ecu (in addition to the national currencies), ensures a high level of coordination in the monetary-financial policy of EC countries and enables us to speak of the appearance within the community of areas of relative monetary stability. A special mechanism has been set up to coordinate the foreign policy of the members of this association. The entire system of intergovernmental interaction developed on the basis of "microintegration" among companies within the community. EC partners account for more than 50 percent of their foreign trade. Other types of economic relations on the company level are also intensive (industrial and scientific and technical cooperation, participation in capital, organization of joint marketing systems, etc.).

All of these structures are under a common "roof"—an institutional superstructure of the community, the main elements of which are the Council of Europe (a conference of the heads of states and governments), the EC Council (on the ministerial level), the Commission (the executive authority with a "supranational status"), the European Parliament and the European Court. This entire system reproduces, in its essential features, the mechanisms which exist on the national-governmental level.

The scale of interrelationships among the members of the EC and the extent to which their economies have become interwoven within a single complex are such that in the main the process of Western European economic integration may be considered irreversible. In that sense the structures which developed within the community turned out, despite many predictions, to be quite strong. By this token, they have become quite attractive to their neighbors: Since the start of the EC its membership has doubled and the possibility of expanding this association has not been exhausted.

How can the successful development of the integration process in Western Europe be explained? Mainly, obviously, that the people were able successfully to combine the economic with the political components within the community, to join within a single mechanism uncontrolled-market and regulating principles and to find an efficient correlation among the national, intergovernmental and supranational elements within the system of interaction among the countries in the area.

At the present time the members of the community are making active efforts to increase their cooperation further. Remaining trade and economic barriers are a hindrance to upgrading the efficiency of the economy.

In an effort to correct the situation, a program consisting of nearly 300 different steps was adopted, aimed at establishing a single internal market: an area without boundaries, within which goods, capital, services and civilians could move freely. The total lifting of all restrictions on imports from EC members, the standardization of health and technical standards, the opening of markets to state orders, reciprocal recognition of diplomas and scientific degrees and the creation of a common market for services and lifting restrictions on the flow of capitals, along with a large number of other similar steps are contemplated.

The implementation of this broad program has been launched at a rather fast clip. At the present time about 120 separate steps have already been coordinated and approved, and although the adoption of the most difficult among them lies ahead, we can already project that most of them will be implemented if not by 1992 at the latest by the end of the century.

The implementation of this program will contribute to the further interpenetration among the economies of the EC countries. A new quality of integration cooperation develops among members of the community, based on the single market, which will not be a duplication of the national markets (some restrictions will remain) but will adopt many of their features. Incentives will develop also for the further extension of integration into new areas, for the lifting of barriers in one area or another will force the countries to promote a coordinated policy in a wide range of related problems. In turn, intergovernmental interaction enhances economic relations among companies and intensifies the close interweaving of the national economies on the microlevel.

The increased interdependence will accelerate the search for common prescriptions for regulatory market forces no longer under national control. In order to upgrade the efficiency of the decision making mechanism, obviously, it will become necessary to strengthen the supranational principle governing the functioning of the entire system. Other trends in enhancing cooperation among EC countries exist as well. They will include a structural sectorial and regional policy, scientific and technical and social programs, monetary-financial integration and foreign policy coordination.

Therefore, the prospects for the development of the EC until the mid-1990s are already becoming apparent. However, the program for establishing the domestic market is not considered the final objective of the community. It is merely a prerequisite for the further intensification of integration. A discussion is already under way not only on the creation of a market but also of a unified economy, a single central bank and a single

currency. There is a high degree of likelihood that integration will develop in all areas, i.e., a movement toward an economic and fiscal union with all its consequences.

Naturally, by no means does everyone agree with the concept of converting the EC into a kind of federal state. For example, Margaret Thatcher, the head of the British government, is firmly opposed to such a prospect. Her September 1988 Bruges Speech triggered a broad echo in EC countries. Nonetheless, in the course of the debates which followed the speech most statements were in favor of a greater unity among the countries leading to the formation of a single union. Surveys have indicated that about 70 to 80 percent of citizens of EC countries support this viewpoint.

The intensification of integration leads to the fact that the community will act in the international arena as an even more consolidated political and economic unit. Already now the influence of the community on the Western European countries not participating in this group is being increasingly felt. The more active ties between the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the EC in the economic area are taking place under conditions defined essentially by the community. The strengthening of the positions of the EC in Europe is a base for the enhancement of its role in relations with other countries as well.

All of these changes mean that entirely new conditions exist for the activities of the Soviet Union in Europe. It is obvious now that without close interaction with the EC it would be inconceivable to build a "common European home." Equally obvious are the difficulties which arise along this way.

Let us note that in itself the course toward the creation of a single market does not prove the aspiration of the EC to "separate itself" from the outside world. The community does not set itself such objectives, for it is one of the biggest commercial blocs in the world and is interested in foreign relations. However, we can benefit from such an interest only if we are able to adapt to the new realities which are developing in Western Europe. We must bear in mind that it is more difficult for us than for other countries to establish close economic cooperation with the EC under the conditions of a single market. Thus, the United States and Japan have opened numerous branches on the territory of the integrated association numerous branches and their science-intensive output is needed by enterprises operating in the community. The members of the EFTA and many developing countries are linked with the EC through a system of contractual relations of the preferential type. The USSR has nothing of the sort, for which reason its efforts to adapt itself to the new situation should be higher than that of the countries we mentioned and not lesser, as is presently the case, for in the opposite case business cooperation will diminish.

However, the establishment of a single market by the EC will not have exclusively negative consequences in building of a "common European home." An "averaging" of the policies implemented by the individual members of the EC takes place, which could neutralize extremes in their individual actions. The activities of this integrated association become more predictable and a certain stability of its economic and political course is ensured.

The Western European integration complex could be coupled more easily (compared with individual countries) with the Eastern European part of the "common European home." Naturally, this would occur providing that the increased integration in the community will parallel the improvement and development of its relations with the Soviet Union and CEMA. Furthermore, we must not forget that the community has assumed a very realistic position on a number of international problems.

It is also important to bear in mind the essential significance of the experience in EC integration, which could prove to be useful in the implementation of broad-scale projects of European dimensions.

Eastern Europe: A Time of Change

The development of integration processes in the socialist community is encountering difficulties. Unlike the trends characteristic of Western European integration, the process of providing more favorable conditions for quality changes in commercial and economic exchanges has been hindered in CEMA. Barriers are being erected to importing a wide variety of consumer goods by tourists.

The results of the administrative-command type of socialist division of labor applied in CEMA cannot be compared with the results of integration development within the EC. The level of integration of the countries within the community has turned out higher. For example, the share of machines based on cooperation in the overall volume of machine building output involved in the exchanges among countries within the EC account for more than 40 percent, compared to no more than some 7 percent in CEMA.

This situation can be changed above all by developing commodity-monetary relations within the framework of the integrated association of socialist countries. It is no accident that such close attention is being paid today to establishing a unified CEMA market. However, the development of economic intercourse among CEMA members on the microlevel is taking place very sluggishly. For example, producers from the socialist countries are partners in no more than one out of seven joint enterprises set up on Soviet territory.

Nonetheless, relations with partners from the capitalist countries as well, although enhanced in some areas, are still developing at a substantially slower pace than among the Western countries themselves. Neither of these favors the establishment of an integral complex within the framework of the entire European continent. To a certain extent, the situation which has developed within CEMA reminds us of the position of the EC in the scientific and technical area in terms of the United States a decade ago. At that time many of the community programs were in a state of crisis. The lag behind the United States in scientific and technical competition was worsening; companies in EC countries preferred to cooperate with their partners on the other side of the ocean rather than with each other. In the mid-1980s, however, the picture has changed radically, largely thanks to the efforts of EC authorities aimed at accelerating scientific and technical integration which now, one could say, is in a stage of real boom. In this area supragovernmental regulation is organically combined with the profound development of commodity-monetary relations on a broad scale.

In principle, a similar potential for influence on the micro level exists within CEMA as well. Unlike the community, however, here the rights of the joint authorities, needed to solve the difficult problems of interaction among member countries, are not being broadened. For a long time we deemed the absence of any supranational elements an unquestionable advantage of socialist integration. Is this concept not one of the stereotypes which should be reassessed?

Let us recall that in the EC as well this problem has frequently triggered, and still does, quite sharp contradictions and arguments. Nonetheless, the predominant trend remains that of shifting to the level of the community an increasing volume of rights, above all by virtue of the need adequately to control its influence on the increasingly interwoven national economic systems. Considerations of efficiency prevent us from proclaiming as an absolute the principle of unanimous decision-making. All participants are interested in the efficiency of the integration mechanism, including those who, for a variety of specific reasons, would possibly prefer to have the right to veto but are ready to abandon it for the sake of common (which means also their own) interests. Under the conditions of healthy economic relations the illusion of traditionally conceived equality yields to the acceptance of only one right yielding an advantage: the right based on the higher efficiency of production activities (which includes the quantity and quality of output, production costs, competitiveness, etc.). Is there no rational kernel in this mechanism? It is entirely natural that in the formulation of common technical rates and standards the relatively weaker subjects of economic relations will be oriented toward the leaders in their respective sectors.

Clearly, the criterion of efficiency will gradually become increasingly determining also in the process of building a

“common European home.” For if the “common European building” is oriented (albeit on a long-term basis) toward the formation of an economically integral complex, the members of the EC, obviously, will try to include as part of its functioning the same principles which proved their efficiency within the framework of the community. Obviously, the socialist countries should not see in the least in this an unconscientious effort to impose upon them the rules of the game operating in the Western part of the continent. Conversely, it is time here as well to surmount the reflexes inherited from the cold war and closely study the possibilities of using any EC experience beneficial to us. It is quite important for the CEMA members to make their economies more open and capable of competing, which is based on the requirements of the global market.

The development of contacts with the EC is necessary on a bilateral as well as multilateral basis, not by pitting one against the other, but by reciprocally supplementing these two lines, each one of which contributes to the building of the “common European home.” At the same time, it is important to enhance the coordination in the activities of the members of the socialist community in this area, for it is precisely now that its clearly inadequate scale is becoming one of the disintegrating factors within CEMA. An indicative experience is provided by the EFTA countries which conclude official contracts with the EC each one separately but which, in the course of the talks, frequently act on the basis of collective and coordinated positions. This facilitates the establishment of relations of mutually profitable cooperation between the two organizations. With a corresponding level of coordination of the policies of CEMA members, the development of bilateral relations with the community could take place without undesirable consequences.

As to the development of European-scale cooperation, in this case a great deal depends on upgrading the efficiency of interaction within CEMA. In turn, this is largely defined by the nature and pace of the changes occurring in the individual socialist countries.

Perestroika in the USSR is an important factor in the development of general European economic cooperation. One of the main objectives of the economic reform in the Soviet Union is the active use of commodity-monetary relations. Most frequently our producers have an unchallenged monopoly status on the domestic market and carry out their activities in greenhouse conditions. However, we are interested, for the sake of accelerating the development of scientific and technical progress in the Soviet economy, in real competition with Western companies. Yet we have no experience in such competition and we must think how to lower the undesirable costs of adaptation to the strict and, occasionally, harsh rules prevailing on world markets or how to help our single-sector enterprises develop a more varied strategy, considering that they have become used to operating only on the Soviet domestic market, if they intend to compete with multisectorial and diversified

concerns of the multinational type. We must gradually adapt to competing with joint enterprises and, in some areas, with cooperative enterprises, in order to make less painful the organization of contacts with the Western European economy, contacts which will become increasingly greater with the elimination of obstacles on the path of the development of economic relations on a European scale.

The enhancement of market forces, encouraging cooperatives and individual labor activities and, upgrading the autonomy of enterprises and developing credit relations and a wholesale trade market—all of these innovations in our economic life—are inherent in the Western European countries. This makes simpler the “coupling” of the economic mechanisms which, unquestionably, increases the opportunities for their interpenetration and creates more favorable prerequisites for the development of an economic area on the European scale.

Another and equally important aspect of perestroika in a European context is related to the fact that the abandonment of supercentralization for the sake of greater freedom of action of market forces is accompanied by efforts to upgrade the efficiency of economically substantiated planning and control. In our view, a similar picture can be noted in the EC: barriers obstructing the movement of freight, capital and services among member countries are being lifted and, at the same time, regulatory mechanisms are being created on the level of the entire community. This similarity of processes is not accidental. The emancipation of market forces itself would be impossible without intervening in their activities and increasing regulatory functions on a higher level. The search for and testing of optimal ratios between regulatory and uncontrolled principles in the economy are taking place in both Western and Eastern Europe. In itself, this will provide additional impetus for their interaction and reciprocal enrichment. Tests on the coordination of market and planning economic management methods could be conducted in joint enterprises, which would serve as testing grounds.

The restructuring of the mechanism of foreign economic relations in our country will also contribute to the building of a “common European home.” The decentralization of this mechanism and encouraging direct contacts among enterprises and adopting legislation for joint enterprises as well as many other steps carried out in this area facilitate mutually profitable and stable business relations with foreign partners. In principle, this makes it possible significantly to expand economic operations between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries. It is true that at the initial stage this may entail certain costs which virtually always accompany the creation of new structures. For example, our economic units are not prepared to export to foreign markets and to engage in activities under conditions entirely alien to them. There is an urgent need for skilled cadres and specialists with corresponding knowledge and for the

organization of new services (advertising, marketing, etc.). In the short-term, the existence of such bottlenecks could hold back the development of relations with Western Europe.

It is precisely in the course of the changes currently taking place in CEMA and in the individual member countries, while the new mechanisms are only being established, that it would be important to consider their compatibility with the respective Western European structures, for it is much more difficult to adapt to each other already existing different systems than to include within them, from the very start, the type of elements which would facilitate general European cooperation. And since we are largely still at the stage of planning, it is precisely now that we could and should orient such planning not only toward the solution of our strictly internal economic problems but also toward laying the economic foundations of the “common European home.”

Common Economic Interests

It is precisely in Western Europe that, more than anywhere else, the conviction prevails that the best way to defend the economic interests of the individual countries is through close cooperation with other countries and that any autarchy would mean regress. In principle, such an approach creates favorable grounds for building the “common European home.” What is important is the contribution which the individual European countries would make to it.

The economic problems encountered by both Eastern and Western European countries include many which may seem similar, universal. This includes, for example, upgrading labor productivity, the faster application of the results of scientific and technical progress, the use of energy and resource-conserving technologies and improving the economic structure.

There also exist common problems, the solution of which requires joint efforts. This involves protecting the environment, the efficient use of raw materials and resources, the creation of industrially safe technologies, and the development of a European infrastructure (transportation, communications). In principle, some of them can be solved on the national scale. This approach, however, would be obviously less effective.

Naturally, priority in cooperation is given to problems in which the combination of interests appears to be the simplest and most urgent. The development of active contacts in the areas of power industry, transportation, communications, information transmission, environmental protection and statistics would stimulate the unification processes in Europe. This would make it possible to convert subsequently to the intensification of relations in more complex areas of cooperation such as, for example, science and technology, where both sides also have a significant potential and degree of interest.

The organization of interaction in some areas is relatively simple. For example, the development of programs for the training of computer operators eliminates even linguistic barriers. Other problems are much more complex. In particular, this applies to the transmission of twin-purpose technologies. These problems as well can be solved. The discussion on restrictions in exporting high technology goods seems to be based on a single key: a revision of the COCOM lists. Other approaches, however, are possible as well. If the main reason for prohibitions is the fear that such technology would be used for military purposes, reaching agreements on control over end users would eliminate this obstacle to the development of trade in a wide variety of goods. Naturally, this triggers a variety of problems. However, the experience in organizing verification of military targets, acquired as part of the disarmament process, could serve as a certain guideline. Logically, as a first step, the system for the transmission of technologies for joint enterprises located on Soviet territory could be eased. In that case our foreign partner himself would be able to control its use for strictly civilian purposes.

Problems of transmitting technology for the development of nonmilitary sectors are closely related to another complex problem: the conversion which is assuming a very topical nature in connection with the initiated process of limiting armaments and disarmament. The common interest in converting to civilian production some of the instrumental and technological potential previously aimed at military production is becoming increasingly obvious. However, optimal approaches are only being tentatively sought. A significant percentage of the orders placed with enterprises and companies producing missile technology and any other items for military purposes could be redirected toward the peaceful joint development of outer space or the implementation of global ecological projects.

Today many people are sounding the alarm on the subject of the threatening harm caused by the economy to the environment. We have realized through personal experience how important it is to introduce in this area mechanisms which would function in the interest of society as a whole and which could counter departmental egotism. However, ecological problems reject not only any "departmental affiliation" but also national-state borders. Many of them have already assumed a general European nature. The efficiency of solving them is also directly related to readiness to acknowledge the priority of common interests. The EC countries, realizing the serious nature of the situation, are granting increasing rights in the field of ecology to the supranational authorities of the community. Perhaps it would make sense for the Soviet Union to consider this method. For example, this would involve the partial assigning of certain functions of control over the condition of the environment to an all-European authority, especially created for this purpose, making its stipulations mandatory.

Potentially, the Soviet Union constitutes a huge market. However, the lack of a convertible ruble blocks access to

it more than any other restriction. The result is that the West as well could be interested in the convertibility of our currency. Therefore, here as well more active cooperation is possible. Let us recall that in the first postwar years the tasks of the Western European countries were very similar to those currently encountered by CEMA: it was necessary to develop economic relations despite limited gold and dollar assets and the lack of convertible currencies. Under those circumstances, the European Monetary Union was of great importance. A multilateral currency clearing system was introduced, which facilitated reciprocal payments. The operations passed through a single center—the bank—the availability of reserves in which made it possible to settle the accounts. Active use was made of loans. Today, since common interests exist, it may be necessary to engage in a more daring search for similar forms of cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe.

Naturally, this problem is only one of the many aspects in the introduction of convertibility, the full implementation of which, without harming the material situation of the population, requires many other factors, including the efficient introduction in foreign trade circulation of the resources at the disposal of the USSR. The vulnerability of the raw material orientation of our exports is now being emphasized. The existence of raw materials, however, is a tremendous and, in some cases, a unique resource. We must handle it properly and gradually increase the level of its processing and convert to exporting semi-finished and finished goods on the basis of such raw materials. We could offer more extensively internationally necessary services (above all in the area of tourism) and make better use of our stock of patents and licenses.

In principle, many opportunities exist for the development of efficient ties among all European countries, defined and codified in the final document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the European Security and Cooperation Conference. In terms of the USSR, in our view their use will depend on three most important factors.

First, the speed with which domestic enterprises will master competitive types of output and learn how to exhibit their wares on foreign markets. For the time being the results of the economic reform are uneven and do not always yield the desired effect. We are unable to apply efficient cost accounting at enterprises, which is one of the main reasons for the low efficiency of their foreign economic activities. Therefore, for the time being the USSR has not laid the first-rate foundations on which a broad-scale European cooperation could be organized.

Second, on the macrolevel it is necessary to ensure favorable conditions for internal and foreign economic activities of enterprises as the degree of openness of the Soviet economy is increased. Perestroika in foreign economic relations is still outstripping in terms of speed

the internal economic reform which, in itself, creates problems in exporting on Western markets. In this case we feel the need for synchronizing the two interrelated processes. Today our enterprises urgently need information concerning markets and possible partners. European cooperation requires the creation of authorities which could bring together potential partners, such as the Center for Business Cooperation or the Secretariat for the Eureka Scientific and Technical Program, which have functioned in the EC since 1973. One could raise the question of extending the activities of such authorities to all European countries. A major landmark in establishing a favorable climate for interaction with Western European companies should be the conclusion of a trade-economic agreement between the USSR and the EC. The more areas it will cover the greater new opportunities will be presented for the development of relations with EC countries for Soviet economic units.

Third, and last, the extent of participation of the USSR in the European division of labor will substantially depend on the countersteps to Soviet initiatives which will be taken by the Western European countries.

The development of cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries in Europe would constitute a major contribution to ensuring international economic safety. Regional (European) aspects of this problem are becoming today objects of increasingly close attention. This too is opening an area for common interests for all countries on the continent.

The changes occurring in both Western and Eastern Europe in relations between capitalist and socialist countries on the continent create prerequisites for closer European interaction. Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to underestimate the difficulty of the problems the solution of which would require the building of a "common European home." It took some 3 decades for Western European integration to develop a program for a unified internal market. How much time will be required for the implementation of the idea of a "common European home," which would involve even greater difficulties? This will make it necessary to erase from the people's minds, in ideology and in politics the "image of the enemy," which would hardly be possible to accomplish without close contacts among people. Progress toward a general European entity is impossible without "human bridges." This, however, requires the creation of corresponding economic conditions. What matters is to begin. The daring and far-sightedness under the sign of which in a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" a practical motion has been initiated on the way to disarmament must be applied to the areas of economics, ecology and culture. This is in the common interest of the Europeans.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Historians Have the Floor

18020014m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 119-120

[Review by S. Khizhnyakov of the books "*Istoriki Otvechayut na Voprosy*" [Historians Answer Questions]. A collection. Moskovskiy Rabochiy, Moscow, 1988, 240 pp; "*Istoriki Sporyat*" [The Historians Argue]. Thirteen talks. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 510 pp; A. M. Samsonov, "*Znat i Pomnit*" [Know and Remember]. A dialogue between a historian and a reader. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 368 pp; "*Urok Dayet Istoriya*" [History Teaches the Lesson]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 414 pp; and "*Perepiska na Istoricheskiye Temy*" [Correspondence on Historical Topics]. Dialogue conducted by the readers. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 494 pp).

[Text] Finally, the long awaited new works by historians are coming out not only in periodicals. One after the other, books describing—albeit fragmentarily so far—the history of the party and the Soviet state from positions free from stereotypes and concealment of the past are being published. To a certain extent, these books will compensate for the lack of a good course in domestic history of most recent times and, unquestionably, will be particularly useful to the young and curious readers.

In the strictly scientific sense, these publications cannot be classified as scientific studies. They have been written as a lively journalistic debate which invites the people to think. The reader himself is a mandatory participant in the discussion. In taking his questions into consideration, arguing with him and helping him to find his way in the complex problems of our history, the authors try to direct his independent intellectual search toward a more profound and scientifically substantiated interpretation of the past. Such a form of presentation of historical topics advantageously distinguishes the new works from the problem-free monographs and popular science publications which until recently predominated in the stream of books. However, this does not relieve historians of the task of continuing this discussion on the level of innovative research, enriched with the experience of historical journalism and recent debates.

It is quite gratifying to note the wide range of authors (primarily professional historians), some of whom have written two or even three books. Such a praiseworthy need to take up the pen suffers, it is true, from certain faults, such as the fact that some topics are actually duplicated. In our view, the partial reprinting of previously published works in periodicals somewhat lowers the value of original works although, naturally, this is entirely admissible. In each of the books, however, we can sense the aspiration of the publishers not to interfere in the work of the author or the line of thought of the historian or to "edit" the text in the spirit of the

"simple" evaluations. This is an accurate indication of the actual assertion of the principle of socialist pluralism of opinions in the latest historical publications.

Let us now say a few words about each one of these works. The collection published by Izdatelstvo Moskovskiy Rabochiy was based on typical questions which are currently being asked in letters to the editors, in classrooms and in labor collectives: about the course charted by the Bolshevik Party on the eve of and during the October Revolution, the structure and activities of the first Soviet government, the experience in economic management during the first post-October years, the nature of Trotskyism and the cult of Stalin's personality, collectivization and the political trials in the 1930s, and the reasons for the failures during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. The book also touches upon little-known aspects of the cultural and national building in our country and the pressing problems of global socialism and the international communist movement. It includes biographic materials about N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomskiy and N.I. Muralov. What were the circumstances of the Leningrad Trial, how to assess M.S. Khrushchev's activities, as well as other questions of interest to the readers concerning postwar history have also been included by the authors of this collection, although it would be difficult at this point to qualify their answers as complete. It is precisely the lack of thoroughness, it seems to us, that is a shortcoming of the collection as a whole; the desire of the publishers to cover a number of problems is clearly inconsistent with the limited size of the work. However, the publication of this collection is entirely justified as a "primary" satisfaction of the readers' interest.

In terms of their content, the books published by Politizdat are thorough. Thirteen polemical talks on the October Revolution, the Civil War, the NEP, the founding of the USSR, the political system at the end of the 1920s and 1930s, the cultural revolution, the Great Patriotic War and other problems of our history are offered to the readers in the collection "*Istoriki Sporyat*." In this work there are no direct questions asked by the readers but the form of presentation of the material seems to presume them, reflecting the existing disparity of assessments and concepts in public opinion as seen through the discussion among scientists. It is perhaps for the first time in many decades that a book on history interests us not only in terms of the problems themselves and the novelty of approaches but also for a certain clash of opinions in understanding individual features and characteristics of a given historical period, although in the majority of cases the interlocutors merely try to add to each other's statements. One of the merits of this collection is the attempt to provide a modern interpretation of the theoretical legacy of Lenin and his fellow workers, the aspiration to shed light and identify the nature of the new thinking in historical science. This book can be described also as one of the initial steps toward the revival of the standard of scientific debates, greatly lost in previous decades.

A "Dialogue Between a Historian and the Reader" is the subtitle of another publication by Politizdat, which is a book by Academician A.M. Samsonov, essentially dealing with the "blank spots" in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Its content and form are also different from the usual work of history. This too is an original collection of readers' mail, concentrated in a special voluminous section, as well as thoughts on the subjects, expressed by a specialist. A major and frank discussion is presented in the area where scientific and moral problems come together, involving concepts such as conscience, memory of the people, honesty today and responsibility for the future. The book reflects the sharp need of today's reader not only to acquire a sum of specific knowledge on the heroic and tragic events on the road to victory and to recreate the entire truth of the history of the Patriotic War but also to understand the invisible link among generations. It is as though this book sums up the initial result of a broad public discussion, earmarking trends for further research in the field of military-historical problems.

A modern and daring view of historians concerning problems which, for a long time, were left unanswered, is found in the Politizdat collection "*Urok Dayet Istoriya*." This book, compiled by the editors of PRAVDA, together with the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, includes the most interesting essays from the PRAVDA publications "Pages from the History," expanded and supplemented with new facts and documents. Put together, although perhaps not reflecting an integral picture of Soviet history, these materials clearly direct the attention of the reader on the imperatives of contemporary historical knowledge: What type of society did we build? What made deviations from the Leninist path possible? What historical alternatives did we lose? What does the slogan "More Socialism" mean? In the preface to the collection, its editors express the hope that the book will help secondary school and VUZ teachers, secondary school seniors and university students and students enrolled in the party education system, as well as anyone interested in the history of the party and the Soviet state. Under the conditions of a pressing need for the latest methodical and training publications on such problems this hope, unquestionably, will be justified. In the period of "approaches" to the definitive "Essays on CPSU History," which is currently being written, the publication of this book as well is a useful contribution.

The reader will be interested in yet another Politizdat publication: "*Perepiska na Istoricheskiye Temy*," which includes expanded answers by historians, writers and political journalists to specific readers' mail concerning the most sensitive and complex stages in the establishment and development of our society, the fate of historical personalities who found themselves in the focal point of most important events in social life. This work, which provides a substantially more profound treatment of many questions raised in the publications we already mentioned, deals with topics which were either little

studied or not mentioned in the past. Whose interests did Kerenskiy represent? What prevented a trial of Nikolay Romanov? Why was the Constituent Assembly disbanded; who were the "left-wing" S.R.? How was the Red Army created. What do we know about Makhno-Kolchak, the white emigres, and the fate of the Second Assault Army during the Great Patriotic War? This, albeit by no means complete, enumeration of the topics included in the book will interest anyone who is trying today to base his ideas exclusively on historical truth, however bitter it may be. By structuring their conclusions on the basis of good quality factual data, the authors make use of a rich variety of genres: the documentary story, a journalistic essay, and an interview based on readers' letters. We believe that this work has assumed the precisely needed form of a popular book on history which, in the future as well, could successfully coexist with purely scientific works.

Despite their overall fragmented content and uneven quality, these new publications constitute a significant step toward the day when basic historical science, having made use of the archives which have become accessible in recent years and relying on the results of the debates, will become at true pilot in the area of contemporary knowledge of the path covered by the party and the country.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Ethnic Groups in the Contemporary World

18020014n Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 120-122

[Review by G. Starushenko, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, of the book "Narody Mira" [Peoples of the World]. Historical-ethnographic manual. Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1988, 624 pp]

[Text] The role of ethnic factors in economic, social, political, cultural, demographic and other internal and global processes has considerably increased today. Dictated by the scientific and technical revolution and by the entire course of global progress, the trend toward the breakdown of national barriers and toward the internationalization of social life becomes dialectically interwoven with the development of ethnic communities, the growth of national self-awareness and, frequently, in connection with the natural lack of coordination and time differential among historical processes under way, also with manifestations of nationalistic and chauvinistic moods and prejudices and the aggravation of interethnic contradictions. This is explained not only by a drastic acceleration of global developments and the tremendous ethnic variety of the population on earth (according to researchers, there are 3,000 to 4,000 ethnic groups), but also the tempestuous growth of their numbers (over the past 20 years the number of the large ethnic groups in excess of 1 million people has increased from 280 to 325). A certain aggravation of relations

among nationalities in our country as well has increased the interest of the broadest possible social circles in national problems, the contemporary situation of existing ethnic groups and the ethnocultural aspect of the world as a whole and of individual countries and areas. Therefore, we should welcome this initial effort at drafting a Soviet encyclopedic manual on ethnography—the science of the peoples of the world.

This work was compiled by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography imeni N.N. Miklukho-Maklay and Izdatelstvo Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. It was written by approximately 150 scientists not only from Moscow and Leningrad but also from all the Union and many autonomous republics and oblasts. The result has been a basic work reflecting the contemporary level of development of Marxist-Leninist ethnographic science and, partially, "the sciences of man," such as demography, linguistics, anthropology, religion, and others.

The manual starts with an introduction which provides an overall description of the ethnic situation in the world and surveys on the racial, national, linguistic and religious breakdown of the world's population. The main section includes approximately 1,000 information-packed articles on nations (in numerous cases a single article describes groups of related nations in terms of culture and way of life). The offer the reader short but varied information on all ethnic groups, the number of which exceeds 5,000. Unfortunately, not all articles are of equal value in terms of content. Clearly, this is explained by differences in the available ethnographic knowledge of various parts of the world.

The manual primarily describes the ethnic history of nations, their traditional culture, social organization and linguistic situation. The contemporary socioeconomic aspect, class structure and features of professional standards are mentioned only briefly, taking into consideration the essential topic of this manual. Although it is precisely traditional culture and way of life that are the main area of manifestation of ethnic specifics and the main target of ethnic studies, such limitations in the manual are somewhat regrettable. Naturally, we must not ignore the strict format limitations. Nonetheless, a number of articles, particularly those about nations the national and political problems of which are particularly topical today, and contemporary realities could have been reflected more extensively.

A special (third) section in the manual includes articles on basic ethnographic concepts and terms which, combined with the introductory articles in the first section, provides an idea of the methods used by Soviet ethnographic science. This section also includes glossaries with interpretations of the special terms used in describing the traditional cultural and social organization of nations. This extensive referential system, which facilitates our understanding of articles concerning the individual nations, is also of specific cognitive value.

All statistical information, including the one in the summing up tables on the ethnic structure of the population of all countries in the world, is based on 1985 evaluations. Informative maps of the areas settled by the individual nations throughout the world and of individual areas, as well as charts on the racial and linguistic structure of the world's population and a large number of illustrations (some 2,000) are a successful supplement to the statistical data.

On this basis, we can consider with full justification that this book will be extremely useful to scientific workers in different areas, teachers, students and anyone interested in ethnographic problems. Let us emphasize, however, that its publication is not merely of purely scientific but also of broad social significance. This tremendous amount of data, gathered for the first time within a single encyclopedic manual, convincingly proves that virtually all nations on earth were established and acquired their contemporary aspect in the course of complex processes of historical development, migrations and lengthy inter-ethnic contacts. This reduces the opportunity for engaging in pseudoscientific speculations on controversial problems of ethnogenetic and ethnic history. Such speculations frequently present a major obstacle to the constructive settlement of conflicts among nationalities, which must be a normal procedure in any civilized society. The materials in the collection prove not only the ethnocultural variety in the world but also its growing interdependence and unity of the human species. Such a profoundly scientific interpretation of global ethnic problems will unquestionably help to humanize relations among peoples and nations and increase trust among them both within the individual countries as well as on a global scale.

In this connection we can only regret what we consider the inadequate size of this edition, which does not exceed 100,000 copies (let us remember that in our country alone there are more than 300,000 public libraries!). We believe that as of now the publishing house could undertake preparations for a second edition of this manual, supplementing and improving its structure and text in accordance with readers' wishes.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Relevance of Ancient Philosophy

180200140 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 122-124

[Review by L. Golovanov, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the books "*Istoriya Antichnoy Estetiki: Rannyyaya Klassika*" [History of Esthetics of Antiquity: Early Classics]. Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1963; "*Sofisty, Sokrat, Platon*" [The Sophists, Socrates and Plato]. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1969; "*Vysokaya Klassika*" [The High Classics]. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1974; "*Aristotel i Pozdnyaya Klassika*" [Aristotle and the Latter Classics]. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1975; "*Ranniy Ellinizm*" [Early Hellenism]. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1979; "*Pozdnyy Ellinizm*" [Late Hellenism]. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1980. It would be pertinent to add to this the somewhat different work "*Ellinisticheski-Rimskuyu Estetiku I-II vv. n.e.*" [Hellenist-Roman Esthetics of the First and Second

Centuries A.D.]. Moscow State University Press, Moscow, 1979; A.F. Losev, "*Istoriya Antichnoy Estetiki. Posledniye Veka*" [History of the Esthetics of Antiquity. The Final Centuries]. Vols 1-2. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1988; "*Antichnost Kak Tip Kultury*" [Antiquity as a Type of Culture]. Nauka, Moscow, 1988; A.F. Losev, "*Istoriya Antichnoy Filosofii v Konspektivnom Izlozhenii*" [History of the Philosophy of Antiquity. A Synopsis]. Mysl, Moscow, 1989; A.F. Losev, "*Derzaniye Dukha*" [Daring of the Spirit]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988]

[Text] The second-half of the 20th century is a dynamic and largely contradictory age whose contemporaries we are. Our descendants will remember it not only for the fact that for the first time mankind was able to leave the earth and go into space but also, I believe (if we speak of the spiritual sphere, the sphere of universal human intellectual values), for the fact that an equally amazing breakthrough was made into the "space" of antiquity. By this I mean the great and largely unsurpassed culture of distant and brilliant centuries which constituted the initial base of European civilization. The category "space" as applicable to ancient culture is entirely apt, for the ancient Greeks meant by this concept the maximal summation of everything visible and conceivable, as well as the concept, consistent with ours, of human life organically linked with the surrounding world, possessing astronomic, esthetic, ethical, sociopolitical and philosophical dimensions.

Unquestionably, in educated circles interest in ancient thought, starting with the Renaissance, has been permanent and there has been no lack of works on this subject. However, it is only in our time that, for the first time, it has been presented in such an expanded and integral aspect that we can justifiably speak of its rediscovery. What is particularly instructive is that this unique creative contribution to the humanitarian area has still not, unfortunately, been properly assessed (although some of it was noted with the awarding of the 1986 USSR State Prize) as being the work of one person: Aleksey Fedorovich Losev (1893-1988), an encyclopedically trained scientist and original thinker. To him the study of antiquity was a lifetime project, a long and difficult one, which included the Stalinist camps and years of forced silence as well as periods of rejection by the official philosophical Olympus. Each of his fundamental works on the esthetics of antiquity would bring honor to any collective of authors. One can daringly say that this monumental work has justifiably become part of the gold stock of Soviet culture.

A.F. Losev reconstructs the spirituality of antiquity, placing in its center the concept of esthetics, which he interprets more broadly, not only as the theory of the expressive forms of art. This has its justification, for the specific nature of a world perception running through all periods in antique history, consisted of imbuing the mind with the inspired ideas and images of beauty, the ideal embodiment of which was the invariably beautiful material-sensory universe.

The distinguishing feature of all the works of this outstanding scientist is the combination of strict scientific knowledge with original judgments, compositional clarity and high literary skill. Their reading brings real pleasure independent of any professional interest. A.F. Losev's works clearly stand out, as V.D. Prishvina says, "with the sharpness and freshness of the very form of thinking" ("*Traditsiya v Istorii Kultury*" [Tradition in the History of Culture], Nauka, Moscow, 1978, p 253).

It so happened that the year the researcher died three of his books were published simultaneously. They are the topic of these notes.

Let us mention above all the seventh volume of his work on the esthetics of antiquity. Like all previous ones, it is characterized by a comprehensive and many-sided depiction of rich spiritual life over a rather long period of antiquity (third-sixth centuries A.D.). The new volume is maximally saturated with relatively unknown facts, examples, excerpts from texts, and a profound philosophical and philological analysis. Essentially, it is the final part of a lengthy project.

Whereas in his preceding monographs A.F. Losev had made a thorough study of the classics of antiquity, starting with the early period and ending with Hellenism, with this work the reader is offered a broad depiction of the lofty and tragic spiritual world of the final centuries of antiquity with its philosophical schools. The author describes the intellectually saturated works of the major philosophers of the third to the sixth centuries A.D., who were the bearers of the wisdom of antiquity. Neo-Platonism marked a very intensive effort to concentrate the entire wealth of the philosophy of antiquity in the struggle against growing religious monotheism. However, the struggle ended in defeat: to the then developing feudalism ancient cosmology was insufficient; it needed a theory of the personal absolute which alone could satisfy its needs in the course of the establishment of the new system of social hierarchy which was taking shape. It is true that even after Christianity was established in Europe, for quite some time Neo-Platonism continued significantly to influence progressive philosophical opposition.

Thus, in the seven-volume work, for the first time, the entire powerful intellectual legacy of antiquity is introduced in scientific circulation, without the interpretation of which we cannot truly understand the development of theoretical thinking, the socioclass and general humanistic values of subsequent centuries and evaluate the struggle among concepts and trends in the most complex events of historical progress until the present.

A.F. Losev proceeds from the fact, as we can see in reading his works, that dialectical-materialistic methodology can be used as a firm foundation in the study of antique philosophy, which abounds in mythological and logical fine points. It is through this methodology that the author shapes his understanding of the nature of the

culture of antiquity: its main feature is the primacy of social relations in slave-owning systems over spiritual phenomena, while mandatorily taking into consideration the dialectics of the inverse tie. This principle imbues the entire series of the works of this scientist, allowing the reader to realize that culture is nothing other than the historically determined practical result of material and spiritual values embodied in the individual.

Incidentally, the systematic presentation of this viewpoint may be found in other works by the same author: in the essays "Philosophy of Antiquity and Sociohistorical Systems," and "Types of Thinking in Antiquity," recently published in a collection which he edited, and in his new book on the history of antique philosophy. Anyone interested in the nature of qualitative transitions in the evolution of culture in general should pay attention to them.

Although the philosophers of antiquity did not leave us any particular esthetic theory, their philosophy itself, their entire view of the world and their practical purposefulness were of a clearly manifested esthetic nature. A.F. Losev convincingly proved that if beauty in ancient times was inseparable from the body, the object, the thing, in precisely the same way the esthetics of antiquity is inseparable from cosmology and astronomy, for it is merely an aspect of a profoundly developed overall dialectics of space by the ancients. In Losev's multiple volume work on the esthetics of antiquity we see a scientifically systematized combination of antique philosophy, religion and nature philosophy, in which the process itself of theoretical thinking, the process of knowledge, is presented in an aesthetically beautiful image (see "*Istoriya Antichnoy Estetiki*," vol 7, book I, p 71, and others).

This volume was followed by one more (the author was able to submit it to the publishers), which acquaints the readers with Latin Neo-Platonism; in this volume, furthermore, the author describes the dynamics itself of the establishment and development of the main esthetic categories throughout the entire history of the esthetics of antiquity; in the same key he offers the typology of the entire antique perception of the world (concepts of man, nature, space, art, human activities, beauty in all of its manifestations, harmony, etc.). This will be completed with an index prepared by the author (alphabetical and subject) and a bibliography, i.e., a methodical key to the assimilation of this entire fundamental work. This will constitute the final volume totaling 105 printer's sheets!

Why do we turn to such a distant past with such growing interest and what makes so interesting the studies made by A.F. Losev, which attract in their intellectual field of gravity an increasingly wide circle of readers? What could be the use today of the results of ancient thinking which, one may think, would be of interest only to students of antiquity, who would include them in their latest interpretations?... The answer to such questions are found in that same Losev, in a new and recently

published, this time journalistic work entitled "Derzaniye Dukha:" "The history of philosophy is the type of school of thought without which there can be no complete philosophical culture which, in the final account, is the foundation of spiritual culture in general" (p 266).

At the end of his unusual creative path, already having a foreboding of his approaching plunge, as he said, "into the precipice of history," A.F. Losev turns in this book as though with a message to the living generations: the real power of man lies in the power of the mind. "It is only the live mind that can make us the workers of life, tireless enthusiasts in pursuing objectives worthy of man... and lead to a healthy service to society" (p 6). Learn dialectics, is the spirit with which the author turns to the reader. Ever since it appeared in the ancient world and to this day, dialectics has always been the opposite of eclecticism which, simulating science, drives out thinking and impoverishes the mind. Dialectics has always opposed the formal-abstract perception of the world. It has opposed dogmata, "world schematics" and all types of scholasticism. Losev's works are a clear example of the "dialectical interpretation of the history of human thought" which Lenin so greatly encouraged (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch" [Complete Collected Works], vol 29, p 131).

The book "Derzaniye Dukha" introduces the curious minds into the "laboratory" of creative thinking, the nucleus of which is dialectics, in which "beauty" and "good" have been inseparable since antiquity. It is itself esthetic and ethically exigent. "...Dialectics in its pure aspect," A.F. Losev writes, "is not simply a play of contradictions and sterile blabbering, with all sorts of assertions and denials.... I believe that if one deals with dialectics without drawing from it any vital conclusions it is a waste of time. Whatever a person may be doing, he should bear in mind his great purpose.... The dialectics of freedom and necessity is the final guarantee for our both personal and universal human nobility" (pp 77-79). The scientist formulated his personal credo as the ideal of "universal and free human well-being" (p 281), for he appeals for the full realization of human essential forces and of the entire potential of civilization.

Aleksey Fedorovich was an amazingly outstanding individual. In addition to a comprehensive education and ability to work which ignored any age limit, he was distinguished by his striking responsiveness and a well-wishing attitude toward anyone in his spiritual field. His apartment in the Arbat, with its cozy old-fashioned furnishings and a multilingual library which covered most of the space, was, metaphorically speaking, a real "garden of Apollo." Even now, when its owner is no longer there, each object seems to exude "love for wisdom." His close friends, together with his widow Aza Alibekovna Takho-Godi are going through his files, classifying all that should be published.

It would be expedient to put together and publish (in five volumes, perhaps) A.F. Losev's selected works for the 1927-1957 period, which preceded the writing of his epic "Istoriya Antichnoy Estetiki," which today is practically inaccessible and unknown to most readers but without the study of which the "house" that Losev built is with a truncated foundation. Perhaps this work itself should be entirely republished on a subscription basis, for this multiple-volume work is needed not only by specialized researchers but also by the broad public; yet it has long been a bibliographic rarity. Unquestionably, the publishers should pay attention to Losev's translations of Greek and Roman mythological texts which he assembled in a strictly defined order. Finally, there also are the original works of fiction by this scientist (novels, novellas and stories) which he started writing in the camp in 1933. Many of his poems have been preserved. Clearly, his works on mathematical logic will be of some interest. Naturally, not everything in Losev's creative legacy is of equal and uncontroversial value. His works are valuable for the accomplishments they contain and not their finished nature, for which reason they need not simply admirers but, above all, talented followers who could enrich and advance the study of the by no means exhausted and always relevant topic: the history of antique philosophy.

In one of his essays published in the last of the books under review, Losev spoke of the eternal youth of science: truth does not age once it has been ascertained by the people ("the time category cannot be applied to the table of multiplication"), and in that sense his own works are also timeless. The classics are always contemporary!

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

ATR: Peaceful Choice

18020014p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 124-126

[Review by B. Kulik, doctor of historical sciences, of the book by M.S. Kapitsa and M.P. Isayev, "Mirnyy Vybor Azi" [Asia's Peaceful Choice]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 351 pp]

[Text] Very recently ATR, an initially strange seeming and unusual abbreviation, entered the foreign policy terminology. For example, it is not included in the rather thorough reference-dictionary "What is What in World Politics," which came out at the start of 1987. Today this combination of letters, which stands for "Asian-Pacific Region," is encountered with increasing frequency in publications for, similar to a political-economic phenomenon, it has emerged on the proscenium of contemporary international life.

Students of international affairs, economists, political experts and experts in individual countries, as though suddenly remembering and trying to catch up, have

drastically intensified their attention in the ATR; they are writing about its affairs and problems ever more frequently and extensively. And, as is frequently the case in coming across new difficult and conflicting phenomena, in their efforts to determine the place of the ATR in the contemporary world, they occasionally allow extremes and sharp turns from Eurocentrism to assertions of the total decline of "old woman Europe." Thus, the American journal NEWSWEEK wrote: "The suspicion is growing that the map of the world, familiar to the Europeans, in which Europe is in the center while the distant Pacific Area is vaguely outlined somewhere at the edge, is becoming ominously obsolete." With increasing frequency scientists and political figures are voicing the view that the ATR is assuming the center of global politics and economics. The Asian-Pacific Region, which is the home for more than one-half of the population on earth, where extremely rich natural resources are concentrated and where the entire range of social systems existing on earth is represented, has indeed a tremendous development potential. At the same time, here countries displaying a great variety of rates of economic growth stand side-by-side and it is here that the obsolete and painful hotbeds of regional conflicts may be found.

To the Soviet Union the topic of the ATR is not simply a relevant international problem. In terms of territory and population, our country is an indivisible and quite significant part of this area. Suffice it to say that one out of every three Soviet persons lives in Asia. The Soviet Union also has vast holdings along the Pacific Ocean.

All of this implies increased requirements concerning work on ATR problems. This is based on the vitally important objective of including the Asian-Pacific Region in the overall process of establishing a comprehensive system of international security. Unfortunately, extensive works on the study and interpretation of international problems of the ATR and the most important aspects of Soviet policy in that area still infrequent. For the time being, most writings on this topic are found in periodicals and are essentially of an informative nature. In this connection, the monograph "*Mirnyy Vybor Azii*," which was published by Politizdat in 1988, and whose authors are M.S. Kapitsa, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and director of the academy's Institute of Oriental Studies, and M.P. Isayev, candidate of historical sciences, is worthy of serious attention.

The scientists take Asia as the base of their study. Essentially, however, the study covers the entire Asian-Pacific Area. The authors provide a picture of the contemporary situation in the ATR and cite eloquent data indicating its importance to the world's economy. An unquestionable quality of this monograph is the fact that the authors concentrate on problems of peace and security in this the largest part of the planet. It is from this point of view that they consider noteworthy historical stages in the struggle for the solution of such problems, bring to light the nature of the imperialist strategy

of "neoglobalism" in the ATR, comprehensively study the Soviet approach to ensuring security in the area and describe in detail the specific steps taken by our country to attain this objective. In our view, the most interesting are the parts of the book which deal with Soviet policy in the ATR at the present stage.

With the help of abundant factual data, the authors trace the influence on the situation in the ATR and on the enhancement of the peace potential which exists here of global foreign policy initiatives, directly aimed at the Asian-Pacific Area. Soviet policy in the ATR is founded on the principles of the new political thinking. This is meeting with understanding in the various countries in the area and leads to the elimination of the former anti-Soviet stereotypes and the strengthening of the position of our state as a full-fledged member of the Asian-Pacific community. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out in his talk with Japanese socialists in May 1988, here as well the process is under way, the mind is at work, and a trend toward joint and equal discussion of problems of economic, political and cultural cooperation is strengthening.

The monograph concretizes and substantiates the comprehensive approach adopted to problems of ATR security. This approach calls for the implementation of measures of confidence in the military-political areas, rescuing the area from the threat of nuclear weapons, prevention of putting together new and expanding existing military blocs, closing down foreign military bases, and rejecting by ATR countries of their participation in the plans for the militarization of outer space. The development of good neighborly cooperation among all countries in this area is an inseparable element of the concept of regional security.

ATR safety can be secured only if each state in the area would make its contribution to this objective. The authors describe in detail the joint search of ways for the solution of regional problems.

Nonetheless, they do not belittle the difficulties encountered in the course of strengthening peace and cooperation in the ATR. They highlight this process in its entire complexity. The process is taking place in a rather contradictory manner. As in the past, we have been unable to block the trend of militarization in the area. Furthermore, this trend is gathering dangerous speed. The ATR is entangled in a thick network of American military bases, some 300 of them. Japan is continuing to increase its military strength. In the past 5 years its military expenditures have been increasing by more than 5 percent per year, taking inflation into consideration. The developing countries in the area are becoming involved in the arms race.

Although lately some ATR countries have reached a high pace of economic growth, most of them are experiencing major difficulties. The foreign debt of ASEAN members

has increased from \$70 billion in 1983 to \$114 billion at the start of 1989. The foreign trade deficit of the Philippines in 1989 totaled \$1.08 billion, which is 6.9 percent above the 1987 figure.

Unfortunately, the authors of the monograph frequently limit themselves to noting the phenomena taking place in the ATR whereas it would have been more fruitful to highlight the main factors and leading trends in the development of the area. In this case the limited nature of sources used in the consideration of such a complex topic can be felt clearly.

In their study, M.S. Kapitsa and M.P. Isayev quite justifiably assign an important role to relations between the Soviet Union and the Asian socialist countries, including the PRC. We believe, however, that the consideration of Soviet-Chinese relations deserves a deeper study, precisely in the light of solving ATR problems. Now, taking into consideration the results of the Soviet-Chinese Summit, this task becomes particularly relevant.

It is to be hoped that the publication of this monograph will lead to the further enhancement of the study of ATR problems, as problems of a most important battlefield in contemporary world policies. In this case we must abandon standard approaches to processes occurring here, eliminate established stereotypes and penetrate into the essence of phenomena. This would be entirely consistent with the criteria of the new political thinking.

The relevance of the study of the problems of the ATR increases in connection with the new Soviet proposals formulated in M.S. Gorbachev's September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech. These constructive suggestions, which are aimed at lowering tension, reducing armaments and respectively changing military policies in the area, met with a broad response in ATR countries and continue to provide an unabated incentive for the activities of peace-loving forces. The Soviet scientists are as yet to interpret this relevant topic and, above all, to develop constructive ideas and considerations based on the Krasnoyarsk initiatives.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Short Book Reviews

18020014q Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) pp 126-128

[Text] A.G. Aganbegyan. "Sovetskaya Ekonomika—Vzglyad v Budushcheye" [The Soviet Economy—View Into the Future]. *Ekonomika*, Moscow, 1988, 256 pp. Reviewed by E. Baranov, doctor of economic sciences, professor.

The process of revolutionary renovation of Soviet society has triggered the lively discussion of problems of economic perestroika in the press, and in literary-artistic, sociopolitical and popular science journals. Less

noticeable against this background are materials published in our leading economic journals and monographs. The probable explanation of this is that some time is needed in order to surmount the inertia of existing stereotypes and ensure a sober and profoundly scientific analysis. The monograph by A.G. Aganbegyan is one of the "first swallows" in a number of thorough scientific publications reflecting contemporary concepts relative to the Soviet economy.

The author describes the essential feature of the economic restructuring of our society at the present stage: the indivisible link between processes occurring in the national economy and perestroika in other areas of social life, the political and ideological above all (see p 169). The author provides a retrospective analysis of the development of the Soviet economy for the postwar period (see pp 36-53). To this effect he uses the visual method of computing the scale of implementation of social programs in correlation with the size of the growth of the national income and the availability of housing for the population, the structure of the employed population, etc. Let us particularly note the approach offered in the book for computing and analyzing the integral indicator of social production efficiency, the dynamics of which can be traced from the 7th to the 12th-5 year periods and, in the future, until the 2000.

The monograph provides an adequately full description of the role of scientific and technical progress as a decisive factor in the acceleration of socioeconomic development. The author emphasizes that preference should be given to the application of new revolutionary technological systems which are primarily of a low efficiency nature and are either wasteless or generate small waste, and which are linked with microelectronics and based on the latest scientific concepts on the microstructure of substances (see pp 131-133). This part of the book could have been more interesting had the author described the features of the developing economic mechanism, which should lead to interweaving technical and technological new developments in the fabric of the entire reproduction process.

Today it is already obvious that excessive centralization in management has become an obstacle on the way to the acceleration of socioeconomic development. It is equally obvious that the state retains the key role in ensuring the country's defense capability, the uninterrupted functioning of the most important elements in the industrial and social infrastructure and in pursuing a unified policy of upgrading the people's well-being. However, the science of economics has still not provided definitive answers to many questions related to the demarcation of functions of centralized state control and economic self-management.

We believe that the approach presented in the book concerning the functions of the state order is fruitful: the governmental authority which needs a corresponding item for the implementation of its tasks is the customer.

The customer establishes economic relations with the producer within the range of allocated financial funds (see pp 248-249). From this viewpoint the currently extensively discussed question of the share of state orders in the overall volume of output appears entirely secondary and digressive, for depending on the specific governmental need, it could range from 0 to 100 percent.

Academician Aganbegyan assumes that major capital investments in the hands of the state play the role of economic instruments "which can purposefully influence the increased production of a given commodity..." (p 186). We find it difficult to agree with this. The mass flows of centralized investments, in the range of dozens and hundreds of billions of rubles each 5-year period, have long stopped being an instrument for efficiently influencing the economy. Numerous examples of this fact could be found both in the current press and in the book itself. The "free" nature of centralized capital investments of ministries, departments and production enterprises does not stimulate the efficient use of investments but create construction delays and the freezing of huge national economic resources which are thinly distributed among numerous projects, thus putting a heavy burden on our deficit state budget. Clearly, centralized investments in the production area can be retained only as an exception, as one-of-a-kind national economic projects which follow the latest trends of scientific and technical progress and which are financed, as a rule, through loans.

It is also necessary to refine the concept of rejecting current production control on the part of the USSR Gosplan and other state agencies (see p 180). The author is unquestionably right when it is a question of petty supervision and unjustified interference in the activities of totally economically independent production units. In my view, however, today a different meaning should be invested in the concept of current regulation of the production process. The state management authorities must constantly feel the "pulse beat" of the economy. They must promptly detect and anticipate any undesirable trend through economic methods. Otherwise they could become uncontrollable, as was the case, for example, in 1988 with the tempestuous wage increase.

The book deals extensively with economic methods of managing the production units in the national economic system. The author convincingly describes the advantages of collective contracting and leasing, the so-called second model of cost accounting (see pp 222-232). At the same time, he should have considered in greater detail problems of the variety of forms of socialist ownership and their corresponding specific manifestations of production relations which, already now, in our reality, have far exceeded the limits of the two familiar models of organization of economic interaction with the state.

Great attention should also be paid to the question of surmounting monopoly in our economy. Without its elimination it would be hardly possible to eliminate the

diktat of producers and to ensure the normal economic procedure of establishing contractual prices and a wholesale trade in means of production.

A no less important question is that of the system of economic standards which regulate the activities of cost accounting enterprises and organizations. We support Aganbegyan's concept of granting the right "to the labor collectives themselves to establish, without any rates, the ratios of distribution of residual profits in the incentive funds" (p 252) in the immediate future. As the author convincingly proves, strict regulations in the distribution of residual profits have practically reduced to naught the stimulating function of the first model of cost accounting. In this case it is a question not only of an unjustified differentiation in standards but of the distribution principle itself.

The system of economic standards governing relations with the budget requires a major scientific reinterpretation. As the author emphasizes, this system must be based on the tax on profits and firm rates of payments for labor and natural resources. However, under the new economic conditions, when investments will be essentially based on enterprise and credit funds, payment for production assets is becoming obsolete.

This range of problems shows the complexity and variety of problems which face the Soviet economy. The book provides a solution to many among them. A number of recommendations are debatable, which confirms the insufficient developments of such problems today. Unquestionably, the publication of this monograph will draw the attention of our economists.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

18020014r Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89 (signed to press 17 May 89) p 128

[Text] On the occasion of Press Day, the journal's editors and the presidium of the board of the USSR Union of Journalists awarded the KOMMUNIST Prize for 1988 to the editors of MOLODOY KOMMUNIST, the Komsomol Central Committee journal, for active work in the ideological and theoretical upbringing of young people, interpretation of the experience of perestroika in the Komsomol and pointed formulation of topical problems of life of the growing generation.

Problems of the reform of the political system and the results of the election of USSR people's deputies were discussed in a dialogue with scientific associates from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Slavic and Balkan studies. The participants in the meeting expressed a number of wishes to the editors on improving their coverage of problems of history and today's life in the socialist countries.

The editors were visited by M. Lolic, executive secretary of the presidium of the Yugoslav League of Communists Central Committee. The Yugoslav guest obtained information on the work of the journal in covering topical problems of perestroika, its role in the democratization of the political system and the assertion of the party's vanguard positions in all areas of social development. Also discussed were problems of cooperation between KOMMUNIST and SOTSIYALIZAM, the journal of the League of Yugoslav Communists. The meeting was attended by M. Veres, the Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union.

In the course of a talk with the editors, K. Yamaya, correspondent for the Japanese newspaper HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN, was interested in the work of KOMMUNIST in interpreting the course of perestroika in the country's socioeconomic and political life, and the foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state. The Japanese journalist was particularly interested in the development of relations between the USSR and the PRC in the light of the Sino-Soviet Summit.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

Publication Data

18020014s Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 8, May 89

English Title: Kommunist, No 8, May 1989

Russian title: Kommunist, 8 (1342), May 1989

Editors: N.B. Bikkenin (editor-in-chief), A.I. Antipov, E.A. Arab-Ogly, B.S. Arkhipov, K.N. Brutents, Ye.T. Gaydar, I.A. Dedkov, S.V. Kolesnikov, O.R. Latsis, V.N. Nekrasov, Ye.Z. Razumov, N.N. Sibiryakov, Yu.A. Sklyarov, V.P. Trubnikov, P.N. Fedoseyev, S.F. Yarmolyuk.

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo "Pravda"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of Publication: May 1989

Signed to Press: 17 May 1989

Copies: 935,000

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1989.

END

1/10

22161

64

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103

5285 PORT ROYAL RD

SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTS may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTS or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTS and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.