


JPRS-UKO-89-003  
25 JANUARY 1989



# *JPRS Report*

# Soviet Union

**KOMMUNIST**  
No 15, October 1988

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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**KOMMUNIST**

No 15, October 1988

**Information Report on the CPSU Central Committee Plenum**  
*18020003a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 15, Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) p 3*

[Text] A CPSU Central Committee plenum was held on 30 September 1988.

In light of the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the plenum considered Politburo proposals for reorganizing the party apparatus as well as some personnel matters. The plenum was addressed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Comrade M.S. Gorbachev reported that A.A. Gromyko asked the CPSU Central Committee for a retirement on a pension. M.S. Gorbachev pointed out the big services performed by A.A. Gromyko to the Communist Party and the Soviet state and expressed good wishes to him. (M.S. Gorbachev's and A.A. Gromyko's statements were published by the press).

The plenum met A.A. Gromyko's request and relieved him of his duties as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

The plenum passed a decision on the CPSU Central Committee commissions on the key directions of domestic and foreign policies (a resolution on this matter was published in the press).

The plenum elected CPSU Central Committee Secretary V.A. Medvedev a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

The plenum elected V.M. Chebrikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, to be a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum elected A.V. Vlasov a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

The plenum elected A.P. Biryukova and A.I. Lukyanov candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, while relieving them of their duties as CPSU Central Committee secretaries.

The plenum relieved M.S. Solomentsev of his duties as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Commission in connection with his retirement on a pension.

The plenum relieved V.I. Dolgikh of his duties as candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in connection with his retirement on a pension.

The plenum relieved P.N. Demichev of his duties as candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo in connection with his retirement on a pension.

The plenum relieved A.F. Dobrynin of his duties as secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in connection with his retirement on a pension.

The plenum endorsed B.K. Pugo as chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Commission.

With this the CPSU Central Committee plenum ended its work.

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**On the Formation of the CPSU Central Committee Commissions and the Reorganization of the CPSU Central Committee Apparatus in Light of the 19th All-Union Party Conference Decisions**  
*18020003b Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 15, Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) p 4*

[Resolution of the 30 September 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] 1. The plenum has deemed it expedient to have the following commissions of the CPSU Central Committee:

Questions of Party Building and Cadre Policy—chairman: G.P. Razumovskiy.

Ideological Commission of the CPSU Central Committee—chairman: V.A. Medvedev.

Questions of Socioeconomic Policy—chairman: N.N. Slyunkov.

Questions of Agrarian Policy—chairman: Ye.K. Ligachev.

Questions of International Policy—chairman: A.N. Yakovlev.

Questions of Legal Policy—chairman: V.M. Chebrikov.

2. To instruct the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to take practical steps on setting up a new structure of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus and local party committees, taking into consideration changes in the

functions of party bodies under the conditions of the deepening of restructuring and the implementation of the reform in the country's political system.

3. The central committees of the communist parties of Union republics and kraykoms and obkoms of the party, during the course of accountability and elections that are taking place, should especially concentrate on selecting cadres to the party apparatus and the promotion to such work of comrades possessing high political and business qualities and of dedicated supporters of restructuring, who enjoy trust and prestige among Communist Party and nonparty members.

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**Revolution, Perestroyka, Humanism**  
18020003c *Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 15,*  
*Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) pp 5-11*

[Editorial]

[Text] The Great October Socialist Revolution was the most important landmark in the history not only of the peoples of our country but of all mankind. Whoever assessed its importance—whether friend or foe—can only acknowledge the grandiose nature of the event which took place in 1917 and its fateful nature in terms of the further development of civilization. In terms of scale and immediate and more distant social consequences, not all of which have been as yet revealed by history, not to mention world philosophy, the October Revolution has no analogue. For the first time in history the popular masses acquired the real opportunity to determine their own fate and to build a society on the basis of the principles of social justice and true humanity. As was predicted by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the socialist revolution was called upon to embody the humanistic ideals of mankind.

Pursuing the democratic traditions of liberation in universal history, Marxist humanism proceeds from the priority of the universal interests and values of mankind over any other specific interests dictated by social, national, governmental or narrow-class egotism. Marx, Engels and Lenin saw the historical mission of the working class above all in that, as it liberates itself in the course of the socialist revolution from capitalist exploitation, it also liberates all those exploited and oppressed, eliminates the nutritive grounds for social antagonisms and thus lays the material and spiritual foundations for the all-round and harmonious development of the individual. In its historical perspective, the socialist revolution means the release of man from the chains of economic, social, political and spiritual alienation, restoring to him his essential forces and bringing to light his creative capabilities.

The socialist revolution not only proclaimed but also, for the first time in the history of mankind, actually implemented many general democratic rights and freedoms for which the popular masses had struggled even 100 years after the bourgeois-democratic revolutions in the West. Suffice it to cite as an example the right of nations to self-determination, equality between men and women, granting young people as of the age of 18 the right actively to participate in political life, and many others.

The beginning of a new age in international relations was laid. The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems was dictated not only by the existing political realities and the conditions needed for building socialism, but also the superior humanistic principles aimed at eliminating war from life of society in general. Now, at the end of the 20th century, in the course of the global integration of mankind, developing into an integral and interconnected community, although not void of profound contradictions, this humanistic aspiration has been developed further. The assertion of guaranteed international security on our planet and the right of every person to live under the conditions of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world has truly become the powerful imperative of our time.

The revolutionary activity of the popular masses is a fundamental principle of Marxist humanism. It is the masses alone that, in the process of revolutionary change, can free themselves from social and national oppression of exploiters and the oppression of prejudices and illusions which enslave their minds and willpower. A person cannot be truly free without self-liberation. That is why the founders of Marxism-Leninism invariably and systematically rejected the voluntaristic and utopian petit-bourgeois revolutionary idea of the coercive "promotion of happiness" of their own and other nations, justifiably believing that this can only compromise the socialist revolution and be accompanied by catastrophic consequences. Actually, history convincingly proved that whenever in the course of revolutionary reorganization the idea of bringing coercive "happiness" became prevalent, this caused tremendous harm to social ideals and to the objectives of the socialist revolution and was paralleled by unjustified casualties and crimes against humanity. Such was the case during the period of the cult of personality in our country and the period of the "cultural revolution" in China, not to mention the regime of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

In speculating on such examples, which deserve condemnation, for decades the bourgeois ideologues claimed that however noble the ideals of the socialist revolution may have been, the price paid by the peoples for their implementation is excessively high and does not justify them, for which reason it is better to tolerate capitalism as being, allegedly, the "lesser evil." However, the groundlessness of this argument can be easily detected by the unbiased historian or politician: the crimes which

Stalin committed in the course of the accelerated collectivization and the political repressions of the 1930s-1950s were by no means the "price of the socialist revolution," but the price paid by the people for the deformation of socialism and for the distortion of the Leninist program of building socialism in our country. Unfortunately, to this day we are forced to pay for the material and spiritual harm caused by these deformations and crimes. Those who today justify the casualties which our people suffered during the period of the cult of personality by citing lofty objectives or objective circumstances actually do nothing but repeat (merely changing the sign) the arguments of bourgeois ideologues opposing the socialist revolution.

The lengthy period of stagnation as well caused significant harm to the social development of our country and the humanistic ideals of socialism. The antihuman "residual" approach which dominated the social area during those years of stagnation had as its result a belittling of the social guarantees and living conditions of several population strata, a drop in the level of education and health-care, a lowering of the average life span, increased infant mortality, increased alcoholism and drastic worsening of the ecological situation in a number of areas. Bribery, corruption, total permissiveness and arbitrariness allowed by some party, soviet and economic leaders, seriously undermined the moral foundations of our society. Today we must take energetic efforts firmly to uproot from our lives all such negative phenomena and antisocial trends which are incompatible with the humanistic nature of socialism.

The liberating democratic impetus of the October Revolution and its humanistic guidelines were experienced by the Soviet people in the course of all of their trials. The great historical significance of the revolutionary restructuring and social renovation initiated with the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum means precisely the restoration of the Leninist program for building socialism and the assertion of consistent Marxist humanism in all areas of life. In his address to the heads of the mass information media, ideological establishments and creative associations, last September, M.S. Gorbachev said: "Today we have not only a concept of perestroika but, certain assertions notwithstanding, also a fundamental strategy of renovation, concretized in the most important areas of social development. A most difficult time has begun: it was not easy to formulate the concept of perestroika but this, comrades, was easier than to implement it in specific actions. The implementation of our plan is related to organizing a huge mass of people, a perestroika of thinking in the party and the people, in each collective and in every individual. This is a process of tremendous difficulty and scale."

As we know, historical experience is measured not in terms of the number of years lived but in terms of the social shifts and changes in social life. In a revolutionary period of social life 3 years is a long time. Within that

time a significant step was taken along the difficult and complex road of social renovation in the spirit of the revolutionary traditions of the October Revolution and on the basis of Lenin's plan and our own understanding of the laws governing the building of socialism.

After a lengthy period of stagnation society is acquiring a dynamism and a hope for a better future and, with it, a confidence in the future. A pleasing change has taken place in the moral atmosphere. Increasingly broader population strata are becoming involved in the democratization process on all levels. Glasnost is asserting itself in public opinion. A new economic mechanism, based on the rational combination of the interests of the individual, the labor collective and the entire society, was formulated and is being applied. The moral cleansing of the society and the increased social activeness of the people may be considered the main results of renovation today.

Now, however, when socialist society has assumed a new qualitative status, and when it is merely beginning to acquire its distinguishable features, voices of reinsurance seekers may be heard, rhetorically asking: Have we rushed ahead too fast? Has democratization come out of control? Have the sensible limits of glasnost been overstepped?

Let us bluntly say that such fears and questions, inherited from the cult of personality and stagnation and, therefore, understandable to some extent, are groundless. No, the party has not alienated itself from the masses and has not rushed ahead. On the contrary, the masses are marching alongside party and the party is expressing their will and expectations. Our people are no longer willing to tolerate negative processes and trends of stagnation. The overwhelming majority of Soviet people expect of their leaders even greater decisiveness and consistency in implementing the strategic course adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress and confirmed at the 19th Party Conference. Democratization is only gathering strength. We must not limit it but enhance the level of political standards in the country's life for leaders in all positions and the broadest possible popular masses. We must not introduce any kind of "limits" to glasnost but enhance the standards of accurate and prompt information and the level of skill and responsibility of the members of the press for their writings. Such precisely were the considerations which dictated the adoption of the glasnost resolution at the 19th Party Conference.

On the problem of democratization and glasnost we must develop Lenin's perspicacious ideas and follow his bold example. In arguing with his political opponents, who called for "waiting" on the matter of the socialist revolution until, gradually, under capitalist conditions, the masses become sufficiently cultured to this effect, V.I. Lenin emphasized that, by making a socialist revolution we shall also create the necessary and favorable conditions for the fast growth of the culture of the

working people. The same is happening today as well. It is precisely in the course of radical perestroika, democratization and glasnost that the broad masses will be able most quickly and substantively to become involved with political culture and to realize the entire extent of their social and moral responsibility. In this case it is important to understand that there is no method for involving the people with political culture and democracy other than the intensification of political life, live creativity of social renovation. To learn democracy means to live within it and to live under the conditions of democracy means also constantly to learn democracy. All other assumed ways of democratization, such as the slow maturing of democratic habits in an essentially stagnating society or expecting democracy to come from above (albeit from the highest governmental level), would be either the naive dream of a utopian or the thoughtlessness (or design) of the conservative. Democracy, glasnost and freedom of speech can be banned with ukases. They cannot be promulgated by decree. Like the new thinking, they can truly mature in the course of the sociocreative work of millions of people and in no other way.

Democracy is the political foundation of socialist statehood. In accordance with Lenin's behests we are comprehensively broadening the democratic rights and freedom of will of the individual; democracy presumes a pluralism of opinions and the right to disagree. The sovereign self-government by the people is the foundation of a socialist state of law; it is an organic combination of direct and representative democracy.

Democratization allows us to bring up all the advantages of the socialist system and its tremendous potential and maximally to broaden the process of the involvement of man in perestroika, for it is precisely man, with the entire array of his social and personal qualities, social roles and hypostases—as a worker, citizen, member of a family and a labor collective, with his unique individuality—who is the main character in the changes taking place. We must strengthen our confidence in man and respect for his dignity. We must offer social opportunity for encouraging his initiative, inventiveness and enterprise. In developing in the individual responsibility to society, it is important, at the same time, to develop in man responsibility to himself, for the way he manages his own life, capabilities and talents.

The second most important aspect of social responsibility, which was forgotten during the period of stagnation, is the responsibility of society to the individual and of the state to its citizens. In the process of the radical restructuring and revolutionary renovation of socialism, bureaucratism is our major opponent. It is one of the main reasons hindering the implementation of this most important function. We must engage in systematic and unabating struggle against it. Bureaucratism has many faces; it suppresses initiative and activity of the masses and promotes and encourages dependency. The bureaucratic ideal of socialism is the all-embracing "statism" of material and spiritual life and the conversion of all

people into submissive subjects, so that the satisfaction not only of the individual needs of the working people but also the needs of society will be interpreted as the personal good deed of a big or small bureaucrat.

Bureaucratism and dependency are, metaphorically speaking, the siamese twins born of the authoritative model of socialism, which developed over many decades. These twins share a common circulatory and nervous systems. They cannot exist independently of one-another. Both embody the alienation of man from real social life: bureaucratism means coercion from the outside while dependency means voluntary-coerced self-alienation.

Let us frankly say that we shall not be able to eliminate bureaucratism without eliminating dependency in the minds and behavior of the broad strata in terms of the socialist state and society as a whole, or turn the economic, political and legal structures and institutions toward man and make them work to his advantage. That is why the daring and firm support of the personal initiative and independent activities of the masses and the autonomy of labor collectives and self-government are the most efficient means of struggle against bureaucratism and a prerequisite for surmounting the vestiges of economic and political alienation in our society. The social meaning of perestroika is, precisely, to provide maximal scope for the free, creative and constructive energy of man.

Revolutionary perestroika introduces a "human dimension" in all areas of life in our society. A "human dimension" means adopting a systematically humanistic approach to the problems of socioeconomic and scientific and technical progress and to problems of culture.

As we know, from the very beginning Marx and Engels identified historical progress toward communism with real humanism. Communism, they emphasized, is, in terms of its social nature, the embodiment of universal human values and democratic ideals and the development of the age-old humanistic tradition in social consciousness and of the practical activities of previous generations. Communism becomes true humanism not in the distant future, when it will be fully developed and asserted as the new social system, but already in the process of building socialism and its further progress toward ever higher levels of development.

What precisely distinguishes real humanism from the abstract humanism, the limited nature of which was criticized by the Marxists, is that it is not formal and, therefore, not impersonal, but specific, linked with unbreakable ties to daily practical life. It is addressed to every individual. It considers man the highest moral and social value. In the course of all of our activities, socialist history occasionally forgot this specific, practical, personal "human dimension," along with the official conditions of humanism. This means that today we have even less right to forget this circumstance. We must not

forget the specific-individual nature of socialist humanism. The houses we build, and the food, clothing and shoes we produce or, in a word, anything that we create, we must create not for the sake of the Gosplan, not for the sake of accountability and reports to "higher authorities," or for the State Statistical Committee, but for specific people, so that every person will find it pleasant to live in them, to wear comfortable clothing, to be well nourished, and to become actively exposed to the achievements of culture. We are striving to make all our lives better for one and all, excluding only those who would like to live at someone else's expense.

The law-trend of the growing role of the people's masses in history, which was discovered by historical materialism, includes, as an inalienable aspect, the increased role of the human, of the personality factor in the development of society, for the popular masses are not a faceless, an amorphous crowd which, incidentally, excludes for the Marxists any thought of "flirting" with the masses, but demands taking into consideration their real moods. They are a tremendous number of individuals who, in the course of social progress, become actively involved in historical creativity. Those in whose minds classes, social strata, nations and masses have become abstract and faceless concepts which conceal the destinies of individuals understand little about Marxism. Read the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin and you can clearly see that they are "inhabited" not only by profound ideas and scientific conclusions but also by thousands of real historical individuals with their profound interests, daily concerns and cherished hopes.

In bringing them the democratic and humanistic nature of our system, we do not intend to abandon its determining concepts such as "human rights" and "socialist self-management," "social cohesion" and "socialism with a human face" merely because our ideological opponents have distorted their content and tried to use them in their struggle against us. Yes, the true rights of man and the dignity of the individual and the simple standards of morality are to us supreme social values, while the self-government of the masses is a practical ideal which is being implemented in life. Real socialism is a society born of the October Revolution, truly based on the cohesion of all social strata, all generations and all nationalities, united through common interests and a single historical destiny. A society turned to man is, precisely, the social system which was anticipated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, for the sake of which a socialist revolution was made and which is being asserted in the course of the revolutionary restructuring and radical renovation of our lives.

Humanism is a wide and rich gamut of feelings and convictions. Embodied in the behavior of the individual, they ennoble and enhance both the person who is guided by them as well as those around him. We cannot tolerate for the moral principles of socialism, which are naturally accompanied by humanism, to be lost or impoverished.

Recently, noted men of Soviet culture wrote with justifiable concern that traditional moral values, tried through the ages, such as conscience and honor, charity and compassion, generosity and responsiveness, have virtually disappeared from our vocabulary, not to mention daily use. These and many other humane facets of the personality must, unquestionably, regain their permanent individual and social value. Professional ethics and an ever broader range of social activities are inconceivable without such moral qualities. However, they are necessary not only to workers in health-care, education, services, law enforcement and cultural institutions. They are urgently needed by all of us, for such qualities enhance the individual in his own eyes and in the opinion of those around him. They give everyone greater dignity and confidence in his strength and vocation. And although such human qualities cannot be measured in tons, meters, or kilowatts, or included in statistical reports, nonetheless they enhance greatly and visibly the social well-being and moral prosperity of society: they create the moral atmosphere of intolerance of all evil, an atmosphere which we need so greatly, and charge us with spiritual energy.

The nature of man, his inner world, do not tolerate a moral vacuum. If the truly humanistic values are expelled from of it or become bogged down within it, they will be replaced by philistine antivalues alien to our society, be they jealousy, malice, vengefulness or greed. Why conceal it from ourselves: such antivalues, which sunk their toxic roots in the hearts of many people during the years of stagnation, corrupted them and caused tremendous harm to those around them, to the entire society. They must be eliminated, they must be firmly uprooted! Unless all of us, with a pure heart, learn to celebrate not only our own successes but the successes of others and be saddened not exclusively by our personal failures but also by the failures of other people, there could be no question of collectivism or real humanism!

True and not distorted collectivism rests not on harming the individual but on his emancipation. It is aimed against bourgeois individualism, which violates the rights, honor and dignity of others. It does not violate the individuality of the person. Conversely, it draws its strength from the cohesion among the individuals which make it. The more varied, original and complex they are, the stronger and firmer becomes the collective, the more obligations it can assume. As we know, Marx, Engels and Lenin exposed fictitious and distorted collectivism (which today is frequently manifested as group egotism) as drastically as they did bourgeois individualism, precisely because both suppress the initiative, enterprise and freedom of huge masses of people. The cornerstone principle of communism they proclaimed—that the free development of one is a prerequisite for the free development of all—was considered by them as the life-asserting foundation of their humanistic outlook.

Today we are going through a responsible, a crucial period in the history of our country. However, in emphasizing the crucial and transitional nature of the entire historical stage in the development of Soviet society, we must not conceive of it as some kind of temporary (not to mention short-time or intermediary!) condition. We must reject the rusty mentality of the "time servers," who are ready to tolerate, as was frequently the case in the past, any kind of shortcoming, omission or distortion of socialism, relying on the fact that they would be corrected sometime in the indefinite future.

Socialism must steadily develop. It must meet the present and steadily growing criteria of social progress and not rely on the old measures and evaluations. The Soviet people, the young generation even more so, who grew up and developed in postwar times, are addressing to the social system in which they live the no longer relatively limited and modest demands of the first years of the Soviet system and even those of the 1950s and 1960s. Essentially and as a whole they are right, although some people may not like this. Society must meet the increased requirements and expectations of the Soviet people, to the extent to which they do not contradict our social and moral values and the humanistic principles of socialism. At the same time, the growing demands of the individual concerning the standard and quality of life must be consistent with his efforts, with his labor contribution to the material well-being and spiritual wealth of society, for we can handle and distribute, according to the rules of labor and justice, only that which we, ourselves, have created!

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#### At the Watershed

18020003d Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) pp 12-21

[Article by Nikolay Grigoryevich Tyurin, deputy editor KOMMUNIST department of party building, and state and social organizations]

[Text] It cannot be said that what happened on 11 June of this year, at the regular plenum of the Luga Party Gorkom made any explosive impression on the party and nonparty residents of the city and the rayon: our time is generous in new developments, of things which, until very recently, we could not even think. However, many Luga people read a second and third time some excerpts from the report published in the rayon newspaper, headed "Perestroyka Means Ideological Renovation," after which they turned to other people who would comment on the text. By no means did they always find them. Rumors were circulated in the district. Looking strictly at the facts, what had happened at that plenum?

On that particular Saturday, 5 minutes before the start, six party members had tried to attend the gorkom plenary meeting. At the entrance hall they were stopped,

and the head of the organizational department explained that admission was only by invitation, with cards which those people did not have. At that point, they presented an appeal they had previously drafted, addressed to the participants in the plenum, and requested that it be read. At the appointed time they were invited into the conference hall, where they were told that the plenum had considered the appeal (read by V.N. Grebnev, party gorkom first secretary), that not one of the speakers had supported the document, that the participants in the plenum had decided to discuss the appeal without its authors being present and that now they were to be informed of the draft resolution. A draft resolution was unanimously adopted by the plenum. The concluding fact was the following: the address contained an appeal to the members of the city CPSU committee to relieve V.N. Grebnev of his position of first secretary, for it was precisely he, in the view of the signatories, who embodied the obstruction mechanism in Luga.

What happened then? In the same way that the party gorkom plenum decided to make its resolution public in the newspaper, the authors of the appeal as well wanted to make their viewpoint public. On 14 June they submitted to the editors of *LUZHSKAYA PRAVDA* a letter with the request, but were refused. That same day, the rayon newspaper published a report on the plenum, which ended as follows:

"The party gorkom plenum received a letter signed by CPSU members Yu.I. Luppov, V.S. Zorin, I.I. Fomin, G.R. Kuznetsov, A.P. Lebedev, V.F. Mironov, A.I. Kiselev and O.A. Kotlova, in which they accuse V.N. Grebnev, party gorkom first secretary, of illegal actions.

"The participants in the plenum assessed this letter. Fifteen people participated in its discussion. It was considered groundless, slanderous and insulting. The CPSU Gorkom Plenum passed a resolution unanimously expressing confidence in V.M. Grebnev as the head of the city party organization for the full period of his term (until the next regular city party conference). The plenum decreed that its resolution be directed to the primary party organizations in which the signatories of this letter belong.

"Comrades Luppov, Zorin, Fomin, Kuznetsov, Lebedev, Mironov, Kiselev and Kotlova were summoned to the plenary meeting and informed of the plenum's resolution and the assessment of their actions. In their presence a resolution was passed on this matter, unanimously approved by the plenum participants."

It may have seemed that the highest point of the conflict had been reached, and should have been followed by a drop and, if not total pacification, in any case a period of quiet. Whatever the details of the procedure may have been, these people had addressed themselves to the plenum and obtained a simple answer. Apparently, however, the energy which was accumulated on the two



opposites poles of this situation needed an outlet. Several days later, Engineer G.R. Kuznetsov, one of the signatories, summed up his new letter as follows:

"The newspaper publication, the recommendation of the CPSU Gorkom to censure us in the primary party organizations, the dissemination of rumors and intrigues, the refusal to publish our address and the content of the speeches by the CPSU Gorkom members at the plenum, and the 'explanatory work' of lecturers of the Znaniye Society and the editors.... prove the organized persecution of the eight party members who believed in perestroika. Furthermore, this proves that there are in Luga forces which I can describe only as being reactionary and which, without thinking or trying to find the truth, are ready to engage in committing the most unseemly acts the moment they hear the command: 'At them!' This is a dangerous trend which must not be ignored.

"I beg of you, using the means of democracy and glasnost, to help us.... to defend our name, honor and dignity."

It soon became clear, however, that in general, there were no reasons for R.G. Kuznetsov to claim "organized persecution," and a great deal of what had been written in the letter turned out, after being very closely studied, unproved, to say the least. However, Gennadiy Romanovich had no doubts in his mind that their collective action not only failed to achieve its objective but also triggered against the entire group a corresponding attitude on the part of the gorkom. Where to seek help? No, not to the superior party level did he address himself but to the Leningrad Perestroika Interprofessional Club, one of those voluntary social organizations which have appeared in recent years on the wave of renovation, generally known as informals. It was already on behalf of the club's council, with an accompanying note, signed by three Perestroika activists, that G.R. Kuznetsov's letter was addressed to the journal KOMMUNIST.

The Leningrad itinerary of the Luga letter was not chosen at random. It is true that the Perestroika Club, the backbone of which consists of young scientific and technical intellectuals, some 40 percent of whose membership are party members, is hardly the image of a perfidious sect, with which we still frequently associate the word "informal." Furthermore, one of Kuznetsov's fellow students at the university was a member of the club's council. However, these were not the sole considerations which led to these steps. Was it to draw maximum attention? Was it to prove readiness to act, going beyond the limits of ordinary motivations? Clearly, such were precisely the motivations which were consistent with Gennadiy Romanovich's decision and, furthermore, which were consistent with his character. But here is a noteworthy detail: after a while, finding out that Kuznetsov had addressed himself to the Perestroika Club, another six among those who had addressed themselves to the plenum of the Luga CPSU Gorkom, signed

their names under a similar letter and addressed it to that same club. It is thus that the destinies of people who, until very recently, hardly knew one another or even were totally unsuspecting of each other's existence, became entangled. For the sake of what? For the sake of perestroika," says Yuriy Ivanovich Luppov, one of the signatories. "This was the main thing...."

However, it is now time to describe, albeit briefly, the place where all of these events took place. From the viewpoint of economic indicators, in the oblast, Luzhskiy Rayon is doing well. According to the specialists, it has an adequate base for the development of the agrarian sector. It has no natural anomalies. The Luga people have neither industrial giants nor the gigantic problems of the latter. In a word, life is tolerable. The trouble is that with increasing frequency notes of concern and disagreement and differences on the organization of daily affairs appear. In Luga words on perestroika and its specific results are being compared ever more critically and persistently. Understandably, in such comparisons there is bound to be a mention of the party gorkom, the city executive committee and the names of several people, included in the concept of "town authorities." As to the first secretary of the gorkom, for quite some time the people of Luga have become accustomed to relating a great many ordinary and not so ordinary things to his person.

Valentin Mikhaylovich Grebnev is a local, a native of the area and his entire life in the city and rayon is known. At the age of 15 he found a job at the lumberyard; at 16 he became a guerrilla; in 1944 he was severely wounded. After the liberation of the area from the fascist occupation forces he worked in river transportation and, as of 1945, in Komsomol, economic and party jobs in that same Luzhskiy Rayon, with a spell for study at the Leningrad Higher Party School. For the past slightly less than 18 years he has been first secretary of the Luga CPSU Gorkom. He is the recipient of four orders and nine medals, and was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor in 1981.

Matching Valentin Mikhaylovich's career is his reputation which, in this unhurried area, kept growing like the rings on a tree trunk. "The boss," is the way Grebnev is referred to in Luga. We heard this word both from the mouths of leading workers and rank-and-file people. "Not even grass can grow without his say-so," added one of our interlocutors. Therefore, is it not time to consider all present successes and failures through the lens of the activities of Valentin Mikhaylovich, and the sum total of his features as a leader, party member and individual? "No, this would not be in the Marxist style," says I.I. Fomin, one of those who signed the appeal to the gorkom plenum and the letter to the Perestroika Club. "Other than Grebnev we have had good people, in town and country, in all areas. However, it is unquestionable that the first secretary has had and still has a strong influence on the state of affairs in the rayon." I asked Ivan

Ivanovich: What kind of situation? "In short, a situation which will become intolerable in the future," slowly said my interlocutor, as though this was something he had long resolved in his mind.

I.I. Fomin retired quite a long time ago and, consequently, is almost independent of superiors (seven of the eight party members who addressed themselves to the gorkom plenum are pensioners, a feature to which we shall return). However, he too, it seems, feels the concern experienced by many others, when a one-man power determines the solution of major socioeconomic problems. Is this concern all that exaggerated? Outside appearances do not show any exceptional processes taking place in Luzhskiy Rayon. This is confirmed by socioeconomic statistics, documents of plenary sessions of the party gorkom and meetings of the city soviet of people's deputies.

For example, in the first 2 years of the 5-year plan the volume of industrial output increased 17.6 percent and goods marketed, 18 percent. This entire increase was the result of higher labor productivity, which increased by 19.6 percent. Assignments and socialist obligations for the production of consumer goods were significantly overfulfilled. The work of the collectives in the implementation of the Quality, Energy and other programs within the framework of the general Intensification-90 rayon-wide program developed further. In the past 10 years more than 200 million rubles have been invested in the development of agricultural production alone. During the 11th 5-year period the net income of the sovkhozes increased from 877,000 to 13.6 million rubles. There are no losing farms in the rayon.

Nor is there a lack of public study of problems encountered by the city and the rayon. For example, the reasons for failure of the plans for selling milk, grain, potatoes, and vegetables to the state in 1987 and the first 2 years of the 5-year period, the nonfulfillment of the plan for the stockpiling of fodder for the livestock of the public farms, and the exposure of the reasons for the nonfulfillment of the 1987 plan by the construction organizations in the rayon were listed at the plenary meetings of the gorkom and the city soviet sessions; the reasons for which it takes an average of 16 years of waiting for more than 1,300 families registered with the city executive committee to obtain housing were explained; the reasons were determined for the scarcity of kindergartens and nurseries in the city and the fact that schools work in two shifts.... Many other items of urgent concern to the people of Luga in a great variety of activities were discussed. Therefore, what is the reason for the intolerance shown by some people of what is taking place in Luga and its environs?

"Everything began with perestroyka," O.A. Kotlova said, explaining that an understanding was developed and soon reached the necessary point of realization that one could no longer live as in the past.

In describing how difficult it was for her to sign the appeal to the plenum, Olga Aleksandrovna smiled sadly:

"Today it is easier for the young. Our generation, however, was raised in a spirit of absolute obedience to orders, instructions and commands, and everything which comes from "higher authorities." However, we cannot advance without crossing this threshold. For what is perestroyka if not the sum of actions of those who are unwilling to tolerate any longer claims of prosperity and semi-empty shelves and the abundance of big words and quiet actions of those who are directly responsible for the education of the people?"

What is common here in terms of the present stage of perestroyka and what is specific to the Luga situation? Yes, there are both obstructions and opponents of renovation processes and, with our sharper vision today we can see much more than we could until recently. It is more accurate to say that as we came across major or minor deformations, we frequently considered them as being the virtually only possible way. Today we are feeling ever more deeply the wrongness of the distortions of socialism wherever and however they may appear. As to the wish to have a real change for the better, in a small city such as Luga it is, obviously, more painful for the fact that life here most frequently does not seethe but curls along, flows and even stands still. Naturally, there is a sharp contrast between it and what the people of Luga read in the press or see on television. Such is the general background on the basis of which, one would think, appeared the feelings of those party members who turned to the gorkom plenum with a personal criticism of the first secretary.

Who are these people who decided to take this unusual step? It is true that the plenums of the Astrakhan and Sakhalin Party Obkoms, at which their first secretaries resigned, and the plenum of the Yaroslavl Obkom, which deprived of his mandate the delegate to the 19th All-Union Conference and former first secretary of the oblast party committee, indicated that a high position in the CPSU is not a lifetime privilege. However, the decisions of these plenums were backed by the opinion of thousands of party members. Here, in Luga, it was a group of eight people. What motivated them?

If we study the biographies of the "disturbers" of Luga tranquillity, the first thing which strikes us is that this is a joint action by people of very different ages: seven of them retired some time ago or quite recently; one is a 40-year old engineer with practical experience of work in the party apparat. As to the veterans, two of them have special pensions, and four are veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and bearers not only of combat orders but also, in the case of two of them, their disability makes their retirement today truly deserved. They include former cadre officers or modest bookkeepers, fitters, people who moved around and rebuilt agriculture and worked hard in social work, and have first-hand knowledge of party, soviet and trade union work. Many of

them are the recipient of honor certificates and medals for labor or in honor of anniversaries. In a word, they are quite typical lives of the people of the senior generation, who honestly shared the joys and sorrows of their country.

The case of their young associate G.R. Kuznetsov is more complex. He is a graduate of the physics department of Leningrad State University. In his third year of study he became interested in philosophy, psychology and sociology. Since then he has tried to look at social processes through the lens of the precise sciences. He went to work as a secondary school student, as a turner in the school workshop, and took courses in telegraph and radio communication. He served as a military specialist in Siberia. Back home, for a while he was a director of the Luga Regional Museum, after which he became an engineer at the local radio repair equipment plant. In 1979 he was summoned to the party gorkom and told that an instructor at the organizational department was needed. This may have seemed to complete the questing period in his life and his future appeared clear and open. But...

Gennadiy Romanovich and I met twice and spoke of his labor biography. At the Leningrad CPSU Obkom I read Kuznetsov's long cardboard-bound memoranda in which he described in the greatest possible detail the history of his conflict with the Luga Party Gorkom. The initial impression was of an educated, thinking and involved person. The second impression, which developed almost simultaneously with the first, was that he could be classified as an "inconvenient" person, with perhaps a somewhat exaggerated opinion of himself and, above all, clearly lacking the skills and, sometimes, the instincts which help a person swim in the sea of life. Could this be described as loyalty, conformism, comradeship or a feeling of closeness? Naturally, it is not a matter of words but of the extent to which this quality is manifested in one social context or another. What is obvious is that G.R. Kuznetsov did not remain silent where others would. He showed persistence in implementing assignments which the majority of his colleagues would try to avoid and he stood out with his erudition where it would have been better to suppress it. The results of all this, alas, are known:

Little by little a person who is unwilling (or cannot) to "be like everyone else," becomes the target initially of negative emotions and, if this does not work, negative actions.

How did this develop? Several years ago, in checking on a critical report from an enterprise about the wrong actions of the personnel of the city newspaper, G.R. Kuznetsov established that the complaint of the production workers was largely substantiated. He should have stopped there, having reported the results to the leadership. However, he began to "dig deeper" and realized, from this and other similar situations, a number of facts which made him consider the work style of a given

journalist and her ties with the gorkom propaganda department and the secretary in charge of ideological affairs (today the ex-secretary). A correspondent from the central press came to Luga. He took the "official" viewpoint which conflicted with Kuznetsov's. Worried by the fact that his potential opponent was not answering his letters, Gennadiy Romanovich went to Leningrad, to seek a personal meeting with the journalist and, since the journalist was absent, met with his wife. Remembering the pushiness of this unexpected visitor and his style of speaking heatedly although very logically, one could easily imagine the state of mind of the wife against whom this visitor raised ever more convincing.

What happened then has two versions: the one written up in the documents, which was "accepted," and the one written by Kuznetsov. The wife, who was visited by Gennadiy Romanovich, submitted to the editorial management a petition in which she requested that she and her husband be protected from blackmail and threats on the part of a member of the Luga Party Gorkom. The first secretary of the gorkom went to check matters on the spot. Back from Leningrad, V.I. Kislyakov, the gorkom second secretary, reported that the petition was correct. Kuznetsov's explanatory note was considered unconvincing. As a result, on 14 December 1984 the Luga City Party Committee Buro passed a resolution according to which G.R. Kuznetsov was issued a strict reprimand for violating party ethics, and he was assigned to economic work. In May 1985, this reprimand was lifted without any motivation or any statement by Kuznetsov.

Therefore, on the one hand we have a group of veterans and, on the other, a relatively young person. They find one another and formulate a common program for action. What is their platform? "Naturally, personal damage," says Vladimir Ivanovich Kislyakov who, after his work at the gorkom, became deputy manager of Construction Trust No 64. "The old facts on which resolutions were passed a long time ago were summed up and tendentiously assessed. What is this if not slander? That is precisely what I said at the gorkom plenum."

The gorkom personnel willingly provide details concerning the personal harm done to the authors. Allegedly, they were motivated not by lofty reasons but by a hurt self-esteem, unsolved housing problems, and so on. The minutes of the gorkom plenum in which the discussion of the question submitted by the "group of eight" was discussed, projects a feeling of anger and energetic rejection. There are no meaningful arguments concerning the address itself but virtually every speaker has called for prosecuting those who signed it. The feeling is that they are discussing not people well known to many of the participants in the plenum, who have been frequently addressed as "comrade," but some kind of alien and hostile force and that the only answer here is a unanimous rebuff. What provided the emotional impetus for

such unity? In my view, not least in the feelings of this plenum were the statements which hit the most sensitive problem of Luga's recent past, known locally as the "Karelov case."

This case emoted the city and the rayon substantially, for the main character in the trial was the former director of the public catering trust, V.G. Karelov who, for 14 years had been one of the most noted citizens. Let us not discuss the details of the crime described by the rayon newspaper in articles reading like crime novels, the more so since the "Karelov case" brought to light quite a well organized mechanism for cheating customers, juggling with deficits and extensive bribery. The people of Luga reacted less to the details of cheating customers in weighing the products or the thousands of rubles stolen, than to Karelov's metamorphosis. Only yesterday he had enjoyed the reputation of a person who was welcomed in any official premise, out of which he would emerge with decisions which were "necessary to the trust and its collective."

In the spring of 1985, when the sentence was passed, according to which many subordinates of the former trust director went to jail while he himself was sentenced to 10 years of deprivation of freedom in a strict corrective labor colony, with confiscation of property, as a war veteran he fell under the provisions of the amnesty granted on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the victory, but the rumor issued its own verdict: Karelov had been protected by those who had benefited from his services. Angry letters were sent from Luga to various authorities. This played a certain role in the fact that by decision of the RSFSR Supreme Court the case was sent for a new trial. Last December the Leningrad Oblast Court had a circuit session which put everything in its proper place. However, hearing the sentence, according to which Karelov and his closest associates had been sentenced to various terms of deprivation of freedom, the Luga people attending the trial felt conflicting emotions: there had been punishment but conclusions about the atmosphere in which this fault had been exposed and dealt with had not been fully reached. The text of the sentencing repeatedly mentioned the party gorkom and the city executive committee by no means as authorities which had opposed Karelov and his associates.

The current practices of the rayon show other vital problems as well, such as: if we study the materials of the recent plenums of the Luga CPSU Gorkom it may seem that the life of this rayon is codified in statistical figures, names of enterprises, farms and organizations, appearing as though a topographic map in which, for understandable reasons, one can see neither specific landscapes nor the climate. In all the speeches in the reports, the level of summations was the same: maximal. No real situation as happens in life nor any direct impression of meetings and talks with people or else a study of the views of "individuals" could be found....

I can anticipate the question: Do we have to go into particulars when what is necessary is to bring to light the most essential features in the practice of a party organization with 70,000 members? And how can we do without mentioning basic sectors and summed up figures? It is true that a manager must see the trees for the forest. However, the specific nature of a party raykom or gorkom is, precisely, that it is precisely on this level that general party stipulations are resmelted into a specific policy, into resolutions, and where perestroyka must become tangible. Could we neglect in this case the power of dealing with individual cases in order to bring out general features? For otherwise we cannot avoid the danger of the multi-faceted ubiquitous formalism and its atmosphere in which anything which we do not like, which are unwilling to tolerate, fits perfectly well.

Let us consider the following situation: In May 1987 speakers at the gorkom plenum on cadre policy problems noted that virtually all rayon organizations were experiencing an acute lack of leading personnel. Figures of vacancies in industrial collectives and sovkhozes were quoted. This was followed by self-criticism and remarks addressed at the primary party organizations. The conclusion seemed obvious: to seek and find worthy people, rely more actively on the best spiritual qualities of the people, make more persistent use of the democratic mechanisms and undertake experimentation more boldly.... Actually, that was what was discussed at said plenum. What happened in practice? Alas, practice was not all that consistent with words about perestroyka in work with cadres. Here, for example, is what follows from the notes drafted by the party control commission of the Leningrad Party Obkom, based on the results of its investigation:

"In the past 3 years 60 CPSU members, who had committed criminally punishable acts, avoided party responsibility. Within the same period of time 9 party members, including 6 managers, who had committed criminal acts which had been considered by the primary party organizations, were not expelled from the party, thus violating the CPSU statutes."

"Between 1985 and 1987 the people's control committee penalized 122 managers and chief specialists in enterprises and sovkhozes. In virtually all cases the gorkom was informed but only one-third of the cases were discussed by the primary party organizations. The gorkom had not abandoned its practice of prosecuting party member-managers bypassing the primary party organizations. In 3 years, therefore, the city party committee buro issued party reprimands to 47 managers."

"The CPSU Gorkom and the party organizations are poorly struggling against drunkenness at work and at home. Drunkenness by managers is a subject of particular concern. In 1 year more than 70 managers of different ranks, 16 of them CPSU members, had to be taken to detoxification facilities."

Naturally, this sharp critical analysis was not ignored by the gorkom. But here is a note signed by V.M. Grebnev, summing up the steps which were taken to implement the resolution of the CPSU Obkom, based on the note we cited, and I catch myself thinking that the optimistic tone of this note is hardly consistent with the problems which accumulated in work with cadres. What was discovered by the investigation did not appear all of a sudden and nor will it disappear instantly. In the note we come repeatedly across examples which could be classified as miraculous conversions. For example, the note mentions the name of A.V. Savostyanov, director of the city meat combine, who was taken to a sobering-up tank. According to the gorkom the manager was punished and is in the process of full recovery. Is this not hasty? Quite recently, in an article on the meat combine, entitled "Enterprise Pilfering is Not Declining," the rayon newspaper wrote: "Comrade Savostyanov is doing everything possible to prevent protective measures, saying that this is an internal affair. Such was the case, for example, on 16 June and 12 July of this year, when surplus delicatessen items, weighing, respectively, 60 and 21 kilograms were established as a result of an investigation." Perhaps it may have been necessary to look more closely at the actions and the motivations of this person who, whether he wants it or not, is influencing hundreds of people with his behavior? In broader terms, perhaps one should not show hasty optimism when it comes to the difficult and long processes of training a corps of managers.

Understandably, this approach is useful not only in terms of the manager, but whenever statements and facts meet with the reaction of the public. In such a case, the gorkom personnel may have seen in the view taken by the veterans who signed the appeal to the plenum not simply an effort to express their hurt, making use of perestroyka. Naturally, any sharp opposition to the gorkom plus, in Lenin's words, the logic of the factional struggle, may have led the "group of eight" to display a type of bitterness inadmissible in party circles, excessively sharp criticism and lack of self-criticism. On the other hand, however, there is a reaction to each action. Yuriy Ivanovich Luppov did not approach the gorkom and the city executive committee exclusively because of his own housing problem but repeatedly spoke persistently about the practice which had developed in Luga of commissioning obviously unfinished apartments.... As to Aleksandr Petrovich Lebedev, an "old complainer," he is probably not about to be granted the right to exchange apartments in his cooperative, for the reason that long before he submitted his petition, he detected in the work of the administration substantial violations.... And equally intolerable is, sometimes, Vladimir Sergeyevich Zorin who compiled a list of former gorkom and gorispolkom personnel who, at various points in their careers, were either tried or otherwise penalized. Although old, these are basic facts.... And the same could be said about every one of the eight people.

Incidentally, some of the party members who attended the gorkom plenum did not feel "insulted" in the least. Such was the case, for example, of retired Colonel Viktor

Fedoseyevich Mironov, who said: "All I want is that I, as a party member, may be led by people who have the moral right to do so." He recalls the way when, as early as 1975, on the instruction of the city people's control committee, he investigated the public catering trust and reached the conclusion that Karelov should be dismissed as director before the worst had happened. He reported his considerations to V.I. Kislyakov, who was at that time party gorkom second secretary. The latter's answer was: "And where could we find someone better?"

Not all party meetings are alike. In some of them, as a result of a seemingly simple and clear item on the agenda, all of a sudden a considerably more complex problem develops, with a multiplicity of opinions, positions become crystallized and, frequently, conflicting. The resolutions passed at such meetings also differ. One thing, however, is unquestionable: they are passed by the majority, not in a hurry, and this majority is ready to defend its viewpoint. Such was the mood of the party members at the housing management section No 3, from a meeting which, in accordance with the CPSU Gorkom Resolution, discussed the plenum's resolution in the part which assessed the appeal of the "group of eight." Five of those who had signed the appeal were members of that organization and one of them, Ye.I. Luppov, was deputy party organization secretary. It was announced in advance that the meeting would be attended by A.M. Lavrenov, head of the gorkom organizational department, and K.P. Khabarov, chairman of the city people's court. Understandably, 20 minutes before the meeting, it had already become necessary to bring additional chairs to seat the people at the red corner of the ZhEU-3.

This complex and stressed discussion lasted more than 3 hours. Nineteen people spoke. It was obvious that many of them had come here with views they had already thought about, and that there was a lot of bitterness in the people. Naturally, it was essentially a question of the actions of party members who had addressed themselves to the gorkom plenum and the form of address itself, which was read on the request of the meeting. Although they criticized the unnecessary sharpness of the address and its lack of substantiation, the majority of the speakers did not support the evaluations of this address as included in the plenum's resolution, such as being "slandereous" and "insulting." It is true that until very recently the situation in which such a plenum would have been held would have made it simply impossible and, to be fair, this plenum required unusual restraint and principle-mindedness. However, collective thinking means not to yield to emotions and to be able to see the essence beyond superficial events. Clearly, the participants in the plenum lacked such qualities. Here as well the veterans (the party organization at the ZhEU-3 consists essentially of pensioners) began to speak about life in Luga the way it is, not in terms of average statistical packaging but on the basis of daily facts: scarcity of goods and services, lines, very poor health-care services, difficulties with housing, discoordination in the transportation system, and rudeness and indifference in the offices where people go to voice their needs.

Against that background, the role of the city party committee and its work style were analyzed by the rank-and-file communists particularly thoroughly. The main question was whether there was perestroika at home, where the invisible but strong ties of party leadership lead, whether the words mentioned here were honest and whether the actions were energetic. The answer to this determines today the degree of unity of the gorkom and the 156 primary party organizations in the rayon. The meeting at one of them indicated that there is a disparity in the views between the city party committee and its apparat, on the one hand, and the basic party unit, on the other and that such disparities will probably remain as long as one of the sides in this dialogue does not substantially change its position. Who will take the first step? In his address the representative of the gorkom emphasized that the meeting must voice its opinion with maximal clarity, for the resolution was given to it not for information purposes only but for "taking steps and taking people to task." This was again done according to the old rules which totally rejected the democratic approach in the formulation of a collective opinion by the party members: the punishment of the eight "disturbers" had been predetermined "from above," and all that was left was to vote in favor. There was puzzlement in the hall and shouts: "Why is it that this is the first time we hear about it?" "These words were not included in the publication!" and "Who needs such surprises and why?"

By a majority of 47 votes the meeting's resolution was the following: "To request the Leningrad CPSU Obkom to consider the second item in the resolution of the Luga City Party Committee Plenum." Eleven people voted for addressing this request not to the obkom but to the gorkom. Four abstained. At that point A.M. Lavrenov, the head of the gorkom organizational department, proclaimed the meeting invalid in the absence of a quorum but the din of protest erupted in the hall, through which the explanations given by Anatoliy Mefodyevich could be heard with difficulty: "The party organization numbers 136 members.... At the start of the meeting 72 were present and several left, not feeling well.... There were 62 people who voted and, consequently..." the people stood up and rushed to the doors. There was a cry from the heart: "They will always find a reason. When will we ever be right?..."

An invisible but strict watershed separates our past from the present. Everyone must solve the task of crossing it, of removing anything which prevents us from fully accepting and defending in practice the idea of profound renovation of our reality. Naturally, it is not easy to abandon views and customs developed not by someone else but on the basis of one's own experience. However, if they conflict with perestroika the choice becomes inevitable. This particularly applies to the party manager who, by virtue of the specific nature of his work, exerts a daily influence on the thoughts and actions of very many people. Is the necessary stock of spiritual energy available? Has the ability to change within oneself, dictated

by life, and in the actions for which one is responsible become dulled? These are difficult, very difficult questions. However, they must be answered and the more directly, the better.

"We have everything we need to intensify perestroika," V.M. Grebnev said. "Did you visit the knitwear factory? This is a good collective and so is the new director. Have you looked at the sovkhos imeni Dzerzhinskiy? I was its director in the 1960s. And now, whenever I happen to be in the vicinity, I invariably take a look at it. I believe that in the future as well this rayon will do good work. I would not like to obstruct this.... I am tired. For 18 years I have been first secretary. This is no joke, and sometimes 1 week drags like a full year. The obkom agrees...."

Valentin Mikhaylovich looks people straight in the eyes and his handshake is firm. And it is he, and not someone else, who has mentioned his retirement, voluntarily, because of age.

Well, this has always been the case in life: everyone has his own time and his turn. By accepting this truth a great deal of blame can be avoided. One must learn how to accept it....

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### From Bureaucratic Centralism to Economic Integration of Sovereign Republics

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[Article by Viktoriya Vladimirovna Koroteyeva, candidate of historical sciences, junior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography, Lev Stanislavovich Perepelkin, candidate of historical sciences, junior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography, and Ovsey Irmovich Shkaratan, professor, doctor of historical sciences, leading scientific associate in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography, vice-president of the Soviet Psychological Association]

[Text] "We must restore the Leninist principles of federalism as the foundations of inter-nationality and inter-republic relations. The opinion which has developed in our republic is that the time has come to convert to a qualitatively new form of combining local with national interests" (V.I. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, conference delegate).

This is the first time since the 12 RKP(b) Congress (17-25 April 1923) that a representative forum of the Communist Party—the 19th Party Conference—has passed a special resolution on the national problem "On Internationality Relations." Characteristically, 20 of the nearly 70 delegates who spoke out at the conference mentioned national problems which were concerning them, national-economic ones above all. The study of

these statements confirmed the conclusions of specialists to the effect that today two aspects in the life of the peoples have become most pressing: their cultural-linguistic development under the conditions of the growth of national self-awareness and national-economic policy, and economic relations among republics within the Soviet federation.

It is no accident that the leaders of large regional party organizations, who addressed the conference, paid particular attention to the economic aspect of national policy. National relations in the country can be harmonized only on the basis of a firm economic foundation or, in V.I. Lenin's words "in the national problem as well, we must start not with abstract or formal principles but... with a precise consideration of the specific historical and, above all, economic situation (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 162).

Let us turn to history, to the period when the Soviet state was being founded. At the start of the 1920s Lenin's and the party's views on socialism had undergone a radical change. Not only the economic management methods but also the ways of advancing toward socialism were reviewed. In the course of the efforts to build a multinational state its forms were reinterpreted as well. In his prerevolutionary works Lenin constantly pointed out the advantages of a centralized state compared to a federation, naturally, while preserving for the peoples the right to self-determination and autonomy. Not having turned this concept into dogma, in his last articles, written in 1922, Lenin formulated the principles of the federation structure of the Union of Soviet Republics. This was a plan for the democratic organization of relations among nations in a socialist state. The struggle which developed on such Leninist views at the 12th (1923) Party Congress indicated that by no means were all leaders ready to make such a decisive turn in national policy. In the final account, however, the congress adopted the Leninist concept, as was reflected in the resolution and, before that, in the treaty on the founding of the USSR (1922).

In practice, the principle of the federation was manifested in the clear separation of functions among all Union and republic administrative authorities. There was very little duplication in the activities of the republic and the central people's commissariats. Thus, the all-Union authorities were in charge of foreign relations, military affairs, transportation and communications. Finances, food supplies, the national economy, labor and the peasant-worker inspectorates were under double administration; justice, education, health-care, social security, agriculture and internal affairs were under the full jurisdiction of the republic people's commissariats. The people's commissariats were structured as collective authorities. The republics enjoyed a sufficiently broad autonomy in handling their allotted share of the Union budget.

Such an organization of relations between the republics and the center ensured the solution of a number of important problems in the conditions of a multinational

state. To begin with, it secured self-determination and the independent development of each ethnic group in the country, which was particularly important, considering the resolution of the 12th RKP(b) Congress: "The Union of Republics is considered by a significant share of Soviet officials, both in the center and the localities, not as a Union of Equal State Units, aimed at ensuring the free development of national republics, but as a step leading to the elimination of such republics and the beginning of the establishment of the so-called 'single-indivisible'." Furthermore, this form of governmental structure made it possible to balance national with republic interests. Finally, it enabled the center to provide expedient aid to the underdeveloped outlying areas, mandatorily taking local specific features into consideration. The policy of aid "financial, organizational and, above all, cadre" was based on a long-term development. The basic idea was not to keep the peripheral areas under a system of dependency but to stimulate their accelerated development.

By no means do we favor making absolute the experience of the mid-1920s, for the model of state structure which was being applied at that time had a short life. Furthermore, all of its specific aspects were determined by the historical circumstances of that time. During the years of the "great change," which were tragic to the country, when coercive collectivization was undertaken, cost accounting in industry was abolished, and the scientifically substantiated and balanced plan for the 1st 5-year period was replaced by a pursuit of arbitrarily set indicators. The bureaucratism of the center eliminated the federalism in the organization of nation life. For example, the unified People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR was created in 1929 and became the unchallenged master of agrarian policy throughout the Union. By the start of the 1930s virtually everything—the time for sowing and harvesting the crops, and so on,—was being regulated from the center. The same solution was given to the organization of industry. Unfair accusations of nationalism addressed at local cadres, which became more frequent in the 1930s, made unsafe the requirement of taking into consideration the specific problems and requirements of the native republic population.

In order to realize the way the amount of power of the all-Union state authorities was being gradually enhanced to the detriment of the competence of the republic authorities, suffice it to compare Article 1 of the 1924 Constitution with Articles 14 and 73 of the 1936 and 1977 Constitutions. For example, in the first USSR Constitution the supreme authorities of the country were to "lay the foundations for a general plan for the entire national economy of the Union, to define industrial sectors and individual industrial enterprises of all-Union significance and conclude concession contracts." According to the 1936 Constitution the all-Union authorities were already in charge of "drafting the national economic plans of the USSR," "managing banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and

enterprises and trade institutions under all-Union jurisdiction; overall management of industry and building under Union-republic jurisdiction." The same aspiration to transfer economic management to the center was characteristic of the 1977 Constitution as well. Today such centralization has gone so far that 90 percent of the economic potential of Estonia, for example, is managed by Union and Union-republic ministries. But are the remaining 10 percent sufficient for the normal management of the republic's economy?

Equalization of rights of the superior state authorities and the authorities of state administration (people's commissariats, departments), which took place in 1936, had major negative consequences. According to the 1977 Constitution, the central authorities were given the right to "resolve other (i.e., those not stipulated in Article 73—author) problems of all-Union significance," or, in other words, omnipotence on USSR territory. The economic rights of republics were not stipulated in the Constitution.

It was thus that a situation developed, which was quite accurately characterized in the appeals to the 19th Party Conference by the participants in the joint plenum of the boards of the creative associations of the Estonian SSR: "In the national republics the omnipotence of the bureaucracy is manifested as the legitimized arbitrariness of all-Union ministries and departments, which ignore local economic, ecological and sociocultural needs and interests. As a result, an economy working at a loss appears in the local areas, there is uncontrolled migration, the threat of an ecological catastrophe increases, and the dissatisfaction of the population concerning the meeting of its sociocultural demands, increases. Under the conditions of a multinational state all of this is fraught with the aggravation of national relations and the increased dissatisfaction of the local population with the activities of the central authorities." In other words, it was the Stalinist model of autonomy, which presumed the decisive domination of the center over the local areas, that won and remains applicable to this day.

However, the negative consequences of excessive centralization were not manifested immediately. For a long period of time everything seemed to remain the same as in the past. For example, aid to ethnic groups lagging in their development and their involvement in contemporary types of production activities continued. However, the principle of natural, of organic development was violated. What enterprises to build and what sectors to develop were all decided by the center, ignoring the possibilities, labor skills and existing forms of organization and division of labor. Even in terms of the backward areas—Central Asia and Kazakhstan—one had to take into consideration thousands of years old traditions of artisan labor, the specialization of the local farms in growing cotton or fruits, the existence of traditional nomad cattle breeding and other realities of economic life. Naturally, there were virtually no traditions

of industrial production in Central Asia and their bearer—the working class—was virtually absent. That is precisely why particular attention should have been paid to the existing forms of labor and, on their basis and with the help of cooperatives, prerequisites should have been created for industrialization. At that time this process may have appeared to be lengthier. Today's experience indicates that this could have been the shortest and most efficient way to converting relations from patriarchal to modern. In that case, it is possible that the latest party documents would not have formulated the same tasks that were formulated at the 12th RKP(b) Congress: involving the native population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in industrial production and local women in public labor.

The specific example of the single cotton crop grown in Central Asia indicates who benefited from the thus established relations between the republics and the center. The very term had not even been used in publications until recently. Yet the area planted in cotton, in Tajikistan, for instance, increased by a factor of nearly 40 over 60 years—from 1.5 percent of the entire arable land to 40 percent. The yield and quality of the cotton has been steadily declining, the soil is becoming more salinized, there is an acute shortage of water and irreversible ecological changes are taking place. Yet on that same land income from intensive truck gardening exceeds the income from cotton growing by a factor of 15-16 and from viticulture, by a factor of 6. It is obvious that with such a correlation in income, planting such a large amount of land in cotton was impossible without external coercion. Unquestionably, this was influenced by the interested departments, for cotton as we know, is a strategic raw material.

Most of the income, given the low purchase prices and labor discounts, went not to the cotton grower but to the consumer, primarily outside the cotton growing republics. This situation suits the central departments and not only them. The circumstances of the so-called cotton matter indicate that in addition to "legitimate" income caused by distortions in the economic mechanism, there also exist huge illegal earnings obtained with the help of figure padding, distributed among corrupt groups of officials, both centrally and locally. The bulk of the population in cotton growing republics is the victim, paying for this through the exhausting labor of the weakest—women and children—the local quality of education, and high morbidity and infant mortality.

As a result of the lengthy domination of administrative management methods of the economy, a partial change in the overall basic interests of the peoples became possible: selfish interests of corrupt elements within the central and local administrative apparatus merged. The clash between integration, as a mandatory prerequisite for the normal functioning of the economy of a modern society and its specific—center-oriented bureaucratic form—was aggravated. It was essentially due to the fact that by the turn of the 1930s, for half a century, an



orientation toward uniformity in the organization of the economic life of the peoples of the USSR was established and preserved. This approach was in sharp contrast to the Leninist concept of national development: "...In the same way that democratic centralism does not exclude in the least autonomy and federation, it does not exclude in the least but, conversely, presumes the total freedoms of the different localities and even different freedoms within the state to develop a variety of forms of state, public and economic life. Nothing could be more erroneous than confusing democratic centralism with bureaucratism and stereotype" (op. cit., vol 36, pp 151-152).

What were the negative consequences of neglecting such Leninist views?

One of the gravest problems was the absence of close interconnection between the results of the labor activities of the republic's populations and the benefits they obtained. Thus, in the 11th 5-year period the real income of the Belorussian working people increased by 13 percent and of those in the Ukraine, by 14 percent. However, the growth of labor productivity in Belorussian industry was 21 percent as compared to 15 for the Ukrainian SSR; respective figures were 42 and 21 for agriculture and 22 and 15 for construction. Who would undertake to explain why, with such disparities in production efficiency the population's income from labor showed a greater increase in the Ukraine? Per capita income of the Georgian population was even higher (a 20 percent increase although labor productivity had increased by 19 percent in industry, 16 percent in agriculture and 18 percent in construction, which was noticeably less than in Belorussia).

Characteristically, despite the very great disparities in labor results, wage disparities were not all that great. The average wage was 201 rubles in the RSFSR, 195.9 in Latvia, 180 in Armenia, 186.5 in Kazakhstan, 173 in Belorussia, 164.2 in Uzbekistan, and so on. These disparities were due more to the sectorial economic structure of the republics than the quantity and quality of labor and its efficiency and productivity. Let us not forget that the RSFSR includes the entire north, which requires additional support to ensure the self-reproduction of the population. This factor alone should have given greater advantages to the northern areas.

The obvious insufficient investment of capital in the way of life and services in the large cities of the RSFSR must be taken into consideration. Here the share of heavy industry, and science-intensive production, which require highly skilled manpower, is high. Hence the disproportion: a highly skilled manpower presumes respective outlays for its own reproduction; however, in frequent cases investments in the social and cultural infrastructure of areas with less skilled manpower have turned out to be much higher.

The problem of economic relations among Union republics is complex in two senses. First, at the present time there is no information as to what and how much are the republics' contributions to the Union fund and what and how much they obtain from it. Second, today there are no clear criteria to justify such trends. This situation could be clarified on the basis of detailed inter-republic balances of production and distribution of goods in physical and value terms and the resulting amounts—the contributions made by the republics to the all-Union budget and the budget subsidies they receive. Under the conditions of an unorganized price setting system, the assessment of relations among republics in terms of value raises serious questions. The price structure is not always consistent with the socially necessary labor outlays.

Thus, the prices of energy carriers, cotton and some other products of the primary area—the extracting industry and agriculture—have been reduced; the prices of many types of machine building items and other processing industry sectors, have been raised. The prices of centralized procurements have been artificially differentiated by area. For example, Estonia is selling to its enterprises electric power at the price of 2.5 kopeks per kilowatt/hour, whereas the Latvian SSR charges 1.5 kopeks and Pskov Oblast, 1 kopek. There is no economic evaluation of the land as a base for rental payments. This a problem of agricultural economics but its lack of solution leads to distortions in republic economic relations. On the gradually developing single market for agricultural commodities, income from production must depend on labor outlays and not on the monopoly use of favorable natural conditions. Currently such monopoly is even not in the hands of the public farms of the respective areas but of individual producers.

We must also acknowledge that there is absolutely no price setting in our country in the information area of productive human activities. A situation has developed in which ideas are practically worthless. The submission of new scientific and technical developments, which includes other republics as well, is free of charge. Yet skilled labor invested in their development and the possible results of their application should be taken into consideration in trade among republics. So far, the scientifically and technically most advanced areas and republics lose tremendous amounts of money on this. All of this distorts the actual contribution which the republics make and which depends on the results of the toil of their population invested in the country's national economy.

Therefore, it is virtually impossible to evaluate the amount of funds which flow from some republics to other. One can confidently say only that there is an actual existence of redistribution relations among republics, originated by the center. Thus, the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan are the only ones which have

at their disposal the entire turnover tax and the income tax paid by the population. Furthermore, in 1988 they were granted subsidies totaling in excess of 5 billion rubles.

It is even more difficult to understand or explain such a systematic redistribution among republics. Does it agree with claims that actual equality has been achieved among republics and ethnic groups and the continuing rapprochement among republics in terms of the levels of socioeconomic development?

Therefore, 20 years ago the gap among republics was being narrowed according to official statistical indicators. Starting with the 1970s, however, against the background of an overall slowdown in the growth rates in the country, the stagnation process affected above all the Central Asian republics. This means that the slower pace of development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan is increasing their lagging behind other and more developed republics. It is obvious that if such a trend is retained, the ever growing aid in the redistribution of funds will be inevitable. However, transferring funds without changing radically the situation in the republics which are the recipients of such aid slows down the development of other areas and questions the possibility of providing such aid in the future.

In the name of what was a redistribution of resources in favor of lagging republics done for decades? Its ideological and moral foundation was the aspiration to achieve not only equal right but true equality among all the ethnic groups and republics. Actually, so far no one knows what this means. Everything was simpler in the past, in the prewar years, for example, when the former national outlying areas had been lagging behind Russia for an entire historical age. Any plant or factory built in such areas was clear proof of the fact that backward ethnic groups were taking the path of progress.

Subsequently, in the 1960s to the 1980s, planners and scientists began to understand by equality the elimination of disparities in indicators of socioeconomic development, such as the share of people employed in industry and agriculture, the percentage of the urban population, the capital-labor and energy-labor ratios, and other. In the course of the fast change of ideas over the past 2 or 3 years, however, it became clear that equality does not mean equalization under some kind of abstract ideal and not all differences in indicators should be equalized.

If in assessing the development of an ethnic group or republic we indeed rely on statistical indicators, they should apply only to those which characterize the quality of life: availability of goods and services, the population's health standards and mortality by age groups, life span, etc. Equally important indicators are those which confirm the balanced level of efficiency of labor and the

satisfaction of human needs. Many of them are extensively used in global practices, for they reflect the true disparity or equality among countries (nations).

One such indicator is infant mortality. Its high level means that something is not in order in terms of the quality of life if standards of medical services and living conditions and recreation of the people have fallen severely behind. Today the advanced countries in the world have attained a very low level of infant mortality (six dead children under 1 year of age per 1,000 newly born), compared with 25.4 in the USSR in 1986. However, hiding behind this average figure are huge disparities between 11.6, which was the level of infant mortality in Lithuania, and 58.2 in Turkmenia. These differences, as we can see, are major. Furthermore, it is characteristic that in terms of the availability of physicians and, incidentally, cadres of intellectuals in general, republics with a high level of infant mortality are virtually indistinguishable from those in which such mortality is relatively low. Thus, in 1987, physicians per 10,000 population averaged 43.6 for the USSR, 46.7 for the RSFSR, 44.2 for Lithuania, 34.8 for Uzbekistan and 34.7 for Turkmenia.

Let us consider another indicator such as the length of attendance of schools and VUZs. On the surface it appears quite objective and indicative of the cultural standards of the population. Statistical figures indicate that all republics have acquired roughly identical successes in educating their populations. In 1986, higher and secondary (full and partial) training per 1,000 people aged 10 years or older averaged 701 for the USSR, 706 for the RSFSR, 653 for Lithuania, 698 for Uzbekistan and 684 for Turkmenia. However, today we are quite familiar with the fact that in Uzbekistan, for example, school students spent at least one-third of their school time working the cotton plantations. Therefore, the actual term of their training was not 10 but at best 8 or 7 years. All such data indicates that the republics of Central Asia are remaining behind in many respects.

These and many other shortcomings in the organization of economic life of the peoples of the USSR prove the inefficiency of the management practice which is not based on autonomous economic activities of the peoples and their self-development. In particular, the paternalistic form of giving aid, i.e., imposing upon ethnic groups rates, forms and trends of activity, is faulty. Free subsidies do not lead to a stable improvement in the economic life of the republics receiving such aid. Thus, with a low availability for the rural population of housing, health care facilities, trade and culture, the funds allocated for such purposes in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenia have lately remained unused. Incidentally, the inefficient way of redistribution in terms of subsidies can be confirmed by the example not only of the overpopulated rural areas in Central Asia but also the depopulated Russian Nonchernozem where substantial investments have been made of late.

Aid and financial redistributions are, clearly, inevitable within the boundaries of large economic formations operating on the principles of economic sovereignty (by which we understand autonomy in the use of their own resources, implementation of socioeconomic programs and formulation of strategies for socioeconomic development) and integration. Uneven development, the need for structural reorganization of the economy and, finally, possible errors in economic policy frequently result in the fact that some countries and regions fall behind other. However, under the conditions of economic partnership and integration giving aid proves to be advantageous to both sides. In the USSR providing comprehensive aid by progressive to lagging republics is inevitable. However, the thus allocated funds must be clearly known, and the terms for their repayment stipulated. Free aid must be an exceptional event (in the case of natural disasters, for instance, etc.). We favor specific aid and control over the efficiency with which it is used. In our view, not only the all-Union but also the republic budgets could be lenders.

One could say that it is largely as a reaction to the coerced giving of unspecified aid that the idea of a republic (regional) cost accounting was formulated by the Estonian economists and sociologists last September. It is indicative that this suggestion was actively supported at the 19th Party Conference only by the delegates of the most or the relatively developed areas in the USSR: Belorussia, the Ukraine, the Baltic republics, a number of autonomous regions and oblasts in the RSFSR and representatives of Moldavia and Georgia. The delegates of republics obtaining such aid ignored the idea of a republic cost accounting. Naturally, this is no accident. We are faced with two entirely definite standpoints.

Neither of them appeared from scratch but were a reflection of economic reality: the impossibility of further extensive development and the intensification of territorial economic disparities and, consequently, rivalry among republics for obtaining resources. Under such circumstances the ideologues representing republics which have drastically fallen behind on the Union scale in terms of socioeconomic development and lack their own resources for surmounting such a lag pay prime attention only to one type of imbalance: the tangible differences in the living standards of the populations of their republics. This is used as substantiating the requirement of redistributing funds in their favor. The implementation of such a program would bring about another imbalance: the gap between wages and the level of consumption of goods and services, on the one hand, and end results, on the other.

A different view prevails among some specialists and, to a certain extent, the broad population strata of the most developed republics on the scale of the USSR. It can be reduced to acknowledging the need for a consistency among the standards and quality of life and the amount of resources created through the labor of the population

of a given republic or area. The amount of such resources must be determined to a decisive extent by human reproduction conditions: the development of the socio-cultural and life infrastructure and, particularly, education, health care, and increased science-intensiveness of jobs (i.e., the meaningful nature of labor), etc.

It was this second viewpoint, which reflects the aspiration of the peoples for independence, responsibility for their development and increasing the efficiency of their production and growth of well-being, that was supported at the conference. The following was entered in the resolution "On Inter-Nationality Relations:" "One of the main tasks is to create conditions for the greater autonomy of regions and to promote the type of cooperation in which each republic would be interested in improving the end results of its economic activities as the foundation of its own well-being and multiplication of the common wealth and power of the Soviet state. The radical economic reform and the democratization process provide broad scope for the optimal combination of interests of both national-state formations as well as the country as a whole. Matter must be organized in such a way that the working people will be well familiar with the output of their republic or oblast, its contribution to the country's economy and its own returns. Attention should be paid to the idea of converting republics and regions to cost accounting, with a clear determination of their contribution to the implementation of Union programs." The decision was made to introduce the respective amendments to the legislation.

The inclusion of these stipulations in the conference's resolution indicates the great leap which has been made over the past 2 or 3 years in the interpretation of the problems facing our society. However, we must not rest on our achievements. It is necessary to convert from the general idea of a regional (republic) cost accounting to the establishment of an integral concept suitable for practical use.

Usually, the "cost accounting" concept is applied to enterprises and means relative autonomy by this production unit in choosing orders, making payments out of its gross income and setting up its wage fund. The purpose of cost accounting is to ensure the maximal adequacy of production. By analogy with the fact that the cost accounting principle could be applied to associations and entire sectors, efforts are being made to apply it to territorial communities—be they cities, rural rayons, oblasts or republics. However, the end result, the economic efficiency of the activities of an enterprise or sector, is to earn profit from goods marketed. In the case of a territory or the society, it can operate only as a factor for ensuring the qualitative reproduction of man.

The inadequacy of the "cost accounting" concept as applicable to territorial units is also related to the fact that it does not encompass strategic aspects of economic policy. Yet without legal, organizational, financial and other instruments for influencing the structure, nature

and efficiency of material and spiritual reproduction in the area, the local and republic management authorities cannot balance economic with socioterritorial reproduction and make full use of the population's labor potential.

The concept of "regional cost accounting" does not imply any disparity among territorial-administrative and national-state formations. Indeed, many oblasts in the RSFSR, Gorkiy for instance, are comparable in terms of the scale of their economy, territory and population size to small republics. Should it follow from this that they must be equalized in terms of economic rights? Naturally, the right to obtain withholdings from enterprises and independently use local budgets or block the thoughtless or ecologically harmful farming of the land should be equally granted to territorial units on all levels. However, we must distinguish among territorial communities, the functions of which are the reproduction of man and the territory of the republic (ethnic territories) and, furthermore, the reproduction of national cultures and, therefore, the reproduction of ethnic groups.

The variety of production sectors and the scope of areas for the application of labor within the framework of a national republic are of particular importance in national development. It is not a question of creating all sectors within a given republic or providing all types of skills found throughout the country, but of having the entire "hierarchy" of types of labor in terms of skill, and intellectual complexity, represented in the republics. Within the range of his ethnic territory the individual should have the opportunity to obtain an education and to choose an employment and social career and, in the final account, to express himself as an individual. In order for small ethnic groups to be able to reach a high rank in the global division of labor, they must find their own "niche" and focus on a narrow range of freely selected sectors.

In a territorial community, for example, an urban agglomeration or oblast does not have to be self-sufficient. The migration mechanism, including the fluctuating one, compensates, within an ethnic territory, for the lack of a variety of areas for the application of labor and cultural and educational institutions. Given the existence of contemporary means of mass communication, the capital and a number of very big centers of national culture can influence the entire republic territory. The lack in a republic of a specific social and cultural institution impoverishes the nation as a whole.

The principle of self-determination, which has been acknowledged as necessary for the free development of the nations, includes not only the right to establish one's own national statehood. In terms of economic life, it means the opportunity independently to determine priorities in economic policy, development pace, optimal selection of sectors, etc. None of this is part of the "regional cost accounting" concept. Any ethnic group

has the right to select its preference: tempestuous economic growth and respective consumption standards, improvements in population health as a result of ecologically clean living conditions and, perhaps, maintaining a traditional life style, which would include a time breakdown for work and relaxation and social intercourse. Under the conditions of the interdependence among nations, particularly in a multinational state, naturally, certain restrictions apply to the independent choice of economic management methods. Thus, the method applied in the use of nature should not be such as to harm the neighbors and less intensive work should not be rewarded the same as more intensive work through the equalizing redistribution of funds among republics. The consistency between production and consumption is a rule. However, the level on which this consistency is established cannot be decided by anyone on the outside, even though motivated by the best of reasons. What matters to the progress of the ethnic groups is not economic growth per se but the cost at which it is achieved and the objectives it pursues. The preservation of the continuity of cultural development and the organic introduction of essentially new types of activities in national culture and preservation of aspects of life which are significant to the ethnic community are, in our view, the determining features of the economy as a foundation for the development of ethnic groups.

National-state formations should be granted the right to subordinate economic to national-cultural decisions. This cannot be accomplished within an administrative-command economic system and a centralized economic integration. Today the question is being raised ever more urgently of how to avoid the development of production facilities which are inconsistent with the cultural habits of the population and remain unattractive to it. For a long time such production facilities were developed by creating enclaves of nonethnic, most frequently Russian, population. As a result, in some republics (such as Latvia and Estonia) the size of the newly arrived population came close to that of the native population, and the problem arose of free national development. Encouraging migrations into labor-surplus Central Asia republics, characterized by a high birthrate, is also totally puzzling. For the capacity of the Central Asian Oases is limited (that of Tashkent, for example, is no more than some 6 million people).

And what about the language which must be used by the republic economic complexes? From the economic viewpoint, the existing practice of separating areas of application of Russian and national languages among individual sectors and production facilities leads to a split in the labor market. Additional disproportions arise: members of different ethnic groups become limited in their choice of place of work by the language used at the enterprise. Narrowing the area of application of the ethnic language in economics, leads to a reduction in its use in other areas and a lowering of its prestige, including also among those who speak it. It is no accident that today in several republics the question appears of the inexpediency of

building enterprises which would require additional migration and a further decline in the share of the native population and a reduced reproduction of its culture.

On the basis of such considerations, we believe that the entire set of ideas related to the organization of economic life in the republics within the Soviet federation can be expressed most more fully not through the term of "republic cost accounting" but the constitutional concept of "sovereignty" (in the context of this article, "economic sovereignty").

In a multinational state based on the principles of a federation, some of the sovereign rights of the republics are mandatorily delegated to the central authorities. The question of economic sovereignty, therefore, means in practical terms defining the optimal proportions of the division of power between the all-Union and republic authorities. In our view, in order to ensure the economic sovereignty of the republics, they must be granted the following rights:

To create, develop or terminate specific production types and sectors, based on the interests and possibilities of the population and the ecological situation;

To ban the creation and development of specific types of production (the right to a veto) and to appeal decisions on their termination;

To establish direct (without the mediation of the center) economic relations with other republics and to formulate joint economic programs;

Independently to make, on the basis of agreed rates, withholdings for the all-Union budget and handle the remaining part of the republic budget;

Jointly with other republics to determine the expenditures of the all-Union budget;

To obtain loans from the all-Union budget or the budgets of other republics with the obligation to repay them within the stipulated time;

To appeal to the central authorities or the authorities of other republics for free aid;

To levy taxes on enterprises under Union and Union-republic jurisdiction, located on their territory. Determining the amount of tax withholdings from enterprises in favor of the territories should be a republic prerogative; this would make it possible to optimize the location of production facilities not based on departmental criteria;

To pursue independently, on the basis of the general stipulations of the Union and the republic constitutions of social, demographic and cultural policy on their territory;

Independently to export to the world market (in accordance with the interests of the Union as a whole).

Similar rights must be extended to the autonomous republics in their interrelationship with Union republics within which they are located. The implementation of these and other suggestions will obviously call for the drafting and enactment of special laws concerning the economic rights of Union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs.

The economic prerequisites for the reorganization of inter-republic economic relations are the following: perfecting the economic mechanism (above all achieving an optimal correlation between the plan and the market forms of economic relations); development of cost accounting on the level of enterprises, associations and sectors; price reform (including the introduction of an economic assessment of the land and natural and manpower resources; setting prices for commodities in the information area); encouraging the variety of forms of social ownership and types of labor activity.

Economic sovereignty is a mandatory prerequisite for the revival of a true federation, a federation of equal republics. The controversial aspect is the expediency of creating relatively autonomous economic organisms within the national economic complex of the USSR, for the comprehensive contemporary scientific and technical development throughout the world, on all continents, leads toward eliminating national economic boundaries. It may seem that, in discussing economic sovereignty, we may be turning our country back compared to the level of integration attained by capitalism. Such, however, is not the case. Sovereignty does not presume in the least the elimination of all-Union scientific and technical programs or cooperation even on broader international scale. It is a question of something else: such a cooperation and combination of forces should be achieved with the interested and voluntary involvement within it of each republic.

Therefore, the autonomy of ethnic groups and republics and the organic division of labor and their connection through the socialist market of commodities, manpower and services are the features which we consider as the foundations of true integration, not only economic but also cultural and spiritual. We see this as the foundation of the inviolable friendship among the peoples of the USSR in the future. Let us acknowledge that we should expect some difficulties along this way. They are related, above all, to organizing the economic mechanism and, particularly, the creation of a socialist market. However, having taken this path, our country also gains certain advantages. Foreign experience has taught us that the most controversial stages in integration involve the establishment of a single monetary system and political integration, i.e., the creation of unified management authorities. In this case there is nothing new for us to invent: the country has a unified monetary system (although so far the backing of the ruble for various

commodities differs among republics and areas) and all-governmental management authorities, which must convert from planning by directive to the exercise of a structural policy and the promotion of the country's overall scientific and technical development.

For the time being, these are still quite general concepts. The purpose of this article, however, was to substantiate the need to raise at the forthcoming Central Committee plenum on problems of national relations that of decisively broadening the sovereign rights of republics, particularly in the economy, and the question of the juridical mechanisms for achieving economic sovereignty and integration among republics within the Soviet federation, taking into consideration past experience and developing it in terms of contemporary conditions on a skilled, democratic and open basis. Such is precisely the way we conceive of the further discussion of the problems raised here.

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#### **Pesticides, Ecology, Agriculture**

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[Article by Aleksey Vladimirovich Yablokov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, head of laboratory at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Biology of Development imeni N.K. Koltsov]

[Text] *"Today unconsidered chemicalization is being particularly damaging to nature. Comrade chemists, halt your current expansion, take a breather, let the people breathe normal air, let rivers and soils clean themselves from all sorts of trash and, during that temporary halt bring order in current production facilities and, above all, suggest ecologically pure and economically profitable wasteless projects...."* (conference delegate F.T. Morgun, chairman, USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection).

*"The introduction of a soil protecting farming system and implementing other environmental protection measures have made it possible, without the use of toxic chemicals and herbicides, for the past 9 years to obtain stable grain crops of 34-35 quintals per hectare and to create a good fodder base (conference delegate A.P. Aydak, chairman, Leningradskaya Iskra Kolkhoz, Yadrinskiy Rayon, Chuvash ASSR).*

Until recently it was believed that the problem of pesticides (insecticides and other zoocides, fungicides and herbicides) was a purely agricultural one. It is clear now that it has assumed a firm place among the many global large-scale ecological problems, for it is related to the very strategy of the development of agriculture and, at

the same time, to health-care, the protection of the animal and plant world, and of the biosphere in general. It would be no exaggeration to treat this problem as political as well.

The Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and the Period Until the Year 2000 call for "the steady increase in the use of means of protecting farm crops and forests from pests and diseases, safe for man and the animal world." The 1987 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Improving Scientific Support in the Development of the Agroindustrial Complex of the Country" calls for "significantly expanding the study and practical utilization of biological methods. Increasing research on the development and accelerated production of highly efficient and ecologically safe means of plant protection...." It is thus that the party and government documents unequivocally acknowledge that the use of chemical protective means is dangerous to man and nature. It is a coerced measure and, essentially, an undesirable one. However, as was justifiably pointed out in the journal ZASHCHITA RASTENIY, "In recent years a predilection for chemistry has become increasingly noticeable... Even recommendations dealing with intensive technologies for growing grain and other crops call almost exclusively, as a means of preventing crop losses, for the extensive use of pesticides."

#### **The Other Side of the Coin**

In the USSR chemical plant protection means are being developed today at a significantly pace rate than any other. Millions are spent on the purchase of pesticides abroad, and technologies for their manufacturing exceed by several hundred percent outlays related to finding alternate solutions to plant protection problems. What are the reasons for this situation? And are the supporters of comprehensive chemicalization of agriculture right by considering it the main way of sectorial intensification?

In 1986 the USSR used an average of some 1.9 kilograms of pesticides per hectare (in the zone of their utilization, i.e., approximately over 87 percent of the arable land) or about 1.5 kilograms per capita. For purposes of comparison, let me point out that in the United States, that same year, such indicators averaged 1.6 kilograms per hectare (over 61 percent of the arable land) or 1.5 kilograms per capita (starting with 1979 the volume of pesticides used in that country on a per capita basis was stabilized and, since 1982, has been declining substantially). The conditions for the chemicalization of agriculture are different in our country from those in the United States: to begin with, in the United States more than one-half of the total amount of pesticides is used on industrial crops (cotton, tobacco); second, unlike the USSR, there every year more than 550 million tons of dry plant residues are being plowed back into the soil (75 percent of all agricultural waste), which creates more favorable conditions for the fuller breakdown of the pesticides and for maintaining life in the soil. In many areas in our country

(Central Asia, Moldavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Krasnodar Kray) the use of pesticides is several hundred percent higher than the national average.

It is believed that the use of pesticides contributes to substantially increasing labor productivity in agriculture (for example, processing with herbicides instead of machine weeding) and to reducing crop losses caused by diseases and pests both in the fields and in storage. Computations have even been made of prevented damage, according to which the use of pesticides saves the national economy several billion rubles annually. The materials which will follow will indicate that such computations cannot be considered sufficiently well-founded and that the negative consequences of the use of pesticides could exceed their usefulness by several hundred percent.

A thorough study indicates that all pesticides without exception show either a mutagenic (changes in heredity) or other adverse effects on animate nature and man. Even a single contact between man and pesticides such as Dieldrin, Malathion or Parathion results in encephalographic changes (changes in the biocurrents of the brain), which can last as long as 6 months. The influence of the most advanced and rapidly decaying organophosphoric pesticides is fraught with development of depression, irritability, disturbed ability for abstract thinking, memory or other neuropsychological disturbances; 90 percent of all fungicides, 60 percent of herbicides and 30 percent of insecticides which were used in the United States in 1986 could cause cancer.

Studies made in our country at the start of the 1970s indicated the correlation between the frequency of complications during pregnancy and giving birth, cases of stillbirth, anomalies in newborn babies, and worsening of comprehensive indicators of the health of children and the intensiveness of the use of pesticides. Such results were recently confirmed by the USSR Ministry of Health in the course of a broad study of the situation in six Union republics. It was established that in all areas using more pesticides the health indicators (among adults and children) had become drastically worse. Apparently pesticides, like radiation, have no lower threshold of action: in the use of any kind of pesticide in the habitat, there occurs a greater or lesser destruction of the protective (immune) human system. As a result, the body becomes disarmed in facing even most ordinary diseases of the respiratory, nervous and cardiovascular systems and the reproductive and digestive organs. Data on the development of professional pathology among individuals directly exposed to pesticides for several years (such as mechanizers or greenhouse workers) are being acquired rapidly.

In the last 2 to 3 years the public in the developed foreign countries has paid very close attention to the contamination of surface and ground waters with pesticides. Incidentally, scientists warned of the inevitability of this dangerous phenomenon decades ago. At that time their

concern was ignored. Now, however, in a number of states in the United States as much as one-third of all artesian wells have been closed as water supply sources because of their pollution with pesticides. In our country there simply is no control over the presence of pesticides in artesian waters.

The suppressed "pests" and "weeds" in any field do not account for a higher share of the percentage of the overall number of living species. Therefore, the pesticides essentially strike not at the "targets" at which they are "aimed" but at a number of other organisms, including the natural enemies of parasites. As much as 99 percent of fungicides and insecticides fall into the soil, water, plants and animals which are not targets of destruction, after which the multiplication of the pests is no longer restrained by natural mechanisms. As a result, a greater threat to the protected farm crops could be created compared to the period before they were protected with chemicals.

In substantiating the need to put an end to state support of the use of pesticides, by the end of 1986 the Indonesian government said: "The extensive utilization of pesticides as part of the agricultural program in Indonesia and other rice-growing countries over the past 20 years has caused more harm than usefulness, for it has led to a greater extent not to the destruction of the pests but to the destruction of their natural enemies."

The fact that after treating the land with pesticides, a situation which favors the appearance of new pests must be considered as being a most serious negative effect. Thus, until the 1950s, the main enemies of cotton were the boll weevil and the cotton earworm. Now, after extensive chemicalization, we must fight the cotton moth, the tobacco leaf roller, the tobacco aphid, the tick, and the inch-worm, the numbers of which drastically increased precisely after the first two species were suppressed. The usual consequence of treating a field with herbicides is the appearance of new weed species.

The suppressed insects quickly develop a resistance to the chemicals as a result of natural selection and the multiplication of isolated individuals which turn out to be less receptive. Today there are some 500 types of ticks and insects in the world which are resistant to one or several pesticides (and more than 10, to all pesticides without exception). In our country we have no less than 150 such varieties. According to scientific forecasts, by the year 2010-2020, all main pests and agents of diseases and weeds could become unresponsive to pesticides.

The major adverse consequence of the immoderate use of herbicides leads to intensified soil erosion: the lack of a grassy cover leaves the soil unprotected to the wind, rain and melting snow.

Another inevitable evil related to pesticides is the changed content of microelements and other substances in the crops and, in the final account, a worsening of the

nutritive value of the products and the impossibility of preserving them until the new harvest. One of the real dangers which should draw our attention is the breakdown of contemporary genetically very unstable high yielding strains, as a result of the fast accumulation of mutations within them. We are familiar with cases of dumping crops over large areas, due to the appearance of concentrated degenerate plants after the use of some pesticides. There also are data to the effect that somehow pesticides encourage the proliferation of viruses in nature, including some of them dangerous. Thus, cyneb, which is used in our country, increases the viral diseases in apples, while the use of polychlorochampphen increases the viral diseases in sugar beets.

The aspiration of the chemists to earn revenue from the production of new pesticides as soon as possible leads to the saturation of the market with compounds which have been insufficiently studied from the viewpoint of the threat they represent to nature and man. Exhaustive full sanitary-hygienic (for warm-blooded beings, including man) and ecotoxicological (for other groups of organisms) tests of pesticides are exceptionally complex. In the United States only a few of the hundreds of active components of pesticides have undergone all stipulated safety tests. Such tests, based on the full program, take several years per compound and cost millions of dollars (and, let me add, do not ensure absolute ecological safety).

It is sometimes said that most negative phenomena are caused by pesticides of previous generations which were essentially quite durable chloroorganic compounds. The contemporary pesticides, which are quickly decaying organophosphates, carbamates and pyrethroids, which, furthermore, are used in very small doses (sometimes a few grams per hectare) are allegedly unable to cause major harm to nature and man. This is a dangerous delusion. The creation of specific pesticides which act exclusively on specific types of plants and animals is impossible. If today it suffices to use small and extremely small doses of pesticides, this can only confirm the fact that their toxic power has been increased several hundred percent.

It may seem that some of the problems related to the use of pesticides could be solved with a properly organized control over their concentration in the environment and the food product. However, the existing standard methods enable us to trace the content in the environment (and food product) of no more than a small percentage of the overall number of used chemicals. This objective circumstance is worsened by the fact that our control system is extremely poorly organized. In 1984 only 12 percent of the areas treated with pesticides in the RSFSR were kept under control by the laboratories of plant protection stations, while the investigation of residual amounts of pesticides covered no more than 3.4 percent of agricultural commodities. In Moldavia, which is one of the worst parts of the country in terms of chemical pollution, until recently there was not a single center for

observing the level of intoxication of the environment with pesticides. Let me add that the contemporary research methods are unsuitable in assessing the accumulation of chemicals in various components of biocoenoses, their migration along the food chains within the ecological system, and their breakdown (in the course of which, incidentally, more toxic compounds could develop). Essentially, we found ourselves unprepared for pesticide control.

What are the material benefits from such an extensive use of pesticides? According to some estimates, losses suffered by our agriculture exclusively from reduced harvests as a result of underpollination of plants (since such compounds destroy the natural pollinating agents) are some 2 billion rubles annually, i.e., they eliminate 30 to 40 percent of the benefits ascribed to the action of pesticides.

Also insufficiently substantiated is the claim that their use allows us to preserve nearly one-third of the crops: no pesticide can boast of full protection of the crops. Furthermore, no computations are ever made of the losses to crops (or whether some losses would occur at all) should other means of protection be used. Interestingly enough, despite a tenfold increase in the use of pesticides in the United States over the past 40 years, overall losses of agricultural production caused by various pests, weeds and diseases have not decreased but, conversely, have risen from 31 to 37 percent. And what if we were to add to them the losses to other economic sectors, caused by pesticides? It turned out, for example, that rice grown in the Kuban contributed to the state some 1.5 billion rubles in profits but, at the same time, the damage caused by the use of pesticides to the fishing resources of the Azov basin exceeded 2 billion! For this reason alone we can only agree with the view expressed by F.T. Morgun, who has described pesticides as the Trojan Horse of modern civilization.

The following question arises: If all of this is known to the supporters of pesticides, why do they continue to promote their extensive utilization?

One of the reasons is psychological, the so-called "power symbolism:" by applying a strong poison we instantaneously kill farm pests, unlike alternate methods which do not yield immediate visible results. Another one, usually underestimated reason in our country, is the interest of international multi-billion business of selling chemical means of protection. We purchase abroad more than one-half of the chemical components for the production of pesticides (at the cost of hundreds of millions of foreign exchange rubles annually). Sixty-two of the 130 types of pesticides used in Moldavia in 1987 were imported. The largest foreign chemical companies are able to advertise and place their goods. No advertising has been needed in the agroindustrial complex of the USSR, for until recently it was the "outlay mentality" which predominated in our country, according to which the basic development indicator was not to add to the



crops or to lower production costs but the volume of outlays. In particular, this is one of the reasons for which a significant use over and above the recommended protective chemicals is used and extensive instead of selective treatment is provided, with the extensive use of aviation (as much as 40 percent of pesticides in our country are administered from the air, which is categorically banned in many countries). Actually, frequently outlay norms of pesticides are increased simply because our technology is unable to observe the stipulated rules. For example, we purchased from Japan the pesticide Topsin, which should be used in a dose of 67 grams per 100 liters of solvent. In our instructions for "simplified" technology, the stipulated norm is 100 grams.

The reason for the unrestrained use of pesticides in the USSR, in my view, is, nonetheless, the ineradicable wish on the part of some agricultural production managers to solve the problems of the Food Program in one fell swoop, with the help of a major wand. In the 1950s yarovization, summer planting of potatoes in the south, planting corn everywhere, and plowing the virgin lands were this magic wand; today it is senseless water reclamation and, finally, agricultural chemicalization.

The danger related to pesticides is worsened in our country also by the "planned" system for their application in the soil (rather than on the basis of the specific situation in a given season and on each field); the increasing (as a result of virtual impunity) violations of the rules governing their storage and application; the lack of efficient material incentives to reduce the utilization of chemical means of protection; finally, the lack of systematic data on the structure of population morbidity, caused by the pollution of the environment with pesticides.

#### Science Suggests....

The claims that chemicalization is just about synonymous with agricultural intensification are wrong. Unlike pesticides, which enable us to protect the crops under extreme circumstances for 1 to 2 years (for example, in an invasion of locusts) and which create more problems than they solve, other methods exist for obtaining high crops without such negative consequences.

In 1985 there were more than 20,000 farms in the United States where the use not only of pesticides but even chemical fertilizers was banned (the number of such farms is increasing by several thousand every year). In the FRG and France thousands of farms have converted to the "biological farming" system and their numbers are also growing.

Similar examples may be found in the USSR as well. All 16 farms in Muromtsevskiy Rayon, Omsk Oblast, have abandoned the use of pesticides. Their average yields are above the oblast's average and in 1986 two farms here raised the highest grain crop in Omsk Oblast (respectively 31.7 and 32.7 quintals per hectare). The Kuban

Agricultural Institute developed and applied herbicide-free methods for rice and corn growing, and many farms in Belorechenskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray are doing without chemical protection. Many farms in Shishatskiy and Mirgorodskiy Rayons, Poltava Oblast, have abandoned the use of pesticides and, as a whole, in that oblast the use of pesticides is the lowest in the Ukraine. This was also the only oblast in the republic in which, in the doughty 1981-1985 period, the average grain crop yield did not drop but increased. Furthermore, the humus content on the Poltava fields is increasing instead of declining, as is the case in other oblasts; here capital returns are the highest in the republic and grain yields are above the Ukrainian average.

Officially, it is frequently acknowledged that pesticides should be used only when the other possibilities have been exhausted. As a rule, however, these "other possibilities" are not applied, although they include quite simple and quite efficient agrotechnical means. Thus, the structure of crops has been successfully reorganized in Kyshtovskiy, Severnyy and Vengerovskiy Rayons, Novosibirsk Oblast, based on the anticipated number of pests. Such highly accurate forecasts are made by the Biological Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department. Therefore, organizational and agrotechnical measures are not a supplement but an alternative to a chemical crop protection method.

The biological protection methods as well are varied. To this effect insects which can efficiently lower the amount of agricultural pests are being bred and released in the agroecosystems. In worldwide farming, more than 300 such species are being bred on an industrial scale (no more than 15 in the USSR). We have fallen seriously behind world science in the development of biological methods, and the main reason for this, in my view, is the excessive attention paid to chemical plant protection methods. The following example proves the need for the development of basic research in this area: one of the "leaders" in biological defense are the trichogramma, a genus of parasitical insects belonging to the Helicide family. Already today the trichogramma are being especially bred and successfully used in the struggle against moths, borers, weevils and leaf rollers. To this day, however, the full array of species of this family remains unknown in our country and it is not excluded that the most efficient varieties of trichogramma have still not been found in terms of biological protection.

The use of special plant-eating insects (herbiphages) in the struggle against weeds offers tremendous practical advantages and the possibility of the total rejection of herbicides. What makes herbiphages most promising is, above all, their highly selective attitude toward the host plants, which virtually guarantees the impossibility of their attacking other species. As of now it is already possible to use herbiphages against the field sow thistle, many varieties of bristlethistles, cornflower, the spurge family, the mustard family, the creeping crowfoot, bindweeds, the shepherd's purse, the horsetail, wheat grass

and ragweed, i.e., the overwhelming majority of varieties in the struggle against which herbicides are essentially used. Successful scientific work in this respect has been done by the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Zoology, the USSR Academy of Sciences Zoological Institute and other scientific institutions in the country. In the West the popularization of herbiphages and microbiological means of protection has been restrained by the chemical concerns, which is understandable, for they are interested in marketing an increasing quantity of herbicides. But why is their use in our agriculture hindered? Is it ecological illiteracy or the lack of initiative?

The new is frequently considered good and the old is forgotten. As early as 150 years ago an efficient means of preserving the harvested grain was registered: silicone powder, made of ground skeletons of microscopic diatomic algae. Adding no more than 0.5-3.0 kilograms of this powder per ton of grain prevents its damaging by insects when stored. The effect of this powder is mechanical: the minute particles block the respiratory organs of the insects. Also known are other types of nontoxic pesticides. However, for some reason they are not used in our country.

Plant selection based on resistance to damage, expanded in recent years by the successes achieved in genetic engineering and biotechnology, is of major importance among the various protection methods. It has become possible to include genes in the hereditary apparatus of crops, which develop substances which repel potential enemies. It is true that the stability achieved with such methods may be relatively quickly eliminated as a result of the appearance of new races of pests, which requires constant biotechnological and selection work to develop ever new stable forms. What is unquestionable, however, is that such methods for plant protection are safer for man and the environment, compared to chemical means.

The totality of the methods we listed (agrotechnical, biological, stable strains, etc.), with an extremely limited use of chemicals, is described as the integrated protection method. The wide-scale conversion to precisely such a method is a real task of our agriculture in the immediate future. This would enable us noticeably to lower the chemical load on the environment and significantly to upgrade the efficiency of protective measures in agricultural production. Speaking of agricultural production in the foreseeable future, however, and the strategy of its development, we must acknowledge as of now that the integrated method as, incidentally, the other protection methods, cannot be considered a panacea. We need not a superficial but a profound ecological approach to agriculture, related to making substantial changes in the entire aspect of agricultural production.

The overwhelming majority of the arable land today is under a single crop. By sowing the same strain on an entire field, man himself develops weeds and pests, for in nature neither one may be found. Nonetheless, we have

known for a long time that several crops can be simultaneously grown in a single field. For example, spring wheat combines well with oats, barley, mustard, peas, vetchlings, lentils, beans, vetches, flax, carrots, etc. In many cases such crops increase the overall harvest from the same area and always lower the amount of weed and the harm caused by pests and diseases. This also improves the soil structure. The mixed growing of corn, oats and sunflower under the conditions of Penza Oblast, averaged 414 quintals of fresh fodder per hectare, compared with 326 quintals of exclusive corn planting. Under the conditions of the Moscow area a combination of three crops (peas-mustard-sunflower, or vetches-mustard-sunflower) not only yielded higher and more stable feed crops; weed pollution was lower by a factor of 3-4, which made the use of herbicides unnecessary.

Theoretical developments and successful experimentation have indicated that the special "weeding" of crops of any sort could successfully increase yields: the use of specific weeds could reduce bad weeds and announce to the entire agrocenoses the existence of an increased "reserve of strength" against adverse weather influences, pests and diseases. For example, nectar-yielding plants, which are grown alongside cabbage, reliably protect it from the overwhelming majority of pests. The task is now being considered of designing agrobiocenoses for the basic crops with an optimal choice of "satellite" varieties, in the presence of which the valuable features of the cultivated crop would show up most fully.

Inevitably, in the future agriculture will have to abandon the cultivation of single crops and convert to crop combinations. This will ensure the practical invulnerability of our fields to the effect of insects, ticks, fungi and viral diseases in amounts threatening the crops: in complex ecological systems the interconnection among species is such that the steady high number of any kind of variety (i.e. the appearance of species belonging to the economic categories of weeds or pests) becomes impossible. Furthermore, mixed crops virtually prevent soil "fatigue."

Mixed crops can be raised in several varieties. One of them is mixes or "blends." This system has been used for centuries in China in the growing of two-season rice (the second strain is mixed with the earlier). Mixed varieties of wheat were successfully cultivated in the 19th century in the progressive farms in Russia and Western Europe. Substantial data confirm the efficiency of mixing corn, cotton, buckwheat and other crops. Naturally, by no means does every blend lead to higher yields. We must study differences among plants in terms of their speed of development, height, age and life span. Such studies were made at Moscow University and have yielded good results. On an area of 4,000 hectares wheat yields of mixed strains averaged 43.3 quintals, compared with a single-strain wheat of 33.7 quintals per hectare.

Eliminating the monotonous agricultural landscape is a major trend in improving agricultural ecology. A field which spreads from horizon to horizon is convenient for

the fast mechanized cultivation of crops but does not meet the requirements of preserving and maintaining variety as a condition for the stabilization of agricultural ecological systems. Furthermore, this violates also the principles of the ecological consistency of the soils, i.e., the utilization of a specific soil for a specific crop or strain. Administrative planning, reduced farm autonomy, and increased average size of the fields seriously disturbed in our agriculture the traditional adaptation of crops to soils. Characteristic of Western Europe and North America is a considerably greater similarity of the soil cover compared to our country. Although there as well a flexible strain policy (the use of strains adapted to a specific acidity, excessive moisture or drought, and a specific—low or high—content of microelements, etc.) is yielding significant economic results. In the United States, as a result of the more accurate location of strains in the 1950s and 1960s alone, corn yields were increased by 17 and barley by 13 percent.

Sylvan crops are being actively developed in many countries throughout the world today. Essentially this is something which has long been known in our country as field protecting forests. Forest belts not only provide a barrier to dust storms and erosion, but are also a means of retaining moisture. In areas of risky farming forest protecting plants drastically increase the amount and stability of crops, and restore the natural integrity of territories violated by agricultural production.

In the immediate future agriculture will have to be concerned with restoring the biological fertility of the soils, a fertility which has been violated almost comprehensively as a result of concentrated chemicalization. This will require the development and application of a new type of "fertilizers," which will be compounds which enrich the soil with fungi, bacteria and algae—with all the live components of the soil which precisely make it biological, as V.I. Vernadskiy said (i.e., "semi-living") as a natural body. It is a question essentially of the need to develop a new trend in agronomy—the biotechnology of the humus. Abroad such work has already emerged from the stage of laboratory research. Unfortunately, in our country such work is middling.

To sum it up briefly: pests and weeds appear not because of lack of pesticides in the environment. This is an indicator of the imperfect management of the agroecological system. To rephrase the familiar statement by D.N. Pryanishnikov, we can say that the lack of knowledge in the biology of the plants which are being cultivated and, particularly, their habitat in terms of each specific field, makes it impossible to compensate with a surplus of pesticides, fertilizers or reclamation.

If we proceed from the interests of preserving the health of the people and ensuring the life support systems in the biosphere, the only proper strategy is the gradual abandonment of the use of pesticides and the development of ecologically substantiated forms of farming. Already now chemical plant protection means could be only an

instrument of extreme interference in critical situations but not in daily practical work. I am confident that without the slightest damage being caused to the crops, this very next year the use of pesticides could be reduced by at least 50 percent.

We must develop the economic foundations for the use of pesticides, bearing in mind not only their short-term effect but also long-term consequences to man and the biosphere; we must direct the development of agrochemistry toward increasing yields and the nutritive value of foodstuffs.

Greater attention should be paid to discussing the strategy of development of agriculture, so that 5 to 10 years from now we do not find ourselves even more trapped by the chemical (and essentially anti-ecological) approaches.

Finally, in solving the problems of the development of agricultural chemicalization on all levels, from the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and Gosagroprom and down to the level of the obkom, oblast executive committee and RAPO, we must mandatorily take into consideration not only the instant advantages of the use of pesticides but also the inevitable losses—economic, social and ecological.

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**The Generation of the 1st 5-Year Plan; Page  
From the History of the Komsomol**  
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[Publication Prepared by O. Khlevnyuk]

[Text] What was the Komsomol generation of the 1930s? In today's arguments and thoughts about socialism, we turn to the people of that period as our immediate predecessors. We try to understand them in order better to understand ourselves.

They were not all the same, although most of them had identical zealous thoughts about socialism. Many of them, despite all difficulties, fought to build it. The breakdown of the traditional way of life in the country, which resembled an avalanche, suited the young hot-heads. The Komsomol youth actively responded to appeals such as "catch up and surpass!" "speed up!" and "destroy!" A great part of the young people's concepts of the immediate tasks remained immature, unconsidered, and concepts adopted on the basis of superficial propaganda and frequently alienated from reality. However, the objective of constant progress and aspiration for the better enabled the young people of the 1st 5-year period quickly to learn and relatively easily to surmount attractive but inviolable stereotypes.

The Komsomols were one of the main pillars in the course toward accelerated industrialization and collectivization. Full use was made at that time of their energy and enthusiasm, mixed with youthful maximalist intolerance. The principles of war communism in the organization of social life were extensively widespread. The struggle for strengthening the command-administrative system and the selfless surmounting of its first gross errors, opposing the danger which was steadily increasing in the country as a result of the most severe consequences of the "big leaps" had become closely and indistinguishably intertwined. This was one of the main or, perhaps, even the most tragic paradoxes of that time. However, that same paradox contained a major trend of rejection of the administrative method and was a school for the mastery of new means and methods applied in building the new society.

Having chosen the course of command and rushing, and trying to approach the target through unrelenting pressure, by the end of the 1920s the participants in the building of socialism became increasingly convinced of the faulty and ineffectual nature of the course they had charted. For that reason the 1st 5-Year Plan was characterized not only by a significant underfulfillment of industrial plans and the critical situation in agriculture. The shoots of a new culture appeared within the failures and errors in the culture of revolutionary enthusiasm based on cost accounting and humanism, a culture against which were aimed, as a catastrophic consequence, the mass repressions of the end of the 1930s.

A bright page in this part of the history of the 1st 5-Year Plan was the building and start-up of the Stalingrad Tractors Plant. It was the biggest plant in the world! It completed 144 tractors per day! One tractor came out every 5 minutes! The latest equipment had been purchased with foreign currency from the leading tractor manufacturing country in the world, the United States. Everyone knew this or, at least, anyone who read the newspapers or participated in their collective reading, or who listened to the as yet rare radio sets and the much more widespread reports by numerous agitators. This was also well-known to the 7,000 Komsomols, mobilized by the Komsomol Central Committee for Building and Operating the Tractors Plant on the Volga.

It was largely thanks to the energy and enthusiasm of those "7,000" that the enterprise was completed within a maximally short time and by June 1930 the first tractor came off the assembly line. However, the plant reached its full capacity only in April 1932. Before this were to happen the Komsomol and the entire collective had to reassess many customary stereotypes of political and economic thinking and be among the first to cross the still short distance separating war communism from the socialist principles of living and working.

The way all of this happened and the experience of the Stalingrad Tractors Plant, which became a training school for the Komsomol and the rest of the country, was

described in the 1933 book "*The People of the Stalingrad Tractors Plant*." In his preface to the book, M. Gorkiy wrote: "Without fearing any 'overpraising,' I can confidently say the following about this book: it is one of the most interesting and original books ever to come out in the country in the past 15 years." Compiled as a collection of autobiographical essays of workers and engineers, to this day, when we understand immeasurably better and more profoundly our own history, this book is perceived as a frank and unexpectedly direct testimony of the times and the peoples of the 1930s.

To a significant extent it consists of essays about young people and their actions, characters and thoughts. The initiator of this book—the talented journalist Ya. Ilin—was also very young himself. It is perhaps precisely for this reason that this book happily escaped one of the saddest features of political journalism of the 1930s (and not only the 30s), which was intolerance and sharp tonality, based on the "positive-negative" principle, and cautious brevity in describing complex topics, and a lack of contradictions.

Ilin did not live to be 27, in 1932. "He was burned out on the job," was the way people like him were described. He grew up in the Komsomol. He worked at the plant. He was tortured by the same questions which the entire Komsomol movement of the 1920s asked itself: "How to live?" "To what to aspire?" "How to find one's place in the common ranks?" He answered: "To go among the people... means to allow every person to apply his energy, knowledge and strength to building the new society." Ilin brought to journalism this interest "in every person." He worked in PRAVDA and traveled for months on end in the Donbass, the Urals, Leningrad and Stalingrad. His dream was to write the history of his generation, the generation of the young people of the first 15 years of postrevolutionary time. "*The People of the Stalingrad Tractors Plant*" is an unquestionable step toward this objective.

However, the fate of this book did not turn out to be all that happy. This was probably due to the fact that many of its characters were deleted by force, and because the very content of this work became increasingly inconsistent with the requirements governing the interpretation of "heroic reality."

The contemporary reader as well would find many interesting features in the stories about the people of the Stalingrad Tractors Plant. Until this book has been reprinted, however, following are a few excerpts with comments:

It all began the way it had frequently happened in the past and was frequently repeated in subsequent years: a mobilization of the Komsomol members for building the Stalingrad Plant was under way in the country.

"We, Moscow Komsomols, heard about the Tractors Plant for the first time at the start of 1930. I was present at a meeting attended by some 500,000 people.... The speaker came on the stage without a single note and spoke so beautifully that people listened to him for a whole hour with baited breath. He said that a socialist city will be built at the Stalingrad Tractors Plant as early as the winter of 1931. In that city all children would be raised separately from their parents. Every worker would have his own room.... The rooms in the socialist city would be separated by movable partitions. The socialist city will have clubs and huge swimming pools in which one could swim winter and summer. The houses would have bathtubs. The rooms would be cleaned with vacuum cleaners. Each such statement was welcomed by us with applause."

As was the case with many members of the Komsomol during the 1st 5-Year Plan people who went to work at the Stalingrad Tractors Plant had a great deal to think about. This included faith in an imminent better future and socialism, the fast building of which would radically change the country and solve the numerous contradictions and difficulties of present life. Many people considered the rationing system and the housing crisis unworthy of attention compared to fierce debates on the cities of the future, plans for garden cities and communes, a new way of life, fast highways and universal availability of automobiles for the population.

"...News came with each passing day. Lunacharskiy published his article on the socialist cities. This coincided with our dreams. Lunacharskiy wrote about a new way of life and we saw in front of our eyes the splendid picture of the socialist cities in which we would live.... We read in the papers that V.I. Ivanov, the chief of Traktorostroy, had requested of the Komsomol Central Committee to mobilize 7,000 young people to work at the Tractors Plant. It was then that we decided to go to Stalingrad. The decision to go there coincided with our long held dreams."

"There were numerous volunteers.... Those who had been rejected walked for several days with their heads down. Everyone among the chosen felt himself if not a hero in any case a person who was destined to accomplish something big. I delivered in my factory training course a speech on behalf of those who were going, saying that we are going as a united shock brigade and will show everyone how one must work and live."

The concept of how to live and work was quite original in the minds of most of the Komsomols who went to the Stalingrad Tractors Plant, as it was in hundreds of thousands of their coevals. The policy of the "great change," and the tempestuous increase in the pace of industrialization, ignoring economic laws, contributed, in addition to everything else, to the widespread nature of war-communism methods and forms of organization of labor. Drafts, mobilizations, labor battalions, sounding the alarm, and work on the principle of first aid:

"Send as many people wherever needed," regardless of cost, were all based on the sincere, on the noble thrust of the builders of a new society, frequently assisted by enthusiasm; inhuman efforts were made to correct the frank errors of those who were designing the construction project. The Stalingrad Plant was no exception.

"I recall February 1939 as though it was yesterday. It was cold and windy.... We had not been issued gloves but could not tolerate to stand idle. Our hands and faces were cold. We would rub our faces with our fingers and there would be white strips on our faces between the fingers.... It was difficult at first at the construction site... but we worked well."

"At that time the alarm was frequently sounded at night. The people rang bells, the sirens wailed, everyone rushed thinking that there was a fire somewhere, but then it turned out that this was just a test of the readiness of the Komsomols."

"The time of installation came. I believe that this was the most active and happy period for the plant. If the equipment would arrive at night we would be wakened up and summoned:

"Start unloading!"

"And we did. How hard we worked! Even during our leisure time we tried to stick around, for we may be summoned suddenly."

From the material point of view the life which these young people lived was quite hard. The consumption of basic food products dropped significantly. Durable goods of prime necessity could not be found and the housing crisis worsened. A characteristic reaction to these circumstances was the strengthening of the ideology of asceticism and equalization which, as it were, were widespread in Komsomol circles. Under the influence of such concepts of equality, social justice and the principles of communist community life, the mass popularization of communes began at the Stalingrad Tractors Plant.

"At first we organized in our hut housing communes. At that time this was the fashion. Everything in the communes was common. Everyone could take your blanket and cover himself or put on your shirt. If someone's shoes would give out, he would take from his neighbor his only shoes, leaving him unshod for an entire day.

"I asked one of my comrades once:

"Where did you get these new trousers?"

"He answered:

"These are not my trousers, they were bought by the commune. Who knows who will be wearing them tomorrow?"

"If some youngsters opposed such socialization they were subjected to 'indoctrination.' We described such opposition as 'petit bourgeois tendencies.'

"Money was absolutely scorned. Everyone earned almost identical wages, mostly between 60 and 90 rubles. However, there were also those who earned 150 rubles or more. One of the highly paid youngsters would come after receiving his wages, put the money on the table and say:

"Whoever needs it, take!"

"Going to the cafeteria or to the theater, a person would put all his money on the cash box, count the necessary amount and pay for everyone. On one occasion, distracted, that person left his entire earnings in the cash box.

"At first cleaning women, sent by the plant administration, swept the floor of the barracks daily and aired the rooms. Eventually, the boys became fed up with such cleaning and did not allow the cleaning women inside....

"No matter," they said, 'we can live with the bugs. It is not the bugs that will solve the problems....'"

It was precisely on such qualities of the Komsomol youth—enthusiasm and readiness for material privations—that the national economic leadership initially relied in building the Stalingrad Plant. They believed that the political consciousness of the Komsomols would make it possible to master modern technology quickly and without any particular difficulty, a technology which, considering its advanced nature, would not be difficult to master. The young workers themselves believed this.

"What was the idea that many people had about launching the plant? Suffice it to bring the machine-tools, install them and put the workers next to them (preferably young ones, not corrupted by their experience at the old plants), give them some training, put in place the American managers and, with the active help of the party-public organizations, the plant will start working."

"A rumor spread: a conveyer belt was being procured. We believed that the conveyer belt could do everything. It embodied superior American technology. The conveyer, we thought at that time, was the most important feature of the American assembly-line plant and it was precisely the conveyer that would define the wonderful pace of having one tractor come out every 5 minutes."

The plant produced its first tractor in June 1930, timed for the 16th Party Congress, in accordance with the tradition of timing, regardless of the cost. This first-born was not particularly reliable and the workers who accompanied it experienced a number of worrisome minutes, fearing that the tractor would unexpectedly stop in a

Moscow street. In Moscow they were lucky. In Stalingrad, however, the plant, which was not ready for work, was in turmoil. As early as July 10,000 people, using the most advanced equipment, had been able to assemble with difficulty....five tractors. Assimilating the work of this enterprise was extended to several months.

Above all, the utopia of blind reliance on the advanced technology and the unrestrained enthusiasm of the young, proved to be totally groundless.

"Something or other was taught to us at the factory-plant school, but nothing very much. The first time we approached the steam-driven hammer, nothing came out. The boys took turns in stamping. Nothing came out, neither a part nor metal.... At that point the decision was made not to waste the metal. We were given billets and we used them to learn how to strike accurately."

"At first the machine-tools were smarter than we were."

"Ivanov (the plant's director—editor) walked around unshaven, frequently cursing. He toured the shops and looked closely at everything. At one point he stopped at a machine-tool the young handler of which was striking with a hammer a delicate cam which, handled skillfully, could have been handled with one's fingers."

"We were primitively illiterate. We had to learn not only how to lubricate the machine tools but even how to carry the lubricant.... We thought that anything will do, used dirty oil, and it took long arguments to convince us and teach us how to store the oil, how to protect it from dust when carrying it, and how not to set the oil cans on the floor, and thousands of other 'petty' production rules. This took a great deal of time and we were impatient."

In addition to everything else, this impatience was manifested in the fact that efforts were made to solve new problems with the old customary storming methods, like a "cavalry charge."

"We rushed from one 'bottleneck' in the work to another, mending them as they broke down, and they kept appearing at different places simultaneously. There was chaos in everything and it was then that the idea of a production battle appeared.... A production battle was proclaimed from thus and such to thus and such a date and the entire plant, clutching its teeth, would rush forward. A barely perceptible improvement occurred but tension dropped and, once again, we retreated. Once again we faced disorder...."

"What prevailed all around us was the notorious 'pushing,' when an innumerable number of people would be rushing around the shops without any output, while people were merely 'pushing' scarce parts...."

"Motivated by 'enthusiasm,' the boys visited other shops, studied other machine tools and the following morning, short of sleep, would go to their own machine tools and produce defective items....

"I remember that at that time we organized a production headquarters the purpose of which was to eliminate breakdowns. The headquarters operatively interfered in various production problems, submitting its suggestions. All shops and virtually all sections had their own representative of headquarters, who 'pushed the parts'."

"Let me say a couple of words as instruction to our descendants: although such headquarters helped us to start the production of tractors, we nonetheless do not advise others to follow our example. Headquarters means rushing. It is not a work method, particularly not a method for the commissioning of new plants. We set up headquarters because we lacked experience, because we were seeking ways to master the running of the plant."

Generally speaking, such rushing methods proved that they were totally unsuitable. They not only failed to improve the situation but confused it further, taking the people away from the real problems. With such rushing the people were unable to learn and simply became tired. Such extremes kept worsening the situation within the collective. In October 1930, on the 5th month after the plant had been commissioned, 48 tractors had been produced.

"Confusion reigned at the plant. I recall coming across the rigger Krasavin, one of the heroes of the assembly work, an enthusiast in construction work, who had become unrecognizable. He was frowning and had a pinched expression on his face. He spoke curtly: 'I do not get it, you can kill me and I still do not get it! We run around, we fuss, we invest all our efforts and there are no tractors'."

"We have more than enough bare enthusiasm.... Our entire trouble is that we keep swimming in these waves of bare enthusiasm...."

Indeed, "bare enthusiasm" pushed aside all economic methods in managing the enterprise. Equalization and anonymity dominated the plant, by virtue of which no worker was responsible for the condition of a specific machine tool. No records were kept. In the heat of the rushing no one even knew how many workers had shown up for work. Dozens and hundreds of truants (which were known at the plant as "holy spirits") asked friends to punch them as being present. According to the records no one was absent but in fact machine tools remained unmanned. In the period of production battles there was no time to deal with such "petty matters." However, life made it necessary to return to the "sinful earth."

"The people realized that sallies will not make the equipment work."

"Technical training was of tremendous help to the plant. We organized hundreds of circles and involved in training about 6,000 young workers."

The struggle against equalization was launched in all areas. To this effect a system of labor organization and incentive was applied in the shops and cost accounting principles were introduced. It turned out that this was much more efficient than administrative pressure.

"Piece-rate work yielded excellent results.... No further persuasion or goading became necessary. On the very second day of the brigade piece-rate system we started producing with a Bulard machine tool 40 parts per shift whereas according to our strictly computed data, no more than 20 could be produced! Going beyond that and applying the system of individual piece-rate work, the production of that same part reached 80 per shift."

"The Komsomol took up cost accounting, planning, and managing the tools and transportation among shops. Komsomol technical conferences were held on each one of these problems. The first cost accounting brigades at the plant consisted of Komsomol members."

The first cost accounting brigades were organized in the autumn of 1931. Their work made it possible to improve the quality of output, reduce production costs and economize. The members of the brigades adopted an entirely different attitude toward their work, displaying greater responsibility and interest.

"We gave bonuses to people working on the basis of cost accounting for reducing defective goods, caring for the tools and overfulfilling their programs. The attitude of the workers toward cost accounting was interesting. They felt that this was not something on paper, remembering bonuses and savings. Look at the way the brigade leader is discussing matters with the economist as he signs a contract. How does he do this! He substantiates his objections better than would any scientist. He fights literally for each hundredth of a percent in computing norms and working time."

The elimination of equalization in production led to a reassessment of the idea of "communist" socialization in daily life. It turned out that life in the communes and the equalization within them of personal inclinations and needs actually hindered the professional and cultural growth of young men and women.

"The 'Motor' Commune where I lived consisted of 18 people living in seven rooms. In the evenings, however, everyone usually gathered in one of the rooms, engaging in the same old inefficient discussions. One would come from work and until one would go to bed, there would be endless talk about difficulties at the plant, that this or that was in short supply and that it was impossible to do anything else.... Every single day there would be a

meeting, session or a communal talk. And if one would remain in one's room, people would start denouncing him and say, 'aha, he is starting to reject us!'"

The rule in the communes was the following: whatever one earned, everything went into the common kitty and was distributed according to need. This allowed some people not to be concerned with upgrading their skills. They had first or second grade skills, particularly the girls, and were quite unconcerned: "Why do I need higher wages, when I am living in a commune?" In some cases no wages would be paid for as long as a month and a half: "It is all the same," they thought. "The commune will feed us!"

"We tried to ignore the ever-widening cracks in such an artificially socialized way of life but the cracks kept widening.... All of us felt that equalization and the pursuit of 100-percent socialization were distorting life. The disappearance of two members of the commune—Seregin and Sergeyev—indicated that things were not going well in the commune. Two days later, we came across them on the stairwell.

"Where were you?"

"With some embarrassment they answered that they had quit the commune. They had lacked the courage to do this openly....

"Risky daring thoughts began to appear: Should we not violate the sacredness of the constitution of our commune and abandon the 100-percent socialization? The commune split into two camps: the 100-percenters and the 60-percenters. Four months were spent in discussing the various suggestions but it had become clear to everyone that they could not live as before."

Naturally, such lengthy discussions of problems which had become obvious to the majority, were no accident. The war communism views and practices remained quite strong and the pressure applied by the supporters of equalization was quite heavy. We were able to deal with the problem of the communes at the Stalingrad Tractors Plant, not in all their aspects at that, only with the support of PRAVDA editors who had come to visit the plant, and a commission headed by A. Kosarev, Komsomol Central Committee secretary. To accomplish this it even became necessary to remove the leadership of the plant's Komsomol organization, which consisted of active propagandists of the purity of "communist ideals."

Equal efforts were required to eliminate the scornful attitude toward the social area. In all the new construction projects during the 1st 5-Year Plan social developments were accidental, using the few funds which were left over after the huge investments in industry. However, ordinary "petty matters" quite soon developed into problems of prime importance, creating an incredible cadre turnover and a decline in labor productivity.

Gradually, this was realized both at the center and the local areas, for which reason G. Ordzhonikidze, chairman of the All-Union Sovnarkhoz, and A. Kosarev, the Komsomol Central Committee secretary, who came to Stalingrad, paid particular attention to the sociocultural area.

"Ordzhonikidze's arrival made a tremendous impression on us. He did not promise us anything extraordinary in his speech. He did not mention.... the fantastic cities or the fact that we will have communism in 6 months. The people dreamed of homes with movable partitions but lacked even wooden sheds where they could get a glass of water. They thought of a huge food combine but had failed to build even an ordinary kitchen facility."

"The first thing he did in the hammer press shop, he went to the shop cafeteria and sat down on a bench, next to a worker. 'Well, how is the food?' he asked his neighbor who was bending over his soup. 'Poor,' his neighbor simply said, and showed him a dented wooden spoon. 'See, this is what we use instead of spoons.' 'Where are the spoons?' quietly asked Ordzhonikidze. The cafeteria manager became nervous and said that there were no spoons in Stalingrad and, furthermore, they were being stolen. 'Where are the spoons?' angrily repeated Sergo. 'Why are there no spoons? You were able to build a plant but have neither the force nor the possibility of procuring spoons?'"

"After Ordzhonikidze's visit, we were visited by Kosarev, the Komsomol Central Committee secretary. He said: 'Here the bugs are devouring the tractors.' This was true. A life in which at night, because of the bugs, one would curse one's fate, could not generate a charge for productive work. In frequent cases young and healthy boys, after sleepless nights, and after fighting the bugs, would come to the shop so tired as to be unable to work....

"We undertook to clean the huts.... We made repairs, we killed the bugs.... In this we ran across strong resistance. The mentality of 'we can live with the bugs, it is not the bugs that solve the problem,' was still alive at the plant."

"The Kosarev Commission saw to it that in literally a few days several dozens stalls were built at the plant and in the settlement. They were given the name of 'Kosarev's stalls.'... In a few days the Udarnik sound motion picture theater was built of stone. It had 1,500 seats. Hastily housing and a kitchen factory began to be completed. The boys began to acquire good clothing, watches, books."

Naturally, they were far from really surmounting the contradictions of the "big leap." Furthermore, the developing command-administrative system constantly reproduced that same war communism model of socioeconomic development which the Stalingrad tractor builders had experienced. Practical experience forced an



easing of its most extreme manifestations and blocking open leftism and a barracks mentality. However, naturally, all of this could not weaken the foundations of the system.

Nonetheless, new trends were slowly maturing and a gradual reassessment of the values of war-communism was taking place. "The boys felt that a sober approach to life was necessary," one of the Komsomol members from the Stalingrad Plant said. This understanding of the need for a sober attitude toward reality which was being shaped slowly and painfully was the foundation for the manifestation of specific ways and means of struggle against political and economic intoxication and for a proper assertion of a sober way of life in the full meaning of this term. It was not in the least a matter that, along with rushing and indiscriminate pressure, youth qualities, such as enthusiasm and loyalty to ideals, were lost. It was simply a matter of heroically becoming accustomed gradually to take into consideration high competence, standards, endurance and strict economic considerations.

"Let us consider two workers: Sukhachev, at the machine assembly shop, and Zagryazhskiy, at the casting shop. In order to fulfill his norm, Sukhachev went to work early. He did not take time off for lunch but, nonetheless, was unable to fulfill his norm. Zagryazhskiy came to work on time, left on time and was able to fulfill his norm fully. He knew what the norm consisted of. He worked skillfully, economically, at an even pace.... After work, Zagryazhskiy looked over his faults. He was well familiar with his earnings. Sukhachev was not. Such were the two different styles of work.

"There were also two styles in social and cultural work."

"Today, as we look at the past, we reinterpret it.... Today we would not spend 2 hours to move a transmission belt manually but would see to it that the turbines work normally. I remember the way in some communes the assembly workers would spend as many as 20 sleepless hours, waiting for the equipment to arrive and became so tired that they fell asleep on their feet. At that time this was considered heroic. Today this would be considered simply lack of common sense. Why did everyone have to keep watch, when a single person was sufficient...."

"...I think today of all the comrades with whom we are struggling and conquering difficulties in our work. Most of them are young people, rarely over 25 or 26. Their heroism does not lie in the fact that they compete in assuming greater physical loads. This is not required, there are cranes to do such work. They are not heroes because they remain in the shop after the work shift, for this would indicate nothing but our inability to organize the work. Their advantage is that they have mastered new production technology painstakingly, methodically and with stubborn efforts."

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### The 'Virgin Field' of Rural Medicine

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[Article by Vitaliy Pavlovich Karpenko, rural physician, Cherkassy Oblast]

[Text] Rural health care is a virgin field of problems. It is a major topic and a complex and confused tangle of organizational errors, unsolved social and economic problems and a faster growth of requirements with a growing lag of possibilities. Today it concentrates within itself a number of difficulties found in the domestic health care system and a very complex array of attitudes of the town toward the country and of workers and officials toward the peasantry. The present situation in rural medicine is the result of the "second-rate nature" of the rural system in our social life, the "residual" principle of financing the social area in general, and the traditional "requisitioning" approach to the countryside and the rural resident, of which many delegates to the 19th Party Conference spoke heatedly and impassionately.

For decades we took from the countryside virtually all that it could give. By force or persuasion, accelerated changes and promises of a better life and, of late, with abundant flows of depreciated money, the countryside gave its milk, meat and grain in exchange for expensive but substandard industrial goods and trains of vodka. It gave the best part of its youth and frequently received in exchange careerists-time servers and incompetent specialists; it surrendered fertile land and received in exchange salinized soil and a polluted atmosphere, drying out rivers and dying forests.

It was not only the countryside that became impoverished as a result of such uneven trade. All of us became impoverished in terms of food, talent, conscience, skill, traditions and morality! The inevitable facing of the needs of the countryside, triggered by the scarcity of products, radically changed attitudes toward individual labor activity and cooperatives, and billions of rubles invested in agriculture all served the same purpose, that of changing the situation for the better. Yet such a change will be very difficult....

Today in the Russian villages there is no one to work and live or to revive folk industries and customs. In Kalinin Oblast alone there are 14,000 empty houses. In the past 20 years the population here became "aged" significantly, and declined by nearly one-half. Under those circumstances, rural health care found itself in a vicious circle. In order for it to develop and strengthen it needs people and strong farms to help it. However, in order to end the exodus of the population and to strengthen the economy of such farms, we need as of now, among other

mandatory conditions, a developed health care, itself efficient and healthy. Yet we know that without radical intervention this vicious circle will not be broken.

Before discussing strictly medical problems, I would like to take a short historical trip to not all that distant times. In 1985, 2 months after the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a young head physician of a small rural hospital in Novgorod Oblast, who had recently completed a course for the advancement of physicians, found himself in a difficult and rather peculiar situation in his attempt to improve the work of his institution. I shall try to enumerate very briefly his accomplishments. He introduced a two-shift work for outpatient reception and a flexible work schedule for some of the personnel. He organized precise accountability of procedures and found that some medical personnel had free time, after which he reduced unnecessary combination of jobs and the thus released money decided to use to pay those who worked the hardest and were the most conscientious. Finally, he introduced three new developments: self-registration by the patients, releasing of medicines from the hospital to the disabled and war veterans, and sale of medicines to the entire population at night and on holidays.

What came out of all this? The administration of the central rayon hospital took under its wing the "aggrieved," and threatened the chief physician with prosecution. The chairman of the oblast medical workers trade union committee and the deputy head of the oblast health department paid him personal visits and then issued their advice to the heads of the rayon hospital, after which the chief physician became the former chief physician. This was a rather typical situation for that time (but was it for that time only?). An individual may err but the collective is always right! The conflict was resolved in favor of the latter. All "innovations" were immediately revoked.

The former chief physician who, until then, was familiar only with his small sector, visited, looking for a job, many rayons in Kaluga, Bryansk, Smolensk and Kalinin Oblasts. He visited almost 20 section hospitals, talked to colleagues, managers, nurses and feldshers. The picture which emerged was staggering! Despite the eloquent entry in his work record, "dismissed for absenteeism," he was offered a job everywhere. Furthermore, in two rayons he was invited to head the rayon health department. From a truant and a "cat in a bag," to chief physician of a rayon?! The explanation was simple. The rural rayons in the Nonchernozem have an acute hunger for cadres. There even are hospitals with openings for two or three physicians headed by a feldsher. No one is amazed at this situation. The impressions gained by such trips could be the topic of a separate article. At this point, nonetheless, I would like to discuss only two most indicative features.

This was a remote little village, in the forest, at a point where several oblasts met, an area of fishing and hunting, timber felling and poaching. I met with a young, self-confident lady physician, sparkling like a diamond. A

thin and irritable cadre inspector took me there. Yes, it was me, for it was I who was that same former chief physician. "Accept! This is pure gold! You can buy yourself a car in a year and in 2 years you can have an apartment in a cooperative building. What else do you need?"

Slightly to the north, very close to the Belorussian Highway, there is a neglected hospital in a picturesque ravine, at the edge of a village. For 2 years there was no physician here. The last physician had become a drunkard and had been unable to complete his term. Patients were treated by nurses. Now, for the past 4 months, there has been a new physician, a nice looking intelligent boy from Yaroslavl. He lives the way his predecessor did, in a small room at the hospital, with no prospects for housing. He has a bed, a transistor radio, and bundles of medical publications piled up on bed tables and two chairs. His wife has 2 more years to graduate. "Will you able to stand it?" I asked. "I do not know, one must. When my wife comes it will become easier." I saw yearning in his eyes....

Three years of work in a section hospital and impressions and discussions during that trip give me the right to discuss the state of medicine in the Nonchernozem, as an insider. However, if we speak of the problems of rural health care, I would give priority not to material facilities (although they are in pitiful condition) or transportation and drugs (which must be improved a great deal), but to the organization of health care itself and to the cadre problem, the problem of the personality of the physician in general and the manager in particular. Even under today's conditions a knowledgeable and honest manager can accomplish a great deal. All that he needs is a somewhat greater freedom, more rights, money and trust!

The chief physician does not have the right to organize the work in his own hospital, to change functional obligations or deal with matters of wages. I can recall two orders issued by the Ministry of Health on increasing the rights of heads of treatment establishments. However, considering the current practices, such orders will remain nothing but perestroyka on paper. Not one of the thousands of orders and instructions is in itself stupid or obviously harmful. Put together, however, they do not provide the opportunity of working at full strength or, sometimes, even simply working.

Physicians among our readers have probably noted that one of my innovations in my previous job was illegal: issuing drugs by the hospital. Even then I was not punished for that simply because my "sins" in the eyes of the management were more serious. But try now, when we are persistently told from the highest levels that "anything which is not prohibited by law is allowed," to do something similar! Even if this is dictated by life itself and by the interest of the work. The minister, however, is far away and the prosecutor is right next door. Why did I start selling medicine from the hospital? Because in the

village in the evening, at night or during holidays there is no place where to procure medicines. The duty nurse would record the issuing of such medicine during her shift and submit the list to the senior nurse who, once a week, would stock up with medicines from that same pharmacy. Who suffered from this? The more so since accountability was strict, there was no abuse and it is only the patients who benefited. However, it was forbidden.

Anyone of my colleagues could remember dozens of such examples and petty matters. Why, for example, in the summer, when only 15 to 20 percent of the rural hospitals are filled, would it be impossible to grant unpaid leave (for 2 or 3 months) to one-half of the orderlies and the nurses? In winter they have to work at double or triple the normal load. It would be at that time that the chief physician would be able to add to their salaries from funds saved during the summer. Or else, he would be able to hire the retirees temporarily as supernumeraries.... Brigade contracting? Bonuses and supplements for intensive high-quality work, as stipulated in the new wage conditions? For the time being, these are merely pious wishes and many hospitals which raised the salaries of managers, orderlies and surgeons are forced to reduce the number of other physicians who combine jobs. All of this is still for the sake of the notorious wage fund, as a result of which the patients suffer.

Here is a simple example: for a number of years one or two openings for physicians, and four to five openings for secondary medical personnel remained vacant in the hospital servicing Vyshnevolotskiy Rayon, Kalinin Oblast, where I worked until recently. However, every year we were short of wage funds. Was that a paradox? What was happening was that it was not we who were planning but it was the financial officials who proceeded, as elsewhere in the national economy, on the basis of achievements, i.e., on the basis of the actual wages paid the preceding year. The entire table of organization, according to the regulations, was simply ignored. All one had to do was hire at the end of the year a new person and the result would be a wage overrun. How, therefore, could the chief physician find funds for a brigade form of work and for encouraging those who are more industrious, competent and conscientious?...

Rigid regulations by superiors concerning working time and wages and obligations leads, in fact, to some kind of averaged minimal standard. Logic and the duty of the physician indicate that it would be better for all such rates to be reviewed on the basis of local conditions. But... in some cases the load of skilled specialists who have mastered the use of additional methods would unjustifiably be increased but how can they be rewarded? In another case, the working day of a driver would be extended to an unseemly number of hours and there would be no possibility of compensating him for it. This leads to the rule of the "individual" principle, according to which patients are directed to tests, and consultations at random. This suits perfectly the lazy medical workers.

But try to base everything on what is in the interest of the patients and you immediately see a change in the attitude of one's associates. Not everyone can maintain the maximal level and we can pay only the same to everyone. Inevitably, the entire collective begins to work on the basis of a minimal level.

The very structure of the rural health service is stupid. The ratios of beds and medical workers, based on the size of the population, are uniform. In Perm Oblast or in the Ukraine, where settlements may be few but large (1,500 to 2,000 people or more per settlement) the medical centers are archaic. Each village in that area should have its hospital, and that would be justified. In the Nonchernozem, where 3,000 to 4,000 people in a sector are dispersed among 50 to 60 small villages in which, incidentally, no more than 10 would have a telephone and only six would have a bus line to the center, feldshers are in obviously short supply and the rates for medical transportation and fuel expenditures do not provide even for urgent medical assistance. The section hospital itself, given the current table of organization, cannot meet all of its assignments. Most of the outpatient work, observation of patients, bandaging, or visits to patients are assumed by the rural feldshers, and so are house calls. No transportation is stipulated for them. What about help to the farms? To begin with, we help them by going in the summer to work in the fields, together with teachers, sales clerks, and librarians. Secondly, as they convert to cost accounting even such help which was more like charity, which was provided earlier, becomes problematic.

If more medical centers are opened in the Nonchernozem and provided with transportation facilities and if the rayon polyclinic would strengthen its mobile brigades with physicians, section hospitals would become unnecessary. And if we should live to see a time when the chief physician of the rayon himself will determine the structure of the medical system, based on the specific nature of his rayon (population size and number of villages, distances, availability of roads, age structure, and so on), in all likelihood even within the same oblast tables of organization, structure and salaries will vary. But is this conceivable? Auditors would come from the oblast health department, the Ministry of Health or the AUCCTU. Could the number of such auditors be somewhat reduced?

The most urgent problem in the villages is emergency aid. It is still too early to speak in this case of any kind of social protection of the rural resident. Let me start by saying that the majority of rural hospitals in that same Nonchernozem are allowed one-two or, less frequently, three physicians per 25-35 beds, plus one car and one driver. Let us imagine that both the physician and the driver can work for years on a round-the-clock basis. In that case not only the Hippocratic oath but even criminal liability would be of no help. We too have our families and ordinary concerns, and the right to paid leave and days off (the Constitution was written for us too!).

I must point out that most frequently it is the chief bookkeepers who like to remind physicians of their Hippocratic oath, while they cut appropriations for everything and then earn bonuses for having saved on the wage fund. What to do? The USSR Ministry of Health dealt with this difficulty in a brilliantly simple manner. An order which was issued in 1978 directly and unequivocally states that no physician on duty can be kept in hospitals with less than 50 beds. And that is all!

In such hospitals there either are no feldshers or there is one feldsher only. What would a sick person do at night, who could be summoned, at whose door should one knock? Should he go to the city, to the "emergency room?" Most frequently, emergency aid facilities are unable to service the entire rayon. At that point at night, someone from a distant village, would be given the following answer: "If your physician or feldsher would confirm that you need it, we shall come." In practical terms, this means the following: the person who has already rung up has already walked 2 to 3 kilometers to the nearest telephone and is now forced to go to the feldsher in the neighboring village. The feldsher must come (there is not even a question of transportation, for even during the day such transportation must be requested), examine the patient, help him somehow and only then, if necessary, could he dial 03. In other words, once again someone must go where there is a telephone. Need we say that in such cases such an "emergency" aid would no longer be required? And if it is in the winter and there are snow drifts, the feldsher, who would most likely be a girl, would find it sometimes simply frightening to walk in a snow storm in darkness and through a forest. The next morning an ordinary working day begins, and who would be concerned by the fact that she was short of sleep? It is somehow hard to believe that satellites are orbiting the earth, that there are health centers equipped with the latest facilities, and that there are physicians-ministers and physicians-academics who are engaged in stormy debates concerning the family physician and paid medical services. What is the use of all this when here, in the countryside, everything is as it was during Veresayev's times?...

The situation of the physician in the section hospital is no better. Although the ministerial order does not call for night duty, how can we do without it? In the hospital where I worked, the chief physician and I answered all the calls, including those transmitted to us by "emergency aid." We were on duty at home every second day, and when one of us was on leave, every day. And every day, except for our day off, we saw outpatients and did other work. Actually, we could consider as days off only two Sundays per month. Since "no night duty was stipulated," no such duty was supposed to exist and, naturally, neither payment nor time off for such work were stipulated. I do not know about payment but as far as time off was concerned one had to work alone doing the work of two people (incidentally, the same situation is programmed in the new salary conditions, according to which being on call at home is considered legitimate,

a night differential would be paid and compensatory time off would be given. I have no idea what will happen in hospitals with one physician only).

How do we deal with this? As best we can. There are unwritten laws and native wit and, finally, the somewhat old-fashioned concept of conscience. It is "accepted" in all rural areas that a physician, who receives one and a half salary and who must be on call in nonworking time does not have to stay in the hospital until 7:00 p.m. (by doing someone else's job, the working day lasts some 10 hours). On the one hand, I would prefer to "sit it out" to the end of the working day and then not have to run at night to pay home calls. However, the patients do not allow it. Our difficulties do not concern them. If they need us, they call us. On the other hand, all of this is unofficial. In other words, it exists and does not exist. And as long as I do not quarrel with the management and my position is not desired by someone else, no one starts counting my working time.

But there is more to it. By myself, arbitrarily, I could shorten my working day but I cannot shorten my obligations. In the final account, holding more than one job presumes not only an increased salary! Yet no one has ever relieved me of such additional obligations. The result is that I can leave but, nonetheless, the work must be done. This leads to developing a selective attitude toward obligations: something may be important, something may not; I may be punished for this and forgiven for that; this will be checked, and that will not. The result is that I have a lot of unfinished work. Before an investigation, I feel like a student about to be examined. The inspector, furthermore, checks only his small area and demands that precisely in that area everything should be in order. At that point I, an ordinary physician, not even a manager, find myself constantly dependent on my superiors and on them only and not on the patients. The circle is closed.

I have discussed very briefly the basic problems with which the feldsher, the physician and the chief physician—workers who bear great responsibility and have a certain amount of independence, and who largely determine the state of contemporary rural medicine—face on a daily basis.

There also are problems which are strictly rural: the low wages of feldshers, inconsistent with their difficult working conditions; the unsettled way of life of the physician, lack of opportunities for adequate contacts with people and alienation from the contemporary level of medicine. What kind of continuity, what kind of family physician could we be talking about, if after 3 years of experience, yesterday's graduate, as a rule, returns to the city taking even lower-paid work and the latest young specialist comes to the village? How lucky then does the poor peasant become! He may get someone with a passing grade or someone who was accepted in a medical institute because of pull or else a third year student who has become disenchanted with medicine. In a city there is a

choice. There are more experienced physicians and polyclinics and professors who charge a fee. In a city the incapable person would be detected sooner. Here there is no choice. And so, the rural resident bows to the doctor whoever he may be.

How much I would like to believe that perestroika in medicine would reach the Nonchernozem as well. Here as well there would be good specialists, roads, and our own rural "emergency aid." They should be available! Our foundations, our history, our small homeland are in this now poor area. And if our "sower and feeder" is in a bad situation, it means that it is a bad situation for all of us. I wish that this thing could be advanced faster....

What, from my viewpoint, could be done as of now, in the next 2 to 3 years? Let me repeat myself somewhat. The rural feldsher's salary should be properly raised and his transportation should be secured. There should be normal living conditions for the rural physician. The rights of the manager of a treatment-prophylactic institution should be properly backed by laws and financial support in truth and not on paper only; the standardized structure, wage rates and tables of organization should be abandoned. Finally, the organization of rural emergency aid should be intelligently organized.

Can we solve all of these problems quite rapidly? I am confident that we can. Above all, this could be accomplished by decentralizing financing and management in the health care system. If, as indicated in the resolutions of the party conference, the full rights of the soviets are restored and all major problems of governmental, economic and sociocultural life are transferred under their jurisdiction, this should include problems related to the protection of the population's health.

This may be followed by the other problems, such as quality, skill, and training. All of this, however, is secondary until the main problems have been solved. As long as the rural medical centers are empty, as long as there is a shortage of physicians in section hospitals, as long as people who are unable to wait for "emergency aid" keep dying in the remote villages and until the guaranteed constitutional right of everyone to have skilled medical aid has been secured.

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**Education Away From the School**  
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[Article by Feliks Sergeevich Makhov, candidate of psychological sciences, director of the children's home, head of the area of work with children and adolescents at places of residence of the Council for Economic and Social Development and Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress, Leningrad CPSU Obkom]

[Text] The objective formulated in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum sets the target of establishing a system which will encompass all

education and upbringing units. A unit such as educational work outside of the school is ascribed an important role within it. "The main thing is to involve every child, adolescent and young person in work according to his interest and fill his free time with technical and artistic creativity, sports and tourism. Constant attention must be paid to the amateur associations of young people. We must contribute to the socially useful trend of their activities and the satisfaction of the healthy interests and requirements of young age."

What to do to implement this task? Let us begin with the fact that the social problems in this area are not well known. Discussions in the press and on television virtually ignore problems of extracurricular pedagogy, and the content, ways and means of such work virtually remain outside the field of vision of scientists. We lack even a simple systematic study of the processes occurring in this area. Yet the free time of adolescents assumes particular importance not only because it provides scope for the development of the personality but also because it is one of the prime values in life, the "price" of which will be increasing with the advancement of social and economic progress.

#### 'Stories' of Cultural-Educational Work

The area which must deal with the organization of the population's leisure time for different age groups has a paradoxical feature. Adolescents, i.e., those for whom this problem is the main one, turn out in the most unfavorable position. To illustrate this, let us visit the "stories" of cultural and educational work with the population at home.

Palaces and houses of culture and departmental and trade union clubs pay extremely little attention to work with adolescents. According to our data, in such institutions in the big cities no more than 8-10 percent of children living in the microrayons closest to them attend such circles or amateur associations sponsored by these institutions.

Where else could they spend their leisure time? The answer would seem to be self-evident: in the schools, which should function evenings, and in clubs for adolescents at places of residence. Let us consider what happens there.

In most big cities, including Leningrad, despite resolutions passed by local soviets on the mandatory work of schools and PTU in the evening, such stipulations are virtually ignored: after 5:00-6:00 p.m. they are either closed or one could find on their premises anyone but the adolescents. Repeated raids and investigations have confirmed that with the exception of one or two discotheques in the city, mass work in the schools during leisure time is virtually nonexistent.

Practical experience convincingly proves that the introduction in the schools of the so-called "second schedule" (mandatory organization of optional, circle and section training during extracurricular time) not only do not attract students but frequently repel them even further. After six or seven hours of class the children once again find themselves within those same walls (which, frankly, are not all that attractive), seeing the same teachers (by no means always liked), this time as managers of circles, sections and clubs. Such a school (PTU) is more like a rotating door in which one sees constantly the same faces, which are boring, tired and irritated. Both teachers and students are back in the school during the second half of the day but not by choice. Could it be that the children should go to school to study and relax and spend their free time elsewhere, as do their fathers, mothers and elder brothers and sisters? In any case, today the school is not ready to become the "magnet" which would attract people after classes. Obviously, this is a matter for the future. For the time being, other possibilities should be looked into. Therefore, as we can see, most frequently this "story" is barren and cold.

Remains the clubs for adolescents. One would think that it is precisely here that the children could find something they like. Alas, the actual situation is different. In Leningrad, for example, more than 300 of the 433 such clubs lead a pitiful life, located in semibasements or apartments, lacking funds, material and technical facilities and skilled cadres. All of them are so obsolete that we cannot rely on this "story" as well.

There also are rayon Pioneer and secondary school student clubs. However, their name alone cannot fail to trigger a semiskeptical and, sometimes, even a semi-scornful attitude on the part of a 14-15-year "street-wise" adolescent. He may not know what to do with himself during his leisure time but you will not drag him to the Pioneer Club even with a lasso.

Poor child, where is he to go? Who will say a word in his favor? Should he go to sports schools for children and adolescents or sports clubs? For the time being, there are so few of them and their work is so one-sided that, frankly, it would be difficult to hope for any mass help here. It is extremely difficult to become a member of such a club and very easy to be refused: all it takes is to be considered "unpromising." This too has been discussed on frequent occasions.

There also are rayon military-patriotic clubs (formerly clubs for problem children), which are managed by the internal affairs administration. But these clubs as well, which were the pride of Leningrad 20 years ago, have not been updated.

Therefore, the overall picture triggers a nagging feeling of dissatisfaction. The situation, however, is alarming, as indicated by numerous signals, such as the appearance of "punks" and "fanats," "rockers," "extremists," and drug addicts.

### The Possibilities of the Club

In his "*Pedagogical Poem*," A.S. Makarenko says virtually nothing directly pertaining to schools. He speaks of pedagogy less in terms of lessons in class than everything which pertains to the children outside the classroom. And if today we favor the maximal participation of our children, who are growing within perestroyka, we should consider that studying is not the most important thing in life. Anything which takes place around us: the struggle for peace and renovation of society, technical creativity, sports, help to veterans and friendship with pupils in children's homes and boarding houses (not sponsorship but, precisely, friendship); saving rivers, lakes and springs and environmental protection; participation in the restoration of architectural monuments; preparations for marriage and family, service in the armed forces, and many, many others. All of this could and should be accomplished by the children in a club, in the broadest possible meaning of this term.

A complex which would combine school, production and club, must become the ideal model of the future. This will help us to solve several most important problems, such as linking training with club work (for example, shifting a significant share of optional school subjects to the club or the hobby club), and linking labor training with productive labor. Finally, this would enable us to apply the method of business games and collective activities, not only in optional classes but in other areas of student life.

I am convinced that a scientifically formulated and methodically prepared alliance among school, production and club will bring fresh air to fill the sails of creativity, amateur work, self-government, and vocational guidance. Such an alliance would bring life and ennobling research and Timur-movement work, which today has become bogged down as a result of adult bureaucratism and formalism.

There is a viewpoint according to which many extracurricular club associations and clubs for adolescents were organized not thanks to the school but despite it, as a result of errors and blunders in the style and content of educational work. This claim is quite justified. Let us not conceal the fact that clubs and club associations offer more favorable conditions for collective upbringing. This can be explained with several reasons. First, the advantage of the club is that here we have a common emotionally colored interest, which is the foundation for interpersonality contacts and healthy rivalry. It is precisely here that it is easier, compared to the school, to find a "kindred spirit," in terms of interests and creativity and emotions.

Second, compared to the school the club is much more informal. Here no grades are given and "no one pressures the mind" (as the adolescents say) and one does not have to do something one does not like. In a club one can abandon the customary concept of the "school way of

life" according to which there are those who teach and those who learn. The democratic nature of the club atmosphere begins with the principle of voluntary participation which, unquestionably, is more attractive to the adolescent than the obligatory nature of studies.

Third, in the club the adolescent believes that he is doing something really worthwhile (at least from his viewpoint): whether hiking, poetry, chess or work with automobiles, boxing or macrame. He can see the specific results of his work. This cannot fail to enhance him in his own eyes. The children believe that sooner or later these skills and abilities will come in handy. Most frequently, this is precisely what happens.

The extracurricular club has a substantial number of other important features. Here the principles of children's self-government are implemented more easily. This, as we know, is very important in the education and self-education process. It is only a collective structured on the basis of the principles of self-government, uniform exigency, creative competition and self-service that can and must develop into an efficient educational system.

One of the leading principles in Soviet pedagogy is the comprehensive enhancement of reciprocal educational influences within the collective. A.S. Makarenko not only proved the validity of this idea but also brilliantly implemented it in his pedagogical practices. Unfortunately, this outstanding Soviet educator was unable to implement his idea of writing a book on children's clubs, a work in which he intended to develop these views. However, even that which he developed and tried enables us to introduce today a great many features in extracurricular work.

Let us try to answer the following question: Why is it that in school collective sponsorship of seniors over juniors is by no means always effective and fruitful? Above all because, as a rule, the interests of older and younger children differ. In a club, a community of interests exists. As we pointed out, this is its unquestionable advantage.

The activities of motor clubs for adolescents in Latvia is a convincing example of what the club movement can do today, when it is well organized and takes into consideration the interests and psychological features of children.

Adolescents can engage in productive or any other socially useful labor by assigning to clubs for children and adolescents (according to their special interests) social projects within their reach. A club can fully establish business cooperation with museums, theaters, newspapers, societies for the preservation of nature and historical and cultural monuments, the Soviet Children's Foundation imeni V.I. Lenin, the Soviet Culture Foundation, the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Social Inventions Foundation, commercial enterprises and other organizations.

Naturally, the educational balance between practicality and selflessness, and between the personal contribution of the individual adolescent and the interests of the collective and between the aspirations of the individual and the opinion of the group is exceptionally important. If these and other important educational problems are successfully solved, the club for adolescents could implement a most serious and most attractive idea: the creation of a true club cooperative.

We must see to it that no single child is kept outside this "unusual school for usual children," where occupation triggers interests, develops capabilities and is a kind of "vaccine" against early symptoms of laziness, indifference, passive time marking and hypodynamia. Proper conditions must exist to identify the talent of a child. In this important undertaking the alliance and interaction among the family, the school and the club is urgently necessary and useful.

### Thinking of the Future

Why is it that cultural-educational and extracurricular institutions do not work at full capacity? Why is it that socially significant club work has still not become a school for moral and social experience? Why is it that the share of social, technical and artistic-esthetic creativity of our children and adolescents remain slow in club activities? The reasons are many. One of the main reasons is that today, on a national scale, problems of organizing cultural and educational work with children and adolescents are being solved through the uncoordinated efforts of many ministries and departments. They include the ministries of culture, health-care, internal affairs, defense and housing-communal economy, and the USSR Goskomsport. Also involved are various social organizations, such as the trade unions, the Komsomol, DOSAAF, the Culture Foundation and the Children's Foundation. However, all work done by such ministries, departments and organizations prove to be ineffective as long as their activities remain uncoordinated. Yet there was a time when the People's Commissariat of Education had an efficient system which managed all matters of preschool, school and extracurricular education and upbringing. The best form of education was considered the one in which it was difficult to see where school started and an extracurricular establishment ended. A.V. Lunacharskiy said that extracurricular institutions are becoming a "subject of most zealous concern." The attention which was paid to these problems was also confirmed by the fact that at that time an Institute of Methods for Extracurricular Work was set up, to study and sum up the experience of extracurricular institutions and the best club workers.

The division of efforts leads to the fact that in Leningrad, for instance, there are far less clubs for the young technician than there are in Gorkiy (although the city on the Neva has three times the population of the city on the Volga).

What is being done locally? Who guides and coordinates the activities of extracurricular establishments on the scale of a rayon or city? It is believed that this should be the job of the soviets of people's deputies. But how specifically, remains unclear. Would it be the job of the culture department? The RONO? The secretary or the deputy chairman of the ispolkom? No clear answer to such questions exists. For that reason, confusion and lack of control are cheek by jowl with favorable reports and the fear of anything that is new and unusual, and the unwillingness to assume unnecessarily trouble. Efforts are being made in many oblasts and cities to develop such a system by "home-grown means," by creating a variety of temporary social agencies and organizations, councils and commissions. Without belittling in the least the significance of social initiatives, let me point out that they are efficient only with a clear organizational structure, within which they must be implemented. Unless such a structure is available, as a rule the role of the public remains minimal.

Let us consider perhaps the social councils of microrayons alone. Most frequently they are idle and solve no serious problems whatsoever. They are absolutely helpless from the administrative-economic viewpoint and have a low reputation.

It is obvious that under such circumstances the creation of management authorities both within the USSR State Committee for Public Education and under the city (oblast) local soviets is an urgent step. Such authorities must be given adequate administrative rights which would enable them to eliminate the numerous interdepartmental barriers. I am convinced that they will have plenty to do.

The second reason for the adverse situation in organizing the recreation of children, adolescents and young people is the level of training of cadres. We find here the highest turnover among cultural-educational workers and school educators. This is especially due to the fact that frequently incompetent and sometimes even unsuitable people find shelter in such clubs, the major concern being, above all, to be given official living premises. In a single Leningrad rayon educators-organizers turned out to consist of 45 percent retirees, 30 percent former teachers and 25 percent people in different professions—economic managers, commercial and scientific workers, a former zoo official and a veterinarian.

Again in Leningrad highly professional extracurricular educators (children's club workers), who can deal with children and adolescents in an attractive, pleasant and meaningful way, are extremely scarce. I would not err by saying that they mastered this difficult art by themselves, like an "individual labor activity," for today this skill is not taught anywhere. Yet it was, in the 1930s. Club teachers for pedagogical technical schools and VUZs were trained at the Academy of Communist Education imeni N.K. Krupskaya.

The view which was firmly established in the postwar period was that the training of extracurricular educators was totally unnecessary. It was believed (and to this day little has changed in this respect) that any teacher or cultural worker with higher or secondary specialized training could cope quite well with organizing the leisure time of children.

Today we are harvesting the bitter fruits of this error. Our school educators and method-organizers turn out, after their graduation, incapable of engaging in professional extracurricular club work. They are experiencing a great deal of difficulties in establishing informal relations with their pupils. This particularly applies to teachers who, away from the classroom frequently lose even the contact they have established with the adolescents in class.

The explanation is simple: the lack in many educators of real enthusiasm, which they could and would like to share.

Pedagogical schools and institutes do not develop this most important quality of the teacher, believing that it should be developed by the family, the school and extracurricular establishments before the future educator has joined an educational institution. However, this is rarely the case. I believe that the subject "favorite occupation" should be included in the diploma of a graduate of a pedagogical school or institute (cultural education schools and culture institutes in particular).

The educational institution should help to shape or develop such an attraction. Naturally, this calls for amending the training curriculums. Less time should be spent on mastering ossified pedagogical dogmas and more on the development of the creative potential and capabilities of the student and his interest, which should be his creative dominant.

The culture institutes train people in all sorts of professions: method-organizers, heads of artistic amateur work, and library workers, but not educators for extracurricular work. This skill is simply not taught. It is true that here and there related and specialized courses are offered. However, they cannot fill the tremendous gap which has developed today in extracurricular pedagogy and cultural and educational work, in connection with the new tasks of restructuring the education and culture areas.

Furthermore, in frequent cases such specialized courses are offered by people who either lack basic specialized training or have little to do with the practice of club work with children and adolescents. Once again the reason is the same: no one is training cadres. Let us look at the Higher Culture Trade Union School. It has all possible departments, such as trade union building, history of the trade unions, choir singing, etc. However, so far it has no department for extracurricular work.



The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Further Improving General Secondary Education of Young People and Improving the Working Conditions of General Education Schools" approved the steps taken by the AUCCTU on further increasing the participation of trade unions in organizing extracurricular work with students. The plans call for organizing by 1990 at places of residence an additional 40,000 interest circles and 60,000 amateur associations for children and adolescents, 16,000 clubs for adolescents at schools and PTU and 300 clubs for the young technician, among other measures. Another 780 secondary school students' rooms and 560 new sports schools for children and adolescents will be opened. All of these facilities, taken together, would make it possible to include another 2 million children and adolescents by 1990.

Let us consider these figures. These are tremendous prospects, particularly if we bear in mind that in terms of quality as well the party sets today culture and education workers the task of drastically upgrading the efficiency of the work of palaces and houses of culture and clubs. How can we today not think of the cadres which must solve this problem!

The following fact is indicative as well: not a single club educator was among the winners of the Lenin Komsomol Prize for 1987 in the area of pedagogy. Was this fair? Could it be that no one has deserved it? We have many people who are successfully combining their pedagogical and artistic talents and are real promoters. I could name dozens of names of workers in children's clubs who deserve the title of USSR people's teacher, as much as schoolteachers do. Alas, for the time being one can only dream of this.

Two years ago I had the opportunity to attend a conference of educators in charge of organizing clubs for adolescents in Leningrad. I asked who among those present had received a state award or an honorific title. Not a single hand went up. Yet there were some 300 people in the hall and, among them, people who had been working for decades with interest, creatively and dedicatedly in clubs for adolescents!

In October 1987 a group of extracurricular work educators (more than 100 managers of trade union clubs for adolescents and young technicians) addressed themselves to the organizers of the all-Union congress of teachers with a request to include representatives of this branch of pedagogy among its participants. So far, problems of education have been discussed at such fora without their participation. The all-Union congress of public education workers will be held this coming December. Finally, extracurricular activities educators will be represented in it.

In thinking of the future of extracurricular institutions, we must as of now solve problems related to the training of educators for extracurricular activities, enhance their

prestige and seriously undertake the search for, summation and dissemination of progressive experience. We must once and for all realize that the extracurricular educator is engaged in an occupation as honorable as that of the schoolteacher. In that case we could calmly consider the fact that the salary of the former has remained substantially lower.

There also are other important economic problems which must be solved without delay. It is time, for example, to note the obviously obsolete instruction of the USSR Ministry of Finance "On the Procedure for Planning, Utilizing and Accounting for Extrabudgetary funds and their bookkeeping," which literally binds, hand and foot, the heads of extracurricular institutions. The extrabudgetary fund is steadily growing yet it is impossible to make use of it to the fullest extent in the interest of the children.

Therefore, it should be a question not simply of improving the work of extracurricular institutions but also of including these powerful means of influence over the awareness and behavior of children and adolescents within a single educational and upbringing system. This requires a program which could encompass all stages in the educational process: school (PTU)-club-work. The solution of the natural problem of a club—to organize the leisure time of children and adolescents—should be considered exclusively as a mandatory prerequisite for shaping a value awareness and upgrading needs, motivations and interests and promoting positive changes in behavioral stereotypes. We have excellent pedagogical instruments to this effect: the A.S. Makarenko communal method, and Makarenko's views on the role of collective creative work and children's self-government.

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### **Ethnic Groups and Their Languages Under Socialism**

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[Article by Yevgeniy Vladislavovich Zeymal, doctor of historical sciences, head of sector, oriental department, State Hermitage (Leningrad)]

[Text] The question of the fate of national languages of all ethnic groups in our country was given a clear and unequivocal solution in the Leninist program for the national-state building of the USSR. The principled view held by the bolsheviks was defined as early as in the 1st Party Program. The "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which was adopted on 15 November 1917, proclaimed not only the equality and sovereignty of the peoples in our country but also the free development of all national minorities and their languages.

The Soviet state, particularly after the founding of the USSR, actively implemented these concepts. More than 50 alphabets were created for languages which had no written form; textbooks and dictionaries were compiled; schools were organized; the publication of newspapers, journals and books was undertaken. And now, around us, we constantly see in daily life the results of this gigantic work, as Lenin said, the blossoming of a variety of socialist cultures, each one of which constitutes a unique contribution to the treasury of the socialist culture of the entire Soviet people.

Nonetheless, by no means is everything smooth in the development of languages and cultures. A look at the figures does not show a picture of tranquil prosperity: the 1926 all-Union census recorded the existence of 194 ethnic groups in the USSR (but not always of national languages); according to 1939 data there were 99; the 1959 census registered 109 ethnonyms; there were 106 in 1970 and 101 in 1979 (with annual breakdowns of 97, 126, 122 and 123). The scope is frightening: dozens of ethnic groups disappeared, stopped existing. How to explain this?

Scientific publications on ethnic processes in the USSR (dozens of books and hundreds of articles) show, however, no concern whatsoever on the subject of such an intensive process of "erasing boundaries" among ethnic groups. The following "theoretical substantiation" is popular: consolidation of socialist nations on the basis of the economic, social and cultural rapprochement among ethnic groups under socialist conditions are manifested through the unification, the merger of separate ethnic groups the existence of which, consequently, is terminated. This process is considered and assessed by analogy with the processes of the further elimination of class differences, the rapprochement between mental and physical labor and between town and country, and similar phenomena and trends, the progressive nature of which does not trigger (nor could it trigger) any doubt. Occasionally—with a hint of approval and even pride—researchers note the "decline of the mosaic of ethnicity in our country."

As a rule, no profound scientific study is made of the real processes and of the "mechanism" itself of such a fast rapprochement among ethnic groups. All that are quoted are illustrating examples: thus, the Batsbi, who speak a "one-village" language in the Georgian SSR, "voluntarily acknowledged Georgian as their native and functionally prime language; the Vakhan, Shugnano-Rushan and Yazgulem, who live in the Tajik SSR, use in the main areas of social life the more developed literary Tajik language, etc." ("*Sotsializm i Natsii*" [Socialism and Nations], Moscow, 1975, p 186); in the Daghestan ASSR the Archin, Andi, Chamal, Tsez and others (about 15 ethnic groups) merged with the Avars; the Besermyan merged with the Udmurt, etc. Obviously, it is by no means a question of small ethnic groups or languages without literacy or else dialects of an overall single national language.

Some of the "merged" ethnic groups include those for which an alphabet was recreated in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s (such as the Talyshi) which subsequently (because of the smallness of ethnic groups and the widespread use among them of the language of neighboring ethnic groups) "was not developed further" (see "*Sovremennyye Etnicheskiye Protssesy v SSSR*" [Contemporary Ethnic Processes in the USSR], Moscow, 1977, pp 286-287). As a rule, the question is not even raised as to why the process of economic and cultural consolidation is accompanied, under the conditions of a growing social homogeneity of the Soviet people, by assimilation (the term "assimilation" itself is not considered taboo but used either in specific cases such as, for instance, marriages between members of different ethnic groups, and so on, or else when examples are given of the absorption of some ethnic groups by other under the conditions of a capitalist society). No one is amazed at the reason for which this consolidation which, unquestionably, is a progressive phenomenon, which unites ethnic groups speaking different languages, has such a fatal influence on the future of dozens of languages; no one fears the consequences which Soviet culture as a whole brings to this aspiration to uniformity.

Following the harsh critical assessment which the situation of this social science was given at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, it is high time for the specialists to draw serious conclusions. Naturally, much more important than any critical analysis of existing publications on national relations in the USSR are specific studies of each one of the parts of this complex problem. We must also bear in mind that the concepts of the "healthy" nature and the dogmatic interpretation of already adopted political decisions, as well as the scholastic alienation from reality and the aspiration to "be in the mainstream" did not appear by themselves but, to a certain extent, were instilled in science from the outside.

Against the background of the former "universal admiration" of the successes in the process of consolidation of socialist nations, sober voices were heard as well, pointing out very tactfully or simply quite cautiously, the gap which existed between the quoted figures on the reduced number of ethnic groups in the USSR and reality: "To a certain extent this reduction is, obviously, caused by changes in the approach taken by statisticians to defining a national (ethnic) affiliation" (Yu.V. Bromley, "*Ocherki Teorii Etnosa*" [Essays on the Theory of the Ethnos], Moscow, 1983, p 354).

Therefore, in reality, by no means had all ethnic groups, dropped out of the list, terminated their existence between 1926 and 1939: they had survived and are alive. All that had changed were the criteria used in defining the "nationality" concept.

The term "nationality" (like many others) could, in addition to a strictly scientific, have an ordinary daily life significance. Such an item is included in our passports and in various documents and surveys (the so-called fifth item), which could be filled extremely simply

by any citizen: in determining nationality the decisive significance is that of the native language and the nationality of the parents (particularly when it is not the language of the "nationality" that is the native language but any other such as, for example, Russian).

The scientific content of the "nationality" term remains debatable. The closest to the universally accepted meaning is the viewpoint expressed by Academician Yu.V. Bromley, who considers identical the concept of "nationality" and "ethnonym" (the self-name of a nation). The other trend is to consider nationality as reflecting affiliation with a nation (as described in the Ozhegov Dictionary), and not of ethnicity, ethnos. Such an approach seems to stem from the criteria used in defining nationality on the basis of one of the main ethnic characteristics: the national language. This turn in logic leads to entirely unexpected "consequences:" the concept that the most reliable ethnic distinguishing feature is national statehood. In practice this leads to a paradox: the total number of Soviet ethnic groups would barely exceed 60, i.e., it would be reduced by nearly one-half even compared with the "truncated" data of censuses, starting with 1939.

The theoretical "vacillations" on this matter have been reflected in referential publications as well; in the second edition of the Big Soviet Encyclopedia (vol 29, 1954) the article "Nationality," strange though it might seem, is absent. Such hesitations and vacillations are not only of a strictly scientific or "academic" nature. Their influence on daily practice and on the destinies of ethnic groups and their languages in the USSR is felt acutely. In the case of many ethnic groups (precisely those which mysteriously "disappeared" between 1926 and 1939), the native language, which they continued to speak and use, was no longer taken into consideration in defining their nationality.

For example, the Vakhan, Ishkash, Rushan, Shugnan and Yazgulem, which live in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (all told some 40,000 according to 1926 data) and who even have their own representatives in the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, are now classified as Tajiks in statistical data and passports, although the languages of the Pamir belong to an entirely different branch of languages and are different from Tajik to approximately the same extent as Russian is from Latvian. The result is that for the people of the Pamir the item "nationality" reflects not their ethnic affiliation but something like "citizenship" within the Tajik SSR. Under the Soviet system more than one generation of Pamir people have been raised without schooling in their native language (even grammar education) and without printed publications. Understandably, Tajik became their second language and Russian or Kirghiz their third. This multilingualism naturally came to the Pamir ethnic groups; it is precisely this that guarantees the fact that there could not even be a question of their national isolation. The people of the Pamir, not only in Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast, but also

beyond it, include many outstanding men of science and culture, engineers, and party and soviet workers. Alas, it is impossible today to determine how many Rushan, Shugnan, Yazgulem, etc. exist: by becoming "Tajik," they lost their ethnonym and are gradually losing their own language.

This example clearly shows the actual closeness between the Pamir ethnic groups and the Tajik socialist nation from the social, economic and cultural viewpoints. However, should a consolidation which is taking place or already existing imply also an ethnic, a linguistic assimilation, and a socialist culture with a "tendency" toward uniformity? Locked within its limits of daily life, and pulled out of the main areas of life, any national language is doomed to degeneracy, whether gradual or fast. Yet a language is not simply a formal "symptom" or one of the necessary prerequisites for the preservation of a national culture. In itself, it is a unique phenomenon in world culture. The languages of those same nationalities in the Pamir are among the most ancient languages on the territory of the USSR. Priceless information on the history of the science and culture of mankind in general is provided also by languages of tiny ethnic groups such as the Ket on the Yenisey, many languages of the "small" ethnic groups in the Caucasus, and others. Yes, they developed when many other concepts existing in modern life simply did not exist, i.e., these languages are to a large extent archaic. One should probably not interfere in the natural course of development, artificially adapting them to modern times and to the level of scientific, cultural, social and other achievements and create neologisms. However, it is obviously inadmissible by replacing ethnicity with "republic citizenship" to deprive such ethnic groups of the right to their ethnonym and thus artificially to encourage the disappearance of their languages.

There is only one common reason for such phenomena, clearly conflicting with the initial principles of Leninist national policy and the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia:" anticipation, the aspiration to see faster the "visible shoots of communism," which, actually, frequently do not exist and, furthermore, which are erroneously interpreted. Something else is important as well: to determine when in our history this aspiration gained the upper hand.

The October Revolution untied the tangled knot of the political, economic and national rightlessness of the peoples of the Russian Empire—the "prison of the nations." The tsarist ministry of education formulated its "national policy" toward so-called "non-Russians" approximately as follows: "Russification and merger with the Russian people." Printed publications in a number of languages were banned and the dissemination of literacy among ethnic groups without a written language was considered not only unnecessary but even harmful. The 1897 census officially acknowledged the existence in Russia of 146 "languages and dialects" (as we know, in 1926 they turned out to be nearly 200).

V.I. Lenin and the bolsheviks countered the reactionary, obscurantist and chauvinistic policy of tsarism with the demand for the elimination of all oppression, social as well as national. According to Lenin, no single nation or language should have any privileges. The "great and powerful Russian language does not need for anyone to study it by being threatened with a stick" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, p 295). This must be a voluntary matter, the need for which practical experience and the requirements of economic and social life could be the most convincing arguments. Lenin drew the essential conclusion that "there is only one solution to the national problem (in as much as its resolution is possible in the capitalist world, a world of profit, fighting and exploitation). This solution is systematic democracy" (op. cit., vol 23, p 425).

Eliminating the exploitation of the working people and the oppression of one nation by another became the principal instrument for the elimination of national oppression and inequality. The Soviet system laid as the foundation for the solution of these most difficult problems the Leninist national program, imbued with the ideas of democracy.

It is difficult and, within the framework of a single article, simply impossible, to cover all the areas and stages of such comprehensive work. The national-state building was distinguished by its dynamic and creative nature, which was manifested in establishing the boundaries of the national republics, oblasts and okrugs. The right political and organizational decisions were not reached immediately. Nor was there always the necessary knowledge to understand the real ethnic situation and to evaluate the interests and needs of the different nationalities and their interrelationships.

Thus, the Gori ASSR (initially Ingushetiya and Chechnya became part of it as national okrugs), which was formed by decree of the VTsIK of 20 January 1921, began to "break down" quite rapidly: in 1922 two autonomous oblasts were established: the Kabardino-Balkar and Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (since 1927 the Karachayevo Autonomous Oblast and the Cherkess National Okrug, which became an autonomous oblast in 1928). When Ingushetiya and Osetiya became autonomous oblasts in 1924 it became necessary to abolish the Gori ASSR. However, the search continued, and on 5 December 1936 the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was founded.

It was thus that in a stressed situation, taking reality into consideration, and without any prescriptions and models, making errors and correcting them, the national-state demarcation among the Central Asian peoples, which had become part of the RSFSR in 1918, took place. Such was the case of the Turkestan ASSR (the Khorezma and Bukhara People's Republics were founded in 1920 but joined the USSR later, in 1924). In the Turkestan ASSR only the Kirghiz, Uzbek and Turkmen were recognized as "native nationalities," while the

Tajiks, the oldest population in the area, were forgotten. At that time the then greatest oriental expert, Academician V.V. Bartold objected to this fact (see V.V. Bartold, *"Soch."*, vol II, part I, Moscow, 1963, p 468). In October 1924 the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs were founded as a result of the division of ethnic groups, along with two autonomous oblasts, the Kara-Kirghiz and Tajik. Immediately after them the Tajik Autonomous Oblast was reorganized as the Tajik ASSR (within the Uzbek SSR). Strange situations were not avoided: the population of Khodzhent (today Leninabad) held meetings at which the people expressed their unwillingness to join either the Tajik ASSR nor the Uzbek SSR but demanded the creation of a "Khodzhent Republic." Essential errors were made as well: the Tajiks, which accounted for a significant percentage of the population in the large cities (Samarkand, Bukhara and others), which were within the Uzbek SSR, were forced to record in their documents their nationality as Uzbek (as a rule they are bilingual) and there were rumors to the effect that whoever registered as a Tajik would be resettled in the Tajik ASSR. Alas, this error was not corrected and today, although living in Uzbekistan, the Tajiks have preserved both their language and their national self-awareness. The building process continued, nonetheless: in 1929 the Tajik ASSR became a Union republic; the Kirghiz and Kazakh SSRs were formed in 1936 (from autonomous republics), while the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast (founded as part of the Kazakh ASSR in 1925) became an ASSR as part of the Uzbek SSR.

A stable and politically tested structure of our multinational state was built along with the elimination of the economic backwardness of the national peripheral areas, the creation of national leading cadres and intelligentsia and a general upsurge of cultural standards. By the end of 1936 the "building" had been erected and it seemed as though the national problem had lost its political urgency. Obviously, it was precisely then that we should have formulated, both theoretically and practically, the problem of the ways leading to the further development of the socialist nations. However, no one even thought of making a thorough scientific study of it under the circumstances of the universal triumph of the recently adopted constitution. The established structure seemed entirely stable, its theoretical concepts seemed inviolable and any deviation from them (or any attempt at supplementing and developing them) involved the risk of being misunderstood (or ignored).

At that point priority began to be given on the theoretical level to the concepts of the withering away—on the way to communism—of varieties, including the national-linguistic one. As has already been noted in KOMMUNIST, the interpretation of the live processes in the young socialist society gradually began to be replaced by making things fit dogmatic systems, deviations from which were either generally ignored when they appeared in real life or else depicted as isolated and atypical phenomena. A trend developed of accelerating the elimination of all

"boundaries," and of "urging on" history, ignoring "details" and increasingly departing from the reality of the facts.

In the 1930s, when the right to theoretical development and creative thinking turned out to be monopolized by a single person, studies of the national problem were actually interrupted. Attention was paid primarily to the solution of the national problems of oppressed peoples the world over. No new tasks related to the further development of the national cultures of all nationalities in the USSR were formulated. Theory rose above reality to such an extent that "petty matters" were no longer noticed. No attention was paid to the specific aspects in the lives of real peoples and ethnic groups and occasionally, for the sake of the future great objectives, their needs and interests began to be ignored.

At that time the concept of the consolidation of socialist nations was developed, while neglecting one of the basic ethnic features, one of the basic manifestations of national culture (and its carriers)—language. It was thus that the "concept" developed for the 1939 census, which marked the beginning of eliminating the teaching of a number of national languages or studying in such languages. The new conditions (the completion of the initial stage in the building of socialism) did not, however, eliminate the need for further consistent democratization of society although, in fact, the rights of ethnic groups in the USSR were being restricted and the possibilities of the development of their national cultures, reduced.

Such an approach (with an apparent theoretical success) contributed to the "distortions" which are comparable only to the mass repressions of 1937: there were numerous deportations of the population of the Baltic Republics, who had not as yet had the opportunity to become fully part of Soviet reality. This applied not only to the members of the reactionary organizations but also those who were totally unrelated to them; the autonomous republic of the Germans on the Volga was liquidated and, in 1944, the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was "abolished" (it was restored on 9 January 1957), and so on. Such distortions remained for a long time "blank spots" (were they only blank?!) in our history. They not only brought pain and suffering to the victims but harmed the Soviet system itself and the confidence of the people in its justice: even under the special and critical circumstances of prewar and war times "punishing" entire nations was criminal. To tell the truth about it means to strengthen in yet another area the moral reputation of the Soviet system.

Many of the "small" nations, which lost their official right to real ethnic identity after 1939, retained their language and originality, despite the fact that no printed matter was published in their language, their national language was not taught, etc. According to the latest censuses there were slightly over 100 ethnic groups while the training process in USSR schools is in 55 languages

only (1972 data; another more recent figure is 39). All of this inevitably creates conditions under which an ethnic group and its language and culture must indeed vanish.

Hastening in theory and thoughtless practical use of dogmatic concepts provide a powerful impetus for the artificial acceleration of assimilation processes. The space between the theory of linguistic life and reality expands further and further. "Under socialist conditions no language can be forbidden or abolished. A language may wither away if society no longer needs it" (*Socialism and Nation*, p 186). In practical terms, this theoretical "postulate" remains unproven. If a language (let us assume for the sake of improperly understood "consolidation successes") is proclaimed a "dialect" and when society "no longer needs it" on paper much earlier than in real life, conditions for the proper existence and development of this language also disappear. One can only be amazed at the durability of some languages which, after several decades following their "abolition" on paper are still being used (although in a somewhat narrowed area of daily life), and continue to survive.

However, there are languages which already today could be recorded in the "Red Book" of culture or are very close to this. In the Fansk Mountains (Central Tajikistan), the Yagnoby lived in an isolated valley. Their language was a small "fragment" of the Sogdi language (today dead) which was the dominant language in Central Asia for a number of centuries (also as a language of interethnic contacts) and was well-known along the trade-caravan roads of Asia, linking the Near to the Far East. In the middle of the 20th century there were some 2,000 Yagnoby: they were bilingual (with Tajik as their second language), attended Tajik schools (the Yagnoby had no alphabet) and were recorded in the internal passports as Tajiks (although the Tajik and Yagnoby languages were much more dissimilar than, for example, Russian and Polish; respectively, they belonged to the Western-Iranian and Eastern-Iranian subgroups of the Iranian group of languages. There was not even a question of preserving the Yagnoby originality and language, they were few and their economic and cultural standards remained very low. The Yagnoby had not retained anything other than the language from the rich legacy of the Sogdi, which had built cities, and created outstanding works of art (sculpture, paintings, and so on) and literature (we have translations of Sogdi Buddhist, Christian, Manichean and other religious works, the understanding of which was made greatly possible with the help of the living Yagnoby language). It would be difficult to say how long it took for the natural withering away of the Yagnoby language. However, the fate of this monument of culture, which had existed for more than 1,000 years, was disturbed by a "bulldozer:" the Yagnoby resettled hundreds of kilometers away, in the plains (with the planting of new areas in cotton); the ordinary living conditions and territorial community were disrupted and the Yagnoby melted among the other ethnic groups. Today the Yagnoby language is spoken (and by no means by everyone) only by those who have been able to return to their native areas.

Today there are approximately 800 Yukagiri (their language belongs to the Paleoasiatic group of languages) (only slightly more than 100 of them know their native language), who numbered about 2,000 in 1926. Recently the first (!) Yukagiri alphabet and orthographic rules came out. No more than 100 copies were printed, and so far more than one-half of them have remained unused, for only two classes of students could be formed. This alphabet appeared too late, for there is little hope that this ethnic group can be revived. Yet until 1987 the children of the Yukagiri were trained in school in the Yakut language or in Russian and the process of their assimilation continued.

One could name other unwritten languages of small ethnic groups living among (quantitatively) larger ethnic groups. Obviously, tactfulness and concern are particularly important in their treatment (in that sense we can only welcome the development of the Yukagiri alphabet), while "rushing" events (as was the case with the Yagnoby) is, furthermore, also immoral.

Attempts were made in the past to "label" the defense of the languages of small ethnic groups as manifestations of nationalism (particularly if this was demanded by the speakers of that language), or as purism. The multilingual nature of such ethnic groups, as well as their active participation in the economic, social and cultural life of our country and of the socialist nation with which such ethnic groups truly merged is the most reliable guarantee that no artificial isolation or closed "folklore cultures" have existed or could exist in their case. It would be difficult and, perhaps, senseless to rebuild the "structure" on the ruins of a truly dying language. However, there are no sensible reasons for a living and functional (albeit limited) language to be proclaimed nonexistent, regardless of the number of people who know and consider it their native language.

The real picture of the situation with such languages must be clarified and interpreted without delay. Their condition—development, viability, extent of closeness with other languages—demands an accurate assessment. Even to the linguists some problems would remain debatable. Thus, as early as the 1920s the question arose of the possibility of having a single literary language for the Chechen (there were 408,000 in 1939) and the Ingush (92,000), whose languages were similar (like Ukrainian and Russian, for instance) and which are part of the Veynakh linguistic group of the Eastern Caucasus. A complex ethnic situation has always existed in Dagestan, which includes some 30 peoples and ethnic groups with their separate languages and more than 70 recognized dialects. Under the Soviet system, for example, a literature blossomed in the Avar, Laks, and Kumyk languages. However, many other languages remain rare "exhibits" of this "linguistic museum:" thus, there are only several hundred people who speak Ginukh. What is today the condition of the languages of ethnic groups which "blended" within the Avar ethnic group? Have the languages—"dialects" in the Ukraine, the languages of

small ethnic groups in the Estonian SSR, and the Tat, Talysh, Udin, Budukh, Kryz, Khinalug and other languages in Azerbaijan, the languages of the ethnic groups of the north, and so on, been preserved? Which among them have disappeared forever and which among them are still alive?

The situation must be assessed in each specific case without any plans, dogmatic labels or prejudices. Summations and conclusions are simply impossible without addressing ourselves to the real situation of languages and ethnic groups. There is no need to develop a scientific potential for the study of such problems. All that is necessary is to "focus" the existing potential on the implementation of such a task.

Not only small ethnic groups but even large national units numbering several tens of thousands or more people turned out to have been "eliminated." The example of the Latgali enables us to trace the historical circumstances of the establishment (and "disappearance") of their national self-awareness and their real situation today.

Latgalia is located in the southeastern part of the Latvian SSR, bordering Pskov Oblast and the Belorussian SSR. The initial documents in Latgalian date before the 16th-17th centuries and printed publications have been known to exist since 1753. An alphabet was developed with Latin characters for the Latgalian language. In 1871, in connection with the overall program of Russification of non-Russian groups, a ban was imposed on all publications in Latgalian. The establishment of a Latgalian literature (or, in broader terms, Latgalian culture and national self-awareness) was artificially obstructed. The prohibition remained until 1904. In November 1905 GAYSMA ("Light"), the first Latgali newspaper, began publication in Petersburg. It was a bourgeois-Catholic newspaper. Subsequently a number of Latgalian newspapers and journals (including bolshevik) were published in Petersburg-Petrograd, Dvinsk-Daugavpils and Rezhitse-Rezekne.

The establishment and development of Latgalian culture (literature, theater, and so on) continued in bourgeois Latvia until the K. Ulmanis coup d'etat, after which the official ideological doctrine of "greater Latvia" stopped all publications in Latgalian (which was classified a "dialect").

A blossoming of Latgalian national self-awareness took place in the 1920s and 1930s in the USSR as well (at that time Latvia had some 400,000 Latgalis and there were some 20,000 in the USSR). The press discussed problems of the Latgalis and their national culture. The Latgalian newspaper TAYSNEYBA ("Pravda") was published in Novosibirsk (1926-1936); textbooks were translated from the Russian, etc. Political publications in the Latgalian language came out as well and the literature classics (A.S. Pushkin in particular) were published. All publications in Latgalian in the USSR suddenly came

to an end in 1937. Later, in the first postwar years, rayon newspapers in Latgalian were still being published in Latgalia as well as the "*Latgalian Farm Calendar*" (1947-1949). It was then that the official existence of this language came to an end. Such is the surface image of events, avoiding the analysis of reasons, "motivations," and so on.

What about today's reality? Reduced to the level of daily needs, the Latgalian language continues to live although it has not been taught anywhere for more than 40 years, and the internal passports of the former Latgalians classify them as "Letts." Latgalian is indeed close to the Latvian language and the correlation between them is roughly similar to that between Russian and Belorussian. However, the Latvian language has been subjected to a greater extent to the influence of German, whereas the Latgalian maintains ancient independent connections with the Lithuanian language.

History is familiar with many examples of peoples coerced into losing their language. In this case, however, there has been no coercion whatsoever on the part of the Letts. There was a true consolidation, social, economic and cultural. However, so far there has been no assimilation, although to many Latgalians Latvian has become a second language.

The fact that Latgalian proved to be resistant and survives also proves the need, together with the right to an ethnonym, to restore the publication of newspapers, open national theaters and have local radio broadcasts in Latgalian. Above all, in the three or four rayons where Latgalians predominate, even the optional teaching of their native language should be organized in the schools. Reducing the language to basics is a matter of concern. This impoverishes terminology, increases the number of borrowed terms, influences the structure of the speech and its imagery and, gradually, leads to the disappearance of abstract concepts. If a language is a monument of culture, the only description of this process is that of destroying a monument. Obviously, we should not wait until it has become irreversible.

For a long time the Latgalian language has not been heard from official rostrums, the stage, classrooms and study halls. However, it remains in the Roman Catholic Church, rich and untouched by "destruction," even if the priest is not a Latgalian but a Pole and if he studied Latgalian in the seminary. The logic of the church is simple: if you wish to listen to beautiful true Latgalian speech, to go church.... This aspect of the "Latgalian problem" should obviously not be forgotten.

Today, in order successfully to continue the development of national cultures under the new conditions, we must, in this area as well, return to the Leninist principles and standards: we must ensure maximally favorable circumstances for the development of all nationalities in the USSR and for enriching the general socialist culture with the entire wealth and coloring of national cultures.

Each Union republic has its special commission on national problems operating under the highest party and soviet authorities, scientific subdivisions and a mass and a specialized press in which controversial or not entirely clear problems can be discussed freely and comprehensively.

Above all, however, we must correlate theoretical concepts on the condition of the problem with real life without looking back or sideways (what would others think of us?), i.e., in V.I. Lenin's words, "not to delude ourselves but to have the courage to frankly acknowledge that which exists" (op. cit., vol 1, p 407). "Statistics" should not determine the fate of a nation and its languages by creating an inverse relation. Its duty is to reflect their true status and to provide the researchers not with second-hand "edited" information but accurate materials. It is precisely the truthful idea of reality that will eliminate reasons for unnecessary aggravations.

The main criterion in determining a nationality in the all-Union census of January 1989 must be the ethnic self-awareness of every citizen and not a list of nationalities which was adopted many years ago. Only thus can we understand which small nations are being assimilated, which ones are preserving their native language and ethnic features and national dignity. At that point scientists dealing with national problems will have real grounds under their feet. They will have the possibility of comparing and analyzing and determining trends and, therefore, earmarking and converting from theory to practice further ways of development of ethnic groups in the USSR and their languages in the age of socialism. Similar problems are appearing in the other socialist countries with a heterogeneous ethnic population.

The thorough and objective study of the problems discussed here is only one of the ways for the solution of a major and topical problem: strengthening the historically new social and international community of people—the Soviet people. This will be helped also by admitting and correcting the errors which were made. An honest and principled assessment of the true situation means eliminating the grounds for many negative phenomena which conflict with the essence of Soviet society and its international nature. At the same time, it will mean depriving our enemies of yet another reason for speculation and slander. It will contribute to the better implementation of the Leninist principles of national policy in action. "The rapprochement and blossoming among nations and the rapprochement among our peoples and joint efforts," M.S. Gorbachev noted at the 18 July meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, "will be based on the further blossoming of each ethnic group and culture and the development of each language. This is our wealth and not our shortcoming."

**Readers' Thoughts, Arguments, Suggestions**  
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[Text] G. Kulagin, worker, Ufa: What Makes a Person Rich

I always look at the homes which the old masters built with a sense of wonder and envy. Whether this was the work of a mason or a carpenter, it was always distinguished by its good quality and elegance. I tried to find out their main secret. Probably, it was that the builder invested part of his soul in each house he built. Sometimes it seems to me that these people in their bast sandals, dressed in their worn out heavy coats, with a hatchet on their belt, were much richer than we are. Today such masters are considered artists. At that time these were simple peasants.

A great deal is being said today about the education of the youth. There are more and more writings about how to "involve" and entertain it. It seems to me that the problem is how to teach the young to put their hearts in their work. In my life I have experienced a great deal of hunger and also some privations. However, this did not make me despair or envy the sated. I envied those craftsmen who were able to work so well and beautifully. We have reduced a great deal of our labor to reports and accounts which please or sadden no one. Our work has become a kind of obligation. Actually, what kind of work could this be when all we are waiting for is the lunch break, the end of the shift, the day off, the paid leave and the pension?! Naturally, economic instruments do exist. But how much did they influence the craftsmen who built a simple little wooden church?

Why do some people seem to oppose democracy? In my view, because in that case they must act independently and creatively and not wait for instructions. But where will such qualities come in people who have learned to live on the basis of orders? Such people bear no moral responsibility for their actions, for they can always fall back on an instruction, a diploma which allows them to speak according to a piece of paper on which words about the general well-being have been printed.

We have fallen behind because the means of production seem to be hanging in the air and belonging to no one. It makes no sense to the people to care for something that is not theirs. The owner knows how and wants to work; the manager knows how to manage. The conclusion is simple: the owner should hire the manager to manage the business and pay him. In our country it is precisely the opposite. It is naive to think that the bureaucratic mentality exists only among bureaucrats in offices. No! It can be found among workers and even housewives. Incidentally, today it is precisely workers and housewives who are hurling accusations at members of cooperatives, because we have become accustomed to live a kind of middling life, as long as we get paid. We have even heard it said that under Stalin there was order....

Yes, there was, but of what kind? Many people either do not know or do not wish to remember how hard life was at that time. My mother, while she was alive and was able to do so, went to church and always lit one candle for the brigade leader, for the eight potatoes which he had given her at a very difficult time; she fed me with these potatoes for 8 days....

Money is not everything a person needs. There must be satisfaction with one's labor. Without it labor has no meaning and we are impoverished.

S. Tolyautas, milling-machine operator, Calculators Plant imeni V.I. Lenin, Vilnyus: On the Basis of Current Requirements

When I started writing this letter I had some doubts: I wanted to go back to the study of communism but the topic was not new and the idea that I could make no major discoveries was another restraining factor. Furthermore, I am not as yet fluent in Russian. After I sat down to write, however, the reasons "for" prevailed. Furthermore, the thoughts of a worker could be useful in making the picture more complete.

I can see from my own practical experience that for the time being the existing forms of political and economic training are not yielding the desired results, at least not among us. Recently my instructor, who is a Hero of Socialist Labor, asked me how I understood the principle-mindedness of the communists. In trying to answer this difficult question, once again I reached the conclusion that principle-mindedness is impossible without competence. I include general theoretical training in this. Today Lenin's conclusion that "an illiterate person cannot participate in politics" has acquired a new meaning. The only true way leading to the further development of our society is democratization: the more there is democracy the more there will be socialism. Consequently, ever new masses of people must become involved in the management of the country and society. As I see it, the role of the party is to help these people to understand things, to find the most accurate ways.

In terms of ideological training, the standard of many party members is quite low and does not allow them to understand the essence of matters. Do not believe that I consider myself an exception. I simply would like to learn more. Some people have no such wish. Some party members remind me of students who have missed several months' worth of classes. Not everyone has a sufficiently clear idea even of what was discussed at the congress and the party conference and the Central Committee plenums. But how can we implement the party's resolutions if we are poorly familiar with them? This troubles me a great deal.

I carefully read once again the statutes concerning all the duties of a party member. Every party member must possess a minimal theoretical knowledge. How to acquire it? True, there is such a thing as certification. So



far, however, this is pure formality as are, frequently, political training classes. But what if we were to start the study, one way or another, of social subjects on the basis of the teachings in VUZes, technical schools and vocational-technical schools or, in the final account, even secondary schools? This suggestion may sound naive but, in my view, it would benefit both "teachers" and "students." Furthermore, the party organizations would begin to look differently at the training of their party members, while people who are basically ambitious would not like to find themselves among the laggards.

It is not normal to hear a party member judge things on the basis of all kinds of rumors. Who will counter such rumors? I am convinced that many of our difficulties stem from insufficient knowledge, lack of information. Naturally, I do not oppose the fact that everyone should have his own opinion and views on events. Ignorance, however, (political or any other), cannot be conceived as having an opinion or a viewpoint. That is how I understand things.

Furthermore, some of my fellow workers consider me naive for believing in the possibility of changing or influencing life somewhat. I would like to believe that. There are no alternatives to this. An alternative in this case would be acknowledging the unrealistic nature of perestroika. I and many others do not wish to accept this. We need to strengthen the faith in people but this requires profound knowledge and truthful information. I believe that this problem must be formulated clearly and sharply.

Listening to nonparty workers, one begins clearly to understand that many of them would like to see the party members as people who are convinced of their ideals, who are well familiar with these ideals and objectives and who seek ways of attaining them. Unless the people see this they become disappointed and do not conceal their disappointment. On the basis of present-day requirements simply doing good work is no longer sufficient for a party member, although it is very important. Yet many among us, I believe, have retained a strong feeling of being "little people," of being "cogs;" the past has not disappeared without a trace. There is still a strong tendency to wait for any initiative from above (who do you think you are?). But then why did people join the party?

**V. Rybakov**, labor veteran, Kuybyshev: 'Brain Trusts' of Perestroika

We speak today of the new principles which govern the training and promotion of party cadres and the quality improvements in their structure. The results of this approach will become visible in the future. But how to live today? Are we sure that the implementation of the resolutions passed at the party conference are in reliable hands?

Naturally, the personnel of the party apparatus include many very worthy and capable people. It was thanks to them that perestroika was initiated and is taking place. However, such personnel include more than enough mediocre people. Let us speak honestly: Were there many talented young men and women who took up Komsomol work? There were only few. And what did the Komsomol members working within the apparat learn? They learned command-administrative management methods, subservience to rank, and hypocrisy.

As we know, the violation of Leninist norms in many areas of our life, and the bureaucratization of party and Komsomol work took place a long time ago. Under those circumstances service within the apparat became a good jumping point for quick advancement, as a result of which even a most ordinary person who had barely managed to graduate from a VUZ was given the right to command people, including some who were far superior to him in terms of professional and personal qualities.

I believe that we must more actively fill leading positions with intelligent, honest and decent party members, young if possible, and warm supporters of perestroika, people who have not been contaminated by the routine of the apparat. This could be helped by elections based on competition and secret balloting. We must also radically review the entire system for training party cadres. This pertains to the principles governing the selection of students for party schools, the level of instruction in such schools and the subsequent assignment of graduates.

As a result of the demarcation of functions among party, soviet and economic authorities, unquestionably, the prestige of the party organizations in society will be enhanced. Relieved from the oppressing present turnover and "controlling" functions, they could become the "brain trusts" of perestroika, the generators of new ideas and the accumulators of valuable experience. The creative nature of the work in the party apparat will attract talented, highly skilled and morally clean people. At the same time, competitiveness and the lack of undeserved benefits and privileges will repeal careerists and unprincipled profit-seekers.

**V. Livshits**, chief technologist, Chelyabinsk Metal Structures Plant: Back to Equalization?

Although not even 1 year has passed since we have been working under the new economic conditions, it has already become clear that there is a "huge gap" between the stipulations of the Law on the Enterprise and their implementation. In its 29 September 1987 resolution, the Commission on Improving Management, Planning and the Economic Mechanism approved standard regulations for enterprises working under the conditions of full cost accounting and self-financing, which is actually the equivalent of the annulment of many regulations of this law: ministries and departments have been granted virtually unlimited rights to set economic rates. They made immediate use of such rights and increased their requirements

concerning properly operating enterprises. According to the law, payments for assets must be "deposited, as a rule, on the basis of a rate identical for all enterprises." In practice, however, nothing of the sort takes place. Some enterprises pay on the basis of the maximal rate while others make no payments whatsoever.

Nor is the principle of equally stressed requirements concerning the utilization of productive capital, manpower and natural resources by enterprises observed. There is no stability in rates over the 5-year period. Some of them go up while others go down. This situation reminds us of the behavior of Chekhov's famous criminal who loosened the nuts of railroad tracks and who could not realize that there was a connection between the nut and the train accident. The violation of even a single subitem of the law frequently leads to its actual violation on all levels. The law must be obeyed to the letter. The enterprises are not issued sectorial and departmental standards. This, apparently, is being done so that the "good enterprises" will not know the extent to which their funds are being requisitioned by the superior authorities in favor of the "poor" enterprises.

The Gosplan keeps referring to the amount of funds stipulated in the plan for each year in the 5-year period. However, the enterprises have no such plans. As a rule, the plans are not ratified by the superior authority, either for the 5-year period or on an annual basis. The plants have no approved plans for technical retooling and profit distribution (they have plans only for the volume of output and labor productivity).

Here is yet another problem. In preparing our enterprise for a conversion to the new system of salaries and rates, we immediately came across the following problem: How to set up the wage fund? The categorical answer of the superior organization was the following: draw up a table of organization for the engineering and technical personnel, the employees and even the workers, and submit it for consideration and approval, after which multiply this number by the respective salaries and rates. If the resulting sum is less than the already achieved wage fund, it is good; if it is more, it must be reduced, i.e., the wage must fit the level already reached.

It is a well-known fact that this level is roughly the same everywhere and depends neither on labor productivity nor quality or skill. How can earnings be increased? The answer is by increasing labor productivity. And how to accelerate the growth of the wage fund by increasing the growth of labor productivity at a plant in which the indicators are roughly 15 to 20 percent above the average for the sector and, in accordance with the regional coefficient, the specific wage is approximately on the level of the sectorial average? The State Committee for Labor claims that the wage fund must, as in the past, be shaped on the basis of wage rates and labor intensiveness, i.e., on the basis of the already attained level, as though item 1 of article 3 of the Law on the Enterprise did not exist.

The result is that we try to encourage those who work well without insulting those who work poorly. However, by pursuing a policy of equalization we shall not be able to solve the problems facing the national economy whether in 3 or in 10 years. They can never be solved without awakening in the individual the deeply slumbering need for intensive and creative toil.

L. Malinovskiy, candidate of technical sciences, Moscow: 'Pie' and Market

Of late the press has been full of criticism of the administrative system and of calls for dismantling it. As we say, it does not take too much intelligence to wreck something. The impression is frequently created that, furthermore, problems of limiting the influence of the market on the socialist economy are so basic that they are even not worth discussing. Yet this impression is quite distant from the truth.

Supply and demand prices, the strict dependence of enterprise income on production marketing and the existence of competition, which offers the consumer the possibility of a choice, are intrinsic features of market control. They enable us to solve the problem of producing good quality goods and optimal distribution of the public product, which is like dividing a pie between two people: the one who slices the pie does not have first choice. Under the conditions of the administrative system, in which the producer does not depend on the consumer, it is precisely the one who is slicing the pie who makes the choice. In this case the producer could leave the consumer the crumbs from the pie.

Unfortunately, the problem is not solved by putting the bulk of the income which ensures expanded reproduction directly into the hands of the enterprises. The lack of instruments for the efficient transfer of funds, which takes place under capitalist conditions through the stock market, does not allow us, within the framework of our variant in the development of the socialist economy, the fast redistribution of investment resources in favor of sectors the accelerated development of which is necessary in order to ensure high rates of scientific and technical progress. The market system can cope with the task of ensuring a better distribution. The overall volume of goods shipped to the market is automatically related to the amount of money available to society. The management to market systems are achieved by regulating monetary flows. These, precisely, are the economic means of management.

In capitalist market systems, commodities for personal use, means of production, land and enterprise funds are market commodities. Under socialism the land and enterprise assets are not commodities. Therefore, how

can we structure a market system? I believe that the key problem here is how, under the conditions of a state ownership of assets, to create an instrument which would perform the distribution functions of the stock market?

In my view, that part of the profits which under capitalism goes to the owner as dividend and is partially distributed as investments in other enterprises through the stock market must go to the state and be distributed by the state authorities, the Gosplan for example, among the most profitable economic sectors and enterprises. Such distribution will ensure the maximal efficiency and fast reaction by the socialist economy to new technical developments. Planned economic management can be achieved by controlling investment processes. With a planned redistribution of investments negative phenomena related to the speculative fluctuations of the price of shares on the stock market can be eliminated. Another share of the profits should go into the investment fund of the enterprises and be paid directly to their workers as additional wages. Its amount must be limited in order to exclude the accumulation of wealth in the same hands and in order to take into consideration the contribution of the worker to the enterprise's fixed capital.

The implementation of the economic reform is quite frequently related to a rejection of the use of the system of subsidies in the economy, without making a distinction between subsidizing individual commodities and subsidizing inefficient enterprises. Yet the use of taxes and subsidies for specific commodities is the most important regulatory instrument in a market economy. By raising taxes on some types of commodities and lowering them on other and granting subsidies, the structure of the social consumption of commodities could be changed in the interest of society as a whole.

The distinguishing feature of the administrative system is a different type of subsidy: payments to individual enterprises which ensure their careless existence despite their low efficiency. Currently subsidies are provided even for the production of goods which are either unsaleable or for which there is no demand. Such subsidies should indeed be eliminated by closing down or totally reorganizing unprofitable production facilities. This would make it possible to put enterprises under equal competitive conditions and eliminate the administrative setting of prices and to convert to contractual prices. Prices can and must be regulated through economic levers—taxes and subsidies. A market socialist system excludes the unfairness of the capitalist division of the social product and retains the advantages of the market. If we are able to solve the array of most difficult problems of the economic reform we would be able to develop an economic management system which would indeed be superior in terms of its efficiency to that of the developed capitalist countries.

**K. Markvardt**, doctor of technical sciences, professor, Moscow Transport Engineering Institute: How to Train an Engineer

Unquestionably, the restructuring of engineering training is a complex and comprehensive problem. It includes establishing an optimal number of subjects and developing a system for ties with production facilities, the technical re-equipping of VUZes and enlarging their training areas.... Despite the entire importance of such problems, however, they are merely means of attaining the main object: the training of specialists. It is at this point that there appears what I would describe as a reasonable fear: Are we not ignoring this main aspect in the restructuring of the higher school?

Let us frankly say that what worsens the situation is the fact that so far the majority of VUZ teachers are not clear as to what specifically they themselves should change in their work. This question is not simple at all, for it is a question, naturally, of improving not only the activities of individual teachers but of the system as a whole.

Higher school personnel have long known that a few months after the examinations, the majority of students would be unable to pass the same tests. This fact has been repeatedly proved at different VUZes and on different levels and, therefore, is unquestionable. Nonetheless, the young specialists who graduate from an institute find jobs, although in a number of cases they do not work as is expected of them. What do they acquire in the VUZ? One possible answer is the following: education, that which remains when everything they have learned has been forgotten. This thought has been carried to its extreme, for which reason it has assumed the nature of a paradox. Clearly, this means that the level of reproduction on the basis of which usually remembering is based, has been lost.

The accumulation of information in the mind can easily be checked but the development of thinking is a much more difficult matter. An examination means essentially a test of memorization. This being the case, in a traditional training system all the efforts of the students are concentrated on this objective. Regardless of the right words we may be telling the student about the importance of developing his mind and the need for working systematically, all of this will have no influence whatsoever if an examination awaits the student at the end of the semester. This would determine not only the immediate objective but also the choice of the most efficient ways of attaining it.

Those who enter an institute today have an idea of the subject of their future profession and of certain systems, processes and structures and are psychologically attuned to them. Such knowledge increases after the "Introduction to the Subject," which is a topic covered in the first year. After that, however, the study of the subject itself is postponed for several years, until the final courses. Meanwhile, the student must study the so-called basic disciplines. Since the purpose of the training in this case is not to establish ties but the isolated (unsystematic) study of foundations, no understanding, in the full meaning of the term, is achieved. It is absolutely

necessary for both teacher and student to have a clear idea of the significance and place of the information which is imparted in terms of engineering activities. Without it no systematic knowledge can be acquired.

Today many people are speaking of the expediency of converting to a system of gradual (spiral) training of the specialist. This means that the student should advance through the respective levels of skill until he has reached the level of the technology in his subject after the third year. If for some reason his further training cannot be pursued, the time spent in the VUZ will not be wasted for him or the national economy. With the existing curriculum, after 3 years the student is no more valuable in terms of the respective area of technology than a person with general secondary education.

Actually, progress toward the peaks of professional skill can be achieved only with such a spiral-type curriculum and a continuing education system, at each subsequent stage in a VUZ or on the outside. Nonetheless, everything is reduced to establishing relations, a substantial amount of which are lost in the course of differentiation of knowledge and is inevitable in the process of the acquisition of such knowledge. The subject of specialization can and must be a system-forming factor.

How are such requirements implemented in the course of the training process? I believe that the ideal way is that of modeling future professional activities. To this effect, from the very first day of entering a VUZ, the student should be issued an assignment which will call for mastering the entire array of subjects stipulated in the curriculum. The broader and more complex the assignment is, as it combines within a single system all acquired knowledge, the better it will be. At the first stage it could be issued for a full year or a semester. This assignment must be completed and defended, possibly followed by an intermediate qualification degree on the subject.

Unquestionably, the conversion to such a system will require a tremendous amount of work. However, not all of this should be done immediately and one could begin with something minor, such as issuing assignments in all areas which would ensure the establishment of relations consistent with the subject of specialization, after which such assignments can be increased.

This kind of work will demand of the educator not only knowledge of the subject he teaches but also of the training process itself. Today, in order to know this, the secondary school teacher must have education training. It turns out, however, that this is not required of VUZ teachers. A dissertation must be defended in order to be granted the scientific degree of candidate of sciences. Yet in order to obtain the title of docent or professor no special work or study is needed. No serious scientific research is being conducted on the level of candidate or doctoral dissertations in the area of training specialists. This explains the fact that most higher school personnel

still consider it their main task that of providing the students with the necessary information which they must remember, and the extent to which it has been memorized, as confirmed by the tests. Unless we abandon such an understanding of the task, the benefits of the training of engineers in institutes will be small.

#### A. Volkov, worker, Ivano-Frankovsk: On Faith and Trust

It has now become clear that perestroika is necessary in the attitude toward religion and believers as well. We, atheists, must learn tolerance. I have been a member of the party since 1977. I am Russian and I live in the Western Ukraine. Here religious traditions are quite strong. A high percentage of the population consists of believers. Not so long ago the local authorities were still trying, at all cost, to prove "success" in atheistic propaganda. They thoughtlessly closed down churches, above all those of the Russian Orthodox Church. Did all of this lead to atheism?

No, not to atheism but, rather, to sectarianism, to the blossoming of clandestine communities listening to the "radio voices." What the people lost was not faith in God but trust in the Soviet system which, in the opinion of many believers, is against the freedom of conscience and does not observe its own laws. There has been a revival of nationalism. That was the actual result of the "antireligious struggle" waged by the local authorities.

I have frequently spoken on this subject at party meetings and mentioned errors in atheistic work. Survey forms were distributed in the schools, for example, with questions such as "Are religious holidays celebrated in your family?" Virtually everyone answered "no," although it is perfectly well known that such is not the case. We are teaching people, since their earliest childhood, to lie. And how could one tell a school student that his mother is "stupid, underdeveloped and backward, because she is a believer, and you should not listen to her?!" We have heard this too.

My wife is Ukrainian and was born in a village. She is a believer. This does not hinder our love and family peace. What will our two sons grow up to be? The main thing is, above all, to be honest. But I shall not teach them atheism by taking to my belt. This would mean that I am a poor father and husband, and a poor communist.

I have thought a great deal about such problems and I believe that the party must protect the rights and interests of the working people, including believers. Whenever they are rejected, there are always people who rely on such denigration. By pitting the child against his mother, the family, which is the foundation of any strong state, is destroyed.

Let me particularly emphasize that the national problem and religion are closely interconnected. I would like my views to be considered by the party members. I sign my name to this letter, for today one should no longer be afraid to discuss very important matters.

#### Excerpts from Letters

**L. Baranov**, worker, Moscow:

Glasnost is the most powerful weapon of perestroika. To this day, however, it is frequently replaced by semitruth and semiglasnost. The newspapers flaunt sensational events of the past but topical problems such as, for example, the struggle against lies, they bypass like ships avoiding an underwater reef! And if they write about present problems, they are unwilling to go beyond noting facts (such as scarcity of vegetables), repeating the same things over and over again with no essential results.

I am convinced that perestroika means struggle against the routine of the old measures and concepts and irresponsibility and economic breakdown. What is needed is struggle and not endless talk about struggle.

**M. Mikheyev**, candidate of historical sciences, Leningrad:

The development of enterprise autonomy, brigade contracting and the democratization of the life of labor collectives should strengthen their responsibility and protection from administrative "outside pressure." For that reason, in my view, the people's control posts in brigades and shifts have outlived their usefulness. Clearly, new forms of the organization of people's control should be sought.

**B. Kotov**, turner, Volgograd Petroleum Refinery:

Honestly speaking, I still do not understand at all what is meant by a state of law. Probably, it presumes that we shall be given no more than three rights: to work, work and work once again, and all other matters will be settled by the managers. For the time being, the opinion of the people here is frequently ignored. Thus, the population of our Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayon is worried by ecological problems, for the pollution of the air with toxic substances is high. Why do we have to live in a state of eternal fear for ourselves, our children and our grandchildren?

We frequently say that we must live like Leninists. We put flowers at Lenin's monument and yet turn back a delegation carrying a letter on production matters as though it is a thorny weed of possible consequences, although the letter was signed by more than 35,000

people. No time was found to receive our comrades. As a party member I am ashamed to look at those people. This is not my opinion alone and there are many who think like me.

**A. Garbuz**, economist, Moscow:

Throughout the world it is natural not only to go to a public library to read but also to copy something. The advantages of this are obvious and I shall not enumerate them. "Xerox's" are found in our scientific libraries as well. A typical picture is waiting for hours in line in front of a small window and a closed door, commotion, irritation and discussions in which we do not come out well in comparison with foreign scientific information centers. The result is that we can copy 20 to 30 pages daily. If a copy of a major work is needed, it takes a month of waiting in line.

The public libraries as well have begun to acquire duplicating equipment. For the time being, however, this is being done so timidly and slowly that one cannot hope for any serious output. I am afraid that no acceleration can be achieved without drastically increasing the number of "xerox's" and without equipping public libraries with them. Paying for duplication eliminates many far-fetched prohibitions (for example, why could I not, at my expense, duplicate a work of fiction?) Above all, this will enable us substantially to add to library funds from such revenue.

**A. Kolyadov**, chief physician, Nevskiy Prophylactic Sanatorium, Leningrad:

I am confident that as long as the present purely administrative restrictions in the sale of alcoholic beverages are retained, moonshining will exist and the number of people punished for "petty hooliganism while waiting in line" (which today account for thousands of people) will increase. The sooner we begin to correct the obvious errors, the more useful this will be to society which has seriously decided to put an end to whitewashing and bureaucratic administration. In my view, both of these features, in the struggle against alcoholism as it has been waged over the past 3 years, have increased. Instead, we should be doing real work to ensure the restructuring of the social area. We shall not advance even a single step without changing the traditional approaches.

**V. Vydryakov**, propagandist, Kherson:

I recently found out that Trotsky's works total 21 (!) volumes. Where have they been published? Are they accessible to citizens like myself? Why was Trotsky exiled from the USSR, on what basis? Was this a decision of the supreme "threesome," which later led to the creation of similar "threesomes" throughout the country? What is clear to me is that we cannot begin to find the truth if we continue to depict one political leader or another exclusively in black colors. Under Stalin this approach was understandable and even logical. The same applies to the period of stagnation. Today, however, we live in new times.

**B. Lvin**, economist, Leningrad:

Target funds, set up on a voluntary basis, are developing in our country. Their institution is taking place on the highest levels, thanks to the support of large organizations and the authority of noted governmental and social figures. We need a variety of such funds, not only all-Union and republic, but some of local significance, so to say. The broadest possible range of objectives and scales of their activities are possible, such as preserving and studying the works of a certain painter, restoring a specific architectural monument or supporting scientific developments (perhaps even collecting funds for the publication of requested works) and many others.

Obviously, we need a single authoritative law which would regulate the creation of decentralized funds based on local initiative. It should include a procedure for considering petitions by the founders (whether organizations or private individuals) and the full conditions for their registration. Consistency with real social needs and the degree of trust enjoyed by the managers of such funds will be determined by the contributions made, if numerous such funds exist. This will help to eliminate the alienation of such funds from those who contributed them and the "dilution" of important, albeit local, problems within a combined budget on a national scale.

#### Reactions to Our Publications

**O. Kuznetsov**, chief, Navigation Safety Department, Kholmsk Fishing Port, Sakhalin Oblast:

I read with a great deal of interest the article "Bureaucratism and Bureaucracy: Need for Refinement" (No 12, 1988). The work of its authors deserves sincere praise for the depth of analysis and daring of views. However, it is as though this serious work has its last page smeared with an unguent to soothe the "wounded" souls of officialdom. This particularly applies to the conclusion: "...Naturally, the first step in surmounting bureaucratic rule cannot be quick and at best would take years." We do not have such years! Unless the roots of the bureaucratic system are pulled out in the immediate future they would strangle perestroika. The people's faith that finally there will be a switch from words to actions is not infinite.

**V. Chudnovskiy**, doctor of psychological sciences, Moscow:

I was inspired to write to you by V. Yadov's article "The Social Type of Personality," which was published in issue No 10 of this journal. As a whole, this was an interesting and needed article. Nonetheless, it contains an idea which makes it necessary to counter the author's viewpoint with a different one.

Noting that collectivistic education is an unquestionable accomplishment of our social system, the author points out that it has begun to develop a trend toward the

shaping of personal irresponsibility. I believe, however, that this irresponsibility was developed not thanks to but despite collectivistic education or, rather, as a result of the distortion of its nature. Clearly, the article reflects the currently popular viewpoint that collectivism is a concept which has become discredited and obsolete, a feature of the stagnation and prestagnation periods.

Unquestionably, the social deformations of the past decades have had a bad influence on the development of collectivism. The bureaucratization of the apparatus led to the revival of group egotism, philistinism and individualism. As special studies have indicated, many of the social activists turned out to have strong egotistical aspirations. Distortions in economic development (as a result of which the working people did not become the true masters of the means of production) led to a gap between social and personal interests and to a situation in which the upbringing of the collective largely consisted of declarations, while real life created nutritive grounds for the shaping of totally opposite features in the personality. In scientific publications collectivism was frequently interpreted one-sidedly, only as subordinating the individual to the interests of the majority. With such a concept the humanistic aspect was largely lost.

However, we must not throw out the baby with the bath water by excluding from the theory and practice of upbringing the concept of "collectivism." This concept cannot be replaced by (very significant) concepts, such as "professionalism," "competence," or "initiative." It cannot become obsolete anymore than could the concepts of "altruism" or "humanism."

What has become discredited is not the real but the fictitious collectivism about which Marx and Engels wrote that it is not only an entirely illusory collectivism but also a new set of fetters (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 3, p 75).

Today we are solving an entirely urgent task of restoring the role of economic incentives in the labor process. The distortions which took place in this area undermined the prestige of social labor and had a destructive influence on character formation. However, this matter has another side as well: to be the full master of production means not only to be the master of one's wage but also to feel responsibility and concern for others. This precisely is the essence of collectivism. The concept of "collectivism" must be relieved from its extraneous accretions and its Marxist understanding must be restored. The humanistic trend is an inseparable element of true collectivism and a manifestation of its essence.

In my view, this leads to the conclusion that collectivism, organically and mandatorily combined with developed individuality, must become one of the basic features of the social type of free individual who is born through perestroika.

**I. Vysotskiy, Alma-Ata:**

You keep writing and we keep doing nothing, I thought, as I read the letter of P. Krasutskiy and the comments of specialists (No 12, 1988). The abandonment of the "coerciveness" was depicted quite clearly and convincingly: differentiated approach, work based on contract, and brigade contracting. What does common sense and knowledge of the law indicate? Cost accounting enterprises must not be forced to waste their manpower. If everything is to be based on the law, let us say once and for all "no" to violators of the respective articles of the KZOT and the Law on the Enterprise. There must be a categorical "no" to departmentalism, under the prosecutor's supervision, acting comprehensively and regardless of the time of year.

I fear, however, that publications alone will change nothing. In the past I raised such questions with the local newspaper. The answer was the following: "What would you like to hear?... No one can be deprived of civil rights or not even expelled from the party for refusal to do agricultural work.... The times today are such that on the subject of rights and obligations (which are unequivocally described in official documents) one can argue only with one's conscience." Thus, everything turns out to be simple: you want to act according to your conscience, go where you are sent; you want to work on your job, stay there and consider yourself sinful. But what happens if a slight pressure is applied or one is put "on the carpet," or simply "one's actions are remembered." This is a topic of endless debates....

Yet I think that if we rely on persuasion and voluntary participation, there will never be any tomatoes or cucumbers on the shelves of our stores. I liked the KOMMUNIST article which I found useful.

**A. Kunarev, candidate of technical sciences, Moscow:**

Problems of Soviet scientific and technical policy are considered profoundly and extensively in the article by B. Saltykov (No 11, 1988), both in retrospect and in terms of their current status. In my view, however, the author has ignored one of the most important parts of the mechanism for controlling science, which is the antithesis of administrative-command structures: The self-management of the entire system of scientific institutions by an association of scientific workers. Recently a group of scientists suggested the creation of such an association.

Such an organization, developed on the basis of democratic principles, could, in my view, best solve problems of scientific management: the scientists themselves would be managing it. As to appeals to instill in the minds of managers the idea that basic science is not a commodity appears, to say the least, naive.

**Subscribers On the Journal**

**V. Portnov, engineer, Petrodvorets:**

KOMMUNIST is one of the leading party printed organs. For that reason it should also become one of the most popular publications in our country. To this effect, I submit the following specific suggestions:

Consider how to improve the appearance of the journal. Use better quality paper. Increase the size of the journal;

KOMMUNIST should be addressed to all categories of readers, including young people;

A more daring coverage of "blank spots" in party history and the international communist and worker movements;

Print more theoretical works of a debatable nature, particularly those which affect problems of the country's contemporary political development and the building of socialism;

It would be worth considering the publication of a mass popular addition to the journal, such as books containing the works of noted party leaders. Naturally, this will require additional funds. I suggest that such funds be found by reducing the publication of political works which remain as dead weight in newsstands and for which there is no demand.

**N. Dudenko, Kiev:**

What would I like to see in the journal?

I would like to see articles on economic, ecological, national, ideological and other problems of "regional cost accounting." It would be good to set up a journal task force which would visit other areas, such as the Ukraine and elsewhere. Topics such as "Health and the Environment," "Chemistry and Food Products," and "Children and Ecology" demand an urgent study. Problems of raising children in the family, in kindergartens and schools, must be discussed most seriously.

In my view, the positions of the party authorities concerning various social initiatives must be interpreted in greater detail. I am familiar with the statements made by people in the defense of Baykal, the Urals, Ufa, Gorkiy and the Ukraine. Everywhere they come across power pressure from superiors. A reciprocal misunderstanding arises which, in the final account, works against perestroika and undermines trust and social activeness.

**A. Bruskov, Novosibirsk:**

I suggest that the number of issues of KOMMUNIST be raised to 20 a year. The two additional issues, let us say once every 6 months, could include materials from our political heritage. I believe that the readers would welcome an issue with such materials.

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**Resolute Policy of Economic and Social Reform  
and of Renewal of the LCY**

*180200031 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 15,  
Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) pp 83-90*

[Article by Dusan Ckrebic, member of the presidium of  
the LCY Central Committee]

[Text] More than 2 years have passed since the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY], but a fundamental turnaround has not yet been achieved in overcoming the social and economic crisis, which has been developing over a period of several years. This bears witness to the fact that LCY policy is not being implemented with sufficient speed and effectiveness in the most important areas of social life. Stagnation is continuing in the economic sphere, labor productivity is failing, restructuring of the economy in accordance with the demands of scientific and technological progress is being implemented slowly, social problems remain unsolved, employment is not guaranteed, especially for the young, export growth is slow, the material situation of associated labor is deteriorating, and so forth. A tendency toward stagnation can also be observed in the development of self-managing socioeconomic relations, accompanied by a decline in the influence of the working class on resolving questions of reproduction. Shortcomings are appearing in the functioning of the political system. Interethnic relations are becoming strained.

In such conditions the LCY, as the leading ideological and political force in society, should first and foremost implement the decisions of its 15th Congress far more energetically and effectively. Meanwhile there is sluggishness and indecision in the work of party members and bodies and a return to the discussion of questions already removed from the agenda, which places unavoidable constraints upon political actions and impedes a concrete and successful examination of the accumulated problems. In conditions where the ideological and political influence and capacity for action of the LCY in society are weakening—as confirmed in practice on many occasions—the positions of bureaucracy, statism and technocracy inevitably grow stronger, as a result of which concern for the immediate needs and long-term interests of the working class, working people and all citizens is relegated to a position of secondary importance.

Taking account of the obvious shortcomings and negative trends and the delays in overcoming them, and also in order to work out realistic proposals, give new impetus to the work of communists and develop their initiative and creativity, at its 11th December 1987 plenum, the LCY Central Committee decided to convene an LCY conference on "Consolidation of the Leading Ideological and Political Role and of the Unity and Responsibility of the LCY in the Struggle to Find A Way Out of the Socioeconomic Crisis." The main task of the conference, which was held in Belgrade from 29 to 31 May 1988, was

to mobilize party members and agencies to implement the decisions of the 13th LCY Congress and to steadfastly carry out the policy drawn up by it.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with the LCY Statute the Central Committee determines procedure and criteria for the selection of conference delegates. It elects LCY members who have shown by their work that they are implementing the policy and decisions of the congress, and who have made a creative contribution to the development of socialist self-managing socioeconomic relations. In short, this means those LCY members who by their efforts have gained political authority where they work.<sup>2</sup>

The LCY made thorough preparations for the conference. A Central Committee working group was formed, which prepared "Theses on Consolidation of the Leading Ideological and Political Role and the Unity and Responsibility of the Party, and on Its Successful Work in the Struggle to Find A Way Out of the Socioeconomic Crisis," and a draft of the corresponding resolutions.

Party members and LCY organizations and agencies carried out a wide-ranging critical discussion of the Theses for several months. A genuinely democratic exchange of opinions took place, well-founded observations were made and supplements introduced into the texts of the documents which the conference was to approve.

A wide range of communists, scientists and specialists took part in the discussion. The discussion which developed was characterized primarily by frank and well-argued dialogue and sharp criticism of the shortcomings which had become apparent in the implementation of policy determined by the congress. Attention was drawn to the responsibility of the leadership in LCY bodies for the sluggishness and inconsistency with which the decisions of the 13th Congress had been implemented. The essence of the most important observations on the text of the Theses was that this document should have posed far more deeply and radically the question of the need for changes in society, in the LCY and in the economic system, that the Theses did not make sufficiently clear the possible ways out of the crisis, and that greater decisiveness on the part of the leadership was imperative. In short, there was sharp and constructive criticism, directed at the search for more qualitative approaches to the further development of socialist self-management. Supplementary material entitled "Basic Principles for Changing the Economic System," prepared by the Federal Executive Council's Commission on Problems of Economic Reform, was submitted for the delegates' consideration. The discussion at the conference itself, like that in the primary LCY organizations and bodies which preceded it, confirmed that despite the critical nature of the current situation the LCY is capable of finding a way of successfully developing society and overcoming the present crisis. It has become clear that



there is a need for urgent changes, for a decisive new course toward comprehensive and immediate reforms, a need which has been brought about by the protracted social crisis.<sup>3</sup>

The course and substance of the work of the conference showed a high degree of unity in the LCY with regard to directions in which to find ways out of the social and economic crisis, changes in the economic system and the further improvement of self-managing socioeconomic relations on the principles formulated in the LCY Program. Referring to the guidelines of the program, the conference spoke unanimously in favor of fundamental reconstruction of the economic and political systems and of further democratic renewal of the LCY. It can be said, that the basic topics on the conference agenda were: imminent changes in the economic system; completion and further development of the political system and constitutional changes directed at the implementation of economic reform; changes in the LCY intended to guarantee its successful fulfillment of its leading ideological and political role under conditions of an urgent and all-embracing reform of society.

Thirty years ago the orientation of the LCY program paved the way of ideological struggle for the creation of such social relations that would allow the working class, working people and all citizens to participate in the formation of a society of free producers without class oppression, without exploitation, free from domination by the estranged social strata, and without bureaucracy and technocracy. We steadily followed this general course, despite clashing throughout the whole of the past period with statist consciousness and logic. We also came up against certain illusions, according to which it is possible to replace economic laws to a significant extent by mutual agreements and accords between economic units, and thus weaken the negative influence of the market.

Practice has shown that it is unwise to make concessions in the face of sound economic logic and that the operation of economic laws is independent of will. We were thus obliged to look for a way of escaping from the conceptual limitations which we had imposed upon ourselves in the past, captive to classical systems and certain illusions. The questions of implementing reforms and guaranteeing the independence of economic units are now critical. On the basis of market criteria of economic management and economic laws they must have complete freedom to make decisions about efficient and rational development, to increase their competitiveness and to master new production technologies, thereby exerting substantial influence on their own material situation. These are fundamental conditions for freeing associated labor from statism, regulation and rigid state management by order and decree. The position of the conference in this connection was clear: "A lack of respect and recognition for the influence of the market on production intensifies statism, bureaucratism and

arbitrariness in the economic and social areas, which leads to the degradation and undermining of the economic efficiency and the political democracy of self-managing socialism."

Only by strengthening and improving the planned market economy and by further consolidating the independence of economic units is it possible to increase the interest of workers in more economical and efficient management of the means of social ownership as social capital, developing the principles of economic responsibility for and risk behind economic decisions.

We have now come face to face with what is at the same time both a problem and a demand of our time—the need for a significant increase in the efficiency with which means of production are utilized in the social sector. A low level of efficiency under socialism is impermissible. The solution lies in stimulating the interest of workers in improving the quality of their work, which will also allow them to earn more.

This is not the first time the LCY spoke at this conference in favor of the market, the independence of economic units and planning as an instrument in the hands of the workers, organized on the principles of self-management. A certain amount of experience in this field has been accumulated in the course of several decades. We have a long period of achievements behind us in the development of socialist socioeconomic relations on the basis of self-management, the concept of social ownership, associated labor, the delegate system, the use of market and economic laws, and so forth. The LCY failed on this path however. The conference essentially reestablished time-tested principles, gave new impetus to efforts for implementing the decisions of the 13th LCY Congress and advocated the further practical development and use of market methods of economic management and the elimination of the shortcomings and weaknesses which manifested themselves, primarily in the economic life of the country. Such an approach was directed at fundamental and all-embracing reforms as the way to develop and make concrete the LCY program directives and as a step forward in relation to what has already been accomplished. In order to strengthen and further develop socialist self-managing socioeconomic relations we must carry out economic reform, and also reform of the political system in order to overcome the stagnation which is evident in the process of formulating economic criteria and in the development of market relations as a means of economic management. At the same time changes in the Constitution and the political system must create the prerequisites for a dynamic implementation of economic and comprehensive social reform. Our reform is essentially a break with stagnation and the obstruction process, with management by order and decree which is once again on the increase, with polycentric statism and with the strivings of bureaucratism to weaken the power of the working class and associated labor in the area of social reproduction and management.

Future elaboration of the principle of social ownership and its development as the cornerstone of our self-managing socioeconomic relations demand a strengthening of the economic functions of social ownership. This can be achieved only if the worker bears economic responsibility for its efficient, rational and economically justified use. The conference confirmed that in a market economy, social resources such as social capital must be reproduced and increased on the basis of economic criteria of efficiency. For this to be possible, taking account of the weaknesses which have appeared in practice, it is imperative to define the basic factors of social ownership in order to increase the interest, rights and responsibility of economic units as independent factors in the reproduction process.

Side by side with social ownership, as the basis of socialist self-managing production relations and the dominant form of ownership in previous decades, other forms of ownership have also developed in our country.<sup>4</sup> Under present circumstances it is impossible to achieve further social progress, change the structure of the economy, increase employment and draw the large private resources of citizens into the national economy without making dynamic use of "small-scale economic operations" and developing other forms of ownership: communal, private and personal. The conference spoke out resolutely in favor of eliminating all obstacles and of overcoming dogmatic and bureaucratic trends and excessive management by order and decree, which impeded the functioning of other forms of ownership and their interconnection with social ownership.

In the last decade associated labor fell ever more into the grip of statism, norms and management by order and decree. In setting its sights on decisive reforms, the conference therefore emphasized the need for a "radical elimination of the present excessive regulation in the organization of economic life, and of administrative pressure on the economy and of other non-economic obstacles." Particular note was made of the importance of the qualitatively new functions of the state which ensure, through economic coercion, economic laws and the planned market economy, that it is possible to resist spreading administrative interference in economic life. The LCY will be resolute in its opposition to state interference being the main method of economic management, rather than economic stimulation, whereby thanks to an efficient economic and rational approach to economic management, and by increasing the productivity of labor and work in accordance with market conditions, efficiency of social reproduction as a whole is achieved.

We know that significant differences exist in our country between the levels of development of individual regions, republics and provinces. The progress of each area is a condition for the harmonious and more rapid development of the whole country. The need to accelerate the pace of progress in the least developed area of the autonomous province of Kosovo is a particular problem.

We have always paid due attention to eradicating differences in the levels of development of individual areas on the basis of principles of solidarity. It is natural, however, that within the framework of economic reform there will be changes in the system for stimulating progress in the poorly developed republics and the autonomous province of Kosovo, as regards both a more efficient use of resources and the establishment of a market-based reciprocal link among associated labor organizations in an underdeveloped region and in other areas of the country.

The economic advancement of underdeveloped areas will be achieved given a significant increase in the influence of the intended market orientation of the Yugoslav economy as a whole. Considerable changes are expected in the existing system for stimulating progress in poorly developed areas, a system which at one time produced positive results but was later shown to have serious shortcomings.

As far as reform of the political system is concerned, the conference adopted a resolution targeted at such changes as must ensure the further development of self-management and the intensification of the workers' role in the self-management system; to define more precisely the functions of the federation and increase the efficiency of its work; to guarantee the independence of workers in the associated labor system in their capacity as producers of goods and creators of new values in order that they should organize themselves according to their own requirements and make decisions independently, assuming the responsibility for this at the same time; to effect a substantial reduction in excessive management by order and decree on the part of the state and its agencies, particularly in the economic area, and to implement considerable decentralization; to consider proposals which were voiced in the course of the discussions and which concern guaranteeing a greater measure of influence for associated labor on decision-making in the SFRY Assembly; and finally to create conditions for the functioning of economic and other factors within the new economic system.

Current discussion about changes in the SFRY Constitution in connection with the discussion of the draft amendments to it put a number of questions on the agenda which are of fundamental significance for the further development and completion of the political system of socialist self-management. The beginning of economic reform, and its success, depend in many respects upon constitutional changes, which must ensure a greater influence of associated labor in the assembly and delegate systems, a strengthening of the rule of law in society and laying the foundations for the functioning of a unified Yugoslav market, define the functions and improve the work of the federation, and so forth. Delays and procrastination in the implementation of constitutional changes would make it impossible to carry out pressing economic reform, which would simultaneously exacerbate the crisis in society and intensify nationalism

and social tension. This is the position of the conference. That is why it spoke out with complete certainty in favor of changes. Moreover preparations for these changes in the economic and political systems must be complete by the end of 1988.

Demands to convene an extraordinary LCY Congress, made by communists and individual party agencies in the course of the discussions on the eve of the conference and then at the conference itself, were motivated exclusively by discontent with the pace at which reforms of the economic and political systems are being prepared. Consequently, priority was given to reforms, and the convening of an extraordinary LCY congress was deemed necessary only if the leadership should be unable to cope with the set task. The LCY Conference spoke resolutely in favor of a higher degree of democratization of relations in society and of openness in work. Criticism directed at individual leaders responsible for the existing situation was in no way criticism of democracy. On the contrary, the unanimous conviction was expressed that it is only possible to find a reliable way out of the present crisis by means of a further democratization in society and democratization and openness in the LCY, in short, only on democratic foundations. It is an indisputable fact that the further development of socialist democracy demands dissolution of the personal link between the party leadership and administrative authorities and separation of the executive political organs of the LCY from administrative functions. In society and in the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, a front of organized socialist forces, the party must exert influence not from a position of power, but primarily as an ideological and political force. In the LCY itself it is also imperative to constantly and resolutely deepen democratic relations and to develop freedom of speech, dialogue, and reasoned criticism. In such a democratic situation clashes between diverse viewpoints and the emergence of differentiation between minority and majority are natural and unavoidable. The minority is obliged in its activities to comply with the decisions of the majority. On the other hand a democratic attitude toward the opinion of the minority constitutes normal civilized conduct. However, in order to avoid the formation of factions and the organized formation of a minority within the LCY, in practical work the line must be followed which has received the support of the majority in the course of democratic discussion. Unity in the LCY is an essential prerequisite for the consolidation of its ranks and for heightening its role as the leading ideological and political force in society. The position of the conference is that unity "is achieved on the basis of a democratic reconciliation of the interests of the working class, peoples, and ethnic groups of Yugoslavia, but in concrete questions unity must be realized through collective programs for the development of the country." It is not somehow a given and eternal fact but must be constantly reaffirmed, proceeding from the interests of the working class and taking into account the specific situation. The work of the LCY conference encompassed almost all fundamental questions of social development.

A vast number of opinions, proposals, demands, warnings and recommendations were expressed at the conference. They include a broad range of ideas—from the conceptual and theoretical to the specific, concerning the improvement of current practice. The conference enriched the LCY both ideologically and in content, which will allow the party to set about solving problems connected with reforms in the political and economic systems. A number of questions were also raised which are of significance for the preparation of the next congress.

It must be acknowledged that renewal of the LCY is perhaps the most complex task which the party has set itself. How is it to begin its own reorganization? It is no simple matter for the party to embark upon a critical review of its own practice, which has led to the bureaucratization of the LCY, and to rise above the tempting position of being the so-called party in power. It is vital that we overcome our own dogmatism, political monopoly and other weaknesses, which are evident at every step, and at the same time fight for a new role of the LCY in society, a role in which it functions as a party of progress advocating socialism, the power of the workers class, new production relations resulting from the development of the social form of ownership as the dominant form of ownership, and a better life and bright future for its citizens. Many questions have accumulated, but answers of practical value are still lacking.

It is clear that to simply proclaim our need for a modern party which is equal to the demands of the 21st century is totally insufficient. No one disputes the imminent need for a renewal of the LCY, but questions do arise: What does this imply? How is the LCY to be made the leading ideological, political and motivating force in the new conditions? There is no doubt that the LCY should already be concerning itself with these questions now. It must study and make theoretical generalizations about many proposals and the experience of inner-party life, not for 1 second losing sight of the fact that all of this must be done in a way which constantly enriches democratic relations in the LCY. Diverse interpretation of democratic centralism or of the relationship between the majority and the minority in the party is merely a component of the global problem of future development of the LCY, which was discussed at the conference.

The resolution adopted at the conference provides a solid foundation for and orientation toward future work. The resolution does not circumvent the need to increase the responsibility of party members and bodies. The task being set is that of renewing the LCY in accordance with its program. It is also imperative to restore the moral profile and prestige of party members and to effect ideological and political differentiation in the leadership on the basis of the decisions of the 13th Congress and the conference resolution. What is involved here is therefore not the abstract formulation of questions: all the decisions of the conference must be implemented, turned into operational plans and targets. Finally, the sharp

criticism directed at the leadership and party organs necessitates frank discussion of many problems. The work of each communist and party body must therefore be examined and evaluated without any euphoria. If we are to find a way out of the crisis there must be enormous efforts and increased responsibility on the part of everyone: collective bodies and individual party members and especially the higher leadership. Absence of unity at the most important moments, the unsatisfactory work of party agencies, their sluggishness and endless feuds have led to a decline in the level of leadership just as decisive measures and actions have become necessary.

The LCY has assumed great obligations and huge responsibility, a fact which is also borne out by the proceedings of the regular LCY Central Committee plenum, which approved a specific operational program for the implementation of the decisions taken at the conference. By the entire course of its work, by its content and by its decisions, the conference infuses the LCY and its leading bodies with new strength, exhorts them to join creatively and with a feeling of great responsibility in implementing the necessary changes.

On the basis of proposals prepared by the presidium the LCY Central Committee has considered a draft operational program, resulting from the positions of the conference. Its final wording reflects the views of a significant number of those LCY Central Committee members who spoke at the plenum. It may be confidently stated that the Central Committee did not only approve the program, but worked actively on it. At the plenum itself the LCY Central Committee focused its attention on the key task facing the party and society. It pointed to the urgency of radical changes in the working methods of leading agencies. It has become clear that it is necessary to consult much more frequently with labor collectives, workers and other working people so that problems of vital importance for working people may be considered jointly with them and solutions to many of the problems sought in the workplace. These problems already exist, but as economic reform is introduced they will gain even greater scope.

A basic number of specific problems must be solved by the end of this year and the remainder, taking account of their character, by the 14th LCY Congress. Awareness of the necessity of rapid, considered and decisive actions must penetrate all social areas. It is now no longer enough to simply support in principle the reforms upon which we are embarking. What is needed is the active participation in them of all workers, from the bottom to the top.

Along with many positive phenomena there are violations of social interests and economic principles, work efficiency is low, and many reserves are still not being used. A market economy and economic laws will not tolerate the habits accumulated over many years, habits which must be renounced without delay.

The LCY is aware of its potential and its strengths. At the same time it is aware of its responsibility both for the situation in society and for carrying out the necessary reforms. We are firmly convinced that the LCY has all that it needs to be equal to its historic destiny at this decisive time.

#### Footnotes

1. The LCY conference is a form of Central Committee work provided for by the Statutes. It is convened at least once between congresses in order to ensure the direct influence of party members and of primary organizations of the LCY and its bodies in working out the LCY viewpoint and policy on the most important ideological and political, socioeconomic and other questions. The conference determines its positions and proposals on these questions. The Central Committee is obliged to consider these positions, proposals and recommendations and on the basis of them to confirm decisions and conclusions for practical work. This way the conference ensures the necessary direct influence of party members, organizations and bodies on formulating and implementing LCY policy, and on strengthening its responsibility and unity in the struggle for finding the fastest way out of the economic and social crisis.

2. Elections were held by all LCY organizations for conference delegates in proportion to the number of party members, one delegate per 5,000 communists. Members of leading LCY bodies also had delegate status at the conference: a certain number of delegates were elected from the central committees of the republic organization, the LCY provincial committees and the party committee of the Yugoslavian People's Army. In all, 786 delegates were elected from more than 2 million LCY members, and more than 50 percent of these were delegates representing the area of material production and individual agricultural producers, which exceeds their relative strength in the aggregate composition of LCY members.

3. The conclusion and main assessment of the conference decisions, the desire to complete reform of the political and economic systems, and renewal of the LCY are founded upon a high degree of unity and unanimity among the delegates. The speeches of 353 participants in the discussion, and the 78 written communications left not a shadow of a doubt as to the need for pressing reform as the only way out of the present difficulties.

4. More than 83 percent of the agricultural land under cultivation is in the private sector, the number of craftsmen is not small, hundreds of thousands of people are engaged in individual activity in the services sector and in small-scale production.

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**For a New Economic Thinking; NOVA MYSL and KOMMUNIST Roundtable**  
*18020003m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 15, Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) pp 91-104*

[Text] Many of the key problems of socialist economic theory are awaiting profound scientific work. This will greatly determine the future of the economic reforms which are now taking place in the majority of socialist countries. The roundtable held by KOMMUNIST, the theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee, and NOVA MYSL, the theoretical and political journal of the CZCP Central Committee, on 25-26 April, in Prague, sought answers to some problems of political economy.

The discussion, in which leading Czechoslovak and Soviet economic scientists participated, dealt with the following topics: ways and means of use of socialist ownership; role, forms and structure of activities of central authorities in charge of managing the national economy; ways of objectivizing the value instruments of management, above all price-setting, under the conditions of the restructuring of the economic mechanism; and perfecting the mechanism of CEMA as a prerequisite for upgrading the role and importance of socialism in the contemporary world. Other problems discussed included socialist enterprise and democracy in the production area.

The report on the roundtable proceedings was drafted by Ye. Shashkov, deputy editor, KOMMUNIST department of the socialist countries.

#### Concept of Ownership—Time Function

**J. Kase**, candidate of historical sciences, NOVA MYSL editor-in-chief:

Reality proves that there is no alternative to perestrojka. However, this is a difficult process. There are those who have already firmly assumed a position in the vanguard of restructuring while others continue to "sift" through its ideas, and others again, hiding behind the slogan of defense of socialism, try to reduce it to cosmetic measures, changing nothing, leaving everything as it was. The processes of renovation which are occurring today require a reliable ideological and theoretical support. However, modern theory must not deal exclusively with a description of what has already been accomplished, of what is already known. Its task is to submit options in answering the questions which arise in the course of practical activities and which could arise in the future. In particular, metaphorically speaking, one should go into the kitchen of economic theory to make a more profound study of the life of working people in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, the development of perestrojka in the production area, and the trends which will become dominant in its future development.

**Z. Gaba**, professor, candidate of economic sciences, leading scientific associate, head of sector at the Czechoslovak SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

Problems related to socialist ownership and the forms and methods of its exercise cannot be solved on the basis of the old concepts of this category and with the help of obsolete approaches. In this case we must not lose its essence, i.e., that which makes socialism what it is. There are several ways of applying the concept of socialist ownership by labor collectives. The most suitable, in my view, is the one in which the collective is the co-owner of socialist property, i.e., when it fulfills a social order using the public means of production assigned to it and, at the same time, satisfying his own economic interests. In this connection, I would like immediately to raise a question which is controversial in our country: the question of the social management of the enterprise. Management is an attribute of ownership, its function. If a labor collective acts as its owner, a certain share of managerial functions should be transferred to it. The question is what specific part of such functions should be retained by society.

**L. Abalkin**, academician, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

I would like to emphasize that the concepts of ownership and socialism are a function of the times. I mean by this that we must not consider theory as the sum total of invariable concepts, formulated once and for all. As to the variety of forms of socialist ownership, in our country as well to this day a purely mechanical approach has prevailed. Let us consider, as an example, three forms of ownership: state, cooperative and private, on which individual labor activity is based. Added up, they account for 100 percent, and the specific share of any one among them could be increased only by reducing the share of another. However, this mathematical solution of the problem does not reveal the entire complexity of the processes. Above all, the forms of ownership are not separated from each other by insurmountable barriers. That is precisely why secondary, derived and frequently mixed forms of economic relations appear. The simplest example in this case is that of the cooperative enterprises based on leasing state property. Property does not stop being owned by the state, for the lease does not eliminate the nature of the acquisition. We could speak of various forms of family and individual contracting within state and even cooperative ownership. A large number of mixed, rather complex and even conflicting forms appear.

Today the question cannot be reduced to their simplest possible combination. The content of each traditional form must be subject to changes. It is not a matter for the share of kolkhozes in our system become greater or lesser. If these farms remain as they have been in the past, even their high share will not indicate any progressive change.

Or else, let us consider state property. It is not a question of its share but of the processes occurring within it. Sometimes we use quite simplistically and frequently with some difficulty, the concepts of "state and nationwide ownership," failing to see one of the most important theoretical problems, that of the representation of ownership. Society is the owner. The state is only its representative with the right to use such property with greater or lesser results. Under certain circumstances, as any other representative of ownership, whatever its kind, the state acquires and develops its own special interest, which is separate from that of the supreme owner. It could degenerate into a bureaucratic organization and deform the socialist nature of ownership.

**Rejoinder.** All of this is true. The question is only when and under what circumstances does the state act truly as an authority which represents the common interest and which gives to ownership its exclusively socialist aspect?

**L. Abalkin.** Let me cite one example which, it is true, is somewhat mechanistic. Let us consider the Unified Power System of the country or any urban bus system. Both are items of state ownership, although they represent entirely different systems of relationships. In the former case it is state ownership which must be managed by a single center. But could one say that the fleet of buses in a city is, in the direct meaning of the term, national property? If we answer in the affirmative, problems of regulating its activities must be solved on the national level, by the supreme authorities of the state. In other words, the local authorities, the city soviet, will also be a state institution and a subject of such relations. This indicates that a variety of production forms can develop within state ownership itself: national ownership, municipal, etc. The question is the following: What is the economic foundation for the autonomy of local authorities? Do they obtain it simply as a graceful gift from the central authorities or do they have their own economic base? This does not stop it from being state ownership. Who is the subject of this ownership? Obviously, today it would be legitimate to say that a complication develops, and that the subjects of ownership themselves are a complex concept and that along with the people, as the supreme subject of ownership, the labor collectives as well, along with territorial-regional associations of working people, within the labor collective—the usual cost accounting brigades—also become subjects of such relations.

The final essential question related to the progressive and promising nature of development of one form of ownership or another is to which among them should we give preference and pay greater attention? Briefly, without any emotions or any kind of ideologizing, the more progressive the form of ownership and of economic organization which ensures the highest possible production efficiency is, the highest possible labor productivity and the highest possible quality of output are achieved. Socialism does not eliminate such universal economic criteria. Therefore, when we consider today problems of

the development of the cooperative in its contemporary forms, for example, not only in the production of commodities and services (which are rather simple matters) but in terms of a cooperation which develops as an intellectual activity, as scientific research, as creative activity, a mass of problems which must be interpreted appears. Therefore, if one form of ownership or another can solve such problems better and more efficiently, including in the areas of science and technology, it means that it is the most progressive.

Nonetheless, in addition to general economic there also are specific socialist criteria of forms of ownership which we must apply. These, however, must not be simplified. Understandably, by definition the socialist form excludes exploitation and hired labor. The nature of ownership under socialism, however, is characterized above all by the status of the worker in production. The development of self-management and democratization is not something related to ownership but a matter of ownership itself. The maturity of socialist ownership relations is determined by the extent of the real participation of the worker, of the labor collective, of the class and the society as a whole in the actual handling of this ownership.

**N. Petrakov,** USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economic-Mathematical Institute:

When we speak of ownership as an economic rather than legal category, we must clearly define what we mean by the exercise of ownership. Marx provided a very clear definition of this: ownership is exercised through the appropriation of the added product. Under socialism, the appropriation of the added product is done by the whole nation. The handling of the added product is based on specific rules. However, such rules may vary. They could distort the meaning and the content of socialist ownership and create a situation in which the working people are converted into ordinary hired labor, with no access to the handling of the added product although they are considered co-owners and users of the property. In my view, we could speak of two forms, of two principles governing the handling of the added product under socialism: the cooperative and the leasing principles. I do not agree with statements made in Soviet economic publications to the effect that the cooperative movement is the lower level of production organization, essentially acceptable in consumer services, public catering, etc. The cooperative must be considered on a broader basis, as a specific form of organization of social interaction, organically consistent with socialism. But is it consistent with the new system because it pits against each other the "hiring-hired" person or the "manager versus the managed?" The cooperative form includes the possibility of organized coparticipation in management through active influence over the distribution of the added product. The cooperative form is not alien to the state form of ownership. For example, why is it that our

socialist enterprises, to the extent to which they can dispose of their own added product, are unable to set up their own enterprises on a cooperative basis?

Essentially, this is a cooperative form, for it is its organizers that manage these enterprises. On the other hand, it is a state form, for such enterprises are enterprises belonging to the state.

It seems to me that the idea of self-financing, which has been proclaimed in our country, based on payments for resources is, essentially, an application of the leasing form in handling socialist property on a high national level. It is question of the fact that state ownership is achieved by paying for resources which are national property. Here again I disagree with the idea expressed by Zdenek Gaba, according to which management is a necessary attribute of ownership. It seems to me that this opens the possibility of intervention by the state, by the bureaucratic apparatus, in the daily economic life of enterprises. The right of ownership can be exercised through the leasing method, understood in the broad meaning of the term, and through its collective and cooperative forms, also understood in the same broad terms.

**F. Valenta**, academician, vice-president of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, director of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

As it did in the mind of N.Ya. Petrakov, Professor Z. Gaba's concept triggered a similar question in my mind. I hope that he will clarify his idea.

**G. Shmelev**, doctor of economic sciences, head of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System:

The exercise of the right of socialist ownership and its nature depends, first of all, on the level at which someone makes decisions on the use of public property, what economic rights are concentrated in the center and what rights are transferred to the middle management level; what is retained by the labor collective. Secondly, the nature of the exercise of socialist ownership is determined by the nature of the distribution and redistribution of the newly created value, and the extent to which, in this case, the national, collective and private interests are combined. Turning to the history of the socialist countries, we can note the curtailing of economic rights relative to the use of public property. Many of the rights were taken away from the labor collectives and individual workers and given to the upper management echelons. In terms of our country, this can be clearly illustrated by taking the kolkhozes as an example, beginning with the 1920s. The center of economic decisions on handling kolkhoz property was shifted not only from individual working people to the kolkhoz management but from them it went even "higher" to the rayon party and state apparatus.

What is the sense of the present perestroika in the socialist countries? It is in the fact that changes are made in the forms of exercise of social ownership and the most important functions of its subjects. Clearly, granting rights to the "lower" strata requires a certain organizational and political perestroika, changes in the functions of party and state authorities, and reducing the administrative apparatus on the level of ministries, departments and other local units. Increasing the rights of labor collectives in the exercise of public ownership presumes a clear demarcation among the functions of party and state authorities and reducing the unjustified interference of party organizations in economic activities. It is not a question of removing the party from dealing with economic problems. The party will retain its right to participate in the formulation of the economic strategy of developments of the national economy and to engage in political and ideological work on the implementation of the plans but not the right to issue instructions on how to implement them.

**F. Valenta**. N.Ya. Petrakov questioned the idea that management is a necessary attribute of ownership. I would like to broaden the question even further. Namely, could the entrepreneurial function or activity of labor collectives or individuals as owners of the production process be related to the exercise of ownership? A debate on this matter was held last spring in Bratislava. The reason was the demand to grant labor collectives and individuals, within the framework of the restructuring of the economic mechanism, the exercise of ownership rights. The following curious aspect was noted: If individuals and labor collectives are granted this right, would they not act as lessors who appropriate the surplus profit? Naturally, this is an exceptionally narrow interpretation of the problem. I am convinced that we, in Czechoslovakia, must approach enterprise and the ability to manage skillfully as relatively autonomous functions which could be intensified and stimulated through a form of exercise of ownership, such as participation in the distribution of the added value. I believe that this precisely is the trend followed in the perestroika of the economic mechanism in our country. I think that we must not link the enhancement of the labor initiative of collectives and individuals exclusively to changes in the forms of ownership.

**Z. Gaba**. On the one hand, the problems of management touch upon those of ownership; on the other, they involve technical and organizational problems. I believe that ownership without management makes no sense. Let us consider the case of the capitalist managers who manage in the interest of the owner of capital. If a socialist state, which represents ownership by the whole nation, is separated from the management function and forbidden, in general, to interfere in the affairs of enterprises, the state plan would become meaningless and so would the centralized management of the national economy.

**L. Abalkin**. Ownership cannot be reduced merely to the appropriation of the added product or to management. It

has a variety of aspects. I too believe that management is an intrinsic function of ownership. In the simplest case, the owner and the manager are one and the same. This occurs, for example, when the owner of a private capital is also the manager of his own enterprise. In this case the functions of owner and manager merge. However, such functions can also be divided. In the case of a share holding capital, it is divided into capital as property and capital as function. Respectively, added value as well can be divided into two parts: percentage and entrepreneurial income. Both, however, are the function of the appropriation of the added value.

Potentially, this possibility exists under socialist conditions as well such as, for example, when the owner has delegated his rights to a unit, an authority or an individual, who exercise such rights on his behalf and instructions as they manage these objects of ownership. We must bear in mind that when the collective is given the right actually to manage material objects of ownership and some of the value of the added product, it becomes the subject of ownership relations. Naturally, it is not the supreme owner but is, nonetheless, a subject of ownership relations and we must not exclude it as such. Furthermore, when we speak of the exercise of ownership, we must take the following problems into consideration: the first is how to divide the added product, what part to give to the state and what to leave at the disposal of the collective. Before sharing something, however, one must create it. The other problem is how to organize the type of management system which would lead to an increase of this amount, of the volume of the added product. This becomes a management function or, rather, a management feature. Therefore, in my view, management is a necessary link in the exercise of ownership.

**N. Petrakov.** Naturally, by making lease payments for production resources which belong to the entire society, the function of state management is thus implemented. However, this management is not based on interfering in the economic activities of the labor collective. It is based on delegating the right to handle it under certain conditions. Such conditions are established by defining the rates of payments for resources.

**V. Starodubrovskiy,** doctor of economic sciences, deputy director of the International Scientific Research Institute of Management Problems:

We know that during the period of stagnation a certain deformation of socialist production relations occurred. Unquestionably, ownership relations as well were subject to such deformation. First of all, an attitude developed toward public property on the part of the labor collectives as being "nobody's." In other words, there was a certain alienation of the working people toward means of production. Second, there were bureaucratic

distortions in the activities of the apparatus and excessive centralization of the function of handling the property, its bureaucratization. Lenin himself had pointed out the antagonistic nature of contradictions between bureaucratic distortions in the work of the apparatus and socialist requirements.

I fully agree with Z. Gaba that the labor collective is the co-owner of socialist property. The most difficult thing is how to implement this co-ownership in practice. How to interest the people in this?

**A. Cervinka,** candidate of economic sciences, department head at the Law School, Charles University:

The greatest shortcoming of the centralist model of implementation of socialist ownership is the fact that authorities and individuals which make decisions do not bear economic responsibility for them. For that reason the restructuring of the economic mechanism, particularly in terms of problems of ownership, must be based on the establishment of areas of economic responsibility and economic interest.

**I. Galuska,** professor, doctor of economic sciences, deputy chairman, Federal Price Administration:

We must find the type of means of implementation of socialist ownership which will contribute to dynamizing and enhancing the creative approach of the individual worker, the labor collective and society as a whole. We must not ignore this key criterion in the elimination of the old and the search for new approaches in the exercise of forms of ownership.

#### **Sectorial Management and Economic Logic**

**F. Valenta.** At the initial stage in the development of the socialist economy we proceeded from the fact that the national economy is like a big enterprise. What remains today from this concept is that the enterprise is managed by someone outside of it, above it, i.e., by a superior authority. The conversion to intensive development within the framework of the restructuring of the economic mechanism calls for the internal structural components of the national economy (individual enterprises, associations) not only to have their own managing authority but also to manage the individual subsystems in the national economy.

Today, when the restructuring of the economic mechanism has become the main prerequisite for ensuring a new quality of economic development and intensification, priority is ascribed to the implementation of the old demand of changing the structure of centralized planning in such a way that on the lower levels, while the plan is being shaped, real possibilities can be created for an innovative advancement of production processes. This set of problems directly affects those of ownership and self-financing, for it is a question of the creation of a source of funds for their accumulation in the lower strata



and not within the framework of the entire national economic complex. This also pertains to problems of self-management and the possibility granted to the labor collective to make independent decisions.

**I. Dvorak**, corresponding member, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, department head at the CZCP Central Committee Higher Political School:

Practical experience indicates that changes in enterprise management are impossible without making radical changes in the ways and means of their management by the central economic authorities. We must also change the very content of the state plan. The plan must be aimed at solving strategic problems. We must abandon physical indicators and ratios in formulating the state plan. If we wish to replace administrative-command management with economic methods, the central leadership must do everything possible to create the type of situation in which the enterprises will be economically interested in the implementation of important national economic tasks.

**O. Latsis**, doctor of economic sciences, first deputy editor-in-chief of **KOMMUNIST**:

For the past few months an economic reform has been taking place in our country. So far, however, we have not been satisfied with its results, although there have been some changes for the better, particularly in the economic behavior of enterprises and labor collectives. So far no essential changes are visible in the activities of the central economic authorities. This forces us to revise yet once again the entire range of problems which we considered in undertaking the economic reform. Let us note, in this connection, that in the course of discussions and drafting their documents, the Soviet economists displayed greater realism in assessing the activities of economic authorities. We abandoned the simplified formula that if there is less centralization there will be more democratization. What the old system lacked was not only democracy but also real centralism. If we recall that the purpose of centralism is, above all, the planned development of our economy in the interest of society, and that Lenin's definition of planning emphasizes a conscious proportionality, it becomes entirely clear that we had less proportionality than anything else. Officially, the management was centralized and decisions were made by the central authorities, and the documents were apportioned, as they came from the top. However, the real processes did not obey these centralized decisions.

We are now using economic standards instead of directly distributing assignments among enterprises. It turned out, however, that even the methods and ways of state orders are being used for the sake of preserving, in an even worse bureaucratized way, all the shortcomings in the activities of the central authorities. This leads to the justifiable conclusion that the new ideas, as they are run through the old machinery, become emasculated.

This effort is like an attempt to fly by adding wings to an automobile.

**Rejoinder.** Extending this thought logically, the result is "down with the ministries!"

**O. Latsis.** In terms of most of industry, ministries in their present aspect, according to many economists whose point of view I share, cannot be considered, in general, as a form consistent with contemporary tasks. The present area of sectorial management must increasingly become a specific area of administrative services based on cost accounting. A ministry cannot operate on the basis of cost accounting, for it provides neither goods nor services. True, it is being said that to a certain extent it could bear material responsibility. The legitimate question, however, is the following: If it has made a mistake which has resulted in losses, out of what funds will it compensate them? The ministry itself does not produce anything. Therefore, it can pay only out of money which it takes from those same enterprises. Which is precisely what it does.

It is obvious that an authority which does not create resources should not handle them. The enterprises themselves should handle their resources. Naturally, this does not mean their waste, as was the case with Yugoslavia for example, which is worrying the Yugoslav comrades. The area of joint centralized decisions and centralization of resources is quite vast. It will be preserved and even broadened with the contemporary scientific and technical revolution. However, the centralization of resources and assets should not be administrative and based on allocations from superior authorities. Let me remind you of the totally acceptable methods which were used in the USSR in the 1920s: owning shares in associations, share holding companies, and syndicates. These are forms of voluntary share participation in enterprise associations.

Under the conditions of the new economic mechanism, a significant share of the functions related to the centralization of resources is shifted to the collectives of organized production enterprises and contractual associations. Unquestionably, there will also remain an area of centralized utilization of resources in which the final word will be that of the central state authorities, for these will be decisions of the remaining most necessary sectorial ministries or the Gosplan, when matters will affect very big projects which cannot be carried out on a cost accounting basis.

The changes which we are making should enhance the level of the real socialization of ownership.

Finally, the reform firmly raises the question of changing the activities of functional central departments. This is a rather extensive problem. Let me merely earmark some of its features, in particular those applicable to the Ministry of Finance which, in our country, is still kept aside, although it is precisely this department that should be in the center of all changes occurring today. In recent

decades the ministry deemed as its most important function that of meeting the expenditures part of the state budget, whatever it may have been. In frequent cases this was achieved by fictitious means, with the help of income not received as yet. In practice this developed into a concealed or, to a certain extent, even open inflation. Meanwhile, the true function of the Ministry of Finance in a well organized economy should be the opposite. It should see to it that the national currency is as strong and realistic as possible and that no unnecessary and unjustified outlays take place.

**Ye. Gaydar**, candidate of economic sciences, editor, department of political economy and economic policy, **KOMMUNIST**:

For quite some time in our country there were, essentially, two economies. One existed in the legal documents and was the one propaganda spoke about. The other was in real life. The paper economy did not reflect inflationary processes. Meanwhile, in the real economy prices rose, particularly by eliminating the inexpensive variety of consumer goods and, on a parallel basis, inflationary processes were manifested with the worsening of the deficit. In the economy which existed on paper state control, manifested as a direct mandatory management, was virtually comprehensive. The share of the nonsocialized sector remained minimal. In the economy which existed in real life, millions of people were involved in the various types of activities (which today we describe as individual labor activities). As consumers, they accounted for the virtually entire population of the country. Glasnost shed a light on the real economy, on the world in which we live. It allowed us to formulate a realistic program for eliminating its most acute contradictions.

But now, however, after having become accustomed for many decades to the parallel coexistence between the real and the fictitious world, public awareness takes us back to the dogmas which were instilled in us for such a long time and makes understandable claims related to the fact that the program which one could formulate and propose, aimed at improving the real world is, all the same, not all that splendid as the fictitious world in which we live, perhaps even in the ideological sphere.

Year after year we have raised the question of reducing the amount of construction and passed a series of resolutions on this subject. However, to this day the uncontrolled expansion of construction remains the most important channel through which surplus funds are put in circulation and feed inflationary trends.

**Z. Gaba**. I would like to go back to the "Ministry and Cost Accounting" question. In my view, the sectorial management authorities cannot operate on the basis of cost accounting. Nonetheless, the central management authorities must assume great economic responsibility for the results of their work. If we proceed from the fact that the main functions of the center are to manage

cooperative relations within the entire society and to coordinate the activities of individual sectors and enterprises, it would be admissible for the wages of the personnel of the central authorities to be directly related to the general development indicators of the national economy expressed, for example, through the growth of the national income. In considering the question of the central authorities, nor should we ignore the problem of cadres and their selection and training. The cadre problem is in our country the greatest barrier to perestroika, for the administrative area actually governs its life alone, for which reason it is not interested in changing the administrative-mandate management system which it introduced. This is a problem which exceeds the framework of the economy but without the solution of which we cannot ensure the success of perestroika.

There is a viewpoint according to which the center should provide nothing but overall leadership through indirect management instruments. I assume, however, that the method of issuing assignments by the center to specific entities should not be ignored, perhaps for the fact alone that specific tasks of the national economy such as, for example, scientific and technical development, must be coordinated on the scale of the entire state and cannot be auctioned out to individual enterprises. Naturally, a considerable part of the assignments issued by the center will be implemented through indirect management instruments. However, this should not generate the idea that the direct assignments included in the state plan are already a thing of the past.

**N. Petrakov**. As we know, there is the Leninist concept of the economic role of the socialist state and the respective concept formulated by Stalin at the end of the 1930s. Essentially, these are opposite concepts. The erroneous understanding of the role of the socialist state in economic management was manifested in the fact that the state became directly involved in the management of socialist enterprises and labor collectives. In the course of this it abandoned a number of functions related to providing overall economic conditions for efficient economic activities, such as the creation of the necessary industrial, scientific research and social infrastructure and maintaining the stability of the monetary system.

One of the essential functions of the socialist state is protecting the interests of consumers, i.e., the struggle against monopoly trends. Incidentally, this concept has been codified in our Law on the Enterprise. It is an entirely new governmental function which the ministries cannot perform, for a ministry represents the producer and not the consumer. Another important problem, in my view, is that so far in our planning practices we have not separated legislative from executive powers. The Gosplan drafts the national economic plan and submits it to the USSR Supreme Soviet for its consideration. After its ratification by this highest authority, however, it is the Gosplan that holds the resources. It could amend the plan even after its approval by the Supreme Soviet.

**F. Valenta.** The natural question which may be asked from everything said here is the following: Are the layers of all such problems the result of the fact that the extensive type of development of our economies continued longer than was necessary? It was on this basis that the outlay mechanism was established. As we know, so far it has been operating on all levels of economic management. The second question is the following: By what amount of time did we prolong our extensive development?

Today in Czechoslovakia a process is underway of shaping new structures for state enterprises. In this connection, I believe that major changes should also take place in the structure of the authorities superior to the enterprises. By this I mean the ministries. The ministries cannot remain as they were in the past. Nonetheless, let us note that in the entire array of problems of restructuring the economic mechanism in our country, the loosest concepts are those relative to the functions and structure of the central management authorities.

**L. Abalkin.** You have painted quite a convenient picture, according to which economic development was divided into two stages: extensive and intensive. Typical of the extensive development are the administrative management system, command methods, the outlay economic management mechanism, and all that was considered normal. Today a new stage has come and requires a different system, a new economic mechanism. It becomes necessary to ask whether the administrative-command management system was inevitable, does it indeed reflect the extensive type of development, was it sensible and justified or did it become, from the very beginning, a retreat, a violation of the principles of economic management inherent in socialism? If the latter applies, and I believe that such is precisely the case, today we are not only changing the mechanism in accordance with changed circumstances but also eliminate the deformations which occurred in the socialist management system.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the extensive way of development here did not begin in the 1930s. It was characteristic of the 1920s as well. However, the model of the mechanism which was developed under Lenin, as applicable to extensive development, did not contemplate such a system.

The second pertains to the creation of management structures, considered from the viewpoint of political economy. It is a question not simply of problems related to enterprise management but of the economic logic of developing a sectorial management. I believe that this process is based on what we describe as the socialization of production. We have individual enterprises among which integration processes are intensifying. This is followed by merging dispersed processes within a single process, which leads to the appearance of common functions which the individual enterprises cannot perform by themselves. It is such a socialization that creates

the need for special management authorities. These authorities must be at the service of the enterprise. They must not manage but service enterprise activities and help the enterprises to work efficiently. Such authorities must be controlled by the enterprises which create them, be maintained by them and serve them. This is, so to say, their purely economic function which does not include political functions of regulating relations among classes or ethnic groups. In general, the state itself, from the viewpoint of its economic function, is the offspring of that same process. It should serve the efficient functioning of the economic reproduction process. The current prevalent logic is distorted. We say that now there is a delegation of rights. The state delegates its rights to the ministries which, in turn, delegate some of their rights to the enterprises.... In my view, the true logic is entirely different: it is the enterprises that must delegate part of their functions to the authority they create!

#### Necessary Reform of the Price Setting Mechanism

**I. Galuska.** The experience of previous economic reforms in Czechoslovakia indicates that their implementation was hindered because of lack of clarity and the fact that the price-setting problems were not solved. The conversion from prices, which had become distorted over a long period of time, and a clearly manifested internal structural imbalance and, which is particularly important, an imbalance in terms of foreign prices, with a constant scarcity of foreign exchange, could lead to a drastic inflationary increase. I do not mean that contemporary economic theory rejects inflation. However, a sharp inflationary spiral could discredit any reform.

At the 7th CZCP Central Committee Plenum, which was held by the end of last year, the task was set of establishing between domestic and foreign prices the type of connection in which domestic national economic proportions would be shaped in accordance with world prices. This idea was developed in national economic practices. A significant number of Czechoslovak enterprises are establishing direct or indirect relations with foreign partners. The separation of our internal prices from international prices at the initial stages in organizing relations with foreign companies led Czechoslovak enterprises to a "schizophrenic condition." The point is that the formulation of their plans and strategies were oriented toward internal prices and followed one direction. In assessing economic activities from the viewpoint of the efficiency of cooperation with foreign partners, it became clear that entirely different approaches were needed. For that reason we would like for our producers to be able to compare their activities with foreign companies in terms of price parameters as well.

The key problem is how to use world market prices with the new economic mechanism? I see two possible ways. The first presumes joint activities by all or perhaps even some interested CEMA members in creating their own common market, which would ensure the convertibility of the currency not only within CEMA but beyond it as

well. The second is for Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries to solve such problems autonomously, on the basis of their own methods and approaches. I believe that this too could be successful but would take more time.

The creation of a joint price mechanism of CEMA countries is dialectically related to the creation of a joint foreign currency mechanism. We have a detailed plan for the implementation of all such tasks. Czechoslovakia is developing a second option as well, should joint decisions based on the first be delayed. The second plan presumes the use of world prices only as applicable to the Czechoslovak economy.

We intend to achieve domestic price flexibility with the help of contractual prices between producers and consumers. We deem it expedient to take the price of the truly possible imports of one item or another from the world market as the "upper level" of a contractual price. In our view, this would also reflect the level of global labor productivity, the achievements of scientific and technical progress, the quality of the item, etc. This could also become a major obstruction to inflationary trends. The study which was made of the activities of a number of Czechoslovak enterprises indicated that in objectivizing the foreign exchange rate and the prices charged by many plants and factories, production outlays for one commodity or another would exceed the upper limit of the contractual price. In order for such enterprises to be able to function under the new circumstances, we are planning to set, for a certain period of time, temporary double prices. This will be a kind of short-time declining state budget subsidy.

On the other hand, in the case of some Czechoslovak light industry enterprises, converting to global prices would, conversely, lead to a drastic increase in their profitability. Part of their "superprofits" could be used to set up a temporary fund for subsidizing enterprises in the other sectors.

At the present concluding stage of preparations for a price restructuring, which will begin as of 1 January 1989, our enterprises are increasingly becoming aware of their dependence on existing resources of means of production. In the course of the previous classical price reforms the problem of agreeing about new prices of goods, give or take a few million that could go either way, did not exist. Today the labor collectives are struggling for each thousand korunas. This proves that a process of realizing the importance of objectivizing value instruments is beginning.

**N. Petrakov.** The value category in socialist political economy is among the most dogmatically interpreted. The Stalinist formulation of restricting the realm of activities of the law of value essentially excluded the need to take into consideration the objective requirements of that law. Extensive opportunities were provided for the arbitrary, the subjectivistic interpretation

of the use of the law of value. Actually, I dislike the very term "use." Economics does not use laws but production resources and capacities, consistent with objective conditions which are reflected in the laws. Such objective conditions should be known and in no case should we speak of any kind of limitations imposed on the laws.

The dogmatic approaches aimed at limiting the law of value had a very unfortunate influence on the socialist economy, especially on the Soviet one. The possibility of setting prices regardless of the effect of the law of value was considered by some economists as one of the advantages of socialism. The result was that an economy based on shortages became synonymous with a socialist economy. Furthermore, objective information on the efficiency of one economic decision or another vanished, for prices were set on a planned basis, neglecting the law of value, and despite their best wishes the planning authorities had no clear economic indicators which would let them know what was efficient and what was not, and where were outlays high or low. For example, in our current domestic market the price of oil is half that of soda water. An endless number of such examples could be cited.

We need a truly radical price reform. The main thing is to change the price setting mechanism. In a dynamic economy any price rigidly fixed for a long period of time becomes quite quickly obsolete, even if it was maximal at the time it was set. That is why we need so greatly today a flexible price setting system, which would take supply and demand into consideration. Naturally, the structure-determining prices should be set on a centralized basis. This applies to basic power carriers (natural gas, petroleum, electric power) and a limited range of food products. However, this should apply to an insignificant group of prices. The main thing is for dynamic and flexible prices to be set on the basis of contracts, taking supply and demand into consideration.

Let me emphasize that supply and demand are not one of the factors of price setting but its aggregating part. A price which balances supply with demand takes into consideration all the factors related to production and consumption.

**Rejoinder.** Do we not in such a case come close to the concept of uncontrolled price setting under socialist conditions?

**N. Petrakov.** It seems to me that in this case we are not rejecting the planned economic management system in the least. We must influence not the consequences but the reasons. We must not correct the thermometer but treat the patient. The factors which are on the side of supply are, as a rule, those which are, one way or another, planned in the socialist economy. They involve production potential and investments. The factors on the side of demand are the income of enterprises and the population. They too are controlled. We control wages

and we control, on a centralized basis, the policy of income. The planned influence of such factors is, precisely, an influence on the price level, on their dynamics.

In general, to speak of a low or high price makes sense only when the commodity is on the shelf, when it exists. Setting up artificially, from altruistic considerations let us say, low prices on goods for children or books is senseless if such intentions are not backed by respective investments which will provide sufficient goods on the market on the basis of such low prices. Therefore, we must discuss the fact that the socialist state indeed can, on the basis of social considerations, set prices inconsistent with economic balance and change prices when it is a question of goods which are harmful to the population, restricting their consumption through prices.

**Question.** What do you suggest should be done in this case?

**N. Petrakov.** We must convert to a flexible system of balanced prices. However, under the conditions of an inflationary economy, such a step would entail a very fast price increase and trigger undesirable social consequences. Our previous anti-inflationary policy did not yield the desired results, for we believed that price control was the only instrument in the struggle against inflation. Control over income was weakened, although this was, actually, what brought about the appearance of "surplus" money, when the sum of commodity prices proved to be lesser than the monetary funds of enterprises and the population.

Immediate balancing would mean a sharp price increase or a reduction of the mass of money in circulation. Therefore, the question of establishing balancing prices and of balancing the market should be considered not merely a price problem but also a problem of improving the entire monetary system. For the time being our economic publications have ignored this essential problem. Yet the problem of improving the monetary system is one of life or death in terms of economic management methods. This is because all economic methods are based on value categories, whether long-term rates, the taxation system, and so on. If our monetary yardstick is defective or faulty, the entire system of economic management methods breaks down. That is why the problem of a reform in price setting should be solved along with that of normalizing the monetary system. Unless we change the economic mechanism and the mechanism for the circulation of currency, such a monetary system would yield absolutely no results. It is for that reason, it seems to me, that we must now make a reform in the mechanism which determines enterprise and population income.

Enterprises producing unnecessary goods obtain loans for wages and for paying their taxes to the budget. As a result, as we already said, in this case our budget revenue is frequently fictitious, for this is not real income but money borrowed from the State Bank and deposited in

the budget. Essentially it is the same state money. And if loans are not repaid, it means that the mass of money in circulation will increase. This is actually what is taking place in our country to this day.

**Rejoinder.** Does this mean that the steps which are being taken are ineffective?

**N. Petrakov.** The self-financing system could totally eliminate the possibility of obtaining unearned money. If it is strictly applied, some enterprises will have to go into bankruptcy. From the social viewpoint, this is no simple step. We are trying to amend the wage system and pay everyone on the basis of end results. It is on this basis that a series of steps have been formulated. Furthermore, we have a set of steps which are aimed at encouraging savings with all possible means. For example, this applies to building a second home, a dacha, increasing the sale of apartments, and raising interest rates on term deposits. In this respect the issuing of stock certificates and securities by enterprises could play a positive role.

Therefore, the problem of reducing the amount of surplus money can be solved although it is exceptionally difficult. This would require enhancing the activities of our banking system.

Let me say a few words on the correlation between world and domestic prices. We have lowered the prices of raw materials and foodstuffs and raised prices of processing industry goods. We would like to change this correlation although, obviously, for the time being we shall be unable fully to duplicate world prices, since, in the case of our country, this would be an artificial step.

**Ye. Gaydar.** A simple study of our financial statistics leads to the conclusion that in our country the state budget deficit amounts to tens of billions of rubles. Obviously, under the circumstances of such a macro-economic reality, even the strictest possible steps taken in order to restructure the economic mechanism would be insufficient to reduce the level of the inflationary pressure which exists in the national economy. Everything indicates this to be an economic-political task. The current financial situation is directly related to the characteristic structure of the national economy which developed in our country. Curiously enough, sectors, the exaggerated development of which is unrelated to social needs, constitute closed reproduction circles and work for their own sake.

Some departments try to interpret the objectively necessary task of accelerating socioeconomic development as accelerating the increased volume of output of their own commodities, which yield no results whatsoever. By adopting such a view the situation could become hopeless. We would have no possibility to maneuver and obtain additional resources. Ensuring a positive balance

in the state budget must become the strictest possible requirement if we wish to implement our reform and prevent suppressed inflation from turning into a galloping one.

**M. Sikula**, doctor of economic sciences, head of the department of economic sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences:

From the viewpoint of the Czechoslovak economy and its structure, we must substantially narrow its specialization. This, however, would result in further monopolizing. I believe that this problem should be solved by taking into consideration the situation of any given producer compared to the world market. If this would increase his competitiveness, it becomes more important than restricting his monopoly status.

**A. Cervinka**. In dealing with the problem of price setting on the basis of value, Marx reached the conclusion, in the third volume of "*Das Kapital*," that in determining production prices we must rely above all on capital transfusions. Supply and demand are unstable values which change in the course of scientific and technical development. They are influenced by the processes on the world markets.

Monopolies can bring certain positive and negative elements (for example, the monopoly status has been all too frequently abused). Unfortunately, we have not asked how to prevent the appearance of negative monopoly trends and how to fight them. This is a difficult problem.

I remember that in 1982, in Czechoslovakia we formulated the idea of organizing a "network of various forms of consumer services." In addition to the already existing state organizations, we were planning the extensive involvement of individuals in such services. I must point out that the idea met with violent opposition although the CZCP Central Committee had approved it with a resolution. There were those who were not all that willing to part with their monopoly status in providing services.

**V. Starodubrovskiy**. Let us note that the problem of objectivizing economic instruments is not simply a question of methods for defining such instruments but also of developing the economy itself. If the economy can ensure the convertibility of currency on any market and, thereby, the convertibility of its own commodities, everything indicates that in this case requirements concerning price setting will change as well. Priority will be given to ensuring price uniformity oriented toward the world market and balancing prices, taking both domestic and the world markets into consideration. With such a level of economic development the combination of conflicting requirements concerning price setting would become possible.

If prices are oriented toward supply and demand and if we ensure the type of balancing price oriented toward the domestic market, the contradiction between the two production costs appears. One production becomes oriented toward the domestic and the other toward the foreign market. The task of achieving a high technical standard of output is only part of the problem. It is important to come out on the world market with suitable technical and economic indicators and to ensure production efficiency, so that the cost of output may not exceed the one prevailing on the world market.

The orientation of prices toward the domestic market could lead to the fact that the incentive system will operate in the sense of lowering production costs and improving the situation but not at the pace needed for exporting on the world markets. Therefore, the question of the orientation toward world prices remains. The problem is how to combine these two principles and how to ensure the conversion of the first to the second. I. Galuska considers as one of the ways to be temporary subsidies, and so on. Clearly, there are no alternatives here. It is impossible immediately to adopt world market prices. The problem of ensuring the balancing of the market within the country, while maintaining an orientation toward world prices is objectively conflicting and the ways applied to the different groups of commodities will obviously vary.

**F. Valenta**. Indeed, a contradiction between balanced prices on the domestic market and their correlation with world prices does exist. However, it is precisely with this that we must begin. The balanced prices on the domestic market will create a qualitatively different situation which will help to bring our prices closer to world prices. With the current type of prices such a possibility is unrealistic. Restructuring the price setting mechanism and specifically setting prices for new commodities is inevitable. Such prices must be balanced for the domestic market. Obviously, as of now setting prices on the basis of contracts between producers and consumers is realistic.

What conditions must be set within the economic mechanism so that balancing prices can be considered normal for the economy? The outlay mechanism continues to function in our country, under which the individual worker earns more by using more materials, while the enterprise shows high profitability by increasing its production costs.

We hope that with the introduction of enterprise self-financing we shall be able to put an end to the outlay approach. This will require substantial changes in planning methodology. The point is that in the structure of both state and enterprise plans there are elements which could prevent price balancing from becoming natural in our economy.

**I. Dvorak.** I agree that we must gradually convert to balancing prices and that there is a contradiction between domestic balancing prices and price fluctuations on the world market. Prices on the world market reflect the conditions governing the production and marketing of goods abroad which, as a rule, are substantially different from ours. Therefore, the structuring of our internal price fluctuations in terms of changes on the world market should in no case be mechanical.

**O. Latsis.** We want to change the fundamental incentive for production activities, so that the interests of the enterprises may replace administrative instructions and orders. However, considering the existing economic atmosphere, the interest of the enterprise operates very weakly and our new economic mechanism will not function like a motor. The producer's rather than the consumer's market is retained, i.e., the monopoly status of the producer. This status does not depend on the number of enterprises which produce commodities for the market. Even if many of them exist, combined they are monopolists, for the goods remain in short supply and the consumer is ready to buy anything he can find, any defective item, at any price, as long as it is sold to him. It is this that we must surmount.

Competition must be developed within the entire CEMA market as well. However, there is no CEMA market and it cannot be developed as long as there are no markets within the individual countries in which the master is the consumer and not the supplier.

The question of a balancing price is related to the problems of the market. I believe that the economists in our country are greatly to be blamed for the fact that in their time they convinced one another, the political leadership and the consumer at large that the balancing price is some kind of market evil. They created the false concept that abandoning it would give some advantages to the consumer, the low-income one in particular. This is not true, no advantages exist such as to benefit the individual consumer by rejecting balancing prices, and nor do they exist in relations among enterprises. Today this dogma has been greatly weakened without, however, having been eliminated. We must convince once and for all both economists and the broad public in our countries that a price which does not provide a balance is simply not a price.

**L. Abalkin.** It seems to me, that when we speak of objectivizing value instruments and prices we must proceed from the following three aspects:

First. There is no socialist economy without commodity production. Commodity production and its corresponding turnover are inherent in socialism. Second. The socialist enterprises are socialist commodity producers. Third. The socialist market is a normal, a natural and a legitimate form of ties inherent in the socialist economy.

Now as to the relatively difficult problem of price increases. Here we should distinguish between two approaches. On the one hand, the concept of a socialist economy existing on paper and, on the other, the one which exists in real life. According to our estimates, in the Soviet Union 60 percent of the increase in retail trade and one-third of the increase in capital investments are related to price increases. In this connection, I would like to emphasize that the price reform is possible only within the framework of a single, integral, comprehensive restructuring of the entire commodity-monetary economy of the country. Can we normalize prices without solving the problem of credits? Today it has not been objectivized anymore than the problem of prices. It is of a formal nature and essentially cannot be described as credit. We cannot normalize prices without solving the problem of the efficiency of the banking system and seeing to it that banking operations are performed by cost accounting organizations only.

No balancing of prices will ever stimulate greater output if we retain the existing system of material and technical procurements and unless we convert to the wholesale trade in means of production totally, i.e., unless we apply the specific market forms for the distribution and exchange of means of production.

In conclusion, let me ask the following rhetorical question: Could there be a non-deficit budget with the help of which 70 percent of the country's national income is distributed? In principle, could such a budget be consistent with intensive economic development? If not, then could we restructure this entire monetary mechanism without radically changing the load on the budget and its participation in the distribution of the national income? If we leave all this as it is, there will be no budget without deficit and with such a budget credit cannot become normalized. With the lack of normal credit, the monetary system will not be rebuilt and whatever prices we may set they will not be consistent with contemporary requirements.

**I. Galuska.** Let us consider this last remark by Academician L.I. Abalkin. I believe that it is insufficient merely to eliminate price deformations while retaining deformations in the credit, financial and other components of the economic mechanism. Along this way too we can find ourselves in a vicious circle and be unable to break it.

We are unanimous in the belief that it is necessary to create balancing prices. This must be done during the first stage of restructuring, for the question assumes a political nature. We must explain the reason for which the use of a market mechanism is inevitable. Clearly, this is because an outlay price can never be converted into a balancing price and will remain a constant obstruction in the elimination of deformations in value instruments. The question is how to convert to balancing prices and how to make use of external prices, for this conversion involves certain dangers, as confirmed by the Yugoslav, Polish and Hungarian experience.

### **CEMA: Integration Does Not Tolerate Dogmatism**

**M. Sikula.** The restructuring of the national economic mechanisms of our countries is a necessary prerequisite for establishing the new mechanism of socialist economic integration. Unfortunately, the efficiency of the international division of labor is still not in the center of economic interests of the participants in the socialist integration process.

The task of developing direct relations was formulated for the first time in the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration, which was adopted in 1971. However, no substantial progress was made in its implementation. It seems to me that the reasons for this are that no real economic autonomy was established within the national economies, and the cost accounting entities were unable to establish direct cooperation relations on an international scale.

The separation and isolation of the internal reproduction processes from the area of foreign economic relations within the framework of the national economy, as we know, are a major obstacle to their optimizing. In my view, the same thing occurs in the process of rapprochement among the national economic mechanisms. They must come closer to each other not only along the line of so-called contact blocks of foreign relations. The rapprochement among them must take place in all areas.

**O. Latsis.** Unfortunately, so far there have been no radical changes for the better in our cooperation within CEMA. As we know, as early as the 1970s, the development of integration encountered so-called structural barriers and the imperfect structure of our trade, the basis of which remains, on the one hand, primarily raw materials and power carriers and, on the other, essentially processing industry goods, those of the machine-building industry above all. Such a structure which, in its time, played a positive role can no longer serve as a factor of growth today. Within the framework of the old cooperation mechanism, however, it cannot be surmounted.

I support the idea expressed by M. Sikula to the effect that it is insufficient merely to call for a rapprochement among foreign economic blocks. We must also mention a rapprochement among the very foundations of our economic mechanisms. Naturally, it is a question not of their unification but of their uniform restructuring in order to meet the common goal, which is to stimulate reciprocal trade. Our enterprises are not interested in working even for the domestic market, and are even less interested in working for the more demanding foreign market, for it is the state that appropriates all benefits derived from such work. We must change the very foundations of the economic mechanism, but in such a way that the enterprises would struggle for increasing their markets, both domestic and foreign, for in the final account this should be one and the same in their case. In the past 3 years much more has been done in the Soviet Union in this direction compared to the preceding

decade. As a result, for the first time after a long pause there has been an increase in exports by our machine-building industry. A tremendous amount of work lies ahead. After losing the needed skills in terms of production and marketing, the ability to work with the market, trading for 1 or 2 years is a short period of time compared to a neglect which lasted decades. The positive changes which have taken place in the structure of our exports confirm that we are following the right way.

**Z. Gaba.** Why are we unable to organize more efficient cooperation within CEMA despite the fact that everyone is interested in this? What are the reasons for the difficulties? It seems to me that they are related to the existing concept of socialist ownership. We cannot even conceive of state ownership being as flexible as private ownership. Capital knows no border yet under state ownership such borders exist and are very difficult to cross. The result is the appearance of serious problems if one socialist country would like to invest funds in another. A similar situation prevails in manpower transfers. In our countries, in frequent cases rational economic steps encounter obstacles of a superstructural nature. I believe that problems of state-national ownership require essentially different approaches in order to lift the barriers which arise on the way to socialist integration.

For the time being, we quite frequently support integration with the help of various administrative-coercive instruments. For example, what kind of efficiency of direct relations could there be a question of if the cooperating plants are 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers away from each other. The benefits of their cooperation would cover no more than transportation costs!

Another obstacle on the way to socialist integration is the fact that we ignore the universal laws of integration which are the same for the capitalist and the socialist system. I am referring to the difficulty of integration processes between developed and less developed countries. We know from EEC practices that essentially the less developed countries can only support integration processes but cannot actively participate in them, for any artificially active "integration" becomes unprofitable not only to them but also to the developed countries. We pretended that this law does not apply to socialist integration. Let me make another remark pertaining to internationalism and, specifically, the mutual aid among socialist countries. We sometimes provide assistance which has a short-term beneficial effect to one country or another but which turns into loss in the long term. Let us take the question of Soviet petroleum. The low price at which it was sold to the socialist countries led to errors in energy conservation policy. I believe that the aid which the fraternal countries must give to each other should not be a kind of charity. Aid must be based on rational economic considerations on either side.

**V. Starodubrovskiy.** In my view, possibilities of further development of cooperation among CEMA members and the mechanism of such cooperation are tied, first of



all, to the development of the internal economic mechanisms and the domestic markets of these countries; second, to the forming of a common, a united market and, third, a rapprochement among economic mechanisms not only in terms of foreign economic relations but on a more profound level as well. Whereas previously the idea of a rapprochement among the structures of such mechanisms appeared like an abstract idea, today, when we are converting basic relations to direct cooperation, this is becoming a vital necessity. For example, in the European CEMA countries prices of raw materials and fuel are close to world prices whereas within the USSR they are oriented toward internal costs, regardless of the leasing factor, regardless of the assessment of the land, etc. As a result, any semi-finished products which the Soviet enterprises receive from CEMA countries will be more expensive than similar goods they procure within the framework of cooperation within our country. Such an artificially created disparity is beginning today to narrow the area of mutually efficient cooperation options.

**I. Galuska.** The statements made by Z. Gaba and V.G. Starodubrovskiy have raised in my mind a number of basic questions. Why is it that joint enterprises based on capitalist and socialist ownership work better than joint associations based on socialist ownership alone? Why is it that the distance of 4,000 kilometers between enterprises could make doubtful the results of their cooperation, while the 12,000 kilometers separating enterprises (such as between companies in the FRG and Japan) do not result in catastrophic transportation costs and cooperation between them develops successfully? Yet, at CEMA sessions, virtually every since it was established, in one way or another we have been saying that we must begin by solving certain problems within the national mechanisms and only then organize a joint mechanism, after which cooperation will be able to develop. Has the rich "experience" of joint enterprises not shown "achievements" over long periods of time in this respect? In short, our cooperation will not advance as long as we do not examine the roots of existing theoretical problems and difficulties in specific practical activities and fail to distinguish between reasons and consequences.

One such basic problem, which determines the successful functioning of the mechanism of cooperation is that of prices and foreign exchange relations. In the course of our debate we already mentioned the difficulties which arise in organizing cooperation relations, caused by the lack of economic interconnection of prices. A similar situation prevails with foreign exchange rates. Czechoslovakia has two foreign exchange coefficients (the USSR has substantially more): one for the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and the second for the capitalist countries, i.e., in the area of the dollar. These exchange coefficients are different. The correlation between them is approximately 1:2, in the directly opposite trend compared to the rate of exchange between the ruble and the dollar. In determining the economic

advantage of any kind of deal with the USSR, the triple recomputation of foreign exchange rates leads to comical results. As a result, the economic interest is extremely difficult to achieve and becomes more an accident than a pattern. In short, the foreign exchange problems related to prices require an immediate solution, for in the long term this could turn into losses reaching into the billions.

Unless we are able to prove to the entire world that socialism can achieve true integration and international division of labor we shall be unable to create the necessary prerequisites for the establishment of a joint socialist market. This could have major not only economic but also political consequences. Our discussion is essentially one of the events in the struggle for the renovation of socialism.

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### Self-Development Mechanisms in Contemporary Capitalism

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[Text]

1

One of the most important trends in the Marxist analysis of the contemporary world is defined by the following question: What is capitalism today? Today the gap between the specific available knowledge and the theoretical interpretation of the nature and scale of the changes experienced by the capitalist social system in recent decades has become entirely clear. A quest is under way for new methodological approaches, and new scientific hypotheses are being formulated. In particular, the article by Ye. Primakov "Capitalism in an Interrelated World" (KOMMUNIST No 13, 1987) formulates the important theoretical problem of "changing the mechanism of self-development of the capitalist system." In our view, the study of this problem provides a key to understanding the evolvement experienced by capitalism in the course of the 20th century.

To begin with, let me express a few general considerations. The first pertains to the familiar thesis of the production method as being the dialectical unity of production forces and production relations. Its classical interpretation is that at each stage in the development of production forces there is a corresponding specific form of production relations.

However, the 20th century proved that the inviolability of said interconnection is very relative. Capitalism and socialism coexist and are developing on the same material and technical foundations. The range of conditions of production forces on the basis of which capitalist production relations can develop and, therefore, the possibility of changes in the latter proved to be much broader than was thought in the past.

Naturally, the question arises as to what should then be understood by the "maturity of material prerequisites" for the conversion from capitalism to socialism. The existence of such prerequisites were mentioned by the Marxists as early as the end of the 19th century and, even more so, after October 1917, who assumed that the decisive reason for the delay of socialist revolutions in the capitalist centers was the lack of maturity of subjective prerequisites. However, as historical experience indicated, the situation was both different and more complex. Naturally, the formula of "maturity of material prerequisites" has its place. It implies the type of socialization of capitalist production in which objectively the possibility of its socialist reorganization appears. However, this does not mean that the development of the capitalist economic system finds itself into an impasse. In other words, the maturity of the objective prerequisites is not a short-time situation but an entire historical period in the course of which both production methods can function on a given material and technical base.

If such is the case, the problem of conversion from capitalist to socialism (in the presence of material prerequisites to this effect) cannot be reduced at all to the "maturity" or "backwardness" of the subjective factor. Theoretically, such a transition can be caused either by an extreme situation in which a national crisis arises within a given country (or group of countries), caused by specific reasons, and the entire system of social relations collapses, or else the actual results in the global competition between the two systems, having provided clear proof of the advantages of socialism, have motivated a capitalist society to switch to an alternate system. Examples of the first situation are October 1917 in Russia and the people's democratic and socialist revolutions after World War II. For the time being, the second situation is only potential.

In connection with this interpretation, yet another question arises: How accurate is the idea, popular in Marxist publications, according to which with the aggravation of capitalist contradictions the possibilities of eliminating them within the capitalist system become increasingly smaller. Actually, it proceeds from the assumption that the possible evolution of capitalism is a constant. In reality, such is not the case.

Actually, the possibilities of the development of the capitalist system did not narrow but expanded in the course of time. This is confirmed by a simple comparison between the capitalism of the beginning and the end of the 20th century, for instance. However critically we

may have accessed state control of the economy and the condition of the social infrastructure or contemporary forms of political democracy in the developed capitalist countries, all of these were new realities which did not fit capitalism as it was a hundred or even 50 years ago.

Nonetheless, capitalism was able to "master" them in the course of its lengthy evolution. This evolution was by no means peaceful. Conversely, it was accompanied by "tempests and storms." Consequently, the first and main task in research is to determine the way in which capitalism was able to accomplish this. Traditionally, the Marxists focused their main attention on the study of the intensification of contradictions within capitalism and the shaping of prerequisites for the revolutionary reorganization of society on a socialist basis. Like any society, however, capitalism would not have existed even a single day had it not had some "self-regulatory" "built-in" mechanisms through which periodically accumulating contradictions can be dealt with, and new crises resolved.

Actually, what type of mechanisms are we referring to? First, the market mechanism, which regulates capitalist production. Second, the class struggle between labor and capital, which stems from production relations, and which regulates the most important proportions in public reproduction. Third, the state, which regulates social relations as a whole, based on the task of protecting and strengthening the existing order. Fourth, the mechanism of ideological influences, the purpose of which is to control the sociopsychological climate in society. Such mechanisms do not remain unchanged. Their ability to develop and the expanding range of adaptations of the social system to changing circumstances were, precisely, the factors which made it possible to speak of the "self-development" of capitalism and which are the meaning, the essence of this concept.

## 2

If we consider the history of capitalism in the first half of the 20th century, we are bound to notice that it was distinguished by profound contradictions and upheavals which frequently questioned its very existence. The gravest possible economic and political crises, the revolutionary actions of the proletariat, fascism and two world wars were an uninterrupted chain of such events which were considered by the Marxists as proof of the total groundlessness of capitalism and the threshold of its end. Even if we abstract ourselves from the specific historical circumstances which led to the dogmatizing and stagnation of Marxist thinking in the 1930s and 1940s, we must acknowledge that reality provided a number of reasons for such an evaluation.

It is only now, armed with the experience of the postwar decades, that we can draw a different conclusion, namely: the period from the end of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century proved to be a transitional period in the dynamics of the capitalist system. If we try

to formulate briefly the main difference between the "old" capitalism, analyzed in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, and the contemporary "new" capitalism, in our view, it consists of a conversion from one type of development, defined by the initially inherent and spontaneously operating mechanisms, to another type—controlled development. Naturally, neither the previous spontaneous nor the present controlled factors must be absolutized. However, we can speak with full justification of the predominance of the former type in the past and the latter type in the postwar decades.

As a rule, the Marxist analysis of a social system begins with its economic base. In this case, however, it would be expedient to change the analytical procedure. This logically stems from the preceding thesis of the changed nature in the development of capitalism. The production method determines the dynamics of all forms of social activities. However, it determines it only "in the final account," for politics, law and ideology have their own relatively autonomous dynamics and have an inverse influence on the economic base. What is the role of this influence in the transition to controlled capitalist development? And what is, specifically, the role of ideology?

We are familiar with Marx's statement about ideas which become a "material force," as pertaining not only to revolutionary ideas which activate not only the toiling masses but also ideology in general. This statement is directly related to the period of the 1930s-1940s, which became a turning point in the interpretation of the dramatic and, frequently, tragic experience of the capitalist system in the initial decades of the 20th century. We would hardly exaggerate by saying that this experience played the role of "shock therapy" for the ruling class and the entire society. Efforts to find an answer to the questions triggered by this "shock" were made on the ideological and political levels. Obviously, the trend toward a critical interpretation of one's own experience is a characteristic feature of any society which has entered (or is entering) its period of maturity. If such is the case, in capitalist society this trend became dominant precisely during that period. Metaphorically speaking, a kind of mechanism of "self-knowledge" and "self-instruction" of capitalism developed, although, naturally, they had been prepared by the preceding developments of bourgeois social thinking.

The intensiveness of the functioning of this mechanism in the 1930s-1950s was unprecedented. The simple enumeration of new or substantially renovated theories and concepts would cover many pages: Keynesianism, neo-classical synthesis, the theory of the industrial society, the "social market economy," "mixed economy," "managerial revolution," "welfare state," new modifications of the theory of social stratification and conflict, institutionalization, "human relations," and so on, and so forth.

In Soviet literature dealing with such concepts, usually everything was reduced to criticizing their ideological and social nature, sometimes ably and sometimes quite

crudely. In both cases, however, as a rule what was ignored was their pragmatic content and their purpose, which was to solve the practical problems of society. As a whole, despite the entire variety of theoretical developments and, frequently, their mutual exclusivity, the dominant trend was that of seeking ways for the evolutionary development of capitalism, proving the need for economic and social balance, control of social processes on the basis of a stable growth of output, social compromise and ideological and political pluralism. It was on the basis of this conceptual foundation and in accordance with the practical scientific recommendations that the regulatory mechanisms of the capitalist system were corrected.

Whereas the profound economic and political crisis in capitalism provided an impetus to seek a solution, what were the objective economic prerequisites for restructuring the mechanisms aimed at stimulating and controlling the dynamics of the capitalist system?

Let us include among the material prerequisites, above all, the production process itself and its technical standard and scale, as well as the tremendous potential of knowledge acquired by mankind. The consideration of production forces as public property, on this basis, became both necessary and practically possible. The question, however, was whether this was compatible with capitalist production relations. The experience of our century proved that such relations can evolve to the extent to which this is made possible by the functioning of the capitalist economic system. Specifically, this was manifested in the dissemination of various types of share holding (associated) form of capitalist ownership and partial nationalization of the economy.

Let us particularly note on this level the significance of stock ownership as a form of production socialization consistent with developed capitalism. The assertion of this form of capitalist ownership created prerequisites for expanding micro- and macroeconomic regulation, both material (the organization of big corporations as the main unit of the economic system), as well as the sociopsychological, organizational-technical and ideological (separating the ownership of capital from production management functions, the appearance of a separate managerial stratum, and improvements in management theory and practice).

However, despite the great significance of these factors, the restructuring of the mechanisms for the self-development of capitalism would have been impossible without the necessary social and political prerequisites. Said aspect of the problem is of essential importance. As we know, capital is a social relation. The confrontation between the capitalist and the working class is a social form of manifestation of the given production method. This is axiomatic. However, it does not logically follow, as confirmed by actual historical experience, that it is not economic but social disproportions that present the greatest threats to the capitalist system, and that the

greatest stress appears in the realm of social and political relations which originate the most powerful influence on the entire system of the mechanisms of capitalism "self-regulation."

A determining factor in the appearance of the new sociopolitical prerequisites for evolution within the system was, in our view, the changed balance of forces in the struggle between labor and capital. Its main socio-economic result was the growth of the historical or moral component of the value of manpower, reflecting the historical trend of "increased level of needs" of the working people. In our view, the qualitative shift toward a relative balance of power between labor and capital took place after World War II.

Without changing the social nature of capitalist accumulations, the process influenced the existing production method in at least two directions: first, it is precisely this process that is the foundation of the long-term trend toward gradually replacing labor intensive technologies, oriented toward the wide use of relatively inexpensive manpower, to labor-saving and capital-intensive technologies, based on scientific and technical progress. Second, the increased value and cost of manpower, as one of the essential factors in increasing the capacity of the domestic market. This applies to both purely quantitative and qualitative changes. A new way of life developed with much higher and varied standards which were adopted by the majority of the population.

It must be stipulated, however, that this process cannot be assessed only as the result of the economic struggle between labor and capital. In considering some phenomena from class-oriented positions, occasionally we forget the development of society as a whole, based on the attained level of civilization (morality, culture, education, availability and use of leisure time, etc.). This as well contributed to the shaping of the new way of life and, as a consequence, to easing the disproportion between production and consumption, which is inherent in capitalism.

Finally, new political prerequisites developed. In the past 150 years the struggle waged by the working class in the capitalist countries changed from a spontaneous process to a stable organized movement; the state was forced to accept the legalization of the struggle waged by the working people, their trade unions and their political parties, and the introduction of universal suffrage. Despite all differences in the forms and pace of this process in the individual countries, the qualitative change in the correlation among political forces was largely prepared by the struggle waged by the working class in the period between the wars and under the direct influence of the October Revolution. However, it was only after World War II that very stable political conditions developed for the organized working people to exert a steady influence on social development.

3

The prerequisites we mentioned determined the nature of the change in the mechanisms of capitalist self-development. Its key trends can be defined as follows:

Maintaining the efficiency of the capitalist market while, at the same time, controlling the economic and socio-economic disproportions appearing within it;

Strengthening the system of capitalist exploitation while, at the same time, controlling relations between capital and labor, taking into consideration the requirements of manpower reproduction and the need for a favorable social climate at work;

Ensuring the political stability of capitalist society by flexibly controlling social contradictions through compromises and within the framework of bourgeois-parliamentary democracy.

It should be stipulated that in Western Europe and, partially, Japan, the reformist labor movement proclaimed as its objective the conversion of capitalism into a society of "democratic socialism," while the left-wing of the labor movement, represented above all by the communist organizations, rejecting reformism, called for a revolutionary conversion from capitalism to socialism. However, these objectives remained unrealized. Therefore, the labor movement, including its left-wing, which successfully promoted a number of progressive social changes, nonetheless objectively contributed to the renovation of the mechanisms of capitalist self-development.

How was this renovation manifested, and what did it yield?

The capitalism of the age of free competition had only one regulatory instrument—the market. Its comprehensive role is universally known. As the "motor" of the capitalist economy, the market also generated a trend toward its obstruction; as a controlling agent, it essentially corrected itself and the results of its previous chaotic activities. Today the system for controlling the capitalist economy includes several mechanisms: the market, production management on the company level, state control and, finally, international coordination of economic policy. We feel that this system has been studied by Soviet economists much better than a number of other important problems of contemporary capitalism, for which reason we shall limit ourselves to mentioning only a few relevant considerations.

Let us mention, first of all, the correlation between competition and the monopolies. The impression develops that compared with the first decades of the 20th century the obstructing influence of monopolization on the dynamics of production forces has declined. Obviously, this was the result of the combined influence of several factors, above all those based on the very nature

of the economic system of capitalist ownership. Competition remains the basic feature of this system, and a trend toward monopolization is only partially successful. Petty and medium-scale enterprise has proved its exceptional flexibility. Furthermore, the purposeful state policy of supporting competition, which was expanded after World War II through coordinated measures on the international level, played an essential role. Finally, the intensive process of internationalization of the capitalist economy stimulated competition.

The second question is that of the correlation and interconnection among the different types of economic control. The concept of "state-monopoly control" was established in Marxist publications a long time ago. It gave the impression of the existence of some kind of uniform, internally integral, system. In reality, such is not the case. There are two independent types of control: on the company and state levels. Naturally, their essential purpose is the same. However, beyond that community of interests, they are autonomous, not only from the viewpoint of the subjects and the areas of control but also in terms of criteria, specific tasks, and instruments.

"Trust planning" developed on the grounds of the capitalist socialization of production and is totally subordinate to the incentives and criteria of economic management on the capitalist market. Briefly, its objective is to maximize profits on the basis of the most efficient organization of production and marketing. Thanks to the combined power of modern corporations, the multinational above all, with their tremendous management experience acquired over many decades, this type of capitalist production control has reached a high level of efficiency.

What remains, however, is the question of how this efficiency is correlated with the functioning of the capitalist market as a whole. Obviously, in this case we must distinguish between two aspects: the immediate and the more distant consequences of improvements in the production management system on the corporate level. The efficiency of these systems is the result of the summation of tremendous practical experience. Not so long ago, in addition to everything else, this was helped by the radical renovation of the technical base and the method for gathering, processing and spreading economic information. That is why, in the short-term, contemporary control of production on the company level contributes to streamlining the capitalist market and not to its disorganization. However, the long-term consequences of such control remained outside the realm of interests and control of private business. The reaction of the capitalist market was the outbreak of a series of crises in the 1970s and 1980s.

State control is an even more complex phenomenon. It is heterogeneous in terms of its origins and motive forces, conflicting in terms of its tasks and varied in terms of methods and instruments. As to origins, they include the needs of the capitalist production method (reducing

cyclical fluctuations, developing the economic infrastructure, assisting scientific and technical progress and the structural reorganization of the economy), the requirements of the state itself (militarization, maintaining an overinflated state apparatus) as well as the need to maintain sociopolitical stability (easing the gravest social disproportions and developing the social infrastructure).

The result is that different classes and social strata become interested in the exercise of the various functions of state control. Equally clear is the fact that the state must be guided not only by the criteria of private interest and capitalist profitability but also of social requirements, which by no means agree with market principles. Finally, it is obvious that the assessment itself of the efficiency of state control depends on which one of its functions is being applied and the social positions on the basis of which it is considered.

The limitations of this article allow us to express no more than a few general considerations concerning the existing system of mechanisms for controlling capitalist production. First, the correlation among the various priorities within the state control system is quite flexible; it is based on fluctuations in the economic situation and the balance of sociopolitical forces. Second, the system as a whole is not monolithic. Its basic components—the market mechanism, private capitalist management and state control—function on a relatively autonomous basis. Their correlation and interaction are also quite flexible, which makes the control system itself somewhat flexible. Third, this system is not only of a reciprocally complementary but also an internally conflicting nature. The more actively the state tries to achieve the optimal combination among regulatory mechanisms within the capitalist economy the stronger is the opposite trend toward their autonomy, the bearers of which are the big corporations.

The conversion of the state from a "guardian of order" to a comprehensive regulatory agent of economic and social processes is the most important structural change within the mechanisms of capitalist self-development. This motivates a return to the basic problem, which is the role of the state as the central link in the contemporary system of sociopolitical mechanisms which regulate the class struggle between hired labor and capital. Above all, let us recall Engels' thesis that in a society divided into "irreconcilable opposites," the state is a "force which stems from society but which puts itself above it, becoming increasingly alienated from it" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 21, p 170).

In our view, it is precisely this conclusion that is a key methodological concept which leads us to the study of the entire variety of specific relations between the state and society under capitalist conditions. Both the class nature of the state and its relative autonomy can be explained within the framework of this approach.

In the period between the wars the political history of capitalism proved the existence of a growing variety of relations between the state and a class-oriented society. However, the main line of the evolution nonetheless remained the establishment of a widespread system of institutions regulating sociopolitical relations within the framework of representative democracy, with an orientation by the state toward essentially implementing the functions of an "arbitrator."

The system of sociopolitical mechanisms in contemporary capitalism includes several basic components: institutionalized forms of the socioeconomic struggle and sociopolitical life, the democratic institutions of the state, established on the basis of universal suffrage, and the state in the traditional meaning of the term, i.e., as a special power system of laws, control and coercion.

The creation and functioning of this system became possible thanks to the changes in political ideologies both within the ruling class and most organizations of the working class, from an inflexible attitude toward social compromise and from total confrontation to partial consensus. The new approach of the capitalist class is based on an awareness of historical experience indicating that the capitalist system is threatened with collapse precisely whenever and wherever its stressed system of sociopolitical mechanisms collapses.

The evolution of the labor movement toward sociopolitical compromise was the result not only of subjective reasons (the traditions of reformism, bureaucratization of some of the leadership, etc.) but of objective factors as well. One of them was the successes themselves achieved by the labor movement. As the gains of the working people increased, the question of the "price" of changes and the "cost" of revolutionary or reformist methods of restructuring society assumed increasing practical significance. In virtually all developed capitalist countries the majority of the labor movement chose the strategy of social compromise as being "less painful" and less "costly."

The experience of building socialism in the USSR was another argument in favor of such a choice. With the decisive role they played in the defeat of German fascism, the Soviet people made a tremendous contribution to the powerful democratic upsurge in the European countries. However, the very practice of building socialism in the USSR with features such as coerced collectivization, the mass repressions of the 1930s, and so on, was rejected by the Western European labor movement and contributed to strengthening the positions of reformism.

Neither the strategy of social maneuvering, pursued by the capitalist class, nor reformism in its social democratic and trade union aspects, indicate the cessation of the class struggle, the more so since in virtually all developed capitalist countries an active left-wing of the labor movement remains. Relationships between labor and capital are more than anything else an interwoven

fabric of struggle and compromise: a struggle based on conflicting interests; a compromise, largely predetermined by the equalized correlation of forces.

Under those circumstances, extensive opportunities appeared for the state to assume the role of "independent umpire." Let us note that both the question of the extent of such independence, and the entire problem of relations between the state and society under contemporary capitalist conditions, are still awaiting a profound Marxist analysis free from primitive approach and dogmatic rhetoric.

Let us consider only one aspect only of this problem. The traditional concept which ruled unchallenged in Marxist literature in the past was that the working class is opposed to the alliance between the monopolies and the bourgeois state whose clearly defined task is that the ruling class formulates policy and the state executes it. Reality, however, is different. Naturally, the state is not a neutral force. It remains bourgeois as long as it defends and strengthens the legality of the capitalist ownership of means of production with all the consequences of this fact. However, it remains bourgeois also in the sense that it is to a much greater extent related to the economic ruling class and takes much more into consideration the priorities of the capitalist production method.

Nonetheless, as a result of actual sociopolitical conditions, the postwar domestic policy of the state in the developed capitalist countries remains the result of interaction among three basic forces: the bourgeoisie, the working class and the state itself which, in addition to everything else, is pursuing its own interests. The widespread system of institutions, called upon to regulate sociopolitical relations, proved capable promptly to react to fluctuations in the balance of such forces and to amortize periodic outbreaks of tension in society.

#### 4

What follows from this analysis is that in the postwar period an essentially new system for controlling social processes under capitalist conditions developed, which makes it possible periodically to "remove" accumulated contradictions. This system is distinguished by a variety of mechanisms, ways, means and methods and the existence of a number of crisscrossing ties among them. The key object of its functioning is to maintain the necessary flexibility and maneuverability and to surmount the tendency toward ossification, which is inherent in any system. That is precisely why the main line in the search of ways to improve it is that of ensuring the balance between the increased regulatory role of the state and the other autonomously acting mechanisms of capitalist "self-adjustment."

The totality of the changes which have taken place is so significant that we can justifiably speak of a qualitatively new stage in the development of capitalism in the second half of this century.

This author has deliberately avoided to speak of a "stage" or "phase" in order not to go back to the perhaps useful but nonetheless somewhat scholastic argument on the correlation between said terms, which periodically broke out in the 1960s and 1970s. The question of stages is now ready for discussion, for it is clear that the evolution of capitalism has followed a path different from what was thought by the turn of the century. The historical process does not resemble the extremely deterministic structure which, in some of our social science textbooks, resembled teleology. In other words, this process contains a potential of choices, which are made during crucial moments of social development. Obviously, it is precisely on the basis of such views that we should approach the classification of capitalism into periods, taking into consideration the historical experience of this end of century.

It is from this viewpoint that the question raised by V. Medvedev in the article "The Great October and the Contemporary World" (KOMMUNIST No 2, 1988 p 6) is entirely legitimate: Has the concept of monopoly capitalism "as some form of modification of classical 19th century capitalism" "clashed with the real state of affairs," and is the former an "adequate form of the capitalist production method?" In our view, the answer can be only affirmative. Nonetheless, we would like to express a few additional considerations on this subject. To begin with, "classical capitalism" was not consistent with the capitalist production method of the 19th century. Second, in both cases such consistency must not be interpreted as absolute. Its relative and partial nature was a prerequisite for the development of the production method. Third, not only is monopoly capitalism qualitatively distinct from premonopoly capitalism but, as we already said, it is also distinct from monopoly capitalism of the first decades of the 20th century.

The question of stages has its terminological aspect as well. Usually our publications describe contemporary capitalism as "state-monopoly" capitalism. However, does this concept fully reflect present-day realities? Does it not imply that competition is no longer a basic feature of the capitalist economic system? Generally speaking, what does this definition mean: Is it a contemporary stage in the development of the production method or a social system as a whole? Finally, does this not ignore the quality changes in the economic base and the social and political structure of society, determined by the evolution of the entire set of mechanisms of capitalism self-development, reflecting the processes of the gradual conversion of its basic features into their opposites? The posing of such questions is quite timely.

To a great extent they are related to the study of the immediate prospects of capitalism. In the postwar decades capitalism experienced two different periods: the first was from the end of the war to the start of the 1970s; it lasted some 30 years; the start of the second, which is still current, was proclaimed with the "petroleum shock" of 1973 and the economic crisis

which followed it. The regulatory system which we depicted was set up and practically tested during the first period. The significant economic and social results achieved by the developed capitalist countries during that period triggered moods of euphoria in the ruling circles and in bourgeois social science. These successes were ascribed to the system of regulatory mechanisms.

Possibly these moods were fed by the devastating criticism of state regulations, voiced later by many bourgeois economists and political experts, ranging from neoconservative to left-wing radical. However, the main reason for the criticism was the new reality—the drastic slowdown in the pace of economic growth, the aggravation of economic and social contradictions and the lack of readiness on the part of the recently developed system of regulatory mechanisms to solve the new problems which were destabilizing capitalism.

These are universally known problems. Rated according to the extent of their direct influence on the capitalist "self-regulating" mechanisms, let us name above all the qualitatively new standard of production internationalization, combined with major shifts in the international division of labor and the structural reorganization of the economy. The process of production internationalization, which became bogged down in the 1930s, developed with increasing intensiveness after World War II. At the same time, the establishment of international mechanisms was initiated, the purpose of which was to regulate it. Nonetheless, they remained a rather incomplete addition to the national systems of regulatory mechanisms oriented toward domestic processes.

Under these circumstances the contradiction between capitalist production forces and production relations appeared to shift to a global level and was manifested as a contradiction between the regulation of national economies and the uncontrolled development of the global capitalist economy. Its worst aspect was the uncontrollable widening gap between developed capitalism and the developing countries, and the hunger and poverty of hundreds of millions of people which formed a tremendous potential for social revolutions and for political coups d'etat, regional wars and international terrorism and, finally, a universal explosion from which the "rich" capitalist countries could not protect themselves. Capitalism faced the task not only of perfecting national regulatory systems but also the creation of a corresponding international system.

This is demanded by the growing degradation of the environment, which has already reached a critical level and is fraught with the danger of a catastrophe in the near future. Let us acknowledge that not only the capitalist but the socialist countries as well proved to be unprepared for this. The complexity of solving the ecological problem consists, in addition to everything else, of the fact that it presumes a radical revision of centuries-old practice of interrelationship between man

and nature. It is all the more necessary because the developed "third industrial revolution" presages a further greater pressure on the biosphere.

The current stage in scientific and technical progress created yet another grave problem determined by the latest reorganization of the economic and social structures within capitalist society. It is a question of the unprecedented use of labor-saving technologies, the revival of mass unemployment and the appearance of a new line of social division between the "society of two-thirds" which has entered a new stage of change, and the remaining third of the population, doomed to sporadic employment, and subject to extremely low living standards and moral degradation.

Finally, the main problem of our time—the prevention of nuclear war and ensuring lasting peace and security—has been reformulated. It is not a matter merely of the fact that it was "resolved" within the policy of "mutual guaranteed destruction," but the separation of the mechanism for solving it from the other mechanisms of capitalist self-development. Today the situation has changed radically. The unreliability of the old concepts and means of ensuring peace is becoming increasingly obvious and the continuation of the arms race is not only extremely burdensome but also incompatible with the solution of domestic social problems and, even more so, global problems, such as protecting the habitat or eliminating hunger and poverty in the developing countries.

The question of the way the system of capitalist regulatory mechanisms will react to the new problems should be the subject of a separate discussion. Therefore, I shall limit myself to some general considerations. It is clear that, for the time being, this system has not experienced any structural changes. Nonetheless, it is experiencing some stress and is changing.

The controlled evolution in the management of capitalist production can be seen more clearly. Despite the "crusade" which American neoconservatism and European neoliberals proclaimed against state regulation, its function and relative role have essentially remained unchanged. However, its methods were significantly corrected. A restructuring is also affecting private capitalist management, characterized by a trend toward production diversification, decentralization in decision-making, and so on. As a whole, a search is under way of new variants of the optimal combination of macroeconomic control and private enterprise autonomy.

The prospects for the evolution of sociopolitical mechanisms appears less clear, for their operational conditions appear threatened: the relatively stable balance of class forces and the strategy of social compromise, in the sense of the concept of the "welfare state" which is exhausting its possibilities, based on it.

The trends, forms and framework of the possible evolution of the system of the mechanisms governing the self-development of capitalism are not self-evident. Nonetheless, in our view, this system has a sufficient reserve of strength and, apparently, will maintain its basic features in the foreseeable future.

The basic problem of the evolution of the mechanisms of capitalist self-development is not a question of institutions, ways and means of control, but of its purposes and content. The key fact which determines the contemporary and future situation in the world is the irreversible interdependence of all countries and social systems. Not a single one of them can henceforth solve its problems without taking into consideration other countries, regions or social systems. The very existence of mankind is threatened. This has reformulated the question of the correlation of interests, the balance of contradictions and agreements, and struggle and cooperation. For that reason the concept of new political thinking is of the greatest possible importance not only in the restructuring of international relations but also in reassessing the internal policies of all countries regardless of their social system.

For the time being, the present system of capitalist regulatory mechanisms is aimed at its preservation and development. It cannot fail to react to the most pressing problems which face society and all mankind on the threshold of the year 2000, and will try to solve them in a capitalist fashion. However, that same system could operate differently. It is the product of the lengthy development of society and has accumulated a tremendous amount of practical experience and knowledge. Excluding some specifically capitalist forms, it could become an instrument for the socialist reorganization of production and society. The specific ways which may be followed in such a change will depend, in the final account, on the deployment of forces in the capitalist countries, the consolidation of the new democratic majority and the extent to which it can influence social processes in the interest of peace and social progress, and the ability of the ruling class to rise to a new level of political thinking. This will depend to a substantial extent on the course of restructuring and renovation of society in the socialist countries.

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#### **History of the October Revolution in Latest Publications**

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[Review by V. Startsev, doctor of historical sciences, professor, Leningrad]

[Text] So far, the sharp debates on the history of Soviet society, which have developed in recent years, have bypassed the period of the October Revolution. This is



not only a question of the fact that the main attention has been focused on the numerous "blank spots" in the events of the 1920s to the 1940s. By constantly turning to the October Revolution topics, as early as the 1960s our science undertook to recreate the historical truths of the revolution. Above all, the myth of Stalin's role as the "second leader" of the October Revolution was debunked and it was proved that although his activities were noticeable, they were by no means exceptional against the background of the work done by other members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.

Works written by historians of different generations, in which efforts were made objectively to interpret the course of all events which took place in 1917 in the capital and the localities, and to identify the main political stages, began increasingly to appear since the beginning of the 1960s. Essentially, the basic outline was earmarked of a concept of the history of revolutionary events closer to the complex political struggle of that unique time. Lenin's life and activities and role in the formulation of the plan for a socialist revolution in Russia, the internal party situation between March and October 1917 and the struggle on the possibility of an armed seizure of power by the bolsheviks all of them became the principal topics of a number of studies. The writings published at that time described the specific work done by the bolshevik organizations, the establishment and activities of soviets of worker and soldier deputies, the movement of soldiers' and peasants' committees and the hegemonistic role of the working class in the revolution. To a lesser extent studies were made of the counterrevolutionary camp but even there new material was introduced in its study. We consider interesting works written on the history of the February revolution, the April and July crises, the Kornilov movement and the October uprising in Petrograd and Moscow. As a whole, a significant stock of Soviet studies on the history of the Great October Revolution was created between 1962 and 1968. However, it is precisely the existence of this stock that today frequently creates the illusion that in this case "everything has already been told" and that "all is quiet on Mount Shipka." Yet this is hardly the situation. Extensive reserves for research remain in the area of party history. Furthermore, questions such as alternate development, role of the petite bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, and the domestic policies of the Provisional Government have not been studied in the least in the light of contemporary knowledge.

As time passed, the impetus obtained in the science of history as a result of the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses, dried out and the new winds blew rather in the opposite direction, which was far from creative. Starting with 1971 a deliberate obstruction of research was started and efforts were made to go back to depicting the country's socioeconomic history on the eve of the revolution and during its first months in terms of the vulgar sociological interpretations of the 1930s. The retreat from the scientific assessments developed in the

1960s was accompanied by the persecution of a number of talented scientists, "pro-worker" campaigns and bureaucratic administration. All of this inevitably affected the historiography of the October Revolution. The overall number of scientific works and publications declined and so did the influx of young people into the "dangerous" area of research. The consequences of this have still not been eliminated: they brought about a crisis and the actual breakdown of the school of study of the October Revolution in both Moscow and Leningrad. It is no accident that the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution yielded few new works and scientific names compared with the 50th. It is true that a number of major works were reissued but original research became fewer with every passing year. It was with such a legacy that we approached the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, celebrated already under the conditions of change, in an atmosphere of increased interest in domestic history, in an atmosphere of glasnost and democratization. How have these changes affected works on the history of the October Revolution? What has this literature reflected?

Let us begin with research dealing with the economic and political prerequisites of the revolutionary events in Russia in 1917. Let us note among them the collective work by Leningrad historians B.V. Ananich, R.Sh. Ganelin, B.B. Dubentsov, V.S. Dyakin and S.I. Potolov "*Krizis Samoderzhaviya v Rossii. 1895-1917*" [The Crisis of Autocracy in Russia, 1895-1917] (Nauka, Leningrad, 1984). This, in fact, is the first "civilian history" of our country of the period of the reign of Nicholas II, within which two of the three Russian revolutions took place. The authors make a comprehensive study of Russia's economic development and sociopolitical system at the turn of the 20th century and the years which followed. They study the economic policy of the government and all levels of the political superstructure. Finally, the eve of the 1905-1907 Russian Revolution, the revolution itself, its political consequences, and the growth of a new revolution during World War I have been properly and thoroughly described. Actually, this is the first time that the policy of the Russian ruling classes has been described in its full dimension. The reform of the 1905-1907 governmental system and the Stolypin agrarian reform are considered not briefly and not merely as "hasty little steps" leading to an inevitable revolution, but for their own sake, in the entire range of their content and multivariant possible consequences. This is a serious work in which the history of the country's political and economic development in the 22 years of the reign of Nicholas II was not made to fit the revolutionary events of 1917 but presented as a separate topic.

With the assertion of the principles of socialist pluralism, works are coming out which analyze the problems of the October Revolution from a variety of viewpoints. The monograph "*Rossiia Nakanune Velikikh Svershenyi. K Izucheniyu Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskikh Predposylok Velikoy Oktyabrskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Revolyutsii*" [Russia on the Eve of Great Accomplishments. On the

Study of the Socioeconomic Prerequisites for the Great October Socialist Revolution] (Nauka, Moscow, 1988) by V.I. Bovykin is a defense by the author of his previous viewpoint, emphasizing the maturity of material prerequisites for the proletarian revolution. However, unlike the 1970s, when such a viewpoint was prevalent and showed gross intolerance of opponents, which included the use of methods inadmissible on the level of scientific ethics, today it coexists with the so-called "new trend" developed by P.V. Volobuyev, the late K.N. Tarnovskiy and many other historians.

As to P.V. Volobuyev, he approaches the study of the prerequisites for the February and October Revolutions from an unusual aspect, the area where several sciences—history, philosophy and political economy—meet. The choice of ways of social development is an area of manifestation of the latest research of this scientist who is becoming increasingly involved with the study of philosophical categories and the depth of events of the 19th century and the contemporary world, a choice being made by many young societies and states. P.V. Volobuyev was able to describe the trend of his scientific research in the monograph "*Vybor Putey Obshchestvennogo Razvitiya: Teoriya, Istoriya, Sovremennost*" [Choice of Ways of Social Development: Theory, History, Contemporaneity] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1987). (A review of this book was published in KOMMUNIST No 17, 1987—editor.) The second and third chapters of his book, which deal with the way of Russia's development at the beginning of the 20th century and the study of the socialist alternatives following the victory of the bourgeois revolution and bourgeois social system in February 1917, are related to the topic of that survey. The author's conclusion concerning the overall problem appears fully substantiated: "Therefore, the historical choice—socialism or capitalism—definitively became part of Russian reality in 1917, reflecting two possible social developments which were antithetical in terms of their class content and trend. However, the possibility of Russia's conversion to socialism was suppressed by real facts such as material and technical and cultural backwardness, economic disorganization, insufficient strength of the proletariat with a clear predominance of petit bourgeois and peasant masses, not to mention the dogmatic concepts which were prevalent at that time among most socialists, to the effect that the West alone was prepared to open the gate to socialism" (p 153).

Two books among the historical publications which have come out in recent years trace the course of preparations for and making of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The first is based on extensive global all-Russian data, which includes the first months of the Soviet system; the second is based on material from the capital alone, which was the center of the revolution between February and November 1917. The first is "*Istoricheskiy Opyt Trekh Rossiyskikh Revolyutsiy*" [Historical Experience of the Three Russian Revolutions]. The third book "*Korennoy Povорот v Istorii Chelovechestva. Velikaya*

*Oktyabrskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Revolyutsiya*" [A Radical Turn in the History of Mankind. The Great October Socialist Revolution] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1987) was reviewed in KOMMUNIST (see No 16, 1987). The second, "*Piterskiye Rabochiye i Velikiy Oktyabr*" [The Workers of Petersburg and the Great October] (Nauka, Leningrad, 1987) describes the specific work done by the bolsheviks at Petrograd enterprises during the February revolution and the three political crises in 1917. In this work the opposition to Kornilov's mutiny is based on new factual data on the condition and political activities of the Petersburg proletariat, which was the main motive force of the socialist revolution. Being one of the authors of this book I shall not review it.

A popular essay on the struggle waged by the party for the masses and on preparations for and making the October armed uprising, entitled "*Revolyutsiya Proletarskaya, Revolyutsiya Narodnaya*" [Proletarian Revolution, People's Revolution] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1987) has been written by A.M. Sovokin. His works, written between the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1970s, introduced a great deal of new features in the then prevalent views. In particular, he analyzed the documents of the 13-14 July 1917 party conference in connection with Lenin's suggestion of deleting the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" His is the first study and dating of a group of Leninist manuscripts of the start and the first half of September 1917, in which the question was raised of returning, for a short while, to a possibly peaceful development of the revolution. A.M. Sovokin was the first to study a document related to Lenin's draft theses for the Sixth Party Congress, the recently discovered Leninist manuscript "Letter to the Comrades," of 16-17 October 1917. In his new books, based on his previous works, the author has tried to sum up the experience in party work among the masses throughout the country. However, in my view, his presentation of the Leninist plan for armed uprising, for example, follows the old method by suppressing the sharp differences which developed between Lenin and the majority of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee in the middle of September 1917 on the question of the expediency of the uprising and its timing. How long will historians leave this topic to the literary writers? In his play "On and On and On!" M. Shatrov dates these differences to 24 October. Actually, they broke out in mid-September 1917 and by 24 October they had already become settled. A.M. Sovokin, however, insists that the Central Committee and Lenin had adopted an extremely cautious attitude concerning the timing of the action (see p 221). Could anything be more caution than the fact that on 15 September the Central Committee decreed that nine out of the 10 copies of every letter written by Lenin be destroyed! In those letters Lenin called for starting the uprising immediately, i.e., during the proceedings of the democratic conference.

During the anniversary year a monograph was published by someone I believe to be one of our most interesting historians, L.M. Spirin: "*Rossiya 1917 God. Iz Istorii*

*Borby Politicheskikh Partiy*" [Russia 1917. From the History of the Struggle Among Political Parties] (Mysl, Moscow, 1987). This book is distinguished by its journalistic style and extensive amount of relatively unknown facts. It is a popular history of the multiparty system in Russia both before and after the February revolution. Nonetheless, even here we fail to see as yet efforts at acquiring a deeper understanding of the overall problems of the history of the revolutionary times, and the description of the party leaders is strictly consistent with the stipulations of the 1930s, with minor corrections made in the 1960s.

Let us also name monographs on specific problems of the history of events in 1917: G.L. Sobolev's "*Petrogradskiy Garnizon v Borbe za Pobedu Oktyabraya*" [The Petersburg Garrison in the Struggle for the Victory of the October Revolution] (Nauka, Leningrad, 1985), G.Z. Ioffe's "*Velikiy Oktyabr i Epilog Tsarizma*" [The Great October and the Epilogue of Tsarism] (Nauka, Moscow, 1987) and L.I. Semennikova's "*Partiya Bolshevikov vo Glave Oktyabrskogo Vooruzhennogo Vosstaniya (Sovremennaya Sovetskaya Istoriografiya)*" [The Bolshevik Party at the Head of the October Armed Uprising (Contemporary Soviet Historiography)] (Moscow, 1988). An interesting effort has been made with the creation of collective monographs ("*Velikiy Oktyabr i Zashchita Yego Zavoyevaniy*" [The Great October and the Defense of Its Gains], vols 1 and 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1987). Not every work can be mentioned in a small survey. Furthermore, one of our main tasks is an effort to determine where such research is going. Before doing so, however, let us say a few more words on popular editions of the history of the revolution, which have come out in recent years.

Let us mention among them the encyclopedia "*The Great October Socialist Revolution*". A "small encyclopedia," had already appeared under that title as early as 1967. It did not exceed 37 printer's sheets. It was quite an event! A great deal of the new features which were described as the rejection of the theory of the "two leaders" and a new look at the history of the October Revolution had been included in this booklet brimming with optimism. In 1977 a big encyclopedia, which contained more than 80 printer's sheets, came out. It had a better presentation and included color inserts and was externally more attractive than the first edition. Today we already have a third edition which is a thick volume of 120 printer's sheets. In terms of facts, it was tremendously increased with a large number of entirely new articles. Let us also note that the rules of glasnost have already been reflected in this book: There are brief biographies of L.D. Trotsky, G.Ye. Zinovyev and L.B. Kamenev. As a reference publication, naturally, this new encyclopedia is meeting its task. As to general and theoretical problems, it can only reflect, in my view, the average level of our historical science which had been reached by the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. The same aspiration to avoid sharp edges may be seen in the book "*Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya. Voprosy i*

*Otvety*" [The October Revolution. Questions and Answers], published by Politizdat in 1987, although we see among its authors noted historians such as Yu.I. Korablev, A.Ya. Grunt, G.Z. Ioffe, V.I. Miller and others. As an effort to put out a popular book on the October Revolution in a new form, naturally, this work can only be welcomed.

Let us particularly note three books aimed at the broadest possible reading masses, the purpose of which is to satisfy their growing interest in the events of the revolutionary period. The first is "*God 1917. Rossiya. Petrograd. Ocherki, Stati, Vospominaniya*" [1917. Russia. Petrograd. Essays, Articles, Recollections] (Sovetskii Pisatel, Moscow-Leningrad, 1987). The book describes in an artistic-documentary form, step by step, the development of revolutionary events between February and October as they were seen by eyewitnesses and active participants, such as A. Blok, M. Gorkiy, M. Koltsov, B. Lavrenev, A. Lunacharskiy, D. Furmanov, V. Antonov-Ovseyenko, N. Podvoyskiy and bolshevik journalists. The second and third books are the works of a single author (Yu. Pompeyev. "*Fevralskiy Vikhr. Eti Velikiye Polgoda. Dilogiya o Revolyutsionnykh Sobytiyakh 1917 Goda*" [Whirlwind. The Great Half Year. Two-Volume Work on the Revolutionary Events of 1917]. Sovetskii Pisatel, Leningrad, 1987; Idem. "*Oktyabr Semnadsatogo*" [October 1917]. Leningrad, 1988). With the help of a huge amount of historical data, much of which offered to the contemporary reader for the first time, the author draws in the style of a documentary novel-chronicle the broadest possible picture of the February and October Revolutions. Although we welcome the initiative of those involved in the publication of such very well written and interesting works, let us note that on the purely scientific level some of their ideas can be criticized from the conceptual viewpoint.

Unfortunately, this anniversary wave, particularly in terms of popular science books, includes some failures and patently weak works. This clearly seems to apply to the book by V.M. Mironenko "*Shturm Veka (Ot Fevralya k Oktyabryu 1917 G.)*" [The Storming of the Century (From February to October 1917)], published by Politizdat in 1988. In my view, the author compiled his "storming" from bits of works by other historians, putting together his essay without even bothering to offer believable examples. As a person who has dedicated more than 20 years to the study of the storming of the Winter Palace, I was stunned to read that "at 1:30 in the morning the Baltic seamen occupied 'gallery 1812.' Detachments of seamen, Red Army men and soldiers, successfully defeating the already disorganized opposition of the besieged, and rushed up the numerous staircases of the Winter Palace" (p 235). For your information, the "1812 gallery" is located in the eastern wing of the palace, while the Provisional Government was seated in the northwestern wing. The gallery had been boarded up and closed, for it was located on the territory of the Winter Palace hospital. It remained totally outside the storming. The storming itself took place not along

"numerous staircases" but up a single staircase which was subsequently renamed the "October" staircase in honor of the event. There was no shooting at the time the palace was taken over. Such errors, caused by the inability critically to evaluate historical sources and to use existing publications, abound in the book.

What lessons can be drawn from even such a short study of recent publications? Let us frankly admit that it is only isolated books published not only in the past 3 to 4 years but in the entire period since 1956 that come closer to the standard which has been reached today by social requirements and could serve in the elaboration of a new type of historical thinking. Most of the works repeat the stereotyped history of the preparation for and making of the October Revolution although, it is true, while avoiding the theory of the "two leaders" but not correcting other deformations. Thus, many of the Stalinist definitions and evaluations of 1925-1931 remain in the publications, in one aspect or another, although without any direct reference to their author. Let us add to this the ever diminishing amount of new historical sources and a reduction in the volume of planned studies of the history of the October Revolution by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of USSR History.

The level of glasnost and democratization attained by our society in the past 2 years and the direct appeal by the party leadership to the social scientists to eliminate the "blind spots" in our history and fill them with the names of the people who truly fought for the victory of the revolution and the building of socialism dictate the need for broadening the topics and revising a number of existing and ossified stereotypes. The full governmental and party rehabilitation of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskiy, the legal rehabilitation of Kamenev and Zinovyev, and a more objective approach displayed in our political journalism toward the role which Trotsky played in the revolution are all facts which call for taking a new historical look on the way the party leadership functioned in 1917. Let us recall, for example, that 21 members and 10 candidate members were elected at the Sixth RSDWP(b) Congress as members of the Central Committee. But who do we see in the painting by V.A. Serov "V.I. Lenin Proclaims the Soviet System," which has been reproduced on the cover of the third volume of the "Historical Experience...?" Only Lenin, Dzerzhinskiy and Sverdlov. Three people out of 31. Judging by very recent publications on the history of the October Revolution, virtually all the others are still considered traitors, turncoats, opportunists and enemies. What is needed is not only the actual correction of deliberate deletions and distortions but also a study of the views, platforms, articles and verbal addresses. No one is asking, for instance, to forget the strike-breaking behavior of Zinovyev and Kamenev on the eve of October or suppressing the differences between Trotsky and Lenin at that time. However, one could and should also mention the positive contribution made to party experience and the participation in the preparations for the October Revolution by said revolutionary leaders.

Fatalism can and must be expelled from our theoretical considerations: Yes, objective prerequisites did exist for a socialist alternative to the ordinary, i.e., the capitalist way taken in Russia after the overthrow of autocracy in February 1917. However, this was no more than an opportunity. A capitalist development of the country was more likely. No objective prerequisites could automatically bring about a socialist revolution "inevitably," "necessarily," etc. No maturity of objective economic prerequisites for a socialist revolution were ensured, naturally, by the victory itself. It was only the objective political prerequisites which were created by the autumn of 1917 that offered the proletarian party the opportunity to seize the power. The transformation of this opportunity into reality depended only on its daring, the resolve of its leadership and the readiness to fight displayed by the party masses, the nonparty workers and soldiers, who were already under the political influence of the bolsheviks. Fortunately for our party, it was headed by a man who displayed not only outstanding ability to engage in theoretical analysis but also sufficient daring to assume responsibility for the historical destinies of the country. He convinced the majority of the Central Committee of his rightness and was able to prove the groundlessness of the political analysis made by his opponents. He infused with his daring and resolve the majority of members of the RSDWP(b) Central Committee. They used the historical opportunity which actually existed for a brief historical moment only. It existed for perhaps no more than a few weeks, in the course of which fluctuating and equal political conditions within the country could definitively turn in favor of the counterrevolutionary right-wing camp.

Finally, the historians of the October Revolution must engage in intensive creative work in order to provide a full and clear answer to the following question: "Was this the kind of socialism we built?" I believe that we must thoroughly study the views of socialism held by not only Lenin, Bukharin and other bolsheviks, but even those of the S.R. and the mensheviks, and to compare such pre-October views with the practice of building socialism between November 1917 and March 1921.

Also remaining is an endless amount of historical work to be done, only part of which we were able to accomplish between 1962 and 1968: the publication of sources, clarifying facts and dates, writing the biographies of political leaders, and determining the periods and interpreting the stages of the revolution. For example, is it accurate to consider that the October Revolution (even in Petrograd) took place only on 24 and 25 October 1917? It was not without reason that John Reed spoke of 10 days. Yes, it is true that the Sovnarkom was approved by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets in the night of 27 October. However, that same day Kerenskiy and Krasnov captured Gatchino; the mutiny of military cadets broke out on the 29th. Threatened by an all-Russian railroad strike, the RSDWP(b) Central Committee initiated talks on transferring the power to a "unified socialist government." In the second capital as well an

armed struggle was being waged, followed by an armistice, until an agreement could be reached in Petrograd on the establishment of a new regime. It was only by 4 November that the mutinies had been dealt with, the Kremlin had been captured and the difference settled with Central Committee and Sovnarkom supporters of surrendering the power. Naturally, in the course of the revolution itself it was necessary, in order to make it morally prevalent, to claim that by 27 October the socialist revolution had already won. Today, however, as we objectively assess events in their interconnection, we see that that victory occurred only on 4 November, when the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, having rejected the demand of the capitulationists, instructed Lenin to fill the vacant positions in the government with new candidates.

In general, until the NEP was introduced, what was Soviet history other than a continuous attempt at solving many problems, not only of the building of socialism but also of communism, through revolutionary storming? The strictly transitional period to socialism began, essentially, only in 1921. Today, after April 1985, in the course of perestroika, we started it on a new basis, as though a second time. The experience of the October Revolution, studied on the basis of reliable and historically accurate positions, will unquestionably be of major help to us in the struggle for the renovation of socialism and for ascribing to it a truly Leninist aspect.

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### The Potential of Ideas

18020003p Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) pp 121-124

[Review by E. Markaryan, doctor of philosophical sciences, head of department at the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law, of the books "*Kibernetika i Noosfera*" [Cybernetics and the Noosphere], 1986, 157 pages; "*Kibernetika, Noosfera i Problemy Mira*" [Cybernetics, the Noosphere and Problems of Peace], 1986, 143 pages; F.I. Girenok, "*Ekologiya. Tsivilizatsiya. Noosfera*" [Ecology. Civilization. The Noosphere]. 1987, 183 pages; N.N. Moiseyev, "*Algoritmy Razvitiya*" [Algorithms of Development]. 1987, 304 pages.]

[Text] Of late the idea expressed by V.I. Vernadskiy of converting the biosphere (i.e., the sphere of life on the planet) into the noosphere, the sphere of the mind, has provided an incentive for the development of an amazingly wide range of problems, including those of peace, as confirmed by several books published by Izdatelstvo Nauka. This is determined by the clearly manifested integrative nature of this idea, which is a key to the interpretation and solution of the problem of harmonizing relations between society and nature, which has become so pressing today. I shall try to analyze these books precisely from this viewpoint.

In discussing the concept of the noosphere, in the preface to the collection "*Cybernetics and the Noosphere*," A.L. Yanshin emphasizes that it permits us to depict in their integral aspect many of the processes which are being studied intensively but, nonetheless, separately (see p 8). However, we must also take into consideration the fact that the identification of the integrative possibilities in contemporary science is the most important prerequisite for the development of the concept of the noosphere itself. It is along that channel that very serious difficulties emerge.

The main difficulty encountered in the comprehensive study of the biosphere and society, writes N.N. Moiseyev in this connection, is that the various forms of movement and levels of organization of matter—inanimate, animate and social—were separated as a result of the interests shown by different specialists—physicists, biologists and social scientists. Each group developed its own traditions, style of thinking and language (see "*Algorithms of Development*," pp 3-4). In his view, the theory of the noosphere should be a synthetic discipline called upon, through the principles of the self-organization of matter, to bring together the natural, technical and humanitarian sciences. For the time being, we are short of the necessary knowledge leading to the development of such a theory, is the author's summation (see *ibid.*, pp 3, 9, 11).

Although I agree with this view, I would like to point out that it is not merely a matter of the lack of integrative knowledge but also the traditions governing its specialized use, even when such knowledge is available. The already extant or recent general scientific theories (such as cybernetics, the theory of adaptation and optimizing, synergetics and others) are potentially fully applicable to society. As a rule, they have been studied and continue to be studied from the viewpoint of the natural and technical sciences only. The need to surmount this tradition is entirely obvious in the light of the imperatives of the survival of mankind, when the search for optimal adaptation strategies for the development of civilization becomes the main task of all science.

It is just as important today to surmount the tradition of pitting society against nature, a tradition cultivated in the social sciences. The principles and concepts developed on the basis of the nutritive grounds provided by such traditions have become so customary that they are still being used to support integrative ideas, such as the idea of the noosphere. An example of this is the overall interestingly planned monograph by F.I. Girenok. However, he bases his research on cognitive means which, by virtue of their very nature, cannot contribute to the efficient solution of synthetic problems. They include, above all, the conceptual system of "natural" and "artificial."

Like many other authors, F.I. Girenok believes that "natural" is that which develops by itself, regardless of man, while "artificial" is that which has been created by

man, through his efforts (see "*Ecology. Civilization. Noosphere*," p 4). In accordance with the logic of this system, the natural processes, pitted against purposeful human activities, are usually identified with elemental natural processes. I believe that the concepts of "natural" and "artificial," which have a number of meanings, must be formulated today in such a way as to be consistent with the basic Marxist requirement which determine the structuring of the social sciences. This requirement calls for the study of the development of society as a natural historical process or, in other words, as a process which obeys both objective laws and natural processes.

Noteworthy from this viewpoint is the article by Yu.A. Kosygin "Earth and Society," which, among others, provides a new broader interpretation of conservation laws, applicable, according to the author, also to the study of human social life (see "*Cybernetics, Noosphere and Problems of Peace*," pp 17-18). The integrative incentives for the noospheric way of thinking are also seen in the article by G.N. Alekseyev "Energy Entropy, Cybernetics and Noosphere," which is an attempt at integrating society within a uniform process based on the laws of the conservation and transformation of energy (see "*Cybernetics and the Noosphere*").

It is indicative that N.N. Moiseyev, who also makes use of the conceptual system of the "natural" and the "artificial" in characterizing nature and society, is forced to change its initial meaning. He asks whether we should not adopt a different viewpoint which would not pit one against the other but study the development of the "natural" and the "artificial" on single basis of the processes of self-organization (see "*Algorithms of Development*," pp 127-128). We believe that the concept of the natural-historical process is precisely the one which leads to the adoption of such positions.

The integrative nature of a noospheric thinking has two interdetermining basic aspects. One of them expresses the need for the formulation of uniform principles, concepts and criteria for the integrative study of society and the natural components of the biosphere. The second is related to the integrative study of social life itself, which presumes, in particular, criteria of comparability among its different areas. However, the second aspect is not especially considered in the books under review. Whenever the formulation of this question is dictated by the very nature of the problems under discussion, the tradition of the one-sided specialized study of the various areas of human activities and ways of their implementation, typical of previous development stages in the social sciences, assumes the upper hand. This remark applies, in particular, to the book by F.I. Girenok, the part in which he studies the correlation between the concepts of civilization and culture.

He defines civilization as the means and level of mastery of the forces of nature, and culture as the means of the mastery by man of his own nature. It is self-evident that

these means are qualitatively different. However, is the main task today that of determining their specific differences and, once again, pitting against each other these means of implementation of activities, which remained independently studied for such a long period of time? Should it not be precisely the opposite? The main task of a noospheric style of thinking is to make such means comparable, to understand their real contradictory unity within an integral mechanism for the implementation of human activities. This, however, requires an integrative category which can express the analyzed methods as respective units within the given mechanism. Research practices indicate that the most adequate for such a function is the concept of "culture." It is precisely culture that must provide an integral expression of the specific means of human activities. Considered in accordance with the general scientific principles of the self-organization of life, culture is a universal adapting and optimizing mechanism of such activities.

Such a characterization may not be not part of the established stereotypes of the narrow limited use of the concept of "culture." However, in my view it meets the requirements of noospheric thinking and the imperatives of the survival of mankind. Let us study the nature of such imperatives and try to translate requirements which express the task of survival from the by now customary political language into the language of science. These are requirements which call for the adaptive behavior of social systems, the laws of which were violated by the extensive-consumerist use of nature and the corresponding type of scientific and technical development. We have become accustomed to connect the concept of "adaptation" to biological systems. Actually, this is a fundamental feature of life, inherent in its social aspect as well. The long one-sided differentiated development between social and natural sciences and the mentality of total permissiveness concerning nature have not contributed in the least to the profound realization of this fact.

Adaptive behavior means that it is aimed at the self-preservation of the system. In some cases, this effect can be paralleled by radical structural changes in the system. This particularly applies to a society which is adapting to the conditions of existence not through the morphophysiological restructuring of the individuals within it, as is the case in biological populations, but through the reorganization of its specific types of culture.

Today mankind finds itself precisely in a situation in which, in order to ensure its self-preservation, it requires radical changes in the overall type of development of civilization which created objective prerequisites for the self-destruction of humans on the planet. Their survival depends on the ability to mobilize the adaptive potential of the culture of mankind and activate its mechanisms of self-preservation, the majority of which are distinguished by the manner in which their civilization has developed. Efforts currently made throughout the world to prevent a nuclear war and an ecological catastrophe could serve as examples of how the mobilization of this

potential is being initiated. However, in order to ensure the efficient solution of this problem as a whole, we need an essentially new type of knowledge about society as a self-organizing system and of the manifestation within it of the general laws of adaptive behavior as well as factors which determined their violation in the age of machine civilization.

Today there is frequent talk of the need for a theoretical breakthrough in the social sciences and of leading it into new levels of relation with practical life. We believe that from the point of view of the noospheric principles and the imperatives of survival, a breakthrough in the achievements of the laws of the adaptive behavior of social systems and their coadaptive interaction with the natural components of the biosphere must become most important. This problem, although it pertains to the behavior of society, is not simply of a general human but, rather, a general scientific nature. The point is that in this case the unusual synthetic task is raised, which requires the mobilization of the intellectual potential of all sciences. It involves the task of achieving, in the course of human activities, the organic combination of the specific laws of social life with laws of a more general order which operate on different levels of the organization of matter as well.

Unquestionably, the elaboration of the theory of the noosphere presumes the implementation of research programs separately, within the areas of the natural sciences and the social sciences. The entire matter, however, lies in the fact that these tasks are so closely related that they are rather more like two aspects of a more general problem, the solution of which is possible only with the close interaction among the social, natural and technical sciences. This becomes obvious when the biosphere is considered not simply as an external habitat given to the people but as a general system of life on earth, in which society is a specific structural component.

We believe that this precisely is the nature of the formulas of coevolution of man and the biosphere, frequently used in the description of noospheric processes. It expresses quite accurately the need to harmonize relations between society and nature. Such harmony can be achieved only with a type of development of civilization which would not destroy the ecological mechanism of the self-organization of the natural components of the biosphere, which took millions of years to develop, but would be coordinated with and adapted to it.

The decisive elimination of the extensive-consumerist utilization of nature, governed by narrow departmental or group interests, and the desire to extract instant advantages regardless of the consequences of influencing the biological environment, is the initial prerequisite for such development. The conversion to the noosphere must mean, above all, the practical solution of this problem. V.I. Vernadskiy's theory of the noosphere, Ye.P. Velikhov writes in the preface to the collection "*Cybernetics, Noosphere and Problems of Peace*," could

be interpreted as the ability and need to assess the immediate and more distant consequences of human activities and circumventing or reducing to a minimum the dangers threatening mankind (see p 10). It is very important to emphasize this aspect of the noosphere. The problem is that the shaping of the noosphere is, in principle, inaccessible without the permanent extensive use of the method of system-optimizing prognostic modeling of ecological development, for this enables us to convert the use of the method of trial and error from the level of these systems to the modeling level.

The various aspects of ecological modeling, mathematical in nature, based on the extensive use of computers, are discussed extensively in the books under review. In particular, this applies to the collection "*Cybernetics, the Noosphere and Problems of Peace*," in which the article by G.I. Marchuk especially deals with mathematical modeling as related to environmental protection activities. In describing the overall condition of this area of knowledge, he notes that a great deal of work remains to be done before the isolated efforts to solve an essentially comprehensive problem turn into reliable support in daily activities (see p 40).

It is important to bear in mind that even if ecological modeling is consistent with all contemporary requirements, the recommendations issued on its basis would remain exclusively hypothetical. It is only after their practical investigation and correction that they could gain the status of efficient programs for activities. This means that the formulation of a strategy of conversion to the noosphere requires a combination of modeling experiments with real "nature" noospheric experimentation. Is such experimentation possible in principle?

Unfortunately, this problem which is of key importance in the practical implementation of the idea of the noosphere has not been discussed in the books under consideration. It is true that they include individual statements on physical ecological experiments. However, they are interpreted only as the restructuring of natural complexes. Obviously, it is precisely this interpretation that has been adopted by G.I. Marchuk in his article, when he says that the irreversibility of ecological experiments and the scale of the national economy frequently make mathematical modeling inevitably the only possible means of solving specific environmental protection problems (see p 34).

This is an entirely legitimate and justified view in adopting a natural scientific approach to ecological experimentation. But what if the problem is considered from the socioecological viewpoint? In that case, it is presented in a qualitatively different light, for the main task today consists of radically changing the current extensive-consumerist nature of the development of civilization. But how can this be accomplished, taking into

consideration the conditions under which the stereotypes of activities, so extensively adopted throughout the world, oriented toward departmental and single disciplinary purposes, continue to support and to reproduce the extensive system of utilization of nature?

It is precisely with a view to seeking efficient ways of surmounting such stereotypes that ecological-noospheric experimental zones must be created, based on the systemic (and not departmental, as in the past) optimizing of the utilization of nature. Within such zones means could be developed of concentrating and integrating the efforts which are necessary in order to release and increase the adaptability of the potential of contemporary civilization and the qualitative enhancement of overall ecological standards. We believe that it is precisely such zones which could give the integration among social, natural and technical sciences a directed and broad nature, for the close cooperation among such sciences is an initial prerequisite for a systematic optimizing of the use of nature. Naturally, this is merely one of the possible options in the search for practical ways to the noosphere. It is obvious, however, that the time has come when the elaboration of projects directly aimed at the comprehensive solution of this problem becomes a most important incentive for the further fruitful development of the concept of the noosphere.

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**Time. Reader. Journal**

1802003q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 15, Oct 88 (signed to press 3 Oct 88) pp 125-128

[Text] What determines the aspect of a journal? Time, authors and readers, and the collective which makes the journal. Views on a wide range of problems were exchanged among *KOMMUNIST* readers, authors and associates at the meeting which was held at the USSR VDNKh (reported in the previous issue).

The time of perestroika in which we live and work is complex, difficult and contradictory. There have been changes and there are many problems the solution of which lies ahead. They can be solved only through joint efforts, only through joint interests. Such interest currently exists in the people, most of whom are rejecting indifference, which was a terrible evil of the past; they have, and are able to defend their viewpoint and ideas which they consider important today.

This was confirmed at the meeting which took place. The journal was represented at the meeting by Academicians V. Kudryavtsev and N. Moiseyev, playwright A. Gelman, Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Danilov, and Candidate of Historical Sciences G. Bordyugov. Following are some of the questions which they asked or were asked by the public.

**N. Moiseyev.** I recently submitted to the journal my thoughts on the way I conceived the image of socialism. The question may be asked: Why has a mathematician decided to work outside his field? In my view, today, regardless of his profession, every person must try independently to interpret the new phenomena and events around him and profoundly consider many problems related to our understanding of socialism. No progress is possible without a theoretical foundation.

How to structure such a system, so that it may work for man and for society? A number of additional questions arise here. One of them is the impossibility of solving economic problems away from organizational ones. Another question is the development of the market. It is related to the concentration of industry, and a tremendous array of economic and social problems. For example, are we ready quickly to react to constantly changing requirements? Would we be able to organize contacts with people with related skills, with a tremendous number of partners? Nonetheless, we cannot neglect the market. The market brings prices closer to costs and leads to the elimination of the diktat of the producer over the consumer. I shall not claim that in my article I made a major contribution to the solution of such problems but nonetheless would like to express my view.

By now we have acquired sufficient experience in the area of structural analysis of social relations to enable us to consider matters on a scientific basis. We live in an age when designing systems of production relations and the organizational structure of society is possible. We can no longer live as we did in the past. We need new approaches and a new way of thinking, which would be based on man and his real interests. Such new approaches are being developed under our very eyes.

**V. Kudryavtsev.** The topic of the implementation of the economic reform is today one of the most important. It is important to pay attention to its legal support as well. The Law on the Enterprise was the first of an entire series of laws regulating the economic area under the conditions of the reform. We believe that we also urgently need a law on ownership. We know that the Constitution mentions two forms of ownership: public and private. Today the question requires a more differentiated approach, for ownership comes now in a variety of aspects, since leasing and family contracting, individual labor activity, and joint enterprises with socialist and capitalist countries are being increasingly established in the country.

One of the notes I have received reads as follows: "What are the social forces supporting perestroika?" If we say that the working class supports perestroika and, let us assume, that the peasantry does not, this would be absolutely wrong and unscientific. The watershed between "proponents" and "opponents" of our progress toward renovation does not follow class lines. Both can be found in each social group.



In this connection, it is occasionally asked whether there is class struggle in the USSR, and if there is not, does this mean that we live in a classless society? I would answer both questions in the negative. We have two classes—the working class and the peasantry—and the intelligentsia which has come from them. We do not see any class struggle between them. However, for 30 years we erroneously claimed that we have achieved virtually complete unity among all social groups and their objectives. Therefore, it was claimed, there were no grounds for contradictions between them. Actually, a variety of interests exist within the framework of coinciding basic objectives. We must take into consideration not only the interests of the working class but also those of the intelligentsia and, in the countryside, for example, we must see not only the peasantry as a whole but also distinguish among the interests of sovkhoz workers and the rural intelligentsia—teachers and physicians. In this connection, problems arise of taking a new, of a deeper approach to the social structure of our society. It is important to pay attention to sociology and to surmount dogmatic and obsolete concepts. We can welcome the article on problems of the social roots of bureaucratism published in *KOMMUNIST* (No 12, 1988) by a group of authors among whom we see the name of Professor Yu. Levada. During the period of stagnation he tried to provide a deeper analysis of the problems of the social structure within socialist society but, to say the least, he was not understood.

We perfectly realize that the pluralism of opinions is based on the pluralism of interests. It has been suggested that deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet be elected not only on the basis of territorial districts but also as representatives of social forces (trade unions, the *Komsomol*, the association of theater workers, etc.). Each such organization will elect its own representatives to the supreme authority of the state. It is true that some people consider this undemocratic, for the result would be that actors, for example, will vote twice: as members of a creative association and as citizens of the country. The problem does exist. The variety of interests, obviously, should be reflected in the organizational structure of the soviets, including the supreme authority.

**A. Gelman.** I received the following note: "Are you pleased with the results of the 19th Conference?" I attended the conference as a guest. As a whole, I believe that the resolutions it passed were serious and convincing. Already now, shortly after the conference, they are being implemented quite consistently, although some so-called "superstructural" trends continue to function as a large number of hindrances obstructing the entire social organism. I am referring to the numerous instructions, orders and regulations which make democracy something "allowed." This is dangerous.

I also believe that the conference should have listened to a demand formulated by many party members, which I consider quite important: holding open Central Committee plenum sessions. I believe that if a plenum is

public, the party could do in more substantive work. The Central Committee plenum is the most important forum where basic problems are solved, problems which must be discussed openly and publicly. It is important for every member of society and of the Central Committee to feel greater responsibility. Unfortunately, the question remains unsolved. I hope that it will be raised again at the next party conference.

**V. Danilov.** I have been asked the following: "In your view, what other 'blank spots' should be dealt with by the science of history?" I believe that by now we are quite well informed about the "blank spots" and "black marks" in our history. We perfectly realize that their number will continue to grow in the course of perestroika. To begin with, the very practice of perestroika faces us with ever new questions which may have seemed clear in the past but which now are becoming, to say the least, questionable. This is a very positive fact. Second, the rehabilitation of many party and state leaders, public figures and scientists has not been completed. New names, new ideas and new concepts are entering our public consciousness. All of this is a structural part of the overall process of reorganizing our way of thinking and it is still too early to draw a balance.

In this connection, I would like to say a few words on the materials published in *KOMMUNIST*. The editors are actively working in this area. The formulation of problems related to the study of history and the development of new ideas account for a rather large share of the materials published in the journal. Nonetheless, I would like to see *KOMMUNIST* become a rostrum for an open discussion of all problems of society, particularly those pertaining to the science of history.

The journal recently carried an article by G. Bordyugov and V. Kozlov on Bukharin's ideas and life. In my view, this was a good and quite controversial article. For example, I have a different understanding of the role which Bukharin played in the party's life in the 1930s. I totally disagree with the interpretation given by the authors of that article concerning the problems which were facing our society at that time. Although I believe the publication of such data important and useful, I nonetheless think that the editors acted improperly by presenting the authors' views as their own. They should have given other historians as well the possibility of expressing their own viewpoint.

Let me draw attention to yet another "blank spot" in historical awareness. I am referring to the theoretical legacy and events related to Trotsky. The re-creation of the real picture of this political figure, free from subjective accretions, is an important task of our science. Its relevance is further enhanced by the fact that the discussion of the alternate ways of building socialism, which were formulated in the 1920s, are related exclusively to a single personality. This is an obviously one-sided approach.

**G. Bordyugov.** In my view, our debates will continue, particularly on the subject of Trotsky. His is a rather complex personality. In my view, his works after 1925 and the views he held in 1925-1927 should be studied closely.

I would particularly like to draw attention to the problem of prime sources, for the specific importance of their study and interpretation is understandable. Now, for example, a collection of N. Bukharin's works is being published. However, this collection does not include his speeches at Central Committee plenums. I believe that the records of these plenums should be published as well. An intermediary step in this direction would be to publish outlines of the plenums, something which could be done by **KOMMUNIST** as well.

The journal's editors answered a significant number of the questions asked by the readers briefly (as much as time permitted). The topics which were touched upon will be considered in greater detail in forthcoming **KOMMUNIST** publications. On what will the editors concentrate their attention in 1989?

**KOMMUNIST** is the theoretical and political organ of the party's Central Committee. One of the most important purposes of theory is to contribute to the understanding of life. This means not to fear penetrating into the deep foundations of our life and to discuss them truthfully and openly. The editors intend to publish materials on a great variety of topics, not avoiding controversial ones. It is important now, as we draw lessons from the past, to give the party a healthy development, to make this development irreversible. In his last works Lenin considered extensively such problems, anticipating future difficulties. It is important to turn to Lenin's works precisely from this viewpoint and to do everything possible for the party's authority to be that of a Leninist party.

One of the questions which concerned the people on the eve of the 19th Party Conference was whether the party would be able to assess the current situation, the current state of things, soberly and without embellishments. There were those who said that it is easy to criticize the past but to what extent will the party undertake to evaluate the present critically and self-critically? We believe that the conference proved the maturity and courage of the party, for it solved this problem in its essential and main features.

The interpretation and further development of the set of ideas at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, is the pivot of the work of **KOMMUNIST**. The materials on the dialectics of the socialist society and the priorities of the new political thinking on the threshold of the 21st century must contribute to the creative intensification of Marxist-Leninist theory. One of the leading topics will be the study of the main paths followed in the reform of the political system and the study of the initial experience in its implementation. The main attention will be focused

on the activities of the party and the soviets under the new conditions, the conversion of the soviets into agencies of true democracy, the shaping of a socialist state of law and the efficiency of democratic mechanisms in the society and the party.

As is presently the case, the journal will focus its attention on the most important aspects of the economic theory of socialism, the study of achievements and the "sensitive spots" of the radical economic reform taking place in the country, including the conversion to wholesale trade, reform in price setting, creation of efficient management and economic structures, and development of cooperative and individual labor activity. Problems related to changes in economic relations in the countryside and the resumption of a proprietary attitude toward the land will be the central point of the party's theoretical and practical work, and **KOMMUNIST** intends to deal with this topic in several articles.

One of the leading trends of the journal's work remains the elaboration of many aspects of the central problem of socialism: the dialectics of economic efficiency and social justice. A cycle of articles related to the solution of priority problems in the present stage of perestroika is in the works. It will include the food and housing problems, ensuring the population with high quality goods, eliminating scarcity and lines, restructuring of public education and health care. The editors will pay great attention to problems of development of inter-nationality relations in the country, social initiatives and problems affecting the young, women and the retired.

The readers also noted that the lack of materials which interpret and analyze our spiritual life and culture, the moral atmosphere in society and the changes occurring in this area, remains a weak spot in the journal's work. The editors believe that such topics should, unquestionably, have been discussed more extensively. The section on criticism and bibliography should also become more meaningful and varied.

The editors consider as one of their tasks the further elimination of "blank spots" in Soviet history and the restoration of the full truth about our past. They are planning the publication of essays on outstanding party and state leaders, and analytical articles on the complex periods in building socialism, including the "anatomy" of stagnation. However, the readers expect of **KOMMUNIST** argued and substantiated viewpoints concerning the "blank spots" in history, based above all on documents. Presently a number of memoirs are being published. However, in frequent cases these are "recollections about recollections." The editors consider necessary the publication of original documents and materials which take into consideration all historical facts. Last summer the journal published the minutes of the sixth (Prague) conference of the RSDWP, which had only recently been deciphered by our historians. The editors will continue to publish archive documents related to the history of the party and the country.

The truth must be the main feature of the journal both now and in the future, for without the truth about the past and the present we cannot see the clear ways which will lead us into the foreseeable future. We are in favor of truth, however bitter it may be.

Discussions and roundtable debates will continue (including the participation of foreign scientists and political personalities), dealing with topical and unstudied problems of socialist society, the world community and the struggle for the creation of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

Until recently the journal was clearly short of effective reactions to topical problems of domestic and international life. The editors hope that the materials in the new section which will appear in 1989 will reflect the KOMMUNIST viewpoint on such problems.

We hope that our journal has become more democratic, something to which, unquestionably, the publication in a great variety of forms of letters, opinions, and thoughts by the readers, has contributed. The purpose of the editors is not to "hunt for names," although such names are present in the journal. A meaningful article will always be published, regardless of whether or not its author is famous or still unknown.

Such are, in their general outline, the plans of the editors. We expect of the readers letters with suggestions about what, in their view, would make the journal more meaningful and interesting.

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