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KOMMUNIST

No 14, September 1988

Party Policy is a Policy of Renewal

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[Unattributed article entitled: "Party Policy is a Policy of Renewal"]

[Text] Perestrojka has entered the stage of practical action. Painstaking and intensive work is being done to implement the decisions of the 19th Party Conference and the July Central Committee Plenum. This work continues the April line which began to take shape in spring 1985 and was further developed and substantiated at the 27th Party Congress, the January and June 1987 party plenums and February 1988, and in the documents relative to the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution.

These are not imply chronological landmarks in the development and implementation of the restructuring policy. The quest undertaken by the party's collective creative thought, enriched by the experience of practice and of the people, is literally a new invention of socialism, a "reconnaissance operation" along the entire front of socialist renewal. The party's April line rests on an objective uncompromising assessment of the past, a realistic analysis of today's achievements and errors, and a bold view of the future. The party's April line is a policy of revolutionary restructuring of society on the basis of radical economic and political reform, renewal of the country's ideology and entire spiritual life, a policy which relies on the best healthy forces of the people and which expresses the interests, needs, and aspirations of the Soviet people.

Lenin said that policy is "a science and art which does not fall from the sky and is not provided free." (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 65). In slightly over 3 years of the restructuring process, the party and indeed the entire people have attended a difficult political school. We have learned and are learning the demanding science of democracy and glasnost. We are drawing lessons of new thinking from life and mastering the art of creative and intellectually saturated approaches to the problems facing society. We are overcoming apathy and inertia, gradually purging ourselves of the mentality of "cogs in the machine," freeing the activeness and independence of thought and action. The April line in the party's work today means renewal of its policy, of its ideology, and of the very model of party organization.

A major landmark in the accomplishment of this task is the 19th All-Union Party Conference: it enriched the party with the new experience of the nationwide political school. The questions discussed and resolved there were made the center of attention of broad social forces. The

July Central Committee Plenum had every justification for noting that the conference demonstrated the mighty restructuring of our party as the true motive force of the restructuring process, as its initiator, and as its recognized leader which reflects the fundamental interests of the people and socialism.

The 19th Party Conference assumed the difficult mission of providing answers to the burning issues which concern literally each and everyone: how the restructuring process is progressing, what we have achieved, what we have not yet managed to do in the 3 years of change, what paths to pursue in the future, and what must be changed in approaches, forms, and methods of work and in the social system itself. The preparations for the conference and the wide-scale discussion on the Central Committee theses showed how great the people's expectations of restructuring are and how strong the thirst for change is, which frequently grows into understandable impatience and an aspiration to immediately convert to a more democratic and effective system of management, and to rapidly achieve sufficiency in foodstuffs and commodities and a substantial rise in the standard of living. The paramount political task is not to deceive these expectations, and at the same time not to be led astray into hasty and immature action, and not to conduct innovative restructuring by the usual methods of decreeing that the masses should be "kept happy" with various "panaceas"—whether this means an egalitarian utopia or the universal and automatic activation of market mechanisms.

The party conference unambiguously expressed itself in favor of making the revolutionary transformations irreversible and doing everything to achieve its objectives, and called on all party organizations, all communists, and all nonparty people to involve themselves even more actively in the processes of renewing society, which are of historic importance for the fate of the motherland. A conclusion which expresses the common hopes and attitudes of working people—that it is necessary to intensify work to implement the practical tasks of restructuring—is of historic importance for the fate of the homeland. As M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report to the July CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "There was a unanimous demand that there should be no foot dragging or biding time, that it is necessary to react more keenly to shortcomings and failures and to act resolutely, eliminating all barriers and obstacles in our path." The party conducted an open discussion about the most important things. This allows us to say that the conference took place in a Leninist spirit and expressed the party's high degree of responsibility to the people and to the revolution.

This was confirmed by the actual nature of the conference's discussion on the course of the restructuring process and on problems of democratizing party and society. An unerringly correct approach was taken which rejected the monopoly on truth and established as its starting point the creative quest in theory and practice,

the concrete study of people's real interests, and reliance on people's common sense. It would thus be naive to expect that 5,000 delegates would assess various problems in exactly the same way or would use similar words of "approval" which we know so well from former years. Such expectations are nothing but a reflection of old approaches and surviving concepts of "monolithic unity," which can most often be reduced to uniformity of thought. The diversity of viewpoints voiced at the conference reflected the difference in views and interests of various social strata. This is surely evidence that the party embodies the unity of the people by integrating differing approaches within a single political line. Moreover the discussion at the conference clearly showed the personal principle, the individual approach to problems: in this respect, this most representative forum revealed, for the first time in many years, the wealth of original personalities which are being placed in the foreground by our complex and interesting times, and the diversity of "human material," intellect, gifts, and experience which the party has embraced.

A contribution to revealing all this wealth was made by the spirit of open comradely discussion, the delegates' desire to give more acute and clear expression to the will of that section of the party masses which they represent, paying particular attention to those issues which have their own slant or urgency in a given region or social stratum. There were also direct conflicts of opinion, arguments, mixed audience reactions to speeches, and intense discussion of alternative formulations of draft resolutions which the conference was to pass. Incidentally, to a certain extent the differentiated public interest, express the diversity and conflicting interaction of interests in the party and society. This is the reality: the party does not and cannot consist of one-dimensional "representatives of the masses" who think in a uniform manner and invariably vote unanimously (this was graphically confirmed by the party conference, for the first time in many decades). The party is a progressive vanguard section of society, an alliance of people who express the interests, hopes, contradictions, and problems of the populace. It is an intellectual, political, and moral force which strives to rely on the strength of its authority, rather than on the usual right of interference in all matters. One of the main tasks which the conference had to accomplish was to change the approach to the party as the leading force in society; to push back that mechanical model of party leadership which formed in the 1930s and 1940s, in which the CPSU essentially fulfilled the function of the highest tier of state power and of economic executive management, and was at the top of the administrative hierarchy; and to overcome the limited and deformed conception of the essential policy conducted by the ruling Communist Party.

The roots of this issue which has now been raised so urgently by life itself lie in the first years of the building of socialism, when the Bolshevik Party assumed the new role of ruling party, having convinced the working people and won the country for them from the exploiters, to use V.I. Lenin's words.

We know that as socialist society rises to new and higher levels of development, an increasing role is played in its activity by management, which, according to the founders of our teaching, must embrace the whole of society and all its components and interconnections. (see K. Marx and F. Engels: "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 2, p 537) Is the Communist Party the agent of such management? The approach to defining the party's concrete practical functions in the world of political relations depends on this apparently abstract theoretical question. Should party committees directly "manage" the social processes, or should they, within the framework of the socialist legal state, perhaps retain only general political leadership, the development of economic and social strategy, organization of the masses, and ideological and educational influence over people, and through them over events and phenomena? What is the yardstick for combining the efforts of party and state bodies to implement economic and social programs, a combination which is not equivalent to fusion and which presupposes a precise and unerring division of functions?

These questions are not accidental. After all, a policy's distinguishing feature is its direct or indirect link with power. Any social problem assumes a political nature if its solution is directly or indirectly connected with class interests and the problem of power. (see K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 1, p 360) Party leadership of the socialist state is political leadership. At the same time, however, the party's functions are of a political-ideological and political-organizational nature rather than an administrative one. V.I. Lenin repeatedly addressed this issue.

Confusing the concepts of leadership and management is not an academic argument about definitions. If the party is viewed as a primarily administrative "top organ," a sort of management department at the top of the hierarchical pyramid rather than a powerful ferment of social progress, a nationwide intellect which generates ideas and defines the country's further course of development, then the very concept of party and party membership quite simple depreciates and the revolutionary essence of the communist organization is emasculated. The only guarantee against the prevalence of this bureaucratic administrative approach is comprehensive development of the processes of democratization, and people's involvement in them. The division of functions between party and economic bodies, between party and state, is not simply an arbitrary distribution of roles between policy makers on the principle of convenience. It is a **qualitative** differentiation according to the nature and character of activity. For this reason the vanguard leading role of the party is strengthened rather than weakened if each link in the political system and each state or social institution performs its own functions.

An urgent requirement for just such an approach to determining the competence of the ruling Communist Party was felt even at the beginning of the 1920s, when Lenin wrote about the need "in day-to-day" life to recast

the type of party work, to transform everyday life, and to reach the point at which the party becomes the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat without separating itself from the masses, but moving ever closer toward them and rousing them to revolutionary awareness and the revolutionary struggle." Vladimir Ilich noted that this is "the most difficult, but also the most important task." (op. cit., vol 44, pp 420-421).

Today too, the "transformation of everyday life" in party work means renouncing the devaluation of party tasks and functions to the level of mere execution and "traffic control," whether in economic affairs or in any other sphere of policy. This means renouncing the model where the party is a sectarian "Order of the Sword" which promotes the formation and consolidation of a regime of personal power and the perpetuation of the administrative-command system with all its accompanying deformations, arbitrariness, and lawlessness.

The founder and leader of the party regarded it primarily as a political force, a political vanguard of society which operate by fundamentally different methods—through organizational, cadre, and ideological work, while rigorously observing Soviet laws and the democratic principles of social life.

At the same time, the division of functions is not, of course, an end in itself. The party has been and remains the ruling, leading force in society, and the central issue is one of the achieving optimum proportions for the "flexible combination of soviet and party functions" which Lenin bequeathed to us, a combination which Vladimir Ilich called a source of extraordinary force in our policy. (see op. cit., vol 45, p 399) Oversimplified forms of this combination, used to compensate, as it were, for defects in the economic mechanism, led to the duplication of functions, the debilitation of the soviets, and deformations in the work of party organizations. Such forms must become a thing of the past and give way to new ones which correspond to the present level of development of party and society.

The conference noted that as a political vanguard, the party has all the necessary means and methods at its disposal to perform its leading role. The party's main resource is 20 million communists through whom it conducts its policy in all areas of social life. In accordance with the conference decisions a specific mechanism for "flexible combination of soviet and party functions" is to be created—the recommendation of the first secretaries of the appropriate party committees for the reintroduced position of soviet chairman.

As we know, the discussion of this issue at the conference was especially lively, and various points of view were expressed. The first reaction of a number of delegates to this proposal was to reject it. What is the reason for this? Apparently, it is primarily because everyone had become fairly tired of the former practice whereby party organizations substituted for the soviets and exercised strict

control over them, and the combination of the post of soviet chairman and party committee first secretary recalled the experience of past years when party and executive power lay in the same hands. However, the proposal contained in the 19th CPSU Conference report and resolution "On the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System" is fundamentally different. What is involved is using the party's authority to reinforce the plenary powers of the soviets' the party committee first secretary will not head the soviets; executive body but rather its presidium, which is expected to supervise the implementation of political decisions made at a session. "We must rely on the party's authority and restore the soviets," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the conference. "If we bring these two key forces of our political system into conflict, nothing will be achieved. There is no sense in this. The point of the matter is to ensure their organic harmony." The proposed measures were supported by the majority of delegates. The 19th All-Union Conference and the July CPSU Central Committee Plenum put forward an extensive and multifaceted program of practical measures in the area of the state structure, which, in addition to the restoration of the full powers of the soviets of people's deputies, included the establishment of a state of law, a broad judicial reform, and improvement in the legislation of the USSR and the Union republics, including that which applies to the electoral system and the increased role of social organizations.

The restructuring policy creates a new type of link between the party and the masses, and of the people's unity with their political vanguard. Throughout the party's history this link has been a reliable criterion for the effectiveness of party policy. At the beginning of the 1920s V.I. Lenin wrote about the need and ability to merge with the masses to a certain extent, and warned of the danger of the vanguard being separated from the mass of working people which it leads. Today, too, one can hardly speak seriously of the danger of even a 20 million-strong party "dissolving" in society, among the masses. There is another real danger, that of alienation from the masses. It is no secret that the party came fairly close to this destructive borderline during the years of stagnation, when the party's role of political vanguard weakened and its function as one of the management structures—in fact the supreme and most important—was inordinately hypertrophied: in many cases party membership became a means of access to this structure. The restructuring process and the development of glasnost and democratization led, and are leading, to qualitative changes in this area. There is growing confidence and the channels of reciprocal ties between party and society are multiplying. Indeed, the open nature of the conference, the unconcealed nature of the polemic, and the conflict between different points of view were factors in strengthening confidence and the party's authority among the masses.

An important function of the party is its constant analysis of the state of social consciousness and trends in its development. No real policy is possible without such an

analysis. It was precisely this that Lenin had in mind when he wrote about the need to know **attitudes**, to know **everything**, to understand the masses, to be able to approach them and win their **absolute** confidence. This must also be promoted by the activation of sociological research, by extensive information about the work of party organizations, by open party fora and meetings, by the free discussion of all questions of party, state, and social life, by an attentive approach to examining the critical remarks, opinions, and proposals of working people, and by the publication and discussion of drafts of the most important decisions.

The mass information media are an indispensable channel for the party's communication with the masses and for making open party policy a reality. A considerable amount of attention was devoted to the party in discussions at the conference. Heterogeneous approaches to defining the role of the press in the restructuring process were revealed. Delegates' speeches emphasized that a most important achievement of the restructuring process and of our democracy is the active stand of the mass information media and the expansion of glasnost. This is a force which has largely restored the people's faith in truth and social justice, raised their spirits, and immensely strengthened their confidence in the party. At the same time, critical remarks addressed to the press met with approving applause from some of the audience in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. What happened? Above all, it was that the press cannot be a "lady agreeable in all respects," as M.A. Ulyanov said at the conference. The increased criticism contained in published material does not suit everyone. The press does, however, sometimes deserve fair reproach—after all, glasnost presupposes the social, legal, and moral responsibility of the mass information media, and a high standard of moral awareness, professionalism, and competence of journalists. The 19th Party Conference Resolution "On Glasnost" notes: "The indispensable requirements in this area are a high ideological standard and morality, competence, strict observance of professional ethics, absolute reliability of information, and the right of each citizen who has been criticized to publish a valid response in the same press organ. Openness and criticism should not serve as grounds for the growth of cliquishness or manifestations of demagoguery and national, regional, or corporate egoism. The viewpoints of all sides in a dispute must be reflected objectively and without distortion in the mass news media. No one has a monopoly on glasnost, either."

We have no right to forget that the deformations of socialism in the 1930s began with the inculcation of voicelessness, and that a lack of glasnost marked the beginning of the stagnation period. Conversely, it was glasnost that became the symbol of the restructuring process and an indicator of the reality of the changes which had been initiated. Glasnost and its further development and consolidation will serve as a guarantee that the processes of democratization are irreversible and that the potential and the deep reserves of the socialist

system are revealed. In the expansion and consolidation of glasnost, special attention must now be paid to ensuring the effectiveness of public opinion, to the practical orientation of discussions, to eliminating elements of demagoguery and idle talk and to combining words with deeds through the activation of interests. It must be constantly borne in mind that the further the restructuring process progresses, the more it will be channeled into deep transformations in all areas of Soviet social life.

In Lenin's words, party policy must take place at the people's "level of awareness" and must correspond to popular common sense. That is why it is so important to determine and analyze the real state of public awareness and the attitudes and demands of the masses. A major role is expected to be played in this by Marxist sociological science, the basic areas of development for which were defined at a recent CPSU Central Committee plenum.

However, taking place at the "level of awareness" does not mean blindly following all its "meanderings," because according to Lenin the people may give in to attitudes which are far from progressive. Prejudices which favor leveling are the most enduring survivals in people's awareness. "Crude," that is, leveling communism (Marx) is easier to assimilate than socialist principles, such as distribution according to work, according to the classic writer's accurate observation. The problem of implementing social justice with regard to today's level of economic development may thus give rise not only to fruitful discussion, but unfortunately also to social demagoguery based on a distortion of reality and leading to social and psychological disunity among various groups in society.

The key issue of deepening the restructuring process is the unification and consolidation of the principal social forces of renewal on the basis of principle. A great deal of difficulties will have to be overcome along this way. We proceed from the view that there are no class antagonisms in our society. However, even the nonantagonistic contradictions of socialism may assume a significantly sharp and tense nature if they are not resolved in good time. Nonetheless, consolidation cannot be understood to mean the artificial smoothing out of contradictions, and problems cannot be driven back under the surface when they appear. That is a pointless exercise. It is, however, necessary to ensure that these conflicts are resolved by socialist methods, i.e., democratically and humanely, rather than by violent methods involving the "aggravated class struggle" of the past, pressure and administrative measures. This is, after all, the meeting point of conservatism and the contemporary forms of left-wing extremism, which are characterized by their reliance on speculative ideological and political postulates, and on an administrative-command style of leadership. Both extremes are nurtured by one-dimensional thinking, open arbitrariness, and the naive conviction that the shortest distance between two points in social life is a straight line. Politics, however, is a sort of

non-euclidean space where the simple laws of mechanics do not operate. It is equally harmful in this case to "run ahead of progress" by whipping up the social processes, and to try to artificially brake the movement as it gathers momentum. "We do not have the right to allow the restructuring process to trip on the stumbling-block of dogmatism and conservatism, of someone's prejudices and personal ambitions," M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report at the conference. "It is a matter of the country's destiny, the destiny of socialism."

What do the disagreements most frequently revolve around? As a rule, they do not concern the main issue of whether restructuring is necessary or not. Virtually no one doubts that; the absolute majority of the people is in favor of change and renewal. The arguments are about a different issue—the rate, ways, and methods of restructuring, in other words *tactics*. We have a clear conception of our strategic goals and of the direction we are following, and there are no doubts about the correctness of the socialist choice or the vitality of Marxist-Leninist teaching, which scientifically substantiates the possibility of building a society of social justice, a civilization of free and equal rights. It is, however, no less important to learn what Lenin called "another art which is needed in a revolution—flexibility, the ability to change one's tactics rapidly and abruptly, taking changed objective conditions into account and choosing a different path toward our goal if the previous one has proved inexpedient or impossible in the given period" (op. cit., vol 44, p 151).

The components which make up this art are the precise selection of priorities, paramount tasks, and rate of advance, and the ability to make necessary compromises and use various ways and means of work. "We consider that the development of precise tactics for action must become one of the main tasks of the conference," V.A. Yarin, machine operator of the V.I. Lenin Nizhnyi Tagil Metallurgical Combine, stressed in his speech. The delegate put the issue thus: to precisely identify the priority areas, to mark out the boundaries and timeframes, to name those responsible, and to demand that what has been planned should be firmly put into practice. The party has defined the priority policy areas and the paramount tasks as the solution of the food and housing problems, saturation of the market with goods, unconditional fulfillment of the programs adopted for health care and environmental protection—in other words, the issues on which the people's social sense of themselves, and indeed the fate of the restructuring process as a whole, depend. Today this is the only true policy which expresses the interests of the workers class, peasantry, intelligentsia, and all social groups and strata.

Lenin described the basis for sincerity in party policy as the "correspondence of word and deed which is fully accessible to verification." (op. cit., vol 32, p 259). The diversity of opinions expressed during the discussions at the conference were crystallized in the major decisions on deepening the restructuring process, reforming the

political system, and further democratizing the party and society. It is natural that in the special resolution "On Certain Urgent Measures for the Practical Implementation of the Reform of the Country's Political System," the 19th Party Conference stressed the need—arising from the interests of the task in hand—to immediately set about implementing what had been planned, and established specific timeframes in which the decisions adopted had to be fulfilled, while the July plenum worked out a concrete mechanism for their implementation. The most topical task today is that of strengthening accountability and discipline based on awareness of the need for change and on increased mutual exigency.

The restructuring process is extending the customary class boundaries of communist policy through the increasing inclusion of nationwide, common human values among its priority interests, and its assimilation of everything accumulated by the people's work and intelligence in all previous systems. At the same time, the most topical issue for the party is the definition of its policy with regard to each class and stratum in socialist society. The basis of this policy is reliance on the workers class, the best of its progressive strata, and its progressive attitudes. In this context it is important to avoid playing to the crowd and empty compliments, which have most often been the reflection of a formally bureaucratic and abstract propagandist approach to the real needs and interests of workers.

A most important component of contemporary party policy is the implementation of Leninist principles in relations with the peasantry. The promising conclusion "do not dare to command" which Vladimir Ilich advanced as early as 1919, at the height of "war communism," and which was first put into practice during the New Economic Policy period, must now start functioning in practice.

The party has developed a set of measures for the universal transfer of kolkhozes and sovkhoses to the new principles of economic management, principles which are aimed at the social reconstruction of the village, restoration of the socioeconomic balance between town and country, and a change in production relations in agriculture itself. These measures will help the peasant to feel that he is the owner of the land.

The conference formulated a policy with regard to the intelligentsia in a Leninist spirit by promoting an increased role for the spiritual area as a whole, and mobilizing the intellectual forces of the people. Individual relapses of "Makhayskiy-ism" (belittling the intelligentsia's role and significance) must be avoided, and it must be remembered that Lenin regarded knowledge and experience as the supreme virtues of the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia played an active role in preparing and implementing the restructuring process. Today, too, the party relies on its creative forces and bases its relationship with it on the principles of mutual confidence and responsibility.

Administration by decree, excessive haste, and blanket measures organically conflict with the party cultural policy. The party is resolutely abandoning such methods in its work with the intelligentsia, too. In this area, in which leveling is intolerable, there is a particular need for competition, for a free creative quest, and the artist's civic responsibility to the times and society. It is this that will ensure a progressive socialist orientation for the processes taking place in the intellectual sphere.

Party policy in the ideological and propagandist area proper is being restructured. We are increasingly renouncing the old model of ideological development which relied on mentors and enlightenment; theoretical work to restore and develop the Leninist concept of socialism is being intensified; and the tasks of inculcating political culture and democratic culture in general are being accomplished. The main means of forming such a culture are continuous dialogue, discussion, glasnost, stronger reciprocal ties with the "audience," and real and broader involvement of public opinion, criticism, and proposals "from below" in the party's ideological life.

Soviet people, who are actively interested in the success of the restructuring process, are thirsting for new knowledge enriched by new experience and based on the treasury of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This aspiration, this social demand on social scientists, has been very well expressed by one of our readers, Ye.V. Uspenskiy, a communist and war and labor veteran from Odoyev, Tula Oblast. He writes:

"The 27th Congress and the 19th Conference of our party, as well as the publication in the press of many documents defining what is new in the economy, policies, and culture of Soviet society, have sharpened the political interest of working people. They are interested in changes in social relationships, but we are not adequately armed with the contemporary party-political theory. It is clear to us that a theoretical and truly scientific substantiation of what is taking place can be formed on the basis of experience. Real life, however, is urging us on, and a vexing helplessness is appearing in conversations with people, in some cases leading to the arbitrary interpretation of a number of concepts and differences in their concrete explanation. Working people are demanding clarity, and we are finding it difficult to answer their questions with conviction.... Everyone understands that the restructuring process is necessary and irreversible. Nonetheless difficulties are presented by such questions such as: What is to be restructured, and how? What is required of the worker in the restructuring process? What are democracy, self-management, glasnost, bureaucratism, departmentalism, self-support, self-financing, and so on? What is democratic centralism? How will the party's activity manifest itself when the soviets have full power? The answers to these and other questions must be specific.

"It is obvious that the restructuring process will make considerable gains if every communist and working

person has a clear idea of the essence of the changes taking place in our society, his role in them, and the new meaning of old terminology."

In this context it is important to find one's bearings on one more issue: the correlation of scientific knowledge and belief. The link between conviction and experience, between belief and science is complicated and multifaceted. One thing is clear, however: the more truth there is, the more belief and true conviction there will be. Are we not dropping our former ideological blinkers by renewing and developing our ideas about socialism? Can we rely on the dogma of even the most Marxist of beliefs if we assume the responsibility of calling ourselves the successors of Marx and Lenin? One cannot get far with blind belief alone. We need a contemporary scientific theory of socialism; a precise and reliable knowledge of the society in which we live and of the contradictory processes taking place in our integrated world; the whole truth about the past and present; and fearless prediction of the future. This means that we need honest and powerful science, intellectual courage, and moral fearlessness. "As the party of Lenin and a mighty political organism," the July Central Committee Plenum noted, "we must put all of our intellectual potential to work and make step-by-step progress on theoretical matters, thus enriching policy and practice. In turn, we must gain new experience from practice, interpret it, open the way for further activity, and consistently pursue the political course elaborated by the CPSU."

Party policy takes into account the entire diversity of interests which is determined by the complexity of Soviet society and the diversity of social, demographic, and "generation" processes (this is, incidentally, untilled soil for our social scientists). The conference paid serious attention to the policy on young people. This is natural. After all, young people are always marked by the social conditions in which they have grown up and been educated. It must be honestly admitted that they have far from always formed in a favorable way. Not only the shortcomings of schools, but also deeper reasons have had an effect in this area. The corruption, bribery, protectionism, and gross violations of the socialist system, all of which flourished during the years of stagnation, actively contributed to the demoralization of some young people, to their loss of interest in public affairs, and to the growth of a cynical behavior and skepticism about their own future. Society and the party will have to make a considerable effort to strengthen the social foundations of education and to purge it of anything alien to socialist principles.

A most important component CPSU policy in the task of consolidating society is the development of interethnic relations based on the Leninist principles of ethnic policy and practical internationalism. For our Communist Party and the Soviet state, ethnic policy is the most complex policy, but also an important and necessary one, because economic, social, and spiritual issues are closely bound up within it.

Today this has raised numerous problems, which are increasing rather than decreasing in urgency. They are the result of our past and present shortcomings, of frequently narrow-minded understanding of the processes of nations' and nationalities' real lives, and of shortcomings in the analysis of various real phenomena in the development of national awareness and consciousness. We must view every issue, wherever it arises, in the interconnected context of all-Union life, examine it from broad party and state standpoints, and if necessary make the required compromises.

The party's contemporary ethnic policy must assign priority to sensitivity, attentiveness, and maximum support for everything progressive in ethnic development, whether this concerns problems of language and culture or socioeconomic issues. Two most important aspects of policy in this area are those of avoiding national nihilism and the propagation of national exclusivity. The socialist ideal is, after all, not a deadening process of unification, but a complete and dynamic unity containing an ethnic diversity. The resolution "On Interethnic Relations," which the conference unanimously adopted, notes that it is a task of historic significance "to persistently assert and creatively develop the Leninist norms and principles of ethnic policy, and to resolutely cleanse them of artificial accretions and deformations. The basis for this is provided by the 27th CPSU Congress, which combines meeting the interests of all nations and ethnic groups with the common interests and needs of the country, and by an internationalist ideology that is incompatible with any brand of chauvinism and nationalism." This particularly applies to party members. The July CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed that "there can be no justification for a communist who has adopted positions of chauvinism or nationalism. This is essentially a deviation from one of the party's most important political principles. Every communist must remember this."

The CPSU follows its political course primarily through the communists working in the state agencies and in all areas of social life. This sharply increases the significance of the party's cadre policy, and the search for effective ways of influencing the placing, renewal, and replacement of functionaries. The conference resolution "On the Struggle Against Bureaucratism" stresses that the party will succeed in carrying along all social forces in the struggle against bureaucratism and in scoring real successes in this struggle only if it sets a convincing example of democratization of its own activity and of intraparty life, cleansing them of all bureaucratic accretions whatsoever. In this context the July CPSU Central Committee Plenum states that "The initiative and good organization of the communists, an active stand of each party member in the constructive resolution of the arising problems, the assertion of new approaches in the political, economic, social, and spiritual fields in combating shortcomings, manifestations of bureaucratism, lack of discipline, and irresponsibility are of decisive significance." The party's current accountability report and

election campaign represents an important test of party committees' and organizations' readiness for persistent and effective work in this area.

The policy of restructuring and renewal is a policy which is not only aimed at solving the country's domestic problems, but is also designed to consolidate a peaceful climate all over the world—a condition for the progress of civilization. Indeed it is impossible to separate the domestic and external aspects of the restructuring process. "....Contrasting foreign policy with domestic policy," Lenin wrote, "is fundamentally wrong, non-Marxist, and unscientific thinking" (op. cit., vol 30, p 3). The party's international policy is also undergoing a period of decisive renewal in form and substance on the basis of the new political thinking. There is still a considerable amount to be done here in order to eliminate the rudiments of conservatism and ideological stereotypes, in order to operate from a realistic standpoint in any situation, just as in domestic policy. This is confirmed by the Soviet leadership's bold actions to reduce tension around Afghanistan, by the decisive steps in the cause of reducing and eliminating lethal weapons, and by the change in the international situation as a whole. The conference raised the issue of the need to involve the party's and people's collective thought in the process of making foreign policy decisions and creating an effective, constitutionally empowered mechanism for discussing questions of international policy.

The changes in all areas of party policy are changes in the party's image and in the very model of party activity. We have a clear policy today—a policy of restructuring and renewal aimed at ensuring that Soviet society acquires a new quality. It is now time for the main task of putting the accumulated ideological and political potential into practice and involving the masses' energy in work.

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My Notions of New-Look Socialism

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[Text]

I

We are experiencing a very important period in our history: a conversion to a new qualitative condition. In the past 3 years we have had an avalanche of information hurled at us, which has forced everyone, the entire people, to take a different look at reality and to see things which we could only guess but did not know. Today we realize that any illusions and mental stereotypes are a mortal threat. Everything must be reinterpreted and we must change remaining concepts concerning the processes of global development.

In the course of the postwar decades the world changed unrecognizably. A fundamental change in values and in the structure of contradictions has taken place. The end of the 20th century is as different from its beginning as was the 19th century from the age of chivalry.

Only 40 years ago the might of any country and the pace of its progress toward civilization were based above all on the amount of steel it smelted, the amount of energy it generated and the raw materials it could extract from the ground. Gradually, the priority role played by steel and resources turned to electronics, computers and "higher technologies." It is becoming increasingly obvious today that the new horizons for progress will be open to countries whose social system will find itself able maximally to ensure the use of the creative potential of its citizens.

The emancipation of human energy and the development of man's capabilities, inventiveness and initiative are becoming vital requirements of a society, nation or country. In accordance with the ecological imperative, mankind needs a new technological foundation for its development, a new morality and new political relations among governments. All of this is inconceivable without true democracy, without freedom of thought and without a truly deep culture.

We are finally coming out of our lethargy. The people have begun to ask questions to which, for the time being, there are no ready answers. What does the renovation of socialism mean? Why do we need it? What should it be? No one likes a description of an infinitely remote future. It is important today to speak of the forthcoming decades, two or three, and no more.

Socialism and the structure of the socialist system are usually related, above all, to the form of ownership. However, I think that it would be more profitable to approach the problem of defining socialism and the interpretation of our principle of "more socialism" from different positions. It should not be man for socialism but socialism for man! Socialism is the type of organization of society which can embody man's age-old dream for social justice, social protection, and social comfort, if you wish! The first principle of social justice is "to each according to his work." Its implementation requires a particular, a socialist forms of ownership.

Thus, "more socialism" means "more man." This formula contains an appeal for creating, on the basis of socialist ownership, the type of organizational forms which would ensure the social comfort of the individual, including the stable development of the country. Above all, it would enable us to bring to light the people's talent, individual capabilities and initiative.

Therefore, we must create a scientific, I would say a pragmatic foundation of an overall system for a contemporary organization and development of socialist society and convert to a strict scientific analysis. The search for

a rational organization of society must be based not only on the general concepts of Marxist dialectics and past experience but also on the profound study of the realities of the contemporary world and of our country. The instruments for such a quest are the latest methods of systems analysis, the theory of management, the theory of organization, economics and sociology, and the sciences of man.

The first step along this way is drawing a reliable picture of the overall political, social and economic situation in the world. Guided by it, we could speak of an adequate organizational development in our society as well. The main characteristic of this picture, which can be easily proved, is that in the next decade, as in the past, the earth will remain divided into a socialist and a capitalist world. There will be no convergence whatsoever. Convergence conflicts with the increased complexity of organizational structures and their variety, which is the characteristic feature of all known development processes. The world of the next decades, despite the appearance of numerous integration trends, will be characterized by a growing pluralism of political and social systems, cultural and religious communities, and so on.

The socialist form of ownership has become established on earth and adopted by more than 1.5 billion people. Nonetheless, what great differences exist among the structures of social, political and production activities in the socialist countries! How greatly different is socialism in China from that in Cuba, not to mention in Czechoslovakia or the GDR! I believe that in the USSR as well, some organizational aspects of socialism in the Baltic republics, for example, will eventually become substantially different from those which will turn out to be most consistent with living conditions in the republics of Central Asia.

The appearance of a socialist way of life, as we can see, by no means leads to the automatic collapse of capitalism. Despite a series of crises which appeared on its way, capitalism is still quite firmly standing on its two feet, demonstrating in a number of areas an amazing viability. Like the socialist world, the capitalist world is astonishing in terms of the variety of its organizational forms. For example, U.S. and Japanese capitalism are quite different from each other; the way of life, nature of enterprise and social relations in those two countries, despite all deals and contacts between them, remain different and trends toward unification are not all that strong.

It seems to me that no "convergence" between socialism and capitalism is taking place or will take place. Nonetheless, we live in an interrelated world. We can claim with some justification that such an interrelationship will intensify. However, such claims require additional comments. Usually, theories in political economy consider such systems in their pure, in their refined aspect, away from their specific implementation and regardless of control mechanisms, production activities and social

conditions and, especially, the social protection of the individual. Yet the variety of organizations of capitalist and socialist production methods is steadily increasing. Possibly it may be quite difficult to establish a clear demarcation among some of their aspects, particularly under the conditions of the ecological imperative.

The dialectics of social development is such that it is a complex combination of two conflicting processes: integration, which is the result of scientific and technical progress and economic development, and differentiation, the reasons for which are found in that same scientific and technical progress, in the creative work of millions and millions of people and in the development of their culture and self-awareness. Therefore, the world of the immediate future is a unity of exceptionally varied political and social structures. It is a unity, because all of us are linked by the common objective of ensuring stability on the planet and because differences and contradictions stimulate the progress of mankind. Consequently, in discussing the alternate structures of socialist society in our country, we must clearly see this objectively inevitable pluralism and suitably become part of the general development.

This does not mean in the least that the world of the next decades will become some kind of conflict-free "paradise." The nature of the contradictions will change and there will be shifts within their range. In particular, economic contradictions could, in a number of cases, become greater. I believe, for example, that starting with the very beginning of the 21st century, when the drama created by the military confrontation between the United States and the USSR will abate, economic contradictions between the United States and Japan will be the most difficult to eliminate. Contradictions between society and nature will steadily worsen.

The way of development of socialism and the efficient organization of society in our country must become more firmly intertwined with the ever-growing volume of global relations. Society must remain open for such relations, for otherwise it would be inconceivable to deal with this tangled knot of contemporary contradictions and confrontations.

II

One of the main questions which is now being extensively discussed is that of the market and planning, and the problem of combining them. I believe that today few serious specialists question the need of planning. The entire development of the global economy proves the growing role of the planning principle. The reasons are obvious. They include, above all, the increasing complexity of the newly developed structures. The transport aircraft is an example. This is a long project which requires the coordinated work of dozens of scientific and production collectives. Furthermore, there is the complexity of production relations. If today the production process were to be controlled on the basis of the classical

market laws of the Victorian age, contemporary capitalism would be strangled by most severe crises. That is why in the developed capitalist countries and in the multinational corporations planning plays a very significant role. Finally, the ecological problems require as of now coordination between the active efforts of the people and the possibilities of the biosphere. In the immediate future this will necessitate qualitatively to improve planning methods and to find new approaches to planning in general. In the socialist countries the various social programs are destined to play a special role.

Therefore, planning production activities is vitally needed by socialism. Despite this, however, and despite nearly 70 years of experience, so far we do not have any real scientific foundation for planning. The available scientific works are, as a rule, partial and, occasionally, eclectic. Nonetheless, the theory of management and the theory of organization provide a number of common principles the use of which enables us to lay the necessary foundations and to eliminate the absurdities about which so much is being written and spoken today.

The first of these principles is establishing a target of management. We cannot speak of management (and the plan is the most important management element) unless we formulate its objectives. "Non-target planning" is nonsense!

The concept of program management was developed in the mid-1960s. As its name indicates, it is related to the concept of a management target. In technical systems any objective has always been exogenous, for it has always been issued from the outside, such as, for example, launching a space which is coupled with an orbital station. This target is dictated by the management system. In social systems, each target is formulated by the system itself. This is a permanent doctrine. In our country program stipulations are formulated in party documents. Program management stipulates a system of procedures which can ensure the implementation of targets set at party fora.

The objectives must be realistic, i.e., backed by the type of resources which the country can appropriate for the sake of achieving them. However, they must be expressed not in terms of the intermediary product, such as the number of tons of steel, petroleum, and so on, but in the language of human needs: availability of food products, level of public education, population health, state of defense capability, and so on. Therefore, the stage of the definition and setting of the target is the most important prerogative of the party and the state. However, this in itself is not as yet planning but a choice of guidelines, a formulation of programs for general development of the state. The study of development options and comparing them in terms of a large number of parameters is not, at this point, the task of the planning authorities. This is a pre-plan scientific analysis which must be made by scientific institutions. The right to

make a choice is left to the party congresses; the Supreme Soviet discusses the political recommendations of the party and makes governmental decisions.

Such is the system of a programmed management. We notice something similar to it in contemporary life. However, the streamlining of a number of procedures, the creation of a special information service which can take the formulation of options out of bureaucratic control and, to an even greater extent, departmental supervision, and to ensure the choice of objectives in such a way that they could serve as a scientific foundation for the making of governmental decisions are extremely relevant problems, the solution of which can be truly achieved with an ideal system.

The next stage is structuring the plan according to objectives set at the previous stage. The purposes are formulated as programs for social development, the well-being of the people, education, medical services, defense capability, development of the infrastructure, and so on. The task of the plan is to coordinate all such programs on the basis of outlays and resources—monetary, material and manpower.

The essential distinction between planning based on the program method and the type of planning which became traditional in postwar decades is the abandonment of planning "by department," on the basis of achievements. Let us point out that a great deal has already been accomplished in this respect, in any case in the method applied in computations. I am referring, for example, to the "granite-hard" system for drafting and coordinating planning decisions, created under the guidance of Academician G.S. Pospelov, and many other quite complex mathematical support systems. Therefore, the conversion to program planning is already quite advanced. Conservative thinking and narrowness of outlook on the part of the personnel, their insufficient training on the theoretical-economic and, particularly, managerial level, and the existing departmental organizational structure, which we shall discuss later, present powerful obstructions.

The second essential distinction of program planning is the fact that production activities and procurements are considered a single process. Saying what should be produced and where is insufficient, for the document which we know as the plan should indicate the amounts and sources of resources needed for the implementation of one item of the plan or another.

The third distinction is that from the viewpoint of the program method, the plan is not the law. It is an aid to the state authorities in the implementation of programmatic stipulations and a foundation for drafting the system of state orders and other activities within the framework of economic management methods.

The fourth characteristic is that the plan should not be too detailed. According to the theory of management, as a rule the complexity of the system of managing a project grows faster than the increased complexity of the project itself. This means that at a certain level of complexity of the project, in this case the national economy, the possibility of centralizing management of all the details of the operational process essentially disappears. Let me emphasize the word **essentially!** Therefore, centralized management and planning can cover only the basic aggregated characteristics of the economy.

The most important principle of the program method is that of feedback. The world in which we live is not rigidly set: everything is subject to the effect of random disturbances, not only atmospheric but in economic processes as well. Therefore, not only an airplane but the economy as well needs an automatic pilot. The system of economic mechanisms, about which today a great deal is being written and which is being extensively discussed, is such an automatic pilot. The "designing" of such mechanisms should be the prime task in planned economic management. I believe that in the course of time this precisely is what the main task of the Gosplan will become: designing means of attaining the targets set in the program.

Today this most essential form of managing and planning activities is based primarily on intuition and experience. However, the foundations of the theory which enables us purposefully to approach the scientific designing of such mechanisms have already been developed. Let us single out among them three entirely different types. The first is directly related to support of the plan. It applies, above all, to the system of state orders, which is the most powerful instrument of management (as Western experience indicates). The state order must be advantageous to the enterprise and account for a relatively small percentage of its capacity. In addition to the state order a number of other means exist for influencing the enterprise (taxes, the credit system, etc.).

The second type of mechanism is related to the functioning of enterprise associations. Decentralization and their autonomy bring about changes in the structure of the targets of collectives. Subordinating their activities to higher-level targets (such as, for example, on the scale of the association) requires the development of special mechanisms of the "reward-punishment" type and of cooperation mechanisms. Quite reliable theories and methods for such computations have been developed. However, all of this remains virtually unknown to the economists and I can recall no more than a few cases in which the "theory of mechanisms" has been put to practical use.

All of these are management mechanisms. Their designing and choice of parameters are the most important element in organizational and management activities. In addition to these target mechanisms, objectively there are mechanisms of a third type—spontaneous ones—

without which, however, society cannot live. They have been "activated," to the extent to which tens and hundreds of millions of people are manifesting their will, achieving individual objectives and pursuing personal and group interests. However, these mechanisms as well could be adapted, with greater or lesser success, to serve general governmental objectives, in the same way that a ferryman uses the force of the current to move his load to the other shore. Such a mechanism includes, above all, the market.

The market is an amazing mechanism. It has existed since the social division of labor appeared and has a remarkable property which could be efficient in managing the national economic organism but also, if its features are neglected, be a source of insurmountable difficulties: the market reacts to the law of value. I will leave it to political economy theoreticians to discuss the precise meaning of this assertion and limit myself to the way it is understood by specialists in the theory of management. The market triggers a negative feedback: it determines the trend of a change in prices which brings them closer to socially necessary labor outlays.

Following the abolishment of the NEP the market was proclaimed "persona non grata." However, the fact that the market was banned did not mean its elimination. The ban coincided with an appearance of a shortage of virtually all commodities. The situation was further worsened by the proclamation from all pulpits that in the socialist economy demand must outstrip supply, for this stimulates the development of output. The result was the appearance of a situation in which it became very easy to sell something but unbearably difficult to buy something. This led to the most disgusting phenomena of speculation, corruption, loss of interest in the work and, in the final account, a major degradation in the moral foundations of society. The market assumed its most distorted aspect. Now, however, in the age of perestrojka, it must resume its proper place within the system of economic mechanisms. We must learn how to use its features for the good of socialist society.

The market must help us to bring the prices of goods closer to their value, something which cannot be achieved without it. The market must bring to light the real needs. It must stimulate the elimination of shortages and ensure the priority of the consumer over the producer: difficulty to sell and facility to buy!

However, we should not consider the market an instrument for coordinating individual interests with the market system. In a planned socialist economy the market is, above all, an indicator of needs, which takes into consideration defects in planning and random factors related to the weather, the situation in international economic relations, the trends of scientific and technical progress, and so on. However, it could stimulate phenomena which hinders social progress. A number of features could oppose the ecological imperative, violate

the stability of social development and hinder the reaching of planned objectives. Therefore, the functioning of the market must be directed and regulated. I am deliberately avoiding the use of "managed," for the market would no longer be a market and be able to perform its functions if its activities are strictly managed.

Regulating the market and guiding its activities along the proper channel is one of the most important problems of economics. This must involve the use of the first two types of management mechanisms: the state order, various benefits and penalties and tax, investment and credit policies. Price controls may also be possible. However, one must be very cautious in the use of this instrument. Incidentally, I found quite interesting the example of limiting agricultural production in Austria. A farm has the right to sell at market prices, to a sugar refinery let us say, a stipulated amount of sugar beets. Anything which the producer can sell above his quota is paid by the plant at half-price. Naturally, the problem of regulating the market requires much more detailed considerations.

III

In the 1960s, when the fundamental principles of the programmatic method for managing the country's economic life were formulated, they were discussed quite extensively by specialists and even propagandized in popular publications. However, these works had no serious influence whatsoever on the development of "big" economic and management science, and even less so on planning practices, although the term "program-target method" began to be used but, in truth, not in its scientific but its bureaucratic interpretation. Since this required making substantial changes in the organization of our national economy, they could not have the type of influence consistent with the type of relations among people which were needed for the implementation of the program method. Before explaining my views on the nature of the necessary changes, however, I must discuss some general problems of the science of organization.

According to Marxist dialectics, social development is defined by the structure of contradictions and, above all, by production relations. The behavior of millions of people obeys the reality of certain laws. We know that man does not take even make a single step which does not contribute to the advancement of his interests. If we follow the development of the animate world we would see that one such "interest" is the aspiration of the individual and the population to retain their homeostasis. In society this is the homeostasis not only of the individual but of the family, the group, the class, the nation, etc. The commonality of interests of one social group or another (and not only a class) and the understanding of such commonality play a tremendous role in human behavior.

In my view, the quality of the social system could be characterized by the extent to which the interests and aspirations of the majority of groups coincide with those of society as a whole and with its stability and possibility of development. In recent decades, in our country the aspiration to group stability and to preserving one's own homeostasis within the framework of the administrative-command system led not to the development of society but to its stagnation. It is within the framework of this system that the sectorial structure of industry and "sectorial mentality" appeared: each commodity began to be produced by a single sector and it was only one specific service that was responsible for a given project. The rationality of this system was substantiated by considerations of production concentration, the need for order, and so on. Any duplication was considered harmful. Any innovation, including the use of scientific and technological achievements, which demanded a decision on the intersectorial level, became a target of innumerable coordinations. A great deal has been already said about the faultiness of this system. Let me merely underscore that its ossification was not the result of someone's malicious intent but a logical outcome of the development of the system itself. Its unspoken credo was to secure the existence of not the best, perhaps, but of all organizational units within the national economic mechanism. Competition, not to mention the bankruptcy, of any enterprise was considered inadmissible in principle!

How could such a system adopt a management method which would require a programmed rather than sectorial financing, a full restructuring of planning and use of market control mechanisms and consider cooperative relations the most important functional element?

The laws of the development of organizational structures are as objective as Newton's laws. The nature of development of the economy and its organizational foundations are inseparably linked. If we wish to achieve certain economic objectives such as, for example, to ensure under specific circumstances the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, we must change the organizational structure. The solution of the new major national economic problems is impossible within the boundaries of the old organizational structure.

Despite the specific nature of this problem, I consider appropriate to mention some general characteristics which the rational organization of society must have. They are the following:

1. The interests and aspirations of individuals and groups, created by the organization of the society, should lead to its progress, moral as well as technological.
2. The organization of society must ensure a high level of social justice and the social protection of its members.
3. The organization of society must ensure the fullest possible utilization of the intellectual potential and its intensive growth.

4. The organization of society must ensure the implementation of the stipulations of the ecological imperative.

Naturally, the first feature is basic. The others are, to a certain extent, its consequences. Actually, could we speak of the development of the moral foundation of society if it is unable to guarantee a high level of social justice? In precisely the same way the fettering of the intellectual potential of the people conflicts with the possibility of perfecting its technological foundations. The same applies to the ecological imperative: if the actions of individuals or groups are not coordinated with the coevolutionary requirements of nature and society, and if no such coordination becomes vitally needed by virtue of the organization of society itself, society should expect a catastrophe and there should be no question of any kind of development. Nonetheless, I have especially singled out the last three characteristics to emphasize their particular significance under contemporary conditions.

IV

What should be the efficient organization of our socialist society, taking all conditions and traditions into consideration? The answer to this question requires profound interdisciplinary research. This is a specific scientific trend. Let me emphasize that modern Marxism is a basic science. An answer to the question could hardly be provided today, and even less so within the limitations of a short article. That is why at this point I would like to draw attention to one single aspect of the problem which, it seems to me, is of essential, of crucial significance. It is the need to abolish the existing system of sectorial monopolies and to assert a new antisectorial way of thinking. Otherwise it would be impossible to ensure economic progress and technical retooling. Monopoly and production without competition not only make the diktat by the producer over the consumer inevitable and, consequently, leads to the inevitable shortages, but also lead to stagnation, and to the degradation of society, for they do not include the internal incentives to improve technology. Yet applying the results of scientific and technical progress as ordered by superiors, without the need created by the very fact of the existence of one production cell or another, is exceptionally difficult to accomplish. This is confirmed by our postwar experience and our grave and still extant technological lagging behind other developed countries.

What are the ways of surmounting the "sectorial disease?" Above all, we must abandon the hypnosis of production concentration as the only way of development. The dialectics is such that under capitalism, in addition to the tendency toward capital concentration, there also is an opposite tendency which was described as early as the 1920s by A.A. Bogdanov, in his "Teknologiya" [Tectology]. Problems of the degree of concentration and centralization of management must be solved specifically. For example, it is obvious that the

creation of gigantic automobile enterprises is justified but the situation with concentrating automotive services is different. Along with huge automotive service combines, in the United States for example, there also are small garages employing no more than a few people. They compete with the giants owned by Ford or General Motors quite successfully. That is why we must decide the fate of enterprises in all sectors in accordance with the specific features of their functioning. The aspiration to unification which, in my view, is inherent in the laws on the enterprise and the cooperative, seems dangerous to me.

Today each enterprise or association must be under a ministry. This situation limits the opportunities of an enterprise to show initiative. In my view, a plant, a factory or an association could also exist "under a Soviet system." They could be truly independent, pay taxes to the government, ask for state orders if this is profitable to the enterprise, and so on. The state entrusts the collective of such an enterprise with some of its property in the same way that a stock holding company entrusts its capital to the manager. The collective (or the management) is responsible to the law for the fate of the production cell entrusted to it.

I believe that the industrial ministries should be deprived of administrative rights toward the majority of "their own" enterprises. They must be responsible for the strategy of production development. They should manage a certain number of losing enterprises which develop and produce new equipment, for initially new equipment is always losing! The losses should be compensated by offering the new developments for mass production. Such a procedure would exclude distorted phenomena in the production, let us say, of agricultural equipment: although we are producing more such equipment than anyone else in the world, we are still short of the necessary machines.

Within the framework of such an organization of state industry reciprocally advantageous relations would develop among republics and oblasts, not imposed from above. Naturally, such a "freedom" enjoyed by the producers would also have certain social consequences: competition would inevitably lead to the bankruptcy of poorly working enterprises and the living standards in the various parts of the country would become disparate although, one could remain confident, they would improve in general. Such consequences are not all that undesirable, for on the scale of society as a whole, they would stimulate the exchange of experience and the more intensive work of the people and would contribute to bringing their intellectual potential to light.

For a long time we have ignored the fact that the "superstructure" is not determined singly by the "base" but, having taken one shape or another, it begins to influence the latter's development, sometimes in entirely unexpected ways. At least two generations grew up under circumstances in which people said one thing, thought

something else and did something else again. Our administrative system was perfectly satisfied with beautiful reports, fake indicators, reflecting merely the wishes of the command, and endless figure-padding. All of this contributed to the stagnation, corruption and atrophy of social life. The state could no longer continue to exist in this way. Our socialist fatherland and the way of life for which dozens of millions of people had sacrificed their lives, demand a firm moral foundation. Without it we can not solve economic and social difficulties or, in general, create a truly socialist society. Morality is inaccessible outside of democracy and glasnost. In one form or another, these truths have been codified in the party documents and repeatedly expressed. However, proclaiming the principles of democracy and glasnost is one thing and their implementation something entirely different. Along this way we are encountering direct opposition and lack of understanding of what democracy actually means, a low cultural standard and that same morality without which democracy is merely a dangerous illusion. The circle is closed!

How to break it? I believe that, above all, society must demand a consistency between the high criteria of morality and "purity of behavior" on the part of those who stand in front of the public, be they managers, noted scientists, writers, public figures, and so on. I do not suggest in the least that we go back to the party maximalism of the 1920s. I am convinced that party and soviet personnel and other managers should be paid more than a driver or an engineer. In this case we must observe the principle of paying according to labor. However, this will also be the basic principle of morality: although paid more for more difficult work, in everything else the manager would remain an ordinary citizen. The implementation of the fiscal security reform, based on the "uniform ruble" under the conditions of glasnost will create the necessary moral climate and become just about the most important symbol of social justice.

The principle of payment according to labor and "uniform money" must be implemented everywhere and strictly, not only toward individuals but oblasts and republics as well. Today Finland, which is a former outlying area of the Russian Empire, has reached a higher living standard than England. Glory and honor to the industriousness of its people. In our country as well, there should be no place for equalization. Where people work better, where the organization of economic activities is higher, the living standard should be higher as well. Naturally, difficult problems arise, related to the level of rental payment for resources, and so on. However, these problems are simple and can be solved within the framework of the cooperative. It was not in vain that Lenin described socialism as a society of civilized members of cooperatives. The firmness and monolithic unity of the state organization of the Union of republics is also largely the consequence of cooperation: people find it "more profitable" to band together.

The assertion and strengthening of morality is a matter for the entire country, the entire nation. State and party

decisions to this effect are insufficient. The activeness of the people must be awakened. I see this as the tremendous role of the public organizations, whatever their nature, particularly that of societies dealing with charity, aid to children's homes, restoration and preservation of monuments, folk creativity and culture as a whole. Comprehensive improvements must be their target. No bureaucratic fettering or regulation should exist, and such societies should be truly social.

The role of art is infinitely great. All of us, in our country, lack a humanitarian upbringing. A great deal is being said today of the aspiration to humanize education. I consider this trend exceptionally important. Whereas the 20th century developed under the sign of the blossoming of physics, technology and biology, the forthcoming century should become the "century of man." Knowledge of literature, music, painting and history is extremely necessary.... This, however, is not enough. We must change the entire way of thinking. It must not be man for science, technology and economics but, conversely, everything must be for man, not in words but in deeds. This too means "more socialism." However, acquiring such a world outlook, eliminating the vestiges of the mentality of the "cog," and opening the gate to the flow of individual talent is a grandiose task. I see as the first difficulty the training of teachers who can engage in such restructuring. Particular attention should be paid to this problem. The present school reform is an initial and very timid step in the right direction. Furthermore, one can see it only through a microscope. I believe that we must enhance the prestige of the teacher, the standard of his material well-being and his status in society and, naturally, assert his right to independence in his creative work. Only then can we hope for an influx of fresh forces, of talented young people inspired by new ideas.

The final question which I cannot ignore in this section is that of religion. A great deal has already been said and done on this account in the past few years. Today a new understanding of its role in human life is taking place. As history indicates, religion is a natural element of the social structure. Here is why: religion has not only social but also gnosiological foundations. A certain vagueness remains in any of our scientific elaborations and aspirations to become aware of events around us. However extensively science may be developing, and however profound and reliable the initial phenomenological material may be, our concepts are based on a certain combination of hypotheses or else, as V.I. Vernadskiy said, "empirical summations." However substantially science could compress this area of vagueness, the picture of the world which we imagine will always contain a certain system of axioms or, at best, concepts which can be tested only a posteriori. I profess a certain physical image of the world and acknowledge that each new knowledge awakens in us the need to formulate new hypotheses which can be sometimes understood with difficulty even by scientists in different areas. The coordination of physical constants, thanks to which our

universe can exist and, within it, man, I do not perceive as a divine plan but seek other explanations. S. Hocking, the noted British physicist, said: "Thus, everything takes place because we exist!" However, other equally meaningful interpretations may also exist. Perhaps we are because everything is as is! That is why, given the level of knowledge we have reached, a place remains for religious feelings. We cannot ignore the fact that religion and religious feelings are not one and the same. The physical picture of the world is, in a certain sense, also a fragment of faith. It is faith in the unity between nature and man, in the fact that our thoughts and feelings are as much natural processes as are the universe and life. Such faith could create a religious feeling. Having acknowledged this, however, in a socialist society as well we must remain tolerant of religious views which embody an element of human culture.

Naturally, the laws of the socialist state must exclude the possibility of the existence of extreme sects or of any kind of fanaticism.

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I realize that everything I have presented here is not a system of views. It is merely an invitation for a major discussion. We owe to history purposefully to plan the development of an efficient socialist society. Such a society does not develop by itself, as a result of the effect of elemental forces. Furthermore, occasionally distorted forms of social organization appear to such an extent that they can only discredit the very idea of socialism. Alas, this does not apply to our country alone. The problem of a "rational socialism" is the most important of all problems facing the socialist world. For the time being, no single socialist country has been able to outstrip, shall we say, the level of development of production forces of the United States or Japan and, which may be even more important, the ability of those countries to assimilate new technical and scientific ideas.

Today a spirit of criticism is prevailing in the country. No less important, however, are constructive activities. Furthermore, it is precisely such activities that today, after the overthrow of the idols, that is becoming determining. This has already started. Unfortunately, however, so far emotional aspects prevail in the activities of the masses, which are short of a systematic approach and of a profound and tranquil scientific analysis. One does not replace the other. I believe that the time has come to return to a very important thought expressed by the late Academician M.A. Lavrentyev.

During N.S. Khrushchev's time he tried to create, under governmental control, a consultative council of scientists, whose task would be the study of prospects for the development of the country and ways of surmounting the difficulties which inevitably arise along the path of progress. According to Lavrentyev, such a council should include scientists whose qualifications are universally

acknowledged but who do not hold any high administrative position. They should be independent of the administrative apparatus, of the system. Another prerequisite would be for every member of the council to be the head of a scientific school, to enjoy a high scientific reputation. He considered this very important, for if the need would appear flexibly to conduct a specific study, the members of the council could immediately set up a proper scientific group.

Such a council would have no special rights other than one: the right to access to departmental information and its scientific analysis. This council was given an office in the Kremlin and met on several occasions.

Soon after N.S. Khrushchev's resignation, however, the council was disbanded. The departments could not tolerate the existence of any kind of authority directly "reporting" to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and capable of developing its own opinion, independent of opinions which arise within the apparatus.

I believe that the time to recreate such a council has come. Our problems are exceptionally difficult. No single economist or philosopher can solve them. We also need some engineering thinking. Natural scientists—physicists, mathematicians, biologists, etc.—could make a tremendous contribution to this. The information industry is assuming an increasing role. It is only such a collective, carefully organized in accordance with Lavrentyev's idea, that could systematically develop the problems which are facing today both our country and the entire world. The attention of the entire world is indeed focused on us. I am convinced that successful decisions on our part could qualitatively influence the entire future history of mankind.

The principles of Lavrentyev's council should be mandatorily preserved. Participation in its work should yield no privileges whatsoever. Its members should have the freedom to think. Such a consultative council should be created under contemporary conditions probably under the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

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Back to the Future
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[Article by V. Kadulin]

[Text] A great deal had to change in life and in our awareness before A. Chayanov's "A Short Course on Cooperatives" could end up on the desk of Yuriy Ivanovich Litvintsev, first secretary of the Tula Party Obkom. It was not solely out of respect for the memory of the great scientist that the people of Tula were able to find,

with extreme difficulty, and subsequently to duplicate, this textbook which had become a bibliographic rarity. They were motivated by urgent and entirely prosaic concerns.

Alienation from the land and the products of one's toil, the coercion of administrative-command management methods, suppression of commodity-monetary relations, the "rationing" of resources, and numerous deficiencies in the social organization are felt in their full magnitude in the very hard daily life of the Tula countryside. The difficulties which are shared by the entire Russian Non-chernozem are worsened here by the development of heavy industry, which is powerful and disturbing the socioeconomic balance of the area.

It is rare for any one of our numerous ministries not to have its own enterprise in the oblast. Its 23 rayons include 69 cities and worker settlements. Many of them have become major centers for coal mining, ferrous metallurgy, power industry, machine-building, and chemistry. Together with Moscow, which is nearby, like a huge pump, until recently they have been siphoning off the labor resources of the countryside. And whereas at the very start of the 1940s two-thirds of the oblast's population lived in villages, today four-fifths are urban residents. Based on global standards, such figures may seem quite favorable. However, the obkom secretary complains, with every passing year the oblast's population is aging. Almost one out of three is retired. The population is also declining in absolute terms. Above all, the organization of agricultural production and the technical facilities in agriculture are far behind contemporary standards, as far behind as the level of social development of Tula villages and the rates of availability of food products and their structure in terms of the rural population and the urban residents.

The oblast is self-supporting and even supplies to the Union fund grain, potatoes, vegetables, fruits, meat and milk, although in relatively modest amounts. However, in order reliably to ensure the steady socioeconomic renovation of the countryside and the implementation of the Food Program, a great deal remains to be done. The extensive mechanization of livestock farms, some of which have changed little since the time of Count Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy or the use of intensive technologies, however important this may be in itself, was insufficient. It was also necessary to realize the simple truth that even the most advanced unmanned technology is based on production relations among people, on human interests.

Aware that their optimizing would require more than minor improvements, the people of Tula undertook the radical reorganization of administrative structures and economic relations within the agroindustrial complex. Eighteen months ago, with the support of the party's Central Committee, they were able to set up, on a cooperative basis, the first agroindustrial association in the country, the "Novomoskovskoye," which replaced

the RAPO, which had the high status of a state administrative body but was of little use to the work because of its bureaucratic nature. Similar associations appeared in many other oblast rayons despite the opposition of the involved departments.

This, however, is only one trend in the restructuring of economic relations on the rayon level, on a cooperative basis. Another one is gathering strength as well: in the fields and livestock farms of Yasnogorskiy Rayon, which is not alone in this respect, the individual, family and collective contracting system is being applied ever more extensively. Its determining feature is the long-term lease of basic means of production. The main cost accounting subunits in kolkhozes and sovkhoses are becoming, in such cases, primary cooperatives of lessees engaged in the production of agricultural commodities and providing a variety of services.

In this case, should we be astounded by the great interest shown by the managers of the oblast party organization in such an apt and timely discovery of the booklet by A. Chayanov? As one might guess, this outstanding economic scientist has helped them to strengthen their faith in the accuracy of their choice and, which is also important, to oppose dogmatic criticism of the changes they are making. From of that distant year of 1926, A. Chayanov is answering today's guardians of total "statism" of socialist ownership, explaining when and why, in servicing the countryside, the cooperative machinery turns out to be more advanced than the state enterprise: "The cooperative, in which even the smallest subdivisions are managed by officials elected by the working people, operating under the daily and tireless control of the members of the cooperative who elected them, independent of the administrative orders issued by the center, flexible in economic work, allowing the fastest and freest manifestation of advantageous local initiative, is the best machinery needed in the case of organized local independent activities in which, in each separate case, one must flexibly adapt to local conditions and take into consideration even the slightest features of each locality and time of work."

In reading this work, which was written with envious literary skill and is based on the firm foundation of the facts and phenomena of real life, one cannot escape the thought that this work, as many other works by A. Chayanov and his fellow workers, should become available to the readership at large as soon as possible. We need a turn to the past not for the sake of mechanically repeating it, but for the sake of the future. It means returning to Lenin, to his cooperative plan, through the experience of the cooperative movement in the country, undistorted by subsequent deformations. It enables us to take a new look, without prejudice, at the tremendous and by no means as yet exhausted possibilities of the cooperative, the simple growth of which, under contemporary conditions as well, to use Lenin's words, is identical to the growth of socialism.

This is a position firmly held by Gennadiy Vasilyevich Trushin, first secretary of the Yasnogorskiy Party Raykom. To him Lenin's article "On the Cooperative," which was written shortly before Lenin's death, is like a symbol of faith. This faith in this booklet is not blind but nurtured by personal experience and the lessons of real life rather than doctrinaire schemes. To this rural raykom secretary, a return to Lenin's ideas of the cooperative, and a turn to the broad development of its contemporary forms mean, above all, dismantling the very foundations of the huge pyramid of the administrative system, which became ossified in the course of several decades, and a real and very promising possibility of putting an end to rigid bureaucratic methods used in managing human behavior, which offer no alternatives, and which have been afflicted with a protracted crisis. Trushin is convinced that it is immoral to manage the production process with an administrative stick, as immoral, in his view, as are cheering appeals for bare enthusiasm, economically unsupported, in which the numerous inconsistencies of our economic mechanism force the worker to dodge, work at half strength and, frequently, not care for the job. Trushin tirelessly repeats that the ruble is moral when it has been earned, when it is not moved from one state pocket to another but truly participates in economic turnover, in each purchase and sale act. It is moral because it loyally serves as an instrument of social accountability and outlays and results and as a social measure of labor and consumption.

A great deal is being said today about adopting a political approach to the solution of the problems facing party committees and the inadmissibility of having them substitute for economic and soviet authorities. Trushin, who sincerely welcomes this formulation of the matter, does not forget to specify that by giving priority to politics over economics we must not ignore that, nonetheless, politics is the concentrated expression of economics. There is no way for the party committees to avoid this in their activities and, should they do so, the result would be nothing other than harming perestroika.

Such are the positions on the basis of which the rayon party organization helps the comprehensive organization of the leasing system. It is helping without getting carried away by a campaign spirit or pursuit of high percentages and without resorting to power pressure which could only compromise a major and promising project, but trying to act through persuasion and relying on the power of the example.

At first the more convincing examples had to be borrowed from the book or be sought in close or distant neighbors. Now, however, it is the latter who increasingly visit Yasnogorskiy Rayon to learn on the spot experience in leasing. As to the Yasnogorsk people themselves, they continue to learn, arguing heatedly, according to eyewitnesses, at the debate club for managers sponsored by the party raykom, where the pioneers of the leasing system speak, and participate in the business games organized by the raykom.

The rayon already has the Agroservis Cooperative, created on the basis of rayselkhoztekhnika, which is engaged in providing production-technical and material facilities to kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The collectives of the mobile mechanized column, the capital construction department and the cost accounting planning-accounting group of the RAPO have merged within a design-construction cooperative.

The Yasnogorets, an agroindustrial food cooperative, which is a subject of particular concern to the first secretary, is being organized. The cooperative was set up on the basis of withholdings from industrial and other organizations in the rayon. The amount of the share, by general agreement, was computed simply: the 60 rubles per capita are multiplied by the number of workers employed in one production collective or another. It is much more difficult to gain permission for such withholdings from one's own department and for the share holding organizations to find such funds. Therefore, the board of the recently established Yasnogorets is already feeling a shortage of funds needed to lease premises and equipment, for which initially it must pay in cash instead of credit. However, eventually a solution will be found, for how else can it be when everyone has set great hope on this cooperative? For the immediate task which Yasnogorets has set itself is the additional production and marketing (in two of its own stores!) an average of 20 kilograms of meat and 50 kilograms of milk per year per rayon resident. This would be a substantial addition to the food supplies of the rayon. Future plans for the cooperative call for building a smoking shed, a cheese making plant, an organization for storing and processing fruits and vegetables, and the construction of housing, a music school and a physical culture and health recovery center.

The party raykom secretary met repeatedly with the young mechanizers from the Agroservis Production-Technical Cooperative. Last year Trushin persuaded them to undertake the production of feed on a collective contracting basis. Currently the next step is being prepared, and it is important for the raykom secretary to determine the mood of the boys and their readiness to lease 920 hectares of land and the necessary equipment and to organize an independent cooperative which could reliably supply feed to the Yasnogorets so that it may produce 800 tons of meat and 1,600 tons of milk for the rayon's population. Also planned is the creation of two other leasing cooperatives, one of which will undertake the production of concentrated fodder and the other will process milk purchased from the population.

Another process which is gathering strength is that of setting up leasing cooperatives by rural workers within rayon sovkhozes and kolkhozes. The family leasing system is being developed. Finally, the experience acquired in setting up cooperatives and leasing, gained in the countryside, is being disseminated by the party raykom directly among industrial enterprises. Thus, at the Yasnogorsk Machine-Building Plant ten members of the

MZhK organized a cooperative for the production of consumer goods worth 600,000 rubles. In the future the members of rayon cooperatives will undertake the production of a variety of goods and services worth in excess of 3 million rubles. The cooperative movement which is developing in the rayon from below will be completed with forming a council of cooperatives.

This truly democratic management body will not lay off workers. It will be headed by a farm manager. The type of self-management organically inherent in cooperatives will replace the administrative-pressure management methods in the rayon agroindustrial complex. The council of cooperatives will perform entirely different functions related to providing a variety of services, such as scientific and technical developments, information and consultations.

And what about the RAPO? It will be simply forced to terminate its existence. All indications are that the Yasnogorsk RAPO has become resigned to its lot and is not trying to obstruct the cooperative movement which has become widespread in the rayon but nor is it in a hurry to help it. The raykom secretary spoke of this calmly, without irritation. While still working as kolkhoz chairman, he became convinced of the absolutely unnecessary existence of the RAPO as it had been established. Trushin is sorry for most of the specialists who were simply lost and alienated from the land as a result of their daily involvement in bureaucratic "paper" procedures.

To what extent are kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers returning to the land, to steady work which does not tolerate mischief and slovenliness and to economic autonomy and, perhaps, self-respect, all such things which were largely corrupted and lost during the cruel times of total "decourtrification" of the countryside?

The Zybino State Livestock Breeding Farm is frequently referred today as the Arendator Association, for the reason that the virtually entire sovkhoz has been leased out. Functioning within it are some 50 primary units—group, family or individual lessees. This includes the families of farm specialists, including that of the director. Here leasing has been practiced for several years, a great deal of it without experience, using the trial and error method, says Sovkhoz Party Committee Secretary Galina Leontyevna Martseva, who used to be its chief bookkeeper. The farm went through the systems of shop management structures and collective contracting, initially on the link and brigade levels, with payments based on end results according to progressively increasing rates, and the checkbook system for accounting for and controlling outlays.

As was to be expected, the initiative and responsibility of the specialists and rank-and-file working people increased. Greater order was introduced in the contracting subunits. Crop yields increased and milk production and weight increases in the kolkhoz livestock farms

improved. Meanwhile, production outlays remained on virtually the same level and, in some cases, even increased. It was only leasing that eventually led to the anti-outlay economic mechanism.

Motor vehicle drivers were the first to convert to a leasing system, for in their case leasing was relatively simpler compared to other production subunits. Now the motor vehicle is beginning to "earn" the money paid the driver. Their work rates were set according to the model of the leased motor vehicle, taking as a base the average cost of its maintenance for the 3 previous years. The more freight the truck hauls and the less it idles because of repairs or any other reason, the higher will be the income, and not the wage, of the lessee. In the past all drivers worked hard in summer, but in winter some of them preferred to rest, taking their motor vehicles to the garage for repairs and earning 97 rubles per month as per their wage rate. Now the driver must pay for the repairs and for spare parts out of his own pocket, so that he would rather do the repairs himself and, above all, he would try to run his vehicle in such a way as to keep it running without breakdowns and as long as possible. Unlike the situation in the past, it has become unprofitable to keep the vehicle idling with the engine running, thus burning fuel, for he must also pay for the fuel.

Only yesterday some 40 vehicles were idling in the sovkhos. However, even when they worked, there was a chronic shortage of vehicles. Now the fleet consists of 18 vehicles but the amount of work they perform has increased. Compared to 1987, idling for technical reasons has been reduced by a factor of 7; vehicle maintenance expenditures have been reduced by 50,000 rubles. Figure padding disappeared when last January all shops in the state livestock breeding farm converted to the leasing system and it became unprofitable to pay money out of one's own pocket for work that was not actually done.

Leasing discourages waste. Today cost accounting does not permit the worker to do that which he light-handedly did only yesterday: for example, to let anyone who asks for it, use a tractor or give him a bucket of mixed feed in exchange for a bottle of liquor or simply for free, for he was not giving away something that belonged to him. Discounts, all sorts of free norm/hours or soft-plowing hectares and many other customary rates, on the basis of which lots of time and efforts were wasted throughout the country, become unnecessary to a leasing collective. They are replaced by prices. The cooperative members do not give their produce to the lessor but sell it to state purchasing organizations on the basis of internal farm or contractual prices; they do not obtain materials and services they need but purchase them on the basis of planned or, again, contractual prices. The personal well-being of every lessee is based on the amount of the residual income, which is higher the more he sells and the less he pays for services. The leasing contract, personal accounts and checking accounts are what regulate production and relations among participants.

Naturally, this is the basic system. There still exist breakdowns in the leasing mechanism which requires further improvements and organization. Scientists who have studied the Zybino experience have noted a number of unquestionable advantages. However, in their view, here one could speak of leasing relations only with a certain degree of tolerance, above all because they do not exhaustively include or clearly stipulate reciprocal obligations. This particularly applies to the responsibility of the lessees for the nonimplementation of contractual obligations. The primary cooperatives as well do not entirely justify, in the opinion of the scientists, their name above all because they do not have the rights of juridical persons. Naturally, this limits their cost accounting autonomy.

Actually, the Zybino people themselves do not absolutize their accomplishments in the least. According to G.L. Martseva, the sovkhos did not try to reorganize the existing shop management structure, relying on improving economic relations within production subunits and among them. Naturally, discrepancies in such relations are bound to appear.

The Zybino milkmaids work in units of two. They service no more than 50 cows and milk them in two shifts. One milk maid is in charge of all accounts; income and expenditures based on the sale of milk to the sovkhos, offspring and manure are shared evenly. Inequality develops among the units. Milk prices are the same for the entire livestock breeding cooperative but the units' expenditures vary: some were given younger cows which yield more than other. The cow barns in the sovkhos are for 100 and 200 cows. The cost of leasing is evenly divided, although in one of the cases it is paid by two units and in the other by four. The clash which is "typical" of our economy develops in taking care of the cow barns. It turns out that the cow barn is shared by all and, at the same time, belongs to no one. Difficulties owed to the same reason appear in the crop growing cooperative, which includes about 30 mechanizers who jointly handle three crop rotation systems which include quite large areas. For that reason the scientists believe that it would be more useful to lease to an individual cooperative separate crop rotation areas.

Many of my interlocutors emphasized the "division" consistent with the nature of leasing and the specific nature of agricultural production. However, such divisions do not disintegrate or divide the collective and fears on this account are groundless. Much more worrisome is the present division within the ordinary labor collectives, a division which, in the opinion of the sovkhos party secretary, considering the truncated half-way cost accounting system, is extremely high. The situation with small leasing units is different.

In the Milino Sovkhos, such a two-member unit leased a livestock farm raising 100 heifers. Here daily weight increases average 900 to 1,000 grams and some heifers are growing even faster. In other farms cattle are raised

for a period of 3 years, thus wasting expensive fodder. The young lessees, however, intend to sell the animals after 16 months. When I arrived at the farm, Aleksandr Skobin, the senior member of the unit had gone to fetch fodder. His partner Tabrik Kadyrov was whitewashing the walls, waiting for his return. Even without this, however, the neatness of the livestock farm was a pleasing sight. The work of the partners is not heavy, the technology has been organized to its smallest details, and there is free time. For that reason, joined by their wives, they decided to lease more milk cows.

In the northernmost area of Yasnogorskiy Rayon, despite the poor land and extremely worn-out equipment at the Grigoryevskiy Sovkhoz, four young mechanizers, headed by Valentin Grishin, are proving the inviolability of the rule which applies to the size of a leasing collective: better less but better. Having estimated the load per tractor and assessed their possibilities, these boys, one of whom had never before dealt with grain growing, estimated that they could handle 330 hectares in grain, 120 hectares in fallow land and 64 hectares in seasonal grass. The lessees get along well. They know each other well and their families are friends. Things went well! The volume of work which was previously performed in the sovkhov with the help of some 20 people from the city, was completed by them alone and with no particular stress. Naturally, they relieved each other. When they plowed, not one of them ignored rocks or bits of metal on the ground. They knew that the fields would be harvested with a combine and it made absolutely no sense to harm the machinery. They were not in a hurry to cover more ground, as in the past, knowing that their income would be based not on the size of the land but on the size of the crop. They abandoned the rating system and the labor participation coefficient, believing all this to be unnecessary red tape. With only two combines they harvested the crops on time and without losses. In the past this same amount of work required five combines. This year the spring crops were affected by the drought of the previous autumn. The sovkhov yields averaged 9 quintals whereas these boys averaged 15.5 quintals per hectare. They also completed the sowing for next year's crop in better time.

The same conditions stipulated in the contract concluded between Valentin Grishin's unit with the sovkhov management were included in the lease signed with a second unit. The results turned out entirely different. This unit numbered eleven people of with different backgrounds, and the mutual understanding on which relations in the first unit were based did not develop here. The unit began to break down as soon as a few mechanizers began to behave unconscientiously.

Nikolay Ivanovich Suportkin, the sovkhov director who recently took over this understaffed farm, is heavily relying on family leasing. The number of sovkhov mechanizers is more or less adequate, but the need for livestock breeders is urgent. That is why in the near future Suportkin intends to employ the families of the lessees.

The people of Yasnogorsk joke that they have in their rayon their own "Arkhangelsk muzhik," referring to the story of the vicissitudes of lessee Nikolay Sivkov in Arkhangelsk Oblast. Unlike the behavior of that oblast's leadership, however, Trushin refers with obvious sympathy to Vladimir Nikolayevich Chirikov, his wife Galina Ivanovna and his oldest son, 16-year old Dima, a student at the SPTU, who lives in Arkhangelskoye Village: "This family has become unrecognizable. One can literally see the people maturing."

Chirikov is a gas pump operator. Although not arduous, this is a necessary work for which he earns no more than 120 rubles. His wife worked as a fitter. No one in the petroleum distribution command was ever interested whether the station was doing good work. During their free time they worked in their backyard and took care of their cow. Starting with last spring, the Chirikov's life became much happier. What had changed? Was it that the fitter's job held by Galina Ivanovna at the station had been abolished? Or was it that the television and the newspapers started stirring things up on the subject of family contracting? Both, probably. One way or another, the Chirikovs held a family council and decided to risk it, to lease. They signed a contract with the kolkhoz. Soon afterwards, to the amazement of the people around them, they showed an envious industriousness and business acumen. Their son developed a passion for peasant work. They leased nine cows and a tractor from the kolkhoz. Vladimir Nikolayevich built, with the help of materials procured from the sovkhov, a wooden cow shed, equipped with running water and electricity, and installed a machine milking system. He organized the grazing of his herd on the neighboring pasture, which in the past was mercilessly trampled by the cattle, in such a way that he was even able to mow some grass. This family of lessees was able to procure 30 tons of hay and prepare silage.

The leasing contract is exhibited for all to see on the wicket-gate of the Chirikov home. This year the income of the lessees should be 3,202 rubles and the income they would contribute to the kolkhoz would total 17,350 rubles. As a lessee, through his labor Chirikov would contribute to the kolkhoz earnings of 9,728 rubles, whereas the average kolkhoz member would generate no more than 5,295 rubles. Here is another indicative comparison as quoted by the rayon newspaper which regularly describes the experience of the lessees. The average cost per quintal of milk in the rayon is 36 rubles. In the Zybino State Breeding Sovkhoz, which is highly mechanized, and has skilled specialists who also work on a leasing basis, it will average 28 rubles; in the Chirikov family it will be even two rubles lower. Yet the cows which Chirikov leased are not the best. This year the Chirikov family will average 2,800 kilograms per cow, which is above the kolkhoz average. Next year the average will be 4,000 kilograms. But what if this family of lessees is given purebred cattle, helped to acquire equipment consistent with the specifics of a family farm and given advice by specialists? That is the way things

should develop, G.V. Trushin believes. This, however, is a matter for the future. Today Vladimir Nikolayevich and Galina Ivanovna can tell you a story which may seem silly only on the surface. Of late a number of guests have visited the Chirikov's. After one such visit the rumor spread in the district that whenever guests were expected from Moscow, the Chirikov cows would be replaced, rugs would be put on their floors and they would receive a thousand rubles from the raykom.

The jealousy and ill will shown toward the lessees and their income are manifested today in less innocuous forms as well. Leasing is frequently secretly or sometimes openly opposed by the administrative apparatus and the farm specialists, for the reason alone that it makes quite realistic the possibility of drastically reducing the number of such officials, disrupting the customary way of life and making the attitude toward common projects much more interested and responsible. The need for brigade leaders was eliminated with the conversion of the entire Zybino farm to a leasing arrangement. Today the functions of the brigade leaders have been assumed by the specialists. Having realized that she was superfluous, the garage dispatcher became the cafeteria manager. The management personnel was reduced from 52 to 36. The amount of "paper" work has been tangibly reduced with the use of the leasing system, despite the still largely bureaucratic management system of the agroindustrial complex. At the Revyakino Sovkhoz, for example, this made it possible to reduce the management to five officials.

The cooperative lessees would like to see the farm specialists as capable advisors and not "drivers." The lessees at the Santalovo Sovkhoz stated this most firmly. They opposed paying the specialists four or five additional salaries based on annual results, and insisted on their own conditions. Cost accounting, which is intensified by the leasing arrangement and is beginning to function ever more actively in favor of the public interest, gives the rural workers civic courage and develops a taste for democracy although, it is true, by no means always.

Purchase and sale relations are the core of the leasing arrangement. They presume the free choice of technology, feeding, use of chemical fertilizers, and so on. However, the practice of planning the structure of areas in crops and funding resources by superior authorities and lack of wholesale trade in means of production substantially narrow the limits of this freedom. The activities of the lessees are severely hindered. It is difficult to speak of intensive production work, economy and responsibility of the parties for the strict observance of obligations when material support available to the farm and the personnel who sign leases with it is based on the principle of "grab what they give you." Essentially, the lessee becomes a hostage to such obligations. The extent of the risk to which he becomes exposed groundlessly increases. It is only a free market and totally

unrestricted commodity-monetary relations that could totally eliminate the obstacles erected on the way to the development of leasing relations.

"As a manager of a farm and of lessees, what is it that I need?" asked Valentin Ilich Nikitin, director of the Santalovo Sovkhoz. "To have cash in hand! Sell what you have produced and buy what you need. If you have sold little or purchased too much your income will drop. That is what economics is all about!"...

Today's revival of cooperatives is difficult. It is not only a way to the enhancement of the rural economy but also to new opportunities for the accelerated social development of the countryside and the intensification of its spiritual life. Year after year the Revyakino Sovkhoz was unable to meet the task of selling its produce to the state. For 8 years no construction whatsoever took place at the farm. As a result of the concern shown by the party raykom, which paid a great deal of attention to the renovation of cadres, the energetic and enterprising Nadezhda Mikhaylovna Udalova, who had worked at the sovkhaz as its chief economist and, subsequently, party committee secretary, assumed the leadership of the farm. Today the sovkhaz is fulfilling its state plan and has started to use the leasing system. In terms of its standard of economic work this farm, which cannot boast of abundant equipment or natural land fertility, assumed second place in the rayon. Ten newly built houses have now added a happy little street to the kolkhoz settlement. The entire sovkhaz collective celebrated moving into new houses. There was a performance by the recently created chorus. Warm send-offs are being celebrated for those who retire. The first three families have left urban life behind, and have returned to their native land. Running water was finally brought in houses built over the past 20 years, where, all that time, idle pipes were gathering rust. Natural gas will soon be piped in to the sovkhaz settlements. Roads are being built to connect two villages.... Some people may consider such changes not particularly significant. However, to the sovkhaz workers unspoiled by modern conveniences these are happy confirmations of the renovation of life, achieved through hard peasant toil.

A. Chayanov's "*Short Course in Cooperatives*" ends on a high note: "Russian peasant, your future is in your own hands! For you the only road to a bright life of work goes through the cooperatives. You must know that this road is the only one! To deviate from it means to perish."

An increasing number of supporters of the leasing system is appearing in Yasnogorskiy Rayon. The people of Yasnogorsk are becoming increasingly resolved to bring matters to their successful end. It is perhaps precisely for this reason that in their thoughts on the future of the cooperatives they have always been concerned with not stopping, not going back!

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Turnover: The Way to Radical Reform
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[Article by Viktor Danilovich Belkin, doctor of economic sciences, professor, head of laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources; Pavel Alekseyevich Medvedev, doctor of economic sciences, docent, Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov; and Igor Vasilyevich Nit, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow State University docent]

[Text] *"...I personally believe that until a monetary reform has been carried out cost accounting will be illusory, incomplete and will not allow our economic managers to experience the attractiveness of cost accounting and to learn truly to work, like owners, at the enterprises.*

"M.S. Gorbachev. Viktor Ivanovich! Are you speaking of the price reform or the monetary reform?"

"I. Postnikov. The monetary, wholesale and retail reform, all of this must simultaneously be included in the reform" (V.I. Postnikov, conference delegate, general director of the Stavropolskoye Broiler Raising Association).

The basic shortcomings of the radical reform became apparent in the course of the discussions at the 19th Party Conference. It was pointed out that the old administrative-pressure enterprise management system had remained practically the same, disguised as state orders; this harmed enterprise economic independence. In this case it is a matter not merely of the bureaucratic arbitrariness of ministries, departments and the Gosplan. The comprehensive state orders are objectively based on the still operating system of centralized allocation of material resources. Under that system almost all resources are allocated for the fulfillment of state orders. In order radically to correct the situation the idea is to reduce the time for converting to wholesale trade in means of production and complete it by the end of the current 5-year period.

The question which arises is how to accomplish this? This is a difficult question, for even the longer terms which were set in the past for a conversion to wholesale trade proved to be insufficient.

Superficially it may appear that converting to wholesale trade can be accomplished by simply eliminating funding. However, considering the present commodity-monetary imbalance, the enterprises would immediately buy out material resources, some of which they would stockpile in reserve. Such was the case in 1987, when the Minstroydormash enterprises were converted to wholesale trade. The enterprises purchased the metal they would need for the year during the first quarter, thus creating hardships for other metal consumers. In such a case restrictions could have been imposed on funds and,

as had been frequently done in the past, pull out surplus enterprise funds as the final sacrifice on the altar of the reform. However, this too is not a solution. Under the existing procedure for their accumulation, soon afterwards surplus funds would show up once again. As we know, natural indicators are the instruments used in current administrative management and planning: pieces, tons, meters, and so on. From the beginning of the 1930s and to this day finances, credits and money have been assigned a secondary, an accountability-control role. It was literally prescribed that they should do nothing to hinder planning and distribution in physical terms. This led to "easy" credit and surplus funds.

Problems of material turnover, credit and finances in the conversion from the existing semi-bartering economic mechanism to a commodity-monetary system are insoluble in different extents. What is needed here is a comprehensive reform in the turnover area. Following is a concept for such a reform: its essence is the interrelated conversion to wholesale trade in means of production and the conversion to clearing accounts. First to be converted to wholesale trade are enterprises producing consumer goods or providing paid services to the population. One of their aspects is that they are already linked to consumers through market purchase and sale relations. The success of their activities is objectively assessed by the consumers who indicate their rating of such goods and services by paying with their earned rubles which they can spend within a relatively broad range.

Initiating wholesale trade in means of production will have a positive influence on balancing the consumer market and on the living conditions of millions of people, for this would provide a major impetus for upgrading labor productivity and increasing the production of popular goods. Such incentives will become particularly effective, for the enterprises will be able to spend their earned funds as they wish within the overall balance. Such money, fully converted in internal trade, will be described as convertible. It should not be confused with the current means of payment, for which reason it should be deposited in separate bank accounts.

If the transition to wholesale trade is initiated differently, involving first subdivision enterprises, this would worsen the consumer market balance, for the income of the workers in such enterprises would increase without any increase in consumer goods.

The enterprises must be informed of the conversion to wholesale trade in advance, in order to enable them to confirm, decline or amend planned deliveries of equipment, raw materials, and so on. It is one thing to obtain such materials from stocks, "with rationing points," and another to pay for them with cash. If the order is unplanned, nonstandard or urgent, it must be paid for on the basis of contractual prices and fulfilled out of reserves which today are quite abundant virtually everywhere. This will apply to rubles spent in specific areas in

the production process. The need for further payments based on such orders will create certain difficulties for the enterprises converted to wholesale trade. However, they cannot be avoided, for otherwise middlemen would make the conversion more difficult. The conversion to wholesale trade of enterprises producing goods for export may take place similarly. Foreign exchange earned from exports or its equivalent in rubles has the same property as money earned from the sale of consumer goods to the population: it has been earned for commodities the social need for which is confirmed by the fact that they were marketed to the final consumer. Export enterprises must keep two types of accounts in the bank: in foreign exchange and in convertible funds. Some foreign exchange could be recomputed in terms of convertible money based on the current exchange rates.

If the foreign exchange earned from the export of additional goods is used to import consumer goods, considering the existing correlation between foreign trade and domestic prices of such commodities, one could confidently say that the consumer market balance will improve. Naturally, this will not take place if the thus earned currency is used to import means of production. Bearing in mind the particular importance of balancing the consumer market with foreign exchange earned as a result of sales of additionally produced goods, it would be expedient, in the first stage, to use such currency precisely for importing consumer goods.

After second subdivision and export enterprises have been converted to wholesale trade, the producers of the means of production could also be converted, for such means of production will be paid for in convertible currency by the population and the importers. This will be followed by converting to wholesale trade of enterprises manufacturing means of production for such producers, and so on. Correspondingly, the need for state orders with material and technical support based on centralized funding will be reduced and replaced by convertible currency.

After starting with the consumer market, the area of true commodity-monetary relations will be expanded until it has encompassed the entire national economy. This will lead to the formation of a twin market—in consumer goods and in means of production.

Agricultural enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes as well must be converted to wholesale trade based on convertible currency. The agroindustrial complex is a promising area for converting to wholesale trade and the best results could be expected in this area. For decades an expensive variety of agricultural equipment had been literally imposed on kolkhozes and sovkhozes, advantageous to the manufacturer but not the consumer. Meanwhile, a great deal of needed items were not available. As was noted at the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes converted to cost accounting and self-financing are substantially reducing their orders for agricultural equipment and other

resources. Today's deficit could turn into overproduction tomorrow. However, the necessary steps have not been taken. In terms of some types of combines and tractors there has been overstocking. This should serve as a serious warning to the entire national economy.

Possible progress in resource conservation, based on the conversion to wholesale trade in means of production, the expansion and intensification of cost accounting relations should be anticipated and steps should be planned to ensure the efficient use of thus released resources and to limit or even halt the production of certain commodities.

The credit-financial reform as well should take place in connection with the conversion to wholesale trade in means of production and the monetary (clearing) reform. Above all, we must restore commercial credit to its full magnitude, without which wholesale trade is inconceivable. Furthermore, the conversion to wholesale trade will eliminate the need to keep above-norm reserves by enterprises. The financial and credit resources used to this effect will become unnecessary, for which reason they could be repaid to the banks relatively painlessly. In our view, this would make it possible to reduce and, subsequently, eliminate any surplus funds in the national economy and accelerate the convertibility of working capital.

The budget will earn real revenue in convertible funds from the enterprises converted to wholesale trade. The increased production and marketing of goods for the population will increase the commodity-monetary balance and thus strengthen the purchasing power of the ruble, as a result of which improvements in the financial health of the national economy will begin to take place.

Along with the development of wholesale trade and the credit-financial reform, we must restructure and make price-setting more flexible; the scale and area of application of contractual and ceiling prices must be expanded. Let us remember that the reports submitted at the 19th Party Conference called for simultaneously combining the price reform with improved balancing. This is quite important, particularly in terms of retail prices, for it is only under the conditions of a saturated market that their reform can take place not to the detriment of the population. In that case the consumer would be able to choose among commodities of different prices and quality but meant to meet the same type of needs.

In order to ensure the normal functioning of the market and block price increases, the monopoly of producers must be eliminated and the economic competitiveness and rivalry among enterprises secured. This is a rather difficult task, particularly bearing in mind that huge monopoly enterprises were organized in our country in literally all sectors. Many efforts will have to be made to put an end to inefficient concentration. In this case production cooperatives and foreign trade, which will promote serious competition, could play a great role.

The coexistence between two sectors would be inevitable throughout the period of converting to wholesale trade and implementing a radical reform in the entire national economy: the former will be governed by the present administrative and the latter by economic methods. Prior to their conversion to wholesale trade, the enterprises in the first sector will obtain their raw and other materials out of material and technical procurement stocks and their earnings will not be internally convertible. It will be important for the transitional period to prevent any premature erosion in the management of the first sector and a lowering of its efficiency. In particular, we must prevent the uncontrolled transfer of resources from the first to the second sector. In order to accomplish this, fines for failure to meet contractual obligations which are part of the enterprise plans for the first sector must be paid out of separate accounts and the harm caused to other parties must be fully compensated.

The question of the length of transition to wholesale trade and of completing the radical reform is of essential significance. If we limit ourselves to a consideration of the technology of the implementation of the system suggested in this article, the duration of the transitional period would be one agricultural year. Within that time the funds which will be paid by the population for consumer goods and services and earnings from exports will cover the entire vertical production system and limit the current means of payment.

In the case of many enterprises, however, preparations for the conversion to the new economic management conditions will require more time. Today 13 percent of all industrial enterprises operate at a loss and many of them fail to sell their products. They will have to restructure their work and, possibly, to specialize in different areas or to be leased, converted into cooperatives, and so on. However, we must bear in mind that under the present circumstances of a centralized plan and prices, the features of many enterprises do not give us an adequate idea of their actual condition. Under the conditions of contractual prices and a corresponding variety of produced goods, previously unprofitable enterprises may become profitable. Lowering the prices of a number of goods which currently remain unsold will facilitate their marketing.

Major difficulties exist in the development of cost accounting relations in agriculture. At the present time, with the current prices and the imposed production structure, no more than 20 percent of kolkhozes and sovkhozes could realistically convert to self-financing. As is the case with industry, restructuring of finances, credits and price setting will play an essential role in solving such problems. Particularly promising in terms of agriculture, however, is the mass conversion to various forms of leasing. As practical experience proves, lowering production outlays and working profitably can frequently be attained in 1 or 2 years.

In connection with the conversion to wholesale trade, contractual prices, and so on, fears are frequently expressed that the centralized management of the national economy will be relatively weakened. In our view, it is precisely the opposite that will happen. The economic management authorities, which have financial funds at their disposal, could have an extensive and comprehensive management influence on subordinate enterprises and other economic projects. Fiscal allocations will decisively anticipate and determine the use of material and labor resources. The role of the bank as the most important economic management body will be enhanced. This type of management is the most consistent with the principles of democratic centralism. By increasing the effectiveness of centralization, management through fiscal instruments does not harm the cost accounting autonomy of production units or fetter their initiative.

The radical restructuring of trade could play a major role in the implementation of the political reform and in strengthening the power of the soviets. At present, even with adequate budget allocations, essentially the soviets have no funds: their resources come, as a rule, from sectorial ministries and departments. With the conversion to wholesale trade and convertible currency, the situation will change radically. Convertible currency, deposited in the regional budgets, will lay a reliable economic base for the activities of republic and local soviets and will ensure the application of regional management methods based on cost accounting. The use of such funds will make possible the building of housing, laying roads, acquiring the necessary resources through wholesale trade, and implementing other measures aimed at developing the social and production infrastructure and ensuring the protection of the environment.

We suggested, in order to ensure intensified work on such a concept for the reform in the turnover area and the formulation of a detailed program and methods for its implementation, that it be tried experimentally in Estonia and Moldavia. The concept was discussed by the managements of these republics. Our suggestion was approved. A task force on the implementation of the concept, consisting of representatives of the Gosplan, Gossnab, the banks, the ministries of finance and other republic departments has already been set up to promote the implementation of this concept, and preparatory work has already started.

However, in the light of the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, this is no longer sufficient. In order to complete the radical economic reform this 5-year plan, the work front for conversion to wholesale trade and convertible currency must be broadened substantially. In addition to the republics we named, most promising in this respect are Lithuania, Latvia, Belorussia and Armenia, and Moscow, Leningrad and Tyumen Oblasts. The management of the latter, actually, has already declared its approval.

The mass training of cadres, which will ensure the creation and functioning of a first rate commodity-monetary turnover area, familiar with economic management methods, is an important and difficult project. So far there are few such cadres. This may be the most important feature required for the successful implementation of the reform in the turnover area.

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The Philosophy of Economics

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[Article by Otto Rudolfovich Latsis, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] The first year of the radical economic reform was marked by the adoption of several major planning decisions which, although heterogeneous seeming, in fact shared major common features.

On 1 September 1988 the CPSU Central Committee Politburo considered the suggestion of the USSR Council of Ministers on radically improving the ecological situation in the area of the Aral Sea. Major irrigation projects were halted and the main efforts of construction workers were turned to the reconstruction of irrigation and collector-draining systems; ceilings on the utilization of water for irrigation and industrial requirements were introduced. Somewhat earlier a decision on building a huge complex for the production of tractors in Yelabug was revised. Instead, a plant for passenger cars will be built. Let us recall that this is a question of an extremely big project which in its initial (tractor) variant was to cost 3.8 billion rubles. The building of the third power unit of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania was halted. The building of this unit with a "Chernobyl"-type reactor, but half as powerful, had been taking place for the past 3 years "as an exception," without a blueprint. The project of developing phosphorites in Estonia, the result of which would have been greater losses (economic as well as ecological) than advantages, was tabled. Somewhat earlier, the decision was made to abandon the initiated construction of the Daugavpils GES, which promised a very modest increase in the production of electric power but entailed major losses of valuable land in Latvia, the RSFSR and Belorussia.

What do such events, affecting different parts of the country and different economic sectors, have in common? All of them involve the correction of errors which may be traced to the decades of stagnation and, in the case with the Aral Sea, to even before them. In all cases, the present sensible decisions were made on the demand of the public and are the direct result of glasnost and the democratization of our life.

These decisions have yet another aspect worthy of particular discussion: economics. It is important not only because the correction of errors in the projects and the plans is expensive (thus, tens of millions of rubles have already been invested in the third block of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant). Also it is not only because many other projects and construction sites, including even larger ones, are triggering the concern and objections of the public (including the project for an extensive program for hydraulic power construction, plans for the development of nuclear power, the construction of the Volga-Chogray and Volga-Don canals). The broader conclusion which can be drawn is that it is a question not simply of refining individual decisions within the framework of the adopted economic strategy. We are on the threshold of mastering a new strategy. Its overall meaning is familiar. It has been reflected in the resolutions of the 27th Party Congress: the strategy of intensification. However, by no means have all sectorial specialists already realized that "intensification" means not simply a reallocation of investments but a new philosophy of economics, and that it is important to learn how to apply it in specific plans and projects.

Repeatedly the public has been told that it is only specialists who can judge projects in the power industry, reclamation, chemicalization, and so on. This meant specialists in those same sectors. They are not always boosted through technocratic boasting; occasionally, they are the result of the honest lack of understanding that the purpose of any construction is man and man alone, for which reason the same right must be granted, but even at an earlier stage, to specialists (those are also specialists!) who study not an object but man, and should express their views: medical doctors, geneticists, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, economists, ethnographers and jurists. The economists have the special obligation of selecting the development option on the basis of the views of all other specialists.

It is time to interpret the experience of past decades, when huge programs were developed down to their details, occasionally "forgetting" to ask the main question: Is the program itself needed? Particularly typical in this case is the fate of the Aral. Actually, it is not a matter of the sea itself or, in any case, not of the sea alone. The death of the Aral is a symbol, the clearest possible manifestation of the ecological and social difficulties which can afflict a huge area which, furthermore, suffers from salinization and the poisoning of the soil and waters with toxic chemicals, the flooding of land with saline waters, lagging in the social infrastructure, and disproportions between demographic and ecological development. This is the result of familiar negative processes in the sociopolitical area. However, the difficulties of the area have their technical and economic denominator as well: cotton growing as a single crop.

The entire strategy of regional development and the allocation of substantial capital investments were subordinated not to upgrading the well-being of the population or ensuring the optimal utilization of its labor and

natural potential but the maximizing of cotton production. The seemingly justification was the following: to ensure the country's "cotton independence," was what the organizers of this development considered to be their merit. The reason for this was the long years of instilling stereotypes of specific ideas, as a result of which even economists had unlearned how to formulate the simple question, which is mandatory before making any kind of economic decision: How much will all of this cost?

What have we already paid and how much more shall we continue to pay for having cotton as a single crop? Clearly, no economic results can justify the harm caused to the health of people and to nature. In this case, however, was there any positive economic result? Pursuit of cotton tonnage is paid for not only by poisoning the water and the land, but also in rubles, capital investments. This price was paid regardless of the various options. No one compared what would cost less: to expand the cotton fields in Central Asia or to develop crop rotation by increasing, for example, feed production for animal husbandry. Perhaps one-half of the money invested in the "cotton independence" would have sufficed to avoid the wheat, corn and meat and milk dependency which developed at that time. Furthermore, were we threatened by "cotton dependency" resulting from a drop in cotton production, remembering the poor use to which we are still putting it and how much of it could be saved? Was there anyone to compute the cost of the "rice independence," which was achieved as a result of hard work and major sacrifices in the Kuban? An equal number of such examples may be found in industry: let us recall perhaps the dramatic story of the struggle relative to the Baykal Cellulose-Paper Combine, the initial substantiation of the construction of which proved to be false. The authors of the project claimed that there was urgent need for super-strong cord for airplane tires. It turned out, however, that better and less expensive cord could be made out of another material.

The reason we are recalling these failures is not to "condemn" the old errors and ask that we avoid the making of new ones. A simple appeal of this kind would be ineffective. New errors are inevitable unless we change the very approach to strategic planning. Let us consider, with a single example, what we are discussing: I have in my hand a pamphlet entitled "Basic Stipulations of the USSR Long-Term Energy Program," which was published at the end of the stagnation period, in 1984. It is a puzzling document, not only because it lists neither an author nor an organization responsible for it. The text does not inform us when was this program drafted and by whom, was it adopted and, if it was, again when and by whom? Everything is confused. Yet decisions which would cost not billions but even trillions of rubles are being presented in a peremptory assertive form as actions which have been predetermined and for which there is no alternative. It is true that the pamphlet does not report how much power will be produced as a result of the implementation of this program, for which

the authors call for spending 20-22 percent of all capital investments in the national economy over a period of 20 years. However, the pamphlet does provide indirect information, according to which the specific power intensiveness of the national income would be reduced by 12-17 percent.

This is less than 1 percent per year. Therefore, the plan was to retain, essentially, until the end of this century, the current economic structure, a structure under which we are producing more steel than does the United States by a factor of more than 2, but fewer machines and equipment. We are producing more grain harvesting combines by a factor of 16, six times more tractors, and 50 percent more chemical fertilizers but less grain. We are the biggest producer of petroleum in the world and burn more fuel than any other country on poor roads, in uneconomical motor vehicles or simply because we produce too few 0.5-1 ton trucks and too many 6-ton trucks which we use to transport small loads. Many other similar examples could be cited by any one reader, based on his own experience. Let us also merely mention the fact that we have no meters for natural gas and water used for home needs.

Someone may object that this document, which is 4 years old, has lost its validity; the energy program drawn up during the period of stagnation is being reviewed. This is true. However, has the approach to its formulation changed? As to the attitude toward glasnost, the answer is obvious: nothing has changed. The power industry workers have not even considered the need to ask society a question which affects personally everyone: Do we prefer to pay for increasing the production of power (both in terms of money and the abuse of nature) or concentrate on conservation? Furthermore, the hydraulic power workers and nuclear energy specialists are violently opposed to any efforts on the part of the public to ask such questions. As in the past, the specialists in the various sectors assume for themselves the right to say openly that the country will need certain amounts of energy, water and metal in the long term. Did they ask the country? Meanwhile, even in some capitalist countries where the means of production are not owned by the public, options and development alternatives are being openly and meticulously discussed.

It is particularly annoying to realize that we are wasting our own experience and repeating errors which we realized decades ago. We were aware of them at the very dawn of the building of socialism. In 1920, Trotsky, the people's commissar of railroads, signed the then familiar Order No 1042: a 5-year plan for increasing the fleet of steam-driven locomotive engines. The plan was fulfilled quite energetically, sparing no outlays. The objective was reached quickly and, just as rapidly, the plan was acknowledged as being a classical failure. There were many steam-driven locomotive engines but the work of the railroads did not improve. The bridges were too weak to handle the heavy steam-driven locomotives. Meanwhile, girders for bridges would have been far less

expensive. The new people's commissar, Dzerzhinskiy, had to correct the situation. He was later to say the following: "Why was Trotsky's order No 1042 a most horrible mistake? Because Trotsky raised a separate entity to the level of universal salvation." Dzerzhinskiy himself who, later, took over the management of industry, frequently rejected plans for the development of individual sectors unrelated to the plan for the entire national economy. In subsequent years, however, efforts to find "universal salvation" were resumed, adopting their final form in the second half of the 1940s, when the leader made personal decisions as to how much petroleum, coal and steel were needed and that there was no need for cybernetics and genetics.

Today the development and draft of the new five-year plan and of longer-term concepts are taking place under new and much more favorable circumstances. It would be unforgivable not to use them for the sake of upgrading the strategic planning of our economy on a qualitatively new level. What does this require? It requires changing the approach to the formulation of plans and terminating the pursuit after "universal rescuers."

Experienced planning workers who would read such a recommendation may smile condescendingly: imagine, a discovery! Any student of economics could explain all roots dealing with comprehensiveness, balance, proportionality, etc. Nonetheless, why is it that in practice reputable economic authorities have still not been able to meet the requirements familiar to any economist? Today, when we have reached an understanding of the need to combine economic with political reform, one could answer this question as well quite confidently. The mechanism used in the formulation of strategic plans and concepts has become obsolete. It is affected by a monopoly, manifested less in the structure and economic status of enterprises than in the structure and interests of departments and scientific and engineering institutes. The trouble does not lie in the fact that, let us say, Minvudkhoz proves the need to increase the transfer of water while Gidroproyekt supports plans for new ruinous water reservoirs. The trouble is that there is no one to suggest other options and to counter monopolistic projects and interests with other projects and other interests.

In the past few months KOMMUNIST has frequently addressed itself to this problem. Based on the articles by our contributors and readers' letters certain conclusions may be drawn on what could and should be done to eliminate such monopoly. To begin with, departments and departmental institutes must be deprived of their monopoly status. Competing organizations and a competition among projects and the selection of the best should become the standard. Second, at the stage of long-term planning and design, forecasts must be made not only of production-technical but also of market conditions for the implementation of the suggested

development options. The cost of future decisions cannot be defined by eye, on the basis of arbitrary assumptions. Market control or "social accountability," as Lenin described the act of purchase and sale, must be considered a prime criterion in substantiating any decision. Third, economic decisions affecting the entire society must be discussed by the entire society.

Decisions pertaining to the Aral, Yelabug or the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant reflect a noticeable restructuring of the work of the USSR Council of Ministers. A turn toward glasnost and the aspiration to respond quickly and efficiently to the demands of the public also proves the novelty of the situation in which the government has discussed some draft laws of late. All of this is pleasing but all of this merely confirms that we are still at the very beginning of the way to the skillful utilization of glasnost in the interests of the entire society.

Glasnost is not merely the pleasure of observing the way the authorities react to addresses by citizens. Glasnost also means work and responsibility on the part of the citizens themselves, of those who write and those who read. For example, a just demand by citizens to abandon the building of yet another water reservoir which would be ruinous to nature and the budget is a demand which becomes entirely convincing when it is paralleled by the common readiness of those same citizens to turn off their water taps, for planners are not the only ones who must change their way of thinking. We cannot seriously hope to solve economic and ecological problems by rejecting any kind of industrial interference with nature. The assertions of some members of departments notwithstanding, the criticism of groundless projects is not directed against reclamation, hydraulic construction, chemistry, power industry, etc., in general. It is addressed against inefficient decisions and against the unreasonable choice of investments. However, society must be precisely informed of the true alternatives and the cost of some options. It must also know what obligations and limitations would the choice of a given option impose upon us and, in such a case, how should the behavior of anyone among us change—both in terms of production and consumption.

Mark Twain's "*The Prince and the Pauper*" includes a noteworthy episode: having unexpectedly been granted unlimited power, Tom Kent uses the big Great Seal of England to crack walnuts. Well, walnuts must be cracked but the Great Seal should be used for something greater. The opportunities offered by glasnost, unparalleled in our life, have already frequently been used in socially important matters. The beneficial influence of glasnost on contemporary life is unquestionable. However, it remains below the possibilities of the press as an instrument for society to study itself. Squabbling on a specific matter sometimes takes more newsprint than a discussion of the objectives of multi-billion investments or many years of work by millions of people. The discussion of such a socially significant matter could take place or not as randomly as an argument about trifles. For that

reason the currently popular and even fashionable demand of enhancing the standard of discussions should not be reduced merely to an appeal to avoid nonparliamentary expressions. What matters in this case is the content of the discussions, concern for socially significant decisions not to be made regardless of public opinion.

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From Civic Courage to Scientific Proof

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[Article by Rozalina Vladimirovna Ryvkina, doctor of economic sciences, professor, head of the sector of methodology of economic-sociological research, USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production]

[Text] Today society is tremendously interested in political journalism. The range of the social problems raised in it is much broader and studies are much richer and noteworthy, compared to the works of sociologists. Obviously, if we try to compare the content of a sociological journal with an index of articles in the field of "perestroyka journalism" published during the same time segment, the emerging image will not be in favor of sociology (although their functions may differ, they are also related). Furthermore, against the civic nature of the background of political journalism, the scale of the problems it discusses and its ability to draw attention, the shortcomings in our sociological science stand out particularly clearly. This gives food for thought.

Could this seem to be all that relevant to the readers, when the public is asked to evaluate important problems, such as the Food Program, the ecological crisis, economic reform and the democratization of our life? The informed reader may also add that recently a decree was formulated on the development of sociological science in the country and training sociology cadres. If this takes care of all that must be done, why worry? (Actually, this view is shared by many people.)

Reality, however, proves that there are reasons to worry. Decrees are implemented by people and people act to the extent of their understanding, which is based on their standards and their interests. Their interests, as we know, vary. That is precisely why it is important to discuss the problem "on the input" level, when the implementation of that adopted document is only at its beginning. Such a discussion must be comprehensive.

Usually, sociology brings to mind mass surveys, interviews and computers. But what is their purpose, what is the purpose of the entire work, what is the main feature here? The main feature is to know the society in which we live. Today we are unfamiliar with much of it. This ignorance is not decreasing. Life is becoming more

complex, new processes are developing while the scale and, particularly, the depth of studies (and, respectively, the level of information) are improving inadequately.

How has the system of state inspection affected the attitude toward workers' labor in different sectors? How have the steps taken to reduce drunkenness influenced the behavior of the various population groups? What difficulties are being experienced by the various categories of managers, engineering and technical personnel, employees and workers in converting their enterprises to cost accounting? What are the feelings of the members of newly created cooperatives and how much do they like their work? What administrative cadres (what sectors, what levels in the position hierarchy) are today unnecessary and what should be the number of such personnel so that the new functions could be implemented skillfully and efficiently? What is the attitude of students toward sociopolitical subjects taught in VUZes and why are students frequently passive?

Today we are unfamiliar with the answers to these and many similar questions. We cannot know the answers for no one has provided the necessary measurements. It is not a question of indirectly computing something. We can consider as knowledge only that which has earned the public's trust. Therefore, it must be obtained on the level of contemporary requirements governing the gathering and processing of mass data. Confidence in such data presumes a reliable nationwide multiple-step selection which must mirror the structure of the population, its differentiation by republic, region, rayon, city, village, area and employment sector, etc. Selection is the passport of information, its ticket and the guarantee of its reliability. No nationwide sampling exists in our country. For that reason the studies which are made cannot enrich our knowledge about society as a whole and of the processes which are currently taking place within it.

Ignorance about society is one of the reasons for the low quality of management decisions. The low quality of decisions worsens or does not improve the working conditions of all categories of workers. In turn, this lowers their labor incentives and triggers alienation. Such is one of the channels through which lack of information influences social life.

Another channel exists as well: lack of information always parallels the weakening of civic-mindedness. In the absence of information the educational process loses its meaning. Lack of information on the part of the people, of the "lower strata," about the "upper strata," and the "upper strata" about the "lower strata," triggers mistrust, weakens social integration and increases the level of conflicts which do not become any less dangerous for remaining hidden.

The objection may be that whatever the case we seem to have obtained sufficient information in the course of perestroyka. However, although we are gaining an understanding of our historical past (the crimes committed

during the cult of personality, the extent of deformation of the values of socialism), we continue to remain largely ignorant about what is taking place today, in our immediate surroundings. Furthermore, we do not even know what precisely it is that we do not know, having become accustomed to living in the restricted area of social life which has been more or less made known to us: the sociodemographic and socioclass structure of the population, employment, level of education, wages, housing conditions and social services. Even questions which exceed this narrow circle are not asked all that frequently, for the people have become accustomed to live without any information about themselves.

Sociology could serve (and, in the overwhelming majority of countries can and, indeed does serve) as a most important source of greatly lacking knowledge about the actual processes taking place in society. Political journalism is properly assessing the depth and scale of the problems which appear. The sociologists face a task of tremendous importance: based on the level attained by political journalism, to penetrate into the social processes of our time and to reflect the entire array of such processes in a scientific language. In terms of its role in the study of society, sociology must be familiar with all of its basic "subsystems." However, it must not be familiar with them in general. As a science of the forms of activities of different social groups, the mechanisms regulating such activities and their influence on the course of socioeconomic development, sociology could consider its role as fulfilled if the entire system of activities of all social groups and the entire system of regulators of their behavior are quite clear and established quite comprehensively.

As one of our colleagues justifiably pointed out, "once and for all, we must convert from civic daring to scientific provability."

Is sociology ready for this?

For a long time sociology suffered from the label tagged to it as early as the end of the 1920s of being a "bourgeois pseudoscience," and a "servant of imperialism." "Noted" scientists opposed its revival as a science, erecting against it many frightening ideological arguments. As early as the mid-1960s, our social scientists were still arguing about whether or not Soviet scientists could use the concepts of global sociology, such as social status, urbanization, social role, social mobility, alienation, elitism and many others. Authors suspected of using categories not approved by highly placed officials, who had assumed for themselves the monopoly right to interpret what was Marxism and what was anti-Marxism, were considered untrustworthy and subjected to ostracism. Their articles were banned, their books were "buried," and their names were not mentioned. For a number of decades we did not publish the works of the greatest personalities in global sociology, which allowed the militant ignoramuses to distort the nature of the scientific work of leading sociologists, such as M. Weber,

T. Parsons, P. Sorokin and others. All of this was being done under the cover of the slogans of the invariable superiority and absolute infallibility of our ideology, science and culture, which prevailed during the period of stagnation. In order to strengthen the faith in these slogans, negative social processes were concealed and problems requiring critical assessments and the raising of sensitive questions of politics, national relations, religious faith, and so on, were bypassed.

The recovery of Soviet society radically changes conditions for the development of sociology as well. New opportunities become available. For the first time the hope appears that society will develop the need to know everything about itself, without secrecy or embellishments. The hope that sociology will be given a social order to engage in profound scientific research and development endures, not for the sake of making a "formal report" but for ensuring the real solution of problems and truly understanding the social mechanisms operating in the country.

The appearance of such a hope is a sign of our time. However, will this hope turn into reality? Conditions to this effect seem to exist: sociological scientific research institutes have been opened in Moscow and Leningrad, a sociological journal is being published, and respective departments have been opened in many VUZes throughout the country; conferences and seminars are being sponsored, sociological methods have become part of management practices and are being extensively used in solving a number of tasks related to perestroika.

It is nonetheless obvious that despite such unquestionable accomplishments and despite all the efforts on the part of society, the situation concerning the organization of sociological research and the training of cadres in this area can be assessed only as stagnating. The period of stagnation itself was excessively long and the marks it left were too deep. An essentially different organization is required, including mobile creative collectives of researchers who can quickly react to changing social circumstances, "trace" the efficiency of newly developing forms of social relations and their social consequences, determine the profound reactions of different population groups to the new working and living conditions and forecast their behavior. Social workers of a new type are needed, who would be willing and able actively to participate in perestroika.

The recently passed CPSU Central Committee resolution (incidentally, the just about first resolution on sociology in the country's history) offers a long-range program for the creation of a system of organizations which could provide society with comprehensive social information. This system is quite complex: it involves a set of sociological scientific research institutes, departments of sociology in a number of universities and other VUZs throughout the country, special departments for upgrading the training of practicing sociologists and for

the sociological training of economic managers, a laboratory for the study of demand for sociologists, centers for the study of public opinion, and departments of sociology in evening Marxism-Leninism universities. According to the concept, these organizations will be spread around the country, reaching even the most distant areas but, nonetheless, form a single entity. The demand for sociologists will be met by the VUZes training such specialists. The VUZes must also train teachers of sociology; the sociological scientific research institutes should provide teachers with the necessary information for the training of students and act as bases for the training process. The special departments which will train economic managers will thus also train people who would become customers of sociologists; the laboratories will determine demand for sociologists in the various areas, enterprises and administrative bodies while, at the same time, will help them to become aware of arising problems and to solve them.

A new stage is beginning in the development of sociology, in which its social significance has been accepted and a process for the dissemination of sociological education is advancing. Obviously, however, the results will depend on **who precisely will train whom precisely and how**, and what assignments will be given to the trained specialists. One could "throw the forces" into "putting out fires," and into circumstantial topics which would multiply scientific whitewashing, or else into a profound analysis of that which is truly occurring in the country and the development of a scientific set of instruments which would make it possible to find our way in the complex tangle of social processes.

Unquestionably, the chosen course will adopt the second option. However, I do not hesitate to repeat once again that this will be accomplished by the people themselves. Living and working under the conditions of replacing illusions and myths with realities does not develop without a trace. To this day this is manifested in various extents in the guise of utopian, illusory or simply erroneous concepts of society, fear of new thinking, fear of attacking official authorities and faithlessness in the possibilities of one's own reason. This feeling remains strong within the people. Despite the entire importance of the resolution on sociological science, in itself it will not ensure the type of psychological reorientation or create the type of new culture which are necessary in order to solve the problems. A great deal more is required: sociology must, in a way, be reborn; barely emerging from a lengthy stagnation, it must develop its cadres of specialists who are willing and able to engage in the reorganization of social life. No other solution exists. We must remove a rock the weight of which exceeds the social weight of today's sociological science.

In their "*German Ideology*," K. Marx and F. Engels wrote that a scientist should not share the illusions of his age; on the contrary, he must distinguish between that

which is proclaimed and that which actually exists. He must point out contradictions between slogans and reality and take the side of and help the progressive forces.

We believe that the same applies to the mission of the sociologist. Sociologists must play a number of crucial roles in society. The first was already discussed: providing society with knowledge of the social processes occurring within it, from those which are "known to everyone" (the trend of increased population needs, changes in the orientation of the youth), to those which are concealed and the detection of which requires special methods. In this case, in relying on the sociologist, society also relies on his competence. He is the individual to whom society entrusts self-knowledge, self-analysis, and painting of its own portrait, in the hope that this portrait will be true and profound. The other role of the sociologist is to formulate social programs, plans and projects which would include answers to the question of "what is to be done?" The sociologist is also a social engineer, the designer of new and more progressive forms of social life. Finally, another role of the sociologist is a civil one: to supervise the satisfaction of the needs of the people and see to it that their demands, views and interests are taken into consideration and satisfied.

The conversion of our economy to cost accounting should also change the status of the sociologist: from someone "assigned" to a given enterprise by a superior department, he must become "hired" by the enterprise on the basis of a contract and undertake to do truly necessary work the need for which is felt by the administration and the labor collective and for the use of which they are prepared to pay him. The sociologist must be useful to the development of the enterprise. You must agree that the conversion which must be accomplished is huge: from a bureaucratic mechanism for the use of specialists to an economic mechanism; from the aspiration to have a sociologist at an enterprise simply for the sake of proving one's "progressiveness" to a realization that such a specialist could really work "profitably."

Naturally, in the past as well there were enterprises in which sociologists helped to improve the work and contributed to the more productive work of the collective. However, this was the exception, which today must become the rule. This, however, presumes knowledge of the multivariant development of social projects under different socioeconomic situations, the ability to see the various opportunities for solving practical problems and surmounting real difficulties and real contradictions which constantly arise and are duplicated in any area, sector or enterprise. One must also be able to persuade, to surmount the widespread aspiration to take the path of least resistance and to promote agreement with one decision or another on the part of anyone involved, such as the members of labor collectives, specialists, managers, representatives of departments and party authorities.

Understandably, the sociologist should be noted by above-average social qualities. In addition to professional competence and depth of understanding of social problems, he must also assume an independent social stance. This means not only the ability to stand up for his beliefs, sometimes opposing those of the majority, but also the ability properly to guide this majority. Under the conditions of perestroika, he must be a fighter for the new forms of economic management and administration. Such a social role cannot be performed without a developed civic self-awareness.

As a rule, the sociologists who are trained today somehow begin to flag under the conditions of real life (the more so since at work it is hardly a question of engaging in research). The result is that we are training specialists who, both in terms of their knowledge and the features which become instilled in them, cannot be useful in actual practical work.

What to teach the sociologist and how, in order to make him a figure of importance to the development of society?

Sociological training is an intrinsic part of higher education throughout the world. Its main components are general sociological theories of the social system (theory of social groups, social stratification and mobility, social roles, theory of social institutions, theory of organization, etc.); methodology, method and techniques of sociological research; history of world sociology and the sociology of individual countries; finally, the specialized sociological disciplines, such as the sociology of politics, economics, law, morality, family, science, religion, education, health, urban and rural ecology, and production sectors. The list of sociological disciplines which are taught and which developed in more than 100 years of history of sociological science vary with the individual countries. The main features, however, remain the same: the future specialists are given systematized fundamental sociological training and master the entire wealth of knowledge accumulated in global sociology. Without this no one can be a sociologist in the 20th century. It is precisely the mastery of the entire arsenal of categories, methods, means of analysis and theoretical approaches that enables sociologists from different countries to exchange the results of their studies, to compare observed processes and to discuss their mechanisms.

Under the conditions of accelerating foreign political, economic and cultural relations, the Soviet sociologist can no longer work on a different level and formulate and solve problems regardless of global experience. He must acquire high theoretical and methodical standards, the ability to absorb what is necessary and reject what is harmful, and take into consideration the features which are specific for his own country. He cannot achieve this without knowledge of global science and without mastering the art of sociological analysis. The training of specialists only to the extent of materials produced by our publishing houses and approved and allowed by the

respective departments is not only useless but simply harmful. Under the conditions of the accelerated socio-economic development of our country, having mastered the best foreign methodology, our sociology must concretize it in order to be able to solve the very specific problems of our society. Such a concretizing is the equivalent to the development of a new methodology.

From the viewpoint of the range of problems, theories and methods which must be mastered by Soviet sociologists, the widespread aspiration to divide sociological science into two separate sciences, respectively taught at philosophy and economic departments, is quite dangerous. The result would be two types of sociologists: those trained on the basis of the philosophical and of economic disciplines, to which would be added some specialized subjects (sociology of labor, living standard, etc.). Such a structure of sociological education is a vestige of the attitude toward sociology as a second-rate science, a sum total of numerical data suitable only for purposes of illustrating prevalent philosophical or economic concepts. Specialists trained on the basis of such narrow and truncated programs cannot have an overall sociological concept of society. They will be familiar only with its "material" or "spiritual" aspect. On this basis it would be impossible to master a system of sociological knowledge. If such an educational structure is applied mass practice, sociology cannot develop as an independent area of the social sciences, for its base and comprehensive nature of approach to society would be undermined. Furthermore, such a system contradicts world-wide practical experience and Soviet sociologists would become noncompetitive.

The alternative to this is establishing in many universities in the country independent sociological departments (as stipulated in the decree itself). It is no accident that it is precisely this method that has been adopted in world practical experience. Only a separate department could provide this science with the possibility to deploy its full potential and the entire volume of knowledge acquired in the course of its long history and enable us to eliminate anything unnecessary, which distracts the students from mastering the already difficult subject. In this case we cannot avoid the clash of interests, for some people will develop the aspiration to strengthen traditional preserved ways and means of training while others will try to reject them in favor of the new forms which reflect the current problems of society. Does society need one or the other model of such departments and will such a department yield the necessary results? The question must be solved through practical experience and, above all, the quality of training of specialists and demand for them. Weak departments which do not meet expectations, should be closed down.

As in any other area, it is important in the organization of sociological training to define the trend or unit which must be particularly emphasized today. In our view, such a most important unit is the teacher of sociological subjects, working in the main (and for the time being

practically barren!) sector of training sociologists in the areas of the mass professions, and for work in the various economic and cultural sectors. This is the "bottleneck" without the elimination of which we cannot organize the work of the entire system of sociological services in the country.

Let us consider the recent past. In the mid-1960s, when a revival of sociology was started in the country, the emphasis was on training sociologists for industrial enterprises. However, as a whole we were unable to consolidate such cadres, ensure their high prestige and achieve significant returns. The reason was the poor training of the sociologists. The plant sociologist had not acquired the necessary system of knowledge. Naturally, some efforts were made to train such sociologists by occasional enthusiasts in isolated large centers through organized courses, lectures and exchange of experience. However, none of this changed the situation: enterprise managers remained displeased and sociologists, dissatisfied. The result was layoffs and disappointment in that science, loss of its prestige, and difficulty for new groups of sociologists to be hired at plants or other economic enterprises.

This kind of experience is extremely instructive. Today, under the conditions of the new and as yet not organized economic management mechanism, much must be considered and planned. A great deal must be brought to the awareness of the young specialist before he enters real life, for if the situation of the 1960s is repeated, no one would be given a third chance of talking a plant director, kolkhoz chairman or chief of a planning-economic administration into providing an opening for a sociologist. That is why the question of who will be training the future specialists is so important today. All forces must be concentrated on the training of VUZ instructors in sociology.

For the time being, the need for such a strategy has not been realized as clearly as it should. Essentially, the departments and sections set up in the country are training applied sociologists for work at enterprises and economic organizations. Until recently the training of sociology teachers had not been formulated as the main task.

Who is training practical sociologists today? If not all, at least 95 percent of such teachers are VUZ instructors who teach (or else only yesterday taught) courses in philosophy, scientific communism, political economy, labor economy and planning. Are these the cadres who could train sociologists of a new type? Judging by the series of articles in VESTNIK LGU, those who teach sociology at Leningrad University include professors who not only opposed sociology 20 years ago but are to this day very strange supporters of it, who are continuing the tradition of finding deviations, giving departmental interpretations of Marxism, etc., which developed during the age of stagnation.

A very significant pattern emerges: not a single one of our leading sociologists, whose works are known both in our country and abroad, is engaged in teaching students at Moscow or Leningrad state universities, although that is precisely where they are located. Students are trained by entirely different people. In what and why precisely by them?

Unquestionably, the question of who has the right today to train cadres of teachers of sociology and which what kind of people and type of organization should this new and difficult project be carried out should be seriously considered, including on the level of the USSR Academy of Sciences. A detailed study must be made of which specific VUZes in the country have experience in training sociologists, what is the nature of this experience and what has it yielded. It is important to know where curricula may be found, what is their quality, who has followed them and where are such people working? We must have an idea of the type of training system which has been applied in one VUZ or another, whether a system of relations with industry and management has been organized, and so on. It is only on the basis of all this that we should determine what kind of people and where should sociology teachers be trained, for the entire course of the training process and its practical results will be determined by this initial link in the "chain" of the process of sociological training.

Obviously, today no individual institute can train teachers of sociology on the required level (bearing in mind that the majority of leading sociologists, as was already pointed out, do not work in VUZes to begin with). Different methods must be tried. For example, leading sociologists should be invited to various VUZes to lecture on the "scarcest" topics in which there are few specialists in the country. A kind of "professorial corps" could be set up, which could truly train perhaps no more than the initial graduates in teaching sociology. Another method as well is possible: to create under the USSR State Committee of Public Education or any other organization (the Soviet Sociological Association, for example) an inter-VUZ center which would include leading specialists and authors of basic works with great experience in specific studies, and to establish contractual relations between such a center and a number of VUZes throughout the country. Sociologists from other countries should be recruited as well. Another method is the retraining of teachers in other subjects (law, theory of management, social psychology), and those who are already engaged in teaching courses in sociology (we are developing this method currently at the IPK of Novosibirsk University). Other methods could be found as well. The main thing is to realize that it is precisely the training of teachers that is today the main task, the solution of which requires efforts and reliance on the experience of skilled sociologists.

Who should learn sociology and what type of would specialists need it? Naturally, above all those who will make sociology their main work. It is a question of

professional sociologists who will go to work at plants, construction projects, hospitals, and so on. Second, sociology is needed by engineers, physicians, teachers, chemists and cosmonauts who must master the art of "human relations." Consequently, we need the type of teachers who can teach sociology in technical, medical, pedagogical, art, sports, commercial and other educational institutions throughout the country. Finally, it is important also to take into consideration sociologists who are already at work but lack specialized training. Today we do not know how many teachers each of these three categories will require and how to train them. Therefore, it would seem expedient, on the basis of the resolution and of the preliminary work by the respective departments, to draft a long-term program for the development of sociological training in the country and to include in it a substantiated estimate of the future demand for sociology teachers—practitioners, researchers and consultants. This program must be discussed in all sociological centers in the country and only then should sociological departments and sections be established. In such a case we could rely on the fact that the familiar factors of haste, "feel" and randomness will not prevail.

The following question arises seriously: in order to train specialists who can actively participate in social change, the students must, throughout their virtually entire period of training, remain in the thick of social life or, rather, in that area or sector of life in which they will be working. They must be familiar with it in all of its details, understand all of its mechanisms and know and understand what precisely social groups have been activated in each such mechanism, what are the interests of such groups, what is their line of behavior, and so on. None of this can be learned from books (not to mention books which are as yet unwritten).

The discussion of this problem by the USSR State Committee of Public Education and the RSFSR Minvuz with sociology teachers at Novosibirsk University led to the conclusion that it would be expedient for sociological education to be based on combining training at a sociological department with work (throughout the entire period of training) as a sociologist in one enterprise or another, a VUZ, a secondary school, an administrative office, and so on. Incidentally, with such a solution to the problem, students who enter the department could be assigned to such training by enterprises which need the services of sociological cadres. Institutes as well could request the training of sociology teachers. For example, the technical VUZes in Novosibirsk, which would like to offer training in industrial or management sociology, social problems of scientific and technical progress, the theory of labor collectives, and so on, could assign to the sociology department their own associates so that, after the completion of their training, they could return to teach the respective subjects.

It seems important also to refine the concept of "demand for a sociologist." In this case two interpretations are

possible. Under the first the "demand" exists if enterprise, establishment, department or VUZ managers openly say that they need a sociologist and file a proper request. In frequent cases, however, what happens is that the organization is in turmoil because of turnover, conflicts, complaints and pressure "from above." However, asked whether it needs a sociologist, the management answers in the negative. Is there demand in this case or is there not? A similar situation prevails in the VUZes: it is unlikely for the rector to announce that he needs a teacher of sociology, even if sociology is being taught by a teacher who has no experience in conducting sociological research.

How to break this circle of social problems without realized demand for sociologists. With the intensification of the political and economic reform and the creation of a system for sociological training, based on the new principles of education and free from administrative-bureaucratic style, we may expect that presently "latent" demand for sociologists will sharply increase. At that point a permanent and efficiently operating mechanism for diagnosing social problems in our society will come into being.

If today the sociology teacher could provide the students with specific knowledge about our society he could become the educator of active fighters for perestroika.

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Thoughts on Soviet Perestroika

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[Letter to the Editors by Mike Davidow, American publicist and writer]

[Text] The revolutionary perestroika which is currently taking place in the USSR is exciting not only the Soviet people. It is of tremendous importance to countries and peoples the world over, including the United States. This was confirmed anew by the interest which the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference triggered throughout the world.

Not so long ago, I had the opportunity to visit a number of American cities. Everywhere—in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco—and in the small provincial cities, invariably the conversation turned to perestroika and democratization of life in the USSR. The people are following the changes occurring in your country with sincere interest and ascribe to them great hopes for a better future of the entire planet.

To me the restructuring itself and the sharp but nonetheless constructive debates which were held at the 19th Party Conference are taken more personally and understood than they are by many people in the West. I look at perestroika through the eyes of a person who lived (and

lives) in two different worlds. All in all, I was a correspondent in the USSR for 11 years. I studied Soviet reality and wrote about it "from within," as the saying goes. I have visited all 15 republics and dozens of plants, kolkhozes, and sovkhoses. I have spoken with scientists and writers. I see in perestroika a new historical stage in the development of Soviet society.

Soviet society turned socialism from merely a theory into the most tangible reality of the 20th century. It is not easy to be a pioneer. One must not only open the way but also to experience in practice and make even the best of theories be consistent with reality. Socialism was built in a country which could hardly be classified at that time as advanced. The Soviet people had to pay a monstrously high price to be able to build this country through their own efforts, surrounded as it was on all sides by a hostile capitalist camp, to make a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism, having defended their own socialist system and the rest of the world. All of this influenced the development of the Soviet Union and its economy.

Perestroika was not only (or merely) an answer to the period of stagnation between the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. Unquestionably, this was a delayed answer to a precrisis situation. Perestroika marks a gigantic step, a leap, if you wish, on the way to surmounting the obstacle which Lenin defined as the most difficult and decisive in the peaceful competition with capitalism: to catch up with it and surpass it in labor productivity. The Soviet leadership is approaching this problem soberly, realistically, brimming with confidence, daringly rejecting not simply that which is obsolete but also that which hinders the true advancement of the socialist economy and the emergence of socialist society on the high level of democracy, relieving it of negative encrustations, deformations and parasitical forms presented as socialism.

The Soviet Union approached perestroika with an exceptionally vast reserve of practical knowledge, unprecedented in terms of wealth, with a tremendous experience, both positive and negative. Furthermore, it can rely on its people. Decentralization, the conversion of enterprises and local authorities into the main units of radical restructuring in economic management, will require great maturity on the part of tens of thousands of managers of plants, kolkhozes and laboratories which, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, will have to master the necessary knowledge and acquire the necessary skill in the science of economics, engineering and electronics.

In the 70 years of existence of socialism, collectivism has become part of the flesh of the Soviet people and this has contributed a great deal to the accomplishment of great objectives. Until recently, however, **personal responsibility** was not simply neglected but in frequent cases collectivism was used (and still is) to conceal behind the slogan of socialist humanism individual irresponsibility and parasitism. In my view, this contradiction between the

high standard of collectivism and the significantly lower standard of personal responsibility is one of the key problems which must be eliminated through perestroika and the radical restructuring of the economy. The main thing is not to lower collectivism but to raise personal responsibility and initiative to the high standard of collectivism and thus place both to an even higher level.

Socialism introduced humanism in the production system and in production relations. This is its greatest contribution to the progress of mankind. The 19th All-Union Party Conference indicated quite clearly that humanism will not only be preserved in the true shape of broad social advantages but will also be intensified on the basis of the principle of "more socialism and more democracy." However, I deem it necessary to say most frankly that not all supporters of perestroika, it seems to me, adequately value and understand the significance of these advantages.

Being the first to open the way to socialism, the Soviet Union must find new forms of relations between individual and cooperative labor and the dominant state ownership and management of the means of production. Lenin emphasized the significance of the cooperative. Unfortunately, this was ignored in the rather rigid administrative-command approach to state management. Economic perestroika corrects this major omission and thus introduces the extensive available opportunities for cooperatives and individual labor. All labor is for socialism and in the name of socialism, as is being emphasized today.

Perestroika is a gigantic step toward broadening democracy in the USSR. The enemies of socialism have always depicted it as an opponent of democracy. Today they depict glasnost as proof of their own claims, as though throughout the existence of the Soviet state no democracy existed within it. This is totally false. The October Revolution marked the birth of the Soviet system, the first system of rule by the majority of working people in history. After Lenin, unfortunately, the framework of socialist democracy was narrowed for a long time. Glasnost means not only the development of true democracy but also surmounting the deformations which have hindered and limited its development.

Perestroika is not simply a renovation of socialist practice but also intensification of theory. That which is obsolete becomes part of the past and new theoretical ways are being opened. However, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a scientific study must be made of the course and the socioeconomic consequences of perestroika. A breakthrough on the theoretical front is urgently needed. This is understandable. In my view, the lack of profound theoretical development could provide a loophole for pragmatism and pragmatic decisions. Pragmatism is preferable to dogmatism, which is the main obstacle on the path of perestroika and radical change. It is precisely on the basis of dogmatism that the conservative forces

passively or actively oppose the renovation processes. However, I believe that attention should also be drawn to the danger of pragmatism, although today this is the lesser of the two, for otherwise it could develop into a major one.

The Soviet people support perestroika with all their heart. It seems to me that now the main question is how with the participation of the popular masses can this difficult and comprehensive revolutionary change be implemented. Judging by what I have observed, this is still insufficiently clear to many people, if not to the majority. In this case, I believe, reality must be comprehensively analyzed. It is only in that case that the activities of the masses will become a powerful transforming force.

A radical economic restructuring presumes a vast program. In the course of perestroika a number of new problems have appeared, which is natural. One of them is that of a well-organized price and credit system through which one can control the market, taking its laws into consideration. This is by no means a simple matter and I doubt that the average Soviet citizen realizes the way all of this will take place in daily life. For example, the following questions arise: What does this mean in a Soviet socialist society? How do the laws of the market operate in a planned socialist society? What role and to what extent should such a role be played by price controls? I have mentioned merely a few questions raised by the radical reform, questions which demand an interpretation in a form which not only an economist would understand.

For a long time socialism existed as a political theory which, thanks to Marx, became a science. It seems to me that the influence of the utopian socialism of the past was not totally surmounted under the Soviet system as well. This was particularly felt in the first days after the October Revolution, when a trend toward egalitarianism was quite strong. Lenin had to struggle against this trend which was caused by lack of experience in building socialism. The influence of utopianism was also felt in the opposition to Lenin's new economic policy which, in a certain sense, was a struggle for making socialism scientific. The old influence of utopian socialism continued to be felt even after the victory of socialism was secured. In my view, it was manifested perhaps in the strong trends toward equalization of wages, reducing the duration of the socialist stage of development and underestimating the comprehensive nature of progress toward communism.

After the 27th CPSU Congress, great attention has been paid to instilling in ideology a new, fresh and creative scientific way of thinking. The objective of closer and more active contacts between philosophy and sociology, on the one hand, and ideology, on the other, will strengthen the scientific approach to theory and practice. It seems to me that what is taking place now is only the initial phase of this process. I have the impression that

many of the thoughts publicly expressed today for a long time did not go beyond the walls of a kitchen or dining room. However, it is one thing to hear them among friends and, most likely, among like-minded people, and something entirely different to submit them to public attention and analysis. The latter, in my view, is still largely lacking. Critical studies are still too few. To limit oneself to such studies of the past is not simply one-sided. It is unfair toward the new concepts and suggestions which are thus deprived of a useful and necessary critical analysis.

Unquestionably, nothing which would hold back the flood of opinions should be done. It seems to me, however, that the purpose of glasnost is not only to stimulate the maximal freedom of expression but also to surmount completely the gap between words and actions, in order to formulate more objective and real solutions to problems and so that out of all of this the most efficient actions in terms of implementing perestroika could be undertaken.

One of the important tasks of perestroika is to see to it that the worker will feel that he is "the master of his enterprise." The Law on the State Enterprise and the election of directors and other managers by worker collectives have immeasurably broadened and deepened socialist democracy and self-management. Socialism eliminated class antagonism and the social grounds for it. However, a division between labor and management in the production process remains. As was noted at the 27th Congress, under socialism production relations are not static. They are as dynamic as is socialist society itself. Possibly, one of the most important aspects of perestroika is the additional emphasis which is now placed on meeting the social requirements of the worker collective as a structural part of the production process and production relations. I believe that achieving this objective will have a profound influence not only on Soviet workers. It will turn socialism into an even more attractive force for workers the world over, including in the United States. It will also be an incentive for the working people in the West to demand a better life, jobs, and greater rights in management and production.

The CPSU Conference proved the existence of a new understanding by the Soviet communists of the fact that without a radical reform of the political system no real change can be achieved in economics and in the social situation, for a bureaucratized state suppresses all initiative, contributes to the dissemination of social apathy and creates corruption. The resolutions adopted at the conference on reform of the political system in the country are the biggest possible step toward the implementation of the basic tasks of perestroika.

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I See No Other Way

18020002h Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 14,
Sep 88 (signed to press 19 Sep 88) pp 56-57

[Letter to the Editors by I. Kuzub, electrician, Sevastopol]

[Text] Dear editors: I am 26 years old and have been a member of the CPSU since 1985. I am an electrician with secondary school training and a member of the shop's party buro. I have no particular problems but my natural wish for the people to live better puts me in the ranks of the supporters of perestroika. I see no other way for myself and for our entire society. However, there still is no perestroika in our enterprise and the economic reform is continuing to mark time. That is my reason for writing this letter.

A great deal needs changing, the system of the distribution of earnings in labor collectives above all. I am referring to wages based on skill, when the money earned by a brigade is divided on the basis of the workers' grade. The results are the following: a sixth grade and fourth grade worker may be doing the same work on the level of a fifth grade worker, conscientiously, and within the same period of time. Although an equal amount of labor has been invested, earnings are different. The sixth grade worker, who has contributed to the brigade earnings the revenue earned by a fifth grade worker would be paid on the basis of the sixth grade, actually earning the difference made by the contribution of the fourth grade worker. Currently, if the average complexity of the work done by the brigade corresponds to fourth grade qualifications, the average qualification of workers cannot, according to regulations, exceed that rating. In addition to four men with high rating, the brigade must include unskilled workers, thus artificially preventing their professional growth. Consequently, the existing wage system prevents workers from upgrading their knowledge.

The attitude of highly skilled workers toward the new equipment determines the overall efficiency of the use of progressive technologies. Most of the workers with a high rating obtained it 10, 15 or even 20 years ago. It may be that at that time their knowledge had reached a high standard. This is not to say, however, that today such workers continue to meet modern requirements. Meanwhile, the young workers, who could master the new equipment today, are waiting for vacancies for a raise in grade. I favor the principle of competitiveness in production: those who know more and are more skilled should be entrusted with the implementation of responsible assignments which require a high skill. No other way is possible with a cost accounting system.

Under the present system of distribution of profits, substantial distortions develop in the brigade in terms of the growth of labor productivity as well. I am referring to the annual planned norm reductions. Every year the norm/hours allocated for the least expensive and low-skill operations are reduced. In the course of time,

however, it turns out that workers with a low rating do not contribute any profits to the brigade. Meanwhile, the costly norms for highly skilled work remain virtually unchanged. Gradually, the result is that it is the highly skilled workers who support the workers with lower skills. Such a situation adversely affects relations within the collective.

Norms reduced to fantastically low limits do not leave any time for high-quality work. For example, if a person drives nails in a wooden case for a period of ten minutes, he could complete the same task in five, either by driving the nails half-way or by not using all the required nails. The growth of labor productivity is achieved by lowering the quality, for the workers are not personally interested in the use of new equipment.

It is considered that skilled cadres of high-grade workers are the foundation of any enterprise. Their attitude toward perestroika will greatly determine its efficiency at an enterprise. However, do they want perestroika, do they consider it all that necessary? As a rule, these are people with high earnings, who have today virtually anything they need for a peaceful life. They are praised, set as an example, and given awards. As being the worthiest, these people assume leading positions in public organizations.

Changes in the system for the distribution of brigade earnings and improving the labor norming system would create prerequisites for promoting to the status of front-runners those who have earned this right through their industriousness and knowledge. Something has already been accomplished in this direction. The labor collectives have been granted certain rights. However, these are merely half measures, for they have been granted to the entire collective and not to individual workers, whose status continues to depend on the administration. On this matter as well I have my own opinion.

At the present time the attitude toward labor and the moral and political qualities of the worker is defined, as a rule, by people who are poorly acquainted with that individual. I am referring to different production characteristics. The brigade alone can provide an objective evaluation of its members. This would protect individual workers from a variety of attacks and provide the opportunity of voicing one's opinion freely. The primary labor collective should deal with matters of paid leave, taking time off, absenteeism for various reasons, unpaid leave, and so on. However, one condition must be observed: this must not affect the production indicators of the collective as a whole. It is the collective itself which can best deal with such problems.

In my view, the present socialist competition is essentially used to conceal a variety of violations. It does not contribute in the least to the growth of labor productivity. The aspiration to be rated in the competition encourages management to conceal various shortcomings instead of doing everything possible to expose and,

subsequently, to struggle against them. The competition itself is reduced to having everyone fulfill his job obligations. We are competing for the implementation of the production plan, for good quality of output, upgrading production discipline, observing safety regulations, and so on. Having legitimized the possibility of a careless attitude toward obligations, we describe as winners those who have violated obligations the least. And it is on such subjects that passions are seething. Someone is allegedly doing something, someone else is keeping count, and some kind of results are being summed up. And what is the use of all this?

I believe that one can compete only in upgrading labor productivity and the quality of output and the assimilation of new equipment. All other production indicators will automatically reach high standards. The essence of the socialist competition is distorted when there is no willingness to struggle against reasons for the nonfulfillment of direct obligations by some individuals.

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Useful Questions

18020002i Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 14, Sep 88 (signed to press 19 Sep 88) pp 57-58

[Letter to the editors by Ye. Bender, pensioner, Azov]

[Text] I am neither a historian nor a politician. My entire life has been spent working, from 1924 to 1981. I worked unsparingly, for which reason I am not indifferent as to where our labor went and the type of society we built.

As a higher level of social development compared with capitalism, socialism should improve the well-being of the people. The people should feel this. As long as such well-being has not been achieved, there is no socialism in its Leninist understanding, but only an approach to it. We have realized that within a given set of features of socialism an authoritarian regime could also develop. We finished building socialism in the mid-1930s and eliminated the nepmen and the kulaks and yet our life worsened. There was more socialism in Lenin's NEP. Yes, there was unemployment but the number of unemployed declined rapidly. A small part of industry was in private hands but under state control. Elsewhere, however, there was socialism.

I am always irked by condescending references to the NEP as a failed experiment in our history. Few people remember those times. I thank Zalygin for the novel "Posle Buri" [After the Storm]. However, he remains the exception.

I was born and raised in the oil fields of Baku. In 1924 I was accepted as student at the electrical engineering workshop which was essentially engaged in repairing electric motors for oil drills. There were 29 workers and one foreman, who was knowledgeable and respected. He

also performed the duties of a tallyman, a norming worker (we worked on a piece-rate basis), controller, storekeeper, and dispatcher. No superiors ever came to see us. The work was stressed but there was no pressure, there were no quarrels, rushing or idling. I shall remember this work for the rest of my life as a model of efficient organization of labor. Working without haste but also without stopping is a feature of high standards. We worked a great deal but we also earned well (an electrician earned as much as 300 rubles and a fitter as much as 150). There was an abundance of food products and durable goods, and the prices were several hundred percent lower than they are now.

I shall not describe the speed with which the oil drilling facilities were rebuilt, after their virtually total destruction prior to the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, the way new deposits were developed and new equipment installed. We have become accustomed to putting socio-cultural aspects of life last. Such was not the case at that time. Housing settlements beyond the oil fields began to be erected starting with 1923. Such settlements were landscaped, there were flowers and one could hear music coming out of windows. Each small district had its own club and a theater with a stage and a hall for dances. It had a really good library. There were three orchestras, a physical culture section and a soccer team. To the young the club was their second home. One would come back from work, wash up, eat and go to the club.

The worker faculty was a major project. I think that it opened as early as 1922. The last 2 years of study at the worker faculty were on a full-time basis. The scholarship was 25 rubles (a descent light overcoat cost 19 rubles). The teachers at the worker faculty were excellent. A graduation diploma gave the right to enroll in any VUZ in the country without entrance examinations. Our oil field district also had a technical school and a big FZU.

A great deal of attention was paid to physical culture. A sports club had been organized in the premises of the former movie theater. A sports stadium was built. A track spartakiade was held in the summer of 1927. Concern for the individual was felt everywhere. A youngster named Kolya Korneyev lived in our yard. He suffered from bone tuberculosis, which affected his legs. He was sent to the children's sanatorium on the bank of the Apsheron, where he was healed. This occurred in 1922.

In tsarist times the workers had no rights. Under the Soviet system the attitude toward workers became one of respect. Such was the NEP under the conditions of Azneft, which was a major state enterprise. To me the NEP was a miracle created by the Soviet system for the good of the people. Its advantages compared with capitalism were total. The question now is why should I consider the NEP a retreat from socialism, a step backward, and everything which occurred after 1929 and to this day, socialism, developed socialism at that?

I shall not argue whether accelerated industrialization was needed or not. Let us assume that it was. However, it took place at the expense of lowering the living standard of the working people. Such a step could have been allowed as a temporary measure. In our country, however, it stretched over more than 50 years and led to a crisis.

Therefore, what was it that occurred at the end of the 1920s: accelerated progress toward socialism or withdrawal from it? Speaking about the people, what happened was not to their advantage.

Why do we frequently hide Stalin behind the authority of the party? It was categorically stated at the 15th Congress that sending the peasants into kolkhozes had mandatorily to take place with the free agreement of the toiling peasants. The party conference, which was held in April 1929, ratified the 1st 5-Year Plan, which called for the collectivization of 18 to 20 percent of peasant farms. How did the general secretary implement the decisions of the party authorities? By 20 February 1930 50 percent of all peasant farms had joined kolkhozes. The results of such an accelerated collectivization are familiar. Millions of peasants died of hunger in 1932-1933. A similar approach was adopted toward industrialization. The 1st 5-Year Plan was quite stressed. Yet it was fulfilled in 4 years and 3 months by channeling the overwhelming share of funds into heavy industry. The result was a one-sided economy which hurt the people.

I may be wrong. But how can socialism exist without goodness, without concern for the people! For whose sake and for what reason did we build socialism then? We give priority to the socialist system while pushing the interests of the people somewhere in the background. Why are we trying to mitigate the crimes of our past? All of these are not meaningless questions. They affect the present and our future.

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Alternatives in the Power Industry
18020002j Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 14,
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[Letter to the Editors by V. Lyatkher, professor, doctor of technical sciences, head of the Gidroyekt Laboratory]

[Text] The accelerated development of the nuclear power industry is not the only way to solve the energy problem, in any case not on its regional level. I am convinced that wind energy can meet the growing needs.

The development of wind energy would be expedient above all where strong winds blow and there is a developed grid of power transmission cables and a stressed

ecological situation. In particular, a wind power station (VES), which would generate more energy than the Crimean Nuclear Power Plant without, however, presenting any threats to the ecology, could be put on the barren peaks of the mountainous part of the Crimea. Highly efficient wind power systems could be installed in Daghestan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. They too would be able to provide all the necessary electric power for the Baltic area, the North, the Far East, Northern Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, Kirghizia and the lower reaches of the Volga. By adopting the same pace of development of machine-building output for wind energy as the production of equipment for nuclear power plants (wind power units are, naturally, substantially simpler), in our estimates, by the year 2000 we could install VES with an annual output in excess of 50 billion kilowatt hours, which is more than the output of all hydroelectric power plants along the Volga.

The Gidroyekt Institute, notorious for designing a number of hydroengineering projects with sad ecological consequences, has been assigned work on the large-scale development of wind energy. Until recently, the most daring assumptions concerning the long-term large-scale utilization of wind power had been virtually excluded from design projects. The situation is currently beginning to change: a cost accounting wind energy laboratory has been created. Next year it must design, build and undertake the testing of the first series of experimental wind power generators. This laboratory needs help, particularly in terms of placing orders for machine and electrical engineering equipment, for most enterprises in these sectors are overwhelmed by state orders and are still lack the right independently to sell some of their output.

The new type of wind power systems have low material intensiveness, high installation readiness and full automation. They demand a minimal amount of land at the peaks of mountains and hills. With developed power grids leads to the expectation that the cost of electric power generated by the wind in said areas will not exceed the present average cost of energy, which is 0.8 kopeks per kilowatt/hour.

Reliable energy production can be obtained by linking the wind generators within a system related to the hydroelectric power plants and water reservoirs. This will offer additional advantages as well: in the winter, when the river flow is minimal, the speed of the wind is maximal, which eliminates the need to store water for the winter or the building of major water reservoirs which flood huge territories. Thus, the development of wind generating systems along the middle and lower reaches of the Volga, where the winds are quite strong, would allow us to lower the water level in the Volga water reservoirs. Instead of big water reservoirs we could have a few substantially smaller reservoirs and reduce the area of flooded lands several hundred percent (virtually to a level which would only slightly exceed the area flooded by a river at its highest). Such an essential

change in the system of utilization of rivers in the plain areas presumes the creation of significantly simpler hydraulic power equipment compared to the one currently used.

The wind which, in its time, as Marx said, "conquered... the land for the Dutch," working on the basis of contemporary qualitatively new machinery, would decisively change the energy-ecological situation in our country.

In order to achieve this, the conditions which have led to the current state of affairs in the hydraulic power industry must be changed. In addition to certain objective reasons, this includes the nonoptimal nature of hydraulic power projects, the delayed completion of design documentation and its insufficiently high quality. They are largely related to the monopoly status enjoyed by the Gidroyekt Institute in the hydraulic power area, the absence of a favorable moral climate and of economic incentives for the high creative activeness of the personnel and the insufficiently democratic system for the formulation of designs.

Despite numerous critical articles in the central press, the situation in the institute is changing very slowly. In the scientific research sector which should determine the institute's technical policy, to this day such projects have remained virtually without discussion. The institute is displaying a cautious attitude toward many progressive suggestions. It fails to show any particular concern about the length of construction time and the high cost of hydraulic power systems.

In my view, the situation can be corrected, the danger of recurrences reduced and the efficiency of the work upgraded by setting up scientific-production and design-research associations. There should not be a single one, as is stipulated in the recent order issued by the USSR Minenergo, which eliminates almost totally the possibility of creative competition and objective assessments of results, but several, competing among themselves and for customers and contractors. Such associations could include independent scientific and engineering organizations specializing in different areas, expeditions, and experimental plants and trusts.

Subdividing is a necessary and urgent matter which will enable us to create conditions to surmount the monopoly of individual managers, release the technical intelligentsia and lead to the development of relatively free schools with their own "style," and create opportunities for the more intensive growth of scientists and specialists. Such a reorganization would enable us to enhance the quality and pace of design work. Separating science from engineering units (remaining within the scientific-production association on a cost accounting basis) would finally provide science with the possibility of rejecting its servant role and undertaking the search for solutions which will yield substantial results not on paper but in fact, results which could be purchased and sold. It is only in the presence of independent scientific schools and

sufficient freedom of choice for customers and contractors that a real incentive for upgrading the economical nature and quality of projects will appear.

A huge enterprise such as the Gidroyekt Institute and now, to an even greater extent, the Energoprojekt Association, which so far have not proved their worth in the least, are representative of our entire system of the period of stagnation, in which unsuitable people in managerial positions could cause a great deal of harm to people and nature. Changes frequently prove to be irreversible. Nonetheless, something could be corrected. To this effect, it is necessary to break up the giant and to deprive it of its monopoly right to the truth. The creation of several scientific-production associations and their healthy rivalry, under public control, would help us to find the proper proportions within one of the most important sectors for the people—the power industry—accelerate its development and substantially lower the likelihood of tragic errors.

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Restore the Teacher to His Right Height

1802002k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 88 (signed to press 19 Sep 88) pp 60-61

[Letter to the Editors by I. Tkachenko, history teacher, CPSU member, Rudnyy, Kazakh SSR]

[Text] It is common knowledge that the Soviet school is undergoing a difficult period. The school reform has still not become widespread. Society cannot be satisfied with contemporary methods for the training and education of secondary school students, the technical facilities of the schools and, above all, the contemporary teachers. And although our press has published some articles on training methods and the technical aspects of the schools, in my view, the problem of teacher cadres is being covered insufficiently and in a lackluster fashion.

The teacher. Who is he today? What should he become tomorrow? How does perestroika depend on him? Should such problems not excite us?

Today our teacher is both spiritually and materially poor. What are the reasons for this? Who considers them and interprets them properly? The teacher is poor, for which reason the school is spiritually poor and the young people who come out of it are spiritually poor. Can our society be satisfied with this?

By virtue of some puzzling laws, for a long time our teachers have been deprived of material and spiritual goods. Should we not become indignant at this situation? The teacher performs a most difficult type of work. No one questions this. However, in our country the teacher is the last to be given health treatment (on an average a teacher is given a pass to a sanatorium once every 35

years). This is a sad fact. Has anything changed? No, it has not! As in the past, teachers are literally fighting for the crumbs which are being tossed at them by industry.

Above all, the teacher has been deprived of books, which are his work tools. Here is a clear example: in Rudnyy subscription to artistic literature is by lottery drawing and it is always held on Saturdays, i.e., when all categories of workers are free while the teacher is at work(!). Therefore, anyone has a chance to win in the lottery books by L. Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy, Chekhov, Bunin, Pushkin, Sholokhov, Balzac, Dickens, and others. Only teachers have no such opportunity. How can such a scandalous fact be explained? Do the party and soviet authorities not realize this? And if they do, why do they look at it calmly? Recently, this method was used in our city for a subscription to the works of Solovyev and Klyuchevskiy. And what happened? Did these books fall into the hands of teachers of history? Not in the least!

What are our obsolete textbooks worth? Where are the real and profound school aids, particularly in history?

At this time we, teachers, are painfully fighting over the problem of subscriptions to periodicals. For example, we are not given the possibility to subscribe to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY or other popular publications. Who is controlling this situation? Who will rescue the teachers from run-arounds, irritation and painful awareness of their second-class status? Teachers are second-class people in our fatherland. Therefore, what kind of future does this fatherland want to have?

The teacher has been deprived of the hope to normal housing. And this is taking place when thousands and thousands of all kinds of offices and palaces are being built, in which our benefactors are carrying out their extremely important duties. Look at how many teachers have left the schools for that reason alone, even though we are currently so short of teaching cadres!

Yes, the teacher must be a personality. This is being mentioned all too often. But how? Who would help him attain this status? Understandably, individual innovative teachers will not lead us to higher levels. We are thankful for their existence! It is only the new school and the new type of teacher who could take us to a higher level. In my view, however, this depends not only and exclusively on him (who among us would abandon his status?). This depends to a greater extent on the approach of the state to the school. For the time being, no such approach is visible.

Nor is there so far in our school any glasnost, democracy or perestroyka. It is dark, neglected and uncomfortable not only for the students but for the teachers as well, particularly for those who are creative. Such teachers are literally drowning under orders and nagging by officials on all ranks and of all kinds. So far there is not even a sign of self-management in the schools.

The teacher is asked to show love and respect for the children. How could it be otherwise! But does the teacher not dream about it himself! In my view, there is an inviolable law: in order for love for the children to prevail in the schools the same love must warm up the teacher-educator.

In concluding my disturbed (and even hateful, forgive me!) letter, allow me to remind the readers of KOMMUNIST of Lenin's vision of this problem at a time when our schools were taking their first steps: "The people's teacher in our country must be placed at a height which he never attained and could not attain in bourgeois society. This is a self-evident truth. We must advance toward such a state of affairs systematically, steadily and through persistent work, promoting his spiritual upsurge and comprehensive training for holding this truly lofty title and, above all and everything else, enhancing his material status" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, pp 365-366).

What a pity that today one must stubbornly and extensively prove the accuracy of such truths! How regrettable this is!

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Who Is to be Blamed for Stagnation in the Social Sciences?

180200021 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 88 (signed to press 19 Sep 88) pp 61-64

[Letter to the Editors by Academician Ye. Chelyshev]

[Text] Our public is no longer satisfied with general thoughts on the adverse situation which has developed in Soviet science and, particularly, the stagnation in the social sciences over the past decades. Not only scientists but also the broad public want and have the right to know how this stagnation became possible and who is responsible for it. Today, under the conditions of democratization and glasnost, such problems are being extensively discussed in our press. Frequently the accusation turns to the "academic Olympus," i.e., the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, which is being blamed for instilling the administrative-command system in Soviet science.

Unquestionably, the administrative-command system, which dominated our country for many long decades, caused tremendous harm not only to its economic development but also to its spiritual life, science and culture and all areas of social activities. Furthermore, one could claim that the authoritarian-bureaucratic management method in the area of spiritual production, which includes scientific activities, is even less admissible than in material production. Naturally, this system and this management method were not anonymous.

However, despite the rather widespread view, in the period of stagnation the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium was by no means the peak of the administrative-command system in our science. In many respects it was, rather, its first victim. As is frequently the case in mountains, the nearby modest height, particularly as we approach it, conceals the peaks which are covered in eternal snow and from which glaciers drop into the valleys and a piercing wind blows. Such was the case with science in general and, particularly, the social sciences, for a multiple-step authoritarian-bureaucratic hierarchy in the command management of science weighed over the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. It unceremoniously interfered in all and not only organizational-economic problems of academic science, keeping its material and technical support on a short leash, but also penetrated into strictly scientific problems, engaging in the petty control of activities of scientific institutions, the international contact maintained by Soviet scientists, etc. In turn, during the period of stagnation the Science and Schools CPSU Central Committee Department controlled the administrative departments and institutions. It not simply "commanded science," instructing noted scientists on matters pertaining to their special fields, but also assumed the "nomenclatural right" to appoint and replace managers of scientific institutions, including heads of departments and laboratories. Furthermore, through the head of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, the personnel of this department "supervised" the USSR Academy of Sciences institutes but in fact managed their scientific activities, frequently solving problems concerning the "shutting down" of entire scientific areas and specialized subjects. They did not need any scientists who would be seeking, formulating new ideas or opposing ossified dogmas. They found more to their liking social scientists who acted as commentators, scholasticists who would thoughtlessly and obediently perform the role of conduits of directives issued from above. They prepared in their offices various types of "scientific" conferences with predetermined, preprogrammed results and conclusions, at which, as a rule, anything that was new and which contradicted stereotypical standards of thinking was questioned, while scientific arguments were replaced by abundant quotations and references to various "authorities." Alas, how many such conferences I personally and many of my colleagues have had to participate in.... What strong inner objections they triggered in many of their participants! The persecution of innovative scientists was repeatedly instigated and anything which did not fit dogmatic formulas or ideas issued by superior authorities were anathematized and proclaimed pseudoscientific. The efforts which some of our scientists made to enliven, to introduce something new in the social sciences, were firmly blocked. Let us recall the case of Academician A.M. Rumyantsev alone, who had tried to organize sociological work in the course of his brief tenure as director of the Institute of Specific Social Studies.

Who was navigating this ship which now finds itself aground?

During the period of stagnation the Department of Science and Educational Institutions was headed by S.P. Trapeznikov, a favorite of L.I. Brezhnev's, who enjoyed great personal influence on the latter. Despite the tremendous harm which S.P. Trapeznikov caused our science, social science in particular, I cannot describe him as the "evil genius" of Soviet science, for he was a nobody scientifically or spiritually. The tense relations between S.P. Trapeznikov and the academy are confirmed by the fact alone that despite strong pressure, repeatedly the USSR Academy of Sciences General Assembly rejected his candidacy as USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member (in the field of USSR history). For this he repeatedly took his revenge against the academy as best he could, and he could do a great deal...

Finally, this entire hierarchical pyramid was topped by M.A. Suslov, the "party's chief ideologue," a person with Stalinist training, who arbitrarily set the priority areas in the social sciences. One such area in the 1970s was the doctrine of "developed socialism" which, through the efforts of its zealous supporters, became a refined apology of socioeconomic stagnation, accompanied by the complete separation of theory from practice and suppression of any dissident thinking. It was on his initiative that the development of Soviet sociology, social forecasting and other promising trends in the social sciences was blocked.

Under the pretext of "secrecy" but actually for the sake of concealing from the public the unseemly reality of stagnation, Soviet economists, sociologists, jurists, demographers and other specialists were deprived of access to statistical data; historians and literary workers vainly tried to gain access to "classified" files; specific social studies and public opinion surveys were frustrated; access to foreign publications was sharply limited, and so on. This alone alienated many social scientists from social life, leading them to abstract theorizing, which was directly or indirectly encouraged. In the 1970s many noted Soviet social scientists (philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others) who worked in the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, were subjected to a real "witch hunt," and were persecuted for "unorthodox views" by V.N. Yagodkin, Moscow City Party Committee secretary.

Taking all of these circumstances into consideration, as well as the overall ideological and political atmosphere which prevailed in the country during the period of stagnation, it would be naive, to say the least, to assign full responsibility for the state of social affairs at that time exclusively to the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium and its Vice President P.N. Fedoseyev, as is sometimes done by our press.

At the end of April 1988, addressing a conference on topical problems of historical science and literature, sponsored by the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Writers' Union and the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and discussing the difficulties experienced by our social sciences during the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation, Academician P.N. Fedoseyev described, in particular, the manner in which the arbitrary decisions made by Stalin who, at that time was preparing to institute new repressive measures, it was suggested to P.N. Fedoseyev who, in 1947, was heading a group of specialists drafting the new party program, to delete from the text the idea that in our country "with the full victory of socialism and the assertion of the moral-political unity within society, the dictatorship of the proletariat had fulfilled its great historical mission and become a the state of the whole people" (VOPROSY ISTORII No 6, 1988, p 8). Such were the conditions under which our social scientists had to work at that time. Even the slightest disobedience of ideological diktat at that time was harshly punished. How numerous were our social scientists and scientists in the humanities, who had to drink the bitter cup of this punishment and who became victims of arbitrariness!

I believe that our social scientists will also speak of the circumstances in which they created their works, which today make a person frequently blush, the way in which they tried to oppose authoritarian arbitrariness and the manner in which some of them, while remaining in their leading positions, nonetheless, with a great deal of difficulty and at risk to themselves, defended scientific truth and supported and protected talented scientists. It is hardly proper and just to judge them for a variety of forced compromises, on the basis of today's positions.

The "selective quotations" from their works pertaining to different periods is particularly inadmissible; this leads to the creation of a distorted concept of their scientific.

Thus, of late, in the course of frequently justified criticism of the situation which developed in the social sciences, some authors mention in this connection the name of P.N. Fedoseyev, forgetting, incidentally, to note that he was not involved in the persecution of honest scientists and repeatedly, even while Stalin was alive, was himself out of favor because of his scientific activities. In 1947 he was relieved of his duties as first deputy chief of the VKP(b) Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Department; in 1949 he was relieved of his position as editor-in-chief of the journal BOLSHEVIK. M.A. Suslov as well did not conceal his malevolence, to put it mildly, toward him (see, for example, his article in the 24 December 1952 issue of PRAVDA).

P.N. Fedoseyev was a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium for 3 decades and many people well recall his speeches against dogmatism, obscurantism and scholasticism in science. He did a great deal to strengthen the creative alliance between philosophers

and natural scientists and to give comradely support to the young philosophical generation which was born of the cleansing wave of the 20th Congress; he actively contributed to the rehabilitation of geneticists and cyberneticists in the 1950s and 1960s (who, during the period of the cult of personality, were chastized, among others, by Academician M.B. Mitin) and to the development of systems analysis and other progressive trends in the social sciences in the 1970s, and headed the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on Philosophical Problems of the Natural Sciences. It was on his initiative that a series of publications on "Science, World Outlook and Life" was created, and selected general scientific works by Academicians P.L. Kapitsa, N.N. Semenov, V.L. Ginzburg, D.S. Likhachev and many other scientists, were published. Soon after N.S. Khrushchev was replaced, P.N. Fedoseyev was removed from his position as USSR Academy of Sciences vice-president, for he embodied in the eyes of the people who had then assumed the party's leadership, the course charted by the 20th CPSU Congress in the social sciences.

In 1971 the Academy of Sciences' General Assembly re-elected Vice-President P.N. Fedoseyev. Today the USSR Academy of Sciences is frequently blamed for being undemocratic. I shall not get into an argument on this matter. I must point out, however, that during the period of stagnation our academy was the country's most democratic institution. Unlike, for example, some creative associations which automatically expelled their members by instruction from above, despite the pressure put on it the academy did not allow A.D. Sakharov to be expelled from its ranks.

In the 1970s, in order to preserve for the sake of science gifted social scientists, who were being subjected to various forms of administrative persecution for their scientific and social activities, Academician Fedoseyev transferred them from some Academy of Sciences institutes to others: sociologists to the TsEMI and the Institute of the State and Law; philosophers, to the Institute of the History of the Natural Sciences and Technology, and so on. Since it was impossible to create new scientific institutes, he encouraged the creation of scientific councils under the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, to deal with comprehensive studies of social problems in areas where social, natural and technical sciences intersected.

Let me also mention that during the period of stagnation Academician P.N. Fedoseyev held a principled position on problems of dialectical and historical materialism, opposing the profanation of its basic theoretical concepts. In particular, he defended the view that the main contradiction in the development of socialist society is the one between production forces and production relations and that without solving this contradiction no steady scientific and technical progress and advancement of social relations is possible. Objecting to the most zealous supporters of the concept of developed socialism, which glossed over social reality, he pointed out that

under socialist conditions contradictions within society could assume a very sharp, a conflicting nature. P.N. Fedoseyev also pointed out the need for a dialectical approach to the struggle between the two opposite systems in the world arena and the inadmissibility of absolutizing it. Let us note that these ideas were developed by the author in the book "*Filosofiya i Nauchnoye Poznaniye*" [Philosophy and Scientific Knowledge] (1983).

It was precisely these views expressed by P.N. Fedoseyev and similar statements made by other scientists that were at that time violently attacked by the central party press. This motivated P.N. Fedoseyev in July 1984 to write a long letter to the CPSU Central Committee and the editors of KOMMUNIST, in which he substantiated his views on the future development of socialist society, pointing out the abnormal situation which prevailed in the social sciences and proving the groundlessness and danger of the scholastic approach adopted by his opponents to social problems encountered by our country. Allow me to cite a single quotation from this letter, letting the readers judge for themselves the views supported by P.N. Fedoseyev. Thus, in describing the simplified apologetic concepts of socialism which, at that time, were popular among social scientists, he wrote: "We would render poor service to our foreign friends by interpreting simplistically the way of socialist development and indicating to them that possible difficulties and crisis situations which may occur before the total and final victory of socialism, are related only to 'individual antagonisms'." The letter also contained a number of constructive proposals aimed at surmounting dogmatism, conservatism and quotation-mongering in the social sciences and establishing within them a creative atmosphere through collective work and free scientific debates.

In sending this letter to KOMMUNIST, it is not my intention to claim that the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium does not bear responsibility for the situation in our science in general and in the social sciences in particular. The activities of the Academy of Sciences and its leadership and the situation prevailing in the social sciences are not free from substantial shortcomings. However, their criticism must be truly party-oriented and freed from subjectivistic prejudices. It must be substantiated and argued and, consequently, convincing.

My letter is dictated by the natural desire to bring clarity to the circumstances which brought about an unfavorable situation in our social sciences during the period of stagnation. It must be a question of how to rescue science from authoritative-bureaucratic management methods, incompetent interference, incompatible with democracy and glasnost, without which no fruitful scientific activities are possible.

Obviously, today, when the processes of perestroyka are gathering strength, it is important to identify the sources of lagging and stagnation in our social sciences. That is

why authors who turn to the past are right. However, they are not right when, ignoring the reasons, they write only about the consequences, not to mention the fact that it was precisely the social sciences which suffered the most from the influence of the authoritarian-bureaucratic system which prevailed in our country for many years. Many obstacles remain on the path to liberating our social sciences from the stereotyped and ossified way of thinking, supported by dogmatic views which became deeply ingrained in us in the course of many long years. The fresh wind of change is occasionally perceived or attempts are made to present it as a destructive storm.

Nonetheless, the voice of leading social scientists and humanitarians is being heard increasingly loudly in various areas of our social sciences; their writings are triggering a growing social interest. It is precisely they and their numerous followers who must lead the social sciences out of the impasse and "refloat the boat," thanks to the powerful influx of social renovation. Suffice it to recall the warm response which was triggered among the public as a result of the activities of Academician D.S. Likhachev, who opposes the condescending and scornful attitude toward general humanitarian problems and the so-called residual principle in the attitude toward culture, and who emphasizes the significance of the humanities in the renovation of our society and the raising of individuals who can implement scientific and technical progress in our country. Unquestionably, a decisive role in the development of all Soviet science, including its social and humanitarian areas, will be played by the long-term programs for priority scientific research, currently discussed in all units of the USSR Academy of Sciences, calling for the creation of fundamental works of a scale such as the two-volume monograph by T.V. Gamkrelidze and V.V. Ivanov "*Indoyevropeyskiy Yazyk i Indoyevropeytsy*" [The Indo-European Language and the Indo-Europeans], which was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1988.

Nonetheless, unfortunately and repeatedly we have been hearing that proper attention is still frequently not being paid to the considerations expressed by the scientists in solving various practical problems of the socioeconomic, political and cultural renovation and development of our country and that their suggestions are meeting with opposition in the course of perestroyka.

Naturally, we must continue to take most decisive and extreme steps to release social science teachers in secondary and higher schools from dogmatism and quotation mongering. Unfortunately, this process is still extremely sluggish. The development of the social sciences in our country must be given a green light.

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The Labor Movement in Search of a Democratic Alternative

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[Article by Yuriy Andreyevich Krasin, rector, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] In the 1980s the labor movement in the developed capitalist countries came across a phenomenon described as a "conservative wave." The policy they had practiced of regulating the economy and partially redistributing the national income in favor of the low-earning population strata was replaced by neoconservatism which proclaimed as its credo the freedom of private enterprise, freeing it from all restrictions imposed by state intervention in the reproduction process.

Neoconservatism has the features of a social revenge against all the gains which were achieved by the labor and democratic movements in the postwar period. For that reason, it initially seemed that the "conservative wave" would abate soon as a result of the opposition of the majority of the population, for it led to the growth of unemployment, the dismantling of the social gains of the working people, intensified aggressive trends within capitalism, and strengthening the neocolonial system of exploitation of the developing countries. However, despite numerous forecasts, neoconservatism proved to be quite durable and, which was particularly unexpected, gained the support of the lower strata. The labor movement and the communist and social democratic parties faced the need for a strategic reorientation. The solution of this problem required, above all, the theoretical interpretation of the profound current processes governing the development of public production.

The reasons for the success of neoconservatism lie in the changes within capitalism, which are taking place under the influence of the profound changes in the technical and economic foundations of public production. By the turn of the 1980s the scientific and technical revolution in the area of developed capitalism entered a qualitatively new stage: a technological revolution began, leading to a revolutionary turn in social production forces. Its main elements were the following: structural reconstruction of public production based on science-intensive technologies, use of microprocessors, the information industry, robot technology, automated control systems and biotechnology.

What is behind these external manifestations of the technological revolution? Marx's prognostic considerations in the part in his "*Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1859*," which deals with the development of basic capital as an indicator of development of capitalist production are of great methodological significance in the study of the processes under way. Marx describes the consequences of those same technological changes which have become apparent in our time.

Actually, the technological revolution leads to huge labor savings and manpower reductions in the production process. "Labor," Marx noted, "is now not only something included in the production process but something in which man, conversely, behaves toward the production process itself as its controller and regulator.... Instead of being the main agent in the production process, the worker stands alongside the production process" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 46, part II, p 213).

It is becoming clear that the creation of real wealth depends increasingly less on the working time and the amount of invested labor and increasingly more on the power of production agents which are activated in the course of the working time and the tremendous efficiency of which is determined not by the working time needed for their manufacturing but by the overall level of science and its application in the production process and on technological progress.

Thinking in abstract-theoretical terms, we could say that no such changes fit the framework of capitalist relations (as mentioned by Marx in his "*Economic Manuscripts*") but require a conversion to a higher type of production relations, to a socialist organization of society. However, history does not obey the laws of "technological determinism." The technological revolution takes place within capitalist conditions without automatically leading to a social revolution. Naturally, however, the economic situation in the capitalist countries is changing radically. This creates the need for a change in the economic policies of the ruling class in order to face the realities of revolutionary changes in production forces.

Neoconservatism was the first to become aware of the spirit of the time. Its economic policy expresses the objective need for profound structural changes in public production, going beyond the national framework, triggered by the technological revolution. Under capitalist conditions the application of flexible technologies which determine the high mobility of the production process calls for freeing the economy from the fetters of strict governmental control, easing the tax burden and encouraging entrepreneurial initiative, and risk in the various promising trends of technological progress, and efficiency in decision-making, not only on the level of large but also of medium-sized and small enterprises. State instruments for direct control of production processes become excessively burdensome and inefficient, as well as incapable of encompassing all areas and realms of economic development. Is this not one of the main reasons for the crisis in the neo-Keynsian control strategy? The very formulation of the objectives of the neoconservatives indicates their aspiration to free the development of the economy from the inflated and nationally restricted state interference: "debureaucratization," "deregulation," "denationalization," "privatization," and "flexibilization." The thought has even been expressed that the neoconservatives would like to implement the idea of the "withering away of the state."

Although the economic policy of the neoconservatives is a heavy burden carried by the poor population strata, objectively it has met the requirements of the technological revolution. The meeting of such requirements in a conservative form benefits above all those circles of the monopoly bourgeoisie which are related to multinational corporations and are interested in weakening state economic control. Nonetheless, it encourages economic growth and, to one extent or another, it offers material benefits (mostly to the detriment of long-term class interests which are as yet unrealized and, particularly, precisely because of the lack of a convincing alternative) to a significant segment of the working class and the middle classes, who vote for conservative candidates.

The new deployment of social forces, expressed in the "two-thirds society" has become quite clear. Essentially, a majority consensus is reached in which, in addition to anti-state middle classes, includes that segment of the working class the traditional needs of which are satisfied by a neoconservative policy. This is entirely possible on the basis of the production level which has been reached. Some bourgeois theoreticians are even referring to the reality of providing a guaranteed minimal income for all members of society regardless of their labor activity. As to needs of a higher order, they are still by no means realized by the working class and, for the time being, do not threaten the stability of capitalist society. Furthermore, a considerable segment of the so-called new workers, to whom material sufficiency is not a priority requirement, lean in the direction of such a consensus. However, they see in the modernization of the production process, which is under way, a means of asserting the creative nature of labor. Therefore, to use the expression of French researcher R. Souby, a broad view of "agreeing with modernization" takes shape.

Capitalism, which uses the results of technological progress, has localized the sharp social discontent of the suffering minority, which accounts for approximately one-third of the able-bodied population and which holds a defensive position: workers in sectors and professions squeezed out by technical progress, the unemployed, the jobless youth and the immigrants. Their discontent is amortized by a system of social philanthropy, which remains under neoconservative rule as well. Frequently discontent does not turn into revolutionary protest but into political absenteeism, apathy, hopelessness or growth of populist nationalistic and chauvinistic moods which are food for the extreme right reaction.

Mass support of the neoconservative course is largely secured also through the skillful use of the population's discontent with bureaucratism in the state apparatus, appeals to individual activities and traditional moral values in the opposition to corruption, bribery, loose morals, lack of spirituality in mass culture, and so on. Some trends in the development of the mass consciousness also nurture neoconservatism. The exceptionally high dynamism of social development in the postwar period, and the sharp breakdown of economic and social

structures this created, have triggered among the broad population strata in capitalist society a yearning for stability and for the traditional values of a simple human society free from bureaucratic facelessness. This creates favorable grounds for successful social demagoguery promoted by neoconservatism.

We must point out that the conservative segment of the monopoly bourgeoisie is still firmly retaining the initiative in terms of making structural economic reforms which clear the way to a technological revolution. The labor movement and its party are in a state of deep defense and, for the time being, offer no specific alternate options. The social democratic strategy of neo-Keynesianism, as it developed in the postwar period, has exhausted its possibilities. Nor does the concept of antimonopoly democracy formulated by the communist parties, aimed at winning over the democratic forces holding decisive positions in the state and pursuing a policy of regulating socioeconomic life, "work." Liberalization and the denationalization of the economy undermine such strategic concepts. This is one of the serious losses affecting the labor parties and the "crisis of objectives" they are experiencing.

The communists, and by no means all of them, are only now beginning to realize the entire importance of the task of interpreting and assimilating the consequences of the technological revolution under way. In his speech at the June Central Committee Plenum and Party Central Control Commission, Achille Occhetto, the present secretary general of the Italian Communist Party, said: "We must provide an evaluation of the great processes of restructuring and modernization, which have taken place in our society in recent years. We must realize their consequences, costs and demands regarding democratic management and the new determining contradictions which open opportunities for implementing a policy of real alternative, opening a way to a programmatic and governmental alternative."

The difficulties in the labor movement are worsened by the profound changes occurring in the course of the technological revolution in the structure of the working class, paralleled by changes in its aspect, needs and value orientations. In addition to traditional workers engaged in primarily physical labor and directly participating in the production process (whose number is steadily declining), new labor strata are appearing, engaged primarily in mental work and related to progressive technologies, performing control, tuning and regulatory functions. In terms of their number, they may still be fewer than the traditional workers, but their numbers are increasing rapidly and, above all, they are ever more clearly becoming the type of nucleus of the working class linked to the center and the core of the current capitalist economic system. Taking into consideration long-term technological changes, they constitute the future of the working class.

Under those circumstances the political parties, essentially oriented toward the old social base of the labor movement, may find themselves within the foreseeable future expelled from the main bridgeheads of the political struggle to the peripheral positions of defending the corporate interests of no more than one, albeit large, segment of the working class. Along this way, one easily finds himself trapped by "laborism," in which loyalty to the class positions of the proletariat assumes an inviolable, a dogmatic nature. Parties which wish to represent the working class today as a class called upon to play a universal-historical role in liberating mankind from exploitation and alienation, must throw off the blinkers of obsolete ideological stereotypes and see reality as it is, see the contemporary working class in its entire variety, including the features which are developing among the new workers and the areas in which experience is gained in formulating a strategy of confrontation with modern capitalism.

The technological revolution takes capitalism higher in the historical spiral which formulates in a new fashion the basic problems of the confrontation between sociopolitical forces and requires a new vision of the problem of conversion to socialism along with a strategy for the revolutionary parties of the working class, consistent with this vision.

Clearly, the technological revolution neither solves nor could solve the basic contradictions within capitalism, from which, in the final account, stems the need for a socialist change. Capitalism tries to make the tremendous forces of science, nature, social combinations and social contacts it has brought to life the framework needed for the preservation of its values. Compared with such social forces, however, as Marx said, stealing someone else's time is a rather poor foundation for public production. It is historically doomed, for it no longer represents or creates social wealth.

The initiated change in production forces reproduces and concentrates capitalist contradictions directly in the area of development of the social individual. By freeing the worker from the production process and giving his labor an increasingly creative nature, the technological revolution demands the comprehensive development of the social individual and creates requirements superior to simple material needs. For the time being, the contradictions within capitalism on this ground have not reached the level of stress which triggers a critical condition proving the need for fundamental change. For that reason, for the time being big capital has the possibility of utilizing the achievements of technological progress in reducing the harshness of socioclass contradictions by ensuring the fuller satisfaction of the mass needs of yesterday of a significant percentage of the population.

However, the concentrated invasion of science and technology in the production process with the help of new technologies leads to increasingly profound changes in

the subjects of the social production process. The producers are no longer a kind of specific class or social stratum but, in Marx's words, "a combination of social activity." The area of production activities which, in the past, was the prerogative of the working class, is widening and involving other worker categories exploited by big capital and objectively interested in radical social change.

There is an increasingly urgent need for a production worker of a new type: highly skilled, involved with his work, enterprising, flexible and with a high degree of freedom. To him the conditions for leading a creative life become much more important than wages. It is on this basis that the standard of a universal interest in the wealth of variety of this world, the wealth of social relations, appears. Elements of a new culture of social relations develop among workers in connection with new technologies and with spiritual areas which are part of the "combination of social activities." Needs develop, such as the aspiration for democratic freedoms and self-government, social justice, greater interest in the development of the personality and the forms of its self-assertion, conditions for social activeness and activity, and leading a spiritually meaningful life. Obviously, this is the platform on which the struggle will be mounted against capitalism in the new round of the historical spiral. In our view, that explains the great importance of including such values in the political programs and ensuring their political ties with the specific tasks of escalating democratic changes.

It is no accident that the bearers of new values are, for the time being, less the worker parties than the mass democratic movements which express the interests of the new social strata, the new strata of the working class. Such interests and values, interpreted in a Marxist way and organically related to the traditional values of the labor movement, will become increasingly important in the activities, programs and strategies of the political parties of the working class. This will open to them the gates to the future.

The inevitability of neoconservatism is not fatal. What is inevitable is the technological revolution. The form which it will take, however, whether conservative or democratic, depends on the correlation and struggle among socioclass forces. The offensive of neoconservatism is explained by the fact that the working class and the democratic forces proved unprepared for an objectively ripe change in the development of public production. However, the neoconservative course is fraught with insoluble contradictions. Although contributing to a change in production forces, it is unable to satisfy the democratic needs of society and individuals, generated by such changes as well as by the entire atmosphere of an integral and contradictory world. The framework of the paternalism it cultivates is too tight for this. The anti-statism of the neoconservatives as well comes from the impossibility of engaging in major national economic

projects without the interference of the state, which forces it, in violation of its own concept, to resort to the power of the state in the implementation of its economic policies.

The contradictions within neoconservatism prepare the grounds for a democratic alternative. However, this alternative will not come by itself, without the active role of the subjective factor. The task of the labor movement is to regroup its forces in such a way as to lead to the creation of a democratic majority which could rally on the platform of a reform opposing neoconservatism. What is needed is a bloc of forces which would include the working class and the middle classes interested in the struggle for a democratic option in the development of capitalism, opposed to the conservative option. Such a bloc of heterogeneous democratic forces cannot be a monolithic unity or resemble a popular front. Rather, it could be a flexible and equal interaction among heterogeneous autonomous parties, organizations and movements, materialized through dialogue, contacts, compromises and joint and parallel actions.

The democratic majority needs an alternative program to neoconservatism. Such a program must be sufficiently broad and flexible in order to synthesize within it the differentiated interests of the contemporary working class and the middle classes, i.e., the social majority. It must be structured on the basis of the realities of the already initiated new round in the technical and cultural progress of capitalist society. The outlines of a program for a democratic alternative, which could become a platform for cooperation among democratic forces in the struggle against neoconservatism, is gradually beginning to take shape.

It involves, above all, demands unrelated to profound social changes and, one could say, which are on the surface of economic life. This applies, above all, to reducing the length of the working time without lowering wages, which would make it possible to ease the consequences of structural unemployment and free time for more meaningful activities by individuals. Such steps include the creation of a widespread system for retraining the manpower, paid for by big capital and from the state budget. This would make it possible to ensure the employment of workers in skills which are doomed to disappearance in the course of scientific and technical progress. The development of a system of social shock absorbers, which could lower the cost of the structural reorganization of public production and ease the situation of the poor strata, pushed by the technological revolution to the margin of social life, would be of major importance.

The demand for a purposeful redirecting of capital investments into the social and spiritual infrastructure goes much farther: it applies to culture, science, art, recreation and environmental protection. Clearly, such

reorientation will require the type of political changes which would force big capital into expenditures which, from its viewpoint, are unproductive.

Obviously, this category also includes the democratic management of shareholding companies, controlled by the working people as a result of their ownership of stock, and establishing trade union, insurance, investment, and other foundations. Shareholders account for 19 percent of the population in the United States, 21 percent in Sweden and more than the overall trade union membership in Great Britain. Stock holding foundations are very active. It would be of interest to study the experience gained in setting up so-called working people investment funds, which were started in Sweden in the 1980s.

Could an increase in stock ownership and in the number of funds controlled by worker organizations become a prerequisite for a conversion of quantity into quality? Perhaps Marxists should go back to assessing the role of shareholding capital, owned and controlled by the working people. Instruments for democratic influence on corporate investment policy could possibly be created in this area. In this connection, it would be pertinent to recall that the founders of Marxism described shareholding societies as the elimination of capitalism within the framework of a capitalist production method.

Also noteworthy is the idea expressed within the labor movement of an intensive development of cooperatives as a democratic form of production organization, which comes the closest to the labor of free associated producers. We should also discuss the possibility of multinational consumer and production cooperatives.

Steps aimed at surmounting the crisis in civilization also assume a political coloring. This applies to survival, demilitarization of the economy, disarmament, reconversion of military production and the redirecting of released funds to the solution of pressing global problems and the creation of prerequisites for a new global economic order which would exclude neocolonialist forms of exploitation of the developing countries and ensure the free choice by each country of its own way of development.

Another item on the agenda is the democratization of economic relations by increasing the participation of the working people and their organizations in decision-making and management on the enterprise and corporate levels, restricting the bureaucratic interference of the state in economic life and, at the same time, enhancing its role in defining the overall framework of economic and social policy in accordance with the interests of all social strata. In order to debunk neoconservatism, which speculates on antistatism, we must develop a comprehensive democratic system for social self-government, which can assume the exercise of regulatory functions in the area of production and social processes in which the inefficiency of the "welfare" state has been

noticed, due to bureaucratic centralization which fetters enterprise. This would open the opportunity for the democratization of society not through an anarchic rejection of the state, which needs democratic forces in order to carry out progressive changes, but through combining self-governing and state mechanisms for regulating social life. Naturally, the establishment of such a broad "economic democracy" is impossible without strengthening the positions of leftist forces in the social political system on all its levels, from top to bottom.

Giving priority to the spiritual values of human civilization, which could involve in the political struggle population strata which are dissatisfied with the simple aspiration to material sufficiency, is a distinguishing feature of such an alternate program. Such values include the dignity of the individual, a spiritually saturated way of life, morally meaningful human relations, aspiration toward self-expression, participation in solving problems of governmental and social life and development of self-government.

The democratic alternative has its international aspects as well. The answer to the neoconservative course of economic development cannot be structured on the simple rejection of multinational cooperations, the activities of which conceal a powerful trend toward production internationalization. The national states are unable to oppose it. Nationalization in the case of multinational monopolies would be, to begin with, inefficient; secondly, it would be harmful, for it would mechanically tear the living fabric of global economic relations and the intensifying cooperation among national economies.

The integrity and interdependence of the global capitalist economy means that a democratic alternative should include the concept of international interpenetration and integration among national economies and the international interaction among left-wing forces, which can create a system of democratic control over public production encompassing national, regional and global parameters.

In this area the labor movement has fallen greatly behind. It is facing a contradiction: the internationalization of the economy has become an essential feature of capitalism while the labor movement—the historical ground for international labor solidarity—operates so far within the national platforms of struggle. A total answer to the requirements of the technological revolution, which is multinational in nature, is impossible within national framework. Emerging on the international level would broaden the field for political maneuvering by left-wing and democratic forces beyond the national boundaries and would enable them to organize extensive international interaction. By this token these forces could surmount the weakness stemming from the fact that they are trying to counter the conservative course through means of national policy, thus clashing with the objective trend toward the internationalization of public production. A democratic alternative unrestricted by

national boundaries is needed in order to emerge in the international arena. What makes this even more important is the fact that global economic relations are today becoming comprehensive and imbuing opposite social systems.

The success and influence of neoconservatism are an indication that the alternative, which could lead to democratic forms of development of the technological revolution, is still only at its start. However, there are strong factors operating in its favor, which lead us to assess the future optimistically.

To begin with, the objective logic of capitalist contradictions in the new round of the historical spiral shifts the center of gravity in the production of fixed capital from impersonal means of production to the social individual. The merciless waste of human resources in public production by neoconservatism diverges from this need and will increasingly encourage democratic changes.

Second, gradually but irreversibly a process of awareness and assimilation by the working class of new needs, the satisfaction of which requires the democratization of social life, including economic management, is taking place.

Third, although delayed, a renovation has been undertaken in the political forms of the labor movement and their release from dogmatism and ossification, their democratization, their drastically expanding openness and their ability to accept and synthesize pluralism of interests and aspirations of social forces which are able to counter neoconservatism.

All of this leads us to believe that the struggle for a democratic form for the implementation of the initiated revolution in production forces will be intensifying.

Once again the realities of a democratic alternative raise a question of vital importance to the communist parties, the question of a socialist future, for the revolutionary struggle for socialism is the meaning of all communist activities. It is for the sake of attaining socialist objectives that they have frequently displayed and are displaying models of heroism and self-sacrifice. Does the very formulation of the question of a democratic alternative on the grounds of capitalism not indicate that a socialist future is postponed indefinitely and that the present realities of developed capitalist society deprive the communists of a political space within which to assert their originality as revolutionary parties?

Such is not the case! Under the conditions of the technological revolution, the democratic variant in the development of capitalism which counters neoconservatism, does not postpone but brings socialism closer. In addressing the meeting of representatives of parties and movements in November 1987, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized that no one can refute the conclusion "that there is

an alternative to capitalism. This alternative is socialism." On the broad universal-historical level it is precisely socialism that is replacing the capitalist socioeconomic system which, through its own development, is creating an increasingly pressing need for socialist forms of organization of society. At the same time, the technological revolution which is taking place under capitalist conditions reminds us of Marx's familiar statement that no social system can yield its place to another system before it has exhausted its possibilities for the development of social production forces.

Capitalism has clearly not exhausted its possibilities. However, what follows from this is not the abandonment of socialist objectives but the need for the Marxists to review some simplified and straight ideas concerning the conversion of human society from capitalism to socialism and the need systematically to apply the principle of historicism in assessing this process.

To Lenin the fact that capitalism had entered its monopoly stage was an indication that the mature capitalist system was ready to convert to socialism. This was not an abstract conclusion but the result of a Marxist analysis of the capitalist socialization of production by the monopolies which, precisely, had created the possibility of its social control. Now, however, when the revolutionary tension and the heat of passion of the critical periods of the first half of the 20th century have settled, we can clearly see that the transition of capitalism to socialism on a global scale could not take place within the relatively short historical time hoped for by the Marxists.

Actually, even the length of the bourgeois revolutions, the scale and extent of tasks of which were considerably lesser than those of the socialist revolution, took several decades. The bourgeois revolution in France covered several cycles and took nearly a century. Proceeding on the basis of universal parameters, the bourgeois social revolution is continuing in the developing countries to this day, influencing the content of our age and experiencing the latter's influence. What can we say about a socialist revolution which changes the very foundations of social life? Unquestionably, it extends over a very long time segment, during which the social conditions themselves of a conversion from capitalism to socialism change qualitatively.

Looking back, it is easy to see that monopoly capitalism itself has gone through various stages of development, at each one of which possibilities and forms of conversion to socialism differed. The capitalism of the turn of the century could be considered from this viewpoint as early monopoly capitalism. Its very establishment led to shifts in the global capitalist system, creating stress centers and promoting the ripening of a revolutionary situation above all not in the most developed capitalist areas where capitalism had significant life resources.

Contrary to the ideologues of the Second International, who were waiting for the entire system to reach some high point of maturity, with a brilliant perspicacity Lenin discovered the possibility of a breach within the capitalist system in several countries or in a single separate country.

The great October Socialist Revolution made the first breach and opened a new direction in global history. Its historical significance goes far beyond the framework of the specific conditions in which it was made. From the viewpoint of internal development, however, this was a model of conversion to socialism consistent with the conditions of early monopoly capitalism. The relative socioeconomic underdevelopment of the country where the breach took place was balanced by the power of the state system of the working class and its special role in shaping the economic base and regulating and restructuring socioclass and national relations. The possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist system became possible on the international level, as the type of interaction which presumed not only confrontation but also the development of the economic and cultural relations which were needed for a fast rise of socialism to the cutting edge of scientific and technical and spiritual progress.

After Lenin's death, however, the experience in the first breach began to be accepted not as a model of the initial period of a lengthy historical process which, as is clear today, would stretch over many decades, but as a general universal model suitable, with certain modifications, for all countries. Such dogmatic views were oriented not toward the study of a historical evolution of capitalist society in the present age but the constant expectation of its collapse. They justified the logic of the polarized opposition between the two social systems, essentially reducing their constructive interaction to naught.

The historians are as yet to assess the lost opportunities and negative consequences of the use of simplified and nonhistorical systems for socialism and the communist movement. It is important to note at this point that the inconsistency between these systems and reality becomes striking as capitalism reaches a new round in the spiral. Recent monopoly capitalism, related to the technological revolution, demands different theoretical concepts concerning the transition to socialism. Obviously, the model of this transition will not be a breach but a dialectical surmounting of capitalism on the basis of the technical and economic foundation it is laying as a result of the organic maturing of the elements and prerequisites for socialist social relations. Perfectly suitable as a description of this model of social revolution is Hegel's term "removal" (aufheben), which combines three meanings: eliminating, preserving and enhancing.

In this model the democratic alternative coincides with the prospect of the "long march" toward socialism, through the comprehensive development of democratic forms of functioning of capitalism. Socialism will

become the result of this path, proceeding from the gradual development of the self-governing organization of the working people and a firm infrastructure of power of a socialist type. These concepts are consistent with Marx's ideas as expressed in his "*Economic Manuscripts*:" "In the way that the system of the bourgeois economy will develop in front of us, step by step, the same will happen to its self-negation, which will be its end result" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 46, part II, p 222).

The historical experience of our time leads to the conclusion that mature socialism is born on the basis of the highly developed mechanism of economic self-regulation, which develops within the system of developed commodity-monetary relations. In our country this was preceded by a political change. According to Lenin, the mechanism for the self-regulation of the economy and the system of democratic rule were to develop under the control of the socialist state. The Stalinist deformations of socialism prevented the solution of this problem. Today, however, it has become an imperative demand of perestroika. In the developed capitalist countries, this mechanism is being established in its essential features within latter monopoly capitalism. This offers the possibility of advancing toward socialism through a democratic alternative.

In order for it to assume a socialist trend, perestroika and the renovation of socialism in the USSR and the other socialist countries are of great importance. Their success determines the attractiveness of the socialist ideal and its assertion in the plan for a democratic alternative. When the efficiency of the economy, democratic control over its development on the part of society, self-government and social justice have been secured as a result of perestroika and renovation, socialism will appear in the eyes of the entire world as the proper form of development of the technological revolution and the struggle for socialism will be given a new powerful impetus.

The democratic alternative affects above all the labor movement in the developed capitalist countries. Could it be classified as a specifically regional problem, for the liberation movement is developing in the developing countries as well, where the majority of mankind is concentrated, a majority which feels the burden of economic and cultural backwardness, oppression and inequality? One may ask whether the peoples of these countries are considering a democratic alternative to neoconservatism.

However, such is not the case. The experience in social movements and revolutions in the developing countries convincingly proves that the free choice of the peoples of such countries concerning their own way of development and their formulation and implementation of economic programs for revolutionary change rest on the need for a fundamental reorganization of the global economic and political order. Such reorganization, in turn, depends on

the profound political changes occurring in the developed capitalist countries, a necessary prerequisite for which is removing the conservative forces from the key positions of power and influence. The democratic alternative is consistent with the interests of the progressive development of the liberated countries.

Naturally, this is not to say that the struggle waged by the forces of liberation of third world countries makes no sense until a democratic alternative has been achieved in the main centers of the capitalist system. This struggle is inevitable and just. However, its effectiveness will depend on the ability of the progressive forces in the developing countries to oppose maximalist utopian concepts and programs and their ability to find their own democratic alternative, consistent with their national interests, to the global neoconservative course pursued by the multinational corporations, as it makes these countries part of the system of neocolonial dependency. A search in this area opens the way to solidarity of the liberation struggle waged by the peoples in the developing countries with the labor movement in the developed capitalist area.

The democratic alternative and its development and implementation is a new bridgehead for cooperation and constructive dialogue between communists and social democrats. These two trends in the labor movement have a common enemy: conservative reaction. They are struggling for the same immediate future: for a democratic variant in the development of capitalism. Naturally, difficulties caused by profound ideological differences in understanding the more distant prospects and objectives and the means of achieving them are inevitable. Here as well, however, a rapprochement is possible in the course of the implementation of the democratic alternative. The development of the technological revolution in democratic forms will, in all likelihood, create prerequisites for the type of means of implementing socialist changes which would be different from the current ideas of communists and social democrats. It is not excluded that implementing the possibility of organically surmounting and dialectically "elimination" of capitalism on the basis of the technological change it creates, will establish the type of forms of social reorganization and of historical activities by progressive political forces which will remove many of the differences which divide the labor movement.

Extensive work must be done to interpret many unusual realities, to surmount obsolete systems, concepts and mental stereotypes, in formulating the strategy of a democratic alternative. The objective need for profound revolutionary change in the capitalist system, triggered by the technological revolution, has still not been realized by the working class and the other mass social forces. Marxist theoretical studies of this problem are also not on the necessary level as yet. Behind the habitual formula of the constant intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, based on traditional arguments, what is ignored is the main thing: interpreting the

features, trends and contradictions of capitalist society under the conditions of the technological revolution and the formulation of a theoretical concept and strategy of a democratic alternative which contains in its embryonic stage a far-reaching possibility of the revival of the socialist alternative, possibly in forms which will be considered acceptable by both trends in the labor movement.

In this connection, the problems which arise for the working class and its parties in the capitalist countries require an updating of the entire political standards of the working class and developing some new concepts of the socioclass struggle and the content and prospects of global progress, consistent with contemporary reality. The quick answer to this challenge of our time must not be delayed. Obviously, before it can convert from defense to offense the labor movement faces a lengthy period of gathering strength and gaining experience in the struggle under capitalist conditions, modified under the influence of the nuclear-space realities and the revolutionary change in production forces. It is not the habit of the Marxists to hope that history itself will solve difficult problems. Needed here are daring initiatives, innovative quests and intensive theoretical work. The way the time remaining until the end of the century will be spent and the lessons and conclusions which will be drawn in theory and politics will determine the fate of the communist and the labor movements.

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The Way of the Legal Reforms; Thoughts on the Editorial Mail

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[Article by Yuriy Vladimirovich Kudryavtsev, candidate of juridical sciences, KOMMUNIST consultant]

[Text] One of the first among the many problems which concern the Soviet people today is that of the radical restructuring of our legal system. This is understandable, for the process of democratization in the economic, political and social areas would be inconceivable without revising a number of ordinary concepts about the law and justice, the rights and obligations of the individual, the status of governmental bodies, and the competences and responsibilities of officials. All of these problems were in the center of attention of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and were reflected in its resolutions. It is obvious that no socialist state of law can be created without a radical legal reform.

Concern about the present state of the Soviet legal system, a critical view of many remaining theoretical concepts, a serious and profound study of practices and specific suggestions have all been reflected in the individual and collective responses of our readers to the

article of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law, and the questions raised by the journal (see KOMMUNIST No 14, 1987). Over the past year about 200 such letters have been received by the editors. Naturally, it is simply impossible to publish all of them. In preceding issues (Nos 14, 15 and 18 for 1987; Nos 2 and 7 for 1988) we published those among them which allowed us to acquire a more or less accurate idea of the nature of the mail and matters which affect most of all both jurists and the public at large. The geographic principle of our selection also played a certain role.

On a most general level, what did the discussion indicate? Above all, the entire mail which literally flooded the editors after the publication of the article of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law and the questions asked by KOMMUNIST confirm the exceptional gravity and neglect of problems which have accumulated in our legal life. They also indicate the great extent to which jurists—scientists and practical workers—and others among our readers are affected and concerned with this situation. The content of the absolute majority of responses is an eloquent proof that, as the readers could partially realize by following the course of the discussions, that the creative and constructive potential in both scientific and practical juridical thinking has by no means been lost. The main thing now is to be able to use it to the benefit of perestroika.

The materials which were not published by the journal include a variety of mostly interesting observations and suggestions. The results of this discussion are presented in the present survey of the mail.

The following is a legitimate question: What is now the worth, after the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference have been passed, of analyzing the views expressed not only after it but also weeks and months before it? I am convinced that it is worth doing so! The conference merely earmarked the main trends of the reform in the legal system in their general and essential aspect. The search for specific ways is by no means ended. Therefore, any relevant opinion is valuable.

What the Law Can or Cannot Do

The topic of the discussion on the first three of the six questions raised by KOMMUNIST can be formulated as follows: Let me remind you that the editors asked to evaluate the role of the law in perestroika, to single out the most important trends in the legal reform, to indicate what legislative acts would have to be passed or deleted or else amended in order to intensify the democratization process.

The majority of jurists caution against underestimating the role of the law and juridical mechanisms in perestroika of the economy and the democratization of all sides of social life. "Outside and despite the law," writes L.S. Yavich, doctor of juridical sciences and professor at

Leningrad State University, "material production cannot function normally; institutions of political democracy cannot efficiently work and the all-round development of the individual and the creative initiative of the masses cannot be ensured." Agreeing with him is Professor V.I. Bolgov, doctor of philosophical sciences, from Moscow, who believes that "as a regulator of social relations, the law can assist or hinder social progress.... The law and legislation are of tremendous importance to perestroika in all areas of social life, the economic and social areas above all." Candidate of Juridical Sciences P.P. Glushchenko is convinced that perestroika could be accomplished much faster and at a lower cost if it can be organized on a legal basis. Such views are shared by Yu.Kh. Kalmykov, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, head of department at the Saratov Juridical Institute, E.S. Tenchov, candidate of juridical sciences, docent at the Ivanovo State University, V.N. Yershov, senior consultant, juridical department, USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs, L.B. Galperin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor at Kemerovo State University, Yu.V. Golik, candidate of juridical sciences, docent, dean of the law school in the same university, S.Z. Zimanov, doctor of juridical sciences, member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, and other comrades.

It is entirely clear that in practice the role of the law and, above all, its efficiency depend above all on the quality of the laws, their scientific substantiation, timeliness and consistency with public requirements. If the quality of the laws is low, if laws have been passed hastily and have not been profoundly thought out, they will either not operate at full efficiency or else, which is worse, will seriously harm the area of social life which they are called upon to regulate. Both were clearly demonstrated by the legislation on the struggle against alcoholism and unearned income, court appeals of illegal actions committed by officials and individual labor activity, a legislation which, let us note, was passed on the basis of the best of motivations and which, generally speaking, initially yielded tangible results. A large number of examples of such cases may be found in the letters of our readers. "It is time to introduce state inspection in lawmaking," F.T. Selyukov, candidate of juridical sciences from Moscow, believes. "Why not identify the author of any draft law? If successful, he would benefit from its results; if not, he would be responsible for its failure."

Therefore, a great deal depends on the quality of the laws. However, to limit ourselves to this statement would mean to simplify the problem. Even the best law can "live" only when it is fully implemented through the behavior of the people. No such thing could be said about many of our laws. Why? The reasons are numerous and old, a chain of different and frequently conflicting historical events in the Soviet period, which link together blind faith in orders and the instructions with scandalous illegality and arbitrariness of the 1930s-1950s; linking the omnipotence of the administrative-command system with the anarchy of departmental lawmaking and legal

illiteracy of officials.... Today we are witnessing a variety of sometimes conflicting theoretical views on legality and the law, ordinary concepts about them and practical steps related to their application.

For a long time in theory legality and the law were considered one and the same. If a law was passed (or else a departmental regulation) it meant that, consequently, new legal rules had been drafted according to which henceforth society must live. In theory and, subsequently, in the ordinary awareness, this led to the belief that the law was virtually omnipotent and once passed it would bring order, let us say in the economy, put an end to crime and drunkenness, and so on. But let us ask ourselves the following: Does any law deserve to be considered legal, i.e., based on truth, accuracy and justice? Does each new regulation adequately reflect the real social relations which have been established in life and which it must regulate?

Obviously, by no means is this the case with every law, the letter writers believe. The point is that the reasons for difficulties can by no means always be corrected juridically. The result of relying exclusively on the law and on passing laws on all occasions was their inefficiency which, in turn, led to a loss of faith in the power of the law, to legal nihilism. An extreme also appeared, such as disrespect and, subsequently, scorn of the law in general. Juridical science has already extensively commented about legislation. It has criticized the actual situation extremely cautiously or else, eventually, "suggested" and "prognosticated" that which the mandating authorities demanded of it and which, to tell the truth, they would have accomplished even without its help.

Such is the complex and conflicting situation in which juridical science and practice find themselves today. Their important role in perestroika is unquestionable. Jurists assess the scale of the problems which have accumulated in a different way. Nonetheless, virtually all of them have long agreed on the following: A radical, a comprehensive legal reform is needed. As we know, a decision in principle on this account was made at the 19th Party Conference. The time has now come for a profound formulation of specific practical steps in this direction.

"I consider as the basic direction of perestroika in the legal area the updating of existing legislation, making it strictly consistent and integral. The updating of legislation should be codified, firm, clear and accessible to the broad toiling masses," writes V.M. Korelskiy, doctor of juridical sciences and professor at the Sverdlovsk Juridical Institute. V.D. Shakhov, candidate of juridical sciences and docent at the same institute, who fully supports the idea of a radical reform of the Soviet legal system, believes that "political-ideological institutions of which the law is a part must, by virtue of their secondary nature in terms of the base, change to the extent to which changes take place in the economic area. Nonetheless, most of the legal acts of the past 'preserve' extensive

forms of economic development." These and similar views are expressed by many readers who emphasize that without major changes in our legal system, in legislation above all, and without the restructuring of juridical thinking itself neither a successful economic reform nor democratization are possible. "However, the entire matter," notes D.A. Medvedev, postgraduate student at the department of law, Leningrad State University, notes, "is what should be understood by a general legal reform: Does it mean a radical improvement of the entire array of legislative and executive laws... or should the reform follow the path of introducing supplements to the current legislation?" He answers his own question: The main task of the reform in the legislative area, governing economic regulations (civil, administrative, financial, etc.) is, first of all, to provide an overall coordination between "old" and "new" laws (such as the Foundations of Civil Legislation and the Law on the State Enterprise (Association)) and, secondly, the creation of new laws covering all contemporary new developments in our economic system. It is precisely thus that the question was formulated in the resolution passed at the conference "On the Legal Reform," which speaks of "radical revision, codification and systematizing of legislation."

Candidates of juridical science, docents at the Kharkov Juridical Institute P.B. Yevgrafov and A.M. Zaporozhets, Kiev Engineer V.N. Grigoryev, V.K. Rudenko, leading specialist in juridical services, Perevozskiy RAPO administration, Gorkiy Oblast, I.N. Pakhomov, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, department head at the Odessa Institute of the National Economy, and others, are in favor of a radical reform and changing the very attitude toward the law; they oppose the coercive nature of departmental instructions. The authors suggest specific ways for the implementation of the legislative reform extending essentially to all its sectors and areas in our economy and social life. This is understandable, for today's juridical practices have no problems which would not require new nontraditional approaches.

Not limiting themselves to a negative assessment of departmental rule-making, a number of scientists analyze its reasons and assess the phenomenon as such on the basis of very different viewpoints. Noting the firmly established stereotype in the minds of many people, according to which a law is no more than a general instruction while the juridical reality consists of departmental instructions, orders and regulations, V.A. Tumanov, doctor of juridical sciences and professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law, writes: "What are the reasons for the inflated departmental rule-making and the stereotype which has developed on this basis? Naturally, the complex hierarchical system of administrative structures and the largely bureaucratic nature of its activities are of great importance.... Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that the legislation itself and, respectively, the legislator are to be blamed for many of its aspects. In the 1960s, when the current codes were being adopted, the prevailing formula

was that 'the law must not be an instruction.' In practical terms, however, this theoretically substantiated formula led to the fact that many most important relations were only generally regulated with laws." It is obvious that the "details" of social relations, without the regulation of which we simply cannot do, are surrendered to departmental rule-making. No management is possible without such work as the authors of most letters acknowledge. The entire matter is one of the quality of such rules, their consistency with the law and, above all, their sensible limits. "The existence of a system of legal acts," V.A. Tumanov goes on to say, "is determined by the complexity of contemporary social life and the needs for efficient state management. Consequently, we need the guarantee that whatever is being eliminated in the course of perestroika and obstructing departmental rule-making would not be replaced by something 'new,' which would continue the line of the old. The danger of this is real and it must be counterbalanced by an efficient mechanism for controlling the consistency of all legal acts with the Constitution and the law."

The question of constitutional control (supervision) is yet another important topic to which the letter writers address themselves. Control by the prosecutor's office over legality is obviously inadequate, is the opinion expressed by many jurists. It has turned out incapable of opposing the avalanche-style of departmental "law-making." Furthermore, the range of competence of the prosecutor's office is limited; its supervisory functions do not extend to the activities of the higher state management authorities. According to the Constitution (Article 121) such activities can be controlled by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. However, nothing is known about the results of such control from the press or the VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR.

Therefore, essentially there is no actual operating mechanism for constitutional supervision. Yet without such a mechanism a state based on law is no more than a pious wish. Based on this premise, V.A. Vlasikhin, candidate of juridical sciences and head of group at the USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute, believes that "Constitutional supervision presumes the existence of an autonomous mechanism for controlling the consistency of the laws with the Constitution (or the acknowledgment of their invalidity in cases of conflict and of corresponding regulations consistent with the laws and the Constitution, of an autonomous nature, independent of the legislator or the administrator."

Our readers and the press have suggested that constitutional supervision be assigned to the courts, the USSR Supreme Court above all. We believe that this would be a logical step, for it is a question not of checking any newly adopted legal act but of considering complaints or appeals in cases of violations of the Constitution. However, the party conference resolved differently: Its resolution stipulates the creation of a new authority: a constitutional supervision committee.

It is an open secret that the courts, the people's courts above all, have largely lost their independence as proclaimed by the Constitution, and their special status as institutions of justice traditionally independent of any administration. The restoration of their status is difficult yet urgent. One way or another, in order to ensure the strict constitutionality of laws and legal acts we cannot escape the proper separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial, in order to achieve efficient reciprocal control based on their independence from each other.

The range of these problems leads us and our readers to the broader topic of legal support of the democratization of society in all of its aspects. This topic is discussed by M.A. Krasnov, senior scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law, Professors L.S. Yavich and S.D. Pavlov, N.V. Fedorov, candidate of juridical sciences from Cheboksary, S.G. Potapov from Barnaul, R.B. Shishka, candidate of juridical sciences from Kharkov, V.S. Ustinov, candidate of juridical sciences and docent at the USSR MVD Higher School in Gorkiy, and others.

These authors concentrate on ensuring the real primacy of the Constitution in the Soviet legal system. So far, the Fundamental Law by no means always "works." Quite frequently we come across legal acts which arbitrarily interpret, narrow or even distort the meaning of constitutional stipulations. The result is damage caused to the rights and legal interests of citizens, strengthening the positions of the bureaucracy and undermining the fundamental constitutional and general legal principles of our system. Nonetheless, as the authors justifiably note, referring to the Constitution in defending their rights does not put the citizens in good light either in the eyes of the court nor (even more so!) departmental offices.... What is the reason for this? Is it that the Constitution itself is imperfect or alienated from reality? Such a supposition deserves serious attention. As we know, the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference and of the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum call for making the necessary amendments to our Fundamental Law. Nonetheless, matters frequently stop at the level of the legal standards of officials who ignore the Constitution and consider it to be no more than a set of beautiful slogans.

The authors address themselves to the problem of shaping a new style of juridical thinking and surmounting the deeply rooted legal nihilism. Many of them relate the democratization of economic, political and social life and the intensification and broadening of the rights of the individual and their guarantees to changes in the principle itself of regulating social relations and to converting to the principle that "anything that is not prohibited by law is allowed." Naturally, in this case its simplistic interpretation is inadmissible; the adoption of this principle does not mean that rights and mandatory standards will disappear from the legislation: We must not forget that in addition to juridical functions, they

also are of informative and stimulating significance. Furthermore, it would be inadmissible to apply this principle to state management: The law must strictly stipulate the range of competence of officials and list their prerogatives. The rights and the extent of the rights which will be stipulated by the legislation are no simple matter. Some of our readers have tried to solve it.

Naturally, the participants in this discussion assess the condition and potential possibilities of Soviet legal science, without which any practical step in the area of legal reform, as has frequently been the case in the past, could lead us away from the real problems. Notes on matters of the perestroika in this science are submitted by N.S. Alekseyev, honored worker of science of the RSFSR, doctor of juridical sciences, professor and editor in chief of the journal PRAVOVEDENIYE, V.F. Mironov, deputy chairman of the military court, Leningrad Garrison and candidate of juridical sciences, L.V. Petrova, post-graduate student, department of philosophy, Kharkov State University, Ye.F. Melnik, doctor of juridical sciences from Kiev, P.M. Rabinovich, doctor of juridical sciences and professor at Lvov State University, V.S. Bukin, docent, Volgograd, and other comrades.

"The most relevant line of perestroika in the legal area," writes L.V. Petrova, "should be changing the nature of legal thinking. This applies both to a reinterpretation of the understanding of the law as well as of related categories: legal awareness, legal attitude, legal standards, and so on." "In the past 10 to 20 years juridical science has been increasingly less oriented toward man, whose social behavior is the end objective of legal influence.... The scientific development of such topics was assigned a secondary role or else totally eliminated from the plans for research.... It is thus that in the science of law as well, I think, the underestimating of the human factor in social development was reflected," states Ye.F. Melnik.

The authors of the letters are legitimately concerned with the state of the connection between science and practice. According to P.M. Rabinovich, "juridical science is a mandatory 'component' in securing the state-legal aspects of the strategy of acceleration. Nonetheless, cooperation between juridical and state-legal practices is frequently formal and sporadic: It has not become a mandatory component of scientific research or practical work." He suggests the introduction of a rule according to which scientific research by law experts should not be considered completed without official data (references, laws) concerning the application of the results of such work by practical authorities (naturally, this should not pertain to strictly theoretical research—author); the legal authorities should have the mandatory duty to commission various studies to VUZes and scientific research institutes and to consider their recommendations, and so on. V.S. Bukina believes that an extensive discussion of the methodological problems of legal reforms should be

initiated and that those which are already planned but lack firm scientific foundations be stopped. We can only agree with such suggestions.

Problems of the renovation and humanizing of criminal law and procedures and problems of the struggle against crime are extensively covered in materials sent by **A.B. Sakharov**, professor at the USSR MVD Higher Militia School in Moscow, **N.A. Struchkov**, honored worker of sciences of the RSFSR, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, from Moscow, **P.A. Fefelov**, candidate of juridical sciences, Sverdlovsk, **S.I. Dementyev**, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, head of the department of criminal law and criminology, Kuban State University, **E.S. Tencheov**, from Ivanovo, **M.M. Utyashev**, candidate of juridical sciences, Ufa, and **Ts.M. Kaz**, docent, Saratov. The theme of most of the letters is the need to humanize criminal legislation by decriminalizing a number of actions, particularly first offenses, which present no major social threat, and maximally to limit the area of application of the death penalty. Nonetheless, the scientists justifiably believe, criminal law "must serve the socialist system at each stage in its development and, at the present time, solving the problems of perestroika, eliminating anything which hinders and obstructs it...." (N.A. Struchkov). In other words, in addition to decriminalizing minor violations, this is the right time to introduce criminal liability for actions which cause serious harm to society, to our economy in particular. According to E.S. Tencheov, one such action is waste, "the struggle against which, with the help of criminal penalties, is directly stipulated in Article 61 of the USSR Constitution."

Also found in the responses are opposite assessments about our crime policy, with calls for increasing the severity of penalties and the more extensive use of the death penalty. Characteristic in this area are two letters whose authors, one would think, have adopted the right positions in demanding efficiency, clarity and simplicity in criminal law and, in general, in our attitude toward crime. But what do they suggest? It is necessary, **A.M. Sova**, from Gorlovka writes, for the criminal code to have a "stipulated sentence with a certain penalty" for each criminal action, so that both the population, the judges and the nonprofessional assessors could become suitably familiar with the responsibility. The author goes on to say that "for example, the criminal code should stipulate that a jail term of 6 years... 'should be imposed for stealing windshield wipers from an unwatched car' (no more and no less). In other words, it should be clear. The tears of parents and the shouts of lawyers should make no difference. This would be the law!"

A.N. Shumilov from Bryansk Oblast, has even stronger objections: "An individual who has violated the law, who has violated any right of society or even of a single member of society, thus destroys himself and deprives himself of all human rights and of the right to life." This author then suggests very harsh punishments for specific types of crime....

Unfortunately, this view, we must admit, reflects moods which truly exist and are quite widespread in society. Their explanation is that it is a legitimate, albeit temporary, reaction to illegality and avoidance of punishment which occurred in past decades. However, although justifiably indignant at negative phenomena, the authors themselves, I believe, fall into an extreme. Whatever crime may have been committed by an individual, we must not approach everyone with the same yardstick. Each life is individual and requires a thoughtful and considered analysis and consideration of all circumstances. This is the main task of the court. One can imagine how difficult and long will be the path of shaping a high legal standard in the people, a new type of legal thinking and the creation of a state based on law, founded on the principles of humanism, justice, equality and understanding the fact that all evils have social roots, on the elimination of which we must concentrate all our efforts.

Components of Legality: View From Within

The discussion of such problems brings us close to the topic of guaranteeing legality in the activities of judicial and law enforcement authorities, a topic which, to one extent or another, is addressed by virtually all of our correspondents. The last three questions formulated in **KOMMUNIST**, as our readers probably recall, dealt with the ways and means of ensuring legality in the activities of law enforcement authorities; restructuring of legal education; and upgrading the legal standards of officials and private citizens.

As we know, of late this topic has been the focal point of attention of the mass information media and the public at large. This is understandable, for the difficult legacy of the period from the 1930s to the 1950s, violations of laws and the rights of individuals in the recent past and the by no means always successful efforts to correct violations of justice to this day, in the fourth year of perestroika, are all painfully reflected in the hearts of all honest people.

Unlike the large number of critical articles in the periodical press, the responses by our readers—jurists, scientists and practical workers—who look at the problem as though "from within," are, in their majority, constructive. In assessing the current state of affairs and exposing the reasons for the violations of the law in the activities of the militia, the courts, or the prosecutor's office, the authors also consider the place and role of such authorities in perestroika and what must be specifically done for the laws to be strictly observed in each case and by every individual.

In noting the difficulty and the variety of factors which influence the condition of legality in society, **V.F. Yakovlev**, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, and director of the USSR Ministry of Justice All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet Legislation, believes that "the social value of the system of legality in terms of

society is of prime importance among such factors. The law enforcement authorities," he writes, "will be able successfully and systematically to apply the law in their own activities and in all areas of social life only to the extent to which society and its predominant forces are profoundly interested in a system of legality. This should be the expression of the social instruction issued by society to law enforcement authorities. Their activities must be rated on the basis of the level of observance of the laws." **V.V. Pankratov**, candidate of juridical sciences and head of sector at the USSR Prosecutor's Office All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Problems of Strengthening Law and Order, believes that the main reason for breakdowns and violations of the law within the law enforcement system itself is the clash between conflicting interests, "the existence of noncoincidental structures within the departments (such as the MVD), and the disparity of interests between departments and society." Pointing out that during the period of stagnation the authority of the prosecutor's office, the courts, and the militia declined substantially in the eyes of the people and that they "became somehow alienated from society, standing above it," **A. Nepomnyashchiy**, political worker in the navy, considers that the reason for this phenomenon is the lack of glasnost, secrecy of statistics and banning the criticism of such authorities. **K.A. Bukalov**, candidate of juridical sciences, docent, from Saratov, considers the main problems as being the insufficient activeness of the party organizations in law enforcement authorities and the low professional standards of some of their personnel.

Some letters explain the existing situation on the basis of, one may say, more specific reasons. Here is what writes, for example, **B.V. Sinev**, from Alekseyevka, Belgorod Oblast: "I am not a lawyer. My juridical training comes from more than 2 years of juridical efforts in an unsuccessful attempt at defending a totally innocent enterprise manager." Believing that one of the reasons for illegality is departmental rule-making, the author goes on to say that "the situation became particularly difficult when, at the beginning of the 1980s, a campaign was mounted for promoting order and strengthening discipline in the national economy. Such order included the demand strictly to observe existing laws and legal departmental regulations, although by then a significant part of them had become obsolete. This brought about a drastic increase in the number of sentences passed on the best enterprise managers who had violated obsolete departmental regulations in the interest of the work."

Therefore, a variety of reasons for difficulties in the work of the law enforcement authorities exist. Nor should we ignore the traditional mistrust of courts and laws inherited from prerevolutionary times and only reinforced during the period of Stalinist repressions and the recent stagnation, and the imperfect system of "indicators" which, incidentally, are still used in assessing the work of law enforcement authorities, indicators for the sake of which, under the conditions of the blossoming of bureaucratism, occasionally the honor and dignity, freedom

and even human life are light-handedly sacrificed. In this context it is also difficult to overestimate the significance of the professional independence of courts and prosecutor's offices, which must be free from any local or departmental influence. Lack of discrimination in the hiring of militia, court and prosecution cadres and the formal approach taken to their moral upbringing also played a role. Finally, let us not forget the most terrible feature of corruption, which afflicted these authorities, and their coexistence with the criminal world, in which dealing with someone who was innocent (or, more accurately, bothersome) was no longer a professional error but a deliberate obedience to someone's ill-will. Yes, how bitter it may be to realize that all of this existed and has by no means disappeared to this day. Nor will it disappear, many of our correspondents believe, as long as the law enforcement authorities are not truly placed under the control of the people, and until their work becomes totally open. "Once the system is out of control... and assumes the monopoly of performing all functions of protecting the interests of the state and the people," writes V.V. Pankratov, "all the shortcomings of centralization, specialization, cooperation, and so on, assume truly tragic consequences. The monopoly status can corrupt an official to the same extent that a price monopoly can corrupt the producer of a commodity...." In this case, control by the people should not be confused with, to put it mildly, "supervision" of the court and the prosecutor's office by local party and soviet authorities. The solution, according to the author, lies in democratizing the structure and activities of law enforcement authorities.

Nonetheless, democratization and glasnost will not by themselves solve the specific problems which have accumulated in this area. Unquestionably, however, they are a mandatory prerequisite for the development of the type of social atmosphere in which good initiatives will not vanish and organizational, political-education, cadre and other steps will finally become effective, unless considered unsuccessful, but openly, not secretly, and therefore deleted and replaced by others. No one is protected from errors, either today or in the future. In order to have as few such errors as possible, we must jointly seek ways of avoiding them through open discussion.

What do the jurists suggest? Above all, that the true independence of the judicial authorities be secured and their status and prestige be enhanced. In their view, this would require a number of organizational steps, such as changing the procedure of the subordination of courts and the rights of superior authorities to supervise the activities of inferior ones; raising the minimal age of prospective judges; substantially increasing judges' salaries; increasing the number of sitting judges and expanding the rights of people's assessors and steadily enhancing the juridical knowledge of the latter. The judges must also be relieved from their heavy volume of technical work; changes must be made in judicial procedures and, at the same time, naturally, amendments must be made

in criminal procedure legislation; returning cases for further investigation must be stopped if the available proof is sufficient to settle a case and acquit the defendant; improving the statistical accountability of people's judges in the consideration of criminal cases. These and other similar suggestions are contained in the materials submitted by former jurist-practitioner and now retired **N.Kh. Khamitov** from Sterlitamak, Professor **Yu.V. Kachanovskiy** from Khabarovsk, veteran prosecution worker **A.A. Kuzevanov** from Elista, **M.K. Malikov**, candidate of juridical sciences, docent, department head, Bashkir State University, **Z.D. Yenikayev**, candidate of juridical sciences, docent, department head in the same university, **P.M. Filippov**, candidate of juridical sciences, docent, Volgograd, **F.M. Popovich**, chairman of the people's court, Kalarashskiy Rayon, Moldavian SSR, and other comrades.

The enactment of the USSR Law on the Procedure to Appeal in Court Illegal Actions by Officials, should such actions violate the rights of citizens, immeasurably increases the role of courts in defending the rights and interests of citizens. In itself, the adoption of such a law is an important democratic step. However, is the procedure stipulated in the law perfect in every way? Could it be that the legislators were hasty and trapped by traditional approaches, having substantially reduced the framework within which the citizens can defend their rights (for example, eliminating the threat of appealing the decisions of collective authorities)? Does not the law need the backing of additional legal guarantees? Such questions are being shared and quite convincing arguments are being formulated by **V.I. Shishkin**, candidate of juridical sciences, deputy chairman of the Kirovograd Oblast Court, **A.G. Lantsetti**, scientific associate, from Moscow, **V.A. Demidenko**, candidate of juridical sciences, docent, department chief, USSR MVD Higher School in Kiev, and others. **V.I. Shishkin** in particular believes that "the law leaves without judicial protection the most essential rights of citizens, the rights to housing, communal-consumer, labor and social security, the process of implementation of which triggers a significant number of complaints." According to the author, these and many other shortcomings in the law he mentions are the result of the fact that "the draft was written in violation of the principles of glasnost. The upper hand was assumed by the old approaches to the drafting of legal materials: departmentalism, secrecy, and the corporate interests of individual groups of officials. Work on this draft was not only not reflected in the press but was also kept secret from the majority of legal scientists and practical workers, and the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies were acquainted with the draft law only while they were in session."

This is serious and, in great many ways, just criticism. Clearly, the law should be further improved, taking practical experience into consideration. What is clear, however, is that in earmarking a legal reform we must, above all, reject the old stereotype according to which the views of legal scientists and the public at large were virtually ignored in drafting a law.

The final outcome of a case affecting a person is determined in the courtroom. Ideally, it is precisely the court—independent, competent, authoritative, with all the necessary opportunities and time thoroughly to consider each case on the basis of the laws and personal convictions which have developed as a result of the adversarial relationship of the parties—that must decide without hesitation and always correctly whether or not the defendant will be acquitted or sentenced. Alas, in many respects today this is indeed nothing but an ideal. For a number of reasons, some of which already mentioned, the decisions of the courts and the very procedure of the trial and, sometimes, the sentence still frequently depend on the results of the preliminary investigation which, as we know, in our country is concentrated in the hands of three different departments: the prosecution, the militia, and the KGB. Some authors see as the source of many problems precisely this "dismemberment" of the investigation and the lack of coincidence among departmental interests and criteria in assessing the work, and combining the functions of investigation and supervision over the legality of its exercise (by the prosecution). The authors describe in detail the faults of the investigative apparatus and its procedures and criticize the imperfection of criminal procedure legislation and suggest ways of correcting the situation. One such way is having the investigation carried out by an independent department or, in any case, separately from the prosecution. This point of view is shared by Professor **L.M. Karneyeva**, honored worker of sciences of the RSFSR, doctor of juridical sciences, **N.Kh. Khamitov**, **Yu.V. Kachanovskiy**, **M.G. Korotkikh**, candidate of juridical sciences and docent at Voronezh State University, **V.V. Pankratov**, the **Belyakov** husband and wife, jurists, from Krasnoyarsk Kray, **A. Khanberdiyev**, candidate of physical-mathematical sciences from Ashkhabad and others, although their views as to how such a department could be organized vary.

It is common knowledge that the 19th Party Conference deemed expedient "to concentrate the investigation of the majority of criminal cases in the investigative apparatus of the MVD, organizing it as an autonomous unit not subordinate to republic or local internal affairs authorities...." **L.M. Karneyeva**, however, questions the effectiveness of this recommendation believing, among others, that in this case the investigators will find themselves under the undesirable influence of the operative apparatus, which will not contribute to the observance of legality in the course of the investigation. Clearly, we must study this matter yet once again, closely, before the competent state authorities make their final decision.

The end objective of perestroika and of the democratization of the law enforcement authorities is the creation of a reliable mechanism for guaranteeing and protecting the rights of the Soviet people, exposing crimes and punishing the culprits in accordance with the principles of the equality of everyone in the eyes of the law, justice, consistency between the penalty and the act, and so on. Here as well the most important role is that of the

independent social institution—the bar. The need to upgrade its role and its status, and the unsolved problems in its work are currently the subject of extensive articles. Materials on such problems may also be found in the section “Discussions and Debates” of KOMMUNIST (No 18, 1987; No 2, 1988).

The leitmotif of virtually all letters is one of increasing the rights and possibilities of the defense in a criminal trial; allowing the defense attorney to participate in the case from the earliest possible stages (detention of the suspect, institution of proceedings, etc.) as the main guarantee that the rights of the suspect will be protected and the investigation will be conducted legally; finally, ensuring the organizational autonomy of the bar as a social institution. These and other problems are in the center of attention of many of our correspondents, mostly attorneys. This is discussed in a collective response by the chairmen of six attorney collegiums: Bashkir, Kurgan, Perm, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen and Udmurt; by N.N. Izyurov, member of the presidium of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Bar Collegium; lawyers D.S. Levenson, G.P. Padva and G.I. Tumasov, from Moscow, jurists P.D. Gulin and A.V. Morozov from Kuybyshev, and other comrades. A number of letters criticize the view held by Professor A.D. Boykov (see KOMMUNIST No 18, 1987), who, according to the authors of such letters, concentrated his attention and, therefore, the attention of the public, on the “shady sides” of the activities of the bar, whereas under present circumstances what it needs are help and support. The professional cohesion of lawyers and the argued criticism of some of the views expressed by A.D. Boykov are worthy of all due respect. However, does exposing the “shady sides” not represent a form of help and support, the more so since it is done so tactfully and constructively? Having different views on the problem is the right thing.

As a whole, the position of the readers who write about the bar must be supported. The figure of the attorney, as a consultant, as an experienced guide in the laws and as counselor and defender in an investigation and in court, has legitimately gained high social status in many countries. It is even more necessary in a socialist state of law, the main feature of which is man, with the entire array of his rights and democratic freedoms.

Nor should we underestimate under contemporary conditions the role of a most important detachment of Soviet practical jurists, such as the legal counsels of ministries, departments, enterprises, establishments and organizations.

“Unquestionably,” writes A.I. Yushchik, chief of the juridical department at the Elektronmash imeni V.I. Lenin Production Association, Kiev, “in its present aspect the juridical service cannot ensure the first-rate implementation of the legal reform. There are no serious indicators with which to assess the quality of legal work; professionals, who could assess it objectively, are

unavailable in the local areas. Yet demand on the part of superior organizations have been obviously lowered, for even there legal work is considered by the management, something secondary and abstract. Hence the lack of understanding of the real possibilities of legal services and, as a consequence, the clear underestimating of their role, manifested most clearly in the small number and low wages of legal services personnel. It would be hard to imagine a more stupid evaluation of the work of a legal counsel than the one which equates the salary of a head of juridical department with that of a bookkeeper with secondary specialized training. Nonetheless, this is a fact!” Legal counsel A. Kaurov from Belgorod, jurists A.F. Semeshko and V.A. Moskvitin from Lvov and candidate of juridical sciences A.F. Shklyar from Zagorsk write about upgrading the role and status of juridical services in the national economy under the conditions of perestroika and, above all, surmounting the illegal departmental rule-making and shortcomings in its work. One of the main obstacles on this way is the fact that the legal counsel of an administration is subordinate to the department or enterprise he serves. Under such circumstances, to object to an illegal decision made by one’s director, we are forced to agree, is no easy matter.

The 19th Party Conference paid particular attention to the juridical service in the national economy. A state of law is inconceivable if legality in the very foundation of society—economics—is weak.

Virtually all letters deal with problems of the selection and training of legal cadres and ways of improving legal training. It is not easy to provide a simple assessment of the personnel of juridical establishments. Naturally, the broad public is justifiably indignant at the frequent abuses such services allow, as has been repeatedly noted in the press, and has a tendency to use such cases to depict their activities in darker colors whereas people engaged in legal work frequently fall into the other extreme. An objective and unprejudiced view would reveal shortcomings of the personnel of law enforcement authorities. However, nor should we forget their merits and properly assess their difficult, dedicated and, in some cases, dangerous work. “You must believe that I and other veterans of the prosecutor’s office and the court react not less but more strongly to judicial bungling, errors, blunders and criminal negligence, callousness and indifference toward the Soviet people,” writes A.A. Kuzevanov. “Better than anyone else we know that such errors could have been avoided. Let me even say that we are in favor for people who have committed forgeries and used impermissible methods in conducting investigations to be criminally charged as stipulated by the law. However, I find puzzling some of the views, conclusions and suggestions of journalists and writers who have firmly ‘taken up’ the project of bringing order in the administration of justice....”

Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that many law enforcement personnel are today still far from meeting the strict requirements which were formulated by V.I.

Lenin and F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and which were reemphasized at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "These authorities must be purged, from top to bottom, from unprincipled people, who are politically, professionally and ideologically immature and morally faulty, who display callousness and indifference toward the fate of people and who scorn the laws," writes Z.D. Yenikeev from Ufa. "There must be a reaction to each case of violation of the law. Each violation which has been committed should be publicized and made known to the public. Without the eyes of the people, without mobilizing public opinion, we shall not be able to put an end to the scandals which are currently taking place." A. Nepomnyashchiy as well believes that the main obstacle is in the alienation of the militia, the courts and the prosecution from the people, and the impossibility of "assessing them and pointing out their errors" because of lack of information concerning their work. "In the cohort of Soviet jurists—investigators, prosecutors and judges," writes Yu.V. Korenevskiy, "the majority are professionally knowledgeable and honest people who are dedicating all their efforts to their difficult service. However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the jurists have remained totally unaffected by the social corrosion and the decline in social mores which were mentioned from the rostrum of the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum."

What suggestions are being made in order to solve the problem? The main one, the strategic one, so to say, is the democratization and subordination of the courts, the prosecutor's offices, the militia and the bar to the people. More specifically, this implies a strict selection of cadres, including people recommended by labor collectives; radical improvements in all political and educational work with the personnel; periodic certifications; inevitable and strict liability in any case of illegality or violation of the rights of citizens; restructuring of the work in order to "unburden" judges or investigators and allow them to upgrade their professional skills. How does the training of a judge, investigator, prosecutor or lawyer begin? Naturally, with law school students. It is precisely in law school that such people become aware of the standards of the law and respect for them and where many moral qualities and beginnings of professionalism are developed; it is precisely out of the VUZ that will come either a knowledgeable specialist and a convinced believer of justice or a passing-grade student and a person with a "double standard," who should not be allowed to come even close to law enforcement work.

Problems of juridical training and moral upbringing of future jurists are considered in detail and with unceasing concern for the state of affairs in the materials we have received from N.F. Kuznetsova, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, head of the department of criminal law at the law school of Moscow State University; V.V. Tirskiy, candidate of juridical sciences, docent at Tomsk State University; V.V. Melnik, candidate of juridical sciences, senior teacher at the Military Institute; V.N. Skobelkin, doctor of juridical sciences, department head,

Omsk State University; P.B. Yevgrafov and G.G. Chernov from Zhitomir; A.A. Voytik, postgraduate student, Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law; M.N. Korneyev, deputy minister of justice, Kirghiz SSR; M.F. Orzikh, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, department head, Odessa State University; N.M. Konin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, prorector, Saratov Juridical Institute, and others. In describing the contemporary state of higher juridical training, Professor L.S. Yavich writes, among others, the following: "So far, the main efforts were concentrated on training 'legal experts,' individuals with a certain knowledge of the laws and some skills in the interpretation and application of legal standards.... The main shortcoming was the unsatisfactory legal standards of those with higher juridical training, their bureaucratic way of thinking, lack of initiative and even lack of principles." The solution, according to N.F. Kuznetsova, is providing basic education and relating it to practical experience, computerization and involving jurists-practitioners in teaching (along with having VUZ teachers train in juridical institutions). The social activeness of the future fighters for justice, she believes, is developed through student self-government, student participation in the legal education of the population, and so on. The views expressed in the various letters differ greatly in terms of the content of the training process, its forms and final objectives. For example, M.N. Korneyev believes that a profound theoretical mastery of the laws can be achieved through specific practical training. The students must be taught how to work with documents. N.V. Rybakov, state justice counselor third class, supports a different viewpoint. "The VUZ program should not be burdened with practical matters. The jurist must be educated. He must know Latin, Roman law, Marxism and political economy.... Practical experience will come on the job and the better educated the jurist is, the sooner this will be achieved."

The task of training comprehensively educated specialists who, furthermore, have also mastered practical skills, is difficult but its solution is necessary. Nonetheless, however well professional skills may have been developed and however deep a knowledge of specialized subjects may have been acquired, to struggle for legality and to be honest and just in everything, to see people as equal fellow-citizens, is possible only in the case of someone who is highly moral, with a broad education and who respects the law he serves. This applies also to the legal upbringing of the population but is not reduced in the least to the dissemination of legal knowledge.

I deem necessary to quote another letter which, in my view, includes the very important thought: "Juridical training is short of specific (rather than abstract) love of man and, in themselves, juridical disciplines cannot develop such qualities in the students. In this connection, we must heavily rely on means which have the power to exert emotional influence. Pushkin, Gogol, Leo Tolstoy, Dostoevskiy, Gorkiy and Sholokhov, Shakespeare, Goethe, Balzac and Stendhal are textbooks on

the basis of which one can and should learn how to penetrate into the preserves of the human soul, and from which one can learn how to love man." This is the view of A.V. Naumov, doctor of juridical sciences and professor at the Moscow USSR NVD Higher Militia School, who has entitled his note "A Profession of Love for Man." Is this not the quality which must become determining for the jurist in a state of law, whatever his position? Yes, this applies precisely to the jurist and not only to the physician and the teacher. This is not paradoxical in the least. Enough "sacred hatred" and "people's anger." It is easy to destroy with such feelings but impossible to create. Yet perestroika means, above all, creation.

It is with this thought that I would like to end this survey of the readers' mail and thank all participants in this discussion. The exchange of views on essential, pressing and sensitive problems of our juridical reality, I believe, would enable us to see more clearly the ways of perestroika and democratization of the Soviet legal system, which is the most important structural component of the democratization of the entire society.

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From Zhukov's Unpublished Memoirs
18020002o Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 88 (signed to press 19 Sep 88) pp 87-101

[Article consisting of readers' comments on article previously published, as well as first-ever transcription of statement made by G. Zhukov]

[Text] As seen from the editorial mail, the questions raised in N. Pavlenko's article "In the First Stage of the War" (KOMMUNIST No 9, 1988) have triggered a great deal of interest. However, many readers have expressed their disagreement with the views held by the author. The most complete, combined, so to say, disagreements are found in the letter by teachers at the department of history, North Osetian State University. This letter is being reprinted here in its entirety. We asked for comments on it by Dr of Historical Sciences V. Kulish. N. Pavlenko, the article's author, was also acquainted with the letters to the editors. Bearing in mind the importance of the memoirs written by Soviet military commanders, he provides a more detailed explanation of some circumstances accompanying his meetings with G. Zhukov and has given the editors a tape recording of one of the statements by the marshal. This is a first transcription of this recording.

Letter by B.Kh. Ortabayev, doctor of historical sciences, professor; S.A. Kokayev, docent, department head, veteran and Great Patriotic War invalid; and S.B. Gatagov, senior teacher, teachers, history department, North Osetian State University:

KOMMUNIST No 9 carried the notes by military historian N. Pavlenko "In the First Stage of the War." The meaning and purpose of their publication remain puzzling to us, for they contain nothing of cognitive, educational or scientific value other than the thesis of the endless errors made by Stalin on the eve and during the war, which sets our teeth on edge. Compared with a long series of various articles, notes and reports on this topic, published of late by authors ranging from academicians to philistine amateurs, which stubbornly inflate the idea that we defeated the most dangerous and strongest enemy without being prepared for war, without a supreme command, without an officer corps (destroyed during the time of repressions), without any whatsoever authoritative government, without the greatest possible organization of the rear lines, and so on, and so forth, these notes are distinguished by an even greater (for a military historian!) superficiality, lacking any attempt at scientific analysis of the most complex events which took place in an extremely complex international and domestic environment, improper comparisons between the civil and the Great Patriotic Wars, a promotion of the persistent idea, which ignores all objective conditions, of the absolute incompetence displayed by Stalin in everything, highlighting only "blunders" and "errors," with a lack of any accurate decision and so on, and all in the spirit of the notorious malicious claim made by N.S. Khrushchev to the effect that Supreme Headquarters formulated its plans for military operations with the help of a globe which stood in Stalin's office.

We are already becoming accustomed to the numerous efforts to engage in an open misrepresentation of our history under the banner of glasnost and democratization (the other extreme, no more truthful than the one which prevailed until 1956 and, in a different aspect and with a different "Leninist" leadership, until the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum), for which reason it hardly makes any sense to pay attention, not to say to analyze such an ordinary article (one more or one less, it makes no difference). However, these notes contain two features which draw attention:

1. The notes are published in the CPSU Central Committee theoretical organ, for which reason they automatically lay a claim to the official party viewpoint. So far KOMMUNIST has not published such tendentious articles or notes, displaying an open obsession, oriented more toward a new falsification than toward the truth.
2. The author tries to substantiate his views by referring not to memoirs of outstanding military leaders, such as G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, I.S. Konev, K.K. Rokossovskiy, N.G. Kuznetsov, S.M. Shtemenko and others, which have become the most profound and objective sources concerning all matters pertaining to the Great Patriotic War, and the most authoritative testimony of the organizers of the victory, which have been repeatedly published, but to their statements, without indicating sources and interviews which allegedly the

author had with these marshals long before the publication of their memoirs. These quotations and excerpts from interviews with G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy and I.S. Konev conflict with what has been written about the respective events and about Stalin in the memoirs of these marshals. Thus we see here an attempt to compromise and to accuse of lack of principle and hypocrisy not only outstanding military leaders but also profoundly decent and most honest people who rose above their hurts and who realized the full extent of their great responsibility in telling the real historical truth about the war in the victorious end of which they played such a truly outstanding role.

As one may see, therefore, our puzzlement related to the publication of these notes in KOMMUNIST is entirely reasonable. Furthermore, naturally, their publication demands an answer and we hope that this letter will be published in the proper section of this journal.

V. Kulish, doctor of historical sciences:

Unfortunately, the historians from the North Osetian State University raise in an extremely angry and irreconcilable tone questions the answer to which is a major prerequisite for the truthful interpretation of the history of the Great Patriotic War.

Comrades Ortabayev, Kokayev and Gatagov write that, like other authors, "from academicians to philistine amateurs," N. Pavlenko is promoting the "obsessive idea of Stalin's absolute incompetence in everything." Such authors are looking exclusively for "blunders" and "errors," ignoring the complex objective conditions. To begin with, obviously, there is no need to aggravate the formulations used in this already sharp article. As the Supreme Commander in Chief, J. Stalin is given his proper due in the article. However, the thesis of the correlation between objective and subjective factors must be considered closely. All too frequently it shows up in arguments concerning historical truth.

Pitting objective against subjective factors, and paying primary attention to objective conditions in the interpretation of military and nonmilitary events, defeats and failures in particular, is an old approach. It has been repeatedly used in works on history. Stalin was the founder of such an approach toward the history of the Great Patriotic War. During the first 2 years of the war, in his speeches, reports and orders, included in the book "*On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*," he gave the following reasons for our military defeats: the suddenness of the enemy's attack, the treacherous violation by Germany of the 1939 nonaggression pact, the superiority of the German Army in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft, the numerical superiority of mobilized and combat-ready German troops, compared to the Red Army, 2-year experience in waging military operations in Europe with the use of the latest means of warfare, and the lack of a second front in Europe.

All of these reasons reflected reality only partially and, naturally, their purpose was not to clarify the real reasons for the retreat of the Red Army to Moscow and Leningrad and, later, to the Volga and the Caucasus. It was important to Stalin to draw the attention of the Soviet people away from foreign and domestic political errors and blunders, and to exonerate himself. During the war this made some sense. Stalin was the head of the state and the party and commander of the Armed Forces. Exposing the true reasons for failures would have undermined the confidence of the people and the Army in Stalin's leadership and would have adversely affected the waging of the war. Later as well, however, Stalin's concept was the methodological foundation for the study of the history of the Great Patriotic War. This concept has largely preserved its positions to this day, although it has now assumed the aspect of a factorial approach.

The "advantage" provided by such an approach to the study and evaluation of historical events in general and the history of the Great Patriotic War in particular, compared with systems analysis, is that it allows the "historian" arbitrarily, as he understands it, or in accordance with the prevalent concept, to break down the factors, to establish connections among them and to determine their hierarchy and role in the events he is describing and thus to ascribe a scientific appearance to his interpretation of their meaning. Such was the way many books and articles were written in which facts and statistical data were faked and so was, directly, the history of a number of events in the war and, particularly, those which were unfavorable to us. For example, Stalin expressed the view that in 1941 the German fascist forces were superior to the Red Army in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft. Initially, the historians of the war simply repeated this statement without undertaking the study of the correlation of forces. Computations which were made after the 20th CPSU Congress revealed that the enemy did not have such superiority. A "solution" was found in the 1960s: The total number of enemy tanks was counted while we counted only the latest models (KV and T-34), only mentioning the existence of a certain number of obsolete-model tanks. At the beginning of the war, the German fascist forces which faced the Soviet Union had 1,634 tanks of the latest model (T-III and T-IV) and some 1,700 tanks of older models (T-I, T-II, and the Czech T-38) out of a total of 3,582 tanks and assault guns. They were opposed on the Soviet side by 1,475 KV and T-34 tanks which throughout the entire war were considered to be the best in the world, and a large number of older model tanks. From January 1939 to 22 June 1941 alone more than 7,000 tanks were delivered to the Red Army. Recently the following data were published on the correlation between the forces and equipment of Soviet and enemy troops in the area of the Kiev Special Military District on 22 June 1941: personnel, 1.2:1; guns and howitzers, 1.4:1; medium (T-34) and heavy (KV) tanks, 3.5:1; light tanks (T-26, BT-7), 5:1; and aircraft, 2.5:1 in our favor.

This comparison alone indicates that the reasons for failures and defeats rested less on the correlation of forces than the skill in handling them.

Let us point out that objective conditions are never totally negative or positive: they are always contradictory. The prewar situation and the problems which faced the country during the war were contradictory as well. However, it was not they by themselves that were the reason for our failures and our victories.

It was not only the army but the entire administrative-command system that suffered a defeat during the first period of the war. It turned out incapable of flexibly reacting to changes in the domestic and international situation, finding optimal decisions promptly and choosing the most efficient ways and means for eliminating or neutralizing the threat of war. During the war the faulty nature of this system was reduced significantly and its consequences were eliminated through the enthusiasm and initiative of the Soviet people and their mass heroism and dedication, including their self-sacrifice, and the enhancement of activities of party organizations, soviet authorities, public organizations, soldiers, commanders and political workers of all ranks. Stalin and his circle also used the victory in the war to rehabilitate the bureaucratic management system. They presented matters as though strict centralization of management, with its inherent methods, including mass repressions, had not led the country to the brink of military catastrophe but, conversely, had allegedly saved it from defeat.

That is precisely why Stalin was not interested in an analysis of the reasons for the tactical development of events in 1941-1942, an analysis which inevitably would have brought about the exposure of his own errors and blunders and the faultiness of the administrative-command management system. It suited him entirely for the researchers who studied the history of the war to "fail to notice" the errors and blunders of the high leadership of the country and the Armed Forces, their lack of preparedness and inadequate competence, justifying the tragic military defeats and the losses of people and material values by citing objective circumstances and the "extremely difficult" situation. All the defeats suffered in 1941 and 1942 remained a kind of "thorn in the flesh."

The solution was found in the concept of active defense and counteroffensive. The opportunity for its presentation was found in the letter by Colonel Razin addressed to Stalin. In his answer to him, Stalin wrote: "I am speaking of a counteroffensive after a successful enemy offensive which, however, did not yield decisive results, in the course of which the defender rallies his forces, mounts a counteroffensive and inflicts a decisive defeat on the enemy. I think that a well organized counteroffensive is a very interesting type of offensive." Although in this case Stalin referred to the war of the Persians against Crassus, the Roman military commander, and the defeat of Napoleon's Army by M.I. Kutuzov in 1812,

he was confident that his idea would not be ignored. He was not wrong. Soon afterwards military defeats were presented as follows: "Comrade Stalin countered the adventurist German strategy of the 'lightning' war with a wise strategy of active defense.... In a rigid defense, combined with continuous counter strikes, the purpose of the Soviet Army was to force the enemy to disperse the forces of his assault groups and to exhaust and weaken the enemy forces, hinder their advance and gain time needed for deploying the main forces of the Soviet Army and then, mounting a decisive counteroffensive, inflict a severe defeat to the enemy forces and turn the course of the war in favor of the Soviet state;" "the failure of the plans of the German fascist command at Stalingrad clearly proved the triumph of Stalin's strategy and the wisdom of Stalin's plan of active defense as well as the faultiness of the German strategy and tactics."

In debunking the cult of Stalin's personality, the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses provided extensive opportunities for scientific work on the history of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet historians wrote extensive monographs and articles dealing with the most important events of the war and began to publish documents and materials and memoirs of participants in the war. A tremendous amount of factual data were put in circulation. It was on this basis and with the participation of a large number of Soviet historians that the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism prepared and, between 1960 and 1965, published the six-volume "*History of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945.*" Naturally, much effort was needed to heal the damaged awareness of the people and, sometimes, to amend one's own ideas. The researchers had to be given the freedom of creativity. Finally, the time factor played an essential role. In a 10-year period a major step had been taken in the scientific study of the events of the Great Patriotic War; the experience of its first period was studied and so were the reasons for the defeats suffered by the Red Army, the ways of increasing the country's military power, the elimination of the adverse consequences of the initial failures, the creative activities of staffs and commanders, the role played by the popular masses in achieving victory and the organizing activities of the party, the soviet authorities and the public organizations. The question was raised of the fact that the mass repressions of the 1930s had drastically lowered the combat capability of the Armed Forces.

However, the impact of the deformations of socialism and the rigid centralization and command-administrative management methods on the waging of the war remained virtually untouched. The personality of Stalin, who had been previously assigned the role of a generator who had activated all processes in the life and activities of Soviet society, the army operations at the front and the work of labor collectives in the rear, was either deleted from books and articles or else thoughtlessly replaced with the words "the party," "headquarters" and "the commander in chief." Descriptions of the course of the war turned out to be excessively objectivized and the role of individuals, reduced.

Trends toward reanimating the administrative-command system of the 1930s and the rehabilitation of its main creator—Stalin—were noted in the second half of the 1960s. One of the methods used was another rewriting of history. Less than 1 year after the final volume of the six-volume work had been published, steps were taken to disavow its views. A decision was made to write a 12-volume history of World War II and the concept for the new work was hastily drafted. The factorial approach which, as it were, had not been eliminated during the preceding decade, the predominance of description over analysis, the emphasis of objective conditions, the concealment of the errors and omissions of the leadership behind the complexity of the situation, the statement that everything that had occurred had been objectively determined, the creation of an appearance of harmonious combination of all events related to the Great Patriotic War and the impeccable management of the war were the basic features of the "new" concept. Mass repressions and faults of the management system were mentioned as nagging partial events and pure accidents. Historians who tried to study the negative aspects of the leadership of the war and the tragic events of its first period were accused of subjectivism and of the fact that by concentrating on "negative aspects" they were belittling the tremendous work done by the party and the people to prepare the country and the Armed Forces to repel the fascist aggression, and of denigrating the greatness of the heroic exploits of the Soviet people, "deheroization of events," hiding the "black bread of the facts" behind a search for the "merciless truth of the war," and so on.

Naturally, all such accusations were false. Nonetheless, these were precisely the approaches on which the concept and content of the 12-volume "*History of the Second World War*" were based. Despite the abundance of factual and statistical data and documents, including some previously unknown, the thorough description of the course of many events and of the entire war, and the tremendous number of examples of heroism, as a whole this work provides a simplistic idea of the Great Patriotic War. It is not astounding in the least that this work became obsolete almost immediately after its publication. Today there is an urgent need to write a new scientific multiple-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

We should not be astonished by the fact that to this day we do not have scientific works in which the activities of the superior authorities in the country and the party's Central Committee, the State Defense Committee and Supreme Command Headquarters and its working arm, the General Staff, are studied and of works which would trace the process of formulating and making decisions by such bodies and their formulation of strategic, operative and economic plans. Still unstudied remains the style of leadership of the country and the Armed Forces and the question of relations among leaders, although these were of far-reaching political and military consequences. Under the circumstances which had developed at that

time, Stalin's wrong judgments, errors and blunders could not only not be corrected promptly or blamed on other members of the leadership but, as a rule, were not even noted by the latter. Our people had to pay a high price for this. N. Pavlenko raises these questions in his article, which constitutes its unquestionable merit.

Comrades Ortabayev, Kokayev and Gatagov write that the memoirs written by our outstanding military commanders are "the most profound and objective sources concerning all problems of the Great Patriotic War and most authoritative testimony of the organizers of the victory." Let us remind these historians, in this connection, that memoirs are considered in Soviet history studies as additional sources. In terms of their nature they cannot be entirely objective for the reason alone that they present the subjective views of their authors on the events in which they participated, the people whom they met and themselves, as a result of their activities. Naturally, memoirs frequently contain information which it is impossible to find anywhere else. With all due respect to our military leaders and their decency, honesty and responsibility for their writings, their memoirs are no exception in terms of historical sources. Furthermore, we must take into consideration not only the personality of the writer but also the conditions under which the memoirs were written and published and the purpose of their publication. A clear example of this are the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov.

Zhukov started work on his war memoirs in 1958, soon after his resignation. At that time he was not certain that his memoirs would be published. In the mid-1960s, however, the political atmosphere had changed substantially. Among others, the task was set of "rewriting" the history of the Great Patriotic War. Preparations for the "*History of the Second World War*" had been dragging on for years. Therefore, in order to assert the new concept, primarily use was made of memoirs of outstanding military commanders. In terms of their ideological and political trend, memoirs which had been published earlier, between 1958 and 1965 (more than 30 titles) were considered unsuitable as a way of solving the problem. This particularly referred to the memoirs by General A. Gorbatov. A special group was set up under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy to "correct" the situation. It was assigned to supervise the publication of military memoirs. Through the efforts of this group and the publishing houses, the commanders, whatever their rank, who were writing their memoirs were issued the proper instructions on how to meet the set objectives. Memoirs which could not be rewritten were simply not published. Such was the case with the work written by B. Vannikov, the people's commissar of armaments, which was being prepared for publication between 1965 and 1970 but which was published only in 1988. Between 1966 and 1968 the books by Marshals of the Soviet Union A. Grechko, I. Konev, K. Meretskov and K. Rokossovskiy, Army General S. Shtemenko and aerospace designer A. Yakovlev were published. Ye. Boltin, the former head of the

department on the history of the Great Patriotic War at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, who reviewed those books, reached the following conclusion: "These books, considered in their totality, enable us to recreate the characteristic features of the portrait of the commander in chief as the leader of the Soviet Armed Forces during the war. This totally demolishes the irresponsible claims of his military incompetence, his conduct of the war based on "the globe," his allegedly absolute intolerance of other people's opinions, and other similar fabrications.... The Supreme Commander in Chief listened to the views of his subordinates and took them into consideration when such views were expressed with conviction and substantiation. He possessed a broad strategic outlook. He was able to grasp what was essential and decisive in the circumstances and to clearly define the objective and main trend of the operations of the forces. In short, the memoirs by the Soviet commanders prove J.V. Stalin, despite the entire complexity and contradictoriness of his character, to be an outstanding military leader." Neither the reviewed books (with the exception of the memoirs of S. Shtemenko, and only to a limited extent) nor the content of the review could justify such a conclusion. Nonetheless, it was published and, subsequently, repeated in several variations in books on the history of the Great Patriotic War.

In order to make more convincing the description of Stalin as a military leader, also needed was the testimony of the most authoritative military commanders in the period of the war, who had directly worked with him: G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevskiy. It was known that Zhukov had a manuscript with his memoirs. In the course of 1965 and 1966, as he continued his work on the memoirs, he met with historians and writers. In the course of these meetings Zhukov expressed his opinion on the events of the war, Stalin and his work with him. He submitted his manuscript for the study and selection of excerpts for publication in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, where I worked at that time. In this work, as in the notes on the talks between Georgiy Konstantinovich with K. Simonov, his view of Stalin was as follows: "Stalin's professional military knowledge was inadequate, not only at the beginning of the war but until its very end. In the majority of cases, however, one could not deny him intelligence, common sense or understanding the situation. In the analysis of the history of the war, in each specific case one must properly determine what actually happened. Stalin was responsible for the type of orders and insistence, which were stubborn and ignored any kind of objection and which affected matters adversely and harmfully. Most of his orders and instructions, however, were accurate and fair."

Zhukov provided more specific descriptions as well: "From the very start of the war Stalin was at home in strategic problems. Strategy was similar to his customary area—politics.... He had a poor understanding of matters of operational skill at the start of the war. I began to

develop a feeling that he had mastered operative problems in the last period of the battle for Stalingrad. At the time of the battle at the Kursk Arc one could already say, without exaggerating, that in such problems as well he acted with full confidence. As to problems of tactics, strictly speaking, he never understood them to the very end." "At the start of the war (I consider the battle for Stalingrad a landmark) it so happened that, as he listened to reports, he occasionally made remarks which proved his basic lack of understanding of the situation and insufficient knowledge of military affairs."

Thorough editing made such views expressed by G. Zhukov read as follows: "I became thoroughly familiar with J.V. Stalin as a military leader.

"J.V. Stalin mastered the problems of organization of front operations and operations of groups of fronts and managed them with full knowledge of the matter. He well understood major strategic problems. J.V. Stalin particularly displayed such talents as a commander in chief starting with Stalingrad.

"J.V. Stalin's natural intelligence and extensive erudition helped him in guiding the armed struggle as a whole. He was able to identify the main feature in a strategic situation and, holding on to it, counter the enemy and carry out one major offensive operation or another. Unquestionably, he was a worthy supreme commander in chief."

One can easily see disparities in these evaluations and pay proper due to the art of "editing." In the course of its preparation for publication, the chapter on the repressions of 1937-1938 and their consequences and many other segments were deleted. At the same time, other topics were added to the memoirs. It is common knowledge, for example, how unconvincing appear the testimony on the planned meeting between Marshal Zhukov and Colonel Brezhnev.

Similar steps were taken in terms of the recollections of A. Vasilevskiy, I. Konev and others. All of this proves that the memoirs of even outstanding Soviet military commanders cannot and should not be considered "the most profound and objective sources of information about all problems related to the Great Patriotic War." This is not to say that they can be ignored. We know, for example, that Stalin did not allow any records and notes to be kept of meetings of Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff. Information on such conferences can be found only in the memoirs. In some cases, the memoirs are the only source which helps us to pin down one specific fact or another. Nonetheless, in addition to the published memoirs, in our study of the history of the Great Patriotic War we must make use of letters, personal documents, statements by participants and witnesses to events, and archives. It is only the thorough study of the entire set of sources that would enable us to write truthful historical works.

N. Pavlenko, doctor of historical sciences, professor:

In the postwar period specialists encountered the problem of insufficient sources dealing with the history of the Great Patriotic War. The reasons were several. A number of documents remain classified and some materials had been lost in the fronts during the first months of the war. To a certain extent this gap was filled by memoirs. Essentially, however, such memoirs dealt on the operative-tactical command level.

Naturally, the historians knew that a great deal of the activities of the Supreme Command could be established with the help of Marshals G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevskiy. However, it was not accepted to ask them. Stupidly labeled a "Bonapartist," G. Zhukov was in disfavor, and I. Vasilevskiy was not only his friend but also the father of his son-in-law. It is a known fact that not a single member of the large collective of editors of the *"History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,"* headed by P. Pospelov ever turned for help or a reference to G. Zhukov.

Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Chuykov published his memoirs in 1964 and 1965 in the journals OKTYABR and NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA. He formulated in them the erroneous concept that Berlin could have been seized as early as February 1945 which, naturally, would have hastened the end of the war. Allegedly, our Supreme Command rejected this opportunity. The result was that the casualties suffered by us in March and April 1945 were unnecessary. Such assertions puzzle not only historians but many readers as well.

In order to settle this matter, the editors of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL decided to publish a special article on the Berlin operation. A variety of suggestions were submitted as to who should be its author. Journal associate V. Polikarpov (today doctor of historical sciences) called for commissioning G. Zhukov. Naturally, we liked the idea. Immediately, however, the question arose of how to bypass the disfavor in which he was.

Initially we turned for advice to the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department. P. Zhilin, my deputy, and I were seen by A. Yegorov, deputy department head. He said as follows: The idea was good but the department would not submit the suggestion to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. Our request was refused by Colonel General M. Kalashnik, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. He said roughly the following: The publication of the six-volume history of the Great Patriotic War was nearing completion and that they could do without Zhukov. This applied to an even greater extent to our journal. At that point I turned to Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov, chief of General Staff. He answered: "You are the editor in chief, you have an editorial collegium, so you decide whether to commission or not to commission this article."

We took Zakharov's advice and commissioned Zhukov to write the article. Soon afterwards it was received by the editors. This did not end our difficulties but, nonetheless, the article was published in June 1965.

The fact that after such a lengthy period of disgrace this military commander had come out with an article played a major role in lifting the disfavor. In August of that same year, the APN signed a contract with Zhukov on the publication of his book *"Recollections and Thoughts."* On the request of the editors of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, G. Zhukov gave the editors a copy of his initial memoirs (with a view to selecting excerpts for subsequent publications). In 1966 the journal printed several chapters from the memoirs in three separate issues. Writers, journalists and cinematographers made more frequent visits to Zhukov in Sosnovka. The military commander began to receive invitations to meet with writers, students attending the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, VUZ students, and so on.

Nonetheless, serious restrictions remained. Zhukov was not allowed to meet with students attending military academies and schools, officers and soldiers. In this passion for prohibitions, matters occasionally reached a point of absurdity. For example, in the summer of 1966 Georgiy Konstantinovich agreed to be interviewed by cinematographers in Perkhushkovo, where his command center was located during the period of the battle for Moscow. However, A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, forbade any filming to be done in Perkhushkovo. Zhukov took this very hard. The filming was moved to his dacha in Sosnovka. However, the heaviest blow to the military commander was the active "maneuvering" the purpose of which was to prevent his presence at the 24th CPSU Congress, although he had been chosen congress delegate.

Naturally, Zhukov knew that his meetings with military audiences were not approved. However, he answered my invitation to come to the journal. In the summer of 1966 he visited the editorial premises of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL twice. The second visit was on 13 August 1966. Zhukov's article "Counteroffensive at Moscow" was discussed. He answered critical remarks by members of the editorial collegium and questions asked by military historians.

Following is the text of his address with slight abbreviations:

Answering remarks on refining his assessment of the enemy during the period of the battle for Moscow, Zhukov said: "It is I who formulated the concept of exhausting the enemy. This assessment affected the assault groups which struck northwest of Moscow and in the Tula area, where the German command had been assigned the task of crushing resistance at the flanks of

the front, circle and capture Moscow. How to understand this assessment? I proceeded from the fact that the enemy was no longer able to carry out its assignment of capturing Moscow. Unquestionably, he was played out in terms of achieving this objective. It was no accident that Guderian refused to move and, without an order from his supreme command, began to withdraw. This confirms the fact that his possibilities had been truly exhausted. Hepner, who commanded the tank army in the northwest, also began to pull back his units without receiving an order from Hitler's headquarters or without the order of the commander of the "Center" group of armies. This confirms the impossibility of implementing the assignment and the fact that in these directions the enemy was exhausted. I am not saying that the group of armies "Center" was totally exhausted. On the contrary, what I am saying is that we mounted our counteroffensive without superiority. It was a question only of the exhaustion of the flanks."

The second question which Zhukov answered dealt with assessing the counteroffensive. "This is indeed a very unclear and confused matter. Toward the end of November and the beginning of December, when we organized our resistance to the enemy and, subsequently, used a more active form of resistance, such as a counterstrike, we clearly thought that a counteroffensive was being intended which, subsequently, it turned out did not take place. We became fully aware of this fact when the events developed more favorably to us: On the one hand, Guderian began to move back and, on the other, Hepner began to withdraw. When the counterstrikes mounted by the First Assault Army and the Lizyukov group began to push the enemy back, all of this developed as a logical continuation and, in the final account, by 8 December, turned into a broader counteroffensive. When Guderian's left wing began hastily to retreat, this enabled the command to efficiently increase its strength not only along the front but in depth as well. The first version of the assignment on 30 November stipulated very brief counterattack assignments. The assignments of the forces in terms of depth did not exceed 20-30 kilometers. (Rejoinder. Here and there somewhat more, within the range of 50 kilometers.) In the final account, all of these orders fell in place by 8-9 December. We had no order stipulating that earlier, by 30 November or 1-2 December, a directive had been issued, indicating that this was an order to counterattack. No such assignment was set, for we had neither the necessary strength nor the means. We committed additionally the First Assault Army which joined the fighting not on 6 December but on 29 November against a tank group which had crossed the canal in the Yakhroma area. Essentially, by 6 December the virtually entire army had been committed.

"There was no start of a counteroffensive in the classical meaning, as was the case, let us say, at Stalingrad. The counteroffensive began as a development of a counterstrike. Naturally, aviation strikes were intensified and additional all-army groups were committed.

"After the enemy's flanks had been routed and the enemy began to retreat hastily, the opportunity appeared, after a certain regrouping, to advance toward the Center. This explains the slow, I would say the inefficient offensive, for we had neither tanks nor artillery in sufficient amounts. We practically forced the enemy back. Why were there such results in the Center? In converting to a counterstrike and counteroffensive, we did not yield a single soldier, gun or machine gun to the central armies. Everything was concentrated on the flanks, for it was there that the main enemy groups were to be found. It was they that we wanted, first of all, to exhaust, to drain out and thus to advance faster with our own flanks and threaten the Center.

"Now on the question of the attitude toward headquarters and a more objective interpretation of its activities so that, in addition to the criticism, I could say a couple of good words about Stalin. In my article I tried essentially to provide an accurate interpretation of the matter. Perhaps I should expand my interpretation not of the role played by headquarters but by the General Staff, which followed quite closely the operations on the sector of the Kalinin Front and the Western Front and, at the same time, detected the time of weakening of the enemy forces and the time of the conversion.

"What was headquarters? I was a member of headquarters from the first to the last day of the war. Did headquarters gather to discuss problems? It did not. Who was in headquarters and who held discussions? It was Stalin. Headquarters meant Stalin. The General Staff was his apparatus. Stalin summoned to headquarters whoever he deemed necessary and when he deemed necessary. The person may have been a member of headquarters or simply a commanding officer. He would summon him along with the chief of General Staff or his deputy and would hear out the view of the commanding officer and, immediately after that, of the General Staff. That is how headquarters operated.

"If you believe that little has been said about the Supreme Commander in Chief, this is accurate. One should speak in greater detail about Stalin for his role in the defense of Moscow was greater than has been mentioned here. I would like to ask the editors to reinsert the deleted paragraph which reads as follows: 'I have frequently been asked where was Stalin during the battle for Moscow. My answer is that Stalin was in Moscow, doing the almost impossible to organize the defense of Moscow.' In my view, this is the highest praise that can be awarded to the Supreme Commander in Chief. This part, however, has been deleted and I believe that it should be reinserted. I am confident that your readers can only thank you for this. The comrades are right by saying that what appears now is that the command and the front's military council did everything while headquarters remained somewhere in the background.

"You may have noticed that, petty though it might seem, I have said that we had to ask for things but that we were given all that was available. This means that the

Supreme Commander in Chief indeed took notice of the possibilities and requests of the front and met them. This, perhaps, should be added but it would be inexpedient to add more. In my view, the matter of headquarters is more or less clear. I have tried here, as they say, to express my own viewpoint more objectively. Naturally, there were rather unpleasant moments in the work of headquarters, but I believe that it would serve no purpose to publish them, for which reason it is not worth expatiating on their subject.

"As to the psychological turn. Naturally, a psychological turn took place in everyone, from the commanding officer to the soldier. Once success began to be apparent, it grabbed soldiers and the military council of the front. I find it difficult to describe it here. Everyone's mood was uplifted. Everyone was pleased and happy that a movement forward had been initiated. Let the editor think about it and make suggestions.

"Should we distinguish in terms of time the counterstrike from the counteroffensive? No such sharp distinction could be made. One became interwoven with the other and one proceeded from the other. In my view, there is no need for any kind of academic demarcation. What I describe in my article was what happened in real life.

"A classical counteroffensive, as we understand it, as a separate stage, did not exist. The counteroffensive was the result of the course of events. Had the enemy provided a strong resistance to our counterstrike no counteroffensive would have taken place. Headquarters would have had to concentrate new forces and have a new redeployment in order to crush the enemy's resistance. At that point it would have been a question of preparing a counteroffensive and at that point we would not have managed with the First and 10th Armies.

"Why was the 20th Army committed? Krasnaya Polyana is 22 kilometers away from Moscow. In that sector, there was a breach. The moment the Lizyukov group was hastily brought up, the breach was plugged. As ordered by Stalin, Bulganin went there with the assignment to recapture Krasnaya Polyana from the enemy. It was a question exclusively of Krasnaya Polyana but no further. I went to Dedovo Village, to take over from Rokossovskiy. This was one of the features of our Supreme Commander although he too is not to be blamed. He was given the wrong information: He was told that this was the city of Dedovsk.¹

"As to the difficulties with the roads and the struggle with the snow. You probably know well that we would occupy a village and, other than the disabled, no one else would be found there, for the entire able-bodied population had been recruited by the Germans. Strictly speaking, we did not see any local population, for which reason there was no one to put to work. Nonetheless, in the large settlements and the cities we made adequate use

of the local population. Naturally, it is difficult for me at this point to say specifically where and what was used, this was not part of my functions as commanding officer.

"On changing the command post. If the front commander made the decision, headquarters did not object. The location of the command post must be consistent with the interests of troop control. Headquarters could not indicate to me the place from which I would control the forces. Naturally, however, you can understand that the front's headquarters was located inadmissibly close to the enemy, essentially within the range of long-range artillery fire. This is not correct. Frankly speaking, however, at that time we did not even think of it. The matter seemed petty. Today, however, as I analyze it, I have already found a justification (laughter). Army headquarters as well was inadmissibly close and so were divisional and regimental headquarters.

"There were many headquarters and had they to be moved back, what would the soldiers think? 'Well, the higher-ups are beginning to move back, is it not time for us too?' This is an entirely natural human weakness.

"The following happened as well, and you could ask about it Khokhlov and Bulganin. If I remember accurately, this occurred on 2 or 3 December, when we had made the breach in the Center, at the point where the Fifth and 33rd Armies intersected. At that time a large enemy group, obviously a regiment or, perhaps, a reinforced regiment, broke through toward the front's headquarters. In a birch forest the security regiment had to accept battle. The regiment was quite strong and energetic, headed by experienced people, and staff officers also took part in the fighting. However, this frightened some of them. Even Khokhlov came to me: 'Time to move.' However, it made no sense to 'move' while the enemy was there, one had to fight. Therefore, naturally, such times were not entirely suitable for staff work. However, this was the only case and at any other time nothing else bothered us.

"As to assessing the armies which had come from the reserve and the fact that they were not combat capable. I deem inexpedient to raise this question, for it would contribute nothing. As a whole, the nature of the advancing troops along the front has been reflected, in my view, quite adequately. What would be gained if I were to say that the 10th Army, commanded by Golikov, was insufficiently trained, and so on, and so forth? Nothing. The more so since Golikov himself wrote about his army and its lack of preparedness. Kuznetsov as well has written about the First Assault Army. I do not know whether we should say more on this matter, it seems to me that we should not. (Rejoinder. This is natural, considering the haste with which reserves were being trained.) Yes, we committed many divisions which were totally unprepared and poorly armed. They would reach the front one day and go into battle the next. Naturally, returns were as expected.

"As to what happened on 5 January and Stalin at headquarters. Present were Voroshilov, Stalin, Novikov, Beriya, and Voznesenskiy. Shaposhnikov submitted a very short report. I do not recall who else attended, whether it was Shtemenko or Vasilevskiy. I believe it was Vasilevskiy.

"The idea was being discussed of converting to a general offensive in all directions. Naturally, this was neither the idea of the General Staff nor of Shaposhnikov, who was reporting. This was exclusively Stalin's idea. He believed that the time had come for this and that it was necessary to strike in other directions as well. A rather unpleasant discussion took place. I have presented it in somewhat gentler terms.²

"At this point Malenkov, naturally, supported Beriya, who said that Voznesenskiy would always find some unpredictable difficulties even though such difficulties could be surmounted.

"In fact, at the point when we began the winter offensive which yielded no results, we set a rate. There were days when we were permitted one shot with a gun and two or three mines. You realize that no results could be expected if a gun is fired once. Why did the front commander not find the courage to object to this decision? Such courageous actions, however, did occur. However, Stalin demanded that we advance. If there were no results today there would be results tomorrow, and furthermore you block the enemy. Meanwhile, there will be results in other sectors. Naturally, these were juvenile considerations, for which reason there were no results whatsoever at the Kalinin Front; there were no results at the Western Front and the Southwestern Front. We had no results whatsoever along the entire strategic westerly direction, and furthermore the Leningrad Front and the right wing of the Northwestern Front could not advance even 1 meter in a northwesterly direction. The same occurred in the south.

"There were heavy casualties without any general strategic results. Had such forces and facilities been hurled in a westerly direction, I am dead certain that, unquestionably, the enemy could have been wiped out, routed and thrown back at least as far as the Smolensk Line. Furthermore, the left wing of the Northwestern Front would have almost reached Velikiye Luki and even Vitebsk. The enemy had no defense whatsoever in that area. Along that direction two additional armies could have been committed and mount a strike from the flank and the rear at the entire central group. But we lacked the necessary forces.

"It was no accident that the Supreme Commander in Chief was concerned. He had wasted the reserves and then had begun to take them away from the Western Front; he transferred the 30th Army to the Kalinin Front

and took as his reserve the First Assault Army. (N. Pavlenko. Why did you not object, Georgiy Konstantinovich?) I would like to see the way you, Nikolay Grigoryevich... (laughter).

"I do not wish to boast post facto but Stalin hardly had anyone who was more unpleasantly argumentative than I was. In my view, this can be confirmed by anyone who was with me at headquarters. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevskiy could tell you a great deal about it.

(Rejoinder. Nonetheless, how come that Stalin took away from you the First Army?)

"Very simply: Stalin did not issue the order himself but rang up Vasilevskiy and said that the First Army should become the reserve of the Supreme Commander in Chief headquarters. I rang up and so did Sokolovskiy. 'It has been ordered.' I called Stalin. He said: 'Withdraw it without any further discussion.' I told him that this would weaken the strike force. 'You have lots of troops, count how many armies you've got.' 'But count the type of front we have, and there is fighting in all directions. This is a counteroffensive and instead of increasing our forces we are beginning to withdraw them!' In such cases, however, he would hang up and that would be all. Had I been discussing things with my subordinates, naturally, I would have hardly been able to give any proof (laughter). Stalin had a Stalinist character and he was able to issue peremptory orders.

(Rejoinder. Could you tell us something about the Moscow defense zone.)

"Yes, as to the Moscow defense zone. Artemyev was my subordinate and my deputy. That is why whenever necessary, I simply rang up Artemyev and he helped with whatever he could. However, he was a rather odd deputy, who was in direct contact with Stalin and Beriya. They were training NKVD troops to fight in Moscow itself. Naturally, I explored with him and Stalin what could be taken out of those forces. Frankly speaking, this yielded nothing. This is a separate question and we could discuss it if necessary.

"I did not know what the Moscow defense zone had at its disposal and what forces and facilities it had. I knew that essentially Beriya and Artemyev were dealing with this. Artemyev had never visited me at headquarters and we communicated only occasionally. I dealt mostly with Gromadin. At that time he commanded the country's anti-aircraft defenses and, naturally, was of great help with his anti-aircraft guns. I remember that he gave us one battery when there was a breach in the direction of Solnechnogorsk. The tanks were advancing and he moved an artillery battery from anti-aircraft positions and threw it forward; with hasty preparations, it was able to stop approximately 25-30 tanks. The anti-aircraft battery knocked out eight to 10 tanks and the rest turned back. He helped us in other spots as well.

(Rejoinder. Tell us about the fading out of the Yefremov and Belov operations.³

“Actually, there were no operations whatsoever in that case. There was a breach. Yefremov was cut off and so was Belov. They remained behind. There were large partisan groups in that area. They were quite active in the Vyazma area and helped both Belov and Yefremov with supplies and communications. It would be unfair not to note the role of the partisans. No such fading out of activities occurred with Belov and Yefremov, for there were no operations. Operations were mounted against Vyazma and then came to a halt. Belov alone acted without heavy artillery or tanks; Yefremov had a little bit more but he also lost a great deal of ammunition. Strictly speaking, they turned into guerrilla detachments, so that we cannot speak of any fading out of the operations. They simply had no opportunity to mount them.

“As to the cutting off of this group. When a battle is covering such a huge area of 600 kilometers along the front, it is very difficult for a front commander to follow up problems of a tactical nature.

“Yefremov passed through the open breach. The main forces of the army remained behind. I could not determine what he had left to secure the Ugra. For your information, he had left behind no more than a detachment of 90 men without tanks or guns, and with light arms only. Do I share any responsibility for Yefremov? Naturally, I do. I am responsible for all the troops but not for activities which I have not organized. Providing support is not one of the front commander’s obligations, and I did not deem it necessary to consider what was happening right and left of me. What was Yefremov to do? Using the main forces of the army, which had been stopped at the Shanskiy Plant, he should have left a couple of divisions to act as a strut, and thus to secure his rear. He failed to do this. No one was thinking straight at that time and I underestimated the Vyazma enemy group. What I am writing about our errors is that the nut turned out to be harder to crack. However, I do not think it necessary to assume greater responsibility for the sake of appearing self-critical. There were plenty of errors in the course not only of this operation but of others as well. I will furthermore tell you that the size of this article and its trend—for this is an anniversary article—naturally restricts me to a certain extent.”

After an intermission, G. Zhukov answered historians’ questions.

What was the difference or interconnection between headquarters and the State Defense Committee?

I found no difference and it was difficult to determine where the State Defense Committee ended and where headquarters began and vice versa. This is because Stalin

was the head of headquarters and also chairman of the state committee. Wherever I would go, whether it was headquarters of the state committee, I was equally abused.

Whenever necessary, Stalin said: “Malenkov and Voznesenskiy, consider, together with Zhukov, what it is that he wants. Report in 2 hours.” What this was, whether members of headquarters or the State Defense Committee, was hard to say. Stalin was both. He commanded everyone, he directed, his word was final. It was actually an order. If Stalin said something it meant that this was the final order which could not be appealed. How to distinguish here within this interconnection? It is very difficult to understand. To this day I have not even asked myself this question.

The result is that in our publications headquarters is frequently mentioned and that this is an abstract concept.

The comrades know that there was a State Defense Committee and a headquarters. And since it existed, something had to be written about it. However, there were official decrees issued by the State Defense Committee but nowhere will you find any decisions by headquarters.

A comrade here asked: How were (decisions) recorded? They were not. Vasilevskiy recorded them in a work notebook and so did I. When Stalin spoke I made notes. About some details, I am sometimes asked: “Can you remember even the date?” It is precisely this that I have recorded. It is true that my notes are very brief, expressing basic thoughts. However, no one kept minutes or took down proceedings.

In our literature the question of the preparations for war is interpreted as follows: Stalin improperly assessed the military-political situation. The General Staff is to be blamed for not bringing on time the troops to a state of combat readiness, and so on. A great deal has been said about Sorge’s accurate reports. How did the General Staff react to this, for reconnaissance is an arm of the General Staff?

You see, this is a major question which cannot be covered in the 30 minutes the editor has put at our disposal. It is related to big policy, economics and the entire organizational work of the country’s leadership, its prewar policies, Stalin’s personality and, naturally, military leadership. For that reason, I can answer you in general terms and about the period during which I was chief of General Staff. As you know, I assumed that position on 1 February 1941.

Let me begin with what you said, that the General Staff had its Main Intelligence Administration. This is not entirely accurate. It was precisely then that the General Staff had no intelligence of its own. Intelligence was in the hands of the people’s commissar of defense. Golikov, who headed the Main Intelligence Administration, was

also deputy people's commissar of defense. Therefore, the management of intelligence was concentrated not within the General Staff but the people's commissar of defense, Timoshenko. The General Staff was provided with information by an individual who was not under the command of the chief of General Staff. He informed the people's commissariat on problems which he deemed that the General Staff should know. Naturally, this is an essential problem.

If a general staff has its own intelligence, it has the possibility, on the basis of data received on a daily basis from its intelligence apparatus, to analyze each aspect, each feature, and to draw proper conclusions. If it lacks this possibility, consequently, it must be satisfied with fragmentary information which others have deemed necessary to supply to it and, naturally, is unable to make a full analysis of the situation.

You must not think that I am shifting the responsibility and saying that the conclusions which were reached were those of the people's commissar. This would not be entirely accurate. In this case we must also take into consideration the specific nature of the organization of intelligence work and relations among intelligence agencies.

Golikov. Naturally, he should be interrogated with the same partiality with which you are interrogating me. What were the instructions he had received from Stalin as far as informing the people's commissariat? Golikov frequently saw Stalin, bypassing the people's commissar. The latter did not know that Stalin would summon Golikov to report. Golikov was in touch with Beriya and Beriya's intelligence forces. Both compared data and quite frequently went to see Stalin together to report in his office. I am not familiar with all the details. People's Commissar Timoshenko felt insulted on frequent cases for not being informed of everything pertaining to intelligence. Golikov reported to the people's commissar, I do not know exactly, whether under Stalin's influence or because the conclusions he drew himself were not entirely accurate. Quite frequently, however, let me try to state this more accurately, he underestimated the information he received and deflated the gravity of incoming information. In Golikov's reports the size of the forces deployed in Poland, both those transferred from the west or newly raised, were depicted (as I was able to determine by comparing data) as being less threatening than they actually were.

I then thought of the reason for this. The only explanation that I found was that, apparently Golikov thought that Stalin considered a great deal of the intelligence data exaggerated, on the one hand; on the other, as containing a great deal of false information care of British, American, German and other intelligence services. It is common knowledge that British intelligence, guided by the concept of its general staff, tried to add as much "fuel" as possible and promote a clash between Hitler and the Soviet Union, in order to free Hitler's hands entirely and

turn him to the east and, on the other hand, to provoke Stalin. Therefore, Stalin was somewhat justified in his mistrust of intelligence data. He saw in them misleading moves on the part of the British and French governments. This was confirmed by their own behavior during the period of the "funny war," when Hitler was not being blocked in the west. Why? So that he would be given a free hand in the east. Stalin followed the situation quite closely and, I would say that perhaps under the influence of his fear of Germany he went the wrong way.

Actually, and again on the subject of intelligence. Was the General Staff nonetheless familiar with the situation? It was. We were well aware of the concentration of troops in Poland. We were aware of the concentration of aviation and others. We repeatedly reported to Stalin on what was worrisome. This particularly applied to the final period (May and even April-May), when the Germans intensified their air reconnaissance, when all kinds of sabotage, terrorist and other gangs, including the Bender organizations, began to make incursions. The General Staff knew this and expressed its concern.

Initially Stalin considered these reports quite closely. In our presence (I was there and so was Timoshenko and I think that there was no one else) he instructed Molotov to send a messenger with a personal letter to Hitler and to demand of him a thorough explanation for the reason for which troops were being massed so close to the Soviet Union.

I do not recall when that was, 2, 3 or 4 days later, or perhaps a week later (I remember now), while submitting a personal report to Stalin, the latter said that the previous day he had received a personal letter from Hitler, who assured him that the massing of forces in Poland had nothing to do with preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, that such troops were to be used for an entirely different purpose, against a major target in the west. The air force concentrated in Poland, on Polish airfields, was also safe from the strikes of British aviation.

Let me tell you that, naturally, Stalin believed this version. He was convinced that Hitler was preparing, on the one hand, an invasion of Britain and, on the other, intended to strengthen its African forces where Rommel's Corps was in operation.

Naturally, this proved to be very wrong. Did I, as chief of General Staff, realize how wrong Stalin was? I would lead you astray and, perhaps, be posing if I were to say that I was fully convinced that war was inevitable. At that time I believed, I was entirely satisfied with Stalin's response. Naturally, I considered Stalin to be so farsighted and brilliant that I could not even doubt that Stalin's mind could not penetrate into the heart of the matter. I did not. I believed that Stalin's mind was up to it and that he understood better than I did. I trusted Stalin. Timoshenko as well had no doubts whatsoever.

Later, however, the closer we came to 22 June events developed and assumed an increasingly threatening nature after the troops which, allegedly, planned for Operation Sea Lion began to move not west but east, when German troops showed up in Romania and Yugoslavia, when German troops were redeployed from Yugoslavia to East Prussia, etc. I could see that there was a kind of strategic dispersal of forces with a view to redeployment. At that time, however, even I did not believe that this already meant war. To begin with, it was not all that clear as we can see it today. As to the Barbarossa Plan, I do not know who found out about it and when. I personally was told of it in 1945.

Naturally, individual elements of the plan reached us. At one point Nikolay Grigoryevich showed me some kind of document which I signed. Timoshenko had signed it also (Pavlenko: Timoshenko, you, Beriya and Abakumov). No other document existed. Naturally, it did not speak of "Barbarossa" or of the strategic directions aimed south, toward Moscow and Leningrad. I found out about Sorge, for example, from the motion picture, when it was played last year, as well as about his reports. Stalin may have had such reports but, in all likelihood, they passed through Beriya and as to what Beriya reported on the basis of his more extensive intelligence operations, we were not told. Stalin did not share his conclusions. I do not know about the other members of the Politburo but, obviously, Stalin knew. Eventually, he even said that we have quite important information but we do not trust it, for, according to our data, it comes from a double agent. I think that this referred precisely to Sorge, who was subsequently actually accused of working both for us and for Hitler. In my view, the Main Intelligence Administration, headed by Golikov, had a hand in this. This must be clarified, for Sorge's wife was arrested here, in Moscow, and sent where no one would like to go.

Therefore, when the situation became more alarming, naturally, Timoshenko and I became more insistent. I had repeated and very serious discussions with him. He felt that this case was "heating up." On a number of occasions (in April and May) we had serious discussions with Stalin, as a result of which a number of steps were taken. In the final account, it is common knowledge that, in my view, we drafted 750,000 men in March and the beginning of April (rejoinder. In May. Training exercises with 750,000 men began). Initially there were 500,000, to which 250,000 specialists were added. I believe that this took place at the end of March and beginning of April and in May they were already joining the troops. They were already in the Kiev and Belorussian Special Military Districts, the country's anti-aircraft forces and the air force.

Later, under the guise of mobile gatherings, the North Caucasian Military District was activated; the 19th Army was raised, commanded by Konev, which was moved to Belaya Tserkov, for the southwestern direction was the main one in the strategic plan. It was in that area

that we began to transfer the 16th Army of the Transbaykal Military District, commanded by Lukin. This was followed by Yershakov's army from the Urals; the 22nd Army was moved to the Velikiye Luki area, followed by the 28th and 21st Armies. I recall that the 63rd Corps of this army was commanded by Petrovskiy's son, but as to who the army commander was, I forget.

A number of steps were implemented in the air force, along with other organizational procedures. The raising of 15 additional mechanized corps and many other measures were undertaken in March. Naturally, all of this was the result of the growing concern. Naturally, any soberly thinking person would ask (Today, of course, everything seems clearer but at that time we looked at events differently) how is it that, nonetheless, in those circumstances, we did not undertake even a partial deployment?

At this point, naturally, we must bear in mind Stalin's categorical requirements and stipulations. He firmly said that if we do not provoke the Germans to war there will be no war, we would be able to avoid it. We had the means of avoiding it. The means he mentioned were diplomatic or political, or else, some kind of general governmental combination. Naturally, it was more difficult for us to guess what it was. However, Stalin had issued his orders: Anything you do must be done in the greatest possible secrecy and you are responsible for every single step you take.

When the question was raised of bringing up even one covering echelon which, according to the plan, was to be deployed along the border, Stalin said: "Wait." He found out that the Kiev district had begun to deploy as instructed by Timoshenko, despite strictest possible instructions. Beriya immediately rushed to Stalin and said, look, the military is not obeying, it is provoking, I have a report from... (unintelligible, editor), and deploying in an order of battle.

Stalin immediately rang up Timoshenko and gave him a proper dressing down. This hit me as well. I was asked what I was doing and ordered immediately to summon Kirponos, immediately draw back the troops, punish the culprits, and so on. Naturally, I did not rescind the order whereas other commanders did not risk it. Given an order.... But who would give the order? Who would stick out his neck? Let us say that I, Zhukov, feeling the danger threatening the country, would issue the order to deploy. This would be reported to Stalin. Why did I do so? Because of the danger. Well, Beriya, take him to the basement. What other discussion could there be?

Naturally, I do not reject the blame. It may have been that I discussed matters with Stalin inappropriately and unconvincingly. Perhaps I was not sufficiently authoritative. However, Stalin never experienced the misfortunes which subsequently afflicted the country. Subsequently he was quite aware of each report and intelligence information. Since at that time he had still

not experienced this misfortune, naturally, his vigilance had been somewhat dulled. Above all, naturally, what prevailed over all of his steps and which reflected on us as well, was his fear of Germany.

He was afraid of the German Armed Forces, which had easily marched over Western Europe and routed it, and in front of which everyone dropped on his knees. He was afraid. Why? Because he had brought the country to such a threatening point and had not prepared it for war. He realized that his entire prewar policy had proved to be wrong. He was late. Hitler had begun to prepare the country in 1935-1936. He had subordinated the entire economy and politics to preparation for war. We, however, began to staff our territorial system with regular cadres as late as 1939, unless I am wrong. Naturally, as you know we entered the war not with an overall regular army but with a territorial army, which affected the combat capability of the troops. What does a territorial system mean? It means that they did not know how to fight airplanes, were unfamiliar with tanks, for which reason, you may recall, our army was so greatly afraid of tanks.

It was thus, it was under those circumstances that this sinister event took place.

How did it happen that on our own territory the Germans looked for bodies of soldiers buried in the 1914-1918 World War? How did you allow this?

This is one and the same question. Eventually, we went to see Stalin and realized that he had finally and truly understood that the directive to deploy had to be issued. Molotov, Beriya and Malenkov were sitting down. Stalin was pacing, smoking his pipe. He said: "The Germans have requested of us permission to look for the bodies of World War I casualties. It was here that the battles were fought," he said pointing at the map, "it is here that they would like to search." I looked at the direction: Brest, Grodno, Brody. "God! This is the most unconcealed reconnaissance!" "See to it that they find out nothing. It is not worth quarreling over such a petty matter or make noise."

German civilians! These are officers in civilian clothes! Is this not clear? It is entirely clear!

"Beriya and the border troops have been given instructions. These people will not go too deep." Eventually, they began to work. (Rejoinder. Nonetheless, were these Germans not behind the lines?) They did not find any bodies but, naturally, saw what they wanted to see. (Rejoinder. Were there many groups of Germans behind our lines?) There were 10 to 12 groups. What was most characteristic is that subsequently aviation reconnaissance covered the same areas. The groups were searching, let us say, at a depth of 10 kilometers while reconnaissance in those areas covered as much as 50 kilometers.

What was the reaction of the General Staff and your reaction to the TASS 14 June announcement?

Naturally, this was a strange declaration. I remember that Timoshenko and I were discussing something in his office. I told Timoshenko: "We must call, for in the final account we are nonetheless responsible for what is occurring. If not you and I may be shot later for doing nothing."

He rang up. The discussion was harsh and Timoshenko too became angry. He then hung up. I asked: "Well, what?" "He ordered us to read the newspapers tomorrow." "Why?" "Some kind of TASS communication is being drafted." Indeed, we read it the next day, on 14 June. It came as a total surprise to us. At the Supreme Soviet session (I believe in August 1940) Molotov had made precisely the same type of statement in the spirit, naturally, and not the letter, of the one included in the TASS statement.⁴ I compared these two statements, those of Molotov and TASS and, naturally, I realized that this was not a new policy but was based on the desire to pacify Hitler and to avoid any worsening of relations.

Naturally, this statement asked the German government some questions. How did it react to the statement? How it reacted? With silence. Then, it was too late. Several days later they gave us their answer in powerful strikes. That is what happened with this declaration.

It has been written that you attended a military academy in Germany?

I have already answered this question once, that I attended the "Stors Academy."⁵ This was a pamphlet with my biography, which was published in France immediately after the war. Naturally, however, it had everything turned upside down, including the fact that I had attended a German academy. I already said that the first time I saw Germany was in 1945. Did I teach others or did I study while Berlin was being captured? I believe that it was I who taught the Germans. I have repeatedly spoken about the academy with Uborevich. The academy was attended by Tukhachevskiy, Yakir and Uborevich. Clearly, they confused me with Yakir. This may also be because I did give a bad turn to the Germans and somewhat distinguished myself. Therefore, they would like to ascribe this to the operative-strategic art of the Germans, the fact that my initial experience should be credited to them.

Why did you change your mind about using Katukov's Army? At headquarters you yourself suggested that both tank armies (Bogdanov's and Katukov's) be used to bypass Berlin.

In the course of my activities I never held on to what I had said previously. I watched the situation. If the situation changed not the way I anticipated, I immediately made corrections. If Katukov's Tank Army had not been thrown at the central German group, the Eighth

Army would have been stopped at the Zeelow Hills. No delay was possible. I had already decided that if the situation would worsen in the central direction I would throw it in that same direction.

I was with Chuykov, at the observation point. I realized that we had made a mistake in that area. We had underestimated the Zeelow heights, we had not reconnoitered sufficiently. Our long-range fire was insufficient to suppress resistance in that direction. Although the air force was bombing the area heavily it had been unable to suppress the enemy. Unquestionably, Chuykov's Army had been halted. Naturally, we could not hesitate and give the Germans time to organize their resistance. Were we to hope that by maneuvering the two armies together we would be able to turn things around? This was problematical. I was not confident that success in that direction would quickly follow.

Then I believed that the more we pulled out of the enemy its Berlin reserves, destroying them in an open field, the easier it would be to capture Berlin. Look at the situation, the way the Germans went so far as to remove forces from the defense sector, throwing at us anti-aircraft artillery and tanks. They used anything they had prepared for the immediate defenses of Berlin and we crushed them. We were delayed by 2 or 3 days but then we took Berlin in a very short time. Has there ever been another occasion in history for the capturing of a capital such as Berlin, with its underground communications and major installations within such a short time!

To a certain extent, those who write that the Germans did not have sufficient forces to fight for Berlin are right. The Germans did not use their forces adequately. They threw them directly at us. Later, when it became necessary to fight on the streets of Berlin, they did not have a strong defense in all directions. (Rejoinder. They repeated what we did in 1941, when our troops were being thrown into battle and destroyed in separate units.) Precisely.

Clearly, historians will criticize you for Berlin, for the fact that you launched a tank army into a frontal attack against Berlin while the all-army forces made a flanking maneuver.

What about the Second Tank Army? Dear comrade, you did not follow closely the development of the operation. Look: The 47th Army bypassed Berlin. It was accompanied by the Second Tank Army, followed by the First Polish Army, and immediately reached the Elbe. From the south, Konev cut off Berlin with its Fourth Tank Army and sent to the Elbe Zhadov's Fifth Army and other forces. Therefore, we reached the Elbe before we took Berlin. I then rang up Stalin and he said: "The Americans and the British should not enter Berlin before us." I answered him that, precisely, our first task was to cut off the Allies from Berlin and then take the city.

Footnotes

1. This refers to the case of Stalin receiving wrong information (Dedovo Village, which was captured by the Germans, was mistaken for Dedovsk city), for which reason he ordered Zhukov to take the city back from the enemy. Zhukov's efforts to convince Stalin that Dedovsk was in our hands were unsuccessful.

2. On 5 January 1942 Supreme Command Headquarters held a conference on mounting a general strategic offensive in the winter. A report was presented by Marshal of the Soviet Union B. Shaposhnikov, chief of General Staff. Stalin deemed necessary to launch an offensive along all the fronts. Zhukov objected, suggesting an offensive in a western direction. He was supported by N. Voznesenskiy, the Gosplan chairman, who proved that the means needed for an offensive along all the fronts were unavailable (for the rest, see the text).

3. By the end of January 1942 a number of breaches were opened in the enemy's defenses in the Vyazma direction, which were used by the command of the Western Front to move behind enemy lines the First Guards Cavalry Corps commanded by P. Belov and elements of the 33rd Army commanded by General M. Yefremov. An air landing was also made in the area of operations of these forces (a brigade of 2,000 men). The enemy brought up reserves from the rear and closed all breaches in its defense. For that reason our forces in the Vyazma area turned out surrounded. In breaking out of the encirclement, a significant part of the forces, headed by General Yefremov, perished.

4. At the seventh session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on 1 August 1940, V. Molotov said: "The course of events in Europe has not only not weakened the strength of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact but, conversely, underscored the importance of its existence and further development. Of late the foreign and, particularly, the British and Anglophile press, have frequently speculated on the possibility of a discord between the Soviet Union and Germany, in an effort to frighten us with the prospect of increased German power. Both on our and the German side, these efforts have been repeatedly exposed and rejected as worthless. We can only confirm that, in our view, the existing good neighborly and friendly Soviet-German relations are based not on random considerations of a circumstantial nature but on basic governmental interests of both the USSR and Germany."

5. Reference to military commanders without academic training, who had been trained through practical work and self-education.

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On the Eve of World War II; A Historian's Notes
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[Article by Aleksandr Oganovich Chubaryan, doctor of historical sciences, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History]

[Text] The 50th anniversary of the tragic events of 1938-1939 has triggered a sharp increase in the interests of the public in the history of the eve of World War II, and has resulted in to hundreds of new works written in the USSR and other countries on various aspects of global development in the 1930s.

Lively and sharp debates have developed among Soviet historians, journalists, public figures and diplomats. We are gradually surmounting the syndrome of prohibition in the study of foreign policy and in the critical interpretation of many stages and problems in the history of Soviet foreign policy, which prevailed for such a long time.

Today two trends have become clearly apparent in our debates, in terms of the approaches concerning the prehistory of World War II. A number of historians are cautioning us against criticizing any aspects of Soviet foreign policy of the 1930s and subsequent years, noting that such criticism harms the country's international prestige and authority.

The opposite trend was manifested in efforts to consider the then foreign policy line of the country only within the context of Stalin's deformations of socialism, ignoring the study of international political developments in the 1930s. The supporters of this approach demand a full revision of our former assessments and concepts concerning Soviet policy of that period. In this case the actual course of events is frequently replaced by them with speculative concepts estranged from the political realities of that time.

In these matters we also feel steady external pressure: some Western historians continue to do everything possible to justify the policies of Britain, France and the United States and to consider the USSR responsible for the outbreak of World War II.

The conflict of such sometimes opposite views and assessments and the range of different views and positions faced the historians with the task of launching an extensive debate on the methodology itself of the approach to complex and contradictory phenomena which existed on the eve of War War II. In this connection, let us express some considerations.

To begin with, there is a problem of current historical experience. Of late the thought has frequently been expressed in periodicals and roundtable discussions that the past can be assessed only on the basis of the testimony of direct participants in the events of those years.

However, a critical reinterpretation of the past is impossible without new approaches, which presume the mastery and use of the experience of the present and the contemporary vision of historical processes. We must also bear in mind that today history has at its disposal a number of documents which were not available to anyone of the participants in those distant events. Clear to the historian are the concealed potentials which even the most perspicacious witness of the past could not have detected in their entirety. The study of alternate decisions and the verdict of the historian as to what decision would have been more advantageous and acceptable presumes a historical distance.

Second, the most important methodological prerequisite for the study of the prehistory of World War II is that during that period there was an inevitable organic and widespread connection between the foreign policy of any country and the overall development of international relations and the domestic political situation. The dialectics of domestic and foreign policy was, in particular, that foreign policy objectives and decisions made by a country were restricted by the actions of the other participants in the events. The dramatic events of 1939 cannot be understood without a thorough study of the international situation throughout the 1930s or without considering the views held by the various countries and the world public.

However, the difficulty which the study of the prehistory of World War II presents is due to the fact that, at the same time, Soviet foreign policy was experiencing the influence of Stalin's deformations of socialism and violations of the standards of morality. This could not fail to affect the assessment of the situation and the implementation of a number of foreign policy measures.

Third, we must consider international political developments during prewar times on the basis of the various options which existed in the 1930s in the area of international relations. It is a question not only of comparing and weighing the various choices but also of determining the objective conditions and subjective factors which influenced the possibility of exercising one option or another. Without setting ourselves the task of identifying the entire set of problems of the prehistory of the war, we would like to draw attention to some approaches to the study of the events of the end of the 1930s and to earmark the problems on which studies and new discussions are particularly necessary.

Threat to All Mankind

Soviet historiography has done a great deal to expose the social roots of fascism and its nature and classification, and to identify the stages which led to the assumption of power by Hitler and his supporters, the implementation of the aggressive fascist program and the study of the entire complex picture of international relations of the 1930s.

Nonetheless, under contemporary conditions we should depict more profoundly the threat which fascism presented to human values and to the achievements of global civilization and culture. This formulation of the question will make clearer the extreme nature of the situation which appeared at the end of the first third of our century. Today, looking at the results of the end of this century, we can note that fascism hurled a challenge to the progress of all mankind, its social and political gains and the very existence of many countries and peoples.

In its aspiration to world domination, it appealed to the base instincts and adopted the most reactionary and antihuman theories and concepts; it used the historical experience in applying mass repressions and the enslavement and oppression of entire races and nations. It is precisely this aspect that gave the existing circumstances their extreme nature. Fascism opposed not only socialism; it set as its programmatic task not only the enslavement of the Slavic and many other peoples. It also presented a threat to the Western democracies and showed the aspiration to subordinate to itself the peoples of colonial and dependent countries and to redraw the map of the world to suit its own interests.

The main danger to mankind was that fascism planned the physical annihilation of tens of millions of people coldly and purposefully, "theoretically" substantiating genocide and racial and national exclusivity. It corrupted the mind and the awareness of people by using social demagogy and boosting the basest possible feelings and concepts.

In real life, this challenge hurled by fascism against human values was concealed behind specific and externally customary political and diplomatic slogans and categories. Skillful social demagogy misled the people, camouflaging (particularly at first) the real objectives of this antihuman ideology. Expressing the interests of the most reactionary and militaristic strata, fascism also made use of the discontent of the middle classes and parts of the working class in Germany, which were suffering from the consequences of the severe economic crisis and social upheavals.

Fascism skillfully adapted to its own needs the new situation in political and social developments and changes in the thinking of millions of people, which had come as a result of World War I. It is thus that a genetic link was forged between the two global military catastrophes of the 20th century, when the defeat of Germany and the national degradation to which the members of the Entente subjected the Germans created nutritive grounds for revanchist ideas and for appealing to the inflated national feelings of the German people, adopted by the theoreticians and practitioners of Nazism.

Emphasis on this aspect of global developments in the 1930s enables us to look at the prehistory of the war on the basis of a certain macrolevel, in the context of

protecting mankind from the total danger which faced it. This approach allows us to gain a better idea of the meaning and nature of the universal human values and to expose the ideology and practices of fascism as one of the most sinister and terrible threats to mankind in the 20th century.

The other important problem is to determine the extent to which a feeling of the forthcoming catastrophe existed in the various strata. The familiar resolution of the 7th Comintern Congress reflected the understanding of the leaders of the communist movement of the fact that fascism was the main threat to the entire world. After the advent of the Hitlerites to power in Germany, naturally, feelings of condemnation of Nazi policy and ideology existed in the USSR; propaganda worked in the same spirit. Congresses of men of culture and science, the numerous meetings held by the European public, conferences of pacifists and the worry expressed by many Western European liberals confirm the fact that many members of the European public were also aware of the approaching danger.

Nonetheless, however, chauvinistic feelings were widespread in Europe in support of fascist ideas and slogans. The right-wing conservative circles were impressed by the anticommunism and anti-Sovietism of the fascist program. European reaction hoped that fascism would firmly block the growth of the revolutionary movement and curb the European radicals.

Let us note yet another important circumstance. In addressing ourselves to the prehistory of World War II, occasionally we get so carried away by the criticism of Anglo-French policy of "pacification" that we virtually forget the main culprits for the war. At a meeting of historians, a Polish scientist justifiably pointed out that it sometimes we feel that Chamberlain and Daladier are more responsible for the outbreak of the war than Hitler and his circle.

Did the Possibility of Joint Defense From Fascist Aggression Exist?

The challenge which fascism hurled at mankind provided a real base for a broad unification of a great variety of forces who were ready to oppose the arising catastrophe. To the Soviet Union, fascism meant the threat of enslavement and the death of millions of people; increasingly, the people of Europe realized the possible consequences of the fascist menace. The intellectuals in different countries, writers, scientists and painters cautioned and called for surmounting indifference and conformism and for joining efforts in the struggle against the brown plague.

Serious concern spread among the ruling circles of many European countries and in the United States. Many political leaders in Britain, France and other countries saw in the strengthening of Germany a threat to their positions in Europe and other parts of the earth. The

economic and political contradictions among the capitalist countries created grounds for a sharp rivalry between England and France, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other.

A major stage in ensuring European security and the possibility of unification of antifascist forces appeared between 1933 and 1936. It was then that the outlines of the system of collective security and consolidation of the fighters against fascism throughout the world appeared. The set of steps and proposals formulated by the Soviet Union called for joint action on the part of a number of big and small European countries, concluding agreements guaranteeing the Eastern borders of Germany's neighbors ("Locarno of the East"), etc.

At that time the similarity of approaches between Soviet diplomacy and the views held by a number of influential personalities in France (L. Bartou, P. Boncour, and E. Herriot) became apparent. The Yugoslav king, the Romanian minister of foreign affairs and many leaders of other Western countries joined in the attempt to create a collective security system. As in the past, they "rejected" the ideology and practices of socialism but were ready to join efforts in the struggle against fascism. There were numerous meetings between M. Litvinov, who was an enthusiastic supporter of cooperation with the bourgeois-democratic countries in the West, with political leaders and diplomats of big and small countries. Some results were achieved: a Soviet-French and a Soviet-Czechoslovak mutual aid treaty was concluded, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, disarmament talks were held, and the USSR was recognized by the United States.

Nonetheless, no decisive change occurred. From the very beginning, the British leadership blocked the formulation of a joint security system and, subsequent to Bartou's assassination, the orientation of French diplomacy changed as well. Germany was clearly accelerating the implementation of its program for global domination while the possibilities of forming an anti-fascist front were becoming increasingly illusory.

The infamous policy of "pacifying" the aggressors, the main booster of which was England, was based on three foundations: first, the militant rejection of socialism and the desire to eliminate or weaken the USSR (which seemed possible by turning German aggression to the East); second, the strategic underestimating of the nature of fascism as a menace not only to socialism but to the Western democracy; third, the illusion that Hitlerite Germany could be restrained within limits which would suit England and its allies. Naturally, it would be erroneous to reduce Western policy merely to the policy of "pacification" (in actual practice everything was more complex), for significant forces and influential circles existed in England, France and many other countries, which were ready, although with some hesitations and stipulations, to set up a joint front against fascism with the USSR. However, these forces were disunited and

many even realistically thinking politicians and public leaders feared and were unwilling to establish contacts with communists and leftist circles in the West or with Soviet representatives.

Unfortunately, nor was it possible to create a united front of social forces. At that time the role of society as a whole in solving international problems had not been fully realized. Furthermore, ideological and conceptual differences had polarized global public opinion to such an extent that it was difficult to surmount contradictions and to formulate and, above all, to implement a joint program. Finally, there was also a major split among leftist forces in the capitalist countries of Europe. There was no understanding of the threatening catastrophe among the broad population circles. The discord between communists and social democrats had drastically reduced the possibilities of waging an antifascist struggle.

Although in the mid-1930s both the Comintern and some other international organizations had made important decisions and issued recommendations on the antifascist struggle, no real unification of antifascist forces which could oppose the aggressive actions of Germany and Italy was achieved.

Errors and distortions related to the cult of Stalin's personality were a major obstacle to the establishment of a broad antifascist front of left-wing forces. The familiar and sharply negative assessments of the social democrats, made by Stalin and ratified by the Comintern by the turn of the 1930s, hindered cooperation with social democrats, who were the objective allies in the antifascist struggle.

Stalin's condemnation of "abstract humanism," and his rejection of European pacifists were an obstacle to broadening the ties between the Soviet public and Western liberal pacifistic circles. Meanwhile, the mass repressions in the Soviet Union, including those against the leaders of the Comintern, seriously distorted the image of socialism, undermined confidence in our country among broad Western public circles, and weakened the ranks of the communists, i.e., of the tremendous real force which opposed fascism. All of this narrowed the possibility of creating a broad antifascist front of public forces.

Nor should we ignore a certain apathy which existed among some Western intellectuals. The world witnessed numerous individual protests raised by writers, painters and scientists against the man-hating regime. Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein and dozens of other noted men of science and culture left Germany. However, neither they nor their numerous colleagues became symbols of active struggle against Nazism or able to organize and lead a mass resistance to it.

On that level, the task of historians is to make a profound study of the positions held by Western social forces, including the study of the pacifist movement of that time. Unfortunately, in the past we all too frequently became carried away by a simple enumeration of meetings between men of science and culture and participants in international conferences and congresses, without analyzing how influential and representative such fora were and the forces and circles which, in that case, remained outside the antifascist movement, declining close cooperation with the Soviet public. The disorientation of the public and its division were largely assisted also by the failure to organize a united antifascist front on the official state level.

Such were the strained circumstances with which the world entered 1938.

Munich—The Apogee of 'Pacification' and Prologue to Tragedy

The history of the Munich accord is well-known. For that reason, let us merely consider some general matters. Above all, Munich was a watershed, marking a new stage in the international-political development of the prewar period. Before Munich, the course of "pacification" pursued by Britain and France, was expressed in a general political direction, a refusal to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union, maintaining permanent contacts with Hitlerite Germany and silently accepting the acts of German aggression. The Austrian Anschluss, which Hitler promoted in March 1938, was an act which was calmly swallowed by the Western powers.

At Munich, however, the situation became essentially different. It was Chamberlain and Daladier who personally gave Hitler part of Czechoslovakia, refusing to take into consideration the interests of the Czechoslovak people. They thus created a dangerous precedent, as a result of which, without firing a single shot, Hitler was given part of a European country. Furthermore, England and France, as though acknowledging the Hitlerite method of "protecting" German nationals living in other countries, encouraged Hitler to repeat such steps. Munich struck the strongest possible blow at plans for collective security and at the very idea of the unification of European countries on an antifascist basis.

The British and French leaders believed that they would be able to direct the German appetites to the east and, at the same time, would be able to control the aspirations of Hitlerite Germany. However, soon afterwards events refuted these illusions; Germany was clearly getting totally out of control. In March 1939 it seized the rest of Czechoslovakia.

Munich deprived Europe of its stability. Henceforth, the small countries on the continent felt insecure and were aware of their helplessness in the face of the growing fascist threat. Munich created a threat of isolation for the Soviet Union. The USSR, which was previously part of a

center of political and diplomatic events, lost the possibility of influencing the development of international relations. The war was coming threateningly closer to the Soviet borders.

Frequent claims are made in foreign historiography to the effect that the Western powers were led into an agreement with Germany because of their mistrust of the USSR, particularly taking into consideration the mass repressions of 1937-1938 and the weakening of Soviet military power as a result of the destruction of its leading military cadres. Unquestionably, the Stalinist repressions shocked the Western public and substantially weakened the international prestige of the socialist state even in the eyes of many of our supporters. However, strong doubts can be expressed about judgments concerning the influence which our internal events had on British and French Munich policy. The policy of "pacification" had begun and had been implemented even before 1937. As early as the mid-1930s, the Western leaders (in London in particular) had tried to isolate the USSR by holding talks with Germany. Furthermore, it was hardly considerations of a moral order and concern for the rights of the Soviet people that so strongly affected double-dyed politicians such as Chamberlain, Daladier, Halifax, and Laval.

At the same time, Munich had a great impact on the USSR and on the views held by Stalin and his circle. The existing mistrust in the Western democracies gained strong and entirely real confirmation. Obviously, Stalin clearly felt the growing isolation of the USSR and the inevitable approach of the threat of war. Gradually, the USSR began to look for alternate solutions. The result was the establishment of contacts with Germany. This turn was manifested in Stalin's irritation at Litvinov. Rumors on Litvinov's disgrace spread in Moscow's diplomatic circles. They were confirmed when Molotov, a person of an entirely different mind set and background, one of the leaders who were closest to Stalin, became the new head of the foreign policy department, in May 1939.

In summing up the results of the development of events in 1938, the conclusion is that the Western countries dealt a crushing blow at the idea of collective security in Munich and motivated the USSR to seek alternatives through diplomatic contacts with Germany and stimulated Stalin's increased mistrust in the Western democracies, which was also manifested in August 1939.

The Prewar Crisis

The sharp discussions which have developed on the prehistory of World War II are largely focused on the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks of the summer of 1939 and on the Soviet-German Pact of 23 August 1939.

That spring, the British and French leaders were able to realize the futility of their efforts to control Germany's actions. Step by step, the Nazi leadership implemented its program, entering into an alliance with Italy and

Japan. In March 1939 Germany seized Klaypeda, thus creating an immediate threat to the Baltic States. As they intensified their anti-Polish campaign, the Hitlerites were preparing to strike at Poland. There is documentary proof that the final decision to attack that country was made by Hitler in April 1939. By then Italy had occupied Albania and Japan, making use of the anti-Comintern Pact, had energized its aggressive encroachments in the Far East and, in May 1939, provoked a military conflict with the USSR.

Realizing that Germany was preparing to crush the entire European system of states, the British and French leaders took two major steps: they decided to issue guarantees to Poland and Romania and agreed to hold political and military talks with the USSR. Poland and Romania were traditional spheres of French influence. British positions in Poland were also strong, and the occupation of the latter was considered in Paris and London as a blow at the positions of these countries and as leading to their substantial weakening in the case of a possible conflict with Germany. Meanwhile, however, Britain continued its secret talks with Germany, continuing to play the game of "pacification" and hoping to reach some kind of agreement with Hitler.

Active Soviet-German contacts as well began in the spring of 1939. They opened with a discussion on trade and economic matters but gradually extended to the political area as well. It was in those complex circumstances that political and, subsequently, military talks were initiated among the USSR, Britain and France.

There is a view according to which these talks were doomed to failure. Some Soviet historians believe that after Munich there was no longer any alternative to the Soviet-German agreement which followed. In my view, such a categorical judgment is simplistic. Naturally, mutual trust among the three potential allies in opposing Hitlerite Germany was substantially undermined as a result of Munich. Nonetheless, not everything had been lost as yet. One chance remained: to hold political and military talks in the summer of 1939 leading to the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact and, particularly, a military convention between England and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. The development and outcome of these talks are quite well known, for which reason we shall consider only some of their aspects.

The thorough study of available documents allows us to evaluate the actions of the participants in the talks and to modify some of our previous ideas. Above all, we must draw a demarcation line between the views held by Britain and France in the course of the talks conducted by the military missions in August 1939, something which was virtually ignored in the past. There was a greater concern in Paris on the subject of intensified German aggressiveness. Balancing between the old policy of "pacification" and the fear of German aggression, French diplomacy behaved inconsistently at the talks. In

the final account, after some hesitations, on 21 August the French government instructed its representative to sign the Tripartite Military Convention.

At the same time, as French documents indicate, the French representatives in Warsaw tried to influence the Polish minister Beck, recommending that a way be found to agree to allowing Soviet troops to cross Polish territory, should war break out against the aggressor (referring to Germany) and that such an agreement be included in the convention.

The situation was reaching an impasse because of the views held by the then British leadership. The British representatives were denied permission to sign the convention. At the same time, as British documents now reveal, British diplomats continued their secret talks with the Hitlerites. The British diplomats indicated their lack of interest in securing a Polish agreement to the passage of Soviet forces.

Today many researchers write that the key to the success of the Moscow talks was largely in the hands of Warsaw. We question the veracity of this assumption, bearing in mind the lack of constructive positions held by England which, as our actual main Western partner in the talks, was clearly unwilling to reach an agreement. Nonetheless, during those dramatic days the Polish position was of great importance.

Some Polish historians criticize today Soviet scientists for their simplified approach to Polish policy. They write that in a number of Soviet works the importance of Polish-German relations in the second half of the 1930s are exaggerated. I believe such accusations warranted, and that we should provide a more accurate and more balanced assessment of Polish policies of that time. It is nonetheless a fact that during the decisive days Beck and his circle showed a lack of realism. Beck constantly referred to Pilsudski's behest, according to which in no case should the appearance of foreign soldiers on Polish territory be allowed. He also told the French ambassador to Warsaw that the Red Army had been weakened as a result of repressions against its command, for which reason one could not rely on it. All of this may be taken into consideration. However, let us recall that at that time there were dozens of German divisions already massed on the Polish border and that their attack could be expected any day.

Given those circumstances, Beck's reminiscences and his appeal to Pilsudski's testament appear not only unconvincing but also tragic in terms of Poland's destinies. It is possible that, in any case, no agreement would have been reached with Moscow. However, Polish intransigence during that dramatic period cannot be assessed other than as a manifestation of political nearsightedness.

As to the USSR, we are well familiar with the statements of the Soviet delegation to the talks, its readiness to sign a convention, and its main and mandatory requirement

of obtaining Polish and Romanian agreement to the free passage of Soviet forces. Unfortunately, so far we have no sufficient data which would provide a full picture of the way in which, during those August days, the Soviet leadership discussed the developing situation. Nor do we have the body of reports submitted by Soviet envoys to the European capitals. We believe that the syndrome of mistrust of Britain and France, after Munich, and the active contacts with Germany inevitably affected the Soviet position. Furthermore, it was known in Moscow that England was continuing its talks with Germany. It was equally unquestionable that Poland was unwilling to make concessions and compromises.

Nonetheless, we need a more profound and impartial analysis of the Soviet view and a clarification of what was done and what was lost at the August talks in the efforts to reach an agreement. After 20-22 August, the talks reached a dead-end and the possibility of an agreement was lost.

In connection with the Moscow talks, we are justified in mentioning a phenomenon in international relations, such as the idea of missed opportunities. Our foreign history experts have already begun to use this term. The conclusion is that during those worrisome August days the participants in the Moscow talks clearly underestimated the aggressive nature and striking power of fascism and ignored the mortal threat of fascism to all mankind.

Be that as it may, the talks proved futile and the Soviet Union faced the problem of making the right decision. Available data indicate that the war was literally on the threshold, Germany's attack of Poland had been predetermined and we were facing the direct threat that fascist Germany would emerge on the Soviet border not far from Minsk and that the Germans would seize the Baltic States. Reliance on the fact that Britain and France would truly act on the guarantees they had given Poland was quite problematical, as confirmed by subsequent events.

Nor should we ignore the fact that in the Far East there was the threat of militaristic Japan. In other words, the Soviet Union was facing a possible war on two fronts. As a result, Moscow accepted Germany's suggestion on Ribbentrop's visit. On 23 August, he signed with Molotov the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact. This treaty, dictated by the created situation, was to avoid the need for the USSR to go to war in 1939 and provided time for increasing the defense capability of the country (as to the use to which it was put, this is a different matter which requires a thorough study).

"It is said that the decision which was made by the Soviet Union to sign a nonaggression pact with Germany was not the best possible," M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the

Great October Revolution. "This is possible if we are governed not by strict reality but by speculative abstractions taken out of the context of their time."

In itself, the conclusion of the nonaggression pact was not something exceptional. An entire set of nonaggression treaties had been signed toward the end of the 1920s and during the 1930s. The latest had been agreements concluded between Britain and France and fascist Germany in September-December 1938. However, there is yet another aspect which links the treaty to the deformations which were inherent in the period of the cult of personality, with its scorn of the principles of morality inherent in Stalin and his circle. These factors influenced both the interpretation of the treaty and the actions of the Soviet government after its conclusion. It is precisely they that more than the treaty itself shocked world public opinion and, as in the past, remain an area of sharp discussions and criticism of the USSR.

The very day after the conclusion of the pact in the Kremlin, PRAVDA came out with words which pricked the ears of many people, on the end of hostility between the two countries. Yet another Soviet-German treaty was concluded on 28 September 1939, after the Germans seized Poland, the purpose of which was to demarcate the new border. Neglecting the fact that this treaty was being signed with fascist Germany, it was described as a "Friendship and Border Treaty."

Molotov's speeches to the Supreme Soviet condemned the British and French actions, which were described as aggressive because they were trying to suppress Hitlerite ideology by the force of arms. In his 31 October 1939 speech, Molotov said: "Our relations with Germany... have radically improved. In this area matters have developed along the line of strengthening friendly relations and developing practical cooperation and political support of Germany in its aspirations to peace." He also said: "We have always been of the opinion that a strong Germany is a necessary prerequisite for a lasting peace in Europe." One year later, on 1 August 1940, he officially stated that "the existing good neighborly and friendly Soviet-German relations are based not on accidental and circumstantial considerations but on the basic governmental interests of both the USSR and Germany." Such statements gave reasons to speak of relations between allies and the fact that the condemnation of fascism had disappeared from our propaganda even created the impression of an ideological conciliation with it. Furthermore, Molotov's statements contained illegal and insulting attacks on the Polish state. Subsequently, in the course of the war which Britain and France waged on Germany, and until the autumn of 1940, Stalin and Molotov praised the "great successes" achieved by the German armed forces.

Also allowed were biased assessments of the struggle which Britain waged against Hitlerite Germany. Such statements and actions confused world public opinion and placed the international communist movement in a difficult situation.

On the basis of a series of economic agreements signed with Nazi Germany, until the start of the Patriotic War the USSR supplied Germany with strategic and raw materials, constantly facing the fact that the Hitlerites were not meeting their own economic obligations toward our country.

Finally, mass repressions and violations of socialist legality continued inside the Soviet Union in 1939-1940, including those against the Polish population on the territory of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia and against the population of the Baltic States.

Such are the conflicting and complex circumstances related to the signing of the Soviet-German Pact of 23 August 1939 and the subsequent course of events. Unquestionably, the signing of the pact was a forced and a difficult decision and the result of the international developments of 1938-1939; at the same time it was paralleled by actions triggered by Stalin's deformation of socialism, also manifested in the area of foreign policy. Soviet historians must continue their profound studies of the prehistory of the pact and its nature and consequences and also make a thorough study of the documents which accompanied the treaty.

However, when Western historiography hurls today accusations at the USSR of having unleashed the war, we must most clearly say that it was precisely the British and French leaders who bear the heavy responsibility for their nearsighted policy of connivance with Germany and their attempts to reach an agreement with it behind the back and at the expense of the USSR. In the final account, such a policy undermined the possibility of establishing an anti-Hitlerite coalition toward the end of the 1930s and was largely responsible for the tragic consequences of 1939.

Mankind in an Extreme Situation

The entire problem of the prehistory of the war includes yet another exceptionally important aspect, which we already noted. In our view, one could approach this period, which was extreme in the history of the 20th century, on the basis of broader positions, asking oneself how, in general, should a political party and its leadership behave at a time when there is a threat to the fate of mankind. Should it find within itself the strength to rise above instant advantages and egotistical interests in order to realize the burden of responsibility to mankind and world civilization and, surmounting sharp disagreements among countries, find ways and means of achieving agreements and compromises.

By taking such an approach, we would be able to find new facets and new features in the actions of the different sides and their leaders on the eve of World War II and to understand the motivations of their behavior governed by the objective factors of international development, as well as their errors. Such an approach would

enable us to consider, with new strength and from a new angle, the experience of the prewar period and master this lesson-warning which the prehistory of World War II gives us.

This approach is very important today, when once again, this time on a qualitatively new and incomparably more threatening level, mankind finds itself in a crucial situation. Particularly pressing today is the question of a new thinking, of the ability to trust that governmental leaders and the world public as a whole will accomplish a breakthrough in interpreting the realities which have developed and to assert in international relations new principles and methods. The question of morality in foreign policy and international relations as well assumes great importance.

The concept formulated by our party of the priority of universal human values and interests at crucial stages in human history confirms that we are asserting a new climate and criteria in international affairs, based on concern for the interests of people and mankind as a whole, and on the task of the survival of the population on earth under the conditions of a nuclear threat.

A new light is also shed on the role of world public opinion in international relations. Major steps are being currently taken to unite people of different political and religious persuasions on an antinuclear and antiwar platform, and our aspirations toward the preservation of peace are coming closer to the ethical program of pacifism. It is thus that the narrow sectarian approach of the past is being surmounted.

Benefiting from the experience of universal history, including the lessons of the eve of the last war, should play an important role in the difficult and noble process of restructuring of international relations.

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Surmounting Obstruction

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[Survey prepared by V. Kremnev and V. Markov]

[Text] **Renovation and perestroyka: factors of acceleration and obstruction.** This was the topic of the joint roundtable meeting held by *KOMMUNIST*, journal of the CPSU Central Committee, and *NOWE DROGI*, journal of the PZPR Central Committee. The roundtable meeting was held in March 1988 at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

The following participated in the discussion: on the Polish side: L. Krasucki, deputy editor-in-chief of the journal *NOWE DROGI*; L. Gilejko, director of the Institute for the Study of Working Class Problems; M. Gulczinski, deputy director, Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of

the State and Law; J. Raciborski, department head, NOWE DROGI; M. Swencicki, general secretary of the Polish People's Republic Council of Ministers Consultative Economic Council; and M. Sisko, head of the Science, Education and Scientific and Technical Progress Department, PZPR Central Committee; on the Soviet side: S.V. Kolesnikov, deputy editor-in-chief of KOMMUNIST; N.I. Alekseyev, department head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology; A.G. Zdravomyslov, head of sector, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism; V.M. Kremnev, consultant, department of socialist countries, KOMMUNIST; V.S. Markov, KOMMUNIST political commentator; M.A. Muntyan, chief scientific associate, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences Institute for the Exchange of Experience in Building Socialism; R.I. Osipova, senior scientific associate at the same institute; B.S. Popov, head of the institute; B.M. Pugachev, deputy head of the institute; and V.Z. Rogovin, head of group at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology.

In opening the session, R.G. Yanovskiy, academy rector and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, noted that the friendship between our peoples and the interaction between the parties and, in particular, between our journals, are developing in a number of directions, in accordance with expanded political, economic, scientific and technical and cultural cooperation. Our age is characterized by the increasing depth, dynamism of change and scale and difficulty of the problems. It is perhaps necessary for us to reread the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics and to seek new approaches, new solutions to problems and new work methods. Today V.I. Lenin's thought that more common, more extensive and farther reaching views are needed twice as much, is particularly relevant.

Perestrojka and renovation require the further creative enrichment of revolutionary theory, for without solving the general problems, the specific problems which have accumulated to such an extent in all areas of life, not only in Soviet society but also in Poland and the other socialist countries, will not be solved.

Although unanimous on the main points, the participants in the discussion voiced their own understanding of the various aspects of the problems under discussion, disagreeing with some decisions suggested at the meeting or in the press. The businesslike and open discussion brought to light interesting points of view on problems of self-government and democratization, the correlation between social and economic efficiency, the social base of perestrojka and of its opponents, socialist pluralism and the party's leading role.

Reform and the Social Base of Inertia

In the socioeconomic area, the participants in the roundtable meeting noted, the obstruction mechanism is operating above all through the obsolete administrative-command economic management system, which appeared

under extreme circumstances. In circumstances marked by the tempestuous growth of the scientific and technical revolution, production intensification and quality changes in the role of the human factor in production, the contradiction between strict centralization and the drastic worsening of the national economy have intensified the need for greater enterprise autonomy.

Today, in the course of the radical economic reform, based on the resolutions of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, this contradiction is being resolved; the obstructing effect of obsolete economic management methods is being gradually eliminated. However, a number of elements of the command-administrative system still remain.

R. Osipova: I am concerned about the future of the economic reform.

The concept of the reform includes the need to eliminate the omnipotence of the administrative management system. However, the implementation of this task has been assigned to the sectors, and we should clearly not rely on the fact that they will abandon their command positions and become profoundly interested in granting self-management and autonomy to enterprises. It is rather the opposite that will happen. The units of the centralized administrative sectorial management will try to keep for themselves all command positions. This is also manifested in the practice of converting the enterprises to the new system, in which withholding rates are set by the ministries and state orders are actually turning into new mandatory assignments, while the Law on the State Enterprise is becoming cluttered with departmental regulations interpreting it in the interest of the department. The reform based on sectorial and departmental principles conflicts with the concepts on which it is based. In order to eliminate this contradiction, we need a complete conversion to partnership relations among enterprises and ministries, based on cost accounting.

L. Krasucki. The absence of an efficient economic mechanism distorted the party's leading role in economic life. Only yesterday the excessively centralized and mandatory system of management in this area had turned the party into a factor of constant direct interference in economic life and into a "superdirectorate" on all economic management levels, filling with administrative coercion the gap in the economic mechanisms and incentives. Today we are facing the task of converting to an indirect method of influencing economic life, based on autonomy, self-government and self-financing of enterprises, and the use of economic instruments which stimulate initiative and enterprise.

The party will influence the development of the economy through its concepts and representatives in the economic management centers; through its leading cadres, the party members working in the trade unions and

the agencies of worker self-government; and through the party organizations at enterprises, as centers of creative initiatives, which rally the labor collectives.

The course charted toward increased enterprise in the socialized, state and cooperative sectors, will be combined with the development of individual economic initiative wherever it may be useful to meet social requirements, and economically efficient where statism or cooperation make little sense and demand administrative backing.

N. Alekseyev: I do not agree with the idea that the party should guide the development of society indirectly, through the economic mechanism. Such an economic mechanism must be developed, attuned and activated. How can this be done indirectly? This can be done only directly, providing that the party, the state and the superior planning authorities and the scientific forces in the country undertake the purposeful and persistent formulation of such a system, with its comprehensive substantiation and consistent backing. As to the economic mechanism itself, it must be structured on the basis of the utilization of interests, in order for such interests to operate at full capacity. The present mechanism did not protect and is still not protecting our common interests, for enterprises submit material accounts to society on the use of such national assets to the extent to which they were used, and nothing else. However, withholdings for the development of society must be directly proportional to the size of the nationwide production assets used by the enterprise, i.e., the size of the production assets. Higher payments should be made for substantial assets and lesser payments for fewer assets.

M. Swencicki: The economic reform which is being carried out in Poland has three basic aspects: reform of the central planning system; extensive use of the market mechanism; self-government, independence and self-financing of enterprises.

The hierarchically centralized planning system will be totally eliminated. Central planning will be concentrated on strategic matters. Enterprises will be influenced through economic instruments: taxes, interest rates, the rate of exchange and customs fees and not issuing plans to enterprises. Because of adverse starting conditions, exceptions are contemplated, the purpose of which will be to meet the basic needs of the population and the national economy in the first stage of enterprise autonomy; they are so substantial that few opportunities will be left for the functioning of the market mechanism. The enterprises will be free to produce whatever they want but should this be inconsistent with the plans of the center, they will not be given the necessary resources.

Five years of reform have proved that a second stage in the reform is needed. After the 10th PZPR Congress, a packet of 170 measures was prepared for 1988-1990. Time will show whether they are adequate in terms of

achieving an upturn in the economy. As of now, however, it is clear that the reform is being made more difficult by the condition of the national economy, inherited from the mandatory-distribution system, the lack of resolution of a number of conceptual problems, and threats to the interests of different social and professional groups.

S. Kolesnikov: What is hindering perestroika, and what are the forces opposing change? A great variety of answers are being provided to this question. Until very recently, in analyzing the sources of opposition to perestroika, the emphasis was above all on subjective factors. Today we are trying to go deeper, to study the reasons related to the nature of social relations and economic, social and political structures.

Naturally, the obstruction mechanism brings together heterogeneous and different phenomena which express extremes of conservatism as well as unrestrained vanguardism. Both forms have essentially common roots: command-administrative management methods. However, whereas the aspiration simply to preserve the already existing system predominates among the critics of perestroika on the right, the supporters of "revolutionary" phraseology call for skipping stages, shaking up cadres, and so on. As a result, this "extreme-perestroika" phraseology and extremist actions objectively turn out to be factors which slow down social development.

If we try to give the obstruction mechanism any whatsoever specific definition, we could say that it is a set of political, ideological, organizational and sociopsychological factors which are based on obsolete social and political mechanisms, underdevelopment of democratic forms, psychological inertia and dogmatic concepts about socialism, which have sunk roots into the minds of some people.

However, does the obstruction mechanism, which dons different clothing, have a single social base? A great variety of socioeconomic and ideological forces, representing disparate interests, coexist, interact and even clash in a developing, a dynamic society. This, however, is not a reflection of the antagonistic confrontation of hostile sides with opposite class interests. Seeing the real processes of interaction among different social groups and taking into consideration their real interests, including economic ones, it would be nonetheless erroneous automatically to apply to our social structure the familiar Leninist criterion of defining classes (by their attitude toward the means of production, role in the social organization of labor, and means of obtaining and amount of consumable share of the public wealth). Otherwise we could "detect" in socialist society a new "class" of bureaucrats, of "managers," and so on and launch something in the nature of a "class struggle." Such a literal understanding of the class approach to present problems can cause nothing other than political and ideological costs.

Clearly, we cannot classify all obstruction factors into one or several social groups. Actually, they include the social institutions which appeared under the specific conditions of the activities of the administrative-command system, and people who were raised and molded under specific social circumstances. A worker corrupted by the practice of figure padding, who has become accustomed, year after year, to earning undeserved wages, a manager who can see the immediate possibility of losing his position as a result of perestrojka and a scientist, who keeps repeating the same thing over and over again, may equally and objectively contribute to obstruction.

L. Krasucki: As a whole, I support the viewpoint expressed here on the social base of inertia. We must take into consideration the appearance and even intensification of contradictions between the supporters and opponents of the reform, and between an orientation toward innovative solutions and preservation of old stereotypes. Such contradictions function regardless of social differences. They develop not only parallel but also tangentially to the main line of political "watersheds." Increased requirements related to changes in all areas do not suite everyone: some people prefer to retain what is, to live and work under the conditions of stability and tradition instead of being put to a strict investigation by the new mechanisms and risk to lose what they already have.

The obstructing influence of active, albeit substantially weakened, antisocialist forces remains strong. The party is waging against them a struggle on the basis of strengthening reform and harmony. The more renovated socialism becomes the less scope there is for its opponents. Such is the dialectics of renovation: accord and struggle.

M. Gulczinski: The resolve of all social forces, greater than ever before, to promote changes which would allow us to surmount the bad tradition of recurring Polish crises and conflicts, is the main factor in the reform. Whereas in 1956 and 1970 the aspiration to be satisfied with replacing the leadership predominated in society, today there is need for profound changes in the nature of the system.

Feelings in favor of reform are clearly dominant. According to public opinion surveys, in the mid-1980s 53 percent of those surveyed noted the possibility and necessity of improving our political system through reform, whereas 24 percent considered that this system needed no renovation and 6 percent called for its total change.

M. Swencicki: The state apparatus is usually classified with the groups opposing reform. There is a certain amount of truth in that. The conservatism of part of the state apparatus is creating obstructions. However, it would be a major omission to ignore other social forces and mechanisms which complicate the reform. In general, the social majority and, particularly, the young and

the better educated residents of large cities support the plans for radical reform. Nonetheless, the more extensive use of the market mechanism, while accelerating the country's economic development, will necessitate various "local outlays." The introduction of balancing prices for consumer goods, and the closing down of the so-called "miners" stores (in which the sale of goods in short supplies is based on "miners" certificates) would mean that some customers who have enjoyed certain privileges will be denied access to various goods in short supply.

The distribution of raw and other materials among enterprises follows a similar pattern. In introducing balancing prices, the economically weak enterprises will be forced to change their technology and specialization, to lay off unnecessary workers or, in general, to close down (other examples could be cited as well). This triggers opposition and the desire of some strata and collectives to "leave everything as is."

L. Gilejko: Naturally, there are groups in our society which have a negative attitude toward the economic reform and are even trying to revive compromised solutions. There also are those which, while supporting the economic reform, oppose the development of democracy. However, the ratios of reforms supporters and opponents vary among the individual social groups. There are more opponents in the various units of the power system, particularly those which will be radically changed or closed down. Surveys of different centers indicate that directors of enterprises react to the reform differently. The view of the leading aktiv of voyevodstvo party committees is also quite differentiated, particularly in matters related to politics. For example, a strong opposition to the principle of partnership in relations among the party, the trade unions and worker self-government may be noted. The surveys conducted in 1985 by the PZPR Academy of Social Sciences Institute for the Study of the Working Class indicate that more than 47 percent of the workers are in favor of the reform. Let me add that 95.2 percent of the surveyed workers rejected the view that the current reform is a "misunderstanding and should be abandoned quickly."

Another essential feature is that most of the respondents disagreed with the stipulation that "the reform cannot succeed for the authorities are not truly interested in implementing it" (91.1 percent of those surveyed). However, 38 percent of the workers agreed that "whether the enterprise is autonomous or is managed by a ministry is not important.... What matters is for the people to have money and for goods to be available in the stores."

Therefore, if it is true that the classification into proponents and opponents of the reform is one of the most essential in Polish society, this applies to the working class as well. What is important also is that the working class as a whole favors it. The different attitudes toward

the reform make it a compromise between the "technocratic" and the social options. This is a prerequisite for support of the reform by the majority of the workers.

A. Zdravomyslov: The viewpoint has been expressed in our literature (by G.S. Lisichkin) that in addition to the apparat, opponents of perestrojka are unskilled workers. We can agree with this. The phenomenon of stagnation in Soviet society is related to psychological equalization, which is inherent in that stratum, and which has led to an inflation of the consumer "stratum" and to a consumerist mentality. This is the social base of the obstruction processes, which is still extant.

Many of the speakers emphasized the negative, not to use a stronger word, role of equalization.

S. Kolesnikov: The stereotypes of dependency and equalization prejudices have been instilled in economic practices and in the awareness of the people all too long. Now they must, in the full meaning of the term, be "scraped off" wherever they are still to be found. We must surmount equalization approaches and the equalization mentality, which dampens the initiative of working people and deprives society of development incentives. Actually, nor should we forget those who would like to reduce the justice of socialism only to the ruble, rejecting the principles of social equality (which are by no means identical with equalization).

L. Krasucki: We are trying to establish a firm link between economic efficiency and the targets of social policy. Above all, we have declared war on equalization which, as a consequence, leads to the equal distribution of poverty; the task has been set of strengthening ties between labor contribution and income. In a number of cases highly skilled labor and work which demands considerable outlays of thought and energy are paid less than simple work of average quality.

V. Rogovin: I consider as myths the equalitarianism of the Stalinist and stagnation periods and the fact that unskilled workers, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the working people, backed Stalin and his system. In fact, Stalin deliberately concentrated the entire power in his hands but set up privileged groups, which included not only the higher bureaucratic strata but some few strata of workers and kolkhoz members. All of this was supported by a certain ideology which bore the mark of Stalin's hypocrisy.

If we speak of the mechanisms of obstruction and acceleration, we must bear in mind that their roots should be sought in the confrontation between real social interests and values. To this day we have a sharp confrontation between socialist social values and values which are of a clearly nonsocialist nature.

Human needs include not only material values but a number of needs of a higher order, above all the mass need for work worthy of man. The historical mission of

socialism is to eliminate the age-old division of society into those engaged in labor which develops man as an individual and offers tangible advantages in consumption, and those who engage in stupefying labor and, furthermore, are harmed in terms of consumption.

Democratization Versus Obstruction

The policy of the ruling parties and the state in the Soviet Union and Poland must be "blamed" for the fact that the opponents of perestrojka have no specific social base, a policy which is based on the transition from the subordination of interests to their coordination and from coercion to persuasion and, in some cases, even to compromise. This would have been impossible without acknowledging the natural variety and contradictory nature of the interests of the various socioprofessional groups and within such groups. However, merely acknowledging this is insufficient; the acknowledgment demands a firm structural-institutional support, a broad process of democratization, including self-government, to which the Polish comrades, who have greater experience, not exclusively positive, in organizing self-government, paid great attention.

L. Krasucki: The democratization of our political system means broadening, on the basis of socialist principles, the possibility of expressing and coordinating a variety of interests, positions and views. It means the application of political methods of management: dialogue, persuasion, gaining supporters and winning over the majority in support of decisions considered accurate.

In order to eliminate formalism, ostentation and bureaucratic distortions on many levels of socialist democracy and ensure the real participation of the masses in the exercise of power, the PZPR deems necessary to surmount formalism and ostentation in its own life and work. The emphasis is on the growth of internal party democracy, for the essence of the period we are surmounting has been that of exaggerated centralism. This means broadening the area of discussions, providing that the different viewpoints and approaches are not converted into harmful factional activities. It is a question of socialist pluralism of views and positions.

We believe that the parties must develop relations typical not of a centralized and hierarchic institution but a political movement which, precisely as a movement, can achieve conscious unity within its ranks.

What happened in the past was that demand for profound reforms were heard within the party but were suppressed by the leadership, brimming with imaginary complacency, suffering from the "complex of infallibility," and thinking in terms of yesterday's categories, which triggered the sharp objection of the working people. Under the conditions of democratization, development of glasnost and socialist pluralism, this becomes impossible. Our party knows from its own experience that unless today it does not eliminate halfway measures

and indecisiveness in socialist renovation, tomorrow we would have to pay for this in our economy and politics and with a worsening of prospects and of Poland's international positions.

The turn which was taken by the CPSU in the spring of 1985 to a policy of glasnost, perestroyka and new thinking is creating in both our countries historical opportunities for success of ideologically similar processes of change. As it changes itself, gradually, although with some difficulty, the PZPR is becoming the true vanguard of renovation in socialist Poland.

M. Gulczynski: We in Poland have realized, but only after some trials—economic crises and political conflicts—that their grounds are the obvious nonfunctional nature of the old methods of economic management and exercise of power. Social management was dominated by autocratic-bureaucratic arbitrariness (too much depended on managers and too little on democratic institutions and principles); irresponsibility in social affairs spread; and social contradictions accumulated, manifested in spontaneous political conflicts.

It is noteworthy that in the 1980s more was said and written about economic reform than about reform in the political system. However, perhaps even more has been done in this last area: the activities of existing institutions (particularly the Sejm and the allied parties), some of which have been substantially updated and become energized (the Patriotic Movement for National Revival, the new trade unions, a qualitatively new worker self-government); the political system was enriched with institutions such as the State Court, the Constitutional Court, nationwide discussions and referenda, the Social Consultative Council under the Chairman of the State Council, the Socioeconomic Council of the Sejm, and other consultative authorities; profound changes were made in the administrative procedure code, the law on censorship and the principles governing cadre policy.

Consideration of the differentiations within society and its multiplicity of subjects have been the foundations for the modifications made in the Polish political system. We favor socialist pluralism and oppose the standardization through administrative methods of views and forms of political activity. Administrative standardization led to suppressing initiative and activeness which, in terms of their nature, are quite differentiated. Consequently, the creation of economic and political opportunities for the manifestation of the multiplicity of subjects within our society is a prerequisite for further socialist progress.

The habit of decreeing from above what one should think, say and do and blocking the expression of social aspirations are being surmounted by restoring the "civil rights" of conflicting interests, for the expression of interests and views was blocked when they differed from the interests and views of the administrative-bureaucratic centers.

Unquestionably, a necessary prerequisite is that of glasnost in public life: surmounting barriers blocking information. Glasnost favors the expression and comparison among different opinions and views and the formulation and expression of the interests of social groups. The indicators of progress are, above all, increased freedom of speech and extent of information about social affairs, including public opinion (the new law on censorship makes it mandatory to substantiate the banning of publications and stipulates the possibility of appealing such bans to the Supreme Administrative Court).

An unusually important innovation is that of public opinion surveys on essential problems and the publication of their results. Glasnost must become a firm element of the democratic socialist system, needed in order to bring to light the multiple subjects, the pluralism of our society in the elaboration of social agreements and public control over the authorities and, finally, for the self-knowledge of society.

J. Raciborski: The concept of socialist pluralism as a standard is very important to the future model of the functioning of the state. This pluralism must reflect the natural differentiation within Polish society in the area of awareness and material interests. However, this does not pertain to a bourgeois type of pluralism. It presumes not the "free play" of political forces but a mechanism of agreement, dialogue and joint formulation and implementation of optimal concepts. The democratization of national accord, as this formula is usually described in Poland, means the existence, alongside the PZPR, of other "first-class" political subjects. As a preliminary condition they must acknowledge the leading role of the PZPR and the fundamental principles of the system. However, there remains a wide field of discussion concerning the program, means of administration and achieving set objectives.

B. Pugachev: The practice of building socialism clearly confirmed the Leninist idea that the working people themselves alone can act as the full masters in all areas of life in socialist society. The timely realization of this idea presumes the development of a variety of forms of socialist self-management, awakening the true political activeness of the masses and waging a principled and uncompromising struggle against all forms of alienation of the working people from the system and against any efforts on the part of social groups and strata to assume the prerogatives of exercising such power from the position of group or narrow self-seeking interests. The democratization of socialist society presumes the awakening of a variety of social initiatives and the struggle against "prohibitions" and bureaucratic alienation.

The contemporary model of socialism can retain and strengthen its attractiveness only as a model of a profoundly democratic society, widely open to any progressive idea. Today such an openness in society is directly related to the idea of socialist pluralism, which presumes the free discussion of all vitally important problems in

building socialism and the free comparison and clash among different viewpoints and the work of various social organizations, based on constitutional-democratic socialist principles.

L. Gilejko: The most important purpose of the economic reform is the creation of better opportunities for the main subject of economic management, the enterprise. This means autonomy, self-government and self-financing. A close connection exists among these principles governing the functioning of an enterprise. As the Polish experience shows, self-management is the most important among them. The present reform is a third attempt since 1956 at reorganizing the economy and management. The implementation of the second stage of the reform will replace the subordination of the interests of subjects of economic management to their coordination. Vertical relations will yield their leading significance in favor of horizontal relations. Cooperation among enterprises will become their own affair, not based on the initiatives of the center. In self-management their relations with the state authorities will increasingly become relations among partners. However, the self-management of enterprises and worker self-management are not one and the same. We must point out that there is a steady orientation of the workers toward self-management. At the same time, however, surveys indicate that only 25 percent of respondents are ready to participate in self-management work. A much larger number are those who justify their lack of readiness with references to excessive fatigue; remaining economic difficulties reinforce such moods. Unwillingness to participate in social activities is a major threat to self-management, for its authorities, deprived of an active social base, could become appendages to management, in which many directors are interested.

J. Raciborski: In a socialist society involving the masses in management is much more important compared to classical bourgeois democracies, where elections play the main role. It is difficult to imagine any other way of socialization of the system and elimination of political alienation. However, a typical "closed circle" situation is created. The masses are in no hurry to participate in the exercise of power, for the institutions through which they would exercise it have become bureaucratized and are inefficient. On the other hand, such institutions are inefficient precisely because they have a small number of active members within the masses and no social pressure on such institutions exists.

M. Swencicki: One of the tasks of the reform is to strengthen worker self-management. Only this can provide labor collectives with the full feeling of being the masters of their enterprise. A self-governed enterprise depends incomparably more on market forces, compared to an enterprise managed by the state.

Despite the apparent obvious advantages of enterprise self-government, we cannot consider that all conceptual problems related to the functioning of the national

economy on this basis have been solved. Neither the Yugoslav nor the Polish example provides a clear answer to the question of the efficiency of a self-managing enterprise.

Doubts remain to the effect that in self-managed enterprises, first of all, forces will appear which would be quite interested in improving the efficiency of jobs and wages, discipline and responsibility. Second, the innovative ability of enterprises and the entire national economy will not abate; third, self-managed enterprises will be interested in opening new enterprises and, consequently, the strictly self-management model will not threaten the national economy with a consolidation of the existing economic structure.

The idea of self-management is one of the greatest humanistic ideas introduced by socialist ideology. In practice, for many years it was underestimated and its implementation was either hindered or directly excluded. Today as well, however, there is no guarantee that worker self-management will be optimal from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, compared with private enterprises. For that reason a variety of steps are being taken to limit self-management in order to strengthen the orientation of enterprises toward efficiency. Obviously, the outstanding Hungarian economist Janos Kornai is right by describing as an illusion the ability of socialism to ensure both high efficiency of economic management and other values of socialist ideology. In practice we are fated to choose between different values and engage in difficult attempts at ensuring their optimal combination.

V. Kremnev: It is very important that we have been able, both in theory and in politics, to define the main link, the pivot of the obstruction mechanism: administrative-bureaucratic centralism. Consequently, the method of fighting this phenomenon is also clear in its general outline: democratization, development of self-governing principles. This precisely means the pluralizing of social life and its acceptance. Actually, pluralism is the foundation of democracy. Pluralism in views, interests and forms of organization of human activities has always existed despite the opposition to this term. Democracy appears on its basis if the objective variety of interests and views is not only tolerable but also officially recognized and if the right of conflicting interests to exist and struggle for their existence on the basis of legality and the Constitution has been legitimized.

Occasionally pluralism is mentioned within the framework of Marxism. However, there is the threat here of the appearance of several Marxisms, with the claim that this is better, for pluralism would include non-Marxist views which, incidentally, would help Marxism to retain its own nature. Here the term "socialist pluralism" has been repeatedly mentioned. This term has its specific connotation (different views on socialism and means of building it), as does "bourgeois pluralism" (the existence

of several bourgeois parties provides grounds for claiming it). The two concepts, however, are limited versions of the more general concept of "pluralism." Its opposite is not socialist or bourgeois pluralism but monism, uniformity, that same standardization which is so much liked by the administrative-bureaucratic management system. Within socialist society there is pluralism of socialist and nonsocialist—religious—views, as well as outlooks, interests and behavior which are condemned both by socialism and religion. Marxists and communists must be concerned with the fact that in pluralism the determining role is that of the communist outlook but as a result of a natural rather than an administrative, a coerced choice.

N. Alekseyev: Self-government by the labor collective and democracy are possible only when the collective has been given the real right to manage its labor income after subtracting that which goes to meet the needs of society. If, as in the past, the Gosplan remains in charge of such income, the so-called self-government which we are praising today would be that same old blabbing practiced by permanent production conferences, trade union committees, etc. Within a very short time the working class would reject such self-government, for it is useless and not serious. Adults cannot engage play too long children's games without discrediting themselves.

A. Zdravomyslov: The most essential component of the obstruction mechanism is the bureaucratization of managerial activities. Like any society, socialism cannot exist without management. However, bureaucratization is the type of process in which the results of management activities become increasingly separated from their targets. We wish to clarify a problem and end up by confusing it totally. We organize our information process in such a way that it turns into disinformation. We start some project which may seem quite useful and important but the result is harmful: the work is not done and the people engaged in doing it become corrupted. We wish to enhance interest in the work but apply a system of steps which lowers such interest. This is the phenomenon of bureaucratism, the essence of which lies in the implementation of processes which are the opposite of the necessary direction to be followed.

What is the result of all this? First of all, because of the splintering of administrative functions, the overall purpose of the activity is lost. Second, as a result of the need to coordinate a number of disparate functions, decisions are made with great delays. The process of bureaucratization further develops... into a corrupt administrative apparatus if it is not opposed by democratic forms of control and renovation of cadres.

The "pure" bureaucrat is guided by honest objectives. He is an honest person. As to corruption, it is the moral-political corruption of cadres based on bureaucratization. Our bureaucratism is an original historical phenomenon and, in my view, should not be identified with the bureaucratism opposed by Saltykov-Shchedrin

or any other Western-model bureaucratism. The peculiarity of Soviet bureaucracy is that it is ideologized and does not have any clearly manifested economic roots. It conceals its status behind the idea of national interests. Hence the need to struggle against it not on the basis of the old dogmatic ideology but of the new way of thinking.

Toward a Renovation of the Concept of Socialism

M. Muntyan: The formulation of theoretical models of socialism, based on the democratization of all areas of social life, is a common aspect of the programmatic documents of many fraternal parties in the socialist countries. Democracy is both a target and an effective means of accelerating renovation processes in society. Although in principle democracy can never be more than required, real, working democracy is closely related to the cultural and economic standard of development of society and its democratic traditions. A certain cultural backwardness which existed in the past in most countries which had taken the path of socialism should not be ignored to this day in analyzing the state of democracy in the socialist world. That is why it seems to me somewhat artificial to deny the links between the Soviet bureaucrat and the characters in Shchedrin's satire.

The democratization of all aspects of life of socialist society is an internally contradictory process. The contemporary level of development of socialism urgently requires efficient, competent professional management. However, it also requires the involvement of the broadest possible toiling masses in the formulation and adoption and not strictly implementation of managerial decisions. The meaning of self-government and democratization is to secure for the toiling masses the "control packet" of power functions. Only thus could socialist society be protected from the activities of bureaucratic or technocratic "nurses" who, under the pretext of the growing professionalization of management of all aspects of social life could, as in the past, once again try to "protect" the people from the burden of managing governmental affairs.

At times of aggravation of circumstances in the socialist countries, in the presence of sociopolitical crises or crisis phenomena, the constitutional mechanisms of the expression of the will of the people were obviously not functional. They had been created, they exist but remain unused. The political system of contemporary socialist society needs major restructuring. However, let us emphasize the special role of the level reached by the political standard of society. For the time being, in the Soviet Union in any case, it adversely affects the implementation of even the democratic possibilities which are inherent in the existing socialist institutional system. The high political standard of society guarantees the irreversibility of the processes of democratization and renovation of socialism which our collective system so

greatly needs. It will lead to the appearance of a mechanism of constant change and the perestroika of socialism. However, successes in the development of political standards and in acquiring the durable habits of democratic community life cannot be the instant results of any series of actions or steps. This is a difficult and lengthy process.

M. Gulczynski: The previous distortions can be surmounted not only as a result of their critical exposure but also the subsequent development of legality. Unquestionably, legality is a necessary need for each truly democratic system, particularly under the conditions of the enhancement of conflicting interests and views and their coordination processes. The intensification of political processes inherent in democracy requires a respective growth of political standards. It is based on law and legality. Without it conflicts would intensify and the chaotic and merciless struggle among individuals and groups struggling for their interests would increase. This would trigger the social need for despotic rule with a "firm hand." This helps us to understand the significance of the creation and development of a socialist state of law. The lack of ability and skills needed for comprehensive participation in the exercise of power is a major limitation. The Poles have traditionally had greater sympathy for democracy than the possibility of mastering it, both in terms of freedom and self-discipline. For that reason, the broadening of democracy must be combined with comprehensive practical education and instruction of citizens and power centers.

S. Kolesnikov: An obstruction factor, such as the insufficient organization and low standard of labor and community life, is manifested in economic and other areas of social life. The characteristic features of the way to socialism followed by our country and changes in the historical order of development which Lenin mentioned in his last works (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, pp 379, 381) are manifested. A great deal has changed since then. However, democratic forms of activities by the masses have still not become part of the standards, way of life and habits. Nor could they, because of various forms of political alienation. There virtually are no habits or standards of political life. This particularly influences the behavior of young people, who usually lean in the direction of maximalism. However, among the other population groups as well the rising level of social activeness frequently falls behind the level of social responsibility; many people consider democratization as the opportunity for increasing their demands to the state, the trade union and the collective, but not to themselves. The need for autonomous and social activeness, previously fettered by ritualistic forms, still lacks adequate forms of expression. That is the reason for the various excesses such as, for example, strikes which bring the strikers themselves, not to mention society, more harm than good.

V. Markov: The slowdown of socioeconomic development during the period of stagnation indicated the growing lack of satisfaction of the interests of significant

masses of working people. Consequently, it indicated that the inner contradictions within the social organism were either ignored or solved improperly. It is time to surmount the scorn for dialectical materialism in the theoretical study of socialism and the attitude toward contradictions as something which "pollutes" socialism, for which reason the concept of "contradiction" itself is usually used alongside concepts such as "difficulties," "shortcomings," and "negative phenomena."

Very important to us is the study of contradictions between production and consumption: to begin with, these are decisive areas affecting the entire social reproduction process; second, here mass interests are manifested most directly; third, the sharp changes which are taking place in both areas have drawn such close attention on the part of our public that one could detect behind theoretical arguments the clash among qualitatively different mass interests and, consequently, judge more clearly of their structure and social influence.

The historical experience of socialism has already proved adequately, in our view, that one of the main forms of manifestation of contradictions between production and consumption is the need to meet two conflicting requirements: on the one hand, to make the economy maximally efficient; on the other, under the given circumstances to ensure the maximally highest standard of social justice. In this case no distortions are admissible. That explains the great need for high governmental wisdom and strict science, for it is a question not simply of the allocation of investments or distribution of the portions of the national income, but also a coordination of the interests of different population groups and ensuring the type of consumption structure which would exclude the appearance of "social outsiders" and, at the same time, would increase incentives for economic development.

M. Sisko: There is a widespread conviction that the study of social phenomena and processes cannot catch up with the development of events, that there are no theoretical summations consistent with the contemporary age and that those which do exist are not efficient practical instruments.

Such assessments trigger understandable concern and make us think of the reasons for today's adverse phenomena in science and how to surmount them. Social science was governed by strict conditions which allowed it to perform primarily the functions assigned to it by the administrative system. It was asked, above all, to provide a theoretical interpretation and justification of current affairs. The result was the domination, and not in Poland alone, of apologetics, which pushed aside criticism and innovation. Hence the lack of "intellectual modernization" of Marxism in Poland.

The demand is now formulated to strengthen the positions of the social sciences in two areas: to avoid the uncritical approval and substantiation of narrowly pragmatic objectives and tasks in the area of politics and to

eliminate the established belief that science (including the science of Marxism-Leninism) is a treasury of permanent and unquestionable truths which become converted straight into directives. We have long been familiar with the factors which assist the process of obtaining innovative scientific research results (creative freedom, competitiveness, glasnost in scientific life and selection of scientific talents). However, these science-stimulating factors had not been used.

As in the past, the need to ascribe a dynamism to the cognitive functions of Marxism-Leninism and to strengthen Marxist-Leninist methodology is a radical problem in the development of Polish social thinking. The substantial presence of non-Marxist scientific research orientations is triggering a kind of competition among ideas. The Marxists must be well prepared for dialogue and polemics. Support in terms of administrative measures which the authorities could give them does not always yield the desired effect, although they too should be used if our opponents engage, under the guise of conducting a scientific discussion, in pursuing a policy aimed against the system.

The role of the social sciences in Poland and in other countries depends on the speed with which we can create an integral theory of the socialist society. Many of its elements still need further refinement and interpretation. For example, we must determine what has contemporary socialism inherited from the capitalist system and why, and if ideologically pure models of future socialism are possible and what would be their practical meaning?

N. Alekseyev: I deem unproductive the approach expressed earlier to defining the obstruction mechanism, bearing in mind that it is obvious to all of us. The obstruction mechanism is, above all, a durable widespread concept of socialism, instilled in the minds of a very large number of people: a centralized, planned, state socialism which we professed for a long time, without questioning its scientific nature and substantiation. To this day, this concept dominates us, our society and our party.

The other aspect of the obstruction mechanism is the underdeveloped nature of problems of our further development and the groundlessness and lack of proof of many seemingly constructive proposals. In our country, as in the other socialist countries, there have been endless debates, going on for decades, of the possibility of using profits, the price mechanism, commodity-monetary relations and the market.

Who is to be blamed for the fact that such discussions are not brought to their logical conclusion? Responsible for this, above all, are the higher party and state echelons, which rarely make theoretical summations based on practice and which develop the new concept for the further development of socialist society with insufficient daring and consistency.

We have wasted a great deal of time. During the period of stagnation as well accurate ideas were expressed but without any serious substantiation. Today we have set ourselves the task of developing an integral concept of perestroika and advancement of our society and, above all, of its foundations, its economic base.

In general, such an integral concept was scientifically, and quite fully and profoundly formulated at the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Nonetheless, substantial parts of it remain undeveloped and it is not being consistently applied.

The principal merit of this concept is that it is based on management with and through the interests of social groups, labor collectives and the population. So far, the higher planning and management echelons in our national economy have applied the technocratic approach, a technocratic way of thinking.

B. Pugachev: We are faced with broad tasks of studying the practice and developing the theory of contemporary socialism. We need a breakthrough in our knowledge, to a new level of theoretical summations of acquired experience. This is impossible without the ideological interaction among the social sciences in the socialist countries. Today ideological and theoretical cooperation among scientists cannot take place without an open discussion of contradictions in the socialist world, debates, and "confrontations" among different schools and trends within the framework of overall Marxist-Leninist theory. In this connection, the patient comradely comparison among different viewpoints, consideration of the ideological specifics of each country and the unquestionable and decisive rejection of having a monopoly on truth in ideological debates and readiness to listen to the opinion and arguments of the other side are important in this case.

M. Swencicki: Let me say a few words on the insufficiently scientific nature of the approach to reform. The course of the economic reform in Poland teaches us if not humility at least patience. In 1981 the optimists imagined that the reform could be completed within a single year, while the pessimists gave it 2 to 3 years; 7 years of practical experience have indicated that the task of reorganizing the national economy, not to mention the entire society, turned out to be inordinately difficult from the political, economic and social viewpoints. This also includes ideological problems which may simply be impossible to solve.

The participants in the discussion of this extensive and complex topic of the renovation of socialism reached the conclusion that reorganization in the economy, politics and ideology, in all areas of social life and the structure and principles of the functioning of the social system can lead to a true acceleration of progress only when this process is based on freeing man's social activeness. Without independence and interest on the part of the people their social responsibility cannot be enhanced and the true

socialization of the individual is virtually impossible. Consequently, the leading aspects of perestroika and of surmounting the obstruction mechanism are comprehensive democratization and expansion of glasnost. The main thing is not to deviate from this path, which proved to be much more difficult than it seemed and, to this day, still seems to be such to many people who have taken it.

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Pugwash-88

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[Article by A. Antipov]

[Text] The Pugwash Movement has held 38 conferences. On 38 occasions, starting with 1957, most prestigious scientists the world over have met, in a rather small circle, to discuss confidentially the gravest problems caused by the arms race, so that, applying a strictly scientific analysis, they could find possible ways of preserving peace on earth and learning how to think in a new way, as called upon in their manifesto, which became a programmatic document of the movement, by Bertrand Russel and Albert Einstein.

This is the third time that the conference has been held in the Soviet Union. This conference was distinguished by its unusually broad representative nature: more than 200 participants from 41 countries came to us. This proves not only the strengthening of the movement itself but also the tremendous interest in the USSR, triggered by the processes of renovation of social life in our country. Although the meetings of the work groups were traditionally held behind closed doors, there were a number of journalists, including four television units. Contacts with the Pugwash members, participation in plenary sessions and press conferences provided rich food for thought.

"Is it a secret society or a generator of new ideas?" This loudly asked question on the cover of one of the publications about the Pugwash Movement drew the attention of the participants in the conference. But can a secret society generate socially significant ideas? Pugwash has provided a great deal of impetus to the progressive development of the political process. Suffice it to list the treaties on banning nuclear tests in the three media (1963), and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (1968), the convention on banning bacteriological weapons (1972) and the most important ABM (1972), SALT-1 (1972) and SALT-2 (1979) Treaties. However, life goes forth and social life is changing faster than ever. Increasingly the masses are joining in the formulation of policy. Thoughts were expressed at the conference on the need to make the movement more open, to disseminate the Pugwash conclusions more broadly and to involve more actively into the movement new forces, the scientific youth above all. However, this should not be done to the

detriment of traditions developed in the course of 30 years, which make it possible to preserve the informal nature of the movement and the highest possible competence of its participants—natural and social scientists—and to ensure democratic means for the formulation of recommendations, based on the interdisciplinary and comprehensive study of situations arising in the world.

What problems hold today the center of the Pugwash attention? They include, above all, a search for ways leading to a nuclear-free world. As long as the arsenals will stockpile nuclear weapons the threat of their spreading to the as yet nonnuclear countries and of their unsanctioned use will remain. This means reaching agreements on the total end of nuclear tests and the prevention of the militarization of space, changes in military doctrines and formulation of concepts of adequate defense.

The problem of verification of the implementation of agreements is becoming increasingly significant. Its technical aspect is clearly manifested. However, the solution of its technical aspects will have far reaching military and political consequences, for extensive control will yield accurate knowledge not only concerning the size or potential of a given type of armament but also the very system for its existence, nature of deployment, state of readiness, and so on. In turn, this will contribute to promoting reciprocal trust and understanding, which are in very short supply in today's world.

The 38th Conference decisive included in the range of problems analyzed by the movement those of environmental protection and the struggle against economic backwardness, poverty and hunger. The threat of an ecological crisis is becoming no less dangerous to civilization than that of the use of nuclear weapons.

Ecology, energy, economics... The problems which stand behind these concepts have become closely interwoven, and it is no accident that they have been described as global. They are manifested everywhere, regardless of the level of development reached by a country or its social system. The reliable solution of any one of them is impossible through the efforts of a single area, country or nation. Furthermore, their isolated study is impossible, for if we undertake the study of one of them we inevitably come to the second and the third, and inevitably include in our study a number of mechanisms of social development and the interests of the entire civilized community and, in the final account, every individual. These are truly global problems!

But are they adequately viewed as global? Is mankind ready, as a single person, to undertake their solution? In other words, have the masses been conquered by the idea of having an integral, an interdependent world? We have come close to this but a great deal of work remains to be done before every person on earth comes to realize the need to solve global problems as being a topical task for

himself, his nation and mankind as a whole, and sees in the solution of such problems a prerequisite for his own well-being and that of his descendants, and calls for practical action on the part of those to whom he has entrusted the management of society.

Let us illustrate this with a few examples and thoughts inspired by the conference.

And so, the energy. There is a direct correlation between the standard of civilized life and the availability of energy: the gross national product, computed per capita and per year, as a rule, is higher the greater is, in one country or another, the consumption of energy, again per capita. In the United States annual power consumption per capita is about 10 kilovolts. In our country it is lower by a factor of 2 or 3. Currently the efforts of the developed countries are aimed at reducing the power-intensiveness of the economy and conserving energy, and impressive successes have been achieved in this area. However, in many developing countries the need for energy consumption per capita is lower by hundreds of times compared to the developed countries. Here as well the way to surmounting hunger, poverty and disease passes, one way or another, through the development of new power sources, so that in the next century it may reach a level acceptable from the viewpoint of civilized life.

However, new itineraries have to be found as we advance toward that standard: inevitably, the old ones will lead to ecological and economic dead ends. Actually, only 20 or 30 years ago the power industry was based on burning organic fuel—petroleum, coal and natural gas. Today we are feeling most acutely the effect of the exhaustion of their reserves in the ground. For they are not merely fuels but also most valuable raw materials for the chemical industry! According to some forecasts, in no more than 10 years from now oil and gas extraction will begin to decline and by the year 2020 their share in the fuel and energy balance will drop down to 20 percent. This is one aspect of the matter. The other is that if in the future such resources remain abundant, the development of the power industry on their basis would lead to catastrophic changes in the climate due to the "greenhouse effect." Actually, the warming of the climate as a result of human industrial activities is already a reality. The content of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased by 20-25 percent compared with the preindustrial age and the average temperature on the surface of the planet has risen within that period by approximately 0.6 degrees. This process is continuing and currently we are actively studying the question of the type of changes which will take place in the various weather zones over the next decade and the precipitation on the planet and, with them, the nature of the development of agriculture.

Naturally, this involves environmental pollution. Thermoelectric power plants (TES) remain a powerful source of dangerous compounds in the atmosphere, such as sulfur dioxide, carbon oxide and benzopyrene. Add to

this the very fine dust which, in the developed countries, is considered the second most dangerous air pollutant after sulfur dioxide. Approximately one-sixth of this man-made dust, so to say, is discarded in the air through the smokestacks of the TES.

The picture is gloomy and the situation may appear hopeless. However, mankind is not threatened by energy hunger! According to the specialists, if it is a question of an energy crisis at all, what is meant by this is a crisis in the present means for the generation of energy and not its resources. Help is provided by nuclear energy, based on the use of nuclear reactions which split uranium and plutonium. Even the most conservative estimates indicate that with such resources mankind has supplies for hundreds of years into the future and, consequently, can rely on providing a high level of civilized life for every person on earth, with nuclear energy taken as a temporary way of solving the problem. A number of physicists and specialists in this sector are convinced that despite the Harrisburg and Chernobyl accidents, the nuclear power industry has proved its viability and high efficiency. In a highly developed country such as France, for example, today 70 percent of all electric power is generated at nuclear power plants (AES).

Thirty years of experience in the running of AES has proved that if they function normally they are incomparably more efficient in ensuring ecological cleanliness compared with a power industry based on fossil fuels. Nonetheless, the scale of the consequences with which any AES accident is fraught forces us, again and again, critically to consider all aspects in the development of the nuclear power industry, to make a great deal of changes in the plans, correct the operational systems of functioning reactors, seriously consider the training of the personnel, and develop new scientific concepts in evaluating the risk related to the effect of specific power units under specific circumstances.

Most serious problems related to the utilization of radioactive waste, dismantling and storing reactors which are no longer usable and the possibility of blowing up an AES as a result of terrorist acts or nonnuclear armed conflicts have not been given a definitive answer. New problems are appearing, which require fundamental scientific work.

The global nature of energy problems was realized by the most perspicacious scientists a long time ago. As early as 1912 F. Soddi wrote that "sooner or later but, naturally, not in the indefinite future, nothing will be left for replenishing the natural use of energy on earth other than the initial stocks of nuclear energy...." However, it was only toward the end of the century that this warning is now being profoundly realized by the broad public and becoming an element of the strategy of survival.

When the first AES were being built in the 1950s, public opinion considered this an encouraging manifestation of the peaceful utilization of the results obtained in developing mass destruction weapons. It was from this viewpoint as well that the launching of the first nuclear

electric power plant in Obninsk, in 1954, was of tremendous importance. Naturally, the advantages of the nuclear power industry were quite quickly realized by countries engaged in doing such work (let us parenthetically note that this was secret work not submitted to broad discussion). However, the nuclear power industry was used to solve above all national and not global problems, which could not fail to leave a mark on the nature of development of new industrial sectors. Such development showed the traces of the past war, the stressed political situation in the world and the domestic strategies and tactics of governments and parties.

It was only in the 1970s that the world experienced the real danger of an energy crisis and felt some of its manifestations. The problem began to be realized precisely as being global, not only in scientific circles but also among men of culture and the mass information media, the young and the broad public. International cooperation in this area was started.

Could the nuclear power industry follow a path which would have excluded Harrisburg and Chernobyl, the path of rejection by a certain segment of society of plans based on the development of new nuclear power plants and fear of that same energy of the atomic nucleus, which could get out of hand?

Apparently it could, had it been considered, from its very first steps, as one of the efficient means of solving the global problem of providing mankind with energy. This applied not only to individual countries or areas but to all mankind, and not only for today and tomorrow but for a future which appeared quite imminent. As we can see, intellectual prerequisites for this approach existed. In the final account today, when the faults of the now existing nuclear power industry have become so obvious, it is precisely and not in the least through the international interaction among scientists, engineers and politicians that a search has been undertaken for a solution to this situation. No other way is possible in approaching general planetary problems. It is better to do so, naturally, at the very early stages and not under the pressure of circumstances which, as we know, could have tragic consequences.

To learn how to think in a new way means seriously to address ourselves to the problem of man, to seek reliable means of overcoming his alienation. It is not enough to say that today the working person finds himself alienated from the results of his work, the peasant from the land and the nations from their past and their history. The individual alienated from mankind is yet another of the global problems of our time. Essentially, it is only now that we understand the entire depth of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto which, among others, states the following: "Remember that you belong to the human species and forget all else." In thinking of the future of Pugwash, one of the participants in the conference said that the movement is bound to study how man stop hurting mankind.

Today mankind must cross a critical pass in the course of its development. Shall we be able to cross it? In considering the answer to this question we find grounds for optimism in the fact that the pass has been located. Through the efforts of the international scientific community its altitude and steepness have been studied and the first evaluations of the efforts which will have to be made in climbing to the peak have been made. The Pugwash Movement plays a major role in this important project. Essentially, it is the prototype of a future international independent consultative council of scientists which, apparently, will be needed by the United Nations, the importance of which is increasing in the contemporary world. This authoritative organization must be adequately supplied with intellectual potential.

In his greetings to the participants in the Pugwash Conference of Scientists, M.S. Gorbachev noted that "scientific thinking is a powerful force. Today it is needed by mankind in order to ensure its survival. The ideas formulated by the founders of your movement were, essentially, the harbingers of a new way of thinking. The participants in the movement have set the example of a responsible and highly moral approach to the fate of history and progress."

The contemporary Pugwash Movement does not conceive of itself outside such an approach. This is convincingly confirmed by its 38th Conference.

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Short Book Reviews

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[Text] "K. Marks, F. Engels, V.I. Lenin o Demokratii" [K. Marx, F. Engels, and V.I. Lenin on Democracy]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 512 pp. Reviewed by doctors of philosophical sciences G. Karpov and A. Sertsova.

The question of democracy was one of the main topics in the work of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The resolution "On the Democratization of Soviet Society and the Reform of the Political System," which was adopted at the conference, emphasized that under the conditions of perestroika it is vitally necessary for "all projects in the country to be decided by the people and their rightful representatives and be under the people's total and effective control." For that reason, this recently published collection, which includes excerpts from the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on problems of democracy, is particularly relevant today. Its entire content is consistent with our time and with the most important problems of perestroika in the political system of Soviet society, the solution to which will ensure our advance.

The collection opens with a section on the nature of democracy. What is democracy? What meaning does Marxism-Leninism invest in this concept?

Following are some statements included in the collection. In his "On the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law," Marx wrote: "Democracy is the resolved puzzle applicable to all forms of governmental systems." It is only through democracy, according to Marx, that "again and again the state can be reduced to its true reason, to the actual person, to the actual people, and be asserted as their own work." In developing these ideas, in his article "On the Question of National Policy," V.I. Lenin said briefly: "It is not the people for the state but the state for the people."

Democracy, as the "rule of the majority" (Lenin) is not in the least the same as anarchy and chaos, as we are occasionally threatened by the dogmatic interpreters of Marxism. "Since when has a decision based on the majority been known as 'anarchy'?" Lenin asked in his article "Frightening the People with Bourgeois Fears." "...The people have nothing to fear," he wrote. "A decision made by the majority of workers and peasants is not anarchy. Such a decision is the only possible guarantee of democracy in general and of success in finding ways of saving ourselves from dislocation in particular."

The section entitled "Bureaucratism is the Opposite of Democracy" is truly relevant. The compilers of this collection have followed their study of the tasks involved in the struggle against bureaucratism with interesting materials relative to the anti-democratic nature of any type of cult of personality. This includes statements made by Marx, Engels and Lenin criticizing the superstitious and to this day still extent reverence of authoritarianism, emphasizing the inadmissibility of any pitting of the historical personality against the masses. The collection includes the instructive thoughts of the great theoreticians and politicians on the way of strengthening the true authority of individuals holding leading positions in the proletarian party.

The final section in the book deals with internal party democracy. Interesting thoughts have been expressed by Engels at different times in his letters to E. Bernstein and F.A. Sorge. Any labor party, Engels wrote, can develop only in the course of an internal struggle of opinions and views, fully consistent with the laws of dialectical development in general. Freedom to discuss all problems within the party is a necessity for its moral and political health and a prerequisite for conscious discipline and high-level organization in its ranks.

This book comes with a well compiled topic indicator. Unquestionably, it will become a valuable aid to propagandists and to all readers who reflect about the future of socialist democracy.

"*Sotsialisticheskoye Sodruzhestvo i Problemy Otnosheniy Vostok-Zapad v 80-e Gody*" [The Socialist Community and Problems of East-West Relations in the 1980s]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1987, 296 pp; "*Realnyy Sotsializm v Sovremennom Mire*" [Real Socialism in the Contemporary World]. Nauka, Moscow, 1987, 248 pp. Reviewed by V. Aleksandrov, doctor of historical sciences.

The joining of efforts by scientists from the fraternal socialist countries in writing joint works on the problems of real socialism has become a noteworthy phenomenon of our time. The collective monographs mentioned here are the specific results of such cooperation among scientists from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia (identified, respectively, as No 1 and No 2).

These works describe for the benefit of the readers real socialism in the contemporary world and its interaction with other parts of the global community, above all along the line of East-West relations. The authors analyze the theoretical and political problems of socialism in the light of new thinking and study the complex problems of development of global socialism in the 1980s.

The consideration of the contemporary world, divided into two opposite systems—socialism and capitalism—is the methodological foundation for the two studies, considered from the viewpoint of the unity and confrontation, competition and interaction between its components. This enables us to gain an objective understanding of the place and role of the two systems in the development of civilization.

In assessing the overall result of the advance of the socialist countries on the path of social progress, the authors indicate that it takes the world of socialism to new historical landmarks. The books are aimed not only at explaining the historical successes of socialism but, above all, at analyzing existing problems and difficulties. Considerable attention is being paid to interpreting the concept of "real socialism," and studying the question of the interconnection between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions in the course of building socialism, which is of great significance particularly in the light of crisis or precrisis conditions existing in a number of countries of real socialism (2, pp 11-16).

The scientific study of the situation in the socialist countries in the 1980s convincingly proves that the acceleration of socioeconomic development and perestroika which, albeit to different extents, are developing in the individual countries, have been objectively placed on the agenda throughout the socialist world (1, p 11).

Perestroika is necessary also in the area of cooperation among socialist states. While positively assessing the experience acquired in their interaction, the researchers unanimously agree that here as well the need has appeared for new and more intensive forms of contacts

and a more profound economic and scientific and technical integration. The vital needs of socialism have formulated as a prime task the creation of a new economic mechanism and socialist cooperation among the individual countries (2, p 55). The main idea here is the joint search by the fraternal parties of ways for optimally combining national with international interests (1, p 34).

Real socialism does not develop in an isolated world. Increasingly it interacts with countries which are part of the alternative system. The state of affairs in socialism is substantially influenced by capitalism. With the help of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, integration processes, the preserved dependent position of the developing world, structural reorganizations and other factors, capitalism was able not only to adapt to the social changes which occurred in the world but even somewhat to improve its positions in the historical competition with socialism.

Nonetheless, at the start of the 1980s, the capitalist countries encountered serious economic difficulties (1, pp 60-72). The upsurge, in the first half of the 1980s, of the "neoconservative wave" in the West is described by the authors with the accurate stipulation that this trend is not simple and that in a number of capitalist countries the influence of the conservatives is either weakening or has become insignificant (1, p 78).

The works describe the inconsistency and contradictoriness of U.S. policy toward the socialism community which is exerting an increasingly positive influence on the global community. The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries formulated a new concept of international security in terms of East-West relations and are working for its implementation. The authors, who describe this concept, consider the ideas of national, regional and general security, and the military, political, economic and humanitarian aspects of the comprehensive system of international security formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress; they express their views on matters of "sensible sufficiency" of armaments, measures of confidence, etc. (1, pp 146-163).

The researchers draw distinctions between the approaches of the socialist and capitalist countries to trade-economic and scientific and technical cooperation. The policy of sanctions, boycotts, and restrictions in the sale of so-called strategic goods is harming both its initiators and the cause of peace and international security. Conversely, the socialist countries favor comprehensive trade-economic and scientific and technical cooperation.

Real socialism is linked with close ties of solidarity and comprehensive forms of internationalist interaction and reciprocal influence with the revolutionary labor movement in the developed capitalist countries. In speaking of the basic trends of the influence of socialism on the revolutionary labor movement, the scientists note that

the labor movement obtained the opportunity of struggling on bridgeheads and in ways which would have been inconceivable without the existence of real socialism (2, p 162).

In describing the positive importance of socialism to the nonsocialist world, the authors analyze the factors which could reduce the efficiency of this influence (weakened unity among socialist countries, errors, difficulties and stagnation phenomena in building the new society and problems within the labor and communist movements within the capitalist countries).

An interesting analysis is provided of the need for a creative approach by national liberation movements and countries with a socialist orientation in applying the experience of real socialism (2, p 195).

The experience of socialism is constantly being misrepresented and falsified by many bourgeois and anticommunist authors who are trying to prove that there has been a withdrawal from the classical theory of socialism. They claim, for example, that the development of commodity-monetary relations conflicts with the nature of socialism and is a return to capitalism.

Naturally, the authors have not included all aspects of the role of real socialism in the world and of its interrelationship with the West. Considerations on the future of economic and political cooperation and the possible new trends it could take are of a general nature. The problem of the ways of radically involving the socialist countries in the global division of labor should have been considered more profoundly and thoroughly. The humanitarian aspects of international security have not been sufficiently discussed.

However, these books are interesting for what they have already accomplished. Their study will be useful not only to the specialists.

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Chronicle. Meetings With the Editors

18020002t Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 88 (signed to press 19 Sep 88) p 128

[Text] A meeting between KOMMUNIST readers and authors and members of the journal's editorial staff was held within the program of Journals Days, at the USSR VDNKh. The discussion was focused on problems of development of the Leninist concept of socialism, ways of protecting the political system, the processes of implementation of the economic reform and the tasks of the science of history in eliminating the "blank spots" in history.

A brief report on this meeting will be published in the next issue of this journal.

A discussion on ideological problems of perestroyka, involving journal authors and associates, was held at the Sports Club, during the Journals Days, at the VDNKh.

An exchange of views on problems of the further intensification of cooperation between the two fraternal publications was held at a meeting between the editors and B. Ligden, editor-in-chief of NAMYN AMDRAL, political and theoretical journal of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. The Mongolian guest was acquainted with the participation of KOMMUNIST in CPSU activities in implementing the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. In turn, B. Ligden described the work of the journal NAMYN AMDRAL on implementing the tasks set by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party on renewing the forms and methods of building socialism in Mongolia.

The editors were visited by J. Kase, editor-in-chief of NOVA MYSL, the theoretical and political journal of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee and member of the ideological commission of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee. The talk dealt with the work of the editors related to the implementation of the tasks set at the 27th CPSU Congress and the 17th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and problems of the further development of cooperation between the two fraternal journals and upgrading its efficiency.

A meeting was held with A. Arno, minister plenipotentiary attached to the embassy of the FRG, at which topical problems of domestic and foreign policy, formulated at the 19th Party Conference, were discussed.

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