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USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 13, September 1985

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EDITORIAL--THE HONEST AND PURE NAME OF PARTY MEMBER

AU060601 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 3-11

[Text] In preparing for the 27th Congress, the CPSU is carrying out an exacting review of its ranks. This means a comprehensive analysis, courageous and uncompromising in the Leninist manner, of the work done by each party organization and each party committee, and a rigorous self-appraisal by each communist of his personal contribution to the common cause. Such an analysis and such self-appraisal are indispensable and reliable preconditions for further increasing the leading role of the CPSU in society and for even greater consolidation of its unity with the people, on which in turn depends the successful solution of the diverse and complicated tasks of perfecting developed socialism, the most responsible stage on the road to putting the communist ideals into practice.

Having made a sober analysis of our achievements and shortcomings, the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum formulated a concept for accelerating in every way possible the socioeconomic development of Soviet society on the basis of scientific-technological progress, and oriented the party and the entire people toward the implementation of changes on a historic scale, essentially posing the question of a different quality of growth and the qualitative renewal of all aspects of life. Each communist must acquire a profound awareness of feeling for the specific features of the moment we are living through, in order to actively participate in the reorganization of the forms and methods of party work, in perfecting its style, and in thus increasing the effectiveness and social significance.

The precongress accountability report and election campaign opens up wide possibilities. It is necessary to conduct this campaign everywhere so it takes the form of a frank, principled, practical and constructive discussion between like-minded people on the most burning problems of life, a discussion which would mobilize them to new accomplishments and which would help to concentrate all the thoughts of communists on seeking out the quickest ways and most effective methods of significantly accelerating scientific-technological progress, intensifying production and on the basis of this, of achieving the world's highest level of labor productivity. Indissolubly connected with the solution of this truly historic task if the activation of

the entire system of political and social institutions, which means deepening socialist democracy and the people's self-government.

The present accountability report and election campaign, which will occur in the party at the junction between the 11th and 12th five-year plans, is expected to raise to a new level the practical work which has developed in the country and in every labor collective to impose order and strengthen discipline, to consolidate the regime of economizing, and to increase the creative initiative of working people. It is also expected to tangibly widen the concerned participation of the trade union and Komsomol aktiv in this work. Accountability reports and elections with party organizations make it possible to put into practice the demands of contemporary cadre policy by forming efficient party bureaus and committees, introducing into their composition the most worthy and respected, energetic and unquestionably honest communists possessing practical knowledge and simultaneously getting rid of workers who lack initiative and do not justify the trust placed in them.

"The main slogans of the moment, which must be made the leitmotiv of our precongress meetings and of all preparations for the 27th Party Congress," M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said at the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "in creative work, unity of word and deed, initiative and responsibility and exactingness toward oneself and one's comrades. It is for the communists to set an example. It is necessary to intensify the accountability of each party member for his attitude to social duty, for his fulfillment of party decisions and for his pure and honest image as a party member. A communist is judged by his deeds and actions. There are and can be no other criteria."

The question of the moral image of the party member is one of the fundamental questions of the party's vital activity. It is a great political question, for what is involved is the further strengthening of the party's links with the masses, of the growth in the party's authority among the people, the strengthening of the unity of its ranks and the increasing of its fighting efficiency. The question must constantly remain at the center of the party organizations' and party committees' attention. Today, on the eve of the next congress, this attention should be redoubled. Concern for the purity of the party's ranks is one of the best and eternally living traditions of the CPSU and a tradition which has weighty ideological, political and, finally, historical grounds.

The very concepts of communism and communist urgently require a thoughtful and responsible attitude toward them. It is inadmissible that their great meaning should be erased from our conscience in the flow of everyday affairs, or that they should be perceived in a too prosaic or even philistine manner, as unfortunately still happens.

The building of communism is, after all, not simply a task that is intended merely to improve the external conditions of people's lives and to save them from the harsh necessity of expending all their strength on acquiring the means of subsistence. Communist building is the formation of such social relations as will make possible the universal and complete equality of all members of society in the main areas, that is, in the free and unhindered

satisfaction of the highest human needs: for the comprehensive development of everyone as a condition for the comprehensive development of all, for the achievement by the individual of peaks of physical and moral perfection, and for creative self-realization by the individual. The highly humane essence of communism consists in the indissoluble link and the interdependence between the good of the individual and of society and in the consistently collectivist nature of social relations. And this must never be forgotten.

The moral purity and nobility of the communist ideal and of the revolutionary struggle to implement it are great and indisputable. But the responsibility of the people who have made transforming this ideal into a reality the meaning of their entire lives--the communists--is just as great and indisputable.

For a party member, having firm communist convictions is natural, but not enough. These convictions must take shape as actions and deeds, the political and moral content of which serves the great aim--the building of communism--in a real way. Every communist is expected to be a conscientious, active participant in historical creativity, to have a constant sense of the indissoluble link between times, and to learn from the experience of previous generations of fighters for social justice, in order to maximally increase his own contribution to the approach of a communist future.

The Bolshevik Party led by V. I. Lenin developed its own style of activity, the distinctive features of which are a consistently revolutionary nature, democracy of internal party relations and of relations with the masses, the highest political and moral responsibility for the destiny of country and people and moral purity in thought and deed. We justly call the sum total of principles and norms by which the CPSU is guided the Leninist ethics of bolshevism, which is in organic unity with communist morality. It is the indispensable duty of the holder of a party card to assimilate this ethic and this morality and to instill in himself an inner need to always follow them. In becoming a party member, a person crosses a threshold beyond which his deeds are naturally gauged by a different, stricter measure than before.

It is necessary to learn to be an honest and pure party member every day, in great and small matters, more frequently following such high examples as the outstanding bolsheviks-Leninists were and have remained in the people's memory. This, for example, is how Klara Tsetkin wrote about one of them. "There was one determining factor: the revolutionary convictions, in the burning flame of which all of Dzerzhinskiy's outstanding qualities matured and reached their full flourishing. For them these convictions were sacred, inviolable and obligatory. For their sake he, kind and responsive by nature, could and even had to be strict, harsh and implacable to others, for in serving these convictions he was incomparably stricter, harsher, and more implacable toward himself. He worked according to his conviction passionately but in a purely practical manner, and was free of the slightest sign of personal ambition, pursuit of effect alone, thirst for glory and honor, mere phrases, and concessions to loud words and transient sentiments. He never wanted to seem other than he in fact was. Everything in this revolution was real and honest: his love and his hate, his fervor and his wrath, his words and his deeds."

Communist ideological principle and its practical expression--genuine communist activity--are the fundamental conditions for the development of all the other qualities which make up the moral image of a member of the Leninist party. And anyone who considers that it is not obligatory to be a communist in all one's manifestations is profoundly mistaken. Moral awareness is a complex phenomenon, but it is clear to the point of self-evidence that this awareness will not bear any schism, which inevitably brings a person to a moral collapse.

The true party member is a collectivist who is irreconcilable to any manifestations of individualism. The communist's ideal is an ideologically convinced and active revolutionary fighter, a person of open spirit and pure thoughts, who is modest, conscientious, obliging and ready to come to the assistance of anyone who needs it. Selfless work for the common good, sincere and unselfish concern for one's comrades and conscientious fulfillment of party instructions are a natural vital need for the communist. To put it more briefly, a person who is worthy of this lofty title is obligated to serve as an example for others at all times and in all manners.

An honest party member who invariably makes the strictest demands on himself is naturally exacting toward those around him, too. His distinguishing features are exactingness, principle and resolution in the struggle for rigorous observance in practice of the principles of socialism, for the assertion of the Soviet way of life, and for consistent implementation of party policy. A communist's own honesty gives him the moral right to lead people, to make criticisms regardless of the persons concerned, and to struggle for social justice. If a person is disgusted by the very thought that one could deceive the party or state to satisfy one's personal interests, or that it is inadmissible to be hypocritical and devious in justifying mistakes one has made, then nothing hinders from coming out openly against bad management and eyewash, red tape and bureaucratism, lack of responsibility and laxity, infringement on people's rights or an unfair attitude to them.

For the party member, a good, completely unstained name in the most reliable moral fulcrum in his fulfillment of his statutory obligations and civic duty.

Such a fulcrum is especially necessary for a communist leader. After all, people expect considerably more from him than they do from a rank-and-file party member. Not even the slightest slip on his part and, moreover, no deviation from the norms of party ethics and communist morality pass unnoticed. Profound competence, the ability to work at full capacity and selflessness are indispensable qualities for a leader, particularly today. But no less important for him are freedom from immodesty, self-conceit and haughtiness, unfeigned modesty, good will toward subordinates, simplicity and accessibility, sensitivity of spirit and constant, persistent care for the improvement of the conditions of working people's work and everyday life. And it stands to reason, receptiveness to criticism from below. A serious and correct attitude to this criticism is the touchstone of a leader's party-mindedness and morality.

The concerns of the present day make it necessary to stress with particular force the inadmissibility of a communist having a conciliatory attitude to phrase-mongering and inactivity, to any routine, or to attempts to substitute a deep reconstruction of the forms and methods of work by minor improvements, or even by simple chatter. Profoundly alien to the true party member are liberalism and leniency toward those who breach party and state discipline, who avoid by all possible means the necessity of assuming responsibility in solving this or that question posed by life and who betray their official duty to satisfy local or departmental interests.

No communist and no party organization has the right to disregard a single case of a careless or, even worse, irresponsible attitude to the fulfillment of the state plan or of the socialist obligations assumed by a labor collective, to any attempts to correct plan tasks in a downward direction which are dictated by group egoism or to the avoidance of very difficult but extremely important and necessary work on the technical modernization of production, on the improvement of quality and on improving the reliability and durability of articles produced.

Failures in the work of both leaders and ordinary workers, as well as that of the labor collective as a whole, must without fail become the subject of principled discussion at party meetings and at bureau and at bureau and party committee sessions. Such practical discussion is expected to contribute to a rise in the creative activeness of party organizations and of the entire collective, an increase in mutual exactingness and a rise in the responsibility of each communist and each worker for the assigned task.

The urgent demand of the times is for stricter accountability of communists, and primarily of leading cadres, for the fulfillment of party and government decisions and for observance of party and state discipline and the norms of communist morality. For this reason, one must remain outside strict and exacting party control. The most important task of this control lies in revealing and eliminating all that is alien to the nature of socialism and that diverges from its principles, to preserve in every way possible the purity of the party's ranks and to strengthen their unity and cohesion.

In his time, Lenin warned communists many times of the necessity of displaying the highest revolutionary vigilance and bolshevik irreconcilability in defending the party, which had become the ruling party after the victory of the October Revolution, from infiltration of its ranks by unscrupulous people, careerists, rogues and swindlers, and from any attempts to use the party's authority or the title of party member for selfish purposes.

Lenin taught that political rogues, thieves, bribe takers and all who disgrace the title of party member and who damage the party's authority in the eyes of the people, must be punished in a most severe manner. Even in our days, Lenin's lessons have not lost their acute topicality. Today, too, people who should not be allowed to come within a mile of the party strive to attach themselves to it. Today, too, individual party members, including some occupying leading positions, are caught inflating figures, embezzling, taking bribes and engaging in moneygrubbing. And however small the number of improper acts committed by party members in relation to the enormous,

overwhelming majority of pure and honest party members, each case of violation of the norms of party ethics and communist morality does serious moral-political harm to the party.

Life has confirmed many times the simple but at the same time extraordinarily important truth that the party grows stronger by purging its ranks. In this connection, some readers turn to the editorial staff with the question: Why were purges of the party conducted before but are not conducted now, although it would seem that it would be possible in this way to get rid more swiftly and easily of those of its members who disgrace the lofty title of communist by their behavior? Mass purges had to be abandoned for very weighty reasons, which are set out in detail in the widely known resolution of the 18th Congress entitled "Changes in the Statute of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)." There are many of these reasons, and it would hardly be expedient to cite them here. Let us simply recall that even then the membership was recognized to be thoroughly well-grounded. In no way does this mean lowering demands in evaluating communists' fulfillment of their obligations and their party and civic duty.

Work is being persistently conducted in the country to improve legality and law and order and to bring official persons to account for abuses which they have committed. Even today there is no end to those who have simply become more devious in their love for using their official position for selfish aims, for example, for building dachas and private houses, for engaging in other forms of the vulgar understanding of a "fine" life, and for rendering various kinds of services and good deeds to near and far relatives, to people from the same place of origin, and to associates at work. Some render these kinds of services "selflessly," at the state's expense. Others again do not disdain bribes. However bitter it may be to speak about this, responsible workers of the state and economic apparatus are sometimes found among the bribe takers.

What is the reason for this? It stands to reason that there can be no answer. However, there is full justification for asserting that this is due not least to errors in acceptance into the party and shortcomings in educational work. At the same time, it is also the consequence of lack of control, of belated discovery of violations of the CPSU Statute, and of inadmissible tolerance and leniency toward those who set out on the road of flagrant violations of party and state discipline and of the rules of socialist communal life. It is also the result of a neglectful or formal attitude to signals and letters from working people about various kinds of abuses and those guilty of them.

Many misdemeanors and even crimes committed by party members are directly and immediately connected with a predilection for spirits. Through the will of the people, an irreconcilable struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism is today being developed in the party and country. Voices cry out for the introduction of a "dry law" in this connection. There is a considerable number of arguments against this postulation of the question. But then again, it is quite legitimate to pose the question of the incompatibility of an attachment to spirits with CPSU membership. And thus there can and will be no leniency toward those communists who violate party decisions on this question and the Leninist norms of party ethics.

The struggle against and prevention of various kinds of negative phenomena are far from being the task of only the party control organs which are specially empowered for this. Party control according to the Leninist understanding is control carried out by the entire party, by its electoral leading organs, by the primary party organizations and by each communist.

Particular emphasis should be laid on the exceptionally important role which primary and workshop party organizations and party groups can and must play in the struggle for the purity of the party's ranks and for the honest and pure image of the party member. After all, there each communist is on show with all his merit and shortcomings. It is hardly necessary to prove how much can be done to prevent possible violations of the party statute or the norms of socialist community or to prevent the moral fall of a person, by the exacting words of his party comrades. No abuse can be concealed from their alert gaze. It is only necessary to want to see! And it is necessary to have the courage to speak about a violation which is noticed. Such a line of behavior is an elementary demand of bolshevik ethics. Unfortunately, it has to be admitted that this is observed far from always and by far from all communists. The fault here lies with an all-forgiving atmosphere, or else one of direct suppression of criticism, with the same old group egoism, concern for falsely understood honor of the collective and personal probity, the latter supposedly excluding any "spoiling of relations." The struggle for the purity of party ranks and the moral education of party members is not simple and at times involves a long process, but it is always notable. Every party organization is obliged to pay the closest attention to the education of its members. As experience shows, very noticeable and effective assistance can be given here by the accountability reports of communists, including leaders at party meetings. Such accountability reoprts are capable of positively influencing the process of qualitative improvement of the party ranks.

Those who enter the party are, as a rule, people with a high level of awareness who are full of resolution to consistently struggle for the communist ideals. Those joining the ranks of the CPSU declare their aspiration to serve it with faith and truth in strict accordance with the Program and Statute.

In order to prepare a person for rigorous fulfillment of the party member's obligations and to carefully test him, the CPSU Statute stipulates a term of candidate status. Lenin attached enormous significance to it. He was convinced of the necessity of a "serious test of whether a candidate is really a tried communist to any extent," and denmanded that the term of candidate status be made a "serious trial, and not an empty formality" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 18). Lenin's instructions are still topical today.

Today, too, not everyone, unfortunately, undergoes a comprehensive test of his ideological-political maturity, becoming a party member merely on the grounds that in the year he spent in candidate status nothing reprehensible about him was noted. It must be clear to any communist how dangerous such a formal approach to the acceptance of new members into the party is.

The party as a whole and each party organization in particular take care to educate convinced, staunch communists of pure spirit and unstained name. But when a person is within its ranks, he is obliged to engage purposefully and persistently in self-education and to develop in himself a sense of party conscience and party responsibility. This means that from day to day each part member must work on himself, temper his will, and foster an ability to maintain a self-critical attitude to his own actions, and he must do this independently and without rushing ahead. The honest and pure name of party member is achieved through conscientious work, political activeness and irreproachable personal behavior.

It is difficult or, to be more precise, impossible to speak of the honesty and purity of a party member, for all his outwardly satisfactory behavior, if he is not deeply concerned over the state of affairs in his own organization, over rigorous fulfillment of the decisions of party congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums and of Central Committee resolutions, if he reconciles himself to formalism in organizational-party and ideological work, if he remains silent at meetings, and if he indifferently passes by negative phenomena occurring in his own collective. Occupying a temporizing position, not daring to pose urgent questions in a direct and acute manner, fearing to make constructive criticism, guarding oneself by any means from trouble and unpleasantness, but still saying the "correct words" when the occasion arises, are almost the most typical manifestations of dishonesty before the party. Some party members regard the leadership quite obsequiously and toady to them just so as not to cause unpleasantness for themselves. It is because of such people that there forms in a party organization a secretive atmosphere, in which measures, including party meetings, are carried out "for the record" and in observance of "good form," merely in order to create an appearance of well-being.

But it is precisely this ostentatious "quiet" well-being that is a reliable sign of a party organization's loss of the necessary militancy. In this case it can easily happen that the organization will begin to serve as a cover for improper activities which do direct harm to society, which have a negative influence on the moral atmosphere in the given social microenvironment, and which throw a shadow over the entire party.

Neither must another category of people be passed over in silence, that sign of people who seem to be extraordinarily active and to rush headlong to fulfill any instruction, but who work for show, being primarily concerned to gain the favor of superior leadership by any method. As a result of their endeavors, measures in the organizations in which they operate are, as a rule, more numerous than those in other organizations, and the "scope" of the participants in these measures is invariably wider. But they smell of formalism and soullessness a mile off. Simulation of tumultuous activity and activeness meant only for show, which quite often turns into a campaign-like attitude, is not at all better than quiet, "decorous" passivity.

Criticism and self-criticism are the most reliable and well-tried method of resolving conflicts which arise in social life and in the life of party organizations and committees, a method which makes it possible to constantly infuse a fresh spirit into their multifaceted activity and to distinctly

highlight their pluses and minuses. That is both a statutory right and a statutory obligation of the party member. Wide-scale development of criticism and self-criticism is the best proof of the political health of a party organization, of its ideological maturity, and of its correct understanding of its purpose and its duty to party and people.

In no important party document is this question bypassed. It is also regularly raised in the party press. Yet it still is necessary to admit that the situation regarding criticism and self-criticism leaves a lot to be desired. The fault here lies with those party committees which evade truly self-critical analysis that would uncover omissions in the working methods of the organizations which they head and in their own activity, and which would reveal and lay bare the reasons for errors committed. Shortcomings are at times fleetingly ennumerated in reports and speeches, drowning under loud declarations about real or imaginary successes. Insipid, indirect and depersonalized criticism can teach nothing to anybody, and cannot help anyone to improve matters in any way. Such "criticism" educates only the demagogues and the dodgers.

In some party organizations, direct, principled criticism which is not surrounded by a wall of reservations and respectful obeisance and which is courageous in the bolshevik manner is considered to be in poor tone, and is regarded almost as a "scandal in a noble family." Such criticism engenders a single desire in the "workers" who are subjected to it, a desire to put the "troublemaker" in his place, and to let him get the feeling that he should not be cleverer than other people. Open persecution for criticism is not met so often. The opponents of "washing one's dirty linen in public" have become skilled at mastering apparently respectable but nevertheless no less immoral methods of suppressing criticism. It is, after all, even possible to publicly express gratitude for criticism and to acknowledge it as correct and useful, but then to calmly forget about it. It is possible to pretend to be guided by critical remarks in one's activity without essentially changing anything either in one's style or work or in one's own behavior, which were the cause of just censure in the first place.... It is the duty of each party organization and each communist to conduct a resolute struggle against any attempts to suppress criticism. In the course of the precongress accountability report and election campaign it is important to achieve the holding of party meetings in the primary organizations and conferences and congresses of the union republic communist parties, as the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum demanded, in an atmosphere of practical approach, principle, and a self-critical approach to evaluating the work of party organizations and their leading organs. It is important that accountability reports and elections contribute to the further consolidation of the Leninist norms of party life, to the development of internal party democracy and of criticism from below and above, to the growth of the activity and initiative of communists, and to an increase in their responsibility for the affairs of their organizations and of the party as a whole.

While developing criticism and self-criticism in its ranks in every way possible, our party is an irreconcilable opponent of irresponsible faultfinding, whatever the motives that dictate it. Specially discussing the question of letters and complaints from working people, the CPSU Central

Committee Politburo stated that it is necessary to support in every way party members and also nonparty comrades who uncover shortcomings in a principled manner and who set an example of bolshevik irreconcilability to any evil. Also emphasized was the need to pay particular attention to the situation in these collectives from which the greatest number of critical signals come. It is also necessary to give a resolute rebuff to cavilers and slanderers.

An important feature of party ethics is irreconcilability to the bearers of evil as well as those who attempt, under the banner of the struggle against evil, to settle accounts with unaccommodating people, to slander an honest worker, or to take revenge for a personal insult. In the struggle for the honest and pure name of party member, no compromises are permissible with respect to any deviations from the demands of the statute or from the norms of communist morality. A high price must always be paid for such deviations.

It goes without saying that in resolving the question of punishing a communist, it is sometimes difficult to gain an understanding of why he violated discipline or our moral norms, of the way in which he made a deal with his own conscience, and of why he dared to deceive the party. Campaignlike work and the carrying out of punishments to teach or warn others are contraindicative to discipline practice. But it is just as clear that the party must be merciless toward scoundrels and rogues.

We are frequently too soft on party members who commit acts dictated by selfish motives, and we take thieves and those guilty of eyewash under our protection only on the grounds that this never seemed to be noticed in them before.

There is no need to be surprised that a certain number of people are expelled from the party or are subject to strict party penalties for using their official position for selfish purposes or else for behavior which fails to correspond not only to the norms of party life but also to Soviet laws. One has to be surprised by something else, the careless "kindness" of some party organizations and committees which show inadmissible leniency toward those who have committed criminally punishable acts. Some of these persons have even been punished for unlawful acts, but the question of their party membership is still undecided. And yet the CPSU Statute states clearly and unambiguously that a communist who had committed a crime is subject to expulsion from the party. Nevertheless, some party organizations and party committees evidently consider it possible to make their own amendments to the statute. Such faulty practice is quite intolerable.

Neither is it possible to justify the unsuitable practice of examining questions of the personal responsibility of communists, and primarily leading workers, directly in the raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms, bypassing the primary party organizations. This practice has been resolutely condemned by the CPSU Central Committee, but it still persists. Meanwhile it is well known that the educational effect of even the most just decisions which have been taken behind closed doors, hidden from the party masses, is sharply reduced. Such practice often gives rise to various kinds of false rumors. There are not and cannot be two disciplines in the party, with one discipline for leaders and another for rank-and-file communists. Considerable losses are also caused to

the party's authority when a primary organization severely but justly punishes or expels from its ranks someone who is guilty of flagrant violation of party and state discipline or of the norms of the socialist way of life, and a higher authority then unjustifiably mitigates this carefully weighed decision.

Superficial, formal discussion of communists' misdemeanors, and even the examination of personal affairs when the person concerned is absent, are also to be found. It is necessary to gain an understanding of any such matter in an objective and interested manner, however swiftly the matter has arisen. Just as important is a well-considered approach to the question of removing party penalties. This must be done neither hurriedly or slowly, if a party member who has been punished has convincingly proven by all of his further behavior that he deserves to be rehabilitated. After all what is involved every time is the fate of a person and the authority of the party.

Friendly mutual assistance and unremitting mutual exactingness, as well as constant self-appraisal of their own behavior by all communists without exception, are reliable guarantees that each party member will always be able to be equal to the situation, and that his party organization will be able to fulfill in full its role as the political nucleus of the labor collective. All forgiving, complacent, and self-satisfied attitudes must have no place in our ranks.

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CSO: 1802/1-F

M. GORBACHEV -- TO THE COLLECTIVE OF THE STAKHANOVUGOL PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION 22ND CPSU CONGRESS MINE

LD281909 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) p 12

[Text] Dear comrades:

Your letter about achievements of the collective of the 22nd Congress Mine, Stakhanovugol Production Association reminds us yet again that at the decisive turning points in history, the Soviet working class, which is a revolutionary class, an innovative class, knows how to use its will, organization, and selfless work to motivate millions of working people to achieve the foremost targets of socioeconomic development.

That was how I was at the dawn of the Stakhanovite movement, whose 50th anniversary we are celebrating at the moment.

At that time, our heroic working class, which had mastered equipment that was advanced for the times, made a breakthrough, literally, along the entire front of scientific and technical progress. This secured the economic independence of the country and made it possible to create a reliable defensive shield, against which the fascist aggressor smashed his head.

There are great lessons in the Stakhanovite movement. They have permanent significance today, when we are faced with the task of putting into practice just such a massive labor breakthrough, but on a far greater scale, in the sphere of intensification of the national economy, acceleration of scientific and technical progress and a restructuring of thinking at all levels of cadres.

It is no secret that the coal industry is not yet working steadily. But the experience of your collective shows that at every enterprise, in every association there are reserves and quite a bit of them. And if they are used to the full, if the job is tackled with intelligence and due sense of responsibility, one can not only make up the shortfalls, but also ensure stable work for all the country's mines.

I very much cherish your words about nationwide support for the party's political course elaborated by the CPSU Central Committee April 1985 Plenum.

What is also dear to me is the fact that your words have the full support of the workers--tens of thousands of tons of coal produced above plan.

Thank you for the invitation to the miners' festival in honor of the anniversary of the Stakhanovite movement. Let us celebrate it as was taught by the great Lenin--with shock work. Then affluence will come more quickly to every family. The life of every Soviet person will become more interesting and full.

I wish you, dear comrade miners, new labor victories.

5003
CSO: 1802/1-F

M. GORBACHEV -- TO PARTICIPANTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON REVIEWING THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PM280827 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 13-14

[Text] I greet the representatives of the states participating in the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, who have gathered in Geneva at a conference to review the operation of that most important international agreement.

The nonproliferation treaty, drawn up by the collective efforts of many states, has demonstrated in practice its viability. Not a single new state has acquired nuclear weapons since the treaty was concluded. It is the broadest arms limitation accord in terms of the number of parties to it. An international nonproliferation regime has emerged on its basis and become and effective instrument of peace.

Another important result of the conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty is that it has provided favorable conditions for broad international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, which is so necessary to the solution of the problems of energy supply to mankind and other major economic problems of concern to all peoples. The International Atomic Energy Agency has done a good service in the practical accomplishment of these tasks.

The Soviet Union resolutely stands for the further expansion and development of this cooperation. It is important that atomic energy should really become an asset of the whole of mankind and serve only the purposes of peace and construction.

Respecting its commitments under the treaty, the Soviet Union has been doing and will continue to do everything within its power not only to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race.

The Soviet Union has more than once taken unilateral steps, setting examples for others and thus contributing to the drafting of agreements on the limitation and ending of the nuclear arms race. The USSR has assumed the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If those nuclear

powers which have not yet done so would have followed suit, it would have been on the whole equivalent to a general ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

Fresh evidence of our desire to ease the way to curtailment of the nuclear arms race is the institution by the Soviet Union of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. It is beyond doubt that a mutual Soviet-U.S. moratorium on nuclear explosions could provide favorable conditions for the conclusions of an international treaty on the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and contribute to a fuller implementation of the provisions of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The problem of curbing the nuclear arms race in the nuclear and space age is inseparable from the task of preventing the militarization of space. If space is put to the service of war, the nuclear threat would be dramatically escalated. But if peace is preserved in space and it is kept outside the sphere of military rivalry, an impetus could be given to the solution of the entire range of questions on limiting and reducing nuclear arms arsenals. Broad possibilities would simultaneously be opened for comprehensive international cooperation in various fields of human activity both on earth and in space. This is the purpose of the Soviet Union as it tables for discussion at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly concrete proposals on international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space under conditions of its nonmilitarization.

In short, we stand for energetic work to curb the arms race being carried out in every area. Undoubtedly, measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in this context.

I wish the participants in the conference success in their efforts to further strengthen the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

5003
CSO: 1802/1-F

M. S. GORBACHEV'S REPLIES TO AMERICA'S TIME MAGAZINE

PM020927 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 14-29

[Text] America's TIME magazine has asked General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev to reply to a number of questions and also to receive for a conversation the editor in chief of Time, Inc., H. Grunwald, the managing editor of TIME magazine, R. Cave, the assistant managing editor, R. Duncan, and the magazine's Moscow bureau chief J. Jackson. The conversation took place on 28 August of this year.

We publish below M. S. Gorbachev's replies and his conversation with the American journalists:

Question: How would you characterize U.S.-Soviet relations at this juncture and what are the primary events that define that relationship?

Answer: Had you asked me this question some 2 months ago, I would have said that the situation in our relations was becoming somewhat better and that some hopes of positive shifts were appearing.

To my deep regret, I could not say that today.

The truth should be faced squarely. Despite the negotiations which have begun in Geneva and the agreement to hold a summit meeting, the relations between our two countries continue to deteriorate, the arms race is intensifying, and the war threat is not subsiding. What is the matter, why is all this happening? My colleagues and I are quite exacting and self-critical when it comes to our own activities not only in this country but outside it, and we are asking ourselves again and again if that is somehow connected with our actions.

But what is there that we can reproach ourselves within this context? Indeed, in this crucial situation Moscow is trying to practice restraint in its pronouncements with regard to the United States. It is not resorting to anti-American campaigns, nor is it fomenting hatred for your country. We believe it very important that even in times of political aggravation the feeling of traditional respect harbored by Soviet people for the American people should

not be undermined, and, as far as I can judge, that feeling is largely a mutual one.

And is it bad that, at a time when the disarmament negotiations have resumed and preparations are under way for the first summit after a 6-year undermined interruption we are persistently seeking ways to break the vicious circles and bring the process of arms limitation out of the dead end? In particular, that is precisely the objective of our moratorium on nuclear explosions and of our proposal to the United States to join it and to resume the negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests, as well as of the proposals regarding peaceful cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in space. We are convinced that we should look for a way out of the current difficult situation together.

It is hard, therefore, to understand why our proposals have provoked such outspoken displeasure on the part of responsible U.S. statesmen. Attempts are known to have been made to portray them as nothing but pure propaganda.

Anyone even slightly familiar with the essence of the matters would easily see that behind our proposals there are very serious intentions and not just an attempt to influence public opinion. All real efforts to limit nuclear weapons began with a ban on tests--just recall the 1963 treaty which was a first major step in that direction. A complete end to nuclear tests would halt the nuclear arms race in the most dangerous area, that of qualitative improvement. And it would, besides, seriously contribute to maintaining and strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

If all that we are doing is, indeed, viewed as mere propaganda, why not respond to it according to the principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"? We have stopped nuclear explosions. Then you, Americans, could up and take revenge by doing likewise. You could, to boot, deal us yet another propaganda blow, say, by suspending the development of one of your new strategic missiles. And we would respond with the same kind of "propaganda"? Of course, it could not be a substitute for a comprehensive arms limitation agreement but it would, no doubt, be a significant step leading to such an agreement.

The U.S. Administration has, alas, taken a different road. In response to our moratorium it demonstratively hastened to set off yet another nuclear explosion as if to spite everyone. And to our proposals concerning a peaceful space it responded with a decision to conduct a first battle services test of an antisatellite weapon. As if that were not enough, it has also launched another "hate campaign" against the USSR.

What kind of impression does all this make? On the one hand, that of some kind of confusion and uncertainty in Washington. The only way I can explain this is anxiety lest our initiatives should wreck the version of the Soviet Union being the "focus of evil" and the source of universal danger which, in fact, underlies the entire arms race policy. On the other hand, there is an impression of a shortage of feeling of responsibility for the destinies of the world. And this, honestly speaking, gives rise again and again to the question whether it is at all possible in such an atmosphere to conduct business in a normal way and to build rational relations between countries?

You asked me what is the main, the determining thing that defines Soviet-American relations. I think it is the immutable fact that whether we like one another or not, we can either survive or perish only together. The principal question which we must answer is whether we are at last ready to recognize that there is no other way but to live at peace with each other and whether we are prepared to switch our mentality and our mode of acting from a warlike to a peaceful track. As you say, live and let live. We call it peaceful coexistence. As for the Soviet Union, we answer that question in the affirmative.

Question: What do you think will be the results of your Geneva meeting with President R. Reagan in November? What specific actions should the U.S. and the Soviet Union take to improve their bilateral relations?

Answer: In fact, I have already set forth the reasons why today I look at the prospects of the Geneva meeting with more caution than I did at the time we gave our agreement to that meeting. Its outcome, after all, will depend to a great extent upon what is taking place now.

Everyone would probably agree that the political atmosphere for talks takes shape well in advance. Neither the President nor I will be able to ignore the mood in our respective countries or that of our allies. In other words, actions today largely determine the "scenario" for our November discussions.

I will not hide from you my disappointment and concern about what is happening now.

We cannot but be troubled by the approach which, as I see it, has begun to emerge in Washington from both its practical policy and the statements made by senior White House staffers. That is a scenario of pressure, of attempts to drive us into a corner, to acribe to us, as so many times in the past, every mortal sin--from unleashing an arms race to "aggression" in the Middle East, from violations of human rights to some scheming or other even in South Africa. This is not a state policy, it is some kind of a feverish search for "forces of evil."

We are prepared to have a meaningful and businesslike talk; we can also present claims. I wish to assure the readers of this magazine that we have something to say about the United States being responsible for the nuclear arms race, and about its conduct in various regions of the world, about support to those who in effect engage in terrorism, and about violations of human rights in America itself, as well as in many countries close to it. But here is what I am thinking about: Is it worthwhile for the sake of that to set up a summit meeting with which our nations and people on all continents associate their hopes for peace, and for a secure and tranquil life? Abusive words are no help in a good cause.

I see the concept of such an important meeting differently. We in Moscow, naturally, are well aware of how profound is all that divides us. Studying what U.S. political leaders have been saying in recent years, we could not disregard statements about which we do not agree and which, frankly speaking,

in many cases we are indignant about. At the same time we have not lost hope that, after all, points of contact, areas of common or parallel interests can be found. Indeed, there are reasons for this. Take, for example, the statements to the effect that nuclear war must not be waged and that it cannot be won, or that the United States is not seeking military superiority. In short, I have been reckoning on having an honest and unbiased conversation imbued with a desire to find a way leading back from the edge of the nuclear precipice; to discuss not myths and stereotypes of which we have had enough, but the real problems, the real interests of our countries, our future and the future of the entire world community.

But there is every indication that the other side is now preparing for something quite different. It looks as if the stage is being set for a bout between some kind of poitical "supergladiators" with just one thought in mind: how best to deal a deft blow at the opponent and score an extra point in this "bout". What is striking about this are both the forms and the content of some statements. The recent "lecture" of Mr. McFarlane is a case in point. It contains not only the full "set of accusations" we are going to be charged with in Geneva but also what I would call a very peculiar interpretation of the upcoming negotiations. It appears that even the slightest headway depends exclusively upon concessions by the Soviet Union--concessions on all questions: on armaments, on regional problems and even on our domestic affairs.

If all this is meant seriously, then it is evident that Washington is not preparing for the event we have agreed upon. The summit meeting is designed for negotiations, for negotiations on the basis of equality and not for signing an act of someone's capitulation. This is all the more true since we have not lost a war to the United States, or even a battle, and we owe it absolutely nothing. Nor, for that matter, does the United States owe us.

But if they are not meant seriously, then the bellicose outcries are all the more inappropriate. Why flex muscles needlessly, why stage noisy shows and transfer the methods of domestic struggles to the relations between two nuclear powers? In them the language of strength is useless and dangerous. There is still time before the summit meeting; quite a lot can be done for it to be constructive and useful. But this, as you well understand, depends on both sides.

Question: What is your view of the Strategic Defense Initiative research program in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations? Can you envisage a mutual agreement prohibiting the development of such systems? And what kinds of verification would the Soviet Union agree to in such a case? If an agreement cannot be reached, what do you foresee in other aspects of arms control?

Answer: Responding to critics of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, official Washington likes to advance an argument it believes deadly--it is after all the Russians that oppose "star wars." If this is so, then it has to be a good and proper program. But if this logic is followed in the nuclear age, a rather gloomy future awaits us.

Our approach, and I hope that of many Americans, to this question is different. There are, we believe, situations, in which both sides are losers. They are nuclear war, the arms race, and international tension. And, respectively, there are situations in which they are both winners. Those are peace and cooperation, equal security, and elimination of fear of a nuclear catastrophe.

As to the evaluation of the "star wars" program, we cannot take in earnest the assertions that the SDI would allegedly guarantee invulnerability from nuclear attack weapons thus leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the opinion of our experts and, to my knowledge, of many of yours, this is sheer fantasy and a pipe dream. However, even on a much more modest scale at which the Strategic Defense Initiative, according to experts, can be implemented as an antimissile defense system limited in its capabilities, the SDI is very dangerous. This project will, no doubt, whip up the arms race in all areas, which means that the threat of war will increase. That is why this project is bad for us and for you and for anybody in general.

We approach what is called the SDI research program from the same point of view. First of all, we do not consider it to be a research program. In our view, it is the first stage of the project to develop a new ABM system prohibited under the relevant treaty of 1972. Just think of the scale of it alone--$70 billion to be earmarked for the next few years. That is an incredible amount for pure research as emphasized even by U.S. scientists as well. The point is that in today's prices those appropriations are more than four times the cost of the Manhattan Project--the program for development of nuclear weapons and more than double the cost of the Apollo program which provided for the development of space research for a whole decade--up to the landing of man on the moon. That this is far from being a pure research program is also confirmed by other facts, including tests scheduled for space strike weapons systems.

That is why the entire SDI program and its so-called research component are a new and even more dangerous round of the arms race which will inevitably lead to a further aggravation of Soviet-American relations. To preclude this it is necessary, as was agreed in January by the minister for foreign affairs of the USSR and the U.S. secretary of state, to prevent an arms race in space. We are confident that such an agreement is possible and verifiable. I have to point out that we trust the Americans no more than they trust us, and that is why we are interested in reliable verification of any agreement as much as they are.

Without such an agreement it will not be possible to reach an agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons either. The interrelationship between defensive and offensive arms is so obvious as to require no proof. Thus, if the present U.S. position on space weapons is its last word, the Geneva negotiations, and one has to be forthright about it, will lose all sense.

Question: Since the time you became general secretary you have taken several steps to improve the Soviet economy. Could you not tell us about the further steps you propose to take? What in your view are the main problems of the

Soviet economy? What changes in the world economy could be beneficial to the Soviet Union?

Answer: Let me start with history. There are problems whose origin was beyond our control. The old regime left the Soviet government with a grim legacy: A backward economy, strong vestiges of feudalism, millions of illiterate people.

Add to this two devastating wars which ravaged a major part of our country, leaving in ashes and ruin much of what the work of the people had created. There were irreparable losses: 20 million perished during the years of the Patriotic War, with millions wounded and maimed. Forty years have passed but our people still preserve the sorrowful memories of the past, and of the bereavement they suffered. To heal the wounds inflicted upon human hearts and upon the land, the Soviet people needed peace and nothing but peace.

It was often written in the West that it would take the USSR some 50 to 100 years to restore all that had been destroyed as a result of the fascist invasion. Having restored the national economy in the shortest possible time, the Soviet people did what would have seemed the impossible. But the fact remains that after the revolution we were forced to spend almost 2 decades, if not more, on wars and reconstruction.

Under those arduous conditions, using our system's potential, we have succeeded in making the Soviet Union a major economic world power. This attested to the strength and the immense capabilities of socialism.

There are also difficulties of a different nature due to our own shortcomings and deficiencies. We make no secret of this. Sometimes we do not work well enough. We have not yet learned proper managerial skills as is required by a modern economy and warranted by our enormous capabilities, i.e., raw materials and skilled manpower resources, advanced science, especially basic science, the support and, as we can now see, the readiness and willingness of people to work better, to improve quality and efficiency.

The imperative of our time is to decisively improve the state of things. Hence the concept of accelerated socioeconomic development. Today is is our most important, top-priority task. Ways to accomplish the task have been determined following comprehensive discussion. We are planning to make better use of capital investments, to give priority to the development of such most important sectors as machine building, electrical engineering and electronics, energy production, transport and others. Attention remains focused also on the agroindustrial complex, especially as regards processing and storage of agricultural produce. In general, we will do all that is necessary to better meet demand in high quality food products.

To improve the functioning of the national economy it will be necessary to further strengthen centralization in strategic areas of the economy through making individual sectors, regions and elements of the economy more responsive to the needs of economic development. But at the same time we are seeking to strengthen democratic principles in management, to broaden the autonomy of production associations, enterprises, collective and sovkhozes, to

develop local self-management and to encourage initiative and a spirit of enterprise, naturally in the interests of society and not to its detriment.

In short, we seek the most rational methods of managing the economy. Large-scale economic experiments are under way, which are aimed essentially at developing a more efficient mechanism of management that would dramatically accelerate the rate of scientific and technological progress, and make better use of all resources. Our objective is that, in solving this task, all levels of material and moral incentives and such tools as profit, pricing, credit and cost-accounting of enterprises should be put to work. That is the thrust of our work for radical improvement in the entire system of management planning.

In addition, we are bringing into play other potentials for speeding up economic development. I have in mind greater discipline and order, demanding more from everyone, from worker to minister, a drive against irresponsibility and red tape, instilling labor ethics and ensuring greater social justice throughout our society.

So we have enough economic problems and things to attend to, and indeed what country has not? We are aware of our problems and we are confident of the capabilities inherent in our social system and our country. I have recently visited various regions and had meetings with many people--workers and farmers, engineers and scientists. And what was common to all these meetings? The need for a drastic change, the necessity to radically improve performance are not only supported by the people, but becoming their demands, the real imperative of our time.

I want to emphasize this: The attention we have recently been devoting to the economy is due not to an intention to set new records in producing metals, oil, cement, machine tools or other products. The main thing is to make life better for people. There is no goal more important to us. This year alone the decision was made to raise the salaries of several categories of employees in public health and science and of engineers and technicians, to improve the material status of a considerable number of retired people, to allocate annually free of charge about 1 million plots of land for planting gardens, for people to have what you call a "second home." We are planning many other steps as well. Their scope will naturally depend on progress in the economy. Of late, positive changes have become evident: The rates of industrial production and labor productivity have increased.

You ask what changes in the world economy could be of benefit to the Soviet Union? First of all, although this belongs more to politics than economics, an end to the arms race. We would prefer to use every ruble that goes for defense today to meet civilian, peaceful needs instead. As I understand it, you in the United States could also make better use of the money consumed nowadays by arms production. This is not to speak of the problems generated by the budget deficit and public debt. The problems of other countries should also be taken into account. While insisting on cessation of the arms race, we also believe it immoral to waste hundreds of billions on developing means of annihilation while hundreds of millions of people go hungry and are deprived of the elementary essentials. We, all of us, just have no right to ignore this situation.

As to the world economy, we are of the opinion that the Soviet Union, and other countries too, I believe, would benefit from ta more stable general economic, monetary and financial situation, from an equitable solution to the problem of indebtedness, from progress towards a new economic order. And, of course, the removal of discriminatory restrictions, of all other obstacles to development of world trade, and further development of the international division of labor in which we and our friends and allies intend to play a more active role. All nations of our planet would stand to gain from such changes. By way of example, the establishment of broad trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States would help create hundreds of thousands of additional jobs in your country.

Question: The Soviet Union is anxious to gain better access to advanced technology developed in the United States. How badly is this needed by the Soviet Union, and primarily for what purpose? If the United States does not provide greater access, where do you intend to turn to obtain this technology?

Answer: The very way you are framing the question gives food for thought. Indeed, is there anyone who is not anxious nowadays to gain access to advanced technology? Everyone is, including the United States--even primarily the United States. I do not mean just the legal purchase of licenses and science-intensive goods or illegal industrial espionage. The United States practices its own specific methods as well. The "brain drain," for example, not only from Western Europe but from the developing countries as well. Or take the activities of multinational corporations, which through their subsidiaries are laying their hands on scientific and technical achievements of other countries. Now they are trying to use the so-called "star wars" research program for the same purpose. As for the Soviet Union, it uses the achievements of foreign science and technology in an incomparably more modest way; though we have never concealed our desire to participate on a broader scale in the international division of labor and to develop scientific and technological cooperation--all the more so since we are going to this "market" not as supplicants, not empty-handed.

The authors of the version that the USSR is allegedly being consumed with a thirst for U.S. technology forget who they are dealing with and what the Soviet Union is today. Having one technological independence after the revolution, it has long been enjoying that status of a great scientific and technological power. This enabled us to make it through World War II, to be the first to blaze the trail in space and to undertake space research on a large scale, to acquire a reliable defense potential, and on the whole, to successfully develop the country's productive forces. Incidentally, how are we to understand the following inconsistency in the U.S. reasoning. To substantiate increased military spending, all they do in the United States is talk about the fantastic achievements of the USSR in the field of technology. When, on the other hand, they need an excuse for prohibitive measures, they portray us as a backward country of yokels with which to trade and, moreover, to cooperate would mean undermining one'w own "national security." So where is the truth? Whom is one to believe?

We speak openly about our dissatisfaction with the scientific and technological level of this or that type of products. Yet we are counting on accelerating scientific and technological progress not through "technological transfusions" from the United States to the USSR, but through "transfusions" of the most advanced ideas, discoveries and innovations from Soviet science to Soviet industry and agriculture, through more skillful use of our own scientific and technological potential. That is the thrust of our plans and programs. At the same time, we would, naturally, not like to forgo those additional advantages which are provided by reciprocal scientific and technological cooperation with other countries including the United States.

The 1970s saw a fairly broad development of such cooperation in the energy field, including nuclear power, in chemistry, space research, cardiology, oncology and other fields. The benefit was mutual and U.S. scientists are well aware of it. This cooperation has by now come to naught. We regret it, but let me assure you that we will survive because we have first-class science of our own, and because the United States is far from having a monopoly on scientific and technological achievements.

By the way, the United States, being aware of this, is trying to apply growing pressure on its allies so that they, too, should not trade with us in science-intensive products. What is more, the United States, under the very same "national security" pretext, places a ban on deliveries of some types of such products to Western Europe and ever more frequently denies access to U.S. laboratories and scientific symposia to representatives of Western Europe.

This is, of course, intended to cause damage to us. But it is not the only objective. The bogey of a "Soviet threat" is also used more and more broadly by the United States in its competitive struggle with its allies to slow down their scientific and technological progress and thus to undermine their competitive positions in the world market. Those designs are becoming increasingly clear. But I do not think that others will put up with the status of unequal partners who would serve as a source of technology while being restricted to a subsistence diet themselves. Overall, this is a shortsighted and futile practice.

Yet, I would not wish to end our interview on a negative note. It is quite obvious that should two such countries as the United States and the USSR, with their immense scientific and technological potentials, continue to cooperate in this area on an equitable basis, this would benefit the whole world, in addition to our two peoples.

I should like to take this opportunity to convey to the readers of your magazine wishes of good endeavor, happiness, and a peaceful future. On behalf of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people, I would like once again to tell all Americans the most important thing they must know: War will not come from the Soviet Union, we will never start war.

Mikhail Gorbachev: I would like to express some views which, I believe, are of great importance for a correct understanding of the problems dealt with in this text.

I must say that lately I have received quite a few requests for statements and interviews from the mass media of various countries. Why was the decision taken to respond affirmatively precisely to TIME magazine's request?

When I read your questions I thought that the very wording of these questions contained an expression of a certain concern in connection with the nature of relations that are now taking shape between our two countries. It is not often that we hear from representatives of American political and other circles an expression of alarm on this score. I thought that this nature of the questions that were presented to me (if I understood it correctly) was a very important element.

Then there is yet another, a no less important reason. It is related to assessment of the present-day situation in the world. This situation is complex and tense, and I would even say explosive. Besides, it has a tendency to become still worse. I will not speak here about the causes of this process. You know very well our viewpoint on this matter. I would rather reply to the question of where we all are at present, in what world we are living. The least of my intentions is to dramatize the situation. But I intend to be frank with you because much depends on the assessment of the situation by both sides. We hold that when we deal with leaders of such powers as the United States and the USSR their analysis of the situation and their practical policy should be permeated with a sense of the tremendous responsibility that rests on them before their own peoples and the whole of mankind.

The reality of our time is that the level of development of science and technology makes the origination of a totally new situation, the commencement of a totally new stage of the arms race, possible. I tried frankly to reply to your questions and I ask you not to treat my replies as a new portion of "propaganda." For it is a fact that already now it is very difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to come to terms, to take some steps toward each other. The mutual mistrust is that great. And if the arms race enters a new stage, if the latest achievements of science and technology are used in practice for those aims, will not one of the sides feel tempted to use the imagined superiority over the other side in order to get a free rein and make the fateful step? A very responsible stage.

But however acute our bilateral relations are, some limitations nevertheless continue to operate today: the existence of military-strategic parity that ensures for both sides a certain degree of security, the ABM treaty, the SALT II treaty that is being observed in practice, the nuclear proliferation treaty, and the treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments. These limitations do exist and exert their influence, although, as is known, attempts to undermine them are already being made: Forces have been brought into play that strive to remove these limitations that impede a further development of the arms race.

Were all these restraining factors to vanish, the competition in the development of ever newer types of weapons would proceed with unprecedented force, because all the steps taken here by one side would be countered by steps taken by the other side. The appearance of a poison is followed by the

appearance of an antidote. Such is a lesson of history that must not be ignored.

At what, then, will we arrive?

I would put it this way: Time is running out; the train might leave if we do not act fast enough. Such is the second reason for my consent to reply to the questions of TIME magazine.

All people want to live, nobody wants to die. So it is necessary to muster political courage and stop the developing sinister process. It is necessary to stop the arms race, to start disarmament and the improvement of relations.

I have already had the opportunity to say, during the conversation with the delgation of the United States Congress headed by Speaker O'Neill that visited Moscow, that we are emphatically for an improvement in Soviet-American relations. Such is the viewpoint of our leadership. We draw sober realistic conclusions from the current situation. It is an indisputable fact that we not only call for an improvement of the situation, for an improvement of relations but also make absolutely concrete proposals and also take on our part practical steps in that direction. It is only natural that in doing so we count on an appropriate response of the American side.

Alas, in response to all our attempts to escape the vicious circle of the arms race and mutual suspiciousness we hear only a negative answer: "No, no, no, propaganda, propaganda, propaganda." But that really is not the way serious politicians behave with their partners.

Nevertheless, we hold that all that we have heard from Washington about the latest steps of the Soviet Union, including our proposals designed to move from a standstill the talks on the nonmilitarization of space, on strategic nuclear arms and on medium-range arms, our decision to end nuclear explosions, etc., is not the final say of the American administration. We hope for this.

Esteemed gentlemen, I regard this part of our conversation, when we are talking here, looking each other in the eyes, as the most important one. We hope that the American public will be clearly and conscientiously informed of our understanding of the current situation in the world and in Soviet-American relations, our understanding of how one must act in this situation.

Our countries simply cannot afford to allow matters to reach a confrontation. Herein lies the genuine interest both of the Soviet and American peoples. And this must be expressed in the language of effective politics. It is necessary to stop the arms race, to tackle disarmament, put Soviet-American relations into a normal channel. Honestly, it is time to make these relations between the two great peoples worthy of their historic role. For the destiny of the world, the destiny of world civilization really depends on our relations. We are prepared to work in this direction.

The situation is acquiring special acuteness also because the political atmosphere in Washington, judging by the information that reaches us, is being

fanned up more every day. Statements are being made that cannot but give rise to surprise and indignation.

The White House and some representatives of the U.S. Administration are intimating that any accords with the Soviet Union on the limitation of the arms race are out of the question. The most that one can hope for, they declare, is the mutual acquaintance of the leaders of the two countries and the drafting of an agenda for discussion in the coming years and even decades. For example, an interview by such representatives of the United States Administration in Armacost and Tower, published a couple of days ago, is couched in this spirit. In short, everything is being done to ward off in advance any possibility of accords between the United States and the USSR on ending the arms race and preventing the militarization of outer space. It is stated in Washington with utter frankness: Whatever the Soviet Union does, the United States under all circumstances will create strike space weapons and antisatellite systems. That's what I call nailing something. First they break off the nailheads and then want somebody to pull them out with his teeth!

What is to be done in such a situation? It is necessary to stop this process. That will be in the interests both of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Countless attempts have been made in the past to force the Soviet Union to its knees, to exhaust it; all that had failed and all such attempts will fail in the future as well.

As for us, we are not declaring the United States an "evil empire." We know what the United States is, what the American people are, and their role in the world. We stand for a new, better stage in our relations. But if matters reach a qualitatively new stage of the arms race, which I have referred to, it will be much more difficult to solve such a task, if possible at all. That is why we call on the United States seriously to reach agreement with us on strategic nuclear arms, on medium-range arms and on problems of outer space.

Well, it seems I have said what was most important. Now I would like to hand over to you the signed text of my replies to TIME magazine's questions so nobody can accuse you of printing anonymous replies (laughter). I draw your attention to the green cover: There is not even a hint of any export of revolution (laughter).

Henry Grunwald: Mr. General Secretary, we are happy to be here to get this interview. We are very glad for the generous time you allocated to us for choosing to convey these thoughts, related to this publication. We too are concerned about U.S.-Soviet relations, and we are not alone in that concern.

Yuo have spoken here about certain people in Washington who want to undermine U.S.-Soviet relations, but President Reagan himself has said on a number of occasions that he feels no hostility toward the Soviet Union, that he is seeking an improvement in relations with it and does not seek military superiority over your country. Do you accept these assurances? And more broadly, what are your impressions of President Reagan?

M. S. Gorbachev: To a certain extent I have already mentioned this in the written replies. We took note of a number of the President's positive pronouncements in 1983 and 1984, including his speech in the United Nations. We took note of his remarks that nuclear war is impermissible, that there will be no victors in it. This is very important. We also paid attention to his words that the United States does not strive for attainment of military superiority over the USSR. This and other positive points in the President's remarks, as it appears to us, offer the possibility to peer into the future together, to overcome the present negative phase in our relations. We believe that it is still possible to set many things right by covering our parts of the road towards each other. That is why we consented to the meeting with the President road towards each other. That is why we consented to the meeting with the President in Geneva. For the same reason, we react so acutely to what is being said today in Washington in connection with that meeting. As an American woman journalist put it, it is intended to work up the American public to such a state that even if the accord reached in Geneva is only on an exchange of ballet companies, people will applaud.

We are in a serious mood and are preparing serious proposals for that meeting--whatever may be said by right-wingers and other personalities around President Reagan. We would not have agreed to the meeting if we did not have faith in the possibility of its positive outcome. Such is our position.

You have also asked about my personal opinion of the President. I have not met with him and it is difficult for me to express my opinion of him in human terms. But in political terms we proceed from the premise that the President was elected by the American people, which is respected by our people, and we are prepared to do business with him.

Henry Grunwald: I would like to ask a question concerning space weapons. In your written replies to our questions and in the conversation with us you said the Soviet Union wished to reach accords in three areas: strategic offensive arms, medium-range nuclear arms and space arms. Yet, from the commentary that one reads coming from Moscow, there seems to be really no room for talks on the problem of space weapons because the only thing you want with regard to space weapons is to stop them, starting with research. So I want to ask if the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct talks on space weapons? For it is known that you, too, have conducted and are conducting extensive research in this field and, therefore, evidently realize that it is impossible to stop this activity entirely on the strength of talks. One can only reach accord on some agreed-upon levels or limits.

M. S. Gorbachev: A very fundamental question: If there is no ban on the militarization of outer space, if an arms race in space is not prevented, then there will be nothing at all. This is our firm position. And it is based on our most responsible appraisal that takes into account both our interests and those of the United States. We are prepared to conduct talks, but not on space weapons; not on what specific types of these weapons which will be allowed to deploy in outer space. We are prepared to conduct talks on preventing an arms race in outer space.

The Soviet Union proposed that agreement be reached in Geneva on the prohibition of the development, including research, testing and deployment of strike space weapons. It is necessary for a ban to embrace very phase of the inception of this new class of armaments. Research, indeed, is a part of the program to develop space weapons. So when we see that the United States appropriates tens of billions of dollars for this research, we absolutely clearly realize the real plans of the authors of those programs, and the eventual goal of the policy on the deployment of weapons in space that stems from those programs.

When we speak about research and the need to ban it, we naturally do not mean basic sciences. This research is going on and, obviously, will continue. What we speak about is development projects in the United States carried out under assignments and contracts from the defense department; moreover, about those which have reached a point when there are bound to appear models and experimental prototypes and when out-of-laboratory, field experiments and tests are to be conducted--in short, when everything necessary for the subsequent stage of designing and producing appropriate systems is being done. When the United States asks us if it is possible to verify compliance with an appropriate ban, we say it is. Verification with the help of national technical means is possible at the stage I have just described. If we now can discern car license plates from space, we will most certainly be able to monitor out-of-laboratory, field tests. The main point here is that if the process is stopped in the initial phase of the so-called research, any interest in the subsequent stages of the development of space weapons will evaporate. Who will then be willing to squander resources?

However, if tens of billions of dollars are spent on research, no one, naturally, would like to stop halfway. And when weapons are ultimately placed in space, the process will get out of hand altogether and we will reach, as I have already said, a situation the consequences of which will be impossible to predict.

And you can be certain that the other side will not be sitting on its hands.

Talk about a purely research character of the SDI is basically meant to conceal the extensive process of the development of space-based weapons systems.

The fact that the United States is now planning to test second-generation ASAT systems is fraught with serious consequences. We will have to react to this adequately. In fact, what it amounts to is the testing of certain components of space-based ABM systems. Moreover, we have to reckon with Washington's negative response to our proposal that the United States join our moratorium on nuclear explosions.

The U.S. government also refuses to stop tests because it needs them to develop nuclear pumping for laser-based ABM systems. But these are components of a future space-based ABM system. And what if the program is put into top gear? Let America think seriously about the consequences of this.

Evidently someone in the United States has decided that the possibility of overtaking us has put a hold on the Soviet Union. But this is an illusion. It was not achieved in the past, and it will not be achieved now. We shall find a response, and quite an adequate one at that. But then all the talks will be buried and I do not know when it will be possible to return to them. Perhaps, this prospect is to the liking of the U.S. military-industrial complex but we, anyway, are not going to play into its hands.

Our proposals are meeting the interests of both the Soviet people and the people of the United States. And this is precisely what riles representatives of the military-industrial complex most of all. And, one must say, there are many of them in the United States, quite a few in the government, too; and we feel that, of course. But I must say that we have a huge reserve of constructiveness. We will continue to urge the U.S. Government to take a different approach. Great opportunities would then be opened in the field of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range systems alike and the way would be clear for a serious process of improving relations between our countries and for resolving other international problems.

I recall that when I was in Dnepropetrovsk recently, a worker asked: What are these "star wars" plans made by President Reagan? Will the United States not deceive us? I replied: Do not worry, we will not let ourselves be deceived. But if our partners in the talks show readiness to look for mutually acceptable solutions, we will make every effort to reciprocate.

I think our position is humane and unselfish: It fully meets the interests of the Soviet Union, the United States and all other peoples as well.

Don't you Americans have any better use for your money? We know that you have problems that must be solved. Perhaps, we do not know them as well as we do our own--but we do know them.

Ray Cave: I would like to ask two questions. I have sensed in your words concern over certain events related to U.S. statements and actions during the past few weeks. I have in mind, specifically, the announcement of the forthcoming ASAT tests and also the very strange case of chemicals with which Americans were supposedly dusted in Moscow. Evidently, these two events cannot be considered auspicious in the context of intensive preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit. Have these two events come as a surprise to you and have they seriously damaged summit preparations?

M. S. Gorbachev: As for preparations for the Geneva summit, I can assure you that we are preparing seriously for it, attaching immense importance to that meeting, and pinning serious hopes on it. True, we do hear the pronouncements of our partners which show that Washington attaches a more modest importance to the summit and characterizes it as a mere get acquainted meeting and a possibility to draw up an agenda for some future, remote talks. But it is too great a luxury for the leaders of two such states as the Soviet Union and the United States to go to Geneva merely to get acquainted and then admire Lake Geneva and the Swiss Alps. When the international situation is so tense, it would be an unpardonable luxury.

In short, we are seriously preparing for the meeting and will do everything possible for it to yield tangible results for the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Ray Cave: In a magazine article to be released this week, former President Nixon says that an agreement limiting or reducing arms, but not linked to restrains on political conduct, would not contribute to peace. In short, he is saying that the first priority of a summit should not be arms control, but potential stress points between the United States and the Soviet Union. Do you share that view?

M. S. Gorbachev: It was interesting to hear from you about Mr. Nixon's viewpoint. As for specific issues we will discuss with President Reagan in Geneva, we are working on them in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State and the White House. This process is continuing and I would not like to go into detail at this stage.

But I have associations of a different nature with Nixon's name. There was a time when, despite a complex situation, we managed to find possibilities and ways for developing cooperation with the U.S. government under Nixon. Very important decisions were made at that time.

Recall the 1960s. The international situation was complex at that time too. But it was in 1963 that a very important banning nuclear tests in the three media, still effective today, was concluded.

All this belongs to history. But history is good when its lessons are not wasted. So now we must look at the situation from responsible positions of statesmanship and find ways to improve the situation and to put right Soviet-U.S. relations.

Henry Grunwald: I wonder if we could venture one or two personal questions. You have started quite a new style of politics in the Soviet Union. You have gone out and met many people, mingled with workers, and been very visible. Do you like this work style? What benefits does it bring?

M. S. Gorbachev: First, it was V. I. Lenin who taught us this style. He spoke constantly about the need to live in the midst of the masses, to lend an ear to them, sense their sentiments and reflect their aspirations in practical policy. So the priority in this belongs to V. I. Lenin, and such personalities appear once in a century.

Second, this practice is not new to me. I behaved this way when I was working in the Stavropol territory, and here, in Moscow, before I was elected to my present post. Many people among us work in the same way. Perhaps the press is now publicizing more and covering wider my trips and meetings with people.

On the whole, we have a need for precisely such a style of activity. We are faced with problems and rather big ones too. They should be solved in a new way. In the course of recent years we have been analyzing the present stage of our development, and there is a need to acquaint the working people with

the conclusions at which we arrived, to check them out on the attitudes of the people, and then submit them to the upcoming congress of our party.

So the point is not whether I like this style or not, but particularly that it is impossible to work in a different way now if we wish to achieve practical results in the policy we have worked out.

Henry Grunwald: Another personal question: You have proposed very deep changes in Soviet society and have already replaced quite a number of officials in the course of this process. One assumes that this will be continued. Are people afraid of you?

M. S. Gorbachev: I do not think so. What is being done in our country now has not been conceived by myself alone. This reflects the consensus of our entire leadership. We are convinced that our actions are right. These problems are ripe and must be solved. The main conclusion one arrives at as a result of talking with people is that our proposals and practical steps are ardently supported. Moreover, in the party and among the population, there is the desire to act at a still faster pace. We hold that while it is necessary to show courage and resolution, at the same time we must exercise caution. We shall continue acting in the spirit of high responsibility toward our people. And people demand from us a firm policy, so that words should not differ from deeds. So we are strictly controlled in this sense. And the fact that we are not acting in an atmosphere of greater openness shows our democracy still more. So it is not a matter of people being afraid. Quite the contrary, they welcome our approach.

I do not want you to think, however, that I am trying to present everything in a rosy light. A profound process is taking place in the country. It requires much readjustment from all of us. Naturally, this affects people, personnel, and has a bearing on the work methods of everyone. So the change of some personnel does not mean that we have an extraordinary situation. This is a natural process and it is bad when this process stops.

So the matter is not that some or other personnel changes reflect some political struggle around the questions we are solving now. We believe that readjustment is required from everyone and everywhere--from us, in the republics, in the oblasts, in every work collective. This will, naturally, require vast efforts from the party. However, because the line we took reflects the urgent needs, it is resolutely supported by our people. This gives us confidence that we are acting correctly.

In conclusion I would like to express an idea that can be regarded as cardinal to our entire conversation. It was said, justly, that foreign poilcy is an

extension of domestic home policy. Because this is so, I would ask you to give some thought to the following: Because we are making such grandiose domestic plans, what external conditions must we be interested in? I leave it to you to furnish the answer.

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FROM THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF ANTIWAR FORCES IN THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 30-40

[Article by Dr of Historical Sciences R. Yevzerov, written on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Zimmerwald Conference]

[Text] An ornithological trip had been organized on four carts from the Swiss city of Bern at the beginning of September 1915. By way of a circuitous road the tourists proceeded to the Zimmerwald hamlet. Here, in the small hotel, the fictitious tourists, 38 representatives of the labor movement from 11 countries, held an international socialist conference from 5 to 8 September; this was their first practical international action against the raging imperialist war.

Ever since then, the name "Zimmerwald" has become part of history as a symbol of the international antiwar struggle waged by socialist forces. The principal merit for this and, above all, for the organization of the Zimmerwald left--the dynamic nucleus of the international labor movement, which opposed the imperialist war and its supporters--belongs to the bolsheviks, to V. I. Lenin above all. It was he who assumed the main burden of the tremendous theoretical, ideological-political and organizational work involved in substantiating and achieving the first international antiwar association of socialist forces under wartime conditions in history.

The circumstances under which the Zimmerwald Conference was prepared and took place was exceptionally difficult. The course of the war and the related difficulties increasingly triggered a desire for peace and the discontent and ferment among the masses. On the other hand, in the face of the growing revolutionary situation, the maneuvering of the power of the haves and their accomplices within the ranks of the labor movement intensified. They were hoping to resolve in a new way, through different means, the same old tasks of domination and rivalry and the weakening of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, which constituted the actual content and meaning of the imperialist war.

The variegated picture of the opportunistic views and oscillations in the ranks of the labor movement included both overt social chauvinism and centrism of various hues. The centrist opposition to governments and to social

chauvinism, which swung from left to right, demanded peace and favored international unification under its own aegis "of all revolutionary forces"--pro-imperialist as well as revolutionary.

The camp of the revolutionary social democrats was very small and splintered.

However, the struggle against war urgently demanded the rallying and concentration of the internationalist forces of the socialist movement and the development of their active efforts, considering the growing discontent of the masses. The implementation of this task was impossible without a scientific analysis of events and without determining, soberly and realistically, the ways and means in waging the antiwar struggle. Above all, the popular masses had to be won over and a theoretically substantiated and consistent concept of the struggle for peace and against the continuing imperialist war had to be implemented. This required the ideological, political and organizational distancing from social chauvinism and its defenders and the turncoats in the labor movement, who had joined the imperialist forces and violated the unanimously adopted antiwar resolutions of the Stuttgart (1907), Copenhagen (1910) and Basel (1912) congresses of the Second International.

For the second time, all truly internationalist and revolutionary forces had to be rallied and helped to carry out their vanguard role in the growing antiwar protest of the masses.

Finally, it was necessary to draw closer to the hesitating segment of the centrists and all hesitating elements within the socialist movement, who held primarily pacifist views, to the extent to which they were ready and able to struggle against the imperialist war and social chauvinism.

In general, the international unification of antiwar socialist forces had to be structured on an essentially Marxist basis. Its formulation and the implementation of such a union were the historical merits of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party he headed.

The prime task of the Marxists was to define the nature of the war which had broken out and which the governments and their supporters presented as a just cause for the whole nation. Lenin's theses "Tasks of the Revolutionary Social Democracy in the European War" and his manifesto "War and the Russian Social Democrats," which proceeded from the study of the events and were based on the resolutions of the Second International, immediately characterized the war as imperialist. The social chauvinists and the centrists, who were trying to whitewash "their own" imperialists and "their own" governments, spoke out against this.

Antiwar work needed the further intensification and substantiation of this characteristic. Lenin considered that the specific historical evaluation of the war under way had to be "based on the full clarification of the nature of imperialism, including its economic and political sides" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 93).[1] What made this even more important was that major differences existed in the views on imperialism within the ranks of the labor movement itself, and even within its international and revolutionary segment.

At the start of the world war the development of problems of imperialism, built on concepts which Lenin had formulated before the war, became particularly intensive as an inseparable component of the struggle for strengthening and unifying internationalist forces. This is confirmed by a number of Leninist works which preceded the writing of his classical book "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism," and were timed for the Zimmerwald Conference, as well as the double issue of the journal KOMMUNIST (Nos 1-2, 1915), which was edited by Lenin and came out before the start of the conference, the purpose of which was "to rally everyone against social chauvinism and Kautskyanism" (vol 27, p 280).

In accordance with Lenin's thought that imperialism is a separate epoch "in terms of actual relations" (vol 26, p 30), both the KOMMUNIST editorial and Lenin's article it carried "The Collapse of the Second International" contained the summed-up characterization of imperialism as monopoly capitalism, which essentially included all five of its basic features. By the time of the second Zimmerwald Conference, which was held in Quintal (Switzerland) in April 1916, Lenin had already completed the classic study of imperialism, which was embodied in the book "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism" and in a number of related works.

Lenin's interpretation of events countered the views of those who denied the economic base of great-power imperialist policy and refuted the Kautskian concepts of "ultra-imperialism" and hopes for reform in capitalism for the sake of "rescuing" it from the imperialist devils.

Lenin's analysis of the social changes in the transition to imperialism was also the base in defining the views of the various classes, social groups and political parties and trends concerning the war. This exposed its actual, its imperialist nature which, as a rule, had still not been understood by the broad masses, concealed and distorted as it was by various parties and organizations, including the majority of the socialist labor movement.

In turn, the clarification of the essential problems, such as where did social chauvinism come from, what had given it strength and how to fight it, was based on Lenin's study of imperialism and the economic and social foundations of opportunism, including centrism and Kautskyanism.

Therefore, the question of the struggle against the war became part of the overall context of the imperialist epoch, which marked the unparalleled aggravation of the needs of the popular masses, oppression by the trusts, militarism, political reaction, and the tremendous intensification of the class struggle, and which proved that the development was assuming a much more spasmodic, catastrophic and conflicting nature. At the same time, resolving the problem of the war and of means to stop it was determined by yet another radical historical change, repeatedly mentioned by Lenin, who emphasized that "in the common recognition of the Marxists, objective conditions for the defeat of capitalism have already matured" (ibid., p 119). The draft resolution written by Lenin for the Zimmerwald Conference read: "Socialist objective conditions have fully ripened and the current war is a war waged by

capitalists for privileges and monopolies, which could postpone the collapse of imperialism (ibid., p 282).

Lenin's scientific analysis includes the starting points for the contemporary theoretical work of the communist movement in clarifying the features of the qualitatively new situation of the growing menace of a nuclear war and the new tasks and possibilities of the anti-imperialist and antiwar struggle. Today's Lenin's demand of "considering more profoundly the reasons and significance" of war and "not allowing to suppress one's mind with the horrors of war" (vol 30, pp 68, 70) is particularly relevant today.

Even before the outbreak of World War I, the struggle for peace and against the arms race had been one of the most important components in Lenin's activities. He considered the tasks of the social democrats were to do everything possible to prevent or stop the war and to use the crisis the war had generated to accelerate the fall of the bourgeoisie. At the same time, Lenin firmly refuted fabrications to the effect that the socialists were interested in the war not only because it "complicates the immediacy of the revolutionary explosion" (vol 9, p 381) but, above all, because the working class "is the natural enemy of war, for wars conflict with its aim" (vol 17, p 188). Such was Lenin's principled position, proving the groundlessness of the efforts of the opponents of Leninism (including the false interpretation of the history of the Zimmerwald Conference) to prove that to Lenin the struggle for peace was merely a "means for revolution."

Lenin invariably concentrated his attention on the struggle for the preservation of the lives of millions of people, the achievements of civilization and culture and the very conditions for the existence of human society. Thus, Lenin and the bolsheviks, following the Marxist tradition, most sharply and irreconcilably exposed the world war imposed upon the peoples, full of the "horrors of contemporary 'patriotic' barbarism, under the circumstances of the tremendous technical successes of large-scale capitalism" (vol 26, p 22) in the antiwar documents of the RSDWP of the autumn of 1914, contrary to chauvinistic exultation and all-justifying "defense." Lenin and the bolsheviks condemned both imperialist plunder as well as the savagery which doomed the proletariat to the greatest sacrifices and the destruction of its most energetic and capable part, its vanguard. "Putting an end to war, peace among nations and an end to plunder and violence are precisely our ideal," Lenin wrote on the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference (ibid., p 304). He noted in the text of the manifesto which was adopted the words "there are no sacrifices or burdens too great to achieve the objective of peace among nations."

Categorically condemning the imperialist war, the bolsheviks worked to end it and to protect mankind from similar wars. However, they also realized the difficulty of the task "precisely because," as Lenin pointed out, "this war is quite deeply rooted in the sum total of relations in the imperialist age" ("Leninskiy Sbornik XXXVII" [Leninist Collection 37], p 50). The assessment of the bolsheviks consistently pointed out the "impossibility of any kind of democratic peace without a number of revolutions and without a revolutionary struggle in each country against its own government" (vol 26, p 305). This conclusion was basically contrary to the imperialistic and social chauvinistic

aspirations to continue the refined barbarism of war behind a screen of words, fictitious love of peace, and the centrist line of separating the struggle for peace from the class struggle under the Kautskian slogan of "During Times of War, Struggle for Peace; During Times of Peace, Class Struggle!"

Lenin proved that the democratic struggle against the war and the revolutionary struggle for the reorganization of society were organically interrelated and indivisible. That is precisely why defining the possibilities and means of putting an end to the imperialist war led to the slogan of converting the war from imperialist to civil which, given the circumstances, was the only correct revolutionary withdrawal from the war.

As to the general slogan of the struggle for peace, Lenin considered it understandable and acceptable and, as a first step, expressing the changed moods of the masses and a beginning of the unification of the leftist forces within the socialist movement. He believed, however, that the parties of the working class should not be limited by this slogan and be bogged down at the initial stage but be guided by the realistic prospects which were provided by Lenin's conclusion of the transformation of the war from imperialist to civil, unlike other interpretations of the war and means of struggling against it, which were abstract and alienated from reality.

Furthermore, contrary to the schematism which was fraught with leftist underestimating of just national wars under imperialism, Lenin emphasized that although the imperialist epoch "had created the present imperialist war, it could also create a different war" (vol 54, p 476). The draft resolutions of the left-wing social democrats drawn up for the Zimmerwald Conference included the recognition of the legitimacy of the war waged by oppressed nations (colonies in particular) against their oppressors and expressed the socialists' sympathy for this struggle (see vol 26, pp 282, 383). He also bore in mind the situation in which "in the course of the war it becomes a question of the defense of democracy" (vol 30, p 262). Lenin ascribed tremendous importance to the changes which the revolution and victorious socialism could make to meeting demands, such as limitation of armaments and democratization of foreign policy, "which could not last without socialism" ("Leninskiy Sbornik XXXVII," p 47).

History brilliantly confirmed the entire depth and perspicacity of Lenin's analysis. This analysis became the methodological foundation and incentive for the development of the problems of unity in the struggle against the threat of war, formulated at the 7th Comintern Congress. Its accuracy was confirmed in World War II as well by the existence of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the unity achieved within the ranks of the resistance. As Lenin had predicted, the tasks of democratizing foreign policy and limiting armaments acquired an essentially different aspect and realistic possibilities after the victory of the October Revolution and after the formation of the world socialist system. This particularly applies to the present, when the question of preventing a nuclear catastrophe has become most urgent.

The radical conclusion of the need to put an end to the imperalist war through revolution demanded the realistic consideration of the fatal influence of the outbreak of the social crisis on the toiling masses and the working class and,

at the same time, the identification of its role as a mainspring for further progress. Lenin's dialectical analysis under conditions in which "the appearance indicates a total breakdown" led to assessments filled with historical optimism: "War is the greatest of all crises. Any type of crisis means (with the possibility of a temporary restrain and regress) the following:

a) accelerated development;

c) b) aggravation of contradictions;

b) c) their identification;

d) collapse of everything rotten, etc.

"This is the viewpoint from which the crisis should be considered...: does any crisis contain progressive and useful features?" (vol 26, p 372).

Views on the simple result of the revolutionary situation created by the war were alien to Lenin's historical optimism: "How long will this situation last and will it become further aggravated? Will it lead to revolution? Neither we nor anyone else could know this. This will be indicated only by the experience in the development of revolutionary moods and the conversion to revolutionary actions by the progressive class, the proletariat," Lenin wrote on the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference (ibid., p 221). According to Lenin, however, historical development is determined by the general trend of the work of the socialists, leading to revolution; the objective nature of occurring processes does not reduce in the least the role of the party of the working class to passively following the "course" of history. The main problem is not whether the social democrats will be able to prevent a war or, in general, whether the revolutionaries could guarantee the success of a revolution but the need to behave as socialists. In the autumn of 1914 Lenin wrote that "there may be another half a century of slavery until a socialist revolution occurs; however, what will be the legacy of our own age, what will our contribution be?" (ibid., p 370).

The answer to what could a revolutionary proletariat party "contribute" under extremely difficult conditions is found in the activities of Lenin personally and the bolsheviks in the development of the Russian and international revolutionary movements and the unification of all internationalist forces.

Lenin's scientific determination of the mechanism of and prospects for the revolutionary process was an important structural component in such activities. In continuing his work of the problems of a revolutionary situation, which he had started even before the war, he provided, as we know, a summing-up Marxist characteristic of the situation in the work "The Collapse of the Second International," the publication of which was timed for the Zimmerwald Conference. Lenin made a close study of the process of change in the moods of the masses and the conflicting impact of the war on them; he called for exerting active influence on the masses, so that as their vague protest developed it could be converted into a clear revolutionary aspiration.

"In order to develop the 'ferment in the masses' a left-wing declaration and program are needed. They are needed because of this ferment and in order to convert it into a 'movement', in order to develop the 'ferment' within a decaying International," Lenin wrote during the period of preparations for the Zimmerwald Conference (vol 49, p 117), pointing out that the active efforts of the party of the working class are an inseparable component of the growth of the revolutionary situation.

In Lenin's view, the new historical conditions provided the possibility of cooperation among revolutionary movements in all warring countries, even though their immediate tasks may be different. Therefore, it was reality itself that placed on the agenda the internationalist objective of a common proletarian movement against the governments and the bourgeoisie of all countries at war, achieved through the revolutionary initiative in all countries, provided by the "power of the example set by serious revolutionary actions, their advent and development" (vol 26, p 289). The objective foundation for this was provided by the effect of the law of uneven economic and political development under imperialism, discovered by Lenin, a law which enabled him to formulate in his work "On the Slogan of United States of Europe," which was published on the eve of the Zimmerwald Conference, the universal historical conclusion that "...the victory of socialism is possible initially in a few countries and even in a single separate capitalist country" (ibid., p 354).

Lenin's slogan of striking at one's government in the imperialist war, which was equally mandatory for socialists in all warring countries, played an important role in preparations for such an "access" to revolutionary actions. It was a question not of anarchic efforts to respond to the war with extremist actions, which would mostly help the government to defeat the antiwar and anti-imperialist forces opposing it, but of making use of all possible ways, means and methods ofproletarian class struggle, taking decisively into consideration the wartime circumstances and the dynamics of the revolutionary situation.

The close interconnection between the problems of the antiwar and the revolutionary struggle, dictated by World War I, placed them within the context of the general correlation between democratic demands and the making of a socialist revolution. Its accurate understanding was of essential importance in realistically directing the class struggle of the proletariat and thwarting efforts to pit against each other the democratic reforms of the socialist revolution, the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism. Furthermore, the internationalists as well underestimated the significance of the struggle for democracy in terms of the struggle for a socialist revolution, discarding as "unattainable" a number of antiwar and other democratic demands, the right of nations to self-determination in particular.

Lenin proceeded from the need to distinguish under capitalism between unattainability in its absolute economic meaning (such as the elimination of crises) and its conventional political meaning (such as democratic demands). However, the "unattainability" of the second kind required not abandoning the formulation of respective demands but their more decisive and consistent implementation and the intensification of their anticapitalist and

revolutionary line. "Based on democracy already attained and exposing its incompleteness under capitalism," Lenin wrote, "we demand the overthrow of capitalism and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie as a necessary foundation for the elimination of the poverty of the masses and the full and comprehensive implementation of all democratic changes" (vol 27, p 62). All of this applies to the threat of war as well, for "the greatest manifestation of democracy is found in the basic problem of war and peace" (vol 40, p 92).

The fact that wars are rooted in the imperialist economy determines the utopianism of any kind of dreams of "peaceful" capitalism. However, it does not eliminate the need to promote the implementation of democratic antiwar measures, although they cannot be firm without socialism which can oppose the aggressive aspirations of imperialism. It was precisely the victory of the socialist revolution that, during the very first years after the October Revolution, already created the possibility of taking palliative measures to ease the difficult situation in the world, make agreements with the segment of the bourgeoisie willing to do so, and seek means of utilizing "the few chances for a peaceful evolution of capitalism toward the new system, something which we, as communists, have no great faith in but are willing to try, which we consider our duty" (vol 44, p 407), as Lenin was subsequently to note in connection with the 1922 Genoa Conference. For a number of decades the land of the soviets has fulfilled this duty by promoting the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence and collective security; in our days it has formulated the peace program and is defending the need for civilized intergovernmental relations and the pursuit of a course of peace and progress. Today the possibility of preventing a thermonuclear war, which is being prepared by imperialism, is entirely attainable only thanks to the power of real socialism, the military and strategic parity it has attained with the imperialist world and only on the basis of the development of a mass antiwar struggle.

Lenin's program for the antiwar revolutionary struggle of the proletariat included a definition and clarification of its proper methods, ways and tactical means. They were essentially indicated by Lenin as early as August 1914 and were subsequently developed and enriched. Thus, the revolutionary-internationalist line formulated in the slogan of the conversion of the imperialist war into a civil war was concretized within the set of measures which could become the initial steps for its implementation with the maximally active participation of the masses themselves. In his correspondence during the period of preparations for the Zimmerwald Conference, Lenin frequently emphasized that acknowledgment of the revolution will remain a mere phrase unless the practical problems of revolutionary action have been analyzed, discussed, tested and explained to the masses in detail. At the conference he said that "one cannot make a revolution without explaining one's revolutionary tactics" (vol 54, p 375).

Lenin realized that the Marxist program of action could secure for the internationalists the support of the proletarian masses and other basic population strata only as a result of systematic propaganda, agitation and organization. His works during the period of preparations for and holding of the Zimmerwald Conference contain numerous thoughts, conclusions and stipulations relative to such activities. He believed that one should not

ignore the feelings and illusions of the ignorant mass but be able to influence it; that the forces of the petite bourgeoisie should be used, if it turns to the left, and that it should be helped to "learn" from the errors, should it turn to the right; that it was necessary to come closer to the pacifist elements in the labor movement as well, without abandoning one's own positions in this case; and that it was important to be able to approach the young.

In addressing the Zimmerwald conference, Lenin emphasized the task of "taking the new situation into consideration and applying new, specific means of struggle" (ibid., pp 375-376). It was necessary to learn new revolutionary types of organization and struggle which are "put quite rarely on the historical agenda," but the significance and consequences of which "would extend for decades ahead" (vol 26, p 259). Under those circumstances, resolving the problem of establishing clandestine working class organizations became extremely urgent.

Lenin's antiwar course was concretized in terms of all realms of working class activities, organization and representatives. Also taken into consideration were the specific features of the individual countries and worker movement detachments, as well as the expediency, in a number of cases, of undertaking a slower and more cautious conversion to decisive tactics. Nor were the antiwar requirements addressed to governments ignored: immediate conclusion of an armistice, immediate initiation of peace talks, and rejection of annexations and reparations. All that Lenin asked was that they not become an opportunistic trite statement. He emphasized the importance of exposing governmental policy stipulated in secret treaties. He ascribed great importance to the struggle against the economic difficulties which were afflicting the working people. Special emphasis was put on work within the armed forces. The main attention was concentrated on the formulation of the specific objectives of the struggle against a specific evil. We know what great efforts Lenin made in resolving all such problems and, on a broader level, the formulation of the common strategy and tactics of the labor movement, and the great importance of these Leninist ideas in the current activities of Marxist-Leninist parties.

Lenin not only laid the basic foundations for an international antiwar unification but also did a tremendous amount of most difficult work for its implementation. The most important in it was the unification of revolutionary Marxist forces and their transformation, despite the counteraction of social chauvinists and their accomplices, into the nucleus of a broader international antiwar unity.

As he headed the revolutionary Russian workers movement, Lenin closely followed the processe of shaping the antiwar revolutionary forces in other countries as well. He ascribed particular importance to changes in the German social democratic movement, for it was here that the heaviest blow had been dealt at the international organization of the workers and it was here, the first among the large parties, that "the loud voice of protest had been raised by the comrades who had remained loyal to the socialist banner" (ibid.,p 337): K. Liebknecht, R. Luxembourg, F. Mehring and other revolutionary social democrats.

Lenin, who took into consideration the typological specifics of the different detachments in the labor movement, closely studied the strong and weak aspects of the views held by the honest socialists in the Latin countries, the prospects of the revolutionary labor movement under the historically developed influence of anarchism in particular. Based on the British example, he established the characteristic features of the antiwar protest under the circumstances of a government by a particularly experienced bourgeoisie and a relatively greater freedom of expression of the feelings of the masses.

Lenin highly rated the fulfillment of their international duty by the Serbian socialists. He considered exemplary the accurate parliamentary tactics of the Bulgarian left-wing socialists; he classified among the better revolutionary and internationalist elements of the international social democratic movement the ranks of the Marxists in Poland and the Netherlands, although he did not agree with them always and in everything. He proudly noted the speeches of Eugene Debbs, one of the U.S.socialist leaders, the revolutionary views of individual socialists in Switzerland and the growth of antiwar opposition in the Scandinavian countries, all of which spoke of positive shifts in the global labor movement.

Lenin clearly anticipated the difficulties of preparing for and holding the Zimmerwald Conference and the break with social chauvinism on an international scale. However, he was certain of the need to work tirelessly for the unification of revolutionary forces. He ascribed particular importance to the theoretical and practical-political Marxist definition of unity and most persistently called for the formulation of a common ideological declaration which would answer the basic problems of the labor movement. As a result of Lenin's persistent, painstaking and purposeful efforts in the course of preparations for the Zimmerwald conference and in the course of the conference itself.[2] The revolutionary social democrats were not only able to submit their own draft resolutions and manifesto but also to defend their positions and to set up a group which was described as the Zimmerwald left. It included eight delegates, representing the bolsheviks, the Latvian and Polish ("Rozlamovtsy") social democrats and the German, Swiss, Swedish and Norwegian left social democrats. K. Liebnecht, who had been drafted in the armed forces by the German authorities, sent a letter expressing his solidarity with the left flank of the conference.

Resolving the problem of the unification of antiwar forces within the general framework of the conference was even more difficult. Headed by Lenin, the Zimmerwald left made tireless efforts to prevent the failure of the conference or its turning to the right, in order to achieve an actual antiwar unification of forces and win over those who were mistaken or who hesitated. That is precisely why Lenin and his fellow workers agreed to compromise decisions while preserving and establishing their own principled positions, emphasizing their readiness to "defend the decisive Marxist position concerning the tasks set by the imperialist epoch to the proletariat" and voted for the manifesto and resolution adopted at the conference.

In assessing the results of the conference, Lenin indicated in detail that its manifesto, although suffering from inconsistency and reticence, actually

included a number of basic concepts expressed by the Zimmerwald left on the war and the struggle against it and marked a step toward the ideological and practical break with opportunism and social chauvinism. Lenin explained to the revolutionaries who had rejected this document that "refusing to take this step forward together with the minority of Germans, French, Swedes, Norwegians and Swiss, while we preserve our full freedom and total opportunity to criticize inconsistency and to work for something more, would be sectarianism. To refuse to go along with the growing international movement of protest against social chauvinism for the reason that this movement is slow and is taking 'only' one step forward, and that it is ready and willing to take a step back tomorrow would be bad military tactics..." (vol 27, pp 41-42).

Zimmerwald became a step toward the restoration of unity within the ranks of the labor movement in the struggle against war. Providing an expression and a shape to the growing mass discontent with the war, in turn, the Zimmerwald Conference became a center of gravity for the antiwar forces. Within a 6-month period, 13 parties of the 28 social democratic parties and eight socialist opposition groups from 18 countries in Europe and America proclaimed their affiliation with the Zimmerwald movement or their support of it.

The revolutionary forces which could restore the international unity within the labor movement on a principled basis developed and strengthened within the Zimmerwald ranks. The Zimmerwald left, headed by Lenin, played a leading role in this matter. Soon afterwards, on Lenin's initiative, the first printed publication of the "nucleus of left-wing social democrats of all countries who have a clear, precise and complete answer to the question of what to do and where to go" was drafted on his initiative (vol 49, p 163). The pamphlet "International Leaflets" No 1, in German, containing documents from the Zimmerwald left, was published. Its positions were further developed in the journal VORBOTE ("Herald") which began publication in January 1916. In its publications the Zimmerwald left engaged in painstaking work on the development, in a revolutionary spirit, of the basic principles included in the resolutions of the conference, their practical interpretation and extensive familiarization of the proletarian masses with their content. In trying to test the accuracy of one decision or another in the course of the practical struggle, the leftist forces helped to realize the need for a revolutionary withdrawal from the war.

All of this allowed Lenin and the bolsheviks to strengthen the truly revolutionary forces in the labor movement and carefully to nurture the "nucleus" of the new, Third International, established at Zimmerwald.

Today, when the situation is substantially different from the times of Zimmerwald, its experience in rallying the consistent fighters against war and the extensive unification of disparate yet as a whole peace-loving forces, remains significant. Lenin's methodology in assessing the most crucial problem and the lesson drawn from his theoretical, tactical and organizational activities in preparing, establishing and developing the Zimmerwald movement at a dramatic turning point in history are particularly relevant in our restless times. They earmark a number of important lines of struggle for achieving the broad antiwar unity which is vitally necessary precisely now,

when any effort of fanning the flames of a nuclear war could bring about irreversible catastrophe.

It is a question, above all, of the need for an accurate class analysis of the reasons for imperialist wars and the threat of war and their socioclass origins, which helps us to identify the foundations and mechanisms of the possible development of events and their political trend. A profound and clear assessment is needed of the contemporary crisis in capitalist society, the search by the imperialist ruling class of a solution to it through military preparations, the growing role of the military-industrial complex in the leading imperialist countries and the place and possibilities in the corridors of power of these countries of realistically thinking political personalities, who could turn the West's political course away from confrontation and the arms race and toward the restoration of detente. Particular attention should be focused on the current specific features in the status of the labor movement and to determine the means of energizing possibilities and capabilities of the working class, which is in the center of our epoch, in the struggle against wars.

Bearing in mind the full complexity and alternating dynamics of social processes in the present age, the intermediary stages in their implementation and the consequently determined flexibility in the tactics of the labor movement and its development, proceeding from the experience of the masses, it is of exceptional importance always to subordinate all communist activities to the final revolutionary objective, not abandoning it, regardless of historical turns and ensuring the maximal participation of the working people in the struggle for attaining it.

The solution of the gravest problems of war and peace, organically related to the cause of social progress, as we learn from the experience of the struggle waged by Lenin during the period of the Zimmerwald conferences, must become the cause of the broadest possible popular masses, on the basis of the unification of all antiwar forces and the utilization of all opportunities, paying main attention to educating the working class and awakening itfor action.

The formulation and implementation of an independent and efficient position by the communist movement is a mandatory prerequisite for such unification. This can be achieved, as contemporary experience proves, only through painstaking and purposeful work aimed at ensuring the coordination of the various trends and viewpoints. No less important is the ability to defend the basic communist position in such a way that ideological quarrels and differences in political convictions, which exist within the framework of the labor movement and are even more inherent in forces outside of it, would not block fruitful interaction on the most important problem of our time: the prevention of thermonuclear war, the cessation of the arms race mortally dangerous to mankind and the gradual conversion to disarmament. What are needed are both an ability to compromise and a maximal identification and support of anything positive among those who, erring, do not support the Marxist views or avoid them but are ready to cooperate within the ranks of broad antiwar movements for the sake of the struggle against the most sinister danger of turning our planet into nuclear ashes by imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Subsequent references to V. I. Lenin's "Complete Collected Works" will indicate volume and page only.

2. In addition to clarifying their positions in the press, the Leninists timed for the beginning of the conference the publication in the German and Russian languages and distribution among the delegates the resulting pamphlet "Socialism and War (The Attitude of the RSDWP Toward the War)," which included as an addendum the main antiwar bolshevik documents and the resolution adopted on the national problem at the 1913 Boronino Conference. Also distributed were individual leaflets in the French language of the resolution of adopted at the Bern Conference of the foreign sections of the RSDWP of February-March 1915. Lenin also wrote the draft resolution of the left-wing social democrats for the Zimmerwald Conference and organized preliminary conferences with left-wing socialists; he submitted a report on the basic problems of the antiwar struggle. It was in the spirit of Lenin's suggestions that the draft theses of the Polish "Rozlamovtsy," substantially redrafted by the left wing, were adopted as the basis for the draft.

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TOWARDS THE 27TH PARTY CONGRESS

DEVELOPING THE PLAN MECHANISM OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 41-51

[Article by O. Yun, USSR Gosplan deputy department chief]

[Text] Our country has created a powerful scientific and technical, production, economic and social potential. However, as Comrade M. S. Gorbachev emphasized at the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, life dictates the need for substantially accelerating socioeconomic progress. The solution of this problem calls for the active advancement of the entire economic mechanism and making the means and methods of planned economic management of the economy, socialist economic management, consistent with the characteristics of the contemporary level of development of production forces.

Comprehensive production mechanization and automation based on the application of progressive technological processes is a characteristic feature of our time. As a result of the high-level productivity of a comprehensively mechanized or automated line, shop or automatic enterprise, their stoppage or disorganized work sharply lower their volume of output or lead to the production of faulty goods or worsening of economic indicators. Under such circumstances, the growth of worker responsibility for ensuring the reliable work of machines and equipment is inevitable. The labor of the workers in tuning such mechanisms approaches that of engineering and technical personnel in terms of nature and required skills. In order to service comprehensively mechanized or automated production facilities, the workers join brigades in which the work is structured on the principles of reciprocal supplementing of efforts and mutual aid, thanks to mastering several professions and skills. Here labor relations are based on an independently developed organization and voluntary observance of labor discipline, i.e., on self-management. The brigade is the type of association of working people in which everyone voluntarily accepts the rule of his own association. Its labor front is established by a contract with the enterprise administration. No one has the right to include in or exclude from a brigade a worker without the agreement of entire brigade collective or its council.

Since production technologies are improved as a result of the active utilization of the achievements of science and technology in the machine systems, science becomes a direct and main production force. Comprehensive production mechanization and automation are possible only on the basis of the

comprehensive technological utilization of the achievements of scientific and technical progress. They ensure the conversion of the economy to primarily intensive development. This leads to changes in production structures and ratios and affects the nature of the training of specialists and their relations within the production process.

1

In order to accelerate production intensification, the familiar 12 July 1979 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree deemed it necessary to convert to the formulation of a system for long-term and current plans for economic and social development, on the basis of the 20-year Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress. Scientific and technical, economic and social comprehensive target programs and programs for the development of individual areas and territorial-production complexes began to be formulated and systematically secured with all types of resources. It is thus that planned reproduction ratios include efficient trends in the development of science and technology, defined by the scientific organizations, taking into consideration their reciprocal influence, significance of results for the national economy and the resources necessary for their application.

This system of plan documents was already formulated in drafting the 11th Five-Year Plan and, unquestionably, proved justified as a whole. However, the plan structure requires further improvements.

In the same manner in which during the period of the industrial revolution at the beginning of the 19th century the conversion to production technology, based on the use of workers and of power-generating and transportation machinery, led to the development of the power industry and transportation as independent sectors, at the present stage in its development, production automation has raised the question of making data processing a separate production sector.

Under the conditions of computer data processing, information is acquiring all the characteristics of the social product: it is being created not for its own needs but for meeting the need for information of the other members of society; it has a consumer value, determined by its usefulness in resolving user problems; it requires socially necessary outlays of labor and materials (in terms of computer and office equipment and mathematical programs) for its reproduction in socially necessary volumes and supplying it to the consumer.

The work on including the processes of information reproduction for social needs must be completed as quickly as possible, the more so since communications, i.e., the transmission and the receival of information has long been an independent sector. As long as activities related to data processing are planned and considered a nonproduction type of work, considerably outstripping in terms of its pace the growth of output of material products and energy, it will be inevitably held back. This will also hold back the automation of production and management processes and, as a consequence, overall economic and social progress.

The necessary changes must be made in planning and accounting methods and indicators with a view to accelerating the automation of technological processes. At the present time, the system of indicators used singles out no more than two technological production methods: manual labor and mechanized (automated) production. In order to increase the attention paid to production automation, the methodical instructions on the elaboration of long-term and current plans, the plan forms and indicators and accountability and statistical documents should have for each sector and enterprise indicators of development of automation and technical production standards (share of goods produced with the help of each separate technological method) and the formulation of respective incentives.

2

During the period of industrialization of the national economy, when a significant share of resources was channeled into the development of new industrial sectors while the technical retooling of traditional ones was carried out at a slower pace, substantial differences existed among enterprises in terms of technical facilities and levels of labor productivity. At that time extensive plan indicators were needed, setting up individual assignments for each sector, rayon, enterprise and individual worker: what and how much to produce, what resources to use, and what percentage of the created output to be allocated to the general state fund.

The use of said indicators as a value guideline in stimulating the collectives under the conditions of a conversion to intensive development does not encourage in the individual worker, enterprise and sector the desire to identify all its possibilities and reserves in the formulation of their plans. The plan can be fulfilled more easily when the assignment is lower and resources are greater. The draft plans submitted by enterprises to ministries and by ministries to the USSR Gosplan reduce, as a rule, production possibilities while increasing resource requirements. The central planning authorities are not realistically able fully to determine the actual possibilities and needs of the individual regions, sectors and enterprises without the assistance of the labor collectives, for which reason the plants are inevitably insufficiently substantiated. The overfulfillment of plans by some enterprises and the underfulfillment by others lead to the violation of established reproduction ratios, the growth of above-norm stocks, the freezing within them of increased commodity output and a lowering of the pace of economic and social development.

The increased interest of the individual enterprise and worker collective in intensifying their activeness and upgrading their labor efficiency can be ensured on the basis of the distribution of labor results in accordance with stable economic standards which guarantee an increase in resources left at their disposal, directly related to improvements in production results.

Standards for wages, economic incentive funds and profit distribution were applied in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Nevertheless, a certain incompleteness was allowed to occur in their application. In addition to the standards, volume indicators were established in the same areas, such as wage fund and absolute amounts of economic incentive, profit and profit withholdings for the

budget. If a sector or enterprise exceeded the planned assignments, the standards worked. However, wherever a deviation from the plan for the worse occurred, as a rule the standard was shifted in favor of the volume indicator, as a result of which the stimulating role of the standards and their purpose, which was that everyone should receive according to his labor and end results--the individual worker as well as the enterprise as a whole--were reduced to naught. Consequently, as was the case in the past, a number of proportions which had been included in the five-year and annual plans (each economic standard is also an economic ratio) became invalid as a result of changes made in the standards.

The 14 July 1983 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree, on the basis of which a wide-scale economic experiment is taking place in the country, involving a number of industrial ministries and consumer services, marked a major stage in broadening the rights of industrial production associations (enterprises) in planning and economic activities and in increasing their responsibility for work results. The 12 July 1985 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree, which summed up the results of the 1984 experiment and stipulated additional steps to increase the influence of the economic mechanism on the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, was another step in the development of an integral economic management system, which would ensure the country's accelerated socioeconomic development. The decree also calls for extending the new methods of economic management to a number of other industrial sectors and transportation and communications enterprises starting with 1986. The plan indicators of enterprises will be reduced and the state plans will formulate assignments on most important physical ratios, ceilings of centralized resources, economic standards and efficiency indicators.

Assignments on the production of basic commodities in physical terms, including new equipment and export commodities, will determine the most important physical ratios in the development of the national economy. In addition to ceilings (funds in the annual plans) for the most important material and technical resources, they will be used to enable the enterprises to establish long-term economic and contractual relations with each other. Long-term economic relations ensure the reliable quality of output, timely supplies and rhythmical work by suppliers and consumers and, therefore, the implementation of the most important balance ratios.

The five-year and annual plans set ceilings for centralized capital investments and construction and installation projects and the installation of fixed capital as a result. Noncentralized capital investments will be based on production development funds. Starting with 1986, the production associations (enterprises) working under the new economic management conditions will be granted the right to use said funds to finance outlays not only for technical retooling but also the reconstruction of operating enterprises and production facilities. They will also be allowed to redistribute funds for production development and assets of the unified fund for the development of science and technology, left at their disposal. This gives the enterprises the possibility of more actively engaging in scientific and technical developments and recruiting scientists and engineers for purposes of perfecting technological processes; they will have the right

independently to select the more efficient ways of upgrading production effectiveness. The needs of enterprises for material and technical resources for work paid out of such funds will be given priority. Intensive development is becoming a reality.

The economic standards for the 12th Five-Year Plan were issued to sectors and enterprises as control figures of the five-year plan (enterprises were included in the experiment on the basis of short-term standards extended through the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan which, naturally, limits its range of influence). On the basis of these standards the enterprises must draft their own five-year and annual plans which will stipulate the establishment of wage and economic and incentive funds and unified science and technology development funds: the higher the net output of the enterprise, the more funds it will have at its disposal. Experience gained in the implementation of the 1984 and 1985 plans confirmed the interest of the enterprises in high (but realistic) production development indicators: in virtually all sectors involved in the experiment, planned assignments for basic economic indicators were higher than or matched the control figures. This eliminates the aspiration to obtain an easier plan and promotes the use of a "counteroutlay economic mechanism." The volume assignments of the five-year plan may be refined in the annual plans without changes in stipulated standards. As a result, the five-year plan is based on stable economic ratios which must be met regardless of the pace of development.

At the same time, stable economic standards governing the distribution of end enterprise output not only contributes to the formulation of stressed plants but encourage enterprise collectives to overfulfill their obligations. As confirmed by the data of the experiment in five ministries, 1984 assignments for production marketing and all production efficiency indicators were overfulfilled. The conversion to planning on the basis of standard methods in defining outlays and formulating efficiency assignments creates prerequisites for energizing enterprise economic activities and provides an impetus for the initiative and creativity of labor collectives.

3

Two aspects in enterprise activities are important from the viewpoint of the national economy: first, the way the enterprises meet the need for commodities they produce and, second, at the cost of what outlays and with what labor efficiency is this accomplished?

The first problem is resolved above all by upgrading the balancing of plans. However, plan balancing on the national economic level is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for balancing proportions on the enterprise level. The USSR Gosplan coordinates commodity production and consumption by drafting 400 material balances for the five-year plan and 2,000 for the annual. The USSR Gossnab breaks down the variety of produced and distributed goods into 15,000 items, wherease the ministries classify commodities into 50,000 types. In assigning suppliers to consumers by the USSR Gossnab, this variety is subdivided another 10-15 times. The national economy produces 24 million different types of industrial and agricultural commodities. The coordination between their production and consumption is specifically achieved by the

associations (enterprises) through contractual relations. This ensures the refining and realizing of basic reproduction ratios, above all in physical terms.

Direct economic relations between producers and consumers and the signing of procurement contracts between them will enable us to intensify the social nature of the formulation of labor targets, determine the resources needed for their implementation and improve plan balancing. However, contractual relations must be extended not only to commodity procurements but also to joint work by commodity producers and consumers, with a view to upgrading quality and minimizing production outlays in both. In this case, the contract becomes the method for the real and voluntary unification of enterprises on an extradepartmental basis, for the sake of jointly resolving scientific and technical, production, economic and social problems (agroindustrial, scientific-production and other associations). Here as well the power of the labor collective becomes the supreme authority. Bearing in mind the structure of developing associations and changes in production relations, enterprises must amend the organizational structure of production management. The functions of ministries and departments as well must be refined as a result of the broadened economic autonomy and responsibility of enterprises.

With extensive development, resulting from the commissioning of a relatively high number of enterprises every year, the annual review of economic relations was a production necessity. Production intensification does not require the reassigning of suppliers and consumers for the entire volume of output or the "regular" break of economic relations with all consequent negative aspects. It suffices for the new relations to cover the increased output, granting the enterprises, on the basis of existing economic relations, the right to determine themselves the specific variety and quality and procurement deadlines. At the present time, however, most relations are established through the annual and reciprocal assigning of supplies and consumers.

The conversion of enterprises to direct long-term economic relations will require refining the functions of the Gossnab: its main function will be to shape, together with the USSR Gosplan and the sectorial ministries, and in accordance of the ratios of the five-year plan, efficient economic relations among enterprises. This will make it possible to abandon the annual funding of a considerable share of material resources allocated to the enterprises.

In accordance with the interests of the national economy, enterprise activities should be rated above all in accordance of the fulfillment of their contractual obligations. This had already been stipulated in the 1979 decree. Nevertheless, due to mental inertia, in practice, enterprise activities continued to be assessed on the basis of, and workers encouraged to implementation volume plan indicators. However, with a significantly greater variety of commodities actually produced by the enterprise, compared with the planned figure, this allows it to fulfill its variety plan officially and to produce commodities not needed by society.

The increased attention paid by party and economic bodies to the implementation of enterprise delivery obligations is yielding tangible results. Since 1982 the share of enterprises entirely fulfilling their

contractual obligations has increased by more than 12 percent. As a whole, however, contractual discipline remains low. Some of this is due to objective reasons. Contractual relations have still not been extended to the transportation system. Hence some of the instability in the work of its users. Unquestionably, however, the main reason for underprocurements is the insufficient level of organization of the production process at the enterprises.

Under the new economic management conditions, stricter requirements have been set concerning this indicator: material incentive funds are reduced by 3 instead of 1 percent per each percentile of nonfulfillment of contractual obligations. An enterprise which has met its contractual obligations in full is awarded a 15 percent supplement to the incentive fund. This yielded immediate results. In order to ensure the necessary conditions for the full implementation of contractual obligations, in the course of the formulation of their plan the enterprises try maximally to concretize relations with suppliers and consumers. This has inevitably upgraded the balancing of their plans. As a result, the enterprises of the machine-building industries engaged in the economic experiment have improved the implementation of their procurement obligations; the number of enterprises failing to fulfill contractual obligations has diminished. In 1984 enterprises and associations of the Ukrainian food industry, Belorussian light industry and Lithuanian local industry ministries fulfilled their contractual obligations in full. The responsibility of suppliers for the prompt implementation of obligations on comprehensive procurements will be significantly increased starting with 1986. The cost of correcting defects detected by the customer and returning the goods because of low quality will now come out of the material incentive funds of supplying enterprises.

4

The Law on Labor Collectives, which was passed in our country, is aimed at the further development of the initiative of the working people. This is also the purpose of broadening enterprise economic independence in the utilization of earned funds.

Production development funds are not subject to confiscation or centralization by the ministry. They are left entirely at the disposal of the enterprises and may be used for them in carrying out necessary projects during subsequent planning periods. The enterprises themselves formulate and adopt plans for the technical retooling of production facilities, financed from the assets of said fund.

An enterprise which can produce the necessary output with a smaller staff can save some of the normed wage fund and use it to increase the wages of the remaining workers. It is thus that the progressive Shchekino experience, which was not developed under the old conditions, is given a material base and scope for dissemination. As a result, the entire increase in output in all ministries involved in the experiment in 1984 came from increased labor productivity. Furthermore, the number of production personnel in the enterprises of three of the ministries declined.

The possibility also appears for the most painless solution of the problem of wages of engineering and technical personnel. The engineering and technical worker with higher education is engaged in more difficult work than the worker with secondary education training, for which reason he should earn more on the basis of distribution according to labor. Currently, wage ratio between them is 1.1:1. This has hindered hiring graduates of technical VUZes in production jobs and the intensification of public production through the application of scientific and technical achievements. At the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum and the Conference on Problems of Accelerating Scientific and Technical Progress reasonable concern was expressed on the subject of the lowered prestige of engineering work. Under the new economic management conditions, the enterprise's management has the right, together with the trade unions, to raise wages of engineering and technical personnel by one-half and that of workers for high-quality work by up to 24 percent. The collectives are making active use of this right. However, we cannot fail to be concerned by a trend toward equalization which is appearing in this connection: in all five ministries which worked under the new conditions in 1984, wage and salary supplements averaged 10 to 15 percent of wage and salary scales. This is clearly inconsistent with the range of abilities and the creative activeness of the personnel. Nor does this improve the ratio between engineering and technical personnel and worker wages. Further work must be done in this direction.

The possibility of independently controlling all assets of the production development fund and part of the science and technology development fund, and encouraging the achievement of high end results with fewer workers encourage enterprise labor collectives to make active use of the results of scientific and technical progress, although the features of the economic experiment have still not become fully apparent because of the short time which has passed since the application of the standards was undertaken. The most successful application of the new equipment was achieved at the enterprises of republic ministries, where the relative simplicity of technological processes made it possible to replace obsolete equipment and, therefore, to obtain quick results on a sufficiently broad scale. The task of the USSR Gosplan and Gossnab is to provide the enterprises with the full set of equipment needed for technical retooling and reconstruction, without which no intensification would be possible. Let us reemphasize that the stable and lengthy nature of the work of economic standards is a necessary prerequisite for the active utilization of enterprise successes in science and technology. In the future, it would be expedient for the development production fund to be increased both from amortization withholdings left at the disposal of the enterprise as well as increased production profitability, turning it into the only source of financing enterprise technical retooling and reconstruction.

Obviously, under such circumstances it would be expedient to concentrate the activities of the central planning bodies and sectorial ministries above all on the use of essentially new technologies and products developed within the target scientific and technical programs, the development of specialized scientific production associations, new construction and expansion and radical reconstruction of operating enterprises.

The use of the sociocultural measures and housing construction fund must be approved by the labor collective. The main task here is to ensure all the necessary resources for this fund, as stipulated in the 12 July 1985 decree. Since the ratio between the amount of labor and the social and consumer benefits accruing to every working person will be observed better, it would be expedient systematically to increase the assets of this fund, making it the basic source of satisfaction of the social needs of enterprise workers. The decree stipulates that during the 12th Five-Year Plan the assets of this fund must become one of the main sources of financing housing construction, children's establishments, prophylactic clinics, Pioneer camps and other nonproduction projects of operating enterprises.

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The use of economic standards will make the enterprise entirely dependent on the end results of its work in terms of its development, wages and satisfying the social needs of the collective. This inevitably raises the question of the accurate evaluation of such results, particularly in terms of value.

The extensive development of the national economy and the need for its fastest possible industrialization have led to setting wholesale prices which are only insignificantly higher than production costs. The orientation toward production intensification has raised the question of the more accurate reflection of the value of the product and the level of socially necessary labor outlays in commodity prices. Starting with 1967 the capital-labor ratio was introduced as a price-setting factor in the guise of payment for production assets and, starting with the 1970s, so was production quality. Important additional factors stipulated in the new CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree include higher category production-technical commodities the wholesale price markup of which may be as much as 30 percent. Wholesale price discounts for commodities certified as first category will be 5 percent for the first year, 10 percent for the second and 15 for the third. The further manufacturing of such items will become unprofitable to the enterprise.

In order to ensure the stability of five-year plan assignments, the 1979 decree stipulates that for the duration of the five-year plan wholesale prices in industry, cost prices in capital construction and freight rates will remain stable.

The wholesaleprices for industrial output, effective as of 1 January 1982, somewhat streamlined economic relations among enterprises and sectors. However, they had been set on the basis of the 1980 level of outlays and, consequently, were not based on the ratios of the 11th Five-Year Plan and were unable to stimulate their observance. Furthermore, the assignments of the 11th Five-Year Plan were set in old prices. Their recomputation in terms of the new prices of the approved five-year plan led to changes in all of its cost ratios.

In order to ensure the stability of planned assignments, in the future new prices must be set together with the five-year plan and the plan itself must be issued to the performers in new prices. This calls for making the setting

of new prices consistent with the organization of the work on drafting the plans. The areas in which prices are changed must be defined by groups of products in accordance with planned growth of labor productivity in planning their reproduction and the level of balancing with the need for variety, developed for each planning level. The violation of this principle inevitably leads to setting prices on the basis of individual rather than socially necessary outlays and, consequently, to their unjustified increase.

In signing their contracts, the enterprises should be given the possibility of setting their own prices for their commodities, based on the rules set by the USSR State Committee for Prices, for items which play no decisive role in shaping reproduction proportions or affecting the living standard of the people. With fixed prices set for the most important types of raw materials, materials and finished products, this could not lead to price anarchy. It would enable us, however, to take more fully into consideration developing supply and demand ratios. The economic experiment, which granted the production association (enterprise) the right to set wholesale prices for semifinished goods for intraministry consumption and for experimental batches (prototypes) of goods for which no prices have been set, as well as markups to wholesale prices for efforts to improve the consumer qualities of delivered products, compared with current standards, is the first step in this direction. Contractual prices will be set also for especially fashionable goods, starting with 1986.

At the same time, in order to increase the interest of enterprises to produce new and scarce goods, to reduce the production of obsolete commodities and thus to increase the role of price setting in ensuring the balancing of the national economy, in the case of prices set on a centralized basis the extent to which needs are met on the basis of the proportions included in the five-year plan must be taken more fully into consideration.

Under the conditions of the intensified development of output, the financial bodies must amend their tasks. In converting to machine technology, their main purpose was to ensure the maximal accumulation of state budget resources needed for centralized financing of socialist construction. Today the center of attention must shift to providing enterprises with equal economic conditions for economic activities.

Enterprise gross profits reflect not only the results of the labor of their collectives but also the social conditions under which they function and which differ with each enterprise. The enterprises have different equipment facilities, use manpower with different skills and exploit natural resources of different value. Consequently, the economic results of enterprise work become inevitably different.

In order to ensure comparability in the results of the work of enterprise collectives using their own manpower, currently a certain percentage of the value of the goods created as a result of the utilization of more efficient resources granted to the enterprise by society is withheld as payments for assets.

The development of true cost accounting calls for a procedure according to which no single social resource of varying consumer value and, therefore, ensuring different labor efficiency, may be used by the enterprise free of charge. It is a question, above all, of the fastest possible institution of payments for the land, consistent with its economic evaluation, and payments for the use of skilled manpower. Without this, differential rental 1 and part of the value of the added product created through skilled labor in the training of which the enterprises did not participate are kept by the enterprises. At the same time, payments for assets should be consistent with the percentage of assets created by the enterprise as a result of centralized capital investments, for the funds set by the enterprises out of their own or borrowed assets have been already entirely paid for. Another variant would be to introduce payments for centralized capital investments made by all production enterprises without exception.

The introduction of payments for the use of goods and resources so far considered free of charge, with a standardized distribution of profits, would reduce demand for such resources and ensure their more economical consumption.

Such fixed payments (which should include the turnover tax) would constitute the guaranteed contributions of enterprises to the state budget.

The profits left at the disposal of the enterprises, after fixed payments have been made, will correspond to the contribution made by their collectives to the value of the added product (cost accounting or net profit). Since the collective of the individual enterprise works not only for itself but also for society at large, some of the cost-accounting profit, based on fixed standards, should be contributed to the budget as well.

The standardized distribution of profits will make enterprises interested in increasing output, saving on material, labor and capital resources, increasing public production efficiency and maximally satisfying social requirements at the lowest possible cost. Such standards as well should remain unchanged over the five-year period. Without this the enterprises would be unable to determine the share of the results left at their disposal as a result of their work on technical retooling and production reconstruction. This would inevitably restrain their activeness.

In order to increase the interest and upgrade the responsibility for decisions related to enterprise activities, it would be expedient to set up in ministries and departments sectorial centralized funds for production development, material incentive and sociocultural measures and housing construction, from the standardized withholdings from enterprise cost-accounting profits.

In order to ensure the better combination of sectorial with regional interests, some of the payments for the land and skilled manpower (to the extent to which the local authorities provide its training), should go to the local budgets in the same way that today they are already receiving 50 percent of the payments for water. This will give the local authorities the real possiibility of coordinating the activities of all enterprises and organizations on their territory in terms of land use, environmental

protection, utilization of manpower and development of the production and social infrastructure.

As the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum emphasized, whatever our approach to the economy may be, in the final account everything comes to the need for major improvements in management and the economic mechanism as a whole. Immediate and energetic steps must be taken in order to improve the entire set of problems.

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THE INVENTION PROCESS: REAL AND IMAGINARY

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[Article by Engineer Ye. Temchin]

[Text] The task of the fast qualitative updating of production and achieving the highest level of labor productivity in the world was assigned on a most urgent basis to our national economy at the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The intensification of the socialist economy and the growth of its efficiency depend directly and to a very great extent on the degree to which the national economy will make extensive and consistent use of advanced equipment and technology, the aptness of their formulation and the extent to which they are truly new. In terms of such assignments, a purposeful and well-organized invention activity must play an exceptionally important role, for it is impossible to conceive of a truly new and truly progressive equipment and technology without original technical solutions on the level of inventions.

The history of scientific and technical progress invariably leads to the conclusion that it is a chain of major and minor inventions and discoveries. Each one of them led to the subsequent necessary step in the progress of human thought, making the further ascension up the endless spiral of knowledge and social practice possible.

Inventions have grown to a massive scale in our country. Over the past 10 years alone, some 666,000 authorship certificates have been issued in the Soviet Union. According to the USSR Central Statistical Administration, the economic benefits of the utilization of inventions was 3.1 billion rubles in 1984, a 25.4 percent increase over 1980.

From a spontaneous process with totally unpredictable results, in our country inventions have become a system which the state can control to a considerable degree, directing the scientific and technical creativity of the people to the solution of the most promising national economic problems. The overwhelming majority of inventions are made in our country in the course of the implementation of the plans for new equipment. This is an advantage of socialist economic management which should be utilized in the best possible manner. The task is entirely realistic.

Most Important Property of the State

The Sovnarkom Regulation on Inventions, dated 30 June 1919, signed by V. I. Lenin, stipulates that "inventions acknowledged as useful are proclaimed the property of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic...." It further states that "no fiduciary stamps and payments for declarations and issued certificates shall be charged." With this decree, the socialist state assumed total responsibility for inventions.

In order to invent something, one must know first of all what has already been invented. Some 20 years ago, in addition to other centers for scientific and technical information existing in our country, the USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries decided to create a unified patent information center. The role was initially assigned to the All-Union Patent Information Scientific Research Institute (VNIIPI) which somewhat later took over the "Patent" printing press with its branches. This entire service was subsequently reorganized into the Poisk Scientific-Production Association. The idea was to concentrated within a single pair of hands the gathering, processing and delivery of information needed by the consumer relative to inventions made in the country and abroad.

Today the Soviet Union has a huge array of documents totaling in excess of 18 million descriptions of inventions belonging to the world patent fund. The information is stored in the All-Union Patent-Technical Library (VPTB) and the film libraries of the Poisk NPO [Scientific-Production Association] of the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries.

The next logical step was taken at the end of the 1970s: the decision to create a state patent information system (GSPI), the purpose of which was to speed up the delivery of information needed by consumers. The Poisk NPO and the VPTB operate on the upper levels of this system, collecting absolutely all relevant data. The sectorial and territorial centers are the second level. With the help of the Poisk NPO they developed their own patent stocks, dealing primarily with problems of interest to the sector or to enterprises and establishments located within the area serviced by the specific center. According to the plan, the third level should be that of patent subdivisions of scientific research institutes and design bureaus and other consumers of patent information. The purpose of such a hierarchical structure of the system is to bring information closer to the consumers who would not need to turn to the Poisk NPO or to the VPTB on each occasion. The latter becomes necessary only if the nearby center lacks the necessary data. Let us point out that no GSPI analogue exists in the capitalist countries, where practices are different. Inventors are forced to seek the services of various companies specializing in specific scientific and technological areas. This is expensive and obtaining complete information is not always guaranteed.

The GSPI is continuing to develop by completing its patent stocks and speeding up information processing. The Poisk Association, which records bibliographic information on magnetic tape, supplies it on a weekly basis to the centers, thus allowing them to acquire arrays of necessary information. At the present time an experimental system is under way of supplying bank data by telephone. This will accelerate even further the delivery of information to users.

Information of interest to consumers may be retrieved in literally numbered minutes.

In structuring a uniform patent information system and investing huge funds in its development, the state tries comprehensively to facilitate the work of people who develop new equipment, technology, materials, etc. Today inventors do not have to dig into data records and look for needed materials. A simple question is sufficient for the patent establishments or for the enterprise wherethe person works to contact an information center and have quick access to everything necessary.

The USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries runs an All-Union Scientific Research State Patent Expertise Institute (VNIIGPE). This institute is an element, a structural component of the unified information system we mentioned. It is precisely here that the initial investigation of the efficiency of the GSPI takes place. It is here that all requests for inventions are received. It is also here that experts assess the originality of the suggested technical solution and determine whether it is entitled to be considered an invention and if an authorship certificate should be issued. A very large number of requests are submitted. At the beginning of the 1960s, when the institute was just being organized, nearly 50,000 requests had been received; 20 years later, the number reached 200,000!

Both the Poisk NPO and the VNIIGPE have made a substantial contribution to the organization and development of invention work in the country. While the Poisk subdivisions have significantly speeded up the delivery of information needed by consumers, the institute's experts have accelerated the very process of consideration of requests. In the past, when different departments dealt with this work, it took between 5 and 7 years for a request to be considered, and in frequent cases the suggested technical solution itself became obsolete or else a better one became available. Equipment renovation is becoming increasingly faster. Today, on an average a new machine may be considered new for a period between 3 and 5 years. More than ever before, success is decided by the speed of reacting to anything new and progressive. That is precisely why the USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries has given its institutes the task of intensifying all processes related to inventions.

Some success in this respect has been achieved by the VNIIGPE: today it takes about an average of 1 year to consider a request. We say an average, for some requests, accurately drafted and creating no doubts in the minds of experts and jurists, are considered much more rapidly by the VNIIGPE--about 6 months. Let us point out that the experts work quite intensively. Their efforts could be described as an intellectual conveyor belt. Naturally, they use modern equipment, for electronics have taken over a great deal of the work. But this is not all, for the very technology of the expertise has changed.

In order to maximally accelerate the handling of requests, a special service had to be set up to function like a filter. Its purpose is to sift all improperly drafted documents before they are considered by the scientific and technical experts, thus saving them time and effort. A request is a legal document which should be filled properly. No allowances are tolerated. The task of such preliminary expertise is not only to return to the author or

authors an improperly formulated request but also to explain how to draft it properly.

No fees are charged for requests submitted to the All-Union Patent-Technical Library or for other services to the inventor. Unlike the situation in the capitalist countries, no fees are charged for expertise or for issuing authorship certificate in the Soviet Union, as stipulated in the regulation on inventions. Furthermore, the VNIIGPE has organized free consultations for request authors. Any inventor could meet with an expert and consult on the way the necessary documents should be drafted. Of late, as agreed with the All-Union Society of Inventors and Rationalizers, its local organizations or enterprises, the institute has begun to provide one more service: experts go to the local sites, teach seminars or give consultations.

Having created a one-of-a-kind and expensive system of aid to inventors, the state is steadily improving it, asking the working people in one thing only in return: create new things, think, invent!...

The question, however, is the efficiency with which the system is used. It turns out that last year alone, some 30,000 requests were returned to their authors at the preliminary expertise stage, where the fine points of the suggestions themselves are not studied but attention is paid exclusively to the legal side of the matter. In turn, basic scientific and technical expertise led to the rejection of 70,000 requests, without looking at the suggested inventions.

Such rejections are quite costly to the state, particularly in the case of scientific and technical expert evaluations, for before determining whether or not the request includes an invention it is necessary to study a substantial array of patent documentation and check whether a similar invention has not been developed over the past 50 years. At best, some 2,000 documents must be studied; the number rises to 10,000 if an idea could be of use to several economic sectors. A new design for a coupling may be used in the chemical, petroleum and gas and shipbuilding industries or in many other economic sectors. It becomes necessary to determine whether the same design has already been developed by the personnel in these sectors and whether it is being put to use. It costs the state about 55 rubles to research a single request. If the requester disagrees with the decision of the experts, he has the right to appeal. The appeal must be reviewed by the Control Council for Scientific and Technical Expertise of the USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries. The average cost per review is about 100 rubles. One can easily see what this amounts to with tens of thousands of rejections. Add to this the valuable time wasted by both authors and experts.

Naturally, the expertise system itself is not ideal: there have been errors and cases of unconscientious work. Curiously enough, however, whenever a dispute breaks out between an applicant and an expert and the case is sent for review by the Control Council for Scientific and Technical Expertise of the State Committee, it turns out that in the overwhelming majority of cases the experts were right. Statistical data here are convincing: all in all, unwarranted rejections account for between 1 and 4 percent of the total.

It is important to bear in mind that no more than 10 percent of requests for inventions are sent to the VNIIGPE by individual inventors. The other nine-tenths come from personnel at scientific research institutes, design bureaus and enterprises, which work according to plans for scientific research and experimental design work (NIOKR). One-half of these 90 percent must be returned. Clearly, they must have been drafted at the place of work of their authors. The accompanying documents are signed by heads of scientific research institutes, design bureaus and plants, recommending that the submitted request for authorship certificate be considered. How is this possible?

Patent specialists and expertise workers explain the current rather high percentage of rejections with the fact that the patent services of institutes and enterprises are very weak and that the qualification of their personnel is by no means always on the necessary level. Hence improperly drafted documents and the second-rate worth of the solutions submitted by the requesters and, therefore, the rejections. It is at the places of origin that this matter has been dealt with by untrained personnel and irresponsibly. A careless patent search was made; available data were not properly checked, so that the experts using the same available information are able to establish that the suggested invention was already invented by someone else.

A selective investigation, which was conducted several years ago, indicated that 28 percent of scientific research institutes and 58 percent of industrial enterprises have patent services with staffs of one and that more than 25 percent of the investigated enterprises draft no reports on patent research for the simple reason that they do not carry it out. However, this is not the only, albeit very important, reason for the fact that the flywheel of inventions sometimes idles. There are other reasons also.

One of the indicators in assessing the work based on NIOKR plans is the activeness of the developers; another is the number of requests submitted. Submitting a request for invention is a plus. If other associates submit requests as well, the conclusion is that the entire collective is doing good work in creating new equipment. The fact that, as we saw, in 50 percent of the cases no authorship certificates based on such requests are issued by the VNIIGPE makes no difference! What matters is the fact that the "organized" inventors are active. Let us openly admit that in inventions as well, such a strictly creative area of human activities, the unfortunate "gross output" is felt here as well. We are referring to noninventions. But what if an invention has been made? Authorship certificates are indeed issued for one out of each two requests submitted to the VNIIGPE.

The VNIIGPE experts point out that in recent years certificates have been issued for technical solutions which, although essentially new, are quite insignificant and of no practical value. Why is this? The point is that it is not only a matter of prestige to be considered an inventor but that obtaining an authorship certificate, regardless of the value of the invention, is also to one's advantage, for according to existing legislation, a reward ranging between 20 to 50 rubles is offered for each one. As to whether or not it will be used in the national economy makes no difference. What is encouraged is the very fact, so to say, of creative zeal.

G. S. Nenakhov, head of a group of experts in that institute, sadly told me that an expert will frequently realize the uselessness of a technical solution and that this is nothing but a twist of an already existing invention. Yet he has officially no right to refuse to issue an authorship certificate. There is an element of newness and everything has been properly submitted. Should the expert nevertheless refuse to issue an authorship certificate, the usually experienced petitioner will appeal the refusal and the case will go to the control council for scientific and technical expertise of the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries, where, once again, the formal aspect of the case will be unfailingly considered....

Such touchy situations develop quite frequently. So-called specialists have appeared who manage, applying a variety of tricks, to bypass existing inventions, submit several requests monthly and obtain authorship certificates. Such authors earn substantial funds over and above their salaries although their inventions are totally useless. Such "masters" usually look at someone else's invention and, knowing mathematics, draft something like a matrix of possible variants with which to circumvene it. Practical experience has shown that dodgers, who are quite expert at such "matrix-making" can virtually run cirlces around any invention. A number of loopholes exist to this effect. As a result of such activities, however, from the official viewpoint invention has appeared, whereas in fact this is a totally unnecessary trifle damaging to the state.

V. P. Steshenko, chief designer at the AvtoZAZ Production Association, who is the author of several dozen inventions used in the automobile industry, is convinced that a decisive struggle should be waged against such "inventions."

"But how to do it if the request is filed quite properly?" I asked, recalling my conversation at the VNIIGPE. "On what grounds could the issuance of an authorship certificate be refused?"

"On the grounds that it is insignificant and useless...."

There are at least three things that should be done, suggested the chief designer from Zaporozhe. First, the USSR State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries should formulate a stricter system for issuing authorship certificates, mandatorily taking into consideration the value of the suggested solutions. Secondly, some thought should be given to really upgrading the responsibility of officials who have signed on behalf of their establishment the documents accompanying authorship requests. Thirdly, the system for evaluating the creative activeness of collectives should be radically revised. They should be assessed not by the number of submitted requests and authorship certificates obtained, but on the basis of their quality and real contribution to the acceleration of scientific and technical progress.

In principle, one can only agree with such suggestions, although their implementation is not such a simple matter. For example, what does making the system of issuing authorship certificates stricter and taking the practical value of suggested technical solutions into consideration mean? Some inventions may be of no practical value at a given time but may provide an

impetus for new and productive searching and discoveries. Are we not familiar with such cases? And how to increase the responsibility of officials? This too is no simple matter. They are simply asked to sign the corresponding document. Who then? The authors of the requests or the patent workers? How can a manager have the time to study profoundly each request and to determine the efficiency of a suggested solution? As we can see, the problems which arise are numerous. Nevertheless, certain experience exists in managing invention affairs which, we believe, could answer many of these questions.

The Tallin Lesson

Elsewhere, I have already written about the RET Radioelectronic Equipment Production Association in Tallin. Thanks to properly organized and controlled invention activities, in recent years the enterprise has substantially renovated its output which today not only does not yield to the best world prototypes but in some aspects is even superior to them.... What is equally important is that the inventors here have no quarrel with the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries. They are refused authorship certificates extremely rarely and the new technical solutions they submit are substantial and relevant. There is no chasing of invention "gross output" here. How is all this achieved?

Some 8 years ago the RET Association took over a special design bureau which had been operating also in Tallin and was under the same ministry as the enterprise. The bureau supplied the ministry with designs on the basis of which the RET manufactured its items. In many cases such items were obsolete and below the level reached in this area elsewhere in the world. In assuming jurisdiction over the bureau, the then general director P. P. Melnik immediately went to the designers and told them that so far they had worked poorly and that he would no longer tolerate such work. "We must," he said, "produce first-rate goods, matching the best world models. Let the designers themselves think of how to reorganize this work. The general director gave them time to think, explaining that after that no bonuses for the production of new equipment would be paid unless it included an invention and proved to be better than the best foreign models.

The deadline came and went and, once again, Melnik approached the designers. A number of suggestions had been formulated but the association's general director liked one in particular. It was the development of new equipment not on the basis of prototypes or catalogues, as had always been the case, but of patents and authorship certificates, on the level of inventions. Usually, before starting their design, designers studied models of domestic and imported items and their technical specifications, after which they undertook to develop their own prototypes. In other words, in creating new equipment they compiled what others had already mastered. Yet, it usually takes several years from the birth of an idea to organizing the production of an item. Therefore, in developing so-called new equipment, the engineers operated on the basis of morally obsolete prototypes, for no other way was possible. As a rule, in this century of headlong scientific and technical progress, during the few years of life of new equipment, other more progressive solutions would appear. The bureau designers therefore were earning bonuses for their own obsolete or aging designs as though they were creating new equipment. Such

equipment was new only compared with what the RET had already produced in the past. The entire point was to find a basis for comparison.

We know that even the latest information on new developments is patent information. Long before a technical solution has been applied in industry and the production of a new commodity has been undertaken, the author tries to acquire a protective document which will assert to his priority. Patents abroad and authorship certificates in our country describe the most advanced achievements of scientific and technical progress and earmark its further trends of development.

The decision was made at RET to set up a patent research department. T. Lumi, a young engineer, was appointed its manager. The obligations of the new subunit (as defined by Lumi himself), included not only helping inventors in properly formulating their requests but also organizing patent research. The department undertook to supply developers with all necessary information on technical solutions developed by inventors at home and abroad. Furthermore, Lumi and his comrades set themselves the task of forecasting invention activities for a period of 10-15 years into the future thus indicating to the engineers the lines along which new solutions should be sought, and the areas of promising and unpromising development of inventions. A strict order was established: even before a technical assignment has been given to the designer, the patent experts should find out the new solutions developedin this specific area anywhere in the world and what has already been accomplished by other inventors accomplished. It is only then that the specific targets which are to be given to the designers can be formulated.

The new department went to work and the number of inventions began to increase rapidly. However, a problem arose. In themselves, inventions are merely ideas set down on paper. The point is to convert them quickly into industrial prototypes. In a word, another service had to be set up, not bothered with current production affairs but focusing all its efforts on preparations for the industrial application of inventions and the creation of prototypes. No such service was included in the table of organization. Nevertheless, realizing the usefulness of this initiative, the minister supported it by deciding to allow the RET to establish yet another new department, for which he allocated the necessary funds and personnel. The new subunit included experienced designers, technologists and machine-tool workers. Their task was maximally to accelerate preparations for the production of new equipment based on inventions.

What is the usual path traveled by a new technical idea from concept to industrial prototype? If you are a designer and such an idea has come to you, its development must be included, first of all, in the NIOKR plan. This plan, as always, is crowded with current projects; available people who would engage in unplanned work are never available. One must wait. Finally, when a real possibility appears to begin work, it must be carried out in accordance with all regulation stipulated in various instructions, and according to all state standards which regulate the technical presentation of blueprints and other aspects of design activities. Experimental design is followed by equally troublesome and rigidly regulated technological preparations. Unfortunately, this takes between 5 and 7 years.

The decision was made at the RET to do all types of work not in sequence but on a parallel basis, combining them if possible. Customary long-established procedures had to be violated. Both design and technological work on a new development were undertaken on a parallel basis. In order to speed up things even further, the decision was made to work on the basis of sketches, without waiting for the blueprints and technology to be ready in accordance with all regulations. All of this would be done while the prototypes were being tested and a decision would be made whether or not it was worth to prepare for series or mass production. It is at that point that everything would be processed as required. For the time being, haste was necessary. The winner in scientific and technical progress competition is the one who makes practical use of an innovation faster than the others. The sooner a test can determine the usefulness and economic benefits of an invention, the sooner the question can be resolved of whether or not such an innovation is worth using. The preparations themselves for such production are greatly facilitated in such cases. It is much simpler and easier to take an experimental already tested prototype and draw the blueprints for it, to choose the suitable technology and to define the procedure for the various operations and the necessary equipment, and to develop fittings and attachments. All that remains is to perfect the initial experience acquired in preparing the prototype and to make it consistent with actual production conditions, which is necessary in mass production.

The new work procedure became firmly established at the association. If anyone now develops a new idea, he turns first of all to Lumi's department. The patent experts check the novelty of the idea and establish whether an analogue has been developed elsewhere in the world. If no such analogue is found, the patent experts recommend to the department for the accelerated application of inventions to investigate the technical side of the suggestion. This is done immediately, for that department is not bound by current production affairs and has all the necessary possibilities of quickly producing anexperimental prototype. All that this requires is the presence of the author of the suggestion and the sketches which are made by experienced designers, while the technologists determine the best way to manufacture a sample item. This is followed by the machine tool workers who may also suggest a few things to the technologist and the designer.... As a result, the entire cycle, from conception to the creation of the first experimental sample--takes about 3 months and preparations for production take about 1.5 years rather than 5-7 years as in the past.

The motto expressing the work program of anyone engaged in the development of new items in the association is "each new item an invention and each new item on the level of world standards." In the past 3 years the association has created more than 10 new types of instruments plus the "Estoniya-010-Stereo" radio stereophonic set. All such items were inventions and, which is even more important, were manufactured within a short time. Let us incidentally point out that more than one-third of the RET output has been patented in industrially developed countries.

We must also point out that useful experience in organizing invention work has been acquired by other domestic associations as well. In Leningrad this

applies to the Leningradskiy Metallicheskiy Zavod Turbine Manufacturing Production Association and some others; in Riga, to the VEF and in Sverdlovsk to Uralmash.... The list could be extended. What is much more important, however, is to ask why this experience has not become widely adopted even within the sectors to which said associations belong.

Criteria and Incentives for Innovation

Had the RET general director not prodded the designers in the past and, subsequently, failed to show real concern for renovating the enterprise's output, everything would have remained unchanged. There would have been no trouble and life would have gone on as usual. Equipment described as new but essentially old would have been produced and the proper bonuses would have been awarded. The point is that life is possible either way: one could find himself at the cutting edge of scientific and technical progress or calmly exist on its margin.

Alas, to this day no reliable criteria have been established for rating what is new and what is old equipment. What equipment could be considered new? The one whose features are better than equipment previously produced? New compared to old? But what kind of criteria are these! Could competitiveness abroad be taken as a criterion? At foreign markets, however, frequently everything is determined by fashion. Furthermore, anything which appears on the world market could by no means be described as a technical innovation for, as we already noted, while items are being designed, experimental prototypes are being tested and preparations for their production made, years may pass and it is quite likely that during that period better technical solutions may appear. There is much in favor of taking as a required criterion the existence in the development process of new and more efficient technical solutions or, in other words, inventions. This is convincingly confirmed by the experience of the Leningradskiy Metallicheskiy Zavod Turbine Manufacturing Production Association.

This enterprise works under rather difficult circumstances. Until recently, the ministry was concerned above all with the fulfillment of the plan and no one seriously dealt with reconstruction and retooling production facilities. The logic of the ministry personnel, absorbed in daily production matters, was simple. Was the enterprise coping with the plan somehow? It was. Was it producing good machines? It was. Therefore, no need for reconstruction for the time being.

LMZ machines are excellent. They are eagerly purchased abroad, including by technically developed countries as well. Some 30 percent of the association's output is exported. This is quite natural, for LMZ turbines are of good quality and designed according to the latest word in technology and their parameters meet superior world standards.

How does the collective manage to achieve this? Is its success ensured by intelligent and talented designers? Yes, naturally. The high reputation enjoyed by the Leningrad Turbine Manufacturing system is universally acknowledged. However, there is more to this. The point also is that here they do not look back and are well-informed of achievements in worldwide

turbine manufacturing and trends in the development through the patent service organized at the LMZ. What is very important is that its designers now work not from models but from patents, obtaining this type of information the moment it appears. As is the case with the RET, the LMZ patent service is a first-class participant in the entire creative process, starting with the stage of new machine design. A project submitted by a designer is not considered before the patent experts have established the technical standards of the new development.

Candidate of Technical Sciences G. V. Chuzhin, chief of the LMZ Patent Department, has even developed a formula which helps to assess a project from the novelty viewpoint. Let us note that it was precisely Chuzhin, like Lumi at the RET, who laid the beginning of the active work by the plant's patent experts. However, alone, they were not able to produce anything useful. In Tallin the enthusiasts had been supported by the association's general director. In Leningrad as well, without A. P. Ogurtsov, LMZ chief engineer, no such efficient department would have existed. Truly sharing Chuzhin's ideas, the chief engineer appointed him to head the new service and saw to it that patent work became an inseparable component of new machine designs. This chief engineer introduced a procedure according to which it is precisely the patent expert who determines the novelty of a design. Initially, this procedure made designers dissatisfied. Today no one questions the usefulness of the LMZ patent department. Incidentally, the department pays great attention not only to patent but also to other types of scientific and technical information. That is why the designers are well-informed of what is being done not only in the country but also throughout the world. The legal protection of developments is also ascribed great importance here.

"In supplying goods to third countries, we regularly come across leading turbine-manufacturing companies from Japan, the FRG, France, and other countries. That is why we patent our discoveries in these countries as well, thus enhancing the competitiveness of our output," A. P. Ogurtsov, now general director of the association, recently said addressing one of the collegiums of the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries, which had given a high rating to the patenting and licensing work of the association.

The association is also active in selling licenses. Whereas it sold one license during the 9th Five-Year Plan, by the end of the 10th (by the time Chuzhin had become head of the patent department), six had been sold; 15 licenses have been sold in the first 4 years of the current five-year plan. Even the insignificant share of the earnings left at the disposal of the enterprise cover almost one-third of the entire cost of its scientific research and experimental design work.

In speaking of the RET and LMZ experience, however, we must bear in mind that in this respect the situation is much worse at many, many enterprises and scientific research institutes. Their patent services are extremely weak and insufficiently active. That is why the developers of new equipment do not receive the necessary help from patent experts and are forced personally to procure the necessary information, although in some cases they lack the necessary knowledge and experience for this.

It is true that the situation seems to be changing for the better. The new State Standard according to which patent research is mandatory during all design stages became effective as of 1984. However, like any other regulation, the State Standard could be circumvened, if one so desires. And some do. The reason? The impossibility of observing it because of the underdevelopment of the patent service. In such circumstances, the application of the sectorial standard is sought until the situation improves, for it does not require patent research during all design stages, for it is claimed that otherwise the enterprise would be totally unable to develop and produce items needed by the national economy. Such are the motivations for petitions submitted by ministries to Gosstandart....

Sooner or later, however, said state standard must be met and patent services, naturally, wherever needed, will have to be established. The question is what will they be like and who will be staffing them. For everything rests with people, with their attitude toward the job and the level of their competence. This period of sharp changes in the national economy and its decisive conversion to intensive development sets special and stricter requirements concerning the personal qualities of those who are on the leading edge of the struggle for scientific and technical progress. Personal ability and interest in the work become particularly important. "Not size but skill": This is the way the problems facing our society today must be resolved.

T. A. Lopatina, who replaced Chuzhin, told me somewhat sadly that it is very difficult to find among the young specialists someone with good patent training, for the institutes, as she said, "are giving us dilettantes." This may be somewhat exaggerated but is nevertheless largely true. Courses in patent studies offered by technical VUZs are optional. This means that you can attend or not attend a lecture as you please. The time to put an end to this practice has come. The national economy will require an increasing number of people with full patent training. So far, such specialists are being trained by a small institute, the only one of its kind in the country, within the system of the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries. Scientific research institutes, design bureaus, industrial enterprises, or wherever new equipment is being created, must be staffed by people with patent knowledge. They need patent experts, such as researchers, analysts, lawyers and economists.

In addition to developing efficiet patent services at enterprises, another problem must be resolved: we must eliminate the real threat of a departmental approach in determining what is new in any given development, as well as insufficiently skilled assessments.

In this connection, the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries has repeatedly suggested the creation of an extradepartmental institute, whose assignments would also include the study of existing global achievements, forecast invention development trends in the world, produce generalized information data for the scientific substantiation of state plans for new equipment, etc. Such an institute would by no means be merely a consultative authority. It would have the right to make decisions mandatory for other deparments and be granted administrative functions.

The tasks set by the party for the accelerated socioeconomic development of our society, on the basis of the extensive application of scientific and technical achievements, should be resolved within the shortest possible time. This will require profoundly planned, daring and energetic activities, including in the area of invention management, an area of human activities which is on the cutting edge of scientific and technical progress.

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THE PROJECT: SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

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[Article by Sergey Zalygin; writer's thoughts]

[Text] The course charted by the party--switching socialist social production to the track of intensification, improving its structure and further advancement of the economic mechanism and overall management, creates feelings of profound satisfaction in every Soviet person. In his report at the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M. S. Gorbachev convincingly depicted the main trends in the solution of this problem and emphasized the need for profound awareness of the existing situation and for taking bold and energetic action. "The historical destinies of the country," the plenum stated, "and the positions of socialism in the contemporary world greatly depend on our future work." It was emphasized that the human factor must be energized and that everyone in his job must work conscientiously and with total dedication.

All of us also followed with great interest the CPSU Central Committee Conference on Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress. The conference made a realistic assessment of the situation in our economy and its scientific concept of the further socioeconomic development of the country was unanimously supported by all of us as a most important national project.

Soviet society proved to the world a long time ago that it can cope with peace and wartime tasks which no other society could tackle. Today this tremendous experience must be applied in full, together with the economic and spiritual potential it creates. To accomplish this, however, and for both to yield the best possible results in the elaborated strategy, each one of our initiatives, plans and projects must be put in the hands of people who can master the experience of the past and properly assess all possibilities and requirements not only of the immediate but also the relatively distant future.

In his meeting with metallurgical workers in Dnepropetrovsk, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev emphasized that laying a qualitatively new technical base for production raises new requirements concerning the knowledge and skill of cadres.

The soundness and validity of decisions which are made by them--scientific-technical, economic and social validity--depend on the extent to which the

cadres will meet these requirements and, naturally, on their responsibility, civic exigency and conscientiousness. The latter is particularly important, for unless the masses realize the social significance of a given problem the human factor cannot be properly energized.

The Soviet writers as well are excited by the questions now formulated by the party, inspiring them, in turn, to participate in the psychological restructuring of public consciousness in the spirit of the new requirements. Naturally, they are attracted by the various aspects of life. This becomes a matter of individual inclination and attachment, without which a writer cannot exist and, naturally, of their strictly personal experience.

I, for example, can simply not fail to feel excited by problems of reclamation and water resources, perhaps because I have worked in this area for more than a decade.

That is why I looked at one such problem, at the way it was formulated and what the specialists are doing to resolve it, at what it is that they take into consideration and what they ignore, at the way people approach this problem, and at those who are "for" and "against" something.

This led to a great deal of thoughts which I would like to share in this journal.

Not so long ago, I had the occasion to attend the public defense of a dissertation. I was impressed by the self-confidence with which the seeker of a scientific decree behaved in presenting a thesis related to the technical and economic validity of a plan for the redistribution of water resources in the European part of the RSFSR.

The October 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum emphasized the need "significantly to upgrade the scientific validity of the regional redistribution and efficient utilization of water resources, showing constant concern for protecting the environment." Naturally, therefore, the public displayed increased interest in the content of the dissertation. What made one cautious was that although seeking a doctoral decree in geography, the candidate was an engineer by training. He had conducted no basic research which would substantially increase and broaden any kind of geographic knowledge; nor could he boast of practical accomplishments in this area, despite the familiar requirements of the USSR VAK [Higher Certification Commission].

What made the scientific council wary was a principle included in his thesis, which triggered an immediate critical reaction in the audience: anything which could prove the candidate's conclusion or solution was worthy of total respect; anything which either did not or contradicted them was "unscientific" and even not worth mentioning. Until that point I had thought that science guides practice and is guided by the criteria of the latter, something I had learned at school. Here the opposite prevailed: science was being shamelessly and arbitrarily used to suit a practical task.

The public present at the dissertation was large and varied: people had come

from a number of different places. One question after another was asked of the candidate. What about the answers? A question such as "What is the cost per unit of agricultural output from such planned irrigation?" would be answered in the following spirit: "What does it matter to you?" "What are the construction costs per hectare of irrigation?" was answered in the same vein. The candidate was clearly puzzled as to the reason for such questions. What kind of technical and economic considerations could motivate someone who considered most important cost indicators unnecessary?

Many other answers were puzzling. Question: "Why out of a number of mathematical models did you choose this one? What makes it better than others?" Answer: "Because it is better than others." It then became clear that other than the verbal claim, no model whatsoever had been included in the dissertation.

Naturally, other answers were given as well, not on such a "modest" level but sufficient to create doubt as to the substantiveness of the work.

Stormy debates were expected. However, they did not take place! The candidate refused to pursue the dissertation, claiming that "suitable conditions" had not been provided.

Let us let the candidate wrestle with his conscience by considering as an adverse factor for the defense of his dissertation a debate on a problem of interest to the scientific public. He should have been familiar with the official rules governing this procedure. However, one could only be amazed by the fact that the scientific council had presented for discussion an entirely "raw" work and that the opponents, who rated it apologetically, were unable either to eliminate the general puzzlement which developed at the meeting or answer additional questions relative to their own references.

Why did this engineer have to defend his work as a dissertation? The question is easy: to provide his project with a scientific (albeit pseudoscientific) cover and to become "titled" (is this not prestigious!). Clearly, he was relying on the poor qualification of the members of the council when it came to strictly technical questions and to their tolerance, for the council does not bear even the slightest responsibility for the practical qualities of the topic and technical experts tend not be too strict toward an author with a scientific degree.

In general, some departments are quite inventive when it comes to the formal utilization of the prestige of science in promoting their own projects.

When I worked at the USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department I had the occasion to participate in a conference on the comprehensive development of the Ob Basin, under the guidance of Academician Pelageya Yakovlevna Kochina. The conference was attended by representatives of a great variety of mostly scientific organizations. All of them firmly opposed the building of the Nizhne-Ob GES, a plan which called for flooding 135,000 square kilometers of land and an even wider area of partially submerged land. This territory was the size of several medium-sized European countries.

What happened? While matters were being considered and academic publishing houses were working on the publication of the materials of this conference, in its latest publication Gidroproyekt printed an announcement according to which no criticism had been aimed at it, but only isolated remarks which it was acknowledging gratefully....

The prospect of flooding petroleum and natural gas deposits, today known as the "Tyumen" and "Tomsk," suited no one other than that department which kept proving that it would be more convenient to extract petroleum from artificial islands in the Zapolyare instead of from dry land (and that for this reason some of the cost of this project should be assumed by the USSR ministries of petroleum and gas industry!).

I recently found out that the petroleum workers had made their own computations and determined that flooding would cause losses in the range of billions of rubles.

But what happened? Did this cool off the departmental zeal of the hydraulic energy workers? Not at all! Apparently, the "lessons" of the plan for the Nizhne-Ob GES had not been learned and the criticism which then broke out in our press was quickly forgotten. Pity! It would be quite useful for hydraulic power workers and hydraulic engineers to go back from time to time to the materials published in Nos 3 and 9 of KOMMUNIST for 1963 and the articles in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of that period. A great deal of what we are writing today had already been considered on a sufficiently qualified level and conclusions had been drawn which are not only relevant today but will also remain instructive in the future.

A plan.... A plan, planning, are concepts which always carry a certain social meaning and which were quite important long before socialism appeared. We have become accustomed to honor and trust a plan. How else can we do? For everything we have built and created in our country, everything which has led us into the ranks of the most developed countries in the world within an incredibly short time, everything has gone through the stage of planning. The building of the new socialist society began with a plan.

This makes it even more necessary to preserve the moral prestige of the plan now, when such grandiose problems of scientific and technical progress are being resolved. If we consider even a single separate plan, we see in frequent cases that it is not merely a "construction project" but a long-term system projected for a century ahead, which, nevertheless, should be implemented within the shortest possible time.

The importance of plans and planning will increase immeasurably under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution. Not so long ago we were still speaking of the transformation of nature as of a long-term project. Today their scale, amount of funds involved and impact on natural processes are so great that were we to approach them as we have in the past--from the strictly technical and narrow departmental viewpoints--would be totally inadmissible.

Under contemporary conditions, an error, even a seemingly insignificant one, made in the substantiation of a project, self-sufficiency in undertaking a risky project, neglect of some "particulars" or "petty matters" and departmental egocentrism turn into a cost which could subsequently exceed the value of attained indicators, particularly if this involves an invasion of the natural environment and a disturbance of its balance. As a result of our activities, the natural environment has already been "stressed" to the limit. Can we take a risk, bearing in mind that this threshold may be simply crossed today or tomorrow?

Yet the planners are taking risks. They are taking risks, perhaps motivated by a traditional mentality and by their habit of making precise calculations in areas where no precision is possible. They not only fail to take everything into consideration but frequently even to think. They assume that this involves "nothing terrible." Frequently an assignment is given for a project without the necessary or even without any scientific substantiation. This fact is recalled only when the technical and economic substantiation has already been drafted. At that point, an urgent "support" of the project is hastily initiated on the basis of various conclusions by consultants and random and most acceptable formulations "in favor" (arguments "against" are ignored--there is no time for them!).

In some cases the scientists themselves, speaking on the subject of a project which they describe, no more and no less, as the "project of the century," immediately add that the scientific organizations conducted a systematic study only after the basic project decisions had already been largely predetermined.

Or else, what kind of preliminary scientific studies could there be a question of if, for example, the plan calls for many cubic kilometers of water to be fed into a previously huge lake, now shallow, after which it becomes apparent that its level has been rising by itself for quite some time, so that the threat of flooding an entire range of coastal projects appears? At that point, this project becomes urgently reoriented toward expanding the areas under irrigation.

What kind of scientific and technical substantiation could the project have if it is initially aimed at collecting 20 cubic kilometers of water, subsequently reduced to 6, after which the planners "accept" one or two cubic kilometers? (Does this not indicate the importance they attach to "clinging to the project and keeping it "afloat" by all possible means?) Major hydraulic systems are no matchboxes which could be strung in a single row regardless of number!

Despite this procedure (or, more accurately, lack of procedure) a strict rule should be set according to which any major, not tomentionany nature-transforming, project, should not begin without preliminary strictly scientific studies and without the objective comparison of all arguments "for" and "against." Such projects should begin and end on a scientific basis. This is a requirement of scientific and technical progress. A technical project is, above all, a technical development of a scientifically substantiated recommendation. All the rest comes later.

Regardless of circumstances, we must learn how to assess projects not on the basis of the degree of accuracy with which their individual elements have been computed but of the inaccuracies which may be allowed in the project.

Let us take the planning of an irrigation system. Could anyone determine accurately the resulting degree of salinization of the land? For the sake of appearance the engineer or project manager would ask for the opinion of the consulting soil expert; the consultant will draw up a conclusion according to which, with an optimal irrigation regime the soil is not threatened with salinization. Everyone knows perfectly well that the extent of responsibility of the author of such a conclusion is quite questionable. However, no one can prove this. If salinization does occur it means that the suggested irrigation procedure was not followed (it never is!).

No, no such conclusion should be drawn! The conclusion must mandatorily include considerations on the possible deviation from projected figures or, in other words, on one's own accuracy and, therefore, one's own responsibility. If that same consultant would write that a possible error could be doubled or tripled the project would be differently assessed both by planners and experts. This would not lower the prestige of the consultant in the least, for he cannot be either more clever or more intelligent than his own science.

However difficult and complex this may be, our time demands of us to be aware of the accuracy of our "accurate" computations, for in this case deviations (in nature-transforming projects) may turn out to be tenfold, hundredfold or even higher. The planning of some projects on Lake Baykal, and on the Don and Danube rivers is an example. We must learn how to predict possible changes in climatic, atmospheric and soil conditions and consequences of demographic and, naturally, economic order.

Let us say that in designing a bridge span or foundation the engineer would "load them" with extreme loads which, in all probability, they will never experience; at that point another 50 percent (or even 100 percent) coefficient of reserve strength is introduced; dams are designed to handle a flood which may occur once every 10,000 years. But who can determine the reserve coefficient in assessing the influence of a dam on the environment? Eventually, the dam gets built, with substantial cost overruns as a rule. How to pay the builders? Above all by borrowing from an area which is of the greatest importance in terms of possible consequences and effect on the environment: by saving on the cost of the lake. The construction of safety dykes is eliminated, shore-strengthening operations are stopped, no study is made of the timber within the area of the water reservoir, and the trees are burned. In some cases the construction workers cannot even burn the trees but simply flood them, under the pressure of the completion date set by the state commission, which made them hurry. If a forest is flooded it inevitably rots and if rot begins it does not end. This is a virtually irreversible process which poisons the water.

This can no longer be tolerated. Essentially new criteria in assessing such projects must be adopted. For a thousand years we have used a measurement unit such as the ruble or any other coin. The time has come, however, when its universal application has proved to be by no means adequate in many areas

of our activities and, above all, in assessing nature-changing projects, for such projects involve within their influence the type of natural bodies and areas such as animate matter, the atmosphere, surface and groundwater, and soil covering huge territories, which cannot be estimated in terms of money. Consequently, we must create some kind of relative scale of values for natural conditions and elements, based on the extent of their "usefulness" and, in addition to a monetary expression, assess the projects on the basis of such a scale as well.

Or else, perhaps critical limits of water and atmospheric pollution, saturation of the soil with chemicals and minimal sizes of forested areas must be set and after that estimate the number of "steps" which one project or another would bring us closer to this threshold.

With modern technology we can accomplish a great deal; however, there is a difference between "we can" and "one could." "One could" offers alternatives: "One could not," "one should not," "one does not have to"; in frequent cases no such alternative is offered in the case of "we can." This is carried out without what we describe as the struggle of opposites and is presented as a necessity: we can means we must! In this case we lose the feeling of caution and responsibility. The technical idea becomes the idee fixe for the planner. Whereas this is explainable in terms of the behavior of an inventor, one way or another, it is unacceptable in the case of a planner, for the possibility of a choice of alternatives and a critical attitude toward any technical means and method should always be present.

Furthermore, we are passing on to future generations more than merely one installation or another. We are also passing on the ethics of our production relations, standards of interaction with nature and responsibility for the future, which is embodied in today's plans.

Where the designer can and must display his capabilities is in the choice of variant. Anything else is no more than a separate confirmation of the general idea within this choice. What does the "optimal" choice begin with? What is its basis for comparison?

Comparisons among variants are frequently based on so-called "reduced outlays," which indicate the sum of capital investments relative to the standard recovery of the cost of the planned project. That is why "reduced outlays" cannot include the consequences of the project, for this is an abstract value, and although it allows the correlation of one variant of the project with another, it has no real meaning and significance; nor is it reflected in the balance sheet of an establishment or a bank. The customer must trust the designer that the use of this variant would be better than all others and should be adopted, for this is what "reduced outlays" indicate. The designer cannot explain even to himself the real meaning of this decisive indicator. He has compared three variants on the basis of "reduced outlays" and chosen the best. However, what guarantees that this variant is no more than the best of three and that a fourth, which would be truly the best, has remained unnoticed? Where are the possible consequences taken into consideration, for reduced outlays are by no means a full indicator. The possible negative consequences were mentioned at the very start of the project

and then forgotten. They were mentioned precisely because the question of consequences is frequently reduced to a question of coordination, for if a city soviet or oblast executive committee has issued a document to the effect that it has no objection to the construction of one project or another, the very question of many of its consequences has been "deleted" once and for all, although no scientifically substantiated basis for such an agreement may exist.

However, the designer will be on the level of his high vocation only when he is able to conceive most completely of all the results of the implementation of the project. That is what distinguishes the designer from the construction workers. Without this distinction, both would be no more than technical performers. Even the work of the builder involves not only nervous stress but actual initiatives. He is always short of something--materials, machinery or manpower--for which reason something has to be replaced and something else juggled about. What about the designer? He has "coordinated," supplied the blueprints, and that is all. In some cases, the builder is more familiar with the blueprints than the designer himself. The designer is no longer the owner of his creation. Nor does he have the right of authorship supervision.... To both this means peace of mind but also lack of responsibility.

It is thus that the very process of designing takes the designer away from the problem of consequences.

Design organizations are financed out of withholdings from the cost estimate of the project; not all but mainly the cost of construction and installation work. This is entirely justified in building a bridge but not at all in the erection of a dam. Here the volume and cost of construction and installation is huge but quite simple and monotonous; few blueprints and computations are required. That is why gigantomania is profitable to the designer.

In general, hydroengineering installations require the fullest possible consideration of consequences, the more so since such consequences are no secret to anyone. They clearly show up in the guise of underwater growth and evil-smelly water reservoirs, dead fish floating on the surface, eroded banks and swamped and salinized plowland. At the time when large-scale designing of this type was only at its start, this could be ignored: "Nothing terrible will happen...." What about now? Now all that the designer can do is pay no attention to the facts, conceal them and wait for the time and way of manifestation of the next consequences--climatic and global. Meanwhile, new centers are being designed according to old models by paying maximal attention to construction and installation work and minimal attention to consequences. Such consequences are no profitable item.... Had it not been for the expert evaluation, they would be totally ignored.

Let us now consider the final stage in designing, in the course of which the cost of the project is estimated. Strictly speaking, the cost is the first consequence and, being the first and most visible, there is no way to postpone or ignore it.

The designer knows in advance the amount which the state has allocated for the construction of the project. What is he to do if his cost estimates exceed

this amount? The solution is the following: promptly finding one or several "interested" organizations to which this cost overrun may be charged. Generally speaking, from the governmental viewpoint this is senseless, for the price of the project does not change and, once construction has begun, one way or another the state will see to its completion and will invest whatever is necessary. What matters here is something else: to prove to the Gosplan that the cost of the project has not been exceeded in the least. Consequently, a hundred million rubles may be charged to the Ministry of Fish Industry, for instance, since the dam would allegedly "improve" fish breeding conditions; another hundred million will be charged to river management. To both this hydraulic project will stick in their throats, entailing heavy losses and additional expenditures. Meanwhile, the hydraulic project builders have succeeded: they have "reduced the cost" of the project to precisely the stipulated amount. Easy and simple. In turn, the designers learn how to "save" with this method!

It may also happen that the project is not carried out but is filed away. The designer may anticipate this. This happens when the customer is left with surplus funds for which he has no use. Such a project is like a find: there is less "coordination," and the expertise is simpler (if it comes to expertise). This is a case of joint irresponsibility, which frequently affects neither the customer nor the design organization. But then what kind of feeling of responsibility and conscientiousness could such a "forgery" create in the design collective?

The first condition for upgrading the quality of the work is to exclude from it anything unnecessary and to let the individual or the collective assume a single responsibility: to deal only with the essence of the matter. In such a case the quality of the project will be the highest.

Unquestionably, this was the purpose of the USSR Council of Ministers decree which called for a drastic reduction in the number of design organizations. Nevertheless, many of those left are unnecessary; unnecessary organizations means unnecessary projects and unnecessary projects means unnecessary arrangements.

All of this occurs because each department stubbornly tries to develop its own design organization and not only to develop it but to raise it to the highest possible level by transforming a design group or bureau into a branch and a branch into a design or even a scientific research institute! At that point it becomes necessary to have one's own (sometimes known as "pocket") candidates and doctors of sciences, for this means prestige and independence. I am designing for my own purposes as I wish and as I need, I do not have to kowtow to anyone and I demand nothing of the Gosplan! I have my doctor of sciences, my project and the expertise, albeit partially, is also mine: today my doctor of sciences acts as expert on my neighbor's project; tomorrow the neighbor's doctor will provide expertise on mine!

A department always tries to prove that it is maintaining high contemporary standards, for which reason it must have its own scientific facilities--scientific research, technological and scientific design institutes. The latter as well matter a great deal, for they determine prospects and with

prospects one could directly approach the Gosplan. That becomes quite another matter! That is why the departments support their design organizations by all means possible. To this day, no reliable supradepartmental assessments of projects have been organized; nor has the range of problems been established whose solution should be mandatory for each major project, in the sense of ensuring the fullest possible anticipation of all consequences, those affecting nature above all. Whose job is this if not that of the highest scientific institutions? The departments have no intention of conceding this prerogative, as confirmed by the experience in building and operating cellulose and paper industry enterprises on the Baykal and the water reservoirs of many GES. This has proved the fact that such problems are national and by no means departmental.

It is pointless to blame a department for failing to assess all possible consequences of a construction project, for this may exceed the competence of its specialists. The department should be blamed for something else: why does it undertake to resolve extraneous problems and why does it belittle their importance to suit its own narrow interests?

What about high-level academic science? Why does it show shyness? That same USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography could have interfered much more energetically in such problems and assess them most strictly. Unfortunately, however, a high-level scientific institution or another, engaged in work on cost-accounting topics, assigned by the designer-contractor, finds itself in the role of a subcontractor and becomes financially and even morally dependent on its "employer," and it is in this capacity that it subsequently acts as an expert. Is this admissible? Is it not time to reject the services of such "experts" once and for all?

Science, with a capital letter, has the responsibility and the task of raising nature-transforming projects to the level of national arguments "for" and "against." It plays the role of both forecaster and main historian of large problems.

Yes, historian! It would be both pertinent and useful to recall a fact such as this: An all-union conference in the struggle against drought was held in 1931, at which Academician Nikolay Ivanovich Vavilov raised the question of developing agriculture in the north. Actually, the development of agriculture in the north, in the areas of age-old Russian grain-growing and livestock raising, and its further intensification was nothing but a means of struggle against the drought. For a long time the best crops and milk yields have been obtained not in the north of Europe, not in the blessed south, not in France and not in Italy. In our country as well, the southern areas have been overplowed, whereas in the north we can still move, even beyond the polar circle. In the southern areas we must provide water over distances covering many thousands of kilometers, as well as fertilizer; in the north there is sufficient water and mineral fertilizers are relatively close by (Apatity, Solikamsk) and organic fertilizers (peat, sapropel) are produced locally. Farm policy has always consisted of reducing the number of consuming oblasts and then expanding the number of producing ones as much as possible. By concentrating agriculture in the south, along the Don and the Kuban, we are neglecting these principles and plan to deliver water and fertilizers over

distances of thousands of kilometers from north to south while moving agricultural commodities from south to north. A large number of problems arise. It becomes necessary to develop a huge refrigerated fleet of railroad cars and tremendous warehousing facilities and to overburden even further the already overburdened transportation system. This also worsens problems of a strategic demographic nature.

It is in that direction that we must indeed focus our efforts for it is in the northern areas of the European part of the Soviet Union, the Tyumen north and Yakutiya, where the population is drastically increasing and where we continue to supply it with products by air and, in all likelihood, will continue to do so for a long time to come. Yet, there have been many ideas and initiatives dealing with agricultural problems that we can remember, the purpose of which was to revive and develop agriculture in the northern oblasts--Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Kirov and Vologoda, and the Komi and Karelian ASSRs. However, such projects are being advanced rather slowly and, in frequent cases, backwards rather than forwards.

Naturally, no principle of economic activity is eternal. Any principle could be rejected. However, "refutal by silence" is unworthy of science. That is why what we need now is the unequivocal view on this matter even if it is issued by that same VASKhNIL. If the latter remains silent what could we demand of design technicians? Even if we were to give priority precisely to the project which they find most interesting and advantageous, who would correct them?

Who would express sharp disagreement with the ever-growing departmental diktat and departmental exaggeration of its importance? In any food or other national economic problem and program, departmental plans and promises (and, respectively, requests for material and technical supplies and financing) are as though this same department plays the main role in the solution of the entire problem, so that if more is given to it everything will be in order!

This is just about a universal phenomenon, in the course of which trade dictates its conditions to the customer, the official to the petitioner and the departments to science and the national economy. In the case of nature-transforming projects another anomaly must be emphasized as well: the area of relations between customer and contractor. The builder always acts as the contractor. He is always working on the basis of someone else's request and order. He played this role thousands of years ago and does to this day. However, if the contractor himself determines what, where and when to build or not to build, if he himself finds construction projects in nature, designs them and proves the full validity of his projects to the customer, the latter has no choice other than to observe the principle of "you eat what they give you." For he is not the owner of the funds for the implementation of his own project.

As we can see, the management system in nature-transforming matters is lame. It must be improved. This is another example of an area of activities in which the statement made at the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum fully applies: "Immediate and energetic steps must be taken for the entire set of management problems."

Better than anyone else, the customer knows his own needs and the conditions under which the newly built installations will operate. The ministry which makes direct use of natural resources in agriculture, fishing, timber, the gas and petroleum industries and others, can assess the nature-transforming project and its necessity and consequences, unquestionably better than the builder-contractor.

The job of the builder-contractor is to build quickly and qualitatively, and to meet the requirements of the customer in the best possible way.

Obviously, matters would be advanced by establishing more firmly the status of ministry-customers and ministry-contractors. The customer must also act as the general fund manager.

We know that the Rosgiprozem Institute of the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture developed a relatively inexpensive project for the simplest possible type of reclamation and land management for a huge territory. However, was it compared with the same type project for engineering reclamation drawn up by Soyuzgiprovodkhoz? It was not, thus showing the priority of the contractor over the customer: the first assertion that the latter's project is better because it promises to accomplish more.

Promises are promises but here is what happens: losses in harvesting, transporting and storing agricultural commodities will exceed the expected gross harvest as a result of the implementation of the plan for the redistribution of water; if such is the case, would it not be simpler to invest such funds in building roads and warehouses and increasing transportation facilities?

Or else, why provide one irrigated area or another with ever more water if already now a third of it is being wasted? We know that the more water is added to an irrigation system the more of it goes to waste.

But let us go on. Irrigation plays different roles in different areas. In the desert area it is the foundation for farming, for if there is no irrigation there is no farming; in an area of unstable moisture, it is no more than a means of upgrading the productivity of already extant farmland. Therefore, it must be comprehensively compared with other means used for the same purpose, such as forest, agronomical, chemical and others which may not be all that promising but which are less expensive and less risky. The point is that basic and frequently irreversible changes occur in the soil as a result of profound land reclamation projects: it either substantially increases its fertility or loses it, most frequently forever. The risk is the following: We would like to obtain more but may lose everything. That is what frequenty happens when as a result of irrigation the land becomes either swampy or saline. However, we are still unable to take this risk into consideration and make a forecast; furthermore, we are unable to draft "yesterday's forecast," i.e., to sum up scientifically and objectively our own experience in building and operating hydroengineering systems. When I read that the cost of thus-and-such a GES was recovered 300 or even 400 percent over the past 20 years, I know that this applies to nothing but construction

costs. But what if we were to add to this land lost as a result of flooding, assess the value of the farm goods which could have been produced from such land but were not, taken fully into consideration losses of fishing resources and river transportation and, in a number of cases, changes which have taken place in sanitary and hygienic conditions? What happens then? What would the recovery time for that same GES become?

I have not come across comprehensive publications on this account. Many of our institutions and services seem to be quite shy in providing such data.

Let us follow this thought: irrigation is the most expensive means of upgrading yields and could be efficient only at a generally high farming level. Unless this background exists no success is possible. Hence the obviousness of the sequence to be followed in reclamation: from simplest and inexpensive to basic and expensive but in no case the reverse.

We live in rather crucial times. Whereas only recently the very word "future" was an abstract concept considered only by some scientists and philosophers, today, sometimes even without giving it much thought, we are "making" such a future on a daily and hourly basis, defining its features through a number of our plants and projects and shaping it with our thoughts and, alas, thoughtlessness. Today our influence on the world around us is such that it cannot be merely a happenstance which would vanish without a trace. What to use of natural resources and what to leave to our descendants; what kind of society will move from the 20th to the 21st century, and what type of person will it be who will cross this threshold: all of this depends on our activities today and, at the same time, all of this is the immediate and, perhaps, more than immediate future of mankind. The scientific and technical revolution is a revolution precisely because it determines as of today the development of the future and if today no entirely provable and reliable means of assessing large-scale projects are found, tomorrow we may find ourselves in a very critical situation. That is why the expert evaluation of projects should have not only arguments "for," which are so thoroughly and purposefully selected by designers (they are rarely blamed for such thoroughness) but also arguments, "against," which would be developed equally substantively. Such arguments "against" should be provided by a special, no longer departmental but superior "antiproject" bureau, which would consider that a project has already been carried out and would estimate in the reverse order both maximal "loads" and adverse circumstance which will accompany the operation of equipment and systems.

This will convert nature-transforming design into industrial design, in which every designer knows that the mechanism he has created will be tried either on testing grounds or in the field under conditions of extreme stress before being serially produced.

It is thus that new models of airplanes, motor vehicles and agricultural machinery are tested; however, since nature-transforming projects can be tested only on a 1:1 scale, to a certain extent "antidesigning" would prevent the risk of irreparable errors. Naturally, a situation may develop in which no single project would pass such a "test." However, "antidesigning" itself

should not have the final say. Its task would be to supply the experts with all the data not included in the project.

A "plus" acquires real meaning only if compared against a "minus." Such comparisons could be made only by special state commissions. It would be expedient to assign to them financial expertise as well, a comparison between the projected costs of the designer and those of the performers. This, as a rule, is also not being done and frequently no performer accounts are submitted.

Another task in perfecting design is the democratization of the activities of design organizations. We should not be limited to "coordination" letters, for nature-changing projects must mandatorily be submitted to the sessions of the local soviets (oblast, city). We are amazed at the stubbornness with which designers avoid such a seemingly entirely natural procedure, citing the "dilettantism" of their possible judges. Let us note that among designers as well there are as many dilettantes as one may wish. Furthermore, under our circumstances public opinion is educated, represented by scientists, engineers, people "in step with the century," who have attended the school of public education and social activities. They do not ask for too much. They ask for problems to be resolved openly and on a high scientific and not strictly technical level. How to avoid at this point repeating Lenin's words, as they were cited at the CPSU Central Committee April Plenum: "Today we are aware of our tasks more clearly and specifically than yesterday; we have no fear of openly pointing out our errors in order to correct them." The Soviet people are very interested in upgrading the efficiency of the entire public production in their country. It is with such a mood that all of us are advancing towards the 27th Party Congress.

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WITH ATTENTION TO SOIL FERTILITY

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[Article by F. Morgun, first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Poltava Obkom]

[Text] The party is advancing towards its 27th Congress with an expanded program which calls for creative work, realism and innovation. All of us are witnessing the way the Central Committee and its Politburo, in formulating current economic strategy, are firmly clearing the way for technical progress and initiative and for variants of economic management tested by life.

The speeches of M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, at the CPSU Central Committee Conference on the Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress, and in Leningrad, the Ukraine and Belorussia, boldly formulate basic problems of economic, social and educational nature, the solution of which will determine the destinies of the country. New large-scale party plans are the focal point of attention of all Soviet people, including the working people in the Poltava area.

As it implements its assignments, the Poltava Oblast party organization is establishing the necessary conditions for creative work and for the manifestation of the practicality of cadres in all sectors. A great deal is being done to develop the agroindustrial complex. As in the rest of the country, the key problem is to increase grain production. Today there is no task more important for our farmers than to significantly upgrade yields. Farm specialists are improving the crop structure, mastering crop rotation and applying new high-yielding strains and progressive agrotechnology. For the past 10 years the oblast has extensively used the minimum-tillage soil cultivation system, which allows us to maintain and increase soil fertility.

The Poltava people made extensive use of the training and lessons of the virgin land epoch in their variant of plowless cultivation. The development of new lands covering tens of millions of hectares was an event of tremendous significance. Unfortunately, however, errors were also made in the course of developing the virgin land. As we know, after the initial successes yields began to drop, and the amount of sow thistle and wild oats began to increase. The annual mouldboard plowing and repeated disking of the soil, carried out in

the struggle against weeds, triggered large-scale soil wind erosion. In order to protect the soil, headed by Academician A. I. Barayev, the Soviet scientists developed the sweep soil cultivation system.

We began to apply this experience in the Poltava area in accordance with local conditions. What motivated us to take this step? Above all, concern for the fate of the chernozem. People familiar with the Poltava area primarily from the works of N. V. Gogol, our great native son, may think that all we have here are rich chernozems, absolutely flat fields and other grain cultivation advantages. To a certain extent this was the case in the past. However, many decades of careless breaking up of the soil with plows led to the fact that, like many other areas, today Poltava Oblast is filled with ravines, the slopes have become eroded, the land has tangibly become poorer, the water in the rivers is low and springs are drying out. Sandstorms occur with increasing frequency. A century ago the expedition headed by V. V. Dokuchayev quoted figures on the content of humus on the Poltava fields. This figure has dropped by one-half in recent years.... This occurred for a variety of reasons, one of the basic ones being the stereotyped cultivation of the soil. The plow was the only tool used in all cases.

Plows were used in the Ukraine, the Central Chernozem area, in the Nonchernozem, beyond the Volga, the Carpathians, the Far East, Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the Baltic areas. One and the same tool was used in the flat steppes, mountains, foothills, taigas and swampy areas. For many long years the plow was the only tool used in our area, in Poltava, in early spring, in the hot summer and the autumn. Before the autumn sowing, occasionally the soil became so lumpy that we did not know how to break it up and, in many cases, we were either totally unable to sow winter crops or else knew they were doomed. Statistical data show that for a period of 20 years (prior to the use of sweeps), every year an average of 127,000 hectares in winter wheat or more than 20 percent of winter crops, had to be replanted.

Abandoning a custom practiced for many decades was by no means simple. Sluggishness and old habits blocked the path, and tremendous organizational, explanatory and educational work had to be done to help the farmer take the decisive step. It was above all the oblast and rayon party committees and many party committees in kolkhozes and sovkhozes which undertook this job. They held practical seminars in the fields and directed farm managers and specialists toward purchasing the new equipment. The application of the new farming technology became one of the leading topics of long-distance conferences for which, in the evening hours, many thousands of specialists, mechanizers and grain growers gathered. Lecturers and propagandists and the press and the radio engaged in promoting plowless farming, taking some farms as examples. A permanent section entitled "Think, Agronomist!" was introduced in ZORYA POLTAVSHCHINI, the oblast party newspaper. Such sections now exist in all rayon newspapers. Special articles and posters described the advantages of minimum-tillage and the basic experience acquired in its use.

Twenty-five base farms were assigned to look for the best variants of plowless technology, in accordance with local conditions. They were supplied with a full set of special machines and tools.

In order for managers, specialists, mechanizers and the entire population to be able clearly to see and realize the merits of minimum-tillage, the following system was extensively used at first: the field was divided into two parts: the first was cultivated with a sweep and the second was plowed as in the past. The same wheat strain was sown in both. In all cases, wherever the new technology was properly applied, minimum-tillage won.

The new technology was tested and perfected and the resulting data were studied repeatedly and extensively. It was only after the people had become convinced of its advantages that the farms converted to plowless cultivation. On the sixth year, when again and again everything had been tested and when the necessary material base and trained cadres were available that the decision of the oblast's full conversion to minimum tillage farming was made at the February 1980 oblast agronomy conference.

In 10 years, the Poltava "plowless field" expanded from individual testing plots to 1.5 million hectares. Today, together with perennial grass areas, it accounts for more than 97 percent of the entire arable land.

During the droughty 1975, when no more than 15 percent of the areas in winter wheat had been planted in minimum-tillage areas, the oblast kolkhozes and sovkhozes averaged 21.7 quintals of grain per hectare. In 1983 (another droughty year), when the amount of moisture was significantly below the long-term average from autumn sowing to harvesting, the wheat crop averaged 28.2 quintals. The year 1984 was also difficult. The lack of precipitation during the previous autumn, the snowless winter and the fierce spring drought substantially affected grain crops. Nevertheless, the oblast averaged 26.7 quintals of grain per hectare; the wheat crop averaged 28.2 quintals and corn, 33.4 quintals.

The current year, 1985, is developing in a way I cannot remember after many years of work in the Poltava area. Starting with the autumn, the drought was unparalleled and after plowing the winter crops did not even appear. In the winter the fields were frozen with ice. Between March and May no more than 24 millimeters of rain fell, or almost one-fifth of the annual average. The relative moisture of the air frequently dropped to 20 percent and even lower and the heat reached 30 degrees centigrade. Perennial grasses waned. Their first mowing on most areas yielded no more than 20-25 quintals of green mass, compared to 150-200 in an ordinary year. The early grain crops were low and weak.

It was sweep cultivation above all that helped our grain growers to come out of this most difficult situation, for it allowed them maximally to preserve the scant amount of moisture in the soil for the plants. Thanks to this, the oblast farmers were able to harvest a grain crop even higher than last year's.

Unquestionably, other factors as well played a positive role in this case: the farms had more equipment and fertilizers of improved quality, new more efficient strains were used and the area of reclaimed land expanded. However, our agronomists are convinced that plowless cultivation intensifies the results of all these factors. This is confirmed by the following summed up data: during the 8th Five-Year Plan, prior to the use of plowless

cultivation, grain yields in Poltava Oblast were average for the republic. During the 10th Five-Year Plan they increased by 0.2 quintals and in the first 4 years of the 11th, by 1.8 quintals.

Let me cite examples borrowed from individual rayons and farms which skillfully applied the new technology. In droughty 1984, the Kolkhoz imeni Engels, Karlovskiy Rayon, for example, averaged 50.9 quintals per hectare from early grain crops and 57.8 quintals from winter wheat. The farms in Lokhvitskiy Rayon, harvested less grain than neighboring farms in Sumy and Chernigov oblasts before applying minimum-tillage cultivation. Now their harvests are better. Tens of farms could be named today in which, even under adverse weather conditions, with sweep cultivation winter wheat crops average 40 to 45 quintals, corn 50-70 quintals and sugar beets 500 quintals per hectare. Earlier than others, Karlovskiy and Lokhvitskiy rayons totally converted to the new method and are harvesting the best crops in the oblast.

According to specialists from the oblast statistical and agricultural administrations, between 1974 and 1984 our oblast's kolkhozes and sovkhozes were able to harvest an additional 2,042,000 tons of grain thanks to sweep cultivation. Crop additions were significantly higher in the base farms which had been equipped with a full set of special machines and tools. Compared with plowing, they averaged 5.1 quintals of winter wheat, 4.1 quintals of spring barley, 3.9 quintals of peas, 3.4 quintals of oats, 4 quintals of grain corn and 41 grain quintals of sugar beats more per hectare.

In farms with generally high farming standards the advantages of sweep farming are even more noticeable. Let us take as an example the training farm of the Poltava Agricultural Institute. Before the 1970s, its production indicators were no better than those of farms in similar VUZs throughout the country. Before using minimum-tillage it averaged 25.1 quintals in grain crops per hectare. The 1984 average was 52.6 quintals. Animal husbandry production increased sharply. For example, milk per fodder-fed cow increased from 3,116 to 5,434 kilograms. Sweep cultivation tremendously increases yields of different crops. Sugar beet yields have increased by more than 80 quintals. Corn for silage and sunflower production increased. If feed is less expensive, the cost of basic animal husbandry output drops. During the past five-year plan and the first 4 years of the current, meat and milk production per hectare exceeded the republic's average.

We have attained one of the leading positions in the Ukrainian SSR in capital returns. With sweep soil cultivation labor outlays in crop rotation averages 0.88 man/hours per hectare, compared with 1.39 with plowing; fuel consumption averages, respectively, 17.5 and 28 kilograms and production costs, 7.8 and 10.2 rubles. As a result of such savings, the average net farm income in our oblast over a 10-year period totaled 320.8 million rubles. These funds helped the kolkhozes and sovkhozes to strengthen their economy and resolve social problems better. In 1984 twice as much housing was built compared with the beginning of the five-year plan per 1,000 rural population.

I would like to be understood correctly: I am not citing such data for the sake of boasting. As demanded by the CSPU Central Committee, a spirit of critical assessment of work results has been established in the oblast party

organization. In many areas of farming our neighbors are better than the Poltava people and we are learning from them. I am confident that whenever they will acquire the full set of tools for sweep farming and the agronomists will seriously take up this matter, their results will be better than ours, for according to economic evaluations, in terms of quality the arable land in the Poltava area is rated sixth among the nine oblasts in the forest-steppe zone of the Ukrainian SSR. Furthermore, the situation is such that we receive the least amount of chemical fertilizers and have worse equipment than the other oblasts in this zone.

2

In the struggle to increase field and livestock output we try to use, as the party teaches us, above all factors which yield the highest returns with the lowest possible outlays. Minimum-tillage technology is precisely one such factor in farming. It requires no new expenditures and, conversely, yields tremendous savings and is a major reclamation reserve. I am profoundly convinced that agronomy measures, such as increasing the amount of fertilizer, using highly effective strains and applying progressive cultivation methods can make full use of their potential only if combined with sweep cultivation.

Sweep cultivation is not simply one of the means of upgrading yields. It is a new and higher stage in the development of farming, in which increased output is ensured while production costs and labor outlays are reduced.

Speaking of the advantages of the new technology, let me emphasize that it helps farmers to gain time. In most areas in the European part of the country very little time is left between the harvesting of grain and other crops and preparing the soil for planting the winter crops. With plowing, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes have no time to prepare the area properly. Late shoots appear weak in the winter and frequently perish.

With sweep cultivation, the flexibility of technological operations enables us, even after the late harvesting of crops, such as corn for silage, to plant the wheat at a better time and, above all, to obtain timely and even shoots. This allows the Poltava Oblast farms to prepare the soil within a shorter time and to lower production outlays in crop growing by 24 percent.

The advantage of sweep cultivation is that it contributes to the accumulation and preservation of moisture in the soil. Over the past 20 years a great deal of efforts were made in the Poltava area to improve conditions for increasing moisture in the soil and ensuring its availability for the plants. Screening plants were planted, fences were made and installed and other snow retention means were used; ice and snow were carried to the fields, thawed water was retained and the fields were surrounded with tree belts. However, the results of these steps were not particularly significant. The use of minimum-tillage, however, allowed the additional accumulation of 30 to 50 millimeters of productive moisture per hectare; this creates favorable conditions for guaranteed crops. It is easy to estimate that even with a minimal amount of added moisture of 30 millimeters per hectare, the oblast's entire cultivated land--1.75 million hectares--will acquire additionally 530 million cubic meters of water. This figure is particularly impressive if we bear in mind

that the land under cultivation in the Poltava area uses slightly more than 100 million cubic meters of water, or less than the amount of moisture provided by sweep technology by a factor of 5. Furthermore, let me point out that more than 60 million rubles have been spent in the development of irrigation systems covering 41,000 hectares.

The opponents of sweep cultivation claim that the grain grower cannot do without a plow and that the land must be mandatorily plowed up. The question which arises, however, is the following: Why plow to begin with? It is claimed that the purpose is to destroy the weeds and that in a looser soil it is easier for the air to reach the useful bacteria which nourish the plants.

However, we now know that weeds can be destroyed by other means, including minimum-tillage, more efficiently than with a plow. This was confirmed by many farms in our oblast. Furthermore, any type of cultivation, if done indifferently, may lead to the appearance of weeds. Are the fields in the three areas in which plows are exclusively used clear of weeds?

It has also been proved that in a structured grainy soil, cultivated with the minimum-tillage method, both air and moisture penetrate the soil more easily than with the use of a plow. A structurally grainy soil can absorb moisture profoundly and expend it slowly, whereas a lumpy or powdery soil (produced by plowing) retains the moisture to a far lesser extent. In droughty years, crops sown on plowed fields have perished, while many fields have yielded a good crop after sweep cultivation. Therefore, it is a question not only of the amount of precipitation but of the condition of the soil as well.

The noted Soviet scientists N. A. Krasilnikov has estimated that between 5 and 7 tons of live bacterial mass exist per hectare on the surface stratum of fertile soil. The bacteria live, develop, multiply, die and decay, becoming food for others. In the spring and summer they provide as many as 30 generations. This means that within that time between 70 and 200 tons of microorganisms are active per hectare, which greatly exceeds even the highest possible wheat yield. This live mass is not inert. It actively transforms a huge quantity of organic and inorganic matter and synthesizes ever new matter in accordance with its biological nature and local conditions. This living machine is performing tremendous work.

But this takes place in living soil only. What kind of soil could be considered living? Only a soil which contains moisture, which is vitally necessary for the activities of such microorganisms. A soil plowed up in dry weather, in July or August, turns into hard, moistureless lumps. Unless heavy precipitation falls, the microorganisms within it will die.

Like the other sciences, the strength of agronomy lies in the fact that in resolving its problems it is based on inviolably objective natural laws and scientific principles. Here no authority is valid unless it proceeds from accurate experimentation, practical experience and life itself. Soil-protecting sweep cultivation is based on the laws of nature.

According to data provided by the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, with sweep cultivation of the soil the circulation of matter increases by a factor of

1.5, particularly that of organic substances, moisture and nutritive elements. The biological activeness of the soil increases and various ferments are actively formed.

Such processes improve the phytosanitary condition of the soil by contributing to the death of many plant disease agents. Sweep cultivation is the foundation of the new trend in contemporary farming ("alternate," "organic"), based on the principles of ecological and biological balance. Everything in nature is interrelated. By destroying sprouting weeds, minimum-tillage also contributes to reducing the amount of harmful agents which feed on weeds. The studies conducted by Professor Yu. N. Brunner at the Poltava Agricultural Institute (coinciding with data obtained by many other scientists) indicate that sweep cultivation increases the number of ground beetles which feed mainly on insects harmful to plants.

All of these characteristics of sweep cultivation, with strict observance of soil protection technologies, allow us to do largely without the use of toxic chemicals which, as we know, while destroying weeds and pests, also harm cultured plants and kill useful microorganisms.

Oblast farms which have skillfully applied sweep cultivation, the kolkhozes imeni Shevchenko in Mirgorodskiy Rayon and imeni Ordzhonikidze, Shishatskiy Rayon, respectively chaired by N. T. Demyanenko and S. S. Antonets, in particular, have already abandoned the use of herbicides and are obtaining high yields.

The fact that I speak very positively of sweep cultivation does not mean in the least that I consider the sweep the tool for all times and occasions. Today we are struggling against the plow with the knowledge that plowless cultivation is better; tomorrow, obviously, even more progressive tools will appear.

3

Let me emphasize the fact that we are enjoying the steady support of the agricultural departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the CP of the Ukraine Central Committee. This is even more important if we bear in mind that we have had to surmount a certain skeptical attitude and, frequently, even the open opposition of the heads of and scientists in a number of scientific institutes. Without such support, the oblast's farmers would have found it very difficult to conduct this experiment on a broad scale and to develop an essentially new variant of soil protection farming.

In recent years delegations from all oblasts in the Ukraine, Stavropol and Krasnodar krays, Rostov, Volgograd, Kuybyshev, Belgorod, Saratov, Penza, Voronezh, Kursk, Tambov, Lipetsk and Ivanovo oblasts, the Tatar, Chuvash, Mari, Bashkir and Kalmyk ASSRs and some oblasts in the Belorussian and the Moldavian SSRs have come to the Poltava area to study our experience; Hero of Socialist Labor V. V. Kalyagin, first secretary of the Ipatovskiy Raykom, Stavropol Kray, has come twice with a group of specialists.

Today minimum-tillage cultivation technology is being applied in many areas. The sharp turn from plow to sweep has been made, in particular, by our neighboring Kirovograd, Dnepropetrovsk and Chernigov oblasts, where until recently sweep technology was mistrusted. In the autumn of 1984, together with a group of Poltava specialists, I visited farms in Novoukrainskiy Rayon, Kirovograd Oblast, where we studied experience in corn growing. We saw in our neighbors many fields on which sweep technology had been used. They were a pleasing sight. The people of Kirovograd had boldly taken up the use of the new technology.

Until recently, L. I. Shlifer, Hero of Socialist Labor, chairman of the Zarya Kommunizma Kolkhoz, one of the most experienced Kirovograd farmers, rejected the sweep cultivation method. I recall that at a republic conference he supported those who objected to sweep cultivation of sugar beets. Today he is one of the most active supporters of plowless technology in the Kirovograd area, proving its advantages with the high yields achieved by his kolkhoz.

According to the press, in recent years sweep technology is extensively used in the Crimea and the Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad, Kharkov and other oblasts.

A joint session-conference of the section on anti-erosion soil protection and the coordination council on soil-protecting farming of VASKhNIL was held in July 1981 in Poltava, chaired by A. I. Barayev. The Poltava soil protection variant was approved and recommended for use in the other farming areas in the country. In recent years, Aleksandr Ivanovich Barayev has come repeatedly to us observing most closely the work of the Poltava people in the use of plowless soil cultivation and helping them with advice and support. In our searching we also rely on the studies of our native son V. N. Remeslo, the outstanding selectioneer. To the very last days of his life, Vasiliy Nikolayevich repeatedly visited his native Piryatinskiy and other rayons and many oblast farms, always interested in the efforts to apply sweep technology and giving advice. He actively and thoroughly supported the Poltava soil protection system in the press and among scientists and practical workers. He wrote in the republic newspaper SILSKIY VISTI that "the achievements of Poltava Oblast and all practical experience suggest to me that farming...has reached a crucial stage and that the plowless system...will capture the minds and hearts of the grain growers and the kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields. Whoever fails to understand this will fall behind. The future belongs to the sweep."

VASKhNIL Academician A. N. Kashtanov visited the oblast in the spring of 1981. He toured several rayons, studied the practice of a number of farms and met with agricultural scientists, managers and specialists. At the meeting, Aleksandr Nikolayevich emphasize that "today the soil of Poltava needs soil protection as much as it needs air, for all you have left is half the humus of what you had during the period of the Poltava battle.... Kolkhoz and sovkhoz mastery of minimum-tillage cultivation technology...will be no less significant than the victory which was won at the Poltava battle."

USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member V. A. Kovda, chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on Soil and Land Reclamation Problems, and Dr of Agricultural Sciences N. K. Shikula, professor at the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, were of great help to oblast scientists and

specialists. The Poltava people were also helped by N. M. Miloserdov from Kherson Oblast, I. Ye. Shcherbak, from Nikolayev Oblast, V. F. Sayko and A. G. Tarariko, from Kiev Oblast, and other scientists. Naturally, the Poltava people themselves did a great deal of scientific and organizational work. This included specialists, such as I. A. Gopey, A. I. Timoshenko, I. Ye. Spitsa, V. P. Vantsak, N. A. Dobrovolskiy, V. K. Chuyko and I. P. Brazhenko.

In 1983, Terentiy Semenovich Maltsev spent almost an entire week studying the Poltava fields. We remembers the words of caution of this wise farmer: "Do not rest on your accomplishments.... Remember, the struggle for minimum-tillage has not ended." This is indeed the case. To this day, some scientists totally disagree with the fact that the sweep is better than the plow.

It was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress that it was extremely necessary for the country that "along with the development of theoretical problems, the efforts of science be concentrated to a greater extent on resolving key national economic problems and on discoveries which could make truly revolutionary changes in production." This was followed by another fundamental conclusion: "Anything which makes the process of application of something new difficult, slow and painful must be eliminated."

I must point out that both conclusions fully apply to the fate of sweep farming. Indeed, the technology which can make truly revolutionary changes in agricultural production is being applied with difficulty and extremely slowly.

The new technology, which was created by life itself, tested by practical experience and time and is so greatly necessary and, I would say, salutary to the land and grain growers, should have enjoyed comprehensive support and rapidly applied. Actually, it has been developing with difficulty. In the fields it has been making its way with an extremely sharp struggle against inertia and routine.

I have frequently heard it said in scientific circles: Why are you aggravating this problem so? The sweep has been recognized and is used over millions of hectares. This is true. For a number of years it has been extensively applied in Kazakhstan and today it is being applied by enthusiasts in many other parts of the country. According to the Central Statistical Administration, in 1984 the new soil cultivation technology was being applied on 52.5 million hectares. According to the agronomists, this brings the country hundreds of millions of rubles of profit annually.

However, could we be satisfied with such data, the more so if we look at the situation in agriculture not through the rose-tinted glasses of the marginal observer but the soul of the grain grower? For 52.5 million hectares of minimum-tillage is no more than one-fifth of the all-union plowland....

Time goes by and, as in the past, the plow is literally destroying the soil on hundreds of millions of hectares. Every year 1.5 billion tons of soil, containing 75 million tons of humus and more than 30 million tons of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium, are washed off. Consider, readers, these figures! The fact that we lose more than 1 billion tons of soil annually because of

stereotyped plowing cannot, like life itself, be the subject of computations, whether in money or in gold.

The strong dust storms of 1984 in the south of the Ukraine, the Kuban and Rostov and other oblasts were yet another severe warning against the danger of conservativism and stereotype in soil cultivation.

In its competition with the traditional soil cultivation system, the new technology finds itself in an unequal condition. Above all, it is short of sweeps; there is a total lack of wide-scope cultivators and farm requests for disk harrows and other machinery remain virtually unsatisfied. Meanwhile, industry is continuing to increase the production of plows.

Nor is there necessary support for the new on the part of some scientific institutes and agricultural agencies, as we pointed out. To this day by no means all merits and possibilities of minimum-tillage have been studied and rated to the extent they deserve.

4

Let me especially discuss the efforts of some scientists who have obstructed and continue to obstruct the use of the sweep, and the lessons which scientists and pratical workers, anyone who avoids minimum-tillage technology should draw. I have already written on the subject.[1] I understand that a few things must be brought up again. However, time does not wait and a number of problems are being resolved with inadmissible slowness. We must increase crop yields faster and take urgent measures to protect the soil. We must not remain deaf to the voices of those who are sounding the alarm, claiming that today the question is not only one of protecting the soil but also that a great deal of it must be "reanimated." This urges me again and again to write, for the method of minimum-tillage cultivation is the most powerful means of soil improvement.

The universal credo that "science serves man" was accepted long ago. The prestige of our science is high and its services in many sectors are great. It is not astounding that people listen to the scientists. The Soviet people are justifiably proud of great discoveries and accomplishments on earth and in space. Against this outstanding background, however, we cannot fail to see substantial shortcomings in some areas and, as was confirmed at the 26th Congress, we must not tolerate "sterile laboratories and institutes."

The acute struggle which has been waged for decades on minimum-tillage farming and the lessons of this struggle lead to the conclusion that not everything is organized and aimed at resolving the primary problems in agricultural and other sciences. The reason, it seems to me, lies above all in the so-called ivory tower scientists, whose numbers have greatly increased in recent decades. They include agrarian scientists, people who have "acquired a degree" and subsequently assumed positions in scientific institutes and laboratories, having had "book training" only and not lived with the needs of the production process.

However, knowledge resulting not from a blend with practical experience, is frequently sterile and full of errors. Unless he has truly experienced the production process, invested his feelings in it and experienced the pain of crops perishing from a fierce drought or dust storm, seen hail suddenly destroy ripening crops, assumed material and moral responsibility for his orders, when the crops had been poor because he failed to choose the best cultivation method and the kolkhoz members' earnings were low and their payments in kind were miserable, a professor delivering lectures or a manager of scientific research institute as a rule fails to justify the hopes of science and practice. For such a person lacks the main thing: the conviction of the manager, confidence in his opinions, daring thoughts and ability to undertake decisive (as well as cautious) actions.

In a number of scientific institutes and some experimental stations, the "certification" of minimum-tillage and subsequent conclusions were frequently the work of scientific workers who were not profoundly acquainted with the foundations of minimum-tillage technology and who, furthermore, had not even seen a sweep. The infrequent "experiments" conducted in such scientific institutes were clearly doomed to failure, for they had been conducted without the necessary set of equipment and with gross violations of the main requirements governing minimum-tillage cultivation. Hence the basis for frightening conclusions to the effect that minimum-tillage meant thick weeds and low yields.

As early as July 1979, in an article on using a soil protection farming system in the Poltava area, PRAVDA wrote that this experience must be extensively disseminated. In discussing the views of specialists in the Southern Department of VASKhNIL, the newspaper pointed out that "some support the Poltava initiative; others look at it mistrustfully and others again, taking the position of outside observers, are waiting to see what will happen." This position has remained virtually unchanged in recent years. The idea of minimum-tillage cultivation continues to be criticized and its spreading is being held back despite the obvious advantages offered by the new technology.

The problem "On the Condition of Research and Application of Soil-Protecting Cultivation Technologies in the Ukrainian SSR" was considered at the 25 December 1984 session of the VASKhNIL Southern Department Presidium. No single representative of our oblast was invited to attend, whether a scientist or a practical worker. As we study the minutes of the session and read the statements, we clearly see a sharply expressed prejudice on the part of many of its participants. The sweep, it is alleged, increases the amount of weeds and does not provide the necessary conditions for the efficient utilization of chemical and organic fertilizers.

We can understand those who opposed minimum-tillage technology during the first years of its establishment. People had spent a lifetime working with plows and traditions and habits had developed over centuries. We always took these circumstances into consideration, heeding the views of our opponents, and trying to make them change their minds. But how to accept such a view today, when we have the long years of experience of Kazakhstan, the Poltava

grain growers and many farms in other oblasts, and when worldwide farming is actively converting to minimum-tillage cultivation?!

Discussions in scientific collectives are continuing while the long experience of practical workers in minimum-tillage technology remains improperly studied or summed up. The resolution is held back by an entire number of urgent problems, above all the production of the necessary equipment, the drafting of new textbooks and the training of skilled specialists. The developing situation concerns the grain growers. The result is that the initiative in the use of minimum tillage is assumed by the practical workers. One can understand them. They are closer to the land, they work for the Food Program on a daily basis, and a great deal is demanded of them. It is also they who are seeking efficient technologies. However, this is not easy for them without reliable scientific support.

The agricultural propaganda media are still paying little attention to this type of farming. This makes twice as valuable the movie "In Agreement With Nature" ("Tsentrnauchfilm," script by G. F. Chertov and A. B. Shkolnikov, scientific consultant VASKhNIL Academician A. N. Kashtanov). This sharply publicistic motion picture helps supporters and opponents of minimum-tillage farming to assume an accurate position in the debate. This film describes not only crucial production problems but moral categories as well--courage and responsibility for the future of the land.

5

The Poltava experiment is part of the work done in the country in the fight against soil erosion and for upgrading its fertility. Perfecting and spreading the new farming system, which will enable us to obtain more from the land today and to protect its fertile base for future generations, is one of the most important party and state problems of today. The economical nature of minimum-tillage soil cultivation, with its energy-conserving possibilities, was discussed by M. S. Gorbachev at a meeting of the aktiv of the Leningrad Party Organization: "In agriculture one could plow the land to the bottom but one could also cultivate it with a sweep and achieve the same results and even to protect the soil. In the latter case fuel outlays are reduced by 35 percent."

Based on the experience of the central farms in the oblast, our scientists and specialists drew the following conclusion: with a comprehensive use of minimum-tillage soil cultivation and the availability of all necessary machines and tools, every year the oblast would be able to obtain an additional 425,000 tons of grain and significant amounts of sugar beets and sunflower and more than 1 million tons of fodder crops. Annual fuel savings would reach 13,500 tons. The use of soil protection technology in the farming areas of the European part of the country would yield an additional estimated 40 to 45 million tons of agricultural commodities in terms of grain; it would reduce soil cultivation outlays by 400-420 million rubles and save 1.4-1.6 million tons of fuel and some 8 million man-days working time.

The experience of the virgin land and our Poltava experiment indicate that a conversion to minimum-tillage soil protection farming system could be achieved

only if the solution of the problem is approached comprehensively. Unquestionably, the creation of base farms in each administrative rayon in the steppe and the forest steppe, which could experiment with and disseminate agrotechnical means of minimum-tillage farming, would be very helpful.

It is absolutely necessary, in our view, to include in the curriculae of agronomy, agrochemistry and soil science plant protection, mechanization and electrification and agricultural and forest reclamation departments and VUZ, technicum and vocational and technical school sections and special courses in departments for upgrading the skill of leading cadres, teaching soil-protecting minimum-tillage farming and the technical support it requires.

One of the main obstacles on the way to the extensive application of a soil-protection farming system today is the shortage of tools. Even our oblast, which initiated the largest Ukrainian experiment in the development of this new variant of soil-protection farming system, with the support and tremendous assistance of union and republic party, soviet and economic bodies, is to this day not supplied with the necessary tools for sweepless processing.

Even the equipment which is being produced is of unsatisfactory quality. More advanced sowing machines, sweep cultivators, deep subsoil sweeps, subsoil cultivators, wide scope cultivators and combination units are needed.

The funds invested in the production of sweep equipment, which is extremely necessary, will be recovered quite quickly. Nor are they so substantial compared with the tremendous losses annually suffered by our farms from wind and water erosion. The material damage which was caused by a relatively short dust storm over the sugar beet fields in our oblast, on 10 May 1981, were tenfold higher than the funds which would have been invested in bying a full set of equipment needed for the cultivation of an equal area of land.

Today exceptionally favorable conditions for creative work exist in the countryside. Everything is available--substantial state funds for the development of production, good wages and scope for thinking and practicality. The extensive use of minimum-tillage cultivation will enable us, in addition to yielding tremendous economic and social benefits, to oppose efficiently the elements and to maintain the fertility of our fields for high current and future yields.

Depending on existing conditions, from 100 to 300 or more years are necessary to increase the fertile stratum of the soil by 1 centimeter. This same centimeter can be destroyed by a single violent tempest or heavy downpour. Man alone can come to the aid of the land. Minimum-tillage farming is the reliable foundation for protecting our plowland from destruction and upgrading its fertility.

The new soil cultivation technology is not a whim or a self-seeking aim; it is not due to hasty enthusiasms. The land is in a condition which requires help and we, the people, must do this and help it always remain fertile. Minimum-tillage farming is no longer a strictly agricultural matter. It is a matter of patriotic and civic concern. The more fields without plows we have the more generously will the land reward us.

FOOTNOTE

1. The author has discussed problems of minimum-tillage farming in the books "Dumy o Tseline" [Thoughts on the Virgin Lands], Kolos, Moscow, 1968; "Pole bez Pluga" [Field Without Plow]. Izvestiya, Moscow, 1984--editor's note.

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FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY

FOLLOWING THE PATH OF INTENSIFICATION

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[Article by Milos Jakes, member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee]

[Text] The defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism, and the liberation of a number of countries in Europe and Asia by the Soviet Army created the prerequisites for one of the most important events of our century --the birth of the world socialist system. Lenin's prediction regarding the fact that socialism "creates new, higher forms of human society when the legitimate needs and progressive aspirations of the working masses of and nationality are satisfied for the first time in an international unity" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 26, p 40) has been comprehensively confirmed in the formation and development of this system. Life has shown that the tasks of building a new society, and also the tasks of its development and defense are impossible to fulfill without international unity and cooperation between fraternal countries, without the uniting of their efforts, resources, and collective experience. The contemporary period in particular provides convincing evidence to the highest degree that progress in the construction of mature socialist society is all the more successful and complete, the better we succeed in utilizing the advantages of socialism in individual countries and within the framework of the community as a whole. This is particularly true with regard to economic and scientific-technological cooperation between fraternal countries, the main areas of which were determined by the Moscow top-level Economic Conference of CEMA member countries in 1984. Raising the level of this cooperation and thereby making the fullest possible use of the potential of socialism in the economy--a decisive sphere of development, and also of competition with capitalism--this is what the conference is oriented towards in its program documents of a long-term nature.

In the battles waged by the Czechoslovak people for social and national freedom, for the triumph of revolution, and for the construction of a new society, a major advantage and decisive international condition of success was the fact that they could always rely on the cooperation with them, and also that they could make use of their experience. This advantage was primarily born of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people and their army against

fascism, a struggle which, 40 years ago, brought freedom both to our people and to other peoples in Europe and Asia. And in the postwar period the might and international authority and assistance of the Soviet Union, and also the newly born unity and cooperation between the young socialist states, made it impossible for imperialism to prevent their peoples from independently deciding the question of their sociopolitical system, to unleash aggression against them, to take away their freedom and to revise the results of World War II. All this also created a favorable situation for the Czechoslovak people who, in February 1948, were able to unambiguously choose their path and embark upon the construction of socialist society.

In this respect Soviet methods of leading the national economy, developing people's initiative and increasing their participation in management of the state, that is, enhancing the role of the subjective factor as a key factor in socialist construction, have been of particular value to us. And today CPSU experience serves as an inexhaustible source of examples of resolving problems set by the building of mature socialist society and by world development. At the same time we also utilize the experience of other fraternal states.

Evaluating the path trodden by our country and the results it has achieved, we can claim with full justification that without reciprocal economic assistance and cooperation with socialist countries, and particularly without the assistance of the USSR, we would not have had either rapid economic and social progress or, in essence, socialism itself. CEMA, founded at the dawn of the formation of the world socialist system, has assisted economic cooperation between fraternal countries by virtue of its organizational role. It was formed even earlier than the Warsaw Pact organization, which was a response to the appearance of NATO and its aggressive, militarist policies.

Economic cooperation between socialist countries and its concrete results, which benefit each of these countries, fully justify the existence of CEMA, the significance of which is constantly increasing. Under its influence our cooperation has steadily acquired higher forms. From bilateral relations it has developed into multilateral relations, from reciprocal commodity exchange --to scientific-technological cooperation, and production specialization and cooperation, and from developed cooperation and friendly mutual assistance--to socialist integration. The fact that CEMA is the largest and most dynamically developed economic formation in the world has the most principled significance.

A significant proportion of the total economic potential of the European CEMA member states is accounted for by the USSR, whose key position is determined not only by the volume of its production resources and capacities and by its powerful scientific-technological potential, but also by its vast domestic market, and a number of other factors. All this creates a stable, irreplaceable economic rear support for countries incorporated in CEMA. And it is primarily thanks to the USSR that our community has become a successfully functioning international economic system.

Its further progress will not only depend on how well we learn to utilize the potentials of socialism within individual countries, but also, to an increasing extent, on how we utilize its international and, in particular, its

integrational advantages. Resolving this task will undoubtedly help to develop the world revolutionary process, to further alter the correlation of forces to the advantage of socialism, peace and progress, and to increase the attractiveness of our community in people's eyes. The Moscow top-level conference also proceeded from this.

Today, as at the end of the 1940s--beginning of the 1950s, imperialism, headed by the United States, has unleashed a "cold war" against the socialist states, which the present American administration has proclaimed as a new "crusade." Its chief component part is unrestrained militarization, which even has outer space in its grip, with the aim of gaining military superiority over the socialist countries, exhausting their economies and thereby delaying their fulfillment of economic goals, imposing its will on them and ultimately changing their sociopolitical structure. In addition to "psychological war," an important role is played in this "crusade" by economic war and also measures in the spheres of technology, credit and foreign exchange, which envisage a broad range of destabilizing actions and the use of a "differentiated approach," an embargo on "strategic commodities" and new technologies, and also other "sanctions" against the socialist countries.

The majority of CEMA countries are now faced with the complex tasks of building and perfecting developed socialism. And in our country it is a question of comprehensively intensifying the national economy and combining the scientific-technological revolution with the advantages of a socialist planned economy. Today this task is just as urgent as socialist industrialization was once urgent. Intensification of the national economy is indissolubly connected with deepening socialist democracy, increasing people's activeness and creative initiative, improving their qualifications and level of education, and shaping a socialist way of life. We will be able to resolve these problems successfully only if we have a clear idea of the ways of resolving strategic issues and if we consider them from the positions of Marxism-Leninism and from the viewpoint of the aims of our policies.

Life has repeatedly confirmed the truth of Lenin's direction that "whoever sets about individual problems without first resolving the general ones will inevitably at every step unconsciously 'stumble' on these general problems. And to stumble blindly on them in every particular case means dooming one's policy to worse vacillation and lack of principle" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 15, p 368). And that is why, however urgent the series of problems which life poses us, in resolving them we must not fall into pure practicism, technocratism, or, finally, be guided by the principle "charity begins at home." Frequently the consequence of this is an extremely expensive path of errors and miscalculations, and sometimes even uncontrolledness, which plays into the hands of opportunism.

That is why close cooperation and coordinated progress of the countries belonging to the community is so important. They cannot count on each of them individually, in isolation from one another, purely by their own resources or with the "assistance" of developed capitalist countries being able to resolve existing problems. Mutual cooperation and support alone are the guarantee of our economic and technical invulnerability to imperialist countries and, at

the same time, the prerequisite of rapid, comprehensive, constant, stable development.

It is precisely for this reason that the results of the top-level conference of CEMA member states are of such exceptional significance. It demonstrated our common desire for economic progress, stronger defense capabilities, cooperation and increased political influence for the socialist community in the world. At the same time the conference indicated the qualitative point reached by our development both in individual countries and in cooperation between them.

A large role was played by the internationalist position of the Soviet Union and its Leninist CPSU in preparation for the conference and in the drawing up of its documents. Among the most important results was the jointly coordinated strategy of economic and scientific-technological development for the next 1.5 decades. This strategy is expected to create the prerequisites for a major increase in the industrial production of the countries belonging to the community. The common denominator of the economic strategy of world socialism, as it is also formulated by the congress of fraternal parties, is intensification of social production.

The CPCZ Central Committee and the CSSR government highly appraised the results of the economic conference and have determined for party and state organs and organizations at all levels concrete measures and tasks to realize the decisions of the conference so that Czechoslovak side consistently and thoroughly fulfills its obligations. We believe coordinating the economic policies of the CEMA countries and developing a comprehensive program for their scientific-technological development to be an important prerequisite of implementing this strategic course.

All this, as Comrade Gustav Husak, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee and president of the CSSR, emphasized at the conference, requires the perfection of the mechanism of mutual cooperation, including both the coordination of long-term plans and financial-economic instruments, primarily price formation, so that the systems of management in individual countries more effectively, from an economic point of view, assist their fullest and deepest possible participation in the international socialist division of labor.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that "all economic, political and spiritual human life is internationalized more and more under capitalism. Socialism internationalizes it totally" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 23, p 318). Development confirms this Leninist thesis.

The process of socialist internationalization with the simultaneous flourishing of national forms of social life is gradually becoming the most important factor in the socioeconomic, cultural and spiritual progress of our peoples. It has a tangible influence on the formation of a socialist way of life and on the creation of conditions for the free development of the individual. We proceed from the fact that this process is based on the international principles of socialist construction, principles which have universal significance. These are primarily social ownership of production

means, planning and the leading role of the workers class and its vanguard in the shape of the Marxist-Leninist party.

A vital feature of all the basic processes of development under socialism is their planned, consciously controlled nature. The internationalization of productive forces in this sense cannot be an exception and progress spontaneously. The chief factor ensuring its systematic progress is organized cooperation and the embodiment of a new type of relationship between countries on the principles of socialist internationalism, in which full observance of the equality and sovereignty of each country is organically inherent. CEMA is just such a form of organization.

It is precisely the planned, coordinated nature of integration processes that is the main long-term source of dynamic, stable development in the economies on the CEMA member states. This factor is, at the same time, the material foundation of the political and ideological unity of the countries belonging to the community.

As integration intensifies, heightened demands are made on the directing of this process and on the quality of programming and mutually coordinating socioeconomic tasks with the requirements of other spheres of social life. The significance of CEMA is also increasing in this connection. The progress of individual national economies and of our community as a whole will depend to an increasing extent on the level, quality and effectiveness of CEMA's purposeful influence. It is precisely in this sphere, it was noted at the economic conference, that considerable reserves exist. Life shows that resolving major, complex scientific-technological, export, investment, raw material and fuel and energy problems without giving them mutual international coordination leads to the squandering of vast resources and does not produce the desired effect.

Let us take, for example, the problem of the rise in the cost of extracting raw materials and fuel. This problem faces the entire community. The fuel and energy base of our countries cannot be expanded simply by increasing the extraction of primary resources. The way to resolve the problem lies primarily in making better use of these resources. In addition to bringing new native native sources of traditional resources or their substitutes into economic circulation, radical changes in production and technological structures are also required. In machine construction, for example, it is far more rational for us to orient ourselves toward international cooperation, which ensures the constant updating of manufactured goods on the basis of jointly introduced technologies, than to expand existing production capacities or build new ones. It is clear that close cooperation, coordination and the rational division of production programs and consequently also of investment and research programs within the CEMA framework make it possible to concentrate capital investments in the necessary areas, raise the technical levels of production, and thereby speed up intensification of the entire reproduction process.

And in this respect it is impossible to manage without unified programs to coordinate the development of socialist countries and without the development of instruments which will help to intensify their economic cooperation and to

bring the structures of their economic mechanisms closer together, which will make it possible to more closely connect the national state interests of each of these countries with the general international interests of the community.

All this gives rise to the necessity for changes in the methods of party work. New, serious demands are made on ideological and mass political activities. It is important to explain to working people the significance and role of integration and to prepare them for the consequences of inevitable structural changes in the economy, for new methods of management and so forth.

One of the most important political and socioeconomic tasks in the international sphere formulated in the decisions of CPCZ congresses is that of intensifying economic cooperation between the CSSR and the Soviet Union. As Comrade Gustav Husak stressed at the economic conference in Moscow, we "believe to be correct the conclusion that the main area of our coopeation must be the further development of socialist economic integration.... The development of integration processes is an objective requirement of further economic development and of the most rapid possible introduction of the achievements of scientific-technological progress. Our experience attests to the fact that cooperation with the Soviet Union forms the core, and will do so to an increasing extent in the coming years, of the entire process of international socialist integration within the CEMA framework. Just as in the past, when relations with the Soviet Union have been a decisive factor in the accelerated formation of the structure of economic development in some member countries, these relations will have a salutary influence in the future also, in the fulfillment of new tasks.

The development of our cooperation with the USSR is characterized in particular by reciprocal commodity exchange. During 4 years of the 7th Five-Year Plan, Czechoslovak exports to the USSR have increased by 74 percent at current prices, and imports by 81 percent. In 1983 commodity circulation between our countries reached 12.9 billion rubles. The Soviet Union's share in Czechoslovak foreign trade has grown from 36 percent in 1980 to 45 percent in 1984.

Quantitative and qualitative production and scientific-technological cooperation between our countries is also steadily growing on the basis of jointly developed, most important production and scientific-technological programs. Thus, together with the Soviet Union, we are resolving energy problems and participating in the construction of gas pipelines on the territory of the Soviet Union and in other undertakings. For Czechoslovakia, which is experiencing a serious shortage of energy and raw material resources, deliveries from the USSR have vital importance.

Soviet scientific-technological assistance has made it possible for our country to develop an extensive program in the sphere of nuclear energy, including the production of reactors for nuclear power stations. This program is not only necessary to our country, where virtually all growth in the production of electroenergy is ensured by nuclear power stations, but it also helps to resolve energy problems within the framework of the whole community.

This example alone, as well as a whole series of others, once again emphasizes that cooperation with the Soviet Union is the key to socialist economic integration. Our people have many times satisfied themselves of the truth of this and of the advantages of cooperation with the land of the soviets.

Cooperation between the CSSR and the USSR is also intensifying in other spheres, particularly in the production of new machine tools, equipment and materials. It has been established in branches of heavy and transport machine construction, in the manufacture of chemical and petrochemical equipment and agricultural equipment, in the automobile and chemical industry, and in the production of manufacturing machine tools, vessels, machines and equipment for livestock breeding and fodder production.

We are perfecting this cooperation on the basis of developing specialization and cooperation. The results achieved attest to progress in this area. In 1984 the proportion of our deliveries in accordance with agreement on production cooperation and specialization reached 33 percent of our total deliveries, and the proportion of machine construction products in the total volume of our exports reached 45 percent. An increasingly important place is being given to intrabranch cooperation, which will be an accelerating factor in the growth of volumes of foreign trade deliveries.

We proceed from the fact that scientific-technological and production cooperation and specialization are a basic prerequisite of a comprehensive and fullest possible use of the advantages of socialism and the combination with them of the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution. At present, cooperation primarily in those spheres which most require the use of advanced scientific knowledge and complex equipment, for example, in robot technology, electronics, biotechnology, and so forth, is being moved into the foreground. The formation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Robot Scientific-Technological Association can serve as an example of the new area of our cooperation, which is in accordance with the decisions of the top-level conference.

Cooperation, particularly in the form of production cooperation and specialization, makes it possible to make the most efficient use of material resources and scientific research and production potential, and leads--on the basis of intensifying the division of labor--to the most efficient production structure, primarily in machine construction and the chemical industry.

In accordance with the decisions of the economic conference we will continue to comprehensively expand this cooperation. It was with this aim that the Program of Long-Term Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation Between the USSR and CSSR for the Period Up to the Year 2000 was developed and signed in May 1985. It makes it possible to concentrate scientific-technological forces, production resources and capital investments on resolving the tasks of speeding up intensification and increasing production efficiency, to achieve a high technical level and quality in products for export, and to better satisfy the requirements of the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries. Thanks to the understanding shown by the USSR, it is becoming possible to make structural changes in order to reduce the energy and raw material requirements of the Czechoslovak economy and thereby resolve complex ecological problems in our

country and take a new step toward reducing its dependence on imports from developed capitalist states.

Intensification of the national economy and economic integration are dialectically mutually connected and mutually conditioned processes.

Our party proceeds from the fact that increasing the efficiency of the national economy is not only a means of resolving the present-day problems of the Czechoslovak economy and a condition of ensuring social guarantees and the people's living standard, but also a process inherent in the construction of developed socialist society and, consequently, a natural law of socialism's further progress.

Integration makes it possible to more rapidly realize a decisive condition of intensification and increased efficiency--the accelerated introduction of the achievements of science and technology into practice, which in our country is connected with structural changes in the national economy. This simultaneously requires a constant increase in people's qualifications and improvement in their education, which is also the aim of the school reform conducted in recent years, the utmost revelation of the creative initiative of the working people, and their active participation in management.

An important prerequisite of resolving these tasks is the formation of a reliable mechanism of economic management. The 16th CPCZ Congress stressed the paramount importance of improving the quality of planning as a basic link in the system of national economic management and also the necessity to enhance the role of the plan at all levels, which can be achieved by consistent application of the principle of democratic centralism in the process of developing and implementing the plan and with the active participation of the working people.

These requirements are gradually being fulfilled by means of a series of measures aimed at perfecting the system of planned management of the national economy. They are expected to accelerate the introduction of the achievements of science and technology into practice, which is a decisive factor in increasing social labor productivity. They are also aimed at improving quality and achieving a high degree of efficiency in all spheres of production and in every workplace. At the same time as perfecting centralized planning and management, the independence and responsibility of production associations and enterprises are being increased regarding the fulfillment of state plan tasks and the intensification of economic accountability methods of economic operations.

An essential component part of this work is to consistently observe socialist principles of work remuneration and strengthen social justice. It is a question of making wages more dependent on results achieved and ensuring that they correspond to the real significance of specific professions. The sphere of application of the brigade method of work organization and remuneration is expanding. We also consider strengthening discipline and order to be an inalienable component part of the struggle for efficiency. All this helps to increase the labor activeness and creative initiative of people, which has found particular reflection in the competition in honor of the 40th

anniversary of the liberation and in efforts aimed at making it possible to work 2 days using saved materials.

The party's consistent fulfillment of its leading role and an increase in the efficiency of party work are a prerequisite of successfully resolving all the complex tasks arising in connection with the process of intensification. Party organs and organizations at all levels are orienting political educational, organizational and control activities toward ensuring that economic organs more decisively uphold the interests of all society and assist in the most rapid possible introduction of the achievements of scientific-technological progress into practice, and that an increase in labor productivity is ensured in every workplace and norms strictly observed. The effectiveness of party work must, in the final analysis, primarily effect an improvement in the quality of manufactured articles, a reduction in prime production costs and full utilization of production resources.

The party demands that all communists, in whichever sector they may work and whatever position they may hold, constantly bear in mind that the individual will always be a decisive factor of success. His awareness, working ability, professional knowledge and experience, understanding of his duties and his responsibility to the labor collective and society, belief in the correctness of the tasks set by the party and his awareness of what is required of him and wherein lies his concrete contribution to the fulfillment of these tasks--these are the main guidelines of our party concern. The CPCZ constantly devotes attention to explaining its economic policies and mobilizing people to implement them. Today more than ever before the economy is the main field of struggle between the two opposite social systems, and the successes we manage to achieve in this struggle are our contribution to consolidating socialism and peace throughout the world.

Now, in the year when our country has celebrated the 40th anniversary of the victorious conclusion of the national liberation, antifascist struggle and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the glorious Soviet Army, we insistently stress the mutual connection between our work and the resolving of the most important tasks of the contemporary era. The past 4 decades have been imbued with the creative labor of our people. Invariably adhering to the behests of the generation that struggled for the liquidation of exploitation and social, political, cultural and national oppression, the behests of the fighters for national liberation and a new social system, under CPCZ leadership the people are building a developed socialist society.

As a result of the systematic development of all branches of the national economy, the total volume of industrial production in our country has increased 12.7 times in the period 1948-1984, and labor productivity in the industry has grown 6.7 times. The volume of production in machine construction has increased 35 times and in the chemical and rubber industry it has grown 36 times.

The sharp upswing in Czechoslovak industry has led to the volume of foreign trade increasing 22 times in comparison to 1948, and the volume of trade with the Soviet Union has increased more than 60 times. As a whole, our commodity

circulation with socialist countries has increased 45 times, with developed capitalist countries--7.3 times, and with developing countries--8.9 times.

Agriculture has also achieved considerable successes. Its gross output has increased 2.2 times. But it must be taken into account that the area of agricultural land has decreased by one-tenth in comparison to 1948, and the number of those employed in agriculture has dropped by three-fifths. Labor productivity measured by the total gross agricultural output per worker has increased 5 times. Grain production alone has risen from 5 million to 12 million metric tons during this period. The average grain harvest has risen from 15.8 to 48 quintals per hectare. Growth in livestock breeding has been even more intensive--output has increased 2.8 times. Milk production, with virtually the same number of cows, has increased from 2.5 billion to 6.3 billion liters. One could also cite statistics relating to the production of meat, eggs and so forth, which attest to the fact that the test set by the party--to increase the country's self-sufficiency in basic food products--has been successfully fulfilled.

Differences in the living conditions of agricultural workers and workers in other social groups have been eliminated. The average wage in industry and in agriculture has also been made even. Today 23,000 engineers, 124,000 technicians, and 320,000 skilled workers work in rural areas. The level of education in the national economy as a whole has also risen. Whereas in 1953, 38 out of every 1,000 workers had a secondary education and 20 out of every 1,000 had a higher education, today the respective figures are 167 and 72.

Progress in education and science and other achievements of the cultural revolution are a powerful source of development of our country's economic potential.

As a result of the upswing in the national economy and growth in social labor productivity, the national income has increased 6.5 times since 1948. This has made it possible, in accordance with the chief aime of our party's policies, to raise the material and cultural living standard of the working people and guarantee their social and civil rights. In comparison to 1948 individual consumption has increased 4.3 times and social consumption 8.9 times. The whole population is covered by social insurance in old age and in illness. By 1984 a total of 3.1 million apartments had been built, in which almost 9 million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, with a population of more than 15 million, have taken up residence.

We have been able to achieve these results only thanks to the existence of the world socialist system and CEMA, and primarily thanks to our extensive and comprehensive cooperation with the USSR.

At present our attention is concentrated on fulfilling the tasks of the 7th Five-Year Plan. After the fall in the growth rates of the national income during 1981-1982, when the country's economy had to adapt to new conditions, in 1983 growth in the national income speeded up and reached 2.7 percent, and in 1984 it reached 3.2 percent. The dynamics of development in the national economy are being restored. During 4 years of the five-year plan period the volume of industrial production has grown by 10.8 percent, including by 17.8

percent in machine construction and 38.4 percent in the electrical engineering industry. A record grain harvest was achieved in agriculture in 1984 and the efficiency of agricultural production is growing, which is reflected in the decrease in fodder consumption per unit of production and in the increase in daily weight gains in livestock breeding. The progress made in fulfilling the state plan creates real prerequisites for realizing the main aspects of the 7th Five-Year Plan and the decisions of the 16th CPSZ Congress.

The Czechoslovak people's 40 years of struggle for socialism are convincing evidence of the correctness of CPCZ Marxist-Leninist polices and of the party's firm links with the masses. The successes in socialist construction, as well as the expensive lessons of the crisis development within the party and in society during 1968-1969, prove that without a party founded on the principles of Marxism-Leninism there would be no socialist Czechoslovakia. We have had to overcome many obstacles and defend our Leninist course. As Comrade Gustav Hustav Husak has said, Lenin's behests have always been sacred to us, and a party that has learned through its own experience will guard the purity of Leninist ideas as the apple of its eye.

Our country's most recent history has proven irrefutably that the vital interests of the Czech and Slovak peoples require the closest possible cooperation and fraternal alliance with socialist countries, and primarily with the Soviet Union. This is a fundamental principle of our policy, formulated by Klement Gottwald. Today there is virtually no sphere in existence in which close contacts and fruitful cooperation would not be implemented between our countries.

The guarantee of this development has been, is and will continue to be the relations between the CPSU and the CPCZ, and the ideological unity and unity of actions of both countries on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism which have been put to the test by life. For Czechoslovak communists the glorious party of Lenin has always been an example of loyalty to Marxist-Leninist teaching and its creative application, and an example of principle, selflessness and heroism in overcoming all difficulties and obstacles. It was and remains an innovator in the search for new ways of building a society free from exploitation, which is once again confirmed by preparation for the 27th CPSU Congress. Relations between our parties are traditionally distinguished by mutual trust and understanding, unity of views on all main issues of domestic and foreign policy and loyalty to the principles of socialist internationalism.

In the historic battle for socialism, peace and social progress we will act in close cooperation with Soviet communists and all the Soviet people. In this we see a guarantee of further triumphs, in this lies the source of our historic optimism.

In our work we rely on the vast potential and powerful united force of the socialist states. The working people of our countries will not give up any of their historical achievements and will be able to defend their just cause. We

know that good will alone is insufficient for this and that success to socialist construction is achieved when party poilcy is based on firm scientific Marxist-Leninist foundations and on the creative application of the fundamental principles of socialist construction, principles which are of a universal, international nature.

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REALITIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY EPOCH

IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE

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[Interview with Jaime Perez, deputy secretary general of the Uruguay CP Central Committee, conducted by editor V. Bushuyev]

[Text] The struggle waged by the people's masses against the aggressive interventionist policy of U.S. imperialist circles, for the overthrow of dictatorial regimes imposed by Washington, the implementation of long-needed socioeconomic changes and for democracy and social progress is growing in the Latin American countries. The increasingly active role which the working class is playing at the present stage of the revolutionary democratic struggle is intensifying the purposefulness of actions taking place throughout Latin America.

It is precisely these sustained combat actions of the masses that are undermining the positions of the imperialist proteges and force the reactionary military, which has ruled a number of countries until recently, to retreat, to agree to the holding of elections and to return to civilian rule. As was noted at the conference of communist parties of South American countries (Buenos Aires, July 1984), important successes in the development of the democratic process in this part of the world were noted in recent years.

In the past few years reactionary military dictatorships have collapsed, one after the other, in Bolivia and Argentina. An end was put to the long rule by the generals in Brazil. With the powerful support of the international solidarity of the working people, the Chilean people are courageously struggling against the dictatorship, and the democratic forces in Paraguay have become energized. Significant successes have been achieved in the democratization of political life by the peoples of Colombia, Equador and Peru. Everywhere, the communists are in the vanguard of the democratic struggle of the masses.

The development of events in Uruguay is creating a great deal of interest. A military dictatorship had ruled that country since June 1973, representing the interests of the most reactionary forces of big capital and the land owners. The dictatorship increased the country's dependence on imperialism, suppressed basic civil freedoms and elevated to the rank of state policy terrorism aimed at the worker and people's movements. Its advent to power represented an

effort on the part of American imperialism and the local reaction and the generals--supporters of the anticommunist "national security doctrine"--to destroy the democratic institutions and gains and to suppress the struggle for radical change in economic and social structures, which is assuming a tremendous scope. In the course of this struggle the working class and the people's masses, rallied in a Broad Front, which includes the Communist Party of Uruguay (CPU), achieved considerable successes in uniting the most progressive and consistently democratic antiolygarchic and anti-imperialist forces in the country and creating conditions for the formation of a people's government.

The defeat of the military regime, which was an unquestionable victory for the working class and toiling masses in Uruguay, opened new prospects in the country's life. The victory confirmed the accuracy of the political line of the Uruguayan communists, which combined over a long period of time an uncompromising struggle against the dictatorship with a broad strategic and tactical approach to the problems of interaction and unification of all antidictatorial forces.

Editor V. Bushuyev met with J. Perez, one of the leaders of the CPU and conducted the following interview.

Question: What results of the rule by the dictatorial regime in Uruguay forced it to give up the power and agree to the restoration of bourgeois democratic institutions in the country?

Answer: During the nearly 12 years of rule, the dictatorship ruined the republic, causing tremendous damage to industry, agriculture, education and health care. It aggravated the housing crisis, reduced by at least 50 percent working people's wages, increased the foreign debt of this country of some 3 million people to $5 billion and found itself entangled in a series of finacial scandals. All of this was done for the sake of defending "Western Christian civilization" and the "national spirit." Acting in a Nazi fashion, the dictatorship launched repressive measures against the working class, the middle classes and various political forces, including our party.

However, having ruined the country and drastically lowered the population's living standards, it proved unable to divide the working class which rallied arounditsmilitant trade union--the National Convention of Working People (NKT)--or to weaken the ranks of the Broad Front.

Despite cruel repressive measures, it was also unable to crush our party. When it became obvious that the use of force could not deal with the communists, the dictatorship tried to undermine our leadership and to drive a wedge in the CPU leadership. All reactionary efforts, however, ended in defeat. The communist party emerged from the most severe trials in its history stronger, covered with the glory of its martyred heroes.

Eventually, it was the Uruguayan people who dealt a crushing political defeat to the military dictatorship. The country's working class,the Broad Front, headed by the outstanding patriot General Liber Serena, and the other democratic political and social forces played a decisive role in this event.

A number of reasons determined the collapse of the dictatorship, forcing it into holding elections and accepting a return to democracy.

The first is that our people were aimed at removing the threat of a coup d'etat as early as 1964, after a military dictatorship was established in neighboring Brazil and saber rattling began in Uruguay itself. At that time the working class, the communist party and the other left and democratic forces were able to lift the threat hanging over the country. The working class decided to go on indefinite general strike and to occupy factories and plants should a reactionary coup d'etat take place.

A process of growing emasculation of democracy began in 1968, although officially all of its institutions seemed to be preserved. Laws began to be violated and parliament gradually to lose its influence with the assumption of power by Jorge Pacheco Areco, the stooge of the reactionaries. With his support and that of the Colorado Party, despite internal discord, Juan Maria Bordaberry, another representative of the extreme right, won the 1971 elections.

Dramatic events occurred in Uruguay in 1972. In condemnation of Bordaberry's policy, a general strike was proclaimed by the trade union leadership and the progressive forces on 13 April, which involved the participation of the working class and the broad population masses, as a result of which the entire country was paralyzed. On the following day Uruguay became the arena of operations of leftist "urban guerillas" from the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros), on the one hand, and the crimes of the "death squad" created by the fascists, on the other. On that day the "squad" executioners murdered 12 people. This was a major social upheaval in a country which had lived for decades under a bourgeois-democratic order and had experienced no bloodshed.

Eight of our party comrades were murdered 3 days later. The most reactionary circles profited from these circumstances. The parliament voted for the imposition of martial law, opposed only by the representatives of the Broad Front. The Law on State Security was passed several months later, according to which military courts were given the right to try civillians, which included, as reality confirmed soon afterwards, not only participants in armed actions but all democrats, including communists, although we had not shed a single drop of someone else's blood while a great deal of ours had been. On 27 June 1973, with the support of the reactionary circles in the armed forces, Bordaberry issued a decree dissolving the parliament and terminating the activities of parties and trade union, student and other organizations.

Democracy was violated. The answer of the workers was an indefinite general strike. They occupied plants and factories which, during the 15 days of heroic defense, repeatedly fell under military control but were retaken by the strikers. Thousands of trade union leaders, including the NKT leadership, were subjected to reprisals. The detainees were taken to the city stadium in Montevideo. Meanwhile, hunger in worker families increased, for which reason the plenum of the trade union organizations within the NKT decided to end the strike, although rejecting the proposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to reach agreement. Under the existing circumstances such an agreement would have indicated the juridical recognition of the dictatorship. Although ending

the strike, the working class had not abandoned the antidictatorship struggle, intending to wage it by other means--through the unification of the entire people.

Naturally, strikes could not overthrow the dictatorship. The working class could not accomplish this by itself. Nevertheless, the strike enabled the people to determine the real intentions of the reaction, after which the dictatorship could no longer rely on the support of the main political parties and could use only the services of isolated defectors, who were second-rate individuals used to decorate the facade of the tyrany. The military command was forced to put trusted people--officers--in all governmental positions, central and local.

Throughout 1974 the working class pursued the struggle. It celebrated May Day in an atmosphere of terror. Troops were brought into Montevideo and army helicopters patrolled over the city. Nevertheless, three big meetings were held at predetermined areas in the capital, many of the participants of which were subsequently subjected to cruel reprisals. Comrade Rodney Arismendi, our party leader, was arrested on 8 May. However, as a result of a broad expression of solidarity and worldwide protests, in January 1975 the authorities were forced to send him into exile and he went to the Soviet Union.

In September 1974 the military regrouped its forces and openly fascist-leaning elements definitively assumed the upper hand in the armed forces. An operation which had been thoroughly planned over a number of years, directed against the communist party, was launched in October. Special prisons were created, where the executioners' experience acquired by the Americans in Vietnam, the French colonizers in Algeria, the dictatorships in Latin America and the results of the studies by physicians and psychologists were applied, with a view to determining the most vulnerable points in the human organism. Most refined torture was actively used--physical, mental and involving the use of chemicals.

Question: Comrade Perez, in the Soviet Union it is known that you personally have been subjected to all such painful tortures and that you were thrown in a prison which the executioners mockingly named "Libertad" ("Freedom"). Tell us what happend then to you personally.

Answer: Yes, I have experienced all that. I was arrested on 24 October 1974. I was first tortured by the secret police and then at the Punta de Carretas prison, where I spent a full year. I then realized what it meant to spend half a year in a cell known as "Infierno" ("Hell") where day and night the prisoner wore an impenetrable hood which covered his entire head.

After several days at the Libertad Prison, I was released for three months. I was convinced that the purpose of this was to kill me on the outside. However, thanks to the actions of the people's masses and, above all, thanks to the international solidarity of the working people and the protests of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Cuba and the other socialist countries and the democratic and progressive forces, my life was spared. I spent three more months under horrible conditions, followed by 6 months in one of the barracks

in the interior of the country where, as a result of all I had gone through, I contracted something similar to Parkinson's Disease: I lost the use of my hands and feet, and the soldiers themselves had to feed me. I even spent two months in a military hospital. From there, however, I was transfered again to the second floor of the Libertad Prison, where members of the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros), serving long sentences, were being held. Most fraternal relations were established between us. Intercourse with these people was quite interesting and useful, for it enabled me to gain a better understanding of the outlook of these radical members of the middle classes, the most militant segment of whom are the Tupamaros. The rest of the time I communicated essentially with my party comrades, for the military soon realized that instead of the discord they expected between communists and prisoners belonging to other organizations, their unity and reciprocal understanding only kept growing.

But let us set my bitter jail experience aside. During all that time, the people were pursuing their struggle. As I already said, the first landmark on the path of the defeat of the dictatorship was the general strike. The second was the plebiscite of November 1980.

During the plebiscite the dictatorship tried to make the people accept the "lesser evil," by palming off the approval of a draft of an essentially fascist constitution. Its adoption would have prolonged the dictatorship by many more years, but this time "legalized," "legitimized" and based on the constritution. The mask, therefore, would be changed but the content would not. However, the experience of the struggle with the dictatorship, the people's desire for unity, the fact that even many members of traditional bourgeois parties--the National (Blanco) and Colorado--realized the danger of this plan, and the freedom-loving and progressive traditions of our people, based on the heroic events of the past, the legacy of Jose Artigas and the democratic educational system, which was introduced as early as 1870, influenced the results of the plebiscite. Unexpectedly for the dictatorship, the people said their firm "No!" In terms of plebiscites of this kind this was a truly historical phenomenon.

After recovering from the defeat, the dictatorship drafted a new plan. The Law on Parties allowed, albeit limited, activities by the National Party, The Colorado Party and the small Social Christian Civil Union. The Broad Front and the communist party remained outside the law, and General Serena, other military patriots and many of our comrades remained in jail. It was thus that the dictatorship intended to "legalize" the developed situation. Here as well, however, the reaction was defeated. The new plan was, after the legalizing of said parties,to hold in two years, the type of elections for their leadership in which the victory of those found suitable by the reactionary military would be secured. However, the situation in the country was already such that victory in those elections went to candidates who had opposed the draft of the fascist constitution in their time.

It was as of that moment that the military began to realize that a solution had to be found, for it had simply become impossible to block the growing onslaught of the people's masses. This was confirmed, among others, by the impressive general strike which was declared by the working class on 1 May

1983, without seeking any kind of agreement from the authorities. The strikers demanded a return to democracy and the release of political prisoners.

One of the largest meetings in the country's history was held on 27 November that same year. In its presidium our party was represented by Martha Valentini, the wife of the noted CPU figure Jose Luis Massera. She had recently been released from prison where she had been imprisoned for communist party membership. Massera himself, despite an extensive international solidarity campaign and demand for his release, continued to waste away in the Libertad prison. The representatives of all political and social forces in the country--left, center and even right--who were in the presidium together with Martha, were unanimous in their resolve to put an end to the dictatorship and turn the country back to democracy. These demands were the main theme of the meeting. Let us note the high level of political consciousness of the participating masses. After it was announced at the meeting that "greetings" had been received from Walensa, all the participants in the meeting condemned this sally by a revolutionary provocateur involved in the conspiracy against socialist Poland, and his "message," clearly concocted by the imperialist special services, was not even read publicly.

However, the military had no intention whatsoever to yield to the will of the people. Secretly from the masses they tried to hold separate talks with representatives of the National Party, the Colorado Party and the Civil Union on making changes in the constitution.

Another general strike was launched by the working class on 18 January 1984. It was organized clandestinely and its purpose was to thwart any attempt at conspiracy behind the back of the people. Once again the country found itself totally paralyzed on 27 June, the day of the 11th anniversary of the general strike and the coup d'etat. That strike, held under the slogan of civil disobedience, shook up the national consciousness of the Uruguayans, for it was joined by virtually the entire nation.

Such actions were becoming increasingly unanimous and widespread. For example, some days or on the occasion of a new crime committed by the dictatorship, housewifes would take to the streets and mount noisy demonstrations, such as beating on saucepans, blowing automobile horns and making as much noise as they could. Such noise literally penetrated barracks and officer premises, and rolled throughout the country like a hurricane. Even during international soccer games, which are so popular in Uruguay, people frequently crowded the stands less for the sake of the game than for gathering together and chanting anti-dictatorship slogans. For example, they shouted in a chorus "Borombon, borombon, he who jumps not is 'boton'!" (a "boton" is a police agent). The stands rocked from the noise.... The same happened during the numerous street demonstrations at holidays.

Under the existing situation the military leadership reached the conclusion that the time had come to seek some kind of political solution, before the indignant people, who felt a tremendous hatred for the dictatorship, would take more decisive action. Talks were initiated between the military and the representatives of political forces. They were held publicly, thanks to which

the people were able to exert a certain amount of pressure on them. In order to make the talks possible, the military was forced to release Comrade Massera and subsequently General Serena, who had wasted in jail for many years, to legalize some of the parties within the Broad Front and set a date for holding general elections.

Conditions were created for a conversion from dictatorship to democracy through general elections, which were held in November 1984, as a result of which democracy triumphed. The groups which had supported the dictatorship one way or another garnered less than 10 percent of the vote, despite the fact that voting was strictly mandatory and that the precentage of voters was high. In the municipal elections in Montevideo the Broad Front lost by no more than 1.5 percent of the vote, bearing in mind that the capital accounts for about one-half of the country's population and 80 percent of the working class, and that it contains the majority of industrial enterprises and state and cultural establishments. Although the communist party was still banned and 5,500 of possible party candidates could not run, the Progressive Democracy coalition we had created within the Broad Front, achieved substantial successes. Julio Maria Sanguinetti, the Colorado Party candidate, won the presidential elections.

The day the parliament opened, 15 February 1985, became a national holiday. The new government took over on 1 March, and the same day a decree legalizing the communist party and other organizations, including the National Convention of Working People and the University Students' Federation, was promulgated. On 2 March, together with members of other forces within the Broad Front demonstrated on Montevideo's main avenue. The release of political prisoners began a week later. Hundreds of thousands of people cheered them along the entire way from the prison to the city, a distance of 50 kilometers, waving the flags of the Broad Front, the communist party and individual groups of the National Party. On 15 March our party held a meeting on the sports stadium. The stands and the field were packed. The meeting was attended by numerous fellow-fighters rallied within the Broad Front. Also participating in the meeting and presenting greetings were representatives of the National and Colorado parties. It was at that time that the CPU Central Committee held its first legal plenum.

Question: During the entire period of dictatorship it was precisely the communists who were in the front ranks of the struggle for democracy and the basic interests of the working people. What are the tasks facing the party under the new conditions which have now developed in the country?

Answer: The party's reputation was considerably enhanced during the dictatorship period. The people see it as one of the forces which fought most actively for the restoration and democracy and suffered the heaviest casualties. Many party members were killed, imprisoned and tortured and disappeared. The masses saw the communist party as a patriotic force acting in the best traditions of our homeland, as flesh of the flesh of the working class, as an active supporter of the Broad Front, supporting its unity and prestige, promoting the development of its primary committees and throwing its full support behind its leadership headed by Libero Serena.

Despite the severe trials our party strengthened. Its influence among the masses increased and its ranks were reinforced even during the darkest periods of the dictatorship. The number of new members increased during the months preceding and following the elections. Its reputation is growing at a truly dizzying speed. Let us note two of its characteristic features: The influx of working youth increased in both the communist party and the Youth Communist Union, which had played a considerable role in recent years, and the mass participation of women. Today 40 percent of the CPU membership consists of women workers, specialists, members of the creative intelligentsia and school and university teachers.

The reaction had tried everything--from torture to forgeries--to split the party leadership which, however, had rallied even more tightly around Comrade Arismendi. The leadership is distinguished by its modesty and industriousness, and is closely linked with the masses. Our party remains inflexibly loyal to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and is imbued with the spirit of patriotism. It is also displaying its international solidarity with fraternal socialist Cuba, with Nicaragua, which has become the victim of an undeclared war by American imperialism, with the communist party and people of Chile and the suffering Paraguayan people. We support the struggle waged by the Soviet Union and its Leninist communist party for peace and an end to the arms race unleashed by imperialism. Our party, which had consistently acted in a spirit of internationalism, even before the dictatorship, and had always enjoyed international support even during the hardest times, continues, in the period of restoration of democracy, to head the struggle waged by the working class and the entire people. It clearly understands the importance of remaining loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism for the sake of defending peace and the victory of democracy and socialism, and the national liberation of the peoples.

Our party favors further progress on the path of democracy. This means, first of all, the need to uproot totally the vestiges of fascism and eliminate its repressive machinery. This will stabilize democracy and secure the effectiveness and scope of all the rights and freedoms of the working people, gained at such high cost. There are no longer political prisoners in the country. An investigation is under way of large illegal deals made by the dictatorship. However, such things must be carried out to the end, so that anyone who has committed a crime or is responsible for the "disappearance" of people is punished. It is also necessary to restore to their former positions all those who were replaced by the dictatorship for their leftist beliefs, and there are in the thousands.. Some of them have already returned to work, and generals Serena, Licandro and other democratic officers have regained their ranks and some of them have returned to active duty. Some trade union leaders, state employees and secondary and higher education workers have resumed their positions.

Secondly, progressalong the path of democracy requires, in the communists' opinion, that the demands of the worker and popular masses for intensified political and social changes be met. The living standards of the working people, workers, specialists, pensioners and others must be significantly improved. The extreme right, which would like to preserve a continuity with the previous regime, is calling upon the working people to agree to something

similar to the "Moncloa Pact," for the sake of strengthening democracy. As we know, this pact was an effort on the part of the Spanish bourgeoisie to impose on the working people in their country the abandonment of the struggle for social and democratic rights under the pretext of strengthening democracy, after the collapse of the Franco regime. We are convinced that the struggle waged by the working class for its rights will not weaken but strengthen democracy, for no democracy whatsoever is possible wherever the working people continue to suffer from hunger, unemployment and poverty. Under the dictatorship the working class was the most active fighter, and the defeat of the dictatorship and undertaking the restoration of democracy were made possible thanks to it and the leftist progressive parties, including ours. It would be extremely unfair to demand of the working class to continue to tolerate its present difficult situation whereas those groups which earned huge profits under the dictatorship retain their former privileges.

Our working class is headed by truly combative trade union leaders, who are independent of the bourgeois state and the entrepreneurs, for which reason they support demands which we, communists, fully agree with, mobilizing the working people in the struggle for their implementation. In particular, we deem necessary the satisfaction of the vital requirements of the working class in the areas of wages, unemployment, job openings, health care, education, housing, culture, and restoration and development of social legislation eliminated by the dictatorial regime. We also demand the solution of the problem of the small and middle farmers, who also suffered during the dictatorship, and that steps be taken in the implementation of the agrarian reform.

Third, to us progress toward democracy means reviving the country's economy, developing industry and agriculture with the help of effective state loans, and establishing positive business relations with all countries, including the socialist ones. The time has come to nationalize banks and foreign trade, revive industrial output and restore the state economic sector.

Fourth, such progress means pursuit of an independent foreign policy, a policy of nonalignment, defense of world peace and observance of the principles of self-determination, nonintervention, national sovereignty and independence. The government is already taking steps in that direction and, although we can still not speak of a firm course, real symptoms of change are visible. This is confirmed, for example, by the invitation to a visit extended to D. Ortega, the Nicaraguan president, and to delegations from Cuba and Angola to the inauguration ceremony of the Uruguayan president; incidentally, no such invitations were extended to the leaders of the racist Republic of South Africa or to Pinochet and Stroessner, respectively the dictators of Chile and Paraguay. Let us also note the unanimous opposition by the parliament, the president of the republic, our party, naturally, the Broad Front and the militant class-oriented trade unions to the U.S. trade and economic embargo against Nicaragua.

All of these are positive features. However, although we appreciate them suitably, we continue to insist on further pursuing an independent foreign policy, establishing firm relations with all nonaligned countries and friendship with the socialist countries, refusing to implement the

recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and proclaiming as a minimum a 10-year moratorium on the payment of interest and repayment of most of the foreign debt. Incidentally, had this depended on the communists, such debts, from which our country derived no benefits but even suffered considerably, would be repayed in the distant future, or not at all, for the imperialists, who were enriched at the expense of the hunger, blood and tears of our people, have extracted from the Uruguayan economy much more than what it owes.

In conclusion, let me say that we were and remain an Uruguayan communist party, and firm supporters of the Broad Front. This means that we are the perpetuators of our patriotic traditions and believe that it is only the anti-imperialist, democratic and progressive Broad Front that can be the real pretender to the power. The development and expansion of the communist party is taking place at a very crucial time for us and the homeland, for as a result of the period which has now ended, during which the people suffered so greatly and saw for themselves how tirelessly and irreconcilably our party fought for the restoration of civil freedoms, its reputation increased immeasurably and manifestations of anticommunism have been reduced to a minimum in the country. This is expressed in the great potential of the front, in organizational matters and in cadre education.

We are full of realistic optimism. Although Uruguay is at the southern tip of a continent constantly threatened by aggressive and provocatory imperialist U.S. policy, we are convinced that in our epoch, the epoch of victorious socialist revolutions, there is no geographic fatalism in the world. We have faith in the unity of the working class, the Broad Front, the democratic forces, the entire nation. Finally, we also have faith in the fact that our party can influence the situation in the country, such as to exclude a repetition of the tragic past forever.

The communists have the possibility of securing democracy and consolidating achieved successes. It is a question of progress toward radical democratization of the country's life, of advancement toward progressive democracy, national freedom and socialism. This presumes harnessing our forces for making programmatic demands for economic and social changes which will open possibilities of the assumption of power by the people, headed by the Broad Front, and forming a patriotic and anti-imperialist government.

Therefore, the current stage is one of increasing the experience and consciousness of the people's masses and reaching a higher stage in the unity of all patriotic, democratic and anti-imperialist forces, the working class above all. Aspiration toward unity among these forces is a structural component of the class struggle and an instrument in the strengthening of democratic gains.

It is for the sake of attaining these objectives that our party must retain its firm loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and the theory of the socialist revolution, which made possible to undertake in 1917 a change in the political appearance of the planet, surmount fascism, create a world socialist community and abolish the colonial system. Today socialism speak in many languages, including Spanish, thanks to the Cuban revolution. Let us also not forget the

Nicaraguan process. We are aspiring for our country as well to take the path of changes which the working class, the progressive democratic and anti-imperialist forces and the communist parties, guided by the great Marxist-Leninist ideas, are called upon to make.

Our party has honorably come out of a period of most severe trials and today, with increased strength and influence among the masses, is firmly pursuing a course of unification of the working people, the middle classes and all progressive circles, as it fights for uniting the majority of theUruguayan people and, as in the past, continuing to strengthen its fraternal ties with the CPSU and the entire international communist movement.

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THREE CENTERS OF IMPERIALISM--NEW ASPECTS OF CONTRADICTIONS

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[Article by V. Kudrov]

[Text] Paying constant attention to the problem of the changing correlation of forces in the capitalist world and the study of conflicting trends in rivalries and cooperation among capitalist countries is one of the important traditions in the Marxist-Leninist approach to the study of the realities of international developments. In his study of the problem, V. I. Lenin scientifically substantiated the law of the uneven economic and political development of countries in the epoch of imperialism and identified the process of the steady development within this law of two opposite yet interrelated trends - the centrifugal and centripetal - in the changing correlation of forces within imperialism. He noted that "...Two trends exist: the first makes the alliance among all imperialists inevitable; the other pits some imperialists against others. Neither has a firm foundation" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 332). The two trends are closely interrelated within the dialectics of unity and struggle, Lenin said, emphasizing that "their internal tie divides them by its very nature" (op. cit., vol 40, p 242).

Three centers of concentration of economic, scientific and technical and financial and political power stand out in the contemporary capitalist system: the United States, Western Europe (the EEC in particular) and Japan. International statistics show that these three centers account for over 80 percent of the capitalist world's industrial output and 65 percent of its exports. The correlation of forces among them is subject to constant change. The power criteria change as well: new values and guidelines assume priority, on the basis of which new centers of imperialist rivalty appear.

During the 1970s Western Europe and, particularly, Japan, came substantially closer to the United States in terms of superior economic growth rates and scientific and technical progress and economic development, surpassing it in a number of important economic indicators. Japan, in particular, became the leader of the capitalist world in the competitiveness of industrial commodities; in some sectors (automobiles, steel, etc.) it surpassed the United States in labor productivity; the FRG and Switzerland caught up with

the United States not only in terms of per capita generating of the GNP but also in terms of wages and personal income. All of this determined the shift from "monocentrism," which was characteristic of the previous period during which American monopoly capital held unchallenged dominating positions, to the present "polycentrism," in the capitalist world. This was a transition paralleled by a certain equalization of the levels of economic and scientific and technical development as well as quality shifts in cooperation in economic and political activities among the leading capitalist states and steps for joint regulation of the economy. What is taking place is essentially a process of assumption of multinational forms by state monopoly capital, objectively reflecting the aspiration of monopoly capital, which had become closely interwoven with the state and dominated it, to exceed the narrow limits of national control over the economy and try to smooth contradictions and conflicts between nationally owned companies and governments in world markets and to formulate a joint line of approach in economic relations with socialist and developing countries.

Western propaganda, particularly after the recent annual conferences bythe leaders of the seven leading capitalist countries, in Williambsburg, London and Bonn, is trying to present economic relations among them as increasingly closer cooperation. In fact, however, new centers and areas which aggravate interimperialist relations are ever present in such interrelationships. On the other hand, a certain commonality of interests is developing, demanding joint efforts and accelerating economic and political integration processes, the study of which is important in order to accurately understand the future dynamics of the world capitalist economy and to determine its future development trends.

I

The uneven economic and political development of the individual countries and regions under capitalism is the result not only of objectively developing ratios in the international division of labor and differences in regional and national conditions of extraction of profits but also the anarchic nature of the social system itself. Regardless of its forms, this unevenness unquestionably creates changes in the correlation of forces, leading to redivisions of spheres of influence and domination in the capitalist world. Lenin's concept on the division of markets under capitalism "according to capital" and "according to power" remains relevant.

In the not so distant past the correlation of forces among capitalist countries and groups could be determined quite clearly on the basis of a limited set of traditional economic indicators, such as the GNP, the overall volume of industrial output, the production of steel, pig iron, metal cutting machine tools, cement, grain, etc. Such criteria no longer suffice under contemporary conditions. The scientific and technical revolution, the economic competition between the two systems, the condition of the economy of the developing countries and other factors have a tremendous impact on the correlation of forces. We must bear in mind that in addition to the aggravation of imperialist rivalries, levels of economic development and intensive integration processes are taking place and that multinational corporations are playing an increasing role, for to a certain extent they

serve as channels for the international redistribution of new equipment and technologies (above all of American origin). Therefore, a country producting a high volume of material goods can no longer be considered "strong" or fully developed unless we add to this the no less impressive factor of its own scientific and technical potential and the ability to use it.

Currently the interimperialist struggle among the main capitalist countries is increasingly turning into a rivalry for new technological ideas and their practical implementation in new goods and technologies and a struggle for scientific and technical progress in the broad meaning of the term.

It is precisely against this background that the place of the United States in the current apportionment of resources in the capitalist part of the world must be considered.

The role which the United States has played throughout the history of economic and scientific and technical development has changed constantly, with alternating periods of intensification and weakening. Nevertheless, the dominant trend was that of intensification, related to the high capacity of the domestic market, and the relatively high population income and pace of scientific and technical progress. In recent years, however, a different long-term trend has been noted toward a relative weakening of U. S. economic positions, revealed by production and foreign trade efficiency and scientific and technical progress indicators.

The study of indicators, such as fixed capital, capital investments, capital-labor ratio and end per capita social product reveals a process of onslaught mounted by Western Europe and, particularly, Japan, on U. S. positions. Thus, on a per capita basis, fixed capital outlays in terms of U. S. standards increased from 1950 to 1980 as follows: Britain, from 51 to 75 percent; FRG, from 50 to 104 percent; France, from 56 to 87 percent; and Japan, from 20 (1955) to 80 percent. In terms of the U. S. level per capita investments within the same period increased as follows: Britain, from 58 to 68 percent; FRG, from 47 to 115 percent; France, from 37 to 120 percent; and Japan, from 13 (1951) to 158 percent. The drawing closer to the United States of the main Western European countries and Japan in terms of fixed capital and per capita capital investments is the result of more intensive accumulation. Let us also emphasize that in terms of per capita capital investments Japan, France and the FRG are already substantially ahead of the United States.

Comparisons in terms of fixed capital- and investment capital-labor ratios also show a trend toward equalization of the levels of economical development of the countries within the three centers of contemporary imperialism. In terms of fixed capital-labor ratio, for instance, the FRG has already outstripped the United States, while in terms of capital investment-labor ratio (volume of investments per employed person) not only the FRG but Japan and France as well are ahead of the United States.

As a rule, end social product ratios are also chaning in favor of U.S. rivals. Thus, on a per capita basis, this indicator's ratio to the U.S. level rose within that period from 42 to 90 percent for the FRG, from 51 to 88 percent for France, and from 22 to 75 percent for Japan. It dropped for England from

62 to 51 percent, because of end social products growth rates lower than those of the United States. In this connection, we cannot ignore the fact that the rates at which the main Western European countries and Japan are drawing closer to the United States in the production of the end social product on a per capita basis are lower than for the indicators of production resource outlays we already mentioned. This indicates that the rivals of the United States are making greater use of extensive factors of economic growth and that their successes in the production of finished items are more modest. This conclusion also applies to comparisons among indicators of social production efficiency.

However, a drop in the share of a country in overall results should not always be simply interpreted as a weakining of its positions, for this could also be the result of the development of integrated relations with other countries while preserving its scientific and technical superiority. It is this which characterizes in particular economic relations between the United States and Western Europe.

The process of the relative weakening of U.S. positions may be traced not only from domestic but also from a number of foreign economic indicators, such as foreign trade, gold and currency reserves and capital exports. Between 1965 and 1984 the U.S. share in world exports dropped from 15 to 11 percent, and although it remains in a leading position, it is already being challendged by the FRG.

A relative weakening of the competitiveness of American goods, including the squeezing of American manufacturers from their own domestic markets, unparalleled in U.S. history, began in the 1970s. Automobile industry data are particularly indicative. Whereas foreign car imports in the United States were insignificant in 1960, by 1970 foreign cars already accounted for 15 percent of domestic sales, reaching 30 percent by 1979 as a result of the inability of the American automobile industry to reorganize itself for the production of economical compacts. In 1960 95 percent of all consumer radio and television sets and other electronic appliances sold on the U.S. market were domestically manufactured, compared to no more than 50 percent in 1979. In 1972 the United States imported only 9 percent of the metal cutting machine tools and 6 percent of forge and dye equipment it needed. Today, they account for 28 and 19 percent, respectively.

As a whole, foreign companies supply goods meeting about 20 percent of the needs of the country's domestic market. In the areas of computers, integrated circuits and other science-intensive goods in which the U.S. positions appear to be quite solid, a major shift in the correlation of forces unfavorable to the United States may be noted as well.

In recent years the total foreign trade balance of the United States has been marked by huge and increasing deficits. Deficits totalled $36.4 billion in 1980, $39.7 billion in 1981, $42.7 billion in 1982, $70 billion in 1983 and

$123 billion in 1984. Approximately one-third of this deficit ($37 billion in 1984) is the result of U.S. trade with a single country--Japan.

Exports of West European and Japanese capital have sharply increased in recent year, leading to a decline in the share of the United States in the overall volume of direct foreign investments. Whereas in 1960 the United States accounted for 55.1 percent of this share, with Western Europe accounting for 37.1 perrcent and Japan for no more than 0.5 percent, the situation had substantially changed by 1981: 43.3 percent for the United States, 42.7 percent for Western Europe, and 8.8 percent for Japan. The Western European countries had practically equalled the United States in terms of direct foreign investments.

Therefore, Western Europe an Japan have developed two powerful counterbalances to the economic hegemony of American imperialism. As a result of the increased role played by them in the world's capitalist economy, the share of the United States in the GNP of the capitalist world declined from 47 to 37 percent today.

Nevertheless, the process of decline in the share of the United States in the economy of the capitalist world should not be exaggerated. Throughout the 1970s the growth rates of the Western European economy outstripped as a whole those of the United States. During the second half of the decade, however, they began to decline noticeably. The Western European share in the industrial output of the developed capitalist countries dropped from 45.8 percent in 1975 to 42.9 percent in 1983. The unemployment growth rates as well proved to be higher than in the United States. The processes of the structural reorganization of industry in the Western European countries are developing much more slowly than in the United States and, particularly, Japan.

It cannot be said that Western Europe made no efforts to correct the developing situation. The Western European countries achieved some successes in automobile manufacturing, ferrous metallurgy and the textile and shoe industries. A joint strategic program for scientific research and development in the area of informatics was formulated by the EEC with a view to catching up with Japan and the United States in this area. Efforts are being made also at the governmental levels of individual Western European countries. Thus, a state fund of $1.8 billion was set up in France to help companies producing new types of commodities, including microcomputers and particularly economical cars. F. Mitterrand, the French president, has now submitted a plan for European cooperation in the development of contemporary technology and equipment, known as "Eureka", and a European scientific-space program as a counterbalance to the notorious American "Star Wars" program.

At the same time, however, disputes on specific problems of economic policy have been practically paralyzing the activities of the leading agencies of the Common Market for many years. Periodically, various "trade wars" erupt among EEC members, occasionally assuming a rather sharp nature. As a whole, the Common Market, which consists of ten national markets of Western European countries, cannot fully oppose the U.S. domestic market or Japan's economic potential.

Nevertheless, these countries continue to wage a rather sharp trade battle against the United States and Japan, maintaining sufficiently strong positions as a whole. A particularly deep American-Western European rift exists in connection with Washington's monetary policy. The lowered inflationary rate and high U.S. bank interest rates lead to a higher value of the dollar compared to the currencies of the Western European countries and Japan, by 50 to 70 percent. This causes a mass outflow of capital from Western Europe (to a lesser extent from Japan) to the United States, an outflow which totalled $40 billion in 1983 alone. According to TIME magazine, foreign investors are financing as much as 15 percent of U.S. national debt repayments. Capital exports to the United States, which serve the self-seeking interests of individual Western European businessmen and entrepreneurs, are causing tremendous harm to national interests and the Western European economy as a whole, for they essentially rob it by depriving it of resources for its own investments, which has a depressing effect on business activities.

Japan's successes in its trade with the United States and the Common Market countries are related to the perfecting of its commodity export structure and the accelerated growth of capital exports. Whereas in the 1960 the bulk of Japanese exports consisted of ferrous metallurgy goods, they were replaced by consumer electical engineering goods and automobiles in the 1970s, and the emphasis between the end of the 1970s and start of the 1980s shifted to more science-intensive output and new higher-quality generations of the older exports (computers, tools with digital programming, robots, microprocessors, video recorders, etc.). Japanese capital exports, used as a tool for foreign economic expansion, increased sharply as well. At the beginning of the 1970s Japan's foreign investments totalled slightly over $3 billion, going essentially to the developing countries in the hope of reliably securing the country's economy with raw materials and advantageously utilizing inexpensive manpower. Currently Japan's direct foreign investments exceed $40 billion, directed essentially toward the industrially developed countries which are applying anti-Japanese protectionist measures in an effort to balance their trade with that country.

As a whole, the Western European countries heavily depend on the United States and Japan technologically. This applies, above all, to microelectronic equipment and goods based on it, such as computers, robots, video recorders, etc. Thus, currently the EEC accounts for 20 percent of the consumption and only 9 percent of the production of modern computers in the capitalist world. Of late the Western European deficit in trade with Japan has risen significantly, from $0.5 billion in 1970 to $11.6 billion in 1983, triggered, above all, by substantially higher purchases of Japanese electronic equipment.

Thus, the process of equalization of the levels of economic development of the three centers of modern imperialism feed, in the long term, a centripetal trend into the system of interimperialist relations. At the same time, economic, trade, financial and other contradictions dividing the centers are clearly becoming aggravated, thus intensifying the centripetal trend. A worsening scientific and technical rivalry among the three centers of imperialism is assuming particular importance in the course of the interaction among these trends.

II

Starting with the 1970s the Western press began to note symptoms of equalization of levels in both the economic and the scientific and technical development of the United States and its rival, and America's gradual loss of its previous scientific and technical primacy. Above all, the U.S. share of total outlays for scientific research and experimental design (NIOKR) of the capitalist countries was reduced. The U.S. rivals came closer to it in the share of NIOKR expenditures in the GNP and in the number of scientists and engineers working in this field. The United States became weaker in comparison with its competitors in patenting. The number of patents granted foreigners, Japanese in particular, marked a sharp increase, while that awarded to Americans declined over the past 15 years. The United States also began to yield to its rivals in the pace of new applications and production updating. The U.S. process of updating machine tools slowed down, as a result of which by the end of the 1970s the share of such tools 10-year old or less was 31 percent, compared to 60 percent for Japan, 36 for the FRG and 41 for Italy. Finally, the positions of the United States in the production and export of science-intensive goods relatively weakened, although in a number of areas it remains the world's leader.

Particularly significant successes in the growth of economic power and coming closer to the United States in the levels of economic and scientific and technical development were achieved by Japan. Japanese capital used a set of social, economic, technical, managerial and even psychological factors in the competitive struggle, which allowed it to achieve a relatively fast change in the correlation of forces between Japanese and American and Western European monopolies. Japan not only became the second most powerful country in the capitalist world and the main rival of American imperialism but also the most competitive country in the world capitalist market and a leader in many important and most promising areas of scientific and technical progress. Forced to proceed from the weakness of Japan's economic base and aspiring to maximally compensate for it, the ruling and business circles in that country formulated a far-reaching program for the transformation of Japan into a big and technologically largely independent country and a leading exporter of the latest (one-of-a-kind) goods and technologies. The country officially adopted a program for the creation of an "informatics society," which implies the establishment of powerful scientific and education infrastructures and communications facilities, the expansion of the fleet of computers, robots and numerical control [NC] machine tools and the development of a powerful industry for the production of software packets.

With the help of sharp and refined exploitation methods, Japanese capital was able to develop among a certain segment of the country's working people interest in highly productive labor, using a thought-out wage system based on quantitative and qualitative parameters and based on end results achieved not only by the individual worker but the entire enterprise personnel. This helped to increase labor productivity. As a result of the practical implementation of corresponding economic principles, state monopoly capital was able to create the illusion of a "commonality" of interests between labor and capital and to trigger large social forces, something which led to fast

industrial economic and technical progress. Various methods of labor organization and wages became widespread; they are refined means of exploitation concealing the growing enslavement of labor by capital, the earnings of which are increasingly growing. Bourgeois propaganda sets nationalistic tragets for the Japanese, such as to work better than workers in other countries, to outstrip industrially developed "white" countries and always to have in mind production efficiency and the good of "their own" company.

Although the Japanese worker has the same general education standard as the American, he is better professionally trained as a rule. A sociological study conducted in Japan and the United States has shown that the average Japanese who takes a job in production spends 500 days in training during his first 10 years of employment, i.e., 50 days per year, whereas in the United States this period is shorter by a factor of six.

In addition to training and stimulating labor activeness, NIOKR expenditures are an important factor in raising the level of use of the "human capital." Contemporary Japan is second in the capitalist world in such expenditures. It has more scientific workers than England, France and the FRG combined. Although Japan spends one-third of U.S. NIOKR amount, its growth rates of such expenditures are much higher. Thus, in the mid-1970s they averaged 20-22 percent annually (7-8 percent in the United states), and although of late they have dropped to 10-12 percent, they practically double every 5 years. We must also take into consideration that in Japan science is more closely related to industry than in the United States. Japanese industry assumes some 70 percent of NIOKR implementation and costs. The main emphasis in this case is on applied research and, particularly, development.

In Japan it is precisely the state which has become the promoter of the course toward accelerated scientific and technical progress, selecting the priority sectors, which must be stimulated in the interest of the entire economy, formulating programs for their development on the basis of specific companies, granting loans, providing research laboratories and offering other forms of support. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry Science and Technology Department annually drafts a list of steadily updated research topics and items, on the basis of which the companies are assisted through loans granted on easy terms and tax benefits. Thus, companies which develop or produce essentially new commodities are given a 25 percent tax benefit; for some items as much as one-half of their NIOKR expenses become tax deductible. Companies producing particularly complex items are allowed to increase amortization deductions up to 25 percent of sales during the first year of their appearance on the market, and so on.

Such practices yield respective results. Contemporary Japan is leading the capitalist world in the production of miniaturized memory systems ("chips"). The country is planning to produce by 1989 a computer tenfold faster than the most powerful American model. An 8-year program for the development of sensory robots at a cost of $83 million has been adopted; a program is being implemented for the creation of totally automated plants using laser technology; work is under way on the development of laser and optical fiber commmunications systems.

Japan has made full use of the advantages of a young country benefiting from the experience of older ones, the United States above all. Today its industrialists are purchasing the best American prototypes or licenses with the task of developing virtually new better-quality products compared to the overseas prototype. A characteristic feature of the Japanese policy of borrowing foreign equipment and technology is their rapid assimilation and dissemination and the development of new models on their basis. Meanwhile, at the present stage Japanese industry is increasingly beginning to provide its own solutions to scientific and technical problems it considers most promising.

Currently the United States is displaying substantial irritation at the growth of Japan's financial possibilities in foreign trade and direct foreign capital investments, as well as successes in electronic technology. Typical in this respect was D. Wilson's article "The Crisis in the American Electronic Industry," published in the 11 March 1985 issue of BUSINESS WEEK, the organ of U.S. business circles. Wilson wrote that "the famous American leadership in the field of the latest technology, which is the source of innovations in the entire machine building sector, is being rapidly eroded in all main electronics markets." The United States is purchasing an increasing share of electronic components and equipment abroad, mainly from Japan. The deficit in U.S.-Japanese trade in electronics increased from $9 billion in 1983 to approximately $15 billion in 1984, which is even higher that the U.S. deficit in American-Japanese automobile trade.

Nonetheless, all such successes notwithstanding, Japan remains heavily technologically dependent on the United States which remains its important source of ideas and solutions in scientific and technical progress. It is from the United States that Japan obtains its basic theoretical concepts on the development of new equipment, basic ideas and even technical documentation based on the latest discoveries and inventions. Although Japan outstripped Western Europe and assumed second place in the capitalist world in overall scientific and technical development, the United States remains in the lead and will continue to enjoy real superiority over Japan in this respect. Here is a typical example, again borrowed from the field of computers. Japan's successes in the development and creation of modern personal and super computers is known. Overall, however, in terms of the entire range of computers, compared to the United States, Japan remains weak: in the world computer market its monopolies are far behind American companies which dominate 80 percent of it.

The present condition of Japan's industry is also characterized by major distortions in its structure. According to Japanese economists, no more than 10 percent of Japan's entire output (essentially in the labor-intensive processing industry sectors) can successfully compete in terms of standards on the world's marketplace. As to the other sectors of Japan's economy, as a rule they fall substantially behind U.S. and Western European indicators in terms of labor productivity and technical standards. Indicative of the Japanese economic structure as a whole is the extremely low and dropping share of so-called primary sectors, i.e., the extracting industry and agriculture.

Also characteristic of Japan's economy are so-called "congenital" weaknesses. This applies, above all, to the relative smallness of the domestic market, the development of which chronically lags behind the growth of output, as a result of which the country's economy is increasingly dependent on the foreign market; the lack of domestic raw material and energy base, the exceptionally high cost of land and growing dependence on food imports; and low-quality housing andgeneral weakness of the social infrastructure. Japan has low indicators of so-called social well-being: low old-age pensions, short paid leave and a long work day.

III

All of this does not mean that U.S. monopoly capital is in strategic retreat. It has reasons to believe that it could seek a return match from its rivals. The hopes of the American monopolies of retaining and securing their scientific and technical superiority in the future are based on plans for maintaining the existing gap in theoretical and basic research and overall NIOKR expenditures. In 1984 such expenditures amounted to $97 billion in the United States as against $58 billion in Western Europe and $27 billion in Japan. Unlike its rivals, the United States has a comprehensively developed foundation for basic research in its universities, financed at the rate of more than $10 billion annually, or triple the amount spent in Japan and 50 percent more than in Western Europe. The United States greatly relies on the organizational restructuring of the NIOKR area and higher education, a new governmental scientific and technical policy, a structural reorganization of the economy and a change in the state regulatory system. Noteworthy is the fast growth of so-called "risk" capital in the United States, i.e., of "pioneering" new-development companies, which are largely considered in the United States an alternative to Japan's industrial policies. After coming out of the 1980-1982 crisis sooner than most Western European countries and Japan, currently the United States is increasing its NIOKR investments in an effort to consolidate its positions in the face of its competitors, who are gathering strength.

In the United States an influencial group of entrepreneurs and political personalities, mostly affiliated with the Democratic Party, favor the formulation and implementation of a governmental "industrial policy" similar to that of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry. A special commissionwas appointed to study this matter. In Republican Party circles, however, private initiative, including the encouragement of "risk" capital," rather than governmental intervention, is mostly relied upon.

At the same time, strict administrative measures are taken to influence competitors. Criticism of Tokyo is increasing in U.S. commercial and industrial circles, and a number of protectionist bills are being considered in the Congress, the main purpose of which is to limit Japanese imports. Demands are growing for lifting Japanese restrictions on American imports, agricultural above all. The Reagan administration has decided to impose 144 new quotas and restrictions on imports of textiles and farm commodities from 36 countries. The U.S. steel companies are urging the adoption of legislation which would limit the amount of imported steel to 15 percent of needs (currently it is 20 percent). A draft bill has been introduced in the Senate

mandating the use of American-made parts in foreign cars sold in the United States. At the same time, big business and the Pentagon are taking steps for the development and production on a mass commercial basis of many new microelectronic items with a view to preserving and strengthening the positions of American companies on the world marketplace.

Today the United States is increasing not only economic and scientific and technical pressure on its allies. In various contacts and talks Washington makes wide use of its military and financial superiority. Let us also take into consideration the great significance of the fact that the preservation of the high rate of exchange of the American currency on world financial markets is helping to increase the influence of the dollar on the economic policies of the other capitalist countries. No less than two-thirds of the world's capitalist trade today is paid in dollars, and 70 percent of the world's foreign currency reserves are in dollar notes. All of this cannot but strengthen the international positions of American corporations.

In frequent cases the business circles in Western Europe and Japan, who are losing many of their markets in the developing countries due to the insolvency of the latter as a result of their crushing indebtedness to the banks of the imperialist countries, are promoting the further expansion of mutually profitable trade and economic relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries. Guided primarily by its selfish considerations, however, the United States is doing everything possible to destroy such relations and, in any case, to control its allies' exports to the socialist countries. In July 1984, the list of goods "banned for export" to socialist countries was expanded under U.S. pressure, by the so-called Coordination Committee for Control of Exports (COCOM), This essentially is very harmful to the economic development of countries allied to the United States, the purpose of which is to undermine their competitiveness, including in the area of new technological developments. The current American administration is not reluctant to use the threat of applying strict economic penalties to those who dare to disagree with its diktat. As the representative of the Californian bourgeoisie, which is technologically the strongest at the moment, it is brimming with the desire to prevent the loss of the country's scientific and technical leadership in the capitalist world and, conversely, to strengthen the U.S. positions by establishing the prerequisites for a new technological market on the basis of the accelerated development of the foundations of future equipment and technology. The future alone will be able to prove the accuracy of such assessments. For the time being, however, these positions have begun to strengthen relatively.

The capitalist world is in the throes of rivalry on the level of separate monopolies, state-monopoly complexes and super-powerful multinational concerns fighting for survival and economic leadership. The increasingly aggravated scientific and technical rivalry among the three centers of world imperialism has become an important component of these processes. At the same time, integration processes and scientific and technical and other types of cooperation and interaction among developed capitalist countries are increasing.

Despite the entire complexity and interweaving of the two trends in capitalist development--centrifugal and centripetal--the latter continues to predominate at this stage. This is dictated both by the effect of objective economic laws of development of the world capitalist market as well as the class interests of the big monopoly bourgeoisie, which are essentially of a cosmopolitan nature. As Marx wrote, in its struggle against the working class the bourgeoisie is able to display systematic solidarity, a truly "Masonic" brotherhood" (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 25, part I, p 217). In recent decades the world has witnessed the birth of a number of institutions aimed at promoting the coordination of positions held by the capitalist countries in resolving their worsening economic and political problems and conflicts. They include the Builderberg "think tank," the notorious "Trilateral Commission" and the regular meetings held by the heads of states and governments of the seven leading capitalist countries. Under the developing circumstances of relations among these countries, the military and political hegemony of American imperialism is becoming increasingly important, as it displays with increasing clarity its aspiration to dictate a line of behavior to its allies, above all on matters of security and military policy.

It would be erroneous, however, to absolutize in any way the significance of these factors and to consider the centrifugal trend as established definitively or even on a long-term basis. Such absolutizing could only harm the correct understanding of the realities of contemporary capitalism--the effect of the law of its uneven development continues to trigger sharp interimperialist contradictions and to lead to the outbreak of new conflicts in the imperialist world, worsened by the current crisis.

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FROM THE EDITORIAL MAIL

INTERSECTORIAL COST ACCOUNTING OF THE AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 115-120

[Review of letters to the editors by Engineer V. Maslyakov]

[Text] Although a great deal of time has passed since the publication of T. Muranivskiy's article "Concept of the Intersectorial Cost Accounting and its Application in the Agroindustrial Complex (KOMMUNIST, No 17, 1982), the editors are still receiving letters on this subject. The letters emphasize the question of perfecting economic management methods, intersectorial cooperation and labor incentive, aimed at upgrading end results at the lowest possible cost. The contradictions which developed between the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, on the one hand, and the organizations which service them within the framework of the agroindustrial associations are analyzed, questions on price setting in the agrarian sector of our economy are raised, and attention is directed to the need for the fastest possible elimination of all shortcomings in agriculture. In their letters and considerations the readers call for the most efficient use of the help of the state and, particularly, markups on purchasing prices for lagging farms. The extensive application of cost accounting and collective contracts assume the greatest possible importance to this effect. These are the most effective economic levers which will help make lagging farms totally self-supporting and ensure their strict implementation of planned assignments. Virtually all authors discuss the need to use acquired experience. This problem is discussed, among others, by A. Puzanovskiy, docent at the political economy chair, Kostroma Agricultural Institute, and Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye. Svetlov, senior scientific associate at the USSR Goskomselkhoztekhnika All-Union Scientific Research and Design Institute of Automated Management Systems. Most readers, such as V. Sikora, candidate of economic sciences from Kiev, engineer P. Gerasimchuk, Georgian SSR Adzhar Goskomselkhoztekhnika, Muscovites engineer L. Shishkin and scientific worker I. Ivanov, N. Yusnikov, first secretary of the Russko-Polyanskiy CPSU Raykom, Omsk Oblast, and others, suggest a continuation of the discussion on the search for new means and methods of economic management of the agroindustrial complex (APK).

"We should have addressed ourselves once again to some topical problems raised in the article," writes V. Chistyakov, head of the Department of Economic-Mathematical Methods and Forecasting, Novosibirsk Institute of the National

Economy, "following the comprehensive establishment of rayon agroindustrial associations (RAPO), as well as after the promulgation of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Perfecting Economic Relations Between Agriculture and the Other National Economic Sectors" and the all-union economic conference on problems of the agroindustrial complex. Great hopes are placed on the RAPO, and their past activities and development trends should be studied more thoroughly. "The systematic application of economic management methods in all sectors and areas of the agroindustrial complex, strengthening cost accounting and converting to progressive labor organization and wage methods are of the greatest importance among the set of measures aimed at upgrading agricultural production efficiency. The purpose of the agroindustrial association is the eliminating bottlenecks and disproportions, which lower the efficient utilization of the existing agricultural potential, and economically linking the interests of servicing organizations with the needs of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. These are the targets of the resolutions of the May 1982, October 1984 and April 1985 CPSU Central Committee plenums.

The steps taken at the May and subsequent Central Committee plenums are already yielding tangible results. The oblast and rayon agroindustrial associations are paying prime attention to problems of the efficient utilization of material and labor resources and increasing returns on investments. Agricultural output rose somewhat last year. Sales of milk, cattle, poultry, fruits and vegetables increased. Labor productivity in agriculture increased by 6 percent. Kolkhoz and sovkhoz profits totalled nearly 20 billion rubles. Good results are expected this year as well. Relations among RAPO partners have become better organized although, frankly, no complete unity of action has been established. Unfortunately, many managers of various subdivisions within the RAPO are in no hurry at all to subordinate their interests to the common needs of the farmers and to end results. Instead, they continue to be concerned exclusively with the well-being of their own enterprises and organizations.

"Agroindustrial associations were established in the country more than a year ago," the 1984 all-union economic conference on problems of the agroindustrial complex noted. "A significant number of RAPO have concentrated their attention on basic economic problems and are organizing intersectorial relations. However, by no means have all associations determined the nature of the reorganization and the rights and possibilities of the new bodies. Many agroindustrial associations are short of initiative and enterprise."

As the initial experience gained in the work of the RAPO indicates, the problem of surmounting economic contradictions among agroindustrial sectors and departmental interests remains unresolved. Many readers note with concern that unless interdepartmental barriers are eliminated the new development will slump, for the RAPO are still short of complete autonomy. Whenever it becomes a question of the practical exercise of the rights granted them in acordance with standard regulations on economic relations between agriculture and other sectors, frequently servicing and processing organizations give preference to departmental interests. For example, if RAPO decisions and actions (changing plan indicators, ceilings, profits, spare part and service tariffs, per diem expenses, withholdings for RAPO funds, etc.)

conflict with the economic interests of servicing enterprises and are merely of "administrative-mandatory" nature, they invariably trigger countermeasures, ranging from open refusal to obey RAPO council decisions to "circuitous maneuvers," including efforts to substantiate higher profit ceilings or lower plan indicators. Such enterprises frequently go over the head of the association, turning directly to their departments and redistributing resources and profits in their own interest. The obstacles created by departmental interests must be eliminated not through administrative or organizational measures but through the creation of the type of economic interests which will encourage everyone to act in a signle direction--attaining the highest possible end results and obtaining as much agricultural products as possible with the lowest possible outlays.

These problems are discussed by V. Fliner, deputy director of the Ivankovo Agricultural Mechanization Technicum imeni V. I. Lenin: "Today the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, Goskomselkhoztekhnika, Soyuzselkhozkhimiya, the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and others must resolve the common problem of increasing agricultural output. At the same time, however, each department has its own plan and funds. It is not astounding, therefore, for one of the partners to be fulfilling his tasks and plans to the detriment of the common interests. Selkhoztekhnika, for example, frequently does substandard repairs at high cost.

"Kolkhozes and sovkhozes find it more profitable to repair most of the equipment themselves. Selkhoztekhnika, however, is not selling them the necessary spare parts. It must fulfill its own plan, the so-called gross output. We believe that, in general, the time has come to convert to "company" repairs, which would lower their cost substantially. Today all partners must maximally participate in the development of the APK, which requires a single economic mechanism based on a single material and financial foundation. Under agroindustrial conditions the burden must be equally shared by all and all must be equally responsible for end results."

V. Novikov, former manager of the Bogodukhovskiy Rayon Selkhoztekhnika, fully supports the suggestion to reorganize financial and economic relations within the system of agroindustrial associations. It was precisely here that the Bogodukhovo variant, known throughout the country, was born through the combined efforts of Selkhoztekhnika and the kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers, on the basis of a single system of indicators and end farming results.

V. Novikov further points out that "It is regrettable that it is only departmental barriers and the unwillingness to disseminate and apply our experience on a national basis that have practically reduced to naught long years of work and entailed high expenses. As a Selkhoztekhnika worker, I can say that as it broadens its repair base excessively and sometimes groundlessly, and as it distances itself from the needs of agriculture, it has brought about a situation according to which the more machines break down in the kolkhozes the better its plan indicators become, i.e., the worse it becomes for the kolkhozes, the better for Selkhoztekhnika. With high-quality repairs and lengthier periods of utilization of machines by the kolkhozes, that organization would be unable to earn above-plan profits. This is the reason for all subsequent economic consequences and lack of interest in good

and high-quality repairs. On the contrary, repairs are made in such a way as to have the tractor return to the workshop faster. The equipment must be repaired. However, repairs should be scientifically organized and minimal. The actual work results of those responsible for the condition of tractors, combines and other machinery should be judged not on the basis of increased outlays for repairing farm equipment but on their reduction."

Most of the responses prove that the time has come to undertake an economic experiment on the use of new types of financial and economic relations on the RAPO scale, based on intersectorial cost accounting. It is important to establish the type of economic situation in which all participants in the technological chain, all link personnel, would be interested in improving their work results and earn not on the basis of equipment repairs, irrigation and application of fertilizers, reclamation work, etc., but of end results. The economic mechanism must be such as to direct to this end all participants in agricultural production.

The relevance of such an experiment is discussed in the letter of N. Denisenko, head of the Agricultural Department of Bogodukhovskiy Raykom, CP of the Ukraine, Kharkov Oblast. "Organizational problems," he believes, "stem from the difficulties which RAPO encountered from the very start. A number of various ministries, departments and associations were set up in their time on the union and republic levels. Virtually all RAPO partners are strictly under their jurisdiction. The RAPO council, which organizes the work of the agroindustrial complex in the rayon must coordinate with the various departments virtually all of its decisions on fund and asset redistribution and personnel problems, which drastically reduces their efficiency. The result is that numerous departments literally "tear up" "from above" this general association, the purpose of which is to provide new solutions to agricultural problems. It would be expedient in this connection to analyze the problem of the further intensification of the flexible approach to APK management. Under RAPO conditions this problem is resolved partially and only on the local level. Yet it should be resolved more radically on the level of the state..."

Readers and many specialists put great hope on the introduction of standards, increased control, etc. Unquestionably, such are needed in order to introduce order and economic discipline in the APK, which is quite important today. The point is, however, that such measures fail to deal with the main contradictions of its economic mechanism, according to which economic activities of servicing and processing sectors are evaluated not on increased crop, milk or weightincreases, but entirely on the basis of departmental interests.

The comprehensive approach to the solution of such problems requires that the organization of the technological production process for a specific commodity (in this case agricultural products and food), as well as the earning and distribution of profits be accomplished jointly by all enterprises and organizations participting in the production of the finished item. Intersectorial (territorial, interdepartmental) cost accounting units, which would include groups of juridically autonomous enterprises and organizations under different departmental jurissdictions but interrelatied through the

joint production of a specific finished item, based on intersectorial cost accounting, could act as the new financial and economic structural units of the agroindustrial complex.

Intersectorial cost accounting can be applied without any reorganization of the current management structure. However, changes in the organizational structure of management could logically develop as a consequence of the appearance of new types of economic relations among APK enterprises and organizations involved within the single technological process and forming territorial intersectorial cost accounting units or complexes. Obviously, such changes should be made only if it becomes necessary to make the system of administrative management bodies consistent with the locally developing economic relations among participants in the production of farm commodities and foods.

Available experience in the use of intersectorial cost accounting has yielded encouraging results. I. Steblina, first secretary of the CP of the Ukraine Yampolskiy Raykom, Vinnitsa Oblast, writes: "The application of intersectorial cost accounting in the agroindustrial complex has a realistic base. Thus, during the 1983 sugar refining season, the Gonorovskiy Sugar Refinery received fresh and clean beets from its partners. The plant worked rhythmically and earned a net profit of 3 million rubles, 1 million of which above-plan. The council of related enterprises raised the question of the redistribution of the plant's above-plan profit among the partners. Unquestionably, such a step would stimulate the increased production of the finished item (sugar)." At this point, however, major difficulties arose in the distribution of the profits (due to the lack of a method or legal regulations) and the creation of centralized APK funds.

As indicated by the readers' responses, the practical application of intersectorial cost accounting requires a thorough consideration of problems of price setting for farm products. E. Sagaydak, head of the price-setting problems department of the All-Union Scientific Research Agricultural Economics Institute, notes, among others, that under the conditions of the APK possibilities for the application of intersectorial cost accounting largely depend on the condition of price relations in this public reproduction subsystem. "The study of such relations," he writes, "indicates the existence of substantial disparities in the methodological foundations for structuring the various types of prices, and a noncoincidence in price-setting dates. Farm budget subsidies (double price lists for agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers, etc.) perform specific economic and social functions but limit the dynamic interconnections among different types of prices under the conditions of the agroindustrial complex. In this connection, the concept governing price setting for goods produced by the APK must be considered a structural component of the intersectorial cost accounting concept." In his view, the most essential stipulations of this concept are as follows.

The creation of a balanced price system and adequate conditions for the establishment and development of APK as a separate target of planning and management, representing a totality of interrelated elements (prices), ensuring relations of intersectorial equivalent exchange, stability and equalization of reproduction conditions in all APK units; setting production

prices for the various APK sectors on a single methodological basis, bearing in mind a conversion within the framework of this system to a uniform type of prices reflecting the process of modification of value under developed socialist conditions; simultaneous upgrading of the economic substantiation of all kinds of prices within the APK system with a view to restoring the socially necessary labor outlays in the creation of commidities or providing services, stimulating their high quality and ensuring labor savings in use of goods and services; intensifying the organic interaction between price setting and other areas of advancement of the economic mechanism, with a view to ensuring the balanced and proportional development of APK.

E. Sagaydak further writes that under some circumstances urgent measures would have to be taken in the price-setting area, for one cannot consider normal the type of cost accounting relations in which during the 10th Five-Year Plan the actual average level of profitability in relation to fixed capital was approximately 2 percent in agriculture and more than 13 percent in industry. It is this in particular that determines the significance of the steps taken at the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum to perfect the economic mechanism, including prices. The implementation of the planned measures in the price-setting area will intensify the influence of intersectorial cost accounting relations on upgrading production efficiency in all APK areas.

P. Dubko, candidate of economic sciences and docent at the Political Economy Department of the Kalinin Agricultural Institute, believes that establishing price parity is a pressing requirement. "But how could this be accomplished," he asks, " when the price planning process is separated from the production planning process and whenever production quality deviates from the median, which is the base of the planned price, the enterprise is unable to change prices in accordance with the actual social labor outlays contained in the output, something which encourages the production of a larger volume of lesser quality goods? "Price setting problems are directly related to the problems of planning and the economic levers and incentives used. Here a great deal depends on the extent to which economic management tools, such as plan and contract, are interrelated. Under mature socialist conditions, P. Dubko goes on to say, it is incorrect "to pit the plan against the contract and to raise planned and contract prices as though they are difference concepts, for in such a case the planned price stops being a social measurement of labor and production activities and each enterprise a specific defender of the public interest."

At the CPSU Central Committee conference on the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, said the following on the need to reduce our country's administrative and managerial machinery: "A great deal remains to be done to perfect the structure of the republic management bodies which have an excessive and increasing bumber of ministries and departments. Here, even more than on the union level, the problem of management integration and concentration has become pressing." A large number of responses dealt with this matter in terms of conditions in the agroindustrial complex.

P. Silaychev, teacher at the Rzhev Sovkhoz-Technicum, Kalinin Oblast, writes: "Many organizations within the APK are directly or indirectly related to

agricultural production. Their efficient operation requires a management agency which would combine the interests of Selkhoztekhnika, Selkhozkhimiya, land reclamation and water resources and the transportation, procurement, storage and primary processing of farm goods. This calls for the establishment of a ministry.

"We have already gained some experience in the area of joint work by organizations producing agricultural commodities. For example, the Georgian and Estonian SSRs have combined three republic ministries (agriculture, water resources and Selkhoztekhnika). They have simplified their management structure, reduced the apparatus and ensured a better balance in the development of all APK subdivisions. The time has come to consider the problem of the further improvement of the APK by interesting the processing industry enterprises in the results of agricultural output. The question of creating a single ministry or a special authority in charge of correcting the work of existing ministries and departments has long become pressing.

"I believe that a single ministry in charge of the production and processing of agricultural commodities would considerably simplify the management of the agroindustrial complex."

His views are supported by Candidate of Economic Sciences N. Kononenko, head of sector at the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics and Organization.

"The study of the utilization of the production potential of UkSSR APK enterprises indicates that despite its systematic improvement, neither the food sector nor society at large are attaining the necessary results and that many of its indicators have even worsened compared to the past. Studies have established that the growth rates of agricultural output in terms of comparable prices are lower than those of production outlays by a factor of 5, and in terms of services for the upkeep of equipment supplied to farming partners, by a factor of 2.6.

"Regardless of the steady increase in production capacities of the Goskomselkhoztekhnika repair and servicing base, for a number of years the quality of repairs and technical servicing of the machine and tractor fleet has remained virtually unchanged and is clearly inconsistent with contemporary requirements. This is confirmed by the fact that during the 9th and 10th five-year plans the number of equipment repairs exceeded established norms by a factor of 1.4 for tractors and 1.7 for combines. Above-norm labor outlays for commodity production are due to the disproportional development of the material and technical base of the food sector and the servicing sphere of APK. The same type situation is developing for the 11th Five-Year Plan."

In to enhance the efficiency of the utilization of the APK food production potential, Kononenko suggests that the production sphere be subordinated to that of services, thus making the latter the structural link in the single technological agricultural production process, i.e., to eliminate the subordination of enterprises within the APK to different departments.

The development of the production sector of the APK should be based on a single organizational and technological foundation, i.e., planning, material and technical procurements, financing and settling accounts with the state should be placed under a single authority in charge of agricultural output, for which reason Goskomselkhoztekhnika, Soyuzselkhozkhimiya, the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, the Ministry of Fruit and Vegetable Industry, the Ministry of Food Industry and the other organizations and departments should become part of the Ministry of Agriculture. It is on this basis that a single agriculture and food ministry could be organized, the more so since positive experience, both at home and in other socialist countries, has already been acquired in this area. This would enable us substantially to reduce the administrative apparatus and develop the APK food sector more purposefully. For example the establishment of the APK in Estonia led to the reduction of the republic's management apparatus. A total of 22 identical and duplicating subdivisions were closed down. The size of the administrative staff diminished by 2 percent.

The establishment of a single authority in charge of managing agriculture and related sectors would eliminate many existing contradictions. This is not merely a wish but a requirement of reality. This conviction is shared by many of our readers. The search for optimal forms of organization of the agroindustrial complex and its structure, management and planning must go on. The time has come for complete integration among many units. In this case the organizational-economic and psychological restructuring of all of its partners is urgently required.

However, any type of integration imposed on the agroindsutry "from above" would fail to yield desired results unless efficient steps are taken "from below" aimed at the profound qualitative reorganization of local economic relations.

"The existing sectorial priority system of planning and management of the agroindustry must be abandoned in favor of comprehensive territorial-sectorial management," A. Kaliyev, economists from Alma-Ata believes. Problems of economic relations among its sectors and areas must be resolved on the basis of the reassignment of functions, rights and obligations among departments and territorial bodies.

"Palliative measures or partial changes cannot satisfy us in making improvements in the organizational structure of management," Comrade M. S. Gorbachev stressed at the CPSU Central Committee conference. "The work that awaits us is no stopgap. It is no simple merging or splitting of organizations and shifting officials from one chair to another... Problems of improving the organizational structure must be resolved boldly, substantiatedly and, above all, comprehensively, from the higher to the lower levels, vertically as well as horizontally." Naturally, the search for the new should not distract us from making more efficient use of the potential of existing management institutions. No new capacities are required here. Actuating what already exists would suffice.

These requirements fully apply to a search for new methods of economic activities in the agroindustry. The APK created at the rayon soviets of people's deputies could and should totally subordinate the activities of rayon agricultural service organizations and their economic interests to the end results of kolkhoz and sovkhoz activities. The cost of services should be included in those of the respective agricultural commodities and the wages of workers in servicing organizations should be largely linked to end farming results.

To this effect, RAPO could assume management, control and regulatory functions in this process. The RAPO council drafts detailed contractual obligations among kolkhozes, sovkhozes and their partners, technological charts based on contracts for joint production plans and estimates of overall profits and standards governing their distribution.

The RAPO councils sum up the results of the implementation of the plan and the distribution of the overall earnings based on intersectorial cost accounting in accordance with the real and strictly assessed contribution of the individual participants. The bulk of the profits goes to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Another part goes to the material incentive fund (based no equal distribution) and yet another to the RAPO fund (for the development of the rayon). RAPO sets the amount of profits to be used for the purchansing of new equipment, materials and spare parts by the partners, and for the development or reconstruction of the production base, according to the agricultural production requirements of the rayon. A stipulated share is withheld for the state budget. Other profit distribution items are possible as well, based on specific circumstances.

Therefore, the RAPO assumes additional functions as the intersectorial rayon cost accounting complex. The RAPO council, with granted economic rights, becomes the leading agency of this complex, controlling the production and financial and economic relations among kolkhozes, sovkhoses and their partners in the single technological process. Accountability and mutual control play a special role in this matter.

The reassignment of functions among management bodies under the conditions of intersectorial cost accounting would broaden the rights and possibilities in forming and using RAPO financial reserves and would expand the control and regulatory functions of the rayon USSR Gosbank departments. This would ensure a transition to decentralized accountability, according to which payments to the budget would be made not by ministries and departments but by the production enterprises (associations) themselves, through a single channel: the RAPO.

The fundamental principles of cooperation must be strictly observed in the use of intersectorial cost accounting. This implies voluntary participation in intersectorial cost accounting units (complexes); a scientific approach to the solution of cooperation problems; preservation of the economic autonomy of enterprises (organizations) participating in the joint production of finished goods; democratic centralism in managing intersectorial cost accounting units; strict accounting and control over the share of participation of enterprises

and organizations in the production of finished items and in profit earning and distribution; and ensuring the material incentive of enterprises (organizations) participating in joint activities.

The comprehensive approach to managing a group of interelated sectors participating in the production of agricultural commodities requires a revision of the means for the application of cost accounting from pitting the economic interests of kolkhozes, sovkhozes and their partners against each-other to drawing closer to each-other and cooperating on the basis of collectivistic principles. The struggle for upgrading quality and reducing agricultural production costs must become the common cause of all agroindustry partners.

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PARADOXES OF DEPARTMENTALISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 120-121

[Letter to the editors by Engineer V. Maslyakov]

[Text] In a country as huge as ours, transportation holds a leading position in the national economy. It is no accident that throughout the existence of the Soviet state the party and the government have paid constant attention to its development. The decision to create a unified rail and waterway transportation system was made as early as 1920, in the Plan for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO). The union Ministry of the River Fleet was in charge of organizing freight hauling along all rivers in the country.

Subsequently, the aspiration to develop internal water transportation enterprises in different economic rayons led to the fact that instead of having a single ministry, a Ministry of the River Fleet of the RSFSR, and main administrations of the River Fleet of the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belorussia and Moldavia were established.

Today the production capacities of the sector are scattered among union republics, departments and individual enterprises. This has created numerous organizational forms of management. For example, the Main Administration of the River Fleet of the Ukranian SSR Council of Ministers has the rights of a production association and its ports and plants operate on a cost accounting basis.

Despite a considerably lesser volume of freight hauling, the management of river transportation in the Belorussian SSR is more complex: Main Administration of the River Fleet-Shipping Administration production units (ports, plants, etc.).

All of this leads to the fact that territorial barriers are restraining cooperation and specialization among industrial enterprises in the river transportation systems of union republics.

Several of the big rivers were divided administratively, regardless of sectorial economic interests. For example, the Irtysh is divided between the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR; the Dnepr is divided between the Ukranian SSR and

the Belorussian SSR. This has triggered a parochial interest in using "someone else's" fleet within the boundaries of "one's own basin," worsened the organization of the transportation process and led to the appearance of underpowered transportation organizations.

The lack of coordination in river transportation has a greatly damaging effect on uniform technical policy. Each department has its own ideas on building ships, ports, hydroengineering installations and industrial enterprises. For example, a sluice was built on the Dnepr. It's dimensions are lesser than those used in the unified deep-water network of the European part of the country. Naturally, it is unusable for modern river boats, not to mention those of the "river-sea type". A new sluice must be built if the Dnepr basin is to become part of the unified waterway network.

We are currently facing the crucial problem of intensifying the role of internal water transportation in servicing the national economy and upgrading its share in the country's freight hauling. The attention of the planning authorities has been frequently drawn to disparities in the allocation of freight in departmental transportation and the insufficient utilization of waterways.

Although in recent years river transportion has increased in the RSFSR, which accounts for over 90 percent of all river freight haulage in the USSR, the possibilities of the Volga-Kama, Volga-Don, Volga-Baltic Sea and White Sea-Baltic Sea Waterways, and the Amur Basin are by no means fully used. No direct hauling of timber, petroleum and other freight from the areas of the Volga-Kama Basin to the Kaspian-Azov and Black Sea ports is taking place.

The southern railroads, particularly in the Donbass and the northwestern rayons, i.e., precisely in directions in which some of the bulk freight flows could be switched to river transportation, are overloaded.

The organizational splintering of river transportation hinders the strengthening of inter-rayon economic relations; it prevents the development of long distance mass freight hauling, although it is precisely in this case that its efficiency is the highest.

Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committe general secretary, noted in his speech "The Fundamental Problem of Party Economic Policy," that "a great deal of work remains to be done in perfecting the administrative and economic management systems. We cannot postpone such work for we realize that unless we create new economic and organizational conditions, we cannot truly accelerate scientific and technical progress." In the light of these instructions, decisive improvements in sectorial organizational structure in the immediate future is an urgent task. The interests of the national economy urgently require putting an end to the existing splintering and the creation of a unified system of riverine transportation in the country.

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THE COMMUNIST IDEAL AND ITS SPIRITUAL PREREQUISITES

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 122-125

[Review by Genrikh Volkov of the book "Iskusstvo i Kommunisticheskiy Ideal" [Art and the Communist Ideal] by E. V. Ilenkov]. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1984, 349 pp]

[Text] It happens that even after the death of an author the thoughts, ideas and images he created continue to live and develop. His old books gain new popularity and posthumous editions come out.

The book under review by Soviet philosopher E. V. Ilenkov was published after his death. It includes previously unpublished works and articles published during his life time in a number of different publications. Written at various times and in different genres, they have as their living core his thoughts on the philosophical, humanistic, ethical and aesthetic prerequisites for the advancement toward the communist ideal, and his impassionate, witty and sharp arguments against anything which hinders this advancement.

The author depics a broad historical view of the ascent toward this truly scientific social ideal, from the religious ideal to that of the Renaissance and the Elightenment to that of communism. Treacherous clashes have cautioned mankind--the traveller--on the centuries-old march of the spirit, depicted by the author in vivid and impressive colors.

The age of Enlightenment proclaimed the great principles of freedom, equality and fraternity! In the light of Reason they seemed real, inevitable and close. All that was necessary was to realize their greatness and they would be attained.

"And a miracle happened. The powerful sounds of the Marseillaise rolled over the land of France, innumerable Bastilles crumbled under the crushing cannon shells, the herds of priests and bureaucrats scattered in all sides and the people raised to the skies ther tricolor of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" (p 119).

It seemed as though all that was necessary to reach this ideal was to dispatch kings and reactionaries to the guillotine. But already then the fattening

bourgeois and bankers, the new nobility, were reshaping life acording to their mercantile ideal and life and the practice of "what was" proved stronger than "what should have been."

Many outstanding minds began to think hard about this.

The great utopian socialists reached the conclusion that the only path open to mankind toward the beautiful future was that of eliminating private property and that socialism was the only salvation of mankind from the spiritual, moral and physical degradation which threatened it.

What made the thinking of the utopian socialists brilliant, the author emphasizes, was that now the emphasis was not on the conditions of activities of man as he was and not on his past, but on the conditions governing his development and establishment and his future which always, at all times, lay ahead. That is why an ideal cannot be presented to man as a finished design, as an icon, but as a standard in measuring the progress of living man, as he steadily expands his possibilities.

However, regardless of how strongly Saint Simon and Fourrier appealed to the moneybags, urging them to accept the ideals of the future, all that this lead to was scoffing. "Having observed first hand the misadventures of a splendid ideal on earth, the people were unable to accurately understand the earthly roots of these tragic misadventures and, having failed to comprehend them, once again began to look for them beyond the clouds" (p 123).

While the French were acting, the Germans were observing them attentively and philosophizing. They made their revolution in the sphere of the spirit. They adopted the ideal of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, but subjected it to a critical analysis.

Above all, Kant undertook to clarify the composition of the ideal itself and to depict precisely and specifically the inner "nature of man," the external manifestation of which he was.

In analyzing in detail Kant's views on the subject, the author concludes that the philosopher "reconciled" the ideal of the Enlightenment with that of Christianity, and Robespierre with Christ. He transferred the implementation of the ideal into the area of infinite moral self-perfection of the individual. The ideal turned out to be unattainable, a tempting ghost.

Hegel formulated the problem differently. He considered any given condition a stage in the implementation of the high ideal. "Thus Hegel helped philosophy tobreak with the concept of the ideal as an illusion which will forevertempt man with its beauty but will also eternally deceive him, turning out to be the irreconcilable opposite of 'what is'. An ideal is a picture of supreme perfection entirely attainable by man" (p 153).

But where and how? In art, perhaps, for the ideal is inseparably related to beauty. In art man proves himself as a harmoniously developed personality. However, the blossoming of art lies behind rather than ahead. This, according to Hegel, was the "golden age," the age of antiquity. The true ideal is

attained through action. Was the philosopher closer to the truth? But if so, what kind of action? The action of the mind, of attaining the Absolute Spirit? The secret of the ideral turns out to be an idea, an absolutely accurate portrait painted in logic, in "thinking about thinking."

No, Ludwig Feuerbach firmly declares. Our ideal is not a castrated being, disembodied and abstract. Out ideal is the integral, real, comprehensive, perfect and educated person." Man rather than god, absolute and concept: such is the principle of the philosophy of the future.

This was beautiful and inspiring. The young Marx and Engels adoptedthis principle enthusiastically. But then, such beautiful principles had been proclaimed earlier as well. The question was how to implement them.

"Marx turned his sober sight straight toward the earth and clearly saw that the people were hardly ever chasing the blue birds of the ideal. They were forced, however gross this may have sounded to the dreamers, to wage a daily hard struggle for bread, a roof over their heads and the right to breathe clean air... He saw that it was not 'ideals' that the people were mostly short of, but most elementary human conditions for life, work and education" (p 163).

The author debunks the popular legend about Marx, according to which he had accepted the idea of beauty in his early youth, and idea which, alas, was a beautiful yet utopian dream of the universal happiness of all mankind, after which, looking though these rosy spectacles, he began to seek means for the implementation of the ideal. Marx's path to communism was the direct opposite. He never proceeded to look at reality from an a priori scheme. He began by studying real contradictions in life and tried to determine the outcome of their dynamics and their resolution. He did not impose the ideal on reality but tried to understand the type of ideal which ripen within reality itself, the type of ideals which are born of the needs of the proletariat, the revolutionary class. This is the radical difference between Marxism and utopianism.

The beautiful thesis of the old philosophy, according to which man is the aim of social development was given a new, social, content by Marx. Yes, man is the sole "subject" of the historical process, and his labor is the only "substance" of all forms of human culture. The so-called "essence of man" is the product of the joint, the collective, work of many generations, a sum total of all social relations. Naturally, Marx turned to the study of social relations in capitalist society, relations of ownership, division of labor and other economic categories.

E. V. Ilenkov is the author of the vivid, graphic and precise interpretation of the problem of "professional cretinism," as it faced Marx. "Professional cretinism," the author emphasizes, "is the private ownership of some capabilities" (p 178). It is the consequence of and prerequisite for the commodity-capitalist division of labor and property. Here tangible, "material" wealth mecomes the object of all public production, while the living person is merely a tool, a peculiar semifinished commodity, a partial detail of a partial machine, a "cog" within it.

The entire pyramid of the social division of labor in which not one class opposes another while physical labor clashes with mental work, but also in which their various types clash, inevitably crumbles with the elimination of private ownership and with production socialization.

In the course of the revolution the toiling masses becom involved in politics and, subsequently, social management. As socialism develops, comprehensive education and the harmoniously developed individual are increasingly becoming mandatory requirements. The total solution of this problem does not presume in the least, as the foes of communism and Marxism claim, the conversion of every individual into some sort of universal genius engaged in doing a little bit of everything and nothing specifically. "Every living person could and should be developed in terms of those general ("universal") abilities which make him a modern Person (and not a chemist or a turner), i.e., in the areas of thinking, morality and help. The comprehensive development of the individual presumes providing equally real conditions for the development of the capabilities of all people without exception in any desired direction. These should be conditions in which every one could reach without hindrance and in the course of his general education attain the cutting edge of human culture, the highest limits of what has been or has not been accomplished yet, and then freely to choose the sector of the front of the struggle with nature in which he would like to concentrate his individual efforts, such as physics, technology, poetry or medicine" (p 181-182).

We gave this lengthy quotation because it formulates properly the question of how to understand the Ideal of the comprehensive development of the individual, a question which has been actively discussed in our literature for several decades.

Those familiar with E. V. Ilenkov's books know him as a brilliant polemicist and tireless fighter for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory. His entire book is imbued with the atmosphere of intensive discussions in which the author has taken part.

Those discussions dealt with the nature of the ideal and how to understand the interrelationships between science and humanism, science and art, and man and technology. In their totality, these problems can be reduced to the famous triunity: Truth, Goodness and Beauty.

The author firmly opposes pitting them against each-other. Essentially, in its sources, science does not oppose humanism and humanism does not oppose science. Those who consider science the highest value of contemporary civilization and fetishize it are wrong. Equally senseless are views which promote morality without science, in the spirit of Rousseau or Platon Karatayev. "Neither morality nor science can be considered the supreme 'value' in the value scale of human civilization. Both morality and science have been, are and will remain nothing but tools, instruments made by man for his own use, in order to increase his power over nature and increase the extent of human happiness" (p 200).

The fashion of deifying science and turning it into a fetish develops by itself into making a fetish of technology. In the scale of the superior

values of civilization, the author asserts, the unquestionable priority is held by man, and man alone. Man is the only yardstick in the world of science and technology rather than vice-versa. The instant someone begins to measure man on the scale of machine perfection, man turns into something unimaginable. This is described in the witty pamphlet "The Secret of the Black Box," which mocks the cybernetic-philosophical claims of a future superiority of machines over man and the creation of an electronic "superman." In this ficticious world of domination of cyberns all that has always in fact represented strictly human dignity and wealth is turned upside-down, becoming a minus sign, a vice and an atavism. The author proves clearly the concept of professional cretinism taken to the limit of absurdity, in which the Ideal of cybern development is the Black Box, i.e., absolutely nothing.

Intelligent machines are needed in order to arm the human intellect and not to replace it, and to indicate where, in what areas man will be superior and will always remain superior to any kind of cyberns. This applies to the area of dialectically conflicting thinking, imagination, phantasy, intuition, humor and a feeling for beauty and morality or, in other words, once again the concepts of Truth, Goodness and Beauty in their organic unity.

An entire section of the book deals with the role of art in the development of an integral creative individual, the interrelationship between art and science and between art and the scientific and technical revolution. The author considers this question with great polemical sharpness.

A certain condescending and sympathetic attitude toward art has become usual, perhaps self-evident, in discussions in specialized and mass publications. Art is advised to hasten in order not to fall too far behind the pace and rhythm of the "scientific and technical age." From above, science pats the allegedly lagging art, which has failed to reach its heights, on the shoulder.

E. V. Ilenkov immediately reveals the falseness of this view and exposes its "grounds." "One of the unspoken premises for this view is the belief that the power of creative imagination, manifested in Raphael's paintings, Mozart's operas, Michelangelo's statues, Shakespeare's tragedies, Pushkin's poems and Leo Tolstoy's epic contain something which unquestionably belongs to the past compared to the "intellect" embodied in atomic boilers, computers, ballistic missiles, transistors, television sets and fake caviar" (p 209).

Formal mathematical logic is considered the special logic of the natural sciences. The strict observance of the algorithms of this logic is beginning to be considered the highest virtue of "modern scientific thinking in general," and the informative value of the Sixtine Madonna begins to be measured in "bits," as seriously as earlier efforts to rate it in terms of rubles or dollars. The velocity scale of space rockets is used to judge the unhurried epic rhythms of Bach or Tolstoy. Is it therefore amazing that all such values and rhythms turn out to be quite "non-contemporary?" What is taken as "congenial" with supermodern science? Is it the rhythms of the twist or the shake, or else the "masterpieces" of pop art?

The author sensibly concludes that one must use the word "contemporary" more cautiously when applied to art, to the art of the past and the art of the

present. The true and not the ficticious interests of the scientific and technical revolution are profoundly related to developing in the people the powerful force of the free imagination, i.e., the imagination oriented toward beauty. "Let us not consider Mozart and Tolstoy 'obsolete' artists. Better acknowledge that these people were ahead of us in something quite substantial. With all respect due modern science and technology, let us not deify them and turn them into standards of absolute value of everything and every one. On the contrary, let us try to gauge scientific and technical innovations with the old but true measurement, the measurement of human dignity and development of human capabilities" (p 212).

The "specifics" of art also become understandable from this high point of view. Art develops the universal human capacity--the capacity of creative imagination, phantasy and intuition. Once developed, this capacity may be applied in all realms of human activities and knowledge: science, politics, daily life and directly at work.

"Manuscripts do not burn," M. A. Bulgakov said. With even greater justification we could say that thoughts and ideas do not die! This comes to mind when we read and reread lines which E. V. Ilenkov wrote years and even decades ago. They, these lines, are like living soldiers filled with passion, daring, courage, the virginal purity of Marxist thinking and civic-mindedness.

The publishing house has done a good deed by assembling and publishing them in a single work. The book has a short but vivid preface by M. A. Lifshit (alas, also deceased), providing a good description of the personality of Evald Ilenkov.

He was a delicate character, indeed. However, he reached Berlin with his weapon, and throughout his life time he remained a tempered and irreconcilable soldier, albeit on a different front, the front of the struggle of ideas.

In reading his works, we feel in every line the restlessness of the mind and the zeal of the soul. There was no difference between his words, actions and convictions. He honestly strove to participate in the common process which Lenin described as the continuation of Hegel's and Marx's cause.

We too subscribe to M. A. Lifshits's concluding words as we wish the collection of articles by E. V. Ilenkov a safe journey into the hearts and minds of the readers.

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UNDER THE PRAVDA PEN

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 13, Sep 85 (signed to press 2 Sep 85) pp 125-126

[Review by Al. Romanov of the book "Glazami `Pravdy'" [Through the Eyes of PRAVDA] by V. Afanasyev. Pravda, Moscow, 1985, 160 pp]

[Text] This book describes the world through the eyes of PRAVDA. Whether it is a question of Bulgaria, fighting Vietnam, FRG, Japan, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, or France, all essays included in this book are distinguished by their sharp political analysis and sociological summations based on specific historical examples or economic indicators pertaining to one country or another.

The book's author is PRAVDA's editor-in-chief, academician and journalist. The value of this book, written in a straight and expressive style, rests in the clarity of the author's positions and his invariable aspiration to study profoundly and present to the readers the "world of politics" and current domestic and foreign policy problems of countries he has visited, particularly singling out the aspiration of all honest people for peace, mutual understanding and friendship among peoples.

The essays included in the book, originally published in PRAVDA at different times, are distinguished by their ideological-topic unity. Thus, in sharing his impressions on a trip to Bulgaria in 1969, the author describes the tremendous progress which a nation can achieve on the path of socialist progress. Like that of the other socialists countries, Bulgaria's main resource is its people, courageous fighters and dedicated workers. In the 13 centuries of its existence, Bulgaria has experienced harsh trials. In no more than one quarter of a century after the overthrow of the Monarchic-fascist dictatorship, however, its people, headed by the communist party, the party of Georgi Dimitrov, turned their previously backward country "into a developed socialist state with a progressive economy, science and culture, a powerful working class and a large intelligentsia detachment." In his essay "The Cyrillic Alphabet," written on the occasion of Bulgarian education, culture and slavic literacy day, the author convincingly describes how sacredly Bulgarian-Soviet friendship is protected here and the strict implementation of Georgi Dimitrov's behest to the effect that friendship with

the Soviet Union is no less necessary to Bulgaria's national independence and blossoming than the sun and the air are to any living being.

The essay "Vietnam's Main Road" was written at a time when, in its helpless rage, the American military was dropping an incalculable number of bombs and shells on DRV territory along with thousands of tons of toxic substances. The author witnessed the bloody crimes of the American assasins and thugs. He also witnessed the heroic and truly nationwide resistance to the American aggressors. No force or threat were able to weaken to resolve of the Vietnamese people to fight for the independence and freedom of their homeland. The aggressors were shamefully defeated. The strength of Vietnam, the author states, is that of the new social system. The nature of the war waged by the Vietnamese people was just. "No nation who has tasted freedom and become the master of its country and ruler of its present and future can be defeated."

A significant part of the book, which could be arbitrarily described as its second part, deals with the author's impressions and thoughts related to his trips to Japan and the biggest capitalist countries in Europe. He discusses the complex political situation in these countries and the crisis phenomena in their economies and profound social contrasts. For example, his essays on Japan include not only a convincing study of the economic situation of this "second industrial country in the capitalist world," which has hurled a "daring challenge to the United States itself," but also, with the help of specific examples, describe the high art of organization and production managment, the skill to use the latest achievements of science and technology and the industriousness and discipline of the working people, developed in the course of centuries of confrontation with a stingy natural environment, which distinguishes Japanese industry.

Japan, a densely populated country, experienced the horror of the American atom bombs in August 1945. To this day, a sad, angry and warning toll of the bells is heard on Hiroshima. The essay "Hiroshima Must Not Be Repeated" deals with the contemporary problems of the struggle for peace, an end to the arms race, and lifting the threat of nuclear war.

Equally urgent contemporary problems affecting the people are discussed by the author in other essays as well.

In the talks held in Edinburgh, the most beautiful city in Great Britain, in which social personalities, scientists, and military from both sides participated, the fourth informal meeting dealt with topical problems of safeguarding peace, reducing the scale of the nuclear arms race, disarmament and detente in Europe and all necessary steps which would make it possible to prevent the dissemination of the arms race to outer space.

He writes about the FRG, the sharp political struggle waged in that country under the conditions of severe economic difficulties and of the struggle between two opposite trends in international relations: confrontation, on the one hand, and detente, strengthening peace and developing cooperation between nations and states, on the other.

There are essays on France, on the profound socioeconomic crisis in that country, the growing discontent of the French people with the existing situation, and, finally, the refusal of the communists to participate in a socialist government which is actually persuing a right wing, bourgeois policy. He writes about Portugal of today, where the political situation has been increasingly worsening of late and where the reaction is resorting to open threats while the government is conniving with fascist-leaning elements.

He writes about Spain, where after nearly 40 years of Franco dictatorship, today "political passions are raging" and a great, sharp and difficult debate is under way dealing with the past, the present, and the future.

The parts in the book discussing the communist parties of these countries are read with particular attention. Here the readers will find expressive features and views, imbued with the spirit of solidarity, on the daily organizing, political and idealogical activities of communists abroad.

The book under review is a politically saturated party-oriented work of political journalism in terms of its content, form and style. Unquestionably, it will be of interest to the readers.

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BOOK WORLD

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[Review by Academician B. Kedrov of the book "Pamyatnyye Knizhnyye Daty" [Memorable Book Dates]. Issues 1-5. Kniga, Moscow, 1981-1985]

[Text] "The book, the greatest of miracles created by man, embodies the entire knowledge of life in the world, the entire history of the growth of the intelligence of the world and the entire historical effort and experience of the peoples on earth. Books are the most powerful tool in the further development of the spiritual forces of mankind." It is with these words expressed by M. Gorkiy that opens one of the parts of the reference work under review, five issues of which (1981-1985) have already come out.

The appearance of a new yearbook is a natural phenomenon in our culture. The prestige of books is higher than ever before. The readers are showing a persistent and profound interest in the history of the creation of works of the human mind.

We have long become accustomed to see in dates in the lives of great people symbolic landmarks not only of their own lives but their culture as a whole. But are the dates of birth of works which have ensured the immortality of their authors any less important? How were these works created, where were they published, how were they received by their contemporaries, and what is their significance to posterity?

Unquestionably, the most important task of a publication goes much beyond pure information. In developing a microprototype of a book, the remembrance of whichis to be revived, and making it an essential fragment of the behavior of our contemporaries, the authors of historical and bibliographic essays use specific means with which to involve the reader in the universal age-old cultural and constructive work of mankind in the relms of scientific, sociopolitical and artistic creativity. Exposure to spiritual values through the best accomplishments of creative thinking is precisely the circumstance which will develop in the reader impeccably accurate taste guidelines. The ideologically adjusted materials in the publications under review help to shape a clear conceptual Marxist-Leninist position, particularly in young people, through their "lofty exposure" to the values of culture.

Under the conditions of a differentiated and extremely specialized knowledge, which is so typical of the epoch of the scientific and technical revolution, the restoration of an integral broad view on culture is exceptionally important. It is precisely this integrity which is a prerequisite for the integral and harmonious development of the human personality. Yet it is precisely the harmonious and comprehensively developed personality that is the ideal of the communist system, for which reason the prerequisites for such a harmony to be obtained in the future must be created as of now. Recent party documents eloquently prove this fact.

The materials in the yearbook are classified into six parts: politics and publicism, science and education, domestic prerevolutionary, foreign and Soviet literature, and bibliography. The scope of topics in the publications is combined with the unity of starting principles: completeness of necessary information, its brevity and accuracy, extent and limits of popularity, which presume a broad readership yet exclude simplification and trite entertainment. The history of the writing and publication of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin account for a significant share of the political-publicistic section. The dates noted include the 110th anniversary of the first Russian publication of "Das Kapital," the centennial of the publication of the "Communist Party Manifesto" in Russian (translated by G. V. Plekhanov and with a preface by the authors, especially written for this edition), the 25th anniversary of the publication of the first volume of V. I. Lenin's collected works in 55 volumes, and many other dates. The book history of the Russian revolutionary movement is widely represented, including Pestel's RUSSKAYA PRAVDA, Hertzen's KOLOKOL, VESTNIK `NARODNAYA VOLYA' and others.

Turning to the rare documents and the epistolary legacy of Lenin's closest retinue and to archival materials contributes to the fact that individual cases developed into an entire panoramic view, reviving the past and developing in the readers of today the historical and revolutionary memory of the people. For example, a relatively short note on the history of the publication on the first collection of Lenin's works, entitled "In 12 Years" has been masterly presented. In particular, it includes the words of V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich: "Why Complete?" said he (Lenin--author), in objecting to my maximalism. One could print perhaps some selected parts, only that which would be of current significance in the theoretical interpretation of a number of our party problems...." Lenin's modesty but also concern for the usefulness of this project are of current, of actual usefulness in party work.

Here is another example. In connection with the centennial of Marx's death, the yearbook shows the way this memorable date has been noted at different times in books, publications and articles. Behind this picture the reader will feel the triumphant march of Marx's doctrine. This memorable date becomes a characteristic mirror which reflects the life of his words, thoughts and actions, which became the words, thoughts and actions of millions of people.

The makers of this yearbook have also addressed themselves to outstanding works of science: this is a question not only of the specialized content of discoveries and works but also of their humanistic and conceptual significance. The very heading of this section: "Science and Education,"

indicates the most important shades of meaning: science as the light of knowledge. Campanella's "City of the Sun," Galileo's "Dialogue on the Two World Systems," Diderot's and D'Alambert's "Encyclopedia," Lavoisier's "Considerations on Phlogiston," Dokuchayev's "Russian Chernozem," Mechnikov's "Studies on the Nature of Man," Tsiolkovskiy's "Selected Works" and many other publications deal with science in its historical dynamics. They also describe history itself rather than merely retell the content of an old treatise. Without a historical approach, even the most significant accomplishments of past scientific thoughts would have been presented in the yearbook as a museum antique, as a rarity of interest to specialists only.

In describing the book history of Campanella's "City of the Sun," and the history of the translation into the Russian language of this scientific monument to Utopian thinking of the turn of the 17th century, i.e., carrying out in its entirety a strictly historical-bibliographic assignment, the compilers of the yearbook do not forget the essence of their intention, comparing typologically and sensitively two views on the text: their own and the author's: "I was born to strike at vice: sophistry, hypocricy and tyranny," citing Marx's view on this work, who considered Campanella among philosophers who "began to look at the state through human eyes and to derive its natural laws from mind and experience rather than theology" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works] vol 1, p 111). It is thus that the history of the book becomes interwoven with the history of sociopolitical thinking and it is precisely in this connection that it is perceived by the readers of today.

The yearbook includes a variety of materials on artistic literature. This variety, however, is profoundly thought out. We have no feeling of eclectic variety or whimsical randomness, for memorable dates are not merely "round" figures. The choice is made by the cultural memory of mankind, impressed in contemporary awareness. The compilers of this edition have tried to observe this objective criterion. As a rule, their main interest includes the supreme phenomena of the history of culture. A number of other titles are noted as well, which, may be less significant but without which the life of culture (literature, science) would be incomplete or simply impossible. These materials are equally presented with great tactfulness and skill, taking the scale of the phenomenon into consideration.

The section entitled "Bibliography," is a very pertinent and necessary part of the collection. It gives a specific coloring to the entire publication, as though substantiating its character as a study of books. Information on Gutenberg's discovery, Peter the Great's "Gazette," Brockhaus' educational work, the book publishing innovations during the first years of the Soviet system and many others are depicted in the book as phenomena of culture and as a characteristic cultural synthesis. The compilers of this yearbook have followed quite consistently this concept in the first four issues. Another special section was added to the fifth issue, as a development of the bibliographic nature of this publication: "Book Art," which includes expressive illustrations.

The publication allows us to judge of the range of interests of contemporary readers. We see how lively, topical and significant Russian classical works are today, the way the concept of Soviet classics is developing and the growth

of the readers' attention to the art of books. The structure of the yearbook and its presentation have been improved with every issue and the style of articles and notes has become increasingly expressive. The authors include both noted Soviet personalities in the fields of culture and science and talented young people.

As is the case with any new project, the yearbook has its shortcomings. Unfortunately, the issues do not come at the beginning of the current year although this would allow cultural and educational institutions to note the most significant dates properly. In describing the various monuments of bibliographic culture, particularly those which are little known to the readership at large, in our view it would be expedient to provide excerpts from such works (which, furthermore, would introduce some variety in the presentation of the materials). We believe that these and some other features could be taken into consideration in subsequent issues.

Although this publication has gained popularity, the size of its edition appears small: 50,000 copies. Judging by the content of the already published issues, the readership appears wide and varied. The materials contained are equally useful to engineering and technical workers, people in the humanities and public figures, for whether they discuss science, art or literature, they are discussing the culture of mankind and its best examples. Equally unquestionable is the patriotic nature of the materials, dealing with the fates of national book masterpieces, which are the pride of the Russian and other peoples in our country.

This is a noteworthy publication which confirms the attitude toward books as being of high spiritual value. Obviously, continuing this publication would be equally useful and important in the highly difficult, delicate and painstaking project of the communist upbringing of the individual and in the struggle for humanistic ideals.

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