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TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

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5 October 1983

USSR REPORT
TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No 10, July 1983

Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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IDEOLOGICAL WORK--ON THE LEVEL OF THE TASKS OF PERFECTING DEVELOPED SOCIALISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 83 (signed to press 5 Jul 83) pp 3-14

[Text] The 14-15 June CPSU Central Committee Plenum is an important landmark on the path of socialist progress in our country, leading to the fuller implementation of the cause and objectives of the Great October Revolution. It dealt with topical problems of party ideological and mass political work. The programmatic speech delivered by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, the report by Comrade K. U. Chernenko, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary and the plenum's decree give the party members the necessary arms for enhancing further the role of Marxist-Leninist theory and the creativity of the people headed by the Leninist party--the main social force which created a developed socialist society in the USSR and which has been called upon to ensure its comprehensive advancement and gradual growth to the higher communist phase.

The Soviet working people fully share and support CPSU domestic and foreign policy. The plenum's decree notes that "the ideological-political situation in the country is characterized by the further unification of the Soviet people around the CPSU, its Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo headed by Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov," whose election as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium met with comprehensive, unanimous approval.

The plenum raised most urgently the task of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, under the guiding star of which our party and Soviet people are thinking and struggling. Marxism-Leninism is the theory which illumines the path of practice and the ideology of the working class and all builders of communism. Its enrichment with new concepts and ideas is as necessary as is the advancement of mature socialism and as important as improving the work in all communist construction sectors. Practice cannot be successful unless its path is illuminated by proper theory and theory cannot fulfill its role as guiding principle, as beacon, without detecting and developing the ripe problems of social development.

The objective conditions which have developed at the present stage for the further elaboration of scientific communism, which was created by K. Marx and F. Engels on the basis of the study of capitalism and developed by V. I. Lenin through the study of imperialism, the summation of the new experience acquired in the struggle waged by the international proletariat and, above all, the October Revolution and the experience in building the first state of workers and peasants in the world and the political and socioeconomic changes in the country, are more favorable than ever before.

Our country today has a developed socialist society and our hopes for an even better future are linked with its progress. It is precisely the profound and comprehensive familiarity with mature socialism, its laws and the mechanism of their action, the study of socialist reality and the processes, trends and phenomena within it and the elaboration, on this basis, of new theoretical concepts, ideas and practical conclusions that must become the main directions in theoretical work. It must be fully realized that at the developed socialist stage in the USSR and under the conditions of the changed circumstances in the world we must make better use of the ideological and theoretical arsenal at our disposal and must expand and enrich it.

The documents of the June Central Committee Plenum direct our cadres, party organizations and sociological scientific research institutes to the further creative elaboration of theory so that it can contribute more effectively to the implementation of the party's strategy of comprehensive advancement of developed socialism and the struggle for peace and security of the peoples and against imperialism and its aggressive policy and ideology.

Reliable foundations--Marxism-Leninism, the accuracy of which has been confirmed through the sociohistorical practice of hundreds of millions of people, and which is a major base for the development of problems of mature socialism and global progress--enable us to engage in fruitful theoretical work in our country. The concepts and conclusions contained in the materials of the 24th-26th party congresses, Central Committee plenums and Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's speeches were noted at the plenum as true achievements of recent Marxist-Leninist thinking.

The concepts formulated in the speech by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the June Plenum in connection with drafting the new CPSU program substantially enrich our knowledge of the content of processes taking place in a developed socialist society and are of guiding significance in theoretical work. "The realistic analysis of the existing situation and the clear guidelines for the future, which relate practical experience with the final objectives of our communist party should be reflected in the new edition of the CPSU program," he emphasized.

Our party has reached a level in history in which profound qualitative changes in production forces and corresponding improvement in production relations have become inevitable. A close interconnection must exist between this and changes which occur in the minds of the people and in all forms of social life which are commonly described as superstructural.

The key task in economics is a radical enhancement of labor productivity, which must rise to the highest global level. We must ensure the most sensible utilization of the existing production and scientific and technical potential and surmount lagging in sectors such as agriculture, transportation and services.

The main path leading to a qualitative change in production forces, the plenum noted, is a conversion to intensive development, combining in fact the advantages of the socialist system with the achievements of the scientific

and technical revolution in its latest stage, which promises a technological upheaval in a number of production areas. In this connection the task was raised of developing the type of system of organizational, economic and moral measures which would interest both managers and workers and scientists and designers in equipment renovation. The social sciences, economics above all, must make their contribution to the creation of such a system, which is being developed by the Gosplan, the USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology.

The importance of making a profound study of the changes occurring in ownership relations is entirely understandable. The main feature is to determine the specific ways and means for bringing state ownership closer to cooperative-kolkhoz ownership, which would blend into a single property of the whole people in the future.

The time has come to perfect distribution relations and to ensure in fact the strict consideration and observance of the principle of payment according to labor, so that every citizen would receive the material goods consistent with the quantity and quality of his socially useful labor. We must eliminate as soon as possible cases of unearned income, appropriation of state funds and squandering and even theft of socialist property.

The party is encouraging radical improvements in planning and management with a view to perfecting production relations. It believes that ensuring a properly organized and uninterrupted work of the entire economic mechanism is the requirement of the present and the programmatic task for the future. Existing shortcomings in planning, including the wasting of resources and the gap between commodities and population income, substantially hinder the growth of production capacities and the balanced development of the national economy and create difficulties in supplying the population with certain commodities and foodstuffs.

The CPSU Central Committee general secretary said that in drafting economic plans we must learn comprehensively to take into consideration the social, national and demographic social development factors, for the end objective of all efforts in the economic area is to improve the people's living conditions. Briefly, we must have a uniform party policy and social development strategy. It must include a thought-out and scientifically substantiated national policy based on the Leninist principles of full equality among nations and nationalities and their free development within the framework of the fraternal union and steadfast course of rapprochement among them.

The Central Committee plenum concretized concepts on the establishment of a classless social structure which, according to the conclusion of the 26th CPSU Congress, will take place in its main and essential features at the stage of mature socialism; it brought to light the correlation between this process and the solution of problems such as ensuring a separate apartment for each family; improving the system of payments for labor; producing the necessary quantity of superior-quality goods and ensuring the uninterrupted supply of the population with comestible products; and raising the quality standard of health care. "The solution of all of these major tasks in the

area of domestic party policy," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said, "will constitute substantial progress toward social homogeneity."

In its policy the party also proceeds from the fact that significant changes will take place in the political and ideological superstructure in the years and decades to come. Although many of the stipulations of the CPSU program on improving Soviet statehood and socialist democracy have already been achieved, particularly after the adoption of the new USSR Constitution in 1977, a great deal more remains to be done. In the future Soviet statehood will gradually grow into social self-management. This will take place through the further development of the state of the whole people and the more extensive involvement of the masses in the management of social affairs. Understandably, however, this process is determined also by the material possibilities of the society and the level of consciousness and culture of the masses.

That is why, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted, we should not abstractly conceive of the further means and methods for the development of democracy but proceed on the basis of reality. It is particularly important to give a specific content to the existing forms and to improve more energetically the activities of all democratic institutions. He sharply criticized the practice according to which democratic norms and stipulations are not supported with deeds. What is the use of a meeting if it does not include an interested and frank discussion, if the speeches of the participants have been edited in advance while initiative, not to mention criticism, is smoothed over and suppressed? What is the worth of the work of a trade union organization which does not dare to raise its voice in the defense of the interests of the working people or in the case of production disorders?

The concept of the further democratization of the procedure for decision-making on main problems of state and social life was raised at the plenum. It is a question of the increasingly broad and practical discussion of draft resolutions by labor collectives; the mandatory consideration in proper cases of the conclusions of trade unions, the Komsomol and women's organizations and a most attentive attitude toward the suggestions of our working people; greater publicity in the work of party and state organs; regular accountability on the part of leading personnel to the population; and reduction and simplification of the administrative apparatus.

The programmatic stipulations contained in Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's speech indicate the directions which must be followed in theoretical work and the conditions under which it could be fruitful. To sum it up, these conditions are as follows:

--We must be firmly guided by revolutionary theory and make skillful use of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of scientific research. We must not reject or replace the principles of Marxism-Leninism or the practically tried concepts and ideas but work on their basis, enriching the achievements of Marxist-Leninist thinking through the study of reality and the summation of experience acquired by the USSR and the other fraternal countries, i.e., we must follow the path of increasing our knowledge;

--We must proceed from existing reality with all its pluses and minuses. We must abandon the method of presenting universally known concepts which were formulated decades ago and make reality fit them, simplistically depicting the process of the embodiment of ideas in life, as though everything takes place precisely according to theoretical predictions. In such cases we forget that along with universal-historical successes of determining significance, under the influence of one factor or another errors and blunders which must be corrected were committed, while problems left unresolved in the past must be resolved as soon as possible. The question of how to react to difficulties and errors is of essential significance. In referring to them, the revisionists essentially reject the tremendous accomplishments of real socialism. They encourage doubts as to the progressive and beneficial nature of the socialist way and are even ready to ignore the accomplishments of the peoples. The Marxists-Leninists try to correct errors committed in one area or another in order to ensure the strengthening of the new society and its well-being;

--We must work with a view to the future more than we have so far; we must promptly note developing trends and problems; we must see better into the future and help bring it about. We must closely link the solution of current problems to progress toward communism.

In order to depict the efforts which must be applied for the implementation of one theoretical and practical problem or another, their scale and complexity are emphasized quite justifiably. However, frequently such an emphasis is excessive in an effort to justify occasionally some rather modest results. We must always see to it that the complexity and difficulty of our tasks be considered not a restraining but a mobilizing factor in our work. "...The work of the Marxists is always 'difficult,' and what distinguishes them from the liberals is precisely the fact that they do not classify what is difficult as impossible," Lenin wrote ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, p 24). Each difficulty, he taught, "you must answer with ever-new efforts at organization and discipline" (op. cit., vol 36, p 408).

Unquestionably, it is important to have a concept of the volume and qualitative novelty of the work which lies ahead. Naturally, however, resolve is also needed to carry it out, as well as firm confidence in success. Immminent matters must not be postponed under the pretext of their complexity or by referring to "objective" reasons such as resource scarcity, for example. All of us, Soviet people, must not fear difficulties but work despite them, work even more energetically and fruitfully.

Persistence and work can make miracles and surmount all obstacles. We have good reason to feel the inspiring confidence that the Leninist party and the Soviet people will honorably deal with the new tasks--the ones already on the agenda and the ones which will appear in the future!

The Central Committee plenum directs the party members to enhance ideological-educational and mass political work. This is a problem of strengthening the ties between the party and the masses and even closer internal cohesion within our society. "The party committees on all levels and each party

organization," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized, "must realize that despite the importance of other matters with which we must deal (organizational, economic and others), ideological work is assuming increasing priority."

Marxist-Leninist ideology holds unchallenged dominating positions in Soviet society. It is our great accomplishment. However, the changes which occur in life and events within the country and in the world arena, naturally, must be properly understood by the masses. This calls for enriching the content and enhancing the efficiency of ideological work. We must take into consideration the fact that social consciousness is an area in which backward, negative changes in some of the people are not excluded, nor are manifestations of views and moods which are neither socialist nor patriotic. An individual consciousness is not irreversible. Some people may convert to positions alien to socialism under the influence of one conflict in their lives or another or under the influence of imperialist propaganda.

A sharp struggle is being waged in the world between socialist and bourgeois ideology, as a reflection of the confrontation between conflicting social systems--socialism and imperialism; a struggle is being waged between the working class, the toiling masses and the oppressed peoples, on the one hand, and the imperialist bourgeoisie and the forces of reaction, neocolonialism, aggression and war, on the other. Of late imperialism has mounted real "psychological warfare." It is committing propaganda aggression against the socialist countries. It is disseminating lies and slander about the socialist way of life and socialist foreign policy. Through its most reactionary representatives, it is openly proclaiming its intention to liquidate the socialist system and is engaged in war preparations against the USSR.

Facing the unity of Soviet society, the subversive imperialist centers engage in the use of a variety of tricks. They even bring forth the idea of some kind of "commonness" between socialist and bourgeois ideology, claiming that since both are ideologies, why not introduce into socialist ideology something borrowed from bourgeois ideology? However, socialist and bourgeois ideology are incompatible and radically opposite: the former expresses the interests and objectives of the working class, the working people and the nations; the second represents the interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie--the bearer of reaction and aggression. It would indeed be strange and monstrous to make any kind of concessions to bourgeois ideology, not to mention borrowing something from its arsenal for the sake of "renovating" socialist ideology. The answer to the ideological intrigues and attacks promoted by imperialism can be only one on our part: firm counteraction and aggressive struggle. As was noted at the plenum, we need a well-planned, unified, dynamic and efficient counterpropaganda system.

Our party, as the June Central Committee Plenum proved once again, proceeds from the fact that at the developed socialist stage the role of the toiling masses becomes even greater and reaches a new level. It is a stage during which the solution of constructive problems directly depends on the conscious participation of all working people--not some of them but precisely one and all.

It is hardly necessary to prove that the development of the economy and the solution of a prime task such as upgrading labor productivity could be ensured only with the direct participation of all working people, of every working person. Let us take as an example the implementation of the Energy Program. Naturally, it depends above all on the respective scientific, design and engineering organizations, the collectives of builders of power plants and their personnel, the coal miners and petroleum and gas workers. However, the efficient and economical utilization of fuel and energy resources is a matter affecting all Soviet people. The implementation of the Food Program as well is a nationwide cause in which not only kolkhozes and sovkhozes and the sectors in the agroindustrial complex but the collectives of industrial, transportation and trade enterprises must make their contribution.

Economics is an area of mass action. Its progress demands of all detachments of working people, above all those who are directly employed in material production, to energize their labor efforts. So far we have not reached the point at which everyone does conscientious work, systematically fulfills planned assignments and thus makes his contribution to ensuring the continuity and rhythm of the production process.

All labor collectives have frontrankers, laggards and workers of "average quality," who are in the majority. We highly value the labor of the frontrankers who set the example of the heights in labor productivity which could be achieved under current technological conditions. They are surrounded by attention and honor. Work is being done with laggards as well, to help them to fulfill their labor obligations better. However, the success of a project is nevertheless determined by the bulk of the workers. Therefore, without weakening our support of the frontrankers, we must increase our attention to the majority within the collective and organize the efforts to enhance their skills and to arm them with progressive experience. The successes achieved by the collective as a whole will become more significant after the labor activeness of the bulk of the workers has been enhanced. This will also accelerate the increased number of frontrankers and production innovators.

The advancement of socialist production and other social relations depends on each individual Soviet citizen. Production planning and organization themselves should be such as to provide optimal conditions for comradely cooperation and mutual aid, as they are the essence of socialist production relations. Ensuring the implementation of the shift assignment by the individual workers and, thus, the harmonious work of all shifts, shops, links and enterprises as a whole would mean the actual implementation of such cooperation. This would be helped also by the implementation of planned assignments by each labor collective in terms of variety, quantity and quality and contractual deliveries of goods among related enterprises.

The value of the brigade form of labor organization and wages and work based on a single order lies precisely in the fact that the entire collective and its individual members work better, make fuller use of equipment and materials and achieve more substantial qualitative and quantitative results. The consistent observance of the Law on Labor Collectives, which was adopted at

the Eighth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ninth Convocation, which was held after the plenum, should contribute to improving the interaction among people in the course of the labor process and the collective's fulfillment of its organizational, constructive and educational role.

The main purpose of ideological-educational work is to ensure the observance of the principles of socialism, which govern the development of our society, in all realms of life and by all members of society. It is a question of principles such as collectivism, the universal obligation to work, expressed in the formula "he who does not work does not eat," distribution according to labor, conscious discipline and organization, legality, and ensuring public order and the safety of the individual.

Soviet society reached great heights in this development largely thanks to the fact that the absolute majority of the citizens observe the principles of socialism. However, people who violate them still exist. There even exist elements who grossly violate laws and encroach on socialist property, human safety and even life. The most important prerequisite for the progress of our society is to help every citizen to realize the need for strictly observing the sacred principles of socialism, for they also affect his private interests.

"... The party," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at the plenum, "urges that a person in our country be raised not simply as the bearer of a certain amount of knowledge but, above all, a citizen of the socialist society, an active builder of communism, with its inherent ideological stipulations, morality, interests and high labor and behavioral standards."

The material and moral incentive system and social recognition must be totally oriented toward developing in the people the need to work for the common good.

At the present stage, with the further development of socialist democracy, we must also help the citizens to realize the profound ties between it and discipline. Naturally, the development and intensification of democracy has a positive influence on the education of the people and contributes to the molding of the personality. We must bear in mind, however, that discipline and order are inseparable aspects of socialist democracy. Without discipline and a proper feeling of responsibility on the part of each and everyone, even the most democratically made decision will remain unfulfilled and useless, and democracy will become formal.

The party committees must find means to develop the initiative of the working people, enhance their role in production management and promote in them the feeling of full ownership of the country. In the course of the revolutionary struggle and the building of socialism, the Soviet people matured, tempered and grew as zealous patriots and internationalists, convinced of the justice of the communist ideals. They are distinguished by their active civic stance, and deep interest in public affairs and in the well-being of the homeland.

However, the process of shaping the new man and turning the citizen into a conscious and active builder of communism must be a continuing one. It is a

problem not only of ideological work but of our entire life. In this case lectures, reports, courses and seminars, their obvious importance notwithstanding, are insufficient in themselves.

Communist upbringing also means improving population supplies and the work of trade and public catering enterprises, real concern for meeting the needs and requirements of the people, attentive attitude toward them, and uprooting manifestations of bureaucratism, formalism and red tape. The method of persuasion for educational purposes must be accompanied by measures of economic, organizational and legal nature.

The CPSU Central Committee Plenum formulated the shaping of a scientific, a Marxist-Leninist outlook in the Soviet people as a key task. Its implementation is consistent with the private interests of each one of us, and the interests of the labor collective and society at large. A person within whom a Marxist-Leninist outlook has taken a firm hold can participate in the administration of the state, society and the production process more knowledgeably; he can independently assess events of domestic and international life and provide a reasoned rebuff to ideological opponents.

A vast number of publications are produced, a wide network for political and economic education, Marxism-Leninism universities, lecture offices, and political education clubs operate in helping the masses to study Marxism-Leninism. A great deal is being accomplished to this effect by the press, the television and the radio. However, in the example of the revolutionary workers of Lenin's guard, those who can should undertake the independent study of the works of the founders of scientific communism. It is futile for people to try to find ever "new" prescriptions for mastering knowledge in the hope of mastering revolutionary theory without effort, like swallowing a pill and becoming a "mature" Marxist.

The tried and reliable method is that of independent and systematic work with books, prime sources in particular. Seminars, theoretical conferences, lectures and other forms of collective study should be considered as props in this work. This is particularly important in the case of leading workers, who must steadily enhance the level of their theoretical training. Guided by the party line, they must think through the problems raised by life. They must make decisions on the basis of complete and comprehensive information on the state of affairs in the collective, rayon, city or oblast by studying and summing up facts and practical data.

By summing up processes in global developments, the Central Committee plenum enriched and concretized CPSU assessments and positions on a number of topical international problems. The ratio of forces in the world arena has substantially changed since the adoption of the party program; the struggle between the two global social systems has **become acute. The plans formulated** by the most reactionary imperialist circles for resolving the historical dispute between the conflicting social systems through military confrontations would be fatal to mankind, should they be implemented. The nature of the further development of relations between them is essentially a problem of preserving peace on earth. Both now and in the foreseeable future, this is the pivotal problem of CPSU foreign policy.

The threat of nuclear war calls for a reassessment of the basic meaning of activities of the entire communist movement. "The communists," states Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "have always fought oppression and the exploitation of man by man. Today they are also struggling for the preservation of human civilization and the right of man to life."

Today the socialist countries are a factor of tremendous importance in securing lasting peace. Strengthening their cooperation and unity is the main direction followed by the CPSU and the Soviet state in their international activities. The past 20 years enriched our concepts of the socialist world, proving its variety and complexity. Major economic and cultural differences and differences in the ways and means for resolving the problems of building socialism exist among its individual components.

An accurate political line must be followed and the leading role of the communist party strengthened in order to realize the opportunities inherent in the socialist system for the confident progress of society and the development of harmonious relations among countries.

The plenum confirmed the CPSU position on the fact that differences among socialist countries should not hinder the development of reciprocal cooperation. Ensuring cooperation despite differences is a sacred obligation of the ruling communist parties, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized.

The Soviet Union and its closest friends and allies--the members of the socialist commonwealth--share the opinion that life demands not merely expanded cooperation but the enhancement of its quality and efficiency. This means, first of all, further improvements in the field of political interaction, the most important instrument of which is the Warsaw Pact. Secondly, the CPSU and the Soviet Union try to raise economic integration to a qualitatively new level. This integration will become even deeper, all-embracing and efficient in the future, reliably securing the strengthening of the national economies of member countries. Thirdly, in the area of spiritual life, the CPSU sees a further ideological rapprochement among fraternal nations and the strengthening of their feeling of unity and common historical fate. The higher and closer the levels of social development of the socialist countries become, the greater their reciprocal understanding and the closer, richer and deeper their cooperation will become.

"The objective scientific analysis of the essence of differences which may arise on one problem or another between individual socialist countries or among several fraternal parties in the world communist movement and the search for means to eliminate them on a Marxist-Leninist basis, by strengthening communist cohesion," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said, "are unquestionably among the important tasks facing the party on the international level."

The policy of the Soviet Union toward Asian, African and Latin American countries, which have become free from colonial and semicolonial dependence, is imbued with support for the just expectations and struggles of their nations. We can clearly see that the objective interests of even young countries in which the capitalist system has taken hold conflict with the aggressive policy of rule and diktat pursued by the imperialist countries.

We feel closest to countries of the former colonial world, which selected a socialist orientation. The socialist states support them and help them in the political and cultural areas and help to strengthen their defense. To the extent of our possibilities we are assisting them in their economic development as well. "Basically, however, as is the case with the full social progress of these countries, this development can only be the result of the efforts of their peoples and the proper policy of their leadership," the CPSU Central Committee general secretary said.

Important ideas were formulated at the plenum on the policy to be pursued toward the capitalist countries. The general crisis in the capitalist system is continuing to intensify. Imperialism has become entangled in internal and international antagonisms, upheavals and conflicts. This affects the policy of the capitalist countries in different ways. The aggressiveness of reactionary forces, headed by U.S. imperialism, has increased sharply. They are trying to turn back historical development at all cost. This adventurism makes such a policy extremely dangerous to mankind and is encountering the powerful opposition of the nations: the antiwar movement is growing in the Western countries, including the United States. At the same time, other trends now exist in the capitalist countries, other policies which take a more realistic view of the international situation, realizing the need and reciprocal advantage of a lengthy peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems.

As to the Soviet Union, it has invariably favored strengthening the peace, reciprocal understanding and cooperation among nations. Many major problems exist in the solution of which all countries are interested, regardless of social system, such as preserving nature, developing new sources of energy and mastering space and the resources of the world's oceans.

The communists are convinced that the future belongs to socialism. However, as our party has frequently stated, such conviction does not mean that we intend to undertake to "export revolution," or interfere in the affairs of other countries. We firmly believe, in the final account, that socialism will prove its advantages precisely in the course of its peaceful competition with capitalism.

Peaceful coexistence objectively helps maintain the military-strategic balance between socialism and imperialism and, as was confirmed at the plenum, we shall not allow this balance to be disturbed. We shall continue to do everything necessary to ensure the safety of our country and that of our friends and allies. We shall increase the combat power of the Soviet armed forces--a powerful factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialist reaction. However, reducing the level of armaments and military expenditures on both sides and disarmament would represent a great benefit to all people on earth.

The objective of the USSR is not simply to prevent war. In favoring a radical improvement in international relations, it will continue to support respect for the sovereign rights of countries and peoples and the strict observance of the principles of international law, which imperialism is

trying to reject and crush. In our age it is precisely socialism which is the systematic defender of the healthy principles in international relations and the interests of all nations.

This was reasserted in the joint declaration adopted at the 28 June 1983 meeting of party and state leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. They urgently called upon all countries, the NATO members above all, to weigh soberly and objectively the threatening trends in the current development of international relations and, while there is still time, to draw sensible conclusions consistent with the interests and expectations of mankind and the safeguard and strengthening of peace.

The solution of the set of new tasks facing the country requires the further enhancement of the leading role of the CPSU. Under developed socialist conditions the significance of the conscious principle and its guiding influence on the processes occurring in reality increases, and the party is trying to improve all aspects of its work, ideological work in particular.

Party committees and primary party organizations are now concentrating on implementing the decisions and stipulations of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum, earmarking specific measures to this effect. It is entirely clear that enhancing the efficiency of party work calls for improving its means and methods and developing intraparty democracy and communist activity.

The plenum reasserted the importance of the proper division of functions between party and state organs, which is not always practiced. Party committees frequently assume the implementation of extraneous executive functions and duplicate the work of state organs. The negative consequences of this are quite serious: the responsibility of state managers is lowered and they develop the tendency to shift it to the party committees. In turn, elements of departmentalism develop in the party organs, although they should approach any matter from the viewpoint of national, state positions. The work of the party committees is weakened in areas for which they alone are responsible, and they pay less attention to problems of intraparty life and the upbringing of party members and cadres.

The Central Committee plenum emphasized that ideological work is a matter for the entire party and that is the way it should be organized. It must be the daily concern not only of the respective party committee departments but their bureaus and first secretaries as well. At the same time, the party committees in republics, krajs, oblasts, cities and rayons must have specially trained cadres able skillfully to organize ideological work with the various population groups and be responsible for it.

The party ascribes great importance to the direct participation in such work of party members who are heads of soviets of people's deputies, economic organizations, enterprises and cultural establishments. Experience has proved the value of talks, including addresses on television, by managers to labor collectives and the population. Who if not they should inform the

working people or answer the people's questions? Meetings with the working people enable the managers to determine the moods of the masses, their requests and needs better and efficiently to take measures to improve the work of all organs and organizations.

The party committees must make full use of the rich arsenal of means for education and upbringing the country has at its disposal. Such means must be used more actively and creatively, taking into consideration, among others, the considerably increased level of education and ideological demands of the Soviet people. A great deal remains to be learned in this area. Formalism, routine, timidity and, sometimes, even sluggishness of thought must be surmounted.

The party organizations and committees in the sociological scientific research institutes, VUZs, university departments and chairs must develop in their collectives a creative atmosphere free from group or "dissertational" interests, an atmosphere of principle-minded and exigent attitude toward the quality of research.

The plenum indicated the major tasks facing the editorial collectives of newspapers, journals, publishing houses, television, radio and news agencies. We know how important it is not to lag in covering domestic and international events and giving them a prompt party evaluation.

The plenum noted the major contribution to the enrichment of the spiritual culture of the working people and their upbringing in the spirit of the communist ideals of the literature and art of socialist realism. The workers in culture must enhance even higher the responsibility for the ideological content and artistic level of publications and repertoires. They must more actively shape and enhance the needs of the individual and influence his ideological-political and moral aspect more efficiently.

The Central Committee plenum called for improving the education and upbringing of children and adolescents and enhancing the quality of school work. The party considers the combination of education with productive toil and developing in school students habits and love for socially useful labor an irreplaceable means for molding individuals. The thought was expressed of the need for reform in our school, which would include the system of vocational-technical training. On 23 June the Central Committee Politburo set up a commission to deal with this matter.

The interests of our society and its systematic development as a socialist society advancing toward communist demand that the new generations profoundly adopt Marxist-Leninist convictions and the principles and norms of communist morality and be zealous Soviet patriots and internationalists. Negative phenomena in youth circles such as delayed civic maturity, political naivete, parasitism and the unwillingness of some young people to work wherever demanded by society must be surmounted.

We have everything necessary to mold the young citizens in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist outlook and communist morality. The most literate generation in

the country's entire history is entering independent life today. This generation grew up under socialist conditions. These are the children of the people who made the greatest accomplishments and gave the world unfading examples of mass heroism and dedicated service to the homeland, progress and peace. They must take up the traditions and experience of their people.

A variety of tasks were set by the June Central Committee Plenum. They are so important that their solution will require the dedication of maximal creative efforts, knowledge and acquired experience. Persistent and active work must be done, intelligently and tactfully. All of us, members of the Leninist party, must get in the mood for new major accomplishments.

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TO PRESERVE AND MULTIPLY DETENTE ACHIEVEMENTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 83 (signed to press 5 Jul 83) pp 15-16

[Yu. V. Andropov's address to the readers in the FRG on the occasion of the publication of his collected works by the Pal-Rugenstein Publishing House in Koln]

[Text] I willingly accede to the request of the Pal-Rugenstein Publishing House to present to you speeches and articles collected in this volume on USSR domestic and foreign policy. Naturally, we must know more about each other for the sake of better reciprocal understanding. This applies to both individuals and nations. This book precisely provides the opportunity to present once again to your public some central aspects of our policy.

I hope that this book will help the readers to acquire a clearer idea of the Soviet Union, the affairs and problems which preoccupy the people in our country, their concerns and their aspirations. Naturally, it is up to you to judge its contents. I would like, however, for you to understand the main thing: all the thoughts of the Soviet people and their leadership may be reduced to the simple and natural desire to engage in peaceful toil, to live in harmony with other nations and to find a common language with them, above all in matters such as restraining the arms race, preventing a new war and strengthening universal peace and international security.

Allow me to say that the Soviet Union has always ascribed very great importance to relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. The roots of this approach lie both in history and in the present. In aspiring toward durable peace we have no right to forget the lessons of two world wars. Today the strength of European and universal peace largely depends on the state of relations between our countries. However, after World War II years had to pass before even diplomatic relations with the FRG could be established. A real change occurred only at the beginning of the 1970s. The decade which followed the Moscow treaty proved that we can cooperate quite well. We can cooperate in all realms of life. It is our belief that it is important to preserve and develop such cooperation.

Currently, in 1983, an exceptionally important feature has entered our relations. The concern for peace, which both you and we cherish, does not allow me to remain silent on the planned deployment of American nuclear missiles targeted at the Soviet Union on your soil.

It is claimed that the new batch of missiles will improve FRG security. Let me answer this with the greatest conviction, that the deployment of new missiles will improve neither your nor our security. Furthermore, it will undermine the security which now exists.

We do not believe that the people of the FRG want a nuclear catastrophe. However, the new missiles, once launched, be it as a result of someone's ill will or a stupid accident, could play a fatal role with unpredictable consequences.

We know that many people in the FRG are worried about their security. The threat, however, does not originate from the Soviet Union. Our country has no ill intentions concerning either the FRG or any other NATO country. As in the past, we would be ready today to reach an agreement on the total abandonment on the part of both East and West of nuclear weapons, whether medium range or tactical, aimed at European targets. This would be a real "zero option," and would mark the liberation of the peoples of Europe from the nuclear threat. Our objective--on which our entire policy is based--is to eliminate the use of force in resolving any disputes and ensuring a reliable peace and the development of cooperation among nations.

We do not demand the unilateral disarmament of the West. However, the same should not be asked of us, either. When we speak of disarmament, we always think in terms of a reduction of armaments, a disarmament in both East and West. Further rearming is senseless, ruinous and dangerous.

Reciprocal respect and the strengthening of reciprocal security would enable our countries, and not only they, to preserve and multiply what was achieved in the period of detente. I emphasize precisely to multiply, to enhance for the sake of our mutual interests the level of relations between our countries in the economic, scientific and technical and cultural areas.

I wish the readers of this book all the best and, above all, well-being under the conditions of peace.

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CONTROL AND VERIFICATION--THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS OF PARTY GUIDANCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 83 (signed to press 5 Jul 83) pp 17-30

[Article by V. Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee]

[Text] The steady economic and spiritual progress of Soviet society is ensured through the constructive efforts of all our people under the tried leadership of Lenin's party. The communist party is tirelessly concerned with enhancing the efficiency of its leadership. It makes active use of the rich arsenal of means for organizational and political influence aimed at achieving programmatic objectives. It systematically applies in practice the scientific foundations of managing social processes. This was convincingly confirmed at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which defined the scientifically substantiated immediate and long-term communist construction tasks.

"The CPSU ascribes great importance to the comprehensive assertion of the Leninist workstyle, which is creative and ensures a scientific approach to all social processes, steady reliance on the masses, high efficiency, concreteness and exigency and intolerance of any manifestations of formalism, bureaucratism and ostentation," stresses the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress." "The party emphasizes that what we need today is action rather than loud words."

Control and verification of execution are powerful levers through which the party influences the course of social development. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the successful solution of problems requires more "verified facts which indicate in which areas and under what circumstances are we progressing or stagnating..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 325).

The significance of permanent and strict control, the political essence of which, as we know, is to ensure the implementation of the party's general line, policy and decisions would be indeed difficult to overestimate. It is a mandatory prerequisite for achieving planned objectives. One may say that it crowns the style of party work.

Discipline in all production management units strengthens, the responsibility of the working people for the implementation of their assignments is enhanced and progressive work methods, the experience of innovators and the achievements of scientific and technical progress are applied more efficiently under

the direct influence of party control. The efficient and extensive verification of execution helps to eliminate bureaucratism, callousness, complacency and arrogance--all such things which conflict with the Leninist workstyle and the laws and norms governing the lives of Soviet people. It was no accident that the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which called for enhancing the discipline, level of organization and order on all levels and in all economic management and administrative units as the most important and urgent task, inseparably linked its solution to increased control and verification of execution and to strengthening key management sectors with politically mature, competent, energetic and initiative-minded workers. The importance of this aspect in the activities of the party and all of its organizations was emphasized in the report by Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, "Sixty Years of USSR," and his speech at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Practical experience convincingly proves that once a political line has been formulated and decisions made, control actively influences the organization of execution and the execution itself, provides the most reliable assessment of results and work by the cadres and ensures reliable information for further activities. If control is weakened the entire chain of efforts breaks and a situation we are familiar with from practical experience develops: good decisions are made but no improvements result. Briefly, control of execution combines everything related to the implementation of Lenin's basic stipulation of ensuring unity of words and actions.

The strict observance of basic Leninist instructions on the role and significance of control and forms and methods of its application and constant concern for upgrading efficiency are inseparable and most important features of the activities of the CPSU and all its organizations.

The activities of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo and secretariat, which systematically analyze the course of execution of decisions and five-year-plan assignments, control the activities of all party units and state and public organizations and are always concerned with helping our cadres to master the Leninist workstyle and be able to complete assignments, are models of true Leninist approach to control and verification of execution.

As we know, the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improving Control and Verification of Execution in the Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress" formulates specific assignments and contains a program for comprehensive improvements in this area. The practical implementation of this project is a most important prerequisite for enhancing the level of party leadership and achieving new successes in the comprehensive advancement of developed socialism.

The party committees in the Ukraine pay continuing and ever-increasing attention to further improvements in the field of control and verification of execution as the most important functions of the party's leadership.

Integral Function of Party Leadership

In its Leninist interpretation, control of the implementation of decisions and directives is the specific embodiment of a realistic, practical and scientific approach in the activities of party organs and organizations. The function of control, which is political in nature, enables us comprehensively to resolve important interrelated economic, social and educational problems. Verification, as Lenin pointed out, is necessary above all "in order to see in fact, on the basis of experience, whether or not decisions which were made were accurate and to what extent, and the amendments to which they must be subjected after they were made as a result of political events..." (op. cit., vol 11, p 133).

Our party has mastered scientific management methods. It has political perspicaciousness and experience in charting an accurate course, making proper decisions and, if necessary, amending previous plans.

Strict, systematic, practical and efficient control enables us promptly to determine the way performers understand the objective and the specific tasks and means for their implementation, the "spirit" and "letter" of a party decision, so to say. It enables us to take steps to prevent possible errors. It is precisely control which enables us not only to notice on time unfinished projects and omissions but efficiently to eliminate them and to mobilize the people in surmounting arising difficulties, thus ensuring the reaching of set objectives.

The main purpose and meaning of control consist precisely in achieving unity between a decision and its execution. Lenin persistently asked for the type of control which "would prove and actually give aid in all possible ways, although small but real. It is only by relying on it that further progress is possible" (op. cit., vol 53, p 68).

As the function of management, it is important for control to provide efficiently an objective assessment of results obtained in the course of the implementation of a party decision, from the viewpoint of the consistency between them and planned deadlines, targets and assignments, and identify **existing resources** and reserves more fully. Naturally, by reflecting the state of affairs, control helps to identify future trends and to formulate additional measures for the successful overall solution of problems.

While encouraging the development of high responsibility for assignments and the strengthening of party and state discipline in cadres, control is a reliable instrument in the exercise of cadre policy.

Lenin emphasized that literally comprehensive control applied under conditions of full publicity "guarantees that every leader finds himself in the final account in his proper place and undertakes projects most consistent with his forces and capabilities..." (op. cit., vol 6, p 139). The proper and skillfully organized verification of execution reflects as in a mirror the qualities of the individual worker--his political maturity, competence, efficiency and organizational capabilities.

Therefore, control and verification of execution come very close to and organically intertwine with other functions in the exercise of party leadership.

It follows from this that systematic control is an important, a mandatory prerequisite for the further enhancement of the leading and guiding role of the party in the life of Soviet society. Control is not a self-seeking aim but a means, a reliable level for the implementation of a collectively formulated political line and for the advancement of social and intraparty relations. Aimed at the creative application of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and ensuring unity between words and actions, control contributes to enhancing the militancy of the party organizations and the more accurate demarcation among the activities of public organizations.

Party control is important also as a factor in the further development of the Soviet political system, the nucleus of which is the CPSU. The party uses it as an efficient means of involving the broad toiling masses in political life, in giving them access to direct participation in the administration of governmental and social affairs and as one of the powerful organizational means for ensuring close and unbreakable ties with the people.

Reality raises increasing demands concerning the very organization and execution of control and the qualifications of those assigned to perform this function, as well as the overall workstyle and methods. The need for steady creative search for more efficient ways and means of control is based on the tremendous scale, novelty and complexity of the socioeconomic, political and ideological tasks at the present stage in building communism and, in the final account, the increased role which the CPSU plays in the life of our society.

Improving Control of Execution Is the Most Important Component of Improvements in the Workstyle

The period after the 26th CPSU Congress is characterized by the active efforts of all party committees in the republic to improve control practices and ensure the further enhancement of its role in the practical implementation of party policy. These problems hold a central position in the organizational-political and engineering-economic steps taken to implement the congress's decisions, formulated by the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee, the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, the primary party organizations and all soviet and economic organs.

The systematic consideration at party committee plenums of information on the implementation of such measures and previous decisions has become the rule. Such problems are systematically discussed at primary party organization meetings.

In improving its work on control and verification of execution, the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee tries to organize matters in such a way that party committee secretaries and department heads exercise daily control over the most important decisions, review them periodically, verify

the situation on the spot and take prompt steps to ensure the implementation of assignments. All managers, party organs and primary organizations are directed not merely to record negative facts but to prevent them and to concentrate all efforts on the prompt implementation of decisions and the completion of projects. Whatever problems may be discussed by the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee, specific actions on the spot in the course of the verification and the type of practical assistance given are mandatorily determined.

The party organizations have a number of tried and efficient control means and methods. They include the profound and comprehensive study of the situation on sight, regular discussions of reports submitted by party organizations and party committees and heads of soviet and economic organs on their work and the implementation of specific resolutions, work done on critical remarks and suggestions formulated at plenums, bureau and party committee sessions and party meetings, and thorough study of statistical data, information and working people's letters and petitions. We see to it that various control means and methods are used in accordance with the specific circumstances and in close interaction with each other.

Regardless of the type of control method used, we must always remember that neither verifications nor discussions are final aims. The main thing is to improve the work. This means that a serious study of the circumstances in one sector or another must be combined, as demanded by the CPSU Central Committee, with live organizational and educational work and that reaching of specific results must be secured.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee encourages all party committees and primary party organizations to establish an efficient control system which allows them to obtain accurate information and effectively to influence the state of affairs with the lowest possible outlays of forces and time. Valuable experience has been acquired in this area by the party committees of Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkov and many other oblasts. Here great attention is being paid to the profound and comprehensive study of problems before submitting them for discussion and, on this basis, adopting specific resolutions which are promptly brought to the knowledge of the performers, and the elaboration of measures on the implementation of resolutions, stipulating what, when and by whom should assignments be carried out and informing the party members on the implementation of decrees.

The so-called "technology" of verification of execution itself is of major importance, for its success depends not only on the competence of the verifiers but also their preparations for such important projects. To this purpose, the republic party committee and the local party committees define as a rule in their long-term and current work plans the range of decrees the implementation of which will be verified on site. Before going to the local areas thorough preliminary work is done. The main problems and the ways and means of verification are defined and minutes, statistical data, letters of the working people and other documents are studied.

The practice of drafting coordinated verification plans on the scale of republics, oblasts, cities and rayons is being increasingly applied. This enables us to eliminate duplication and parallelism in the work of party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol and economic organs.

Why conceal it, it happens that sometimes the same organization will be checked by dozens of commissions. For example, 188 different departmental commissions, involving 422 members, operated at the Belotserkovskiy Production Association for Tires and Rubber-Asbestos Goods imeni XXV S"yezda KPSS over a 2-year period. Furthermore, at different times 760 association workers were taken away from their jobs. Such investigations disturb the normal labor rhythm, unnerve the collective, force the party and economic workers to lose a great deal of time in drafting various references, explanatory notes, and so on. Unfortunately, sometimes this is not followed by drawing conclusions or taking practical steps. Understandably, such verifications do nothing but harm.

Great significance is ascribed to the comprehensive study and discussion of the most important long-term problems at plenums and meetings of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat and the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms. The practice of setting up comprehensive groups headed, as a rule, by secretaries or department heads of the Central Committee or the party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, consisting of party and candidate party members of party committees, senior party, soviet and economic personnel, leading production specialists and scientific institutions has proved its usefulness. They study the situation and progressive work methods, establish reasons for shortcomings and, together with the local organs, earmark and take steps for their elimination.

Here is an example. By virtue of a number of reasons, at one point a stressed situation developed in the republic's coal-mining industry. The sector was lagging. The Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee and the UkSSR Council of Ministers drafted a specific program to assist the lagging enterprises. In accordance with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree on the development and technical retooling of the coal industry, extensive measures were drafted to supply the mines with new equipment, improve the organization of the miners' work and resolve a number of social problems.

Strict control was organized over the implementation of these measures. Secretaries, department heads and other senior workers of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers and experienced specialists repeatedly visited the lagging mines and production associations. They studied extensively the situation in the sectors and brigades and helped to formulate specific suggestions for the elimination of shortcomings. The work regimen of mines and sectors and the structure of several production associations were reviewed in accordance with the condition of the mines and cadre availability. Active control over the implementation of assignments on the manufacturing and delivery to the mines of mine power-driven locomotives and cars and cutting and tunneling machines, mechanized supports and spare parts for coal-mining equipment by enterprises in other sectors was organized. Extensive work was done to ensure the comfort of mining towns and

settlements and to improve the working and living conditions of the miners. Particular attention was paid to the organizational-political strengthening of the party organizations and to enhancing the level of the organizational and ideological-educational work.

These measures yielded results: in 1982 the coal industry fulfilled its coal extraction plan and its overall output increased by 3 million tons.

Here is another example. By the end of 1979 the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee passed a decree on increasing the construction of housing for small families, young families above all. Permanent party control was organized over the solution of this important social problem. Needs were defined and deadlines were earmarked for the creation of a flexible fund for such housing. Steps were taken for the formulation of new plans and increasing the production of housing by house-building combines. Deadlines and construction quality were strictly supervised. Although we cannot claim that the problem of ensuring small and young families with housing has been fully resolved, a great deal has already been accomplished. In recent years, the share of homes for small families has nearly doubled within the overall volume of housing construction. Young families are being provided with housing far more quickly. This positively affects their settling down and the keeping of cadres.

The most fruitful method for improving the workstyle is to combine control over the implementation of decisions with specific aid on site, the elimination of shortcomings and the solution of pressing problems.

Of late the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee personnel have given on-site practical help to party organizations and soviet, economic, trade union and Komsomol organs in the Transcarpathian, Kirovograd, Nikolayev, Ternopol and Odessa oblasts. Such work is being done under the direct guidance of Central Committee secretaries.

We have developed the practice of profoundly analyzing the implementation of party and government directives and five-year-plan assignments based on annual results. For example, a comprehensive study was made of the work of all oblast and the Kiev city party organizations on the implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the plans for economic and social development, based on 1981 and 1982 results. The party obkoms did similar work in each city and rayon, while the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers covered the national economic sectors. In the course of the study attention was focused on unresolved problems and means of strengthening organizational and political work.

We would be fully justified in claiming that control and verification of execution are today considered with great attention on all levels and by all management units. Nevertheless, we still come across cases of underestimating the importance of this work. The discussion of the reports submitted by the Kiev, Chernovitsy, Vinnitsa and Kherson oblasts by the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee proved that in some areas little organizational work is being done and the necessary exigency concerning the strict implementation of decisions is not applied at all times. Some decisions are even

passed on to the performers with delays. Control over some decrees is sometimes withdrawn without a profound verification of their actual implementation, although the assignments remain unfulfilled and the situation does not improve. Occasionally, verification of execution is reduced to the gathering of very superficial data. The attention is focused not on what has changed and how, what has remained unfulfilled and what measures are being taken to eliminate shortcomings but on whether a given item was discussed or not, whether a resolution was passed and what type of conferences were held. To say the least, this could hardly be considered useful.

We try firmly to uproot such shortcomings by persistently improving the organization of control.

Strengthening Cadre-Performing Discipline

The quality of the decisions made is a major condition or, more accurately, a prerequisite for the efficacy of control. A planned decree, based on the profound knowledge of reality and comprehensively substantiated, containing clear stipulations, is by itself a major organizing force. It is precisely this type of approach to decision-making that characterizes most republic party committees.

There are still cases, however, where documents are drafted hastily and suffer from vagueness and pretentiousness. They do not clearly define problems or means for resolving them. The impression is occasionally created that some decrees are passed merely for the sake of saying that "we reacted and passed a resolution," which means concealing one's inactivity behind a document. This approach can only be described as bureaucratic.

In some cases the party committee would waste a great deal of effort and time in working on one problem or another and would pass a good resolution which, however, is soon forgotten. However, such a resolution, regardless of its quality, has no magic powers. It remains on paper only unless it is followed by the necessary organizational work and efficient control. It is precisely this which frequently leads to the fact that another and even several decrees are issued on a single matter. Such practices were condemned by the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized, "the rule must be that any new resolution on the same subject be passed only when previous decisions have been implemented or some new circumstances have developed."

The city and rayon party committees play an important role in the implementation of party resolutions and in mobilizing the working people for fulfilling the party's assignments. It is precisely the rayon level, as the party documents stipulate, which is the focal point where the fate of our plans is decided. Proper attention is continually paid in the republic to enhancing the level of organizational and political work of party gorkoms and raykoms. A great many new and interesting features have appeared in their management style. Efficacy, specificity and persistence in attaining set objectives have increased. The ability to single out the core of the work with the help of the primary party organizations and to harness the labor collectives in

the use of existing reserves, implementing economic plans and fulfilling socialist pledges is what characterizes, for example, the work of the Donetsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk and Zaporozhe gorkoms, Bershadskiy Raykom in Vinnitsa Oblast, Nikopolskiy in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Simferopolskiy in the Crimean Oblast, Stryyskiy in Lvov Oblast, Chernobayevskiy in Cherkassy Oblast and other party committees. They show particular concern for the assertion of a thoughtful and purposeful approach to the implementation of party resolutions and for making every official fully responsible for this in each party organization.

However, this is not the case everywhere. Some party gorkoms and raykoms are still conducting poor organizational work. They do not properly study the situation in the economic sectors and sometimes do not assess results self-critically. They undertake to deal with the situation of one labor collective or another only when poor reports or information on difficulties are received. Looking at the practice of such party committees more closely, we invariably see that their efforts are focused not on live organizational work among labor collectives and primary party organizations but on drafting all kinds of notes, data and references, and preparing and holding various meetings. Naturally, this has nothing in common with the party style, which is efficient and creative.

Obviously it would be no exaggeration to say that control as a function of management must be focused on problems related to cadre-performing discipline, for the fate of the plans and implementation of decisions are in cadre hands.

Like the other fraternal republics in the country, our republic today has a large detachment of experienced and politically mature managers and specialists, loyal to the party cause and able to ensure the implementation of even most complex assignments. They are distinguished by their profound party-mindedness, knowledge of their work, discipline, ability to work with people and a sharpened feeling for the new.

Let us name among them S. V. Gusovskiy, director general of the production association of the Arsenal plant (Kiev); A. M. Makarov, director general of the Yuzhnyy Mashinostroitel'nyy Zavod imeni L. I. Brezhnev Production Association; V. V. Biblik, director general of the Kharkovskiy Traktornyy Zavod imeni S. Ordzhonikidze Production Association; Ye. A. Matsegor, director general of the Novokramatorskiy Mashinostroitel'nyy Zavod Production Association; P. N. Galkin, director of the Titanium-Magnesium Combine imeni 60-Letiya Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy Sotsialisticheskoy Revolyutsii Combine in Zaporozhe; A. I. Goryainov, director general of the AvtoKraz Large Trucks Production Association in Kremenchug; V. A. Plyutinskiy, chairman of the Zarya Kommunizma Kolkhoz, Rovno Oblast; D. K. Motornyy, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov, Kherson Oblast, and many, many others.

Unfortunately, we still come across managers who do not burden themselves, as the saying goes, with daily, common and painstaking work in organizing the implementation of specific resolutions. For example, every year a number of resolutions are passed by the UkSSR Ministry of Local Industry on increasing the production of consumer and durable goods, upgrading their quality, ensuring the protection of socialist property and **eradicating eye-washing and**

padding. More and more new orders and decrees were issued, and control over their implementation was lifted at the proper time. But commodity output by no means improved as it should have. The ministry's party committee as well failed to display persistence and initiative in developing within the apparatus an efficient and exigent atmosphere and promoting a high degree of executive discipline. The commissions in charge of supervising the apparatus' work were inefficient. This fact attracted the attention of the ministry collegium, Minister Yu. F. Gayevskiy personally, and party committee secretary V. A. Galushko. These shortcomings are currently being eliminated.

The party organizations are paying increasing attention to criticism and self-criticism in developing high executive discipline among the cadres. Control over the implementation of decisions provides extensive data for critical analysis of the situation. It enables us to engage in the active and purposeful development in the cadres of qualities such as a healthy dissatisfaction with achievements, ability to surmount difficulties, ensure the implementation of assignments under all circumstances and achieve planned results with the lowest possible outlays. In turn, criticism and self-criticism substantially enhance control efficacy, contribute to the elimination of exposed shortcomings and block the appearance of other errors and omissions.

A practical and exigent approach in assessing the work of cadres has been firmly established in the republic party organization. Personnel who fail to cope with their assignments or behave incorrectly are criticized sharply. The attempts of individual workers to avoid just criticism and conceal their unconscientiousness behind a variety of fabricated reasons are blocked firmly. The party organizations are guided by the principled stipulations to the effect that cadres, particularly leading cadres, must be judged not by their words but their practical accomplishments and that a respectful attitude toward working people must be combined with strict exigency.

We aspire to subject the activities of every manager to systematic and skilled analysis leading to a prompt principle-minded and objective evaluation, so that if necessary the respective economic and cultural sectors be strengthened with energetic, creative and initiative-minded personnel who can work purposefully and intensively, who try to learn and adopt the good features supplied by daily practical experience. Of late the leadership of some ministries and departments in the republic, the oblast, city and rayon party organizations and soviet executive committees has been strengthened. More than 50 economic, party and soviet workers on the roster of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee have been relieved of their positions for failure to cope with their assignments over the past 2.5 years. Naturally, such dismissals occur when other measures have been unsuccessfully applied.

Reliance on the Masses Is a Prerequisite for Successful Control of Execution

The inseparable link between control of execution and the organization of the work and implementation of plans is manifested with particular clarity, as we know, in the activities of the primary party organizations. We could say

that it is precisely the ability to harness the working people in the implementation of party and government decisions that is the main criterion of their militancy and work efficiency.

Guided by the stipulations of the party congresses, the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee deemed it necessary to implement a set of specific measures to improve the work of the primary party organizations and to enhance their influence in the labor collectives. The approach is such that no essential problem, whether or not it applies to production, living conditions, cadre training and placement or education of the working people, would or should be resolved without the participation and consideration of the opinion of the primary party organizations--the political nuclei of labor collectives.

The instructions and recommendations included in the CPSU Central Committee decrees on the work of the party organizations of the Put' k Kommunizmu Kolkhoz, Kustanay Oblast, the Dneproshina Production Association in Dnepropetrovsk and the Belorussian State Academic Theater imeni Yanko Kupala and the materials of the All-Union Practical Science Conference, which was held in Tbilisi, contribute to the further strengthening of the party's influence on affairs in labor collectives.

The republic's primary party organizations are engaged in purposeful work aimed at upgrading production efficiency and work quality in each labor collective, shop, brigade and workplace. They use to this effect a variety of party control methods: consideration of specific problems related to the work of economic managers to upgrade production efficiency, hearing reports submitted by party members on the implementation of plans and socialist obligations, and individual talks with party members. A particular role is assigned to party meetings. Here the party members not only jointly earmark a program of action but strictly and exigently take to task those who deal poorly with their assignments, display slackness in the work and allow disciplinary violations.

The party meetings are an important method for exercising control "from below." For example, in the course of the reports and elections in the party organizations in 1982 many critical remarks and suggestions on problems of socioeconomic development and organizational and ideological-educational work were addressed to economic managers, republic ministries and departments and party and soviet organs. The existing system for their summation, implementation and control enables the party committees promptly to eliminate existing shortcomings and omissions and, if necessary, to submit suggestions to republic and union organs.

The greatest possible significance is ascribed to enhancing the activeness of the working people in the struggle for strengthening labor and production discipline in the spirit of the requirements of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums and the stipulations and tasks formulated by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov. These problems were considered comprehensively at open party and worker meetings and were reflected in the socialist pledges of labor collectives. Many frontrankers and production innovators came out with useful initiatives.

For example, the initiative of the Muscovites "Honor and Glory According to the Work!" was supported at worker meetings in all shops of the Preobrazovatel' Association in Zaporozhe. Measures were formulated and approved on strengthening labor discipline. The state of the discipline and cadre turnover, among others, are considered among the basic indicators under the new competition conditions. No single violation of discipline or poor implementation of official obligations remains unnoticed here. This has drastically reduced working time losses caused by absenteeism; the number of leaves by permission of the administration has declined by one-third and labor and production discipline has improved noticeably. Planned assignments and socialist obligations are being fulfilled and production quality has improved.

The primary party organization commissions for controlling administrative activities and the work of the apparatus are doing useful work in strengthening performing discipline. They number some 200,000 party members in the republic. This is a major force. The most important tasks supervised by the commissions include the quality of the work and the output, implementation of specific steps aimed at upgrading labor productivity and production efficiency, installation of new equipment, conservation of materials and energy, efficient use of fodder in animals husbandry, and so on.

The work of the commissions became substantially energized with the 1982 CPSU Central Committee decree on this matter and the formulation of the new Regulation on Commissions. For example, great economic results were obtained by the comprehensively created commissions for control over loading and unloading operations and use of the rolling stock. In the first 5 months of 1983 car idling at spurs of enterprises and organizations was reduced by nearly 15 minutes; more than 2 hours were gained in loading and unloading at railroad stations.

The party committees are steadily concerned with further improving the efficiency of the commissions. The systematic training of their chairmen and members, publicity, and summation and dissemination of the best experience are having a positive influence on their work.

Experience proves that the most important prerequisite for successful work by all party organizations, prompt implementation of decisions and ensuring effective control are the high political maturity and organizational capabilities of the party organization secretary. The most authoritative party members are made secretaries. Let us mention in the tremendous detachment of true leaders of party members in large labor collectives V. R. Zhukov, party committee secretary at the Metallurgical Plant imeni S. M. Kirov in Makeyevka; N. U. Kotlyuba, party committee secretary at the Zaporozhtransformator imeni V. I. Lenin Production Association; V. G. Udovichenko, party committee secretary at the Turbines Plant imeni S. M. Kirov in Kharkov; D. A. Chernenko, party committee secretary at the Plant imeni 61 Kommunar, in Nikolayev; V. I. Aprintsev, party committee secretary at the Kineskop imeni XXVI S"yezda KPSS Production Association in Lvov; V. T. Faustov, party committee secretary and the Krivbassshakhtoprokhodka Combine; T. P. Savchuk, party committee secretary at the Kommunist Kolkhoz, Volyn Oblast; M. K. Rodionov, party committee secretary at the Kiev Polytechnical Institute, and many

others. Reliance on a broad aktiv, ability to create an efficient and creative atmosphere and to rally and lead the people, and principle-mindedness and persistence in the work are the features which help the party organization secretary to ensure efficient and effective control of execution and ensure the completion of initiated projects.

The active involvement of the working people in production management and control over the implementation of plans and adopted resolutions helps to strengthen the ties between the party and the masses. Only the broadest possible control from below, to cite Lenin, can be truly profound, constant and comprehensive, enabling us to penetrate in all the pores of economic and social life without exception. This is confirmed by numerous examples. In particular, last year, with the participation and under the control of the trade union organizations, labor conditions were improved in shops and sectors employing a total of 635,000 people.

Along with the party organizations, the trade union committees act on the remarks and suggestions of the working people and enhance the role of worker meetings, permanent production conferences and brigade councils. The discussions of the draft USSR Law on Labor Collectives proved the enhanced activeness, high consciousness and political maturity of the republic's working people.

The people's control organs, with their 2.2 million members, are actively engaged in fighting negligence, waste and abuse. Last year alone, the people's controllers made 10,000 **inspections**. Based on the data they provided, the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee and the republic's government passed 24 decrees; more than 4,000 decrees were passed by the local party and Soviet organs.

Based on their constitutional powers, more than half a million deputies are taking daily part in exercising truly mass control. The soviet permanent commissions and the deputy groups and posts set up at the most important production sectors at residential areas, closely interacting with a broad aktiv, control the implementation of work plans of enterprises and organizations on their territory and the satisfaction of the growing requirements of the population. Thus, more than one-third of the more than 70,000 voters' requests accepted by the local soviets of people's deputies in June 1982 have already been implemented.

The republic's Komsomol organizations are actively participating in the implementation of party resolutions on the lives, work, training and recreation of young people.

The working people's letters and petitions are a most important channel for communications with the masses and an efficient means of control "from below." The Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee alone received more than 60,000 such documents in 1982. The information they contain is studied thoroughly and suggestions and remarks are taken into consideration in practical work.

The power of control activities multiplies if it is accompanied by extensive publicity, if the working people are properly informed of what is being done or planned in one sector or another of economic and cultural construction. The Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee and the party obkoms ascribe great importance to improving press, television and radio coverage of the implementation of party decisions and the activities of leading party and state organs. Regular information is published on problems of major national economic and political significance discussed by the republic party committee.

Of late, editorial groups are paying far greater attention to the key tasks of national economic development, the work of basic industrial sectors and the implementation of all-union and republic comprehensive target scientific and technical programs. The press is actively helping the implementation of the tasks of the Food Program. The tasks of strengthening party, state and performing discipline are formulated more efficiently in the press and in television and radio transmissions; shortcomings are exposed efficiently and the specific culprits are named.

Sharp critical remarks, profound study of the work of lagging collectives, creation of editorial staffs at shock construction projects, reciprocal verifications among competitors, public production reviews and mass unannounced investigations by worker and rural correspondents are all important means for upgrading the publicity and efficacy of control, helping the party organizations to eliminate shortcomings more efficiently and fulfill assignments more successfully.

Control and Verification of Execution Is An Important Prerequisite for Ensuring the Implementation of the Main Tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan

The consistent work done in the republic in organizing and controlling the implementation of party decisions contributes to the energetic and purposeful implementation of the party's political line and plans and assignments.

Almost half of the third year of the five-year plan is behind us. The results of the work accomplished prove that the decisions of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums are having an increasing influence on economic life and that their implementation is yielding positive results.

In industry, the current plans and socialist obligations for the first half of the year have been fulfilled for the most important indicators. The leading industrial sectors, ferrous metallurgy, and the coal, chemical and petrochemical industries, above all, have improved their work. Assignments on coal, petroleum, natural gas, iron and manganese ore, iron, steel, rolled metals, steel pipes, chemical fertilizers, plant protection chemicals, metal-cutting machine tools, hammer-press equipment, agricultural machinery, cotton and silk fabrics, clothing, leather shoes, consumer and durable goods and a number of other goods of importance to the national economy were overfulfilled.

Compared with the same period in 1982, the volumes of iron and steel smelting, rolled metal and chemical fertilizers increased substantially. As planned, sectors determining technical progress are developing at a higher pace.

Compared with 1982, the volume of construction and installation work has increased and construction labor productivity has improved. The scale of reconstruction and updating of existing enterprises and production facilities has broadened.

Systematic steps are being taken to improve management and ensure the extensive use of the program-target method in planning the development of science and technology. The scientific and technical potential is strengthening and the efficacy of its utilization is rising. The tasks related to strengthening the ties between science and production are steadily controlled by the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee and the local party committees. They were comprehensively discussed at the republic meeting of the party-economic aktiv in April 1982; this year, the implementation of the republic's comprehensive target national economic programs was extensively analyzed at the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee plenum.

Having completed the wintering of the cattle and their spring field work on an organized basis, the rural working people are persistently struggling for this year's harvest. Milk production and cattle weight on delivery have increased. This enabled us substantially to increase the volume of procured animal husbandry goods.

Unquestionably, the steps which were taken to improve planning and material and technical supplies to the national economy and, naturally, the work on strengthening discipline, organization and order, and upgrading cadre responsibility for assignments in all units and at all levels contributed to the implementation of planned assignments.

The republic's party organizations are persistently striving not only to fulfill this year's plans but maximally to catch up in the production of a number of items by individual enterprises, farms, rayons and oblasts which have fallen behind in previous years. Great attention is being paid to improving the organization of production and labor, reducing the number of lagging collectives and ensuring the implementation of production plans and further improvements in working and living conditions.

The communist party, which was created 80 years ago by the great Lenin, is distinguished by the inseparable unity between words and deeds, persistence in reaching set objectives and the ability systematically to implement its political line.

The success and level of influence of the Leninist party among the masses and the extensive participation of the working people in control over the implementation of the party's policy trigger the hatred and rage of our enemies. The bourgeois "theoreticians" are doing their utmost to prove the unprovable: that allegedly in our country the rank-and-file party members and working people do not participate in control and that control itself is centralized

"from above," provided exclusively by the party apparatus. The absurdity of such malicious claims is self-evident. As we say, facts are a stubborn thing. And it is precisely the facts that confirm the following: how can a party "impose" its will on 270 million people if these people would have even the slightest doubt as to the correctness of its policy and if life itself had not convinced them of the beneficial nature of this policy.

The will and creative aspirations of the party and the people are materialized in the steady growth of the power of our socialist homeland, the strengthening of its international authority and the new accomplishments in all economic and cultural construction sectors.

The party members and working people in the republic, like all Soviet people, consider the implementation of the plans of Lenin's party and the plans and assignments of this year and the entire five-year plan their lofty patriotic duty and primary obligation. The dedicated work of the people of Soviet Ukraine for the good of the homeland confirms their infinite loyalty to the cause of the party and the communist ideals.

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KARL MARX AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA

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[Article by G. Fridlender]

[Text]

1

"Marx and Engels, both of whom knew Russian and read Russian books, were greatly interested in Russia. They sympathetically followed the Russian revolutionary movement and were in contact with Russian revolutionaries," V. I. Lenin wrote ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 2, p 13). In appealing for merciless struggle against tsarist autocracy, which they considered the bulwark not only of Russian but all international reaction, Marx and Engels "were full of the brightest faith in the Russian revolution and its powerful universal significance" (op. cit., vol 15, p 247).

Reactionary bourgeois historians of social philosophy, who hate our people, have wasted and continued to waste a great deal of time and effort to prove that the struggle which Marx and Engels waged against autocracy, their criticism of anarchism and populist socialism of the 1870s and their direct and open polemics, filled with burning revolutionary passion, with A. I. Hertzén, M. A. Bakunin and P. N. Tkachev, prove that the founders of scientific socialism were allegedly uninformed about Russian culture and neither knew nor valued its great historical gains and traditions. Such claims, however, used by today's cold war fighters, like their distant predecessors, are the coarsest possible lies. This is irrefutably confirmed not only by the works and letters published during the lifetime of Marx and Engels but also those which became known after their death. Valuable new data for the refuting of this false legend may also be found in most important publications of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism over the past 30 years, such as "Correspondence Between K. Marx and F. Engels and Russian Political Personalities" (1951); "K. Marx, F. Engels and Revolutionary Russia" (1967); the catalogue "Russian Books in the Libraries of K. Marx and F. Engels" (1979); and volumes 11-13 (1948-1955) and 16 (1982) of the "Marx and Engels Archives," which contain their previously unpublished manuscripts on the 1861 peasant reform and socioeconomic relations and the political system of post-reform Russia.

"Better than anyone else, Marx, as a convinced internationalist, was able to penetrate into the characteristics of the situation of any country...." This statement by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov (KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1983, p 10) splendidly describes Marx's attitude toward Russia and Russian culture.

Marx and Engels developed a great interest in Russian history and the Russian social movement as early as the 1840s. During that time, as Engels was to note subsequently, knowledge of Russian among the noted representatives of Western culture and the Western European revolutionary movement was a rarity, for which reason "to the West any Russian work was a book closed with seven seals" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 18, p 526).* It was no accident that frequently most fantastic concepts regarding tsarist autocracy existed among the Western progressive intelligentsia and revolutionaries. According to Marx, "an entire crowd of French and German enlighteners were praising Catherine II as the flag bearer of progress" (vol 14, p 511); while denouncing feudal Germany in his "Travel Pictures" of 1928, H. Heine described Nicholas I as the "standardbearer of freedom."

All of this, as well as the shameful role which Nicholas I played in suppressing the 1848 revolution, inspired Marx and Engels to mock mercilessly the "tsarist" illusions of the then-West European revolutionaries and socialists and to engage in daring and irreconcilable struggle against them with the weapons of political polemics and criticism. However, it was in the 1840s, in Paris, that Marx established his first contacts with Russian cultural and social personalities in the circles of V. G. Belinskiy and A. I. Herten.

Let us recall Marx's famous letter to P. V. Annenkov, dated 28 December 1846, in which, applying a classical form, unsurpassed in depth and clarity, he described the foundations of historical materialism and criticized Prudhonism, thus anticipating the most basic concepts of the "Poverty of Philosophy" which was being written at that time (1847), soon followed by the first Marxist programmatic document--the "Communist Party Manifesto" (1848). This proves the great importance which Marx ascribed to acquainting the progressive Russian intelligentsia with the ideas of scientific socialism. With his brilliant understanding of the alliance between Russian and Western European revolutionaries and socialists, with the help of P. V. Annenkov, N. I. Sazonov and other Russian acquaintances of the 1840s, Marx tried to familiarize Russian society for the first time with the ideas of historical materialism and scientific socialism and to arm the future generation of Russian revolutionaries with the faith of scientific-revolutionary theory, which would help them to avoid the temptations of bourgeois liberalism, on the one hand, and philistine petit bourgeois socialism, on the other.

After the defeat of the 1848 Western European revolutions and Marx's move to London, in the 1850s both Marx and Engels undertook the profound study of Russian history and Russian culture and literature. By the end of 1850 (or the very beginning of 1851), Engels began to study Russian and other Slavic languages, which he systematically continued to do in 1852 and 1853. Marx began to study Russian later--in the winter of 1869-1870. Even before that, however, he eagerly studied the monuments of Russian culture through accessible German, French and English sources. In 1856 Marx read in the British Museum, in French, the "History of the Language and Literature of

* Subsequently, any reference to the works of Marx and Engels will be indicated only by the volume and page.

the Slavs," by F. G. Eichhoff (1839), which included a translation of "The Lay of Igor's Campaign", the heroic-patriotic pathos of which he described in a letter to Engels, dated 5 March 1856 (see vol 29, p 16).

As we see from Marx's pamphlet "Mr Vogt" (1860), as early as the 1850s he was familiar to a certain extent with the translation of the "History of the Russian State," by N. M. Karamzin (see vol 14, p 510) and, consequently, with the chronicles and other ancient monuments mentioned in the work. Let us note that in the pamphlet on Vogt Marx sharply and mercilessly criticized the official hypocrisy of the domestic and foreign policy of Russian autocracy, totally demolishing Karamzin's monarchic utopian concept. From the book by I. G. Schnitzler, the liberal historian from Strasbourg, "History of Russian Under the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas" (1847), Marx was familiar with the history of the Decembrists' uprising in Petersburg and the Ukraine. The fact that he subsequently read in Russian "Historical Monographs and Studies of Nikolay Kostomarov" (St. Petersburg, 1872), the works of D. L. Mordovtsev, "Imposters and Low Outlaws" (in two volumes, St. Petersburg-Moscow, 1867), and "Political Movements of the Russian People" (in two volumes, St. Petersburg, 1871), proves the particularly close attention he paid to the history of the class struggle between the peasantry and the ruling class in Russia starting with the 16th-17th centuries. These books gave Marx a sufficiently good idea of Razin's uprising and the peasant war headed by Pugachev, and their motive forces, as well as other aspects of the then-peasant and cossack movements against landowners and the autocracy.

One of the sources from which Marx became familiar with the history of the liberation movement in Russia between the end of the 18th and middle of the 19th centuries, were the works of Herten, his KOLOKOL and other publications of the London Free Russian Press. Marx maintained a very critical attitude toward Herten's populist "Russian socialism" and his liberal oscillations. However, he made a close study of a number of Herten's works, published in London, such as "From This Shore," "Polar Star," "Jail and Exile," (the second part of "Past and Thoughts," published in 1854) and others. The latter book Marx used in his study of the Russian language in 1869-1870, and the copy which has reached us (as well as many other Russian books belonging to Marx, known to us), is sprinkled with his numerous notes, including translations of as yet unknown words and idiomatic expressions.

As early as 1859, in his "On the Critique of Political Economy," Marx briefly commented on the seventh stanza of Pushkin's "Eugene Onegin." Marx described Onegin--the supporter of free trade and admirer of Adam Smith's liberal ideas --and his father as representatives of the social mentality of two different ages, one of which had replaced the other, and highly rated Pushkin's understanding of the nature of socioeconomic processes occurring in Russia. Even earlier, in 1851-1852, Engels had used "Eugene Onegin" and "The Copper Knight" as textbooks for the study of Russian. According to F. Lafargue, having mastered the Russian language in 6 months, Marx "was able to read Russian poets and prose writers with satisfaction. He particularly valued Pushkin, Gogol' and Shchedrin ("Vospominaniya o Markse i Engel'se" [Recollections About Marx and Engels], Moscow, 1956, p 65). N. I. Sazonov introduced him to "The Russian God," a poem by P. A. Vyazemskiy. Marx was also

familiar with and valued Griboyedov, Lermontov, Turgenev, Nekrasov and Shevchenko and many works of free Russian poetry. While reading in 1878 the pamphlet by M. Dragomanov "Persecution of Ukrainian Literature by the Russian Government," which was written in French (Geneva, 1878), he underlined on p 28 the description of Shevchenko as "the son of the people in the full meaning of the term," a person who "more than anyone else...deserves the title of people's poet" (exhibited at the Marx and Engels Museum in Moscow). Marx's library also included music for the piano from M. I. Glinka's operas.

In a letter to B. Augusti, a German writer, dated 25 October 1879, which was recently discovered, Marx described himself as a person spoiled by "the best French, English and Russian novelists" (vol 50, p 462). He classified the works of the Russian 19th century novelists as the peak of the classics of realism, the unfading significance of which was noted by the founders of Marxism in their views on Balzac and the "brilliant school" of English novelists, led by Dickens and Thackeray.

2

From the day he moved to London in 1849 and to the end of his life Marx thoroughly studied Russia's present and past. He concentrated on tsarist foreign and domestic policy, the Crimean War, the preparations for and implementation of the peasant reform, the socioeconomic situation of the Russian peasantry and the other classes in Russian society, the development of capitalism in Russia, the beginning of the shaping of the Russian working class, the Russian liberation movement, Russian culture and literature and features of the national character and living conditions of the many nations inhabiting Russia.

In his article "Political Parties in England--The Situation in Europe," published in the NEW YORK DAILY TRIBUNE on 24 June 1858, Marx pointed out the ripening revolutionary situation--"symptoms of war waged by the serfs" on landowners in Russia (see vol 12, p 520). Soon afterwards, in his article "On the Abolishment of Serfdom in Russia" (1 October 1858), he pointed out that the Chief Committee on Peasant Affairs, which was set up by Alexander II, was a step which the tsarist government was forced to take fearing the threat of a peasant revolution.* "In my opinion, the greatest event in the world today is, on the one hand, the American slave movement...and, on the other, the movement of slaves (i.e., serfs--the author) in Russia," Marx wrote to Engels circa 11 January 1860 (vol 30, p 4). In his article "On the Liberation of the Peasantry in Russia," thoroughly studying the struggle between the tsar and the landowners on the draft future "liberation" of the peasantry, Marx perspicaciously pointed out the inevitable halfway nature of the forthcoming peasant reform, the inevitable result of which will be a "Russian 1793" (vol 12, p 701). Half a century later, the 1905 Russian revolution confirmed Marx's brilliant prediction.

* "Even the tsar cannot control the development of economic relations," Marx wrote at that time with deep sarcasm in his pamphlet "Mr Vogt," in which he provided a concise interpretation of the history of the policy of the tsarist government on the peasant problem (see vol 14, pp 509-510).

After the 1861 peasant reform, Marx continued to study official publications, economic and statistical materials and scientific works on the reform and its socioeconomic results. He formulated his assessment of the reform in his "Notes on the 1861 Reform and Russia's Post-Reform Development" (1881-1882).

In describing the nature of the 1861 peasant reform, V. I. Lenin wrote: "The peasants 'were liberated' in Russia by the landowners and the land-owning government of the autocratic tsar and his officials. These 'liberators' arranged matters in such a way that the peasants gained their 'freedom' in rags. They emerged from slavery under the landowners to slavery to those same landowners and their figureheads" (op. cit., vol 20, p 140).

In noting the bourgeois content of the peasant reform, Marx indicated that at the same time it strengthened in the Russian countryside the monstrous serfdom vestiges which were laid as a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peasant: "A slice of land to the peasant. Results of expropriation of forest, meadows, pastures and some peasant lands. Factual dependence of the peasants on landowners' arbitrary behavior" (vol 19, p 427).

Marx emphasized the insight shown by N. G. Chernyshevskiy, who, at the very moment of the implementation of the reform, was able to see that the "liberation" of the peasants, prepared by the government, meant in fact their actual plundering by the landowners.

Marx intended to make a thorough study of Russian agrarian relations the foundation of a number of chapters in the section on land rent in the third volume of "Das Kapital." He made a particularly thorough study, as did Lenin later, in his work on "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," of the works by Russian zemstvo statisticians, and books on the history of agrarian relations and the socioeconomic development of post-reform Russia.

The attention which Marx paid to the lives of workers and peasants in tsarist Russia and his sincere sympathy for their struggle were also manifested in the great interest he showed in the book by N. Flerovskiy (V. V. Bervi) "The Situation of the Working Class in Russia" (St. Petersburg, 1869), which N. F. Daniyel'son sent to him immediately after it was published. Flerovskiy's books shipped from Petersburg and the desire to study the works of Chernyshevskiy in the original, served as an impetus for Marx's intensified study of the Russian language. After reading in Russian the first 150 pages of Flerovskiy's book, on 10 February 1870 he told Engels that "this is the first work which gives the truth of the economic situation in Russia... Burning hatred for landowners, capitalists and officials.... This is the most significant of all books published after yours on 'The Situation of the Working Class' (in England--the author)" (vol 32, pp 357-358). In his 5 March 1870 letter to Laura and Paul Lafargue, after reading Flerovskiy's book, Marx wrote: "The study of his work leads to the deep conviction that a tremendous social revolution is inevitable and imminent in Russia...." (ibid., p 549). Marx deeply sympathized with the internationalism of the author--"a serious observer, a fearless toiler, impartial critic, powerful artist and, above all, a person made indignant by oppression in all its varieties, intolerant of all sorts of national anthems and passionately sharing all the sufferings and aspirations of the productive class" (vol 16, p 428).

Marx crowded his copy of Flerovskiy's book with remarks and marginal notes. Flerovskiy learned of Marx's interest in "The Situation of the Working Class in Russia" through N. F. Daniyel'son and G. A. Lopatin. In a letter to Marx he deemed it necessary to describe in detail the method used in collecting data for his work.

In January 1873 N. F. Daniyel'son sent to Marx the new satirical cycle by Shchedrin, just published as a separate work, "Petersburg Diary of a Man From the Provinces," to which he added a general description of the works of the great satirist: "I am sending you the satires of Shchedrin, the only remaining intelligent member of Dobrolyubov's literary circle. His character has become popular as quickly as those of Ostrovskiy and others. No one better than he can note the trivial aspects of our social life and mock them with greater wit. In addition to the cases of Nechayev (277), Myasnikov (101) matters, the International Statistical Congress (277-305) and others, you will find in this author characterizations familiar to you but only now appearing in our country, such as Types V and IV of moderate liberals (Shchedrin's skimmer) the spokesmen for which are, among others, S.-PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, VESTNIK YEVROPY and others; you will find described the concessionaire type and others" ("K. Marks, F. Engel's i Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya" [K. Marx, F. Engels and Revolutionary Russia], Moscow, 1967, p 284). Marx's notes are found on the four books by Shchedrin kept in his library ("Petersburg Diary of a Man From the Provinces," "The Gentleman From Tashkent," "The Monrepo Asylum" and "Abroad"). Marx noted in each of the books the extremely fine satire of Russian reality, underscoring and adding notes to Shchedrin's assertions which confirmed his profound knowledge of the very "essence" of Russian social and political relations in the post-reform age. Marx also admired the striking and wittily brilliant "Aesopian style" of the writer.

Marx approached the study of any problem of social life as a zealous proletarian revolutionary. This fully applies to problems of Russian social and political life. In studying the past and present of Russia he proceeded from the general foundations of his revolutionary doctrine. He tried to earmark means for the strictly scientific historical-materialistic interpretation of past and current events in Russian history.

"The movement of ideas which is taking place today in Russia confirms the ferment deep within the lower strata. The minds are always linked with the body of the people with invisible threads." These Marxian words (vol 33, p 147) splendidly characterize the reasons which motivated him to look particularly closely into the historical processes occurring in Russia. After the fall of the Paris Commune the revolutionary wave in Western Europe declined. The center of the world's revolutionary movement moved to Russia. In welcoming the upsurge of revolutionary Russia, which had become the "leading detachment of the revolutionary movement in Europe" by the 1880s (vol 19, p 305), Marx and Engels linked the Russian revolution and the fall of autocracy to a new stage in the development of the global revolutionary process. They considered the phenomena of progressive Russian culture and literature a harbinger of the Russian revolution.

One of the main subjects of heated polemics among the supporters of the various social camps in 19th century Russia dealt with the Russian peasant land community and its future development.

Under the conditions of the 20th century Marx's letter to the editors of OTECHESTVENNYYE ZAPISKI (1877), his outline of a letter to V. I. Zasluch and the preface which Marx and Engels wrote to the second Russian edition of the "Communist Party Manifesto," analyzing the Russian community and its historical destiny, became particularly important. These documents by the founders of Marxism refute the view which is widespread among bourgeois philosophers and economists of historical fatalism, as though stemming from Marx's doctrine. Historical materialism, as Marx brilliantly proved, makes a detailed study of the specific socioeconomic conditions of each individual country and age and takes most closely into consideration both these special conditions and the general laws governing the development of mankind.

Marx's attitude toward the ideological struggle in Russia during the 1860s-1870s anticipates the assessment given to it subsequently by Lenin. Marx, who professed a very deep respect for Chernyshevskiy, whose works, in Marx's opinion, "truly do honor to Russia" (vol 16, p 428), and who intended to acquaint the progressive Western European readers with Chernyshevskiy's revolutionary activities, became merciless when discussing the opponents of the great Russian revolutionaries-democrats--the supporters of a monarchic constitution and liberal "reforms."

Marx found the merciless truth not only in the works of friends but also of enemies. The manner in which Marx, while reading books by even the most reactionary bourgeois scientists was able to extract data for the revolutionary criticism of reality and for refuting their own views, is confirmed by his summary of the book by A. Gaxthausen, a Prussian official, monarchist and reactionary, entitled "The Russian Rural Structure" (1866). Gaxthausen hated the idea of communism and tried, in the interests of the landowners and their government, to embellish the situation of the Russian peasantry not only after the reform but even before it, under the serfdom rule. Quoting the 19 February 1861 regulation and the statutory deeds, which defined relations between landowners and "emancipated" peasants, Marx emphasized that in fact, Gaxthausen's claims notwithstanding, ... they were the equivalent of the "slavish exploitation" of the peasants (see "Arkhiv Marksa i Engel'sa" [Marx and Engels Archives], vol 12, Moscow, 1952, p 109) and, with the help of Gaxthausen's factual data, he supported his now-familiar conclusions of the 1861 reform as a shameless plunder of the peasantry in favor of the landowners.

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"Russia truly reached Marxism as the only correct revolutionary theory after 50 years of unparalleled pain and sacrifice, unheard-of revolutionary heroism, incredible energy and dedication to research, training, practical tests, disappointments, verifications and comparisons with the European experience," Lenin wrote in summing up the results of the development of social thinking in Russia (op. cit., vol 41, p 8).

Already P. I. Pestel' and other Decembrists had expressed the idea that the "aristocracy of wealth" is no less dangerous to the people than the landed aristocracy. Their spiritual heirs--the young Herten and Ogarev and the Petrashevites--tried to seek ways leading to a new harmonious society by turning to the ideas of Western utopian socialism.

Belinskiy was deeply taken by the idea of socialism. In an article on the novel by Eugene Sue "The Secrets of Paris" (1844), the great critic shrewdly described the bourgeois nature of the July 1830 revolution in France: "In the eyes of the law the French proletariat is the equal of even the richest property owner...and capitalist; both are tried by the same courts...; the trouble is that this equality does not make the lot of the proletariat any better. As the eternal working person of the property owner and capitalist, the proletarian remains entirely in his hands. He is his slave, for it is he who gives the proletarian work and arbitrarily determines his wage" (V. G. Belinskiy, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works]. In nine volumes. Volume 7, Moscow, 1981, p 63).

It is no accident that most of the first Russians Marx and Engels met were part, as we noted, of Belinskiy's and Herten's circles. Although not one of them was able as yet to understand the nature of scientific socialism in the 1840s and to distinguish it from the theories of the English and French utopian socialists of that time, they all admired the outstanding personality and irrefutable logic of Marx's revolutionary thinking. Sazonov, who remained a democrat and corresponded with Marx till the end of his life mentioned him in his letters to his teacher; in his memoir "Outstanding Decade" (1880), the liberal Annenkov classified Marx among the most outstanding people he had met by the will of fate in his early years, describing him as a "man consisting of energy, willpower and invincible conviction." "Marx was one of the first to say," Annenkov wrote, describing his impression of a letter he had received from Marx criticizing Prudhon's "The Philosophy of Poverty," "that governmental forms and even the entire social life of nations with their morality, philosophy, art and science are only the direct results of economic relations between people and that as such relations change they also change or even disappear. The entire question is to find and define the laws which trigger changes in economic relations among people, which are of such tremendous consequences" ("Vospominaniya o Markse i Engel'se," pp 280-282). M. A. Bakunin as well acknowledged Marx's theoretical superiority over Prudhon, despite his support of the ideas of anarchism, which was the reason for his long struggle against Marx.

According to Marx himself, as revealed in his letter to L. Kugelman, dated 12 October 1868, the works "The Poverty of Philosophy" (1847) and "Critique of Political Economy" (1859) "had never found such a large market as in Russia" (vol 32, p 472). However, between 1840 and 1860 the main problems of Russian social life were the struggle against autocracy and serfdom. Furthermore, until the middle of the 1850s, most supporters of the Russian liberation movement consisted of educated nobility. Finally, at that time, Herten was laying the foundations of his doctrine of a populist "Russian socialism," based on faith in the rescuing power of the peasant community and the socialist instincts of the Russian peasant. All of this, despite the

gradual penetration of Marx's ideas and works in Russia, erected a theoretical barrier between the ideas of the leaders of the Russian liberation movement in the 1850s-1860s and those of scientific, proletarian socialism. It was only toward the end of his life, in his "Letters to an Old Comrade," that Hertzzen, breaking with Bakunin, turned "to the International, to that International led by Marx" (V. I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 21, p 257).

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1860s the next legitimate step was taken in the ideological development of the progressive members of the Russian liberation movement, which objectively led them toward the ideas of Marxism. This step was inseparably tied to the activities of the spiritual leaders of the second Raznochintsy stage of the Russian revolutionary movement--N. G. Chernyshevskiy and N. A. Dobrolyubov--qualified by Engels as "two socialist Lessings" (vol 18, p 522).

As Lenin noted, Chernyshevskiy had still not realized nor could realize that "it is only the development of capitalism and the proletariat that can create the material conditions and social force for the achievement of socialism" (op. cit., vol 20, p 175). However, despite his utopian socialism, in Lenin's words Chernyshevskiy was an "outstanding profound critic of capitalism" (op. cit., vol 25, p 94). Marx noted this feature in Chernyshevskiy's views in his concluding remarks to the second edition of the first volume of "Das Kapital," expressing his admiration for the outstanding mind of the great Russian philosopher, who had "masterly proved in his 'Political Economy Outlines (According to Mill)'" the bankruptcy of bourgeois political economy (see vol 23, pp 17-18).

G. V. Plekhanov justifiably emphasized that "Chernyshevskiy's views relate to those of Marx and Engels in the same way that Feuerbach's materialism relates to the dialectical materialism of the latter" (G. Plekhanov, "Soch." [Works], vol VI, Moscow-Leningrad, 1924, p 341). This proves not only Chernyshevskiy's philosophical materialism but his profound historical insight on the course of the class struggle in the West and his passionate belief in the fall of capitalist tyranny.

"He frequently told me," G. A. Lopatin wrote, referring to Marx, "that of all contemporary economists Chernyshevskiy is the only truly original thinker, while the others are simple compilers;" that Chernyshevskiy's works "are the only modern works related to this science, truly worth reading and studying; that the Russians should be ashamed of the fact that not one of them has bothered so far to acquaint Europe with such an outstanding philosopher; that Chernyshevskiy's political death is a loss to the scientific world not only of Russia but of all of Europe, etc., etc." ("Vospominaniya o Markse i Engel'se," pp 204-205).

As confirmed by Lopatin, Marx's references about Chernyshevskiy as a great philosopher, publicist and citizen, strengthened his resolve to return to Russia in the autumn of 1870 to organize Chernyshevskiy's escape (see I. I. Popov, "G. A. Lopatin." Moscow, 1926, p 23; G. A. Lopatin, "Avtobiografiya, Pokazaniya i Pis'ma" [Autobiography, Testimony and Letters]. Leningrad, 1922, pp 71-72). Following Lopatin's detention and the obvious failure of

his attempt to free Chernyshevskiy, on 12 December 1872 Marx turned to N. F. Daniyel'son with the request for fullest possible "factual" data about Chernyshevskiy, for he wanted to draw the attention of progressive European public opinion to his fate. "I would like," he wrote, "to publish something about Chernyshevskiy's life, personality, and so on, in order to create a feeling of sympathy for him in the West" (vol 33, p 458). In his next letter to Daniyel'son (dated 18 January 1873) Marx asked for the view of Chernyshevskiy's Russian students on the following: speaking of Chernyshevskiy, should he limit himself to the description of no more than his "scientific merits" or should he also "mention the other" (i.e., practical, revolutionary) "aspect of his activities" (see *ibid.*, pp 468-469).

In the pamphlet "The Alliance Between Socialist Democracy and the International Association of Workers," which Marx and Engels wrote with the participation of Lafargue, the founders of Marxism described in detail Chernyshevskiy's role as the "head of a revolutionary party," around which "an entire phalange of publicists and a large group of officers and students had rallied." They spoke of his political activities during the reform and of his heroism and tragic fate (see vol 18, pp 389, 396-397, 430-432). They pitted Chernyshevskiy, as the most outstanding representative of progressive revolutionary and democratic forces in Russia against the nobility-bourgeois liberals, the supporters of revolutionary romanticism and conspiratorial-anarchic methods used by Bakunin and Nechayev in their struggle, whose theoretical carelessness and adventurism Marx invariably and harshly condemned.

Five volumes of Chernyshevskiy's works with Marx's annotations are preserved at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Marx actively contributed to the publication in the Russian uncensored press outside the country Chernyshevskiy's "Letter Without Address," and the first part of his novel "Prologue." Marx not only attentively read the manuscript of "Letter Without Address," which he summarized in 1873, before it was published by P. L. Lavrov, but returned to the work in 1881, crowding his published copy of "Letters" with numerous remarks and underlinings. As we pointed out, Marx used Chernyshevskiy's revolutionary criticism of the 1861 peasant reform in his notes on the reform and post-reform development of Russia. He also probably read Chernyshevskiy's "What Is To Be Done?"

Marx accepted the request of N. I. Utin and his comrades to represent the Russian section in the General Council of the International Association of Workers in London. The members of the Russian section supported Marx in his struggle against the Bakuninists.

The first Russian translation of the "Communist Party Manifesto," made by M. A. Bakunin, came out in Geneva in 1869. However, Bakunin repeatedly departed from the original in the translation. Three years later, a Russian edition of "Das Kapital," translated by G. A. Lopatin, N. F. Daniyel'son and N. N. Lyubavin, was published in Petersburg in 1872. This was the first of the translations of Marx's main work into a foreign language. In reporting to F. A. Sorge of the publication of the Russian translation of "Das Kapital," in a letter dated 21 June, Marx emphasized that "it was masterly done" (vol

33, p 414). In pitting the Russian revolutionaries--noblemen of the 1840s-1850s against the new generation of Russian revolutionaries--"offspring of the people," Engels wrote about them in particular to I. F. Becker: "The latter include people who in terms of talent and character are unquestionably among the best people of our party; these are boys whose endurance, firmness of character and theoretical understanding are frankly striking" (ibid., p 411).

Marx and Engels harshly condemned Bakunin's anarchism and Nechayev's and Tkachev's revolutionary adventurism and conspiratorial tactics. They patiently and persistently explained the illusory nature of the populist belief in the originality of the patriarchal nature of the Russian way of life and the aspiration of the theoreticians of populism--ignoring the real facts of socioeconomic development--to reject the development of capitalism in Russia and the establishment of a revolutionary working class in that country. At the same time, they admired the heroism of the Russian participants in the Paris Commune--Ye. L. Dmitriyeva-Tomanovskaya and A. V. Korvin-Krukovskaya (Jacquelard); and were most actively concerned with the fate of Chernyshevskiy, Lopatin and other Russian revolutionaries. Marx and his family became particularly close to Lopatin. After his arrival in London in 1870, with a letter of recommendation from Lavrov, Lopatin gained the warm sympathy of Marx and his entire family. Eleonora, Marx's younger daughter, taught him English. Marx spent hours discussing Chernyshevskiy, the situation in Russian and world literature with Lopatin, quoting many of its greatest accomplishments in the original. In September 1870 Lopatin became a member of the General Council of the International, in which he reported on Russian affairs. Marx helped Lopatin in his work on the translation of "Das Kapital," and warmly sympathized with his daring attempt to free Chernyshevskiy. He was pleased by his escape from Siberia and was eagerly interested, in his letters to his Russian friends, in his fate.

After Lopatin's detention, his friend Daniyel'son and Lyubavin completed the Russian translation of "Das Kapital," which he had started under the guidance and advice of Marx himself. Subsequently, for many years, Daniyel'son corresponded with Marx and Engels, systematically supplying them with Russian books.

P. L. Lavrov as well maintained close relations with Marx and Engels. He described Marx as his great teacher. Marx read the newspaper VPERED!, which Lavrov published, and others of his publications. In his letters to Lavrov he discussed a number of problems of sociopolitical life and tried to help the Russian revolutionaries to achieve a sober, scientific and strictly materialistic interpretation and solution of such problems. After Marx's death, Engels gave to Lavrov the Russian books from his library for the library of the Russian revolutionary emigres in Paris.

Marx met L. H. Gartman in London in 1879. During the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, other revolutionary-Narodovol'tsy also corresponded with Marx. Their heroism and fearlessness in their struggle against autocracy triggered the admiration of Marx and Engels despite the theoretical errors of the populist movement they could clearly see and despite their condemnation of their

terrorist tactics. "These are truly active people, with no melodramatic posing, simple, practical and heroic," Marx said, describing the heroes of NARODNAYA VOLYA in a letter to J. Longe, dated 11 April 1881 (vol 35, p 147). In a letter dated 14 December 1882 he wrote to Laura Lafargue with pleasure that the fast spreading and success of his theory in Russia would please him more than it would anywhere else" (ibid., p 342).

The Russian revolutionaries of the 1870s-1880s were not alone in their steadily increasing interest in Marx's doctrine. During that period Marx also met with a number of bourgeois-liberal Russian scientists, such as M. M. Kovalevskiy, a sociologist and historian, N. I. Storozhenko, the literary expert, and others. In 1879-1880 he studied closely and summarized Kovalevskiy's book on communal land ownership; in a letter to Kovalevskiy (April 1879) he praised highly the book by historian N. I. Kareyev "Peasants and the Peasant Problem in France in the Last Quarter of the 18th Century" (see vol 45, pp 153-226; vol 34, pp 286-287). The outstanding Russian scientist-economist N. I. Ziber was an outstanding propagandist and commentator on the political and economic ideas of Marx in Russia in the 1870s-1880s. He met personally with Marx and Engels in London. Marx himself positively rated Ziber's works and the features of his research method in reviewing the first volume of "Das Kapital" (see vol 23, pp 19-21).

In 1871 the brother of the famous composer, the lawyer V. I. Taneyev, described by Marx as the "loyal friend of the liberation of the people" (vol 34, p 185), wrote an article on the history of the First International, which was accepted by M. Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin for publication in OTECHESTVENNYYE ZAPISKI. In another article Taneyev emphasized that "Karl Marx, who founded the International Society of Workers, is the greatest statesman of our time. The second half of the 19th century should be named the century of Darwin and Karl Marx..." (V. I. Taneyev. "Detstvo. Yunost'. Mysli o Budushchem" [Childhood. Adolescence. Thoughts of the Future]. Moscow, 1959, p 556). The high appreciation of the historical importance of Marx's activities and his tremendous role in the international workers movement were expressed in the numerous letters received by Engels on the occasion of Marx's death in 1883 from the Russian revolutionaries and students. "The Russian socialists bow in front of the grave of a person who sympathized with their aspirations in all the vicissitudes of their terrible struggle, a struggle which they are continuing and will continue until the principles of the social revolution have triumphed definitively," said the appeal of the Russian socialists, signed by P. L. Lavrov and read aloud by Ch. Longe at Marx's grave. This address, which describes Marx as "the most outstanding of all socialists of all time," "one of the greatest minds," and "the most energetic fighter against the exploiters of the proletariat," emphasized that the Russian language was the first in which a translation of "Das Kapital" was published and the Russian students were the first who heard in the universities a sympathetic presentation of the theory of the great thinker (see K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 19, p 352).

A number of outstanding representatives of Russian literature took part in the heated discussion on Marx's ideas on the question of the development of capitalism in Russia, which was held in the 1880s-1890s. The posthumous

publication of the translated letter sent by Marx to the editors of OTECHESTVENNIYYE ZAPISKI, first in VESTNIK NARODNOY VOLI (1886) in Geneva, and subsequently in the journal YURIDICHESKIY VESTNIK, in 1888, led the populist writer Gleb Uspenskiy to write the article "Bitter Reproach" (1888). In this article the author paid homage to Marx's "impeccable accuracy and impartiality" in his interpretation of the course of Russian economic life after the 1861 peasant reform. "This bitter and terrible reproach must be heard by every Russian person...", Uspenskiy wrote. He considered Marx's letter a severe warning addressed to the Russian nobility and bourgeois society which revered "coupon clipping" (G. I. Uspenskiy, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol XII, Moscow, 1953, pp 7, 14). The censorship did not allow the publication of this article which was published for the first time in excerpts in 1902 and, in its entirety, during Soviet times. Marx's name repeatedly appeared in the 1890s in L. N. Tolstoy's diaries. "People should freely work jointly. They should learn how to work for one another, but capitalism does not teach them this. On the contrary, it teaches them jealousy, greed and egotism," he noted with deep sadness (L. Tolstoy, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." in 90 volumes. Volume 53. Moscow, 1953, p 85). But how to surmount envy and egotism? was the painful question the great writer asked himself. As the spokesman for the moods of the Russian patriarchal peasantry, he could not believe that "capitalism would lead to socialism." Still and all, despite his contradictory attitude toward socialism, Tolstoy's conclusion coincides in the main with the conclusion contained in Marx's doctrine: to learn how to become morally perfect, Tolstoy claims, "is totally impossible under the capitalist competitive system; it requires an entirely different system" (ibid.).

The new period in the history of the creative adoption and mastery of Marxist ideas in Russia began with the founding of "Liberation of Labor," the first Russian-Marxist group, by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich and their closest supporters (1883). Plekhanov's new translation of the "Communist Party Manifesto" (1882), and his works "Socialism and Political Struggle" (1883), "Our Differences" (1885), and "On the Development of the Monarchic View on History" (1895) were the first decisive blows struck at the entire system of populist views and convictions and cleared the theoretical grounds for the victory of Marx's teaching in Russia. Not limiting himself to the struggle against the populist idealizing of the peasantry and the "subjective sociology" of Lavrov and Mikhaylovskiy, Plekhanov became in his works a zealous defender and propagandist of Marx's historical materialism and the doctrine of the Marxist founders on the historical mission of the proletariat as the gravedigger of capitalism. In his struggle against the revisionism of E. Bernstein and other representatives of the right-wing German social democrats, Plekhanov firmly defended Marx's philosophical materialism, to which he remained loyal throughout his life. In his criticism of neo-Kantianism, Machism and other bourgeois philosophical trends of the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, Plekhanov brilliantly combined his defense of Marx's philosophical legacy with the propaganda and development of the ideas of the 19th century Russian revolutionary democrats, thus adding a new chapter to the history of Marxism of international importance.

The further development of Marx's revolutionary doctrine at the end of the 19th and into the 20th centuries is inseparably linked with Lenin, the

struggle waged by the Russian working class and the great historical path of the Bolshevik Party. In the conditions of the new historical age--the age of imperialism and the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution--Lenin comprehensively developed and intensified the philosophical, economic and political content of Marxism and other aspects of the Marxist doctrine. Thanks to Lenin's genius, revolutionary Marxism, elevated to a new height, became an organic, an inseparable component of Russian Soviet culture and the cultures of the other Soviet socialist nations. The creative application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the solution of the problems of 20th-century socioeconomic development is the foundation of the achievements of mature socialism.

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MARXIST DOCTRINE OF THE PARTY AND BOLSHEVISM

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[Article by Dr of Historical Sciences Ye. Bugayev]

[Text] The conscious fighters for social justice and the liberation of the working people from all forms of exploitation and oppression will always consider bolshevism. Bolshevism neither did nor could become merely a part of history, for it is precisely bolshevism that is linked with the basic progressive changes which have taken and are taking place in the life of mankind today.

It is an inescapable fact that the bolsheviks were the only ones to organize mankind's penetration into the new historical era and who created the first socialist society in the world, which has now reached a high level of maturity. They proved in practical terms that the reorganization of social life on a collectivistic basis was not only possible but objectively necessary. Bolshevism opened to mankind the path to the establishment of truly human conditions for life and development. It extolled the toiling person--the creator of all earthly goods. V. I. Lenin was right a thousand times when he wrote about the Bolshevik Party that "... we believe in it, we see in it the mind, honor and conscience of our epoch..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, p 93).*

Bolshevism means above all true Marxism, profoundly understood and comprehensively developed by Lenin and the Leninists in terms of the new historical conditions. It is a revolutionary theory which organically blends with the workers movement and has become a firm part of the socialist consciousness of the masses. Finally, it is a need for continuing revolutionary purposefulness and organization, stemming from the essence of Marxism and implemented by the progressive segment of the working class.

The bourgeois ideologues and various opportunists within the labor movement have long and persistently tried to depict bolshevism as a strictly Russian phenomenon and, consequently, a phenomenon which would not survive on any other national ground. E. Fischer, the political renegade who in his time was a member of the Austrian Communist Party and, in the final years of his life, repeated everything which K. Kautsky, his spiritual father, had been

* Subsequent references to V. I. Lenin's "Complete Collected Works" will list volume and page only.

able to write against the communist party and the socialist revolution, went so far as to classify the communist party as a specific Russian phenomenon related to an allegedly "special interpretation of Marxism by Lenin."

Naturally, bolshevism is the offspring of the Russian working class, literally experienced and hammered out by the proletariat in our country and the revolutionary intelligentsia which took the class positions of the proletariat. At the same time, through its accomplishments it earned the honorable right to become in its essential features the model of a truly proletarian political trend and political party against the activities of which, taking, naturally, specific circumstances into consideration, the proletarian revolutionaries in any country should check their actions. An arrogant attitude toward the experience of any national party conflicts with the internationalist content of Marxism. This makes it even more stupid to reject the experience of Lenin's party, which organized the working people for the first victorious socialist revolution in the world and has been successfully guiding the building of the new society for the past 6.5 decades.

There are those who try to present bolshevism also as an actual departure from classical Marxism or else to prove that Marx and Engels did not share the same view on the need for class nature, character and objectives of the communist party. Many go even further by claiming, as did R. Rossanda, who was expelled from the Italian Communist Party in 1969, that in general "no party theory may be found in Marx." As to Lenin, allegedly he created "his own" party under different circumstances, for which reason he did not take Marx's view on this problem into special consideration.

An extreme multiplicity of such fabrications is coming to light once again in connection with the 165th anniversary of the birth and centennial of the death of Marx and the 80th anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress, which completed the process of the establishment of bolshevism. Actually, this applies not only to the doctrine of the party but to Marxism-Leninism as a whole. And, unfortunately, bourgeois and reformist theoreticians are not alone in engaging in such unseemly projects. "The communists should not fall for the trenchant phrases of all kinds of 'improvers' of Marx or cling to the fabrications of bourgeois science," Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, has pointed out. "We must not dilute the Marxist-Leninist doctrine but, conversely, struggle for its purity and develop it creatively. Such is the path which leads to knowledge and the solution of the new problems. This approach alone is consistent with the traditions and spirit of our doctrine and the requirements of the communist movement." It would be useful, in this connection, to recall some of the basic ideas expressed by Marx and Engels on the party, embodied in the Leninist doctrine of the party and in bolshevism.

Suffice it to compare the most important documents drafted by Marx and Engels, from the "Communist Party Manifesto" (1848) to Engels' summations in the 1890s, to see the full unity of their views on the need, nature and historical purpose of having a political party of the proletariat. They wrote in the "Communist Party Manifesto" that "the communists are distinguished from the other proletarian parties only by the fact that, on the one hand,

they single out in the struggle waged by the proletarians of different nations, the general interests of the entire proletariat, regardless of nationality; on the other, by the fact that through the various stages of development of the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, they are always the representatives of the interests of the movement as a whole.

"Consequently, in practice the communists are the most decisive segment of the worker parties of all countries, always inspiring others to move forward;* from the theoretical viewpoint, they have the advantage over the remaining proletariat, of understanding the conditions, course and overall results of the proletarian movement" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4, p 437).**

What is extremely important is that already here the essential features of the truly revolutionary party of the working class, which distinguish it from previous worker organizations, are pointed out: 1) its revolutionism and vanguard role toward other existing organizations of the working class, including worker parties; 2) internationalism; 3) mastery of a scientific theory of social development. This same basic document formulated for the first time the immediate objective of the communists: "...the shaping of the proletariat as a class, the overthrow of bourgeois rule and the seizure of political power by the proletariat" (vol 4, pp 437-438). The "Manifesto" is one of the first fully mature works of scientific communism, the result of the combined efforts of great scientists and revolutionaries.

Toward the end of 1850, the Bylaws of the Alliance of Communists, which Lenin described as a "small but truly proletarian party" (vol 23, p 365), which was reorganized after its separation from the group of A. Willich and K. Schapper --phrase-mongering "revolutionaries" and supporters of adventurism in tactics --stated even more clearly that "the objective of the communist alliance is to achieve the destruction of the old society by all means of propaganda and political struggle--the overthrow of the bourgeoisie--the spiritual, political and economic liberation of the proletariat and the communist revolution. In the different stages of development which the struggle of the proletariat must cross, the alliance will always be the representative of the interests of the movement as a whole, as it will always strive to rally around it and to organize all revolutionary forces of the proletariat..." (vol 7, p 565). Therefore, the founders of scientific communism wrote about three different types of liberation and, therefore, three forms of struggle: ideological, political and economic. They saw in the communist party the organizer of all revolutionary forces of the proletariat.

Bearing in mind the ability of the bourgeoisie to penetrate the worker organizations directly or through their agents, to corrupt them or to subordinate

* In the 1888 English edition the words "always inspiring others to move forward" are replaced by the words "most progressive."

** Subsequent references to the works of Marx and Engels will indicate volume and page only.

them to its influence, Engels pointed out that the party of the working class "should not follow in the wake of one bourgeois party or another but be structured as an independent party with its own objective and policy" (vol 17, pp 421-422).

Bearing in mind the experience of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels emphasized in the resolution on the charter of the International, at the congress in The Hague, that "in its struggle against the combined power of the property-owning classes, the working class can act as a class only if it is organized in its independent political party which opposes all the old parties created by the property-owning classes.

"Such an organization of the working class as a political party is necessary in order to ensure the victory of the socialist revolution and the reaching of its final objective--the elimination of classes" (vol 18, p 143). Let us particularly note in these thoughts the requirement of having an independent and separate proletarian party and final objective.

We find in bourgeois, socioreformist and revisionist publications differing claims to the effect that Marx and Engels, unlike Lenin, in mentioning a party at all, had in mind a society which was free, unrestrained by a clear organizational framework, in which everyone could write, say or do whatever occurred to him. It has long been the rosy dream of the bourgeoisie for the communist party to be something loose, shapeless, ideologically and politically uncohesive, unable either clearly to formulate its objectives or to organize itself to reach them; this is presented by the revisionists and frank renegades as the latest and the democratic modification of Marxism. For example, R. Garaudy (who was a member of the French Communist Party Politburo before turning renegade and his expulsion from the party) preached that the communist party "cannot have an 'official philosophy.' In principle, it cannot be idealistic, materialistic, clerical or atheistic." E. Fischer spoke just as firmly in favor of the "reorganization" of the communist parties so that they may consist "if you wish, of Marxists and non-Marxists, communists and social democrats, Catholics and Protestants."

The efforts to find in Marx and Engels even a semblance of tolerance for or justification of ideological and political pluralism in the communist parties cannot withstand a comparison with their actual views on the ideological and organizational foundations of the party's structure. They always claimed that the revolutionary proletarian party must show a "unity of thought and action" (vol 18, pp 341-342). They firmly believed that the guarantee for the force and combat capability of the party lay in its ideological-political and organizational unity. They actively participated in the drafting and editing of the first Bylaw of the Alliance of Communists in 1847, which clearly listed the demands facing its organizations and party members. After defining the objectives of the alliance ("...overthrow of the bourgeoisie, rule by the proletariat, elimination of the old bourgeois society based on class antagonism and founding of a new society, without classes and private ownership"), Article 2 on "membership conditions," described the way of life and activities consistent with this objective; revolutionary energy and propaganda zeal; acceptance of communism; obedience to the orders of the alliance. "Those who fail to meet these conditions will be expelled" (vol 4, p 524).

It was in the bylaws that the organizational structure of the party was described for the first time: communities of from three to 20 members (in contemporary terminology, cells or primary organizations), subordinated to districts; districts accountable to the head of the district of a province; district heads accountable to the Congress--the "legislative power" (ibid., pp 525-527). In the Central Committee address to the Alliance of Communists Marx and Engels called upon the members of the alliance comprehensively "to create an independent, both secret and open organization of the workers party and to make each one of their communities the center and the nucleus of worker associations, in which the position and interests of the proletariat could be discussed independently of bourgeois influences" (vol 7, p 262). Anarchist moaning about "dictatorship" from the center, familiar to us from the proceedings of the Second RSDWP Congress, notwithstanding, Engels firmly defended the right of the General Council of the International "temporarily to expel individual sections until the next congress was called" (vol 17, p 482).

Naturally, the structure and forms of organization of the party were different during the different stages of the labor movement and operational conditions: the Alliance of Communists, the First International, the social democratic parties in individual European countries, and the broad labor parties in England and the United States. Nevertheless, Marx and Engels always demanded the creation of an ideologically cohesive and organizationally strong and flexible revolutionary vanguard of the working class, which could lead the proletariat and its allies. In precisely the same manner they invariably and firmly opposed the penetration of the party by people contaminated by bourgeois and anarchic views and deemed it necessary to expel from the party those who did not share its ideological positions. "Openly outside the International," Marx wrote about the anarchists, "these people are not dangerous.... However, as hostile elements within it, they destroy the movement in the countries where they have sunk roots" (vol 33, p 473-474).

In the Constituent Manifesto of the International Association of Workers (First International) Marx noted in 1864 that "one of the elements of success--numbers--the workers already have; however, numbers become decisive when the mass is organized and is guided by knowledge" (vol 16, p 10). It was precisely that knowledge, which they had, that they gave the working class, rather than "inspiration."

Let us particularly emphasize that ever since the "Communist Party Manifesto," in which Marx and Engels raised the fiery slogan "Workers of the World, Unite!" they continually reminded them of the unity of the class interests of the proletariat and the need to unify the struggle of its national detachments for a single international cause. "Past experience," Marx wrote, "proved that a scornful attitude toward the fraternal alliance which must exist among workers in different countries and which would motivate them in their struggle for liberation firmly to support one another, punishes their coordinated efforts with a common defeat" (ibid., pp 10-11). All subsequent experience merely confirmed and still does this fundamental concept of scientific communism.

After the death of his older friend, Engels repeatedly emphasized the complete and firm unity between his and Marx's views concerning the need for and objectives of a proletarian party. "In order for the proletariat to prove itself sufficiently strong at the decisive moment and to win, a position that both Marx and I have defended since 1847, it must found a separate party, distinct from all others and opposing them, aware of being a class party" (vol 37, p 275). Very shortly before his own death, Engels once again reminded that "in our tactics one thing remains unchanged for all countries today which have reached the level of modern development: to lead the workers to the creation of their own independent party, opposed to all bourgeois parties" (vol 38, p 379).

Such are some of the most important considerations expressed by Marx and Engels on the basic problem of scientific communism: the nature and objectives of the political party of the working class.

Suffice it today to consider Lenin's works both during the time of his struggle for the creation of a revolutionary party of the working class in Russia and against revisionism of all hues in the Russian and international worker movements, and in the period of the bolshevik leadership of the struggle waged by the working class against autocracy, capitalists and landowners in the three revolutions and after the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, to realize that Lenin's thinking always followed the direction indicated by Marx and Engels. In comprehensively developing the ideological-theoretical, political and organizational foundations of the party, Lenin entirely relied on the ideas of the founders of scientific communism and developed them on the basis of the dialectical-materialistic analysis of the new phenomena in social life and the experience of the international, already including the Russian, labor movement. In this connection, it is worth recalling his exceptionally important thought that the Marxist doctrine "is the summation of experience, illuminated by a deep philosophical world outlook and rich knowledge of history" (vol 33, p 29). Bolshevism was the direct extension of the Marxist theory of the party and its development on the basis of the "summed-up" experience of the Western European and Russian revolutionary movements.

Noting that "the trend of socialism toward merging with the worker movement is the principal merit of Marx and Engels" (vol 4, pp 244-245) and that they were the first to reach the conclusion of the need for an independent proletarian party, Lenin wrote that "to us this conclusion constitutes an old and firm gain of 50 years of experience of the international social democratic movement, an acquisition on the basis of which we began to organize the Russian social democratic workers party" (vol 11, p 129).

Eighty years have passed since the second RSDWP Congress, which concluded with the founding of the Bolshevik Party. At various times, however, speaking of the origins of bolshevism, Lenin wrote that "in 3 years, between 1900 and 1903, bolshevism saw the old ISKRA off and took up the struggle against menshevism as a purposeful direction" (vol 19, 103); "The bolsheviks are not a 'case.'" They emerged from the struggle against opportunism between 1894 and 1914!!" (vol 33, p 233). This was no accident! The period between the

substantiation of the idea of the need for the founding of a party of a new type to the point of its organization as a real party, the embryo of which was Lenin's Petersburg "Alliance in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class" (1895) was saturated with an extremely tense theoretical and organizational work. The appearance of bolshevism as a trend in social thinking coincides in time with the beginning of Lenin's revolutionary activities.

The founder of the Bolshevik Party undertook its creation at a time when capitalism had entered its imperialist stage, i.e., when it had become ripe for a socialist revolution as a whole and as a system. Under imperialist conditions, the working class needs a political party which would firmly believe in the urgent necessity for such a revolution and understand the ways to lead to it the entire working class and its potential allies along a way specific to the individual country, and would dedicate itself to preparing for it.

By the turn of the 20th century no such party existed in the world. The parties of the Second International, which existed in Western Europe, could not be a model for the creation of a revolutionary party of the working class. After the deaths of Marx and Engels, under revisionist pressure, they had lost their militant spirit and the feeling that a socialist revolution was topical. They had slid to reformist positions and many of their leaders, having accepted the rules of the game of bourgeois democracy, had begun to make the bourgeoisie very hopeful that they would act as its agents in the labor movement, as Lenin was subsequently to describe the Russian menshevik opportunists.

It was precisely after a thorough study of the theory and practice of the parties of the Second International and the various leftist-anarchic big and small groups in Russia and abroad, that as early as 1899 ("Our Program"), Lenin drastically separated the tasks of the party of the working class, on the founding of which he was working, from right-wing and left-wing opportunism. He saw in the party of a new type an "organization of revolutionaries, needed in order to 'make' a political revolution" (vol 6, p 111), and not for the sake of 'improving' capitalism and correcting workers and social democrats with the "philistine comfort of a 'cultural' decent philistine life" (vol 33, p 233). Lenin considered the existence of an independent and irreconcilable Marxist party of the working class the "only prerequisite for the victory of socialism and a path to victory which would be most free from vacillations" (vol 9, p 275).

Based on the ideas of Marx and Engels and the experience of the Russian and world revolutionary movement, and taking into consideration the new phenomena in the historical process, Lenin created an integral theory of the party as the supreme form of political organization of the working class, called upon to head its struggle for the revolutionary reorganization of society and to be the leading, organizing and guiding force in the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism and communism.

What are the most characteristic features of such a party, features which it must preserve and develop in order successfully to fulfill its historical purpose?

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress," notes, in emphasizing the essential differences between the Bolshevik Party and the parties of the Second International, which were incapable of revolutionary action: "The typical features and characteristics of the party of a new type, inherent in it from the time of its appearance and crystallized in the course of its further development, are that:

"It is guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and creatively develops it, ensuring the organic unity between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice;

"It is the collective political leader of the working class, the highest form of its organization and the vanguard of all working people; closest possible ties with the masses are the source of its inexhaustible strength;

"It builds its activities on the basis of democratic centralism, tirelessly strengthening the ideological and organizational unity of its ranks and conscious discipline, and develops the activeness of the party members;

"It is irreconcilable toward any type of factionalism and groups and manifestations of revisionism, opportunism and dogmatism;

"It critically analyzes the results of its revolutionary-transforming activities and policy, and continuously studies, assesses and uses the experience acquired by the international communist movement;

"It systematically implements the principles of proletarian internationalism."

All of these characteristics and specific features of the revolutionary party of the working class have been earmarked by the founders of scientific communism and ignored by the opportunists of the Second International; they were restored and developed by Lenin to the level of clearly formulated ideological-political and organizational principles on which alone the party of a new type could be founded and operate successfully.

The party, Lenin taught, is part of the working class. It is its vanguard, marching ahead of the class and leading it in the struggle against the forces of the old society and, after the socialist revolution, also becomes the "direct leading vanguard of the proletariat" (vol 42, p 294). The party preserves and develops this concept by closely controlling its membership. Lenin persistently demanded that "it is better for 10 working people not to call themselves party members (real working people do not run after titles!), than for a single chatterer to have the right and opportunity to become a party member" (vol 7, p 290). The party can be the vanguard, the collective leader of the working class, providing that "it encompasses within itself the best representatives of this class, if it consists of fully conscious and loyal communists, trained and tempered through the experience of persistent revolutionary struggle" (vol 41, p 187).

Bearing in mind the existence of "capital-obedient" worker parties, Lenin explained that "... whether a party is a truly political worker party or not depends not only on whether it consists of workers but also on who leads it and what is the meaning of its actions and political tactics. It is only this that decides whether or not we have a truly political party of the proletariat" (ibid., p 261).

In Lenin's view the party nucleus must consist of the best members of the working class, who will ensure the pursuit of a strictly sustained class policy. That is precisely why Lenin demanded that initially "the proletariat only and exclusively be singled out" (vol 6, p 256), and not until then "only on behalf of the actually existing worker party can we, without losing the loyalty to our convictions, call to revolutionary work all progressive elements in the country, call upon all working people to support socialism, all those who are suffering and burdened" (vol 7, p 57). Noting the tremendously successful founding of the Bolshevik Party, which already confidently headed the first popular revolution in the epoch of imperialism, he wrote in 1907 that "naturally, the main prerequisite for this success was the fact that the working class, the flower of which was created by the social democrats, was distinguished, by virtue of objective economic reasons, from all other classes in the capitalist society by its greatest capacity for organization... However, the objective-maximal ability of the proletariat to unite as a class is implemented by living people, and in specific forms of organization. No other organization other than that of ISKRA could have been able under our historical circumstances, in the Russia of 1900-1905, to create the type of social democratic worker party which has now been created" (vol 16, p 103).

Initially these living people were in the dozens, then in the hundreds and thousands of professional revolutionaries, who subsequently were bestowed the honorific title of Leninist Bolshevik Guard. Naturally, the "accident" that both bolshevism and the ISKRA organization were headed by Lenin tremendously accelerated the process of the founding and unification of the party. Everyone agrees with this.

In order to judge accurately who was a member of the Leninist party at that time, when it was a party of people pursued and persecuted, the affiliation with which was always threatened by jail, exile or the death sentence, it is worth turning to the 1922 party membership census.

The social structure of party members during different periods and years of activity is shown in the selective yet quite representative data for 26 guberniyas and oblasts. Eight of them are industrial (Moscow, Petrograd, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Nizhegorod, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tula and Bryansk); 13 are agricultural (Voronezh, Tambov, Ryazan, Orel, Rybinsk, Cherepovtzi, Vyatsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Kubano-Chernomorsk, Don, Kaluga and Stavropol); five republics and autonomous oblasts (Chuvash, Karelian Labor Commune, Belorussia, Crimea, and Mari). Party membership was as follows (in percent of total figure):

	To 1905	1905-1916	1917
Workers	58.6	64.5	63.8
Peasants	3.4	3.5	8.3
Employees	32.4	27.1	23.9
Other	5.6	4.9	4.0

Data for the same years, but this time covering 71 guberniyas and oblasts, show the social structure of those joining the party (in percent of all joiners):

	To 1905	1905-1916	1917
Workers	65.4	65.8	64.9
Peasants	3.7	3.8	9.2
Employees	26.1	25.2	21.6
Other	4.8	5.2	4.3

("Vserossiyskaya Perepis' Chlenov RKP 1922 Goda" [All-Russian Census of RKP Members, 1922]. Izdat. Otdel TsK RKP, Moscow, 1922, No 1, p 7; No 2, p 68).

In this case it is a question not simply of working people classified by profession but of the most advanced workers aware of their class status and having a proletarian mentality. Even a witness such as the menshevik V. Bazarov was forced to admit in his article "What Is the Source of the Bolsheviks' Strength?" that "the nucleus of the Bolshevik Party is the flower of the Russian working class, its most conscious, organized, firm and creatively gifted segment. The bolshevik labor intelligentsia, which plays a leading role in trade unions, factory-plant committees and other work organizations of the proletariat, has done a tremendous amount of cultural work in recent months. We owe to it, more than to anyone else, the fact that despite all destructive influences our industrial life has not reached as yet a state of total anarchy" (NOVAYA ZHIZN', 25 October (7 November) 1917).

In emphasizing the strictly class nature of our party and the need steadily to strengthen its worker nucleus, Lenin deemed it quite important to reinforce the bolshevik ranks with members of the peasantry, intelligentsia and other social strata who had adopted a proletarian outlook and taken the positions of the working class. The RSDWP Program, which had been drafted by ISKRA and adopted at the Second Congress, stipulated that "the party of the working class, the social democrats, call into their ranks all strata of the toiling and exploited population, as long as they adopt the proletarian point of view."

Entirely consistent with the ideas of Marx and Engels, Lenin taught that the communist party will be able successfully to play its role as a leader in the revolutionary reorganization of society and the building of communism only if it gains the support of the entire working class and, through it, that of all working strata.

The party is the vanguard of the class, its conscious and organized detachment. "The intermediary between the party and the class is the 'broad stratum' (broader than a party but narrower than a class), the stratum of those who vote for the social democrats, the stratum which helps them, sympathizes with them, and so on" (vol 24, p 35). This stratum has its own organizations--professional (unlike in Western Europe, in which they appeared after the party, they had appeared in Russia during the 1905-1907 revolution), cooperative, cultural-educational, and others. Lenin deemed it the obligation of the party to work within them and to direct their activities into a revolutionary channel, bearing in mind their readiness to accept and ability to implement the party's appeals, without imposing its leadership but proving through its actions and the example set by the bolsheviks its moral right to lead and show the way.

During the first Russian revolution, when the working class created a new organization, the soviets, which were the organs of the armed uprising and the embryo of a new, a revolutionary power of the Paris Commune type, Lenin believed that the bolsheviks should try to assume their leadership. However, he rejected both sectarian demands for "purely worker soviets," totally subordinated to the party. He dismissed fears of the political variety in these new organizations. "We do not fear such scope and variety of structure but desire it," he wrote, "for without the unification of the proletariat with the peasantry, without the combat rapprochement between social democrats and revolutionary democrats, the total success of a great Russian revolution would be impossible" (vol 12, p 66).

The party program, drafted by Lenin's ISKRA, was the first in the history of the labor movement to proclaim the dictatorship of the proletariat a mandatory prerequisite for the socialist reorganization of society. The party of the working class was again the first to proclaim in its program that the working class undertake to represent the interests of all working people, to assume the role of their leader and to consider the nonproletarian toiling masses its allies in the struggle against all forms of oppression.

In drafting and substantiating the party's agrarian program and its program on the national question, Lenin supplied the working class with allies during the revolutionary-democratic and the socialist stages of the revolution. In order to attract on the side of the working class the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the urban petty owners and the working people in the national outlying areas, the Leninist party did not refuse compromises and agreements with other parties for the sake of attaining specific objectives benefitting all working people. However, the bolsheviks-Leninists never abandoned their principles. They did not conceal their objectives and precisely stipulated the conditions, duration, limits and objectives of such agreements and compromises aimed at strengthening the alliance between workers, peasants and all working people in the interest of the common struggle, most strictly preserving its autonomy and role of organizer of all revolutionary forces. "... No practical alliances with other revolutionary factions," Lenin wrote as early as 1897, "could or should lead to compromises or concessions in theory, program or banner" (vol 2, p 450). Lenin's party never allowed itself to forget the idea of proletarian hegemony in any revolution. "A

proletarian unaware of the idea of hegemony of his class who abandons this idea," Lenin wrote, "is a slave unaware of his condition as a slave; in the best of cases, he is a slave who struggles to improve his status as a slave rather than for the overthrow of slavery" (vol 20, p 308).

The alliance among the working class, the peasantry and all working people, hammered out by the bolsheviks, embodied Marx's scientific prediction to the effect that the working class will be unable to liberate itself without at the same time liberating all exploited people. It also embodies the familiar Marxist concept of the correlation between the grounds for historical actions and their participants, expressed by Lenin as follows: "... The more difficult, great and responsible the new historical task is, the more people should be involved, millions of people who must be attracted to engage in the implementation of such assignments" (vol 36, p 446).

Lenin taught that the party can play the role of conscious vanguard of the working class only if it is guided in all of its activities by the only scientific theory of social development--Marxism. He called for rejecting the very idea of rallying within the party anyone describing himself a Marxist while, in fact, supporting reformist views, although such a person may have been a revolutionary of great merit in the past. Lenin considered the precise definition of the ideological positions of anyone who intended to join the party a preliminary condition for its founding.

Marxism was the ideological base of the new party. "We stand fully on the grounds of Marx's theory..." (vol 4, p 182). It is from this theory that the party members "draw all of their convictions," "applying it in their ways and means of struggle and activities" (ibid, p 183). As Marx and Engels had in their own time, Lenin mocked those who claimed that a spontaneous labor movement would by itself create a socialist ideology. Like them, he demanded that scientific socialism be treated as a science, i.e., that it be studied and that this knowledge be disseminated among the masses. Lenin called for protecting the exclusive theory from the sallies of revisionists, preserving its essential foundations while, at the same time, developing it.

Lenin's entire life is an example of tremendous theoretical activities, marking a new stage in the development of a theory which is justifiably known as Marxism-Leninism. "Leninism," Yu. V. Andropov has pointed out, "is Marxism in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions and collapse of the colonial system, the epoch of transition of mankind from capitalism to socialism. Marxism in our time is simply impossible outside of and despite Leninism."

Naturally, the revision of one obsolete concept or another requires a profound scientific analysis of reality, historical experience and thorough substantiation drawn from this analysis, rather than superficial and hasty innovations which burst like soap bubbles in contact with reality and which "remind us too much of the tale of the empty barrel." Not only during the lifetimes of Marx, Engels and Lenin, but to this day "new directions" in Marxism--national, regional, and so on--"are nothing but another variety of opportunism," while the freedom to criticize the essential foundations of

Marxist-Leninist doctrine, as during Lenin's "What Is To Be Done?," "means freedom to choose an opportunistic direction in the social democratic movement..., the freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism" (vol 6, p 9).

Bolshevism adopted and developed the ideas of Marx and Engels on the need to develop, preserve and strengthen the party's ideological and organizational unity. In expanding their concept of the importance of unity of action by the working class, Lenin wrote that proletarian unity "is impossible without unity within its party" (vol 22, p 256). He unified the party ideologically and organizationally in the course of a lengthy, persistent and hard struggle. Lenin considered as absolutely mandatory the ideological unity among all revolutionary forces on a firmly defined foundation codified in the party program. Without this, the party would be like a community of people marching together without a direction or purpose. That is why he so firmly opposed on the eve of the Second Congress and during it the automatic unification within the party of groups and committees which held different ideological positions or the motion to do without a party program. "In order to achieve a 'combat unity' in action rather than in words, we must know clearly, distinctly and on the basis of practical experience precisely in what way and to what extent we can be united" (vol 9, p 274).

Ideological unity is a mandatory prerequisite for the functioning of a revolutionary Marxist party of the working class. However, it can be firm only when strengthened through the material unity of the organization, when it is structured on the basis of firm norms and regulations, codified in its bylaws and mandatory for all party members, when the party maintains a strictest possible discipline based on awareness of its necessity. Without this the party would resemble an army engaging in a campaign without headquarters, without knowing how to form a column or a battle order. That is why, while he planned the creation of a party of a new type, Lenin was firmly convinced that "it was necessary, first of all, to develop strong ideological unity.... Secondly, it was necessary to develop an organization..." (vol 4, p 357).

As we know, during the preparations for the Second Congress, Lenin firmly demanded that the party to be created be a maximally organized detachment, in which it would be responsible for each one of its members, while each party member would be answerable to the party. This was the purpose of the first article in the bylaws which Lenin suggested to the Congress. At that point he was jointly opposed by all opportunistic trends represented at the Congress, supported by the oscillating ISKRA supporters headed by Martov and Trotskiy, who formed the nucleus of menshevism--Western-type social democracy. "Actually, in the debates on the first paragraph," Lenin wrote, "the full position of the opportunists on the organizational problem began to take shape: their support of a loose party organization, not firmly united.... their enmity toward 'formalism,' which demanded that the party member belong to one of the acknowledged party organizations, their leaning toward the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, who is ready "only platonically to acknowledge organizational relations," their weakness for opportunistic philosophizing and anarchic phraseology and their tendency to support autonomism versus centralism..." (vol 8, p 189).

The party is a voluntary association. Its members voluntarily assume certain obligations, which include the strict observance of the stipulations of the party's program and bylaws, and to implement accurately and quickly the decrees issued by democratically elected party organs. Without this the party cannot exist at all as an entity. It would be unable to implement any decision and would turn into a club of jabbering Manilovs. In fighting for the comprehensive development of the democratic foundations of party life, autonomy and creative initiative in the actions of all party organizations, and party members, Lenin also demanded the creation of conditions which would protect the party from cliques of petty tyrants' whims and scuffles, described as free 'processes' in the ideological struggle" (ibid., p 381). That is why, from the very first days of its existence, the Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin, irreconcilably fought all kinds of factionalists and dissenters, considering them enemies of the party and the unity of the working class in its struggle for liberation and construction.

Democratic centralism, the leading principle in the organizational structure of the party developed by bolshevism, ensures the development of intraparty relations as relations of party comradeship, creative autonomy and reciprocal exigency among all party members, high-level organization and universal discipline.

One of the most typical features of bolshevism, inherited from Marx and Engels, is the steady dissatisfaction with achievements, readiness for open self-criticism, and critical analysis of the results of activities. Marx, Engels and Lenin shared a common scorn for the philistines and for what the party's enemies or scandalmongers around the party would think or say about it. In their time, people like Bernstein and Kautsky held back the "Critique of the Gotha Program" for 16 years, a program which even today has lost not one iota of its relevance. Their pretext, which is also current, was that it could be used by its enemies. The work was published only 8 years after the death of its author, at Engels' firm insistence. Following the publication of this outstanding work of Marx's genius, Engels noted with satisfaction that "naturally, malicious insinuations could be spread for any reason. All in all, this merciless self-criticism has made a crushing impression on the enemy and forced him to ask what kind of inner strength may there be in a party which can voluntarily face such things!" (vol 38, p 31).

How similar this is to Lenin's 1904 appeal to ignore the malicious gloating and the "nips" of the enemy of the occasion of the public discussion of the state of affairs within the party and his answer to the enemies of bolshevism: "Let these gentlemen try to paint for us the picture of the real state of affairs in their own 'parties,' even remotely similar to the picture presented in the minutes of our Second Congress!" (vol 8, p 190). It was this valuable quality that allowed the bolsheviks to do their critical cleansing work in the organization of the Russian social democrats, without which a real and efficient party of a new type could not be created. "... Self-criticism is absolutely necessary in any live and vital party," Lenin wrote. "There is nothing more vulgar than complacent optimism" (vol 10, p 355). Indeed, no progress is possible in theory, politics or organization without a close critical analysis of what has been accomplished, what remains unfinished or what has been totally forgotten in our haste.

It is precisely for this reason, rather than for their own pleasure, that the bolsheviks analyze the errors of the past, remembering, as Lenin taught them, that "one cannot learn how to resolve one's problems through new methods today if yesterday's experience has not opened one's eyes on the erroneousess of the old methods" (vol 44, p 205). Any conceit, self-admiration, boastfulness, unwillingness to see one's shortcomings and openly to acknowledge and correct them will, in the final account, not only alienate the person from the party and weaken and break down its organization but, should this disease spread, undermine and even destroy the party. Naturally, in this case we should remember Lenin's statement that to a party member the right to criticize means "precisely the freedom to criticize, total and comprehensive, as long as this unity is not destroyed through specific actions, and the inadmissibility of any criticism which would undermine or hinder the unity of an action resolved by the party" (vol 13, p 129).

Inflexible support of the principle of proletarian internationalism--one of the cornerstones of the doctrine of Marx and Engels on the historical purpose of the working class and its political party--is an outstanding bolshevik feature, which earned it universal recognition.

Lenin, who fully shared the ideas of Marx and Engels, considered nationalism the mortal enemy of the revolutionary struggle waged by the working class. Our party itself was created on an international basis, rallying the working class of multinational Russia. The bolsheviks had to face various and numerous manifestations of national narrow-mindedness, exclusivity, separatism and national boastfulness but never and on not a single point did bolshevism grant any concessions to nationalism, for, as Lenin wrote, "through its tactics of division and factionalism, nationalism turns to naught the great behest of rapprochement and unification of the proletariat of all nations, races and languages" (vol 7, p 325).

The activities of the bolsheviks in the international workers movement were of tremendous importance. They took active part in the socialist congresses, where they assumed the most consistent revolutionary internationalist position. This was manifested with particular clarity on the eve of and during World War I. The bolsheviks opposed the social chauvinism of the leaders of the Second International, who wrapped themselves in nationalism, exposed the centrists (Kautsky, Martov, Trotskiy), and called upon the proletariat of all countries to turn the imperialist war into a civil war against "its own" bourgeoisie.

Already then Lenin was rallying the left-wing elements within the European social democratic parties and the foundations of the Third Communist International, which re-created on a new basis the glorious traditions of the offspring of Marx and Engels--the International Association of Workers.

Our party carefully preserves and increases such bolshevik traditions. The CPSU considers itself an indivisible part of the universal communist army. Its long and comprehensive experience in struggle and construction is available to all. "This experience indicates," the CPSU Central Committee general secretary pointed out, "how complex are the many problems which arise on the

way to building socialism. They also prove, however, that socialism alone can resolve the most difficult problems of social life."

As we review through our minds' eye the distance covered by our party since its foundation and the successes of international communist and worker movements, again and again we realize the relevance of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the communist party as the vanguard force of mankind, accomplishing the transition from capitalism to the higher form of human community--communism.

The Bolshevik Party, which was founded by Lenin as the progressive and conscious vanguard of the working class and the supreme form of its class organization, as it follows Lenin's way and as it resolves on the basis of Leninist methodology newly arising problems in the theory and practice of building communism, has become the party of the whole people at the contemporary stage of development of Soviet society. This entrusts upon it a particular responsibility and enhances its leading role in social life. The decisive importance of the leadership provided by the Marxist-Leninist party in the struggle for the elimination of the exploiting system and successful building of socialism and communism has long been acknowledged by both our friends and our enemies. This has been confirmed through the positive experience in successful guidance of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the creation of a new social system by the CPSU and the other fraternal parties and through the negative experience of errors in pursuing a proper policy and, in isolated cases, errors in the policy itself. "One pays for errors in politics," Yu. V. Andropov said at the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum. "Whenever the leading role of the communist party weakens the danger arises of sliding toward bourgeois-reformist development. The ties between the party and the people are broken and self-appointed pretenders to the position of spokesmen for the interests of the working people fill up the vacuum. If nationalistic feelings are not rebuffed intergovernmental conflicts arise for which it may seem no foundations exist in the socialist world."

The leading role of the party cannot be enhanced merely through resolutions and appeals. It requires the enhancement of the efficiency of party leadership, initiative in all party units and the vanguard role of the individual party member. Let us recall in this connection the words of S. M. Kirov, the outstanding member of Lenin's guard: "In our daily practical work we must always experience a bolshevik, honest and noble inner concern for the party's cause" (S. M. Kirov, "Izbrannyye Stat'i i Rechi. 1912-1934" [Selected Articles and Speeches, 1912-1934]. Partizdat TsK VKP(b), 1937, p 561). The party's leading role and unity with the people are not acquired once and for all. They must be earned again and again on an increasingly broad base. They are secured through strict control over the implementation of party and government directives by all institutions and organizations--party, state, economic and social--and by the observance of the party's program and bylaws by all communists without exception.

In concluding his report "Sixty Years of USSR," on 21 December 1982, Yu. V. Andropov said: "When we say that 'people and party are as one!' we state the surmountable fact that the objectives and tasks which the party sets for

itself accurately express the expectations and requirements of all Soviet people. Our multimillion-strong people are implementing the party's policy through their actions."

The Soviet people share this historical optimism. They unreservedly trust our Leninist party and its leadership and fully support its domestic and foreign policy. This gives the party even greater strength and multiplies the creative energy of the people.

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EFFICIENCY IN MANAGEMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 83 (signed to press 5 Jul 83) pp 57-66

[Article by V. Kovalenko]

[Text] The resolutions of the May and November (1982) and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums set the rural working people strategic assignments on drastically increasing agricultural production in order reliably to supply the country's population with food products within the shortest possible time.

For more than 20 years the Pavlodar Kolkhoz imeni 30-Letiya Kazakhskoy SSR has been successfully resolving such basic problems under the droughty conditions of that part of the country. Year after year it has obtained stable and high crops and overfulfilled its plans for the sale of animal husbandry products to the state. A solid feed base has been developed here through the extensive utilization of groundwater. Even during the drought of the year before last, when the crops of many farms perished, this kolkhoz has had sufficient amounts of fodder and fulfilled its plans for the production and sale of animal husbandry goods. The farm has been steadily profitable, averaging 10,000 rubles' worth of goods per kolkhoz member. The value of the output of kolkhoz fields and livestock farms sold increased from 2 million to 12 million rubles from 1965, considered the base year, to 1982. Net income increased from 214,000 to 3 million rubles. During the 10th Five-Year Plan the farm's annual sales to the state averaged some 17,000 quintals of meat and 29,000 quintals of milk, or, respectively, quadruple and triple the amounts reached during the 7th Five-Year Plan.

The kolkhoz's social consumption funds have increased so much that the kolkhoz can now build with its own funds kindergartens, schools, a hospital, a dispensary and hostels. Such construction is based on standardized designs and thorough industrial methods, and the projects are equipped with the latest facilities. Konstantinovka village, one of the poorest during the first years of the Soviet system, has now become a blossoming, very rich garden settlement.

Delegates to the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum pointed out that high results in the work of collectives are achieved as a rule with a stable management. The example of leading farms proves precisely this point. The Kolkhoz imeni 30-Letiya Kazakhskoy SSR is another clear confirmation. For the past 24 years it has been headed by Yakov Germanovich Gering, Hero of

Socialist Labor, deputy to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, candidate of agricultural sciences and delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress. Relying on the party organization, he has chosen creatively thinking and initiative-minded specialists and heads of farm subdivisions. This is one of the main factors for the tempestuous growth of output in all kolkhoz sectors.

Along the Main Direction

"Initiative is like an offshoot. Surround it with concern and it will become a heavy blade of grass or rise as a powerful tree. Ignore it, it will wane and yield to the weeds," Il'ya Iosifovich Bayuk, first secretary of the Uspenskiy party raykom, liked to say. To Gering, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni 30-Letiya Kazakhskoy SSR, these words were not merely a metaphor. They expressed the very essence of the raykom's extensive and long efforts.

When he, a young zootechnician, was elected chairman of a chronically lagging kolkhoz, in 1959, he himself could not as yet see how to achieve a fast economic upsurge. The operative word was fast, such as to turn the attention of the people to the public farm. Where could he find the necessary money, even a ruble or two, to advance to the kolkhoz members? Without this all the plans he had shared with them at a meeting--the building of schools and kindergartens, and mandatory advances--were meaningless.

These gloomy thoughts were interrupted by the telephone. Bayuk was asking him to come to the raykom bureau together with the party organization secretary. At the bureau, he asked Yakov Germanovich:

"How do you plan to manage? What do you need?"

The chairman mentioned the need to advance money to the kolkhoz members for earned labor days.

"Well, comrades," the secretary turned to the bureau members. "I believe that a loan is in order for this purpose. But bear in mind, chairman, that you will not go far on credits. Here is my advice: try to see to it that the first advance given the kolkhoz members be turned into some kind of event. Try to make everyone realize that such an advance coming from borrowed money is an extreme measure, acceptable only because of the kolkhoz's poverty. And also that all of them must jointly take up the work and earn their own rubles. I am familiar with your farm. I think that you have many unnecessary chiefs and that they account for the bulk of the labor days. For example, you could consolidate brigades. Nor is it mandatory to have a manager for each small livestock farm. Tallymen are not needed everywhere. In some sectors results could be tallied by the brigade leader. So, think along those lines. You have yet another possibility of reducing outlays. The kolkhoz has equipment. However, is this equipment always properly used? Frequently hay is hauled with a tractor, whereas a horse would do perfectly well. So, estimate the cost of a 'horse/day' and a 'tractor/day.'"

"Now as to construction. The fact that you need a new school and a kindergarten is unquestionable. The situation with timber is difficult. Yet

timber is available. It is not standard size, it is more than half a meter in diameter, it is 'thick.' So, this accursed 'thickness' cannot be handled by an ordinary power saw. Yet, in our rayon alone there are 20,000 cubic meters of such timber. So, think about what to do. Try to present at an open party meeting all your problems...."

... The meeting was attended by virtually all kolkhoz members. Both party and nonparty members spoke. They spoke heatedly and with interest. Although small, a cash advance was paid for labor days and projects for a new school and kindergarten were adopted. And the people turned their efforts to the kolkhoz. Skillful mechanizers put together larger-diameter saws, which made the use of thick lumber for construction possible. On the initiative of the chairman, supported by the raykom, in the spring the cattle were moved to state pastures in Bayanaul'skiy Rayon, 220 kilometers away, where good grass grew 1 month earlier than in Uspenskiy Rayon. In the summer, 12,000 quintals of excellent-quality hay was mowed and stacked. It was estimated that with a little more fodder the cattle could winter where they were. Six inexpensive arched sheds with reed roofs and six houses for the cattlemen and shepherds were built. In the winter, cattle and sheep deliveries earned the kolkhoz some 100,000 rubles. It was thus that the Bayanaul'skiy Rayon department, headed by Tuley Sultangizinov, opened the kolkhoz's profit account.

In order to keep the personnel in this remote sector with difficult working conditions, their pay was raised by 30 percent compared with the first and second sections. New homes were built by installments in the central farmstead in Konstantinovka. These families were given priority in fuel supplies and feed for their private cattle. It was unanimously accepted that the people in Bayanaul were holding the front line of the kolkhoz's economic front, for which reason they were rewarded both morally and materially.

To this day the people in Bayanaul produce the least expensive beef in the oblast. They are now raising cows for beef of the Kazakh white head strain. Annual profitability per cow is no less than 400 rubles. This amounts to an annual profit of 500,000 to 600,000 rubles. Such is the result of the initiative of the kolkhoz members, supported by the party raykom. Many more such initiatives were launched and each of them yielded substantial results!

Such was the case, for example, of upgrading the structure of the herds, improving breeding and developing highly productive strains. Such work has been underway in Konstantinovka for many years. The farm has developed a highly productive beef and dairy herd. This complex project was initiated by Yakov Germanovich while he was still the kolkhoz zootechnician. The purposeful selection work led to the fact that the milk fat content rose from 3.63 to 4.1 percent, while milk production increased from 1,500 to 3,400 kilograms. The kolkhoz became a breeding farm for dairy cattle and its dairy herd began to yield the farm 300,000 to 400,000 rubles in annual profits.

However, in order to be able to accomplish this, the chairman needed more experience and knowledge. He graduated from an agricultural institute and completed postgraduate studies by correspondence. In 1971 he defended his dissertation on "Development of a Dairy Herd in the Kolkhoz imeni 30-Letiya

Kazakhskoy SSR by Crossing Siemmental With Jersey Cattle." Naturally, without the support and assistance of the party raykom this zootechnician with a secondary education, and subsequently chairman, burdened by a large number of difficult obligations, would have been unable to earn the degree of candidate of sciences.

However, such support and assistance pay for themselves a hundredfold and promise even greater benefits in the future: by 1985 milk production per cow will reach 4,000 kilograms with no loss in fat content. Plans to this effect are currently being drawn under the guidance of the chairman by the selection department in which four university-trained selection zootechnicians are involved. The kolkhoz selection workers are painstakingly developing the sheep and hog-breeding complexes on the farm and the fur animal, horse and poultry farms. All of these farms and complexes are yielding steady profits.

Let us take the hog-breeding complex. It would be difficult to imagine that this modern industrial-type complex with a purebred hog herd of 16,000 head **once** was simply a pigsty with narrow little windows and 300 mixed-breed hogs.

At that point, shortly after he assumed his new position, farm manager Khristian Arngol'd went to the chairman and asked bluntly:

"No good breed comes from bad seed, the saying goes, Yakov Germanovich. All our hogs are mixed breeds and weight increases are miserable. Who needs that? We should buy purebred hogs and feed them better rations."

That is how hogs of the large white breed appeared at the farm. The number of pigs born to a sow increased substantially and daily weight increases doubled to 500 grams. A breeding farm for 100 head was built. The work at the farm was reorganized as well. Previously, each hog breeder worked with her group. Whenever skimmed milk and concentrated feed arrived they would be divided among the groups and quarrels would break out. The following experiment was made: the hog breeders were divided into four-member teams collectively responsible for 100 sows. This put an end to misunderstandings regarding the feeds and allowed for free days. Feeding teams were organized on the model of the first team which achieved the best results. Rations improved. Special feed, known in the kolkhoz as "mush," began to be fed to the hogs. It involves the mixture of a great variety of feeds, which considerably reduced the cost of concentrates and lowered costs per quintal of weight increase by 30 percent.

Kolkhoz specialists visited the Belaya Dacha Sovkhoz near Moscow to study its experience in using food waste and maintaining an optimal microclimate in the sties. They borrowed the technology for the manufacturing of the mush feed from a sovkhov in Gorkiy and the technology of food distribution from Luzinskiy Sovkhoz, Omsk Oblast. Kolkhoz chief engineer G. N. Kiselev and mechanic P. P. Varkentin assembled a Mayak stationary feed mixing system and converted it to the preparation of liquid feeds which are then piped to the animals. As a result of all this, the hog complex is currently working successfully and producing the least expensive pork in the oblast. Hog breeding is the fastest animal husbandry sector, for which reason its accelerated development was emphasized. During the 11th Five-Year Plan the size of the

herd will increase from 16,000 to 24,000. Production costs will drop while the profitability and efficiency of the entire hog-breeding complex will increase as stipulated in the USSR Food Program.

My Land--My Wealth

Yakov Germanovich met the hydrologist Shaymerdenov accidentally a long time ago. Looking at the sad autumn fields with their darkened stubs and patches of wormwood, Shaymerdenov said:

"All that grows in Uspenskiy Rayon is straw and wormwood. This could be changed! We are possibly standing over a sea of fresh water."

Yakov Germanovich was seized by the idea of drilling on kolkhoz land even a single well. K. I. Lavrent'yev, head of the Pavlodar geological unit, agreed to allocate a drilling rig and pipes but only in the winter. He warned that drilling the well would cost 60,000 rubles, which made the chairman break out into a sweat. The sum equaled almost 30 percent of the kolkhoz's annual income. How to mention this figure to the members of the board, considering that some people needed flour or a hundred-ruble loan? Nevertheless, he did. There was a tense silence.

"There is no life for us without sufficient water," heatedly argued Yakov Germanovich. "During the summer we cannot even wash properly. We raise our cattle with meager rations. You must agree! Shall we risk it?" He convinced them and they did. Under most difficult conditions, in 45 winter days a well was drilled and they hit water with an output of 18 liters per second, compared with no more than 3 liters per second which all wells in the kolkhoz villages of Konstantinovka and Ravnopole yielded. It was with this initial jet that the transformation of the kolkhoz lands began. At that point the hydrologists themselves became interested in drilling and included the kolkhoz territory in their hydrological survey plans.

Eight hectares in truck gardens and soft fruits and 5 hectares in vegetables were cultivated around the first well. The first crop on the irrigated area was very satisfactory: 125 quintals of cabbage, 230 of tomatoes and 270 of cucumbers per hectare! This was an unparalleled yield considering the area's semidroughty land. Soon afterwards the hydrologists helped to drill a second well. By 1965 kolkhoz lands irrigated with groundwater reached 600 hectares.

The first spraying machines were tried at the Uzyum Kamys sector during the following year. The crop here reached 270 quintals of green corn per hectare, higher by a factor of 6 compared with unirrigated land. The other crop yields were also substantially better. This meant that the irrigated area had to be expanded. The economists approved. They estimated that the drilling of another 14 wells and building a water reservoir for 8 million cubic meters of water would cost the kolkhoz 400,000 rubles. Such outlays would enable it to irrigate 1,000 hectares. The additional income per irrigated hectare would be 200 rubles. This meant that the entire cost would be recovered in 2 years.

However, the farm needed more than the irrigation of plowland. Its developing animal husbandry called for the irrigation of cultivated pastureland, for the yields of natural saline pastures did not exceed 10 quintals of green vegetation per hectare even during a good year, while during severe droughts the grass burned up. By that time the farm had already gained experience in developing stable grass crops. Taking the nature of the local soil and weather conditions into consideration, the kolkhoz planted grass mixtures consisting of hybrid clover, improved sandy esparto grass, awnless brome-grass, meadow fescue and slender wheat grass. Some leguminous and other grasses were added to prevent any drop in pasture yields which could be caused as a result of the planting of some species. This is particularly important in the droughty steppe zone with its spotty soil. Together with the scientists, the kolkhoz agronomists developed a new method for improving the grass stand, consisting of planting perennial grasses under a cover of oats. Starting with the first year of the organization of the pastureland, the cover crop makes it possible to obtain substantial fresh grass yields by creating favorable conditions for the development of mixed grasses and blocks the weeds.

As early as 1974 irrigation machines were watering more than 1,000 hectares in cultivated pastures. Yields per irrigated hectare for all crops, including grain, were higher than on nonirrigated land by a factor of 8, while production costs dropped by one-half. This ratio between yields and production costs was retained in subsequent years.

The availability of groundwater sharply changed the kolkhoz's specialization. By 1961 income from crop growing and from animal husbandry became almost equal. By 1970, thanks to the increased production of fodder on irrigated land and the sharp increase in cattle herds, revenues from animal husbandry tripled. The explanation lies in the increased amount of irrigated land. Today more than 5,000 hectares are under irrigation as against 2,094 in 1975. Such irrigated land is used essentially for feed growing. Irrigation transformed this lean and droughty land. The growth of intensification is due to the irrigated areas. Science is helping each irrigated hectare to produce at full capacity. For the past 10 years new spraying machines have been undergoing tests at the farm; the cluster method of work with "Fregata" sprayers was applied and industrial tests are underway to determine which are the most efficient spraying machines. The kolkhoz has become a production stronghold of the Raduga All-Union Scientific-Production Association for Mechanized Spraying. The Orel All-Union Scientific Research Institute set up here a laboratory for leguminous and cereal crops. Scientists estimate that in the future productivity per irrigated hectare will be higher by a factor of 10-12 compared with nonirrigated lands. A real possibility exists of irrigating with groundwater as many as 40,000 hectares along the right bank of the Irtysh, in Pavlodar Oblast, no less than 20,000 hectares in Semiplatinsk Oblast and as many as 50,000 hectares in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast. This will be the equivalent of an additional 1 million-plus hectares of unirrigated farmland. In the future, the initiative and experience of the Kolkhoz imeni 30-Letiya Kazakhskoy SSR in the use of groundwater will help to improve the level of intensification of many farms in Northern Kazakhstan.

Great attention is being paid on the farm to agronomy and selection, which contributes to its impressive results. Kolkhoz subdivision heads and specialists write articles for agricultural periodicals, discuss such articles and draw practical conclusions. Anything that is new and progressive is considered and suitable ideas are applied in fields and livestock farms.

The kolkhoz has one more inexhaustible source of scientific information: direct contacts with scientists and scientific collectives. Since 1973 the farm has had its corn selection and seed-growing department which was headed by the highly experienced agronomist Ivan Filippovich Miller until the very last days of his life. He had spent a lifetime dreaming of introducing an early corn strain in Northern Kazakhstan and Siberia. For decades he made hundreds of experiments in his own garden and eventually developed the linear Pavlodarskiy-220 hybrid. In 1978 this hybrid yielded 60 quintals of grain corn per hectare over a 20-hectare irrigated plot. This crop was able to avoid the frost, for its vegetation period was between 95 and 100 days, which is precisely the frost-free time span which nature here grants the farmers. Ivan Filippovich was able to develop another strain, Pavlodarskiy-550, which took no more than 75-80 days to ripen. The strain yielded 25 quintals on nonirrigated and 80 on irrigated land per hectare.

What was the significance of these two strains to the kolkhoz? It meant the start of resolving the grain problem for animal husbandry. Here is why: the planting of grass crops on irrigated land is economically inexpedient. The existing strains average 25-30 quintals of grain per hectare on irrigated land and 12-15 quintals on nonirrigated land in a good year. Grain crops can be profitable on irrigated land under local conditions only with yields of no less than 50 quintals. Thanks to the work of the kolkhoz selectioneer, in the next few years, planting his strains on as many as 1,000 hectares of irrigated land, the farm will obtain an additional 60,000-70,000 quintals of grain per year. Currently the kolkhoz produces 80,000 to 100,000 quintals of grain annually, which meets the needs of its animal husbandry. Miller's strains will make it possible to increase the output of the livestock farms by at least one-half.

The creative work of the kolkhoz selection workers was highly rated by oblast authorities in corn selection, VASKHNIL Academician B. P. Sokolov and A. N. Ivakhnenko, a noted scientist at the All-Union Scientific Research Corn Institute, in particular. They closely follow and assist the kolkhoz selectioneers in their work. In addition to the bases of the Raduga VPO [All-Union Scientific-Production Association for Agricultural Mechanization] and the All-Union Scientific Research Cereal and Leguminous Crops Institute (Orel), research is being conducted at the farm by personnel from the chair of hydrogeology and engineering geology of the Kazakh Polytechnical Institute imeni V. I. Lenin, headed by VASKHNIL Corresponding Member S. M. Mukhamedzhanov.

The kolkhoz specialists have established creative relations with dozens of other scientific research institutes and laboratories. Frankly, cooperation with scientists is no easy matter. Everyone, while doing intensive work in his area, must keep learning to be a worthy partner of the scientists. However, this is only one side of the matter. The other, which frequently

frightens the farm management, involves the concerns and difficulties related to setting up base centers which must be assigned land, equipment and people for the experiments. The scientific associates need premises and amenities. Otherwise, no fruitful work and cooperation would be possible.

The Right Person for the Job

From the very first days of his work as chairman, Yakov Germanovich tried to make every kolkhoz member and specialist not merely an obedient subordinate but an interested like-minded person. He learned how to consider economic and social problems through the lens of complex human relations and tried to master the art of guiding them. One of the decisive skills of the chairman is ability to choose heads of kolkhoz subdivisions in such a way that they are the most suitable people for their jobs.

Let us take Tuleu Sultangizinov. He headed the Bayanaul department for 11 years. He was promoted from simple shepherd. His main quality was noted: his great concern for the work and skillful approach to people. As to his training, a good specialist, the zootechnician Daulen Amirov, a good specialist, was "coupled" with him to help him in his zootechnical work. Such a "team"--a practical worker and a specialist--proved to be ideal in the difficult Bayanaul conditions.

The party committee's work on the selection and placement of cadres to run the kolkhoz is most serious. What are the methods used? For many years Yakov Germanovich was the chairman of the State Examinations Commission at the Pavlodar Sovkhoz-Technikum, of which he himself is an alumnus. He looked over the graduates and recruited many of them.

The other method used took longer. Ever since the farm strengthened, students began to be assigned to it for practical training. The kolkhoz board made it incumbent upon managers of departments, brigade leaders and livestock farm managers to watch them closely and to recommend the ablest among them for work at the kolkhoz. Furthermore, the board recommended that the trainees showing a clear talent for organization be assigned to autonomous sectors where they could prove themselves. In this manner, the farm was able to recruit dozens of VUZ and technical school graduates who are now excellent organizers and specialists. The best kolkhoz members are sent to school. Such was the case of Lyubov' Ivanovna Usik, who was a common laborer at the fur farm. She was sent to a technical school from which she graduated successfully and is now brigade leader at the same farm; currently 40 kolkhoz members and secondary school graduates are pursuing full-time or correspondence studies.

Link managers are chosen carefully, for link leaders play a decisive role in the struggle for harvests, particularly on irrigated land. The link leader is both manager and instructor. Petr Ivanovich Ekk was assigned to head a link in charge of the cluster work of 15 "Fregata" machines, which meant the irrigation of 1,000 hectares. Typically, his sector became a forge for highly skilled spraying workers. Every year he lets go two members of his link for work elsewhere and takes on novices who after 1 year reach the skill

of their teacher. The kolkhoz has a purposeful program for cadre training. Every year some 300 future mechanizers, land reclamation workers, drivers and construction workers undergo a training course here. The secondary school provides the main reinforcements for the SPTU [Agricultural Vocational-Technical School]. Eighth-grade graduates who wish to work at the kolkhoz are sent to the SPTU. Both parents and children like the fact that they do not have to go "to specialize" somewhere in the city. Good training conditions are offered: students are given a scholarship and clothing but live at home. The SPTU branch has become the training center for kolkhoz cadres. During the 10th Five-Year Plan 540 of its graduates joined the kolkhoz. Bearing in mind that the farm today has more than 2,000 active workers, this is a significant addition. The kolkhoz managers are sometimes asked whether they fear a surplus of cadres? They do not, for in the future 13,000 hectares will be under irrigation and we know that a significantly larger number of workers are needed per irrigated compared to nonirrigated hectare.

The numerous delegations which visit the kolkhoz to gain experience occasionally ask the following questions: how is production specialization and concentration achieved? It exists, although not officially. The specialization is within the farm. The farm has sectors such as grain production, feed production, grass seed production, dairy and meat animal husbandry, sheep breeding, hog breeding and horse breeding. The kolkhoz has a large fur and camel-raising farm. Does this splinter the forces of the kolkhoz? Does it weaken the intensive development of the individual sectors? Experience has confirmed that in a large farm comprehensive intrafarm specialization does not hinder an increasingly intensive development, for each sector here could become basic in a small farm. For example, there are 10,500 hectares under grain and grain-fodder crops, i.e., an area equal to the one planted in grain crops in a rayon elsewhere in the country. The same could be said of cultivated fodder areas, which cover nearly 10,000 hectares, 4,000 of which are under irrigation.

How has the kolkhoz benefitted from the crop-growing sectors? Sales of wheat-grass, clover and sweet clover seeds alone earned the kolkhoz about 1 million rubles. The kolkhoz showed a profit of half a million rubles from crop sales. It has deliberately undertaken to intensify its animal husbandry sectors by creating fur, nutria and camel farms. The horse farm was expanded considerably. Racehorses are bred here as well.

What caused the creation of these farms? Let us take fur growing. We know that if properly organized, it is profitable. The kolkhoz had the proper conditions for the creation of a fur farm--large-scale livestock growing always has waste. The organization of a fur farm was started by appointing a skilled specialist as manager. Other specialists were hired and the fur farms were designed and built under their management. It was only when the farms were built and the cadres trained that purebred blue foxes, minks and black foxes were imported. The project was successful, and 1 year later the fur farm showed a profit. After a great deal of fresh feed was produced as a result of the development of irrigation, a nutria farm was set up. The point is that the nutria, which yields excellent fur in great demand and dietetic meat, is vegetarian, unlike the fox and the mink. An experimental nutria

farm was set up following the same method as the fur farm. It is experimental, for the nutria are raised without a pond. Two years of practical experience has proved that the nutria liked such unusual conditions. Future plans call for 50,000 nutrias. With the slaughterhouse and a shop for canned meat with a capacity for 150-200 tons of canned goods per year, this will be an entire complex which will yield no less than 500,000 rubles' profit per year. The horse farm is also modestly profitable. Horses are raised and bred here for the reason that rural life cannot be conceived without them. Horses are used at the livestock farms with mechanized feed distributors. They are also used to haul small freight, in plowing private plots and potato growing.

Generally speaking, great importance is assigned here to economic analysis and cost-effectiveness. Everyone here must know how to compute and be familiar with the cost of one item or another. Virtually all kolkhoz members are engaged in improving their economic training and actively participate in the discussion of all economic plans of the farm. It is precisely because of this that the kolkhoz was the first in the rayon to convert all of its production subunits to total cost-effectiveness. Here wages are strictly based on the implementation of the cost-effective assignment. This has enhanced responsibility for assignments on the part of managers and rank-and-file workers. The farm became steadily profitable after cost-effectiveness was applied. Cost-effectiveness demands a conscientious attitude toward the land, the equipment and even petty items worth only a few kopecks.

Cost-effectiveness lists were drawn up for all kolkhoz subdivisions. The fulfillment of the production-financial plan can be seen from the figures on these lists which are displayed in the Red corners of brigades and livestock farms. They show savings, cost overruns or underfulfillments, which make the kolkhoz members think and seek ways to improve the work. Every month the results of the implementation of cost-effectiveness assignments by all subdivisions are analyzed at the joint meeting of the kolkhoz board and the economic analysis bureau. Such monthly conferences are an excellent school of management for the chief specialists and heads of sections, brigades and livestock farms and all competing kolkhoz members. The kolkhoz subdivisions have organized socialist competition showing monthly, quarterly and annual results and the award of bonuses. Particular attention is being paid in organizing the competition to maximally accurate planning. The plan must be stressed but realistic. It is precisely proper planning which is the economic core of the competition.

The most appropriate basic decisions are made at the joint session of the kolkhoz board and economic analysis bureau. Thus, for example, it was decided that the kolkhoz greenhouse combine will be built in the Pavlodar Oblast center. To begin with, this eliminated the need to haul vegetables from the kolkhoz to the city over a distance of 70 kilometers. Secondly, it resolved the manpower problem, for many Pavlodar housewives went willingly to work at the kolkhoz's greenhouse combine.

That is how decisions are reached collectively and economic and management work is structured. Economic analysis has become the main instrument in

kolkhoz democracy, and the general meeting has become a school for economic management for all kolkhoz members.

The kolkhoz board, the party committee and the chairmen believe that the main thing is to involve the people with all farm concerns. All their activities are aimed at developing in the kolkhoz members a feeling of full ownership.

During the summer, a walk in the kolkhoz park is pleasant. Trees in the steppe...once this was a great rarity. Today more than 1 million trees have been planted in the kolkhoz, such as pines, firs, birches, and poplars. The two main colors of the kolkhoz settlement are white for the homes and green for the trees. They offer a pleasant sight from near and far. It is beautiful and cosy. The refreshing fountains spout their water at the House of Culture and the monument to V. I. Lenin, and swans swim in the small ponds in front of them. Konstantinovka and Ravnopole, the kolkhoz villages, look younger and increasingly beautiful. Of the 2,300 active members 700 are between the ages of 18 and 30. Another 1,800 children are attending children's combines and schools. This means that a new generation will take over. The current kolkhoz population is almost 5,000 strong; 20 years ago it was one-third that figure, including no more than 100 young people. Today the Komsomol organization alone numbers 400 members, reliably assisting the 160 kolkhoz party members.

The kolkhoz was able to create for the people almost urban conditions, adding to them the full advantages offered by rural life. It has an excellent hospital and two new 10th- and 8th- grade schools, a cultural club which does exemplary work, kindergartens, nurseries, cafeterias, a music school, a kolkhoz history museum, public baths, a communal housing department, a consumer service combine, a pharmacy, a post office, telegraph, telephone and a daily bus service to the rayon and oblast centers. Its streets and sidewalks are asphalted, it has stocked ponds full of fish. It maintains a boarding house in Sukhumi and has its own places in mineral water sanatoria; it is completing the construction of a kolkhoz sanitorium in Kislovodsk. Every year 600 kolkhoz members rest in the sanatoria and rest homes or take a trip abroad. In a word, "everything for the sake of man, for the good of man."

Naturally, such conditions make rural living and working attractive and contribute to the growth of professional skills and the people's cultural standards. Most people have their own cars, motorcycles, television sets, refrigerators, washing machines and modern furniture. Briefly, the rural workers have a rich, interesting and constructive life.

In discussing the resolutions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the kolkhoz members of this leading farm in the country decided to accelerate the implementation of their plans and socialist obligations and to complete the 11th Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule by producing and selling to the state goods worth 60 million rubles, or half as much as during the 10th Five-Year Plan.

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GROWING WINGS; NOTES FROM A RURAL RAYON

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[Article by B. Tulunin]

[Text] KOMMUNIST has received many letters describing shortcomings in the organization of production, labor, management, cadre selection and organization of educational work in labor collectives. Several such letters were sent from the Chapayevskiy Sovkhoz in Zhirnovskiy Rayon, Volgograd Oblast. They were sent to the CPSU obkom and raykom with the request to consider them closely and to report to the editors and the authors on the results and the steps taken. The party committees answered quickly. However, even after that the editors deemed it expedient to send their correspondent to the site; the results of the trip, it is believed, proved to be useful and instructive.

The first letter was from party member L. I. Zhirnova, secondary school teacher at the central farmstead of Chapayevskiy Sovkhoz. It was received as early as April 1982. "I have given a great deal of thought to the question of why our sovkhov director, who has committed most severe financial and economic violations, who insults people and belittles their human dignity, has been kept as manager and party member..."

The essence of Zhirnova's letter, followed by her verbal communication, after she saw the editors recently, could be reduced to the following: some years ago V. I. Polikarpov was appointed sovkhov director. Sufficient time has passed to be able to judge whether or not he could make the farm cease lagging. Clearly, he could not: the farm has continued to stagnate in all respects and operates at a loss; as in the past, unproductive losses of all kinds are high and manpower and material resources are used inefficiently.

Polikarpov should have sought the help of the specialists. There are dozens of specialists, a tremendous force, in the sovkhov. However, he was unable to find a common language with them. He would insult his subordinates, show mistrust, resent a critical remark or different views and look at someone only as being suitable or unsuitable for him.... He surrounded himself with "his own people;" cases of unfairness and abuse of official position appeared.

The new director engaged in unparalleled construction of production premises. This may have looked good. However, the director clearly believed that all means to this end were good. Furthermore, the construction was done by the sovkhov itself. Naturally, this is no simple matter. Difficulties appear,

including those resulting from improper instructions. Sometimes walking the thin line between the possible and the impossible is necessary. Polikarpov overstepped this limit. He was warned by specialists and sovkhos party members. He listened to no one...a criminal case was filed. However, everything ended with a fine levied on the director and two other officials. Each one of them paid a substantial fine to the sovkhos for damages caused.

Naturally, a number of questions related above all to the director were asked in the sovkhos and the entire rayon. Was the investigation quite thorough and objective? Was full compensation paid for the damages? Was all of his income earned? There were serious questions and fabrications, there were rumors and misrepresentations and a lengthy argument as to was there any hope that the director would eventually unite the collective, take the farm out of its difficulty. Such matters distracted, disturbed and divided the people. They wanted clarity and frank talk. No such talk--at that time, in any case--took place. Soon afterwards new thoughts appeared, one of which was especially nagging: if the director, as many assumed, had gotten away with it so easily and continued to manage the farm, did this mean that he had his protectors and patrons in the rayon or the oblast? Incidentally, was this not the reason for letters (not only Zhirnova's and not only to KOMMUNIST) being sent to Moscow?

Typical in this sense were Zhirnova's letter and personal address to the editors, in which she insisted that not all violations and abuses had been exposed; no principle-minded party assessment of the events was made; these and many other facts, including the fact that hired workers were not being paid according to their work (although their work was hardly of high quality they frequently earned a great deal more than sovkhos construction workers for the same work) poorly reflected on the social mood of the collective. "Please investigate, do not send the letter to the CPSU obkom."... Actually, after her discussion with the editors, Zhirnova agreed that there was no reason not to trust the obkom. It was precisely to the Volgograd Obkom that the editors turned with the request to consider her written and oral statements. The editors noted in particular her view that people such as the director of Chapayevskiy Sovkhos should not be trusted with management positions; he was unable to improve the farm's situation and had failed to draw any serious conclusion from the events.

Following are some excerpts from the obkom's answer to the editors, dated July 1982.

"As the investigation conducted in 1978-80 proved, a hired brigade of construction workers worked at the sovkhos. It was engaged in the construction and repair of 40 projects.... Sovkhos director Comrade Polikarpov and chief bookkeeper Comrade Balakshin did not supervise the legality of monetary expenditures for construction.... The sovkhos officials were paid illegal bonuses for allegedly completing the projects ahead of schedule."

"The Zhirnovskiy CPSU raykom bureau strictly reprimanded Comrade Polikarpov and chief bookkeeper Comrade Balakshin for lack of supervision over monetary expenditures, to be entered onto their party cards. At a party raykom plenary meeting Comrade Polikarpov was deprived of his membership in the CPSU

raykom bureau and was not recommended for nomination for rural soviet deputy.... Taking into consideration that an audit did not prove that Comrade Polikarpov had appropriated funds, the Zhirnovskiy people's court fined the guilty officials, including Comrade Polikarpov, 5,600 rubles as compensation for overpayment for construction...."

"Cases of rudeness by the director toward his subordinates...were not found."

"The CPSU raykom and obkom deem possible the further exercise of the position of sovkhos director by Comrade Polikarpov."

This answer did not satisfy L. I. Zhirnova. Once again she went to the editors at the beginning of August and brought a new letter signed by her and her husband, M. P. Zhirnov, the sovkhos's chief zootechnician. The letter cited additional facts and figures (which, naturally, needed verification). Among other things, the couple insisted that large funds were paid to "dead souls" for fictitious orders. They also reported that Polikarpov, convinced of his impunity, had organized the persecution of the authors of the letter. The editors had no choice but to turn again to the obkom with the request for a more extensive and comprehensive investigation by competent individuals.

Here are excerpts from the second obkom answer to the editors (November):

"Sovkhos officials...received a bonus of 2,305 rubles for allegedly completing projects ahead of time. The sovkhos director personally was awarded 889 rubles.... Comrade Balakshin was strictly reprimanded and the reprimand was entered onto his party record.... He was relieved from his position as sovkhos chief bookkeeper."

"Last October the oblast prosecutor's office reopened its criminal investigation of abuses on the part of Comrade Polikarpov and other Chapayevskiy Sovkhos officials."

"The additional investigation revealed that Comrade Polikarpov had acted improperly toward the authors of the letter."

"The question of Polikarpov's party membership and responsibility will be considered by the CPSU obkom bureau."

The editors received a substantial addition to this answer (and, it is assumed, not the last, for several aspects of the matter have not been covered), at the beginning of February last. It was reported that the bureau had considered Polikarpov's case:

"For gross violations of state and financial discipline, manifested in the overpayment of substantial funds to hired individuals, illegal payments of bonuses to officials and persecution of the authors of the letter for their criticism, Comrade Polikarpov, Chapayevskiy sovkhos director, was released from his position."

As subsequently became apparent, after talking to people in the Volgograd area, this news was welcomed differently in the farm and the rayon. The

majority agreed that releasing Polikarpov from his position was necessary, for it had become clear that many of his qualities were hardly consistent with the strict party requirements toward heads of collectives and educators and, in any case, after gross violations and abuses had been confirmed. Some also asked whether he should have been appointed director in the first place and were there substantial "indications" to justify the appointment?

But then, we also heard a totally unexpected view: "A valuable manager, a pity to have lost him," said A. S. Udalov, the raykom's first secretary. He expressed the assumption, without any convincing substantiation, that in the course of time Polikarpov could have brought order to the farm and made it profitable. Was this not a justification of the fact that the raykom had failed for too long a time to raise the question of replacing this manager?

Let us consider reality. Two sovkhoses, both surrounded by fertile chernozem, work side by side. Their lines adjoin. Some 10 years ago new directors took over both. One of them has been increasing its pace of output with every passing year and is one of the best farms in the rayon. The other has shown virtually no progress.... The names of these farms: imeni Kirov, formerly weak and now leading, and "our own" Chapayevskiy....

Could it be that the former was given more aid or was more comprehensively assisted by the rayon agricultural administration, executive committee or party raykom from the very beginning?

Many people were asked this question. The general agreement was that the same amount of help was given to both but that the results depended on how fully and sensibly such aid was used. And, above all, the way each farm made use of its internal resources and possibilities. Willy nilly, the conversation turned to their managers and their individual workstyles and on whom and how they relied in their work.

Everything becomes clear when compared to something else. Both directors had long experience in agricultural production. N. I. Zhdanov, the director of the Sovkhoz imeni Kirov, came to the sovkhos after having helped another farm catch up. V. I. Polikarpov, who was appointed director of Chapayevskiy Sovkhoz, had not proved to be outstanding in his previous, less responsible positions. Zhdanov had later offered to help him as a fellow director. Polikarpov had refused. Zhdanov had criticized him openly and anyone who had criticized Polikarpov even once was treated as an enemy. Invariably, this was to the detriment of the work.

The director of the Sovkhoz imeni Kirov began by combining production with social matters and has followed this profoundly party-oriented line; he is steadily developing in the people a communist attitude toward labor, the public good and their own professional and spiritual growth. He relies in his efforts on the party members, on the chief and the "not chief" specialists, the middle-level management and production frontrankers. What percentage of the successes achieved by his farm is the result of trust and exigency, strict justice and general goodness, and friendly responsiveness? What "value" could be set on a reputation earned above all through personal example?

From the very beginning, the director paid particular attention to the mechanized hog-breeding complex under construction. A few things were done in the course of the work leading to technological improvements on an industrial basis and increasing the size of the herd to 22,000 to 26,000 head. Although not immediately, a united collective of initiative-minded and caring enthusiasts developed, people who created and mastered the work of the complex and who were also learning, both on site and from the leading farms in the country.... It is true that they had to let go the first head of the complex, who was a knowledgeable zootechnician with many good intentions and words but little action. He was replaced by the young engineer N. V. Shefatov, who justified their hopes and, incidentally, mastered zootechnical work properly. Today two operators account for a 430-ton meat increase per year--as much as only a few years ago was produced by the large collective of the entire kolkhoz. Labor productivity improved also in raising the suckling pigs.

Zhdanov enjoys the reputation of a convinced economist: he loves and knows how to deal with figures and how to teach others to do so. His main "weakness" is construction. However, under his leadership not only industrial projects, housing and so-called "social facilities" have been built; he has also "built" the type of collective without which nothing would have happened during all those years. Here a great deal was and is being done steadily to improve working and living conditions, retaining in production work secondary school graduates and recent university alumni, young specialists to provide new housing for young families and make the leisure time of the people interesting and useful. It is said of Zhdanov that he knows everything about every worker: what he can do and, consequently, what could be asked of him. His respectful yet exigent attitude toward workers and specialists is considered as the main reason for the establishment of a good moral and psychological climate on the farm. A steady desire to improve all matters on the economic and social levels are felt here through the active solution of arising problems and struggle against shortcomings (which exist everywhere but what matters is the attitude toward them!). Here one can see clearly what the collective can do and where its strength lies.

The average annual profitability of the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov was 29 percent over the last five-year plan and 33 percent for the first 2 years of the present. In 1982 profits exceeded 1.4 million rubles. About 60 percent came from the main sector, hog breeding. Let us note, however, that this was by far not the only source.

Dairy animal husbandry is the main livestock sector in Chapayevskiy Sovkhoz. Naturally, it has large industrial farms and produces a great deal more milk and beef compared to the neighboring farm, being specialized. But at what price! For example, Chapayevskiy uses 25 percent more fodder per kilogram of milk than imeni Kirov, although cattle breeding at the latter is more of an auxiliary activity. Production costs per quintal of milk in Chapayevskiy are slightly under 30 rubles or almost 50 percent higher than at the neighboring sovkhov. Comparative beef productive data are similar. What is there left to say about Chapayevskiy's secondary sectors? Last year it lost 10 percent of its hogs and 25 percent of its sheep; few pigs were born and there were no more than 18 lambs per 100 ewes.

Chapayevskiy Sovkhoz produces grain and sunflower seeds. The farm is somewhat ahead of the imeni Kirov in sunflower yields but is lagging in grain crops, and even during "normal" weather conditions it does not always fulfill its plan. Over the past 7 years it has averaged 13 quintals of grain per hectare; the average over the last 2 years was 10.6 percent. In some cases yields have not exceeded 7 quintals. Yet everyone knows that "all other conditions being equal," truly good seeds should produce only high-grain crops.

An aside is necessary at this point. The weather was bad during the first 2 years of the current five-year plan. Zhirnovskiy Rayon as a whole failed to fulfill its plan for grain production and sales to the state. Naturally, the fierce dry wind which blew during the crucial time for the crops and other unexpected natural events were an objective reality which had to be taken into consideration. However, as practical experience confirms, there are many ways to counter bad weather and to win by applying a scientific farming system. But then how can the system be applied if many of its most important elements are not properly interconnected?

Thus, the amount of fallow land is far below the norm. However, even from such land good and even excellent results are obtained in the rayon in droughty seasons. Shallow soil cultivation was applied and the experience of Kazakhstan was studied. Meanwhile, another serious trouble developed in the course of the application of this farming system which, as it were, had been far from mastered: weeds covered the fields.... The famous Zonal Scientific Research Agricultural Institute near Saratov was only a few hours away. How could it help the people of Zhirnovskiy Rayon and others in applying the new system impeccably?

Who if not the seed-growing Chapayevskiy farm should have harnessed all possibilities in order to ensure stable, high-quality crop yields year after year?

The level of "profitability" (we are deliberately putting the word in quotes) in the sovkhov last five-year plan averaged minus 5; it was minus 13.5 for the first 2 years of the current five-year plan. The implementation of the farm's plan for economic and social development has fallen considerably behind as a whole; the social development plan is "leading among the laggards." All of this equals substantial material losses. But how to estimate the moral losses? Little has been done here for the people; the collectives are "aging," and the social climate has worsened in recent years.

Zhirnova spoke of all of this. The situation which developed during the period of Polikarpov's management and the low level of ideological-educational work in the sovkhov, she said (and, as was later seen, justifiably), did not contribute to the development of criticism and self-criticism. They developed labor and social inertia and private ownership feelings in some of the workers. The editors pointed out this feature to the party obkom twice. Obkom representatives visited the rayon and Chapayevskiy. However, in its answers to the editors the obkom which, one would think, should have reacted to such problems, failed to mention anything.

Asked what assessment could be given to the organization of educational work in the sovkhoz, A. I. Orlov, its party committee secretary, confidently gave it a "D" rating. Being a recently appointed secretary, he may have found it easy to grade it so accurately and objectively. He considers as the most important task of the party committee to harness the party members for the improvement of all aspects of the political leadership of the collective. Extensive work lies ahead. The secretary knows what should be achieved: organizational-party, economic and ideological-educational work must be conducted along the same channel and in close interaction; the vanguard role and prestige of the party organization and party members, above all that of party members who are managers, must be enhanced.

After the departure of the previous director, his obligations were assumed by V. A. Kaverin, the chief agronomist. He and M. P. Zhirnov, the chief zootechnician, became the actual managers of the farm. Conversations with them, studies of production affairs and documents characterizing the work of the main sectors gave no reason for optimism. Actually, in many areas, the farming standard above all, the yields of this seed-growing farm are severely behind many "ordinary" farms in the rayon and the zone. The farm has virtually no contacts with scientific institutions. There is no noticeable persistence in resolving problems related to mastering the zonal farming system. Furthermore, crops on large areas are farmed with violations of agrotechnical rules and quite frequently, mostly due to inefficiency, they are harvested and processed with delays. This applies above all to feed production. The fodder is frequently harvested and stored with technological violations. It is not suitably prepared for feeding the animals and the rations hardly meet zootechnical specifications. As a result, the end product--meat, milk and wool--is far below the real possibilities and is excessively costly.

The study of the situation indicates that many losses could be prevented with no particular effort, exclusively through the better organization of the people and the work, proper control and, finally, simple concern for the fate of what has been produced and what the farm has.... This situation should have energized the two "chiefs." They should become concerned and finally establish during this hard period for the farm proper contacts between them and subordinate specialists and the engineering, zooveterinary and other services, and bring the necessary order. This, however, is not happening. While all of this is happening, the chief agronomist, whose direct obligation is to develop in the personnel respect for public labor and production, eliminate greed, and engage in explanatory and educational work among those who are excessively concerned with their private plots, is quite openly "carried away" by breeding foxes and has continued to engage in this project, which is as questionable as it is "highly profitable," even after repeated warnings. This makes the people ask: where does the chief agronomist find meat--the staple food of the foxes? Therefore, in addition to everything else, this led to gossip about Kaverin as to the specific means he used to obtain a product not stored at the village stores. He did not consider the moral consequences of his actions.

Zhirnov as well is the subject of many grievances. He is known here as the "theoretician," for he has extensive knowledge, useful ideas and knows what

needs to be done at the farm. However, all of this must be organized by someone. It is not a question of issuing prompt assignments to specific performers and occasionally helping people to "self-organize," in order to carry out simple and nonlabor-intensive work which, however, must be done by the zootechnician. It is difficult to "pull out" from his office the chief zootechnician. Frequently he is absent when a necessary practical order must be given privately, control its execution and complete projects. Incidentally, it was because of him essentially that no cooperation was achieved with the management of the hog-breeding complex of the Sovkhoz imeni Kirov.

The following question arises: how is that after such serious remarks regarding him, it was he who, together with his wife, wrote to KOMMUNIST and asked for a just solution to the Polikarpov matter? But let us distinguish between the two. On this matter, they displayed principle-mindedness and a certain courage in defending their positions, although it was not easy for them when the former farm manager and several other people who, to say the least, were under his influence, tried to harass the "writer" who was bringing skeletons out of the closet. As to the claims, which are based on real facts, they are against Zhirnov not because he was a citizen who turned to the editors but in his quality of manager--specialist, technologist, production organizer and educator--enjoying extensive rights and bearing the burden of great responsibility for the situation.

... Both the farm and the rayon were waiting for the new director. "I shall try to assist him in whatever he needs," said Zhdanov, director of the neighboring sovkhoz. They say about him that his actions match his words.

Toward the end of February this writer happened to attend a single policy day at Chapayevskiy, which was held at the machine-tractor workshop, and at the Sovkhoz imeni Kirov, where it took place in the office of the hog complex. The working people were addressed by senior CPSU raykom personnel.

As is usually the case, the raykom had drafted and made copies of "Material for the Single Policy Day," consisting of some 10 typewritten pages. The concept behind it (which is also usually the case in practice) is that this material will be the base on which the speaker will structure his address to the specific audience.

But what if this "material" is merely read out loud, word for word, neither changing nor adding anything or taking into consideration the characteristics of the collective, the condition of its affairs and the problems concerning it, regardless of whether this is an industrial or agricultural enterprise? The temptation is great...

The speaker yielded to this temptation in addressing the Chapayevskiy mechanizers: a great deal was said "textually," on the need to strengthen the discipline, prevent losses and follow the best examples. However, also hurled at the audience were some 50 figures describing work indicators of some 30 industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the rayon and the oblast.

Yet the topic of the policy day was "According to Labor and Honor." This, it seemed to us, would have been an excellent opportunity to speak to the people intimately, to consider their concerns (naturally, after having studied the situation at the machine tractor workshop), to honor the best mechanizers and jointly to seek ways how to influence within this generally healthy collective the "home-grown" violators of discipline and wastemakers. But that is precisely what did not happen.

The mechanizers asked the representative of the raykom a number of questions dealing with various production problems and daily life. Not all of them received a clear answer and, possibly, not everything could have been answered immediately.... Yet should not each talk begin with a report on what had been accomplished to satisfy previously expressed wishes and complaints?

The policy day ended with exclamations such as "Every time they invite us to ask questions but what good comes of it?" or "Once again, it will all end with talks and meaningless promises."

Here again the Chapayevskiy people "were unlucky!"

The policy day at the hog-breeding complex was different. The Kirov people listened to the speaker with great interest. He did not use the 10 pages of "material" but only a couple of pages of notes. The talk dealt with essential matters. It touched on the most topical problems and was aimed at the specific audience. The tone of the questions was positive, without nervousness. Looking at the faces of the people throughout the talk it was clear that the collective was proud of its meat factory, labor mechanism and living conditions created for the working person, and the output which is increasing with every passing year. Here honor was based on labor: if you had done more and better there would be glory and honor for you, as well as high earnings and a generous gift for victory in the socialist competition. Many Chapayevskiy people were envious of their neighbors!

Naturally, technical progress has not bypassed Chapayevskiy. We visited one of its sections in Andreyevka village. Here plants had been built recently, in which labor-intensive processes were fully mechanized; in one of them the farm processes, cleans, grades, calibrates, and dries grain crop seeds; sunflower seeds were processed in another. Not far from them was a large dairy farm, not fully "settled" yet but already containing 1,400 head of cattle.

The milking premise links two modern, clean and warm cow barns. Had it been operative, a milkmaid could have handled alone 100 cows. However, the milking stall is unfinished and some of the equipment has been squandered. The farm is paying a high price for this: the labor productivity of the milkmaids is naturally half of what it should be because of forced line mechanized milking.

The calfpen stands nearby. It too is a good premise and the "youngsters" in it were chewing alfalfa hay. However, the hay was poured into shallow troughs and the little dry protein-rich leaves--the most valuable part of the hay--spilled on the floor. The reason for all of this was that the hay had

not been cut up at the feed shop. The malfunction of the machine may have been minor but the mechanics had neglected to correct it.

These and a few similar facts of neglect for the work and inattention to the working people, so typical of this sovkhos as a whole, were merely the prelude to what we saw in the fourth section. "When Wings Are Cut Off," was the title of a report published in the rayon newspaper. The newspaper had frequently described the trouble in this section whose village had the poetic name Zhuravka.

As early as last November the editors had received a collective letter from Zhuravka. Understandably, it was sent to KOMMUNIST for the reason that earlier commissions on the study of letters sent to the journal on the subject of Polikarpov had worked at the sovkhos. The Zhuravka people had not treated this problem. They had written and, subsequently, spoken of the difficult working and living conditions: the fact that in the early morning, going to the farm, and in the evening, leaving the farm, milkmaids and calf handlers must walk through the mud in utter darkness; before reaching the "asphalt"--the road leading to the rayon center (with its stores and consumer services), one has to follow a nearly impassable trail. The bus schedule is inconvenient and unreliable: one could reach the highway and the bus has either passed by or shows up in an hour or not at all. There are difficulties with water supplies, and drinking water must be taken from quite a distance away. Bread is not promptly delivered to the village.

On that occasion, in November, the rayon newspaper wrote that most milkmaids in this section had already fulfilled their annual obligations and that N. V. Alekseyeva had milked from each cow almost a quarter of a ton over and above her pledge. What was worrisome was that a good fodder crop had been harvested but the feed rations had been reduced; the animals were not receiving hay for there was no way to take it from the stack: the loaders had broken down and no one knew when they would be repaired; instead of hay the cows were being fed totally unimproved straw. The Zhuravka people had raised a good corn crop, harvested it on time and overfulfilled their silage plan; in Andreyevka they had harvested weeds instead of corn. And so, the sovkhos management instructed that most of the silage procured by Zhuravka be taken there, thus putting the Zhuravka people in a difficult situation.

The newspaper also wrote that for many years there has been talk of paving about 1 kilometer of road leading to the asphalted highway but nothing had been done; the situation with feed production and mechanization of labor-intensive processes at the farm was poor.

Did this article concern the sovkhos and rayon management? No, judging by the fact that after it was published, the difficult situation in Zhuravka worsened in a number of respects.

The answer of the Zhirnovskiy CPSU raykom on the results of the consideration of the Zhuravka letter, as requested by the editors, came at the end of December. It was reported that a commission consisting of the head of the raykom agricultural department, the chairman of the rural soviet executive

committee and senior sovkhos workers, had visited Zhuravka. They reported that the building of the road had been started and would be completed by April 1983 and that within the same period of time a new water main would be laid in the village and the emergency well would be reactivated; they reported that lighting had been installed in the livestock farms and that the schedules for bread deliveries and bus traffic had been reviewed.

Consequently, at the beginning of the winter senior officials visited the village. They could have shown an interest in all the other problems of the section, or at least evaluated the way the farm had made its preparations for the winter.

The farm was totally unprepared. Even toward the end of February, when the frosts, which had been late in coming this year, appeared, virtually no single important measure had been taken.

... Piles of silage and other feeds were standing near the premises. In the autumn in the slush, the fodder had to be unloaded in water, the livestock breeders said. They had begged the management to pour some gravel on this low spot.... It is from here that the women load the feed in baskets to take to the barns, and after each milking, following those same narrow, twisting passages, covered with ice, they return carrying the milk.... The barns appear to be even colder inside than outside because of the high humidity. There are cracks on the doors. When the cold freezes the most sensitive parts of the milking machine the milkmaid has to apply a rag dipped in hot water.... Let us also add that the lights along the road to the farm had burned out.

In the small office of the section, livestock breeders and mechanizers said that the problems they had raised in their letter to the editors had still not been resolved. If the new water hydrants which the sovkhos managers had promised to supply to the village are not heated, once again when the cold weather hits water would have to be brought in from a distance; the mood of the people worsens if on a Friday stale bread, which must last until Monday, is brought in; it is hard to maintain the labor enthusiasm and easy to become dispirited knowing that not far from here, at the neighboring Sovkhos imeni Kirov, things are entirely different; people are working and living under normal conditions. Here, in Zhuravka, the livestock premises lack even the most primitive amenities for the workers to change and warm up. They are not issued regulation clothing or even simple overalls. Since there is no kindergarten some women have to take their children along to the farm.... The administration apparently had decided to organize the children in a group cared for during working time by an old woman. For years on end the question of building nothing more than a duplex for the specialists has been under discussion. The assigned specialists come here and soon leave, unable to find housing. For a number of years manpower at the farm has been declining and not one secondary school graduate has come to work here.

The Zhuravka people sent to the editors a second letter in January. It reported, among others, that unexpectedly a group of mechanizers were deprived of some of their bonus for seniority. What did the on-site investigation reveal?

On the suggestion of V. I. Limanskiy, the section manager, a paper had been "drafted" and subsequently issued as the resolution of the section's local committee. It took no special effort to determine that it had no juridical force; no one summoned the people and told them specifically what work failures had taken place and the violations of labor and technological discipline for which it had been decided to punish them, incidentally, could have been educational as well. Instead, the manager "processed" rumors and gossip and penalized only those he disliked and threatened to expel (he is accused of being unable to get along with people and his favorite saying is "I will kick you out").... The workers also mentioned that there had been disciplinary violations and it was entirely likely that some people deserved a fine.

How did all this end? The sovkhos workers committee, which discussed the complaint of the mechanizers in February, deemed the paper groundless and the amounts which had been withheld from eight workers were repaid.

Although embarrassing to write about it, it was not merely for the sake of resolving this problem that a member of the journal's staff had come here. This proved to be a rather simple matter which did not require any particular outlays for lumber, nails or other simple materials or a lot of manpower to accomplish in a few days something which could and should have been done a long time ago in Zhuravka: to repair doors, put glass on windows and cover the cracks in livestock premises.

After the departure of the correspondent, the Zhirnovskiy Rayon people's control committee checked the situation in Zhuravka. While noting what had been done, it set rigid deadlines for lighting up the area, repairing the water main, installing additional water hydrants, and repairing the Red corner and personnel amenities ("the impression they made today is pitiful. The premise, as the saying goes, is without windows and doors. The animal husbandrymen have nowhere to relax," the rayon newspaper wrote in March). The committee drew the attention of the respective rayon managers to the inadmissibility of the breakdown in bus schedules and bread deliveries to the village; it pointed out to Kaverin and Zhirnov the unsatisfactory organization of the working and living conditions of animal husbandrymen in the other sovkhos sections as well.

... Neither Chapayevskiy nor Zhuravka are isolated cases. The problem of disparity, or "strip farming" in the results of sovkhos and kolkhoz activities in which for years and sometimes decades, side-by-side with farms which set a model of intensification and increased production efficiency, others continue to operate at a loss and remain weak, as though inscribed forever in the list of the laggards, remains acute to this day and for the entire country. Their decisive upsurge would be of tremendous economic and social significance, for the people everywhere are the same--they are our people, Soviet, industrious. All of them would like to be in step with progress and with the country, to work in an organized and productive fashion and to see the substantial and tangible results of their work, to see their future.

It looks as though this has been realized in Zhirnovskiy Rayon and a great deal has been planned. We see in this the profound meaning of one of the

programmatic points of the activities of Zhirnovskiy Rayon Agroindustrial Association (RAPO) which was established last year: to provide comprehensive and ever-increasing aid to lagging kolkhozes, sovkhoses and production sectors. The task is to make all farms profitable by the end of the five-year plan. More equipment, fertilizer and construction and other materials will be allocated to them. However, there will be permanent and strict control over the utilization of all resources knowledgeably and efficiently; the farms will be strengthened with cadres and managers and specialists in accordance with contemporary requirements. The party members in the rayon and the party, soviet and other organs and organizations and the personnel of the oblast and rayon agroindustrial associations have much to think about.

Naturally, the party raykom which must firmly upgrade the level of political management of the complex and comprehensive processes taking place in rural life and improve all organizational, cadre and ideological-educational work, has a great responsibility. Now, in the light of the decisions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the activities of party and other social organs and organizations in shaping the new man and the new type of economic thinking and strengthening discipline, order, organization and responsibility, become particularly important. The party considers this a guarantee for future successes in resolving economic and sociopolitical and ideological problems. All such matters where extensive work must be done require a firm and consistent policy, planning, a scientific, realistic and comprehensive approach, and true party concern for the work, the people and the individual.

The time has long come to help all of our "Zhuravkas" to sprout and spread their wings. This is an important prerequisite for the successful implementation of the party's Food Program and its entire socioeconomic and agrarian policy.

The new director arrived in Chapayevskiy at the peak of the spring sowing campaign....

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NEW DOCUMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 10, Jul 83 (signed to press 5 Jul 83) pp 78-93

[Published on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the routing of the German-fascist forces in the battle for Kursk]

[Text] The so-called Kursk salient, which protruded within enemy territory, was formed after the defeat of the Hitlerites and Stalingrad and in the course of the advance by the Soviet army in the winter of 1942-43. By the end of March our forces stabilized the front. Both sides undertook accelerated preparations for the operations in the summer. The Supreme Command knew from intelligence data that the Wehrmacht was concentrating large groups of forces in the sector of the Kursk salient.

In March 1943 Supreme Command headquarters assigned Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov to study the situation in the area and to formulate suggestions. Zhukov provided a detailed assessment of the enemy's concentrations and his probable intentions in a report which was coordinated with the general staff, dated 8 April 1943 (see Document No 1). After a close study of the situation and the suggestions of front commanders, headquarters decided to switch temporarily to planned defense along the Kursk salient, to establish here powerful defensive lines and to wear out the enemy's shock forces, thereby creating favorable conditions for a Soviet counterattack, followed by a general strategic offensive.

Almost at the same time--on 15 April 1943--Hitler signed Operative Order No 6 of the Wehrmacht headquarters for Operation Citadel in the area of the Kursk salient. The enemy's intention was to surround and destroy the forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts with strikes along converging directions from the north and the south and subsequently to strike at the Southwestern Front from the rear. The Hitlerite command concentrated as many as 70 percent of the tank divisions and more than 65 percent of the combat aircraft assigned to the Soviet-German Front.

The task of repelling the enemy from Orel was assigned to the forces of the Central Front and, from the Belgorod area, to the forces of the Voronezh Front. The Steppe Military District (renamed the Steppe Front on 9 July) was deployed in the rear of the Kursk salient as headquarters reserve. The Kursk defense was based on the extensive staggering of troops in combat order and combat positions. Five or six defense lines were built. The overall depth of engineering installations in the area reached 250-300 kilometers.

The Hitlerite command considered surprise particularly important. However, with the help of reconnaissance the Soviet command was able to determine precisely the day the enemy was to launch his offensive and took the necessary measures to repel his strikes.

On 5 July, the first day of the offensive, the enemy engaged the main forces assigned to Operation Citadel with the purpose of ramming the Soviet defenses with tanks and reach Kursk. The 13th Army, which absorbed the main strike, was heroically fighting in the sector of the Central Front. The enemy failed in his efforts. As early as 10 July the offensive of the German-fascist forces in the Central Front sector came definitively to an end. In 7 days of combat the enemy had been able to advance no more than 10-12 kilometers inside our defenses.

The enemy's offensive on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, the Voronezh Front sector, which was attacked by a stronger concentration of forces, failed equally. The main fascist blows fell on the Sixth and Seventh Guards and 69th and First Tank armies. Having failed in the Oboyan and Korochoa directions, the enemy focused his main efforts in the direction of Prokhorovka, where he was defeated by the forces of the Voronezh Front, reinforced by headquarters with the Fifth Guards tank and Fifth Guards armies and two tank corps, on 12 July (see documents Nos 3, 4 and 5).

The enemy converted to defense and, as of 16 July, began to withdraw his forces to its starting positions. The forces of the Voronezh Front and, in the night of 19 July, the Steppe Front, began their pursuit of the enemy (see Document No 12).

Even earlier, on 12 July, the forces of the Bryansk and the left wing of the Western fronts and, on 15 July, the forces of the right wing of the Central Front mounted their offensive. They encircled deeply the enemy group in the Mtsensk sector and forced him to withdraw. On 5 August the forces of the Bryansk Front, with the help of the flanks of the Western and Central fronts, liberated Orel. The same day, the forces of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod. Salutes in honor of the forces which had liberated these cities were fired in Moscow on the evening of 5 August (see documents Nos 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18).

The advance of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction began on 3 August. On 23 August the forces of the Steppe Front liberated Kharkov with the assistance of the forces of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts.

In terms of military-political results and strength of participating forces, the Kursk battle was one of the largest in World War II. It resulted in the fact that the strategic initiative was taken over by the Soviet command once and for all. In the Kursk battles the Soviet troops displayed mass heroism, higher skill and high moral spirit.

The documents which follow pertain to the unparalleled exploit of the Soviet people and their armed forces and are kept in the Central Archives of the

USSR Ministry of Defense. Most of them are published for the first time. The documents were prepared for printing by Maj Gen N. I. Lutsev, chief of TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR] and archives senior scientific associate Ret Col P. Ya. Dobrovol'skiy.

Abbreviations

A--Army
VA--Air Army
gabr--howitzer artillery brigade
gap--howitzer artillery regiment
DPK--Division Party Commission
iptap--fighter-antitank artillery regiment
md--motorized division
mk--mechanized corps
mp--mechanized regiment
oiptabr--separate fighter-antitank artillery brigade
pd--infantry division
PTO--antitank defense
PTR--antitank gun
RS--rocket shells
ed--infantry division
sk--infantry corps
sp--infantry regiment
sr--infantry company
TA--tank army
tbr--tank brigade
td--tank division
tk--tank corps
tp--tank regiment

Document No 1

Report by Supreme Command Headquarters Representative on a Possible Enemy Offensive in the Spring and Summer of 1943 and on the Activities of Our Troops in the Immediate Future

To Comrade Vasil'yev¹

8 April 1943, 0530 hours

I am reporting my opinion on possible enemy actions in the spring and summer of 1943 and considerations regarding our defensive battles for the immediate future.

1. Having suffered severe losses during the winter 1942-43 campaign, the enemy will be clearly unable to develop by the spring substantial reserves to mount a new offensive to capture the Caucasus and reach the Volga with a view to achieving a deep surrounding of Moscow.

Considering the limited nature of large reserves, in the spring and the first half of the summer of 1943 the enemy will be forced to deploy his offensive operations on a narrower front and resolve problems strictly by stages, the main purpose of the campaign being to capture Moscow.

Proceeding from the existence of forces currently concentrated opposite our Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, I believe that the enemy will mount his main offensive operations against these three fronts so that, after defeating our forces in that direction, he would be free to maneuver with a view to surrounding Moscow in the shortest direction.

2. Clearly, having concentrated maximum forces, including as many as 13-15 tank divisions, and supported by strong aviation, during the first stage the enemy will strike with its Orel-Kromy group, bypassing Kursk from the north-east, and his Belgorod-Kharkov group, bypassing Kursk from the southeast.

An auxiliary strike with a view to splitting our front should be expected from the west, in the Vorozhba area, which is between the Seym and Psel rivers, against Kursk, from the southwest. The purpose of this offensive will be to route and surround our 13th, 70th, 65th, 38th 40th and 21st armies. The end target of this stage may be reaching the line formed by the ~~Korocho River-Korocho-Tim-~~ **the Tim River and Droskovo.**

3. During the second stage the enemy will try to emerge at the flank and rear of the Southwestern Front in the general Valuyki-Urazovo direction.

An enemy counterstrike may be expected from the Lisichansk sector in the northern Svatovo-Urazovo direction.

In the remaining sectors the enemy will try to reach the Livny-Kastornoye-Stariy and Novyy Oskol line.

4. During the third stage, after regrouping, the enemy is likely to try to reach the Liski-Voronezh-Yelets line and, covered from the southeast, may organize a strike bypassing Moscow from the southeast via Ranenburg-Ryazhsk-Ryazan.

5. It should be expected that this year the enemy will rely in his offensive operations essentially on his tank divisions and aviation, for his infantry is now considerably less well-trained for offensive operations compared to last year.

Currently, facing the Central and Voronezh fronts, the enemy has as many as 12 tank divisions and, reinforcing them with three or four other tank divisions taken from other sectors, could throw at our Kursk group as many as 15-16 tank divisions, totaling as many as 2,500 tanks.

6. In order for the enemy to collapse in front of our defenses, in addition to measures to strengthen the PTO of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, we must concentrate as rapidly as possible from the passive sectors and transfer as headquarters reserve along the threatened directions 30 iptap regiments; all

self-propelling artillery regiments should be concentrated on the Livny-Kastornoye-St. Oskol sector. Some of the regiments should be assigned to strengthen Rokossovskiy and Vatutin and as much aircraft as possible should be concentrated as headquarters reserve in order, through concentrated air strikes, interacting with tanks and infantry formations, to defeat the shock groups and wreck the enemy's offensive plan.

I am unfamiliar with the definitive deployment of our operative reserves, for which reason I deem it expedient to suggest their deployment in the Yefremov-Livny-Kastornoye-Novyy Oskol-Valuyki-Rossosh-Liski-Voronezh-Yelets. The bulk of the reserves should be deployed in the Yelets-Voronezh area. Deeper reserves should be deployed in the Ryazhsk, Ranenburg, Michurinsk and Tambov area.

One reserve army should be kept in the Tula-Stalinogorsk area.

The mounting of an offensive by our troops in the next few days with a view to anticipating the enemy would be inexpedient. It would be better if we wear out the enemy with our defenses, destroy his tanks and, subsequently, bring in fresh reserves, convert to a general offensive and definitively finish off the main enemy group.

Konstantinov²

G. K. Zhukov. "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Thoughts]. In 3 volumes. Novosti News Agency Press. Vol 3. Moscow, 1983, pp 13-15.

Document No 2

From the Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters on a Possible German Conversion to Offensive

To Troop Commanders of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh, Southwestern and Southern Fronts

2 July 1943, 0215 hours

Available information indicates that the Germans could mount an offensive along our front between 3 and 6 July.

Supreme Command Headquarters Orders:

1. To increase reconnaissance and observation of the enemy with a view to the prompt detection of his intentions.
2. The troops and the air force to be ready to repel a possible enemy strike....

Supreme Command Headquarters
J. Stalin
A. Vasilevskiy

Copy
TsAMO SSSR, f. [Stock] 3, op. [List] 11,556, d. [Case] 13, 1. [Sheet] 156

Document No 3

Directive of the Central Front Command on Dealing a Counterstrike Against the Advancing Enemy³

To the Commander of the Second Tank Army
To the Commander of the 16th Tank Army
To the Commander of the 16th Air Army

Copy to the Commander of the 13th Army

5 July 1943, 1030 hours

1. At 0530, on 5 July 1943, as many as three infantry and three tank divisions of the enemy have mounted an offensive along the entire front of the 13th A.
2. By 1900 hours on 5 July 1943 the formations of the Second Tank Army must assume a launching position for a counterstrike along the following line:
 - a. Third tk--except for Polselo Goryainovo, northern suburb of Berezovets, northern suburb of Gorodishche;
 - b. 15th tk--second Ponyri, Kutyrki;
 - c. 11th gv. TBR--Leninskiy, elevation 224.3;
 - d. Army headquarters--no change of location.

The Second Tank Army be prepared to deal a counterstrike at dawn on 6 July 1943 in the general direction of Arkhangelskoye.

3. The commander of the 16th Air Army use fighter planes to cover the deployment of the Second Tank Army to the line indicated by myself in a special order.

Confirm reception and report execution.

Rokossovskiy Telegin Malinin

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f.62, op. 329, d. 23, l. 20.

Document No 4

From the Operative Report of the Staff of the Voronezh Front on Combat Operations of Front Troops

5 July 1943, by 2200 hours

... The right flank of the front forces (38th and 40th A) continued to defend their old lines. The enemy showed no activity in this area.

The Sixth and Seventh gv armies are stubbornly fighting enemy tanks and infantry, which started an offensive in the morning with no less than six tank divisions.

After artillery, howitzer and air preparations, supported by a large number of aircraft, the enemy mounted a decisive offensive from the Streletskoye, Tomarovka, Zybino, Trefilovka sector, engaging simultaneously no less than 450 tanks. The enemy's first attack was repelled with heavy losses to him....

A tank and an infantry division moved to the Solomino area and fanned out in Krutoy Log; as a result of a counterattack mounted by units of the Seventh gv A the enemy, which had crossed to the eastern bank of the Sev. Donets River at Karnaukhovka, Maslova Pristan, Priyutovka and Bezlyudovka was thrown back to the western bank of the river and chased out of Krutoy Log and Razumnoye.

As a result of fierce combats during the day, according to very incomplete data, the enemy suffered severe losses from the activities of the aviation, groundfire, RS fire and howitzers...

The Sixth gv A absorbed the main strike of the enemy tank forces. As a result of fierce combat during the day the enemy was able to capture Cherkasskoye in the sector of the 67th Guards sd and approach the Krasnyy Pochinok settlement.

The 52nd gv sd was subjected to exceptionally fierce bombing by the enemy's air force and, under the pressure of enemy tanks, abandoned the settlements Berezov, Gremuchiy, Zhuravlinyy, Glushinskiy, Bykovka, Solonets, Olkhovka and Voznesenskiy. The situation remained unchanged in the remaining sectors of the army's front....

Since the morning the Second VA struck enemy airfields at Mikoyanovka, Ugrim and Pomerki, destroying 34 enemy aircraft. A total of 127 airplanes were brought down in aerial battles and 22 with anti-aircraft fire. Our losses totaled 78 aircraft....

Front Chief of Staff Guards Lieutenant Ivanov

Operative Department Chief Major General Teteshkin

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 203, op. 2843, d. 442, ll. 292-295

Document No 5

From the Directive of Supreme Command Headquarters on the Destruction of the Enemy Forces Which Have Broken Through

To Colonel General Konev

Personal

12 July 1943, 0115 hours

In the Belgorod direction, deploying as many as 200 tanks and infantry, the enemy pressed elements of the 69th Army and, advancing toward Korochoa, by the end of 11 July reached the Kiselevo, Mazikino, Sheyna sector.

Supreme Command Headquarters Orders:

1. The destruction of the enemy group moving toward Korochoa and farther to the Oskol River, with a joint strike by Ryzhov⁴ and Obukhov⁵ from the south-east and Solomatin⁶ from the north in order to achieve the following:

a. Ryzhov and Obukhov concentrate at the end of 13 July in the area of Novyy Oskol, Veliko-Mikhaylovka, Sidorovka, Bulanovka and Slonovka.

b. On the morning of 13 July Solomatin to occupy the area of Vyazovoye, Skorodnoye and Bobrovo-Dvorskoye....

Supreme Command Headquarters

J. Stalin

Antonov

Copy

TsAMO SSSR, f. 3, op. 11,556, d. 13, 1 164

Document No 6

From the Battle Report of the Bryansk on Assuming the Offensive

To Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Stalin, Supreme Commander in Chief

12 July 1943, by 2400 hours

... After a powerful aviation and artillery fire on heavily fortified enemy defense lines and with tank and air support the striking groups of the 61st, Third and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front assumed the offensive at 0540 hours on 12 July 1943 in the following sectors: 61st A--estuary of the Nogr River, Sivkovo; Third A--Izmaylovo, Vyazhi; and 63rd A--(excluding) Yazhi, Orlovka.

Stubborn fighting developed in all sectors. Surmounting fierce fire resistance and destroying enemy sensors and strongholds, our troops breached the front end of the enemy's defenses in all directions....

The enemy is stubbornly resisting our advancing forces with fire and counter-attacks by ground troops, bringing in from behind and throwing fresh units in

the combat sectors. As many as two infantry regiments and 40 tanks were brought to the sector held by the 61st Army. At 0540 on 12 July 1943 the air force noted wide motorized columns moving on the Bolkhov-Kazminka and Bolkhov-Telche...

Front Commander Colonel General Popov
Front Military Council Member Lieutenant General Mekhlis
Front Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sandalov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 202, op. 5, d. 1,276, ll. 113-115

Document No 7

From the Report of the Western Front Staff on Assuming the Offensive by the Front Forces

To the Red Army Chief of General Staff
12 July 1943

At 0600 on 12 July, with air, artillery and tank support, the 11th GV Army assumed the offensive. Preceding the infantry's attack, the bomber air force destroyed enemy manpower and equipment throughout the night. The attack was preceded by strong artillery fire which lasted 2 hours, 45 minutes.

Toward 1800 hours, after crushing the enemy resistance, the army forces breached the enemy's defense lines and advanced from 2 to 4 kilometers along the flanks and up to 10 kilometers in the center of the army front, reaching the Glinnaya-Zhilkovo-Nikitskoye-Rechitsa-Zhukovo line.

The army forces, which are surrounding and destroying separate enemy resistance points, are continuing to develop their offensive.

The Fifth Tank Corps joined the battle at 1700 hours in the sector of the Eighth sk from the Fomina River in the direction of Krapivna.

In a day-long combat, the army forces captured more than 700 soldiers and officers and a large number of guns, mortars, machine guns, automatic weapons, bicycles and depots with various types of ordnance.

The booty is being inventoried.

After losing a substantial part of its manpower and equipment, protected by rear guard, strengthened with strong artillery and mortars, the 293rd enemy pd is withdrawing in a southwesterly and southerly direction....

Petrov⁷

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2511, p. 2424, ll. 319-321

Document No 8

From the Directive of the Central Front Command on Assuming the Counter-offensive

To the Commanders of the 48th A, 13th A, 70th A, Second TA and 16th VA

12 July 1943
2200 hours

1. As many as six tank and eight infantry enemy divisions, after suffering heavy casualties in manpower and equipment as a result of 8 days of offensive operations, were stopped by our troops along the following line: Nikitovka, Krasn. Kashara, southwest of the Teploye suburb, eastern part of Samodurovka, elevation 236.7 (1 kilometer southwest of Gnilets), Mishkin, Obydenki-Izmaylovo.

2. On the morning of 15 July 1943 the forces of the 48th A, 13th A, 70th A, Second TA and 16th VA will mount a general counteroffensive for the destruction of the shock enemy group in the area of Krivtsovo, Kunach, Mao. Bobriki (Trusovo), Nizh. Tagino, Probuzhdeniye, Teploye, Bityug, Ponyri, and Protasovo. By the end of 17 July 1943 the army main forces must reach the following line: Nagornyy, Preobrazhenskoye, Shamshin, Novopolevo, Rozhdestveno, Kamenka (12 kilometers northwest of Maloarkhangelsk station), Veselyy Poselok, Lebedikha, Voronets, Morozikha, Katomki.

Subsequently the strike will be developed in the general direction of Star. Gorokhovo, Filosofovo, Plosskoye, Nesterovo.

3. Two infantry divisions of the 48th A are stubbornly holding the line sideways of Olkhovets, Kritovo, Dubovyy, Krestyanka; two infantry divisions with the 45th and 193rd tp, reinforced by the entire artillery, will attack the enemy in the morning of 15 July 1943 in the sector Sandrovka, Nikitovka, Panskaya, sideways of Krasn. Slobodka and, will strike at the left flank in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana, Shamshin; by the end of 17 July 1943 they will reach the line Nagornyy, Preobrazhenskoye (Kurakino), Shamshin, with a view to further exploiting their success toward Zmiyevka.

Until the striking force has achieved its target, one infantry division will be held in the Yudinka, Rodionovka, Chibisovka. It will be used subsequently to develop the successful operations along the left army flank....

4. The 13th Army, consisting of the 15th sk, 17th and 18th gv. sk, 29th sk, Ninth tk and 143rd and 55th sd, with its reinforcements, will mount a general offensive in the morning of 15 July 1943 and will strike as follows:

a. The 18th gv. sk, the 143rd and 55th sd and Ninth tk, reinforced, from the Grinevka, Fedorovka, Ponyri, in the overall direction of Fedorovka, Maslovo, Kamenka;

b. The 15th sk from the line sideways of the forest (3 kilometers to the southwest of Krasn. Slobodka), elevation 253.2, elevation 255.6, sideways

of Grinevka, in the overall direction of Krivtsovo, Kunash, Staropolevo;

c. Reinforced 17th gv. sk from the line Berezovyy Log, the two Ponyri, Kutyrki, Pogorelovo, in the general direction of Kashara, Podsoborovka, Yasnaya Polyana, Bogomolovka, interacting with the forces of the 48th A and 70th A, with the support of the entire aviation of the 16th VA, to destroy the enemy in the sector I have indicated and, by the end of 17 July 1943 to reach the line Ivanovka, Novopolevo, Rozhdestveno, Kamenka, Veselyy Poselok.

Subsequently, the strike to be developed toward Star. Gorokhovo Filosofovo, Nesterovo....

5. The 70th A, consisting of the 28th and 19th sk, 140th, 175th, 181st sd and 19th tk and three infantry divisions will firmly defend the line Aleksandrovka, Katomki, Shepelevo, Verkh, Grankina, Chern, Nov. Svet, Khalzeva, Trofimovka, sideways of Bryantsovo; on the morning of 15 July 1943 the balance of the army forces will advance from the line sideways of Pogorelovo, Teploye, Krasavka, Degtyarnyy (southeast), Muravl and will strike in the direction of Gnilets and Nizh. Tagino, helping the forces of the 13th Army to destroy the enemy in the sector I indicated. By the end of 17 July 1943 the main forces of the striking army group must reach the line Nizh Tagino, Lebedikha, Voronets, Morozikha, Katomki.

The development of the strike in the overall direction of Kamenets, Nizh., Groznyy, Kromy...to be considered for the future.

6. The Second TA, with infantry and tanks of the 13th Army, on the line Soglasnyy, Buzuluk, Shirokoye Boloto, Druzhovetskiy, Saborovka, to assume the offensive with all army forces on the sector Ponyri, Bityug, Kashara, to cross the battle order of the 13th Army and strike in the general direction of Snova, Senkovo, Gremyachevo and by the end of 17 July 1943 to reach with its main forces the area of Olgino, Gnilyusha, Shusherovo.

The development of the strike toward Nikolskoye-Nesterovo to be considered as a subsequent action.

7. With its diving and bombing aircraft the 16th VA will support the attack mounted by infantry and tanks of the striking group of the 13th A in the Protasovo, Ponyri sector.

Subsequently, interacting with the forces of the 13th A and the Second TA, to assist them in routing the enemy in the area I have indicated and to prevent his withdrawal to the north and northwest of the line Novopolevo, Gremyachevo, Voronets.

The fighter aircraft will provide cover for the striking group of the 13th Army the start of its offensive, the attack and the advance.

Until forces of the 13th A have reached the line Soglasnyy, Buzuluk, Shirokoye Boloto, Druzhovetskiy, Saborovka, all the forces of the 16th VA will assist the forces of the 13th A and subsequently will assist with some

of their forces the offensive of the Ninth tk and with its main forces the Second TA.

A brief report on the readiness of the troops for the offensive to be submitted by 2300 hours on 14 July 1943.

9. To be informed of this directive: commanding officers, first members of military councils and army chiefs of staff. The remaining commanders of army staffs to be informed only of the activities of their armies.

Confirm reception.

Front Commander Army General Rokossovskiy
Front Military Council Member Major General Telegin
Front Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Malinin

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 62, op. 321, d. 21, ll. 21-25

Document No 9

From the Report of the Chief of Staff of Artillery, Central Front, on the Firmness and Heroism of the Front Artillery Unit Personnel

To Lieutenant General Comrade Samsonov, Red Army Chief of Staff

14 July 1943

Artillerymen in the units of the Central Front proved their high firmness and persistence and skill and ability to repel mass enemy tank attacks.

Following are individual episodes characterizing the heroic exploits of artillerymen.

Sergeant Comrade Sergeev, commander of Gun No 3, Second Battery, 1,329th iptap, Second oiptabr, set a model for the destruction of enemy tanks. In a few minutes he destroyed five enemy tanks with his gun, two of them Tigers....

In the 7 July 1943 battle, Senior Lieutenant Comrade Budozhanov, commander of the Third Battery, 1,323rd iptap, Second oiptabr, personally destroyed six enemy tanks, one of them a Tiger, over open sights. The battery lost 15 men killed and three guns in this battle. However, it did not abandon its position. The battery destroyed nine enemy tanks.

In the 7 July battle Senior Lieutenant Comrade Reputin, commander of the Fourth Battery, 449th iptap, Second oiptabr, was wounded three times. However, he did not abandon the battlefield, continuing personally to direct the repulsion of the enemy tank attack; the battery destroyed 12 enemy tanks. Comrade Reputin was taken out of the battlefield only after he fell unconscious....

Major Comrade Ivanov, commander of the 872nd gap, 32nd gabr, Fourth Artillery Corps, used in the breach, heroically directed the defense of Protasovo. On 5 July 1943, toward 1500 hours, under strong enemy pressure our infantry withdrew from Protasovo. Major Comrade Ivanov remained at his NP without infantry cover. The fire positions of his regiment were in the eastern suburb of Protasovo. Comrade Ivanov issued the following order to his artillerymen: "Die but do not retreat." Seeing the approaching enemy tanks, he ordered the battery commanders to take their positions and directly control the fire at the tanks over open sights; he readied the service squads to repel the enemy pressure with their sidearms....

Front Artillery Chief of Staff Artillery Major General Nadysev

Copy

TsAMO SSSR, f. 201, op. 406, d. 7, ll. 60-61.

Document No 10

From the Political Report of the Political Department of the 55th Infantry Division on Party-Political Work and the Heroism of the Personnel

To Major General Comrade Galadzhev, Chief of the Central Front Political Administration

To Colonel Comrade Voronov, Chief, Political Department, 13th Army

To Colonel Comrade Mukhin, Chief, Political Department, 17th Guards Corps

16 July 1943

.... Inspired by Comrade Stalin's telegram of congratulations and the appeal of the Front Military Council, the division troops, commanders and political workers displayed heroism, resourcefulness and initiative on the battlefield.

The personnel of the Second sr, 228th sp (company commander Senior Lieutenant Fiofatov) set a model of highly offensive thrust. On the general signal, the first company rose to the attack and pushed the enemy back with a headlong strike.... The machine gunners commanded by VKP(b) member Sergeant Panishev, fought courageously. Machine gunner Sergeant Panishev was in the company battle order at all times and suppressed with his fire two enemy machine guns. Excellent work was done by Komsomol member Sergeant Kozlov, medical instructor of the Fifth sr, 228th sp. He was at all times in the battle order helping the wounded and removing them with their weapons from the battlefield. Red Army man Chertikhin of the 228th sp acted fearlessly. He killed four German submachine gunners.... Komsomol member Avakumov, squad commander of the Third sr, eliminated a mounted machine gun with two hand grenades and thus secured the advance of the infantry.

In the battles against the German aggressors company party and Komsomol organizers are models of courage and heroism. During the offensive in the battle order they maintained the militant and aggressive spirit of the troops and led the company personnel.

Gudinov, party organizer of the Third sr, 111th sp, rose to the attack shouting, "Forward, for the homeland!" leading the entire company. He was killed during the fierce clash.

Malykhin, party organizer at the first sr, 111th sp, headed the first group of soldiers to jump into an enemy trench. He was wounded during the battle.

Troops, commanders and political workers who distinguished themselves in the clashes with the German aggressors were presented government awards. At the 111th sp the regimental commander presented medals to 14 men and nominated seven men to the division commander for awards. All in all, in two days of combat, awards were presented to 52 men in the division. During the first day of battle, 15 July 1943, the increase in party membership in the division was as follows:

- a. Petitions filed for admission...205.
- b. Accepted as party members in combat...61.
- c. DPK accepted as party members...34....

Lieutenant Colonel Ivushkin, Chief of the Political Department, 55th Infantry Division

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 62, op. 335, d. 19, ll. 508-508 reverse.

Document No 11

From the Combat Report of the Central Front Command on the Combat Operations of Front Troops

Moscow, Comrade Ivanov⁸

18 July 1943, 2350 hours

1. An enemy group consisting of eight infantry divisions (216th, 76th, 86th, 292nd, Sixth, Seventh, 31st and 258th pd), 10th md, Fourth td, 304th mp (Second td) and three Chasseur battalions, reinforced with 10-12 assault gun batteries and six or seven artillery regiments, was routed in the heavy battles toward the end of 18 July 1943 and thrown back to its previous defense line: Krasn. Slobodka, Krivtsovo, Khitrova, Arkhangelskoye, Verkh. Tagino, Voronets, Trosna, and is trying to consolidate its positions here....

2. The forces of the Central Front operating in the direction of Kursk-Orel, in the course of 4-day heavy offensive battles, after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, threw back its defeated units to the line he held until 5 July 1943.

... On 18 July 1943 the front aviation, using groups of divers and bombers, struck at enemy concentrations and gave cover to its troops in the battle-field. A total of 535 sorties were made, 433 at night....

Kostin⁹ Fedin¹⁰ Sergiyenko¹¹

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 62, op. 321, d. 104, ll. 276-277

Document No 12

Report of the Steppe Front Command to the Representative of Supreme Command Headquarters on the Enemy's Withdrawal

To Comrade Yur'yev¹²

19 July 1943, 1300 hours

Air force and combat data show that the enemy is pulling back in a southerly and southwesterly direction.

Battles for Plota and Aleksandrovka are under way.

My decision is immediately to commit Solomatin and two of Managarov's¹³ sd. The target: to pursue the enemy headlong toward Shakhovo, Gostishchevo and Belgorod and by the end of 20 July to cut off the Oboyan, Belgorod Highway in the Yerik area and enter the Yerik, Shopino, Gostishchevo area.

Kryuchenkin¹⁴ will pursue the enemy along the left bank of Sev Donets toward Belgorod. Shumilov¹⁵ will advance toward Myasoyedovo and Staryy Gorod.

Please confirm.

Konev Susaykov Zakharov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 240, op. 2779, d. 290, ll. 1-2

Document No 13

Order of the Supreme Commander in Chief on Reversing the July German Offensive From the Areas South of Orel and North of Belgorod in the Direction of Kursk

To Army General Comrade Rokossovskiy
To Army General Comrade Vatutin
To Colonel General Comrade Popov

24 July 1943

Our forces totally reversed the July German offensive in the areas south of Orel and north of Belgorod in the direction of Kursk through their successful operations yesterday, 23 July.

On the morning of 5 July, committing large tank and infantry forces, with heavy air support, the German-fascist troops mounted an offensive in the Orel-Kursk and Belgorod-Kursk directions.

The Germans threw in the offensive against our troops their main forces concentrated in the Orel and Belgorod areas.

As has now been established, the following were committed to the battle: seven tank, two motorized and 11 infantry divisions in the Orel-Kursk direction; 10 tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions in the Belgorod-Kursk direction.

Therefore, the enemy mounted his offensive with 17 tank, three motorized and 18 infantry German divisions.

By concentrating these forces on the narrow sectors of the front, the German command hoped to breach our defenses and to surround and destroy our troops located along the Kursk salient arc through concentric strikes from the north and south in the general direction of Kursk.

This new German offensive did not catch our troops unawares. They were ready not only to throw back the German offensive but to deal powerful counterstrikes.

At tremendous cost in manpower and casualties, the enemy was able to breach our defenses at a depth of no more than 9 kilometers in the Orel-Kursk direction and from 15 to 35 kilometers in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. In the course of fierce combat our troops exhausted and wore out elite German divisions and with their subsequent decisive counterstrikes not only threw the enemy back and fully restored the positions of 5 July but even breached enemy defenses and advanced toward Orel between 15 and 25 kilometers.

The battles for reversing the results of the German offensive indicated the high combat training of our troops and provided unsurpassable examples of persistence, firmness and heroism on the part of troops and commanders of all arms, including artillery, howitzers, tanks and the air force.

Therefore, the German plan for a summer offensive should be considered a total failure.

This exposed the legend that Germans are always successful in summer offensives, and that the Soviet troops are forced to retreat.

The forces commanded by the following distinguished themselves in the liquidation of the German offensive: Lieutenant General Pukhov,¹⁶ Lieutenant

General Galanin,¹⁷ Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Rodin,¹⁸ Lieutenant General Romanenko,¹⁹ Lieutenant General Kolpakchi,²⁰ Lieutenant General Chistyakov,²¹ Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Katukov,²² Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Rotmistrov,²³ Lieutenant General Zhadov,²⁴ Lieutenant General Shumilov, Lieutenant General Kryuchenkin and the fliers of the air force units commanded by Aviation Colonel General Golovanov,²⁵ Aviation Lieutenant General Krasovskiy,²⁶ Aviation Lieutenant General Rudenko²⁷ and Aviation Lieutenant Naumenko.²⁸

During the combat from 5 to 23 July the enemy suffered the following losses: more than 70,000 soldiers and officers killed; 2,900 tanks, 195 self-propelling guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 airplanes and more than 5,000 trucks hit and destroyed.

I congratulate you and the troops you command on the occasion of the successful completion of the liquidation of the summer German offensive.

I thank all troops, commanders and political workers of the troops under your command for their excellent combat actions.

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell on the battlefield in the struggle for the freedom and honor of our homeland.

Supreme Commander in Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union J. Stalin

Copy

TsAMO SSSR, f. 203, op. 2889, d. 16, l. 43

Document No 14

From the Political Report of the Chief of Political Administration of the Central Front on Party-Political Work in Front Large Units and Units for the Period From 5 to 12 July 1943

To Lieutenant General Comrade Shcherbakov, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Worker and Peasant Red Army

26 July 1943

... The personnel of the Front Political Administration among the troops of the 13th Army were assigned to help unit commanders and political workers in preparing the personnel to repel enemy attacks and to mobilize party and Komsomol members for a decisive and inflexible resistance to the enemy.

At 2 am during the night of 5 July, before the enemy started his artillery barrage, our frontline artillery opened concentrated fire on the firing positions of enemy batteries and areas of presumed enemy concentrations. The artillerymen had already studied and targeted the areas, which made it possible to destroy a significant number of enemy artillery batteries.

This forced a certain enemy redeployment and his artillery barrage opened at 5 am. The moment it started, our artillery opened a counterbarrage with a view to suppressing the enemy batteries and to disorganize his units which were taking their starting positions for the attack.

Ending his artillery barrage, reinforced by concentrated air force strikes, using strong infantry forces supported by tanks and self-propelling guns, the enemy started his offensive. During the first day he committed to the breach six infantry and four tank divisions. After throwing some of the forces against the flanks of the 48th and 70th armies, adjacent to the 13th Army, the enemy concentrated his main strike on the 13th Army in the sector between the railroad and the highway, defended by units of the 15th and 81st infantry divisions, supported by artillery.

In the sector held by the 70th Army the strike was aimed at units of the 280th and 132nd sd. At the same time, with somewhat lesser forces, the enemy attacked the right flank of the 13th Army and the 16th Lithuanian Infantry Division.

The units of the 16th sd and the right flank formations of the 13th Army held back the enemy ressure and, following a decisive counterattack, threw back individual enemy troops in combat order and corrected the situation.

Fierce battles were fought on the sector of the 15th and 81st infantry divisions. The enemy attacked with 150 to 200 tanks at the time and strong infantry forces, actively supported by his air force which made more than 2,000 sorties per day.

Despite the strong attacks by superior enemy forces, in 3 hours of combat the enemy was unable to advance. All enemy attacks were repelled with great losses to the enemy.

At 8 am the enemy mounted a second strong attack on the battle order of the 15th sd and, with the support of more than 100 tanks and aviation, suffering severe casualties, somewhat pushed back units of the 15th sd which held back along the Druzhovetskiy, Saborovka line. The 676th Infantry Regiment of the division did not allow the enemy to pass and, finding itself encircled, deployed in perimeter defense and fought for 16 hours. Subsequently, after our units counterattacked, it breached the siege in an organized fashion. In the sector of the 81st sd for 2 days the personnel repelled 12 fierce enemy infantry and tank attacks without retreating.

On the following day, after regrouping his forces and intensive barrage against the front line, the enemy resumed the offensive against units of the 81st sd with as many as two infantry divisions and 80 tanks. The division fought off the enemy attacks heroically but, after suffering considerable casualties, was forced to retreat somewhat.

At that point, the 1,019th sp, 307th sd, was committed to the battle to assist the 81st Division. Toward the evening it totally replaced the units of the 81st Division, which was pulled back on the second defense line. The reserve sector of the 15th sd was occupied by units of the 17th gv. sk.

The units of the 15th and 81st sd fulfilled their assignment in its essential lines and caused heavy casualties to the enemy. They did not allow a breach of the front and prevented the enemy from gaining operative scope for his mobile forces.

The personnel of the 15th and 81st sd fought courageously and stubbornly. The troops of these divisions, who absorbed the main strike, repelled 10 to 12 attacks. They destroyed a number of tanks in the area of their own trenches with hand grenades and Molotov cocktails....

On 6 July the enemy mounted a strong attack against units of the 70th gv. sd. More than 300 tanks and as many as two infantry regiments participated. The main strike was aimed at the 203rd gv. sp (Major Comrade Konovalenko, regimental commander; Major Comrade Radchenko, commander for political affairs) which advanced with a counterattack. The attack mounted against it included up to 250 tanks and a regiment of enemy infantry. The regiment was continuously hit from the air by groups of 50 to 100 airplanes which made as many as 1,500 sorties per day.

Despite fierce attacks, the enemy was unable to break the guards' resistance. The troops kept their word in answer to the appeal of the Military Council: "We, the people of Stalingrad, withstood there and we shall withstand here. We shall fight to the death and the enemy will not pass"....

As many as 70 tanks reached elevation 236.1 and the fire positions of the battery commanded by Capt G. I. Igishev. Igishev's battery opened intensive fire from a distance of 500 to 600 meters and destroyed 22 enemy tanks. Meanwhile, enemy fire destroyed all guns. Only 13 men of the gun crews remained, most of them wounded once or twice. Comrade Igishev himself was wounded twice. After destroying Igishev's guns, the enemy faced the resistance of the batteries along the flanks, which intensified their fire at his tanks. In his effort to occupy the firing positions of Igishev's battery, the enemy committed to the attack a group of submachiners. Realizing this, Igishev rallied his personnel and shouting "For the homeland, forward!" counterattacked and threw back the enemy submachine gunners. Comrade Igishev died in the counterattack along with virtually the entire battery personnel. The next tank attack was repelled by the neighboring battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant Andreyev which, profiting from the enemy's confusion caused by the daring counterattack mounted by Captain Igishev, took its guns to open positions and destroyed 11 enemy tanks. During the day eight tank attacks were repelled on this sector. The enemy lost many tanks and manpower and by the end of the day was pushed back to his starting positions. The Military Council of the 70th Army recommended that Comrade Igishev be awarded posthumously the title Hero of the Soviet Union.²⁹

Exceptional heroism was displayed by Senior Lieutenant V. S. Kartuzov, squad commander at the Fourth Battery. When the battery commander died in repelling a tank attack, although severely wounded, he took over the command of the battery. Crawling from one gun to another, he inspired the troops to fight the enemy tanks. Noticing that one of the guns had reduced its fire, Comrade Kartuzov crawled to it. The gun was under attack by a group of

German submachine gunners whom Kartuzov scattered with submachine gun bursts, killing some of them. During the battle against the submachine gunners the entire gun crew was eliminated. Meanwhile, three tanks were approaching the position. Despite his loss of blood and being almost unconscious, Kartuzov found the strength to fire the gun and set afire two German tanks....

In accordance with the assignments set the front units, from the first day of the enemy's offensive, the Political Administration drew the attention of the political organs of the units and the party political apparatus to the following items:

1. The entire system of party-political work must be such as to develop the inflexible firmness of the defending units and achieve a situation in which every soldier will consider it a law of life to fight to the death and not allow the enemy to breach his positions.
2. Ensure the daring actions of the personnel in the struggle against enemy tanks and prevent any confusion and disorganization of the troops in the course of enemy tank attacks, particularly in the use of large groups of heavy T-6 tanks and Ferdinand self-propelling guns.
3. Secure the high political and moral spirit of the fighting units. Eliminate firmly and strictly even the slightest cases of disorganization, panic and cowardize.
4. Promote the truly vanguard role of party and Komsomol members in battle and recruit in the party the best troops and commanders....

Major General Galadzhev, Chief of the Front Political Administration

Copy

TsAMO SSSR, f. 62, op. 335, d. 16, ll. 360-372

Document No 15

Report by the Representative of Supreme Command Headquarters on the Combat Operations on the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts

Moscow, Comrade Ivanov

5 August 1943, 0405 hours

1. On 4 August 1943, the enemy's 106th and 320th pd stubbornly resisted Shumilov; the Sixth td is fighting Rotmistrov and Managarov. Its assignment is to cover the withdrawal of the 167th and 168th pd; the 19th td, together with the 57th and two regiments of the 255th pd are engaged in delaying combat against Chistyakov and Katukov.

The 11th td faces Trofimenko.³⁰

2. Continuing their offensive, the forces of Chistyakov, Zhadov, Managarov, Kryuchenkin and Shumilov toward 2000 hours on 4 August 1943 reached the line north of the suburb of Lokna, Moshchenoye, the center of Tomarovka, Sergeyevka, Kozychev, northern suburb of Bystryy, Redilovka, northern suburb of Streletskoye, northern suburb of Oskochnoye and Chernaya Polyana, advancing 10 to 20 kilometers.

Katukov is fighting for Borisovka and, in the south, Rodmistrov is fighting for Orlovka and Bessonovka. Trofimenko advance regiments moved ahead 2-4 kilometers in some sectors on 4 August.

3. Today Nikolayev³¹ and I saw Trofimenko and finalized the action plan for the morning of 5 August.

Trofimenko and Moskalenko³² will begin operations at 0500 on 5 August.

The 47th A will remain in reserve behind Moskalenko and will be committed to combat according to circumstances.

4. On 5 August I ordered:

Stepin³³ to occupy Belgorod and begin to dislodge the enemy operating against Shumilov.

Solomatin with some of Managarov's forces to advance toward Mikoyanovka.

Rotmistrov and Katukov to advance decisively to the Grayvoron, Zlochev, Kazachya, Lopan line.

Chistyakov's army to capture Tomarovka and to begin to move the front from east to west.

Trofimenko will operate in the general direction of Grayvoron, and Moskalenko will operate on Trofimenko's right.

Yur'yev

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 203, op. 2777, d. 89, l. 92-94

Document No 16

From the Combat Report of the Bryansk Front Command to the Supreme Commander in Chief on the Liberation of Orel

To the Supreme Commander in Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Stalin

5 August 1943, by 2400 hours

... On 5 August 1943, the forces of the Bryansk Front continued their offensive in pursuit of withdrawing enemy forces in the center and along the left wing.

After stubborn battles on the approaches of Orel and fierce 2-day battles in the city, at 0600 on 5 August 1943 Orel was totally cleared from the occupation forces by the troops of the Third and 63rd armies.

More than 100,000 civilians who had suffered in German slavery for 22 months were liberated in Orel.

Substantial booty is being inventoried. As many as 200 fascists were taken prisoner....

Front Commander Colonel General Popov
Front Military Council Member Lieutenant General Mekhlis
Front Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sandalov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 202, op. 5, d. 1,276, ll. 220-220 reverse.

Document No 17

From the Order of the Commander of the Steppe Front for Advance and Capture of Belgorod

To the Commanders of the 53rd, 67th and Seventh Guards Armies

Copies to: Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Zhukov
The Chief of the Red Army General Staff
The Commander of the Voronezh Front

5 August 1943, 0200 hours

1. As a result of the successful breach by the front troops of the two enemy defense lines, the enemy is retreating to the southwest and is trying to hold back our offensive along intermediary lines. The forces of the Voronezh Front are successfully developing their offensive. By the end of 4 August the front's left wing reached the Bessonovka area.

I hereby order:

a. The commander of the 53rd Army, with one mk to sweep off and destroy in a headlong and strong push the Sixth td of the enemy and to pursue him energetically in the direction of Mikoyanovka.

By the end of 5 August 1943 the army must reach Dolbino station, site 205.9 excluding Tavrovo.

With a strike from the army right flank, the immediate task of the first mk by 1000 hours on 5 August is to reach Reynoye sector and to cut off the enemy's withdrawal to the south and the southwest. The subsequent task of the corps is to continue with its energetic offensive in the general direction of Mikoyanovka and by the end of 5 August, to capture Mikoyanovka, Varvarovka and Boldyrevka.

Contact to be made with units of the Fifth Tank Army....

b. The commander of the 69th Army must destroy with a decisive strike the units covering the enemy and to capture Belgorod on 5 August.

By the end of 5 August breach the Krasnoye, Koloniya-Dubovoye line.

c. At dawn on 5 August, the commander of the 7th gv army, to breach the enemy defenses and toward the end of the day to reach the Koloniya-Dubovoye, Tavrovo, Brodok line and, together with units of the 69th A to surround the Belgorod enemy group. To secure the operation for the defeat of the Belgorod enemy group from the south with no less than three divisions along the line Novaya Nelidovka, Prodok, Toplinka.

2. I draw the attention of the army commanders to the need decisively to eliminate the lagging of the artillery behind the infantry. This is extremely important in exploiting the success achieved after the breaching of enemy defenses.

All of our artillery is motorized and with sufficient persistence on the part of the commanders could move quickly.

I demand that an artillery strike and artillery fire be rapidly organized in the course of the pursuit, thus preventing the enemy from assuming intermediary positions.

3. In pursuit of the withdrawing enemy, to change troop control methods. The staffs of regiments and divisions must come closer to the troops. The army staffs must direct divisions and corps more flexibly, using the radio and mobile facilities and communications aircraft.

4. I demand of the troops daring maneuvers and the bypassing of enemy strongpoints instead of attacking them frontally and thus slowing down the pace of the offensive.

5. Commanders of corps, divisions and regiments to be informed of items 2, 3 and 4 of the present order.

6. Report execution.

Konev Zakharov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 240, op. 178508, d. 2, ll. 13-17

Document No 18

Report by the Command of the Steppe Front on the Liberation of Belgorod

Moscow, Comrade Ivanov

5 August 1943

I hereby report that toward 1800 hours on 5 August 1943, as a result of fierce battles the troops of the Steppe Front and units of the 69th Army captured Belgorod by storming. Battles are under way for the destruction of remaining enemy groups in the western part of the city.

In the battle for Belgorod the enemy lost as many as 3,200 killed alone.

Ammunition and engineering equipment depots were seized in the city. The booty is being inventoried.

Konev Susaykov Zakharov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 240, op. 2,779, d. 290, l. 40

FOOTNOTES

1. Vasil'ye--J. V. Stalin's alias.
2. Konstantinov--alias of Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, Supreme Command Headquarters representative.
3. The counterstrike on the advancing enemy group on 6 July 1943 was dealt by elements of the 13th and Second tank armies, 19th Tank Corps and the aircraft of the 16th Air Army. The Hitlerite offensive was stopped.
4. A. I. Ryzhov--major general commander of the 47th Army.
5. V. T. Obukhov--major general of tank troops, commander of the Third Guards Mechanized Corps.
6. M. D. Solomatin--lieutenant general of tank troops, commander of the first mechanized corps.
7. Petrov--alias of Lt Gen A. P. Pokrovskiy, chief of staff of the Western Front.
8. Ivanov--alias of J. V. Stalin.
9. Kostin--alias of Army Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy, commander of the Central Front.

10. Fedin--alias of Maj Gen K. F. Telegin, member of the Military Council of the Central Front.
11. Sergiyenko--alias of Lt Gen M. S. Malinin, chief of staff of the Central Front.
12. Yur'yev--alias of Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, representative of Supreme Command Headquarters.
13. I. M. Managarov--major general, commander of the 53rd Army.
14. V. D. Kryuchenkin--major general, commander of the 69th Army.
15. M. S. Shumilov--lieutenant general, commander of the Seventh Guards Army.
16. N. P. Pukhov--lieutenant general commander of the 13th Army.
17. I. V. Galanin--lieutenant general commander of the 70th Army.
18. A. G. Rodin--lieutenant general of tank troops, commander of the Second Tank Army.
19. P. L. Romanenko--lieutenant general, commander of the 48th Army.
20. V. Ya. Kolpakchi--lieutenant general, commander of the 63rd Army.
21. I. M. Chistyakov--lieutenant general, commander of the Sixth Guards Army.
22. M. Ye. Katukov--lieutenant general, commander of the First Tank Army.
23. P. A. Rotmistrov--lieutenant general, commander of the Fifth Guards Tank Army.
24. A. S. Zhadov--lieutenant general, commander of the Fifth Guards Army.
25. A. Ye. Golovanov--aviation colonel general, commander of long-range aviation.
26. S. A. Krasovskiy--aviation lieutenant, commander of the Second Air Army.
27. S. I. Rudenko--aviation lieutenant general, commander of the 16th Air Army.
28. N. F. Naumenko--aviation lieutenant general, commander of the 15th Air Army.
29. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was posthumously awarded to G. I. Igishev by Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, dated 17 August 1943.

30. S. G. Trofimenko--lieutenant general, commander of the 27th Army.
31. Nikolayev--alias of Army Gen N. F. Vatutin, commander of the Voronezh Front.
32. K. S. Moskalenko--lieutenant general, commander of the 40th Army.
33. Stepin--alias of Col Gen I. S. Konev, commander of the Steppe Front.

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REAL SOURCE OF THREAT TO PEACE

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[Article by V. Bogdanov and A. Podberezkin]

[Text] The tireless efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet state, aimed at strengthening peace, are meeting with the approval and support of the broadest possible strata throughout the world. The results of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the USSR Supreme Soviet session and the plenum speech by Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, proved clearly once again that the safeguard of peace on earth, both today and in the foreseeable future, is and will remain the invariable main objective of our country's foreign policy. "Our objective," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov stressed, "is not merely to prevent war. We aspire toward the radical improvement of international relations and the strengthening and development of all good principles in such relations."

The specific foreign political actions taken by the Soviet Union in restraining the arms race, such as the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which was unilaterally adopted by our country, terminating the deployment of new medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR, and others, confirm the purposefulness and consistency with which our country is pursuing this line.

Recently the Soviet Union launched another outstanding peace initiative of universal significance in the matter of restraining the nuclear missile armaments race. By USSR Supreme Soviet decree the Soviet government turned to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and the People's Republic of China with the suggestion that all nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union above all, freeze as of 1 January 1984 their nuclear armaments, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This easily attainable as well as highly effective step would create optimal conditions for the conduct of further talks on arms limitation and reduction.

Soviet foreign policy initiatives and the programmatic speeches by the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state are imbued with deep concern for the fate of peace. Their substantiation and principle-mindedness and calm and confident purposefulness are in sharp contrast to the irresponsible and aggressive declarations coming out of the White House, in which, hiding behind the smokescreen of claims of the "Soviet military threat," or the imaginary "lagging" of the United States, Washington tries to conceal its true

intentions. The real facts confirm the feverish efforts of the Reagan administration to increase the military power of the United States and its aspiration to update dramatically and purposefully the American military potential, the nuclear above all, during the 1980s, in order to reach a new level of power and lay the material foundation which would support the claims of overseas monopoly capital to world hegemony. The actions of the current leadership, as such facts indicate, directly increases the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war and a new spiral in the unrestrained arms race which threatens all mankind with catastrophic consequences. Today there is no more vital international problem than restraining the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race above all. This has been repeatedly and most seriously emphasized by the Soviet Union on a high level. This was also firmly pointed out to the entire world by the heads of Warsaw Pact member countries at the January conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Prague. "The task of restraining the arms race and converting to disarmament, nuclear in particular, holds the main position in the struggle for the prevention of war."

The relevance and effectiveness of this program were fully confirmed at the meeting among heads of party and state leaders of the members of the socialist commonwealth, which was held in Moscow on 28 June 1983. The participants in the meeting reemphasize that they "consider as a key problem of our time putting an end to the arms race as soon as possible and converting to disarmament, nuclear in particular. They believe that everything possible should be done to reach these vital objectives for the sake of safeguarding peace, civilization and life on earth."

I

What is the specific nature of this stage in the arms race into which American imperialism is trying to involve today the entire world? How is it manifested and what are the specific military-strategic objectives pursued by U.S. militaristic circles?

Let us immediately point out that the American military assigns strategic weapons a special role in its plans. Several reasons explain this. According to American military circles, strategic weapons are potentially able to resolve faster, so to say, expansionist assignments, which cannot be achieved with any other weapon. Therefore, it is hoped that strategic nuclear weapons will become an active, one could say a decisive instrument of aggressive foreign policy.

In developing its nuclear potential, the United States is pursuing far-reaching objectives. Above all, it is considered as the basic instrument which, as the American rulers believe, could contribute to the resolution of the historical dispute between socialism and imperialism by force. The nuclear weapon is assigned the role of direct tool for the political blackmail of the socialist countries and the possibility of its combat use is not excluded. Economic considerations as well play a major role in the strategic armaments race mounted by U.S. imperialism. The task of creating additional difficulties for the economies of the USSR and the other socialist countries, and to

force them to reallocate increasingly greater resources for the war industry is formulated by the aggressive U.S. and NATO circles for the sake of the same strategic objective: the undermining of socialism as a sociopolitical, governmental and ideological system. Washington is unhesitatingly computing the number of economic programs of the Soviet Union which could be spoiled in this manner at the present stage. The existence of such computations, which are based on imaginary and unattainable plans, introduces additional elements of tension in the situation and worsens the threat of a nuclear conflict.

Today's rulers of the United States have set themselves the objective of achieving the type of superiority over the Soviet Union which would make it possible to use quite freely and on a global scale the American military machine in the suppression of the national liberation and progressive movements in the liberated countries. At the same time, Washington is continuing to make use of its nuclear arsenal as a foreign policy instrument in relations with its allies. The strategic superiority in the Western world, enjoyed by the United States above all thanks to its huge nuclear potential, enables the American ruling circles largely to compensate for the decline in the political and economic share of the United States in the capitalist part of the world, to pressure its partners and allies in the areas of many strategic problems and to involve them in the orbit of the arms race and the campaign for the promotion of a military psychosis.

Apparently, the ruling upper crust in the United States proceeds from the fact that qualitative changes in the basic indicators of nuclear weapon efficiency took place in the 1960s and 1970s, which make it possible to use such weapons in combat circumstances. As a result, changes in Washington's strategic doctrines are taking place literally under our own eyes, increasingly directed toward operations for war with the use of nuclear weapons. "The formulation (by the United States and some of its allies--the author) of new military programs," we read in the Political Declaration of Warsaw Pact Members, "is inseparably tied to the escalation of strategic concepts and doctrines--"first disarming nuclear strike," "limited nuclear war," "protracted nuclear conflict," and others."

Whatever the nature of the concepts of waging nuclear warfare may be currently developing in Washington, in the final account they may be essentially reduced to two. According to the first, nuclear warfare may be started by Washington in a specific area (Europe is considered the most likely). In other words, it would be geographically limited. It is assumed that such a war would most likely be initiated by the United States with the use of tactical nuclear weapons targeted against the armed forces, troop control centers and other militarily, politically and administratively important targets in the socialist countries. According to the second, a nuclear war may be initiated as a result of a direct military clash between the United States and the USSR, in the course of which, in the first stage, both countries will use their strategic forces. However, it would be possible to "limit" the choice of targets to sites considered most important from the military and political viewpoints, such as the enemy's strategic forces (bases, airfields, missile-launching sites, military and political control centers, communications, etc.), together with concentrations of conventional non-nuclear armed forces.

The two concepts share a number of similar features. To begin with, as the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Members notes, they are "based on the consideration that by using first nuclear weapons victory may be won in a nuclear war." Secondly, the opposite side is already trying on a preliminary basis to impose a certain scenario for waging nuclear war, somehow legalizing it. Thirdly, persistent efforts are being made to accustom the popular masses to the idea that in some circumstances nuclear weapons could and should be used in the course of military operations. Fourthly, quite important, both concepts stipulate the possibility of waging not only "limited" but "protracted" wars. At each separate stage of such a war (or its escalation) it is presumed that the United States will make numerous nuclear strikes using from a few to thousands of nuclear charges. Finally, the formulation of such concepts also includes the prospect of waging (shielded by the "nuclear umbrella") "conventional," non-nuclear wars in various parts of the globe.

The absurdity and the danger of such ideas are obvious. Given the current strategic situation, waging "limited" wars is as impossible as it would be today or in the foreseeable future to deal a "disarming" nuclear blow at the opposite side. Regardless of the scenarios for nuclear war which may be formulated overseas or the arguments in their support which may be raised, the aggressor would be unable to avoid a crushing retaliatory strike. As was justifiably pointed out in the authoritative report of the so-called independent commission on problems of disarmament and security, chaired by O. Palme, "regardless of the number of new types of weapons which a country may add to its arsenal, it cannot reduce its vulnerability. No known technology can even potentially ensure the effective and reliable protection of the population from nuclear attack."

Unquestionably, any hopes that the aggressive American imperialist circles may have for a possible victory in a nuclear war are illusory. However, Washington continues to believe in its ability to create the type of strategic arsenal with the help of which, as the transoceanic strategists assume, it would be possible if not to reach the cherished goal--the combat use of nuclear weapons with impunity--at least to create the threat of its use, i.e., to force the enemy to take this possibility into consideration with the help of political blackmail. In any case, Washington's line is dangerous for it leads to a continuing unrestrained arms race, weakens the stability of the military strategic situation, increases international tension and worsens relations among countries and, in the future, may even raise the question of the very possibility of terminating or even restricting the arms race through international agreements.

Already now, as a result of the rapid improvements in armaments, a situation is developing in which the question of international control over the execution of possible agreements on banning or limiting them has become substantially more complex. Weapons systems are being developed which seem to be teetering between nuclear and conventional weapons. The threat of the appearance of essentially new types of weapons, which could drastically change the scale and means of conducting combat operations, may appear. Furthermore, the increased complexity of existing armament systems leads to the fact

that in assessing the ratios of military forces, qualitative characteristics, which are the most difficult to control, are beginning to play a special and occasionally primary role.

The United States is planning the strategic armament race on a long-term basis, perhaps even decades. Thus, currently concepts governing their development are structured in accordance with possible U.S. foreign policy requirements in the 21st century. At the same time, the U.S. military-political centers clearly realize that the possibility of developing new even particularly effective weapons potentially means that the other side will develop similar possibilities. The target, therefore, is not the creation of some kind of "absolute" weapon but the steady development of new types of armaments faster than the other side and thus maintaining a permanent military-strategic superiority.

This feature is characteristic of the current stage in the arms race, in which the United States is relying on the development of supermodern technological bases for the creation of increasing complex armament systems in the future. An example of this is found in all currently announced Pentagon military programs.

II

As we pointed out, strategic nuclear weapons have played, play and will apparently continue to play in the forthcoming decades a special role in the American arsenal among the other types of armaments used in U.S. foreign policy. According to published data, by the middle of this year the United States had already stockpiled more than 10,000 units of strategic nuclear ammunition. Currently, concealed behind provocative propaganda slogans regarding the "Soviet military threat," a new stage in improving the U.S. strategic potential has been initiated.

From the military-technical viewpoint, four basic groups of qualitative characteristics may be singled out, which the American military-political leadership is trying to improve. The first is to increase the accuracy of the targeting of the warheads, the direction of the nuclear explosion, the power and its reliability. Second, to deploy by the end of the 1980s a new generation of means of delivery of nuclear ammunition--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-based ballistic missiles (SBM), strategic aviation and long-range cruise missiles and considerably improving their efficiency. Third, increasing the invulnerability of its own strategic nuclear forces by further strengthening and increasing the mobility of launching systems and improving the communications, control and guidance systems of strategic forces. Fourth, increasing the "flexibility" in the use of strategic forces in the different theaters of military operations or, "generalizing" the strategic potential, thus making possible its utilization in military conflicts of different scale and objectives. A typical example in this connection are the plans for the use of long-range cruise missiles and strategic bombers armed not with nuclear charges but "conventional" explosives.

According to the administration itself, Reagan's strategic program includes five basic interrelated components:

1. Modernizing and creating new ground-based ICBM systems. This program is based on the development of the new MX missiles. According to the latest plan approved by the White House, the making of 100 such missiles is contemplated. By equipping the American army with MX missiles, the first test of which was conducted by the Pentagon last month, Washington would like to create the type of strategic potential which, the American strategists hope, will guarantee the United States, in their opinion, at a given stage in the development of a nuclear conflict, the ability efficiently to continue the war from the positions of decisive superiority. In order to develop weapons to counter the MX missile, in Washington's opinion, the USSR would be forced seriously to reallocate its material resources. This is part of the concepts formulated in the American capital of draining the resources of the USSR in the course of the arms race. The plan of arming the United States with 100 MX missiles does not mean that the older missiles would be withdrawn. The question of withdrawing some of them is frankly linked by the Reagan administration to any "success" at the Geneva talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments, which the White House is purposefully trying to lead to an impasse and, consequently, wreck.

2. Radical reconstruction of the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet, which includes a number of programs, the purpose of which is increased reliance on American strategic forces deployed in the world's oceans. Such programs would include, in their first stage, the reequipping of 12 Poseidon submarines with Trident-1 missiles and subsequently deploying an essentially qualitatively new submarine fleet based on Ohio-class submarines equipped with Trident-2 SBM, which, it is believed, could be deployed as early as 1987-1988. The building of 20 such submarines is planned (funds have already been appropriated for nine), each one of which will carry a total of 192 nuclear warheads. Three Trident-type submarines are already operational. Incidentally, the Pentagon considers the Trident-2 as a future universal system which could be used for strikes against USSR territory from sea and land alike. At the same time, starting with the 1984 fiscal year, the deployment of 100 cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads will be undertaken aboard submarines. This, in itself, means the creation of a new strategic potential. All in all, by 1989, the American navy submarines and ships will carry 3,995 cruise missiles equipped with nuclear and conventional warheads.

3. Considerable updating of existing Air Force systems and development of new types of strategic aviation aircraft. This program, planned for the 1990s, includes arming the current strategic bombers with 3,500 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads; the building of 100 strategic B-1B bombers, starting with the mid-1980s, and arming them with the latest cruise missiles; completing by 1990 the new Stealth bomber, which will be armed with a new generation cruise missile with a range of almost 10,000 kilometers, considerably faster and more accurate; producing in the immediate future new missile armed airplanes which could carry as many as 72 cruise missiles each; arming with cruise missiles all remaining B-52 bombers.

4. Particular emphasis is put on improving the command, control and communications systems. The development of a new warning, operative control and communications system which, in the Pentagon's estimates, would make possible the waging of "limited" as well as "protracted" nuclear warfare. In particular, Washington is planning the creation of a control and command system which could operate long after any first nuclear strike.

5. Finally, it is a question of Reagan's plans for the development of anti-missile and antispace defense systems and improving the current air defense system. This would open the gate to the race for nuclear weapons of all types.

A comparison between the situation in mid-1981 with mid-1985 we can easily see that within a 4-year period Washington intends to increase the number of means of delivery of strategic weapons from 1,993 to at least 2,129 and the number of warheads from 9,753 to 12,839 (increasing the number of MIRV from 6,450 to 9,992). This increase will be achieved above all by increasing to 160 units the Poseidon ICBM warheads, the deployment of the Trident ICBM (2,624 warheads) and arming the B-52 strategic bombers with air-based cruise missiles (2,400). Within that period 500 Minuteman-3 ICBM will be rearmed with the new MK-12A nosecones and warheads, which would substantially improve the accuracy (double) and power (almost double) of such missiles. The warheads themselves are being modified and improved.

As a whole, whereas currently the United States has 26,000 nuclear charges, including, as we pointed out, more than 10,000 strategic ones, over the next decade, according to official data, the production of another 17,000 is planned. It is true that 11,500 of them will be replacements for the current less-advanced warheads. Even then, this would represent a "net" addition of 5,500. These, however, are official figures. In reality, the Reagan administration has already amended its plans in the direction of creating an even larger number of nuclear charges qualitatively different from the ones currently used by the United States.

This problem has its qualitative aspects as well. The basic requirements governing the new types of ammunition are their compactness, greater power, accuracy and safe handling. Increased accuracy is the most important feature.

The most significant qualitative improvements in the U.S. strategic arsenal are expected in the area of increasing the accuracy and the reliability in the delivery of warheads. Thus, improvements in the computer guidance system of Minuteman-3 ICBM makes it possible to increase the accuracy of hitting a target from 350 to 200 meters. The currently underway replacement of the old Mark 12 multiple nosecones and 170-kiloton warheads with the more advanced MK-12A nosecones and 350-kiloton warheads would affect 500 of the 550 Minuteman-3 missiles. An even greater accuracy (90 meters) is expected of the MX system.

The ALSM-B air-based cruise missiles, launched from bombers, are also expected to have a 150-meter accuracy. The first B-52 bombers armed with

such missiles have already been on combat duty since September 1981. All in all, by 1990 the U.S. strategic bombers will be armed with a total of 3,780 missiles.

Naturally, it would be difficult today to say confidently which of these programs will be fulfilled (or overfulfilled), and which systems will no longer be produced or which armaments will be withdrawn during the second half of the 1980s. The figures we have cited are based on weapons systems or types already developed or in their final stages of development, and on currently officially known plans. The results of their implementation toward the beginning of the 1990s could be a radical restructuring of all components of U.S. strategic power. The number of strategic nuclear charges would be increased sharply (we estimate up to 23,000-25,000); their individual power and accuracy would be upgraded significantly. According to the plans the strategic potential of the future should consist of highly accurate and powerful nuclear weapon carriers and nuclear warheads with practically "zero" accuracy. A new component--long-range cruise missiles equipped with nuclear and conventional warheads, some 30,000 of which will be deployed in the future--will be added to the strategic "triad" (ICBM, SBM and strategic air force).

Nor should we forget the fact that the deployment of new medium-range American missiles in Europe, planned by Washington and NATO, is also aimed at increasing the American strategic arsenal, for such missiles, as was confirmed at the December 1982 NATO Council Meeting, should a military conflict break out in Europe, would be used to strike at Soviet territory in an effort to destroy fully or partially the strategically most important targets on the European territory of the USSR.

The Pershing-2 and the cruise missiles planned for deployment in several Western European countries are a first-strike weapon especially developed for the destruction of strategic targets, whether or not Washington and some other Western European capitals are willing to admit it. They meet the basic requirements of such systems. The authors of the prestigious Western publication by the Stockholm Institute for the Study of Problems of Peace openly state that a first-strike weapon should either "reach its target very quickly or approach it undetected." Furthermore, such weapons should be highly accurate. Pershing-2 meets the first requirement and the cruise missile, the second. Combined, these systems meet the third requirement of accuracy within a few dozen meters.

In this connection, the problem of deploying American medium-range missiles becomes not simply a European but a global problem which must be taken into consideration in a comparison between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.

The strategic potential of Britain and France--the U.S. allies--should also not be ignored. Britain has 64 Polaris A-3 SBM with multiple warheads and Vulcan bombers. France has 80 M-20 SBM and 18 ground-based ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,700 kilometers, as well as several airplane squadrons (Mirage-4) armed with nuclear weapons. The NATO countries have repeatedly updated their medium-range nuclear weapons now being tested. In

Great Britain the Polaris A-3 are being replaced with improved Polaris A-3TK SBM, and Trident-2 will be added to its arsenal in the course of this decade. France has decided to replace its M-20 SBM with a multiple M-4 SBM carrying seven warheads and its S-3 single warhead ground missiles with S-4, which will also be equipped with seven warheads. According to the press, the nuclear power of the French armed forces increased from 30 to 75 megatons between 1975 and 1980.

We must also take into consideration planned changes in the specific share of each of the components of the U.S. strategic forces. Whereas currently American ICBM account for 20 percent of the overall number of warheads, in 10 years, as a result of the faster growth of the other components of the strategic forces, the share of nuclear charges on ICBM may be substantially reduced, accounting for no more than 10 percent, although most of them will be far more efficient than the current ones. The rapidly increasing number of sea-based ballistic missiles could become a serious threat to international stability. Improvements in the guidance systems of American Trident-1 SBM and the development of the new Trident-2 missiles will result in the appearance of a powerful and highly accurate potential for waging nuclear war at sea, located significantly closer to Soviet territory.

This leads to the conclusion that the U.S. militaristic circles intend to develop a qualitatively new strategic potential toward the end of the 1980s, in addition to the already existing one. Such an increase in strategic power may offer, as some people in the United States seem to feel, a hypothetical possibility of pursuing a more "flexible" nuclear policy and resolving essentially new strategic problems throughout the globe. In order to implement all of these plans, the Reagan administration is contemplating an extremely rapid increase in military appropriations over the next 5 years. For the 1983 fiscal year alone they were increased by 13.2 percent, totaling \$263 billion (including the military programs of the Pentagon and other departments). As a whole, some \$1.7 trillion will be spent on military purposes over the next 5 years. However, these are merely the official estimates which, according to Pentagon information, are clearly understated. In order to fulfill all the military programs planned by the Reagan administration, by some estimates the additional amount of \$750 billion will be required through 1987.

The U.S. military-industrial circles are developing the new stage in the strategic armaments race on the basis of a technological foundation which was developed through scientific research and experimental designs during the 1970s. Furthermore, Washington's current military-strategic concepts provide a starting point for further research with a view to the creation in the future of technologically even more advanced means of warfare.

Let us name in this connection the already-mentioned Pentagon preparations for waging war in and from outer space. "Whoever controls outer space can keep in his sights the entire globe." This statement by a Pentagon official exposes the true meaning of the Pentagon's feverish activities in near space. This objective could be largely accomplished by deploying over the next 5 years in outer space small multiple-target manned space apparatus which could

"inspect" and destroy Soviet satellites. Such Pentagon activities disturb the normal operation of early-warning communications and other similar services of the other side.

As confirmed by the new military strategy announced by Reagan, the American military considers outer space a promising theater for military operations in the future. Together with steps taken to develop a potential for a first nuclear strike, the plans of the Reagan administration for the creation of a powerful antiballistic missile defense (ABM) on earth and in outer space are aimed at achieving military-strategic superiority over the USSR and securing for the United States the possibility of blackmailing the Soviet Union with the prospect of engaging in a protracted "limited" nuclear conflict from a position of decisive superiority.

Judging by statements made by C. Weinberger, the United States has been studying a variety of ABM alternatives with a view to finding the most efficient means for the implementation of this dangerous idea. The newly created Space Command, which will coordinate U.S. military activities in outer space, began operations on 1 September 1982 at the Norad Space Defense Center in Colorado Springs. The Pentagon is now drafting plans for the reorganization of the U.S. Air Force Space Command into a single space command for all four branches of the armed forces--Air Force, Navy, Army and Marines. This step was triggered by the headlong expansion of U.S. space military programs. A variant of a "space fighter-interceptor" is being developed along with the already operational shuttle-type spaceships. Programs are being drafted for improving the efficiency with which the shuttle can be used for military purposes. Thus, the Boeing Corporation is building for the U.S. Air Force eight so-called space towing ships which could take into high orbit (more than 22,000 miles) satellites weighing as much as 2.5 tons, whereas the present shuttles can orbit at an altitude of no more than 600 miles.

The Pentagon is counting heavily on the creation of military orbital stations in near space, i.e., of essentially military platforms armed with laser and ray guns which could strike at launched enemy missiles and (in the future), their launching sites.

The United States has been engaged in similar preparations for several decades. Thus, since 1974 the Livermore Laboratory has been testing systems for the destruction of targets through the controlled energy of charged particles. Work is under way on the development of antisatellite weapons and research has been accelerated on the creation of an "electromagnetic" bomb to be specially used against all enemy communications systems. The administration intends to spend on such developments \$2.6 billion in 1984 and \$3.1 billion in the 1985 fiscal year.

President Reagan's decision actually lays the material foundation for studies which have been under way in the United States in recent decades. It is no accident that the largest military-industrial corporations have seized on the idea and have undertaken to finance the development of the "high-boundary" project, according to which a network of 432 satellites carrying 40 to 50 missiles each will be set up in outer space.

The Reagan administration is relying on the militarization of outer space from a very practical point of view. By 1988 allocations in this area will reach \$14 billion annually. All in all, according to American estimates, implementation of existing programs will cost some \$100 billion. A number of them have already advanced from the stage of ideas to specific prototypes of military hardware.

The danger of the militarization of outer space and its use for military purposes naturally worries anyone who cares for peace. As we know, the attention of the heads of Warsaw Pact members was drawn to this aspect of the arms race at the latest conference of the Political Consultative Committee. Once again attention was paid to the entire danger represented by this type of arms race at the meeting of party and state leaders of the socialist countries, which took place in Moscow on 28 June last. Comrade Yu. V. Andropov as well drew attention to the American plans for the development of a so-called antimissile defense related, as reported by the American press, to plans for the military "development" of near space. In answering the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, on 22 March, he emphasized that "the intention of acquiring the possibility of destroying the respective strategic weapons of the other side with the help of antimissile defense, i.e., to deprive it of the ability to retaliate, is aimed at disarming the Soviet Union in the face of the American nuclear threat."

III

Meanwhile, Washington is not abandoning its efforts to gain superiority over the USSR in operative-tactical forces. This objective, which was announced in 1979, has been materially expressed in recent years with the latest F-15 and F-16 fighter planes (729 and 1,388 respectively of these models were to be purchased), A-10 assault planes (733), and the multipurpose F-A18 fighter, deliveries of which to the U.S. Air Force should begin this very year (a total of 1,366 will be purchased). All in all, by the beginning of the 1990s the fighter aircraft fleet should exceed 7,000 units capable of performing a variety of combat assignments, some of which involve nuclear weapons. Similar examples could be cited in the case of helicopters, tanks and other equipment.

A steady increase in offensive capabilities and striking and firepower, and the improved maneuverability on the battlefield have been the main directions in the development of the U.S. ground forces over the past 20 years. Here again Washington is pursuing a line of achieving superiority over the socialist countries and is trying to create new, more modern and more complex battle systems. The main efforts here are focused on the development of high-precision guidance systems, remote control facilities, high-precision locating of enemy positions, target detection and tracking, and automated guidance, control and communications systems such as, for example, automatic fire control on the battlefield with computers, and so on.

Washington believes that these lines followed in the arms race would make it possible significantly to change the nature and very principles of a future war. The Pentagon is clearly relying on acquiring the possibility of waging

automated warfare, so to say, with the help of "thinking" electronic weapons. In order to strike its chosen targets, the Pentagon intends to use thousands of high-precision nuclear and chemical warheads of low and very low capacity, as well as conventional non-nuclear charges. The preparations for warfare with such armaments can only mean that Washington and NATO are seriously counting on victory in a regional (European) military conflict with the use of operative-tactical nuclear weapons, which would prevent it from becoming a world war which would affect United States territory--an obviously groundless concept which, nevertheless, was approved at the December 1982 NATO Council Meeting, where the question of preparations for "air-electronic-instant-nuclear warfare" was discussed.

The current modernizing of non-nuclear U.S. forces is quite clearly aimed at upgrading the combat potential of all components of the American armed forces. Washington is spending 80 to 85 percent of its military budget on its implementation. According to the reckoning of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, by 1991 the U.S. army will be increased by 135,000 men; the number of aircraft carriers will be increased from 13 to 22; fighter aircraft will be increased by 980 airplanes, the marines by 50,000 men and the military air transport aviation from 522 to 1,090 airplanes. Actually, this is an effort on the part of Washington to assume global political-economic and strategic control over any section on earth either directly or through its military-political allies.

To this effect, Washington intends to create new regional commands to provide operative control of possible combat operations at each proposed theater of combat operations. Such steps can be considered only as direct military preparations involving the accelerated building of military bases and other military projects around the globe.

Nor is the danger reduced from the fact that those who inspire today's military policy are relying less on the direct use of nuclear weapons than on efforts to develop with their help the type of political-psychological background for international relations in which the threat of nuclear strike would seem real and admissible to the opponents of the United States. As confirmed by historical experience and given the current economic and defense power of the USSR and the socialist commonwealth as a whole, any reliance on such a "political" use of nuclear weapons and that socialism will not withstand such competition in weapons and war of nerves is entirely groundless. However, it is dangerous, above all because it brings mankind closer to the brink of nuclear catastrophe and makes the international situation less controllable. The development of new variants of how better to break out a nuclear war in the hope of winning it is not only irresponsible but crazy.

"One would truly have to be blind to the realities of our age," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized, "not to see that in whatever way and wherever a nuclear storm may break out, it would inevitably lose control and trigger a universal catastrophe." This warning accurately reflects the essence of the situation.

It is entirely clear that the Soviet Union will never allow a situation in which both it and its allies would find themselves relying on the mercy of

imperialism. Nothing will force the Soviet Union to make any kind of unilateral concessions. Together with the fraternal socialist countries, the USSR will continue to be greatly concerned with maintaining its defense capability on the necessary level and preserving military-strategic parity. However, this would be a parity on a higher and, therefore, more dangerous level. Our country continues to emphasize that it will do everything possible to avoid such a course of events. It counters the policy of aggressive U.S. and NATO imperialist circles with the only currently sensible alternative--a policy of urgent steps to restrain the arms race and radically to change the climate of international relations by preserving and developing detente. Today, the Soviet Union says, all efforts must be concentrated on preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

It is precisely such a course which is meeting with the growing support of all peace-loving forces on earth. However complex and dangerous the contemporary international situation may be, opportunities for preserving and strengthening peace and safeguarding the future of mankind exist. Such opportunities derive above all from the peaceful foreign policy of the USSR and the other socialist countries and the unity and cohesion among all peace-loving forces. "The forces of peace are more powerful than the forces of war. Everything depends on their cohesion and the purposefulness of their actions." This conclusion formulated at the Prague Political Declaration of Warsaw Pact Members, is more relevant than ever today and calls for action.

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FRUITFUL DEVELOPMENT OF MARXIST SOCIOPHILOSOPHICAL THEORY

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[Review by V. Shevchenko, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the books (1) "Marksistsko-Leninskaya Teoriya Istoricheskogo Protsessa" [The Marxist-Leninist Theory of the Historical Process]. Nauka, Moscow, 1981, 463 pp; (2) "Ocherki po Istoricheskomu Materializmu" [Essays on Historical Materialism]. Nauka, Moscow, 1981, 359 pp; (3) "Teoriya i Istoriya" [Theory and History] by V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ya. Koval'zon. Politizdat, Moscow, 1981, 288 pp; (4) "Istoricheskiy Materializm kak Sotsial'no-Filosofskaya Teoriya" [Historical Materialism as a Sociophilosophical Theory]. Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1982, 364 pp]

[Text] Several long monographs on historical materialism have come out over the past 2 years. These works may be considered a specific answer by our scientists-philosophers to the just criticism addressed to them in editorials in PRAVDA--"The High Duty of Soviet Philosophers" (19 September 1975), KOMMUNIST--"On the Condition and Directions of Philosophical Research" (No 15, 1979), and the 25th and 26th CPSU congresses.

The party pointed out at the proper time that despite some successes, major lagging has taken place in the development of a number of basic problems of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and emphasized the need for the creation of conceptual works which would develop historical materialism in particular, on the basis of increasingly close ties with life and practice and on the basis of the comprehensive use of the latest data in the individual disciplines. It most firmly called for the elimination of shortcomings preventing the progress of Soviet philosophical science.

In the books under review historical materialism is presented in its entire real complexity and comprehensiveness as an inseparable component of philosophical science over a period of almost 150 years, from the time of the appearance of Marxism, which is for the working class and its vanguard--the communist party--a reliable manual for action and for the revolutionary-practical transformation of the world in accordance with known objective laws.

As a whole, the works are written on a good theoretical level in accordance with the accomplishments of other authors in this field of knowledge. The presented viewpoints on a number of complex and understudied problems do not

always coincide. As a rule, this confirms the existence of creative promising solutions which cannot be reached without the formulation of new ideas, their comparison and their critical interpretation. Let us note that virtually all books provide a substantiated analysis of bourgeois and revisionist concepts which are trying if not to bury (for the umpteenth time!) the Marxist philosophical theory of society, in any case to belittle, distort or even misrepresent it.

Naturally, it would be difficult in a review to describe comprehensively all the qualities and shortcomings of these books. For this reason, we shall concentrate mainly on the basic principles on which the presentation is structured and which determine (to a certain extent) their content, the more so since the very choice of the principle for structuring the theory of historical materialism essentially answers the question which inevitably faces every author: how does he imagine the nature of the philosophical knowledge of society and what type of conceptual characterization does he ascribe to it? Before that, however, let us express some general remarks.

Virtually all works on historical materialism published in our country until recently were textbooks. Their presentation of the theoretical content of this science followed a roughly similar system with minor differences. The reader was first exposed to the nature of the materialistic understanding of history, as discovered by the Marxist classics, and the solution they provided to the main problem of philosophy as applicable to society. This was followed by a study of the laws governing the development of material production, the determining role of the latter in terms of other aspects of social life, considered in a strictly defined sequence: class structure and class struggle, political organization of society, of the state above all and, finally forms of social consciousness or, in other words, the spiritual life of the people. This interpretation of the philosophical theory of the historical process is usually based on Marx's statement to the effect that "the method used in the production of material life determines the social, political and spiritual processes of life in general" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 13, p 7).

For a long time the merits of this structure seemed unquestionable, for it made it possible to describe quite clearly, particularly to people previously unfamiliar with Marxist sociophilosophical theory, the effect of the mechanisms of social determination and to bring to light the causal ties and dependencies among economic, political and spiritual factors in society and among the various areas of human social life. However, whenever it became necessary to include new topics which did not stem in the least from the adopted structure, they were simply automatically added to a given work arbitrarily.

Naturally, all of this triggered critical remarks on the subject of one variation or another of the adopted system for the presentation of the theory of historical materialism and even of its content. The need to go beyond a training course quite clearly revealed the shortcomings of the existing system, above all that which deprived it considerably, if not completely, of an overview of society, which has always been a distinguishing feature of the sociophilosophical views of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Another aspect of this

problem, which was also actively discussed in philosophical publications, was the complex multistoried theoretical structure of historical materialism. Unfortunately, for a long time this was affected by scholastic theorizing, in which efforts to develop the most accurate classification of categories in historical materialism were frequently unrelated to the content of the science itself and were made without a sufficiently profound consideration of the characteristics of the philosophical approach to the study of society.

Therefore, the task which faced the social philosophers most urgently was precisely that of determining and substantiating the existence within historical materialism of a number of levels of theoretical summation of reality, on the one hand, and ensuring that each such level provide an overall vision of the historical process and, consequently, that each social phenomenon be considered in philosophical theory precisely from the viewpoint of its "participation" in this entity, on the other.

Let us now consider the initial principles on which the books under review rest.

We find in (2) the traditional system used in the presentation of the material. Along with a description of the nature of the material foundation of social life and its determining role in terms of the other realms of human activities, the work includes chapters on the philosophical-sociological study of the scientific and technical revolution, culture, structure of social consciousness, interaction between society and the individual, social progress and many others. The analysis of the methodological aspects of the study of social phenomena (the role which dialectical materialism plays in them, and the characterization of the general methods for the study of such phenomena) is worthy of approval and support. The authors have properly acted by analyzing the methodological problems of developed socialism in one of the chapters.

Unfortunately, the book lacks a convincing substantiation of the accepted structure in presenting the theory of historical materialism, with the exception of a few most general statements, not to mention the brief explanation of the presentation of the topics. For example, it is difficult to understand why the chapter on the socioeconomic system is in the eighth place, between chapters one of which deals with the law of substantiation of the superstructure through the base while the other (which, incidentally, is quite successful) deals with the motive forces governing the development of society. Such omissions hinder the integral perception of the material.

Conversely, from the very beginning, the authors of (4) provide a study of the structure of the theory of historical materialism: "... we truly can consider with full justification historical materialism as an essentially sociological discipline" (p 21) or as a general sociology (see p 19) the purpose of which is to study "the essential principles of social organization, which express the method for its structure, functioning and development as a specific entity, separating the basic components of the social system and determining the most complex network of interactions existing among them" (p 18). It is not limited to the solution of these problems, the authors

point out, for it also considers the "laws governing the structure, functioning and development not of individual socioeconomic systems but of structure varieties similar from the sociocultural viewpoint" (p 24) as well as the "most general principles of the classification of social formations" (p 25). Finally, "the interpretation of the nature and qualitative specifics of the social form of dynamics...constitutes...the cognitive task of the sociophilosophical level of summation..." (p 26). Such is the conceptual multileveled nature of historical materialism, the authors claim, although they limit themselves merely to a general presentation of their view without backing them with the necessary methodological substantiations on which they do not theoretically expatiate.

We see here clearly two principles governing the structure of the theory of historical materialism. On the one hand, the main areas of social life are extensively analyzed (chapters IV-VI) in accordance with the mentioned Marxian concept. Actually, the authors depart from Marx at one point by combining two different areas--the social (in the narrow meaning of the term) and the political--within a single sociopolitical sphere. However, the social sphere is a subject of separate theoretical study. It has become generally accepted to speak of the social structure of society and social relations, and the social policy of the party and the state, for which reason the position taken by the authors seems unjustified. The need for a profound and comprehensive methodological elaboration of the problem of the social realm of human activities, above all at the present stage in the development of real socialism, has long become pertinent and, understandably, in this case philosophy has the final say. On the other hand, it is accurately emphasized that historical materialism studies society as an integral system. Therefore, the authors legitimately preface their study of individual areas with an interpretation of society (Chapter III) in the totality of all its aspects, relations and ties, from the viewpoint of the categories of "socio-economic system," "base and superstructure," "way of life," "culture," "social management," and "personality." Having covered the various areas, they return to the study of society as an integral self-developing system, presented in an interesting and meaningful way, particularly in the part dealing with social progress, the role which the people's masses play in them and the clarification of the concept of civilization. What remains unclear is the reason for which this work does not include a separate chapter on the basic problem of philosophy as applicable to social life. Yet this is the foundation of the entire Marxist sociophilosophical doctrine.

In "Teoriya i Istoriya" V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ya. Koval'zon systematically defend the methodological approach they formulated 20 years ago in their textbook, reasserting the accuracy of its essential ideas. From the very beginning, the authors point out that historical materialism, as a philosophical and theoretical-methodological science, has always studied not individual social phenomena or processes but society as a single organism interacting with all its components.

Among the fundamental general philosophical premises for a scientific theory they single out above all materialism and dialectics. "The initial and basic categories with the help of which the general idea of materialism is translated into the language of social theory include the concepts of 'social

life' and 'social consciousness'" (p 42). Dialectics enables us to approach the consideration of society from the viewpoint of its development and the progressing and natural ascension from the lower to the higher, manifested through two main principles--the principle of historicism and the principle of system, each one of which is a mandatory prerequisite for the implementation of the other. A number of premises thoroughly consider the principle of human activeness and practice, which proves that historical materialism as a truly scientific knowledge of social laws is a reliable theoretical guide of the working class in the radical reorganization of social reality. The authors have given a good interpretation of the party, class and truly revolutionary-critical nature of the Marxist theory of society.

The authors set themselves the task of elaborating on a system for the presentation of the theory of historical materialism "which would not only be consistent with the content of this science but depicted in a manner which would enable us to make a more efficient use of its concepts as a methodology for the study of social life and the historical process in their variety and complexity and their unity and integrity" (p 61). According to them, we should single out three methodological aspects in the study of history--natural history, activity and humanism, which derive one from the other systematically: knowledge of objective historical laws enable us to understand the mechanism of action and the use which people make of these laws and, consequently, to find a way, to master the means for purposefully and consciously changing social reality; history acquires a meaning if it is presented as a history of the appearance of man himself and his development. The following concept is important as well: in order to convert from natural materialism to social materialism it was necessary to identify within society an area which is shaped in the course of human activities yet which does not depend on their will and consciousness. Marx's brilliant discovery was precisely the fact that people consciously produce material goods but the social result of their production activities (specifically the type of production relations which develop among them) are independent from them. That is why "not man or his activities by themselves, but the system of material production relations becomes the starting point in the elaboration of social theory" (p 68).

The book does not provide a separate study of the realm of social life. Social life falls within a broader concept in the three aspects of the sociophilosophical study of society based on its overall consideration as an exceptionally complex self-developing system. The authors prove quite extensively, which is one of the unquestionable merits of the monograph, the theoretical-cognitive possibilities inherent, in their view, in each of the three aspects. They deal extensively with underdeveloped methodological problems of world history, including that of the unity and variety within the historical process.

The understanding of the nature of historical materialism, as presented by the authors, has interested the philosophical public in the country. This is confirmed, for example, by a discussion of one of the works by the two authors in which they formulated their basic ideas even before the publication of their work (see VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 12, 1981, pp 82-85). Both positive and critical remarks were voiced. The latter essentially demand a continuation

in the substantiation of the specific content of each of the described aspects of the philosophical interpretation of society. According to many specialists, whereas the natural-historical and humanistic aspects, as basically different levels of theoretical summation of social reality, have been presented quite convincingly, the same cannot be said of the activities feature. Not all scientists agree with adding the "problems of activity" to the natural-historical aspect of the study of a society, aimed at describing the logic of the latter's development. Attention is also drawn to the need for a more extensive description of the unity among the three approaches and the possibility of their application in the current teaching of historical materialism, which is dominated by the interpretation of individual features and areas of social life. Let us emphasize, however, the unquestionable merit of the authors to be among the first to convert from general use to a constructive advancement of the principles governing the presentation of the philosophical theory of the historical process, the need for which, as we pointed out, has long become necessary.

The collective monograph (1), which presents and largely applies yet another methodological approach, has triggered a great deal of interest. The work notes the negative consequences of the discussion on systematizing the categories of historical materialism in the course of which the logical substantiation of the problem became marginal. A truly new attempt has been made to use the method of ascension from the abstract to the concrete in order strictly to substantiate the logic of the dynamics of philosophical thinking in its theoretical representation of the essential features of the historical process.

Since historical materialism is the science of the general laws and motive forces of human development, its study, according to the authors, requires above all the presentation of an objectively integral unit of the social aspect or, in other words, the "cell" of social life, which cannot consist of a social relation or individual human action. Its presentation is the legitimate result of the advance of theoretical thinking from the specific to the abstract. "The objectivized result of human activities," the monograph notes, "is the only 'cell' of social life of its kind" (p 18). These considerations lead to the conclusion that it is precisely the category of activity (which seems to prove this quality of the 'cell') should be the initial category and, therefore, the starting point for the theoretical reproduction of the historical process. That is why the substantive consideration of the basic categories of the historical-materialistic theory--social life and social consciousness--precedes the study of levels and clusters of social knowledge such as the category of activity, labor, social relations (material and ideological), production method, social determinism, sociohistorical practice and source and motive forces of the development of society and their historical varieties.

Such sequence in the presentation of the theoretical content of the philosophical science of society directly stems, in the view of the authors, from the method of ascension from the abstract to the concrete or, more precisely, from the interpretation they provide to this method. However, as the discussion of the main features of the concept developed in this book by the

philosophical public proved, a number of scientists disagreed with it (see FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI, No 4, 1981, pp 146-150).

A more substantive argumentation is needed essentially for the claim that the "cells" as a "no longer divisible," to use the authors' expression, "unit of social system" and the adoption of the category of activity is initial in the presentation of the philosophical theory of the historical process. Let us add to this that the monograph does not always consistently follow this conceptual stipulation. One of the sections emphasizes that practice "not only does not exclude the need to resolve the basic philosophical problem but itself obtains a rational interpretation only in relation to and on the basis of the materialistic answer to the question of the correlation between social life and social consciousness..." (p 387). However, if such is the case, the presentation of the dialectical-materialistic solution of the basic problem of philosophy as applicable to society should become the initial base which precisely enables us to resolve accurately the entire set of problems related, in particular, to the categories of activity and sociohistorical practice, rather than vice versa. It is only regrettable that only a few introductory pages have been used to formulate and substantiate an essentially new concept suggested by the authors, for which reason it is difficult to acquire extensive answers to questions which inevitably arise in the consideration of this problem. Actually, this work is only the first part of a contemplated project. Possibly, the publication of the second part, which will deal with the study of the integrity, unity and variety of formation stages, would provide extensive clarifications.

The work is distinguished by its wealth of interesting, profound and long-range conclusions and summations which show the reader the variety of analytical aspects and facets which Marxist-Leninist sociophilosophical theory possesses. It is a first systematic presentation of areas dealing with philosophical problems of anthroposociogenesis and public production, within the unity of material and spiritual production. A favorable impression is created by the parts which describe the material foundations of the historical process and the essence of the dialectics of production forces and production relations, including those in the conditions of a scientific technical revolution. The chapters on sociohistorical practice have been written vividly and with theoretical refinement, expressing its correlation with activities, the clarification of which, we believe, is of essential importance in concretizing and intensifying the materialistic understanding of history.

An accurate viewpoint is presented on the meaning of categories such as "social life" and "social consciousness." The authors emphasize that "it is impossible to provide independent and unrelated definitions of matter and consciousness. This equally applies to the definitions of social life and social consciousness" (p 402), which could be defined only through their dialectical comparison and contraposition, i.e., in their gnoseological aspect. The authors substantiate their criticism of the broader interpretation of social life as found in some publications. We can only agree with the fact that the effort to include in social life ideological relations and practical-organizational means for their strengthening--the establishments

and institutes of the superstructure--"contradicts, one way or another, the integrity of the materialistic concept of history and creates the danger of surrendering its essential concepts to the popular factorial theory" (p 393).

The books under review prove that a major step forward has been taken in the development of historical materialism. The profound and comprehensive interpretation of this step and the principled and sympathetic discussion of the viewpoints presented by the authors will help to sum up and synthesize everything positive achieved through the joint creative efforts of the country's philosophical scientists.

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WORLD WAR II: RESULTS AND LESSONS

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[Review by Adm A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, of the book "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II 1939-1945]. D. F. Ustinov, chairman of the chief editorial commission. Vol 12: "Results and Lessons of World War II." Voenizdat, Moscow, 1982, 495 pp]

[Text] The building of communism in our country is inseparably related to the struggle for the preservation and consolidation of peace and ensuring the security of the peoples. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the fact that the international situation has become significantly aggravated of late. The U.S. imperialists and their NATO partners are stubbornly pursuing a course of achieving military superiority over the socialist countries and would like to turn history back. "... Such policy," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "will not bring success to the imperialists. However, its adventurism makes it extremely dangerous to mankind."

In struggling against the increased threat of war and for international cooperation, the Soviet people and all progressive mankind also draw on the lessons of historical experience, particularly that of World War II, which teaches political far-sightedness, social activeness and decisiveness in the efforts to consolidate peace.

It is no accident, therefore, that the concluding 12th volume of the work on the history of World War II has been welcomed with great interest. "The people," we read in the work, "turn to the events of World War II so that they may never be repeated and so that the defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan will be a stern lesson to those who are formulating adventurous plans for a new and far more horrible military tragedy" (p 462).

1

The multiple-volume history of World War II is unquestionably an important contribution to Soviet historical science. On the basis of the unified scientific Marxist-Leninist concept, it reveals the reasons for the war and describes all its processes and phenomena, the sources of the victories achieved by the Soviet Union and the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, and its significance in terms of the historical destinies of nations.

The overall work consists of 688 authors' sheets. It contains 2,521 documentary photographs, many of which are previously unpublished, and 185 color maps. Each volume makes extensive use of new archive documents and materials and statistical data. The authors rely on extensive historiography, including the memoirs of Soviet military leaders. Books by Western authors have been used and critically considered.

The preparation and publication of such a work required the solution of a number of theoretical, methodological and organizational problems. This extensive and complex project was headed by the main editorial commission which included political leaders, noted military commanders and major scientists. It rallied a large group of authors and dealt with the essential problems of the history and theory of the last war.

This multivolume work systematically embodies the Leninist ideas of the defense of the socialist fatherland and Soviet military construction. It clearly presents and describes in action the policy of the communist party, the scientific substantiation of which was so brilliantly confirmed in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

The authors have done a great deal in terms of the further elaboration of the important scientific problems such as the reasons for the outbreak of the war, its political nature, time breakdown, motive forces and sources of the victory of the Soviet people. A number of new concepts have been put in scientific circulation, which enable us to bring to light more profoundly the course of World War II and the intergovernmental political and economic relations among the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. The chronological framework of the Great Patriotic War has been defined once and for all. It is depicted as a single and unbreakable process in the struggle waged by the Soviet people against fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.

The panoramic development of World War II has been recreated against the background of extensive specific historical data. It is presented in its dynamics and recreates the atmosphere in which those who won the great victory over fascism with their blood lived and struggled. The work describes the broadening framework of the war which inevitably involved one country after another in Europe, Africa and Asia. This is the first time in our literature that military operations in Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, China, the Atlantic, the northern seas and the Pacific have been presented and interpreted so thoroughly in their historical sequence.

The war is described within the unity of its major and minor problems. The authors have considered every nation which participated in the antifascist war and its contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. Thorough coverage has been provided of the process of enhancing the revolutionary activeness of the masses in the struggle against the aggressors, the further weakening of imperialism and the elimination of colonial oppression in a number of Asian and African countries.

The publication concentrates on the entry of the USSR in World War II as a result of the treacherous attack launched by fascist Germany against it. It

covers the events on the Soviet-German front, the conversion of the national economy of our country to a military footing and the development of the war economy in the USSR. It shows the tremendous international significance of the entry of the Soviet Union in the war.

The experience of the comprehensive activities of the communist party in strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and the leadership of the country and its armed forces during the war is covered systematically. The Leninist Party acted as a fighting party which assumed the full responsibility for the fate of the socialist homeland and which honestly fulfilled its great historical mission.

The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was the triumph of the new social and state system born of the October Revolution, the socialist economy, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the moral and political unity of Soviet society and the unbreakable friendship among the peoples of the USSR.

The defeat of fascism had a most profound impact on the entire course of global developments. The work proves with tremendous emphasis the criminal nature of the activities of the aggressors, of fascist Germany above all.

The history of the definitive defeat of the members of the aggressive bloc and the solution of the problems of the postwar structure of the world are presented in their entire complexity. The last volumes properly present the class-oriented, antifascist and systematically democratic policy of the Soviet Union in the international arena and its humanism. In the entire history of mankind no single winning country has behaved so nobly and justly as the great Soviet state.

The work is having a major influence on the elaboration and assertion of scientific concepts on basic problems of the history of World War II. Its reputation and popularity are growing. It has been translated and is being published in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and distributed in 39 countries throughout the world.

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The final volume of this publication deals with the results of World War II and includes conclusions and assessments of a summing-up nature. It proves that in terms of its scale and fierceness, human losses and material costs, this war, the most important component of which was the Great Patriotic War, was unequal. It was waged on the territories of 40 countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Four-fifths of the population on earth were involved in it. More than 110 million people were drafted for military service by the belligerent countries, or half again as much as in World War I in 1914-1918. The flames of war burned for 6 long years and destroyed more than 50 million human lives.

Vol 12 proves convincingly Lenin's idea developed by the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties to the fact that imperialism was and remains a

source of wars. Like the first, the second World War was triggered by imperialism. V. I. Lenin noted that "under capitalism no other substantiation for the division of the world in spheres of influence, interests, colonies, and others, is possible other than a consideration of the power of the participants in the division, the general economic, financial and military strength, and so on" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 417). This statement entirely applies to the history of the outbreak of World War II.

However, World War II had its characteristics, compared to World War I. It was prepared and unleashed under different historical circumstances. As a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet state, the ratio of forces of peace and war had changed substantially. Imperialism had lost its monopoly on shaping global policy. The USSR was a powerful bulwark of peace. Relying on the growing economic and military power of the land of the soviets, and implementing the Leninist peaceful foreign policy, the communist party and the Soviet state persistently and systematically favored the creation of a collective security system. They did everything they could to restrain the fascist aggressors. The 18th VKP(b) Congress was of great importance in this respect. It called for the pursuit of a policy of peace and for preventing the provocateurs of war to involve the USSR in a conflict. The international communist movement and the antiwar movement of the working people and the broad strata of the intelligentsia in the capitalist countries were a major obstacle on the path of fascism and of its expansionistic plans.

The nations have no right to forget, the work says, the fact that the aggressive countries began their bloody campaign under the banner of the struggle against the "Red menace." Historical experience proves that whenever militant imperialists and their stooges shriek about the "communist threat," or "Soviet expansion," this means that activities threatening the peace and security of the nations are under way concealed behind this false pretext... "Such was the case in the past and such is the way the aggressors are acting today" (p 21).

Vol 12 deals extensively with the political nature of World War II. The war began within the capitalist system in its imperialist stage. The members of the fascist bloc waged an unjust and unfair war (some of them until they abandoned the fascist bloc and declared war on Germany). As to the Anglo-French coalition, at its initial stage its war as well was of an unfair nature. Actually, Britain and France did nothing to give Poland any real aid.

The nature of the war waged by the capitalist countries opposing the members of the Axis began to change gradually. The dynamics of the process was complex and conflicting. This was helped, to begin with, by the headlong escalation of the fascist aggression, which really threatened the national independence of these countries; secondly, the upsurge of the antifascist struggle waged by the broad popular masses and the combat activities of their vanguard--the communist and worker parties.

The determining factor for the conversion of the war from imperialist to a war of liberation and a just war was the struggle waged by the people's masses against the aggressor. From the very beginning the peoples of Poland and Yugoslavia waged a liberation struggle, for their national independence. The entry of the Soviet Union in the war, after it was treacherously attacked by Hitlerite Germany, played a decisive role in the development of the war into a just antifascist war of liberation. This became a guarantee for victory. The United States and Great Britain, who were forced to enter into a coalition with the USSR, pursued their own political objectives throughout the war and remained imperialist. This substantially influenced the extent of their real contribution to the winning of a joint victory over the fascist bloc and limited the possibility of defeating the aggressor more quickly.

The liberating and just nature of World War II was clearly manifested in the armed uprisings mounted by the peoples of a number of European and Asian countries, uprisings which subsequently developed into people's democratic and socialist revolutions. The lofty objectives of the struggle against fascism gave a broad scope to the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries. The formation and strengthening of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the mobilization of its material and spiritual forces in opposing the aggressor and defeating him were related to the liberating nature of the war.

The volume convincingly proves that the USSR blocked the path of the fascist aggressors to world domination. It stopped extending their expansion to other countries and continents. The struggle waged by the Soviet Union became the main unifying feature in the efforts of the individual nations and countries in the battle against the most malicious enemy.

The decisive role of the socialist country in defeating the aggressor and liberating other nations is presented extensively. The USSR gave particularly substantial aid to the peoples of central and southeastern Europe. About 7 million troops were directly involved in the liberation of 11 European countries with a population of 113 million. The liberation of northeastern China (Manchuria) and North Korea involved the participation of more than 1.5 million Soviet troops.

The work cites extensive data showing the great role of Soviet foreign policy in securing the victory. Its key assignments were the creation and strengthening of the anti-Hitlerite coalition of countries and nations; the undermining and elimination of the coalition of fascist and militaristic countries; ending the war within a shorter time and with fewer human casualties; elaboration of solid foundations and guarantees for the postwar peace and security. These problems were resolved successfully. The war convincingly proved the possibility of effective cooperation among countries with different social systems in opposing aggression.

The work convincingly emphasizes that the Soviet people honorably withstood all the trials of the war and followed its victorious path thanks to the historical advantages of the socialist social system. The peoples of Russia had repeatedly demonstrated in the past their high patriotic feelings in the

struggle against foreign aggressors. However, never in history had such spiritual firmness and mass heroism been displayed as those of the Soviet people and its armed forces in the Great Patriotic War. This was based on the fact that they were defending from enemy invasion their new socialist state, their own Soviet system. The significance of this fact far exceeds previous military accomplishments.

The unparalleled unity among the working people of all nations and nationalities in our country, which developed under socialist conditions, was of particular importance in the struggle for victory. In a single thrust the Soviet people rose to the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and its satellites. The hopes of the fascists and all imperialist reaction of the breakdown of our multinational state burst like a soap bubble.

The mass heroism in the front and the rear displayed by the Soviet troops, workers, kolkhoz members and the intelligentsia, gave the war waged by the Soviet Union against fascist German and militaristic Japan a truly national nature. Self-sacrifice became the supreme moral category in the behavior of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. The exploit of Aleksandr Matrosov, who blocked a pillbox with his body, was no exception. The same exploit was performed by more than 200 soldiers and officers. The exploits of the Soviet guard were one of the indicators of mass heroism. Hundreds of Soviet regiments and divisions were awarded orders. The labor exploit of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia was rated highly. Thus, more than 60 million people were awarded the medal "For Valorous Work in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

The historical victory of the Soviet people and its armed forces was achieved thanks to the skillful leadership of the communist party. From the first to the last day of the war its tremendous efforts were focused on a single objective--defeat of the aggressor. The comprehensive experience of CPSU leadership in the struggle to defend the socialist fatherland, thoroughly covered in the 12th volume, is of international importance. It serves social progress and the prevention of a new world war. It is also a warning to the forces of reaction and aggression which are concocting delirious plans for disturbing and weakening the unity between the Soviet people and its Leninist party.

The peoples and armies of the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition contributed a great deal to the common victory over the enemy. Valuable contributions were made by the peoples of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Mongolia and, in the final stages of the war, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Vietnam, China and Korea, the members of the resistance movements and the antifascist underground. The working class and its communist vanguard, who displayed political maturity and understanding of their historical mission in the defense of their class and national, universal interests, led the antifascist struggle. All of this is also described extensively in the volume.

The peoples of all continents remain loyal to the traditions of the active struggle against the warmongers. They are expressing with increasing firmness their resolve to put an end to the policy of force and confrontation and

to assert in relations among countries the principles of respect for national independence and sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The communist and worker parties are in the vanguard of the struggle waged by the peoples against the threat of war.

3

In the light of the political and military confrontation, the last volume presents the economic results of the war and assesses the contribution made by the economies of the fighting members in the anti-Hitlerite coalition to victory. The course and outcome of the war proved the increased impact of economic conditions and economic organizations on the increased pace of mastering new combat ordnance and weapons. Thanks to the advantages of the socialist economic system, this pace increased quite rapidly in the USSR. As early as 1943, the share of new weapons accounted for 42.3 percent in infantry, 83 percent in artillery, more than 80 percent in tanks and 67 percent in aviation.

The fierce economic confrontation between the belligerent sides was distinguished by features such as a steady increase in the production of military hardware, increasing the load of industry, transportation and other economic sectors, steady renovation of troop ordnance, and saturation of the armed forces with the necessary quantity of effective means for the armed struggle.

The victory of the USSR over Hitlerite fascism was not only political and military but economic as well. The Soviet production system proved to be the more viable. Our country made efficient and purposeful use of material and manpower resources. It was convincingly proved that the socialist economic system enjoys unquestionable advantages over the capitalist system in both peace and wartime.

Despite a certain advantage which fascist Germany enjoyed at the beginning of the war in terms of the volume of output of basic industrial commodities, the Soviet economy was able not only to withstand but substantially to outstrip the level of the enemy's military output. During the war years the Soviet economy produced 482,200 guns, 351,800 howitzers, 102,800 tanks and self-propelling artillery systems, and 112,100 combat aircraft (see p 168). Once our war industry was developed, the scale of output of military equipment substantially exceeded war losses. The saturation of the armed forces with military equipment and other material facilities increased steadily.

The socialist economy proved to be more flexible and mobile. It was rapidly restructured and actively reacted to the changing requirements of the armed struggle. One of the most difficult and urgent problems which faced the land of the soviets as a result of the aggression--converting the national economy to a military track--was resolved successfully. In this case the forced relocation of our industrial enterprises from the threatened areas to the east was particularly important. An entire industrial country was moved to the east. By 1945 the eastern areas of the USSR accounted for about 76 percent of the pig iron, about 75 percent of the steel and 75 percent of the rolled metal produced by the country. "This was a tremendous operation equal

in significance to a successful, most important battle in World War II" (p 158).

The book extensively describes the ways and means through which the party and our entire people resolved during the war the problems of rebuilding the national economy in the areas liberated from enemy occupation, which was of major importance in meeting the needs of the front and of the local population. In the course of rebuilding the national economy, the Soviet people had to surmount major difficulties caused by the destruction of many plants and factories and manpower, equipment and material shortages and the lack of construction equipment. Despite this, toward the end of the war the Soviet people had rebuilt 7,500 major industrial enterprises, 85,000 kolkhozes, 1,800 sovkhoses and 3,000 machine tractor stations. The extensive scope of restoration work in the liberated areas reflected the strength and maturity of the Soviet economic system.

Bourgeois historians tendentiously exaggerate the contribution of the United States and Great Britain to the victory over the fascist coalition. To this effect they emphasize above all the volume of war production. Their claim that the weapons for victory were hammered only overseas is completely false. They avoid the seemingly basic question of when and how these weapons were used in the war theaters, for the efficiency of the means used in the armed struggle is determined not by stockpiling them in arsenals but their use in combat, in battles. The bourgeois historians consider the results of the economic support for the war, made by the Western countries in the anti-Hitlerite coalition, in a deliberately distorted context.

The real economic arsenal for victory was the Soviet Union. Through the very end of the war it outstripped the United States and Great Britain in the production of some types of armaments, particularly tanks and self-propelling artillery systems. For example, 29,000 such weapons were produced by the USSR in 1944, compared with 20,500 by the United States and 4,600 by Great Britain. Our tanks were superior in terms of quality as well. The main thing was that throughout the war Soviet military equipment was used efficiently and on a tremendous scale against the enemy. Our victory was won thanks to the unity between the front and the rear and the war and labor exploits of the Soviet people.

The experience of the struggle waged by the Soviet Union against the fascist bloc during the war proves that Lenin's concepts on the increasing role of the economy and the economic organization of society and the advantages of the socialist planned economy are of tremendous importance in strengthening the defense capability of the country today. This experience has taught us a great deal. Today the communist party and Soviet government are taking the necessary steps for our armed forces to have all necessary means for waging a modern armed struggle in the case of imperialist aggression, and to have as many such means as is necessary in order to be on the level of their historical purpose but nothing more than that.

Armed struggle was the decisive means for waging war by the fascist bloc. The authors describe its features, such as the sudden and treacherous attack by the aggressor, the tremendous spatial scope of the war, the struggle for strategic initiative and others.

Military problems such as the strategic results of the armed struggle on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese fronts and the features and results of military operations on the other fronts have been particularly considered.

The authors emphasize that the USSR armed forces played a decisive role in the defeat of the aggressor. The bulk of the most combat-capable German and German-satellite troops were on the Soviet-German front. Neither the United States nor Great Britain engaged in large-scale active operations until the summer of 1944. More specifically, between June 1941 and the opening of the Second Front, for 3 war years, an average of 15 to 20 times more enemy troops were concentrated on the Soviet-German front than on all other fronts involving the forces of the United States and Great Britain (North Africa, Italy). Even after the opening of the Second Front in Europe (June 1944) the number of Wehrmacht units fighting the American, British and French troops on the European theater of military operations was less by a factor of 1.8-2.8 compared to the forces fighting on the Soviet-German front. Let us also note that the operations conducted by the United States, Britain and France in Western Europe developed when the forces of fascist Germany were already exhausted in the war against the USSR. The military power of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites was crushed at the Soviet-German front. It was here and here only that the global strategic plans and tensions of the aggressor were crushed. The Soviet-German front was the main front in World War II. The German-fascist forces suffered more than 73 percent of their overall casualties in the battles against the Soviet army. Wehrmacht personnel losses on the Soviet-German front were quadruple the losses it suffered on the Western European and Mediterranean theaters of military operations combined. It was on the Soviet-German front that the bulk of the Hitlerite military equipment was destroyed. This front accounted for as much as 75 percent of the overall losses in tanks and assault guns, 75 percent of the air force and 74 percent of artillery guns. U.S. President Roosevelt wrote: "From the viewpoint of high strategy...it would be difficult to ignore the obvious fact that the Russian armies are destroying more enemy soldiers and armaments than the other 25 members of the United Nations combined."

The book provides summed-up information on the development of the USSR armed forces during the war and the birth of the armies of the people's democracies. It contains data on the characteristics of the structure of the armed forces of the bourgeois members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition--the United States, Great Britain, France and China.

The question of the martial art during the war plays an important role in the work. The authors assess the individual armed forces participating in the war. They describe the characteristics of Soviet military science and art,

their steady development and superiority over the martial skills of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. The historical battles waged by the Soviet armed forces for Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad, on the Kursk arc and for the Dnepr and the brilliant Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Warsaw-Poznan, Berlin, Hingan-Mukden and other operations made important contributions to the development of strategy, operative art and tactics. They proved the outstanding abilities of our military leaders and commanders and the combat skill of the Soviet troops.

The martial art of the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitlerite coalition as well did not stand still during the war. Its development after the major defeats suffered by Great Britain and the United States at the beginning of the war, took place under favorable military-political circumstances, in which the main forces of the fascist bloc were tied down on the Soviet-German front.

The war confirmed the advantages of the Soviet system of guiding the armed forces, based on a progressive social system, the high moral-combat qualities of the personnel, their heroism on the battlefields and the scientific methods implied in the study of military phenomena. It proved that the level of military guidance at all levels in the USSR armed forces directly depends on the political outlook of command cadres, their professional mastery and practical skills in troop control.

5

The study of the events of World War II is closely related to that of the postwar development of international relations. The radical changes in the ratio of forces in the world arena in favor of socialism and democracy, the establishment of the world socialist system--the most important historical event after the Great October Revolution, and the further upsurge of the international communist movement are described. The victory over fascism accelerated the development of the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America and contributed to the breakdown of the imperialist colonial system, which had begun after the October Revolution.

The area under imperialist rule shrunk considerably as a result of World War II and the postwar revolutionary movement. The general crisis of capitalism worsened even further. The old "traditional" capitalist contradictions were aggravated and crisis phenomena in economics, politics and class relations broadened.

Imperialist aggressiveness increased in the postwar decades, American in particular. The United States established a widespread set of bases and other military projects in various parts of the world. More than 1,500 such facilities, located on the territories of 32 countries, existed in 1982. The Pentagon is keeping abroad some 500,000 soldiers and officers. More than 300,000 U.S. military servicemen are stationed in Western European military bases. More than 100 American bases exist in Japan and its ports are bases for the Seventh U.S. Fleet, including nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear weapons. Some 130,000 American soldiers and officers are billeted in

military bases in the Far East and the area of the Pacific Ocean (outside U.S. territory). In an effort to acquire military superiority over the USSR, the United States and its NATO partners are pursuing a plan of increasing their nuclear arsenals and developing new types of mass destruction weapons--neutron, chemical and bacteriological. They are trying to militarize outer space. The aggressive imperialist policy is a real threat to the world and to the security of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and all peoples fighting for freedom and social progress in their countries.

The struggle for strengthening the results of the victory over fascism was one of the most important directions pursued in USSR foreign policy activities. The Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth had to surmount the stubborn opposition of reactionary Western circles in the process of achieving a postwar structure of the world on a just and democratic basis. The political results of World War II were definitively codified at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, which was the result of the initiative of the members of the socialist commonwealth.

Problems related to the war and the victory over fascism were and remain the focal point of the sharpest confrontation between communist and bourgeois ideology. The authors expose the reactionary nature of bourgeois historiography of World War II, substantiatedly defending historical truth.

Lenin's instruction on the need firmly to expose all sorts of sophistries "which justify war" (op. cit., vol 45, p 319) becomes particularly relevant today. Imperialist reaction should not be allowed to frighten or mislead the people. The CPSU and all fraternal countries in the socialist commonwealth are persistently and systematically fighting the ideological subversions of the bourgeois West, its militaristic concepts and doctrines and various disinformation and slanders.

The materials contained in the volume convincingly prove that live ties to history and knowledge of the experience of the war multiply the forces of nations. The defeat of fascism in World War II proved that the aspiration of the imperialist powers to global hegemony and domination of other peoples is, in the final account, doomed to failure. By unleashing the war, imperialism not only failed to achieve its objectives but was unable to preserve even its prewar positions and spheres of influence. This once again confirmed Lenin's prophetic statement to the effect that "...any attempt to wage war on us will mean to the countries which become involved in such a war a worsening of the conditions in which they could have lived without war or before the war, compared to the conditions they will obtain as a result of and after the war" (op. cit., vol 42, p 131).

The security of our fatherland is on the level of today's requirements. The fact that the U.S. imperialists would not hesitate to launch a sudden war is taken into consideration. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "We shall continue to do everything necessary to ensure the security of our country and our friends and allies. We shall increase the combat power of the Soviet armed forces--a powerful factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialist reaction."

All efforts which the U.S. imperialists are making to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union are futile. The first socialist country in the world will not find itself unarmed in the face of any threat. All efforts must be focused on the single purpose of safeguarding peace.

The experience of World War II teaches us actively to counteract the intrigues of imperialist forces which are trying to disturb peace and to do everything necessary to prevent a new global conflagration.

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CAPITAL EXPORTS--A TOOL FOR MONOPOLY EXPANSION

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[Review by Academician S. Tikhvinskiy of the books (1) "Vneshnyaya Ekspansiya Kapitala. Istoriya i Sovremennost'" [Foreign Expansion of Capital. History and Present Times], by A. A. Gromyko. Mysl', Moscow, 1982, 494 pp; (2) "Eksport Amerikanskogo Kapitala. Iz Istorii Eksporta Kapitala SShA kak Orudiya Ekonomicheskoy i Politicheskoy Ekspansii" [Export of American Capital. From the History of U.S. Capital Exports as a Tool for Economic and Political Expansion], by G. Andreyev. Moscow, 1957, 451 pp; (3) "Ekspansiya Dollara" [Expansion of the Dollar], by G. Andreyev. Moscow, 1961, 480 pp]

[Text] The objective scientific analysis of the economic and political factors which determine the behavior of the ruling circles in the imperialist countries, the United States above all, becomes particularly relevant in the current complex international situation created by the energizing of aggressive imperialist forces. In studying the distinguishing features of the imperialist stage in the development of capitalism, V. I. Lenin noted the particular importance at this stage of capital exports. "Typical of the old capitalism, under the total domination of free competition," he wrote, "was the export of commodities. Typical of the latest capitalism, with monopoly rule, has become the export of capital" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 359). The first and, particularly, second World Wars were largely triggered by the struggle among the leading imperialist countries for capital export markets. In the postwar years capital exports assumed an unprecedented scale, doubling with every decade and becoming one of the main factors influencing the policy of contemporary state-monopoly capitalism. Capital exports began to be used as the most powerful tool for imperialist expansion, largely determining international economic relations and the diplomacy of the leading capitalist countries.

Dr of Economic Sciences A. A. Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR minister of foreign affairs, provides a comprehensive study of the history and contemporary situation of capital exports in his new basic work (1).

The author makes a close study of the development of American imperialism starting with the 1930s. He carefully follows the works of foreign economists, statistical reports by monopolies and banks and materials of international economic organizations. He has presented the results of his studies

in major works such as (2) and (3), as well as numerous articles in scientific journals. These works have had a substantial influence on the development of a number of important problems of contemporary international relations by Soviet scientists. The new monograph sums up a long period of fruitful research done by the author on one of the most topical problems of the political economy of contemporary capitalism.

In writing the monograph, the author studied a tremendous volume of documents, a large number of which are new. Suffice it to say that he has referred to more than 300 titles of foreign sources alone, monographs and statistical and reference works. The book contains thoroughly analyzed data based on reports issued by international economic organizations, banks and corporations and official publications of economic and financial institutions in the leading capitalist countries. The collected and summarized information, based on a large number of foreign monographs and periodicals, is presented in 84 tables which illustrate the ideas expressed in the book. All of the authors' conclusions are based on reliable and solid documentation.

On the problem-history level, the author provides a thorough study of the most important trends, scales, forms and directions of American capital exports. He considers capital exports as a tool for monopoly expansion, a base for U.S. global aspirations and an instrument of neocolonialism. The work traces the direct connection between the imperialist aspirations of the American bourgeoisie and its foreign policy course and "economic diplomacy." It indicates the interconnection and dialectical interdependence among economics, politics and diplomacy, the latter being the strongest feature of this comprehensive, multifaceted scientific study.

The profound and comprehensive study of Marxist-Leninist concepts on the basic laws governing the development of imperialism has allowed the author to note four new features in capital exports characteristic of highly developed state-monopoly capitalism. They are, first, the increased scale of capital exports and the growing importance of this process. "On the one hand," the author writes, "increased capital exports are the result of the fast development of production forces, intensification of production internationalization, expansion of global economic ties under the influence of scientific and technical progress and the broadened positions of multinational corporations. On the other, "... the fast growth of capital exports is an indicator of the inability of contemporary, highly developed capitalism to resolve its development problems other than through accelerated internationalization, acceleration of foreign expansion, suppression of the sovereignty of nations and their subordination to its hegemonic aspirations by shifting the burden of its contradictions to the peoples of other countries" (p 22).

Secondly, the aggressive nature of the policy of capital exports is increasing substantially. A specific manifestation of this aggressiveness is the gross violation by U.S. imperialism of basic norms of international relations, flouting the principles of equality and mutual benefits and undermining the foundations of the national sovereignty, freedom and independence of nations. This policy is directly related to the activities of the military-industrial complex and the global militaristic plans of the monopolies.

Increased aggressiveness in the area of capital exports is explained by the increased irregularity in the development of the imperialist countries, the aggravation struggle among international capitalist markets and commodities and the characteristics of the economic situation of underdeveloped countries which remain as imperialist reserves to this day; however, the harnessing of this reserve is becoming increasingly difficult as a result of the increased strength of national liberation forces, the fact that an increasing number of young countries are choosing the path of progressive development (a socialist orientation above all) and the strengthening of comprehensive relations between liberated countries and the socialist world.

The third feature of contemporary capital exports is the increased interconnection between capital exports and the foreign policy course of the imperialist countries. "Reality has entirely confirmed the accuracy of Lenin's approach to the study of the role of capital exports in imperialist policy," the author notes. "To speak of capital exports today means to look above all at the expansion of a small group of industrially developed capitalist countries" (p 27). More than nine-tenths of the \$450-460 billion --the sum total of private direct capital investments in 1981--come from eight countries: the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, Switzerland, Japan, The Netherlands, France and Canada. The group of principal capital exporters almost entirely coincides with the names of countries attending the annual meetings of Western leaders who, at such conferences, draft the main directions of their policy; all largest multinational corporations are based in these countries.

However, the author does not simplify the interconnection between capital expansion and foreign policy, proving that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the monopolies to make use of international capital flow exclusively for the purpose of pursuing their imperialist policy. Some influential Western business circles favor cooperation with the USSR and the other members of the socialist commonwealth, based on the principles of non-interference, respect for sovereignty, just consideration of their partners' interests and mutual benefits.

The fourth and final feature of contemporary capital exports is its increased exploitative nature, manifested above all in the tremendous payments which capital importers must make to suppliers. During the 1970s interest payments on debts incurred by the developing countries alone increased by a factor of more than 9! The owners of direct investments in such countries are earning profits reaching 20-25 percent of the sum total of such investments.

Meanwhile, the exploitation of the working people in capital exporting countries is growing. Increased exports of private capital means reduced employment and increased unemployment. Capital exports by the government in the guise of economic, technical or military "aid," means confiscating some of the income of the working people in "their own countries" through taxation and various collections. Large corporations not only do not suffer from this but even earn tremendous profits, for the government's foreign "aid" involves the obligation to purchase commodities from the financing countries, which considerably encourages production and marketing. Furthermore, such "aid"

opens a path to profitable private capital investments. "The growing contradiction between the upper crust of monopoly business and the rest of society in the capitalist world is manifested today more clearly in the area of capital exports than anywhere else," the author writes (pp 34-35).

As he notes, these features of contemporary capital exports are inherent in imperialism as a whole. However, they are manifested above all in the international activities of American monopolies and in the policy pursued by the U.S. government under their control and for the sake of their selfish interests.

Already by the end of the 19th century, in the 1880s and 1890s in particular, the United States was acting as a developed capitalist country with a tremendous concentration of capital in the hands of trusts and syndicates. The young American imperialism not only rapidly gathered strength within the country but increasingly began turning to the outside. Although before World War I the United States was a borrower and many millions of dollars of foreign capital were poured into its economy, it too exported capital and resorted to the use of a variety of means of economic expansion toward other countries. In some of them (Canada, Mexico) already then American capital was playing an important role compared with that of other countries. In mid-1914 the overall amount of U.S. capital investments abroad was \$5 billion (see p 60).

The United States did not fail to use its growing capital resources invested abroad for attaining its expansionistic objectives not only in Northern and Latin America but in Europe, Asia and Oceania. The end of the 19th century marked the end of the open activities of the United States as an imperialist country which had taken the path of territorial conquest and had inaugurated a series of wars aimed at the redivision of the world. This was helped by the fast growth of capital exports. U.S. expansionism was clearly manifested toward China. Here foreign policy actions became most closely interwoven with economic expansion. On the basis of a specific study of relations between the two countries at that time the author concludes that the United States pursued an aggressive policy of conquest toward China "virtually from the very beginning of the existence of the United States as an independent country" (p 81).

Even before World War I American capitalism had made repeated attempts at enslaving Russia economically, its Far Eastern areas and Siberia above all. American businessmen earned huge profits of 500, 1,000 and even 2,000 percent from their exploitation of the wealth of this area (see p 65). U.S. capital continued to penetrate some important Russian economic sectors until the Great October Socialist Revolution. In 1917 it accounted for 117,750,000 rubles in Russian stockholding companies alone (see p 68).

World War I gave a powerful impetus to the further development of U.S. economic expansion. The granting of extensive loans and credits, which played a tremendous role in financing World War I and were subsequently used for expansionistic objectives based on the war debts, were the most important levers of this expansionism. The war brought about two important changes in

economic relations between the United States and the other large capitalist countries. To begin with, it made indebted to the United States, with all political and economic consequences, as many as 20 foreign countries. Most European countries were deep in debt from loans received from the United States, which exceeded \$11 billion by 1921 (see p 87). The author cites numerous cases of the use of war loans by the United States as instruments for pressure and blackmail toward a number of debtors (Romania, France, Italy, Germany and Latin American countries). Secondly, in the course of the war a tremendous withdrawal of foreign capital from the United States took place, created by the needs of the Allies for dollars with which to pay for American supplies. This radically undermined the weight and influence of foreign capital in the American economy (see p 88).

The reactionary and aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism, which had become wealthy during the war, was manifested particularly clearly in the generous American loans granted to finance the Russian counterrevolution. The U.S. ruling circles displayed their extreme hostility toward the Soviet state not only as organizers and participants in the intervention against our country but also as creditors of the White Guards. Of an overall amount of loans totaling \$10 billion, appropriated by the United States for allied countries in 1917-1918, \$450 million was scheduled for the Russian Provisional Government; most of these funds were used to finance the White Guards--Kolchak, Denikin and others (see p 100).

The imperialist and anti-Soviet aspirations of the United States were manifested most openly in its approach to the so-called "Russian debt." A number of aspects of this problem are considered in the book for the first time, which is of particular interest, for the true role which the United States played in this matter at that time had remained insufficiently clarified in both Western and Soviet literature. The facts and documents presented by the author convincingly prove that "the Soviet people saw an open enemy in American monopoly capital" (p 110).

After World War I the United States became a leading country in terms of economic power, share in the global capitalist economy, volume of exports and degree of capital concentration. Using its economic superiority, American imperialism charted a course of further extensive foreign economic expansion, redivision of spheres of influence and, in the final account, assumption of global domination.

The growth of U.S. global aspirations increased the importance of capital exports which, in the hands of the American monopolies, increasingly became one of the main tools in the economic redivision of spheres of influence in its favor. Between 1919 and 1940 the overall amount of American foreign investments (excluding the military debts of the Allies) increased from \$7 billion to \$12.2 billion (see p 125).

In his study of American capital exports between the wars the author notes the following characteristics: a considerable increase in private capital exports; increased role of the state which is increasingly becoming the largest capital exporter and guarantor in the export of private capital;

increased direct long-term capital investments, both private and governmental, with a relative decline in the share of portfolio investments (see p 128).

In its striving to establish its domination over the global capitalist market, American monopoly capital tried above all financially to subordinate to its rule the European countries. It mounted a fierce struggle for restraining European capital from colonies and areas of influence of the European capitalist countries.

The direct and extensive financial support of Germany by U.S. ruling circles and monopoly capital in the period between the wars played a sinister role in the rebirth of German militarism, the rebuilding of German military-economic potential and Germany's preparations for World War II.

The United States hoped above all to use Germany's military and economic potential and reactionary political system, restored with its help, as a bridgehead in the struggle against the USSR and all progressive and democratic forces. Great importance was ascribed to the use of German economic potential in the postwar aggravated competitive struggle against Britain, France, Italy and other European capitalist countries. The extensive financial aid which monopoly capital gave Germany as loans and direct investments and close cooperation between American monopolies and German cartels were aimed at such targets. This was also the purpose of the various plans and measures regarding Germany, crafted by the United States, including guaranteeing its reparation payments. The author singles out as the most important among them the "Dowes Plan" (1924), the "Young Plan" (1930), and the Hoover moratorium (1931).

Cooperation between American and German monopolies expanded even further with Hitler's arrival to power. After 1933 dozens of American enterprises in Germany directly participated in fulfilling military orders. Many of the American companies and banks which actively helped the Hitlerites to seize power and, subsequently, to engage in military preparations, belonged to Zionist capital.

The policy and strategy of U.S. imperialism in World War II were defined by the imperialist nature of American monopoly capital and its age-old aspiration to establish unchallenged control over the global capitalist market. Its objectives were to extract maximal profits, achieve the comprehensive weakening of the Soviet Union, exhaust its imperialist competitors--Germany and Japan--and get rid of them, and weaken the positions of Great Britain and assist in the loss of its dominions and colonial possessions.

The U.S. monopolies used World War II, as they did World War I, for purposes of tremendous enrichment at the expense of the working people of their own country and their allies. Despite the fact that American overseas capital investments increased relatively slowly--by some \$4.5 billion in 6 years, between 1940 and 1945 (see p 186)--they continued to earn substantial income for the American monopolies, totaling \$3,257,000,000 (see p 208).

Although private capital investments retained their leading role, during World War II the role of state capital exports from the United States was increased, as can be clearly seen from the activities of Washington's Export-Import Bank. Loans to the Kuomintang authorities in China with a view to helping them in their struggle against democratic forces in the country were one of the typical examples of the use of Export-Import Bank credits for foreign policy objectives.

The work extensively describes the use of U.S. lend-lease as a means of economic and political expansion. The author exposes the attempts of American bourgeois propaganda greatly to exaggerate the actual role of American lend-lease aid to its allies, particularly assertions to the effect that supplies of lend-lease armaments and materials to the Soviet Union made its victory over Hitlerite Germany possible. Naturally, lend-lease procurements played a certain positive role in equipping the Soviet army with arms and combat equipment. However, it was not they who determined the course and outcome of the struggle on the Soviet-German front. The overwhelming share of armaments and military ordnance was produced by the domestic economy. Total procurements of industrial commodities by the Allies throughout the war accounted for no more than 4 percent of the Soviet industrial output (see p 198).

The increased foreign expansion of American monopolies after World War II was most clearly manifested in the variety of plans and programs for "aid" to other countries. "The main feature which runs through all 'aid' programs," the author points out, "is the aspiration of American monopoly capital to impose to a maximal number of countries and, if possible, with minimal outlays, internal systems suitable to U.S. monopolies and norms of international behavior consistent with Washington's requirements" (p 216).

The work exposes in detail the expansionist nature of the American-British 6 December 1945 financial agreement, the "Marshall Plan," and expansion with the help of agricultural "surpluses." He pays particular attention to the use of "aid" as an instrument of neocolonialism and clearly proves that U.S. practices in providing "aid" to the developing countries "not only failed to yield positive results in terms of these countries' economic development and the enhancement of the well-being of their peoples but, conversely, led to an even greater domination of American capital in their economies and their increased dependence on the United States, with all the consequences to their peoples" (p 243). As a rule, the U.S. ruling circles used "aid" to the developing countries for the purpose of imposing obligations of a military nature. The seizure of the main sources of raw materials in the capitalist world became one of the most important factors in U.S. foreign policy. The United States tried above to seize the very rich petroleum deposits in the Near and Middle East, Latin America and many other parts of the world. The data cited in the book clearly show the way American monopolies took over the richest sources of petroleum and the position they assigned in this matter to capital exports, particularly loans and credits as means of economic penetration in the respective countries. The data enable us to understand the origins of the contemporary aggressive policy pursued by the United States in the Middle East.

The author also discusses the expansion of American capital aimed at seizing world sources of other types of strategic raw materials, such as natural rubber, tin, lead, copper, nickel, chromium, manganese and others.

The activities of international monetary credit institutions, above all the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are among the new channels for U.S. economic expansion after World War II.

The book proves the groundlessness of the efforts of official Washington circles and American bourgeois economists to present matters as though the participation of the United States in the creation of the IBRD and IMF was dictated by the altruistic intentions to help countries which had suffered from the war to rebuild their economy. Actually, the entire system of agreements related to the IBRD and IMF is so structured that control over all aspects of their activities is in U.S. hands, directly or indirectly. The activities of the IBRD clearly proved that "not only did it not contribute to the growth of international trade but, conversely, it was one of the tools used in undermining international trade and discriminating against the socialist countries and progressive regimes in developing countries; it not only failed to serve the cause of the economic reconstruction of the member countries..., but conversely, was used to develop the economies of such countries in a one-sided direction suitable to U.S. monopolies" (p 325). The United States is trying to use the IMF as well with a view to increasing its monopoly expansion.

In recent years the struggle which the United States is waging with the help of capital exports with a view to strengthening its economic and political positions in the capitalist world is taking place under the circumstances of an increasing foreign expansion on the part of the Western European countries and Japan. Characteristically, the share of the United States in the annual increase of direct foreign investments by developed capitalist countries has been gradually declining, despite the fact that in terms of absolute amounts the annual export of capital from the United States has grown steadily. "This disparity," the author writes, "inevitably leads to the growth of interimperialist contradictions" (p 359).

The U.S. ruling circles made use of large-scale expansion of American private capital as an old and tried means in their competitive struggle against their rivals.

American investments increased most intensively in Western Europe. Between 1966 and 1981 they increased by a factor of nearly 6 (see p 371), totaling \$101.3 billion. There were 10,262 branches of U.S. corporations operating in Europe in 1977 (see p 373). Direct U.S. investments in Western Europe are having a double influence on the economy of the host country. On the one hand, they are a means for the further development of the economic and scientific potential of the Western European countries; on the other, the expansion of American capital is having a restraining influence on the development of the national industrial sectors (see p 375).

The overwhelming share of American investments goes to the developed capitalist countries. They currently account for nearly three-quarters of all direct American capital investments. The United States is relying on a deep penetration into the economies of the developed capitalist countries and establishing control over their key sectors, thus hoping to put Western Europe and Japan in a position of dependence. A huge production apparatus controlled by American multinational corporations has been created abroad. The annual output of the branches and subsidiaries of American companies exceeds the value of American commodity exports by a factor of more than 5.

The author offers an extensive study of capital exports as a tool of contemporary neocolonialism. "Capital exports as a means of neocolonialism is the focal point of a number of basic problems of relations between developing countries and monopoly capital which, as a rule, particularly in recent decades, are supported by official policy," the author notes (p 384). The overall volume of funds annually received by the United States from the developing countries has increased from \$5.3 billion in 1965 to \$31.1 billion in 1979, i.e., by a factor of almost 6 (see p 388).

In an effort to tie the developing countries to the capitalist system through the establishment of stabler types of dependence, the Reagan administration singles out among recipients of American "aid" those of considerable political or military-strategic interest to the United States.

The increased exploitation of the developing countries by American capital is expressed in the transfer of profits by foreign monopolies, manipulations with purchase prices and sales in intracompany monopoly trade, "price gaps," excessive payments for licenses and transportation, losses resulting from the "brain drain," currency depreciation as a result of galloping inflation in the West, and so on. According to various estimates the losses suffered by the developing countries exceed \$100 billion annually (see p 417).

In his theory of imperialism, V. I. Lenin noted the processes of capital internationalization and merger between monopolies and the machinery of the state in the bourgeois countries. This is confirmed by the new processes occurring in influence which monopoly capital exerts on U.S. foreign policy. A consideration of the history of the international expansion of American capital in the book proves that it is precisely the interests of monopoly capital that has largely determined the nature, direction and means of U.S. foreign policy, the aggression in Indochina, the overthrow of the democratic regime in Chile, intervention in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern and Central American countries, and so on.

The materials cited in the monograph confirm the increasing subordination of the foreign policy and diplomacy of foreign countries to the interests of monopoly capital. The specific features characteristic of our age are manifested in this process which, in itself, is not new. The political claims of the imperialist monopolies are so far-reaching that the ordinary institutions of bourgeois diplomacy are no longer suitable, as is confirmed, in particular, by the unparalleled increase in the activities of so-called private diplomacy. "The transfer of some foreign policy decision functions from government

offices to monopoly headquarters is the clearest possible confirmation of the profound crisis in imperialist diplomacy!" the author emphasizes (p 437). Neglecting customs, traditions, norms and methods of "classical" diplomacy, the monopoly bourgeoisie is broadening its diplomatic arsenal through methods such as blackmail, fraud, all sorts of embargoes and sanctions in response to activities by governments of other countries "unsuitable" to the monopolies. The notorious concept of U.S. "vital interests" as well is aimed at protecting the interests of American capital at all costs, including that of violating the national sovereignty of other countries.

"The intensification of the general crisis in capitalism has spread to its economy and politics. It is manifested in the serious crisis experienced by the world capitalist economy and in the foreign policy of the imperialist countries," the author writes (p 441). He convincingly proves the futility and doom of the imperialist policy "from the position of strength" and the "cold war."

The author adds to the study of the foreign expansion of capital, American in particular, a constructive alternative--a platform for peaceful cooperation among countries and nations (see Chapter VIII, Section 2). This alternative consists of the consistent and steady pursuit of the implementation of the Peace Program for the 1980s, adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress. As the author justifiably emphasizes, "ensuring the peace and security of the peoples despite the aspiration of monopoly capital for an arms race and aggression opens the way to peaceful cooperation based on equality, respect for sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and mutual benefit" (p 444). Such a policy, pursued by the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth, is the logical extension and development of the principle of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems, which was formulated by Lenin even prior to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. From the very first day of the founding of the Soviet state and to the present, this principle remains one of the fundamental principles governing Soviet foreign policy. The aggressive imperialist policy aimed at destroying detente and trade-economic relations with the socialist countries and continuing the policy of domination and exploitation of other countries and peoples, is countered by the socialist countries with their consistent course of preservation and intensification of detente and establishing extensive, equal, mutually profitable and long-term cooperation among all countries in the world.

The author presents as a progressive alternative to increased foreign economic expansion of imperialist capital, that of the United States in particular, inequality, discrimination and exploitation in international capitalist economic relations, which lead to the further intensification of their crisis, as well as substantiates a radical reorganization of such relations on an equal and just basis (see Chapter VIII, Section 3).

Against a broad historical background the author depicts the stages and the course of the struggle waged by the Soviet state from its very first days for a restructuring of international economic relations on a new democratic basis. As early as 1922, at the Genoa and Hague conferences, the Soviet

government submitted a broad program for action for the solution of global economic problems, including the annulment of enslaving treaties, the prevention of inflation, the struggle against the fuel crisis, the reorganization of international transportation, and others. After World War II the Soviet Union has repeatedly called for a democratization of international economic relations, considering mutually profitable and equal economic cooperation among countries as a material base for the policy of peaceful coexistence among countries with different socioeconomic systems. Thus, as one of the initiators of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it formulated together with the other socialist countries in 1964 the basic principles of equal international economic cooperation. The expanded position of the USSR on contemporary problems of international economic relations is found in the familiar declaration by the Soviet government, "On the Reorganization of International Economic Relations," dated 4 October 1976. As the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized, "we are ready to cooperate and are actually cooperating in the establishment of equitable international economic relations."

The principles of equality and mutual advantage have been concretely embodied in the practice of extensive trade and economic relations organized between the USSR and all countries in the world and, particularly, in trade and economic relations between the USSR and the countries and peoples of the former imperialist colonial periphery. The Soviet Union is expanding its practice of concluding long-term trade and economic agreements with the developing countries under conditions which ensure the true sovereignty and respect for the legitimate rights of the cooperating countries. The USSR tries to help these countries to strengthen their political and their economic independence. For this reason, the entire system of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the other socialist countries may be considered as a real and effective contribution made by the members of the socialist commonwealth to the implementation of the progressive concepts of a new international economic order, as formulated by the developing countries and supported by the socialist ones.

As in the past, the monopoly circles of the Western powers, the United States in particular, remain the main obstacle on the path to the establishment of a new international economic order and the reorganization of the entire system of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis. It is precisely they who continue to block the so-called global talks on the adoption of the main directions for a new world economic order in an effort to ensure the inviolability of the existing unequal and discriminatory system of international capitalist division of labor.

The contribution of the Soviet Union and the socialist commonwealth as a whole to the radical reorganization of the entire system of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis is traced in the monograph also through the practice of trade and economic cooperation between the socialist and developed capitalist countries.

In his article "The Doctrine of Karl Marx and Some Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee

general secretary, notes that "Marxism is not a dogma but a live manual for action and for independent work on the complex problems which we face with each historical turn. In order not to fall behind life, the communists must enhance and enrich Marx's doctrine in all directions, and creatively apply his method of dialectical materialism, justifiably described as the living soul of Marxism."

A. A. Gromyko's monograph is pertinent in terms of these tasks. It is essentially the first fundamental and original scientific study made in recent years in this area and a substantial contribution to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory in the realm of foreign policy in general and foreign economic policy in particular.

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IMPERIALISM AGAINST THE LIBERATED COUNTRIES

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[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences N. Yermoshkin, of the book "The World Economic and Social Crisis. Its Impact on the Underdeveloped Countries, Its Somber Prospects and the Need To Struggle If We Are To Survive," by Fidel Castro. Report to the Seventh Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries, Havana, 1983, 224 pp]

[Text] In 1953, at the trial of the participants in the heroic storming of the Moncada Barracks, Comrade Fidel Castro Rus, at that time a young political leader, delivered a fiery speech full of revolutionary passion--"History Will Prove Me Right"--which became the actual programmatic document of the people's democratic and anti-imperialist revolution in Cuba.

This speech by the young leader of a handful of braves in his defense and in the defense of his comrades was quite unlike a routine speech by a lawyer. Every single one of its words exposed local and foreign tyranny which was trampling on the freedom of the Cuban people. The accused asked for neither mercy nor leniency for himself: "I am concluding the plea in my own defense. However, I am not acting like all lawyers who beg for the release of the defendant. I cannot request this when my comrades are already suffering on the Isla de Pinos in shameful exile. Send me to them, to share their fate, for it is clear that those who are honest must either perish or sit in jail in a republic in which the president is a criminal and a thief."

In describing the colonial status of his beloved homeland, Castro exposed the very core of imperialist plunder: "We export sugar to import candy; we export hides to import shoes; we export iron ore to import plows..."

Thirty years later, at the Seventh Congress of Heads of States and Governments of Nonaligned Countries, in New Delhi, Comrade Fidel Castro returned to this topic and delivered one of his most outstanding expository anti-imperialist speeches. Passionate and honest, it put to shame the old and new colonizers and the boundless greed and cupidity of Western monopolists and their pharisaic hypocrisy. In his capacity as chairman of the nonaligned movement, he also submitted a report on the impact of the global economic and social crisis on the developing countries. This study drew the closest possible attention of the world public. Published as a book, as suits such a strict and official document, the report makes one noteworthy aside. Its

publication data state that it was "printed in Havana in February 1983, on the 30th anniversary of the storming of the Moncada Barracks."

In recent years a number of attempts of various natures have been made by Western foundations, institutes, groups of scientists or individual researchers to analyze the entire set of complex problems facing the 127 young countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America conventionally known as developing or liberated countries. Most such commissioned works, however, reflected in the final account nothing but the interests of one or another monopoly capital group. Even the two reports of the W. Brandt commission, drafted within the framework of the Socialist International, which are most complete and conscientious from the viewpoint of the selection of factual data, explain the trouble of the young countries with the statement that "everything is bad" in the modern world. Radically different from Western studies, Castro's report exposes the reasons for this "badness," and names the culprits for the extremely difficult socioeconomic situation in which Asian, African and Latin American countries find themselves. These countries present a rather variegated sociopolitical and geographic picture. They are different in terms of economic levels and selected development paths. Essentially, however, as F. Castro particularly emphasizes, their common interests are based on their recent colonial past, the catastrophic poverty of the overwhelming majority of their populations, the need to eliminate backwardness, to develop their own industrial base and agricultural upsurge, and the aspiration to put an end to imperialist diktat in the spiritual and economic areas.

"The world is experiencing one of the deepest economic crises in its entire history," Castro writes. "This crisis originated in the largest capitalist countries. However, it had its most severe effect on the developing countries which are now experiencing the gravest economic difficulties of the entire postwar period" (p 11). The author analyzes in detail the characteristics of postwar capitalist development and traces the influence of the crisis on the periphery of the capitalist economy. He notes that "some of these most important events are related to the increased concentration of power, capital and means of production and, subsequently, the extraterritorialization of this process as a result of the appearance of multinational corporations" (p 16). He points out that with the intensification of contradictions in the world capitalist system and the aggravation of the financial, raw material, energy and economic crises, Western monopoly capital has become increasingly interested in the natural resources of Asia, Africa and Latin America and has done everything possible to shift to the young liberated countries the burden of its economic disorder. "The current crisis has brought Third World countries a virtually total breakdown of their national economies and the failure of their hopes for improvements," the author concludes (p 31).

Castro emphasizes that the breakdown of the imperialist colonial system forced the West to change its strategy and tactics in plundering the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Second priority was given to methods of noneconomic coercion, such as political domination and armed suppression. Such methods were not abandoned forever or rejected. Why, otherwise, would the United States, France and Great Britain urgently create "rapid deployment

forces," girdle the world with their innumerable military bases, maintain naval armadas in distant foreign waters and build airfields and stockpile weapons tens of thousands of miles from their own borders? Naturally, this does not relate to the mythical "communist threat." The purpose of the bayonets of their soldiers, the guns of their ships and the bombs of their airplanes is to protect the imperial ambitions of monopoly capital, which is engaged in a concentrated economic offensive against the young countries and is substituting neocolonial for colonial forms of exploitation.

To a certain extent, the experience tested by American capital in Latin America was applied to the liberated countries. The emphasis was on the large contemporary monopolies, the so-called multinational corporations (MC), which became a tool of imperialist plunder and exploitation. It is they who became the main carriers of the bacillus of neocolonialism. Their tentacles spread to cover literally all parts of the world.¹ They shamelessly plunder those who were sunk to the bottom by the shameful colonial system. Today more than 500 million people are going hungry, virtually all of them in the liberated countries. According to the FAO,² every year 40 million people die of hunger and malnutrition. However, as F. Castro emphasizes, this does not prevent the Western countries, with their surplus of products, "deliberately to curtail their production or senselessly destroy large quantities of food for the sake of keeping prices up and market competition" (p 180).

More than 1 billion people, i.e., one-quarter of the earth's population, and again in Asian, African and Latin American countries, subsist under conditions of horrifying poverty. Infant mortality here is at least 10 times that of the developed capitalist countries. Thus, the author writes, "12 million (one out of 10) of the 122 million children who were born in 1980, the International Year of the Child, did not live to see 1981 and 95 percent of them were in the developing countries" (p 183). More than two-thirds of mankind are entirely deprived of medical services today. According to UNESCO, 814 million adults are completely illiterate, and again the majority of them are Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. The army of unemployed in the liberated countries has reached astronomical figures--500 million--which exceeds 50 percent of their active population.

Here the average lifespan is 55 years. Between 30 and 40 percent of the urban population live in slums and hovels. Every year 11 million people are added to the urban poor. In this connection F. Castro cites IBRC data which show that the per capita GNP in the developed countries was on an average 40 times higher than in the developing countries in 1980 (see p 175).

Such is the cruel reality of life of the ordinary Asian, African or Latin American. Whereas the socialist countries show their understanding and sympathy for the difficult economic situation of these people and help them in their struggle against their colonial past, the imperialist countries, conversely, are trying to tighten the noose of neocolonialism around their necks even further. The economic hold of imperialism has hardly abated today. To this day V. I. Lenin's statement made 70 years ago remains topical. The imperialist ideologues, he emphasized, "speak of national liberation..., leaving economic liberation aside. Yet, actually, it is precisely

which is the most important" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 22, p 187). As during colonial times, the economy of the tremendous majority of the liberated countries continues to operate within the framework of the global capitalist economy, primarily as its raw material appendage, and remains a suitable place for the application of monopoly capital, a source of superprofits and a market for industrial commodities. F. Castro justifiably points out that the struggle for the establishment of a new economic order, which has been under way for more than 10 years, has failed to yield any somewhat positive results (see p 22). If we look today at the Algiers Charter, which laid the beginning of the struggle for a new economic order, we would regrettably realize that not one of its basic stipulations has been implemented. Furthermore, in a number of aspects the situation has become less favorable to the young countries. In any case, the gap in the levels of economic growth between developed and developing countries has increased in favor of the former, while the exploitation of the raw material periphery by imperialism has increased substantially. "The blabbering of the developed capitalist countries on the establishment of a new international economic order," the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-ANBA recently noted, "is actually nothing other than an attempt to continue to treat the liberated countries as raw material suppliers and to block the development of their own national industry."

Frightened by the 1974-1975 simultaneous blows of the economic, raw material and energy crises, the United States, its European allies and Japan made generous promises to assist in the industrial development of Asia, Africa and Latin America. To this day, however, they are being kept in the position of raw material depots.³ At the UNIDO⁴ 1975 Lima conference, they agreed with the view that the young countries should be given at least the type of aid which would help to increase their share in the world's industrial output to at least 25 percent by the year 2000.

In the 8 years which have passed since, the share of the young countries in the world's industrial output rose from 7 to no more than 9 percent. "Furthermore, we should bear in mind that this insignificant 9 percent of industrial commodities," the author points out, "comes almost entirely from enterprises using obsolete technology and that their production, technology, finances and trade are enmeshed in the net of the multinational corporations. Furthermore, this weak and dependent industry is concentrated only in a few Third World countries (p 122). Although their population is triple that of the developed capitalist countries, their industrial output is lower by a factor of 6 and, on a per capita basis, by a factor of approximately 16-18 less than in their former mother countries.

In recent years bourgeois propaganda and science have tried to present matters as though the West is doing everything possible to encourage the industrial growth of Asian, African and Latin American countries. F. Castro convincingly proves that in reality the purpose of all Western investments in these areas is to extract superprofits to the detriment of the real national interests of the young countries. Although in recent years the share of the liberated countries in world exports of finished products has increased, the fact that a new form of dependence is being imposed upon these countries is a

cause for serious concern: they are turning into exporters of easily produced commodities for the MC which control distribution and marketing and remain as importers of capital and means of production, which determines the course of development of these countries (see p 57).

The author exposes the falseness of assertions to the effect that the activities of multination corporations are contributing to development. "The developing countries are offered a model of multinational development which would turn them into "export launching pads" for industrial commodities destined for the world market. However, the type of industry created in the developing countries on this basis hardly meets the real requirements of their economic development" (p 141). The MC today control from 40 to 50 percent of world trade and sell from 80 to 90 percent of the main commodities exported by the developing countries (see p 16). F. Castro most seriously warns that increasing MC activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America are a real threat to the national sovereignty of the young liberated countries. The increasing penetration of multinational corporations raises to a dangerous level the dependency of these countries from the developed Western countries. In describing the manifestations of this threat, the author emphasizes that the MC ignore the legislation of the countries in which they operate and not only interfere in their domestic affairs directly but demand of their own governments to exert to their benefit political and economic pressure on the governments of these countries. They refuse to recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of local legislation on matters of compensation in cases of nationalization, and hinder the efforts of the developing countries aimed at establishing effective control over their own natural resources (see p 144).

F. Castro deals extensively with the problem of the indebtedness of liberated countries. According to the latest estimates, their burden of indebtedness, including debts on commercial credits, had exceeded \$700 billion at the beginning of 1983. In order to repay them, the liberated countries must surrender their earnings from their exports of agricultural, raw material, food and industrial commodities (excluding petroleum) to the last cent for a period of two years. "The burden of indebtedness is such that it undermines not only possibilities of economic development but of preserving the already low consumption level characteristic of most developing countries which greatly depend on imports" (p 88). By the end of 1982 the liberated countries had to pay the huge amount of \$131 billion on interest alone. Virtually all new loans are used to pay interest. According to THE ECONOMIST, the journal of the British business circles, "today lending to economically underdeveloped countries has become a very profitable deal for the bankers." In recent years, for example, short-term 3-5-year loans at 8 to 15 percent annual interest have become common practice. Naturally, such usurious loans can be used as stopgaps but, of course, there could not even be a question of using them for industrialization purposes. The author notes that the financial mechanism of the imperialist countries is better geared to draining the resources of the liberated countries than increasing them.

Financial indebtedness to the West has become one of the gravest problems facing the liberated countries, literally strangling them, the more so since in recent years Western and Japanese creditors have been imposing considerably

more rigid repayment and lending conditions. Failure to repay a single loan automatically means that all other loans become due even though according to loan agreements they have a grace period of several years.

The high level of indebtedness is a powerful means of influencing economic policy and the foreign political course of Asian, African and Latin American countries. This makes it possible to block the aspiration of some liberated nations to reject a capitalist way of development.

As the author justly points out, the difficulty of repaying such huge loans is worsened by the crisis in the international monetary system, inflation and excessive price increases for technologically complex goods, paralleled by a drop in raw material prices, and a variety of artificial tariff barriers erected by the West, i.e., by an overall worsening of the trade climate for the Asian, African and Latin American countries. F. Castro cites specific examples of the criminal games which the West plays with prices. Thus, whereas a pound of sugar was worth 42 cents in 1980, it has dropped to 6 cents in 1982. This means that the price of a 60-horsepower tractor for sugar cane growers produced in the West had leaped from the equivalent of 24 to 115 tons of sugar, i.e., it had nearly quintupled. Quite recently an average truck was the equivalent of 6 tons of jute; today it is the equivalent of 26 tons. A similar situation prevails with all types of raw materials with the exception of energy carriers and rare metals (see pp 57-62).

The concentration of international trade in raw materials in the hands of a diminishing number of MC is an adverse factor affecting the producers. Even gigantic raw material trusts such as Anaconda, Kennecott and Nickel were absorbed by the omnipotent petroleum monopolies.

All of this combined leads to the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Asian, African and Latin American peoples to become debt-free. They find themselves in a vicious circle: on the one hand, they must sell increasing volumes of raw materials; on the other, they are earning increasingly less from such sales. Furthermore, not only interest payments but the repayment of the principal have come due.

Such increased indebtedness and development without development are no accidental phenomena but the result of a deliberate, carefully planned and well-coordinated strategy pursued by the Western monopoly centers toward their former colonial periphery. Naturally, today one can discuss and argue as to whether or not Western loans and credits have been properly used and the extent to which the financial policy of one young country or another was sound. One thing, however, remains unquestionable: the United States and its imperialist partners have made skillful use of money--a weapon which capitalism has mastered to perfection--with a view to tying the liberated countries to themselves, to deprive them of the possibility of choosing their own way of development and to hinder the process of the growth of the struggle for national liberation into a struggle for social liberation.

In his analysis of the complex problems facing the young countries and their growing financial contradictions with the imperialist countries, Castro

reaches the important conclusion that "according to numerous and unquestionable data, neocolonialism, as colonialism in the past, has entered a period of crisis" (p 22).

F. Castro deals extensively with the question of the arms race unleashed by American imperialism and its military bloc allies. The author comprehensively reviews its negative consequences to the liberated countries.

"Military expenditures, wars and armaments," the author emphasizes, "are phenomena encouraged and developed by the capitalist system and the imperialist policy of aggression and intimidation. The struggle against such irrational and dangerous manifestations of this policy is one of the most important tasks facing all mankind and, particularly, the peoples of the developing countries, affecting the share of the population on earth which is most directly experiencing the threat of war and the arms race" (p 209).

The arms race, worsened by conflicts provoked by imperialism, directly affects the young Asian, African and Latin American countries by including them in the militarization process, increasing conflicts between neighboring countries and enabling the imperialists to egg them on against each other and to inflate local territorial and national disputes, which are delayed-action mines left behind by the colonizers, aggravating the international situation. Castro notes that the imperialist policy of "increasing impressively military aid in an effort to resolve the complex problems of the contemporary world through the comprehensive use or threat of use of force has led mankind to a new spiral in the arms race, seriously threatening peace and the very survival of mankind" (p 200).

Today, the author goes on to say, more than 30 developing countries are themselves producers of weapons, and many of them purchase weapons abroad. In 1980 the young countries imported weapons worth \$19.5 billion. Military purchases lay a heavy burden on the weak economy of such countries. Such outlays are unproductive and cannot be recovered in time. "They contribute nothing to the development of health care, education and culture" (p 204).

Increased militarization and higher expenditures on armaments may be considered today one of the characteristics of the current socioeconomic development of Asian, African and Latin American countries. The world has witnessed 215 armed clashes and conflicts provoked by the imperialists after World War II. Virtually all of them have taken place in the developing countries. Directly or indirectly, however, (through financing or delivery of arms), the United States or its allies have always been involved in such conflicts. Today three-quarters of all exported weapons go to Third World countries. We must bear in mind also that the funds spent by the developing countries for armaments are showing a steady and progressive growth.

The increased scale of the arms trade is consistent with the strategic objectives and economic interests of the military-industrial complexes which enjoy tremendous influence in the United States, France, Great Britain and other Western countries.

The author points out the senseless wastefulness of the arms race. "Throughout the world military preparations absorb a tremendous quantity of various nonrecoverable resources and raw material stocks. The military requirements of the United States for metals such as aluminum, copper, lead and zinc alone account for between 11 and 14 percent of their overall global consumption" (p 207).

"At the various summit conferences," Castro points out, "the nonaligned countries have steadily emphasized the potential danger and absurdity of the arms race. Again and again they have called for peaceful and constructive alternatives to the arms race, above all the use of the possibilities related to disarmament and the financing of economic development" (p 20).

In the final part of his work, F. Castro discusses the imperialist global information strategy. He describes the way the old and new oppressors are engaged in the broad ideological indoctrination of Asian, African and Latin American nations in an effort to disorient them, keep them in a state of obedience and force them passively to accept inequality and poverty.

"The imperialist mass information media," he says, "are engaged both secretly and quite openly in the ideological and cultural penetration of the developing countries. They are imposing upon the nations of the young countries alien views and ideas and try to belittle and distort the national cultures of these countries. A huge percentage of television programs shown in the Third World was made in the developed capitalist countries. The multinational news agencies manipulate news originating from our countries, giving them a slant advantageous to themselves. They also supply our countries with deliberately distorted information on events abroad" (p 190). Essentially, an interference in the domestic affairs of developing countries is taking place under the banner of the formula of total "freedom of information" fabricated by the bourgeois ideologues. This so-called "free flow of information" is a convenient screen for "information imperialism" in which freedom for some becomes spiritual slavery for others, the young and independent countries above all, whose possibilities do not as yet allow them to rely on their own forces.

F. Castro writes in conclusion that "all of these facts and realities are irrefutable. We must also realize that no simple solutions are possible for such complex and difficult problems. Our aspirations and demands meet, on the one hand, with the lack of reciprocal understanding, egotism and excessive demands and, on the other, the tremendous technological, economic, military and political power of imperialism, its neocolonial practices and fears and merciless laws which rule this system which is imposing on the Third World openly exploitative, unequal, strangling and unfair economic relations.... We have no choice other than to struggle for the recognition of our demands" (p 211).

The nature of these demands may be reduced to the following: establishing a new, more equitable international economic order; restricting and strictly controlling the activities of multinational corporations and banks; liberalizing trade and eliminating protectionist barriers; easing the burden of

a tremendous foreign indebtedness which hangs on the neck of the liberated countries like a heavy rock; helping to eliminate hunger and illiteracy, improving medical services and enhancing the living standard of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

F. Castro directly relates successes in meeting the expectations of the liberated countries to the consistent struggle for peace and improving the climate of international relations, restricting the arms race and using some of the thus-released funds for development (see p 212).

F. Castro's book is an uncompromising indictment of imperialism. The author, as he himself writes in the preface, set himself the objective "of providing the heads of state and governments and political leaders, particularly in Third World countries, official data the impartiality of which would be unquestionable and would describe the tragedy of our peoples" (p 5). Unquestionably, the world's public has been presented with a substantial study of neocolonialism and its criminal practices, exposing the complex mechanism of the merciless, refined and painful exploitation of the peoples of the young liberated countries by contemporary imperialism.

To F. Castro the anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggle is hardly an academic topic. It has been the cause motivating his entire life. "Only he who has been severely wounded," he has said, "and only he who has seen his homeland so rightless and justice so violated can ... find the proper words which come from the heart and are the shriek of the soul."

In his new work, F. Castro has found not only "the proper words coming from the heart itself," but has supported them with a streamlined system of facts and arguments the expository power of which is annihilating. Neocolonialism is presented in its entire loathsome nakedness.

The translation of this book into Russian and its imminent publication is without doubt useful and therefore urgent. It will arm Soviet social scientists and journalists, our large army of propagandists and anyone interested in the problems of the national liberation struggle with rich factual data. It will make it possible to imagine differently and more completely the dimensions and methods of neocolonial plundering of the peoples of the young liberated countries.

This is not only a profound and interesting but quite necessary book each line of which castigates the bloody crimes of imperialism. It is a contribution to the real cause in the name of which, 30 years ago, a handful of heroic Cubans, including the author of the book, "Stormed the Moncada Barracks."

FOOTNOTES

1. According to the latest estimates of the UN Center on Multinational Corporations, there were 11,000 MC with 82,000 branches in the world.

2. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization. It consists of about 150 UN member countries.
3. The West exports from the developing countries 25 percent of the iron ore, 50 percent of the bauxite, 55 percent of the copper ore, 90 percent of the tin and 80 percent of the tungsten concentrates it consumes, and huge quantities of petroleum, rubber and other valuable raw materials.
4. United Nations Industrial Development Organization. It consists of more than 150 UN member countries, including the USSR and the other socialist countries.

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