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USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 2, January 1983



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USSR REPORT

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

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Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU-Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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WE ARE PROUD OF OUR HOMELAND

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[Text] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--for the past 6 decades these proud words have been pronounced with filial warmth by the citizens of our great homeland in referring to their native land and what has been accomplished in it at Lenin's behest. For 6 decades these words have given courage and hope to the fighters for the liberation of mankind on all continents. For 6 decades they have triggered the fear and helpless rage of those who would like to turn history back....

The First All-Union Congress of Soviets opened in Moscow at 11 am on 30 December 1922. It was attended by 2,215 delegates. The ceremony hall of the Bol'shoy Theater was festively illuminated. The congress was opened by Petr Germogenovich Smidovich, the oldest member of the RSFSR delegation. When the storm of ovations in the hall quieted down, the delegates listened closely to the old bolshevik.

"Today we are uniting in a single state, forming a single political and economic organism.... This new level of unification among Soviet republics is a source of tremendous new strength of resistance and construction...."

The first document which the congress passed unanimously was that of greetings to V. I. Lenin, its honorary chairman. For reasons of health, Vladimir Il'ich had been unable to attend. However, the historical decisions made at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR were the embodiment of Lenin's thoughts and principles of national construction.

There were three items on the agenda: consideration of the Declaration on Founding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the Treaty on Founding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and elections for the USSR Central Executive Committee. The speeches of the delegates representing the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Transcaucasus were brief but extremely meaningful: they summed up the results of the extensive discussions on a political problem of the greatest importance to the destinies of the peoples of the Soviet republics, carried out at meetings of working people and uyezd and republic congresses of soviets. All of them expressed the unanimous will of the working people that there be a united state! Only such a united state could ensure the protection of each nation from external invasion, under the conditions of capitalist encirclement, and to create conditions for the successful building of socialism. The representatives of the Bukhara and Khorezma People's Soviet Republics, who were attending the congress, presented greetings to the delegates, expressing their confidence that in the near future their republics would become socialist and would be happy to be among the countries which had joined the USSR.

Both the declaration and the treaty on the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were unanimously adopted by the congress.

The founding of the USSR is an outstanding exploit of the Leninist party, which crowned the tremendous theoretical and practical work done by the bolsheviks to resolve the national problem and their heroic selfless struggle waged for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from social and national oppression. "History is unfamiliar with such a headlong flight from a state of backwardness, disasters and dislocation to a powerful and modern great power with the highest cultural standard and steadily improving wellbeing of the people," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, in his speech at the joint ceremonious session of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

Our multinational state has entered the 7th decade of its history more powerful and stronger than ever, brimming with the resolve to implement the plans earmarked by the party. Today the Soviet people look proudly at the distance they have covered. We are proud of our fatherland and the achievements of all its republics and all the peoples in our country. We are proud of the fact that the main result of the 60 years of development of our nations was the creation of a mature socialist society.

I

Pride in their country, in its accomplishments and contribution to the development of world civilization has been characteristic of the working people of all nations and nationalities in the past as well. The concepts of "land of our fathers." "home" and "hearth" have always been linked with unbreakable love and deep attachment on the part of the people. These patriotic feelings gained particular strength and sharpness during the dangerous and mortal trials experienced by the people, threatening their independence and very existence. However, under the conditions of an exploiting system the feeling of patriotism was always spoiled in the minds of the working people by the fact that they felt themselves like outsiders, like third-rate people, on their own land. Furthermore, the ruling classes did everything possible to encourage nationalism and hostility among nations. This was characteristic of prerevolutionary Russia as well, where the burden of the capitalist slavery in the towns and the most shameless exploitation of the rural poor by landowners and kulaks blended with cruel national oppression. The czarist empire with its predatory laws, exploitation of working people, rightlessness and national oppression, was justifiably described as the bad stepmother of workers and peasants and the prison of the peoples.

The Great October Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in the history of mankind. Headed by the Leninist party, the system of soviets of worker,

peasant and soldier deputies was established throughout Russia. The reorganization of the material and spiritual foundations of social life eliminated the private ownership of productive capital. The land was nationalized and decisive steps were taken to eliminate the monopoly enjoyed by the exploiting classes in the fields of education and culture. At the same time, a historically unparalleled emancipation of the peoples from national oppression began. Lenin's slogan of combining the revolutionary struggle for socialism with a revolutionary program on the national problem was being implemented by the party (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 62). The foundations of the state of workers and peasants were being laid, subsequently justifiably described as the fatherland of friendship and the glory and happiness of the peoples.

The party strove to establish not only formal, juridical equality among nations and nationalities but actual equality as well. The solution of this problem in a country which had inherited an unparalleled variety of economic systems, and the extreme backwardness of many nations and nationalities, could be ensured only with active and comprehensive help to previously oppressed nations and nationalities on the part of more developed ones, the Russian people and its working class above all. "The peoples of our country today express particular gratitude toward the Russian people," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at the ceremonious session on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. "No single republic could have achieved its current accomplishments without its selfless fraternal aid."

The Soviet people are the highest accomplishment, marking the full solution of the national problem as it was inherited by us from the past, becoming a new social and international community. The milestones of its formation were the October Revolution, victory over the combined forces of external and internal reaction in the civil war, the founding of the USSR, the restoration of the national economy, industrialization and socialist socialization of agriculture, the cultural revolution, the Great Patriotic War, which tempered the friendship among the peoples of the USSR, the postwar restoration and, finally, the building of developed socialism in our country. "For the first time in history," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted, "the multinational composition of the country changed from a source of a weakness to a source of its strength and well-being."

II

The party's concepts of mature socialism greatly intensify our concepts on the development of national relations in our country and their frequent refining and concretizing.

Increased internationalization in all areas of social life is the general component of processes occurring in the economy, sociopolitical relations and spiritual life in our multinational country under mature socialist conditions.

Socialism radically changes the moral content of internationalization. It is only under socialism that it acquires a truly humane nature and serves the interests of each nation and nationality, big or small. Under socialism,

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internationalization presumes achievements such as the elimination of national-linguistic and spiritual barriers in society, comprehensive dissemination of the best achievements of national cultures, appearance of a single multinational socialist culture and adoption of the ideology of socialist internationalism.

The Soviet people--a social and international community--is not a new nation and does not replace existing socialist nations and nationalities. Naturally, however, this does not eliminate or delete the question of the further merger of nations. "Our final objective is obvious," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasizes. "In Lenin's words, it means 'not only the rapprochement but merger among nations' (op. cit., vol 27, p 256). The party well understands that the road to this objective will be long." The completion of the process of merger of nations is a matter of the distant future. National differences will be here considerably longer than class differences. Anticipation and the artificial acceleration of the objective process of the merger of nations are inadmissible. Nevertheless, it must not be deliberately hindered.

The tremendous historical achievements of the USSR in the development of national relations are clear. This does not mean, however, that all problems have disappeared and all difficulties in this area have been surmounted. Therefore, the improvement of developed socialism must include a planned, scientifically based national policy. Its vital task is the even more efficient utilization of the advantages secured for the peoples of our country rallied in a single union.

We are quite familiar with Lenin's statement recommending that "the cornerstone in the national problem as well must consist not of abstract or formal principles but ... an accurate consideration of historically specific and, above all, economic circumstances..." (op. cit., vol 41, p 162). Typical of the developed socialist stage, in which some differences and specifics remain, is the fact that all republics and all ethnic areas reach an approximately equal level of economic development. What is essentially important here is that the further equalizing of the level of development of all parts of the country, linked with the more efficient distribution of production forces in accordance with the location of raw material and manpower sources and the reaching of advanced levels of scientific and technical progress in all sectors and production facilities, is the appearance of a qualitatively different problem compared with the historical task of surmounting the economic backwardness of many territories and entire nations, which was resolved totally and definitively in our country.

The distance to the present heights covered by a number of republics seems truly fantastic.

No more than 65 years ago Kazakhstan was known as the region of "a thousand troubles." Today the chugging of a virgin land tractor and the rumbling of space rockets here symbolize the beauty and progress of the Soviet homeland. The thermoenergetic complex currently built on Kazakhstan soil, in Ekibastuz, can simply not be compared to anything else, for it has no analog. The pride of the American power industry--the Tennessee Valley Authority--consists of 31 stations whose total generating power is 13 million kilowatts. Ekibastuz will have no more than five stations generating a total of 20 million kilowatts. Today the industrial enterprises in Belorussia, whose economy before the revolution could boast of producing nothing more than tarred hemp, is exporting goods to more than 70 foreign countries.

The countrywide functioning of a single national economic complex is a law of the developed socialist society. This complex is not simply the sum total of the economies of individual republics and regions but an integral, dynamically developing organism, characterized by a uniquely increased scientificproduction potential with intensified complex relations among economic subunits and regions.

The single national economic complex embodies the highest possible achievements of contemporary science and technology. Naturally, this applies not only to modern equipment and a system of planned organizational measures but above all to human relations. Metaphorically speaking, the power lines of the single national economic complex cross the minds and mentalities of all working people. Actually, Soviet economic unity would have been impossible without features developed in millions of Soviet people after decades of joint united toil, such as a wide outlook, the ability to put public above personal and national above local interests, mutual aid and reciprocal guarantees affecting members of one's collective, rayon population, or fellow workers living thousands of kilometers away, in other oblasts, krays and republics.

It should be emphasized that the objective conditions governing contemporary production and the integrity of our economic mechanism make recurrences of parochialism and a narrow departmental approach, which are essentially vestiges of a private ownership mentality, particularly intolerable. Such manifestations clash with our entire collectivistic way of life and the feeling developed in dozens of millions of Soviet working people that they are the masters of their country.

This valuable feeling is embodied in thousands of visible actions, above all the new scope gained by the socialist competition for the implementation of the historical plans of the 26th CPSU Congress and the tremendous political and labor upsurge which marked the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

The results of economic development, achieved through the inspired toil of our entire people headed by the CPSU, can only be pleasing. In 6 decades our country's share in world industrial production increased from 1 to 20 percent. The value of its basic production capital exceeds 1 trillion rubles today. Currently the USSR has outstripped the United States in the production of pig iron, steel, petroleum (including gas condensate), iron and manganese iron, coke, cement, tractors (in terms of overall engine capacity), cotton, chemical fertilizers, and many other types of output.

However, the mature socialist economy is not characterized merely by its gigantically expanded scale. The functioning of a single national economic

complex, improved planning, development of production and scientific-production associations, establishment of territorial-production complexes, creation of agroindustrial associations in rayons, oblasts, krays and republics (ASSRs) in accordance with the decisions of the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, intensification of interfarm cooperation and rapprochement between the two forms of public ownership of productive capital raise production socialization to a qualitatively new level.

All this largely determines also the sociopolitical development of the mature socialist society. The rapprochement among all classes and social groups within Soviet society, leading to the establishment of an essentially classless structure within the framework of mature socialism, is continuing under the influence of the development of socialist production relations. The establishment of classless nations will be the next historical milestone reached in the development of national relations.

The decisive force in the creation of a classless socialist society or, in Marx's words, the "social mind and social heart" of this process is the Soviet working class--the leading force in our society. Today, together with the peasants, the workers constitute the largest population group in all union republics.

This was secured through the accelerated growth rates of national cadres of the working class in republics which were previously lagging in their industrial development, secured in recent decades. In the last decade these rates were double or triple those of the average for the country at large.

The share of the working class in the population of all union republics reached today is approximately the same or similar. This is an important social gain. Another characteristic feature of contemporary social development is the fact that the working class and union republics are becoming increasingly multinational. Thus, it is represented by more than 100 nationalities in the RSFSR and the Ukraine, 80 in the Georgian SSR and more than 20 in the holdavian SSR. "Multinational labor and, above all, worker collectives, are precisely the environment in which the internationalist spirit is developed best and the friendship and fraternity among the peoples of the USSR are strengthened," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov has pointed out. Comradely mutual aid and the feeling of belonging to a single family, which has become so profoundly rooted in the minds of all our nations during the past victorious decades, are the moral norm of the multinational collectives.

As the educational standards of our multinational working class, its skills and political and labor activeness rise, its role will be increasing steadily in the life of the entire country and the individual republic. The party, which pays tremendous attention to the further growth of the national detachments of the Soviet working class, encourages the fuller representation of the native nationalities of all republics within it. This task is of both tremendous economic and important political significance.

In recent years, profound changes have taken place in our way of life in the country. The well-being of the Soviet kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers

has increased significantly. Gradually, the work of the kolkhoz peasantry is becoming closer to that of the workers. As was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, the number of mechanizers and other workers handling the latest equipment is increasing in the countryside. Typical of the kolkhoz countryside and the town are multinational collectives. Thus, the Agroindustrial Association imeni U. Yusupov (Uzbekistan) employs working people of 23 nationalities; the Ariit Sovkhoz (Kazakhstan) has 21; the Druzhba Sovkhoz (the Ukraine) has 20; the Druzhba Sovkhoz-Plant (Moldavia) has 15 and the Sovkhoz imeni Tashirov (Kirghizia) has members of 14 nationalities.

The accelerated process of elimination of major disparities between physical and mental work, characteristic of all union republics, should be considered among the most important social results of combining the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of socialism.

Mature socialism is a stage in the development of our society at which the nationwide nature of the social policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state are manifested ever more clearly and convincingly. As a token of the tremendous significance which it ascribes to the increased well-being of the Soviet people (twice the funds compared with the preceding decade were allocated for such purposes in the 1970s), our party encourages the steady elimination of differences in the material and cultural standards existing among social groups and regions and town and country, inherited from the past, so that the just socialist principles of distribution may be consistently observed and their distortion prevented.

The distance covered by our country from the establishment of the USSR and the experience acquired by the peoples of our country convincingly prove the vitality and deeply democratic principles governing the organization of the Soviet multinational state. Lenin and the bolshevik party tirelessly emphasized that the more democracy there is the greater are the opportunities offered to the working people of different nations to participate in social management, the stronger their desire to unify becomes and the faster becomes their freedom from national prejudices and national narrow-mindedness. The union principles in social life are strengthened as the Soviet political system develops toward further democratization. Our constitution stipulates that "the USSR embodies the state unity of the Soviet people. It unifies all nations and nationalities with a view to the joint building of communism."

The intensified role of the communist party in the political system of mature socialism also means upgrading the efficiency of the managing, directing and organizing activities of the CPSU in the development of nations and nationalities in the USSR and the strengthening of their fraternal alliance. Profoundly scientific management in the area of national relations, based on Marxist-Leninist principles, is a mandatory prerequisite for progress in our multinational society.

The party firmly struggles against manifestations alien to our way of life, such as chauvinism and nationalism or nationalistic quirks of all kinds. Through all its activities and painstaking ideological work, the party is educating the working people in a spirit of socialist internationalism. "Reality proves that the USSR is a dynamic and efficient form of governmental unification of Soviet nations and nationalities for the entire historical period of the gradual growth of socialist statehood into communist social self-administration," the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR" emphasizes.

The founding of the USSR and the close international unification among all nations in our country uniquely accelerated the spiritual development of the society born of the Great October Revolution. Under mature socialist conditions an international type of spiritual production is developing, covering all realms of creation and distribution of cultural values, moral and aesthetic upbringing, the creation of a healthy and truly socialist moral climate and the strengthening relations of friendship and fraternity among people of all nationalities.

Socialism and the fraternal cooperation among nations opened a wide road to knowledge and culture for all nations and nationalities in our huge country. No Soviet person is amazed today by the fact that in this same country in which before the revolution there were no higher educational institutions on the territories of 10 of the 15 current union republics and that only 13 of the more than 100 nations and nationalities on Russian territory had their own literary languages, today Russians, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Kirghiz, Belorussians, Letts and Turkmens--all nations and nationalities in our homeland--are acquiring an approximately identical level of education.

The single international culture of the Soviet people, which encompasses anything of universal significance in the achievements and original traditions of national cultures, and which expresses the common ideals of all nations and all working people in our country, is growing on the fertile soil of mature socialism. The Russian language, as a means of international communication, is of tremendous importance in its establishment and development.

Today 82 percent of the population of our country speaks Russian freely. It is important to note that in the 9 years between the last two population censuses (1970 and 1979) the group of non-Russian people who stated that they spoke Russian freely as a second language increased by nearly 20 million and that its share in the overall non-Russian population increased from 37 to 49 percent. This is the result of the increased interest displayed by the working people in learning Russian.

It is precisely the blossoming of the cultures of all our republics and Soviet peoples that led to the new tide in Soviet art mentioned at the 26th party congress. Lenin's prophetic words to the effect that the socialist revolution and the related breakdown of national barriers not only will not decrease but, conversely, will increase by 1 million times "'differentiation' of mankind in the sense of the wealth and variety of spiritual life and ideological currents, aspirations and shades" have come true (op. cit., vol 26, p 281). However, regardless of the variety of the spiritual worlds of Soviet peoples of all nationalities, we are united by a single common feature--the feeling of national pride. This feeling, experienced by every citizen of the land of the soviets, was beautifully expressed by Irakliy Abashidze, the noted Georgian poet:

> To what part of this dear country Could I say: 'I give you up'? To which one? When I consider as my very own This entire happy land My fatherland.

The communist idea-mindedness of the Soviet people is the spiritual foundation for this feeling. Soviet national pride is the vital credo of the new man, an organic alloy of convictions, moral concepts and actions. The worker-patriot, the master of his destiny and of our entire Soviet home has a broad range of concerns and deep attachments. He has a broad outlook, a vast world of interests, and high responsibility for his work and prosperity of the fatherland.

The vivifying feeling of pride in one's fatherland creates no quiet appeasement or complacency but a constant attraction for and habit on the part of the Soviet people to engage in actions, in political and labor activities. In their minds a socialist outlook blends with a constant readiness to act, to create a world. This charge of vital purposefulness is a source of labor successes and, in the final account, great accomplishments.

A proletarian, a socialist approach to patriotism in its classical form is defined in Lenin's famous article "On the National Pride of the Great Russians." "The interest (slavishly understood) related to the national pride of the Great Russians," Lenin wrote, "coincides with the socialist interest of the Great Russian (and all other) proletarians" (op. cit., vol 26, p 110). This principle, which was tested in the flames of class battles and in peaceful construction, is entirely relevant today, when we are already speaking of the national pride of the Soviet person and his love for his entire huge multinational socialist fatherland. The source of this splendid feeling is found not only in the memory of each nation of the ageold way covered by his fathers and grandfathers, but above all in the feeling of his socialist primogeniture. Yes, it is precisely our peoples who were destined to be the first to break the chains of exploitation tying our planet and to begin the historical process which changed the face of the earth.

The nationwide pride of the Soviet citizen does not contain a single drop of feeling of his own exclusivity or superiority over other nations or any aspiration toward national exclusivity. Although aware of their involvement in the greatest historical accomplishments of their homeland and the entire socialist world, the Soviet people look with sympathetic interest at the results of the constructive toil of other nations as well.

The basic feature of socialist patriotism is its close ties with proletarian internationalism. The feeling of national pride is incompatible with national boastfulness and national narrow-mindedness on the part of people who

confuse patriotism with ethnocentrism and who praise any kind of archaic features regardless of class meaning.

Every citizen of our great union well understands that the tremendous successes, greatness and power of the fatherland are the result of the friendship among the peoples, a friendship which was bequeathed to us by Lenin and hammered out by the party in the revolutionary storms and the battles for the independence of the homeland, and the unparalleled efforts of the builders of a new life. The Soviet people will strengthen this friendship and protect it like the apple of their eye.

III

Sixty years have passed since the USSR was founded. Are 6 decades a long time in terms of universal history? If we bear in mind that it is a question of 6 decades in the 20th century which, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, has brought with it more change than any preceding century, and if we measure this distance not in terms of years but the accomplishments of our people following the untrodden path, we could say with no exaggeration whatever that the 6 decades covered in heavy struggle and the unparalleled efforts of the people of our country, led by the party, are unequalled in the history of mankind in terms of the influence they have had on its destinies or historical lessons.

As they stood by the cradle of our multinational state, the delegates to the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR could not, naturally, see the entire way which lay ahead or the extent of achievements and trials which were to be the lot of our nations. However, the atmosphere which prevailed at the congress as recorded and the scant recollections of the participants prove that all of them were perfectly aware of the universal-historical significance of the decisions they were making on that day. M. V. Roslyakov, delegate to the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, recalls that "it was an extraordinary uplift. All delegates behaved toward one another with some kind of particularly friendly warmth. We constantly felt that we were taking part in an event of tremendous importance, which was not only to determine the fate of our state but would influence the course of mankind's history."

In closing the congress, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin said: "... What is taking place today under relatively modest circumstances is an event of global importance. It is possible that now, at this moment, the importance of this event is not entirely realized. However, with every passing day it will become increasingly important on the political horizon. This is absolutely unquestionable.... It is here that today we are laying the cornerstone of a truly fraternal comity. For thousands of years the best minds of mankind had struggled over the theoretical problem of finding a system which would make it possible for the nations to live in a state of friendship and fraternity without the greatest of pains and struggle. It is only now, today, that we are practically laying the cornerstone in this direction.... I have no doubt that the work we have done today will not disappear without a trace in the minds of the working class the world over." The thought of the "all-Russian elder," who was elected by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee, to the effect that the founding of the Soviet Union will have an increasing importance "on the political horizon" is more relevant than ever today. As the revolutionary process develops on the planet, as the oppressed nations become liberated and as the power of our country grows, the significance of the Soviet experience and the influence of our country on international affairs increase.

As a result of the victory of the socialist revolutions in a number of European, Asian and Latin American countries and the establishment of the socialist comity, which today accounts for a considerable share of the globe, the example of the USSR in resolving most complex social and national problems has been adopted as valuable practical experience by many nations.

As we know, the October Revolution and the formation of the USSR were a signal for an unparalleled develop ont of the national liberation movement throughout the world. Now, when the colonial empires have crumbled and the struggle is being waged in the last bastions of colonialism and racism, the Soviet example becomes particularly important to the liberated countries. As former colonial nations reach state independence, they develop a greater interest in the Soviet experience in achieving factual equality among nations.

We are aware of the current gravity of the problem of the lagging of the developing countries which account for most of mankind behind the capitalist West--a lagging caused by the former policy of imperialist colonial plunder, strengthened by trade and economic discrimination on the part of Western governments and monopolies.

The struggle waged by the developing countries for the democratization of foreign economic relations, waged with the active support of the socialist states, could bring about certain improvements. Nevertheless, two facts remain inviolable: within the framework of capitalism, dominated by the spirit of profit, inequality is increasing both among people within each nation and among nations; the only example of actual and true equalization of the levels of development of different nations is found in the socialist world, in the Soviet Union above all.

Naturally, the aggravation of the national problem, which is closely related to the aggravation of social problems and the intensification of the class struggle, affects not the developing countries exclusively. The history of recent decades also indicates that in the developed capitalist countries as well, including those in which intranational discord should have long abated, the struggle against national oppression is breaking out with unparalleled force. This is the answer of the masses to '...creased social and national oppression and assimilation by force.

Imperialism stops at nothing in pursuit of its objectives. All honest people on earth reacted with anger and pain to the killing of Palestinians in Lebanon to the war being waged with the help of "guerrillas" supported by American imperialism and by so-called U.S. "advisers" against the people of El Salvador, and the murders committed by the British soldiery on the suffering land of Ulster. Meanwhile, the NATO staffs are formulating plans for the destruction of entire nations and continents with nuclear weapons.

The active and systematic pursuit of the Leninist strategy of peace by the Soviet Union is of prime importance to the fate of mankind under the conditions of the aggravated international situation triggered by the dangerous political course taken by American imperialism.

The important initiatives and proposals submitted by the Soviet government, which met with tremendous public response throughout the world, are another confirmation of the resolve of our country and the entire Soviet people to pursue their chosen course of detente and disarmament. Specific proposals regarding a treaty on reciprocal nonuse of military force and on maintaining relations of peace between members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO were formulated in the political declaration of Warsaw Pact members, which was adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Prague.

At a time when cynical talks on the admissibility of "limited," "protracted" and other varieties of nuclear war is being heard in the West, unilaterally the USSR has assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and expressed its readiness to reach an agreement on the nonuse of conventional weapons. The Soviet Union has proposed a reduction of strategic armaments by more than one-quarter, providing that the United States reduces its armaments correspondingly, for the number of carriers on both sides be equal, and for a substantial reduction on a reciprocal basis of the number of nuclear warheads as well as maximally restricting improvements in nuclear weapons. The strategic arsenals of both sides could be frozen for the duration of the talks.

The international public, in Europe above all, has paid great attention to the Soviet proposals on considerably reducing the number of Soviet mediumrange missiles in Europe to the number of corresponding British and French missiles, while at the same time reducing to an equal number aircraft capable of carrying medium-range nuclear weapons located in this area, at the disposal of the USSR and the NATO countries.

"The Soviet Union will do everything dependent on it to ensure the present and future generations a tranquil and peaceful future," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized. "This is our political objective which we shall not abandon."

The day after the closing of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, on 31 December 1922, Lenin continued to dictate to his secretary his work "On the Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomization'." In substantiating the need for the creation of a strong union of socialist republics, Vladimir Il'ich emphasized that "we need this measure the way the world communist proletariat needs a struggle with the world bourgeoisie and a protection from its intrigues" (op. cit., vol 45, p 360). That day, Lenin concluded his dictation with the following prophetic words: "... There will come in the future in universal history a precise day when the peoples oppressed by imperialism will finally wake up. At that point a decisive, lengthy and severe battle for their liberation will begin" (itid., p 362). The voice of Lenin sounds firm and convinced, blending with the words of the party anthem precious to all of us.

Yes, this long and decisive battle is under way. It is waged by the "universal communist proletariat," which rallies today the members of the socialist comity, the world communist and worker movements and the forces of national liberation and, despite all difficulties, it will be carried out to its end!

The Soviet people are proudly aware of the fact that in the noble struggle for peace throughout the world, the liberation of mankind and the elimination of all national oppression, it is their great homeland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--that is the acknowledged vanguard.

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LABOR PRODUCTIVITY: THEORY, PRACTICE, GROWTH RESERVES

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[Article by A. Bagdasarov, candidate of economic sciences, and S. Pervushin, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Upgrading labor productivity and saving time is the constant and invariable prerequisite for social progress and the principal and decisive factor in the development of production forces. In a socialist society this is the only possible base for ensuring the planned growth of the well-being of all members of society. Practical experience confirms the profound meaning of Marx's prediction to the effect that "... Time-saving as well as the systematic allocation of the worker's time in the various production sectors will remain the prime economic law based on collective production. It will remain a law even when a much higher level has been reached" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 46, part I, p 117).

Under developed socialist conditions, when a powerful production potential has been acquired and when the national economy is converting to a primarily intensive type of economic growth, the problem of upgrading labor productivity becomes particularly topical. Its solution greatly depends on the elaboration of precise scientific concepts on the nature and the factors of growth of labor productivity at the present stage, and particularly on the proper assessment of the role of labor and materials in improving this integral indicator.

"Targeting the country's resources on economy and their fuller and more efficient utilization," the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized, "requires a new approach to many economic management problems." In our view, this includes the way the significance of labor and materials changes as production forces develop in terms of ensuring economic growth and upgrading social production efficiency. The Marxist-Leninist study of domestic and global experience enables us to formulate a simple answer to the questions posed by reality.

I

The Marxist-Leninist classics, who ascribed exceptional importance to the growth of labor productivity, comprehensively explained the economic nature of this process and described the changes in the forms of its manifestation in the various stages of development of production forces. This analysis inevitably proves that the growth of labor productivity is manifested in a reduction in overall outlays per unit of finished product. By increasing the productive force of labor Marx understood any general change in the labor process which would shorten the working time socially necessary for the production of a given commodity, thanks to which a lesser amount of labor results in the production of a higher quantity of consumer values (op. cit., vol 23, p 325).

Marx and Engels proved the influence of the various factors leading to such results. They include reducing the relative labor outlays and specific outlays of fuel and raw and other materials and lowering their production cost. Marx considered the reduction of labor productivity units -- both those included in productive capital and those newly added during production time--a manifestation of the progress of production forces. "Upgrading labor productivity," he notes in "Das Kapital," "means precisely that the share of labor is reduced while the share of materials increases but in such a way that the sum total of labor contained in the commodity is reduced.... " (op. cit., vol 25, part I, p 286). If the economy of some elements of outlays is absorbed by increases in others, no growth of labor productivity takes place. "... If the production of a specific machine," Marx wrote, "requires the same quantity of labor saved in its application, it becomes a simple case of shifting labor, i.e., the sum total of labor needed in the production of a commodity is not reduced and there is no increase in labor productivity" (op. cit., vol 23, p 402).

The classics of Marxism-Leninism considered lowering the production cost per unit of output a summing up characteristic of the growth of labor productivity. "In order for the new production method to represent a true increase in productivity, as a result of the wearing out of the capital good it must transfer to the individual commodity a cost less than the one which is saved as a result of reduced labor; in a word, it must be a method which lowers the production cost of the commodity" (op. cit., vol 25, part I, p 286).

Tugan-Baranovskiy's effort "to ignore" this mandatory characteristic of the growth of labor productivity as a specific manifestation of the saving of overall outlays per unit of finished product was sharply rebuffed by V. I. Lenin. In his letter to Potresov, Lenin pointed out that "... To increase labor productivity without reducing the cost of the product is absurd if considered as a general phenomenon..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 46, p 29).

Increasing labor productivity, conceived as an economy of overall outlays per unit of finished product, is a general indicator of the growth of production efficiency. It is only thusly considered labor productivity that enables us to consider it as a decisive factor of economic growth. Unfortunately, until recently we have pitted labor against materials. In planning and economic practice increased labor productivity is considered as a summing up indicator of economic growth. The fact that an increasing share of the national income is produced without increasing the number of workers is considered an argument in support of the fact that the main prerequisite for economic growth at the present stage is reduced labor outlays per unit of produced material goods regardless of the level of material outlays. This is the prerequisite on which the methods for planning and determining labor productivity are based. According to this concept, labor economy represents the most important characteristic of production intensification and the increased output per worker is taken as the decisive way to upgrade economic efficiency. The growth of labor productivity is considered the main prerequisite for eliminating manpower shortages.

However, the analysis of data collected over many years does not confirm the accuracy of this view. Although the share of the national income produced without increasing the number of workers is growing, its relative growth is declining. Whereas in the 8th Five-Year Plan the average annual growth rates of the national income exceeded 7 percent, in the 10th they had declined by almost one-half.

Other quantitative and qualitative indicators of economic growth are worsening as well. This includes profit and production profitability. Production costs in many economic sectors are increasing. In recent years production costs have been growing in the coal, metallurgical and many other sectors of the extracting and processing industries and in agriculture, although statistical data confirm the steady increase in labor productivity in these sectors. Yet, according to Marx's definition, "the share of production costs of raw materials and auxiliary materials should be reduced as labor productivity increases, for labor productivity in terms of such materials is revealed precisely in the fact that their production cost has declined" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," vol 25, part I, p 286). Although the growth rates of labor productivity in the national economy, as computed on the basis of the accepted method, are somewhat outstripping the growth of wages, the population's income is increasing faster than the increased volume of commodities. This precisely is one of the explanations for the widening gap between the population's monetary income and its commodity coverage.

One of the main reasons for the worsening of quantitative and qualitative indicators of economic growth is the fact that instead of real labor economy labor is replaced by materials on a nonequivalent basis. Each new step in increasing labor productivity is accompanied by the increased share of material outlays, not compensated by reduced labor outlays. This can be clearly traced in the ratio between the growth rates of labor productivity and the capital-labor ratio.

Average Annual Growth Rates of Labor Productivity and Capital-Labor Ratio in USSR Industry (in percentages)

	Years				
	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980	
Labor productivity	4.6	5.8	6.0	3.2	
Capital-labor ratio	7.3	6.1	7.3	6.3	

This adverse ratio between the growth rates of labor productivity and the capital-labor ratio is the consequence of the low economy standard of the equipment and the unsatisfactory use of capital assets.

It is easy to realize that if the production cost of a machine exceeds the amount of labor saved or else if the conditions which govern the use of capital assets are such that outlays for capital assets exceed the amount of labor saved, the sum total of outlays per unit of finished product becomes higher. However, it is precisely this process that has taken place during the last 5-year periods. This means that extensive growth factors, based primarily on widening the "field of production" and the production machinery, are gaining the upper hand.

Given the existing ratio of outlays between labor and materials, there are definitely no grounds whatever to consider labor savings as the main reserve for economy and to consider them the main factor of economic growth as is presented in scientific and popular science publications and textbooks.

When savings in overall outlays per unit of finished product could be achieved when the share of outlays of labor and materials were equal or when the share of materials only slightly exceeded the share of labor, labor savings were possible. At a higher level of industrial development, when materials account for the overwhelming share of overall outlays (in excess of 80 percent in industry), labor savings are no longer a decisive prerequisite for economic growth. With such a ratio, achieving overall savings becomes difficult unless there has been a substantial reduction in material and capital intensiveness. No savings in overall outlays are possible also when labor savings as a result of newly installed equipment are the equivalent of production outlays.

All of this leads to the conclusion that, given the current structure of outlays, it is impossible to limit oneself to the labor-saving indicator in planning and economic practice, for overall economic indicators will not improve without a simultaneous saving on materials. Furthermore, the desire to ensure economic growth primarily by replacing labor with materials is encountering increasingly tangible restrictions in terms of material resources, for increased material outlays means, in the final account, increased outlays of previously invested labor. Since most extracting industry sectors involve high labor intensiveness, given the existing balance of manpower resources their increase is facing increasingly rigid limitations in terms of possible increases in the number of workers employed in such sectors. This contradiction can be eliminated only by steadily lowering specific material outlays.

Increased labor productivity, conceived only in terms of labor savings and increased output per employed worker cannot, under present-day conditions, be considered the main factor of economic growth.

II

Marx's labor theory does not mean in the least that materialized, previously applied labor has no effect on production results. Conversely, each new step in raising the capital-labor ratio increases the role of past materialized labor in the production and reproduction of material goods. In the conditions which prevailed during his lifetime, Marx prophetically predicted the inevitable domination of materials over labor: "Together with machine systems--and mechanical manufacturing based on them--the prevalence of materials over labor will become not only a social truth expressed in the relationship between the capitalist and the worker, but also, so to say, a technological truth as well" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," vol 47, p 552).

Marx pointed out that the breakdown into labor and materials is of the same general and abstract nature; however, when this breakdown exceeds the framework of the production process of the individual commodity, considered by itself, it becomes conventional and relative to a large extent. Drawing attention to this aspect of the problem, he wrote: "That which is the result of previous labor, as I consider the process of the production of an individual commodity, is also the result of coexisting labor when I consider the process of its reproduction..." (op. cit., vol 26, part III, p 289).

Marx was critical both of the bourgeois economists for exaggerating the role of materials in terms of capital and the socialist Godskin for his underestimating of materials, although such underestimation, as he pointed out, was a natural reaction to the fetishistic concepts of the defenders of capitalism (ibid., p 286).

The elimination of private ownership relations removes the foundation for such pitting of labor against materials which are not converted into capital any longer. If it is a question of the reproduction process, it would be more accurate to discuss not materials or labor separately but general labor, which is their synthesis. It is as impossible to imagine the fact that productive capital can operate independently as to assume that labor can create anything without the use of even the simplest labor tools. In the case of an isolated production process, pitting labor against materials no longer reflects the essence of things.

The recognition of the fact that equipped labor is more productive does not involve the danger of coming closer to the bourgeois theory of production factors, which ascribes to capital the ability to create value and added value. In this case, it is not a question of capital as such--the alienated past labor of the worker pitted against current labor--but of a universal labor which represents the unity between past and present labor. "Materialized labor itself," Marx said, "is directly involved in the machine system not only ... as a labor tool but as a productive force in itself" (op. cit., vol 46, part II, p 204). If we measure exclusively the productivity of labor, the social productive power of labor, materialized in a machine, is ignored and the entire production growth becomes exclusively the result of increased labor productivity.

Therefore, superficially, on the surface of phenomena, increased labor productivity is manifested in the growth of output produced per unit of time spent by workers engaged in material production or in terms of reduced working time spent in the production of a unit commodity. When manual labor predominates, the external form of manifestation of this law significantly coincides with its essence. The importance of production factors created through past labor increases as labor becomes better equipped. In studying production conditions in terms of added value, Marx paid attention to this problem: "... If ... at first glance," he wrote, "it is clear that largescale industry, having harnessed the tremendous forces of nature and the natural sciences for the sake of the production process, must exceptionally increase labor productivity, it is by far not equally clear whether or not such an increase is compensated by increased labor outlays elsewhere" (op. cit., vol 23, p 398).

With the domination of the public ownership of productive capital the category of labor productivity expresses relations among people related to the optimal reproduction of the public product. Whereas under capitalism savings on its paid-for share is the inspiring motive for the growth of labor productivity, the socialist society is interested in overall labor savings, including its unpaid part, most of which is represented in its physical form as productive capital. Consequently, the increasing attention paid to material savings is not only dictated by the cost-effective interests of the individual public production units but proceeds from the characteristics of the socioeconomic system.

III

The all-round analysis which labor and materials play in ensuring the growth of public production indicates that under the conditions of a developed socialist economy the importance of material savings in the growth of public labor productivity has substantially increased with the high level reached in the capital-labor ratio. As we know, reduced material- and capital-intensiveness of the product by 1 percent outstrips corresponding wage savings by a factor of 5-6. At the same time, with the existing equipment and technology, each sector has extensive possibilities of saving on materials. This means that at a high level of industrial development the capital saving type of growth compared with labor saving, characteristic of the previous development stage, becomes preferable. Material savings prove to be not only the most efficient means for upgrading public production efficiency but the main prerequisite for its conversion to primarily intensive development.

Naturally, none of this lessens the role and significance of labor in public production or the need for comprehensive labor savings. However much the role and significance of material labor may increase within the reproduction process, material production conditions are inconceivable without the animating force of live human labor. The potential for production intensification and upgrading labor productivity, found in material factors, can be realized only by people--by the organizers and direct performers of production functions.

In terms of the contemporary stage of development of the Soviet economy, the topical nature of labor savings is predetermined also by the fact that the country has extensive opportunities for achieving such savings. The fact that in a number of cases such reserves are used unsatisfactorily is the reason for manpower shortages in most parts of the country. The demographic situation which has developed of late does not allow us to rely on a steady influx of manpower in material production. Meanwhile, underproductive manual labor, which accounts for about 40 percent in industry and which determines

the higher need for manpower resources, is applied in many types of work. Tangible losses result from absenteeism and cadre turnover. The necessary labor stress and intensiveness are not applied in a number of sectors and production facilities. The working time is not fully used and not all workers work with total dedication.

Although the share of the active population engaged in material production is gradually declining, it is still considerably higher compared with industrially developed capitalist countries. In 1980 73.9 percent of the overall number of workers in the USSR were employed in all material production sectors, compared with 95 percent in 1913, whereas in the United States, for example, the share was 59.5 percent in 1980. Between 1950 and 1980 the share of manpower employed in U.S. agriculture dropped from 22.9 to 5.1 percent, compared with a respective drop from 48 to 20 percent in the Soviet Union.

We see, therefore, that substantial labor economy possibilities exist. The experience of the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans indicates that labor savings, achieved primarily as a result of improved labor ratio, do not lead to overall outlay savings. Whereas in the 8th Five-Year Plan a 1 percent increase in the capital-labor ratio ensured a 0.96 percent labor productivity increase, the figure declined to 0.57 in the 9th and 0.46 percent in the 10th Five-Year Plan. This means that during the last five-year plan the growth rates of the capital-labor ratio outstripped the growth rates of labor productivity by a factor of 2 and that labor savings under such conditions paralleled reduced production efficiency. This trend is not objectively inevitable.

Mass economic management experience in our and other countries indicates the possibility of surmounting such adverse trends by increasing equipment economy and better utilizing and lowering the specific material intensiveness of the product. This experience proves that additional investments in capital goods are economically expedient only if the installed equipment is less expensive than the one it replaces or if it ensures a growth of output which covers outlays for additional industrial equipment. For example, the comprehensive application of robots in a number of production facilities doubles or triples labor productivity. Here the installation of a robot yields savings ranging from 8,000 to 12,000 rubles per year.

Global experience proves that contemporary scientific and technical progress enables us to lower production costs of new machine generations and upgrades their productivity, which lowers material outlays. Soviet economists have estimated that the average annual growth rates of material savings in the United States outstripped labor savings by a factor of 1.2 from 1950 to 1973 and 1.6 from 1960 to 1973. This ratio is secured through the extensive application of material-saving technology and increased efficiency of each subsequent generation of reduced equipment and lowered cost per unit of capacity. All this convincingly proves the basically possible overall savings in labor and materials per unit of end product under the conditions of the contemporary scientific and technical revolution.

Therefore, one of the main prerequisites for real labor savings lies in the application of the type of equipment and technology in basic production

processes which would ensure economical overall outlays per unit of finished product. We believe that this principle is of decisive importance in technical policy and in the adoption of consistent measures ensuring the technical equipment and retooling of production facilities and labor operations. As we know, the mechanization of auxiliary and support operations, which is possible with the application of relatively simple and inexpensive machines, at the present stage, when the basic labor processes have become mechanized in most sectors, could yield substantial economic results in the sense of both release of manpower resources and upgrading production efficiency. Such economic maneuvers create prerequisites for reaching a higher technological standard in already mechanized operations. On the basis of the same principle an optim. I solution may be found to the problem of the sequence and pace of mechanization in other operations which so far remain manual.

This study reveals more general conditions for the influence of technical progress on the level of labor productivity. The primary mechanization of basic mass production processes leads to substantial savings in overall outlays as we increase the share of productive capital in the cost of the product as a result of the fact that labor savings compensate for equipment outlays. Once the primary mechanization of basic operations has been completed, for a while further savings in overall outlays are achieved by increasing the share of the active part of the assets and the extent of their utilization -- increased shift coefficient of machine utilization, reduction in intra-shift idling, and others. However, the existing reserves for the growth of labor productivity for given equipment and technology, as basic operations become mechanized, become exhausted quite rapidly and a simple quantitative increase in the number of mechanisms and equipment can no longer be compensated with labor savings. Under such circumstances, i.e., without changing the technological level, the increased machine-labor ratio is no longer justified unless dictated by a grave shortage of manpower.

Once the primary mechanization of labor has been completed, further investments in technical production improvements assume a socioeconomic meaning and are able to encourage the growth of production efficiency only if the new equipment and technology prove to be more efficient than the ones they replace. Quite clear criteria exist for purposes of determining this effect. The most elementary among them is the fact that the new equipment and technology must lead to a reduction in the overall outlays per unit of end product. The desired results can be achieved both by applying more productive and economical machines and progressive technologies and by improving the forms of production organization which lead to a more efficient utilization of assets. The acquired production potential has predetermined the exceptional relevance of the application of the types of forms of organization of the production process which ensure increased labor productivity without additional equipment outlays, as a result of the more efficient organization of labor and production and fuller use of installed equipment. The essential possibility of such a solution to the problem is confirmed by the long experience gained by the Shchekino people and their followers, as well as the brigade contracting method which is becoming increasingly popular. As we know, in both methods, which are organically interrelated. the highest growth rates of labor productivity are achieved (with insignificant additional investments in increasing the capital-labor ratio).

Many foreign countries make extensive use of the method of increasing labor productivity by improving the forms of production organization. According to the British National Economic Development Organization, while the equipment and technological levels are roughly identical in the United States and Great Britain, U.S. labor productivity is *riple that of Great Britain. The authors of the study explain this superiority in terms of the more advanced forms of production organization in the United States.

Material savings become particularly topical in the struggle for upgrading labor productivity under contemporary production conditions, as they account for more than 60 percent of the structure of outlays. What enhances the importance of this economy factor even further is the fact that it is an integral manifestation of the system of measures aimed at social labor savings. Practical experience indicates that reducing the material- and capital-labor ratio of the product, based on the use of new equipment, technology and production organization, saves not only the labor invested in this capital but reduces the need for new labor. In metal processing, for example, a conversion from cutting to pressure processing saves 250,000 tons of rolled metal per million tons and eliminates the need for 15,000 metalcutting maching tools and 20,000 machine tool operators.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Intensifying Saving and Rational Utilization of Raw Material, Fuel-Energy and Other Material Resources" calls for the adoption of an expanded system of measures for the implementation of this most efficient factor in achieving public labor savings. A number of measures have been earmarked to encourage material resource savings, including a procedure for setting wholesale prices in which the prices of new commodities involving lesser material intensiveness will take into consideration the preservation of the level of earnings from the marketing of older types of output.

The conversion to the brigade form of labor organization and incentive, which must become basic in the new five-year plan, will enable us to eliminate the lack of coordination in shop and sector activities as a result of which the orientation to intermediary indicators prevents the enterprises from achieving high end results. For example, the organization of construction operations based on the brigade contracting method encourages the brigades to save on labor and materials and, at the same time, contributes to the ahead-ofschedule delivery of finished projects. The conversion from assessing results of production activities on the basis of gross indicators to normative net output exerts a certain positive influence on labor and material savings.

A consistent national economic approach to the shaping of socially necessary outlays requires both labor and material norming. This makes measures aimed at norming material outlays and introducing mandatory assignments related to lowering material- and capital-intensiveness of output relevant. Methods used in determining material outlays should serve the same purposes. Bearing in mind the increased role of material savings in achieving high end production results, we must also assess the currently used methods for determining lawor productivity. The method for determining labor productivity, currently used in our country and in other socialist countries, of relating the created product to labor outlays P/t^2 characterizes only the efficiency of newly applied, i.e., one of the three mandatory components of material production, which are manpower and labor means and objects. The task of determining labor savings through this method is met to a certain extent, with the stipulation, however, that as a result of the reduced share of labor in overall outlays this method has a distorting effect on the dynamics of indicators, for the growth rates of labor productivity are inversely proportional to its reduced share in overall outlays.

The main feature is that this indicator does not reveal anything regarding overall outlay savings. Since labor outlays materialized in machines and materials are not taken into consideration, the entire growth of output is presented as being exclusively the result of the increased productivity of newly applied labor. It remains unclear under such circumstances whether the growth of labor productivity is the result of more productive working time and increased labor stress and intensiveness or the use of more productive machines and mechanisms. The growth of labor productivity determined through this method offers no information as to the dynamics of production costs. As we pointed out, labor savings in many sectors are accompanied by increased production costs. All of this confirms the inadequacy of the current method used in determining social labor productivity.

Along with the labor productivity indicator, the purpose of which is to determine the intensiveness and completeness with which the main element of production forces -- manpower -- is used, we need a summing up indicator which would organically link end results of production activities (finished product, national income) to labor and material outlays. It is to this effect that academician S. C. Strumilin has suggested the formula $P/t^1 + t^2$. which shows the ratio between the end product and the sum total of labor and material outlays. This formula actually expresses production efficiency. S. G. Strumilin deemed possible the conversion to this measurement method involving the use of value indicators. Naturally, in this case totaling labor and material outlays with a view to expressing them through a single indicator presents a certain difficulty. It too, however, can be surmounted if we take into consideration Marx's remark to the effect that the social labor contained in productive capital is actually expressed through the price of capital goods (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 49, p 50). Since value indicators are commensurable, we believe that it would be justified in this case to use the method of reduced outlays in which all elements of labor and materials are interrelated and interdependent in accordance with the formula $T^1 + T^2 = C + EF$, in which C stands for current labor and material outlays in material working assets, F represents the use of productive capital and E is the normative efficiency coefficient. Production efficiency thus computed also becomes an expression of the productive power of labor. This approach to measuring labor efficiency is entirely consistent with the

task set at the 26th CPSU Congress of ensuring the faster growth of production results compared with outlays.

The entire system aimed at lowering material- and capital-intensiveness presumes above all the development of an economic incentive for the implementation of such measures by the direct participants in the production process. In its most general aspect, the implementation of this principle consists of establishing direct relations and a dependence between the indicators of the growth of the people's living standard and the efforts to upgrade the quantitative and qualitative material production indicators and measures aimed at ensuring the fuller subordination of the production process to the national interests.

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CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIALIST DIRECT SOCIAL PRODUCTION

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[Article by V. Mazur, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] The problem of the consistency between labor and consumption measures, based on the vital need to upgrade the level of proportionality and efficiency in the national economy, stipulated by the 26th CPSU Congress, the more satisfactory assessment of individual labor contributions to public production, improving labor organization and wages and "firmly blocking all loopholes, sponging, bribery, speculations, unearned income or any encroachment on socialist property" is becoming increasingly important. This conclusion also proceeds from the fact that one of the most important tasks in socioeconomic policy for the 1980s is increased control over labor and consumption measures. Problems of labor and consumption measures control must be classified, in our view, among those which, as was pointed out at the congress, require the development of economic theory and bringing it closer to practical requirements. However, a number of political economic aspects of this control as well as the very essence of the relation between "laborconsumption measure" have been and remain insufficiently studied.

I

The theory of the socialist economic mechanism is being intensively developed in the science of economics. However, in describing its functional subsistence, we usually single out planning, economic incentive, management organization and participation of the broad toiling masses in it (competition), while entirely skipping control over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption. Essentially, such a solution could hardly be considered satisfactory.

In order to determine the accuracy of considering within the socialist economic mechanism, on the same level with the others, the subsystem of control over labor and consumption measures, the following must be taken into consideration. Essentially, control in economics is a function of the subject of economic activities. Therefore, if private owners are the subjects, such control takes place within the boundaries of a single separate production cell; under socialized production conditions, the subject of which is society, it becomes an overall social function. Since an economic system which would automatically block deviations from the socially necessary production ratios and, therefore, would not require order-bringing influences, no economic mechanism, i.e., a mechanism which would control public production, would be possible without supervision on the part of the agents of this production process over deviations in each stage of the reproduction process from socially normal requirements applicable to labor and consumption measures.

For example, the uncontrolled market-regulating factor reacts to deviations of individual production outlays from the socially necessary ones and the social cost through prices which influence individual outlays in the direction of minimizing them so that they may be at least not higher than the socially necessary ones. Those who violate this measure--production costs-suffer damages and are ruined, whereas those who apply this measure better are encouraged and enriched. We can easily note, to begin with, that the feedback here is rigid and merciless; secondly, it includes receipt of information on deviations from the social norm, which has a controlling impact on the organization and planning of production by the commodity producer and which encourages higher labor productivity and, in the final account, the measure of consumption; thirdly, we note that the control exercised by the law of value, even under conditions of simple commodity production, means that the income is distributed, as a rule, by far not according to labor.

Socialist socialized production radically undermines and, in the final account, eliminates the uncontrolled market regulator. Society deliberately creates a mechanism for nationwide scientific planned management and above all the planned distribution of social labor and all resources among economic sectors and reproduction areas; the individual consumption fund is distributed among the workers according to the quantity and quality of the labor they have invested in public production (in this context we ignore the social consumption fund). It is precisely this mechanism which must ensure proportionality, balancing, and systematic development, socioeconomic equality inherent in socialism, and higher material and moral work incentives.

Understandably, as society shapes and develops the planned economic mechanism, it must be concerned with controlling the labor and consumption measures in order to supervise the work of all of its subsystems, units and assemblies which ensure in the course of the economic and social functioning and development process the overall observance of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." The essence of this control lies in continuing information gathering and processing (which, naturally, should be reliable and accurate) as well as information on the extent of the consistency (or deviation) between the real economic process and the planned model and volume and structure of public production--the volume and structure of the production and nonproduction requirements of society and the population.

On the eve of the October Revolution V. I. Lenin wrote that "until the 'higher' phase of communism has arrived, the socialists will demand the strictest possible control on the part of society and the state over the measures of labor and consumption ... " ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Completed Collected Works], vol 33, p 97); immediately after its victory they will require "accountability and control which would be comprehensive, general and universal--accountability and control over the quantity of labor and the distribution of products, which are the essence of socialist reorganization, once the political domination of the proletariat has been created and secured" (op. cit., vol 35, pp 199-200).

Accountability and control over the measures of labor and consumption are the most important component and function of the socialist methods of production, distribution, exchange and consumption and a basic principle in socialist economic management. Let us point out that the same could be said in the case of planning and incentive. The task of raising the level of this control and the search for and use of ways, means and methods consistent with the specific conditions of each historical stage has always been and remains the most important task of the economic policy and practical activities of the communist party and the socialist state. The currently implemented program for improving the socialist economic mechanism also calls for substantial improvements of such control.

Therefore, we reach the conclusion that social control over the measures of labor and consumption is a mandatory element in the structure of the socialist social production regulator, and a link binding planning with incentive: it is on its basis that planning is stimulated and stimulation is planned. Therefore, as we break down the socialist economic mechanism into subsystems for their detailed consideration and the study of this mechanism as an integral system, in our view, control over the measures of labor and consumption should be considered on the same level as planning, i.e., as the core of socialist economic management and incentive and as its motive force after the former and before the latter.

II

Social planning and control over the measures of labor and consumption and incentive were problems which had never been resolved before socialism. "It is only where the production process is under the control of society which actually predetermines production," K. Marx emphasized, "that society establishes a link between the quantity of social working time spent in the production of a specific object and the dimensions of the social needs to be met with the help of this object" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 25, part I, p 205). In the first phase of communism this task acquires a specific definition, for the results and target of the production process here become the direct social product of associated workers, produced from the very beginning for the satisfaction of their needs, while distribution is not as yet based according to needs but according to labor. Hence the special relationship which develops between the worker and society at large: everyone receives a share of the social product in proportion to the quantity and quality of the labor he has invested in public production. This share is a means for satisfying the needs of the worker and the development of his personality, rather than the simple reproduction of his manpower. Hence the essentially new theoretical problem of determining the qualitative definition of each of the aspects of the "labor-consumption measure" relationship, the nature of their homogeneity and, subsequently, their quantitative characterization, measurement and correlation. The political economic study of this problem can and must answer the question of why, what precisely and how and for what reason must society supervise the labor and consumption measures?

From the production viewpoint the "labor-consumption measures" involve three elements: labor process, product and consumption (satisfaction of needs); each of them has its own measure. The capitalist production method is unfamiliar with this relationship, for its specific objective is profit rather than meeting the needs of the people. In this case the process of dynamics, of self-growth of value and the change of its forms, the forms of capital, becomes the subject of political economy studies. In resolving the problem of measure, measurement and correlation in terms of capitalism, among other similar problems--an essentially complex and delicate theoretical problem--K. Marx developed the theory of the double nature of labor invested by the commodity producer, and the forms of value, money and the "manpower" commodity. The sum total of money earned by the worker is not equivalent to the labor he has invested but to the value of his manpower. In the system of bourgeois relations the real wage, i.e., the sum total of specific commodities and services is not a measure of satisfaction of needs but a measure of restoring the value and, therefore, the reproduction of manpower possessing a specific skill. Consequently, a comparison is possible only among commodities which are quantitatively determined on the basis of a single economic quality, value, i.e., by a historically defined social form of expression and correlation between social labor outlays and requirements. The size of the value, as we know, cannot be determined directly in terms of units of labor time, a measure which is inherent in labor. It is expressed indirectly, through money.

Therefore, Marx was the first to reveal the nature of the homogeneity and method of correlating all factors and values involved in the political economic study of capitalism and the bourgeois form of economic management. He also determined the initial principles for resolving this problem under socialism. Marx's model of a forecast socialist "labor-consumption measure" relation, which was described, as we know, in the "Critique of the Gotha Program," is presented as follows:

"In a society based on collectivism and the joint ownership of productive capital, the producers do not exchange their products; the labor invested in the production of commodities is manifested here as the value of the products, as an inherent material property, for at this point, unlike the situation in a capitalist society, individual labor is no longer a circuitous but a direct structural component of overall labor.... Each individual producer receives from society, after all deductions, precisely as much as he gives to society. That which he has contributed to society is his individual labor share. For example, the social working day is the sum total of individual working hours; the individual working time of the individual producer is the share he has contributed to the social labor day, his contribution to it. He receives from society a receipt to the effect that he has delivered a certain quantity of labor (excluding his labor in favor of social funds). On the basis of this receipt he obtains from the social stock the quantity of consumer objects consistent with his labor outlays. The quantity of labor he has contributed to society in one form he receives in another.... The equal measurement is labor" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 19, pp 18-19).

Let us consider this model and experiment mentally with its ideal implementation. Let us imagine that each one of the associated producers is precisely aware of the extent of his labor contribution to overall labor within the planned period (next year) and the norm, so to say, of withholdings for the common fund; let us assume that taking this into consideration along with the corresponding "current outlays" he can precisely determine the quantity of products and services which can satisfy his needs and, on this basis, he submits a preliminary request to society; let us assume that the overall labor has been distributed in public production according to a plan in shares which precisely reflect the structure of individual and social requirements. In that case the work plan for the implementation of his obligation to give society a certain amount of work of a specified quality will not represent merely a confirmation of the fact that the individual labor contribution has been made but a certificate of the right to receive from society the requested products and services. Regardless of the name given to the measure of value recorded in the certificate, rubles for example, it does not represent money but rather just an accounting unit. In this case society avoids the "notorious value" and its inherent measure, for this mechanism for the shaping of socially necessary labor outlays does not require their confirmation through the market. Generally speaking, it is a question of converting production into a direct-social production not in its essential features but in its entirety and completeness, and asserting planning not simply as the dominating but as the only form of economic relations. This eliminates aspects of economic relations which are related to the existence of commodity output and the effect of the law of value inherent in the contemporary stage of socialist development.

In order to make operational Marx's model of the "labor-consumption measures" relationship, one more condition must be added to the indicated assumptions. We must find a means for resolving the contradiction between labor as a realization of individual capabilities and labor as a realization of social needs; between labor as the inter need of the individual required for his free and comprehensive development and labor as a source of products and services, as a means for the satisfaction of all other needs of the individual and society. We see, therefore, that it is a question of the specific duality of labor in society, whose basic principle of activity is "from each according to his capabilities," including the socialist "labor-consumption measure" relation.

In such a society, therefore, the ratios of distribution of labor must be consistent, on the one hand, with the structure of overall requirements and, on the other, with the proportions of breakdown of the sum total of individual capabilities. However, the labor proportions based on individual capabilities and labor corresponding to social requirements cannot coincide within the foreseeable historical future and, perhaps, essentially by themselves. They cannot be ensured by a market regulator, by reducing labor to an abstract and specific "notorious value." It is only planning, a proportionality deliberately formed and supported by society, above all between workers and jobs, simultaneously oriented toward the capability of the working people and the means of society, that can become the socioeconomic means for the solution of this contradiction. We must assume that this particular duality inherent in the work of the associated producer is the main difference separating the political economy of labor from that of capital, the political economy of direct public production and the political economy of commodity production.

The problem of the contradiction and duality of labor producing a commodity distributed according to labor under conditions of commodity-monetary relations is quite familiar to us and we are steadily working to resolve it. This is a traditional problem in political economy and, its complexity notwithstanding, probably its main difficulty. As socialist society develops, the problem of the conflicting duality of direct social labor becomes increasingly urgent. It becomes essentially a new rather than a traditional political economic problem. This contradiction cannot be resolved through value and price.

We believe that socialist political economy and the practice of socialist economic management have come very close to this stipulation and to the planned solution of the problem of the dual nature of direct social labor. This has been helped by the more profound mastery of the method described in "Das Kapital" on the study of the system of socialist production relations and, above all, the methodological role of the theory of the dual nature of labor; the intensive search for criteria to govern the distribution of wages based on labor among economic sectors, enterprises (associations) and workers; and the definition of the specific means for the implementation of the principle of universality of labor and the right to work according to one's capabilities. Let us discuss these aspects in somewhat greater detail.

In interpreting Marx's theory of the dual nature of labor, Soviet economic thinking has singled out the following particular features. First, abstract and specific labor is a specific-historical form of outlays inherent in commodity output consisting of labor in general, on the one hand, and purposeful useful labor, on the other. Labor in general, i.e., the expenditure of physical and nervous strength, becomes abstract labor when it starts playing the role of regulator, a measure of exchange relations.

Secondly, as works by Soviet economists have pointed out, the duality of the natural basis of labor--its expediently useful form and its dialectical opposite of "labor in general"--which expresses the processes through which social production forces function, always acquires a certain socioeconomic form and cannot exist without it any more than production forces can exist without production relations. In our view, these postulates lead to the question of the dual nature of labor of the associated producer or, in other words, the dual nature of labor which creates the direct social product.

Therefore, we must surmount above all concepts according to which the rejection of commodity production and the dual nature of the work of the commodity producer either eliminates in its totality the question of the duality of labor or reduces this duality to the eternal, the natural-historical duality of labor: the expenditure of manpower (quantitative aspect) in a useful form (qualitative aspect). Such concepts are metaphysical and antihistorical.

Marx wrote that "... all previous economists have reduced in an equivocal and incomplete manner the concept of commodity to that of 'labor.' Reducing a commodity to 'labor' is insufficient. It must be reduced to labor in its dual form..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 49, p 49). He found in the specific-historical contradictory duality of the labor of the commodity producer the methodological key to understanding the entire capitalist production system and the laws governing its functioning, development and revolutionary conversion into direct-social, communist production. This is understandable, for labor is the foundation of society and the contradiction within its duality is the motive force of social progress. In this light, there are no grounds whatever to refuse to find this type of key (the division of labor into its opposites) to understanding social production in the higher communist system. Here labor, as directly social, will operate as a new unity of new contradictions. Generally speaking, economic development is not interrupted and, by virtue of its very nature, cannot be noncontradictory or problem-free.

Nor are there grounds to reduce the dual nature of direct social labor to the general sociological or general economic categories of "labor in general" and "useful labor." Such a reduction means to ignore the truth confirmed by Marxism-Leninism to the effect that the nature of all relations within a given production method is determined specifically, through its inherent production relations rather than general economic relations and forms inherent in all socioeconomic systems. This means to depict communism as a society which is exclusively consistent with the nature of man and mankind. The point is, however, that human nature is consistent with all socioeconomic systems, for the nature itself is historical. The efforts to find in general economic categories the key to understanding the essence of economic relations of a given production method is one of the main characteristics of vulgar rather than scientific political economy.

Therefore, from the methodological viewpoint, the only accurate solution to the problem of the duality of the direct social labor is the identification of its specific historical duality. On a broader level, the essence of the problem is the fact that the general historical and final objective of production--the satisfaction of human needs--even though it becomes the direct objective of society as the organizer and manager of the production process, cannot be achieved directly but only through a specific and always conflicting socioeconomic method.

in defining the criteria governing distribution according to labor under contemporary conditions, our economic science justifiably notes, on the one hand, the direct social nature of socialist labor and, on the other, its duality as specific labor which creates consumer values and abstract labor which creates the commodity value. In this connection, the question is raised of the type of labor, roughly stated, on the basis of which distribution should be based--concrete or abstract? Since it turns out that the various types of specific labor are not directly commeasurable and that distribution based on abstract labor and the proportionally newly created value of produced commodities are inconsistent with the quantity and quality of the labor which the worker gives society (because of different technical facilities at the disposal of the enterprises), the Soviet economists face the entirely natural theoretical problem of finding a common characteristic linking all the various types of socialist organization of human activities distinct from value-forming abstract labor. It is justifiably pointed out that any type of useful human activity (usually identified with specific labor) is also labor in general. In this connection, the solution of this problem is sometimes sought in the fact that the last in commodity production is abstract labor which forms the value, acting on a planned basis as "direct labor in general" and as such becoming the objective criterion which is the foundation of distribution according to labor, depending on its quantity and quality.

These and similar considerations related to the implementation of the socialist principle of distribution according to labor, although not free from inadequately substantiated analogies with the labor of the commodity producer, directly lead our theoretical thinking to the formulation of the problem of the particular dual direct social labor, which was previously unknown. However, it stops in the face of this stipulation. In our view, this is due to the fact that in economic reality all aspects of direct social labor operate in the guise of commodity-value forms, for which reason socialist political economy is inevitably influenced by the theory of the dual nature of the work of the commodity producer. The result is that the qualitative definition of socialist (communist) labor as labor based on the capability of the members of society is ignored.

Finally, the formulation of the problem of the new duality of nature is actually found in the USSR Constitution. The Constitution stipulates that "citizens of the USSR have the right to work ... including the right to choose their profession, type of employment and job according to their vocation, capabilities, professional training, and education, taking into consideration social needs. This right is ensured by the socialist economic system, the steady growth of production forces, free vocational training, enhancement of labor skills and learning new specialties, the development of the vocational guidance system and employment." It is easy to note that this interpretation of the right to work reflects the conflicting duality of this labor: it is an object of need and realm of application of the individual capabilities of the worker and a means for the satisfaction of social requirements.

But let us go back to our imaginary experiment in implementing Marx's model of the relationship between the "measure of labor and measure of consumption." What is required to turn this model into socioeconomic reality? To accomplish this, by combining the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of socialism, society must reach the level of scientific and technical potential which will enable it to resolve at least the following problems:

First, to identify and correlate the individual and social requirements of the associated producers, to define their structure and volume in their dynamics, to forecast, and so on. In this case sociological research plays an irreplaceable role. Understandably, similar problems must be resolved through respective means in terms of resources as well.

Second, to take into consideration and develop individual capabilities for one type of useful labor or another and, respectively, provide conditions for their application in public production, reducing and, ideally, eliminating the vestiges of necessary labor which cannot be broken down into capabilities; to achieve in the interests of the comprehensive development of the individual a balanced structure of labor and needs, on the one hand, and a structure of capabilities, on the other; to distribute the balance of labor which cannot be labor according to capability in such a way that within the public production process total equality may be observed in implementing the principle "from each according to his capabilities" (today this applies primarily to manual labor, the share of which for industry as a whole reaches about 40 percent and the performance of which, following the introduction of universal secondary education, practically terminates the reproduction of manpower). The direct social production and direct social labor presumes, therefore, the intensive development of education, psychology, ergonomics and other sciences related to man and labor.

Third, the creation of a corresponding base for gathering and processing all the necessary direct social and economic information needed for the functioning of the production process. This includes the development of economic cybernetics, socioeconomic statistics and overall economic-mathematical methods, increasing the use of computers in economics, and developing automated systems for planned computations and management in the national economy.

Fourth, all varieties of labor regardless of complexity, intensiveness and difficulty must be reduced to a single measure of one-quality labor in terms of direct social labor. Obviously, this is the final word in terms of the labor reduction theory.

Fifth, the product must be assessed from the viewpoint of socially necessary outlays it contains in terms of units of direct social labor.

Sixth, labor, products and requirements must be correlated and distributed.

We believe that a great deal is being done to resolve the last two problems through research in the theory of optimal planning of socialist production and direct social assessments of its results and factors. Possibly, national economic modeling will enable us to develop new (secondary) economic measurements with the help of which these problems will be resolved on an adequately satisfactory level.

Should such a scientific and technical potential and level of socialist socialization of production and all its areas, in which the solution of such problems will prove to be entirely possible, be identified with conditions under which labor becomes a prime vital need, and a conversion to distribution according to need? One thing is obvious: a conversion to communist relations would be impossible without the conditions which would enable us to implement Marx's model of "labor-consumption measure" relations. However, it would be premature, to say the least, to judge whether these conditions are not only necessary but adequate for the implementation of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his needs." This leads to the essential admissibility of the assumption that within the historical limits of socialism the direct social nature of the production process will reach the level of development and maturity in which it will be able to do without socioeconomic formations of commodity-value forms inherited from the past. The latter, being useless as a means for resolving the contradictions of the dual direct social labor, will gradually lose their specific economic role and wither away. It would be an unforgiveable error, on the grounds that voluntaristic and extreme leftist attempts to abandon commodity-monetary levels of socialist economic management, in the absence of corresponding prerequisites, would inevitably lead and indeed do lead to a dislocation of the economy and distortions of the "barracks communism" type, to exclude from the programmatic stipulations of the communist movement the target of achieving and advancing in direct social production toward increasingly higher levels of maturity, including the one forecast by Marx in his "Critique of the Gotha Program."

We believe that the paradoxes and extremes in the development of political economic thinking, when it is either unable to imagine the implementation of the "labor-consumption measure" relationship under conditions of remaining commodity-monetary relations, or imagine them without such relations, reflect the changing international and domestic conditions governing the development of real socialism and the complex heterogeneous duality of labor--as a direct-social and commodity-producing duality--and elements of pragmatism in economic science, which narrow its ideological-theoretical horizons. To classify the withering away of commodity-value relations as among the consequences rather than the prerequisites for the establishment of a higher phase of communism means to turn the historical task inside out, to put the cart before the horse, and to ignore rather than resolve the problem. It means unjustifiably to limit the potential of socialism and to demobilize and, to a certain extent, disorient socioeconomic thinking, social science and practice in the struggle for the further development of the direct social nature of production as the only true way leading to the final objective of our movement.

The problem of control over the measure of labor and consumption, as we can see, is neither reduced nor could be reduced to technical and economic problems. It is a question of historically specific production relations (laborconsumption measure), and of political economic categories (measure of labor, measure of consumption). This problem is primarily not econometric but socioeconomic and political. It can be resolved only with a corresponding social, socioeconomic and political organization of the activities of each labor collective, sector, region and entire national economy. In this light, the groundlessness of claims of the withering away of political economy as commodity production disappears becomes increasingly obvious.

Under the conditions of direct social production, periodically, with every working day, the worker gives to society a share of labor, the quantity and usefulness of which are determined by the plan and the purpose of which is to satisfy one need or another within a given volume. In this case, as a socioeconomic phenomenon, labor must obviously be analyzed and measured from the very beginning in terms of the need it satisfies. It is precisely this that

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defines the concept of "direct social labor" as opposed to labor which produces goods for trade, not to mention labor used for obtaining added value.

If we consider the direct social labor from the viewpoint of its specific duality and the positions of Marx's model of "labor-consumption measure" relationship, the political economic foundations for resolving the problem of correlating labor, the product and the "equal measure-labor" requirement become quite clear. The associated worker (simultaneous consumer, producer and production organizer) determines the set of products (services) he needs for the planned period and the share (quantity) of the labor he is willing to provide for each one of them, i.e., to use for the satisfaction of the specific requirement. The consumption measure here, as we can see, is directly the amount of labor (reduced and therefore expressed in terms of working time) which the worker (through society) allocates for the satisfaction of this need. In this case, labor according to capability, as allocated by society in proportions consistent with the structure of needs which have been jointly defined by the members of society, acts as productive labor, while the labor which is not consistent with the proportions defined by social needs becomes nonproductive. Let us note that as society reaches through corresponding means a balance between the sum total of the needs of the members of society and the sum total of the distributed labor according to capability, the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work" convers into the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his needs." Such an economic system means that society has reached a highly democratic nature, for all its members consciously participate in forming the foundations of social life which were previously imposed by the market element, by an alien, uncontrollable economic force, since, consequently, the "individual-society" relationship here acts as a subject-to-subject relationship.

In developing his approach to the solution of this problem, Marx wrote in "Das Kapital:" Let us assume an "alliance of free people using commonly owned productive capital and plannedly (selbstbewust) expending their individual work force as a single social work force. All definitions of Robinson Crusoe's labor are repeated here but on a social rather than an individual scale. All of Robinson's labor products were exclusively his own and, consequently, were direct objects of consumption for himself. The entire labor product of the alliance of free people is the social product. Some of this product ... is used to meet the vital needs of the members of the association, for which reason it must be distributed among them. This distribution method will change in accordance with the nature of the socioproduction organism and the level of historical development reached by the producers.... Let us assume that the share of vital means needed by every producer is determined by his work time. In this case the work time would play a dual role. Its socioplanned distribution would establish proper relations among the different labor functions and requirements. On the other hand, the work time would also be the measure of the individual participation of the producer in the overall labor and, consequently, in the individually consumed part of the entire product" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 23, pp 88-89).

Therefore, control over the measure of labor presumes not simply a measurement of outlays of human energy but a mandatory measurement related to the volume of requirements satisfied through such outlays. Consequently, from the viewpoint of political economy, the direct-social production control over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption consists not of two controls or processes but of a single process. It begins with control over the establishment of a structure, level and quantitative value of needs and continues as control over the distribution of resources and production factors among areas, sectors and types of activities, and ends not simply as control over the distribution of products and services but as a manifestation of the consumption measure, i.e., the satisfaction of requirements.

III

As we may see, the qualitative and quantitative characterization of the measures of labor and consumption is no simple matter. Neither, therefore, is the considered problem of control, even without exceeding the framework of the abstract-theoretical model of socialist production as being exclusively direct-social. The practical breakdown of the "labor-consumption measure" relation is even more complex and so is, on the basis of economic and sociopolitical control levers, the need to maintain between these measures the necessary correlation in the economy of real socialism, in which the plan regulator has been called upon reliably to develop under social production conditions in which economic units retain relative economic independence, commodity-monetary relations, a personal auxiliary farm and a market in which the law of value prevails.

Under such circumstances the "labor share" of the worker or the portion of labor experience, before returning to their source in a different form, several changes in the course of which a number of its characteristics become substantially different, so that at the different stages along the way this portion is controlled by a variety of laws and moves along nonidentical relations and ties. Labor is expended as directly social, i.e., society becomes responsible for all of its indicators, and it is measured here not indirectly but directly, with the help of labor norms controlled by society (the state) which are scientifically substantiated (ideally), such as time, output, service and grade coefficient norms. Then, the share of "labor in general" given to society is converted into abstract labor, into part of the value created by a specific production collective. Henceforth, going through the converted value forms such as price, profit, wage, and so on, it obeys, to one extent or another, the law of value and the other laws governing commodity-monetary relations. After all deductions, it goes back to consumption, to the satisfaction of requirements which also operate in the converted type of solvent demand.

The "labor-consumption measure" relation, therefore, develops a multiplelayered system of converted economic forms.

The characteristic feature of the current historical situation, we believe, is the fact that at the socialist stage of maturity direct social production must still face the solution of the contradiction of commodity-creating labor and is already engaged in the solution of the direct social labor contradictions. This twin task can be resolved only through the further development of socially necessary production and upgrading the level of the scientific management of society consciously provided by the working people headed by the communist party.

Socialist practice and the science of economics have done a great deal to provide the corresponding measures of labor and consumption, to surmount the consequences of the contradiction between the effect of the law of distribution according to labor and the law of value and, in particular, to neutralize in the course of the stimulation the factors (natural conditions, technical facilities, and so on) which, although affecting the significance of newly created values, do not reflect the results of the efforts of the specific worker or collective (with the help of various types of planned prices, fund payments, fixed and rental payments, and so on). On the other hand, the question is raised that the stimulation of scientific and technical progress, labor and material economy and use of intensive growth factors require distribution according to labor and, as some economists have written, a "predistribution according to value." Attention is drawn to the changes made here in the economic mechanism: strengthened direct relations between the value of the wage fund for the labor of the collective and the collective's contribution to the growth of the national income through planning wages based on net production norms; increased dependence of the economic incentive fund on end results of enterprise economic activities. In general, they reached a conclusion that two aspects of distribution exist--based on labor and the labor product.

We believe that the solution of this and other problems is hindered by the underdeveloped nature of the theory of converted forms in socialist social production. We must clarify the mechanism for reducing the socialist product to the dual nature of labor, not only the one which creates commodities but on a deeper basis--to the dual mature of the direct social labor as the foundation for planned economic relations which now operate in terms of commodity-monetary forms as well. Since, by its very nature, direct social labor is measured, as we note, mandatorily in terms of the needs it satisfies, the criterion of distribution according to labor presumes unity between the quantity of labor (outlays of physical and nervous energy) and its quality (including results and useful effects not only of individual but of collective labor). In principle, we can agree with some economists according to whom the law of distribution according to labor is consistent with distribution based on labor results and the contribution which the worker or the collective makes to achieving the highest possible end national economic results. Indeed, if the labor spent is consistent in terms of its parameters to that needed by society, distribution according to labor would be equivalent to distribution based on labor results.

It may be assumed that it is precisely through the study of the two-step duality of labor we noted that an adequately nonconflicting theory of correlation between labor and consumption may be developed. This becomes even more important in the case of socialism, for whereas in a market economy measures for economic correlation arise spontaneously, in a planned production system they must be invented, so to say, and applied by science and society as the subject of economic management and the conscious creativity of the masses.

The formulated suggestion of the duality of the labor of the associated producer and the qualitatively different duality of labor-producing commodities is understandably a theoretical hypothesis, although quite adequately substantiated, the consideration of which, we believe, may contribute to progress in political economy research. However, the fact that the internal planning regulator inherent in direct social production, which is not a hypothesis but has been confirmed through the experience of world socialism, does not ensure proportionality and balance in the reproduction process and a consistency between the measures of labor and consumption in the activities of society and its members, the contradictions related to commodity-monetary relations escape social control and lead to the intensification of economic imbalance, uncontrolled redistribution of income among working people, excessive nonsocialist property differentiation and the appearance of unearned income in some strata. This, put together, adversely affects labor incentives and the functioning of the socialist economic mechanism as a whole. This raises with particular urgency the problem of the elaboration and implementation of economic, social, political and state-legal measures of control over the measure of labor and the measure of consumption, in order at least to prevent inadmissible deviations which undermine the socialist system and, at best, to support scientifically substantiated planned correlations between such measures.

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5003 CSO: 1802/8 BASIC ECONOMIC LAW OF SOCIALISM AND THE CONVERSION OF LABOR INTO A PRIME VITAL NEED

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[Article by A. Melent'yev, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] As was emphasized at the 26th party congress, the elaboration of the concept of developed socialism is the main achievement in theoretical thinking in recent years. A most important feature of the maturity of the first phase of the communist society--the creation of conditions which ensure the increased effect of the laws of socialism in general and the laws of its economy in particular--was substantiated in the course of a creative debate. This is expressed in the enriched content and manifestation of new forms of implementation of economic laws. It applies mainly to the one which constitutes the general communist principle of socialism, the basic economic law.

At the present historical stage the process of the full, free and all-round development of all members of society as consumers of material and spiritual goods and as their creators is taking place. In other words, characteristic of mature socialism are both the steady increase in the real income of the working people and the increasingly full satisfaction of their material and spiritual needs as well as the established trend of gradual conversion of the very process of public production in the area of the realization and growth of all human forces and capabilities.

I

Public ownership is a historically and logically absolutely necessary prerequisite and a starting point for the communist production method. It means, above all, that all productive capital belongs to the association of working people. Its nature excludes the possibility of the monopoly control of the objective conditions governing the labor process by individuals (or any form of their production collectives).

The Marxists have always sought the economic nature of the ownership of productive capital in the historically developed means of combining productive capital with manpower, which constitutes "the most profound secret, the concealed foundation of the entire social system" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 25, part II, p 354). In the language of contemporary political economy, this is known as the "basic production relation." How is this combination achieved under the conditions of the communist system and what is the socioeconomic mechanism which is brought into action by the socialization of productive capital?

As the owner of the productive capital, the society of the working people as a whole can economically achieve this ownership only by acting as the joint, the overall worker--the overall direct producer. Every individual member of society, as the associated owner (co-owner) of production conditions, must become part of the overall social manpower in order to exercise this ownership economically, and as such (and only as such) unite with the social productive capital. Therefore, the first "step" on the way to a specifically communist (in the broad meaning of the term) method for combining productive capital with manpower is the general act of uniting the individual manpower (individual workers--associated owners of productive capital) within a single overall social manpower which is formed by them.

The second "step" which necessarily stems from the first is the planned production of the overall product "at the expense of the entire society." Expending "their own individual manpower as a single social manpower" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 23, p 88), the associated working people invest their labor above all within the limit of their own individual needs and thus produce the necessary product. For the other part of the worker a product in addition to this level is produced -- the added product which goes to society. The production of the overall social product is the direct foundation of the third and final act of the basic production relation -- the distribution of the product among the subjects of this relation. The fund for the restoration of expended productive capital and the added product which goes above all to meet expended reproduction requirements--the material foundation for the growth of the individual consumption of the association members in the future--remains at the disposal of the society of working people at large. One way or another, individual working people manage to acquire the product which is necessary for meeting personal needs and which is represented by a variety of objects. It is important to note that the added product which is left at the disposal of society and consists mainly of productive capital is also the product of the individual working person, although it is not owned by him (by the "private individual," according to Marx), to be used for his individual consumption. The added product belongs to every worker precisely because he is a "member of society," and thus meeting the general needs of the associated producers. V. I. Lenin especially emphasized that in the new society "the added product does not go to the class of owners but to all working people and to them alone" ("Leninskiy Sbornik XI" [Leninist Collection XI], p 382).

It is this entire movement leading to the basic production relation as a whole that determines the content of the basic economic law of the communist system in its most general and abstract aspect: organized production, carried out plannedly by the entire society for the sake of the working people and the working people alone. The latter "produce as socially united workers and subordinate to themselves their own socialized production" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 26, part III, p 552). The fact that the working people work for themselves in the course of social production is the most essential principle of the communist system, radically different from preceding exploiting societies in which workers worked for the slaveowner, the feudal lord or the capitalist. "For the first time after hundreds of years of work for others, of coerced labor for the exploiter, the possibility arises to work for oneself ... " (V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 196).

Naturally, the formula "work by the working people for themselves," taken in its "bare" aspect, cannot be considered as expressing definitely the content of the basic economic law of the communist system perhaps simply because under the conditions of petty barter and simple commodity economy the producers work for and subordinate to themselves their own output. The economic relationship between the society of working people as the overall owners of productive capital and each individual member as its associated owner determines the specific historical nature of the existence of the worker under the conditions of a communist (in the broad meaning of the term) production process: the individual working person works for himself not directly but through his work for society. It is quite important to emphasize that the latter is of an indirect-social nature. Becoming an element of the single overall manpower, systematically pursuing the social production process and creating direct social consumer values, every working person indirectly works for himself as an individual who has a set of material and spiritual needs.

II

In subordinating the social production process to the associated working people, the basic relationship within the communist production method thus serves as the specific socioeconomic base for the conversion of labor into a superior manifestation of human activity, a realm of realization and universal development of the comprehensive inner forces and capabilities of the worker, and a prime vital need.

As we develop this thesis let us discuss in greater detail the following circumstances. First, the need to work as such is not exclusively a phenomenon of the communist system but appeared long before it. Being, as conceived by the Marxist classics, not only "the first basic prerequisite for all human life," but also an "expression of life and assertion of life," the "vital manifestation of the worker," or the "way of life of the individual," in itself labor directly serves the realm of realization and development of human capabilities. It is a "play of fiscal and intellectual forces," and a "positive and creative activity." "In practical terms," Marx wrote, "man's universality is manifested precisely in the universality by which all of nature is converted into an inorganic body ... " (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 42, p 92). That is why always, under all social conditions, labor has been a natural, an organic, an ineradicable human need: "... In a 'normal condition of health, strength, vitality, art and skill,' the individual feels ... the need for a normal portion of labor and for ending his rest ... " (ibid., vol 46, part II, p 109). This helps us to understand Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy (that of Adam Smith in particular), most relevant to this day, according to which, in the spirit of biblical dogmas, work was a curse inflicted by external need. At the same time, it was precisely Marx who proved the objective foundation of the views of bourgeois political

economists on labor in production relations prevailing in exploiting systems: "Actually, Smith is right in the sense that in its historical forms labor--slave, corvee, hired--is labor which always acts as something repulsive. It is always labor based on external coercion as opposed to nonlabor which becomes 'freedom and happiness'" (ibid., vol 46, part II, p 110).

Secondly, then, the means of combining productive capital with manpower inherent in antagonistic societies determine the socioeconomic alienation between labor and the toiling masses. As a consequence of this alienation, turning "his activities, his essence merely into a means of existence" (ibid., vol 42, p 93), man becomes one-sided, damaged and imperfect, regardless of the level of his individual consumption. Objective socioeconomic conditions place the direct producer in a situation in which, while fulfilling his truly human labor functions, he feels himself an animal (working animal) and feels only his animalistic-consumer functions (ibid., p 91). It is true, Marx points out, that eating, drinking, and so on "are also truly human functions. In their abstraction, however, alienated from the circle of other human activities and turning the latter into the sole end objectives, they are of an animalistic nature" (ibid.).

Third, the appearance as the result of the revolutionary establishment of the basic production relation in the communist system, as a result of the public ownership of productive capital, directed exclusively to benefit the participants themselves, and the planned and organized social production process represent "the return of man to himself," the "true achievement of the human nature of man for the sake of man," and the end of the "prehistory of human society" (K. Marx). Under the conditions of the elimination of socioeconomic alienation, labor no longer acts as a converted form of "means of enslaving people." For the first time in the entire history of mankind it becomes consistent with its true nature--a "means for the liberation of the people, granting everyone the possibility of developing in all directions and efficiently displaying all his capabilities, physical as well as spiritual" (ibid., vol 20, p 305).

The fact that under the domination of the social ownership of productive capital the individual working person directly working for the society of working people as a whole (as part of the overall social labor force) and thus indirectly (through society) working for himself as an individual, converts labor as such from a means of survival (simple source of goods for personal consumption) into the prime manifestation of human activities, a prime vital need. This means, naturally, that without any longer being a "means" to achieve the outside "objective" (the development of the individual, understood in terms of personal consumption), the direct production process also becomes in a certain sense a "target" (a "self-seeking target"), i.e., it becomes an area of comprehensive development of the association of working people as a whole and of each one of its individual members in particular. Marx wrote that Ricardo, the classic of bourgeois political economy, "demands production for the sake of production, and he is right. To object to this, as was the case with Ricardo's sentimental opponents, by pointing out that production as such is not self-seeking, means to forget that production for the sake of production is nothing but the development of

human production forces, i.e., the development of the wealth of human nature as a self-seeking aim" (ibid., vol 26, part II, p 123). Developing his thought further, Marx expressed the main thought that if in antagonistic societies "this is a development of the capabilities of the human species, although initially it takes place at the expense of the majority of human individuals and even entire human classes," under the conditions of a communist system "it will destroy this antagonism and coincide with the development of every single individual" (ibid.).

On the basis of these positions, perhaps one should approach more cautiously and thoughtfully such a seemingly self-evident and obvious formula, according to which "under capitalism production takes place for the sake of production, whereas under socialism it is not self-seeking in the least." The first and second parts of the formula taken separately and contrasted are unquestionably just. Nevertheless, they are accurate not in the absolute but merely in a certain specific sense.

Let us note above all that "production for the sake of production" in the primitive-literal meaning would be irrational to any society, including the capitalist. Under capitalism, from the socioeconomic viewpoint, production takes place for the sake of production only to the limited extent to which it is subordinated not to consumption but to the process of the growth of value. Whenever the growth of production clashes with this self-growth, the absolute necessity develops to hinder the development of production forces and, furthermore, the nonmarketing and even the direct destruction of some of the public production potential. This is manifested most clearly in cyclical economic crises. The entire history of capitalism supports Marx's theoretical conclusion of the socioeconomic limits of production development inherent in this society and based on its fundamental economic law.

As to the communist (in the broad meaning) production, naturally it would be stupid to consider it outside its initial constituent and decisive definition according to which it is a process for the production of consumer values destined directly (consumer goods) or in the final account (productive capital) for the personal consumption by the members of the association of working people, and in which, consequently, it acts as "capital." Nevertheless, the socioeconomic specifics of the communist (and, therefore, socialist) production process is not limited by this circumstance. It is precisely as a consequence and on the basis of the considered initial feature of being a source of well-being and satisfaction of the individual needs of the associated working people that production in such a society converts into a process of direct manifestation and development of the physical and spiritual capabilities of the members of the association. It becomes a realm of direct individual development. In this respect as well it could be considered a feature of the "target" itself.

Therefore, under certain circumstances, obviously it would be accurate to say that capitalist production is not "production for the sake of production," while socialist production, while remaining above all a means of existence, also turns out to be a "self-seeking," a "self-stimulating" aim. Therefore, the formulation of the problem of "encouraging labor through labor" under socialism, which has become popular of late, rests on substantial socioeconomic grounds.

In characterizing with absolute unanimity the "basic principle" of the communist system as the full, free and comprehensive development of all members of society, the classics of Marxism-Leninism (ibid., vol 23, p 605; vol 20, p 294; V. I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 6, p 232) pointed out that this development is not reduced exclusively to the growth of individual consumption but is also an attribute of the most immediate process of socialized production, an aspect of active productive and creative effort. Thus, Marx spoke of the development in the future society of a "rich individuality which would be equally comprehensive in terms of production and consumption" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 46, part I, p 281). Engels and Lenin singled out "well-being" and "comprehensive development" as two aspects of the socioeconomic nature of communist production, each one of which has its own relatively independent content. Engels described the possibility of ensuring "all members of society, through social production, not only fully sufficient and steadily improving material living conditions but also total free development and application of their physical and spiritual capabilities" (ibid., vol 20, p 294). Lenin noted that the planned and organized production process conducted by the entire society exists "for the sake of ensuring the full well-being and free and comprehensive development of all members of society" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 6, p 232).

Contemporary political-economic works (and other works as well!) describe the supreme objective of socialist society as the "comprehensive development of all members of society." However, in many cases this development is actually interpreted exclusively in terms of the "maximal satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the working people," the "growth of real per capital income," and so on. Naturally, it would be hardly possible to reach a level of comprehensive development of all members of society without a substantial increase in the consumption of material and spiritual goods compared with already reached levels. However, as has already been pointed out, to reduce totally the content of the basic economic law of socialism to the correlation between "personal consumption of the associated working people as a target and planned and organized production as a means for achieving it" means, nevertheless, to impoverish its content to a certain extent. The type of interpretation of the basic economic law which, in its general features, cannot fail to be the basic law of the entire communist system as a whole, unwittingly leads to the conclusion that skilled labor in material production remains, in the best of cases, merely a means of subsistence, although already under socialism it begins to develop and, under communism, fully becomes the first manifestation of the activities of all members of society.

Naturally, the nature of the labor inherent in a communist society cannot be manifested immediately as a result of the victory of the socialist revolution, as a consequence of building socialism in its essential lines or even under the conditions of the mature socialist stage. It must be interpreted as a complex, lengthy evolutionary process which covers an entire historical age until full communism has been built. Under socialism, however, as the first phase of the communist society, and even during the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, objective socioeconomic foundations are laid for the development of a corresponding nature of labor. "... In all previous revolutions the nature of activities always remained intact," Marx and Engels pointed out, "... whereas a communist revolution opposes the previous nature of activities..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 3, p 70).

In this connection it is necessary to emphasize that from the very first months of the Soviet system, Lenin raised the question of converting labor into a prime vital need in practical terms. His classic works during the post-October period, such as "How To Organize the Competition?," "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System," "The Great Initiative," "From the Destruction of the Age-Old System to the Creation of a New One," "Economics and Politics in the Epoch of Proletarian Dictatorship" and many others indicate how closely and profoundly Lenin followed the very first embryonic forms of the development of the objective need of converting labor into free work for society, appearing under the conditions of the establishment of the public ownership of productive capital, as a need of the healthy body, as communist labor in the true meaning of the term.

III

Marxist theory invariably proceeds from the fact that progressive changes in social relations and social processes are based on the development of production forces and on their level and nature. In this respect the process of converting labor into a prime vital need is no exception. The real socioeconomic possibility (and need) of making labor a need, based on the new method for combining manpower with productive capital, becomes reality with the growth of the positive changes in socialist production forces, in the course of progress in resolving the problem of laying the material and technical foundations for communism.

During the period of laying the foundations for socialism and in the course of its subsequent development, through the stage of its maturity, material conditions for the full implementation of this opportunity do not exist. Nonmechanized, hard, monotonous, and mechanical work, which predominates during the initial stages of the building of socialism, and which largely remains after the victory of socialism, demands of the worker, as a rule, merely a relatively limited range of capabilities (physical strength, endurance, skill, and so on), acting as the main limiting feature in the conversion of labor into a creative process, a need. The problem remains under the conditions of the developed socialist society as well. As the 26th party congress emphasized, to resolve the problem of eliminating manual, unskilled and hard physical labor, in which millions of people are still employed, "means to eliminate essential obstacles on the way to converting labor into a prime vital need for every person." Under mature socialist conditions, however, the material and technical base experiences substantial quantitative and qualitative changes, related mainly to the development of the scientific and technical revolution which, precisely, is the profound material foundation for the intensively developing process of creating the need to work.

The necessary components of the scientific and technical revolution--comprehensive mechanization and automation--extend the progressive general historical trend of replacing manpower with materials in the course of producing social consumer values. By "transferring" to machines and mechanisms various functions which directly influence the labor object and by controlling and managing this influence, the associated producers retain for themselves that part of labor activities which is creative and requires systematic comprehensive knowledge, for which reason it stimulates professional interest and gives satisfaction. With the development of this process, mature socialism prepares the conditions for actually achieving not only socioeconomic but material and technical production conditions for the associated producers, which, according to Marx, "are most worthy of their human nature and suitable to it" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 25, part II, p 387).

Naturally, the development of comprehensive mechanization and automation under socialism, particularly in its first stages, is not an absolutely uninterrupted progressive process of enrichment and enhancement of the content of labor. To the contrary, inevitably there are short (relatively, from the viewpoint of historical perspective) countertrends which lead to the simplification of the labor of individual categories of workers engaged in material production. However, it is important to bear in mind that the trend existing under contemporary automation conditions toward a certain drop in the level of the creative principle of labor and its meaningfulness in terms of a number of "elements" of the overall social worker, is a necessary intermediary link in the conversion to a superior automation stage which will enable us to achieve a drastic progress in the content of labor activity. In other words, if the work of individual categories of direct producers (such as operators of automated machine tools, or workers servicing conveyor belts and technological processes) becomes monotonous and simple "mechanical mental work," which requires only the development of automatic reactions to the readings of instruments, the real possibility appears to formalize and transmit said functions to instruments and attachments and sets of automated mechanisms developed by contemporary science.

The trend toward converting material production into a direct realm of development of the creative capabilities of the associated workers, based on the scientific and technical revolution and high-level technical labor facilities, acquires its real manifestation in the changes which take place in the socioclass structure of the mature socialist society.

Some of the essential criteria of socioclass differences under socialism are found in differences in the nature and content of the work performed by individual categories of working people. Every member of the socialist societv. as the associated owner of productive capital, is the owner of all objective social labor conditions from the socioeconomic viewpoint. At the same time, under socialism, from the viewpoint of opportunities for the development and realization of the capabilities of the worker in the labor process, the structure of social productive capital remains quite heterogeneous (this is most clearly manifested through the differences in the technical base of industry and agriculture), and the individual worker is actually related only to a specific segment of the production capital.

Technical progress in the national economy and the closeness in the nature of productive capital in all its areas and the gradual conversion of science

into a "direct production force," while production becomes a "technological application of science," create the necessary prerequisites for the elimination of the major disparities between agrarian and industrial and physical and mental work. Consequently, on the basis of combining the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system, the real equality among all members of society increases: the individual worker becomes not only freely associated with social productive capital in producing direct social consumer values but acquires, in the course of this process, increasingly equal objective conditions for the manifestation and development of his capabilities directly in the course of his work. The objective study of the specific level of this process currently reacher. became the most important prerequisite for the conclusion reached at the 26th CPSU Congress to the effect that "the establishment of a classless social structure will take place in its main and essential lines within the historical framework of mature socialism."

IV

The question of the development of the content of the basic economic law along the line of converting labor into a prime vital need includes a major methodological potential not only for defining the socioeconomic criteria of reaching the level of mature socialism but for analyzing the prospects of the further historical development of the communist system, with socialism as its first phase.

One of the essential problems of this fundamental topic is the one currently actively discussed in contemporary publications of the existence of specific limits of individual consumption and strictly consumer activity of the members of the communist society and the existence of realistic limits for their development as consumers. Under conditions in which the problem of satisfying the material and spiritual needs of the working people remains, the question may seem far-fetched or at least premature. However, the correct answer to it will determine the proper understanding of the direction which must be followed in developing human needs as of today, at the level reached by mature socialism, the knowledge and utilization of the laws of which represent the content of the direct (although historically lengthy) conversion to total communism.

A more attentive consideration of the problem, in our view, may lead to the following arguments favoring its positive solution.

To begin with, individual consumption of one commodity or another is not the most essential aspect of the content of the "comprehensively developed physical and spiritual needs of the working people." Naturally, such consumption differs. Personal consumption of a strictly individual nature is one thing, while consumption of "combined," collective and socially organized nature is another; the use of basic necessary commodities is one thing and the consumption of higher cultural values, another. Clearly, we are faced with substantially different types of consumption and with more or less enhanced forms of human activity. Nevertheless, with all such differences in personal consumption as such, the acquisition of useful objects created through human toil is merely a prerequisite for the development of man as a creator, a builder. The all-round universal development of man in the true meaning of the word is a process of active creative toil in which the capabilities of the individual grow and are realized in terms of socially useful results. Hence, obviously, we draw the conclusion that the development of man as a consumer is an initial and relatively limited task the foundations of whose implementation are laid during the historically initial stages of the evolution of communism as a system.

Secondly, at a certain stage of development of this system, the law of distribution according to labor, like the law of the labor equivalent exchange between the society of working people as a whole and the individual working person separately, must convert into the law of distribution according to need. However, the law of distribution according to need means a condition of exchange of activities between the society of working people and its individual members in which the former fully satisfies all requirements of the latter. It is precisely this that determines the "total well-being" category. The acknowledgement of the possibility of distribution based on need presumes an acknowledgement of the possibility of the total satisfaction of all needs, i.e., of consumption meeting requirements in terms of structural-volume and temporal parameters.

Naturally, this concept must not be absolutized or reach a level of absurdity. The law of increased requirements will not only continue to act under full communism but will gain a new development. Consequently, the stipulation remains according to which "as man develops ... his needs broaden." In the higher communist stage, however, the significance of the second element of Marx's stipulation is enhanced even further: "... at the same time, however, the production forces expand, used for the satisfaction of such requirements" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 25, part I, p 387). Under the conditions of total communism, the possibility of such "expansion of production forces" will obviously grow to such an extent that the "time lag" between the new requirements which develop in the members of society on the basis of the specific level of production development and their actual satisfaction will be insignificant compared with the present state of affairs. In other words, the dialectical, the conflicting interaction between production and need will assume a new shape: the identity of the correlated features will be strengthened. Without this the real functioning of the law of distribution according to need and the reaching of "full well-being" become impossible.

Third, as we know, the interaction between production and consumption always goes through specific production relations. This means above all that the origin and dynamics of need act only in the final account as consequences of a specific level of production forces; directly, they are caused by factors in the specific system of economic relations. Under the conditions of a communist system the phenomenon of planned, conscious and purposeful shaping by society of the individual needs of the members of the association appears and develops. This is a phenomenon of direct social control. Even during the first phase in the system the course of passive satisfaction of the spontaneously developing structure of individual requirements is counterindicated.

Since under mature socialist conditions, thanks to the accurate purposeful utilization of a share of the social consumption funds many of the needs of the working people become directly social in nature (such as the basic needs for education, health care, and comfort; to a lesser extent, the need for cultural goods, recreation, support of the disabled, and others). In other words, there are grounds to assume that at a specific historical stage the association of the working people, planning and actually shaping the qualitative and quantitative structure of personal needs, will be able to regulate, to limit, and to set necessary "sensible" limits to their development. The efficient socially centralized rationalization of individual requirements becomes possible in the course of the steadily progressing process in converting production into a direct area of manifestation and growth of the physical and spiritual needs of the associated working people which, in itself, objectively affects and changes the entire structure of individual needs, radically changing their hierarchy: the needs of the members of society for material and spiritual goods gradually turn from primarily the need to work into needs entirely determined by the latter.

A

The problem of the full satisfaction of human material and cultural needs is today one of the basic tasks in building communism. Its implementation will require lengthy and stressed labor of society at large and its individual members. This is the orientation of the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums, which reflected cases of major shortcomings in providing the population with food products, consumer goods and housing, indicating the remaining unresolved problems in the area of exposing the working people to cultural values. On the other hand, the resolutions of the congress and the adoption of the Food Program, which scientifically substantiate a significant growth in the well-being of the working people this very five-year plan and throughout the 1980s, prove both the essential possibility of resolving the formulated problem within a certain although (let us reemphasize this) rather lengthy historical period.

However, whereas reaching "total well-being" is realistic, and the task of developing the members of the communist society as consumers of material and spiritual goods will be resolved sooner or later, does this mean that this society, like all previous systems with highly developed material wealth, will set itself an internal socioeconomic limit which will mean nothing but the loss of incentive, of a motive power for production? If the higher objective of communist production is reduced merely to individual consumption, while "comprehensive development" and "total well-being" entirely coincide in content, the question could be answered positively with adequate justification.

To emphasize the noncoincidence between these two concepts is an efficient theoretical weapon opposing the concept of "consumer socialism" and bourgeois and revisionist views on the historical prospects of development of real socialism, the purpose of which is to use the thesis of socialism as a society whose single and final objective is consumption, considered as "proof" of its historical limitation.

The question of "and then what?" (i.e., after total well-being has been reached) was theoretically answered in the early works of Marx and Engels

(developed most extensively by Marx in his "Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844"); it was subsequently developed into an integral concept in works such as the "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1859," "Das Kapital," "Anti-Duhring" and "Critique of the Gotha Program." Specifically, it could be answered as follows: "in the future" there will be labor which will fully reach its essential nature -- a realm of universal development of the social person. The creative process, the production of material and spiritual goods, in which the working people will achieve such development, has no limits. The circumstance that the most essential aspect of the content of the basic economic law in the communist system is the development of man in the course of the direct production process without essential limits means that the basic production relations between the society of working people as a whole and as the owner of the productive capital and the individual worker, as the associated owner, controlled by this law, will follow an endless evolution in its qualitative advancement, a process in the course of which the shift from the first phase of the formation to the second will be merely a relative transitional feature.

The dialectics of development of mature socialism and the stage of its improvement are such that the satisfaction of the needs of all members of society in terms of the variety of material and spiritual goods and labor itself gradually become not only the result of socialist social production but a necessary prerequisite for its further development. The development, along with the intensified measures of ideological and educational nature, of purposeful work on all levels of the management system in shaping under present conditions of the complex set of objective technical-economic and socioeconomic conditions of converting labor into a decisive realm of manifestation and increased capability of the people, into a "self-stimulating process" (the latter is particularly important, for unresolved problems in the area of labor incentive, based on the law of distribution in terms of its quantity and quality, are still quite numerous) can become the most important direction in molding conscious discipline in the working people and an essential factor in resolving major problems of building communism, set by the party, such as a drastic increase in social labor productivity, utilization of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, and conversion to a primarily intensive type of expanded reproduction.

In this connection, a certain reinterpretation of the traditional concept of the basic economic law, on the basis of the study of the objective process of enriching its content, assumes not only a theoretical but a practical nationil economic significance, directing the intensively developing restructuring if the entire economic mechanism toward the fuller realization of all opportonities offered by developed socialism in laying the material and technical foundations for communism.

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NEW PATRIOTIC WAR DOCUMENTS

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[Published on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the German-fascist forces at Stalingrad]

[Text] Profiting from the absence of a second front in Europe, in the summer of 1942 the German-fascist forces mounted an offensive along the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Having developed here a considerable superiority in manpower and equipment, the Hitlerite command set as its objective to recapture the strategic initiative, to capture the petroleum resources of the Caucasus, the fertile areas of the Don, the Kuban and the Lower Volga, to rout the Soviet forces in the southern part of the country and, in the final account, to win the war.

The main battles developed in the Stalingrad area. Between 17 July and 18 November 1942 our troops engaged here in heavy defense combat. During that period the enemy suffered tremendous manpower and equipment losses. The plan of the Hitlerite command to capture Stalingrad quickly and its plans for the entire summer and winter 1942 campaign failed.

This created conditions for mounting a counteroffensive by the Soviet forces, the plan for which was formulated in the course of the defensive operation. The purpose of the counteroffensive was to rout the forces covering the flanks of the enemy's assault group by striking from bridgeheads on the Don in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya and from the area of the Sarpinskiye Lakes, south of Stalingrad. The plan called for developing the offensive along converging directions toward Kalach and the Sovetskiy settlement, to surround the enemy, to create an external encirclement and subsequently to capture or destroy the main enemy forces. As a result of the operation the strategic situation in the southern part of the country was to change drastically in our favor.

In the course of the counteroffensive mounted by the Soviet forces between 19 November 1942 and 2 February 1943, the Hitlerite hordes suffered a crushing defeat. On 23 November mobile elements of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts met in the area of Kalach, Sovetskiy and Marinovka and surrounded 22 divisions and more than 160 separate units of the Sixth and part of the Fourth German tank armies, totaling 330,000 men. On 12 December the Hitlerite command attempted to break the blockade with tank formations in the Kotelnikovskiy area but were stopped by our forces and subsequently routed. The task of eliminating the German-fascist armies surrounded at Stalingrad was assigned to the forces of the Don Front, which enjoyed a superiority over the enemy by a factor of 1.7 in artillery and 3 in aircraft, but were inferior to the enemy in terms of personnel and tanks by a factor of 1.2. In stubborn battles, the Soviet troops crushed the desperate opposition of the Hitlerites. The surrounded enemy was issued a capitulation ultimatum under humane conditions. However, obeying Hitler's instructions, it was rejected by the fascist command. Our forces resumed their offensive. The enemy group was split into two parts. The forces of the Sixth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Paulus, terminated their resistance on 31 January, while the northern group surrendered on 2 February.

The Stalingrad victory was of tremendous military and political significance. It laid the beginning of a radical turn in the course of the Great Patriotic and Second World War. Conditions were created for the mass expulsion of the fascist aggressors from our homeland. Having deprived the enemy of the strategic initiative, the Soviet armed forces retained it firmly in their hands until the end of the war. The international reputation of the Soviet Union and its armed forces increased. The anti-Hitlerite coalition became even stronger. The peoples of Europe, enslaved by fascist Germany, mounted a more active struggle against Hitlerite occupation. The outstanding Stalingrad victory proved the increased power of the Red Army and the high military skills of its command personnel. This was an exploit of the entire Soviet people, inspired and organized by the communist party, which skillfully directed the efforts of the front and the rear toward the defeat of the enemy.

The documents published here show new aspects of the history of the battle for Stalingrad. They confirm yet once again, vividly, the tremendous attention which Supreme Command Headquarters paid to the organization of the armed struggle in the Stalingrad sector and the daily leadership it provided in the activities of our forces during the defensive and counteroffensive periods, the stressed and purposeful work of commands and staffs of fronts and armies, and the unparalleled dedicated heroism and courage of the Soviet troops, Stalingrad workers, and party and nonparty members who defended their homeland arms in hand. The documents give an idea of the most important components of the great historical victory won by our forces on the Volga.

The documents are stored in the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. This publication was prepared by Major Gen N. I. Lutsev, archives chief, P. Ya. Dobrovol'skiy, senior scientific associate, and Yu. M. Lebedev, andidate of historical sciences. Most documents are published for the first time.

Abbreviations

A	army	NP observation point
ADD	long-range aviation	orvb separate repair-restoration
VPU	auxiliary control center	battalion
gmp	guards mortar regiment	otb separate tank battalion
dep	road operation regiment	pd infantry division
kd	cavalry division	sbr infantry brigade
kk	cavalry corps	sd infantry division
"KS"	fuel brand	sp infantry regiment
mk	mechanized corps	TA tank army
mp	mechanized regiment	tbr tank brigade
msbr	motorized infantry brigade	td tank division
MTF	dairy farm	tk tank corps
M-20	type of rocket	ur fortified sector
NP	observation point	

Document No 1

Telegram of the Supreme Commander in Chief to the Representative of Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters on Helping Stalingrad¹

To Army General Comrade Zhukov

3 September 1942, 2230 Hours

The Stalingrad situation has worsened. The enemy is 3 versts from Stalingrad. Stalingrad could be taken today or tomorrow unless the Northern Group of Forces comes to its aid immediately.

Demand of force commanders north and northwest of Stalingrad immediately to strike at the enemy and come to the aid of the people of Stalingrad.

No delay is admissible. A delay now is a crime. All aviation must be sent to help Stalingrad. Very little aviation remains in Stalingrad itself.

Acknowledge immediately receipt and measures taken.

J. Stalin

Copy TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense] USSR, f [archive] 3, op [list] 11,556, d [file] 10, 1 [sheet] 7

Document No 2

Telegram From the Supreme Commander in Chief to the Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Adoption of Measures for the Defense of Stalingrad 2

To Army General Zhukov

6 September 1942

0230 Hours

You will receive two fighter plane regiments on 6 September. One will come from Kamyshin and the second from the Voronezh Front. Two days later a new group of fighters will arrive. Novikov³ has the right temporarily to concentrate all fighter aircraft on the Stalingrad and Southeastern fronts wherever required by the circumstances. Khryukin⁴ and Stepanov⁵ will be under Novikov's command. Furthermore, you must bear in mind that your powers are unlimited in terms of transferring aviation or all other forces from the Stalingrad and the Southeastern fronts to the north and vice versa. You have full powers to maneuver force concentrations. Three thousand M-20 shells have been already shipped to you.

J. Stalin

Copy

TsAMO USSR, f 3, op 11,556, d 10, 1 9

Document No 3

From the Political Report of the Political Administration of the Stalingrad Front on Combat Operations of Front Troops and Personnel Heroism

To Comrade Shcherbakov, chief of the Main Political Administration of the RKKA [Worker and Peasant Red Army]

12 November 1942

On 11 November at 0630 hours, following intensive artillery and mortar fire, enemy forces consisting of some nine battalions, supported by 20 tanks, mounted an offensive. The enemy directed its main strike toward the sector of the Krasnyy Oktyabr' and Barrikady plants, in an effort to reach the Volga south of the Barrikady plant. A fierce battle was fought throughout the day on a small sector 200 meters wide, in the area of the 138 sd. The enemy kept throwing fresh reserves in this direction. In particular, this combat was jointed by units of the 294th and 161st German infantry divisions which had been transferred recently by air from Rossoshi and Millerovo. At the cost of high casualties, toward the evening the Germans were able to breach our defenses southeast of the Barrikady plant and reach the Volga.

With a view to restoring the situation, our units mounted a number of counterattacks. In stubborn battle, the northern group of our forces, commanded by Colonel Gorokhov, succeeded, despite fierce enemy resistance to throw back the Germans with a counterattack and advance 400 meters. The fascists were pushed back from the shore in attacks during the night. Fighting continued with a view to restoring the situation fully. The fierceness of the fighting may be seen from the fact that according to partial data in a single day elements of the 62nd Army destroyed a considerable number of German forces: as many as 2,000 soldiers and officers were killed and four tanks were destroyed. During 11 November 14 guns, 18 machine guns and 16 mortars were destroyed by the air force, artillery and infantry subunits; two ammunition dumps were destroyed. After bombing raids by our aviation of the rear and battle order of the fascists, 38 major explosions were recorded.

As in the past, the firmness and stubbornness of units and subunits in battle were noted. Troops, commanders and political workers, fighting the German fascists, are continuing to show examples of heroism, daring and courage. Recently, 26 men--remnants of an artillery battery of the 149th Infantry Brigade, found themselves cut off from their unit and for 3 days were able to receive no supplies, including food. In the first note reaching the unit command, however, this group of braves did not even mention food. The note consisted of two words: "send grenades." This group, headed by Senior Lieutenant Vinogradov, after losing half of its personnel, rejoined its unit fighting. Vinogradov, wounded, in shock and near death, acted as the most daring brigade hunter of Hitlerites....

The guard mortar troops set outstanding examples of heroism and firmness in the battles against the German fascists. On 24 October the battery took positions at the OP to fire at the Stalingrad bakery sector. Meanwhile, enemy aviation showed up and began to drop bombs on the battery's OP. The bombs hit the vehicles, destroying equipment and people. The courageous troops, commanders and political workers, however, did not falter but continued to carry out their combat assignment. The battery fire destroyed as many as 700 enemy soldiers and officers. Major General Gur'yev, commander of the 39th gv sd, rated the combat operations of the battery as excellent.

Under conditions of fierce enemy air force bombing and strafing, artillerymortar fire support was given to units of the 138th, 193rd and 308th sd, fighting in the sector of the Krasnyy Oktyabr' and Barrikady plants. The fire support was given by the 92nd guards mortar regiment (regimental commander Major Tsarev, Senior Battalion Commissar Sobolev, deputy commander for political affairs). Regardless of conditions, the regimental batteries are implementing their combat order. According to very incomplete data, in October the regiment destroyed as many as 5,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

The following cases of courage and heroism in battle prove the extent of dedication to the cause of the party and the homeland shown by the guards-mortarmen:

Surrounded by five German submachine gunners, Comrade Dotsenko, a peasant, nonparty member, guardsman with the 92nd Guards mp, bravely joined the battle. As a result of a fierce exchange of fire he killed four of them and wounded the fifth. Dotsenko returned to the regiment with his trophies: a portable machine gun and three submachine guns. Comrade Yarmatov, Uzbek Komsomol member, guardsman with the 90th Guards mp, fearlessly threw himself at the fire on a rocket system in order to put it out. Risking his life, Yarmatov saved the vehicle. All the rockets were fired at the enemy.

Comrade Levinkov, worker, Russian, Komsomol member, tankman with the 19th Guards mp, received a head wound in battle. Asked by the commander to go to the hospital, he answered: "Comrade commander, I feel able to fight. Allow me to remain in the ranks until the battle is finished." Levinkov left for the hospital only after the combat assignment was carried out.

Comrade Ryzhkevich, party member, from a peasant family, guards major and commander of the 112th Battery, 19th Guards mp, spent 2 days on the NP. The observation point was under steady enemy mortar and automatic weapons fire. However, Ryzhkevich did not abandon the NP, which was convenient for controlling the battery's fire, promptly reporting data and issuing firing orders. As a result, the fascists suffered substantial manpower and equipment losses in this sector.

Comrade Borovikov, party member, worker, Russian, guardsman with the Second Guards mp, was hit in the leg during combat. Although losing blood, he continued to guide the crew of his weapon. When his crew comrades wanted to take him to the rear, Borovikov said: "I am a communist and will not abandon the battlefield even if they hit me another five times."...

Brigade Commissar Doronin, Stalingrad Front Political Administration Chief

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 220, op 486, d 25, 11 143-146

Document No 4

rirom the Report of the Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Command of the Red Army Air Force on the Condition of the Air Force of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad Fronts⁶

To Comrade Vasil'yev7

November 1942

2. In order to maintain the highest possible combat readiness the entire aviation of the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Southwestern and Kalinin[®] fronts, and ensure air superiority in the course of the operations and tireless aviation operations against the enemy, in the course of such operations we must set aside as reinforcements 70 fighter aircraft for the Southwester Front, 20 for the Stalingrad Front and 10 for the Don Front; diver aircraft, 40 for the Southwestern, 40 for the Stalingrad and 20 for the Don fronts.... The same number of aircraft must be planned for the Kalinin Front as well. For this reason, I propose to shorten the time for the combat of both operations of forming fighter aircraft units, and strengthen the supply of aircraft for these two fronts essentially. Such air reinforcements will unquestionably be more effective in combat compared with the hastily set up and newly raised fighter and diver aircraft regiments.

3. On 12 November material support of the fronts' air force has not been completed because of insufficient automotive transportation, fuel tank trucks, lack of gasoline at advance airfields, insufficient radio control facilities and warming-up facilities. Five to six additional days are needed to ensure the full material support of the air force.

4. We deem inexpedient the postponement of operations for a longer time.

5. In order to ensure uninterrupted supplies in the course of the operations, ten Douglas aircraft must be taken from Golovanov's⁹ air force and sent to the Southwestern Front.

Konstantinov¹⁰, Novikov, Vorozheykin

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 229, op 643, d 2, 11 2-6

Document No 5

Report by Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Offensive Readiness of the Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts

To Comrade Vasil'yev

14 November 1942

0135 Hours

1. The arrival of new fresh enemy reserves has been established over the past few days on Ivanov's¹¹ and Fedorov's¹² sectors. Internal regrouping and closer approach to the front end of army reserves were noted, in particular a Romanian tank division in Romanenko's sector.¹³

Small groups of tanks have been noted 5-6 kilometers from the front defense line; clearly, the enemy is using these small groups to strengthen defenses

along his front line. The enemy is stringing barbed wire and laying mine fields along the front line.

2. Today all of Fedorov's units have taken up their initial positions and are working on their assignments. Currently all of them are engaged in organizing their rear lines and accelerating deliveries of ammunition, fuel and food.

Between 9 and 12 November the enemy air force systematically struck at the area of concentration of Fedorov's units. Enemy air force activities declined sharply starting with 12 November.

Interrogation of prisoners captured along various sectors of Fedorov's Front reveals that there is no talk among enemy troops on our prepared move; 14 clearly, the enemy has been unable to detect our groups and our intentions....

3. Based on the condition of the units and the course of preparations by Ivanov and Fedorov, the transfer could take place on 18 or 19 November. I deem any further postponing inexpedient. Please inform me of your decision on the moving date.

4. On 14 and 15 November I will be with Chistyakov¹⁵ and Batov¹⁶ to check on the course of the preparations. I plan to be in Moscow on the evening of the 16th. Mikhaylov¹⁷ will move from Ivanov to Fedorov toward 1200 hours on 16 November.

Konstantinov

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 229, op 643, d 2, 11 8a-10.

Document No 6

Telegram by the Supreme Commander in Chief to Headquarters Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on Setting the Day for Beginning the Offensive by the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts¹⁸

To Comrade Konstantinov

Eyes Only

15 November 1942, 1310 Hours

You will determine the day of Fedorov's and Ivanov's movement, after which you will report it to me on arrival in Moscow. Should you decide that any one of them should start a day or two ahead or later, I empower you to resolve this problem according to your best judgment.

Vasil'yev

Copy

TsAMO USSR, f 229, op 643, d 1, 1 26

Document No 7

Report by the Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Course of Preparations for Offensive by the Don Front

To Comrade Vasil'yev

19 November 1942, 2400 Hours

I met with Dontsov¹⁹ at Fedorov's. As Dontsov reports, Galanin²⁰ is ready to begin to move on the morning of the 21st. Final decision on the date will be made tomorrow, of which I will report immediately.

We are undertaking Zhadov's preparations.²¹ This will involve the participation of four sd, six reinforcement artillery regiments, two RS M-13 and RS M-30 regiments which will be taken from Batov in a few days, and breach tanks and aviation allocated by headquarters. The main strike toward Hill 129 and subsequently will depend on the circumstances, or will be south of Spartanovka if the enemy continues to defend itself, or else in a southwesterly direction toward Orlovka should the enemy withdraw to the west or the southwest.

Reinforcements for the divisions which will strike will require 5,000-6,000 men. Dontsov has arrived in his headquarters.

Mikhaylov

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 229, op 643, d 2, 1 16

Document No 8

From the Report of the Representative of Supreme Command Headquarters on the Plan for Combat Operations of the Southwestern Front

To Comrade Vasil'yev

20 November 1942, 0400 Hours

1. Along with the advance of the First, 26th and Fourth tk and Third kk toward the Don River, and the Eighth kk toward the Chir River, on 20 November our main attention is focused, first of all, on the defeat of the 11th and Ninth pd, Romanian forces, which are preventing the offensive of Lelyushenko's²² left flank and, partially, Romanenko's right flank. To this purpose, in order to operate on the flank and rear of said divisions, we are directing out of the Blinovskiy sector the Eighth Guards thr and from the Second Romanenko echelon the 159th sd; we are directing from Varlamov's sector in the general Gorbatovskiy direction one kd of the Eighth kk.

The overall objective following the routing of the 9th and 11th Romanian PD is to bring up Lelyushenko's left flank to the Chernaya and Chir rivers and thus to ensure the further development of operations from the west. Part of the front's aviation will be used here.

The second task on 20 November is the routing of the Romanian forces in the Verkh. Fomikhinskiy, Raspopinskaya, Verkh. Cherenskiy and Perelazovskiy.

Most of the front's aviation will be used as support of and for joint action with tank and cavalry corps and, if necessary, strike at enemy reserves brought up from the deep rear....

3. A major concern regarding the prompt supply of the troops with everything necessary for combat arises related to the further advance of the forces toward the Don because of extended communications lines between the forces and logistic bases.

Request your instructions on the fastest possible shipping to the front, along the lines of rear control, the additional 400 trucks planned by Comrade Konstantinov.

4. The Stalingrad Front reports that it is beginning operations today strictly according to plan.

Mikhaylov

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 229, op 643, d 2, 11 17-19

Document No 9

Battle Report of the Stalingrad Front Command on Combat Operations by the Front's Forces

Te Comrade Stalin, Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters

Copy to Army General Comrade Zhukov

21 November 1942, 0030 hours

1. After 1 hour of artillery fire, on the morning of 20 November, the central group of front armies began its offensive in the general direction of Nariman, Tundutovo, Tinguta, Hill 87.0, Plodovitoye and Zety, surmounting strongly fortified enemy defenses, breaching them and reaching the following lines at the end of the day: 64th Army--the right wing continues to hold previous positions, while the left wing struck in the direction of Gavrilovka and Nariman, surmounted stubborn enemy resistance and captured the PR, southwest of Yagudnyy, Hill 1.7, Hill 110.9 (5 kilometers east of Gavrilovka), and Hill 83.6.

57th Army--encountered stubborn enemy resistance along its flanks and repelled enemy tank and infantry counterattacks in the Balka Blinnikova and Balka Morozova sectors, inflicting considerable losses to the units of the Second pd and reached the Andreyevka, benchmark + 3.0, Balka Tonen'kaya, the southern slopes of Hill 97.3, Hill 111.8, Hill 94.2 and Hill 118.3.

At 1730 hours the 13th mk crossed Koshary.

51st Army--breached enemy defenses with its main forces on the sector of Lake Tsatsa and Lake Barmantsak and the 15th sd in the Sarpa and Tsatsa lakes and inflicted substantial casualties to units of the enemy's 18th and First bd.

At 1800 hours the army reached the following lines: MTF (3 kilometers southwest of Dubovyy Ovrag), Hill 86.0, Privolzhskiy Woods, Hill 87.0, Zakharov, and 4 kilometers west of Vasil'yev.

At 1800 hours the Fourth mk, heading the main forces, reached the following lines: Barn (west of Tsatsa Lake, 8 kilometers), PTF (southeast of Plodovitoye, 7 kilometers).

By 1800 hours the Fourth kk reached the line of Tsatsa Lake and Semkin.

The enemy (15th mp 29th md, Second, First and 18th pd, Romanian) suffered substantial losses in killed, wounded and captured, and materials, resisted stubbornly. Pressed by our units, it withdrew along the Tinguta railroad and from the area of Dubovyy Ovrag to the Tingutinskoye forestry station and Plodovitoye.

We also noted enemy concentrations in the area of Balka Morozova (tanks, infantry), Balka Tonen'kaya, and Balka Blinnikova and as many as 100 tanks in the area of Farm No 2, Sovkhoz imeni Yurkin and Tingutinskoye forestry station.

The following were captured according to preliminary data:

Guns, various calibers ... more than 40

Machine guns ... more than 70

Several mortar batteries, a large quantity of rifle ammunition, more than 700 prisoners--Romanian 29th, Second, 18th and First bd, and more than 400 horses.

3. 62nd Army--during the day it repelled a number of minor enemy attacks and is holding its lines.

The artillery front group and the 62nd Army expended 3,427 shells. The guards mortar units expended 1,204 shells.

In the sector of the 62nd Army the following enemy forces were destroyed and suppressed:

Infantry ... 800 men

Tanks ... one

Guns ... six

Mortars ... eight.

4. 28th Army--on the morning of 20 November it struck simultaneously at enemy groups in the sectors of Utta, Syantsyk and Khalkhuta and captured Syantsyk. In the Khalkhuta sector units of the 34th guards sd with the 77th gmp and the 565th otb are engaged in combat with enemy forces of up to four battalions of motorized infantry with tanks on the following line: northwestern edge of the sands north of Khalkhuta, western slopes of the elevation east of Khalkhuta, and northern slopes of elevation 7.4, with its main concentration on the right flank.

5. Single aircraft from the front's aviation bombed the Abganerovo, Plodovitoye and Tinguta sectors and engaged in combat reconnaissance. Because of poor weather conditions only 12 sorties were made. Five airplanes failed to return to their bases.

Enemy aviation reconnoitered in the area of Beketovka, Kapustin Yar, Vladimirovka, Mal. Chapurniki, Krasnoarmeysk, Verblyuzh'ya and Yusta, and made four sorties.

6. During the night the front armies improved their positions and brought up ammunition and starting with the morning of 21 November continued their offensive according to the operational plan.

The 62nd Army will hold its lines.

7. Front commander and member of the Military Council of Front VPU.

Varennikov23

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 220, op 451, d 42a, 11 329-331

Document No 10

Directive of the Supreme Commander in Chief on the Routing of the Kotelnikovo Enemy Group²⁴

To Comrade Mikhaylov

14 December 1942, 2230 Hours

First. Bearing in mind the changed situation in the south, postpone the implementation of the first stage of the Kol'tso operation.

Second. All of Yakovlev's²⁵ facilities, mechanized units above all, must rapidly move south and deploy behind units operating against the Kotelnikovo enemy group.

Third. Order Dontsov and Ivanov to continue the systematic destruction of surrounded enemy forces from the air and the ground. The enemy must not be allowed a breathing spell night or day. The ring must be tightened steadily and efforts to break it must be nipped in the bud.

Fourth. The main task of our southern forces is to defeat the Kotelnikovo enemy group with the forces of Trufanov²⁶ and Yakovlev over the next few days, to occupy Kotelnikovo and to consolidate firmly its positions there.

Vasil'yev

Copy

TsAMO USSR, f 3, op 11,556, d 10, 1 366

Document No 11

Combat Report of the Stalingrad Front Command on Combat Operations by the Front Forces

To Comrade Stalin, Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters

Copies to Army General Comrade Zhukov Don Front--Comrade Mikhaylov

24 December 1942

1. On 24 December 1942 the front forces developed an offensive in the general direction of Kotelnikovo and, surmounting enemy resistance, advanced between 4 and 16 kilometers.

The enemy was surrounded in the sector of the 67th Army, in the area of the Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant. In the remaining directions the forces continued to increase their defense while in the Nugra and Shebenery they waged containing battles with advancing enemy motorized infantry and tanks.

2. The Kotelnikovo enemy tank group--the Sixth, 23rd and 17th td--are stubbornly resisting the advancing forces of the Second Guards' Army and 51st Army, counterattacking with tanks and infantry. The enemy is offering particularly stubborn resistance along the line of the elevations south of Kumskiy Peak, Hill 146.9 and the hill area 8 kilometers north of Zarya....

No enemy activities were noted on the remaining sectors of the front.

3. 62nd Army--units of the 138th, 95th and 39th Guards sd fought to improve their positions and by the end of the day elements of the 39th Guards sd closed the encirclement on the territory of the Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant, east of the railroad, along the line of the machine shop. Hand-to-hand combat is continuing for the destruction of the surrounded enemy, with hand grenades.

Second Guards Army--the army began its offensive in the morning with the forces of the First and 13th Guards sk, Seventh tk and Second Guards mk against the enemy tank group and, after crushing its resistance, occupied the special settlement, Kolkhoz imeni 8 Mart, Kumskiy Peak, Zagotskot, Hill 146.9, Balka Rossypnaya, Balka Osipova and Balka Dedova.

Seventh tk and Second Guards mk are engaged in combat with enemy tanks and infantry in the area of Hill 146.9 (8 kilometers north of Shestakov).

The enemy is resisting stubbornly.

51st Army--the forces of the 87th, 302nd sd and 13th tbr mounted an offensive in the northwesterly and westerly directions and, surmounting enemy resistance, captured Birzovoy, the barn (3 kilometers southwest of Birzovoy) and Hill 157.0.

In the Nugra and Shebenery sector the enemy attacked units of the 76th ur and captured Nugra and Shebenery.

Units of the Third Guards mk are being engaged to counteract the enemy offensive on the sector held by the 76th ur.

4. Poor weather prevented operations by the front's aviation.

The enemy's air force hauled supplies to the surrounded troops and made some 30 sorties.

5. According to partial data the following were destroyed on 24 December 1942:

Enemy soldiers and officers ... more than 1,000

Machine guns ... 30

Earth-and-timber pillboxes ... 19

"ugouts ... 57

Tapes ... about 30.

64

6. In the course of 25 December 1942 the Second Guards and 51st armies will continue their offensive with a view to the destruction of the enemy tank group.

The 62nd Army will continue to destroy the surrounded enemy group in the area of the Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant and to improve its positions in the sectors of the 138th and 95th sd.

The other front armies are firmly holding on to their defense sectors and engaging in combat reconnaissance.

7. Front commander and member of the Military Council of the KP Second Guards Army.

Varennikov

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 220, op 451, d 42a, 11 413-415

Document No 12

From the Political Report of the Political Department of the 62nd Army on the Exploits of Troops and Worker Detachments of Stalingrad Plants

To Comrade Chuyanov, Stalingrad Front Military Council Member

To Major General Comrade Doronin, Stalingrad Front Political Administration Chief

31 December 1942

... With a view to strengthening individual strongpoints in the defense lines of its units, based on 5 October 1942 Decree, the Army Military Council included the following in the army's personnel: the armed workers detachment of the Krasnooktyabr'skiy Rayon, numbering 100 men (assigned to the 39th Guards sd); the armed workers detachment of Barrikadnyy Rayon, numbering 45 men (assigned to the 308th sd); Traktorozavodskiy Rayon, 70 men (assigned to the 37th Guards sd); the separate armed detachment of the Stalingrad Tractors Plant, numbering 30 men (assigned to the 37th Guards sd); and the strike detachment of Traktorozavodskiy Rayon--77 men (assigned to the 37th Guards sd). In the course of the fierce battles with advancing German-fascist forces, most of these comrades met with heroic death for their city and their plants. Some of them were wounded and sent to hospitals, so that currently only isolated members of their units remain within the armed forces. Thus, for example, only three members of the armed workers detachment of the Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant assigned to the 39th Guards sd remain; 12 men of the armed workers detachment of the Barrikady Plants assigned to the 95th sd remain. The situation in the other units is similar.

Furthermore, the army includes 83 orvb, consisting of 294 workers from the Stalingrad Tractors Plant.

The personnel of the 83rd orvb displayed exceptional dedication in carrying out the assignments of the Military Council. This is confirmed by the following facts: under most difficult circumstances, under steady shelling, the battalion repaired 91 tanks and 60 engines....

The battalion also participated in the liberation of the Spartanovka and Rynok settlements. Headed by Stalingrader deputy commander for political affairs Major Comrade Marchenko, a group of troops daringly penetrated one of the sectors in the Rynok settlement and routed landed enemy troops, thus ensuring the successful solution of the combat assignment of the battalion.

The Army and Front Military Council highly rated the work and combat actions of the personnel of the 83rd orvb. Nineteen men were presented with government awards. Among the best people of the battalion 19 were accepted as members and candidate members of the VKP(b); eight were accepted as Komsomol members and 15 were prepared to join the VKP(b) as candidate members; 52 Stalingrad troops and commanders were promoted and the battalion command cited 51 troops.

Presently the 83rd orvb is on the left bank of the Volga and is engaged in repairing engines and other machinery as assigned by the armored automotive tank department of the staff of the 62nd Army and the front.

Despite the small number of former workers and employees of Stalingrad enterprises and plans within the 62nd Army, they have found their proper place in the ranks of the heroic defenders of the noble city on the Volga.

The heroic exploits of Nikolay Sheremet'yev will be remembered forever. This 20-year-old patriot grew up at the Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant. During the shelling his father, mother and four sisters died at their post. Sheremet'yev swore to avenge the death of his family and the ruins of his beloved city and joined the ranks of the guards of the 13th Order of Lenin Division. As a machine gunner, in the street battles in the city, by 15 October 1942 he had killed 16 Hitlerites.

On 18 November 1942 the division party commission accepted him as VKP(b) candidate member. "What I have accomplished," Comrade Sheremet'yev said, "is only the beginning. The fascists will pay dearly for the death of my father, my mother and my sisters."

He displayed exceptional daring and courage in the battle for capturing enemy strongholds. On 2 December 1942, in the seizure of the L-shaped house, Sheremet'yev was the first to mount his machine gun at a suitable position and with accurate bursts hit counterattacking fascists, tripled the number of Hitlerites killed in that battle. In an uneven combat with the enemy, without retreating a single step, Nikolay Sheremet'yev died. The hero's body was buried in a common grave on one of the streets of his native city. The workers set high examples of courage and daring in the fights for their native Stalingrad. Stalingrad Tractor Plant worker Sergey Alekseyevich Beloborodov, VKP(b) member, born in 1901, armor troops, performing the duty of platoon commander of a PTR regiment, 13th Guards sd, displayed daring and fearlessness in street combats. On 3 December 1942, in storming the L-shaped house, he was the first to throw himself into the attack, leading the other troops. In the course of the attack Beloborodov suppressed two enemy firing points. Comrade Beloborodov was awarded the medal "For Courage."

Junior Sergeant Selivanov, formerly a driver for a construction trust, is today a courageous machine gunner with the 42nd Guards sp, 13th Guards sb. He has killed 25 fascists. He was awarded by the government the medal "For Courage," and the badge "Excellent Machine Gunner" by the command. On 18 September, in a most difficult sector, Comrade Selivanov repelled four Hitlerite attacks.

Mariya Stepanovna Ul'yanova, worker at the Krasnyy Oktyabr' Plant, is considered the best nurse of the 42nd Guards sb, 13th Guards sd. Under fire of all kinds she carries out her duties coolly. Recently Comrade Ul'yanova was awarded the medal "For Courage," and the party organization accepted her as candidate member of the VKP(b).

The enemy is being destroyed equally mercilessly by Grigoriy Alekseyevich Kuznetsov, gunner of a 50-millimeter mortar, 13th Guards sd, and Ivan Mikhaylovich Tutikov, gunner of an 82-millimeter mortar in the same division. Both of them are accurately hitting the enemy. Comrade Kuznetsov has killed 12 Hitlerites and destroyed one mounted machine gun. Comrade Tutikov has killed 27 fascists and destroyed trucks and two firing points of the enemy. Both of them have been accepted as candidate members of the VKP(b) and nominated for government awards.

From the very first days Aleksey Mironovich Ivanov, a mechanic at a Stalingrad plant, and his son Viktor, plant transportation dispatcher, have been defending their city. As former partisan and veteran of the defense of Tsaritsyn in 1918, Aleksey Mironovich has become the best fighter in the Stalingrad strike battalion. In September 1942 father and son fought the fascist aggressors in the ranks of the 92nd Brigade. Under heavy enemy fire they carried mortars and shells to the battery. At night they acted as scouts and guides while during the day they were in the ranks of the attackers. Aleksey Mironovich was awarded the Order of the Red Banner while his son Viktor has also been nominated for a government award.

The Palagushkin father and son are fighting just as courageously within this brigade of Stalingrad workers. Mikhail Fedorovich Palagushkin, a former partisan, and his 16-year-old son Yuriy, have set examples of loyalty to the homeland, courage and daring in the battles against the fascists in the Tsaritsa River sector. Yuriy has particularly proved himself. Under steady shelling he brought up shells and carried secret documents across the Volga. To this day Yuriy is the best signalsman, efficiently carrying out all combat assignments. Yuriy Palagushkin, a former young Stalingrad worker and today Red Army volunteer, was awarded the medal "For Courage." Set Viktor Fedorovich Aleksandrov, former milling plant worker, enjoys great respect and honor among the personnel of the 12th dep. During the difficult days, this daring and skillful Volga man delivered ammunition and transported wounded across the Volga under a hail of bullets and mortar shells, night and day. Liquid freight, such as bottled KS, is very dangerous to haul across the Volga, for death is inevitable should any fragment or bullet hit the target. Aleksandrov was the first to undertake this. He loaded nine cases of KS bottles and started for the right bank. In the middle of the Volga River the boat hit a mine and fragments pierced the sides. Water rushed in. Alesksandrov did not lose his presence of mind. He plugged the holes with his shirt, bailed the water out and delivered the needed freight to the unit.

The Army Military Council awarded Comrade Aleksandrov the medal "For Combat Merit," while the battalion's party organization accepted him as candidate member of the VKP(b).

Members of the 62nd Army who were given awards include Stalingraders such as the courageous squad commander of the 90th sp Komsomol member Junior Lt Nikolay Il'ich Perechenko, who was awarded the Order of the Red Star for excellent performance of assignments.

Anna Fedorovna Remneva, secretary of Shop No 20, Stalingrad Plant No 221, voluntarily remained within the plant's worker strike battalion. She penetrated rear enemy lines on three occasions and brought a great deal of valuable information which was used by the command of the 39th Guards sd. She was awarded the Order of the Red Star. Leonida Antonovna Zaveryukha, a nurse at City Hospital No 5, voluntarily remained to serve in the plant's worker strike battalion. She penetrated the enemy's rear lines twice and collected a great deal of valuable information on the size of enemy troops, armaments, fortifications, and fire points. She was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

All such facts of daring and heroism on the part of Stalingrad people are being extensively publicized among the entire army unit personnel. Hundreds and thousands of great patriots are being raised in the spirit of their examples of boundless love for their city, plant, enterprise or establishment.

Brigade Commissar Vasil'yev, Chief of the Political Department of the 62nd Army

Uriginal

TRAMO USSR, £ 48, op 486, d 35, 11 319-321

ocument No 13

Report by the Supreme Command Headquarters Representative on the Experience Acquired in the Battles Waged by the Don Front Troops in Piercing Enemy Defenses in the Period Between 10 and 13 January 1943²⁷ To Comrade Stalin, Moscow

14 January 1943, 1045 Hours

The experience acquired in the combats on the Don Front between 10 and 13 January proves the following:

1. In order to breach strong enemy defenses along an 8 to 12-kilometer front, the first echelon must consist of four to five infantry divisions; the second echelon must consist of three to four infantry divisions with regulation firepower. Furthermore, mobile forces must be available to develop the breach and act in operational depth.

2. The following reinforcements must be made available in order to secure the reliable breaching of the front along a 12-kilometer sector and inflict a serious defeat on enemy manpower, cause a strong drop in morale and eliminate enemy fire facilities, destroy his fortifications, trenches, communications, dugouts, and so on: three artillery divisions of the RGK and two RS divisions, and five to six strike antitank artillery regiments for reliably securing the breach flanks against enemy tank attacks; two to three 203-millimeter howitzer artillery regiments for the destruction of the strongest installations. Mandatorily the necessary time must be provided for reconnoitering the targets, deploying and assuming a combat order, organizing control, aiming and preparations for fire by the entire mass of weapons, mortars and RS.

3. In planning the fire, we must mandatorily take into consideration the combat operations of 76-millimeter regimental guns, 45-millimeter guns, and 82-millimeter and 120-millimeter mortars. These effective weapons must be taken strictly into consideration during the period of artillery fire and each such gun and mortar must be given specific assignments for the destruction or suppression of on-site targets.

4. The offensive must begin with a powerful artillery and mortar fire on the enemy defense area along its entire tactical depth. The 55-minute artillerymortar fire of 10 January yielded excellent results; the enemy suffered major casualties and his morale was affected profoundly. The artillery preparations ended with a powerful firing raid on the front end and immediate depths of enemy defenses with the use of M-30 heavy rocket launchers.

The infantry attacked promptly.

5. The artillery offensive continued, along with the advance of tanks and infantry. They were accompanied by the artillery and mortars with a line of fire 1.5-2 kilometers distant. In this case the 82-millimeter mortars performed well. Along with the infantry individual guns for direct sighting were moved as well as some mortars and observation points--advance and those of battery commanders.

General conclusions:

1. Our tactics proved to be accurate and most of the powerful firing facilities were suitably used.

2. Stubborn battles yielded positive results and inflicted tremendous losses to the enemy in manpower, armaments and combat materiel.

3. The breach must be developed with even greater persistence. Individual enemy units must be eliminated. The enemy must be deprived of housing and prepared defense lines; the bringing up of supplies by air must be prevented. A surrounded group must be eliminated rapidly with a view to relieving forces and facilities for other fronts.

Voronov

Original

TSAMO USSR, f 206, op 176,501, d 3, 11 122-128

Document No 14

From the Directive of the Don Front Command for Offensive

To the Commanders of the 64th, 57th, 21st and 65th Armies

Copy to the Commander of the 16th VA

16 January 1943

1. Under the pressure of our forces, the routed enemy remnants are continuing their disorganized retreat in northeasterly and easterly directions.

2. Since the morning of 16 January 1943 the forces of the 64th, 57th, 21st and 65th armies are continuing their headlong advance with a view to preventing the enemy from reorganizing along new lines.

3. 64th A--in its unchanged composition is continuing to breach the enemy defense front, concentrating its main strike on the left flank in the direction of Peschanka, must reach the following line by 16 January 1943: Hill 145.2, excluding Hill 149.0, and seize Zelenaya Polyana, Verkhn. Yel'shanka and others with strong advance elements.

4. 57th A--in its previous composition, will continue its offensive toward Alekseyevka, and Hill 145.0; by the end of 16 January 1943 it must capture the line of Hill 149.0, excluding Studenaya Yablonovka, and capture Hill 147.5 with a strong advance element....

5. 21st A--in its previous composition, continuing its offensive, must reach the following line by the end of 16 January 1943: Studenaya Yablonovka and Gonchara village, and capture Opytnaya Stantsiya and Gumrak with a strong advance element.... 6. 65th A--in its previous composition, advancing in the general direction of Novaya Nadezhda village and securing its left flank against enemy counterattacks from the north, must reach by 16 January 1943 a line with the exception of the Gonchara village, of Bol. Rossoshka, and capture Novaya Nadezhda village with a strong advance element....

Taking into consideration the favorable developments of the circumstances, and successfully completing the routing of the surround enemy forces, the army commanders must demand of all army forces courageous and daring actions and total stress of efforts.

Confirm receipt.

Rokossovskiy, Telegin, Malinin

Copy

TsAMO USSR, f 206, op 176,504, d 1, 11 269 front and back.

Document No 15

From the Report of the Representative of the Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters on Aviation Combat Operations in the Period of the Battles for the Destruction of the Surround Enemy

To Comrade Vasil'yev, Moscow

25 January 1943

I hereby report on the work of our aviation in the battles for the destruction of the surrounded enemy in the Stalingrad area.

The 16th Air Army of the Don Front, commanded by Aviation Major General Comrade Rudenko and under the leadership of Aviation Colonel General Comrade Novikov, operated with great stress despite poor weather conditions and the short winter day: Pe-2 bombers made two sorties each daily; diver and fighter planes made three sorties daily, while U-2 night bombers made from five to eight sorties each per night. For the period of operations from 10 to 25 January the 16th Air Army engaged in combat under conditions of enemy fighter counteraction and enemy anti-aircraft artillery and infantry weapons. A total of 5,850 combat sorties were made. Our fighter planes brought down or set afire on airstrips 186 enemy airplanes. Furthermore, with fire and bombing our aviation damaged 415 enemy aircraft on airfields. These airplanes were captured at the various enemy airfields by our ground forces. Such a large number of airplanes left at airfields confirms the good organization of the combat operations of our aviation and the impeccable work of the personnel of the 16th VA.

In assisting the advance of the armies of the Don Front, the 16th VA inflicted the following defeats in its activities against enemy forces: 157 tanks, 2,126 trucks, and 39 tractors; it blasted 17 field ammunition dumps and four fuel dumps; it bombed 76 dugouts and earth-and-timber pillboxes; at various times it suppressed the fire of 25 artillery and mortar batteries; it dispersed about 6,000 enemy soldiers and officers. In the course of the operation the 16th VA maintained good contacts with the troops, engaged in continuous reconnaissance and operated in support of ground units engaged in combat....

Nikolayev²⁸

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 206, op 176,502, d 5, 11 93-94

Document No 16

Report of the Don Front Command on the Results of Combat Operations by the Front Troops from 10 to 25 January 1943

To Comrade Vasil'yev, General Staff, Moscow

26 January 1943

In continuing the destruction of surrounded enemy forces at Stalingrad, from 10 to 25 January 1943 the forces of the Don Front advanced by an average of 50 kilometers and cleared more than 1,300 square kilometers of territory, liberated 68 settlements and, after defeating the bulk of the enemy's forces, are completing the clearing of Stalingrad from the remnants of enemy forces.

within that period the enemy suffered the following losses.

1. Destroyed: soldiers and officers, more than 70,000, 1,970 trucks, 315 guns, 950 machine guns, 160 mortars, 290 tanks, 132 airplanes and 43 dumps of various kinds.

Captured: prisoners, 16,600, 1,000 wounded, 2,978 guns, 904 mortars, ...,670 machine guns, 42,517 rifles, 140 antitank weapons, 72,850 shells, about 140,000 mines, as many as 1.5 million rifle cartridges, 1,950 submachine guns, 1,240 tanks, 57 armored carriers, 49,000 motor vehicles, 4,660 motoryiles, 2,400 bicycles, 523 airplanes, 210 tractors, 170 radio stations, 496 relephone sets, 4,570 carriages, 42 locomotive engines, 160 railroad cars, dumps of various types, two railroad trains, and five hospitals. Furthermore, 2,500 war prisoners and former Red Army personnel were freed.

The 29[°]th German infantry Division and 20th Romanian Infantry Division have terminated their resistance and totally surrendered.

The former forces distinguished themselves in the battles of Major General Comrade Rudenko, ²⁹ Lieutenant General Comrade Chistyakov, Lieutenant General Comrade Tolbukhin, ³⁰ Lieutenant General Comrade Batov, Major General Comrade Zhadov, Lieutenant General Comrade Chuykov, 31 Lieutenant General Comrade Shamilov, 32 and Major General Comrade Galanin.

The destruction of the surrounded enemy forces is nearing its end. Rokossovskiy, Colonel General, Commander of the Don Front Forces Major General Telegin, Member of the Don Front Military Council Lieutenant General Malinin, Don Front Chief of Staff

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 206, op 262, d 180, 11 110-111

Document No 17

Report by the Don Front Command on the Meeting Between an Emissary of the Sixth German Army and a Representative of the 57th Army

To the Red Army Chief of General Staff, Moscow

27 January 1943

The commander of the 57th Army reports that on the evening of 26 January, Colonel General Paulus, commander of the surrounded Sixth German Army, sent to the commander of the 143rd sbr his emissary to conduct talks. The representative of the 57th Army was requested to produce in writing plenipotentiary proof on the subject of discussing the surrender of the Sixth German Army.

The definitive meeting between the representatives of the two sides was set for 0800 hours on 27 January 1943 at a site on the Tsaritsa River.

Lieutenant Colonel Russkikh, commander of the 143rd sbr, was appointed by our side to conduct the talks. He was instructed to present the surrender conditions on the basis of the previous ultimatum;³³ at the same time, the troops of the Don Front were issued the order to stop firing between 0800 hours on 27 January and the end of the talks; all firepower of the infantry and the artillery were to be ready for a mass fire on the enemy should he refuse to surrender, with a view to the total destruction of the surrounded enemy group.

At 0800 hours on 27 January Lieutenant Colonel Russkikh, representative of the 57th Army, met with the representative of Colonel General Paulus. The latter stated that General Paulus had stil! not received instructions from Hitler, as a result of which he refused to engage in further talks on the surrender of the Sixth German Army, after which Lieutenant Colonel Russkikh presented the ultimatum. Due to the refusal by the commander of the Sixth German Army to surrender, the forces of the Don Front were ordered to resume combat operations with a view to carrying out their assignment--the total destruction of the surrendered enemy group.

All front armies resumed combat operations between 1000 and 1100 hours.

Colonel General Rokosovskiy, Don Front Commander

Major General Telegin, Don Front Military Council Member

Lieutenant General Malinin, Don Front Chief of Staff

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 206, op 262, d 180, 11 121-122

Document No 18

Combat Report by the Representative of the Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters and the Don Front Command on the Elimination of the Surrounded Enemy Troops in the Stalingrad Area 34

To Comrade Stalin, Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Moscow

2 February 1943

1830 Hours

In carrying out your order, the troops of the Don Front completed the routing and destruction of the surrounded enemy group at Stalingrad on 2 February 1943 at 1600 hours.

Totally destroyed and partially captured: 11th Army Corps, Eighth Army Corps, 14th Tank Corps, 51st Army Corps, Fourth Army Corps, 48th Tank Corps, totaling 22 divisions: 44th, 71st, 76th, 79th, 94th, 100th Light, 113th, 376th, 295th, 297th, 305th, 371st, 284th and 389th infantry divisions; Third, 29th and 60th motorized divisions; 14th, 16th and 24th German tank divisions; one cavalry and 20 infantry Romanian divisions.

Furthermore, the reinforcement forces destroyed the following:

a. The 42nd, 44th, 46th, 59th, 61st, 65th and 72nd RGK artillery regiments; First/97th AP, 43rd, 639th, 733rd, 856th, 855th, and 861st RGK artillery batteries; 243rd Assault Guns Battery; Second and 51st Mortar RGK regiments, Sixth Barreled Mortars; Ninth, 12th, 25th, 30th, 37th and 91st Anti-Aircraft Batteries of different regiments, individual units of which are operating at other fronts. b. The 45th, 71st, 294th, 336th, 652nd, 672nd, 685th and 501st separate sapper battalions and one separate unnumbered sapper battalion.

c. The 21st, 40th, 540th and 539th separate construction battalions.

d. The Sixth Signals Regiment and assumedly, 594th Signals Regiment.

e. The Seventh and 28th batteries of the artillery instrument reconnaissance (AIR).

f. A number of bridge columns and other support units.

More than 91,000 men were taken prisoners, of these more than 2,500 officers and 24 generals of whom: general field marshal, one; colonel generals, two; the others are lieutenant generals and major generals.

As a result of the total elimination of the surrounded enemy forces, combat operations in the city and area of Stalingrad have stopped.

The booty inventory is continuing.

Artillery Marshal Voronov, Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters

Colonel General Rokosovskiy, Don Front Troop Commander

Major General Telegin, Don Front Military Council Member

Lieutenant General Malinin, Don Front Chief of Staff

Original

TsAMO USSR, f 243, op 616, d 4, 1 40

FOOTNOTES

- Most of the document published in "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny" [History of World War II], Vol 5, Moscow, 1975, pp 175-176.
- 2. Ibid., p 176.
- A. A. Novikov, aviation colonel general, commander of the Red Army Air Force.
- 4. T. T. Khryukin, aviation major general, commander of the Eighth Air Army.
- 5. P. S. Stepanov, aviation major general, deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force.

6. Document No 4 is the answer to the telegram of the Supreme Commander in Chief on the subject of air force preparations for the forthcoming operation (telegram published in the book by G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Thoughts], in two volumes, Vol 2, Moscow, 1979, p 96).

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- 7. Vasil'yev--J. V. Stalin's code name.
- 8. Along with preparations of the operation for the defeat of the Germanfascist forces at Stalingrad, the Supreme Command Headquarters prepared operations for forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts, one of the assignments of which was to prevent the transfer of German troops from the Group of Armies Center to the Stalingrad area.
- 9. A. Ye. Golovanov, aviation lieutenant general, commander of long-range aviation.
- Konstantinov--code name for Army Gen G. K. Zhukov, representative of Supreme Command Headquarters.
- 11. Ivanov--code name for Col Gen A. I. Yeremenko, Stalingrad Front commander.
- Fedorov--code name for Lt Gen N. F. Vatutin, Southwestern Front commander.
- 13. P. L. Romanenko--lieutenant general, commander of the Fifth Tank Army.
- 14. Code name for the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts offensive.
- 15. I. M. Chistyakov--major general, commander of the 21st Army.
 - 16. P. I. Batov--lieutenant general, commander of the 65th Army.
- 17. Mikhaylov--code name for Col Gen A. M. Vasilevskiy, chief of general staff, representative of the Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters.
- Document published in the book by G. K. Zhukov, op. cit., Vol 2, pp 98-99.
- 19. Dontsov--code name for Lt Gen K. K. Rokosovskiy, Don Front commander.
- 20. I. V. Galanin--major general, commander of the 24th Army.
- 21. A. S. Zhadov--major general, commander of the 66th Army.
- 22. D. D. Lelyushenko--lieutenant general, commander of the First Guards Army.
- 23. I. S. Varennikov--major general, Stalingrad Front chief of staff.

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- 24. The operational plan for the elimination of the enemy group surrounded at Stalingrad, code named "Kol'tso," was approved by the supreme commander in chief on 11 December. However, the German fascist command took measures to rescue the surrounded troops. The Army Group Goth, formed for this purpose, initiated combat operations on 12 December 1942 and in 3 days of combat advanced from the Kotelnikovskiy Rayon to Stalingrad, covering 45 kilometers. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Commander in Chief Headquarters issued a directive on 14 December which stipulated, in particular, that the Second Guards Army be given to the Stalingrad Front to operate against the Kotelnikovo enemy group.
- Yakovlev--code name for Lt Gen R. Ya. Malinovskiy, commander of the Second Guards Army.
- 26. N. I. Trufanov--major general, commander of the 51st Army.
- Document published in the book "Stalingrad: Uroki Istorii. Vospominaniya Uchastnikov Bitvy" [Stalingrad: Lessons of History. Recollections of Participants in the Battle], Moscow, 1980, pp 207-209.
- Nikolayev--code name for Artillery Marshal N. N. Voronov, representative of Supreme Command Headquarters.
- 29. S. I. Rudenko--major general, commander of the 16th Air Army.
- 30. F. I. Tolbukhin--lieutenant general, commander of the 57th Army.
- 31. V. I. Chuykov--lieutenant general, commander of the 62nd Army.
- 32. M. S. Shumilov--lieutenant general, commander of the 64th Army.
- 33. On 8 January 1943, before the beginning of our offensive, in an effort to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and preserve the lives of the surrounded troops, the Soviet command submitted to the German command an ultimatum on surrender under humane conditions. The German command, however, rejected the ultimatum. The Soviet command was faced with the necessity to mount a decisive offensive aimed at the total routing of the surrounded enemy.

34. Document published in PRAVDA, 3 February 1943.

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SHLISSEL'BURG-SINYAVINO SALIENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 83 pp 67-77

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Achkasov and Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Basov on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the breach of the blockade of Leningrad]

[Text] The defense of Leningrad in the Great Patriotic War is recorded in world history as a symbol of unparalleled courage and endurance of the Soviet people, who stood up to defend with their bodies their socialist homeland. Unquestionably, for many years in the future the heroic epic of the city of the great Lenin and the cradle of the proletarian revolution will hold the attention of historians, writers and poets, inspiring them to create new scientific and artistic works. The exploit of those who, 40 years ago, broke the ring of the fascist blockade around the suffering city is becoming increasingly vivid as part of this epic.

in January 1943 the Soviet forces were completing the routing of the 330,000strong enemy group at Stalingrad. The operation to breach the Leningrad blockade (code-named "Iskra"), which was carried out during those same historical days, was comparatively modest in terms of space and the size of participating forces. However, it represented another major victory in the northwest, which played an important role in the struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors. The news itself that the Shlissel'burg-Sinyavino Salient had been regained from the enemy, a narrow strip of land south of lake Ladoga, triggered a sigh of relief in all Soviet people and flowed like a bright stream in the river of the nationwide celebration in connection with the defeat of the German-fascist troops on the Volga. Now, along the entire vast northwestern direction, the Hitlerite forces were compelled to convert to defense. With every passing month Leningrad increased its contribution to the country's military and economic potential and, together with everyone else. hammered the victory over the enemy. From the purely military viewpoint as well Operation "Iskra" was unparalleled.

The struggle waged by the Soviet forces to capture the Shlissel'burg-Sinyavino Salient has its own history which should be recalled today.

We know that Moscow, which the Hitlerites were planning to take in a flash and thus decide the outcome of the war, was the main target in the offensive mounted by the German armies and the basic strategic direction was the one leading to Moscow. One of the decisive conditions for the offensive against the capital of the Soviet state was believed by the German-fascist command to be the routing of our forces in the Baltic area. "Only after resolving this urgent problem which should end with the seizure of Leningrad and Kronshtadt," the Barbarossa Plan stipulated, "should offensive operations be continued to capture Moscow--the most important center of communications and defense industry" ("The Nuremberg Trial." Collection of Materials. Vol 1, Moscow, 1952, pp 357-358).

In turn, the Soviet command considered Leningrad its most important bridgehead in the battle in the entire northwestern area. Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov pointed out that should the city on the Neva fall "we would have to set up a new front to defend Moscow from the north and thus use strategic reserves which headquarters was preparing for the defense of the capital. Furthermore, we would have inevitably lost our powerful Baltic Fleet" (G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Thoughts], Moscow, 1979, vol 1, p 350).

Our command countered Hitler's plan of headlong advance of German forces, which enjoyed considerable superiority in manpower and equipment, across the Soviet-Baltic area toward Leningrad, and the advance of German and Finnish forces out of Finland, with a consistent defense mounted by our forces along convenient natural lines.

As always, in this hour of great danger, all Leningraders, the workers above all, stood up to defend the city. In the first 2 days of the war about 100,000 requests of volunteers for the active army were filed. The patriotic thrust of the population was headed by the Leningrad party organization, which enjoyed exceptional prestige among and the trust of the masses. It was headed by oblast and dity party committee secretaries A. A. Zhdanov, A. A. Kuznetsov and T. F. Shtykov. On 27 June the city party committee turned to the Ped Army general headquarters with a request to allow the formation of seven volunteer divisions. Two days later the Leningrad People's Militia Army beg to be raised. The Leningrad initiative was approved by the VKP(b) Central .mmittee and taken up by many industrial centers throughout the country. In addition to the militia, the city raised other volunteer formations such as parties and regiments and detachments, strike and worker battalions, and anti-aircraft, firefighting and medical detachments and groups. By 1 October 1941 it had sent about 160,000 troops and commanders to the front (including units of the People's M. Ltia). Military training for the working people was organized in all rayons by decision of the city party committee.

The building of fortifications at the approaches to the city and in the city itself was of great importance to defending the city. More than 133,000 Leningraders--men, women and adolescents--participated in defense works on a daily basis. They dug antitank ditches totaling 626 kilometers, laid 50,000 posts and 635 kilometers of barbed wire and installed 15,000 pillboxes and 22,000 firing points. Despite persistent attacks, the enemy was unable to break down the resistance of Leningrad's defenders. All troops and city residents were fully resolved to defend the city at all cost. The Leningrad party organization directed to the army and navy more than 57,000 party members.

In the battles for Leningrad the enemy suffered extensive losses. On 25 September the commander of the Group of Armies North reported to Berlin that he was unable to continue the offensive with the available forces and that the German troops were in a difficult situation.

Meanwhile, the Hitlerite command was in a hurry to capture Moscow. The forces which were to be released after the capture of Leningrad were to play an important role in this respect. However, it was only the Fourth Tank Group, consisting of four tank and two motorized divisions, that was sent to the Group of Armies Center. The most important task of Hitler's "lightning war' plan in the northwestern strategic direction was defeated. The Wehrmacht not only failed to capture Leningrad but, for the first time in World War 11, was firmly stopped by the heroic defenders of the city and was unable to advance any farther. The main forces of the Group of Armies North were unable to participate in the offensive on Moscow.

The enemy reached the Neva and captured Shlissel'burg (today Petrokrepost) on A September 1941, cutting off all land communications with Leningrad. However, in the course of the heavy fighting, Hitler's generals realized that it was impossible to overcome the defenders of the Neva fortress with a frontal attack. A fanatically cruel plan was formulated: to wear out their forces through blockade, hunger, dislocation and disease and, should this too fail to bring them down on their knees, to decide the outcome of the struggle by storming the city.

By the beginning of September the blockade was still not complete. The path through take Ladoga remained open, the same path which had been used 2.5 enturies before by the Russians, headed by Peter the Great. Ladoga became the "lifeline" of blockaded Leningrad. In an effort to blockade the city entirely and to join the Finnish forces, the Hitlerite command strengthened its forces by bringing up from the reserves four divisions and a brigade. The enemy tried to breach the area between the Volkhov and Svir rivers and to set up a second, wider blockade around Leningrad, which would include Lake ladoga. On 16 October the fascist forces started an offensive and by 8 Novemier captured Tikhvin, cutting off the last remaining railroad which linked Leningrad with the rest of the country.

to do this, for all our available forces were already thrown against the main direction (south of the city--the author), and removing from here any forces would have meant the surrender of the city. Therefore, the decision was made to advance in order to meet the 54th Army with no more than a single division and the brigade of the Neva Operative Group" (G. K. Zhukov, op. cit., vol 1, p 360).

Unfortunately, the 54th Army was unable to mount an offensive either on 17 September, as Marshal of the Soviet Union G. I. Kulik, its commander, had promised, nor on 21-22 September on which J. V. Stalin, the supreme commander in chief, insisted. According to postwar publications this was caused by G. I. Kulik's indecisiveness (he was relieved from his command on 29 September 1941).

On 12 October Supreme Command Headquarters pointed out to the Leningrad Front Military Council the need to free the Kiev Railroad on the Leningrad-Mga-Volkhov sector through the combined strike of the 55th Army, the Neva Operative Group in the blockaded zone and the 54th Army outside the blockaded area. The task was to eliminate the enemy's salient from Mga to Shlissel'burg, no more than 15-20 kilometers wide. The chosen sector did not require significant transfers of troops along the front, such as to weaken defenses.

The operation began on 20 October but developed slowly, for the enemy had been able to create here a powerful defense. The front command had still not lost hope in breaking through the blockade. However, the operation had to be terminated, for on 16 October the enemy Legan an offensive from the Chudov area toward Tikhvin and from Kirishi to Volkhov. Two divisions from the 54th Army and two divisions and a marine brigade from Leningrad were sent to the Volkhov and Tikhvin areas to stop the Hitlerite forces which had breached the front lines. Part of the troops from the Seventh Separate Army and four headquarters reserves formations were sent there as well.

Between 10 and 12 November the forces of the 54th, Fourth and 52nd armies counterattacked, routed the fascists who had reached Tikhvin and threw them off behind the Volkhov River. The enemy's intention of meeting with the Finnish troops in Sviri and to establish a second ring of the blockade was defeated. The flow of supplies to Leningrad once again moved via Tikhvin and Volkhov to Lake Ladoga.

However, the delivery of supplies, food above all, on the ice track across Lake Ladoga could not meet even the city's minimal requirements. It was a time of fierce hunger. There was no heat and electric power, and the water mains broke down. The entire country watched with pain and admiration the unparalleled firmness and dedication of the Leningraders.

Supreme Command Headquarters continued stubbornly to seek new possibilities of lifting the blockade. Objectively, this became possible following the counteroffensive of the Soviet forces at Moscow, at the beginning of January 1942. The defeat shook up the Wehrmacht and the strategic initiative passed in the hands of the Soviet command. The fact was also taken into consideration that in some northwestern sectors the enemy's defenses were relatively weak. For this reason headquarters planned not only to breach the blockade but to rout the Group of Armies North. It was planned that the forces of the right wing of the Volkhoz Front, interacting with the Leningrad Front, would strike at the 18th German Army and lift the blockade of Leningrad, while the forces of the left wing of the Volkhov Front, interacting with the Northwestern Front, would strike at the enemy's 16th Army.

Uniortunately, the limited superiority which the Soviet forces enjoyed in the northwestern direction proved to be insufficient. The enemy retained his superiority in aviation and gun and ammunition supplies. The blockaded forces on the Leningrad Front were exhausted and were unable to engage in active offensive operations.

The operation, code-named Lyuban, developed slowly. The Second Strike Army breached the defense north of Novgorod, cut off the Novgorod-Leningrad railroad and approached Lyuban. The 54th Army advancing toward Lyuban from the north, from the Pogost, also advanced somewhat. Nevertheless, the situation which leveloped was described in one of the documents of the 18th German Army as follows: "If this breach (by the troops of the Volkhov Front--the author) were to be combined with a frontal strike on the Leningrad Front, a considerable part of the 18th Army would have been lost and its remainders would have been thrown off to the West." The course of the operation was determined by the fast increase in the forces of both sides on the active sectors of the front. The enemy accomplished this faster, above all by concentrating major air forces. Furthermore, six divisions and one brigade were transferred from Germany to the Group of Armies North. The Soviet command had insufficient for es to complete the Lyuban operation successfully. The Second Strike Army had to fight its way to join the main front forces.

As a result of heavy winter battles in the southeastern approaches to Leningrad, the Red Army inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and deprived him of the possibility of organizing here a new offensive. However, the efforts the rout the Group of Armies North and lift the blockade failed. As before, the city could be supplied only through the "lifeline."

The active hattle for Leningrad was resumed on both sides in the summer of 1941. After capturing the Crimea, the German command transferred to the north five divisions and the heavy artillery of the 11th Army, and sapper and other reserve units. Field Marshal E. Mannstein was appointed to head the storming of Leningrad, which was planned for September.

The while, the Soviet command was preparing a third attempt to breach the blockade by routing the enemy south of Lake Ladoga. The forces of the leningrad Front, commanded since June by Gen L. A. Govorov, were the first to trike on 1° August. On the opposite side, the forces of the Volkhov Front, manied by Gen K. A. Meretskov, started their offensive on 27 August. The Sinvavino operation was developing according to plan. However, when the forces of the Volkhov Front were only 7 to 8 kilometers away from the Neva, the enemy was able successfully to transfer six divisions to the breach and to repel the Soviet offensive. Because of the adverse ratio of forces which developed at the end of September, Supreme Command Headquarters decided to terminate the offensive and to strengthen the defense. Once again the Hitlerites were able to keep the Shlissel'burg-Sinyavino Salient. However, the Sinyavino operation of the Soviet troops was of great importance: instead of the planned storming of Leningrad, the enemy was forced to engage in counterfights. Having lost about 60,000 soldiers and officers, he abandoned his military-political objective of the 1942 campaign--the capture of Leningrad.

As we know, in September 1942 the Supreme Command made the decision on the Stalingrad counteroffensive. Major reserves were assigned to the area. Despite this, however, besieged Leningrad as well received reinforcements. In October the 67th Army, commanded by Gen M. P. Dukhanov, was formed from the Neva Operative Group; the 13th Air Army, commanded by Gen S. D. Rybal'chenko, was formed in November. In December the Leningrad Front received one infantry division, five infantry brigades and several separate units. The Volkhov Front was reinforced by five infantry divisions, four different brigades and many separate units. The strength of the Volkhov Front personnel increased by nearly one-quarter.

The strengthening of the Leningrad Front made it possible to strike a powerful blow simultaneously from the outside and inside of the blockade. The conditions for this became ripe and in November 1942 the Leningrad Front Military Council submitted to Supreme Command Headquarters the proposal that an operation for breaching the blockade be carried out in the winter of 1942-43. The same Shlissel'burg-Sinyavino Salient, 15 kilometers wide, was again chosen for the operation. Headquarters agreed with the proposal and ordered the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to prepare Operation "Iskra" for 1 January 1943.

The operation took place when the Red Army was completing the routing of the German-fascist forces surrounded in the Stalingrad area. To begin with, the enemy forces at Leningrad were not threatening the city with a direct attack, which enabled the Leningrad Front command to concentrate the front forces and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet on the breach sector. The laying of a pipeline and power cable along the bottom of lake Ladoga into Leningrad and the increased amount of supplies across Lake Ladoga in 1942 had increased the combat capability of the troops. The troops began to receive more weapons and ammunition manufactured in Leningrad.

The prestige of the Leningrad party organization rose in the course of the struggle against the enemy and the privations caused by the blockade. The party members were in the first ranks of the city's defenders. The strong ties between the party organization and the masses were confirmed by its growth during the most difficult days of the blockade. A total of 970 people became party members in December 1941, 795 in January 1942, 615 in February and 728 in March. In those difficult times for Leningrad, the party organinition was the heart of the city's defense. In addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet Session in the summer of 1742, A. A. Zhdanov said that the working people of Leningrad "live with the single thought and spirit of doing every-thing possible for the defeat of the enemy.... All men and women of Lenin-grad had found their place in the struggle and were honestly fulfilling their duty as Soviet patriots" (PRAVDA, 19 June 1944. The increased possibilities of the Volkhov and, particularly, the Leningrad fronts and the Baltic Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral V. F. Tributs) made it possible to strengthen significantly the Second Strike and 67th armies which were to mount the offensive. During the period of preparations for the operation, the Ladoga Navy Flotilla (commanded by Capt 1st Rank V. S. Cherokov) hauled major reinforcements and ammunition for the forces of the Leningrad Front despite the perilously icy conditions, thus enabling it to assign for the purpose an entire combined arms army rather than a single division as in 1942. Aviation support was provided by the 13th and 14th air armies and naval aviation (a total of some 900 airplanes).

At the start of the operation the Soviet forces enjoyed superiority over the enemy by a factor of 4.5 in infantry, more than 6 in artillery, 10 in tanks and 2 in airplanes. This was a decisive prerequisite for success, for the enemy had converted the Shlissel'burg-Sinyavino Salient into a powerful fortified area with field and concrete installations. It was defended by five divisions, with four divisions kept as operative reserve. The offensive mounted by the forces of the Kalinin Front in the Velikiye Luki area, which blocked the enemy forces in all directions, had a positive significance. The front actions were coordinated by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Ye. Voroshilov, and Army Gen G. K. Zhukov, representatives of Supreme Command Headquarters.

At the beginning of the offensive the improved circumstances could be felt literally everywhere. The Soviet Information Bureau announcement on the successful counteroffensive of the Soviet forces at Stalingrad triggered a tremendous political uplift in the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts. Meetings on the occasion of this happy news were held in all units and formations. Propaganda work was developed extensively among the troops. The topics of the lectures and reports dealt with preparing the troops for offensive combat.' The political organs also paid great attention to the material-technical support and living conditions of the troops. Before the operation, party and Komsomol meetings on "Tasks of Party and Komsomol Members on the March and in Battle" took place in an atmosphere of high political uplift.

Fefore the operation the troops were visited by the heads of the Leningrad party organization, who spoke at meetings and talked with the soldiers. A troiching meeting was held between the troops of the 268th Division and the felegation of workers, which included veterans of the defense of Petrograd in 1919. The Leningraders took to the division the Red Flag which had been presented to the workers of Petrograd by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets for the heroic defense of the city from Yudenich's hordes. The troops gave an oath under the flag to destroy the fascist aggressors and lift the Leningrad blockade. The army and navy troops received a number of letters with instructions from the city plant collectives.

The battle spirit among the troops was quite high. In the period of preparations for and implementation of the operation, about 28,000 soldiers and officers of the 67th and Second Strike armies joined the communist party as members and candidate members. At the beginning of the combat virtually the entire 34th Ski Brigade, consisting essentially of young people, joined the Komsomol. The political workers set examples of valor and courage in battle. As a rule, the company deputy commanders for political affairs were in the chains of the attackers while battalion deputy commanders marched with companies facing the most difficult and responsible assignments. Their personal example inspired the troops to mass heroism and immortal exploits.

Mass bombing of enemy artillery batteries, airfields and control centers took place on the eve of the operation, by the front aviation. In the morning of 12 January 1943, after lengthy artillery and aviation fire, the forces of both fronts began their offensive in a converging direction. Success was decided by artillery fire, including the heavy naval guns and the dedication of the troops. The formations of the 67th Army rapidly crossed the Neva on the ice and captured its left bank. Toward the end of the day the forces of the Second Strike Army (commanded by Gen V. Z. Romanovskiy) pierced the enemy defense lines and advanced between 2 and 3 kilometers.

The fierce fighting lasted 7 days. Every single hill, ravine, house and pillbox had to be fought for. The desperately resisting Nazis rarely surrendered. On 18 January the forces of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at Workers Settlements Nos 1 and 5. The meetings between the troops of the two fronts were untorgettable. In his book "Leningrad Deystvuyet" [Leningrad Is Acting], the writer P. Luknitskiy described the atmosphere of one such meeting as tollows: "Immediately, like a wave, all order disappeared. Troops and commanders of the two fronts rushed toward each other. Hugging and kissing among soldiers who had gone through death and fire and had never met before can happen only at war and only at a time of a good victory!... Questions, congratulations and laughter blended in an indescribable noise of exultation."

The forces of the 67th and Second Strike armies then turned the front to the south and continued their offensive with a view to throwing the enemy off the Sinyavino hills and widening the breach sector. The authors of these lines took part in and witnessed the events. Proofs of the huge slaughter were visible everywhere, on the vast swamp from the worker settlements to Sinyavino where the two fronts had met. Broken-down guns, carriages abandoned by the enemy, field kitchens, submachine guns, cartridge cases and corpses covered the area. Meanwhile, the battle was thundering uninterrupted on the Sinyavino elevation.

No further offensive on the part of the Soviet forces toward the Mga railroad station took place. The enemy brought up to previously prepared defensive positions five divisions (21st, 61st and 96th Infantry, Fifth Mountain Infantry and the "Police" SS Division). The front was stabilized along Settlement No 2 Imeni Mirov, Sinyavino and Dontovaya Lipka. The fighting on this sector became fierce because of the enemy's persistent attempts to restore the blockade of Leningrad.

In 7 days of intensive and stubborn fighting, with active air support, our forces crushed the powerful defense installations which the enemy had built for 1.5 years. The effort to pierce through strong, deeply echeloned, long-term enemy fortifications in a forested and swampy area in which natural and

artificial obstacles were used, confirmed the great importance of artillery, heavy artillery in particular. The fire support given by the naval artillery, the most powerful and long-ranging of the front weapons, played an essential role not only in destroying the enemy's defense installations but in suppressing its artillery as well.

Operation "Iskra" had a number of distinctive features. Above all, the offensive of two fronts in a converging direction along a narrow sector with the crossing of a wide water obstacle on the ice (the Neva River) and the swampy area (the area of the Sinyavino Peat Works) required exceptionally efficient planning of the operations of land and air forces and naval ar*illery.

The contealed operative regrouping of formations and units and the deployment of artillery on starting positions on the eve of the offensive, and the planning of artillery and aviation strikes along the entire depth of enemy defenses ensured the surprise and full use of the forces and facilities of the advancing troops in the initial days of the operation. The steady increase in efforts predetermined the success in surmounting the fortified enemy lines and the subsequent actions to widen the area of operations.

The front interaction plan thoroughly coordinated the movement of forces and the fire. Not only radio but wire communications across Lake Ladoga were established between the fronts and the advancing armies. Artillery groups for destruction and counterbattery struggle were set up within the strike army groups. All tank units were used for direct infantry support. In the breach sectors the tank density reached 20 units per front kilometer. More than 30 engineering and sapper battalions of the fronts engaged in road construction, and organized the moving of the equipment across the Neva and the swamps and provided technical support to the advancing forces.

Despite tangible superiority (by a factor of 5-7) over the enemy in forces and ordnance, the average pace of the offensive of the Soviet forces was planned and actually remained) between 2 and 4 kilometers daily. The advance toor place only during daylight. This was more an "erosion" of longterm enemy defense installations rather than a breakthrough in the Hitlerite defense. As was planned, the front forces met on the seventh day.

The moment the offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began, the fascist command tried to increase its fire on the troops in combat order, Leningrai and Kronshtadt and thus to draw some of our artillery away from the breach sector. However, the deployment of the artillery to cover the city and the troops contributed to the successful counterbattery struggle and the suppression of enemy fire.

The "Iskra" operation was the first breach of a powerful, long-term and deeply echeloned enemy defense in the Great Patriotic War.

The people of Leningrad learned how to interpret events at the front by the nature of the artillery fire, aviation sorties and troop movements. This time again they infallibly identified the start of the offensive by our troops and stood by waiting for good news. The announcement that the blockade had been breached spread a wave of happiness throughout the city. On the night of 19 January Leningrad did not sleep. Early morning flags were raised on the city and solemn music was played on the radio. In more than 16 months of blockade the people of Leningrad had forgotten how to laugh. On that night they laughed and cried with happiness. Every Soviet person at the front and the rear was ecstatic. A campaign of aid to Leningrad was mounted throughout the country. Greetings and congratulations, gifts and shipments came to the city on the Neva from all parts of our homeland, sent by organizations and private individuals. Hundreds of enterprises held a Leningrad "help week." During that time the moral and political unity of Soviet society and the power of the friendship among the peoples of the USSR were manifested yet once again with particular emphasis.

The mass heroism displayed by the Soviet troops in the defensive battles for Leningrad is well-known. In the course of Operation "Iskra" it became comprehensive. Anger at the cruelty and inhumanity of the fascist monsters, hurt for Leningrad and an infinite th.rst for victory blended in the highest possible fighting thrust. Nevertheless, the best among the many tens of thousands of heroes could be singled out. The 136th and 327th infantry divisions, commanded respectively by Gen N. P. Simonyak and Col N. A. Polyakov became the 63rd and 64th Guards infantry divisions and the 61st Separate Tank Brigade commanded by Lt Col V. V. Khrustitskiy, became the 30th Guard Tank Brigade.

Many coastal and railroad artillery batteries and naval artillery and aviation units distinguished themselves in the blockade breakthrough operation. They included the 57th Diver Aviation Regiment, which became the Seventh Guards Diver Aviation Regiment, the First Guards Mining-Torpedo Aviation, and others. The marines which advanced with the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts distinguished themselves with their heroic deeds. The navy brigade commanded by Col I. N. Burakovskiy, which had already distinguished itself during the battles in the autumn of 1942 at Sinyavino, protected the left flank of the breakthrough sector of the Volkhov group of forces. The navy brigade commanded by Col F. A. Burmistrov, which was set up in August 1942 of seamen and officers of the fleet ships and units, advanced along the left bank of the Neva along with the army subunits. An interesting proof has been preserved of the actions of this brigade. In his report to Dukhanov, commander of the 67th Army, Colonel Burmistrov reported the view of the commander of a heavy tank regiment which was interacting with the brigade: "I have been fighting for quite some time and have seen a great deal but this is the first time that I see such soldiers. These are eagles, not people: the seamen rose to the attack, scorning death, under a hail of enemy grenades and machine-gun fire. Their thrusts were so strong that many of them found themselves not behind but ahead of the tarks." About 19,000 troops and commanders were awarded oriers and medals and 25 people were awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union."

The 18-month military confrontation at the walls of Leningrad gave the Soviet forces an advantage after a long period of balance of forces. They were able to crush the enemy resistance on a narrow, most important front sector. Enemy fortifications had to be stormed each 20 to 30 meters. The entire area south of Ladoga was soaked with the blood of troops and commanders who had opened a way to Leningrad. The city on the Neva withstood during the most difficult days of mortal clash with a bitter enemy.

"The breach of the Leningrad blockade in January 1943," noted A. A. Kuznetsov, Leningrad city party committee secretary and member of the Leningrad Front Military Council, "was a victory of tremendous military, political and economic significance... This was a strike not only at the fascist troops ... but at Hitler's prestige and that of his command" ("Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945]. Vol 3, Moscow, 1961, p 140).

The victory of the Soviet forces confirmed the definitive failure of the offensive plans of the fascist command toward Leningrad and the entire northwestern section of our country. From a weakened and vulnerable point along the Soviet-German front, Leningrad rapidly became a bridgehead for the Red Army's offensive. The possibility of defeating the fascist forces, which were still at the city's walls, increased. Opportunities were opened for the advance of Soviet forces into Finland and the Baltic area, threatening the flank of the German Group of Armies Center. "Iskra" started the flame which was to purge the entire northwestern part of the country and all Baltic states from the fascist filth.

The corridor 8 to 11 kilometers long, which was pierced along the Ladoga shore, made it possible to restore direct land connections between Leningrad and the rest of the country. On 18 January 1943 the State Defense Committee decreed the laying of railroad tracks between Polyana and Shlissel'burg and build a bridge across the Neva. At the same time, the installation of an ice-sled road across Ladoga Lake, which had been started, was stopped. It took 2 weeks to lay the 33-kilometer-long rail tracks (to Shlissel'burg) and the ice bridge across the Neva. On the morning of 7 February the first train from Bolshava Zemlya arrived at the Finland station. The Leningraders named this track "Victory Road." A highway was built along the tracks. Traffic on lafoga lake continued as well. Supplies to the city improved drastically. Unthering strength, Leningrad's industry increased its production of military and civilian goods. It met the full requirements of the troops of the Leningrad Front for automatic weapons, shells and mines of various calibers. During the second half of the year the city's industry undertook the manuin thring of equipment for other industrial centers in the country. Starting with January 1944 it was once again included in the all-union national econame plan. This was a new exploit of the workers, engineers, and the entire population of Lenin's city.

After the blockade of Leningrad was lifted and as a result of the general worsening of the situation of the fascist forces at the front, following their defeat on the Volga, the Hitlerite supreme command definitively abandoned the idea of capturing the city on the Neva. It decided to destroy it through artillerv fire. The enemy artillery group at Leningrad was reinformed to a strength of 25 regiments. It included a powerful siege artillery at up to 420-millimeter shells, specially transferred from Sebastopol and from Germany. Together with the mortars, it numbered about 3,330 pieces. Artillery fire on Leningrad and Kronshtadt intensified starting in January 1943. In order to reduce the effectiveness of our own battery fire, the enemy usually fired short bursts by several dozen guns of varying caliber. In order to ensure the most successful struggle against enemy artillery, by order of Supreme Command Headquarters, all long-range army and navy artillery was combined within the Third Leningrad 'Conterbattery Artillery Corps. Our artillery opened mass fire on the Hitlerite batteries. In 1943 more than 9,000 batteries firing on Leningrad and Kronshtadt were suppressed. Furthermore, bombing and diving aircraft 'ere drawn into the struggle against heavy enemy artillery. Through the joint efforts of the artillery and the aviation, the German artillery group was neutralized and the enemy's plan to destroy Lenin's city was defeated.

Therefore, the blockade breakthrough not only enabled our forces and navy to engage in active operations but created the necessary prerequisites for the definitive defeat of the Hitlerite blockading forces at Leningrad in January 1944.

The Leningrad victory was of tremendous political significance. The city of the Great October Socialist Revolution proved insurmountable to the Wehrmacht. The Leningraders, who gave to the entire Soviet people an example of heroism, firmness and dedication in the struggle against the fascist aggressors, came out the winners in an unparalleled, difficult duel with the strongest forces of the aggressor. The example of Leningrad inspired the entire Soviet peoply and the other peoples in the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the freedom-loving forces in the occupied countries to engage in an even more decisive struggle against fascism. In a certificate to the city, U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt wrote: "On behalf of the people of the United States of America I present. this certificate to the city of Leningrad in memory of its valorous soldiers and its loyal men, women and children who, isolated by the aggressor from the rest of their people, and despite constant bombing and incredible suffering caused by cold, hunger and disease, successfully defended their beloved city during the critical period from 8 September 1941 to 18 January 1943, thus symbolizing the fearless spirit of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all nations in the world fighting the forces of aggression."

The defeat of the Hitlerite forces at Leningrad shook up Finland, Germany's ally, which no longer believed in the victory of the aggressive fascist bloc. This vent influenced public opinion in Sweden and other Baltic countries and reduced the cooperation between these countries and Germany. The crushing defeat suffered by the Hitlerite forces at Stalingrad and the lifting of the Leningrad blockade undermined the prestige of Nazi Germany and immeasurably enhanced that of the first socialist state in the world.

The uniquely courageous struggle waged by the Soviet forces and population in Leningrad under the conditions of a lengthy enemy blockade were a model of moral-political firmness and inflexible will on the part of our people, headed by the communist party. The heroic Leningrad epic is one of the most outstanding and hair-raising mass exploits of people and army in the entire history of war on earth.

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WE BELIEVE IN PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

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[Article by Gordon Andersen, national chairman, New Zealand Socialist Unity Party]

[Text] Every meeting of leaders of the world communist movement is always a truly major international event. In this case, the sheer number of participants who came for the ceremonies, proves the relevance and particular significance of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. This is also confirmed by the fact that nonsocialist parties, social democratic parties and many trade union movements were extensively represented as well.

One can confidently say that the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR proved once again convincingly the support which international public opinion gives to the policy of peace, creatively presented and reasserted during the ceremonies. The unity of the USSR is one of the most important prerequisites for the strength and solidity of the positions of the Soviet Union and all peace-loving forces on earth.

In speaking of the creative efforts of and proposals submitted by the Soviet Union for the preservation of peace, we can say metaphorically that each card in the deck held by the Soviet Union is one of peace. We see that the peaceful Soviet policy is exceptionally varied and that the Soviet Union is openly proposing to the governments of the bourgeois countries, that of the United States in particular, its numerous initiatives. One could choose any one among them and immediately undertake a reduction in the number of missiles and other armaments and, following this path, reach a total ban on nuclear weapons. Therefore conditions are now developing such that the supporters of peace the world over must take responsive action and implement such clear suggestions and strengthen relations of peace and detente.

The celebration of the 60th anniversary of the USSR has once again drawn the attention of various Marxist parties and other progressive forces to the field of national relations and the situation in the capitalist countries. Major possibilities exist which could be applied in fighting for the solution of this problem. Actually, if properly organized, the forces which can resolve the national problem in many countries, including New Zealand, could become an important international force in the struggle for national freedom, peace and democracy.

What we urgently need in New Zealand is to expand our activities in ensuring the freedom and equality of the Maori people. The Maori--the New Zealand native population--are forced to do the lowest-paid jobs. The Maori account for most of the unemployed. The Maori national language is being destroyed. For many years and under different pretexts, using most despicable methods, the land of the Maori has been taken away. Currently landowners and agents of the bourgeoisie have expelled this nation from its land altogether.

Therefore, in New Zealand our contribution to the progressive forces of peace is consistent with our own tasks in resolving the national problem. On this level the clear Leninist formulation on this specific matter and the tireless creative activities of the CPSU over a long period of time provide tremendous practical support and our source of inspiration for the Marxist parties and their allies.

In assessing the successes with which the Soviet Union is celebrating the 60th anniversary of its founding, we must recall what the people of that country, that of the Russian Federation in particular, had to begin with in 1917, during the Revolution, and in 1922, when the Soviet state was founded. We must recall the backwardness and oppression and the most cruel forms of discrimination and exploitation to which the peoples of czarist Russia were subjected. All of this faced the CPSU and the people with exceptionally difficult and complex problems. Under circumstances in which imperialism was trying to encourage hostility and discord among nations in the different republics and counterrevolutionary sallies, the CPSU faced exceptional requirements. That is why now, looking back at this relatively short time interval, from the viewpoint of political history, when we meet with representatives of the different republics and see their cultural and social progress, and as we see the voluntary union among these countries and the results of tremendous material aid to previously backward peoples, given above all by the Russian Federation, and when we see Tashkent, reborn after a terrible earthquake, all of this combined proves to us the dynamism, persistence and clear ideological positions inherent in the CPSU leadership and the Soviet people as a whole.

As we see all this, we naturally think of what is happening in our country. Obviously, it would be proper to begin by saying that recently the prime minister of New Zealand threatened to proclaim a state of emergency unless the strike proclaimed by the workers at the petroleum refinery would end. A state of emergency would be the equivalent of martial law which, the same day, would place in a state of combat readiness the special units of the armed forces. Yet it was a question of no more than a single strike and, in such a case, naturally, such draconian measures on the part of the bourgeeis government were not needed. Clearly, there were other considerations as well. What were the true reasons which guided the prime minister in making such a declaration?

The strike at the petroleum refinery was by far not the main reason for the action of the prime minister. Such measures were taken in answer to the major conflict which had broken out between the trade unions, on the one hand, and the government and the entrepreneurs, on the other. The government's

pilicy is intensifying the economic crisis in New Zealand. This is manifeste. in increased unemployment and in the closing down of enterprises. Many other symptoms indicate that the crisis is intensifying and becoming increasingly serious. Even some bourgeois strata are beginning to complain of the country's economic situation.

The Labor Federation, which includes all trade unions in the private sector, coordinated its activities with the trade unions in the state sector and initiated a campaign of work stop meetings. These activities were exceptionally successful. The purpose of the meetings was to promote a mass movement against the wage freeze imposed by the government and (most important) to draw up a so-called alternative economic strategy or program. The document presenting this program has already been drafted and we face in the future even more extensive work on this matter. The program is based on the concept of public ownership, i.e., on an idea which is in striking contrast to the current policy of the government.

Therefore, the government is trying to shift all economic difficulties on the shoulders of the working people, the retired and the dependent. Under such dircumstances, the trade union movement which unites workers in private and state enterprises, has earned the support and approval of its alternative program by its affiliated organizations.

Such is the true reason which forced the prime minister to threaten the imposition of martial law.

Inday multinational companies are increasingly taking over New Lealand; foreign banks are entangling the country in a web of loans. The government is becoming increasingly isolated in the sense that the workers are becoming increasingly ulcertain as to their future, which sets them against it. The purchasing power of the population is declining as a result of the wage freeze. All components for a class conflict are ripening at a faster rate under the conditions of the crisis.

in this situation a number of attacks were launched on the Labor Federation, the trade unions and the New Zealand Socialist Unity Party. Several years ago, the prime minister said that, possibly, our party might be banned and warned of legal sanctions to be taken against it should we continue our activities. This forced us to tighten our ranks and to develop a more accurate position regarding differences within the trade union movement, for we realized that unity and coordination within the trade union movement have a considerable impact on the broad masses in New Zealand.

Our party confidently proceeds from the fact that the main feature in resolving all social problems is the extent of consciousness and activity of the masses.

This fully applies to a vital problem such as the struggle for peace. Let us note that a number of towns and settlements in our country have proclaimed themselves nuclear-free zones. Opposition to the docking of American navy ships armed with nuclear weapons in New Zealand ports has assumed a wide

scope. In most cases, whenever American navy ships dock in New Zealand ports, the port workers go on strike. The official policy of the Labor Federation is one of supporting such strikes. The Labor Federation opposes the ANZUS Pact, the military pact binding Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The New Zealand Labor Party (a social democratic party) also opposes the docking of American navy ships at New Zealand ports. For 2 consecutive years it has passed at its annual congresses decisions opposing the ANZUS Pact. However, the government press remains persistently silent on their subject. Therefore, a great deal of declarations in favor of peace have been made in New Zesland. However, they are still insufficiently supported by specific action. Nevertheless, such actions have already begun and, we believe, will become stronger. In this connection, recent statements by official U.S. personalities made in New Zealand have made it clear to us that the Americans fear a labor party electoral victory, for in such a case American navy vessels will no longer be able to dock at New Zealand ports. Many American representatives have stated quite unequivocally that the docking of American navy ships armed with nuclear weapons at our ports is a stipulation based on the fact that New Zealand is a member of ANZUS, although we have proved very clearly that this requirement does not stem in the least from our ANZUS membership and that this interpretation expresses a purely American position. Past experience forces us to take into consideration the fact that the Americans will do everything possible to hinder the advent to power of a labor government in New Zealand, particularly a labor government which enjoys the support of a rapidly growing trade union movement and would be pursuing a policy of peace.

Our party is unanimous on this matter. Its membership is growing. If we believe that so far we are not doing sufficient work among the unemployed, for which reason we still have no organizations among them. Although some efforts have been applied, so far the unemployed have not become organized into a necessary and impressive political power.

Our party pays attention to the situation of the Maori people, particularly to their struggle for land. The trade movement also supports the Maori movement for regaining the land which was taken away from it many years ago.

Therefore, major political events are developing in New Zealand. There are signs that the growing class conflict will continue to expand. The New Zealand communists must be ready both politically and ideologically in the face of developing events.

That is why the lessons of our own history are so relevant and important to us today.

The history of the communist movement in New Zealand is one of intensive struggle waged by the communists for the mastery and profound understanding of Marxism-Leninism and the application of its concepts under the specific conditions of our country. On this level the New Zealand communist movement, starting with the 1930s, has been forced to surmount a great deal of differences on the question of the necessary type of party to be organized and, in particular, on the key problem of relations with the social democrats. Subsequently, the party was also quite strongly disturbed by leftist sectarianism and the penetration of petit bourgeois ideology. The party's leadership fluctuated from leftist sectarianism to extreme right positions. This applied not only to elections but to strikes and the mass struggle in general. A particularly difficult and dangerous situation developed within the party at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.

At that time Comrade M. A. Suslov warned our party's leadership of the eventual results of such a political line. What actually happened was literally what Comrade Suslov had said. Maoists took over the party's leadership, with the exception of a few people who, in 1966, founded the Socialist Unity Party. The influence and membership of the communist party itself dropped drastically.

We were fiercely attacked for our publicly proclaimed views on Poland and Afghanistan. However, our party has always tried to carry out its international duty in all grave situations, despite the serious difficulties which appear in a country such as New Zealand, where the workers have little experience in international affairs.

Our party is small. It is operating in a small country. However, we proudly consider ourselves part of the international communist movement in which we have great faith. We also have great faith in the forces of peace. We have great faith in the Soviet policy of peace and highly appreciate it. We are loyal to Marxism-Leninism. We believe in it and in proletarian internationalism. We are inflexibly convinced of the final victory of our party and the international communist movement in the struggle against imperialism and war.

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CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE FINNISH SOCIETY

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[Article by Gunnar Asplund]

[Text] The purpose of this article, based on the Finnish example, is to determine the leading trends in the social stratification of contemporary capitalist society. In interpreting these processes, the author makes critical use of official statistical data. He actively joins the debate on methodological problems of the analysis of the social structure and formulates a number of interesting as well as sharply controversial concepts and assessments. In particular, this applies to the problem of the social limits of the contemporary working class, which has still not been brought to a unanimous solution, and the inclusion in it of hired workers identified as belonging to the "white collar" category.

The main conclusion reached by the Finnish researcher is that the Finnish working class is a developing, a growing class. It is increasing in terms of absolute numbers and percentage of the active population. Its reinforcements come from the other social strata which are subject to proletarization in the process of intensified exploitation of labor. This refutes the assertions of bourgeois sociologists on the "disappearance" of the proletariat and its "dissolution" within some kind of "middle class."

Another major concept proved by the author is that the bourgeoisie accounts for an insignificant percentage of the country's population. Nevertheless, it is precisely the bourgeoisie which remains the dominant and exploiting class.

The class struggle is the decisive force of social development in a classantagonistic society. The very struggle and its direction and prospects largely depend on the position of the opposing classes and their internal evolutionary trends. It is important, therefore, for the revolutionary and democratic forces fighting for social progress to have a clear idea of the class structure in a capitalist society.

It is from this viewpoint that we should consider, albeit briefly, the Finnish national economic structure as it has been developing over the past 30 years, for the changes which have taken place within it are reflected in the changes within the societal social structure. Following are data characterizing the participation of the active population in the country's principal economic sectors.

	1950		1960		1970		1980	
	Thous.	7.	Thous.	%	Thous.	%	Thous.	%
Total	1,984	100	2,033	100	2,118	100	2,358	100
Agricultural and timber industry	909	46	721	36	429	20	295	13
Other industrial and construction sectors	533	27	616	30	726	34	805	34
Other economic sectors	514	26	690	34	935	44	1,203	51
Other labor areas	29	1	6		28	2	55	2

The table shows that the number of people employed in agriculture and forestry in the 1950s and, to an even greater extent, in the 1960s and 1970s, declined noticeably compared with workers in industry and construction. The service industries increased faster than the rest. Here transportation, trade and banking play a leading role.

What influenced the changes in the structure of the national economy? Some of the most important reasons are the following:

The development of production forces influence by the scientific and technical revolution;

Monopoly competition, which has a tremendous impact on trade and advertising;

The struggle of the working class, inspired by the successes of the countries of real socialism; its results have been expressed, among others, in the expanded system of social insurance and the development of production which meets what is referred to as collective requirements.

Manpower in agriculture and forestry was reduced as a result of the extensive utilization of machinery. The use of modern equipment in construction is rapidly advancing as well. Furthermore, an increasing number of construction projects are being taken over directly by industry (prefabricated panels, concrete, and so on). For this reason, the number of people employed in the sector remains stable although the volume of output continues to rise. Thus, there were 115,000 people employed in housing construction in 1960, 130,000 in 1970 and 123,000 in 1980. Their respective output was respectively 25 million, 38 million and 43 million cubic meters.

As a whole, the volume of industrial output in Finland increased by 216 percent between 1960 and 1980, while the number of people employed in industry increased by no more than 37 percent. This confirms the ever-increasing impact of the scientific and technical revolution. In the 1970s industrial production increased by 55 percent while the number of industrial workers increased by only 1 percent. However, the category of white collar workers increased (by 49 percent), mainly that of technical specialists.

In the period under consideration huge masses of manpower, urged on by the fierce rivalry among monopoly groups, rushed into trade, banking and insurance company work. In some areas one may see five banks in a row, offering the same type of services. In a more sensible society a single bank would have sufficed. That same monopoly competition leads to the creation of an unnecessary number of various offices which, as a rule, are overstaffed: in pursuit of profit, each one of them tries to improve services, supply them faster, discount prices, and so on. An increasing number of people are entering advertising.

Let us try to illustrate this with figures. As we pointed out, trade expanded in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1970 it employed 328,000 people, or 15 percent of the population. During the following decade the number of personnel in this area did not increase although the volume of trade sales and competition increased considerably, assisted by the comprehensive use of automated systems, computers in particular. The volume of employment in commercial insurance, totally useless from the social viewpoint, increased as well: it increased by 75 percent in the 1970s. Employment in the service industry increased by 66 percent (from 284,000 to 471,000 people) and so did employment in education (for modern production requires skilled workers), scientific research, social services and health care (the bourgeoisie realizes that it must be concerned with taking care of its skilled manpower). Let us note that these trends were largely dictated by the increased requirement of the working people and, above all, the results of their struggle.

Hired Labor

The fact that industry today employs many more people (triple the number) than agriculture and the forestry industry proves that Finland is a developed capitalist country. This is most convincingly confirmed by the fast conversion of the population from petty agriculture and forestry to industry and services. Let us recall that the share of hired labor in the country's population was 58 percent in 1950 and that it had reached 85 percent by 1980.

This is confirmed by an official table which breaks down the working population not on the basis of social but so-called professional characteristics, which makes the analysis harder. Nevertheless, even bourgeois statistics are unable to conceal entirely the class stratification processes occurring in Finnish society.

	1950 (in %)	1960 (in %)	1970 (in %)	1980 (in %)
Blue collar workers	42	43	47	44
White collar workers and managers	16	23	32	41
Landowners	36	28	16	10
Other entrepreneurs and employers ¹	6	6	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100
	1950 (Thousands)	1960 (Thousands)	1970 (Thousands)	1980 (Thousands)
Blue collar workers	834	881	987	1,010
White collar workers and managers	319	444	666	953
Landowners	713	597	349	232
Other entrepreneurs and employers	119	128	110	108
Total	1,983	2,033	2,112	2,303

Including contributing family members

This table offers a sufficiently complete picture of the situation in agriculture, although it does not include the forestry industry workers. However, it includes those engaged in truck gardening, raising fur animals and fishing. Let us add the following detail: young people are leaving agricultural production and the countryside. The outflow of young people is reflected on the aging of the working people in agriculture and forestry. Thus, in 1980 more than one-half of the workers in these sectors were 45 years old or older, compared with 25 percent of the manpower in the other economic sectors.

Most petty landowners abandoned the land and the forests in the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of which the number of rural entrepreneurs declined by one-half. This applies to small landowners only. Between 1969 and 1978 the number of lots (2 or slightly more than 2 hectares) declined from 264,000 to 211,000. Some small lots are either leased or cultivated during the leisure time. As a rule, the family cultivates its lot itself, without outside help. Although agricultural output as a whole has increased, so have outlays for mechanization which essentially "eat up" the entire income. The farmer has become more dependent on banks and monopolies which control processing and marketing.

In a certain sense, in terms of his status, the farmer is becoming more similar to the hired worker, for he earns a "wage" paid by the monopolies in the processing industry. The monopolies act as employers. Within increasing frequency agreements are made on income (purchasing prices), in accordance with the so-called income policy. Partners in such discussions are the Central Organization of Agricultural Producers (COSP) and the state.

It is of interest to point out that the rural proletariat, understood in the traditional meaning of the term, has also virtually disappeared from the countryside. Machines have replaced people. In the area of timber procurements, the number of workers declined from 101,000 to 30,000 between the 1960s and the 1970s.

The reduced share of the proletariat in agricultural and forestry has been compensated essentially by the increased size of the industrial proletariat which numbers today a half-a-million-strong army. For comparison's sake let us point out that, according to statistical data, app cimately 1 million people are employed in Finland. Let us also add that during that period about 250,000 Finns have emigrated to Sweden, whose population increased less rapidly, in search of employment.

As we saw, official statistics break down the active population by profession rather than class. Therefore, they do not give a clear idea of the population's social structure. For example, bourgeois statistics are unable to single out the white collar workers. They do not help (but rather hinder) the answer to the question of whether white collar workers are members of the working class or a segment of the middle classes, and are they represented in all classes or not. The determination of the true picture of the class breakdown requires a reassessment and review of the data and the methodology itself used in official statistics. In this case a form 1 approach is inadmissible, for it is a question of the class struggle, the ideological struggle in the first place.

'The New Middle Class'

If we were to agree even for a minute with bourgeois statistics, according to which the rapidly growing white collar worker category--hired labor, regardless of social position (in some cases exact opposites: the messenger boy and the director of an establishment)--under our very eyes the contemporary capitalist society would indeed convert quite rapidly into a society of white collar workers. The result would be that there are many more white collar than blue collar workers. Such is the case with American statistics: white collar workers account for the majority of the U.S. population.

Pointing out the trend of a rapid increase in the white collar category, the bourgeois sociologists are attempting to prove what suits them. They apply the traditional trick of classifying the white collar workers along with the petty entrepreneurs in the so-called "middle class." That is why they say that the "new middle class" has either become or is becoming the dominant force, naturally, at the expense of the role of the working class. Based on the fact that the "new middle class" supports the bourgeoisie and capitalism as a social system by and large, they draw the conclusion that the existence of a capitalist society in the West is secured "forever."

The leading non-Marxist so iologists in Finland have long supported this viewpoint. As early as 1945, Heikki Varis, the leading sociologist of the period, claimed that "Finland can be considered a society of a growing middle class." Characteristically, he excluded the peasantry from this "middle class." Subsequently, in the 1960s, the leading sociologists Erik Allardt and Jure Littunen said that Varis' concept of the social structure "is the most progressive and most accurate of all previously formulated concepts regarding Finland."

Following their computations and studies of a number of facts, the sociologists in the 1970s were able, generally speaking, to gain a better understanding of the structure of Finnish society. They reached the conclusion that statistical figures were excessively inflating the white collar worker category which included, among others, groups of people whose jobs more closely resembled physical labor. Nevertheless, they were unable to surmount Varis' methodological errors.

Some of these researchers, using clearly distorted facts, have actively joined the ideological struggle on the side of the bourgeoisie. They include above all Prof Viaine Luoma, who spoke of a "Finland of white collar workers." He wrote that one should aspire to achieve a "united independent social movement of white collar workers, which would gradually become the dominating power in the trade union movement." He also said that "once united, the white collar workers could greatly strengthen Finnish society." In reality, however, it would be difficult to assume that sales clerks, barbers, cashiers or typists could become a social monolith together with directors and other highly placed officials, generals, clergymen, and others. Luoma tries to substantiate somehow his effort by claiming, for example, that white collar workers become united in the course of their work through "mental effort," whereas blue collar workers are united through "physical labor." Naturally, such "research" cannot be considered scientific. Obviously, the author himself does not attempt to do so, limiting himself to unsupported statements. His purpose, rather, is to drive a wedge between blue and white collar workers. It is not in vain that he is a member of the bourgeois National Coalition Party.

Such errors are shared also by the Finnish Statistical Center in the effort to differentiate between blue and white collar workers within the sum total of hired labor. Official statistics classify as white collar workers those engaged primarily in "nonphysical labor;" this includes workers "responsible for production output at enterprises and activities of offices and organizations," i.e., senior officials or otherwise described as managers. Nevertheless, it is indeed difficult to give a simple answer to the question of who is a white collar worker? A great variety of groups of people are included in this concept. To this day many people still imagine the white collar worker, as he was a century ago, in terms of an educated man, carrying a briefcase and wearing a tie. Actually, however, even according to such statistics, the typical white collar worker is a person with no specialized training (or with low-level vocational training). Such people account for 54 percent of the total. They include a large number of women (56 percent) engaged in monotonous work for small pay; they frequently marry blue collar workers or are the offspring of blue collar worker families.

Let me say this, however: the overwhelming majority of white collar workers have far more in common with the blue collar workers than the so-called senior employees. If we approach the matter of white collar workers from Marxist-Leninist positions, in my view, we should say that in their absolute majority they are part of the working class. Furthermore, the white collar workers prove to be an important and growing segment of the working class.

Marxism-Leninism on Classes

The definition of classes, which V. I. Lenin provided in his work "The Great Initiative," is a reliable starting point in the study of a given social structure. "Classes," he wrote, "are large groups of people distinguished in terms of their place in the historically defined social production system, their relationship (most of which is legally codified) with productive capital, their role in the social organization of labor and, consequently, the means through which they receive the share of the social wealth at their disposal and its amount. Classes are groups of people among which one may take the labor of another as a result of different positions in a specific social economic system" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 15).

Therefore, if we consider Lenin's definition, the main distinguishing line in a class society runs between exploiters and exploited. Intermediary classes and strata may be found between them in a capitalist society. Lenin identified classes on the basis of three important criteria.

The relationship with productive capital is the principal among them. In the capitalist system there are two basic and one intermediary forms of relations between a person and productive capital. One of them is the large-scale ownership of productive capital, which is the basis for exploitation. The second is the lack of ownership of productive capital, which forces those deprived of it to sell their manpower to capital owners. However, there also exists an intermediary form of relations between a person and productive capital: ownership which is so small that it does not secure its own means of existence through added value. In this case, the owner himself must work as a petty entrepreneur.

The role which the various groups of people play in the social organization of labor is the second important criterion. Let us note above all that in a capitalist society this role may be expressed in legislative, managerial or administrative activities in industry, services or state administration. Consequently, it is a question of performing a function in the system of the capitalist exploitation of labor and the creation of conditions needed for its implementation.

Furthermore, this role is of an executive nature, subordinated to activities in which a variety of social institutions are engaged. It may be reduced to intermediary middle functions in the course of which the obligations of a specific social stratum are related to passing on the orders issued from above and supervising their execution in the interest of the ruling class. Naturally, not every manager plays such a role. This takes place only when a specific individual, serving the interests of the capitalist class, performs supervisory and enforcement functions toward subordinates. Let us add that the functions themselves are, naturally, predetermined by dominating production relations.

Finally, the third class determining indicator is the size of income and the means through which it is earned. The principal means for extracting income is the exploitation of outside labor (the owner of capital pockets the income) and wages which are paid to those who sell their manpower. Income may be acquired also as a result of the individual use of one's productive capital, the free practice of one's profession, a percentage of commercial operations, and so on, as well as bonuses for managerial and supervisory activities.

Let us now ask a question difficult to answer: should white collar workers, i.e., personnel in services and offices, be socially separated from the proletariat on the basis alone that some engage in nonproductive while others in productive labor? In both the means through which they earn their income is so similar that, generally speaking we can include the bulk of the white collar workers within the working class. Even more important is the fact that both while and blue collar workers are forced to sell their manpower and both are in a subordinate and exploited position.

Based on these criteria, we can determine the class affiliation of social groups in capitalist society. Let us begin with the working class. Its main characteristics are the following:

Lack of ownership of productive capital, by virtue of which it inevitably becomes the target of exploitation, forced to sell its manpower to the owners of productive capital. Secondary productive capital in its possession such as, for example a power saw, manual construction tools, and so on, are no grounds for excluding the hired worker from the working class;

Subordinate position in performing various functions within the capitalist production system and various social institutions. According to this characteristic, those who perform managerial and supervisory functions toward their subordinates cannot be included in the working class;

The amount of wages which are shaped on the labor market in accordance with the law of manpower value. Naturally, the size of the wage depends also on the quality of the commodity, supply and demand and, not least, the level of professional organization of the working people.

Now as to the bourgeoisie. Who are its members?

Large owners of productive capital, whose main income is derived from the exploitation of manpower;

The main organizers of the exploitation process at enterprises, offices and other areas of economic life in the country. Without being the owners of productive capital, they are most closely affiliated with the owners, earning huge income in terms of wages but. essentially, representing part of the added value;

Highly placed officials in government departments, whose obligations include ensuring the conditions under which the capitalist exploitation system can operate. Their income is the result of the redistribution of the added value in amounts which significantly exceed the usual manpower value.

Finally, the middle classes.

As we pointed out, some features of the main classes in a capitalist society --the bourgeoisie and the proletariat--are characteristic of the middle classes. However, within these classes each separate category has its specific features. Following are examples:

The category of people with only petty ownership of productive capital earns the bulk of its income as a result of its labor. Depending on the amount of property and income, such people must either moonlight or hire out. In the latter case the income from exploitation is usually additional rather than principal. This is a characteristic feature of petty landowners and other small entrepreneurs;

Independently practicing physicians, lawyers, engineers, writers and other workers in culture. A good education or a rare skill make it possible for this social category to manage its own manpower with relative freedom;

The category of individuals whose income is derived from commercial operations on a percentage basis. This includes resalers who earn certain percentages, or agents for advertising and insurance companies. They are paid on a piece-rate basis and their lifestyle is typically petit bourgeois: fierce competition and the aspiration to force the client to purchase a commodity at all cost, and the extraction of maximal profit;

The middle classes also include project managers, department heads, and so on. They are the middlemen who pass on the orders received from above and must supervise their execution; in terms of their subordinates, they serve the interests of the ruling class.

Furthermore, the middle classes include the personnel of some institutions which are part of the political superstructure of society and are of an

undisguised class nature. Their objective and task is the preservation of the existing system. Such institutions include the state coercion apparatus, the bourgeois mass information organs and media, and so on. The nature of their work and the selection of their cadres reflect the interests of the ruling class. Within this category of workers, however, profound stratifications exist, which assume a class nature, for they are influence by the conscious working class.

Naturally, it is not always easy to draw a line demarcating the main classes in the capitalist society and the middle classes. Frequently this line is arbitrary, based on quantitative indicators alone. Furthermore, even minor quantitative differences may lead to the classification of individuals working under similar circumstances into one of the two basic classes or the middle classes.

Class Structure in Finnish Society

According to the item "professional status" in official statistics, the impression is created that capitalists are only those described as "employers." However, a closer study indicates that more than 90 percent of such "employers" are merely petty entrepreneurs employing less than 10 hired workers. Most frequently, this applies to owners of stores which sell goods with term payments, bars, barber shops, repair shops, and so on. Two-thirds of the individuals belonging to this category may be essentially classified as belonging to the middle classes. Their main income is derived from their own toil although, as we pointed out, they may use the labor of several hired workers. The real big employers are stockholding companies, capitalist cooperatives, the state itself and the municipalities. However, they are specifically excluded from said statistical breakdowns.

The biggest problems in the study of the class structure arise when we analyze the "white collar workers and managers" item in official statistics. Those included in this category must be classified as belonging to all classes.

Let us note above all that, as we pointed out, the overwhelming majority of white collar workers have far more in common with the blue collar workers than the "managers." A common feature of white and blue collar workers is mental or physically tiring labor, absence of creativity, lack of legal rights and absence of opportunity effectively to influence decision-making. Both earn modest salaries and work under adverse labor c nditions. Not only blue collar but white collar workers have been resorting of late to strikes in order to improve their position. This is another common feature. Therefore, most white collar workers are an important segment of the working class.

The remaining white collar workers, who occupy an intermediary position, belong to the middle classes. Only some of their features classify them as part of either basic social class. They may also show the characteristics of both classes. They have no identical characteristics. Each group has its own specific features. The status of the middle classes is frequently contradictory on the inside. On the one hand, they are close to the working class and could cooperate with it in the defense of their interests; on the other, the ruling class tries to draw them closer to itself and pressures them.

Enterprise managers and senior officials are entirely members of the bourgeoisie. Let us try to present all of this in figures.

	1950	1960	1970	1980
Working class	57	60	67	70
Blue collar workers	49	50	52	48
White collar workers	8	10	15	22
Middle classes	41	38	31	28
White collar workers	4	6	10	14
Peasants	32	27	16	10
Petty entrepreneurs	5	5	5	4
Bourgeoisie	2	2	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100

Class Structure of the Finnish Population (in percentages)

The table shows that the Finnish working class is growing steadily, although starting with the 1970s, the share of so-called traditional workers has been declining. Currently workers number approximately 1.1 million. Furthermore, the working class also includes half a million white collar workers. Some 300,000 white collar workers have an intermediary status, representing the middle classes (let us note, parenthetically, that the working class could draw them over on its side in the course of the class struggle if it supports them and pursues a proper policy of alliances). The peasants, numbering 230,000, are an impressive group within the middle classes (this applies to those who cultivate their land themselves), as well as approximately 100,000 petty entrepreneurs who operate in other economic sectors.

The Finnish bourgeoisie numbers as many as 50,000 people and its share, as the table shows, does not exceed 2 percent of the population. It owns the big capital and holds key positions in public administration. Simply stated, the power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

Consequences of Change

The most important conclusion which we may draw by tracing the changes in the structure of Finnish society is that the ranks of the working class are increasing rapidly, including today more than two-thirds of the employed population. Being oppressed and exploited, the proletariat opposes the capitalist class. History teaches us that of all social groups the working class is the best-prepared to adopt the principles of communism, and to mount a struggle for building it. The great role played by the working class in a country's population is one of the prerequisites for socialist victory.

Naturally, however, this condition alone is insufficient. Prestige and success in the struggle largely depend on the level of class consciousness. The latter, however, does not appear by itself, automatically. It is a complex process which takes place unevenly and differently in the various working class strata. The fast quantitative growth of the proletariat at the initial stage of capitalism is not paralleled by a corresponding increase in the ranks and prestige of the worker parties. Occasionally, petit bourgeois ideological trends can even increase within the worker parties. Such was the specific case in Finland. However, the history of the labor movement in our country proves that the development of the political awareness of the proletariat leads to the fact that the parties which enjoy (along with the communist party) the support of some toiling strata adopt more progressive positions. This was the case with the Social Democratic Party of Finland which, in many respects, has become more attractive compared with the 1950s when, under Tanner's leadership, it held anticommunist and anti-Soviet positions and essentially supported the reactionary front of right-wing forces.

The class awareness of the working people, particularly of its new strata, we repeat, develops gradually. Initially, the working class begins by creating its trade unions. It is within them that it struggles for the satisfaction of vital economic and social demands. The case of Finland is an example. The number of people organized in the trade unions of working people increased steadily, particularly in the 1960s and the 1970s. The Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions numbers today more than 1 million members, consisting mainly of traditional workers, although it also includes a more than 100,000-strong detachment of white collar workers. Trade unions covered 30 percent of the working people in 1950, about 35 percent in 1960, approximately 55 percent in 1970 and more than 80 percent in 1980. This is the highest level reached in a capitalist country.

The level of vocational organization of hired labor is based not only on the awakening class awareness of the working class. This process is no less influenced by the situation within the trade unions and the position they have been able to gain in society. As long as capitalists and the state ignore the trade unions and, sometimes, even persecute them (as has been the case in Finland as well), it is difficult for them to expand. Another important circumstance is to surmount the division existing within trade union ranks and, in this connection, to establish cooperation between communists and social democrats.

Statistical data on strikes give a certain (although rather superficial) idea of the growth of the class awareness of blue and white collar workers in Finland. The 1970s were noted by an explosive increase in the number of strikes. Whereas the average number of annual strikes was 73 between 1960 and 1969 (41,000 participants), it rose to 1,420 during the following decade, involving as many as 375,870 people. The scale of strikes is expanding. Teachers, bank workers, nurses, insurance company agents and even policemen are joining the struggle. For example, a noteworthy strike occurred in the spring of 1980 involving members of the trade union of industrial enterprise white collar workers. Some 45,000 members participated, 84 percent of whom were women. The strike brought closer this group of white collar workers to the backbone of the working class and the traditional workers. The latter supported them both materially and morally.

As a whole, the rapid increase in the number of strikes and their participants over the past decade clearly indicates that antagonism between labor and capital is becoming aggravated.

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ATTENTION, 'HAWKS!'

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[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences R. Ovinnikov]

[Text] Today political "hawks" are in fashion in Washington. This term usually applies to officials whose outlook and practical activities are somewhat similar to the militant representatives of the feathered species. However, it is not merely a question of individual specimens. Many U.S. political organizations and institutions claim today that it is precisely they, through their ideas and representatives, who laid the foundations for and accomplished a most dangerous turn in the international arena from detente to a new aggravation of tension. However, such organizations and institutions are clearly overestimating their possibilities and role in unseemly matters by claiming authorship of the aggressive and militaristic course taken by Washington, which is threatening peace and security on our planet.

Could anyone be unaware of the fact that the key to major political decisions is in the hands of big business, which determines its nature and direction. It was precisely on its instructions that a drastic turn was taken in U.S. policy at the beginning of the 1980s toward the arms race and preparations for thermonuclear warfare. As we know, the American ruling class was then in a difficult situation. Growing economic difficulties and social unrest within the country were added to the weakened foundations of the political system, which had been so clearly manifested in the Watergate scandal. In the international arena, adding to the shameful defeat in Vietnam, factors alarming to Washington developed, such as the growing aspiration of the liberated countries to reject the path of economic colonialism and the further strengthening of the positions of world socialism. The inability or, rather, the unwillingness of the power of the rich to find a solution to the situation through the adoption of a sensible approach to present-day realities, triggered adventuristic and hegemonistic aspirations among the most aggressive circles of American imperialism which intended to resolve all its problems through military power.

Such a drastic political turn required an ideological cover, a justification in the eyes of the American and global public of the thoughtless course which led to aggravated confrontation and nuclear catastrophe. This was the objective of an extensive propaganda campaign which was mounted, in which the tone was set by a variety of reactionary organizations which engaged in active efforts by intensifying chauvinistic, conservative and militaristic feelings in the country. Despite all their variety and dissimilarity, the attack mounted on detente, fierce anti-Sovietism and hegemonism became their rallying flag.

One American organization, which seemed to represent the extreme in adventurism, notably stood out on the propaganda field and in the political arena. Its very name was alarming -- "The Committee on the Present Danger." It was just about the first in the United States to raise the slogan of pitting the positive trends of the age against the tremendous military machine of American imperialism. The members of the committee became the leading propaganda spokesmen for the forces of reaction and militarism. Finally and decisively, it was precisely the members of the committee, after many years of siege, were able to achieve a mass breakthrough to the peaks of official power in the United States. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, 1 year after the electoral victory of the present Republican administration that "the 'Committee on the Present Danger,' which was created 5 years ago, directed into Reagan's administration 32 of its 182 members in order to achieve a firm position against the Soviet Union.... The best known and most influential of the former committee members is, naturally, Ronald Reagan. However, committee members were appointed also to the highest positions in the government. This is literally the equivalent of a seizure of the national security system in the country."

In this context, naturally, the "Committee on the Present Danger" is of particular interest. How was one of the largest "hawkish" nests in the United States created? How were its members trained? What means are they using now in casting a sinister shadow on international relations? The answers to such questions largely help us to understand the origin, nature and direction of activities in the United States of the forces of antidetente most threatening to the cause of peace.

How They Started

The line from which the United States began to reorganize the forces which had become deeply entrenched in the cold war was the year 1974, when a group which described itself as the "Coalition for a Democratic Society," fired the first volley for effect at detente. It had brought together a handful of American "intellectuals" sharing openly right-wing views (hence their subsequent renaming as "neoconservatives"). They included the journalist N. Podhoretz, R. Perle, an aide to Senator H. Jackson ("the senator from Bueing"), E. Rostow, one of the initiators of the escalation of U.S. aggression in Vietnam, J. Kirkpatrick, Georgetown University professor, and some others. The starting point of the "crusade" against the USSR they preached, was the thesis of "ideological incompatibility." Hence the organizational conclusion of the inexpediency and undesirability of peaceful coexistence with socialism. These were precisely the prerequisites on which the group prepared and published at that time, under Rostow's guidance, a pamphlet entitled "Pursuit of Detente." It was described as an "attack of the very idea that an end to the cold war could be made."

The alliance between the ideologues and theoreticians of anti-detente, on the one hand, and the Pentagon's practitioners of the "hot war" was the next

step. A secret conference was held in the underground headquarters of the U.S. Strategic Air Command in Omaha, Nebraska, in 1975. "This was the first time," recalled subsequently one its participants, "that such a varied and heterogeneous group of experts had met on such a level of secrecy.... " What specifically was discussed? "The relative decrease" of the U.S. defense budget during the period of detente was "alarming," for which reason Pentagon appropriations had to be increased urgently and the U.S.-NATO allies had to be urged on. "As we said and reassured ourselves," the participant in the meeting noted, "the U.S. military forces would soon have an excellent new bomber in the B-l; the Pentagon leaders spoke (and soon began to act in that direction) of the accelerated development of the MX missile and the new Trident submarine. We planned the neutron bomb for the European front." It was thus that literally underground a cool planning of a new spiral in the arms race was initiated, aimed at restoring to American imperialism its lost military superiority. The tone at the conference in the concrete-lined bunker was set by P. Nitze, who had held a number of high positions in the Pentagon starting in the 1950s, and had remained in the course of his entire political career an unrepentant, as the American press wrote, "irreconcilable supporter of a hard line" toward the Soviet Union. Once again at the conference Nitze made the threatening statement that eventually the Soviet Union would acquire a "potential which would enable it to win a war." Such was his pretext for rejecting the SALT II treaty, because of which, as a sign of protest, 1 year previously, he had openly resigned his membership in the American SALT talks delegation.

It would have seemed that if Nitze was indeed fearful of Soviet superiority, SALT II, which imposed limitations not only on the United States but the USSR, would have been the best means to prevent a similar situation. The entire point, however, was that the opponents of SALT II in the United States had completely different plans. They were described by R. Molander, who was then a member of the U.S. National Security Council. "One month (after his appointment--the author)," Molander writes, "I met the first of a small but quite influential group of people who fiercely opposed SALT for the single reason that it could prevent America from acquiring the opportunity of dealing a first strike at the Soviet Union. I will never forget the way an Air Force colonel lectured me to the effect that we should have used nuclear bombs on the Soviets at the end of the 1940s before they themselves had acquired that weapon. He told me that if SALT were to fail we would soon gain once again the opportunity to use nuclear bombs against them and that this time we should make use of this opportunity."

It is no accident, therefore, that it was precisely SALT II that the opponents of detente made the main target of their counterattack. This treaty made it harder for the more adventuristic forces in the United States to achieve their cherished objective--to unleash a nuclear war on the socialist world.

Mobilization of Forces

The troubadours of the new cold war round gradually rallied their ranks more and more tightly. A sufficiently strong, although initially small group of U.S. noted individuals developed, which began to hold meetings on a permanent basis. In addition to Rostow and Nitze, it included J. Schlesinger, who had been dismissed by President Ford as defense secretary, for holding excessively militaristic views, even from the president's viewpoint, Texas banker Ch. Walker, former deputy secretary of the treasury in the Nixon administration, California magnate D. Packard, head of the Hewlett-Packard Company and formerly deputy secretary of defense and, finally, H. Fowler, former secretary of the treasury in the Johnson administration. Urging one another on with talks about the "Soviet threat," and planning a new round in the arms race in the United States, they were promoting the creation of a political organization which could launch a frontal attack on detente.

The "Committee on the Present Danger" was created on the initiative of this group in Washington, in November 1976. It was named after an organization which had been set up at the beginning of the 1950s and which, joining the Truman administration, was exerting pressure with a view to increasing military appropriations and had succeeded in tripling them! The leadership and the members of the reborn committee deserve special consideration. Three of its members became co-chairmen. The first of them, D. Packard, was, in addition to his California interests, closely linked to the main powers on Wall Street. He was a member of the international committee of Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank, and one of the directors of Standard Oil of California and Morgan's U.S. Steel. The second co-chairman, H. Fowler, was a partner in the Wall Street brokerage of Goldman-Saks and a regent of the Morgan-related Carnegie Foundation. Finally, the third co-chairman was L. Kirkland, the treasurer (and currently the head) of the AF of L-CIO, the American trade unions organization. The character of this so-called "defender of the interests of the American working people," is confirmed by the fact that he was a member of the boards of the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations. E. Rostow became chairman of the executive committee of the new organization, while P. Nitze headed its political research. Incidentally, the latter had spent more than a decade at work at the Dillon-Reed Wall Street brokerage, and was married to the heiress of one of the founders of Rockefeller's Mobil Oil Company.

The study of the initial committee membership (numbering 141 people) showed that two other factions within the ruling class were quite heavily represented, factions which from the very beginning had pioneered the resumption of the cold war--"neoconservative" ideologues and military practitioners. Members of "think tanks" working on ideological and political problems were heavily represented precisely by "hawks:" Georgetown University (seven members), Stanford (five) and the American Enterprise Institute. In turn, the generals were represented in the committee by illustrious names including two former commanders in chief of NATO forces in Europe, two deputy defense secretaries, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy, not to mention less important generals.

Furthermore, there was another striking coincidence which distinguished the committee from many other reactionary organizations which were beginning to appear in the United States and, as proved to be the case later, which played a decisive role in the fact that the majority of American leading circles

switched to extreme nationalistic and militaristic positions. From the very beginning, the committee represented the extreme right wing of the most important operational center of the largest transoceanic magnates influencing U.S. foreign policy--the New York Council on Foreign Relations.

In the 1970s, as before, the members of the council, which was supported by the Eastern Seaboard groups of the American financial oligarchy, the Rockefeller, Morgan and Ford groups above all, had remained the backbone of all new political organizations of American business. Thus, the leading organ (the "Policy Formulation Committee"), which was created in 1972 by the "Business Round Table" organization, which rallied the heads of the 200 largest American companies, had half its members come from the Council on Foreign Relations. Sixty percent of the American membership of the so-called Trilateral Commission, which had been established above all through the efforts of the Rockefellers in 1972, were also council members. That is why it is no accident but quite natural that 40 percent of the membership and two-thirds of the leadership of the "Committee on the Present Danger," in 1976, were also its members.

It is true that the "Business Round Table" dealt mainly with American domestic political and economic problems. In a few years the Trilateral Commission became the main instrument of big business in U.S. foreign policy. Adding to the slogan of "cooperation" with the Soviet Union the words "and competition," it gave the impetus for withdrawal from detente. However, under those circumstances, given its open reliance on direct confrontation with the socialist world, the "Committee on the Present Danger" was nevertheless way ahead. At that time, as THE NEW YORK TIMES said, such a slogan was still a "cry in the wilderness," in terms of the predominant mood of the majority of U.S. ruling circles. Characteristically, the committee was created not "from above"--under the guidance of the Council on Foreign Relations, as had been the case with the Trilateral Commission, but "from below," and included no more than about 3 percent of the council's membership. Nevertheless, the views of the "Committee on the Present Danger" began to metastacize ever more dangerously.

The Cancer Grows

Having gathered strength, the "Committee for Present Danger" engaged in tempestuous efforts in inflating the "psychological warfare" against the Soviet Union. Some of its pamphlets (such as "What Does the Soviet Union Plan?") were openly aimed at fanning militaristic hysteria in the United States. Others (such as "Will America Become No 2?") aimed at the base nationalistic feelings of the American petit bourgeois. The core of the committee's political program, and its target No 1 was to undermine the very possibility of the conclusion of the SALT II treaty. In pursuit of nuclear superiority, the "hawks" hoped to blast the main foundation for normalizing relations between the USSR and the United States, thus causing detente irreparable damage.

On the eve of the 1976 presidential elections the "Committee on the Present Danger" opposed President Ford's reelection, considering his program excessively moderate. In a letter to Schlesinger, dated May 1976, Rostow openly counseled pitting Reagan against Ford and drafting for his benefit "the base of a possible speech." However, the hope of promoting Reagan as the official Republican candidate for the presidency was not be be. After Carter's victory a seemingly dark period came for the committee. A committee leadership delegation, which had visited Carter in August 1977, had been "despondent" as the press noted because of the president's arguments that U.S. public opinion would not support increased military expenditures.

At that point the Committee on the Present Danger changed its tactics, converting to an extensive systematic campaign to promote its views, encouraging nationalistic and conservative feelings. It focused particular efforts on changing the very way of thinking in the main foreign policy "brain center" of the U.S. ruling class--the Council on Foreign Relations out of which, strictly speaking, it had come. Nitze, Pipes, Perle, Klein, Zumwalt and other committee members frequently spoke at council meetings mainly on Soviet (or, rather, anti-Soviet) topics. They were joined by previously silent members of the "related" committee of the Center for International and Strategic Studies of Georgetown University--Crocker, Highland and others.

During the period of detente the strategic concept held by the Council on Foreign Relations was the doctrine of "world order." Its most important component was the idea that the preservation of international peace and security was impossible without a certain cooperation with the Soviet Union. The effort to forecase international events for a 10- to 15-year period ("Project for the '80s"), undertaken by the council in the mid-1970s, on that basis, was also relatively well-weighed. However, common sense and sensible voices became increasingly weak until 1979, when the project was declared "naive" and "insufficiently groun i in political realities." The problems of ideological justification of the new round in the arms race and the hardening of the policy "from a position of strength" found their place on the council's agenda.

Under those circumstances the Committee on the Present Danger became energized even further. In July 1980 a delegation of leading committee members visited Reagan, who had become by then the official Republican party candidate. As the American press wrote, "he was told that the country must engage in extensive military rearmament and undertake to resume the policy of containment of the Soviet Union." After Reagan had won the elections, as an American journalist wrote, "the view of the Committee on the Present Danger on the subject of peace seemed to become national policy." Actually, it did not merely seem that way.

The Hour Struck

The point was not only that committee member Reagan had become president of the United States. Several dozen committee members showed up in the highest governmental positions. They rapidly became part of the fabric of institutions which made key foreign political decisions and assumed their effective control. A study of the administrative positions they hold indicates that the members of the Committee on the Present Danger assumed control over the basic mechanisms related to the implementation by American imperialism in the international arena of a policy of force and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and government authorities the domination of which presented them with great opportunities to block within the administration the very possibility of taking steps toward peace, cooperation and disarmament.

The U.S. National Security Council, the Pentagon and the CIA were the main bases of the brigade of fierce anti-Soviets. R. Allen was the first to take over the National Security Council, while R. Pipes became the council's chief expert on problems related to the Soviet Union. J. Kemp, another committee member, was put in charge of handling U.S. Middle East policy.

Members of the Committee on the Present Danger took over equally important positions in the Pentagon. F. Ickle became deputy secretary of defense for planning policy and took as his assistant R. Stillwell, another committee member. R. Perle became deputy secretary of defense for problems of "international security." Committee member J. Lehmann became secretary of the navy, while A. Heber became assistant secretary of defense for scientific research. Finally, W. Casey, another committee member, became head of the CIA, while eight other members accounted for almost one-half of the consultative authority under the U.S. president on problems of foreign intelligence.

The concentrated takeover by committee members of leading positions related to disarmament talks blocked tightly possibilities of achieving any major progress whatsoever in this area. E. Rostow became director of the Armaments and Disarmament Agency, while J. Douglas became his deputy. W. van Kleeve was promoted chairman of the committee advising the agency. In turn, Nitze was appointed U.S. representative to the Soviet-American talks on mediumrange nuclear missiles in Europe. Even such a newspaper as THE NEW YORK TIMES was forced to note that "virtually every senior official in the administration, dealing with limiting strategic armaments, is an opponent of the 1979 treaty," i.e., of SALT II. The noted American historian A. Schlesinger, former adviser to President Kennedy, exclaimed on this subject that "allowing Rostow and Nitze to discuss armament control with the Russians -- my God! It is like sending someone suffering from typhoid fever to fight the epidemic!" That same Rostow openly stated after his appointment that the main thing for the United States is "the total resumption of the policy of containment," and that limiting armaments in general would play a "secondary role."

Finally, committee members took over the most important international channels whose function, strictly speaking, was to smooth clashes between countries and promote mutual cooperation. J. Kirkpatrick became permanent U.S. delegate to the United Nations, while K. Adelman became her senior deputy. M. Novak became the U.S. representative to the UN Human Rights Commission. M. Kampelman was appointed representative to the Madrid talks on the implementation of the Helsinki accords. Immediately following their appointments, these U.S. officials mounted an unrestrained campaign of slander and a real "witch hunt" directed above all against the USSR and other socialist countries. The members of the Committee on the Present Danger do not have in the least a monopoly on the initiative of generating cold war waves within the Republican administration. Those around them share their overall spirit. However, even under these circumstances the committee members stand out with their extremist views. Their "personal" contribution to the administration's policy is, specifically, their aspiration to burn all bridges of cooperation between East and West and urge on the United States into a condition of "permanent war" against the Soviet Union.

Trade as a Club

The advent of the Reagan administration to power marked the triumph of reliance on force not only in foreign policy but in an area in which one might think practical interests of American business would prevail. We are referring to foreign economic relations between the United States and the socialist countries, the USSR above all. The journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS openly noted at the beginning of 1982 that a "virtually complete turn" had taken place in the U.S. approach to trade with the Soviet Union. Whereas previously, according to the journal, the United States considered such trade "one of the keys if not the main key to reaching a policy of agreement with Moscow, now it is considered as a means for the adoption of "punitive sanctions." As was to be expected, the committee members were among the pioneers and most active participants in promoting this "turn."

Starting in the autumn of 1978 the Council on Foreign Relations set up a special group to study nominally the role of the Soviet Union in world economics. "The reinterpretation of the problem of trade and payments" involving the USSR was the more prosaic topic discussed at one of its meetings. The meaning of the group's activities became clear when one of its participants, R. Vernon, published in the summer of 1979 in the journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS, an article symbolically entitled "Brittle Foundations of East-West Trade." In calling for the breaking of trade relations, the author formulated as a justification the thesis to the effect that the Soviet Union received from such trade "disproportional" benefits, for the "social profit" of the USSR is considerably higher than the "private profit" of the individual American companies which, furthermore, compete against each other, while the USSR can pursue a centralized line. It is easy to note that the Soviet Union was thus "accused" of possessing advantages stemming from its social-ist social system and foreign trade monopoly.

Other studies of East-West trade were published in the United States, quite clearly revealing the hopes of American imperialism of using, among others, Soviet imports of American technology for the purpose of undermining the Soviet economy. In their view, Soviet imports of such technology could "be used as crutches on which the patient will become dependent to such an extent that he would be unable to reject them and walk without their help." However, the Soviet Union did not fall into this dangerous trap. This was yet another reason for the conclusion that trade with the Soviet Union had to be ended. Awareness of their own helplessness triggered increasing anger in the respective U.S. circles, and only after a few months in power the Reagan administration organized the undermining of trade with the Soviet Union on a planned basis. However, its initial attempt to force the U.S. allies as well to convert trade and economic relations with the USSR into a cold war weapon, made at the summit conference of seven Western countries in Ottawa, in July 1981, was unsuccessful. Incidentally, at the meeting held by the U.S. National Security Council, preceding that in Ottawa, the Pentagon suggested that naked pressure be exerted on the allies to make them follow in Washington's fairway. The means suggested were so unceremonious as to embarrass most of those attending the session. The only ones among them who supported the Pentagon line in full were W. Casey and J. Kirkpatrick, i.e., two members of the Committee on the Present Danger.

The Ottawa failure did not disturb the American administration, which undertook to pressure its allies. In January 1982 a special American delegation was sent to Western Europe with the task of wrecking East-West trade. It was headed by J. Buckley, while F. Ickle was its second most influential member. The Buckley-Ickle delegation made another trip to the Western European capitals in March 1982, this time to promote "possible new economic sanctions" against the Soviet Union. It was actually a question of blocking the laying of the Urengoy-Western Europe gas pipeline and stopping Western credit to the USSR. The shameless overseas pressure and blackmail failed. The Western European countries, interested in the building of the pipeline, rejected the efforts of the American administration. The latter had to backtrack and reluctantly to lift the "sanctions." Washington suffered a major political defeat in this "important strategic problem," as Washington had officially described its subversive action, which was to last for the duration of this century.

The militant anti-Soviet forces within the American administration, however, did not lay down their arms. They are fiercely trying to change the very nature of trade relations between the West and the Soviet Union. Whereas the official slogan of the 1964-1965 World Fair in New York was "Peace Through Trade," the Reagan administration essentially raised the slogan of "Trade-Economic War on the Socialist World."

A Course of Perpetuating War

A course of "open confrontation" between the United States and the USSR on a global and regional scale became the COTE of the "new military strategy" of the Reagan administration. However, its structural component is the concept of "active counteraction" with the help of the multivariant use of strategic nuclear weapons. Another one is the concept of "geographic escalation." THE NEW YORK TIMES notes that the essence of the "geographic" or, as it is also known, "horizontal" escalation concept is the following: "Under the cover of the resurrected nuclear containment weapons, the American armed forces must be ready to fight with conventional weapons in a protracted global conflict." In this respect the strategic doctrine of the Reagan administration is directly indebted to two members of the Committee on the Present Danger holding leading positions in the Pentagon--F. Ickle and J. Lemon. The former was described by THE WASHINGTON POST as the "intellectual sponsor" of the idea of "protracted warfare."

Indeed, as early as the middle of 1980, as adviser to Reagan, the candidate for the presidency, Ickle was the first to formulate the concept that the United States must mandatorily convert the confrontation with the Soviet Union into a "protracted" military conflict, in the course of which it will acquire the possibility and time to organize on a mass basis a war industry output. Ickle emphasized that the United States cannot tolerate a "passive and indifferent attitude toward the political coloring of the world map," but must retain a "superiority in terms of territorial and resource safety" simultaneously "in several parts of the world." Such was the cynical prescription for initiating a power confrontation with the USSR and above all for "bringing order" in the "rear" of American military structures along the entire perimeter of the intended global clash. It was precisely to this effect that the key role, according to Ickle, was to be assumed by the U.S. Navy. It was no accident, therefore, that its new secretary J. Lemon, proclaimed straight off that the United States had to achieve "naval superiority."

The plans of American imperialism for an unrestrained arms race began rapidly to acquire substance. It was proclaimed that the U.S. Navy will be increased by one-third and the number of navy ships raised to 600. In his militaristic excitement Lemon told newsmen that he intended in general to "block the Soviet navy" in order to prevent it from hindering his operations. At the same time, plans were drafted according to which in the first year of war with the Soviet Union the United States ("as in the Korean War") would double or triple its war output and in 3 years ("as in World War II") would increase it by a factor of 8. According to other plans the waging of a "protracted war" on the USSR and world socialism at large would triple the American budget and would channel to this purpose one-half of the country's gross national product.

By the end of 1982 the plan had been divided into three specific stages: "horizontal escalation," "global conflict" and "protracted warfare." According to Pentagon estimates, preparations for its implementation alone required the appropriation of an additional \$750 billion to the Reagan administration's already planned unprecedented 5-year military expenditures totaling \$1.6 trillion. Such concepts are no longer merely irresponsible. This is not even "teetering on the brink of war." It is an insame gamble on a world war.

The 'Hawks' Attack

Having made their nest at the peaks of official power in Washington and charted a course of total confrontation with the socialist world, the "hawks" of anti-detente and militarism are zealously seeing to it that with every passing day U.S. policy becomes more aggressive. They are expressing their open discontent at any deviation from this path. As of the spring of 1981, intensifying their efforts, the members of the Committee on the Present Danger mounted a general offensive within and "ithout the administration for the implementation of their adventuristic plans. R. Perle, for example, openly proclaimed that in relations with the Soviet Union the policy of detente "was a wrong policy and is wrong today and that, in general, this is not our policy." R. Pipes is already calling for practical preparations for nuclear war the likelihood of which, according to him, has reached the 40 percent figure. In addressing a Senate committee, F. Ickle emphasized that increased U.S. defense expenditures must be "considerably greater than is currently proposed by the administration."

The Committee on the Present Danger increased its pressure on the administration from the outside as well. According to E. Rostow, currently the committee's activities are focused not only on keeping the administration along a militaristic course in general, but also to "spank" it "if it deserves it" because of insufficient zeal in this respect. Thus, in March 1982 the committee stated that U.S. military expenditures are barely "minimal," for which reason they should be increased drastically. A decisive step was taken in May. N. Podhoretz published in THE NEW YORK TIMES a long article entitled "The Torment of Neoconservatives Regarding Reagan's Foreign Policy." It sharply criticized the administration for its failure to succeed in deploying "American ground forces" in the Persian Gulf, had allowed itself to "find itself in a defensive position in Central America" and, above all, for its insufficiently energetic confrontation with the Soviet Union. Proclaiming that the "neoconservatives" find themselves as a result of all this "in a state of virtual political despair," Podhoretz expressed "hope for a miracle" -- for the fact that the Reagan administration would "correct" its "errors." Informed of the article, President Reag n personally telephoned the author to assure him that the American policy was not one of detente. Actually, this was merely the beginning of a new, dangerous turn in the course pursued by official Washington under the pressure of extremist forces. In London on 8 June and in the United Nations on 17 June the U.S. President delivered speeches the main line of which was unrestrained anti-Sovietism.

However, even this did not satisfy the hawks. They immediately undertook to exert further pressure on the administration. Secretary of State A. Haig became one of their targets. In the middle of June 1982 G. Will published in NEWSWEEK on the need to fight "crawling Haigianism." On 18 June a decisive meeting between Haig and representatives of right-wing forces took place in Washington. It was attended not only by leaders of the "neoconservatives" and members of the Committee on the Present Danger (N. Podhoretz, I. Christol, M. Novak) but also by one of the leaders of the extreme right, R. Viguerie. According to press reports, a "unanimous agreement" was reached at the meeting: Haig was to go. He resigned 1 week later. It is noteworthy that he was replaced by Shultz, one of the founders of the Committee on the Present Danger, who appointed as his deputy another committee member, A. Wollis.

However, the facts prove that the committee members themselves are not entirely unanimous on problems of U.S. foreign policy. This was clearly manifested by the resignation of E. Rostow from the position of director of the Disarmament Control Agency, who was one of the main initiators of the creation of the committee. The current situation, marked by the fact that the power in the United States is in the hands of circles the unrestrained adventurism of which, it would seem, should make inadmissible the very idea of their running the leading capitalist power, is not only dangerous but profoundly unnatural in the nuclear century. For understandable reasons, the ideals of cannibals cannot attract willing supporters. It is becoming increasingly clear to the simple Americans that the only "prospect" offered by the pathological anti-Soviets is the conflagration of an annihilating nuclear conflict. The suicidal juggling with the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war is triggering an opposite effect, creating concern and condemnation among broad American circles. As the noted American observer J. Reston has pointed out, against this background "important discussions" on a national scale have begun in the United States, unlike anything similar during at least the past 50 years.

The essence of the debate which is currently under way in the United States is the prevalence of common sense or muscle power, consolidation of peace or nuclear catastrophe. For the first time in the history of that country, millions of people are participating in the debate. The sympathy of the rank-and-file Americans is not on the side of the members of the administration who are dangling nuclear bombs over their heads and over the entire world.

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5003 CSO: 1802/8 WORK - DUTY AND OBLIGATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 83 pp 105-107

[Letter to the editor by L. Odinokova, Laureate of USSR State Prize, head of procurement brigade, Parizhskaya Kommuna Shoe Factory in Moscow]

[Text] The majority of Soviet people work conscientiously, with total dedication. This makes time wasters, loafers, drunks, rolling stones in search of easy work and avoidance of socially useful labor even less tolerable. The collective of our Parizhskaya Kommuna Factory welcomed the speech by Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, to the effect that a decisive struggle must be waged against any violations of discipline, labor discipline included, with complete understanding and approval.

The main way to strengthen it is through the educational influence of the worker collective, i's principle-minded position and strict exigency. This means the skillful combination of moral and material incentives and good labor organization, for it is accurately said that discipline begins with order at work.

Today any collective can precisely gauge an individual's amount of labor and personal contribution. The use of brigade labor methods of organization and wages is particularly important in this case. We must say that they have become particularly widespread in the shops and brigades of Parizhskava Kommuna. They have enabled us to increase the results of cooperation, facilitate management, greatly improve unity between personal and public interests and create an atmosphere of reciprocal support and intolerance toward labor discipline violators. Brigade councils function at each flow. consisting of the most skilled workers. The councils determine the rating and wages of every individual worker, taking into consideration not only the worker's skill and complexity of job but discipline and attitude toward assignments (the range of the labor participation coefficient ranges from 0.7 to 1.3. In other words, a worker can earn from 70 to 130 percent of her wage). In our factory idlers and loafers cannot hide behind other people's backs. At brigade council meetings they are told the unvarnished truth and are paid only for what they have earned.

The influence of public opinion on the careless, and collective responsibility for results have a very tangible effect on production. A study has shown that disciplinary violations have dropped by 30-40 percent, the young workers are mastering their jobs more quickly, labor productivity is rising noticeably and earnings are substantially higher compared with sectors still working on a piece rate basis.

All of this has unquestionably contributed to the fact that the Red Challenge Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU and Komsomol Central Committee was awarded to the Zarya Shoe-Manufacturing Association, of which our factory is a part, for successes in the competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. Parizhskaya Kommuna, the head enterprise, reached the level planned for the end of 1985 during the second year of the five-year plan -- its production of shoes with the Emblem of Quality reached 60 percent and labor productivity increased five percent. Having confirmed the efficiency of brigade methods of labor organization and wages, the factory has decided to extend their practice to 80 percent of all vorkers by the end of 1983 and the entire collective by the end of the five-year plan.

Still.... Unfortunately working time losses still exist. People still remain different. Not all of them feel the inner need to apply the universal norms of behavior at work and not all of them feel pangs of conscience or guilt when they violate them. For a variety of reasons, even material incentives do not always produce the necessary results.

I have worked at Parizhskaya Kommuna for 18 years. I cannot even imagine how one could be late for work, not to mention being absent. However, some workers, mostly young, do commit such acts, and when someone scolds them they frequently answer without a twinge of conscience, "So what? None of your business! It is I and not you who'll get paid less!" And indeed, many of our workers earn 180-200 rubles (skillful and fast ones can earn up to 250 rubles for excellent quality work), while others barely manage to "scrape up" a 100 rubles.

The price of such "philosophy" is quite high for all concerned. Delayed deliveries of raw materials, semi-finished goods and complementing items trigger a chain reaction of idling or work stress on the part of honest workers. Output drops, its quality worsens and earnings decline.

Disorder and impunity are the results not only of an atmosphere of reciprocal forgiveness but also largely the fact that the violators are not always properly chastized. Unfortunately such measures are not always taken.

Actually, what kind of measures could we use against such slovenly individuals? We could assign them a low labor participation coefficient and withold 15-20 rubles from their monthly wage. But this hardly affects them, for soft-hearted mothers send clothing, shoes and money to their children. Thus, quite innocently, the parents sometimes "program" in them the mentality of the loafer and prevent them from acquiring the main virtue -- working well.

At the meetings which were held to discuss the materials of the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the workers in literally every shop pointed out that both conscientious workers and idlers enjoy the same benefits and, in particular, the same length of paid leave. In my view, the total days of absenteism should be taken into consideration and substracted from the amount of paid leave (no distinction is made now between those who were absent one shift or an entire week). Such punishment would be felt immediately by a sloppy individual. In our factory, in particular, the leave granted to many workers has been extended from 15 to 18 days, with an additional day added per each year of work (after the first 3 years). This has offered greater opportunities to those who would like to rest in the southern part of the country or the Baltic area, to take a long tourist trip, etc. Unwittingly, we would question the worth of depriving ourselves of such vivid impressions which we would long remember.

Many factory workers have parents living in the Moscow area and in Tulsk and other oblasts. The girls visit them on Sundays and holidays. Occasionally some of them are unable to show up for work at 7 am and come at noon for valid reasons (inability to procure railroad tickets, etc.). Most of them immediately report to the shop chief who allows them to work the evening shift. Those who have come late by accident work conscientiously, realizing that there is a shortage of workers along the line, that along the conveyor belt everyone depends on everyone else, and that anyone missing in a given operation must have a replacement. Naturally, other legitimate reasons exist as well as a result of which workers do not work their shift by permission of the administration. However, such workers deem it their duty to pay off their obligation, which they do voluntarily, without prompting.

I think that leave of absence must be mandatorily worked off and that those guilty of absenteism should be made to work off the time they have actually wasted, at lower wages in accordance with the damage they have caused.

Let us particularly mention some individuals who loaf or engage in long bouts of drinking and even openly state their unwillingness to work: "Work can kill a horse but nobody ever died of too much sleep." As one goes to work at 0730 hours they are already in line at the canteen, waiting for the clerks to bring them their alcohol (which, incidentally, they frequently do). These are frequently men of an age when people are usually full of strength and energy and rich in labor experience and expertise. Such people have either not acquired such experience or have wasted it not only by failing to work over long periods of time but preventing honest people to work and corrupting the youth. Although such parasites are to be pitied (for many of them have no family and support themselves through sporadic work) they are mostly worthy of anger and scorn.

Let me say that such cases are the exception. However, not so long ago occasionally people whose labor record showed two or even three dismissals would apply to the factory. What is most amazing is that they had been dismissed at their own request! One of them -- a fitter-plumber got drunk and got up to mischief after a month and a half at work. However, he was the first to lose control when the order of his dismissal was issued: "What's with you? I have always worked properly. I will complain and have them dismiss me at my own request." The factory, however, disagreed and the same type of firmness was shown on several other similar occasions. Now drunkards and loafers are even afraid to apply for work. If all enterprises were to obey the laws the labor record would provide an objective description of its owners. I have mentioned only the most inveterate cases, although there are some who have either not become accustomed to or are unwilling to work. Recently two new girls came to work in our shop. They were both frivolous and had already changed jobs twice. What do you think? One of them brought a tape recorder to work. She put it on the floor by her feet. You see, she needed music. We tried to talk them out of it, to educate them, but they simply quit.

Naturally, becoming part of a labor collective is no simple matter for a novice. It demands the support, understanding and exigency of the others to whom the novice must become used. Otherwise thoughtlessness and flippancy in such loafers only increase. But how to influence them if they quit after a couple of weeks and their exposure to skills at various jobs proves to be too short? How can someone be straightened out in such a short time, made to believe in his own forces, share with him the joy of his first success? Obviously, the efforts of the collective are ineffective and legal measures must be used to prevent the transfer of drifters from one enterprise to another.

It is such "workers" who poison our lives and sometimes even prevent us from resting. One such loafer lives on the floor above one of our workers in Shop No 4. Her two children live with their grandmother elsewhere. She gives drunken parties which last until 2 or 3 am. Naturally, our worker is unable to sleep and comes to work with a headache. The militia is perfectly aware of the existence of this idler, and although the tenants have reported her, the only answer has been "Use your own influence, educate her." Just try to do so! She answers with curses.

In my view, our laws are too humane. The first (and not the last) warning is issued to an idler only after a 3-month absenteism. Why not have the militia or the rayon executive committee keep a special eye on such people and mandatorily assign them jobs within a 10-day period? Given the manpower shortage, this would remedy the situation quite adequately. Should such people fail to go to work within that period they should be mandatorily ordered to do so.

Parishskaya Kommuna is among the initiators of Moscow's patriotic initiative of further strengthening labor and production discipline and creating a total atmosphere of exigency, high-level organization and strict observance of the moral principles of living and working in a model communist city.

The struggle for strengthening discipline demands not loud words but specific action. The entire collective should tirelessly fight disorderliness and irresponsibility. If the people remain silent they are in fact supporting such vices and doing the work of the absenteists, waste-makers and slackers, sharing with them the moral and material successes achieved without their participation. "Working time is for work!" This principle must be honored throughout the work shift. Its implementation requires no additional funds or resources, but applied daily would yield substantial results and tremendous benefits to society at large and each Soviet individual.

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5003 CSO: 1802/8 USE OF POWER

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 83 pp 107-109

[Letter to the editor by A. Kuz'minykh]

[Text] I would like to submit as a topic for discussion the complex and sore problem of strengthening labor discipline. I have been employed for almost 30 years as worker, foreman, and section and shop chief (including 25 years at Uralmash), so that I have not only reflected on this subject but have experienced it personally.

I have frequently appealed, written, had difficulties and frequently promised myself not to worry. Still, I am deeply convinced that labor discipline is one of the main links in the chain of problems the solution of which, firmly and daringly undertaken, will enable us to upgrade the efficiency of the entire national economy. At the present stage in our development, the party calls for achieving high rates of economic growth not only by quantitatively increasing production forces but by ensuring their more qualitative use. This problem can be successfully resolved only if we are able to make better use of the work of every working person, machine and ton of raw materials.

Bearing in mind the limited nature of manpower, the increased cost of idling and unconscientiousness (the loss of a single minute of working time on a national scale is the equivalent of the loss of the daily work of 200,000 workers), we must decisively change the ways and means used in strengthening labor discipline in all areas and levels of work.

The question of how to accomplish this better is frequently raised in the press: "To force" or "to interest?" In my view, this is as stupid as the question of which foot is more important to a person: the left or the right? Man needs both in order to walk. Similarly, strengthening the discipline requires the use of persuation, material and moral incentive and coercion.

We can be proud of the fact that within a short historical period we were able to convert from capitalist forced to conscious socialist discipline. A conscientious attitude toward labor has become the norm of the absolute majority of Soviet people, a force of habit. The steadily improving moral and material incentive system makes what is good for society good for the collective and the individual working person (although, unfortunately, by far not everything possible has been done in this respect). But there still are people whom it is useless to convince of the need to work honestly or to encourage. The negligent are blamed at meetings, criticized in "flashes," "Komsomol Beacons" and people's control leaflets and called upon to work better, as though asked a favor. Frequently, however, this does not help. Malicious time-wasters and drifters must be forced to fulfill their duty to society through administrative and economic methods. Some of them are indeed being used (loss of bonuses and earnings based on annual results, or priority in obtaining housing). Nevertheless, in my view, the effective levers used to influence labor discipline violators in labor laws are insufficient.

Today time-wasters and waste-makers are not held fully liable for working time losses and the damages they cause (particularly at enterprises and organizations in which material incentive funds are not formed for one reason or another). According to the law, a worker is liable for the full material damage caused only by the decision of the court. If such damages do not exceed one third of the salary, compensation is based on the decision of the administration and the written acceptance on the part of the worker. This is hardly correct. Unless the administration has a full-time legal counsel it simply lack the time to go to court. And what sloppy individual would agree voluntarily to have anything deducted from his wage for faulty production or ruining a machine tool? In general, no damages are demanded of a truant for equipment idling. I believe that as we go on working and improving labor legislation it would be expedient to make suitable changes. For example, if the amount of material damages is less than one third of the wage it should be deducted from it without the agreement of the culprit. Let him go to court himself and dispute the decision if he deems it unfair.

The administration has the right to transfer to lower paid work for a period of no more than 3 months malicious violators of labor discipline or drunks, with the concurrence of the trade union (shop) committee. Here again, however, we face the legal stipulation of "in accordance with skills." Why not have the right to assign such workers auxiliary or janitorial positions, i.e., a job regardless of profession or skill? In such a case the moral would be added to the material factor.

The time has clearly come to allow the social organizations as well to make firmer use of levers of material and administrative influence against malicious truants and drunks. Today comrade courts in particular have no powers whatsoever other than reprimands and persuation. No measures can be taken against a discipline violator who refuses even to show up in court. I believe that comrade courts should pass on to the people's courts the cases of the most inveterate culprits (the people's court could put them on probation or assign them mandatory jobs), while habitual drunks would be given mandatory treatment.

Someone may sensibly object that such measures are simply impossible to enforce, for discipline violators would move to wherever life is easier. Indeed, when charged, truants, waste-makers and drunks often claim that "Another enterprise would grab me." Considering the manpower shortage, they are in fact hired with open arms and sometimes even at a higher salary. Eventually, with the help of such a trial and error method, they find jobs in which they can work less and earn more. Later they get higher pensions since they depend on the wages earned during the final work years.

Such rascals must be deprives of this opportunity. To begin with, it would be expedient to allow someone to resign only after the truant or waste-maker has mandatorily worked off all the daily or shift working time he has lost and has paid for the material damages he has caused. This would force him to consider his actions more seriously. (Unfortunately, so far we have no reliable data on intrashift losses. Such records are kept by the foremen who frequently fail to indicate in their reports equipment idling due, for instance, to the fact that the workers left 1 hour before the shift ended, or who conceal other cases of labor discipline or order violations. A peculiar protective reflex develops in the sense that they are unwilling to appear in a worse light compared to others. Furthermore, such violations frequently result in the loss of the monthly bonus of the subdivision manager after the results of the intraplant competition are drawn up.)

Secondly, discipline violators may be fired only after their actions have been discussed at worker meetings and are issued a work reference which they must mandatorily submit when applying for another job.

Finally, it would be expedient to pass a law according to which a person fired for truancy can be hired only through an employment office (rather than by personnel departments) and only under worse working conditions and a lower wage. In order to wage an effective struggle against drifters and to reduce cadre turnover, no more than one resignation per year without objective reasons should be allowed (army service, education, illness, retirement, etc.). This would not affect in the least the interests of honest workers but would restrict those who love to hop from one enterprise to another.

The USSR Constitution codifies not only the right to work but everyone's obligation to do so. In the big industrial cities, however, one comes across hunereds of registered (with militia records) idlers, every one among them a potential criminal. The militia is helpless in the struggle against them. According to the law, coercive measures may be taken only after the person has not held a job for 6 months (providing that his name is on record with the militia). After 6 months the loafer finds himself a job at some enterprise for a week, shows to the militia a certificate to this effect, and then once again loafs undisturbed, joining the ranks of drunks and criminals.

Such "workers" have a disastrous influence on discipline as a whole. They erode its principles, reduce ideological and educational work to naught, and corrupt the youth. That is why the struggle against them is the main, primary and most import feature in the struggle for strengthening discipline as a whole.

In my view, in recent years the courts have abandonned one of their most important tasks — ensuring discipline and self-discipline in production. For example, we punish someone for the theft of a few packs of cigarettes through the courts. This is proper and necessary. But then why are we so reluctant to prosecute people who violate the legal obligation to work, who drift from one job to another dozens of times every year (remaining practically unemployed), who are chronic truants and drunks, and who demean the honor and dignity of the Soviet person and cause material damages in the hundreds and thousands of rubles?

It is very good that the time for the application of coercive measures toward out and out loafers has now been reduced to 3 months and that the militia has been given broader rights in the struggle against them. The struggle against anarchy, lack of discipline and slackness cannot be waged through propaganda and agitation, competition and the work of organizers. It must be waged through coercive means as well.

I favor the type of help and a good attitude toward a person which will not weaken him or encourage his parasitism, but will help return the worker to his job and the father and husband to his family, which will shape the character of the working person and give him a worthy life and happiness of all kinds. As we know, happiness is the lot of those who work well.

The author of these lines does not claim infallibility. Practice, however, is the yardstick of truth. Thirty years of work in material production give me the modest right to think that I have acquired a certain degree of competence in this matter.

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5003 CSO: 1802/8

'BREAD IS THE STAFF OF LIFE'

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian Nc 2, Jan 83 pp 110-115

[Review of letters to the editor]

[Text] Subsequent to the publication of the article "Bread and People" (KOMMUNIST No 6, 1982), a number of letters were received by the editors, expressing views on the subjects discussed in the article. Their importance and relevance and need for further discussion were pointed out in the letters of engineer S. Kipiani, Militia Colonel R. Artamonov (Moscow), pensioner and Great Patriotic War veteran K. Korol' (Minsk), Gossnab worker M. Ures (Gorkiy), medical school instructor G. Bikson (Riga) and many others.

These answers express warm feelings toward those who meet man's daily needs for a most valuable food product through their labor, the tremendous importance of bread in human life, and the need to develop a thrifty attitude toward it and an awareness of its true value. The readers submit suggestions on how to save on bread and reduce waste to a minimum and how to maintain the freshness of the bread better and prevent its staleness. Many critical remarks are addressed to those who fail to ensure the necessary quality of bakery goods, allow waste and fail to provide the necessary variety.

The value of bread! Many readers justifiably write that this concept is of essentially moral and frequently political significance. A disrespectful and scornful attitude toward bread is an indication of lack of standards and education and basic lack of understanding of the true value of this resource which is the focal point of tremendous physical and spiritual outlays related to its production and the dedicated work of selection workers, agronomists, tractor and combine operators, drivers, millers and bakers.

G. Savitskas, deputy editor of TIYESA, the Lithuanian republic newspaper, writes:

"Our newspaper publishes frequent articles on the attitude toward bread. It was precisely letters to the editor that dictated the article "It Is Not the Wind Which Brings Us Bread." The Lithuanians have a good custom: anyone who accidentally drops a piece of bread must pick it up and kiss it. This is a ritual dictate by folk wisdom. The people must be helped to reach the moral heights from which they approach the results of the work of their grain growers. We must look more frequently in the eye the sower, agronomist and combine operator, who grow and harvest the grain, and the miller and baker who turn it into bread for our tables. We must look at them and ask: Have they and we done everything possible to preserve every grain grown with the efforts of so many people?"

M. Malyy, Hero of Socialist Labor and head of a comprehensive turners' brigade at the Chernomorskiy Shipyards, writes:

"Every year we, Black Sea shipbuilders, help the rural working people by building agricultural projects and thus strengthening the technical base of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. At harvest time our mechanized detachment is always in the lead in the battle for the crops. We can firmly say that we, the workers, are aware of the real price of bread. It is the duty of every party member to promote a thrifty attitude toward it. The USSR Food Program, which was adopted at the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum for the period through 1990, makes it incumbent upon us not only comprehensively to contribute to the measures adopted for its implementation but energetically to struggle for the efficient, wise and truly thrifty use of food resources, bread in particular. Everyone must consider it the concentrated expression of our nationwide toil."

Some of the letters describe the positive experience of bakery and bread store and transportation workers and their efforts to meet better the needs of the Soviet people. This is expressed in the production of only high quality goods, observing store delivery schedules and creating proper storing conditions.

V. Lepishenko, head of an electricians' brigade at the Leybur Association in Tallinn, writes:

"In the final account, success in the efforts to improve the quality and freshness of bakery products depends on the efforts of all those engaged in their production." He describes the dedicated work of masters such as N. Karas', N. Mikhel'son, L. Rubanov, M. Semenov and other skillful bakers. "Thanks to their peaceful toil," he writes, "fresh and tasty bread is always available to the citizens."

V. Bezrukov, party bureau secretary at the Lentorgbyttrans Administration, describes the efficient work of transportation workers who are steadily supplying the bakeries with the necessary products for baking the bread and ensuring its prompt delivery to Leningrad stores and cafeterias. The collective displays a very responsible attitude toward its job. It is steadily engaged in the search for and finding progressive ways and means of labor organization and improving services to stores. A new two-story gauge for 400 cars has been completed. Bread is being delivered on a round-theclock basis in accordance with an hourly schedule.

L. Kulinich, secretary of the primary party organization at Kievkhlebtorg reports on some new features in the work of bread stores in the Ukrainian capital: A great deal is being done here always to deliver bread and bakery products while fresh. The bread is transported in containers and delivered to 23 stores; their number will reach 109 by the end of the five-year plan. In many stores the bread is wrapped in special cloth or polyethylene covers. Posters have been displayed everywhere appealing to the population to use bread economically. Recipes are advertised for the use of stale bread. The amount of stale bread returned to the plants has dropped from 0.24 percent in 1979 to 0.14 percent in 1982 (of the overall quantity of goods sold). According to Kievkhlebtorg data, last year the volume of daily sales declined by 20 tons." On the one hand, this is the result of the continuingly changing population diet; on the other, of the efforts of the bakers, who have lowered the weight of the items, the personnel of the bread stores and the thriftier attitude toward the bread on the part of the consumers themselves.

However, to claim that all shortcomings in the matter of the thrifty attitude toward bread have been eliminated would be premature. Complains are still filed regarding the low quality of the goods produced by the baking plants in Gorkiy, Irkutsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts, Krasnoyar Kray and the Moldavian SSR. In many places the quality of the bread is worsening instead of improving. The loaves are deeply cracked and even contain bits of raw dough.

Bread losses in the stores remain high. Many bread stores have air drafts which contribute to the fast aging of baked goods, and more bread than is necessary continues to be ordered, for which reason the stores frequently return the unsold amounts to the bakeries. Sometimes the customers themselves do not estimate their actual daily bread requirements.

The readers angrily condemn people who buy bread to feed cattle and poultry and criticize careless public catering managers who thoughtlessly dump bread leftovers. The elimination of such shortcomings is a tremendous reserve the use of which will contribute to the implementation of the Food Program.

It is extremely important for the planning organs to determine requirements more accurately and to make their computations in such a way as to avoid bread "surpluses," and for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes to grow grain containing the necessary volume of gluten, the millers to supply the bakeries with suitable raw materials, the enterprises to receive only high-quality bread, the transportation workers to deliver the bread on schedule and the stores to provide all the necessary bread-storing facilities.

However, the consumers as well have something to think about: they must determine the amount of truly needed bread. store it in such a way as to prevent its staleness and, should it dry, to see to it that it is not dumped but sent to the livestock farms. Naturally, every family has the obligation to teach its children, from a very early age, a thrifty and respecful attitude toward bread.

It is only by observing these numerous conditions and with the willingness of everyone to reduce losses of this most valuable food staple to a minimum that tangible results can be achieved in saving on bread and resolving the most important problems of the Food Program.

Everyone must be made profoundly aware of Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's statement made at the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum to the effect that "Today the economical and thrifty attitude toward the people's property is a feature of the realistic nature of our plans."

The readers suggest realistic ways for the use of stale bread. It would be a good idea for all bread stores to display posters and have booklets describing easy and simple means for using it in meals. Short publicity films could be shown on the use of such methods.

A number of letters, that of A. Gladchenko, party committee secretary at the Volgograd Production Association for Tractor Plants and Standards, in particular, describe specific practical experience in the use of bread waste: "Our plan has two cafeterias servicing simultaneously 500 people. Naturally, bread consumption is high, although we must point out that it is declining with every passing year, for the menues include a variety of grain and pasta products. In terms of the number of calories as well lunches have greatly improved compared with 3-4 years ago. Nevertheless, the amount of bread leftovers remains high. We have organized strict control over the utilization of every gram of bread. Thus, stale bread us used for croutons, and what remains, together with other food wastes, goes to the auxiliary farm. Many workers bring their bread leftovers from home and put them in special containers by the gate. In the final account, the worker cafeterias receive from the auxiliary farm additional quintals of high-grade meat."

Some readers suggest duplicating the Stavropol experience in opening centers accepting the population's stale bread and opening bakeries next to them. We disagree with this, for sanitary regulations would make it impossible to keep leftovers brought from home nextdoor to fresh bread. However, it would be expedient to open such centers at large house-management offices. Special trucks could collect stale bread at specified times and follow specific itineraries in the microrayons.

Many writers share the view that education in a spirit of thrift remains insufficiently high. Reader A. Bredichevskiy (Perm) writes: "It is a question of being careful with each crumb while developing respect for bread. This moral quality must be promoted by all mass information media." The readers justifiably believe that a thrifty attitude toward bread -- the great national good -- must be developed from childhood, above all in the family and the school. In particular, it is suggested that "bread classes" be taught in school, attended also by those who grow and bake the bread.

Hero of Socialist Labor Z. Ruks, shop chief at the bread combine in Riga suggest the following: "In the schools, urban schools in particular, teachers should describe and show more frequently and thoroughly how difficult the work of the grain grower is and the persistenke and sometimes even heroism necessary to grow the daily bread. From the very first grades the children should be exposed to agriculture, and taken to visit near by kolkhozes and sovkhozes. An awareness must be developed of what we use every day, starting with food products produced through the stubborn efforts of man."

Again and again the readers raise the question of the inadequate variety of bakery goods (as before, demand for small-size items, rolls and crackers remains unsatisfied). Some comrades suggest that more diet bread varieties be produced and are interested in what is being done to develop new types of goods meeting the requirements of modern science. In particular, reader G. Skobeleva (Moscow) asks whether bread with medicinal properties is being produced.

Our editors have been informed by the Bread Baking Industry Scientific Research Association that several developments are currently under way. In particular, bread with added dairy protein is being produced for diabetics. Low-calorie bread is being baked for overweight people. According to the specialists, "lunch bread" (a temporary description) seems promising. It is being developed, as are other medical varieties, on the initiative and with the participation of the personnel of the Nutrition Institute. In the past the grain hull was discarded. It as proved, however, that it was here precisely that valuable microelements and vitamins were to be found. Modern equipment makes it possible to grind the hull in such a way as to make it suitable for baking. Bread baked according to the new process has a special taste. It improves the work of the gastrointestinal track and helps to eliminate from the body cancerogenic substances.

In discussing grain-based products, the readers raise other questions related to food products. Following are lines from the letter of G. Chibritova, worker at the Dulevskiy Porcelain Plant:

"I am writing on the subject of macaroni, which are also made of flour. Of late the population has been reluctant to buy and use this product. Low quality is the reason: they are dark-colored and coarse, even in appearance. Cooked, they turn into a thick mush. A macaroni broth is farinaceous, opaque and has a raw smell. The same could be said of other flour goods as well. Let me add that the variety of such products is extremely poor. As an inking worker I paint gold-colored strips to give the product a finished appearance. I love my work and try to avoid rejects. Still I know that however expensive the porcelain we handle may be, it is far less costly than bread in terms of vital importance, which is the main thing. That is why I am always amazed at how wheat flour can be turned into poor-quality macaroni?"

The editors showed this letter to V. Kochergin, chief of the USSR Ministry of Food Industry Bread Baking, Pasta and Yeast Industry. He reacted to the remarks quite energetically and expressed his total agreement with them. The chief of the main administration showed us a case in which samples of macarori, vermicelli, noodles and pasta shells were displayed in two varieties. Those made of hard wheat were amber colored and semi-transparent. This type does not break down, maintains its shape when cooked and yields no precipitate. The other -- floury and porous -- turns into mush when boiled. This is caused by the low content of gluten in soft wheat varieties. Flour from such varieties is disliked by both customers and bakers alike. The production process of pasta goods made of such varieties is also uneconomical. For example, whereas the machines used in making macaroni from hard wheat flour can produce 385 kilograms per hour, their output drops to 57 kilograms when so-called bread-baking flour is used, resulting in products criticized by G. Chibrikova and other readers. Therefore, hard wheat strains are the stumbling block. In order to correct the situation no less than 3 million tons of such wheat is needed annually (incidentally, the bakers as well need hard wheat flour, for, used as an additive, it improves the consistency and taste of the bread and delays staleness). The llth Five-Year Plan calls for annual purchases of 2.3 million tons of hard wheat, i.e., the demand of food processors remains systematically unfulfilled. In 1982 iemand for "macaroni flour" totalled 1.7 million tons, but the Ministry of Food Industry received 511,000 tons only. How can we speak seriously of quality improvements under such circumstances!

The reasons for this situation are several. They include the refusal of many farms to grow hard wheat which has lower yields and requires more demanding weather conditions. The solution of this problem is also affected by the work of the agricultural authorities which do not adequately engage in promoting the specialization and concentration of the production of high-grade wheat demanded by food producers. The insufficient flexibility of the Ministry of Procurements organs is also felt: they frequently draft purchasing plans regardless of specific demand for one type of grain or another and report results based on the overall volume of purchases ignoring variety. The attitude toward the growing of hard wheat, shown on various levels, should be reexamined if consumer demand for goods made of suitable wheat varieties is to be met.

Justifiable views are expressed to the effect that the real price of the bread cannot be determined on the basis of the price lists on display in our stores. In this connection, the readers also discuss the problem of actual production outlays.

A. Blazhenov, propagandist at the school of economics of the Chernoyarskoye Agricultural Production Association (Pavlodar Oblast), writes:

"Bread is the staff of life. That is what the people think. For quite some time bread has stopped being an insoluble problem in our country. The Soviet people realize that our bread retail prices are quite low. However, low cost does not mean inexpensive production in the least. The agricultural workers are quite well aware of the true cost of bread. The harvest alone domands a great deal of sweat and nerves! Great efforts are demanded in growing and harvesting the crop! Bread means not only grain but fat, yeast, fuel and the labor of thousands of people -- growers, millers and bakers. That is why we must have a clear idea of the economic aspect of the problem."

Indeed, the price of bread -- the most important food of millions of people -- has remained fixed in our country over the past decades. This is one of the convincing manifestations of the party's social policy aimed at upgrading the well-being of the broad popular masses. By ensuring stable wheat and rye bread, pasta, groat and many other prices of grain products the state assumes a heavy share of the outlays in order to strike a balance between it and production costs. Unfortunately, few people realize this.

Interesting considerations are expressed on this subject by T. Zelenets, chief economist at the Dyatkovo Elite-Seed Farm, Bryansk Oblast: "Having worked in agriculture for more than 20 years, I am well familiar with how much work it takes before a loaf of bread reaches our table. The road travelled by a loaf from the field to the table is long and twisty. I fail to understand why does a loaf of bread costs the same as an empty bottle? In my view, the real cost of the bread should be charged, at which point the attitude toward it will become more thrifty."

The writers are indignant at the fact that many people behave toward bread without due respect, because of its extremely low price. M. Feoktitov, engineer technologist at the Pamyati Revolyutsii 1905 Goda Plant in Moscow, writes: "The attitude toward bread is simply boorish and can be described only as sacrilegious. How to avoid this? An acquaintance of mine, recently back from America, told me that there a 500-gram loaf costs a dollar, or roughly the equivalent of a ruble. Perhaps we too should revise the price of the bread and immediately add a "bread" supplement to the salaries of lowsalaried workers. This would significantly alter the attitude toward bread in a significant number of people. Note the amount of bread thrown away. And how can we describe its use as pig food? Black marketeers sell meat not at government prices but it a 1000-percent profit."

All the letters discussing the need to increase the price of bakery goods invariably emphasize that such a measure would contribute to developing a more thrifty attitude toward our national resource. Similar suggestions have been received by many newspapers and journals and the radio and television. A large volume of such correspondence has reached the USSR Ministry of Food Industry. Some call for "rounding" the prices of finished bakery goods while others suggest that the price be immediately doubled or at least increased by 20-30 percent. Whatever the case, economists and the USSR State Committee for Prices, together with trade workers, have something to think about as they begin to consider the suggestions of the working people.

The ministries, departments and organizations named in the article "Bread and People" have responded to it. One of the first to answer was Z. Belousov, head of the Moscow Bread Trade Administration, who wrote that "In discussing the article in our bread stores, we aim at reminding the working people yet once again of the national economic importance of our sector, particularly emphasizing individual responsibility. We also call for a stricter implementation of bread storing regulations, thus ensuring its longer freshness. Our orders to bakeries must become even more accurate and strictly observed." The author also points out, however, that the food industry workers are still not meeting the demand for some varieties of wheat bread, such as the table and Riga ones, and many dietetic goods.

R. Usmanov, USSR deputy minister of food industry, reports that after reading the article the USSR Ministry of Food Industry notes that it raises very relevant and important problems awaiting a solution. Although the article was published recently, it has already played a positive role." The 1983 plan for the production of bread and other related items has been raised, variety has been increased, and measures have been taken to increase the production of rye bread. The answer received by the editors expresses satisfaction with the fact that after the article came out, the USSR Gossnab allocated 1,000 tons of bread wrapping material for the third year of the five-year plan (compared with a previous allocation of some 55 tons over the past few years). This will make it possible considerably to increase the production of prepackaged bread and, therefore, to extend its proper preservation. The Ministry of Food Industry is planning a substantial increase in the production of technological equipment in 1983, compared with 1981.

Unfortunately, problems related to the creation of comprehensive mechanized production lines for making rolls, bisquits, gingerbread and toffee sticks, the series manufacturing of which has been assigned to the Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances, remain unresolved. "The USSR Ministry of Food Industry," R. Usmanov writes further, "hopes that all ministries and departments involved in bread production and marketing will adopt a fully responsible attitude toward the solution of the problems they face. In turn, the ministry and its local organs will take more efficient measures to improve the variety and quality of baked goods and will react more sharply to all critical remarks and suggestion of the working people on such matters."

The article had criticized the work of the subdivisions of the Main Moscow Automotive Transportation Administration. V. Kuroptev, the administration's deputy chief, reports that "The administration reviewed the article "Bread and People" and considers the questions it raises relevant, and the criticism of the Moscow Bread Transportation Administration Association accurate." The association is currently strengthening its material and technical facilities, applying the brigade form of labor organization among drivers and retooling its truck beds for container use. Measures are already being taken to improve drivers' and repairmen's material incentives for observing their work schedules and the large baking plants have set up dispatcher centers. In V. Kuroptev's view "The implementation of these measures by the main administration and related organs, the construction of bakeries at big universities and the opening of Bread firm stores in each rayon will enable us to ensure the uninterrupted supply of fresh bread to the Muscovites."

The results of such measures are already beginning to show. Thus, the trade workers are currently filing increasingly lesser claims against transportation workers, for the number of delays has declined and, thanks to the use of containers, the unloading of the bread has been speeded-up considerably. The problem of building bakeries at a number of bread stores in Moscow has been resolved positively. Five such bakeries were commissioned in 1982, producing a variety of breads and buns. By the end of the five-year plan their number will be increased to 50. Other cities should follow Moscow's example, so that their residents would always have bakery goods straight from the oven.

Virtually all departments and organizations which were criticized reacted in a businesslike fashion and with the necessary principle-mindedness. Virtually, but not all. In particular, the answer given by V. Govor, chief of the food industry department, USSR Gosplan, was rather muddled. The letter indicates that its author considers the existing situation in planning bread baking entirely normal and that incidental blunders are not the result of any fault on the part of the Gosplan's personnel but the carelessness of local planning organs.

According to established practice, estimates on the amount of bread to be baked must undergo a lengthy coordination procedure before becoming codified in the plan. The process starts with requests submitted by the trade organizations. They are reviewed by the local planning organ and reported to the enterprises. As of that moment the draft plan takes two separate directions, as clearly exemplified in the case of the Russian Federation. The estimates made by plant economists initially go to the local bread baking industry administration, then to the republic ministry, and only after that to the USSR Ministry of Food Industry which, after adding up all republic requests, submits the total figure to the Gosplan. At the same time, computations follow the route of the planning organs from the bottom to the top, and it is precisely the primary sites which pad the figures, usually in order to show in their plan better production growth rates in the food industry, although it is quite well known that there will be no increase in the demand for baked goods. The data submitted by the local planning administrations reach the USSR Gosplan after the ministry's. However, it is precisely they rather than the requests of the food producers that are totalled up and approved by the superior department, thus acquiring the force of law. Having become an official document, the plan goes back to the bakeries.

In the final account, it is the enterprise collectives who have to pay for the inflated figures. Since the stores do not need the officially approved amount of bread, the bakery personnel face the danger of plan nonfulfillment with all the consequences this entails. A knee-jerk reaction takes place, and in the final account permission is granted to reduce the volume of bread to be baked. However, this frequently prevents the collective from fulfiling its profit plan....

This practice, which has been going on for years, is well known to the personnel of the USSR Gosplan Food Industry Department. Their official answer, however, is that there is nothing wrong with their planning.

Unfortunately, the USSR Ministry of Procurement, which was seriously criticized, chose to remain silent. As in previous years, many legitimate complaints have been voiced in a number of areas on the quality of flour procurements. According to the USSR Ministry of Procurement State Bread Inspectorate the average content of raw gluten in the grain has totalled 23-24 percent, although in the Volgo-Vyatskiy and Tsentral'no-Chernozemskiy areas in the RSFSR and in the Ukraine it has not exceeded 15-19 percent. In its 28 December 1977 order the ministry itself confirmed that according to the regulations on the organization and observance of the technological process, quality wheat should contain no less than 25 percent gluten.

The wheat flour shipped to the bakeries is sometimes dark colored, although the documents stipulate that it is of superior or first-grade quality. After milling the flour must undergo a so-called "seasoning" process in the mill and reach its proper condition in 5 days' time. In practice, however, many bakeries receive unseasoned flour. The editors express the hope that the USSR Ministry of Procurement will react suitably, albeit belatedly, to the critical remarks addressed to it. In his speech at the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted that each ministry and department must review most carefully the situation over and over again and earmark and implement measures to resolve existing problems, and that the main criterion in assessing its work is the extent to which the steadily growing requirements of the public are satisfied.

The implementation of the Food Program was classified in the plenum's decisions in the ranks of those to which prime attention should be paid. Today the sectors engaged in the production of grain and flour and bread baking and distribution have a particularly serious responsibility. As was noted at the January session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, many letters sent by the working people properly raise the question of adopting a thrifty attitude toward bread, which is one of our main resources. The respective state organs and organizations were instructed to take additional measures to ensure already made decisions on the efficient use of bread and other food products. Undoubtedly, the workers in agriculture, the flour and food industries, trade and transportation will draw the necessary conclusion from the demands of the party's Central Committee, carefully study the critical suggestions contained in the letters of the working people, related to their work, and take measures to ensure the fast correction of shortcomings.

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HISTORICAL LESSONS FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 83 pp 116-118

[Review by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I. Naletov of the book "Boy Absolyutno Neizbezhen" [A Totally Inevitable Battle] by A. I. Volodin, Politizdat, Moscow, 1982, 192 pp]

[Text] Many works have been written on V. I. Lenin's book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism," for it is too close to the thinking of contemporary man and too closely linked to the fate of the first socialist revolution in the world to ever be forgotten or replaced by indifference. However, not everyone can say something significant, something new on this work of Lenin's.

Now we have A. I. Volodin's work, with its challenging and hard title. It was during the period of the maturing, yes, precisely, maturing, of the work "Materialism and Empiriocriticism," that Vladimir Il'ich hurled this challenge in his letter A. M. Gor'kiy, perfectly aware of the fact that this challenge will reach the main targets: the empiriocritics Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunacharskiy and others. The very challenge precisely expresses the spirit of Lenin's work, who, in the depressing reactionary atmosphere which followed the defeat of the first Russian revolution, saw the future battles between the proletariat and the capitalist world, battles which were to be irreconcilable and waged until victory was achieved.

In order for the reader to be able to sense the entire political gravity of the philosophical struggle, the author had to describe clearly the developing situation within the European social democratic movement at the end of the 19th century, the features of the prerevolutionary period (1903-1905) in Russia and the circumstances of reactionary excesses after the defeat of the revolution. He had to trace also the development of philosophical thinking during this large interval of time, tracing all its basic trends: the strengthened positions of Marxism, its capturing of new revolutionary class strata, on the one hand, and the conversion of bourgeois philosophy to more refined forms of struggle against proletarian ideology and the appearance of revisionism, on the other. Finally, he had to give the reader an idea of the trends in the development of science at the turn of the century, the reasons for the crisis in the natural sciences and the appearance of the so-called "physical" idealism and, in this connection, Machism (imperiocriticsm), as one of the forms of bourgeois philosophy adapted by its Russian supporters to the revision of Marxism and its "renovation," "expansion," etc. The essential content of Volodin's book is a consideration of these problems, albeit in dissimilar proportions.

As a whole, his analysis is of a clearly expressed historical-philosophical nature. His main purpose is to present the history of philosophical ideas and the political struggle in their interconnection. Regardless of the documentary nature of the book, the author indicates quite clearly that the facts, dates and names cited are by far not self-seeking. They are merely the external manifestation of specific revolutionary dialectics in its basic components: theory and practice, tactic and strategy, party, leaders and masses, and so on. Therefore, the deeper meaning of Volodin's work, which may not be so obvious, is the logic of the revolutionary struggle on its broadest possible level or, which is one and the same, the dialectics of varied conflicting relations, ties and positions which form the single revolutionary process on a monolithic rather than fragmented basis.

The unity between the historical and the logical approaches, which may appear to be conflicting or paradoxical occasionally, is, in our view, one of the most interesting aspects of the work. This unity does not avoid complex problems or contradictions, but neither does it stop at merely noting them: theoretically, they must be resolved in accordance with the way such contradictions are resolved within reality itself, in the historical process and in interrelationships among real individuals. The human relations interwoven in Volodin's narration give it both a convincing and lively spirit. His book helps us easily to imagine an entire gallery of "party" portraits. They include Plekhanov and Lenin--both materialists but belonging to different RSDWP factions, or else Lenin, Bogdanov, Lunacharskiy and Bazarov, all bolsheviks but with quite distinct philosophical convictions. Could one understand such paradoxes? Is it possible to find in the labyrinth of events, individuals and interwoven views and relations, which make life as it is instead of a fictional history of our revolution, the history of our revolution or any kind of inner logic? In all of these cases Volodin's book finds and properly explains this logic, although tracing it is not so simple. This is not a canon logic of postulates and conclusions. It is the logic of the class struggle with each "conclusion" meaning people and clashes between their interests and not always bloodless battles.

The author describes the positions or ways of each of the characters not only historically but logically accurate. We see Plekhanov with his straight philosophical views. On problems of theory his position is principle-minded and "ascetically" consistent. For example, he rejects Machism and revisionism. It would be erroneous to ignore, as the author points out, Plekhanov's sharply negative attitude toward the Machism of Bogdanov and Lunacharskiy as merely a manifestation of political positions. Plekhanov was critical of Machism also when it was preached in menshevik circles (N. Valentinov, Yushkevich and others). In practical terms, however, something also noted by Volodin, it was pitiful and sometimes as base as the menshevik tactics, seeing Plekhanov's theoretical criticism of Bogdanov pursuing strictly factional objectives.

Paralleling Plekhanov's line was that of L. I. Aksel'rod, who either considered Bogdanov's ideas a manifestation of the bolshevik positions as a whole or tried subversively to weaken the ranks of the bolsheviks with his thunderous proclamations of Lenin's opposition of Bogdanov's ideas. Or else, here is Gor'kiy, who defined his attitude toward philosophical views more on the basis of emotions or spirituality than of essence, taking their theoretical and political meaning into consideration. "Failing to understand the entire principle-mindedness of the differences which had appeared," the author writes, "Gor'kiy tried to 'smooth' the relations between Lenin and supporters of the 'new philosophy'--Bogdanov, Bazarov and Lunacharskiy. Naturally, nothing could or did come out of it" (p 113).

Despite its brevity, the book provides not only a proper characterization of the phenomenon of Machism but reveals the sociopolitical mechanisms of its dissemination in Russia at the turn of the 20th century. With a view to the readership at large, it might have been expedient to describe the philosophical credo of Machism in somewhat greater detail. Obviously, Lenin's work would have been interpreted more extensively as well. However, apparently desirous of avoiding any duplication of other books analyzing 'materialism and empiriocriticism," the author does not focus his attention on this aspect. Naturally, this approach makes sense if based on the assumption that the reader is well familiar with Lenin's work. One way or another, in terms of anything related to the main topic -- a consideration of the sociopolitical context of Lenin's work and its influence on the further course of events in Russian history and in the history of the social democratic movement -- the author is impeccably accurate and is equally accurate in his description of Machism. What we theoretically know of Machism and of the Machist revision of Marxism assumes a specific feature in the characters and its documentation in facts.

V. I. Lenin's "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" is an example of how and in what sense science is combined with party-mindedness in philosophy and the way in which natural science data can be summed up and philosophically interpreted, as well as how to combine scientific with social progress, how to criticize ideological opponents while revealing the valuable features which could be contained even in idealistic philosophy, and how to be absolutely accurate in a critical analysis without becoming petty. In a word, it is a model of dialectics based in a Marxist fashion on solid materialistic foundations.

How is Lenin able to find the only solution worthy of implementation among the multiplicity of possible solutions and alternatives? Where does the secret of Lenin's talent in this respect lie? The answer to these questions in the book under review is clear: the secret lies in the dialecticalmaterialistic approach to each problem, be it theoretical, philosophical or political (or even tactical). The question now is how to distinguish Lenin the philosopher from Lenin the theoretician of the revolution or Lenin the leader? This would be absurd. Volodin's book proves this not by a collection of facts but by the study of one of the most important and complex periods in Lenin's activites--the period related to the maturing, drafting and publication of "Materialism and Empiriocriticism." What, from the author's viewpoint, was of decisive significance in such an accurate, daring and impeccable definition of the party's course in theory and practice? Above all, it was the ability to approach each problem from a specific historical viewpoint and to see in each case of interwoven interrelationships the "main link."

Works on philosophy and theory became an important political matter after 1907, precisely when it became necessary to draw all useful lessons from the defeat of the revolution and to interpret them theoretically, when it was equally important theoretically to prepare the huge masses of people who had become involved in revolutionary activities as a result of the 1905-1907 events but who had not undergone serious Marxist training. At that time strategic unity largely depended on the success of theoretical works, for it had become a question not of the views preached by individual noted party leaders but of the education and training of the masses, their practical training for forthcoming revolutionary battles. "When the masses interpret the new and incredibly rich experience of direct revolutionary struggle, the theoretical struggle for a revolutionary outlook, i.e., for revolutionary Marxism becomes the slogan of the day," Lenin wrote ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 17, p 294).

The need for a philosophical analysis of the latest discoveries in the natural sciences became clearly apparent at that time. Unfortunately, Volodin has barely touched on this aspect of Lenin's work. To a certain extent, the author may be justified, for this aspect has been considered in other works most frequently. However, let us point out yet once again that the battle was waged not only for materialism and dialectics and not only for a new social system but for science, for the future of science.

All facets of Volodin's book enable us to feel again and again the relevance of Lenin's work in terms of the current stage of the revolutionary movement and to understand its significance in the contemporary ideological struggle. Is unity within the movement not equally important today? Should common interests not be placed above one's own conceit? Is Marxism not fighting today, with the help of Lenin's works, similar Bogdanovs, Bazarovs and other "renovators" of Marxism?!

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PROBLEMS OF DETENTE IN WORKS BY SOVIET SCIENTISTS

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[Review by Doctor of Historical Sciences Prof V. Aleksandrov, head of the chair of international relations and foreign policy, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Society Sciences, of the books (1) "Istoriya Vneshney Politiki SSSR. 1917-1980 gg." [History of the USSR Foreign Policy, 1917-1980]. In 2 volumes. A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, editors. Vol 2, 1945-1980. Nauka, Moscow, 1981, 757 pp; (2) "Bor'ba Sotsialisticheskogo Sodruzhestva za Razryadku Mezhdunarodnoy Napryazhennosti" [The Struggle of the Socialist Comity for Detente] by A. V. Vakhrameyev. Nauka, Moscow, 1979, 285 pp; (3) "Problemy Voyennoy Razryadki" [Problems of Military Detente]. Nauka, Moscow, 1981, 380 pp; (4) "Razryadka Mezhdunarodnoy Napryazhennosti i Ideologicheskaya Bor'ba" [Detente and Ideological Struggle]. Nauka, Moscow, 1981, 391 pp; (5) "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya i Bor'ba Idey" [International Relations and the Struggle of Ideas]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1981, 287 pp; (6) "Razryadka Protiv Antirazryadki. Nekotoryye Voprosy Bor'by KPSS Protiv Podryva Razryadki Agressivnymi Silami" [Detente Against Anti-Detente. Some Problems of the Struggle Waged by the CPSU Against the Undermining of Detente by Aggressive Forces]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1982, 271 pages]

[Text] At the present time, when tension has once again become dangerously increased and the threat of a devastating war has intensified dangerously in international relations, by the fault of imperialist circles, problems of the fate of detente, which had a beneficial influence on the situation in the world in the 1970s, and its origins, content and prospects, become particularly urgent.

For quite some time a most sharp political and ideological struggle has been waged unabated on the problems of detente. Having charted a course of aggravation of the international situation, sparing no efforts, the reactionary imperialist circles in NATO countries, in the United States above all, are trying to "bury" detente, to discredit it in the eyes of the nations and to eradicate the very word from the political dictionary. Dozens of thick volumes and hundreds of journal articles have been published in the West, whose authors--a variety of "politologists" and "Sovietologists"--are trying to convince the readers that detente was allegedly an accidental phenomenon, an "error" made by some Western politicians, and that it is a "one-way street," a "trap," a "deceiving maneuver" on the part of Moscow, and so on. The persistent and continuing struggle on problems of detente particularly emphasizes the exceptional importance and relevance of their comprehensive study.

A principled study of the laws of global development, which brought about detente, and a profound assessment of this new phenomenon in international life have been provided in the CPSU documents and in the reports and speeches by our party and Soviet government leaders. By detente we mean a condition of international relations opposite to the cold war with its dangerous tension which threatens to develop into an armed conflict. Detente means above all the elimination of the cold war and a conversion to normal relations among countries with opposite social systems. It is a political course not toward military preparations and hostility toward other countries but of peaceful, mutually profitable cooperation. It means the conscientious observance of the norms of international law and respect for the sovereignty of each country and noninterference in reciprocal domestic affairs. It means the practical aspiration to help to restrain the arms race and readiness to resolve differences not "from a position of strength" but through peaceful means, taking the legitimate interests of other countries into consideration.

Detente problems have become the target of thorough studies on the part of Soviet students of international affairs, who have published a number of significant works in recent times. Let us particularly single out the basic monograph (1) which is a detailed analysis of the origins of detente in the general context of the development of the international situation. This work is the result of the efforts of a large number of authors, highly rated by the Soviet and foreign scientific public. It has become bedside reading and a guideline in the study of contemporary international relations.

Specialized works have also been published on the various problems and aspects of detente, particularly such problems as the prerequisites for the appearance of this process, its content, its political and military aspects, the role of the CPSU, the Soviet state and other countries within the socialist comity in the struggle for weakening international tension, the positions of the United States and Western European countries, the influence of detente on the social progress of mankind and the solution of global problems, the nature of the ideological struggle between the two systems and the confrontation between the supporters and opponents of detente and its prospects.

The present review considers, naturally, only a few of the scientific works published recently.

As we know, detente became possible in the 1970s as a result of a number of objective and subjective factors. The conversion from cold war and an explosive confrontation between the two worlds to detente was caused mainly by changes in the ratio of forces in the world arena. The fact that the socialist comity was able to achieve military-strategic parity with the group of imperialist countries within the NATO bloc had a particular, one could say decisive, significance in ensuring peace. However, under such circumstances as well the detente process was hardly automatic or uncontrolled. The

initiatives of the CPSU, which formulated the peace program, and of the other fraternal parties in the socialist countries and the active struggle waged by international public opinion against the threat of war and for the consolidation of peace played an exceptionally important role in its development. The realistic position of political leaders and business circles in a number of capitalist countries had a certain effect as well.

The studies conducted by Soviet authors of problems of detente assign a primary role to the activities of the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries. This is the theme of the thorough monograph by A. V. Vakhrameyev (2). Its unquestionable merit is that so far it remains the only work of its kind providing a summed-up and systematic description of the long, consistent and persistent activities of the members of the socialist comity, aimed at defending peace, applying the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations, terminating the cold war and developing mutually profitable cooperation among countries with different social systems.

The author makes a thorough study of the numerous peaceful initiatives and constructive proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact members. He closely traces the way gradually, under the influence of such initiatives, the political atmosphere on the European continent became cleansed of the paralyzing impact of the cold war and acquired greater reciprocal understanding and willingness to cooperate. "Life convincingly proves," the author writes, "that it is precisely the socialist comity that acts in the international arena as the main force, as a kind of generator of detente" (p 10). It is mainly thanks to such efforts that it became possible to improve the international situation as a whole in the 1970s.

Definitions of "detente," its individual components in international tension as a whole, political detente, military detente, materialization of detente, and so on, appeared in Marxist publications.

The Soviet scientisits pay great attention to the problem of military detente. The international situation, which has become aggravated due to the reactionary imperialist forces, the U.S. ruling circles above all, demands more urgently than ever before the adoption of urgent measures to restrain the arms race which is now threatening the very existence of mankind.

"Problems of Military Detente" (3) is the title of a collective monograph which studies the objective prerequisites, targets and basic directions of international military detente, the difficulties and obstacles erected along its way be aggressive imperialist circles and their accomplices, and the systematic course followed by the USSR toward adding military to political detente with a view to strengthening peace and the security of nations. On the basis of the principled programmatic stipulations and initiatives of the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses, the authors interpret the measures proposed by the Soviet Union related to military detente, nuclear missile and conventional weapons, ground, air and naval forces, and the situation in Europe, and the Near, Middle and Far East. On the basis of a description of the process of detente included in the party's documents, an effort has been made to formulate the concept of "military detente." "Military detente or detente in the military area represents a process related to international political detente of formulation and practical implementation, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, and in accordance with the principles of equality and equal security as well as preservation of the safety of all parties, of effective measures aimed at limiting and ending the arms race, ensuring real disarmament and limiting and totally excluding the use of force or the threat of force in relations among countries, i.e., blocking, preventing and ensuring the peaceful settlement of armed conflicts between them" (p 17). This meaningful and vast definition of military detente, however, should have been supplemented by an essential element such as the development of a certain amount of trust between countries in military strategic matters.

Along with a study of general theoretical and methodological problems, the monograph offers a thorough study of the main problems and directions of military detente. This applies in particular to the nonuse of force or threat of force in international relations, nuclear disarmament, limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, banning the development of new types of mass destruction weapons, reducing conventional armaments, abating the confrontation between blocs, creating security systems in Europe and Asia and restricting the use of seas and oceans for military purposes.

As a whole, (3) is a comprehensive, thorough study of the main problems of detente in the military area and the first work of its kind by Soviet scientists. Naturally, not all authors have been equally successful. The monograph includes repetitions which could have been avoided. Some definitions are not complete and require further consideration.

Today the problems related to detente are the focal point of the ideological struggle in the international arena. They are considered in their most general aspect in the collective monograph (4). This work offers a profound study of the role, nature and content of the ideological struggle in current international relations. Prime attention is being paid to the reasons for the drastic "ideologization" of U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s and the ideological aspects of U.S. contemporary military strategy as well as the struggle waged in the United States on the subject of Soviet-American relations and relations with the socialist countries in Eastern Europe. The authors also study on the ideological level problems of European security and cooperation, interimperialist contradictions, problems of the liberated countries, and others. The work helps us to clarify more profoundly the reasons for which detente, as a specific trend in international relations, has become the target of ideological confrontation. It emphasizes, as confirmed by the course of events, that detente creates more favorable conditions for the development of the global liberation process. However, the authors also justifiably note that in the 1970s imperialism tried "in its foreign policy and ideology not only to adapt to detente but, far more frequently, to 'adapt' politically and ideologically detente itself to its own class interests and objectives" (p 61).

Particularly noteworthy among recent publications is also the collective work (5). It is related to (4) on a number of topics (imperialist ideological diversions mounted against socialist countries, European security and cooperation, ideological struggle and the developing countries). It also thoroughly covers such topics as the aggravation of the crisis in bourgeois ideology, the Leninist strategy of peace and its falsifiers, economic cooperation among countries with different social systems and its opponents, and ideological aspects of the scientific and technical revolution. The last two works complement each other and provide an adequate idea of the condition of the ideological struggle on the problems of detente.

The unquestionable merit of the works under consideration is the detailed study of the role of ideological confrontation in contemporary international relations. "One can say," we read in (5), "that today the ideological struggle in the international arena seems to have acquired a new dimension. It has become one of the leading areas of confrontation between the two systems, of the struggle waged by the international working class against international capital and by all forces of peace and democracy against imperialism and reaction" (p 6).

As confirmed by practical experience, the development of the detente process neither stops nor limits the ideological struggle between the two systems. On the contrary, as is pointed out in (4), "under the conditions of detente the ideological confrontation between the two socioeconomic systems and among different political forces, above all in the area of international relations and on the subject of detente itself and the conditions and prospects of its development, directly related to objective changes in the ratio of forces in the world arena, has assumed an exceptionally active and comprehensive nature" (pp 4-5).

As the books under review emphasize, the reasons for the aggravation of the ideological confrontation between the two systems at the present stage are the result above all of the objective changes occurring in the world. The strengthened positions of real socialism, the growth of the international worker and national liberation movements and the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism motivate the imperialist circles to energize their ideological opposition to changes in the international arena and to apply subversive psychological warfare methods.

The Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries are rebuffing the ideological campaigns mounted by imperialist circles. Aware of the inevitability of the ideological struggle, the communists nevertheless do not consider it an obstacle to continuing the detente process or improving business relations between socialist and capitalist countries.

The study of the ideological struggle between the two systems, undertaken by the Soviet scientists, confirms the conclusion of the existence of a most profound crisis in bourgeois ideology which neither has nor could develop new and attractive ideas. This is a reflection of the irreconcilable contradiction between the objectives and interests of imperialism and the objective requirements of social development and the interests of the people's masses. Naturally, this should not lead in the least to underestimating the possibilities of reactionary ideology and its course aimed against the cause of peace and social progress. Countering bourgeois ideology remains the most important task of the socialist countries.

The publication of works such as (4) and (5) is a considerable contribution to the study of topical problems of contemporary international relations. Some of their merits are the thoroughness of the study, the comprehensive coverage of most important problems, the significant novelty of data and the ideological and political relevance of the problems under discussion. While providing a picture of the ideological confrontation between the two systems in connection with detente, at the same time these works themselves become participants in the irreconcilable struggle which the socialist world is waging against bourgeois ideology.

Naturally, these works do not cover the problems under consideration entirely. Nor are they deprived of some shortcomings, the most essential among which is that they essentially limit themselves to the study of the groundlessness of bourgeois theories and concepts in international relations. In other words, it is a question of ideological actions carried out by imperialism and its accomplices. This makes the ideological struggle waged by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries and all Marxists-Leninists on problems of international relations, detente in particular, appear merely as efforts to counter bourgeois theories and misrepresentations. The result is the erroneous idea that our class opponent is attacking while we are merely successfully defending ourselves.

It is well-known that in the ideological confrontation between the two systems the historical initiative belongs to socialism. It 's precisely through the strength and authority of its ideas that socialism is conducting its offensive against the capitalist world, winning over the sympathy and support of ever-new millions of people. The CPSU and the other fraternal parties in the socialist countries are engaged in an active and coordinated ideological struggle in the world arena. This involves above all the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism as ideology on which the entire struggle waged by the socialist world for a democratic reorganization of international relations is based. The most important direction in the communist ideological offensive is the dissemination of the truth about real socialism and tireless propaganda of the peaceful foreign policy course pursued by the socialist countries. We believe that the Soviet scientists face a great deal more work on the study of the aggressive ideological struggle waged by socialism. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the work by Yu. I. Kandalov, "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya i Ideologicheskoye Sotrudnichestvo Bratskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Stran" [International Relations and Ideological Cooperation Among Fraternal Socialist Countries] published by Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya in 1981.

At the beginning of the 1980s the detente process met with the stubborn counteraction of reactionary imperialist circles who had become enraged by the failure of their efforts to use it against real socialism and social progress. The reactionary forces were able to erect some difficulties on the path of the revolutionary currents (the Polish events are one such example). However, they were unable either to undermine the socialist world or to prevent new major victories in the liberation struggle waged by the peoples, as a result of which they took a course of undermining detente, feverishly intensifying the arms race and adopting a policy "from a position of strength," and threats and direct intervention in foreign affairs.

Under these circumstances, last year's publication of the meaningful monograph (6) is a good example of efficient scientific development of topical and grave political problems. With the help of abundant factual data and the use of numerous Soviet and foreign sources, the authors consider the social need for detente and the objective factor which ensure positive change in the world arena. They profoundly study the reasons for the discontent on the part of imperialist circles in the United States and other NATO countries with the consequences of the process of detente in the 1970s and their stubborn desire to destroy this positive trend and to develop a new addition of the cold war in international relations.

The work substantiates the fact that the counteraction to detente in the West appeared since the moment of its birth and that a stubborn ideological and political struggle was waged in the 1970s on problems of improving international relations, a struggle which has become particularly acute today. Particularly interesting is the section in the book which substantively traces the internal confrontation within the United States on problems of the attitude toward detente, the evolution in the political positions of the American leadership and the study of the economic and foreign policy programs of the Reagan administration. Also noteworthy is the critical analysis of the basic ideology myths used by imperialism against peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist countries and their mutually profitable cooperation in an atmosphere of detente.

In their thorough study of the foreign policy actions of he Soviet state in the international arena and its numerous constructive initiatives and proposals, the authors particularly emphasize that the CPSU and the USSR consider the struggle for the comprehensive expansion and intensification of detente not a temporary task dictated by circumstances but a scientific foreign policy line, the purpose of which is to do everything possible to save the peoples from the threat of nuclear war and to preserve peace on earth.

Equally deserving of a positive rating is the critical analysis found in the final chapter in the book of anticommunism as a sting aimed by imperialism against the developing countries as well. This leads to a conclusion of major political significance: "... Militant anticommunism does not limit itself in the least to the struggle against the global communist and worker movements or real socialism.... At the present stage anticommunism is the fierce opponent of anyone who disagrees with the policy and ideology of imperialism" (p 270).

Although the publication of a number of basic works by Soviet scientists on topical problems of detente must be rated quite positively, it is necessary, in our view, to note some omissions. In the works under review this applies to an insufficiently detailed consideration of the currently basic propaganda myth promoted by bourgeois ideologues of the "Soviet threat." For the sake of fairness, let us note that it is criticized in all the works. However, we failed to find a truly thorough and comprehensive presentation of the falseness of this reactionary propaganda fabrication.

Another general remark belongs here as well. In recent years and even decades a number of collective works have appeared in Soviet scientific publications on social sciences. They are a compilation of joint creative scientific efforts. Unquestionably, this enables us to raise the research level of particularly important problems. However, in some cases such collective monographs lack an organic internal unity in the consideration of problems. Occasionally they resemble more collections of individual articles. Unfortunately, to a certain extent this applies to the works under review. In this connection, it would be desirable for collective monographs to be written and edited as an organic entity. Naturally, the creation of individual monographs on the systematic and comprehensive study of one problem or another should be encouraged.

Let us note in conclusion that we cannot share the view that the problem of detente has already been exhaustively covered in scientific publications and that no new research is possible.

Detente is not a matter of the past. It is not merely history. A stubborn confrontation in the international arena is continuing for its preservation, development and expansion. "It is our profound conviction," Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary noted, "that the 1970s, which took place under the sign of detente, were not an accidental event in the difficult history of mankind, as some imperialist leaders claim today. No, the policy of detente is not a covered step in the least. The future belongs to it." This means that to the Soviet students of international affairs detente problems remain an important and exceptionally topical area for new scientific research.

In the aggravated global situation of the 1980s, the scientific study of the laws and trends of development of international relations and a comparison between the views of Marxist and bourgeois scientists on the condition and prospects of detente enables us to assess soberly and optimistically the opportunities for the preservation of international peace and to increase the vigilance of peace-loving forces faced with the intrigues of the most militaristic and reactionary imperialist circles, thus assisting in the struggle waged by all supporters of peace and social progress for the prevention of a nuclear war.

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Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 83 pp 123-128

[Text] During that period KOMMUNIST received 1,078 communications as follows: articles, essays, reviews and remarks, 220; answers to journal publications, 192; questions, suggestions and wishes addressed to the editors, 149; and declarations, petitions and complaints, 517.

In the land of soviets 1982 will be remembered as the year of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. On this occasion letters were addressed to the editors on the functioning and further strengthening of the country's unified national economic complex; the Leninist national policy; and the development, reciprocal enrichment and rapprochement among our cultures. We received letters on the significance of the Russian language as the language for international contacts, which enables the Soviet people not only simply to understand one another but to grow spiritually and professionally and jointly to resolve the socioeconomic problems of the individual republics and the country at large.

"Without all of this," notes V. Krets, from Ungen, "the people of many nationalities would have been unable to join efforts in building projects such as the Karakum Canal or the Kremenchug and Nurek power plants; no outstanding successes would have been achieved in conquering the virgin lands and building the BAM and other all-union socialist industrial projects."

Our readers emphasize the current importance of ensuring the implementation of state plans, the efficient utilization of material and manpower resources and the creation of favorable economic and organizational prerequisites for highly productive labor and upgrading the efficiency and quality of all work in implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November 1982 Central Committee Plenum. All labor collectives and individual working people must make their substantial contribution to the implementation of the party's policy and its correct Leninist course.

B. Kozachenko (Moscow), candidate of economic sciences, particularly emphasizes in his letter on the party's contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory the importance of the development of its concept of developed socialism -- a stage of social maturity which marks the completion of the reorganization of the totality of social relations on the basis of principles specific to socialist collectivism. "Yes, we live and work by the laws of collectivism, and the more important our tasks and more difficult our work become, the more discipline, organization, exigency and responsibility are needed on all party, state and economic management levels and at each job."

Many of the accomplishments of the communist party and the Soviet people are inscribed in gold letters in the history of the homeland. Letters, articles and notes addressed to the editors discuss the continuity of times and geneerations. Our Soviet system is strong precisely because we remember our great revolutionary traditions. Party veteran I. Orlov (Gus-Zheleznyy, Ryazan Oblast) suggests that all party organizations chronicle their history and that their work and struggle experience be studied and summed up. He suggests that the memory of local active revolutionaries-bolsheviks, those who, without sparing their forces and even sometimes at the cost of their lives, totally dedicated themselves to the sacred cause of the victory, defense and implementation of the ideas of the Great October Revolution, be perpetuated.

World reaction is encroaching on all of our accomplishments, threating with war socialist and other countries. These threats are being embodied in an increasing number of new mass destruction weapons, the increased production of which is triggering the firm protest of all mankind. I. Solodov, from Odessa, K. Darbinyan, from Izhdevanskiy Rayon in Armenia, and others angrily comment on the aggressive imperialist plans and bourgeois propaganda falsehoods, slandering the camp of socialism and peace. These letters reflect the thoughts of all Soviet people, who approve the CPSU's peaceful foreign policy and its tireless concern for upgrading the country's defense capability, and appeal for improving patriotic education, strengthening labor discipline, civic activeness and law and order, and upgrading vigilance.

Many of the articles and letters received by the editors on the implementation of the party's economic strategy and politics, express views on the state of the science of economics. Thus, in the view of Muscovite Docent Yu. Ivanov, "A certain lagging in the field of political economy is becoming increasingly tangible... The elaboration of problems related to upgrading socialist production efficiency remains important." The author emphasizes that production efficiency is frequently considered a general economic category. What is not fully considered is that it is a historical category as well. "When we speak of production efficiency," Yu. Ivanov writes, "we must always bear in mind the social form of our socialist production method." He discusses problems related to the need comprehensively to take into consideration the specific types of efficiency reflecting various aspects of socialist production and (technical, economic, social) means of upgrading it.

Particularly noteworthy among the letters on economic topics are those discussing the implementation of the party's Food Program. They are essentially reactions to the article by V. Golikov "There Is a Program -- Active Efforts Are Needed," carried by KONMUNIST (No 13, 1982). Thus, Candidate of Economic Sciences G. Azarin (Barnaul) notes the increased role of science in converting agricultural enterprises and the entire agroindustrial complex to intensive development. Citing the practice of Altay farms, which are creatively using progressive experience and scientific recommendations and are creating the necessary socioeconomic conditions for manpower reproduction and upgrading farmers' skills, he proves that even under adverse soil and weather conditions any kolkhoz and sovkhoz could be highly productive and profitable.

The critical remarks expressed in that article were answered officially by the party committees. Thus, Ye. Nazarov, Krasnodar Kray party committee secretary, points out that it accurately indicates existing shortcomings in the kray's grain production and that invested funds are still not yielding full returns. Bearing this into consideration, the kraykom plenum discussed a number of organizational and technological measures aimed at increasing grain crop yields and upgrading production efficiency.

Reports have been received, again from Krasnodar Kray, on cases of losses and waste of crops and negligent attitude toward farm output. The letter on the situation which has developed at the local cannery was considered by the Abinskiy Rayon party committee on the editors' request. Here is raykom secretary V. Ivanin's report: "It is indeed true that the plant's area is littered with a large number of wooden cases, and unusable glass and metal containers. Poor lighting creates conditions for the theft of materials. During the first 10 months of 1982 above-norm losses in glass and metal containers totalling 47,000 rubles took place.... In October a loss of 84.1 tons of quince took place by the fault of the administration and the heads of the structural subdivisions." The director, chief engineer and chief accountant were punished. The rayon prosecutor is investigating. A general meeting was held at the plant on the basis of the results of the consideration of the letter. The plant's party organization and administration have taken measures to eliminate such shortcomings.

Scientists discuss in their letters topical problems of agricultural production. In the view of a developer of zoned oat strains, Candidate of Biological Sciences Ye. Lyzlov (Nemchinovka, Moscow Oblast), the agricultural organs are clearly underestimating this crop and its advantages are used by far not completely. "Yet it could play a major role in the implementation of the Food Program. As we know, oats yield most valuable dietetic and children's foods and are irreplaceable as feed for many cattle and poultry breeds. Today oats are sown on small lots, usually not fertilized, unlike other grain crops. Naturally, this affects yields. Most frequently the animals are fed oats alone instead of as part of mixed feeds, and the amount of food products based on oats is insufficient."

The author draws the journal's attention to the following important problem as well: In many kolkhozes and sovkhozes, he writes, there are virtually no horses left, although they are irreplaceable in intrafarm transportation, particularly when there are no roads, in plowing and cultivating small lots and working private plots. The use of tractors, powerful tractors at that, is stupid from all viewpoints, as well as uneconomical, entailing overexpenditures of fuel and other materials. That is why it would be proper for the farms to maintain an optimal herd of horses. Their main feed is oats, which is another reason for promoting this valuable and traditionally Russian crop.

Candidate of Agricultural Sciences G. Malinovskiy (Omsk) discusses problems of strengthening the animal husbandry feed base. Perennial grasses are needed in his area. Usually, however, they consist of grass crops. One should plant only leguminous crops, which are rich in biologically active protein which is now in short supply in feed rations and which enrich the soil with nitrogen. Unfortunately, this problem is being solved too slowly. There has been a scarcity of seed grain for many years. "Our agronomists," the author writes, "have already lost the concept of what the proper and regular renovation of grasses means." The problem will remain unsolved until the local kolkhozes and sovkhozes "stop relying on importing grass seeds from other rayons, and seriously undertake to grow them themselves, as they do with grain crop seeds."

Other letters discuss the need for the rational and scientific substantiation of the use of the land and other natural resources and the moral aspects of the interrelationship between man and nature. Thus, teacher A. Ryzhikov (Temnikov, Mordovian ASSR) is concerned by the fact that we have not enough steppe reservations. However, should we declare the virgin land steppes reservations and will this be of practical value in terms the scientific research work being done there? The author's main argument is that "It is only in the virgin land steppes that the formation of the chernozem can be fully studied, thus providing agriculture with fuller recommendations on how to preserve and maintain the high fertility of arable land."

G. Bardysh, deputy manager of the Lvovpromstroy Trust, reminds us of the purpose of forests which act above all as regulators and natural moisture deposits, and have a positive influence on the climate and, therefore, the productivity of the country's agricultural areas. He appeals for a more concerned attitude toward forests, the proper organization of timber procurements and the fuller use of the timber. "Timber losses are high even at the procurement stage and become even higher in timber cutting. In a number of production facilities they reach up to one half of the initial volume. The processing of 1 million cubic meters of timber waste, however, would save 6,000 hectares in timber and 12.5 million rubles per year." His main conclusion is that "The time has come to review the departmental affiliation of timber procurement and processing and lumber enterprises. Under the present multi-departmental system, developing a comprehensive approach is practically impossible."

According to A. Dolganov, Lenpromstroyproyekt engineer, major savings can be achieved by improving the work of engineering organizations with the help of new technology and the establishment of a unified automated engineering system throughout the country. In his view, what makes this even more necessary is the fact that "At the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution the planners face tasks which, by virtue of their novelty and complexity, frequently prevent correct decision making and require increased pre-planning work and technical and economic research... The use of "traditional" but actually obsolete methods extends the time needed for the development of a project, quality drops and unfinished features and even major errors are allowed to happen, which are very costly to the state." The author substantiates his suggestions in detail, like a specialist developing a problem, and supplies, in conclusion, rough estimates proving that the necessary capital investments and other outlays required for the establishment of an all-union system of automated engineering organizations could be redeemed in 2-3 years. This will come as a result of reducing the cost of designs and projects and their operation and substantially reducing the necessary engineering personnel.

The need to upgrade methodology standards in the development of philosophical and sociological problems and energizing the struggle against all kinds of idealistic-type "theories" is discussed by G. Polikarpov (Saratov), P. Karavdin (Chelyabinsk) and others. Let us point out that the editors pay great attention to such problems in their study of received manuscripts, in preparing them for publication and in the course of their work with the authors. Unfortunately, frequently the materials submitted to our journal merely reiterate familiar Marxist-Leninist or specialized subject concepts without relating them to our times, vital problems and practical requirements. Some of the manuscripts contain grossmethodological errors. Let us take as an example lines from the letter by physician I. Zil'berman (Leningrad): "Industriousness is not a biological but a strictly social quality... Yet we accustom our children to carelessness and idleness." The author then proceeds to contradict himself by writing that "Industriousness or idleness and disrespect for physical work are genetically programmed in man since birth ... coded in his brain." If we were to agree with this premise, which was disproved by science long ago, we should remove from the agenda many problems related to education and upbringing!

Some writers submit refinements in the understanding of one term or concept or another, as they see them. On the basis of the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences P. Pobedash (Sebastopol) points out that they defined an economic system as the sum total of production relations representing the foundations of society and should not be confused with society at large. In his opinion, the interpretation of an economic system as society at a certain stage in its historical development, found in a number of publications (such as "Filosofskaya Entsiklopediya" [Philosophical Encyclopaedia], vol 5, p 393), which includes not only production but all other social relations, leads to the conclusion that the concept of the economic social system (which is the accurate translation of Marx's term die okonomische Gesellschaftsformation) remains in name only, for it becomes identified with the other concept -- "society." According to P. Pobedash such an approach makes it impossible to determine the structure of a society as a social system and its breakdown into various areas.

The author also stresses that the popular interpretation of the basic concept of "production method" in historical materialism as merely a means for the production of material goods takes into consideration exclusively the material aspect of the production process. In his view, the concept should also encompass the production and reproduction of manpower as the main element of production forces. This, he believes, is considered in Marx's concept of "means of production of material life." It is precisely on the basis of this concept, he says, that the system of categories of historical materialism can be structured.

Doctor of Historical Sciences M. Solov'yev (Moscow) writes that our scientific publications provide insufficient studies of the country's history from the mid-1930s to the beginning of the 1960s. The author considers unacceptable and irrelevant to the nature of the period definitions such as "stage of building mature socialism" or "period of strengthening and developing socialist society." He suggests instead the use of the term "early socialism." He supports this with the following arguments: The initial material and technical base of socialism is created during the transitional period. At that point the sociopolitical and spiritual components of the developing society were not as yet all-embracing. They were even in their initial stage. In the course of subsequent developments, the socialist foundations inherent in mature socialism of the society itself, took shape. The editors consider these views to be of a terminological rather than strictly theoretical nature and view Solov'yev's suggestion acceptable as a whole, the more so since the term "early socialism" is already in circulation in scientific publications.

The responses to the article "The Soviet System for Cadre Certification at the Present Stage" (No 10) by V. Kirillov-Ugryumov, VAK [Higher Certification Commission] chairman, have been mainly positive. Some of the letters, however, insist that "The VAK reviewer has the final word in everything" related to the dissertation (Docent A. Petrov, Riga; Professor Gayayeva, Tbilisi, and others). Here is the answer of the author of the article himself: "The USSR VAK assigns for review no more than two percent of all candidate and about one half of all doctoral dissertations. The result of the discussion following the defense of a dissertation conducted by a specialized council is a conclusion on the novelty, accuracy and the scientific and practical significance of the candidate's work. If the conclusion offers clear and precise answers to such questions the dissertation does not have to be reviewed. If the conclusion of the specialized council is voiced in mostly general terms and meaningless statements it becomes difficult to avoid an additional review. Furthermore, a negative review does not mean in the least that the dissertation has been rejected by the USSR VAK, for a final decision is made only after a talk has been held among the experts' council, the applicant and the head of the specialized council to which the dissertation was defended, and in many cases the question is resolved in favor of the applicant. Therefore, it is not the reviewers but the supported arguments of the dissertation's author that decide the outcome. Naturally, a review delays expertise time. Nevertheless, in 97 percent of the cases the dissertation is considered within the stipulated time."

D. Levinzon (Zaporozhye), chairman of the method council of the political education office of the Zavodskiy Rayon party committee, supports the "substantiated account" of the VAK chairman. He writes that the TsNIL [Central Scientific Research Laboratory[of one of the plants, headed by the author, has been able to develop, thanks to the attention paid by the party organization and the management, an efficient system for on-the-job training of science candidates. "Each development on the invention level is put to practical use. The studies are conducted with modern experimental facilities. In recent years the plant has acted as a responsible developer of many most important problems of sectorial and, frequently, intersectorial significance."

Many of the letters raise questions of party ideological work and developing in every Soviet person high idea-mindedness and morality. Most of the letters have been in response to the article "Aggravation of the Ideological Struggle in the World Arena and the Political Education of the Working People" (No 16) by K. Rusakov, CPSU Central Committee secretary.

"All of us must draw deeper conclusions from the instructions issued at the 26th CPSU Congress on improving the communist education of the Soviet people," writes Muscovite A. Aleksandrov, CPSU member since 1928. He particularly emphasizes the problem of moral education and the need to intensify the struggle against bourgeois ideology and any violations of the moral code of the builder of communism.

A. Tkachenko, instructor at Dnepropetrovsk University of Marxism-Leninism, believes that greater concern should be shown for the shaping of a comprehensively developed individual. He points out that, unfortunately, we do not mandatorily combine study with work, although this requirement was already formulated in the "Communist Party Manifesto" and subsequently in Lenin's works. Yet we have extensive opportunities for involving school students in machine and industrial work. According to him, not all problems related to upgrading the role of mothers and preparing them for it have been resolved.

Responses are continuing to come to the editorial "People's Teacher" (No 13). The readers believe that the editorial deals with topical problems and indicates who shou i work, and how and along what lines. "In order to resolve the problem facing the schools, as set by the 26th congress, not in words but in practice," writes V. Girshovich, secondary-school principal (Losino-Petrovskiy, Moscow Oblast), "we must approach the training and education of the sudents more daringly and innovatively than ever before." The author notes that the editorial is "imbued with true party concern for the future of Soviet schools and is consistent with the thoughts of practical teachers, for it defines quite accurately our present 'touchy' spots and 'bottlenecks'." This and other letters include criticism of public education organs. "Unfortunately, the attitude toward progressive experience shown by the heads of the Ministry of Education is not simply one of indifference, as the article points out," writes teacher A. Novikov from Perm. "No, it is a very prejudiced, active and firm attitude: the impression is created that some officials within the education management system are categorically opposed to innovation in education and training." He writes that formalism has still not been e iminated and that official speeches frequently seem to rate positively progressive methods and experience, while in fact everything usually comes down to banning something or other.

V. Tyshchenko, docent at the philosophy chair of the Novosibirsk Pedagogical Institute, writes that the schools must take serious and immediate practical measures. He expresses his gratitude to the editors for mentioning the new education management structure. "But who will eliminate the discoordination and narrow departmental interests of the numerous ministries affected by the measure?" The author refers to the experience of oblast party committees whose support has already made possible progress in resolving some vital problems. Consequently, he concludes, the problem must be resolved on the highest party and government levels.

The readers discuss the interrelationship and continuity between secondary school education and training and vocational-technical, secondary special and

higher educational institutions. Our task is to train the secondary and higher school student as a young working person with a rich spiritual life, creatively utilizing the achievements of scientific and technical progress. In this connection, A. Nasyrov, candidate of pedagogical sciences and head of chair at the Tobolsk Pedagogical Institute, complains that in the higher school, for instance, the aspiration to improve the training and education process is usually reduced to updating and, more frequently, the broadening of curriculums and training plans. Consequently, "the brain of the student becomes increasingly like a suitcase in which all information needed for his future profession must be packed with maximal density." In the author's view, however, "no proper concern is shown for the main thing -- the mandatory involvement of the student in 'acquiring' knowledge, in developing cognitive activities. The VUZ must train the student how to think creatively, to resolve specific production assignments and to become interested in scientific research."

Letters on the role of literature and art in communist upbringing include reactions to the article "Checking the Road Coordinates" (No 10) by V. Korotich. "This was a sharp, profound and emotional article leading to a great deal of thought and imbued with concern for the further development of our literature. Concern for its development is also always an indication of what hinders and obstructs it. The author has reviewed the 'sensitive' aspects and has described them frankly." The author of these lines, Col D. Dazhin, regrets that few works of literature are published on "those who smelt the steel, mine the coal, farm the fields and drive the trains." N. Burlakov (Sebastopol) writes: "V. Korotich is quite right when he says that some literary workers lack modesty; instead, they show conceit and selfimportance. We have noticed this when meeting with them in the so-called periphery." Muscovite K. Davydov writes that "As a propagandist I deem it necessary to recommend to my students to study this pertinent KOMMUNIST article."

Reactions to the editorial "We Are the Soviet People" (No 12) include the letter by V. Strugallo (Krasnodar). "We have something to be proud of," he writes. "The article describes clearly and substantively the achievements of the Soviet people. It accurately notes that we also have a number of unresolved problems." Like many other readers, he expresses the wish that along with disseminating best practical experience KOMMUNIST would address itself more frequently to "the difficult problems" of our economic and social development. "Using all means of oral propaganda and the press, we must wage a decisive fight against bureaucratism, careerism, money-grubbing and other manifestations of philistine and petit bourgeois private-ownership mentality, a consumerist attitude toward life and 'the vice of all vices' -- drunkenness." "The successful struggle against negative phenomena and trends," writes Candidate of Economic Sciences N. Vodomerov (Vologda), "requires a scientific study of the nature of, the specific reasons for their continuity and the search for efficient measures to counteract them." The Shestakovs, a Muscovite couple, emphasize the ripe need to engage in a fierce struggle against parasites, who become rich through illegal actions and live clearly way above their means. "Is it to their benefit that jewellers sell knick-knacks worth 20,000 rubles?" they ask.

Voicing his profound approval of the article "Cardiology -- Achievements and Prospects" (No 9), V. Kovalev, one of our active readers and voluntary correspondents (Arkhangelsk), regrets that "Propaganda of a healthy way of life is still weak. Greater persistence, and the systematic and comprehensive work by the medical profession together with the party, trade union and Komsomol aktivs are needed, based on an efficient plan and skillful combination of persuasion and criticism and, if necessary, coercive methods." The author believes that it would be useful for each party organization to consider the range of corresponding problems.

The mail received by the editors is as varied as life itself. We are particularly pleased by articles and letters which express valuable thoughts, thoughtful constructive suggestions and considerations on the ways to resolve the vital problems of communist construction and the implementation of specific plans. The editors also have a very definite attitude on reports on violations of the norms of party, state, labor and production discipline, and economy and thrift regimens, misuses on the part of officials, and absence of unity in political-educational, organizational and economic work. The editors consider each critical report and substantiated complaint jointly with the respective competent local or central organs and organizations.

We already mentioned the results of our work with some letters. Let us cite two other examples. An investigation confirmed many of the facts described in the collective letter from Solnechnyy, Khabarov Kray. In his answer to the editors, L. Obushenkov, kraykom party secretary, noted that such "Legitimate complaints were triggered by violations of labor legislation on the part of the Solnechnyy GOK [Mining and Concentration Combine] management. They committed violations in dismissals, transfers and punishments, as described in the statement of the combine's workers. The organs of the prosecution and the court displayed formalism and red tape in considering labor disputes and allowed violations of socialist laws." Obrushenkov reports in detail on party measures taken to hold strictly liable the combine's director, party committee secretary and trade union committee chairman. Criminal charges have been filed against two managers of production subdivisions.

Following is an excerpt of the answer on the results of the consideration of the letter sent by women workers at the Voskhod Sovkhoz, Voronezh Oblast, written by A. Kaz'min, head of the party obkom agricultural department: "Cases of lack of restraint and rudeness toward sovkhoz specialists and workers on the part of the director have indeed taken place. The inadmissibility of such actions was severely pointed out to him at a party committee meeting. Comrade Spasskiy acknowledged the criticism as just and promised to behave properly in the future."

In their thorough work with letters, the editors take into consideration the views and suggestions of the readers, help to resolve the problems they raise and work to eliminate shortcomings and to improve the quality of all work.

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