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TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 17, November 1981

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Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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INFORMATION ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 p 3

[Text] A CC CPSU plenum was held on 16 November 1981. It heard reports "On the State Plan for the Economic Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1982," presented by Comrade N. K. Baybakov, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman and USSR Gosplan chairman, and "On the 1982 State Budget of the USSR," presented by Comrade V. F. Garbuzov, USSR minister of finance.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary, delivered a major speech at the plenum.

The following comrades participated in the debates on the reports: G. V. Romanov, Leningrad CPSU Obkom first secretary; T. Ya. Kiselev, Communist Party of Belorussia Central Committee first secretary; G. A. Aliyev, Kommunist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee first secretary; O. S. Miroshkhin, Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee second secretary; P. P. Grishkyavichus, Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee first secretary; V. S. Murakhovskiy, Stavropol'skiy CPSU Kraykom first secretary; Ye. V. Kachalovskiy, first secretary of the Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast party committee, Communist Party of the Ukraine; B. Ye. Shcherbina, minister of construction of petroleum and gas industry enterprises; V. N. Golubeva, weaver at the Ivanovo Worsted Combine imeni V. I. Lenin; K. N. Belyak, minister of machine building for animal husbandry and fodder production; and N. D. Khudayberdyev, Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers chairman.

The CC CPSU plenum passed a corresponding decree on the matters under discussion, which has been published in the press.

With this measure, the Central Committee plenum completed its work.

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L. I. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AT 16 NOVEMBER 1981 CC CPSU PLENUM

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 pp 4-12

[Text] In the time that has elapsed since the 26th CPSU Congress, a great amount of political, organizational and economic work has been accomplished. The labor and political activity of the masses has increased. The Soviet people have entered the new 5-year plan period with a feeling of optimism, of confidence in their own powers. They are deeply convinced that the great and complex tasks of communist construction set by the congress will be successfully carried out.

This Central Committee plenum may be regarded as the direct and immediate continuation of the work of the congress. At the congress, we approved the economic policy for the eighties and confirmed the basic directions for the country's economic and social development. Now, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, we are taking the next step. We have to discuss the draft 5-year plan, which puts in specific form the decisions of the 26th party congress as they apply to the first half of the eighties.

In examining the documents submitted by the Gosplan, the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo came to the conclusion that the plan tasks for the years 1981-85 correspond in the main to the congress' requirements. This, comrades, is the most important thing for the assessment of the plan.

The draft clearly outlines ways of solving the main task of the 5-year plan period. The party's course for increasing the country's economic potential and raising the efficiency of the national economy is being consolidated. The draft is oriented toward fulfilling the congress' decisions in the sphere of the social program. Industry and agriculture will develop dynamically. Measures are being taken to concentrate capital investments. A new major step in the development of Siberia and the Far East is being made. The economy of every union republic will be further developed. Reliable provision is being made for the needs of defense.

On this basis, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee endorsed as a whole the drafts of the 11th 5-year Plan and the plan and budget for 1982 and is submitting these documents for the consideration of the party Central Committee plenum.

It is clear from the report by Comrade N. K. Baybakov under what difficult conditions the 5-year plan was formulated. There are two groups of factors accounting for this.

The effect of factors that are wholly or partly outside our control is apparent in the economic situation. Drought has been causing a great loss to agriculture, and thus to the whole economy, for 3 consecutive years now. In working out the plans we naturally also had to take into account the worsening of the international situation.

Another factor is being felt. We speak correctly about the new demands that the modern stage of development of the economy is making. Unfortunately, however, the style of economic activity and economic thinking, the methods of planning and systems of management are not being reorganized energetically enough.

All this could not fail to leave its mark on the draft of the 5-year plan. The plan is difficult and demanding. But what follows from this? It follows that we need to redouble, to treble our efforts to fulfill it. It follows that we need to speed up the reorganization of the style and methods of economic management.

Further on L. I. Brezhnev dwelt on the most urgent problems of economic construction and ways of solving them.

I will begin, he said, with food. The problem of food is, on the economic and political level, the central problem of the whole 5-year plan. The basis for resolving it is a high rate of agricultural production. Such a rate is included in the draft plan. The average annual grain crop should increase by almost 35 million tons over the 5-year plan, and meat production by more than 2 million tons. A considerable increase in production of potatoes, vegetables and fruit is planned.

The 5-year period started off with a year in which the harvest was poor. But this cannot and must not shake our aims for a speedy and steady growth in food production.

Incidentally, the experience of many years shows that weather unfavorable for agriculture occurs in our country virtually every other year. Hence it must be regarded not as the exception, but as a fairly normal and natural phenomenon of our climate. A number of practical conclusions are to be drawn from this.

Until we are capable of controlling the weather, it is necessary to adapt the work in agriculture in a more skillful way to climatic adversities. This presupposes more stringent regional specialization. This presupposes the introduction of those strains, those agrotechnical methods which ensure good harvest yields both when there is too little and too much moisture. Finally, this presupposes the production and better utilization of the relevant machinery. All this, along with development of land reclamation and more effective utilization of the growing quantity of fertilizers, will help to lessen the dependence of agriculture on the weather.

In working out tasks, norms and indicators for agriculture, it is important to attentively take into account the most probable and realistic conditions for a given region. One cannot evaluate the work of those who are engaged in agriculture on the strength of 1 year's results. People and their labor should be

appraised taking into account what they achieve when the weather is good and when it is bad and how steady and stable the results of their labor are.

The grain crop growers of Kazakhstan provide an example of good, stable work. In the 10th 5-Year Plan the republic overfulfilled the plan for production and procurements of grain crops, and in practice ended up selling the state 1 billion poods of grain annually. This year the working people of Kazakhstan, laboring under difficult weather conditions, sold more than 960 million poods of grain. This is a great victory, comrades (applause).

Overcoming the difficulty of a year of drought, the working people of the Ukraine fulfilled the set task for grain crop sales, and poured into the state granaries 827 million poods. The cotton growers of Uzbekistan worked well, as always, as did the tea-growers of Georgia and all the agricultural workers in these republics.

The working people of Belorussia, Lithuania, and also the Stavropol Region, the Kuban", Rostovskaya, Tyumenskaya and a number of other oblasts in the Russian Federation, have achieved significant successes. They have not been favored by good weather, either, but the achievements of these republics and oblasts deserve all the more respect for this (applause).

The working people of Azerbaijan have achieved a steady increase in production of all agricultural crops for two 5-year periods. This year, despite difficulties with the weather, record crops of grain, cotton, grapes and vegetables were gathered (applause).

I think that the CPSU Central Committee plenum has the right to congratulate the communists and all working people who have achieved great successes in the first year of the current 5-year plan. I should like to wish them fresh victories (lengthy applause).

The uninterrupted supply of high-quality food products to the people, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, demands good work both from agriculture and also from many other sectors. It is for this reason that the 26th CPSU Congress considered it necessary to draft a comprehensive food program and include it in the 5-year plan.

The composition of such a program is a matter which is to the highest degree creative and, to be frank, complex. It must unite in one whole the efforts in agriculture itself, in the sectors serving it, in the systems of procurement, storage, processing, transport and trade in agricultural produce. And what is especially important, it must subordinate the work of all these sectors I mentioned to the common final aim, which is to meet the country's food requirements.

In drafting the program, the structure of the agroindustrial complex should be carefully worked on, and the existing discrepancies in it removed. In the plan presented, somewhat more resources are directed toward the development of sectors supplying agriculture with productive capital, and also those which carry out more thorough processing and which ensure the preservation of agricultural produce. We need to go even further along this path, and to increase the capacities

of elevators and cold storage facilities more energetically, to remove bottlenecks connected with transport, particularly special transport, packing and primary processing of products.

The procurement system needs considerable improvement. At the present time practically all grain crops procured are transported to elevators (very often at a distance), although a considerable part of the grain crops will soon go back again. Clearly we should gradually convert to the construction of small storage areas, along with large elevators, and mixed feed plants nearer to kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Also, the construction of nothing but large enterprises for processing milk, slaughtering cattle and processing meat can hardly be justified. Cattle and milk frequently have to be transported over hundreds of kilometers to get there. This also leads to losses and unproductive expenditure. They can and must be sharply decreased.

On another issue. As is known, big losses are allowed to occur in many towns in the storage of potatoes and vegetables. In order to correct the situation, the draft plan provides for an increase of 60 percent in capital investment in building storage depots and a 40 percent increase for construction of roads with hard surfaces at farms. Furthermore, vegetable storage depots should be built both in towns and in kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This will make it possible to transport produce as required directly to shops and catering establishments, and will lead to a considerable reduction in losses.

Reviewing the situation in agricultural machine building, L. I. Brezhnev set the task of raising technical standards and increasing the reliability and service life of machines. The problem cannot be resolved simply by building new plants, he said. Hence the work at enterprises already in operation must be improved. There are opportunities to do this. This is what the 5-Year Plan aims at. It is necessary for Ministers A. A. Yezhevskiy, K. N. Belyak and L. I. Khitrin, together with the USSR Gosplan, to get on with this in earnest and to put things in order here.

In drawing up the food program, an important role should also be assigned to such major problems as improving the economic mechanism and the management system--management of agriculture and other agroindustrial complex as a whole, and of course, management locally. The deciding word on what is to occupy each hectare, when this or that work is to be started, should belong to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes themselves. The rayon level of management must also be strengthened. Conditions must be created for the more active stimulation of the growth of and increased intensity in agricultural production, encouragement of the initiative of kolkhoz and sovkhozes and of all links in the agroindustrial complex, and forcing them to work not for interim indicators, but for a high final result.

In view of the significance of the question, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee proposes to discuss the food program at one of the next CPSU Central Committee plenums. Confidence was expressed that the party Central Committee will support this proposal. After all, there is no more important, no more noble cause than satisfying the most vital needs of the people (applause).

Urgent measures have been taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, L. I. Brezhnev went on to say, in order to eliminate as quickly as possible interruptions in supplies. It is necessary, he stressed, to make fuller use of local food resources and also the possibilities of subsidiary farms. It is necessary that rayon and city party and Soviet organs, industrial enterprises and associations and kolkhozes and sovkhoses support initiative and enterprise in this matter in every way.

In general there are many tasks ahead in agriculture and in the sectors serving it. They are complex tasks. However, I can say with confidence that our party and our people are up to them (lengthy applause).

L. I. Brezhnev's speech dealt at length with the tasks facing industry, transport and communications.

One of them, concerning the entire national economy, consists of successful development of the fuel and energy complex. The plan provides for substantial growth in production of energy and fuels, particularly natural gas. However, the country's needs are growing fast, too. That is why the plan's target is to make use of all available factors and incentives to save fuels and energy. At the same time, fuel and energy production tasks should be overfulfilled. This is one of the chief concerns of the central economic organs. The ministries headed by Comrades N. A. Mal'tsev, B. F. Bratchenko, P. S. Neporozhniy, B. Ye. Shcherbina, and V. A. Dinkov, above all, bear the responsibility for an uninterrupted supply of petroleum, coal, natural gas and electricity for the country and for ensuring the necessary scale of fuel exports to fraternal countries and to the world market.

The country is greatly indebted to the heroic toil of the natural gas and oil workers and construction workers who opened up access to the rich resources of Western Siberia. Under the 11th 5-Year Plan, they face even greater tasks. New deposits are to be brought into exploitation, five huge main gas pipelines are to be constructed and put into operation to link Western Siberia and the center of the country. The export gas pipeline from Urengoy to Uzhgorod will also come into operation. These undoubtedly are key projects of the 5-year plan and they must be completed on time without fail. Allow me to express our joint conviction that the construction workers will cope with the task with honor (applause).

Speaking of long-term prospects, L. I. Brezhnev announced that a more accurate estimate of the resources of natural gas, petroleum and gas condensate in Western Siberia, which has been made lately, once more indicated that nature has not let us down. The resources which the country has at its disposal make it possible to face the future with confidence. All that is needed is to use them efficiently and prudently. There must be no slackening of the efforts aimed at the development of the fuel and energy complex, including the development of new sources of energy. At the same time it is necessary to introduce equipment and technological processes which save energy.

These are the pivotal tasks in the development of the national economy. They must be constantly held in the center of attention of republic, oblast and city party organizations, all economic organs and scientific institutions. The CPSU Central Committee is confident that it will be so (applause).

Another decisive area of the 5-year plan is capital construction. A specific feature of the draft 5-year plan and the 1982 plan is that they envisage a considerable increase in the commissioning of productive capital, with a smaller growth in capital investments. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee has supported the government's proposal for reducing by R30 billion the volume of capital investments and construction and assembly work originally planned for the 5-year period. What gave rise to this?

Account was taken of the available material and labor resources, the capacity of construction organizations and also the considerable extent of incomplete construction. There is now, in fact, a realistic, better balanced plan of capital construction, creating the necessary conditions for normal work.

There are quite a number of good collectives in the country, such as, for example, the Leningrad Glavzapstroy, which hands over planned projects on time or ahead of schedule 5-year plan after 5-year plan, the builders and fitters of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant and the builders of nonferrous metallurgy enterprises in the Ukraine and of Belorussian light industry factories. One can and must learn from these collectives.

But by no means everybody is working in this manner. L. I. Brezhnev criticized a number of ministries which are lagging behind in handing over projects for commissioning, and called on Ministers P. S. Neporozhniy, N. V. Goldin, G. A. Karavayev and A. M. Tokarev to correct the situation as quickly as possible. It is at sites due for commissioning that the maximum concentration of labor, material and financial resources must be ensured. The sites must be given everything necessary for the projects to become operational as soon as possible. To do this, the mobility of construction organizations will have to be increased, and machinery and cadres will have to be relocated when necessary.

No less important is the task of commissioning production capacities in time. In this connection L. I. Brezhnev drew to the attention of Comrades L. A. Kostanov, V. Ya. Isayev, N. A. Mal'tsev, V. V. Listov, and A. G. Petrishchev, to the necessity of constantly keeping an eye on projects being built on the basis of compensation deals.

Concluding his remarks on capital construction, L. I. Brezhnev recalled two more factors. The first is the need to ensure that projects temporarily mothballed are maintained intact. The second is that it is equally necessary to build up stocks for normal work during the 12th 5-Year Plan, especially in the raw material sectors.

L. I. Brezhnev then analyzed how the highly important party directive on enhancing the efficiency of the national economy and its intensification is reflected in the draft of the new 5-year plan.

Together with an increase in the overall volume of capital investment by 10 percent, the draft plan envisages an 18 percent growth in national income. This is undoubtedly a difficult task. But the very juxtaposition of the two figures already indicates that the plan is based on a course for the better utilization of

all resources. Measures for growth in labor productivity and for raising the quality of output are envisaged. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers dated June of this year directs technical progress and capital investment policy and initiative of managers and labor collectives in saving material resources.

At the same time, although the draft envisages high targets for levels of efficiency, it still does not overcome the tendency toward a lowering of capital return in a number of economic sectors. The material intensiveness of output in production is changing and production costs are dropping too slowly. In general, it is necessary to work much more, and persistently, to make the economy really efficient. All production collectives, economic managers and party committees from the top to the bottom must struggle persistently to implement the party's economic policy.

The rate of replacement of equipment will increase by approximately one-half in accordance with the draft plan. This imposes great and responsible tasks on scientific research and design institutes.

Unfortunately, not all of them by any means are working as required by the present stage of scientific and technical progress. The technical and technological solutions put forward do not always correspond to this level. An unnecessary diffusion of forces is continuing. Naturally, the principle of competition should operate in science. But is the existence, for example, of more than 200 union-administered organizations engaged in the same type of planning justified?

The State Committee on Science and Technology, the Academy of Sciences, ministries and departments should be more energetic in carrying out the 26th party congress decisions on effective use of accumulated scientific and technical potential, and in speeding up the introduction of new technology.

The current demographic situation, L. I. Brezhnev stressed, requires that better use be made of labor resources. The plan provides measures to restrict the numerical increase in workers in certain nonproduction sectors and for active involvement of pensioners, housewives and rural inhabitants in production. However, this is clearly not enough. The root of the evil lies in the slow reduction of manual labor. In industry as a whole, some 40 percent of the workers are engaged in manual labor. This figure is even greater in construction and in services. The USSR Gosplan and the State Committee for Science and Technology should speed up the drafting of a target-oriented comprehensive program for reducing manual labor, particularly heavy physical labor.

As a social system, socialism possesses enormous potential for the rational and humane use of society's main productive force--the working man. This potential should be used to the fullest (lengthy applause).

A balanced, thought-out development of foreign economic relations, above all the deepening of cooperation with socialist countries, said L. I. Brezhnev, constitutes a considerable reserve for raising the efficiency of our economy. Cooperation of this kind is of foremost economic and political importance. That is why

we are bound to require that all economic managers fulfill decisions in this field adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers in a more responsible manner.

The next big problem that L. I. Brezhnev discussed was that of improving economic management and the economic management mechanism. The solution of these problems is an integral part of the party's political and theoretical work. No small amount of work has been done to improve the management of the economy. However, the economy does not stand still. The system of intersectorial and intrasectorial relations is growing and becoming more complex. The smooth operation of all national economic units is therefore becoming a more and more important condition for the efficiency of the economy.

The congress proclaimed the slogan, "The Economy Must Be Economical." In fact, the whole economic mechanism must be brought into line with this requirement. It must be admitted, however, that so far this has not been done properly. It is for this very reason that we still come up against an economic situation in which enterprises and associations find it economically unprofitable to take on intensive plans, to step up scientific and technological progress or to improve the quality of output. It is for this reason that we have still not managed to rid ourselves of the kind of indicators which, in essence, encourage waste. I have in mind the notorious "gross value," measured in tons or rubles, when it comes to machine-tool output or the baking of bread, for instance, or in ton-kilometers, when it is a matter of evaluating the work of the transportation system.

It is well known that the basic production units, given our conditions, are enterprises and associations. This means that all management organs and the whole of the economic mechanism ought to help them work better. Meanwhile, in practice, enterprises which are working well and those working badly are sometimes treated the same. Nonfulfillment of plan tasks is sometimes covered up by downward revisions of the plan. At the same time, the savings of leading enterprises are disallowed on various pretexts. Enterprises are frequently deprived of the right to allocate their development funds independently.

Substantial improvement is needed in the system of material and technical supplies. Interruptions in supplies, even if they are of short duration, literally disorganize the work of many enterprises and construction projects. All these are problems whose solution does not require additional expenditure but could produce a considerable effect on the national economy.

Some may say that many of the issues raised have been reflected, to one extent or another, in the well-known resolution on the improvement of the economic mechanism. Indeed, that is so. But after all, more than 2 years have passed and the resolution is being implemented too slowly and half-heartedly.

All the aforesaid leads naturally to one conclusion. In our efforts aimed at the implementation of the 5-year plan we should, at the same time, improve the economic mechanism and the system of economic management. The Politburo has come to the conclusion that it would be advisable to make these issues too the subject of one of the next plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee. I hope, comrades, that you members of the Central Committee will agree to that (applause).

The growing interconnection between economic and social progress characteristic of a developed socialist society, L. I. Brezhnev went on, determines the front-ranking position of the social program in our plans. The draft which is being submitted shows an increased share of the national income being devoted to consumption. The volume of the allocations for consumption is being increased in 1985 by R73 billion in comparison with 1980. The principle adopted at the congress concerning the faster rate of growth of the "B" group has been adhered to.

The increase in the output of textiles, footwear and knitwear will be considerably larger than in the past 5-year period. The output of cultural and household goods is being increased by a factor of 1.4. The variety of articles will be expanded and their quality will be improved. There are already quite a few enterprises whose output is in great and merited demand. Such are the Moscow Sokol and Moskva Clothing Associations, the M. V. Lomonosov Porcelain Goods Plant in Leningrad, the Kiyevlyanka Knitwear Association, the Yerevan Masis Footwear Association, and a number of others. Articles produced at enterprises of ministries headed by E. K. Pervyshin and A. I. Shokin deserve a good word.

The course toward raising the income of the population is being continued. Large statewide undertakings for increasing and improving wages have been started. Thus, beginning in 1982, wages and salaries in the coal industry are being raised, and technical retooling will be simultaneously speeded up.

State aid to families with children, to working mothers and young marrieds, as well as the practice of part-time working days for women are being expanded. The construction of children's establishments is being speeded up. Minimal pensions are being raised and other measures to improve the system of pensions are being taken.

As before, considerable funds are being assigned to development of health care and public education.

Housing construction has been allocated R93 billion. Apartments are being designed to be more comfortable. Particular attention is focused on Siberia and the Far East. In the countryside it is planned to build 30 million square meters of housing more than in the 10th 5-Year Plan.

The party also sees existing difficulties. For the reasons which were spoken of above, there still remain interruptions in the supply of meat, dairy products, cotton fabrics and a number of other goods. There is only one way to solve these and other problems. That, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the party, is growth in production, a rise in labor productivity and an increase in the efficiency of the economy. The 5-year plan draft is geared toward just that.

We know from our history that difficulties have also existed in the past. They are possible, too, in the future. This is natural with the birth of something new, with progress. The main thing, as V. I. Lenin taught, is not to close one's eyes to difficulties but to find the right ways of overcoming them and to know how to mobilize the masses to combat them. This splendid tradition of the Bolsheviks lives on today in the deeds of communists and all Soviet people (lengthy applause).

We have everything for successful work: highly-developed productive forces, the socio-political and moral unity of the Soviet people, and the clear-cut strategy of advancement embodied in the resolutions of the congress. It is now up to the entire party to raise even higher the level of organizational work in the field of economic construction.

The 11th 5-Year Plan must be, and will be, a glorious milestone on the path of the historic achievements of the Soviet people. There is no doubt that the working people of our country will apply their strength and energy, their creativity and initiative, to the attainment of increasing successes along this path (lengthy applause).

Speaking about the 1982 plan, L. I. Brezhnev noted that the rates of growth envisaged in it are moderate. In adopting the plan, we have proceeded strictly from realistic possibilities. We shall demand its unconditional fulfillment equally strictly. Let me say, Comrades, that the USSR Council of Ministers was resolutely decided against allowing the practice of correcting the plan at the end of the year, which has been permitted in the past. Let us support this attitude (applause). For following its endorsement, the plan becomes a law for our lives and activities, and everybody, from worker to minister, is obliged to treat the plan as law, as a most important party and state document.

The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee sets the task: the plan for 1982 should not only be fulfilled but overfulfilled. What has to be done to that end?

First, it is necessary to ensure the most stringent possible procedure for conservation in the use of all types of resources, to curb negligence and waste, speedily and drastically;

Second, it is necessary to achieve real and radical progress in capital construction to bring into use all production capacities at all projects envisaged in the plan without exception;

Third, it is necessary to carry out livestock wintering in an organized manner and without losses, to carry out the whole complex of work to obtain a big harvest in 1982 on time and with good quality;

Finally, it is necessary, during plan fulfillment, to accelerate the development of group "B" and thus improve supplies to the population of consumer goods and foodstuffs.

These tasks are not simple ones. They are broad and require precise cooperation of all natural economic sectors. In order to cope with them successfully, the plan's figures must be supported with economic and organizational-political measures which guarantee their implementation. Organization, efficiency and discipline--these are the inescapable demands both at the center and in the provinces. It is from this point of view that the activities of all party, state and economic organs should be conducted (applause).

We have the right to expect that central committees of union republic communist parties, kraykoms, obkoms, raykoms and gorkoms, relying on their great and varied experience in the management of the economy, will considerably enhance their influence on economic life. In this case, petty supervision or usurpation of Soviet and economic organs are uncalled for. It is a matter, instead, of a carefully considered and exacting cadre policy, persistence and sense of purpose in defending the interests of the state as a whole and a determined struggle against every violation of the decisions adopted and even more so of Soviet laws, and against every violation of party and community ethics.

The Central Committee attaches enormous significance to the militant drive of primary party organizations. The situation and mood in labor collectives and, hence, production performance, depend a great deal upon how communists work. It is necessary for each communist--and there are almost 18 million of us--to devote, each in his sector, all his strength, experience and knowledge seeking our reserves and upgrading labor effectiveness, and setting a worthy example of dedication of work (applause).

The year 1982 will be full of major political events. Trade union and Komsomol congresses will take place. There will be elections to local soviets of people's deputies. The 60th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be marked. Each of these events has its own specific character, its own political content. They are nevertheless all called upon to give a fresh, powerful stimulus to further strengthening the unity of the party and people, to even closer cohesiveness of all the nations and nationalities of the country, to raising the political and creative activity of the masses.

I should like to stress in conclusion, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, a simple thought. It relates to everyone, regardless of who occupies which post, of who works where. It is necessary to work better, to draw up plans better and fulfill them better, to organize production better and to produce better; in a word to work more efficiently. This, comrades, is in the final analysis, the basic, deciding factor (lengthy applause).

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ON THE DRAFT STATE PLAN FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR IN 1981-1985, THE STATE PLAN FOR THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR IN 1982 AND THE 1982 USSR STATE BUDGET

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 pp 13-14

[CC CPSU 16 November 1981 Plenum Decree]

[Text] The draft State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985, the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1982 and the 1982 USSR State Budget are hereby approved in their essential lines.

The USSR Council of Ministers shall submit said drafts for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The activities of the CC CPSU Politburo with a view to the implementation of the strategic course formulated by the 26th party congress in the areas of domestic and foreign policy and the implementation of the tasks of the building of communism are hereby fully approved in their entirety.

Guided by the stipulations and conclusions formulated in the speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary, the central committees of communist parties of union republics, the party kraykoms, obkoms, okruzhkoms, gorkoms and raykoms, the party organizations, the soviet, trade union and Komsomol organs and the ministries and departments shall focus their attention on the successful completion of this year's assignments and on the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the 1982 and five-year plans. To this effect, all efforts shall be channeled into the implementation of the party's most important stipulations -- increasing national economic efficiency and intensification. Maximal use shall be made of the existing potential for accelerating scientific and technical progress, increasing labor productivity in all units of the national economy and increasing commodity output and improving its quality. Particular attention must be paid to ensuring considerable improvement in capital construction. The necessary steps must be taken to ensure the efficient and thrifty utilization of metals, fuels, electric power, raw and other materials, and financial and manpower resources. Everything possible must be done to make our economy economical. The role of science must be enhanced and the activities of scientific research, design and engineering organizations must become more effective. Persistent efforts must be made to ensure the further improvement of economic planning and management and to improve the style and methods of economic management.

Foreign economic relations, expanded cooperation with the socialist countries above all, must become more effective.

The CC CPSU emphasizes that the broad tasks earmarked by the party for increasing the country's economic development, the dynamic development of industrial and agricultural output and the fuel and energy complex, the solution of the food problem and the further enhancement of the material and cultural standards of the Soviet people demand that each sector, union republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon and labor collective to multiply its efforts for the fuller utilization of reserves and possibilities. In this connection, prime attention must be paid to improving organization and efficiency and to strengthening the state and labor discipline in each production sector and management area.

The CC CPSU expresses its firm confidence that the party members and all working people will expand socialist competition even further and mark the 11th Five-Year Plan with shock labor and new successes in the struggle for the implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

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I. I. BREZHNEV'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM THE WEST GERMAN MAGAZINE DER SPIEGEL

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 pp 15-25

[Text] Question: This will be your third state visit to the FRG. The global situation has become more unstable and, in some respects, more dangerous since your last visit in 1978. In your view, what role could the FRG play under the existing circumstances and, in this connection, what significance do you attach to your forthcoming talks in Bonn?

Answer: Let me begin by stating that I am pleased to pay another visit to your country. I have been to the FRG twice before and on both occasions we held useful talks and meetings which I remember with pleasure.

My forthcoming visit to the FRG at the invitation of Chancellor Schmidt is a natural continuation of the line of reciprocally beneficial cooperation between our countries, a line of constructive development in Soviet-West German relations on the basis of the 1970 treaty. The nature of our course was expressed most clearly at the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses. We also know that Bonn considers relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union an important element in world politics, on which stable peace in Europe greatly depends.

Naturally, there will be no dearth of topics to discuss in our exchange of views with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and other FRG leaders. It seems to me that today it is particularly important to define the actions which each one of our countries could undertake for the sake of resolving the most vital and urgent problem of mankind--the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the creation of reliable prerequisites for a lasting peace.

Both our countries have frequently spoken out in favor of the establishment of a military balance in Europe on the lowest possible level, including the area of nuclear armaments. The question is how to do so. Our current views are quite disparate. However, a solution must be sought. Let me recall that in the May 1978 declaration, which I and Chancellor Schmidt signed, both parties clearly stipulated that no one should strive to achieve military superiority and stated that approximate equality and parity would suffice for ensuring defense. We still support this view. This is a basis and a starting point for subsequent talks.

You ask about the role of the FRG in our truly complex world. I believe that at the beginning of the 1980s, as was the case at the beginning of the 1970s, the FRG faces decisions of paramount importance. Will the course which enhanced the

weight of the FRG in European and world politics so greatly be extended and developed further or will the capital accumulated during those years be wasted in sterile and dangerous confrontations? I would like to hope that as a result of our talks with Chancellor Schmidt and other governmental and political leaders in the FRG, there will be growing mutual confidence that our countries will support the tried and proven line with the ability to answer trust with trust, to protect the achieved gains, and to develop bilateral cooperation in various areas systematically and continuingly. Such a line could suitably become part of the common effort to restrain the arms race and to strengthen detente and international security.

Question: At one time, particularly great hopes were placed on joint economic projects. From your point of view, what are the prospects for economic cooperation between our countries under current conditions?

Answer: In our view, economic cooperation between the USSR and the FRG is developing well and has a good future.

Today the FRG is one of the main Western trading partners of the Soviet Union. The USSR values the efficiency and conscientiousness with which our West German partners are fulfilling their obligations, based on economic agreements and accords. Naturally, we answer in the same manner.

To the best of my understanding, the development of large-scale long-term economic relations with the USSR helps the FRG to resolve the serious problems facing its economy. Your country needs reliable sources of energy, raw and other materials and foreign orders to ensure population employment no less than others. Soviet cooperation with the FRG is useful in many important areas of our economic life.

Another very important feature is the fact that our economic relations are not simply meeting present-day requirements but are being developed on a long-term basis. In my view, some of our joint projects, which extend into the 21st century, are good examples of such cooperation. Naturally, they are of both economic and political significance in the best meaning of this term, for an orientation toward long-term economic relations is also an orientation toward durable peaceful coexistence and good neighborly relations.

The statutory meeting of the mixed Soviet-West German Commission for Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which was held in Moscow recently, and the talks held on that occasion between N. A. Tikhonov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, and L. A. Kostandov, his deputy, on the one hand, and O. Lambsdorff, federal minister for economics, and other FRG representatives, on the other, took place precisely from this point of view, looking toward the future.

Judging from the results of this meeting, the future development of our relations rests on a solid foundation. We felt the seriousness with which the FRG approached the projected deal for new deliveries of Soviet natural gas in exchange for the supply of pipes and the building in the Soviet Union of a gas pipeline linking Europe with Siberia, with West German participation. Other possibilities for mutually profitable cooperation were brought to light as well.

Let me add one more thing on the subject of our economic cooperation: it harms no one and in the final account benefits everyone, for it strengthens the foundations of peace in Europe and the rest of the world.

Question: Today East-West relations have worsened greatly. How do you assess the situation in the world and, particularly, the fate of detente, which many politicians consider irreversible?

Answer: Today the situation in the world is restless. "Hot spots" are breaking out in various parts of the world. The lethal weapons race is continuing. New forms of such weapons are being developed, particularly dangerous because, as the specialists say, they are lowering the nuclear war threshold, i.e., they are increasing the likelihood of its outbreak. Particularly insidious under these circumstances are the views of some Western strategists and politicians on the advisability of some kind of "limited" nuclear war and the possibility of winning it.

There may be those who hope that a nuclear war could be limited to European territory and consider this an acceptable variant. Need we mention that this hardly suits the Europeans? To them this would be fatal, a catastrophe which would result in the annihilation of entire nations with their centuries-old civilization.

To speak to the point, no "limited" nuclear war is possible in general. The outbreak of a nuclear war, whether in Europe or anywhere else, would inevitably and unavoidably assume a universal nature. Such is the logic of war itself and the nature of modern armaments and international relations. This must be clearly seen and realized.

Therefore, let those who may be relying on putting a torch to the nuclear storehouse while personally standing aside have no illusions.

Your magazine recently published an interview with a scientist described as "the father" of the American neutron bomb. He remarked that all people are monsters. His daughter, who was present, asked: Then, are you a monster too? Yes, he answered, adding that war is part of man's very nature. Here is a clear sample of the kind of man-hating mentality displayed by those who are today so zealously encouraging the nuclear arms race.

The clear purpose here is to dull the vigilance of the Europeans and to accustom them to accepting the neutron bomb as ordinary, as a "defensive" weapon or, in a word, as something similar to a bayonet or hand grenade. In reality, however, matters are quite different. According to the specialists, only a few neutron charges could destroy anything living in a city the size of Hamburg.

Such topics may be unpleasant. However, they are pertinent and it is better to mention them openly and frankly. They must be mentioned while it is still not too late, while the trouble can still be avoided. The development of a neutron bomb is no problem. The real problem--from the political and human viewpoints--is how to prevent the appearance and use of this weapon. On one occasion the Europeans were able to accomplish this. They can do it once again.

It is claimed in the capitals of some NATO member nations that the Soviet Union is to be blamed for the thickening of the clouds over the world. However, if we discard the propaganda chimeras and address ourselves to the facts it becomes clear that this is a malicious fabrication.

The Soviet Union threatens no one and does not intend to attack anyone. Our military doctrine is defensive. It precludes preventive war and the concept of a "first strike." I can state most responsibly that under no circumstances will the Soviet Union use nuclear weapons against countries which refuse to manufacture them or to acquire them and to deploy them on their territory. We are ready to guarantee this by treaty to all countries without exception.

Our desire to prevent a nuclear catastrophe was convincingly manifested at the current United Nations General Assembly, at which the USSR came out with a new and important and constructive initiative. Its main feature is to see to it that no one is the first to use nuclear weapons. If no one is the first to do so, this means that they will not be used in general.

Since it is a question of the stand taken by the Soviet Union on the problem of war and peace, allow me to recall something else.

As is known, we concluded the SALT II Treaty with the United States and were ready to implement it honestly.

We propose that an agreement be reached on terminating not only any and all tests of nuclear weapons but their further production as well, in order to restrict and subsequently to eliminate stockpiles of them entirely.

We suggest the conclusion of a treaty banning the development and creation of any new type of mass destruction weapon.

We have formulated suggestions on specific, considered and just steps to reduce tension and eliminate hotbeds of conflicts over huge areas stretching from Central Europe to the Far East, including the Near East, the Persian Gulf zone and the Indian Ocean.

Unfortunately, the leading powers in the Western world, the NATO bloc above all, have not as yet shown any serious interest in holding talks on these problems of vital importance to mankind and its peaceful future. Here and there they speak far more willingly not of detente but confrontation, not of peaceful mutually profitable cooperation but the use of trade for military-strategic purposes, not of agreements based on equality and identical security but diktat from the positions of military superiority, not of the elimination of hotbeds of conflict through mutual effort but the creation of new military bases and increasing their military presence in various parts of the world, not of restraining the arms race but of "rearming," and not of limiting or banning one or another type of weapon but of developing new and even more destructive means of mass human destruction.

Unfortunately, therefore, they not only speak of such a policy but also practice it. Naturally, you understand that I am referring above all to the policy of the present U. S. administration as it has manifested itself thus far, and the

statements of highly placed U. S. government officials and what is even more important, their practical actions.

In fact, all of this is the opposite of detente. It is flagrant disregard of the aspiration of all nations for a lasting peace. Naturally, it is to be profoundly regretted that the leaders of one of the biggest countries in the world have found it possible to structure their policy on such a base.

As to the Soviet Union, as I have frequently repeated, we are sincerely trying to maintain normal relations with the United States based on mutual respect and consideration of reciprocal rights and interests. Furthermore, we would like to maintain good and friendly relations and to cooperate for the sake of strengthening peace on earth.

Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe are about to take place. I shall have more to say about this. Sometime after that, we hope, SALT talks will be initiated. We shall engage in both talks honestly and constructively, aiming at reaching a just agreement, naturally bearing in mind the surity interests of the Soviet people and their friends and allies.

Recently, President Reagan expressed U. S. readiness to discuss with the Soviet Union other problems as well on which the two countries disagree. We welcome such readiness, for we have always believed that talks are the most suitable means for the solution of international problems. Naturally, the most important thing here is for the correct words to be supported by corresponding practical actions.

As to the dream of achieving military superiority over the USSR, it would be better to abandon it. If necessary, the Soviet people will find a way to make any necessary additional effort or whatever is required to ensure the reliable safety of their country. It would be far more sensible and realistic to speak of maintaining the already existing parity, which, as experience indicates, is a good basis for preserving peace.

Naturally, Europe must play a special role in strengthening peace and intensifying detente, if only because it is the smallest and most brittle of all the "homes" of mankind which would inevitably fall victim to a nuclear conflagration. The Final Act of the Helsinki Conference proves that the European countries are aware of the value of peace and the danger of the threat of war. Is this not also confirmed by the spontaneous antiwar and antimissile movement which has now developed in a number of NATO countries as a response to the dangerous militaristic policy of the leaders of that bloc?

However, this is not only a question of the wave of popular protest against adventurism. The Europeans are making an invaluable contribution to strengthening peace through their daily creative activities by steadily expanding and encouraging fruitful peaceful relations among the nations on the continent--economic, scientific and technical and cultural, contacts between parliaments, public organizations and municipal authorities, etc. Regardless of the icy winds and destructive appeals coming from the camp of the enemies of detente, the material frame of peaceful cooperation in Europe is continuing to strengthen and to become richer.

At this point, how can we fail to recall yet once again Lenin's words on the subject of relations between the young Soviet Russia and the bourgeois countries: "...We may argue, we may squabble, or we may disagree on some things--which is quite likely to happen--but in the final account it will be basic economic necessity that will have its way.... The development of proper trade relations between the Soviet republic and the capitalist world will inevitably develop further" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 45, p 71). Reality has confirmed and goes on confirming the wisdom of these words.

I have already spoken about the role which the Federal Republic plays in weaving this fabric of peaceful relations in Europe and the importance of the relations between our two countries in this area.

Question: A new stage in the arms race is developing. The problem of medium-range nuclear weapons, both Soviet and American, has become one of the most acute in Europe. Do you see the possibility of stopping this development?

Answer: I have said on frequent occasions that we believe that there is no area of disarmament or weapons category on which agreement cannot be reached. The problem of medium-range weapons in Europe can be resolved in the interests of all European peoples. This can and must be done. However, this will be possible only if all parties accept the building of a lasting peace as their common task.

What does this mean in specific terms? In Russian translation, the name of your magazine is "The Mirror." Let this mirror reflect the true picture.

To begin with, let us recall the development of the events which, in the final account, led to the present nuclear weapons situation in Europe. The United States started deploying nuclear weapons in Europe and along the seas which border it starting in the 1950s, with the purpose of striking at the vital centers of the USSR and its allies. They were described as "advance theater of operations weapons," while the doctrine they served was known at one point in Washington as "balancing on the brink of war." It was then or slightly afterwards that nuclear weapons made their appearance in Europe and in some other NATO member countries.

Try to put yourself in our position. Could we remain indifferent as we saw the way we were being surrounded on all sides by military bases and how an increasing number of carriers of nuclear death, such as missiles fired from the sea or the land, from airplanes, etc., were being aimed at Soviet cities and plants from various points in Europe? The Soviet Union was forced to develop the means of its own defense, rather than to threaten anyone, Europe least of all. It developed such weapons and deployed them on its own territory in numbers which corresponded to the armaments deployed by those who had proclaimed themselves our potential enemies.

At no point, then or now, have we considered a nuclear confrontation, particularly in Europe, as the best solution. The USSR has frequently called for setting limits to such rivalry. However, as it happened this did not lead to real talks. Why? Because neither in the 1960s nor the 1970s did the government in Washington

wish its medium-range system, the so-called advance theater of operations weapons, to be discussed or to be the subject of possible agreements. Everything suggests that at that time, the existing medium-range weapons ratio suited the Americans.

In recent years, the theme of the "Soviet threat" to Western Europe has been heated up by Western propaganda and reports on SS-20 missiles have appeared. In the autumn of 1979, we suggested that representatives of the United States and the USSR meet without delay to consider the situation and to reach agreement on parity, even on a level below that which had been established at that time. The answer to the Soviet initiative was NATO's "double" decision of December 1979 concerning "additional rearmament."

Nevertheless, let us consider the ratio of nuclear forces in Europe.

If we include among medium-range weapons the main missile and aviation nuclear arms of NATO countries, which can strike at targets in the Soviet Union from Western European countries and the seas adjacent to Europe, i.e., within the 1,000 km or greater radius of action (but, naturally, less than an intercontinental range), and the corresponding Soviet weapons with a similar range deployed in the European part of the USSR, we would see that approximate parity in such weapons exists between NATO and the USSR in Europe today. The NATO countries have deployed here 986 such weapons, more than 700 of which have been placed by the United States (F-111, FB-111 and F-4 aircraft, and airplanes aboard aircraft carriers deployed in the seas and oceans around Europe). The British potential consists of 64 ballistic missiles and 55 bombers, while France has 144 units (98 missiles and 46 bombers).

The Soviet Union has 975 pieces of similar armament. The situation did not change even after the USSR began to replace the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the more advanced SS-20s. For each new missile, we remove one or two old ones, which we destroy together with their launching systems.

It is true that the SS-20s can carry three warheads. However, their combined power is less than that of one of the old ones. Consequently, as we replaced the obsolete missiles, we lowered the overall power of our nuclear medium-range potential.

However, NATO's medium-range weapons as well are being steadily improved and expanded. Great Britain, for example, is introducing updated ballistic missiles carried aboard Polaris submarines, with six warheads each (rather than three as is the case now). France is contemplating replacing land and sea-based single-warhead missiles with seven-warhead missiles. The number of French submarine missile carriers is increasing as well.

And all of this is taking place when, in terms of the number of nuclear warheads which can be launched simultaneously--a very important indicator, NATO already enjoys a 50 percent superiority.

These data, which reflect the real situation, incontrovertibly prove the far-fetched nature of the stir raised by NATO regarding the USSR's "intolerable

superiority" in medium-range weapons and the "need for further rearmament." It is rather the Soviet Union which should raise the question of further rearming itself.

If another nearly 600 American missiles are deployed in Western Europe, NATO will acquire a 50 percent superiority in terms of means of delivery, and its superiority in terms of nuclear charges will approximately double. Does this not clearly indicate that a major disturbance of the approximate balance would occur--taking all factors into consideration--and that the USSR and its allies would be seriously threatened?

Remember the U. S. reaction two decades ago to the possibility that several dozen Soviet missiles might be deployed in Cuba at the request of the Cuban government. Washington shouted that a mortal threat was hanging over the United States. Now they are trying to convince us that American nuclear theater of operation weapons deployed along the perimeter of our western borders is not a subject of discussion. Our actions aimed at neutralizing the existing threat are said to "exceed the limits of necessary defense" of the USSR, while the intention of deploying hundreds more of the latest American missiles on our doorstep is presented as a "defensive action." What is this: cynicism or the absence of an elementary sense of proportion?

Agreement has been reached with the United States on resuming talks on medium-range nuclear weapons, scheduled to begin in Geneva soon. The USSR welcomes this agreement, as do the governments and millions of people of other countries, who want to see the threat of a new war and tension diminish and who want a lasting peace.

However, here is something that must be mentioned. With increasing frequency, as the time for the talks nears, we hear from the American side (from rather high places at that) statements regarding the need for a "special approach" to the United States. Rather odd preliminary stipulations are being voiced: God forbid that there should be any mention of American theater of operations weapons, or any question of including the nuclear weapons of U. S. NATO allies, and talks should be restricted solely to the dismantling of Soviet medium-range missiles "in exchange" for the missiles which the United States is planning to deploy in Europe.

The logic on which this position rests is hard to understand, but in any case it has nothing in common with objectivity and realism. Obviously, those in the United States who come up with such "suggestions" do not believe even for a second that the USSR could accept them. No country concerned with the safety of its people would agree to this.

Most likely, in reality the authors of such "suggestions" want no talks at all, least of all talks which might be successful. They would like to see the talks fail, thus giving them an excuse for pursuing their planned arms race, the intent of which is to turn Western Europe into a launching pad for the new American missiles targeted on the USSR. They begin by blocking the talks in order to be able to say later that, you see, the USSR is ignoring the Western view and there is no course left to the United States but to deploy the missiles....

This must be borne in mind by all those who are truly concerned about the current dangerous situation in Europe and throughout the world and are sincerely striving toward fruitful talks and the limiting of nuclear arms in Europe.

Everything in the official explanations of the plans for the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Europe is a sham, from beginning to end. This includes the argument that "further rearmament" is in answer to the challenge of the Soviet Union, which allegedly does not intend to discuss medium-range weapons, and that the United States decided to deploy its new missiles in Western Europe only as a response to the request of its allies, concerned exclusively with their "safety."

I shall not dwell on the way the Americans literally extracted the "consent" of some Western Europeans to accept the "umbrella" of the new U. S. missiles. This fact is known. It is easy to understand the hesitation of those who are becoming hostages to an alien policy, or extras for the weapons deployed on stage of the theater of military operations, as the fashionable expression goes in Washington.

Who will press the button at the nuclear launching pad, and to which of the "two and a half" wars in which Secretary Weinberger is engaged will they find themselves assigned? It suffices to ask these and a few other similar questions and to take into consideration that the American missiles are targeted on strategic sites on USSR territory and that the new American missiles could be used as first-strike weapons to expose the essence of what is taking place.

Western Europe is being adapted to the next aggressive turn in U. S. nuclear doctrine at the cost of tremendous danger to the nations inhabiting it. In order to neutralize mobile missiles, powerful retaliatory strikes will have to be made upon their presumed sites. Such is the "concern" which those overseas show for the safety of the Western Europeans. This is a hard fact.

The Soviet Union is not seeking a preferential treatment. The only thing we insist on is that the United States and the NATO alliance as a whole apply to our security and the security of our allies the same yardstick they apply to their own. We consider that the purpose of the forthcoming talks should be to translate into the language of specific obligations the principles of equality and identical security for both sides. The Soviet Union would like to see as a result of the talks a reduction rather than an increase in the level of confrontation and the clearing of the path to further steps along the road to military detente in Europe.

As we have already pointed out, were the United States to adopt a sensible position in this case, and were NATO to abandon its plans for new missiles, we would be ready to reduce the overall number of Soviet missiles. Let me add that we would be prepared to reach an agreement on very substantial reductions on both sides.

As to the need to take into account the nuclear potential of U. S. NATO allies, we are simply proposing that that which exists be taken into consideration. The Soviet Union is not striving for a reduction in this specific potential. What matters to us is the overall result, the general balance.

It is precisely for the sake of making the practical solution of the problem easier that we have proposed--and do so again--that the moment the talks begin, i.e., as of 30 November 1981, a NATO-USSR moratorium be declared on the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe for the duration of the talks and until a permanent treaty has been concluded. This would mean that both sides would freeze their plans for the deployment of their medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe including, naturally, American theater of operations nuclear armaments, and preparations for the implementation of such plans would be stopped. The NATO countries would stop deploying Pershing-2, cruise and other medium-range nuclear missiles and the Soviet Union would stop deploying the SS-20s.

Therefore, the Soviet Union answers with a clear "yes" to any honest talks leading to restraining the arms race and to real disarmament. We believe in the necessity for and reality of such talks and from our side will encourage their success.

Question: The United States, under President Reagan, does not even want to hear about the SALT II Treaty, which has already been drafted by Moscow and Washington. Do you believe in any real possibility of reviving this treaty?

Answer: Whenever I am asked about the SALT II Treaty I always think back to the lengthy and difficult talks which preceded its conclusion. The treaty reflected an accurately established balance of interests on both sides. Everything had been weighed as on an apothecary scale. That is precisely why the treaty was acceptable to both sides.

At the time of the conclusion of the treaty, the Soviet Union had a larger number of carriers while the United States had more warheads. Nevertheless, we agreed that the moment the treaty became effective, the number of strategic missiles would be reduced by approximately 10 percent or by 254.

By establishing parity between the USSR and the United States in the area of strategic offensive armaments, as a result of which the Soviet Union was to remove more such missiles than the United States, the SALT II Treaty was laying a reliable foundation for the adoption of further measures in the matter of limiting and reducing strategic armaments. This was equally the purpose of the quite strict framework within which the designing of new types of missiles and the improvement of existing ones was to be conducted.

It is not our fault that this treaty--perhaps the most important ever in the area of arms control--has still not been enacted.

Washington is trying to substantiate the refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty by claiming that the United States allegedly fell behind the USSR, which was already enjoying or was about to gain soon some kind of major advantage in strategic armaments. However, the treaty precisely precluded the gaining of an advantage by either side.

I state most clearly that ever since the SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979, the Soviet Union has avoided any action in the area of strategic armaments which could result in changing the rough parity which had been established.

Conversely, the United States has been adopting every new military program for which astronomical funds have been appropriated. All of this is done on the pretext of eliminating a nonexistent U. S. "lag" behind the USSR. As to the SALT process, its extension is linked to the implementation of programs for increasing U. S. strategic might. The result is that Washington is discussing not a reduction in strategic armaments but their increase, making the talks dependent on the speed at which the armaments conveyor belt is progressing.

The Soviet Union has consistently called for the continuation of the SALT process and for real restrictions and limitations on strategic weapons on the basis of the principles of equality and equal security. This calls for going on with the talks calmly, without cheap propaganda or attempts to apply pressure. Everything positive gained in drafting the SALT II Treaty must be retained and in no case should such a most important problem be linked with any other, regardless of its importance.

Let me say a few words on the subject of control. Washington likes to proclaim that arms limitation agreements must be subject to close control. Who objects to this? We too wish to be confident that the United States is meeting its obligations, for which reason we are no less, and even more interested than the United States in control. However, a great variety of plans is being seriously discussed in the United States on how to conceal intercontinental missiles more safely and how to place them outside the control of domestic technical facilities. It is not the Soviet Union but the United States which is running through variants of anticipatory use of nuclear weapons involving the element of surprise. Our position calls for never being the first to use nuclear weapons. It is based on the general attitude that a nuclear war is an inadmissible catastrophe.

Both we and the United States have experience in controlling the implementation of the SALT II Agreements. We are confident that domestic facilities ensure adequate control. The resolution capacity of such observation means, those in space above all, is rising steadily and the potential of domestic control facilities could also be improved. This is well known to the American administration. If trust prevails, additional control means could also be developed. Under all circumstances, however, the priority remains with domestic means of control, which are those most consistent with the interests of state security.

We must not allow the development of science and technology in the field of armaments to outstrip the possibility of controlling steps for the limitation and reduction of armaments. This means that we need an agreement in this area now, in order to stop the arms race conveyor belt and to ensure a reduction in armaments with reliable control and in the interests of the safety of all nations.

Question: Your repeatedly expressed idea of the further extension of measures of trust on our continent has created a certain interest in the West. The Soviet Union is prepared to extend them to the entire European part of the country. What reciprocal step do you expect on the part of the West in this case?

Answer: Strengthening trust among countries, particularly in the area of military affairs, is consistent with the vital interests of the European nations and all participants in the European conference, including the United States and

Canada. No other way is possible, for the path to peace lies not through confrontation but through talks, meetings and conferences of representatives of countries and in the final account practical steps which contribute to the rapprochement among peoples, the normalizing of the international atmosphere and the elimination of obstacles such as mutual mistrust, prejudice and fear.

We in the Soviet Union would like to hope that the circumstantial propaganda schemes which are directing the actions of some Western delegations at the Madrid meeting will not overshadow the basic need for cooperation and that an agreement will be reached on holding a European conference on steps to strengthen trust, security and disarmament in Europe. There can be no trust without reciprocity and equality. International security is based on the identical security of the contracting parties.

Naturally, when we agree to extend measures of trust to the entire European part of the USSR, we expect reciprocal steps on the part of the West. Military preparations in NATO's European zone do not begin at the European continental shelf, as everyone knows. Consequently, the islands adjacent to Europe and the corresponding water and air space must be included as well. That is what we are talking about.

Question: Once again there is a debate in Europe on the subject of nuclear-free zones. What is your view on the creation of such zones in various parts of our continent?

Answer: You are asking about nuclear-free zones. Their importance is obvious to those who are seriously concerned with the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the stabilization of peace. It seems to me that the way to reach an agreement on this subject is not so complicated.

Actually, many countries, the majority of which have no such weapons on their soil, signed the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. There is hardly any doubt that most of them value their nuclear-free status and would like to see it as a guarantee that they will not find themselves involved in a nuclear conflict. If the nuclear powers would assume the obligation to respect the nuclear-free status of such countries, not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory and not to use them against them under any circumstances, the conditions necessary for several nuclear-free zones would develop immediately in various parts of the world.

I was recently asked by someone in Finland what the Soviet attitude would be regarding the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe? We made our answer public and I am not about to repeat it word for word. Let me merely point out that the USSR expressed its readiness to assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against Northern Europe on the basis of a multilateral agreement with the countries in the zone or bilateral agreements with the individual countries. We do not base this obligation on a positive attitude toward the zone on the part of the other nuclear powers although, naturally, the members of the zone would feel more secure if guarantees that their nuclear-free status will be respected were to be offered by the nuclear powers within NATO as well.

We do not exclude the possibility of taking some steps on our own territory within the context of the establishment of a North European nuclear-free zone. Without entering into details, let me remark that such steps could be considerable.

Northern Europe is not by any means the only area on our continent in which the possibility of creating nuclear-free zones is under active discussion. This idea is enjoying considerable popularity in the Balkans. Many Mediterranean countries are interested in it. Naturally, we sympathize with such ideas.

The Soviet Union is in favor of preventing the expansion of nuclear arsenals of any kind in Europe and, conversely, of initiating the process of their curtailment. Let me conclude by repeating my opening statement: should the possibility of creating a nuclear-free zone appear in one part of Europe or another, the USSR would most energetically support practical steps in this direction.

Question: The FRG believes that the development of events in Poland is very serious. Can we proceed from the fact that the Soviet Union considers the problem of normalizing the situation in Poland as closely related to the preservation of European peace?

Answer: Unquestionably--closely connected with the preservation of peace and, I would add, the place of socialist Poland in Europe.

There is great and various speculation in the West on the subject of Poland. Most of it, however, has the single purpose of destabilizing the situation even further, undermining the positions of socialism in that country, complicating relations between Poland and the Soviet Union and, naturally, deriving corresponding advantages from all this such as to further the plans of the NATO bloc.

There are those who cannot wait to impose the burdens of the cold or any other kind of war upon the nations. The Soviet Union has not engaged and does not intend to engage in such actions. To us Poland is a friend, a good neighbor and an ally. Our attitude toward it is that of an ally and a friend. The USSR is trying to help the Poles recover from their economic difficulties and is helping them to the extent of its possibilities.

It would be good if the West would understand that peace and tranquility are needed by all European countries and not only by the members of the Socialist comity.

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WHAT MATTERS IS THE END RESULT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 pp 26-33

[Article by A. Koshurin, general director of the Krasnyy Vyborzhets Nonferrous Metal-Processing Production Association, Leningrad]

[Text] Metals play a special role in the material resources of any country. The 26th CPSU Congress indicated the need for thrifty, economical use of metals in its appeal to metallurgical workers to improve the quality and variety of their output.

Our association has rich revolutionary, combat and labor traditions. In 1922 the Petrograd Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Deputies awarded the plant the honorific revolutionary name "Krasnyy Vyborzhets" for its active participation in the Great October Socialist Revolution, the civil war and the subsequent rebuilding of the national economy. It was here that the first collective contract on socialist competition in the country was signed at the dawn of the First Five-Year Plan, in March 1929, laying the foundations for its extensive dissemination.

In multiplying and developing the collective's great combat and labor traditions, subsequent generations of Vyborzhets workers worked tirelessly during the prewar five-year plans and in the difficult period of the Great Patriotic War to improve their output, increase variety and meet industry's need for rolled ferrous metals.

Our association is producing rolled pieces made of copper, brass, bronze, aluminum, copper-nickel and aluminum alloys in the shape of foils, bands, sheets, strips, tiles, pipes, rods and shaped parts. Its output goes to various sectors of the country's national economy. Whereas previously we had an essentially stable "portfolio" of orders, today the variety is being steadily renovated. This is dictated by the requirements of the economy and reflects the scientific and technical progress developing within it. The enterprise is creating all the necessary conditions for increasing the volume, expanding the variety and improving the quality of the output. During the last decade the reconstruction of the smelting-casting facility was completed and that of the rolling shop is nearing completion. Thanks to the mastering and use of modern equipment and of progressive technological processes, defective production declined by 8 percent, production of flat rolled goods increased and its volume of output nearly doubled within that period. Many new technological processes were applied in smelting.

Naturally, we have not by any means resolved all the problems related to the rational and economical use of nonferrous metals in the manufacturing of rolled pieces. Further possibilities exist and our efforts to utilize them are continuing.

In 1976, on the occasion of the approaching 50th anniversary of the mass socialist competition which originated in our enterprise, the collective launched the initiative of reaching end national economic results by manufacturing and supplying the consumers with new and economical types of rolled nonferrous metal goods on the basis of direct creative economic relations. We pledged to develop and supply the consumers with 220 new types of goods during the five-year plan, saving the national economy no less than 50 million rubles.

New types of rolled metal goods were manufactured previously as well, on the instructions of the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy or the Soyuzsvetmetobrabotka All-Union Production Association. However, demand exceeded the volume of output by a great deal. Such work assumed a systematic nature as of 1976 and we are signing either direct economic contracts or contracts for creative cooperation.

Effect on Related Enterprises

Most of the new items we produced during the 10th Five-Year Plan were based on direct economic contracts with customer enterprises.

In order for such a contract to be concluded, the customer submits the technical specifications for the item, the estimated economic effectiveness of its utilization and data on needs for this item for the next 3-5 years. The association's technical and production services consider the customer's proposal, formulate a program for work and determine the outlays required for the development of the new item and the organization of its production. If necessary, coperformers are recruited, consisting as a rule of training or scientific research institutes in Moscow or Leningrad, or sometimes Leningrad machine-building enterprises. Cost estimates are determined on the basis of the work program (including the cost to the coperformers). The customer pays for all development outlays.

In some cases, creative cooperation is organized instead of economic contracts. Such was the case of producing a precision batch of shaped parts for the Elektrosila Association for the windings of the hydrogenerators of the Sayano-Shushenskaya GES. This piece requires virtually no machining and had it been made of ordinary copper strips, 15 tons of copper per generator would have been lost in shavings.

Our enterprise is among the 28 Leningrad enterprises which joined in the competition for fulfilling the orders for that electric power plant qualitatively and ahead of schedule. The development of the technology and instrument fittings involved the efforts of the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni Kalinin and the Izhorskiy Zavod and Elektrosila Associations. Each enterprise assumed the total cost of its part of the project. In individual cases, when projects did not require substantial funds and labor costs, technical cooperation contracts were concluded as well. It was on the basis of such a contract that we cooperated with the Metallurgical Combine imeni V. I. Lenin in Magnitogorsk and the Scientific Research Institute of Metallurgical Heat Technology in selecting and testing new materials for the tuyeres of blast furnaces.

The analysis of the economic results of the use of new items by our enterprise enabled us to find ways of upgrading effectiveness in the use of nonferrous metals. This pertains mainly to the conservation of meal and labor outlays and the economical use of the equipment by the consumer as a result of making the shape and dimensions of the rolled pieces as close to the finished product as possible.

For example, the Svetlana Association in Leningrad previously used standard copper piping in instrument manufacturing. In 1979, at the request of the enterprise, we developed the production of corrugated pipes. This made the almost complete elimination of milling and the reduction to a minimum of machining possible. Outlays per item dropped by a factor of 2.5. The production of several more items is being developed and mastered for the same enterprise in 1981.

Increasing the time span between equipment repairs provides an important reserve. A square-shaped copper part with an internal aperture used in the face jackets of smelting furnaces was developed for and is being supplied to some ore-mining and metallurgical combines. As a result, according to consumer-supplied data, the operating period of smelting furnaces is extended by a factor of 1.7 and copper outlays for the production of the jackets has declined by 40 percent.

According to estimates by the Central Scientific Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy, the replacement of copper tiles in the molds of continuous steel smelting systems with complex copper alloys considerably extends the molds' service life and not only saves on copper but greatly reduces the idling of high-production equipment, thus increasing the removal of the metal from the system.

Increasing the effectiveness of technological processes is another source of saving. Several types of shaped copper parts for electrolytic bus bars were developed and shipped to the Dzhezkazgan Ore-Mining and Metallurgical Combine imeni Satpayev and the Severonikel Combine imeni V. I. Lenin of the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. The use of these shapes not only saves copper but extends the service life of the equipment and reduces specific outlays of electric power per unit of output. Thanks to the increased recovery of commercial-quality nickel, Severonikel is able to save tens of thousands of rubles per year.

The use of the new electrode alloys developed by the association for contact welding at pipe-manufacturing plants has served to triple or quadruple the strength of welding electrodes. This increases the effectiveness of the welding lines and reduces the need for nonferrous metals correspondingly.

The association is using a comprehensive method for the production of shaped copper pipes, as a result of which it has mastered the manufacturing of a great variety of various shaped parts. This was made necessary by the increased demand in the country's economy for raising the unit power of hydro- and turbogenerators, metallurgical furnaces and high-energy physics equipment, in which shaped copper pipes are used as cooling windings of rotors and stators, induction coils for metallurgical furnaces, heating systems and physics machines. A major project has been completed for developing the industrial production of condenser pipes with a "curled" surface needed in electrical machine building. The operational results of many electric power plants equipped with "curled" pipe condensers have proved their substantial advantages compared with smooth-pipe condensers. The most important are a 20-30 percent increase in heat exchange intensiveness and a 4 percent increase in

turbine power. This proves the great advantage of using "curled" pipes in power-machine building, particularly in terms of high-power steam turbine condensers, allowing for a considerable reduction in the dimensions of the condensers and a commensurate reduction in the metal-intensiveness of turbogenerators.

A specific system of work on each item, based on the degree of manufacturing complexity, has been developed by the association in the course of the creation of economical new shapes. Thus the association itself makes the technological preparations for the manufacturing of less complex items. In many cases, however, the association cannot produce the necessary instruments and equipment by itself. In such cases the customer undertakes their production, based on our blueprints, on a contractual basis.

As a rule, a comprehensive brigade consisting of technological engineers and skilled frontranking workers is in charge of the development of a new item. In this case we make good use of the experience acquired by the association thanks to the dissertations defended by the workers.

The defense of workers' dissertations began in the first postwar years when the country's national economy had to be rebuilt quickly. At that time, the metallurgical workers at the Kirov Plant in Leningrad were the first to initiate the speed-smelting system. The news of this development rapidly spread throughout the city and inevitably interested the progressive workers at Krasnyy Vyborzhets. Smelter A. I. Lyagin and shop technologist Ya. A. Kutepov conducted a series of experiments on a 20-ton reflection furnace and reduced the length of a smelt by 3 hours and 50 minutes. During the same period A. S. Podmostkov, another one of our famous smelters, was doing his own research. Lyagin and Podmostkov reported on the results of their studies to the plant's technical council. These reports were described subsequently in the press as workers' dissertations. That is how workers' research and creative activities were started in 1951. During the 10th Five-Year Plan they defended 49 such dissertations, one half of which dealt with the development of technological processes for the production of new types of rolled metals.

The production of complex and most economical shapes requires thorough and highly skilled technological processing and the use of new specialized tools and equipment. For example, the mastery of the production of a number of complex shapes for consumers during the last five-year plan was preceded by extensive work by the association's specialists, together with scientists from the Pipe-Production Technology and Equipment Chair of the All-Union Correspondence Machine-Building Institute. As a result of their efforts, more than 15 varieties of new press equipment were created, most of which are essentially new and are protected by authorship certificates.

Another problem which developed was the low resistance of pressing tools made of traditional steels. The Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, whose scientists suggested the use of new steel brands, became involved. The resistance of tools made of such steels was substantially greater. The institute's scientists developed a new direction in the combination of dyed steels used in the making of hot-extrusion tools. The ferrous metallurgy enterprises have already mastered the production of such steels on the basis of these developments. The new features of this work merited the issuance of authorship invention certificates.

In cooperation with Giprotsvetmetobrabotka, our head institute in Moscow, several copper-base alloys were developed, the parameters of which are considerably superior to standard alloy indicators of the same type. As a rule, such alloys are new and are protected by authorship certificates.

The successful development of economical new shapes is directly related to the socialist competition at all production levels, from the brigade and shop to the entire association. In the course of the fulfillment of its socialist obligations, the press-operators' brigade headed by G. I. Gusev, USSR State Prize laureate, mastered the production of eight new shapes in the 10th Five-Year Plan, saving the national economy about 1 million rubles. The collective in which Hero of Socialist Labor A. A. Dubnov is working is doing equally successful work.

The experience we gained in the 10th Five-year Plan in expanding the variety of output, upgrading its technical standard and improving its quality as a result of the development and application of economical new shapes confirms its great importance to the national economy from the viewpoint of upgrading the effective utilization of nonferrous metals and the overall production process.

This matter has another aspect, which is no less important than economic effectiveness. The creation of anything new always demands scientific investigation, technical solutions and studies related to both main and related production areas. New knowledge and higher skills become necessary. Creative collectives made up of workers and engineers are set up. A trend toward steady technological advancement appears. The creative principle of socialist competition is strengthened. In the course of the implementation of its socialist obligations during the 10th Five-Year Plan, the association developed 243 new types of rolled metal goods, which saved more than 53 million rubles. Our initiative was supported by all Soyuztsvetmetobrabotka enterprises, as a result of which the national economy received about 1,000 new shapes of rolled metal and saved more than 310 million rubles.

Unresolved Problems

Clearly the production technology for the manufacturing of any new metal shape is far more complex than that for standard pipes, rods, sheets, etc. Labor intensiveness and equipment use are greater and, as a rule, the labor-intensiveness required for the manufacturing of the necessary instruments is several times greater. Durability is reduced and the production of proper-quality goods is considerably lower. In the final account, all of this lowers the technical and economic work indicators of the manufacturing plant. Furthermore, in our type of work, the frequent retuning of basic equipment needed in the production of new items results in failure to meet orders for standard equipment in full. Naturally, this creates justified complaints from the customers.

A considerable increase in the production of complex economical shapes creates serious difficulties related to the manufacturing of tools and fittings, the use of instrument-quality steel and the need for several types of specialized equipment as part of the ordinary technological process.

Let me cite two examples. We mastered the manufacturing of four sizes of complex-shaped parts for the inductors of the four sizes of smelting furnaces used at Azelektroterm, thus saving the national economy more than 4 million rubles. The

difficulty involved in our manufacture of them was greater by a factor of 2.5 compared with standard shapes. The equipment load quadrupled and the production of suitable parts declined by 20.5 percent. Despite the higher price charged for such shapes, labor productivity was one half that for standardized pieces.

Here is the second example. Over the course of several years, together with the Giprotsvetmetobrabotka Institute and some shipyards, we have tried to develop a new alloy to replace the copper-nickel alloy currently used. Such an alloy, which is more resistant to corrosion and which considerably extends machinery use between repairs, was developed. We are perfectly aware of the fact that it is needed by the national economy. On the other hand, however, it is not technologically advantageous and only 10-30 percent of the parts produced with it are usable. The labor-intensiveness and equipment load needed for its casting and machining are higher than in the manufacturing of the standard alloy by a factor of 2.5-3. The moment we begin to produce this alloy we will be in danger of being unable to meet the orders of other customers, for our basic equipment, the hydraulic presses in particular, is overloaded as it is and is operating on a continuous schedule.

The question which arises is whether enterprises can cope with such difficulties and problems by themselves, with their own resources, while at the same time ensuring the steady expansion of variety and increased volume of output of economical rolled shapes. Judging from our experience, I believe that they cannot. Here is why: above all, we must fulfill the plan in terms of gross output and tonnage, labor productivity and many other indicators. All of our efforts are aimed at meeting these indicators and filling orders on time. Only some small "cracks" remain as potential in terms of equipment load, to which we can add the enthusiasm of engineers and workers for work on the development of new items.

In our view, in order to continue to upgrade the effectiveness with which nonferrous metals are used in the national economy, long-term relations must be developed with customer enterprises so that, as a result of mastering and producing new economical rolled-metal shapes, the production of the older shapes can be reduced or stopped entirely. Furthermore, a certain share of the customer's savings should be reflected in the higher price of the new commodity, thus compensating the manufacturer for his loss in productivity and giving both parties an interest in the economic indicators of the new item.

The new items are more complex and labor-intensive. The existing "gross output" indicator does not increase the incentive to produce such items. The more material-intensive an item is, the easier it becomes for the enterprise to fulfill its plan, the faster the pace of growth in the volume of output and labor productivity becomes and the greater its wage and material incentive funds become. For example, the production of lead-phosphor bronze bands requires 16 percent more wages and withholdings, but the wholesale price is only 4 percent higher, for in this case improvements in quality features are related to increased labor outlays without affecting labor intensiveness. Such new shapes require greater tool outlays and additional technological operations. The additional labor outlays are included in the price of the items as an addition to the existing material intensiveness. Since they account for about 5 percent, the wholesale price is increased by an insignificant amount. Had the enterprise invested this labor in the series production of items already mastered, its profits would have been higher.

This is not a strictly sectorial problem. In order to implement the party congress assignments, heeding the principle that "the economy must be economical" in its work, the entire economic mechanism must be made consistent with this requirement. "However," as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "we must admit that this has not been accomplished so far to the necessary extent. That is precisely why we still come across economic situations in which enterprises and associations find it economically unprofitable to adopt intensive plans, to accelerate scientific and technical progress and to improve production quality. That is precisely why we have still not been able to get rid of indicators which essentially encourage waste. I am referring to the notorious "gross" output computed in terms of tons or rubles in areas such as machine-tool manufacturing or bread baking, or in terms of ton/kilometers in assessing the work of the transportation system."

In order to interest an enterprise in the production of complex and highly effective items, the collective's labor must be suitably encouraged. The solution of this problem is related to the normative net output indicator, the use of which in assessing enterprise activities was stipulated in the 12 July 1979 CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers Decree.

As of 1982, in accordance with ministry plans, enterprises engaged in nonferrous metal processing will use the normative net output indicator in assessing their activities and summing up the results of the socialist competition for the fulfillment of the plan for the volume of output, productivity and capital returns. The labor productivity growth indicator, computed on the basis of the normative net output, will be used in determining the size of the material incentive fund.

By blocking the effect of material intensiveness on work results, this indicator paves the way for the economical use of nonferrous metals in production and mastery of the manufacturing of complex shaped parts. The normative net output, which will include both additional and basic labor outlays for improving the goods, will reflect the efforts of the collective in the production process more objectively.

Ensuring the availability of complex technological tools is an equally important problem. Our association does not have a sufficiently well-equipped machine-tool shop which could meet the need for such tools. Therefore, the consumer frequently undertakes to produce them. Along with the development of the basic output and the expansion of production facilities, we must plan the development of support services, the instrument and repair shops above all.

Concerns for the Future

The "Main Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the Period Through 1990" assign the workers in nonferrous metallurgy the following tasks: "To develop at a faster pace the production of semiconductors, high-purity and specialized materials, precision alloys and other materials with improved parameters, and economical shapes of rolled metals..."

Our efforts to produce economical new types of rolled metals will continue during the 11th Five-Year Plan, as we realize that the task of economical utilization of nonferrous metals has become one of the most important ones. Therefore, in each specific case, guided by final national economic results and together with our customers, we will resolve the problems related to covering outlays for the

development of new items, developing technological processes through our own efforts or together with coperformers, production of the necessary instruments, whether by the customer or the producer, and finding acceptable solutions for coordinating temporary prices in accordance with the increased labor outlays and machine-tool hours and reduced labor productivity by the manufacturer.

Naturally, we can resolve all of these problems only for the production of small experimental batches. Series production raises major problems related to planning equipment loads, the structure of the production plan, the setting of definitive prices, the need for more instrument steel, the increased capacity of instrument and appliance shops and, in many cases, the need for technological production retooling.

Such problems must be resolved on the level of the superior organizations. However, in order to achieve this we must have an exact knowledge of the demand for new economical rolled metal shapes, not only for the current period but on a long-term basis. Unfortunately, we are not supplied with such data. During the 10th Five-Year Plan, we carried out this work on the basis of our technical and production facilities and current consumer demand alone.

The 26th CPSU Congress asked ministries which use ferrous and nonferrous rolled metal goods to reduce their specific outlays by no less than 18-20 percent for ferrous and 9-11 percent for nonferrous metals. This is a difficult task which, however, is dictated by life and must be carried out. Obviously, there are several ways to accomplish this, the first of which is to reduce the material intensiveness of goods produced by the machine-building industry. A no less important means of saving nonferrous metals is the development and delivery of economical new shapes to the consumer. Here, like anywhere else, a systematic and planned approach is needed. Obviously, the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology must join efforts with the machine-building ministries in the development of suggestions on the replacement of standard types of rolled metals with more economical ones. On the basis of such suggestions, the USSR Gosplan and Gossnab will be able to determine the need, for new types of rolled metal parts for the entire country, the effectiveness of their utilization and consequently the expediency of the development and production of each new type of rolled piece, so that in the final account, it can be included in the respective state standard.

At that point, the Giprotsvetmetobrabotka Institute will be able to study the situation and forecast the demand for economical new rolled metal shapes, so that the planning organs of the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy can include them in the production plans of plants engaged in the processing of nonferrous metals. This is the way our collective sees the possibility of resolving the problem formulated at the November 1981 CC CPSU Plenum: "...To ensure the strictest possible regime of savings in the utilization of all types of resources and to block negligence and waste efficiently and firmly."

We shall unquestionably fulfill the 11th Five-Year Plan by improving the organization of the production process and working more efficiently.

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SECTORIAL TECHNOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MACHINE BUILDING

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[Article by Doctor of Technical Sciences P. Belyanin, director of the Scientific Research Production Technology and Organization Institute]

[Text] The contemporary scientific and technical revolution has immeasurably intensified the role of technology as a science of the development of social production forces. New technological processes based on the latest scientific and technological achievements are steadily restricting or radically changing the old production methods. It is technology precisely that largely ensures the development of progressive technological-economic characteristics and high quality in new machines and other items and creates the best possible labor conditions and maximum efficiency with minimum outlays. Technological improvements related to environmental protection and the conservation of all kinds of resources assume prime significance. Today, those who possess progressive technology have the key to technical progress.

During this five-year plan, the pace of equipment renovation will be increased by approximately one half. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the November 1981 CC CPSU Plenum, "This faces scientific research and design institutes with major and important tasks."

The extent of the technological application of science or, in other words, the speed and effectiveness of practical utilization of its achievements under the specific circumstances of one economic sector or another, is largely determined by the standard and quality of work at the technological institutes which are directly engaged in the integration of science with production.

The main directions in the activities of sectorial scientific research institutes are the same regardless of the specific features of the various industrial sectors, including machine building (machine-tool building, shipbuilding, automobile manufacturing, etc.). The end objective of their activities is to provide scientific-technological support for developing and mastering the production of new commodities, upgrading labor productivity and ensuring the comprehensive conservation of material resources and energy and the growth of production effectiveness as a whole. Another common feature shared by these institutes is the main principle governing the organization of their work: the combination of extensive practical activities in the application of new technologies and equipment

with long-term research aimed at ensuring the comprehensive acceleration of scientific and technical progress.

Technological scientists have accomplished a great deal in recent years. However, the problems which must be resolved over the next 10-15 years far exceed the content and scale of the work of sectorial scientific research institutes today in terms of their complexity and importance to the development of the national economy. Unfortunately, the view that technologists are second-grade specialists is still widespread. The work of technologists in many enterprises is no longer considered prestigious and is assigned poor moral and material incentives. Production technologists are frequently given petty practical assignments aimed at urgently eliminating all sorts of production difficulties. The role of sectorial technological scientific research institutes is also being underestimated.

The steady enhancement of the material and spiritual living standard of the people, technical progress in the national economy and the steady increase in the export of goods produced by the machine-building industry to many foreign countries demand the accelerated renovation of existing and the development of new types of commodities. This requires a drastic expansion of the variety of the machines, instruments and mechanisms produced.

It is not the mass output of the machine-building industry in the present traditional understanding of the term (mass production of a small variety of fixed-design items), but the production of a broad variety of steadily updated goods similar only in terms of basic design and engineering parameters, which will become the predominant type of machine-building output in the immediate future. The variety of items and models produced by a single plant will inevitably broaden.

Already today, machine-building enterprises in industrially developed countries ordinarily classified as engaged in mass and large-series output account for no more than 25 percent of the overall volume of output. At the same time, we also note in mass production (automotive vehicles, timepieces, radio and television equipment, etc.) a steady increase in the variety of models produced. Thus, the ZIL Association is manufacturing the ZIL-130 in dozens of models, the watch manufacturing enterprises in the country are offering customers dozens or hundreds of different models and varieties of time pieces, etc. Given these conditions, the current classification of machine building into mass (large-series) and small-series is quickly losing its meaning. It would be more accurate to define a modern machine-building plant as a specialized multipurpose production facility which reacts rapidly to all changes in national economic requirements for machine-building goods.

Such a multiple-purpose nature and the possibility of rapid restructuring of the present and particularly the future machine-building output for the manufacturing of new and more complex items must be backed by the development of technology and the specific activities of sectorial scientific research institutes.

At the present pace of scientific and technical progress, the mastery of the production of a new item, particularly if it is complex and large (ship, airplane, locomotive engine, turbine, etc.), involves many difficult tasks in terms of production technology and organization for the sector. It would be no exaggeration to say

that most of the difficulties encountered in mastering the series production of complex new machines and systems are caused by their low technological standard.

Naturally, it is not a question here of lack of competence or skill on the part of designers and developers. The problem is to ensure high operational qualities in the new items, considerably superior to the parameters of the already existing models, and the possibility of organizing their series output. Objectively, this is the most complex scientific and technical problem of all. It can be successfully resolved only through the joint efforts of experimental-design bureaus (OKB), sectorial technological institutes and industrial enterprises.

Long experience has confirmed the high degree of effectiveness of planned and systematic work done jointly by a sectorial technological institute, OKB and other NII [Scientific Research Institutes] in all the stages of the creation of new equipment, from predesign research to mastery of the series production of the item. It is precisely in the early stages of designing that it is easiest of all to develop comprehensively and test progressive designs for a new commodity and to select the optimal (technological) variant. This, however, requires the faster development of technology and the timely creation of a complete scientific base which will enable the designers to adopt the most progressive solution.

For example, the joint work which the technologists from our institute are doing with designers leads to conclusions concerning the technological nature of each new item. It involves an evaluation of its technological level and a list of recommendations aimed at its improvement in the manufacturing of semi-finished pieces, parts, assemblies, machine units, control systems and functional systems for the item. At the same time, in working with other participants in the project, a technical-economic assessment of the new item is provided and the labor-intensiveness required for its manufacturing is determined (forecasted) for its production in series. This applies both to the item as a whole and to its basic parts individually as well, to the capacity and productivity of mass produced units. The outlay norms and metal use coefficients for series production are determined as well.

Technology manuals on the basic types of items produced by the sector, which contain both general-sectorial requirements regarding the technology of the item and specific recommendations for each type of technology, in accordance with the characteristics of one design or another, are of great help to designers. In our view, it would be expedient to publish such manuals separately for each different type of equipment. Given the current rate of renovation in machine-building output and advancement in manufacturing technology, such manuals should be reissued at least once each 5-7 years. Every year we also publish a large number of technical recommendations in which the results of the scientific research and experimental work conducted by our associates is summed up and made available to the enterprises.

When a new item is to be manufactured in series, the institute, together with the manufacturing plant, develops and applies comprehensive measures for mastering and developing the production process, the use of new technology and equipment, the reduction of labor intensiveness, the automation and mechanization of production processes, the training and upgrading of cadre skills, etc.

The whole of the experience acquired by domestic and worldwide machine building indicates a trend toward a steady and considerable increase in the cost of new equipment (due also to the increased labor intensiveness required). The example of ships and airplanes would suffice. In recent decades their cost has increased dozens of times. Limiting the steadily rising outlays for the creation and production of new equipment and accelerating labor productivity are the most important tasks for all machine-building sectors. The sectorial technological institutes can make a major contribution to the solution of these problems.

Unquestionably, the most effective way to upgrade labor productivity is the comprehensive mechanization and automation of production processes on the basis of low operational and low-waste technology. Automation and mechanization must permeate basic and auxiliary production and all areas of management and administrative services.

In addition to the other reasons for it, the need to upgrade labor productivity in industry (in machine building above all) is dictated by the growing shortage of manpower. Today this has become one of the most acute problems facing our industry. There is a shortage of industrial workers. Added to their insufficiently effective utilization, this restrains the growth of output. Meanwhile, the inflow of new manpower in machine building and other industrial sectors is continuing to diminish. This situation cannot be explained by deteriorating demographic conditions alone. Under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution in all industrially developed countries, the participation of the active population in machine-building output is steadily decreasing as compared with its contribution in other areas of social activity.

American specialists have forecast that the contribution of workers engaged in metal processing, which accounts for a considerable share of U. S. industry, will decline sharply in the immediate future. A trend toward a reduction in specific employment in industry is being noted in our country as well. Naturally, it would be difficult today to forecast reliable indicators on the breakdown of manpower resources, particularly over a long period of time, such as 20-30 years. However, there is no doubt that as the years go by, machine building will be receiving a diminishing share of the labor resources.

In order to ensure further improvement in the life of the entire population of our country, a considerable percentage of manpower resources will have to be transferred to the nonproduction sphere on a planned basis in the years to come. This will include rapidly developing sectors such as health care, education, science, culture, services, trade and work in procurement and other organizations.

The volume of machine-building output can be steadily increased with a smaller number of workers only by raising the level of production automation. The task now is to formulate its basic principles and to create corresponding equipment and technical facilities for this purpose.

Most effective, in terms of traditional mass output, are automated lines with fixed programming, consisting of special machine tools and cyclical control systems. In this case auxiliary operations are accomplished with the simplest possible automated operators (mechanical hands) and transport systems. Mechanized storage areas are installed along such lines. As to multiple-purpose machine-building enterprises,

their output should be mechanized by the installation of multioperational retunable automated lines which will include production systems with digital programming or computer-controlled automatic machines, industrial robots, general-purpose automated transportation vehicles and automated storage depots.

The automation of machine-building output in all its sectors and over the next few five-year periods must cover the whole range from the automation of individual production processes (based on the use of machines, systems and instruments which make production processes possible with minimal effort or without any human physical stress, only human control), through the comprehensive automation of production (based on systems of machines and automated lines which cover the full cycle of the production process without any direct human participation), to the comprehensive automation of the production process on the basis of automatically self-tuning production systems controlled by computers. Such systems can optimize equipment work loads and regimens, reduce the technological cycle of the various operations to a minimum (including transportation and loading and unloading) and provide complete and comprehensive information on the status and condition of the production process at all times.

Today, the various industrial enterprises and sectors have reached various stages of automation, essentially based on the effect of objective factors such as the nature and specifics of the production process, the complexity of produced items, etc. However, here a great deal depends also on the proper choice of basic directions in technical policy on the part of the sectorial technological institutes.

Comprehensive production automation in machine building includes two individual problems: the automation of intellectual work (engineering above all), and automation of production processes or, in other words, automation of physical -- workers' -- labor. However these problems must be resolved jointly on the basis of computers. Therefore, the task of upgrading labor effectiveness in machine building can be formulated as a problem of comprehensive production automation on the basis of computers. This means that a new item (part, assembly, machine unit) must be designed with the help of automated methods (computation of geometrical dimensions, coupling parameters, etc.), that the technology used in its manufacture must also be developed with the use of computers, and that on this basis the manufacture of the new item must be automated.

Research and practical experience have proved that no effective automation of production processes is possible without the automation of engineering work based on computers. Thus, in the initial period of extensive application of metal-cutting machine tools equipped with digital programming, a considerable percentage of such tools were not used at full capacity due to lack of programs for the machining of parts, although trained programmers were available. The reason was the very high labor-intensiveness of the formulation of control programs. For example, in the case of multiple-coordinate machine tools for which programmers had no labor automation facilities, thousands of man/hours were required (for programming particularly complex parts).

The problem was resolved after a system of automated computer programming was developed and applied. A single programmer working with a computer can easily service 5-6 metal-cutting machine tools with digital programming. The same work

without automated programming systems would have required five times the number of programmers.

Three basic categories of engineering cadres are considered in the automation of intellectual labor in machine building: designers (who design the items to be produced, the technological equipment, fittings and other technical facilities); technologists (who develop the technological processes and the entire related technical documentation); and production engineers, who are in charge of preparation, planning and organization of the production process. Despite some functional differences in the activities of these three categories of engineering cadres, the requirements regarding the procedure governing the elaboration, operation and content of these systems for the automation of engineering work have a great deal in common, including the formalizing of problems, the development of algorithms and programs for their solution with computers and the processing of information on the programs, which requires the automated search for and selection of the optimal solution variants.

General purpose programs for designing technological machining processes using computers, developed under the overall supervision of Academician N. G. Bruyevich, prove the effectiveness of automating engineering work. These general-purpose programs, which include more than 500,000 instructions, make it possible to establish, with computer help, on the basis of part design and other specifications, the means for manufacturing and the conditions under which the finished parts will meet accuracy requirements. The computerized technological chart received for each part includes information on the sequence of operations and transfers, operational dimensions, number of bases, types of tools, attachments and equipment needed, systems for cutting the semi-finished parts and machining time norms.

With the use of computers, outlays in engineering work in designing technological processes are reduced by an average factor of 20-25. For example, the labor intensiveness in designing a technological process for the machining of a frame part, the manufacturing of which would require 18 switches and 80 separate operations on a machine tool, by a traditional method (without computer use), would take 76 hours. The use of an automated technological design system and a computer reduces it to 3.6 hours.

The creation of comprehensively mechanized and automated sectors and shops is the means of reducing the number of workers engaged in manual labor and upgrading labor productivity. Practical experience indicates that the installation of a single machine tool with digital programming in a multiple-machine tool operation releases three or four production workers; the installation of a comprehensively automated line releases as many as 30, and the installation of an automated sector, as many as 60 production workers.

Progress in machine building is characterized by the increasingly extensive use of superhigh and superlow temperatures and pressures, increased operational speeds and specific machine and system capacities and the use of other, including essentially new, production intensification methods and means. The high parameters of promising technological processes and equipment make the transfer of control functions from man to automated systems inevitable.

A forecast by our institute, according to which by the year 2000 the leading enterprises in domestic machine-building industry will no longer require technical specifications on paper, confirms the scale and possibilities of comprehensive automation backed by a modern level of development of science and technology. Blueprints, descriptions of technological processes and all accounting and report data may be stored in and processed by computers and computer systems. By that time, one half of the technological equipment will be part of automated lines, sectors and shops and will be controlled by computers. The development of comprehensive production automation will make it possible to achieve a qualitative change in the level of labor productivity.

The limited nature of manpower resources and the relative and, in the future, absolute reduction in the number of people engaged in machine-building output require not only a considerable acceleration of the growth rates of labor productivity but a careful study of changes in the nature of labor and the structure of industrial workers. Some of the most important trends in this area include the decline in the specific number of workers and the increased contribution of people performing intellectual work (engineering and technical personnel, employees), as well as highly skilled workers, including graduate engineers and technicians. Along with a sharp decrease and the subsequent total elimination of unskilled, monotonous and hard physical work (above all in types of work harmful to the health), we are expecting a considerable increase (in absolute and relative terms) in the number of manual workers engaged in servicing equipment and the means of automation and mechanization (tuners, fitters, repairmen, etc.).

In the light of these trends in scientific and technical progress, the work of the technological institutes on radically improving sociohygienic working conditions becomes particularly important. The new technology and equipment, the comprehensive automation and mechanization of production processes and the new forms of organization of labor and production must be developed in such a way as to contribute maximally to bringing physical labor closer to intellectual work, to stimulate the interest of young people entering production work and to ensure that great prestige is enjoyed by all professions. The attraction of new cadres to enterprises in industrial sectors which have not paid proper attention to such problems may develop into a most difficult problem.

Whereas success in resolving the theoretical problems in automation depends essentially on the skill of the scientific cadres and the purposefulness and intensiveness of their work, the actual pace at which the level of production automation and mechanization in industry is increased is determined by the scale of enterprise technical retooling. The task now is to increase the availability of highly productive technological equipment considerably and to broaden the variety of modern means for the automation and mechanization of production processes drastically.

Considerable success has been achieved in the area of domestic machine-tool manufacturing (broadly speaking, in the production of various types of technological equipment) during the last 10-15 years. It has become possible for machine-building sectors and enterprises to order and to obtain a greater variety of types and models of metal-cutting, forge-pressing, casting, welding, hot-wire and other technological equipment. At the same time, the process of sectorial differentiation in machine

building has made the centralized supplying of all machine-building sectors with the full complement of the required varieties of technological equipment and attachments impossible.

In accordance with the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, during the 11th Five-Year Plan the machine-building ministries must increase the production of specialized technological equipment to meet their own requirements, and that of tools and attachments for intrasectorial use. This is logical, for no one better than the sector itself can determine the optimal requirements consistent with its specific requirements concerning new special and specialized technological equipment, control-measuring instruments and systems, means for the mechanization and automation of production processes, instruments and attachments. However, the mere determination and accurate formulation of such requirements is insufficient. They must be translated into specific developments and blueprints.

Powerful and highly skilled design bureaus operating as part of the technological institutes must play the main role in the development of the basic types of progressive technological equipment. Naturally, this does not exclude the possibility of the design of certain types of equipment by design bureaus in other sectors.

The concentration of equipment designers in technological institutes is expedient not only because this creates the best possible conditions for strengthening the creative cooperation between technologists and designers, but also because modern and, to an even greater extent future, machine-building technology requires corresponding productive capital. Any new technological process, if it truly includes new ideas and production methods, inevitably requires new technological equipment and attachments. Therefore, the scientific research related to the development of new technological processes ends only when the process is entirely ready for industrial use. A study conducted by a sectorial institute should be considered complete only when the entire material base of the new technology, including the production, development and finishing of new equipment prototypes has been established. This, however, requires a powerful experimental-production base.

But it is no secret that the absence or insufficient strength of such a base is the main weakness of most sectorial institutes today. Should we be surprised, therefore, that the making and operational development of prototypes often takes 3-5 years? The result is that this equipment has become morally obsolete even before its series production has been organized and its users are unable to achieve their planned labor productivity growth indicators.

It is difficult to produce experimental models at enterprises which manufacture machine tools in series. However, the building of experimentation plants at sectorial technological institutes requires a great deal of time and funds. The most effective means of resolving the problem is the development of a planned organization of scientific-production associations in which the sectorial technological institute will act as the head enterprise. It is clear that the inclusion in such associations of big plants engaged in series production would be inexpedient, for in such a case the solution of the current problems facing the enterprise would inevitably divert the collective of the head institute from work on the most important long-range problems of technical progress in the sector.

As a rule, the series production of specialized new equipment must be organized in sectorial plants, for which purpose the necessary production facilities must be expanded at the proper time. In recent years, a number of machine-building ministries have opened plants producing specialized technological equipment. Unquestionably, this is a progressive trend and its further development in the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans is of great importance.

The work effectiveness of the sectorial design bureaus and enterprises which design and manufacture specialized equipment for sectorial needs is largely determined by the principles governing the creation of such equipment. If each new model is redesigned, and if on each separate occasion its basic elements have an original design, one could hardly hope for the prompt satisfaction of enterprise requirements for specialized equipment.

Long years of experience, including that acquired by our institute, prove the great effectiveness of creating a comprehensive system of standardized technological processes (modules) and combined specialized equipment. Practical experience indicates that if a large machine-building sector engaged in the production of a great variety of complex multiple-piece parts has created 2,500-3,000 technological and 300-350 structural modules (blocks, machine units and other standardized equipment and attachment elements), this would cover the entire variety of technological processes and equipment used in a given sector. The practical experience of sectorial technological institutes, including our own, shows that the hiring of highly skilled and competent specialists by the sectorial institute, to be personally responsible for each such module and its consistency with specific production requirements and with scientific and technical standards achieved in the USSR and abroad, is a very important prerequisite for the development of an effective system of technological and structural modules.

The use of a system of technological modules ensures the selection of the most progressive technological processes and reduces the labor intensiveness of their development by 30-35 percent. In turn, the extensive use of structural modules (standardized elements) reduces the time needed for designing new equipment by a factor of 3-4 and ensures the most effective design decisions.

Granting the machine-building ministries a leading role in supplying their enterprises with the basic types of specialized technological equipment does not mean in the least the autonomous development of a machine-tool industry by each sector. On the contrary, the effective production of specialized equipment by the sectors is possible only through close cooperation among the enterprises of many ministries, for the great harm which departmental lack of coordination causes the national economy is well known.

For a number of reasons, production specialization in some machine-building sectors has even declined, rather than increased, in recent years. Some of the lag in the level of labor productivity in some domestic machine-building sectors as compared with the most highly industrialized countries is precisely the result of the insufficiently high level of production specialization, and is explained by the fact that most enterprises are engaged in unspecialized output. Some machine-building plants which produce complex items manufacture as many as 500,000 different parts, most of them, as a rule, in small batches. This creates great difficulties in organizing the comprehensive automation of engineering work and production

processes. At the same time, part and assembly specialization has not become widespread in most machine-building sectors as yet.

The effectiveness of the creation of specialized sectorial and intersectorial production facilities for general machine use is unquestionable. However, the important and useful decisions which were made in their time on this subject (particularly for Moscow and Moscow Oblast) have not been fully implemented for a number of reasons, including lack of departmental coordination (for example, repairs on technological equipment have still not been centralized, the volume of specialized production of progressive types of semi-finished parts is insufficient, etc.).

In many cases the use of highly productive specialized equipment makes it possible to meet the needs of all sectorial enterprises for one item or another by setting up one or two specialized shops or sectors (this measure is particularly effective for new items previously not produced by the sector). However, the manufacturing of such equipment in quantities sufficient to meet the needs of all plants using such items requires unjustifiably high outlays, and is not always possible because of the manufacturing plants' insufficient capacity.

Therefore, the sectorial technological institutes face the important task of formulating long-range programs for upgrading the level of sectorial specialization, based on forecasts of the development of the goods produced, technology and production organization. The coordinated efforts of all machine-building sectors and their technological institutes and design bureaus will make it possible to accelerate the pace of enterprise technical retooling considerably. Supplying them on time with up-to-date specialized equipment and a steady increase in technological production possibilities are mandatory prerequisites if domestic machine building is to reach the leading positions consistent with or even superior to the global scientific and technical achievements.

Cadres are the prime foundation for the work of any scientific research institute. Regardless of how extensive its laboratory and experimental production facilities may be, the results and effectiveness of scientific research and development are determined mainly by the talent, experience and skill of its personnel.

A large sectorial institute must mandatorily have a scientific council and a post-graduate study system if it is to train highly qualified scientific workers -- doctors and candidates of sciences. Most of its personnel, however, consists of practical engineers specializing in a variety of fields.

Technology and production organization are scientific sectors the successful development of which demands that the individual researcher have practical experience. It is very difficult for a young specialist who joins the institute immediately after VUZ graduation to become a good technologist. Naturally, this does not negate the expediency of adding young specialists to the staff of sectorial institutes. However, it is mandatory that sectorial technological institutes include a sufficient number of "oldies" -- experienced specialists (technologists, designers and engineers with other qualifications) who have spent many years working in the sector's enterprises.

But it is very difficult for a sectorial institute to attract experienced specialists from the enterprises. If a highly skilled production specialist has no scientific degree, he cannot earn at the institute the wage (salary, bonus) he receives at the enterprise. This is the main reason why, in recent years, the transfer of personnel from industry to sectorial technological institutes has come to a virtual standstill. The creation of conditions for the planned and systematic reinforcement of technological institutes with cadres of experienced specialists coming from industrial enterprises is of great importance in improving the work effectiveness of sectorial NII.

The sectorial institute has great potential for establishing firm and fruitful relations daily with industrial enterprises. Naturally, in order for such possibilities to be realized, the formulation of a suitable system and proper organization are necessary. The opening of institute branches in centers where sectorial enterprises are located and base laboratories at leading plants and design bureaus is the most effective and fully tested organizational form of direct and specific relations between a sectorial institute and experimental design bureaus and plants.

Branches and base laboratories are a powerful lever for the practical utilization of completed research projects, joint implementation of major and comprehensive measures aimed at improving technology and production organization, and strengthening the creative cooperation between the institute and the enterprises in carrying out research and experimentation. The experimental-production sectors of the institute set up directly at the enterprises can become the physical base for such cooperation.

Naturally, such branches must be clearly specialized in certain scientific areas and must take into consideration the nature, specialization and production characteristics of the plants they service. By enabling the head institute to concentrate its efforts on the solution of major sectorial problems, such branches and base laboratories considerably facilitate its work and the solution of the problem of involving the most skilled and creative workers in industry in scientific research, design and experimentation.

Ties with "big-time" science -- the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the academies of union republics -- are no less important. It is hardly necessary for a sectorial technological institute to engage in independent basic research. It is far more important for it to make timely and skillful use of the achievements of academic institutes in sectorial research and to engage extensively in joint projects, based on creative cooperation contracts, coordination plans and, in some cases, economic contracts. The work of our institute, conducted in close contact with the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Electric Welding Institute imeni Ye. O. Paton, is an example of such successful long-term cooperation. Our institute is also participating in work on the topical problem of "Physics, Chemistry and Mechanics of Surfaces," which is coordinated by a scientific council set up under the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. The extensive experimental and production facilities available make it possible for us and for the other participants in this project to conduct extensive applied research on technological influences on the surface of parts with a view to improving their quality and service life (laser impact on surfaces, ion implantation of elements on surfaces, plasma treatment of surfaces, etc.).

It can be confidently said that the systematic upgrading of the skill of scientific and engineering and technical workers, the steady expansion and intensification of scientific and technical and production relations with industrial enterprises and academic institutes and the strengthening of research and experimental-production facilities are mandatory prerequisites for considerably increasing returns from sectorial technological science. This is exceptionally important, for the further development of our country's economy, the strengthening of its power and the improved well-being of the people are possible only on the basis of the steady improvement of the production process, the main link in which, precisely, is progressive technology.

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PHYSICS AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

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[Article by A. Prokhorov, academic secretary, USSR Academy of Sciences Department of General Physics and Astronomy]

[Text] The role of science in social progress is well known. It is no accident that outstanding scientific and technical achievements coincide in time with the greatest social transformations in the history of mankind's development. They are triggered by a common reason -- the logic of the development of social production forces and the need for their further growth. The turn in the development of production forces initiated by science and its discoveries is becoming increasingly significant and profound. The Soviet people are faced with a task of historical importance: the organic combination of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system and the broader development of methods for combining science with the production specifics of socialism.

At the present stage of the building of communism, the CPSU is paying particular attention to the organization and planning of scientific activities in the country. The role of the USSR Academy of Sciences, whose main task is to conduct basic research, has increased. It is on the basis of such research that technological progress is achieved.

According to the directival stipulations of the 26th CPSU Congress, the development of science and technology must be even more profoundly subordinated to the solution of the economic and social problems facing Soviet society, the accelerated conversion of the economy to intensive development and the upgraded effectiveness of public production during the 11th Five-Year Plan.

At the 26th party congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, stressed that "The country urgently needs, along with work on theoretical problems, an effort by "big-time" science focused on the solution of key national economic problems and discoveries which can make truly revolutionary changes in production."

This is a clear formulation of the social demand made of us, the scientists.

The further development of basic and applied research will contribute to the strengthening of our country's economic potential. The latest scientific

achievements, which are of important practical significance, must be utilized by industry immediately and effectively. The scientific workers in industry, higher educational institutions and academies of sciences bear great responsibility for the resolution of the problems which arise in this connection. Today they constitute a large detachment of 1.4 million people. Of these, 48,000, i.e., 3.4 percent, work in USSR Academy of Sciences institutions. Despite this seemingly modest number, the academic institutes play a great role in ensuring the country's scientific and technical progress.

The Academy of Sciences is conducting research along the main lines of knowledge. It is implementing comprehensive programs in accordance with the course charted by the Leninist party. The latter circumstance is exceptionally important, for Soviet scientists have always considered their active participation in the nationwide project of building a communist society as the essence of their activities. In turn, socialism offers an opportunity to "extensively disseminate and truly subordinate public production and product distribution to scientific considerations" (V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 381).

The majority of the contemporary scientific and technological problems require a comprehensive approach, such that its importance is, legitimately, increasing. In order to make the role and tasks of academic institutes in resolving such problems clearer and more understandable, let us explain what is meant by basic research. Briefly stated, it is the active and purposeful study of profound natural phenomena and the discovery within nature of new properties, relations and laws on the basis of which we acquire new opportunities for the creation of even more powerful production forces, and new means of experimentation with nature, exerting a sensible influence over it and controlling its processes. On this level, physics plays a special role, which is to study the structure and the simplest forms of the dynamics of matter and its interaction and manifestation in complex natural phenomena.

Modern physics studies elementary particles, nuclear nuclei, atoms, molecules and the macroscopic aggregates of these particles, such as solid bodies, liquids and gases, including plasma, and the physical fields which bind matter particles into systems. Despite the great variety of objects under examination, certain directions (solid-state physics, plasma physics, etc.), and individual disciplines related to qualitative differences among the processes and phenomena studied (mechanics, acoustics, and theories of heat, electricity, magnetism and optics, for example) can be singled out. Based on the research methods used, we distinguish between experimental and theoretical physics.

In my opinion, all physics research can be classified in two main groups. The first is designed to expand our ideas in the area of the natural sciences and to meet the needs of man to acquire an increasingly profound understanding of the physical laws governing the objective world. The purpose of the second is to acquire basic knowledge in order to answer questions as to how to achieve one practical result or another. As the science of physics developed, its content became richer, research expanded and our penetration into nature intensified. However, the primary importance of active observation and experimentation and the decisive role of practical use remained unchanged. "Truth is a process," V. I. Lenin wrote. "Man progresses from a subjective idea to objective truth through 'practice' (and technology)" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 29, p 183).

It is in this light that the attitude of the contemporary physicist toward theoretical experimentation must be understood. Not only the consolidation of the "positions occupied" but the further broadening of the "bridgehead" for advancing on the knowledge front as well is impossible without theoretical summations based on a well-developed mathematical apparatus. However, the starting point in basic research in physics is experimentation and "live contemplation" (i.e., active and purposeful interaction with the natural object) and the final point is also the testing of nature, but on a new "spiral" of knowledge for, as F. Engels pointed out, the success we achieve proves the agreement (consistency) between our perceptions and the object (objective) nature of the objects perceived (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 22, p 304). Therefore, the successful development of physics inevitably requires the proper combination of theoretical with experimental research.

The history of nuclear physics and the mastery of atomic (nuclear) energy provide a good illustration of this point. The practical importance of the study of the atomic nucleus became clear after the discovery of how to split the uranium nucleus -- with its absorption of neutrons -- into fragments containing large quantities of energy. The division is accompanied by the release of a larger number of neutrons than were absorbed by the uranium nuclei. These neutrons can take part in the further splitting of uranium nuclei and make possible the development of a chain reaction with all its ensuing consequences.

At the time the study of the interaction between neutrons and uranium nuclei was undertaken, it was assumed transuranium elements would be obtained. However, atomic nuclei resulted from the decay of the uranium core to the extent of virtually one half. Initially, this was hard to believe. Thus, in the course of basic research unexpected phenomena and unfamiliar properties of the material world which are simply impossible to predict through strictly theoretical means are discovered.

The result was a new source of energy, although the engineering solution to the making of a nuclear reactor involved surmounting many difficulties. When our country faced the task of achieving the practical mastery of nuclear energy, outstanding Soviet physicists such as academicians I. V. Kurchatov, A. P. Aleksandrov and many others went into industrial development. The existence of a galaxy of major specialists energetically engaged in basic research in nuclear physics and the comprehensive support they received from the communist party and the Soviet government enabled our country to resolve the nuclear problem quickly and effectively.

That is why Lenin was so right in noting in his "Philosophical Notebooks" that "Practice stands above (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the merit of universality but immediate reality as well" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 29, p 195). These words of wisdom from the great philosopher do not contain even a single grain of practicalism. They are a guideline for the actions of the natural scientist.

We sometimes hear that if a researcher is given a strictly practical target, his work will be of "no general scientific significance." Such views are annoying for two reasons: first, any enrichment of the arsenal of our knowledge and any actual expansion of objective truth is universally significant; second, the channeling of

creative forces away from the resolution of real life problems and into an ivory tower has always turned out to be detrimental to the scientist himself.

Let me mention the story of a discovery made by radio astronomers. Extraterrestrial sources of radio emanations were discovered in the course of research with a strictly practical target, the identification of sources of radio communication and radar static, which was of clearly defined practical value. As we know, this discovery was of basic importance. The development of radio astronomy which followed it gave mankind a powerful new means of studying the universe and substantially enriched our knowledge of the world.

A number of new industrial sectors and directions are the result of basic research conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences. We already have mentioned nuclear energy. Let us also mention quantum electronics, computers, power electronic semiconductors, the industrial manufacture of crystals and superhard substances, cryogenic technology, etc. Each one of these examples is instructive in its own fashion. They share the common feature that basic research seems to have carried secretly within itself, as an embryo, the potential for the extensive industrial utilization of the results, which in some cases was hardly suspected.

Thus, the birth of quantum electronics more than a quarter of a century ago was preceded by basic research in gas radiospectroscopy which, in turn, was made possible only thanks to the fast development of radar, which provided physicists with a powerful method for the study of molecular radiospectra. One can say that in such cases there is always a two-sided "game:" scientific output gives an impetus to technical developments, new technology multiplies the pressure to gain more knowledge, and so on.

The successful synthesizing of diamonds was based on ideas developed in the course of basic research on the behavior of substances under extreme conditions -- at high temperatures and pressures. The subsequent technological successes furthered the development of science.

Solid state physics is the basis of modern electronics. Here again the role of "pure" research is perfectly obvious. Initially, solid state physics developed as a purely scientific discipline whose purpose was to determine the basic properties of matter characterized by form stability and the basic laws governing processes taking place within it. Scientists consider crystals to be the main such matter. The properties of crystals are determined by their framework and type of structure. Deviations from the ideal "structure," i.e., the existence of defects and anomalies, greatly affects the properties of matter as a whole. The study of defects in crystals accounted for a major share of basic research conducted in that area. However, at one point, those engaged in it were criticized for being involved in such an "untopical" subject. It is true that for a while the practical expediency of such studies was difficult to prove. It was only later, when the first solid-state electronic appliances -- transistors -- began to be developed, that it became universally clear that the study of defects in crystals was quite necessary, for this was the only way in which improvements in the qualities of most complex instruments could be suggested.

Today solid-state electronics is developing at a fast pace. Within it a subfield known as microelectronics has developed. It was triggered by the desire to achieve

the drastic miniaturization of instruments: to reduce their weight and dimensions and the power needed to operate them, and to improve their reliability. For example, successes in microelectronics made it possible to supply outer space equipment with "brains," to create pocket computers, and to design microprocessors which automatically control technical systems.

The development of microelectronics continues to depend on basic research in solid-state physics. Thus, the idea of integrating a given functional system within a single crystal, inside a monoblock, not by putting together its individual elements, such as transistors, resistors, condensers and wiring, but by individual control of crystal properties, proved its usefulness. The result was a crystal which works in its entirety as the functional system required. This became known as an integral system. It changed not only the structure but the very way in which design engineers think.

The next level of integration -- the combination of several functional systems within a crystal -- is leading us toward large and superlarge integral systems. Their speed, reliability and level of miniaturization are increasing. More studies will enable us to create instruments with a very long service life and an insignificant likelihood of faulty manufacture.

What are the prospects for the development of microelectronics? They lie in the area of mastering submicron dimensions. This will not only lead to the creation of even faster computers of later generations but will drastically increase the level of the integration of their operational functions. Complex new problems will arise, both theoretical and experimental, the resolution of which would be inconceivable without new physical and mathematical developments and the creation of a new technological base, new analytical equipment, new research methods, and the elaboration of new scientific approaches.

Therefore, nuclear power, quantum electronics and microelectronics, which constitute today the foundations of technical progress, are the result of basic research. Let us consider two circumstances which, in my view, are important. First, research and development must mandatorily be conducted on a broad front. The various areas of science and technology are interrelated and no substantial progress can be achieved in any given area in physics without the development of its other areas. Naturally, the concentration of forces and funds in a single area could lead to success for a while. Subsequently, however, it would inevitably become an obstacle to knowledge and practice and will narrow opportunities along important lines. Second, one cannot demand immediate practical applications when planning and conducting basic research as is done in applied research. The view that any type of basic research must necessarily yield practical results, and "quickly" at that, is erroneous.

It is true the sensible question arises as to what constitutes a truly productive scientific activity arises, for the view I just expressed may be used by some as a justification for their negligence or lack of talent. It seems to me that this question can be easily answered if it is specifically considered by the collective. Healthy moral relations in the collective, principle-minded party leadership, a general interest in the results of labor and frank views expressed to advance the purposes of the project are the main prerequisites for preventing ethical shortcuts in science. To go back to my thought, let me emphasize that only a certain

percentage of basic research, providing that a good foundation has already been laid in this area, yields practical results rapidly.

It would be no exaggeration to say that today virtually all workers in the USSR Academy of Sciences system are concerned with the problem of effectiveness and the speedy application of the results of their research to the national economy.

This problem has proved to be quite complex. Naturally, no single solution applicable to all cases can be found. It is unquestionable, however, that the direct participation of scientists in the practical realization of their discoveries and the implementation of ideas they have suggested, is more effective than their simple submission for use by a sectorial institute. Difficulties inevitably arise in the course of the practical implementation of scientific results. As a rule, they can be surmounted most easily through the joint efforts of those who have obtained these results.

Such participation may take various forms. The classical example in this sense is the harnessing the energy of the atom. It was only the efforts of physicists working hand in hand with engineers that made the task of rapidly resolving the problem set by the party -- ensuring nuclear power for our country -- possible within a historically short time. Such a development would have been hard to imagine without this close alliance.

The same applies to quantum electronics. USSR Academy of Sciences scientists not only discovered it but ensured the practical development of this new technological sector and are continuing to make substantial contributions to its further development and application. It proved to be an entirely new field for the sectorial institutes, and it was the help they received from the academic establishments that enabled them to master the new physical phenomena and the technical means of controlling them quickly. The scientists conducted seminars and conferences, offered numerous consultations, acquainted the workers in industry with their laboratory systems and, naturally, worked jointly with them. Today, collectives in many ministries and departments are continuing on their own to develop quantum electronics successfully, while the academic institutes are going ahead with their research and development. The guarantees of progress in this direction are the increased ties between science and production, the development of adaptable and flexible relations of this kind, and improvements in material and moral incentives.

The industrial production of crystals (including diamonds and rubies) has been developed on the basis of technological methods for growing a wide range of crystal bodies suggested by USSR Academy of Sciences scientists. Many academic institutions are continuing their studies in this area. Recently, an original and effective technology was developed for obtaining large (high-grade) sapphire and garnet crystals. The former are used in microelectronics and the latter in quantum electronics. A new type of precious crystals not found in nature -- "phyanite" -- which has earned a good reputation worldwide, was created.

The industrial production of materials with predetermined properties is developing successfully in the USSR. The various technologies suggested by scientists are submitted as a rule in an advanced state of readiness. This facilitates their use and shortens their application by 3-8 months. The industrial enterprises, in turn, improve on the methods suggested.

Academy of Sciences physicists and chemists have developed a technology for the manufacturing of fiberglass light conductors with exceptional transparency, which has been offered to industry. The initial experimental optical-fiber communication channel was developed by sectorial institutes working jointly with academic establishments. The conversion to such channels will revolutionize communications and will yield major economic results. They are highly interference-proof and do not create any radio interference themselves. They can transmit large volumes of information at high speed. Furthermore, optical-fiber cables are lightweight. They are corrosionproof and, an aspect of great importance, use glass instead of copper which is scarce.

I have frequently emphasized the idea of involving scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences department I head in the practical application of the results of basic research. I am deeply convinced that this involvement must be kept energetic throughout the realization of an idea, from the physics laboratory to the plant conveyor.

The contribution made by scientists to the creation of fast computers in the initial stage, when the BESM-6, the most powerful computer of its time, was developed, is well known. Subsequently, the institute which had developed the computer was transferred to an industrial ministry: it was assumed that the further development of new technology was linked exclusively to the solution of engineering problems, and that no major scientific problems remained. It turned out, however, that a need for extensive basic research remained and that it is wrong to exclude Academy of Sciences specialists.

Here is another example: USSR Academy of Sciences scientists helped to develop the science of acoustics in our country. In its time, the academy had an acoustics institute. However, on the assumption that only technical problems remained to be resolved in the field of acoustics, the institute was placed under the jurisdiction of a sectorial department. This hindered the development of basic research in this area. Steps are being taken today to recreate such an academic institute.

Even when the initial idea for the solution of one or another important problem is entirely clear and it seems that only purely technical problems remain to be resolved, its practical solution frequently involves essential difficulties which can be surmounted only through basic research. The accuracy of this view is supported, for example, by the work on controlled thermonuclear synthesis. The idea of a reactor in which hot plasma at a temperature of about 100 million degrees Centigrade would be kept in a magnetic field and would generate energy appeared as early as the 1950s. On the basis of the information then available to scientists, it seemed that the idea of such a thermonuclear synthesis could be implemented relatively quickly. However, the behavior of hot plasma in a magnetic field proved to be so whimsical that a serious and comprehensive study of its properties became necessary. Today, thanks to basic research, the solution of this problem has seen great progress, particularly on the basis of the "Tokamak" system suggested by Soviet scientists.

Many examples of the fruitful participation of physicists in taking the results of research into practical implementation in the national economy can be cited. Occasionally, scientists find themselves resolving specific practical problems as well. Thus, the USSR Academy of Sciences Urals Scientific Center Institute of

Physics of Metals developed permanent high-power magnets. One of their applications is in the textile industry, in a system which automatically interrupts roving if the threads in a flax-spinning machine break. The addition of such magnets to all the spinning machines at the Yakovlevskiy Flax-Spinning Combine in Privolzhsk, Ivanovskaya Oblast, saves 1 million rubles per year. The use of such magnets in the entire sector promises to yield savings of 50 million rubles per year.

However, placing an order with industry for the production of an experimental batch of these new cutoff appliances proved impossible and the Institute of Physics of Metals used its own facilities to manufacture 35,000 magnetic systems for the combine. Because of the low production capacity of the institute's experimental workshop and its unsuitability for mass production of such equipment, all of the scientific personnel joined in the production of the new magnetic systems. The usefulness of this step is unquestionable, but is this an example worthy of emulation? The positive results were obtained by taking creative forces away from tasks better suited to their qualifications and experience. Cases in which highly skilled cadres engage in projects not exactly within their field are not isolated. They prove that the system of interaction between academic science and production must be improved.

Naturally, this does not detract from the positive experience acquired in Soviet science, particularly among scientists in Siberia and the Ukraine, already described in *KOMMUNIST*. The article I am referring to merely points out one of the weak features in the interaction between spiritual and material output which should be eliminated. The most promising method for such interaction is the inclusion of representatives of industrial enterprises in the scientific groups of academic institutes, the creation of joint laboratories, the formulation of joint programs, the joint development of new technology, the designing of equipment jointly by scientists and production workers and the development of new methods of physical research. Obviously, all of this requires additional scientific-production facilities and additional financing.

Let us note that the numerical strength of academic institutions is as a whole low but that their contribution to the national economy is substantial. The total number of persons working at the physics institutes in Moscow and Leningrad does not exceed 15,000. However, the volume and range of physics research are expanding steadily, for which reason the institutes must be systematically reinforced with new cadres. Naturally, this does not relieve them of the obligation to improve their work effectiveness.

In my view, the budget for basic research must be increased as well, bearing in mind not only the development of new lines of research but long-term research projects. Currently, funds based on economic contracts are allocated only for the solution of specific problems, whereas funds can be spent on long-term research only by violating the strict and officially clearly stipulated rules of financial discipline. Naturally, rules are rules, and I am not calling for their violation but for the broadening and development of a regulatory system consistent with the needs of science and technical progress, particularly since economic contract financing of active laboratories and institutes is ten times as costly as budget financing. Unwittingly, this makes the scientific institution lean toward practicalism and to strictly applied projects which do not lead to the type of

success expected of a scientific institute. I think that the financing of academic institutes must be made consistent with the demands of reality.

The majority of the USSR Academy of Sciences physics institutes today need greater experimental production facilities, above all for experimental production, which are flexible and comprehensive, equipped with automated machine tools and design bureaus with facilities for automated designing. If such existed, the various developments could not only be brought to the required level but could also be reproduced in the required numbers, when necessary.

The procedures for the material and technical supply of academic institutes must be radically reorganized as well. Considering the current pace of development in science and technology, the procedure of filing requests for materials, instruments and equipment 2 years in advance is a harmful anachronism which greatly hinders scientific progress. Also abnormal is the fact that material and technical supply of academic institutions is rarely effected on a priority basis, although a large number of such institutions, by virtue of their current work, merit a different attitude. Obviously, this system needs correction. Would it not be more expedient also to organize a supply system based on store-type purchasing? Let us point out that on a national scale, the material and technical needs of the physics institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences are relatively small.

Speaking of improvements in the organization of basic research, let us consider their wide range and the excessive consolidation of historically developed institutes. A scientific group develops into a major scientific line, a cooperative of a large number of researchers the management of which becomes increasingly more difficult. Such physics conglomerates operating under the roof of a single institute frequently lose their mobility and begin themselves to hinder progress. However, as we know, progress is largely based on the activeness of relatively small scientific groups. In my view, it would be expedient to break up the excessively expanded and complex institutes. Their optimal dimensions depend on a number of circumstances. Experience proves, however, that from 500 to 1,000 (and no more) people is optimal. World-wide practice confirms this: basic research is most effective in relatively small laboratories and institutes.

The work of scientific collectives should be assessed on the basis of research and development results, taking into consideration the extent to which such results have been acknowledged, their practical outcome and their scientific, technical, economic and social effects. Because of the characteristics of basic research, such activities should be assessed over periods ranging from 7 to 10 years.

The various conferences, seminars and meetings which the USSR Academy of Sciences regularly holds with other institutions are an important side of its activities. It also sponsors consultations given by scientists to people from various economic sectors. An important advantage of this is the unhindered opportunity available to any enterprise from any ministry to obtain a scientific consultation. The number of such consultations is quite large and it would be impossible to determine the economic effect of this activity. However, it is entirely abnormal that it is not taken into consideration in the evaluation of academic institutions, for which reason the scientists themselves sometimes have little enthusiasm for it. Furthermore, an enterprise which has received such assistance frequently forgets about it. Naturally, this occasionally leads to a cooling of relations between

scientists and production workers. It would be desirable to find a method of providing moral and material incentives for consultation work. This would strengthen the alliance between scientific and industrial work even further.

In short, all aspects of the system of interaction between basic research institutes and related organizations need further improvement. KOMMUNIST has already drawn attention to the problems of the moral climate in a scientific environment. However, the ethical aspect of interrelationships between scientific institutions and economic structures needs profound study and corresponding legal and party support.

Basic research is the life-bearing source of new knowledge, progressive ideas and even more effective methods and means of action. It is on this basis that the industrial sectors are improving their production radically and strengthening the country's economic potential.

Thanks to the concern of the communist party and the Soviet government, the power of developed socialism, in which science plays a growing role, is increasing. The contribution which its members make to resolving the problems in the economic and social progress of our homeland is greatly determined by the strategy in the organization of basic research and its proper combination with applied studies and developments. Soviet scientists are dedicating all their efforts to the successful implementation of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and are contributing to the acceleration of scientific and technical progress and, on this basis, to the achievement of new successes in the development of socialist industry and culture.

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RESTRUCTURING IDEOLOGICAL WORK: THOUGHTS OF A PROPAGANDIST

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[Article by L. Onikov]

[Text] The CC CPSU accountability report to the 26th party congress, which was submitted by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC general secretary, spoke of the need to reorganize many sectors and areas of ideological work. As a propagandist, I would like to express some considerations in this connection.

It is noteworthy that, as a rule, the question of such a reorganization is discussed in terms of changing the forms of the work, while the main feature -- the content, the effectiveness of ideological actions -- is much less often discussed.

In this connection, let us recall the growth of education in our society. "The Soviet person has changed. His knowledge has become richer, his erudition has expanded and his spiritual demands have increased considerably," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th congress.

One of the practical conclusions derived from these words, it seems to me, is that the time when most propagandists were considerably superior to their audiences in terms of education has passed. Today, our students have either caught up or are catching up with us in this respect.

According to the 1979 all-union population census, 54 percent of all the people employed in the economy had completed either secondary or higher education; 417 out of every 1,000 working people had reached that educational level. In our country, it is the ranks of the intelligentsia that are growing the fastest. Today, one out of every four working people in the national economy is engaged primarily in mental work. Another qualitatively new phenomenon which must be considered is that today it is no longer rare for a second or even third generation within a family to have completed secondary or higher education; in the 1920s-1930s, this was the exception.

Therefore, the most important direction in the reorganization of many sectors and areas of ideological work must be to make the professional standards and skills of the propagandists consistent with the changes which have taken place in the people's educational and cultural standards. This presumes mainly a substantial enhancement of the ideological and theoretical training of propagandists, who must acquire a profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and the skill to link it closely with the tasks in the building of communism.

In the past, given the relatively low level of education, occurrences of primitivism, triteness and formalism in propaganda were if not justifiable at least explainable to some extent. Today, they are categorically inadmissible. Wordiness, lack of proof, and the unfounded and monotonous reiteration of familiar truths irritate a modern audience, anger the people and lead to directly counterproductive results. Those at whom our propaganda is aimed are no longer listeners in the literal meaning of the word. Today they can argue. They try to gain a deeper and more thorough understanding of phenomena in sociopolitical life and to analyze them independently. They are unwilling to accept ready-made conclusions and truisms and feel the need for analytical and sometimes alternate judgments and proof.

In the course of the reorganization, the need for a specific analysis of the most typical manifestations of formalism in propaganda work and the reasons for their persistence takes on particular importance. They include the force of old habits, the need for reinsurance, the sluggishness of thought typical of some propagandists and low professional standards.

Obviously, the restructuring of ideological work must begin with a restructuring of the system governing the selection, training and retraining of propagandists. Without abandoning the lecture system as a means of imparting knowledge to them, we must more energetically develop in them the practical skills of the Leninist art of communist propaganda, the ability to convince their audiences and to engage in skillful debate on the basis of the achievements of social psychology, to take into consideration public opinion and the mood of various social groups and not only to mold public opinion but to express it as well. This is no easy task, for the millions of people engaged in political education -- lecturers, journalists, worker and peasant correspondents, propagandists, speakers, political informants and agitators -- were trained during different periods of the country's development. They have different practical and propaganda experience -- a factor which must be taken into consideration in the training and retraining of the ideological aktiv.

Here is another essential consideration, in my view. Quite frequently, in the course of the discussion of reorganization problems, two obvious thoughts are stressed: a weak link with life is the most serious shortcoming in political education work, and in order to upgrade its effectiveness, we must achieve unity among ideological-theoretical, political-educational, organizational and economic activities. Unfortunately, however, the number of specific practical suggestions on how to achieve this is clearly insufficient.

It seems to me that the main reason for this is a clear underestimation of the educational role of organizational-political work. Proceeding from the need to ensure unity among all the types of activities discussed in this article, V. I. Lenin totally rejected any overestimation or underestimating of any one of the elements in this single complex, not to mention pitting one against another. A study of Lenin's works clearly indicates, however, that while underscoring the importance of each of these facets, it was to organizational-political work precisely that he assigned the main role in the education process.

Even before the revolution Lenin asked: "Do we still have to prove to the social democrats that there can be no political education without political struggle and political action? How can one think that the working masses can be politically

educated through classes, books, etc., without political activity...?" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 4, p 312). After the revolution, he just as clearly promoted the idea of the decisive importance of sociopolitical practice in the process of shaping socialist conscientiousness. Only when the proletariat "is educated not through books, meetings and speeches, but through the practice of management...can it become the type of force which will throw off capitalism with all of its vestiges, like a straw, like dust" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 37, p 444).

V. I. Lenin insisted that the main prerequisite for developing high political consciousness, discipline, organization and a feeling of ownership is not "some kind of class or book," meeting or speech, but political activity and the personal practical experience gained by the working people in the course of their active participation in the administration of the affairs of the state and society.

The forms and degree of the participation of the working people in management constitute a major and multiple-stage problem. Let us point out that the most widespread method here is participation by the working people in ensuring the strictest possible control over the volume of labor and consumption. Lenin believed that virtually all working people can participate in control, and he suggested that the entire toiling mass participate in the work of the control organs (see "Leninskiy Sbornik VIII" [Leninist Collection VIII], p 25). He also believed that this activity is within the reach of everyone, even the insufficiently educated or undertrained working person: "Not skilled workers but only the unskilled, mainly women, must be involved in workers inspection," he advised (ibid., p 24). The following statements show the tremendous political significance which Lenin ascribed to this matter: "Our aim is the literal involvement of the poor in practical participation in management, and all the steps necessary to accomplish this -- the more varied the better -- must be thoroughly recorded, studied, systematized, checked against broader practical experience and legitimized" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 36, p 204). He called for "control of participation," to "see if everyone is participating and what the results of participation are from the viewpoint of teaching the participants how to administer the state" ("Leninskiy Sbornik VIII," p 26). He stressed the need for "thorough planning of the forms of participation" and suggested the drafting of a "detailed instruction" and "the establishment of a gradual sequence of participation, an order," "so that the involvement of a mass of participants does not result in confusion" (ibid.).

There have been times in our history when this Leninist idea has been mentioned in the most general terms or has even been ignored altogether. The negative consequences of reducing the educational role of the organizational-political participation of the working people in management were not long in revealing themselves during such periods. They were manifested in the exaggeration or the near-absolutization of the role of ideological work in communist education, created the illusory idea that propaganda alone could shape the new man. Because of this, something was expected and even demanded of propaganda and agitation which they were unable to provide if kept separate from the implementation of Lenin's idea as to the educational role of the participation of the working people in management without being combined with organizational party and economic work.

The great merit of our party's Central Committee is that it restored these Leninist ideas and developed them in accordance with present-day conditions. Comrade L. I.

Brezhnev's works and many of his addresses promote the idea of the need for comprehensively broadening the participation of the working people in management. "We see as the meaning and content of socialist democracy," Leonid Il'ich said, "the participation of increasingly broad masses in the management of the country and social affairs." "The party demands that all of our laws and decrees dealing with the principles and methods of work at enterprises mandatorily stipulate the participation of the working people in management..."

One of the principal directions in the reorganization of ideological work is the fullest possible implementation of Lenin's ideas on the participation of all working people in management and mass control.

This task cannot be accomplished by propaganda or organizational-political work alone. It is only through joint efforts in these most important areas of party activity that we can make use of the essentially endless educational possibilities of our democracy and use the opportunities it presents for shaping socialist awareness not only through books and classes but through the practice of management as well. This would enable us to engage in the specific types of activity Lenin called for and to further the perfecting of socialist social relations.

I believe that the implementation of these Leninist stipulations would enable us above all to energize the decisive upgrading of the effectiveness of communist education and to arm our propaganda and agitation with a long-term program of action in order to achieve the mass, skilled and effective participation of the absolute majority of the working people in management.

This will result in an even greater focus on resolving the topical problems in ideological-educational and organizational party work and will strengthen the ties between the party and the masses. The party committees will gain additional opportunities to become better acquainted with public opinion and the moods of the people and to reach each individual.

Here is another problem. The most important line to be followed in the reorganization of ideological work involves its content, improvement in which depends on the skill of the propagandist in using a class approach to phenomena in social life in each individual case.

As long as two opposite social systems and antagonistic classes remain in the world, the class approach will remain the main principle which determines the strategy and tactics of the CPSU and its political practice. It is also clear that within the country, as changes such as rapprochement among all classes and the establishment of a classless social structure take place, the content of the class principle changes and must keep on changing. A profound interpretation of the essence of the class approach consistent with contemporary conditions is of essential significance. Incomplete work in this area could mean the danger of automatically transferring the already invalid class assessments of the preceding period to the moral and political unity achieved by Soviet society. This could create unnecessary social tension, unhealthy prejudice and suspicion.

Let us not forget the other extreme. The social experience of the majority of the Soviet people was shaped under circumstances when the question "who-whom?" within the country had already been resolved in favor of socialism, there were no longer

any hostile classes in the country, and capitalist encirclement had been breached. The modern generation knows about the class struggle in our society only from school curricula, works of art and the stories of veterans. Objectively, this means a danger that class categories and assessments may be abandoned for abstractly understood general human values, ideological demobilization and loss of political vigilance. It is particularly important and timely to caution the youth against this during the current situation of fierce class struggle.

Obviously, in shaping the class awareness of the Soviet people we must direct their attention to the fact that under present-day conditions and in relation to the conversion of all classes and social groups in Soviet society to the sociopolitical and ideological positions of the working class, the class approach criterion no longer serves the interests of a specific class but the developed socialist society as a whole. I believe that we must be reminded more frequently that it is the constructive, the positive side of the class approach that is the most important. Our adversaries would like to divide and undermine the unity of Soviet society. As we know, they are trying to this end to promote a clash between the party and the people, and in particular between the party and one group or another in the intelligentsia, between one nation and another, between the leaders and those they lead, between generations, etc. Naturally, the class interests of socialism call for defeating such intentions, firmly blocking any kind of diversion and, conversely, strengthening the unity within Soviet society and between the party and the people even further, increasing the party's leadership and influence and enhancing the role of the CPSU as the leading and guiding force in society and the nucleus of its political system. The class interests of socialism also presume the active blocking of antisocial phenomena and criminal actions -- anything which could harm socialism within the country.

"....Politics begins where the millions of people are....," Lenin said ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 36, p 16). Nonclass differences are becoming increasingly clear as class disparities are eliminated. As was noted at the 26th congress, the characteristics and interests of all social groups within our society must be taken into consideration more attentively.

The advantages of socialism are manifested most vividly in relations among people, in the actual solution of moral and ethical problems, in reality. Indifference toward other people's misfortunes, injustice, callousness, cruelty, fraud, oppression, alienation, etc. are damnable problems which have remained unresolved for centuries and are still far from resolved. Our society cannot and must not remain indifferent to them. Capitalism neither resolved them nor can it resolve them, whereas socialism as a society free from exploitation resolves them systematically and ever more completely. This is the most important aspect of the class, the political approach to the problem of man, an area in which socialism, the socialist way of life, can reveal its radical superiority over capitalism socially as well as morally, and can rally around this most positive and constructive human idea people of all ages, nationalities and social affiliations.

One of the means of restructuring ideological work, increasing its effectiveness and helping the entire people to accept Marxist-Leninist values must, in my view, follow this direction precisely.

Favorable conditions exist now for the implementation of this task. The 26th congress noted that the essence of economic policy and its first and final points are "specific concern for the specific person, for his needs and requirements." In addition to its material side, concern for man has a "moral aspect," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said. "No particular expense is involved here. Something else, however, is absolutely necessary: comprehensive and daily attention and responsiveness to man. How can old age be made beautiful? How can the life of an invalid be made easier? How a real or seeming insult be remedied? Life faces us with similar problems at every step along the way. They can be resolved only by tirelessly improving the high art of a concerned attitude toward man."

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AT A CENTER OF CULTURE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 81 pp 59-69

[Essay by N. Plakhotnyy]

[Text]

1.

I happened to come across an old record with songs performed by Aleksandra Prokoshina. The moment the sensitive tip of the corundum needle touched the record, our Moscow apartment was filled with free-sounding melodies. It was as though they had come through the open window from a village street along which hired reapers walked after their day's work.

Lovers of Russian songs have not forgotten the typical voice of the famous singer in the Pyatnitskiy choir--Aleksandra Vasil'yevna Prokoshina. Also memorable to many of us are lines from the poem which Mikhail Isakovskiy dedicated to her:

Sing to me, sing, Prokoshina,
That the meadows are as yet unmowed....

As I listened that evening to the prewar record, my thoughts drifted to what had become of the singer. I even tried to find out but achieved nothing definite. Later on, traveling on an assignment, I accidentally found out from a person who has nothing to do with the world of art that Prokoshina was alive and well and was living in a rural area. Her exact address? Kirovskaya Oblast, Kotel'nichskiy Rayon, Iskra Kolkhoz.

"What is she doing there?"

"Imagine," I was told, "she is working there with the amateur ensemble of the kolkhoz house of culture. Under her management the rural choir is...laureate of the Leninist Komsomol Prize. They have sung abroad. That is how good they are!"

This conversation took place in the Valday, in Starorusskiy Rayon. My interlocutor was Vasily Nikolayevich Rybin, chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Il'ich. Although a manager to the marrow of his bones, unlike some of his colleagues he does not limit himself to matters of production and trade. He is a passionate book reader and loves paintings. It is always interesting to talk and argue with him.

At one point, Rybin thoughtfully said:

"We would have liked for such a famous artist to join our kolkhoz. If she were to accept the management of our club amateur activities, she would get all she wants from us."

Honestly speaking, I had no idea how this could be achieved. A few minutes later, however, I was won over by the chairman's logic.

In his view, some artists come from rural areas. Why, after reaching retirement age, would some of them not go back to their native places to engage in educational work? Some of them might like that, but do not know how to go about it. The city is saturated with intellectual people, most of whom would be unwilling to leave, particularly in their old age. Although in the villages everyone knows everyone else, frankly speaking, great opportunities for the development of the individual exist. It is a known fact that the villagers are always happy to welcome someone new. If such a someone also happens to be a famous native person, they would welcome him warmly, with bread and salt.

The countryside persistently looks for partners, not only in material production. Unfortunately, successes in such an area are still infrequent. As was pointed out at the all-union conference of cultural and educational workers held in Bryansk, traditional sponsorship relations between creative and production collectives have become noticeably weaker. The question was even raised of whether it is not too soon to forget that the city has a cultural mission.

It was not a whim that directed the thoughts of my acquaintance, the chairman, toward asking someone of artistic fame to join the kolkhoz. But then, to jump from a minimum to the maximum!...This was something like the peasant's dream of having a flying carpet, a magic tablecloth and other miraculous objects of daily use. Actually, there was also some hope that eventually such a thing could happen, for it would benefit everyone. Meanwhile, there is no specialist in this area on the territory of the Pen'kovskiy Village Soviet, with its house of culture and several clubs. Usually, secondary school graduates who have failed in their initial attempts to enroll in a VUZ or technical school take over as cultural and educational workers.

Svetlana Solobchuk, artistic manager of the Voronovskiy club, frankly answered:

"Why did I decide to come here? They offered it to me and I accepted. Next year, however, I will do everything possible to enroll in the pedagogical institute."

"Why not enroll in a cultural and educational school, a cultural institute? You have experience which would be taken into consideration."

"And spend all my life in a village? No thank you! I am still too young for that."

Those may be the ideas of an unenlightened person, unfamiliar with inspiring examples. In youth views and convictions are usually shaped on the basis of sympathies. Someone's outstanding and impressive life becomes a guiding star which gives the inspiration to act. That is why it is so important for children's collectives to meet with people of different professions. An old tradition exists at the Kolkhoz imeni Posmitnyy, near Odessa: any new arrival who has led an interesting life (writer, journalist, musician, public personality, famous artist, athlete or famous farmer) is invited to meet with the schoolchildren, simply to talk about himself and his work. Such reciprocal contacts are the core of education.

I have recorded various facts in my journalist's notebook under the heading of "Problems of Culture." One of the latest entries is from Mar'inskiy Rayon, Donetskaya Oblast. It is several lines long and is a result of the following circumstances:

...A tryout for a new play was underway at the house of culture. Way back in the hall a middle-aged man dressed in worker's clothes eagerly followed the action on the stage. During intermission we struck up a conversation. His name was Nikolay Varusha, a tractor driver and a member of the theater circle. He was not involved in that particular performance but had come to watch the rehearsal. Being short of experience, he was trying to learn from others. It was from him that I learned of some details of cultural life in his big village.

"We have been frequently visited by theater groups from Donetsk, Odessa and Khar'kov," Varusha said, sounding like a guide. "We have an excellent theater hall with 800 seats and a grateful but demanding public! There is no place for hack work. On one occasion, touring artists came to visit us in Yelizavetovka, too lazy to bring their stage sets, thinking that in the villages anything goes! Our reaction to this was that these actors had no respect for their work....Another unpleasant thing is that they were in a hurry, as though the theater was on fire. Yet an actor must have an attractive personality. Imagine what it feels like when professional artists come to the village and find the time to meet with the drama circle. That would be a lesson to be remembered for a lifetime!"

Here is another event of a diametrically opposed nature.

...Chernaya Sloboda was about to meet with actors and the day and hour of the performance had already been announced. Contacts with theater collectives had already become regular and introduced into the life of the local rural society a particular mood and a new coloring. And everything began accidentally: Andrey Vasil'yevich Suchugov, the kolkhoz chairman, met with the director of a musical comedy theater while in Ryazan, attending a conference. The result of the conversation was an agreement for sponsorship cooperation. Shortly afterwards several interesting cultural events took place at the house of culture and it was suggested that the next meeting take place at the Red Corner of the dairy farm.

This, however, did not happen. For some reason, in the last 10 days of the month, new production at the Vpered Kolkhoz dropped and someone on the rayon level ordered that for the purpose of teaching them a lesson the performance in Chernaya Sloboda would not take place. Subsequently, everything was straightened out, meetings with the theater collective were resumed, but this unpleasant occurrence of bureaucratic administration keeps nagging and is hard to forget.

Yes, we still have so-called "pure" economic managers who are accustomed to giving second priority to spiritual demands. It never occurs to such pseudomanagers that neglecting culture today is a political error and that it directly harms the economy, for whose sake they seem to work so hard and spare nothing.

During my latest trip to Staraya Rus' I met there with N., a touring theater and motion picture actor. "One day only!" announced the posters along the main streets and crossroads. I was tempted by this ad and decided to meet with my favorite face to face.

The big hall of the house of culture of the chemical machinery plant was crowded and additional seats had been set up in the passageways and ahead of the front row, occupied by amateur art activists. This is an old privilege to which the financial authorities object for some reason.

Our expectations notwithstanding, the event turned out to be somewhat boring, despite the obvious efforts of the performer. It was the concept that was wrong, for it is psychologically hardly justified to take on a solo concert performance. As we know, it is risky and unrewarding to rely merely on one's own charm and past success. N. took 2 hours to describe his own career, which he illustrated with segments of films he had played in. This might have been acceptable as a speech to motion picture workers, but this could hardly be called a concert, the more so since it was clear to the audience that the actor would have been able to do better with a different kind of performance.

I discussed the event the next day with Aleksandr Ivanovich Sokolov, a contributor to STARORUSSKAYA PRAVDA, the rayon newspaper. He is a person with experience, temperamental and straightforward, and he presented the problem from a somewhat different viewpoint:

"Usually," he said, "obsolete and monotonous programs, one very much like the other, are presented in the provinces. It is difficult to review them. The touring performers are not concerned with the impression they make on the public and do not like to give repeat performances. In my view, therefore, it would be more useful for visiting actors to try, even if only once in a while, to perform together with local amateur artists."

"This is not quite customary...."

"Say rather that it is no longer customary! Once this was commonplace in the case of performers on tour."

Inveterate theater lovers in Staraya Rus' are still proud of the fact that at the turn of the century their little city was visited by great Russian actors. The museum of kray history lovingly cherishes old posters announcing to the public forthcoming amateur performances with the participation of V. F. Komissarzhevskaya, M. G. Savina, M. F. Andreyeva and V. N. Davydov....Periodically, actors toured the provinces, where they performed roles in local theaters. This enlivened the out-of-the-way places and helped to mold local talents.

Such a theater tradition did exist! No special order must be issued to the artists to restore it. One must simply try to disseminate the experience of the local doers of good deeds. For many years Aleksandra Vasil'yevna Prokoshina has been working with the Iskorka Youth Ensemble. Ivan Semenovich Kozlovskiy has invested a great deal of effort in the esthetic upbringing of rural youth! However, it is only recently, when his anniversary was being celebrated, that the following fact from his career emerged: it turned out that the singer had sponsored the children's music school in Mar'yanovka village, in the Kiev area, for many years. Actually, it was his effort and care that led to the creation of this cultural center.

No, the people of Staraya Rus' do not have to look far to find other examples. At one time people from their area engaged in a variety of creative professions such as science, the arts, writing, journalism and teaching in secondary schools and VUZs

solemnly pledged that wherever they might happen to be they would not forget the city of their youth and would do everything possible to promote its blossoming.

It is still too early to sum up the results of the activities of the people from Staraya Rus', the more so since some things do not yield themselves to recording. But here is a real, a tangible case: the creation of an art gallery, which was established through voluntary work and which recently was promoted to a governmental institution. It is located in a restored 16th-17th century palace. Many valuable canvases hang on the walls of its spacious exhibition halls. There are more than 170 canvases painted by V. S. Svaroga alone. Most of them were donated by his students--painters V. V. Ushakov and M. I. Ivanov. USSR People's Painter N. V. Tomskiy, president of the USSR Academy of Fine Arts, presented as a gift to the rayon several dozen sculptures. Unique exhibits have enriched the F. M. Dostoyevskiy House Museum, as a result of the efforts of writers D. Granin, A. Shevtsov and G. Alekhin. A group of former Staraya Rus' residents, now living in Leningrad, are in touch with the cultural and educational institutions of the kolkhozes imeni Lenin and Krasnyy Rybak. On the initiative of Candidate of Biological Sciences A. Severova, who lives in Moscow, a complex scientific expedition was sent to Priil'men'ye. The rich material on the vegetal world of this unusual area was systematized and published. A. Severova presented the rayon library with several copies of her monograph "Forests, Meadows and Swamps of the Staraya Rus' Area and Their Use." This is a valuable aid used by local naturalists.

Sponsorship is becoming increasingly varied. Rear Admiral A. S. Antipov, a native of Staraya Rus', established relations with the local Pioneers club and helped the children to fulfill a cherished dream--to become seamen. The Young Robinsons Club built its own ship--an old minesweeper which the members rebuilt and adapted for sailing on the quiet Polista River. The children of this little town, which is quite far from the sea, learn "maritime science" at their training base, develop their courage, ability to communicate and many other features which the harmoniously developed citizen needs.

3

It is my deep conviction that any normal person has a creative gift. If the vicissitudes of life make someone satisfied to remain always in the audience, it is caused by a misunderstanding. It means that at a given point in time no instructor-educator was available to detect the "divine spark" of talent and fan it into a fire.

...Any group, any collective, must have its live wire, Makar Anisimovich Posmitnyy, the famous leading kolkhoz figure, used to say. He used that term instead of the popular word "organizer," because of its different shade of meaning, although both terms include the concept of energy. Posmitnyy particularly valued live wires in culture. He was the first to raise the question of giving the agricultural specialist and the cultural and educational worker equal rights and pay, which was subsequently legitimized by a decision of the board.

The high praise of the efforts of the keepers of the fire in the hearth (culture, naturally) did not fail to have its effect. They were fruitful. The great feeling of dignity of the local kolkhoz members and unusual hospitality are striking. Here cases of disrespect and rudeness in unofficial and official relations at different levels are rare. Frank views and criticism are encouraged. Brigade meetings deal with sincerity and passion on more than production problems. If necessary, they discuss toadying, flattery, pedantry or slander. Generally speaking, allowances are made for no one. It is a mutual education process.

It is good for a village to be famous for its customs. New arrivals to Rastsvet, for example, are touched and amazed by the fact that in the evening boys and girls sing their simple warm songs on the streets. People come from other places to hear under the tall poplars songs such as "O, You Galya," "Susidka," "Bright Fog," "You Tricked Me," or "Lonely Harmonica." Lovers of modern songs may whisper, "how patriarchal!" However, it would be right to say "to each his own." Whatever the case, not only adults but young people are seduced by such a warm atmosphere in the rural evening. It involves a complex set of emotional and psychological feelings and spontaneous actions....For quite some time the Ostapchuk family has been trying to move here. It was not a question of earnings, for earnings depend on the work. What about living conditions? They were no better! These people were ready to leave their orderly garden, with its fence and a garage. Were they quarreling with their neighbors? Nothing of the kind....In the course of their conversation, Vasilii Antonovich Bondarenko, who had taken over from Makar Posmitnyy, unexpectedly heard the following admission:

"There are good songs in your village, and no one sings anymore in ours."

Indeed, it is uncomfortable to walk along a silent rural street, it is as though it has lost its soul. That is why there comes a point when the evening silence becomes unbearable. The fact that with every passing year there are more and more radios in the village homes and more and more television antennas on the roofs does not guarantee by itself happiness and attractiveness on the streets. Even the most perfect radio engineering facilities cannot replace the living folk art which, if neglected, withers away, fades out like a firefly touched by human hand.

The respect and sympathy which Posmitnyy showed for "his" fellow villagers was the means through which they united in the difficult task of farming. When his successor assumed his position, he became confused by a variety of urgent matters and paid somewhat less attention to the house of culture. As the doctors say in similar cases, no visible change occurred. Nevertheless, the new chairman is now doing everything possible to compensate for his neglect. This is Posmitnyy's influence!

According to Lenin, socialism means civilized members of a cooperative, and the level of civilization is based not only on the amount of land which the peasant has or powerful technical means and advanced tools. Culture is the strictest criterion in determining the level of civilization of the farmer. That is why, according to Lenin, the mission of the urban working class and the party in the countryside, covering a long historical time segment, would consist of various aspects of active cultural work. "...Cultural work among the peasantry," he wrote, "is aimed precisely at cooperation as its economic target." He immediately added that "...total cooperation is impossible without an entire cultural revolution" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 45, p 376).

When Lenin spoke of a civilized peasantry he had in mind widespread "comprehensive literacy," "adequate level of intelligence," and a "sufficient degree of teaching the population the use of books...." At that time, these were urgent and vital problems. Our society has already invested much effort in resolving them. However, as we think over the wise advice of the builders of communism given to the future generations, we must bear in mind that people are not satisfied with their accomplishments. They always aspire to the new, so that at each spiral in the country's socioeconomic development the content which is usually invested in the concept of "spiritual needs" changes, although there are unquestionable permanent values. One of them is folk creativity, whose importance has always been high.

Technical progress does not affect production means only, but...the work tools of cultural workers as well. That is why the popular idea that television has seriously damaged cultural centers in the villages, as a result of which some people are no longer interested in amateur club activities, club attendance has declined sharply, and so on, is blasphemous. The blue (and now also color) screens can indeed charm a person, but only for a while, after which this benefit of civilization begins to be used moderately. Placed in capable hands, radio and television are irreplaceable instruments of culture. They perform a great educational role, make life more beautiful and spread awareness among the masses. Does television hinder club activities? To say this would be slanderous and as wrong as saying that the art of healing has been withering away with the appearance of antibiotics and other modern active drugs.

Club work is an exceptionally delicate area of social activity. Stereotyping and inertial thinking are particularly intolerable in this area. However, some cultural administrators spare no effort in ensuring uniformity in the work plans of subordinate cultural and educational institutions, although we must strive to achieve precisely the opposite--uniqueness and originality, so that each center may shine in its own light and so that the variety of spiritual requirements can be met.

The rural way of life, closeness to nature and agriculture, are imprinted in the soul and become the ineradicable features of human nature. For example, we are familiar with the desire of the peasant to embellish his way of life and work with the vivid hues of national ceremonies. It is the custom of the rural resident to create objects of beauty made of materials at hand and to use them. This is an expression of the characteristic of the individual and of his own features; in addition to everything else, it is one of the means of competitiveness, without which village life would be simply extremely poor.

Let us consider family and other ceremonies. As a whole, they are an ornament of human relations, giving them a proper mood and local coloring. There was a time when they were undeservedly neglected or scorned. This did not fail to have its consequences: substantial harm was caused to rural spiritual culture. Today, the good folk customs and traditions are being revived through common efforts, including both those which are widespread in any peasant environment and those which are specific to a given area or region. This project, which was initiated by enthusiasts, was subsequently supported by cultural institutions and party committees. Now we are witnessing (and participating in!) pleasant entertainments such as birch day, the day of the first furrow or the day of the first sheaf....It is true that the production motif prevails, but even such celebrations can carry a powerful emotional charge if they are in harmony with natural folklore elements.

The CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers 1977 decree on improving cultural services to the rural population and the subsequent Central Committee decision on the development of amateur artistic work call for the working people themselves to be the makers of culture. Amateur art may not meet all the standards of professional art but does have incomparable charm, ingenuity and spiritual simplicity and is without question close to folk art. Actually, amateur art has also a strictly practical purpose: it serves the task of educating the specific collectives, enhancing the spiritual life of the village, feeding the mind and giving happiness to the heart...thus helping the people in their work.

Farsighted economic managers, made wise by practical experience, do not ignore the spiritual factor whatever the circumstances. Not so long ago the Druzhba Kolkhoz,

Kostromskaya Oblast, celebrated the 50th anniversary of its founding. In such cases people tend to reminisce. On this occasion, reminiscences seemed particularly abundant. White-haired veterans recalled the following historical fact: in 1932, after hours of debate, the decision was passed by majority vote to purchase a gramophone for the reading room. The kolkhoz may have had some more important needs. However, esthetic considerations gained the upper hand. Subsequent long practical experience entirely confirmed the expediency of this outlay. Here is a feature: Shunga does not have any particular cultural facilities--the rooms are no palaces, but are perfectly equipped. Recently the kolkhoz board, true to its principles and without unnecessary talk, appropriated 6,500 rubles for the purchase of a full set of musical instruments for its variety ensemble.

The Shunga village soviet has under its jurisdiction four autonomous economically strong arms. One of them is the 12-y Oktyabr' Kolkhoz, whose chairman is Twice Hero of Socialist Labor Praskov'ya Andreyevna Malinina. The kolkhoz is systematically and in a planned manner strengthening its production potential. However, spiritual needs are not forgotten. This shown in everything...The shock projects of prime importance--those which are related to the children--are the nurseries and schools, which are simply perfect. If the construction of a dairy complex is undertaken, at the same time thought is given to where to organize a sports complex--if it is to be next to the school or the house of culture. Naturally, not all plans can be carried out, for the material resources are still not sufficient. However, this inspires the collective to start looking for reserves. This applies to both production and spiritual projects.

The well-organized club activity helps to reveal and hone gifted people in the collective. A slogan inscribed on a piece of red calico hanging in the foyer of the house of culture reads: "Those Who Don't Prove To Be Talented Are Only Lazy."

In Samet mass cultural work is done not only by full-time entertainers; music, singing and choreography specialists are invited from other areas and from Kostroma. The members of 12-y Oktyabr' Kolkhoz consider music director Honored Worker in Culture Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Rusanov one of their own, even though he lives and works in the oblast center, where he teaches at the art school. This outstanding specialist dedicated to his art maintains profound creative ties with the amateur performers of this clear-voiced village on the Volga. Here Rusanov has found many outstanding talents and has helped them to grow. That is why the songs of the Samet Kolkhoz members may be heard far beyond the okrug, in various parts of the country. Praskov'ya Andreyevna Malinina herself is the choir leader. The kolkhoz chairman spares neither her time nor her efforts, for she believes that she can resolve a variety of difficult problems through the club. The value of this cultural "shop" has been tested for many years and its effectiveness is obvious. On the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of this creative association, the celebrants received congratulations from the USSR Ministry of Culture, the All-Union Choir Society, several theaters and famous actors and composers.

At this point, let us quote one of P. A. Malinina's orders formulated at a conference of farm managers and specialists:

"My dears, one must live with the interests of our youth...How do I interpret this? Absolutely literally! For example, if you do not want your little village to get old and to wither, if you want the school to supply it with fresh forces, if you want to prevent the draining of such forces, spend some time in the club. Do not

fear that you are too old for this. If you do not know how to sing or act, organize an athletic group. Let us say that you cannot do even this. Then set up a circle of young technicians and try to invent, to improve on something. Young people love this! Together with them, you too will develop, learn and increase your knowledge. Dear comrades, a manager must not focus his attention on production only. Economics is affected by a variety of factors, including some that are spiritual...."

4

There is a popular saying according to which art demands sacrifice....No, it does not demand sacrifice but planned financing! Nevertheless, there is something more essential than what is in the plans for the development of material resources. It is a question of the live public interest, and love for art. Frequently this alone is a great creative incentive.

...I had to stop in Kosovo on my way to somewhere else. There was a 3-hour wait for the bus to Ivano-Frankovsk and I was reluctant to waste that time. What to do? I recalled the advice of the rayon executive committee chairman:

"Go to Sheshora. This would not take long."

"What do I look for? An important industrial project or a local site?"

"A local site," he answered. "Ganna Vasilashchuk lives in Sheshora."

"The painter? I have heard of her."

"Now go and see, you may end up by liking our area even more."

This was a favorable opportunity, for a group of tourists was traveling in that direction from the local Karpatskiye Zori tourist base. We reached the mountain village half an hour later. For a while our bus meandered along the narrow twisted streets, finally stopping a few meters away from a steep slope. Ahead of us was a tall rock and somewhere down below we could hear the slapping of the waters of the fast-running Cheremosh.

A twisted sandy path led to a stone house with an attic rising in the midst of tall black poplars and apple and pear trees. The door opened wide and a short woman in a brightly colored sleeveless padded jacket began to walk toward us. Seeing the guests, she smiled broadly.

"Come in."

I had barely crossed the threshold when I stopped in amazement: the entire space inside was brightly lit. The light did not come from the windows but from the walls on which homespun colored fabrics hung. The impression created was as though someone had managed to take a rainbow from the sky and had hung it in the room before we came.

Someone next to me said in a daze:

"What a beauty!"

After our initial impression subsided, we started looking at the colored designs whose complexity was not easy to unravel.

Our host went into the next room and came back carrying a pile of towels in canvas bags. She hastily loosened their strings and spread the heavy fabric on the table (adding even more light to the attic!). She started talking while gently rubbing the cloth. It was a poem:

A cherry orchard around the house,
Beetles are buzzing on the cherries,
Ploughmen are walking behind their ploughs,
Girls are singing,
Mothers are cooking dinner.

The artist was not simply declaiming the poem, but interpreting orally the design on the towel; her fingers moved lightly over the design as though it were a keyboard. The colorful lines came alive. A pale pink cherry orchard appeared on the cloth, with a peaceful village street along which tired boys and singing girls walked. The dusk was depicted so artfully that we could see the scattered light of distant stars and the flight of june bugs. One could even smell the bittersweet aroma of the thick carpet of cherry blossoms fallen on the ground.

The power which comes from talent is a mystery of birth and education but also, unquestionably, the result of human help. Possibly, not everyone is always aware of his own involvement in this process.

As a child, Ganna was given the book "Kobzar'" [Kobza-player] by Taras Shevchenko. She carried the book with her wherever she went and soon memorized it from cover to cover. This young Gutsul girl perceived the poetic characters not as works of the mind but as a manifestation of the spontaneous forces of nature. She could not imagine that an ordinary person could create music or poetry.

Spreading out a piece of cardboard, Ganna began to design on it while murmuring her favorite verses. The result, after she colored her design, was a strange-looking ornament.

"What is all this about?" her father asked after she had finished.

Recovering from her embarrassment, Ganna began to "describe" her design:

"This is a poem, but in color. Shevchenko writes that 'the sun rises, bring in the day.' Now see here: here is the red sun with its rays. There are many of them, for it is midday. The grass is green, over it the sky is blue and there are swallows with white breasts. Now here, you see, the sun is setting, it has reached the end of the earth and is going to rest....Here the colors are different, they are darker. You can see the stars shining like golden sparks."

Such was her occasional strange perception and interpretation of her surroundings.

The Gutsul'shchina is an amazing region, a land of epic songs, and the people here are artful and react deeply to the loss of beauty. However, in order to stand out one must have unusual ability and special qualities of the soul.

Gradually, the works of the weaver from this mountain village became famous and recognized. There was unpleasantness as well. The excessively cautious saw formalistic trends in Vasilashchuk's style. It took a great deal of effort to protect

this young talent from pseudocritics who could have misled and disoriented the artist. I heard that her first exhibit was timed for the opening of a rayon party conference at which good mention was made of Ganna Vasil'yevna's work.

The weaver has created more than 1,500 canvases. Most of them are inspired by the works of the great Ukrainian poet, for which reason G. V. Vasilashchuk was awarded the diploma of laureate of the Ukrainian SSR State Prize imeni T. G. Shevchenko.

The towel she wove in memory of V. I. Lenin is entitled "Years of a Great Life." It is particularly precious to the artist. Ganna Vasil'yevna has tried to describe the revolutionary, great worker and people's leader who dedicated his life to the struggle for the happiness of the simple people. The canvas seems to contain all imaginable colors but the overall tone is purple-fiery, infinitely deep.

Like most people, I am not knowledgeable in color symbolism. All I know is that red symbolizes the just struggle for liberation.

Ganna Vasil'yevna smiled softly:

"Oh, that is not all!" Patiently, she began to explain the meaning of the colors. "One must also bear in mind," she said, "the color combinations, their composition. We know that black is the symbol of sadness. However, the earth is black yet gives life to everything....We have discussed this and many other things in our graphic arts studio at the house of culture. If you have the opportunity, please come and visit us!"

Ganna Vasil'yevna shares the daily concerns of her fellow villagers: for the past 9 years she has been a people's deputy. She is the permanent chairman of the kolkhoz women's council. She loves to plant trees and can frequently be seen in the nursery, where she grows saplings which grow into powerful trees which are the pride and glory of the Carpathians.

Occasionally, leaving everything behind her, Ganna Vasil'yevna goes into the mountains, near the cliffs where waterfalls are born and where edelweiss, those wonderful creations of nature, blossom in the spring. These flowers grow in inaccessible places, in the cracks of steep rocks. Risking their lives, the strong, the brave, the honest and the daring climb to see them, encouraged by a great love; all they want is to look at the flower. This alone, they say, is entirely sufficient to give a person a feeling of incomparable love.

The legend of the edelweiss will be the topic of the next towel. For the time being, the artist thinks of three of its basic colors--soft white, bright blue and pale pink.

It has been pointed out that a conversation about grain and the village economy develops into a topic of morality and culture in the broad meaning of the term. Sometimes, such transitions occur imperceptibly. It is as though the moment people begin to discuss material values a heated argument develops on spiritual subjects. Actually, this has its own dialectics and logic.

Recently, addressing a business conference, Terentiy Semenovich Mal'tsev, honorary VASKHIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin] academician, said:

"Comrades, we must not forget that the toil of the plowman, the sower, demands inspiration. This is a special condition of the human soul which shows its wealth. For ages the toil of the peasant, his life and poetic creativity have been a blend of the people's life, people's celebrations and workdays saturated with songs and dances. On the one hand, they were a means for the self-expression of the individual. On the other, they were something like a good seasoning of the work. Today rural youth seek mainly stage entertainment. Naturally, it is hard to argue about taste. Nevertheless, it is quite regrettable that folklore art is disappearing from rural life and that rural toil is penetrated not by harmonious but by some kind of raggedy melodies and disjointed rhythms whose spirit and content are alien to the countryside. The intimate Russian songs, as we know, have cheered up the peasant throughout his life. They were irreplaceable assistants in his toil, eliminating his fatigue, mobilizing, uplifting his spirit and his mood, responding with amazing accuracy to the nature of the farmer's toil....Unfortunately, the old melodies have already been forgotten by many."

In the final account, is it not the purpose of all of our activities to create better conditions for the multiplication of the spiritual potential of society? "We have great material and spiritual opportunities for the increasingly full development of the individual and we shall continue to increase them," Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress. "However, it is equally important," he emphasized, "for every person to know how to use them sensibly." Our party considers this one of the most important tasks of its social policy.

The present pace of social progress and economic success depends to a tremendous, sometimes determining extent on the intellectual potential of the creators of material goods, their education and their culture.

Therefore, we must not spare the fire that the soul needs!

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PROLOGUE TO THE GREAT VICTORY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 81 pp 70-81

[Article by Army General and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union A. Beloborodov]

[Text] Forty years have passed since the defeat of Hitler's elite hordes on the approaches to Moscow. We, the military, who were directly involved in the great battle, are beginning to realize with increasing clarity the greatness of this exploit performed by the Leninist party, our armed forces and the entire Soviet people.

In our country's history, 1941 was among the most dramatic years. Fully mobilizing its armed forces and the forces of its satellites, and relying on the economic potential of enslaved Europe, Hitlerite Germany treacherously attacked the USSR. Enjoying great superiority in tanks, airplanes and manpower, and profiting from the suddenness of the attack, in the initial weeks of the war the fascist aggressors advanced hundreds of kilometers within the country. The Hitlerites were relying on the "lightning war," hoping with the help of tank wedges, supported by aviation, to cut through our forces and reach the country's vital centers.

Fascist Germany ascribed decisive significance to the capture of Moscow. It assumed that the resistance of the Red Army would be crushed once and for all with the fall of the capital of the Soviet state and that the war would end with a German victory. "In 1941, the seizure of Moscow was far more important to the Germans than it was to Napoleon in 1812, for by then the city was no longer second to Petersburg..., but had become the first and main city of the Soviet Union..., a kind of key to the entire Soviet system," H. Guderian was to write subsequently. The fascist command relied mainly on the headlong strike of the Group of Armies Center, which was operating in the Smolensk-Moscow direction.

The initial enemy plan of capturing Moscow was defeated on the run, as result of the bloody battle of Smolensk, in July-September 1941. Thanks to the boundless heroism of troops and commanders, our troops shook up a considerably superior and most powerful enemy concentration to such an extent that, for the first time in World War II, the German command was forced to review its operative plans. On 30 July, the Group of Armies Center was ordered to take up defensive positions. We gained time to train reserves and to build defensive positions.

Therefore, the enemy's obvious errors in the implementation of its plans of war against the USSR became apparent even before the beginning of the battle for Moscow. Although the enemy had achieved substantial territorial successes, he was unable to resolve his strategic problems. The fascists were stopped 300-400 km from Moscow.

The mobilizing and guiding role of the Communist Party in repelling the enemy's invasion, the heroic resistance of the Soviet forces, the tremendous efforts of the entire nation to give maximal help to the front and the selfless struggle waged by Soviet patriots on territory occupied by the enemy already then threatened the "Blitzkrieg" with failure.

However, the danger to the homeland remained. In those circumstances, difficult for our country, the fascist command prepared for a new offensive, the purpose of which was to end the war before winter. On Hitler's order, the operation code named "Typhoon" for the capture of Moscow was drafted. In order to carry out this assignment, the Group of Armies Center was reinforced by the Fourth Tank Group and by two army corps and the Second Army and the Second Tank Army Group, which came here from the south. This was the only time in World War II that the high command of the ground forces had deployed in a single direction three of the four existing tank groups. Some 75 percent of all tanks on the eastern front and nearly one-half of all the soldiers and the air force were concentrated in this area. Never before had the Hitlerite command prepared its forces so thoroughly for an offensive as in the case of Operation Typhoon. In his order of the day to the troops on the eastern front Hitler confidently wrote: "Finally, prerequisites have been created for dealing a final tremendous strike which must bring about the enemy's annihilation before the winter." However, Hitler and his jackals miscalculated badly.

As it had done previously, in the autumn of 1941 Supreme Soviet Headquarters considered that the main task of our forces was to preserve the integrity of the strategic front. The Group of Armies Center, which was advancing in the direction of Moscow, was opposed by the forces of three fronts. The Western, commanded by I. S. Konev, was deployed in defensive positions along the main approach to Moscow, along a 340-km-long line, from Ostashkovo to Yel'na. The Reserve Front, under the command of S. M. Budenny, had focused its main forces along defensive positions behind the Western Front. Furthermore, two front armies--the 24th and the 43d--covered a 100-km-wide strip in the Spas-Demenskoye and Kirovskoye directions. Two divisions of the right-flank 31st Army occupied defensive positions in the area of Seliger Lake and Ostashkov. The forces of the Bryansk Front, commanded by A. I. Yeremenko, were assigned to cover the Bryansk-Kaluga and Sevsk-Orel-Tula directions.

The enemy concentrated in the Moscow direction 74.5 divisions totaling as many as 1.8 million men, more than 14,000 guns and mortars and 1,700 tanks. The forces of the three Soviet fronts operating in a westerly direction totaled 1.25 million men, 7,600 guns and mortars and 990 tanks. The enemy enjoyed air superiority as well: 1,390 airplanes against 677 Soviet aircraft which, furthermore, were of obsolete design.

Therefore, at the end of September 1941, the Hitlerites had been able to create a powerful strike group which was considerably superior to our forces covering the way to Moscow. The situation was worsened by the fact that by then we had lost important industrial parts of the country. On the eve of the battle for Moscow and during it, most of the defense plants were being evacuated. The enterprises deployed in the east had not as yet been able to organize mass output. As a result, the production of some types of armaments and military ordnance declined temporarily.

From the very beginning of the war the Soviet government had done everything possible to create and strengthen the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Forced to take the demands of the people's masses into consideration, the governments of Great Britain and

the United States initiated talks with the USSR. The first conference of the three great powers was held in Moscow in September-October. The Soviet Union was promised military and economic support, and the amounts of military procurements were established. However, despite the obligations they had assumed, the Western powers were not in a hurry to help our country. Even according to the former American military attache in the USSR, deliveries of war materiel from the United States and Great Britain to the Soviet Union "were disappointingly small" at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942. Germany was not as yet being threatened by more active involvement of the USSR's Western allies in the war. Furthermore, while fighting fascist Germany and its allies alone, the Soviet Union was forced to keep considerable forces in the Far East, to restrain Japan's aggressive aspirations.

These were the circumstances in which the fascists opened their general offensive against Moscow between 30 September and 2 October 1941. Guderian's tank group breached the defensive lines on the Bryansk Front. The bulk of the Group Center attacked the forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. Along with the offensive of the ground forces, the enemy air force dealt concentrated strikes at command centers of the fronts, armies, formations and reserve areas. For a while, the command of the troops, particularly on the Bryansk and Reserve fronts, was disturbed.

An exceptionally difficult situation developed in the defense area held by the 24th and 43d armies of the Reserve Front. Having crushed the resistance of the defending forces, the enemy rapidly moved toward Spas-Demenskoye, toward Vyaz'ma and Yuhnov. Our large army formations which fell under the strikes of the enemy forces suffered heavy losses and withdrew in an easterly direction. On 7 October, elements of enemy motorized corps reached the Vyaz'ma area, as a result of which elements and units of the 19th and 20th armies of the Western and 24th and 32d armies of the Reserve Front and the group commanded by I. V. Boldin were surrounded. In fierce combat the 22d, 29th and 31st armies pulled back to the Selizharovo-Olenino-Sychevka line. Elements of the 30th Army, suffering heavy casualties, and individual groups retreated to Volokolamsk.

The development of events in the Bryansk Front area was equally extremely unfavorable. On 1 October, the enemy's Second Tank Group reached the Sevsk area and mounted an offensive toward Orel, Tula and Bryansk. The forces of the Bryansk Front were split into three parts and began to retreat under exceptionally hard conditions.

The surrounding of the main forces of the Western Front in the Vyaz'ma area and the defeat of the forces of the Reserve and, partially, the Bryansk Front created an exceptionally difficult situation along the Moscow direction. Essentially, there was no continuous defense line standing between the advancing enemy tank formations and Moscow. The capital was seriously threatened.

On 5 October the State Defense Committee passed a special resolution on the defense of Moscow. The Mozhaysk defense line was established as the main line of resistance. The students of the infantry and artillery schools in Podor'sk, the Military School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR, the military-political school, the combined tank battalion of the armed forces academy, the 108th Reserve Infantry Regiment and recently raised voluntary subunits consisting of Moscow workers were sent there. On 6 October, military students and troops from other units courageously confronted the fascist forces and stopped them temporarily. A group headed by A. M. Vasilevskiy, representing headquarters, visited the Western Front. It directed to the Mozhaysk defense line as many as five infantry divisions from forces retreating in the Rzhev, Sychevka and Vyaz'ma directions.

The encircled forces of the Western and, partially, Reserve fronts continued their stubborn resistance. With their active combat operations they pinned down 28 divisions of the Group of Armies Center and blocked their advance to Mozhaysk. "Thanks to the stubbornness and firmness displayed by our surrounded forces in the Vyaz'ma area," G. K. Zhukov wrote later, "we gained valuable time with which to organize our defense along the Mozhaysk line. The blood which the surrounded forces shed and their sacrifice were not lost."

On 10 October, the decision was made to combine the forces of the Western and Reserve fronts within a single Western Front under the command of G. K. Zhukov. The Kalinin Front was organized under the command of I. S. Konev on 17 October. On 18-20 October the forces of the Kalinin Front counterattacked the enemy's Third Tank Group and forced him to take up defensive positions, thus weakening the group advancing directly on Moscow.

Headquarters continued to increase the forces of the Western Front, which was reinforced with the forces on the Mozhaysk line and 11 infantry divisions which had come from the rear and from other strategic directions. The 32d and 78th infantry divisions were transferred here from the Far East (the 78th Division was commanded by this author). Three divisions were raised from Muscovite volunteers. In addition to infantry divisions, the front was reinforced with 16 tank brigades, more than 40 artillery regiments, 10 flame-thrower companies and many other separate units and subunits. Four new armies were raised toward the middle of October, totaling about 90,000 men. However, more forces were needed if a firm defense was to be organized along the Mozhaysk line. For that reason, Front Commander G. K. Zhukov decided to organize the defense along individual directions. K. K. Rokossovskiy's 16th Army was deployed in the Volokolamsk direction; the 5th Army, commanded by D. D. Lelyushenko (subsequently replaced by I. A. Govorov), was deployed along the Mozhaysk direction; K. D. Golubev's 43d Army was deployed in the Maloyaroslavets direction; and I. G. Zakharkin's 49th Army was deployed in the Kaluga direction.

Active guerrilla efforts played a major role in defeating the Hitlerite advance. Guided by the CC VKP(b) decree "On the Organization of the Struggle Behind the German Forces," the Moscow City Party Committee extensively developed the guerrilla movement in the Moscow area. All in all, there were 41 partisan units and 377 diversionary groups totaling 15,000 people on the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy. During the partial occupation of Moscow Oblast, the people's avengers killed more than 17,000 Hitlerites and caused considerable damage to the enemy's equipment. Orders and medals were awarded to hundreds of partisans for their heroism and courage. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to four: M. A. Gur'yanov, S. I. Solntsev, I. N. Kuzin and Z. A. Kosmodem'yanskaya.

Moscow became the ideological and organizational center of the selfless struggle which the Soviet people waged against the German-fascist aggressors from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War. The Central Committee Politburo, State Defense Committee and Supreme Command Headquarters, headed by J. V. Stalin, did not leave their combat posts in the capital during the most difficult days for our homeland, directing all the activities of the party, the people and the armed forces for the defeat of the enemy. All progressive people on earth, who were fighting fascism, were looking to Moscow with hope in their eyes.

The Soviet people stood up to defend their capital. Troop and military hardware echelons came here from all parts of the country. The working people of the capital and of the Moscow area played a truly outstanding role in the heroic defense of

Moscow. Their selfless struggle against the enemy was organized by the Moscow party organization. On 13 October, a party aktiv meeting decreed "the mobilization of the entire Moscow party organization, all party and Komsomol members and all working people of Moscow for repulsing the German-fascist aggressors, defending Moscow and organizing the victory." The Muscovites responded to the party's call properly. By the end of 1941, the Moscow party organization had delivered to the front 114,000 men, including 8,000 leading party and soviet workers for political work in the army and navy. In the first months of the war, Moscow and the Moscow area sent to the front about 300,000 Komsomol members.

Fifteen people's militia divisions consisting of working people in the capital and the Moscow area were raised to help the forces which were defending Moscow. The biggest Moscow enterprises raised their own regiments, battalions and companies. Such was the case of the Kalibr Plant, which raised a regiment; battalions were raised by the First State Dairies Plant, the Meat Combine imeni A. I. Mikoyan, the Krasnyy Bogadyr' Plant, etc. In addition to them, another 87 fighter battalions were raised. Party members accounted for almost half of their personnel.

Despite the evacuation of the basic equipment, the workers and engineering and technical personnel of Moscow's enterprises organized the production of the latest military ordnance, armaments and ammunition, equipment and food supplies for the Red Army. Thus, the Kompressor Plant mastered the production of BM-13 rocket launchers which became lovingly known as "Katyushas." When the battle was joined not far from Moscow, more than 100 Moscow enterprises undertook the mass production of PPSH submachine guns. By the beginning of 1942, they were producing more submachine guns than all the specialized plants under the People's Commissariat of Armaments. The Muscovites shipped to the front 20,000 PPSH in December. By the end of 1941, the farm workers in the Moscow area had delivered to the state more than 4 million poods of grain and 25 million poods of potatoes and vegetables. The declaration of a state of siege in the city and adjacent rayons as of 20 October, based on the 19 October 1941 State Defense Committee decree, was one of the important measures which ensured the mobilization of the efforts of the troops and population in Moscow for rebuffing the enemy. This document became the base of all activities of the Moscow party organization and the command and political apparatus of the fronts which were defending the capital. All party-political work was aimed at comprehensively raising the spirit and firmness of the troops, developing in the soldiers a deep hatred of the enemy and promoting awareness of duty and responsibility to the homeland for the fate of Moscow. Front, army, corps and division newspapers were extensively used in mass political work among the personnel. Great attention was paid to summing up and informing all the forces of the combat experience of the best soldiers, subunits and units. Every commander and soldier was issued the specific task of maintaining his position. "Not one step back!" was the demand of the party and the people, a demand which the Soviet troops fulfilled with honor, stubbornness and dedication.

For 2 weeks the enemy tried to breach the Mozhaysk defense line along which our troops had been operatively deployed. The fascists failed to capture Tula, which was covering Moscow from the south. Guderian thought that the target was easy. Heroic Tula, however, repelled all enemy attacks. "Gun and ammunition makers, miners and metallurgical workers fought to the death," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in speaking of the exploit of the Tula people. "From the 1941 firing lines the valorous Tula workers' regiment passed into immortality."

By the end of October, the offensive of the German fascist forces on Moscow had been stopped. The front stabilized on the Volokolamsk-Kubinka-Serpukhov-Aleksin line. In one month of fierce fighting the Hitlerites had been able to advance 200-250 km without, however, reaching their objective: they did not break through toward Moscow. The fascist command blamed the autumn rain, dirt and early frost for its failures, totally unwilling to acknowledge the real reasons for the failure, which were the great firmness and mass heroism shown by the Soviet soldiers and officers and the improved martial skill of our command.

The enemy's offensive was stopped, but the situation remained exceptionally difficult. The Hitlerite army, deployed in Moscow's immediate vicinity, was very strong. The enemy was preparing to press on with tremendous strength in an effort to capture the city at all costs before the winter, using the same method of operations as in October, totally ignoring the changed situation. As during the October offensive, with blind faith in the power of a first powerful strike, the Hitlerite command had kept only insignificant forces in reserve.

Aware of the offensive prepared by the German fascist forces, the Soviet command took urgent measures to reinforce the Western Front and to strengthen its defense positions. Party-political work among the troops was intensified.

The ceremonious session held in Moscow on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, and the traditional military parade on Red Square, were of tremendous importance in uplifting the moral spirit of the Soviet people and the defenders of the capital. J. V. Stalin addressed briefly the participants in the parade who were leaving for the front. "The entire world is looking at you," he said, "as a force which can destroy the predatory hordes of German aggressors. The eyes of the enslaved peoples of Europe, suffering under the yoke of the German aggressors, are turned to you as their liberators. You have assumed a great liberation mission. Be worthy of it!" The firm confidence of the party and the government in the inevitable defeat of the enemy sounded in these words with new strength.

Despite the reinforcement of the troops which were defending Moscow, at the beginning of the November operation the enemy had retained his superiority. He had twice the number of soldiers, and his superiority in artillery and tanks was greater by a factor of 2.5 and 1.5 respectively. The fascist armored hordes resumed their offensive against Moscow on 15-16 November. Fifty-one divisions, 20 of which were tank and motorized, struck powerful blows from the north and the south in two shock groups in order to surround Moscow in a wide enveloping movement, striking out from Volokolamsk and Tula. Fierce battles broke out. Everywhere our troops fought their defensive battles with exceptional stubbornness. Mass heroism was displayed by the forces of the valorous 316th Infantry Division commanded by I. V. Panfilov, L. M. Dovator's cavalry group, P. A. Rotmistrov's Eighth Tank Brigade and many other formations and units which held back the avalanche of the enemy's offensive. Everyone today is familiar with the words of Vasiliy Klochkov, the courageous political instructor: "Russia is big but there is nowhere to retreat after Moscow!" The words of this hero, who shared the fate and the immortal glory of the 28th Panfilov Guardsmen at the Dubosekovo Station, became the slogan of the capital's defenders. Day after day they were found in the newspapers and the appeals of the military councils, and lived in the heart of every soldier.

The forces of the 78th Infantry Division, which I was then commanding, courageously fought the fascists. Like the Panfilov forces, the division was part of the 16th Army.

On 18 November, at a critical moment, the division was ordered to counterattack the German fascist forces who were rushing toward the Volokolamsk-Moscow highway.

"The Siberians hurled themselves at the enemy," later recalled K. K. Rokossovskiy, who commanded the 16th Army. "They struck the enemy's flank. The enemy was swept off, overrun, thrown back....The Germans were able to stop the further advance of the 78th Division only by sending fresh units in that direction." The Hitlerite forces were able to capture Klin on 23 November and to break through to Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana. The enemy was only 27 km away from Moscow's suburbs. In the south, bypassing Tula, Guderian's tank divisions reached Kashira. It seemed to the fascist generals that one more effort and victory would be theirs. However, this did not happen. The Hitlerite forces were unable to make a full break through the armed forces of the Western Front and fire even a single shot on Moscow.

The offensive of the fascist forces against Moscow was blocked at the beginning of December. During the battles between 16 November and 5 December alone, the Hitlerites lost more than 155,000 men killed and wounded, about 800 tanks and as many as 1,500 airplanes. By then, for the first time, the Soviet air force assumed operative control in the air over Moscow. The Soviet forces won the tremendous defensive battle for Moscow and the Hitlerites converted entirely to defensive operations.

The defeat of the enemy offensive by the Soviet forces in October-November 1941 revealed the crisis in the German Blitzkrieg strategy and its failure. In this case, the counteroffensive which Supreme Command Headquarters had mounted at Tikhvin and Rostov-na-Donu was of great importance. It deprived the German Groups of Armies North and South of the possibility of assisting the Group of Armies Center. The spirit of the German fascist army was severely broken. The situation which developed at Moscow urgently called for a Soviet counteroffensive.

There are few examples in the history of wars in which after a lengthy defense and without achieving the necessary numerical superiority over the enemy the defending side has been able to mount a successful counteroffensive. As to the offensive which our forces mounted at the battle for Moscow, it was unique in military history in terms of the complexity of the initial situation and the scale of its results. The main factors which enabled Soviet military strategy to achieve victory were the high moral and combat qualities of the troops and the increased skill of the command personnel.

By the end of November, when the defensive battles on the approaches to Moscow had reached their peak, the Soviet command was already changing the methods of combat operations and converting from defense to a decisive offensive. The political organs concentrated all party-political work among the troops on developing in the soldiers an aggressive spirit and confidence in the inevitable victory. The party stratum among the troops was increased. In December, the forces of the fronts fighting on the approaches to the capital numbered almost 200,000 party members.

The forces of the Western Front, commanded by G. K. Zhukov, the Kalinin Front (I. S. Konev, commanding) and the Southwestern Front, commanded by S. K. Timoshenko, launched their counteroffensive on 5-6 December. The objective of the counteroffensive was the simultaneous defeat of the most dangerous concentrations of forces of the Group of Armies Center, which was threatening Moscow from the south and the north.

The forces deployed along the left flank of the Kalinin Front launched their offensive on the morning of 5 December. Sustained fighting began for the liberation of Kalinin. After completing this operation, our formations and units pursued the enemy, who was

retreating to the southwest suffering heavy casualties. Here the forces of the Kalinin Front went into motion. By 7 January, their right wing reached the Volga in the Rzhev area.

The northern shock group of the Western Front started its counteroffensive on 6 December. Breaching the enemy's lines between the Volga reservoir and Yakhroma, our forces quickly bypassed Klin and found themselves in the rear of the Third and Fourth German tank groups. The enemy was forced to abandon the Klin-Istrinskoye water reservoir line. Pursuing the enemy, our forces reached the central sector of the Western Front near the Lama and Ruza rivers by 25 December. However, the efforts to cross them on the run were repelled by enemy fire and counterattacks.

The shock group of the left wing of the Western Front began its offensive in the area south of Ryzan' on 6 December. The enemy was also attacked by the forces operating northeast of Tula. These strikes in the directions crossing in the area of Uzlovaya Station created a major threat to the flank and rear of the Second German Tank Army. The enemy's hasty retreat from the Tula area turned into a rout soon.

At the same time, after surrounding and defeating the enemy group at Yelets, forces of the Southwestern Front increased their success in a northwesterly direction.

Profiting from the favorable changing military operations, the Central Group of the Western Front mounted its offensive on 18 December and, after breaking through enemy lines, liberated Maloyaroslavets on 2 January 1942. It liberated Borovsk 2 days later and fought its way toward Vereya and Medyn'.

The Hitlerite army was overwhelmed by the suddenness and power of the pressure of the Soviet forces. For the first time in World War II, its elite forces were thrown back.

After the war, describing the battle for Moscow, reactionary West German historians claimed that the German fascist forces retreated in an orderly fashion, for which reason they did not always offer strong resistance. No, gentlemen historians, such was not the case! Of hundreds of battles fought in the Great Patriotic War, I remember the battle of Moscow with particular clarity. All of us felt an inordinate uplift and enthusiasm. Troops and commanders of our 78th Division attacked the enemy as though they had not spent months in heavy defense battles with superior enemy forces but had had a long rest.

Actually, sometimes the defeated Hitlerite generals themselves give the lie to the "planned shortening" of the front, which sets the teeth on edge. "The power of the Russian strike and the scope of the counteroffensive were such," Tippelskirch wrote, "that a considerable area of the front was shaken up and an irreparable catastrophe almost occurred." Westphal, another Hitlerite general, admitted that "the German army, which was previously considered invincible, found itself on the brink of destruction."

The shock formations of the Group of Armies Center were crushed at the beginning of January 1942. The concluding period of the battle for Moscow began on 8 January. With decisive strikes in Vitebsk, Smolensk and Rzhev directions, the troops of the Northwestern and Kalinin fronts deeply outflanked the Group of Armies Center from the northwest. The forces of the left wing of the Western Front advanced in the direction of Vyaz'ma, outflanking the Group of Armies Center from the southeast. However, we were unable to complete the encirclement of the entire enemy group.

On 20 April 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the organization of defensive positions along the lines already reached.

The counteroffensive developed into a general offensive bounded by nine Soviet fronts and continued until April. In 4 months the enemy was thrown back to the west over a distance of 100 to 350 km. The immediate threat to Moscow was removed and Moscow and Tul'skaya oblasts and many rayons in Kalininskaya, Smolenskaya and other oblasts were totally cleared of Hitlerites. In the course of the Red Army offensive, 38 divisions, 15 of which were tank and mobilized, were hit heavily. The Hitlerites lost more than 500,000 soldiers and officers killed, wounded or captured. Some Wehrmacht units became incomplete, which lowered the combat capability of the fascist army. The inglorious end of the "general offensive" threw Hitler into a rage. He made major changes in the command of the troops: 35 high-ranking officers were dismissed.

The title of Guard Units was awarded to 14 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry corps, 2 marine brigades, 5 tank brigades, 9 artillery and 6 aviation regiments, including our 78th Infantry Division, for model performance of combat assignments in the battle for Moscow and for valor and courage. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 110 soldiers who had distinguished themselves, and USSR orders and medals were awarded to tens of thousands of military personnel. In honor of the victory of Moscow, in 1944 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium instituted the medal "For the Defense of Moscow," which was awarded to more than 1 million participants in that great battle. In honor of the 20th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany, Moscow was awarded the title of "City-Hero," with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal, on 8 May 1965.

The Soviet people and their army won a victory of tremendous historical importance at Moscow. The defeat of the fascist aggressors at the walls of the capital marked the beginning of a radical turn in the course of the war. For the first time after severe failures, the Red Army deprived the Hitlerite command of the strategic initiative. The failure of the Blitzkrieg meant that the temporary factors which governed the success of fascist Germany, such as the advantage of sudden attack, total force mobilization and superiority in combat experience, dried up entirely and became inoperative. Now the outcome of the war depended on different, permanent factors. The skill of our military commanders improved. The mastery of Red Army soldiers and commanders increased and strengthened. Starting in 1942, the USSR steadily increased the production of armaments and combat materiel and the capacity of the plants evacuated to the east increased. Although the enemy was not defeated yet and, furthermore, recovering from the blow, was able to mount a new offensive to the south in the summer of 1942, with every passing day the advantages of our socialist system and the spiritual superiority of the Soviet person, which brought about the definitive defeat of fascism, became increasingly obvious. "After exhausting the German army in the severe defensive battles," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "in December 1941 the Soviet forces repulsed the Hitlerite hordes, drove them away from the walls of the capital and chased them toward the west. The defeat of Moscow shattered the legend of the invincibility of the fascist army. The historic victory of Moscow inspired the Soviet people to new exploits and strengthened their confidence that the enemy would be inevitably defeated." The defeat of the German fascist forces at Moscow had a sobering effect on the aggressive Japanese and Turkish circles and was of tremendous international importance in rallying the anti-Hitlerite coalition and developing the national liberation movement throughout the world.

The battle for Moscow will be remembered forever by grateful mankind as an important landmark on the way to achieving victory over fascism in World War II and establishing peace on earth.

However, ignoring the lessons of history, the imperialist bosses are concocting aggressive plans. In their efforts to please the new pretenders to world domination, the bourgeois falsifiers are trying to conceal the importance of the Moscow battle and to misrepresent the reasons for the defeat of the German fascist forces. Whenever imperialism has forced the Soviet people to take up arms, the enemies of socialism have been invariably defeated. This is an irrefutable truth. That is why the bourgeois historians are forced to falsify the truth. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, when the bourgeoisie loses its influence over peoples, "it has always and everywhere resorted and will resort to most desperate lies and slander" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 25, p 352).

The political sources of fabrications about the war are rooted in the aggressive line followed by the Western imperialist countries, mainly the United States. The reactionary NATO circles are interested mostly in the experience of the initial period of the the war against the USSR, in the course of which the fate of the Blitzkrieg plan was decided. This experience attracts attention also because the appearance of new mass destruction weapons has considerably changed the conditions of armed struggle and has created prerequisites for the implementation of operational plans within shorter periods of time compared with the past. Efforts are being made to rebuild the undermined authority of the former Hitlerite General Staff, to rehabilitate its military theory and to justify the fascist strategy and the entire Hitlerite military leadership. The real reasons for the failure of Hitler's Blitzkrieg are being distorted in all possible ways.

We know that the Blitzkrieg theory dates from the very turn of the 20th century, when von Schlieffen, chief of the general staff of the Germany army, tried to substantiate the idea of finding a "quick solution" to objectives of the war. Von Schlieffen's plan crumbled in 1914. However, General Grener and other military commanders blamed the younger Moltke for the failures of the German army and claimed that von Schlieffen's ideas could have been implemented and that the war could have been won.

The Blitzkrieg idea was then taken up by the fascist military theoreticians. In particular, they used the projections of the Austrian General Eimansberger, who proved the primary role of tanks in future battles. The Hitlerite General Guderian became a zealous supporter of these views. At the same time, the Blitzkrieg theory contained the idea of the effective use of aviation in support of tanks and for dealing concentrated strikes on the enemy. The use of forces against the civilian population, which was openly advocated by Ludendorff, was also part of the strategic Blitzkrieg plans.

Naturally, the wide use of tanks and aviation made combat operations faster and more flexible. However, in concocting their plans for Blitzkrieg, aimed above all against the USSR, the Hitlerite command ignored the increased importance of the moral factor in modern war. It neither took nor could take into consideration the advantages of socialism as a social system in the political, economic, spiritual and defense areas. In preparing their aggression against the first socialist country, the German generals did not take into consideration the fact that in such a war they would have to face the heroic resistance not only of the Red Army but of the entire people and the moral and political unity of a society headed by the Communist Party.

The victories in Western Europe turned the heads of the fascist politicians and military leaders. They boastfully publicized the Blitzkrieg theory, the invincibility of their army and its impeccable martial skill. Actually, the Hitlerite military successes did not prove in the least the accuracy of the Blitzkrieg theory, which was faulty in its very essence. The defeats of Poland and France were the result of the disgusting betrayal of the national interests by the reactionary bourgeois governments of these countries and their anti-Soviet policies, which led them to reject the adoption of collective security measures against the threat of fascism. The French imperialist ruling circles believed that Hitler in Paris was better than a victory for the Popular Front. Similar convictions were shared by the government of bourgeois Poland.

The fascist plan for Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union was not formulated in haste. The drafting of the plan began in the summer of 1940. On 18 December, Hitler signed Directive No 21 of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, code named "Operation Barbarossa," the objective of which was to defeat the land of the Soviets by means of a quick campaign even before the end of the war against Great Britain. Following the defeat of the Red Army, the objective of the fascist leadership was to destroy the Soviet state, physically annihilate most of its population and turn the living into slaves of German colonists who were to settle in the Baltic area, the Ukraine and the European part of the RSFSR. This cannibalistic plan was adventuristic and faulty in its very essence, for the Hitlerite strategists were building their assessments on the overestimation of their own forces, their one-sided interpretation of the experience acquired in the war in Europe, and the prejudice that the Soviet state was a "colossus with feet of clay." In the very first months of the war the development of military operations in the east proved the groundlessness of such ideas. Halder, chief of the general staff of the ground forces, was forced to acknowledge this in August 1941. The entry in his diary reads: "The general situation indicates with increasing clarity and obviousness that we underestimated...the Russian colossus.... This applies to all economic and organizational aspects, communications and, particularly, the purely military capabilities of the Russians."

Such admissions were later forgotten or deliberately ignored because of the new adventuristic plans formulated by imperialist circles. The cold war mounted against the USSR and the entire socialist comity encouraged the bankrupt Hitlerite strategists to resurrect their former plans and illusions. The events of the initial period of the past war are explained and interpreted in Guderian's account "Memoirs of a Soldier," Mannstein's "Lost Victories," and many others, in such a way as to lead the reader to the conclusion that the Blitzkrieg plan is realistic and can be implemented. After the creation of NATO, increasingly energetic efforts were made to prove that fascist Germany could have implemented this plan had errors not been made in the course of the war.

The trump card of false fascist propaganda has been played as well. In ordering his troops to advance on the USSR without a declaration of war, Hitler howled to the entire world about a fictitious "Soviet threat," claiming Nazi Germany had allegedly seen through the treachery of the Soviets, who were about to attack it, had fore-stalled the "aggressor" and was forced to wage preventive war. Today, the U.S. and NATO propaganda services are still brandishing the rather battered bogey of the "Soviet military threat," in an effort to justify their accelerated arms race. The widely advertised pamphlet "The Soviet Military Power," recently published by the Pentagon, presents not only a subjective but a deliberately false description of the ratio of armaments and armed forces between the USSR and the United States. While advertising the military potential of the USSR, the authors do not mention a single word

or quote a single figure on the tremendous armaments of the United States, on the real American military threat. It is behind such a smokescreen that the American hawks are trying to justify their demand for achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union. The mass production of the neutron bomb and of toxic chemicals is being developed. The plan for the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles is being speeded up. The Pentagon is hastily training so-called "rapid deployment forces," which will be used as police forces abroad.

However, the lessons of history must not be forgotten. The nations know what a world war is. The enemies of detente are opposed by the military and economic power and political prestige of the USSR and the other members of the socialist comity, the international communist and workers movements, the peace-loving aspirations of the developing countries and the decisive struggle for peace waged by the peoples throughout the world.

The military-strategic balance which has developed between the USSR and the United States and between the members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO objectively serves the preservation of peace on earth. "We have not aspired and are not aspiring to military superiority over the other side," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th party congress. "This is not our policy. However, neither will we allow such a superiority over us to be established. Such attempts and even talks with us from a position of strength are absolutely futile!" Leonid Il'ich emphasized the same thought in his answers to the questions asked by the editors of DER SPIEGEL, the West German journal. "...It would be better to abandon the dreams of achieving military superiority over the USSR," he pointed out. "If necessary, the Soviet people will find the possibility of making any additional effort, doing everything necessary to ensure the reliable defense of their country."

The armed forces of the USSR are the basis of the military power of the joint armed forces of the socialist states. They are always ready to defend the gains of socialism. The CPSU and the Soviet government are tirelessly concerned with improving weaponry and combat materiel and upgrading the combat readiness and spirit of the army and navy. This is a forced response to the intrigues of contemporary reactionary forces. To this end, our armed forces must be always ready to carry out the assignments set by the 26th CPSU Congress on the further strengthening of the defense power of the USSR.

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CSO: 1802/5

NEW DOCUMENTS OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 pp 82-98

[Documents published on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the German-fascist forces at Moscow]

[Text] The Soviet people are solemnly celebrating the 40th anniversary of the defeat of the Hitlerite hordes at Moscow, which took place at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942. This victory played an outstanding role in the struggle for the freedom, honor and independence of our socialist homeland.

Fascist Germany's military command ascribed decisive political and military-strategic significance to the plans for the capture of Moscow, relating them to the outcome of the aggressive war it had treacherously launched against the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Subsequent to the failure of the plan to capture the capital of the land of the soviets without a pause in the course of the initial weeks of the war, Hitler's generals prepared a major offensive operation code-named Typhoon. The plan called for splitting the Soviet defense with three powerful blows struck by tank groups in an easterly and northeasterly direction and surrounding and destroying the forces of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts, after which Moscow was to be outflanked from the north and the south using strong mobile forces, and the city captured by mounting a simultaneous frontal infantry attack.

The fascist Group of Armies Center advancing on Moscow comprised some 1.8 million men, 1700 tanks, more than 14,000 guns and mortars and 1390 airplanes. The enemy's superiority over the Soviet forces deployed in the same areas ran to a factor of 1.4 in men, 1.8 in guns and mortars, 1.7 in tanks, and 2 in aircraft.

The Hitlerite forces launched their offensive on 30 September, toward Bryansk, and on 2 October, toward Vyaz'ma. They encountered heroic resistance from the Soviet troops. Nevertheless, the enemy was able to breach the defenses and to reach the Vyaz'ma area by 7 October.

From the middle of October to the beginning of November 1941, the Soviet forces resisted stubbornly in fierce battles along the Mozhaysk defensive positions, and they stopped the superior enemy forces along the line of the Lama, Ruza and Nara rivers.

The enemy's attempts to develop the offensive after capturing Kalinin and in the Tula direction were defeated in the course of heavy defensive battles.

The enemy suffered heavy casualties and was forced to halt the offensive. After bringing up reinforcements and regrouping, it was decided to capture Moscow before the advent of the winter at all costs. The enemy still retained superiority, by a factor of 2 in manpower, 2.5 in artillery and 1.5 in tanks and even more, in some directions (Volokolamsk, Tula).

The German fascist forces resumed their offensive against Moscow on 15-18 November 1941. At the end of November and the beginning of December, they succeeded in reaching the Moscow Canal, in the Yakhroma area, crossing the Nara River to the north and south of Naro-Fominsk and approaching Kashira from the south. However, the enemy could advance no further. As a result of stubborn fighting and counterstrikes by the Soviet forces, he was exhausted and had suffered tremendous losses in manpower and materiel. The spirit of the German-fascist army was broken and conditions developed enabling the Soviet forces to mount a counteroffensive and to defeat the enemy at Moscow.

In preparing the counteroffensive, the Supreme Command Headquarters called for the simultaneous defeat of the shock formations of the Group of Armies Center, which were threatening Moscow from the north and the south. The Western Front was to carry out the main task in the counteroffensive. The forces of the Kalinin and Southwestern Fronts were to advance from the north and the south. Headquarters assigned an important role in the implementation of this concept forces advancing in the Tikhvin and Rostov directions.

In the course of the preparations for the counteroffensive at the beginning of November 1941, the High Command decided to raise 10 reserve armies. Measures were also taken to strengthen the fronts with large army groups and reinforcements. During the second half of November, the reserve armies, the raising of which was one of the basic and daily concerns of the party's Central Committee, the State Defense Committee and Supreme Command Headquarters, began to move into the area of forthcoming operations. On 1 December, the First Shock Army, commanded by General V. I. Kuznetsov, and the 10th Army, commanded by General F. I. Golikov, which played an important role in subsequent offensive combats, were transferred from the reserve of the High Command Headquarters to the Western Front.

The Soviet troops mounted their decisive counteroffensive on 5-6 December 1941, at a time when the enemy's offensive capabilities had been exhausted. The fronts' powerful coordinated strikes dealt the German forces their first major defeat since the beginning of World War II. The mortal danger hanging over the capital of our homeland was removed.

Developing its success, the Red Army launched a general offensive on all the fronts in January 1942, by decision of Supreme Command Headquarters. During the combats, Moscow, Kalininskaya, Tul'skaya and Ryazanskaya Oblasts and parts of other oblasts occupied by the enemy were totally liberated.

The victory of the Red Army at Moscow marked the beginning of the military-strategic and moral-political turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole. The entire world saw that a force capable of crushing Hitlerism existed.

The great victory at Moscow was won thanks to the leading role of the communist party, which did tremendous work to develop war production and to strengthen the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and which inspired the troops to mass heroism.

The documents which follow are pages from the heroic history of the defense and counteroffensive by the Red Army at Moscow. The documents are stored at the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives. They were prepared for publication by Major General N. I. Lutsev, the archives' chief, and by Senior Scientific Associate P. Ya. Dobrovolskiy. All documents except Nos 2, 9 and 11 are being published for the first time.

Abbreviations

ap -- artillery regiment
ARGK -- artillery of the High Command reserve
vdbr -- airborne assault brigade
VPU -- auxiliary control post
gap -- howitzer artillery regiment
gsd -- guards infantry division
gmp -- guards multi-rail rocket launcher
ZF -- Western Front
kd -- cavalry division
kk -- cavalry corps
KP -- command post
KF -- Kalinin Front
MVO -- Moscow Military District
msbr -- motorized infantry division
OrVO -- Orel Military District
pap -- gun artillery regiment
pd -- infantry division
PTO -- antitank defense
sd -- infantry division
sp -- infantry regiment
YuZF -- Southwestern Front

Document No 1

From the Directive of the Supreme Command in Chief on Raising the 10th Reserve Army

To: Lieutenant General Golikov
Commander of the Forces of the Moscow Military District
Commander of the Forces of the Privolzhskiy Military District
Chief of the Main Formation Administration
Chief of Rear Forces of the KA [Red Army]
Chief of the Political Administration of the KA

21 October 1941
2400 hours

Supreme Command Headquarters Order:

1. A 10th Reserve Army, directly under the command of Supreme Command Headquarters, will be raised.

2. The 10th Reserve Army will consist of five infantry divisions from the MVO, as follows:

- 326th and 328th sd reassigned to Penza;
- 324th sd reassigned to Inza;
- 322nd sd reassigned to Kuznetsk;
- 330th sd reassigned to Syzran' and two infantry divisions from the OrVO;
- 325th sd reassigned to Serdobsk and
- 323rd sd reassigned to Petrovsk.

3. The army will be commanded by Lieutenant General Golikov, F. I.; Major General Dronov will be the army's chief of staff.

4. The army's administration and service units must be organized and assigned to the chief of the Main Formations Administration by 26 October.....

Supreme Command Headquarters

Stalin
Vasilevskiy

Copy

TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defence Central Archives], f. [archive] 3, op. [list] 15,556, d. [file] 3, ll. [sheets] 161-162

Document No 2

Order of the Commanding Officer of the Forces of the Western Front on Increased Defense Combat Readiness¹

39 October 1941

1. After suffering heavy casualties in men and materiel, the enemy has been bringing up tanks, artillery and motorized units during the past 3 days with a view to mounting a new and decisive offensive. Such an offensive can be expected imminently -- between 31 October and 2 November.

2. The task of the units of the Western Front is the following: on 31 October and 1 November, to prepare for an annihilating encounter with the enemy and, in the course of the first defensive battle, to inflict on the enemy the type of defeat which will totally wreck his intentions and create subsequent conditions permitting a counterstrike by our forces.

3. I order the immediate implementation of the following measures:

a. The creation of obstacles. All highways adjacent to our defensive positions and highways which the enemy can use to maneuver must be destroyed to a depth of 100 km. The destruction must be continuous. All bridges must be destroyed². All possible tank approaches must be mined with antitank mines and bottles of KS².

Barbed-wire obstacles, obstructions, barricades and antipersonnel mine fields must be erected and interdiction barrages must be organized in all the possible directions of infantry attack. Barricades must be built in all settlements, using all available materials on hand, including residential houses.

Traps must be set in all possible directions and the greatest possible number of hedgehogs must be set up. More surprises must be planned and, if possible, areas flooding.

Particular attention must be paid to the establishment of antitank areas. The following antitank areas must be mandatorily created: Teryayeva Sloboda, Novo-Petrovskoye, Istra, Anufriyevo, Lokotnya, Mikhaylovskoye, Zvenigorod, Dorokhovo, Kubinka, Akulovo, Rayon Maurino, Rayon Tashirovo, Petrovskoye, Naro-Fominsk, Kamenka, Kresty, Stremilovo, Lopasnya, Serpukhov, Drakino, Visokinicheskoye direction, Shatovo and Kalugino.

The antitank areas must be supplied with every facility for PTO, antiartillery, antiaircraft and anti-infantry defense, antitank rifles, PTO grenades and artillery of all calibers, including pieces captured from the enemy.

b. For the protection of the personnel from artillery and mortar fire, all defensive installations must be placed deep in the ground. Large shelters and various dugouts, slit trenches and evacuation trenches must be prepared. Battle formations must be echeloned in depth. Regimental commanders and superior officers must have reserves, which must be positioned well in the rear and scattered.

c. Failure-proof command lines must be established and all wires in the tactical zone must be underground. A portion of the delegate service must be mounted.

d. Interaction with the air force, tanks and artillery must be thoroughly planned. Representatives of such branches must be present in unit commanders' KP.

e. Meeting points for regiments, divisions and armies must be worked out particularly carefully.

Forces and facilities for securing reliable meeting points must be procured for each meeting point.

f. Tanks must be deployed in depth behind the infantry in ambush positions in order to fire on the enemy from stationary positions.

g. The chief of staff will assign artillery, engineer and operative personnel to all units to check on the implementation of this order. The Military Council must be informed of the status of the staff.

h. In accordance with this order, the military councils of the armies must issue immediately the necessary instructions and organize the supervision of its execution.

The plan for implementation and control must be reported to the Military Council by 0900 hours on 31 October.

Zhukov Bulganin Sokolovskiy

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,511, d. 1,029, ll. 249-253

Document No 3

Petition of the Military Council of the Western Front on Naming the Eighth Guards Infantry Division Division imeni General-Mayor Panfilov I. V.

To Comrade Stalin, J. V.

21 November 1941

By order of Supreme Command Headquarters of the Red Army, the 316th Infantry Division of the 16th Army was renamed the Eighth Guards Infantry Division in recognition of model operations on the front in the struggle against German fascism.

Major General Comrade Panfilov Ivan Vasil'yevich, who commanded the division from its formation and to the time it was made a guards division, was its organizer. Comrade Panfilov himself is the brearer of three orders. His last award was the Order of the Red Banner, which was presented to him by the Military Council of the Western Front for excellent performance of his combat assignment. Major General Panfilov, I. V., died heroically on the battlefield on 17 November last.

The Military Council of the Western Front and the Military Council of the 16th Army request of the government of the USSR that the Eighth Guards Infantry Division be named after Major General Panfilov, I. V.

Zhukov Bulganin

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,524, d. 15, l. 20

Document No 4

From the Political Report of the Western Front Political Administration on Party-Political Work Among the Troops

To: Chief of the Main Political Administration of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]

23 November 1941

....The agitators are doing extensive work on the education of the personnel. The units of the 43rd Army alone have 1,500 agitators, who are in direct contact with the people in the front lines and work with them daily. The agitators inform the personnel of orders and the situation at the fronts and popularize heroes of the Patriotic War....

Agitation and propaganda work became particularly extensive following the publication of Comrade Stalin's October addresses. Instructions were given to the

agitators immediately after the newspapers carrying Comrade Stalin's report to the ceremonial session of the Moscow City Soviet were received by the units. The agitators immediately went to work in the trenches, organizing collective and individual readings.

The best agitators, who have gained a reputation among troops and commanders of the 202nd vobr, are Captain Comrade Matveyev, Junior Lieutenant Comrade Kashchenko and Lieutenant Comrade Cherenkov. Lieutenant Comrade Kornetskiy, Lieutenant Comrade Golovin and Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Comrade Piskarev are the best at the 26th tbr. Fighter Platoon Sergeant Comrade Selov'yev is the best at the 19th sd. All of these agitators correctly understood the order of Comrade Stalin, people's commissar of defense, and are closely relating their propaganda to the life and combat efforts of the subunits and units. Readings and talks, mainly on a one-to-one basis, directly at the frontline positions, are their main work methods.

Red Armyman agitator Comrade Pavlov of the 51st sp holds talks and newspaper readings daily, in the intermissions between battles. After receiving a newspaper or pamphlet, Comrade Pavlov reads it and then crawls from foxhole to foxhole and informs the soldiers of its contents.

Second Battery 64th gap agitator Red Armyman Comrade Panfilov regularly organizes talks and newspaper readings in connection with the regiment's combat activities and popularizes the names of the best troops and the commanders who have distinguished themselves in combat. Comrade Panfilov presents the material simply and clearly and deservedly enjoys a good reputation among Red Armymen, who await his arrival impatiently in order to obtain information on the situation at the fronts and other matters.

The agitators are not only spreading the bolshevik word among the masses and popularizing the best and most courageous people, but are themselves setting an example in obeying military orders and displaying courage and heroism. Agitators are frequently the initiators of combat competition.

The work of the agitators at the 49th sp, 50th sd is noteworthy. Red Armymen Comrades Nazarov and Krasnenko and Sergeant Comrade Boltunov, agitators at the 49th sp, do extensive explanatory work. They base their talks on newspaper and pamphlet materials, relating them to the combat efforts of the subunits and the heroic struggle which the troops and commanders are waging against the German occupation forces. They always lead in combat, setting examples of courage and heroism guiding the Red Army masses....

The 49th sp agitators are organizing daily talks and newspaper readings. They remind the soldiers of their military oath, the laws of the government, the need to care for their weapons and materiel, etc. They extensively popularize the best combat experience and organize combat competition on that basis. In the course of one battle, Red Armyman Comrade Babin destroyed 18 Hitlerite submachine gunners with accurate rifle fire. The entire personnel of the regiment was informed of this action. The slogan heard in the companies was "Let us shoot like Red Armyman Comrade Babin!" During another fight, machine gunner Comrade Prodoyko killed 80 soldiers and officers with his machine-gun fire. The agitators immediately spread the news throughout the regiment and called upon the Red Armymen to destroy fascists in the manner of machine gunner Comrade Prodoyko.

The agitators are educating the people by means of examples of firmness and heroism. There are many such examples to be cited in the front units. By carrying the bolshevik word to the masses, the agitators are greatly helping commanders and political workers in the implementation of battle orders.

Brigade Commissar Makarov, chief of the Western Front Political Administration

Copy

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,526, d. 26, 11. 1-6

Document No 5

Petition of the Military Council of the Western Front on Awarding the Title of Guards⁵ to the 50th and 53rd Cavalry Divisions and Awarding Them the Order of the Red Banner

To Comrade Stalin, J. V.

25 November 1941

During a long period of military operations on the Western Front, the 50th and 53rd Cavalry Divisions within the group commanded by Major General Dovator displayed great and unflagging military valor. They repeatedly repelled attacks mounted by superior enemy forces and, with their own counteroffensive, they inflicted a severe defeat on the enemy and captured prisoners and booty.

The strikes whereby the forces reached the enemy's rear lines were particularly bold in the areas of Smolensk and Vyaz'ma and the outer reaches of Moscow, at Skirmanovo.

The divisions of Don Cossacks proved that the dashing combat traditions of the Don and the name "Cossack" continue to terrify the enemies of the homeland.

The front's military council requests that they be awarded the title of Guards Division and the Order of the Red Banner for the daring, courage and heroism shown by all personnel of the 50th and 53rd kd in the battle against German fascism.

Major General Pliyev, I. A., commanding officer 50th kd

Brigade Commissar Mel'nikov, K. S., commanding officer 53rd kd

Zhukov Bulganin

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,524, d. 15, 1. 28

Document No 6

Letter from the Commanding Officer of the Western Front on the Plan for the Front's Counteroffensive⁶

To: Lieutenant General Comrade Vasilevskiy, deputy chief of General Staff

30 November 1941

Request that the plan for a counteroffensive by the Western Front be urgently submitted to Comrade Stalin, people's commissar of defense, and that a directive be issued for undertaking the operation, as otherwise preparations may be delayed.

Zhukov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 28, op. 11,627, d. 988a, l. 1

Document No 7

Combat Order of the Kalinin Front Command for an Offensive Operation Aimed at the Defeat of the Klin Enemy Group in Cooperation with the Forces of the Western Front

2 December 1941

1. The enemy, holding defense positions along the line of the Bol. Kosha, Nashiga, Rachayna, T'ma and Volga Rivers, is continuing attempts to pierce through to Moscow from the Solnechnogorsk and Istra directions.

Units of the 162nd and 86th pd are holding defensive positions deployed along an extensive perimeter on the southern bank of the Volga, in the Kalinin-Moskovskoye More sector.

2. While the forces of the Kalinin Front will maintain their active defense in the Selizharovo and Torzhok directions, on 4 December 1941 the front's left wing will advance toward Star. Pogost and Mikulino-Gorodishche, will penetrate to the rear of the enemy forces in Klin, and will destroy them, together with the right wing of the Western Front.

3. To the left of 30 A, the defense will be continued along the Sudimirka, Sverdlovo, Bortnikovo, Orlovo and Petrakovo line.

Turnikovo-Sudimirka-Kalyazin is the demarcation line (all of it is part of the KF).

4. 22 A -- (249th, 279th, 186th, 178th and 220th sd) will defend the Seliger Lake-Bol. Kosha River-Nashita River line and will prevent an enemy breakthrough toward Kuvshino and Torzhok.

Berezki-Sukromlya-Kunganovo will be the demarcation line on the left.

5. 29 A -- (183rd, 174th, 246th, 252nd and 243rd sd), while continuing stubborn defense in the Torzhok and Medyn' directions, will advance with the 246th, 252nd and 243rd divisions on the morning of 4 December 1941 and, interacting with 31 A, will advance toward Danilovskoye, take Kalinin and continue to advance toward Turayevo.

Left demarcation line: Kesova Gora-Rameshki-Kalinin (excluded)-Mikulino-Gorodishche.

6. On 4 December 1941 at 1300 hours, 31 A will advance along the (excluded) Kalinin-Lisitsa line, concentrating its main strike in the direction of Star. Pogost. Toward the end of the day, after the elimination of the enemy, it will reach the Negotino-Star. Pogost-Kozlovo line. Continuing its energetic advance, it will, by the end of 7 December 1941, reach the Shosha River, so that the army can reach the rear of the Klin enemy group and, in cooperation with the forces of the Western Front, surround and eliminate the Klin enemy group.

During the night of 3-4 December 1941, advance elements must capture the areas of Bo. Peremerki, Gorokhovo and Star. Semenovskoye and secure crossings of the Volga.

7. The Air Force:

a. Will cover the 31 A concentration and group in the Kushalino area, North of Kalinin and Lisitsa;

b. Will assist the ground forces in the destruction of the enemy's manpower, artillery and reserves through systematic strikes at the enemy's combat order along the direction of the main strike;

c. Will prevent enemy counterattacks toward Kalinin and Redkino;

d. Will prevent reserves from being brought up on the Staritsa Highway.

8. My reserve will be the 54th kd and a separate motorized brigade ready to exploit the success of 31 A toward Pushkino.

9. The location of my KP remains unchanged.

10. Acknowledge receipt.

Colonel General Konev, commanding
officer of the Kalinin Front

Corps Commissar Leonov, member of
the Kalinin Front Military Council

Colonel Katsnel'son, deputy
commanding officer, front staff

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 213, op. 2,002, d. 5, ll. 132-134

Document No 8

Directive from the Commanding Officer of the Western Front on Strike at the Enemy

To: Commander of the 30th Army⁸

3 December 1941

Practical experience has confirmed that strikes along a broad front are unsuccessful. We are unable to provide a large number of tanks. For this reason, you must:

1. Strike, as with a dagger, along a limited front.
2. Fully equip the shock group with PTO on all sides.
3. In order not to scatter your forces, limit yourself to active defense in the remaining sectors.
4. Petrov's group will provide air support. Petrov is with Kuznetsov's staff. Assign air liaison personnel to the units in accordance with my order.
5. Submit the offensive plan for approval no later than the morning of 4 December.

Zhukov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,513, d. 85a, ll. 573 and 575 back

Document No 9

Order of the Commanding Officer of the Western Front to the Commanding Officers of the 20th, 16th and 5th Armies on Converting to Offensive Operations

6 December 1941.

1. According to all available information, the enemy facing the Western Front concentration is played out and cannot continue the general offensive at the present time without additional preparations. Enemy activities during the past 2-3 days have been in the nature of active defense along the entire front. The enemy is engaged in a separate operation counteracting the offensive of elements of the First Army, which has crossed the canal, against the First Army only.
2. The enemy's infantry is severely exhausted and is fighting unsteadily. The experience in our counterstrike against the group which breached the lines of the 33rd Army indicates that at even the slightest outflanking movement and combined attack by our infantry and tanks, the enemy, abandoning everything will retreat in a state of terrible panic. During that very small operation, the enemy abandoned about 50 guns, more than 50 heavy machine guns, 47 tanks and a great deal of other equipment. (The enemy) particularly fears outflanking movements and tank attacks from the flanks and the rear.
3. According to all available information, the enemy has no reserves, having used them up entirely in the course of the 18 days of combat. His tank divisions are at 30 percent personnel strength at most and average 40-50 tanks each, including all models. He has very small amounts of shells and fuel. With a view to defeating the enemy's subsequent offensive against Moscow and defeating the exhausted enemy, I hereby order:
 1. Conversion from defense to decisive offense.
 2. The offensive must be based on a series of well-prepared and consecutive operations aimed at the destruction of the enemy and the consolidation of the positions captured.

All operations must be thoroughly planned and comprehensively supported with manpower, equipment, reconnaissance and control.

3. The assignment given the commanding officer of the 20th Army remains unchanged. All army units must begin operations as of the morning of 7 December. The reserves must be kept behind the center, close to the right flank. As of the morning of 7 December, the right-wing group of the 16th Army commanded by Rokossovskiy will interact with the 20th Army in a strike in the direction of Vereskovo and Zhilino, consolidating its positions and assisting the 20th Army in reaching the Rozhdestveno-Zhilino line. Kryukovo, in the center, must be entirely recaptured on 7 December. On the morning of 8 December, the offensive will begin with the left flank, with the immediate target of (reaching) the Kryukovo-Bokeyevo-Yerofeyevo-Istra line. The immediate target is to reach the Istra Reservoir-Istra River line.

Fifth Army Commander Govorov will continue the counteroffensive under way with the immediate target of eliminating the enemy and reaching the Kotarevo-Lukino-Ivashkovo-Rybushkino line. In the course of the offensive, particular attention must be paid to the organization of interaction with the commander of the 16th Army.

The Istra River will be the boundary on the left. Army Commander Rokossovskiy will be responsible for the unit which will ensure the 16th Army meeting point.

4. The air force will operate as requested by the army staffs.

The commanding officer of the air force will assign personnel to act as liaison and to observe air force activities to each division and brigade.

5. Army commanding officers must pay particular attention to combat support for their operations as follows:

1. Maintain carefully organized and continuous operating reconnaissance and observation on the battlefield.
2. Maintain steady antitank defense day and night, particularly along the flanks and to the rear of the troops.
3. Maintain proper organization of control of the units in the sections, companies, battalions, regiments and divisions.
4. Show continuing concern for the men and supply them with warm clothing, food and rest, raising their spirit and guaranteeing them ammunition.
5. Acknowledge receipt and submit plans for operations and steps by noon on 6 December 1941.

Zhukov Bulganin Sokolovskiy

Copy
TsAMO SSSR, f326, op. 5,057, d. 2, ll. 393, 394

Document No 10

Combat Order of the 16th Army Command for Offensive Action

9 December 1941

1. Unable to withstand the strike by our forces, the enemy will begin a hasty retreat, in some instances abandoning transport vehicles, equipment and armaments.
2. On the morning of 10 December 1941, the 16th Army will take the offensive in two strike groups, with a view to cutting off the withdrawal of the enemy and to capturing his transport vehicles, equipment and armaments and preventing him from restoring order and organizing his resistance along new lines.
3. The group headed by Major General of Tank Troops Comrade Remizov, consisting of the 145th tbr, 44th kd and 17th Separate Infantry Brigade will convert to offense on at 0700 hours on 10 December 1941 from the Kryukovo area, will strike in the direction of Mar'ino and Sokolovo, and will proceed farther to the north, preventing the enemy's withdrawal to the west and the northwest, destroying the retreating enemy forces and capturing transport, equipment and armaments.
4. After firmly securing the Goretovka area, Obshchestvennik Sovkhoz and Bakeyevo, the main forces of the 18th sd, 146th tbr and 49th Separate Brigade will at 0700 hours on 10 December 1941 launch their offensive with a view to capturing Yeremeyevo, Aleksino and Podporino and subsequently pursuing their strike toward Aduyevo, Dukha-Aleksino, Kurtasovo and Rakovo, and engaging in intensive reconnaissance toward Darna, Rychkovo, Yermolino and Maksimovka.
5. The group commanded by Major General Comrade Beloborodov, consisting of the 9th gsd, 17th tbr, 89th Separate Tank Battalion and 36th and 40th Separate Infantry Brigades, will start their offensive at 0700 hours on 10 December 1941, striking in the direction of Pavlovskoye, Sannikovo and Istra and further north. They will cut off enemy retreat toward the southwest and the west, destroying manpower and capturing transport, equipment and armaments.

Major General Remizov and Major General Beloborodov will include in their strike groups mobile units consisting of mounted troops, submachine gunners, tank units and motorized infantry of at least battalion strength, equipped with truck-mounted PTO. Such detachments shall be commanded by experienced and courageous officers capable of engaging in decisive actions behind enemy lines.

The motorized battalions will be transported by the vehicles of the 145th tbr, 17th tbr and 9th gsd.

6. In case the enemy retreats precipitately, one quarter of the strike force will be directed to engage in his pursuit, while the rest of the force will be used for parallel pursuit, led by the mobile detachments consisting of tank units and motorized infantry with PTO weapons. They must seize the river crossings and gorges along the path of the enemy's retreat.

I categorically forbid any frontal clashes with units covering the enemy retreat or frontal combat against fortified positions held by the enemy rearguard. In such

cases, a small covering force must be left behind while the main forces bypass them quickly and penetrate as deep as possible along the path of enemy retreat.

7. The 282nd Separate Infantry Regiment, 7th gsd, 354th sd, and 8th gsd, with one tbr, will continue to defend their positions and engage in active reconnaissance in front of their defense lines.

8. Report the beginning of the offensive, and subsequently submit hourly reports.

Lieutenant General Rokossovskiy,
commanding officer of the 16th Army

Division Commissar Lobachev, member
of the Army Military Council

Major General Malinin
army chief of staff

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 358, op. 5,916, d. 64, ll. 208-209

Document No 11

From the Sovinformbureau Summary of Operations

13 December 1941

....At the beginning of December the German Information Bureau wrote the following:

"The German command will consider Moscow its main objective even if Stalin tries to shift the focus of military operations elsewhere. It is stated in German circles that the German offensive against the bolshevik capital has moved so far ahead that one can see inside the city of Moscow with a good pair of binoculars."

It is beyond question today that this boastful plan for surrounding and occupying Moscow has crumbled. Here the Germans have suffered an obvious defeat.

The Germans blame the winter, which they say prevented them from implementing their plan for capturing Moscow. To begin with, however, there has not been any real winter in the Moscow area, for the temperature has not exceeded 3-5°. Secondly, complaints about the winter mean that the Germans did not effectively equip their army with warm clothing, although they had shouted to the entire world that they has long been ready for the winter campaign. They did not supply winter uniforms because they were hoping to end the war before the advent of the winter. As can be seen, the German hopes were not justified. They made a serious and dangerous mistake here. However, the error in the German plans cannot be explained at all by the winter conditions. It is not the winter that must be blamed but the organic defects in the work of the German command in the area of war planning.

PRAVDA, 13 December 1941.

Document No 12

Report by the Commanding Officer of the Western Front on Prisoner Testimony

To Comrade Stalin

14 December 1941

Prisoners of war from Guderian's group report that now, because of the cold, they are being allowed to wear the parade uniforms they had brought along for the victory parade in Moscow.

Zhukov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,524, d. 15. 1. 75

Document No 13

Answering Telegram From the Commanding Officer of the Western Front to Mongolian People's Republic Marshal Choybalsan

Ulan Bator

To Hero of the MPR Marshal Choybalsan

18 December 1941

Thank you for your congratulations on the occasion of the defeat of the Hitlerite army at Moscow. We shall strike at the Germans as, together with you, we struck at our joint enemy on the Khalkhin-Gol River.

I extend to you a warm handshake and my wish for prosperity for the Mongolian People's Republic to blossom and your good health.

Zhukov

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,524, d. 20, 1. 125

Document No 14

From the Political Report of the Kalinin Front Political Administration on Party-Political Work and the Political and Moral Status of the Personnel

To: Chief of the RKKA Main Political Administration

19 December 1941

....The Red Army units are being welcomed enthusiastically by the population of Kalinin and the villages which have been for more than 2 months under German occupiers' heel.

The Red Army's entry into Kalinin developed into a memorable celebration for the city's population. Men, women and children hurled themselves toward the troops and commanders and hugged and kissed them like close friends and relatives.

The population of Kalinin and the kolkhoz members who were liberated from the fascist beasts by the Red Army, are demanding that it pursue the occupation forces, without respite, to avenge them for all the atrocities and violence and to exterminate the enemy mercilessly.

The 2 months during which the fascist bandits threw their weight around have left their mark. Many beautiful buildings are in ruin. On the night of 16 December, the fascist bandits blew up a major railroad bridge across the Volga....

The political apparatus and the party and Komsomol organizations focused all their efforts on ensuring the success of the offensive and the liberation of Kalinin from the German occupation forces.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the entire political apparatus, from the regiment to the front political administration, subordinated everything to the resolution of the problems assigned by the command.

Extensive agitation and propaganda work, both printed and oral, was carried out. Oral agitation became particularly active after the political organs received your directive, of which all unit and subunit political workers were immediately informed. The political apparatus properly realized the great importance of this directive and is implementing it.

In all the mass political work done to give political support to the combat operations, the political workers and party and Komsomol organizations paid particularly great attention to informing the Red Army personnel of the successes achieved in defeating the enemy on the Southern and Northwestern Fronts, especially the failure of the fascist plans to surround and capture Moscow. The personnel welcomed these successes with the greatest enthusiasm, as a vivid confirmation of the growing power of the Red Army and the exhaustion of Hitlerite Germany's reserves.

Confidence in the complete and definitive defeat of the fascist aggressors by the Red Army has increased and strengthened further.

The following are typical statements made by troops and commanders, reflecting the views of all personnel.

At a meeting held on the occasion of the Soviet Informbureau announcement on the failure of the Hitlerite plans to surround and capture Moscow, Comrade Novikov, junior lieutenant with the 234th sp of the 179th sd, said: "It is difficult to express the joy we feel today. The enemy has suffered a major defeat in the approaches to Moscow. The fascists soon will feel the even more powerful strikes of the Red Army. Our task is to smash the enemy in our sector mercilessly. This will speed up the rout of the fascist bandits on all fronts."

The same thought was expressed by Comrade Dedyurin (nonparty member), Red Armyman with the 259th sp of the 179th sd: "At Moscow, our comrades performed miracles of

courage. We too must rout the enemy mercilessly. I call upon all soldiers to strike at the enemy more daringly and firmly, destroying him by every possible means."

Comrade Gal'tsev, gunner, gun No 1. First Battery (56th ap ARGK), said: "We fell back for 5 months, conserving our power, strength and organization, and adding to them combat experience every day. For the first time in history, not only did such a lengthy retreat fail to disrupt our army, but it even strengthened its discipline and political and moral status. Now we say "Enough! Clear out, much-vaunted Aryans, while we see to it that nothing remains of your predatory army."

The Red Army's successes inspire the personnel. They are pursuing an impetuous and advancing thrust and calling for daring and decisive operations along all sectors of the front. This was seen to an even greater extent during the offensive and the battles for Kalinin.

During the battles for Kalinin, the mood of the troops and commanders was militant, exhilarated and aggressive.

Going into battle, the soldiers said: "Kalinin must be ours! Let us expel the fascists from the city!"

The men fought with exceptional daring and courage in the battles for the liberation of Kalinin. I cited some of the many examples of heroism, courage and daring shown by the troops, commanders and political workers in the struggle against the Hitlerite bandits in my daily cables.

The steadily increasing number of requests to join the ranks of the VKP(b) confirm the high political-moral status of the personnel and the political upsurge.

In the heat of the fighting on 8 and 9 December, 43 petitions for VKP(b) and 18 for Komsomol membership were submitted to the party organizations of the 262nd sd.

Six petitions for VKP(b) and 11 for Komsomol membership were submitted at the 56th ap ARGK; four at the 928th sp, eight at the 277th ap, five at the 912th sp, eight at the 906th sp, 10 at the 275th sp, 29 at the 915th sp, 15 at the 914th ap, etc.

Brigade Commissar Drebednev, chief of the Kalinin Front Political Administration

Copy

TsAMO SSSR, f. 213, op. 2,016, d. 17, 11. 118-123

Document No 15

Western Front Command Directive to the Military Councils of Front Armies on Taking More Decisive Steps To Rout the Enemy

22 December 1941

1. The offensive mounted by the forces of the Western Front as of 6 December 1941 is playing a decisive role in the overall plan for defeat of the enemy.

Success in speedily defeating the enemy forces depends on the success of the operations of the Western Front armies. However, the practical experience gained in the last days of our offensive indicates that some unit commanders, failing to understand the significance of our offensive, are allowing passivity in their operations and a reduction in the pressure on the enemy.

Under the impression that there are difficulties in the organization of the rear elements, and a certain distension of the battle formation, and increased enemy resistance, some commanding officers have essentially brought their offensives to a standstill and are spending days marking time.

It must be seriously suggested to such commanders that passive activity by our troops will play into the hands of the enemy, enabling him to stop, dig in, organize his firing system, thus defeating our offensive plan and hindering the implementation of the general plan for defeat of the enemy.

2. Radio intercepts, prisoner interrogations and documents prove that the enemy is losing his combat capability. He has lost all his tanks -- his main trump card -- and planes and has suffered heavy casualties in men and armaments. He can hold out against our units only because they are not pressing hard. Furthermore, profiting from our carelessness and inconsistencies, the enemy is even mounting successful counterattacks.

I order the following:

1. It must be made clear to all command personnel that any delay in the offensive mounted by our forces or any indecision may have a fatal impact on our offensive and spare the enemy from defeat.
2. When there is enemy resistance along the entire front making it difficult to surmount his defense, artillery, "RS," and mortars are to be massed along a narrow section and a destructive fire must be launched. After this forceful preparation, the infantry must be daringly thrust against that narrow segment of the front, with the entire mass of tanks, and continuing artillery and air support.
3. Commanders who show indecision in routing the enemy must be regarded as incapable of leading their units forward and surmounting difficulties and removed.
4. Starting on 23 December, the army military councils will submit signed reports to the front military council on the results of the combat operations of the army forces, at 0900 and 2200 hours, on a daily basis.

The reports must detail both the positive and negative operations of the units.

General of the Army Zhukov,
Western Front commanding officer

Bulganin, member of the
Western Front Military Council

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 208, op. 2,513, d. 88, ll. 345-346

Document No 16

Information Submitted by the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People to the Chief of the Defense Construction Administration on Defense Installations Constructed¹⁰

To: Colonel General Comrade Artem'yev, Commander of the Moscow Defense Zone Forces

13 February 1942

The following is a report on the defense installations built on the Moscow line and inside the city limits.

Appendix: two sheets.

M. Yasnov, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet of Deputies of the Working People

Report on Defensive Installations Built on the Moscow Line and Inside City Limits

Type of Installation	Unit of Measurement	Defense Line	Inside City Limits	Total Built
Antitank ditches	meters	58,962	21,332	80,294
Escarpments	"	49,264	47,839	97,103
Block obstacles	"	37,252	30,557	67,809
Hedgehogs	pieces	11,144	19,172	30,316
Barbed-wire entanglements	meters	177,166	25,963	203,129
Permanent gun emplacements	pieces	131	13	144
Gun log emplacements	"	119	119	238
Ground artillery emplacements	"	32	-	32
Permanent machine-gun emplacements	"	95	-	95
Machine-gun log emplacements	"	54	246	300
Machine-gun fire emplacements with metal covers	"	67	-	67
Machine-gun fire emplacements with reinforced concrete covers	"	805	233	1,038
Mortar fire emplacements	"	55	-	55
Command and observation posts	"	115	-	115
Underground depots	"	32	-	32
Underground medical stations	"	4	-	4
Trenches and connecting trenches	meters	127,834	-	127,834
Artillery emplacements in houses	pieces	-	15	15
Machine-gun emplacements in houses	"	-	481	481
Barricades	meters	-	10,398	10,398
Total excavation	m ³	2,377,038	726,828	3,103,866

M. Yasnov, chief, Defense Construction Administration

Original

TsAMO SSSR, f. 450, op. 11,158, d. 93, ll. 36-38

FOOTNOTES

1. Document published in the book "Moskva-Frontu. 1941-1945 gg." [Moscow--The Front, 1941-1945]. Nauka, Moscow, 1966, pp 32-33.
2. Type of inflammable mixture indicated.
3. Type of liaison effected by representatives, officers as a rule.
4. By GKO decree, dated 23 November 1941, the Eighth Guards Division was named after Major General Panfilov, I. V.
5. By NKO order, dated 26 November 1941, the 50th Cavalry Division became the Third Guards Cavalry Division, and the 53rd became the Fourth Guards Cavalry Division. They were awarded the Order of the Red Banner by NKO order dated 28 June 1945.
6. The Western Front counteroffensive plan was sanctioned by Supreme Command Headquarters on 30 November 1941.
7. The 2 December 1941 combat order of the Kalinin Front Command was issued pursuant to the 1 December 1941 Supreme Command Headquarters directive (see "Moskva-Frontu," pp 82-83).
8. Major General D. D. Lelyushchenko was the commander of the 30th Army.
9. Document published in the book "Moskva-Frontu," pp 85-86.
10. On 12 October 1941, the State Defense Committee made the decision to construct defense engineering installations on the immediate approaches to Moscow -- the Moscow Defense Zone. By order of the commanding officer of the MVO dated 14 October 1941, the construction work related to the creation of a Moscow defense line was assigned to the Moscow City Soviet. Overall data on the building of defense installations by the working people of Moscow and Moscow Oblast can be found in the book "Vystoyali i Pobedili" [We Stood Our Ground and Won]. Moskovskiy Rabochiy, Moscow, 1966, p 296.

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IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS OF THE 12TH MSZMP CONGRESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 81 pp 99-110

[Article by Miklos Ovari, MSZMP Central Committee secretary and Politburo member]

[Text] In the spring of 1980, when the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party was being held, the situation in our country was characterized, on the one hand, by considerable successes in all areas of socialist construction and, on the other, by the appearance of new difficulties created by the worsening of international circumstances and the new problems which had to be resolved in order to surmount such difficulties.

The principal achievement during the decades which have passed since the liberation of the country from fascism is the firm establishment of the power of the working people. One quarter of a century has passed since the period of sharp class conflicts came to an end, and since then no antagonistic class contradictions have existed in Hungary. The socialist political system and the production relations inherent in it unite the toiling classes and strata in Hungarian society. This is the objective foundation on which rests the unity of the people, a unity which was born and strengthened under the sign of socialist ideas. Nothing similar has ever happened before in our country's history.

The great accomplishment in the political area is the fact that the 12th MSZMP Congress was the 6th consecutive high forum of Hungarian communists, which confirmed the steadiness of the party's general course which was formulated 25 years ago in the struggle against the counterrevolution.

One quarter of a century has passed since a counterrevolutionary mutiny broke out in the country, partially as a result of the "errors" committed in the course of the building of socialism and partially as a consequence of revisionist betrayal, which brought about a split within the party, and the attacks mounted by the internal enemies of the new system, supported by the forces of international imperialism. The fast and effective help of the Soviet Union made it possible at that time to avoid a protracted civil war or the conversion of Hungary into an arena of imperialist military intervention. At that time, a revolutionary center was created under Comrade Janos Kadar's leadership, which was able to rally and lead into battle the forces of socialism in Hungary and, after surmounting a profound social crisis, lead the country to rapid consolidation.

The most urgent task was the restoration of party unity and trust in it on the part of the masses and its reorganization. The essence of the implementation of this

tremendous task was the fact that our party once again began to be guided by the Leninist norms and principles in its activities. It firmly broke with dogmatic and revisionist views and with sectarian and opportunistic methods of leadership. It stood up against the wave of nationalistic passions raised by the anticommunists and simply and openly took up the defense of the Marxist-Leninist principles of socialism. We did not fear the fact that the party would be reduced numerically. On the contrary, we tried to purge its ranks of hesitating elements, careerists and even people who were honest and loyal to the cause of socialism but who, for one reason or another, had avoided the struggle against the counterrevolution. At the same time, it was proclaimed that party membership in itself would offer no advantages to anyone and that nonparty people could assume any other position other than, naturally, one in the party, if they had the necessary leadership qualifications.

The party's reorganization, the recreation of its unity on a principled basis, the systematic implementation of the principles of democratic centralism in party life, the sincerity and persuasiveness of the party's word, faith in the masses, return to the strict observance of socialist legality and the development of socialist democracy restored the trust of the masses in the party. This trust was expressed mainly in the fact that increasingly broader masses began to understand and to support the party's policy in word and action.

The general course which the MSZMP has been steadily following during the past 25 years has been one of creative application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and of the overall laws governing the building of socialism, a course of ensuring socialist objectives strict priority while comprehensively taking into consideration the national and historical characteristics of the country and the specific situation in which the building of socialism develops. Our people set a high value on such steady elements of party policy. Naturally, however, this consistency does not mean static immobility. Our party regularly put on the agenda and successfully resolved the arising problems of socialist construction. This included the reorganization of agriculture, steadfast improvement of the economic management system and the implementation of a number of reforms in all basic areas of social life.

The most important of our achievements is the country's increased economic potential. During the past quarter of a century national income in Hungary rose by a factor of 3.5; industrial production increased by a factor of more than 4.5, while agricultural output increased by 74 percent. The increased national income made it possible to ensure the steady enhancement of the living standard. Real population income and consumption almost tripled and approximately one half of the country's population moved into new premises.

Twenty-five years ago the enemies of socialism in Hungary were preparing to bury it. Ever since then they have claimed that the socialist system is not viable. The successes of our economic development prove that socialism has sunk profound roots into Hungarian soil and that the socialist production method is not only possible but yields high results. They are the product of the persistent work of the people and proof of the effectiveness of the organizational work done by the party and state organs in the economic area. Hungary's membership in the socialist comity is an inviolable prerequisite for our labor activeness. Economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is a reliable foundation for our constructive toil.

One of our achievements is the considerably increased socialist awareness of the people and their cultural standard. The ideas of scientific socialism and the

Marxist-Leninist outlook have become widespread in Hungarian society. Radical changes in the way of thinking were triggered as a result of the overthrow of the capitalist system, the elimination of the vestiges of feudalism, the establishment of the power of the working class and the laying of the foundations of a socialist society. This eliminated the economic base of centuries-old backwardness in life, customs and world outlook. Never before had our history seen such a rapid improvement in the level of education and political consciousness of the masses. Social progress enhanced individual interest in building socialism and the understanding that man can be happy only when he is part of society. The people's initiative and responsibility in thinking and action increased considerably.

The fact that the building of socialism and the affiliation with the socialist comity changed the international position of our country and led to the enhanced prestige of the Hungarian People's Republic also has a positive impact on social consciousness. The outlook of the people broadened. They can assess the world and the position which our country holds in it more realistically. In the past, the nationalism of the ruling classes had an adverse effect on the people's consciousness. This makes even more valuable the fact that socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism have become the guiding ideal of the people in our country.

Such are the most important historical gains on which we relied when we held the 12th MSZMP Congress, and from which we proceed today, when the implementation of the program for building a developed socialist society is taking place under the conditions of an aggravated international situation and increased economic difficulties.

In its assessment of the global situation, the 12th Congress pointed out that the members of the socialist comity had achieved significant successes in building a new society. Their internationalist unity and joint actions are a decisive factor in the struggle for peace and social progress, which is being waged on a global scale.

The national liberation and revolutionary democratic movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America play an important role in global politics. The nations and countries of these continents are achieving new successes in the struggle for the elimination of the vestiges of the colonial system and against neocolonialism.

Speaking of the factors which influence the shaping of the international situation, we must take into consideration the fact that the general crisis of capitalism has continued to worsen and that internal contradictions in the capitalist countries have become aggravated. The struggle waged among themselves for sources of energy, raw material and markets has intensified. As a result of economic decline, which has affected even the most developed capitalist countries, inflation and severe unemployment, the burden carried by the working people is increasing. Political tension and instability in global economic relations are increasing.

In recent years, the actions of imperialist circles interested in the arms race which are hindering social progress have brought about a worsening of the international situation. One of the reasons for the tension is the fact that these circles are trying to disturb the balance which has developed between the two global systems--the socialist and the capitalist. They do not conceal the fact that their objective is to attain military superiority. The tension is being aggravated by ever new programs for increasing rearmament--quantitative and qualitative--and the desire of the imperialists to expand further and to strengthen their military presence in various parts of the globe. All of this seriously threatens the cause of peace not only in Europe but throughout the world.

In the course of the implementation of the resolutions of the 12th MSZMP Congress, we must also take into consideration the simultaneous presence of elements of tension and detente in the international arena. Under these circumstances, our party ascribes particular importance to the preservation and consolidation of the results of detente. We deem it our prime task to strengthen our alliance, friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist comity, both in the Warsaw Pact organization and through bilateral relations. We support the Soviet proposals aimed at restraining the arms race and, together with our allies, are struggling for the implementation of the constructive initiatives of the Warsaw Pact members.

Despite the adverse change in world circumstances, we believe that the results of detente can be protected and that the unity of progressive and peace-loving forces and their active efforts can defeat the plans formulated by imperialist circles for a new round of the arms race and that the threat of a new world war can be avoided. Our faith is based on the fact that in recent years the ratio of forces has not changed in favor of imperialism and that the power of the forces of progress, democracy and peace is tremendous and is growing steadily.

The worsened conditions for economic construction in Hungary may be explained by essentially two interrelated reasons. The first is the exhaustion of the possibilities of extensive development and of the conversion to intensive economic management, which began in our country more than 10 years ago. This presents more difficult problems. The second reason is the rapid changes which are taking place in the global economic situation. The historically developed structure of the national economy and natural conditions in Hungary are such that foreign economic relations play a considerable role in its economy. Thus, our exports account for 50 percent of the national income, for which reason the Hungarian national economy reacts very sensitively to changes in the foreign markets and successes in economic construction greatly depend on our ability to adapt to the processes occurring in the global economy.

The change in foreign economic conditions exposed the weak spots of our economy and work shortcomings. The pace of conversion to intensive economic management and to increased effectiveness in production and modernization in the production structure and variety are lagging behind the requirements of the current circumstances, which are entirely possible given the current level of development of our national economy. The prime task of this five-year plan is to improve the balance of foreign trade and payments, to achieve better coordination between budget expenditures and revenues, manpower and jobs, investments and construction capacities and to preserve and improve the balance between the commodity stock and the purchasing power. That is the reason for which the Sixth Five-Year Plan, which was passed at the end of last year on the basis of the resolutions of the 12th MSZMP Congress, calls for slower growth rates. The main economic policy target for the next 5 years is to improve the balance in the national economy through the active utilization of qualitative factors of economic growth and the increased competitiveness of our goods on the foreign markets.

The successful solution of the problems of economic construction and the meeting of stricter requirements concerning quality and effectiveness demand the ever fuller identification and active utilization of reserves in all areas of social activity. The accelerated practical utilization of scientific achievements is of great importance. We must be concerned with the more effective utilization of production capacities. Substantial reserves are found in improving the level of labor and production organization. Our entire activity must be imbued with the aspiration to

strengthen the regimen of savings in the national economy. Unprofitable production must be made profitable or abandoned gradually. It is particularly important to increase the share of goods which do not require great outlays of raw materials and energy in their manufacture or which could replace imports. We must make more effective use of the most important source of our strength--manpower resources, professional skills and industriousness. An end must be put to adverse phenomena such as surplus manpower in one area and scarcity in another. That is why, along with the reorganization of the production structure, we must be concerned with the systematic regrouping of the manpower and the organized retraining and improved skills of the working people.

In accordance with our objectives in the field of economic policy, we must steadily improve the system of economic management, whose basic principles began to be developed following the suppression of the counterrevolutionary mutiny and which found their practical implementation in the 1968 economic reform. This system is based on the general laws governing the building of socialism. Its purpose is to ensure effective socialist planned economic management, based on the public ownership of productive capital, consistent with our country's features. Naturally, commodity-monetary and market relations must also be taken into consideration with a socialist economic management method. Our system equally includes elements of centralized management of basic economic processes and control over them and the increased autonomy of state enterprises and cooperatives and their material interest in reaching higher production indicators.

In order to make better use of existing reserves and satisfy population needs, particularly for services, we are supporting the private plots, which are closely related to the big agricultural enterprises, and the utilization of existing manpower reserves, including the labor of private citizens and their families, within the framework of flexibly organized forms. Some of the working people willingly engage in work which is useful both to the national economy and to the working people themselves in their leisure time. This is an additional source of our economic growth which contributes to the fuller satisfaction of rapidly changing needs and to the increase in the national wealth. As a rule, such auxiliary activities are closely related to the activities of the socialist enterprises and are controlled both legally and through a system of management and supervision consistent with the social interests.

During the congress and in the course of the implementation of its resolutions, we paid particular attention to international economic relations. Comprehensive cooperation with the socialist countries is of particular importance to our national economy. Approximately one third of Hungarian foreign trade is with the Soviet Union and one quarter is with the other socialist countries. We purchase from the Soviet Union most of the raw materials, energy, machines, equipment and modern technology we need. Many of our particularly important capital construction projects, including the first Hungarian nuclear power plant in Paks, are based on Soviet design and technology. Long-term accords with the fraternal countries are increasing the reliability of production markets and increased profitability.

It is precisely because international economic relations play a considerable role that the Hungarian People's Republic is greatly interested in the development of economic cooperation with the other socialist countries. This equally applies to interaction within CEMA and to bilateral relations. Our own interests--we are convinced that they are also the common interests of the socialist countries--require of such economic cooperation that it be even more planned and effective and that the pace of development of socialist economic integration become faster. That is why we are actively participating in CEMA activities, in finding new opportunities for cooperation and in the formulation and implementation of long-term target programs.

The developed capitalist countries play a considerable role in our international economic relations. We are developing such relations without making principled and political concessions, and on the basis of reciprocal advantages. Taking the political aspect of this matter into consideration, we proceed from the fact that economic relations are a very important element in normal relations among countries and that maintaining them serves the policy of peaceful coexistence and the preservation of the results of detente.

We are trying to expand our trade with the developing countries, which are playing an increasingly important role in global economics. The importance of economic relations between socialist countries, including Hungary, and these countries is great because in addition to reciprocal advantages they contribute to the strengthening of the economic independence of the countries liberated from colonial oppression, to the development of their production forces and to their successful struggle against the neocolonialist aspirations of the imperialist powers.

The possibilities and difficulties of our economic development in the Sixth Five-Year Plan prevent us from raising the living standard of the population at its former rate. Having realistically assessed the economic situation of our country, we set ourselves the task of stabilizing and consolidating our achievements in this area and creating conditions for the further enhancement of the people's well-being. Let us add to this that the living standard we have reached can be preserved only as a result of even more effective and intensive work.

The main objectives of the party's policy in raising the living standard remain the same: preserving the confidence of the people in the future by ensuring full employment and social benefits; wage differentiation based on labor results and further gradual elimination of unjustified disparities among family incomes; and proportional increase in the participation of various classes and strata in sharing social benefits.

The systematic implementation of the principle of income based on labor is of great importance from the viewpoint of economic development and shaping the living standard. While firmly opposing the superficially attractive theory and convenient practice of equalization, we must see to it that everywhere, among rank and file workers and managers, a revenue difference based on the way one works can be felt. Payment based on labor is a logical consequence of the basic socialist principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." The difference between socialism and capitalism is not that under socialism one can work less effectively, in a less well-organized manner and with less discipline. On the contrary, the power of the people and the public ownership of productive capital not only ensure the opportunity for but demand the planned management of the economy or, in other words, the most effective utilization of material and spiritual resources.

Our people have confidence in the future. They are aware of the country's economic situation and, since they want to maintain the level of prosperity they have reached, agree with the party's economic policy and support it. They are ready to lay through their toil the foundations for the reaching of our objectives. We also know, however, that our society includes large families, elderly people with small pensions and young families at the beginning of their lives who live in relatively difficult conditions. The congress' resolutions and practical policy pay particular attention to improving the situation of such population strata.

The MSZMP Central Committee and the state organs are applying great effort to preserve our achievements. On the basis of our economic potential we are striving to improve the living conditions of the people without changing the level of real income. Next year, we shall convert to a 5-day work week without lowering wages. We are continuing with the implementation of the second 15-year housing construction program. Along with the building of new housing units, increased attention is being paid to the preservation and renovation of existing housing facilities. The system of housing allocations is being changed and we are taking more into consideration the level of family well-being. We consider the modernizing of trade and service enterprises and improved supply and service standards to be important tasks. Health care and children's institutions and schools are being developed.

The fact that our economic objectives have become more modest does not mean that we are slowing down the pace of our development in other areas of social life. The further strengthening of the socialist features of our society is an inviolable prerequisite for the solution of economic problems as well. For this reason the party pays great attention to political factors.

The situation in the party was frankly discussed, negative phenomena in social life were criticized and future tasks were clearly formulated at the congress. This created a good political response and strengthened the faith of the masses in the party's policy. The organized study and implementation of the resolutions were undertaken after the congress. Elections for the Hungarian National Assembly and for local organs took place in a healthy political atmosphere, under the influence of the main political objectives formulated by the MSZMP. After the elections, the government drafted its program, which was approved by the National Assembly, as was the 1981-1985 plan for the development of the country's national economy. Thus our people were not only informed of the difficulties but realized that the party's policy was a real solution to the situation and that we have programs for the economy and other areas of social life. Let us add to all this that we not only have programs but are doing successful work for their implementation.

The Hungarian trade union congress was an important event in domestic political life. It was held during a period in which requirements facing all areas of our work have become stricter while possibilities for satisfying needs have become more modest. Because of the events in Poland, the congress' work created greater international interest. The results of the congress proved the political maturity of our working class, its realism, unity and support of MSZMP policy. The congress properly reflected the viability of the Hungarian trade union movement and the fact that it can successfully fulfill its double task of supporting the power of the working people and defending the interests of its members. The accuracy of the party's policy toward the trade unions, the principles of which were formulated following the defeat of the counterrevolutionary mutiny, was confirmed. These principles are based on the fact that the trade unions cannot be independent of the working class or its party and also that they have great autonomy and responsibility. The party guidance of trade union activities is achieved through the party members working in trade unions.

The congress of the Patriotic People's Front, which was held at the start of 1981, was a vivid manifestation of the social activeness of the broad population masses in the country. It proved the further consolidation of national unity under the sign of the socialist objectives and the fact that the patriotic front movement rallies within its ranks all patriotic, progress and creative forces. The preparatory work

and the holding of the congress itself confirmed the correctness of the party's policy of alliance. They properly reflected the firm resolve of the various social strata in our society and of people with different outlooks to preserve, protect and increase our country's historical gains.

The congress of the Hungarian Communist Youth Union--the party's youth organization, which was held in the first half of 1981, also proved that the moral and political condition of the Hungarian youth is on the proper level. The overwhelming majority of the members of the young generation are either studying, working or honorably fulfilling their patriotic duty through their army service. Socialism offers broad opportunities for the application of the energy of young men and women and for the manifestation of their initiative and feeling for the new. We also realize, however, that for understandable reasons young people still lack adequate political experience. Therefore, their education in a spirit of loyalty to socialism is not only a matter for the Komsomol but for the entire society. Our young people must be familiar with the historical path of our party and the basic lessons learned from its struggle.

The current domestic political situation in Hungary cannot be reduced merely to the enumeration of various measures. The political aspect of the country is defined above all through the daily work of the people and their reaction to events. The implementation of the decisions of the 12th MSZMP Congress is assuming increasingly specific features in an increasing number of workplaces. The experience acquired over the past 18 months has been positive. The achievements in the economic and other areas of social life have been the result of the efforts of the entire people, the labor competition in honor of the party congress and the 35th anniversary of the country's liberation and in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. They have been the result of communist subbotniks, the work of economic managers and the activities of party and social organizations. In a word, they have been the result of increasing unity among all forces in our society.

Bearing all this in mind, we can say that the basic stipulations and conclusions of the 12th MSZMP Congress regarding the country's domestic situation remain topical: the domestic political situation in the Hungarian People's Republic is stable. The power of the working class is firm, the party is implementing its leading role in the life of our society and relations between the party and the masses are distinguished by mutual trust.

However, we must also take into consideration that tension may develop despite the successful implementation of economic policy. The country's public opinion accepted with understanding the inevitable increase in prices. However, we have still not been able to explain with sufficient clarity the fact that price setting does not depend on our subjective intentions and that these problems are resolved in the production area. Everyone agrees with the principle of distribution according to labor. However, its practical implementation is not proceeding smoothly everywhere.

Increased economic effectiveness also demands a regrouping of manpower. We are trying to resolve these problems in a humane way. However, we have still not been able to convince everyone of the fact that such regrouping is consistent with the interests not only of the national economy but of the working people themselves, since everyone is interested in engaging in activities most useful to society.

Some phenomena of domestic political life could be avoided if we were to work more effectively. Whereas our people understand objective difficulties, they cannot agree--and rightly so--with the fact that here and there there is lack of organization,

obvious lack of discipline, negligence, waste of public property and bureaucratic obstruction of the solution of vital problems. The implementation of our congress' resolutions and the need to maintain a good political atmosphere call for comprehensive and systematic struggle against such phenomena and, as Comrade Janos Kadar stressed at the congress of the Patriotic People's Front, our people have the right to demand the triumph of justice not only in the solution of major problems affecting the entire society but in all areas and matters.

The strengthening of the political features of our society implies the development of the people's political activeness. We are pleased to note that the working people in our country, as they express their opinions, submit suggestions and make critical remarks, participate increasingly in social life. However, we are still dissatisfied with the results achieved in the area of the implementation of socialist democracy so far. That is why our party's 12th congress indicated the need to upgrade the purposefulness and meaningfulness of the work of the forums of socialist democracy. The participation of the working people in the solution of social problems must be energized at each workplace and establishment. They must express their views, submit proposals and participate in control and, if necessary and possible, in decision making.

The congress also stressed that socialist democracy does not mean a weakening of individual responsibility. We cannot accept as proper a practice in which the making of necessary decisions or the impossibility of finding who is responsible for poor decisions is concealed behind references to collective responsibility. As was pointed out at the congress, socialist democracy cannot be the refuge of people who avoid the implementation of their obligations, of undisciplined people. Democracy cannot develop without disciplined and responsible work performed on a high-quality level. Socialist democracy also means order and discipline, interrelated obligations and rights, expression of personal opinion concerning social affairs, active participation in labor, a sense of personal responsibility and readiness to assume it in the social interest.

Intellectual workers, who account for one quarter of the country's active population, play an important political role. The overwhelming majority of them are conscientiously working in production, state administration, education, health care, culture and science, participating in social life and proving their support of socialism through their daily actions. Their activities are contributing greatly to the development of the country and they justifiably deserve the trust of society and the respect of its political institutions. The bulk of the relatively small but very important and valuable category of our intelligentsia, which we usually describe as creative, also consists of people supporting the cause of socialism and dedicating their knowledge and art to the people.

However, if we are to provide a realistic assessment of our cultural life we must acknowledge that negative phenomena exist in this area as well. This pertains not to differences in taste or style or to delusions and errors in the interpretation of the problems facing society, but to the fact that, partially under the influence of the cold war winds and partially due to superficial assessment of the economic situation and future of the country, some creative workers are developing increasingly pessimistic feelings and loss of political conviction. There have been cases of one-sided and distorted depictions of our socialist development and belittling or negation of our achievements and, sometimes, simply "proudly" proclaimed alienation from social affairs and assumption of unclear positions concerning all such phenomena.

Our party greatly values the role of the creative intelligentsia in the development of socialist culture and in raising the population's educational standard. The MSZMP realizes that the artistic depiction of complex contemporary phenomena is a difficult task. That is precisely why we are asking the workers in the arts, the writers, not to be satisfied with the superficial study of such phenomena but to try to penetrate them in depth and in matters of decisive importance to the fate of mankind, in accordance with the expectations and desires of our people, to support the cause of peace and progress. The members of the artistic intelligentsia must not follow the fashion or become hermits, but must contribute to the development of our country on the way to socialism and to the shaping of a healthy life through the depiction and enhancement of human values.

Bearing in mind the more difficult international circumstances, economic construction problems can be resolved successfully and quickly only by conscious and highly educated people. That is why concern for steadily enhancing the educational level of our people, which equally implies the mastering of political, professional and general knowledge by them, is an urgent need.

The intensified socialist features of our society formulate stricter requirements not only in politics and economics but in consciousness as well. Whatever the sector of economic life, we must pay greater attention to the more systematic observance of the political and moral norms of socialism. Whatever their job, workers who implement their obligations, live and work honestly and serve as a model in work and in serving the interests of society must enjoy greater respect and prestige. Particular attention must be paid to the norms of socialist community life, human relations, mutual respect, reciprocal attentiveness and readiness to help. An increasing number of people in our society are thinking and acting with a feeling of responsibility. We must see to it that their example is followed by the broadest possible masses. We give priority to the strengthening of the socialist features of society but not as a substitution for the enhancement of living standards. We are confident of the fact that a healthy social atmosphere is a basic human need and an important production factor. By contributing to the solution of economic problems and improving the living standard of the population, we are helped toward our great historical objective--the building of a developed socialist society.

Comrade Janos Kadar concluded his speech at the 12th MSZMP Congress as follows: "I appeal to you to have faith and to act. If you approve the accountability reports and the draft resolution with your vote, we shall display the same type of unity in its implementation."

The congress unanimously adopted the plans submitted for its consideration. Since then, the Hungarian communists have been selflessly working on their implementation. The toiling people of our country are voting in their favor every day through their toil and social activeness. That is why we are justified in our belief that the congress' resolutions will be implemented despite the more difficult conditions.

We base our confidence on the fact that we have a party trained in battle and rich in historical experience, a party which enjoys the trust of the people. We rely on the fact that the people consider as their own the gains of socialism and are fully resolved to build a developed socialist society.

Our affiliation with the comity of socialist countries and particularly the unbreakable friendship between the peoples of Hungary and the Soviet Union are an important

source of confidence in the future. "Friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and cooperation with the fraternal Soviet people," Comrade Janos Kadar said in his address on Soviet television 4 years ago, "are based in our country on socialist principles and socialist convictions. I can say with a clear conscience that Hungarian-Soviet friendship--without which we cannot even conceive of a reliable future for our people and the peaceful socialist development of the country--is a decisive matter to the Hungarian people, a question of their faith, and their national cause. This makes us happy and I am discussing this today as well with pleasure, for entire generations struggled and worked for this friendship and cooperation and because a great deal is being done for their sake today as well."

In the course of heavy battles the first socialist state in the world acquired rich experience in the theoretical and practical problems of the building of socialism. The study of this experience considerably facilitates the search for proper solutions by countries following the socialist way. Our party and people will continue to rely on the invaluable experience of the Soviet Union. Naturally, its use does not mean its automatic duplication but its creative application, based on the specific analysis of specific situations. This was expressed at the 26th CPSU Congress in the following words: "...A process of rapprochement among socialist countries is underway and is continuing to develop. However, it does not eliminate national specifics or the historical features of the socialist countries. We must identify in the variety of forms of their social life and economic organization the actually existing wealth of ways and means leading to the assertion of a socialist way of life."

In describing the experience acquired in the course of cooperation among socialist countries in the course of decades, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev expressed this idea as follows: "No two countries in the world are entirely alike. Each separate country has its unique features. Such specific features must be taken into consideration in order to develop healthy cooperation and find mutually satisfactory solutions to problems. The attentive and well-wishing approach, in the full meaning of this term, in our approach to such individual characteristics has become the norm in Soviet-Hungarian relations." Our own experience as well confirms the profound truth contained in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's words to the effect that "friendship and mutual aid have given our peoples, jointly and separately, a new source of strength."

The CPSU, the MSZMP and the communist and workers parties of the other socialist countries are pursuing the same objectives and are guided by the same principles. The solution of the problems they face equally serves the cause of their peoples, the socialist comity and the universal progress of mankind. In turn, their cooperation is a mandatory prerequisite in resolving their own problems and serving the common cause. It is on this basis that the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party is pursuing its historical mission.

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IMPORTANT FACET OF MARXIST METHODOLOGY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 16, Nov 81 pp 111-114

[Review by B. Slavin, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the book "Printsip Sistemnosti v Teorii i Metodologii K. Marksa" [The Systems Principle in K. Marx' Theory and Methodology] by V. P. Kuz'min. Second edition. Politizdat, Moscow, 1980, 312 pages]

[Text] Monographs of equal interest to specialists in different fields are a rare event. As a rule, such monographs deal with methodological problems shared by different sciences. It is precisely to this type of work that the study by V. P. Kuz'min, which addresses the systems principle in K. Marx' theory and methodology, belongs. Let us point out that an expanded edition of the work was sold out as quickly as the first edition, which came out in 1976. The heightened interest in this work, shown by broad readership circles, is based mainly on the topical nature of the subject and its good treatment.

The problem of systems has been discussed in extensive domestic and foreign publications. However, the role which the systems approach plays in Marx' works remained largely unexplored. The question was made more sensitive as a result of the different interpretations given of the nature of this approach, which were frequently limited to its formal-logical aspect.

V. P. Kuz'min's book is important and original because it is essentially the first monograph in which the systemic problem is directly related to the study of Marx' creative method. The author focuses on the implementation of the systemic approach in Marx' works, "Das Kapital" in particular, and also on the contribution of the Marxist systemic approach not only to the study of socioeconomic systems but to the contemporary understanding of the problem of systems in general.

The author proves that the dialectical-materialistic understanding of the systemic approach makes it possible to consider it as a variety of qualitative analysis. Unlike usual qualitative analysis, however, which deals with individual objects or phenomena, this approach is a kind of "lens" which includes integral formations and sets. The systemic approach offers an adequate characterization of the mechanisms of integration of phenomena and reveals their qualitative multidimensionality. Since it deals with real systems, the systemic approach in its Marxist interpretation makes it possible to synthesize human knowledge and practical activities. It contributes to solution of many important management problems including those in the social area. It is an effective method for the modeling, forecasting and planning of complex multiple-quality subjects.

The author begins with a description of the history of the development of systems ideas in the pre-Marxian period. It was Hegelian dialectics that contributed more than anything else to the development of a systemic, an integral view of everything extant.

The dialectical-materialistic theory of social development, developed by K. Marx and F. Engels, was the most important historical stage in the systemic-scientific understanding of reality. It became a model for the study of the laws governing other areas of the material world. "Science," the author says, "entered a qualitatively new phase. It traced the basic natural laws of the development of nature and society and discovered, metaphorically speaking, the laws governing the dynamics of 'substances' themselves" (p 26). The author describes stages in the development of the systemic approach such as "object-centrism," "systems-centrism" and "meta-systemic knowledge" and provides a Marxist study of social systems and their qualities.

According to V. P. Kuz'min, in his analysis of social systems Marx made a strict distinction between two types of social qualities: functional and system-integrative. Social qualities of the "first order" reflect social needs and have a mandatorily physical shape. Unlike them, social qualities of the "second order" in individual objects are not directly materialized but express the integrative qualities of the social entity and its cooperated supraindividual nature (see p 81).

According to the author, the strictly scientific differentiation among social qualities enabled Marx to make outstanding discoveries in political economy. In particular, he was able to understand the true nature of value and to clarify the real correlation between exchange and consumer values and the moral and physical wearing out of machinery and to expose the nature of commodity fetishism.

The book justifiably emphasizes the importance of the Marxist discovery of systemic-integrative qualities of overall social formations. The latter is particularly important in connection with typical bourgeois falsifications which are trying to depict the Marxist understanding of social relations as strictly naturalistic.

From the topical viewpoint, the consideration of systemic-integrative qualities enables us to establish a hierarchy and scale of subordination of the objectives of management in society. It prevents us from replacing general systems management objectives with the objectives of individual subsystems.

The systems-integrative qualities acquire a new feature, a new dimension, if the social system is considered not in its static but in its dynamic aspect, i.e., if society is considered as a living functioning and developing organism. In this case, the integrative quality of the social system assumes a structuring specific-historical aspect which gives its specific coloring to each individual phenomenon included in the system. A dialectical-materialistic understanding of phenomena in social life alone makes it possible to interpret this specific-historical feature of social systems completely.

Bourgeois philosophy was unable to reach a truly scientific understanding of the specific-historical features of social systems. That is why its views regarding many social phenomena have remained on the level of abstract concepts (such as, for example, "production in general," "consumption in general," "state in general," "freedom in general," etc). Such concepts frequently became the methodological starting point of the defenders of the capitalist system.

The author rightfully agrees with Marx' idea that if all we have is a knowledge of abstract, of general conditions governing any kind of production, we cannot understand any one of its actual historical stages. It is only by clarifying specific social conditions and the historical specifics of a social system that the characteristics of one or another historical phenomenon can be understood. Let us recall, as Marx wrote, that "...any explanation which does not include specific differentiations is no explanation" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 1, p 229). Let us also recall the way Marx proved the uselessness of Hegel's attempts to draw a definition of a specific political system from the general concept of "organism." In our view, theoreticians such as Lassalle, Kautskiy, Mikhaylovskiy and others made the same methodological error. By identifying the state with general management functions, they were unable to see its socioclass nature, for which reason they erroneously interpreted and assessed both the bourgeois and the proletarian state.

To sum it up, let us point out that the book under review has the important merit of singling out the matter of the systemic quality in Marx' methodology. This enables us to gain a deeper understanding of "Das Kapital," to use this element of dialectical-materialistic methodology in the study of contemporary reality and to counter with substantive criticism the various vulgarizers of Marxism.

V. P. Kuz'min's book offers an interesting study of the dialectics of the foundation of social systems as reflected in Marx' works. He supports the idea that the attempts of pre-Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers to find such foundations in nonmaterial areas (law, religion, etc) yielded no positive results also because they were unable to explain many phenomena in material life. Marx proved that the single foundation of social systems should be sought in the area of social production, which is the basis for the interpretation of all other areas of human activity.

The social form of matter dynamics appeared with the appearance of labor. Its establishment is related to the fact that "matter in nature becomes the basis" and the carrier of a higher quality. "At this point the phenomenon of double qualitative definition of social systems appears, social systems become definite, subordination relations are established and the lower form of motion becomes 'subordinate' to the higher" (p 117). Such dynamics and the substitution of lower by higher forms represent the progressive development of the world around us, whose progress and content consist of the "accumulation of qualities and features which enable the individual to become better adapted to external conditions..." (p 121).

The understanding of the proper correlation and dialectical relations among various foundations is of important methodological and practical significance. "...Attempts to interpret an object only within a single system of coordinates, monostructurally," the author writes, "as well as the attempts triggered by this approach to directly derive from one phenomenon other phenomena with different qualities, are fraught with serious theoretical and practical errors" (p 226). Let us add to this that it is precisely such errors that we encounter in attempts to derive complex social and spiritual human qualities from man's biological nature.

According to the author, the determination of the historical specifics of a social system does not cover all the foundations on which the system is based. In reality, "each separate phenomenon is not only a phenomenon of a specific stage in the evolutionary ladder (in terms of the historical origin of one phenomenon from another), but has an entire set of foundations in which each stratum cannot exist without the previous one, which becomes its own foundation" (p 163). For example, as the physical and chemical foundation of life, the earth in turn is subjected to cosmic laws.

As a rule, the lower foundations remain relatively firm. This makes it possible to allow a certain abstraction which, naturally, has its limits, when engaging in theoretical analysis.

The consideration of the interaction among the various foundations is very necessary in the study of matters related to comprehensive problems which arise in areas where sciences intersect, in communications processes which lead to the formulation of a uniform program for a variety of approaches and factors, etc.

The dialectics of the interaction of foundations is manifested with particular strength when dealing with problems of continuity in historical development and the systematic accumulation of knowledge, experience and culture by mankind. The author particularly emphasizes this fact.

On the basis of a thorough study of "Das Kapital" and its drafts, the author describes in detail the process of the change in leading factors in the development of production forces and the changes in their specific-historical structure.

The preservation and accumulation of the foundations of civilization are manifested with particular clarity in the dialectics of the "fundamental" and "actual" structures of human activity. It is here that under the influence of the development of production forces a process of growth of human requirements takes place and the emphasis in human activity changes with them. Thus, material production is one of the basic structures of life, without which no single society can do. At the same time, as the material needs of individuals are satisfied, social and spiritual requirements become increasingly topical. Whereas under capitalism the satisfaction of such requirements cannot become the immediate objective of human activity, this becomes a real fact under socialism.

Under mature socialist conditions, social and spiritual problems and problems related to the implementation of the final objectives and ideals of the building of communism become increasingly topical along with basic tasks of economic development. The consideration of such matters today is the most important general systemic criterion in the management of a socialist society, a criterion which, according to the author, must be clearly realized by all practical workers (see p 216).

On the basis of his study of the systemic principle in Marx' theory and methodology, in the final chapters of his book the author describes the role of the systems approach in contemporary scientific knowledge. In his view, the development of the systems principle in Marx' theory was influenced not only by dialectical and historical materialism but by the systems principle as well, which affected his understanding of the dialectics of social systems. "K. Marx' materialism and dialectics," the author states, "cannot be understood quite fully and properly without a systemic concept of the world" (p 233). "The lack of understanding of the historicism of any social system is explained above all by the lack of understanding of its systems-specifics" (p 236). In emphasizing the significance of the systemic study of reality in terms of the development of dialectical materialism, the author believes that without the study of the specific laws governing various spheres, areas and systems of reality the "increased" knowledge of dialectical materialism today would have been impossible.

Properly defending the need for the study of the specific systems of reality in terms of the development of dialectical materialism, in our view the author nevertheless interprets one-sidedly the category of the universal and its cognitive arguments. In

his view, the universal has the quality of "encompassing all phenomena, regardless of any specific relation with material reality..." (p 238). In our view, such an interpretation of a philosophical category does not exceed the framework of abstract understanding. Hence the author's wish to add specific material features to concepts which he considers strictly abstract and ideal. This is clearly manifested in his attempt to describe dialectics as a multiplicity of individual areas of philosophy, such as the dialectics of social development, logical dialectics, philosophical problems of the natural sciences, etc (see p 237).

As we see it, in dialectical materialism the general is not opposed to the specific, the abstract to the concrete or the ideal to the material. It encompasses the variety of specifics not as an abstract idea but as a real particular phenomenon of the material world which acts as a specific substance: the specific-general.

The systemic approach, as the author convincingly proves, is an essential "aspect," "facet" and "feature" of dialectical methodology (see pp 236, 242, 297). Even though it plays a most important heuristic role in contemporary scientific knowledge, "it cannot replace or substitute for the methodology of dialectical materialism as a whole" (p 242).

In order to be truly scientific, the systemic approach must mandatorily be based on the achievements of dialectical materialism. In this sense we fully share the author's view to the effect that "the systemic approach, which is developing on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology, blends with its principal foundations, which are consistent materialism and dialectics" (p 239). This shows the radical distinction between the systemic approach in its Marxist interpretation and the general theory of systems developed by bourgeois theoreticians.

The dialectical-materialistic systemic approach makes it possible to resolve important problems, something which is totally impossible with the general theory of systems which is developing within the framework of the so-called "systems movement" in the West.

V. P. Kuz'min's book is an interesting Marxist study of one of the complex problems of contemporary theoretical knowledge.

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VALUABLE STUDY OF LENIN'S THEORY OF THE STATE

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[Review by D. Kerimov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, of the book "Sokrovishchnitsa Marksistsko-Leninskikh Idey o Gosudarstve" [A Treasury of Marxist-Leninist Ideas on the State] by G. D. Obichkin. On V. I. Lenin's book "The State and Revolution." Mysl', Moscow, 1980, 164 pages]

[Text] Socialist statehood has a long theoretical and practical history, the study of the basic stages of which enables us to understand its nature and social purpose more profoundly. V. I. Lenin's work "The State and Revolution," which describes the laws governing the appearance, consolidation and withering away of the socialist state and which determines its political and socioeconomic tasks, forms of organization and functioning mechanism, plays an outstanding role in the development of the Marxist theory of the state.

"On the very eve of the October Revolution, during the final period of clandestinity," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev wrote, "Lenin's thoughts were focused on the development of problems of decisive importance for the victory of socialism such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialist democracy and the two phases of the communist society. This marked the birth of one of Lenin's outstanding works--'The State and Revolution.' Lenin developed the theory of the Soviet state as one of the forms of proletarian dictatorship on the basis of the creativity of the revolutionary masses. The basic principles of the Soviet system, elaborated by Lenin, preserve their significance in the case of any state of the working people which replaces the bourgeois state. This has been proven today by the experience of socialist revolutions in other countries."

The CPSU and the communist and workers parties of the members of the socialist comity are guided in their practical activities by Marxist-Leninist theory and are enriched with its experience in building socialism and communism. Hence the tremendous importance which our party ascribes to the study of the works of the founders of scientific communism and to their skillful and creative utilization in theoretical and practical activities.

G. D. Obichkin is the author of a recently published book on Lenin's ideological heritage, on the socialist state in particular. It is distinguished by its thorough study of Lenin's creative laboratory. The author shows the reasons which motivated Vladimir Il'ich to undertake the study of the problems of the state. He describes the historical conditions under which the work was written and the tremendous preparatory work which preceded it.

In tracing the birth and the shaping of Lenin's ideas and conclusions on the state and the formulation of his overall concept of the socialist state, the author considers in strictly logical sequence the content of "The State and Revolution." He begins by making a comparative study between the manuscript "Marxism on the State" ("The Blue Notebook") and the work itself. This enables him to show the continuity among the views of Marx, Engels and V. I. Lenin on the state and, subsequently, to describe Lenin's development of the Marxist doctrine of the origin and nature of the state and proletarian statehood in the light of the experience of the Paris Commune and the two phases of the communist system.

The author describes in detail the outstanding contribution which Lenin made to the Marxist theory of the political power of the proletariat in the epoch of a socialist revolution and the establishment of a historic type of state--the socialist state. In particular, he provides a detailed analysis of the development of Marx' ideas on the breakdown of the bourgeois governmental machinery.

Contemporary revisionists frequently accuse Lenin of totally excluding the possibility of a peaceful transformation of the state apparatus in the course of a socialist revolution. Regardless of such misrepresentations, however, Lenin claimed that independently of the form which the socialist revolution takes, the working class cannot use the old governmental machinery which has been adapted for the economic exploitation and spiritual oppression and political suppression of the working people. Thus, when the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power to the soviets arose in September 1917, Lenin emphasized that the slogan "Power to the Soviets" means a radical reorganization of the old state apparatus and its replacement with a new, popular and truly democratic apparatus of soviets (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 34, p 202).

The contemporary revisionists not only reject the need of defeating the bourgeois state apparatus, referring to the new historical conditions, but maliciously distort Lenin's views on the matter, presenting them as a concept of comprehensive anarchic destruction. However, Lenin pointed out that we must adopt different approaches to the individual parts of the bourgeois state mechanism, taking into consideration their aim, role and mode of operation. The working class must eliminate the reactionary, the oppressive part of the bourgeois state mechanism, in order to be free from exploitation and establish its own power. However, the bourgeoisie has also created a part of the state mechanism which is necessary for the normal life of society (banks, the mails, the telegraph, etc). "One must not and should not break down this apparatus," Lenin wrote. "It must be freed from its subordination to the capitalists. The capitalists and their influence must be cut out, pulled out of it. It must be subordinated to the proletarian soviets. It must be made broader, more comprehensive and more popular" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 34, p 307).

Lenin's theory of the breakdown of the bourgeois state apparatus, as the author points out, has not only been tested and proved by past experience but is equally significant today.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, which is an essentially new system with new tasks and objectives, requires a corresponding new system of socialist statehood. The revolutionary practice of the toiling masses in Russia created an unparalleled form of state organization of dictatorship of the proletariat--the soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies. The author describes the basic principles, the principles of the soviet system, as elaborated by Lenin: electivity of members of state leading organs, their replaceability, their answerability to the voters, accountability, democracy, etc.

In calling for the creation of a powerful and durable socialist state, Lenin profoundly described the nature and tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its extremely great organizational role in the building of a socialist society. He proved that the qualitative distinctions separating proletarian from bourgeois democracy, which is formal and limited in nature. Mercilessly exposing the opportunists, Lenin proved that the communist party is the leading and guiding force of the socialist state. "In educating a workers party," he wrote, "Marxism educates the vanguard of the proletariat, which can seize the power and lead the entire people to socialism, which can guide and organize the new system and be the teacher, manager and leader of all working and exploited people in the organization of their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 33, p 26).

New forms of socialist statehood developed in the people's democracies after World War II. These forms assumed increasingly clear socialist features with the successes achieved in building the new society. This process of development and improvement of the forms of socialist statehood is continuing to this day, reflecting the characteristics of the historical development of one or another socialist country. Therefore, a thorough and profound study is necessary of the various factors which define one or another form of proletarian dictatorship. Lenin was categorically against ignoring such factors and underestimating specific features of the development of a specific country or the national characteristics and traditions of one or another nation.

Particularly noteworthy is the section of the book in which Lenin's contribution to the theory of Marxism in the two phases of the communist system is discussed. The author provides a comprehensive study of the problems of the transition from capitalism to socialism as a necessary period in the development of the new society and in the correlation between the dictatorship of the proletariat and democracy. He points out that the concept of communism is applicable to socialism to the extent to which productive capital becomes public property and there are no longer exploiting classes. However, one should not forget that socialism is incomplete communism. It is a society which has only emerged from capitalism and which bears the marks of the old society. As the lower phase of communism, socialism is distinct from the higher stage in the areas of production forces, level of economic maturity, characteristics of the socioclass structure, etc.

The author emphasizes that as it creatively develops the Leninist theory of socialism and sums up the experience and the results of the building of socialism, our party is providing a profound and scientific characterization of developed socialism as the highest point of contemporary social progress. This is a new major creative contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism, embodied in the USSR Constitution.

As we know, Lenin developed the basic concepts of the Marxist theory of the state while fighting anarchism, opportunism and revisionism, the crushing criticism of which remains equally important today. This criticism "is a powerful ideological weapon in the struggle against the distortions of Marxism today, against all kinds of pseudoscientific theories, whose basic objective is to embroider the reality of the bourgeois state, to deny the oppressive role of its organs toward the working class and the toiling masses and to blacken the truly democratic socialist state" (p 121).

The author expresses interesting considerations regarding Lenin's intention of writing the seventh chapter of "The State and Revolution," which was to be a summation of the experience of the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions. The close study of subsequent works by Lenin and the preparatory materials for that chapter, as well as related

works by Soviet historians, on the subject of which he expresses polemic remarks, leads the author to reach the conclusion that there are no sufficient grounds to believe that such a chapter became the basis of any of the works which Vladimir Il'ich wrote after the October Revolution.

One of the chapters in G. D. Obichkin's works discusses the international significance of the Leninist theory of the socialist state. The author cites practical data on the publication and the study of "The State and Revolution" abroad.

The book under review is a masterly work of research and is distinguished by the topical way in which a number of problems of a general theoretical nature have been formulated. Thus, the study of Lenin's ideas regarding "mature" and "full" socialism, which became the foundations of the contemporary concept of developing socialism, is of essential significance. As was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, it is on the basis of this concept that the party "refined and concretized the way and the time needed for the implementation of our programmatic objectives and defined its strategy and tactics over a long historical period."

The study of the literary heritage of the Marxist-Leninist classics not only enriches our knowledge of the history of the development of truly scientific summations, ideas and theories, which bring to light the objective laws of social development, the revolutionary class struggle and changes in socioeconomic systems, but helps us to master the Marxist dialectical method for the study of social phenomena and to make practical use of it in the reorganization of society on a communist basis.

Although as a whole the book has a positive value, we should point out that it would have benefited considerably had the author described more extensively the significance of Lenin's work "The State and Revolution" in terms of the post-October establishment and subsequent development of socialist statehood and particularly in terms of its contemporary advancement.

The greatest change in the history of mankind was accomplished thanks to the victory of the October Revolution: for the first time, from a tool of exploitation, oppression and suppression of huge toiling masses, the state became a tool for their liberation, for the satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the working people, for social progress and for building a new world.

Following the building of a socialist society, when the historical mission of the dictatorship of the working class was fulfilled and the new social system began to develop on its own basis, gradually the proletarian state developed into a state of the whole people, whose role in the building of communism is increasing substantially. Under the conditions of mature socialism, the tasks of the state and the whole people become considerably broader, deeper and more complex.

The tremendous tasks related to the reorganization of society, which were assigned to the Soviet state during the periods of dictatorship of the proletariat and mature socialism, are discussed in the book through a description (unfortunately incomplete) of its basic functions. In this connection, it would be desirable for researchers working on this topic to intensify further this analysis and to describe in greater detail the implementation of Lenin's idea on the creative-constructive role of the socialist state, as expressed in "The State and Revolution" and in subsequent works, and to trace the way the Leninist principles of the activities of the Soviet state--democratic centralism, unity of legislative, executive and control functions, combination of collective and one-man rule, internationalism, planning, publicity and socialist

legality--are currently implemented in Soviet state construction and the way the CPSU is fulfilling the behests of the leader regarding improvements in the Soviet state apparatus, development of socialist democracy and enhancement of a scientific level of state management. This would make it possible to describe even more clearly the topical practical and methodological significance of the basic work "The State and Revolution," which is a treasury of Marxist-Leninist ideas on the state.

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N. N. BARANSKIY'S SCIENTIFIC LEGACY IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORANEITY

Moscow **KOMMUNIST** in Russian No 16, Nov 81 pp 117-119

[Review by Prof V. Pavlenko of the following books by N. N. Baranskiy: "Izbrannyye Trudy. Stanovleniye Sovetskoy Ekonomicheskoy Geografii" [Selected Works. The Coming into Being of Soviet Economic Geography]. Mysl', Moscow, 1980, 287 pages; "Izbrannyye Trudy. Nauchnyye Printsipy Geografii" [Selected Works. Scientific Principles of Geography]. Mysl', Moscow, 1980, 329 pages]

[Text] We can only welcome the tradition which has developed in our country of celebrating noteworthy dates in the history of Soviet science by publishing the works of its creators. Selected works by N. N. Baranskiy, a very great scientist in the field of economic geography, were consequently published on the occasion of the centennial of his birth. Put together, they clearly show the ideas and theoretical concepts formulated by the scientist in the course of his long and active scientific work, which covered a period of more than 40 years. Despite the entire variety and difference in topics, N. N. Baranskiy's works share some common features. They include his continuing reference to the theoretical legacy of the founders of scientific communism as an inexhaustible source of basic ideas, a profoundly conscious class approach to the study of economic processes on a regional basis and a Bolshevik passion and intolerance for any deviation from Marxism, whatever its nature.

What is the main significance of N. N. Baranskiy as a scientist? In order to answer this question we must go back to the 1920's, the period during which a number of social sciences came into being on the essentially new Marxist-Leninist basis. It was precisely then that Nikolay Nikolayevich, who had come to science after doing practical work, wrote his first books which laid the foundation for Soviet economic geography.

Suffice it to recall the then prevailing circumstances--the domination of conservative views in many social sciences, the weakness of Marxist cadres and the methodological confusion introduced by Trotskyites and right wingers--to realize the complexity of the problem facing N. N. Baranskiy. The fact that he was able to resolve it successfully, frequently in the course of fierce debates and ideological struggle, can be explained not only by his profound knowledge of the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics and his proper economic training (he was a graduate of the Moscow Commerce Institute), but his political training as a professional revolutionary who joined the ranks of our party as early as 1898.

Here is another important circumstance: the scientific interests of this communist scientist fortuitously meshed with the most topical problems facing the young Soviet state, which was only just entering the path of building a new society, a path of

radical reconstruction of the country's economic and social structure. The task was to surmount the age-old spontaneously developed territorial division of labor and to replace it with a planned territorial organization of the economy. It was precisely then, as a lecturer at the Communist University imeni Sverdlov--the leading communist higher educational institution in the country--that N. N. Baranskiy developed, as he himself wrote, "the concept of economic geography as a legitimate science of the most efficient location of economic projects..." ("Stanovleniye...", p 274). It was here, in the famous "Sverdlovka," which trained hundreds of outstanding party and economic leaders, that he headed the chair of economic geography and wrote the first Marxist textbook on this subject.

Throughout his long years of work, N. N. Baranskiy systematically defended and developed its basic stipulations related to the solution of practically important problems of improving the territorial organization of the production process of the socialist society.

As we reread N. N. Baranskiy's basic works, unwittingly we note the broad scope and depth of analysis of the phenomena and trends he studied. Let us draw particular attention to the author's interpretation of the theoretical foundations of the location of production forces.

One of them is the problem of the geographic (territorial) division of labor with the consequent theory of territorial production specialization and the theory of economic zoning. It is quite pertinent to recall this precisely today, when our science is faced with very important problems of improving the location of production forces and the territorial development of the economy, formulated by the 26th party congress.

Soviet planning workers celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Gosplan quite recently. In this connection as well, we must point out that many important and economically well-substantiated achievements of scientific thought in the past, which directly involved N. N. Baranskiy, have hardly been fully implemented.

Let us take as an example the location of the big processing industry enterprises. Unfortunately, cases are still frequent in which enterprises which are totally unrelated to the existing economic structure of a given republic or city are opened and are furthermore not supplied with necessary manpower resources. This means that everything such enterprises require--from raw materials to manpower--must come from other areas and that finished goods must frequently be shipped throughout the country, thus increasing national economic costs and worsening the work of the transportation system.

Another topical problem in contemporary planning practice is that of comprehensive economic development. The production of many goods in mass demand, construction materials and agricultural products, which could and should be produced in adequate amounts locally, remains underdeveloped in many oblasts, krays and ASSRs. Petroleum products, nitrogen fertilizers, grain products, mixed feeds and other bulky goods, the production of which gravitates toward consumption areas, must be shipped from afar to some economic rayons which may cover several oblasts and ASSRs. Once again, this leads to excessively long and inefficient haulage and burdens the railroads additionally.

The socialist theory of economic zoning, with N. N. Baranskiy developed, has long given us the proper approach to the solution of such problems. However, as one may easily note, of late economic zoning is being poorly applied in planning. Consequently, the advantages of the systematically developed territorial division of labor are being insufficiently used.

In reading N. N. Baranskiy's works, in which he discusses economic zoning, we reach the conclusion that our scientists must resolve the problem of the intensification and concretizing of his theory under contemporary conditions, while planning workers must ensure the skillful practical utilization of the advantages offered by his theory.

N. N. Baranskiy dealt extensively with one of the major problems of historical materialism--the interaction between nature and society. In terms of the methodology of economic geography, he conceived it as the study of the influence of spatial differences in the natural environment on spatial differences in industrial economic development. He equally rejected the underestimation of the role of natural conditions and the ideas of primitive "environmentalism."

A long time ago, N. N. Baranskiy expressed the idea that the influence of human society on the geographic environment is growing "at an increasingly fast pace." He also pointed out that there is no question of any "jumping away from nature," and that the ties between man and nature will become stronger and more complex. On the basis of these ideas, he elaborated the theory of the geographic division of labor, in which he did not reduce the reasons for it merely to natural factors. He wrote that "as social life becomes more complex and as differences in the social order of different countries and areas increase in the course of the historical process, the social reasons for the development of the geographic division of labor increase as well. They become superimposed on the reasons based on natural conditions without, however, eliminating them."

N. N. Baranskiy's basic works on the methodology of economic geography and his views on its ties with physical geography, political economy and its role among the other sciences, are based on the proper understanding of the problems related to the correlation between society and the geographic environment. His concepts are presented most completely and systematically in his "Brief Outline on the Development of Economic Geography," in his "Izbrannyye Trudy." However, the close reading of some other articles and reviews reveals some conflicting definitions as well.

N. N. Baranskiy's works included in "Izbrannyye Trudy" cover only part of his scientific legacy. The editors were faced with the difficult task, common in such cases, of including the most important writing. Basically, they have been successful in their choices. However, the publication of the works they selected in two separate volumes is largely arbitrary and the principle on the basis of which the material is presented is unclear. Since the time of publication of the articles is not indicated, this hinders the possibility of formulating an idea about the development of the author's scientific views.

As the author of a basic VUZ course in USSR economic geography and of a secondary school textbook, whose 16 editions have trained many generations of Soviet people, N. N. Baranskiy dealt extensively with the methodology of economic geography, the method of teaching it, economic cartography and the geography of foreign countries, particularly the United States. He wrote basic works, which are important to this day, on each of these subjects. Therefore, we can speak with full justification of an entire system of sciences at the intersecting point of economics and geography, sciences in the establishment and development of which N. N. Baranskiy's work was a most important stage. Therefore, it was quite legitimate that he was one of our first scientists in the social sciences to be awarded the high title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

Also characteristic is the fact that, as master of many foreign languages and a person who closely followed foreign publications, he always considered them with a critical eye. He diligently pointed out the positive and negative features in the tremendous number of books he reviewed. He totally rejected the method of enthusiastic references and the thoughtless borrowing of ideas and terms which, why not admit it, still exists among some scientific workers. These qualities become clear in reading his reviews and surveys included in "Izbrannyye Trudy."

Naturally, we must point out yet another typical feature—the author's ability to present simply and graphically even the most complex theoretical concepts, as is the case, for example, of his articles on the role of the geographic environment, the correlation between the spatial and historical aspects in the development of society and on the economic-geographic situation, distinguished by a brilliant presentation and stylistic clarity. Unquestionably, this was a reflection of N. N. Baranskiy's rich experience as a passionate propagandist-revolutionary.

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MOTION PICTURES IN THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION

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[Review by Hero of Socialist Labor S. Gerasimov, USSR people's artist, of the book "Protivorechivyy Ekran: Dukhovnyy Krizis Burzhuaznogo Obshchestva i Kino" [The Conflicting Screen: The Spiritual Crisis in Bourgeois Society and the Motion Picture] by V. Ye. Baskakov. Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1980, 223 pages]

[Text] In my work in motion pictures and pedagogical activities at the VGIK [All-Union State Cinematography Institute] and in my encounters with the public, I frequently think of the destiny and high purpose of cinematography. The art of the screen has tremendous power which can shape the human personality and give it the best qualities. The workers in the Soviet cinema, our colleagues in the fraternal socialist countries and the progressive motion picture artists in the capitalist countries consider precisely this as their main objective. However, the screen can also destroy the personality, instill false ideas, deform the mind, make the brain sterile and release most base instincts. It performs this function in the hands of monopoly capital. Hence the sharpness of the ideological battle which is developing on the screen and which is assuming today increasingly new shapes. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his amazingly profound and powerful speech at the 26th party congress, our ideological enemies are acting today with increasing refinement and craftiness.

That is the reason for which I find the publication of V. Ye. Baskakov's new book extremely timely. The author, who is a noted specialist in cinematography, analyzes contemporary Western cinematography in close connection with the crisis phenomena which are encompassing today the political, economic and spiritual life in capitalist society. He discusses the basic problems of ideological struggle on the screen on the basis of specific data.

As we know, cinematography--the most popular and effective type of contemporary art--plays a special role in the global confrontation of ideas, reflecting the main contradiction of our epoch--the contradiction between capitalism and socialism. The spiritual crisis, which characterizes the current condition of bourgeois civilization, as the author points out, is manifested in a variety of ways in Western motion pictures. On the one hand, the motion picture reflects the phenomena of the spiritual crisis of capitalism; on the other, it is itself a battlefield where conflicting ideologies clash and in which this crisis is manifested. Furthermore, to a certain extent it affects the general process of the appearance of crisis phenomena in Western spiritual life. Finally, as the basis for the development of one or another trend in movie criticism and art studies, cinematography influences the theoretical manifestation of the various aspects of the spiritual crisis in contemporary capitalist society.

With the help of extensive motion picture data from the United States, France, Italy, Spain and small motion picture industries, the author presents a broad panoramic view of the contemporary condition of the Western motion picture and the work of outstanding directors. He convincingly proves that contemporary bourgeois culture, cinematography above all, is losing its humanistic traditions; the defense of most stagnant and routine bourgeois values is noteworthy. However, at the same time, democratic trends are steadily increasing in Western motion pictures, something which is of essential importance.

This is a first systematic and comprehensive study of the latest trends and directions in Western motion pictures in the 1970's undertaken in the area of Soviet art studies; the work offers a Marxist criticism of contemporary bourgeois and revisionist cinematographic theories. The author intensifies, develops and concretizes works formulated in his previous works on the interpenetration between bourgeois "mass culture" and decadent currents in Western cinematography, and the "diffusion" of ideological, stylistic and genre characteristics of Western cinematography. The author makes an extensive study of the various manifestations of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism in bourgeois cinematography and television.

V. Ye. Baskakov substantiates his description of cinematography in the capitalist countries on a high theoretical level but also with an eye to the readership at large. The clarity with which some complex theoretical problems are described is one of the unquestionable merits of this work. The author consistently criticizes not only the main trends in bourgeois cinematography but the theories which shape the ideological content, the conceptual background of one or another motion picture--whether neo-Freudian, the philosophy of the Frankfurt school, leftist concepts of all hues, which are essentially antihumane, or the "pop philosophy" of Canadian sociologist M. McLuhan.

The author shows the tremendous importance of the Soviet revolutionary cinema to the cinematographers in the West and the developing countries and sharply criticizes the various anti-Soviet and antisocialist films which are roaming the West and the ideological systems which some directors who oppose us ideologically palm off on their audiences.

His discussion of the American motion picture grows into a politically tested familiarity with the basic and occasionally varied trends of development of cinematography in the United States and a profound study of the works of artists with a realistic and humanistic orientation. The author also exposes the mechanisms which ensure the commercial success of many planned motion pictures which have nothing to do with true art. Nor does he ignore motion picture fashions in the United States such as "disaster movies," "horror movies" and films which promote cruelty, mysticism and immorality. He includes among the fashionable phenomena in contemporary Western cinematography "retroart," a variety of "return to the past," the futile wish to restore through the motion picture the traditional way of life and its values and priorities, along with unseemly attempts to rehabilitate in the eyes of millions of people the ideology and practices of fascism and imperialist aggression.

In the chapter titled "Behind a Scientific Screen," the author sharply criticizes the process of making respectable and "politicizing" immorality and pornography on the Western screen, "substantiated" through a variety of leftist Freudian theories.

Finally, in the chapter "In Search of Alternatives," he describes the works of Western cinematographers who are persistently seeking alternatives to the bourgeois world and its culture. Although the creative and ideological efforts of this group of

masters, who include Italian directors F. Rossi, the brothers P. and V. Taviani, E. Sculu and D. Damiani and the directors of the West German "new wave," are far from being straightforward, unquestionably they embody a progressive, a humanistic principle. We find exceptionally interesting the study of the work of the Italian director, writer and poet P-P. Passolini, whose conflicting and tragic creative and personal life is symptomatic of the talented artists living under capitalist conditions. The author discusses the topical problems of the ideological struggle not only in cinematography but in the theory of the motion picture.

Unquestionably, this book represents another step forward in our art studies based on the theoretical and methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism and the close interconnection among artistic creativity, ideology and politics. It is a contribution to the better understanding of ideological and cultural-esthetic processes taking place in Western art and culture.

Under the circumstances of the aggravated ideological struggle in the international arena, the study of problems related to the reflection of the ideological-political and spiritual crisis of capitalism in motion pictures is extremely topical.

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POLICY WITHOUT A FUTURE

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[Review by Dr of Economic Sciences I. Usachev of the following books: "Global'naya Strategiya SShA v Usloviyakh Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoy Revolyutsii" [U.S. Global Strategy in the Conditions of the Scientific and Technical Revolution]. Mysl', Moscow, 1979, 452 pages; "Doktrina 'Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti' v Global'noy Strategii SShA" [The Doctrine of 'National Security' in U.S. Global Strategy] by V. F. Petrovskiy. Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1980, 335 pages; and "Uoll-Strit i Vneshnyaya Politika" [Wall Street and Foreign Policy] by R. S. Ovinnikov. Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1980, 271 pages]

[Text] In his time, the industrialist Henry Ford, after becoming the first king of the automobile in America, loved the arrogant joke that he was willing to offer the customer the widest possible selection of colors for his automobile providing it was black.

This would not be worth mentioning had it been merely a question of historical curiosity. On the political level, however, Ford's joke is no oddity whatever but the working philosophy of "the American way of life." More than enough is being said about democracy and freedom in the United States. However, what kind of freedom and democratic rights are available to the notorious "average American" when it is a question of the choice of a foreign policy course of a country allegedly belonging to him? They hardly go beyond the rights which the millionaire with a sense of humor kindly granted the customer: to accept unconditionally the political coloring which suits the real masters of present-day America.

It is true that the American of today has developed a more critical attitude toward the political commodity of doubtful quality, speaking frankly, which official Washington would like to press upon him. However, who in this case is asking the opinion of the ordinary American?

The present Republican Reagan administration has chosen a course aimed at turning U.S. foreign policy back to the days when the fierce Cold War was being waged. The same theme comes out of the White House and other departments: weapons and more weapons, the United States must have military superiority.

However much this noisy propaganda campaign may be dulling the mind, many Americans are questioning the purpose of the present twist in U.S. political life. Their Western European allies, greatly confused by the obvious irrationality of American foreign policy, are concerned as well.

Is this irrationality accidental, the result of the influence which some individuals who have come into the limelight by virtue of circumstances, are exerting on politics, or does it have deeper reasons? Of late, American foreign policy has in fact been substantially subjected to the influence of individual, subjective factors. Nevertheless, its essence is that in the course of the formulation and execution of a foreign political course, the leadership of the United States is traditionally and quite firmly maintaining the sum total of inherited concepts which, one way or another, are mandatorily part of any given official political line and which constitute the foundations of its doctrine. It is the study of this doctrine and the concepts related to it that enables us to understand the direction of the drift of today's American foreign policy and the reason for this drift and, consequently, of American diplomacy as its conduit in international affairs.

A great deal of experience has been acquired in Soviet American studies in the study of such fundamental problems. Of late, a number of works have been published by some authors which provide a thorough analysis of the deep currents within American foreign policy, its motivations and, in particular, the factors which create the vacillations and instability in U.S. foreign policy.

The American ruling circles have never concealed the fact that their main sociopolitical objective is to perpetuate capitalism, to maintain and restore its positions in its historical confrontation with socialism, to restrain and, in the final account, to try to eliminate the world socialist system. Another aspect of this objective is the desire to keep the developing countries within the capitalist system, to preserve the last bulwarks of colonial oppression, to prevent the liberation of these countries from neocolonialism and to turn them away from choosing a socialist orientation. Finally, another major political objective of the American bourgeoisie is to consolidate the dominating position of the United States in the capitalist world, to restrain its rivals in the competitive struggle and to subordinate them to its economic and political influence.

All of this, put together, has expressed and still expresses the policy of hegemonism and the aspiration of American imperialism to establish its global domination. Related to this, as V. F. Petrovskiy emphasizes in his book, is the cult of power, military power above all, in U.S. foreign policy.

As V. I. Lenin pointed out, the nature of political objectives has a determining influence on the conduct of a war. This equally applies to preparations for a war, the arms race and reliance on the military power factor. From this viewpoint, unquestionably, specific political objectives predetermine the direction followed by Washington's strategic concepts and its military programs.

On the basis of a profound study of the basic directions followed by U.S. foreign policy after World War II, R. S. Ovinnikov reaches the conclusion that the general course of this policy and its specific characteristics, which are related to specific problems, are invariably dictated by a single center. The general outlines of Washington's foreign policy and its main turns and zigzags in the last decade reflect a complex balance of aspirations and possibilities of the U.S. financial oligarchy at the present historical stage.

It would be accurate to single out among the factors which have influence the shaping of American foreign policy of late the scientific and technical revolution which, metaphorically speaking, is increasingly developing as the supplier of tools for U.S. diplomacy. This range of problems is extensively discussed in the book

"Global'naya Strategiya SShA v Usloviyakh Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoy Revolyutsii," edited by Academician G. A. Arbatov. Its authors have made a comprehensive study of the principal elements of the "updating" of the global strategy of American imperialism in the 1970's. Whereas the objectives have not changed, they point out, the importance of the means used to reach them is increasing. It is natural, therefore, that in the hands of the ruling U.S. circles the most important successes in science and technology become to a considerable extent a reserve for expanding the arsenal of weapons serving the military and political objectives of American imperialism. In using science as a milk cow, the latter has raised its militarization to an unheard-of level. American reality clearly illustrates Lenin's thought that in bourgeois countries "militarization imbues all social life" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, p 137).

The increased defense power of the Soviet Union invalidated the plans based on "decisive" U.S. military superiority and the admissibility of the use of military force against the socialist countries or their use as an instrument of blackmail with impunity. As early as the 1960's, the United States began to display an increasing understanding of the unquestionable fact that the launching of a global war against the socialist countries by Washington would be the equivalent of suicide. In his 15 May 1980 speech at a reception given in the Polish capital on the occasion of a conference held by the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact members, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that they "have created a reliable defense, thus eliminating the desire of aggressive enemies of socialism to try to remake the sociopolitical map of Europe, which was drawn up after World War II, by force. This laid the foundations for a more realistic approach on the part of Western government leaders and the basis for peaceful coexistence and detente."

The realistic trends in the foreign political thinking of the Western powers in general and the United States in particular contributed to the progress of detente. Thanks to the initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist comity, an impressive international-legal foundation was laid for normalizing relations among countries belonging to different socioeconomic systems.

The establishment of approximate parity between the USSR and the United States in strategic nuclear missiles was a confirmation of the double defeat of American imperialism. Physical proof was offered that the members of the socialist system are able to resolve most complex technical and industrial problems within a short time. It also brought to light the progressively diminishing effectiveness of armaments as the basic tool of the foreign policy of American imperialism. The situation of "strategic dead-end" led part of the American ruling circles to the realization that a global nuclear war was inadmissible. The awareness that military confrontation must yield to talks was the logical consequence of this fact.

However, the appearance of such realistic principles at the beginning of the 1970's did not mean, as V. F. Petrovskiy points out, that they were automatically extended to the entire system of American foreign political concepts and views. Although in the final account Washington was forced to join the process of international detente, there were forces in the United States which were unwilling to accept the new realities and which channeled their entire energy into finding a way out of the "strategic dead-end," i.e., into violating the approximate strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and into restoring the effectiveness of the utilization of armed forces or the threat of their use as a foreign policy instrument.

R. S. Ovinnikov is able to substantiate the fact that at the start of and during the 1970's U.S. policy represented a real tangle of contradictions in which the traditional global appetite of American imperialism and its diminished possibilities were interwoven. The most clear manifestation of the duality of American foreign policy was in its approach to the basic task of our time: rejection of the use of force in relations among countries belonging to opposite systems and the ending of the arms race.

The Pentagon strategists have never rejected the possibility of using nuclear weapons. However, the new situation had substantially hacked down their plans, for the need to take measures which would exclude the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war began to be extensively realized in the country and throughout the world. Under such circumstances, the Pentagon's paid and voluntary agents began to promote the illusion that it was possible to find a means for the use of nuclear weapons in a way which would not lead to the nuclear devastation of the United States itself.

In an effort to strengthen their positions, which had been attacked as a result of the successful development of detente, toward the end of the 1970's the U.S. militaristic circles undertook the intensive propaganda indoctrination of public opinion (American and international), the central element of which was the false campaign regarding the "Soviet military threat." Plans aimed at ensuring military advantages, mainly strategic, to American imperialism were formulated and promoted behind it. As early as 1974, U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger formulated the concept of "limited strategic war," which was aimed at increasing the "usability" of U.S. strategic weapons for political and military objectives and thus accustoming the people to think in terms of the admissibility of nuclear war. Carter took the next step in the same direction with his famous "Directive No 59." This was taken up by the Republican administration, which ordered the full-scale production of the neutron bomb. All this is accompanied by the promise of "limiting" the nuclear war. However, no one can be misled to think that such a war could be "limited" by any possible means. Essentially, this is acknowledged by the American political leadership itself. Actually, it is a question of intensifying the preparations made by U.S. imperialism for a conflict in which Washington will be the first to strike with nuclear weapons. In the West, it is Europe that is listed as the first arena for such a conflict.

In the first half of the 1970's, the United States chose as the main road to the development of offensive strategic forces the accelerated installation of intercontinental and ballistic missiles with multiple warheads in submarines (MIRV in American terminology). Washington's wish to acquire the advantage with the help of clusters of warheads increased the difficulty of the talks for the drafting of the SALT II treaty. The Soviet Union was forced to take responsive measures in order to neutralize the American maneuver. This circumstance played its role in the fact that at the June 1979 Vienna summit meeting, the American side in fact decided to sign the SALT II treaty, although as was made clear subsequently, it was quite unwilling to assist in its implementation.

The new emphasis in the strategy of the present administration confirms the increased intransigence in the military-political course charted by the United States. It is no longer a "selective" (as was the case at the beginning of the 1970's) but an emphatically global U.S. expansionism that has been proclaimed. Essentially, the claim to the right of military intervention on all continents and in all regions, characteristic of American foreign policy in the 1950's and 1960's, is being revived. This line is supported by Washington's efforts to ensure the accelerated development of military hardware and armaments known as conventional. As the authors of

"Global'naya Strategiya SShA v Usloviyakh Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoy Revolyutsii" point out, the consequences of such changes in conventional armaments are "quite comprehensive." The scientific and technical revolution affects not only the development of new models and systems of armaments but the organizational structure of armed forces and the means, methods and organization of troop control.

Strategic and tactical mobility, based on the creation of high-capacity maritime and air transport facilities, and the rapid transportation of landing forces in conflict areas are the most important directions in the technical development of U.S. armed forces. It is possible to say that these facilities have become the physical manifestation of the "globalism" of imperialist policy.

On the eve of the 1980's, the White House proclaimed a new military-political doctrine, which openly calls for the accelerated growth and modernization of all components of the American military machine. The Near and Middle East have become equated with Western Europe and the Far East as areas of "special interest" of the United States. In other words, it is a question of the strengthening of the military power factor in American foreign policy and the broadening of the geopolitical area of its possible application. This course is not even justified with references to U.S. defense requirements.

"Not a single day passes without Washington trying to restore the spirit of the Cold War and to heat up militaristic passions," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his report at the June 1980 CC CPSU Plenum. "Any pretext, real or imaginary, serves this aim." Washington proceeds from the version of the "legitimacy" of American military intervention in any international or domestic socioeconomic process in other countries which, from the viewpoint of U.S. ruling circles, affects the "security" of the United States, i.e., the economic and political interests of American monopolies. As V. F. Petrovskiy points out in his book, the Carter administration began to emphasize the "historical responsibility" of the United States and its readiness, if necessary, to engage in military operations in areas it considers of strategic importance. Therefore, Washington openly intends to resume its role of "global policeman" which, as we know, brought about the shameful fiasco of American imperialism in Indochina.

The subjective idealism which is the conceptual base of bourgeois sociopolitical and military ideology is the justification for the voluntarism and, therefore, the adventurism of U.S. strategic concepts. This conclusion is fully confirmed by what is occurring in the shaping of American foreign policy and plans for military construction.

A closer study reveals that the military doctrine of today's American leadership does not actually include any new idea. It is a repetition of the old bankrupt concepts and merely inflates their negative aspects.

As early as the end of World War I, Lenin drew attention to the fact that the United States had slid into the "bloody swamp of bureaucratic-military institutions which subordinate everything to their own power and suppress everything" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 33, p 38). The current developments in the United States are a continuation of this process. The voices of sober American politicians are suppressed in the course of the chauvinistic campaign, and the upper hand is assumed by the puppets of the military-industrial complex, to whom the interests of the American and other nations are merely a currency in the game of big war business.

Particular efforts are being made to accelerate the arms race in Europe. The purpose is obvious. Europe is an area in which detente has been most successful, for which reason the militarists would like to undermine it precisely here. The Pentagon is trying to increase the contribution of U.S. military bloc allies in the implementation of its plans for establishing a certain "technological superiority" over the members of the socialist comity. In an effort to "tie" more reliably the military complexes of its allies to the U.S. military machine, Washington is involving them in joint actions under NATO's aegis. Such was the case of the long-term 15-year program for "updating" NATO armaments, which was passed at the Washington session of the NATO Council in May 1978, a program which calls for the additional expenditure of \$80 billion. In order to cover this huge sum a decision was made to raise the military appropriations of NATO countries by 3 percent annually in real figures, i.e., taking inflation into consideration. At every NATO meeting the American bosses literally grab by the throat members of the bloc who drag their feet in wasting on military preparations funds which they urgently need for the solution of grave economic problems.

Washington not only extracts from its Western European allies funds for war (and for giving profits to the military-industrial complex), but is trying to make them the victims of an inevitable counterstrike in the vain hope of safeguarding its own territory from the flames of war. This is one of the most dangerous aspects of plans for the deployment of American medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In the past, wars waged on foreign soil were the source of enrichment of American imperialism. This has become such an intrinsic part of its nature that even today, despite the existence of global strategic armaments in the world, as we pointed out, the American politicians are dreaming of shifting a nuclear war to the European continent.

Alongside such sinister plans, as far as the Western Europeans are concerned, the present American administration is trying to broaden NATO's "area of action," i.e., to involve this bloc in activities aimed at assigning to the United States the function of "global policeman." Over the past few months, Washington has openly called for a more active involvement of its Western European allies in a possible military intervention in the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of the world. This supports the conclusion of the author of "Global'naya Strategiya SShA v Usloviyakh Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoy Revolyutsii" that the current U.S. administration is trying to make the course of further intensification of the arms race the principal, the dominating line in the activities of the North Atlantic bloc virtually for the balance of this century (see p 434). It is trying to adapt the bloc to its global strategy and make it a direct instrument in the struggle against the worldwide national-liberation movement.

American imperialism is trying to make the Chinese leadership an accomplice in the implementation of its global plans. As we know, the Beijing leaders would like to make China a "superpower" by the end of the century, above all by expanding and updating the country's military potential. Speculating on anti-Sovietism, they are hoping to involve in this process the imperialist powers as well. The trip which H. Brown, the American secretary of defense, made to Beijing at the beginning of 1980, the talks he held and the subsequent visit to the United States by Geng Biao, State Council vice-premier, and A. Haig's servile trip to Beijing proved that Washington is ready to assist in the plans of the Chinese hegemonists and to give them military-technical aid. The rapprochement between Beijing and American imperialism, based on the struggle against international detente and peaceful coexistence among nations, is an unquestionable threat to the cause of peace.

The studies of Soviet Americanists irrefutably prove that the present turn in U.S. policy was conceived some time ago, that it is not a question of a hasty remaking of old concepts into "new" doctrines and that the current plans for "updating" NATO armaments, the formulation of new strategic system and the inflation of military budgets have undergone solid preparations over a number of years.

A rather cynical hope may be seen behind the notorious "unpredictability" of White House maneuvers, as described today by the Western press: the effort to increase with its help the pressure applied on Washington's allies in order to force them to take steps totally contrary to their interests. Actually, this was precisely the tactics which American diplomacy has been following in the past few months when it asked of its allies to break economic relations with the Soviet Union or apply economic sanctions against Iran. This can only be described as open blackmail.

Naturally, it would be an error to underestimate the essentially negative impulse which American imperialism was able to give to the arms race at the start of the 1980's. Suffice it to say that the production of major weaponry systems which Washington undertook at that time is assessed as costing more than \$300 billion. Such systems seem to generate the energy of their social support forces--the militaristic groups which would like to undermine the process of international detente, turn the world back to balancing "on the brink of war" and continued military rivalry. We know, however, that American imperialism has already tried to pursue a similar line and that such attempts have resulted in a deep crisis in American foreign policy and in the aggravation of the country's economic, political and social difficulties. This has made the unrealistic nature of Washington's main objectives, which were shaped at the peak of the Cold War, obvious. Views of the world based on frenzied anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, on which the U.S. political course was based at that time, were unable to withstand the test of reality.

As was noted in the 23 June 1980 CC CPSU Plenum decree, detente is the natural result of the global ratio of forces which has developed over recent decades. The military-strategic balance reached between the socialist and the capitalist worlds is a gain of essential historical significance. It is a factor which restrains the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, something which is consistent with the basic interests of all nations. Hopes that this balance may be disturbed are doomed to failure.

One of the characters in E. Caldwell's novel "Georgia Boy" hoped to "make money" by selling "expandable family-size coffins." As was to be expected, he failed. Today's "old boys" from another state--California--are offering the American people something quite similar. Obviously, they are unfamiliar with their prototype created by the famous American writer, and with the predictable outcome of this kind of enterprise.

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SHORT BOOK REVIEWS

Moscow **KOMMUNIST** in Russian No 16, Nov 81 pp 125-127

[Text] V. Ya. Dobrokhotov. "Razrabotka V. I. Leninykh Nauchnykh Osnov Partiynoy Propagandy" [V. I. Lenin's Development of the Scientific Foundations of Party Propaganda]. Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1980, 263 pages. Reviewed by Dr of Historical Sciences V. Ivanov.

The 26th CPSU Congress called for upgrading the effectiveness of ideological education and for reorganizing many sectors and areas of ideological activity. The party bases the implementation of this instruction on the inviolable Leninist principles, which were developed and enriched in the course of the building of socialism and communism.

The author proves that Marxist-Leninist theory is the scientific basis of the propaganda activities of a party of a new type. He describes in detail the principles of party propaganda comprehensively developed by V. I. Lenin, such as party-mindedness, scientific approach, fruitfulness and ties with revolutionary practice and life. He extensively analyzes the most important ways and means of propaganda work, examples of which are found in Lenin's works. The author uses the extensive specific historical data which chronologically cover virtually all of Lenin's revolutionary activities.

The book describes the beginning of the Leninist stage of revolutionary propaganda during the period of the establishment and shaping of the Bolshevik Party. It describes the manner in which the leader of the proletariat developed the Marxist theory on the scientific foundations of communist propaganda, protecting it from the attacks of opportunistic elements. Lenin's role as the leader, theoretician and organizer of agitation and propaganda work is described along with the most essential moments in the history of the party's ideological work.

As the author emphasizes, the starting point of Lenin's approach to defining the nature, tasks and methods of party propaganda is the principle of party-mindedness. In the final account, Leninist party-mindedness predetermines the possibility of implementing its other principles, which convert propaganda into an effective means in the class struggle of the proletariat. Party-mindedness is the consistent and concentrated manifestation of class positions. It determines the party propaganda qualities such as high idea-mindedness, intolerance of any manifestation of hostile ideology, aggressiveness, purposefulness, skillful exposure of bourgeois and revisionist falsifiers, militancy, principle-mindedness and political acuity.

Every single Leninist address bears the mark of intolerance of hostile private ownership ideology and is a model of consistent communist idea-mindedness. The author cites numerous cases showing the systematic and principle-minded struggle which Lenin

waged for party propaganda ideological purity. We know, for example, how sharply he criticized Bukharin's book "The Economy of the Transitional Period." On the basis of Lenin's concepts, M. S. Or'minskiy, the noted party publicist, pointed out that Bukharin found himself "in the same camp as Martov, the Mensheviks and the revisionists" (p 72).

V. I. Lenin gave the example of militant and aggressive spirit of party propaganda. "Our main task," he taught, "is...to pit our own truth against bourgeois 'truth' and force its acknowledgment" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 399). Lenin repeatedly emphasized in his work the importance of vigilance in ideological work.

Lenin considered inseparable ties with life, the masses and the practice of revolutionary struggle and construction as the source of strength and effectiveness of party propaganda. The presentation of even the most complex theoretical problem by the propagandist should make the student realize his specific role in the class struggle of the proletariat. V. Ya. Dobrokhotoy emphasizes that the sense of all of Lenin's propaganda work is a call to action.

Lenin's views determine the current propaganda activities of our party, and their successful implementation is the most important prerequisite for its effectiveness. In tracing the strict continuity of party propaganda, the author is guided by the party documents which earmark the means for the advancement of ideological and political and educational work today. It is worth noting that the final section of each chapter contains data on the development of Lenin's views in CPSU documents and in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's works, particularly the two-volume "Aktual'nyye Voprosy Ideologicheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Topical Problems of CPSU Ideological Work] and the books "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth] and "Tselina" [Virgin Land].

On the basis of Lenin's methodology, the author proves that the role of the party's ideological work has increased under contemporary conditions. It is one of the most important factors in the building of communism.

The CC CPSU decree "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Educational Work" calls for "ensuring the high scientific level of propaganda and agitation." This party document, which was rated highly by the 26th party congress, represents the further development of Lenin's ideas on the revolutionary upbringing of the masses and on methods of political education work.

The implementation of the Leninist principle of scientific propaganda today means conducting it on the level of the contemporary achievements of the social sciences and in close connection with the specific tasks of improving developed socialism. "The party demands of the workers on the ideological front," the author states, "the creative propaganda of the great Marxist-Leninist doctrine, so that the people are not merely aware of its basic concepts but learn how to find in theory, in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin and in CPSU documents the key, the most accurate method for the solution of the problems which our present-day reality raises" (p 130). Loyalty to the cause of communism, inflexible belief in the correctness of the party's policy, life-bearing Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, party principle-mindedness, a creative attitude toward the work, an intolerance of any manifestation of hostile ideology or retreat from the norms of communist morality, these are the criteria of propaganda party-mindedness today (see p 96).

The author is entirely correct in concluding that there is no difference between the form and content of communist propaganda. The decisive elimination of elements of formalism and pomposity, and the steady search for a lively and clear form of presentation are important prerequisites in upgrading the effectiveness of ideological work. Verbal triteness, cliches and repetition of universally known truths, misuse of abstractions, pomposity, use of pseudoscientific style, lack of convincing arguments, and inability to engage in dialogue with the audience on an intimate basis, as well as other shortcomings exposed by the party, must be decisively eliminated. The party organizations are doing extensive work in this direction.

The thorough study of Lenin's lessons of militant and aggressive party propaganda contained in this book will be of unquestionable use to propagandists.

L. L. Murav'yeva and I. I. Sivolap-Kaftanova. "Lenin v Londone. Pamyatnyye Mesta" [Lenin in London. Memorable Sites]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1981, 222 pages. Reviewed by Dr of Historical Sciences V. Novikov.

In March 1920, filling out the form for delegate to the Ninth RKP(b) Congress, Lenin answered the question about the period of time spent as an emigre as follows: "1900-1905 and 1908-1917" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 40, pp 233-235). He was forced to spend almost 15 years outside Russia, away from the center of the revolutionary workers movement, and away from relatives, family and friends. Vladimir Il'ich yearned for the beloved Volga areas but, as he pointed out himself, "frequently the revolutionary struggle is impossible without revolutionary exile" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 30, p 270).

As an emigre he experienced the most difficult events of the class struggles, privations and persecution by the authorities. Great Britain was one of the 12 countries in which Lenin was forced to work during his wanderings dedicated to his endeavors.

The Soviet researchers have made extensive studies of Lenin's life and revolutionary activities as an emigre. However, unfortunately not very much has been written about that period, although there is a great deal of interest in the topic. Unquestionably, the publication of "Lenin v Londone" will draw the attention of the broad social circles. The value of the book lies above all in the fact that it offers a strictly documentary study of the London period in Lenin's life and activities in 1902-1903, and his visits to the British capital in 1903, 1905, 1907, 1908 and 1911. The authors have not simply made a thorough study of the numerous events and facts and the happenstances of the extremely great struggle waged at that time but have felt and experienced them profoundly. The fact that they have seen many of the places personally is no less important. It is precisely this personal involvement that largely accounts for the success of their book.

The people's desire to become better acquainted with Lenin's genius and his life and to discover something new, something previously unknown in them is entirely natural. The work under review entirely meets these requirements.

The authors extensively describe Lenin's London exile of 1902-1903. Fearing detention by the German police, the Munich section of the ISKRA editors, headed by Vladimir Il'ich, was forced to move to London hastily and to continue the publication of the newspaper from there. This was done so skillfully and efficiently that there was absolutely no interruption in printing the newspaper and shipping it to Russia. The ISKRA personnel showed extremely high levels of organization while operating under conditions of secrecy.

Along with other topics, the book describes Lenin's friends and acquaintances in London, the sites he visited, the nature of the secret correspondence between ISKRA editors and the Russians in Russia, and Vladimir Il'ich's scientific and theoretical work. With the help of specific examples the authors show how thanks to the dedicated work done by Lenin and the editors of ISKRA, the all-Russian newspaper they had created, they were able to achieve the ideological and organizational unification of the social democratic organizations in Russia. The absolute majority of these organizations accepted ISKRA as their leading organ. This was a major step in our party's history when, to use Lenin's metaphor, "the entire flower of the conscious proletariat took the side of ISKRA" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 26, p 344).

The large amount of factual data included in the book proves the close ties which Lenin maintained with many noted leaders of the British labor movement. Lenin and the Russian revolutionary social democrats kept their relations with them and turned to them for help whenever necessary. It was no accident that it was precisely in London that the Second, Third and Fifth RSDWP congresses were held. One of the chapters in the book describes Lenin's participation in their proceedings.

Lenin's life in London was rich and productive on the creative level as well. Vladimir Il'ich spent many hours and days in one of the richest libraries in the world--the British Museum. Books were of vital importance to him, particularly in his scientific theoretical work. In London he wrote many articles and a pamphlet for the peasants entitled "To the Rural Poor." Later on, when he was writing "Materialism and Empirical Criticism," he made a special trip to London from Geneva to expand his knowledge and complete the project. Throughout his entire life Lenin tirelessly struggled for the purity of revolutionary Marxism. In this struggle he also relied on knowledge acquired at the library of the British Museum.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the S.R. petit bourgeois party was a major threat to the revolutionary workers movement. Lenin and the ISKRA editors had worked hard to debunk them. In the summer of 1902, Vladimir Il'ich wrote in ISKRA a series of articles against the S.R. Furthermore, he regularly addressed workers and international meetings in Paris, Geneva, Lausanne, Berne, Zurich, Liege and London on the subject of the program and tactics of the S.R. Party. After one such speech in Whitechapel in London, in a letter to G. V. Plekhanov he reported that the speech was attended by "many workers contaminated by anarchism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 46, p 238). The revolutionary social democrats actively participated in such actions in various European cities. At the time of the sharpest struggle against the S.R., Plekhanov, the outstanding Marxist propagandist in Russia, angrily wrote: "The 'socialist revolutionaries' are the true reactionaries in Russian socialism. It is justifiably being said about them that have a double name precisely because their socialism is not revolutionary and their revolutionism has nothing in common with socialism" ("Soch." [Works], Vol IX, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1925, p 8).

The course of the struggle against the S.R. is presented somewhat briefly by the authors because of the limitations of the book and the broad range of problems discussed, although the presentation is quite interesting.

The book includes many documentary materials describing Lenin's life in London. The reader can see Vladimir Il'ich at home, at rest and among comrades and friends. This in itself is quite important, for it describes the atmosphere in which he worked.

On the basis of a thorough study of published materials and archives, the authors provide an extensive enumeration of memorable sites in London with their specific addresses. This is a first in historical literature. Good illustrations accompany the book. The quality of the printing and the presentation make a good impression. Unquestionably, this is a work written on a good scientific level.

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BOOKSHELF

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 17, Nov 81 p 128

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