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# USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 14, September 1981

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USSR REPORT  
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No. 14, September 1981

Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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## STRUGGLE FOR MANKIND'S FUTURE

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[Text] The historical importance of the 26th CPSU Congress to the life of all mankind, the conclusions entered in its documents and the ideas and suggestions formulated during its proceedings are becoming ever clearer and broader with every passing month. With its exhaustive characterization of the present global situation and the status of international relations and its summation of the preceding period of comprehensive activity by the Leninist party and the Soviet state in the area of foreign policy, the congress expressed its weighty opinions on basic problems in contemporary social developments. The foreign policy line of the CPSU and Soviet state, formulated by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary, in the Central Committee's accountability report to the congress and unanimously approved by the delegates, became the most important factor in international life and in the struggle being waged by progressive forces to restrain the arms race, to strengthen peace and detente and to defend the sovereign rights and freedoms of the peoples.

Now, more than half a year after the congress, we can assert with full confidence that its results will determine the course of world events to an increasing extent.

As is justifiably believed by many political and social leaders, the 1980s can be of essential significance to the outcome of the universal-historical battle to prevent a catastrophic nuclear conflict. The situation is difficult and tense, stressed, one could say. Naturally, there is no reason to claim that the world is in some kind of prewar condition. However, the thunder-bearing clouds accumulating on the horizon, unless dispersed, will pose a potentially increasing threat to the future of all mankind.

Today's Western world includes many pessimistic politicians and philosophers who assume that the policy of detente, which promised the nations a lengthy period of peaceful coexistence and mutually profitable cooperation among countries with different social systems, is dead. Civilization, they claim, is almost in its final stage. At this point, they note the ever increasing stockpiles of armaments, claiming that the forces of militarism are no longer controllable. According to others of their colleagues, not all is yet lost and a solution to the crisis in international relations could be found by relying either on providence or the eternal adaptability of mankind to any misfortune. In the final account, however, both tend to await the inevitable passively and are ready to tolerate the activities of aggressive imperialist circles, those in America above all, which rely on the all-round intensification of tension and accelerated preparations for military

conflicts and wars and try to prove that a nuclear war is not only possible but could even be won by capitalism and would not be fatal to the private-ownership system as a whole.

The current U. S. administration has actually set military superiority over the Soviet Union as the primary objective of its foreign and domestic policy for the next several years. Next year alone, the Pentagon's expenditures will be increased by more than \$40 billion and will reach a total of \$226 billion; the planned military budget for the next 5 years is \$1.5 trillion, or almost as much as has been spent by the United States on its armed forces over the past 12 years. The Reagan administration is openly relying on an accelerated increase in nuclear armaments of all kinds, from intercontinental missiles to the neutron bomb, while preparing the development of new and increasingly monstrous types of mass destruction weapons, including laser rays, which will be used for combat operations from outer space, with the help of earth satellites. Entire parts of the world are unceremoniously being proclaimed spheres of "vital U. S. interest" in which the possibility of armed intervention cannot be excluded. Interventionist "rapid deployment forces" are being created.

Fortunately for mankind, the range of political moods in the Western world is far from exhausted by the views of the priests of militarism and hegemony or the prophets of doom, who are trying to "pipe the tune" along the way to a boundless aggravation of the power confrontation. The political course of the rulers of the United States and some NATO countries and the Beijing hegemonists who share their views is encountering growing resistance from broad public circles who are unwilling to reconcile themselves to the statement that war is certain and inevitable, and who are confident that international disputes can and must be resolved not on the battlefield but through negotiation.

Under the circumstances of the tension heated up by imperialist circles, the continuing arms race, onslaughts against the forces of national and social liberation and the attempts to weaken real socialism and undermine the unity of the socialist comity, on the one hand, and the rising opposition to this policy on the part of all opponents of militarism and hegemonism and all people of good will, on the other, the Soviet Union is asserting its principled support of the struggle for the fundamental interests of the peoples firmly, invariably, always and everywhere. It is struggling tirelessly and consistently, with increasing scope and intensity, for the preservation and strengthening of peace, and an end to the arms race, disarmament and social progress. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statement at the closing of the 26th CPSU Congress is being implemented in concrete actions: "We intend to concentrate all our forces along two interrelated directions. The first is the building of communism, and the second is strengthening the peace."

The truth is that virtually all important agreements aimed at the preservation and development of detente and restraining the arms race which were achieved during the previous decade and the most important talks which were initiated on these problems were the result of initiatives on the part of the USSR and the other members of the socialist comity. As a result, everything positive accomplished in international life is solidly linked in the minds of the peoples to the policy of the Soviet Union. Today as well, in accordance with the instructions of the 26th congress, the CPSU and the Soviet state are systematically pursuing a truly humane Leninist foreign political course. Displaying firmness, self-possession and

principle-mindedness, the Soviet Union is fully resolved not to yield to provocations, while firmly countering various kinds of hostile campaigns, starting with the slanderous myth of the "Soviet military threat" and ending with the hypocritical campaign in "defense of human rights" and attempts to ascribe involvement with "international terrorism" to Moscow. The thesis to the effect that the "pivotal line of the party's and the state's foreign political activities was and remains the struggle to reduce the threat of war and restrain the arms race," which was formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress, is being followed firmly and steadfastly.

The peace program for the 1980s formulated by the congress remains the focal point of world politics. It covers measures for the reduction of nuclear-missile and conventional weapons and contains suggestions on the settlement of existing and the prevention of new conflicts and crises, and is imbued with the desire to intensify detente and to develop peaceful cooperation among nations on all continents. It expresses the readiness of the Soviet Union to engage in talks on all topical problems of peace and security and to consider carefully any constructive ideas formulated by other countries.

The foreign policy initiatives of the 26th CPSU Congress determine the main topics of today's international life. However, they are not influenced by short-term considerations. The tasks which the congress set for Soviet foreign policy are both topical and long-term. They are the foundations for our practical diplomatic activities. The Soviet peace initiatives, which were expressed at the congress and in subsequent speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, are specific and of a comprehensive and constructive nature. They apply to Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, the Far East and Southeast Asia. In developing real opportunities for finding mutually acceptable solutions based on equality and equal safety, these new ideas, concepts and proposals contain nothing which would result in one-sided benefits.

Our party and Soviet state have launched a persistent, comprehensive and consistent effort for the implementation of the foreign policy program of the congress. The events of recent months clearly prove that this policy will have a beneficial effect on the development of the situation in the current decade. It is entirely clear that without the active and purposeful activity of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries for the implementation of the Soviet proposals, the situation in the world would have been even more difficult and explosive. Furthermore, the topicality of these proposals is increasing, for the activity of the imperialist countries, the United States above all, shows no tendency whatever to abandon the line hindering the detente process and to improve the international climate.

Today, as in the past, Europe is one of the leading concerns in Soviet foreign policy proposals and actions. This is understandable, for it is precisely conflicts originating on this continent, where such powerful military capacities are focussed in close proximity, which have developed into world wars on two previous occasions. Another characteristic of the present situation is that along with the already extant hotbeds of military threat, another is appearing. The actual confirmation of this is found in the plans imposed by the United States on its NATO allies for the deployment on the territory of a number of Western European countries of almost 600 additional American nuclear missiles targeted on the Soviet Union and the other



Warsaw Pact members. Whereas the USSR is suggesting that the Western European countries build the political and military security of the continent on the reliable foundations of European economic, political, scientific and technical and cultural cooperation, a policy which has yielded tangible results, particularly since the 1975 Helsinki agreement, the Pentagon is looking at Europe as nothing but a future "theater of military operations" in which the plans for waging a so-called "limited" nuclear war could be carried out without, as is believed possible across the ocean, affecting U. S. territory. At the same time, motivated by a feeling of bourgeois class solidarity in the face of the growing successes of the anti-imperialist forces, and for the sake of pleasing their overseas partners, the leaders of Great Britain, the FRG and some other countries are ready to support the Pentagon's efforts to create conditions for waging a "limited" nuclear war on European soil, thus agreeing to play the role of "nuclear hostages" to American imperialism.

NATO's plans for deploying new American nuclear missiles on the territory of Western European countries have already caused a drastic change for the worse in the continent's political climate and have contributed to the implementation of Washington's plans for separating the western from the eastern part of Europe and establishing American domination over Western Europe. President Reagan's recent decision to begin the production of nuclear means of destruction such as the neutron bomb marked a new stage in the escalation of preparations for a nuclear war. The manufacturing of the neutron bomb and its subsequent deployment in Europe -- a prospect which sober minded Western political leaders consider to be the inevitable next step in the Pentagon's plans -- cannot fail to bring about a dangerous lowering of the so-called "nuclear threshold," or, simply stated, a higher risk of nuclear war. Combined with the U. S. refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty, which blocked the further growth of stockpiles and the qualitative improvement of strategic intercontinental missiles, and with preparations for the deployment of new medium-range missiles, the undertaking of production of the neutron bomb, a so-called close-combat weapon, provides a sufficiently comprehensive picture of the practical preparations launched by the American military for the nuclear conflict being planned, in which, as confirmed by the very nature of the preparations, Washington would be ready to play the role of initiator.

In any case, the impression is created that the militant imperialist circles are deliberately heading toward a return to the worst times of the cold war which, under present conditions, would involve even greater dangers and risks. It is precisely this alarming prospect for the peoples which creates the urgency of holding international talks, as pointed out by the Soviet Union. Our country emphasizes that today there is no sensible means for the resolution of disputes, however serious and complex they may be, other than sober and meaningful dialog. In this area no single opportunity must be missed, for the risk of a nuclear conflict is increasing with every lost day. The realistically-minded Western political leaders also are pointing out the need for serious talks based on the real need to achieve positive results and the readiness of the parties to make their contribution to them.

In this connection, in the opinion of the fraternal socialist countries, the successful completion of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the 35 participants in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be of great importance. The purpose of the meeting is to strengthen and develop the process of settling relations among countries belonging to different social systems

on the basis of equality, trust and mutually profitable cooperation initiated in the Finnish capital 6 years ago. Unquestionably, the holding of a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe, as proposed by the USSR, would represent such a positive result of the meeting.

The American side is showing a basically different attitude toward such talks. Today's rulers in Washington aspire not to reaching agreement on a mutually acceptable basis but to the creation of a certain superiority in military power for themselves. This is an intention which clearly shows a claim to global leadership and, essentially, to world domination. True, under the pressure of world public opinion, President Reagan promised in his talk with FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt to start talks with the Soviet Union on the subject of medium-range missiles in Europe before the end of 1981. However, nothing has been said about the intention to hold talks on an equal basis so that they may contribute to normalizing the situation; no mention is made of any wish to reach agreement as soon as possible; the good-will offer of the Soviet Union to stop deploying its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country the moment the talks are really under way, and providing the American side take a similar step, is not mentioned.

In itself, the promise to start talks is an unquestionably positive fact. However, words and promises must be followed by actions, the more so since, as current practical experience in international relations indicates, talks on important problems frequently become bogged down not only for a period of months but many years through the fault of the Western participants, as has been the case, for example, with the Vienna talks on reducing the size of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, which have been under way for the past 8 years. This has been true despite the readiness to reach an agreement shown by the Soviet Union and the other participating members of the socialist comity.

As to Soviet-American talks, the USSR has frequently emphasized, from the highest level, its readiness to undertake them immediately. Meanwhile, the new U. S. administration has avoided any discussion whatever of such very important subjects as restraining the armament process, the elimination of hotbeds of conflicts and the peaceful resolution of international disputes. No one but President Reagan himself is the author of the statement that "One could argue, if such argument breaks out at all, about what weapons we need and what we do not, but not at all about whether or not we must give up weapons for the sake of treaties or agreements." In an atmosphere of the widespread preaching of hatred for the Soviet Union carried out in the United States with the blessings and involvement of the country's influential political leadership, a great deal of effort must be made, mainly and above all by the American side, as indicated by the development of the situation, in which Soviet-U. S. talks on nuclear armaments could lead to practical results without unnecessary delays. Unquestionably in this case, the adoption of a firm position in favor of the soonest possible successful completion of the talks by American and other foreign political circles and public forces, having realistically assessed the dangers to peace of the U. S. course to the establishment of military superiority over the countries of real socialism, would be of great importance.

The fact that the Western European countries are showing a growing understanding of the extent to which Washington's imperial ambitions are contrary to their vital interests must not be ignored. Despite the gross and unceremonious pressure applied to them from the other side of the ocean, the leading circles in some of these



countries have expressed themselves quite firmly against the intensification of the arms race and in favor of continuing the dialog with the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist comity and energizing contacts with them, including reciprocally profitable economic relations which Washington insists be broken. Thus, the governments of The Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark and the leading circles in many other countries are defending their right to make independent political decisions with varying degrees of firmness and are unwilling to obey the demand to join in the unrestrained arms race.

Many noted governmental and political leaders in Western European countries are in favor of initiating talks with the Soviet Union as soon as possible on problems of missiles and preventing the deployment of neutron warheads on the continent. Such a movement has gathered extensive momentum in the FRG, where the bulk of the membership of the ruling Social Democratic and Free Democratic parties are in opposition to the leadership of the parties and the government on such matters. In Britain, it is the opposition Labor Party which rejects the American plans. The proposals supported by the USSR and the other socialist countries, which call for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe and the Balkans, and the normalizing of the situation throughout the Mediterranean, are gaining increasing popularity in Western Europe.

The efforts of the militant U. S. imperialist circles and their Beijing accomplices have worsened the situation in Asia, Africa, the Pacific Ocean, Central America and the Caribbean. Tension in already existing hotbeds of conflicts in the Near and Middle East, the area of the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Far East is growing. Armed provocations on the part of the Chinese military and its Pol Pot following along the borders of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are continuing unceasingly. Undeclared war is being waged against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. With a view to forcing Libya to abandon its independent foreign policy, the American military organized yet another act of international terrorism by attacking Libyan airplanes. The Israeli aggression in Lebanon is continuing uninterrupted, with Washington's patronage. The ruling racist leadership in the Republic of South Africa is mounting large-scale piratical operations against the People's Republic of Angola, while the latest veto cast by the American representative blocked the just condemnation of such actions by the UN Security Council.

The network of American military bases is expanding in a number of areas in Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean. Attempts are being made to restore old and set up new military blocs. Virtually open pressure is being applied to a number of young states with a view to their inclusion in the aggressive orbit of Washington and the Beijing hegemonists. They are being promised military aid and provoked into competing in the arms race.

In this kind of disturbed situation created in various parts of the globe by the actions of the aggressive imperialist circles, the appeal issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World" was particularly timely and of mobilizing importance. It called upon them to express themselves decisively in favor of talks which would block a new round in the nuclear missile race, talks which would be honest and equal, with no preliminary conditions or attempts at diktat. "Time's awasting!" was the urgent reminder of the Soviet parliamentarians, addressed to the entire world. Any postponment of the resolution of the problem of

stopping the arms race is becoming increasingly unacceptable, for our planet is already oversaturated with mass destruction weapons and attempts are being made to accustom the people in the West to the vicious idea that their application is admissible. The peoples were forced to pay an excessively stiff price for the fact that 4 decades ago world war could not be prevented, and this harsh lesson must not be in vain.

The USSR Supreme Soviet appeal was a document of great international significance not only because it was addressed to the supreme authorities of countries throughout the world and urged parliamentarians to use their potential to act for the good of detente and international cooperation. It fully and totally follows Lenin's tradition, whose beginning was established on the very first day of the founding of the Soviet system, with the approval of the Decree on Peace by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. In the grave situation of that time, V. I. Lenin said: "Governments and peoples are at odds with each other everywhere, for which reason we must help the peoples to intervene in matters of war and peace" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 16. Remaining loyal to this instruction, the Soviet Union is turning in this difficult time in international development to the governments and the peoples, firmly convinced that intelligence, conscience and faith in the future will be a mighty weapon for all true supporters of peace and that such a weapon is unavailable to their opponents in the camp of militarism and confrontation.

The unanimously approved solemn declaration of the Soviet people's deputies was heard throughout the world: "The Soviet Union...has not been nor will it become the initiator of new spirals in the arms race. There is no type of weapon it would not agree to limit or ban on the basis of a reciprocal agreement with other countries." This declaration was heard by all supporters of peace and people of good will and was echoed in the hearts of millions who care about the fate of mankind and its safety. The appeal was supported not only by the supreme state organs of the members of the socialist comity but by many parliamentarians, the leaders of many political parties and organizations and noted political and social leaders in the West. However, we must also note that a different response was also encountered. For example, the members of the Congress of the United States pretended that they had no knowledge of the existence of this USSR Supreme Soviet document, while some petty NATO politicians hastened to christen it "the Kremlin's propaganda action."

As always, the struggle for preserving peace and defeating aggressive imperialist intentions today is closely linked with the activities of the anti-imperialist forces of our time which are aimed at strengthening democracy and guaranteeing the freedom of the peoples. In other words, it is being waged within a broad political context. No other way is possible. According to Marxism, politics, in the broadest meaning of the word, including foreign policy, is the relationship among classes. Relations among countries with different social systems are built on a class foundation. The Soviet Union has never concealed this, nor does it do so now. "Our foreign policy," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev says, "has always been and remains a class, a socialist policy." The same principle is followed by the other members of the socialist comity in their foreign policy. As a class policy, socialist in content, the struggle for the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence is also profoundly humane. It is consistent with the interests of all mankind, and rallies the efforts of a substantial number of countries and multi-million-strong mass movements.

The radical change in the social and political aspect of the contemporary world, the loss of one position after another by monopoly capital and the weakening of its foundations as a result of the growing crises in its citadels determine and explain the current outbreak of aggressiveness on the part of the most reactionary imperialist circles. Therefore, it is not a question of accidental factors related to the access of members of the right wing in the American bourgeois camp to power in Washington, a reaction to individual revolutionary changes in one part of the world or another, or the consequences of one voluntaristic decision or another made in Washington, but of the strengthening of the positions of the militaristic faction in the camp of American imperialism as a consequence of certain circumstances. On the other hand, the achievements of real socialism and the national liberation movement and the development of the world revolutionary process as a whole are the most substantive confirmation of the fundamentally optimistic conclusion drawn at the 26th CPSU Congress and the similar conclusions reached by the other fraternal parties regarding the possibility of defeating imperialism's aggressive plans and preventing war. This possibility is not someone's pious wish but is based on a strictly scientific assessment, on a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the essence of the social development of mankind at the present stage and on belief in the inevitable triumph of the new over the old and the developing and strengthening over the dying and the obsolete, a triumph which, however, does not take place without a decisive and sometimes hard struggle.

The materials of the 26th CPSU Congress provide an expanded answer to the question of the prerequisites for a successful detente policy in the period just past. They include, first of all, the result of the military-strategic balance which exists in the world between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The existence of such a balance tied the hands of imperialism and deprived it of any serious hope of success in the use of power, military included, and methods of struggle against the countries of real socialism. The possibilities of using force against the national liberation movement were substantially curtailed as well. Here is an interesting fact: according to the American Brookings Institution, the United States has resorted to the use of armed forces on more than 200 occasions since World War II to achieve its foreign policy objectives; however, as the breakdown by years shows, the number of such actions began to decline as military-strategic parity began to exist between the United States and the USSR.

The accountability report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the other speeches by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev repeatedly stressed the lack of any reason whatever for the fabrications of imperialist propaganda, according to which the efforts made by the Soviet side of late have resulted in a change in the military balance in its favor. Approximate parity remains in strategic nuclear arms, medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, tanks and overall size of armed forces, as confirmed by measurable data. In moments of frankness this is admitted by some leading American political figures as well. In rejecting the assertion that Soviet military power had increased "immeasurably," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his 7 December speech that "As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have never sought nor do we now seek military superiority. We are neither going nor intending to go beyond concern for the reliable protection of our country and the safety of our allies."

The active policy of peace pursued by the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, the strength of which lies above all in its consistency with



the vital interests of the majority of the earth's population, has played a decisive role in strengthening detente and its success. The growing economic and defense power of the homeland of the Great October Revolution and of the entire socialist comity, and the overall ratio of force in the world, which is changing in favor of socialism, have created an entirely new international situation characterized by a progressively growing limitation of the freedom of action of imperialism.

One of the noteworthy proofs of the overall narrowing of the global positions of imperialism in its confrontation with the forces of progress and peace is its obvious inability to act on a world-wide scale along all fronts in this confrontation, or to play a dominating role in world economics and politics and in the military and ideological areas. The very fact that imperialism today is concentrating its main hopes almost exclusively on the military-technical factor and on achieving military superiority and that the U. S. ruling circles are subordinating all aspects of their activity to this relatively limited objective clearly proves capitalism's loss of ability to undertake any major positive initiative of a political-strategic nature.

The solidarity among the fraternal socialist countries in the world arena, based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism, is the most important factor for success in the struggle against the danger of war. "It is entirely obvious today that the Soviet Union and its allies are now more than ever before the main bulwark of peace on earth," the 26th CPSU Congress indicated.

While strengthening cooperation among themselves, the socialist countries are ready to develop mutually useful relations with other countries. The members of the socialist comity believe that such relations, if based on the strong and stable foundations of true equality and mutual respect for the interests of the parties and free of discrimination or political pressure, could substantially contribute to normalizing the international situation and could provide real benefits to all participants.

The most important prerequisites for a steady increase in their influence on the international situation are an expanded scale of foreign political cooperation among socialist states, further intensification of its content and increased effectiveness in their coordinated actions. The members of the comity are countering the imperialist line and that of Beijing, which is coming ever closer to it (in the pursuit of its own objectives, incidentally, which in the final account are not identical to those of America), with a clear and systematic course of strengthening the peace, restraining and stopping the arms race and ensuring the just settlement of crises at the conference table. The socialist countries believe that relations among countries with different social systems must be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This presumes lowering the level of military confrontation, permanent and constructive dialog and the development of mutually profitable cooperation. The course followed by the socialist states is meeting with a positive response from responsible political circles in different countries, as well as the international public.

The fraternal countries, which have developed a basic unity of views on major international problems, consider the peace program of the 26th CPSU Congress a common platform for action by our comity. The leadership of the ruling fraternal parties shares a profound reciprocal understanding, trust and agreement on problems

which include the need to counter the line of imperialist Western circles with a joint and tested class course.

The members of the socialist comity are tightening their ranks even more closely. Problems related to the world situation and related foreign policy tasks facing the countries of real socialism were resubmitted to comprehensive evaluation at the meetings held between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the heads of fraternal parties and states in the Crimea in July-August 1981, and their foreign policy was coordinated. It was confirmed that the members of the socialist comity are ready to engage in dialog and cooperate with all forces concerned with the present condition prevailing in international relations, and desire to strengthen international security. "The socialist countries," the document entitled "At the Central Committee of the CPSU," which considers the results of the Crimean meetings by the Central Committee Politburo, reads, "have everything necessary to protect their vital interests and will do everything that is required in this respect. However, they have always believed that the benefits of peace are needed by all countries and peoples. Peace is common property and its preservation and consolidation must be the common cause of all states."

Imperialist reliance on force and on frightening today's progressive forces compels the Soviet Union and the other members of the socialist comity to keep their powder dry and to maintain the power balance with the forces of the United States and NATO under the circumstances of their increased military potential in order to ensure the peaceful labor of the peoples which have embarked upon the path of socialist and communist building. The Soviet Armed Forces, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes, will have the necessary counterweight should new weapons systems appear in the arsenals of the United States and the other NATO members. The "Zapad-81" exercises conducted by the USSR Armed Forces, in particular, confirmed the existence of a firm alloy of high technical capability, military skill and invincible moral spirit. The power of the armed forces of the fraternal countries, united within the Warsaw Pact, erects an insurmountable barrier to the implementation of the aggressive plans of the imperialist reaction. Built on the basis of Lenin's ideas of collective defense of the gains of socialism, that organization has served for more than a quarter of a century and serves today as a reliable defense shield for socialism and as an important factor in international peace. The Warsaw Pact members are vigilantly reacting to intensified attempts on the part of imperialist circles to hinder the advance of socialism, to erode it from within to and profit, as occurred in Poland, from errors and miscalculations in domestic policy in order to energize elements hostile to socialism with a view to channeling the course of events in an antirevolutionary direction. The fraternal parties of the socialist comity state firmly and inflexibly that neither fear nor attempts to provoke them will yield results. Nor will the hope of the aggressive imperialist circles to turn back or at least to hinder the development of the world revolutionary process succeed.

The preservation and consolidation of peace and ensuring universal safety are inseparable from the course toward the revolutionary renovation of society, for in the final account the main forces which oppose profound social change and the strengthening of universal peace are one and the same -- the most reactionary and militant circles of monopoly capital. In the course of confronting them, in the struggle for social and national liberation, and in the various efforts to ensure international safety, the anti-imperialist movements are making most important

changes in the ratio of forces in the world and are increasing their positive contribution to the progressive development of mankind.

Under circumstances marked by noticeable class unification in the bourgeois camp, caused by its defeats and the growing difficulties encountered by capitalism, when influential factions in the ruling circles in various capitalist countries are ready to grant concessions to the policies of the most aggressive forces of American imperialism, the pressure exerted by the broad popular masses and the democratic public on governmental circles and the development of an influential public opinion in favor of detente and limiting nuclear and other armaments assumes growing importance. As was already mentioned, the current turn in imperialist policy to preparations for war has encountered and is encountering opposition from a wide variety of social and political forces in the West. This opposition must be supported comprehensively.

The growing strength and capacity for action in Western public circles which do not intend to accept the thoughtless current course of the American ruling strata and their NATO allies and other aggressive alliances as something necessary, inevitable and unavoidable are becoming increasingly apparent with every passing month. The antiwar movement throughout the world has today taken on a mass, truly nationwide nature. It involves the participation of hundreds of thousands, millions of people affiliated with different political, social, religious, women's, youth and other organizations.

The international working class and its political organizations are developing the struggle against the imperialist policy of war ever more firmly. The communist and workers parties -- the Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the proletariat -- are in the front ranks of this struggle. The systematic line of defense of peace is one of the most important directions in the activities of the international communist movement. The social democratic and socialist parties, which pull a great deal of political weight in the capitalist countries, could play and to a certain extent are playing a positive role in the struggle to reduce the threat of war and restrain the arms race, the more so since in recent years their international politics have been marked by certain positive changes in the direction of acknowledging the need for peaceful coexistence. The leadership of these parties cannot ignore the expectations of millions of people who thirst for peace and value the accomplishments of detente. It is precisely this that explains the position of the leadership of the Socialist International, which is showing an increasingly critical attitude toward the present foreign policy course of American imperialism.

In his time, Lenin pointed out that "as the historical creativity of the people broadens and intensifies, the size of that part of the population which is a conscious maker of history must expand as well" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 2, pp 539-540). Everything leads us to believe that the present stormy wave of activity directed against the military policy of the American administration and its allies reflects the intensification of such a process. The active involvement of the people's masses and their organizations in resolving the problem of war and peace is the result of the historical experience acquired by mankind, changes in the ratio of global forces and the positive features which the period of intensive development of detente brought to Western social awareness. The more or less permanent division of the bourgeoisie into various strata, groups and factions noted by Lenin, some of which "lean toward a military solution of the problem" while others "lean toward



pacifism" (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 45, p 70), indicates that the demands of today's antiwar movement may be met to one degree or another. This substantially weakens the positions of the aggressive imperialist circles. Peace is the common property of mankind and, in our time, the prime condition for its existence. It can be preserved and reliably secured only through the joint efforts of all peace-loving forces. Unquestionably, the influence of the ideas of peace on the leading political circles of all countries will grow and the storm-bearing clouds of war can in the final account be dispersed. A struggle against any minimizing either of the possibility of preventing world war or the danger of it is a decisive prerequisite for the conversion of this possibility into reality. "All of us know well that the power of the forces of peace, which are opposing the potential aggressor, is greater today than ever before," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 23 June USSR Supreme Soviet session. "However, we also know that the very nature of modern weapons is such that, should they be used, the future of mankind would be threatened."

The key problem in the international situation, on which the CPSU and the Soviet government, relying on the united will of the Soviet people and in close cooperation with all peace-loving forces, are working, involves reducing the level of tension, preserving detente and ensuring its further strengthening and dissemination.

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## ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IS THE PRIME CONCERN

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[Article by P. Griehkyavichus, CP of Lithuania Central Committee first secretary]

[Text] Soviet Lithuania has entered its fifth decade of socialist life. Thanks to the party's wise national policy, the Lithuanian people have within this relatively short historical period achieved unparalleled economic, social and cultural progress within the monolithic fraternal family of Soviet peoples.

Socialist industrialization predetermined the rapid development of the republic's entire economy. During the postwar years 227 large enterprises were built. The current gross industrial output is higher than that in 1940 by a factor of 58. Within that period electric power production rose by a factor of more than 140.

Reorganized on a socialist basis, and with the support of modern material and technical facilities, the republic's agriculture is confidently intensifying. Particularly important changes took place in this sector after the March 1965 CC CPSU Plenum. The 1980 gross agricultural output was twice that of 1940.

All of this eloquently proves the tremendous potential of the developed socialist society, which offers the possibility of organically combining the contemporary achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system.

The 10th Five-Year Plan was a major stage in the development of the Lithuanian SSR as well as of the entire country. The party's economic policy had a decisive impact on the economy, science, culture and further increase in the prosperity of the republic's working people.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee drew attention to ensuring the stable and balanced growth of public production on the basis of its intensification and the further increase of the existing production potential. The CC Bureau and Secretariat tried to use progressive experience and analyzed the ways and means of exerting party influence on the solution of problems attentively.

During the 5-year period, the national income generated totaled almost 28 billion rubles or one fifth more than during the preceding similar period. About 80 percent of the increase was obtained through higher social labor productivity. Real per capita income rose by 19 percent. The five-year plans for retail trade and population services were overfulfilled. A total of 9.5 million square meters of

housing were built, which made it possible to improve the living conditions of nearly one quarter of the republic's population.

The industrial enterprise collectives, which account for almost one half of the republic's national income, are making a most important contribution to the solution of the crucial problems of economic and social development. Over the past 5-year period, industrial output increased by 26 percent, including the production of capital goods, up 29 percent. This was achieved mainly through the reconstruction, expansion and modernization of operating enterprises.

The republic party committee pays particular attention to raising the level of party management of economic construction. Central committee plenums, the bureau, city and rayon party committees and party and party-economic activists have worked on the analysis and solution of basic economic problems and measures for the implementation of economic and social development plans. Over the past 2 years alone, the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers have studied and considered problems pertaining to the further intensification of industrial and construction output, have developed a system of measures for the solution of the most important problems of the national economy and the implementation of the five-year plan, and have found additional means of developing social planning and improving its effectiveness.

The Azot imeni XXV S'yezda KPSS Production Association in Ionava did irregular work for a number of years. There were major shortcomings there in the selection, placement and upbringing of cadres. Poor use was made of production capacities, and plans for the production of chemical fertilizers remained unfulfilled. At the beginning of last year, the work of the collective was discussed by the CC CP of Lithuania Bureau. At its suggestion, the respective union and republic organs took steps to ensure a stable supply of raw materials and power to the association. A broad plan of organizational and technical production intensification measures was implemented. In 1 year, chemical fertilizer output increased by 19 percent and labor productivity by 15 percent.

The republic party committee is always concerned with problems in the development and location of production forces. The CC CP of Lithuania republic council drafted a general plan for the location of industrial enterprises and the development of the towns, as a result of which the more efficient employment of the population was ensured, and by limiting the size of the big cities, some small towns were enabled to develop. All of this had a positive effect on the development of the republic as a whole.

As we note the positive changes which are taking place in the various economic areas of Soviet Lithuania, we are equally aware of the shortcomings, difficulties and unresolved problems. The levels earmarked in the 10th Five-Year Plan were not reached for all economic and social development indicators. Intensive factors in economic growth were not fully utilized. This hindered the achievement of better end economic results. Labor productivity rose less rapidly than planned. Capital assets in industry and other sectors were used inefficiently. Not everything possible was done to ensure the necessary balancing of plans and to maintain strict state and planning discipline.

Objective difficulties made their mark as well. In the recent bad farming seasons, animal husbandry productivity declined and the output of other types of agricultural raw materials worsened. Fishing industry production dropped as a result of deteriorating conditions. All of this could not fail to affect the food sectors, which account for more than 25 percent of the overall volume of output. Breakdowns in material and technical procurements and in the work of the railroad transportation system had an adverse effect also.

The republic's party organization is directing the efforts of the people toward the elimination of shortcomings and bottlenecks in economic construction and increasing production effectiveness and work quality in all economic sectors. This precisely is the target of the resolutions of the 18th CP of Lithuania Congress and the plans for organizational and political measures for the implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

At the congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that under the conditions of the 1980s, the conservation of human resources becomes particularly important, and this is a complex matter which requires the solution of a number of problems of an economic, technical, social and educational nature. The party's instructions are particularly topical with regard to Lithuania. During the 11th Five-Year Plan, 90 percent of the increase in the national income must be the result of higher labor productivity, while during the 12th, this figure must reach 100 percent.

Bearing in mind the exceptionally topical nature of this problem, and with a view to ensuring the efficient distribution and utilization of manpower, the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers introduced limits on the number of people employed by associations and enterprises, regardless of departmental affiliation, as early as 1979. Life has confirmed the correctness and great mobilizing effect of this measure. By the end of the 10th Five-Year Plan, we had confined ourselves in general to the planned number of industrial personnel; in 1981, a clear trend toward reduction, as compared with the planned ceiling, appeared. In one third of the associations and enterprises, the entire increase in the volume of output is already the result of increased labor productivity.

We ascribe tremendous importance to the development of socialist competition and the creative activity and initiative of the masses for the most efficient organization of labor and production and the comprehensive dissemination and application of the progressive work experience of the best production collectives in the country and the republic.

The brigade forms of labor organization and incentive are becoming increasingly widespread. Currently, more than 158,000 people have joined 14,000 brigades. In capital construction, the brigade contracting method is used by almost 40 percent of the workers. The highly effective nature of this method is confirmed by the fact that Zlobin-type brigades account for about 60 percent of the entire amount of construction and installation work.

Major production successes are being achieved by collectives applying the Shchekino work method. In 5 years of work with this method, the number of people working at the Litbytkhim Association declined by 3.5 percent while the volume of output rose by 25 percent. In 6 years, without increasing the number of workers, the Azhuolas Furniture Factory in Vil'nyus increased its marketable output by one half. Thanks



to the comprehensive application of the Shchekino method, more than 2,000 people have been released from the republic's industrial enterprises in recent years.

Unfortunately, only 45 enterprises have applied this highly effective labor organization method in its entirety in recent years. In addition to other reasons, its application has been obstructed by the repeated changes made by the respective union organs in the procedure for converting enterprises to the Shchekino method and the lack of stable wage funds. Naturally, here and there the insufficient activeness and persistence of economic managers and party and trade union organizations in implementing the Shchekino and Zlobin methods or the brigade organization of labor have also made themselves felt.

In June 1981, the collectives of the drill manufacturing plant in Vil'nius, the Knitwear and Novelties Association imeni M. Mel'nikayte in Utena and the furniture combine in Shilute made their socialist obligations for the 11th Five-Year Plan public. After assessing their possibilities, these progressive enterprises pledged achievement of the entire increase in output under the 11th Five-Year Plan without increasing the number of personnel, and they appealed to all republic production collectives to support their initiative. This initiative was approved by the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic trade unions council, Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee, ministries and departments, heads of associations and enterprises and primary party organizations were instructed to support the appeal of these collectives actively and to structure their work in such a way as to ensure the growth of output without recruiting additional manpower, and use materials and energy thriftily.

Great attention is paid to measures aimed at the mechanization of production processes and reduction in the share of underproductive and hard manual labor. Nevertheless, the percentage of manual labor remains rather high. The mechanization of auxiliary processes and support operations remains the weakest spot.

The 18th CP of Lithuania Congress called for a decisive acceleration of the pace of comprehensive mechanization and automation of production processes and a considerable reduction in the volume of manual labor in all economic sectors. In the industry under the jurisdiction of the republic's council of ministers alone, 174 shops and sectors will be comprehensively mechanized and 275 automated and assembly-automated lines will be installed during the 11th Five-Year Plan. This will make it possible to transfer no fewer than 5,000 people, or half as many as during the 10th Five-Year Plan, from manual to other types of work.

Limited opportunities exist for the solution of such topical problems if the efforts of sectorial ministries and departments are uncoordinated. A comprehensive approach and coordination of the activities of sectorial and territorial management organs are needed. A more rapid increase in the level of mechanization and automation of production processes demands a systematic study and assessment of technological production standards and the development of long term economically substantiated plans for the technical retooling of enterprises, comprehensive mechanization of loading-unloading, warehousing and transportation operations, manufacturing of minor mechanization facilities and nonstandard equipment, etc. We consider a significant expansion of the centralized manufacturing of mechanization facilities, particularly for auxiliary work to be urgent.

To an increasing extent the further upsurge in the republic's economy is being determined by the development of science and technical progress. Systematic measures aimed at intensifying the integration of science and production are being implemented in Lithuania. A republic commission has been set up as a coordinating organ for the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers on essential problems in scientific and technical progress. The efforts of scientific institutions are being focused on the solution of the most urgent scientific and technical and socioeconomic problems and the fastest possible practical application of the projects completed.

During the 11th Five-Year Plan, the republic's academy of sciences and gosplan, together with interested ministries, associations and enterprises, will master the application of essentially new scientific and technical developments, such as semiconductor transformers, microprocessors and lasers. They will determine the most promising areas for the utilization of industrial robots and other highly productive modern tools and technologies.

The republic pays great attention to the creation of scientific-training-production and scientific-training-medical associations and scientific and technical complexes and to strengthening relations among scientific and production organizations on the basis of long-term contracts.

Some thought should also be given to the creation of powerful scientific-production associations of related organizations and enterprises located in the republic but operating under different departmental jurisdictions. For example, it would be expedient to organize a scientific-production association for the production of management equipment on the basis of the Scientific Research Electrography Institute in Vil'nyus, the specialized management equipment design bureau in Vil'nyus and the experimental plant for automation facilities of the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems in Kaunas.

The integration of science and production requires the strengthening of experimental-production facilities for scientific research, engineering and design organizations and higher educational institutions. Whereas the construction of projects along the academy of sciences line is being systematically accomplished, the strengthening of the experimental facilities of VUZs is lagging considerably because of the lack of capital investments. This adversely affects the effectiveness of their scientific developments.

The CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers are directing main attention toward the better utilization of the scientific and technical potential created. Scientific research and design organizations under union administration in the republic should be involved more actively in the solution of this problem, and more effective ways for their interaction should be found.

The decisions of the 26th party congress increase the responsibility for the formulation and implementation of intersectorial and regional programs. Work on such programs and their implementation is a complex matter which demands the efficient organization and concentration of the efforts of many ministries, departments, republic organs and scientific research establishments. The necessary prerequisites for the extensive use of the program-target method in resolving major



intersectorial problems were established after the adoption of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree on improving the economic mechanism.

Work is being completed on a comprehensive program for the intensification of industrial and construction output in 1981-1985 aimed at finding and utilizing reserves and possibilities for ensuring stable development rates in industry and construction. Economic organs, design and engineering organizations and higher educational institutions have been involved in this important project; draft comprehensive programs for production intensification have been drawn up by ministries, associations and enterprises.

The use of the program-target approach will make possible the more effective solution of problems such as improving food supplies to the population, reducing manual labor in loading-unloading, transportation and warehousing operations, developing the unified transportation system, improving efficiency in the utilization of electric power and fuel, improving the use and preservation of water resources, reducing air pollution and others. We expect greater interest and active support on the part of union ministries and departments in this most important project.

Unquestionably, program-target planning and management have a great future. However, this raises the qualification requirements for management personnel and specialists in charge of the formulation and implementation of comprehensive programs. Yet the study and summarization of the experience of union republics in this matter has not been organized. Problems in training managers and specialists remain unresolved, and there are virtually no training and method aids available. Clearly, the Gosplan and USSR State Committee for Science and Technology should devote greater attention to such problems.

Ensuring the best possible working and living conditions and a favorabler creative climate has always been considered by the party a mandatory prerequisite for high-level work effectiveness and quality. The planning of the social development of labor collectives, towns and rayons contributes to the solution of such problems.

Social development plans were formulated for the first time by the frontranking industrial enterprises in the republic in 1968. Under the 10th Five-Year Plan, such plans had been drafted by all labor collectives in industry, construction, transportation and agriculture, most communications and communal economy enterprises and entire cities and rayons. The creation of a republic council whose main tasks are the coordination, methodical management and dissemination of progressive experience in this area and control over the implementation of social development plans contributed to the extensive development of social planning.

The steps taken to develop social planning are yielding positive results. The Cotton Fabrics Combine imeni 60-Letiya Kompartii Litvi in Alitus is a characteristic example. Until 1977 it was unable to cope with its production assignments and its cadre turnover remained high. The situation changed substantially when the combine began to pay greater attention to the individual worker and his working and living conditions. The combine turned into a leading enterprise and became the winner of the republic social development review.

More than 2 years have passed since the publication of the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree on improving planning and economic management. The organizational and methodological management of all activities related to the decisions was assigned to the republic's gosplan interdepartmental commission. Special commissions were also set up by ministries, departments, associations and enterprises.

The normative net output indicator is being applied ever more frequently in planning practice. Enterprises under the ministries of meat and dairy industry and furniture and woodworking industry have already converted to planning and evaluation based on the new indicator. Starting in 1982, virtually all of the republic's industry will be converted to the use of the normative net profit indicator. A system of norms and standards, the application of which will ensure improved substantiation of the plans is being drafted.

Extensive work has been done to improve management in industry, construction, agriculture and other economic sectors. More than 45 percent of the industrial output comes from the production and scientific-production associations. This year, the ministries formulated suggestions for further raising the levels of industrial production concentration and specialization and the creation of new associations. Work on general management plans in capital construction is nearing completion.

However, there remain problems whose solution brooks no delay. In particular, the problem of affiliation of enterprises to ministries and departments on the basis of their technological or territorial proximity has not yet been fully resolved. It would be expedient to ensure greater production concentration in the republic in the areas of timber processing and sawing and the manufacturing of construction materials, reinforced concrete goods and other commodities the production of which is scattered among many departments.

As we know, the 26th CPSU Congress focused its attention on the main target of the party's economic strategy: improving the prosperity of the Soviet people. During the 10th Five-Year Plan, almost 6 billion rubles more than in the preceding 5 years were spent on improving the living standard of the people in the Lithuanian SSR alone. The share of the national income utilized represented by the consumption fund increased from 72 percent in 1975 to 81 percent in 1980. Real per capita income was up 19 percent and social consumption funds were increased by a factor of more than 1.3. The wages of more than 350,000 working people in the nonproduction sphere were raised. Over the 5-year period, the average monthly wage of workers and employees increased by 16.7 percent, while payments for kolkhoz labor were up 17.4 percent.

Steps were taken to improve the pensions of kolkhoz members and a number of other worker categories, and of material living conditions of Great Patriotic War veterans. Over the 5-year period, 2.4 billion rubles were spent on pensions and aid.

The 26th CPSU Congress earmarked an extensive program for the further improvement of the people's welfare covering all aspects of life of the Soviet people: consumption, housing and working and living conditions. The main problem is to improve food and durable good supplies to the population. This is a major problem, not only economic, but political and social as well. In accordance with the

congress' stipulations, the republic is drafting a food program based on further agricultural upsurge.

Thanks to the wise daily guidance of the CC CPSU, its Politburo and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally, and the purposeful work of the republic party organization on implementing the party's agrarian policy, new successes were achieved in the development of agriculture under the 10th Five-Year Plan.

Important steps were taken to strengthen its material and technical base. More than 3.5 billion rubles' worth of capital investments were made by the state and the kolkhozes, or 22 percent more than under the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Kolkhozes, sovkhoses and interfarm enterprises increased their capital assets by 64 percent and their power-labor ratio by 65 percent. The tractor, grain harvesting combine and truck fleets and the availability of other equipment increased. A total of 544,000 hectares of excessively moist or swampy land were drained and 162,000 hectares of cultivated meadows and pastures were developed. Underground drainage was developed on more than two thirds of the areas with excessive moisture.

The systematic and purposeful intensification of production specialization and concentration based on interfarm cooperation was the main direction followed in the development of agriculture and the strengthening of its material and technical base.

A great deal was accomplished in the reorganization of the countryside. Industrial, housing and cultural construction in rural areas was based on regional planning systems, which defined the development of networks of residential settlements and production centers and the location of educational, cultural, health and children's preschool institutions and other population services. The resettlement of the population from farmsteads to comfortable settlements, which now house about 60 percent of rural residents, is continuing.

Considerable work was done to improve the availability of skilled cadres for agriculture. In the 5-year period, the number of specialists with higher education working in kolkhozes, sovkhoses, interfarm agricultural enterprises and auxiliary and other agricultural production enterprises increased by 68 percent.

The strengthened material and technical base, higher level of party and state management, and dedicated farmers' labor made it possible to withstand the last three years of extremely bad weather conditions and achieve a further increase in agricultural production. As compared with the Ninth Five-Year Plan, agricultural output increased by 5 percent, including 15 percent in the public sector farms, during the 10th. The kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other farm enterprises increased their average annual grain production by 17 percent; meat production rose by 19 percent; milk, 16 percent; and eggs, 48 percent. Last year, all categories of farms averaged 167 quintals of meat in live weight and 703 quintals of milk per 100 hectares of arable land.

A reliable foundation has been established for the solution of major new problems.

The first task is to increase the production of farm goods the shortage of which is particularly tangible, above all meat and other animal husbandry products. We must ensure average annual meat production of 500,000-520,000 tons (in slaughtered



weight) and 2.8-2.9 million tons of milk, and we must increase the production of canned meat and dairy goods by a 2.5 factor.

In order to achieve this, we must first of all make efficient and rational use of the entire material and technical base and all the resources and potential we have in this sector. "We shall continue to allocate substantial financial and material resources to the countryside and to pursue the planned conversion of this sector to an industrial base," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the congress. "However, the center of gravity now must shift to capital investment returns, higher agricultural productivity and intensification and improvement of relations with all sectors of the agroindustrial complex. This is the distinguishing feature of the agrarian policy for the 1980s." Today, the efforts of rural labor collectives and all sectorial management and administration units are being focused on this aim.

However, objective reasons alone do not explain the drop in milk production, which averaged no more than 2,942 kilograms of milk per cow in the public sector in 1980, or the decline in the average daily weight increase in cattle, the level of weight gained by young animals, and many others.

The main difficulties we are encountering in animal husbandry involve a shortage of fodder. In accordance with the congress' decisions, we are concentrating on increasing grain production, above all that of grain and grain-leguminous crops such as barley, oats, lupine grass, peas and leguminous feed crops. The structure of the land planted to grain crops is being substantially improved in accordance with specific rayon and individual farm conditions. We plan to reach an average annual grain production of 3.2-3.4 million tons.

At the same time, everything possible is being done to reduce the proportion of grain in the feed balance, including mixed feeds. The most important task in this area is to achieve a sharp increase in the production of coarse and fresh fodder and protein supplements.

The task of increasing fodder crop yields and grass crops remains exceptionally important. It is in this direction precisely that agricultural organs, farm managers and specialists and rural party organizations are focusing their efforts. Unfortunately, because of the quite frequent heavy precipitation in our republic, this problem is most difficult to resolve, and in recent years we have been unable to do so even one single time.

What is the reason for our failures?

Let us point out that a base has been established for raising good farm crops, including feeds, and that actually even in the most unfavorable years the crop in the fields is far more abundant than the amount we can harvest. Consequently, the bottleneck is in the mechanization of the harvest, particularly of grass crops. As to grain crops, their harvesting has become almost entirely mechanized. However, in order to avoid crop losses or failures, we unlike the eastern parts of the country, need a substantially greater number of grain combines, warehouses and, particularly, drying equipment for a similar area.

We particularly feel the shortage of equipment for the production of high-grade hay, without which effective dairy farming is impossible. Even simple tools such as

rakes and tedders are in extremely short supply. The Baltic area has another peculiarity: reliable shelters with drying facilities are needed for the coarse fodder, hay above all. Manpower shortages and insufficient equipment, mainly for harvesting, have forced our farms to restrict the growing of root feed crops and potatoes for feed. It is extremely necessary for the respective industrial sectors to multiply their efforts to help farmers surmount the difficulties arising in this area.

Production specialization and concentration based on interfarm cooperation and agroindustrial integration remains the main direction for the further development of agriculture. The main guidelines for this work in the forthcoming period were defined at the 1980 agricultural workers conference and the corresponding decree promulgated by the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers.

Territorial interfarm associations are gaining practical experience. The program for animal husbandry concentration, specialization and conversion to industrial work methods earmarked at the 19th CC CP of Lithuania Plenum has been essentially implemented. Since then, 23 interfarm and state hog-breeding complexes have been set up to raise between 12,000 and 54,000 pigs per year, and a number of cattle breeding complexes were built. Following the necessary reconstruction, expansion and new construction, there will be 324 fully mechanized dairy complexes, each of which will care for 400 or more cows.

The experience of the past five-year plan taught us some lessons for future use. For example, we reached the conclusion that we must not as yet accelerate the construction of excessively big livestock breeding enterprises which cannot be essentially supplied with multiple-component nutrition, i.e., liquid feed mixes with supplements of potatoes, other root crops and fresh fodder, in order to reduce the use of grain. It would be expedient in the immediate future to build new and reconstruct and expand existing hog-breeding complexes to care for no more than 12,000-15,000 hogs per year, and, generally, to retain this fast-growing meat-producing livestock sector in all farms. The 18th CP of Lithuania Congress called for reaching an average of no less than 100 kilograms of pork per hectare of farmland in the republic during the 11th Five-Year Plan. Capital investments are being directed into the construction of new dairy complexes and the reconstruction and expansion of existing livestock-breeding premises, with a view to ensuring their most effective utilization.

Along with the development of public livestock breeding we have born in mind the potential of the private auxiliary plots. Last year, we obtained an average of 272 kilograms of meat in live weight and 1,677 kilograms of milk per cow from auxiliary farms raising cattle and hogs on the basis of straight sales and contracts. Nevertheless, the contribution of this sector to the state's animal husbandry resources has been declining in recent years. That is why the additional measures earmarked by the party and the government for increasing the agricultural output of private plots are quite timely and important. We are giving all possible assistance to kolkhoz members, pensioners, employees and other rural residents so that they can acquire cattle, hogs and poultry. Conditions are being created for supplying them with fodder and they are given assistance in cultivating the land, raising crops and marketing production surpluses. The CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers recently passed a resolution on increasing the size of plots located in the immediate vicinity of rural resident's farmyards to 0.25 hectares, and on

converting central settlements of kolkhozes, sovkhoses and other state farms into cities under rayon administration and into urban-type settlements. It was resolved to build essentially one-apartment housing in rural areas and to consider them completed only after premises for cattle and poultry have been built.

This project has also demanded that kolkhoz and sovhoz managers address themselves to this agricultural production sector. It is no secret that some of them have become accustomed to regarding private plots as a hindrance to public farming. We are firmly fighting such views.

The problem of specialists with higher skills and cadres with common skills, mainly livestock breeders and mechanizers, is a very topical one. A set of measures formulated by the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers on the consolidation of rural cadres is being implemented for the purpose of improving the selection, training, placement and education of agricultural specialists and workers in the mass professions. During this five-year plan in particular, a vocational and technical school will be established in every rayon. Particular attention has been paid to the vocational guidance of students in the rural general education schools and to ensuring the full staffing of rural vocational-technical schools. It is important to direct more girls toward them and to broaden the range of skills for which girls are suited. Specific subjects for girls will be introduced in each rural vocational-technical school.

Increasing the production and improving the quality of consumer goods and expanding consumer services are of prime importance in the efforts of the party to upgrade the well-being of the people. These most important tasks are always at the center of the attention of the CC CP of Lithuania and the republic's council of ministers. They were considered at the 1979 plenum of the CC CP of Lithuania. Over the 5-year period, the production of such goods rose by 21 percent, including a 47 percent increase in the production of cultural and household goods.

Production of superior quality goods reached 20 percent of the overall volume of output in 1980. The socialist pledges made in this area during the 10th Five-Year Plan were fulfilled. However, in terms of the growth of output of consumer goods as a whole, and the production of a number of most important types of commodities the five-year plan tasks remained unfulfilled.

Ministries, departments, enterprises and associations face the task of further strengthening their links with trade, reacting to changes in the demand situation more sensitively and efficiently and giving priority to developing the production of goods for which the demand is not yet fully satisfied. Above all, we must substantially increase the amount, broaden the variety and to improve the quality of children's goods, clothing, that made of cotton fabrics in particular, and various durable goods made of local raw materials, wood and metal. The heads of ministries and enterprises have been made personally responsible for the strict implementation of planned assignments and contractual obligations for the production and procurement of goods.

"Specific concern for the individual person and his needs and requirements," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the congress, "is the beginning and the end of the party's economic policy. I mention this in order to reemphasize the simple but very important thought that the production of goods for the population and the



development of the service industry constitute a primary party project and we should treat it accordingly." We shall be steadfastly guided by this instruction in our daily efforts.

The successes which our country has achieved in the various fields of life are due above all to the leading and organizing role of the communist party. Mastering the Leninist style is the most important prerequisite for successful party leadership. This requirement was particularly emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress.

In implementing the decisions of the congress, the republic party committee is concentrating on further improvement of the party's leadership and on perfecting the means and methods of party organization work. The planned measures for the implementation of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 18th CP of Lithuania Congress are the basis of the activities of the republic's communist party central committee and its bureau and secretariat. All the most important problems in the life and activities of the republic party organization have been and will continue to be resolved at regularly held plenums, party aktiv meetings and central committee bureau and secretariat sessions. We shall strive to continue to hold them in an atmosphere of high efficiency and exigency and principled assessment of positive results and existing shortcomings.

The historical resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the report submitted by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary, are inexhaustible sources for further improvements in the party's guidance of the economy. The Lithuanian party members will do everything possible to direct the creative activity of the working people toward the successful implementation of the economic and social development plans earmarked in these outstanding party documents.

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CSO: 1802/2

## BRIGADE: EXPERIENCE, TASKS, PROSPECTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 81 pp 26-35

[Article by A. Muzyrya]

[Text] Recently, brigade forms of labor organization and incentives have become widespread in many national economic sectors. The active attraction they exert may be explained not only by the desire to find effective means for achieving the highest possible end production results, but to an equally great extent, the need to develop in the workers feelings of collectivism, comradely mutual aid and a communist attitude toward labor. The "Basic Directions in the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the Period Through 1990" mentions the need "to implement measures for the further dissemination and upgrading the effectiveness of the brigade form of labor organization and wages. This form will become basic in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

### 1

The brigade form of labor organization and incentives is consistent with modern production requirements, in which physical indicators, quality of output, strict observance of contractual obligations and increased labor productivity are related to the planned dynamics of the growth of output. As industry converts to assessing enterprise activities on the basis of net normative output, production collectives must make substantial changes in their "way of life," strengthen their economic services, involve various scientific sectors in the solution of economic problems more energetically and formulate a flexible system of levers and incentives, including the creation of new-type brigades.

At the same time, the scientific organization of labor and increased educational and cultural standards for workers make it possible to develop the democratic management principles on which the brigade form is based. Today, the strengthening of production discipline, higher creative initiative and the education of the collective in a communist attitude toward labor can be accomplished most effectively in brigades.

The number of brigades in various industrial enterprises is growing rapidly. Not the least explanation for this fact is the variety of their forms (specialized, comprehensive, shift, working on the basis of single orders or cost accounting), which makes it possible to take sectorial features, working conditions and the nature of the output into consideration more effectively.

In 1980, the brigade form of labor organization in industry accounted for 49 percent of their total number; this number included 49 percent at the industrial enterprises at the Ministry of Coal Industry, 54 percent at the Ministry of Construction Materials Industry, 62 percent at the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, 57 percent at the Ministry of Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry and 61 percent at the Ministry of Food Industry. Under the 11th Five-Year Plan, the proportion of workers using brigade forms of labor organization and incentives will be increased by a factor of 1.5-2 or even more.

Studies of the activities of many brigades working on the single order basis indicates that they make the most effective use of equipment and of raw and other materials, reduce working time losses and unproductive outlays and make the work more meaningful. At the same time, we can reliably assume that the spiritual growth of the people is energized here also. The professional, the collectivist, the worker is molded in the course of constant contact and under the influence of the collective, as individuals whose business and personal interests are closely interwoven and whose creative capabilities are bought up.

In such a brigade a man takes his initial steps in production management more speedily as well. The national problems which the enterprise as a whole is resolving confront the brigade in a more specific way. The use of the scientific organization of labor, development of new incentives and approaches to the labor rating system and concern for the growth of labor productivity and for upgrading the skills of the working people become the personal concerns of the individual working person. The value of the brigade lies in the fact that as it energizes competitiveness, cooperation and rapid dissemination of progressive experience within the collective, it increases the individual and social force of labor. What makes the brigade strong is that the struggle to resolve the problems of the collective begins and is waged within it on the level of the individual interests of the worker. The very nature of the brigade organization of labor encourages him not only to perform his duties actively but to consider all collective matters as his own, for he is interested both morally and materially in more successful and productive work. The combination of individual responsibility for joint end work results with that of the entire brigade for the efforts of the individual worker results in a united collective which can resolve the contemporary problems of scientific and technical progress.

The system of cost accounting brigades operating on the basis of a single order is being extensively applied at enterprises in different sectors. Their establishment in machine building is a topical problem, as this is a sector in which many enterprises are still not making satisfactory use of highly productive equipment, and intrashift idling and work time losses remain considerable.

However, many examples of the successful development of collective work methods are found in this sector as well. They are being developed extensively and effectively at machine-building enterprises in Sumy. The number of brigades which have been organized here, their contribution to the overall volume of output and the stability of their work are entirely typical of the collectives which are successfully fulfilling the party's tasks. The experience of three leading enterprises -- the Sumy Order of Lenin and Order of the October Revolution Machine-Building Production Association (SMPO) imeni M. V. Frunze, the Nasosenergomash Production Association and the Order of the Red Labor Banner Electron Microscope Plant imeni 50-Letiya

VLKSM (SZEM) -- offers rich food for thought on the problems which arise in the period of organization of brigades and in their subsequent activities, and it points the way to the resolution of them.

These enterprises are leaders in their sectors and their output is complex and one of a kind. However, even in such leading collectives the new form of organization of labor can help to resolve many acute problems which arise in production life. As experience indicates, the enterprises usually began by creating brigades in the most complex or neglected sectors. In their very first year of work, this new type of brigades in all three Sumy enterprises made the "widening of bottlenecks" possible.

At the Plant imeni Frunze, for example, the procurement shop was the bottleneck. It regularly failed to meet its planned assignments, allowed complex and expensive equipment to remain idle and interfered with the work of all related production facilities because of its unrhythmical work. In fact, the shop was slowing down the development of the entire plant. Many decisions were made to change the situation and additional funds were appropriated in order to expand production facilities, but to no avail.

The root of the trouble had to be found. After analyzing the situation at the shop, the plant's party aktiv and trade union committee concluded that the tie between overall production assignments and the assignments issued to the individual workers had been broken. A confused and tangled situation prevailed in the areas of nomenclature and urgency of orders. A comprehensive cost-accounting brigade was set up experimentally. Prior to doing so, the management and representatives of the public organizations made a careful study of the experience in creating cost-accounting brigades in many enterprises in the country, the Kaluga Turbines Plant in particular.

The "Kaluga variant" had been given a high rating at the all-union seminar on sharing experience in the development of the brigade form of labor organization and incentives in October 1980. The Sumy enterprises had seen its value considerably earlier, in 1974. One year after the first complex cost accounting brigade was created, the procurement shop began to supply semi-finished parts not only to the plant but the entire association. Its production program was raised by 30 percent without changing the number of workers or the area of operation.

The milling brigade headed by Lidiya Molochay was one of the first comprehensive brigades to work on the single order basis. The brigade, which consisted mainly of women, itself determined who was most experienced in one production operation or another and organized intrabrigade specialization. At the same time, every worker began to learn from her neighbor the labor methods in which she was weak. Soon, all cadre workers could perform all operations whenever necessary. At that point the shift coefficient of machine tools rose sharply, for the collective allowed no equipment idling even in the absence of workers. In the first year labor productivity rose by 30 percent. Working time efficiency increased and work quality improved.

At the SZEM the new type of brigades speeded up the solution of the cadre turnover problem. The electron microscopes plant renovates its output almost entirely every 3 years. The difficulty in the personnel problem lies not only in the fact that generally speaking it is hard to eliminate the scarcity of machine-tool workers in a



city where industry is growing at a faster pace than manpower availability; in the case of the SZEM it was worsened by the fact that novices found it hard to master the requirements of this particular type of work, for the parts here must be machined at a high precision level. The fact that today the plant has the lowest personnel turnover in the oblast -- 6.7 percent -- is explained essentially by the development of new labor methods: the training process for young cadres was accelerated, young people stopped leaving, and the collective was stabilized and has remained virtually unchanged over the past 6 years.

The development of the brigade organization of labor marked an important turn in the struggle for reducing time losses in intrashift idling at the Nasosenergomash Association. Prior to the organization of brigades, every sixth hour of working time was lost because of equipment idling. In individual piece rate work such losses remained high even among conscientious workers. At the beginning of the shift, the worker had to wait for the foreman to give him his assignment and waste time obtaining blueprints and tools. No such losses occur in a combined brigade: tools, equipment, blueprints and parts are delivered to the next shift at the workplace itself. The preceding shift, which is now aware of the common assignment, prepares the work for its comrades without interrupting the technological process.

The shift coefficient at the Association imeni Frunze rose from 1.55 in 1975 to 1.66 in 1980; the respective figures were 1.27 and 1.45 for the Nasosenergomash Association and 1.34 and 1.63 for the electron microscope plant. The portion of increased output due to higher labor productivity rose to 85 percent at the SMPO, 74 percent at Nasosenergomash and 87 percent at the SZEM. The proportion of Emblem of Quality output has been rising as follows: from 10 percent in 1975 to 45 percent in the last year of the 10th Five-Year Plan at the SMPO, from 7.4 percent to 27.5 percent at Nasosenergomash, and from 12 to 34 percent at the SZEM.

Therefore, the brigade form of labor organization of machine-tool workers unquestionably resolves many production problems, such as optimizing the number of workers, saving on working time in basic and auxiliary operations, effective utilization of tools and instruments and strict control of the quantity and quality of labor by the workers themselves. However, assessing the "degree" of influence by the brigade form of labor organization on enterprise economic activities does not stop with the computation of net results in rubles, tons or kilometers. We must also take into consideration the steadily increasing social effect of the activities of such collectives.

2

The new form of labor organization yields not only immediate but long-term results as well, which sometimes cannot be included in the indicators as specific values. These include a number of educational, moral and social achievements which are not manifested immediately and not always in simple manner. The increased conscientiousness of the people and the development of collectivism are a complex and lengthy process which develops differently and surmounts that which hinders comradely unity to a varying extent. It is precisely because the new form of labor influences not only the labor process itself but the personality of the worker as well that the creation of brigades has become psychologically complex and delicate and precludes a stereotyped approach.

One cannot expect that the organization of brigades would come by itself, on orders from above and without creating the necessary conditions. The implementation of a useful initiative is not based on the wish of the individual manager. Experience and suggestions, initially developed and tested by individual frontrankers, must obey the principle formulated by V. I. Lenin: "...We can and must see to it that the force of the example becomes first a moral and then a compulsory model of labor organization...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 148). However, compulsory does not mean in the least that orders may be unsubstantiated. The Sumy enterprises preferred to create the type of conditions which made the formation of brigades inevitable and made the workers truly interested in increasing their number.

The Frunze workers began to apply a system for increasing production effectiveness as early as 1974. The intraplant planning and accountability procedures were amended and reliable systems were developed for establishing responsibility for intershop procurements and quality control. The experience was approved by the CC CP of the Ukraine and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. The association's collective was awarded the AUCCTU Prize for its development and application. The changed procedure for summing up the results of the socialist competition was one of its innovations. Whereas in the past they were based on the principle of "who has accomplished more," now shop work results were not only computed but analyzed from the viewpoints of the equipment's shift coefficient, tool availability, working time use, lowering of labor intensiveness, etc. Such an analysis excludes accidental successes achieved as a result of a non-stressed plan or occasionally by overtaxing the efforts of the collective. The mandatory criteria considered in summing up competition results included the number of shop brigades working on a single order basis and the number of machine-tool workers in them.

Currently, 80 percent of the machine-tool workers at the SMPO are brigade members; 85 percent are brigade members at the SZEM and 72 percent at Nasosenergomash.

Brigades, whether based on cost accounting or contracting or working on a single order basis are new forms of a small collective. The full set of relations which develop within them and the influence they exert on the shop and plant have been insufficiently studied as yet. This influence goes beyond the plant, being disseminated through the family, friendly contacts among workers and interoperational business relations.

The organization of brigades is a creative undertaking. Production organizers had to display tactfulness, dedication and a fine psychological flair. "The experience of leading collectives and individual innovators," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev wrote, "is an actual upturn in their ways and means of work, technology and the organization of management. It requires persistence, dedication and, if you wish, courage. Occasionally it requires using self-restraint and asking others to do likewise."

Problems related to preparations for the new work method were resolved on the basis of a thorough socioeconomic analysis of each collective, its interests, existing relations, psychological compatibility, age, skill and many other factors, as well as the technological condition of the shops, the definition of sectors engaged in the final production cycle, the assignment of sets of tools to the new brigade and even replanning the shop, streamlining output norms and issuing plan assignments to the brigades. In one of the shops at the SMPO imeni Frunze, preparations for the

new work method began two years previously. "We not only reorganized the shop," says N. P. Oboznyy, the shop chief, "by combining the equipment by type, such as putting small lathes in one sector, big ones in another and combining milling and planing machine tools. Above all, working with the shop and association economists, we assessed all possible alternatives, the work load and salary of each individual machine-tool worker, even the "do you like your job or not" variant. We then submitted our figures to the collective so that each individual worker could answer all questions related to the brigade."

Such thorough preparations were the basis for the fact that in one year 85 percent of the machine-tool workers became brigade members. It was their experience precisely which subsequently helped the entire shop to surmount the difficulties which inevitably arise in the profound restructuring of a collective, in the course of which the nature of work relations among people is changed. The work of the brigade proved to everyone that the new organization of labor offered many advantages as compared with piece-rate work, not only for the novice or the average worker, but for the highly skilled machine-tool worker also, for not everyone in the shop adopted the idea of brigade contracting or working on a single order basis immediately and unreservedly. In particular, there was fear that the initially strange system of wage distribution would lead to equalization. However, judging from the answers of leading workers in all three Sumy enterprises, the experienced workers were concerned with far more than wages. They worried about touchier and more complex matters such as the problem of the satisfaction obtained from the work ("would I merely be correcting someone else's errors?"), the future of their work and creative reputation, and the increase in the level of individual skills.

The ability to create is a characteristic feature of the contemporary Soviet worker. Sometimes, however, this has applied only to the search for optimal work methods. The brigade method broadens the area of the application of this feature. It resolves what Lenin considered one of the most important problems: "...the broadest possible development...of autonomous workers initiative...in the area of creative organizational work" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 35, p 198).

The first brigades at the Sumy enterprises were headed by the best workers, as follows: N. I Ivashina at Nasosenergomash; Hero of Socialist Labor S. S. Skrynik and V. N. Zabitskiy, bearer of the Order of the Red Labor Banner at the SZEM; and V. I. Shevchenko, one of the best instructors in the city; L. A. Molochay, city soviet deputy; and Hero of Socialist Labor I. T. Kovalenko at the SMPO imeni Frunze.

3

The brigade working on a single order basis is a relatively self-contained collective. This enhances the importance of controlling its development, for although the organization of the work in the sector changes with the creation of the brigade, the people initially remain the same, with the full complexity of their natures, habits and knowledge. It was such knowledge, these natures and the ups and downs in reciprocal relations that had to be organically included in the activities of the new brigade.



The importance of the educational influence of the party and trade union group on the new brigade increases immeasurably. Here is what V. A. Dunayev, party committee secretary at the SMPO imeni Frunze, has to say:

"The task set by each party organization is to reach every person. The new labor organization method opens up extensive opportunities for individual upbringing. Small brigades have been used in machine building for many years: two machine-tool workers per machine tool, the second taking over from the first with no interruption in the work. The educational influence of such a group is small. Our task is to organize large brigades with strong party groups, for the social climate can be influenced more successfully and effectively through the party members, and the most direct contact between the brigade and the shop is achieved through them. The collective does not have to break down with the creation of brigades. This, however, could occur if the brigades were to withdraw into themselves."

We watch the microclimate in the brigades closely. At brigade party meetings, regular discussions are held on the development of relations among people and even the most minor misunderstandings and confusions are eliminated immediately. We try not to let the number of party members in a brigade fall below the average party stratum in the association's collective, with the result that the party's influence therein becomes more specific. One of the best brigades is a turners' brigade in a sector of shop No 20, headed by V. I. Sukhstavets. Initially, it consisted of party members exclusively. It was a standard-setting brigade in which the mysteries of collective labor were tested and lessons learned from them. Its work was watched by many people. The party members decided that their personal example would provide the best proof of the advantages of the new work method. In no other brigade did the process of mastering related skills advance so quickly. It was precisely in this collective that the first novices who were accepted were young "problem" workers. They rapidly reached the skill level of the cadre workers, who shared with them their knowledge and work methods and actively involved them in social work. Later on, the brigade's party members themselves became heads of other collectives. N. I. Gerashchenko, the shop's party group organizer, transferred to the new youth collective consisting of 10 turners. His old brigade is sponsoring this one. Headed by the party group organizer, this youth brigade has not as yet had a single case of program unfulfillment or a labor discipline violation.

In such collectives no one looks out for his own interests, but instead willingly goes to the aid of his neighbor. However, this is not always the case. The following may also happen: the moment the brigade has been set up and a contract with the administration has been signed, the new collective demands the best possible facilities for itself, regardless of circumstances.

It would be wrong to say that the creation of brigades always goes smoothly. Such is the opinion of V. A. Sytnik, SZEM party committee secretary. The reorganization of a huge production operation with a number of internal relations differing in nature always involves stress and search. It may also happen that among the many possible solutions, the best one is not chosen.

For example, a brigade of very young, inexperienced and unskilled turners was set up in one of the shops. The assumption was that youth would carry the day. However, the boys had no one to learn from. On the suggestion of the party bureau, the administration replaced the shop's management and the structure of the collectives



was thoroughly replanned. The young people were reassigned to a number of brigades in which they were joined by experienced masters of their work. The young workers are rapidly improving their skills. It was no accident, for example, that in the brigade headed by V. N. Zabitskiy, chairman of the tutors' council at the SZEM, labor productivity doubled during the 10th Five-Year Plan.

"At the Nasosenergomash Association, each brigade includes a representative of the shop and plant committee or the trade union group. They may not always head the brigade but are always members of its council," says N. A. Kireyevskiy, plant committee chairman. "Their task is to supervise the search for new collective labor methods. We have noticed that after brigades have been set up, people willingly attend postshift meetings. In the past, sometimes people had to be persuaded to hold meetings, even during working hours. Now, whenever there is a meeting, the discussions held are important to every one. No one remains passive, and no one is in a hurry to leave. In practical terms, it is here that the training of the working person in becoming socially active begins and the foundations for the standing production conferences -- a powerful factor in worker participation in production management -- are laid."

One of the complexities of educational work in the labor collective is the fact that sometimes as many as a dozen social and administrative organs and commissions may be in charge of its status and results. This situation is brought under control by the brigade, which is particularly important in the case of young people who join the plant.

As we know, it is quite difficult to measure the results of educational work. But here is proof of interest precisely because of the specific, accurate and tangible results recorded:

A study of labor discipline violations by young people with less than 2 years' practical experience was made at the SMPO imeni Frunze. Only 20 percent of all violations were committed by young machine-tool workers who were brigade members, who accounted for more than two thirds of the total number of young workers. The remaining 80 percent were committed by young people who were still engaged in individual work.

The cadre department at the SMPO has noted that in recent years young people who apply for jobs, particularly graduates of secondary and vocational labor schools, are not interested primarily in the wages but in indicators of the social development of the collective: availability of a hostel, club, sports facilities, opportunities for acquiring an apartment, kindergartens, etc. They never fail to ask whether the work is on an individual or brigade basis and express a preference for the brigade variant. This is understandable: the brigade guarantees fast professional growth which, in the case of young people, is more important than many other benefits. Here the novice becomes a part of the training conveyor belt, moving from one machine tool to another and from one operation to another: he is usually trained by those who know the work best. Learning several skills in the brigade is standard practice.

Under the individual piece-rate system, the training of a novice was a rather complex problem. Generally speaking, everyone realized that a novice had to be trained in order to become skillful, as this was necessary for both the plant and

the shop. However, few undertook to do this on their own. The thinking went like this: "Spend some time with the boy, train him at your expense and tomorrow you will have to share the profitable jobs with him." The tutorship system did not always correct this situation. If the instructor himself was a worker, even if a teacher by inclination and desire, he carried a heavy load himself, his time was limited and he was able to pay attention to his pupil only during work breaks or after work. This is why many enterprises appointed foremen as full-time instructors, which was not always justified. Not every foreman can become a teacher, a model or a helper to the young, on the professional and human levels.

In the complex brigade headed by V. I. Yemel'yanenko (SMPO imeni Frunze), the novice covers the distance from the start of the training period to operating machine-tools with digital-programmed controls in 6 months instead of the usual 18. In all Nasosenergomash brigades, the training time for young workers has been reduced by one half. A survey conducted by the SZEM instructors' council indicated that both foremen and young workers prefer the collective training system.

The rule in brigades which use a labor participation coefficient is to discuss this indicator as it applied to young workers every month, rather than every 6 months as in the case of cadre workers, whose stamina and skill remain relatively stable. The rapidly changing KTU [Labor Participation Coefficient] gives the young worker a feeling of growth which, in the opinion of the boys themselves, is a successful labor-productivity incentive.

As we mentioned, young workers with under 2 years practical experience did not stay on at the electron microscope plant. They lacked both material incentive (earnings of up to 40 rubles sometimes) and moral incentive (the work was not interesting, as they were assigned the simplest and most primitive operations), and the prospects were unpromising, for it would be a long time before they could become high-grade specialists at a plant in which the accuracy of machining is measured in terms of fractions of microns.

Now the entire brigade is concerned with the professional growth of the young worker. He is assigned work he can do but which is also slightly above the level of his skill, so that he will retain a steady desire for professional development. The result is that today, no more than six or seven people at the plant fail to fulfill their assignments, and not one of them is young!

The labor participation coefficient has made a subtler and more flexible approach to the evaluation of activities possible. It is not simply a matter of assessing who has done how much but of determining the contribution of the individual to the joint effort, i. e., establishing the attitude of the person toward labor and seeing the sprouting of a communist attitude in this respect. A survey of 130 young machine-tool workers at the three Sumy enterprises indicated that such a just and broad evaluation of their work (not only in terms of quantity and quality but also diligence and desire to grow and stages of growth) attracts young people.

4

The problems confronting the new type of brigade directly affect the life of all workers. High-grade specialists face many new and difficult problems. Many cadre workers fear that high-level skills will disappear in a comprehensive consolidated

brigade and that a feeling will develop that personal successes are collective successes. Does it make sense then to become outstanding and to aspire to achieving the highest level of skill?

According to A. T. Baranik, former chairman of the trade union committee at the SMPO imeni Frunze, "There were cases in which a specialist who joined a brigade reduced not so much the quality but the artistry of his work, so as to be among the best but not the best. What did we do in order to prevent even the slightest reduction in skill?

"First of all, in some brigades, we began to encourage leadership not only through a higher KTU but by reporting exceptional skills in news flashes and reports. The role of moral incentives increases considerably when earnings are uniformly high. Secondly, we began extensively to sponsor individual skill contests by professional grade groups. True, such contests had been held in the past as well, but we changed the conditions: we not only gave bonuses to the first three winners but tried to honor all who showed a steady increase in skill.

"On the other hand, in a well-organized brigade, the organization itself helps to upgrade the skill of the individual worker. There is a possibility of specializing in the type of operation a man prefers: some like to grind flanges, others may prefer to cut threads. In the past, based on assignments, such a worker would have had to perform all operations. Today, if he wishes, he can always specialize in a specific operation, which would be useful to him and the brigade. Furthermore, however stressed the plans may be, the worker always has the time to review his work and look at that of his neighbor, to ask for advice and help and to make some progress, however small."

The specific results of the increased skill of brigade members have included the following: until recently, there was only one person who could grind the most complex part of an electron microscope, the pole piece, impeccably: Hero of Socialist Labor S. S. Skrynik. In a 5-year period after he assumed the leadership of a brigade, he was able to train an entire group of workers as skilled as he was.

In a big collective, plant or association, the individual qualities of a person, such as professional skill, level of discipline and responsibility, are manifested in a limited fashion. In a brigade or a small group all personality traits become far more apparent. The person's spiritual world and nature are evidenced more clearly, and that which is most clearly seen is easier to assess and influence. According to brigade leader V. I. Yemel'yanenko, "Now we have developed a real feeling of collectivism, as was probably the case at the time of the creation of the first communist labor brigades. For example, those who live in hostels frequently visit fellow-workers at home. It is very important for a young man to have people close to him. This gives him a feeling of warmth. His life becomes easier and his work improves. Now we not only teach the person but try to help him in everything, such as finding him an apartment, spending a great deal of time and relaxing together. All of this keeps the person in the collective where his earnings are firm. Overtime here has been reduced, for out of a feeling of solidarity, the brigade cannot leave unfinished work behind to be done on Saturday, for this means that some of us will be resting while others will have to work on their free day."



The brigade contracting method and work on a single order basis gave new impetus to the development of many valuable initiatives which were already being implemented in socialist competition. Work based on a single order is inconceivable without informing the brigade of the plan. This represents a transformation and improvement of the Dinamo method. Efficient internal planning (an element of the Novocherkasak system) is given a new twist: planning is introduced within the brigade itself. The right to retain a part of the wage fund relates the brigade's practice to the Shchekino method, and so on.

The brigade method broadened the possibility of competing in cooperation matters based on the "Workers Relay Race" principle. The Nasosenergomash Association is linked with many enterprises in the country through procurements, including the Tsentrolit Association in Sumy. There was a time when, as they say, procurements from that plant consisted of "exchanging one container for another," i.e., everything Tsentrolit delivered had to be returned as faulty goods. However, as long as the machine-tool worker worked by himself he could only bemoan the delivery of faulty goods. The dialog changed with the appearance of a turners' brigade: turner Yeroshevich could hardly engage foundryman Ivanov in serious conversation. On behalf of Nasosenergomash, however, brigade leader Yeroshevich could address himself to the Tsentrolit foundry shop with the suggestion that a contract for a competition involving related skills be signed with the foundry brigade.

The collective incentive system puts an end to one of the basic shortcomings of individual piece-rate work: the classification of work within the brigade as "profitable" or "unprofitable" and "for oneself" or "for others." Above all, it helps to develop a high moral tone and a healthy production microclimate in which every worker feels himself to be the real master of the enterprise and in which one is for all and all are for one.

The leading brigades in the Sumy enterprises launched the initiative of working under the slogan: "High Production Efficiency, Full Capacity Load and Excellent Quality Output." A large complex of organizational, technological and educational steps has been undertaken to upgrade the effectiveness of output and to achieve high end results. This is one of the most important directions in the work of party and trade union organizations and enterprise administration activities, which are properly guiding and skillfully directing the initiative of the people toward the establishment of a creative atmosphere and a healthy sociopsychological climate in each enterprise, shop and brigade. It is in such brigades precisely that the shoots of communist labor are sprouting increasingly obviously.

Under the 11th Five-Year Plan, the organization of collective work methods has become one of the most important lines in the work of party and trade union organizations and enterprise administrations. Among many other equally important decisions related to improving production effectiveness -- engineering, administrative and educational -- this form of labor organization contributes to the reliable implementation of the party's course of improving production effectiveness. The brigade's source of strength lies in the fact that it directly involves the skills, abilities and creative potential of every worker within it.

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## MANDATORY COMPONENT OF SUCCESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian NO 14, Sep 81 pp 36-47

[Article by K. Pankova, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] As it systematically pursues a course designed to upgrade the living standard of the Soviet people, the party justifiably relies on the upsurge in agriculture. Its concern with steady agricultural development is embodied in tangible form: we know from the CC CPSU accountability report to the 26th CPSU Congress that during the last two five-year plans, capital investments in excess of 300 billion rubles went into agriculture. A substantial increase in expenditures for the strengthening of its material and technical base is contemplated in the 11th Five-Year Plan as well.

Intensive investments, extensive practical utilization of scientific achievements and application of more effective methods for providing labor collectives with incentives have ensured the stable and intensive growth of the sector. Whereas over the past 10 years, the areas under crops have increased by 5 percent, the average annual agricultural output was up 9 percent between 1976 and 1980 over the previous 5-year period. This enabled us to take a new step in increasing food reserves and to increase the volume of goods reaching the marketplace. However, the country needs more products and better overall results from farm work.

In discussing reserves for increased effectiveness, we must not ignore the stubborn persistence of lagging enterprises in the sector. For example, more than one half of all sovkhozes ended 1980 with a loss. In order to ensure more or less normal work on these farms, the state will have to allocate 6 billion rubles to compensate for production losses this year.

Increased effectiveness and quality are among the most important strategic tasks in the party's economic policy for 1981-1985 and beyond that period. However, the status of losing enterprises in the sector has shown no noticeable change over a long period of time. In the case of the sovkhozes, for example, their share has remained roughly at the 1965 level, while the number of such farms has meanwhile doubled. The number of kolkhozes operating at a loss is high also.

When we speak of sovkhov production, it would be only fair to point out that the increased number of losing enterprises is undeniably the result of the reorganization of economically lagging kolkhozes into sovkhoves. However, it is also true that the purpose of this reorganization was not to shift losing production

from one agricultural sector to another. The purpose of the conversion of some economically weak kolkhozes into state enterprises was to improve their economy. In a number of cases this did not take place.

For example, three kolkhozes in Novosibirskaya Oblast were reorganized into sovkhoses at the end of 1970: Put' Lenina, Zavety Il'icha and Rodina, all in Ust'-Tarkskiy Rayon. That year their total losses amounted to about 471,000 rubles. Nine years after their reorganization into state agricultural enterprises, they completed their agricultural year with losses of about 325,000 rubles, despite several purchase price increases.

What are the reasons for such enduring production losses in agriculture?

## I

Those who visit the area naturally try to find out what the farm workers themselves think about the reasons contributing to such production losses. As a rule, the answers are uniform: they blame the weather and accuse industry of supplying the countryside with productive capital at prices which are not offset by the advantages gained from the use of the new equipment. Another reason cited is that the lagging farms have poor managers, allegedly unable to organize effective work.

It is true that the weather frequently lets the rural workers down, and that prices of both capital goods and construction are rising disproportionately to results. However, all farm enterprises without exception face such facts. In 1980, for example, approximately one half of all sovkhoses showed an average profit of 600,000 rubles per farm, while the remainder showed an average loss of more than 500,000 rubles each.

Could it be that the weakness of individual sovkhos and kolkhoz managers and specialists was indeed the whole reason? We know of frequent cases in which an energetic and knowledgeable director or chairman has taken over, found reserves, mobilized the collective for joint work and brought the enterprise into the clear. If such weaknesses were the sole reason for the problem, it would be impossible to explain why for so many years we failed to send out energetic workers to strengthen such lagging farms. The oblast party organizations, thousands strong, include many experienced and knowledgeable agricultural specialists.

A large volume of statistical data and situation studies on the spot, however, lead us to look for the main reason for the existence of losing agricultural enterprises elsewhere, namely in the methods used in working with them.

The contemporary economic policy of the CPSU is characterized by its profoundly scientific approach to the solution of the agrarian problem under mature socialist conditions. The line of sharp upsurge in agricultural production which the party and the government have been systematically following since the March 1965 CC CPSU Plenum is a reliable tool in promoting progressive socioeconomic change in the countryside. However, the measures aimed at the practical implementation of this line have a specific feature in that, having been formulated at the highest management level, all of them naturally are in the nature of general principal decisions. They earmark general directions and formulate "standard" parameters, if one may put it thus, and economic management criteria. Basic decisions applicable

to agriculture on a country-wide basis cannot objectively take into consideration the infinite variety of local conditions and specific situations as they appear in real life. The task of the sectorial and regional organs is precisely to relate such general decisions to the local economic situations, to find optimal ways of implementing them, and thus to ensure an upsurge in agricultural output based on the conditions of the specific oblast, rayon, kolkhoz or sovkhov. As we know, stereotypes are particularly intolerable in agriculture.

The purchase price and capital investment policy, the development of land reclamation, increased fertilizer production and improvement in planning methods and in the material and moral incentive system are subordinated to achieving comprehensive development in all agricultural production sectors, without exception, and to considerably upgrading their efficiency. In the final account, it is all of this that predetermines the objective opportunity for every farm to do highly productive and profitable work. Since this has not happened, the following question arises: to what extent are the measures formulated by the party and the government for agricultural upsurge being applied in practice and how consistently is the requirement calling for a differentiated approach which takes the characteristics and specific concerns of individual kolkhozes and sovkhovs into consideration being honored in the management of kolkhoz and sovkhov production?

One unquestionable and universal aspect of ineffective (losing, underprofitable) farming in all lagging enterprises is their inability to obtain sufficient revenue from the sale of their products to compensate for production outlays. It is obvious that such farms can be pulled out of their economic morass either by raising purchase prices to a level which will compensate for outlays and necessary accumulations or by taking steps designed to reduce such outlays to a level at which the existing purchase prices would make profitable operations possible.

Unquestionably, it is organizationally simpler to control profitability through purchase-price differentiation. This was the approach adopted in the effort to eliminate losses in agricultural production, particularly since all the necessary prerequisites for proper differentiation in agricultural purchase prices existed. Today, farm prices are higher as a result of repeated revisions. They take production conditions in various parts of the country more accurately into consideration and offer better compensation for outlays. This major effort was one of the factors which led to a substantial overall increase in kolkhoz and sovkhov income between 1965 and 1980.

Without a doubt, the price mechanism will continue to improve. Even now, the geographic areas over which some implemented prices are so vast that they cannot take into consideration the full variety of natural and economic conditions and ensure guaranteed accumulations to farms within their confines. For example, today one third of all oblasts and autonomous republics in the Russian Federation (the Severo-Zapadnyy, Tsentral'nyy, Volgo-Vyatskiy and Ural'skiy Economic Rayons) are within a single grain-price zone, although long-range average grain crop yields within them show considerable variations.

It is obvious that the purchase price level for various products must ensure the possibility of obtaining the necessary accumulations for the expanded production of such commodities within territories classified on the basis of the specific conditions which determine the basic average levels of output of an individual



commodity. We must also consider the problem of sliding purchase prices, whose levels change in inverse proportion to the harvest. This is a method used in economically advanced countries. During bad years, sliding prices rescue the farms from financial shortage. Finally, enterprises in which, due to special circumstances, production costs are so high that they cannot be balanced by purchase prices may be subsidized. This would cost no more than what is being currently spent in budget funds every year to compensate for the losses of agricultural enterprises. Furthermore, as the effectiveness of losing enterprises improves, budget subsidies will automatically diminish, which is not happening now, when we are operating on the basis of fixed purchase prices based on the lowest production level.

As we continue to improve the payment procedure for the purchase of agricultural commodities, it is equally important to define its precise place within the system of measures aimed at upgrading the effectiveness of lagging enterprises. The practical experience gained during the last three five-year plans should convince us once and for all that differentiation in purchase prices alone cannot completely resolve the problem of improving the economy of such farms.

The Valtovskiy Sovkhoz is located in the northern part of Gor'kovskaya Oblast, in Navashinskiy Rayon. The sovkhoz was organized by merging several kolkhozes. It is 70 kilometers from the rayon center and even more distant from some of the procurement organizations. During the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the farm averaged no more than 6 quintals of grain per hectare at a cost of 24 rubles per quintal. Its production costs were never less than 46 rubles per quintal of milk and 50 rubles per quintal of potatoes in 1976-1978. Pozdnyakovskiy Kolkhoz is also in Navashinskiy Rayon, 8 kilometers from the rayon center by asphalt road. During the same period of time, its grain crop yields averaged 20 quintals, with production costs of 8 rubles. Both farms sold their grain for the same price -- 12 rubles per quintal of oats, 13 per quintal of rye, etc. Under such circumstances, is it realistic to set the type of prices which would ensure profitability for Valtovskiy Sovkhoz? Of course not. No, because what we need is "healthy" effectiveness based not on high purchase prices but on high labor productivity.

## II

Raising the level of output must become the main line in work with underprofitable or losing farms or, more specifically, with underprofitable and losing sectors, the combination and dimensions of which result in a general kolkhoz and sovkhoz lag.

Operation at a loss is not a zonal phenomenon in the least. There are as many lagging agricultural enterprises in Krasnodarskiy and Stavropol'skiy Krays and Rostovskaya and Odesskaya Oblasts as there are in Gor'kovskaya and Novosibirskaya Oblasts and Krasnoyarskiy Kray. Therefore, it would hardly be accurate to consider zonal differences alone as the reason for low production levels. It would be more accurate to assume the existence of internal reasons which hinder the development of one farm or another. Finding them would solve a full half of the problem.

Naturally, the most important thing is to determine accurately the characteristics of the natural conditions in which lagging kolkhozes and sovkhozes function and to take this as a basis in formulating the long-term policy aimed at ensuring the economic upsurge of each one of them and defining the specific areas of their



production specialization and concentration. Acquisition of a precise knowledge of the potential of the land and the climate of a given rayon or farm, accurate determination of the maximum yields of a specific commodity at the present level of scientific and technological development and the nature of the material and technical reserves which could be applied at any given time in the reorganization of the production base of lagging farms -- these precisely are the problems the solution to which must control all activities of the agricultural administration apparatus and the collectives of lagging enterprises. Unfortunately, this is frequently not the case in practical work.

It should hardly be necessary to demonstrate the importance to a cost-effectiveness enterprise of the fulfillment of farm produce sales plans. This not merely a matter of cash income, for kolkhozes and sovkhoses increase their output in terms of physical stocks as well. A plan, the implementation of which is the first obligation of any farm, which exceeds the actual (normative, let us say) possibilities of a farm eventually undermines economic stability, with all the ensuing consequences. Therefore, planning the volume of sales to the state can and must become one of the basic methods of increasing the productivity and improving the overall economic situation of lagging farms. So far, unfortunately, planning has not become such a lever. Furthermore, it sometimes worsens the already difficult situation in which the lagging farms find themselves.

The Santalovo, Zybino, Mayak and Denisovskiy Sovkhoses in Yasnogorskiy Rayon, Tul'skaya Oblast, have an essentially similar structure. However, at the highly profitable Santalovo and Zybino Sovkhoses, whose 1979 profits were respectively 603,000 and 569,000 rubles, manpower resources were double and power capacities triple those at the losing Mayak and Denisovskiy Sovkhoses (whose losses that same year were respectively 509,000 and 455,000 rubles). This may seem like a case of everything to the strong. However, taking the 1979 milk procurement plan as an example, we can see that in the case of the first two farms it had been reduced by 6 and 26 percent, respectively, from the previous year, whereas it had been conversely raised by 43 and 36 percent, respectively, for the latter two. The Santalovo and Zybino Sovkhoses overfulfilled their plans (by 2 and 29 percent respectively) while, naturally, Mayak and Denisovskiy did not.

Until recently, planning efforts had a substantial impact mainly on the surplus income earned by the farms from above-plan sales. Today, this sensitive problem which plagued the lagging farms no longer exists: higher payments will be based on exceeding the actual average level of purchases. However, unless the arbitrary approach to planning is eliminated and unless scientific methods are adopted in determining the level of purchases, the difficulties facing lagging enterprises will remain. At this point planning errors will affect not revenue but the conditions which govern the establishment of the seed and feed stocks required for further production.

Strengthening the material and technical base of losing kolkhozes and sovkhoses is another possible direction in working with them. The relative scarcity of funds allocated to this sector, the tremendous territory on which an unparalleled process of technical retooling of agriculture is taking place, and the major differences in the initial levels of available material and technical facilities at the individual farms when this stage of their retooling was undertaken make it necessary to make a particularly thorough search for the most effective means of allocating funds.

The chronic lag in the level of material and technical support is the main difficulty which faces underprofitable and losing farms. The average capital asset availability for underprofitable and losing farms in 1979 was 25 percent lower than that for profitable farms; the average power facility supply was 13 percent lower and the availability of material resources was 57 percent lower. A poor material base makes such farms particularly vulnerable to the weather. The Gor'kiy people probably remember how bad 1975 was for the oblast's agriculture. However, even then the output of some farms was such that sales not only covered expenses but yielded substantial profits, whereas others were unable even to cover their production costs. The sovkhoses which were able to withstand the drought were precisely those whose capital assets were higher by a 3.5 factor and whose working assets were twice those of the lagging farms.

Is this circumstance taken into consideration in the practice of agricultural production management? Facts prove that this is far from always the case. True, as the director of a sovkhos in that same Gor'kovskaya Oblast justifiably pointed out, there is not enough to go around to satisfy everyone. The allocation of funds is indeed an extremely complex matter. The legitimate question which arises is that of priority and the expediency of taking current or long-term considerations as a guideline. If we chose current considerations, it would be justified to fund enterprises with a higher level of production organization, in which the production complex has been developed or is evidently being planned and from which returns from additional investments would be earned sooner, i.e. the profitable and high-income farms. This was roughly the practical approach adopted.

The following table shows the volumes of capital investments in some Tul'skaya Oblast rayons in 1976-1978 differing substantially in terms of overall production facilities (soil, availability of productive capital and manpower):

	Rayons with Greater Production Potential				Rayons with Lesser Production Potential			
	Belev- skiy	Lenin- skiy	Novo- moskov- skiy	Total	Arsen'- yev- skiy	Venev- skiy	Kamen- skiy	Total
Average rating of pro- duction potential	120	135	134	-	72	78	83	-
Farmland (1000 ha)	34.7	70.1	28.7	133.5	54.4	114.6	41.8	210.8
Capital investments in 1976-1978 total (mln R)	11.4	33.5	22.6	67.5	10.8	16.9	8.5	36.2
Per 100 ha farmland (1000 rubles)	32.9	47.8	78.7	50.6	19.9	14.7	20.3	17.2

These figures show that capital investments in rayons with better resources were almost triple those in the rayons which needed them more. Another explanation for this situation is also that construction organizations do not give priority to the development of their capacities "in depth," for example in Arsen'yevskiy, Venevskiy and Kamenskiy Rayons, but to industrially better developed ones, such as Belevskiy, Novomoskovskiy and Leninskiy. It is for this reason that construction difficulties in lagging outlying farms worsens.

This situation is not typical of Tul'skaya Oblast alone. An assessment of the situation has shown that the quality of the land in Kupinskiy, Chistoozernyy and Karasukskiy Rayons in Novosibirskaya Oblast is about half that in Maslayaninskiy, Ordynskiy and Kolyvanskiy Rayons (54-59 and 95-97 point ratings, respectively). In 1976 the capital assets of the second group of farms, based on land owned, were 82 percent greater than those of the first. Nevertheless they received twice the capital investments in 1977-1979. Today, the first group farms is lagging 15 percent behind the second in terms of capital-labor ratio, as compared with 8 percent in 1976.

Naturally, the funds channeled into lagging farms cannot always yield as quick and full returns as they do in economically strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes. As a rule, the lagging farms require a deeper and therefore longer-term reorganization of their production base. Frequently they urgently need everything: industrial buildings, roads, housing, children's preschool institutions and schools, cultural facilities and equipment. Such farms face the urgent problem of upgrading land fertility and cattle productivity. For them, building a new mechanized cow barn would not suffice. In order for its cost to be recovered, a number of additional steps must be taken, such as making additional investments in funds and time to improve cattle feeding, which in turn requires upgrading the productivity of the land planted to feed crops. Unless this is accomplished, any new building would remain ineffective. Conversely, production costs would increase, for equipment which is intrinsically progressive would become an additional budgetary obligation of the farm and involve further loss. This is precisely the situation we have been coming across in recent years. Since the lagging farms need substantial funds for such purposes, and since such funds are unavailable, the amounts these farms receive are small. Consequently, this delays reorganization, which is not carried out on a comprehensive basis and thus entails certain losses.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the economic and social tasks which face agriculture, we must not be guided by considerations of quick returns alone in planning investments and allocating resources. In the final account, our losses from the long-term underproductive farming may turn out to be greater than the benefits from giving priority to investments in high-profit farms.

Furthermore, the "responsiveness" of lagging farms to investments, even given their circumstances, is not so minor. Estimates show that returns on investments in such farms in terms of increased output may even be higher in relative terms. Going back to the example of Tul'skaya Oblast, the increase in gross output per ruble invested in two lagging sovkhozes (Mayak and Denisovskiy) was 3 percent higher than at the leading farms. In Novosibirskaya Oblast, with an identical 20 percent increase in capital assets, the 1976-1979 output for the first group of rayons increased by almost half, whereas it remained at the 1976 level for the second. True, the computations were made on the basis of different starting levels in this case, and for the time being, the sovkhozes in Maslyaninskiy, Ordynskiy and Kolyvanskiy Rayons are still producing half as much per hectare of farmland.

Naturally, it would be erroneous to assume that the working conditions in currently lagging enterprises are not undergoing some progressive changes. They too are strengthening their production base and improving cultural and housing conditions. However, none of this has brought about any radical change in the volume of output or effectiveness so far.



### III

The situation of the lagging farms, the large number of them and hence the importance of the role they play in resolving the general problems of agricultural upsurge made it urgent that we address ourselves to the needs of these enterprises.

For example, estimates show that if underprofitable and losing sovkhoses in Novosibirskaya Oblast had raised the productivity of their land to no more than the average for the oblast in 1979 (the average is low, for this group of farms accounted for about 80 percent of the total number of state farm enterprises here), the oblast's additional gross farm production would have totaled about 92 million rubles. Estimates show that the additional output obtained from raising the level of output in the country's lagging farms by one half (in terms of this indicator they were lagging by a factor of more than 2) in 1977 would equal the gross annual output of the private and public sector of a republic such as the Kazakh SSR.

We hear (and, unfortunately read) that such a special approach might develop feelings of dependence in some people. This is entirely wrong, for we did grant highly developed agricultural enterprises the right to a special approach, and the state has deemed it necessary to formulate the type of material incentives for them which take into consideration the high economic level they have reached. Similar, if not greater, attention should be paid to lagging farms. We must not ignore the fact that the high production level achieved by the leading farms was created not without state concern but with its help. As to dependence, this is the result of today's practice of compensating every year for sovkhos losses, while kolkhoz indebtedness is periodically written off without trying to find out what part is the result of the adverse influence of objective factors and what part is caused by errors and omissions in the work of the production collectives themselves.

The practice of writing off losses cannot yield any tangible results in the development of agriculture whatsoever for another reason too -- it fails to resolve one of the main problems: strengthening the production and nonproduction base of economically weak farms. Would it not therefore be better to use the funds currently being wasted on loss compensation for the specific purpose of eliminating the reasons for it?

The aforementioned Valtovskiy Sovkhos in Gor'kovskaya Oblast received compensation of four million rubles for losses suffered during the Ninth Five-Year Plan and 4.2 million for 3-year losses during the 10th. As we mentioned, the sovkhos is located far from the rayon and procurement centers and railroad stations. Under such circumstances roads are of vital importance. However, there are none. The lack of access slows down farm work, considerably reduces results and worsens the already difficult financial situation. The farm leaders have repeatedly requested that the oblast organizations allocate funds for laying the required roads. The sovkhos was not granted these allocations (which, according to specialists, would total 450,000 rubles). Instead, it is continuing to receive millions of rubles as compensation for its work losses without restrictions.

The limited nature of the funds at the disposal of society demands the formulation of a scientific capital investment strategy which would ensure the achievement of overall high end national economic results. Where should such funds go first, and what should be built before anything else? What should be given priority today in a



lagging farm: construction of a kindergarten to relieve female labor resources, housing, for the sake of attracting more personnel, or a mechanized cow barn, which would avoid the need for additional labor outlays? All of these specific questions call for equally specific answers which, furthermore, depend on the general social and economic problems currently being resolved in the countryside.

Side by side with all farm workers, the collectives of lagging enterprises are focusing their efforts on achieving a production upsurge. Without question, these farms have a particularly large volume of unused internal reserves. Obviously they have not done everything possible to ensure the better organization and productive utilization of the available material, financial and labor resources and to ensure full protection of the produce. However, they are frequently unable to resolve all the problems arising by themselves. Here again, we see broad opportunities for interest in helping our neighbors and concerned attention on the part of those who have accepted in a party manner the slogan "No One Must Remain Behind." Help through wise advice, practical example setting and principle-minded party criticism will unquestionably energize economic and organizational work on the lagging farms, will raise the standard in the struggle against shortcomings in the utilization of assets, and will provide an essential ideological reserve for strengthening their economy.

However, the fact that the use of internal reserves to increase output in lagging collectives has fallen off deserves particular attention and analysis. We can speak with full justification of objective reasons for the reduced manifestation of initiative and labor activeness here, as they are determined not only by general conditions but by the specific economy of the farm and the specific working and living conditions of the people who work there, i.e., by the "micromaterial base," which objectively shapes the views and behavioral norms of the members of the specific collective.

The high-profit agricultural enterprises have greater opportunities for improving the working and living conditions of their workers than lagging ones. Failing to fulfill their plans and to show a profit, the latter are unable to create any type of worthwhile material incentives, sociocultural measures or housing construction funds. Moral incentives here are weak also. It is no secret that it is difficult to find among crop growers and livestock breeders, as well as among managers and specialists in lagging sovkhozes and kolkhozes, any people whose work has been taken note of, although it is precisely here that particular dedication to the work is needed.

In Tul'skaya Oblast, for example, leading and lagging farms are identified on the basis of the overall work results of agricultural enterprises every year, in the course of which the implementation of their production and marketing plans, levels of profitability and of labor productivity reached, etc. are taken into consideration. In Yasnogorskiy Rayon, according to this method, the Zybino Sovkhoz was awarded the first place for 1978, followed by the Santalovo Sovkhoz. Mayak and Denisovskiy shared the last -- 18th and 19th -- places. The degree of objectivity in these assessments shows in the indicators we mentioned on the availability of productive capital and manpower and the level of assignments on selling goods to the state.

The absence of the necessary objectivity in the assessment of work result indicators may (and does!) develop in the collectives of lagging enterprises which are fully aware of the situation on their farms and can compare it with that of others, a just feeling of dissatisfaction with their work. It is not unlikely that greater manpower losses on lagging farms is partially explained by this circumstance. In Gor'kovskaya Oblast, the number of workers in chronically lagging sovkhoses dropped by 500 in 1977 alone, whereas, conversely, it increased by 700 in the profitable ones. In the country at large, the gap in the level of manpower availability between highly profitable and losing farms widened from 30 percent in 1975 to 48 percent in 1978. Gradually, the lagging farms develop a shortage of management and specialist cadres as well, although able, highly trained and skilled organizers are particularly needed in precisely this agricultural production sector.

Today wages are no longer the decisive factor in keeping a worker in agriculture, particularly since as in the past, most of the wage is based on the amount of current work, as a result of which the level (particularly in sovkhoses) is little affected by the end work results at the specific farm. In the sovkhoses of that same Yasnogorskiy Rayon in Tul'skaya Oblast, the highest and lowest 1978 earnings showed a difference of no more than 62 rubles (4 percent), although the gap in labor productivity was within the factor of 4 range. Other problems and requirements of the people which losing and lagging farms are unable to meet suitably have found their way to the agenda.

The problem of bringing rural living conditions closer to those of the city will not be resolved without first eliminating the major disparities between the advanced and lagging enterprises in labor, living and recreation conditions which also exist within agriculture itself.

#### IV

The potential and advantages of the developed socialist economy do not develop automatically. End national economic results depend to a decisive extent on the joint activity, effort and organization of the people. The fate of the lagging farm enterprises demands the interested attention of scientists and practical workers and officials at all levels in the management of the agrarian sector of the national economy. A thorough study must be made of the reasons for the lag at each individual farm and a set (yes, a set!) of substantiated measures must be drafted to eliminate it. Planned handling of resources is needed as well as, and most important, surmounting the inertia which prevails concerning the situation of the lagging enterprises. It would be impossible to make use of all sectorial reserves without the use of scientific methods or without creative mastery of progressive management experience by all farm units and at all levels of production management.

It cannot be said that the problem of the lagging enterprises is being ignored in the management of agricultural production. In Gor'kovskaya Oblast for example, it was considered in connection with the decree promulgated on this matter by the collegium of the RSFSR Ministry of Sovkhoses in 1973, on the occasion of the publication of a critical article in PRAVDA in 1974, and on the initiative of the oblast executive committee in 1975. The problem was discussed in 1977 also. However, the number of sovkhoses in the oblast operating at a loss has not diminished.

Working at a loss has not become a regular target of serious scientific attention, although its persistence and scale force us to think here of reasons the study of which is the duty of all scientific branches. It might seem that the primary duty of scientists is to understand the nature of the phenomenon and to formulate and offer practical solutions. Unfortunately, however, little scientific thought is given to or contacts established with lagging farms which are particularly in need of such progressive influence.

The attention of scientists is (understandably) focused on the formulation of long-term solutions which objectively direct us to the modern and most recent types of progressive equipment, materials and technologies. Sectorial agrarian sciences have provided many valuable developments aimed at upgrading agricultural effectiveness. They include high-yield crop strains and highly productive livestock breeds and weed killers, plant pest and animal disease controls, all of which guarantee increased volumes of output and end economic results in farming. However, the application of such progressive innovations, which could yield high returns, is being hindered most of all precisely by the situation of the lagging farms.

The lagging kolkhozes and sovkhoses have a great potential for reducing losses through the fuller utilization of the available material and manpower resources, through the application of new labor, production and management organizational methods, and through the introduction of new wage, material incentive, planning improvement, and production activity accounting and assessment systems. Here again, scientific developments in the field of organization which, as a rule, involve no additional cost could be of great help to them. However, by virtue of a number of circumstances (long distances, poor communications, poor cadre training, low level of consumer services), here again scientists rarely visit the losing farms.

There is no doubt that the general problem of upgrading agricultural production effectiveness will not be resolved until the problem of the fate of losing and underprofitable kolkhozes and sovkhoses is resolved. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev described the further improvement of economic conditions in kolkhoz and sovkhos work as "a mandatory component of effectiveness."

Today agricultural production specialization and concentration based on interfarm cooperation and agroindustrial integration is one of the decisive factors in upgrading work effectiveness and quality and improving the use of material and manpower resources. Under such circumstances, small and consolidated kolkhozes and sovkhoses operating at different economic levels gain additional possibilities for strengthening and developing public production. In successful associations, the net income level of the shareholding farms rises and other most important economic indicators improve. However, at present the process of interfarm cooperation and agroindustrial integration, and with it the process of equalizing economic farming conditions, is developing in the various parts of the country with varying intensity. Frequently, it is the lack of properly organized economic relations among the participants in such cooperation and their lack of departmental coordination that have a restraining effect on it.

The elimination of unjustified inequalities in the economic levels of farm enterprises requires the adoption of planned actions aimed at providing the lagging farms with conditions for profitable work. Unfortunately, the ability of oblast and rayon agricultural administrations to resolve problems related to this matter is



currently limited by the existence of autonomous specialized agricultural production management organs. In Leninskiy Rayon, Tul'skaya Oblast, for example, only three out of 16 farms come under the jurisdiction of the rayispolkom agricultural administration. The others are under the jurisdiction of several associations. In Kaliniskaya Oblast, the agricultural administration is in charge of approximately 60 percent of all sovkhozes, the rest being managed by the specialized associations of the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture. In Rostovskaya Oblast, only 20 percent of the sovkhozes are under the jurisdiction of the local agricultural organs. The rest are divided among a variety of associations, etc. Under such circumstances, it proves to be quite difficult (if not impossible) to ensure the implementation of a uniform system of measures aimed at eliminating lags in farm development and encouraging their increased output and effectiveness.

Occasionally, the special system used in planning the activities of association sovkhozes is such that a disproportionately small share of the resources goes to enterprises under oblast administration, as compared to the volume of their procurements. This is exemplified by the case of the Santalovo, Zybino, Mayak and Denisovskiy farms. Suffice it to say that in some years the first two have received capital investment funds equal to the amount allocated to all nine sovkhozes under oblast administration taken together.

The advantages of specialized production are unquestionable. However, we must admit that the system used in managing agricultural specialization processes has not been efficiently shaped as yet. The amount of autonomy enjoyed by specialized enterprises, which frequently find themselves in special and privileged positions today, clearly detracts from the process of improving the economy of lagging farms. Furthermore, the establishment of a variety of intermediary and parallel management levels cannot, in itself, entirely resolve the problem of upgrading production effectiveness. Organizational measures must be mandatorily supplemented by concentrated work with lagging enterprises and the extensive utilization of economic levers and incentives.

The collectives of the lagging enterprises have many reserves for increasing their volume of output and effectiveness. They are fully responsible for the efficient utilization of the resources at their disposal and for the preservation and quality of the goods. However, the efforts of the lagging farms must be backed by the help of the agricultural production management organs.

Improving the payment procedures for goods sold to the state, strengthening the material and technical base of the enterprises and rational procurement planning are reliable and practically tried levers for exerting a progressive influence on the economy of lagging farms. The task is to regulate their functioning in terms of each individual lagging agricultural enterprise, to determine its production potential accurately and to provide the economic and organizational prerequisites for the long-term laying of solid foundations for productive and profitable work. This will enable us to resolve the problem posed by the party -- converting agriculture into a highly developed socialist economic sector -- more easily and quickly.

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## CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL DETERMINISM

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[Article by N. Pilipenko, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The tremendous scope of the revolutionary creativity of the peoples makes the determination of the laws governing social development, the interpretation of the role which historical necessity and accident play in them, and the identification of the main factors which determine its content and direction highly topical from the practical and theoretical viewpoints. In a word, it is a matter of interpreting the sum total of features included in the concept of social determinism.

We know that because of specific class interests, the bourgeois ideologs try to misrepresent the nature of social processes and to give them a one-sided idealistic-metaphysical interpretation. According to their theories, society is not an integral and complex organism which operates and develops according to objective laws and in which all elements are interrelated. On the contrary, they single out and raise to the level of an absolute one or another factor of social life which they consider its mainspring, thus distorting the actual correlations among the different aspects of reality.

Marxist-Leninist theory, embodied in the many-faceted and broad activities of the communist party, whose strategy and tactics are formulated not arbitrarily but in connection with specific circumstances, causalities and forms of revolutionary struggle and construction, provides a truly scientific answer to contemporary problems. The consistent dialectical-materialistic concept of determinism used by the party enables us to make a profound study of objective and subjective aspects, internal and external conditions and main and secondary reasons for historical progress, to see the real motive forces of society and to analyze the mechanism of action of its laws at different stages of maturity.

The proceedings of the 26th party congress were a vivid example of a deterministic approach to contemporary social processes. In the CC CPSU accountability report submitted by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and in the documents adopted by the congress, the idea of determinism is organically related to the definition of the conscious innovative practice of the Leninist Party based on the knowledge of social laws.

The radical difference between Marxist deterministic concepts and idealistic and metaphysical views deserves the closest possible attention today. The misrepresentation of its concepts by bourgeois ideologs urgently requires the interpretation and

further concretizing of the basic principles governing the proper understanding of the problem.

A retrospective analysis of the idea of social determinism reveals many interesting features. The idea has been expressed by many more or less famous philosophers in the past. And although it was not always clearly singled out, not to mention developed to the fullest extent of its meaning, the importance of even the initial, the naive approaches to it cannot be underestimated. "Thousands of years had to pass," V. I. Lenin wrote in his "Philosophical Notebooks," "before the idea of the 'total connection' or 'chain of reasons' was born. A comparison among the interpretations of this idea throughout the history of human thinking would provide the theory of knowledge with unquestionable proof" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 29, p 311).

A variety of factorial theories of social determinism predominated in pre-Marxist sociophilosophical theories which raised in one way or another the question of the reasons for the development of society, the motivations of human activities, the nature of social laws and the correlation between necessity and accident. According to some, the entire variety of social forms was compressed within some sort of local evolution and the deterministic factor was given a metaphysical interpretation. Thus, beginning with Socrates, ethical determinists proceeded from the fact that purposeful human actions are dictated exclusively by virtue, which is the result of knowledge and the opposite of vice, which is the consequence of ignorance. The logical determinists (the stoics and others) believed that logic guides and binds together all human wishes and that it is not within man's power to change anything in a reality in which everything obeys the laws of rigid necessity, which they interpreted in a fatalistic spirit. The psychological determinists (John Locke, D. Hume and John Stuart Mill) believed that the motivation for social progress is found in the psyche of the individual, which determines the economic and political life of society, depicted as the product of age-old laws governing human spiritual activity. Geographic determinists (G. Boden, Ch. Montesquieu and F. Ratzel) supported the thesis according to which everything which people do or plan depends above all on the influence of nature, of the external circumstances of their existence. We could add to this list variants of economic and technological determinism and so on. From the positions of multi-factor theories (P. Prudhon, P. Bart, L. Woltmann and M. Weber) society is considered as a mechanical aggregation of social institutions in which economic, ideological, political and cultural factors and base and superstructural phenomena are equipollent reasons for social processes.

The core in understanding social determinism is the question of the determining aspect of life in society: social life or social consciousness. However, antidialectical, metaphysical concepts have always either diluted it within a mass of other secondary questions or exaggerated the importance of random factors in the historical process, thus suppressing the materialistic determination of objective trends. Essentially, this brought them closer to frankly idealistic interpretations according to which the ability to introduce a legitimate causal relation in phenomena was interpreted as cognitive thinking.

K. Marx and F. Engels firmly rejected pseudodeterministic, including factorial, theories of the historical process. Having discovered the real laws of society, they created a dialectical concept of social determinism based on the stipulation that all

forms of relations among objects are part of reality itself, any of whose phenomena has, in the final accounting, an objective foundation and a material reason, and that the main determinant of social progress is "the production of material means of existence." It is this precisely, "and thus each specific stage of economic development of a nation or an age," Engels emphasized, "that forms the base on which state institutions, legal concepts, art and even religious concepts of individuals develop and on the basis of which, therefore, they must be interpreted, rather than vice versa, as has been the case so far" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 19, p 350-351).

Naturally, this approach provides no reason whatever for accusing the founders of the proletarian doctrine of narrow economic determinism, something which has been frequently done by our ideological opponents who have hypocritically complained that to Marxism economics is the only important aspect in the activities of the social body.

As Lenin pointed out, the great scientific exploit of Marx and Engels is that they were "the first socialists who raised the question of the need to analyze not merely the economic but all aspects of social life" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 1, p 161). Changes in the production methods are the prime reason for historical progress. However, this does not exclude in the least that all forms of social knowledge, ideology and culture, and all superstructural institutions in turn influence the development of the economic base, social life and the development of the revolutionary struggle of the working class for its future (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 37, pp 394-395; Vol 39, p 84).

The profoundly dialectical concept of the interconnection among all social phenomena, whether material or ideal, in which the economic factor plays a determining role, is a real scientific accomplishment of the Marxist concept of social determinism. This concept requires further development and all-round intensification, for the mechanism of "transformation" of the system of material social conditions into a sum total of individual actions of people and conditions they accept as requirements, objectives and motives has not been fully explained as yet.

The influence of the spiritual sphere--superstructural phenomena, ideas and theories--on social dynamics increases to the extent to which it reflects more precisely its objective needs. "...material force," Marx pointed out, "must be overturned by material force; however, theory as well becomes a material force the moment it has been mastered by the masses" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 1, p 422). This became particularly clear in the period of the birth and establishment of the new communist system saturated with the revolutionary creativity of the working people.

The discovery of the determining role of the production method in the development of human society enabled the leading lights of scientific communism to explain the logical change of socioeconomic systems and to see them as specific historical systems whose various components--production forces, production relations, superstructure, social class and family relations and others--are in a state of interconnection and interaction. Each specific system reveals an entirely individual type of social integrity. It is thus that the concept of determinism was enriched with the idea of the integrity of the social organism and, on the methodological level, the idea of the systemic approach to the study of social life, which is an important aspect of dialectical materialism. "This organic system itself (i.e., the socioeconomic system--

the author)," Marx wrote, "has its prerequisites as an overall entity. Its development in the direction of integrity consists precisely of subordinating to itself all the elements of society or creating from society the organs it still needs. It is thus that in the course of historical progress the system becomes an entity. The establishment of the system of this entity is one of the aspects of its development process" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 46, Part 1, p 229). Hence, according to Marx, the features of a specific society are based not on the characteristics of individuals but, on the contrary, the characteristics of individuals can be derived from the nature of society as a social organism.

The successful development in scientific literature of the principles of the systemic approach, formulated by Marx in his analysis of the capitalist production method, sheds new light on one of the most important and insufficiently studied aspects of Marx' theoretical legacy: the substantiation of the concept of determinism as inseparably linked with the formulation of the concept of the integrity of the social organism. This aspect of Marx' legacy becomes particularly topical today, in the conditions of the advancement of mature socialism and its gradual growth into communism. That is why the study of the variety of determination methods in society and of the dialectical coupling of determined and determining phenomena, based on the fact that the principle of determinism, as applied not only to nature but to society, includes a great variety of relations (functional, structural, correlational, random, necessary, possible, actual) and laws (individual, general, universal, dynamic and statistical) is of great interest.

Since it is nothing other than an area of interaction among people, society represents a system which encompasses various social groups with their needs, interests and value orientations. Human activities have always been based on social laws the boundaries and differences among which are quite arbitrary and flexible. The individual or specific laws are an expression of general laws which, in turn, can be defined through the summation of specific phenomena, including individual laws. Let us also point out that whereas dynamic laws reflect the strict correlation among phenomena, based on the "cause and effect" principle, the statistical, the probability type of laws makes it possible to determine not the relations of each object within the social process but merely of some characteristics of objects as a whole inherent in a class. All social laws, regardless of their type, operate as a specific combination of necessity and accident. The framework of this law can be either narrowed or broadened through human conscious or subconscious activities.

From the systemic viewpoint, the study of this problem would be inconceivable without the systematic differentiation between the objective and subjective aspects of social determination.

The real and stable relations among social phenomena are the objective basis for a systemic understanding of social determinism. Such phenomena must be considered at different levels: in the context of natural conditions and possibilities of satisfying needs based on the nature of the habitat, developed or as yet unknown resources, the status of production forces, equipment and technology, which reflect the historical level of utilization of the environment in terms of social needs, through the lens of the social structure and of spiritual processes and so on. Such a synthesized interpretation of social activities contributes to the better understanding of the existing independence of causal relations among most important elements within social activities, all of which are closely interdependent, from human awareness.



Furthermore, the increased role of the subjective factor with the intensification of the revolutionary reorganization of society requires a comprehensive analysis of the various ways in which its content, scale and pace depend on objective material prerequisites.

What stems from the dialectical-materialistic concept of social determinism is that people themselves make their own history on the basis of specific circumstances among which, in the final accounting, economic factors play a decisive role. They predetermine needs and interests, final and immediate objectives and historical tasks. They put into motion forces which can elaborate and implement programs for change. However, needs as well provide motivations for human activity. Acting indirectly, through an entire system of realized interests, they trigger in people incentives for action and for changing objective reality. This specifically is the manifestation of the subjective aspect of social determination, which becomes particularly important at the mature socialist stage, when optimal possibilities for planned development of all areas of social life are created and when the broadest possible popular strata become involved in conscious participation in the building of communism.

The critical study of contemporary bourgeois social doctrines and the exposure of their false non-party mindedness and their actual ideological direction, hidden behind pseudoscientific facticity, is a major aspect in the elaboration of the Marxist concept of social determinism. The theories of determinism popular in Western socio-philosophical literature essentially promote the idea of "factorial" concepts of a different nature, which developed before Marx and Engels. The "finishing" to which they are subjected today by bourgeois ideologists affects merely their form, their framework, without changing their essence. It consists of attempts to adapt the old idealistic and metaphysical ideas to changed social circumstances and latest scientific data.

W. Rostow, one of the leading lights in contemporary bourgeois sociology, who energized the concept of "equipollent factors," disagrees with Marx who considers political institutions as a superstructure rising over the economic base of society. In his book "Politics and the Stages of Growth," in which he develops his views expressed in previous works, Rostow claims that "economic factors do not play any leading role whatever" in society and that economic, social and political factors act on an interrelated and equal basis (W. Rostow, "Politics and the Stages of Growth," Cambridge, 1971, p 5). Although claiming to give equal priority to these and other factors, it becomes obvious that in fact he gives priority to the political principle in social development.

Various versions of technological determinism, which consider the growth of science and technology the prime reason for the unlimited progress of human society, seem to be different at a glance from this clearly idealistic concept. For example, to listen to the "harbingers" of the so-called "technotronic society," "Today the most developed industrial countries (the United States above all) are beginning to convert from an industrial stage of development to an age in which technology, electronics in particular...becomes the main factor which determines social change and changes in social mores, structure and values" (Z. Brzezinski, "Between Two Ages. America's Role in the Technotronic Era," New York, 1970, p 19). Such concepts, which totally ignore the nature of economic and class relations in society and which leave an indelible mark on the social consequences of the developing scientific and technical revolution, lay a

claim to "refuting" Marxist-Leninist theory, which convincingly reveals the laws governing the progress of mankind toward communism.

During the past few decades bourgeois sociologists and philosophers have made increasingly frequent attempts to compensate for the limitations of technological determinism by showing greater interest in the functional approach in interpreting the reasons for social processes. The supporters of this approach try to describe functional relations among all the elements of the developing social entity without necessarily assuming the equipollent influence of changing elements on its condition.

For example, according to the theory of "historical" determinism, social activities may be influenced by a variety of factors such as economic forces, geography, race, religion, culture, philosophy, etc. At any given point in time or specific situation, each of these factors may become the "prime reason" in explaining the evolution of the social system. "There is always at least one factor which is the reason for change" (J. Ellul, "Problems of the Sociological Method," SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol 43, No 4, New York, 1976, pp 6-24).

One way or another, "historical" determinism records the spontaneous movement of the capitalist society in the course of which a totally unexpected historical event comes out of the clash or combination of different trends. However, it ignores the fact that, in the final account, a historical event is always determined above all by the play of capitalist economic forces. Yet this precisely is the decisive factor in its evolution.

Bourgeois sociology has begun to pay great attention to theoretical elaborations according to which the social entity is divided into relatively autonomous subsystems with different types of determination, different pace of change and different reaction to management and planning. T. Parsons, for example, singles out three basic subsystems and cultures ("Toward a General Theory of Action," edited by T. Parsons and E. Shils, New York, 1962, p 53). The existence of each of them is related to one or another social need. If the object of a study covers individual components of behavioral organizations, developed and consolidated by the individual in the course of the socialization process, it is classified in the personality area. The integration and adaptation of this sphere with other subsystems is based above all on biological determinants. The subject of the study of the social subsystem is the conditions governing interactions among individuals who are members of different collectives and groups such as primary and secondary, official and informal, big and small, ranging from society at large to the interaction within the primary cell consisting of two individuals. The adaptation of the social subsystem is related to assimilation with the environment and is the most flexible. Finally, the cultural subsystem (which Parsons puts on a higher level) covers models of behavior and specific "models" of meanings, i.e., organized knowledge, convictions, values and norms with the greatest inertial force.

The division of the sphere of social activity into three parts, suggested by D. Bell, is a variant of this approach to social life (D. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," New York, 1976, p 21). In his view, various determination levels exist in society: technical-economic, political and cultural. Each of them exists on the basis of its own principles: effectiveness for the technical-economic, equality for the political and self-realization of the individual for the cultural. A specific

rhythm of change is inherent in such subsystems. Changes in technology and economics are linear: the more effective pushes out the less effective. In culture we note an eternal return to some structures. Whereas the technical and economic area may be subjected to a rational determination and planning, the same could not apply to the realm of culture which is essentially governed by spontaneous mechanisms.

Therefore, the views of Parsons and Bell contained a trend of the idealistic-metaphysical pitting of culture, as a certain self-sufficing area, against the "maximum experience" of the real structure of social relations. The disparity, the gap between "cultural" and social subsystems in capitalism, is considered by them the reason for social stress and contradictions and, consequently, one of the basic determinants of social development. Actually, the source of basic antagonisms under capitalism, as confirmed yet again in our days, is the contradiction between the social nature of the production process and the private form of acquisition, between growing production forces and production relations which paralyze them, between labor and capital, between the democratic aspirations of the masses and the realities of political life.

In speaking of the groundlessness of the idealistic interpretations of social determinism and social progress as a whole, it would be pertinent to recall that some bourgeois sociologists and political experts favor "global unity" on the basis of some sort of all-embracing "cosmic humanism." Hence the appeal for mankind to consciously control its own evolution or to guide it. The members of the so-called "Club of Rome" believe that a solution to complex global problems can be found only if planning is extended to all levels and aspects of human activity, ranging from the environment to personality values and concepts. The authors of the second report issued by the "Club of Rome" suggest the following gradation in the levels of analysis and planning: individual-group-demography-economics-technology-ecology (M. Mesarovic and Ed. Pestel, "Mankind at the Turning Point," New York, 1974). They consider individual needs the highest step in the hierarchy.

In themselves, these considerations cannot be totally ignored. However, all views on global planning suggested by bourgeois social scientists are no more than mere statements. The main fact is that, while supporting the creation of supranational institutions, the authors of such plans ignore the basic differences between the two world social systems. They rely on a possible solution of general human problems without the elimination of the capitalist production method.

This task cannot be carried out, for under capitalism, because of the domination of private ownership and unrestrained and uncontrolled economic forces, it is simply impossible to engage in comprehensive centralized planning. Here the objectives of individuals "clash or find themselves in a state of contradiction or else prove to be inaccessible frequently by virtue of their very nature and partially because of insufficient means with which to achieve them. The endless clashes among individual aspirations and actions lead...to a condition precisely similar to that which exists in mindless nature" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 21, p 306).

Planning and scientific management on a national scale are realistic only under the conditions of a socialist social system in which productive capital and political power belong to the working people. That is why it is important for Soviet social



scientists to study the problem of social determinism not only on the theoretical but the practical level. The question here is the following: On what level does the Marxist concept of determinism contribute to the activities of the party and the entire people in building a communist society and what material does our revolutionary-creative practice provide for new philosophical-sociological summations?

Mature socialism is a social system which is dynamically developing on its own basis and which covers a relatively lengthy historical stage leading to the establishment of a communist system. The gradual growth into communism requires profound knowledge of the objective laws of the functioning of the new society and of their specific forms of action and conditions for their full manifestation. It is unachievable without determining all interconnections and interdependencies among the elements of the increasingly complex economic, social, ideological and cultural life of the country. In turn, this calls for improving the methods used in the comprehensive and systematic solution of major governmental problems.

Naturally, the party has always used in its practical activities the systemic approach combined with the principle of determinism. However, the importance of this approach in management, administration and planning has particularly increased at present, when measurably greater possibilities have appeared of harmoniously restructuring the entire system of social relations, covering economics, politics, base, superstructure, social life and social consciousness and the material and spiritual realms of social life.

"The entire art of management and politics," Lenin taught, "is found in the prompt consideration and knowledge of where to focus the main forces and attention" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 40, p 85). In accordance with Lenin's methodology, the 26th CPSU Congress called upon the Soviet people to focus their main efforts and attention on public production intensification, upgrading work effectiveness and quality and accelerating scientific and technical progress. The conversion to a primarily intensive way of development considerably contributes to a solution of the great and closely interrelated problems of creating the material and technical foundations for communism and improving socialist social relations, the socialist way of life and the communist upbringing of the working people, problems which are currently being resolved by our country. We must point out that the systemic, the consistently deterministic approach calls not only for the organic unification of these basic tasks but also of all other tasks which derive from them and which constitute the elements of the main tasks.

The highest, the qualitatively new level, production forces represent the material and technical foundations for communism. They presume the total automation of production processes with powerful energy support, extensive use of chemistry in the national economy, industrialized agriculture, comprehensive and efficient utilization of natural and manpower resources and organic combination of science with production. The shaping of the material and technical foundations for communism, as the main link in the chain of economic, social and cultural tasks of mature socialism, creates the base for abundant material and spiritual goods, converting labor into a source of joy, inspiration and creativity, eliminating major disparities among classes and between mental and physical labor and town and country, involving all working people in direct participation in the administration of governmental and social affairs, fully implementing the demand "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work," and establishing the type of social organization in which the people do the



work which attracts them the most. All of this equals the improvement of the system of socialist social relations without which the gradual progress toward communism would be inconceivable.

The implementation of the tasks related to the building of communism depends on the efficient interaction among the numerous parts of our social organism, an effective national economic structure and coordination of its mechanism, improved planning and management, and application of the comprehensive approach to socioeconomic progress. That is precisely why the party directs administrative and planning activities in the developed socialist society toward the all-round enhancement of quality, the reaching of high end national economic results and the satisfaction of the growing material and spiritual needs of the population.

As it profoundly interprets the social trends, thoroughly weighs objective conditions and determines right historical requirements, at each stage in the struggle for communism Lenin's party is ably drafting long-term social programs and mobilizing the people for their implementation. Such a scientific policy would be impossible unless it were structured on the Marxist concept of determinism.

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## INVOLVEMENT IN WHAT IS PRICELESS

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[Article by N. Motroshilova, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] We mention the word "museum" and our minds naturally project huge museum buildings and collections, such as the Hermitage or the Tret'yakov Gallery, the Graphic Arts Museum imeni Pushkin or the Russian Museum. Our grateful memories of museum workers who were enamored of their work and were intellectuals of the highest grade are inseparably linked with such images.

However, the "museum" concept is quite broad: to many of us it even includes recollections and impressions of museums which are compared with the ones we have mentioned, yet impeccable. They account for the majority of our country's museums. This is no accident, for many of them have developed and exist thanks to people whose enthusiasm is multiplied by their very great professionalism and deep awareness of the specific laws, problems and difficulties of their noble work. I would like to share my recollections, impressions and thoughts about such museums. It is hardly necessary to defend the right of the philosopher interested in spiritual production to interpret the sociopersonal context, prerequisites for and consequences of activities in the specialized areas of spiritual culture. That is why I deem it important to consider aspects other than the fate of the largest museums, which clearly reveal the major changes in the way of life and thinking of our people. The great significance of the creative activity of some individuals, when it is consistent with the historical demands of society and the spiritual requirements of the masses, is obvious. My thoughts, let me say immediately, were stimulated by vivid impressions obtained in recent years, among which I shall select three only: two of them relating to museums proper and one to a book on a museum.

First impression: the Belorussian Folk Art Museum (branch of the BSSR State Arts Museum). The museum opened on 12 December 1979. It is located not far from the famous Raubichi Sports Complex, near Minsk, in a restored building which was built in 1862. What is captivating in this museum? Above all, its exhibits: fabric designs, folk costumes, carved and painted utensils, straw and reed mats and the works of potters, both traditional and unique examples of the creativity of the Belorussian people. The mind and heart are equally touched by the profound knowledge of museum matters and inordinate artistic taste displayed in the presentation of the exhibits and the extent to which windows, furniture, lamps, in a word, the entire interior, and the special architecture of the restored building are linked by a single idea.

Second impression: the UkSSR State Museum of Theater, Music and Motion Picture Arts in Kiev. This museum has a tremendous number of most precious items, about 200,000, but all of this variety as well is strictly subordinated to an idea or, rather, to a number of interrelated ideas, which in my view have been given a brilliant artistic-exhibition representation. The museum developed and was opened in sections. In its current completed aspect, it opened to visitors on 1 May 1980. As its name indicates, it covers several areas of Ukrainian art, which it considers in their historical perspective and brings up to the present. Each historical period, interpreted in its characteristic features, has acquired an organic and original specific-esthetic embodiment thanks to the thoughts and talents of the creators.

Third impression: the book "Zhizn' Muzeya" [The Life of a Museum] (Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 1979) by Aleksandr Kreyn, director of the A. S. Pushkin State Museum in Moscow. With his characteristic talent and brilliance, Irakliy Andronikov described this museum in a motion picture for television. The viewers were told the museum's history, saw its exhibits and became acquainted with the essential features of the noble work of its personnel. The same topics are covered in A. Kreyn's book. The very concept of this vivid and original work is a confirmation of how deeply and seriously museum workers feel about their civic mission and professional responsibility to the people. The author attempts to present to the reader and viewer at large an interesting, sharply focused account, filled with new ideas and theoretical summations of the birth of the A. S. Pushkin Museum in Moscow and its more than 20 years of history, and to provide a well substantiated plan for the further development of the Pushkin tradition in Moscow. The book is like "an inspection window" through which the initial outlines, the creation and the further growth of the museum and its internal problems can be seen in their broad context and their entire significance and complexity. It enables us to penetrate deeper into the personal world of the individuals who play a truly tremendous role in the preservation and multiplication of the spiritual and cultural values created by the people. Their enthusiasm for their work is described by A. Kreyn briefly and accurately: "To one who loves it, museum work means happiness, although it may be difficult to attain" (p 8).

The birth of a new museum is always preceded by an idea and a passion. In this sense, what does "idea" mean? Above all, the firm conviction that a new museum is necessary. Practical experience has proved that it is ideas and passions which embody a ripe social need that forge their way. It is self-evident that the idea of creating a museum based on the theme of "Pushkin and Moscow" was a big and powerful one, for it reflected a national need. Pushkin was born in Moscow. As he himself wrote, he was surrounded by the "ancient cupolas" of "Moscow, built of white stone" for the first 12 years of his life. Subsequently, Pushkin returned again and again to the city he called his "sacred homeland" and to which "in wandering destiny" and "bitter parting" he dedicated his thoughts and words of love and gratitude. Whenever he came to Moscow, Pushkin found there friends and like-thinking people. It was there that the poet fell in love with N. N. Goncharova, his future wife, and it was there that he was married, at the Nikitskiye Gates church. This made it even harder to tolerate the fact that no museum dedicated to Pushkin's life and works was to be found in Moscow, a city which had always played a tremendous role in the mastery of Pushkin's legacy. "Pushkin's love for Moscow," the author writes, "his feeling of kinship with it, and the love which Moscow and the Muscovites felt for Pushkin -- all of these feelings moving toward each other and blending into a single

entity, were among the principal foundations on which the Moscow museum dedicated to the poet and all its collective efforts have been based" (p 19).

The Belorussian Folk Art Museum was also based on the right idea: its creators proceeded from the realization that it is wrong to keep carefully collected masterpieces in storerooms and that what the people have created must be shown to the people. The idea-incentive which motivated the creation of the UkSSR State Museum of Theater, Music and Motion Picture Arts is of interest because of its harmony with the people's expectations and the ripe inner needs of the development of museum work. On the basis of a priceless collection gathered under the Soviet system but scattered in a number of small collections, the authors of the new museum (in this case, I believe, it is as legitimate to speak of authorship as it is in other creative fields) have tried to develop a synthesis: to show the unity of the history of the arts of entertainment and their contemporary nature, the oneness of folk and professional art and the interaction among the arts of the peoples of our country. The especially delicate task was to find the most suitable ideological and artistic means of displaying a collection of long standing. The objectives were clear: to find premises and to create and implement a broad new idea for the creation of this exhibit. The birth and implementation of such an idea is a highly stressed process in which the pains of creativity are interwoven, alas, with many non-creative tribulations which will be discussed later on. Matters become even more complex when the fully mature idea of creating a specific museum outstrips the acquisition of a proper collection. Such precisely was the case with the A. S. Pushkin Museum in Moscow: it began without a single exhibit item.

Nevertheless, the A. S. Pushkin Museum began its life on 12 Kropotkinskaya Street and on 6 June 1961, 20 years ago, it opened its doors to the public. Today it has approximately 24,000 graphic and 65,000 documentary exhibits. An impressive wealth of assets has been put together, dryly described in museum reports as "museum stock" but including memorial objects, documents and books of Pushkin's time of priceless value to human culture. "We can report," A. Kreyn writes, "that during the past few years we have created a worthy new Moscow Pushkin collection -- graphic and documentary Pushkiniana -- which is the main result of 20 years of work" (p 34).

A splendid architectural ensemble of the turn of the 19th century has been created from a neglected country estate, once converted into a communal housing project. It was here that the collected items found their place in carefully planned exhibits based on the "Pushkin-Moscow" theme and the laws of museum work discovered in the course of the creative process. The new museum has become one of the most popular cultural centers in the capital. It is visited by people of all ages and professions who come as visitors, for scientific work and to attend the famous Pushkin encounters. How is it possible that such truly infinite work on the creation of a collection and creation of the museum was accomplished so quickly?

In his book, A. Kreyn reviews many aspects of the process which proved to be so fruitful, the process of the birth and growth of the museum. A concise description of the collections is provided: many facts and details pertaining to Pushkin's life and times which are precious to anyone who is deeply interested in the work of the great Russian poet have found their "material representation." "How was all this collected?" In answering the question, the author of the book and coauthor of the museum has described the outstanding initiative of a large group of cultural workers who supported the idea of a museum, the interesting process of collecting the items



and the abundant "rain of donations." The personnel of the A. S. Pushkin Museum, whose most valuable exhibits were largely gifts from collectors, were the first to keep a record of the gifts and to organize gift exhibitions. Some of the museum's rooms contain truly priceless gift collections such as for example Professor I. N. Rozanov's famous poetry collection, and the rare books and graphic art objects collected by P. V. Gubar.

Let me mention one of the latest donations symbolizing the nation-wide love for Pushkin and respect for the poet's museum. Stepan Ivanovich Nikolenko, from Parfen'yevo Village, Kostromaskaya Oblast, collected in his area and donated to the museum 24 hand-rung bells cast during different periods of Pushkin's life. Naturally, they will be exhibited. Quite frequently in his travels around Russia, the poet heard them ringing, and how frequently they are mentioned in his poems....

This is what the skeptics, who sometimes have the power to decide whether there will be a new museum or not, have never taken and still are not taking into consideration: when a museum is established as a result of a great idea and deep feeling it becomes a kind of "center of gravity" for many people. A most valuable collection donated to the people leads to other selfless gifts; one item is added to another and one idea develops into another; on the initiative of new enthusiasts and with the support of the previously established museum other small ones appear (such as the Pushkin museums in Bernovo Village and Torzhok, Kalininskaya Oblast).

Therefore, an idea which is in harmony with the profound interests of the people triumphs: it "materializes" in new museums and in improvements in the exhibits of the existing ones. This is immediately noted and supported by the people. In other words, the museum becomes popular.

At this point it would be suitable to consider some of the more general problems related to the unusual popularity enjoyed by large and small museums today, and to consider the origins of this "museum boom" which is particularly evident in our country. Since by nature, museums represent a concentration of tangible proofs of ancient and recent history, their popularity in the postwar period is due largely to the greater historical activity of the people. Unquestionably, the growing role of the people's masses and their increasingly conscious and extensive participation in the historical process -- a phenomenon highly typical of the 20th century -- is paralleled by a greater interest in history, a broadening of the people's knowledge of history and the renovation of feelings, emotions and images which are related to problems of history in one way or another. Some of the features which have already become a firmly established part of our life today are an increasingly protective attitude toward ancient monuments, responsible awareness of the fact that our generations are the link between our predecessors and future generations for the preservation of the priceless creations of culture, a most profound respect for and interest in the past of one's own and other peoples, and a clear awareness that "history is being made" under our very eyes as well, and that the greatest achievements of human hands and spirit must be carefully collected and preserved for ever.

It is entirely clear that the strengthening of such features in the minds and behavior of the people has a direct relation to the prospects for the development of large, medium-size, small, professional and folk museums. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the fact that our people are trying to become the cocreators of

history is found in the modest yet highly treasured collections which remind us of the courage and strength of the people and the incalculable calamities of the past war. Visitors to the unfortunate Novgorod area will immediately see that here the search for mementos of the war goes on tirelessly and that the memory of the dead is kept alive. The people's memory has led to the creation of museums in many schools in town and country and at enterprises. The time which separates us from the Great Patriotic War is transforming familiarity with each object carefully preserved in such a museum into real involvement in what is priceless.

The increased social significance of museums is also explained by the intensification and broadening of the spiritual needs of modern man, which are in turn determined by a broad set of circumstances: greater prosperity and higher educational standards, more leisure time, the influence of spiritual values, collective forms of activity, the moral searchings of the individual, etc.

That is why museums today are visited by people of all generations and professions, who come to look for mementos and aspects of history, to enjoy beauty and to acquire humanistic values and shape their personalities. Even if other reasons, superficial or not very serious, lead some to visit a museum, they are bound to experience the beneficial exposure to history and the treasures of the spirit and talents of the people and of mankind. In modern life a museum has yet another attractive force: its collections inspire people to concentrate their spiritual force and to think without hurry. They lead to moral reflection, of which some, alas, dragged along by the rushing stream of daily concerns are deprived.

Perhaps the feature of museums most important to modern man is the fact that they make the link between creativity and spiritual-moral perfection entirely clear. Therefore, it would be difficult to overestimate their role in the development and strengthening of creative principles in the personality.

The increased sociohistorical importance of museums and their educational role is reflected in the molding of those who have dedicated themselves to museum work and particularly in the activities of innovators who are always in the throes of creative search. In his book, A. Kreyn provides an interesting and penetrating description of the specific rules governing museum work and the creative search and discoveries of museum workers. He makes specific mention of workers at the A. S. Pushkin museum, naming in particular N. S. Nechayeva, party organization secretary, one of the museum founders and authors and now chief curator.

Directing a museum is a special and profoundly creative profession. Heads of Soviet museums such as B. Piotrovskiy, the director of the Hermitage, for example, have made an invaluable contribution to the development of domestic culture. And what great contributions have been made by the directors of many excellent museums who, like A. Kreyn or T. Stepina, head of the Belorussian Folk Art Museum, were their coauthors, their creators -- who went the distance "from the first peg...."

Another most important museum profession is exercised by the "exhibit artist." The UkSSR State Museum of the Theater, Music and Cinematography Arts is the child of Viktor Nikolayevich Baturin and the creative group at the Artistic-Production Combine in Poltava (A. Shcherbak, Ye. Putrya, B. Golovko, I. Kovalevskiy, V. Tsymbalist, V. Shamrayenko and A. Boyko). The official title "organizer" is ill-suited to the nature of the activities of people who, like V. Baturin and A.

Shcherbak, are involved from beginning to end in the creative process of organizing an exhibit. The moment work on a project begins (V. Baturin and his group have completed projects at the I. P. Kotlyarevskiy Literary-Memorial and Panas Mirnyy Museums in Poltava, and exhibits at the Military History Museum imeni A. V. Suvorov in Ochakov), the artist must turn into a historian: he must study the period and its documents and become a fine expert on the history of its literature, theater and music. He must look for suitable artistic models and discover the laws which govern this exhibition. Where can such a profession be learned? Perhaps only at the Senezhskaya training-experimental design studio headed by Ye. Rozenblyum, who has also done so much for the theory and practice of museum design work. His daring and interesting artistic ideas have made their mark on the exhibits of the A. S. Pushkin Museum. However, the art VUZs in the country do not train exhibit specialists. Today, very few specialists can provide an accurate assessment of the artistic features of an exhibition.

V. Baturin, whose field is graphic art, studies exhibit items personally and makes designs, patterns, sketches and facsimiles of documents. If a new museum is to be created, the building must be made ready and there is some construction to be done. Here, according to V. Baturin, the artist must be involved in the project from beginning to end, for all technical details (lighting, heating, ventilation, etc.) must be organically related to the artistic solutions. Finally, practical experience has proved that an exhibit is the product of collective creative, inspired and selfless labor, and involves many economic and financial difficulties.

In discussing difficulties, A. Kreyn admits that he has not dealt especially with problems such as museum organization, economics and resources, in order to "avoid constant mention of the 'sharp corners'" (p 8). However, such "sharp corners" should be mentioned, and it might be better if this were done by "an outsider." The following idea, among Kreyn's views, must be heavily underlined: collecting for museums is good for the state and the people.

It would be difficult to predict the outcome of the struggle of those promoting the idea of a new museum without taking into account this major consideration and the enthusiasm, persistence and real fighting qualities of such people. The question legitimately arises: whom do they have to fight? Isn't everyone on whom a museum project depends immediately imbued with a great and clear idea of its nationwide and historical benefits? It turns out that such is not the case, for which reason the creators of a museum must suffer pains which are not creative in the least.

The struggle begins with "winning" a building for the museum. For example, there were ruins of an old facility in an abandoned state on a high hill next to the Raubich sports grounds and in "its territory." However, the moment T. Stepin and I. Pan'shin selected it, a "small" war (fortunately, of short duration) broke out with the Sports Committee. "Victory" came to the museum workers, but not as a result of any good will on the part of the sports organizers. It might have seemed that there would be nothing more suitable than the erection of a beautiful modern museum alongside a popular sports facility! However, it took the approval of Petr Mironovich Masherov, a person whose contribution to the development of Belorussian culture is mentioned with deep gratitude, to acquire the building. Such an incident might not be memorable had the difficulty in obtaining museum premises not been so typical.



Allow me in this connection to share the following considerations with the readers. Entire cities or parts of cities were rebuilt after the war in the form of the currently most popular type of museums -- "open-air museums." Such ensembles meet the definition which L. I. Brezhnev formulated at the 26th party congress: "Restoration of the pearls of the past." Suffice it to recall Leningrad and its suburbs; the Vladimiro-Suzdal'skiy Reserve and Kalininskaya and Penzenskaya Oblasts, in which a true "museum renaissance" is taking place today; Novgorod and the Novgorod area with their sacred and ancient historical sites, and the "old cities of Riga, Tallin and Vil'nyus. It would be impossible to mention all of them! In a number of cases the USSR Ministry of Culture and republic cultural institutions have supported the initiative of museum workers or have turned personally to the local authorities with specific suggestions concerning the preservation of ancient monuments and the creation of new museums. Another important fact is that today there is a state law on the preservation of ancient monuments. But how much more remains to be done!

It hurts to see offices, housing premises and warehouses firmly established in some ancient buildings of museum quality. Incidentally, living and working in such buildings is uncomfortable, and they are simply begging to be turned into museums. Naturally, the solution to this problem involves many difficulties of a technical, esthetic, material and cadre nature, but still... It seems that departmental calculations and actions rarely take into consideration (unless, alas, it is to show totally groundless resistance) the enthusiasm and professionalism of those whose job it is to preserve antiques and to ensure the safeguarding of monuments to labor and creativity.

Difficulties continue to be encountered even after a building has been acquired, construction work is under way and creative work on the exhibits has been undertaken. In the majority of cases they are caused by the absence of workshops specializing in the manufacture of nonstandardized equipment for museums. In existing practice such orders are placed with conventional workshops (furniture and others), which alas, rarely include people with feeling or responsibility and good will. Furthermore, they find the technical aspects of the work unusual and complex. Another difficulty encountered is that workshops will only work "with materials supplied by the customer." Where would a museum customer find the materials? Everything must be procured or "extracted" by the future museum director or the exhibition artist. Here is another paradox: state rates for the work of artists are such as to encourage them to create expensive "organizational" exhibits. An excellent idea consistent with the topic of the exhibition and calling for the use of less expensive and simple materials and artistic solutions frequently bring the artist pitiful earnings. Meanwhile, the organizations which commission the work of an artist allocate substantial funds (for entirely understandable reasons), which can make even an essentially inexpensive museum exhibit an expensive one. All of these are organizational and financial problems which require discussions, the weighing of alternatives and collective decision-making. It is a question of adapting organizational-economic methods to the specifics of creative work.

Let us not oversimplify matters: as a rule, people who counter innovative ideas with "material-technical" financial-economic arguments are guided not by personal but governmental considerations. They feel it their duty to save state funds. This, as we can see, is a very strong motivation. The crux of the matter may be that the laws and criteria for the effectiveness of museum work have not been



clearly expressed, formulated and put to practical use. Indeed, how are we to measure the "returns" from a new museum or the creation of collections and exhibitions in which substantial investments have been made? Not by box office receipts, for tickets cost a few pennies each.... In addition to the monetary worth of the collections, which frequently exceeds the funds spent by the state because of the "flood of gifts," and whose value keeps rising in price (or, as A. Kreyn writes, in pricelessness), we can today no longer ignore the national, and consequently the historical meaning of the spiritual wealth which becomes available to the people. The spiritual and educational value of a new cultural center cannot be measured in rubles and kopeks. However, we can and must convert its role into special "units of measurement," which include the cultural significance and completeness of a collection, the unique nature of exhibits, the depth of the overall concept of the museum, the professionalism in the creation of an exhibition, the popularity of the museum, its contribution to the country's cultural life, its ability to grow further, etc. (museum-work specialists, I believe, could formulate the effectiveness criteria and therefore the returns of a museum in the broad meaning of the term) more accurately and fully.

Let us consider the following question: is the importance of the work of museum authors, creators and workers always rated according to its true merit? I assume that here, as in other areas of creative activity, the impersonal, the average assessment of labor results is particularly harmful. For example, the salary of a museum director or worker does not actually depend on his involvement in creative museum work. However, authorship certificates could be awarded for participation in the creation of a new museum or for new exhibitions which experts have judged brilliant, just as they are awarded for major technical discoveries or scientific ideas (wages should be related to such objective innovation indicators).

Social gratitude can also be expressed through various forms of spiritual and moral recognition. I fail to understand why it is that the creators of highly professional museum exhibitions who have special training in the arts (such as, for example, V. Baturin and A. Shcherbak) are not members of the Union of Artists. Naturally, this is the type of special question in which a nonspecialist has no right to interfere. It is beyond question, however, that it deserves consideration and a decision, at least in principle. Another possibility for spiritual incentive lies in the discussion of museum problems in the mass information media. Let us note that television devotes substantial attention to museums. However, many current television programs on museums, including some very successful ones, deal only with museum objects. The telecast produced by I. Andronikov is proof of how the world of the personalities, searches and amazing discoveries of museum personnel can be described vividly and interestingly.

Let me mention one very important question which has long excited museum workers: they have no periodical of their own. Museum workers and people interested in museum life comprise an entire army. They feel the need to discuss practical and theoretical problems of museum work regularly, and this makes a periodical or a literary publication necessary. This, incidentally, would offer a better opportunity for training young people in this profession of such importance to the people, acquainting them with the laws of museum creativity and innovation.

It may seem that the people I have written about have every reason to be satisfied with their accomplishments. Each one of them, however, is an innovator. This means that he is always searching for and setting himself new tasks.

T. Stepina's plans are closely related to her strict assessment of her accomplishments. Experience has proved that a museum is a developing organism when the treasures of the country are combined with the current creative process. Visitors are particularly impressed when they see the superb masters of today at work, preserving and multiplying the creative "secrets" of the art of our predecessors in the halls of the Belorussian Folk Art Museum. T. Stepina is now thinking of acquiring a properly selected series of folk musical instruments for her museum, so that ancient folk music can be heard in the harmonious surroundings of folk-art masterpieces.

V. Baturin and his group are engaged in a difficult creative search based on the difficult work of the exhibition artist and the exceptional complexity of their new task. Their objective is to create a memorial complex to N. V. Gogol' in Gogolevo Village, Poltavskaya Oblast, the former family estate of the Gogol'-Yanovskiy family. For the time being, all that is there is the old ponds at the burial site of the writer's parents. What is needed not is to restore the house with the outbuilding (where Gogol' stayed when visiting the parental home), and to build the park. In other words, it will be necessary to "recreate," i.e., to replant precisely the same type of trees planted by writer and his father. Objects which belonged to Gogol' and his family, dispersed among various collections, must be brought together. Currently, V. Baturin is doing the work of a research historian: he is going through documents and books in the difficult but interesting search for facts and images which must develop into a scientific, clear and broad idea, into the strictly topical-exhibition plan of the future museum-preserve. (Once again, incidentally, a number of noncreative difficulties are being encountered: more than a year after the official authorization for a Gogol' memorial, the artist has no one to turn to for daily organizational support: no management or museum personnel or sources of financing a number of projects exist. Have there been any changes while this article was being written?).

The personnel of the A. S. Pushkin Museum are working in inspired fashion. The book "Zhizn' Muzeya" provides a description of an entirely specific plan and substantiates a new museum concept related to the poet, as broad as the first of which it is the extension. The history of the A. S. Pushkin Museum is one of both accomplishments and lessons. The first such lesson involves the disappointment of visitors at the fact that this is not a memorial museum. Hence the suggestion that a museum branch be opened in the only house still standing in Moscow where the poet lived (53 Arbat).

Lesson No 2 results from the small capacity of the museum, considering the size of Moscow. The museum finds it very difficult to satisfy the need of the millions of people in the capital and their guests to "communicate with Pushkin". Many unique items and books from Pushkin's time remain in collections which are currently inaccessible to the visitors because of the smallness of the premises. With increasing frequency, museum workers have been suggesting the use of "open collections," despite the difficulties involved. The idea in itself, however, is valuable, for the priceless collections must be made accessible to the people.

The task of organizing a memorial museum on Arbat Street based on the theme "Pushkin Lived Here" is an attractive one. An equally interesting topic would be "Pushkin's Itinerary" in the area of Arbat and the streets around it (as told by I. Andronikov in the television film). It would include the house where Pushkin stayed, which contains historical mementos from Pushkin's time. A. Kreyn writes of the new plans in the final chapter of his book. The realistic and topical aspect of such plans lies in the fact that they are related to Pushkin and Moscow. Let us only add, as we sum up that the new ideas serve the wishes and interests of the people. They have been formulated by people with creative minds and true passion, and that is why they will become a reality.

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## CAPITALIST ECONOMIC CRISIS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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[Article by Professor S. Men'shikov, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] In recent years, the economy of the developing countries has been experiencing the growing influence of the tempestuous and conflicting processes occurring in the contemporary world. On the one hand, the peoples of the liberated countries have inflicted a number of serious defeats on the forces of imperialism. The colonial system has actually been eliminated. Supported by the socialist comity, the heroic people of Vietnam defended their independence and territorial integrity in a fierce battle against American imperialism. The peoples of Laos and Kampuchea embarked upon the path of building socialism. The national liberation revolutions in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan South Yemen and Nicaragua triumphed. The racist system in Zimbabwe was abolished, and the autocratic monarchy in Iran was overthrown. The number of liberated countries with a socialist orientation and countries which have chosen the path of socialism has increased considerably.

In the 1970s, with the support of world socialism, the liberated countries raised the question of eliminating the old international economic order, which has been used by a handful of imperialist predators to exploit hundreds of millions of the working people in the former colonies. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "The reorganization of international economic relations on an equal basis is historically legitimate. A great deal can and must be accomplished in this direction... We are ready to contribute and are actually contributing to the establishment of fair international economic relations."

However, each step forward in the reorganization of the old colonial and neocolonial order must be made against the growing opposition of imperialist forces. Unwilling to accept their defeats and the narrowed sphere of their domination, the ruling circles in the imperialist countries, the United States above all, are trying to mount a global counteroffensive against the forces of national liberation, to preserve and expand the neocolonialist order and to perpetuate their control over the natural resources of their former colonies.

The struggle being waged by the liberated countries is further complicated by the objective circumstances prevailing in the capitalist economy and by the growth of capitalist reproduction contradictions. The developing countries have become the victims of structural and cyclical crises whose center is in the economy of the imperialist states. The crisis processes in the citadels of imperialism have had a



fatal influence on the economic plans of the developing countries. They are hindering the development of their production forces and are leading to a decline in the already low living standard of the working people in the Asian, African and Latin American countries.

These were the main problems discussed at the Second Congress of Economists from Developing Countries, which was held in Havana between 26 and 30 April of this year. Its sessions were attended by more than 700 economists from 80 Asian, African and Latin American countries and guests from the USSR, the United States, Japan and Western Europe. This congress was one of the most important forums for liberated countries since the conference of nonaligned countries held in Havana in 1979. It was attended by representatives of the leadership of a number of the ruling parties in these countries and 34 ministers and advisers of heads of state. Although the congress was organized by the Association of Third World Economists, which is a nongovernmental body, its proceedings had a direct effect on the political and economic practices of a number of countries. The theme of the congress itself was the global economic crisis and the developing countries.

Particularly noteworthy among the topics discussed were the development strategy of the liberated countries and their struggle for the democratization of international economic relations. Tense debates developed on the question of counteracting imperialist policy. Although the participants in the congress included people of different political and ideological persuasions, the debates proved that the predominant viewpoint recognized the close ties existing between the economic development of the liberated countries and the struggle against imperialism.

Both in the discussions at the congress and in its final document, the view that the world is divided into so-called rich and poor countries was totally rejected. The basic difference between imperialism, which is pursuing its neocolonialist exploitation of liberated countries, and world socialism, the Soviet Union in particular, which is the natural ally of the liberated countries was demonstrated. Many of the speeches emphasized the great importance of economic cooperation with the socialist states and their assistance in the movement of the liberated countries along the path of independence and social progress.

As Comrade Fidel Castro pointed out in his speech, the demand made previously and repeated at the congress, for the allocation of an additional \$400 billion in aid to the developing countries over the next decade was addressed to the developed capitalist states only. It was emphasized that socialism bears no responsibility for the economic backwardness of the liberated countries. "During the past decade," F. Castro said, "the theory of the so-called North-South dialog appeared. Some have tried to extend the concept of "the North" to the developed socialist countries, which have never had anything to do with colonialist, neocolonialist and imperialist practices."

The Soviet policy of peace, detente and disarmament as the necessary prerequisites for accelerated economic development throughout the world, including the liberated countries, and the reorganization of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis met with the unanimous support of the congress.

Numerous speeches sharply condemned the policy of American imperialism and pointed out the dangers posed to the peoples by the policy of the Reagan administration.

The speech by the well-known Swedish economist and Nobel Prize winner G. Myrdall, who censured the "new" strategy of the American administration in the developing countries, was indicative in this regard. In particular, he pointed out that the aggressive line pursued by the United States toward the liberation movement in Latin America and Washington's support of reactionary dictatorial regimes are being condemned by broad Western European circles, ranging from the communist to the bourgeois parties.

A number of speeches drastically censured the line of rapprochement with American imperialism pursued by the Beijing leadership, pointing out the danger which such an alliance represents for the liberated countries. It was noted that the absence of the Chinese representatives from the congress was the result of the discrediting of Beijing in the eyes of broad circles in the liberated countries, as a result of its support of the activities of the ruling U. S. circles and the reactionary juntas in Chile and El Salvador.

Many participants in the congress emphasized that real progress in the developing countries is impossible without profound socioeconomic and political changes. The outstanding importance of the experience in building socialism in Cuba for other countries in Latin America was noted.

The congress proved that many economists in the developing countries either share belief in the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism or lean toward it. This was reflected in the final communique and the reports of the congress' commissions, in which the contemporary global economic crisis was characterized as a manifestation of the general crisis in the capitalist system, the aggravation of its internal contradictions and the deep-seated conflict between monopoly rule and state-monopoly capitalism, on the one hand, and the need for the development of production forces and the upsurge of the well-being of the people's masses, on the other.

Everything pointed to the fact that the number and social role of the national intelligentsia are increasing rapidly in many developing countries. Its members analyze the processes developing in their economies from positions reflecting the national interests of their countries. They realize the nefarious influence of capitalism and are calling ever more energetically for a new international economic order and the strengthening of the mutually profitable cooperation between the socialist and developing countries.

We can sum up by saying that the discussions held at the congress yet once again indicated the topicality of problems in economic theory such as that of the nature of the contemporary crisis in the capitalist economy, the channels through which this crisis is influencing the developing countries, crisis phenomena in the liberated countries themselves, and the reverse influence of economic processes in developing countries on world economics. The study of such problems is exceptionally important in the light of the task set by the 26th congress -- developing further work on problems of contemporary capitalism and reaching a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the current stage in its general crisis.

The 1970s saw the further comprehensive intensification and aggravation of internal capitalist contradictions. This was manifested most clearly in the area of public production in the developed capitalist countries.

The range of cyclical fluctuations broadened considerably. As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, capitalism went through three crisis production declines during the last decade. The first was the global economic crisis of 1973-1975, which was the worst since the 1930s. The volume of industrial output in all the developed capitalist countries combined declined by 7 percent (annual data), i.e. far more than during any previous postwar crisis. The crisis spread with more or less equal intensity over all the large capitalist countries simultaneously.

However, the situation was not limited to the intensification of cyclical production contradictions. This time, the intensification of periodical crises became intertwined with a number of structural crises and long-term negative trends in the capitalist economy. This created a qualitatively new set of circumstances with a drastically negative influence on the economic processes in the developing countries as well.

To begin with, cyclical crises became intertwined with chronic inflation. During the 1970s, cost of living increases in the capitalist countries occurred more often. One of the reasons for this phenomenon was the crisis in state finances and the systematic state budget deficits, due largely to the continuing arms race. All of this led inevitably to inflationary monetary circulation and the depreciation of paper money. The main feature of modern inflation, however, is that it reflects considerably increased monopoly domination of the economy.

In the past as well inflation had contributed to the development of economic crises and hindered their resolution. However, as a rule prices either declined or their rise slowed during a crisis. Beginning with the 1970s, prices in the monopolized sectors began to rise even faster during phases of sharp production drops. The reason has been that the monopolies shift rising production costs to the consumers and maintain price increases by sharply reducing production volume. (Such a combination of grave crisis with serious inflation has been described in Western publications as "stagflation.") It was thus that price increases became one of the main levers for the redistribution of real income in favor of the monopoly upper crust and an attack upon the real income and living standard of the working people.

Second, the cyclical processes became interwoven with the energy crisis. Because of its importance, this structural crisis affecting a key economic sector represents one of the most serious upheavals affecting the capitalist system. Essentially, it means that the international monopolies have lost the capacity to control price setting on the world petroleum market fully and to set the artificially reduced prices they paid for the petroleum they extracted from the developing countries. Although the main action took place precisely in the area of petroleum, this crisis affects the power industry as a whole and extends to all economic sectors. It made necessary a reorganization of the fuel and energy balance in the developed capitalist countries and a reorientation toward less energy-intensive production, technology and consumption. However, the attempts at such reorganization encountered the fierce resistance of the monopolies and in the majority of cases have remained in an embryonic stage.

Combined with a variety of political and economic factors, the energy crisis is developing extremely unevenly, triggering spasmodic energy-price increases. Naturally, this contributes to the inflationary processes in the capitalist and developing countries and aggravates the run of periodical crises.

Third, cyclical crisis became intertwined with structural crises in a number of leading sectors of the processing industry, such as ferrous metallurgy, automobile manufacturing and electrical engineering. In the majority of the developed capitalist countries, output peaked as early as 1973 and has been in a state of stagnation or even decline ever since. Serious long-term difficulties arose in a number of chemical industry sectors as well.

Fourth, the cyclical and structural crises which developed in the 1970s were made worse by the general downward trend in the development of output, labor productivity and scientific and technical progress in the developed capitalist countries. In these countries, the average annual growth rate for the national product declined from 4.8 percent in 1960-1973 to 2.7 in 1973-1979; the growth rates for industrial output dropped from 5.9 to 2.4 percent and those of labor productivity in the processing industry went from 5.3 down to 2.8 percent. The spasmodic nature of scientific and technical progress and the alternating sequence of ebb and flow are explained above all by the militarization of the economy and science and the negative influence of monopoly rule as a whole. For many years the efforts of many monopolies were concentrated less on the pursuit of major scientific discoveries and their application than on minor and frequently cosmetic changes in output and technology which would give them a reason for raising prices or an opportunity to edge competitors out.

Fifth, a grave and lengthy financial crisis adds to the contradictions in the reproduction area. The intensified financial crises had a harsh effect on the economic processes in the developing countries as well.

Sixth, the increase in the economic contradictions in capitalism was manifested in the steady trend toward unemployment. After 1973, an absolute reduction took place in the number of people employed in material production sectors, in the processing industry in particular, almost everywhere. The total number unemployed continued to grow even during the periods between the production declines caused by crises.

The complexity and novelty of the situation in the capitalist economy lay above all in the fact that none of these crisis processes were isolated: rather, they were entangled in a single knot. That is why, on the theoretical level, it would not suffice to speak merely of cyclical and structural processes. We see a set of symptoms revealing a deep and comprehensive crisis in the capitalist economy as a structural component in the general crisis of capitalism today. This crisis took a long time to mature but began to become clear starting with 1973. The existence of a qualitatively new stage in the aggravation of contradictions is also confirmed by the crisis in state-monopoly regulation of the economy. According to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "The little help which state regulation of the capitalist economy provides is most obvious. In taking steps against inflation, the bourgeois governments encourage production sluggishness and increased unemployment; if they try to prevent a production decline caused by the crisis, they aggravate inflation."

The efforts of the bourgeois state to cope with energy, financial and monetary crises and the trend toward technological stagnation are in the same state of contradiction. The effectiveness of steps taken against any one of them is limited in practical terms and sometimes results in the aggravation of the difficulties in other sectors on the economic front.



As a result of all this, as was pointed out at the Havana congress, the economic crisis in the citadels of capitalism is of a protracted nature, leaving its heavy mark on the area of international economic relations and the situation in the developing countries. The chronic nature of these difficulties is manifested in the fact that after the 1973-1975 economic crisis was surmounted, the adverse effect of crisis processes on the developing countries did not abate but instead intensified. Thus, the communique issued by the "group of 77," issued in August 1980, stated:

"The global economic crisis has reached an unprecedented scale and is today far worse than the crisis the world faced during the period of the Sixth Special UN Session (i.e., in 1974-1975 -- the author). ...The economies of the developing countries were the main victims of these trends because of their vulnerability and the impossibility of making the necessary conversions."

Let us consider the manifestations of the world crisis in the liberated countries in greater detail.

In studying the crisis processes in the developing countries, we must take into consideration the significant differences among the various groups of such countries based on the nature of their socioeconomic development, level of capitalist development, per capita income, etc. The differences in socioeconomic conditions and gaps in the levels and growth rates for output among the individual countries increased considerably in the 1970s.

These countries' dependence on the course of the reproduction process in the developed capitalist countries increased also. This was due mainly to the considerable strengthening of the positions of the multinational corporations in the economies of countries with a capitalist orientation, and to the fact that the economies of many developing countries are quite heavily oriented toward foreign trade, despite large areas of barter economy and petty production facilities working for the local market. In the gross national product of these countries, exports increased from an average of 16 percent at the end of the 1960s to 25 percent by the end of the 1970s, outstripping the corresponding indicators for the developed capitalist countries (12 and 19 percent). More than 70 percent of all the exports of the developing countries are shipped to the citadels of capitalism, whereas the former colonies and dependent countries account for under 25 percent of the exports of developed capitalist countries. Consequently, the "interdependence" which bourgeois theoreticians love to cite is quite assymetrical and one-sided in practice.

With few exceptions, little has changed in the agrarian-raw material specialization of most developing countries. Agriculture, mineral raw materials and fuels account for about 80 percent of their overall exports. Even excluding the petroleum-exporting countries, agricultural commodities and raw materials account for more than 70 percent of the exports in two thirds of the liberated countries. Consequently, all negative phenomena related to price disparities and drastic fluctuations in prices and demand on the world raw material markets have a direct effect on the overwhelming majority of the developing countries. Of late foreign publications have made frequent references to "recently industrialized countries" which have entered the international competitive markets with finished industrial commodities to sell. It is true that some developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico and India have increased their exports of items produced by their processing

industries. However, the contribution of the developing countries to world exports of finished goods remains low (from 4 to 15 percent in the basic categories of such goods).

However, as was pointed out at the Havana congress, the industrialization processes in the developing countries have not reduced their dependence on foreign technological imports. Industrial goods account for two thirds of their total imports. Implementation of the capital investment programs and growth of output in many economic sectors in the liberated countries depend on deliveries of industrial equipment, industrial raw materials and chemicals from the developed capitalist countries.

The weakness of their position and their relatively limited adaptability are due among other things to the continuing domination of the access of most commodities to the international marketplace by the multinational corporations (TNK). In this area the multinationals play several roles: they act as producers, sellers and customers. They have increased the number of their enterprises and branches in the Asian, African and Latin American countries substantially. Currently, the most active in this respect, along with the American monopolies, are the Japanese and West German ones. According to UNCTAD data cited at the Havana economists' congress, the TNK control between 60 and 90 percent of the international trade in cocoa beans, tobacco, tea, coffee, sugar, rice and wheat; 70 to 90 percent of the trade in natural rubber, cotton, jute and timber; and 50 to 95 percent of the trade in crude oil, copper, iron ore, bauxites, tin and phosphates. They occupy dominating positions on the finished industrial goods market as well. All of this determines the specific characteristics of the shifting of the burden of the economic difficulties experienced by the developed capitalist countries to the Third World.

The effect of the global economic crisis on the developing countries is manifested along several basic lines.

First, a slowdown in the overall rates of economic growth in the developed capitalist countries has made the export positions of the liberated states worse. Whereas the foreign trade of the capitalist countries increased annually by 8.2 percent in physical terms between 1960 and 1973, the increase was only 4.1 percent in the 1973-1979 period. The export volume for the developing countries increased even more slowly, by 2.9 percent annually, in the 1970s.

All of this adversely affected the rates of increase in their output as well. In the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, industrial output in the developing countries increased at a growing rate. The situation changed drastically for the worse after 1973. The average growth rate declined by a factor of 2 or 3. The extracting industry was the most severely affected, although growth in the processing industry declined substantially as well. Only a few countries were able to avoid this fate.

Second, the spasmodic rises in the prices of liquid fuels played a negative role. Only a minority of the developing countries are petroleum exporters or are managing to meet their fuel needs out of domestic production. In the case of the overwhelming majority of the young countries, petroleum price increases led to a considerable increase in the contribution of liquid fuels to overall import costs.

Many spend more than 20 and some more than 40 percent of their export revenue on petroleum purchases.

In practical terms this has created serious interruptions in the supply of the most important economic sectors in the developing countries with petroleum and in ensuring electric power supplies. In turn, this has resulted in the underutilization of production capacities in many energy intensive production areas and in sectors using petroleum as a raw material (the chemical industry, for example). Some countries such as India or Brazil have been forced to impose drastic restrictions on fuel imports. In a number of cases, the need to use scarce foreign currency for petroleum imports forced restrictions on imports of other industrial or agricultural commodities. The steps taken to save on energy and replace petroleum with domestic energy production were only partially effective. On the whole, import and production restrictions have contributed to increased inflationary trends.

The petroleum-exporting countries found themselves in a rather special situation. On the one hand, as a result of increased foreign currency earnings, they became able to accelerate the development of their economic infrastructure (development of transportation, roads, ports and communications). On the other, however, the dependence of such countries on the economic conditions and energy policies of the developed capitalist countries increased. After 1973, this affected the stagnation in the area of petroleum extraction and exports.

Third, the rising inflation in the developed capitalist countries worsened trade conditions for most developing countries (with the exception of petroleum exporters). By the end of the 1970s, the ratio between their export and import prices had deteriorated even further, as compared with the 1960s. The main cause was the extreme instability of prices for traditional exports (essentially farm goods and mineral raw materials) and the systematic rise in the prices of industrial commodities purchased from the developed capitalist countries. Thus, the developing countries were experiencing double pressure from the stagnation and inflation in the citadels of capitalism.

Fourth, the developing countries experienced quite painful reactions to the periodical crisis declines in the industrially developed capitalist countries. Industrial output in the liberated countries dropped to 4.9 percent in 1974-1975. The extracting industry (an 11 percent decline) and heavy industry were most severely affected. In 1979-1980, i.e., in the period of the new world crisis, the growth of industrial output declined sharply (down to 1.8-2.0 percent compared with 6-9 percent in 1976-1977). These drastic drops in growth rates severely affected the overall economic situation in the developing countries.

Sectors geared for the export of agricultural commodities found themselves in a difficult situation in periods of crisis decline. Unlike petroleum producers, the developing countries were unable to organize sufficiently strong sectorial associations for basic types of raw materials and foodstuffs. Periodical drops in the world prices of such commodities remained a scourge to their economies. For example tin, copper, uranium, cotton, coffee, sugar, cocoa bean and peanut prices dropped sharply in 1979-1981. This was particularly hard on the Latin American and African countries which are major exporters of such goods.

The effect of the global economic crisis on the developing countries has some characteristic features. The effects of phenomena adverse to the economies of the

developed countries come about mainly through the mechanism of international trade. In the 1970s, all of this triggered a lengthy crisis in balances of trade and payments in most developing countries (with the exception of the few petroleum exporters).

In a number of cases, this also means the development of major state budget deficits, for food exports are a major source of state revenue. Consequently, the global economic crisis is manifested in such countries first as a financial crisis. In turn, this seriously affects economic policy and production. The state is forced to impose strict restrictions on imports, domestic consumption and capital investments.

As the participants in the Havana congress emphasized, the specific situation of most developing countries is also determined by the fact that after the developed capitalist countries have surmounted their latest periodical production decline, the problems of the developing countries remain and to a large extent become chronic and rising. Even if they succeed in reducing their balance of payments deficit in any given year, their foreign debt and, consequently, the burden of interest and principal payments, continue to grow. The unparalleled rise in interest rates -- up to 15-20 percent annually -- worsens it further. For this reason, the short-term state restrictions on imports, consumption and capital investments become long-term, which slows down their economic growth. The financial-political diktat of the imperialist countries, operating either directly or through the International Monetary Fund, plays a sinister role here as well.

Cyclical reproduction laws do not appear in their unadulterated guise in the developing countries. In most of them machine building is underdeveloped, i.e., there is no material foundation for the cycle. Private capitalism is frequently underdeveloped, consisting as a rule of small and medium-size enterprises. In some of the bigger countries, India for example, production concentration, particularly in the light industry, has reached a high level, and private monopoly associations subject to control by nationally-owned capital have been organized. In the developing world at large, however, such trends are the exception.

The economic cycle is also substantially modified as a result of the considerable development of state capitalism, elements of macroeconomic planning and state intervention in the economy. This affects reproduction greatly even in countries pursuing the capitalist path. Some sectors, including heavy industry enterprises, are subsidized by the state, which pursues a policy of protecting domestic enterprises against foreign competition and replacing imports with domestic production. All of this restrains the free play of market forces and hinders the full development of cyclical processes. All these things lead to the conclusion that the economy of the developing countries continues to reflect the global development of the economic cycle, rather than itself triggering periodical reproduction fluctuations.

At the same time, as the representatives of the liberated countries pointed out in Havana, the crisis phenomena "imported" from the developed capitalist countries are closely interwoven with the structural crisis processes which appear in the economies of the developing countries themselves. Their main cause is economic backwardness, a burden inherited from the colonial past. This includes, for example, the chronic economic crises in one-crop countries, the lengthy stagnation



and decline in traditional processing-industry sectors as a result of low competitive capacity on international markets and a narrow domestic base, and the state's poor financial base as a result of the poverty of a considerable population segment. Long-term crises are also caused by contradictions in the capitalist way of development and the consequences of capitalist industrialization. They include the undermining of traditional agriculture as a result of the mass migration of manpower to the rapidly expanding cities, mass bankruptcy of small and medium-size enterprises under the pressure of large, rapidly expanding new production facilities, the chronic lag in the economic infrastructure (transportation, communications and power) as a result of uneven industrial development, and chronic inflation, which may reach 100 percent or more per year in some countries.

Unemployment is systematically rising despite output growth which sometimes may seem to be progressing at a rather rapid pace. This is a manifestation of the capitalist trend toward separating producers from production capital without reuniting them on a new basis. According to the ILO, 40 to 60 million people in the developing countries are totally unemployed, while the number of those partially unemployed, i.e., taking into account the various forms of partial, hidden and permanent unemployment, reaches the astronomical figure of 300 million. If we look at the figures on those officially registered as unemployed in the 10 countries for which the UN publishes regular statistical figures, their number rose from 9.1 million in 1973 to 15.8 million in 1979. In other words, the unemployment situation as a whole has worsened considerably.

This has been the result of a number of factors, such as the mass exodus from rural areas, the bankruptcy of petty entrepreneurs, the emphasis which many countries have put on the development of capital-intensive production facilities, and imports of foreign technology despite the abundance of inexpensive manpower. Added to systematic inflation and food difficulties, the rapid increase in unemployment is creating explosive sociopolitical situations in a number of cases.

Some crisis processes have been created or worsened by the broadening of the influence of multinational corporations. During the past decade the TNC began to penetrate the processing industry intensively. In many countries (Brazil, Mexico) foreign enterprises have considerably increased imports while developing exports quite reluctantly, a course of action which contributed to the growth of trade and payment deficits.

Finally, the crisis processes in developing countries have intensified as a result of the considerable increase in armament imports, which curtails opportunities for the import of goods needed for production. This aggravates the already severe governmental financial crisis and pours oil on the inflationary fire.

The negative trends in the economies of the developing countries have an inverse effect on the economies of the developed capitalist countries. The slowed economic growth of the developing countries and the widening of the price gap have reduced their possibilities of increasing imports, including those from developed capitalist countries. With accelerated growth in output in the liberated countries, their markets could provide the developed countries with a safety valve. However, the thinking of Western theoreticians and the actions of Western show no understanding of the fact that the transformation of "poor" countries into "rich" ones could contribute to an overall economic upsurge. On the contrary, the Western countries

have adopted an even more rigid position in recent years regarding the just demands of the developing countries for the radical restructuring of the international economic order.

In the face of economic difficulties, a number of liberated countries have in recent years followed a line of economic diversification and development of a wider range of sectors. They are thus trying to reduce their dependence on industrial imports and raw material and food exports. An increasing number of countries are developing their heavy industry. All of this as well leads to further reductions in the traditional markets of the capitalist countries.

We find complaints in the works of Western economists about the competition provided by the young countries which may allegedly threaten production and jobs in the developed countries in the future. However, the Western citadels are closing down industrial enterprises and engaging in "modernization" programs at the expense of the working class, using competition from the developing countries as a pretext.

Some Western authors have even called for the reorganization of industry in the industrially developed countries in the direction of less labor intensive yet high-technology production, yielding the leading position in more labor-intensive traditional sectors to the developing countries. In this connection, they are speaking of a new international division of labor which would put an end to the discontent of the former colonies with their subordinate position in the global economy. In practice, these and similar prescriptions have won no support in the majority of ruling circles, which consider the demands of the developing countries unacceptable and are thus doing everything possible to prevent their implementation.

Western banking circles are greatly concerned about the growing indebtedness of the liberated countries. The business press has frequently expressed the fear that indebtedness has reached such proportions that declaration of bankruptcy by some of them may be unavoidable. Should such fears be realized, according to a number of noted economists, this could trigger a chain reaction of bankruptcies, bringing the capitalist economy to the brink of a new crisis.

Therefore, the crisis processes in the developed and developing countries are closely interconnected in a single general crisis in the capitalist economy. As we mentioned, the specific manifestations of and sometimes some direct reasons for such processes may be quite different. This is understandable if we take into consideration the different development stages of production forces, capitalist relations, state intervention in the reproduction process and the differences in status in the system of world economic relations.

Nevertheless, these processes have something in common, something which brings them together within a single crisis: the profound contradiction between the requirements for the development of contemporary production forces and the state-monopoly system of acquiring the results of this development (both within individual capitalist countries and in relations between imperialist countries and former colonies). State-monopoly capitalism and the neocolonial order based on it hinder scientific and technical progress in the most developed countries and obstruct the elimination of the economic backwardness in most countries within the capitalist system. Imperialist domination is precisely the main reason for the contemporary crisis in the capitalist economy.

Hence the shared interest of progressive circles -- the antimonopoly forces headed by the working class in the citadels of capitalism and the anti-imperialist forces in the developing countries -- in surmounting the crisis. Relying on the support of real socialism, these forces support the main conditions for the elimination of the crisis: the elimination of monopoly rule and neocolonialist exploitation, a radical reorganization of international economic relations, an end to the arms race, detente and the creation of a favorable international political climate for the economic advance of all countries.

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## BEHIND THE SCREEN OF WASHINGTON'S AGGRESSIVE POLICY

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[Article by R. Ovinnikov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] The frame of mind and the policies of a significant part of the ruling U. S. circles took a sharp turn on the threshold of the 1980s. Everything or nearly everything they may have learned from life and from hard political realities went haywire. They seemed to have forgotten that American imperialism had irreversibly lost its economic leadership and military superiority. The lessons of Vietnam and the sad consequences of other foreign policy adventures and domestic policy complications which affected the United States began to be thoroughly removed from their minds. Furthermore, an open course toward erecting a barrier on the path of national liberation and social progress throughout the world and of turning the clock of history back was adopted.

"Adventurism and readiness to gamble with the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their own narrow selfish objectives are particularly obvious features of the policy of the most aggressive imperialist circles," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress. Where the ruling circles in the United States -- the citadel of modern capitalism -- are concerned, these dangerous trends are manifested most clearly. The natural question arises: what was the reason for this sharp turn in the political course of the ruling U. S. circles, and what are they hoping to achieve with it?

### Campaign Against Detente

Looking back today, we can more clearly recreate the outlines of how and why the basic foreign policy directions of ruling U. S. circles changed and how the attack on detente was prepared and mounted.

The main reason for the revision of the attitude toward detente on the part of those who make foreign and U. S. domestic policy was and remains their unwillingness to accept the ongoing course of history. From the very beginning, some of them considered the weakening of international tension as no more than a forced measure, a purely circumstantial phenomenon. They considered detente an opportunity to "sit out," to survive, the consequences of Vietnam and Watergate, which interfered with the military and political adventures of American imperialism, and to regain strength. Others chose it in the belief that it would hinder the process of



national liberation and social renovation of the world. Once these hopes proved to be groundless their enthusiasm for detente was replaced by irritation.

The dissatisfaction of some forces in the United States with the weakening of international tension truly surfaced for the first time during the 1976 presidential election campaign. J. Ford, the incumbent president and second-term candidate, demonstratively declared his refusal to use the word "detente" itself on 1 March 1976.

Also in 1976, the administration took its first serious step toward the resumption of the cold war by brandishing the bogey of the Soviet threat. A group of "independent" experts (recruited by the CIA essentially from the Hoover Institute), headed by R. Pipes, drafted a "new" methodology for estimating USSR defense expenditures. Henceforth, they were to be expressed in "dollar-value equivalents," or, in other words, recomputed in terms of what corresponding outlays would be in U. S. dollars. The simple forgery here was that raging inflation and the high cost of the American army of mercenaries were "added" to the actual USSR defense outlays. In this way, as former President Nixon said, Soviet military expenditures "doubled overnight." Naturally, nothing even resembling this occurred in reality. Soviet defense allocations did not increase by a single ruble. However, the American poisoners of wells, whose "methodology" was willingly adopted by Washington, expanded their slanderous campaign about the "Soviet military threat" even further.

A large number of anti-Soviet political organizations grew rapidly in the United States on the artificial leaven of this myth. The so-called "Committee on Present Danger" became one of the most active among them. It rallied representatives of influential American financial, military and academic circles who were counting on the rebirth of force as a basis of U. S. foreign policy. E. Rostow, deputy secretary of state in the Johnson administration and one of the promoters of the escalation of U. S. aggression in Vietnam, became committee chairman. Other members of the committee included R. Allen, W. Casey, J. Kirkpatrick, J. Kemp and others.

With Carter and his circle, the so-called "trilateralists" -- the members of a special political organization of the U. S. ruling class, the Trilateral Commission -- ascended to power in the United States. They filled positions throughout the entire upper echelon of the new administration. In fact, the Trilateral Commission, which was organized mainly through the efforts of D. Rockefeller, Chase Manhattan Bank president, was yet another tool of the Eastern Seaboard group of the financial oligarchy for controlling U. S. foreign policy.

The commission relied on the need to combine the efforts of the three power centers of world capitalism -- the United States, Western Europe and Japan -- for the primary purpose of countering global trends in the world arena detrimental to imperialism, coming either from increasingly "impertinent" developing countries or from the further assertion of real socialism. The latest American studies point out that the "restoration of American hegemony in all its entire might" became the "comprehensive target" of the commission and the financial oligarchy behind it. The 1977-1978 period became the target date when the members of the Trilateral Commission adopted a course toward resumption of the cold war against the Soviet Union, as the main force obstructing U. S. hegemonistic aspirations. It was precisely then that the pursuit of an open line of confrontation with the USSR was initiated.

During approximately that same period a similar change took place with the establishment of another even more specialized organization of the Eastern Seaboard group of the American financial oligarchy for the purpose of influencing U. S. foreign policy: the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. What makes the influence of this power instrument of the "haves" even greater is that it traditionally supplies whatever administration is in Washington with about half of the senior government officials who shape American foreign policy.

In the period of the establishment and development of detente, the Council on Foreign Relations proceeded from substantially more realistic considerations about the inevitability and even the necessity of cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, as the council's annual reports show, a clear turn toward open anti-Sovietism and the resumption of reliance on force by the majority of its members was noted in 1977-1978 and became established and clearly formed in 1978-1979. The ruling U. S. class at large was seized by the militaristic passion. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations dropped their studies of the possibilities of restricting armaments and gave priority to financing studies on the American military potential.

Under such circumstances, the ruling U. S. circles assigned the Carter administration something resembling a transitional function. It was supposed to prepare the country for withdrawal from detente and a return to the old anti-Soviet rut, following the proper indoctrination of the "average" American. And so Carter and his circle began to pursue that path.

The notorious "human rights campaign" actively launched by Carter was prepared for him by that same Council on International Relations. Its true purpose was not only to put an end to the defensive posture in which American imperialism found itself after the failure of its Vietnam aggression. The objective was the resumption of offensive positions which would make it possible to "legitimize" further American interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In March 1977, i.e., 2 months after it came to power, the Carter administration tried to cancel its agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations. In August 1977, Carter initialed "Presidential Directive No 18," which called for the use of trade and economic relations as a lever against the USSR; in July 1978, sales of technological equipment to the USSR were practically banned. At the same time, the American administration undertook to block all channels for the discussion of arms limitation problems with the Soviet Union, one after another.

The last month during which the the United States was still conducting talks with the USSR on limiting any military presence in the Indian Ocean was February 1978. After December 1978, Washington discontinued talks with the Soviet Union on arms sales limitations, and after June 1979, those on antisatellite systems. The Carter administration used NATO channels for this purpose. A long-term weapons increase program was adopted at the Washington meeting of NATO in May 1978. At the end of 1979, the U. S. government approved the acceleration of its own armaments program. At the same time, it imposed the decision on the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe on its allies.

These are the facts which show when and how the U. S. ruling circles organized, and the Carter administration implemented, a qualitative shift in foreign policy toward further escalation of militarism and hegemonism. American propagandists, who are

trying to rewrite history, are attempting to shift this clearly traced line in the spring of 1978 to a time 18 months later, to make it coincide with the familiar events in Afghanistan.

It is true that the Carter administration was still somewhat hesitant in this regard because of some internal disagreements. More realistic-minded politicians, Secretary of State C. Vance among them, tried to contain the anti-Soviet obsession of such officials as Z. Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser. Judging from the testimony of his closest advisers, Carter would agree with Vance one month and with Brzezinski the next. He signed the SALT II Treaty in June 1979. However, it was on this occasion that the supporters of confrontation with the Soviet Union won a definitive and irreversible victory. Once again, this was merely the end result of deeper internal processes taking place within U. S. ruling circles.

By the autumn of 1979, the toxic chauvinistic moods had gained the upper hand. In a NEW YORK TIMES article, L. Gelb, who had resigned as head of a department at the Department of State, pointed out alarming trends. The forces of the "political center" in the United States, which favored common sense and a sense of restraint and responsibility, he wrote, had now been replaced by right wingers. The foreign policy logic of the latter, Gelb pointed out, is a caricature of reality, and the policy they suggested was notoriously bloodthirsty. Several months later, Vance resigned. The sensible-minded circles which realized that under the new historical circumstances and with the changed ratio of forces, the opportunities of the United States have become limited, were defeated.

#### The Regrouping of Forces

The 1980 presidential elections and their outcome resulted in an important regrouping of forces in the American ruling class. This was reflected in a number of organizational measures. First place in the formulation of the strategic aims of the new administration went to a "brain trust" with a clearly expressed "hawkish" and anti-Soviet orientation. Three of its centers played a leading role, the main one being the Hoover Institute at Stanford University in California, which contributed 22 advisers to Reagan's electoral campaign team. The other two were "idea factories" in Washington: the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and the American Institute of Free Enterprise, which advised the candidate on matters of foreign policy. The first supplied 15 advisers and the second about 10.

It is important to bear in mind here that in terms of financing, the currently politically "fashionable" centers are no different from past ones. The biggest monopolies, in particular Rockefeller's Exxon and Westinghouse, as well as others, account for over half of the budget of the Georgetown Center; 60 percent of the support for the American Institute of Free Enterprise is contributed by private foundations, including that of the Rockefeller brothers; the rest comes from companies (again Exxon and the Ford Motor Company) and banks (mainly Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan). Finally, the Hoover Institute, of which Reagan was an honorary member and frequent visitor, is financed by Rockefeller's Standard Oil of California and Morgan's General Electric. One of the main funders of Stanford University, the "parent" organization of the institute, is the Ford Foundation. In other words, the main nurturing sources of the ideological "honchos" of the new administration are

those same leading Eastern Seaboard groups of the American oligarchy -- the Rockefellers, Morgans and Fords.

These "brain trusts" were major suppliers of cadres for the Reagan administration. Georgetown Center Director D. Abshire, a member of the Council on International Relations and the Trilateral Commission, headed the selection of cadres for the Department of State and the Pentagon, National Security Advisor R. Allen and his assistants R. Pipes, R. Fontaine and H. Nau are former fellows of the center. Allen and Pipes were also fellows of the Hoover Institute (which also employed M. Anderson, presidential adviser on domestic policy and economic problems), while Fontaine worked for the American Institute of Free Enterprise. The center provided C. Crocker to the Department of State as assistant secretary, and J. Kirkpatrick, who is also an associate of the American Institute of Free Enterprise, as U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Nevertheless, the Council on Foreign Relations remained the main reservoir of cadres for senior positions, mainly in foreign policy, although representatives of the Trilateral Commission did not become extinct either. Thus, Vice President G. Bush is a former director of the Council and member of the Trilateral Commission. Secretary of State A. Haig and eight of his 14 deputies are Council members. Incidentally, it is a little-known fact that Haig came to his present position as head of the American foreign policy department after being member of the Chase Manhattan board. In this manner, the "tradition" of the past 30 years, whereby the position of secretary of state is held by an individual related to the Rockefellers -- Acheson, Dulles, Herter, Rusk, Kissinger and Vance -- was maintained. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger is a former member of the Trilateral Commission and four of his five deputies are members of the Council. Other members of the Council on Foreign Relations are D. Regan, secretary of the treasury, CIA Director W. Casey and his first deputy, F. Carlucci, Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors M. Weidenbaum, the President's special representative for foreign trade, W. Brock (member of the Trilateral Commission), and many other senior officials in the new administration. As the saying goes, the more it changes the more it remains the same....

At the same time, let us also remember that the individuals who represent these main institutions which influence U. S. foreign policy in the current administration are supporters of the "firm" course. On the same level, the influx into senior governmental positions in Washington of members of the notorious Committee on Present Danger, a pathologically anti-Soviet organization which waited a long time before its hour struck, is indicative. Allen, Pipes, Kemp and Anderson in the White House, Kirkpatrick and Rostow in the Department of State, and Casey in the CIA are all alumni of that committee. In other words, the enemies of detente have substantially consolidated their positions organizationally and administratively.

Let us examine how all this has affected U. S. policy in international affairs, how the ruling U. S. circles look at the world today, and in what direction they are pushing it.

#### A Look at the Future

The prevailing mood of the ruling class in the United States, as manifested in recent times, cannot fail to make all peace-loving forces suspicious. This is seen



most clearly in the instructions given to presidential candidates in the recent elections and subsequently to the administration which came to power. These involved some special documents drafted in the United States of late. Three of them appeared in the heat of the electoral campaign. The most interesting is a collection of articles by Hoover Institute associates entitled "The United States in the 1980s." Let us point out as a sort of reference that, as THE WALL STREET JOURNAL emphasized, two thirds (19 out of 33) of its authors were advisers to Republican Party candidate R. Reagan. Another is a book published by the Brookings Institution (with Ford Foundation funds) and titled "Setting National Priorities. An Agenda for the 1980s." It was put out primarily for the benefit of the Democratic Party candidate. Finally, there is the book "National Security in the 1980s: From Weakness to Strength," which was the result of the efforts of the California Institute of Contemporary Studies, in the creation of which today's presidential adviser E. Meese played a leading role, and whose director was C. Weinberger, the present head of the Pentagon.

On the eve of and immediately after the new administration came into office, five similar fundamental works came out: the report "A National Agenda for the 1980s," the result of 6 months of work by a special presidential commission; the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace entitled "Challenges to the National Security of the United States;" the report "American-Soviet Relations: A Strategy for the '80s," underwritten by the Rockefeller Foundation and the American Association for the United Nations, and two reports published by the Council on Foreign Relations. The first (published jointly with related organizations in Great Britain, France and the FRG) was entitled "Western Safety: What Is Different? What Must Be Done?" The title of the second, which came out in May 1981, was "The Soviet Challenge: A Policy Framework for the 1980s."

These publications, clearly designed for the 1980s and the shaping of U. S. foreign policy, are of particular interest. Taken together, they reflect in a clear and concentrated manner and synthesize the current moods of the powers that be in the United States. They are far more open than official statements, for which reason they better reveal the essence of a number of actions undertaken by the administration in Washington. Here is another interesting circumstance: members of the chief operational staff of the U. S. financial oligarchy in charge of influencing the country's foreign policy -- the Council on Foreign Relations -- are invariably and heavily represented in the eight groups of authors who drafted these recommendations for the U. S. government, which they consider to be "carefully weighed." They account for about half of the authors. The common denominator in these reports, therefore, can be expressed as follows: such precisely are the concepts and categories of thought typical of the ruling class in the United States at the present historical stage, and this is how it sees the 1980s.

Let us now consider the main directions from which the ruling U. S. circles expect difficulties. In this respect, one of the reports, which was submitted to the new administration on 26 January 1981, states the following: "The 1980s will be a decade of unprecedented challenge to American foreign and military policy. In all likelihood, the United States will be faced not only with increasing Soviet confidence, but with continuing troubles in the Third World and growing differences within the Western alliance." Therefore, the Soviet Union, the developing countries and the imperialist rivals will be the three main problems which will confront American imperialism in the 1980s, according to its own assessment. All of these

problems are indeed real. However, the manner in which they are formulated today in the United States, the way in which reasons and consequences are turned inside out and the care with which black is presented as white reveal more than merely the boundless cynicism of American monopoly capital trying to justify its expansionism. It is by means of great big lies and a systematic campaign of disinformation and misrepresentation, and only thus, that U. S. ruling circles can hope to provide ideological support for their line.

#### To the Brink of War Under the Cover of Slogans

The history of the 35 years since the end of World War II has its canons. Whenever the ruling U. S. circles experience a recurrence of the global hegemony syndrome, they proclaim the distracting slogan: "There is the Villain!" They have invariably set themselves in opposition to the Soviet Union, which they regard as their main obstacle in this connection. That is why the "Soviet military threat" slogan was brought out to conceal the rearmament course and its pursuit to its fatal limit.

The recommendations which were suggested in this area and directed in advance to the new Republican administration by the Hoover Institute, for example, were extremely forthright. "We must," the institute proclaimed, "wage political and economic war on the Soviet Union.... We must replace rhetoric with resolve and detente with dynamic defense. The choice is ours." In turn, the Brookings Institution, which was previously considered "dovish," also began to scream like a hawk. It openly stated that "During the past decade, the United States imposed exaggerated restrictions upon its own acts as a great power." As to military expenditures, the institute cynically preached that "their burden is not excessive and they could be increased considerably without any serious sacrifices."

In turn, the Council on Foreign Relations, after pointing out in its latest annual report that "American-Soviet relations will occupy a central position in the coming decade" in U. S. foreign policy, placed these relations on the same military base: "It is the common view that the lengthy and steady increase in our military power.... is urgently necessary." In another report the Council frankly pointed out that certain U. S. circles are showing "an increasing aspiration to return to the age of the superiority and unchallenged leadership of the United States in world affairs," and that the tendency to "use power as a panacea" for the solution of disputes has been revived in these circles.

The recommendations for a strictly military orientation which all of these "think tanks" of the ruling class have been supplying as if on a conveyor belt also contain eloquent admissions. For example, the reports of both the Carnegie Foundation and the American Association for the United Nations note that "approximate parity" in military power and an "approximate overall balance in strategic nuclear forces" exist between the United States and the USSR. The second report also notes that the USSR is "particularly interested" in disarmament talks and agreements which specifically "confirm parity with the West." However, it is precisely such parity or equality that the U. S. ruling circles are unwilling to accept, as they believe that the time for flexing their muscles has arrived. In its 1 January 1981 issue, after having interviewed what it said were "dozens of U. S. policy makers," THE WASHINGTON POST wrote: "No American government has ever been prepared to acknowledge parity."

Therefore, the slanderous myth of the "Soviet threat" was no more than a deliberate "psychological warfare" method. The efforts of American imperialism are not targeted in the least on preventing Soviet military superiority. The real intention is to use the myth of the "Soviet threat" to prevent USSR-U. S. parity in military affairs and to attempt to disrupt this parity, in the hope that the United States can restore its own superiority.

Such materials, which are essentially for internal consumption by the American ruling circles, indicate something else as well. These circles realize the social consequences of the course leading to a new spiral in the arms race. They realize that the difficulties experienced by the American economy, the diminishing resources and the absence of any "political will" to pursue the armament race in the country are seriously complicating the pursuit of this course. Among themselves they admit that the curtailment of social programs with a view to increasing military expenditures will directly "affect the economic well-being of American social strata which are already in a bad situation". However, the solution they have found to this situation is extremely cynical: everything that is fed to "the public" must be presented upside down. This marked the birth of the semiconcealed or in any case unadvertized recommendations that the U. S. "political leadership" encourage a "broad discussion" of the "Soviet military threat" throughout the country. It was emphasized that in this propaganda campaign the need to curtail social expenditures in order to increase the military budget should be properly "substantiated" (one of the reports even used the term "sold") in citing the "Soviet threat." This shows who needs the big lie regarding the "aggressive intentions" of the Soviet Union and why it was blown up to the point of hysteria.

All we can do is recall that these recommendations fell on fertile soil. The new American administration turned the myth of the "Soviet threat" into its battle flag in the literal sense of the term. A real orgy was launched in the area of increasing U. S. military spending. The increase in the American military budget planned by Carter was deemed insufficient. As U. S. estimates show, the Reagan administration intends to spend funds greater by a factor of seven than the amount spent in the 5 years of the war in Vietnam (1965-1970), in absolute figures or, taking inflation into consideration, greater by a factor of 3.5, on the arms race over the next 5 years (1981-1986). Unparalleled is the only possible adjective to describe such superarmament by the leading imperialist state.

Regardless of this militaristic anti-Soviet fury, the assessment of the various alternatives suggested to the U. S. government by the "brain trusts" is yielding spurious results. United States achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union is acknowledged to be "impractical," "unrealistic" and "unattainable," for the simple reason perhaps that the USSR will not allow this to happen. That is why the inflated military machine of the Pentagon is being directed at something other than war with the Soviet Union. The new U. S. military doctrine, as THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "stipulates the possibility of drawn-out conflicts fought with conventional weapons in several parts of the world simultaneously." DAILY WORLD, the newspaper of the American communists, justifiably pointed out in this connection that since the USSR cannot be "in several places in the world" at once, it is clear that the "hawks" at the Pentagon intend to wage war on a number of countries. Which ones, in particular?

## The Course of Colonial Revenge

Given the present international situation, the most aggressive imperialist forces believe that the time has come to "bring about order" in the "peripheral" areas of the world which they still consider their patrimony. This implies the preparation and mounting of a massed counteroffensive by imperialism against the freedom and independence of dozens of young independent states. This course of action is based on the unwillingness of the imperialist countries and their monopolies to acknowledge the successes in the national liberation revolutions which led to the collapse of the colonial empires.

The collapse of the rotten regime of the shah in Iran, the guard dog of imperialism in the Persian Gulf, the most important oil-bearing area in the world, was the decisive motivation leading the imperialists, those in America above all, to take active steps. In the wake of the Iranian revolution and its consequences, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, the journal of the Council on Foreign Relations, described it as "the greatest threat to international peace and to the interests of the United States and the other Western countries since the end of World War II." However, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy was not the reason but the launching point for the frontal imperialist offensive against the liberated countries. It had been prepared long before the Iranian events and, as the Council on International Relations admitted, was caused by the "growing irritation and impatience with the Third World as a whole."

The theoretical substantiations which the "brain trusts" of the ruling class drafted in order to justify the U. S. interventionist course in the Third World were noteworthy for their unusual frankness. A study by R. Klein, a top member of the Georgetown Center, which was published in the middle of the electoral campaign in 1980, presented the following scenario: in the 1980s the world would abound in "conflicts caused by the problem of economic resources and fought within the Eurasian perimeter." The Western "theater of operations" would cover the area of three oceans -- the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian -- "through which raw materials travel from suppliers to consumers." In order to ensure the success of such "operations," the Western powers should form some kind of "ocean-wide" military alliance. Military operations to be targeted on many of the "approximately 100 weak countries in today's world" were coolly planned. It was also considered self-evident that "not all of them would survive" in the course of such an "operation for preserving the peace."

This concept did not represent the ravings of an isolated individual. The management of the Georgetown Center proudly proclaimed that the work of Klein, one of Reagan's senior advisers during the electoral campaign, was the "core" of the center's study of "many stormy situations which will be facing the United States in the 1980s."

Washington considers the task of setting up an interventionist force to be deployed in the Persian Gulf area most urgent. The Hoover Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Contemporary Studies agree on the fact that the recolonizing of that area or, more accurately, the countries within it, should be undertaken the moment the Western "ability to intervene," that of the United States above all, has been achieved. They consider the use of force in the area possible in the following cases: an "oil boycott instituted by petroleum-producing countries



for political reasons;" "revolution or internal disorders" in any country in the area (such as, for example, "internal chaos such as occurred in Iran in 1979"); and the breaking out of a conflict among the Persian Gulf countries themselves.

The self-evident conclusion is that the moment American imperialism has mobilized the necessary forces it intends to establish an actual protectorate in the Persian Gulf area, to proclaim itself the supreme judge in the area, and to deprive the peoples and countries there of their independence and natural resources. It is no accident that two thirds of the vast additional funds the Reagan administration is throwing into the arms race are precisely for the training of "rapid deployment forces" to be used above all in the Persian Gulf area. Such is the scale of the tremendous threat hanging over the peoples of that area.

In this light, the recommendation of the Institute of Contemporary Studies that the UN resolution on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 be reviewed is hardly astonishing. Furthermore, the question has been openly raised as to whether "the present time is ideal" for such withdrawal, for the presence of these troops in occupied Arab territories represents "a growing asset" for the United States. It is not without interest that J. Kemp, the author of this recommendation, is currently in charge of Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern affairs in the U. S. National Security Council.

The directions of American imperialism regarding Africa have been announced with equal frankness. According to the Hoover Institute, the U. S. line toward that continent is based on the realities of "the struggle for world rule." It states: "The friendship of Gabon and Burundi would not help the West in the least.... On the contrary, we must try to cooperate with Pretoria.... We must show a new realism in the area of foreign policy to replace post-Vietnam timidity." This text ends with the statement that the "struggle for world rule," in which Africa as well must become involved, "is a battle which we cannot afford to lose." Several weeks before the new U. S. administration took over, similar recommendations were formulated by C. Crocker, head of the African department at the Georgetown Center, writing in FOREIGN AFFAIRS. He stated that "The clear refusal on the part of the West to impose trade and investment sanctions on Pretoria" must become one of the "cornerstones" of the African policy of the imperialist countries. Finally, in his view it would be "unwise" to adopt a negative attitude toward the South African military machine "as an instrument of brutality inside the country" or as a weapon "which harms Western interests" outside South Africa. The extent to which such statements reflected the frame of mind of the new administration is confirmed by the fact that Crocker became assistant secretary of state for African affairs. His trip to the African continent in May 1981 and the U. S. veto of the resolution condemning South Africa's aggression against Angola clearly showed that the sympathies of the ruling circles in Washington lie entirely with the South African racists.

In turn, the new administration's line toward Latin America was marked by statements to the effect that the "Monroe Doctrine," according to which Central and South America are considered the preserves of American imperialism, should be revived.

Therefore, the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are faced with the publicly stated intentions of the American imperialists to restore the colonial order in them.

## Allies -- Friendship Is Friendship But...

"Muscle flexing," which has become the trademark of the new U. S. administration in the world arena, promises nothing good for Washington's closest allies. Washington is beginning to look for a means of restraining those of them who are excessively obstinate and establishing its own hegemony on that front as well.

In the assessment made by the Council on Foreign Relations on the eve of the last presidential elections, "the possibly most alarming" to the United States is "the deep-rooted malaise in the relations with our traditional allies," for which reason "the most urgent task of the new administration will be to bring order to this matter." According to the Council, the range of disagreements and differences among the Western countries is unusually broad. This covers "changes in the relative strength of the partners," "differences in the specific expectations of detente," differences on the subject of Middle Eastern diplomacy," "the economic paralysis of the Western countries, which sows the seeds of economic conflict" among them, etc. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the interests of the ruling U. S. circles, the main reason for the complications in the Western alliance is the doubts which have arisen in Western Europe and Japan regarding "American leadership" and the consequent possibility that they may "begin to play a more independent and active role in international politics." The U. S. imperialists would like to cut the development of such events short.

Washington is hoping to put down the "mutiny" on the part of its allies mainly in two ways.

First, the United States intends to exploit that same thesis of the "Soviet military threat" to the utmost, as the most important lever for influencing the Western European countries and Japan. It is being openly stated that "the United States is more likely than the European countries" to reject "the old views on detente" and to lower the significance of armament control and to find "alternatives" to detente through "means of stabilizing" relations with the USSR, such as for example... "increasing the American military budget." The end objective in leading the allies along that path is to enable the United States to use the atmosphere of military hysteria in order to eliminate their desire to think for themselves and their awareness of their own interests.

The second U. S. maneuver concerning its allies, an equally sinister one, is the attempt to involve them in its adventures under the pretext of reestablishing "joint" Western control of the Third World. Washington believes that exclusive U. S. control must be established over the main raw material sources in the developing countries and the supply routes. That is why the recommendations emphasize that the United States precisely must assume "the main burden" in strengthening the Western military presence in the Persian Gulf. The allies' participation could be limited to "secondary assistance" only. The trick is for America as a policeman to patrol the oil shipping lanes from that area to Japan (70 percent of Japanese oil imports) and Western Europe (60 percent of oil imports). This would also make the allies less refractory.

In a word, U. S. strategy with regard to its imperialist rivals is based to a certain extent on the same power methods as the plans of the American ruling circles concerning the socialist world and the liberated Asian, African and Latin American

countries. Once armed, American militarism becomes totally oblivious to any logic other than the force of arms.

#### The International Horizons of the 1980s

As in any dangerous disease, the passions and chauvinistic mood which dominate U. S. ruling circles today may substantially delay the inevitable sobering process. They could even add to it severe damage to the cause of peace. However, the U. S. ruling class has no alternatives. What it imagines today to be the simplest solution to the many real problems it faces would lay the foundations for the most cataclysmic long-range complications in U. S. history if the old policy were continued.

However, having developed the huge military machine of American imperialism, the arms race cannot fail to lead it to the brink of the precipice. From the social point of view, the tremendous military outlays made at the cost of a drastic reduction of the living standard of the American working people can herald nothing other than the gravest domestic policy complications.

In the area of long-term plans of the American monopolies for the preservation of their world market positions, there could be no better way to subvert them than to throw vast funds into the arms race rather than renovating the equipment of American enterprises, which has become critical. Adding to this the further increase in inflation in the United States, which becomes inevitable with such huge military expenditures, the fact that the present adventurist course being pursued by American imperialism cannot but lead into a dead-end street becomes obvious.

The realities of the modern world will not be changing in the 1980s to suit the wishes of U. S. monopoly capital. On the contrary, its foreign policy will have to adapt to them. It is indicative in this respect that the more sensible forces in U. S. ruling circles, which under the present circumstances have almost exclusively adopted in-depth defensive positions, have not capitulated in the least. In an interview granted to the British periodical ENCOUNTER, Z. Brzezinski recalled with irritation how hard it was for him to set a course to serve "the need for the restoration of American power throughout the world." In his words, this course met with "strong opposition" within the administration itself from those who "rejected the concept of power in wholesale fashion." Sober voices are also heard from the Council on Foreign Relations, most of whose members are hypnotized today by the vision of galvanized U. S. hegemony. For example it is said that "In order to attain military superiority or even to try to attain it, defense expenditures on a scale which may threaten the entire fabric" of U. S. domestic political life may be necessary. It is said that "It would be an error to underestimate the resources, skill, possibilities and dynamism of the Soviet economic system."

Naturally, however, the main guarantee of the irreversible social changes which have taken place in the world is the immeasurably increased strength of real socialism and the international workers and national liberation movements. They were not only able to survive the dark period of the cold war of tragic memory, but also to turn back the arms race in the 1970s. It was they who established the principles of detente and reason in international relations and it is they again who are the guarantee that the forward march of history will not be stopped in the 1980s.

## REGARDING THE INTRIGUES OF IMPERIALIST INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

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[Article by S. Tsvigun, first deputy chairman of the USSR KGB]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee report to the 26th party congress emphasizes that the keenness of the class struggle in the international arena makes high demands on the activity of state security organs and on the party tempering, knowledge and style of work of our Chekists, who keep a sharp and vigilant eye on the intrigues of imperialist intelligence agencies.

Like all Soviet people, the Chekists wholeheartedly approve the results of the historic 26th CPSU Congress. L. I. Brezhnev's report and the congress documents generate in us a new upsurge of strength and creative energy and a unanimous desire to work still more selflessly for the good of our beloved socialist motherland. The Chekists are grateful to the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo and to Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev personally for the constant attention they pay to improving the activity of state security organs.

### Intensification in the Subversive Activity of Imperialism and Its Special Services

The present period, the congress pointed out, is marked primarily by an intense struggle between two trends in world politics. On the one hand there is the course of the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries of curbing the arms race, strengthening peace and detente, and defending the peoples' sovereign rights and freedoms. On the other hand, there is the course of imperialism, especially American imperialism, the aggressiveness of whose policy increased sharply at the beginning of the eighties. The reason for this is the further narrowing of the sphere of imperialist domination, the sharpening of internal contradictions in the capitalist countries and of the rivalry between them, and the collapse of reactionary circles' hopes that under conditions of detente they would manage to secure greater opportunities for undermining socialism from within. Imperialist circles regard the fueling of international tension as a method of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This is precisely the aim of the NATO decisions to produce and deploy American medium-range nuclear missile weapons in West Europe, the buildup of the military budgets of the United States and its allies, the Reagan administration's decision to produce neutron weapons, the kindling of crises in various regions, and the intensification of attempts to interfere in other states' internal affairs. All this has created a threat to the security of the socialist countries and many others, has worsened the international political climate and has resulted in a slowing of the detente process.



In explaining the reasons for the deterioration in the international situation, imperialist propaganda resorts to a whole series of farfetched pretexts--ranging from the well-worn myth of the "Soviet military threat" and Soviet "interference" in Afghanistan to fabrications regarding our country's "violation" of the Helsinki agreements or its support for "international terrorism."

However, it is well known that Washington began pursuing a line of worsening relations with the Soviet Union long before the events in Afghanistan. Many facts and documents can be cited to confirm this. For instance, Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace--one of the leading U.S. centers of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism--prepared a special "study" entitled "The United States in the Eighties." Its aim, as the authors themselves say, is to supply Washington with a "comprehensive program for more effective government [upravleniye] and for restoring faith in the U.S. determination to retain the role of leader of the free world." Substantiating the trend of U.S. foreign policy in the eighties, the study envisages, in particular, stepping up the arms race and intensifying American intelligence services' subversive operations against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The anti-Sovietism of Beijing, with its lying, inflammatory propaganda, aligns itself increasingly closely with imperialism's aggressive policy. On this basis the West is helping to equip China with modern armaments and is encouraging its leaders' hegemonist schemes regarding adjoining states. Nor can one help noticing the zeal with which imperialist reaction, in concert with Beijing, is trying to turn the so-called Polish question into another source of international tension.

Against the adventurist threats "from a position of strength" the Soviet Union pits the peace program for the eighties put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress--a sensible and fair basis for the solution of disputed international issues that is supported by the fraternal socialist countries and by broad public circles in other states. Thus the commitment of the USSR and the entire world socialist community to the cause of peace is unshakable. At the same time they have everything necessary to protect their vital interests against any encroachments.

The imperialist circles' line of exacerbating the international situation is being accompanied by a sharp intensification of all forms of subversive activity against our country and the socialist community as a whole. In the absence of open military confrontation, intelligence and other special services are imperialism's main shock force in its attempts to harm the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. This increasingly important role of the special services in the mechanism of American foreign policy is graphically illustrated by the U.S. National Security Council directives whereby "the government's overt foreign policy activity must be supplemented by the implementation of secret operations.... These secret operations will include, in particular, propaganda activities; political actions; economic warfare; preventive subversive operations; sabotage; blowing up important facilities; organizing escapes; help for underground resistance movements--partisans and immigrant liberation groups; support for anticommunist elements in free world countries menaced by communism; disinformation and other measures conducive to the attainment of objectives.

According to the American press, U.S. intelligence services' secret operations consist, first, of small actions implemented daily by the residents of the U.S. espionage and subversion department--the CIA--in a particular country, chiefly via

a network of CIA agents; and second, of large-scale operations directed, for instance, against holding democratic elections, toward overthrowing people's regimes, toward incursions into other countries by paramilitary forces, and toward the illegal delivery of weapons and ammunition to other countries. Incidentally, it was precisely this avenue that was widely employed when back in 1978 American intelligence organized the undeclared war against Afghanistan's people, which continues to this day.

The importance the leadership of the U.S. espionage and subversion department attaches to the careful concealment of secret operations, including the killing of political leaders and statesmen irksome to Washington, is shown by an interview published in the American press under the headline "Mister Death" with a specialist in explosives, poisons and firearms who had collaborated with the CIA for about 20 years, developing on the CIA's instructions methods and means of subversive and terrorist actions.

"The CIA," he declared, "asked me to develop several methods and means of killings. Virtually everything I worked on was designed for murder. I worked on all three main methods of killing people: special firearms, explosive devices and poisons. The CIA wanted to have special means of causing certain death, but without indications of American manufacture."

Occupying a special place in the imperialist states' machinery, special services are usually under the direction and control of the heads of state and government.

The new U.S. President repeatedly stated during his election campaign that if elected he would take the most effective measures to strengthen the American intelligence services. Although many of his other election promises, especially in the social sphere, have not been fulfilled, he is keeping his word about intensifying CIA espionage and subversion activity, as he is about the arms race. Thus in the new system for interdepartmental coordination in formulating and implementing foreign policy decisions recently approved by the White House, the CIA's role is substantially enhanced. It is also interesting to note that the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee is the inveterate anticommunist B. Goldwater, and that the President appointed one of his own closest collaborators--W. Casey--as CIA director and cabinet member. During World War II he was General Eisenhower's chief of theater secret intelligence, and in 1969-77 he served on a number of presidential commissions, including consultative councils on intelligence, on organizing the implementation of foreign policy and others. As a multimillionaire himself, Casey enjoys the complete trust of big business. Since becoming Washington's "number one spy," he has made no secret in his speeches of his intention to step up CIA subversive activity and to "minimize restrictions on the intelligence department's activity." In a speech in the Senate intelligence Committee, Casey declared that the "Reagan administration intends to use intelligence organs as an effective instrument for implementing its foreign policy actions." Stressing that secret operations abroad would be given priority in American intelligence activity, he noted that CIA residents would be given greater rights and powers to mount them.

In the wake of Casey, the leaders of the other U.S. special services one after another publicly expressed their views regarding the most important tasks of American intelligence in the coming decade. Thus Lt Gen E. Tighe, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, noted that military intelligence must step up the

improvement of its work in order to react to rapidly emerging new requirements, including requirements for assessing the USSR's military potential, the combat readiness of its armed forces and new types of weapons. R. Inman, director of the National Security Agency, which carries out mainly electronic espionage, declared: "We must continue to keep the focus of intelligence activity on all questions of long-term planning that are strategically important to the United States in order to provide the best possible intelligence support for the upper echelons of both the executive and legislative branches." This figure, reputed to be a "specialist" on Iran, now occupies the post of first deputy director of the CIA.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has approved the appropriations for American intelligence services' activity in fiscal 1982. These exceeded the sum requested by the Reagan administration. The committee recommended that the additional financial resources be used to step up work to recruit agents with access to information about the socialist countries, to introduce the best possible technical facilities, to strengthen the subdivisions carrying out secret operations and to strengthen analysis subdivisions, to increase the role of external counterintelligence and also to strengthen FBI special subdivisions. Structural and other changes have been made and the cadre apparatus has been strengthened by the recruitment of a large number of specialists in international relations, economics and military matters. Experienced intelligence agents who had been dismissed have been reemployed.

Cooperation between the intelligence services of the United States and of the other imperialist states is strengthening. To this end Casey has visited, in particular, Japan, where he discussed the possibility of stepping up intelligence activity in the Far East and the Southeast Asian countries, and also questions of coordinating U.S. and Japanese intelligence efforts in the region. Commenting on the results of the visit, the American press noted that "the new CIA director's very first official foreign trip shows the Reagan administration's intention to increase substantially the role of American intelligence and of Casey personally in shaping and implementing U.S. foreign policy."

Britain is improving its intelligence agency (MI6). Appropriations for its needs are increasing year in and year out. Thus while they totaled 34.5 million pounds in 1979 and 53 million in 1980, 61 million pounds are earmarked for 1981. The activity of West German intelligence--the BND--has intensified considerably. The 25th anniversary jubilee of the espionage department was celebrated in Bonn recently; officials' speeches in this connection emphasized that the FRG's "prosperity" depends on the BND's activity.

The increase in the activity of imperialism's special services is being accompanied by an intensification of their cooperation. In the process, the organizing role of U.S. intelligence--especially at the NATO espionage coordination centers in London and Istanbul--is being considerably stepped up in the subversive activity against our country. Chinese and American intelligence are coordinating their operations to aid counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan and antisocialist elements in a number of other countries, exchanging espionage information and cooperation in implementing acts of ideological subversion. Beijing's intelligence services try to recruit Soviet citizens, send their own agents across USSR state borders, and use for espionage their own staff members who have the cover of diplomatic posts in the PRC Embassy in Moscow.



## One of the Main Forms of Subversive Activity Is Espionage

In connection with the growth of imperialism's war preparations, its intelligence penetration is being organized on a broad front, using every legal and illegal opportunity. The collection of information regarding the economic, political and moral readiness of the USSR's peoples to endure the burden of the increased arms race and even the possible trials of a thermonuclear war is regarded as one of the most important tasks. American intelligence also makes great efforts to collect political information, including the USSR's plans regarding urgent international problems, relations with the socialist and developing countries, the situation inside our country, relations among the USSR's peoples, information about the population's living standards, about the work of party and soviet organs, public organizations and their leading personnel, and also about the consequences of the U.S. administration's measures to freeze trade and economic and scientific and technical ties with the Soviet Union.

Special significance is attached to reconnaissance on military and industrial facilities, which are regarded as primary targets for a nuclear strike. Intelligence agencies are interested in studying the USSR's internal security system. American intelligence has given its agents the mission of collecting information about the role and activity of judicial, prosecution, state security and internal affairs organs. Heightened interest is displayed in the achievements of Soviet science and technology. One directive sets intelligence the task of "not missing a possible surprise Soviet lead in the field of science and technology." In the words of one American intelligence agent, "competition in the scientific and technical sphere is turning laboratories and proving grounds into an extremely important theater of intelligence operations."

Imperialist spies are displaying great activity in their attempts to obtain data regarding the concentration and redeployment of Soviet troop units, special movements and other Defense Ministry measures that they believe are prompted by events in Afghanistan, Iran and Poland. In obtaining intelligence information by visual means U.S. military intelligence agents often openly violate the norms laid down for foreigners regarding travel and photography in the country in their attempt to get to closed-zone facilities which interest them.

Thus, on approaching the harbor of the city of Poti on board the motor ship *Moldaviya* on a sea voyage along the Batumi-Novorossiysk route, (Raush) and (Spenser), U.S. assistant naval and army attaches, used tricks to photograph the military port despite an announcement over the ship's public-address system that it was forbidden to use movie equipment in the area. Nearby crewmembers stopped these espionage operations.

During a visit to Murmansk, U.S. and UK naval attaches Montgomery and Ward, with various items of photographic equipment in their possession, drove to an area where a defense facility was located. Going right up to the fence, the diplomats began to walk along it, peering into chinks and manipulating their cases. These actions attracted the attention of a group of workers leaving the plant who, together with other passersby, found out that they were faced with foreigners and began to express indignation at their behavior. A militia member who arrived at the scene of the incident filed a complaint [sostavil akt] after checking the diplomats' documents and ordered them to leave.



June 1981 saw the failure of an intelligence-gathering attempt by (Sibenaler) and (Makkollin), assistant military and air force attaches at the American Embassy in Moscow, during a car trip taking in Rostov-na-Donu, Kharkov, Zaparozhye, Melitopol and Simferopol. En route (Sibenaler) and (Makkollin) tried to photograph military installations and industrial enterprises from the moving vehicle. Twice Soviet personnel arrested the Americans in the vicinity of such installations.

Spies make wide use of special sophisticated portable apparatus in areas where there are installations connected with the production and operation of radio-emission [radioizluchayushchiy] systems. Judging by the actions of U.S. military intelligence agents, they have not stopped despite the failure of the "electron" system operation (it was reported in our press) in which bugging devices were used in places of interest to them. It will be recalled that the "electron" system is a radio-technical intelligence-gathering device which can be planted in various guises (for example, in the form of the stump of a pine tree) at a distance of several kilometers from the building emitting the radio waves. It is able to intercept these waves and can then be commanded to "fire" this information to a satellite or other receiver.

Special services attach great significance to stepping up intelligence work by agents on our territory. While carefully investigating the reasons for their spies' failures in recent years, intelligence services are taking measures to ensure more reliable codes and to safeguard their agents' actions. Since there is no social base in the USSR for recruiting agents, they count on isolated anti-Soviet and nationalist elements, on politically unstable or morally degenerate individuals who have acquisitive tendencies or tend to lead a parasitic existence.

It must be clearly stated that most recruiting attempts fail. But occasionally, unfortunately, imperialist intelligence services manage to trap someone in their nets.

Yu. K. Bumeyster, former department chief at the USSR Ministry of the Fish Industry's Baltic Scientific Research Institute, and his accomplice, D. A. Lismanis, former chief designer at the 9 May fishing kolkhoz, were assigned by foreign intelligence to systematically gather data on defense installations in Latvia and other information constituting state and military secrets and also biased political, economic and other information intended to discredit the USSR state and social system. They mailed the intelligence information they had gathered to bogus addresses in the FRG and Sweden using microfilm and secret writing methods. U.S. citizen (Zandberg), West German citizen Strobel, and Swedish resident and CIA agent (Zalkans), one of the ringleaders of the anti-Soviet, nationalist organization "Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party Emigre Committee," participated in recruiting Bumeyster as a spy and maintaining contact with him on their periodic private visits to the Latvian SSR. For his crimes Bumeyster was sentenced to 15 years and Lismanis to 10 years at a strict-regime corrective labor colony and their property was confiscated.

Imperialist intelligence services are still actively using tourist, scientific-technical and cultural ties to get spies into our country. More than 20 of these "tourists" were arrested in 1980 and around 50 were expelled from the USSR.

The current tendency is to make wider use of foreign specialists working at Soviet enterprises for subversive work against our country. Most foreign specialists perform their duties diligently. Businesslike cooperation, mutual understanding and mutual assistance are developing between them and Soviet personnel, and this is an undoubted contribution to expanding the USSR's trade and economic ties with other countries. But there are cases where agents sent to our country as specialists engage not only in espionage but also in sabotaging equipment, assembling automatic lines and units in a faulty manner and delaying equipment startup and so forth.

The hostile activity of (S. M. Kobayakov), employee of the U.S. Burroughs firm, was stopped in late 1980. A regular visitor to the USSR, he made deliberate mistakes when assembling American-supplied equipment at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade All-Union Raznoeksport Association, which delayed the commissioning of the automated control system, and more than once grossly violated regulations governing the length of stay and the movements of foreigners in the USSR. Hostile to everything Soviet, (Kobayakov) tried to bring subversive emigre centers' publications into the country and made biting anti-Soviet pronouncements to those around him. In addition, he engaged in currency speculation, buying up old books, icons and antiquarian articles and sending them to the West via the Canadian and American embassies. (Kobayakov's) criminal activity has been stopped, and he is now prevented from entering the Soviet Union.

There are also cases where institution and enterprise staff, maintaining nonworking relations with foreigners, tell them of the Soviet side's interest in obtaining particular items of equipment, about offers by rival firms and forthcoming deals. There have also been cases where Soviet specialists have shown foreigners private documents.

It should be noted that recently the United States, the FRG and other NATO countries, as well as Japan, have been taking measures to step up technical intelligence work against the Soviet Union. A new element is the fact that since the spring of 1979 the United States has been simultaneously using three different optical surveillance satellites--Samos, "Lasp" and "1010," which make it possible to obtain more accurate photographic data on types of arms and defense equipment, the capacity of the enterprises producing them, the location of military premises and so forth. U.S. special services are developing a new radio-electronic monitoring system using satellites in geostationary orbit. It will replace intelligence facilities lost in Iran.

Contraband and currency speculation associated with the theft of state property and, therefore, with causing economic harm to our country is often inspired from abroad. Attempts to import contraband from abroad continue unabated, as do attempts to export large sums of Soviet currency, precious metals, works of art and antiquities.

Provocations against Soviet citizens and institutions abroad, including attempts to recruit Soviet people and persuade them not to go back home, remain active forms of subversive activity by imperialist states' special services. In a number of capitalist countries provocative demonstrations are regularly organized outside Soviet institutions to exert massive psychological pressure. In the first 3 months of 1981 alone over 130 anti-Soviet assemblages were recorded in various countries. Hostile elements organize fires, explosions and the bombing of Soviet missions. There have been numerous cases of hooligan assaults on Soviet institutions and their staffs, the dispatch of anonymous letters and so forth.

Such actions against Soviet personnel and members of their families have become particularly outrageous in the United States, where widely organized extremist acts violate the elementary principles of humanity, as well as the norms of international law.

The frequency of provocative and hooligan actions against USSR Embassy staff in Washington and the USSR mission to the United Nations increased markedly in 1981. During January-March the Embassy and mission daily received a large quantity of anonymous telephone calls threatening and abusing Soviet citizens (about 150 a day). The Zionists from the notorious "Jewish Defense League" really let themselves go. Hooligans from the organization stopped V. B. Kosov, a Soviet employee at the UN Secretariat, in the street near the Soviet UN Mission, abused him and tried to start a fight. Similar hooligan acts were committed against N. M. Spasskiy and A. A. Bessonov, USSR deputy representatives on the UN military staff committee; V. P. Gladkiy, employee at the Soviet mission; and others.

It should also be stressed in this connection that the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens temporarily resident abroad fittingly rebuff provocateurs and frustrate enemy attempts to harm our country.

#### The Widening Dimensions of Ideological Sabotage

Imperialism has been engaging in ideological sabotage against the USSR for a long time. Recently, however, new trends have appeared in tactics indicating a desire to widen its dimensions and make the hostile actions more intensely anti-Soviet and extremist.

Our party's 26th congress paid special attention to this. The CPSU Central Committee report said that in present conditions "the activeness of the class enemy's propaganda media has increased, and they have stepped up attempts to exert a corrupting influence on the Soviet people's consciousness."

Ideological sabotage is a special form of imperialism's subversive activity which is performed by special means and constitutes direct interference in the socialist countries' internal affairs. One of the main areas of ideological sabotage is handled by specially organized services and is based wholly and entirely on the crudest distortion of facts and outright slander--that is, subversive propaganda which makes wide use of radio, television and press and all the spread of false rumors. The second main area is subversive intelligence organization activity whose purpose is to create in our country all manner of illegal and underground hostile groups, to direct their activity and give them political, moral and material support. The primary purpose of the ideological sabotage is to weaken the socialist system. Its actions are directed against the leading role of the communist parties and their influence among the masses. Their purpose is to "erode" communist ideology, cultivate the bourgeois world outlook and, finally, to disrupt political and economic life and restore the capitalist system in the socialist countries. That is the purpose of the slanderous propaganda campaign recently launched against Poland in order to destabilize the country and its position in the international arena. Opponents of socialism abroad even go so far as to directly interfere in Poland's internal affairs. The provocative anti-Polish resolution recently adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives is an obvious incitement to antisocialist forces.



Of course, the class enemy realizes that in our country, under the conditions of Soviet society's close moral-political unity and the Soviet people's close cohesion around the Communist Party, there is not only no social base for the activity of imperialism's special services, but no base for the activity of its ideological centers either. The ideological saboteurs are consequently making greater efforts to seek out anti-Soviet, nationalist renegades and persuade them to undertake anti-state actions.

The main center for the implementation of ideological subversion is the United States, where this subversive activity has become an organic part of foreign policy and the special services regard their participation in it as being as important as actual espionage.

In undertaking acts of ideological subversion against the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries, in addition to using official propaganda organs, imperialism's special services rely on various emigre nationalist formations and Zionist organizations which they themselves have created and finance. In all there are over 400 different anti-Soviet centers, organizations, committees and groups operating against our country.

Within the framework of ideological subversion, large-scale actions are organized with a view to compromising the USSR's foreign and domestic policy. Under the direct leadership of the U.S. special services attempts are made in particular to coordinate anti-Soviet measures on an international scale. In particular, there have been instances in which the special services have pushed foreign nationalist associations and Zionist centers to joint operations on an anti-Soviet platform.

The assemblage of the so-called "world congress of free Ukrainians" with a view to outlining a general program of subversive actions by not only Ukrainian but also Belorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Zionist and other anti-Soviet emigre organizations and attracting the world public's attention to the Soviet Union's alleged "violations" of the Helsinki agreements can serve as a characteristic example.

The way in which the scales and tactics of ideological subversion vary depending on the international situation is borne out by the imperialist special services' massive subversive activity during the preparation and holding of the Moscow Olympics. A shameless campaign was mounted aimed at discrediting and boycotting the Olympics. At the same time active preparation was conducted for wide-scale subversive activity on the USSR's territory. Special services and subversive centers enlisted over 50 anticommunist organizations for this purpose, including emigre, nationalist, Zionist and clerical organizations. Over 300 extremist terrorist groups prepared to carry out hostile actions in connection with the Olympic Games. However, all these designs were thwarted. They were countered by a system of measures which made it possible totally to paralyze and rule out hostile activity. There were no subversive actions of any note on the USSR's territory during the period of the Olympics.

This lesson did not benefit the ideological saboteurs. As soon as the Moscow Olympics had ended, U.S. Zionist organizations set about elaborating plans to use the forthcoming Olympic Games in Los Angeles to fuel an anti-Soviet campaign in the country around fabrications concerning the position of Jews in the USSR. Thus, a



session of the Council of Los Angeles Jewish Organizations decided to hold demonstrations during the Olympics near the places of residence of members of the Soviet sports delegation, to present them with anti-Soviet literature and letters of provocative content, and to send to the competition special groups of Zionists with the mission of "creating a nervous atmosphere during Soviet sportsmen's performances."

Ideological saboteurs mounted an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign during the preparation and holding of the 26th CPSU Congress. To this end, the Voice of America, the BBC, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and others produced a special cycle of broadcasts prepared by Western "sovietologists" and renegades expelled from the USSR. During the days of the congress work heightened activity was to be observed among hostile foreign centers in dispatching their emissaries to our country disguised as tourists with instructions to inspire antisocial actions and to collect and export slanderous materials for subsequent use with a view to stoking an anti-Soviet campaign in the West. The Zionist organizations of the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands and Sweden displayed special vigor. Thus, it was discovered that (F. Lyulen) and (M. Baer), who had come to Moscow in February 1981 as members of a tourist group from a West European country, had collected slanderous information about the work of various Soviet state institutions. The same month (K. Smukler), a functionary of the "National Conference for the Defense of Soviet Jews" left the United States for the USSR on a similar mission. As a result of measures taken, these materials were discovered and confiscated from foreigners as they entered the USSR.

Reactionary press organs and centers of ideological subversion have recently been actively disseminating fabrications by spokesmen for the U.S. administration concerning the USSR's "involvement" in international terrorism and even the Soviet Union's "leadership" terrorist organizations in the West. This slander campaign is designed not only to justify U.S. international brigandage, it is blatantly inflammatory in nature, aimed at arousing unhealthy sentiments in some Soviet people, sowing doubts as to the humanity of our foreign policy, and attempting to push individual antisocial elements to use the methods of extremism and terror.

Under cover of lies about "Soviet terrorism," subversive actions against our country are being galvanized still further. New anti-Soviet organizations are constantly being created, congresses and conferences of an anti-Soviet orientation are being convened, and the work of subversive radio stations is being expanded and amended. For instance, in late February 1981 a congress of the so-called "coalition for a free Russia" was held in New York, and those taking part appealed to the Washington administration to toughen its policy with respect to the USSR still further. In March the so-called "Association of Emigre Russian Writers" was created in New York, again with the support of the U.S. special service, and it will be used to prepare and distribute materials of an anti-Soviet nature. In Britain a subversive organization which has openly called itself the "Center for Leading the Dissident Movement in Socialist Countries" has been formed at Oxford University. At the same time the BBC has increased its daily Russian-language broadcasts for Soviet listeners by 30 minutes, while Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have increased their volume of broadcasting to central Asia and the Transcaucasus with a view to arousing pan-Islamic and anti-Soviet feelings.

The channels of cultural, scientific and tourist exchange continue to be used to send to our country agents of the imperialist special services, emissaries, functionaries and intelligence liaison men [svyazniki] from subversive centers and

organizations with instructions to carry out acts of ideological subversion, establish illegal links with hostile elements, and incite them to undertake various acts of provocation. Thus, many emissaries of foreign subversion centers were detected and exposed among foreigners visiting the USSR in 1980 as members of groups of tourists and scientific and cultural delegations and were expelled from the country.

Until recently imperialism's special services, in organizing their subversive work within our country, built their main calculations on seeking out from among Soviet citizens of hostile inclination one or more "leaders" who could embark on the path of active confrontation with Soviet power and lead antisocial and anti-Soviet elements into organized struggle against the socialist system. As a result of measures taken by the KGB, implemented in strict accordance with the law and under the leadership of party organs, the antisocial elements, despite the West's considerable material and moral support, did not succeed in achieving organized cohesion on the platform of anti-Sovietism. Their calls for the revision of our political and ideological principles and institutions not only failed to acquire any support, but met with angry denunciation among the Soviet public. The antisocial elements' illegal activity was intercepted and the most active of them were charged with criminal offenses. At the same time relevant preventive work is performed with respect to deluded people. Here the state security organs constantly rely on the aid of the broad Soviet public and expand and strengthen their link with the masses.

The imperialist special services and anti-Soviet centers, having been convinced that the antisocial elements masquerading as defenders of rights" and champions of democracy" have been exposed and rendered harmless, have embarked on a frenzied search for new subversive ways and means. For instance, the ideological saboteurs' speculation on questions of supplying the population with several types of foodstuffs and on individual shortcomings in the organization of the working people's medical and consumer services has been obviously intensified. Actions to fuel emigration have recently been expanded considerably not only among the Jewish, German and Armenian populations, but also among believers to push them to leave the USSR for religious reasons. The ringleaders of Ukrainian nationalist organizations abroad are clamoring increasingly impudently about Ukrainians' "right to emigrate" from the USSR. Actions to support illegal Uniate groupings and to encourage extremism in certain representatives of the Catholic clergy have acquired a more blatant anti-Soviet orientation.

Reactionary foreign Islamic organizations and centers of ideological subversion have galvanized their propaganda, speculating on the events in Iran and around Afghanistan. Attempts have been noted recently to create in our country groups of a religious, mystical leaning such as abound in the West (the "Church of the Prophets," the "White Brotherhood," the "Society for Krishna Consciousness" and so forth.)

New, subtle means are being sought for influencing various categories of Soviet youth. Here anticommunist and anti-Soviet fabrications are clothed in fashionable "theoretical" garb. For instance, strenuous propaganda is conducted for arguments concerning young people's "exceptional" role in the world today and concerning the "autonomous individual," the thesis of the need to "improve and democratize the Soviet model of socialism" is imposed, and so forth. In a number of cases the class enemy succeeds in exerting adverse influence on individual young people. It is in

this aspect that we should view attempts to form groups of young people on the basis of an enthusiasm for "pop music" or "the Western way of life," accompanied by hooligan and other antisocial escapades. There are instances when some young people enter into criminal connections with foreigners. In paying attention to opposing the hostile aspirations of special services and ideological centers aimed against our youth, the KGB organs resort mainly to preventive work.

The activation of propaganda for the creation of various "leagues," "societies," "clubs," "theaters" and "seminars" made up of antisocial elements to counter existing public associations and working people's organizations can also be observed.

Armed with the 26th party congress decisions, the state security organs, with Soviet people's assistance, are taking resolute steps to undermine all acts of ideological sabotage.

Despite enormous expenditure of material resources and manpower, all the attempts of the organizers of subversive activity against our country are being dashed against the Soviet people's indestructible unity, their cohesion around the Communist Party, the friendship of the peoples, the Soviet people's patriotism and internationalism, and their readiness to defend their motherland. However, individual people are still encountered who for diverse reasons fall prey to the imperialist intelligence services and ideological subversion centers.

The main obstacle on their path has always been the Soviet people's high political vigilance. Our party invariably pays paramount attention to the enhancement of political vigilance and the ability to recognize the enemy's perfidious means and methods. A large part here is played by the decisions of the historic 26th CPSU Congress, the report delivered there by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and the resolutions adopted in recent years by the Central Committee relating to the improvement of the entire complex of ideological education work.

In the atmosphere of intensified imperialist subversive activity, the state security organs' responsibility increases still further for reliably protecting Soviet society against the intrigues of the imperialist states' intelligence services and other special services. Party leadership of the KGB organs is a very important condition for the successful fulfillment of the tasks of safeguarding state security. It is precisely party leadership which imparts a correct political orientation to professional Chekist activity and ensures the use of specific means of combating antistate, hostile actions within the strict framework of the provisions of the USSR Constitution and the norms of Soviet legislation.

The high assessment of the KGB organs' activity given at the 26th CPSU Congress, the Congress decisions, and Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's instructions commit the Chekists to work hard and raise still further their responsibility for the task assigned them by the party. Under the party's leadership, with the Soviet people's support, the Chekists are reliably safeguarding our great motherland's state security against any intrigues by imperialist intelligence services.

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TRUE SON OF THE PARTY; ON THE OCCASION OF A. S. SHCHERBAKOV'S 80TH BIRTHDAY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 81 pp 100-109

[Article by A. Ponomarev, deputy director of the Institute of Party History, Moscow City Committee and Moscow Committee of the CPSU]

[Text] "Much hard struggle lies ahead. However, we shall surmount any difficulty and eliminate any obstacle, for we are led by the great Bolshevik Party."

These words from the report which A. S. Shcherbakov submitted in the Leninist days of 1940 outstandingly express his basic characteristic of noted leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. His entire dedicated and purposeful activity for the sake of their triumph was illuminated by a most profound faith in the invincible power of Marxist-Leninist ideas.

A. S. Shcherbakov belongs to the galaxy of fighters for socialism, passionate propagandists and talented leaders who were raised by the Communist Party under the Soviet system. He entered the arena of political activities coming from the very thick of the workers' masses and was trained for it, like thousands of other party members of his generation, through his entire working life since childhood and through active participation in the struggle waged by the working people for the victory of the new system.

Aleksandr Sergeyeovich Shcherbakov was born on 27 September (10 October) 1901 in the ancient town of Ruza, Moscow Guberniya, to a worker's family. At the age of 11 he went to work in Rybinsk, first as a printer's devil and then as a railroad tally clerk. He joined the Red Guard in 1917. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he took part in the creation of the Working Youth League--the future Komsomol. In the summer of 1918, arms in hand, the young worker took part in suppressing the S.R.-kulak mutinies in Yaroslavskaya Guberniya. He joined the Communist Party in September of that year.

Shcherbakov held leading Komsomol positions in Rybinsk, Moscow and Turkestan between 1918 and 1922. After his graduation from the Communist University imeni Y. M. Sverdlov, he was assigned to party work in the Volga area. He then trained at the Red Professorial Institute. He worked within the CC VKP(b) apparatus from 1932 to 1936.

Aleksandr Sergeyeovich belonged to the best trained theoretical segment of the party aktiv. He was a man of great and broad culture and high intellect. He read a great deal, and he knew well, understood, and deeply felt and loved literature and the arts.



The reorganization of literary-artistic affairs, which reflected the process of the conversion of the majority of "engineers of the human soul" to the positions of the working class and their unification on the basis of the principles of party-mindedness and socialist realism began at the start of the 1930's. Extensive discussions of the basic problems of Soviet literature developed during the preparations for the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers (August 1934). Shcherbakov greatly helped the organizational committee of the Writers Union in the preparations for and holding of the congress and gained a deserved reputation among literary circles. This was expressed in his election to the position of secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers.

A. M. Gor'kiy, the great proletarian writer, highly valued Shcherbakov's activities in that position, his erudition and his sensitive and concerned attitude toward the hard work of the writers. Thus, reading Aleksandr Sergeyevich's remarks on the book by A. O. Avdeyenko, in November 1934 Gor'kiy wrote that "my dear comrade, I read with a feeling of deep satisfaction and pleasure your letter to Avdeyenko. You wrote a practical, a convincing review in a good, a truly literary style. This gives me the strong hope that our young literature will find in you a strong, intelligent and concerned leader. You realize how greatly such leaders, such Bolshevik party members are needed...." (M. Gor'kiy, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], in 30 volumes. Vol 30. Moscow, 1955, p 366).

Another letter written by Aleksey Maksimovich is equally noteworthy: "Dear Aleksandr Sergeyevich," Gor'kiy wrote in May 1935, "I shall not conceal that I am quite depressed by your appointment to the Kul'tprop. Naturally, this is necessary. It is closely related to literature and has long demanded energetic workers, people with a definite idea of socialist culture and of its development methods. I am afraid, however, that this new and difficult work will deprive the Union of Writers of two-thirds or even all of your energy. In the union, you were in your proper place and rapidly gained the reputation of a cultural leader and a supporter of literary work.... It is some solace that you are not entirely withdrawing from the union. I was pleased to read that you consider literature your 'favorite project.' Nevertheless, I am concerned" (ibid, p 389).

Shcherbakov was elected secretary of the Leningrad Oblast VKP(b) in July 1936. Joint work with noted party and soviet government leaders such as A. A. Zhdanov favorably influenced Aleksandr Sergeyevich's further growth as a party leader. He was second secretary of the Irkutskaya and first secretary of the Donetskaya Oblast party committees between 1937 and 1938. After that, A. S. Shcherbakov was elected first secretary of the Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee of the VKP(b). In 1941 he was elected Politburo candidate member and CC VKP(b) secretary.

As a party leader, Shcherbakov combined within himself outstanding qualities such as realism, close consideration of possibilities, broad thinking and the ability to look ahead. His vision encompassed all basic problems of the activities of party organizations. With his tremendous work stamina and unusual memory, he could quickly analyze the circumstances and make proper decisions. Aleksandr Sergeyevich was always in close touch with the working people. He displayed a profound comradely attitude toward those around him. He listened closely to the people and very tactfully suggested the right solution whenever necessary. He had the rare gift of understanding in detail even the most difficult problem and explained its essence and basis in a clear, simple and intelligible way.

In the prewar years Moscow and Moscow Oblast had already become a very big economic rayon which accounted for about one-quarter of the entire industrial output of the union. They were the leading scientific and cultural center of the country. Problems of industrial development, particularly of sectors which determined the trend of further technical progress, were always kept in the center of attention of the first secretary of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow City Committee of the VKP(b). Prime significance was ascribed to improving the party's leadership of industry and to the proper combination of party-political with economic work. In addressing party conferences, plenums and aktivs, he persistently developed the idea that the party members must always study and master production secrets, and that without this, complex technological problems could not be resolved.

By decree of the CC VKP(b), promulgated on 29 November 1939, the Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee set up industrial departments in charge of the practical implementation of party directives in industry and transportation. Aleksandr Sergeyeovich followed closely the work of these departments and directed them to link party work more closely with economic interests, to intensify control over the activities of enterprise administration and to combine properly party-political with economic work, i.e., to strengthen the entire system of party and economic management in material production--the decisive area of social life.

In the difficult international situation and the rapidly growing threat of world war, the party's Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee assumed particularly close control over the work of the party organizations and Moscow's defense industry plants, giving them operative aid in mastering and producing armaments. Proudly pointing out that their output was rated highly by military specialists, Shcherbakov called upon the party members and such enterprises not to rest on their accomplishments but to supply the Red Army with new equipment steadily and in great quantity.

As we look at the experience of the Moscow Party Organization of that period we note a number of innovative ideas formulated or promptly supported by Shcherbakov and which were subsequently developed.

Aleksandr Sergeyeovich, who possessed to the fullest extent a feeling for the new, which is a priceless quality in a manager, sharply noted any patriotic initiative born of mass creativity. Problems of the socialist competition and Stakanovite movement and the sharing of progressive experience among the broad strata of the working class were always part of his main activities. On Shcherbakov's initiative the bureau of the Moscow City Committee of the VKP(b) discussed the practical experience of the Frezer Plant imeni M. I. Kalinin in multiple machine-tool servicing. Conferences of multiple machine-tool operators and trade union aktivs representing machine-tool and instrument manufacturing plants in the capital were held with a view to the dissemination of this valuable experience. The combination of skills and multiple machine-tool servicing, which met with a broad response throughout the country, contributed to the better utilization of manpower, production areas and equipment and to the growth of labor productivity and the improvement of workers' skills.

Shcherbakov's name is linked to the implementation of the first general plan for Moscow's reconstruction. In 1940, summing up the results of 5 years of work in the areas of housing and communal economy, development of transportation, subway construction, and water supply and landscaping of the capital, he proudly said: "What

was accomplished in Moscow in 5 years is unparalleled in the history of urban construction and is inconceivable and impossible under capitalism" (MOSKOVSKIY BOL'SHEVIK, 16 July 1940). Shcherbakov called for converting to a new fast construction method: the creation of a powerful construction materials industry in the capital and the oblast, the building of plants for the construction of standardized big and small parts and thus the conversion of the construction process itself into an ordinary housing assembly operation.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich adopted innovative positions toward the development of agriculture as well. In his speech at the 18th VKP(b) Congress he called for achieving a drastic upsurge in potato and vegetable growing, raising the share of kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the Moscow area in supplying the urban population with food and developing most intensive farming around the capital.

Shcherbakov warmly supported the initiative of the Glukho Cotton Fabrics Combine, which had used the facilities of a small sovkhoz to organize an auxiliary farm to supply workers' cafeterias and kindergartens with vegetables and dairy products. The initiative of the Moscow area textile workers was approved by the CC VKP(b) and USSR Sovnarkom. They passed a special decree on the development of auxiliary farms, which became widespread throughout the country.

Military defense work and the patriotic education of the working people became one of the main directions in the work of the Moscow Party Organization. In April 1939, Shcherbakov said: "...The danger of war is growing.... The war is coming closer. We cannot name the date of its outbreak, but it is clear that war is imminent and that one way or another we shall have to fight...." He firmly criticized elements of placidity: "We must not imagine a future war as being in the bag.... The war will be a severe trial and will demand a great deal of sacrifice" (Moscow Party Archive 4, list 10, file 2b, sheet 182). At the same time, however, his speeches were always optimistic, displaying firm confidence in the final victory.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich paid particular attention to the vanguard role of the party members in the development of mass defense work. He repeatedly emphasized that in order to prepare the working people for the defense of the country we must actively prepare ourselves above all.

"Shcherbakov," recalls K. F. Kalashnikov, former secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the VKP(b), "saw to it that party workers engaged in steady military training, setting the example himself. He was a member of the Military Council of Moscow Military District. He was familiar with army regulations and instructions and with all types of firearms. He had a knowledge of artillery, airplanes and tanks. He studied military literature.... He liked to repeat: 'Do not forget what Lenin said: Study military affairs properly!'" (K. F. Kalashnikov, "Pravo Vesti za Soboy" [The Right to Lead]. Voenizdat, Moscow, 1981, pp 36-37).

Problems of theory, dissemination of Marxist-Leninist ideals, and improvements in propaganda and agitation work account for a considerable part of Shcherbakov's creative legacy. He personally frequently contributed to the journals BOL'SHEVIK (he was a member of its editorial staff for many years), PARTIYNOYE STROITEL'STVO and PROPAGANDIST, the newspapers PRAVDA and MOSKOVSKIY BOL'SHEVIK and other press organs. His articles provided a profound analysis of the views of the Marxist-Leninist classics on the role of the Communist Party in building the new socialist society and expressed many valuable thoughts and observations and recommendations topical for that period.



Unquestionably, the older generation remembers Shcherbakov's speeches to the Moscow public. His meaningful and original reports contained profound ideas on the decisive role of the Leninist party in social life and the inevitable triumph of communism; they provided an objective assessment of the political and economic situation in the country and played an important role in the ideological-political upbringing of the working people.

Shcherbakov's political and organizational gifts particularly developed during the Great Patriotic War. As CC VKP(b), party Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee secretary, head of the Sovinformburo from its establishment, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army as of the summer of 1942 and as deputy people's commissar of defense as of October 1942, he concentrated his entire great energy on the mobilization of the masses in the struggle against the hated enemy. Shcherbakov revealed himself as a major organizer of party-political work in the army. He did a great deal of work to implement the decrees of the party's Central Committee and the State Defense Committee, and the orders of general headquarters and the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense.

The following are some features which characterize the scale of the work done by the Moscow Party Organization at the initial and most difficult period of the war.

In the first 3 days, draft commissions and mobilization centers began operations in each rayon in the capital and the oblast. Thousands of propagandists and agitators were assigned by the party gorkoms and raykoms to help the commissions. Twelve militia divisions were raised in the city in an extremely short time.

Workers in industry and the railroads assumed the gigantic burden of evacuating the most important industrial enterprises far into the country's interior. More than 400 plants were shipped out and hundreds of thousands of workers, engineering and technical personnel and employees were evacuated in the autumn of 1941 alone. The work of the remaining plants and factories was reorganized on a wartime basis.

There was literally no single problem of a wartime economy in which Shcherbakov was not involved. Production of arms and ammunition, metallurgy and machine-tool building, ensuring the capital of fuel and the construction of the Saratov-Moscow gas main and of the subway were areas in which the Muscovites felt the daily attention of the first secretary of the party's Moscow Committee and Moscow City Committee. Shcherbakov warmly supported any patriotic initiative. Thus, he gave a high rating to the initiative of Yekaterina Baryshnikova, head of a Komsomol-youth brigade at the First State Bearings Plant, who proved that bigger production assignments could be met with a smaller number of workers. Aleksandr Sergeyevich justifiably defined this initiative as a new stage in the socialist competition and showed its tremendous significance in supplying the Red Army with arms and ammunition.

During these hard and dramatic days Shcherbakov worked on a round-the-clock basis. He was truly tireless, invariably maintaining the clarity and sharpness of his thinking, his calm and his stamina. General K. F. Telegin, who became chief of the Moscow Military District Political Administration in the first days of the war, recalls his first meeting with him: "I was deeply impressed by Shcherbakov's ability to listen. As I was expressing my ideas in detail and perhaps not always quite concisely, he showed no impatience whatever. He neither interrupted nor corrected me. I could feel behind the coldly glistening round-shaped glasses his attentive, concentrated and sympathetic eyes....



"The entire conversation and the atmosphere in which it took place made an indelible impression on me. I left the office with a feeling of inspiration and felt stronger and more confident. I wanted to work more and more and to justify great trust...." (K. F. Telegin, "Ne Otdali Moskvu!" [We Did Not Surrender Moscow!]. Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 1975, pp 29-30).

Having breached our defense lines, in 1941 the German-fascist troops rushed toward Moscow. The capital of the USSR was directly threatened. The aktiv of the city party organization met on 13 October. Shcherbakov reported on the current situation. "We are entering a period of most severe trials," he said. "Moscow is under direct threat." The speaker formulated the main tasks clearly and briefly: to raise the population to the building of defense installations, turn the city into an inaccessible fortress, consider all party and Komsomol members mobilized, undertake to raise communist workers companies and battalions in each rayon, organize tank-fighting detachments everywhere, organize the additional production of military ordnance for the defense of the capital and display vigilance and maximal firmness of spirit and organization.

Shcherbakov's 17 October radio address, delivered on the instruction of the party's Central Committee, expressed the hard truth about the existing situation: "Moscow is threatened. However, we shall fight for Moscow steadily, fiercely, to our last drop of blood. We must defeat the Hitlerite plans at all costs.... Comrade Muscovites! Every one of you, whatever his post, whatever his job, must be a soldier in the army which is defending Moscow from the fascist aggressors.... All our forces to resist the enemy! Everything for the defense of Moscow!" ("Vystoyali i Pobedili" [We Stood Our Ground and Won]. Moscovskiy Rabochiy, Moscow, 1966, pp 154-155).

A state of siege was proclaimed in Moscow and the adjacent rayons on 20 October. "With its entire powerful organism," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "Moscow felt the rising danger. It was grabbed by the passionate aspiration to stop the enemy at all costs, and to prevent it from shedding the blood of the heroes of three revolutions on the capital's streets and squares. The defense of Moscow became the cause of the entire Soviet people."

During those days and nights Aleksandr Sergeyevich could be seen everywhere: among the builders of defense installations, in training workers' battalions to fight tanks, at sessions of the Moscow Military District Military Council and the Moscow Defense Zone, at the command center of the Moscow Antiaircraft Defense, plants and military units.

Shcherbakov paid great attention to the organization of underground antifascist work on Moscow Oblast territory. As early as July 1941, an oblast headquarters in charge of the underground and partisan movement was created by decision of the Moscow Committee bureau. When the enemy entered the oblast's territory, 41 partisan detachments and 377 special combat groups engaged in an active fight against it. In the course of the battles they killed more than 17,000 Hitlerite soldiers and officers, destroyed a substantial amount of enemy military equipment and provided most valuable reconnaissance data to the Western Front command.

The capital's party organization mounted a tremendous restoration effort following the defeat of the German-fascist forces in front of Moscow. Shcherbakov's report submitted to the plenum of the Moscow City Committee of the VKP(b) in May 1942 contained

a detailed analysis of the condition and of the forthcoming tasks in party work. By then about 82,000 of the 236,000 members of the city party organization at the beginning of the war remained. The overall number of primary party organizations had been reduced by one-half. This left its mark on the condition of party-political work. The speaker paid particular attention to the vanguard role of the party members. Under wartime conditions many thousands of workers doubled or tripled their norms and became Stakhanovites. "How is a party member different from them?" he asked. He answered: "The title Bolshevik imposes upon every one of us additional obligations. They are that every party member must not only work honestly but also be an agitator, organizer and leader of nonparty workers in the struggle for the implementation of the party's decisions."

Concern for the life of the population runs throughout Shcherbakov's addresses. Cases of callous attitudes toward the needs of the working people, which he described as criminal, triggered his anger and indignation. "Paying no attention to time... workers and employees are working for the defense of the country," he said in one of his addresses. "...Under such circumstances the most important obligation of economic, party and particularly trade union organizations is to meet the vital and urgent needs of the working people.... Public baths, the heating of homes and hostels, shoe and clothing repairs, streetcars, laundry facilities.... We must deal with such problems every day and every hour...." (Moscow Party Archives, Archive 4, list 13, file 54, sheets 32-34).

During the war our party and its Central Committee carried out tremendous and comprehensive ideological work, focusing above all on the defense of the socialist fatherland. On the Central Committee's instruction, this sector was headed by A. S. Shcherbakov, Politburo candidate member and CC VKP(b) secretary. A. A. Zhdanov, M. I. Kalinin, D. Z. Manuil'skiy, J. V. Stalin, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy and many other Central Committee members and candidate members were actively involved in the organization and conduct of ideological work.

In directing the ideological education of the masses during the war, the CC VKP(b) and its Organizational Bureau and Secretariat considered about 90 topics related to ideological work. Such problems were systematically submitted for discussion at sessions of leading organs of republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon party organizations.

The party apparatus in charge of ideological problems was strengthened. During the war new departments were set up at the CC VKP(b) Propaganda and Agitation Administration: propaganda groups, artistic literature, cinematography, radio broadcasting and installation of radios and the arts. Great attention was paid to party cadre training and retraining. Republic and interoblast 2-month courses for propagandists, courses at obkoms, kraykoms and central committees of communist parties of union republics, annual party courses, courses offered by the higher party school of the CC VKP(b) and central press courses worked actively.

Interrepublic, interoblast and other conferences on agitation and propaganda matters were organized as of the autumn of 1942. In the first years of the war alone, the experience in mass political work of 82 oblasts and krays was summed up. The central committees of communist parties of union republics and the kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms set up voluntary groups of lecturers and speakers. The agitators' ranks swelled steadily.

During the war, the party gave priority to political agitation and propaganda in ideological activities. Shcherbakov always saw to it that, as Lenin taught, agitators and propagandists told the people the truth in simple, clear and direct terms. "In their agitation work and talks," he pointed out, "our agitators frequently smoothly gloss over questions they are asked. There should be no fear of raising searching problems in verbal agitation. Whereas not everything can be said in the press, pointed questions of interest to the workers must not be avoided in a talk."

The fact that during the war more than 500 editions of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, totaling about 17 million volumes, were published is a clear indication of the attention which the CC VKP(b) paid to upgrading the ideological standard of party members and all working people.

Literature and art were given a major role in the party's ideological and political upbringing of the working people, as important means for the mobilization of the spiritual forces of the people in defense of the homeland. In its 1944-1945 decrees on ideological problems, the CC VKP(b) made it incumbent upon party organs to strive for high idea-mindedness and Leninist party-mindedness in artistic creativity. It directed the creative organizations to work on topical military-patriotic themes. The Central Committee passed a number of important decrees on problems of cinematography as well.

Shcherbakov made a major contribution to the preparation and implementation of these and many other matters. During the war the ideological activities of our party and its Central Committee played a tremendous role in mobilizing the people's masses in defeating the hated enemy and achieving victory.

The growth of the combat power of the Soviet armed forces depended greatly on increasing the party's influence on the troops and on their ideological upbringing. As early as the end of 1941, 1,234,000 party members, i.e., two-fifths of the party's entire membership, were fighting at the front.

Tens of thousands of party members were assigned to the army as political workers. They played an outstanding role in educating the personnel and upgrading the combat capability of units and subunits.

"The true political worker in the army," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev wrote in his book "Malaya Zemlya," "is a person around whom the people rally. He is thoroughly familiar with their feelings, needs, hopes and dreams, and leads them to self-sacrifice and exploits. If we bear in mind that the fighting spirit of the troops has always been considered the most important factor in the staunchness of the troops, it was precisely the political worker who was entrusted with the sharpest weapon in the war. He tempered the souls and hearts of the troops. Without this tanks, guns or airplanes would not have brought us victory."

In providing political guidance to the armed forces through its organs in the army and navy--the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and the Main Political Administration of the Navy, which held the status of Central Committee Departments, and through political administrations and political departments the party's Central Committee displayed constant concern for the forces' strengthening.



In the summer of 1942, in a period of difficulty for the Soviet troops, A. S. Shcherbakov was appointed chief of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army by decision of the CC VKP(b) Politburo. Political workers with combat experience in work at the front were appointed to responsible administrative positions. A military-political propaganda council was set up under the Main Political Administration. Its task was to sum up the experience in party-political work among the troops, formulate recommendations for its improvement and give practical aid to military councils and political organs in this area.

Under Shcherbakov's leadership, the Main Political Administration of the Red Army persistently improved the activities of political organs and tried to make party-political work even more effective, inseparably tied to combat assignments and focused on the main objective--ensuring the defeat of the enemy.

Shcherbakov made a substantial contribution to improving party-political work in the army. He traveled to the front, constantly met with political workers and closely listened to their suggestions and wishes. He persistently saw to it that political work in the troops was entirely consistent with the specific conditions of the war circumstances, that it was structured on a differentiated basis, reached the minds and hearts of the individual soldiers and educated them in a spirit of burning hatred for the enemy, infinite loyalty to the socialist homeland and readiness to surmount all obstacles on the way to victory.

In May 1943 the CC VKP(b) passed a resolution on changing the structure of Red Army party and Komsomol organizations. Its main purpose was to bring party and Komsomol organs closer to the troops. To this effect the regimental party bureau assumed the functions of a party committee and was able to influence all aspects of the life of the unit more actively; primary party organizations were set up in the decisive army units--battalions and companies--and the institution of appointed party organizers was introduced. This made it possible quickly to replace the party organization heads who had become war casualties and to preserve continuity in party work. Army Komsomol organizations were reorganized accordingly.

The Main Political Administration of the Red Army ably guided the entire reorganization. It helped in and demanded of the political administrations and political departments the fastest possible creation of full party organizations and increased attention to the choice and appointment of party organizers. As a result of the reorganization party work in the armed forces became more flexible and effective.

With his typical bolshevik passion and energy, Shcherbakov guided the implementation of the other most important assignment of political organs and party organizations: the political education of the troops. Since agitation was the most timely and effective form of political work among the troops, a number of steps were taken to improve it. Agitator groups were set up, in addition to groups of lecturers, under the Main Political Administration and the political administrations of fronts and all political departments. Talented party propagandists and noted social scientists were drawn into political work.

In implementing the instructions of the party's Central Committee, Shcherbakov demanded of political administrations and political departments decisive improvements in the organization of political agitation and units and large units, the extensive inclusion of all troops and the personal participation of leading military personnel



in mass political work. "Talks are an outstanding method," he said. "However, we cannot do without mass agitation. We need mass agitators-tribunes." Shcherbakov deemed inadmissible the lack of militant, politically saturated and intelligible agitation. Our best party people were also talented agitators. His advice was "agitators must be chosen not according to rank but ability. Some Red Army men have the 'divine' gift of the agitators. Their words will reach the minds and hearts of the troops. We must look for such people."

Shcherbakov emphasized with equal persistence the power of the printed word. He paid great attention to improving the content and effectiveness of the army press. Agitation and propaganda became effective weapons in the struggle against the enemy.

Shcherbakov ascribed great importance to the organization of joint work between commanders and political workers. He always demanded of the political workers that they persistently master the foundations of military affairs and that they be properly familiar with regulations and instructions. At the same time, he firmly criticized those who paid little attention to the political-moral condition of the personnel. "Both the commander and the commissar must understand one thing: that we have one cause and a single objective--winning," he emphasized. "Everyone must ensure the implementation of this task from his angle, and from the position and place he holds." Addressing himself to political workers, he said: "Study military affairs and military science. Above all, however, carry out your basic function assigned to you by the party--that of organizers of political work."

In mid-1944 the Red Army undertook the implementation of its great liberation mission. The development of combat operations on foreign territory confronted the political leadership of the troops with new tasks. Requirements regarding all party-political work, both among the troops and among the enemy population, became even stricter. The political organs focused their educational work among the troops on problems of proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism. With a view to summing up the experience gained in political work in the army in the new stage of the war, the Military-Political Propaganda Council under the Main Political Administration of the Red Army heard and discussed a report submitted by the political administration of the Second Ukrainian Front titled "On the Condition of Party-Political Work in the Front Troops Outside the Soviet Union," which was presented in June of 1944. A. A. Zhdanov and A. S. Shcherbakov participated in the discussion.

After summing up the results of the discussion, the Main Political Administration of the Red Army issued a directive to the troops, which included the following assignment: "To reorganize the content of party-political and all educational work in accordance with the new circumstances in which the front troops find themselves. To demand of the political organs and of the entire party-political apparatus highly intensive work and increased personal responsibility for assignments." The political organs were asked to intensify their explanation of the documents issued by the Soviet government on the purpose of the Soviet troops' entry into the territory of European states.

Starting in the spring of 1944 an increasing number of political workers familiar with foreign languages were assigned to the troops. Antifascist schools for prisoners of war were active. The political organs of the Red Army began to publish for the foreign population daily newspapers. They distributed leaflets, pamphlets, posters, slogans and actively engaged in mass explanatory work through the facilities of the Soviet military administration.

Hundreds and thousands of party members whom Shcherbakov promoted to senior political work in the army during the war honorably coped with their most difficult tasks. Noted Soviet military leaders and commanders and members of military councils of fronts and armies, who had the occasion to meet and work with him, referred to him with great warmth.

The Soviet government rated A. S. Shcherbakov's merits highly. It awarded him three Orders of Lenin, the Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov First Class and promoted him to colonel general.

Inhuman stress affected Aleksandr Sergeevich's health, although he was then only 43. Shortly before the end of the war he fell severely ill. On 9 May, however, ignoring the ban of the physicians, he came to Moscow to welcome with all Muscovites the long-awaited victory day for which he had done so much. On the following day, 10 May, A. S. Shcherbakov died.

The life and activities of Aleksandr Sergeevich Shcherbakov are an example to the Soviet people in their struggle for the further blossoming of our great homeland and the triumph of communism.

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CSO: 1802/2

## OUTSTANDING LEADER OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS MOVEMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 81 pp 110-122

[Article by Seppo Toiviainen, Communist Party of Finland Politburo member, and Prof Yu. Krasin, doctor of philosophical sciences, on the occasion of the centennial of O. V. Kuusinen's birth]

[Text] Otto Vil'gel'movich Kuusinen began his revolutionary career at the turn of the 20th century, which was destined to become a century of the greatest revolutionary change. After joining the workers movement as a youngster, O. V. Kuusinen tied to it all his actions and thoughts once and for all. It is probably this consistency and purposefulness that were the main secret of his amazingly rich and fruitful activities as one of the noted members of the Leninist guard which stood at the origins of the contemporary international communist movement.

### 1

O. V. Kuusinen spent a considerable part of his conscious life in the Soviet Union, dedicating his entire efforts to party and state work and to the building of a socialist society. However, he was the son of the Finnish people and developed as revolutionary and communist in the Finnish labor movement. He was a noted leader of the international communist movement and an internationalist to the marrow of his bones.

O. V. Kuusinen joined the Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDPF) as a student, at a time when the first Russian revolution, which met with a broad response and support in Finland as well, was coming closer. The revolutionary events had a great influence on Finland's social democratic movement. At the SDPF 1906 congress, two directions became clearly identifiable within the party: the right wing, which favored an alliance with the bourgeoisie, and the left wing, which consistently defended the principle of the class struggle. O. V. Kuusinen became its acknowledged leader from the very beginning. The role he played as such was particularly influential in ideological and theoretical work.

The SDPF was suffering from all the weaknesses of the Second International. This was manifested particularly clearly in the theoretical field. Although the Communist Party Manifesto had been published in Finnish at the end of 1905, the Marxist classics and their main works were virtually unknown in Finland, nor were V. I. Lenin's works well known. As we know, Lenin closely followed the situation in Finland. He was well acquainted with the characteristics of the Finnish labor movement, which had

frequently shown its solidarity with the class struggle waged by the Russian proletariat. Nevertheless, the majority of the Finnish social democratic leaders were, unfortunately, poorly informed about the labor movement in Russia and the activities of the Leninist party until the Great October Socialist Revolution.

These were the circumstances prevailing in the Finnish social democratic movement in which the young O. V. Kuusinen and his fellow workers were to accomplish a tremendously great deal of work.

In 1906 the young socialists O. V. Kuusinen, (Yur'ye) Sirola, Edward Gulling and Sulo (Vuolijoki) undertook the publication of "Socialist Journal" (SOSIALISTINEN AIKAKAUSLEHTI). They undertook to disseminate and explain Marxist theory. The editors stated that they supported a "principled, red position of irreconcilable class struggle," and firm rejection of conciliation with the bourgeoisie. Despite their youth, the editors represented the most progressive and politically most mature segment of the Finnish labor movement.

In his first articles, O. V. Kuusinen attempted to explain the difference between bourgeois and socialist outlooks. He flailed against capitalism and the bourgeois way of thinking, described the socialist alternative and proved the need to wage a class struggle to the victorious end. At the same time, he sharply opposed reformist and anarchic views.

I. K. Kari, the "Finnish Millerand," was expelled from the SDPF at its 1906 congress, after he joined the reactionary bourgeois government against the wishes of the party. O. V. Kuusinen pointed the edge of his criticism at him. This was followed by a series of articles against "ministerial socialism." It was already then that a feature typical of O. V. Kuusinen was developed: linking organically theoretical with political work. Two years after joining the SDPF, O. V. Kuusinen assumed a number of responsible positions in the party: he was elected member of its leadership and became editor of its central organ--the newspaper (TYUEMIEN) ("Worker"). Subsequently, he was elected deputy to the Finnish Sejm. He headed party courses and was elected delegate to the congresses of the Second International.

Circumstances in Finland became sharply aggravated on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Its main features were unemployment, food crisis, and upsurge of a mass movement in town and country. The initiative was in the hands of the working people. Detachments of a workers' red guard were created and the governmental apparatus became virtually paralyzed. The victory of the Great October Revolution provided even greater prerequisites for a transfer of power to the working class in Finland as well. All objective conditions for this were ripe. Once again, however, the weakness of the subjective factor let itself be felt.

The leadership of the SDPF fluctuated. It showed uncertainty and occasionally assumed conflicting positions. The party issued the revolutionary declaration "We Demand," drafted by O. V. Kuusinen. The wavering, however, went on. Yielding to mass pressure, the Finnish trade unions congress proclaimed a general strike which, however, came to an end 6 days later. This disappointed the radical-leaning worker masses profoundly.

Time passed without the party being able to engage in active action. Instead of leading the masses it passively followed on the tail end of events. Endless



discussions went on as to what line to choose, moderate or radical. Should a bourgeois democracy be developed or should a socialist revolution be started? Meanwhile, the counterrevolution was hastily preparing for a decisive battle. Gathering strength, it unleashed a civil war.

On 26 January 1918, the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and the Red Guard made the decision to assume the power. A workers revolution broke out in Finland on the following day. A revolutionary government--a Soviet of People's Representatives--was established. O. V. Kuusinen was appointed people's representative for education. However, as Yu. Sirola was to point out later on, he was essentially "the heart of the revolutionary government." O. V. Kuusinen drafted many of its appeals and laws. He worked sparing no effort. The revolutionary government made desperate efforts to defend the revolution. However, its strength proved to be inadequate. German intervention decided the outcome of the civil war in favor of the bourgeoisie. The revolution, considered "soft" by any kind of historical measurement, was followed by the most cruel white terror, whose scale outstripped the horrors of the Versailles terrorism toward the Paris Commune.

The end of the Finnish revolution was tragic. However, the revolution armed the Finnish working class and the progressive segment of the Social Democratic Party with the experience they needed for further revolutionary development.

In that same year of 1918, O. V. Kuusinen wrote a pamphlet "The Finnish Revolution" in which he profoundly analyzed the reasons for the defeat of the working class. He castigated the opportunistic indecisiveness of the social democrats, who excused their inactivity with fear of defeat. Firmly rejecting the underestimation of the role of the subjective factor in the revolution, which was inherent in the social democratic movement of the Second International, O. V. Kuusinen emphasized that "we...had to fight and give as much help to historical progress as was possible. History could not do its work without the arms of the fighters" (O. V. Kuusinen, "Finlyandskaya Revolyutsiya" [The Finnish Revolution], Moscow, 1920, p 10).

The author of this work was writing as a mature Marxist dialectician who, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis and revolutionary experience, had abandoned social democratic illusions totally and had come to Leninism and had become a communist.

2

What was the main lesson of the defeat of the workers revolution in Finland? It was the lack of purposeful revolutionary leadership. The victory of the working class needed a party of a type different from the old SDPPF. It needed a Marxist-Leninist, a communist party. O. V. Kuusinen wrote later that "we learned this historical lesson immediately after the defeat of the revolution and converted to the positions of the left-wing social democratic movement, the positions of bolshevism, and founded the Communist Party of Finland in August 1918. Naturally, this was the first yet decisive step on the right way: the creation of an entirely different and truly revolutionary communist party, which was to be conscious and developed theoretically, united politically, strong organizationally and militant and capable of leadership."

Several thousand participants in the workers revolution were forced to emigrate to Soviet Russia. They engaged in heated and sometimes tense debates. They critically analyzed the experience of the Finnish revolution and considered their further actions. Familiarity with the experience of the October Revolution and with Lenin's ideas had a tremendous impact on the Finnish revolutionaries and forced them to reassess the tasks of the Finnish labor movement.

Without belittling the role of O. V. Kuusinen's fellow workers in the creation of the Communist Party of Finland, it is precisely he who is justifiably considered the party's founder. It was he who provided the most profound critical analysis of the lessons learned from the Finnish revolution. It was he who authored the declaration of the founding of the party and the "Open Letter of the Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of Finland to Comrade Lenin." He represented the CPF at the Comintern's Constituent Congress. Above all, it was precisely he who organized the party's practical activities.

In the spring of 1919, O. V. Kuusinen returned to Finland in order to engage in clandestine work and organize the building of the party. The assignment was difficult and required not only flexible political thinking and organizational talent but courage, firmness and the art of conspiracy, for he was well known in the country and police bloodhounds were waiting for him at every corner. The firm clandestine communist workers withstood this trial as well honorably. He became aware of the circumstances quickly and reached the conclusion that the hope for an immediate revolution had to be abandoned, for a revolutionary situation no longer existed in Finland. As a perspicacious politician, O. V. Kuusinen defined the basic link in party activities which made the strengthening of its position possible: it was necessary to organize the work of legal organizations and the press above all.

With his typical energy, O. V. Kuusinen plunged into this project which began by puzzling the CPF leadership abroad. He set himself the objective of establishing a legal leftist workers party. Extensive exploratory work was carried out among the left-wing SDPF opposition which, under his influence, broke with the right-wing leadership and founded the Socialist Workers Party of Finland. O. V. Kuusinen was the author of its program. As a result of his efforts, youth organizations and newspapers were created, a legal "Socialist Journal" began publication, Marxist books were published, and an appeal was addressed to the SDPF calling for the establishment of a united front. Under O. V. Kuusinen's leadership, the Finnish communists set a good example of properly combining legal with clandestine activities, to which Lenin gave a high rating.

O. V. Kuusinen returned to Soviet Russia at the beginning of 1921. He described to Lenin, then involved in preparations for the Third Comintern Congress, the work he had done in Finland on building the party. Lenin immediately realized the importance to the young communist parties of the experience in party construction gained by O. V. Kuusinen and asked him to draw up for the congress theses on party structure and organizational activities. It was then that Lenin gave his familiar assessment of O. V. Kuusinen: "He knows and thinks." He then added in German: "Something quite rare among revolutionaries," naturally, bearing in mind the then prevailing circumstances and moods ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 52, p 272). The still immature communist parties had to learn how to engage in most patient daily work with the masses, something which O. V. Kuusinen had accomplished

so successfully in Finland. He was able to compare the experience of the young communist parties with the historical experience of bolshevism, raise this experience to the level of a Marxist science of party construction and brilliantly express his conclusions in the theses.

It was starting with the Third Comintern Congress that the period of O. V. Kuusinen's work for the Communist International began. Elected member of the Comintern Executive Committee, Secretariat and Presidium, he became one of the most prestigious leaders of the international communist movement. He frequently addressed Communist International Executive Committee plenums on mass work, the international situation, problems of the general crisis of capitalism and the national liberation movement.

At the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, O. V. Kuusinen submitted the report "On the Revolutionary Movement in Colonies and Semicolonies." Today it is universally acknowledged that some of the assessments regarding the national liberation movement provided by the congress were insufficiently specific and even wrong. At the 20th CPSU Congress, with his typical directness and daring, O. V. Kuusinen spoke of the "sectarian raid" in the theses of the Sixth Comintern Congress on the colonial problem, particularly in describing the role of the national bourgeoisie. However, it is equally important to consider the positive and fruitful ideas and considerations with which O. V. Kuusinen's report abounded.

Let us take as an example his description of the proletariat in colonial countries:

"In order to understand the entire difficulty of organizing a revolutionary movement and above all the difficulty of creating a party, we must pay attention to the particular features of the colonial proletariat. To begin with, virtually everywhere this is a first-generation proletariat. Most of it comes from the countryside and goes back to it. Its structure is extremely fluid. Its ranks number few skilled workers but many women and children.... The proletariat in the colonies is difficult to organize. Its actions are primitive and impulsive. It is easy to lead this proletariat but it is equally easy to lead it astray" (O. V. Kuusinen, "O Revolyutsionnom Dvizhenii v Koloniyakh i Polukoloniyakh" [On the Revolutionary Movement in Colonies and Semicolonies]. Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, pp 46-47). Even today, when the imperialist colonial system has been destroyed and the liberated countries have made great progress, this characteristic helps us to understand a great deal of the real development of the workers and communist movements in that part of the world.

Nor was O. V. Kuusinen's assessment of the national bourgeoisie in the colonies so straight and simple. For example, he objected to claims according to which "all national bourgeoisie is simply counterrevolutionary and nothing more" (ibid, p 94). "To the extent to which it favors the economic independence of the country and its liberation from the imperialist yoke," he said in his concluding speech, "to that extent it plays a certain progressive role.... The economic development of India and other similar colonies toward independence is consistent with national interests, not only those of the bourgeoisie but of the proletariat and the peasantry as well" (ibid, p 91).

Unquestionably, O. V. Kuusinen was one of the first leaders of Comintern who was able to note perspicaciously the ripening of fascism and the danger it represented to the workers and communist movements. In his address to the 10th Communist International



Executive Committee Plenum in July 1929 he pointed out that "a shift is taking place within bourgeois rule, a conversion from parliamentary methods to a regime of naked terror and violence and civil war. True, such methods which, it is true, previously were frequently used within the framework of bourgeois democracy, are beginning to play a dominating role in the system of the capitalist countries today and, in general, in bourgeois class rule" ("X Plenum Ispolkoma Kominterna" [10th Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee]. No 1, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1929, p 30). At the 12th Communist International Executive Committee Plenum of August 1932, arguing against those who erroneously ignored the fascist threat, O. V. Kuusinen provided one of the first Marxist formulations of the essence of fascism: "In my view, the Fascist movement should be considered a weapon, an instrument in the struggle, the fist of the class violence of the big bourgeoisie aimed at the revolutionary proletariat, rather than an instrument of the breakdown of capitalism" ("XII Plenum IKKI. Stenograficheskiy Otchet" [12th Plenum of the Communist International Executive Committee. Shorthand Report]. Vol 1, Partizdat, Moscow, 1933, p 36).

In the 1930's, when the question of the adoption of a new strategic line by the communist movement--the line of the popular front--was urgently raised, O. V. Kuusinen was among those who opened the new way. Naturally, like many other valuable aspects of the Comintern legacy, the new strategy was the result of the collective efforts of communists of different countries, who summed up comprehensive experience of communist party activities. However, it was not accidental by far that O. V. Kuusinen was one of the Marxist innovators who prepared the grounds for the Seventh Comintern Congress. He took active part in the work of the preparatory commissions for the congress. At a commission meeting held in August 1934, O. V. Kuusinen submitted the draft thesis on "The Global Situation and the Task of the Comintern," in which he criticized the view that the social democratic movement was the main enemy of the communists. Let us emphasize that problems of unity of action between communists and social democrats and of unity within the workers movement accounted for a considerable share of O. V. Kuusinen's activities and are an important part of his legacy. At the congress itself, he delivered a speech on youth problems. He criticized "ossification in tactics" and defended the line of a united front in the youth movement. Closely familiar with the practice of the CPF, which struggled adamantly and frequently successfully for the creation of a united front within the country's trade union movement and with the other communist parties, O. V. Kuusinen was sensitively aware of the needs of the communist movement.

In the annals of the history of the Communist International, O. V. Kuusinen's name stands among those of outstanding leaders such as G. Dimitrov, M. Thorez, P. Togliatti, W. Pieck, K. Gottwald, D. Manuil'skiy and others.

Subsequently as well, and literally until the very last days of his life, O. V. Kuusinen allocated a great deal of time, effort and attention to the international communist movement. He tirelessly struggled for its unity on a Marxist-Leninist basis. What is the explanation for such comprehensive and fruitful activities? A one-word answer would be "experience." Already in the period when he became Lenin's student and fellow worker, when communist parties were being created in the West, O. V. Kuusinen was one of the few communists with extensive experience in party work among the masses. In the course of his work in the Comintern, O. V. Kuusinen was able to study and summarize the international experience of the revolutionary movement. He tried to share this experience with the Communist Party of Finland and to interpret its activities from internationalist positions



and extract from it anything of international significance. After World War II, O. V. Kuusinen closely studied the new revolutionary experience of the people's democracies and the struggle of the working class in the developed capitalist countries. Therefore, the wise political assessments which distinguished his views rested on his profound familiarity with the historical experience of the revolutionary workers movement. Naturally, as Lenin aptly pointed out, O. V. Kuusinen not only knew a great deal but, most important, he knew how to think, i.e., he was able to summarize the experience of the workers movement creatively and to interpret it on the basis of a Marxist philosophical outlook. These are the reasons for the depth and power of his political intellect, which was entirely dedicated to serving the progressive class of our age.

3

O. V. Kuusinen and Finland. This topic is of basic importance in providing a historical assessment of the personality and legacy of O. V. Kuusinen, the zealous Finnish patriot and noted consistent internationalist.

In setting revolutionary internationalism as its target, reactionary Finnish historiography created the vulgar myth of an alleged loss of patriotism on the part of O. V. Kuusinen. The bourgeois falsifiers did not even try to make a serious study of the development of his views, nor were they able to accomplish this on the basis of their narrow class nationalistic positions. Already in his youth, when he actively joined the movement of national resistance to czarism, O. V. Kuusinen was convinced that the national freedom of Finland could not be gained without the efforts of the Finnish working class and the fraternal support of the workers in Russia. He considered this international alliance a key political idea in the Finnish labor movement.

In the course of O. V. Kuusinen's increasing involvement in the revolutionary workers movement, his patriotism not only did not weaken but acquired an increasingly richer content, for true patriotism leads to the type of reorganization of the foundation of the social life of the nation which puts an end to exploitation and oppression and, therefore, which merges with the revolutionary working class and the working people. Such a dialectical approach also exposes the falsity of bourgeois patriotism, whose purpose is to perpetuate capitalist rule. It exposes the perfidy of the bourgeoisie which, as O. V. Kuusinen wrote as early as 1907, has forced the working people "to absorb the main blow" in all bourgeois revolutions, while it personally merely harvested the fruits of the people's victory, showing its "patriotism" "only in solemn speeches and electoral addresses and newspaper polemics in the course of a struggle for gaining better positions, and in competition for greatest servility and, sometimes, denunciations."

The key to O. V. Kuusinen's views was his clear understanding of the organic unity between patriotism and internationalism and its effective practical implementation. "It would be ridiculous even to assume," he pointed out, "that the working class could separate itself from or abandon its nation. The contemporary working class is the backbone of the living body of the nation, not only because of its size but of its economic and political role. The entire future of the nation rests above all on its shoulders. Therefore, if the working class is so closely linked with the nation, as the party of the working class, the communist party cannot abandon its nation unless it is willing to pull out all its vital roots" (O. V. Kuusinen, "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya," Moscow, 1966, pp 310-311).

Finnish bourgeois historiography does not mention that in March 1918 the Finnish revolutionary government signed a state treaty with workers' and peasants' Russia, which could be considered in many of its aspects a prototype of the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid Treaty. One can easily imagine the extensive opportunities for the national development of Finland which this provided. However, we are not discussing missed opportunities. The importance to Finland's national interests of the 1948 treaty is universally known. That is why it is so important to point out the type of Finnish sociopolitical forces which laid the foundation of a policy which made the conclusion of this treaty possible.

In a 1941 radio speech V. Tanner, the right-wing leader of the Finnish social democrats, said about the Soviet system that "the future of mankind demands that this harmful system be destroyed." O. V. Kuusinen wrote: "the Soviet people are the flagbearer of progressive mankind. They carry the great idea of friendship and fraternity among nations. Millions of working people the world over look to them with hope" (ibid, p 386).

These are two diametrically opposed views, two different political positions. Which one was patriotic and consistent with the interests of Finland? History has answered the question unequivocally. The internationalism of O. V. Kuusinen and the CPF expressed the true patriotism of the Finnish people, while the false patriotism of V. Tanner and those like him was the manifestation of bourgeois chauvinism which radically clashed with the true national interests of Finland.

What about a question which sets the teeth on edge, that of the popular government which was formed by members of the left-wing Finnish emigres during the Soviet-Finnish military conflict of 1939-1940? It is constantly being raised by the reaction which transposes the cause and effect factors. The question debated by Finnish historians is whether such a government had to be created or not. In this case, however, we must not forget the real circumstances of the period and the old anti-Sovietism of official Finland, its rapprochement with Hitlerite Germany as of the mid-1930's and the fanning of a military psychosis, a "Liliputian imperialism," to use the apt expression of Raul Palmgren, the noted Finnish publicist and literary expert. All of this resulted in an entirely unrealistic assessment of the circumstances and an unwillingness on the part of the Finnish government to engage in talks with the Soviet Union on strengthening the safety of Finland and the northwestern borders of the USSR. The actions of the then ruling circles of Finland were distinguished by their total irrationality and bordered on national suicide. Under such difficult circumstances O. V. Kuusinen assumed the great personal responsibility of heading a popular government. The government proclaimed that its main objective was for Finland to take the path of peace and the establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. These facts must not be forgotten and the truth should be restored about the efforts made by O. V. Kuusinen for the unification of the patriotic forces and the creation of a broad democratic front in the 1930's for the sake of ensuring the safety of Finland in the face the threat presented by the fascist Reich.

O. V. Kuusinen's works on Finland, written during the war against Hitlerite fascism, are of great interest. Noteworthy among them is the book "Finland Without a Mask." It represents a sharp study of the reasons for the nationalism of Finland's political leadership before and during the war, and the claims laid by Finnish leading political circles and monopolies on Soviet territory. It is the story of Finland's subordination to the interests of German imperialism and of "Hitlerized Finland."

O. V. Kuusinen also proved that side by side with official Finland there was another, a democratic Finland. After the war, the CPF disseminated the book throughout the country. The work is topical to this day, for in this area as well, avoiding the truth, bourgeois historiography is depicting Finland's participation in the Hitlerite aggression as a "defensive" war.

O. V. Kuusinen's articles on Finland, which were written in the first postwar years, are of great importance. One of them is entitled "What the Triumph of Hitler's Finnish Accomplices Revealed." It provides a clear assessment of the trial of the main culprits for Finland's involvement in an alliance with Hitlerite Germany. Also noteworthy is the article "On Patriotism," which was published in the journal NOVOYE VREMYA under the pseudonym of N. Baltiyskiy.

O. V. Kuusinen's book "Lessons from the Finnish Workers Movement," which was written in 1949, also ends with a chapter which considers the interrelationship between patriotism and internationalism. Here O. V. Kuusinen ironically describes the way the Finnish bourgeoisie attacked the supporters of friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, accusing them of no more and no less than subverting friendly relations between the two countries. "We deem it necessary," writes the author in this connection, "for our communist party to raise the toiling masses in a spirit of true patriotism. True patriotism does not conflict with proletarian internationalism in the least, for with the victory of socialism the working people become the owners of their countries. This includes Finland. As of now, however, the Finnish proletariat must already learn how to be the representative and the prototype of true patriotism."

No description of O. V. Kuusinen's deep patriotism would be complete without mentioning his truly loving attitude toward the outstanding work of Karelian and Finnish folklore--the "Kalevala" epic. O. V. Kuusinen has left thousands of pages of notes on "Kalevala." In the 1940's he prepared and published a new edition of the song. He wrote the theoretical introduction to the work, offering an entirely original interpretation of the poem. To this day official Finnish folklore students are still not given a worthy interpretation of "Kalevala" as suggested by O. V. Kuusinen. This topic could be discussed in a separate article. But what is important here is to emphasize that in Kuusinen's interpretation of the poem we see a patriot profoundly aware of national culture and of its tremendous importance to the working class and to the future progress of the country and mankind. To O. V. Kuusinen "Kalevala" is a poem about the working people, a poem of a classless society in the early stages of human history. However, it also expresses the bright motifs of folk culture which related to the ideals of the working class.

It is obviously no accident that literature and art played a very important role in the life and intensive working days of this proletarian revolutionary. They were not an external supplement but an organic part of his personality. In one of his articles entitled "On the Law of Artistic Unity of Poetry," O. V. Kuusinen writes: "The artistic power of poetry, as of any other work, actually, depends to an essential extent on whether the individual parts of this work represent an organic artistic entity or not. The essence lies precisely in the inner unity of the verse, which determines, in the final account, whether the poem will survive or will not."

It was this inner integrity that was a distinguishing feature of O. V. Kuusinen's own personality and life.



Failure to mention O. V. Kuusinen's attitude toward Lenin and Leninism would mean skipping the main thing. Lenin had a determining influence on Kuusinen's development as a communist and revolutionary.

O. V. Kuusinen met Lenin in August-September 1917, when Lenin was in Finland, hiding from the bloodhounds of the provisional government. The meeting with Lenin played a decisive role in O. V. Kuusinen's conversion to the positions of Leninism.

At the crucial moment of the founding of the Communist Party of Finland, Lenin helped the Finnish revolutionaries in the drafting of their programmatic documents. In giving the leader of the international proletariat his due, the CPF Constituent Congress sent to him an open letter drafted by O. V. Kuusinen. "In this decisive struggle," it read, "we need you, Comrade Lenin, every day, more than anyone else. We need your strong hand and farsighted eyes and the entire courage of your great spiritual power" ("Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya," p 22). It was on the basis of Lenin's work that Finnish communists understood the revolutionary dialectics of Marxist theory and policy. "In 1920," O. V. Kuusinen recalled, "Lenin's brilliant book 'The Left-Wing Infant Disease in Communism' came out. To us it was a revelation. Whereas 2 years previously, Lenin's work 'The State and Revolution' was our guide in understanding the revolutionary core of Marxism, now the study of the 'Infant Disease' revealed Lenin's tactical wisdom and the art of realpolitik which guarantees success in the struggle waged by the communist party" (ibid, pp 667-668).

Subsequently as well, O. V. Kuusinen tirelessly turned to Lenin's works, rereading again and again seemingly familiar works, finding in them new thoughts which helped him to resolve the complex political problems of the revolutionary struggle and of the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement.

Throughout his life, O. V. Kuusinen gained a deep love of and respect for Lenin. In 1960, from the rostrum of the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, he expressed his permanent profound feelings about the great leader.

"In talking with Il'ich," O. V. Kuusinen said, "everyone felt the amazing combination within him of warm humanity and burning revolutionary passion. One could talk to him without any shyness, like talking to one's father or to a teacher who understood everything. Lenin listened attentively and one could see in his live and expressive face and eyes the quick flow of thoughts and feelings. Then, when he explained the problems in short and clear sentences, specifically and profoundly, one was unwittingly amazed by the power of his genius. Complex matters became easy to understand! It immediately became clear where to go and who to go with, what to do and what was the crux of our policy under the specific circumstances. Everything became as clear as day. People came out of a talk with Lenin with the happy awareness of a confidence in victory and a deep attachment to him, to Lenin" (O. V. Kuusinen, "Pretvoreniye v Zhizn' Idey Lenina" [The Implementation of Lenin's Ideas], Moscow, 1960, p 4).

Always learning from Lenin, O. V. Kuusinen was a tireless propagandist of Leninism. He paid particular attention to the interpretation of the Leninist doctrine of politics as a science and an art. In Lenin's view, these two aspects of politics are organically interlinked and their interrelationship is clearly noted in the choice of



the main link of political activity. This topic was perfectly interpreted in O. V. Kuusinen's article "On the Necessary Link," which was published in SOTSIALISTICHESKIY ZHURNAL in 1923. This short, meaningful and sharp article proves that even then O. V. Kuusinen had profoundly understood the Leninist dialectics of political thinking and action.

Constant consideration of Lenin's ideas and the enthusiastic desire to make them available to the masses, the young people above all, inspired O. V. Kuusinen to prepare the textbook "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," in which a group of authors attempted to describe Leninist theory in its entirety under Kuusinen's guidance.

O. V. Kuusinen gathered around him in a spirit of creative cooperation a big group of noted scientists and able young researchers. Subsequently, many of the authors described how thoroughly O. V. Kuusinen approached work on the book. Many chapters and sections underwent several drafts in the search for presenting the most profound and accurate expression of Lenin's thoughts. The leader of the group of authors, who firmly rejected dogmatism and sluggishness of thought, also rejected theoretical thoughtlessness and passing fashion.

What does Marxist-Leninist theory give man? It is with this question that O. V. Kuusinen begins his introduction to the textbook. He answers as follows: "Briefly, the answer is this: the successful study of the foundations of Marxism-Leninism leads to the molding of a purposeful outlook--of the most progressive outlook of our time. This outlook combines within a single streamlined system the views expressed in the most important part of the great theory of Marx and Lenin" ("Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma" [Foundations of Marxism-Leninism]. Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1959, p 5).

In his introduction the author provides a brief yet extremely accurate description of the basic features of Marxist-Leninist outlook and brings out its high qualities. "...Marxism-Leninism," he states, "offers us a tool with which we can look into the future and see the outlines of coming historical turns. It is a kind of 'time telescope' which makes visible the great prospects of the human future free from the yoke of capitalism and from the last exploiting system" (ibid, p 8).

Directly turning to the youth, the author of the introduction points out that "the Marxist-Leninist outlook greatly shortens the way to political maturity provided by practical experience. It helps to direct one's public energy along the right way--for the good of mankind." "Life without a progressive outlook," O. V. Kuusinen concludes, "is hardly worthy of a contemporary developed person. It is even worse to defend substandard outlook surrogates which are good only for those poor in spirit" (ibid, pp 11-12).

In the "Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma," O. V. Kuusinen invested a part of his soul, his revolutionary passion and his profound mind of a Marxist theoretician. This made the book streamlined, integral and convincing. It helped mold the outlook of hundreds of thousands of people and was a contribution to the development of Marxism. This book is a kind of spiritual monument to the great theoretician and Marxist philosopher which O. V. Kuusinen was. It is also his contribution to the great Lenin's memory.

One of the most fruitful periods in O. V. Kuusinen's political and theoretical activities was the period which followed his election as member of the Presidium and CC CPSU secretary (he became CC CPSU secretary in 1941) in 1957. Even before that he had held senior governmental and party positions such as chairman of the Karelo-Finnish SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities, and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Interparliamentary Group. Now, as one of the leaders in the headquarters of Lenin's party, he became directly involved in the formulation of its domestic and foreign policy. He extensively contributed to the drafting of documents for the international conferences of communist and workers parties in 1957 and 1960 and of the CPSU program, which was adopted at the 22nd party congress. He was involved in extensive party and state work. In 1958 he was elected full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Naturally, at that time O. V. Kuusinen frequently addressed himself to theory. He spoke on the most topical problems, amazing those around him with the clarity of his thinking and accuracy of assessment of political phenomena and events. As always, he opposed the dogmatic approach to theory. At the 23d CPSU Congress he said: "There is no point in concealing that sometimes our propagandist, scientific and teaching activities in the social sciences are still somewhat burdened by a dogmatic ballast. Sterile dogmatism is frequently created by the unwillingness to think independently and to study the new facts of reality. Sluggishness of thought is the featherbed on which dogmatism luxuriates. Those who suffer from this ill must try to get rid of it more quickly, realizing, once and for all, that such is the will of the party."

O. V. Kuusinen himself set the example of a creative attitude toward theory. By the end of the 1950's he turned to the new phenomena in the economics and politics of contemporary capitalism. He was no stranger to the topic. Working in the Comintern and attending the plenums of the Communist International Executive Committee and its congresses, he frequently presented analyses of the development of capitalism, its internal contradictions and its socioclass interrelationships. Now, after the war, as a result of profound changes in the ratio of forces in the world and the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, substantial changes have taken place in this area needing a Marxist interpretation. Together with other Soviet scientists, O. V. Kuusinen took up this project.

Among the new phenomena in capitalism he focused mainly on the intensive development of its state-monopoly features. In the past, he pointed out, this was an exceptional phenomenon used in times of war and most severe economic and political crises.

"Today without state-monopoly capitalism the imperialist bourgeoisie can no longer rule even in relatively normal times. This is caused by the intensification of the general crisis in the capitalist system, the progressive disintegration of capitalism and the weakening of its internal--economic, political and ideological--forces. The imperialist bourgeoisie is trying to stop this internal disintegration process with the help of state-monopoly capitalism...." ("Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya," pp 581-582).

O. V. Kuusinen also pointed out that "along with the main class contradiction in bourgeois society--between capitalists and workers--the contradiction between a handful of monopolies...and all other popular strata is growing and becoming aggravated" (ibid, p 586).

This is the ground on which a variety of democratic movements for peace, national independence and sovereignty, against reaction and fascism, in defense of political democracy, humanistic movements of the intelligentsia, the struggle for greater women's and youth rights, and so on, are born. Such movements grow and spread with every passing year, undermining the foundations of state-monopoly rule.

O. V. Kuusinen synthesizes the great independent importance of all such movements which defend the people's democratic rights and gains and the related important theoretical problem of their correlation with the struggle for socialism.

On the basis of Lenin's legacy O. V. Kuusinen proved that the democratic movements of our time strengthen the position of the working class in the struggle for socialism. To begin with, they create more favorable political conditions for raising socialist demands; secondly, they weaken the main enemy of the working class--the most reactionary bourgeois circles; thirdly, the alliance between the broad popular circles and the working class develops on the basis of such movements; fourthly, involvement with such movements provides good training in the political organization, unification and tempering of the masses. "Under contemporary conditions," the author concludes, "the general democratic movement of the masses, which is aimed against imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie, is becoming ever more closely linked with the struggle for socialism. It is one of the important forms of conversion of the masses to a socialist change, either directly or through the stage of the anti-monopoly and democratic revolution which may be the outcome of such a popular movement" (Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya," p 591).

O. V. Kuusinen was an active promoter of the idea contained in the CPSU program, which was adopted at the 22nd party congress. In particular, he ascribed great importance to the stipulation formulated in the program concerning a socialist state of the whole people. In his address to the 22nd CPSU Congress he said: "For many years the opponents of communism, the right-wing social democrats in particular, have been reckoning on the fact that the Marxists intend to retain the dictatorship of the proletariat until the victory of communism and even after it. Today an end is being put to such reckoning. Our new program shows the historical justification for the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is needed in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. As to the period of transition from socialism to communism, it will be characterized by the transformation of the state into a state of the whole nation and by the extensive development of socialist democracy."

In the final years of his life, O. V. Kuusinen spoke a great deal on international problems. He exposed the aggressive policy of imperialism, promoted the ideas of peace and peaceful coexistence and defended the Leninist principles of CPSU and Soviet state foreign policy.

One of O. V. Kuusinen's last addresses, his speech at the February 1964 CC CPSU Plenum, met with broad political response. In this speech he convincingly exposed the anti-Leninist and anti-Marxist nature of Maoist political rule in China. "In reality," he said, "there is no dictatorship by the people in China. There is no dictatorship of the proletariat, there is no leading position of the proletariat and there is no vanguard communist party role. The entire pseudo-Marxist phraseology of the Chinese leadership is merely a camouflage used to conceal a dictatorship which in fact exists." A Marxist revolutionary of long experience, O. V. Kuusinen exposed the antinational nature of the foreign and domestic policy of the Chinese leadership. "A party leadership," he pointed out, "which pursues such a nationalistic policy cannot be considered in the least as expressing the will of the working class."



Until the last minutes of his life, the fiery heart of this Leninist revolutionary did not allow his theoretical thinking, which served the cause of the working class and socialism, to stop or freeze. It was with complete justification that the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government wrote in his obituary that "as a highly educated Marxist and major theoretician and scientist, O. V. Kuusinen actively participated in the creative development of the topical problems of scientific communism and of the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary movement. His scientific works, reports, speeches and articles prove the comprehensiveness of his interests and knowledge. They are a model of creative attitude toward Marxism-Leninism and of the study of vital processes and revolutionary practice."

This assessment concentrates the views and, one may say, acknowledgments which O. V. Kuusinen earned from the fraternal parties through his activities. The German communists noted his contribution to the establishment of the Leninist line in the party leadership and in the organization and development of truly mass party work. In discussing O. V. Kuusinen's qualities such as his outstanding ability to interpret complex and contradictory problems and to help his comrades see above all the political meaning of events and his ability to note and assess the new experience in the revolutionary struggle, Jacques Duclos recalled how O. V. Kuusinen helped the French communists to formulate the main political slogan which became the foundation of the party's strategic line: "Long live free, strong and happy France, for which the communists are struggling and which they will build!" The Hungarian communists gratefully spoke of the importance of O. V. Kuusinen's works, particularly his analysis of the lessons of the Finnish revolution, in terms of the development of the revolutionary struggle in their own country. O. V. Kuusinen's extensive knowledge of the conditions of the class struggle in these countries and the real help he gave were noted by communists in Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, Austria and a number of other fraternal parties.

All that we can add to this is that as early as the 1920's, it was precisely the leadership of the SDPF who described O. V. Kuusinen as the most outstanding leader ever to come out of the ranks of the Finnish social democratic movement.

All those who knew O. V. Kuusinen remember him as a person with a high moral standard. A live illustration of this is provided by lines from a letter he wrote to his daughter. "In many other times," he wrote, "the people's life was easier. Our epoch, however, is the greatest of all time. I would not be amazed if future generations were to be simply envious of us, of you and me, for having lived in this greatest period in the history of mankind." In another letter to a party comrade, who was in jail at that time, he wrote: "Never before have there been reasons for such optimism, for such great and justified hopes as the present."

O. V. Kuusinen chose the path of revolutionary struggle in his youth and followed it in a straight and honest fashion to the end.

5003

CSO: 1802/2



## VETERANS' SOULS DO NOT GROW OLD

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 81 p 123

[Review by V. Zakharov of the book "Veterany v Stroyu" [Veterans in the Ranks].  
Compiled by B. P. Pavlov. Voenizdat, Moscow, 1981, 271 pages]

[Text] Four decades have passed since Hitlerite Germany mounted its treacherous attack on our country. The generations of Soviet people who have grown up since then are familiar with the past war, which took the lives of 20 million of our fellow citizens, only from books, documentaries, feature films and the recollections of veterans. It was in reference to them, the war veterans, that Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev said: "...You did your duty to the country, the party and history honorably. The homeland is grateful to you. Your names have been inscribed forever in the chronicles of the heroic accomplishments of the Soviet people."

Naturally, to those who took part in the battles of the Great Patriotic War 40 years is a long time.... However, as the song goes, the soul of the veterans does not grow old. Some of them continue their service in the armed forces. Others work at plants and factories, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, establishments, scientific institutes and schools. And those who because of age or health, and the effect of old wounds, can no longer work full strength, are engaged in active social work and are trying to pass on to the young the combat traditions of front veterans.

"Veterany v Stroyu" is the title of a book prepared by a group of authors under the guidance of volunteer editors of the Soviet War Veterans Committee headed by Col Gen A. S. Zheltov. The book describes the military exploits of Soviet war veterans and their peaceful toil for the good of the socialist fatherland. The book offers an extensive description of the activities of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, which was created one-quarter of a century ago. These activities have been quite varied and comprehensive. This is a social organization which rallies the efforts of veterans in the struggle for peace, prevention of a new world war, patriotic internationalist upbringing of young people, and perpetuation of the memory of those who fell for the sake of victory over the hated enemy. Soviet veterans are strengthening their relations with organizations of resistance fighters in other countries in the course of joint actions against the aggressive intents and actions of imperialism. This is particularly important now, when the imperialist circles are increasing international tension and the nuclear arms race with a view to gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union, frighten the peoples and impose American rule upon them.

In his address to the readers, Army General and Twice Hero of the Soviet Union P. I. Batov, chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee, writes: "We hope that the book will be read with interest also by gray-haired veterans who may find in it a great deal of useful advice on ways and means for conducting social activities. It will be useful to young readers as well, who will find out about many interesting lives of members of the senior generation and their work and struggle for the happiness of the working people, the glory of our beloved homeland and the triumph of the great Leninist cause."

The Soviet war veterans are still today part of the ranks of the people who, under the party's leadership, are working with dedication on resolving the major and complex problems formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress.

5003

CSO: 1802/2

## INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIALISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 81 pp 122-125

[Review by O. Bogomolov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, of the book by V. F. Stanis "Vozniknoveniye i Stanovleniye Ekonomiki Sotsializma" [Appearance and Establishment of the Socialist Economy]. Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1980, 367 pages]

[Text] The experience in building a socialist economy, acquired by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, invariably draws the attention of those in the exploiting society who are fighting for social progress. It is of interest to the progressive circles of countries who have freed themselves from colonial oppression and are trying to surmount their economic backwardness. Its interpretation and summation are also of exclusive importance in the further development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of transition from capitalism to socialism, which is a strong ideological weapon of the world revolutionary movement.

The monograph by V. F. Stanis considers the main lines of development of the economy of the new society: the socialist socialization of capital assets, the creation of the material and technical base, socialist industrialization and agricultural reorganization, and the upsurge of culture and education. The work provides an extensive study of relations between economics and politics in the transitional period. In particular, it shows the decisive importance which the consistent political orientation of developing countries toward the creation of a socially just society has in terms of making progressive economic changes.

On the basis of the firm foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory, the author proves that however disparate the starting level of socioeconomic development of countries which take the path of building a new society may be, their objective remains the same--the building of socialism and communism. Hence the objective base which underlies all most important directions in converting their economy to the socialist track, regardless of the specific nature of national conditions, different sequence of individual stages and varieties in ways and means of practical policy.

The author discusses in great detail the specific characteristics of socialist changes in the economies of individual countries and attempts to classify these countries into groups on the basis of socioeconomic criteria such as starting level of economic development (high, medium, low), level of development of capitalist relations on the eve of the revolution, geographic location, place in the total capitalist system before the revolution (imperialist, colonial, dependent to one or

another degree, and so on). This makes it possible to depict most adequately the dialectics of the general and the specific in the study of objective laws governing the transitional period. In precisely the same manner he classifies the developing countries, singling out as his research target the group which follows a noncapitalist way of development.

The author focuses his attention on the study of the general, i.e., of the main, the essential features of the socialist economic system and the stage of its establishment and development. He not only offers a detailed presentation of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the transitional period but applies it creatively in his analysis of the essential features of transition processes taking place today in countries with a socialist orientation.

In arguing against those who exaggerate the importance of a mixed economy as the main economic characteristic of a developing country and who try "to reduce all developing countries to a single group representing the 'Third World'" (p 41), V. F. Stanis draws the attention to the fact that the study of the mixed economy is necessary in order to single out within the complex and many-sided process of the transition from one socioeconomic system to another the main economic system which gradually subordinates to itself all other systems and becomes dominating.

We cannot ignore in this connection the part in which the author discusses the role of politics and of superstructural relations in ensuring the transition from capitalism to socialism and giving a socialist orientation to social development in the young national states. In describing the dialectics of economics and politics, the author reaches the conclusion that "in the final account, it is the active role of the political superstructure that leads to the identification in the transitional period of the base which represents a conflicting unity of different types of production relations (systems) within the shaping-determining system, i.e., the choice of a capitalist or socialist way of development" (p 138). This is a very fruitful thought when applied to the study of unstable economic structures in the developing countries.

The socialist socialization of productive capital, which is the nucleus of economic changes in the transitional period, occurs in multiple steps and in a variety of specific ways, the selection of which depends to a decisive extent on the actual ratio of class forces and the gravity of the class struggle in a given country and which is the nucleus of economic changes in the transitional period. The reminder in the book that one or another method of nationalization and even its pace depend on the specific economic and political conditions in which the socialist revolution takes place is quite topical today, when the socialist way of development is being selected by an increasing number of new countries. It is topical from the practical-political and ideological viewpoints, for it eliminates the arguments of the ideologues of communism, who try to present the Marxist-Leninist policy of socialist nationalization in a distorted-primitive fashion for the sake of depriving the proletariat of multiple allies in the anti-imperialist struggle among progressive nonproletarian strata.

The study of state capitalism as one of the transitional forms of socialist socialization is of great interest. The author discusses in detail the characteristics of the state-capitalist form of economic life in developing countries with a socialist orientation and singles out some of their varieties. They play an important role in the establishment and strengthening of the state sector, which is the main base, the decisive command point, in the development of new economic relations and in giving a socialist direction to all economic development.



In order to describe the characteristics of the state sector in countries in which the state's political and economic activity is oriented toward socialism, the author provides his own interpretation of the concept of the "semisocialist system" (see pp 142-143). He emphasizes that the appearance of this system does not mean in itself the beginning of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, for the state does not as yet perform the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the same time, however, it marks the beginning of a separate stage of development in the course of which the political and economic prerequisites for entering into this period are created.

Unlike other researchers, V. F. Stanis does not pit against each other the mixed economic systems of countries with a socialist orientation and countries which are laying the foundations of socialism in the subsequent, the socialist stage of the revolution. On the contrary, he tries to identify the elements whose socio-economic nature shows certain similarities or is shared by such countries. In our view, such an approach, which emphasizes continuity in the development of the general revolutionary process and the close ties and interwoven tasks of the first (national democratic) and second (socialist) stages of the transition to socialism, is consistent with the spirit of dialectics and appears scientifically promising.

Historical experience in laying the economic foundations of socialism, particularly in countries which were economically underdeveloped or averagely developed before their revolutions, has proved most clearly that, as a rule, the formal socialization of the production process is preceded by the actual socialization. In order for the new social production system to assume its proper content, the foundations of the material and technical base of socialism must be created and national economic planning must be organized.

A variety of ways exist for the creation of the material and technical base of socialism; the selection of one or another way is based above all on the level of the country's economic development. As to the creation of the material and technical base in countries with a socialist orientation, according to the author, they will follow a path similar to socialist industrialization. However, the orientation will become socialist in the second stage of transition from precapitalist to socialist forms of society. In the first stage "problems related to the characteristics of the creation of economic conditions for a transition to socialist industrialization" are resolved (p 233), described by the author as "preindustrialization." This term aptly describes the nature of the problem. However, its meaning should have been explained more thoroughly.

Understandably, in a theoretical work on the transitional period the reorganization of agrarian relations is treated extensively. This is a most vital problem in countries with a predominantly rural population. It is gratifying that this section of the book is very meaningful and saturated with interesting data. In describing the universal-historical significance of theory and practice in resolving the problem of land ownership and production cooperation in the USSR, the author draws attention to the characteristics of the agrarian changes which were made in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which are important to the developing countries. This is supported by interesting actual data on the course of agrarian reforms and production cooperation in other socialist countries and in some countries with a socialist orientation.

The consideration of a general law of the transitional period such as the cultural revolution, its implementation in the USSR and the other socialist countries and the initial yet very important steps taken along the way of cultural changes in countries with a socialist orientation is the logical completion of the presentation of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice related to that period.

Unquestionably, the author has interpreted the topic thoroughly and interestingly. It would be hard to criticize him for having presented problems superficially or unconvincingly. The study is distinguished by its thoroughness. Nevertheless, the work would have benefited by including a discussion on the organization of state economic planning and economic computation without which, as we know, the foundations of a socialist economy cannot be laid.

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## ESSAY DIARY 'A DECADE OF DETENTE'

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 81 pp 126-128

[Review by T. Alekseyeva, candidate of historical sciences, of the book by A. Bovin "Mir Semidesyatykh (Politicheskiye Ocherki)" [The World of the 1970's (Political Essays)]. Izvestiya, Moscow, 1980, 336 pages]

[Text] The 1970's are already behind us, although we are still feeling their breath. In the minds of many millions of people on earth they are associated with the profound positive changes which took place in the international arena. That is the reason for turning back to this "decade of detente," which was so instructive and important in terms of the destiny of mankind, to review its events, to remember them, and to "stop" for a second and look back.... We are offered this opportunity with the book by A. Bovin, which is a collection of journalistic essays. They have not been emended, expanded or revised on the basis of new facts. Each essay is dated: 1970, 1973, 1979, etc. They are not broken down by topic but presented in the order in which they were written. It is precisely for this reason, however, that they become a document of the period, for they reflect the main features of international life, the things which excited us, which drew our attention, at one point or another. We see behind the variegated mosaic of problems, countries and individuals the live dynamics of our time, the peaceful progress of socialism and the daily, the hourly struggle of the members of the socialist comity and of all revolutionary forces of our time for peace, detente and social progress.

It is no accident that the book begins with an essay on the 1969 Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, with the political force which had an unparalleled impact on the course of global events in our time, including the past decade. In comparing the dangers concealed within the policy of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the new opportunities offered by the contemporary age and the growing influence of global socialism on the course of history, the communists concluded that objective conditions existed for increasing the onslaught on imperialism and its citadels and outlying areas, the author writes. The objective of the offensive was the following: to impose on imperialism a policy of peaceful coexistence.

The policy of detente, which was subordinated to this purpose, provided confirmation of the accuracy of the party's strategic course and of the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence among countries with every passing month and day; it gathered strength despite the fierce resistance of imperialist reaction. Important treaties and agreements were concluded between the socialist countries and France; a set of agreements was concluded between the FRG and the members of the socialist comity;

the GDR emerged on the broad international area; Vietnam defeated American imperialism, the SALT I agreement was reached, and trade, cultural relations and scientific exchanges developed. The pile of lies and the alienation which had developed in the Cold War period collapsed.

This culminated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The heads of states and governments of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada signed the document unique in the history of world politics: the Final Act. We join the author in reliving these exciting times.

The second half of the decade was a period of relative drop of the detente curve. "The Soviet Union," the author writes, "always considered detente a lengthy process of gradual reorganization of the entire system of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, justice and equality. By virtue of the very nature of the world community and the interwoven disparate and frequently conflicting interests in the international arena, detente could not develop evenly. Recurrences of the Cold War and attempts to turn back political developments were encountered" (p 241). That is why the general worsening of the international situation, which started at the beginning of the 1980's, was not accidental. Symptoms indicating that the reaction was becoming energized and mounting a new offensive had been apparent earlier as well. The sharp and truthful pen of the Soviet publicist pulls away the mask of the enemies of peace and exposes their secret mercenary-minded interests. Several essays deal directly with Soviet-American relations, tracing them in their entire complexity and contradictoriness, involving summit meetings, agreements concluded on the prevention of nuclear war, the joint Soviet-American space flight, the development of relations and cooperation in science and the exchange of delegations. However, there was also the "Jackson Amendment," which was passed by the U.S. Congress and which revealed the power of the pressure which can be exerted by forces opposing detente and willing to turn back the clock of history.

The road which led to the conclusion of the SALT II treaty in Vienna took almost an entire decade. The Americans changed their positions frequently. In the final account, a scrupulously adjusted measure of mutual concessions was found as the basis for the necessary compromise. "The enactment of the SALT II treaty will enable us to start the 1980's with new positive changes along all directions of detente. Rejection of the treaty will throw the world back to Cold War times," the author wrote in June 1979 (p 291). In the light of the obstructionist position which the U.S. administration adopted toward the SALT II treaty, the pages in which Western attempts to amend the balance of military forces in Europe in favor of NATO and to deploy on the continent neutron or "Eurostrategic weapons" sound quite sharply up to date. Strategic parity, the author writes, which long existed on the continent, is a rather delicate matter. The armed forces of the two military-political groups have a different structure. Each one of the sides may have something more and something less, or something better and something worse. Looking at the individual elements, in virtually all cases we would find inequality favoring one or the other of the groups. It is only an overall view of the situation which makes it possible to see the general balance, the general parity of forces. The NATO generals and politicians know this also. However, they "keep it to themselves," so to say. Meanwhile, when they face the public they begin to wail about "inequality" (see pp 305-306). Such was the author's assessment in October 1979. Two years have passed since, but the analysis and assessments we find in the essay have lost neither their keenness nor their topicality. This is perhaps the strongest feature of this book.



China is a separate topic. Several essays deal with events in the PRC, re-creating the living image of the evolution in the internal political life of the country over the decade, tracing the twisted road (not to say the descent) of China to its conversion into an ally of imperialist reaction in the international arena. The accuracy of the psychological characterization of individual Chinese leaders is combined in these essays with a scientifically accurate interpretation of specific situations. The role which China played in the "cooling" of the international climate is obvious today. Beijing's foreign policy, as was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "continues to be targeted at the aggravation of the international situation, sliding toward the imperialist policy." The author faultlessly picks out an event which proves the true aggressive direction: China's armed attack on Vietnam. The Vietnamese adventure, the author stresses, is no isolated event. It is part of Beijing's overall foreign political aspirations aimed at undermining detente. That is precisely why again and again the West is trying to play the Chinese trump." The essays on the trip which H. Brown, the then U.S. secretary of defense, made to China in January 1980 (see pp 323-325), and the visits of Chinese representatives to the West offer a topical body of material which enables us to understand the origins and nature of the Sino-American conspiracy, noted today with a landmark such as A. Haig's trip to Beijing last summer.

As to the "hot spots" on our planet...they were numerous, too numerous over the past decade. The events surrounding them were dramatic. They displayed most rigidly the face of imperialism which was trying at all costs to suppress the national liberation movement of the peoples and the struggle for peace and social progress.

The decade started with the struggle which the Vietnamese people waged against the American aggressors. The essay "America's Prestige and Shame" exposes the reasons for the American course followed in Southeast Asia, its direction and its domestic and foreign policy aspects.

The author considers the Greek-Turkish conflict for Cyprus as well--the only armed international conflict since World War II in superficially calm Europe. A short list of problems discussed in two essays, "The Cyprus Angle," and "In Comparing Viewpoints," discuss the history of the conflict, the role of Great Britain in fanning contradictions between the Greek and Turkish communities, the positions held by Greece and Turkey, the clearly stated position of the USSR and the conclusions and lessons which may be drawn from the events. This complex international problem was inherited by the decade which followed and is still awaiting its resolution. We can agree with the author that the "Cypriot tangle" cannot be sliced through. It must be unraveled with maximum tactfulness and caution. This precisely has been the course followed by the Soviet government concerning concerning the problem of Cyprus and such was the tone of Soviet statements on the problem, the purpose of which was to resolve it, i.e., to preserve the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign, territorially integral non-aligned country, and to secure the full safety and respect for the rights of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

In discussing this group of problems, the author concentrates on the "powder keg" of our time: the Near and Middle East. Once again the readers can see the unraveling of the Middle Eastern spiral which has threatened international safety as a whole as well as the interests of the peoples of the area over the past three decades. Israel, its role in the Middle East, the stratagems related to the "interpretation" of Resolutions

242 and 338 of the United Nations Security Council, the pile of words and military procurements and, finally, oil.... It was not for nothing that the Western press frequently described the 1970's as the "economic decade." There were most complex problems and clashes of interest. From one essay to another we can trace the levels of betrayal of the interests of the Arab peoples, which led to the conclusion of the Camp David accords. It has become clear today that this agreement is a path away from peace rather than toward peace in the Middle East. The essay "Camp David: A Study of Documents" is an example of brilliant scientific analysis of documents and situations.

The book includes two essays on the Iranian revolution: "Iran: Consequences and Reasons" (September 1978) and "With the Koran and the Sword...." (September 1979). They were written one year apart. The author describes the difficult path followed by the people of Iran who rose to the struggle against imperialism, American above all, paralleled by manifestations of religious fanaticism, anticommunist hysteria, internal discord and economic disorder.

Naturally, not all the essays are of equal quality and not all predictions have turned out to be true in their details, in the same way that events which were selected as topics were of different scale and significance. This is entirely natural, for the book is a description of our own complex and conflicting age. Detente is threatened. The peaceloving forces must apply their entire energy to ensure its further development and lower the level of tension. Regardless of delays and temporary breakdowns, the history of detente is the history of the peaceful development of mankind, i.e., the only possible development in the nuclear age. To this day it remains the subject of newspaper essays, reports, columns and notes.

This book deals with important theoretical and practical problems of foreign political activities of the CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee, which combines a Marxist-Leninist analysis with real journalist skill.

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