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# USSR Report

TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No. 1, January 1980



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USSR REPORT  
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Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year). Where certain articles, reprinted from other Russian-language sources, are not translated, indication of this fact is made in the table of contents.

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1980

ON THE 110TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF VLADIMIR IL'ICH LENIN

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 3-10

[CC CPSU 13 December 1979 decree]

[Text] The 110th anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birth is approaching. A giant of scientific thinking, a truly people's leader, a fiery revolutionary, and creator the communist party and the first socialist state in the world, Lenin dedicated his outstanding and heroic life to the great and noble cause of the struggle for the social liberation of the proletariat and of all oppressed masses, and the happiness of the working people.

Emerging in the world arena of the class struggle as the loyal and firm follower of Marx and Engels, Lenin comprehensively developed their revolutionary theory. Master of the unsurpassed gift of scientific foresight, and most profound penetration into the very core of events and phenomena, and creatively applying the dialectical-materialistic method to the analysis of the new historical conditions, he enriched the essentially important stipulations of all components of Marxism and inaugurated a new stage in its development.

Lenin's theory of imperialism, of the social revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, the party, the class allies of the proletariat in the struggle for democracy and socialism, the unbreakable connection between social and national liberation, and the principles governing the peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems became the priceless ideological-theoretical and methodological weapon of revolutionaries of all countries. Lenin's ideas of the defense of the socialist fatherland are of great importance. Lenin's theoretical creativity was crowned by the science he developed on the ways for the building of socialism and communism.

Brilliant theoretician, and the greatest strategist and tactician of the world's proletariat, Lenin mastered to perfection the art of leading the revolutionary struggle and the building of communism.

Lenin and the Bolshevik party inherited the great mission of preparing and leading the first victorious socialist revolution in the world, combining the theory of scientific socialism with the broadest possible practical experience of the people's masses.

To millions of oppressed and exploited people, and to all working people Leninism became the symbol of the social renovation of the world and the revolutionary banner of our epoch. All outstanding revolutionary events of the 20th century are related to Lenin and his doctrine. There neither is nor could there be any Marxism without the new features which Lenin introduced in its development. Leninism is the Marxism of the contemporary age, the single, integral, steadily developing doctrine of the international working class.

The permanent value of Leninism is that it profoundly and accurately expresses the interest of the working class and all working people, and the requirements of global social progress. It makes it possible to provide correct answers to the most important and vital problems of our time. It teaches daring and creative solutions to ripe problems and equips with scientific understanding the prospects of social development. Lenin's richest ideological legacy and the revolutionary-critical spirit of his doctrine, the systematic and firm nature of his defense of the basic Marxist principles from opportunistic distortions, throughout his lifetime, have been an inexhaustible source of revolutionary thinking and action to the contemporary international communist, workers, and national-liberation movements.

Lenin's greatest historical merit was his creation of a proletarian party of a new type--the live embodiment of the unbreakable unity between scientific theory and revolutionary practice. He was the inspirer and leader of the socialist revolution and the building of the new society.

Following Lenin's path, under the leadership of the communist party, the Soviet people successfully accomplished the socialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectivization, and cultural revolution, providing the entire world with an example of the just solution of the national problem. Within a very short time our homeland became a powerful socialist state. The Soviet people defended the gains of the October Revolution in the struggle against the internal counterrevolution and the intervention. The victory of the Soviet people over fascism in the Great Patriotic War had a tremendous revolutionizing influence on the destinies of all mankind.

The building of developed socialist society, in which the constructive forces of the new system and its truly humane nature are becoming ever more apparent, is the universal-historical result of the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet people in the implementation of Lenin's ideas.

The main source of all our victories lies in the unbreakable unity between party and people, and the ability of the communists, in Lenin's words, to

come closer to and, to a certain extent, merge with the broadest possible masses of toiling people, enhancing their energy, heroism, and enthusiasm, and focusing their revolutionary intensive efforts on the most important tasks that lie ahead. Such were the party's Leninist actions in the course of building and defending socialism in a single country in a state of hostile capitalist encirclement. That is how it acted in establishing the first developed socialist society on earth. That is how it shall continue to act in the future.

The course of history and the most profound transformations which have radically changed the appearance of the contemporary world are providing ever new proof of the correctness and invincible strength of the Leninist ideas.

Under the banner of Leninism socialist revolutions won in a number of European, Asian, and Latin American countries. The world socialist comity, rallied on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, is in the vanguard of social progress. It is the most dynamic economic and political force, and a bulwark of peace and security of the nations. Life confirmed Lenin's prediction of the variety of ways and means of building socialism in different countries on the basis of the common laws governing the establishment and development of socialism.

The blossoming of each of the members of the socialist comity is inseparably linked with the strengthening of their ideological and political unity and growing common policies, economics, and social life, and the development of fruitful and equal cooperation in all fields. The interaction among fraternal countries within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, based on the Leninist principles of international solidarity, offers an example of such cooperation.

The international communist movement, at whose origins Lenin stood, has become the most influential political force of our time. Lenin's ideological-theoretical, political, and organizational principles remain the foundation of the activities of the revolutionary parties of the working class and help them to struggle and win.

The CPSU bears high the Leninist banner of proletarian internationalism. It promotes the unity of the international communist and workers movements, and unity of action among all anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces.

Under the conditions of the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, manifested literally in all realms of life in the bourgeois society, the intensity of the struggle waged by the working class and the working people against the omnipotence of the imperialist monopolies is rising steadily. The irreconcilable contradiction between the social nature of production and the private capitalist form of acquisition, sharp social conflicts, the steady growth of unemployment and inflation, a political and spiritual crisis, the militarization of the economy, and the dangerous arms race clearly confirm the accuracy of Lenin's assessment of imperialism as the final stage of the capitalist society with no future.



The national-liberation movement won outstanding victories under the direct influence of the ideas of Lenin and the Great October Revolution, and the inspiring example of the development of world socialism. Many young states, aspiring toward the elimination of their backwardness and toward reaching economic independence and building a just society, are turning to Marxism-Leninism and the experience of real socialism.

Profoundly studying the processes of social life, the CPSU and the fraternal parties are creatively developing Marxism-Leninism. In recent years the treasury of Marxism-Leninism has been increased by the theory of developed socialism, which substantially enriched and refined our concepts of the laws governing the establishment of the new socioeconomic system and the means for the building of communism. The conclusions that in the process of the creation of developed socialism the party of the working class also becomes the vanguard, the party of the entire people, and of the growth of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat into a state of the whole people, and the position of the Soviet people as a new historical human community, are of tremendous theoretical and political significance. The decisions of the 23d, 24th, and 25th CPSU congresses, the party programmatic documents, and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and of other party leaders are an outstanding contribution to revolutionary theory.

On the basis of a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis, the party formulated an economic strategy consistent with the requirements of developed socialism whose supreme objective is the steady upsurge of the material and cultural standards of the people. It formulated the concept of the need for combining the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system and opened the way to the creation of the material and technical base of communism, the transition to intensive economic management methods, and to upgrading production effectiveness and work quality.

Creatively developing the ideas of the Leninist cooperative plan, the CPSU formulated and is systematically implementing a course which insures the steady growth of agricultural production on the basis of the fast development of production forces and the steady improvement of production relations in socialist agriculture, the development of its specialization and concentration, and the enhancement of agricultural and livestock standards.

The objectives and tasks of contemporary social policy have been defined in close connection with economic strategy. This policy is aimed at intensifying the homogeneity of Soviet society with the leading role of the working class, the gradual elimination of major disparities between town and country and between mental and physical labor, and steady rapprochement among all nations and nationalities of the country and the strengthening of their fraternal friendship and unity.

The program for the further development and intensification of socialist democracy and for improving Soviet statehood and the entire political

system of developed socialism is being successfully implemented. The new USSR Constitution--the Fundamental Law of the first state of the whole people in the world--is an outstanding document of creative Marxism-Leninism and the development and concrete implementation of Lenin's ideas of democracy.

Nothing could be more stupid than the attempts of our enemies to present socialism as a society allegedly suppressing the initiative and the rights and freedoms of the people. The steadily growing political and labor activeness of the broadest possible masses and their participation in the discussion and solution of all governmental and social affairs confirm the accuracy of Lenin's conclusion that "live and creative socialism is the creation of the people's masses themselves" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 57).

All activities of the party and the people are directed toward the further strengthening of the developed socialist society, the creation of the material and technical base of communism, the improvement of social relations, and the education of the citizens in a spirit of communist idea mindedness. As a result of the comprehensive organizational and political work done by the party and the selfless toil of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and people's intelligentsia, in the past 15 years our homeland has made considerable progress in all sectors of the building of communism. Outstanding successes have been achieved in the development of the economy, science, and culture. The biggest fuel-energy complex in the world has been created. The volume of industrial output has increased considerably and the material and technical base of agriculture has expanded. The country's defense capability has been strengthened. The social program is being successfully implemented and the prosperity of the Soviet people is rising. Real per capita income has almost doubled and nearly two-thirds of the population have moved into new premises or improved their housing conditions.

In accordance with Lenin's prescriptions, the CPSU is critically assessing accomplishments, focusing its efforts on the solution of ripe problems, boldly exposing shortcomings, and mobilizing the party members and working people to insure the maximum effective utilization of all possibilities of developed socialism and adopt a thrifty, truly economical attitude toward anything created by the toil of the people.

The decisions of the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum and the plenum speech delivered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev define the major problems related to the further upsurge of the Soviet economy and the specific means for substantially upgrading production effectiveness, work quality, and the prosperity of the people.

The party focuses its attention on the key problems of the development of the fuel-raw material base, energy, metallurgy, machine building, the chemical industry, the substantial and immediate improvement of conditions

in transportation and capital construction, the conversion of agriculture into a highly developed economic sector, and the increase in food and consumer goods production. Extensive work has been developed to improve economic planning and management and the entire economic mechanism. The party demands of all party, state, and public organizations and economic organs the further strengthening of discipline and order, painstaking daily organizational and educational work, initiative-minded and responsible attitude toward assignments, and strict implementation of decisions.

The party relies in all its work on the powerful scientific potential of the country. It is always concerned with raising the educational standard of the people and the spiritual wealth of society, and the increase in the values produced by the multinational socialist culture developing on the Leninist principles of party mindedness and nationality. The CPSU pays prime attention to the development of the communist awareness of the working people, to improving ideological and political-educational work, upgrading the scientific level, intelligibility, and effectiveness of propaganda, and the strengthening of its ties with life. The party raises all members of society in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism, communist attitude toward labor and public property, political vigilance, and intolerance of bourgeois ideology.

The Leninist norms of party life and principles of party leadership are firmly observed. Intraparty democracy, criticism, and self-criticism are systematically growing. The exactingness toward every CPSU member is rising. As the scale expands and the tasks of constructive activities become more complex, and with the ever-broader involvement of the people's masses in conscious historical creativity, the role of the communist party--the leading and guiding force of society--rises steadily. The CPSU and its Central Committee sacredly protect and multiply the Leninist revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions.

The entire international activity of the CPSU is imbued with loyalty to the ideas of the great Lenin. Formulated and scientifically substantiated by Lenin, the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism, and of peaceful coexistence are implemented in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The CPSU and the Soviet Government continue to do everything possible to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries, and to give aid and support to peoples fighting imperialism, neocolonialism, and racism, and for the consolidation of the peace and international security, the termination of the arms race, and disarmament.

The CPSU formulated a peace program and is systematically fighting for its implementation. The conclusion of a number of treaties between socialist and capitalist countries and the development of reciprocally profitable cooperation between them, and the successful holding of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe brought about the intensification of detente. The enactment of the Soviet-American SALT II treaty could contribute to substantial improvements in the political climate of the world.

The constructive proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact members and the new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union offer real possibilities for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for a real strengthening of the peace and security in Europe.

The USSR, the socialist countries, and all peace-loving forces on earth are adamantly struggling for detente to remain the leading trend in international relations and for military detente to supplement political detente.

The positive changes occurring in the world are encountering the fierce opposition of imperialist reaction. Militaristic and reactionary circles are energizing their actions against detente. They are trying to change the ratio of forces in their favor and are increasing the arms race. They are trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries and to suppress the liberation movement of the peoples.

The Chinese leadership, which is pursuing a great-power hegemonistic policy, hostile to the cause of peace and socialism, is the direct accomplice of imperialism. Exposing the reactionary nature of this policy and proving the incompatibility between the ideology and practice of Maoism and scientific socialism, the CPSU, nevertheless, invariably stands for normalizing intergovernmental relations and achieving true good-neighborly relations and mutually profitable cooperation between the USSR and the PRC.

The attractiveness of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and the growth of the prestige and influence of real socialism are triggering the fierce resistance of the class enemy. The bourgeoisie and its ideologues, and opportunists and revisionists of all hues are intensifying their struggle against communism. They are trying to falsify Marxism-Leninism, deprive it of its revolutionary nature, and find "contradictions" between the theory of scientific socialism and the practice of its implementation in the socialist countries. They are trying to belittle the universal-historical significance of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the successes of socialism. They are trying to discredit the socialist way of life. The communists are answering the intrigues of imperialism and its accomplices with the international unification of their ranks, systematic struggle against bourgeois ideology, revisionism, dogmatism, nationalism, and struggle for the purity and creative development of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviet people are welcoming the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth in circumstances marked by high political and labor upsurge. On the initiative of leading production workers in Moscow and Leningrad a patriotic movement developed in the country for the implementation of individual five-year assignments by 22 April 1980.

Closely rallying around the party's Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo, headed by the loyal Leninist, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the Soviet people warmly approve and unanimously support the general course of the

CPSU and its domestic and foreign policy. Led by its tested vanguard, our country is confidently following the Leninist path to communism.

The CPSU Central Committee decreed that the 110th anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birth will be a great nationwide holiday. Ceremonious meetings will be held in Moscow, the republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon centers, the collectives of working people, and military units and subunits.

The central committees of communist parties of union republics, the party kraykoms, obkoms, okruzhkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, the primary party organizations, and the political organs of the USSR Armed Forces have been asked to launch active political and organizational work in preparing for the anniversary and focus the efforts on the fulfillment of the decisions of the 25th party congress, the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, and the topical tasks of the building of communism and of comprehensively strengthening the economic and defense power of our homeland. The ripe problem of our development must be formulated and resolved in a Leninist way, boldly and principle-mindedly. The extensive participation of the working people in surmounting existing shortcomings must be insured.

The preparations for and celebration of the great anniversary must comprehensively contribute to the further development of the labor and social activeness of the people, the mobilization of efforts for the fulfillment of the 1980 plan, and the laying of good foundations for a successful start of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Problems of upgrading work effectiveness and quality at all national economic levels, growth of labor productivity, accelerated production intensification and scientific and technical progress, improved economic planning and management, strengthened organization and discipline, and increased personal responsibility for assignments must be the focal point of attention of the party, state, and economic organs, the trade unions, and the Komsomol organizations.

It is recommended that open party meetings be held in March and April 1980 on the topic of "Let Us Live, Work, and Struggle in a Leninist, a Communist Manner," at which the tasks of the party organizations must be discussed in the light of the decisions of the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, the present decree, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's instructions.

Mass socialist competition must be launched in honor of the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the successful completion of the 10th Five-Year Plan. A Leninist honor certificate must be instituted to award labor collectives and leading production workers who fulfill their five-year plans by the anniversary date.

The State Committee for Science and Technology, the AUCCTU, and the ministries and departments must set aside for the competition winners the necessary number of travel cards to visit the USSR Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy and memorable Leninist sites.

In the party and Komsomol political training, and economic education systems, the schools, and all ideological and educational work, the main attention must be focused on the profound study of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and of the historical experience of the USSR, closely linked with the solution of specific economic and political problems. The international significance, topical nature, and the omnipotent force of the Leninist ideas must be comprehensively brought to life. The party's revolutionary-transforming efforts to implement Lenin's legacy and insure the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory must be extensively depicted. The achievements of the developed socialist society and the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU must be comprehensively disseminated. The historical gains of the peoples of the socialist comity and the radical advantages of socialism over capitalism must be convincingly interpreted.

Ideological-educational activities must be improved in accordance with the CC CPSU decree "On Improving Further Ideological and Political-Educational Work." Particular attention must be paid to raising the working people in the example of V. I. Lenin's life and activities and of the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the communist party and the Soviet people.

The central committees of communist parties of union republics, the Moscow City Party Committee, the party kraykoms and obkoms, the board of the Knowledge All-Union Society must promote the reading of lectures and reports. Sociopolitical readings on the topic of "Lenin's cause is alive and winning" must be held in Moscow, the capitals of union republics, and the kray and oblast centers.

The party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, and the cultural organs must sponsor meetings with veterans of the revolution and heroes of war and labor; hikes and marches to Leninist sites, festivals, motion picture and television film presentations, musical performances, art exhibits, and readers' conferences on the topic of V. I. Lenin and the communist party.

The items exhibited in state and people's museums and Leninist rooms must be renovated. Exhibits of books and photographs describing V. I. Lenin's life and activities, library and cultural institution reviews-competitions, and visual agitation must be organized.

In April 1980 the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU Academy of Social Sciences, jointly with the USSR Academy of Sciences, shall hold a scientific conference on "Marxism-Leninism and the Contemporary Age."

The preparations for and celebration of V. I. Lenin's anniversary shall be extensively covered by newspapers and periodicals, TASS, and the USSR State Television and Radio.

The CPSU Central Committee calls upon the party and Komsomol members and all Soviet people to welcome Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's birthday with new

successes in the struggle for communism and to make the final year of the 10th Five-Year Plan a year of shock Leninist work.

Long live Leninism--banner of the revolutionary struggle, communist construction, and peace!

Let the name and cause of the great Lenin live through the centuries!

Long live the great Soviet people--builder of communism!

Long live the Leninist Communist Party of the Soviet Union!

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## INVINCIBILITY OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 11-27

[Article by B. Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee]

[Text] The modern era is characterized by the growing overall crisis of the capitalist system and by the development, in width and depth, of the worldwide revolutionary process, along the channel of which flow all the currents of the liberation movement and various streams of the struggle for a new society, free of national and social oppression.

The 1970's were marked by the further extension and deepening of that process. The all-encompassing crisis is making the exploiter system feverish. Economic instability and upheavals, the sharp spiral of inflation and high prices, the insurmountable increase in unemployment, the cancerous tumor of militarism, the outrageous political scandals in higher places, the breakdown of public morality, and the increasing inability of the bourgeois state to guarantee the security of its citizens -- those and other open sores of capitalism are being revealed on a mass and ominous scale.

On that soil the striving of the working masses to achieve fundamental social changes stands out in increasingly sharp relief. Also linked with this is the considerable reinforcement of the positions, and an increase in the influence of the communist parties in the recent decade. In countries such as France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, India, Finland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and others, they are coming forth as a political force on a national scale, as a very important factor in the ideological struggle. The Communist parties of a number of countries rightfully demand direct participation in the control of affairs of state. There has been a successful buildup of the mass base, and the Communists in the Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany], the United States of America, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other countries are strengthening their authority.



At the present time, without the communist movement, and primarily without its most powerful component, the ruling parties of the countries in the socialist community, not a single serious world problem, not a single fundamental question of modern life, is being resolved or could be resolved.

Revolutionary changes have encompassed many countries in all parts of the world. An outpost of socialism has been victoriously confirmed in Southeast Asia -- Vietnam with its 50 million people. The peoples of Laos have taken the path of socialism and the criminal regime of Pol Pot -- Yeng Sari in Cambodia -- has been annihilated. Progressive regimes are being consolidated in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and a number of other African countries. Anti-imperialistic, people's revolutions have been carried out in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Iran. The stars of socialist Cuba are burning brighter and brighter in the western Hemisphere. One after another, the peoples of Central America and the Caribbean basin are taking their fate in their own hands. The people of Nicaragua have taken the path of a new life. Under blows inflicted by the national-liberation movement and revolutionary forces in what had been the "home country," the last Portuguese colonial empire on earth crumbled. The liberation movement has been shaking colonialism and racism in the south of Africa. An implacable process is under way -- the process of replacing the obsolete reactionary, oppressive regimes by progressive ones, most frequently those with a socialist orientation.

Intolerance with regard to imperialistic dominance and interference, the decisive demand for completely equal rights and justice, the revolutionary passion of the masses, and their striving for fundamental changes are currently characteristic of the entire tremendous zone that previously constituted the colonial periphery of imperialism. This currently is one of the most profound and most effective of those historic processes which are of fundamental importance for the future of mankind.

As a result of events that are currently taking place, an analysis is being made of them, the reasons for these events are being evaluated, and the appropriate conclusions are being made. Two fundamentally different lines currently oppose one another, and combat one another in evaluating the causes, the real sources and the motivating factors in the revolutionary-liberation movements. And from those opposing evaluations there also evolve opposing practical conclusions,

One line, expressed by the champions of the scientific political philosophy, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proceeds from the fact that the upsurge of the various democratic, anti-imperialist, and anticapitalist movements is the result of the action exerted by objective historic factors -- such as the development of productive forces, the scientific-technical revolution; the consolidation of the positions of world socialism, which has been demonstrating its historic advantages over capitalism; the aggravation of the overall crisis of capitalization,

the intensification of its internal and external contradictions, the greater and greater revelation of its antipopular essence, and the overall change in the ratio of forces in the world, in favor of socialism, peace, and progress. An important role is played by the growth of the political awareness and consciousness of the masses.

Marxist-Leninists view the revolutionary processes of modern life as a new graphic and irrefutable confirmation of the rightfulness and accuracy of the theory of scientific communism. They see in these processes the mighty expression of the internal force of the masses of the people, the brightly expressed striving for national independence, their inflexible will to achieve their independent historic creativity, to confirm the sovereignty of their country. They take a deeply sympathetic attitude to the inclusion in world progress of newer and newer masses of millions of people, linking with process the prospect for the further advancement and enrichment of human civilization as a whole and seeing in this an important factor for preventing new wars and eliminating the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe.

The other line in the evaluation and practical conclusions relative to the revolutionary-liberation movements and processes of modern life is the line expressed by the ruling circles and ideologists of imperialism. That line consists in attempting to obscure the true reasons and sources of those processes, in representing them as the result of some kind of "interference from without," and thus to justify their own -- completely real -- interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples, an interference which has as its goal the reinforcement and perpetuating of the system of imperialist dominance.

The very heart of all these interpretations is the big lie about "the hand of Moscow." That lie has been repeatedly offered up as a "revolution" and disseminated by the vast propaganda apparatus of imperialism. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has noted, there have been continuing "attempts to depict the social processes in a particular country, the struggle waged by peoples for their independence and progress, as 'Moscow's intrigues and machinations.'"

The thousand-tongued Western propaganda system importunately, from day to day, forces this false and miserable "theory" upon people in an attempt to obscure and distort the true state of affairs, to make the broad masses antagonistic toward the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, to discredit the revolutionary-liberation forces, and at the same time to distract people's attention from the real practice of imperialistic arbitrariness and dictate.

The method that has been made the basis of this campaign of provocation is extremely simple. There has been a revolution in Angola -- the whole secret is in "the hand of Moscow." The revolution in Mozambique is the

work of the same "hand." Concealed behind the revolutions in Ethiopia and Afghanistan is the same ubiquitous "hand of Moscow," etc.

From such statements (including those made at the highest state level), declarations, interviews, articles, analyses, "reach studies," and reports by intelligence agencies one could compile thick tomes. Attempts to "erect a ring of encirclement" around the weakly developed countries are ascribed to the Soviet Union. A special concept has been developed, to the effect that the Soviet Union has created as "arc of instability" that runs through Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

In the United States there are influential circles which continue to assert that the changes in the developing world are chiefly the result of external influence and intrigues. If, for example, a democratic people's movement is unfolding, then it must have been inspired by the Soviet Union and, correspondingly, all it takes to suppress it is to exert an influence of force from without -- but this time "from the other side," from America -- that is, to inspire a counterrevolution. With this approach the modern world is still being viewed in the context of a great-power, hegemonistic concept, and, practically speaking, the internal impetus for the development of new national states, the natural attraction of peoples toward independence and freedom is being completely ignored.

Today even bourgeois commentators admit that at times the American government becomes a prisoner of the fabrications concerning "the hand of Moscow." For example, the crude actions of the American representatives who attempted unsuccessfully, in the spirit of "big stick" diplomacy, to force upon the Organization of American States the plans for "collective" interference in Nicaragua were explained by the U.S. press, in particular, by the tendency of Z. Brzezinski to see behind every international event the "Russian bear," his "almost hysterical fear" of "communist influence." What we are dealing with here is the deliberate attempt to present them as "facts" and to use them as the orientation guides for the foreign policy of the largest capitalist state. Hence the attempt to return the world to the times when socialism and the other revolutionary forces were not yet capable of substantially limiting the arbitrary will of imperialism on the world scene. Hence also the contradictory nature of the West's policy, in which statements of adherence to peace and detente are constantly accompanied by sneak attacks upon detente and by actions that undermine it.

The scope of the sociopolitical changes which have marked the most recent decades of world history is so considerable that it is seriously disquieting the leaders of imperialism. However, inasmuch as their treatment of these changes comes down, in the final analysis, to fabrications concerning

the "hand of Moscow," the political reaction to them takes the form of demands for the greater and greater buildup of military might, the military readiness of the United States, the forcible counteraction to the liberation movements, and the preservation and intensification of international tension, up to and including the threat of thermonuclear war.

Speaking against the "politicians" who had been shouting about "Red militarism," V. I. Lenin noted as long ago as 1919 that they "give the appearance that they believe this stupidity, and they cast such accusations to the right and left, using for this purpose their lawyer's ability to concoct false arguments and to throw sand in the eyes of the masses" ("Poln. Sochr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol. 38, p 50). In order to undertake seriously, with a consideration of the data provided by science, the explanation of the social phenomena of cataclysmic importance, the historic processes that determine the fates of nations for many decades ahead, it is necessary to measure them within the scale of the protracted periods of the development of human society. Incidentally, when the topic of discussion is such shifts of historic importance as the replacement of one social system by other, as the victory and fundamental confirmation of a new authority, a new system of socioeconomic and political relations, then it is difficult to imagine that people with the most elementary education could actually believe the fabrications concerning the "foreign" origin of such phenomena. All attempts to depict the objectively ripened people's revolution as the result of someone's manipulations, as someone's "interference," fail to conform to reality. They are not only reactionary, but are out-and-out primitive. We might recall, for example, the revolutionary upheavals and the downfall of the monarchies in Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey after World War I and the October Revolution. At the present time not a single serious historian or political figure, whatever the ideology that he adheres to, will say that those events were the result of foreign intrigues of machinations by insurgents. But in those days those events were also ascribed to the "intrigues of the Bolsheviks," and this was used, in particular, as the justification for the shameful military intervention against the young Soviet state.

Obviously, this approach lacks both objectivity and any semblance of scientific content. At the same time, it clearly shows the class influences that have been exerted upon it, because to acknowledge the objective, completely natural nature of revolutionary changes means also acknowledging the historic doom of the attempts to stop the worldwide revolutionary process.

In his speech at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, recalling Lenin's words to the effect that revolutions are not made on the basis of an order or an agreement, said, "One may add that a revolution, the class struggle, the liberation movements also

cannot be abolished by order or agreement. There is no force on earth that can turn back the implacable process of the renovation of social life. Wherever colonialism exists, there will be a struggle for national independence. Wherever exploitation exists, there will be a struggle for the liberation of labor. Wherever aggression exists, it will be repelled."

The liberation movements are an inseparable element in the natural historic process of development and replacement of socioeconomic formations. They express the objectively arising need for a changeover to new, more progressive forms of social life, and are the inevitable and completely natural result of the buildup of internal contradictions in an antagonistic society that has been divided into hostile classes.

Any revolution has a deep-seated economic basis in the method of production, and grows out of the contradiction between productive forces and production relations. In an antagonistic society this contradiction sooner or later inevitably grows into an acute conflict, which is engendered by the attempt of the ruling class to use all means to preserve its dominance, privileges, and authority, and its opportunity to exploit the workers.

In the famous preface to his work "Criticism of Political Economics," K. Marx gave a brilliant formulation that reveals the causes and the meaning of social revolution in the historic process. "At a certain stage in their development the material productive forces of society enter into contradiction with the existing production relations, or -- this is only a legal expression of the latter -- with the relations of property, within which they had developed up to that time. From forms of the development of productive forces, these relations are converted into their fetters. Then the era of social revolution comes. With the change in the economic base, there occurs more or less rapidly a revolution in the entire tremendous superstructure" (K. Marx, F. Engels, "Soch." Works, Vol 13, p7).

This classic explanation of the fundamental objective causes of the social revolution, to which Lenin referred repeatedly, was convincingly confirmed by the practice of the revolutionary actions taken by the masses in the current era and remains completely in force in our day. Lying at the basis of all the revolutionary upheavals of the era that was opened by the Great October is, in the final analysis, one and the same reason: the deep crisis of the capitalist social system, which has entered the phase of its descending development. There is a vital need for new, socialist forms of social structure which conform to the social nature of the productive forces that have been created by mankind and to the interests of the masses of the people. The changeover to these progressive forms, to the affirmation of the socialist system, is what constitutes the basic content of the modern era.

Obviously, this changeover cannot be one-time or identical in all countries, because it is occurring in a varied world. The capitalist system as a whole is ripe for the carrying out of fundamental changes. However, in every country this historic need of the era is blazing a trail for itself in its own way, in conformity with the level of internal socioeconomic development, the state of the revolutionary movement, the measure of the political awareness of the masses, and the national peculiarities. In every country the changeover to socialism cannot be caused or carried out by the arbitrary actions of any party or any group of revolutionaries. Revolutions, as Lenin said, "grow up whenever tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that they cannot live any longer" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 36, p 457). They "ripen in the process of the historic development and they break out at the moment that has been influenced by the total number of internal and external causes" (Ibid., p 531). The attempts to "order" a revolution, "to establish a queue," to indicate its deadlines ahead of time was called by Lenin "charlatanism" (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 31, p 398).

Revolution as an expression of historical necessity has its own laws of origin and development. It begins wherever and whenever the economic need for fundamental revolutionary changes develops into a mass movement by the oppressed classes. A revolution is carried out whenever the aggravation of the economic and sociopolitical contradictions leads to such a nationwide crisis that the "upper crust" cannot control in the old manner, and the "lower strata" become aware of the impossibility of living in the old manner. A revolution, in other words, requires a revolutionary situation, which cannot be created artificially or, moreover, cannot be created by operating from without.

According to the positions of scientific socialism, interference from without, attempts to "instigate" or artificially cause an internal revolutionary process are hopeless and harmful. The CPSU has always proceeded and continues to proceed from the fact that one cannot force a revolution on anyone, one cannot "bring happiness" to another people by means of it. The roots of revolution and its motivating forces are always in national soil.

Of course, the victory of socialism and the building of a mature socialist society in the Soviet Union, the historic achievements of our country and of the entire socialist community, graphically attest to the advantages of mature socialism as compared with capitalism. "A greater effect than that of any kinds of proclamations or conferences," Lenin said, "is provided by living example, by the taking of a definite action somewhere in one country -- that is what ignites the working masses in all countries" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 35, p 278). This inspiring effect has occurred since the Great October Socialist Revolution, and no one can obscure or overshadow it. But this, obviously, is by no means interference in the affairs of other country. Every nation uses both the fact of the ascending movement of real socialism and its experience in the way that it deems necessary. It takes what is beneficial to it, what corresponds to the

conditions and traditions of its own development. The attractive force of the socialist example does not have anything in common with the mechanical "instigation" of revolutions, much less the "transferring" of them to other countries. Its influence is necessarily refracted through the prism of the internal conditions, which are dissimilar in the various countries.

The ideologists of anticommunism, distorting the conclusions of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the relationship of the internal and external aspects of the revolutionary process, attempt to reduce the international factors to the "exporting of revolution." And yet Lenin decisively fought against the "leftist" adventuristic concepts that propagandized such antiscientific ideas. Such concepts were proposed by ideologists of Trotskyism, who, in essence, issued the summons for a state of permanent warfare against the entire capitalist world with the purpose of inciting a world revolution. The "leftist" communists during the period of the Brest Peace also occupied an analogous position.

Objecting to the theoreticians of adventurism, Lenin wrote, "It may be that the authors assume that the interests of international revolution prohibit absolutely all kinds of peace with the imperialists. . . The socialist republic, among the imperialist powers, could not, from such points of view, conclude any economic treaties, could not exist without flying to the moon" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.", Vol 25, p 402).

The communists refute the idea of the "exporting of revolution," and this has been firmly established in many documents pertaining to the international communist movement. "The communist parties, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory," states the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties in 1960, "have always been against the exporting of revolution. At the same time they decisively fight against the imperialistic exporting of counterrevolution."

The opponents of Marxism-Leninism frequently attempt to represent the situation as though revolutions necessarily grow out of wars. The reasoning here is extremely simple. If one accepts their assertion, then there follows from it that the communists are self-interested in wars as a source of revolutions.

What, though, is the actual connection between wars and revolutions?

As is well known, as a result of the crises that led to the arising of the two world wars, revolutions actually did not break out. Even before this the wars of 1870 and 1904 accelerated the revolutionary outbursts in France and Russia. As a result of World War I, the Great October Socialist Revolution was victorious and in many countries of Europe and Asia

there was a wave of revolutions, revolutionary upsurge, which shook to the very foundations the worldwide imperialistic system. As a result of World War II the socialist, people's-democratic, and national-liberation revolutions encompassed entire groups of countries on various continents. Most of them ended victoriously. Socialism left the confines of a single country, and the worldwide socialist system arose. An historic tendency reappeared: wars during our era lead to revolution.

On the eve of World War II the communist parties said that the regimes that give rise to wars would be overthrown. And that is what happened. The working class, the broad masses of the people, having experienced colossal difficulties and the horrors of war, turned their anger against that system, against that regime that had led to war. The destruction of the Nazi regime in Hitlerite Germany, of Italian fascism and Japanese militarism, was in the final analysis a phenomenon that rested deeply on natural law.

An imperialist war aggravates to an extreme degree all the contradictions of the exploiter system, and brings them to a political crisis. Every war heaps unbelievable hardships upon the masses of the people, and if the war is an unjust, predatory, expansionistic one, then the misfortunes that are brought by it awaken in the nation the striving to put an end to the social system that gives rise to such bloody wars. It is for that reason that this kind of war intensifies mass discontent and active protest, and accelerates the maturation of revolutions. And the militant, militaristic circles of imperialism, the military-industrial complex, the Pentagon, the imperialist monopolies must know that their actions which are directed at the unleashing of armed conflicts and aggression can become -- as has been shown both by past experience and by modern experience -- a catalyst for revolutionary and liberation movements.

That truth was confirmed in the 1970's by the Portuguese revolution. It grew out of the internal socioeconomic and political contradictions of Portuguese society and Portuguese colonialism. Broad masses in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau rose in the armed struggle for their national and social liberation. The unjust war that had been conducted for many years caused revolutionary discontent in the Portuguese army itself. There arose the Movement of the Armed Forces--the organization of democratically-minded military personnel who were against the fascist regime. Thus, the colonial war with all its burdens and cruelties accelerated the maturation of the nationwide crisis in Portugal itself, and encouraged the leading members of the army to take decisive actions which, being supported by the working class and by the democratic forces, led to rapid victory.

However, the followers of Marxism-Leninism never felt and do not feel that wars are needed for the development of revolution. Marxists by no means seek a war, do not attempt to cause a war for the sake of starting revolutions. This is all the more true today when there is added to the



so-called conventional calamities linked with wars the threat of the use of thermonuclear weapons, the catastrophic consequences of which are difficult to imagine. The communist and workers' parties are carrying out a consistent, persistent and stubborn struggle against wars.

The pseudotheory concerning the mandatory link between revolution and war, which has been launched by the ideologists of anticommunism, contradicts the facts of modern life. The revolution in Cuba occurred when that country was not waging any foreign war. The same thing pertains to the Chilean revolution. The recent revolutions in Afghanistan and Iran also are not linked to wars.

As is well known, the Great October Socialist Revolution was victorious not only under socialist slogans, but also slogans of peace. The very first decree issued by the Soviet authority proclaimed peace and the principles of peaceful relations among nations. It was precisely socialism which became the bearer of the fundamentally new type of international relations. With the victory of October, there opened up for the first time before mankind the real prospect for the establishment of peaceful relations among states.

The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that the changeover itself from the Cold War to detente is linked primarily with deep changes in the ratio of forces on the world scene, to the detriment of imperialism and its capabilities of unleashing a war. The entire foreign-policy activity of our party and the Soviet government, and the Peace Program of the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses, graphically attest to the stubborn and consistent struggle being waged by the communists and the Soviet nation for the realization of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence. Those principles have been firmly established in the new USSR Constitution.

It is precisely socialism, the international working class, the people's-liberation forces that emerge as the decisive factor for the fundamental reorganization of the entire system of international relations of peace-loving, democratic principles.

Peace and detente create the capability of concentrating the forces of the nations not on the arms race, but rather on the very large-scale social and human problems which arise in an increasingly acute manner under modern conditions. Peace conforms to the interests of absolutely all nations.

There is repeated reaffirmation of the justness of the conclusion by the Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1976 to the effect that the policy of peaceful coexistence, of active intergovernmental cooperation of detente "corresponds both to the interests of each nation, and to the progress of mankind as a whole."

At the present time the false myth of the "hand of Moscow" and the "intrigues of the Kremlin" is being inflated especially actively as a result of the revolutionary upheavels and changes in the young developing states.

Wherein lie the real causes of the large-scale social changes in that part of the world?

The arising of the colonial system at one time was the result of the development of capitalism. The social system that had been based on the exploitation of man by man, led also to the exploitation of entire nations. The class division into oppressors and oppressed, a division that was typical of the bourgeois system within each country taken individually, spread during the 19th century to almost the entire world: entire continents were converted into colonial preserves of imperialism.

The founders of Marxism established the interrelationship between two historic processes -- the liberation of the working class from bourgeois oppression, and the struggle of the oppressed nations against colonial exploitation. Lenin indicated that the replacement of capitalism by socialism is an historic era that includes within itself "a number of democratic and revolutionary, including national-liberation, movements in the undeveloped, backward, and oppressed nations" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.", Vol 30, p 112). The CPSU Program states, "Whereas imperialism suppressed national independence and the freedom of the majority of the nations, shackled them with the chains of cruel colonial slavery, the arising of socialism marks the advent of the era of the liberation of the oppressed nations."

Previously, at the will of the worldwide bourgeoisie, entire nations were turned into slaves; at the present time, however, at the will of these countries, colonies have been turned into independent states. Comparatively recently, the colors of colonial empires predominated on the political map of the world. Where are they now? That which had appeared to be eternal and unshakable has crumbled, and soon the very word "colony" itself will remain only in history textbooks.

What caused the collapse of the colonial system? What factors made it possible for the patriots, within comparatively short historical periods, to achieve independence for their countries?

Without a doubt, a tremendous role was played by the Great October, by the steadily growing international influence of victorious socialism, the arising of the worldwide socialist system, the weakening of international imperialism as a result of World War II and the deepening of its overall crisis, the new correlation of forces on the world scene. Anticolonial uprisings and even wars, the heroic actions taken by masses that had been

brought to the extreme point indignation and despair, used to occur previously, even at the dawn of colonialism, but in view of the immaturity of the historic conditions they ended in failure. It was only during the twentieth century that there matured -- and on the scale of the entire colonial periphery of imperialism -- the cardinal contradiction between the needs of social development, the vital interests of all strata of society in the dependent countries on the one hand and the system of colonial oppression on the other.

In addition to the objective factors that encouraged the most varied social forces to engage in the struggle against the stifling oppression of colonialism, subjective factors also formed: the social self-awareness of the proletariat or the pre-proletariat, and of other "have-not" worker segments began to mature. That social self-awareness took on a more and more clearly expressed anticolonial directedness. The intellectual class grew, and it became the bearer and propagandist of the idea of national liberation from imperialist oppression. All this combined with the desire to adopt from the West the technical achievements, the elements of modern industrial society, and on that basis once again there grew a strong desire for independent development. Colonialism insulted and suppressed the national feeling and simultaneously hindered the independent economic, cultural, and political development, and this, in its turn, led to the upsurge of national self-awareness.

During World War II the Western powers, striving to enlist the support of the population of the colonies in the struggle against the Axis powers, ceremoniously promised them, as had been done during the League of Nations period, that they would be granted their independence after victory. Once again, the real-life situation deceived the expectations of the peoples of Asia and Africa. After getting rid of the rivalry of the German and Italian fascists and the Japanese militarists, the Western powers attempted to restore their former dominance. Against the soldiers in the western armies fired at patriots in Egypt and Syria, Algeria and Madagascar, Malaya and Indonesia, in the countries of Indochina. But the attitude of the world forces had already changed irreversibly -- there had arisen a socialist system, and the positions of international imperialism proved to be seriously undermined as a result of the defeat of its shock detachments -- German and Italian fascism and Japanese militarism -- because of the decisive role played by the Soviet Army. Imperialism was no longer capable of withstanding the onslaught of the peoples of the colonies and dependent countries who had risen to engage in the struggle. Moreover, public opinion in the West, as a result of all these changes, was more and more actively opposed to the continuation of colonial wars. In December 1960 the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted its historic Declaration concerning the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples. In that declaration one saw the expression of the essence of the proposals introduced by the USSR at the United Nations concerning the necessity of the most rapid and complete liquidation of colonialism everywhere.

The vanguard detachments of the anticolonial struggle continued, at the price of terrible losses, to travel along the path of liberating other countries also. For seven years the heroic nation of Algeria fought, losing more than a million persons. But thanks to that struggle, French imperialism which had been bogged down in Algeria was unable to find the forces to hold onto its other African colonies any longer. In addition, the imperialists, seeing the inevitable collapse of the system of direct colonial domination, decided to change over to the tactics of disguised, indirect control--"to leave in order to remain," to retain the economic levers in their hands, to have time to put into power in plenty of time the selected pro-Western local elite, so as to channel the new states onto the path of dependent capitalist development. Forced to reject the direct political control of the countries of Asia and Africa, the imperialist circles were fully resolved to keep them in the orbit of the capitalist world economy, in order to continue to exploit them by methods of neocolonialism.

Thus, the colonial system of imperialism crumbled when the appropriate historical, economic, political, ideological, and moral prerequisites, including the international ones, formed.

At the present time the revolutionary struggle waged by nations for their independence and equal rights is being extended in the remaining preserves of colonialism in the south of Africa.

The intelligence and conscience of mankind cannot be reconciled to the existence of this shameful prison for an entire nation. And it is completely natural and morally justifiable when the patriots in the south of Africa rise up to engage in the decisive struggle, responding to the violence perpetrated by the racist oppressors. Therefore what person with common sense, what person with even the slightest degree of literacy will believe that the struggle being waged by the oppressed nation for its human dignity, for its national rights, the struggle against slavery and violence, the struggle to have their own free homeland, is being waged on the basis of instigation from without?

Churchill used to say that he had no intention of becoming the chairman of a committee to liquidate the British Empire; the ruling circles of France used to state that, regardless of what was happening in the rest of the world, Algeria would remain French; the U.S. administration hoped to use bombs and napalm to hold back the course of history, to prevent the liberation and reannexation of Vietnam. But the objective historic process is stronger than the will of the most decisive and the most cruel oppressors, whether internal or external. The British Empire has become a thing of the past, Algeria is independent, and the nation of Vietnam is free.

The existence of the feudal monarchy lasted a long time, an infinitely long time, in ancient Ethiopia, but its end has come. In the middle of

the 20th century such a despotic, greedy regime became a complete anomaly, having completely outlived its day both from the economic and political point of view, having proved to be incapable of providing the nation with even the most elementary means of subsistence, and keeping it in poverty, hunger, and ignorance.

The revolution was prepared by the entire course of the country's socio-economic and political development. Its economy was enmeshed in a network of feudal relations and was in a state of stagnation. In the countryside, serf and even slave-holding forms of exploitation were widespread. Against that background one could see in sharp contrast the parasitical nature of the wealthy classes. Political lawlessness reigned in the country. All attempts at political activity were cruelly suppressed. The trade unions that had been created by the emperor's decree were under police control.

By the middle 1970's the situation had become intolerable. The severe drought and the death by starvation of hundreds of thousands of peasants, the shameless plundering of the population, the embezzlements by the feudal aristocracy and the officialdom of the funds for providing aid to the starving, accelerated the ripening of the revolutionary crisis. A situation was created in which the uprising by the Ethiopian nation that had been brought to the point of desperation had become natural and inevitable.

Another natural result of the development of the internal contradictions of society was the overthrow of the feudal monarchy in Afghanistan and the April 1978 revolution, which gave the Afghan nation a new authority, which for the first time in the country's history began to express the interests of the working masses.

On the eve of the revolution, Afghanistan occupied a place somewhere in the very end of the list of the poorest countries on the earth. Corruption flourished there. Foreign economic aid and the state sector in the economy were the source of the enrichment of the ruling circles and the increased number of large-scale and medium-scale officialdom. The most elementary democratic rights and freedoms were lacking. The military coup which was carried out in 1973 by Daud gave rise to illusions in a few persons. However, it was soon detected that the overthrow of the monarchy had not gone beyond the limits of a palace coup. The program of progressive reforms was left just hanging. Repressions against the democratic forces began. At the same time there was an increase in the dissatisfaction among the workers, peasants, and the progressive military. The People's-Democratic Party of Afghanistan assumed the initiative and the guiding role in the objectively ripened revolution.

And as for the victorious revolution in Nicaragua, which swept away the mercenary despotism of the Somoza clan--are we really to believe that its objective sources are not obvious? For many years the Nicaraguan

nation waged the struggle against the fascist dictatorship. However, for a long period of time it did not have sufficient forces or a sufficient degree of unity or organizational spirit in the ranks of the patriotic vanguard. But when all the necessary conditions had matured for the success of the uprising, nothing could restrain any longer the national anger, the Somosa guard with its American weapons could no longer prove to be capable of maintaining the doomed clique of the despot in power.

When, last year, the revolutionary movement in Iran began, in the West, and especially in the United States, it was considered to be an insignificant expression of discontent. The CIA in its August 1978 report to the president predicted that the Shah would remain in power for a long period of time. Therefore, when the situation took a serious turn, attempts--which were doomed to failure--were undertaken to save the bankrupt regime of the Shah, a regime that was hated by the entire Iranian nation. Certain responsible individuals in Washington seriously assumed that, by sending, for example, an aircraft carrier to the shores of Iran, they would be able to intimidate the nation and prevent the victory of the revolution. But what can an aircraft carrier or even entire divisions of Marines do, when millions of people go out onto the streets every day, risking their lives, demanding the elimination of the despotic, corrupt pro-American regime? The revolution in Iran had ripened and the explosion that had to occur did occur.

So, if anyone's "hand" was pulling the strings for many years in Iran, it was the hand of Washington. American dominance in the country and the mercenariness of the Shah had been one of the objective stimuli for the upsurge of the national, anti-imperialist movement. The fact of the crude interference of the United States in Iranian affairs found its confirmation in the disquiet that had been expressed by the American parliamentarians. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee warned as long ago as 1976, "By selling Iran the latest weapons, and in a large quantity, the United States is assuming a serious responsibility for the maintenance of those weapons. Anti-Americanism can become a serious problem in Iran." Ought one to be surprised that the revolution immediately took on an anti-American direction? The slogan that became most popular was "Down with American imperialism!" As the proverb goes, "As you sow, so shall ye reap."

Lenin's prediction had come true: the peoples of the East have been awakened and they now want to handle their own affairs. They will not tolerate dictation from without. When, for example, the government of Nigeria nationalizes the assets of the British Petroleum Company, it proceeds from the understanding of its own interests; it is absolutely absurd to see in this the "subversive actions" or "intrigues" of the Soviet Union.

It would seem to be high time to realize that if a particular Asian, African, or Latin American country decides to make a break with the

imperialist system and take a path of socialist orientation, it does so not under the influence of agitation from without, not as a result of the activity of anybody's "agent network." Profound internal causes exist for this. The public opinion of the developing countries is becoming increasingly convinced that capitalism--and especially capitalism in that dependent form in which it is formed there--does not provide any way out of the very serious economic situation, does not offer any way of doing away with poverty, does not open up any prospects for social progress. It is capitalism that is represented by a handful of businessmen of the neo-comprador type, and represented by a bureaucratic bourgeoisie of speculator-brokers who are wallowing in corruption. It is capitalism whose organic flaws as a system are "superimposed" onto the weak development and dependence of the economy, upon the backwardness of the social relations, and therefore, is doubly burdensome, ugly, subordinate to foreign monopolies, and gives rise to a greedy elite which spends the national funds to import luxury items and unrestrained arms, at a time when the masses of the population are living in the most terrible poverty.

It is obvious that from time to time, in one country or another, there arise revolutionary movements that are aimed at overthrowing the pro-Western ruling classes, and that such a movement, by the very logic of things, puts out as its banner socialism, the only social system that carries with it the deliverance from exploitation, from social injustice, and from subordination to imperialism.

Obviously, it is no matter of indifference to Soviet citizens what socio-political orientation the various currents in the developing world adhere to. The adherents of scientific socialism have no intentions of denying their spiritual closeness to the progressive forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Sympathies for the persons who are fighting for true freedom are natural for Marxist-Leninists, and internationalists. And wherever such forces exist and fight, they can rightfully count on our solidarity and support. Those who raise the banner of the struggle against oppression and exploitation, the struggle for independence and national rebirth, the struggle against reaction, are considered by us to be the representatives of a just and noble cause, people with high and bright ideals, people who are willing to make sacrifices for the sake of the welfare of their own nation.

Knowing all this and attempting to use this against us, our ideological and political opponents reshuffle the cards precisely with regard to this point, deliberately distorting the essence of the matter, and substituting one thing by another. "The Russians are inciting centers of revolutions and insurrections," they claim, "thus undermining the status quo in the 'Third World' and undermining that very detente that they themselves claim to be in favor of." Here the most varied things have been mixed into a common heap. First of all, as was already mentioned, it is impossible to light a fire artificially. Secondly, a change in the socio-political status quo in a particular country is by no means equivalent

to the undermining of detente. On the contrary, the cause of detente on an international scale only gains if nations are able without hindrance, without interference from without, to travel freely along the path that they have chosen, because the source of dangerous conflicts that threaten the universal peace is not revolutions, and not the progressive reforms that accompany them, but, on the contrary, the attempts to use coercion in forcing upon the awakened peoples the orders that they are rejecting.

We live in an era of stupendous social reforms, which are revolutionary in nature and global in scale. The peoples of former colonies are waging and will continue to wage a struggle to eliminate all types of unequal rights, discrimination, dependence, a struggle against despotic and puppet regimes that are forced upon them despite their will. This struggle is an inseparable feature of the era and its final success is inevitable.

With unprecedented hypocrisy the aggressive forces of imperialism attempt to represent the attempt to suppress the struggle being waged by nations for the independent determination of their fate, for freedom and independence, as "concern" for detente, and for the "stability" of international relations.

But what kind of "stability," what kind of "equilibrium" is being discussed here?

If we are considering "stability" in the sphere of international, inter-governmental relations, then the path is open. It lies in the consolidation and complete materialization of political detente, its extension to all areas of international policy, and primarily to the military area. It lies in the end of the arms race and, in the final analysis, disarmament, the guaranteeing and maintenance of lasting peace and universal security. Those are the goals of the Soviet foreign-policy course.

But if we are considering the social status quo, that is, the retention everywhere of the existing social structures and political regimes, then the calculations aimed at preserving it are built on quicksand. Attempting to reinforce this kind of "equilibrium" is the same thing as attempting to turn back the wheel of history. It is just as reactionary as it is hopeless. Here the words "equilibrium," "stability," and "status quo" hide the outright attempt to preserve or to restore the hegemony of imperialism, primarily U.S. imperialism.

The leaders of the United States do not conceal their claims of hegemony. In recent years these claims have been expressed in an increasingly open and incontestable manner. "The United States is the most powerful country in the world--militarily, politically, and economically--and it intends to remain such." ". . . We have the capability of carrying out the leading role in the world, and this leading role imposes upon us a multilevel responsibility. . ." These are only a few quotations from the public statements made by J. Carter in 1979. The "leading role" of the United



States on the world scene and the "right" to that role have been repeatedly announced by Z. Brzezinski, including a statement made quite recently in an interview published in U. S. News and World Report. With regard to the debates on the matter of ratifying the SALT-II Treaty, the New York Times stated that the idea expressed by former Secretary of State H. Kissinger concerning the modern world "is based on the shaky premise that the security of the United States requires that the United States 'monitor' the world or at least international events and groupings."

In its most complete and frankest form, the claim of the United States for dominance in the world is represented in the speech given by the president to a council of businessmen on 12 December 1979. The expressions "leading role of the United States," "American guidance," etc. are encountered in practically every paragraph of that speech. One can see all the components of that "leading role": military might as its chief base; the "special responsibility" and "special obligations" of America; "global strategy both in peacetime and in wartime"; the most detailed schedule for using assault forces to invade those areas of the Third World where "American forces may be needed"; the readiness "to avert threats to stability" (that is, to the regimes that are to the liking of the United States); negotiations from positions of superior power; and a program for creating missiles intended to deliver the first strike.

The common denominator of all this hegemonistic, imperialistic concept is the policy of dealing "from a position of power," the policy of the arms race, a race that is paid for by the increasing tens of billions of dollars (as much as \$157 billion in 1981).

The hegemonistic "philosophy" of American imperialism, a policy that serves the interests of the military-industrial complex, proceeds from the cynical principle; That which is necessary or is considered to be necessary for the United States (the so-called "vital interests") must be good for everyone else, and those who do not agree with this will be faced by military might and by economic and every other kind of pressure. That principle found its expression in recent events.

The signing of the SALT-II Treaty, which reflected the existing military parity between the USSR and the United States, was assessed as a threat for the "leading role of America," and therefore massive pressure was organized against its NATO allies to have them accept new American missiles on their territory. That was "necessary" in order to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, to get around the SALT-II Treaty. It was "necessary" in order to bind the NATO countries even more tightly, to convert them, actually, into hostages of the U. S. "global" strategy, or, to put it another way, for the further materialization of the "leading role of America."

The "real call for America's leading role and influence on the world scene" (J. Carter's words in the speech that was mentioned above) was also perceived in the events in the Middle East, in Iran, and in the Caribbean. Therefore the president asked for tremendous amounts of money to finance the forces for a "quick reaction." The plans for the creation of such forces, their intended use as policemen, had been announced earlier. Z. Brzezinski several months previously had called for the "expansion of the capabilities" of the United States "in the plan for the rapid deployment of troops in any parts of the world where the American interests prove to be threatened." He also announced the possible use of those forces without any invitation or consent on the part of the corresponding government, simply on the basis of an American order. And he cynically added, "I do not consider it to be correct to talk too much about the use of these troops. . . It is necessary to be ready to use them when necessary, but it is best not to say too much about this before using them."

Under the cover of the commotion concerning the presence in Cuba of Soviet personnel, a permanently operating staff of a Caribbean operational combined unit has been created. That staff has had forces from all the fighting arms and the appropriate services attached to it. A decision was adopted to expand the scope of military exercises in the Caribbean area, and to give them a regular nature. Those actions evoked a decisive protest from the nations in the region; this found its reflection, in particular, in a special joint declaration issued by the governments of Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and St. Lucia.

It might be worthwhile to recall that at the present time every fourth American in military uniform is serving outside the confines of the United States: An entire army, approximately 500,000 persons, have been dispositioned in 114 countries throughout the world, most of them in Western Europe (330,000). In 30 foreign states, many of which are located thousands of miles from the borders of the United States, there are more than 2,000 American military bases, 225 of which are very large-scale military facilities. The United States has placed far beyond the confines of its borders nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, long-range aviation, contingents of ground forces and marines, tactical vessels of various classes and air-defense means. The American naval forces based in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and the Pacific Ocean represent a constant factor of political pressure against other states, as well as a potential invasion weapon, when that is deemed necessary in Washington, and that fact has been openly confirmed in the president's recent five-year military program. The United States has begun creating its strong points on islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (in particular, it is expanding and reinforcing its principal base there, on the island of Diego Garcia). In the Indian Ocean, primarily in the Persian Gulf, Washington plans to deploy on a permanent basis the new Fifth Fleet consisting of 40-50 vessels.

To all this one should add that, according to the computations made by the American Brookings Institute, during the postwar period the United States has put into action, dozens and dozens of times, armed forces as a weapon in its "global policy."

American imperialism has always been and continues to be the chief bulwark of tyrannical and mercenary regimes. Moreover, interference to their advantage was always justified by the imaginary "communist threat." Today, under the onslaught of the liberation forces, which are rapidly increasing both on a national and an international scale, American imperialism is no longer capable of protecting its proteges and puppets against being overthrown. However, it does not want to give up the "big stick" that has served it for more than half a century.

During the past three or four years American officials, who were by no means embarrassed at obviously violating international law, have made repeated statements concerning the "undesirability" or "inadmissibility" of allowing communists to become part of the government in any of the Western countries. Z. Brzezinski in one of his interviews stated flatly, "We do not want the communist parties to come to power in Western Europe." In early 1978 there appeared a sadly well-known document -- a special statement by the U. S. State Department concerning the question of the participation of communists in the governments of the West European countries. It is difficult to imagine a cruder act of political pressure than this statement, in which, in particular, it was stated, "Our position is clear. We do not have a favorable attitude toward such participation and we would like the influence of the communist in all the West European countries to become weaker." Actually, you can't say it any more clearly. This is truly the language used in military orders. Such frank statements mean just one thing--not a single nation can choose the path that it needs, that corresponds to its interests. If that happens, then there is a violation of the "stability," and that cannot be permitted by the United States of America as the "leading force" in the world.

Western propaganda, and primarily American, has not penetrated too deeply into the moral-political evaluation of such actions. But it constantly invents the imaginary "Soviet interference." Complaining about the defeat of the bloody Nicaraguan dictator Somosa, the well-known American commentators Evans and Novak stated in this regard that the United States should be more decisive in "rendering support to Somosa, regardless of what an unpleasant type he is," and should in general occupy "a more rigid line" with respect to any progressive changes in the developing countries. Incidentally, is it lawful to ask how this agrees with the Christian morality that is mentioned so frequently in the upper circles in the United States?

Today, after the overthrow of the Shah's regime in Iran, which had been the chief ally and obedient executor of the will of the United States in the Middle East, special emphasis is being placed on transferring that vacant job to the newly created Israeli-Egyptian bloc.

The same hegemonistic tendency is reflected by the line that has been set down in NATO for the expansion of the geographical "zone of responsibility" of that bloc, for the "legalization" of the direct or disguised interference into the affairs of other countries, especially those where the revolutionary-liberation struggle is being extended.

In Southeast Asia the role of the strike force that is aimed against the liberation movements of nations is being assigned, in the global plans of imperialism, to China.

Fortunately, the frank anti-Soviet hawks do not express the entire spectrum of reactions of the U. S. ruling circles to the revolutionary processes in the developing countries. There have been elements of sobriety in evaluating the reasons for the revolutionary upheavals in Iran, Nicaragua, and a few other places. For example, U. S. Secretary of State Vance recently stated that the United States "is no more capable of stopping the course of changes than King Canute was able to stop the ocean waves. . . The use of military force is not and must not be a desirable political reaction by Americans to the internal political events in other countries."

However, the entire logic of the class approach of imperialism, the age-old inertia of political behavior, constantly lead to the path of threats, pressure, and interference. And everything is carried out to the accompaniment of cries concerning the "hand of Moscow" and the Soviet "military threat."

This complete fabrication is a multipurpose propaganda weapon.

This myth is intended first of all to disorient world public opinion, to justify the emphasis upon the unrestrained arms race.

This myth, furthermore, is intended to evoke suspicion concerning the policy of the socialist countries on the part of the working masses in the capitalist countries, and on the part of the national-liberation forces and ruling parties of the liberated states.

Simultaneously this myth is a weapon for sowing discord among the revolutionary-liberation forces themselves and for splitting them. Linked in the closest manner with this myth are the slanderous attempts to depict as "antipatriots" and "foreign agents" those persons who, in the interests of their own homeland, in the interests of the freedom and independence of their own people, speak out in favor of friendly relations with the socialist community and the international communist movement.

This myth also serves imperialism by turning facts completely upside down and representing the liberation movements and revolutions as a "threat" to the peace and security of other nations.

Finally, the fabrications concerning "the hand of Moscow" are just a smoke screen that is supposed to conceal the imperialistic interference in the affairs of other states, and to justify the plans for intensifying that interference.

Thus, there are two diametrically opposed concepts concerning modern revolutionary processes. One is the Marxist-Leninist concept, which guides our party. It explains those processes by relying upon facts and scientific analysis, and by using the objective laws of socioeconomic development of human society, which operate, as Marx said, with a "natural" inexorability. The other concept is the bourgeois-imperialist concept, which is fundamentally idealistic and which explains the revolutionary movements as intrigues perpetrated by subjective, chiefly external, forces.

Correspondingly, there also exist two diametrically opposed lines for political behavior. One is directed at noninterference in internal process, respect for the unconditional right of every nation to decide its own fate in conformity with the objectively mature needs of the development of that country. The other is directed at the disruption of the revolutionary processes, as processes that do not have any legal justifications, and directed at the forcible and every other kind of subversive interference in the internal affairs of other countries with the purpose of satisfying foreign interests, and subordinating the particular nation to another country's political will -- as though it is not only justified, but also practically feasible to force upon any nation a regime that is pleasing to the foreign imperialistic forces. The arms race, the demonstration of military might, and the constant threats to put that military might into action are the direct result of that second line.

There is no need to mention the danger to mankind that evolves from the imperialistic concept of the political action in the modern world. However, the entire experience of modern history attests to the fact that that concept does not have any future.

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## VIABILITY OF LENIN'S IDEAS ABOUT THE SOVIETS

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[Review by A. Luk'yanov, doctor of juridical sciences, of the book "V. I. Lenin, KPSS o Rabote Sovetov" [V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Work of the Soviets], K. U. Chernenko, general editor, Politizdat, Moscow, 1979, 744 pages]

[Text] Our country and society are frequently referred to as "Soviets." "The Soviets fulfilled their First Five-Year Plan"; "the Soviets defeated fascism"; "The Soviets Became the Pioneers of Outer Space." Such an identification of the soviets and the first socialist country on earth is natural. The Great October Socialist Revolution won under the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!" Each major step in the progress of our country in the building of communism is related to the rule of the working people represented by the soviets. Equally inseparably the very birth, development, and improvement of the soviets are linked with the activities of the communist party, the ideas of the great Lenin, and their implementation. That is why the interest with which the readers welcomed the collection "V. I. Lenin, KPSS o Rabote Sovetov," published by Politizdat, is fully explainable.

The collection contains the most important instructions issued by Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, decisions of communist party congresses and of the Central Committee, legislative acts on the activities of the soviets, and addresses on such matters by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman.

The collection covers a major historical period--the nearly three-quarters of a century since the appearance of the soviets. Step by step we see the history of the soviet organs of the people's rule, confirming the tireless attention paid by the party to the activities of the soviets, and enabling us to judge of the main laws governing their development in the course of the building of socialism and communism and the possibilities for further improvements in the work of the soviets of people's deputies.

The collection opens with V. I. Lenin's work dated November 1905--the time when, on the initiative of the proletarian masses and in the flames of the first Russian revolution, the soviets of workers' deputies were born. Perspicaciously predicting their great future, Lenin voiced his decisive support of these mass revolutionary organs of the proletariat. Considering them the embryo of a revolutionary government, he pointed out that, "The soviet of workers' deputies must strive to include within it deputies representing all workers, employees, servants, farmhands, and so on, anyone who wants to and can fight together to improve the life of the entire toiling people . . ." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 12, p 62). At this point Vladimir Il'ich particularly emphasized that both the soviet of workers' deputies and the party are equally and strictly necessary in guiding the political struggle (see *ibid*, vol 12, pp 61, 63), and that it was precisely the party that had been called upon to lead the revolutionary masses rallied within the soviets. The idea was clearly formulated in Lenin's draft tactical platform for the Fourth (unification) Congress of the RSDWP, in which he noted that "the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party must participate in the non-party soviets of workers' deputies, absolutely organizing the strongest possible groups of party members within each soviet and guiding the activities of such groups strictly in connection with overall party activities" (*ibid*, vol 12, p 231). It was thus that, from the very beginning, the basic Leninist principle of party leadership of the soviets was formulated: the party guides the soviets not directly, but through the party members working within the soviets.

V. I. Lenin clearly saw two initial aspects which considerably predetermined the success of the revolutionary struggle. First, the creation within a political organization of the bourgeois society of combat revolutionary organs capable of rallying the broadest possible toiling masses and, subsequently, of assuming power. Second, the all-round enhancement of the activeness of such organs in the revolutionary struggle by strengthening their leadership by the party of the working class.

Subsequent revolutionary events, the participation of the Bolsheviks in the work of the soviets, and their adamant struggle for the conversion of the soviets into an instrument for the unification of workers and peasants and into state power organs, fully confirmed the profound justification of this Leninist policy.

The victory of the October Revolution and the establishment of soviet rule in the center and locally, made it possible to find and develop the tremendous potential of the soviet form of administration of social affairs by the working class and the supportive broadest possible toiling masses. The documents included in the collection convincingly prove the consistency and persistence with which the party worked to make such possibilities to be used to a maximum for the revolutionary reorganization of society.

One of the main characteristics of the soviets from the time of their appearance and conversion into power organs is the fact that a deputy elected to a soviet participates in the exercise of his functions without interrupting his daily work and separating himself from the collective which has voted him into the soviet.

This feature, repeatedly noted by Lenin, is inseparably linked with the very essence of socialist democracy, i.e., with the full rule of those who, through their toil, create all the material and spiritual values of society. Consequently, it is not a question of singling out some kind of ruling elite, but, conversely, of involving in the administration of governmental affairs an ever-broader range of people also engaged in productive toil. Strictly speaking, this is the essence of the Marxist understanding of socialist democracy.

However, as the materials in the collection indicate, the pursuit of this line in state construction was far from simple. It was a question of a difficult and complex struggle and of surmounting numerous and resistant bourgeois parliamentary dogmas sanctified by political science, and used by the Russian bourgeois parties.

It is understandable, therefore, that it was precisely in the post-October period, in the period of the drafting of the first Soviet constitution, that Lenin so frequently criticized bourgeois parliamentarianism, proving the inapplicability of parliamentary concepts in the system of soviet organs of people's representation. He believed that as revolutionary organizations of the whole people, the soviets were incomparably higher than the parliaments the world over, and that having set up a soviet system, the Russian workers and peasants had laid down the beginning of a global system of "two universal-historical ages: the age of the bourgeoisie and the age of socialism, the age of capitalist parliamentarianism and the age of soviet governmental institutions of the proletariat" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 38, p 220).

Exposing the intrigues of the bourgeois promoters of parliamentarianism, the Bolsheviks steadily implemented the party's programmatic stipulation that "a bourgeois republic, even the most democratic, operating under the slogans of nationwide, all-national, or non-class wishes, in fact, inevitably remains a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a machine for the exploitation and suppression of the tremendous majority of the working people by a handful of capitalists, by virtue the existence of private ownership of the land and other productive capital. Conversely, proletarian or soviet democracy has turned the mass organizations of the classes precisely oppressed by capitalism, the proletariat, and the poorest semi-proletarian peasants, i.e., the overwhelming majority of the population, into the permanent and only base of the entire state apparatus, both local and central, and from top to bottom" ("Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses and Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums], Politizdat, Moscow, 1970, vol 2, p 42).



Lenin's concept of the full power of the soviets was legislatively codified in the 1918 RSFSR Constitution and the constitutions of the other Soviet republics, and subsequently in the first union constitution of 1924. These constitutional acts clearly stipulated that the state power belongs to the entire working population of the country rallied within the soviets. The union and republic congresses of soviets, and the central executive committees held the legislative, executive, and control power, and the structure of the soviets and the nature of their activities were adapted to a maximum extent to the creation of all the necessary conditions for the participation of the working people in the exercise of governmental power.

Reflecting the stipulations of the party, the Soviet constitutions and other legislative acts defined the local soviets as the "supreme power within the limits of a specific territory." They were entrusted with the implementation of the decrees of superior soviet authorities, the adoption of measures aimed at insuring the upsurge of the territory in the areas of culture and economics, and the solution of all problems of strictly local significance. The higher soviets were entrusted with combining all soviet activities within a given territory and supervising the lower soviets. Thus each local soviet was part of the unified system of state power organs based on democratic centralism. Its purpose was actively to participate in the elaboration of national decisions and implement such decision locally.

At the same time, pursuing a line of strengthening the authority and role of the soviets, the communist party adamantly emphasized the need for properly combining the functions of party and soviet organs, and their close and daily interaction. A number of resolutions of party congresses and Central Committee documents stipulated that, while retaining the overall management and direction of all policy of the Soviet state, the party must clearly separate between its current work and the work of the soviet organs. "Such a systematic demarcation must insure, on the one hand, the more systematic discussion and solution of economic problems by soviet organs, and at the same time upgrade the responsibility of every member of the soviets for his assignments; on the other, it should give the party the possibility to focus to the necessary extent on the basic party work of providing a general guidance to the work of all state organs related to the education and organization of the working masses" ("KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh . . ." vol 2, p 315).

The elimination of the exploiting classes and the victory of socialism in the mid-1930's in our country made it possible for the communist party to raise the question of drafting a new constitution which would reflect more fully the socioeconomic structures of society and the further democratization of the structure of soviet representative organs by replacing the not entirely equal elections with equal elections, indirect with direct elections, and open with secret elections. The adoption and enactment of the 1936 USSR Constitution insured the further development of socialist democracy, the intensified control of the masses over the soviet organs, and the increased responsibility of the soviet organs toward the masses (ibid, vol 5, pp 286-287).

One of the main problems of the 1936 Constitution was the determination of the class nature and place of the soviets in the socialist state and of the principles governing their organization and activities. The new name of the representative organs--soviets of deputies of the working people--reflected the profound social changes which had taken place in our society in connection with the elimination of the exploiting classes, the broadening of the social base of the dictatorship of the working class, and the strengthening of its foundations.

The structure of the representative organs was subjected to substantial changes. The system of soviet congresses was replaced by direct popular elections of supreme and local soviets. Instead of the two-chamber USSR Central Executive Committee, a new supreme power organ was set up--the two-chamber USSR Supreme Soviet, which focused its activities mainly in the field of legislation. The Central Executive Committee Presidium was replaced by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, whose range of competence was characterized, above all, by its right as a "collegial president" and right to interpret the laws. Defining the obligations of the local soviets the 1936 Constitution drew their attention above all on resolving problems of a local nature.

Let us note that from the very first steps of the implementation of the stipulations of the 1936 Constitution the practice of socialist construction began to introduce ever more tangible amendments to their application. The USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of the republics are acting ever more energetically, not only as legislative organs, but as organs resolving a number of management problems. The control activities of the supreme soviets are developing. The supreme soviets and their permanent commissions are intensifying their control over the executive organs. The role of the supreme soviet presidiums is steadily growing in the implementation of the functions of the supreme power organs. They participate daily in the formulation of laws, organizing the work of the supreme soviets, and directing the activities of the local power organs.

The local soviets are becoming ever more initiative-minded participants in formulating the decisions of superior soviet organs, and in implementing these decisions. They are coordinating and controlling ever more energetically on their own territory the activities of organizations under different departmental jurisdictions.

In this manner, the live nature of the soviets as meetings of representatives of the working people, combining the right to legislation, management, and control, as links within the single system of representative power organs, predetermined the need for a number of legislative amendments and supplements.

The decisions of the communist party, aimed at expanding the initiative of republic and local representative organs, and steadily implementing the Leninist norms and principles governing the work of soviets, and the

strengthening of socialist legality were of the greatest importance in supporting said trends in the development of the soviets and of the legislation related to them.

The party program, the documents of the 23d, 24th, and 25th CPSU congresses and a number of Central Committee decrees have emphasized the need to develop all realms of soviet economic, sociocultural, and organizational work, and indicated means for surmounting shortcomings, improving relations between soviet organs and the masses and their public organizations. The decisions of party congresses and of the CPSU Central Committee became the base for the adoption of stipulations governing the permanent commissions of the supreme soviets, and of legislative acts governing rural, settlement, rayon and city soviets, and the law on the status of deputies. Each of these documents reflected the general line of upgrading the role of the soviets as representative power organs engaged in the state management of society at all levels and insuring the active implementation of communist party policy.

This direction in the development of the soviets is particularly clearly manifested under mature socialist conditions. It is natural that it became the pivotal line chosen by the communist party in drafting the 1977 USSR Constitution. The nature of the soviets and the Leninist principle governing their activities have found their most comprehensive and clear manifestation in this constitution.

## II

The new union constitution, as stipulated in the CC CPSU decree "On the 110th Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth," is an outstanding document of creative Marxism-Leninism and of the development and specific manifestation of the Leninist ideas of democracy. The draft of the constitution was formulated under the guidance of the communist party with the active and direct participation of millions of Soviet people. The collection reflects all the stages in the formulation of this draft. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted, the work on the draft of the constitution was conducted thoroughly, with no haste, in order to weigh as accurately as possible each arising problem. The draft was discussed on several occasions by the CC CPSU Secretariat and at a meeting of the Central Committee Politburo. Amendments and supplements were introduced. With every passing month it improved. The nationwide discussion, which involved over four-fifths of the entire adult population of the country, and the comprehensive approval of the constitution were a real triumph of the party's policy in the field of state construction.

The codification in the constitution of the leading role of the communist party as the nucleus of all state and public organizations in the country was of essential significance to the further improvement of soviet activities and of the entire political organization of the Soviet society. It was precisely the party's leadership, as confirmed by the entire historical

experience of the soviets, that is the most important guarantee for their fruitful work and for the strengthening and multiplication of their ties with the people's masses.

The 1977 USSR Constitution legislatively summed up the growth of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the state of the whole people. Whereas the first Soviet constitution proclaimed the establishment of the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry, as represented by the soviet power centrally and locally, and whereas the 1936 USSR Constitution codified the stipulation that all power in the USSR belongs to the working people of town and country, article 2 of 1977 USSR Constitution states: "All power in the USSR belongs to the people." This article establishes the systematic expansion of the social base of the socialist state, which has found its reflection in the new name of the representative organs of state power in the period of developed socialism--the soviets of people's deputies.

Therefore, the historical mission of the soviets--encompassing the worker and peasant masses and all working people, the entire nation--obtained its legislative development and codification. The objective path in the development of people's representative organs in our country was from soviets of workers, and soldiers and peasants deputies, to soviets of deputies of the working people, and from them to soviets of peoples deputies.

The new constitution is systematically implementing the principle of the supremacy of the soviets as the single and exclusive organs of state power. Codifying the full power of the soviets, it stipulates that all other state organs are controllable by and accountable to the soviets of peoples deputies.

The 1977 USSR Constitution made a substantial step forward in resolving a major political problem: unity of the soviet system. It directly stipulates that the soviets of peoples deputies--the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of union republics, supreme soviets of autonomous republics, kray and oblast soviets of peoples deputies, soviets of peoples deputies of autonomous republics and autonomous okrugs, and rayon, city, city-rayon, settlement and village soviets of peoples deputies--are a single system of state power organs. Interpreting the content of this constitutional formula in his address at the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 17 June 1977, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that, "The communist party has always proceeded from the fact that each of our soviets is a particle of the supreme power, and that it not only has the right to resolve all problems within its competence, but is the promoter of state decisions. This, comrades, is an exceptionally important principle. This unity between the high and the local organs, and the reliance of the supreme power on local initiative reflects the main essence of the soviets --their inseparable ties with the people's masses."

The 1977 USSR Constitution formulates with extreme clarity the Leninist principle of combining within soviet work decision making and practical

implementation. It is precisely on the basis of this principle that the soviets of peoples deputies guide directly and through their organs all sectors of state, economic, and sociocultural construction, and all realms of life of society. Consequently, now the constitutional norms include the most important stipulation contained in the first Soviet constitutions and tested in the entire course of the development of the higher and local organs of the soviet system.

Adopting and developing the practice of the Leninist constitutions, the new union constitution and the constitutions of the republics define the supreme soviets as the supreme organs of state power, entitled to resolve all problems within the jurisdiction of the USSR or of the respective republic. At the same time, the constitution codifies a range of problems which could be resolved by the supreme soviets only--ratification of the plan and of the budget and of the accounts on their implementation, election of a supreme soviet presidium and permanent commissions, setting up councils of ministers and peoples control committees, and other organs. The USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics control the work of all their subordinate organs and direct the activities of the entire system soviets of peoples deputies.

A separate chapter in the union constitution deals with the local organs of state power and management. The functions of the local soviets, particularly in areas such participation in the discussion of problems of national importance, insuring comprehensive economic and social development on their respective territories, and coordination and control of activities of organizations under superior jurisdiction, and management of lower units of soviets of peoples deputies, are elaborated far more extensively compared with the previous constitutional legislation.

Thus on the initiative of the communist party the 1977 USSR Constitution resolves far more completely and clearly, compared with the 1936 Constitution, problems related to insuring full power to the soviets. At the same time the initial Leninist principles governing the activities of soviet representative organs and their deputies are being implemented far more consistently.

Today this is confirmed not only by more-or-less objective foreign students of the new Soviet Constitution. The intensified role of the soviets as insured in the 1977 Constitution cannot be denied even by inveterate anti-Soviets such as West German "sovietologists" B. Meisner and L. Schultz. They are forced to acknowledge in the journal OSTEUROPA-RECHT that the new Soviet Constitution has "broadened the rights of the soviets and strengthened their leading functions far more completely" (OSTEUROPA-RECHT, Nos 1-2, 1978).

### III

A considerable part of the collection deals with the contemporary tasks of soviet representative organs and the prospects for the further improvement of their work.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, the enactment of the 1977 USSR Constitution presume that the work of all power and management organs will be raised to a qualitatively new level. Here again it is a question above all of an even more effective exercise of the broad rights given today to the soviets of peoples deputies.

This course in improving the work of the soviets at all levels is determined by a number of objective factors inherent in mature socialism.

Above all such a factor is the tremendous growth of the socialist economy, which calls for systematically improving economic management on the basis of further production intensification, concentration and specialization. This course is related to the increased trend toward centralizing production management along the line of ministries, departments and their local organs, and the creation of specialized production associations whose activities frequently exceed the framework not only of specific administrative-territorial units, but of entire republics.

However, the stronger this sectorial centralization of management becomes, the more important, as the 25th CPSU Congress stipulated, becomes the proper combination of the sectorial principle of management with the system of efficient relations within economic and administrative rayons. The implementation of this task involves painstaking work on insuring a comprehensive approach to the solution of national economic problems and the coordination of efforts of a number of sectorial organizations, i.e., work which is being carried out, centrally and locally, by the soviets and their executive organs.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev raised this thought again in his 2 March 1979 speech. "We know," he pointed out, "that in recent years a great deal has been done to insure production specialization and concentration, and to strengthen the sectorial principles of management. However, this must make even more active the work of the supreme and local soviets and of their executive organs in insuring the comprehensive economic and social development on their respective territories. The sensible combination of sectorial with territorial principles alone could insure effective economic management."

Upgrading the competence, effectiveness and discipline of officials at all levels is a basic aspect in improving production management under contemporary conditions. As a result of the interconnection within, and tremendous scale of our economic mechanism, any omission, or lack of discipline turn out today to be far more costly than in the past. Hence, as was emphasized at the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, the task of intensifying and increasing control over officials and management organs. The soviets of peoples deputies have the richest possible arsenal of means to accomplish this.

It was precisely this arsenal of possibilities of the soviets that was discussed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at his meeting with the voters of

Moscow's Baumanskiy Electoral District. He reminded them, above all, of the great importance which Vladimir Il'ich Lenin ascribed to the economic activities of the soviets. A survey of the work of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee has been preserved in his personal library in the Kremlin. Lenin emphasized the figures according to which in three-and-a-half months in 1920 the executive committee discussed 67 problems of which 8 were economic and 46 organizational, noting on the margin "abnormal"; "the opposite should have been the case." Beside the graph added to the survey, indicating the ratio among organizational (9), political (8), and economic (3) problems considered by the plenary meetings of the Moscow City Soviet, Lenin drew his own graph saying "this is what should have been." The shortest column was that of organizational problems; the slightly bigger column was for political problems, and the column on economic problems was five times the size (see "Biblioteka V. I. Lenina v Kremle. Katalog" [V. I. Lenin's Library in the Kremlin. Catalogue], Moscow, 1961, pp 375, 377).

Referring to this fact, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "The new constitution broadened the rights of the soviets in the field of economics. They must learn how to use these rights, the more so since economic construction includes problems which no one can resolve better than the soviets."

It is entirely natural, therefore, that passing the decree "On Improving Further the Economic Mechanism and the Tasks of Party and State Organs," the CPSU Central Committee deemed it necessary to formulate suggestions on upgrading the role of the soviets of peoples deputies in economic construction. The economic work of the soviets has been, and remains, the central, the leading sector of its activities.

The second most important factor which calls for systematically upgrading the role of the soviets of peoples deputies is the fact that at the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution production intensification is becoming ever more dependent on the level of satisfaction of the material and spiritual requirements of the working people. The improvement and perfecting of the various aspects of population services becomes an important lever in the development of the production process itself and in upgrading labor productivity.

In the past the thesis was popular that under socialism the number of people engaged in material production must steadily increase and that the number of people employed in the non-production sphere must decline. However, the development of the economy itself has called for the comprehensive development of this area and for increasing to the necessary level the number of people employed in it. Whereas in 1940 88.3% of the employed population was in material production, compared with 11.7% in the non-material sectors, the 1978 ratio was 74.4 and 25.6% respectively.

The importance of the role of the soviets of peoples deputies in all fields of population services is confirmed by the example of consumer services,

which are almost entirely under their jurisdiction. Between 1965 and 1978 alone the number of consumer services enterprises rose from 192,900 to 265,700.

The Soviet state is appropriating huge funds for the development of the housing and communal economy and the expansion of networks of schools, hospitals, polyclinics, and trade and public catering enterprises. Most of these organizations are under the jurisdiction of the local soviets and under their control.

Finally, one of the leading factors requiring the adamant improvement of the work of the soviets is the need for systematic broadening of socialist democracy and the inclusion of an ever-larger number of people in the administration of governmental affairs. This is dictated by the economic and social nature of socialism itself. The public nature of socialist ownership, production and distribution under socialism inevitably call for a public, a collective nature of management of governmental affairs. As Lenin predicted, socialist democracy is influencing the economy, while at the same time it is itself subjected to the influence of economic progress (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 33, p 79).

In this respect the soviets possess inexhaustible possibilities. The over 2.2 million deputies and over 30-million-strong aktiv of the soviets, the closest possible relations between deputies and labor collectives and the population at home, the democratic methods for holding soviet sessions and meetings of executive committees and permanent commissions, and the collective and public nature of the solution of problems make it possible to draw effectively and steadily the broadest possible popular strata in the exercise of governmental power.

"Let there be more publicity," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said. "More attention to the needs and views of the people. More direct and interested contacts with the masses. That is how the party formulates the question. Such should be the work style of all soviets of peoples deputies, ranging from the Supreme Soviet to the rural and settlement soviets. . . . Our soviets, Soviet democracy, has a tremendous vital power. It must be used even more completely to bring to light existing reserves, criticize shortcomings, compare views and formulate substantiated decisions."

The importance which this has to the upbringing of the Soviet person--the toiler and the master of his country--is clear. It is precisely in this aspect that the activities of soviet representative organs are considered in the 29 May 1979 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree, "On the Tasks of Soviets of Peoples Deputies Stemming from the CC CPSU Decree 'On Improving Further Ideological and Political-Educational Work.'" This document particularly emphasizes the need to improve the practice of preparations for and holding of soviet sessions and meetings of executive committees and permanent commissions, making fuller use of their possibility for the development of criticism and self-criticism, adamantly uprooting instances



of formalism, and of concealing shortcomings and difficulties, extensively informing the population on problems considered by the soviets and their organs, and systematically practicing the method of submission of reports by leading workers to executive committees, deputies, and chairmen of permanent commissions to the population on soviet activities. "In all their political-educational and cultural-mass work," the decree stipulates, "the soviets of peoples deputies must proceed from the Leninist instruction that the socialist state is strong through the consciousness of the masses, and that Soviet democracy is a tried means for the further intensification of an active life stance and the participation of every citizen in the affairs of his state, the development of the economy and culture, and the building of communism."

The two years which have passed since the enactment of the USSR Constitution have convincingly proved that its implementation has provided a new impetus in improving the work of all stages, if one may say so, of the system of our representative organs.

Plans for legislative work earmarked by the USSR Supreme Soviet are being adamantly implemented. Important legal acts have already been passed, such as the Supreme Soviet Regulation on the Laws Governing Elections, the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Prosecutor General's Office, State Arbitration, the Bar, Citizenship, and Procedure for Conclusion, Implementation, and Denunciation of International Treaties. At the same time, the USSR Supreme Soviet is directing ever more actively the country's economic and sociocultural life, considering annual and five-year plans and reports on their implementation, problems of the condition of the development of one or another economic and cultural sector, and summing up the experience of the soviets. Every day supreme control is exercised over the work of the administrative organs. Suffice it to say that in the past two years alone the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has heard three reports submitted by the government and reports by the Supreme Court, prosecutor general, and a number of ministries and departments. It displayed initiative in participating in the drafting of these questions by the 32 permanent commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers. The Law on Peoples Control in the USSR, enacted on 30 November 1979, will be a major instrument in the implementation of the control functions of the Supreme Soviet and soviets in the country. This law guarantees extensive rights to the peoples control organs centrally and locally, and to the over nine-million-strong army of peoples controllers in the struggle for the implementation of state plans, strengthening the discipline and law and order, and opposing all actions harming the interests of the Soviet society.

In recent decades the activities of the supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics, their presidiums, permanent commissions, and deputies have also become more extensive and varied. It would be difficult to find a problem related to the economy, culture, or services to the working people not considered today by the soviets.

Thus the present development of the functions and forms of work of the supreme soviets proves that the supreme governmental leadership they provide covers all key problems of social life and makes it possible for the peoples representatives to effectively guide the work of the entire Soviet state mechanism. Implemented in accordance with the USSR Constitution, the activities of the supreme soviets do not follow the obsolete forms of parliamentarianism, but the direction dictated by the laws governing the development of the soviets as representative organs of the state power of the working people--workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, and the entire Soviet people. They were, and remain, the new, the Soviet type of representative institutions exercising functions of state management never known to bourgeois parliamentarianism.

Under mature socialist conditions the functions of the soviets become considerably richer in content and fuller. A very brief description of the directions of the development of such functions reduces them to the following:

First of all, a situation develops in which the local soviets bear full responsibility for the economy under their direct jurisdiction. To this effect the rights of the soviets to resolve problems of a local nature and to handle their own budget funds have been broadened. The housing-communal economy and a number of other organizations servicing primarily the population living on the territory of the corresponding soviet is concentrated in its hands.

Secondly, the influence of the local soviets on organizations under superior administration, located on their territory, is greatly intensified. Taking this into consideration, the local power organs are given additional rights related to territorial planning, coordination and control of activities of non-subordinate enterprises and organizations, covering all realms of population services.

Thirdly, the democratic forms of work of the local soviets and of their deputies are developing steadily. The new text of the Law on the Status of Peoples Deputies, rewritten and ratified two years ago, and the legislative acts on rural, settlement, rayon and city soviets greatly contributed to this. Work is being done on draft bills dealing with the rights of kray, oblast and okrug soviets, on voters instructions, and a number of other legislative documents.

All these processes of improving the work of the soviets in the mature socialist period are, more than at any other time, directly related to the level of the party's leadership of the representative organs. This is linked above all with the complexity of phenomena characterizing the development of society at the present stage. The mature socialism becomes, the more urgent becomes the need for a Marxist-Leninist scientific analysis by the party of all-round social relations, and its elaboration of the main directions governing activities throughout the country's political system.

Under such circumstances the soviets can actively express the will and interests of the peoples masses and insure their implementation only by adamantly pursuing the line of the communist party and operating under its guidance.

At the same time the party's guidance of the soviets does not mean the administrative subordination of the soviets to the corresponding party organs, central or local. The party guidance of the soviet representative organs is political. Its task is above all to formulate an accurate policy based on the thorough study of the economic, sociopolitical, and ideological processes of social life. The CPSU implements its guiding role not through its power, but relying on its tremendous prestige and ideological influence among the masses. The Leninist party is exercising its leadership within the framework of the constitution through the party groups in the soviets and through the primary party organizations in soviet establishments. This means that each representative organ and every party member working in the soviet acts strictly in accordance with the constitution and the other Soviet laws, promoting the most effective exercise of the rights of the corresponding power organs.

This principle has been repeatedly emphasized in the decisions of CPSU congresses and decrees of its Central Committee. Thus the CC CPSU decree, "On Measures for Improving Further the Work of Rayon and City Soviet Deputies of the Working People," stipulates that the party organs must be comprehensively concerned with upgrading the role and prestige of the soviets, and support and develop their independence and initiative, so that soviets may bear full responsibility for the solution of problems within their competence (see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh . . ." vol 10, pp 331-336).

It is natural that such a principled approach to the party leadership of the soviets demands a most clear demarcation of functions between party and soviet organs. At the USSR Supreme Soviet session which adopted the 1977 USSR Constitution, on behalf of the Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev reasserted the invariability of this principle. The party has always proceeded from the fact that mixing the functions of party organs with those of the soviets, on the one hand, triggers irresponsibility and lowers the activeness of the soviet organs, and, on the other, lowers the combat capability of the party organizations themselves. Party organs which assume the solution of current administrative problems drastically limit their possibilities to formulate basic political decisions, train cadres, and strengthen ties with the masses.

For this reason the efforts of the communist party to upgrade the role of the soviets and to perfect all aspects of their work, and the successful demarcation of functions between party and soviet organs are manifestations of the profound understanding of the sociohistorical laws governing the development of democracy under socialism and the characteristics of the Soviet form of democracy.

Guiding the soviet representative organs, the party is the main initiator for improving all forms of exercise of democracy by our people. Its concern for the further growth of the prestige, activeness, and initiative of the soviets is the embodiment of the Leninist ideas and yet another proof that the communist party considers serving the interests of the people and implementing their will their main purpose.

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## LENIN AND THE KOLKHOZES

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[Article by A. Chmyga, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Half a century has passed since the beginning of the mass kolkhoz movement which ended in the victory of the kolkhoz system in our country. This noteworthy anniversary coincides with the 60th anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's speech delivered at the First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Cooperatives, in which the experience of the first two years of activity of the collective farms was summed up and the further tasks of collectivization were defined.

Based on the statements of K. Marx and F. Engels, even before the October Revolution, Lenin was the first to formulate the idea of collective land farming. The idea became widespread and had a tremendous impact on the progressive and most conscientious part of the peasantry. In his "April Theses," reports at Bolshevik meetings and at the Petrograd Citywide Party Conference, in his article "The Congress of Peasants Deputies," the pamphlet "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," and in his reports and draft resolution on the agrarian problem, submitted at the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference, Lenin substantiated the objective need for converting to the public cultivation of the land, and the creation of big, model farms from landed estates. "We cannot conceal from the peasants, not to speak of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat in the town, that petty farming, with the retention of a market economy and capitalism, is unable to rescue mankind from the poverty of the masses, and that we must think of converting to large-scale farming on a public basis and undertake it immediately, teaching the masses and learning from the masses the practical expedient measures for such a transition" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 31, p 272).

Lenin's speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies, delivered on 22 May 1917, played a major role in popularizing the idea of collective farming. It expresses the nature of the agrarian program of the Bolshevik party and convincingly proves that giving land to the poor peasants, lacking productive capital, would be insufficient to save them

from poverty, for farming requires cattle and tools as well. "That is why we say that farming individual plots, even though this may be 'free labor on free land' is not a solution to the terrible crisis and general dislocation. It is no salvation." We must "convert to joint farming" (V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 32, p 188). A draft resolution on the agrarian problem, written by Lenin, was distributed to the congress delegates. It emphasized, yet once again, the thought of the need for collective land farming.

In the very first weeks following the October Revolution, when the Decree on Land began to be implemented, the first collective farms began to appear in various parts of the Soviet state. By the end of 1917 they numbered several 10's. One year later over 1,500 communes and cooperatives engaged in the joint cultivation of the land (tozes) were already in existence.

These methods were not imposed upon the peasants from above. They were developed by the peasants in the course of the process of the revolutionary breakdown of economic relations in the countryside. They were the result of their own creativity in the search for means for a better life. The differences among the forms of the first collective farms consisted, above all, of the different levels of socialization of productive capital. In the communes, for example, all productive capital became socialized. Here the peasants lacked even their own private plots. In the cooperatives the basic productive capital and the land alone were socialized, while the cooperative members retained their private plots, which included their house and yard and additional buildings for their cattle and poultry. In the tozes, as a rule, the peasants joined in the collective farming of the land, but only an insignificant amount the productive capital had been socialized.

The appearance of several forms of collective farms was explained by the heterogeneous social structure of the countryside, which, precisely, determined the various social composition of communes, cooperatives, and tozes. The poorest and most progressive parts of the peasantry--the veterans of the revolution and civil war, and the rural activists--essentially promoted the communes. The middle farmers preferred simpler forms--cooperatives and tozes. Thus in 1925 the poor accounted for 85.7% of the communes, 73.6% in the cooperatives, and 50.2% in the tozes; the middle peasantry accounted, respectively, for 12.8, 25.2, and 48.7%.

Lenin paid great attention to the creativity of the people's masses. He saw in the forms of collective farming developed from below a factual means for a conversion to socialism in farming. Addressing a conference of delegates of the committees of the poor, on 8 November 1918, he said: "The communes, cooperative farming and peasant's associations will rescue us from the disadvantages of petty farming. This is the means for upgrading and improving farming, saving our forces and fighting the kulaks, parasites and exploiters" (ibid, vol 37, pp 179-180).

Under the conditions of the civil war and foreign intervention many collective farms greatly suffered as a result of the raids mounted by White Guards, interventionists, and kulak gangs. Nevertheless, their number rose steadily. By the end of 1920 the country already had 10,500 kolkhozes.

State support for the kolkhoz system in the countryside was being strengthened through Soviet agrarian legislation. The law on the socialization of the land, signed by Lenin on 27 January 1918, called upon the local and central organs of the Soviet system to develop collective farming as most advantages in terms of economizing on labor and products, compared with private farms, with a view to conversion to socialist farming. In accordance with the law the Soviet Republic was to provide all possible help to the joint cultivation of the land. Collective farms were given priority compared with private farms in allocation of land, tools, and other productive capital, and in material and cultural aid. To this effect a special fund was set up by Sovnarkom decree, dated 2 November 1918.

The eighth party congress approved the law of socialist reorganization of the land and the transitional measures for socialist farming, whose elaboration took place under Lenin's guidance and direct participation. This document, of programmatic significance, defined the ways and specific means for the gradual socialist reorganization of agriculture. The state granted benefits and advantages to collective farms, which in turn assumed the obligation to provide comprehensive assistance to peasant neighbors to improve their farms. At the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, when the question of awarding bonuses to farms which had acquired the best production successes was discussed, on Lenin's motion collective farms were given priority to private farms. The congress made it incumbent upon the crop committees and land departments "to take measures to enhance state and collective farms and make them strongholds providing comprehensive aid to farming."

During the NEP period, the Soviet state comprehensively contributed to the successful development of the kolkhozes with loans, seed, and agricultural machinery. The 17 November 1921 Sovnarkom and All-Russian Central Executive Committee decree, signed by Lenin and Kalinin, gave them the right to keep surplus goods left after the payment of state taxes. This was an incentive for expanding areas in crops and raising output.

Lenin ascribed great importance to the dissemination of the ideas of a conversion to public farming. ". . . Without explaining the advantages of cooperative farming and without repeating this idea thousands and thousands times," he emphasized, "we cannot hope that the broad peasant masses will develop an interest and undertake a practical testing of the means for its implementation" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 39, p 374). In his speeches at congresses, conferences, and meetings, Vladimir Il'ich repeatedly considered the tasks of the socialist reorganization of agriculture and the consolidation of small peasant farms into big collective farms.

This reorganization, according to Lenin, was not reduced merely to merging small peasant farms into big collective farms. He formulated a broader problem: along with the reorganization of petty commodity production into socialist production on a national scale, the task of its technical reconstruction had to be resolved, the reorganization of farming "on a modern technical basis, resting on contemporary science, technology and electric power" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 41, p 307). This idea of combining the socialist reorganization of agriculture with its technical reconstruction was adamantly promoted in a number of Lenin's writings.

Industrialization was assigned the main role in Lenin's plan for the building of socialism. The development of a large-scale machine-building industry was to become the base for the reorganization of agriculture as well. Great attention was paid to rural electrification. For example, in his draft pamphlet "On the Food Tax," Vladimir Il'ich wrote: "Ways for a transition to socialist farming:

"The small peasant:

"The kolkhozes:

"Electrification" (ibid, vol 43, p 380).

In his work "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautskiy," Lenin described the role of the proletarian state as it actively promoted the conversion of the peasants from private farms to public farming. He proved the significance of agrarian legislation aimed at giving comprehensive support to collective farming.

Lenin frequently emphasized the difficulty of resolving the problem of the socialist reorganization of agriculture. At that time petty peasant production predominated in the country's economy, and its conversion to socialist tracts meant a most profound revolutionary change in the life of tens of millions of people--a considerable majority of the population. He saw as obstacles to this, above all, the conservatism of the views of the private farmer, the strength of his attachment to the past, and his private ownership mentality: "We were well aware of the fact that the peasants live as though rooted in the soil: peasants fear innovation; they are stubbornly holding to the old ways" (ibid, vol 37, p 180).

Attachment to the old and a negative attitude on the part of the private farmers toward any kind of innovation were explained by their socioeconomic living conditions. For centuries they had worked alone, engaged in petty farming, unaware of any large-scale farming other than that of the estate. Yet estate farming represented to them the focal point of all evil, oppression, and misfortune. It was precisely for this reason that the peasants had developed a firm rejection of any big farm. This prejudice neither disappeared nor could disappear immediately after the October Revolution. At the eighth party congress Lenin said that, "The peasant thinks that if



the farm is big, that means that I am, once again, a farmhand. Naturally, this is erroneous. However, the peasant links with his concept of a big farm a hatred, a recollection of the way the landowners oppressed the people. This feeling endures, it has not disappeared as yet" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 38, p 200). That is why Lenin constantly reminded that one should not rely on a fast solution of the problem of the socialist reorganization of small peasant farms, for the "age-old custom of separate farms cannot disappear immediately" (ibid, vol 32, p 186). The social mentality of the peasant could not be changed in one fell swoop, but would require long years and tireless work.

Yet Lenin also noted a positive aspect of the social mentality of the peasant, such as his practicalism and his realistic approach to phenomena in social life. "The peasants are sober and businesslike people," said he, "people living a practical life. Matters must be explained to them practically, through simple practical examples" (ibid, vol 38, p 373).

The theme was clearly apparently in Lenin's speech at the First Congress of Agricultural Communes and Agricultural Cooperatives, on 4 December 1919, which was of a summing-up, a programmatic nature: "We perfectly realize that it is possible to influence the millions of petty peasant farms only gradually, cautiously, through successful practical examples, for the peasants are quite practical people . . ." (ibid, vol 39, p 373).

Lenin assumed that factual results of a transition to socialist farming on a national scale would be possible only when it could be proved to the peasants through practical and understandable examples that such a transition is both necessary and possible. He highly rated the importance of communes, cooperatives, and associations whose example would prove to the peasant the possibility for and usefulness of a conversion to collective farming. In this connection Lenin raised the important question of the relationship between kolkhozes and their peasant neighbors, and of their influence on the peasants. Their help to the private farmers should be socialist rather than philanthropic. Matters should be carried out in such a way that the peasants would improve their farms. The advantage of kolkhozes would be practically proved, thus contributing to the conversion to a new production method.

At the congress of communes and cooperatives Lenin raised again the question of state aid to collective farms: ". . . We would be neither communists nor supporters of the development of socialist farming unless we provided all kinds of state help to collective agricultural enterprises" (ibid, vol 39, p 376). This help was necessary because an innovation such as collective farms could not develop without state support. Vladimir Il'ich compared kolkhozes with weak offshoots making their way through rocks and needing concerned care. The Soviet system and its local representatives were asked to behave toward collective farms "with particular attention and caution" (ibid, p 373).

At the congress Lenin discussed the task of converting each commune and cooperative into a model enterprise so that it might offer a practical example to the peasants, and "be the nucleus which could strengthen among the peasants the conviction that collective farming, as a transition to socialism, is something useful, not a whim or gibberish" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 39, p 378).

Lenin was more demanding toward the agricultural communes. Incidentally, occasionally the view that Vladimir Il'ich had an adverse attitude toward the communes in general and that he even expressed himself in favor of converting them into cooperatives may be found in some historical writings. This view, however, is unsubstantiated. On the contrary, Lenin constantly reminded of the need to provide all-round support to the communes born of the revolutionary creativity of the masses, emphasizing that they are in first place in the law on the land (see *ibid*, vol 37, p 322). ". . . We encourage the communes," he pointed out. "However, they must be organized in such a way as to earn the trust of the peasant" (*ibid*, vol 38, p 201). In Lenin's view the very name "commune" was of very great importance. ". . . Such an honorable title," he emphasized, "must be earned after long and adamant toil, through proven practical success in truly communist building." "First you must prove your capability. . . 'to work like a revolutionary,' the ability to upgrade labor productivity, organize matters in a model fashion, and then ask to be given the honorary title of commune!" (*ibid*, vol 39, p 26).

Lenin categorically opposed bureaucratic administration in the creation of such farm nuclei and expressed the fear that unskillful haste and pursuit of superficial results could compromise the very title of commune. This fear was triggered by the fact that, occasionally, in some areas, associations of peasants, and even of kulaks, were set up as communes, which in reality did not socialize productive capital, did not create truly collective farms and sometimes used the label of commune for purposes of obtaining various types of loans and benefits from the state. Such pseudo communes could even draw the farmers away from collective farming. Yet Vladimir Il'ich demanded of the real communes which tried to reorganize farming and life in a new way, and promote a socialist system, a model organization of the work and the giving of a practical example to the peasants. "The commune must be such as to become a model and so that the peasants around wish to join it" (*ibid*, vol 39, p 378).

The congress took place under the conditions of the intervention and the civil war. Economic, transportation and agricultural dislocation created exception difficulties for the work of the collective farms. Under such conditions as well, however, Lenin emphasized, communes, cooperatives and associations could improve farming and prove to the peasants around them their ability to farm. Referring to the communist subbotniks, he called upon the congress delegates to follow the example of the urban workers and expressed the confidence that this would help to strengthen communes, cooperatives and associations, and would yield practical results in

improving understanding between them and the private farmers, "so that the peasants would not say about members of communes, cooperatives or associations that they are parasites of the state . . ." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 39, p 376).

Lenin considered the strictest possible observance of the principle of voluntary participation one of the most important conditions for the adoption of the kolkhoz system by the peasants. He indicated the inadmissibility and danger of coercion and tirelessly fought even the most minor violations of this requirement. As head of the government he took decisive measures to prevent them. This idea goes through many of his speeches and documents. Lenin discussed in particular this matter at the congress of communes and cooperatives, calling upon the delegates definitely to work for the elimination of the views still existing among the peasants that kolkhozes are joined on the basis of coercion.

Headed by the communist party, the Soviet peasants followed the unknown path leading from private farming to a socialist kolkhoz system. There was no prototype, there was no example in the world to be used in developing the new production system and build the new life. Personal example alone could answer the vital problems arising the course of this construction and be a criterion of the correctness of the charted course. That is why Lenin ascribed great importance to the study and summation of the practical experience in the building of socialism in agriculture. He expressed the hope that the congress delegates would exchange views and formulate practical measures to strengthen communes, cooperatives and associations and intensify their relations with peasants around them.

Lenin's speech to the First Congress of Communes and Cooperatives summed up the results and initial experience of the creation and activities of collective farms, describing their successes and shortcomings, and defining the tasks of the Soviet authorities and of the kolkhozes in the socialist reorganization of agriculture.

Lenin's analysis of the first steps in the building of kolkhozes became the base of the scientific elaboration of the theory of the socialist reorganization of agriculture. Vladimir Il'ich discovered and substantiated the general laws and objective need and historical inevitability of such a reorganization through the consolidation of small peasant farms into big collective farms and in the formation of state agricultural enterprises (sovkhozes). He earmarked ways for the creation of economic, social, political and psychological prerequisites for agricultural collectivization and defined the ways, means and principles of collectivization.

Lenin's system of views on the problem of the socialist reorganization of agriculture and the creation of the most important prerequisites for its implementation is, precisely, Lenin's cooperative plan.

Lenin's article "On the Cooperative" is of outstanding significance. It discusses the most important theoretical and practical problems of the

building of socialism, including the joining of the peasants and their "conversion to a new order through the simplest, easiest and most accessible way for the peasant" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 45, p 370). The article sums up the entire experience in the building of cooperatives under the Soviet system, realistically taking into consideration the situation of the country and the peasantry under the conditions of the new economic policy and of the transitional period. The ideas it contains became a structural component of Lenin's cooperative plan.

Discussing the significance of the complete cooperativization of the entire population in the building of socialism, Lenin pointed out that, "This in itself does not mean the building of a socialist society. However, it contains everything necessary and sufficient for such a construction" (ibid, p 370). Thus defined, the cooperative becomes one of the most important prerequisites for the building of socialism. According to Lenin, socialism in agriculture requires more than the mass cooperativization of the peasants. It requires the further conversion of the cooperated small peasants into big collective farms: "The transition from a cooperation of small farmers to socialism means the transition from petty to large-scale production" (ibid, vol 43, p 226).

Lenin considered the cooperative and the mass cooperativization of the peasantry one of the important conditions anticipating collectivization, making for the peasant a transition to the new system simpler and more accessible. Mass cooperativization of the peasantry in itself did not resolve the problems of the socialist reorganization of agriculture, for the cooperative which preserved the private ownership of productive capital did not affect the foundations of private farming. The fact that the private farmer entered a cooperative did not change the social nature of the peasant farm, which preserved its small scale. It was only the joining of collective farms by peasants that would bring about radical social and economic changes and the appearance of the new socialist class of kolkhoz peasantry, as well as the organization of the new, the socialist type of farming in which there would be no private ownership of productive capital.

It is no accident, therefore, that Lenin's works clearly distinguish among the concepts of "cooperativization," "collectivization," "cooperative" and "kolkhoz." Naturally, the kolkhoz is a cooperative enterprise. However, the concept of a "cooperative" is considerably broader than that of "kolkhoz," which means strictly an agricultural collective enterprise. The kolkhoz and the kolkhoz movement are entirely new historical categories. Unlike the cooperatives which appeared in Russia in the 19th century, they became possible only as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The term "kolkhoz" (collective farm) was the result of the creativity of the people's masses in the building of socialism. It is an entirely definite concept which cannot be confused with any other type of cooperative. It became part of state and party documents and assumed an international meaning. The concept of "kolkhoz" expresses both the social and the economic nature of the new historical phenomenon. The

concept of "kolkhoz system" is just as distinct a category. The substitution of the term "kolkhoz" and "kolkhoz movement" with the term "cooperative" or with "cooperative movement," as is done by some authors, is erroneous.

The question of the scientific terminology in the description of Lenin's cooperative plan and the socialist reorganization of agriculture is not so simple as it may seem on the surface. The indiscriminate use of the terms not only introduces confusion in the study of such important problems but lowers the significance of its specific forms developed in the course of the building of socialism in agriculture, particularly in the case of kolkhozes, and hinders the understanding of the organic link between Lenin's cooperative plan and collectivization.

The first years of the Soviet system and the period of civil war and military intervention were the most difficult for our people and the communist party. Nevertheless, this was a time of most intensive work on the part of Vladimir Il'ich in the elaboration of the theory and practice of the building of socialism in agriculture, and the search for specific ways and means for its implementation.

As we know, the kolkhozes and sovkhoses--the socialist forms of agricultural farms--were the work of the people's masses precisely at that time, in the process of revolutionary agrarian changes. On Lenin's insistence they were legalized by the Soviet state. It was precisely at that time, on the basis of summing up the practice of kolkhoz and sovkhos construction, that Lenin theoretically resolved in his works the problem of the ways, means and forms of socialist reorganization of agriculture. Lenin's theoretical conclusions codified in the party program were ratified at the Eighth Congress of the RKP(b). The viability of the socialist reorganizations in the countryside was confirmed through practical experience: in the 1930's they were implemented as kolkhozes and sovkhoses, forms still existing to this day.

The proper methodological approach to the study of Lenin's theoretical legacy and the implementation of its role in the appearance and successful development of the kolkhoz movement and the victory of the kolkhoz system in the USSR is particularly important also because foreign historians and economists frequently distort the nature of agricultural reorganizations in our country, interpreting collectivization as the coercion of the peasantry and trying to pit it against Lenin's cooperative plan. They claim that Lenin, calling for cooperativization, said nothing about kolkhozes or collectivization. Thus British researcher A. Nowe writes that, "Turning to the works of K. Marx, and even to Lenin's works, we find no indications whatever concerning the creation of kolkhozes" (SOVIET STUDIES, No 4, 1966, pp 4, 407).

Naturally we do not find the term "kolkhoz" in Marx. However, his works contain most important theoretical stipulations on the need for and

legitimacy of the socialist reorganization of agriculture under the proletarian dictatorship. He assumed that the proletarian state will take measures which will facilitate the conversion of the peasants from private ownership of the land to collective ownership, and that conversion to an agricultural association would be necessary. Marx also formulated the conditions for replacing parceled agriculture into collective labor (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 18, p 612; vol 19, p 407, etc). We find similar statements in Engels as well.

As to Lenin's works, a conscientious consideration of his study would easily reveal that Vladimir Il'ich repeatedly used precisely the word "kolkhoz" (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 43, pp 282, 380, 395). In his draft "STO [Council of Labor and Defense] Mandate" he used the term not only in its abridged form, but in full--"collective farm"--enumerating the specific forms of kolkhozes: communes, cooperatives and associations for the joint cultivation of the land. Lenin used the term "collective farm" for the first time as early as January 1918 (Law on the Socialization of the Land) and subsequently resorted to it frequently (see *ibid*, vol 37, pp 320, 360, 362; vol 38, p 256; vol 43, p 60); he also repeatedly used the term "collectivization."

Concluding his speech at the congress of communes and cooperatives, Vladimir Il'ich said: ". . . I am confident that with your joint and unanimous support we shall see to it that each of the currently existing several thousand communes and cooperatives become a true nursery for communist ideas and concepts among peasants, a practical example proving to them that even though it may still be a small, weak shoot, it is not an artificial, a greenhouse one, but a true shoot of the new socialist system. Only then shall we be able to win a firm victory over the old darkness, ruination, and need. Only then shall we fear no difficulties in our future progress" (*ibid*, vol 39, p 382).

This prediction has come true. Thanks to the wise leadership of the communist party, thousands of communes and cooperatives became model collective farms. Through their own experience and example they convincingly proved to the private farmers the advantages of the socialist reorganization of agriculture. Millions of peasants in our country followed their way, illuminated by Lenin's ideas of collectivization, in the 1930's. Lenin's doctrine of the socialist reorganization of agriculture triumphed. The kolkhoz system won completely, enabling the peasantry to put an end to poverty and ignorance in the countryside.

The kolkhoz forms were not fixed but developed and improved steadily. Each one of them--the commune, cooperative or *toz*--played a major role in agricultural collectivization. The experience of the 1917-1929 kolkhoz movement proved that the cooperative was the most acceptable form, particularly for the middle peasantry. That is why during the period of extensive collectivization this became the basic form of the kolkhoz movement. This was reflected in the decisions of the Second All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Members which passed in 1935 the model bylaws of the cooperative.

However, the cooperative as well, as a form of collective farming, was acceptable only for a specific period of historical development, when the kolkhozes were relatively small, consisting of 70 to 80 farmsteads and several hundred hectares of arable land. Following the consolidation of the kolkhozes in the 1950's their size increased considerably. By 1970 the average collective farm consisted of 435 farmsteads and had over 3,000 hectares of farmland. The modern kolkhozes have exceeded the limits of the cooperative form, which was no longer consistent with their content as being socialist, mechanized agricultural enterprises. The November 1969 Third All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Members adopted the bylaws of the kolkhoz in place of the bylaws of the cooperative.

The history of the development of the kolkhoz system in the USSR confirmed the accuracy of Lenin's important definition: "No form will be final until full communism has been reached" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 37, p 223).

The kolkhoz system, created under the leadership of the communist party in the 1930's, is continuing to strengthen and improve with every passing year. The kolkhozes have become powerful, highly mechanized farms with tens of tractors, combines and trucks each. Power generation capacities in agriculture have increased considerably and the power-labor ratio has risen. Kolkhoz yields have more than doubled. At the present stage of development of the kolkhoz system, under the conditions of extensive production intensification, as was noted at the July 1978 CC CPSU Plenum, ensuring the all-round development of agriculture and considerably upgrading the effectiveness of all its sectors has become its main task.

The communist party is steadily enriching the theory and practice of development of agriculture and the socioeconomic changes in the Soviet countryside. "Lenin's theory of the agrarian problem and the ideas and principles of his cooperative plan," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "have been, and remain, a tool used by our party. The CPSU is invariably guided by them and is developing them further in accordance with specific historical conditions."

The scientifically substantiated contemporary agrarian policy pursued by the party, based on Lenin's theory, made it possible to formulate a comprehensive program for the further development of agriculture, a program which is being successfully implemented. At the present stage the development of specialization based on interfarm cooperation and agro-industrial integration assumes particular importance. This process, new to the countryside, is a reflection of the creative application of Lenin's doctrine.

The November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum face the rural workers with important tasks in the final year of the five-year plan. The strengthening of the material and technical base in the villages, carried out by the party, must exert an ever more tangible effect on the level of supplying the country with foodstuffs. To this effect we must insure, above all, increased crop yields and upgrade livestock productivity.

Under the leadership of the Leninist party, together with the entire Soviet people, the kolkhoz peasantry is successfully resolving the problems of the present stage of the building of communism.

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## LENIN AS A POLITICAL THINKER AND FIGHTER

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 51-56

[Article by Prof Guy Besse, member, French Communist Party Central Committee]

[Text] In the contemporary world the role of political thinking has become even more important in the history of knowledge and the progress of efficient studies of the various forms of social life. Also increased has been the number of ideologues hostile to this type of study. This applies, above all, to those who describe themselves, in France, by the flattering term of "new philosophers." Their writings against Marxism are generally addressed against any attempt to rationally consider problems raised by the development of society.

The noisy sallies of the "new philosophers" should not conceal the fact that the struggle against the rational interpretation of social processes and political practices is assuming different shapes. Thus, "critical rationalism"--a philosophy which influenced French biologist Jacques Monod--is characterized, in particular, by a rejection of any global interpretation of historical and social processes. Karl Popper, for example, excludes historical materialism from the realm of rationality. In our view, this approach indicates a profound lack of understanding of historical materialism, as well as a narrowed concept of scientific activities themselves. Popper remains the prisoner of an empirical idea of social relations, which he reduces only to relations among individuals without questioning the very concept of "individual." Popper slides across the surface of reality and fails to understand the original nature of Marx' thinking, which penetrates into the depths of phenomena, reaching their very essence. A close tie exists between this ignorance of historical materialism and Popper's extremely narrow understanding of rational thinking and science in general. Whatever the importance of some of the works written by this philosopher may be, we cannot remain indifferent to the fact that under contemporary conditions "critical rationalism" is frequently used for the sake of weakening efforts made to develop a dialectical rationality.

Yet we cannot ignore the dissemination among scientific circles of concepts according to which one cannot simultaneously interpret both variety and unity of knowledge. Should such concepts rest on substantive grounds, we would have been forced to believe that knowledge is inevitably partial and fragmentary, and that the theory of scientific knowledge itself is doomed to disappear.

In capitalist Europe, in France for example, social forces hostile to the profound changes in society and to a real redistribution of power are equally hostile to the development of scientific thinking aimed at clarifying the nature of objective processes and mastering (both theoretically and practically) the dynamics of social relations.

The big bourgeoisie uses for its purposes total managerial, forecasting and other technology. It uses the mass-information media to persuade millions of Frenchmen that, allegedly, they are unable to understand the secrets of economics and politics. Any attempt at a global interpretation of processes of social life is described by it as "totalitarian." The simple citizen, in the view of the bourgeois ideologues, is called upon only to respectfully obey the decisions of "experts," which, naturally, are inaccessible to the minds of simple mortals.

Currently a fierce campaign is being waged against scientific socialism. It is a question not only of weakening the working class, but of all social forces interested in unity of action against the power of monopolies and against the policy formulated by NATO circles, interested in jointly finding a way to national independence and democratic renovation, and a way to socialism in France.

Particularly topical under such circumstances is Lenin's legacy--the legacy of the thinker and fighter and leader of the Great October Revolution.

Lenin was a political thinker of the highest level. He was trained in the school of Marx and Engels, and gave politics a theoretical base represented by the science of socioeconomic systems. This is manifested with graphic clarity, for example, in the reading of works such as "Who Are Those 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?" This work, which to this day retains its initial freshness, proves, in the course of Lenin's polemics with Mikhaylovskiy, that the author of "Das Kapital" did not try to embrace all reality within Hegel's triad, but called for formulating the laws of the socioeconomic system ruled by the capitalist production method. In other words, what Marx accomplished was scientific creativity. Does this mean that, in Lenin's eyes, philosophy had lost all value as an instrument of knowledge? Yes, if we believe that any philosophy is a mystifying speculation. No, if, following Lenin, we believe that dialectical materialism is "philosophical science."

The active presence of the "philosophical science" is found in Lenin's works, not only those especially dealing with major philosophical problems,

gnosiology, or study of "categories," but in other of his works as well. Let us take as an example the work, "The Development of Capitalism in Russia." Lenin based his study of Russia on ideas related to the socio-economic system. It is a question of a scientific concept whose significance some followers of Marx have still not been able to assess properly. However, Marx would have been unable to formulate this scientific concept without creating a philosophical school which would make it possible to interpret the dialectical unity of production forces and production relations and of base and of superstructure, establish the nature of development, cover the global nature of the process, and clarify each of its elements simultaneously. Therefore, historical materialism cannot be considered as a theory indifferent in terms of any philosophy.

It was this new approach that guided Lenin in the writing of many of his works which became landmarks in his life. This approach was also characteristic of Lenin's daily activities as a publicist, organizer of the struggle of the working people, leader of the proletarian revolution, and head of the young Soviet state. To realize this, he would suffice mentally to go back to 1917-1918, to a period of such profound and headlong upheavals and tremendous upsurge of the activity of the people's masses and merciless confrontation between revolution and counterrevolution.

Lenin's mastery is the mastery of the scientist-philosopher and political leader. He had to be both precisely in order to determine the requirements of the moment, the transition from one stage to another, the changed ratio of forces and circumstances in which the class battles were developing, and to determine the interconnection between the revolution in his own country and the evolution of the surrounding international environment. Let us recall Lenin's thoughts of July 1917, when the Bolsheviks were forced to go underground. He asked himself what situation would develop as a result of the new "historical zigzag."

It was precisely thanks to his feeling for the new that Lenin became a master of the political struggle and dialectical thinking. Looking back, one could better understand why Lenin devoted so much time to the study of Hegel's "Science of Logic." It would be absurd to see in Lenin, in the revolutionary period, the features of some kind of left-wing extremist "young-Hegelianism." Lenin considered Hegel the follower of Marx and this fructified his thinking as a revolutionary fighter and his thoughts on development, change and contradictions. The critical reading of Hegel strengthened in Lenin his feeling for the new.

We are familiar with Lenin's uncompromising attitude toward amateurs of "revolutionary phraseology" who are incapable of analyzing reality, and toward those who considered Marxism a kind of combination of abstract principles, dogmatically applied to reality. He explained that it was precisely concrete experience, life practice, that prove the effectiveness of the concepts develop through Marxist thinking. Life introduces changes to one or another conclusion, forcing us to reinterpret theory.

Revolutionary practice imbues theory in the process of its development, in the course of which it changes and refines it.

The fact that Lenin saw in the struggle the breadth of this anti-scholastic free thinking was emphasized by Paul Vaillant-Couturier, one of the founders of the French Communist Party, who said of Lenin that "contact with him created in the mind the impression of a tempest rushing into a stifling room. It refreshed the brain burdened by prejudices and formal doctrines."

As we know, Lenin believed that history in general, and the history of the revolution in particular, was far richer, more varied, and "inventive" than even the best parties and most conscious vanguards of the most experienced classes could conceive. That is what we must not ignore as we study the contemporary world. Had the development of revolutionary processes today been a simple repetition of previous revolutions, there would be no need to rely in the political struggle on the specific study of specific situations, to grab the main "link" which would enable us to move on. In his work "The Next Tasks of the Soviet System" Lenin sharply criticized those who, failing to interpret the new aspect of situations, were unable to modify the forms of the struggle.

He charged the leaders of the new ISKRA for preaching a materialism alien to dialectics.

Politics, he explained in "The 'Left-Wing' Infant Disease in Communism," is more like algebra than arithmetic and is even more like higher mathematics compared to basic mathematics.

Currently the international revolutionary movement is discussing the question of the means for transition to socialism in various countries. Unnecessary emotion should be avoided in such discussions. The problem could be resolved only if the dialectics of the general and the specific, to which Lenin paid prime attention, is properly understood, and if it is also understood that the category of the existing, as understood by Lenin and Marx, did not mean a temporary structure or nominal abstraction. The extant is always concrete. It is both a relation and a process. It represents a relation, necessary and molding, showing a phenomenon and at the same time revealing it. The extant is a profound process which must be brought to light to provide an empirical explanation of processes under study. Therefore, the extant has dynamism, it lives. This dynamism is manifested in the dialectics of the general and the specific. That is why Lenin believed that knowledge is "polyscopic" and that science (what other people may think notwithstanding) should not be separated from the study of the specific. True universality is not an empty form. It is specific. The extant makes its own road precisely through innovational unity of the general with the specific.

In a communist society every individual will express his human universality specifically, in his own way. The historical differentiation among the

ways leading to socialism is a unique manifestation of the general reality of socialism as a form of social relations free from class exploitation.

No single revolutionary force or nation could console itself with the illusion that it can build socialism away from the deep process which leads mankind to a global communist society. We would err by considering the irreplaceable experience of each nation merely as a marginal factor deprived of any essence, as a phenomenon which could be neglected in the clarification of profound processes. Had essence not been essence for everyone it would not have been essence at all.

Lenin left instructions of prime importance dealing with such complex problems. However, it is precisely because the extant lives and precisely because there is a general movement within the specific and a specific movement within the general, that the science of revolution must adopt different approaches in each country where conditions ripen for socialist changes. Today it is we, rather than Marx or Lenin, who must provide answers to the questions of our time.

I would reveal nothing new by saying that after 1917 the world changed radically. Those who currently hold economic and political power in France know that today, in the course of the class struggle, they could lose considerably more than in 1936 or 1944-1945. They realize that today their very rule is threatened and that the question of social change is on the agenda, for French society could emerge from the crisis only by freeing itself from the power of capitalism.

However, this could happen only when the oligarchy of big capital is opposed by a united working class which could rally around itself all forces interested in change, all forces whose original contribution is needed for the common victory.

Particularly valuable in this connection is Lenin's theory of the role of the working class and its ability to become part of the complex system of social relations and form alliances. We also value quite highly Lenin's thoughts on democracy. In the 1930's these thoughts nourished the thinking of Maurice Thorez, helped by Georgi Dimitroff.

Had the main "link" not been defined, and had the question of "democracy or fascism" not been clearly formulated by the communists as a matter of daily struggle, the Popular Front would not have been created.

Yet what do we see today? Political and social forces opposing progressive changes are practicing the rejection of democracy. The policy of the bourgeoisie within NATO is aimed at integrating our country within a supra-national alliance. Could the French people autonomously determine its destinies and take the path of socialism in the kind of Europe in which the weight and influence of the FRG have risen considerably? It is precisely at this point that the extent to which the question of democracy--

political, economic, social and cultural--has become the basic class battlefield becomes clear. It is precisely here that the importance to the future of mankind of a book such as "Two Tactics of the Social Democrats in the Democratic Revolution," written under the influence of the 1905 events, becomes clear. In this work Lenin emphasized that the proletariat alone could systematically fight for democracy. Taking into consideration the events of 1917, he pointed out, in "The State and Revolution," that the creative development of the socialist society can be no other than democracy brought to its completion. This is because we know that democracy means something more than the taking of the Bastille or the Winter Palace. The revolution is a lengthy process.

The utopians believed that society could be reorganized according to an ideal model. Because of this, the idea of socialism was known before it became reality. A scientific approach is an entirely different matter. It means the constant study of reality and the improvement of the most scientific approach. It is precisely through the study of the contradictions of changing reality and within the struggle occurring within this reality for its change that socialism proves its correctness. Lenin emphasized the obligation of the revolutionary party to develop the scientific theory and the significance of the irreplaceable experience of the popular masses.

In contemporary France the ratio of forces may change in favor of the working class only as a result of the daily struggle involving thousands and millions of working people. In this struggle progress is measured by steps, and each success (in the struggle against unemployment, closing down of enterprises, opposing violations of democratic rights, etc) is a battlefield for new successes. It is precisely thus, as G. Marchais emphasized in his report to the 23d FCP Congress, that a popular alliance may be hammered out in the heart of the country, made stronger by the fact that those making it know that this alliance is their own creation.

It would be pertinent in this connection to recall one of the aspects of the struggle which is also measured in steps, the struggle for changing the ratio of forces. In the course of this struggle, in the course of the cold war period in France the plan for the creation of a joint "European army," whose future seemed secure, was defeated as a result of constant and adamant opposition.

In 1913 Lenin wrote that the bourgeois politicians will always be swindling the people and that the people will trick themselves until they learn how to recognize the class interests behind the mantle of words.

This training is the science of the revolution. No single revolutionary party can avoid the study of the problems it is faced with by the future of the class struggle.

The same applies to problems facing today the communists in the developed capitalist countries. Were I to analyze here the meaning of

"Eurocommunism," I would not discuss the use of this term, but would consider the class content which is ascribed to this term by the struggle of the peoples and the revolutionary forces of such countries. The role of the communist party, relying on Lenin's doctrine, is to understand and explain the other opportunities which are offered to the working people and to all nations thanks to the growing role of the socialist countries, the strengthened workers and democratic movements in the capitalist countries, and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement.

The intensified development of such problems would lead us to consider the contribution of Marxism to the very understanding of the science. The opponents of Marxism present it as a conceptual system obeying inflexible laws. Yet it is precisely Marxism that rescued the category of "necessity" from the aftertaste of oppressive determinism.

In his work, "Two Tactics of the Social Democrats in the Democratic Revolution," Lenin proved that contradictory development offers the struggling forces possible alternatives. Human freedom finds its manifestation precisely in the contradictory development of necessity and exercises its influence. History is not blind destiny. It is work and creation. Each revolutionary party must contribute to the conscious participation of millions of individuals in the struggle for turning a society of people into a society for the people.

In a country such as France such participation of the masses is a prerequisite for the strong political alliance of democratic forces. Experience proves that if any communist party is too weak, the social democratic current joins efforts with the bourgeoisie for the sake of the salvation of capitalism. Thus the viability of the communist party is necessary for the alliance of the various components of the democratic movement.

In 1942 the Soviet soldiers dealt a serious defeat to Hitler's Wehrmacht on the Volga, a defeat from which Nazi Germany was unable to recover. All of us know that the building of socialism is a far more difficult task. No single democrat, no single revolutionary, whatever his country, has the right to ignore the problems raised by the contemporary development of socialist democracy as an effective practice under the conditions of the international circumstances which, as yet, are not a guarantee for perpetual peace. Such problems (economic or cultural) can be resolved by the Soviet citizens alone. Any attempt to do this for them would be madness.

The changes in the contemporary world enable us to look at the development of political thinking and struggle from a different angle. Any true scientist acknowledges the comprehensive contribution which Lenin's country is making to such changes.

## THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT AND RAPPROCHEMENT AMONG NATIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 57-70

[Article by Academician P. Fedoseyev]

[Text] The true socialist solution of the national problem in our country--the elimination of all forms of inequality among nations and the establishment of friendship and fraternal cooperation among nations--is of universal-historical significance. The scale and importance of this problem may be determined by the fact alone that today there are about 160 states in the world and over 2,000 nations, nationalities and ethnic groups. According to some linguists people express themselves in over 7,000 different languages. Obviously, this includes dialects. In any case, however, it is entirely clear that the majority, one could even say the overwhelming majority, of nations, nationalities and ethnic groups live in multinational countries. Therefore, by virtue of this fact alone the national problem holds a very important position in social life.

With full justification we are proud of the fact that national relations in the USSR are characterized by the all-round blossoming of each nation, on the one hand, and processes of their natural rapprochement and cooperation and the shaping of a new historical community--the Soviet people--on the other. Thanks to the Leninist national policy of the CPSU all socialist nations were able to achieve tremendous successes in their economic, social and spiritual development, including the area of national cultures and languages. At the same time the fraternal cooperation among socialist nations and nationalities and their joint efforts to develop a single national economic complex within our country and upgrade its scientific and technical potential, and their increased contribution to the treasury of Soviet culture insure the steady upsurge of the power of the single multinational state--the USSR. At the present stage of development of our society the task of the socialist national policy is, above all, to harmoniously to combine international with national interests, and to develop and strengthen the new forms of relations among them, created by life itself.

The historical successes of our country in the solution of the national problem may be justifiably equated with victories in the building of the



new society in the USSR, such as industrialization, collectivization and cultural revolution. Let us emphasize, in this connection, that the solution of the national problem became possible only thanks to the elimination of the private ownership of productive capital and of the exploiting classes, and the establishment of social unity based on the alliance among the working class, the peasantry and the people's intelligentsia.

The working class plays a leading role in the socialist reorganization of the country, the solution of the national problem and the establishment of the sociopolitical unity of society and total equality among all nations. The CPSU, which rallied all Soviet people under the banner of proletarian internationalism, was the ideological inspirer and political leader of the working people. Under the leadership of the CPSU, and with the selfless and comprehensive help of the Russian people, all previously oppressed nations and nationalities in our country surmounted their former backwardness and reached the peaks of contemporary civilization.

The creation of single, multinational state--the USSR--tremendously accelerated the development of the country's national economy and the equalization of the levels of economic development of the national republics and oblasts. "The unification of the Soviet republics within the USSR," stipulates our Fundamental Law, "multiplied the efforts and possibilities of the peoples of the country in the building of socialism."

The fraternal friendship and mutual aid and cooperation among the peoples of the USSR in all fields of social life withstood the test of time and strengthened and tempered in the struggle for the Soviet system, in the constructive toil of the first five-year plans, in the difficult circumstances of the Great Patriotic War, and in the hard times of the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war. Today our reality offers a number of most vivid examples of friendship and cooperation among the peoples of our homeland in the building of communism.

Under developed socialist conditions the national policy of the CPSU is based on the firm theoretical foundation laid in V. I. Lenin's works. He clearly saw the possibility for drawing the nations together under socialism. He spoke of their merger, bearing in mind, above all, their voluntary unification within a single multinational socialist state. Lenin pitted the voluntary unification and rapprochement among nations against annexations, forced assimilation, and coercive annexation of nations by imperialist countries. "The objective of socialism," he wrote, "is not only the elimination of the division of mankind into small countries and separate nations, and not only the rapprochement among the nations, but their merger" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 27, p 256). Lenin emphasized that the total liberation of all oppressed nations and their right to self-determination is a necessary prerequisite for the voluntary and democratic drawing together and merger of the nations.

Substantiating the programmatic stipulation of the party on the national problem, Lenin wrote: "The proletarian party tries to establish the

biggest possible state, for this is to the advantage of the working people. It strives toward the rapprochement and further merger among nations. However, it wishes to achieve this objective not through coercion, but exclusively through the free and fraternal alliance among the toiling and working masses of all nations" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 31, p 167).

Lenin's statements on problems of national-state construction also reveal that by the voluntary merger of nations under socialist conditions he meant not the elimination of national differences, but the closer unity and fraternal alliance among socialist nations. National differences, Lenin pointed out, "will be retained for quite a long time, even after the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a universal scale" (ibid, vol 41, p 77).

Accordingly, the CPSU program stipulates that following the victory of communism in the USSR the rapprochement among nations will become even greater. Their economic and ideological comity will grow, and the common communist features of their spiritual appearance will develop. "However, the elimination of national differences, linguistic in particular, will be a considerably longer process than the elimination of class boundaries."

Lenin's theory of the national problem and national policy were developed and concretized further in the decisions of CPSU congresses and party Central Committee plenums, the legislative acts of the Soviet state, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's addresses, particularly on the occasion of the celebration of outstanding historical dates, such as the victory of the Great October Revolution, the founding of the USSR, and the drafting and adoption of the USSR Constitution. The principles governing the economy and placement of production forces on a national scale, and measures to improve national-state construction, were elaborated and implemented in accordance with the Leninist national policy. The conclusion of basic importance of the appearance of a new historical community--the Soviet people--was comprehensively substantiated. The experience in the development of national cultures and the establishment of a single Soviet culture was theoretically summed up. The Leninist ideas of socialist patriotism and internationalism were developed.

The most important theoretical problems of national relations, the historical experience in resolving the national problem in the USSR and the processes of development and rapprochement among nations under socialist conditions have become subjects of the close attention of the Soviet scientists, including those in the union republics. In recent years the social scientists have displayed considerably greater interest in such problems. Successful theoretical science conferences were held in connection with the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR in Moscow and the capitals of union republics, such Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Baku, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Kiev, Tallin, etc. They considered a number of important aspects of the improvement of national relations under the conditions of a mature socialist society.

Definitive collective works were published on the basis of studies and conference materials. Let us name, among others, major works, such as "Leninizm i Natsional'nyy Vopros v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh" [Leninism and the National Problem Today] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1974); "Natsional'nyye Otnosheniya v SSSR na Sovremennom Etape" [National Relations in the USSR at the Present Stage] (Nauka, Moscow, 1979); "Torzhestvo Leninskikh Idey Proletarskogo Internatsionalizma" [Triumph of the Leninist Ideas of Proletarian Internationalism] (Nauka, Moscow, 1974); "Istoricheskiy Opyt KPSS v Bor'be za Ukrepleniye Mira i Druzhby Mezhdru Narodami" [CPSU Historical Experience in the Struggle for Strengthening the Peace and Friendship among Nations] (Politizdat, Moscow, 1977); "Deyatel'nost Kommunisticheskikh Organizatskiy Zakavkaz'ya po Internatsional'nomu Vospitaniyu Trudyashchikhsya" [Activities of the Communist Organizations of the Transcaucasus for the International Education of the Working People] (Sabchota Sakartvelo, Tbilisi, 1977); "Internatsional'noye i Natsional'noye v Sotsialisticheskoy Obshchestve" [The International and the National in the Socialist Society] (Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1977); "Velikiy Ochyabr' i Natsional'nyy Vopros" [The Great October and the National Problem] (Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Press, Yerevan, 1977); "Sovetskiy Narod i Dialektika Natsional'nogo Razvitiya" [The Soviet People and the Dialectics of National Development] (Elm, Baku, 1972); "Voprosy Natsional'noy Politiki KPSS v Usloviyakh Razvitogo Sotsializma" [Problems of CPSU National Policy under Developed Socialist Conditions] (Kartya Moldovenyaskv, Kishinev, 1977); "Sovetskiy Narod--Stroitel' Kommunizma" [The Soviet People--the Builder of Communism] (Kyrgyzstan, Frunze, 1977); "Mezhnatsional'nyye Svyazi i Vzaimodeystviye Kul'tur Narodov SSSR" [International Relations and Interaction Among the Cultures of the Peoples of the USSR] (Eesti Raamat, Tallin, 1978), and many others.

Let us note with satisfaction that the scientific works done on this problem have involved all detachments of social scientists (historians, economists, sociologists, philosophers, jurists, ethnographers, philologists and psychologists). What is particularly important is that of late the process of creative integration of research in this area has been accelerated noticeably. This has resulted in the extensive development of comprehensive works on central topics produced through the joint efforts of specialists in various fields of knowledge. This has made it possible to undertake a more profound study of the correlation between class and ethnic and national and international aspects, and to depict more completely the dialectics of interaction among the different facets of the lives of the peoples of our country.

However, we cannot be satisfied with such achievements. The CPSU Central Committee and, personally, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev have drawn our attention to the fact that we must constantly keep in sight all processes related to national relations, study them profoundly, and promptly draw the necessary practical conclusions. We must improve the economic and political forms of fraternal cooperation among nations and insure conditions for the further development and drawing together of socialist nations.

Clearly, the all-round study of problems related to the appearance of the Soviet people should be the starting point for scientific studies of national relations. The Soviet people are a historically developed new social and international community. It is based on the indissoluble alliance among the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, with the leading role of the working class, on juridical and factual equality, and on the fraternal friendship and cooperation among all nations and nationalities in our country.

The authors of some works have allowed vagueness or misinterpretations in the treatment of such matters. Naturally these should be corrected. On the one hand, views that the Soviet people are a certain new single nation and that the merger of nations would mean the disappearance of national distinctions gained a certain popularity. This view leads to the conclusion that the appearance of new historical community--the Soviet people--would result in its absorption of the current socialist nations and their disappearance. In fact, the new historical community does not void the existing nations or build some kind of superstructures above the nations, but conversely provides a model of the unification among people of different nationalities, while the nations and nationalities, their originality, their language and their culture are preserved. Furthermore, as a new historical community, the Soviet people are an organic and effective form of development and blossoming of the material and spiritual forces of each nation and nationality.

In his speech on the draft of the USSR Constitution, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev firmly rejected the concept of a "single Soviet nation." "The socio-political unity of the Soviet people," he underscored, "does not in the least mean the disappearance of national distinctions." The steady drawing together and reciprocal enrichment of the spiritual life of nations are based on the successes achieved in the building of communism. However, the artificial acceleration of this objective process should not be allowed.

Occasional trends which may lead to national-cultural exclusivity and to restraining the processes of internationalization of social life or of its various aspects are a peculiar reaction to hasty theories of unification and disappearance of nations.

Naturally, both extremes present a certain danger unless countered by the active development and dissemination of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the problem of national relations under developed socialist conditions.

The main direction to be followed in the studies conducted in this area may be formulated as follows: What are the prospects for the further development of nations and nationalities under conditions of developing internationalization of all aspects of social life, and what are the ways and means for strengthening friendship and cooperation among nations in the process of the gradual growth of socialism into communism?

The party program and the policy in the field of national relations is to pursue the road to achieving the full unity among nations and nationalities not by belittling or eliminating their sociocultural autonomy, but on the basis of their progressive rapprochement and the creation of maximally favorable conditions for the development of each one of them. Such is the dialectics of national relations at the stage of the developed socialist society building communism. Marxist-Leninist science proceeds from the fact that a communist society will have neither classes nor separate social groups. All traces of class differences will disappear, while national distinctions will remain for a long time under communism as well.

We can see that under mature socialist conditions the processes of the all-round development of socialist nations are accelerated. The steady growth of the economy and scientific and technical potential of the republics within the overall economic and scientific and technical complex of the Soviet Union and the development of national socialist statehood and culture and native languages are prerequisites and means for national development. At the same time the processes of internationalization, i.e., the systematic rapprochement and all-round cooperation among all Soviet peoples, and the strengthening of their fraternal, unbreakable friendship, are intensified in the developed socialist society. The single material and technical base of socialism, the single all-union state, and Soviet culture, socialist in content, national in form, and international in nature, and the extensive dissemination of the language of international communication are all factors which lead to accelerated internationalization.

The development and rapprochement among nations is not separate and parallel, but interrelated processes expressing the single international nature of the socialist society. The ways and means of national development and rapprochement among nations are created only simultaneously, in a state of organic interaction. That is why it is very important for the development of the entire potential of the nations to be optimally combined with internationalization processes. This requires the profound study of the economic, sociopolitical and cultural conditions governing the further development of nations and their systematic drawing closer.

Let us admit that many aspects of economic life of national republics and oblasts have not been as yet adequately covered and theoretically interpreted. A profound study is needed of the establishment of the Soviet people as a new historical community, particularly of the conditions governing the gradual elimination of differences among the basic social groups within our society and the establishment of its total social homogeneity. The study of the sociopsychological and moral aspects of national and international development is particularly lagging.

The building of the material and technical base of communism presumes the strengthening of the single nationwide national economic complex. This is an important factor in further strengthening the friendship and cooperation

among all our nations and nationalities. At the mature socialist stage the task of equalizing the levels of economic development of the Soviet republics has been essentially implemented: each of them today is making a substantial contribution to the all-union economy. Our researchers must comprehensively determine the role which the rational location of production forces which took into consideration the requirements of the socialist state as a whole and the upsurge of the former national outlying areas played in this equalization. Engaged, on a broad front, in the scientific prospecting for natural resources, the socialist state undertook the intensive development of industrial complexes in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Transcaucasus, Siberia, the Far East, the Volga area and the Urals, in order to surmount the backwardness of these areas, whose population in the past largely consisted of oppressed nations.

Despite all noticeable changes which have taken place in the study of this problem, including studies in union republics, a great deal remains to be accomplished. In particular, insufficient studies have been made of aspects of interrepublic and interoblast economic cooperation and integration, particularly in the area of the management of big national economic complexes. The same could be said of the elaboration of a system of indicators and methods for defining and comparing the levels of socio-economic and cultural development of the republics. Currently it is extremely important to study and properly assess the processes of equalization of these levels. Occasionally such work is reduced to determining the equality among one or another individual indicator. However, we must take into consideration that there can be no absolute equality of all indicators. The living conditions of the peoples and the nature of their economic development, based on climatic characteristics and natural resources, distance from industrial and cultural centers, and so on, vary. However, this does not exclude, but conversely, presumes the comprehensive development of the economy of each republic: all its economic sectors are components of the single all-union national economic complex.

In this connection the question arises of the correlation between the domestic sources of development of one or another republic or nation and sources available to the entire country through the achievements of other fraternal peoples. It is only with the joint planned utilization of natural resources on a countrywide basis, in accordance with the needs of the Soviet Union as a whole and of its national republics and oblasts, that we could successfully resolve the problem of the progressive development of Soviet society and of all its nations and nationalities. The study of the economic foundations of international unity and rapprochement among socialist nations is one of the topical tasks of the Soviet social sciences.

The equalization of the social structures of the Soviet republics and, particularly, the fast growth of the working class in republics where, in the past, the share of the workers within the population was far lower than in the central areas of the country, may be considered a qualitatively new phenomenon. Whereas for the Soviet Union at large the number of workers

rose by a 13.7 factor between 1924 and 1978, it rose by a factor of 33.4 in the Uzbek SSR, 35.1 in the Kazakh SSR, 43.1 in Kirgiz SSR, and 42.6 in the Tadzhik SSR. The significant increase in the number of skilled cadres in the republics has been a noteworthy trend. Whereas in the past some republics had no industrial and scientific and technical intelligentsia, today they have large detachments of engineers, technicians, agronomists, physicians, scientists and specialists in all economic sectors.

The headlong growth of higher and secondary education achieved in all republics and, particularly, where great lagging existed in the past, was a decisive prerequisite in this respect. This is confirmed by the following data:

Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education  
per 1,000 People Employed in the National Economy

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1976</u>
USSR average . . .	123	767
Uzbek SSR . . . .	61	779
Kazakh SSR . . . .	99	770
Tadzhik SSR . . .	45	737
Kirgiz SSR . . . .	56	763
Turkmen SSR . . .	78	795

(See "Narodnoye Obrazovaniye, Nauka i Kul'tura v SSSR" [Public Education, Science, and Culture in the USSR], Moscow, 1977, pp 15-16; "Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR za 60 Let" [60 Years of USSR National Economy], Moscow, 1977, pp 57-58.)

The practice of national-governmental construction in the USSR is of universal-historical significance. The establishment of the USSR as a single union multinational state, based on the principle of socialist federalism, became a model of voluntary unification of the working of all nations and nationalities in the joint struggle for common interests and communist ideals. The implementation of the great Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism rallied all nations and nationalities of our country within a unbreakable union of free and equal nations. The new Constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of the union republics profoundly strengthened the democratic foundations of the national-state system. The principle of socialist federalism is implemented through the statute of union republics. In his report on the draft of the constitution

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev indicated the essentially erroneous nature of suggestions calling for limiting the sovereignty of union republics. Article 76 of the constitution reads as follows: "The union republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state united with other Soviet republics within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The rights of the union republics are protected by the USSR. New rights granted union republics have been added and codified in the current constitution: the right to participate in the solution by union organs of problems within the jurisdiction of the USSR and the right to initiate legislation in the USSR Supreme Soviet. This demands of us further work on the socioeconomic and legal problems of the contemporary stage of national-governmental construction.

The moral-psychological climate is a major factor in the strengthening and development of the Soviet people as a historical community. The study of the manners in which national relations are reflected in the minds and moral lives of the Soviet people is of great importance. In this case we must determine more specifically the organic combination between the national and the international in the public and individual awareness.

Today national characteristics are manifested most noticeably in the fields of culture, language, national self-awareness, national mentality, way of life, traditions and customs. It would be erroneous to assume that the rapprochement among nations leads to the elimination of all such characteristics. It could be said that never before have we had such rich opportunities for the development of national factors and for their renovation and enrichment. However, we must understand truly profoundly the occurring processes and know what they are leading to and how to control them. Let us take as an example the matter of historical traditions. Never before have the people been so thoroughly familiar with the history of their nation and of other nations. Naturally, however, such histories have a number of not only positive aspects, but memories of former frictions, discord and conflicts.

The historian must display high principle-mindedness and true Leninist party-mindedness in order to be able to interpret historical events objectively and without prejudice, and thus contribute to the upbringing of patriots and internationalists. The present growing generation is drawing extensive information on the historical past of the nations from textbooks. A number of school aids and monographs have been published on such matters. Many novels, plays and poems have been written. A large number of motion pictures and television films have been made. However, it would be naive to assume that all this triggers only positive emotions and feelings.

Let us not fail to remember, for example, that some works give a one-sided interpretation of Peter the Great's age as a time of blossoming of the Russian state and society, entirely neglecting the most cruel oppression by estate owners and autocratic despotism. Some publications leave the impression that in the history of the Ukrainian people, for example, there has been no happier period than that of the Zaporozhskaya Sech', the nomad



roaming of the steppe, in the history of the Kazakh people, or the reign of one or another king or queen over the peoples of the Transcaucasus. One way or another, some works embellish the blood-thirsty conquerors of foreign lands and oppressors of nations. In an effort to flatter national pride, some historians classify the origin of one or another nation in the period of primitive-tribal organization, ignoring the fact that nations developed with the establishment of firm economic relations and economic communities in the epoch of capitalist ripening and development.

As we know, the Marxist-Leninists are not in the least against the preservation and development of national characteristics and traditions. Yet to begin with not everything in them is acceptable from the positions of proletarian internationalism and individual aspects may have an adverse affect on the social progress of the people and harm their fraternal relations with other peoples. Secondly, the communists are struggling for national development, but mandatorily on an international basis. It is precisely on the basis of internationalism that we decisively reject both national nihilism and national exclusivity. We support the all-round development of national life, and at the same time the all-round development of international principles. The development of such principles and the enhancement of their value in the life of the nations is not in the least the equivalent of sacrificing national development to international development, as our anti-communist adversaries claim. The entire matter is that what is truly international does not contradict in the least, but on the contrary, enriches the national life of nations. The very concept of national as well is not fixed, but is constantly changing and expanding.

Problems related to the cultural development of nations and the further progress of the entire Soviet culture should be studied extremely closely. Both central and republic scientific institutions have done extensive work to sum up the experience of the cultural revolution. Meaningful works have been published on the history and theory of socialist culture, characteristics of national-cultural construction and achievements of socialist nations and nationalities in the country in the course of their spiritual life. Particularly intensive work is being done on the interaction and reciprocal enrichment among national cultures at the present stage and the further spiritual rapprochement among socialist nations. The contribution of each nation and nationality to Soviet culture is steadily growing as their socialist national cultures develop. All Soviet republics are creating works of art which grow on the soil of the national culture, yet at the same time encompass an internationalist, an all-Soviet content, becoming the property of our entire society.

The blossoming of the literature and arts of all nations of the USSR under socialist conditions convincingly proves that the cultures of all nations and nationalities develop most successfully within the common stream of the internationalist socialist culture, encompassing everything valuable of the spiritual legacy of world civilization. In his speech "On the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that,

"Today we can say with full justification that our culture is socialist in terms of content and basic development; it is varied in terms of national forms and internationalist in spirit and nature." A steadily enriched Soviet culture, imbued with the ideas of the international fraternity among all peoples of our country is a great accomplishment of socialism and one of the means for the further rapprochement among nations.

The writing and publication of the six-volume "Istoriya Sovetskoy Mnogonatsional'noy Literaturny" [History of Soviet Multinational Literature] (Nauka, Moscow, 1970-1974), covering the most important aspects of the development and rapprochement among socialist nations, is an example of fruitful collective creative work by scientists from the fraternal Soviet republics.

The current complex processes developing in the field of culture, including literature, cannot be understood without a profound analysis and summation of historical experience. As we know, the widespread cultural relations among the nations of our country have had a tremendous impact on the spiritual life of the masses. Russian classical literature played an outstanding role in the struggle against national prejudices and for consolidating reciprocal understanding and cultural contacts among the peoples of our country. A. S. Pushkin, the great Russian poet, perspicaciously thought of future times "when, having somewhat forgotten their quarrels, the peoples will join in a great family." He inspiredly praised the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldavia. He created immortal works imbued with warmth and friendship toward many peoples. "My great Caucasus, how I loved your sons . . ." wrote M. Yu. Lermontov, discovering the unique spiritual beauty of the people of this mountain area.

The Institute of World Literature imeni A. M. Gor'kiy of the USSR Academy of Science was joined by literary experts from all fraternal republics in the writing of a multiple-volume work on the history of the literatures of the peoples of the USSR in the pre-October period. The completion of this work will constitute their further international contribution to domestic culture.

The multinational Soviet culture is fully consistent with the nature and principles of our society. Its internal unity does not mean the equalization of the national cultures of the peoples of the USSR. It is the great possession of the working people of all nationalities. The USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography imeni N. N. Miklukho-Maklay undertook a study on "Optimizing Sociocultural Conditions of the Development and Rapprochement Among Nations in the USSR," following the example of the Georgian, Moldavian, Uzbek and Estonian SSR's and of some autonomous republics and oblasts in the RSFSR. The resulting materials eloquently prove that the Soviet nations have gained a number of common features and similar elements of culture and way of life. This change may be traced particularly clearly in the young people. Specific (ethno-sociological, above all) studies indicate that previous differences in the level and

intensiveness of consumption of various types of cultural goods by members of different nationalities have been virtually eliminated. In other words, the socialist nations not only have identical broad access to all types of culture, but profit from such opportunities equally.

The main conclusion based on such studies is that people of different nationalities share a common outlook. They are united by the common objective of building a communist society and by the internationalist principles of Marxism-Leninism, which are penetrating ever more profoundly the social consciousness and mentality of the people.

In this respect the Soviet educational system and ideological-educational work play an important role. The identical curriculums of the schools (above all in history and literature in secondary schools, and Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, history of the CPSU and theory of scientific communism in the VUZ's) and materials disseminated through the mass-information media actively contribute to the molding of a materialistic outlook among people of all nationalities and to the gradual restriction of traditional concepts characteristic of previous times and of obsolete social systems (religious outlook, prejudices and so on).

Naturally, each nation and nationality has its national awareness and pride in the values it has created and its contribution to the treasury of world civilization, and above all the building of socialism and communism. At the same time, however, it is unquestionable that thanks to the joint solution of common social problems and the establishment of a new historical community, its member-nations have developed a common internationalist awareness based on socialist ideology, representing an alloy of common features within the national consciousness of each nation and nationality and common international values. The development of the internationalist awareness of the peoples of the USSR has reached a high level. We must make a profound study of its nature and role and correlation with national awareness. Emphasizing the need to energize the study of national consciousness, national mentality and national character, we cannot ignore the topical nature of the struggle against all manifestations of nationalistic prejudices and biases. We must study the spiritual life of nations and nationalities not only for cognitive purposes, but also for the sake of insuring the development of all forms of social consciousness on an international basis, and block the possibility for the development of negative trends.

Soviet culture is not non-national or monolingual. It is a multinational, multilingual culture. It is living and spreading in all the languages of the peoples of the USSR. Multilingualism creates certain difficulties in communications. Yet it symbolizes the spiritual wealth of Soviet society, acting as an inexhaustible source of the colorful and comprehensive expression of socialist culture. The development of national languages has become an important prerequisite for the outstanding achievements of the peoples of the USSR in the political-administrative, economic, cultural and

other realms of life. At the same time, the dissemination of the language of international communication is becoming ever more important. Russian became such a language by virtue of objective historical circumstances.

Struggling against the colonizing policies of czarist autocracy and bourgeois-liberal hypocrisy on the subject of the national problem, Lenin called for full linguistic freedom and equality. He deemed it the party's programmatic requirement to abolish a mandatory state language (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 24, pp 294-295; vol 25, p 146; vol 31, p 440; and vol 32, pp 142, 154).

The bourgeois liberals justified the need to preserve the privileged status of the Russian language as a state language with the statement that it is "great and powerful," for which reason all residents should know it. Objecting to the liberals, Lenin wrote: "To this, liberal gentlemen, we answer that all of it is true. We know better than you do that the language of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevskiy is great and powerful. We wish more than you do that the closest possible contact and fraternal unity be established among the oppressed classes of all nations inhabiting Russia, without distinction. Naturally, we favor every resident of Russia's having the possibility to learn the great Russian language. The one thing we oppose is the element of coercion" (ibid, vol 24, pp 294-295).

Lenin explained in detail that a state language means coercion. This would not draw nations speaking other languages toward it, but on the contrary would alienate them from it. The policy of imposing a state language ignores the question of mentality, which is a particularly important aspect of the national problem. The dissemination of the Russian language as a language for international communication will be powerfully stimulated by economics, "which will make the Russian language necessary." Even the slightest coercion would "defile, harm and reduce to naught the unquestionable progressive significance . . . of a single language" (Lenin, op cit, vol 48, p 734).

The Great October Socialist Revolution put an end to linguistic inequality which made the Russian language the privileged state language and which was coercively imposed upon non-Russian nationalities. Since the establishment of the Soviet system the Russian language lost all privileges or special juridical status. Its study and practice by people of non-Russian nationality is based on their free and voluntary decision. The spreading of the Russian language is determined by the fact that it is used by the majority of the country's population. The Russian language meets common requirements of economic and political life and of the scientific and technical and cultural development of all nations and nationalities in the USSR.

People of different nationalities live and work in the different union and autonomous republics, oblasts, cities and villages. A language for international communications is for them a necessary prerequisite for joint

work, social activities and daily life. Under mature socialist conditions the Leninist principles of national, including linguistic, policy are observed systematically. The principle of linguistic and national equality has been raised to the level of a constitutional article. "The citizens of the USSR," stipulates article 34 of the USSR Constitution, "are equal in the eyes of the law, regardless of origin . . . language . . . and other circumstances." The exercising of equal rights by the peoples of the USSR is insured by a policy of all-round development and rapprochement among all nations and nationalities, and "the possibility to speak their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR."

At the stage of developed socialism, and in the conditions of the further internationalization of all aspects of social life, a language for international communications becomes one of the important prerequisites for the further rapprochement and cooperation among the peoples of the Soviet Union, the development and reciprocal enrichment of national cultures and languages, and the all-round mastering and increasing the achievements of contemporary civilization.

The All-Union Theoretical Science Conference on "The Russian Language--Language of Friendship and Cooperation Among the Peoples of the USSR," held in Tashkent, at the end of May 1979, convincingly proved the need for organically combining the development and practicing of the native languages by all nations and the enrichment of their social functions, along with the extensive dissemination of the language of international communications.

The greeting presented by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the conference profoundly substantiated the national policy of the CPSU and the present role of the national languages and the language of international communications: "Under developed socialist conditions, when the economy of our country has become a single national economic complex and when a new historical community--the Soviet people--has appeared, the role of the Russian language objectively rises as a language for international contacts in the building of communism and the upbringing of the new man. Together with the native language, the free mastery of the Russian language, voluntarily adopted as a common historical possession of all Soviet people, contributes to the further strengthening of the political, economic and spiritual unity of the Soviet people."

The report by Comrade Sh. R. Rashidov, CC CPSU Politburo candidate member and first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, and the subsequent reports and addresses comprehensively dealt with the basic theoretical problems and practical measures aimed at improving linguistic construction and the teaching of the Russian language in national schools, alongside the native languages. The conference discussed and passed recommendations presenting an integral system for the study of the Russian language from childhood and in all subsequent education stages.

The dissemination of the language for international communications is of great importance in terms of scientific and technical progress. In our time more than ever before, science and technology are international. Scientific and technical progress is a powerful factor in the development of nations and the internationalization of all aspects of their life. The exchange of achievements among scientific institutions of all our republics is a necessary prerequisite for the growth of the common scientific potential of the country. Without such interchange we would be unable to upgrade the scientific and technical potential of the republics and achieve the full organic combination of the advantages of developed socialism with the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. For this reason we cannot consider normal the fact that a considerable percentage of works of a general scientific nature are published in the individual republics in the national languages only, for which reason, consequently, they can be used by no more than a limited number of readers familiar with such languages.

The development of the national languages and a broadening of their social functions to the extent to which even the most complex scientific disciplines may be presented in national languages was one of the greatest accomplishments of socialism and socialist culture. At the same time, however, the need to exchange scientific achievements with the help of a language of international communications is becoming ever more vital. It must be remembered that not only the most important studies of Soviet scientists, but the most noteworthy works written abroad are published in Russian. Foreign periodicals and printed matter on natural and social sciences are extracted in the Russian language. All this emphasizes the need for the extensive use of a language for international communications in the dissemination of scientific accomplishments in union republics and, particularly, our republic academies of sciences. For this reason it would be expedient to publish works of major scientific significance both in the national and the Russian language.

We proceed from the fact that considering the high level of development of national culture, of the national language in particular, which performs most extensive social functions, there are no reasons to assume that the publication of scientific works or the teaching of special subjects in Russian in higher educational institutions in national republics could somehow harm the national language or national culture.

The question of doing further work on the problem of the use and study of the Russian language in national republics has been repeatedly discussed at meetings of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. It has also been considered at meetings of the council which coordinates the scientific activities of republic academies. In particular, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Russian Language was instructed to develop together with the philology centers of the academies of sciences of union republics, a long-term program for scientific research and practical measures on the topic of "The Russian Language as a Means for International Communication."

The consistent use of the principle of bilingualism is the most important prerequisite for the successful functioning and dissemination of the Russian language as a language for international communication among union and autonomous republics. As we know, bilingualism, i.e., the fluent mastery of two languages, is quite widespread not only in our country, but in many other countries as well. However, in the conditions of a socialist society bilingualism rests on an essentially different foundation: it creates a linguistic environment in which the further development and enrichment of the national language takes place, along with the increased need to master the Russian language as a language for international communication.

However, it is important to continue to explain, purposefully and consistently, that under the conditions of bilingualism, of national-Russian bilingualism, no damage whatever is caused to the national interest. Conversely, a linguistic situation arises which leads to the harmonious combination of the international with the national aspects in the culture of a nation. Therefore, equal bilingualism, as one of the leading principle of linguistic construction in the USSR, must be further developed and extensively applied at the various educational levels, particularly in national schools and VUZ's.

Psychology and educational practice have confirmed the groundlessness of the previously existing view that the study of a second language in childhood hinders the mastery of the native language. In reality, bilingualism in the different grades of national schools, and the teaching of the Russian language, lead to the development of the type of natural atmosphere of live contacts which stimulates the development and enrichment of the native language and the fast mastery of Russian verbal skills. This eliminates a number of obstacles in the study of the language of international communication in the VUZ's of national republics.

At the same time greater attention must be paid to the theoretical elaboration of problems related to the teaching and study in school of the language of the native populations of union and autonomous republics. The development of national languages is not merely proof of their equality. The main thing is that knowledge and cultural values are mastered more easily and rapidly in the native language. The languages of all nations and nationalities in the USSR play a tremendous role in the successful development of culture, public education and training of national cadres in union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs.

It is important to emphasize that national-Russian bilingualism is being disseminated on the basis of equality of all other languages in the country and has been raised to the level of a constitutional norm. The linguistic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state aims at insuring maximally favorable conditions both for the development of national languages and for the dissemination of the Russian language, and on this basis, the development of national-Russian bilingualism. The proper understanding of the role of

bilingualism and of the role of the Russian language in our multinational state unquestionably contributes to the dissemination, study and teaching of the language of international communication.

As the most outstanding indicator of the development of the national cultures, the linguistic wealth of the peoples of the USSR is the best rebuttal of the fabrications of the anti-Soviets concerning the "extinction" of national identity of the peoples of the USSR and the "standardization" of their cultures. It is worth recalling that it was only after the victory of the Great October Revolution that some 50 peoples in the USSR acquired their alphabets and built up highly developed literary languages. Today, in our country, schools teach subjects in 52 languages. The experience in cultural-linguistic construction in the USSR is a universal-historical accomplishment.

More than anywhere else the efforts of the scientific institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the academies of sciences of union republics, the academic branches of autonomous republics and the chairs of higher educational institutions is required in organizing studies on the national problems. In this respect our society greatly relies on the USSR Academy of Sciences National Council for Scientific Problems. The study of such problems presumes the use of union data, reference materials from the entire Soviet Union and republic sources characterizing results and processes of national development. That is why, along with the central scientific institutions, specialists from various fields in the national republics must be recruited.

Only thus could one surmount, on the one hand, the abstract and schematic nature of works frequently issued by central scientific institutions and, on the other, the trend toward excessive localization of the topic and nature of studies in the individual republics, occasionally resulting in the one-sided treatment of a number of problems. Unfortunately, it must be noted that in some studies of the history and the material and cultural development of individual republics the contribution of the entire country and of the multinational Soviet people to the progress of a given nation or nationality is insufficiently credited. Frequently the achievements of one or another union or autonomous republic is depicted separately from the general progress of the entire Soviet state.

The fact that statistical collections on the development of the republics sometimes either do not mention or do not adequately depict the tremendous and steadily growing contribution which the entire country makes to the national development of a given republic could be hardly considered proper.

One of the main principles in research is the consideration of the unquestionable fact that the achievements of our entire country, of the entire fraternal family of nations and nationalities of the USSR, play a determining role in the life and national development of each nation.



Historical dialectics is such that the all-round blossoming of socialist nations, on the basis of the implementation of the Leninist national policy, leads not to their separation but further rapprochement. We can proudly say that today not only the Soviet Union as a whole, but each constituent union republic is a joint family of working people of a great variety of nationalities, joined by the common ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the single objective of the building of communism. This is one of the vital sources of strength of the socialist society.

The Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and inviolable friendship and fraternal cooperation among working people of different nations are embodied in the global socialist comity. New international economic and political relations, previously unheard of, have been established among the members of the socialist comity, based on common class interests and objectives, total equality, fraternal mutual aid and all-round cooperation. The principles of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries are codified in the Fundamental Law of the Soviet state as follows: "As a structural part of the world socialist system and the socialist comity, the USSR develops and strengthens friendship and cooperation and comradely mutual aid with the socialist countries on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism. It actively participates in economic integration and in the international socialist division of labor" (art 30).

The study and summation of the historical experience and achievements of the world socialist comity in the development of a new type of international relations is the most important task of the social scientists in the socialist countries. It is natural that problems of socialist internationalism and the development of socialist nations assume an important position in the plans for international scientific cooperation.

The struggle against bourgeois and revisionist falsifications of the historical experience in resolving the national problem in the USSR and on the scale of the entire socialist comity, and criticism of the variety of various nationalistic and racist concepts remains a combat sector in the activities of social scientists.

In his time Lenin warned that the bourgeoisie and all petit bourgeois parties will try most stubbornly to divide the working people of different nationalities, promote mistrust and disturb the close international association and international brotherhood of workers. He was confident that through painstaking, adamant and purposeful work our party would be able to defeat the nationalistic intrigues of the bourgeoisie and all possible nationalistic prejudices, and give the working people the world over an example of a truly firm alliance among workers and peasants of different nations in the struggle for the elimination of the oppression of exploiting classes and the building of a new state, a new society.

The CPSU successfully resolved the great historical problem of establishing proletarian internationalism in the liberation struggle and the building of

the new society, and in strengthening the world's socialist comity and the international solidarity of communists and all working people of different countries and nationalities.

The systematic implementation of the Leninist national policy, the raising of the working people in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and the exposure of the reactionary ideology of bourgeois nationalism, racism and cosmopolitanism is considered by the CPSU as its programmatic task and as an important obligation of all party organizations.

In its decree "On Improving Further Ideological and Political-Educational Work" the CPSU Central Committee calls for developing in all Soviet people a feeling of pride in the socialist fatherland, unbreakable fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR, respect for national dignity and national culture and intolerance of any manifestation of nationalism. The purpose of all this is to contribute to the further strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the great Soviet people.

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## END RESULT AS THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

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[Article by B. Odliis, director of the Omega Tractors Plant]

[Text] The party's socioeconomic policy, formulated at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, is aimed at considerably upgrading public production effectiveness. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, "In order systematically to upgrade the prosperity of the people, we must implement with double and triple energy the party's course toward upgrading effectiveness and quality. There is no alternative to this course, which must be steadily pursued in the 11th Five-Year Plan."

Expressing the requirements of the contemporary stage in the building of communism, the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers July 1979 decree "On Improving Planning and Intensifying the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Upgrading Production Effectiveness and Work Quality" earmarked a broad program of measures for the further improvement of the planned management of the economy, strengthening the democratic principles in production management and upgrading the creative initiative of labor collectives.

Effectiveness and quality and steady orientation toward end results and satisfaction of requirements are stipulations formulated by life itself, powerfully knocking at plant doors.

### Better Means More and Less Expensive

In January 1981 the Omega Order of Lenin and Order of the October Revolution Tractors Plant, one of the oldest industrial enterprises in the northwestern part of the country, celebrated its 25th anniversary of converting to the production of skidding tractors. The first tractor, whose appearance was impatiently awaited by timber procurement workers, developed 40 horsepower. It had hand controls and a plywood cabin. Currently the enterprise is producing tractors developing twice that power, with a well-equipped cabin and with special hydraulic control servo-mechanisms which make it possible to lower control effort tenfold, thus facilitating the work of the tractor operator. The plant has initiated the production of

tractors with hydraulic controls which avoid the difficult and tiring operation of choking manually the felled trees, i.e., roping each trunk for subsequent skidding. Yet the timber workers are already demanding new machines of us which would enable them to mechanize the rolling of the timber, choking, trimming, loading the trunks on trucks and all other lumbering operations.

I remember that when I came to the plant, three decades ago, I was the third graduate engineer in the collective, which already then numbered over 1,000 people. Today the plant employs 1,420 graduate specialists, 563 of them university graduates. At the very end of the 1940's, when the plant began its conversion to fast metal processing systems through cutting, we spent a long time looking for a worker with a seventh-grade education who could be entrusted with mastering such progressive technology. Today 90% of the Omega workers are with unfinished secondary, full secondary or secondary specialized training.

For the third five-year period our plant, located in the center of modern Petrozavodsk, is developing through reconstruction and technical retooling, virtually avoiding the building of new production areas. Within that period the volume of output has increased by a 2.4 factor; labor productivity has risen by a factor 1.8, while profits have more than tripled. In the Ninth Five-Year Plan and the first three years of the 10th, the OTZ [Omega Tractors Plant] installed over 1,050 units of new highly productive equipment, including about 350 automated and semiautomated machine tools. This drastically lowered the share of manual labor and upgraded the stability of technological processes. Extensively expanding and renovating production capacities, the enterprise's collective has not lowered capital returns, which this year will remain on the 1970 level and may even outstrip it. However, the continuing reconstruction of the plant and the mastering of new goods will force the collective to look for new means and possibilities for further production intensification.

In recent years labor and living conditions the Omega workers have changed unrecognizably.

The plant is extensively installing specialized transportation and hoisting equipment and ventilation systems. Proper rest premises have been organized in virtually all shops and the number of seats in plant cafeterias has increased manifold. Whereas in 1956 the plant's housing facilities consisted essentially of two-story wooden houses with no amenities whatever, today 80% are houses with private, comfortable apartments. Within that time seven new children's associations have been built; three plant rest centers were set up on the shores of forest-lined Karelian lakes, and a modern prevention-sanatorium was built offering the Omega workers medicinal water and mud treatment and physiotherapy. The plant's house of culture is the center of the collective's cultural life.

However, even all this no longer satisfies the social and cultural demands of the plant workers. Actually, whatever aspect of plant life we turn to, everywhere greater amounts and higher levels of work await us.

Having steadily worked throughout the 10th Five-Year Plan, now the enterprise's collective is focusing its efforts on fulfilling it ahead of schedule. On 6 December 1979 the plant reported the fulfillment of basic plan assignments for the first four years in terms of sales, growth of labor productivity and tractor production. The 11th Five-Year Plan is approaching. The entire variety of problems facing the plant, as for our industry as a whole, could be briefly described in three words: more, better, cheaper. Time, however, has introduced substantial changes to the very meaning of these concepts, changing their usual order of priorities. Today better means also more and more economical, bearing in mind not intermediate, but national economic end results.

In fact, considerably upgrading the technical standard of skidding tractors and their reliability and durability would make it possible to do more work with a lesser number of tractors and tractor drivers, and with lower repair and technical servicing outlays. A certain increase in outlays for the production of more advanced tractors would turn into incomparably higher labor and material savings on a national scale. Yet the power of the inertia developed at a time when quantity was first in industry, followed by quality, has still not been surmounted in the practice of economic management.

Indicative in this respect is the conversion of our tractor plants, including the OTZ, to the production of new models. It took virtually seven long years to convert from the production of the TDT-40M model, whose technical standard and durability were low, to the current TDT-55A tractor, which has been awarded the Emblem of Quality. The conversion took place with the use of two conveyor lines: the old tractor continued to be produced on the first, while the new model was being assembled on the second. Meanwhile, with every passing year, the plan called for the production of more tractors. Under such circumstances there could not even be a question of rapidly mastering the series production of the new model. It was only in 1976, when we were able to convince the USSR Gosplan and Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building of the expediency of lowering the overall production of tractors by 10%, that, finally, we were able to complete the conversion.

The tendency to increase the number of tractors and other machinery produced, above all, at all costs, leads to the fact that for an unjustifiably long time the national economy continues to be supplied with morally obsolete equipment, while technical retooling at manufacturing enterprises drags out.

The struggle against the unfortunate "gross production" has long been waged in our industry. In the past, in the course of planning and assessing production activities of enterprises, we converted from the index of gross output to that of marketable goods and, following the decisions to improve the system of planning and economic incentive, passed in the mid-1960's, to the indicator of goods marketed. Currently the next step is being taken in

directing production activities toward end results: enterprise work will be assessed and economically stimulated on the basis of the net (normative) output and in accordance with the extent to which orders for the delivery of finished goods have been met. Other measures stipulated in the July 1979 CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree are also aimed at such reorientation. It is a question of totally eliminating the rigidity and dogmatism in economic thinking and in the practice of economic management discussed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech to the voters on 2 March 1979, a practice which greatly hinders the growth of the effectiveness and quality of all our work.

The elimination of obsolete stereotypes of economic management is a complex and, occasionally, painful process. As was emphasized at the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, the main reason for the retention of bottlenecks and shortcomings is the fact that in the area of further upgrading effectiveness and quality we have been unable to progress as planned. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in his speech that "far from all ministries and departments were able to surmount the power of inertia, and take a decisive turn toward quality, higher labor productivity and the achievement of best end results."

#### Specialized or Generalized Output?

At first glance the problem seems purely rhetorical, for all development of industry, both domestic and abroad, follows the path of all-round broadening of production specialization and cooperation. In this respect, a great deal has been changed in the national economy. Today our plant receives from specialized enterprises tools, frames, gears, hydraulic equipment and many others. However, production specialization and cooperation are developing less quickly than we would wish. The CC CPSU Accountability Report to the 25th party congress pointed out that "far from all ministries and departments are actively developing specialization, redistributing funds in favor of intersectorial production and the creation of specialized plans for the production of instruments and equipment and standardized assemblies and parts. The repair base is excessively splintered. Such trends lead to the considerable waste of all kinds of resources"

For example, our plant manufactures its own manual transmission assemblies, even though the creation of facilities for the mass production of hydraulic transmissions in the sector would radically enhance the technical standard of the tractors and improve the utilization of the enterprise's production areas. What kind of transmission is that! Recently we opened at the plant a special sector for the production of air heaters, which, as we know, has nothing to do with tractor manufacturing. However, our situation was hopeless: the plant is located in the north and its shops have installed hundreds of ventilation and heating systems. Their normal operation requires air heaters which, sooner or later, must be replaced. However, practically no such items are being allocated to the enterprise.

The country's machine builders are supplying industry with excellent machine tools. However, with extremely rare exceptions, they do not bother

with capital or medium repairs. Furthermore, they have virtually abandoned the manufacturing of spare parts for them. We are forced to manufacture most of our shafts, gear mechanisms and sleeves. The many types of equipment we repair ourselves, and the lack of specialized repair equipment inevitably lead to amateurish work, high labor outlays and poor-quality work. Repairs of machine tools by specialized enterprises would be tremendously profitable. In 1978, for example, the Tulremstanok Plant of the Ministry of Machine-Tool and Tool Building Industry made capital repairs on 16 of our lathes rapidly and well. The specialized instrument manufacturing organizations are helping the plant greatly in servicing its computers. Unfortunately, however, few such examples may be cited.

This is not to say that we, the tractor manufacturers, are behaving any better. Approximately one-half of all tractors produced by the OTZ are in the northwestern part of the country. The area has over 10 enterprises under different departments in which hundreds of workers are engaged in repairing our machines. The labor intensiveness of repairs at such enterprises exceeds the labor intensiveness of the manufacturing of a new tractor by a factor of more than two. Furthermore, whereas before a capital repair the tractor is in operation for five years, after it may work from 12 to 18 months. The creation of a big specialized repair enterprise in the northwest, within the framework of the tractor manufacturing association, would unquestionably yield major national economic savings.

However, under the conditions of the current planning and economic incentive system the machine builders are not interested in providing technical services for the machines they produce or to create specialized repair enterprises within the production associations. At the OTZ specific wage outlays for the production of spare parts are higher by than one-half compared with the manufacturing of tractors. The organization of repairs would increase the share of labor outlays, relatively lower the share of purchased materials and semifinished goods and thus would result in an apparent worsening of the utilization of manpower resources and of the wage fund, which would quite tangibly affect the collective.

The net (normative) output indicator, whose utilization is stipulated in the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree on improving the economic mechanism, makes it virtually identically profitable to the enterprise to produce all types of goods regardless of material intensiveness. However, we should bear in mind that the computation of labor productivity based on net (normative) output could conflict with the further development of production specialization and cooperation. The point is that under the new conditions the enterprise would find it unprofitable to deliver some assemblies and parts to the specialized plants, while conversely it would find it profitable to increase its own volume of output, particularly in the case of labor intensive goods.

Let us hope that the rigid limits imposed on the size of the industrial-production personnel and the planning for the enterprise of volumes of

output entirely consistent with signed contracts and supplies issued for the goods to be produced, stipulated in the same decree, will help to eliminate this contradiction. The most important prerequisites for the successful channeling of all production activities toward end results is the balancing of national economic plans, the accurate consideration of the production capacities of each enterprise and the creation of reserves which would eliminate the hindrances which inevitably arise in economic practice.

The elimination of the elements of a "barter economy" in the structure of a modern industrial enterprise would mean, along with the elimination of labor and material outlays, a drastic acceleration of the pace of scientific and technical progress. We were able to prove this through our own example.

In its time, in accordance with the plan for the reconstruction of the plant for the organization of the production of the current tractor model, 10,000 square meters of production area had to be built. However, the plant was not allocated the capital investments stipulated for this purpose and the shops scheduled for the second site were not built. Reserve production capacities for the production of the new tractor were found, above all, as a result of production specialization and cooperation. The manufacturing of cog wheels was assigned to specialized plants within the sector, while the main consumer of our output--the timber industry--helped us to organize the mass manufacturing of individual assemblies for the new tractor at its own enterprises.

As we mentioned, the plant must convert in the immediate future to the series production of the new tractor for the choking-free skidding of logs, which would double the labor productivity of this operation. Presently the national economy already has over 1,500 tractors with hydraulic gears. Many timber procurement brigades in Karelia and Estonia have considerably outstripped the planned productivity indicators of the new tractors. However, the timber industry finds the number of such tractors produced entirely unsatisfactory. Delays in the construction of the shops on the second plant site, where the tractor with a TB-1M hydraulic gear must be assembled, raises with more urgency the question of further intensifying production specialization.

Yet we do have major possibilities. So far, our plant has been manufacturing a number of parts and assemblies which are also being produced by specialized enterprises within the sector. Thus brake drums similar to those manufactured by the OTZ are manufactured by the Kursk Plant for Tractor Spare Parts. Considerable production areas could be freed by using the standardized booster produced at the Melitopol' Plant for Tractor Hydraulic Assemblies. The OTZ has not entirely organized the contracting of the production of gears by specialized plants.

The systematic implementation of measures for production specialization would enable us considerably to upgrade effectiveness and accelerate the mastering of the production of new tractor models.



## Highly Productive Labor Must Become the Norm

The manpower shortages which are increasing in the country urges now, more adamantly than ever before, the utilization of the substantial possibilities for the growth of labor productivity found at each enterprise.

Further improvements in production technology and the installation of new and progressive equipment would enable us to achieve a considerable growth of labor productivity by the basic production workers. A number of examples could be cited of high returns from the new equipment installed at the plant. However, a paradoxical phenomenon develops in the course of production mechanization and automation. The latest equipment, raising labor productivity and lowering labor intensiveness, demands highly skilled workers-tuners to service it, and considerably increases the share of unskilled and heavy physical labor. Essentially, it converts the operator in charge of sophisticated automatic equipment into a stevedore.

Thus the machining of heavy tractor axles is now done at the plant by semiautomatic duplicating machines with plug programmed control. The new machine tools themselves shift the machining systems and replace tools in the course of the machining process. On the one hand the operator must only control the work of the high-precision automatic equipment. On the other, he must manually set and remove the parts, transferring within a single shift several tons of metal. It has become urgently necessary to equip modern machine tools and automated lines with industrial robots. Today, from science fiction characters, they have become most necessary participants in the production process. However, the development of the mass production of robots is extremely slow.

A largely similar situation has developed in auxiliary production. We build modern warehouses equipped with stacking cranes with special containers. However, so far we are still unloading the goods received on the basis of cooperative supplies primarily by hand. This leads to tremendous outlays of manual labor in the counting of parts and procurements and their storing and moving to the work places. The extremely low pace of work for containerized haulage does not make it possible to radically mechanize the labor of auxiliary workers and reduce the number of such personnel employed in loading-unloading, hauling and warehousing operations.

We believe that the problem of mass production of industrial robots and the organization of containerized haulage on a broad scale should be resolved within the framework of the comprehensive program for the mechanization of manual labor stipulated in the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree on improving the economic mechanism.

The structure of our industrial enterprises, characterized, as a rule, by the existence of petty and splintered auxiliary services within each basic production subunit, developed over a number of decades, has become greatly obsolete and substantially hinders the growth of labor productivity. Under

such circumstances current equipment repairs are inevitably made on a low technological level, involving substantial work-time losses. The same could be said of organizing the labor of workers employed in loading and unloading operations. The only solution here is the specialization and centralization of auxiliary enterprise services.

We are familiar with the positive experience of such an auxiliary production organization at the Volga Automotive Vehicles Plant, approved by the CPSU Central Committee. Our enterprise as well has taken the first steps in this direction. A shop has been opened for freight processing and storage, staffed by about 200 workers. At the same time the plant has set up a transportation-technological department engaged in problems of improving the technology and organization of transportation and warehousing operations. The tangible results of such measures enable us today to confidently undertake the specialization and centralization of the plant's repair services.

We know the great role of technically substantiated norms in insuring the growth of labor productivity of piece-rate and hourly paid workers. For quite some time the plant has used a system of steady improvements of output norms. Every year all plant subunits are issued assignments on lowering the labor intensiveness of their output. Such assignments are issued directly to sector foremen. Their monthly bonuses directly depend on the fulfillment of the plan for the lowering of labor intensiveness.

The norm can act as a production organizer only if it is adequately firm. Could we speak of any organizing role played by a norm which is fulfilled 130-140% or higher? Such a norm conceals idling, enables the careless to work only part of the working time and be classified as a leading worker. Under the conditions of the steady renovation of the production process a tremendous number of factors are in operation calling for higher labor productivity and for the need to review output norms. That is why the process of improving technical norms must be implemented on a continuing basis.

In 1978 and in the first nine months of 1979 alone the plant reviewed over 40% of basic production norms. Labor intensiveness in the manufacturing of basic units--the TDT-55A tractor--was lowered by over 15%. In the previous five-year plan it was lowered by 45% and made stable. Presently the share of technically substantiated norms in basic production has reached 90%.

The problem of norming the labor of auxiliary workers is considerably more urgent and complex. The plant has acquired a certain experience in resolving this problem as well.

Thus the application of the piece-rate normative wage system for fitters and electricians servicing the equipment, and the organization of controlled repairs, following the VAZ [Venyukovskiy Fittings Plant], enabled us to upgrade labor productivity 25%, reduce unplanned equipment idling 35%, lower overtime for equipment repairs 30% and raise the wages of repair workers 8-12%.

Other exceptionally topical problems today are raising the labor productivity of engineering and technical workers at industrial enterprises. By their very nature, the work of the overwhelming majority of the personnel of the engineering services is creative and cannot be assessed merely by the number of design drawings or technological documents. Until reliable systems have been found for assessing the quantity and quality of the work of the engineering and technical personnel, the effective means for upgrading its productivity lies in the organization of the socialist competition based on the formulation and application of individual creative plans for technical progress. In 1979 the plant reached 80% of all measures stipulated in these plans, saving about 800,000 rubles.

The mobilization of reserves for the growth of labor productivity implemented by the enterprise is encountering a number of objective difficulties. The point is that whereas vertically, within the individual sectors, the uniform policy in the field of labor and wage norming is being implemented more or less consistently, horizontally, on the scale of the individual economic areas, the solution of such problems is essentially ignored. As a result, an enterprise systematically improving technical norming and linking ever more closely the growth of wages paid its workers with the growth of their labor productivity, finds itself in a worse situation in terms of manpower availability compared with enterprises where no such efforts are being made. Frequently workers leave the OTZ for other enterprises in the city where labor norming is less well organized and where the overfulfillment of production norms is far easier.

As we know, wage benefits have been introduced for the areas of the European north of the country. In Petrozavodsk, for example, workers who have worked over five years at the same enterprise are paid a 15% regional coefficient and a 30% cadre supplement. All other conditions being equal, we would think that the wages of the people in Petrozavodsk, working under adverse weather conditions, should be 45% higher compared with workers practicing the same profession and possessing the same skills, but employed at enterprises located in the central or southern cities in the country. Yet, as we were able to see, in both places workers' wages show insignificant differences and the stimulating role of the benefits is thus reduced to naught. In our view, this is the result of the fact that in the various industrial sectors the planning of wages rests on "the basis" of the level reached, as a result of which shortcomings and disproportions which may have appeared at one point in the wages paid in the different economic rayons become codified.

Improving the organization of the help which the industrial enterprises comprehensively give enterprises in other economic sectors is a major reserve for the further growth of public labor productivity. "The time has come to bring order into this area," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, "and to eliminate facelessness and parasitism." Indeed, under the conditions of a planned socialist economy, the handling of manpower resources should upgrade public production

effectiveness. However, a very strange situation has developed. Within the enterprise we scrupulously consider outlays of labor, materials, fuel and electric power, and adopt comprehensive conservation measures. Meanwhile, there is no strict consideration of outlays and results of the utilization of manpower recruited to help agriculture and construction and other organizations on a countrywide basis.

In 1979 the Onega workers spent over 30,000 man/days working in the sovkhos they sponsor, building housing and children's preschool establishments and processing vegetables. However, such labor outlays were not reflected in the least in the plant's reports or the documents of the sponsored enterprises, as if they had not occurred. Under such conditions neither the enterprise which assigns the people nor, even more so, the enterprises welcoming such people are truly interested in upgrading their labor productivity. Furthermore, this distorts accountability. Thus we continue to list plant workers working at the construction project as working at the enterprise. The construction workers do not report this personnel and record to their credit the amount of construction work done by our own personnel.

In our view, the time is ripe to introduce governmental statistical accountability that would accurately reflect the extent to which manpower is taken away from industrial enterprises, along with the effectiveness of its utilization by the other organizations and enterprises. The latter should be given conditions which would encourage them to make the best possible use of additional manpower resources obtained on the basis of socialist mutual aid. The earlier this is accomplished, the sooner we shall put an end to the non-productive social labor outlays, and the higher the end results become.

#### Individual Contribution and General Interest

Surmounting the gross output approach in assessing the activities of sectors, production associations and enterprises, it is equally important to put an end through precisely the same approach to the evaluation and stimulation of the labor of individual workers.

Thus the existing system of individual piece-rate work does not, essentially, take into consideration the individual contribution of the worker to the end results achieved by the production collective. Furthermore, promoting through our entire way of life within every working person a collectivistic, the member of the future communist society, using the piece-rate wage system we promote in the same person individualistic aspirations.

Let us consider the daily life of the plant. Day after day at the tractors frame welding sector the worker is engaged in a strictly defined operation--the welding of spars. The more spars he welds, the more money he earns. However, the plant is interested in the spars only to the extent to which the assembly shop will have the necessary number of frames ready for

the production of the planned number of tractors. Let us assume that the sector has enough spars and that there has been a breakdown in a subsequent operation, such as, for example, the welding of the crank. In the interest of the sector, shop or enterprise, the foremen should switch the worker making spars to welding crank pipes. However, this is unprofitable to the worker, as moving to a new and unfamiliar operation may lower his output and therefore his earnings. Such situations in which the private interests of the worker clash with those of the work arise at the plant on a daily basis.

Life itself indicates the effective means for the solution of this contradiction. It is the conversion to collective forms of labor organization and wages, the extensive application of the CC CPSU approved experience of the Volga automotive plant of the creation of brigades whose labor is paid on the basis of the end output and in which earnings are distributed on the basis of a labor participation coefficient. For the past several years such brigades have been successfully working at the OTZ as in many other industrial enterprises throughout the country.

Depending on the composition of the brigade, in our plant the overall earnings to be distributed among its members include the average piece rate based on the factually manufactured and accepted goods by the technical control department, the wage rate of the hourly workers computed on the basis of the grade and established rate consistent with the skill for the factually worked time. In order to interest the collective in doing the work with a lesser number of workers, the overall earnings include some of the wages of absent members (hourly workers), providing that the brigade can meet the required volume of work. All bonuses and various supplements (night differentials or overtime, work on holidays, etc) are paid to the workers on an individual basis. The share of the earnings controlled with the help of the labor participation coefficient is over 60%. With a relatively low level of overfulfillment of the rather strict plant norms, earnings distributed through the labor participation coefficient alone (as is the case in some enterprises) would not yield the desired results.

The labor participation coefficient is raised in the case of workers who have achieved high labor productivity with excellent production quality, and who master and share with other brigade workers progressive experience, and who combine skills. The coefficient is reduced for omissions in the work, low labor activity, low work place standard and violations of labor and production discipline and safety regulations.

The main prerequisite needed for the creation and successful work of the brigades of the new type is the common production assignment shared by the workers and the collective material incentive to carry it out. The brigades are organized on a strictly voluntary basis and the decision to organize them must be made at a workers meeting involving the participation of the members of the shop trade unions committee. The brigade's management is provided by the brigade leader and the permanent brigade council,

which has the right to determine the factual labor participation coefficient (on the basis of a base coefficient) and submit for consideration by the general meeting of the collective suggestions on the inclusion or expulsion of a brigade member. The brigade leader is chosen from the most prestigious and respected highly skilled workers with organizing ability. It is important for the brigade leader to be not a "formal leader" in the primary production collective and for the members of the council to be held in high regard. In order to observe this condition the sociologists at the plant and the Petorsavodsk Planning-Design-Technological Institute for Tractor Manufacturing conduct studies in the newly created brigades on interpersonal relationships and levels of development of the individual qualities among workers, using sociometric and group evaluation methods. Special surveys are also conducted to study the value orientation of the people within the brigade. On the basis of such data the sociologists issue recommendations concerning the choice of the brigade leader and brigade council members, and on improving relations within the collective.

Currently the plant has 56 new-type brigades totaling 760 workers. Their practical experience proves the high socioeconomic effectiveness of the collective forms of labor organization and wages. For example, for a long period of time the welding shop held back the work of the main conveyor line because of unrhythmical delivery of tractor frames. The same shop was responsible for a chronic shortage of spare frames. Following the creation of complex brigades the situation in the shop improved sharply. In the new type brigades, in the course of the first 18 months of their work, labor productivity rose 15%, while average wages rose 10%. Absenteeism declined by more than one-half.

In the new-type brigades every worker is directly interested in the highly productive and conscientious work of all brigade members. This considerably upgrades the role of public opinion within the collective, as it firmly opposes violations of labor and production discipline. Not only the brigade leader but the entire brigade immediately reacts to any work difficulty. Collective responsibility and collective material interest in labor end results motivates the workers to combine skills and master a second skill, while the novices are encouraged to master new operations. Stimulating the creative activeness of the workers, the brigade contracting method system upgrades their strictness toward the organization of the production process at the enterprise and encourages them to raise questions on the elimination of one or another shortcoming or hindrance in the work firmly to the plant's management or party committee.

The CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers decree on improving the economic mechanism of ministries, departments, associations, enterprises and organizations calls for the formulation and implementation of measures for the extensive development of the brigade form of labor organization and incentive, bearing in mind that this will be the basic method of the 11th Five-Year Plan. It is our deep conviction that the principle of brigade contracting could and should become the base of the labor organization not

only of workers but of the overwhelming majority of personnel in socialist industry. The elaboration of ways and means of the brigade organization of labor for the tremendous army of engineering and technical workers and employees will require, naturally, intensive joint efforts of scientists and production workers.

#### Unity Between Word and Action

A great deal will have to be done in the next few years to increase the individual contribution of the workers to the achievement of high end results, and to upgrade the general interest in raising work effectiveness and quality at all economic management levels. Unquestionably, the further strengthening of cost accounting and the improvement of the systems of planning and rating indicators will upgrade the responsibility of enterprise and association managers for end results of production activities. However, in our view, the improvement of the economic mechanism will also require the elaboration of systems of indicators which would enable us to assess the level and extent of optimality of economic decisions made at higher management levels, and at the same time expose omissions and errors that would be inevitable in such complex matters and that could complicate and even endanger the implementation of a specific economic program. The absence of a system for such assessment is one of the reasons for which decisions passed at the higher level of economic management remain occasionally unfulfilled within the stipulated deadline.

In the past 15 years several decrees have been passed on the construction of the second site of the Omega Tractor Plant and on undertaking here the production of new tractors needed for the comprehensive mechanization of the timber industry. Not one of them has been carried out. In each separate case entirely specific reasons for the non-fulfillment of could be found. For example, in the formulation of the plan for the plant's production during the 10th Five-Year Plan a considerable increase in the production of tractors with hydraulic gears was contemplated. Correspondingly, the capital construction plan called for funds for the development of industrial areas for the production of new, progressive-type machines. However, in the course of a subsequent amendment of the plant's five-year plan the capital investments needed for this purpose were deleted. The plan for the production of tractors with hydraulic controls was left unchanged. This obviously resulted in its non-fulfillment by the collective.

As we know, our state strictly punishes economic managers who pad results with a view to claiming better production activities. However, irresponsible economic decisions, and plans based on wishes not supported by corresponding material and technical resources, and the still-existing practice of distributing "fresh air" by issuing the enterprises production orders without resources, are equally intolerable and harmful to society. All such phenomena, firmly condemned by the party, are not the least important in developing aspirations in one or another economic unit to achieve

"favorable" activity indicators at all cost. However, such "successes" turn into national economic losses and harm the cause of the communist upbringing of the working people.

The economic manager, whatever his level, must take always and fully the moral and educational consequences of his decisions. In all cases he must promote unity between word and action. This was yet once again emphasized to our economic cadres in the CC CPSU decree "On Improving Further Ideological and Political-Educational Work." The optimizing of economic management conditions, whose program was adopted in July 1979 by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, will unquestionably strengthen the objective base for such unity. However, it would be naive to assume that the exceptionally complex and contradictory process of social production could be shaped at one point, in full, as an ideal system of indicators which would automatically insure the adoption of optimum economic relations with no exception whatever and their full consistency with the interests of society. That is why under the conditions of even the most advanced system for planning and economic incentive the subjective factor, the business qualities of the economic manager, his party mindedness and his statesmanlike approach to the work, will be of tremendous importance. In the course of the production process situations always arise, and will obviously continue to arise, in which the manager will face the choice of worsening one or another indicator in the activities of the economic unit he heads in the interest of the entire national economy, or else sacrifice the high national economic end results for the sake of narrow departmental interests.

All of us know the complex situation which has currently developed in terms of railroad rolling stock. The plant's collective, together with the collective of the Petrosavodsk section of the Oktyabr'skaya Railroad, has done extensive work aimed at improving the utilization of the rolling stock. In particular, a loading system was developed making it possible to ship on a single flatcar three rather than two tractors. Naturally, this demanded of the enterprise additional outlays related to the temporary dismantling of the loading frames of the tractor and a considerably firmer fastening to the flatcar. However, this loading system made it possible to release about 1,000 flatcars per year and to save the national economy over 200,000 rubles. It is entirely obvious that in such situations the economic manager not only has the right, but the duty to make additional expenditures, since they are dictated by the interest of the matter and would enable us to achieve higher national economic results. Naturally, in such cases the superior economic management organs as well should take into consideration the reasons for this decision, even if occasionally it is not consistent with the letter of the corresponding instruction.

Party mindedness in economic management presumes an interested, a statesmanlike approach, free from departmental or parochial considerations, in formulating programs for the development of the sector and the enterprise, and a principled self-assessment by the manager of the results of his own



activities and high personal responsibility for the consequences of his decisions. Upgrading this responsibility is inseparably linked with broadening the economic independence of the manager, as petty supervision over him can only hinder the work. Unquestionably, the activities of the manager must be clearly regulated. However, the documents and stipulations regulating it must offer scope for maneuvering, for initiative. Petty supervision makes it possible for the careless economic manager to avoid decisions raised by life and cling to the paragraphs of numerous instructions.

The measures earmarked by the party and the government to improve centralized planning and intensify cost accounting have been further developed through the tried practice of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism in national economic management. As we know, this extensive program for improving the economic mechanism will be concretized in a number of normative "working" documents and instructions. A large number of ministries and departments will participate in their formulation. We believe that it would be very important in this connection to take into consideration the experience gained in the implementation of the economic reform in industry, whose beginning was marked with the decisions of the September 1965 CC CPSU Plenum and of the 23d party congress. In particular, these decisions considerably broadened the cost-accounting rights of enterprise managers. This yielded immediate returns. It is no secret, however, that after a while these rights were substantially restricted through a variety of departmental instructions.

Thus, for example, the Regulation on the Socialist Industrial Enterprise clearly defined these rights in the use of the social development fund of the collective. Subsequent instructions clearly contradicting this document restricted the enterprise's possibility to use this fund to subsidize workers' nutrition and pay for transportation used for social purposes. For a number of years nightshift workers or workers working in particularly difficult conditions were granted free food by our plant. However, some time ago an explanation was received to the effect that since the corresponding instruction dealt only with reducing the cost of the food, the enterprise had no right to feed its workers free of charge. Reduce the cost of feeding the workers, we were told, even by 99%. However, paying for the food, even though on a purely symbolic basis, should be retained. The question is what has been essentially changed in the procedure used by the enterprise in handling its social development fund by the fact that nightshift workers would pay four kopeks for their food? Nothing! The workers are puzzled as to why the plant has demanded of them these unfortunate kopeks. Here is another example: Thousands of Omega families spend their Saturdays and Sundays at the plant's rest bases. However, the same instruction forbids the enterprise from subsidizing the cost of the buses with which we transport our workers to these bases. Such restrictions are motivated by the need to intensify control over fund expenditures. However, could it be that the enterprise's management and its public organizations are less interested than the authors of such instructions in spending the economic incentive funds earned by the collective as profitably as possible?

The desire to regulate every step of the economic manager could lead to absurdities. For example, there is an instruction according to which double glass panels in plant premises are allowed only if they are at the height of the worker. Higher than that, single glass panels are required. Since we cannot violate the procedure and accept from the construction workers (and this is in Karelia, with its long, cold winter and frequent winds!) industrial premises with windows consistent with the instruction, afterwards, using funds for capital repairs, we put double panels to maintain the necessary warmth in the shops.

The systematic abandonment of the petty regulation of economic activities is a mandatory condition for strengthening democratic principles in production management. "It is important," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the November 1979 CC CPSU Plenum, "for the superior organs not to infringe on the rights granted enterprises, associations and labor collectives."

The creative initiative of labor collectives, the adamant efforts and selfless work of each one of them determine, in the final account, the successful implementation of the program for economic reorganization aimed at considerably upgrading public production effectiveness, accelerating scientific and technical progress and the growth of labor productivity, and improving quality and, on this basis, insuring the steady upsurge of the socialist economy and the people's prosperity.

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## RENOVATED LAND

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[Article by V. Arkhipenko]

[Text] It is the unanimous agreement of the population of the Vakhsh Valley that the best time of year here is autumn. During the season the valley becomes an area of abundance as though the embodiment of the inexhaustible generosity of nature. The sun swells the heavy grapes, colorful pomegranates and clusters of golden lemons. In the orchards the branches of the fruit trees are bent under the heavy fruits. Big and sweet tomatoes cover the earth, along with the green vines of cucumbers and squash. Visitors are overwhelmed by the size of melons and watermelon, the sweetness of the locally grown onions and the spiciness of the pepper. In this valley, surrounded by mountain ridges, bountiful crops of fruits, vegetables, wheat, corn and feed grasses are collected.

However, all these crops take second place to the most significant and valuable crop, the one which concerns the farmers more than anything else. Cotton is the real ruler of the area. Its fields, its glistening white clusters, framed by the straight lines of mulberry trees, stretch over tens of kilometers.

The entire valley is crossed by canals, dams and manmade reservoirs; the extensive irrigation network brings, like a blood circulation system, vivifying moisture to the cotton, brings life to the truck gardens and vineyards and wheat fields, plane trees and the bright flowers in towns and settlements.

Three manmade lakes shine like mirrors under the sun among the mountain spurs smoothly dropping toward the valley. Under pressure, their water flows to the turbines of the Golovnaya, Perepadnaya and Tsentral'naya hydroelectric power plants and, passing through dam sluices, noisily flows into the main canals. Metal masts supporting braided cables lead, along the mountain ridges and slopes and the valley, toward the enterprises. They feed energy to the machinery and systems of the biggest nitrogen fertilizer plant in Central Asia, which supplies fertilizer to cotton growers in

neighboring republics; they stretch toward the shops of the Kurgan-Tyube Transformer Plant, whose goods are exported to 37 countries; they provide power to three powerful pumps pumping water to the mountain plateaus.

At night, when darkness falls over the banks of the Vakhsh, billions of big stars shine in the endless southern skies. The bright spots of distant galaxies glisten like pearls. It is as though competing with the stars that manmade lights burst out along the valley--in the windows of plant shops and workshops, housing, roads, bridges, canal lines and cotton ginning yards. One can see, from the height of the mountain pass, how down in the valley chains and laceworks of lights merge, interweave, forming complex, golden patterns and strange galaxies. The view is truly fabulous. However, it makes us think of entirely earthly and real matters: the new life of the Vakhsh Valley began 50 years ago, a valley today justifiably described as the pearl of Tadzhikistan.

### The Pioneers

Actually, today as well one could see and feel the land as it was 50 years ago. All it takes is to reach the end of a field and cross the ditch bordering it. The thin slice of water is the boundary separating two worlds. On the one side stretch the even rows of plants with their succulent leaves and stems; on the other is the cracked soil covered with rusty loess dust under the burning sun.

This was the case 50 years ago of the entire Vakhsh Valley, which covers 100 kilometers stretching from north to south. The sole exception was a strip of river flood land, covered by impenetrable growths of tall reeds.

Even before the revolution the population of the Kurgan-Tyube Province, part of the Bukhara Khanate, had tried to build even a small irrigation system. However, at periods of high water the Vakhsh swelled, storming the earthen dikes and easily washing them away. Rarely did it happen that during a given season the water could be kept on the fields. However, on the absolutely flat surface of the flood land it had no outlet. It stagnated and brought the salt from the ground to the surface. This led to the appearance of saline swamps, which were impassible, covered by moist evaporating steam, where only reeds and clouds of mosquitoes grew.

The local population, virtually all them suffering from malaria, left the doomed areas, seeking a better life in the foothills. Subsequently, during the civil war which dragged on in Tadzhikistan, following the ruinous Basmak raids, the valley became entirely deserted. Areas under cultivation totaled even less than 5,000 hectares. Miniscule villages stretched along the river and the shores of the small, hand-dug Dzhuybor and Dzhilikul' canals.

Yet a time came when even here, in this abandoned and neglected area which was considered "wild" even by its former ruler--the Emir of Bukhara--new

life came. In 1929 the VKP(b) Central Committee instructed the Glavkhlopkom [Main Cotton Commissariat] to consider the creation of an irrigation network along the Vakhsh. That year is considered as the beginning of the gradual development of the Vakhsh Valley.

A number of economic, technical and social problems had to be resolved. Extensive capital investments were needed, along with research covering tremendous areas and the efforts of tens of thousands of people equipped with earth-removal tools and transport facilities. Soviet engineers developed the construction plan. However, since we had no experience in the building of big irrigation systems, a group of American specialists were invited as consultants. Following the studies, addressing the governmental commission, the American engineer Ludwell Gordon directly stated that, ". . . Mankind is not familiar with work under such circumstances. Forgive me but this seems impossible to me."

Passing his sentence, the American consultant based his view on objective conditions: he took into consideration the restiveness of the wild Vakhsh, the local climate, the total lack of roads, the absence of skilled manpower and many other factors. Nevertheless, despite the conclusion, the USSR Sovnarkom, hearing the Soviet specialists, decided that a "Vakhshstroy" would be established!

The construction project gathered speed rapidly thanks to the talent of the designers and work managers, and the enthusiasm of thousands of workers who came from all parts of the country, and their selflessness and skill in surmounting difficulties.

At that time there was no new construction project with comfortable working and living conditions. However, Vakhshstroy was the most difficult among them. In the summer, even in the shade, the thermometer showed 50 degrees centigrade. Water for the tracks had to be carried tens of kilometers in barrels and tankers, and was not always sufficient. The mosquitoes from the saline swamps exhausted the people with malaria. More than anything else, the construction workers cursed the omnipresent loess dust which choked the lungs.

At the peak of the work as many as 20,000 people worked at the Vakhsh Valley, driving thousands of horses and camels. However, extensive equipment was used as well. Supplying the shock projects, the country found means to purchase machinery and equipment abroad. Vakhshstroy had 500 tractors and hundreds of trucks--an impressive number even today, and quite fantastic at that time. The newspapers proudly wrote that more excavators were concentrated in that area than in the building of the world-famous Panama Canal.

The pace of the construction was headlong. In three-and-a-half years the main canal with its numerous spurs was completed.

The noteworthy date of 12 September 1933 came. In addition to the builders of Vakhshstroy, thousands of peasants rallied along the still-dry banks of the head section of the main canal, arriving from various places in Tadzhikistan. A thunderous explosion was heard at 1015 hundred hours, blasting the dam. The Vakhsh water stormily rushed into the canal flowing downwards. Happy people were running after it along the banks. They threw their cloth caps and skull caps into the canal, and drew water with their hands, washing their hot faces, and cried without shame. The centuries-old dream of the peasants was coming true . . . .

The Vakhsh irrigation system--the offspring of the First Five-Year Plan--irrigated over 70,000 hectares. In terms of scale it outstripped the biggest irrigation systems in the world. Tens of cotton-growing sovkhoses and kolkhoses appeared on the soil fed the life-bringing moisture.

The development of the Vakhsh Valley continued in the subsequent five-year plans. In the first postwar years thousands of new hectares were irrigated. When the buildings of three hydroelectric power plants were completed along the Vakhsh the possibility appeared for pumping water to the river terraces. In the 1960's the irrigation workers developed the Garautinskiy Massif and the still continuing irrigation of the Tashrabadskiy Massif was undertaken.

The construction of a 7.5-kilometers-long tunnel through the Karatau Ridge was completed in 1968. Water reached the Yavanskaya Valley, surrounded by mountains. Today cotton crops here cover over 16,000 hectares. Vegetables, fruit, and grapes grow here.

The current advance on the Virgin Land has gone beyond the Vakhsh Valley, reaching the very borders of Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast. Day and night tractors, dump trucks and excavators rumble in the Beshkentskaya Valley and powerful explosions shake the rocks. Here, at a shock Komsomol construction project, the modern pioneers--the heirs of the labor glory of the heroes of the First Five-Year Plan--are building a new irrigation system. Naturally, their equipment is far more powerful. However, even today work here is not easy. In summer the sun heats up the rocky, totally virgin land; in the winter the fingers stick to the cold metal. Year-round gusty winds raise clusters of loess dust, making breathing harder and dirtying the engines. The main canal must be pierced through thick rock, or else run between manmade banks in the valleys.

In the final year of the five-year plan the building of an irrigation system covering over 13,000 hectares will be completed. Next will be the creation of a manmade lake among the mountains. This will make it possible to irrigate twice as much land. This will be followed by the development of the Karadumskiy Massif, where new sovkhoses will be set up. Difficult work lies ahead, for the development of cotton fields on plateaus is far more complex than on smooth bottom land. An irrigated field tolerates neither mounds (not reached by the water), nor hollows (where the moisture

accumulates). It must be quite smooth and slightly at an angle, so that the water from the canal will reach by gravity the end of each furrow. This means the shifting of thousands and thousands of cubic meters of soil, cutting down mounds, covering depressions and perfectly leveling the surface of the field. This work requires fine skills and precise computations.

Today's Virgin Land pioneers are highly skilled and experienced people. They are equipped with modern facilities--powerful tractors, bulldozers, scrapers, bucket and rotary excavators, drain-laying machines, vibrators and heavy-duty dump trucks. Above all, they have the unquenchable flame of enthusiasm, passed on by the Vakhsh construction workers to all subsequent generations of transformers of this area.

### The Battle for Cotton

Visitors to the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy who see a cotton plant for the first time curiously look at the shrubs covered with fluffy, white clumps. Usually, far less attention is paid to boles with cream colored staples. Yet following the guide's explanation, this cotton is looked at respectfully. No need to explain its advantages to the population of the Vakhshaya Valley. Everyone knows that this is the fine staple cotton, the most valuable and needed. Without it no high-quality staple could be spun, no fine cloth made. In both strength and appearance it is fully equal to expensive silk. Particularly solid cord for airplane tires, parachute fabrics and many other items are made of it.

Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast is the biggest center for the production of this "cream colored cotton."

It was precisely here that it was born. The young agronomists N. A. Antonov, P. G. Artemov and A. I. Shiyan, who came to work at the Saray-Kamarskiy Agricultural Center, pioneered its growth in the 1920's. They started with . . . 27 seeds of Egyptian cotton brought in a handkerchief. The story has it that a silly kid tried to graze the first shoots. A wall of clay had to be built around each of the protected blades. Whether the story is true or not, it is precisely known that on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution, the agronomists collected the first several boles of the first crop. Three years later the seeds obtained from the agricultural station by the Vakhsh Sovkhoz were sufficient for planting 3,000 hectares. Following the completion of the new irrigation system, 10,000 hectares were planted in this cotton.

However, it became quickly apparent that under local conditions the Egyptian fine-staple strains were unreliable, frequently becoming diseased and unable to ripen before the cold. Agronomist P. G. Artemov, who headed the seed-growing farm developed in the valley, tried to find a solution by thoroughly selecting the seeds from the hardiest boles. His new assistant, agronomist V. P. Krasichkov, went further, developing new strains. In the prewar years the hybrids developed by the Soviet selection workers were already used over vast areas.

Returning from the war, Krasichkov engaged in interspecies hybridization. He began to cross plants with drastically dissimilar characteristics, raised under different natural conditions. This was a painstaking, intensive and frequently ungrateful effort, for frequently after tens and hundreds of experiments initially promising strains had to be abandoned. However, Krasichkov lacked neither persistence nor patience. He was able to develop the 504-B strain, which was superior to the others in the Vakhsh Valley and totally replaced the "Egyptians." Even more promising strains were developed subsequently. Today the basic areas in the south of Tadzhikistan use strains 6,249 and 6,465. They both have the letter index "V," meaning "from Vakhsh." Hero of Socialist Labor Vyacheslav Prokof'yevich Krasichkov, member of the Tadzhik SSR Academy of Sciences and laureate of the USSR State Prize, developed them together with his student agronomist Bobo Sanginov, who after the death of the Russian scientist, is continuing the adamant selection research.

The developed strains are the fastest ripening among all fine-staple cotton strains in the world. This cotton, described as "silky," is far more disease resistant. It yields itself far more easily to machine processing and has a type of staple enjoying the greatest demand among textile workers. Its most valuable quality is its high yields.

Initially the Soviet strains of fine-staple cotton yielded as much as 10 quintals per hectare. Abroad this indicator would be considered quite high even today. For the past two years Vakhsh Valley has averaged over 30 quintals per hectare, while individual brigades have raised over 50. No cotton-growing country has ever reached such high yields.

Today a single unit area yields double or triple and sometimes quintuple more than the first postwar selection strains. Naturally, however, this is influenced also by the higher agro-technical standard, the use of substantial amounts of fertilizer and the increased amount of farming knowledge. Naturally, the attitude of the people toward the work is of tremendous significance.

The best cotton growers, the aces, occasionally reach results which scientists are unable to achieve even on experimental sectors where just about every plant is taken care of individually. In 1978 the brigade headed by Khodzhakul Kuvvatov averaged 53.6 quintals of fine-staple cotton per hectare. This was a somewhat sensational result.

Asked by journalists the secret of his success, he answered: "Simple: I work in the fields from morning till dark . . . ." The answer may appear simplistic. However, it means a great deal. Indeed, Kuvvatov's labor day, from the time of the sowing to the picking, is as long as daylight. Within that time the brigade leader does not even think of days of rest. He can cover literally all 108 hectares in one day. Yet, there is cultivation and cultivation. Kuvvatov's sharp eyes will immediately notice anything wrong: the land may be over dry and be watered, while the neighboring section may



have excess moisture which would rot the roots; in some areas the plants are shorter, requiring additional feeding; elsewhere they may even grow too fast, which calls for clipping the upper shoots.

The survey is immediately followed by orders concerning watering, fertilizing, weeding, spraying or loosening the crust formed after rain. . . . The next morning the brigade leader checks everything and everything starts all over again. The tension reaches its limit during the harvesting period, which may last up to three months. At this time even daylight is insufficient. The pace is hard. However, such work, bordering on heroism, can lead to Kuvvatov's results.

. . . In 1979 the cotton growers of Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast, along with all of Tadzhikistan, were faced with a most severe trial. Toward the end of April the temperature dropped sharply and torrential rains fell, totally washing away the seeds over huge areas. This called for replanting and breaking up the clay crust which had formed around the remaining plants. In May a new downpour with hail caused considerable losses and required another replanting. New surprises came in the summer--unexpected cooling alternating with gusts of drying south winds, locally known as the "Afghan," crushing the tender plants. The natives themselves could not remember so many natural disasters.

The circumstances in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes were like at the front: for days the people did not sleep, falling down from fatigue, carefully caring for each plant. Yet despite the heroic efforts of the cotton growers, the cotton was simply unable to ripen and the bolls did not open before the coming of the cold season. Under such difficult circumstances no known foreign strain would have ripened. However, the domestic strains did not fail: on 26 November the people of Kurgan-Tyube reported the fulfillment of their plan, and several days later, the fulfillment of their pledges. The brigades headed by Khodzhabkul Kuvvatov, Safar Soliyev, Normurod Khidirov, and Abdudzhabor Tangirov, which averaged over 50 quintals of grain per hectare, became the true heroes of the harvest. The mechanizers displayed brilliant skill. The best among them--Dzhema Soliyev and Khukmitdin Fazylov--harvested over 500 tons of cotton each for the season.

Along with the dedication and persistence of the cotton growers, this success was also due to the work of Tadzhikistan selection workers whose "offspring" indeed proved to be champions in early ripening.

Seeing in the fields the strong cotton plants, covered from top to bottom with snow-white bolls, unwittingly one is proud of the achievements of our scientists and cotton growers. It is insulting that such outstanding, unique strains, unequalled in the world, do not even have names, but are marked merely by figures and letters. Why not give them euphonious, beautiful, memorable names? They fully deserve this.

The cotton growers of Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast are also testing strains induced by selectioneering workers from other republics. In our conditions the branchy ASh-25 cotton plant, whose staple is superior to world standards, yielded 43.7 quintals per hectare--nearly triple the yield in Turkmenia, where it was introduced.

However, a major problem exists in the growing of fine-staple cotton. It is far more labor intensive, ripens more slowly and requires considerable amounts of fertilizer. Yet it fetches the same price as the average staple quality. Naturally, for this reason, growing fine-staple cotton becomes unprofitable to the farms. The kolkhoz and sovkhos workers believe that the time has long come to review the system of material incentives in terms of paying for strains with high-quality staple and to apply different payment coefficients. This will greatly improve matters.

### Virgin Land Types

Approaching the Beshkent Valley, a transparency by the side of the main canal is visible from afar: "The people raised grain on the land and the raised the people." In this area, brought to life by the willpower of the pioneers and their working hands, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's words on the Virgin Land are felt particularly profoundly. Here one meets everywhere the "Virgin Land type" shown in the faces of the people. The Virgin Land people are with a special temperament. They are persistent and enduring. They know how to surmount most unexpected difficulties. Their characteristic feature is optimism, even under most Spartan living conditions.

Vakhshstroy molded firm and willful natures. It became the starting grounds for the labor careers of thousands of young people who honorably began their career by inseparably linking their destinies with those of the country. This involved the roads to the front, the difficult postwar days and the headlong rush of the five-year plans.

Today few Vakhshstroy veterans remain. Their lives, professions, inclinations and likings developed differently. However, meeting them one unwittingly feels that they share something in common: a spiritual generosity, a feeling of involvement with the common cause and inability to lead a tranquil life.

Mariya Sergeyevna Vlasova, honored irrigation worker of the Tadzhik Republic, lives not far from the main canal. She came here half a century ago and stayed on. To this day she works as an engineer at the irrigation system. She is familiar with each branch of the canal. She has studied the "holes" of each reservoir, collection center or pumping unit. She is personally acquainted with hundreds of irrigation workers. She should have long taken her well-deserved rest. However, she is unable to leave her favorite work. True, in the winter, Mariya Sergeyevna may tell her friends that one should go back to Moscow, that she has stayed here long enough. . . . However, when the spring comes, when the apricots and almond trees

blossom, and when the slopes of the mountains close by turn green, she forgets her words and is unwilling to leave the place where she spent her youth.

Sergey Zosimovich Miroschnichenko, Vlasova's fellow worker in "Vakhshstroy," and of the same age, lives in Dushanbe. At the beginning of the 1930's he was deputy chief of the construction of the narrow-gauge tracks which Komsomol members laid in a record-setting time from the port on the Pyandzh to Kurgan-Tyube. With the exception of the war years his entire labor career has been linked to the Tadzhikistan irrigation projects. By the time he retired he was deputy minister of land reclamation in the republic. He stayed home for a while then returned to the ministry as scientific secretary.

Poet Mirsaid Mirshakar is also from Dushanbe. At "Vakhshstroy" he was a Komsomol leader, and then became a newspaperman. His first poems were inspired by the labor exploits of the Vakhshstroy workers and he dedicated his first poem to a Russian worker-dredger operator. His friendship with the Ukrainian Komsomol member Platon Voron'ko began at the construction site. As the years went by both became acknowledged poets, loved by the people, and authors of many books. Today as well their main topic is the great accomplishments of their contemporaries.

The pioneers are vividly remembered in Tadzhikistan. To this day they are the topics of books, motion pictures, articles and poems. They are discussed in lectures and in radio broadcasts. In the Vakhsh Settlement a street has been named after N. A. Anipin--a legendary person who headed the most important sectors in "Vakhshstroy." In Dushanbe a street is named after V. K. Karamov, a talented engineer who began his career at the same project and who subsequently built the first hydroelectric power plants in the republic.

Regrettably, the name of S. K. Kalizhnyuk--a skillful, energetic and persistent manager--has not been honored yet. The Vakhshstroy veterans remember him with a feeling of admiration. He did not leave the tempestuous Vakhsh. He spent the last years of his life at the Nurekskaya GES, heading the famed collective of its builders.

Currently, in honor of the 50th anniversary of the development of the Vakhsh Valley, there is a plan to build a monument in Kurgan-Tyube to the heroes of the First Five-Year Plan. Let us hope that this will be a grandiose, touching monument, worthy of the memory of the people who made a once desert area bloom.

The republic also feels deep respect for those who came to replace the Vakhshstroy builders, who founded the first Virgin Land kolkhozes, who developed the irrigated land and who extensively promoted Soviet cotton strains and the new way of life. One five-year plan after another, builders, farmers, selection workers and party workers enhanced the economy of the area and did everything they could to make it a fertile oasis.

At the Kolkhoz imeni Zhdanov, Kumsangirskiy Rayon, everyone, young or old, addresses Abdurazyk Rakhmonov as "bobo-rai." Translated from the Tadzhik this is the equivalent of "grandfather-chairman." Yes, he is not young, and has experienced a great deal over the past decades. He remembers his hungry childhood in a poverty-stricken village, the heavy hoe held by arms still weak, the moving of the family in the hot Vakhsh Valley, the difficult times of developing the Virgin Land and the flames of the front lines. . . . Nor does he forget the first kolkhoz--15 peasant families who moved from Khodzhen, the earthen huts on the banks of the Kumsangirskiy Canal and, around them, the still virgin land and for many kilometers around them, not a single tree or shrub. Their first crops were ridiculous--about three quintals of cotton per hectare.

Today the Kolkhoz imeni Zhdanov is a powerful and rich farm whose revenue is in the millions. Its fields spread over 3,500 hectares. In 1979 it averaged 32 quintals of row cotton per hectare! Today's kolkhoz members do not know what an earthen hut is. They live in spacious, modern homes, surrounded by green gardens. On the suggestion of the chairman, the new urban-type settlement was named Orza, which in Russian means dream. To a certain extent the name embodies the dream come true of Abdurazyk Rakhmonov himself, who began his career as a poor peasant and rose to the leadership of one of the best farms in the republic, who became a Hero of Socialist Labor, and is the bearer of three orders of Lenin and other orders.

People came from many different areas to develop the Virgin Land here. Let us recall that according to the 1926 census the entire Vakhsh Valley was inhabited by only 11,500 people. Today the population of the territory is half a million. As a rule, the population of Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast are either migrants or the children or grandchildren of migrants. The overwhelming majority of labor collectives in Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast is multinational. Russians, Ukrainians, Turkmens, Kirgiz, Greeks and Arabs work at the enterprises and kolkhozes. Let us take as an example the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, Kolkhozabadskiy Rayon. Kolkhoz chairman A. Dustov is a Tadzhik; T. Nuraliyev, his deputy, is Uzbek; chief engineer A. Schnayder is a German; S. Avdanov, head of the dairy farm, is a Kazakh; B. Mikhnev, head of the garage, is a Bashkir; mechanic P. Chilibiyeu is Greek and his colleague D. Ablyakimov is a Tatar.

Most of the people of Kurgan-Tyube, however, are Tadzhiks and Uzbeks. Particularly large numbers of people came here from the mountain areas. Moving into the valley and settling in modern and comfortable settlements and with new labor conditions drastically changed the way of life of the Pamir mountaineers. The overwhelming majority rapidly settled in the new way of life. The people became mechanizers, expert cotton growers, animal husbandrymen, truck gardeners or farm managers.

A typical life is that of Mamura Gadoyeva--a milkmaid at the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, Kolkhozabadskiy Rayon. She barely remembers the mountainous

Penzhikent, which she left as a small girl. At the new place, going to work at the livestock farm, her mother became a leading milkmaid, famous throughout the republic. Mamura herself, after 16 years of work, is achieving ever new successes: in 1978 she milked 4,886 kilograms of milk per cow; the following year she went beyond the 5,000 kilogram mark.

Another native of a mountain village--Mirzosharif Mirzomuradov--had a hard life as a child. His parents died early in life and he began to care for himself as an adolescent. Eighteen years ago, after graduating from a vocational-technical school, his labor career began at the "Vakhshvodstroy" Trust. First as a bulldozer operator, and subsequently as a brigade leader, he became one of the best mechanizers in Tadzhikistan. The people of Kurgan-Tyube elected him deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The noted mechanizer was elected deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities. The members of the collective where he works believe that Mirzomuradov has the amazing ability to pack his time: he skillfully leads his brigade, regularly overfulfills assignments, engages in extensive governmental work as deputy, heads the housing commission of the trade union committee and is a student, successfully attending the agricultural institute as a correspondence student. Currently Mirzomuradov's brigade is leveling the land of the Tashrabadskiy Massif.

Here several new kolkhozes have already been set up. Settlements have been built and new orchard gardens have been planted. The work started by the Virgin Land workers of the First Five-Year Plan is being properly continued by today's pioneers--people of other generations, with a different, much higher level of knowledge. Their characters, however, are similar--those of Virgin Land people.

The Kurgan-Tyube people will properly celebrate the 50th anniversary of the development of the Vakhshkaya Valley: the state received from them cotton and grain, vegetables, melon crops, fruits, grapes, silk cocoons and karakul lambskins above the plan.

#### Looking for New Resources

The land in the Vakhsh Valley most suitable for agricultural production was developed even before the war. Machine irrigation made it possible to utilize the areas of the higher terraces. Unused areas may be found only in the mountain plateaus. Soon, however, this land reserve as well will be put to use. The further considerable expansion of new areas could be achieved only through the intensive utilization of mountain slopes. However, non-irrigated farming alone is possible here.

For decades there was the sneaking suspicion among the people that irrigated farming was the only kind possible in the area. True, the population of the local villages had sown wheat along the slopes. Yet despite the agro-technology which had improved in the course of time, and despite the use of chemicals and fertilizers, yields did not exceed seven to eight quintals per hectare.

Yet scientific experiments proved that there were many areas in the foothills where the microclimate itself and the great amount of moisture in the soil would make it possible to grow good fruit and grape harvests without irrigation. The first specialized farms working without irrigation were set up in Tadzhikistan in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The Fakhrabad Sovkhoz is one of them. Its land spreads along the mountain slopes reaching down to the Vakhsh Valley.

Initially the population of the nearby villages showed great skepticism at the very idea of growing grapes in such areas. Indeed, at first things did not go well--the vines grew poorly, withered away or froze. The vines had to be covered with soil by hand and their hoeing after the winter was again by hand. Naturally, this called for extensive amounts of work and raised production costs.

Recalling the difficult growing period, sovkhos director Egamberdy Bobadzhanov occasionally wonders himself how all this could be surmounted. What won was the persistence of the people and the careful care given each plant, and the latest agro-technical methods. Systematically the sovkhos expanded its area and its yields rose.

Now, along the highway stretching from the mountain pass to the flood land, the green rows of the vineyards stretch one kilometer after another, supported by concrete posts. In August they become heavy with juicy grapes. Essentially, two types of grapes are grown here. The black frosted small Kishmish grapes are honey sweet; the "rose-colored teyfa" grapes are larger, reddish, more acid. Frequently clusters weighing over three kilograms may be found in the vineyards of the Fakhrabad Sovkhoz, and it must be pointed out that such grapes lack no customers in the stores.

In the year of the 50th anniversary of the development of Vakhsh Valley the sovkhos averaged 150 quintals of grapes per hectare, a total of 12,000 tons! By the end of August, one year ahead of schedule, the Fakhrabad collective reported the fulfillment of its five-year plan.

Non-irrigated viticulture and truck gardening offer a major possibility for the utilization of the local land. Obviously, however, this soon will come to an end as well. That is why, continuing the development of the Vakhsh Valley, it is necessary to think more and more not about quantity but quality increases. The new Virgin Land means, today, selection work, intensification of farming and practical utilization of modern scientific developments and, in the final account, the better utilization of the economic mechanism.

Promoting the initiative of the working people is a permanent and truly inexhaustible reserve for all types of output. A "workers relay race" was originated on the banks of the Vakhsh among the construction workers of the Nurekskaya GES. It played a decisive role in accelerating the pace and putting the power plant into operation at full capacity one year ahead of

schedule. Along the banks of the Vakhsh the farmers are now promoting the "farmers' relay race," which has spread throughout all kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Here the competition is developing ever more extensively under the slogan of "The Emblem of Quality for Every Field." Both initiatives enable the farmers to substantially increase yields.

The search goes on. The idea of growing two grain crops per year was born at the kolkhozes of Kurgan-Tyubinskaya Oblast. For example, the farms of Kabodiyenskiy and Shaartuzskiy rayons plant two corn crops on the same area, averaging a total of 120 quintals of grain per hectare. The brigade headed by Mingtur Butayev obtains the same yields alternating wheat with corn. After the cotton harvest to oblast kolkhozes plant fodder crops, such as barley, oats and local strains of peas. The crops are mowed between the end of March and the beginning of April, and cotton is planted again. On the recommendation of the Tadzhik SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Plant Physiology and Biophysics, one of the sovkhozes in Yavanskiy Rayon followed the cotton crop with rye, vetch and rape. In the spring, when there is great scarcity of fresh fodder, now an additional 400 quintals of green mass per hectare is obtained.

The plans of the Vakhsh citrus growers are extensive. The Tadzhik lemons are thin skinned, juicy and flavorful and an exceptionally profitable crop. On the fourth year of growth each tree yields up to 150 lemons. Record crops have totaled up to 1,200 lemons! Vladimir Ivanovich Tsulaya, a man who has dedicated his entire life as a selection scientist to the development of citrus fruits in the Vakhsh Valley, believes that Tadzhik lemons have a great future. Whereas today the overall area of kolkhoz and sovkhoz trench lemon crops reaches 1,040 hectares, in the foreseeable future it will be increased by a factor of more than five.

In the recent five-year plans, along with the agricultural development of the Vakhsh areas, their headlong industrial development was undertaken. In the prewar and first postwar years, primarily plants for the processing of agricultural raw materials were built here. This was followed by a transformer plant and a nitrogen fertilizer plant. The time has now come to build new production facilities requiring tremendous power intensiveness. Their impetus was provided by the Nurekskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant. This GES is unequalled in a number of aspects. While less powerful than the Siberian power giants, it is noticeably more productive than its sisters along the Volga. It is precisely here that progressive scientific thinking was embodied in the 300-meter-high earth dam, the highest in the world, benefiting from an original structure and machine units. Also unique is its water reservoir, which feeds not only the canals and ditches of the Vakhsh Valley, but the irrigation system of neighboring republics as well. In all weather conditions this manmade sea holding 10.5 billion cubic meters of water impeccably meets all irrigations requirements.

The Nurekskaya GES is the power heart of the Yuzhno-Tadzhikskiy Territorial Production Complex, developed in accordance with the decisions of the 24th

and 25th CPSU congresses. It covers over one-third of the entire territory of Tadzhikistan, inhabited by two-thirds of the republic's population. The proven mineral reserves here--petroleum, coal, salt and calcites--guarantee tempestuous industrial development. The power resources of the Vakhsh and Pyandzh rivers are fantastic, exceeding the potential of the Volga and Kama rivers. The electric power plants built here could generate annually as much as 116 billion kilowatt hours of electric power.

This is not a project for the distant future. The famed construction collective of the Nure'skaya GES is already relocating itself on the new construction areas. Some of the construction workers are undertaking the building of the Baypazinskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant. The water reaching its turbines will come from the Nurekskoye Water Reservoir, flowing along a tunnel six meters in diameter. In terms of current concepts the capacity of this station will be relatively small--600,000 kilowatts. Yet, another one, built higher up on the Vakhsh, in the Rogunskoye Canyon will be more powerful by a factor of six.

The development of the Vakhsh is continuing. Starting with the First Five-Year Plan, to this day, and from today into the future stretches the uninterrupted line of search and heroic accomplishments. Ever more daring and broad plans are being implemented.

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## CONTRARY TO COMMON SENSE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 94-100

[Article by N. Polyakov]

[Text] Europe has entered the 1980's, and the people are asking: What kind of years will they be? Looking at the past decade, they note with satisfaction that the policy of detente yielded good results. Despite the difficulties placed in its way, the members of the socialist comity and the realistically thinking Western circles were able, step by step, to lay for Europe the main road of detente, whose purpose is to rescue forever our continent from the tragedy of military conflicts. This even makes Europeans more concerned, who are looking at NATO's idea of converting Western Europe into the launching pad of a new generation of American nuclear missiles, an intention which threatens to darken the future and dangerously undermine it.

At the end of last year the North Atlantic Bloc Council session, held in Brussels (on the level of ministers of foreign affairs and defense) decided to deploy in Western Europe 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 Cruise missiles. In their Brussels communique the ministers claim that it is a question merely of "modernizing" NATO's nuclear potential, and that the Europeans have nothing to worry about, for, from time to time, any kind of armament should be improved. In reality, however, it is planned to transfer to Western Europe a qualitatively new American nuclear weapon aimed at the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Despite the unabated protest of millions of Europeans and the opposition of Washington's junior partners in the Atlantic Alliance, the NATO leaders are marching toward an open conflict with the policy of detente and are trying to deal a blow at the principle of equality and identical security of the parties, which in our time has become a mandatory prerequisite for the normal development of East-West relations. Following the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of strategic armaments, which codified this principle on a global level, the authors of NATO's scenario would like to disturb the balance of forces at all costs in their favor, on the continental level.

Army Gen B. Rogers, supreme commander in chief of NATO's joint armed forces in Europe, frankly told the periodical UNITED STATES NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

that NATO's new step is "dictated by military considerations" and that, from his viewpoint, the beginning of the 1980's will become an "inordinately important risk period." The type of risk implied is understood, as explained by American military circles who, using the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, informed that they consider both the Pershing II and the Cruise missiles a "first-strike weapon aimed at targets on the territories of Warsaw Pact countries." Thus Washington and some of its partners in the Atlantic Alliance are trying to strike down an entire decade of detente, as the 70's will be known to history, and replace it with a return to the cold war.

Today the NATO leaders are trying to create the impression that their plan of converting Western Europe into the arsenal of American nuclear missiles of intermediate range is a "forced measure," and that they, allegedly, had no "other solution." No, there was a solution! It was suggested by the Soviet Union, which called for immediate talks which would have had every chance to succeed had the NATO countries which voted in Brussels in favor of the deployment of American missiles not destroyed the base which existed for such a dialog. However, both Washington and its closest allies wanted not a dialog, but a new spiral in the arms race, and not detente, but the aggravation of the circumstances and the thickening of the political atmosphere, not only in Europe, but beyond it as well. Under such conditions it becomes easier to launch into overseas adventures, such as, for example, carry out police actions by "fast deployment forces," which of late have been so intensively publicized by G. Brown, the American secretary of defense.

Indicative in this respect is that along with the Brussels Atlantic verdict President J. Carter announced a program for the further increase in the military efforts of the United States. Addressing the council of manufacturers, he sketched the outlines of a five-year American military program according to which as early as in the 1981 fiscal year, military expenditures will total \$157 billion, or nearly \$20 billion more in military appropriations than initially requested by the Administration in Washington for the 1980 fiscal year. It is clear, therefore, that the attempt to convert Western Europe into Washington's nuclear hostage is the core of a vast military conspiracy which is being woven by those who do not in the least wish to resign themselves to the existing ratio of global forces and are still hoping to turn the wheel of history back.

In an effort to justify themselves, the NATO leaders claim that a "missile gap" had appeared in the bloc's defense dike. This, it is claimed, resulted in a disturbance of the military balance on the continent and to the "intensification of the Russian threat," linked with the deployment on Soviet territory of intermediate range missiles known in the West as SS-20, and of bombers also known in the West as "Backfire." Well, the blabbering of the "dangerous Russians" does not scintillate with novelty. V. I. Lenin himself once noted that "in order to justify new armaments they try to paint a picture of dangers threatening the 'fatherland'" ("Poln. Sobr.

Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, p 182). Attempts are furthermore being made to insinuate to the Western petit bourgeois, who must pay for the new military expenditures, that the United States is doing this for their own good, in order to "counter Russian superiority."

In order to support this nonsensical version, on the eve of the meeting of the NATO ministers in Brussels, a hysterical campaign was mounted in the West to frighten the public, prevail upon recalcitrant partners and develop a psychotic atmosphere in which it would be easier to pass the decision on imposing a new American nuclear burden on Western Europe. Generals, politicians and various "experts" filled the press with their fabrications, posed on the television screens and depicted the sinister systems and dark silhouettes of Soviet missiles allegedly threatening the Europeans.

The American General Haig, former commander in chief of the Atlantic armed forces in Europe, assumed the mission of traveling salesman for the "war of nerves." He traveled around Western European capitals persuading the public not to oppose the NATO project. In a word, psychological attacks were mounted on all sides for the sole purpose of forcing Western Europe to accept that it really needs the new generation of American missiles to "balance the superiority" of the Soviet Union.

Alas, there are people who are truly unable to part with Goebbels' formula which states that "the bigger the lie, the better!" The very inventors of the legend of NATO's "missile gap" perfectly know that it is totally worthless. "NATO has no gap in its security system," authoritatively certified Count Baudissin, director of the Hamburg Institute for the Study of Problems of Peace and Security Policy, retired Bundeswehr general, and formerly high representative of the Supreme Atlantic Council, in an interview published by the West German STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG. He went on to say that, "I consider it entirely incredible that by the mid-1980's the ratio of forces would be such that the USSR would acquire favorable opportunities for the military and political use of its armed forces in Europe. . . . Clearly some experts find it difficult to accept parity, i.e., to part with the previously existing U.S. superiority in the field of strategic nuclear armaments."

The fact that Defense Secretary Brown claims in an interview given the American journal TRIALOGUE that "NATO is only energetically reacting to the challenge," by preparing to deploy new nuclear missiles in Western Europe, is an obvious attempt to turn facts upside down. Everyone knows that the deployment of Soviet missiles became necessary because of the increased Western nuclear forces. Such forces have existed since the 1950's and include American advance-base armaments which could hit Soviet territory. These are bombers based, for example, in Britain and West Germany. They include military aircraft from the aircraft carriers of the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. They include submarines carrying Poseidon missiles, assigned to NATO. They include the British and French potential.

True, France has withdrawn from NATO's military organization, but has remained a member of the bloc.

In an effort to belittle their own nuclear armaments, the NATO leaders claim that the American submarines with Poseidon missiles, assigned to the Atlantic Command, "Should not be taken into consideration," since their missiles are "already included in the Soviet-American SALT treaty." Here it is a question of substantial forces, as each submarine carries 16 missiles, each of which has 5 nuclear warheads. Where are they located: Are they within NATO's nuclear arsenal or outside its range? Christoph Bertram, director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, provides the following answer: "In the 1960's the Americans placed quite deliberately a number of their submarines carrying Poseidon missiles under NATO's command in order to achieve Euro-strategic objectives. . . . Therefore, all of them must be considered part of the Western arsenal."

Last year President J. Carter, Secretary of State C. Vance, West German Defense Minister H. Appel and others frequently claimed that an approximate balance had developed in the ratio of forces, both on the global and the European levels. C. Vance expressed this as follows: "Today the world has changed. . . . We have turned from a world in which we (i.e., the United States) enjoyed superiority in strategic armaments, to a world of parity."

NATO's secretary general, J. Luns, a cold-war promoter, was also forced to acknowledge this truth. As early as 21 October 1979, in an interview on Dutch television, he stated that an "approximate balance of forces" exists in Europe. In this case, however, it would be permissible to ask that same Luns on what basis, actually, does NATO intend to promote a "further missile armament"? Obviously, on the basis of the approximate balance he noted. This means that the West is deliberately promoting a unilateral violation of the obligations assumed in Helsinki to contribute to European security and, furthermore, to be concerned with political detente and supplementing it with military detente. This means that attempts are being made to change in NATO's favor the military-strategic circumstances on the continent, with all subsequent fatal consequences to peace in Europe and to the tranquillity of its peoples. This also means that attempts are being made once again to hang over Europe the sword of Damocles and to threaten the good initiatives which became possible as a result of the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union, the members of the socialist comity as a whole, and the realistically thinking circles in Western capitals.

The provocative undertaking of deploying in Europe a new model of American missiles did not come up suddenly, but was prepared secretly. On 2 February 1979 H. Appel admitted that the preliminary decision for the deployment of such missiles had been made as early as 1975. This was essentially confirmed by C. Vance. Recently he recalled that the years of "active consultations" lie behind. In other words, while the Atlantists were speaking of detente, in the quiet of general staffs and offices of the

military-industrial complex step by step, they were formulating the scenarios according to which Western Europe would become the nuclear vassal of the United States.

Mass pressure was used to indoctrinate the partners, particularly after the scandalous fiasco with the neutron bomb. Twice last year D. Aaron, a special envoy of the American President, toured the Western European capitals. His assignment was to prevail upon the refractory allies, above all the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Belgium, which at first did not even want to hear about the American project. Accompanying D. Aaron was Gen B. Rogers, along the official NATO line, so to speak. His purpose was to "brainwash" the military establishments of the small countries. Strange though it might seem, the unseemly role of main spokesman was assumed also by H.-D. Genscher, West German minister of foreign affairs, representing precisely the European country which, as acknowledged by its leaders, was a particular beneficiary of detente.

The arm twisting of the recalcitrant allies lasted until the very last minutes. On the eve of the Brussels conference the White House applied a "psychological massage" to Dutch Prime Minister van Agt and his Norwegian colleague O. Nordli, who paid a visit to Washington. At the same time C. Vance and Z. Brzezinski, assistant to the president for national security affairs, applied the same type "massage" to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Olesen. Let us recall that the results of this indoctrination proved to be rather thin: the Netherlands categorically refused for a period of two years in general to discuss the deployment of American nuclear weapons on its territory; Belgium postponed its decision for six months; Norway and Denmark, in accordance with their traditional positions, kept their doors tightly shut to such weapons in peacetime. Turkey as well had major reservations concerning the conversion of Western Europe into an American launching pad.

Thus of the five countries--the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands--in which Washington hoped to deploy its missiles, initially, only the first three gave their agreement. Bonn was particularly zealous: it hospitably opened its doors to nearly all Pershing II and to the lion's share of the Cruise missiles. Should it be surprising that unpleasant reminders of a not-so-distant past are being felt by the neighbors of the Federal Republic: once again they are hearing the sounds of "Watch on the Rhine," which presage nothing good. . . .

The question arises as to why Washington, together with its most loyal henchmen in the Atlantic Alliance, has plunged into such a risky playing with fire? Apparently, above all, because some people on both sides of the Atlantic may fear the adverse consequences to the military-industrial complex, the future of the arms race and the hegemonistic American strategy, should Europe continue to follow the highroad to detente earmarked in the 1970's. The good changes which took place following the conclusion of the Soviet-West German Moscow treaty of 1970 appeared too quick and effective

to some. The same changes were materialized in the development of bilateral and multilateral relations between the two Europes--socialist and capitalist--and were codified at the "forum of the 35" in Helsinki, in 1975. A few people in the United States have still been unable to digest the compromise embodied in the contractual assertion of the principle of equality and identical security of the opposites sides, a principle which, in particular, is the base of the SALT treaty. Finally, the energizing of forces which have long striven for a return to the old policy from the position of strength made itself felt as well.

This was discussed on American television by H. Kissinger, the former secretary of state, who allowed himself a verbosity unusual for a diplomat. He openly stated that the United States "must as of now be prepared for possible armed conflicts in the 1980's." Several weeks later, visiting Brussels, he developed this idea in a sensation-making speech. In our "world of chaos and fast change," he said, the Russians will be gaining "political advantages." How to stop history, and how to restore the leadership of the United States, at least of a significant part of the world? "The solution," H. Kissinger claimed, "is to increase in Europe the potential of nuclear weapons of intermediate range." This shows the inner side of many of the statements about "loyalty to detente" still being made in the West!

On the eve of the new year such statements were heard again coming from President J. Carter and the New Year messages of some Western European leaders. Listening to such statements, it is admissible now, at the beginning of a new decade in this century, to ask once again why has the West not responded to an entire range of Soviet initiatives aimed, precisely, at the further strengthening of detente? Why did it fail to react to the repeated suggestions made by the Soviet Union to reconsider the problem of nuclear systems of intermediate range, which would include, naturally, the American advance-base armaments? Why has the West answered with silence the suggestion of the socialist countries to agree, in the course of the Vienna talks, on freezing the contemporary level of armaments and armed forces? Why does it refuse to conclude between the members of two groups in Europe a treaty on not being the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against the other? Why have the NATO leaders refused to answer the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to reduce, compared with the current level, the number of nuclear intermediate-range armaments deployed in the Western parts of the USSR, providing that such armaments are not additionally deployed in Western Europe? Yet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev twice made such suggestions: on 6 October 1979, in his Berlin speech, and on 6 November, in answer to a question asked by a PRAVDA correspondent.

Washington's reaction and the reaction of the leading Western European capitals has been one of silence. Today they have no grounds whatever to complain that they were not warned in advance of the dangerous consequences of their fatal step. As early as the beginning of December a meeting of

the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Warsaw Pact Members was held in Berlin. Its communique particularly emphasized that, ". . . The adoption of the decision to produce and deploy in Western Europe new types of American nuclear missiles of intermediate range and the implementation of this decision would destroy the foundations of talks. It would represent a NATO attempt to conduct talks from a position of strength. This is basically unacceptable to the Warsaw Pact members. The governments of the NATO countries cannot be unaware of this."

They knew this, yet nevertheless they continued to march along the slippery road, some willingly, and some not. This was despite the fact that the Soviet Union, which began with a withdrawal of 20,000 military personnel and 1,000 tanks from Central Europe, reasserted the sincerity of its intentions.

Only the blind would fail to see that the United States is not accidentally moving out of its shores and far to the east, toward Europe, the launching pads of missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. Its consideration is as tricky as it is simple: in case of conflict make its partners the targets of a response, while sitting it out on the other side of the Atlantic. In other words, it would like to "Europeanize" a planned nuclear war and reach its strategic objectives at someone else's expense, without risking annihilation. It is asking the Western Europeans to sit on a powder keg with the Americans holding the Bickford fuse. That is why Klaas de Vries, Dutch parliamentary representative and chairman of the defense committee, who clearly saw the entirely adventurist nature of the plan, wrote in DER SPIEGEL, the Hamburg journal, that, "NATO's present strategy which allows the possibility to make a first nuclear strike is a suicidal strategy." The use of such a strategy would mean that "the territories of the members of this alliance would become a pile of radioactive wreckage."

The NATO's Brussels intent conceals at least two wedges: one directed to the outside, against good changes in Europe and against the socialist comity, the second is for within, for the death of the Atlantic Entente with its latent currents. It is an attempt by the United States "to bring order" within NATO, to bring into line obstreperous partners, to restore its total authority as the Atlantic boss, and to resume its hegemonistic role in the world arena. The ugly war in Vietnam, Watergate, the failure of Somosa, the American puppet in Nicaragua, the crisis of American-Iranian relations, and other political failures have lowered Washington's reputation in the eyes of its alliance partners and weakened its prestige. In the course of the materialization of detente the Western European capitals acquired a political baggage, displaying independence in their actions ever more frequently, whether economic (as confirmed by the "big seven" Bonn and Tokyo meetings) or political (let us recall, if nothing else, the successful functioning of the institution of political summit consultations between Moscow and Western European capitals).

How to rebuild the respect of its allies? The answer to this is given in the already cited article by the Dutch parliamentarian, who ironically

noted that, "Initially the Americans as well believed that the available Western nuclear potential would suffice to 'contain' the Soviet armaments. It was only when faith in America's leading role was shaken in Western Europe that the Carter Administration decided, with the help of a program of armaments in the field of intermediate-range weapons, to touch up its slightly worn image." Curiously, the American Alan Wolf, a scientific associate at the Institute for Social Change, in California, reaches the same conclusion. He writes in the American journal THE NATION that the decision to deploy a nuclear armament of intermediate range was aimed at binding "the governments of all NATO countries to a single strategy."

It is indicative that at the Brussels NATO session Washington tried to tie its Atlantic partners not only to its missile chariot in Europe, but to its hegemonistic strategy beyond it. It asked of them to adopt sanctions against Iran, take part in its economic blockade and unconditionally support the criminal Camp David course in the Middle East and the racist regimes in Africa. Briefly, in Washington's hands the NATO bloc became an instrument of its global policy and a bridle to control the U.S. allies, and a stick to be used against nations striving toward independent development.

Despite the entire pressure and arm twisting, the NATO American bosses were unable to implement their entire program. It was not only a question of the fact that only three of the five allies allowed the deployment of the new American missiles on their soil. It is also a question of the general political atmosphere within the group, which was conceived by its makers as the "holy alliance" of the 20th century. Discussions in the parliaments of a number of NATO countries of the Brussels act, the negative reaction to it by a certain segment of the press and, above all, the growing movement of the people's objection to the U.S. nuclear dictate, which must be taken into consideration by the governments, confirm, yet once again, that irreversible changes have taken place in the Atlantic Alliance.

As time goes on, it is becoming ever more clear that in the Western capitals as well people are beginning to be aware of the entire danger of Washington's game and to understand that the attempt to conceal it behind pharisaic calls for talks with the Soviet Union is doomed to inevitable failure. Such talks are being conceived on an entirely different basis than the one suggested by the USSR: on the basis of NATO approved steps to deploy new systems of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. A set of preliminary conditions are issued as well placing NATO in an advantageous position compared with the Warsaw Pact.

As to the Soviet Union, as was reasserted by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in Berlin, it is not striving to achieve military superiority. "Our intentions," he stated, "have never included, nor will include, the idea of threatening any country or group of countries. Our strategic doctrine is strictly defensive." Over the past 10 years the number of nuclear weapons of intermediate range deployed over the European part of the Soviet Union



has not been increased by a single missile or aircraft. On the contrary, the number of launching pads for intermediate-range missiles and the power of the nuclear charges of such missiles have even been reduced somewhat, and so has the number of intermediate range bombers.

Naturally, neither the Soviet Union nor its Warsaw Pact partners can remain indifferent to the new threat created in Europe following the passing of NATO's decision. They must be concerned with their own security, and so they will. Yet, as Comrade A. A. Gromyko, CC CPSU Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, reminded us on 21 December, we do not favor a balancing "on the brink of war." As in the past, we deem it our main task to struggle for a lasting peace, detente and against the plans of aggressive-militaristic forces. We have faith in the wisdom and will of the peoples. We believe in the reality of the path jointly earmarked five years ago in Helsinki by the members of the European Security and Cooperation Conference.

The unification of all peace-loving forces and all countries who care for the future of European civilization and for mankind at large is more important than ever. Everyone must realize that the time has come to say a decisive "No" to the fatal actions and false justifications of the initiators of the next round in the arms race.

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## ETERNAL FLAME

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 101-110

[Review by S. Rostotskiy of the television serial motion picture "The Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] Recently our motion picture theaters and television completed the showing of "The Great Patriotic War," a 20-episode historical-publicistic motion-picture epic, exclusive of its kind, representing a documentary cinematographic representation of the immortal exploit of the Soviet people in World War II. The history of the making of this film is well known to millions of people in our country and abroad. The motion picture became the sensation of the year on American television, something I witnessed personally, being in the United States at that time. The tremendous interest shown by the Americans in the film was confirmed by the so-called "ratings"--statistical tables reflecting data on the number of television viewers tuned in to one or another program. All 20 films met with a triumphal reception by the socialist countries and rights to show them were acquired by television companies in France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and other countries.

The sincere and touching narration of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people who saved the world from the fascist plague disturbed some of the bosses of the Western television services who forbade the presentation of the film. The film triggered an influx of helpless rage and hatred in pro-fascist and anti-Soviet circles in the United States, the FRG and some other big and small countries. Here and there attempts were even made to counter the historically accurate depiction of the true events of World War II with tendentiously selected and commented chronicles of the war years, presented as "documentaries," in violation of historical truth. Alas, with the help of a pair of scissors and irresponsible verbal juggling, occasionally one could "win" a lost battle and depict oneself as the decisive force in the tempestuous cataclysms of our century. Unfortunately, such are some of the realities of cinematography. However, the achievement of real truth demands of its servants particular clarity of thinking and clean hands, and real human and civic fearlessness.

Neither Roman Karmen nor his closest assistants spared efforts, forces or time in creating an honest and truthful motion picture on the past war, profoundly touching with the impressive power of facts and experiences, and irrefutable accuracy and completeness of events which have left pain and memories to millions and millions of people. We cannot fail to respect the civic courage of the American producers and cinematographers who participated in the creation of this documentary canvas of the "Russian war," on how one must love freedom and peace, how one must fight for the life and future of mankind, and how important it is today, in our troubled times, to rebuff anyone who is once again spreading the Nazi drug, concocting plans for new aggressive wars.

The film is the confirmation of the restless human memory. It is turned to the hearts and minds of our contemporaries. In the words of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, it is "an appeal for tireless and consistent struggle for a lasting peace, for an end to the arms race and for peaceful cooperation among countries."

Is this not the reason for which Western reviewers anticipated that by the end of 1979 "the heroic saga of events which changed the face of Europe," will be the "motion-picture epic of the year, on the level of the best documentaries on World War II" (I am citing from the American newspaper THE STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE), to be seen by over half a billion people? Is it not because this forecast is proving to be accurate in front of our very eyes that the truth of the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany contains a permanent and priceless historical lesson? "The Unknown War" (such was precisely the title under which the Americans saw on their screens "The Great Patriotic War") became part of the curriculums of secondary schools and colleges in the United States, while in New York high-school students wrote compositions on the topic of the blockade of Leningrad after seeing 1 of the 20 episodes.

The high ideological and artistic qualities of the motion-picture epic had been deservedly rated at international television film festivals in New York and Miami. "The Great Patriotic" was given a special award and prize by the jury at the 12th All-Union Motion Picture Festival, held in May 1979 in Ashkhabad. The jury at the 11th Moscow International Festival, which was held on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet motion picture, noted the outstanding qualities of the non-competition final episode of the epic, entitled "The Unknown Soldier."

The entire 20 episodes of the motion-picture epic were shown with tremendous success on GDR television. "The citizens of the GDR," said E. Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR State Council chairman, "were profoundly impressed by the heroism of the Soviet people and their great communist party, who under exceptionally difficult conditions, not only inflicted the first defeat to Hitlerite fascism, but made a decisive contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitlerite coalition."

I shall never forget the stunned expression on the face of a good acquaintance of mine in Australia after watching the first four episodes in the small viewing room of the studio. The calm yet excited voice of Burt Lancaster sounded. His face, expressing a particular kind of trust, vanished from the screen. The lights were turned on and this 40-year-old person from a distant country in which so little is known about us and, whatever they know, is distorted and, sometimes, occasionally even slanderous, this person who tried to understand our country yet did not share our ideas in the least, was so touched that he could not speak and was crying openly. That evening he told me: "If I am ever asked in Australia about you, about the type of people you are and the type of country this is (his intonation clearly showed that, thinking of those who would ask such question, he bore in mind people hating us), I would tell them nothing. I would simply answer: See that picture. Then I would say: Well, any more questions?"

To me, and to my generation who were only 19 at the beginning of the war and who in June 1941 were already in uniform, everything seen in the epic "The Great Patriotic War" is not merely respect for the memory of the past and experience during those stormy, fatal years. "Instant personal destiny," were the apt words of writer Boris Vasil'yev after seeing the first episode "22 June 1941." Yes, through the power of the screen, the war generation is passing on to the next generations the baton of courage, firmness and patriotism, its full convictions and moral experience, feeling itself, as was aptly and imaginatively expressed by S. M. Eyzenshteyn, "as though at the point where the past and the future meet."

Now, in our peaceful and tranquil homes, when it is as though the war has rushed in again, filling 20 heart-tearing evenings spent by the television screen, I felt again, as many of my contemporaries, the proud, the noble feeling of fulfilled duty, the aching and bitter feeling of the grateful memory of those who did not come back, and the stern feeling of our common responsibility to the future. There was a flood of memories. . . .

I recalled also how, many years ago, in an article entitled "On Behalf of the Generations," I wrote that there are opponents of the topic of the Patriotic War in the motion pictures, believing that this topic has exhausted itself, that everything has already been written, everything has been said, everything has been filmed, and that nothing new could be discovered here. . . . Yes, there have been (and, perhaps, there still may occasionally exist) such views, such opinions. Rejecting what I considered a profoundly erroneous viewpoint, I recalled then the best Soviet films on the revolution, emphasizing the tremendous impact on the spiritual shaping of the generation which grew after the October Revolution. It was precisely that generation, aged 18 to 20, that found itself in the same ranks with its fathers--the defenders of the revolution and builders of our five-year plans--facing a second world war. Yet, today, occasionally we forget that an entirely new generation of people has grown up, people who were not even born on 22 June 1941, yet who are now a generation at work,

maturing, growing and already raising its own children, and that is it not our duty, that of the motion picture workers, to be concerned with the people who were born and live in peace, to be concerned with their upbringing, to think of their souls, of their future? Again and again I am reinforced in my view that, turning to the topic of the Great Patriotic War, and triggering a feeling of gratitude toward its fighters and the makers of our victory--the living and the dead, the known and the unknown--we could have a most powerful and beneficial influence on the minds and hearts of our children and grandchildren, and of the grandchildren of our grandchildren! . . .

How else could it be! Lying open in front of me is a letter by a very young girl from distant Severomorsk, lying beyond the Polar Circle. "Whenever I watched the next episode of 'The Great Patriotic War,'" she writes, "I began to argue with my conscience: Do I live the way I should when so many people gave their lives so that I may live today? . . ." "I was born in peacetime and know of the war only from books, stories and films," wrote another young man, sharing his insurmountable desire to realize, to interpret, to feel his own present. "I swear that all of us, the young, are ready to defend our homeland just as heroically." ". . . This film is very needed by all of us--veterans and people of the young generation, because it is the truth. It is the stern, hard truth of the bitterness and calamities of war and of the great people's exploit." Such was the view on the epic expressed by former machinegunner, physician Ivan Antonovich Poltavets, from Kuybyshev.

The number of such letters seems infinite. Let me say frankly that it is not so frequent and not every film may trigger such a tempestuous flow of feelings, emotional thrust filled with sincerity, pride, love, desire to become better, purer, more beautiful, as though within each one of us, with a new powerful strength an unstoppable heart of a soldier, worker and hero has begun to beat with new power, of the hero of the greatest and most difficult of all the battles which saved the country, Europe and the world from the most evil and base enemy ever known to history.

This, it seems to me, is one the main and most outstanding emotional characteristics of the film, which not only presents the events of the war, but does it by penetrating into events with a concerned, an involved manner--"at the point where past and future meet." Look at the leading figure--a no longer young, very tired and quite experienced person (played by the most famous actor of American and world cinematography, Burt Lancaster, someone we are well familiar with from Kramer and Visconti pictures), and you cannot fail to feel the sharpest boundaries of the present and the past as newsreels and contemporary pictures cross, both largely symbolic and epoch making.

When Lancaster presents his narrative on Red Square, against the background of the Lenin Mausoleum, when he shares with us his thoughts at the Piskarevskoye Cemetery, at the walls of the Brest fortress, under the bells

of Khatyn, when he speaks of Malaya Zemlya and of the graves of his compatriots in Murmansk, we see not simply war graves and not simply an actor or a commentator. We see the man and the citizen. We feel and find out his own emotions, his own discoveries and reachings for the truth, his heart brimming with sympathy. A visitor from a different world, with his sincerity and shared emotion, it is as though he reinterprets events with which, to one extent or another, we are already familiar.

Above all, Burt Lancaster--a "100 percent American"--helps the viewer, there in his own homeland, to realize what this "Unknown War," which cost the Soviet people 20 million lives "and even more, perhaps," was waged not for the sake of glory or territorial conquests, but for the sake of man, his honor, his dignity, his life and his freedom. It was waged for the sake of the defeat of fascism and for the right of the people to live in a world without wars and violence.

To this day some people are amazed and jarred by the American title of this largely unexpected and unparalleled cinematographic view of the war which had a tremendous impact on the destinies of entire countries and peoples, and which left an ineradicable bitter loss affecting virtually every Soviet family. In the United States itself a number of commentators who have called for paying greater attention to events which had such a major impact on contemporary history, have pointed out that to those remembering it, the war in Russia, naturally, was not "unknown." "The Battle of Stalingrad was considered the turning point of the war, while the landing of the Allies in Europe took place only when the main business had been taken care of," noted an influential newspaper such as THE WASHINGTON POST.

I met our American allies in 1945, in Berlin, and, in the past few years, have visited the United States several times. I must say that then, and even more so now, I have always been sadly astounded by the American lack of information concerning the true, the real historical events, particularly those of World War II and, in general, concerning our society and our life, occasionally deliberately promoted by some circles. That is why, as applicable to America, and not to America alone, the title seems to me accurate and necessary. I believe that it is as though, choosing this title, the authors blame in advance those who are sitting in the movie theater or in front of the television set, excoriating all those who would like to conceal the truth. This is the principal meaning and polemic nature of the title, for the film itself destroys, with tremendous power and anger, the possibility, insulting to millions of people, of thinking of this war as "unknown." In my view, the title reveals the daring and courage of the American participants in the making of the film.

The clients who ordered the program are serious, firm and perspicacious people (I refer to the managers of a New York company dealing with the use of mass-information media, "Air Time International"), who, as I know, initially lacked a clear idea of what could become of their suggestion to film a big series of documentaries entitled "The Unknown War . . . The

Eastern Front." It is more likely that they hoped for unique motion-picture material, virtually unknown in the West, recording battles on the Soviet-German front, put together in separate topics, like simple and logically developing newsreels, as had already been done in the United States with the popular series on "Great Battles" or "A World at War." Let it be said to the honor of the American producers that they neither concealed the fact that American mass-information media deal mainly with battles involving the participation of Great Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and Germany and Japan, on the other, whereas the role of the Soviet Union in the development and outcome of World War II remained unknown to the American televiewer. Yet the greatest battles, the program initiators emphasized, occurred precisely on Soviet soil, and the battles which thundered in the East were those in the course of which the backbone of Hitler's Reich was broken.

Needless to say, Roman Karmen--the passionate, uncompromising and inflexible artist-publicist, fearless participant in, and chronicler of many landmarks of our age, including the Great Patriotic War, found it insufficient to give the Americans an accurate and comprehensive chronicle of military operations on the Soviet-German front, or, in other words, to provide a "diary of incidents," to recall another Eisenstein expression. Alas, we are familiar with many such conscientiously yet, essentially, uninspiredly descriptive films which are presented as some kind of additional genre of movie journalism, particularly "diaries" and materials of frontline films we cherish.

R. L. Karmen and his closest associates and assistants--scriptwriters K. Slavin and I. Itskov, A. M. Aleksnadrov and P. A. Kurochkin, most competent specialists in the historical, political and military fields, I. Grigor'yev and T. Semenov, motion picture directors and Karmen's students, S. Pumpyanskaya, Karmen's fellow worker in many other motion pictures, editor Ye. Kozyrev, and the organizers of this tremendous project (which, as the Americans themselves noted, is "unquestionably the most major cinematographic cooperation between our countries") O. Teneyshvili and A. Surikov, and many other personnel of our creative and technical services, took a different approach to their complex, difficult and largely new and unusual assignment.

The ideological-artistic theme of the program was the following: Anyone who would see it on the screen or on television, in our country, in the United States or elsewhere should not only find out where and how the Soviet people fought, but also understand why they fought thus, why is it that they do not want war, why is it that they set such high value on peace and hate aggression, fascism and militarism so much.

The purpose of this motion picture epic can be best expressed by quoting the familiar L. I. Brezhnev statement on the nature of the Great Patriotic War: "This was not only a battle between armies, but a clash between two social systems. It was a struggle waged by the peoples against the most

aggressive forces of the imperialist world. In the battles against the fascist aggressors the Soviet soldiers--the soldiers of the first socialist country in the world--defended the cause and ideas of the Great October Revolution, the socialist fatherland and the freedom and independence of other peoples and countries."

In accordance with author's concepts the Soviet side corrected the draft scenarios suggested by our American colleagues and by H. Salsbury, well known for his information, who acted as consultant on World War II. That is how the program included films missing in the initial American suggestions--films of active historical-publicistic meaning, revealing, on the one hand, the significance of the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and, on the other, the courage, firmness and heroism of our great soldiers who engaged in mortal battle with the Hitlerite military machine for the sake of saving world civilization, and who fought for the cause of the October Revolution and their communist party.

Remember R. Karmen's pictures "22 June 1941" and "The Unknown Soldier," in which this topic is shown in unforgettable, touching frames and characters. It shows in the pathos of the "Sacred War." It shows in party cards pierced by bullets and stained with blood. It shows in the faces of soldiers and militiamen, stern, restrained, sanctified by an awareness of high duty to the fatherland.

These faces, these party cards and these simple and clear words which stated that in the battles with fascism the Soviet soldiers fought for peace and communism and for the triumph of the revolutionary ideals reached the Western screens without triggering even a shade of doubt as to their veracity. The entire structure of the historical narrative, warmed by the feelings of the authors, prove how alive and natural they were. All reprimands of "soft propaganda," voiced in some American newspapers, generally speaking missed their target, for they were countered by the truly human, socially justified current of events, recorded on the documentary screen without the least bit of bombasticism, not in the least in the spirit of the loud and pious political advertising which, in the West, sets the teeth on edge. Let us not even mention the variety of propaganda "voices," melting in ecstasy at the foundations of the bourgeois way of life, broadcast to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Even Mr Salsbury, a respected witness of many events of World War II, could find nothing prejudicial in the movies about communists whose privilege it was to lead in battle and be the first to die, in pictures of party cards torn by bullets, or the documentaries of the rejoicing with which our soldiers were welcomed by the peoples of Eastern Europe, as their saviors from fascist nightmare.

Movie playwright K. Slavin showed to me the plan for the series as submitted by Salsbury in his own variant, so to say. Filled with externally restrained well-wishingness and understanding of what was accomplished by



our peoples and our country in the victory over Hitlerite Germany, and the trials they went through in winning this victory, nevertheless somehow the American plan circumvented, "toned down" the topic of the liberation of the peoples of Europe from Nazi slavery. The topic of joint actions by the anti-Hitlerite coalition of allied countries was also toned down. There were also aspects based on ignorance of certain events and facts and the limited understanding of the development of historical processes. Obviously, that is why the American plan did not call for films such as "Allies," "Liberation of the Ukraine," "Liberation of Belorussia," "Liberation of Poland," and "From the Carpathians to the Balkans and Vienna." Nor did it include the motion picture "The Unknown Soldier," which was quite important and essential to understanding the entire series, covering many sharp problems of contemporary political reality, war and peace, and past and future.

In the final account, however, all this found its place on the screen and reached its target. In the uninterrupted and ever-broadening struggle of ideas the truth of the war waged by the Soviet people against Hitlerite Germany, contained in this movie epic, helps to strengthen peace on earth and gives the people a true idea of the spirit, hopes and expectations of our people--peace loving, good hearted, invincible.

This was precisely what "The Great Patriotic War" was all about. How properly was its meaning understood by the newspaper of the American Communists THE DAILY WORLD, which wrote that the Soviet documentary makers filmed "in the war . . . pictures of the war, praising the exploit of the working people in the mortal battle against Nazism, rather than glorifying war itself with its unavoidable cruelty."

It is noteworthy that the discussions of the future program themselves, regardless of the very different initial approach, did not present insoluble conflicts, which occasionally end in pious wishes to create joint works. They created reciprocal understanding and reciprocal satisfaction. This too is one of the exceptionally important qualities of this joint project and a characteristic of this cooperation. That is why it is an excellent example of how to reach the truth in an argument and display mutual respect for the other's opinion. All this, put together, subsequently echoed in the hearts of the audiences and created the greatest possible degree of belief in the picture.

The creation of a motion-picture epic of such significance and scale was prepared by the entire development of Soviet military-patriotic cinematography and, particularly, our documentary motion pictures. The American initiative coincided with a topic which had been long developing among Soviet masters of motion-picture journalism and was consistent with the readiness to give it a broad epic-heroic scope. It is to be regretted that a certain conservatism and the planning possibilities of our motion-picture studios are still restraining, hindering the birth of such epic motion pictures, the time for which, of this I am convinced, has come. But then, 20 episodes!

Yes, 20 episodes--20 documentary years which captured the screen and rallied millions and millions of viewers in our country alone and many of them abroad--would this not be a subject for profound consideration and bold decisions in the field of reconstructing our entire documentary-publicistic work, which has not as yet found a proper channel to the broad audience, for which reason it frequently idles.

Let me also say that the bold treatment by the authors of "The Great Patriotic War" could not fail to involve the hearts of the people, to excite them, to disturb their memories. Sacred matters were discussed, which must be mentioned directly, honestly and frankly, ignoring common stereotypes or smoothing over, finely tested means for depicting the bright and dark sides of war, not ignoring its difficulties, its nightmares and its calamities.

How good it is that in our country, in fighting routine and, essentially, the indifferent depiction of war in feature films and documentaries, there have been motion pictures such as "Ballad of a Soldier," "Human Destiny," "Liberation," "The Living and the Dead," "Ivanovo Childhood," "Belorussian Station," "The 'Retreads' Are Marching into Battle," "They Fought for the Homeland," "20 Days Without War," "Blockade," "Ordinary Fascism," "If You Care for Your House," "Katyusha," "Memory," "A Soldier Marched," "Along with a Soldier," "Ascent," "Soldiers of Freedom". . . .

Without such pictures it would have been hard for the makers of "The Great Patriotic War" because the daily documentary screen occasionally covered facts and events of the wartime quite one-sidedly; in some cases something quite important for understanding the course of the war and the spirit of the soldier was deliberately omitted; something else was glossed over "for the sake of a general balance."

Yet . . . . "A great deal had to be experienced by the Soviet soldiers, officers and generals on the roads of war. There was a retreat which dried out the heart, there were uninterrupted and fierce combats. There were days, months, and years living with death. There were lengthy and exhausting marches in the cold of winter and heat of summer, in the endless autumn rains and the spring thaw. Now, three decades later, when one recalls what had to be endured by troops, commanders and political workers in our army, one occasionally even doubts that all this took place, that it could be endured . . . ."

That is what Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev wrote about the war.

That is how our best frontline cameramen filmed the war, seeing its bitter paths, the death of comrades, blood, dirt, or starry flashes--the joy of victory, frontline union, self-sacrifice, mutual aid, fraternity. . . .

The anniversary exhibit "60 Years of Soviet Motion Pictures" offered the viewers "A Soldier with Two Submachine Guns"--a weapon and a camera. In

"The Great Patriotic War" they are named individually--each of the 243 frontline cameramen, even though some of them covered the war from its first to its final hour, while others came to the front at the end of the war. . . . Some filmed hundreds and thousand of meters of priceless materials, while some died without filming a single shot. The film "Along with a Soldier" records such a case involving the young cameraman Nomofilov. Many films of the first months of the war were spiritually depressing. Recalling them, Raman Karmen testifies: ". . . Even though we knew that everything had to be filmed, filmed for history, nevertheless the feeling of profound sadness hindered us. It was difficult, it was hard to film our bitterness, tears, losses. Nevertheless, we kept on filming. . . ."

These difficult shots are particularly impressive in the epic, in its first film, in the films "Battle for Moscow," "The Blockade of Leningrad," "To the East," and "The Unknown Soldier." . . . We are faced with a particular vision of man. A vision of man at war--"not abstracted on the level of the epoch," as Aleksandr Tvardovskiy used to say, but "specific, precious and hard."

This vision was provided by the cameramen through their sweat and blood. Occasionally it cost them their lives. Is it astounding that such shots in the four-million-meters-long movie chronicle of the Great Patriotic War are not so numerous and that each new picture of battle found in our archives is a discovery of great social and artistic significance. It is precisely such discoveries that marked the episodes of "The Great Patriotic War," imparting the particular veracity, the extreme accuracy with which they record the atmosphere of the war. The search for human material, enlarged, detailed in commonplace events has become a criterion of the truth in the thoughts of the documentary makers on the roads of the war and our great victory.

Many war reportages are remembered forever. The newsreels of the Leningrad blockade are truly immortal. This was a unique, unparalleled, inconceivably difficult exploit of a person with a camera, dying together with the other people of Leningrad of hunger and cold. Here again we must point out that the documentaries of the Leningrad epic, acquired under conditions previously unknown in human life, defeat all kinds of "documentary" films and stylistic imitations described as "chronicles" or "documentaries" with their strict, icy-cold truth, to this very day. This remark is addressed at both documentaries and feature films, where imitating cinematographers try to find the criterion of truth not in the battles and storms of reality, but in someone else's artistic discoveries and methods.

Unforgettable sights were filmed by frontline cameraman Vladimir Suschinskiy, who died at the end of the war, camera in hand, with the camera continuing to film the clear, blue sky when the person holding it was already dead. A talented documentary maker, observer and fine person, he wrote: "To film well is interesting and captivatingly difficult. One

must know what is interesting. One must be familiar with the circumstances, one must feel it. One cannot film in ignorance of one's surroundings. One must be familiar with everything."

I believe that this principle of "one cannot film without knowing one's surroundings," experienced by the cameraman of the Leningrad blockade and by our masters of frontline movie reporting, such as N. Bykov, V. Muromstev, M. Sukhova, B. Vakar, B. Pumpyanskaya, and S. Stoyanovskiy (I have named only a few of those who died), determines the style, the entire nature of our war and peace documentaries. Let us recall the filming of militiamen in the film on Moscow, the Shostakovich concert in blockaded Leningrad, adolescents and women taking the place of their fathers and husbands at the machine tools, the mines and the fields in the episode "In the East," or Karmen's personal filming of the liberation of the Moscow area, Majdanek, and Berlin, and the Nuremberg trials, the impression created to this day by the battle shots of the battles for Stalingrad, Kursk and Belorussia, and the overwhelming and angering horrible documents of Nazi atrocities and tortures, the hard and frightening films of ruins and rubble, ashes, and twisted metal. . . . What about the corpses of children, old people and women, appealing to the conscience of mankind. . . . Recalling all this, and many other things, I cannot forget that this was filmed by chroniclers of our peaceful construction, the chroniclers of the five-year plans, who before the war had almost never smelled gunpowder. It was precisely they who became the reporters of the most terrible of all wars and had to learn how to film the war in the course of the war itself, a training which left no time for thinking, or forgave errors.

Forgive me, dear friends and comrades, that I am unable here to name all of you, and even less to speak of someone in greater detail, even though every one of you, living or dead, deserves it. It was precisely your work--and your work above all--that made it possible for the people to see the Great Patriotic War on the screens at home and throughout the world. I would simply like to pay my profound respects to all of you for your daring and courage, modesty, dedication and human and civic qualities worthy of our people. Thank you for not being bothered by your role of "unknown" soldiers and continuing to do your work so greatly needed by the people and the country.

"Soviet military filming is a sensation!" exclaimed American reviewers after viewing the first episodes of "The Unknown War." Conjectures were even expressed in the spirit of the occasionally so unexpected and puzzling Western information. "When a group of motion picture workers headed by R. Karmen began to study the extensive archives of the TsSDF [Central Documentary Film Studio], it made an overwhelming discovery: a considerable percentage of the material, consisting of about three million feet of war chronicles, had never been shown publicly . . . "

Naturally, this is not so. A great deal had already been shown in other films. It was simply that the Americans did not know about it. The

seeming novelty of the material was not due in the least to new footage, which unquestionably has been included in the film, but in the distribution, the rhythm and the length--the author's interpretation of events.

Let me refer to the testimony of A. M. Nazarov, RSFSR honored worker in the arts and cameraman at the Lenfil'm Studio. During the war he filmed in blockaded Leningrad and at the Vokhov front. He was also the chief cameraman of the four-episode film "Blockade."

Here is what he writes: "Virtually the entire third episode of the epic "The Great Patriotic War"--"The Blockade of Leningrad"--is based on film taken by my colleagues. Hungry, weak, they could barely move. They could not hold the camera, which they dragged on a sled. Yet like the soldier's automatic weapons, the camera was always ready for 'battle.' How many staggering events the cameramen were able to film on the streets of the besieged city, and in the shops of plants whose output went directly to the battlelines! Many of these pictures, already considered standard references, have been shown in other Soviet movies on the Great Patriotic War. In the new epic they are presented in a different rhythm and sequence, supported by a brief, clear, journalistically sharp and precise narration. The result is that the picture acquires a truly epic quality. . . ."

Quite extensive use has been made of film taken by the Hitlerite newsreel services and, to a certain extent, film by military cameramen of the United States, Britain, France and Japan. The authors have worked hard to check and refine the greatest detail, facts and events as recorded in film libraries. They are effective. In some cases they present reports of facts. In others, they act as accusations; in others again, they are "anti-documents" which expose the impudent lies of Nazi propaganda, such as, for example, claims of Hitlerite military "victories" and "humanism."

The self-exposing nature of Nazi newsreels is particularly obvious in films in which Hitler, looking at the latest newsreel, is intoxicated with his successes on the Eastern Front. No, fascism and the real truth of life are incompatible, they are polar opposites! Even a seemingly accurate reportage makes a false and farfetched impression if it conceals, if it suppresses the meaning of and reasons for the recorded phenomena. Newsreels, such as, for example, the mass hysteria in honor of and for the glory of Hitler and German arms. Furthermore, I think that art, documentaries, and reportages are spokesmen for the truth and honest screeners of historical events only when they combine the facts and testimonies with the class, the social analysis of the realities of the anti-fascist, anti-imperialist and anti-militarist struggle, as was done in "The Great Patriotic War," the historical-publicistic motion-picture epic.

The chronicle of World War II is infinite and far from explored completely. We must continue and intensify the search for documentary proof of the man-hating nature of Nazism, of those who went to their deaths in the struggle against the brown filth, and those who rescued the world from it.

Resurrecting the exploits of the fighters against fascism, this truth should neither frighten nor move. It must not "praise" but shake up, caution the minds of our contemporaries, and above all of the youth of today, protecting the souls of young people from avoidance of politics, lack of spirituality and indifference. Having seen this film one could clearly see how vividly one could describe the fate of mankind while avoiding the chroniclers of World War II.

Interestingly, Vsevolod Vishnevskiy reached the same conclusion during the days of trial for the people of Leningrad. At that time he noted the following: "We have stored 580,000 meters of newsreel on the Patriotic War. My advice would be to record everything--to provide a graphic-stylistic and topic description--for the sake of the major motion pictures to be filmed in the future. Such would be, for example, the motion picture "The 20th Century." I would undertake work on such a scenario with tremendous willingness, arranging from the first newsreels of Pathe, Gomont and Khanzhonkov--to the present. . . . I would try to bring to light the origin of the age, the headlong general progress, wars, revolutions. The birth of the new civilization of the USSR would be the focal point. This would be an exceptional motion picture."

It seems to me that we have taken a major step in that direction.

. . . Remember that there are 20 films in the movie epic "The Great Patriotic War." The Americans know it under the title of "The Unknown War"; in the GDR it is known as "The Decisive Front."

The movie epic is truly encyclopedic in nature. The outbreak of World War II, and the reasons and processes which triggered it. The battle for Moscow and the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg. The 900 days of blockade of Leningrad. The historically unparalleled moving of millions of people and hundreds of plants. The heroic struggle of Soviet partisans. Battles beyond the Polar Circle. The exploits of Soviet fliers and sailors. The great Stalingrad victory. The greatest tank battle of the Kursk Arc. The battle for the Caucasus. The liberation of the Ukraine and Belorussia. The noble liberation mission of the Soviet Army in Europe. The anti-fascist coalition of the Allies. The battle for Berlin and defeat of militaristic Japan. And, finally, the touching film which crowns the entire program--thoughts on the results and lessons of World War II.

These are thousands of meters of captivating, unique film; a selection of extremely rare photographic documents and sound recordings of the war years is not a work of art in itself. It could be used for school programs and short essays, for scientific purposes, and as testimony in court trials, such as those of Nuremberg. . . .

In an extensive review of "World War II in Russia," which was published by THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, the American journalist G. Rosenberg wrote that, "'The Unknown War' could be justifiably described as a motion-picture epic.

. . . It is the story of the courage, the heroism of the Soviet people and the disasters that befell them. Even though the shadow of death never leaves the screen, it also a hymn of courage. It is precisely in this boundless hard land that Hitler's dreams of ruling Russia were buried, as were those of Napoleon 130 years before. Had Hitler not tied himself up there, in Russia, who knows what course world history would have taken . . . ."

Well, all this is true if we consider that the point of reference is not only our victory but the way to it and the memory of this way as well as the truth of history and of the soldiers life. . . .

It was all this that, together, gave the film its epic scope, triggering major feelings and deep summations, quite important to our time and to acquiring an awareness of the past.

The scope of events is tremendous. The initial period of the war was the most difficult, the most bitter. It includes our peaceful morning of 22 June, torn by Nazi bombs. It includes what preceded it. Spain. . . . The Munich conspiracy. . . . Our five-year plans and those who were laying the foundations for the industrial power of the young Soviet Republic. . . .

The theme of the enemy invasion turns from Shostakovich's Seventh--Leningrad--Symphony to the tocsin call of the "Sacred War". . .

Moscow volunteers went to battle accompanied by Bulat Okudzhava's "Arbat" song. . . .

Leningrad is a city which experienced "clinical death." "All the Savichevs have died," recorded little Tanya Savicheva. . . . "Mama, here is your bread," says a Leningrad woman, laying a piece of bread on a grave at the Piskarevskoye Cemetery. A Leningrad worker saying: "I ask of you to evacuate my family. The trouble is that in three to four days I shall be dead." The words are calm, businesslike. He died standing by his machine tool. . . .

Probably I shall never forget the staggering view of the exhausted and concentrated faces of Leningrad's volunteers. I shall not forget the poignant parallel showing the celebration of the New Year by children--ours, blockaded and the others--the German children. . . .

Would anyone be able to forget a little, smiling boy walking along the Ladoga Port and the terribly penetrating, seemingly calm voice of Lancaster: "Look at this boy. . . . In 20 minutes he will not exist. . . ."

In the evening, after the viewing, my Australian acquaintance was to tell me: "You remember that little boy and the women who described the

bombing? . . ." Suppressing a sob, he went on: "They (the fascist fliers) knew that there were children there. . . . They knew. . . ." A long silence followed this. Yes, these images, this terrible human past will long trouble the memory.

Again Piskarevka. I listen to Lancaster. His heart is in this terrifying and heroic blockade life. . . .

There he is, saying (in another episode): "How little we know of the systematic evacuation of over 1,500 plants out of the way of the Hitlerite armies. . . ."

I admit, we too know little. We know more about the war, but what about the rear? On the eve of the war Germany's industrial power was nearly twice that of the Soviet Union. Never before had Germany been so strong.

. . . The evacuated. Refugees. Railway men. . . . For the first time we see in the newsreels the tremendous battle for the rails. The fascists are bombing mercilessly, yet one train follows another. . . . One cannot hold one's tears looking at a boy operating a machine tool. He is standing on a box, as the machine tool was built for an adult. Over the boy's head hangs a small photograph of his father, who died in the battles against the fascists. A woman is operating a blast furnace for the first time in the world, and, perhaps, the last. People are contributing to the defense fund everything they have, they take orphans into their homes, they share the last piece of bread.

USSR Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov, then people's commissar for armaments recalls: ". . . During the war all Soviet people, in the front and the rear, lived with a single thought--to defeat the enemy. Success in the rear created victory at the front, and the front was the line which ran through the hearts of the soldiers in the frontlines and of the workers in the rear. . . ."

All this is shown with tremendous emotional power through the entire structure of the episode "In the East."

"It hammered out the main weapon of victory," said A. N. Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, about industry moved to the Eastern parts of the country.

. . . Stalingrad--the turning point, not only of the Patriotic, but of the entire World War II. The atmosphere of street combat. Fight for every house, staircase, basement. Iron and stone. . . . And the people themselves are like iron, like the stones of Stalingrad's memorial.

The year is 1967. L. I. Brezhnev is speaking at the inauguration of the memorial complex on Miamiyev Kurgan. A sculpture group, miraculously left intact in Stalingrad, showing children in a round dance. A man carefully



removing a cello from a destroyed house. Someone else is moving out a violin, and someone else again a book: these are our refugees and these are their most precious things (this is from another episode). . . .

We hear the good, warm song of Mckuen--an American composer, poet and singer who actively cooperated with our cinematographers. "The winds of war," he sings, "no longer echo, but their echo can still be heard . . . I think that the peace is the only reason for which the earth should turn." . . .

These are my brief notes made under the still vivid impression of the episodes viewed. Each of them, individually, is a complete publicistic work. Together they make a movie epic. They are like parts of a huge motion picture fresco. However, some of them are central films which greatly decide the action and explain a great deal. It was through them that the Americans judged of the quality of the program.

They were "22 June 1941," "The Unknown Soldier," "The Battle for Moscow," "The Blockade of Leningrad," "To the East," two films on Stalingrad and "The Greatest Tank Battle." . . .

Here is something else about the films I shall remember.

Over four million men, over 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, over 69,000 guns and howitzers, and as many as 12,000 combat aircraft took part in the huge battle. In the films the figures play a tremendous role. They have their drama function and are quite precisely interspersed in the material. It said that Americans trust in figures. We, however, see beyond them the way our power grew and strengthened, what a big war that was, we see people, we see the man, we see the country. . . .

Here is yet another psychological touch--soldiers' letters.

Both German and Soviet army soldiers, the narrator says, wrote about duty and courage. However, in the Soviet soldiers this quality acquired a great meaning. The courage of the invader is a crime. The courage of the defender of the fatherland is the highest of all virtues. This is his land, his motherland.

. . . Birds are singing and cicadas dash. A downpour of fire. . . . The painfully familiar picture of battle! . . .

. . . Frontline photographs. Battle commanders. Soldiers and seamen. Medics, landing forces. Colonel General K. N. Leselidze, commander of the 18th Army, with staff generals and officers and with soldiers. Colonel L. I. Brezhnev, chief of the political department of the 18th Army.

Text of a letter-address to the people of Malaya Zemlya, written by Leonid Brezhnev in April 1943: "We have given the name Malaya Zemlya to the

handful of earth we have regained from the enemy near Novorossiysk. It may be small but it is ours, Soviet, it is wet with our sweat and our blood, and we shall never yield it to any enemy. . . ."

. . . A launch in Novorossiysk Bay. . . . Particularly thoughtful, somehow, is the face of the former soldier, now leader of the country . . . Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, surrounded by his regimental comrades. . . .

The northern odyssey of freight convoys bringing freight to our country. Allied convoys and the battle for Murmansk. Very rare reels of sea battles with the "wolf packs," Hitler's submarines. The tragedy of the PKu-17 convoy . . . . The historical truth of the reasons for the catastrophe.

. . . Papanin and Mazuruk. The legendary flier Safonov and Captain Kosmashev, on whose battery the Hitlerites dropped 25,000 shells and bombs.

The battle for the Kola Peninsula. A strange environment and an even stranger war. . . .

After seeing the partisan episode, I read the following by P. K. Ponomarenko, former chief of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement: "Looking at the film, I recalled our heroic cameramen. Masha Sukhova was a strikingly brave woman. She always tried to place herself in the heat of battle. Boris Vakar. He was the great chronicler of the Kovpak link and died with a camera in his hands. Ottliya Reyzman. Our Belorussian cameraman Iosif Veynerovich, who, more than any other cameraman, worked behind enemy lines. . . ."

The Belorussian episode of the epic reaches the bottom of the soul. Children. Khatyn'. The crimes of the Hitlerites. . . . The reaching of Prussia, the liberation of the Baltic, the attempt on Hitler, and Germany in 1944. Oh, it was quite different from Germany in 1941 or 1942! The landing of the Allies in Normandy. . . .

The episode on the Allies delicately describes the relations between the "big three." As we know, they were far from idyllic. Our partners did not always behave honestly and frankly. Nothing is said of that. In all likelihood, the cinematographers are sparing the feelings of the American audience.

. . . Yes, the narration in the film, both directly from the screen, read by Lancaster, and, subsequently, dubbed by Vasilii Lanov--sounds sincere, intimate, non-obtrusive. It plays a very great role in the film. It makes us think, it is intelligent, in the best meaning of the term, giving the visual material a high spiritual and moral tension.

The text was not easy to come by in the difficult discussions between the American partners and our documentary makers. K. L. Slavin showed me R. L. Karmen's diary, kept during the "text" battles with the Americans.

Roman Lazaravich wrote: "Absolute consideration of the taste, requirements and habits of American viewers. Possibility for asserting our political principles in the assessment of events of the Great Patriotic War and the need to develop an intonation of the commentary, acceptable to the Americans, in the course of which our principles would remain inviolate."

The Americans were bothered by some cliches which had endured in Western historiography in assessing the reasons for the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. They related it to the errors made by the fuhrer and his generals, the famous "Russian winter," the absence of roads, the errors of the Nazi leadership in the control of their governmental machine, or their erroneous policy toward conquered nations. In the course of the arguments long-obsolete anti-Soviet stereotypes would reappear. An example was the evaluation of the treaty signed between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany. Also brought to light was the "Polish problem," long resolved by history: the Katyn tragedy and the Warsaw uprising. . . .

All this was subjected to uncompromising discussion and was reflected in the epic from truly historical positions.

Burt Lancaster, with whom each sentence, each word in the commentary were discussed, said, in the final account that, "I deem it an honor to participate in the making of this program. This may be the most important work of my life."

The last episode in the program was "The Unknown Soldier." It was also the last film made by Roman Karmen, the last in his life. It is both an anthem and a requiem. It glorifies the immortal exploit of the Soviet soldier and leaves no one indifferent.

It is culminated by an exciting interview with Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. The leader of our party and state pronounces words which have become the epigraph of each series of the movie epic. We recall how in the film titles addressed to our audiences, it was stated that in the United States this film was entitled "The Unknown War."

"To Soviet people," Leonid Il'ich said, "this was the Great Patriotic War. They waged it for the sake of the freedom and independence of their socialist homeland, and for the sake of saving Europe and the entire world from fascist slavery. The Soviet people lost 20 million lives in this war. Our people will never forget it! It will be remembered not only by those, like me, who went through the flames of the war from beginning to end, but by the new generations who entered life in the postwar years. Remembering this war means to us a call to vigilance concerning the planning of new intrigues by aggressive forces and, above all, an appeal to wage a tireless and consistent struggle for a lasting peace, an end to the arms race, and peaceful cooperation among countries."

Leonid Il'ich says this while gently hugging a little girl.

I noted that the film epic included many faces of children, many little boys and little girls. There is nothing childish in the sorrow with which they lean over the bodies of killed mothers or seek shelter from the bombs. Innocently killed, wounded, maimed, serious like adults. . . . The picture is addressed to the future, it becomes a major publicistic summation, developing the narrative in such a way that it reminds the people, particularly dramatically and expressively, of their duty to the memories of the fallen, to the soldiers. . . .

Nothing is more sacred than the eternal flame of the memory. It judges time and leaves its behests for the future. "The Great Patriotic War" was seen by millions of foreign and Soviet viewers. Entire families watched together.

"We are struck by the courage of the Soviet people," an American newspaper wrote. "When we saw, in each episode, the incredible efforts which they made to make it possible for the children to live and study, despite the war, at the cost of many deaths. We shared the feelings of the Soviet people seeing in each episode how today they mourn over the graves of the dead."

In our country many people watched the episodes several times in an effort to identify on the screen the familiar face of a husband, father or grandfather who failed to return, or identify friends, people from the same regiment, their airplane or their tank. Occasionally, they were successful, judging by letters. "The second in the ranks of officers-party members was our father . . . ." "One of these pictures I found quite familiar . . . . It must be he. Is he alive? . . . And if not, where was he buried, I wish he were alive."

We so much wish he were alive! . . .

After seeing "The Great Patriotic War" Boris Vasil'yev, writer and front-line veteran, and author of the novel "A Zori Zdes' Tikhiye . . ." [Dawns Here Are Quiet], wrote that "to our generation the silence of Khatyn' and the Piskarevskoye Cemetery, the semi-crumbled walls of the Brest fortress, and the silent parts of the newsreels have a particular type of silence. The lips begin to tremble, there is a lump in the throat, and we reach for the handkerchief."

All this is so, proven by the scars of the war. They are still painful and prevent us from forgetting what this war cost us. Remembering, however, does not mean eternal respect for the dead. Remembrance is our common duty to sacredly safeguard the peace and to fight for a better future for mankind, as the soldiers in the Great Patriotic War did, as is asked of the world by this outstanding historical-publicistic motion-picture epic of the war.

## MOSCOW: PAST AND PRESENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 111-112

[Review by Prof L. Gaponenko, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Istoriya Moskvyy. Kratkiy Oчерk" [History of Moscow. Short Outline], 3d corrected and expanded ed; eds: S. S. Khromov (editor in chief), A. A. Preobrazhenskiy, V. F. Promyslov, A. M. Roganov and A. M. Sinitsyn; Nauka, Moscow, 1978, 544 pages]

[Text] The love of the Soviet people and of the working people on earth for the capital of the first socialist state of the whole people in history is great and inflexible. Moscow is truly the symbol of peace and progress, the unfading light of the ideas of Leninism, and the bearer of the great revolutionary, combat and labor traditions and progressive ideals of mankind. In the words of Georgi Dimitrov, it became the "brain and heart of world democracy, the embodiment of everything best on earth, the hope and support of the oppressed the world over." The tremendous interest displayed in the history of the capital of the Soviet state by its citizens and by millions of people in other countries is entirely natural.

A number of books have been written about Moscow or about individual heroic stages in its history. Each of them has made a contribution to the chronicle of the capital. Noteworthy in this respect is this new definitive work on Moscow. Briefly but meaningfully it presents the specific-historical content of all the periods in the establishment and development of Moscow, describing its outstanding role as the most important political, economic and cultural center of the country.

The life and destinies of the ancient city reflect the inexhaustible creative strength of the people's masses. The unique aspect of Moscow is a record of the most important landmarks in our history: the establishment of a centralized Russian state, the defeat of foreign aggressors, the creation of a domestic industry and, correspondingly, of a working class, the stages of the Russian revolutionary movement, and the victorious advance of socialism.

Prerevolutionary works and reference books presented Moscow, as a rule, as the kingdom of the prosperous petit bourgeois, a kind of abode of class

peace. The authors of this volume depict Moscow as the focal point of acute class conflicts and social antagonisms, as a center of unabating struggle waged by the working people against the exploiters. Step by step, they trace the development and changes in Moscow's social life, as throughout the country, depicting the three stages of the struggle. The authors justifiably emphasize that the origins of the proletarian revolutionary movement in Russia are traced to Moscow. It was here that P. A. Alekseyev worked among the textile workers. It was here that Marxist organizations, such as the Moscow Workers Union, appeared.

The arrival of the young V. I. Lenin played an outstanding role in strengthening the Marxist current in Moscow. In January 1894, addressing a clandestine meeting in the house of Zaleskaya, on Vozdvizhenka (today Kalinin Avenue), Lenin sharply criticized the views of the liberal populists. One of Lenin's first works--"Who Are the 'Friends of the People' and How They Fight the Social Democrats?" was clandestinely published in Moscow.

With the help of specific examples the authors prove that Moscow became a reliable base for the Bolshevik party in its struggle against czarist despotism and bourgeois-landowners oppression. The heroic struggle of the Moscow proletariat in 1905-1907 is revealed particularly vividly. Here it proved its political maturity and loyalty to the ideas of the struggle for freedom, turning the December armed uprising into the apogee of the first Russian revolution.

The authors have paid very close attention to summing up and analyzing the struggle of the Muscovites for the victory of the socialist revolution. They have put in scientific circulation a number of new archive documents whose study has made it possible to determine more precisely the correlation among class forces, describe more completely the role of the working class in the victorious completion of the armed uprising in Moscow, and the significance of this important event to the success of the socialist revolution throughout the country. The authors justifiably emphasize that the establishment of the soviet system in Moscow strengthened the universal-historical victory of the proletariat in Petersburg in October 1917.

In March 1918 our party's Central Committee and the Soviet government--the Council of People's Commissars--headed by Lenin, moved to Moscow, which since then has been the capital of the first state of workers and peasants in the world.

The authors describe the establishment and development of socialist Moscow and its place and role in the economic and cultural transformation of the country. With the help of extensive factual data they show Lenin's concern for Moscow and depict the practical implementation of its conversion into a model socialist city, and the way the capital helped other cities and industrial centers in the building of socialism. The Moscow working people had to surmount great difficulties before it could become one of the planned and most beautiful cities in the world. Under the constant

attention of Vladimir Il'ich and under the leadership of the Moscow City Party organization the necessary means were found for the restoration and reorganization of the urban economy. On Lenin's initiative the question of building a subway and the urban construction plan of the capital were discussed. Even though this is in the past, it appears contemporary.

One cannot become indifferent reading the chapters on the heroic labor pathos of the Muscovites in building socialism and creating the material and technical foundations for socialism. In the course of the five-year plans, from a Moscow made of calico and wood, Moscow became the biggest industrial center of the country.

The authors have dealt extensively with the concern of the party and the state for upgrading the prosperity of the capital's working people. Using specific examples, they trace how literally from the very first days of the Soviet system the slogan of "Everything in the Name of Man, for the Good of Man" began to be implemented.

Moscow and its population played an invaluable role in the struggle against the enemies of our homeland, particularly in the civil and Great Patriotic wars. The great defenders of the capital became true symbols of the patriotic firmness and heroism, inflexible will for victory and inexhaustible faith of the people in a bright future. The myth of the "invincibility" of the fascist army was scattered at the approaches to Moscow and the elite Hitlerite hordes were defeated. Our capital was justifiably awarded the honorific title of city-hero.

The authors describe Moscow extensively as the center of progressive science and culture. They show the way the features of an all-Russian national culture developed in the capital and how gradually it became one of the leading scientific and cultural centers in Russia. The various forms of science and culture gained their most complete and extensive development after the victory of the October Revolution. The authors describe in detail the changes which have taken place thanks to the implementation of the Leninist plan for the cultural revolution in the development of public education, science and art.

The final chapters deal with the life and activities of the Moscow working people under the conditions of the developed socialist society. With great love and pride the authors write on the way the ancient, yet eternally young city has reached unparalleled blossoming and is confidently looking at the future. The Muscovites warmly responded to the appeal of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, CC CPSU general secretary, to turn the capital of our homeland into a model communist city.

Moscow has never been built so rapidly. The city has gone far beyond its age-old limits. Districts with beautiful, comfortable homes have developed in the recent suburbs. Even greater possibilities are opening to Moscow in connection with the adoption of the new general plan for its development, for whose implementation the Muscovites are now struggling with the support of the entire Soviet people.

The authors describe the role of the CPSU Central Committee and Moscow City Party Committee in mobilizing the toiling masses for the radical reorganizations carried out in the capital under the Soviet system, as well as the organizational activities of the Moscow City Soviet, and trade union and Komsomol organizations for the implementation of the decisions of the party and the government on the further development of the city and on improving the material situation of the working people.

This one-volume work is a timely and valuable edition. The book is properly illustrated. It is distinguished by its high scientific level. It has been written in a clear style and has met with a good response on the part of both Soviet and foreign readers. Unquestionably, it will assume its proper place, not only in Moscow's historiography, but among the books on the cities in the Soviet Union.

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## INSPIRER OF THE BAKU COMMUNE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 112-119

[Review by G. Akopyan and S. Kaltakhchyan of the book "Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya" [Selected Works] by S. G. Shaumyan; in 2 vols, 2d expanded ed, Politizdat, Moscow, 1978; vol 1, 1902-1914, 511 pages; vol 2, 1915-1918, 463 pages]

[Text] A new, expanded two-volume edition of the Selected Works of Stepan Georgiyevich Shaumyan, V. I. Lenin's loyal student and fellow worker, has been published on the occasion of the centennial of the birth of this noted leader of the communist party and Soviet state.

The work offers of a clear idea of the comprehensive theoretical and practical activities of this outstanding Leninist revolutionary. It reveals unfading passages in the revolutionary movement and struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution in the Caucasus.

Stepan Shaumyan actively participated in the activities of the Leninist-ISKRA and Bolshevik organizations in the Transcaucasus. He published and edited a number of party organs. He was the author of many party committee addresses and manifestos and of profound theoretical works, particularly on the national question.

Characterizing Shaumyan's role in the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus and in Russia at large in defense of the revolutionary Marxist doctrine, Sergo Ordzhonikidze described him as the "heavy artillery of theoretical Marxism," one the best "teachers, organizers and leaders" of the Transcaucasian proletariat. A. Myasnikyan, A. Yenukidze and others considered Shaumyan a "worthy leader of Caucasian Bolshevism" and the "most merciless" fighter against nationalism and separatism in the Caucasus. S. M. Efendiyev, an active leader of the "Gummet" social-democratic organization in Azerbaijan, wrote: "Stepan Shaumyan is the inspirer of the Baku commune, its brain, mind, knowledge and thought. The iron logic of Stepan's speeches aptly struck and defeated the enemies of the commune. He was the beloved leader of the army of petroleum workers."

Many aspects of Shaumyan's theoretical and practical activities--his selfless struggle for the victory of the Soviet system in the Caucasus, and organization of opposition to domestic and foreign counterrevolution--remain topical to this day. They have been kept within the arsenal of the means of struggle against the enemies of the working class.

Consistently defending the purity of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in 1914, in his work "On National-Cultural Autonomy," Schaumyan wrote: "Today attempts are made to justify everything with Marxism and everyone is proclaiming himself a Marxist!" He called for "mercilessly striking and persecuting" anyone who exploits and defiles "this great doctrine" (see vol 1, pp 418-419).

The two-volume works of S. G. Shaumyan make it possible to trace the solution of problems which so urgently faced the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus during the underground period, and the stormy days of the revolution and civil war. This applies, above all, to Shaumyan's irreconcilable struggle against the distortions of Marxism-Leninism; the correspondence between Lenin and Shaumyan on the national question; the study of the conditions for the victory of the Soviet system in Baku and the reasons for the defeat of the revolution in the Transcaucasus; the description of Shaumyan's tactics in the use of Russian revolutionary forces for the defeat of the counterrevolution in Baku and the entire Transcaucasus; the assessment of the erroneous tactics of most kray party committees, which took a course to "peaceful transition" of power, lacking proper conditions, and refusing any reliance on Russian revolutionary forces; and the interpretation of the role and significance of the intervention in the Transcaucasus of two imperialist groups and the reasons for the temporary loss of Soviet power in Baku.

The material in the work is a characteristic chronicle of the revolutionary struggle in the Caucasus, a living history of the heroic battles waged by the working people for the victory of socialism, and valuable source in the study of the struggle waged by the Bolsheviks for Leninist theory and practice.

Volume one opens with Shaumyan's speech at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the birth of the famous Armenian public figure and writer Gazaros Agayan. "Today," he noted, "the title of public figure can be awarded justifiably only to he who has certain scientific views on the laws governing the development of society and the nations . . ." (vol 1, p 19).

Shaumyan called upon the leading people in the Caucasus not to be satisfied with liberal activities or legal publications, but to act "like Belinskiy, Pisarev and Chernyshevskiy--the giants of the 1840's and 1860's"--emphasizing that "whenever they were unable to print what they wanted to tell the Russian public, they resorted to the free press" (ibid, p 21).

Shaumyan called for revolutionary struggle against autocracy and the bourgeoisie. It is on the wrecks of bourgeois "patriotism" and "free thinking,"

he said, that we shall raise the Red proletarian banner and the slogans of "Fight Despotism!" and "Long Live Political Freedom!"

In the summer of 1902 Stepan Shaumyan, together with the noted RSDWP leaders Bogdan Knunyants and other Transcaucasian revolutionaries, founded in Tiflis the "Alliance of Armenian Social Democrats," and undertook the publication of the newspaper PROLETARIAT. This became the first Armenian language publication following the Leninist-ISKRA direction. In October it published Shaumyan's Manifesto of the Alliance, describing its programmatic principles and requirements, proclaiming that "it is one of the branches of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party. . . . "The Alliance of Armenian Social Democrats" expresses its full solidarity with it, and in its activities will fight with it for the interests of the Russian proletariat in general and the Armenian in particular" (vol 1, p 29).

In February 1903, in the newspaper ISKRA, Lenin highly rated the manifesto: "We most warmly welcome the Manifesto of the 'Alliance of Armenian Social Democrats,' and, in particular, its noteworthy attempt to provide a proper concept of the national question" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 7, p 104).

Persecuted by czarism, Shaumyan went abroad in the autumn of 1902 and enrolled in the philosophy department of Berlin University. In the course of his training, in 1903, he went to Geneva where he met Lenin. This meeting created an ineradicable impression on the young revolutionary. Vladimir Il'ich received him warmly. From that moment on friendly relations were established between them and they frequently corresponded.

In the spring of 1905 Shaumyan returned to Tiflis. In his speeches and articles of that period he called upon the working people of the Caucasus to mobilize all revolutionary forces of the area for a decisive struggle against "dying autocracy." Defending Lenin's strategy and tactics of the revolution, he wrote that "it is a question of the seizure of political power by the revolutionary people" (vol 1, p 91), and that it was necessary to prepare for a "general battle against czarism," "armed uprising," "the overthrow of the autocracy, the destruction of the monarchy, and the establishment of a democratic republic" (ibid, p 92).

In his 1905-1907 works Chaumyan shows up as a Marxist-Leninist, as one of the leading heads in the struggle waged by the multinational proletariat of the Transcaucasus. He substantiated and creatively applied the Leninist theory and tactic of the revolution to the conditions of his area. In his articles "Our Organ," "The Last RSDWP Congress," "The Government and the Duma," "The Unifying Congress of the RSDWP," "On the Subject of Plekhanov's Letter," and many others, Shaumyan defended and developed Lenin's theory of the nature, content and motive forces of the first Russian revolution, exposed the groundlessness of the Menshevik arguments which rejected the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution, and exposed their anti-historical approach to the assessment of social phenomena and aspiration to promote constitutional illusions among the masses.

Major theoretical works written by Chaumyan in 1905, such as "Classes in Contemporary European Society" and "Evolutionism and Revolutionism in Social Science" and the work "The National Question and Social Democracy," published in 1906, were substantiations and defenses of the Leninist theory and tactic of the revolution. In a profoundly scientific yet easily understandable style, the author depicts the organic link between dialectical and historical materialism and the vital requirements of the proletariat, its class struggle and its tasks in the revolution.

Many of Chaumyan's theoretical works have preserved their topical nature, for he never left the soil of Marxist-Leninist science in his study of social phenomena and problems.

In a Leninist way S. G. Chaumyan exposed the political nature of reformism, which recognized evolutionary development only within the frameworks of bourgeois society. He pointed out the dialectical unity between evolution and revolution. He emphasized that revolution alone "eliminates the old 'superstructures' which are inconsistent with factual relations among people and restrain the further growth of society . . . completing the familiar cycle of the evolutionary development of society and clearing the way to its further, still evolutionary development." Asking whether "We should consider revolutionism incompatible with evolutionism, and oppose it? Or could we proclaim revolutions as being historically unnatural, harmful, 'unfair' and 'immoral,' and therefore prejudicial?"--he claimed that, "One must be a hopelessly blind philistine or obvious felon and supporter of the old, obsolete order oppressing the entire society to answer such questions with a yes" (vol 1, pp 78, 80). At the same time Chaumyan criticized the "self-seeking anarchic 'rebelliousness' ignoring everything else" (ibid, p 75), proving that "both . . . act in the interest of reaction and to the detriment of the revolution" (ibid, p 81).

The entire study of the correlation between evolution and revolution is reduced by Chaumyan to the only scientific conclusion that "it is only the conscious attitude toward the historical process, the proper and scientific understanding of the laws governing historical development, and the ability to combine evolutionism with revolutionism that guarantees us a sensible, expedient and true revolutionary activity" (ibid).

Considering the ratio among class forces as the "base" and "superstructure" in the antagonistic society, and exposing the entire evil it creates, Chaumyan substantiates and defends the philosophy of optimism. "History," he writes, "never provides its loyal observers with the reason and the right to be pessimistic toward it. In the process of its development, bringing forth inevitable and necessary evils, at the same time it provides the weapons with which to strike and destroy such evils, and to lay the path to the free and victorious progress of mankind" (ibid, p 69).

After the defeat of the first Russian revolution, there followed, to use Lenin's expression, "hellishly difficult" years, and a wild reactionary

outburst. The Mensheviks and the "fellow travelers" of the revolution among the bourgeois intelligentsia became renegades. They called for the abolition of the party. They encouraged despondency and decadent feelings. The Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, were preparing for a new upsurge of the revolutionary movement. As a consistent Leninist, in those years Chaumyan struggled with even greater energy to strengthen the organizations of the proletariat and expressed his firm conviction of the forthcoming new revolutionary upsurge. In his article "Workers Organizations and the Reaction," he wrote: "Under the influence of the reaction, one or another group of the intelligentsia or of accidental non-proletarian elements may, 'disappointed' or 'despairing,' withdraw from the struggle, from the proletariat. The proletariat itself, however, cannot escape itself and its class struggle" (vol 1, p 280).

In 1906 and 1907 Chaumyan actively participated in the work of the fourth (unification) and fifth (London) party congresses, invariably defending the Leninist positions. In the spring of 1905, on Vladimir Il'ich's and the Central Committee's advice, he moved from Tiflis to permanent party work in Baku--the biggest revolutionary center of the Transcaucasus--and until the end of his heroic life--for the next 11 years--remained the acknowledged leader of the Baku Bolshevik organization. His activities in Baku and the Transcaucasus were interrupted only by detentions and exiles. In the reactionary period, when Lenin waged an irreconcilable struggle against the liquidationists and the opportunists of all hues, and against "otzovizm," god-building and the revision of Marx' philosophy, the Baku party organization remained a loyal supporter of the Bolsheviks.

On 27 July 1908 Chaumyan wrote M. Tskhakaya, in Geneva, the following: ". . . We are firmly convinced of the correctness of Il'ich's position . . ." (ibid, p 266); ". . . we have become very interested in philosophy. We are reading and rereading Dietzgen, Plekhanov, Bogdanov and others" (ibid). In another letter (November 1908), exposing Machist revisionism, and criticizing those who failed to understand the reactionary nature of Machism, Chaumyan firmly emphasized that, "We were entirely on Il'ich's side" (ibid, p 288). "As to his (Bogdanov's--the author) empiriomonism, we are just as skeptical, if not more so . . ." he wrote. "I have on my desk three volumes on empiriomonism . . . and, whenever possible, I read them. I read his 'From the Mentality of Society.' So far my view remains extremely negative. His concept of the identical nature of life and consciousness destroys, in my view, the entire Marxian system" (ibid, pp 287-288).

In 1911 Chaumyan actively participated in the preparations for the Sixth (Prague) RSDWP Congress and became a member of the Russian organizational commission (ROK) in charge of convening the conference. He could not participate in the conference because of his detention, but was elected in absentia candidate for co-opting within the Central Committee. In 1913 Lenin sent to Chaumyan, at that time exiled in Astrakhan, the resolution of the Poronino Conference of the RSDWP Central Committee on the national

question and requested his opinion. On 15 November 1913 Chaumyan wrote to Lenin his remarks. This letter marked the beginning of intensive correspondence between them on the national question. Unfortunately, Chaumyan's letter has not been found. However, Lenin's answer shows that Chaumyan deemed it necessary to consider the Russian language as the "state language" of Russia, for "it has had and will have a major progressive significance." He repeated his thesis contained in the Manifesto of the Alliance of the Armenian Social Democrats and the work "The National Question and the Social Democrats" on the establishment of a "future free Russia" on a federated basis, unless possibilities exist for establishing among the peoples of the country other, even closer relations.

In his 6 December 1913 answer Vladimir Il'ich criticized these views. He explained that there was no need to proclaim the Russian language a state language, since "it would assume a progressive significance even more so without coercion." On the basis of Marx' theory and the specific conditions of Russia at that time, Lenin believed, as he did in his answer to the Manifesto of the Alliance of Armenian Social Democrats, that "the alliance must delete from its program the demand for a federal republic," and that "it is not the business of the proletariat to preach federalism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 7, p 105).

In his answers to Lenin and in his work "On National-Cultural Autonomy" (1914), Chaumyan considered Lenin's critical remarks and refined his position. In particular, he agreed that one cannot "resolve the national problem in general, regardless of its specific manifestations" (vol 1, p 421), noting that "there are cases when we support the total separation of a given nation, or are supporters of a federation or autonomy," and that everything depends "on the conditions, time and place" (ibid, p 424).

Opposing national-cultural autonomy and the policy of dividing the nations, Chaumyan wrote that in resolving the national question "we have only one common and mandatory principle, one basic criterion: the interests of economic development and progress of mankind . . . the interests of the international liberation movement of the working class" (ibid). From the viewpoint of these interests, he went on to say, "it would be more desirable and necessary to establish, if possible, closer links and unification among nations," "being far more frequently supporters of rapprochement and unification among nations" (ibid, p 425).

Taking into consideration the demand of the supporters of national-cultural autonomy "to institute national federal or autonomous organs," Chaumyan wrote: ". . . We consider the division of unified Russia into several federated organs harmful and, in such a case, we firmly oppose a federation" (ibid, pp 423, 424-425).

The notes to the two-volume edition justifiably point out that "until 1917 the Bolsheviks had an adverse attitude toward a federal governmental system. Subsequently, on the basis of specific historical conditions, and

taking into consideration the complexity involved in the unification of nations, the Bolshevik party changed its attitude toward a federation. . . . After the October Socialist Revolution the party clearly took the position of acknowledging the federation as the state system governing the Soviet Socialist Republics, and as a form of their unification, for life proved that a federated state association, as it developed in the course of Soviet construction, did not conflict with the principles of democratic centralism" (vol 2, pp 414-415).

Let us note that, criticizing some of Chaumyan's suggestions on defining the party's national policy, at the same time, Lenin highly valued his experience and knowledge on the question of the national problem. In his 6 December 1913 letter he wrote: "I was very glad to receive your letter dated 15 November. You should know that in my situation the response of the comrades in Russia is terribly valuable, particularly those who think about and are working on this question. For this reason, I found your quick reply particularly pleasant" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 48, p 233).

The second volume of S. G. Chaumyan's Selected Works contains basic materials covering the period of preparations for the storming of autocracy and the struggle for the victory of the Soviet system in Baku and the Transcaucasus. Following the victory of the February revolution, Chaumyan returned from his final exile in Saratov and, once again, headed the work of the Baku Party Committee. Chaumyan's authority in Baku was so great that, even before his arrival, in absentia, he had been elected chairman of the Baku Soviet, even though the Bolshevik group within the soviet numbered only 9 of the 52 members.

This marked the beginning of the most complex and difficult period in Chaumyan's revolutionary activities. However, it was precisely then that his ability to assess in a Leninist way the deployment of class forces in the revolution, properly to issue assignments and formulate the tactics of the Bolsheviks in Baku and the Transcaucasus in the rapidly changing circumstances, were displayed most fully.

In June 1917, as a delegate to the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Chaumyan repeatedly met with Lenin to discuss the revolutionary struggle in the Caucasus and throughout the country. At the instructions of Lenin and the Bolshevik faction in the congress, he spoke in defense of the Bolshevik resolution calling for peace without annexations or reparations. It proclaimed the right of nations "to self-determination, i.e., the right of each nation to determine independently and freely its own affiliation with one or another state, or determine to have its own independent state." This resolution was one of the first Bolshevik documents in which, following the February revolution, the party's policy was defined in terms of the national-liberation and anti-imperialist movement of oppressed nations.

Because of the complex circumstances in Baku, Chaumyan was unable to attend the Sixth RSDWP(b) Congress, but once again was elected Central Committee

member in absentia. Subsequently he was made member of the reduced Central Committee. On 15 September 1917 he took part in its sessions which discussed Lenin's letters, "The Bolsheviks Must Seize the Power" and "Marxism and the Uprising," and fully supported Lenin's plan for an armed uprising (see vol 1, p 13).

At the beginning of October Chaumyan represented the party's Central Committee at the first congress of Bolsheviks in the Caucasus spoke on the current situation and the national question. He defended Lenin's positions on the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks and supported Lenin's solution of the national problem. Fully in accordance with Lenin's plan, he stated that "after 3-5 July one could speak only of seizing the power, but not of its transition," and that "our task is to assume the leadership of the revolution and seize the power" (ibid, vol 2, p 137).

Addressing himself to the national problem, Chaumyan emphasized that "at the 1913 Bolshevik conference our program on the national problem was somewhat broadened, and instead of oblast self-administration, on Comrade Lenin's motion, oblast autonomy was adopted." He proceeded to outline the possible boundaries of the three national oblasts in the Transcaucasus (ibid, p 139).

On 15 October 1917 the expanded session of the Baku Soviet approved the resolution submitted by Chaumyan, chairman of its Provisional Executive Committee, which provided a Leninist assessment to the development of the revolution: ". . .The power today is in the hands of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, which is leading Russia to its doom. . . . The power must be taken away from the enemies of the people and placed in the hands of the people themselves, represented by the soviets of workers and soldiers and peasants deputies . . ." (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 18 October 1917).

Thanks to the firm and decisive policy pursued by the Baku Bolsheviks, headed by Chaumyan, an alliance was made between the revolutionary proletariat of the city and the revolutionary garrison. The opposition of the defense movement and the nationalists was surmounted, and six days following the victory of the October Revolution in Petrograd, the power in Baku was seized by the working class. Along with the representatives of the revolutionary proletariat, 146 delegates from the garrison voted in favor of giving the power to the Baku Soviet.

Circumstances developed somewhat differently in the center of the area--Tiflis--and in other cities and rayons in the Transcaucasus, where as a result of the small Bolshevik influence petit bourgeois nationalistic parties seized the power. As Chaumyan wrote, in the Transcaucasus "representatives of three national parties found themselves in power: Georgian nationalists--Mensheviks; Armenian nationalists--Dashnaktsakans, and Muslim nationalists (Azerbaijan nationalists--the author)--the 'Musavat'" (ibid,



vol 2, p 292). Headed by N. Zhordaniya, leader of Georgian Menshevism, these parties set up a counterrevolutionary Transcaucasian commissariat which rejected the power of the Soviet of People's Commissars and pursued a policy of national chauvinism and separatism, and of separating the Transcaucasus from revolutionary Russia. Chaumyan actively exposed the counterrevolutionary policy of the defensists and the nationalists (vol 2, pp 222-223).

In the complex circumstances of the autumn of 1917, when the nationalists and separatists, who had reared their heads, were pursuing an anti-Soviet policy in the Transcaucasus, the kray party committee was unable to formulate a proper tactical line and to mobilize all revolutionary forces, including the troops of the Army of the Caucasus, in the struggle for recognizing the power of the Council of People's Commissars. On 28 October, in Chaumyan's absence (he was permanently residing in Baku) the kraykom discussed the report on events in Petrograd and took a course toward "painless and peaceful transition" of the power to the soviets, at the precise time when the sixth party congress had pointed out that "at the present time the peaceful development (of the revolution--the author) and a painless transition of power to the soviets had become impossible, for the power had already, in fact, shifted into the hands of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie" (see "KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"yezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses and Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums], vol 1, Moscow, 1970, p 488), and when the supporters of defensists and the nationalists did not hesitate to use arms to suppress the revolutionary movement in the Transcaucasus.

In Baku Chaumyan closely followed the development of events in Tiflis and the activities of the supporters of defense and the nationalists. On 18 November 1917 he published an article in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, "The Organization of the New System in the Caucasus," in which he provided a profound analysis of the situation which had developed in the area. He wrote the alliance between the two defense parties--Mensheviks and S.R.--expanded by the nationalist parties "rallying virtually all classes and strata in the Caucasus, cannot establish a revolutionary power." Naturally, Chaumyan went on to say, it was not astounding that "the party of the revolutionary proletariat--the Bolsheviks--refused to participate in such a government" (vol 1, p 150).

Defining the political aspect of this system, Chaumyan wrote: ". . . The new system is avoid answering the basic question raised by the revolution: Will the Caucasus recognize Lenin's new government, or will it declare war against it? Instead of answering the question, the new government of the Caucasus has decided to factually separate itself from Russia and create an autonomous Transcaucasus" (ibid, pp 150-151). In the same article he defined the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus in the struggle for the victory of the October Revolution in the area. "However," he wrote, "the revolutionary proletariat will not allow the petit bourgeois nationalists

to seize the power with their bare hands. . . . The revolution will continue in the Caucasus. Workers and soldiers, marching in step with the revolutionary proletariat in Russia, will struggle for the continuation of the revolution, for the recognition of the power of the people's commissars, headed by Lenin, and for the local power of the soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants deputies. In the Caucasus we recognize only the system which will be created at the congress of soviets. . . . Until then, we are for the revolution and against the petit bourgeois reactionary power headed by Mensheviks and S.R."(vol 2, p 151).

The two-volume work includes, for the first time, an important telegram addressed by Chaumyan to V. I. Lenin, dated 23 November 1917, in which he discusses the possibility to force the Transcaucasian Commissariat to recognize the Soviet system with the help of the revolutionary forces of the Army of the Caucasus. "We have declared war on the Transcaucasian Commissariat, as it is counterrevolutionary. Most of the garrison is on our side. With the help of the army we could force the commissariat to acknowledge the rule of the Sovnarkom. Request immediate instructions" (vol 2, p 152). Incidentally, in including this telegram, for some reason, the compilers of the work have deemed it unnecessary to mention that it was sent for the second time on 25 November 1917, and that no less than six variants of the same telegram are known, the most complete of them also stating that, "A Transcaucasian system has been set up by the supporters of defense and the nationalists, headed by Gegechkori. We have declared war on it, considering it counterrevolutionary. The troops consider its creation as a separation from Russia. Relying on the majority of the troops and on the Baku Soviet, we could force them to acknowledge the authority of the people's commissars. Awaiting answer."

However, the 23 and 25 November telegrams were intercepted by the Tiflis Mensheviks. Using Kamo as courier, Chaumyan sent Lenin a letter informing him of the situation developing in the Transcaucasus, and requesting advice. Unfortunately, the letter has not been found.

On 30 November 1917 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY published Chaumyan's appeal to the party kraykom entitled "Comrade Soldiers at the Front and Rear!" in which he defined the tasks and role of the revolutionary forces in the kray. The appeal called for supporting the workers-peasants government, headed by Lenin, and to help implement in the Caucasus as well all revolutionary-democratic measures already implemented by it in Russia, to set up a soviet system in the Caucasus, and to disband the self-proclaimed Transcaucasian Commissariat (see BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 30 November 1917). The appeal met with broad support among the delegates to the Second Congress of the Army of the Caucasus (10-23 December 1917).

Following his arrival in Tiflis, Chaumyan participated in the work of the congress, which adopted a Bolshevik resolution, recognized the power of the Sovnarkom, headed by Lenin, and rejected the Transcaucasian Commissariat "as a non-soviet and non-revolutionary organ." This was an important victory for the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus.

The articles "The Russian Revolution and the Transcaucasian System," "The Supporters of Defense in the Caucasus Are Karaulov's Allies," "Nationalism in the Caucasus and the Denudation of the Front," "On the Withdrawal of the Army of the Caucasus," and "The Congress of Soviets of Workers Deputies of the Kavkazskiy Kray" give an idea of the selflessness with which Chaumyan struggled for the establishment of a soviet system in the Caucasus. He exposed the policy of betraying the cause of the socialist revolution and called upon the working people to struggle for its continuation and development, and for the victory of the October Revolution in the Caucasus.

By then Chaumyan's letter to Lenin had already been received by the latter. On 16 December 1917 the RSFSR Sovnarkom, chaired by Lenin, having discussed the situation in the Caucasus, appointed S. G. Chaumyan provisional commissar extraordinary for affairs in the Caucasus, which meant that his actions had met with total approval and support.

Fearing that subunits of the Army of the Caucasus would support the establishment of a soviet system in the area, the counterrevolutionary coalition of the Transcaucasian supporters of defense and nationalists pursued a policy of demobilization, disbanding, redeploying, and disarming the revolutionary troops, which were soon afterwards removed from the Tiflis garrison. The counterrevolutionary coalition began to organize attacks on withdrawing echelons of Russian troops.

Chaumyan bitterly described the tactics of the Transcaucasian counter-revolution toward the Russian revolutionary forces as follows: "Half-a-million Russian peasants in uniform, armed, and loyal to the revolution, who could have given invaluable aid to the peasantry and the proletariat in the Caucasus in their struggle against the counterrevolutionary elements, were declared unneeded "outsiders," and efforts were made to make them leave the Caucasus sooner" (vol 2, p 230).

Subsequently, events in the Transcaucasus developed in such a way that the kray's Bolsheviks found it difficult to recover. After great difficulties, reaching Tiflis again, in January 1918, and having received Lenin's mandate, brought by Kamo, Chaumyan undertook to carry out his duties as commissar extraordinary for Caucasian affairs. In his address to the population of the Transcaucasus he stated that, "A soviet system must be established immediately in the Caucasus. At the present time the cause of the revolution throughout Russia has never been so endangered as here, in the Caucasus. Following the counterrevolution in the Northern Caucasus, the counterrevolution in the Transcaucasus has openly reared its head" (vol 2, p 187).

The counterrevolutionary Transcaucasian Commissariat violently opposed Chaumyan's new appointment. An order for his arrest was issued. The Bolshevik newspapers were closed down. Weapons were used against the participants in a meeting called by the Bolsheviks in Tiflis. Learning of this, Lenin stated that "the Mensheviks and the right-wing S.R., these gentle

lambs, are shrieking about our cruelty, forgetting that they have set up gallows for Comrade Chaumyan" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 36, p 215).

Nothing was left for Chaumyan but to retreat to Baku with the echelons of Russian forces going north, to mobilize forces for the struggle against the counterrevolution.

Since the Bolshevik newspapers in Tiflis were closed down soon afterwards, on behalf of the party kraykom Chaumyan published in Baku an open "Letter to the Editor," addressed to the bourgeois newspapers in Tiflis, exposing the counterrevolutionary policy of the Transcaucasian Commissariat and the slanderous campaign it had mounted against the Bolsheviks. On 10 March (New Style) Chaumyan wrote again in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY about the reactionary raging in the Transcaucasus: "Having created an Yelizavetpol'k-type counterrevolution by shooting thousands of Russian soldiers, sending punitive expeditions against Georgian peasants and in the Muslim provinces, and firing at workers in Tiflis, the Transcaucasian Commissariat must be overthrown."

At a meeting of the Baku Soviet, he stated that "the Baku Soviet must become, in the Transcaucasus, the main support and center of the civil war which the Sovnarkom has openly declared in Russia. It must lead the working people of the Transcaucasus in the battle against the exploiters. This will unquestionably end in the victory of the proletariat" (vol 2, p 220).

Defining the tasks of the armed forces, Chaumyan subsequently noted that the revolutionary committee of the Army of the Caucasus, having established a soviet system in Baku, would subsequently call upon the Red Army to defend it throughout the Transcaucasus. "Ever since a soviet system was established in Baku," he emphasized, "we have always said that Baku is the base for the soviet system and that, consolidating ourselves here, we must think of extending a fraternal hand to the Georgian, Armenian and Muslim peasantry in the Transcaucasus, and together with them overthrow the yoke of the beys and khans, and set up a soviet system in the Transcaucasus" (vol 2, p 297).

The Baku Soviet of People's Commissars was set up on 25 April. On 19 May, at a ceremonious session of the Soviet of Workers, Soldiers and Sailors Deputies, held jointly with the Congress of the Soviet of Peasants Deputies of Bakinskiy Uyezd, Chaumyan stated that should we be able to "create a strong international soviet workers system" in the area, "such a system of the united democrats in the Transcaucasus would not fear the Turkish hordes and the Germans menacing Batum" (vol 2, p 292). He called for the creation of a type of government in the area which, allied with the entire Russian proletariat and the peasantry, would defend the unity of the Transcaucasus with Russia, crush the power of the landowners and capitalists of all nationalities, and establish the brotherhood of workers and peasants throughout the Transcaucasus.

However, at that time they were unable to set up such a system. This was prevented, on the one hand, by the separatist policy of the supporters of defense and the nationalists and, on the other, the intervention of German-Turkish and Anglo-French imperialists.

Waging an irreconcilable struggle against the domestic and foreign counter-revolution, Chaumyan tirelessly exposed nationalism and separatism promoted by Mensheviks and nationalists, which had sunk deep roots in the area. Pointing out the nationalist policy of defense supporters and nationalists, in his article "Nationalism in the Caucasus and the Denudation of the Front," published in December 1917 in the newspaper KAVKAZSKIY RABOCHIY, he wrote: "Nationalism has always been, and remains, the worst enemy of the revolution in the Caucasus. . . . The nationalistic course charted by three of the biggest parties in the Transcaucasus is leading, from its very first steps, to the saddest possible consequences" (vol 2, p 160).

When the Transcaucasian counterrevolutionaries tried to justify their nationalism and separatism, Chaumyan angrily rebuffed them, stating that one cannot commit treason against the Russian revolution and as a result gain the right to self-determination. The interests of the Russian revolution and of the Transcaucasian nationalities demand the same thing: the recognition of the rule of the Sovnarkom and providing bread to the army and rear lines in the Transcaucasus (vol 2, pp 155-156).

For the sake of the victory of the soviet system in the Transcaucasus, Chaumyan called upon the working people in the area to set up "organs of the power of the working people--soviets--in order to strike a blow against national separatism, which is bringing such disasters to the Transcaucasus." He emphasized that it was precisely the nationalistic parties in the area which, with the help of their imperialist supporters, "had lost the revolution in the Transcaucasus." Those same forces brought about the fall of the soviet system in Baku, which was overthrown as a result of the intervention in the Transcaucasus of two imperialist groups--the German-Turkish, on the one hand, and the Anglo-French, on the other--and the energizing of the local counterrevolution.

V. I. Lenin and the Soviet government attentively followed the events in Baku and the Transcaucasus and gave all possible support to the area's Bolsheviks. After receiving Chaumyan's 13 April 1918 letter on the civil war in Baku and the actions of the Baku Soviet, stating that "the Transcaucasus has entered a period of active armed struggle for the soviet system," and that the victory of the counterrevolution "would bring about the loss of the Transcaucasus to Russia," on 14 May Lenin answered: "We are enthused by your firm and decisive policy" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," vol 50, p 73).

The Soviet government demanded of Germany to observe the conditions of the Brest peace treaty and the termination of the Turkish offensive on Baku. When it became known that "Anglo-French imperialism had made a very

effective move," and that the soviet system in Baku had been overthrown, Lenin cabled Astrakhan' on the need to take measures to help Baku, "taking all circumstances into consideration." "You know," he emphasized, "that I fully trust Chaumyan. On this end we cannot understand the situation and have no possibility to provide quick help."

On 14 November 1918, following the receipt of a cable from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Sector of the Southern Front informing him that Comrades Chaumyan, Dzhaparidze, and other commissars had been executed by firing squad in Ashkhabad, as recalls E. M. Vovshina, then employed by the Sovmarkom Administration of Affairs, "Vladimir Il'ich's expression changed instantly, as though turning black. I had never seen him so crushed by sorrow" ("Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biograficheskaya Khronika" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biographic Chronicle], vol 6, Moscow, 1975, p 224).

The materials contained in the two-volume work provide a clear idea of the difficult conditions in which the Bolsheviks in Baku and the Transcaucasus fought for a soviet system. They held highly the banner of proletarian internationalism, of the struggle against the domestic and foreign counter-revolution, against nationalism and separatism, and against imperialist intervention and interference in the internal affairs of the peoples of the area.

Many aspects of the history of the revolutionary struggle in the Caucasus share common aspects with the contemporary global-revolutionary and national-liberation movements. Today as well the urgent question remains of strengthening the solidarity among all anti-imperialist forces, and intensifying the struggle against nationalism and separatism, regardless of their label.

The triumph of the unfading ideas of the revolutionary struggle for the victory of the socialist revolution in the Caucasus, ideas which were the guiding star to the Bolsheviks of Baku and the Transcaucasus and to S. G. Chaumyan, the commissar extraordinary for affairs of the Caucasus, convincingly prove the permanent correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory. They call upon the peoples to be vigilant toward the forces of domestic and foreign reaction and imperialism and its local agents.

5003

CSO: 1802

## DEFENDING THE HIGHER INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 120-122

[Review by V. Korionov of the book "Izbrannyye Stat'i i Rechi" [Selected Articles and Speeches] by Rodolfo Ghioldi; Politizdat, Moscow, 1979, 391 pages. This work is the second collection of R. Ghioldi's works published in the Soviet Union. See also "Izbrannyye Stat'i i Rechi" by Rodolfo Ghioldi, compiled by V. M. Goncharov, in charge of translation; Politizdat, Moscow, 1974, 775 pages]

[Text] In the difficult year 1921 envoys of communists and workers parties from all ends of the world were gathering in Moscow for the forthcoming Third Congress of the Communist International. Also traveling to the Red capital was the representative of the recently founded Communist Party of Argentina. He lacked proper documents. He was a stowaway on a ship from Buenos Aires to Genoa. From Genoa his way went through Milan and Trieste. Here was able to acquire a passport, which was so poorly made that its provisional owner himself was amazed that the police were unable to detect the forgery. Nevertheless, he was able to reach Berlin and, subsequently, Revel' (today Tallin).

In the city's port, he saw among the flags of many capitalist countries the Red Flag with hammer and sickle, proudly raised on the mast of the Soviet ship "Subbotnik." Then there was something else unexpected--the red automobile of the Soviet diplomatic mission. On this subject he was to write, later, in the newspaper LA INTERNACIONAL: "While the deep red automobile was carrying us along Revel's streets, I was thinking: all this is a symbol. Whereas the 'Subbotnik' is challenging with its flag the world of the exploiters, the red-colored automobile proclaims, every time it sounds its powerful horn, that the end of the privileged class is nearing, and that, inevitably, an age will come when he who does not work does not eat. . . ." These lines were written by the first Argentine communist to visit our country after the October Revolution--Rodolfo Ghioldi.

The name of Comrade R. Ghioldi is well known today to the Soviet people and the communists the world over. He justifiably could be classified as member of the Leninist guard on the planet, a guard which laid the granite

foundations of the international communist movement, which became the most influential political movement of our time. Like another fiery revolutionary, Victorio Codovilla, R. Ghioldi entered the Argentine labor movement under the influence of V. I. Lenin's ideas. Together with Codovilla he founded in Argentina the International Socialist Party, which in December 1920 took the name of Communist Party at its extraordinary congress.

In his new book R. Ghioldi describes in detail how, under the influence of the October Revolution, the progressive representatives of the Argentine working class stood under the banners of communism. The book is prefaced by a well-argued and knowledgeably written introductory by its compiler and editor, V. M. Goncharov.

It was at the Third Comintern Congress that the envoy of the Argentine communists saw and heard Lenin for the first time. "This was unforgettable, unique . . ." R. Ghioldi said in his talk with the students of Moscow Secondary School No 65 imeni Victorio Codovilla, a tape recording of which is being issued for the first time. "He spoke sincerely, and his views were distinguished by the depth and kind of persuasiveness which was so typical of Lenin's works. He would cite an argument, consider it in various aspects and from various viewpoints, and you would already be overpowered by the arguments, you would be captured by them, you would be pushed into a corner and would be unable to turn yourself free. In my view, this was a master speech which ideally substantiated the tactical line of the Third Congress of the Communist International" (pp 85-86). This meeting between the young Argentine communist and the leader of the first victorious proletarian revolution in history determined once and for all that he would remain with Lenin forever.

R. Ghioldi's new book bears the mark of the most acute ideological confrontation between the communists and their class enemies. "The struggle against the various forms of imperialist ideology," R. Ghioldi writes, "is our high mission in the ideological struggle" (p 262). The outcome of one or another decisive battle of the 20th century--the battle for the minds and hearts of the people--will depend on the way the communists will be able to develop it.

The focal point of this battle is the question of the universal-historical role of Leninism. The fierce attacks mounted against it prove that our enemies understand that it is precisely Marxism-Leninism that is the victorious weapon which insured the triumph of socialism over huge areas of three continents and which will insure the success of the remaining detachments of the global anti-imperialist front. "Leninism," R. Ghioldi emphasizes, "is a doctrine of the global, rather than merely Russian, revolutionary movement" (p 289). He supports this conclusion through the entire content of his book, laying as the cornerstone, naturally, problems of Latin America.

The people's anger is rising in Latin America and the combat spirit is strengthening, R. Ghioldi writes. "Under these circumstances insuring full



political and ideological independence to the proletariat, called upon by history to head the great alliance between workers and peasants, by the joining of other militant anti-imperialist forces, becomes decisive. That is why the ideological struggle must be deployed. The ideological front assumes a vital importance. It is a question of exposing hostile concepts and the intrigues of Trotskiyism and Maoism, and of eliminating the influence of bourgeois nationalism" (p 268).

R. Ghioldi's addresses and articles included in the collection show the invaluable importance to the universal revolutionary-liberation movement of the building of communism in the Soviet Union and the building of a new society in the other socialist countries. The outstanding leader of the Communist Party of Argentina proves this with great power and persuasiveness by taking as an example the international impact of the steady development of socialist democracy in the USSR.

The collection includes two of R. Ghioldi's major articles "On Constitutional Topics," hitherto unknown to the Soviet readership at large. Problems of constitutional structure, imbued with the ideas of true democracy, drew the close attention of the Argentine internationalist. As early as 1918 the first Soviet constitution was published in Spanish in Argentina. "After the October Socialist Revolution," R. Ghioldi writes, "a new constitutionality arose--a socialist constitutionality--radically different from the one created by the bourgeois system and immeasurably higher than the latter" (p 232). Its superiority becomes particularly clear against the background of the steady restriction of democracy in the bourgeois countries and against the background, as R. Ghioldi says, of the present "orphan status of democracy in Argentina." "Nowhere in the world," the author concludes, "has constitutionality reached such a high level as under socialism" (p 238).

The author considers in detail the Soviet 1977 Constitution and its significance to the fighters against imperialism, particularly in Latin America. "To us," he writes, "the new USSR Constitution is a great ideological weapon which helps our struggle against the concepts of imperialism, the bourgeoisie, and the oligarchy" (p 261).

The author pays great attention to defending the principles of proletarian internationalism as the combat ideology of the working class.

The October Revolution, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, dealt a very heavy blow at nationalism, giving the working people the world over a model of the specific implementation of the ideas of proletarian internationalism.

Today the struggle in defense of proletarian internationalism becomes particularly important. The imperialists are well aware of the fact that a united and rallied comity of socialist countries is an insurmountable obstacle on the way to the implementation of aggressive reactionary plans.

For this reason the imperialist leaders are doing everything possible to breach it. Currently they have acquired new, zealous assistants in this sinister affair--the Beijing rulers. "Maoism joining Straus and Pinochet," sarcastically writes R. Ghioldi, "what an alliance! The Maoists are promoting anti-Sovietism in Latin America, spreading the thesis that, allegedly, Soviet aid hides a threat. Naturally, imperialism could not even dream of such an obliging accomplice" (p 135).

The line followed by imperialism and its allies is to weaken the unity of the world communist movement and encourage clashes between communist parties, while mounting an ideological offensive against Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Reminding us of this, R. Ghioldi emphasizes the inadmissibility of making basic concessions to our ideological adversaries, for, in the final account, such concessions "would bring about anti-Leninism and lead us to recognize Trotskiyism and Maoism as legitimate currents within the workers movement. They would weaken the close unity among communist parties and would acknowledge the right to coexistence in a country of several revolutionary vanguard (i.e., of a number of other non-communist) parties, as well as of "Marxist pluralism," and the overemphasis of national characteristics to the detriment of proletarian internationalism" (p 333).

The communist parties of the Latin American countries hold firm positions in the developing struggle on the ideological front. They, the author writes, do not forget their obligations to strengthen and develop international solidarity, particularly necessary in the Southern Hemisphere, where, to use Ghioldi's metaphor, "a kind of 'Maginot Line' has been set up, stretching from Chile to Brazil, representing the support of right-wing, authoritarian and militaristic forces in the southern cone of the continent" (p 171). "The close unity existing among Latin American parties, as shown by the Havana conference," R. Ghioldi notes, "is a factor of unity in the world communist movement, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism" (p 388).

The Communist Party of Argentina holds a noted position in this struggle. It draws the attention of the people to the most acute unresolved problems existing in the country. The party calls for reviewing the anti-peoples and anti-national economic course; the release of political prisoners and individuals detained without trial or investigation, and clarifying the fate of "the missing." It calls for normalizing the activities of political parties and trade unions and the elaboration of an acceptable political course after an extensive and sincere dialog with the people. It calls for fully observing democratic freedoms and civil rights.

According the communists, such problems can be resolved. This depends mainly on the active participation of the working class and of the entire people in the debate, which is already on the agenda. The communists proceed from the fact that the democratic reserves for the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic struggle are far from exhausted. The Argentine

communists proclaim that their national and international duty is to prevent the strengthening of and, even more so, the assumption of power in the country by the "Pinochetists." Conditions to achieve this do exist. The statement published a while ago by the heads of the Communist Party of Argentina pointed out that "the fate of Latin America, its freedom, independence, progress and prosperity depend on the struggle against the main common enemy--international imperialism--headed by U.S. imperialism and its allies, the landowners and big capitalists in each one of our countries. Our homeland does not stand aside from this process, which is gathering strength on the continent. Profound democratic changes adamantly demanded by our people are ripening on its soil as well."

A deep feeling of loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism has always been characteristic of the Communist Party of Argentina, created and raised by outstanding Marxist-Leninists such as Victorio Codovilla, Rodolfo Ghioldi, Geronimo Arnedo Alvarez and others. "Loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism," R. Ghioldi writes, "the Argentine communists fully share with their comrades in the other fraternal communist parties the viewpoint that the touchstone of the loyalty of any revolutionary is friendship and solidarity with, and defense of, the great Soviet Union. This principle is the firm rule, the great tradition of the general line of the Communist Party of Argentina" (p 389).

Always with the land of the Soviets: this combat slogan of Argentine communists has been heard for over six decades. The communists in Argentina, as in other countries, see the CPSU as a powerful progressive force in the struggle for peace and for the bright future of the working people. They gratefully note the role played by our party and its Leninist Central Committee in the battle which will decide the destinies of the nations. R. Ghioldi writes penetratingly of this: "Not only the communists but all honest people acknowledge that Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev is the firm and inflexible flag bearer of the noble cause of the struggle for peace the world over. Mankind realizes that socialism and peace are indivisible" (p 331).

Rodolfo Ghioldi's book is a new confirmation of the fact the Leninist ideas of dedicated struggle for socialism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, held sacred by the communists, have won over millions and millions of people in all parts of the planet, inspiring them to new victorious battles for peace, freedom, true democracy and socialism.

5003

CSO: 1802

## INSTRUCTIVE HISTORY LESSONS

Moscow K**OMMUNIST** in Russian No 1, Jan 80, pp 122-126

[Review by V. Berezin of the books, "Dokumenty po Istorii Myunkhenskogo Sgovora, 1937-1939" [Documents on the History of the 1937-1939 Munich Conspiracy], Politizdat, Moscow, 1979, 471 pages, and "Diplomaticheskaya Bor'ba Nakanune Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny" [The Diplomatic Struggle on the Eve of World War II] by V. Ya. Sipolis, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1979, 320 pages]

[Text] Forty years have passed since the outbreak of World War II, but the question of the reasons for its outbreak remain topical to this day. No calamity in the history of mankind has been so monstrous in terms of the number of casualties and the destruction. Our life has no problem more important than the prevention of a new and incomparably more fatal catastrophe.

It is precisely all this that predetermines the interest triggered by any new publication shedding additional light on how World War II was being prepared and was unleashed within the imperialist camp. This applies, above all, to the publication of documentary data.

Let us note in this connection the recently published collection of documents by the ministries of foreign affairs of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

The 30 September 1938 Munich Accord concluded by the Western imperialist countries on giving to Hitlerite Germany a considerable part of Czechoslovak territory plays a particular role among the events which led to World War II. It became the culminating point of the policy of encouraging the aggressors, pursued by the ruling circles of Britain and France, with U.S. support. The Western power rejected the idea of establishing a collective security system in Europe advocated, starting with the end of 1933, by the Soviet Union, as well as a joint struggle against the aggressive countries, preferring to make deals with them to direct their aggressive aspirations toward the east, against the first socialist country in the world. The British and French ruling circles were ready to surrender

to Hitler even a number of countries in central and southeastern Europe in the hope that he would leave the Western countries and their huge colonies alone and, above all, would advance an armed conflict between fascist Germany and the Soviet Union. The Western power assumed that, at the cost of betraying Czechoslovakia, they had been able in Munich to reach an agreement with Hitler. However, subsequent events destroyed such hopes. As the preface to the collection emphasizes, the leaders of these powers, blinded by anti-Sovietism, factually cleared the way to unleashing World War II for Hitlerite Germany and themselves faced fascist aggression.

The ministries of foreign affairs of the USSR and Czechoslovakia have already published documents on the history of the Munich agreement. In September 1958, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Munich events, both ministries drew up the joint collection "New Documents from the Munich History." This small edition has long become a bibliographic rarity.

The new collection, published on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Munich Accord, is the fullest possible collection of documents taken from Soviet and Czechoslovak archives, many of them previously unpublished.

As confirmed by the documents, the shameful imperialist conspiracy in Munich had been planned in advance. As early as November 1937, after Hitlerite Germany had formulated an operational plan against industrially highly developed Czechoslovakia--the target of old aspirations of the German monopolies--Lord Halifax, member of the British Cabinet, unequivocally let it be understood in the course of his visit with Hitler, that providing that the British colonial empire be retained, the British Government was agreeable to giving Germany a free hand in that country (document No 1).

An immediate danger faced Czechoslovakia following the seizure of Austria by Hitlerite Germany in March 1938. The question of defending Czechoslovakia became the focal point of attention of the world public. Even then the real possibility to restrain the aggressor, who was not as yet sufficiently strong, economically or militarily, was entirely realistic.

The Soviet Union saw this possibility in the collective efforts of the European countries and, above all, the great powers. In its declaration, following the annexation of Austria, the Soviet Government, drawing the attention to the seriousness of the circumstances in Europe and the threat to Czechoslovakia, expressed its readiness to participate in collective actions whose purpose would be "to stop the further expansion of aggression and to eliminate the increased danger of a new world slaughter." It called for an immediate discussion of practical measures, both within and outside the League of Nations (document No 25).

The policy of the Soviet Union toward Czechoslovakia was a structural component of the policy of the communist party and the Soviet state aimed at

developing an effective system for European collective security with a view to the preservation of the peace and the prevention of aggression. The Soviet Union tried to block a conspiracy between the two groups of imperialist countries in Europe and to neutralize the policy of "pacifying" the aggressor, aimed, above all, against the USSR. The key position of Czechoslovakia in central Europe could have played an important role in restraining fascist aggression and considerably hinder the further expansion of German imperialism.

Juridically, Germany was protected from aggression by two mutual aid treaties concluded with France and the USSR. The collection documents convincingly prove that, whenever possible--publicly, diplomatically, or through military channels--with a feeling of full responsibility the Soviet Government proclaimed its readiness to fulfill its contractual obligations toward Czechoslovakia and defend it from the German-fascist aggressors (documents Nos 19, 22, 30, 34, 38, 45, 47, 52, 79, 97, 103 and others). The Soviet Government suggested that talks be initiated among representatives of the general staffs of the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia with a view to the elaboration of specific military measures to provide timely aid to the latter (documents Nos 57, 58 and 108). Should France refuse to fulfill its obligations based on the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty, the Soviet Union also considered giving military aid to Czechoslovakia even without French participation, providing that Czechoslovakia itself would defend itself and request Soviet assistance.

Previously unpublished documents prove that the Soviet Union carried out extensive military-mobilization measures which would insure, should it be necessary, providing the Czechoslovak ally with quick and effective aid (documents Nos 162, 204, 205 and 206).

The position of the British and French ruling circles was different. Their "pacification" policy, displayed in Ethiopia's seizure by Italy, the German-Italian intervention in Spain, and the expanded Japanese aggression in China was entirely revealed in the Munich period and became a policy of being the factual accomplice of the aggressive powers.

Britain played a leading role in this policy. For the sake of the implementation of their plans for an Anglo-German rapprochement, its ruling circles were ready to accept the conversion of central and eastern Europe into a "sphere of influence" of the fascist Reich. Assessing the position of the British Government, as early as April 1938 the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs noted that "the main event in international policy of late is Britain's decisive turn in favor of an agreement with the aggressor . . ." (document No 43). Motivated by the fear of communism and the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the world, the British rulers tried to use Nazi Germany as a striking force against the first socialist state in the world.

The British Government hoped that an agreement with Germany would make this possible after meeting Hitler's demands toward Sudetenland. For that

reason, as is noted in the preface to the collection, it factually began to help Hitlerite Germany to implement its plans for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, bearing in mind, however, that matters should not lead to a war in which France, followed by England, may find itself involved.

As the collection's documents indicate, London formulated a number of measures aimed at the implementation of its plans. Above all, it intended to apply strong pressure on Prague to force it to grant maximum concessions to the Hitlerites. Describing a conference at the Foreign Office on the Czechoslovak problem, A. Cadogan, permanent secretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote that the decision was made to use the "big stick" against Czechoslovakia. The efforts of the British leadership were also focused on preventing France from fulfilling its obligations based on the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty, and to prevent it from taking any step in the defense of Czechoslovakia without consulting with London. Plans were also formulated for the neutralizing of Czechoslovakia, which would have resulted in annulment of its treaties with the USSR and France. In August 1938 Britain developed the so-called plan Z, which was known only to a few members of the cabinet. Its essence was that should an "acute situation" develop, Chamberlain would go to Hitler to settle the Czechoslovak problem, to be followed by a broad agreement between Britain and Germany. It was thus that in profound secrecy the British Government was preparing to make a deal with Hitlerite Germany.

In the final account, the position of the French Government toward the Czechoslovak crisis coincided with the Chamberlain line. Despite the fact that Hitlerite Germany's aggressive actions were a direct threat to France, particularly after Hitler, abrogating the Locarno agreements, moved his troops into the demilitarized Rhineland, the French ruling circles were also pursuing a policy of "pacification" of the aggressor. V. P. Potemkin, USSR deputy people's commissar of foreign affairs, wrote to Ya. Z. Surits, the political representative of the USSR in France, that "the French Government is not changing its position of indecisiveness, idleness and gullibility in the face of events which are presenting a direct threat to the general peace and to France itself" (document No 41).

To calm down the public, from time to time the French Government would issue statements proclaiming its loyalty to its alliance treaties. In fact, together with London, Paris was applying ever greater pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to achieve its surrender to Germany (documents Nos 41, 56, 117, 125, 135, 138, 143, 149, 153 and others). The French leaders were doing everything possible to avoid a discussion with the Soviet Government of practical problems related to the implementation of obligations stemming from the mutual aid pacts. Whenever Soviet-French contacts on the Czechoslovak problems nevertheless occurred, the French representatives usually referred to the position of the then rulers of Poland and Rumania, who were creating difficulties in allowing the USSR to give Czechoslovakia military aid.

In the final account, the French Government's policy was guided by the same class considerations governing England's--to direct the aggression of Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union. Characterizing the position of the Western powers during that period, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has said that, "The anti-Soviet direction of Hitler's policy was actively supported by the reactionary circles in the West. . . . They threw at Hitler's feet ever new victims, nursing the hope that he would move his hordes to the east, against the socialist country."

In August 1938, when the circumstances in central Europe drastically worsened as a result of Germany's increased war preparations, by instruction of the Soviet Government I. I. Mayskiy, the USSR political representative to Great Britain, submitted a declaration to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Halifax, to the effect that the Soviet Union "is becoming ever more disappointed in British and French policy, that it considers this policy weak and nearsighted, capable only of encouraging the aggressor to engage in further 'capers,' for which reason the Western countries must assume the responsibility for the approach and outbreak of a new world war" (document No 94).

However, the Western powers ignored the warnings of the Soviet Government. They also refused to support the Soviet proposals of implementing urgent measures with a view to guaranteeing the security of Czechoslovakia, submitted by the Soviet Government at the beginning of September 1938.

The conspiracy between the Western powers and the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia was concluded with the signing of the shameful Munich agreement. The United States Government did not take part in the Munich conference, but had encouraged its convention and fully approved its decisions. At a press conference the then U.S. Secretary of State C. Hull stated that the results of the Munich meeting create a "universal feeling of relief" (document No 222).

The documents in the collection provide a clear idea of the positions held by the ruling circles of bourgeois Czechoslovakia in the period of the Munich crisis. They alined their foreign policy above all to that of France and England, who, after Hitlerite Germany, frightened them, not unsuccessfully, with the "Bolshevization" of Czechoslovakia.

Yet, the Czechoslovak Government had all the necessary means to reject capitulation demands and lead in the struggle for the freedom and independence of its state. It could accomplish this by relying on its people and army, and with the support of the Soviet Union, the more so since the factual ratio of forces at that time was clearly not in favor of the aggressor. According to the "Grun" plan, operations against Czechoslovakia would involve 39 of the 47 divisions at Hitler's disposal. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia alone had 45 divisions and armed forces numbering 2 million men, 1,582 airplanes, 469 tanks, 5,700 artillery pieces of different calibers, and other armaments. Its army could rely on powerful border fortifications as good as the German Siegfried and French Maginot lines.



However, the Czechoslovak bourgeois leaders, President Benes above all, resolved not to use these possibilities, fearing a revolutionary upsurge on the part of the people's masses should there be an anti-fascist war against Hitlerite Germany. The refusal to oppose the aggressor and betrayed the interests of the peoples of their country.

The only political party in Czechoslovakia which formulated at that time a clear program for the defense of the republic from fascism was the communist party. The collection shows the way the leaders of the Czechoslovak communists called for fighting the aggressor from the rostrum of parliament, at working peoples meetings, and in their printed organ RUDE PRAVO, criticizing the course followed by the British and French governments, and calling for an alliance with the USSR, which they justifiably considered the only reliable guarantor of the integrity and independence of the Czechoslovak state (documents Nos 6, 21, 50, 60, 64, 90 and others).

The Munich agreement and the liquidation of the Czechoslovak state which followed it drastically changed the international circumstances in favor of Hitlerite Germany. It obtained the possibility to continue its aggressive actions under even more favorable conditions. This opened a direct way to World War II.

Speaking of the history of its preparations and outbreak, let us note yet another recent work by V. Ya. Sipols, doctor of philosophical sciences.

The author has extensively used a variety of sources, many of which have been previously unused by Soviet or foreign historians. This applies, above all, to Soviet and foreign archive materials. This has enabled the author to provide new details in the consideration of a number of problems and to make certain facts more specific.

The monograph, which covers the 1933-1939 period, emphasizes that World War II, like World War I, was born, matured, and broke out within the world capitalist system. It was instigated by the German, Japanese, and Italian imperialists. Undertaking in the 1930's feverish preparations of the economy and the armed forces of their countries for war, and establishing terrorist fascist dictatorships within the country, they initiated the struggle for world domination. The fascist aggressors' bloc, as the author proves, was opposed by the Anglo-Franco-American group of imperial countries, who were trying to preserve their dominating position in the world arena, established as a consequence of their victory in World War I.

However, the basic contradiction in the world, despite the ever greater aggravation of relations between the two imperialist blocs, was the contradiction between the imperialist camp and the first socialist state in the world. "The ruling circles of all capitalist countries," the author writes, "deemed it their sacred class task to destroy the new social system established in the USSR. They wanted to extinguish the revolutionary beacon whose glimmering light indicated the path to liberation from capitalist exploitation and to social progress to the oppressed toiling masses the world over" (p 4).

The author deals extensively with the systematic and adamant struggle waged by the Soviet Union for peace and for the prevention of aggression. The communist party and Soviet state faced the task of using all possibilities opening in the struggle against aggression caused by the fact that the fascist aggressors's bloc threatened not only the Soviet Union, but many other big and small countries. The threat of aggression hanging over many capitalist countries objectively created certain prerequisites for cooperation between them and the USSR.

Soviet diplomacy formulated a constructive program for the struggle for the preservation of the peace, restraining the fascist aggressors and preventing the war. Adopting all possible measures with a view to insuring peace on the borders of the USSR, the Soviet Government was also concerned with the preservation of universal peace. It raised the slogan of the indivisibility of peace, a slogan which gained extensive international recognition. The author analyzes in detail the most important initiatives launched by the Soviet Union in that period--suggestions on defining aggression, the conclusion of regional security pacts in Europe and the Far East, the strengthening of the League of Nations, the signing of the 1935 Mutual Aid Treaty between France and Czechoslovakia, and many others.

The author pays particular attention to the complex diplomatic struggle which developed in the international arena in 1939, directly on the eve of World War II. The Soviet Union tried to establish close interaction with Britain and France in the struggle against German aggression. However, the British ruling circles declined to cooperate with the USSR and tried to make an imperialist deal with Germany. The latter, in turn, avoiding cooperation with Britain (even though continuing its secret talks with it), was exploring the possibility for a certain normalizing of relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union left the German soundings unanswered, continuing to call for the conclusion of an effective political and military agreement with England and France. It was only after it became entirely convinced of the double game played by the ruling circles of these countries that it undertook the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Germany with a view to securing the safety of its western and eastern borders.

The work reflects the most important proposals submitted by the Soviet Union on the creation of a common front by all interested countries against German aggression. The materials included leave no doubt that the Soviet Union sincerely tried to conclude effective agreements with Britain and France for the sake of preventing the war.

The monograph proves equally convincingly that the British ruling circles, deeming it impossible to openly proclaim their unwillingness to cooperate with the USSR, in fact were engaged in nothing but "talks for the sake of talks." British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain warned that he would "rather resign than conclude an alliance with the Soviets" (p 242). At that time L. Collier, a high British Foreign Office official, wrote that the British

Government does not wish to link itself with the USSR, but "to give Germany the possibility to deploy its aggression in the east, at the expense of Russia . . ." (p 239).

The author draws the conclusion that, as the embodiment of the most progressive ideas of our time--Marxism-Leninism--the Soviet state was a systematic fighter against war and fascist obscurantism, and a firm spokesman for and defender of the peace the world over. Cooperation among the USSR, Britain and France, and their establishment of a collective front for the defense of the peace, could have erected reliable blocks in the path of the fascist aggressors. Through their criminal policy of connivance with the aggressors, the reactionary circles of the Western powers gave the fascist aggressors the chance to prepare and unleash World War II, which brought the peoples of the world such incalculable calamities.

The principal merit of these works is that they not only resurrect the memory of the shameful Munich deal, but also emphasize the inadmissibility of any neglect of the lessons of World War II applicable to the complex reality of today.

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## MUSIC, AESTHETICS, LIFE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 1, Jan 80 pp 126-128

[Review by Hero of Socialist Labor G. Sviridov, Lenin Prize and USSR State Prize laureate, of the book "O Muzyke i Muzykantakh Nashikh Dney" [On Music and Musicians of Today] by V. F. Kukharskiy, Sovetskiy Kompozitor, Moscow, 1979, 493 pages]

[Text] The book by the noted musical and social activist and talented publicist V. F. Kukharskiy reflects the rich and comprehensive picture of Soviet musical life of the 1950's-1970's. The author's interests cover a broad range. They include a study of the works of individual composers, problems of contemporary opera, the fate of national musical cultures (Soviet and foreign), and problems of current concert activities.

V. F. Kukharskiy writes about the creative accomplishments of Soviet musicians of different generations, ranging from acknowledge masters (let us note here the articles on Aram Khachaturyan and A. A. Kas'yanov) to young talented beginners. He is greatly involved with problems of performing, as discussed in his articles on the biggest conductors, such as A. Pazovskiy and A. Melik-Pashayev, and on opera and chamber-music singers.

Whatever the topic may be, the author's works invariably reveal a clear civic position and a deep awareness of the great constructive role of art in the life of the socialist society. He justifiably considers Soviet music a "highly civic art, inspired by clarity of objective, greatness of communist ideals, which it asserts, and the richness of the spiritual world of the new man, who has become its main character" (p 5).

The book is noteworthy for the well-planned arrangement of the material. Noteworthy in its first section, which discusses contemporary composition, is the article "United and Multinational." This is a major attempt to sum up the experience of Soviet music of the 1950's-1960's. Worthy of respect is the author's musical-aesthetic position, which firmly stands on the criteria of the truth of life, social activeness, democracy of artistic presentation and continuity with the most valuable traditions of the past. "Our art," he writes, "is an art of great historical synthesis. That is what it was in its origins. Such is its path of development today: it is

based on the richest possible spiritual arsenal of democratic spiritual traditions of all nations and nationalities of the USSR and world culture as a whole, and the inseparable unity among and close interaction with the new socialist traditions common to the culture of the peoples of the USSR" (pp 41-42). This idea is developed by the author with the help of specific examples taken from the development of the national musical cultures of the country.

The 1950's-1960's was a period during which words rushed into Soviet music, when the genres of so-called "pure music"--symphonic and instrumental--yielded to vocal and vocal-symphonic large-scale music. It is precisely in it that the author considers an art capable of embodying most specifically and purposefully the ideas, feelings and thoughts of millions of people. Without denying our unquestionable successes in the fields of symphony and chamber music, he singles out the achievements of oratorical-choral and song-symphonic music "as a particularly significant, as a main line of domestic musical culture" (p 22). The author proudly describes the triumphs of Soviet choral art abroad, winning over audiences with the openness of feelings, sincerity of expression, and daring and scale of embodiment of major, universally significant ideas of our time. What is particularly valuable is that our artistic culture reached such peaks by following "its own way," without looking "aside."

As the author justifiably points out, these successes were closely linked with the upsurge of choral performances and above all the activities of A. A. Yurlov, the outstanding choirmaster and passionate propagandist of Soviet music. It was precisely to his tireless energy that we owe a number of major works, such as the cantata dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution, S. Prokof'yev's "Ivan the Terrible" oratorio, A. Davidenko's revolution choir music, D. Shostakovich's "Execution of Stepan Razin," and other works by Soviet composers, made available to music lovers in many countries.

However, we must acknowledge, with deep sadness, that in recent years changes which are far from being for the better have occurred in this area. The high artistic positions of some collectives, which in their time had made Soviet choral art famous at home and far beyond our borders, have been largely abandoned.

Problems of Soviet musical theater, opera above all, occupy one of the central positions in the book. The author welcomes and supports everything that is truly live, creatively promising and born and developed in the operatic area; his attention is drawn to heroic-epic operas dealing with the historical past, works which recreate the romanticism of the first years of the revolution, and operas on contemporary topics. The critic is deeply interested in the fruitful searches of composers dedicating their efforts to this most complex genre.

In his articles the author repeatedly addresses himself to the work of beginning composers who particularly need friendly support: his profound

statements on the music of V. Gavrilin, Yu. Butsko, Sh. Chalayev, and other talented composers, unquestionably contribute to their creative development and social recognition. It is very important for our critics to continue to show the same type of active interest and close attention to the careers of the creative youth.

The author is well acquainted with the country's musical life. For many years he has tirelessly followed the development of musical culture in the republics of the Transcaucasus and the Baltic, and the cities of the RSFSR and Ukraine, helping many musicians with his creative advice and strict yet concerned writings as a critic, comrade and friend. Such fruitful activities are reflected in the book. Some of the major composers whose art was noted by him and supported at the proper time include Otar Taktakishvili and Vel'o Tormis, noted masters of the Armenian musical theater.

Those interested in modern foreign culture will, unquestionably, be drawn by the articles discussing various musical events in Poland and Austria, the festival in Guinea, and other articles. Also noteworthy is the thorough studies of traditional Chinese musical drama, a little-known and virtually unstudied original ancient genre.

The unquestionable merit of a number of articles is their critical direction and the author's frank attitude toward shortcomings in the works of composers and omissions in the organization of musical life. In his articles on modern opera he notes scenario errors of individual performances, composition weaknesses, and unjustified complexity of the music. "Not all innovations are always good," the author emphasizes, cautioning composers against the artificial, the forced breakdown of traditions developed over the centuries. He convincingly opposes speculative "concepts" of individual music experts who have tried to proclaim the inevitability of vanguard extremes in modern music based on the experience . . . of ancient folklore forms (see pp 53-54).

Let us particularly single out in the section on the musical theater the article "The Classics Should Not Be Touched Up," written a quarter century ago on the occasion of the staging of Rimskiy-Korsakov's great opera "Tale of the Invisible City Kitezh" at the Bol'shoi Theater. The conclusions drawn in this article sound amazingly topical, for the trends described with concern by the author at that time are, unfortunately, encountered occasionally to this day. It is a question of pretentious directing and, occasionally, composition "findings," aimed at "renovation," yet essentially at a subjectivistic, simplified interpretation of the classics. Such "updating" leads to the inadmissible distortion and debasement of beautiful creations of the past. The author is right in appealing to workers in the musical theater to engage in the active creative mastery of the classical heritage and at the same time display a careful attitude toward it.

The least that this work is, is a dispassionate "academic" treatise. It includes not only a chronicle of a great period of our musical life, but a true reflection of the spirit of the time and the sharp and vital aesthetic thinking directed toward the further enrichment and renovation of socialist culture. This book will attract the profound attention of anyone interested in the fate of our music.

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