





**V. I. LENIN**



**THE REVOLUTION OF  
1905-07**

**V·I·L E N I N**  
**SELECTED WORKS**

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**IN TWELVE VOLUMES**

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# V·I·LENIN

## SELECTED WORKS

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VOLUME III

THE REVOLUTION OF  
1905-07



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## PREFACE

THE present volume of the *Selected Works* of Lenin covers the period of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-07, which, according to the profound remark of Lenin, represented the "dress rehearsal" of the Revolution of 1917.

During this period, in which the Russian working class emerged on the broad political arena of mass action, a number of very important problems of principle and of tactics arose for solution. It became obvious that the divergences within the Party on questions of organisation, which became revealed at the Second Party Congress held in London in 1903, were actually wider and deeper than had appeared at the time. Behind different viewpoints on questions of Party organisation there loomed entirely opposite conceptions of the role and tasks of the proletariat in the revolution, opposite conceptions of the attitude toward other classes and parties which ostensibly were marching together against the autocracy, and there were profound differences on practically every question concerning principles and tactics. In short, it was found that the old Economism of the nineties of the last century was not dead and buried, but that it had survived in the theories and practice of the Mensheviks, and that the latter were nothing but the Russian variety of revisionism and opportunism which at that time were already seriously sapping the strength of the Socialist Parties in Western Europe. Moreover, in addition to the Mensheviks, who by their tactics and teachings tried to restrict and debase the labour movement and subject it to the bourgeoisie, there were others (Trotsky and Parvus, the Socialist-Revolutionaries) whose high-sounding "Left" phrases merely served as a screen for the same petty-bourgeois influence over the proletariat that the Mensheviks represented and who tried to divert the movement from its proper course. Trotsky's "absurdly 'Left' theory of permanent revolu-

tion," as Lenin called it, eventually landed him in the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie; and the Socialist-Revolutionaries proved themselves to be what Lenin had called them, *viz.*, petty-bourgeois democrats masquerading under socialist phrases, by the whole of their subsequent conduct which ended in open counter-revolutionary action after the October Revolution.

In the writings which form the bulk of the present volume, Lenin waged a ruthless fight "on two fronts" against both these trends, and attacked opportunism in the Russian as well as in the international Social-Democratic movement. He gave a masterly analysis of the problems and tasks confronting the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the epoch of imperialism and elaborated the tactics (*i.e.*, armed uprising for the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry) which alone could secure the most far-reaching victory of that revolution and at the same time provide the widest possible scope for the further struggle of the proletariat for socialism, for the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution.

An integral part of the strategical plan outlined in these writings is the Bolshevik agrarian programme coupled with the tactical line of the Party towards the peasantry both during the bourgeois-democratic revolution and in the course of its transition to the proletarian revolution.

It was this strategical plan, conceived as far back as 1905, that proved victorious in 1917.

The enormous literary heritage left by Lenin from that time could not be used in full in this volume owing to lack of space. Certain of the important works he wrote in that period had to be omitted, such as his five articles against Plekhanov, under the common title, *On the Provisional Revolutionary Government* (1905), the articles *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party* (1906), *The Attitude Towards Bourgeois Parties* (1907), etc. It was also necessary to abbreviate somewhat such classical pieces as *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (of which chapters VII,

VIII, XI and two parts of the Postscript are omitted), and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*. (Chapter III of this work is omitted here, but will be published in Volume XII of *Selected Works*, while chapter V is entirely omitted.)

Moreover, the importance of the period and its comparative historical remoteness necessitated a great number of notes in the nature of both reference and explanation.

In the main, the works in this volume, as in all others (except Volumes XI and XII), are given in the order in which they were written, and are subdivided within each historical period in accordance with the definite problems dealt with. A few exceptions to this rule have been made. For instance, the present volume begins with the *Lecture on the 1905 Revolution* which Lenin delivered in 1917; but as it serves as an excellent introduction to the study of Lenin's works of 1905-07, it is included here. Similarly, the volume ends with an article that was written in 1910; but it summarises Party events of the period covered by this volume and is for that reason included.

The explanatory notes are indicated by an asterisk (\*) in the text, and the note in question can be found under the number in the explanatory notes corresponding to the number of the page on which it occurs. Where more than one note occurs on a page, subsequent notes are indicated by two or more asterisks as the case may be. Footnotes are designated by superior figures (<sup>1</sup>).



**PART I**

**THE CHARACTER, DRIVING FORCES AND THE  
PERSPECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION  
OF 1905-1907**



## LECTURE ON THE 1905 REVOLUTION \*

MY YOUNG FRIENDS AND COMRADES!

Today is the twelfth anniversary of "Bloody Sunday,"\*\* which is rightly regarded as the beginning of the Russian Revolution.

Thousands of workers—not Social-Democrats, but loyal God-fearing people—led by the priest Gapon, streamed from all parts of the city to the centre of the capital, to the square in front of the Winter Palace, in order to submit a petition to the tsar. The workers carried icons, and their then leader Gapon, in a letter to the tsar, had guaranteed his personal safety and asked him to appear before the people.

Troops are called out. Uhlans and Cossacks hurl themselves upon the crowd with drawn swords. They fire on the unarmed workers, who on their bended knees implore the Cossacks to let them go to the tsar. On that day, according to police reports, more than a thousand were killed and more than two thousand were wounded. The indignation of the workers was indescribable.

Such is the bare outline of what took place on January 22 (9), 1905—on "Bloody Sunday."

In order that you may understand more clearly the significance of this event, I shall quote a few passages from the workers' petition. The petition begins with the following words:

"We, workers, inhabitants of St. Petersburg, have come to Thee. We are unfortunate, reviled slaves. We are crushed by despotism and tyranny. At last, when our patience was exhausted, we ceased work and begged our masters to give us only that without which life is a torment. But this was refused. Everything seemed unlawful to the employers. We here, many thousands of us, like the whole of the Russian people, have no human rights whatever. Owing to the deeds of Thy officials we have become slaves."

The petition enumerates the following demands: amnesty, civil liberties, normal wages, the land to be gradually trans-

ferred to the people, convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal and equal suffrage; and it ends with the following words:

"Sire, do not refuse aid to Thy people! Throw down the wall that separates Thee from Thy people. Order and swear that our requests will be granted, and Thou wilt make Russia happy; if not, we are ready to die on this very spot. We have only two roads: freedom and happiness, or the grave."

Reading it now, this petition of uneducated, illiterate workers, led by a patriarchal priest, creates a strange impression. Involuntarily one compares this naive petition with the peaceful resolutions passed today by the social-pacifists, *i.e.*, would-be socialists, but in reality bourgeois phrase-mongers.\* The unenlightened workers of pre-revolutionary Russia did not know that the tsar was the head of the *ruling class*, namely, the class of large landowners, who were already bound by a thousand ties with the big bourgeoisie, who were ready to defend their monopoly, privileges and profits by every means of violence. The social-pacifists of today, who---without jesting---pretend to be "highly educated" people, do not realise that it is just as foolish to expect a "democratic" peace from the bourgeois governments, which are waging an imperialist predatory war, as it was foolish to think that the bloody tsar could be induced to grant reforms by peaceful petitions.

Nevertheless, the great difference between the two is that the present-day social-pacifists are, to a large extent, hypocrites, who by gentle admonitions strive to divert the people from the revolutionary struggle, whereas the uneducated workers in pre-revolutionary Russia proved by their deeds that they were straightforward people who for the first time had awakened to political consciousness.

It is this awakening of tremendous masses of the people to political consciousness and revolutionary struggle that marks the historic significance of January 22 (9), 1905.

"There is not yet a revolutionary people in Russia," said Mr. Peter Struve, then leader of the Russian liberals and publisher abroad of an illegal, free organ,\*\* *two days* before "Bloody Sunday." To this "highly educated," supercilious and extremely

stupid leader of the bourgeois reformists the idea that an illiterate peasant country could give birth to a revolutionary people seemed utterly absurd. The reformists of those days—like the reformists of today—were profoundly convinced that a real revolution was impossible!

Prior to January 22 (9), 1905, the revolutionary party of Russia consisted of a small handful of people, and the reformists of those days (like the reformists of today) derisively called us a "sect." Several hundred revolutionary organisers, several thousand members of local organisations, half a dozen revolutionary papers appearing not more frequently than once a month, published mainly abroad and smuggled into Russia with incredible difficulty—and at the cost of many sacrifices—such were the revolutionary parties in Russia, and revolutionary Social-Democracy in particular, prior to January 22 (9), 1905. This circumstance gave the narrow-minded and overbearing reformists formal justification for asserting that there was not yet a revolutionary people in Russia.

Within a few months, however, the picture completely changed. The hundreds of revolutionary Social-Democrats "suddenly" grew into thousands; the thousands became leaders of between two and three million proletarians. The proletarian struggle gave rise to a strong ferment, often to revolutionary movements among the peasant masses, fifty to a hundred million strong; the peasant movement had its repercussions in the army and led to soldiers' uprisings, to armed clashes between one section of the army and another. In this manner, a colossal country, with a population of 130,000,000, went into the revolution; in this way, slumbering Russia became transformed into a Russia of a revolutionary proletariat and a revolutionary people.

It is necessary to study this transformation, to understand why it was possible, its methods and ways, so to speak.

The principal means by which this transformation was brought about was the *mass strike*.<sup>\*</sup> The peculiar feature of the Russian revolution is that in its social content it was a *bourgeois-democratic* revolution but in its methods of struggle it was a *proletarian* revolution. It was a bourgeois-democratic revolution since

the aim toward which it strove directly and which it could reach directly with the aid of its own forces was a democratic republic, an eight-hour day and the confiscation of the immense estates of the nobility—all the measures achieved almost completely in the French bourgeois revolution in 1792-93.\*

At the same time the Russian revolution was also a proletarian revolution, not only in the sense that the proletariat was the leading force, the vanguard of the movement, but also in the sense that the specifically proletarian means of struggle—namely, the strike—was the principal instrument employed for rousing the masses and the most characteristic phenomenon in the wave-like rise of decisive events.

The Russian revolution was the *first*, though certainly not the last, great revolution in history in which the mass political strike played an extraordinarily great role. It can even be asserted that it is impossible to understand the events in the Russian revolution and the changes that took place in its political forms, unless a study is made of the *basis* of these events and changes in form by means of the *strike statistics*.

I know perfectly well that statistics are very dry in a lecture and are likely to drive an audience away. Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from quoting a few figures, in order that you may be able to appreciate the objective foundation of the whole movement. The average number of persons involved in strikes in Russia during the ten years preceding the revolution was 43,000 per annum. Consequently, the total number of persons involved in strikes during the whole decade preceding the revolution was 430,000. In January 1905, which was the first month of the revolution, the number of persons involved in strikes was 440,000. There were *more* persons involved in strikes *in one* month than in the whole of the preceding decade!

In no capitalist country in the world, not even in the most advanced countries like England, the United States of America, or Germany, has such a tremendous strike movement been witnessed as that which occurred in Russia in 1905. The total number of persons involved in strikes rose to 2,800,000, twice the total number of factory workers in the country! This, of

course, does not prove that the urban factory workers of Russia were more educated, or stronger, or more adapted to the struggle than their brothers in Western Europe. The very opposite is true.

But it does prove how great the dormant energy of the proletariat can be. It shows that in a revolutionary epoch—I say this without exaggeration, on the basis of the most accurate data of Russian history—the proletariat *can* develop fighting energy a *hundred times greater* than in normal, peaceful times. It shows that up to 1905 humanity did not yet know what a great, what a tremendous exertion of effort the proletariat is capable of in a fight for really great aims, and when it fights in a really revolutionary manner!

The history of the Russian revolution shows that it was the vanguard, the chosen elements of the wage workers, that fought with the greatest tenacity and the greatest devotion. The larger the enterprises involved, the more stubborn were the strikes, and the more often did they repeat themselves during that year. The bigger the city, the more important was the role the proletariat played in the struggle. In the three large cities, St. Petersburg, Riga and Warsaw, where the workers were more numerous and more class conscious, the proportion of workers involved in strikes to the total number of workers was immeasurably larger than in other cities, and, of course, much larger than in the rural districts.

The metal workers in Russia—probably the same is true also in regard to the other capitalist countries—represent the vanguard of the proletariat. In this connection we note the following instructive fact: taking all industries combined, the number of persons involved in strikes in 1905 was 160 per hundred workers employed, but in the *metal industry* the number was 320 per hundred! It is calculated that in 1905 every Russian factory worker lost in wages, in consequence of strikes, an average of ten rubles—approximately 26 francs at the pre-war rate of exchange—sacrificing this money, as it were, for the sake of the struggle. If we take the metal workers alone, we find that the loss in wages is *three times as great!* The best elements of the working class marched in the forefront of the battle, leading

after them the hesitant, rousing the dormant and encouraging the weak.

An outstanding feature was the manner in which economic strikes were interlaced with political strikes during the revolution.

It is quite evident that it was only the very close manner in which the two forms of strike were linked up that secured for the movement its great power. The broad masses of the exploited could not have been drawn into the revolutionary movement had they not seen examples of how the wage workers in the various branches of industry were compelling the capitalists to grant an immediate improvement in their conditions. This struggle imbued the masses of the Russian people with a new spirit. Only then did the old serf-ridden, boorish, patriarchal, pious and obedient Russia cast out the old Adam; only then did the Russian people obtain a really democratic and really revolutionary education.

When the bourgeois gentry and their uncritical chorus of satellites, the social-reformists, talk priggishly about the "education" of the masses, by education they usually mean something schoolmasterly, pedantic, something that demoralises the masses and imbues them with bourgeois prejudices.

The real education of the masses can never be separated from the independent, the political, and particularly from the revolutionary, struggle of the masses themselves. Only the struggle educates the exploited class. Only the struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will; and, therefore, even reactionaries had to admit that the year 1905, the year of struggle, the "mad year," definitely buried patriarchal Russia.

We shall examine more closely the relation between the metal workers and the textile workers in Russia during the strike struggle of 1905. The metal workers were the best paid, the most class conscious and the best educated proletarians. The textile workers, who in 1905 were two and a half times more numerous than the metal workers, were the most backward and the worst paid mass of workers in Russia, who in very many cases had not yet definitely severed their connections with their peasant kins-

men in the village. In this connection a very important fact comes to light.

The metal workers' strikes in 1905 show a preponderance of political over economic strikes, although at the beginning of the year this preponderance was not as great as it was toward the end of the year. On the other hand, among the textile workers we observe a great preponderance of economic strikes at the beginning of 1905, and only at the end of the year do we get a preponderance of political strikes. From this it follows quite obviously that the economic struggle, the struggle for immediate and direct improvement of conditions, is alone capable of rousing the backward strata of the exploited masses, gives them a real education and transforms them—during a revolutionary epoch—into an army of political fighters within the space of a few months.

Of course, for this to happen, the vanguard of the workers had to understand that the class struggle was not a struggle in the interests of a small upper stratum, as the reformists too often tried to persuade the workers to believe; the proletariat had to come forward as the real vanguard of the majority of the exploited and draw the majority into the struggle, as was the case in Russia in 1905, and as must certainly be the case in the coming proletarian revolution in Europe.

The beginning of 1905 brought with it the first great wave of strikes over the entire country. As early as the spring of that year we observe the awakening of the first big, not only economic, but also political *peasant movement* in Russia. The importance of this turning point in history will be appreciated if it is borne in mind that it was only in 1861 that the peasantry in Russia was liberated from the severest bondage of serfdom.\* that the majority of the peasants are illiterate, that they live in indescribable poverty, oppressed by the landlords, deluded by the priests and isolated from each other by great distances and an almost complete absence of roads.

A revolutionary movement against tsarism arose for the first time in Russia in 1825\*\* and that movement was represented almost exclusively by noblemen. From that moment up to 1881,

when Alexander II was assassinated by the terrorists,\* the movement was led by middle class intellectuals. They displayed the greatest spirit of self-sacrifice and they aroused the astonishment of the whole world by their heroic terroristic methods of struggle. Those sacrifices were certainly not made in vain. They certainly contributed—directly and indirectly—to the subsequent revolutionary education of the Russian people. But they did not and could not achieve their immediate aim—of calling forth a people's revolution.

This was achieved only by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. Only the waves of mass strikes that swept over the whole country, coupled with the severe lessons of the imperialist Russo-Japanese War, roused the broad masses of peasants from their lethargic slumber. The word "striker" acquired an entirely new meaning among the peasants: it signified a rebel, a revolutionary, a term previously expressed by the word "student." As, however, the "student" belonged to the middle class, to the "learned," to the "gentry," he was alien to the people. On the other hand, a "striker" was of the people; he belonged to the exploited class; when deported from St. Petersburg, he often returned to the village where he told his fellow-villagers of the conflagration which had broken out in the cities and which was to destroy the capitalists and nobility. A new type appeared in the Russian village—the class conscious, young peasant. He associated with "strikers," he read newspapers, he told the peasants about events in the cities, explained to his fellow-villagers the meaning of political demands, and called upon them to fight against the big landlords, the priests and the government officials.

The peasants would gather in groups to discuss their conditions, and gradually they were drawn into the struggle. Gathering in large crowds, they attacked the big landlords, set fire to their mansions and estates and looted their barns, seized grain and other foodstuffs, killed policemen and demanded that the huge estates belonging to the nobility be transferred to the people.\*\*

In the spring of 1905, the peasant movement was only in its

inception; it spread to only a minority of the uyezds,<sup>1</sup> approximately one-seventh of the total were affected.

But the combination of the proletarian mass strikes in the cities with the peasant movement in the country was sufficient to shake the "firmest" and last prop of tsarism. I refer to the *army*.

A series of *mutinies* in the army and in the navy broke out.\* Every fresh wave of strikes and of the peasant movement during the revolution was accompanied by mutinies among the armed forces in all parts of Russia. The most well-known of these is the mutiny on the Black Sea cruiser, "Prince Potemkin," which, after it was seized by the revolutionaries, took part in the revolution in Odessa. After this revolution was defeated, and the attempts to seize other ports (for instance, Theodosia in the Crimea) had failed, it surrendered to the Rumanian authorities in Constanza.

Permit me to relate to you in detail one little episode in that mutiny of the Black Sea Fleet, in order to give you a concrete picture of events at the apex of their development.

Gatherings of revolutionary workers and sailors were being organised more and more frequently. Since men in the armed forces were not permitted to attend workers' meetings, the workers in masses began to visit the military meetings. They gathered in thousands. The idea of joint action found a lively response. The most class conscious companies elected deputies.

Then the military authorities decided to take action. The attempts of some of the officers to deliver "patriotic" speeches at the meetings failed miserably: the sailors who were accustomed to debating put their officers to shameful flight. After these efforts had failed, it was decided to prohibit meetings altogether. On the morning of November 24 (11), 1905, a company of sailors, in full war kit, was posted at the gate of the naval barracks. Rear-Admiral Pissarevsky, in a loud voice, gave the order: "Permit no one to leave the barracks! In case of disobedience, shoot!" A sailor named Petrov stepped forth from the ranks of the company that had received that order, loaded his rifle in view of all, and with one shot killed Lieutenant-Colonel Stein of the Brest-

<sup>1</sup> An administrative unit, recently abolished.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Litovsk Regiment, and with another wounded Rear-Admiral Pisarevsky. The command was given: "Arrest him!" Nobody budged. Petrov threw his rifle to the ground and exclaimed: "Why don't you move? Take me!" He was arrested. The sailors, who rushed from every side, angrily demanded his release, and declared that they vouched for him. Excitement ran high.

"Petrov, the shot was accident, wasn't it?" asked one of the officers, trying to find a way out of the situation.

"What do you mean, an accident? I stepped forward, loaded and took aim. Is that an accident?"

"They demand your release. . . ."

And Petrov was released. The sailors, however, were not content with that; all officers on duty were arrested, disarmed, and taken to company headquarters. . . . Sailor delegates, about forty in number, conferred the whole night. The decision was to release the officers, but never to permit them to enter the barracks again.

This little incident shows you clearly how events developed in most of the mutinies. The revolutionary ferment among the people could not but spread to the armed forces. It is characteristic that the leaders of the movement came from *those elements* in the army and the navy which had been recruited mainly from among the industrial workers and possessed most technical training, for instance, the sappers. The broad masses, however, were still too naive, their mood was too passive, too good natured, too Christian. They flared up rather quickly; any case of injustice, excessively harsh conduct on the part of the officers, bad food, etc., was enough to call forth revolt. But there was no persistence in their protest; they lacked a clear perception of aim; they lacked a clear understanding of the fact that only the most vigorous continuation of the armed struggle, only a victory over all the military and civil authorities, only the overthrow of the government and the seizure of power over the whole state could guarantee the success of the revolution.

The broad masses of the sailors and soldiers were easily roused to revolt. But with equal light-heartedness they foolishly released the arrested officers. They allowed themselves to be

pacified by promises and persuasions on the part of their officers; in this way the officers gained precious time, obtained reinforcements, broke the ranks of the rebels, and then the most brutal suppression of the movement and the execution of the leaders followed.

It is interesting to compare the mutinies in Russia in 1905 with the mutiny of the Decembrists in 1825. At that time, the leaders of the political movement belonged almost exclusively to the officer class, particularly the officers of the nobility; they had become infected through contact with the democratic ideas of Europe during the Napoleonic Wars. The mass of the soldiers, who at that time were still serfs, remained passive.

The history of 1905 presents a totally different picture. The mood of the officers, with few exceptions, was either bourgeois-liberal reformist or openly counter-revolutionary. The workers and peasants in military uniform were the soul of the mutinies; the mutinies became a movement of the people. For the first time in the history of Russia the movement spread to the majority of the exploited. But on the one hand, the masses lacked persistence and determination, they were too much afflicted with the malady of trustfulness; on the other hand, the movement lacked an organisation of revolutionary Social-Democratic workers in military uniform. The Social-Democrats in the armed forces lacked the ability to take the leadership into their own hands, to place themselves at the head of the revolutionary army, and to assume the offensive against the government authorities.

I would like to say incidentally that these two shortcomings will, more slowly than we could like perhaps, but surely, be removed not only by the general development of capitalism, but also by the present war.

At all events, the history of the Russian revolution, like the history of the Paris Commune of 1871,\* unfailingly teaches that militarism can never, under any circumstances, be vanquished and destroyed, except by a victorious struggle of one section of the national army against the other section. It is not sufficient simply to denounce, revile and to "repudiate" militarism, to criticise and to argue that it is harmful; it is foolish peacefully

to refuse to perform military service; the task is to keep the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat in a state of high tension and to train its best elements, not only in a general way, but concretely, so that when popular ferment reaches the highest pitch, they will put themselves at the head of the revolutionary army.

This same lesson is taught us by daily experience in any capitalist state. Every "minor" crisis that such a state experiences discloses to us in miniature the elements and the germs of the battles, which must inevitably take place on a large scale during a big crisis. What else, for instance, is a strike if not a minor crisis in capitalist society? Was not the Prussian Minister for Internal Affairs, Herr von Puttkamer, right when he uttered his famous declaration: "Every strike discloses the hydra-head of revolution." Does not the calling out of troops during strikes in all, even the most peaceful, the most "democratic"—save the mark—capitalist countries, show *how* things will work in a *really great crisis*?

But to return to the history of the Russian revolution.

I have tried to depict how the workers' strikes stirred up the whole country and the broadest, backward strata of the exploited, how the peasant movement began, and how it was accompanied by military uprisings.

In the autumn of 1905, the movement reached its zenith. On August 19 (6), the tsar issued a manifesto on the introduction of popular representation. The so-called Bulygin Duma \* was to be created on the basis of a suffrage embracing a ridiculously small number of electors, and this peculiar "parliament" was to have, not legislative, but only *advisory* powers!

The bourgeoisie, the liberals, the opportunists, were ready to clutch this "gift" of a frightened tsar with both hands. Like all reformists, our reformists of 1905 could not understand that historic situations arise when reforms, and particularly mere promises of reforms, pursue only one aim: to allay the unrest of the people, to force the revolutionary class to cease, or at least to slacken its struggle.

Russian revolutionary Social-Democracy well understood the

true nature of the grant of an illusory constitution in August 1905. That is why, without a moment's hesitation, it issued the slogans: "Down with the advisory Duma! Boycott the Duma! Down with the tsarist government! Continue the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of this government! Not the tsar, but a provisional revolutionary government must convene the first real, popular representative assembly in Russia!"

History proved that the revolutionary Social-Democrats were right by the fact that the *Bulygin Duma* was never convened. It was swept away by the revolutionary storm before it assembled; this storm forced the tsar to promulgate a new electoral law, which provided for a considerable increase in the number of electors, and to recognise the legislative character of the Duma.\*

October \*\* and December \*\*\* 1905 marked the highest point of the rising tide of the Russian revolution. The flood-gates of the revolutionary power of the people opened wider than ever before. The number of persons involved in strikes—which in January 1905, as I have already told you, was 440,000—reached over half a million in October 1905 (in the course of one month, be it observed). To this number, which applies *only to factory workers*, must be added several hundreds of thousands of railway workers, postal and telegraph employees, etc.

The Russian general railway strike stopped railway traffic and most effectively paralysed the power of the government. The doors of the universities and lecture halls, which in peace time were used only to befuddle youthful heads with pedantic professorial wisdom and to turn them into docile servants of the bourgeoisie and tsarism, were flung wide open and served as meeting places for thousands of workers, artisans and office workers, who openly and freely discussed political questions.

Freedom of the press was won. The censorship was simply ignored. No publisher dared send the copy to the authorities, and the authorities did not dare take any measure against this. For the first time in Russian history, revolutionary papers appeared freely in St. Petersburg and other towns. In St. Petersburg alone, three daily Social-Democratic papers, with circulations ranging from 50,000 to 100,000, were published.\*\*\*\*

The proletariat marched at the head of the movement. It set out to win the eight-hour day in a revolutionary manner. The fighting slogan of the St. Petersburg proletariat was then: "*An Eight-Hour Day and Arms!*" It became obvious to an ever increasing mass of workers that the fate of the revolution could and would be decided only by an armed struggle.

In the fire of battle, a peculiar mass organisation was formed, the famous *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*,\* meetings of delegates from all factories. In several cities in Russia, these *Soviets of Workers' Deputies* began more and more to play the role of a provisional revolutionary government, the role of organs and leaders of rebellion. Attempts were made to organise Soviets of Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies and to combine them with the Soviets of Workers' Deputies.

For a period several cities of Russia at that time experienced something in the nature of small, local "republics"; the state authorities were deposed, and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies actually functioned as the new state authority. Unfortunately, these periods were all too brief, the "victories" were too weak, too isolated.

The peasant movement in the autumn of 1905 reached still greater dimensions. *Over one-third* of the uyezds throughout the country were affected by "peasant riots" and real peasant uprisings. The peasants burned down no less than two thousand estates and distributed among themselves the provisions of which the predatory nobility had robbed the people.

Unfortunately, this work was not done with sufficient thoroughness; unfortunately, the peasants destroyed only one-fifteenth of the total number of noblemen's estates, only one-fifteenth part of what they *should have* destroyed in order to wipe the shame of large feudal landownership from the face of the land of Russia. Unfortunately, the peasants were too scattered, too isolated from each other in their actions; they were too unorganised, not aggressive enough, and therein lies one of the fundamental reasons for the defeat of the revolution.

Among the oppressed peoples of Russia there flared up a national movement for liberation.\*\* *Over one-half, almost three-*

*fifths (to be exact, 57 per cent)* of the population of Russia is subject to national oppression; they have not even the right to use their native language, they are forcibly Russified. For instance, the Mohammedans, who number tens of millions in the population of Russia, organised a Mohammedan League with astonishing rapidity. Generally speaking, all sorts of organisations sprang up and grew at a colossal rate at that time.

To give the audience, particularly the youth, an example of how at that time the national movement for liberation in Russia rose in conjunction with the labour movement, I quote the following case.

In December 1905, the Polish children in hundreds of schools burned all Russian books, pictures and portraits of the tsar, and attacked and drove the Russian teachers and their Russian school-fellows from the schools, shouting: "Get out of here! Go back to Russia!" The Polish pupils in the secondary schools put forward, among others, the following demands: 1) all secondary schools must be under the control of a Soviet of Workers' Deputies; 2) joint pupils' and workers' meetings to be called within the school buildings; 3) the wearing of red blouses in the secondary schools to be permitted as a token of membership of the future proletarian republic, etc.

The higher the tide of the movement rose, the more vigorously and decisively did the reaction arm itself to fight against the revolution. The Russian Revolution of 1905 confirmed the truth of what Karl Kautsky wrote in 1902 in his book *Social Revolution and the Morrow of the Social Revolution*.\* (At that time, by the way, he was still a revolutionary Marxist and not a champion of social-patriotism and opportunism as at present.) He wrote the following:

"The future revolution . . . will be less like a spontaneous uprising against the government and will be more like a protracted *civil war*."

This is exactly what happened! This will undoubtedly also happen in the coming European revolution!

Tsarism vented its hatred particularly upon the Jews.\*\* On the one hand, the Jews provided a particularly high percentage

(compared with the total Jewish population) of leaders of the revolutionary movement. In passing, it should be said to their credit that to this day the Jews provide a relatively high percentage of representatives of internationalism as compared with other nations. On the other hand, tsarism knew perfectly well how to play on the basest prejudices of the most ignorant strata of the population against the Jews, in order to organise—if not to lead directly—pogroms, those atrocious massacres of peaceful Jews, their wives and children, which have roused such disgust throughout the entire civilised world. I have in mind, of course, the disgust of the truly democratic elements of the civilised world, and these are *exclusively* the socialist workers, the proletarians.

It is calculated that in 100 cities at that time 4,000 were killed and 10,000 were mutilated. The bourgeoisie of even the freest, even of republican countries of Western Europe are very well able to combine their hypocritical phrases about "Russian atrocities" with the most shameless financial transactions, particularly with the financial support of tsarism\* and with imperialist exploitation of Russia through the export of capital, etc.

The climax of the Revolution of 1905 was reached in the December uprising in Moscow.<sup>1</sup> A small crowd of rebels, namely, of organised and armed workers—they numbered not more than eight thousand—resisted the tsar's government for nine days. The government dared not trust the Moscow garrison; on the contrary, it had to keep it behind locked doors, and only on the arrival of the Semenovskiy Regiment from St. Petersburg was it able to quell the rebellion.

The bourgeoisie are pleased to describe the Moscow uprising as something artificial, and to treat it with ridicule. In the German so-called "scientific" literature, for instance, Herr Professor Max Weber, in his large work<sup>2</sup> on the political development of Russia, described the Moscow uprising as a "putsch." "The Lenin group,"

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 13.\*\*\*

<sup>2</sup> Lenin refers to the book by the German professor, Weber, entitled *Russia's Transition to Pseudo-Constitutionalism*, published in Germany in 1906.—Ed.

says this "highly learned" Herr Professor, "and a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries had long prepared for this *senseless* uprising."

In order properly to appraise this professorial wisdom of the cowardly bourgeoisie, it is sufficient to recall the dry statistics of the strikes. In January 1905, there were only 13,000 persons involved in purely political strikes in Russia, whereas in October there were 330,000, and in December the maximum was reached of 370,000 involved in purely political strikes—in one month alone! Let us recall the successes of the counter-revolution, the uprisings of the peasants and the soldiers, and we will soon come to the conclusion that the dictum of "bourgeois science" concerning the December uprising is not only absurd, but is a subterfuge on the part of the representatives of the cowardly bourgeoisie, which sees in the proletariat its most dangerous class enemy.

In reality, the whole development of the Russian revolution inevitably led to an armed, decisive battle between the tsarist government and the vanguard of the class conscious proletariat.

In my previous remarks I have already pointed out wherein lay the weakness of the Russian revolution that led to its temporary defeat.

With the quelling of the December uprising the revolution began to subside.\* Even in this period, extremely interesting moments are to be observed; suffice it to recall the twofold attempt of the most militant elements of the working class to stop the retreat of the revolution and to prepare for a new offensive.

But my time has nearly expired, and I do not want to abuse the patience of my audience. I think, however, that I have outlined the most important aspects of the revolution—its class character, its driving force and its methods of struggle—as fully as it is possible to deal with a very big subject in a brief lecture.

A few brief remarks concerning the world significance of the Russian revolution.

Geographically, economically and historically, Russia belongs not only to Europe, but also to Asia. This is why the

Russian revolution not only succeeded in finally rousing the biggest and the most backward country in Europe and in creating a revolutionary people led by a revolutionary proletariat.

It achieved more than that. The Russian revolution gave rise to a movement throughout the whole of Asia. The revolutions in Turkey, Persia and China prove that the mighty uprising of 1905 left deep traces, and that its influence, expressed in the forward movement of *hundreds and hundreds* of millions of people, is ineradicable.

In an indirect way the Russian revolution exercised influence also on the countries situated in the West. One must not forget that news of the tsar's constitutional manifesto, on reaching Vienna on October 30 (17), 1905, played a decisive role in the final victory of universal suffrage in Austria.

A telegram bearing the news was delivered to the Congress of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, which was then assembled, just as Comrade Ellenbogen—who at that time was not yet a social-patriot but a comrade—was making his report on the political strike. This telegram was placed before him on the table. The discussion was immediately stopped. "Our place is in the streets!"—was the cry that resounded in the meeting hall of the delegates of Austrian Social-Democracy. The following days witnessed monster street demonstrations in Vienna and barricades in Prague. The victory of universal suffrage in Austria was determined.\*

Very often we meet West Europeans who argue about the Russian revolution as if events, relationships and methods of struggle in that backward country have very little resemblance to West European relationships, and, therefore, can hardly have any practical significance.

There is nothing more erroneous than such an opinion.

No doubt the forms and occasions for the impending battles in the coming European revolution will differ in many respects from the forms of the Russian revolution.

Nevertheless, the Russian revolution—precisely because of its proletarian character in that particular sense of which I have spoken—was the *prologue* to the coming European revolution.

Undoubtedly, this coming revolution can only be a proletarian revolution in the profounder sense of the word; a proletarian, socialist revolution also in its content. This coming revolution will show to an even greater degree, on the one hand, that only stern battles, only civil wars, can free humanity from the yoke of capital; on the other hand, that only class conscious proletarians can and will come forth in the role of leaders of the vast majority of the exploited.

The present grave-like stillness in Europe must not deceive us. Europe is charged with revolution. The monstrous horrors of the imperialist war, the suffering caused by the high cost of living, engender everywhere a revolutionary spirit; and the ruling classes, the bourgeoisie with its servitors, the governments, are more and more moving into a blind alley from which they can never extricate themselves without tremendous upheavals.

Just as in Russia, in 1905, a popular uprising against the tsarist government commenced under the leadership of the proletariat with the aim of achieving a democratic republic, so, in Europe, the coming years, precisely because of this predatory war, will lead to popular uprisings under the leadership of the proletariat against the power of finance capital, against the big banks, against the capitalists; and these upheavals cannot end otherwise than with the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, with the victory of socialism.

We of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution. But I can, I believe, express the strong hope that the youth which is working so splendidly in the socialist movement of Switzerland, and of the whole world, will be fortunate enough not only to fight, but also to win, in the coming proletarian revolution.

January 1917.

## SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT \*

### I

ONLY five years ago the slogan "Down with the Autocracy!" appeared to many representatives of Social-Democracy to be premature and incomprehensible to the masses of the workers.\*\* Those representatives were rightly regarded as opportunists. It was explained to them again and again that they were lagging behind the movement, that they did not understand the tasks of the Party as the vanguard of the class, as its leader and organiser, as the representative of the movement as a whole, and of its fundamental and principal aims. These aims may for a time be overshadowed by everyday routine work, but they must never lose their significance as the guiding star of the fighting proletariat.

And now the time has come when the flames of revolution have spread over the whole country, and when even the most sceptical have gained faith in the inevitability of the overthrow of the autocracy in the near future. But, as if by the irony of history, Social-Democracy has once more to deal with similar reactionary and opportunist attempts to drag the movement back, to belittle its tasks and to obscure its slogans. Polemics with the representatives of those who make such attempts become the task of the day, and (in spite of the opinion of very many who do not relish polemics within the Party) acquire enormous *practical* significance. For the nearer we approach the time to fulfil our immediate political tasks, the more necessary does it become to understand these tasks thoroughly, and the more harmful become all ambiguity, leaving things unsaid and not thinking things out to their logical conclusion.

And yet failure to think things out to their logical conclusion is rife among the Social-Democrats of the new *Iskra*, or what is almost the same, the Social-Democrats in the camp of the *Rabo-*

*cheye Dyelo*-ists.\* Down with the autocracy!—everybody agrees with this; not only all Social-Democrats but also all democrats, even all liberals, if one is to believe their present declarations. But what does this mean? Just how is this overthrow of the present government to occur? Who is to convene the constituent assembly, which even the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists (see No. 67 of *Osvobozhdeniye* \*\*) are now ready to accept as their slogan—including the recognition of universal, etc., suffrage? Just what should constitute the real guarantee that the elections to this assembly will be free and will express the interests of the whole of the people?

Those who fail to give a clear and definite reply to these questions fail to understand what the slogan “Down with the Autocracy!” means. And these questions inevitably bring us to the question of the provisional revolutionary government; it is not difficult to understand that really free, popular elections to the constituent assembly, completely guaranteeing really universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot, are not only improbable, but actually impossible under the autocracy. And if we are in earnest in putting forward the practical demand for the immediate overthrow of the autocratic government, then we must be clear in our minds *as to what other government* we want to take the place of the one that is to be overthrown. Or, in other words, what do we think should be the attitude of Social-Democracy towards the provisional revolutionary government?

On this question, the opportunists in contemporary Social-Democracy, *i.e.*, the new *Iskra*-ists, are as strenuously dragging the Party back as the followers of *Rabocheye Dyelo* did five years ago on the question of political struggle in general. Their reactionary views on this point are most fully set forth in Martynov's pamphlet *Two Dictatorships*, which *Iskra*, No. 84, approved and recommended in a special review and to which we have repeatedly called our readers' attention.

At the very beginning of his pamphlet Martynov tries to scare us with the following horrible prospect:

“If a strong, revolutionary Social-Democratic organisation could ‘order and carry out a popular, armed uprising’ against the autocracy, which

Lenin dreamt of, is it not obvious that by the will of the people, this very party would be appointed as the provisional government? Is it not obvious that the people would place the immediate fate of the revolution in the hands of precisely this party, and no other?"

This is incredible, but it is a fact. The future historian of Russian Social-Democracy will have to record with surprise that at the very outset of the Russian revolution the Girondists of Social-Democracy \* *tried to scare* the revolutionary proletariat with a prospect like this! The whole content of Martynov's pamphlet (as well as of a whole series of articles and passages in articles in the new *Iskra*) reduces itself to painting the "horrors" of this prospect. The ideological leader of the new *Iskra*-ists is haunted by the fear of "a seizure of power," by the bogey of Jacobinism, of Bakuninism,<sup>1</sup> of Tkachevism,<sup>2</sup> and of other horrible *isms* with which various revolutionary nursemaids so eagerly frighten political infants. And, of course, this is not done without "quotations" from Marx and Engels. Poor Marx and Engels! What use is not made of quotations from their works? You will remember that the postulate "every class struggle is a political struggle" was utilised *to justify* the narrowness and backwardness of *our* political task and our methods of political agitation and struggle.<sup>3</sup> Now Engels is dragged forth as a false witness on behalf of *khovstism*.<sup>4</sup> In *The Peasant War in Germany*<sup>5</sup> he wrote:

<sup>1</sup> Bakuninism—the theories of M. A. Bakunin, one of the founders of anarchism, whose teachings exercised an enormous influence on the Narodnik "rebels" of the seventies of the last century. Rejecting politics and the political struggle they set their hopes on, and tried to foster by their work, outbreaks of rebellion among the peasantry, as a means of establishing socialism.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> Tkachevism—the views expounded by Tkachev, a Russian revolutionary writer of the seventies and eighties of the last century, in his Geneva publication *Nabat (The Tocsin)*. The revolution, according to him, was to be carried out by plots and conspiracies, leading to the seizure of power by the revolutionary intelligentsia. His views were practically adopted by the terrorist *Narodnaya Volya* Party. (See note to page 23.)—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>3</sup> An allusion to the Economists and particularly *Rabocheye Dyelo*.—*Ed.*

<sup>4</sup> From the word "*khvost*," meaning tail, i.e., one who drags at the tail of events.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>5</sup> London and New York, 1926, p. 135.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

"The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over the government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents and for the realisation of the measures which would guarantee the security of that domination."

One has only to read carefully this beginning of the long passage from Engels, which Martynov quotes, to see plainly how our *khvostist* distorts the author's idea. Engels speaks of *power that would guarantee the domination of a class*. Is this not obvious? Applied to the proletariat it therefore means power *that would guarantee the domination of the proletariat, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat for accomplishing the socialist revolution*. Martynov fails to understand this and confuses a provisional revolutionary government in the period of the overthrow of the autocracy with the secured domination of the proletariat in the period of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; he confuses the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry with the socialist dictatorship of the working class. If, however, we continue reading the passage quoted, Engels' idea becomes still clearer. The leader of an extreme party, he says,

"is compelled to defend the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class *with phrases, promises and assurances that the interests of that alien class are their own interests*. Whoever puts himself in this *false position* is irrevocably lost."<sup>1</sup>

The words in italics plainly show that Engels expressly utters a warning against the false position that would ensue from the leader failing to understand the real interests of "his own" class and the real class content of the revolution. In order to make it clearer, we shall try to explain it to our profound Martynov by a simple illustration. When the leaders of the *Narodnaya Volya* Party, in trying to represent the interests of "labour," assured themselves and others that 90 per cent of the peasants in the future Russian constituent assembly would be socialists,\* they thereby put themselves in a false position, which was inevitably bound to lead to their irrevocable, political doom, for these "promises and assurances" did not correspond to the objective realities. As a matter of fact they would have been defending

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36. Lenin's italics.—Ed. Eng. ed.

the interests of bourgeois democracy, "the interests of an alien class." Are you beginning to understand anything now, most worthy Martynov? When the Socialist-Revolutionaries describe the agrarian reforms that must inevitably come about in Russia as "socialisation," as "transferring the land to the people," as the beginning of the "equal land tenure," they place themselves in a false position which must inevitably lead them to irrevocable political doom, for, as a matter of fact, those very reforms which they are trying to obtain will guarantee the domination of an *alien class*, of the peasant bourgeoisie. And the more rapidly the revolution develops, the more quickly will their phrases, promises and assurances be dispelled by reality. Don't you understand what it is all about yet, most worthy Martynov? Do you still fail to understand that the *quintessence* of Engels' idea is that *failure to understand* the historical tasks of the revolution is fatal; that Engels' words are applicable, therefore, to the members of the *Narodnaya Volya* Party and to the Socialist-Revolutionaries?

## II

Engels points to the danger of the leaders of the proletariat failing to understand the *non-proletarian* character of the revolution, but the wise Martynov deduces from this that there is a danger that the leaders of the proletariat, who by their platform, their tactics (*i.e.*, their entire agitation and propaganda) and their organisation have isolated themselves from revolutionary democracy, will play the leading part in establishing the democratic republic. Engels sees the danger of the leaders confusing the pseudo-socialist with the really democratic substance of the revolution, while the sagacious Martynov deduces from this the danger that the proletariat, together with the peasantry, may deliberately take it upon themselves to set up a dictatorship in establishing a democratic republic as the last form of bourgeois domination and as the best form for the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.\* Engels sees danger in taking up a false position, in saying one thing and doing another, in promising the rule of one class and in fact securing the rule of

another class. Engels thinks that such deceit must inevitably lead to irrevocable political doom, while clever Martynov deduces from this that there is the danger of doom resulting from the fact that the bourgeois adherents of democracy will not permit the proletariat and the peasantry to secure a really democratic republic. The clever Martynov cannot for the life of him understand that such a doom, the doom of the leader of the proletariat, the doom of thousands of proletarians in the fight for a truly democratic republic, while being physical doom, is, however, not political doom; on the contrary, it is the greatest political victory for the proletariat, the greatest achievement of its hegemony in the fight for liberty. Engels speaks of the political doom of one who unconsciously wanders from his class path to the path of an alien class, while clever Martynov, reverently quoting Engels, speaks of the doom of one who proceeds further and further along the sure class road.

The difference between the viewpoint of revolutionary Social-Democracy and that of *khvostism* stands out in striking relief. Martynov and the new *Iskra* shrink from the task that is imposed on the proletariat and the peasantry of bringing about a most radical, democratic revolution; they shrink from the Social-Democratic leadership of this revolution and thus surrender, perhaps unconsciously, the interests of the proletariat into the hands of bourgeois democracy. From Marx's correct idea that we must prepare, not a government, but an opposition party of *the future*, Martynov draws the conclusion that we must serve as a *khvostist* opposition in the *present* revolution. This is what his political wisdom amounts to. Here is a sample of his reasoning, and we strongly recommend the reader to ponder over it:

"The proletariat cannot secure political power in the state, either in whole or in part, until it has accomplished the socialist revolution. This is the indisputable postulate that separates us from opportunist Jaurèsism<sup>1</sup> [Martynov, page 58]"

—and which, we will add, indisputably proves that the worthy

<sup>1</sup>From J. Jaurès, the most prominent leader of the opportunist wing of the French Socialist Party. Assassinated 1914 on the eve of the war.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Martynov is incapable of understanding what's what. To confuse the participation of the proletariat in a government that is resisting the socialist revolution with the participation of the proletariat in the democratic revolution means failing hopelessly to understand what the whole argument is about. It is the same as confusing Millerand's entry in the ministry of the murderer Galliffet\* with Varlin's joining the Commune which defended and saved the republic.

But listen further, and you will see how our author gets himself tangled up:

"...But that being the case, it is evident that the forthcoming revolution cannot assume any political forms *against the will of the whole of the bourgeoisie*, for the latter will be the master of tomorrow...." (Martynov's italics.)

In the first place, why are only political forms mentioned here, while the previous sentence referred to the rule of the proletariat in general, including the socialist revolution? Why does not the author speak of the revolution assuming economic forms? Because, without realising it, he has already skipped from the socialist revolution to the democratic revolution. Secondly, that being the case, the author is absolutely wrong in speaking *tout court* (simply) of the "will of the whole of the bourgeoisie," because the very thing that distinguishes the epoch of democratic revolution is the diversity of wills of the various strata of the bourgeoisie which is just emancipating itself from absolutism. To speak of the democratic revolution and to confine oneself merely to baldly contrasting the "proletariat" with the "bourgeoisie" is sheer absurdity, because *that* revolution marks the very period in the progress of society in which the mass of society stands, as it were, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and constitutes an immense petty-bourgeois, a peasant stratum. Precisely because the democratic revolution has not yet been completed, this immense stratum has far more interests in common with the proletariat in the task of establishing political forms than has the "bourgeoisie," in the real and strict sense of the word. The failure to understand this simple thing is one of the main sources of Martynov's muddle.

**Further:**

"If this is so, then by simply frightening the majority of the bourgeois elements, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat can lead to but one result—the restoration of absolutism in its original form...and, of course, the proletariat will not be restrained by this possible result; if worst comes to worst, if things tend decidedly towards the revival and strengthening of the decaying autocratic government by a pseudo-constitutional concession it will not refrain from giving the bourgeoisie a fright. However, in entering the struggle, the proletariat obviously has not this 'worst' in view."

Do you understand what this is all about, reader? The proletariat, when threatened with a pseudo-constitutional concession, will not refrain from frightening the bourgeoisie, which will lead to the restoration of absolutism. This is the same as if I were to say: I am menaced by an Egyptian plague in the shape of a one-day conversation with Martynov; therefore, if worst comes to worst, I shall do something frightful, which can only lead to a two-day conversation with both Martynov and Martov. This is utter nonsense!

The idea that haunted Martynov when he wrote the nonsense quoted above was the following: if in the period of a democratic revolution the proletariat frightens the bourgeoisie with the threat of a socialist revolution, this may lead only to reaction which will diminish even the democratic gains. That and nothing more. There are no grounds for talking either about restoring absolutism in its original form or of the proletariat's readiness, if worst comes to worst, to commit the worst kind of stupidity. The whole thing can once more be reduced to that difference between a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution which Martynov forgets; to the existence of that immense peasant and petty-bourgeois population which is capable of supporting a democratic revolution, but is at the present time incapable of supporting a socialist one.

Let us listen to what our clever Martynov has to say further:

"Evidently, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on the eve of the bourgeois revolution must differ in some respects from the same struggle in its concluding stage, on the eve of the socialist revolution."

Yes, this is evident, and if Martynov had stopped to think

of what this difference actually is, he would hardly have written this nonsense, or indeed his whole pamphlet.

"The struggle to influence the course and outcome of the bourgeois revolution can express itself only in the fact that the proletariat will exert revolutionary pressure on the will of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie, and that the more democratic 'lower stratum' of society will force its 'upper stratum' to agree to lead the bourgeois revolution to its logical conclusion. It will express itself in the fact that at every turn the proletariat will confront the bourgeoisie with the dilemma: either backwards into the clutches of absolutism which strangles it, or forward with the people."

This tirade is the central point of Martynov's pamphlet. This is its quintessence and its fundamental "ideas." But what do all these clever ideas turn out to be? What is the "lower stratum" of society, what is the "people" of whom our wiseacre has at last bethought himself? It is precisely that multitudinous, petty-bourgeois, urban and rural stratum, which is quite capable of acting in a revolutionary democratic manner. And what is the *pressure* the proletariat plus the peasantry can bring to bear upon the upper stratum of society? What does the proletariat advancing together with the people in spite of the upper stratum of society mean? It is *the very revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*, against which our *khvostist* is fighting! He is afraid to think out his ideas to their logical conclusion, afraid to call a spade a spade. He therefore utters words the meaning of which he does not understand. He timidly, and with ridiculous and none too clever twists,<sup>1</sup> repeats slogans whose real meaning escapes him. Only a *khvostist* would think of writing such a "curiosity" in the most "interesting" part of his summary: revolutionary pressure of the proletariat and the "people" on the upper stratum of society, but without the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Only Martynov could say a thing like that! Martynov wants the proletariat to threaten the upper stratum of society by saying that it will go forward with the people, but at the same time he wants the pro-

<sup>1</sup> We have already mentioned the absurdity of his idea that the proletariat may, even if worst comes to worst, push the bourgeoisie backwards.

letariat to firmly decide with its new *Iskra* leaders *not to march forward* along the democratic path, because that is the path of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. Martynov wants the proletariat to bring pressure to bear on the will of the upper stratum by exposing its own lack of will. Martynov wants the proletariat to urge the upper stratum "to consent" to lead the bourgeois revolution to its logical democratic-republican conclusion, but to urge them by exposing its own fear of *taking upon itself*, in conjunction with the people, this task of leading the revolution to its conclusion, its fear of assuming power and the democratic dictatorship. Martynov wants the proletariat to be the vanguard in the democratic revolution, and *therefore* the wise Martynov *tries to frighten* the proletariat by the prospect of its having to take part in the provisional revolutionary government in the event of the uprising being successful.

Reactionary *khvostism* could go no further. We should all bow low to Martynov for having developed the *khvostist* tendencies of the new *Iskra* to their logical conclusion and for giving striking and systematic expression to them on the most urgent and fundamental political question of the day.<sup>1</sup>

### III

What is the source of Martynov's muddle-headedness? The fact that he confuses democratic revolution with socialist revolution, that he ignores the role of the intermediary stratum of the people, the stratum that lies between "the bourgeoisie" and "the proletariat" (the petty-bourgeois masses of urban and rural poor, the "semi-proletarians," the semi-proprietors), his failure to understand the true meaning of our minimum programme. Martynov has heard that it is unseemly for a Socialist to take part in a bourgeois ministry (when the proletariat is fighting for a socialist revolution) and he makes haste to "understand" this to mean that it is impermissible to participate jointly with revolutionary-bourgeois democracy in a democratic revolution and in the dictatorship that is essential for the full accom-

<sup>1</sup> This article was already set up when we received No. 93 of *Iskra*, to which we shall have to return at another time.

plishment of such a revolution. Martynov read our minimum programme,\* but failed to observe that the strict distinction it draws between the reforms which can be carried out in a bourgeois society and socialist reforms is not only of abstract significance, but is of the most vital practical importance; he failed to observe that in a revolutionary period the programme must be immediately tested and applied. It did not occur to Martynov that to renounce the idea of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship in the period of the fall of the autocracy is tantamount to renouncing the fulfilment of our minimum programme. Indeed, recall all the economic and political reforms advocated in that programme: the demands for a republic, for arming the people, for the disestablishment of the church, for full democratic liberty, for radical economic reforms. Is it not clear that it is impossible to achieve these reforms in bourgeois society without a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the lower classes? Is it not clear that it is not the proletariat alone, as distinct from the "bourgeoisie," that is referred to here, but the "lower classes," which are the active driving forces of every democratic revolution? These classes are the proletariat *plus* the tens of millions of urban and rural poor who live the lives of petty-bourgeois. That a great many representatives of these masses belong to the bourgeoisie is beyond doubt. But there is still less doubt that it is in the interests of these masses to bring about complete democracy, and that the more enlightened these masses are, the more inevitably will they fight for the complete achievement of democracy. Of course, a Social-Democrat will never forget the dual political and economic nature of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural masses; he will never forget the need for the separate and independent class organisation of the proletariat, which fights for socialism. But he will also not forget that these masses have "a future, besides a past, and reason, besides prejudices," reason that urges them onward toward the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship; he will not forget that enlightenment is obtained not from books alone, and not so much from books even, as from the very progress of the revolution that opens the eyes of the people and serves

as a school of politics. Under such circumstances, a theory that renounces the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship cannot be called anything else than the philosophic justification of political backwardness.

A revolutionary Social-Democrat will reject such a theory with contempt. On the eve of the revolution he will not only show what will happen "if worst comes to worst." No, he will also show the possibility of a better outcome. He will dream—he must dream, if he is not a hopeless philistine—of how, after the vast experience of Europe, after the unparalleled sweep of energy of the working class in Russia, we shall succeed as never before in lighting a revolutionary beacon that will illumine the path of the ignorant and oppressed masses; of how we shall succeed, standing as we do on the shoulders of a number of revolutionary generations of Europe, in carrying out all the democratic reforms, the whole of our minimum programme, with hitherto unprecedented completeness. We shall succeed in making the Russian revolution not a movement of a few months' duration, but a movement of many years, so that it will lead, not merely to a few paltry concessions from the powers that be, but to the complete overthrow of those powers. And if we succeed in doing that, then... then the revolutionary conflagration will spread all over Europe; the European worker, languishing under bourgeois reaction, will rise in his turn and will show us "how to do it"; then the revolutionary wave in Europe will sweep back again into Russia and will convert an epoch of a few revolutionary years into an era of several revolutionary decades; then... but we shall have plenty of time to say what we shall do "then," not from the cursed remoteness of Geneva but at meetings of thousands of workers in the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, at the free assemblies of Russian "muzhiks."

## IV

Of course, such dreams are alien and strange to the philistines of the new *Iskra* and their "master-mind," our good book-worm Martynov. They fear the full achievement of our mini-

num programme through a revolutionary dictatorship of the simple and common people. They are concerned about their own class consciousness, they fear to lose the book tenets they have learned by rote (but never thought out), they fear that they will prove unable to distinguish between the correct and bold steps of democratic reforms and the adventurous leaps of non-class Narodnik socialism and anarchism. Their philistine souls quite rightly warn them that in a rapid onward march it is more difficult to determine the proper path and to decide quickly new and complex problems than in the routine of everyday, humdrum work; they therefore mumble instinctively: Save me! Save me! May the cup of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship pass me by! Oh, that we may not be lost! Well, gentlemen! You had better march "in slow steps and timid zigzags."<sup>1</sup>

It is not surprising that Parvus,<sup>2</sup> who had so magnanimously supported the new *Iskra*-ists as long as the main issue was the question of co-opting the most venerable and most deserving,<sup>3</sup> finally began to feel very uncomfortable in this stagnant company. It is not surprising that he began more and more to feel the *tedium vitæ*, weariness of life, in this company. And finally he rebelled. He not only defended the slogan "organise the revolution" that had frightened the new *Iskra* to death; he not only wrote manifestoes, which *Iskra* printed in separate leaflet form, shunning, in view of the "Jacobin" horrors, even the mention of the Social-Democratic Labour Party.<sup>4</sup> No. Having freed himself from the nightmare of the profound organisation-

<sup>1</sup> From a parody written by Martov on a revolutionary song. See note to page 285.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> A Russian Social-Democrat, active in the German Social-Democratic Party, and at that time adhering to its Left wing. During the imperialist war he turned extreme social-patriot.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>3</sup> *I.e.*, the co-optation of Axelrod, Zasulich and Potresov to the editorial board of *Iskra*. They were not elected to that post by the Second Party Congress—one of the reasons that caused the split in the Party.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>4</sup> I do not know whether our readers have noticed the following characteristic fact: among the heap of trash issued by the new *Iskra*, in the form of leaflets, there were some good leaflets bearing Parvus' signature. The editors of the new *Iskra* disavowed precisely these leaflets by refusing to put the name of our Party or of the publishers on them.

process theory advanced by Axelrod (or Luxemburg),\* Parvus finally managed to go forward, instead of ambling backwards like a crab. He refused to perform the Sisyphean labour\*\* of endlessly correcting Martynov's and Martov's ineptitudes. He openly (unfortunately, together with Trotsky) advocated the idea of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, he urged that it was the duty of Social-Democrats to participate in a provisional revolutionary government after the overthrow of the autocracy. Parvus is a thousand times right when he says that Social-Democracy must not fear to take bold steps forward, must not fear jointly to strike "blows" at the enemy, shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary-bourgeois democracy, on the definite stipulation, however (mentioned very opportunely), that these organisations are not to be mixed up; to march separately, to strike together; not to conceal the diversity of interests, to watch your ally as you would your enemy, etc.

But precisely because of the warm sympathy we entertain for the slogans advanced by a revolutionary Social-Democrat who has turned his back on the *khvostists* the false notes that Parvus sounds came as an unpleasant surprise to us. And it is not in a carping spirit that we mention these small inaccuracies, but because from him that hath, much is demanded. It would be very dangerous at the present time if the correct position taken up by Parvus were compromised by his own carelessness, and the following sentence in his introduction to Trotsky's pamphlet must be described as careless, to say the least: "If we wish to separate the revolutionary proletariat from all other political trends, then we must learn to stand ideologically at the head of the revolutionary movement" (this is correct), "be more revolutionary than everybody." This is incorrect. That is to say, it is incorrect if the statement is taken in the general sense in which it is expressed by Parvus; it is incorrect from the point of view of the reader who takes this introduction as something self-contained, independent of Martynov and the new *Iskra*-ists whom Parvus does not mention. If we examine this statement dialectically, *i.e.*, relatively, concretely and from all its aspects, without imitating those literary raiders who, even

many years after, snatch separate sentences from some complete work and distort their meaning, then it will become clear that Parvus expressly directs it against the *khvostists* and to that extent it is correct (compare particularly the subsequent words of Parvus: "If we lag behind revolutionary development," etc.). But the reader cannot have only *khvostists* in mind, for there are other dangerous friends of revolution in the camp of the revolutionaries besides the *khvostists*; there are the Socialist-Revolutionaries, there are people like the Nadezhdins,\* who are swept in by the tide of events and are helpless in the face of revolutionary phrases; or those who are guided by instinct instead of revolutionary philosophy (like Gapon). Parvus forgot about these, and he forgot about them because the presentation, the development of his idea does not run freely; it is bound to the pleasant memory of that very Martynovism against which he tries to warn the reader. Parvus failed to present his case with sufficient concreteness because he does not take into consideration all the various revolutionary trends existing in Russia, which inevitably arise in an epoch of democratic revolution and which naturally reflect the indistinct class division of society during such an epoch. At such a time, revolutionary-democratic programmes are naturally clothed in vague and sometimes even reactionary socialist ideas concealed behind revolutionary phrases (just recall the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Nadezhdin who, it seems, only changed his label when he went over from the "Revolutionary Socialists" to the new *Iskra*). And under such circumstances we, the Social-Democrats, never can and never will put forward the slogan "be more revolutionary than everybody." We shall not even try to keep pace with the revolutionariness of the democrat who is detached from his class basis, who flaunts phrases and snatches at catchy and cheap slogans (particularly in the agrarian sphere). On the contrary we will always be extremely critical of such revolutionariness, expose the real meaning of its words, the real content of the great events it idealises, and urge that a sober analysis of classes and of shadings within the classes be made even in the hottest moments of the revolution.

Similarly incorrect, and for the same reason, are Parvus' postulates that "the revolutionary provisional government of Russia will be a government of labour democracy," that "if Social-Democracy is at the head of the movement of the Russian proletariat, then this government will be a Social-Democratic government," that the Social-Democratic provisional government "will be an integral government with a Social-Democratic majority." This *cannot be*, if we are to speak not of accidental, transient episodes, but of a revolutionary dictatorship that will be at all durable and capable of leaving some trace in history. This cannot be, because only a revolutionary dictatorship relying on the overwhelming majority of the people can be at all durable (not absolutely, of course, but relatively). The Russian proletariat, however, at present constitutes a minority of the population in Russia. It can become the great overwhelming majority only if it combines with the mass of semi-proletarians, semi-small proprietors, *i.e.*, with the mass of the petty-bourgeois, urban and rural poor. And such a composition of the social basis of the possible and desirable revolutionary-democratic dictatorship will, of course, find its reflection in the composition of the revolutionary government. With such a composition the participation or even the predominance of the most diversified representatives of revolutionary democracy in such a government will be inevitable. It would be harmful if any illusions were entertained on this score. If the windbag Trotsky now writes (unfortunately, side by side with Parvus) that "the priest Gapon could appear only once," that "there is no room for a second Gapon," he does so simply because he is a windbag. If there is no room in Russia for a second Gapon, then there is no room for a truly "great" democratic revolution carried to the very end. In order to become great, in order to recall 1789-93, and not 1848-50,\* and in order to surpass those times, it must rouse the vast masses to active life, to heroic efforts, to "fundamental historic creativeness," it must raise them out of frightful ignorance, unparalleled oppression, incredible savagery and hopeless dullness. It is already raising them, it will completely raise them—and this is being facilitated

by the government itself by its convulsive resistance. But, of course, these masses possess no thought out political consciousness, or Social-Democratic consciousness, nor do their numerous "native" popular, or even muzhik leaders. They cannot become Social-Democrats immediately, without first passing through a series of revolutionary tests, not only because of their ignorance (revolution, we repeat, enlightens with marvellous speed), but because their class position is not proletarian, because the objective logic of historical development confronts them at the present time, not with the task of making a socialist revolution, but with the task of making a democratic revolution.

And in this revolution, the revolutionary proletariat will participate with the utmost energy, and sweep aside the miserable *khvostism* of some and the revolutionary phrases of others. It will introduce class definiteness and class consciousness into the dizzying whirlwind of events and march on unswervingly and boldly, not fearing the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, but passionately desiring it, fighting for a republic and for complete republican liberties, for substantial economic reforms, in order to create for itself a truly broad arena, really worthy of the twentieth century, for the fight for socialism.

April (March) 1905.

**THE TWO TACTICS OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE  
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION \***



## PREFACE

IN time of revolution it is very difficult to keep abreast of events, for they provide an astonishing amount of new material for the evaluation of the tactical slogans of revolutionary parties. The present pamphlet was written before the Odessa events.<sup>1</sup> We have already pointed out in *Proletary* (No. 9—"Revolution Teaches") that these events have forced even those Social-Democrats who created the "uprising-process" theory, and who rejected propaganda for a provisional revolutionary government, virtually to pass over, or to begin to pass over, to the side of their opponents.\* Revolution undoubtedly teaches with a rapidity and thoroughness which appear incredible in peaceful epochs of political development. And what is of special importance, it not only teaches the leaders, but the masses as well.

There is not the slightest doubt that revolution will teach Social-Democracy to the working masses in Russia. Revolution will confirm the programme and tactics of Social-Democracy in actual practice, after demonstrating the true nature of the various social classes, the bourgeois essence of our democracy, and the real aspirations of the peasantry, which is revolutionary in a bourgeois-democratic sense and harbours not the idea of "socialisation," but that of a new class struggle between the peasant bourgeoisie and the village proletariat. The old illusions of the old Narodniki<sup>2</sup> so obviously reflected, for instance, in the

<sup>1</sup>This refers to the mutiny on the armoured cruiser "Potemkin." (Author's note to the 1908 edition. See note to page 9.—*Ed.*)

<sup>2</sup>"Narodniki"—literally "populist"—a term first applied to the social movement of the sixties of the last century, its most characteristic feature being the belief in the possibility of a non-capitalist development of Russia and of attaining socialism without the "sore of proletarianisation" and on the basis of the village commune. For a fuller exposition of the Narodnik theories, see article *Peasantry, Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism* in this volume.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

draft programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, in their attitude towards the question of the development of capitalism in Russia, the question of the democratic character of our "society," and towards the question of the importance of a complete victory of the peasant rebellion—all these illusions will be mercilessly and finally blown to the winds by the revolution. It will give the various classes their first political baptism. These classes will emerge from the revolution with definite political features and reveal themselves, not only in the programmes and in the tactical slogans of their ideologists, but also in the open political action of the masses.

Undoubtedly, revolution will teach us and will also teach the masses of the people. But the question that now confronts a fighting political party is whether we shall be able to teach any lessons to the revolution; whether we shall be able to make use of our correct Social-Democratic doctrine, of our bond with the only consistently revolutionary class, the proletariat, in order to put a proletarian imprint on the revolution, in order to carry the revolution to real, decisive victory, in deeds and not in words, in order to paralyse the instability, half-heartedness, and treachery of the democratic bourgeoisie.

We must direct all our efforts to the achievement of this aim. And its achievement depends, on the one hand, on the correctness of our estimate of the political position, on the correctness of our tactical slogans and, on the other hand, on the extent to which these slogans are supported by real fighting forces of the masses of the workers. All the usual, regular current work of all organisations and groups of our Party, the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation, is directed towards strengthening and extending the ties with the masses. This work is always necessary and there can never be too much of it in time of revolution. At such a time the working class instinctively rushes into open revolutionary action, and we must know how correctly to define the tasks of this action, and then to spread a knowledge and understanding of these tasks as widely as possible. We must not forget that the pessimism now prevailing about our ties with the masses

is very frequently a screen for bourgeois ideas on the role of the proletariat in the revolution.\* Undoubtedly, we still have a great deal to do to educate and organise the working class, but the crux of the matter now is: what is the main political centre of gravity of this work of education and organisation? Is it the trade unions and legal societies, or the armed insurrection and the creation of a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government? Both serve to educate and organise the working class. Both are necessary, of course. But the whole question now, in the present revolution, reduces itself to the following: what is the centre of gravity of the work of educating and organising the working class—the former or the latter?

The issue of the revolution depends on whether the working class will play the part of auxiliary to the bourgeoisie which is powerful in its onslaught against the autocracy, but impotent politically; or the part of leader of the people's revolution. The class conscious representatives of the bourgeoisie are perfectly well aware of this. That is precisely why *Osvobozhdeniye* is praising Akimovism,<sup>1</sup> "Economism" in Social-Democracy, which is now placing the trade unions and the legal societies in the forefront. That is why Mr. Struve welcomes (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72) the trend of principles of Akimovism in the new *Iskra*.\*\* That is why he comes down so heavily upon the hated revolutionary narrowness of the decisions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

It is particularly important at the present time for Social-Democracy to advance correct, tactical slogans in order to guide the masses. There is nothing more dangerous in time of revolution than underestimating the importance of tactical slogans that are consistent in principle. *Iskra*, for instance, in No. 104, passes virtually to the side of its opponents in the Social-Democratic movement, and yet at the same time refers in disparaging tones to the significance of slogans and tactical decisions which are in advance of the times, which indicate the path

<sup>1</sup> Akimovism, from the name of Akimov, the *nom de plume* of Makhnovets, one of the editors of *Rabocheye Dyelo*, a leading exponent of opportunism and Economism.—Ed. Eng. ed.

along which the movement is progressing, with many failures, errors, etc.\* On the other hand, the working out of correct tactical decisions is of immense importance for the Party, which desires to lead the proletariat in the spirit of the consistent principles of Marxism, and not merely to drag at the tail of events. In the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference of the section of the Party<sup>1</sup> that seceded, we see the most precise, the most thought-out, the most complete expressions of tactical views, not those casually expressed by individual publicists, but those accepted by the responsible representatives of the Social-Democratic proletariat. Our Party stands in front of all the others, for it possesses a definite programme, accepted by all. It must set the example for all other parties also by strict adherence to its own tactical resolutions in contradistinction to the opportunism of the democratic bourgeoisie of *Osvobozhdeniye* and the revolutionary phrases of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who only during the revolution suddenly bethought themselves of coming forward with a "draft" programme and of attending for the first time to the question as to whether what they are witnessing is a bourgeois revolution or not.

That is why we think that the most urgent task that confronts revolutionary Social-Democracy is carefully to study the tactical resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference, to define what deviations have been made from the principles of Marxism and to have a clear grasp of the concrete tasks that confront the Social-Democratic proletariat in a democratic revolution. The present pamphlet is devoted to this task. The verification of our tactics from the standpoint of the principles of Marxism and of the lessons of the revolution is also necessary for those who

<sup>1</sup>The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (held in London in May 1905) was attended only by Bolsheviks, while at the Geneva Conference held at the same time only Mensheviks participated. In the present pamphlet the latter are frequently referred to as new *Iskra*-ists, because while continuing to publish *Iskra* they declared, through their then adherent Trotsky, that there is a gulf between the old and the new *Iskra*. (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—Ed.)

really desire to prepare the ground for unity of tactics as a foundation for the future, complete unification of the whole Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and not to confine themselves to mere words of admonition.

July 1905.

## I. AN URGENT POLITICAL QUESTION

THE question that stands in the forefront at the present time of revolution is that of the convocation of a constituent assembly. Opinions differ as to how this question is to be solved. Three political tendencies are to be observed. The tsar's government admits the necessity of assembling representatives of the people, but under no circumstances does it desire this assembly to be a national and constituent assembly. It seems willing to agree, if we are to believe the newspaper reports of the work of the Bulygin Commission, to an advisory assembly,\* to be elected, without freedom to carry on agitation and under an electoral system based on a high property qualification or on a narrow class system. The revolutionary proletariat, in so far as it is guided by Social-Democracy, demands the complete transfer of power to the constituent assembly, and for this purpose strives to obtain not only universal suffrage and complete freedom to conduct agitation, but also the immediate overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government. Finally, the liberal bourgeoisie, expressing its wishes through the leaders of the so-called "Constitutional-Democratic Party," does not demand the overthrow of the tsarist government, nor does it advance the slogan of a provisional government, or insist on real guarantees that the elections will be free and fair, that the assembly of representatives shall really be a national assembly and really a constituent assembly. As a matter of fact, the liberal bourgeoisie, which represents the only serious social support of the *Osvobozhdeniye* group, is striving to bring about as peaceful a compromise as possible between the tsar and the revolutionary people, a compromise, moreover, that would give the maximum of power to the bourgeoisie and the minimum to the revolutionary people, the proletariat and the peasantry.

Such is the political situation at the present time. Such are the three main political tendencies, corresponding to the three main social forces of contemporary Russia. On more than one occasion we have shown (in *Proletary*, Nos. 3, 4, 5) how the *Osvozhdeniye*-ists cover up their half-hearted, or, to express ourselves more directly and simply, their treacherous, policy towards the revolution by sham democratic phrases. Let us now consider how the Social-Democrats estimate the tasks of the moment. The two resolutions passed quite recently by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the "Conference" of the seceded section of the Party provide excellent material for this purpose. The question as to which of these resolutions more correctly appraises the political situation and more correctly defines the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat is of immense importance, and every Social-Democrat who is anxious to fulfil his duties as a propagandist, agitator and organiser intelligently must study this question very carefully and leave all irrelevant matters entirely aside.

By Party tactics we mean the political behaviour of the Party, or the character, tendency or methods of its political activity. Tactical resolutions are adopted by Party congresses for the purpose of determining exactly what the political behaviour of the Party as a whole should be in regard to new tasks, or in regard to a new political situation. The revolution that has started in Russia has created precisely such a new situation, *i.e.*, a complete, decisive and open rupture between the overwhelming majority of the people and the tsarist government. The new question is: what practical methods are to be adopted to convene a genuinely national and genuinely constituent assembly (the question of such an assembly was settled by Social-Democracy in theory long ago, before any other party, in its Party programme). If the people have parted company with the government, and the masses have realised the necessity of setting up a new order, then the party which made it its object to overthrow the government is of necessity forced to consider what it is to put in place of the old government about to be overthrown. A new question arises about the provisional rev-

olutionary government. In order to give a complete answer to this question the party of the class conscious proletariat must make clear: 1) the *significance* of a provisional revolutionary government in the present revolution and in the struggle waged by the proletariat in general; 2) its *attitude* to the provisional revolutionary government; 3) the precise conditions on which *Social-Democracy will join* this government; 4) the conditions of pressure to be brought to bear on this government *from below, i.e.,* in the event of the Social-Democrats not participating in it. Only after all these questions are cleared up, will the political behaviour of the Party in this connection be one of principle, definite and firm.

Let us now consider how the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party answers these questions. The following is the full text of the resolution:

#### "RESOLUTION ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

"Taking into consideration,

"1) That both the immediate interests of the proletariat and the interests of its struggle for the final aims of socialism demand the widest possible measure of political freedom and, consequently, that the autocratic form of government be replaced by a democratic republic;

"2) That the setting up of a democratic republic in Russia is possible only as a result of a victorious uprising of the people, whose organ of government will be the provisional revolutionary government, the only body capable of securing complete freedom for electoral agitation and of convening, on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot, a constituent assembly that will really express the will of the people;

"3) That under the present social and economic order this democratic revolution in Russia will not weaken, but strengthen, the domination of the bourgeoisie, which will inevitably, at a certain moment, by all manner of means, strive to filch from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the revolutionary period as possible;

"The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party resolves that:

"a) it is necessary to make the working class understand concretely the most probable course of the revolution and the necessity of the appearance at a certain moment of a provisional revolutionary government, from whom the proletariat will demand the satisfaction of all the immediate political and economic demands contained in our programme (the minimum programme);

"b) subject to the relation of forces, and other factors which cannot be exactly determined beforehand, representatives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the

purpose of ruthlessly combating all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending the independent interests of the working class;

"c) a necessary condition for such participation is that the Party shall maintain strict control over its representatives and that the independence of Social-Democracy, which is striving for a complete socialist revolution and therefore is irreconcilably hostile to all the bourgeois parties, shall be strictly maintained;

"d) irrespective of whether the participation of Social-Democracy in the provisional revolutionary government will prove possible or not, it is necessary to propagate among the broadest possible strata of the proletariat the necessity of permanent pressure being brought to bear upon the provisional government by the armed proletariat, led by Social-Democracy, for the purpose of defending, consolidating and extending the gains of the revolution."

## II. WHAT DOES THE RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT TEACH US?

THE resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as is seen from its title, wholly and exclusively deals with the question of the provisional revolutionary government. Hence, it includes the question as to whether Social-Democrats may participate in a provisional revolutionary government. On the other hand, it deals only with the provisional revolutionary government and with nothing else; consequently, it does not include, for example, the question of the "conquest of power" in general, etc. Did the Congress act properly in eliminating this and similar questions? Undoubtedly it was right in doing so, because the present political situation of Russia does not raise such questions as immediate issues. On the contrary, the issue raised by the whole of the people at the present time is the overthrow of autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly. Party congresses must take up and decide issues which are of serious political importance because of the conditions prevailing at the time and because of the objective course of social development and not those questions which in season or out of season are touched upon by this or that publicist.

What is the significance of the provisional revolutionary government in the present revolution, and in the general struggle of the proletariat? The resolution of the Congress explains this by pointing out from the outset the necessity of the "widest possible measure of political liberty," both from the standpoint of the immediate interests of the proletariat and from the standpoint of the "final aims of socialism." And full political liberty requires that the tsarist autocracy be replaced by a democratic

republic, as is already recognised by our Party programme. It is necessary to stress the slogan of a democratic republic in the resolution of the Congress both from the point of view of logic and of principles; for the proletariat, being the foremost champion of democracy, is striving precisely for complete freedom. Moreover it is all the more necessary to stress this at the present time because precisely at this moment the monarchists, the so-called "Constitutional-Democratic," or *Osvobozhdeniye* Party in this country, is coming out under the flag of "democracy." In order to set up a republic, an assembly of people's representatives is absolutely necessary. Moreover, such an assembly must necessarily be a national (on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot) and constituent assembly. This too is recognised in the resolution of the Congress, further on. But the resolution does not confine itself to this. In order to set up a new order "that will really express the will of the people" it is not enough to call the elected assembly a constituent assembly. That assembly must have power and force to "constitute." Taking this into consideration, the resolution of the Congress does not confine itself to the formal slogan of a "constituent assembly," but adds the material conditions which alone will enable that assembly to fulfil its tasks. The statement of the conditions which will enable an assembly which is a constituent assembly in name to become a constituent assembly in fact is urgently necessary, for, as we have pointed out more than once, the liberal bourgeoisie, as represented by the Constitutional-Monarchist Party, is deliberately distorting the slogan of a national constituent assembly and reducing it to an empty phrase.

The resolution of the Congress states that *only* a provisional revolutionary government can secure full freedom for the election campaign and convene an assembly that will really express the will of the people, moreover, an assembly that will be the organ of a victorious people's uprising. Is this postulate correct? Those who take it into their heads to refute it will have to assert that the tsarist government will not side with the reaction, that it is capable of being neutral during the elections, that

it will see to it that the will of the people is really expressed. Such assertions are so absurd that no one would venture to advance them openly; but it is precisely the adherents of *Osvobozhdeniye* who are secretly smuggling them into our midst under the cover of a liberal flag. The constituent assembly must be convened by someone: someone must guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections; someone must invest such an assembly with full power and force. Only a revolutionary government, which is the organ of the uprising, can in all sincerity desire this and be capable of doing everything to achieve this. The tsarist government will inevitably oppose it. A liberal government which comes to terms with the tsar, and which does not rely entirely on the people's uprising, cannot sincerely desire this and could not achieve it even if it desired it most sincerely. Therefore, the resolution of the Congress gives the only correct and entirely consistent democratic slogan.

However, the evaluation of the importance of the provisional revolutionary government would be incomplete and erroneous if the class nature of the democratic revolution were lost sight of. The resolution therefore adds that the revolution will strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie. This is inevitable under the present, i.e., capitalist, social and economic system. And the result of the strengthening of the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat after it has secured some political liberty, however slight, must inevitably be a desperate struggle for power between them, must lead to desperate attempts on the part of the bourgeoisie "to filch from the proletariat the gains of the revolutionary period." The proletariat which is fighting for democracy in front and at the head of all must therefore be ever mindful of the new antagonisms and the new struggles which are inherent in bourgeois democracy.

Thus, the part of the resolution which we have just reviewed fully appreciates the importance of the provisional revolutionary government in connection with the struggle for freedom and for the republic, in connection with the constituent assembly and in connection with the democratic revolution, which clears the ground for a new class struggle.

The next question is, what should be the attitude of the proletariat in general towards the provisional revolutionary government? The Congress resolution answers this first of all by directly advising the Party to spread among the working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is necessary. The working class must perceive this necessity. While the "democratic" bourgeoisie leaves the question of the overthrow of the tsarist government in the shade, we must push it to the fore and insist on the necessity of a provisional revolutionary government. More than that, we must outline a programme of action of such a government, which should conform to the objective conditions of the historic period we are living in and to the aims of proletarian democracy. This programme is the *entire* minimum programme<sup>1</sup> of our Party, the programme of the immediate political and economic reforms which, on the one hand, are quite attainable in the existing social and economic relationships and, on the other hand, are necessary in order to be able to take the next step forward in the direction of achieving socialism.

The resolution thus fully explains the nature and the aims of the provisional revolutionary government. By its origin and fundamental nature such a government must be the organ of the people's rebellion. Its formal purpose must be to serve as an instrument for the convocation of a national constituent assembly. Its activities must be directed towards the achievement of the minimum programme of proletarian democracy, which is the only programme capable of securing the protection of the interests of the people which has risen against the autocracy.

It might be argued that the provisional government, owing to the fact that it is provisional, could not carry out a positive programme which had not yet received the approval of the whole of the people. Such an argument would be sheer sophistry, such as is advanced by reactionaries and "autocratists." To abstain from carrying out a positive programme is tantamount to tolerating the existence of the feudal regime of the putrid autocracy. Only a government of traitors to the cause of the revolution

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 30.—*Ed.*

could tolerate such a regime, and certainly not a government which is the organ of the people's rebellion. It would be mockery for anyone to propose that we should refrain from exercising freedom of assembly pending the confirmation of such freedom by the constituent assembly, on the plea that the constituent assembly might not confirm freedom of assembly! Similarly, it would be mockery to object to the immediate carrying out of the minimum programme by the provisional revolutionary government.

Finally, we wish to say that by making it the task of the provisional revolutionary government to achieve the minimum programme, the resolution thereby eliminates the absurd, semi-anarchist ideas that the maximum programme, the conquest of power for a socialist revolution, can be immediately achieved.\* The present degree of economic development of Russia (an objective condition) and the degree of class consciousness and organisation of the broad masses of the proletariat (a subjective condition indissolubly connected with the objective condition) make the immediate, complete emancipation of the working class impossible. Only the most ignorant people can ignore the bourgeois character of the present democratic revolution; only the most naive optimists can forget how little as yet the masses of the workers are informed of the aims of socialism and of the methods of achieving it. And we are all convinced that the emancipation of the workers can only be brought about by the workers themselves; a socialist revolution is out of the question unless the masses become class conscious, organised, trained and educated by open class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie. In answer to the anarchist objections to the effect that we are delaying the socialist revolution, we shall say: we are not delaying it, but are taking the first step in its direction, using the only means that are possible along the only right path, namely, the path of a democratic republic.<sup>1</sup> Whoever wants to approach socialism by another path, other than political democracy, will inevitably arrive at absurd and reactionary conclusions in the economic and in the political sense. If any workers

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 24.--Ed.

ask us at any given moment: why not carry out our maximum programme, we would answer by pointing out how much the masses of the democratically disposed people are still ignorant of socialism, how much class antagonisms are still undeveloped, how much the proletarians are still unorganised. Organise hundreds of thousands of workers all over Russia; enlist the sympathy of millions for our programme! Try to do this without confining yourselves to high-sounding but hollow anarchist phrases. You will see at once that in order to achieve this organisation, in order to spread socialist enlightenment, we must have democratic reforms on the widest possible scale.

Let us proceed further. Having explained the significance of the provisional revolutionary government and the attitude of the proletariat towards it, the following question arises: would we be right in participating in it (action from above) and, if so, under what conditions? What should be our action from below? The resolution supplies precise answers to both these questions. It definitely declares that in principle, it is *right* for Social-Democracy to participate in the provisional revolutionary government (during the epoch of a democratic revolution, an epoch of struggle for the republic). By this declaration we irrevocably dissociate ourselves from the anarchists who, in point of principle, answer this question in the negative, and also from the *khvostists* among the Social-Democrats (such as Martynov and the new *Iskra*-ists) who *tried to frighten* us with the prospect of a situation in which it might prove necessary for us to take part in such a government.<sup>1</sup> By this declaration the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party irrevocably rejected the idea expressed by the new *Iskra* that the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government is a variety of Millerandism, that it is inadmissible in principle, because it thus gives its sanction to the bourgeois regime, etc.

But the question of whether it is admissible or not in principle does not, of course, solve the question of practical ex-

<sup>1</sup> See article *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government* in this volume.-- *Ed.*

pediency. Under what conditions is this new form of struggle—the struggle “from above” as recognised by the Congress of the Party—expedient? It goes without saying that at the present time it is impossible to speak of concrete conditions, such as relation of forces, etc., and the resolution, naturally, does not define these conditions in advance. No sensible person would venture at the present time to prophesy anything on this subject. What we can and must do is to determine the nature and aim of our participation. This is precisely what is done in the resolution, which points out two aims of our participation: 1) to ruthlessly combat counter-revolutionary attempts, and 2) to defend the independent interests of the working class. At a time when the liberal bourgeoisie is beginning to talk eagerly about the psychology of reaction (see Mr. Struve’s most edifying “Open Letter” \* in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72), and is trying to frighten the people and to urge it to yield to the autocracy—at such a time it is particularly appropriate for the party of the proletariat to call attention to the task of waging a real war against counter-revolution. In the final analysis, force alone can settle the great problems of political liberty and class struggle, and it is our business to prepare and organise this force and to use it actively, not only for defensive purposes, but also for the purpose of attack. The long reign of political reaction in Europe, which has lasted almost uninterruptedly since the days of the Paris Commune, has too greatly accustomed us to the idea that action can only proceed “from below,” has accustomed us to seeing only defensive struggles. There can be no doubt that we have now entered a new epoch: a period of political upheavals and revolutions has been ushered in. In a period such as Russia is passing through at the present time, we cannot limit ourselves to the old set formula. It is necessary to propagate the idea of action from above, to prepare for the most energetic, offensive actions, to study the conditions and forms of these actions. The Congress resolution lays special emphasis on two of these conditions: one refers to the formal side of the participation of Social-Democracy in the provisional revolutionary government (strict control of the Party over its representatives), the other—

to the very nature of such participation (never for an instant to lose sight of the aim of bringing about a complete socialist revolution).

Having thus explained from all aspects the policy of the Party in action "from above"—this new, hitherto almost unprecedented method of struggle—the resolution then provides for the case when we shall not be able to act "from above." We must exercise pressure on the provisional revolutionary government from below in any case. In order to be able to exercise this pressure from below, the proletariat must be armed—for in a revolutionary situation things develop very quickly to the stage of open civil war—and must be led by Social-Democracy. The object of its armed pressure is that of "defending, consolidating and extending the gains of the revolution," *i.e.*, those gains which from the standpoint of proletarian interests must consist of the achievement of the whole of our minimum programme.

This brings our brief analysis of the resolution of the Third Congress on the provisional revolutionary government to a close. The reader will see that this resolution explains the importance of this new question, the attitude of the party of the proletariat towards it, and the policy of the Party both in and out of the provisional revolutionary government.

Let us now consider the corresponding resolution of the "Conference."

### III. WHAT IS A "DECISIVE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION OVER TSARISM"?

THE resolution of the "Conference" deals with the question: "*The Conquest of Power and Participation in the Provisional Government.*"<sup>1</sup> As we have pointed out already, there is a latent confusion in the very manner in which the question is put. On the one hand the question is presented in a narrow sense; it deals only with our participation in the provisional government and not with the tasks of the Party in regard to the provisional revolutionary government in general. On the other hand, two totally heterogeneous questions are mixed up, *viz.*, the question of our participation in one of the stages of the *democratic* revolution and the question of the *socialist* revolution. Indeed, the "conquest of power" by Social-Democracy is precisely the socialist revolution, and it cannot be anything else if we use these words in their direct and usually accepted sense. If, however, we understand these words to mean the conquest of power, not for a socialist, but for a democratic revolution, then, of course, there is no sense in talking about participation in the provisional revolutionary government and the "conquest of power" *in general*. Obviously our "Conference-ists" were not clear in their own minds as to what they should talk about: about the democratic revolution or about the socialist revolution. Those who have followed the literature on this question know that it was Comrade Martynov, in his famous *Two Dictatorships*, who started this muddle: the new *Iskra*-ists are very reluctant to recall the manner in which this question was presented (before January 22 [9]) in that model *khvostist* work. However, there can

<sup>1</sup>The full text of this resolution can be reconstructed by the reader from the quotations given on pp. 400, 403, 407, 431 and 433 of the present pamphlet. (Author's note to the 1908 edition. Cf. pp. 57, 63, 69, 92 and 96 in this volume.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*)

be no doubt that it exercised ideological influence on the Conference.

But let us leave the title of the resolution. Its contents reveal mistakes incomparably more profound and serious. Here is the first part:

“A decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be marked either by the setting up of a provisional government, which emerges from a victorious people’s uprising or by the revolutionary initiative of this or that representative institution, which under the immediate pressure of the revolutionary people decides to set up a national constituent assembly.”

Thus, we are told that a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be achieved by a victorious uprising, and—a decision of a representative institution to establish a constituent assembly! Whatever does this mean? A decisive victory may be marked by a “decision” to set up a constituent assembly?? And such a “victory” is put side by side with the establishment of a provisional government “which emerges from the victorious people’s uprising”!! The Conference failed to notice that a *victorious* people’s uprising and the *setting up* of a provisional government would signify the victory of the revolution *in deeds*, whereas a “decision” to set up a constituent assembly would signify a victory of the revolution *in words* only.

The Conference of the Menshevik new *Iskra*-ists committed the same error that the liberals of *Osvobozhdeniye* are constantly committing. The *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists are prattling about a “constituent” assembly and they bashfully close their eyes to the fact that power and force remain in the hands of the tsar. They forget that in order to “constitute” one must possess the *force* to do so. The Conference also forgot that the “decision” of any sort of representatives whatsoever does not by a long way mean that the decision is carried out. The Conference also forgot that so long as power remains in the hands of the tsar, all decisions passed by any sort of representatives will remain empty and miserable prattle, as was the case with the “decisions” of the Frankfort Parliament, famous in the history of the German Revolution of 1848.\* Marx, the representative of the revolutionary proletariat, in his *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, castigated

the Frankfort liberal *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists with merciless sarcasm precisely because they uttered fine words, adopted all sorts of democratic "decisions," "constituted" all kinds of liberties, while in reality they left power in the hands of the king and failed to organise an armed struggle against the armed forces at the disposal of the king. And while the Frankfort *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists were prattling—the king bided his time, consolidated his military forces, and the counter-revolution, relying on real force, utterly routed the democrats with all their beautiful "decisions."

The Conference put on a par with a decisive victory the very thing that lacks the essential condition of victory. How is the fact that Social-Democrats who recognise the republican programme of our Party committed that error to be explained? In order to understand this strange phenomenon we must turn to the resolution of the Third Congress on the seceded section of the Party.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This reads as follows\*: "The Congress declares that since the time of the Party's fight against Economism, certain trends have survived in the Party which, in various degrees and respects, are akin to Economism and which betray a common tendency to belittle the importance of the element of consciousness in the proletarian struggle, and to subordinate it to the element of spontaneity. On questions of organisation, the representatives of these tendencies put forward, in theory, the principle of organisation-process which is out of harmony with methodical Party work, while in practice they deviate from Party discipline in very many cases and in other cases they preach the wide application of the elective principle to the least educated section of the Party, without taking into consideration the objective conditions of Russian life and so strive to *undermine* the only principle of Party ties that is now applicable. In tactical questions these trends manifest themselves in a tendency to narrow the scope of Party work, declaring their opposition to the Party adopting completely independent tactics towards the liberal bourgeois parties and denying that it was possible and desirable for the Party to assume the role of organiser in the people's uprising and by opposing the participation of our Party in a provisional democratic revolutionary government under any conditions whatsoever.

"The Congress invites all Party members to conduct an ideological struggle everywhere against such partial deviations from the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy: at the same time it is of the opinion that persons who share such views to a more or less extent may participate in Party organisations provided they recognise Party congresses and the Party rules and wholly submit to Party discipline." (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—*Ed.*)

This resolution refers to the fact that various tendencies "akin to Economism" have survived in our Party. Our "Conference-ists" (it is not for nothing that they are under the ideological guidance of Martynov) talk of the revolution in exactly the same way as the Economists talked of the political struggle or the eight-hour day. The Economists at once resorted to the "stages theory": 1) struggle for rights, 2) political agitation, 3) political struggle; or, 1) a ten-hour day, 2) a nine-hour day, 3) an eight-hour day. The results of this "tactics-process" is sufficiently well known to all. Now we are invited to divide the revolution itself into distinct stages: 1) the tsar convenes a representative institution; 2) this representative institution "decides" under the pressure of the "people" to set up a constituent assembly; 3) . . . the Mensheviks have not yet agreed among themselves as to the third stage; they have forgotten that the revolutionary pressure of the people will encounter the counter-revolutionary pressure of tsarism and that, therefore, either such a "decision" will remain unfulfilled or else the matter will be settled after all by the victory or the defeat of the people's uprising. The resolution of the Conference is exactly as if the Economists were to argue as follows: a decisive victory of the workers may be marked either by the revolutionary introduction of the eight-hour day or by the grant of a ten-hour day and the "decision" to pass on to a nine-hour day. . . . The two arguments are exactly alike.

Perhaps someone will say that the authors of the resolution did not mean to place the victory of the uprising *on a par* with the "decision" of a representative institution convened by the tsar, that they only wanted to provide for Party tactics in either case. To this our answer would be: 1) the text of the resolution directly and unambiguously describes the *decision* of a representative institution as "a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism." Perhaps this is the result of careless wording, perhaps it could be corrected after consulting the minutes, but, so long as it is not corrected, there can only be one meaning in the present wording, and this meaning is entirely in keeping with the line of reasoning of *Ostobozhdeniye*; 2) the

*Osvobozhdeniye* line of reasoning into which the authors of the resolution have fallen comes out in incomparably greater relief in other literary productions of the new *Iskra*-ists. For instance, the organ of the Tiflis Committee, *Social-Democrat* (in the Georgian language; praised by *Iskra* in No. 100), in the article "The Zemsky Sobor<sup>1</sup> and Our Tactics," goes so far as to say that the "tactics" "which make the Zemsky Sobor the centre of our activities" (about the convocation of which, we may add, nothing definite is known!) "*are more advantageous for us*" than the "tactics" of an armed uprising and of the setting up of a provisional revolutionary government.\* We shall refer to this article again further on. 3) No objection can be made to a preliminary discussion of what tactics the Party should adopt, either in the event of a victory of the revolution or in the event of its defeat, either in the event of a successful uprising, or in the event of the uprising failing to flare up into a serious force. Perhaps the tsarist government may succeed in convening a representative assembly for the purpose of coming to terms with the liberal bourgeoisie—the resolution of the Third Congress provides for that by directly referring to "hypocritical policy," "pseudo-democracy," "grotesque forms of people's representation similar to the so-called Zemsky Sobor."<sup>2</sup> But the point is

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, National Assembly—an assembly of notables, an advisory body convened from time to time by the tsars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Before 1905, this term was vaguely used to cover any kind of national assembly.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> The following is the text of this resolution on the attitude to the tactics of the government on the eve of a revolution:

"Taking into consideration that the government for the purpose of self-preservation during the present revolutionary period, while intensifying the usual repressions directed mainly against the class conscious elements of the proletariat, at the same time 1) tries by means of concessions and promises of reforms politically to corrupt the working class and thereby divert it from the revolutionary struggle; 2) for the same purpose clothes its hypocritical policy of concessions in a pseudo-democratic cloak, beginning with invitations to the workers to elect their representatives to commissions and conferences and ending with creating grotesque forms of people's representation, similar to the so-called Zemsky Sobor; 3) organises the so-called Black Hundreds and rouses against the revolution generally all the reactionary and ignorant elements of the people, or those blinded by racial or religious hatred.

"The Third Congress resolves to call on all Party organisations:

that this is not the resolution on the provisional revolutionary government, for it has nothing to do with the provisional revolutionary government. This case puts the problem of the uprising, and of the setting up of a provisional revolutionary government, somewhat in the background; it modifies this problem, etc. The point is not whether all kinds of combinations are possible, whether there will be victory or defeat, whether events pursue a straight path or circuitous paths; the point is that a Social-Democrat must not confuse the minds of the workers in regard to the true revolutionary path, that he must not, like *Osvobozhdeniye*, describe as a decisive victory that which lacks the *fundamental* condition of victory. We may not even obtain the eight-hour day at one stroke, but only after following a long circuitous path; but what would you say of a man who describes such impotence, such weakness of the proletariat as *prevents* it from counteracting the delays, haggling, treachery and reaction, as a victory for the workers? It is possible that the Russian revolution will result in a "constitutional abortion," as was once stated in *Vperyod*,<sup>1</sup> but can this justify a Social-Democrat.

"a) While exposing the reactionary purpose of the government's concessions, to emphasise by propaganda and agitation, firstly, the fact that these concessions were forced on the government and, secondly, that it is absolutely impossible for the autocracy to grant reforms satisfactory to the proletariat;

"b) While taking advantage of the election campaign, to explain to the workers the real meaning of the government's measures and to prove the necessity for the proletariat having the constituent assembly convened in a revolutionary way on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot;

"c) To organise the proletariat for the immediate achievement by revolutionary means of the eight-hour day and of other urgent demands of the working class;

"d) To organise armed resistance to the actions of the Black Hundreds and generally of all reactionary elements led by the government." (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—Ed.)

<sup>1</sup> The Geneva newspaper *Vperyod* began to appear in January 1905 as the organ of the Bolshevik section of the Party. Eighteen issues appeared from January to May. After May, by virtue of the decision of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, *Proletary* was issued in place of *Vperyod* as the central organ of the R.S.D.L.P. (This Congress took place in London in May; the Mensheviks did not appear, and organised their own "Conference" in Geneva.) (Author's note to the 1908 edition.—Ed.)

on the eve of a decisive struggle, in calling this abortion a "decisive victory over tsarism"? If it comes to the worst, we may not get a republic, and even the constitution we get will be a mere phantom, "*à la* Shipov," \* but would it be pardonable for a Social-Democrat to gloss over our republican slogan?

It is true, the new *Iskra*-ists have not yet gone so far as to gloss it over. But the resolution in which they have simply *forgotten* to mention a word about the republic illustrates very clearly to what extent they have become divorced from the revolutionary spirit, to what extent lifeless moralising has blinded them to the burning problems of the moment! It is incredible, but it is a fact. All the slogans of Social-Democracy have been endorsed, repeated, explained and worked out in detail in the various resolutions of the Conference, even the election of shop stewards and delegates by the workers has not been forgotten—but in a resolution on the provisional revolutionary government they forgot to mention the republic. To talk of a "victory" of the people's uprising, of the establishment of a provisional government, and not to indicate what relation these "steps" and acts have to winning the republic—means writing a resolution not for the guidance of the proletarian struggle, but for the purpose of hobbling along at the tail of the proletarian movement.

To sum up: the first part of the resolution 1) has not at all explained the significance of the provisional revolutionary government from the standpoint of the struggle for a republic and the guarantees for a genuinely national and genuinely constituent assembly; 2) has simply confused the democratic consciousness of the proletariat by placing a state of affairs in which the fundamental condition of a real victory is lacking on a par with the decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism.

#### IV. THE LIQUIDATION OF THE MONARCHIST SYSTEM AND THE REPUBLIC

LET us pass on to the next part of the resolution:

"In either case such victory will inaugurate a new phase in the revolutionary epoch.

"The task, which is spontaneously set before this new phase by the objective conditions of social development, is the final liquidation of the whole estate-monarchist regime, to be carried out in the process of a mutual struggle among the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society for the realisation of their social interests and for the immediate possession of power.

"Therefore, the provisional government that would undertake to carry out the tasks of this revolution, which by its historical nature is a bourgeois revolution, would not only have to push revolutionary development further forward in regulating the mutual struggle of the conflicting classes of the emancipated nation, but also to fight against those of its factors, which threaten the foundations of the capitalist regime."

This part represents an independent section of the resolution. Let us examine it. The root idea underlying the above-quoted arguments coincides with that stated in the third clause of the Congress resolution. But in comparing these parts of the two resolutions, the following radical difference becomes at once apparent. The Congress resolution describes the social and economic basis of the revolution in a few words, concentrates its attention on the sharply defined struggle of classes for definite gains and places the militant tasks of the proletariat in the forefront. The resolution of the Conference describes the social and economic basis of the revolution in a long-winded, nebulous and involved way, very vaguely mentions the struggle for definite gains, and leaves the militant tasks of the proletariat altogether in the shade. The resolution of the Conference speaks of the liquidation of the old regime in the process of a mutual struggle among the various elements of society. The Congress resolution states that we, the party of the proletariat,

must carry out this liquidation, that real liquidation can be brought about only by the establishment of a democratic republic, that we must win such a republic, that we will fight for it and for complete liberty, not only against the autocracy, but also against the bourgeoisie, if it attempts (as it is bound to do) to filch our gains from us. The Congress resolution calls on a definite class to wage a struggle for a precisely defined, immediate aim. The resolution of the Conference, however, discourses on the mutual struggle of various forces. One resolution expresses the psychology of active struggle, the other expresses that of passive contemplation; one breathes the call for lively activity, the other is full of lifeless moralising. Both resolutions state that the present revolution is only our first step, which will be followed by another; but one resolution draws therefrom the conclusion that we must for that reason get over this first step as quickly as possible, leave it behind, win the republic, mercilessly crush counter-revolution and prepare the ground for the second step. The other resolution, on the other hand, oozes out, so to speak, in verbose descriptions of this first step and (excuse the vulgar expression) chews the cud over it. The resolution of the Congress takes the old and the eternally new ideas of Marxism (about the bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution) as a preface or as a first premise for the progressive tasks of the progressive class, which is fighting both for the democratic and for the socialist revolution. The resolution of the Conference does not get beyond the preface, chewing it over and over again and trying to be clever about it.

This is precisely the distinction which for a long time past has been dividing the Russian Marxists into two wings: the moralising and the fighting wings in the old days of "legal Marxism," and the economic and political wings in the epoch of the early mass movement. From the correct premise of Marxism concerning the deep economic roots of the class struggle generally and of the political struggle in particular, the Economists drew the peculiar conclusion that we must turn our backs on the political struggle and retard its development, narrow its

scope, and diminish its tasks. The political wing, on the contrary, drew a different conclusion from these very premises, namely, that the deeper the roots of our struggle are now, the wider, the bolder, the more resolutely and with greater initiative must we wage this struggle. We are now engaged in the same old controversy, but under different circumstances and in a modified form. From the premises that the democratic revolution is not a socialist one, that it is not "of interest" to the propertyless only, that it is deep-rooted in the inexorable needs and requirements of the *whole* of bourgeois society—from these premises we draw the conclusion that all the more boldly therefore must the advanced class present its democratic tasks, and formulate them in the sharpest and fullest manner, put forward the direct slogan of the republic, advocate the need for the provisional revolutionary government and the necessity of ruthlessly crushing the counter-revolution. Our opponents, the new *Iskra*-ists, however, draw from the very same premises the conclusion that democratic principles should not be carried to their logical conclusion, that the slogan of republic may be omitted from the practical slogans, that we can refrain from advocating the need for a provisional revolutionary government, that a decision to convene the constituent assembly can also be called a decisive victory, that we need not advance the task of fighting the counter-revolution as our active task, but that we may submerge it instead in a nebulous (and as we shall presently see, wrongly formulated) reference to the "process of mutual struggle." This is not the language of political leaders, but of fossilised officials!

And the more closely we examine the various formulæ in the new *Iskra*-ist resolution, the clearer we perceive its aforementioned basic features. It speaks, for instance, of the "process of mutual struggle among the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society." Bearing in mind the subject with which this resolution deals (the provisional revolutionary government) we are rather surprised and ask: if we are talking about the process of mutual struggle, how can we keep silent about the elements which are politically *subjugating* bourgeois

society? Do the "Conference-ists" really imagine that because they have assumed that the revolution will be victorious these elements have already disappeared? Such an idea would be absurd generally, and would express the greatest political naiveté and political short-sightedness in particular. After the victory of the revolution over the counter-revolution, the latter will not disappear; on the contrary, it will inevitably start a fresh, a still more desperate struggle. As the purpose of our resolution was to analyse the tasks that will confront us after the victory of the revolution, we had to devote considerable attention to the tasks of repelling counter-revolutionary attacks (as is done in the resolution of the Congress), not to submerge these immediate current and vital political tasks of a fighting party in general discussions on what will happen *after* the present revolutionary epoch, what will happen when "a politically *emancipated* society" will have come into existence. Just as the Economists, by repeating the truism that politics are subordinated to economics, covered up their failure to understand current political tasks, so the new *Iskra*-ists, by repeating the truism that struggles will take place in politically *emancipated* society, cover up their failure to understand the current revolutionary tasks of the political *emancipation* of this society.

Take the expression "the final liquidation of the whole estate-monarchist regime." In plain language, the final liquidation of the monarchist regime means the establishment of a democratic republic. But good Martynov and his admirers think that this expression is far too simple and clear. They must necessarily "deepen" it and say something "cleverer." As a result, we get ridiculous and vain efforts to appear profound, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, we get a description instead of a slogan, a sort of melancholy looking backward instead of a stirring appeal to march forward. We get the impression, not of virile people, eager to fight for a republic here and now, but of fossilised mummies who *sub specie æternitatis*<sup>1</sup> consider the question from the standpoint of *plusquamperfectum*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> From the standpoint of eternity.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> The remote past.—*Ed.*

Let us proceed further:

“. . . the provisional government . . . would undertake to carry out the tasks . . . of the bourgeois revolution. . . .”

Here it transpires at once that our “Conference-ists” have overlooked a concrete question which now confronts the political leaders of the proletariat. The concrete question of the provisional revolutionary government faded from their field of vision before the question of the future series of governments which will accomplish the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in general. If you want to consider the question “from the historical standpoint,” the example of any European country will show you that it was precisely a series of governments, not by any means “provisional,” that carried out the historical tasks of the bourgeois revolution, that even the governments which defeated the revolution were none the less forced to carry out the historical tasks of that defeated revolution.\* But that which is called “provisional revolutionary government” is something altogether different from what you are referring to: that is the name given to the government of the revolutionary epoch, which immediately takes the place of the overthrown government and which relies on the support of the people in revolt, and not on representative institutions emanating from the people. The provisional revolutionary government is the organ of the struggle for the immediate victory of the revolution, for the immediate repulse of counter-revolutionary attempts, and is not an organ which carries out the historical tasks of a bourgeois revolution in general. Well, gentlemen, let us leave it to the future historians on the staff of a future *Russkaya Starina*<sup>1</sup> to determine precisely which tasks of the bourgeois revolution you and we, or this or that government, have achieved—there will be time enough to do that in thirty years; now we must put forward slogans and give practical instructions for the struggle for a republic, and for rousing the proletariat to take a most active part in this struggle.

For these reasons, the last postulates in the part of the resolutions which we have quoted above are unsatisfactory. The

<sup>1</sup> *Russkaya Starina* (*Russian Antiquary*), a historical monthly journal published in St. Petersburg between 1870 and 1918.—Ed. Eng. ed.

expression that the provisional government would have to "regulate" the mutual struggle among the conflicting classes is exceedingly bad, or at any rate awkwardly put; Marxists should not use such liberal *Osvobozhdeniye* formulæ, which lead one to believe that we can conceive of governments which, instead of serving as organs of the class struggle, serve as its "regulators." . . . The government would "have not only to push revolutionary development further forward . . . but also to fight against those of its factors, which threaten the foundations of the capitalist regime." Such a "factor" is precisely the very same proletariat in whose name the resolution is speaking. Instead of indicating precisely how the proletariat at the given moment should "push revolutionary development further forward" (push it further than the constitutional bourgeois would be prepared to go), instead of advising definite preparations for a struggle against the bourgeoisie when the latter turns against the gains of the revolution—instead of all this, we are offered a general description of the process, which does not say a word about the concrete tasks of *our* activity. The new *Iskra*-ist method of exposition reminds one of Marx's reference (in his famous "theses" on Feuerbach) to the old materialism, which was alien to the ideas of dialectics. Marx said that the philosophers only *interpreted* the world in various ways, our task is to *change* it. The new *Iskra*-ists also can describe and explain the process of struggle which is taking place before their eyes tolerably well, but they are altogether incapable of giving a correct slogan for this struggle. They march well but lead badly, and they degrade the materialist conception of history by ignoring the active, leading and guiding part in history which can and must be played by parties which understand the material prerequisites of a revolution and which have placed themselves at the head of the advanced classes.

## V. HOW SHOULD "THE REVOLUTION BE PUSHED FURTHER FORWARD"?

WE now quote the next section of the resolution:

"Under such conditions, Social-Democracy must, during the whole course of the revolution, strive to maintain a position which would best of all secure for it the possibility of pushing the revolution forward, and which would not tie the hands of Social-Democracy in its struggle against the inconsistent and self-seeking policy of the bourgeois parties and preserve it from being merged with bourgeois democracy.

"Therefore, Social-Democracy must not strive to seize or share power in the provisional government, but must remain the party of the extreme revolutionary opposition."

The advice to take up a position which best secures the possibility of pushing the revolution further forward is very much to our taste. We only wish that in addition to good advice they had given a direct indication as to how Social-Democracy should push the revolution further forward now, in the present political situation, in a period of discussions, assumptions, talk and schemes for convening the people's representatives. Can the revolution be pushed further forward now by one who fails to understand the danger of the *Osvobozhdeniye* theory of "compromise" between the people and the tsar, who calls a mere "decision" to convene a constituent assembly a victory, who does not make it his task to carry on active propaganda in favour of a provisional revolutionary government, or who leaves in the shade the slogan of a democratic republic? Such people actually *push the revolution backward*, because as far as *practical politics* are concerned, they have remained on the level of the position taken by *Osvobozhdeniye*. What is the use of recognising a programme which demands that the autocracy be replaced by a republic, when in the tactical resolution, which defines the real and immediate tasks of the Party at a revolutionary moment, the slogan of struggle for a republic is missing? It is precisely

the *Osvobozhdeniye* position, the position of the constitutional bourgeoisie, that is now characterised by the fact that they regard the decision to convene a national constituent assembly as a decisive victory and prudently keep silent about a provisional revolutionary government and the republic! In order to push the revolution *further forward*, i.e., further than it is being pushed by the monarchist bourgeoisie, it is necessary actively to advance, emphasise and push to the forefront the slogans which *eliminate* the "inconsistencies" of bourgeois democracy. At the present time there are *only two* such slogans: 1) the provisional revolutionary government, and 2) the republic, for the slogan of a national constituent assembly has been *accepted* by the monarchist bourgeoisie (see the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) and accepted precisely for the purpose of cheating the revolution, of preventing the complete victory of the revolution, and for the purpose of enabling the big bourgeoisie to strike a huckster's bargain with tsarism. And now we see that of the two slogans which alone are capable of pushing the revolution further forward, the Conference completely forgot the slogan of a republic, and put the slogan of a provisional revolutionary government on a par with the *Osvobozhdeniye* slogan of a national constituent assembly, and called both "a decisive victory of the revolution"!!!

Yes, such is the undoubted fact, which, we are sure, will serve as a landmark for the future historian of Russian Social-Democracy. The Conference of Social-Democrats held in May 1905 passed a resolution which contains fine words about the necessity of pushing forward the democratic revolution and which in fact pushes it backward, which in fact does not go beyond the democratic slogans of the monarchist bourgeoisie.

The new *Iskra*-ists are wont to reproach us for our alleged ignoring of the danger of the proletariat merging with bourgeois democracy.\* We should like to see anyone venture to prove such an assertion on the basis of the text of the resolutions passed by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Our reply to our opponents is: Social-Democracy, acting on the basis of bourgeois society, cannot take part in

politics, unless in this or that instance it marches *side by side* with bourgeois democracy. But the difference between us in this respect is that we march side by side with the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie without merging with it, whereas you march side by side with the *liberal and monarchist bourgeoisie*, also without merging with it. *That is how the matter stands.*

The tactical slogans you advanced in the name of the Conference *coincide* with the slogans of the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party, *i.e.*, the *party of the monarchist bourgeoisie*, and you do not even notice or understand this coincidence, and thus drag at the tail of the *Osvobozhdeniye-ists*.

The tactical slogans we advanced in the name of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party coincide with the slogans of the democratic-revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in Russia have not yet combined into a big people's party.<sup>1</sup>

However, only one utterly ignorant of what is now taking place in Russia can doubt the existence of the elements of such a party. We propose to lead (in the event of the great Russian revolution proceeding successfully), not only the proletariat which will be organised by the Social-Democratic Party, but also the petty bourgeoisie which is capable of marching side by side with us.

The Conference in its resolution unconsciously *stoops* to the level of the liberal and monarchist bourgeoisie. The Party Congress in its resolution consciously *raises* to its own level those elements of revolutionary democracy which are capable of waging a struggle, and will not act as brokers.

Such elements are to be found most among the peasants. When we classify the big social groups according to their political tendencies we can, without danger of serious error, identify revolutionary and republican democracy with the masses of the peasants in the same way and with the same reserva-

<sup>1</sup> The Socialist-Revolutionaries are more in the nature of a terrorist group of intellectuals than the embryo of such a party, although objectively, the activities of that group reduce themselves precisely to fulfilling the tasks of the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie.

tions and conditions, of course, as we can identify the working class with Social-Democracy. In other words, we may formulate our conclusions also in the following expressions: the Conference in its *national*<sup>1</sup> *political* slogans in a revolutionary situation unconsciously *stoops to the level of the masses of the landlords*. The Party Congress in its national political slogans *raises the peasant masses to the revolutionary level*. To anyone who may accuse us of betraying partiality for paradoxes for drawing such a conclusion we make the following challenge: let him refute the postulate that if we are not strong enough to bring the revolution to a successful conclusion, if the revolution results in a "decisive victory" in the *Osvobozhdeniye* sense, i.e., in the form of a representative assembly convened by the tsar, which could be called a constituent assembly only as a joke—then this will be a revolution with a preponderance of the *landlord and big bourgeois* element. On the other hand, if we are destined to live through a really great revolution, if history prevents "an abortion" this time, if we are strong enough to carry the revolution to the end, to final victory, not in the *Osvobozhdeniye* or the new *Iskra* sense of the word, then it will be a revolution with a predominance of the peasant and proletarian elements.

Perhaps some will regard the admission of the possibility of such a predominance as the renunciation of the view regarding the bourgeois character of the coming revolution. This is quite possible considering the way this concept is misused in *Iskra*. Therefore it will be useful to deal with this point.

<sup>1</sup> We are not referring here to the special peasant slogans which were dealt with in special resolutions.\*

## VI. WHENCE THE DANGER OF THE PROLETARIAT HAVING ITS HANDS TIED IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE INCONSISTENT BOURGEOISIE?

MARXISTS are absolutely convinced of the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution. What does this mean? It means that the democratic changes in the political regime and the social and economic changes which have become necessary for Russia do not in themselves imply the undermining of capitalism, the undermining of bourgeois domination; on the contrary, they will, for the first time, properly clear the ground for a wide and rapid European, and not Asiatic, development of capitalism, they will, for the first time, make it possible for the bourgeoisie to rule as a class. The Socialist-Revolutionaries cannot grasp this idea, for they are ignorant of the rudiments of the laws of development of commodity and capitalist production; they fail to see that even the complete success of a peasants' uprising, even the redistribution of the whole of the land for the benefit of the peasants according to their desires ("the Black Redistribution"<sup>1</sup> or something of that kind), will not destroy capitalism, but on the contrary will give an impetus to its development and will hasten the class disintegration of the peasantry itself. The failure to grasp this truth makes the Socialist-Revolutionaries unconscious ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie. It is extremely important for Social-Democracy, both from the theoretical and the practical-political standpoint, to insist on this truth, for from it logically arises the necessity for the complete class independence of the party of the proletariat in the present "general democratic" movement.

But it does not at all follow from this that the *democratic*

<sup>1</sup> Black Redistribution—the division of the whole of the land among the peasants, the traditional demand of the peasants.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

revolution (bourgeois in its social and economic content) is not of *enormous* interest for the proletariat. It does not at all follow that the democratic revolution could not take place in a form advantageous mainly to the big capitalist, the financial magnate, the "enlightened" landlord, and in a form advantageous to the peasant and to the worker.

The new *Iskra*-ists are radically wrong in their interpretation of the sense and significance of the concept, bourgeois revolution. Their arguments constantly reveal the underlying idea that the bourgeois revolution is a revolution which can only be of advantage to the bourgeoisie. And yet nothing is further removed from the truth. The bourgeois revolution is a revolution which does not go beyond the limits of the bourgeois, *i.e.*, capitalist, social and economic system. The bourgeois revolution expresses the needs of capitalist development, and not only does it not destroy the foundations of capitalism, but, on the contrary, it widens and deepens them. This revolution therefore expresses the interests not only of the working class, but also the interests of the whole of the bourgeoisie. Since, under capitalism, the domination of the bourgeoisie over the working class is inevitable, we are entitled to say that the bourgeois revolution expresses not so much the interests of the proletariat as those of the bourgeoisie. But the idea that the bourgeois revolution does not express the interests of the proletariat is altogether absurd. This absurd idea reduces itself either to the old-fashioned Narodnik theory that the bourgeois revolution runs counter to the interests of the proletariat and that, therefore, bourgeois political liberty is of no use to us; or to anarchism, which rejects all participation of the proletariat in bourgeois politics, in the bourgeois revolution and in bourgeois parliamentarism. Theoretically, this idea ignores the elementary postulates of Marxism concerning the inevitability of capitalist development on the basis of commodity production. Marxism teaches that at a certain stage of its development a society that is based on commodity production, and having commercial intercourse with civilised capitalist nations, inevitably takes the road of capitalism itself. Marxism has irrevocably broken with all the non-

sense talked by the Narodniki and the anarchists about Russia, for instance, being able to avoid capitalist development, jump out of capitalism, or skip over it, by some means other than the class struggle on the basis and within the limits of capitalism.

All these principles of Marxism have been proved and explained in minute detail in general and with regard to Russia in particular. It follows from these principles that the idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything save the further development of capitalism is *reactionary*. In countries like Russia, the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from the lack of capitalist development. The working class is therefore undoubtedly interested in the widest, freest and speediest development of capitalism. The removal of all the remnants of the old order which are hampering the wide, free and speedy development of capitalism is of *absolute advantage* to the working class. The bourgeois revolution is precisely a revolution which most resolutely sweeps away the survivals of the past, the remnants of serfdom (which include not only autocracy but monarchy as well); it is a revolution which most fully guarantees the widest, freest and speediest development of capitalism.

Therefore, the *bourgeois* revolution is in the *highest degree advantageous to the proletariat*. The bourgeois revolution is *absolutely necessary* in the interests of the proletariat. The more complete, determined and consistent the bourgeois revolution is, the more secure will the proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and for socialism become. Such a conclusion may appear new, or strange, or even paradoxical only to those who are ignorant of the rudiments of scientific socialism. And from this conclusion, among other things, follows the postulate that, *in a certain sense*, the bourgeois revolution is more *advantageous* to the proletariat than it is to the bourgeoisie. This postulate is undoubtedly correct in the following sense: it is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to rely on certain remnants of the past as against the proletariat, for instance, on a monarchy, a standing army, etc. It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie

if the bourgeois revolution does not too resolutely sweep away the remnants of the past, but leaves some, *i.e.*, if this revolution is not fully consistent, if it does not proceed to its logical conclusion and if it is not determined and ruthless. Social-Democrats often express this idea somewhat differently by stating that the bourgeoisie betrays itself, that the bourgeoisie betrays the cause of liberty, that the bourgeoisie is incapable of being consistently democratic. It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie if the necessary bourgeois-democratic changes take place more slowly, more gradually, more cautiously, with less determination, by means of reforms and not by means of revolution; if these changes spare the "venerable" institutions of feudalism (such as the monarchy); if these reforms develop as little as possible the revolutionary initiative, the initiative and the energy of the common people, *i.e.*, the peasantry, and especially the workers, for otherwise it will be easier for the workers, as the French say, "to pass the rifle from one shoulder to the other," *i.e.*, to turn the guns which the bourgeois revolution will place in their hands, the liberty which the revolution will bring, the democratic institutions which will spring up on the ground that will be cleared of feudalism, against the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, it is more advantageous for the working class if the necessary bourgeois-democratic changes take place in the form of revolution and not reform; for the latter is the road of delay, procrastination, of painfully slow decomposition of the putrid parts of the national organism. It is the proletariat and the peasantry that suffer first and most of all from this putrefaction. The revolutionary way is one of quick amputation, least painful to the proletariat, the way of direct amputation of the decomposing parts, the way of fewest concessions to and least consideration for the monarchy and the disgusting, vile, contaminating institutions which correspond to it.

So it is not only because of the censorship or through fear that our bourgeois-liberal press deplores the possibility of a revolutionary way, is afraid of revolution, tries to frighten the tsar with the bogey of revolution, is taking steps to avoid rev-

olution, displaying servility and humility for the sake of miserable reforms, as a basis of the reformist way. This standpoint is not only shared by *Russkiye Vyedomosti*, *Syn Otechestva*, *Nasha Zhizn* and *Nashi Dni*,\* but also by the illegal, uncensored *Osvobozhdeniye*. The very position the bourgeoisie as a class occupies in capitalist society inevitably causes it to be inconsistent in the democratic revolution. The very position the proletariat as a class occupies compels it to be consistently democratic. The bourgeoisie looks behind, is afraid of democratic progress which threatens to strengthen the proletariat. The proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains, but by means of democracy it has the whole world to win. Therefore, the more consistent the bourgeois revolution is in its democratic reforms the less will it limit itself to those measures which are advantageous only to the bourgeoisie. The more consistent the bourgeois revolution is, the more does it guarantee the advantages which the proletariat and the peasantry will derive from a democratic revolution.

Marxism teaches the proletarian not to keep aloof from the bourgeois revolution, not to refuse to take part in it, not to allow the leadership of the revolution to be assumed by the bourgeoisie but, on the contrary, to take a most energetic part in it, to fight resolutely for consistent proletarian democracy, to fight to carry the revolution to its completion. We cannot jump out of the bourgeois-democratic boundaries of the Russian revolution, but we can enormously extend those boundaries, and within those boundaries we can and must fight for the interests of the proletariat, for its immediate needs and for the prerequisites for training its forces for the complete victory that is to come. There are different kinds of bourgeois democracy. The Monarchist-Zemstvo member,<sup>1</sup> who advocated an upper cham-

<sup>1</sup> Zemstvo—rural local authorities, set up in the 'sixties after the emancipation of the serfs, and representing exclusively the landowning interests. They appeared at various periods as more or less active though moderate opponents of the autocracy. Most of the leaders of the bourgeois political parties which sprang up after October 1905 emerged from the ranks of the Zemstvo—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

ber,\* who is "haggling" for universal suffrage and who in secret, *sub rosa*, is striking a bargain with tsarism for a restricted constitution, is a bourgeois-democrat. And the peasant who is carrying on an armed struggle against the landlords and the government officials and with a "naive republicanism" proposes to "kick out the tsar"<sup>1</sup> is also a bourgeois-democrat. The bourgeois-democratic regime varies in different countries—in Germany and in England, in Austria and in America or Switzerland. He would be a fine Marxist indeed, who in a democratic revolution failed to see the difference between the degrees of democracy, between the different nature of this or that form of it, and confined himself to "clever" quips about this being "a bourgeois revolution" after all, the fruits of a "bourgeois revolution."

Our new *Iskra*-ists are precisely such wiseacres, proud of their short-sightedness. It is they who confine themselves to disquisitions on the bourgeois character of the revolution, on the questions as to when and where one must be able to draw a distinction between republican-revolutionary and monarchist-liberal bourgeois democracy, not to mention the distinction between inconsistent bourgeois democracy and consistent proletarian democracy. They are satisfied—as if they had really become like the "man in the muffer"<sup>2</sup>—to converse dolefully about the "process of mutual struggle of the conflicting classes," when what is needed is to give a *democratic lead* in a real revolution, to emphasise the *progressive democratic* slogans as distinguished from the treacherous slogans of Messrs. Struve and Co., to state straightforwardly and trenchantly the immediate tasks of the actual revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the peasantry, as distinguished from the liberal broker tactics of the landlords and manufacturers. At the present time the crux of the matter lies in the following, which you, gentlemen, have missed, *viz.*, whether our revolution will result in a real, great victory, or in a miserable bargain, whether it will go as far as the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and

<sup>1</sup> See *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 71, page 337, footnote 2.\*\*—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> See note to page 243.—*Ed.*

the peasantry, or whether it will exhaust itself in a liberal constitution "à la Shipov."<sup>1</sup>

It might appear at first sight that by raising this question we are deviating entirely from our theme. But this may appear so only at first sight. As a matter of fact it is precisely this question that contains the roots of the difference in principle which has already become marked between the Social-Democratic tactics of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the tactics inaugurated by the Conference of the new *Iskra*-ists. The latter have now taken three instead of two steps backward; they have revived the mistakes of Economism in solving problems that are far more complex, more important and more vital to the workers' party, viz., the problem of its tactics in time of revolution. That is why we must bestow all our attention on an analysis of the question we have raised.

The section of the new *Iskra*-ist resolution which we have quoted above gives an indication of the danger of Social-Democracy tying its hands in the struggle against the inconsistent policy of the bourgeoisie, the danger of its becoming merged with bourgeois democracy. The consciousness of this danger runs like a thread throughout the whole of the specifically new *Iskra* literature, it is the crux of the whole principle at issue in our Party split (since the time squabbles have altogether been eclipsed by the tendencies towards Economism). And without beating about the bush we admit that this danger really exists and that precisely now, when the Russian revolution is in full swing, this danger has become particularly serious. The very urgent and exceedingly responsible task of finding out *from which side* this danger actually threatens is imposed on all of us theoreticians or—as I should prefer to style myself—the publicists of Social-Democracy. For the source of our disagreement is not the dispute as to whether such a danger exists, but the dispute as to whether it is caused by the so-called *khivostism* of the "minority" or the so-called revolutionism of the "majority."

To obviate all misinterpretations and misunderstandings, let

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 62.—Ed.

us first of all remark that the danger which we are referring to lies not in the subjective, but in the objective side of the question, not in the formal position which Social-Democracy will take in the struggle, but in the material issue of the present revolutionary struggle. The question is not whether this or that Social-Democratic group will want to merge with bourgeois democracy or whether they are conscious of the fact that they are about to be merged. Nobody suggests that. We do not suspect any Social-Democrat of harbouring such a desire, and this is not a question of desires. Nor is it a question as to whether this or that Social-Democratic group will preserve its formal identity and independence apart from bourgeois democracy throughout the whole course of the revolution. They may not only proclaim such "independence" but preserve it in form, and yet *it may happen* that their hands will none the less be tied in the struggle against the inconsistency of the bourgeoisie. The final political result of the revolution may be that, in spite of the formal "independence" of Social-Democracy, in spite of its complete organisational independence as a separate party, it will in fact no longer be independent, it will not be able to put the impress of its proletarian independence on the course of events, and will prove so weak that, on the whole and in the last analysis, its "merging" with bourgeois democracy will none the less become an accomplished historical fact.

This is the real danger. Now let us see from which side it is threatening: from the fact that Social-Democracy, as represented by the new *Iskra*, is deviating to the Right, as we believe, or from the fact that Social-Democracy, as represented by the "majority," *Vperyod*, etc., is deviating to the Left, as the new *Iskra*-ists believe.

The solution of this question, as we have stated, is determined by the objective combination of the action of various social forces. The nature of these forces is theoretically determined by the Marxian analysis of Russian life, and is being practically determined now by the open actions of groups and classes in the course of the revolution. And at present the whole theoretical analysis, made by the Marxists long before the pres-

ent epoch, as well as all the practical observations of the development of revolutionary events, shows that from the standpoint of objective conditions a twofold course and outcome of the revolution in Russia is possible. The reform of the economic and political system in Russia in the direction of bourgeois democracy is inevitable and unavoidable. There is no power on earth that can prevent such a change. But from the combination of the action of the existing forces which are bringing about that transformation two alternative results, or two alternative forms of that transformation, may be obtained. Either 1) it will result in a "decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism," or 2) its forces will be inadequate for a decisive victory and the matter will end in a deal between tsarism and the most "inconsistent" and most "selfish" elements of the bourgeoisie. All the infinite varieties of detail and combinations which no one is able to foresee on the whole reduce themselves to either the one or the other of these issues.

Let us now consider these issues, first, from the standpoint of their social significance and, secondly, from the standpoint of the position of Social-Democracy (its "merging" or its "tied hands") resulting from either of these issues.

What is a "decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism"? We have already seen that in using this expression the new *Iskra*-ists do not grasp even its immediate political significance. Still less do they seem to understand the class content of this concept. Surely we Marxists must not allow ourselves to be deluded by *words*, such as "revolution" or "the great Russian revolution," as many revolutionary democrats (of the type of Gapon) do. We must be perfectly clear in our own minds as to what real social forces are opposed to "tsarism" (which is a real force, perfectly intelligible to all) and are capable of gaining a "decisive victory" over it. Such a force cannot be the big bourgeoisie, the landlords, the manufacturers, not "society" which follows the lead of the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists. We see that these do not even want a decisive victory. We know that owing to their class position they are incapable of undertaking a decisive struggle against tsarism: they are too greatly handicapped by the

shackles of private property, capital and land to venture a decisive struggle. Tsarism with its bureaucratic police and military forces is far too necessary for them in their struggle against the proletariat and the peasantry for them to strive for the destruction of tsarism. No, only the *people* can constitute a force capable of gaining "a decisive victory over tsarism," in other words, the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main, big forces and distribute the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie (also falling under the category of "people") between both of the two forces. "A decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism" is *the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry*. Our new *Iskra*-ists will never be able to escape from this conclusion, which *Vperyod* pointed out long ago. There is no one else who is capable of gaining a decisive victory over tsarism.

And such a victory will assume the form of a dictatorship, *i.e.*, it is inevitably bound to rely on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an uprising, and not on institutions established by "lawful" or "peaceful" means. It can only be a dictatorship, for the introduction of the reforms which are urgently and absolutely necessary for the proletariat and the peasantry will call forth the desperate resistance of the landlords, the big bourgeoisie and tsarism. Without a dictatorship it will be impossible to break down that resistance and to repel the counter-revolutionary attempts. But of course it will be a democratic, not a socialist dictatorship. It will not be able (without a series of intermediary stages of revolutionary development) to affect the foundations of capitalism. At best it may bring about a radical redistribution of the land to the advantage of the peasantry, establish consistent and full democracy including the republic, eliminate all the oppressive features of Asiatic bondage, not only of village but also of factory life, lay the foundation for thorough improvement in the position of the workers and raise their standard of living, and last but not least<sup>1</sup>—carry the revolutionary conflagration into Europe. Such a victory will by no means transform our bourgeois revolution into a socialist rev.

<sup>1</sup> In English in the Russian text.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

olution; the democratic revolution will not extend beyond the scope of bourgeois social and economic relationships; nevertheless, the significance of such a victory for the future development of Russia and of the whole world will be immense. Nothing will raise the revolutionary energy of the world proletariat so much, nothing will shorten the path leading to its complete victory to such an extent, as this decisive victory of the revolution that has now started in Russia.

Whether that victory is probable or not is another question. We are not the least inclined to be unreasonably optimistic on this score, we do not for a moment forget the immense difficulties of this task, but since we are out to fight we must wish to win and must be able to indicate the proper path to victory. Tendencies capable of leading to such a victory undoubtedly exist. It is true that our Social-Democratic influence on the masses of the proletariat is as yet exceedingly inadequate; the revolutionary influence on the masses of the peasantry is altogether insignificant; the dispersion, backwardness and ignorance of the proletariat, and especially of the peasantry, are still enormous. But revolution consolidates and educates rapidly. Every step in the development of the revolution rouses the masses and attracts them with uncontrollable force precisely to the side of the revolutionary programme as the only programme that consistently and logically expresses their real, vital interests.

The law of mechanics is that an action is equal to its counter-action. In history also the destructive force of the revolution is to a considerable extent dependent on how strong and protracted was the suppression of the striving for liberty, and how deep the contradiction between the antediluvian "superstructure" and the living forces of the present epoch. And the international political situation is in many respects shaping itself in a way most advantageous for the Russian revolution. The uprising of the workers and peasants has already started; it is sporadic, spontaneous, weak, but it unquestionably and undoubtedly proves the existence of forces capable of waging a decisive struggle and of marching onward to decisive victory.

If these forces prove inadequate, tsarism will have time to

strike a bargain which is being prepared from both sides, both by Messieurs the Bulygins and by Messieurs the Struves. Then the whole thing will end in a curtailed constitution, or even, if things come to the worst, in an apology for a constitution. This will also be a "bourgeois revolution" but it will be an abortive, premature, mongrel revolution. Social-Democracy cherishes no illusions on that score, it knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie, it will not lose heart or abandon its persistent, patient, sustained work of giving a class education to the proletariat even in the most uninspiring, humdrum days of bourgeois-constitutional "Shipov" bliss. Such an outcome would be more or less similar to the outcome of almost all the democratic revolutions in Europe during the nineteenth century, and if it occurred in Russia, our Party development would proceed along the thorny, hard, long, but familiar and beaten track.

The question now arises: in which of the two possible outcomes of the revolution will Social-Democracy find its hands actually tied in the fight against the inconsistent and selfish bourgeoisie, find itself actually "merged," or almost so, with bourgeois democracy?

Once this question is clearly put, there is no difficulty in answering it without a minute's hesitation.

If the bourgeoisie succeeds in frustrating the Russian revolution by coming to terms with tsarism, Social-Democracy will find its hands actually tied in the fight against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; Social-Democracy will find itself merged with "bourgeois democracy" in the sense that the proletariat will not succeed in putting its clear imprint on the revolution and will not succeed in settling accounts with tsarism, in the proletarian or, as Marx used to say, "in the plebeian" way.

If the revolution gains a decisive victory—then we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the Jacobin, or, if you like, in the plebeian way. "The terror in France," wrote Marx in 1848 in the famous *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, "was nothing else than a plebeian method of settling accounts with the enemies of the bourgeoisie: with absolutism, feudalism and philistinism." (See MARX, *Nachlass*, Mehring's edition, Vol. III, p. 211.)\* Have

those who, in a period of democratic revolution, try to frighten the Social-Democratic workers in Russia with the bogey of "Jacobinism" ever stopped to think of the significance of these words of Marx?

The Girondists of contemporary Russian Social-Democracy, *i.e.*, the new *Iskra*-ists, do not merge with the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists but, owing to the nature of their slogans, practically drag at the tail of the latter. And the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists, *i.e.*, the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie, wish to settle accounts with the autocracy gently, as befits reformers, in a yielding manner, so as not to offend the aristocracy, the nobles, the court—cautiously, without breaking anything—kindly and politely, as befits gentlemen in kid gloves, similar to those Mr. Petrunkevich borrowed from a bashi-bazuk to wear at a reception of the "representatives of the people" (?) held by Nicholas the Bloody. (See *Proletary*, No. 5.)

The Jacobins of contemporary Social-Democracy—the Bolsheviks, the *Vperyod*-ists, the Congress-ists, the *Proletary*-ists,\* I don't know what to call them—wish by their slogans to raise the revolutionary and republican petty bourgeoisie, and especially the peasantry, to the level of the consistent democracy of the proletariat, which fully preserves its class individuality. They want the people, *i.e.*, the proletariat and the peasantry, to settle accounts with the monarchy and the aristocracy in the "plebeian way," by ruthlessly destroying the enemies of freedom, suppressing their resistance by force, making no concessions to the accursed heritage of serfdom, of Asiatic barbarism and of the shameful treatment of human beings.

This, of course, does not mean that we necessarily propose to imitate the Jacobins of 1793, to adopt their views, programme, slogans and methods of action. Nothing of the kind. Our programme is not an old one, it is a new one—the minimum programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. We have a new slogan: the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. We shall also have, if we live to see a real victory of the revolution, new methods of action, corresponding to the character and aims of the working class

party that is striving for a complete socialist revolution. We only want to explain by our comparison that the representatives of the advanced class of the twentieth century, the proletariat, *i.e.*, the Social-Democrats, are subdivided into two wings (the opportunist and the revolutionary) similar to those into which the representatives of the advanced class of the eighteenth century, the bourgeoisie, were divided, *i.e.*, the Girondists and the Jacobins.

Only in the event of a complete victory of the democratic revolution will the proletariat have its hands free in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie, only in that case will it not become "merged" with bourgeois democracy, but will leave its proletarian or rather proletarian-peasant imprint on the whole revolution.

In a word, in order that it may not find itself with its hands tied in the struggle against inconsistent bourgeois democracy, the proletariat must be sufficiently class conscious and strong to rouse the peasantry to revolutionary consciousness, to guide its attack, independently to bring about consistent proletarian democracy.

That is how matters stand with regard to the question of the danger of having our hands tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie—the question that was so unsatisfactorily settled by the new *Iskra*-ists. The bourgeoisie will always be inconsistent. There is nothing more naive and futile than attempts to set forth conditions and points,<sup>1</sup> which, if satisfied, would enable us to regard bourgeois democracy as a sincere friend of the people. Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter for democracy. It may become a victorious fighter for democracy only if the peasant masses join it in its revolutionary struggle. If the proletariat is not strong enough for this, the bourgeoisie will put itself at the head of the democratic revolution and will impart to it the character of inconsistency and selfishness. Nothing but the revolutionary-democratic dicta-

<sup>1</sup> As was attempted by Starover in his resolution, annulled by the Third Congress, and as is attempted by the Conference in an equally unfortunate resolution. (The resolution referred to was adopted at the Second Party Congress in 1903.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*)

torship of the proletariat and the peasantry can prevent this from happening.

Thus, we arrive at the undoubted conclusion that it is precisely the new *Iskra*-ist tactics, owing to their objective significance, that are *playing into the hands of bourgeois democracy*. Preaching organisational diffusiveness, going so far as to call for plebiscites, and the principle of compromise, the divorcement of Party literature from the Party, belittling the tasks of armed rebellion, confusing the national political slogans of the revolutionary proletariat with those of the monarchist bourgeoisie, the distortion of the prerequisites for a "decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism"—all this taken together constitutes exactly that policy of *khvostism* in a revolutionary period which baffles the proletariat, disorganises it, confuses its mind and degrades the tactics of Social-Democracy, instead of pointing out the only way to victory and of rallying to the slogan of the proletariat all the revolutionary and republican elements of the people.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The next two chapters, "The Tactics of 'Eliminating the Conservatives from the Government'" and "The Tendencies of *Osvobozhdeniye*, and the New *Iskra*," with a few introductory remarks, are omitted in this volume. They will be found in *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, where this pamphlet is printed in full.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

## IX. WHAT DOES BEING A PARTY OF EXTREME OPPOSITION IN TIME OF REVOLUTION MEAN?

LET us revert to the resolution on the provisional government. We have shown that the tactics of the new *Iskra*-ists do not push the revolution further forward—the aim they set themselves in their resolution—but retard it. We have shown that it is precisely these tactics that *tie the hands* of Social-Democracy in its struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie and do not prevent it from becoming merged with bourgeois democracy. Naturally, the wrong premises of the resolution lead to wrong conclusions: “Therefore Social-Democracy must not strive to seize or share power in the provisional government, but must remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition.” Consider the first half of this conclusion, which is part of a statement of aims. Do the new *Iskra*-ists set a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism as the aim of Social-Democratic activity? They do. They are not able to formulate correctly the conditions for a decisive victory, and they stumble on the *Osvobozhdeniye* formulation, but they do set themselves the above-mentioned aim. Further: do they connect the provisional government with an uprising? Yes, they do so directly, by stating that the provisional government “emerges from a victorious people’s uprising.” Finally, do they set themselves the aim of leading the uprising? Like Mr. Struve, they do not admit that the uprising is necessary and urgent, but unlike him, they say that “Social-Democracy is striving to *subordinate* it” (the uprising) “to its influence and *leadership* and to use it in the interests of the working class.”

Now, isn’t this logical? We set ourselves the *aim of subordinating* the uprising of the proletarian as well as *non-proletarian* masses to our influence, our leadership, and to use it in our interests. Accordingly, we set ourselves the aim of leading,

in the course of the proletarian uprising, the revolutionary bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie (the "non-proletarian groups") i.e., of "*sharing*" the leadership of the uprising between Social-Democracy and the revolutionary bourgeoisie. We set ourselves the aim of securing *victory* for the uprising, which should lead to the establishment of a provisional government ("which emerges from a victorious people's uprising"). *Therefore . . .* therefore we must not aim at seizing or sharing power in the provisional revolutionary government!!

Our friends cannot think logically even if they try. They vacillate between the standpoint of Mr. Struve, who dissociates himself from an uprising, and the standpoint of revolutionary Social-Democracy, which calls upon us to undertake this urgent task. They vacillate between anarchism, which on principle condemns participation in a provisional revolutionary government as treachery to the proletariat, and Marxism, which demands such participation on condition that Social-Democracy is the leading influence in the uprising. They have no independent position: neither that of Mr. Struve, who wants to come to terms with tsarism and therefore is compelled to resort to evasions and subterfuges on the question of the uprising, nor that of the anarchists, who condemn all actions from "above" and all participation in a bourgeois revolution. The new *Iskra*-ists confuse striking a bargain with tsarism with securing a victory over tsarism. They want to take part in the bourgeois revolution. They have advanced somewhat, compared with Martynov's *Two Dictatorships*.\* They even consent to lead the uprising of the people—in order to renounce that leadership immediately after victory is won (or, perhaps, immediately before the victory?). i.e., in order to renounce the fruits of victory and to turn them over entirely to the bourgeoisie. This is what they call "use the uprising in the interests of the working class. . . ."

There is no need to dwell on this muddle any longer. It will be more useful to examine how this muddle *originated* in the formula which reads: "to remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

This is one of the familiar postulates of international revo-

lutionary Social-Democracy. It is a perfectly correct postulate. It has become a truism for all opponents of revisionism or opportunism in parliamentary countries. It has become a recognised weapon in the legitimate and necessary resistance to "parliamentary cretinism," Millerandism, Bernsteinism and the Italian reformism of the Turatti brand. Our good new *Iskra*-ists have learned this excellent postulate by heart and are zealously applying it . . . *quite inappropriately*. The categories of parliamentary struggle are introduced into resolutions written for conditions in which no parliament exists. The concept "opposition," which became the reflection and the expression of a political situation in which no one seriously speaks of an *uprising*, is senselessly transplanted to a situation in which an uprising has actually *begun* and in which all the supporters of the revolution are talking and thinking about the leadership in such an uprising. The desire to "*stick*" to old methods, *i.e.*, action only "from below," is expressed with pomp and circumstance *precisely at a time* when the revolution has confronted us with the necessity, in the event of the uprising being victorious, of acting *from above*.

Well, our new *Iskra*-ists are decidedly out of luck! Even when they formulate a correct Social-Democratic postulate they don't know how to apply it correctly. They failed to take into consideration the fact that in the period when the revolution is beginning, when parliaments do not exist, when there is civil war and when outbursts of rebellion take place, the concepts and terms of the parliamentary struggle are changed and transformed into their opposites. They failed to take into consideration the fact that, under the circumstances referred to, amendments are moved by way of street demonstrations, interpellations are introduced in the form of aggressive action by armed citizens, opposition to the government is expressed by violently overthrowing the government.

Like the famous hero of our folklore<sup>1</sup> who always gave good advice just when it was most out of place, our admirers of Martynov repeat the lessons of peaceful parliamentarism just at

<sup>1</sup> Ivan the fool.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the moment when, as they themselves admit, direct military operations are commencing. Anything funnier than this pompous emphasis of the slogan "extreme opposition" in a resolution which begins by drawing attention to the "decisive victory of the revolution" and to the "people's uprising" cannot be imagined! Just imagine, gentlemen, what representing the "extreme opposition" means in the epoch of rebellion. Does it mean exposing the government or deposing it? Does it mean voting against the government or defeating its armed forces in open battle? Does it mean refusing supplies to the Treasury or does it mean the revolutionary seizure of the Treasury in order to apply it to the needs of the uprising, the arming of workers and peasants, the convocation of the constituent assembly? Are you not beginning to understand, gentlemen, that the term "extreme opposition" expresses only negative actions—to expose, to vote against, to refuse? Why? Because this term applies only to parliamentary struggle and to a period when no one makes "decisive victory" the immediate object of the struggle. Are you not beginning to understand that in this respect things change radically from the moment the politically oppressed people opens its determined attack along the whole front to win victory in desperate battle?

The workers ask us: should they energetically set to work to start the rebellion? What is to be done to make the incipient uprising victorious? How to make use of victory? What programme can and should be applied when victory is achieved? The new *Iskra*-ists who are making Marxism more profound answer: you must remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition. . . . Well, were we not right in calling these knights past masters in philistinism?

## X. THE "REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNES" AND THE REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

THE new *Iskra*-ist Conference did not stick to the anarchist position which the new *Iskra* has talked itself into (only from "below," not "from below and from above"). The absurdity of conceiving of rebellion and not conceiving the possibility of victory and participation in the provisional revolutionary government was too strikingly obvious. The resolution therefore introduced certain reservations and restrictions into the solution of the question proposed by Martynov and Martov. Let us consider these reservations as stated in the following section of the resolution:

"These tactics ["to remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition"] do not, of course, in any way exclude the expediency of a partial, episodic seizure of power and the formation of revolutionary communes in this or that city, in this or that district, exclusively for the purpose of helping to extend the uprising and to disrupt the government."

That being the case, it means that in principle they conceive of action, not only from below, but also from above. It means the renunciation of the postulate laid down in L. Martov's well-known article in *Iskra* (No. 93), and the endorsement of *Vperyod* tactics, i.e., not only "from below," but also "from above."

Further, the seizure of power (even if it is partial or episodic, etc.) obviously presupposes the participation not only of Social-Democracy and the proletariat alone. This logically follows from the fact that it is not only the proletariat that is interested, and is taking part in, the democratic revolution. This logically follows from the fact that the uprising is a "people's uprising," as is stated in the beginning of the reso-

lution we are discussing, that "non-proletarian groups" (the words used in the Conference resolution on the uprising), i.e., the bourgeoisie, also take part in it. Hence, the principle that socialist participation in the provisional revolutionary government jointly with the petty bourgeoisie is treachery to the working class *was thrown overboard by the Conference, i.e., the very thing Vperyod was trying for.* "Treachery" does not cease to be treachery because the action by which it is committed is partial, episodic, local, etc. Hence, the principle that participation in the provisional revolutionary government should be placed on a par with vulgar Jaurèsism *was thrown overboard by the Conference, as Vperyod insisted.* A government does not cease to be a government because its power extends to a single city and not to many cities, to a single region and not to many regions; nor is the fact that it is a government determined by what it is called. Thus, the Conference rejected the principles that the new *Iskra* tried to formulate on this question.

Let us now see whether the restrictions imposed by the Conference on the formation of revolutionary governments, which in principle is now accepted, and on participation in such governments, are reasonable. What the difference is between the attributes "episodic" and "provisional" we do not know. We are afraid that this foreign and "new" word is intended to cover up a lack of clear thinking. It *appears* more "profound"; in fact it is only more foggy and confused. What is the difference between the "expediency" of a partial "seizure of power" in a city or district, and participation in a provisional revolutionary government in a whole country? Do not "cities" include one like St. Petersburg, where the memorable events of January 22 (9) took place? Do not regions include the Caucasus, which is bigger than many a state? Will not the problems (which at one time troubled the new *Iskra*) of what to do with prisons, the police, the Treasury, etc., confront us the moment we "seize power" in a single city, let alone in a region? No one will deny, of course, that if we lack sufficient forces, if the success of the uprising is incomplete, or if the victory is indecisive, city and other provisional revolutionary governments

may arise. But what has all this to do with it, gentlemen? Did you yourselves not refer in the beginning of the resolution to the "decisive victory of the revolution," to "a victorious uprising of the people"? Since when have the Social-Democrats assumed the task of the anarchists: to break up the attention and the aims of the proletariat, to direct its attention to the "partial" instead of to the general, single, whole and complete? While presupposing the "seizure of power" in a single city, you yourselves speak of "extending the uprising"—to another city, may we venture to think? to all cities, may we dare to hope? Your conclusions, gentlemen, are as flimsy and casual, as self-contradictory and intricate as your premises. The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party gave an exhaustive and clear answer to the general question of the provisional revolutionary government. This answer also embraces all the partial provisional governments. The answer given by the Conference, however, by artificially and arbitrarily singling out a *part* of the question, only *dodges* (but unsuccessfully) the question as a whole and creates confusion.

What does the term "revolutionary communes" mean? Does it differ from the term "provisional revolutionary government," and if so, in what respect? The Conference-ists themselves do not know. Confusion of revolutionary thought leads them, as very often happens, to a *revolutionary phrase*. Yes, words like "revolutionary commune" in a resolution passed by representatives of Social-Democracy represent a revolutionary phrase and nothing more. Marx more than once condemned such phrasemongering when fascinating terms of the *obsolete past* were used to hide the tasks of the future. In such cases, a fascinating term that has played its part in history is transformed into meaningless, harmful tinsel, a child's rattle. We must make it unequivocally clear to the workers and to the whole of the people *why* we want to set up a provisional revolutionary government, and precisely *what reforms* we shall carry out if we exercise decisive influence on the government on the morrow of the victorious people's uprising which has already commenced. Such are the questions that confront political leaders.

The Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party gave perfectly clear answers to these questions and drew up a complete programme of these reforms: the minimum programme of our Party. The word "commune" is not an answer at all; like the distant echo of a sonorous phrase, it only confuses people. The more we cherish the memory of the Paris Commune of 1871, for instance, the less permissible is it to dismiss it with a mere reference without analysing its mistakes and the special conditions attending it. To do so would be to follow the absurd example set by the Blanquists, who were ridiculed by Engels, those Blanquists who in their "manifesto" in 1874, worshipped every action of the Commune.\* What reply will a "Conference-ist" give to a worker who asks him what *this* "revolutionary commune" mentioned in the resolution means? He will only be able to tell him that this was the name given to a workers' government that once existed, which was unable and could not then distinguish between the elements of a democratic revolution and those of a socialist revolution, which confused the tasks of the struggle for a republic with those of the struggle for socialism, which could not carry out the task of launching an energetic military offensive against Versailles, which made a mistake in not seizing the Bank of France, etc. In short, whether in your answer you refer to the Paris Commune or to some other commune, your answer will be: that was a government *such as ours should not be*. A fine answer, isn't it?\*\*\* Is not the evasion of the practical programme and inappropriately beginning to give a lesson in history in a resolution evidence of the moralising of a bookworm and the helplessness of a revolutionary? Does this not reveal the very mistake which they unsuccessfully tried to accuse us of having committed, *i.e.*, of having confused democratic revolution with socialist revolution, the difference between which none of the "communes" could see?

The aim of the provisional government (so inappropriately called "commune") is declared to be "exclusively" to extend the uprising and to disrupt the government. Literally, the word "exclusively" eliminates all the other tasks; it is an echo of the absurd theory of "only from below." The elimination of

the other tasks is another instance of shortsightedness and thoughtlessness. The "revolutionary commune," i.e., the revolutionary government, even if only in a single city, will inevitably have to administer (even if provisionally, "partially, episodically") all the affairs of state, and it is the height of imprudence to hide one's head under one's wing, in this respect. This government will have to enact an eight-hour day, to establish workers' factory inspection, to provide free and universal education, to introduce the election of judges, to set up peasant committees, etc.; in a word, it will have to carry out a number of reforms. To define these reforms as "helping to extend the uprising" means juggling with words and deliberately causing greater confusion in a matter in which absolute clarity is necessary.

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The concluding part of the new *Iskra* resolution does not provide any new material for criticising the trend of principles of "Economism" which has revived in our Party, but it illustrates what has been said above from a somewhat different angle.

Here is that part:

"Only in one event should Social-Democracy, on its own initiative, direct its efforts towards seizing power and retaining it as long as possible, namely, in the event of the revolution spreading to the advanced countries of Western Europe where conditions for the achievement of socialism have already reached a certain [?] state of maturity. In that event, the restricted historical scope of the Russian revolution can be considerably extended and the possibility of striking the path of socialist reforms will arise.

"By framing its tactics in the expectation that, during the whole period of the revolution, the Social-Democratic Party will retain the position of extreme revolutionary opposition towards all the governments that succeed each other in the course of the revolution, Social-Democracy will best be able to prepare itself for using political power if it falls [??] into its hands."

The basic idea expressed here is the same as that repeatedly formulated by *Vperyod*, when it stated that we must not be afraid (as is Martynov) of a complete victory for Social-Democracy in a democratic revolution, i.e., the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. for such:

a victory will enable us to rouse Europe, and the socialist proletariat of Europe will then throw off the yoke of the bourgeoisie and in its turn help us to carry out a socialist revolution. But see how this idea is spoiled in the new *Iskra*-ist rendering of it. We shall not dwell on particulars—on the absurd assumption that power could “fall” into the hands of an intelligent party which considers the tactics of seizing power harmful; on the fact that the conditions for socialism in Europe have reached not a certain degree of maturity, but are already mature; on the fact that our Party programme knows of no socialist reforms but only of a socialist revolution. Let us take the principal and basic difference between the idea as presented by *Vperyod* and as presented in the resolution. *Vperyod* set a task before the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, *viz.*, to win in the battle for democracy and to use this victory for carrying revolution into Europe. The resolution fails to grasp this connection between our “decisive victory” (not in the new *Iskra* sense) and the revolution in Europe, and therefore refers, not to the tasks of the proletariat, not to the prospects of *its* victory, but to one of the possibilities in general: “in the event of the revolution spreading. . . .” *Vperyod* directly and definitely indicated, and this was incorporated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, how precisely “political power” can and must “be utilised” in the interests of the proletariat, bearing in mind what can be achieved immediately, at the given stage of social development, and what must first be achieved as a democratic prerequisite for the struggle for socialism. Here, also, the resolution is hopelessly dragging at the tail when it states: “will be able to prepare itself for using,” but is unable to say *in what way and how* it will be able to prepare itself, and for *what sort* of “utilisation.” We have no doubt, for instance, that the new *Iskra*-ists may be “able to prepare themselves for ‘using’” the leading position in the Party; but the manner in which they have utilised this position up to now and the extent to which they are prepared for this do not hold out much hope of possibility being transformed into reality.

*Vperyod* quite definitely stated wherein lies the real "possibility of retaining power," namely, in the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, in their joint mass strength which is capable of outweighing all the forces of counter-revolution, in the inevitable harmony of their interests in *democratic* reforms. The resolution of the Conference, however, does not give us anything positive; it merely evades the issue. Surely the possibility of retaining power in Russia must be determined by the composition of the social forces in Russia itself, by the circumstances of the democratic revolution which is now taking place in our country. The victory of the proletariat in Europe (and it is a far cry between carrying the revolution into Europe and the victory of the proletariat) will give rise to a desperate counter-revolutionary struggle of the Russian bourgeoisie—yet the resolution of the new *Iskra*-ists does not say a word about this counter-revolutionary force, the importance of which has been appraised by the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. If in our struggle for the republic and democracy we could not rely upon the peasantry as well as on the proletariat, the prospect of our "retaining power" would be hopeless. And if it is not hopeless, if the "decisive victory over tsarism" opens up such a possibility, then we must say so, we must actively call for the transformation of this possibility into reality and issue practical slogans not only for the *contingency* of the revolution being carried into Europe, but also *for the purpose* of bringing this about. The appeal the *khvostist* Social-Democrats make to the "restricted historical scope of the Russian revolution" only covers up their restricted comprehension of the tasks of this democratic revolution and of the role of the proletariat as the vanguard in this revolution.

One of the objections raised to the slogan "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is that dictatorship presupposes a "united will" (*Iskra*, No. 95), and that there can be no united will between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. This objection is fallacious, for it is based on an abstract, "metaphysical" interpre-

tation of the term "united will." Will may be united in one respect and not united in another. The absence of unity on questions of socialism and the struggle for socialism does not prevent unity of will on questions of democracy and the struggle for a republic. To forget this would be tantamount to forgetting the logical and historical difference between a democratic revolution and a socialist revolution. To forget this would mean forgetting the *national* character of the democratic revolution: if it is "national" it means that there *must* be "unity of will" precisely in so far as this revolution satisfies the national needs and requirements. Beyond the boundaries of democracy there can be no unity of will between the proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie. Class struggle between them is inevitable; but on the basis of a democratic republic this struggle will be the most far-reaching and extensive struggle of the people for *socialism*. Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy and privileges. In the struggle against this past, in the struggle against counter-revolution, a "united will" of the proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for there is unity of interests.

Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle of the wage worker against his master, the struggle for socialism. In this case, unity of will is impossible.<sup>1</sup> Here our path lies not from autocracy to a republic, but from a petty-bourgeois democratic republic to socialism.

Of course, in concrete historical circumstances, the elements of the past become interwoven with those of the future, the two paths get mixed. Wage labour and its struggle against private property exist under autocracy as well, they originate even under serfdom. But this does not prevent us from drawing a logical and historical line of demarcation between the important stages of development. Surely we all draw the distinction be-

<sup>1</sup>The development of capitalism which is more extensive and rapid under conditions of freedom will inevitably put a speedy end to the unity of will; the sooner the counter-revolution and reaction are crushed, the speedier will the unity of will come to an end.

tween bourgeois revolution and socialist revolution, we all absolutely insist on the necessity of drawing a strict line between them; but can it be denied that in history certain particular elements of both revolutions become interwoven? Have there not been a number of socialist movements and attempts at establishing socialism in the period of democratic revolutions in Europe? And will not the future socialist revolution in Europe still have to do a great deal that has been left undone in the field of democracy?

A Social-Democrat must never, even for an instant, forget that the proletarian class struggle for socialism against the most democratic and republican bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is inevitable. This is beyond doubt. From this logically follows the absolute necessity of a separate, independent and strictly class party of Social-Democracy. From this logically follows the provisional character of our tactics to "strike together" with the bourgeoisie and the duty to carefully watch "our ally, as if he were an enemy," etc. All this is also beyond doubt. But it would be ridiculous and reactionary to deduce from this that we must forget, ignore or neglect those tasks which, although transient and temporary, are vital at the present time. The struggle against autocracy is a temporary and transient task of the Socialists, but to ignore or neglect this task would be tantamount to betraying socialism and rendering a service to reaction. Certainly, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry is only a transient, provisional task of the Socialists, but to ignore this task in the period of a democratic revolution would be simply reactionary.

Concrete political tasks must be presented in concrete circumstances. All things are relative, all things flow and are subject to change. The programme of the German Social-Democratic Party does not contain the demand for a republic. In Germany the situation is such that this question can in practice hardly be separated from the question of socialism (although even as regards Germany, Engels in his comments on the draft of the Erfurt Programme of 1891 uttered a warning against belittling the importance of a republic and of the struggle for

a republic!)\* Russian Social-Democracy never raised the question of eliminating the demand for a republic from its programme or agitation, for in our country there can be no indissoluble connection between the question of a republic and the question of socialism. It was quite natural for a German Social-Democrat of 1898 not to put the question of the republic in the forefront, and this evoked neither surprise nor condemnation. But a German Social-Democrat who in 1848 left the question of the republic in the shade would have been a downright traitor to the revolution. There is no such thing as abstract truth. Truth is always concrete.

The time will come when the struggle against Russian autocracy will be over, when the period of democratic revolution in Russia will also be over, and then it will be ridiculous to talk about "unity of will" of the proletariat and the peasantry, about a democratic dictatorship, etc. When that time comes we shall take up the question of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat and deal with it at greater length. But at present the party of the advanced class cannot help striving in a most energetic manner for a decisive victory of the democratic revolution over tsarism. And a decisive victory is nothing else than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

*Author's Note to Chapter X, First Published in 1926*

We would remind the reader that in the polemics between *Iskra* and *Vperyod* the former incidentally referred to Engels' letter to Turatti,\*\* in which Engels warned the (future) leader of the Italian reformists not to confuse the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. The coming revolution in Italy—wrote Engels about the political situation in Italy in 1894—will be a petty-bourgeois, a democratic revolution, not a socialist revolution. *Iskra* reproached *Vperyod* with having deviated from the principle laid down by Engels. This reproach was unjust, because on the whole *Vperyod* (No. 14) fully admitted the correctness of Marx's theory on the difference between the three main forces in the revolutions of the nineteenth cen-

tury. According to this theory the following forces are fighting against the old regime of autocracy, feudalism and serfdom: 1) the liberal big bourgeoisie, 2) the radical petty bourgeoisie, 3) the proletariat. The first is fighting only for a constitutional monarchy; the second, for a democratic republic; the third, for a socialist revolution. The socialist who confuses the petty-bourgeois struggle for a complete democratic revolution with the proletarian struggle for a socialist revolution is in danger of political bankruptcy. Marx's warning in this connection is quite justified. But it is precisely for this reason that the slogan of "revolutionary communes" is wrong, because the very mistake committed by the communes that have existed in history is that they confused the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution. On the other hand, our slogan, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, fully safeguards us against this mistake. While absolutely recognising the bourgeois character of the revolution, which cannot *immediately* go beyond the bounds of a merely democratic revolution, our slogan *pushes forward* this particular revolution and strives to mould it into forms most advantageous to the proletariat; consequently, it strives for the utmost utilisation of the democratic revolution for a most successful further struggle of the proletariat for socialism.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The next chapter in this pamphlet, entitled "A Brief Comparison of Certain Resolutions Passed by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and of the Conference," is here omitted.—Ed.

## XII. WILL THE SWEEP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION BE DIMINISHED IF THE BOURGEOISIE DESERT?

THE foregoing lines were already written when we received a copy of the resolutions passed by the Caucasian Conference of the new *Iskra*-ists and published by *Iskra*. Better material than this *pour la bonne bouche*,<sup>1</sup> we could not wish for.

The editorial board of *Iskra* quite justly remarks:

"On the fundamental question of tactics, the Caucasian Conference arrived at a decision *analogous*" (in truth!) "to the one arrived at by the All-Russian Conference" (i.e., of the new *Iskra*-ists). . . . "On the question of the attitude of Social-Democracy towards the provisional revolutionary government, the Caucasian comrades took a very hostile position towards the new method as advocated by the *Vperyod* group and the delegates of the so-called Congress who joined it. . . . It must be admitted that the tactics of the proletarian party in a bourgeois revolution have been *very aptly* formulated by the Conference."

What is true is true. A more "apt" formulation of the fundamental error of the new *Iskra*-ists could not be invented. We shall reproduce this formula in full, first of all indicating in parentheses the blossoms, and then, later, we shall expose the fruit, as presented at the end of the formula.

### "RESOLUTION OF THE CAUCASIAN CONFERENCE OF NEW 'ISKRA'-ISTS ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

"Considering it to be our task to take advantage of the revolutionary situation to deepen" (of course! They should have added: "according to Martynov") "the Social-Democratic consciousness of the proletariat" (only to deepen the consciousness, but not to establish a republic? What a "profound" conception of revolution!) "in order to secure for the Party complete freedom to criticise the nascent bourgeois state system" (it is not our business to secure a republic! Our business is only to secure freedom to criticise. Anarchist ideas give rise to anarchist language: "bourgeois state system"!), "the Conference expresses its opposition to the formation of a Social-Democratic provisional government and to joining it" (recall the resolution passed by the Bakuninists ten months before the Spanish revolution and referred to by Engels: see *Proletary*, No. 3), "but considers it more expedient to exercise pressure from without" (from below and

<sup>1</sup> For a titbit.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

not from above) "upon the bourgeois provisional government in order to secure the greatest possible" (?) "democratisation of the state system. The Conference believes that the formation of a Social-Democratic provisional government, or entry into the government, would lead, on the one hand, to the masses of the proletariat becoming disappointed in the Social-Democratic Party and abandoning it because the Social-Democrats, in spite of the fact that they had seized power, would not be able to satisfy the pressing needs of the working class, including the establishment of socialism" (the republic is not a pressing need! The authors, in their innocence, failed to observe that they were speaking in the language of anarchists, that they were speaking as if they were repudiating participation in bourgeois revolutions!), "and, on the other hand, *would induce the bourgeois classes to desert the cause of the revolution and in that way diminish its sweep.*"

This is where the trouble lies. This is where anarchist ideas become interwoven (as constantly occurs among West European Bernsteinians) with the purest opportunism. Just imagine: not to enter the provisional government because this will induce the bourgeoisie to desert the cause of the revolution and will thus diminish the sweep of the revolution! But here we have before us the new *Iskra* philosophy in its complete, pure and consistent form: the revolution is a bourgeois revolution, therefore we must bow to bourgeois vulgarity and make way for it. If we were guided, only partly, only for a moment, by the consideration that our participation might induce the bourgeoisie to desert the revolution, we would simply be surrendering the leadership of the revolution entirely to the bourgeois classes. By that we would place the proletariat entirely under the tutelage of the bourgeoisie (while retaining for ourselves complete "freedom to criticise"!!) and compel the proletariat to be meek and mild in order not to frighten the bourgeoisie away. We emasculate the immediate needs of the proletariat, namely, its political needs—which the Economists and their epigones have never thoroughly understood—out of fear lest the bourgeoisie be frightened away. We would completely abandon the field of the revolutionary struggle for the achievement of democracy to the extent required by the proletariat in favour of the field of bargaining with the bourgeoisie and obtaining their voluntary consent ("not to desert") at the price of our principles and of the revolution itself.

In two brief lines, the Caucasian new *Iskra*-ists managed to express the quintessence of the tactics of betraying the revolution and of converting the proletariat into a miserable hanger-on of the bourgeois classes. The mistakes of the new *Iskra*-ists which we referred to above as a tendency now stand before us elevated to the level of a clear and definite principle, *viz.*, to drag at the tail of the monarchist bourgeoisie. Because the achievement of the republic would induce (and is already inducing: Mr. Struve, for example) the bourgeoisie to desert the revolution, therefore, down with the fight for the republic! Because the bourgeoisie always and everywhere in the world is frightened by every energetic and consistent democratic demand put forward by the proletariat, therefore, hide in your dens, comrade workers; act only from without; do not dream of using the instruments and weapons of the "bourgeois state system" in the revolution and preserve for yourselves "freedom to criticise"!

The fundamental error in their conception of the term "bourgeois revolution" has come to the surface. The Martynov, new *Iskra* "conception" of the term leads directly to the betrayal of the cause of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie.

Those who have forgotten the old Economism, those who fail to study it and do not call it to mind, will find it difficult to understand the present off-shoot of Economism. Recall the Bernsteinian *Credo*.<sup>1</sup> From the "purely proletarian" point of view and programmes, these people deduced the following: we, Social-Democrats, are to engage in economics, in the real cause of labour, in freedom to criticise all political trickery, in genuinely deepening Social-Democratic work, whereas they, the liberals, are to engage in politics. God save us from dropping into "revolutionism"; that will frighten the bourgeoisie away. Those who read the *Credo* over again (to the very end),

<sup>1</sup> *Credo*—the name applied to a document in which the views of the Economists were proclaimed for the first time. Under the leadership of Lenin who was then in exile in Siberia, and at his instance, a group of exiles issued a protest against this document, and this protest became of great importance for the future history of the Party. The *Credo* and the protest against it are given in Vol. I of *Selected Works*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

or the Supplement to No. 9 of *Rabochaya Mysl* (September 1899), will be able to follow the whole of this line of reasoning.

The same thing is taking place at the present time, only on a larger scale and in application to the estimation of the whole of the "great" Russian revolution—which, alas, even beforehand, has been vulgarised and reduced to a caricature by the theoreticians of orthodox philistinism! We, Social-Democrats, are to have freedom to criticise, are to engage in deepening consciousness, to engage in actions from without. They, the bourgeois classes, must have freedom to act, a free field for revolutionary (read: liberal) leadership, the freedom to pass "reforms" from above.

These vulgarisers of Marxism have never pondered over what Marx said about the need for substituting criticism with weapons for the weapon of criticism. While they take the name of Marx in vain, they actually draw up resolutions on tactics absolutely in the spirit of the Frankfort bourgeois chatterboxes,<sup>1</sup> who freely criticised absolutism, deepened democratic consciousness, but failed to understand the fact that the time of revolution is a time of action, both from above and from below. In converting Marxism into a subject for hair-splitting, they have converted the ideology of the most advanced, most determined and energetic revolutionary class into the ideology of its most undeveloped strata, which shrink from difficult revolutionary-democratic tasks and leave them to be solved by the Struves.

If the bourgeois classes desert the revolution because the Social-Democrats join the revolutionary government, they will thereby "diminish" the sweep of the revolution.

Do you hear this, Russian workers! The sweep of the revolution will be mightier if it is carried out by the Struves, who must not be frightened away by the Social-Democrats and who want, not victory over tsarism, but to strike a bargain with it. The sweep of the revolution will be stronger if, of the two possible outcomes which we have outlined above, the first comes about, *i.e.*, if the monarchist bourgeoisie come to an under-

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 57.—*Ed.*

standing with the autocracy concerning a "constitution" à la Shipov.

Social-Democrats who write such shameful things in resolutions intended for the guidance of the whole Party, or who approve of such "apt" resolutions, are so absorbed in their hair-splitting, which crushes the living spirit of Marxism, that they fail to observe how these resolutions convert all their other excellent words into mere phrase-mongering. Take any of their articles in *Iskra*, or take the notorious pamphlet written by our celebrated Martynov, and there you will read about *people's* rebellion, about carrying the revolution to the *very end*, about striving to rely upon the lower strata of the people in the fight against the inconsistent bourgeoisie. But all these excellent things become miserable phrase-mongering immediately you accept or approve of the idea about "the sweep of the revolution" being "diminished" if the bourgeoisie abandon it. One of two things, gentlemen: either we, together with the people, strive to bring about the revolution and obtain complete victory over tsarism, *in spite of* the inconsistent, selfish and cowardly bourgeoisie, or we do not accept this "in spite of," we do fear that the bourgeoisie will "desert" the revolution. In the latter case we betray the proletariat and the people to the bourgeoisie, to the inconsistent, selfish and cowardly bourgeoisie.

Don't make any attempt to misinterpret what I have said. Don't start howling that you are being charged with deliberate treachery. No, you have been crawling all the time and have now crawled into the mire as unconsciously as the Economists crawled into it, drawn inexorably and irrevocably down the inclined plane of making Marxism more "profound," to anti-revolutionary, soulless and lifeless efforts at "wisdom."

Have you ever considered, gentlemen, what the real social forces that determine the "sweep of the revolution" are? Let us leave aside the forces of foreign politics, of international combinations, which have turned out favourably for us at the present time, but which we leave out of our discussion, and quite rightly so, in so far as we are discussing the internal forces of Russia. Look at the internal social forces. Against

the revolution are rallied the autocracy, the Court, the police, the government officials, the army and a handful of the higher aristocracy. The deeper the indignation of the people becomes, the less reliable become the troops, and the more the government officials begin to waver. Moreover, the bourgeoisie, on the whole, is now in favour of the revolution, makes zealous speeches about liberty, and more and more frequently talks in the name of the people, and even in the name of the revolution.<sup>1</sup> But we Marxists all know from our theories and from daily and hourly observations of our liberals, Zemstvo councilors and followers of *Osvobozhdeniye* that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, selfish and cowardly in its support of the revolution. The bourgeoisie, in the mass, will inevitably turn towards counter-revolution, towards autocracy, against the revolution and against the people, immediately its narrow selfish interests are met, immediately it "deserts" consistent democracy (*it is already deserting it!*). There remains the "people," that is, the proletariat and the peasantry. The proletariat alone is capable of marching reliably to the end, for its goal lies far beyond the democratic revolution. That is why the proletariat fights in the front ranks for the republic and contemptuously rejects silly and unworthy advice to take care not to frighten the bourgeoisie. The peasantry consists of a great number of semi-proletarian as well as petty-bourgeois elements. This causes it also to waver and compels the proletariat to close its ranks in a strictly class party. But the instability of the peasantry differs radically from the instability of the bourgeoisie, for at the present time the peasantry is interested not so much in the absolute preservation of private property as in the confiscation of the landlords' land, one of the principal forms of private property. While this does not cause the peasantry to become socialist or cease to be petty-bourgeois it may cause them to become whole-hearted and most radical adherents of the democratic revolution. The peasantry will inevitably become such if only the progress

<sup>1</sup>In this connection the open letter, by Mr. Struve to Jaurès, recently published by the latter in *L'Humanité* and by the former in *Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 72, is very interesting.

of revolutionary events, which is enlightening it, is not interrupted too soon by the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the defeat of the proletariat. Subject to this condition, the peasantry will inevitably become a bulwark of the revolution and the republic, for only a completely victorious revolution can give the peasantry *everything* in the sphere of agrarian reforms—*everything* that the peasants desire, of which they dream, and of which they truly stand in need (not for the abolition of capitalism as the “Socialist-Revolutionaries” imagine, but) in order to raise themselves out of the mire of semi-serfdom, out of the gloom of oppression and servitude, in order to improve their conditions of life as far as it is possible to improve them under commodity production.

Moreover, the peasantry is drawn to the revolution not only by the prospect of a radical agrarian reform but by its general and permanent interests. Even in its fight against the proletariat, the peasantry stands in need of democracy, for only a democratic system is capable of exactly expressing its interests and of ensuring its predominance as the mass and the majority. The more enlightened the peasantry becomes (and since the Japanese War it is becoming enlightened at a much more rapid pace than those who are accustomed to measuring enlightenment by the school standard suspect), the more consistent and determined will it be in its support of the complete democratic revolution; for, unlike the bourgeoisie, it has nothing to fear from the supremacy of the people, but, on the contrary, can only gain by it. The democratic republic will become the ideal of the peasantry as soon as it frees itself from its naive monarchism, because the conscious monarchism of the bourgeois brokers (with an upper chamber, etc.) implies for the peasantry the same disfranchisement and the same ignorance and oppression as it suffers from today, only slightly polished with the varnish of European constitutionalism. ,

That is why the bourgeoisie as a class naturally and inevitably strives to come under the wing of the liberal-monarchist party, while the peasantry, in the mass, strives to come under the leadership of the revolutionary and republican party.

That is why the bourgeoisie is incapable of carrying the democratic revolution to its ultimate conclusion, while the peasantry is capable of carrying the revolution to the end; and we must exert all our efforts to help it to do so.

It may be objected: but there is no need to argue about this, this is all A B C; all Social-Democrats understand this perfectly well. But that is not so. Those who can talk about "the sweep" of the revolution being "diminished" because the bourgeoisie will desert it do not understand this. These people simply repeat by rote the words of our agrarian programme without understanding their meaning, for otherwise they would not be frightened by the concept of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, which follows logically from the Marxian philosophy and from our programme; otherwise they would not restrict the sweep of the great Russian revolution to the limits to which the bourgeoisie are prepared to go. These people defeat their abstract Marxian revolutionary phrases by their concrete anti-Marxian and anti-revolutionary resolutions.

Those who really understand the role of the peasantry in the victorious Russian revolution would not dream of saying that the sweep of the revolution would be diminished if the bourgeoisie deserted it. For, as a matter of fact, the Russian revolution will assume its real sweep, and will really assume the widest revolutionary sweep possible in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolution, only when the bourgeoisie deserts it and when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side by side with the proletariat. In order that it may be carried to its logical conclusion, our democratic revolution must rely on such forces as are capable of paralysing the inevitable inconsistency of the bourgeoisie (i.e., actually to "induce it to desert the revolution," which the Caucasian adherents of *Iskra* fear so much because they fail to think things out).

*The proletariat must carry out to the end the democratic revolution, and in this unite to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and*

*to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution and in this unite to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie.* Such are the tasks of the proletariat which the new *Iskra*-ists, in their arguments and resolutions about the sweep of the revolution, present in such a narrow manner.

One circumstance, however, must not be forgotten, although it is frequently lost sight of when arguing about the "sweep" of the revolution. It must not be forgotten that what is at issue is not the difficulties of the task, but where to seek for and achieve its solution. The question is not whether it is difficult or not to make the sweep of the revolution powerful and invincible, but how we are to act in order to enlarge the sweep of the revolution. The difference of opinion affects precisely the fundamental character of our activity, its very direction. We emphasise this because careless and dishonest people too frequently confuse two different questions, namely, the question of the direction in which the road is leading, *i.e.*, the selection of one of two roads, and the question of the ease with which the goal can be reached, or how near the goal is on the given road.

We have not dealt with this last question at all because it has not raised any disagreement or divergency in the Party. But it goes without saying that the question is extremely important in itself and deserves the most serious attention of all Social-Democrats. It would be a piece of unpardonable optimism to forget the difficulties which accompany the task of drawing into the movement not only the mass of the working class, but of the peasantry as well. These difficulties have more than once been the rock against which all the efforts to carry a democratic revolution to its end have been wrecked. And always it was the inconsistent and selfish bourgeoisie which triumphed, because it both "made money" in the shape of monarchist protection against the people, and "preserved the virginity" of liberalism, or of *Osvobozhdeniye*-ism. But the fact that difficulties exist does not mean that these difficulties are insurmountable. What is

important is to be convinced that the path chosen is the correct one, and this conviction will multiply a hundredfold the revolutionary energy and revolutionary enthusiasm which can perform miracles.

How deep is the gulf that divides Social-Democrats today on the question of the path to be chosen can immediately be seen by comparing the Caucasian resolution of the new *Iskra*-ists with the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The resolution of the Congress says that the bourgeoisie is inconsistent; it will invariably try to deprive us of the gains of the revolution. Therefore, make energetic preparations for the fight, comrades and fellow workers! Arm yourselves, bring the peasantry to your side! We shall not surrender the gains of the revolution to the selfish bourgeoisie without a fight. The resolution of the Caucasian new *Iskra*-ists says: the bourgeoisie is inconsistent, it may desert the revolution. Therefore, comrades and fellow workers, please do not think of joining the provisional government, for if you do, the bourgeoisie will surely desert the revolution, and the sweep of the revolution will therefore become diminished.

One side says: push the revolution forward to its very end, in spite of the resistance or the passivity of the inconsistent bourgeoisie.

The other side says: do not think of carrying the revolution to the end independently, for if you do, the inconsistent bourgeoisie will desert it.

Are these not two diametrically opposite paths? Is it not obvious that one set of tactics absolutely excludes the other? Is it not clear that the first tactics are the only correct tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy, while the second are in fact purely *Osvobozhdeniye* tactics?

### XIII. CONCLUSION. DARE WE WIN?

THOSE who are superficially acquainted with the state of affairs in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy, or those who judge by appearances without knowing the history of our internal Party struggle since the days of Economism, very often dismiss even the tactical disagreements which have now become crystallised, especially after the Third Congress, by arguing that there are two natural, inevitable and quite reconcilable trends in every Social-Democratic movement. They say that one side lays special emphasis on the ordinary, current, everyday work, on the necessity of developing propaganda and agitation, of preparing forces, deepening the movement, etc., while the other side lays emphasis on the fighting, general, political, revolutionary tasks of the movement, on the necessity of an armed uprising and of advancing the slogans: revolutionary-democratic dictatorship and provisional revolutionary government. Neither side should exaggerate, they say, extremes are bad, both here and there (and, generally speaking, everywhere in the world), etc., etc.

But the cheap truths of worldly (and "political" in quotation marks) wisdom, which are undoubtedly contained in such arguments, too often cover up a lack of comprehension of the urgent, acute needs of the Party. Take the present tactical differences among Russian Social-Democrats. Of course, the special emphasis laid on the everyday side of work, such as we observe in the new *Iskra*-ist arguments about tactics, does not in itself present any danger and would not give rise to any difference of opinion regarding tactical slogans. But the moment you compare the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party with the resolutions of the Conference this difference becomes strikingly obvious.

And what is the reason? The reason is that, in the first place, it is not enough to point in an abstract way to the two trends in the movement and to the harmfulness of extremes. It is necessary to know concretely what the given movement is suffering from at the given time, where the real political danger for the Party lies at the present time. Secondly, it is necessary to know what real political forces are receiving grist for their mill from these tactical slogans or perhaps the absence of slogans. If you listen to the new *Iskra*-ists you will arrive at the conclusion that the Social-Democratic Party is faced with the danger of throwing overboard propaganda and agitation, the economic struggle and the criticism of bourgeois democracy, of being inordinately attracted to military preparations, armed attacks, the seizure of power, etc. But in fact real danger is threatening the Party from a very different quarter. Those who are more or less familiar with the state of the movement, those who follow it carefully and intelligently, cannot fail to see the ridiculous side of the new *Iskra*'s fears. The whole work of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party has already been moulded into solid immutable forms which absolutely guarantee that our main attention will be fixed on propaganda and agitation, impromptu and mass meetings, the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets, assistance to the economic struggle and the adoption of the slogans of that struggle. There is not a single committee of the Party, not a single district committee, not a single central meeting or a single factory group where ninety-nine per cent of all the attention, energy and time are not constantly devoted to the performance of these functions, which have taken root ever since the middle of the nineties of the last century. Only those who are altogether ignorant of the movement do not know this. Only very naive or ill-informed people can take the new *Iskra*-ists seriously when they, with an air of great importance, repeat stale truths.

The fact is that not only is no excessive zeal displayed among us in regard to the tasks of the uprising, the general political slogans and the task of leading the national revolution, but, on the contrary, it is precisely the *backwardness* in this respect

that is most striking, for that is our weakest spot and a real danger to the movement which may degenerate and in some places does degenerate into a movement that is no longer revolutionary in deeds, but only in words. Of the many hundreds of organisations, groups and circles carrying on the work of the Party you will not find a single one which, from its very formation, has not carried on everyday work—the kind of everyday work which the wiseacres of the new *Iskra* now talk about as if they have discovered new truths. On the other hand, you will find an insignificant percentage of groups and circles which have understood the tasks of an armed uprising, which have started to carry them out, which have become convinced of the necessity of leading the national revolution against tsarism, of the necessity of advancing for that purpose precisely such and no other progressive slogans.

We are lagging behind terribly in the fulfilment of the progressive and the genuinely revolutionary tasks; in very many instances we have not even become conscious of them, here and there we have allowed revolutionary bourgeois democracy to become strong because of our backwardness in this respect. And the writers in the new *Iskra* turn their backs on the course of events and on the requirements of the time, and persistently repeat: Don't forget the old! Don't let yourselves be carried away by the new! This is the main, the invariable *leitmotif* of all the important resolutions of the Conference; whereas the Congress resolutions repeat with equal persistency: confirming the old (and without stopping to chew it over and over precisely because it is old and has been settled and recorded in literature, in resolutions and by experience) we put forward a new task, draw attention to it, proclaim a new slogan, and demand that the genuinely revolutionary Social-Democrats immediately set to work to fulfil it.

That is how matters really stand with regard to the question of the two trends in Social-Democratic tactics. The revolutionary epoch has put forward new tasks which only the totally blind can fail to see. Some Social-Democrats definitely recognise these tasks and put them on the order of the day: an armed uprising

is a most pressing need, prepare yourselves for it immediately and energetically, remember that this is necessary in order to attain decisive victory, advance the slogans of the republic, of the provisional government, of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Others, on the other hand, draw back, mark time, write prefaces instead of advancing slogans; instead of pointing out the new while confirming the old, they tediously chew the old over and over again at great length, invent subterfuges to avoid the new, and are unable to determine the conditions of decisive victory or of advancing such slogans as alone would correspond to the striving for a final victory.

The political result of this *khvostism* is now apparent. The fairy tale about rapprochement between the "majority" of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and revolutionary-bourgeois democracy remains a fable which has not been confirmed by a single political fact, by a single important resolution of the "Bolsheviks" or a single act of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Meanwhile, the opportunist, monarchist bourgeoisie, as represented by *Osvobozhdeniye*, has for a long time past been *welcoming* the trend of "principles" of the new *Iskra*-ists and now it is actually running its mill with the grist which the latter bring, is adopting their catchwords and "ideas" in opposition to "conspiracy" and "riots," against exaggerating the "technical" side of the revolution, against directly proclaiming the slogan of an armed uprising, against the "revolutionism" of the extreme demands, etc., etc. The resolution of a whole conference of "Menshevik" Social-Democrats in the Caucasus and the endorsement of that resolution by the editors of the new *Iskra* sums it all up politically in an unmistakable way: we fear the bourgeoisie will desert if the proletariat takes part in the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship! This explains everything. This definitely transforms the proletariat into an appendage of the monarchist bourgeoisie. This proves in deeds, not by a casual declaration of some individual, but by a resolution especially endorsed by a whole trend, the *political significance* of the *khvostism* of the new *Iskra*.

Whoever ponders over these facts will understand the real significance of the now fashionable reference to the two sides and the two trends in the Social-Democratic movement. Take Bernsteinism, for example, for the study of these trends on a large scale. The Bernsteinists in exactly the same way have been dinning into our ears that it is they who understand the true needs of the proletariat, the tasks of its growing forces, of intensifying the whole work, of training the elements of a new society, of propaganda and agitation. Bernstein says: we demand a frank recognition of the situation! And by that he sanctions a "movement" *without* "final aims," sanctions defensive tactics only, preaches the tactics of fear "lest the bourgeoisie desert." The Bernsteinists also raised an outcry against the "Jacobinism" of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, against the "publicists" who fail to understand the "initiative of the workers," etc., etc. In reality, as everyone knows, the revolutionary Social-Democrats never thought of abandoning the everyday, petty work, the training of forces, etc., etc. All they demanded was a clear understanding of the final aim, a clear presentation of revolutionary tasks; they wanted to raise the semi-proletarian and semi-petty-bourgeois strata to the revolutionary level of the proletariat, not to degrade the latter to the opportunist consideration of "lest the bourgeoisie desert." Perhaps the most striking expression of this difference between the intellectual opportunist wing and the proletarian revolutionary wing of the Party was the question: *dürfen wir siegen?* "dare we win?" Is it permissible for us to win? Would not such victory be dangerous to us? Ought we to win?\* This at first sight strange question was raised, however, and had to be raised, because the opportunists were afraid of victory, were frightening the proletariat away from it, were prophesying various evils that would result from it, were scoffing at the slogans which directly called for victory.

The same fundamental division between the intellectual-opportunist trend and the proletarian-revolutionary trend exists also among us, with the very important difference, however, that here we are faced with the question of a democratic revolution, and not of a socialist revolution. The question "dare we win?"

absurd as it may seem at first sight, has also been raised here. It was raised by Martynov in his *Two Dictatorships*, in which he prophesied dire misfortune if we make effective preparations for and successfully carry out an uprising. The question has been presented in the whole of the new *Iskra* literature dealing with the provisional revolutionary government, and in this connection persistent though futile efforts have been made continually to confuse the participation of Millerand in a bourgeois-opportunist government with the participation of Varlin in a petty-bourgeois revolutionary government. It was clinched by the resolution "lest the bourgeoisie desert." And although Kautsky, for instance, now tries to wax ironical about our disputes concerning a provisional revolutionary government, and says that it is like dividing the bear's skin before the bear is killed,\* this irony only proves that even intelligent and revolutionary Social-Democrats miss the point when they talk about something they know only by hearsay. German Social-Democracy is a long way from killing its bear (carrying out a socialist revolution) but the dispute as to whether we "dare" kill our bear was of enormous importance from the point of view of principles and of practical politics. Russian Social-Democrats are not yet by any means strong enough to "kill their bear" (to carry out a democratic revolution) but the question as to whether we "dare" kill it is of extreme importance for the whole future of Russia and for the future of Russian Social-Democracy. An army cannot be energetically and successfully recruited and guided unless we are sure that we "dare" win.

Take our old "Economists." They too raised an outcry that their opponents were conspirators, Jacobins (see *Rabocheye Deyelo*, especially No. 10, and Martynov's speech in the debates on the programme at the Second Congress) who by plunging into politics were divorcing themselves from the masses, forgetting the fundamentals of the labour movement, ignoring the initiative of the workers, etc., etc. In reality these supporters of "the initiative of the workers" were opportunist intellectuals who tried to foist on the workers their own narrow and philistine conception of the tasks of the proletariat. In reality the opponents of Econ-

omism, as everyone can see from the old *Iskra*, did not neglect or put into the background any of the items of Social-Democratic work, did not forget the economic struggle; but they were able simultaneously to present the urgent and immediate political tasks in their full scope, and to oppose the transformation of the party of the workers into an "economic" appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The Economists have learned by rote that politics are based on economics and "understood" this to mean that the political struggle should be reduced to the economic struggle. The new *Iskra*-ists have learned by rote that the economic basis of the democratic revolution is the bourgeois revolution, and "understood" this to mean that the democratic tasks of the proletariat must be degraded to the level of bourgeois moderation and must not exceed the boundaries beyond which the "bourgeoisie will desert." On the pretext of deepening their work, on the pretext of rousing "the initiative of the workers" and defending a pure class policy the Economists, in fact, delivered the working class into the hands of the liberal-bourgeois politicians, i.e., were leading the Party along a path which objectively meant that. The new *Iskra*-ists on the same pretext are in fact betraying the interests of the proletariat in the democratic revolution to the bourgeoisie, i.e., are leading the Party along a path which objectively means that. The Economists thought that it was not the business of Social-Democrats to lead the political struggle, but the business of the liberals. The new *Iskra*-ists think that it is not the business of the Social-Democrats actively to bring about the democratic revolution, but really that of the democratic bourgeoisie, for, they argue, if the proletariat takes a preponderant part in the revolution and leads it, this will "restrict the sweep" of the revolution.

In short, the new *Iskra*-ists are the epigones of Economism, not only by virtue of their origin at the Second Party Congress, but also by their present manner of presenting the tactical tasks of the proletariat in the democratic revolution. They, too, represent an intellectual-opportunist wing of the Party. In the sphere of organisation they began with the anarchist individ-

ualism of the intellectuals and finished with "disorganisation-process," and the "rules" adopted by the Conference permit Party literature to be separated from the Party organisation, introduce an indirect and almost four stage system of elections, a system of Bonapartist plebiscites instead of democratic representation, and finally the principle of "agreement" between the part and the whole. In Party tactics they slipped down on the same inclined plane. In the "plan of the Zemstvo campaign" they declared that the sending of deputations to Zemstvo members was the "higher type of demonstration," since they could discover only two active forces operating on the political scene (on the eve of January 22 [9]!)—the government and bourgeois democracy. They made the urgent task of arming the people "more profound" by substituting for the direct practical slogan to arm, the slogan to arm the people with a burning desire to arm themselves. The problems of an armed uprising, of the provisional government and of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship are now distorted and weakened in their official resolutions. "Lest the bourgeoisie desert," this final chord of their last resolution, throws a glaring light on the question as to whither their path is leading the Party.

The democratic revolution in Russia is bourgeois in its social and economic content. But it is not enough simply to repeat this correct Marxian postulate. It must be understood and applied in political slogans. Generally speaking, all political liberties secured on the basis of the present, *i.e.*, capitalist, relations of production are bourgeois liberties. The demand for political liberties expresses first of all the interests of the bourgeoisie. Its representatives were the first to put forward this demand. Its supporters have everywhere used the liberties they acquired like masters, and have reduced them to moderate and exact bourgeois doses, combining them with the suppression of the revolutionary proletariat by methods most refined in peace time and brutally cruel in times of storm.

But only the Narodnik rebels, anarchists and also Economists could deduce from this that the struggle for liberty must be

rejected or degraded. These intellectual philistine doctrines could be foisted on the proletariat only for a time and against its will. The proletariat always instinctively realised that it needed political liberty more than anyone else, in spite of the fact that its immediate effect would be to strengthen and to organise the bourgeoisie. The proletariat seeks its salvation not by avoiding the class struggle, but by developing it, by extending its scope, its own class consciousness, organisation and determination. The Social-Democrat who debases the tasks of the political struggle becomes transformed from a tribune of the people into a trade union secretary. The Social-Democrat who debases the proletarian tasks in a democratic bourgeois revolution becomes transformed from a leader of the people's revolution into a mere leader of a free labour union.

Yes, the *people's* revolution. Social-Democracy has justly fought and continues to fight against the bourgeois-democratic abuse of the word "people." It demands that this word shall not be used to cover up a failure to understand the significance of class antagonisms. It absolutely insists on the need for complete class independence for the party of the proletariat. But it divides the "people" into "classes," not in order that the advanced class may become self-centred, or confine itself to narrow aims and restrict its activity so as not to frighten the economic masters of the world, but in order that the advanced class, which does not suffer from the half-heartedness, vacillation and indecision of the intermediate classes, shall with all the greater energy and enthusiasm fight for the cause of the whole of the people, at the head of the whole of the people.

That is precisely what the contemporary new *Iskra*-ists, who instead of advancing active political slogans in a democratic revolution only repeat in a moralising way the word "class," parsed in all genders and cases, fail to understand.

The democratic revolution is a bourgeois revolution. The slogan of Black Redistribution of the land, or "land and liberty"—this most widespread slogan of the peasant masses, down-trodden and ignorant, yet passionately yearning for light and

happiness—is a bourgeois slogan. But we Marxists must know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry than the path of bourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress. We must not forget that there is not, nor can there be at the present time, any other means of bringing socialism nearer than by complete political liberty, a democratic republic, a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Being the representatives of the advanced and of the only revolutionary class, revolutionary without reservations, doubts and retrospection, we must present to the whole of the people the tasks of a democratic revolution as widely and as boldly as possible, and display the maximum of initiative in so doing. The degradation of these tasks, theoretically, is tantamount to making a caricature of Marxism, tantamount to a philistine distortion of it. In practical politics it is tantamount to delivering the cause of the revolution into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which will inevitably shirk the task of consistently carrying out the revolution. The difficulties that lie on the road to the complete victory of the revolution are enormous. No one could blame the representatives of the proletariat if, having done everything in their power, their efforts are defeated by the resistance of the reaction, the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the ignorance of the masses. But everybody, and the class conscious proletariat above all, will condemn Social-Democracy if it restricts the revolutionary energy of the democratic revolution and dampens revolutionary enthusiasm by the fear of winning, fear “lest the bourgeoisie deserts.”

Revolutions are the locomotives of history, said Marx. Revolutions are the festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. At no other time are the masses of the people in a position to come forward so actively as creators of a new social order as at a time of revolution. At such times the people are capable of performing miracles, if judged by a narrow philistine scale of gradual progress. But the leaders of the revolutionary parties must also, at such a time, present their tasks in a wider and bolder fashion, so that their slogan may always be in advance

of the revolutionary initiative of the masses, serve them as a beacon and reveal to them our democratic and socialist ideal in all its magnitude and splendour, indicate the shortest, the most direct route to complete, absolute and final victory. Let us leave to the opportunists of the *Osvobozhdeniye* bourgeoisie the task of seeking circuitous paths of compromise out of fear of the revolution and of the direct path. If we are compelled by force to drag along such paths, we shall know how to fulfil our duty in petty, everyday work. But let the ruthless struggle first decide the path we ought to take. We shall be traitors to and betrayers of the revolution if we do not use the festive energy of the masses and their revolutionary enthusiasm in order to wage a ruthless and unflinching struggle for a straight and determined path. Let the bourgeois opportunists contemplate the future reaction with cowardly fear. The workers will not be frightened either by the thought that the reaction proposes to be terrible or by the thought that the bourgeoisie proposes to desert. The workers are not looking forward to striking bargains, they do not ask for sops; they are striving to crush the reactionary forces mercilessly, *i.e.*, to set up a *revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*.

Of course, greater dangers threaten the ship of our Party in stormy times than in periods of smooth "sailing," in periods of liberal progress, which means the painfully slow sweating of the working class by its exploiters. Of course, the tasks of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship are a thousand times more difficult and more complicated than the tasks of an "extreme opposition" or of the exclusively parliamentary struggle. But those who in the present revolutionary situation are consciously capable of preferring smooth sailing and the path of safe "opposition" had better abandon Social-Democratic work for a while; let them wait until the revolution is over, when the feast days will have passed, when humdrum everyday life starts again, when their narrow humdrum point of view no longer strikes such an abominably discordant note, or constitutes such an ugly distortion of the tasks of the advanced class.

At the head of the whole of the people, and particularly of the peasantry—for complete freedom, for a consistent democratic revolution, for a republic! At the head of all the toilers and the exploited—for socialism! Such must in practice be the policy of the revolutionary proletariat, such is the class slogan which must permeate and determine the solution of every tactical question, and every practical step of the workers' party during the revolution.

June-July 1905.

## POSTSCRIPT<sup>1</sup>

### III. THE VULGAR BOURGEOIS REPRESENTATION OF DICTATORSHIP AND MARX'S VIEWS ON DICTATORSHIP

MEHRING tells us in his notes to his edition of Marx's articles from *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of 1848 that incidentally the following reproach was hurled at this newspaper in the bourgeois publications. *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* was alleged to have demanded "the immediate introduction of a dictatorship as the only means of achieving democracy." (Marx, *Nachlass*, Vol. III, p. 53.) From the vulgar bourgeois standpoint the concepts dictatorship and democracy mutually exclude each other. Not understanding the theory of class struggle and accustomed to seeing in the political arena only a petty squabble of various bourgeois circles and cliques, the bourgeois conceives the dictatorship to be the repeal of all liberties, of all guarantees of democracy, tyranny of every kind and all possible abuses of power in the personal interests of the dictator. In effect, it is precisely this vulgar-bourgeois viewpoint that permeates the writings of our Martynov, who winds up his "new campaign" in the new *Iskra* by attributing the partiality of *Vperyod* and *Proletary* to the elogan of dictatorship to Lenin's "being obsessed by a passionate desire to try his luck." (*Iskra*, No. 103, p. 3, column 2.) In order to explain to Martynov the concept of class dictatorship as distinguished from personal dictatorship and the tasks of democratic dictatorship as distinguished from socialist dictatorship, it would be useful to dwell on the views of *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*.

On September 14, 1848, *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* wrote:

"After a revolution, every provisional organisation of the state requires a dictatorship, and an energetic dictatorship at that. From the very beginning we have reproached Kamphausen" (the head of the ministry after

<sup>1</sup> Parts I and II of this postscript are omitted.—Ed.

March 18, 1848) "for not acting dictatorially, for not having immediately smashed up and eliminated the remnants of old institutions. And while Mr. Kamphausen was thus rocking himself in constitutional dreams the defeated party (i.e., the party of reaction) strengthened its positions in the bureaucracy and in the army, and here and there even began to venture upon open struggle."

These few words, Mehring justly remarks, sum up in a few propositions all that was propounded by *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in long articles on Kamphausen's ministry. What do these words of Marx imply? That the provisional revolutionary government *must* act dictatorially (a proposition which *Iskra* was altogether unable to grasp since it was fighting shy of the slogan, dictatorship), that the task of such a dictatorship is to destroy the remnants of old institutions (precisely what was clearly indicated in the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party on the struggle against the counter-revolution and which, as we have indicated above, was omitted in the resolution of the Conference). Thirdly, and finally, it follows from these words that Marx castigated the bourgeois democrats for entertaining "constitutional dreams" in an epoch of revolution and open civil war. The meaning of these words becomes particularly obvious from the article in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of June 6, 1848. Marx wrote:

"A constituent national assembly must first of all be an active, revolutionary-active assembly. But the Frankfort Assembly is busying itself with school exercises in parliamentarism while allowing the government to act. Let us assume that this learned assembly succeeded after mature consideration in working out the best agenda and the best constitution. But what would be the use of the best agenda and of the best constitution, if the government had in the meantime placed the bayonet on the agenda?"

Such is the meaning of the slogan, dictatorship. Hence we can gauge what Marx's attitude would have been towards resolutions which call the "decision to organise a constituent assembly" a decisive victory or which invite us to "remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition."

Great questions in the life of nations are settled only by force. The reactionary classes are usually themselves the first to resort to violence, to civil war; they are the first to "place the

bayonet on the agenda" as Russian autocracy has been doing systematically, consistently, everywhere, all over the country, ever since January 9. And since such a situation has arisen, since the bayonet has really taken first place on the political agenda, since the uprising has become necessary and urgent—the constitutional dreams and school exercises in parliamentarism are becoming only a screen for the bourgeois betrayal of the revolution, a screen for the "desertion" of the bourgeoisie from the cause of the revolution. The genuinely revolutionary class must, then, advance precisely the slogan of dictatorship.

On the question of the tasks of this dictatorship Marx had already written in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* as follows:

"The national assembly should have acted dictatorially against all the reactionary attempts of the obsolete governments and then it would have gained on its side public opinion of such power against which all bayonets and rifle butts would have broken into splinters. . . . But this assembly bores the German people instead of carrying the people with it or being carried away by it."

In the opinion of Marx, the national assembly should have "eliminated from the actually existing regime of Germany everything that contradicted the principle of the sovereignty of the people," then "it should have defended the revolutionary ground on which it rested in order to make the sovereignty of the people, won by the revolution, secure against all attacks."

Thus, the tasks which Marx set before the revolutionary government or the dictatorship in 1848 amounted in substance first of all to *democratic* revolution, i.e., defence against counter-revolution and actual abolition of everything that contradicted the sovereignty of the people. And this is nothing else than revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.

To proceed: which were the classes that in the opinion of Marx could have and should have achieved that task (to carry into effect the principle of the people's sovereignty to the end and to beat off the attacks of the counter-revolution)? Marx talks of the "people." However, we know that he always ruthlessly combated the petty-bourgeois illusions about the unity of the "people" and about the absence of class struggle among the people. In using the word "people," Marx did not thereby gloss

over the class differences, but united certain elements which were capable of carrying the revolution to the end.

After the victory of the Berlin proletariat on March 18, wrote *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, the results of the revolution turned out to be twofold:

"On the one hand the arming of the people, the right of association, the sovereignty of the people actually won; on the other hand, the preservation of the monarchy and the ministry of Kamphausen-Hansemann, *i.e.*, the government of the representatives of the upper bourgeoisie. Thus the results of the revolution have been twofold and inevitably had to lead to a rupture. The people have emerged victorious; they have won liberties of a decisively democratic nature, but direct power has been transferred not to their hands but to those of the upper bourgeoisie. In a word, the revolution has not been completed. The people allowed the formation of a ministry of the big bourgeois, and the big bourgeois betrayed their objectives immediately by offering an alliance to the old Prussian nobility and bureaucracy. Arnim, Canitz and Schwerin have joined the Cabinet.

*"The upper bourgeoisie, anti-revolutionary from the very beginning, have concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with reaction out of fear of the people, that is to say, the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie."* (Italics ours.)

Thus, not only a "decision to organise a constituent assembly," but even its actual convocation is insufficient for a decisive victory of the revolution! Even after a partial victory in an armed struggle (the victory of the Berlin workers over the troops on March 18, 1848) an "incomplete" and "unfinished" revolution is possible. What does its final consummation depend on? It depends on the question, to whose hands is the immediate rule transferred? To those of the Petrunkeviches or Rodichevs, that is to say, the Kamphausens and the Hansemanns, or of the *people, i.e.*, of the workers and the democratic bourgeoisie? In the first case the bourgeoisie will possess power, and the proletariat—"freedom to criticise," freedom to "remain a party of extreme revolutionary opposition." Immediately after victory the bourgeoisie will enter into an alliance with reaction (this would also inevitably happen in Russia, if, for example, the St. Petersburg workers gained only a partial victory in a street fight with the troops and allowed Messrs. Petrunkevich and Co. to form a government). In the second case a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, *i.e.*, a complete victory of the revolution, would be possible.

It remains to define more precisely what Marx really meant by "democratic bourgeoisie" (*demokratische Bürgerschaft*), which together with the workers he called the people, in contradistinction to the big bourgeoisie.

A clear answer to this question is supplied by the following passage in the article in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of July 29, 1848:

"... the German revolution of 1848 is only a parody of the French revolution of 1789.

"On August 4, 1789, three weeks after the storming of the Bastille, the French people in a single day prevailed over all the feudal services.

"On July 11, 1848, four months after the March barricades, the feudal services prevailed over the German people. *Teste Gierke cum Hansemanno.*<sup>1</sup>

"The French bourgeoisie of 1789 did not for a moment abandon its allies, the peasants. It knew that its rule was based on the destruction of feudalism in the villages, the creation of a free landowning (*grundbesitzenden*) peasant class.

"The German bourgeoisie of 1848 is, without the least compunction, betraying the peasants, its most natural allies, who are flesh of its flesh, and without whom it is powerless as against the nobility.

"The preservation of feudal rights, their sanction under the guise of (illusory) compensation—such is the result of the German revolution of 1848. The mountain has brought forth a mouse."

This is a very instructive passage which gives us four important propositions: 1) the incomplete German revolution differs from the complete French revolution in that the German bourgeoisie betrayed not only democracy in general, but in particular the peasantry as well. 2) The foundation for the complete accomplishment of a democratic revolution is the creation of a free class of peasants. 3) The creation of such a class means the abolition of feudal services, the destruction of feudalism, but does not yet mean a socialist revolution. 4) The peasants are

<sup>1</sup>"Witnesses to this are Gierke and Hansemann." Hansemann was the minister of the party of the big bourgeoisie (like Trubetskoy or Rodichev, etc., in Russia), Gierke was the minister of agriculture in the Hansemann Cabinet, who worked out a bold project for "abolishing feudal services," professedly "without compensation," but which in fact abolished only the minor and unimportant services while preserving or granting compensation for the more substantial ones. Mr. Gierke was somewhat like the Russian Messrs. Kablukovs, Manuilovs, Hertensteins and similar bourgeois-liberal friends of the muzhik who desire the "extension of peasant landownership" but do not wish to offend the landlords.

the "most natural" allies of the bourgeoisie, that is to say, the democratic bourgeoisie, without whom it is "powerless" against reaction.

Making corresponding allowances for the concrete national peculiarities and substituting serfdom in place of feudalism, all these propositions will be fully applicable to Russia of 1905. There is no doubt that by learning from the experience of Germany, as elucidated by Marx, we cannot adopt any other slogan for a decisive victory of the revolution than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. There is no doubt that the main constituent parts of the "people," whom Marx in 1848 contrasted with the resisting reaction and the treacherous bourgeoisie, are the proletariat and the peasantry. Undoubtedly, in Russia too, the liberal bourgeoisie and the gentlemen of *Osvobozhdeniye* are betraying and will betray the peasantry, i.e., they will confine themselves to a pseudo-reform and will take the side of the landlords in the decisive struggle between them and the peasantry. Only the proletariat is capable of supporting the peasantry to the end in this struggle. There is no doubt, finally, that in Russia the success of the peasant struggle, i.e., the transfer of the whole of the land to the peasantry, will signify a complete democratic revolution and form the social support of the revolution carried to its end, but it will by no means signify a socialist revolution, or "socialisation," which is talked about by the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie, the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The success of the peasant uprising, the victory of the democratic revolution will but clear the way for a genuine and decisive struggle for socialism on the basis of a democratic republic. In this struggle the peasantry as a landowning class will play the same treacherous, vacillating part as that played at present by the bourgeoisie in its struggle for democracy. To forget this means forgetting socialism, deluding oneself and deceiving others with regard to the real interests and tasks of the proletariat.

In order not to leave any gaps in the presentation of the views held by Marx in 1848, it is necessary to note one substantial difference between German Social-Democracy of that

time (or the Communist Party of the Proletariat, as it was called) and present-day Russian Social-Democracy. Let us quote Mehring:

"*Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* appeared in the political arena as the organ of democracy. And although an unmistakably red thread ran through all its articles, it directly defended the interests of the bourgeois revolution against absolutism and feudalism more than the interests of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. You will find very little material in its columns about the separate labour movement during the revolution, although one should not forget that along with it there appeared twice a week, under the editorship of Moll and Schapper, a special organ of the Cologne Labour League. In any case the reader of today will immediately notice how slight was the attention paid by *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* to the German labour movement of its day, although its most capable representative, Stephan Born, was a pupil of Marx and Engels in Paris and Brussels and in 1848 wrote to their newspaper from Berlin. Born mentions in his memoirs that Marx and Engels never in the slightest degree expressed their disapproval of his agitation among the workers. But the subsequent declarations of Engels render probable the supposition that they were dissatisfied, at least with the methods of this agitation. Their dissatisfaction was well founded in so far as Born was forced to make many concessions to the proletariat whose class consciousness was as yet entirely undeveloped in the greater part of Germany, concessions which could not stand the test of criticism if viewed from the standpoint of the *Communist Manifesto*. Their dissatisfaction was unfounded in so far as Born managed none the less to maintain the agitation conducted by him on a relatively high plane. . . . No doubt Marx and Engels were historically and politically right when they thought that the working class was above all interested in pushing the bourgeois revolution as far as possible. . . . Nevertheless, remarkable proof of how the elementary instinct of the labour movement is able to correct the conceptions of the most brilliant thinkers is provided by the fact that, in April 1849, they expressed themselves in favour of a specific workers' organisation and of participation in the labour congress, which was being prepared especially by the East Elba" (East Prussia) "proletariat."

Thus, it was only in April 1849, after the revolutionary newspaper had been published for almost a year (*Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* made its first appearance on June 1, 1848) that Marx and Engels declared themselves in favour of a special workers' organisation! Until then they were merely running an "organ of democracy" unconnected by any organisational ties with an independent workers' party. This fact, monstrous and incredible from our present-day standpoint, clearly shows us what an enormous difference there is between the German workers' party of those days and the present Russian Social-Democratic

Labour Party. This fact shows also how much less the proletarian features of the movement, its proletarian current, were in evidence in the German democratic revolution (because of the backwardness of Germany in 1848 both in the economic and the political fields, and the political disintegration of the country). This should not be forgotten in evaluating the declarations Marx repeatedly made during this period and a little later about the need for independently organising a proletarian party. Marx drew this practical conclusion only as a result of the experience of the democratic revolution almost a year later, so philistine and petty-bourgeois was the whole atmosphere in Germany then. This conclusion is to us an old and solid acquisition of half a century's experience of international Social-Democracy—an acquisition with which we began to organise the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. In our case it is absolutely impossible for revolutionary proletarian papers to keep outside the pale of the Social-Democratic Party of the proletariat, or for them to appear even once simply as "organs of democracy."

But the contrast which only began to reveal itself between Marx and Stephan Born exists in our case in a form which is the more developed, the more powerfully the proletarian current manifests itself in the democratic stream of our revolution. Speaking of the probable dissatisfaction of Marx and Engels with the agitation conducted by Stephan Born, Mehring expresses himself too mildly and too evasively. In 1885, in his preface to the *Ent-hüllungen über den Kommunistenprozeß zu Köln*,<sup>1</sup> Zürich, Engels, in writing about Born, said that the members of the Communist League stood everywhere at the head of the extreme democratic movement, proving thereby that the League was an excellent school of revolutionary action. And he went on to say:

"Finally, the compositor Stephan Born, who had worked in Brussels and Paris as an active member of the League, founded a *Workers' Brotherhood (Arbeiter Verbrüderung)* in Berlin which gained a fairly wide distribution and existed until 1850. Born, a very talented young man, who however was a little too much in a hurry in his conversion into a big political figure, 'fraternised' with the most miscellaneous ragtag and bobtail (*Kreti und Plethi*) in order to get a crowd together and was not at all the man

<sup>1</sup> *Revelations About the Trial of the Communists at Cologne.*

who could bring unity into the discordant tendencies, light into the chaos. Consequently, in the official publications of the association the views represented in the *Communist Manifesto* occur mingled hodge-podge with guild recollections and aspirations, fragments of Louis Blanc and Proudhon, protectionism, etc; in short they desired to be all things to all men (*Allen Alles sein*). In particular, strikes, trade unions and producers' co-operatives were set going and it was forgotten that what had to be done above all was by political victories to conquer the territory on which alone such things could be realised in the long run." (Our italics.) "When, afterwards, the victories of the reaction made the leaders of the *Brotherhood* realise the necessity of directly entering the revolutionary struggle, they were naturally left in the lurch by the confused mass which they had grouped around themselves. Born took part in the May insurrection of 1849 in Dresden, and had a lucky escape. But the *Workers' Brotherhood*, as against the great political movement of the proletariat, proved to be a purely separatist body which to a large extent only existed on paper and played such a subordinate role that the reaction found it necessary to suppress it only in 1850, and its surviving branches some years later. Born, whose real name was Buttermilch" (Buttermilk), "did not become a big political figure but a petty Swiss professor who no longer translates Marx into guild language, but the meek Renan into his own fulsome German."

That is how Engels appraised the two tactics of Social-Democracy in the democratic revolution!

Our new *Iskra*-ists are also bent on Economism, and with such unreasonable zeal as to earn the praises of the monarchist bourgeoisie for their "enlightenment." They too collect round themselves a motley crowd, by flattering the Economists, by demagogically attracting the unconscious masses by the slogans of "self-activity," "democracy," "autonomy," etc., etc. Their labour unions, too, often exist only on the pages of the braggart new *Iskra*.<sup>1</sup> Their slogans and resolutions display an equal lack of comprehension of the tasks of the "great political movement of the proletariat."

<sup>1</sup> Literally in the Russian "the Khlestakov new *Iskra*." Khlestakov is a character in Gogol's comedy, *The Inspector General*, who is presented as a liar and braggart.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

## THE STAGES, TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION \*

1. THE labour movement rouses the proletariat immediately under the leadership of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and *awakens* the liberal bourgeoisie: 1895 to 1901-02.

2. The labour movement passes to open political struggle and *carries with it* the politically awakened strata of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie: 1901-02 to 1905.

3. The labour movement flares up into a direct *revolution*, while the liberal bourgeoisie has already united in a Constitutional-Democratic Party and thinks of stopping the revolution by compromising with tsarism; but the *radical* elements of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are inclined to enter into an alliance with the proletariat for the *continuation of the revolution*: 1905 (especially the end of that year).

4. The labour movement is victorious in the *democratic* revolution, the liberals passively temporising and the *peasants* actively assisting. To this must be added the radical republican intelligentsia and the corresponding strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie. The uprising of the peasants is victorious, the power of the landlords is broken.

(“The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.”)

5. The liberal bourgeoisie, temporising in the third period, passive in the fourth, becomes downright counter-revolutionary, and organises itself in order to filch from the proletariat the gains of the revolution. The whole of the well-to-do section of the peasantry and a large part of the middle peasantry also grow “wiser,” quieten down and turn to the side of the counter-revolution in order to wrest power from the proletariat and the rural poor, who sympathise with the proletariat.

6. On the basis of the relations established during the fifth period, a new crisis and a new struggle blaze forth; the proletariat is now fighting to preserve its democratic gains for the sake of a socialist revolution. This struggle would be almost hopeless for the Russian proletariat alone and its defeat would be as inevitable as the defeat of the German revolutionary party in 1849-50, or as the defeat of the French proletariat in 1871, if the *European socialist proletariat* should not come to the assistance of the Russian proletariat.

Thus, at this stage, the liberal bourgeoisie and the well-to-do peasantry (and partly the middle peasantry) organise counter-revolution. The Russian proletariat *plus* the European proletariat organise revolution.

Under such conditions the Russian proletariat can win a second victory. The cause is no longer hopeless. The second victory will be the *socialist revolution in Europe*.

The European workers will show us "how to do it" and then in conjunction with them, we shall bring about the socialist revolution.

Written at the beginning of 1906.



**PART II**

**THE AGRARIAN-PEASANT QUESTION IN THE  
REVOLUTION OF 1905-07**



## THE ATTITUDE OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY TOWARD THE PEASANT MOVEMENT \*

THE enormous importance of the peasant movement in the democratic revolution through which Russia is now passing has been repeatedly explained in the whole of the Social-Democratic press. As is well known, the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party adopted a special resolution on this question in order to define more exactly and to co-ordinate the activities of the whole party of the class conscious proletariat precisely with regard to the present peasant movement. Despite the fact that the resolution was prepared in advance (the first draft was published in *Vperyod*, No. 11, March 23 [10], 1905\*\*), despite the fact that it was carefully discussed at the Party Congress, which took pains to formulate the views that had become established in the whole of Russian Social-Democracy, in spite of all this, the resolution has caused perplexity among a number of comrades working in Russia. The Saratov Committee has unanimously declared this resolution to be unacceptable. (See *Proletary*, No. 10.) Unfortunately, the desire we expressed at the time, to obtain an explanation of that verdict, has not been fulfilled so far. We only know that the Saratov Committee has also declared the agrarian resolution passed by the new *Iskra*-ist Conference to be unacceptable,\*\*\* consequently it was satisfied neither with what was common to both resolutions, nor with that which distinguishes one from the other.

New material on this question is provided by a letter we have received from a Moscow comrade (issued in the form of a hectographed leaflet). We print this letter in full:

### “AN OPEN LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND TO COMRADES WORKING IN THE RURAL DISTRICTS

“Comrades! The regional organisation of the Moscow Committee has begun to take up work among the peasants. The lack of sufficient experience in organising such work, the special conditions prevailing in the

rural districts of Central Russia and also the lack of clarity in the directives contained in the resolutions of the Third Congress on this question, the almost complete absence of literature in the periodical and other press on work among the peasants compel us to appeal to the Central Committee to send us detailed directives, theoretical and practical, while we ask you, comrades, who are doing similar work, to inform us of the results you have obtained in practical work.

"We consider it necessary to inform you of the perplexity with which we read the resolution of the Third Congress 'on the attitude toward the peasant movement' and of the organisational plan, which we are already beginning to apply in our work in the rural districts.

"a) To make known among wide strata of the people that Social-Democracy sets itself the task of energetically supporting all the revolutionary measures of the peasantry which are calculated to improve its position, including the confiscation of all land belonging to the landlords, the state, the church, the monasteries and the imperial family.' (From the resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.)

"This paragraph first of all does not state clearly how the Party organisations will, or should, carry on their propaganda. Propaganda requires, first and foremost, an organisation which must be closely connected with those whom the propaganda is to affect. The question as to whether committees consisting of the rural proletariat will comprise these organisations, or whether other organisational means of oral and written propaganda may be adopted, is left open.

"The same may be said of the promise to render energetic support. To support, and what is more, to support energetically, is possible only if local organisations exist. The question of 'energetic support' seems to us generally to be a very obscure one. Can Social-Democracy support the expropriation of those landlords' estates which are most intensively cultivated with the aid of machines, higher grade crops, etc.? The transfer of such estates to the hands of petty-bourgeois proprietors, however important it may be for the purpose of improving their position, would be a step backward from the standpoint of the capitalist development of the given estate. In our opinion, we, as Social-Democrats, should have made certain reservations on this point of 'support': 'if the expropriation of this land and its transference to peasant (petty-bourgeois) ownership results in a higher form of economic development on these estates.'

"Further:

"d) To strive for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and for its fusion with the urban proletariat under the banner of the Social-Democratic Party, and to secure the election of its representatives to the peasant committees.'

"Doubts arise in respect to the latter part of this paragraph. The fact is that the bourgeois-democratic organisations, such as the 'Peasant Union,'\* and reactionary-utopian organisations, such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries, organise under their banner both the bourgeois and the proletarian elements of the peasantry. By electing our own representatives of the rural proletarian organisations to such 'peasant' committees, we shall be contradicting ourselves, our views on entering a 'bloc,' etc.

"And here, too, we believe, amendments, and very serious ones, are needed.

"These are a few general remarks on the resolutions of the Third Congress. It is desirable to have these answered as soon and in as great detail as possible.

"As regards the plan for 'village' organisations in our regional organisation, we are obliged to work under conditions which the resolutions of the Third Congress altogether ignore. First of all we must note that the area of our activity—the Moscow Gubernia and the adjoining uyezds of the neighbouring gubernias—is mainly an industrial area with a relatively 'undeveloped system of peasant home industries and with a very small section of the population engaged *exclusively* in agriculture. Big textile mills, each employing 10,000 to 15,000 workers are interspersed among small factories employing 500 to 1000 workers scattered in out-of-the-way hamlets and villages. One would think that under such conditions Social-Democracy would find a most favourable ground for its activity here, but facts have proved that such bird's eye conjectures are faulty. The overwhelming majority of our 'proletariat' even now, in spite of the fact that certain factories have been in existence for 40 to 50 years, has not become divorced from the land. The 'village' has such a strong hold over it that none of the psychological and other prerequisites, which a 'pure' proletariat acquires in the course of collective work, develop among our proletarians. The type of farming carried on by our 'proletarians' is of a somewhat mongrel kind. The weaver who works in a factory hires an agricultural labourer to till his tiny plot. The same piece of land is cultivated by his wife (if she does not work in the factory), his children, old men, invalids, and the worker himself will also work on it, when he gets old, becomes an invalid or is dismissed for violent or 'unreliable' behaviour.

"Such 'proletarians' can hardly be called proletarians. Their economic status is that of a pauper. Their ideology is that of a petty bourgeois. They are ignorant and conservative. It is from among these that the 'Black Hundred' elements are recruited. Lately, however, their class consciousness has begun to awaken. We try to rouse, and not without success, these ignorant masses from their age-long slumber by using the 'pure' proletariat as footholds, as it were. They are growing in number and in places are becoming firmer, the paupers are coming under our influence, are beginning to adopt our ideology, both in the factory and in the village. And we believe that it will not be unorthodox to form organisations in an environment that is not 'purely' proletarian. We have no other environment, and if we were to insist on orthodoxy and organise only the 'rural proletariat,' we would have to dissolve our, as well as the neighbouring, organisations. We know we shall have difficulties in fighting against the burning desire to expropriate the arable and other land neglected by the landlords, or those lands which the fathers in hoods and cassocks have not been able to manage properly. We know that bourgeois democracy, from the 'democratic' monarchist faction (such a faction exists in the Ruza Uyezd) down to the Peasant Union, will fight us for influence among the 'paupers,' but we shall set the latter against the former. We shall employ all the Social-Democratic forces in the districts, both the intellectuals and the proletarian workers, to set up and consolidate our Social-Democratic 'pauper' committees. And we shall do it in accordance with the following plan. In each uyezd town, or big

industrial centre, we shall set up uyezd committees of groups of the regional organisation. The uyezd committee, in addition to setting up factory committees in its district, will also set up 'peasant' committees. For considerations of secrecy, these committees must not be numerous, and they must consist of the most revolutionary and capable peasant paupers. In places where there are both factories and peasants, it is necessary to organise workers and peasants in a single committee or a sub-group.

"These committees must first and foremost be able to understand clearly and distinctly the local conditions:

- "A) Agrarian relationships: 1) peasant's allotments, leases, form of tenure (communal, individual, etc.); 2) the local land: a) to whom it belongs, b) the amount of land, c) what relation the peasant has to this land, d) on what terms the land is let: i. labour rent, ii. excessive rent for *otrezki*,<sup>1</sup> e) indebtedness to kulaks, landlords, etc.
- "B) Imposts, taxes, the rate of assessment of peasant and landlords' lands respectively.
- "C) Migratory occupations and peasant handicrafts, passports, winter hiring, etc.
- "D) Local factories and works: labour conditions at same: 1) wages; 2) working day; 3) the conduct of the management towards the workers; 4) housing conditions, etc.
- "E) Administration: the Zemsky Nachalnik, the village headman, the clerk, the volost judges, constables, priest.
- "F) The Zemstvo: the peasant councillors, the Zemstvo employees: the teachers, doctor, libraries, schools, tea houses.
- "G) The volost meetings: their composition and procedure.
- "H) Organisations: 'Peasant Union,' Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democrats.

"After collecting all these data, the Peasant Social-Democratic Committee must have resolutions passed at village meetings condemning abuses and irregularities that may occur. This committee should simultaneously carry on intense propaganda and agitation for the ideas of Social-Democracy among the masses, organise circles, small and mass meetings, distribute manifestoes and literature, collect money for the Party funds and maintain contact with the regional organisation through the uyezd group.

"If we succeed in setting up a number of such committees the success of Social-Democracy will be assured.

*"Regional Organiser."*

It goes without saying that we shall not undertake the task of working out the detailed practical directives to which the comrade refers: this is a matter for the local workers and the central body in Russia which is guiding the practical work. We propose to take the opportunity presented by our Moscow comrade's interesting letter to explain the resolution of the Third

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 7.\*—Ed.

Congress and the urgent tasks of the Party in general. It is obvious from the letter that the misunderstandings caused by the resolution of the Third Congress are only partly due to theoretical doubts. The other source is the *new* question, which has not arisen before, about the relation between the "revolutionary peasant committees" and the "*Social-Democratic Committees*" which are working among the peasants. The fact that this question has been raised testifies to the great progress Social-Democratic work among the peasants has made. Questions which are relatively questions of detail are now being forced to the front by the practical needs of "rural" agitation, which is beginning to acquire strength and assume solid, permanent form. And the author of the letter more than once forgets that by blaming the resolution for its vagueness, he, in fact, is seeking an answer to a question which the Congress of the Party did not and could not raise.

For instance, the author is not quite right when he says that the propaganda of our ideas and the support of the peasant movement are possible "only" if local organisations exist. Of course such organisations are desirable, and as the work increases they will even become necessary; but such work is possible and necessary even where no such organisations exist. In all our activities, even when carried on exclusively among the urban proletariat, we must never lose sight of the peasant problem and must broadcast the declaration made by the *whole party of the class conscious proletariat* as represented by the Third Congress, namely, that we support the peasant uprising. The peasants must know this—from literature, from the workers, from special organisations, etc. The peasants must know that the Social-Democratic proletariat, in giving this support, will *not shrink* from confiscating the land (*i.e.*, expropriation without compensation to the owners).

The author of the letter here raises a theoretical question, *viz.*, whether the demand for the expropriation of the big estates and their transfer to "peasant, petty-bourgeois ownership" should be restricted by a special reservation. But by proposing such a reservation the author has arbitrarily restricted the meaning

of the resolution of the Third Congress. There is *not a word* in the resolution about the Social-Democratic Party undertaking to support the transfer of the confiscated land to petty-bourgeois proprietors. The resolution states: we support . . . "including confiscation," *i.e.*, including expropriation without compensation, but the resolution does not in any way decide to whom the expropriated land is to be given. This question was not left open by chance: it is obvious from the articles in *Vperyod* (Nos. 11, 12, 15) that it was deemed unwise to decide this question in advance. It was stated there, for instance, that under a democratic republic, Social-Democracy cannot pledge itself and tie its hands in regard to the nationalisation of the land.

Indeed, unlike the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries, we lay the main emphasis *at the present time* on the revolutionary-democratic aspect of the peasant uprising and the special organisation of the rural proletariat into a class party. The crux of the question now is not the projects of "Black Redistribution," or nationalisation, but to make the peasants conscious of the necessity of securing the *revolutionary* break-up of the old order and of their breaking it up. That is why the Socialist-Revolutionaries are so keen on "nationalisation," etc., while we are keen on *revolutionary peasant committees*. We say that without the latter all reforms are reduced to nought. It is only with them and by leaning for support on them that the *victory of the peasant rising will become possible*.

We must assist the peasant uprising in every way, including the confiscation of the land, but certainly not *including all sorts of petty-bourgeois projects*. We support the peasant movement in so far as it is revolutionary and democratic. We are making ready (making ready at once, immediately) to fight it in so far as it becomes reactionary and anti-proletarian. The whole essence of Marxism lies in that double task, which only those who do not understand Marxism can vulgarise or compress into one simple task.

Let us take a concrete example. Let us assume that the peasant uprising is victorious. The revolutionary peasant commit-

tees and the provisional revolutionary government (partly relying on these very committees) are able to carry out the confiscation of large property. We stand for confiscation, we have declared that already. But to whom shall we recommend that the confiscated land be given? We have not tied our hands on this question, and never shall do so, by declarations like those carelessly proposed by the author of the letter. The author has forgotten that the resolution of the Third Congress speaks first of "*purging the revolutionary-democratic content of the peasant movement of all reactionary admixtures,*" and, secondly, of the necessity "*in all cases and under all circumstances of independently organising the rural proletariat.*" Such are our directives. There will always be reactionary admixtures in the peasant movement, and we declare war on them in advance. Class antagonism between the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie is inevitable, and we reveal it in advance, explain it and prepare for the struggle on the basis of it. One of the immediate causes of such a struggle may very likely be the question: to whom shall the confiscated land be given, and how? We do not gloss over that question, we do not promise equal distribution, "socialisation,"\* etc. What we say is this: this is a question we shall fight out later on, we shall fight again, on a new field and with other allies. Then, we shall certainly be with the rural proletariat, with the whole of the working class against the peasant bourgeoisie. Practically, this may mean the transfer of the land to the class of petty peasant proprietors—wherever the big estates based on bondage and servitude still prevail, where there are as yet no material prerequisites for large-scale socialist production; it may mean nationalisation—provided the democratic revolution is completely victorious; or the big capitalist estates may be transferred to *workers' associations*, for, from the democratic revolution we shall at once, according to the degree of our strength, the strength of the class conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half way. The reason we do not now and immediately promise all sorts of "socialisation" is precisely that we know the

conditions that are required for that task and that we do not gloss over but reveal the new class struggle that is maturing in the ranks of the peasantry.

At first we support to the end by all means, including confiscation, the peasantry generally against the landlords and then (or rather, not "then," but at the same time) we support the proletariat against the peasantry in general. To try now to calculate the combination of forces among the peasantry on "the morrow" of the (democratic) revolution is sheer utopia. Without indulging in any adventurism or betraying our scientific conscience, without striving after cheap popularity, we can and do say *only one thing*: we shall with all our might help the whole of the peasantry to make the democratic revolution *in order that* it may be *easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as quickly as possible, to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution. We do not promise harmony, equality, "socialisation" as a result of the victory of the *present* peasant uprising—on the contrary, we "promise" a new struggle, new inequality, a new revolution, towards which we are striving. Our doctrine is not as "sweet" as the tales of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but let whoever wants to be fed entirely on sweets join the Socialist-Revolutionaries; we shall say to such people—a good riddance to you.

In our opinion this Marxian standpoint also settles the question of the committees. In our opinion *there should be no Social-Democratic peasant committees*: if they are to be Social-Democratic, it means that they are not to be purely peasant committees; if they are to be peasant committees, it means that they are not to be purely proletarian, not Social-Democratic committees. There are many who would confuse these two, but we are not of their number. Wherever possible we shall strive to set up *our* committees, the committees of the *Social-Democratic Labour Party*. They will be joined by peasants, paupers, intellectuals, prostitutes (a worker recently asked us in a letter why we do not agitate among the prostitutes), soldiers, teachers and workers—in short, *all Social-Democrats and none but Social-Democrats*. These committees will conduct the whole of

Social-Democratic work in all its scope, but they will strive to organise separately especially among the rural proletariat, for Social-Democracy is the class party of the proletariat. To consider it "unorthodox" to organise the proletariat which has not entirely freed itself from various relics of the past is a *great delusion* and we would like to think that the corresponding passages of the letter are due to a mere misunderstanding. The urban and industrial proletariat will inevitably become the basic nucleus of our Social-Democratic Labour Party, but we must attract to it, enlighten and organise all toilers and all the exploited as is stated in our programme—all without exception: handicraftsmen, paupers, beggars, servants, tramps, prostitutes—of course, subject to the necessary and obligatory condition that they join Social-Democracy and not that Social-Democracy join them, that they adopt the standpoint of the proletariat and not that the proletariat adopt theirs.

The reader may ask—what is the use, then, of revolutionary peasant committees? Does this mean that they are not necessary? No, it does not. They are necessary. Our ideal is: in all rural districts there must be purely Social-Democratic committees, and then there must be an agreement between them and *all* the revolutionary-democratic elements, groups and circles of peasantry in order to set up revolutionary committees. This is analogous to the independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in the cities and its alliance with all the revolutionary-democrats for the purpose of an uprising. We are in favour of a peasant uprising. We are absolutely opposed to the mixing and merging of heterogeneous class elements and heterogeneous parties. We are in favour of Social-Democracy pushing forward, for the purpose of the uprising, the *whole* of revolutionary democracy, assisting the organisation of the *whole* of it, marching *shoulder to shoulder* with it, but without merging with it, to the barricades in the cities and against the landlords and the police in the villages.

September 14 (1), 1905.

## PETTY-BOURGEOIS AND PROLETARIAN SOCIALISM \*

OF all the various doctrines of socialism, Marxism is now the predominant one in Europe, and the struggle for the achievement of the socialist order is almost entirely a struggle waged by the working class led by the Social-Democratic Parties. But this complete predominance of proletarian socialism based on the teachings of Marxism was not secured all at once; it was secured only after a long struggle against all sorts of obsolete doctrines, against petty-bourgeois socialism, anarchism, etc. Some thirty years ago, Marxism was not predominant even in Germany, where the prevailing views at that time were, strictly speaking, transitional, mixed and eclectic, halfway between petty-bourgeois socialism and proletarian socialism. And in the Latin countries, in France, Spain and Belgium, the most widespread doctrines among advanced workers were Proudhonism, Blanquism and anarchism, which distinctly expressed the viewpoint of the petty bourgeois and not that of the proletarian.

What was the reason for this rapid and complete victory of Marxism precisely during the last decade? The political and economic development of contemporary societies, the whole experience of the revolutionary movement and of the struggle of the oppressed classes have more and more confirmed the correctness of the Marxian views. The decay of the petty bourgeoisie inevitably led to the decay, sooner or later, of all petty-bourgeois prejudices, while the growth of capitalism and the intensification of the class struggle in capitalist society served as the best means of agitation in favour of the ideas of proletarian socialism.

The backwardness of Russia naturally accounts for the firm hold which various obsolete socialist doctrines gained in our country. The whole history of Russian revolu-

tionary thought during the last quarter of the century is the history of the struggle of Marxism against petty-bourgeois Narodnik socialism. And while the rapid growth and remarkable successes of the Russian labour movement have already secured the victory of Marxism also in Russia, on the other hand, the development of an indubitably revolutionary peasant movement—especially after the famous peasant revolts in Little Russia<sup>1</sup> in 1902\*—has caused a slight revival of decrepit and senile Narodnik tendencies. The obsolete Narodnik theories, with a new varnish of fashionable European opportunism (revisionism, Bernsteinism, criticism of Marx), comprise the whole of the peculiar ideological 'stock-in-trade' of the so-called Socialist-Revolutionaries. Therefore, the peasant question occupies the central position in the controversies between the Marxists, on the one hand, and the pure Narodniki and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, on the other.

The Narodnik theories to a certain extent represented a logical and consistent doctrine. They denied the rule of capitalism in Russia; they denied the role of the factory workers as the front rank fighters of the whole of the proletariat; they denied the importance of a political revolution and bourgeois political liberty; they preached immediate socialist revolution, which was to emanate from the peasant commune with its petty forms of husbandry. Only rags and tatters of this complete theory are left now, but in order to understand the controversies of the present day intelligently, and to prevent these disputes from degenerating into mere squabbles, it is always necessary to bear in mind the general and basic Narodnik *roots* of the errors of our Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The Narodniki thought that the man of the future in Russia was the muzhik, and this view inevitably arose from the faith in the socialist character of the peasant commune, from the lack of faith in the destinies of capitalism. The Marxists thought that the man of the future in Russia was the worker, and the development of Russian capitalism both in agriculture and in industry provides increasing confirmation of their views. The labour

<sup>1</sup> The Ukraine.—Ed. Eng. ed.

movement in Russia has won recognition for itself, but as regards the peasant movement, the wide gulf that separates the Narodnik theories from Marxism is revealed to this day in the difference in their *interpretations* of this movement. According to the Narodniki, the peasant movement is a refutation of Marxism; it is a movement in favour of an immediate socialist revolution; it does not recognise bourgeois political liberty; it emanates not from large-scale production but precisely from small production. In a word, according to the Narodniki, it is the peasant movement that represents the genuine, truly socialist and directly socialist movement. The Narodnik faith in the peasant commune and the Narodnik brand of anarchism fully explain why such conclusions are inevitable.

To the Marxist, the peasant movement is precisely a democratic and not a socialist movement. In Russia, just as was the case in other countries, it is a necessary companion of the democratic revolution, which is bourgeois in its social and economic content. It is not in the least directed against the foundations of the bourgeois order, against commodity production, against capital. On the contrary, it is directed against the old, serf, pre-capitalist relationships in the rural districts and against landlordism, which is the mainstay of all the remnants of serfdom. Therefore the complete victory of this peasant movement will not abolish capitalism; on the contrary, it will create a broader foundation for its development, and will hasten and intensify purely capitalist development. A complete victory of the peasant uprising can only create a stronghold for a democratic bourgeois republic within which a clear-cut proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie will for the first time develop.

These, then, are the two opposite views which must be clearly understood by anyone who wishes to understand fully the gulf that divides the principles of the Socialist-Revolutionaries from those of the Social-Democrats. According to one view, the peasant movement is a socialist movement, while according to the other, it is a democratic, bourgeois movement. Hence one can see what ignorance is displayed by our Socialist-Revolutionaries when they repeat for the hundredth time (compare, for example,

*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*,<sup>1</sup> No. 75) that orthodox Marxists have always "ignored" the peasant question. There is only one way of combating such crass ignorance and that is by repeating the A B C, by exposing the old consistently Narodnik views, by pointing out for the hundredth or the thousandth time that the real difference between us is not that one desires and the other does not desire to reckon with the peasant question, not that one recognises and the other ignores it; the difference lies in our respective *appraisal* of the present-day peasant movement and the present-day peasant question in Russia. Those who say that the Marxists "ignore" the peasant question in Russia are, first, complete ignoramuses, for all the principal works of the Russian Marxists, beginning with Plekhanov's *Our Differences* (which appeared over twenty years ago), were principally devoted to explaining the errors of the Narodnik views on the Russian peasant question. Secondly, those who say that the Marxists "ignore" the peasant question prove thereby their desire to shirk the task of making a complete estimation of the real difference of principles on the question: is the present-day peasant movement a democratic bourgeois movement or not? Is it objectively directed against the remnants of serfdom or not?

The Socialist-Revolutionaries have never given and never can give a clear and precise answer to this question, because they are hopelessly at sea about the old views of the Narodniki and the present-day Marxist views on the peasant question in Russia. The Marxists say that the Socialist-Revolutionaries adopt the standpoint of the petty bourgeoisie (are the ideologists of the petty bourgeoisie) precisely because they cannot rid themselves of petty-bourgeois illusions and of the phantasies of the Narodniki when appraising the peasant movement.

That is precisely why we have to repeat the A B C all over again. What is the peasant movement in Russia today striving for? It is striving for land and liberty. What will be the significance of the complete victory of this movement? After gaining liberty it will abolish the rule of the landlords and officials in

<sup>1</sup> *Revolutionary Russia*—the organ of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, published in Geneva during the years 1902-05.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the administration of the state. After securing the land, it will transfer the landlords' estates to the peasants. Will the fullest liberty and the most complete expropriation of the landlords (the expropriation of their estates) eliminate commodity production? No, it will not. Will the fullest liberty and the most complete expropriation of the landlords abolish individual farming by peasant households on communal, or "socialised," land? No, it will not. Will the fullest liberty and the most complete expropriation of the landlords bridge the wide gulf that separates the rich peasant owning many horses and cows from the farm hand, the day labourer, *i.e.*, the gulf that separates the peasant bourgeoisie from the rural proletariat? No, it will not. On the contrary, the more completely the highest *estate* (the landlords) is crushed and annihilated, the deeper will be the *class* distinctions between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. What will be the objective significance of the complete victory of the peasant uprising? This victory will finally destroy all the remnants of serfdom; but it will not destroy the bourgeois economic system. It will not destroy capitalism or the division of society into classes—into rich and poor, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Why is the peasant movement of today a democratic bourgeois movement? Because, after destroying the power of the officials and landlords, it will set up a democratic system of society, without, however, altering the bourgeois foundation of that democratic society, without abolishing the rule of capital. What should be the attitude of a class conscious worker, a Socialist, to the present-day peasant movement? He must support this movement, help the peasants in the most energetic fashion, help them finally and completely to throw off the rule of the officials and of the landlords. But at the same time he must explain to the peasants that it is not sufficient to overthrow the rule of officialdom and of the landlords. In overthrowing this rule they must at the same time prepare for the abolition of the rule of capital, the rule of the bourgeoisie, and for that purpose it is necessary immediately to preach the socialist, *i.e.*, the Marxian, doctrine in full and unite, weld together and organise the rural proletariat for the struggle against the peas-

ant bourgeoisie and against the whole of the Russian bourgeoisie. Can a class conscious worker ignore the democratic struggle for the sake of the socialist struggle, or ignore the latter for the sake of the former? No, a class conscious worker calls himself a Social-Democrat precisely because he understands the interrelation between the two struggles. He knows that there is no other road to socialism but the road through democracy, through political liberty. He therefore strives for the complete and consistent achievement of democracy for the sake of attaining the ultimate goal—socialism. Why are not the conditions for the democratic struggle the same as the conditions for the socialist struggle? Because the workers will necessarily have different allies in those two struggles. The workers wage the democratic struggle together with a section of the bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the workers wage the socialist struggle against the whole of the bourgeoisie. The struggle against the officials and landlords can and must be waged together with all the peasants, even the well-to-do and the middle peasants. On the other hand, the struggle against the bourgeoisie, and therefore against the well-to-do peasants, can only be waged in a reliable manner together with the rural proletariat.

If we remember all these elementary Marxian truths, the analysis of which the Socialist-Revolutionaries always prefer to avoid, we shall have no difficulty in appraising their "latest" objections to Marxism, such as the following:

"Why," exclaims *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* (No. 75), "was it necessary to support first 'the peasants in general' against the landlord, and then (*i.e.*, at the same time) to support the proletariat against 'the peasant' in general, instead of at once supporting the proletariat against the landlord; and what Marxism has to do with this—heaven alone knows."

This is the standpoint of the most primitive, childishly naive anarchism. For many centuries and even for thousands of years mankind has been dreaming of destroying "all at once" all and every kind of exploitation. However, these remained mere dreams until millions of the exploited all over the world began to

unite for a well-sustained, persevering, all-round struggle for the transformation of bourgeois society in the direction which the evolution of that society is naturally taking. The socialist dreams were transformed into a socialist struggle of millions of people only when the scientific socialism of Marx had connected the striving for change with the struggle of a definite class. Separated from the class struggle socialism is either an empty phrase or a naive dream. But in Russia two different struggles of two different social forces are proceeding before our very eyes. The proletariat is fighting against the bourgeoisie wherever capitalist relations of production exist (and they exist—let it be known to our Socialist-Revolutionaries—even in the peasant commune, *i.e.*, on the land which from their standpoint is one hundred per cent “socialised” land). The peasantry, as a stratum of small landowners, of the petty bourgeoisie, is fighting against all the remnants of serfdom, against the officials and the landlords. Only those who are completely ignorant of political economy and of the history of revolutions in all countries can fail to see the difference between these two distinct, heterogeneous, social wars. To evade the dissimilarity between these wars by using the term “at once” is like hiding one’s head under one’s wing and refusing to analyse the actual conditions.

Having lost the completeness of views of the old Narodism the Socialist-Revolutionaries have even forgotten much of the teachings of the Narodniki themselves. *Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya* writes in the same article as follows:

“By helping the peasantry to expropriate the landlords, Mr. Lenin is unconsciously assisting in building up a petty-bourgeois economic system on the ruins of the more or less developed forms of capitalist agriculture. Is not this a ‘step backward’ from the standpoint of orthodox Marxism?”

Shame on you, gentlemen! Surely you have forgotten your own Mr. V. V.! Refer to his *The Destiny of Capitalism*, to the *Outlines* by Mr. N—on\* and to other sources of your wisdom. You will recollect then that landlord farming in Russia possesses features both of capitalism and of serfdom. You will know then that there is a system of economy based on labour rent, this

direct survival of *barshchina*.<sup>1</sup> If, moreover, you take the trouble to consult such an orthodox Marxian book as the third volume of Marx's *Capital*, you will find that nowhere could the *barshchina* system develop and nowhere did it develop into capitalism except through the medium of petty-bourgeois peasant farming. You resort to too primitive methods, methods which were exposed long ago, to trounce the Marxists: you ascribe to Marxism a grotesquely vulgar concept of a direct transition from large-scale feudal economy to capitalist economy. You say: the yield on the landlord estates is higher than on the peasant farms, consequently, the expropriation of the landlords is a step backward. This argument is worthy of a fourth form schoolboy. Just think, gentlemen: was the separation of the low yielding peasant lands from the high yielding landlords' estates at the time of the abolition of serfdom a "step backward"?

Contemporary landlord economy in Russia combines within itself features of both capitalism and serfdom. Objectively, the present struggle of the peasants against the landlords is a struggle against the survivals of serfdom. But to attempt to enumerate all the individual cases, weigh every individual case, define with the precision of chemist's scales exactly where serfdom ends and capitalism proper begins is tantamount to ascribing one's own pedantry to the Marxists. We cannot calculate what portion of the price of food stuffs bought from a petty trader represents labour value and what part of it represents swindling, etc. Does that mean, gentlemen, that we must discard the labour theory of value?

Contemporary landlord economy combines within itself features of both capitalism and serfdom. But only pedants can conclude from this that we are obliged to weigh, count and copy out every little feature in every particular instance and place it in this or that social category. Only utopians can conclude from this that "there is no need" for us to draw a distinction between the two different social wars. Indeed, the only conclu-

<sup>1</sup>The Russian term for feudal labour service rendered by the serf to the lord of the manor. Termed labour rent by Marx. See *Capital*, Vol. III, chap. XLVII, "Genesis of Capitalist Ground-Rent." See also Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. I.—Ed. Eng. ed.

sion that does follow from this is that in our programme and tactics we must combine the purely proletarian struggle against capitalism with the general democratic (and general peasant) struggle against serfdom.

The more marked the capitalist features are in present-day landlord semi-feudal economy, the more imperatively necessary is it at once to organise the rural proletariat separately, for this will help purely capitalist, or purely proletarian, antagonisms to assert themselves the sooner—whenever confiscation takes place. The more marked the capitalist features are in landlord economy, the sooner will democratic confiscation give an impetus to the real struggle for socialism—and, consequently, the more dangerous is the false idealisation of the democratic revolution by the use of the catchword “socialisation.” Such is the conclusion one must draw from the fact that contemporary landlord economy is a mixture of capitalism and serfdom.

Thus, we must combine the purely proletarian struggle with the general peasant struggle, but not confuse the two. We must support the general democratic and general peasant struggle, but we must not become submerged in this non-class struggle, we must never idealise it by false catchwords such as “socialisation,” we must never forget about the necessity of organising both the urban and the rural proletariat into an entirely independent class party of Social-Democracy. While supporting the most determined democracy to the very end, this party will not allow itself to be diverted from the revolutionary path by reactionary dreams and experiments in “equalisation” under the system of commodity production. The peasants’ struggle against the landlords is now a revolutionary struggle; the confiscation of the landlords’ estates is revolutionary in every respect at the present stage of economic and political evolution and we support this revolutionary-democratic measure. However, to call this measure “socialisation,” to deceive oneself and the people concerning the possibility of “equal” land tenure under the system of commodity production—is a reactionary petty-bourgeois utopia, which we leave to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

November (October) 1905.

**THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY  
IN THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1905-07\***



## THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY IN THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1905-07

THE two years of revolution, from the autumn of 1905 to the autumn of 1907, furnished a vast amount of historical experience concerning the peasant movement in Russia and the character and importance of the peasants' struggle for land. Decades of so-called "peaceful" evolution (*i.e.*, when millions of people peacefully allow themselves to be fleeced by the upper ten thousand) can never furnish such a wealth of material for explaining the inner working of our social system as has been furnished in these two years by the direct struggle of the peasant masses against the landlords, and by the more or less free expression of the demands of the peasants at assemblies of representatives of the people. Therefore, the revision of the agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democrats in the light of the experience of these two years appears to be absolutely necessary, particularly in view of the fact that the present agrarian programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was adopted at the Stockholm Congress in April 1906, *i.e.*, on the eve of the first public appearance of representatives of the peasantry from all parts of Russia with a peasant agrarian programme, in opposition to the programme of the government and that of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The revision of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme must be based upon the latest data on landed property in Russia in order to ascertain with the utmost precision what actually is the economic background of all the agrarian programmes of our epoch, and what precisely are the issues in the great historical struggle. This economic basis of the real struggle must be compared with the ideological-political reflection of the struggle that is found in the programmes, declarations, demands and

theories of the spokesmen of the different classes. This is the way, and the only way, a Marxist should proceed, unlike the petty-bourgeois socialist, who proceeds from "abstract" justice, from the theory of the "labour principle,"<sup>1</sup> etc., and unlike the liberal bureaucrat who, whenever the question of reform is raised, disguises the defence of the interests of the exploiters by arguments about whether the reform is practicable, about the "state" point of view, etc.

<sup>1</sup> "Labour principle," the principle of labour by members of the peasant household as opposed to wage labour (a term in vogue among the Socialist-Revolutionaries, derived from the theories of the Narodniki).—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

## CHAPTER I

### THE ECONOMIC BASIS AND SUBSTANCE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

#### 1. LAND OWNERSHIP IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

THE *Landed Property Statistics for 1905*, published by the Central Statistical Committee in 1907, enables us to ascertain precisely the comparative size of the holdings of the peasants and of the landlords in the fifty gubernias<sup>1</sup> in European Russia. First of all we will give the general data. The whole territory of European Russia (50 gubernias) is given (see census of January 27 [February 9], 1897) at 4,230,500 square versts, *i.e.*, 448,800,000 dessiatins.<sup>2</sup> The *Landed Property Statistics for 1905* registers a total of 395,200,000 dessiatins divided under the following three main headings:

	<i>Million dessiatins</i>
A. Privately Owned Land .....	101.7
B. Peasant Allotments .....	138.8
C. State and Church Land, and Land Owned by Various In- stitutions .....	154.7
	<hr/>
Total Land in European Russia.....	395.2

From this general figure it is necessary to deduct, first of all, state lands situated in the Far North and consisting partly of tundra and partly of such forest land as cannot be expected to be rendered fit for agriculture in the near future. There are 107,900,000 dessiatins of such land in the "northern region" (in the Archangel, Olonetz and Vologda gubernias). Of course, by deducting all these lands we considerably overesti-

<sup>1</sup> Gubernia (province), an administrative unit now abolished.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> Verst—.66 miles. Sq. verst—.44 sq. miles. Dessiatin—2.7 acres.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

mate the area of land unfit for agricultural purposes. Suffice it to point out that a cautious statistician like Mr. A. A. Kaufman calculates that in the Vologda and Olonez gubernias 25,700,000 dessiatins of forest could be utilised for additional allotment for the peasants (over and above the 25 per cent of forest land).<sup>1</sup> However, since we are dealing with general data about the land area, without singling out the data about forests, it will be more correct to take a rather cautious estimate of the land reserve suitable for agriculture. After deducting 107,900,000 dessiatins, there will be left 287,300,000 dessiatins, or in round figures, 280,000,000 dessiatins, leaving out a portion of urban land (altogether 2,000,000 dessiatins) and a portion of the state lands in the Vyatka and Perm gubernias (there are altogether 16,300,000 dessiatins of state lands in these two gubernias).

Thus the *aggregate* amount of land suitable for agriculture in European Russia is distributed as follows:

	<i>Million dessiatins</i>
A. Privately Owned Land .....	101.7
B. Peasant Allotments .....	138.8
C. State and Church Land, and Land Owned by Various Institutions .....	39.5
	<hr/>
Total in European Russia.....	280.0

Now we must separate the data about small and large holdings (particularly about the very large holdings) in order to portray concretely the environment of the peasant struggle for land in the Russian revolution. The data on this are incomplete however. Out of the 138,800,000 dessiatins of peasant allotment land, only 136,900,000 dessiatins are classified according to the size of holdings. Out of the 101,700,000 dessiatins of privately owned land, only 85,900,000 dessiatins are so classified; the remaining 15,800,000 dessiatins are recorded as being owned by "societies and associations." If we examine the latter we find that 11,300,000 dessiatins are owned by peasant societies

<sup>1</sup> *The Agrarian Question*, a collection of essays published by Dolgorukov and Patrunkovich, Vol. II, p. 305.

and associations, which on the whole implies small holdings; but unfortunately there is no classification as to size. Furthermore, 3,600,000 dessiatins are owned by "industrial, commercial and manufacturing associations, etc.," of which there are 1,042. Among these associations there are 272 which own more than 1,000 dessiatins each, the total for the 272 being 3,600,000 dessiatins. These constitute, obviously, landlords' latifundia. The bulk of this land is concentrated in the Perm Gubernia where *nine* such societies own 1,448,902 dessiatins! It is known that the Urals factories own tens of thousands of dessiatins of land, which is a direct survival of feudal and seigniorial latifundia in bourgeois Russia.

We shall therefore single out 3,600,000 dessiatins from the land owned by societies and associations as the largest form of holdings. The remainder has not been classified, but generally it consists of small holdings.

Out of the 39,500,000 dessiatins of state lands, etc., only the estates of the imperial family (5,100,000 dessiatins) lend themselves to classification as to size. These, too, are very large semi-medieval, landed estates. We thus get a total area of land, both classified and not classified according to size of holdings, as follows:

	<i>Classified Land Mill. dess.</i>	<i>Non- Classified Land Mill. dess.</i>
A. Privately Owned Land .....	89.5 <sup>1</sup>	12.2
B. Peasant Allotments .....	136.9	1.9
C. State Land and Land Belonging to Various Institutions .....	5.1	34.4
Total .....	231.5	48.5
Grand Total .....		280.0

Let us now classify the peasant allotments according to size of holdings. By compiling the data obtained from this source into somewhat larger groups, we get:

<sup>1</sup> 85,900,000 dessiatins of private landed property, plus 3,600,000 dessiatins of latifundia owned by industrial and trading associations and societies.

## PEASANT HOLDINGS

<i>Groups of Holdings</i>	<i>No. of Households</i>	<i>Amount of Land (dess.)</i>	<i>Average No. of Dessiatins per Household</i>
Up to and incl. 5 dess.....	2,857,650	9,030,333	3.1
5 to 8 dessiatins.....	3,317,601	21,706,550	6.5
<b>Total up to and incl. 8 dess.</b>	<b>6,175,251</b>	<b>30,736,883</b>	<b>4.9</b>
9 to 15 dess. inclusive.....	3,932,485	42,182,923	10.7
15 to 30 dess. inclusive.....	1,551,904	31,271,922	20.1
Over 30 dessiatins.....	617,715	32,695,510	52.9
<b>Total in European Russia</b>	<b>12,277,355</b>	<b>136,887,238</b>	<b>11.1</b>

From these data it may be seen that more than half of the households (6,200,000 out of 12,300,000) have up to 8 dessiatins each, *i.e.*, in general and on the average, an area of land that is absolutely insufficient to support a family. Ten million one hundred thousand households possess up to 15 dessiatins each (comprising a total of 72,900,000 dessiatins), *i.e.*, over four-fifths of the total number of households are, at the present technical stage of peasant agriculture, on the brink of starvation. Middle and well-to-do households—according to amount of land owned—number only 2,200,000 out of 12,300,000, owning altogether 63,900,000 dessiatins out of 136,900,000 dessiatins. Only those having more than 30 dessiatins each can be considered wealthy, and there are only 600,000 farms of this category, *i.e.*, one-twentieth of the total number of households. They possess nearly one-fourth of the total land area: 32,700,000 dessiatins out of 136,900,000 dessiatins. To give an idea as to which category of peasants this group of households, rich in land, belongs to, we shall point out that first place among them is occupied by the Cossacks. In the group of those having over 30 dessiatins per household, the Cossacks number 266,929 households with a total of 14,426,403 dessiatins, *i.e.*, the overwhelming majority of the Cossacks (in European Russia: 278,650 households with a total of 14,689,498 dessiatins of land, *i.e.*, an average of 52.7 dessiatins per household).

The only data available for the whole of Russia to enable us to judge how all the peasant households are approximately clas-

sified, according to the size of their farms and not according to the area of their allotments, are the data about the number of horses they own. According to the latest military horse census, 1888-91, the peasant households in 48 gubernias of European Russia were classified as follows:

		<i>Households</i>
Poor Peasants	{ Without Horses .....	2,765,970
	{ Owing 1 horse .....	2,885,192
Middle Peasants	{ Owing 2 horses .....	2,240,574
	{ Owing 3 horses .....	1,070,250
Well-to-do Peasants	{ Owing 4 horses or more .....	1,154,674
Total .....		<u>10,116,660</u>

On the whole this means: over one-half are poor (5,600,000 out of 10,100,000), about one-third are middle households (3,300,000 with 2 or 3 horses), and slightly over one-tenth are well-to-do peasants (1,100,000 out of 10,100,000).

Let us now examine the distribution of private landed property. The statistical data do not clearly enough indicate the smallest holdings, but they give details about the large latifundia.

#### PRIVATE LANDED PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

<i>Groups of Holdings</i>	<i>No. of Holdings</i>	<i>Amount of Land</i>	<i>Average Holdings (dess.)</i>
10 dess. and less .....	409,864	1,625,226	3.9
10-50 dess. incl. ....	209,119	4,891,031	23.4
50-500 dess. incl. ....	106,065	17,326,495	163.3
{ 500-2000 dess. incl. ....	21,748	20,590,708	947
{ 2000-10,000 dess. incl. ...	5,386	20,602,109	3,825
{ Over 10,000 dess. ....	699	20,798,504	29,754
<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total over 500 dess. ....	27,833	61,991,321	2,227.0
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Total for European Russia.	752,881	85,834,073	114.0

We see here, first, the great preponderance of large holdings: 619,000 small holders (up to 50 dessiatins) own only 6,500,000 dessiatins. Secondly, we see immensely large latifundia: 699 owners own almost 30,000 dessiatins each, 28,000 owners own a total of 62,000,000 dessiatins. *i.e.*, 2.227 dessiatins each. The

overwhelming majority of these latifundia are owned by the nobility, namely, 18,102 estates (out of 27,833) and 44,471,994 dessiatins of land, *i.e.*, over 70 per cent of the entire area occupied by the latifundia. These data reveal quite plainly the mediæval character of the feudal landlord estates.

## 2. WHAT THE STRUGGLE IS ABOUT

Ten million peasant households own 73,000,000 dessiatins of land, whereas 28,000 noble and common landlords<sup>1</sup> own 62,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the field on which the peasants' struggle for the land is developing. Upon such a main background, the amazing backwardness of technique, the neglected state of agriculture, a depressed and down-trodden mass of peasantry and an endless variety of feudal forms of exploitation are inevitable. In order to avoid digression from the subject, we shall have to limit ourselves to pointing out briefly the commonly known facts which have been described in great detail in the extensive literature available on the question of peasant agriculture. The size of the landholdings here described does not in any way correspond to the scale on which farming is carried on. Large-scale capitalist agriculture in the purely Russian gubernias definitely drops into the background.\* The prevailing form is that of small-scale farming on large latifundia: various forms of tenant farming based on servitude and bondage, *otrabotochni* (*barshchina*) farming, "winter hiring,"<sup>2</sup> bondage for trespassing on the landlords' pastures, bondage for the *otrezki*, and so on without end. The mass of the peasantry, oppressed by feudal exploitation, is driven to utter ruin and has to sublet part of its allotments to "efficient" farmers. The small minority of well-to-do peasants evolves into a peasant bour-

<sup>1</sup> Lenin uses the English word "landlord," differentiating between those of "noble" and "common" (*i.e.*, merchant and peasant) origin, the latter being designated by the term *chumazi* (unwashed), the term contemptuously applied by the aristocracy to the "lower" orders.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> Winter hiring—hiring a starving farm hand in the winter for work the next summer. The farm hand borrowed flour and other foodstuffs from the prospective employer, the value of which was repaid in the form of labour.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

geoisie which rents land for capitalist farming and exploits hundreds of thousands of farm hands and day labourers.

Bearing in mind all these facts, fully established by Russian economic science, we should distinguish, in the sphere of the present struggle of the peasants for the land, *four basic groups* of land holdings: 1) a mass of peasant farms crushed by the feudal latifundia of the landlords. The peasant farmers are directly interested in expropriating the latter and stand to gain more than anyone else from such expropriation; 2) a small minority of middle peasants already possessing an approximately average amount of land, sufficient to conduct farming in a tolerable way; 3) a small minority of well-to-do peasants who are becoming transformed into a peasant bourgeoisie and who are connected by a number of intermediate stages with farming conducted on capitalist lines, and 4) feudal latifundia far exceeding in dimensions the capitalist farms of the present period in Russia and deriving their revenues chiefly from the exploitation of the peasants by means of bondage and the *otrabotochni* system.

The data on landed property enable us to distinguish these fundamental groups only very approximately, tentatively and schematically, of course. Nevertheless, we are obliged to single them out, for otherwise it will be impossible to draw a complete picture of the struggle for land in the Russian revolution. And we can say with complete certainty beforehand that no partial corrections in the figures, no partial shiftings of the boundary line between one group and another, can produce any substantial change in the general picture. It is not partial corrections that are important; what is important is that a clear distinction be made between small landownership, which is striving for more land, and the feudal latifundia which monopolise an enormous amount of land. The main fallacy in the economics of the government (Stolypin) and of the liberals (the Cadets) lies in their disguising or concealing this clear distinction.\*

Let us assume the following sizes of land holdings for the four groups mentioned: 1) up to 15 dessiatins; 2) 15 to 20 dessiatins; 3) 20 to 500 dessiatins, and 4) over 500 dessiatins per holding. Of course, in order to present a complete picture of

the struggle for land, we must combine the peasants' allotments with the private holdings in each of these groups. In our source of information the latter category is divided into groups up to 10 dessiatins, and from 10 to 20 dessiatins, so that a group up to 15 dessiatins can be singled out only approximately. Any inaccuracy that is likely to arise from this approximate calculation, and from the method of using round figures that we employ, will be quite negligible (of this the reader will soon become convinced) and will not affect the conclusions to be drawn.

Here is a table showing the present distribution of land in European Russia among the said groups:

<i>Group</i>	<i>No. of Holdings (millions)</i>	<i>Amount of Land (mill. dess.)</i>	<i>Average Holdings (dess.)</i>
a) Ruined Feudal Peasantry, Crushed by Exploitation .....	10.5	75.0	7.0
b) Middle Peasantry .....	1.0	15.0	15.0
c) Peasant Bourgeoisie and Capitalist Landed Property .....	1.5	70.0	46.7
d) Feudal Latifundia .....	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>13.03</b>	<b>230.00</b>	<b>17.6</b>
<b>Not Classified as to Holdings</b> .....	<b>—</b>	<b>50.00</b>	<b>—</b>
<b>Total<sup>1</sup></b> .....	<b>13.03</b>	<b>280.00</b>	<b>21.4</b>

Such are the relations which give rise to the peasants' struggle for land. Such is the *starting* point of the peasants' struggle (7-15 dessiatins per household plus the renting of land on terms of bondage) against the big landlords (2,333 dessiatins

<sup>1</sup> As already mentioned, the figures in this table are round figures. Here are the exact figures: peasant allotments: a) 10,100,000 holdings and 79,900,000 dessiatins; b) 874,000 holdings and 15,000,000 dessiatins. Private landed property up to 10 dessiatins, 410,000 holdings and 1,600,000 dessiatins; 10-20 dessiatins, 106,000 holdings and 1,600,000 dessiatins. Sum total of a) and b) of both categories of land: 11,500,000 holdings and 91,200,000 dessiatins. For group c) the exact figure is 1,500,000 holdings and 69,500,000 dessiatins. For group d): 27,833 holdings and 61,990,000 dessiatins of land. To the latter is added, as already mentioned, 5,100,000 dessiatins of crown lands and 3,600,000 dessiatins owned by large manufacturing and trading associations. The exact figure of land not classified as to holdings was given above as 48,500,000 dessiatins.

From this the reader may see that all our approximate calculations in round figures relate to quite unimportant numerical changes and cannot affect our conclusions in the least.

per estate). What is the objective tendency, the *ultimate* goal of this struggle? Obviously, it is the abolition of large, feudal landlord property and the transfer of the land (according to certain principles) to the peasants.

This objective tendency inevitably arises from the predominance of small-scale *agriculture* which is held in bondage by the feudal latifundia. In order to depict this tendency in the striking schematic way in which we depicted the starting point of the struggle, *i.e.*, the present state of affairs, we must take the *best conceivable case, i.e.*, we must assume that all the feudal latifundia, as well as all land not classified according to holdings, have passed into the hands of the ruined peasantry. It is this best case which *all* the participants in the present agrarian struggle more or less definitely see before them: the government talks about "allotting" land to those "in need of it" and the liberal official (or Cadet) talks about giving additional allotments to those who have little land, and the peasant Trudoviki<sup>1</sup> in the Duma talk about raising the scale of land allotments to the "consumption" or "labour"<sup>2</sup> level, while the Social-Democrat, differing on the question of the form of land tenure, generally accepts the proposal of the Narodniki about allotting land to the poorest peasants. (Tseretelli in the Second Duma, in the 47th Session on June 8 [May 26], 1907, accepted the figures given by the Narodnik Karavayev about the 57,000,000 dessiatins of land to be purchased for 6,500,000,000 rubles, of which 2,500,000,000 were to go to the poorest peasants having up to 5 dessiatins.) In a word, however much the landlords, the officials, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the proletariat may differ on the problems and conditions of the reform, all their views tend in the same direction, *viz.*, the transfer of the large landlord estates to the more needy peasantry. Elsewhere we shall deal separately with the fundamental differences of opinion among the classes on the scope and conditions of such a transfer. At this

<sup>1</sup> Literally, Labourites, the representatives of the peasants in the Duma imbued with Socialist-Revolutionary and Narodnik ideas.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> Consumption level: an allotment sufficiently large to supply the requirements of a peasant household. Labour level: an allotment that can be cultivated by the members of the peasant household.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

juncture we shall supplement our outline of the starting point of the struggle with a similar outline of its probable ultimate goal. We have already described what the position is *now*. Let us see what it may be *then*. Let us assume that 30,000 landlords will retain 100 dessiatins each, *i.e.*, a total of 3,000,000 dessiatins, while the remaining 67,000,000 dessiatins and 50,000,000 dessiatins of unclassified land will be distributed among 10,500,000 poor households. We shall then get the following:

Category of Owner	Now			THEN		
	Number of Holdings (millions)	Amount of Land (mill. dess.)	Average Holdings (dess.)	Number of Holdings (millions)	Amount of Land (mill. dess.)	Average Holdings (dess.)
a) Petty, Ruined Peasantry	10.5	75	7.0	—	—	—
b) Middle Peasantry.....	1.0	15	15.0	11.5	207	18.0
c) Wealthy Peasantry and Bourgeoisie.....	1.5	70	46.7	1.53	73	47.7
d) Feudal Landlords.....	0.03	70	2,333.0	—	—	—
Total.....	13.03	230	17.6	13.03	280	21.4
Unclassified Land.....	—	50	—	—	—	—
Grand Total.....	13.03	280	21.4	—	—	—

Such is the economic basis of the struggle for land in the Russian revolution. Such is the starting point of this struggle and its tendency, *i.e.*, its ultimate goal, its best result from the standpoint of those engaged in the struggle.

Before proceeding to analyse this basis and its ideological (and ideo-political) shell, we shall dwell for a moment on possible misunderstandings and objections.

First, it may be said that my picture presupposes the *division*<sup>1</sup> of the land, whereas I have not yet examined the question of municipalisation, division, nationalisation or socialisation.

This would be a misunderstanding. In my picture I do not

<sup>1</sup> *Razdel* (division)—a plan, advocated by a small group of Social-Democrats, nicknamed *Razdelists*, of dividing the land of the big landlords among the peasants as their private property. See chapter II, section 8 of this article.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

depict the *conditions* of landownership, the *conditions* of the transfer of the land to the peasants are not touched upon (whether to be held as property or in usufruct in one form or another). I have depicted only the *transfer of the land* to the small peasantry *generally*, and there can be no doubt whatever that this is the trend of our agrarian struggle. It is the small peasantry which is fighting, and it is fighting to have the land transferred *to itself*. It is the struggle of petty (bourgeois) agricultural against large-scale (feudal) landownership.<sup>1</sup> At best there can be no other result of the revolution than the one which I have drawn.

Secondly, it may be said that I had no right to assume that all the confiscated lands (or expropriated lands, for I have not yet mentioned the conditions of expropriation) will be transferred to the peasants who have the smallest holdings. It may be said that owing to economic necessity the lands must be transferred to the wealthier peasants. But such an objection would be a misunderstanding. In order to demonstrate the bourgeois character of the revolution, I must take the *best* case from the standpoint of the Narodniki, I must *grant* the achievement of the aim which the struggling parties set themselves. I must take an aspect that most closely approaches the so-called "Black Redistribution" and not the further consequences of the agrarian revolution. If the masses are victorious in the struggle, they will take the fruits of the victory. Who will ultimately gather these fruits is a different question.

Thirdly, it may be said that I have assumed an unusually favourable result for the poor peasantry (that the whole of the peasantry will be transformed into middle peasants with allotments of 18 dessiatins per household) by *exaggerating* the dimensions of unoccupied land reserve. It may be said that I should have discounted *forests*, which cannot be divided among the peasants. Such objections may and inevitably will be made by tsarist and Cadet economists; but they will be unfounded, nevertheless.

<sup>1</sup> What is put here in parenthesis is either ignored or denied by the petty-bourgeois ideology of the Narodniki. I shall deal with this later on.

In the first place, I have excluded the *whole* of the northern region (the Archangel, Vologda and Olonez gubernias), as well as parts of the Vyatka and Perm gubernias, *i.e.*, areas on which the agricultural exploitation of land covered by forests is not likely in the near future. Secondly, a special calculation of the wooded areas would only complicate the matter without, however, making much difference in the result. For instance, Mr. Kaufman, who is a Cadet, and who, consequently, is very *cautious* when dealing with landlord estates, calculates that the surplus over 25 per cent of forest land might go to cover the shortage of land, and he thus arrives at a reserve of 101,700,000 dessiatins for 44 gubernias. For 47 gubernias I have estimated a land reserve of approximately 101,000,000 dessiatins, *i.e.*, 67,000,000 dessiatins out of the 70,000,000 dessiatins of the feudal latifundia and 34,000,000 dessiatins owned by the state and by various institutions. Assuming that all landed estates of over 100 dessiatins are to be expropriated this reserve will be increased by another nine or ten million dessiatins.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. HOW CADET WRITERS OBSCURE THE ISSUE

The data given here on the role played by the large landlord estates in the struggle for land in Russia must be amplified in one respect. A characteristic feature of the agrarian programmes of our bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie is the fact that in them the questions as to which class is the most powerful opponent of

<sup>1</sup> The limit of alienation, 500 dessiatins, as taken by me in the text is purely hypothetical. If this limit is taken at 100 dessiatins, which is also purely hypothetical, the picture of the transformation would be as follows:

Now		THEN		
Households (mill.)	Amount of Land (mill. dess.)	Households (mill.)	Amount of Land (mill. dess.)	Dess. per Household
a) 10.5	75	a) —	—	—
b) 1.0	15	b) 11.5	217	18.8
c) 1.4	50	c) 1.53	63	41.1
d) 0.13	90	d) —	—	—
13.03	230	13.03	280	21.4
	+ 50			

The main deductions as to the character and essence of the transformation are identical in either case.

the peasantry, and which land holdings furnish the bulk of the land reserve to be expropriated, are obscured by arguments about the "scale." They (the Cadets and the Trudoviki) talk mainly about how much land will be required for the peasants according to one "scale" or another, instead of dealing with the more concrete and vital question: how much land is available for expropriation? The first way of presenting the question obscures the class struggle, conceals the essence of the matter by hollow pretensions to a "state" point of view. The second shifts the centre of gravity to the class struggle, to the class interests of a definite stratum of landowners who most of all represent feudal tendencies.

We shall deal with the question of "scales" elsewhere. Just now we want to mention one "happy" exception among the Trudoviki and one typical Cadet writer.

In the Second Duma, the Narodni-Socialist Delarov alluded to the question of the percentage of landowners who would be affected by the alienation of land (in the 47th Session, June 8 [May 26], 1907). Delarov spoke of alienation (compulsory), without raising the question of confiscation, and apparently accepted the same scale of alienation which I have taken hypothetically in my table, namely, 500 dessiatins. Unfortunately, in the stenographic report of the Second Duma the particular passage in Delarov's speech (p. 1217) is mutilated, or else Mr. Delarov himself made a mistake. In the report we read that compulsory alienation would affect 32 per cent of the privately owned estates and 96 per cent of the total area of this land, thus the remaining 68 per cent of the landowners would retain only 4 per cent of the land in their category. The figure, however, is not 32 per cent but 3.2 per cent, because 27,833 out of 752,881 private landowners constitute 3.2 per cent, whereas the area of land affected—62,000,000 dessiatins out of a total of 85,800,000 dessiatins—amounts to 72.3 per cent. It is not clear whether this was a slip of the tongue on the part of Mr. Delarov or whether he got hold of the wrong figures. At all events, as far as we know, he was the only one among the numerous speakers in the Duma who approached the question of the real issue of the struggle in the most direct and concrete way.

The Cadet writer whose "works" one cannot fail to mention when dealing with this question is Mr. S. Prokopovich. True enough, he is, strictly speaking, a member of the "*Bez Zaglavia*" group,\* but, like the majority of the contributors to the bourgeois newspaper *Tovarishch*, at one moment he poses as a Cadet and at another moment as a Menshevik Social-Democrat. He is a typical representative of the handful of consistent Bernsteinists among the Russian bourgeois intellectuals who vacillate between the Cadets and the Social-Democrats, who (in most cases) join no party and in the liberal press pursue a line slightly to the Right of Plekhanov. Mr. Prokopovich must be mentioned here because he was one of the first to quote in the press the statistics of landed property in 1905, although he actually adopted the Cadet position on agrarian reform. In two articles which he wrote for *Tovarishch* (No. 214 of March 26 [13], 1907, and No. 238 of April 23 [10], 1907), Mr. Prokopovich enters into controversy with the compiler of the official statistics, General Zolotarev, who argues that the government can very easily agree to the land reform without any compulsory alienation whatsoever, and that 5 dessiatins per household are quite sufficient to enable the peasant to carry on farming. Mr. Prokopovich is more liberal; he puts the figure at 8 dessiatins per household. He repeatedly makes the reservation, however, that this amount of land is "quite inadequate," that this is a "very modest" calculation, and so forth; but still, he accepts this figure in order to determine the "degree of the land shortage" (the title of Mr. Prokopovich's first article). He explains that he takes this figure "in order to avoid unnecessary arguments"—"unnecessary arguments" with people like General Zolotarev, it must be presumed. Thus, while calculating the number of peasant households which are "obviously undersized" at one-half the total, Mr. Prokopovich correctly calculates that in order to bring the peasants' holdings up to 8 dessiatins, 18,600,000 dessiatins will be required, and since the government's total land reserve is alleged to be not more than 9,000,000 dessiatins, he arrives at the conclusion that "it will be impossible to avoid compulsory alienation."

Both in his calculations and in his arguments, this Menshevik-

Cadet, or Cadet-Menshevik, excellently expresses the spirit and the sense of the liberal agrarian programme. The question of the feudal latifundia and latifundia in general\* is quite obscured. Mr. Prokopovich only quoted data concerning private landed estates of more than 50 dessiatins. Thus, the main issue of this struggle has become obscured. The class interests of a handful, literally a handful, of landlords are concealed behind a veil. Instead of exposing them, we are treated to the "state point of view": the state lands will not suffice. Hence, if they had sufficed, Mr. Prokopovich, to judge from his argument, would be quite content to leave the feudal latifundia intact.

The peasant's allotment scale that he takes (8 dessiatins) is a starvation scale. The total amount of land to be "compulsorily alienated" from the landlords that he allows for is insignificant (18—9=9 out of 62,000,000 dessiatins in estates of over 500 dessiatins!). In order to carry out this sort of "compulsory alienation," the landlords will have to exercise compulsion on the peasants, as was the case in 1861! <sup>1</sup>

Voluntarily or involuntarily, deliberately or not, Mr. Prokopovich has truly revealed the landlord nature of the Cadet agrarian programme. The Cadets are only cautious and sly: they prefer to keep silent altogether about the amount of land they are inclined to expropriate from the landlords.

#### 4. THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL CLOAKS

We have seen that the essence of the revolution now in progress reduces itself to the abolition of the feudal latifundia and to the creation of a free and (as far as possible under present circumstances) well-to-do agricultural peasantry, capable not merely of eking out a miserable existence on the land, but of developing the productive forces and advancing the progress of agriculture. This revolution does not and cannot in any way affect the system of small production, the domination of the market over the producer and, consequently, the domination of

<sup>1</sup>In 1861, when the serfs were emancipated, the peasants were so dissatisfied with the reform that in many places they rose in rebellion and were crushed by force.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

commodity production, for the struggle for the redistribution of the land cannot alter the relations of production on this land. And we have seen that the peculiar feature of this struggle is the strong development of small agriculture on the feudal latifundia.

The ideological cloak of the struggle now in progress is furnished by the theories of the Narodniki. The public utterances on their agrarian programmes of the peasant representatives from all over Russia in the First and Second Dumas have finally confirmed the fact that the theories and programmes of the Narodniki do indeed constitute the ideological cloak of the peasants' struggle for land.\*

We have shown that the land reserve for which the peasants are fighting is that which comprises the big feudal estates. We have taken a very high scale of expropriation—500 dessiatins. But it can easily be seen that our conclusions hold good however much this scale is reduced, let us say to 100 or to 50 dessiatins. Let us divide the group of 20-500 dessiatins into three-sub-groups: aa) 20-50 dessiatins, bb) 50-100 and cc) 100-500, and let us see what the dimensions of the peasant allotments and private estates are within these sub-divisions:

ALLOTMENT LAND			
<i>Sub-divisions</i>	<i>No. of Holdings</i>	<i>Amount of Land (dess.)</i>	<i>Average per Holding (dess.)</i>
20- 50 dess.	1,062,504	30,898,147	29.1
50-100 "	191,898	12,259,171	63.3
100-500 "	40,658	5,762,276	117.1

PRIVATE HOLDINGS			
<i>Sub-Divisions</i>	<i>No. of Holdings</i>	<i>Amount of Land (dess.)</i>	<i>Average per Holding (dess.)</i>
20- 50 dess.	102,237	3,301,004	32.8
50-100 "	44,877	3,229,858	71.9
100-500 "	61,188	14,096,637	230.4

TOTAL IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA			
<i>Sub-Divisions</i>	<i>No. of Holdings</i>	<i>Amount of Land (dess.)</i>	<i>Average per Holding (dess.)</i>
20- 50 dess.	1,164,741	34,199,151	29.3
50-100 "	236,775	15,489,029	65.4
100-500 "	101,846	19,858,913	194.9

Hence it follows, first, that the confiscation of estates of over 100 dessiatins will increase the land reserve, as already stated by nine to ten million dessiatins, whereas the confiscation of estates of over 50 dessiatins, as proposed by Chizhevsky, a member of the First Duma, will increase the land fund by eighteen and a half million dessiatins. Consequently, in this case also the feudal latifundia will form the basis of the land reserve. Therein lies the crux of the contemporary agrarian problem. Moreover, the connection that exists between these big estates and the upper bureaucracy is quite well known: G. A. Alexinsky\* in the Second Duma quoted the data collected by Mr. Rubakin concerning the size of the estates owned by higher officials in Russia. Secondly, it is seen from these data that even after deducting the peasant allotments and the estates of over 100 dessiatins, there is still a great difference between the bigger allotments (and the small estates). The revolution already finds a differentiation among the peasantry in regard to size of holdings, and still more in the amount of capital, livestock, the quantity and quality of implements, etc. It has been sufficiently demonstrated in our economic literature that the differentiation as regards property other than allotment land is far more pronounced than the differentiation as regards allotment land.\*\*

What, then, is the significance of Narodnik theories which more or less accurately reflect the views of the peasants on their struggle for land? There are two "principles" which constitute the substance of these theories: the "labour principle" and the "equality principle." The petty-bourgeois character of these principles is so manifest and has been so fully demonstrated in Marxian literature that there is no need to dwell on it here. It is important, however, to note this feature of these "principles," for they have not yet been properly appreciated by Russian Social-Democrats. In a nebulous form, these principles do express something real and progressive in the present stage of history. They express the struggle for the destruction of the feudal latifundia.

Glance at the outline given above of the evolution of our agrarian system from the present stage to the "ultimate goal" of

the present bourgeois revolution. You will clearly see from it that the "Then" is distinguished from the "Now" by an infinitely greater "equality" in land holdings; you will see that the new distribution of the land conforms to the "labour principle" to a far greater extent. And this is not accidental. It cannot be otherwise in a peasant country, the bourgeois evolution of which emancipates it from feudalism. In such a country, the abolition of the feudal latifundia is undoubtedly a condition for the development of capitalism. But as long as small production predominates, the abolition of the feudal latifundia implies greater "equality" in landownership. In breaking up the mediæval latifundia, capitalism begins with a more "equal" landownership, and then creates large landownership on a new basis, on the basis of wage labour, machinery and superior agricultural technique and not on the basis of labour rent and bondage.

The mistake all the Narodniki make is that, in confining themselves to the narrow outlook of the small master, they fail to see the bourgeois character of the social relations into which the peasant is now entering out of the chains of serfdom. They convert the "labour principle" of petty-bourgeois agriculture and "equality," which are their slogans for breaking up the feudal latifundia, into something absolute, self-sufficing, into something implying a special, non-bourgeois order.

The mistake some Marxists make is that, while criticising the Narodnik theory, they overlook its historically real and historically legitimate content in the struggle against serfdom. They criticise, and rightly criticise, the "labour principle" and "equality" as backward, reactionary, petty-bourgeois socialism; but they forget that these theories are the expression of progressive, revolutionary, petty-bourgeois democracy, that these theories serve as the banner of the most determined struggle against old, feudal Russia. The idea of equality is the most revolutionary idea in the struggle against the old system of absolutism in general, and against the old system of feudal big landownership in particular. The idea of equality is both legitimate and progressive for the petty-bourgeois peasant in so far as it expresses the struggle against feudal and serf inequality. The idea of "equal-

ity" in landownership is both legitimate and progressive in so far as it expresses the aspirations of ten million peasants with allotments of seven dessiatins each, who are ruined by the landlords, for a division of the feudal latifundia measuring 2,300 dessiatins each.<sup>1</sup>

And in the present historical situation this idea really expresses such aspirations; it gives an impetus to the consistent bourgeois revolution, while mistakenly clothing this in vague, quasi-socialist phraseology. He would be a poor Marxist indeed who, while criticising the fallacy of using a socialist disguise for bourgeois slogans, failed to appreciate their historically progressive significance as the most decisive bourgeois slogans in the struggle against serfdom. The real effect of the revolution which the Narodnik regards as "socialisation" will be that it will most thoroughly clear the path for capitalism, will completely exterminate serfdom. The outline which I have drawn above indicates precisely the maximum to be achieved in the abolition of serfdom and the maximum of "equality" to be attained. The Narodnik imagines that this equality eliminates the bourgeois, whereas, in reality, it expresses the aspirations of the more radical bourgeoisie. And whatever else there is in "equality" over and above this is nothing but ideological smoke, a petty-bourgeois illusion.

The short-sighted and unhistorical judgment of some Russian Marxists on the significance of the theories of the Narodniki in the Russian bourgeois revolution is to be accounted for by the fact that they have not pondered over the significance of the "confiscation" of the big landed estates which the Narodniki advocate. One has only to picture to himself clearly the economic basis of this revolution under the present conditions of landownership in our country to grasp not only the illusory nature of the Narodnik theories, but also the truth of the struggle, restricted to a definite historical task, the truth of the struggle against serfdom, which represents the real content of these illusory theories.

<sup>1</sup> We speak here of division not as private property, but for economic use. Such a division is possible—and, with the predominance of small farming, inevitable for some time—both under municipalisation and under nationalisation.

### 5. TWO TYPES OF BOURGEOIS AGRARIAN EVOLUTION

To proceed. We have shown that the Narodnik theories are absurd and reactionary from the standpoint of the struggle for socialism against the bourgeoisie, but they turn out to be "sensible" (in regard to a specific historical task) as well as progressive in the bourgeois struggle against serfdom. The question is: must serfdom in the system of landownership, and in the whole social system in Russia, inevitably die out, must the inevitable bourgeois-democratic agrarian revolution take place only in one definite form? Or is it possible in various forms?

This question is of cardinal importance in arriving at correct views on our revolution and on the Social-Democratic agrarian programme. And we must solve this question on the basis of the data concerning the economic foundation of the revolution given above.

The struggle is being waged principally around the feudal latifundia which are the most outstanding embodiment and the strongest mainstay of the survivals of serfdom in Russia. The development of commodity production and capitalism will inevitably put an end to these survivals. In this respect, Russia has only one path before her, that of bourgeois development.

Yet there may be two forms of this development. The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of the landlord estates or as a result of the abolition of the landlord latifundia, *i.e.*, either by reform or by revolution. Bourgeois development may pursue its course having at its head big landlord economy, which will gradually become more and more bourgeois and gradually substitute bourgeois methods of exploitation for feudal methods. It may also pursue its course having at its head small peasant economy which, in a revolutionary way, will remove the "abscess" of feudal latifundia from the social organism and then freely develop without them along the road of capitalist economy.

These two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development may be described as the Prussian path and the American path, respectively.\* In the first case, feudal landlordism gradu-

ally evolves into bourgeois, *Junker* landlordism, which dooms the peasants to decades of most painful expropriation and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of *Grossbauern* (big peasants) arises. In the second case there is no landlordism, or else it is broken up by the revolution, as a result of which the feudal estates are confiscated and divided into small farms. In this case the peasant predominates, becomes the exclusive agent of agriculture and evolves into the capitalist farmer. In the first case the outstanding content of the evolution is the transformation of serfdom into usury and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal lords—the landlords—the *Junkers*. In the second case the main background is the transformation of the patriarchal peasant into a bourgeois farmer.

Both these two types of evolution are clearly manifested in the economic history of Russia. Take the epoch of the abolition of serfdom. In that epoch a struggle went on between the landlords and the peasants as to the method of carrying out the reform. Both sides were fighting to maintain the conditions of bourgeois economic development (without being conscious of it), but the former wanted a development that would preserve the landlords' estates, the landlords' revenues and the landlords' methods of exploitation (based on bondage) to the utmost degree. The latter were fighting for a development that would secure for the peasants the greatest degree of prosperity possible on the given level of agriculture, the abolition of the landlord latifundia, the abolition of all methods of exploitation based on serfdom and bondage and the extension of free peasant landownership. It goes without saying that in the second case the development of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces would be wider and more rapid than if the peasant reform were carried out in the landlords' way.<sup>1</sup> Only caricature Marxists, as the op-

<sup>1</sup>In the magazine *Nauchnoye Obozreniye* [Scientific Review] (May-June, 1900), I wrote on this subject as follows: ". . . The more land the peasants would have obtained when they were emancipated, and the cheaper they would have obtained this land, the quicker, the wider and the freer would have been the development of capitalism in Russia, the standard of living of the population would have been higher, the home market would have been wider, and the application of machinery in pro-

ponents of Marxism, the Narodniki, depicted them, could believe that the complete divorcement of the peasantry from the land in 1861 would have guaranteed the development of capitalism. On the contrary, it would have been a guarantee—and so in fact it turned out to be—a guarantee of bondage, *i.e.*, semi-feudal tenant farming and *otrabotochni* economy, *i.e.*, *barshchina*, which greatly retarded the growth of capitalism and the growth of the productive forces in Russian agriculture. The conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords was not a struggle waged by “people’s production” and the “labour principle” against the bourgeoisie (as was and is imagined by our Narodniki), it was a struggle for the American type of bourgeois development as against the Prussian type of bourgeois development.

And in those localities of Russia where no serfdom had existed, where agriculture was taken up entirely, or chiefly, by a free peasantry (for example, on the steppes of the Volga, Novorossiia and North Caucasus, which were colonised after the Reform), the growth of the productive forces and the development of capitalism proceeded far more rapidly than in the central provinces which were burdened by survivals of serfdom.<sup>1</sup>

While the agricultural centre of Russia and her agricultural borderlands indicate, as it were, the territorial or geographical division of the localities in which one or another type of agrar-

duction would have gone on at a more rapid pace; in a word, the greater would have been the resemblance between Russian and American economic development. I shall limit myself to mentioning two circumstances which, in my opinion, demonstrate the correctness of this view: 1) owing to the land shortage and heavy taxation the *otrabotochni* system on privately owned farms has developed over a wide area of the country. This is a direct survival of serfdom and is not capitalism; 2) on the other hand, in our borderlands, where serfdom was either unknown or least developed and where the peasants are suffering least from land shortage, the *otrabotochni* system and heavy taxation, there capitalist development in agriculture has developed most. [This subject is more fully developed in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, in Vol. I of *Selected Works*.—Ed. Eng. ed.]

<sup>1</sup>I have dealt in detail with the importance of the borderlands of Russia as a colonisation reserve under the development of capitalism in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. (St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 185 *et al.*) [Cf. Vol. I, *Selected Works*.—Ed. Eng. ed.] The question of the importance of the borderlands in regard to the Social-Democratic agrarian programme will be examined separately later on.

ian evolution prevails, the fundamental features of both types of evolution are clearly evident in all those localities where landlord and peasant farming exist side by side. One of the cardinal mistakes committed by the Narodnik economists was that they believed that landlord farming was the only source of agrarian capitalism, while they regarded peasant farming from the point of view of "people's production" and the "labour principle" (this is the view taken even now by the Trudoviki, by the "Narodni-Socialists" and the Socialist-Revolutionaries). We know that this is wrong. Landlord farming evolves in a capitalist way and gradually replaces labour rent by "free wage labour," the three-field system by intensive cultivation and the obsolete peasant implements by the improved machinery employed on the big private farms. Peasant farming also evolves in a capitalist way and gives rise to a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat. The better the condition of the "commune," the greater the prosperity of the peasantry in general, the more rapid is the process of differentiation among the peasantry into antagonistic classes of capitalist agriculture. Consequently, we see two streams of agrarian evolution everywhere. The conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords, which runs like a thread through the whole history of post-Reform Russia and which constitutes the most essential economic basis of our revolution, represents the struggle for one or the other type of bourgeois agrarian revolution.

Only by clearly understanding the difference between these two types, and the bourgeois character of both, can we correctly explain the agrarian question in the Russian revolution and grasp the class significance of the various agrarian programmes put forward by the different parties.<sup>1</sup> The point of the struggle, we

<sup>1</sup> The amount of confusion that reigns at times in the minds of Russian Social-Democrats as to the two paths of bourgeois agrarian evolution in Russia is demonstrated by the example of P. Maslov. In *Obrazovaniye [Education]* (No. 3, 1907), he outlines two ways: 1) "capitalism in the process of development" and 2) "a useless struggle against economic development." "The first way," if you please, "leads the working class and the whole of society towards socialism; the second way pushes [!] the working class into the arms [!] of the bourgeoisie, into a struggle between big and small proprietors, into a struggle from which the working class has nothing to gain but defeat." (P. 92.) In the first place, the "second way"

repeat, is the feudal latifundia. The capitalist evolution of these is unquestionable, yet it is possible in two forms: either they will be abolished, broken up in a revolutionary manner by the peasant farmers, or they will be gradually transformed into *Junker* estates (and correspondingly, the bonded muzhik will be transformed into a bonded *Knecht*<sup>1</sup>).

## 6. TWO LINES OF AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES IN THE REVOLUTION

If we compare the agrarian programmes put forward by the different classes in the course of the revolution with the economic basis outlined above, we shall at once see two lines in these programmes corresponding to the two types of agrarian evolution which we have indicated.

Let us take the Stolypin programme, which is supported by the Right-wing landlords and by the Octobrists.<sup>2</sup> It is frankly a landlords' programme. Yet can it be said that it is reactionary also in the economic sense, i.e. that it precludes, or tries to preclude, the development of capitalism, to prevent a bourgeois agrarian evolution? Not at all. On the contrary, the famous agrarian legislation introduced by Stolypin under Article 87\* is thoroughly impregnated with the purely bourgeois spirit. There can be no doubt that this follows the line of capitalist evolution, facilitates and pushes forward this evolution, hastens

is an empty phrase, a dream and not a way; it is a false ideology, and not a real possibility of development. Secondly, Maslov fails to see that Stolypin and the bourgeoisie are also leading the peasantry along the capitalist road; consequently, the real struggle is not about capitalism as such, but about the type of capitalist development. Thirdly, it is pure nonsense to talk as if there can be a path in Russia which will not "push" the working class under the domination of the bourgeoisie. . . . Fourthly, it is equal nonsense to allege that there can be a path on which there will be no struggle between small and big proprietors. Fifthly, by the use of terms descriptive of general European categories ("big and small proprietors"), Maslov obscures the peculiar historical Russian trait which is of great significance in the present revolution: the struggle between petty-bourgeois and big feudal proprietors.

<sup>1</sup> Lenin uses the German word *Knecht*, i.e., serf.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> The party representing the Russian big bourgeoisie led by Guchkov. They were called "Octobrists" because they claimed to take their stand on the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905, which promised democratic reforms.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the expropriation of the peasantry, the break-up of the commune and the creation of a peasant bourgeoisie. Without a doubt, this legislation is progressive in the scientific economic sense.

But does this mean that Social-Democrats should "support" this legislation? Not at all. Such might be the reasoning only of vulgar Marxism, the seeds of which are so persistently sown by Plekhanov and the Mensheviks who sing, and shout, and appeal, and proclaim: we must support the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the old order of things. No; in order to facilitate the development of the productive forces (the highest criterion of social progress) we must give our support not to bourgeois evolution of the landlord type, but to bourgeois evolution of the peasant type. The former implies the utmost preservation of bondage and serfdom (remodelled in a bourgeois fashion), the least rapid development of the productive forces and the retarded development of capitalism; it implies infinitely greater misery and suffering, exploitation and oppression for the large masses of the peasantry and, consequently, also for the proletariat. The second type implies the most rapid development of the productive forces and the best conditions of existence for the mass of the peasantry possible under the commodity system of production. Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian bourgeois revolution are not determined by the task of supporting the liberal bourgeoisie, as the opportunists think, but by the task of supporting the struggling peasantry.

Let us take the programme of the liberal, *i.e.*, Cadet,<sup>1</sup> bourgeoisie. True to the motto: "at your service" (*i.e.*, at the service of the landlords), they proposed one programme in the First Duma and another in the Second. They can change their programme as easily and imperceptibly as any of the unprincipled, careerist European bourgeoisie. In the first Duma the revolution appeared to be strong, and so the liberals borrowed from it a piece of nationalisation for their programme (the "state land fund" \*). In the Second Duma the counter-revolution appeared to be strong, and so the liberals threw the state land fund overboard, swerved round to the Stolypin idea of stable peasant

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 167.—*Ed.*

property, and widened the scope of exemptions from the general rule of compulsory alienation of the landlords' land. However, we note this two-faced attitude of the liberals only in passing. The important thing to note is something else, *viz.*, the principle which is common to both "faces" of the liberal agrarian programme. This common principle consists of: 1) compensation; 2) preservation of the landlords' estates, and 3) preservation of the landlords' privileges when carrying out the reform.

Compensation is tribute imposed upon social development, tribute paid to the owners of the feudal latifundia. Compensation is a means for making the feudal methods of exploitation secure by bureaucratic and police means. in the shape of the bourgeois "universal equivalent." Further, the preservation of the landlords' estates in some degree or other is seen in both Cadet programmes, no matter how much the bourgeois politicians may try to conceal this fact from the people. Third, the protection of the landlords' privileges when the reform is carried out has been quite definitely expressed in the attitude of the Cadets towards the question of electing the local land committees on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage and secret ballot. We cannot deal in detail here with another part of our argument.<sup>1</sup> All we have to do here is to define the line of the Cadet agrarian programme. And in this connection we must say that the question of the composition of the local land committees is of cardinal importance. Only political infants may be taken in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. The Minutes of the First Duma, 14th Session, June 6 (May 24), 1906, which show that the Cadets Kokoshkin and Kotlyarevsky, hand in hand with the (then) Octobrist Heyden, resorted to the basest sophistry to repudiate the idea of local land committees. In the Second Duma: the shirking of the issue by the Cadet Savelyev (16th Session, April 8 [March 26], 1907) and the open opposition to the idea of local committees by the Cadet Tatarinov (24th Session, April 22 [9], 1907). In No. 82 of the Cadet newspaper *Rech* [*Speech*], a remarkable leading article appeared on June 7 (May 25), 1906, afterwards reprinted by Milyukov. (*A Year of Struggle*, No. 117, pp. 457-59.) Here is the decisive passage from this Octobrist in disguise: "We believe that setting up these committees on the basis of universal suffrage would mean preparing them not for the peaceful solution of the land problem locally, but for something totally different. The general direction of the reform ought to be left in the hands of the state. . . . The local commissions should consist as equally as possible [*sic!*] of representatives of the conflicting interests

by the Cadet slogan of "compulsory alienation." The question is, who will compel whom? Will the landlords compel the peasants (to pay an exorbitant price for sandy soil), or will the peasants compel the landlords? The Cadet speeches about "equal representation of the conflicting interests" and about the undesirability of "one-sided violence" demonstrate quite clearly that the Cadet idea of compulsory alienation means that the landlords will compel the peasants.

The Cadet agrarian programme follows the line of Stolypin, *i.e.*, landlord, bourgeois progress. This is a fact. The failure to appreciate this fact is the fundamental mistake made by those Social-Democrats who, like some of the Mensheviks, regard the Cadet agrarian policy as being more progressive than that of the Narodniki.

As for the spokesmen of the peasantry, *i.e.*, the Trudoviki, the Social-Narodniki, and partly also the Socialist-Revolutionaries, we find that in spite of considerable vacillation and wavering, they, in both Dumas, adopted a distinct line of defending the interests of the peasantry against the landlords. For instance, vacillation is observed in the programme of the Trudoviki on the question of compensation, but, in the first place, they frequently regard this as something in the nature of public relief for disabled landlords<sup>1</sup>; secondly, in the minutes of the Second Duma one may find a number of reports of exceedingly characteristic speeches by peasants repudiating the principle of compensation and proclaiming the slogan of "all the land to all the people."<sup>2</sup> On the question of the local land committees—this all-important

which can be reconciled without impairing the national importance of the proposed reform, and without turning it into an act of one-sided violence." (P. 459.) In the *Cadet Agrarian Question*, Vol. II, Mr. Kutler published the text of his bill which ensures to the landlords, jointly with the officials, a predominance over the peasants in all the principal land commissions and committees, *viz.*, in the gubernia and uyezd commissions and committees (pp. 640-41), while the "liberal," A. Chuprov, defends this despicable plan of the landlords to swindle the peasants. (P. 33.)

<sup>1</sup> Cf. The *Sbornik* [Symposium] published by *The News of Peasant Deputies and Toiling Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1906, a collection of newspaper articles by the Trudoviki in the First Duma; for instance, the article entitled *Grants, Not Compensation* \* (pp. 44-49), etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the speech made by the Right peasant deputy Petrochenko in

question as to who will compel whom—the peasant deputies are the originators and sponsors of the idea of having them elected by universal suffrage.

We are not yet dealing with the content of the agrarian programme of the Trudoviki and Socialist-Revolutionaries and of the Social-Democrats. We must first of all note the incontrovertible fact that the agrarian programmes of all the parties and classes which come out openly in the Russian revolution can be distinctly divided into two fundamental types, corresponding to the two types of bourgeois agrarian evolution. The dividing line between the "Right" and "Left" agrarian programmes does not run between the Octobrists and the Cadets, as is frequently and erroneously assumed by the Mensheviks (who allow themselves to be deceived by the sound of "constitutional-democratic" words and substitute for the class analysis the analysis of the respective titles of the parties). The dividing line runs between the Cadets and the Trudoviki. This line is determined by the two basic classes in Russian society that are fighting for the land, *viz.*, the landlords and the peasantry. The Cadets want to preserve the landlords' estates and advocate a cultured, European, but withal, a landlord, bourgeois evolution of agriculture. The Trudoviki (and the Social-Democratic workers' deputies), *i.e.*, the representatives of the peasantry and representatives of the proletariat, advocate the peasant, bourgeois evolution of agriculture.

A strict distinction must be drawn between the ideological garb of the agrarian programmes, their different political details, etc., and the economic basis of these programmes. The present difficulty is not in understanding the bourgeois character of the agrarian demands and programmes of the landlords and the

the Second Duma (22nd Session, April 18 [5], 1907), in which, referring to Kutler's proposals, he said: ". . . of course, as a wealthy man he has named a high figure, and we, poor peasants, cannot pay such a price." (P. 1616.) Thus the Right peasant is more Left than the bourgeois politician who is playing at being a liberal. See also the speech of the non-party peasant deputy Semenov (April 25 [12], 1907), which breathes the spirit of the spontaneous revolutionary struggle of the peasants, and many others.

peasants: the work of explaining this had already been done by the Marxists before the revolution, and the revolution has confirmed the correctness of their explanation. The difficulty is to understand fully the basis of the struggle between the two classes within the framework of bourgeois society and bourgeois evolution. The fact that this is a normal social phenomenon will not be understood unless it is reduced to the objective tendencies of the economic development of capitalist Russia.

Now, having shown the connection between the two types of agrarian programmes in the Russian revolution and the two types of bourgeois agrarian evolution, we must turn to the examination of a new, extremely important aspect of the question.

## 7. RUSSIA'S LAND AREA. THE QUESTION OF COLONISATION

We have pointed out above that on the question of capitalism in Russia, the economic analysis compels us to distinguish between the central agricultural provinces with their abundant survivals of serfdom, and the borderlands where these survivals are absent or weak and which bear the features of free, peasant, capitalist evolution.

What do we mean by borderlands? Obviously lands which are unpopulated or not fully populated, and which have not been completely drawn into agriculture. And we must now pass from European Russia to the whole of the Russian Empire in order to form an idea, to obtain a complete picture of these "borderlands" and of their economic significance.

In the pamphlet written by Messrs. Prokopovich and Mertvago, *How Much Land There Is In Russia and How We Use It* (Moscow, 1907), the latter of these authors tries to summarise all the statistical data available in our literature on the amount of land in the whole of Russia and the economic use to which the known amount of land is put. We shall quote Mr. Mertvago's figures, compiled in the form of a table for the purpose of simplicity, and to these we shall add the statistics of the population according to the census of 1897. (See table page 190.)

These figures plainly show the vastness of the land area in

LAND AREA OF THE WHOLE OF RUSSIA										Population According to Census of 1897
Total Land Area			Of Which			Of Which				
Square Versts (Thousands)	Desiatins (Millions)	No Data Available	Registered Land Areas	Arable Land	Meadows	Forests	Total	Total (Thousands)	Average Per Sq. Verst	
<i>In Millions of Desiatins</i>										
10 Gubernias of Russian Poland	111.6	11.6	—	11.6	7.4	0.9	2.5	10.8	9,402.2	84.3
38 Gubernias West of the Volga	1,755.6	183.0	—	183.0	93.6	18.7	34.0	146.3	—	—
12 Gubernias North and East of the Volga	2,474.9	258.0	—	258.0	22.3	7.1	132.0	161.4	—	—
Total for 50 Gubernias of European Russia	4,230.5	441.0	—	441.0	123.3	26.7	163.5	318.5	93,442.9	22.1
Caucasus	411.7	42.9	22.1	20.8	6.5	2.2	2.5	11.2	9,289.4	22.6
Siberia	10,966.1	1,142.6	639.7	502.9	4.3	3.9	121.0	129.2	5,758.8	0.5
Central Asia	3,141.6	327.3	157.4	169.9	0.9	1.6	8.0	10.5	7,746.7	2.5
Total for Asiatic Russia	14,519.4	1,512.8	819.2	693.6	11.7	7.7	131.5	150.9	—	—
Total for Russian Empire <sup>1</sup>	18,861.5	1,965.4	819.2	1,146.2	135.0	34.4	300.0	469.4	125,640.0	6.7

<sup>1</sup> Exclusive of Finland.

Russia and how little we know about the borderlands and their economic importance. Of course, it would be radically wrong to regard these lands at the present time and in their present state as being suitable to satisfy the requirements of the Russian peasantry. All calculations of this kind, frequently made by reactionary writers,<sup>1</sup> are of no scientific value whatever. In this respect, Mr. A. A. Kaufman is quite right when he ridicules the quest for vacant lands for colonisation on the basis of statistics of square versts. Undoubtedly he is also right when he points out how little land there is suitable for colonisation in the borderlands of Russia at the present time, and how wrong it is to presume that the land hunger of the Russian peasantry can be satisfied by migration.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, the correct arguments of Mr. Kaufman, the liberal, contain a very serious mistake. Mr. Kaufman argues in this way: "Considering the type of person that now migrates, the present degree of prosperity, the present cultural level of these migrants" (p. 129 of the book mentioned), there is absolutely insufficient land to satisfy the needs of Russian peasant migrants. "Consequently," he concludes his plea for the Cadet agrarian programme, "compulsory alienation of private land in European Russia is essential."

This is the usual argument of our liberal and liberal-Narodnik economists. The argument is usually so constructed that it leads to the conclusion: if there were sufficient land for purposes of migration, the feudal latifundia could be left intact! Messieurs the Cadets and politicians like them are thoroughly

<sup>1</sup> Also by reactionary deputies. Thus, in the Second Duma the Octobrist Teterenkov cited figures from Shcherbina's investigations of 65,000,000 dessiatins in the Steppe Region [the southern provinces of Siberia, bordering on Turkestan.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*] and further data about 39,000,000 dessiatins in the Altai region [Siberia—*Ed. Eng. ed.*] to demonstrate that there was no need for compulsory alienation in European Russia. Here is an example of a bourgeois joining hands with the feudal landlord for joint "progress" in the Stolypin spirit. (Cf. Stenographic report, Second Duma, 39th Session, May 29 [16], 1907, pp. 658-61.)

<sup>2</sup> *The Agrarian Question*, published by Dolgorukov and Petrunkevich, Vol. II, article by Kaufman: "Migration and Its Role in the Agrarian Programme." Cf. also the work by the same author: *Migration and Colonisation*, St. Petersburg, 1905.

permeated with the ideas of the well-meaning official; they claim to place themselves above classes and to rise above the class struggle. The feudal latifundia must be abolished not because they imply the feudal exploitation and enslavement of millions of the population, and retard the development of the productive forces, but because millions of families cannot be immediately got rid of elsewhere—in Siberia or Turkestan! Emphasis is not placed upon the feudal class character of the Russian latifundia, but upon the possibility of reconciling the classes, of satisfying the peasant without injuring the landlord, in a word, upon the possibility of bringing about the notorious “social peace.”

The arguments of Mr. Kaufman and of his numerous adherents among the Russian intelligentsia must be turned upside down to be put right. It is because the Russian peasant is crushed by the feudal latifundia that the free settlement of the population over the territory of Russia and the rational economic use of the greater part of the soil of its borderlands are being extremely hampered. It is the fact that the feudal latifundia are keeping the Russian peasantry in a downtrodden state that perpetuates, through the labour rent system and bondage, the most obsolete forms and methods of land cultivation and hampers the technical progress and the mental development of the mass of the peasants, their initiative and education which are essential for the economic utilisation of a far larger area of the Russian land reserves than is utilised today. For feudal latifundia and the predominance of bondage in our agriculture imply also a corresponding political superstructure—the domination of the Black Hundred<sup>1</sup> landlord in the state, the disfranchisement of the population, the widespread employment of the Gurko and Lidval methods of administration,\* and so on and so forth.

That the feudal latifundia in central, agricultural Russia are exercising a most baneful influence upon the whole social system, upon social development as a whole, upon the entire condition of agriculture, and upon the whole standard of living of the masses of the peasantry, is a matter of common knowledge. It will be quite sufficient if I refer to the extensive Russian econ-

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, reactionary.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

omic literature which proves the prevalence in Central Russia of labour rent, bondage, the renting of land on terms of bondage, "winter hire" and other charms of mediævalism.<sup>1</sup>

The downfall of serfdom created conditions which (as I pointed out in detail in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*) caused the population to flee from these haunts of the last of the feudal offspring. The population fled from the central agricultural region to the industrial gubernias, to the capitals and to the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia and colonised hitherto uninhabited lands. In the pamphlet I have mentioned, Mr. Mertvago quite truly remarks, among other things, that the conception of what sort of land is suitable or unsuitable for agriculture is liable to undergo rapid change.

"The Taurida steppes," he writes, "owing to the climate and the scarcity of water, will always be one of the poorest and least suitable regions for cultivation. Such was the opinion expressed in 1845 by such authoritative observers of nature as Academicians Behr and Helmersen. At that time the population of the Taurida Gubernia was one-half what it is now, and it produced 1,800,000 quarters of grain of all kinds. . . . Now, after a lapse of 60 years, the population has doubled, and in 1903 it produced no less than 17,600,000 quarters, i.e., nearly ten times as much." (P. 24.)

This is true not only of the Taurida Gubernia but also of a number of other gubernias in the southern and eastern borderlands of European Russia. The gubernias of the southern steppes, as well as the Trans-Volga gubernias, which in the 'sixties and 'seventies lagged behind the Central Black Earth gubernias with respect to output of grain, overtook these provinces in the 'eighties. (*The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, p. 186.<sup>2</sup>) Between 1863 and 1897 the population of the whole of European Russia increased by 53 per cent—48 per cent increase in the rural population and 97 per cent increase in the urban population—whereas in Novorossiya, the Lower Volga and Eastern gubernias, the population increased during the same period by 92 per cent—87 per cent increase in the rural and 134 per cent increase in the urban population. (*Ibid.*, p. 446.<sup>3</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Selected Works*, Vol. I, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, chapter III, pp. 242-94.—Ed. Eng. ed.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Collected Works*, Vol. III, Russian ed., p. 191.—Ed.

<sup>3</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 345.—Ed. Eng. ed.

"We feel sure," Mr. Mertvago continues, "that the present bureaucratic estimate of the economic importance of our land reserves is not less erroneous than that of Behr and Helmersen concerning the Taurida Gubernia in 1845." (*Ibid.*)

This is true. But Mr. Mertvago does not notice the source of Behr's mistakes, nor of the mistakes of all bureaucratic estimates.

The source of these mistakes is that while taking into consideration the given level of technique and culture, no allowance is made for progress of this level. Behr and Helmersen did not foresee the changes in technique that became possible after the fall of serfdom. And there cannot be the least doubt at the present time that a tremendous increase in the productive forces, a tremendous rise in the level of technique and culture, will inevitably follow the abolition of the feudal latifundia in European Russia.

This side of the matter is mistakenly left out of account by many students of the agrarian problem in Russia. The prerequisite for the wide utilisation of the vast colonisation reserves of Russia is the creation in European Russia of a peasantry that is really free and fully emancipated from the burden of feudal relations. A considerable portion of this land reserve is unsuitable at the present time, not so much because of the natural properties of the soil in this or that borderland, but because of the social conditions of agriculture in Central Russia, which doom technique to stagnation and the population to a status of disfranchisement, to wretchedness, ignorance and helplessness.

It is this exceedingly important side of the matter that Mr. Kaufman ignores when he says: "I say beforehand: I do not know whether it will be possible to settle one, three or ten million on these lands." (*Ibid.*, p. 128.) He goes on to point out that the term, unsuitable land, is only relative: "The salty lands are not only not absolutely hopeless, but with the application of certain technical methods they may even be made very fertile." (*Ibid.*, p. 129.) In Turkestan, with a density of population of 3 to the square verst, "there are huge areas still uninhabited." (*Ibid.*, p. 137.) ". . . The soil of many of the 'hungry deserts' of Turkestan consists of the famous Central Asiatic loess soil which becomes highly fertile if sufficiently irrigated . . . it is not

even worth while discussing whether land fit for irrigation is available: it is sufficient to traverse the country in any direction to see the ruins of numerous villages and towns abandoned centuries ago, frequently surrounded for scores of square versts by a network of ancient irrigation canals. The total area of loess soil desert which is awaiting artificial irrigation undoubtedly amounts to many millions of dessiatins." (*Ibid.*, p. 137.)

All these millions of dessiatins in Turkestan, as well as in many other parts of Russia, are not only "waiting" for irrigation and improvements of every kind. They are also "waiting" for the emancipation of the agricultural population of Russia from the survivals of serfdom, from the yoke of the aristocratic latifundia and from the Black Hundred dictatorship in the state.

It would be idle to speculate on the actual amount of land in Russia that can be converted from "unsuitable" into suitable land. But it is necessary clearly to appreciate the fact, which is demonstrated by the whole economic history of Russia and which represents an outstanding feature of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, *viz.*, that Russia possesses gigantic colonisation reserves which will be rendered accessible to the population and accessible to culture not only by every advance of agricultural technique, but also by every advance in the cause of the emancipation of the Russian peasantry from the yoke of serfdom.

This represents the economic basis for the bourgeois evolution of Russian agriculture on the American model. In the countries of Western Europe, which are so frequently referred to by our Marxists for the purpose of making senseless and stereotyped comparisons, the whole of the land was already occupied in the epoch of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Every advance in agricultural technique brought something new only in so far as it became possible to invest more labour and capital in the land. In Russia, the bourgeois-democratic revolution is taking place under conditions in which every advance in agricultural technique, and every advance in the development of real liberty for the population not only creates the possibility for additional investment of labour and capital in old lands, but also the possibility of utilising "boundless" tracts of adjacent new lands.

## 8. ECONOMIC DEDUCTIONS OF CHAPTER I SUMMED UP

Let us sum up the economic deductions which are to serve as an introduction to the revision of the question of the agrarian programme of the Social-Democrats.

We have seen that the "central point" around which the agrarian struggle in our revolution is raging is the feudal latifundia. The peasants' struggle for the land is, first and foremost, a struggle for the abolition of these latifundia. Their abolition and their complete transfer to the peasantry undoubtedly coincide with the line of the capitalist evolution of Russian agriculture. This course of evolution would mean a most rapid development of capitalism accompanied by the transformation of the free peasants into farmers. But another path of bourgeois evolution of agriculture is possible, *viz.*, the preservation of the landlords' estates and latifundia and their slow conversion from estates based on serfdom and bondage into *Junker* estates. It is precisely these two possible types of bourgeois evolution that lie at the base of the two types of agrarian programmes which have been proposed by the different classes in the Russian revolution. Moreover, the peculiar feature of Russia, which is one of the economic foundations for the possibility of the "American" evolution, is the existence of vast colonisation reserves. While entirely unsuitable for emancipating the Russian peasantry from the yoke of serfdom in European Russia, these reserves will become more extensive and more accessible in proportion to the freedom enjoyed by the peasantry in Russia proper, and to the scope of development of the productive forces.

## CHAPTER II

### THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES OF THE R.S.D.L.P. AND THEIR TEST BY THE REVOLUTION

LET us now turn to an examination of the Social-Democratic agrarian programme. The main historical stages in the evolution of the views of Russian Social-Democrats on the agrarian question have already been outlined by me (in the first chapter of the pamphlet: *A Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party* \*). We must explain more fully the nature of the mistake contained in previous agrarian programmes of Russian Social-Democracy, i.e., in the programmes of 1885 and 1903.

#### 1. THE MISTAKES IN PREVIOUS AGRARIAN PROGRAMMES OF RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY

In the draft issued by the "Emancipation of Labour" group<sup>1</sup> in 1885, the agrarian programme was outlined as follows:

"A radical revision of our agrarian relations, i.e., of the conditions of buying out the land and allotting it to the peasant communes. The granting of the right to abandon their allotment and to leave the commune to those peasants who may find it advantageous to do so, etc."

This is all. The mistake in this programme is not one of principle or wrong partial demands. No. Its principles are correct, while the only partial demand it raises (the right to abandon allotments) is so incontestable that it has now been carried out by Stolypin's peculiar legislation. The mistake in this programme lies in its abstract character, the absence of any concrete view on the subject.\*\* Properly speaking, this is not a programme but a Marxian declaration in the most general terms. Of course, it would be preposterous to put the blame for this mis-

<sup>1</sup>The first Russian Social-Democratic group, formed abroad in 1883 by G. P. Plekhanov, V. I. Zasulich, P. B. Axelrod and others.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

take on the authors of the programme, who for the first time stated certain principles long before the formation of a workers' party. On the contrary, it should be particularly emphasised that in this programme the inevitability of a "radical revision" of the Peasant Reform<sup>1</sup> was recognised twenty years before the Russian revolution.

This programme should have been further developed, and in its theoretical part should have explained the economic basis of our agrarian programme, the facts upon which the demand for a radical revision, as distinct from a non-radical, reformist revision, can and should be based, and, finally, it should have concretely defined the nature of this revision from the standpoint of the proletariat (which, by its very nature, differs from the general radical standpoint). In its practical part, the programme should have been further developed by summing up the experience of the peasant movement. Without the experience of a mass—nay, more—of a nation-wide peasant movement, the programme of the Social-Democratic Labour Party could not become concrete; for it would have been too difficult, or impossible, on the basis of theoretical reasoning alone, to define the degree to which capitalist disintegration had taken place among our peasantry and to what extent the latter is capable of bringing about a revolutionary-democratic revolution.

In 1903, when the Second Congress of our Party adopted the first agrarian programme of the R.S.D.L.P.,\* we did not yet have such experience as would enable us to judge the character, breadth and depth of the peasant movement. The peasant risings in South Russia in the spring of 1902<sup>2</sup> remained isolated outbursts. One can therefore understand the reserve shown by the Social-Democrats in drafting the agrarian programme: to "devise" such a programme for a bourgeois society is not the business of the proletariat, and the extent to which the peasant movement against the survivals of serfdom, a movement worthy of proletarian support, was likely to develop was still unknown.

<sup>1</sup> The Peasant Reform—the emancipation of the serfs in 1861.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> See note to page 149.—*Ed.*

The programme of 1903 makes an attempt to define concretely the nature and conditions of the "revision" about which the Social-Democrats had spoken only in a general way in 1885. This attempt—in the main point of the programme, dealing with the *otrezki*—was based upon a tentative distinction between lands which serve the purposes of exploitation by means of serfdom and bondage ("lands 'cut off' in 1861"<sup>1</sup>) and lands which are exploited in a capitalist manner. Such a tentative distinction was entirely erroneous because, in practice, the movement of the peasant masses could not be directed against particular categories of landlord estates, but only against large-scale landed property in general. The programme of 1903 raised a question which had not yet been raised in 1885, namely, the question of the conflict of interests between the peasants and the landlords prevailing at the moment of the revision of agrarian relations which all Social-Democrats regarded as inevitable. But the solution given to this question in the programme of 1903 is not correct, for, instead of proposing a consistent peasant method as against a consistent *Junker* method of carrying out the bourgeois revolution, the programme artificially sets up something intermediate. Here, too, we must make allowance for the fact that the absence of an open mass movement at that time prevented us from giving a correct answer to this question on the basis of precise data, and not on the basis of phrases, or naive wishes, or of petty-bourgeois utopias, which served the Socialist-Revolutionaries for their reply. No one could say with certainty in advance to what extent the disintegration among the peasantry had advanced as a result of the partial transition of the landlords from the *otraboiki*<sup>2</sup> system to wage labour. No one could estimate how large was the stratum of agricultural labourers which emerged after the Reform of 1861 and to what extent their interests had become segregated from those of the ruined peasant masses.

At all events, the fundamental error in the agrarian programme of 1903 was the absence of a clear idea as to what

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 7.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> See note to page 166.—*Ed.*

the main issue was around which the agrarian struggle could and would develop in the process of the bourgeois revolution in Russia—a clear idea of the types of capitalist agrarian evolution that were objectively possible as the result of the victory of one or other of the social forces engaged in this struggle.

## 2. THE PRESENT AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

The present agrarian programme of the Social-Democratic Party which was adopted at the Stockholm Congress\* marked a great step forward in comparison with the preceding one in one important respect, *viz.*, by recognising the confiscation of the landlords' estates.<sup>1</sup> The Social-Democratic Party resolutely started on the path of recognising the peasant agrarian revolution. This idea is definitely expressed in the following words of the programme: "...supporting the revolutionary action of the peasantry up to and including the confiscation of the landlords' estates." In the course of the discussion at the Stockholm Congress, one of the reporters, Plekhanov, who together with John<sup>2</sup> proposed this programme, spoke definitely of the necessity of ceasing to be afraid of a "peasant agrarian revolution." (*Cf.* Plekhanov's Report,\*\* Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, Moscow, 1907, p. 42.)

One would have thought that this admission—that our bourgeois revolution, in the domain of agrarian relations, must be regarded as a "peasant agrarian revolution"—would remove the extreme differences of opinion among Social-Democrats on the question of the agrarian programme. Actually, however, differences arose over the question as to whether Social-Democrats should support the division of the landlords' estates among the peasants as private property, or advocate the municipalisation of the landlords' estates, or the nationalisation of all the land. First of all, therefore, we must definitely establish the fact that

<sup>1</sup>The text of the programme (point 4) speaks of privately owned estates. The resolution appended to the programme (the second part of the agrarian programme) speaks of confiscation of the landlords' estates.

<sup>2</sup>P. Maslov—see note to page 202.\*\*—*Ed.*

these questions can be correctly answered only from the standpoint of the peasant agrarian revolution in Russia, a point which Social-Democrats too frequently forget. Of course, this does not mean that Social-Democracy must refrain from independently defining the interests of the proletariat as a separate class in this peasant revolution. No. But we must have a clear idea of the character and significance of precisely the peasant agrarian revolution as one of the varieties of bourgeois revolution in general. We cannot "invent" any particular "project" of reform. We must study the objective conditions of the peasant agrarian revolution in Russia which is developing in a capitalist direction, and upon the basis of this objective analysis we must separate the erroneous ideology of the different classes from the real content of the economic changes, and thus, on the basis of these real economic changes, determine what is required for the development of the productive forces and of the proletarian class struggle.

The present agrarian programme of the R.S.D.I.P. demands that the confiscated lands be transformed into public property (in a special form, *i.e.*, the nationalisation of forests, waters, and of the colonisation reserves and the municipalisation of privately owned lands), at least in the event of the "victorious development of the revolution." In the event of "unfavourable conditions," the principle of dividing the landlords' estates among the peasants as private property is adopted. In all cases, the property rights of the peasants and small holders generally to their present holdings are recognised. Consequently, the programme provides for a dual system of land tenure in a reformed bourgeois Russia: private property in land, and (at least in the event of the victorious development of the revolution) public property in the form of municipalisation and nationalisation.

How was this duality explained by the authors of the programme? First of all, and above all, by the interests and demands of the peasantry, by the fear of a rupture with the peasantry, the fear of setting the peasantry against the proletariat and against the revolution. By advancing such an argument the authors and the supporters of the programme took the ground

of recognising the peasant agrarian revolution, the ground of giving proletarian support to definitely peasant demands. And this argument was advanced by the most influential supporters of the programme, with Comrade John at their head! To become convinced of this, it is sufficient to glance at the minutes of the Stockholm Congress.

This argument was directly and categorically advanced by Comrade John in his speech.

"If the revolution," he said, "led to an attempt to nationalise the peasants' allotments, or to nationalise the lands confiscated from the landlords, as is suggested by Comrade Lenin, such a measure would lead to a counter-revolutionary movement not only in the borderlands, but also in the central part of the country. We would have not one Vendée,\* but a general revolt of the peasantry against any attempt at state interference with the peasants' *own* [italicised by John] allotments, against any attempt to 'nationalise' the latter." (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 40.)

This seems clear, does it not? The nationalisation of the peasants' own lands would lead to a general revolt of the peasantry! This is the reason why Comrade X's<sup>1</sup> original municipalisation project, which had proposed to transfer to the Zemstvos not only the private lands, but "if possible" all the lands (quoted by me in the pamphlet *A Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*), was replaced by Maslov's municipalisation project which proposed to exempt the peasants' lands.\*\* Indeed, how could they possibly ignore this fact, discovered after 1903, about the inevitable peasant revolt against attempts at complete nationalisation? How could they possibly refrain from adopting the standpoint of another noted Menshevik, Comrade Kostrov,<sup>2</sup> who exclaimed in Stockholm:

"To go to the peasants with this [nationalisation] is to repel them. The peasant movement will go on apart from or against us, and we shall find ourselves divorced from the revolution. Nationalisation makes Social-Democracy impotent, isolates it from the peasantry and thus also makes the revolution impotent." (P. 88.)

One cannot but admit the force of this argument. To try to nationalise the peasants' own land against their wishes in a peasant agrarian revolution! If the Stockholm Congress believed

<sup>1</sup> P. Maslov.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> Kostrov—Party name of N. Jordania, afterwards head of the Menshevik government of Georgia and now a White émigré.—*Ed.*

the assertions made by John and Kostrov, it is not surprising that it rejected this idea.

But was the Congress right in believing them?

In view of the importance of the question of an all-Russian Vendée against nationalisation, a brief reference to history will not be out of place.

### 3. THE CHIEF PLEA OF THE ADHERENTS OF MUNICIPALISATION TESTED BY LIFE

The above-quoted categorical assertions were made by John and Kostrov in April 1906, *i.e.*, on the eve of the First Duma. I argued (see pamphlet *A Revision, etc.*) that the peasantry was in favour of nationalisation, but I was told that the decisions of the Congress of the Peasant Union\* did not prove anything, because they were inspired by the ideology of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the masses of the peasants would never support such demands.

Since then this question has been documentarily answered by the First and Second Dumas. The representatives of the peasantry from all parts of Russia spoke in the First and particularly in the Second Dumas. No one, except perhaps the publicists of *Rossiia* and *Novoye Vremya*,<sup>1</sup> can deny that the political and economic demands of the peasant masses found expression in both these Dumas. One would have thought that after the independent declarations made by the peasant deputies before the other parties, the idea of nationalising the peasants' lands would have been finally buried by now. One would have thought that the supporters of John and Kostrov could easily have got the peasant deputies to raise a cry in the Duma against nationalisation. One would have thought that Social-Democracy, led by the Mensheviks, would really have been able to "divorce" from the revolution the advocates of nationalisation who are rousing an all-Russian counter-revolutionary Vendée.

As a matter of fact, something different happened. In the First Duma concern for the peasants' *own* (John's italics) lands

<sup>1</sup> *Russia* and *New Times*—two reactionary papers subsidised by the government.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

was displayed by Stishinsky and Gurko.<sup>1</sup> In both Dumas the right of private property in land was defended by the extreme Rights jointly with the spokesmen of the government, who were opposed to any form of public property in land, whether municipalisation, nationalisation or socialisation. In both Dumas the peasant deputies from all parts of Russia spoke in favour of nationalisation.

In 1905, Comrade Maslov wrote:

"Land nationalisation as a means of solving [?] the agrarian problem in Russia at the present time cannot be accepted, first of all" (note this "first of all") "because it is hopelessly utopian. Land nationalisation presupposes the transfer of all the land to the state. But will the peasants, and particularly the homestead peasants,<sup>2</sup> voluntarily agree to transfer their land to anyone?" (P. Maslov, *A Critique of Agrarian Programmes*, Moscow, 1905, p. 20.)

Thus, in 1905, nationalisation was "first of all" hopelessly utopian because the peasants would not agree to it.

In 1907, in Murch, the same Maslov wrote:

"All the Narodnik groups [the Trudoviki, the Narodni-Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries] are advocating land nationalisation in one form or another." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 100.)

See what has become of the new Vendée! See what has become of the all-Russian revolt of the peasants against nationalisation!

Yet instead of pondering over the ridiculous position in which those who used to speak and write about a peasant Vendée in opposition to nationalisation have now placed themselves in the light of the experience of the two Dumas, instead of trying to explain the mistake which they made in 1905, P. Maslov behaved like Ivan the Forgetful. He preferred to forget the words I have just quoted, and the speeches at the Stockholm Congress! Nay, more. With the same lightheartedness with which he in 1905 asserted that the peasants would not agree he now asserts the very opposite. Just listen:

<sup>1</sup>Two representatives of the government in the Cabinets of 1905-06, noted for their reactionary attitude in upholding the rights and privileges of the landed aristocracy.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup>Peasants who held their allotments on an individual tenure basis.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

"The Narodniki, reflecting the interests and hopes of the small proprietors [listen to this!], were bound to declare themselves in favour of nationalisation." (*Ibid.*)

Here you have a sample of the scientific accuracy of our advocates of municipalisation! In solving a difficult problem prior to the political declarations of the peasants' representatives from the whole of Russia, they, on behalf of the small proprietors, asserted one thing, and after the peasants' declarations in the two Dumas they assert, on behalf of the very same "small proprietors," the very opposite.

It is worth while mentioning as a particular curiosity that Maslov explains the Russian peasants' inclination towards nationalisation as being due not to any special conditions of the peasant agrarian revolution, but rather to the general qualities of the small proprietor in capitalist society. It seems incredible, but this is what he actually says:

"The small proprietor," Maslov announces, "is most of all afraid of the competition and domination of the big proprietor, of the domination of capital."

You are mixing things up, Comrade Maslov. To mention the big (feudal) landowner and the owner of capital in one breath is to reiterate the prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie. The very reason the peasant fights so energetically against the feudal latifundia is that at the present historical moment he represents the free, capitalist evolution of agriculture.

"Being unable to fight against capital in the economic field, the small proprietor puts his faith in government authority, which, he believes, should come to the aid of the small proprietor against the big proprietor. . . . The reason the Russian peasant has hoped for centuries to be protected from the landlords and government officials by the central authority, the reason Napoleon in France, relying for support on the peasants, was able to crush the Republic, was the hope the peasants entertained of receiving aid from the central authority."\* (*Obrazovaniye*, p. 100.)

How splendidly Peter Maslov argues! In the first place, what has nationalisation of the land to do with the fact that at the present historical moment the Russian peasant is displaying the same qualities as the French peasant did in the time of Napoleon? At the time of Napoleon, the French peasant was

not and could not be in favour of nationalisation. You are rather incoherent, Comrade Maslov!

Secondly, what has this to do with the struggle against capital? We are comparing peasant ownership of the land with the nationalisation of the whole of the land, including that of the peasants. Under Napoleon, the French peasant clung fanatically to small property as a barrier against capital. But the Russian peasant . . . once again I must ask you, my dear fellow, where is the connection between the beginning of your argument and the end?

Thirdly, in speaking about the hopes placed in government authority, Maslov makes it appear that the peasants do not understand the harm of bureaucracy, nor the importance of local government, whereas he, advanced Peter Maslov, does appreciate all this. This is a rather vulgarised critique of the Narodniki! A mere reference to the famous Land Bill (the Bill of the "104" \*), which the Trudoviki introduced in the First and Second Dumas, will suffice to show the fallacy of Maslov's argument (or hint?). As a matter of fact the principles of local government and of hostility towards a bureaucratic solution of the land problem are expressed in the Trudovik bill more clearly than in the programme of the Social-Democrats written according to Maslov! In our programme we speak only about "democratic principles" in electing the local organs, whereas the Trudovik bill (clause 16) distinctly and directly provides for the election of the local authorities on the basis of "universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot." Nay, more. The bill provides for local land committees—which, as is known, the Social-Democrats support—to be elected in the same way, which are to organise the discussion on the land reform and make preparations for carrying it out (clauses 17-20). The bureaucratic method of carrying out the agrarian reform was advocated by the Cadets, not by the Trudoviki, by the bourgeois liberals, not by the peasants. Why did Maslov have to misrepresent these well-known facts?

Fourthly, in his remarkable "explanation" of why the small proprietors "were bound to declare themselves in favour of

nationalisation," Maslov lays stress on the peasants' hope of receiving protection from the central authority. This is the point of distinction between municipalisation and nationalisation: in the one case there are local authorities, in the other case, central authorities. This is Maslov's pet little idea, the economic and political significance of which we shall deal with in greater detail further on. Meanwhile we will point out that Maslov is shirking the question put to him by the history of our revolution, namely, why the peasants are not afraid of the nationalisation of their own land. This is the crux of the question!

But this is not all. A particularly curious point in Maslov's attempt to explain the class roots of the nationalisation policy of the Trudoviki is the following: Maslov fails to tell his readers that on the question of the immediate disposal of the land the Narodniki were also in favour of the local authorities! Maslov's talk about the "hope" placed by the peasant in the central authority is mere intellectual gossip about the peasant. Let us turn to clause 16 of the Land Bill the Trudoviki introduced in both Dumas. Here is the text of the clause:

"The management of the national land reserve should be entrusted to the local authorities, elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, which shall act independently within the limits laid down by the law."

Compare this with the corresponding demand made in our programme:

"The R.S.D.L.P. demands:..4) the confiscation of privately owned lands (except small holdings), which shall be placed at the disposal of large local government bodies (comprising urban and rural districts, as per point 3) to be elected on democratic principles. . . ."

What difference is there between the two from the standpoint of the comparative rights of the central and local authorities? What is the difference between "management" and "disposal"?

Why, in speaking about the attitude of the Trudoviki towards nationalisation, was Maslov constrained to conceal from his readers—and perhaps also from himself—the contents of this clause 16? Because it completely shatters his absurd "municipalisation" theory.

Examine the arguments adduced by Maslov in favour of this municipalisation before the Stockholm Congress, read the minutes of that Congress, and you will find an infinite number of allusions to the impossibility of suppressing nationalities, oppressing the borderlands, ignoring the differences of local interests, etc., etc. Even prior to the Stockholm Congress, I pointed out to Maslov (*cf. A Revision, etc.*, p. 18) that arguments of this kind are "utter nonsense," because our programme has already recognised the right of self-determination of nationalities as well as wide local and territorial self-government. Consequently, there is no need, nor is it possible, from this aspect, to devise any additional "guarantees" against excessive centralisation, bureaucracy and regulation, because this will be either devoid of content or it will be interpreted in an anti-proletarian, federalistic spirit.

The Trudoviki have demonstrated to the advocates of municipalisation that I was right.

Maslov must admit now that all the groups voicing the interests and the viewpoint of the peasantry have expressed themselves in favour of nationalisation in a form that will ensure the rights and powers of the local government bodies not less than in Maslov's programme! The law defining the powers of the local government bodies is to be passed by the central parliament. Maslov does not mention this, but such ostrich-like tactics will be of no avail, because no other method can be thought of.

The words "placed at the disposal" introduce even greater confusion. They do not indicate who the owners<sup>1</sup> of the lands confiscated from the landlords are to be! That being the case, we must conclude that there will only be one owner—the state. What does "placed at the disposal" mean? What are its limits, forms and conditions to be? This, too, will have to be determined by the central parliament. This is quite obvious, and

<sup>1</sup> At the Stockholm Congress the Mensheviks rejected an amendment to substitute for the words, "at the disposal," the words "as the private property." (Minutes, p. 152.) Only in the resolution on tactics is it said, "in possession," in the event of the "victorious development of the revolution," but it does not define this event more precisely.

besides, in the programme of our Party special mention is made of "forests of national importance" and of "colonisation reserves." It stands to reason that the central state authority alone can decide which part of the general mass of forests are to be singled out as "forests of national importance" and which part of the general area of land is to be regarded as "colonisation reserves."

In a word, the Maslov programme, which has now become, in a particularly distorted form, the programme of our Party, is perfectly absurd in comparison with the programme of the Trudoviki. No wonder Maslov has found it necessary, in connection with nationalisation, to begin to talk even about the Napoleonic peasant in order to hide from the public the awkward position we have put ourselves in before the representatives of bourgeois democracy by our confused "municipalisation."

The only real and absolute difference between the two is the point on the attitude towards peasant allotments. Maslov singled out these lands only because he was afraid of a "Vendée." And it turned out that the peasant deputies sent to the First and Second Dumas laughed the fears of the *khvostist* Social-Democrats to scorn and expressed themselves in favour of the nationalisation of their own lands!

The advocates of municipalisation should now oppose the Trudovik peasants and urge them not to nationalise their own lands. The irony of history has thrown the arguments of Maslov, John, Kostrov and Co. upon their own heads.

#### 4. THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE PEASANTRY

We shall try to analyse the question (as to why all the political groups which reflect the interests and hopes of the small proprietors should be in favour of nationalisation) around which P. Maslov flounders so helplessly.

First of all, let us see to what extent the Land Bill of the "104,"<sup>1</sup> i.e., of the Trudoviki of the First and Second Dumas, really expresses the demands of the peasantry of the whole of

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 206.—*Ed.*

Russia. Evidence of this is furnished by the character of the representation in both Dumas, as well as by the character of the political struggle which developed in the "parliamentary" arena on the agrarian question among the spokesmen for the interests of the different classes. Not only was the idea of landed property in general, and of peasant property in particular, not relegated to the background in the Duma, but on the contrary it was always pushed to the forefront by certain parties. The idea was championed by the government through the mouths of Messrs. Stishinsky and Gurko and all the ministers, as well as in the government press, and they all appealed especially to the peasant deputies. The political parties of the Right (for instance, the "celebrated" Svyatopolk-Mirsky in the Second Duma) persistently reiterated to the peasants the blessings of peasant ownership of the land. The actual alignment of forces on this question has become so clearly defined by a wealth of data that there can be no further doubt as to its correctness (from the standpoint of class interests). The Cadet Party in the First Duma, when the liberals regarded the revolutionary people as a force and courted it, was also driven by the general current to the side of land nationalisation. As is known, the Cadet Land Bill introduced in the First Duma contained a clause about "state land reserve" to be made up of all alienated land and to be leased out on long term leases. Of course, this demand was put forward by the Cadets in the First Duma not upon any grounds of principle—it would be ridiculous to speak of the principles of the Cadet Party. No, this demand of the liberals sprang up as a feeble echo of the demands of the masses of the peasantry. Even in the First Duma the peasant deputies began to form a separate political group, and the Land Bill of the "104" constituted the chief and fundamental platform of the whole of the Russian peasantry, which came forward as a conscious social force. The speeches of the peasant deputies in the First and Second Dumas and the articles in the "Trudovik" papers (*Izvestiya Krestyanskih Deputatov, Trudovaya Rossiya*<sup>1</sup>) showed that the Bill of

<sup>1</sup> *Peasant Deputies' News and Toiling Russia.—Ed. Eng. ed.*

the "104" faithfully expressed the interests and hopes of the peasants. It will be useful therefore to examine this bill somewhat in detail.

It is interesting, by the way, to glance at the composition of the group of deputies who signed the bill. In the First Duma the signatories comprised 70 Trudoviki, 17 non-party, 8 peasants who supplied no information as to their party affiliations, 5 Cadets,<sup>1</sup> 3 Social-Democrats,<sup>2</sup> and 1 Lithuanian Autonomist. In the Second Duma the Bill of the "104" bore 99 signatures, and after deducting duplicates, 91 signatures; these comprised 79 Trudoviki, 4 Narodni-Socialists, 2 Socialist-Revolutionaries, 2 from the Cossack group, 2 non-party, 1 "to the Left" of the Cadets (Petersen) and 1 Cadet (Odnokozov, a peasant). There was a preponderance of peasants among the signatories (not less than 54 out of 91 in the Second Duma, and not less than 52 out of 104 in the First). It is interesting to observe, further, that P. Maslov's particular expectations regarding the peasant homestead farmers (referred to above), who would not agree to nationalisation, were also upset by the attitude of the peasant deputies in both Dumas. For instance, in Podolsk Gubernia nearly all the peasants are homestead farmers (in 1905 there were 457,134 homestead farmers and only 1,630 members of village communes<sup>3</sup>), nevertheless 13 Podolian deputies (mainly peasant farmers) signed the Land Bill of the "104" in the First Duma, and 10 in the Second Duma. Among other gubernias in which there are homesteads we might mention Vilna, Kovno, Kiev, Poltava, Bessarabia and Volynia, the deputies of which signed the Land Bill of the "104." The difference between village commune members and homestead farmers as regards land nationalisation may appear important and material only to those who share the prejudices of the Narodniki—and by the way, a severe blow was dealt to these prejudices when the peasant deputies of the whole of Russia first came out with a land programme. As

<sup>1</sup> G. Zubchenko, T. Volkov, I. Gerasimov, all peasants; S. Lozhkin, a physician, and Afanasyev, a priest.

<sup>2</sup> Antonov, a worker from Perm Gubernia; Yerшов, a worker from Kazan Gubernia, and V. Churyukov, a worker from Moscow Gubernia.

<sup>3</sup> The figures refer to households.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

a matter of fact, the demand for land nationalisation is called forth not by any specific form of land tenure, not by the "communal habits and instincts" of the peasants, but by the general conditions of the whole system of small peasant land tenure (both communal and individual) which is crushed by the weight of the feudal latifundia.

Among the deputies in the First and Second Dumas who sponsored the nationalisation bill of the "104" we see representatives from all localities of Russia, not only from the central agricultural and the industrial non-Black-Earth gubernias, not only from the northern (Archangel and Vologda in the Second Duma), eastern and southern borderlands (Astrakhan, Bessarabia, Don, Ekaterinoslav, Kuban, Taurida and Stavropol), but also from the gubernias of Little Russia, the Southwest, Northwest, Poland (Suvalski) and Siberia (Tobolsk). Obviously the plight of the small peasant under the oppression of feudal landlordism, which is expressed with particular force and directness in the purely Russian agricultural centres, is felt throughout Russia, and causes the small proprietors everywhere to support the struggle for the nationalisation of the land.

The character of this struggle bears the distinct features of petty-bourgeois individualism. In this respect particular stress must be laid on a fact which is too frequently ignored in our socialist press; namely, that the greatest blow to the "socialism" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was dealt by the very first entry of the peasants into the open, all-Russian political arena with their independent land programme. The Socialist-Revolutionaries' Land Socialisation Bill (the Bill of the "33" in the First Duma \*) was supported by a minority of the advanced peasant deputies. The great majority appeared as supporters of the Land Bill of the "104," drafted by the Narodni-Socialists, whose programme the Socialist-Revolutionaries describe as individualistic.

For instance, in the Socialist-Revolutionary *Collection of Essays* (published by *Nasha Myst*,<sup>1</sup> St. Petersburg, 1907, No. 1) we find an article by P. Vikhlyaev entitled "The Narodni-Socialist Party and the Agrarian Question." The author of this

<sup>1</sup> *Our Thought*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

article criticises the Narodni-Socialist, Peshekhonov, but he quotes the latter's words to the effect that "the Bill of the '104' reflects our standpoint [that of the Narodni-Socialists] on the way in which the land may be obtained." (P. 81.)

The Socialist-Revolutionaries state frankly that the Bill of the "104" "leads to the negation of the root principle of communal land tenure"—"in the same way" (*sic!*) as Stolypin's agrarian legislation, and the law of November 22, (9), 1906.<sup>1</sup> (*Ibid.*, p. 86.) (We shall show presently how the Socialist-Revolutionaries were prevented by their own prejudices from appraising the real economic differences between the two ways, *i.e.*, the Stolypin way and the Trudovik way.) The Socialist-Revolutionaries discern in Peshekhonov's programme views "the manifestation of selfish individualism" (p. 89), "the pollution of the wide ideological stream with the mud of individualism" (p. 91), and "the encouragement of individualistic and selfish tendencies among the masses of the people." (P. 93.)

All this is true. But in vain do the Socialist-Revolutionaries believe that by employing "strong" language they can obscure the fact that the essence of the matter is not the opportunism of Messrs. Peshekhonov and Co., but the individualism of the small farmer. It is not that the Peshekhonovs are polluting the ideological stream of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but that the majority of the advanced peasant deputies have revealed the real economic content of the Narodnik theories, the real aspirations of the small landowners. The Land Bill of the "104" in the First and Second Dumas<sup>2</sup> revealed the bankruptcy of the Socialist-Revolutionaries when they appeared before the representatives of the broad, really all-Russian, peasant masses.

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 184.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> From the stenographic reports of the Second Duma it appears that the Socialist-Revolutionary, Mushenko, introduced a land bill signed by 105 deputies. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain a copy of this bill. Among the Duma materials I had at my disposal there was only the Trudovik Bill of the "104" that was introduced in the Second Duma. The existence of the Socialist-Revolutionary Bill of the 105 in addition to the two Bills of the "104" Trudoviki (introduced in the First and Second Dumas) merely indicates, at best, that certain peasants wavered between the Narodni-Socialists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but it does not disprove my argument.

While expressing themselves in favour of land nationalisation, the Trudoviki very clearly reveal in their bill the "selfish and individualistic" aspirations of the small landowners. They propose to leave the allotments and the small private holdings in the possession of the present owners (clause 3 of the Land Bill of the "104"), providing legislative measures are taken to ensure "their gradual transformation into the property of the whole nation." Translated into the language of real economic relations, it means just this: we take as our starting point the interests of the real owners, of the real, not the nominal, tillers of the land, but it is our desire that their economic activity may develop quite freely upon nationalised land.<sup>1</sup> Clause 9 of the Bill, which states that "preference is to be given to the local population before outsiders, and to the agricultural population before the non-agricultural," indicates once again that the interests of the small properties are uppermost in the minds of the Trudoviki. An "equal right to the land" is a phrase; state loans and subsidies "to persons without sufficient means to secure the necessary agricultural equipment" (clause 15 of the Land Bill of the "104") are pious wishes; the real and inevitable gainers will be those who can become strong proprietors now, who can become transformed from bonded tillers of the land into free and prosperous farmers. Of course, it is in the interests of the proletariat to

<sup>1</sup> By the way, Comrade A. Finn-Yenotayevsky, in disputing the seriousness and consciousness of the nationalisation efforts of the Peasant Union and of the peasantry in general, cited the statement of V. Groman to the effect that the delegates at the Peasants' Congress "do not anticipate having to make any payment for the land," and they have no idea that the differential rent ought to revert to society as a whole. (A. Finn, *The Agrarian Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 69.) This view is repudiated by clauses 7 and 14 of the Bill of the "104." In these clauses provision is made by the Trudoviki both for payment for the land (a land tax rising in accordance with the size of the allotment) and for the reversion of the differential rent to the state ("limiting the right to increment value" in land "in so far as such increment is not due to the labour and capital of the proprietors [N.B.! the Trudoviki are not opposed to capital!] but to social conditions"). It is true that in regard to urban and other lands, clause 13 provides that: "until such property passes to the whole nation" the right of owners, etc., shall be limited. But this is probably a slip of the pen, for otherwise it would mean that the Trudoviki take the rent from the landowners and return it to the tenants on the nationalised land.

support such measures as will give the greatest impetus to the passing of agriculture in Russia from the hands of feudal landlords and bonded tillers of the land, crushed by ignorance, poverty and routine, into the hands of free farmers. And the Bill of the "104" is nothing but the fighting platform for transforming the well-to-do portion of the bonded peasantry into free farmers.

## 5. MEDIEVAL LANDOWNERSHIP AND THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION

The question now arises as to whether there are, in the economic conditions of the agrarian, bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, material grounds which compel the small proprietors to demand the nationalisation of the land, or whether this demand is merely a phrase, merely the innocent desire of the unenlightened peasant, the vain dream of the patriarchal tiller of the soil.

To answer this question we must first of all picture to ourselves more concretely the conditions of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in agriculture, and then compare these conditions with the two paths of capitalist agrarian evolution that are possible in Russia, as we have outlined above.

The conditions of the bourgeois revolution in agriculture from the standpoint of agrarian relations have been very strikingly dealt with by Marx in the last volume of *Theories of Surplus Value* (*Theorien über den Mehrwerth*, II Band, 2 Teil, Stuttgart, 1905).

After examining the views of Rodbertus and exposing the narrow-mindedness of the theory of this Pomeranian landlord (II, I Teil, S. 256-58), Marx turns to Ricardo's theory of rent. (II, 2 Teil, § 3 b) "The Historical Conditions of Ricardo's Theory.")

Speaking of Ricardo and Anderson, Marx says:

"Both, however, start out from the viewpoint, which is regarded as so strange on the Continent: 1) that no landed property exists as an obstacle to any investment of capital in the land; 2) that there is a passing over from better to worse soils. For Ricardo this is absolute—leaving out of account interruptions through the reaction of science and industry; for Anderson it is relative—the worse soil is again transformed into better; 3) that capital, the mass of capital requisite for application to agriculture, is always present.

"Now, as far as 1) and 2) are concerned, it must appear very peculiar

to those on the Continent that in the country where, according to their notions, feudal landed property has been most strongly preserved, economists start out from the idea that landed property does not exist. Anderson does so as well as Ricardo. The explanation is as follows:

"First, from the peculiarity of the English 'Enclosure Acts,'\* which has absolutely no analogy with the continental division of common land.

"Secondly, nowhere in the world has capitalist production, since Henry VII, dealt so ruthlessly with the traditional relations of agriculture and so adequately moulded its conditions and made them subject to itself. England is in this respect the most revolutionary country in the world. All historically inherited relations—not only the position of the villages but the very villages themselves, not only the habitations of the agricultural population but this population itself, not only the ancient economic centres but the very economy itself—have been ruthlessly swept away where they were in contradiction to the conditions of capitalist production in the countryside or did not correspond to those conditions. The German, for example, finds economic relations determined by the traditional common land relations, the position of economic centres and particular conglomerations of the population. The Englishman finds that the historical conditions of agriculture have been progressively created by capital since the end of the fifteenth century. The technical expression customary in the United Kingdom, the 'clearing of estates,' does not occur in any continental country. But what does this 'clearing of estates' mean? It means that, without regard for the local population—which is driven away, for existing villages—which are levelled to the ground, for farm buildings—which are torn down, for the kind of agriculture—which is transformed at a stroke, being converted for example from tillage to pasture, all conditions of production instead of being accepted as they are handed down by tradition are historically fashioned in the form necessary under the circumstances for the most profitable investment of capital. To that extent, therefore, no landed property exists; it allows capital—the farmer—to manage freely, since it is only concerned about the money income. A Pomeranian landowner, his mind full of his hereditary estates, economic centres and the agricultural collegium, is quite likely, therefore, to hold up his hands in horror at Ricardo's 'unhistorical' views on the development of agricultural relations. That only shows that he naively confuses Pomeranian and English conditions. But it cannot be said that Ricardo, who here starts out from English conditions, is just as narrow in his view as the Pomeranian landowner who thirks within Pomeranian conditions.

"The English conditions are the only ones in which modern landed property, i.e., landed property modified by capitalist production, has adequately developed. Here the English view is the classical one for the modern capitalist mode of production. The Pomeranian view, on the other hand, judges the developed relations according to a historically lower, still inadequate form."

This is a remarkably profound argument by Marx. Have our advocates of municipalisation ever pondered over it?

Also, Marx, in Volume III of *Capital* (2 Teil, S. 156<sup>1</sup>),

<sup>1</sup> *Capital*, Vol. III, chap. 37, p. 723, Chicago, Kerr & Co.—Ed. Eng. ed.

pointed out that the form of landed property which the nascent capitalist mode of production finds does not suit its requirements. Capitalism creates for itself its own suitable forms of agrarian relationships out of the old forms, out of feudal landed property, small peasants' commune property, clan property, etc. In that chapter, Marx compares the various methods whereby capital creates forms of landed property suitable for itself. In Germany the reshaping of the mediæval forms of landed property proceeded in a reformist way, so to speak. It adapted itself to routine, to tradition, to the feudal estates that were slowly converted into *Junker* estates, to the routine of indolent peasants<sup>1</sup> who were proceeding along the difficult road from serf labour to the condition of the *Knecht* and *Grossbauer*.<sup>2</sup> In England this reshaping proceeded in a revolutionary, violent way; but the violence was practised for the benefit of the landlords, it was practised on the masses of the peasants, who were taxed to exhaustion, driven from the villages, evicted, and who died out or emigrated. In America this reshaping went on in a violent way as regards the slave-owning farms in the Southern states.<sup>3</sup> In that case violence was applied against the slave-owning landlords. Their estates were broken up, and the land was transformed from large feudal estates into small bourgeois farms.<sup>4</sup> As regards the mass of "free" American lands, this role of creating the new agrarian relationships to suit the new mode of production (*i.e.*, capitalism) was played by the "American Black Redistribution," by the Anti-Rent movement\* of the 'forties, the Homestead Acts,<sup>5</sup> etc. When a German Communist by the name of Hermann Kriege, in 1846, advocated the equal redistribution of the land in America, Marx ridiculed the Socialist-Revolutionary prejudices and the petty-bourgeois theory of this quasi-socialist, but he appreciated the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Theorien über den Mehrwerth*, II Band, I Teil, S. 280: the condition for the capitalist mode of production in agriculture is "the substitution of a business man (*Geschäftsmann*) for the indolent peasant."

<sup>2</sup> Farmservant and big farmer.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>3</sup> See note to page 180.—*Ed.*

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Kautsky, *The Agrarian Question* (p. 132 *et sup.* in the German original) on the growth of small farms in the Southern states of America as the result of the abolition of slavery.

historical importance of the American movement against landed property,<sup>1</sup> as a movement giving progressive expression to the development of the forces of production and to the interests of capitalism in America.

## 6. WHY SMALL OWNERS IN RUSSIA HAD TO DECLARE THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF NATIONALISATION

Let us glance from this standpoint at the agrarian evolution of Russia since the second half of the nineteenth century.

What do our "great" Peasant Reform, the "cutting off" of the peasants' lands, removing the peasants to "sandy soil," enforcing the new land laws by military force, shootings and corporal punishment, represent? They all represent the first acts of mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of nascent capitalism in agriculture. It is the "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the landlords.

What do Stolypin's agrarian legislation carried out with the aid of Article 87,<sup>2</sup> this encouragement of the plunder of the communes by the kulaks, this breaking up of the old agrarian relationships to the advantage of a handful of well-to-do proprietors at the price of the rapid ruining of the masses, represent? They represent the second big step in mass violence against the peasantry in the interests of capitalism. It is the second "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the landlords.

And what does the land nationalisation of the Trudoviki represent in the Russian revolution?

<sup>1</sup> "We fully recognise the historical justification of the movement of the American National Reformers. We know that this movement strives to attain a result which, it is true, would for the moment promote the industrialism of modern bourgeois society, but which must, as the fruit of a proletarian movement, as an attack on landed property in general and particularly under the conditions existing in America, lead eventually by its own logical sequence to communism. Kriege, who joined the anti-rent movement in New York, together with the German Communists, clothes this thin fact in florid phrases, without troubling about the content of the movement itself." (*Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, Mehring's edition, Volume II.)

<sup>2</sup> See note to page 184.—*Ed.*

It represents the "clearing of estates" for capitalism by the peasantry.

The main source of the well-meant foolishness uttered by our advocates of municipalisation is precisely their failure to understand the economic basis of the bourgeois-agrarian revolution in Russia in its two possible phases, *i.e.*, the landlord-bourgeois revolution, or the peasant-bourgeois revolution. Without a "clearing" of the mediæval agrarian relationships and laws, partly feudal and partly Asiatic, there cannot be a bourgeois revolution in agriculture, because capital must—in the sense of economic necessity—create for itself new agrarian relationships, adapted to the new conditions of free commercial agriculture. This "clearing" of the mediæval lumber in the domain of agrarian relationships in general, and of the old system of landownership to begin with, must chiefly affect the landlords' estates and peasant allotments, because both forms of landed property are now, in their present forms, adapted to the *otrâbotki* system, the heritage of *barshchina*, to bondage, and not to the system of free capitalistically developing economy. Stolypin's "clearing" undoubtedly follows the line of the progressive capitalist development of Russia; but it is adapted entirely to the interests of the landlords: let the wealthy peasants pay three times the value of the land to the "Peasant" Land (read: "Landlord") Bank\*; we will compensate them for this by allowing them to plunder the village communes, violently to expropriate the masses, to round off their own plots, to evict the poor peasants, to undermine the very foundations of life of entire villages, and, at any price, in spite of everything, disregarding the life and husbandry of any number of "old established" peasants working on their allotments, to set up new homesteads as a basis for new capitalist agriculture. There is an unquestionable economic sense in this policy; it faithfully expresses the real course of development as it should be under the rule of landlords who are becoming transformed into *Junkers*.

What does the other policy, that of the peasants, represent? Either it is economically impossible—in that case all talk about the peasants confiscating the landlords' estates, about the peasant

agrarian revolution, etc., is either quackery or an empty dream. Or it is economically possible—on the condition that one element of bourgeois society is victorious over the other element of bourgeois society—and in that case we ourselves must clearly perceive, and clearly show to the people, the concrete conditions for this development, the conditions under which the peasants can reshape the old land relationships upon a new, capitalist basis.

Here the following thought naturally arises: but this peasant policy is precisely the division of the landlords' estates among the peasants as their private property! But what of that? If this division of the land among the peasants as their private property is to correspond to the really new, capitalist conditions of agriculture, it must be carried out in a new way and not in the old way. The basis of the division should not be the old land allotments distributed among the peasants a hundred years ago at the will of the landlords' bailiffs or officials of Asiatic despotism; it must be based on the requirements of free, commercial agriculture. In order to meet the requirements of capitalism, the division should be a division among free farmers, not among "indolent" peasants the majority of whom are working according to routine and traditional methods adapted to patriarchal, not to capitalist conditions. A division according to the old standards, *i.e.*, in conformity with the old forms of landed property based on peasant allotments, will not be the clearing of the old landed property, but its perpetuation; not the clearing of the way for capitalism, but rather its encumbrance with a mass of unadapted and unadaptable "indolents" who cannot become free farmers. In order to be progressive, the division must be based upon a new process of selection among the peasant agriculturists, a selection which will sift the farmers from the useless lumber. And this new selection will be brought about by the nationalisation of the land, *i.e.*, the total abolition of private property in land, complete freedom to till the land, the free transformation of the old peasantry into free farmers.

Picture to yourselves the present system of peasant farming and the character of the old forms of landed property based on peasant allotments.

"United by the communes into tiny administrative, fiscal and landholding associations, the peasants are divided into numerous, diverse categories according to the size of the allotment, the amount of dues paid, and so forth. Let us take, for instance, the Zemstvo statistical survey of the Saratov Gubernia: here the peasantry is divided into the following categories: holders of gift land, proprietors, full proprietors, state peasants, state peasants with communal land tenure, state peasants with individual land tenure, state peasants who were formerly serfs of the landlords, peasants from the estates of the imperial family, tenants on state lands, landless peasants, proprietors who were formerly serfs of the landlords, peasants who have purchased land from the landlord, proprietors who were formerly peasants on the imperial estates, settler-owners, settlers, former serfs living on gift lands, proprietors who were formerly state peasants, liberated serfs, freeholders, free tillers, temporarily bound peasants, former factory workers, etc., also, peasants registered with a commune, strangers from other districts, and so on. All these categories differ in the history of their respective agrarian relationships, size of allotments, amount of dues paid, and so forth. And there is further division within these categories; sometimes the peasants of one and the same village are divided into two entirely different categories: the 'former serfs of Mr. N. and the former serfs of Madame M.' All this motley variety was both natural and necessary in the Middle Ages."<sup>1</sup>

If the new division of the landlords' estates were carried out in conformity with this feudal system of landed property—either levelling to a uniform rate, i.e., equal division, or by establishing some proportion between the new and the old, or in some other way—not only would it not guarantee that the new plots would conform with the requirements of capitalist agriculture, but, on the contrary, it would perpetuate the distinct lack of conformity. Such a division would be a hindrance to social evolution, would harness the old to the new instead of liberating the new from the old. The only way to liberate the new from the old is to nationalise the land, which will create the conditions for the development of free farmers and free farming apart from the old and having no relation to mediæval land ownership in the form of peasant allotments.

In post-Reform Russia the process of capitalist evolution on the mediæval peasant allotments has gone on in such a manner that the progressive economic elements emerged from the determining influence of the allotments. On the one hand, a class of pro-

<sup>1</sup> *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, ch. V, IX: "A Few Remarks on Pre-Capitalist Economy in Our Rural Districts." (*Collected Works*, Vol. III.—*Ed.*)

letarians emerged, who abandoned their allotments, deserted them and let the land go to waste. On the other hand, a class of peasant owners emerged, who purchased and rented land, built up a new husbandry out of various fragments of the old, mediæval system of landownership. The land that is now cultivated by a more or less prosperous Russian peasant, *i.e.*, by one who is really capable of becoming transformed into a free farmer in the event of a favourable outcome of the revolution, consists partly of his own allotment, partly of an allotment he has rented from his communal peasant neighbour, partly, perhaps, of land rented on long-term lease from the state, of land leased annually from the landlord, of land purchased from the bank, and so forth. Capitalism demands that all these distinctions of categories be dropped, that all farming on the land be built up exclusively in accordance with the new conditions and requirements of the market, the requirements of agriculture. Land nationalisation fulfils this requirement by the revolutionary peasant method; at one stroke it completely relieves the people of the burden of the decayed lumber of mediæval forms of landownership. There must be neither landlordism nor peasant allotments, there must be only the new, free landed property—such is the slogan of the radical peasant. And this slogan expresses in the most faithful, in the most consistent and categorical manner the interests of capitalism (against which the radical peasant, in his simplicity, tries to protect himself by making the sign of the cross), the need for the utmost development of the productive forces of the land under commodity production.

One may judge from this how stupid Peter Maslov is in thinking that the only difference between his agrarian programme and the peasant programme of the Trudoviki is the perpetuation of the old, mediæval form of peasant allotments! The peasant allotments are a ghetto\* in which the peasants are suffocating and from which they are striving to escape to get on to free land.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Socialist-Revolutionary Mr. Mushenko, a most consistent exponent of the views of his party in the Second Duma, frankly declared: "We raise the banner of the liberation of the land." (47th Session, June 9 [May 26], 1907, p. 1174 of the Stenographic Record.) One must be blind

Yet in spite of the clamour of the peasants for free, *i.e.*, nationalised land, Peter Maslov perpetuates this ghetto, perpetuates the old system; he would subject the best lands that are to be confiscated from the landlords and transferred to public use to the conditions of the old system of landownership and the old methods of farming. In deeds, the peasant-Trudovik is a determined bourgeois revolutionary, but in words he is a petty-bourgeois utopian who imagines that "Black Redistribution" is the starting point of harmony and fraternity,<sup>1</sup> and not of capitalist farming. Peter Maslov is, in deeds, a reactionary who, fearing the Vendée of a future counter-revolution, consolidates the present anti-revolutionary elements of the old forms of landownership and perpetuates the peasant ghetto, while in words he indulges in reckless phrases learned by rote about bourgeois progress. What the real conditions are for the free-bourgeois progress and not the Stolypin-bourgeois progress of Russian agriculture, Maslov and Co. utterly fail to understand.

The difference between the vulgar Marxism of Peter Maslov and the methods of research really employed by Marx can best be seen in the latter's attitude toward petty-bourgeois utopias like those of the Narodniki (including the Socialist-Revolutionaries). In 1846, Marx ruthlessly exposed the petty-bourgeois character of the American Socialist-Revolutionary, Hermann Kriege, who proposed a veritable "Black Redistribution" for America, and called this "communism." Marx's dialectical and revolutionary criticism threw aside the shell of petty-bourgeois doctrine and picked out the sound kernel of the "attacks on landed property" and the "Anti-Rent movement." Yet our vulgar Marxists, in criticising "equal distribution," "socialisation of the land," and "equal right to the land," confine themselves to repudiating the doctrine, and thus reveal their own doctrinaire stupidity, which to fail to perceive not only the real capitalist character of this alleged "socialist" banner (Peter Maslov sees this too), but also the progressive economic character of such an agrarian revolution compared with the Stolypin-Cadet programme (this Peter Maslov does not see).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the naive expression of this bourgeois-revolutionary point of view in the speech of the "Narodni-Socialist," Volk-Karachevsky, about "equality, fraternity and liberty." (Second Duma, 16th Session, April 8 [March 26], 1907, pp. 1077-80.)

prevents them from seeing the real life of the peasant revolution beneath the dead doctrine of Narodnik theory. Maslov and the Mensheviks have carried this degraded doctrinaire theorising—expressed in our “municipalisation” programme, which perpetuates the most backward and mediæval form of landownership—to such a degree that in the Second Duma the following thoughtless words could be uttered in the name of the Social-Democratic Party:

“While on the question of the method of land alienation we (Social-Democrats) stand nearer to these (Narodniki) fractions than to the People’s Freedom<sup>1</sup> fraction, on the question of the forms of land tenure we are further removed from the former. (47th Session, June 8 [May 26], 1907, p. 1230 of the Stenographic Record.)

Indeed, in the peasant agrarian revolution the Mensheviks stand further removed from revolutionary, peasant nationalisation, and closer to liberal-landlord preservation of peasants’ allotment (and not only allotment) property. The preservation of peasants’ allotment property is the preservation of wretchedness, backwardness and bondage. It is but natural for the liberal landlords, who dream about receiving compensation for the land, to stand up for peasants’ allotments . . .<sup>2</sup> as well as for preserving a good deal of landlord property! But the Social-Democrat, led astray by the advocates of “municipalisation,” does not understand that the sound of words vanishes while the deed remains. The sound of the words about equality, socialisation, etc., will vanish, because there can be no equality under the system of commodity production. But the deed will remain, *i.e.*, the great-

<sup>1</sup> The Party of the People’s Freedom, the “Cadet” Party. By “fraction” is meant the representatives of the respective parties in the Duma. —*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> By the way, the Mensheviks (including Comrade Tseretelli, whose speech I have quoted) are profoundly mistaken in believing that there is any consistency in the Cadet plea for free peasant property. There is not. Mr. Kutler, on behalf of the Cadet Party, spoke in the Second Duma in favour of property (as distinct from the Cadet Bill on state land reserves introduced in the First Duma), but at the same time he added: “The Party proposes only [1] to limit their [the peasants’] right to alienate, and right to mortgage, *i.e.*, to prevent the selling and buying of land on a large scale in future.” (12th Session, April 1 [March 19], 1907, p. 740 of the Stenographic Record.) This is the arch-reactionary programme of a bureaucrat disguised as a liberal.

rupture with the feudal past, with the mediæval forms of peasants' land allotments and with all routine and tradition that can possibly be achieved under capitalism, will remain. When it is said that "nothing will come of equal redistribution," the Marxists ought to understand that this "nothing" relates exclusively to the socialist tasks, exclusively to the fact that this is not going to abolish capitalism. But attempts to bring about such a redistribution, even the very idea of it, will yield a great deal to the advantage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

For this revolution may take place either with the predominance of the landlords over the peasants, and this implies the preservation of the old form of property, and the Stolypin reform of this form of property exclusively by the power of the ruble; or it will take place as a result of the victory of the peasantry over the landlords; but in view of the objective conditions of capitalist economy this is impossible without the abolition of all forms of mediæval landownership, both landlord and peasant. The choice is between the Stolypin agrarian reform and peasant revolutionary nationalisation. These are the only economically practical solutions. Anything intermediate, from Menshevik municipalisation to Cadet compensation, is petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness, a stupid distortion of the doctrine, and a poor invention.

## 7. THE PEASANTS AND THE NARODNIKI ON THE NATIONALISATION OF THE PEASANT ALLOTMENTS

That the abolition of property in peasant allotments is the prerequisite to the creation of free peasant farming, which is consistent with the new capitalist conditions, is quite clearly realised by the peasants themselves. Mr. Groman, in his minute and accurate description of the discussion at the Peasant Congresses,<sup>1</sup> cites the following remarkable opinion expressed by a peasant:

"In the discussion on the question of compensation, one delegate, without meeting with any real opposition, said the following: 'It was said that

<sup>1</sup> *Materials on the Peasant Question* (a report of the Delegates' Conference of the All-Russian Peasant Union, November 19-23 [6-10], 1905, with an introduction by V. Groman, p. 12, *Novy Mir* Publishing Co., St. Petersburg, 1905).

alienation without compensation would inflict hardships on many peasants who have purchased land with their hard-earned money. There are few such peasants, and these have little land, and they will get land in any case when it is distributed.' This explains the readiness to relinquish property rights both in allotment and purchased land."

A little further on (p. 20) Mr. Groman repeats this as the general opinion of the peasants.

"They will get land in any case when it is distributed!" Is it not perfectly clear that economic necessity dictates this opinion? The new distribution of the whole of the land, both landlord and peasant lands, cannot reduce the holdings of nine-tenths (or rather, ninety-nine hundredths) of the peasantry; there is nothing to fear. But the redistribution is necessary because it will enable the real, efficient farmers to organise their land tenure in accordance with the new conditions, in accordance with the requirements of capitalism (the "dictates of the market" to individual producers), without bowing to the mediæval relations which determined the size, location and distribution of allotment land.

Mr. Peshekhonov, a practical and sober Narodni-Socialist (read: social-Cadet) who, as we have seen, has managed to adapt himself to the demands of the masses of small proprietors all over Russia, expresses this point of view even more definitely.

"The peasant allotments," he writes, "this most important part of the territory from the point of view of production, are permanently assigned to a certain estate,<sup>1</sup> and what is worse, to small groups of this estate, to separate households and villages. The result is that the peasantry, taken as a whole, cannot freely choose their place of settlement even within the area of their allotments. . . . The population is not properly distributed to suit the requirements of the market [note this]. . . . The ban on the state lands must be lifted, allotment land must be freed from the shackles of property, the fences to the private estates must be removed. The land must be returned to the Russian people, and then it will distribute itself upon the land in a manner that will suit its economic requirements." (A. V. Peshekhonov, *The Agrarian Problem in Connection with the Peasant Movement*, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 83, 86, 88-89.)

Is it not clear that it is the farmer who is speaking through the mouth of this Narodni-Socialist, the farmer who wants to stand upon his own feet? Is it not clear that he really wants the

<sup>1</sup> Or order, the mediæval division of the population into nobles, merchants, peasants, etc.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

“allotment land” to be “freed from the shackles of property” in order that the population may distribute itself in a new way, in order that holdings may be redistributed in a manner to “suit the requirements of the market,” *i.e.*, the requirements of capitalist agriculture? For Mr. Peshekhonov, we repeat, is so sober that he rejects socialisation, rejects adaptation to communal law in any form—it is not for nothing that the Socialist-Revolutionaries condemn him as an individualist—he rejects the prohibition of hired labour in peasant agriculture in any form.

In view of this striving of the peasantry for nationalisation, it is perfectly obvious that to support peasant allotment property is reactionary. A. Finn, in his pamphlet, quotes some of Mr. Peshekhonov’s arguments which we have quoted and criticises him as a Narodnik; he tries to prove to him that the development of capitalism out of the system of peasant farming and within that system is inevitable. (P. 14 and further in the pamphlet mentioned.) This criticism is not satisfactory because in the general question of the development of capitalism, A. Finn has overlooked the concrete question of the conditions for a freer development of capitalist agriculture on the peasant allotments. A. Finn contents himself with merely presenting the question of capitalism in general, thus scoring an easy victory over Narodism, which was vanquished long ago. We are dealing with a more concrete question,<sup>1</sup> *viz.*, the landlord versus the peasant

<sup>1</sup>“What will the labour economy” (*i.e.*, allowing the peasant to have as much land as he can cultivate with the aid of his family—*Ed. Eng. ed.*) “advocated by Peshekhonov lead to in the long run?” A. Finn asks, and he answers quite rightly: “to capitalism.” (P. 19 of his pamphlet.) From this unquestionable truth, which it was certainly necessary to explain to a Narodnik, he should have taken a further step; he should have explained the specific forms of the manifestation of the demands of capitalism in the conditions of a peasant agrarian revolution. Instead of this, A. Finn took a step backwards: “It may be asked,” he writes, “why we should go back to the past; why we should pursue a tortuous, native path which, after all, will bring us back again to the very road we are already travelling? This is useless labour, Mr. Peshekhonov!” (*Ibid.*) No, this is not useless labour, and it does not bring us to capitalism “after all”; it is the straightest, freest and quickest road to capitalism. A. Finn did not ponder over the comparative features of the Stolypin capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia, and a peasant-revolutionary capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia.

way of "removing the fences" (Mr. Peshekhonov's expression), of "clearing" the land for capitalism.

Mr. Mushenko, the official spokesman of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, in winding up the debate on the agrarian question in the Second Duma, showed the capitalist nature of the nationalisation of the land which the petty-bourgeois socialists are pleased to call "socialisation," the establishment of "equal right to the land," and so on, as definitely as did Mr. Peshekhonov.

"The population will be properly distributed," Mr. Mushenko said, "only when the land is freed, only when the fences put up by the principle of private property in land are removed." (47th Session, June 8 [May 26], 1907, p. 1172 of the Stenographic Record.)

Precisely! The "proper" distribution of the population is the very thing the market, capitalism, requires. But the "proper" distribution of "proper" farmers is hindered by both landlord and allotment property.

One more observation on the statements made by delegates of the Peasant Union merits our attention. Mr. Groman writes in the above-mentioned pamphlet:

"The notorious question of the 'commune'—this corner-stone of the tenets of the old and new Narodnism—was not raised and was tacitly rejected: 'the land must be placed at the disposal of persons and associations,' state the resolutions passed at the First and Second Congresses." (P. 12.)

Thus, the peasants have clearly and categorically expressed themselves against the old commune and in favour of free associations and individual land tenure. There can be no doubt that this was the real voice of the whole of the peasantry, for there is no mention of the commune even in the Land Bill of the Trudovik group ("104"). Yet the commune is an association for the ownership of allotment land!

Stolypin is forcibly abolishing the commune for the benefit of a handful of wealthy people. The peasantry wants to abolish it in order to replace it by the tenure of nationalised allotment land by free associations and "individuals." Maslov and Co., however, in the name of bourgeois progress, are running counter to this very fundamental requirement of this very progress and are advocating the mediæval form of landownership. God save us from this sort of "Marxism"!

## 8. THE MISTAKE MADE BY M. SHANIN AND OTHER ADVOCATES OF DIVISION\*

Approaching the question from a somewhat different aspect, in his pamphlet<sup>1</sup> Comrade Shanin involuntarily provided another argument for nationalisation which he detests so much. By his allusion to Ireland,\*\* by his analysis of the conditions of bourgeois reformism in the domain of agriculture, Comrade M. Shanin has proved only one thing, *viz.*, that the principles of private ownership of land are incompatible with the principles of public or state ownership of land (but this incompatibility ought to be demonstrated also by a general theoretical analysis, of which Shanin did not even think). The only other thing he has proved, perhaps, is that property must be recognised if the state is to carry out any reforms in the sphere of agriculture which is developing on capitalist lines. But all these arguments are beside the point: of course, under the conditions of bourgeois reformism only private property in land is conceivable; of course, the fact that the private ownership of the bulk of the land in the United Kingdom was preserved left no other way open for a part of the country except private ownership. But what has this to do with the "peasant agrarian revolution" in Russia? We will admit that Comrade M. Shanin has pointed out the correct way; but it is the correct way to a Stolypin agrarian reform, and not to a peasant agrarian revolution.<sup>2</sup> M. Shanin does not reveal the slightest spark of appreciation of the difference between the two ways; and yet unless this difference is explained, it is ridiculous to talk about a Social-Democratic agrarian programme in the

<sup>1</sup> M. Shanin, *Municipalisation or Division as Private Property*, Vilna, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> Shanin's reference to the example of Ireland, where private ownership preponderates over tenancy (and not over the nationalisation of the whole land), is not new. The "liberal" professor, A. I. Chuprov, also cites Ireland to prove that peasant ownership of land is preferable. (*The Agrarian Question*, Volume II, p. 11.) Yet the real nature of this "liberal" and even "Constitutional-Democrat" is revealed on page 33 of his article, where Mr. Chuprov, with the incredible, liberal brazenness that is possible only in Russia, proposes that the peasants be subordinated to a majority of landlords on all the land settlement commissions!! Five members representing the peasants and five representing the landlords, with a chair-

Russian revolution. And when M. Shanin, actuated no doubt by the very best motives, advocates confiscation as opposed to compensation, he loses sight of the historical perspective. He forgets that in bourgeois society confiscation, *i.e.*, expropriation without compensation, is as completely incompatible with reformism as is land nationalisation. To speak of confiscation while admitting a reformist and not a revolutionary solution of the agrarian question is like sending a petition to Stolypin to abolish landlordism.

Another feature of Shanin's pamphlet is that it lays particular stress upon the agricultural character of our agrarian crisis, upon the absolute necessity of adopting higher forms of agriculture, of improving agricultural technique, which is so incredibly backward in Russia, and so forth. Shanin makes these correct observations in such an incredibly one-sided fashion, and so completely ignores the question of the abolition of feudal latifundia and the changing of agrarian relationships as the prerequisites for this technical revolution, that an utterly false perspective is drawn. For Stolypin's agrarian reform also leads to technical progress in agriculture, and does so in a correct way, from the standpoint of the landlords' interests. The forcible breaking up of the commune by the laws of November 22 (9), 1906, etc., the setting up and subsidising of homesteads are not a chimera, as frivolous, prattling, democratic journalists sometimes declare them to be; they are the realities of economic progress based upon the preservation of the power and the interests of the landlords. It is an incredibly slow and incredibly painful method for the wide masses of the peasantry and for the proletariat, but it is the only possible way for capitalist Russia if the peasant agrarian revolution is not victorious.

Let us examine the question which Shanin raises from the standpoint of such a revolution. Modern agricultural technique calls for the complete sweeping away of the ancient, conservative, barbarous, ignorant and pauper methods of farming on

man "appointed by the Zemstvo assembly," *i.e.*, by the assembly of landlords. An allusion to Ireland was also made in the First Duma by Prince Drutsky-Lyubetsky, a Right deputy, to demonstrate the necessity for private property in land as against the Cadet Bill. (Session of June 6 [May 24], 1906, p. 626 of the Stenographic Record.)

peasant allotments. The three-field system, the primitive implements, the patriarchal impecuniosity of the tiller, the routine methods of stock breeding and the boorish ignorance of the conditions and requirements of the market must all be thrown overboard. Well, then, is such a revolutionising of agriculture possible if the private ownership of land is preserved? But if the land were distributed among the present allotment owners, the system of mediæval landownership would be half preserved.<sup>1</sup> Division of the land might be progressive if it consolidated modern farming, modern agricultural methods, and if it threw the old methods overboard. But it cannot give an impetus to modern agricultural methods if it is based on the old system of allotment ownership. Comrade Borisov, an advocate of division of the land, said at Stockholm<sup>2</sup>:

“Our agrarian programme is a programme for the period of developing revolution, the period of the break-up of the old order and the organisation of a new social-political order. That is its fundamental idea. Social-Democracy should not bind itself by decisions which pledge it to support any form of economy. In the struggle the new social forces are waging against the foundations of the old order, it is necessary to cut the Gordian knot with a decisive stroke.” (P. 125, Minutes of the Unity Congress.)

All this is quite true and splendidly stated. And all this speaks in favour of nationalisation, because it alone really “breaks up” the old mediæval system of landownership; it alone really cuts the Gordian knot, and allows full freedom for the new farms to develop on the nationalised land.

The question is: by what criterion are we to determine whether the new system of agriculture has already developed sufficiently to have the division of the land adapted to it, or whether the division will perpetuate the old obstacles to this new system? There can be but one criterion, that of practice. No statistics in the world can calculate whether the elements of a peasant bourgeoisie in a given country have “solidified” sufficiently to enable the system of landownership to be adapted to the sys-

<sup>1</sup>I have pointed out above that out of 280,000,000 dessiatins of land fund in European Russia, one-half—138,800,000 dessiatins—consists of peasant allotments.

<sup>2</sup>At the so-called Unity Congress of the Party held in Stockholm in 1906.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

tem of farming. This can be estimated only by the mass of the farmers themselves. The impossibility of estimating this at the present moment has been demonstrated by the fact that the mass of the peasants in our revolution have come forward with a programme of land nationalisation. The small farmer, at all times and throughout the world, becomes so attached to his farm (if it really is his own, and not a piece of the landlord's estate let out on labour rent, as is frequently the case in Russia) that his "fanatical" defence of private property in land is quite inevitable at a certain stage in history and for a certain period of time. It would be childish or stupidly pedantic to try to explain the fact that the mass of the Russian peasants in the present epoch do not betray the fanaticism of property owners (a fanaticism which is fostered by all the ruling classes, by all the liberal-bourgeois politicians) but advance a widespread and fixed demand for the nationalisation of the land, as being due to the influence of the publicists of *Russkoye Bogatstvo*<sup>1</sup> or of Mr. Chernov's pamphlet.<sup>2</sup> It is to be explained by the fact that the real living conditions of the small tiller of the soil, of the small farmer in the village, are confronting him with the economic problem, not of consolidating the new agriculture by a division of the land in the form of private property, but of clearing the ground for the development of this new agriculture (out of the existing elements) upon the "free," i.e., nationalised, land. The fanaticism of the property owner can and should assert itself in due time, as the demand of the free farmer who has already emerged from his shell for the protection of his farm. But land nationalisation had to become the demand of the peasant masses in the Russian revolution as the slogan of farmers who wish to break through the shell of mediævalism. Therefore, for Social-Democrats to advocate division of the land among the masses of peasants, who are inclined towards nationalisation and who are just beginning to enter the conditions for

<sup>1</sup> *Russian Wealth*, an influential Narodnik monthly magazine, edited by N. K. Mikhailovsky and V. Korolenko.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> The leader of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Minister of Agriculture in Kerensky's Cabinet after the February Revolution of 1917; now a White emigré.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the final "selection" of the free farmers who will be capable of creating capitalist agriculture, is historical tactlessness, and reveals inability to take stock of the concrete historical situation.

Our Social-Democratic "divisionists"—Comrades Finn, Borisov and Shanin—do not suffer from the theoretical dualism of the "municipalisers" and their vulgar criticism of Marx's theory of rent (with this we shall deal later on), but they commit an error of a different kind, an error of historical perspective. Having adopted a generally correct position theoretically (and in this they differ from the "municipalisers"), they repeat the mistake of our "*otrezki*" programme of 1903. This mistake was due to the fact that while we correctly determined the trend of development, we did not correctly determine the time of development. We assumed that the elements of capitalist agriculture had already fully taken shape in Russia both in landlord farming (minus the *otrezki* and their conditions of bondage—hence the demand that the *otrezki* be returned to the peasants) and in peasant farming, which seemed to have given rise to a strong peasant bourgeoisie and therefore to be incapable of bringing about a "peasant agrarian revolution." The erroneous programme was not the result of "fear" of the peasant agrarian revolution, but of an overestimation of the degree of capitalist development in Russian agriculture. The remnants of serfdom appeared to us then to be a petty detail, whereas capitalist agriculture on the peasant allotments and on the landlords' estates seemed to be quite mature and consolidated.

The revolution has revealed this mistake; but it has confirmed the trend of development which we outlined. The Marxian analysis of classes in Russian society has been so splendidly confirmed by the whole course of events in general, and by the first two Dumas in particular, that non-Marxian socialism has been shattered completely. But the remnants of serfdom in the countryside have proved to be far stronger than we imagined: they have given rise to a nation-wide peasant movement, they have made this movement the touchstone of the bourgeois revolution as a whole. The hegemony, in the bourgeois emancipation movement, which revolutionary Social-Democracy always as-

signed to the proletariat, had to be defined more distinctly as the role of leader of the peasantry. But where is it to lead them? To the bourgeois revolution in its most consistent and emphatic form. We rectified the mistake by setting the task of fighting against the old agrarian system as a whole in place of the partial task of fighting against the remnants of the old agrarian system. Instead of clearing the landlord estates, we set the task of abolishing them.

While we were compelled to rectify this mistake by the pressure of the imposing progress of events, many of us failed to think out our new estimate of the degree of capitalist development in Russian agriculture to its logical conclusion. If the demand for the confiscation of all the landlords' estates was proved to be historically correct—and such is undoubtedly the case—it implied that the wide development of capitalism calls for new agrarian relationships, that the nascent capitalism on the landlords' estates can and must be sacrificed to the wide and free development of capitalism on the basis of a rejuvenated small production system. To accept the demand for the confiscation of the landlords' estates is to accept the possibility and the necessity for the rejuvenation of small farming under capitalism.

Is this admissible? Is it not an adventure to support small agriculture under capitalism? Is not the rejuvenation of small agriculture a vain dream? Is it not a demagogic "trap for the peasants," a *Bauernfang*? Such, no doubt, were the misgivings of some comrades. But they were mistaken. The rejuvenation of small agriculture is possible even under capitalism if the historical task is to fight against the pre-capitalist order. In this way small agriculture was rejuvenated in America, where the slave-owning latifundia were broken up in a revolutionary manner and the conditions were created for the rapid and unhindered development of capitalism. In the Russian revolution the struggle for the land is nothing more nor less than a struggle for the rejuvenated path of capitalist development. The consistent slogan of such a rejuvenation is—nationalisation of the land. To exclude peasant allotments from this slogan is economically reactionary

(we shall deal with the politically reactionary aspect separately). The "divisionists" are skipping the historical task of the present revolution, for they assume that the very things for which the mass struggle of the peasants has only just begun, have already been achieved. Instead of stimulating the process of rejuvenation, instead of explaining to the peasantry what the conditions for consistent rejuvenation are, they are already cutting out a dressing gown for the appeased, rejuvenated farmer.<sup>1</sup>

"Every fruit has its season." Social-Democracy cannot forswear for all time its support of the division of the land. In a different historical situation, at a different stage in agrarian evolution, this division may turn out to be unavoidable. But the division of the land is an entirely wrong expression of the problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in 1907.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The advocates of division frequently cite the words of Marx: "The free ownership of the self-employing farmer is evidently the most normal form of landed property for small-scale production. . . . The ownership of the soil is as necessary for the complete development of this mode of production as the ownership of the instrument is for the free development of handicraft production." (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 341) (*Capital*, Vol. III, chap. XLVII, sec. V, pp. 937-38, C. H. Kerr ed.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*) From this it merely follows that the complete triumph of free peasant agriculture may call for private property. But present-day small-scale agriculture is not free. State property in land is "an instrument in the hands of the landlord rather than of the peasant, an instrument for extracting labour rent rather than an instrument of free labour of the peasant." The abolition of all forms of feudal landownership and creating the conditions wherein the peasants will be free to settle where they please are essential for the promotion of free, small-scale agriculture.

<sup>2</sup>Chapter III of this work "The Theoretical Foundations of Nationalisation and Municipalisation" is omitted. See note to page 157.—*Ed.*

## CHAPTER IV

### POLITICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN QUESTIONS OF THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

As already pointed out above, considerations of this kind occupy a disproportionately large place in our Party discussion on the agrarian programme. Our task is to examine these considerations as systematically and as briefly as possible and to show the relations between various political measures (and points of view) and the economic foundations of the agrarian revolution.

#### 1. A "GUARANTEE AGAINST RESTORATION"\*

In my *Report*<sup>1</sup> on the Stockholm Congress I dealt with this argument, citing the debates from memory. Now, we have before us the authentic text of the Minutes.

"The key to my position," explained Plekhanov at the Stockholm Congress, "is that I draw attention to the possibility of restoration." (P. 113.)

Let us examine this key a little more closely. It was first pointed out in Plekhanov's first speech, as follows:

"Lenin says, 'we shall make nationalisation innocuous,' but in order to make nationalisation innocuous, we must devise a guarantee against restoration; and there is not, nor can there be, any such guarantee. Remember the history of France; remember the history of England; in each of those countries, the wide sweep of the revolution was followed by restoration. The same may happen in our country, and our programme must be such as, if applied, may reduce the harm likely to accrue from restoration to a minimum. Our programme must eliminate the economic foundation of tsarism; but land nationalisation carried out during the revolutionary period does not eliminate this foundation. The demand for nationalisation, therefore, is in my opinion an anti-revolutionary demand. (P. 44.)

What the "economic foundation of tsarism" is, Plekhanov tells in the same speech:

<sup>1</sup> Lenin refers to his report on the Stockholm Congress, published as a pamphlet and addressed to the St. Petersburg workers whom he represented at the Congress. See *Coll. Works*, Russian ed., Vol. IX.—*Ed. Eng.ed.*

"The situation in our country was such that the land, together with the tillers, was held in servitude by the state, and on the basis of this servitude Russian despotism developed. In order to defeat despotism, it is necessary to eliminate its economic foundation. Therefore, I am opposed to nationalisation at present." (P. 44.)

First of all, let us examine the logic of this talk about restoration. First, "there is not, nor can there be, any" "guarantee against restoration," and on the very next page (page 45) of the Minutes (in the same speech), Plekhanov finally devises the guarantee: "In the event of restoration," he plainly says, "it" (municipalisation) "will not surrender the land" (listen!) "to the political representatives of the old order." Thus, although "there cannot be" any such guarantee, a guarantee against restoration has been found. A very clever trick, and the Menshevik press is filled with rapture over the conjurer's skill.

When Plekhanov speaks, he is brilliant and witty, he crackles and sparkles like a Catherine wheel. The trouble begins when the speech is taken down verbatim and later subjected to a logical examination.

What is restoration? It is the reversion of political power to the hands of the political representatives of the old order. Can there be any guarantee against such a restoration? No, there cannot. Therefore, we devise such a guarantee: municipalisation, which "will not surrender the land. . . ." But, we ask: what obstacles does municipalisation raise to the "surrender of the land"? The only obstacle is the law passed by the revolutionary parliament declaring such and such lands (former landlord estates, etc.) to be the property of the Regional Diets.<sup>1</sup> But what is a law? The expression of the will of the classes which have emerged victorious and hold political power.

Can you see now why such a law "will not surrender the land" to "the representatives of the old order" when the latter have recaptured political power?

And this unmitigated nonsense was preached by Social-Demo-

<sup>1</sup>*I.e.*, local parliaments which were to be set up according to the municipalisation plan and to which the land was to be transferred.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

crats after the Stockholm Congress, and even from the tribune of the Duma.<sup>1</sup>

As to the substance of this notorious question of "guarantees against restoration," we must observe the following: since we can have no guarantees against restoration, to raise this question in connection with the agrarian programme means distracting the attention of the auditors, confusing their thoughts and introducing confusion into the discussion. We are not in a position to call forth at our own desire a socialist revolution in the West, which is the only absolute guarantee against restoration in Russia. But a relative and conditional "guarantee," i.e., one that would raise the greatest possible obstacles to restoration, can be obtained by carrying out the revolution in Russia in the most far-reaching, consistent and determined manner possible. The more far-reaching the revolution is, the more difficult will it be to restore the old order and the more will it be possible to save of the gains of the revolution even if restoration does take place. The more deeply the old soil is ploughed up by revolution, the more difficult will it be to restore the old order. In the sphere of politics, a democratic republic represents a more profound change than the establishment of democratic local government, because the former presupposes (and calls forth) greater revolutionary vigour, intelligence and organisation on the part of the large masses of the people; it creates traditions which it will be far more difficult to eradicate. That is why, for instance, modern Social-Democrats attach such value to the great fruits of the French Revolution in spite of the restorations that have taken place, and in this they differ from the Cadets (and from pro-Cadet Social-Democrats) who prefer the establishment of democratic Zemstvos under a monarchy, as a "guarantee against restoration."

In the sphere of economics, nationalisation in a bourgeois agrarian revolution is more far-reaching than anything else, because it breaks up all the mediæval forms of landownership. At the present time the peasant farms a strip of his own allot-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Speech by Tseretelli, June 8 (May 26), 1907,\* Stenographic Record of Second Duma, p. 1234.

ment land, or a strip of land rented from the landlord, and so on. Nationalisation enables the fences of landownership to be torn down to the utmost degree, and the land to be "cleared" for the new forms of farming suitable to the requirements of capitalism. Of course, even such a clearing affords no guarantee against a return to the old order; to promise the people such a "guarantee against restoration" would be a swindle. But such a clearing of the old system of landownership will enable the new system of economy to become so firmly rooted that a return to the old forms of landownership would be extremely difficult because there is no power on earth that can arrest the development of capitalism. Under municipalisation, however, a return to the old form of landownership is easier, because municipalisation perpetuates the "pale of settlement," the landmark which separates mediæval landownership from its new, municipalised form. After nationalisation, restoration will have to break up millions of new, capitalist (free farmers') enterprises in order to restore the old system of landownership. After municipalisation, restoration will not have to break up any enterprises or to set up any new land boundaries; all that will have to be done will be literally to sign a document transferring the lands owned by the municipality of X to the noble landlords Y, Z, etc., or to pay the landlords the rent from the "municipalised" lands.

Let us now proceed from Plekhanov's logical error on the question of restoration, from this confusion of political issues, to the economic substance of restoration. The Minutes of the Stockholm Congress fully confirm the statement in my *Report*, that Plekhanov hopelessly confuses the restoration which took place in France on the basis of capitalism with the restoration of "our old, semi-Asiatic order." (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, p. 116.) Therefore, there is no need for me to add anything on this question to what I have already said in the *Report*. I shall only deal with the "elimination of the economic foundation of despotism." On this subject the following is the most important passage in Plekhanov's speech:

"It is true that the restoration [in France] did not restore the remnants of feudalism; but in our country we have something that resembles these

remnants, viz., the fact that the land and the tiller of the soil are tied to the state, our old, peculiar form of land nationalisation. By demanding nationalisation of the land you are making the return to this [*sic!*] nationalisation easier, for you are leaving this legacy of our old, semi-Asiatic order intact." (P. 116.)

So, after the restoration, the return to this, i.e., semi-Asiatic, nationalisation will be "easier" because Lenin (and the peasantry) is now demanding nationalisation. What is this? Is it a historical-materialistic analysis, or a purely rationalistic "play upon words"?<sup>1</sup> Does the mere word "nationalisation" facilitate the restoration of the semi-Asiatic conditions, or is this done by certain economic changes? Had Plekhanov thought this matter over he would have realised that municipalisation and division, while eliminating one foundation of the Asiatic order, mediæval landlordism, leave another—mediæval peasant allotments. Consequently, in essence, in the economic essence of the revolution (and not merely of the term by which one might designate it), it is precisely nationalisation that far more radically eliminates the economic foundations of Asiatic despotism. Plekhanov's "trick" lies in that he has designated the mediæval, dependent form of landownership, encumbered with state imposts and services, as "peculiar nationalisation" and skipped the two forms of this system of landownership: peasant allotments and landlordism. As a result of this playing with words the real historical question as to what forms of mediæval landownership are eliminated by one or another agrarian measure is obscured. Plekhanov's fireworks display was very crude after all!

Plekhanov's almost incredible muddle on the question of restoration is to be explained by two circumstances. First: in speaking about the "peasant agrarian revolution," Plekhanov has utterly failed to note its peculiar character as capitalist evolution. He confuses the theory of the Narodniki, the theory of the possibility of non-capitalist evolution, with the Marxian view on the possibility of two forms of capitalist agrarian evolution. Plekhanov constantly betrays a sort of vague "fear of the peasant revolution" (as I told him in Stockholm; see pp. 106-07 of the Minutes), a fear that it will turn out to be economically

<sup>1</sup> Comrade Schmidt in his Stockholm speech, Minutes, p. 122.

reactionary and lead not to the American free farmer system, but to mediæval servitude. As a matter of fact, this is economically impossible, as was proved by the Peasant Reform and the subsequent progress of evolution. The shell of feudalism (both landlord feudalism and "state feudalism," referred to at Stockholm by Plekhanov, and subsequently also by Martynov) was still strong in the Peasant Reform. But economic evolution proved stronger, and it filled this feudal shell with a capitalist content. Despite the obstacles presented by the mediæval system of landownership, both peasant farming and landlord farming developed, though very slowly, along the bourgeois path. If there were any grounds at all for Plekhanov's fears of a return to Asiatic despotism, the system of landownership among the state peasants (before the 'eighties) and among the former state peasants (after the 'eighties) should have turned out to be the purest type of "state feudalism." As a matter of fact it turned out to be freer than the landlord system, because feudal exploitation had already become impossible in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There was less bondage and a more rapid development of a peasant bourgeoisie among the state peasants "with large land holdings."<sup>1</sup> In Russia, either a slow and painful bourgeois evolution of the Prussian, *Junker* type, or a rapid free evolution of the American type is possible. All else is a mere phantom.

The second reason for the "restoration mess" in the heads of some of our comrades was the indefinite state of affairs in the spring of 1906. The peasantry, as a mass, had not yet definitely revealed itself. It was still possible to assume that the peasant movement and the Peasant Union were not the final expressions of the real aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the peasantry. The autocratic bureaucracy and Witte had not yet finally given up the hope that "the *seryachok* will help us out" (a classic phrase used by Witte's own newspaper, *Russkoye Gosu-*

<sup>1</sup>Of course, the former state peasants can be described as possessing "large landholdings" only in comparison with the former serfs of the landlords. According to the statistics of 1905, the former held an average of 12.5 dessiatins of allotted land per household, whereas the latter held only 6.7 dessiatins.

*darstvo*, in the spring of 1906\*), i.e., that the peasant would go to the Right. Hence the strong representation allowed to the peasantry under the Law of December 24 (11), 1905.\*\* Many Social-Democrats still thought that the autocracy would play some trick with the peasants' idea: "let the whole land belong to the tsar rather than to the nobility." But the two Dumas, the Law of June 16 (3), 1907,\*\*\* and Stolypin's agrarian laws should have opened everybody's eyes. In order to save what it could, the autocracy had to introduce the policy of violently breaking up the village communes and establishing private property in land, i.e., to base the counter-revolution not on the vague talk of the peasants about nationalisation (the land belongs to the "mir,"<sup>1</sup> and so on), but on the only possible economic foundation upon which the power of the landlords could be retained, i.e., capitalist evolution on the Prussian model.

Now the situation has become quite clear, and it is high time to abandon the vague fear of "Asiatic" restoration roused by the peasant movement against private property in land.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS A "BULWARK AGAINST REACTION"

"In the organs of local government which will possess the land," said Plekhanov at Stockholm, "it [municipalisation] will create a bulwark against reaction. And a mighty bulwark it will be. Take our Cossacks for example." (P. 45.<sup>3</sup>) Well, we will "take our Cossacks" in a moment and see what this reference to them is worth. But first of all, let us see what the general grounds are, upon which the opinion that local government is capable of becoming a bulwark against reaction is based. This view has been propounded on innumerable occasions by our advocates of municipalisation, and it will be sufficient to quote a passage from John's speech to supplement Plekhanov's formula.

<sup>1</sup> The Russian term for village community.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> I shall not deal here with the fact that the bogey of restoration is a political weapon of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, because everything essential on this subject has been said already in my *Report. (The Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to the St. Petersburg Workers.—Ed.)*

<sup>3</sup> Minutes of the Stockholm Congress.

John said:

“What is the difference between nationalisation and municipalisation of the land if we admit that both are equally possible and equally connected with the democratisation of the political regime? The difference is that municipalisation is better able to consolidate the gains of the revolution, the democratic regime, and will serve as the basis for its further development; whereas nationalisation will merely consolidate the power of the state.” (P. 112.)

The Mensheviks deny the possibility of securing guarantees against restoration, and the very next minute they produce “guarantees” and “bulwarks” like conjurers in front of an audience. Just think a little, gentlemen! How can local government be a bulwark against reaction, or consolidate the gains of the revolution? There can be only one bulwark against reaction and one guarantee of the gains of the revolution, *viz.*, the class consciousness and organisation of the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. And in a capitalist state which is centralised not by the arbitrary will of the bureaucracy, but by the inexorable demands of economic development, this organisation must be welded together into a single, nation-wide force. Without a centralised peasant movement, without a centralised nation-wide political struggle of the peasantry led by the centralised proletariat, there can be no serious “revolutionary gains” worthy of “consolidation”; there can be no “bulwark against reaction.”

Local government which is at all democratic is impossible without the complete overthrow of landlord rule and the abolition of landlordism; while admitting this in words the Mensheviks, with amazing thoughtlessness, refuse to consider what this implies in deeds. In practice, this cannot be attained without the conquest of political power by the revolutionary classes throughout the whole state and one would have thought that the two years of revolution would have taught even the most obdurate “man in the muffler”\* that the only classes in Russia that can be revolutionary are the proletariat and the peasantry. In order to be victorious, the “peasant agrarian revolution,” of which you gentlemen speak, must as such, as a peasant revolution, take over the central power throughout the whole state.

The democratic local authorities may act merely as particles

of such a central power of the democratic peasantry. Only by combating the splitting up of the peasantry according to locality and region, only by advocating, preparing and organising a nation-wide, all-Russian, centralised movement, can real service be rendered to the "peasant agrarian revolution," and not to the cause of encouraging parochial narrow-mindedness and local and territorial stupefaction among the peasantry. It is precisely this cause of stupefaction that you, Comrade Plekhanov and Comrade John, are serving when you advocate the preposterous and arch-reactionary idea that local government can become a "bulwark against reaction," or that it can "consolidate the gains of the revolution." For the experience of the two years of the Russian revolution has plainly demonstrated that this very local and territorial disintegration of the peasant movement (the soldiers' movement forms part of the peasant movement) was most of all responsible for the defeat.

To present a programme of a "peasant agrarian revolution" and associate it only with the democratisation of local government and not of the central government, to advocate this as a real "bulwark" and "consolidation," is really nothing but a Cadet bargain with reaction.<sup>1</sup> The Cadets lay stress on "democratic" local government because they do not want to or dare to touch on more vital questions. The Mensheviks did not realise what a big word they uttered when they announced the "peasant agrarian revolution" to be the task of the day, and in their political commentary to their agrarian programme they displayed the acme of provincial narrow-mindedness.

Here is a sample of John's reasoning, if you please:

<sup>1</sup> I have dealt more fully with this in the *Report*. Here I shall add an extract from a speech by the Menshevik Novosedsky, which I did not hear (see *Report*) at the Congress, but which corroborates this in a remarkable way. Opposing the amendment to substitute the words "democratic republic" for "democratic state," Novosedsky said: "In the event of truly democratic local government being established, the programme now adopted may be carried into effect even with a degree of democratisation of the central government which cannot be described as being the highest stage of its democratisation. Even under democratisation of a comparative degree, so to speak, municipalisation will not be harmful, but useful." (P. 138 of the Minutes. My italics.) This is as clear as clear can be. A peasant agrarian revolution without the overthrow of the autocracy—this is the very reactionary idea the Mensheviks advocate.

"Comrade Lenin is afraid that the reaction will retake the confiscated lands from the local authorities; even if this be the case in regard to the lands which may pass into the hands of the state, it cannot be the case in regard to municipalised lands. Even the autocratic Russian government could not retake the land from the local authorities of Armenia, because this called forth strong resistance on the part of the population." (P. 113.)

Superb, is it not? Why, the entire history of the autocracy is the history of wholesale grabbing of local, regional and national lands; and our wiseacres want to pacify the people who are becoming stupefied in their provincial isolation by arguing that even the autocracy did not retake the land from the Armenian churches, although it attempted to do so, and was prevented from doing so only by the all-Russian revolution. . . . In the centre autocracy, and in the provinces "Armenian lands" which "it dares not take away. . . ." How on earth has such a lot of philistine stupidity penetrated into our Social-Democratic movement?

And here are Plekhanov's Cossacks:

"Take our Cossacks. They behave like rank reactionaries; yet if the (autocratic) government dared to lay its hands on their land, they would rise against it to a man. Consequently, the merit of municipalisation lies precisely in that it will prove of use even in the event of restoration." (P. 45.)

"Consequently" indeed! If the autocracy rose against the defenders of the autocracy, then the defenders of the autocracy would rise against the autocracy. What profundity of thought! But Cossack landownership is of use not only in the event of restoration, but also as a means of supporting that which must be overthrown before it can be restored. Attention was called to this interesting aspect of municipalisation by Schmidt, who spoke in opposition to Plekhanov. He said:

"Let me remind you that even a month ago certain privileges were bestowed on the Cossacks by the autocracy; consequently, it is not afraid of municipalisation; for even now the Cossacks' lands are managed in a manner which greatly resembles municipalisation. . . . It [municipalisation] is going to play a counter-revolutionary role." (Minutes, pp. 123-24.)

Plekhanov became so excited over this speech that he interrupted the speaker (on quite an unimportant point, to ask him whether he was speaking about the Orenburg Cossacks)

and tried to upset the standing orders by demanding the floor out of his turn in order to make a statement. Subsequently he submitted the following written statement:

"Comrade Schmidt misquoted my reference to the Cossacks. I never made any reference to the Orenburg Cossacks. I merely said: look at the Cossacks; they are behaving like arch-reactionaries; nevertheless, if the government tried to lay its hands on their land, they would all rise up against it. And so would, more or less, the regional authorities to whom the confiscated land would be transferred by the revolution, if any such attempt were made. And such behaviour on their part would be one of the guarantees against reaction in the event of restoration." (Minutes, p. 127.)

It is a brilliant plan, of course, to overthrow the autocracy and not touch the autocracy: to deprive it of certain territories, and then let it try to regain them! It is almost as brilliant as the idea of expropriating capitalism by means of savings banks. But this is beside the point. The point is that the municipalisation of the land by regions, which "should" play a miraculous role after the victorious revolution, is now playing a counter-revolutionary role. And this is the point that Plekhanov evaded!

At the present time the Cossack lands represent real municipalisation. Large oblasts<sup>1</sup> such as the Orenburg Oblast, Don Oblast, etc., belong to separate Cossack armies. The Cossacks possess an average of 52 dessiatins per household, whereas the average peasant holding is only 11 dessiatins. Besides this, the Orenburg Cossacks own 1,500,000 dessiatins of "army lands"; the Don Cossacks, 1,900,000 dessiatins, etc. This "municipalisation" is the breeding ground of purely feudal relationships. This municipalisation, as it exists in practice, implies the caste and regional isolation of the peasants, who are split up according to size of holdings, the amount of taxes paid, the conditions of mediæval land tenure as a reward for service, and so forth. "Municipalisation" does not assist the general democratic movement, it serves to disintegrate it; it splits it up into regions and thus weakens that which can be victorious only as a centralised force; it serves to alienate one region from the other.

And in the Second Duma we heard the Right-wing Cossack

<sup>1</sup> Regions.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Karaulov speaking in support of Stolypin (asserting that Stolypin in his declaration also agreed to the compulsory alteration of land boundaries), denouncing nationalisation no less strongly than Plekhanov, and openly declaring himself in favour of municipalisation by regions. (18th Session, April 11 [March 29], 1907, Stenographic Record, p. 1366.)

The Right-wing Cossack Karaulov grasped the essence of the subject a thousand times more correctly than Maslov and Plekhanov. The fact that the land is broken up into regions is a safeguard against revolution. If the Russian peasantry (with the aid of a centralised, not regional, proletarian movement) fails to pull down the landmarks of its regional isolation and to organise an all-Russian movement, the revolution will be crushed by the representatives of the various privileged regions whom the centralised power of the old regime will use to serve its ends in the struggle.

Municipalisation is a reactionary slogan which idealises the mediæval isolation of the regions, and which deadens the peasantry's consciousness of the need for a centralised agrarian revolution.

### 3. THE CENTRAL POWER AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BOURGEOIS STATE

It is the central state power that the adherents of municipalisation loathe more than anything else. Before we proceed to examine their argument, we must first explain what nationalisation means from the political and legal standpoint (its economic content has already been explained above).

Nationalisation means transforming the whole of the land into the property of the state. Property of the state means that the state is entitled to draw the rent from it and lay down general rules governing the possession and use of the land for the whole country. Under nationalisation such general rules include absolute prohibition of any sort of intermediary, *i.e.*, the prohibition of sub-letting, or transferring land to anyone except the direct tiller, and so on. Furthermore, if the state in question is really a democratic state (not in the Menshevik sense, *à la*

Novosedsky), state ownership of the land does not mean that the land cannot be placed at the disposal of the local and regional authorities within the limits of the general laws of the country. On the contrary, that is exactly what it implies. As I have already pointed out in my pamphlet, *A Revision, etc.*,<sup>1</sup> this is exactly what our minimum programme demands when it calls for the self-determination of nations, for wide regional local government, and so on. Hence, the drafting of the regulations governing the allotment or distribution of land among individual persons, associations, etc., according to the requirements of local conditions must necessarily be left to the jurisdiction of the local organs of the state, *i.e.*, to the local government authorities.

If any misunderstanding could arise on all these points, it must have been due either to a failure to understand the differences in the terms: property, possession, disposal and use, or to demagogical flirting with provincialism and federalism.<sup>2</sup> The difference between municipalisation and nationalisation is not the apportionment of rights as between the central and provincial authorities, and still less the "bureaucracy" of the central authority—only quite ignorant people can think and talk like that—but that under municipalisation, private property is retained for one category of land, whereas under nationalisation

<sup>1</sup> Lenin refers to his pamphlet *A Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*. (*Collected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. IX, pp. 51-76.)—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> We observe this kind of flirting on the part of Maslov. . . . In an article in *Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 104, he writes: "Perhaps, in some localities, the peasants would agree to divide their lands; but the refusal of the peasants in a single large region (*e.g.*, Poland) to allow their lands to be divided would suffice to reduce the proposal to nationalise the whole of the land to absurdity." This is a sample of vulgar argumentation in which there is no trace of thought, but simply empty phraseology. The "refusal" of a region which occupies an exceptional position to divide the land cannot alter the general programme, nor make it absurd: certain territories may "refuse" to municipalise the land. This is not the important thing. What is important is the fact that in a united capitalist state, private property in land and nationalisation on a large scale cannot exist side by side. One of these two systems will have to get the upper hand. It is the business of the workers' party to advocate the superior system, that which facilitates the rapid development of the forces of production and freedom to wage the class struggle.

it is entirely abolished. The difference lies in the "agrarian bimetalism"\* which is allowed in one programme, and which is prevented by the other.

If we examine the present programme from the point of view of the possibility of arbitrary action by the central power, etc. (a point of view with which the vulgar advocates of municipalisation try to save their case), we will observe that the present programme is confused and ambiguous in this respect. Suffice it to point out that the present programme transfers "to the possession of the democratic state" both the "lands required for colonisation reserves," and "forest and water areas of national importance." Obviously, these terms are very indefinite, and provide extensive ground for all manner of conflicts. Take, for instance, Mr. Kaufman's latest work in Vol. II of *The Agrarian Question*, published by the Cadets (*On the Question of the Scales of Supplementary Allotments*), in which a computation is made of the land reserves available in 44 gubernias for the purpose of additional allotments for the peasants at the highest rates of 1861. The "land reserves excluding the peasant allotments" are first calculated without forest land and then with the forest land added (over 25 per cent of forest land). Who is to determine which of these forests are of "national importance"? Only the central state authority, of course. Hence, it is in the hands of this central state authority that the Menshevik programme places a gigantic area of 57,000,000 dessiatins in 44 gubernias (according to Kaufman). Who is to determine what the "colonisation reserves" are? Only the central bourgeois state, of course. It alone will determine, for instance, whether the 1,500,000 dessiatins of "army lands" of the Orenburg Cossacks, or the 2,000,000 dessiatins of the Don Cossack lands represent "colonisation reserves" for the whole country (because the Cossacks have 52.7 dessiatins per household), or not. Clearly, the question does not stand in the way Plekhanov, Maslov and Co. put it. The point at issue is not that of protecting the local authorities from the encroachments of the central government by means of paper resolutions; this cannot be done either on paper or even with guns; for the trend of

capitalist development is towards centralisation, towards the concentration of such a force in the hands of the central bourgeois government as no "region" will be able to withstand. The point is that a certain class should possess political power both central and local, that democracy should be applied both centrally and locally to an equal degree and be sufficiently consistent to ensure the complete rule of, let us say, the majority of the population, *i.e.*, the peasantry. This alone can serve as a real guarantee against "excessive" encroachments of the centre, against infringements of the "lawful" rights of the regions. All the other guarantees invented by the Mensheviks are just silly nightcaps donned by provincial philistines to protect themselves from the power of the central authority which has been concentrated by capitalism. Novosedsky, and the whole of our present programme, commits this act of philistine stupidity when he provides for complete democracy in local government, and democracy "not of the highest degree" at the centre. Incomplete democracy means that power in the centre is not in the hands of the majority of the population, not in the hands of those elements which predominate in the organs of local government; and this means not only the possibility but the inevitability of conflicts, out of which, by virtue of the laws of economic development, the non-democratic central government *must* emerge victorious.

From this aspect of the question, to argue that "municipalisation" will "secure" something for the regions as against the central government is sheer philistine nonsense. If this can be called a "fight" against the centralised bourgeois government, it is the sort of "fight" that the anti-Semites are waging against capitalism \*; we hear the same high-sounding promises, equally impracticable economically and politically, as those which the anti-Semites make to attract the stupid and ignorant masses.

Take the most "catchy" argument the advocates of municipalisation use against nationalisation: nationalisation will strengthen the bourgeois state (or as John so splendidly put it: "will strengthen *only* the state power"), and will increase the revenues of the anti-proletarian, bourgeois government; *whereas*...

this is exactly what they say: *whereas* municipalisation will yield revenues for the needs of the population, for the needs of the proletariat. Such an argument makes one feel ashamed for Social-Democracy, for it is pure anti-Semitic stupidity and anti-Semitic demagogy. We shall not quote the "small fry" who have been led astray by Plekhanov and Maslov; we shall quote Maslov "himself":

"Social-Democracy," he says didactically to the readers of *Obrazovaniye*, "always makes its calculations in such a way that its plans and tasks will be vindicated even in the worst circumstances. . . . We must work on the assumption that in all spheres of social life the bourgeois system with all its negative features will prevail. Local government will be of the same bourgeois character as the rest of the state, the same acute class struggle will take place in it as in the municipalities of Western Europe.

"What is the difference, then, between local government and the state power? Why does Social-Democracy strive to transfer the land not to the state, but to the local authorities?"

"In order to define the tasks of the state and of local government, let us compare their respective budgets." (*Obrazovaniye*, 1907, No. 3, p. 102.)

Then follows a comparison: in one of the most democratic republics, in the United States of America, 42 per cent of the budget is spent on the army and navy. The same in France, England, etc. On the other hand, the landlord Zemstvos in Russia spend 27.5 per cent of their budgets on public health, 17.4 per cent on education, 11.9 per cent on roads.

"By comparing the respective budgets of the most democratic states and the least democratic local governments, we find that the former, by their functions, serve the interests of the ruling classes, that the state funds are spent on means of oppression, on means of suppressing democracy; on the other hand, we find that the most undemocratic, the very worst type of local government is compelled, however badly, to serve democracy, to satisfy local requirements.

"Social-Democrats must not be so naive as to accept nationalisation on the ground, say, that the revenues from nationalised lands would go towards the maintenance of republican troops. . . . That reader will be very naive who believes Olenov<sup>1</sup> when he says that the Marxian theory only 'permits' the inclusion of the demand for the nationalisation of the land in the programme, *i.e.*, the expenditure of ground rent [irrespective of whether it is called absolute or differential rent?] on the army and navy, and that this theory does not permit the inclusion of the municipalisation of the land, *i.e.*, the expenditure of rent on the needs of the population." (P, 103.)

<sup>1</sup> A Marxian writer of the time.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Quite clear, one would think. Nationalisation—for the army and navy; municipalisation—for the needs of the people! A Jew is a capitalist; hence, down with the Jews means down with the capitalists!

The good Maslov fails to see that the high percentage of expenditure on cultural needs in the budgets of the local authorities represents a high percentage of only secondary items of expenditure. Why is this so? Because the limits of the functions and financial powers of the local authorities are determined by the central government and determined in such a manner that the latter apportions huge sums for the army and navy, and allows only farthings for "cultural needs." Is such a division unavoidable in a bourgeois society? Yes, it is; for in a bourgeois society the bourgeoisie could not rule if it did not spend huge sums on making its class rule secure and thus leave only farthings for cultural purposes. And one has to be a Maslov to conceive this brilliant idea: if I declare this new source of big revenues to be the property of the Zemstvos, I get round the rule of the bourgeoisie! How easy the task of the proletarians would be if they reasoned like Maslov: all we have to do is to demand that the revenues from the railways, post, telegraph and the liquor monopoly should not be "nationalised," but "municipalised," and all these revenues will be spent not on the army and navy, but for cultural purposes. There is no need whatever to overthrow the central government, nor to change it radically; all we have to do is to secure the "municipalisation" of all the big items of revenue, and the job is as good as done.

In Europe, and in every bourgeois country, municipal revenues are revenues—and let the good Maslov remember this—which the bourgeois central government is willing to sacrifice for cultural purposes, because they are secondary items of revenue, because it is inconvenient for the central government to collect them, and because the principal, cardinal, fundamental requirements of the bourgeoisie and its rule have already been met by the big items of revenue. Therefore, to advise the people to secure the new big items, to get the hundreds of millions from the municipalised lands, and to make

sure the money is spent for cultural purposes by handing it over to the *Zemstvos* and not to the central government—is the advice of a charlatan. In a bourgeois state, the bourgeoisie can only allow farthings to be spent for real cultural purposes, for the large sums are required for the purpose of securing its class rule. Why does the central authority apportion to itself nine-tenths of the revenues from the land tax, the business tax, etc., and allow the *Zemstvos* to retain only one-tenth; why does it lay down the law that any additional taxes raised by the *Zemstvos* shall not exceed a certain low percentage? Because the big revenues are required to secure the class rule of the bourgeoisie, and by its very bourgeois nature it cannot allow more than farthings to be spent on cultural purposes.<sup>1</sup>

The European Socialists take this distribution of the large sums and the farthings for granted, for they know quite well that it cannot be different in bourgeois society. Taking this distribution for granted, they say: we cannot take part in the central government because it is an instrument of oppression; but we may take part in municipal government because there the farthings are spent for cultural purposes. But what would

<sup>1</sup> A study of Kaufman's elaborate work: *Die Kommunal финанzen*, 2 Bände, Leipzig, 1906, II Abt., 5 Band des *Hand und Lehrbuchs der Staatswissenschaften*, begr. von Frankenstein, fortges. von Heckel. (Kaufman, *Municipal Finances*, 2 volumes, Leipzig, 1906, Part II, Vol. 5 of *Handbook on State Science*, founded by Frankenstein, continued by Heckel—Ed.), will show that in England the division of local and central state expenditures is more in favour of the local government bodies than it is in Prussia and in France. Thus, in England, 3 billion marks are expended by the local authorities, and 3.6 billion by the central government; in France, the respective figures are 1.1 billion as against 2.9; in Prussia, 1.1 and 3.5. Let us now take the cultural expenses, for instance, the expenditure on education in the country most favourably situated (from the standpoint of the advocates of municipalisation), i.e., England. We find that out of the total local expenditure of £151,600,000 (in 1902-03) £16,500,000 were spent on education, i.e., a trifle over one-tenth. The central government, in the Budget of 1908 (cf. *Almanach de Gotha*), spent for educational purposes £16,900,000 out of a total of £198,600,000, i.e., less than one-tenth. Army and navy expenditure for the same year amounted to £59,200,000; add to this the expenditure of £28,500,000 on the National Debt service, £3,800,000 on law courts and police, £1,900,000 on foreign affairs and £19,800,000 on cost of tax collection, and you will see quite plainly that the bourgeoisie spends only farthings on education, and huge sums on the maintenance of its class rule.

these Socialists think of a man who advised the party of the workers to agitate in favour of handing over to the European municipalities the property rights in the really large revenues, the total rent from local land, the whole income from the local post offices, local railways, and so on? They would certainly think that such a man was either crazy or a "Christian Socialist" who had found his way into the ranks of Social-Democracy by mistake.

Those who, in discussing the problems of the present (*i.e.*, bourgeois) revolution in Russia, argue that we must not strengthen the central government of the bourgeois state reveal a complete lack of ability to think. The Germans may and should adopt this line, because they are confronted only with a *Junker-bourgeois* Germany, and there can be no other Germany until socialism is established; whereas in our country the whole content of the revolutionary mass struggle at this stage is centred around the question as to whether Russia is to be a *Junker-bourgeois* state (as Stolypin and the Cadets desire), or a peasant-bourgeois state (as the peasants and the workers desire). One cannot take part in such a revolution without supporting one of these strata of the bourgeoisie, one of these types of bourgeois evolution as against the other. Owing to objective economic causes, there is not and cannot be any other "choice" for us in this revolution than that between a bourgeois centralised republic of peasant-farmers and a bourgeois centralised monarchy of landlord-*Junkers*. And to evade this difficult "choice" by fixing the attention of the masses on the plea: "if only we could make the *Zemstvos* a little more democratic," is the most vulgar sort of philistinism.

#### 4. THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL AND AGRARIAN REVOLUTION

A difficult "choice," we said, meaning of course not the subjective choice (which is more desirable) but the objective outcome of the struggle of the social forces which decide the historical issue. Those who say that my agrarian programme, which combines the republic with nationalisation, is optimistic have never pondered on what the "difficulties" connected with

a favourable outcome for the peasantry really are. This is Plekhanov's argument on the subject:

"Lenin tries to evade the difficulty of the question by means of optimistic assumptions. This is the usual method of utopian thinking. For instance, the anarchists say: 'there is no need for compulsory organisation,' and when we tell them that the absence of compulsory organisation would enable individual members of the community to injure the community if they desired to do so, the anarchists reply 'this cannot be.' In my opinion, this means evading the difficulty of the question by means of optimistic assumptions. And this is what Lenin does. He raises a whole series of optimistic 'ifs' as regards the possible consequences of the measure which he advocates. To demonstrate this, I shall quote the reproach which Lenin hurled at Maslov. On page 23 of his pamphlet<sup>1</sup> he says: 'Maslov's draft programme contains, in essence, the tacit assumption that the demand of our political minimum programme has not been fully carried out, that the sovereignty of the people has not been secured, that the standing army has not been abolished, that the election of officials by the people has not been introduced, and so on—in other words, that the democratic revolution has been as incomplete as were most of the European democratic revolutions, that it has been curtailed, distorted, "turned back," like the latter. Maslov's draft programme is especially adapted to a half-hearted, inconsistent, incomplete, or curtailed, democratic revolution, rendered "innocuous" by reaction.' Assuming that the reproach Lenin hurled at Maslov is justified, the passage quoted still shows that Lenin's own draft programme will be good only in the event of all his 'ifs' coming true. But if those 'ifs' do not come true, the application of his draft will prove harmful.<sup>2</sup> Well, we have no use for such drafts. Our draft programme must provide for all contingencies, i.e., even for unfavourable 'ifs.'" (Minutes of the Stockholm Congress, pp. 44-45.)

I have quoted this argument in full because it clearly indicates Plekhanov's mistake. He has completely failed to understand the optimism which scares him. The "optimism" does not lie in presupposing the election of officials by the people, etc., but in presupposing the victory of the peasant agrarian revolution. The real "difficulty" lies in securing victory for the peasant agrarian revolution in a country which at least since 1861 has been developing along the line of the *Junker*-bourgeois type and having assumed this fundamental economic difficulty, it is ridiculous to drag in the bogey of anarchism in connection with the difficulties of political democracy. It is ridiculous to forget that the scope of the agrarian reform must coincide with the scope of the political reform, and that the economic revolu-

<sup>1</sup> *A Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party.*—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> But then it will not be my draft! Plekhanov argues illogically.

tion presupposes a corresponding political superstructure. Plekhanov's cardinal mistake on this question lies in this very failure to get at the root of the "optimism" that is common to both the Menshevik and the Bolshevik agrarian programme.

Indeed, picture to yourselves concretely what a "peasant agrarian revolution" including the confiscation of the landlords' land means in contemporary Russia. There can be no doubt that during the past half century capitalism has paved the way for itself through landlord farming, which now, on the whole, is unquestionably superior to peasant farming not only as regards yield (which can be partly ascribed to the better quality of the land owned by the landlords) but also as regards the use of improved implements and rotation of crops (grass sowing.)<sup>1</sup> There cannot be any doubt that landlord farming is bound by a thousand threads not only with the bureaucracy, but also with the bourgeoisie. Confiscation undermines a great many of the interests of the big bourgeoisie, and the peasant revolution, as Kautsky justly pointed out, leads also to state bankruptcy, i.e., it damages the interests not only of the Russian, but of the whole international bourgeoisie. It stands to reason that under such conditions the victory of the peasant revolution, the victory of the petty bourgeoisie over both the landlords and the big bourgeoisie requires a combination of exceptionally favourable circumstances, it requires what, from the standpoint of the man-in-the-street or of the philistine historian, are extraordinarily "optimistic" assumptions; such a victory presupposes a gigantic sweep of peasant initiative, class consciousness, revolutionary energy, organisation, a wealth of creative genius of the people.<sup>2</sup> All this is beyond dispute, and Plekhanov's philistine jokes at the expense of this last phrase<sup>3</sup> are but a cheap way of shirk-

<sup>1</sup> Comparative data on the superiority of landlord farming over peasant farming through the more extensive sowing of grass will be found in Vol. II of Kaufman's *The Agrarian Question*.

<sup>2</sup> In Russian: *narodnoye tvorchestvo*—the creative genius of the people.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>3</sup> "*Narodnoye tvorchestvo*" is "*Narodovolchestvo*" (*Narodnaya Volya*-ism), said Plekhanov sneeringly at Stockholm. This is the sort of criticism with which *The Adventures of Chichikov* is criticised, by making fun of the name of the hero: "Chichikov... Ch.. Ch.. Ch.. Chi.. how fun-

ing a serious issue. And since commodity production does not unite and centralise the peasantry, but disintegrates and disunites them, the peasant revolution in a bourgeois country can only be brought about under the leadership of the proletariat—a fact which is more than ever rousing the opposition of the most powerful bourgeoisie in the world to such a revolution.

Does this mean that Marxists must abandon the idea of a peasant agrarian revolution? Not at all. Such a deduction would be worthy only of those whose philosophy is nothing but a liberal parody of Marxism. What it does mean is: 1) that Marxism cannot bind the destiny of socialism in Russia with the outcome of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; 2) that Marxism must reckon with two possibilities in the capitalist evolution of agriculture in Russia and clearly point out to the people the conditions and significance of each possibility, and 3) that Marxism must resolutely oppose the notion that a radical, agrarian revolution is possible in Russia without a radical, political revolution.

1) The Socialist-Revolutionaries, in common with all more or less consistent Narodniki, fail to see the bourgeois character of the peasant revolution and tack on to it the whole of their own quasi-socialism. In the opinion of the Narodniki, a favourable outcome of the peasant revolution would mean the triumph of Narodnik socialism in Russia. In reality, such an outcome would be the quickest and most decisive bankruptcy of Narodnik (peasant) socialism. The fuller and the more decisive the victory of the peasant revolution will be, the quicker will the peasantry be converted into free, bourgeois farmers, who would “give the sack” to Narodnik “socialism.” On the other hand, an unfavourable outcome would protract the agony of Narodnik socialism for some time, and enable the illusion that to criticise the landlord-bourgeois variety of capitalism means criticising capitalism in general, to continue for a while.

ny!”\* Only those who think that the mere admission of the possibility of a peasant revolution against the bourgeoisie and the landlords is *Narodovolchestvo* can regard the idea that it is necessary to rouse the “creative genius of the people,” that it is necessary to find new forms of struggle and new forms of organising the peasantry in the Russian revolution, as *Narodovolchestvo*.

Social-Democracy, the party of the proletariat, does not in any way bind the destiny of socialism with either of the possible outcomes of the bourgeois revolution. Either outcome implies the development of capitalism, whether under a landlord monarchy with private property in land, or under a farmers' republic, even with the nationalisation of the land. Therefore, only an absolutely independent and purely proletarian party is able to defend the cause of socialism "whatever the state of democratic agrarian reforms may be," as the concluding part of my agrarian programme declares (this part was incorporated in the tactical resolution of the Stockholm Congress\*).

2) But the bourgeois character of either of the possible outcomes of the agrarian revolution by no means implies that Social-Democrats can afford to be indifferent to the struggle for one or the other outcome. It is undoubtedly in the interest of the working class to give the most energetic support to the struggle; more than that, the proletariat must in its own interest assume the leadership of the peasant revolution. In fighting for a favourable outcome of the revolution we must disseminate among the masses the clearest possible understanding of what it means to maintain the landlord path of agrarian evolution, what incalculable hardships (arising not from capitalism, but rather from the inadequate development of capitalism) it has in store for all the toiling masses. On the other hand, we must also point out clearly the petty-bourgeois character of the peasant revolution, and the futility of placing any "socialist" hopes in it.

Moreover, since we do not bind the destiny of socialism with either of the possible outcomes of the bourgeois revolution, our programme cannot be one and the same for either a favourable or "unfavourable turn of events." When Plekhanov said that we need not make specific provisions in our programme for one or the other outcome (that is, built upon "ifs"), he said it simply without thinking; for it is precisely from his standpoint, from the standpoint of the probability of the worse outcome, or the necessity of making allowance for this worse outcome, that it is particularly necessary to divide the programme into two parts, as I did. We must say that on the present path of landlord-bour-

geois development the party of the workers is in favour of such and such measures, while at the same time it gives the utmost support to the peasantry in the struggle to abolish landlordism entirely and thus create the possibility for broader and freer conditions of development. I dealt with this aspect of the subject in great detail in my Report<sup>1</sup> (the point about leasing land, the necessity for its inclusion in the programme "if worst comes to worst," and its omission in Maslov's draft). I shall merely add that precisely at present, when the immediate conditions for Social-Democratic activity least of all give grounds for optimistic suppositions, Plekhanov's mistake becomes even more patent. The Third Duma provides us with no grounds whatever for abandoning the struggle for the peasant agrarian revolution; but for a certain space of time we shall have to work on the basis of agrarian relationships that allow the most brutal exploitation by the landlords. Plekhanov, who was particularly concerned about the worse case, now finds himself with no programme to meet the worse case!

3) Since we set ourselves the task of assisting the peasant revolution, we must clearly see the difficulty of the task and the necessity for co-ordinating the political and the agrarian reforms. Otherwise we shall get a scientifically unsound and, in practice, reactionary combination of agrarian "optimism" (confiscation plus municipalisation or division) and political "pessimism" (Novosedsky's "relative" democratisation of the centre).

The Mensheviks, as if in spite of themselves, reluctantly accept the peasant revolution, but they do not wish to present a clear and definite picture of this revolution to the people. One can detect in what they say the opinion that was expressed with such rare naïveté by the Menshevik Ptitsyn at Stockholm:

"The revolutionary turmoil will pass away, bourgeois life will resume its usual course, and if no workers' revolution takes place in the West, the bourgeoisie will inevitably come to power in our country. This will not and cannot be denied by Comrade Lenin." (Minutes, p. 91).

Thus, a superficial, abstract conception of the bourgeois revolution has overshadowed the question of one of the varieties

<sup>1</sup> *Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. to the St. Petersburg Workers.—Ed.*

of this revolution, namely, the peasant revolution! All this is mere "turmoil," the only thing that is real is the "usual course"! A more striking expression of the philistine point of view, and of the failure to understand the proper objective of the struggle which is going on in our bourgeois revolution, would be difficult to find.

The peasantry cannot accomplish the agrarian revolution without abolishing the old regime, the standing army and the bureaucracy, because all these are most reliable bulwarks of landlordism, bound up with it by thousands of ties. Therefore, the idea of achieving a peasant revolution by democratising only the local institutions without completely breaking up the central institutions is scientifically unsound. This idea is also reactionary in practice because it plays into the hands of petty-bourgeois stupidity and petty-bourgeois opportunism which pictures the matter in a very "simple" way: we want land; as to politics, God knows! The peasant agrees that the whole of the land must be taken; but whether the whole of political power has to be taken too, whether the whole of political power can be taken and how it should be taken are matters about which the peasant does not bother (or did not bother until the dispersal of two Dumas made him wiser). Hence, the standpoint of the "peasant-Cadet" Mr. Peshekhonov—who in his *Agrarian Programme* wrote: "Just now it is incomparably more essential to give a definite answer on the agrarian question than, for instance, on the question of a republic" (p. 114)—is extremely reactionary. And this standpoint of political craziness (the legacy of the arch-reactionary Mr. V.V.<sup>1</sup>) has left its mark on the whole programme and tactics of the "Narodni-Socialist" Party. Instead of combating the short-sightedness of the peasant who fails to see the connection between agrarian and political radicalism, the Narodni-Socialists adapt themselves to this short-sightedness. They believe this to be "more practical," but in reality it is the

<sup>1</sup> V. Vorontsov—a leading exponent of Narodnik ideas in the eighties and nineties of the last century, against whom and other Narodnik writers Lenin fought his first battles for Marxism in the legal press. See Vol. I of *Selected Works*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

very thing which dooms the agrarian programme of the peasantry to utter failure. It is admittedly difficult to bring about a radical political revolution, but it is equally difficult to bring about an agrarian revolution; the latter is impossible unless it is connected with the former, and it is the duty of Socialists not to conceal this from the peasants, not to throw a veil over it (by using rather vague, semi-Cadet phrases about the "democratic state," as is done in our agrarian programme), but to speak out fully, to teach the peasants that unless they go to the very end in politics they cannot think seriously of confiscating the landlords' land.

It is not the "ifs" that are important in the programme. What is important is that it must point out that the agrarian and the political reforms must conform to each other. Instead of using the word "if," the same idea may be put differently: "The Party explains that the best method of taking possession of the land in bourgeois society is by abolishing private ownership of land, by nationalising the land and transferring it to the state, and that such a measure can neither be carried out nor bear real fruit without the complete democratisation, not only of local government, but of the whole system of the state, including the establishment of a republic, the abolition of the standing army, election of officials by the people, etc."

By failing to include this explanation in our agrarian programme, we have suggested to the people the wrong idea that the confiscation of the land from the landlords is possible without the complete democratisation of the central government. We have stooped to the level of the opportunist petty bourgeois, *i.e.*, the "Narodni-Socialists"; for in both Dumas it so happened that their programme (the Bill of the "104") as well as our programme spoke only of the connection between agrarian reforms and the democratisation of local government. Such a view is philistine stupidity, of which many, particularly Social-Democrats, should have been cured by the events of June 16 (3), 1907,<sup>1</sup> and by the Third Duma.

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 242.\*\*\*—*Ed.*

### 5. PEASANT REVOLUTION WITHOUT THE CONQUEST OF POWER BY THE PEASANTRY?

The agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy is a proletarian programme in a peasant revolution that is directed against the remnants of serfdom, against everything mediæval in our agrarian system. Theoretically, as we have seen, this proposition is admitted also by the Mensheviks (Plekhanov's speech at Stockholm). Yet the Mensheviks have failed to think this proposition out, and to perceive its organic connection with the general principles of Social-Democratic tactics in the Russian bourgeois revolution. This shallow thinking is particularly manifest in Plekhanov's writings.

Every peasant revolution which is directed against mediævalism, while the whole of the social economy is of a capitalist character, is a bourgeois revolution. But not every bourgeois revolution is a peasant revolution. If, in a country where agriculture is organised entirely on capitalist lines, the capitalist landowners, with the aid of the wage workers, were to carry out an agrarian revolution by abolishing private property in land, for instance, this would be a bourgeois revolution, but by no means a peasant revolution. Or if a revolution took place in a country where the agrarian system was so wedded to the general capitalist system that it could not be abolished without abolishing capitalism, and if, say, that revolution put the industrial bourgeoisie in power in place of the autocratic bureaucracy—this, too, would be a bourgeois revolution, but by no means a peasant revolution. In other words: a bourgeois country can exist without a peasantry, and a bourgeois revolution may take place in such a country without the peasantry. A revolution may take place in a country with a considerable peasant population and yet not be a peasant revolution. *i.e.*, a revolution that does not revolutionise the agrarian conditions especially affecting the peasantry, and does not bring forward the peasantry as one of the social forces creating the revolution. Consequently, the general Marxian concept of "bourgeois revolution" contains certain propositions that certainly apply to any peasant revolution that takes place in a country of rising capitalism, but this general concept tells us

nothing at all about whether or not a bourgeois revolution in a given country must (in the sense of objective necessity) become a peasant revolution in order to be completely victorious.

The fundamental source of Plekhanov's mistaken tactical line and that of his Menshevik followers during the first period of the Russian revolution (*i.e.*, during 1905-07) is their complete failure to comprehend this correlation between bourgeois revolution in general, and a peasant bourgeois revolution. The terrible *din*<sup>1</sup> usually raised in Menshevik literature about the alleged failure of the Bolsheviks to grasp the bourgeois character of the present revolution is merely a screen to cover their own shallow thinking. As a matter of fact, not a single Social-Democrat of either group, either before or during the revolution, has ever departed from the Marxian views on the bourgeois character of the revolution; statements to the contrary could be made only by "simplifiers," by those who vulgarise factional differences. But a section of the Marxists, the Right wing, persistently made shift with an abstract, stereotyped conception of the bourgeois revolution, and failed to perceive the peculiar features of the present bourgeois revolution, which is precisely a peasant revolution. It was quite natural and inevitable for that wing of Social-Democracy to fail to understand the source of the counter-revolutionary nature of our bourgeoisie in the Russian revolution, to be unable to determine clearly which classes are capable of securing complete victory in this revolution, and to drift into the opinion that in a bourgeois revolution the proletariat should support the bourgeoisie, that the chief actor in the bourgeois revolution should be the bourgeoisie, that the sweep of the revolution would be weakened if the bourgeoisie deserted it, and so on.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, from the very beginning of the revolution, in the spring and summer of 1905, when there was no hint as yet of the confusion of Bolshevism with boycottism,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This *din* sounds positively funny in Plekhanov's *New Letters on Tactics and Tactlessness*.

<sup>2</sup> Boycottism—a movement to boycott the Duma. See articles "Should We Boycott the State Duma?," "The Boycott" and "Against the Boycott" in this volume.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

boyevism,<sup>1</sup> etc., that is now so widespread among the ignorant or stupid; they clearly pointed to the source of our tactical differences, singled out the concept of peasant revolution as one of the varieties of bourgeois revolution, and defined the victory of the peasant revolution as "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." The greatest ideological victory Bolshevism has won in international Social-Democracy since then was the publication of Kautsky's article, *The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution* (Russian translation edited and with a preface by N. Lenin, published by New Epoch Publishers, Moscow, 1907\*). As is known, at the beginning of the split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in 1903, Kautsky sided with the latter. In 1907, having observed the course of the Russian revolution (a topic on which he repeatedly wrote), Kautsky realised at once the mistake made by Plekhanov, who had sent him his famous questionnaire. In that questionnaire, Plekhanov enquired only about the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution, without singling out the concept of peasant bourgeois revolution, without going beyond general formulæ such as "bourgeois democracy," "bourgeois opposition parties," etc. To rectify this error, Kautsky replied to Plekhanov that the bourgeoisie did not constitute the driving force of the Russian revolution, that in this sense the time of bourgeois revolutions was past, that "a lasting community of interests during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle exists only between the proletariat and the peasantry," and that "it [this lasting community of interests] should be made the basis of the whole of the revolutionary tactics of Russian Social-Democracy." This gave us a clear exposition of the fundamentals of Bolshevik tactics as against those of the Mensheviks. Plekhanov is terribly angry about this in his *New Letters, etc.* But his anger only betrays the impotence of his argument. Plekhanov keeps on repeating that the crisis through which we are passing is "a bourgeois crisis for all that." and calls the

<sup>1</sup> From the word "boyevik," members of the fighting detachments, some of which after the defeat of the revolution committed acts of terrorism, raids on banks, etc.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Bolsheviks "ignoramus." (P. 127.) This abuse is an expression of mere impotent rage. Plekhanov does not appreciate the difference between a peasant bourgeois revolution and a non-peasant bourgeois revolution. In declaring that Kautsky "exaggerates the rapidity of the development of our peasant" (p. 131), that "a difference of opinion between us [between Plekhanov and Kautsky] is possible only as regards nuances," etc., Plekhanov resorts to the most miserable and cowardly shuffling, for every thinking person can see just the opposite. What matters is not the "nuances," not the rapidity of development, not the "seizure" of power, which Plekhanov shouts about, but the fundamental opinion on which classes are capable of being the driving force of the Russian revolution. Willy-nilly, Plekhanov and the Mensheviks are inevitably drifting to the position of lending opportunist support to the bourgeoisie because they fail to understand the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie in a peasant bourgeois revolution. The Bolsheviks from the very beginning defined the general and the fundamental class conditions for the victory of this revolution as the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. In essence, Kautsky arrived at the same view in his article, *Driving Forces, etc.*, and he repeated it also in the second edition of his *Social Revolution*, where he says: "It [the victory of Russian Social-Democracy in the near future] can only come as the result of a coalition between the proletariat and the peasantry." (*Die soziale Revolution*, by K. Kautsky, second edition, Berlin, 1907, p. 62. Space does not permit us to dwell upon another of Kautsky's addenda to the second edition in which he sums up the lessons of December 1905, a summing up which differs radically from Menshevism.\*)

Thus we see that Plekhanov completely collapsed on the question of the fundamentals of the general Social-Democratic tactics in a bourgeois revolution that can be victorious only as a peasant revolution. What I said at Stockholm (April 1906) about Plekhanov having reduced Menshevism to absurdity by repudiating the conquest of power by the peasantry in a peasant revolution has been completely borne out in subsequent literature. And this

fundamental error in the tactical line was bound to find reflection in the agrarian programme of the Mensheviks. As I have repeatedly pointed out above, municipalisation does not either in the economic sphere or political sphere fully express the conditions essential for a real victory of the peasant revolution, for the real conquest of power by the proletariat and the peasantry. In the economic sphere, such a victory is incompatible with the perpetuation of the old system of peasant allotments, while in the political sphere, it is incompatible with mere regional democracy and incomplete democracy in the central government.

#### 6. IS LAND NATIONALISATION SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE?

Comrade John said at Stockholm (p. 111 of the Minutes):

"The draft providing for the municipalisation of the land is more acceptable, because it is more flexible: it takes into consideration the variety of economic conditions, and it can be carried out during the very process of the revolution."

I have already pointed out the cardinal defect of municipalisation in this respect: it vests the small holders with property rights in their allotments. Nationalisation is infinitely more flexible in this respect, because it provides greater scope for the organisation of new farms of the "disenclosed" lands. Here it is also necessary briefly to refer to other, minor arguments that John raised.

"The division of the land," says John, "would in some places revive the old agrarian relationships. In some regions the distribution would be as great as 200 dessiatins per household, so that in the Urals, for instance, a class of new landlords would be created."

This is a sample of an argument which denounces its own system! And this was the kind of argument that decided the question at the Menshevik Congress! It is precisely municipalisation, and it alone, that is guilty of the sin referred to, for it alone attaches the land to individual regions. It is not the division of land which is responsible for that sin, as John thinks, thus falling into a ridiculous logical error, but the provincialism of the advocates of municipalisation. In any case, according to the Menshevik programme, the municipalised lands in the

Urals would remain in the "possession" of the people of the Urals. This would mean the creation of a new, reactionary, Cossack class—reactionary because the privileged small holders, being provided with ten times more land than the rest of the people, could not but oppose the peasant revolution, and could not but defend the privileges of private landownership. The only thing we can assume is that on the basis of this programme, the "democratic state" might declare millions of dessiatins of Urals forests to be "forests of national importance," or "colonisation reserves" (does not the Cadet Kaufman apply this term to 25 per cent of the Urals forest land, which would thus yield 21,000,000 dessiatins in the Vyatka, Ufa and Perm gubernias?), and upon this basis take "possession" of them. Not flexibility, but confusion, and nothing else, is the distinguishing feature of municipalisation.

Let us now see what carrying out municipalisation during the very process of the revolution means. In this connection, attacks are made on my "revolutionary peasant committees" on the grounds that these would be institutions based on estates.<sup>1</sup> "We are opposed to estate institutions," the Mensheviks argued at Stockholm, displaying their liberalism. Cheap liberalism! It did not occur to our Mensheviks that in order to introduce local government not based on estates, it is necessary to defeat the privileged estate against which the struggle is being waged and to wrest power from it. It so happens that "during the very process of the revolution," as John put it, *i.e.*, during the course of the struggle to drive out the landlords, during the process of those "revolutionary actions of the peasantry" that are also referred to in the tactical resolution of the Mensheviks, all that can be set up are peasant committees. The introduction of local government not based on estates is provided for in our political programme; it will inevitably be established, and must be established as the organisation of government after the victory, when the whole of the population will be forced to acknowledge the new order. If the words of our programme about "supporting the

<sup>1</sup> Or orders, the mediæval division of the population—nobles, merchants, peasants, etc.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

revolutionary actions of the peasantry, even to the extent of confiscating the land of the landlords" are not mere phrases, then we must think about organising the masses for these "actions." Yet this is entirely overlooked in the Menshevik programme. That programme is so drawn up as to be easily converted into a parliamentary bill, like the bills proposed by the bourgeois parties which (like the Cadets) detest all "actions" or opportunistically shirk the task of systematically promoting and organising such actions (like the Narodni-Socialists). But a programme drawn up in this manner is unworthy of a workers' party which speaks of a peasant agrarian revolution, of a party which pursues the aim, not of reassuring the big bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy (like the Cadets), not of reassuring the petty-bourgeoisie (like the Narodni-Socialists), but solely the aim of developing the consciousness and initiative of the broad masses in the course of their struggle against serf-ridden Russia.

Just recall, if only in general outline, the numerous "revolutionary actions" of the peasantry which took place in Russia in the spring of 1905, the autumn of 1905 and the spring of 1906. Do we pledge our support to such actions, or not? If we did not our whole programme would prove to be a swindle. If we do, then obviously our programme fails to say anything about the organisation of these actions. These actions can be organised only on the spot where the struggle is proceeding; the organisation can be formed only by the masses who are directly taking part in the struggle, i.e., the organisation must without fail be of the peasant committee type. To postpone such actions until local government bodies covering large regions are set up would be ridiculous. The extension of the power and influence of the victorious local committees to adjacent villages, uyezds, gubernias, towns, regions and to the entire country is, of course, both desirable and essential. There can be no objection to providing for such extension in the programme; but this should not be confined to regions, it should embrace the central government as well. This is point number one. Secondly, in that case we must not speak about local authorities, because this term suggests that the administrative bodies are dependent upon the form

of organisation of the state. "Local government" operates according to the regulations laid down by the central government, and within the limits set by the latter. The organisations of the fighting people of which we are speaking must be quite independent of all the institutions of the old government, they must fight for a new system of state organisation which shall serve as the instrument of the complete authority of the people (or the sovereignty of the people), and as the means for securing it.

In a word, from the standpoint of the "very process of the revolution," the Menshevik programme is unsatisfactory in all respects, reflecting as it does the confusion of the Menshevik ideas on the question of the provisional government, etc.

#### 7. MUNICIPALISATION OF THE LAND AND MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM

It is the Mensheviks who sponsored the agrarian programme at Stockholm, who identify these two terms. Suffice it to mention the names of two prominent Mensheviks, Kostrov and Larin.

"One would think," said Kostrov at Stockholm, "that some comrades are hearing about municipal property for the first time. Let me remind them that in Western Europe there is a whole political trend [precisely!] called 'municipal socialism' (England\*), which advocates the extension of the property owned by urban and rural municipalities, and this is also supported by our comrades. Many municipalities own real estate, and this does not contradict our programme. We now have the possibility of acquiring [!] gratis [!!] for the municipalities a wealth of real estate and we ought to take advantage of it. Of course, the confiscated land should be municipalised." (P. 88.)

The naive opinion that it is "possible to acquire wealth gratis" is beautifully expressed here. But the speakers did not stop to think why this municipal socialism trend, precisely as a specific trend and chiefly in England, which he cited as an example, is an extremely opportunist trend. Why did Engels, in his letters to Sorge,<sup>1</sup> in characterising the extreme intellectual opportunism of the English Fabians, emphasise the petty-bourgeois significance of their municipalisation schemes?

Larin, in unison with Kostrov, says in his comments on the Menshevik programme:

<sup>1</sup> See note to this page.—Ed.

"Perhaps in some localities the local people's authorities will themselves manage these huge estates, as, for instance, the tramways or slaughterhouses are managed by municipal councils, and then the whole [!] of the profit obtained from them will be placed at the disposal of the whole [!] people."<sup>1</sup>

And not of the local bourgeoisie, my dear Larin?

The philistine illusions of the philistine heroes of West European municipal socialism are already making themselves felt. The fact that the bourgeoisie is in power is forgotten, so also is the fact that only in towns with a high percentage of proletarian population is it possible to obtain a few crumbs for the toilers out of municipal funds! However, all this is by the way. The principal fallacy in the "municipal socialism" idea of municipalising the land lies in the following:

The bourgeois intelligentsia of the West, like the English Fabians,<sup>2</sup> has converted municipal socialism into a separate "trend" precisely because it dreams of social peace and class conciliation, and wishes to deflect the attention of the people from the fundamental questions of the economic system as a whole and of the whole state system to minor questions of local government. In the sphere of questions in the first category, the class contradictions stand out most sharply; this is the sphere which, as we have shown, touches the very foundations of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. It is precisely in this sphere that the philistine, reactionary utopia of bringing about socialism piecemeal is particularly hopeless. Attention is directed to the sphere of local, minor questions, not to the question of the class rule of the bourgeoisie, nor to the question of the chief instruments of this rule, but rather to the question of distributing the crumbs thrown by the rich bourgeoisie "for the needs of the population." Naturally, since attention is focused on such questions as the spending of paltry sums (in comparison with the total surplus value pocketed by the bourgeoisie and with the total state expenditure), which the bourgeoisie itself is willing to set aside for public health (Engels pointed out in *The Housing Question* that the bourgeoisie itself is afraid of the spread of

<sup>1</sup> Larin, *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*, p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> See note to page 269.—Ed.

contagious diseases in the town), or for elementary education (for the bourgeoisie must have educated workers, who can adapt themselves to the high level of technique!), and so on, it is possible, in the sphere of such minor questions, to indulge in grandiloquent talk about "social peace," about the harmfulness of the class struggle, and so forth. Where is the class struggle if the bourgeoisie itself is spending money on "the needs of the population," on public health, on education? Why do we need social revolution if it is possible through the local authorities, gradually, step by step, to extend "collective property," to "socialise" production: the tramways, the slaughterhouses referred to—quite relevantly—by worthy Y. Larin?

The philistine opportunism of this "trend" lies in that it forgets the restricted limits of so-called "municipal socialism" (in reality, municipal capitalism, as the English Social-Democrats properly point out in their controversies with the Fabians). It forgets that as long as it rules as a class, the bourgeoisie cannot allow any encroachment, even from the "municipal" point of view, upon the real foundations of its rule; that if the bourgeoisie does allow or tolerate "municipal socialism," it is precisely because the latter does not touch the foundations of its rule, does not interfere with any of its substantial sources of revenue, but extends only to the narrow sphere of local expenditure, which the bourgeoisie itself is willing to leave to the care of the "population." The very slightest knowledge of Western "municipal socialism" is sufficient to show that any attempt on the part of socialist municipalities to go a little beyond the boundaries of their normal, *i.e.*, petty, activities, which give no substantial relief to the workers, any attempt to touch capital, is invariably and absolutely vetoed in the most categorical fashion by the central government of the bourgeois state.

And this fundamental mistake, this philistine opportunism of the West European Fabians, the Possibilists<sup>1</sup> and Bernsteinists, is taken over by our advocates of municipalisation.

"Municipal socialism" means socialism in matters of local

<sup>1</sup> The name applied to a French opportunist group because it advocated only reforms that were "possible" of achievement under capitalism.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

government. Anything that goes beyond the limits of local interests, beyond the limits of state administration, *i.e.*, that which affects the main sources of revenue of the ruling classes and the principal means of securing their rule, anything that affects, not the administration of the state, but the structure of the state, transcends the domain of "municipal socialism." But our wise-aces evade this acute national issue, this question of the land which fundamentally affects the vital interests of the ruling classes, by relegating it to the domain of "questions of local government." In the West they municipalise tramcars and slaughterhouses; why should we not municipalise the greater part of the land? This would be suitable both in the event of restoration and in the event of the incomplete democratisation of the central government—argues the little Russian intellectual.

Thus we get agrarian socialism in a bourgeois revolution, a socialism of the most philistine sort, calculated to dull the edge of the class struggle on vital issues by relegating the latter to the domain of petty questions affecting local government only. As a matter of fact, the question of the disposal of one-half of the best land in the country is neither a local question nor a question of administration. It is a question that affects the whole system of the state, a question of the organisation, not only of the landlord, but also of the bourgeois state. And to try to tempt the people with the idea that it is possible to develop "municipal socialism" in agriculture before accomplishing the social revolution is to indulge in the most inadmissible kind of demagoguery. Marxism permits the introduction of nationalisation in the programme of a bourgeois revolution because absolute rent hinders the development of capitalism; private property in land is a hindrance to capitalism. But in order to include the municipalisation of the big estates in the programme of the bourgeois revolution Marxism must be remodeled into Fabian, intellectual socialism.

Right here we see the difference between petty-bourgeois and proletarian methods in the bourgeois revolution. The petty bourgeoisie, even the most radical—our Socialist-Revolutionaries included—anticipates, not class struggle after the bourgeois

revolution, but universal bliss and contentedness. Therefore, it "builds its nest" in advance, it introduces plans for petty-bourgeois reforms in the bourgeois revolution, talks about various "scales" and "regulations" with regard to landed property, about furthering the labour principle, toiling petty farming, etc. The petty-bourgeois method is the method of trying to create relationships guaranteeing the utmost possible social peace. The proletarian method is exclusively the method of clearing the path of everything that is mediæval, of clearing the path for the class struggle. Therefore, the proletarian can leave it to the petty farmers to discuss "scales" of landed property; the proletarian is interested only in the abolition of the landlord latifundia, only in the abolition of private property in land, which is the last barrier to the class struggle in agriculture. In the bourgeois revolution we are concerned, not about petty-bourgeois reformism, not about the future "ness" of contented small farmers, but about the conditions for the proletarian struggle against all philistine placidity on a bourgeois foundation.

It is this anti-proletarian spirit that municipalisation instils in the programme of the bourgeois agrarian revolution; for, despite the profoundly mistaken view of the Mensheviks, it does not widen the scope and sharpen the class struggle; on the contrary it dulls it. It does this by claiming that local democracy is possible without the complete democratisation of the centre. The sharpness of the class struggle is also dulled by the theory of "municipal socialism," because the latter is conceivable in bourgeois society only on the by-ways, off the highroad of the struggle, only in minor, local, unimportant questions on which even the bourgeoisie may yield, to which it may be reconciled without losing the possibility of preserving its class rule.

The working class must provide bourgeois society with the purest, most consistent and most thoroughgoing programme of bourgeois revolution, even to the extent of bourgeois nationalisation of the land. The proletariat scornfully rejects petty-bourgeois reformism in the bourgeois revolution; we are interested in freedom for the struggle, not in freedom for philistine bliss.

Naturally, the opportunism of the intelligentsia in the work-

ers' party pursues a different line. Instead of a broad revolutionary programme of a bourgeois revolution, attention is focused on a petty-bourgeois utopia: to secure local democracy with incomplete democratisation of the centre; to secure for petty reformism a little corner of municipal activities, away from the great "turmoil," and to evade the extraordinarily acute conflict about the land by following the recipe of the anti-Semites,<sup>1</sup> i.e., by transferring an important national question to the domain of petty, local questions.

#### 8. SOME SAMPLES OF THE CONFUSION ENGENDERED BY MUNICIPALISATION

The extent of the confusion created in the minds of Social-Democrats by the "municipalisation" programme, and the helpless position in which it puts our propagandists and agitators, is illustrated by the following curious cases.

Y. Larin is unquestionably a prominent and well-known figure in Menshevik literature. As can be seen from the Minutes, he took an active part at Stockholm in securing the adoption of the programme. His pamphlet, *The Peasant Question and Social-Democracy*, which was included in the series of pamphlets published by *Novy Mir*,<sup>2</sup> is almost an official commentary to the Menshevik programme. And this is what this commentator writes. In the concluding pages of his pamphlet he sums up the case on the question of agrarian reforms. He foresees a threefold outcome of these reforms: 1) additional allotments, as the private property of the peasants, subject to compensation—"the most unfavourable outcome for the working class, for the lower strata of the peasantry and for the whole development of national economy" (p. 103); 2) the best outcome, and 3) although unlikely, "a paper declaration of compulsory, equal land tenure." One would have thought that an advocate of the municipalisation programme would have made municipalisation the second outcome. But no! Listen to this:

"Perhaps all the confiscated land, or even all the land in general, will be declared the property of the state and will be turned over to the

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 250.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> *New World*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

local authorities to be placed at the disposal gratis [??] of all those actually engaged in farming, without, of course, the compulsory introduction throughout the whole of Russia of equal land tenure, and without prohibiting the employment of hired labour. Such a solution of the problem, as we have seen, affords the best security for the immediate interests of the proletariat as well as for the general interests of the socialist movement, and will help to increase the productivity of labour, which is the fundamental, vital question for Russia. Therefore, the Social-Democrats should advocate and carry out agrarian reform precisely of this character. It will take place when, in the culminating point of the development of the revolution, the conscious elements of social development are strong." (P. 103.)

If Y. Larin or the other Mensheviks believe this to be an explanation of the programme of municipalisation, they are labouring under a tragi-comical illusion. The transformation of all the land into state property is the nationalisation of the land, and we cannot conceive of the land being disposed of otherwise than through the local authorities acting within the limits of the general law of the state. To such a programme—not of "reform," of course, but of revolution—I gladly subscribe, except for the point about distributing the land "gratis" even to those farmers who employ hired labour. It is more fitting for an anti-Semite than for a Social-Democrat to make such a promise on behalf of bourgeois society. No Marxist can presuppose the possibility of such an outcome within the framework of capitalist development; nor is there any reason for deeming it desirable to transfer rent to capitalist farmers. Except for this point, which was probably a slip of the pen, it is an established fact that in a popular Menshevik pamphlet, nationalisation is advocated as the best outcome of the highest development of the revolution.

On the question of what is to be done with the private lands, this very Larin writes as follows:

"As regards the privately owned lands occupied by big capitalist estates, Social-Democrats do not conceive the confiscation of such lands for the purpose of dividing them among the small farmers. While the average yield of petty peasant farming, either on privately owned or rented land, does not reach 30 poods per dessiatin, the average yield of capitalist agriculture in Russia exceeds 50 poods." (P. 61.)

In saying this, Larin really throws overboard the very idea of a peasant agrarian revolution; for his average figures of harvest yields are applicable to all landlord-owned land. If one

does not believe in the possibility of achieving a broader and more rapid increase in the productivity of labour on small farms after they have been emancipated from the yoke of serfdom, then, generally speaking, there is no sense in "supporting the revolutionary actions of the peasantry, even to the extent of confiscating the land from the landlords." Besides, Larin forgets that on the question of "the purpose for which Social-Democrats conceive the confiscation of capitalist estates," a definite decision was made by the Stockholm Congress.

It was Comrade Strumilin who, at the Stockholm Congress, moved an amendment to insert after the words: "economic development" (in the resolution), the following words: "...insisting, therefore, that the confiscated, big capitalist estates should continue to be exploited on capitalist lines in the interests of the whole of the people, and upon conditions affording the best security for the needs of the agricultural proletariat. . . ." (P. 157.) This amendment was rejected, it received only one vote. (*Ibid.*)

Nevertheless, propaganda is being carried on among the masses, despite the decision of the Congress! Municipalisation is such a confusing thing, since the right of private property is to be retained as regards the peasant allotments, that the commentary on the programme is bound to vary from the decisions of the Congress.

K. Kautsky, who has been so frequently and so unjustly quoted in favour of one or the other programme (unjustly, because he has categorically declined to state his view on the question definitely and has confined himself to explaining certain common truths), Kautsky, who, curiously enough, was cited as being in favour of municipalisation, wrote to Mr. Shanin in April 1906 as follows:

"Evidently, by municipalisation I meant something different from what you or perhaps Maslov meant. What I meant was this: the big landed estates would be confiscated and agriculture on a large scale would be continued upon such land, either by the municipalities [!] or by some larger organisations, or else the land would be rented out to producers' co-operative associations. I do not know whether this is possible in Russia, nor whether this would be acceptable to the peasants. I do not say, there-

fore, that we ought to raise this demand; if the demand is raised by others, I think we could easily agree to it. It would be an interesting experiment." <sup>1</sup>

These quotations should suffice, one would think, to show how those who are, or were, fully in sympathy with the Stockholm programme, are destroying it by their own commentaries. This is due to the hopeless confusion in the programme, which in theory is bound up with the negation of the Marxian theory of rent, in practice is adapted to the impossible "middle case" of local democracy under a non-democratic central government and in economics amounts to introducing petty-bourgeois, quasi-socialist reformism into the programme of the bourgeois revolution. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. Shanin, *Municipalisation or Division as Private Property*, Vilna, 1907, p. 4. Shanin justly expresses his doubt as to whether Kautsky may be counted among the supporters of municipalisation; he also protests against the Mensheviks indulging in self-advertisement (in *Pravda*, 1905) at Kautsky's expense. Kautsky himself, in a letter published by Maslov,\* frankly says: "We may leave it to the peasants to decide the forms of property to be adopted on the land confiscated from the big landowners. I should consider it a mistake to impose anything on them in this respect." This quite definite statement by Kautsky certainly excludes municipalisation, which the Mensheviks want to impose on the peasants.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter V, "Classes and Parties in the Debates on the Agrarian Question in the Second Duma" is omitted in this volume. It is included in *Collected Works*, Vol. XI. See also note to page 157 in the present volume.—Ed.

## CONCLUSION

THE agrarian question is the basis of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, and determines the national peculiarity of this revolution.

The essence of this question is the struggle of the peasantry for the abolition of landlordism and the remnants of serfdom in the agricultural system of Russia, and, consequently, also in all her social and political institutions.

Ten and a half million peasant households in European Russia own together 75,000,000 dessiatins of land. Thirty thousand, chiefly noble but partly also "common," landlords each own 500 dessiatins and over—a total of 70,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the picture. These are the main reasons for the predominance of feudal landlords in the agricultural system of Russia and, consequently, in the Russian state and in the whole of Russian life generally. The owners of the latifundia are feudal landlords in the economic sense of the term: the basis of their landed property was created by the history of serfdom, by the history of land grabbing by the nobility through the centuries. The basis of their present methods of farming is the system of labour rent, *i.e.*, a direct survival of *barshchina*; it implies cultivation of the land with the implements of the peasants and by the virtual enslavement of the small tillers in an endless variety of ways: winter hiring, yearly leases, share-cropping, labour rent, bondage for debts, bondage for "*otrezki*," for the use of forests, meadows, water, and so on and so forth, *ad infinitum*. Capitalist development in Russia during the last half century has made such strides that the retention of serfdom in agriculture has become absolutely impossible, and its abolition has assumed the forms of a violent crisis, of a nation-wide revolution. However, the abolition of serfdom in a bourgeois country is possible in two ways.

Serfdom may be abolished by the gradual transformation of the landlords' feudal latifundia into *Junker*-bourgeois estates, by transforming the masses of the peasants into landless peasants and *knechts*, by forcibly keeping the masses down to the pauper standard of living, by the rise of small groups of *Grossbauern*, i.e., rich bourgeois peasants who inevitably spring up under capitalism from among the peasantry. The Black Hundred landlords, and Stolypin their Minister, have chosen this very path. They realised that it would be impossible to clear the path for the development of Russia without forcibly breaking up the rusty mediæval forms of landownership. And they boldly set out to break these up in the interests of the landlords. They abandoned the sympathy which only recently prevailed among the bureaucracy and the landlords for the semi-feudal commune. They evaded all the "constitutional" laws in order to break up the village communes by force. They gave the kulaks *carte blanche* to rob the peasant masses, to break up the old system of landownership, to ruin thousands of peasant farmers; they handed over the mediæval village to be "sacked and plundered" by those who had rubles in their purses. They cannot act otherwise if they are to retain their class rule, for they have realised the necessity of adapting themselves to capitalist development and not of fighting against it. And in order to preserve their rule they can find no other allies against the masses of the peasants than the "commoners," the Razuvayevs and Kolupayevs.<sup>1</sup> They had no other alternative than to shout to these Kolupayevs: "*Enrichissez vous!*"—get rich! We shall create opportunities for you to make a hundred rubles for every one you invest, if only you will help us to save the basis of our power under the new conditions! This path of development, if it is to be travelled successfully, calls for wholesale, systematic, unbridled violence against the peasant masses and against the proletariat. And the landlord counter-revolution is hastening to organise this violence all along the line.

The other path of development we have designated as the American path, in contradistinction to the former, which we des-

<sup>1</sup> Types of kulaks portrayed by Saltykov-Shchedrin.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

ignated the Prussian path. It, too, necessitates the forcible breaking up of the old system of landownership, for only the stupid philistines of Russian liberalism can dream of the possibility of a painless, peaceful solution of the exceedingly acute crisis in Russia.

But this indispensable and inevitable breaking up may be carried out in the interests of the peasant masses and not of the landlord gang. A mass of free farmers may serve as the basis for the development of capitalism without any landlord farming whatsoever, for taken as a whole the latter form of farming is economically reactionary, whereas the elements of free farming were created among the peasantry by the preceding economic history of the country. If capitalist development proceeds along this course it should develop infinitely more broadly, more freely and more rapidly as the result of the tremendous growth of the home market and of the rise in the standard of living, the energy, initiative and culture of the whole of the population. And the gigantic colonisation reserves of Russia, the utilisation of which is greatly hampered by the feudal oppression of the mass of the peasantry in Russia proper, as well as by the feudal-bureaucratic handling of the agrarian policy—these reserves will provide the economic foundation for the tremendous expansion of agriculture and for increased production both in volume and in scope.

Such a path of development calls for much more than the mere abolition of landlordism. For the rule of the feudal landlords through the centuries has put its mark upon all forms of landownership in the country: upon the peasant allotments as well as upon the holdings of the settlers in the relatively free border lands. The whole of the colonisation policy of the autocracy is permeated with the Asiatic interference of a die-hard bureaucracy, which hampered the free settlement of the immigrants, introduced terrible confusion into the new agrarian relationships and contaminated the border regions with the virus of the feudal bureaucracy of central Russia.<sup>1</sup> Not only is landlord-

<sup>1</sup> Kaufman, in his *Migration and Colonisation* (St. Petersburg, 1905), gives an historical sketch of Russian colonisation policy. Like a good "liberal," he shows undue deference to the feudal landlord bureaucracy.

ism in Russia mediæval, but so also is the peasant allotment system. The latter is in a terrible tangle. It splits up the peasantry into thousands of small units, mediæval groups, social categories. It reflects the mediæval history of reckless interference in the relationships of the peasants both by the central government and by the local authorities. It confines the peasants, as in a ghetto, in petty mediæval associations of a fiscal, tax-extorting character, in associations for the ownership of allotted land, *i.e.*, in the communes. And Russia's economic development is actually pulling the peasantry out of this mediæval environment, on the one hand, by giving rise to the leasing and abandonment of allotments and, on the other hand, by creating the system of farming by the free farmers of the future (or by the future *Grossbauern* of a *Junker* Russia) out of the fragments of the most diversified forms of landownership: privately owned allotments, rented allotments, purchased property, land rented from the landlord, land rented from the state, and so on.

In order to establish really free farming in Russia, it is necessary to "disenclose" all the lands, those of the landlords as well as the allotments. The whole system of mediæval landownership must be broken up and all lands must be made equal for the free farmers upon a free soil. The greatest possible facilities must be created for the exchange of holdings, for the free choice of settlements, for rounding off holdings, for the creation of free, new associations, instead of the musty, tax-extorting commune. The whole land must be "cleared" of all mediæval lumber.

The expression of this economic necessity is the nationalisation of the land, the abolition of private property in land, and transference of all the land to the property of the state, which will mark a complete rupture with the traditions of serfdom in the countryside. It is this economic necessity that has turned the mass of Russian peasants into supporters of land nationalisation. The mass of small holders and tillers declared themselves for nationalisation at the congresses of the Peasant League in 1905, in the First Duma in 1906, and in the Second Duma in 1907, *i.e.*, during the whole of the first period of the revolution. They did not do so because the "commune" has imbued

them with certain special "germs," certain special, non-bourgeois "labour principles." On the contrary, they did so because life has urged them to seek emancipation from the mediæval comune and from the mediæval allotments. They did not do so because they wanted to or could build up socialist agriculture, but because they wanted and now want to, because they could and can now build up real, bourgeois, small agriculture, i.e., agriculture purged to the utmost of all the traditions of serfdom.

Thus, it was neither chance nor the influence of this or that doctrine (as some short-sighted people think) that determined this peculiar attitude of the classes struggling in the Russian revolution towards the question of private property in land. This peculiar attitude is to be explained by the conditions of the development of capitalism in Russia and by the requirements of capitalism at this stage of its development. All the Black Hundred landlords, all the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie (including the Octobrists and the Cadets), stand for private property in land. The whole of the peasantry and the whole of the proletariat are opposed to private property in land. The reformist way of creating a *Junker*-bourgeois Russia necessarily presupposes the preservation of the foundations of the old system of landownership and a slow adaptation to capitalism, which would be painful for the masses of the population. The revolutionary way of really overthrowing the old order inevitably demands, as its economic basis, the destruction of all old forms of landownership, together with all the old political institutions of Russia. The experience of the first period of the Russian revolution has conclusively proved that it can be victorious only as a peasant agrarian revolution and that the latter cannot completely fulfil its historic mission unless the land is nationalised.

Certainly, Social-Democracy, as the party of the international proletariat, the party which has set itself world-wide socialist aims, cannot identify itself with any epoch of any bourgeois revolution, nor can it bind its destiny with this or that outcome of this or that bourgeois revolution. No matter what the outcome may be, we must remain an independent, purely proletarian party

which consistently leads the toiling masses to their great socialist goal. We cannot, therefore, undertake to guarantee that any of the gains of the bourgeois revolution will be permanent, because impermanence and inherent contradiction are an immanent feature of *all* the gains of bourgeois revolutions as such. The "invention" of "guarantees against restoration" can only be the fruit of illogical thinking. We have but one task: to rally the proletariat for the socialist revolution, to support every fight against the old order in the most resolute way, to fight for the best possible conditions for the proletariat in the developing bourgeois society. And it inevitably follows from all this that our Social-Democratic programme in the Russian bourgeois revolution can *only* be the nationalisation of the land. Like every other *part* of our programme, we must connect it with definite forms and a definite degree of political reforms, because the extent of the political and agrarian revolution cannot but be identical. Like every other part of our programme, we must isolate it strictly from petty-bourgeois illusions, from intelligentsia-bureaucratic babble about "scales," from the reactionary literature in favour of strengthening the commune or of equal land tenure. The interests of the proletariat do not demand that special slogans, special "plans" or "systems" be invented for this or that bourgeois revolution, they only demand that the objective conditions for this revolution shall be *consistently* expressed and these objective, economically unavoidable conditions be purged of illusion and utopia. The nationalisation of the land is not only the sole means for completely liquidating mediævalism in agriculture, but also the best form of agrarian relationships conceivable under capitalism.

Three circumstances temporarily diverted the Russian Social-Democrats from this correct agrarian programme. First, P. Maslov, the initiator of "municipalisation" in Russia, "revised" the theory of Marx, repudiated the theory of absolute rent, revived the semi-decayed bourgeois doctrines of the law of diminishing fertility, its connection with the theory of rent, etc. The negation of absolute rent is tantamount to denying that private landownership has any economic significance under capitalism and, consequently, it inevitably leads to the distortion of the Marxian view

on nationalisation. Secondly, not perceiving the *beginning* of the peasant revolution, Russian Social-Democrats could not but regard its possibilities with caution, because, for the revolution to be victorious, a number of especially favourable conditions and an especially favourable sweep of the revolutionary class consciousness, energy and initiative of the masses are required. Not having had any *experience*, and holding that it is impossible to invent *bourgeois* movements, the Russian Marxists naturally could not, *before the revolution*, present a correct agrarian programme. But even *after* the revolution had begun, they committed the following mistake: instead of *applying* the theory of Marx to the peculiar conditions prevailing in Russia (our theory is not a dogma, Marx and Engels always taught, but a *guide to action*), they uncritically repeated the conclusions drawn from the application of Marx's theory to foreign conditions, to a *different* epoch. The German Social-Democrats, for instance, quite naturally abandoned all the old programmes of Marx containing the demand for the nationalisation of the land, because Germany had taken final shape as a *Junker-bourgeois* country, because, there, all movements based on the bourgeois order had become completely obsolete, and there was not nor could there be any people's movement for nationalisation. The prevalence of *Junker-bourgeois* elements *actually transformed* the plans for nationalisation into a plaything of the *Junkers* and even into an instrument for robbing the masses. The Germans were right in refusing even to talk about nationalisation. But to apply this argument to Russia (as those of our Mensheviks who do not realise the connection between municipalisation and Maslov's revision of the theory of Marx do in effect) reveals an inability to think of the tasks each Social-Democratic Party has to perform in the given periods of its historical development.

Thirdly, the municipalisation programme obviously reflects the mistaken tactical line of Menshevism in the Russian bourgeois revolution: the failure to understand that only a "coalition between the proletariat and the peasantry"<sup>1</sup> can guarantee its vic-

<sup>1</sup> This is how Kautsky expressed it in the second edition of his pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*.

tory; the failure to understand the leading role of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution, the striving to push the proletariat aside, to adapt it to an incomplete outcome of the revolution, to convert it from a leader into an auxiliary (actually into a labourer and servant) of the liberal bourgeoisie. "Don't lose your head, adapt yourselves, march slowly forward, workers"—these words uttered by Narcissus Tuporilov,\* against the "Economists" (the first opportunists in the R.S.D.L.P.) completely reflect the *spirit* of our present agrarian programme.

The fight against the "passion" for petty-bourgeois socialism must result, not in the diminution, but in the increase of the sweep of the revolution and of its tasks as determined by the proletariat. We must not encourage "regionalism," no matter how strong it may be among the backward strata of the petty bourgeoisie, or the privileged peasantry (Cossacks), nor encourage the isolation of the different nationalities—no, we must explain to the peasantry the importance of unity if victory is to be achieved, we must advance slogans that will widen the movement, not narrow it, that will place the responsibility for the *incomplete* bourgeois revolution on the backwardness of the bourgeoisie and not on the lack of understanding of the proletariat. We must not "adapt" our programme to "local" democracy; we must not invent rural "municipal socialism," which is absurd and impossible under a non-democratic central government, we must not make petty-bourgeois, socialist reformism fit in with the bourgeois revolution, but must concentrate the attention of the masses on the actual conditions of the victory of the revolution as a bourgeois revolution, on the need for achieving not only local, but "central" democracy, *i.e.*, the democratisation of the central government in order to achieve complete victory—and not only democracy in general, but the most complete, highest form of democracy, for otherwise the peasant agrarian revolution in Russia will become *utopian* in the scientific sense of the word.

And let it not be thought that because the Black Hundred die-hards are roaring and howling in the Third Duma, because the raging counter-revolution has reached *non plus ultra* and

reaction is committing its acts of political vengeance against the revolutionaries in general and the Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma in particular—let it not be thought because of all this that the present historical moment is “unsuitable” for “broad” agrarian programmes. Such a thought would be akin to that renegacy, despondency, disintegration and decadence which has spread among wide strata of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who belong to the Social-Democratic Party or sympathise with this Party in Russia. The proletariat only stands to gain by sweeping this refuse as thoroughly as possible from the ranks of the workers’ party. No, the more savage the reaction, the more it actually retards the inevitable economic development, the more successfully does it prepare for the wider upsurge of the democratic movement. And we must take advantage of the temporary lull in mass activity in order to study critically the experience of the great revolution, test it, purge it of dross and transmit it to the masses as a guide for the impending struggle.

November-December 1907.

**PART III**

**FROM JANUARY 22 (9) TO THE DECEMBER  
UPRISING (1905)**



## THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA\*

Geneva, Wednesday, January 25 (12)

EVENTS of the greatest historical importance are taking place in Russia. The proletariat has risen in revolt against tsarism. The proletariat has been driven to revolt by the government. Now there is hardly room for doubt that the government deliberately allowed the strike movement to develop and a wide demonstration to be started in order to bring matters to a head and to have a pretext for calling out the troops. Its manoeuvre was successful! Thousands of killed and wounded—this is the toll of Bloody Sunday, January 22 (9), in St. Petersburg. The army vanquished unarmed workers, and women and children. The army overpowered the enemy by shooting prostrate workers. "We have taught them a good lesson!" cynically say the tsar's henchmen and their European flunkeys, the conservative bourgeoisie.

Yes, it was a great lesson! The Russian proletariat will not forget this lesson. Even the most uneducated, the most backward strata of the working class, who naively trusted the tsar and sincerely wished to put peacefully before "the tsar himself" the requests of a tormented nation, were all taught a lesson by the troops led by the tsar and the tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Vladimir.

The working class has received a great lesson in civil war; the revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence. The slogan of the heroic St. Petersburg proletariat, "death or liberty!" is being re-echoed throughout the whole of Russia. Events are developing with astonishing rapidity. The general strike in St. Petersburg is spreading. All industrial, social and political life is paralysed. On Monday, January 23 (10), the encounters between the work-

ers and the military became more stubborn. Contrary to the false government *communiqués*, blood is flowing in many parts of the capital. The Kolpino workers are rising. The proletariat is arming itself and the people. There are rumours that the workers have seized the Sestroretsk Arsenal. The workers are providing themselves with revolvers, they are forging their tools into weapons, they are procuring bombs for a desperate fight for freedom. The general strike is spreading to the provinces. In Moscow 10,000 people have already ceased work. A general strike is to be called in Moscow tomorrow (Thursday, January 26 [13]). A revolt has broken out in Riga. The workers in Lodz are demonstrating, an uprising is being prepared in Warsaw, demonstrations of the proletariat are taking place in Helsingfors. In Baku, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Kovno and Vilna, there is growing ferment among the workers and the strike is spreading. In Sevastopol the stores and arsenals of the Naval Department are ablaze, and the troops refuse to shoot at the rebellious sailors. There are strikes in Reval and in Saratov. In Radom, an armed encounter took place between the workers and reservists and the troops.

The revolution is spreading. The government is already beginning to waver. From a policy of bloody repression it is trying to pass to economic concessions and to save itself by throwing a sop, by promising the nine-hour day. But the lesson of Bloody Sunday must not be forgotten. The demand of the rebellious St. Petersburg workers—the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, direct, equal suffrage and secret ballot—must become the demand of all the striking workers. The immediate overthrow of the government—such was the slogan raised in answer to the massacre of January 22 (9), even by those St. Petersburg workers who believed in the tsar; they raised this slogan through their leader, the priest George Gapon, who said after that bloody day: “We no longer have a tsar. A river of blood separates the tsar from the people. Long live the fight for liberty!”

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! say we. The general strike is rousing and mobilising larger and larger masses of the

working class and of the urban poor. The arming of the people is becoming one of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement.

Only an armed people can serve as a real bulwark of popular liberty. And the sooner the proletariat succeeds in arming itself, and the longer it maintains its martial position of striker and revolutionary, the sooner will the army begin to waver, the soldiers will at last begin to understand what they are doing, they will go over to the side of the people against the monsters, against the tyrants, against the murderers of defenceless workers and of their wives and children. No matter what the outcome of the present uprising in St. Petersburg may be, it will, in any case, be the first step to a wider, more conscious, better prepared uprising. The government may perhaps succeed in putting off the day of reckoning, but the delay will only make the next step of the revolutionary attack ever so much greater. Social-Democracy will take advantage of this delay in order to rally the ranks of the organised fighters and to spread the news about the start made by the St. Petersburg workers. The proletariat will join in the fight, will desert mill and factory, and prepare arms for itself. Into the midst of the urban poor, to the millions of peasants, the slogans of the struggle for freedom will be carried more and more effectively. Revolutionary committees will be formed in every factory, in every city ward, in every village. The people in revolt will overthrow all the government institutions of the tsarist autocracy and proclaim the immediate convocation of the constituent assembly.

The immediate arming of the workers and of all citizens in general, the preparation and organisation of the revolutionary forces for overthrowing the government authorities and institutions—this is the practical basis on which all revolutionaries can and must unite to strike a common blow. The proletariat must always pursue its independent path, maintaining close contact with the Social-Democratic Party, always bearing in mind its great, final goal, the goal of ridding mankind of all exploitation. But this independence of the Social-Democratic proletarian party will never cause us to forget the importance of a common revolution-

ary attack at the moment of actual revolution. We Social-Democrats can and must proceed independently of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries and guard the class independence of the proletariat. But we must go hand in hand with them in an uprising when direct blows are being struck at tsarism, when resisting the troops, when attacking the Bastille of the accursed enemy of the entire Russian people.

The eyes of the proletariat of the whole world are anxiously turned towards the proletariat of the whole of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, begun so valiantly by our working class, will be the turning point in the history of all countries, will facilitate the task of the workers of all nations, in all states, in all parts of the globe. Therefore let every Social-Democrat, let every class conscious worker remember the great tasks of the nation-wide struggle that now rest on his shoulders. Let him not forget that he represents the needs and the interests of the entire peasantry too, of the entire mass of the toiling and exploited, of the entire people against the enemy of the whole of the people. The proletarian heroes of St. Petersburg now stand as an example to the whole world.

Long live the Revolution!

Long live the proletariat in revolt!

January 1905.

## TWO TACTICS\*

SINCE the very beginning of the mass labour movement in Russia, *i.e.*, approximately for the last ten years, profound disagreements have existed among the Social-Democrats on the question of tactics. As is known, it was differences of just this kind that gave rise, in the latter half of the 'nineties, to the trend known as Economism, which brought about a split into the opportunist (*Rabocheye Dyelo*) wing of the Party on the one hand and the revolutionary (the old *Iskra*) wing on the other. Russian Social-Democratic opportunism, however, differed from that of Western Europe in certain peculiar features. Russian Social-Democratic opportunism very clearly reflected the point of view, or rather the absence of any independent point of view, of the intellectual wing of the Party which was carried away both by the fashionable phrases of "Bernsteinism" and by the immediate results and forms of the purely labour movement. This infatuation led to the wholesale treachery of the "legal Marxists," who deserted to the camp of liberalism, and to the creation by Social-Democrats of the famous "tactics-process" theory, which firmly fixed on our opportunists the label of "*khvostists*."<sup>1</sup> They dragged helplessly at the tail of events, they rushed from one extreme to another, in all cases they reduced the scope of the activity of the revolutionary proletariat and its confidence in its own strength, and in most cases and most of the time all this was done on the pretext of stimulating the activity of the proletariat. This is strange, but true. No one argued so much about the activity of the workers and no one did so much to restrict, cut down and diminish that activity by their propaganda as the adherents of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. "Talk less about increasing the activity of the masses of the workers,"

<sup>1</sup> *i.e.*, "tailists."—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

said the class conscious, advanced workers to their zealous but unwise counsellors. "We are far more active than you think and we are quite able to support by open street fighting demands that do not even promise any 'palpable results' whatever! You cannot 'increase' our activity, because *you yourselves are not sufficiently active*. Be less subservient to spontaneity, and think more about increasing *your own* activity, gentlemen!" This is how the attitude of revolutionary workers towards the opportunist intellectuals had to be characterised. (*What Is To Be Done?*<sup>1</sup>)

The two steps backward taken by the new *Iskra* towards *Rabocheye Dyclo* revived this attitude. The pages of *Iskra* again pour forth the preachings of *khvostism* under cover of the same nauseating vows: I swear to God I believe in and profess the activity of the proletariat. It was in the name of the activity of the proletariat that Axelrod and Martynov, Martov and Lieber (the Bundist) at the Congress advocated the right of professors and college boys to enlist as members of the Party without joining any Party organisation. It was in the name of the activity of the proletariat that the "organisation-process" theory was invented, which justified disorganisation and lauded intellectual anarchism. It was in the name of the activity of the proletariat that the no less famous "higher type of demonstration" theory was invented in the form of an *agreement* between a workers' delegation, sifted through a three-stage system of elections, and the members of the *Zemstvo* for a peaceful demonstration which was not to cause panicky fear. It was in the name of the activity of the proletariat that the idea of an armed uprising was perverted and vilified, debased and distorted.

In view of the enormous practical importance of this latter question, we desire to concentrate the attention of the reader on it. The development of the labour movement cruelly laughed the sages of the new *Iskra* to scorn. The new *Iskra* sent a letter\* to Russia which in the name of "the process of the systematic

<sup>1</sup> *Selected Works*, Vol. II. In this pamphlet the reader will find explanations of the respective policies of the "Economists," *Rabocheye Dyclo* and the old *Iskra*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

development of the class consciousness and activity of the proletariat" recommended, as a higher type of demonstration, that "workers' declarations be sent by ordinary mail to the homes of the Zemstvo councillors, and that a considerable number of copies of this declaration be scattered in the hall of the Zemstvo Assembly." Then a second letter was sent, in which the astonishing discovery was made that at the present "historical moment the political stage is fully occupied [!] by the dispute between the organised bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy" and that "there is only one objective meaning in any [just listen!] revolutionary movement in the lower depths of the masses [!] and that is, to support the slogans of that one of the two [!!] forces which is interested in breaking down the present regime" (it was the democratic intelligentsia that was declared to be "a force"). Before the first letter had time to circulate through Russia and before the second had time to reach Russia, and before the class conscious workers had time to read these marvellous letters and to have a good laugh at them, the events of the real struggle of the proletariat swept the whole of the political rubbish of the new *Iskra* publicists onto the dung-heap at one stroke. The proletariat showed that there is a third (actually, of course, not the third, but the second in order and the first in fighting ability) *force*, which is not merely interested in breaking down, but is *ready to set to work really to break down* the autocracy. Since January 22 (9), the labour movement *has been growing* before our very eyes into a popular uprising.

Let us see then how this transition to an uprising was interpreted by the Social-Democrats who had discussed it before as a question of tactics—and how this question was settled in practice by the workers themselves.

This is what was said three years ago of rebellion as a slogan which defined our immediate, practical tasks.

"Picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this uprising and prepare for it. But *how* to prepare for it? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to go to all the districts for the purpose of preparing for the uprising! Even if we had a Central Committee it could achieve nothing by making such appointments, considering the conditions prevailing in contemporary

Russia. But a network of agents that would automatically be created in the course of establishing and distributing a common newspaper would not have to 'sit around and wait' for the call to rebellion but would carry on the regular work that would guarantee the highest probability of success in the event of a rebellion. Such work would strengthen our contacts with the broadest strata of the masses of the workers and with all those strata who are discontented with the autocracy, which is so important in the event of an uprising. It is precisely such work that would help to cultivate the ability properly to estimate the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to select the proper moment for the uprising. It is precisely such work that would train *all* local organisations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents and events that excite the whole of Russia, to react to these 'events' in the most vigorous, uniform and expedient manner possible; for is not rebellion in essence the most vigorous, most uniform and most expedient 'reaction' of the whole of the people to the conduct of the government? And finally, such work would train all revolutionary organisations all over Russia to maintain the most continuous and at the same time the most secret contact with each other, which would create *real* Party unity—for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan of rebellion and to take the necessary preparatory measures on the eve of it, which must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

"In a word, the 'plan for an All-Russian political newspaper' does not represent the fruits of the work of armchair workers, infected with dogmatism and literariness (as it seemed to those who failed to study it properly), on the contrary, it is a practical plan to *begin immediately to prepare on all sides for the uprising, while at the same time never for a moment forgetting the ordinary, everyday work.*"<sup>1</sup>

The concluding words we have underlined give a clear answer to the question of how revolutionary Social-Democrats pictured the work of preparing for an uprising. But clear as this answer is, the old *khvostist* tactics could not fail to assert themselves at this point also. Quite recently Martynov published a pamphlet entitled *Two Dictatorships*, which has been strongly recommended by the new *Iskra*. (No. 84.) The author is stirred to the very depths of his *Rabocheye Dyelo* soul with indignation at the fact that Lenin permitted himself to speak of "preparing, ordering and carrying out an armed, popular uprising." The stern Martynov smites the enemy with the exclamation:

"On the ground of historical experience and the scientific analysis of the dynamics of social forces, international Social-Democracy always re-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Selected Works*, Vol. II, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 187-88.—Ed. Eng. ed.

cognised that only palace revolutions and pronunciamientos can be *ordered* in advance and carried out successfully according to a previously prepared plan, and this can be done precisely because they are not popular revolutions, i.e., revolutions in social relationships, but only the reshuffling of the ruling cliques. Social-Democracy has always and everywhere recognised that popular revolution cannot be *ordered* in advance, that it is not prepared artificially, but comes about spontaneously."

Perhaps, having read this tirade, the reader will say that apparently Martynov "is not" a serious opponent and that it would be ridiculous to take him seriously. We would quite agree with the reader. We would even say to such a reader that there is no more bitter experience on earth than to have to take all the theories and all the arguments of our new *Iskra*-ists seriously. The trouble is that this nonsense figures also in the editorials of *Iskra*.\* (No. 62.) What is still worse is that there are people in the Party, and not a few of them, who stuff their heads with this nonsense. Hence, we have to discuss matters that are not serious just as we are obliged to discuss the "theory" of Rosa Luxemburg, who discovered the "organisation-process." We have to explain to Martynov that uprising must not be confused with popular revolution. We have to keep explaining that profound references to revolutions in social relationships in deciding the practical question of the ways and means for overthrowing Russian autocracy are only worthy of Kifa Mokiyeitch.<sup>1</sup> This revolution in social relationships began in Russia with the abolition of serfdom, and it is precisely the backwardness of our political superstructure as compared with the revolution accomplished in social relationships that makes the collapse of this superstructure inevitable. Moreover, an immediate collapse *as the result of a single blow* is quite, quite possible, for "the people's revolution" in Russia has already struck tsardom a hundred blows, and whether the hundred and first or the hundred and tenth blow will finish it off is really a matter of conjecture. Only opportunist intellectuals, who try to

<sup>1</sup> Kifa Mokiyeitch, a character described by Gogol in his *Dead Souls*, who ponders over various "philosophical questions," such as why elephants are not hatched from eggs, but "born nude," and what would be the thickness of the eggshell, if elephants were hatched from eggs.—Ed. Eng. ed.

foist their philistine ways on the proletarians, can flaunt their schoolboy knowledge of "a revolution in social relationships" at a time when practical ways are being discussed for delivering one of the blows in the second hundred. Only the opportunists of the new *Iskra* can shout hysterically about the horrible "Jacobin" plan, the central point of which, as we have seen, is to carry on all-sided mass agitation with the aid of a political newspaper!

A people's revolution cannot be ordered; that is correct. We cannot but praise Martynov and the author of the editorial in No. 62 of *Iskra* for knowing this truth ("and generally speaking, what is the use of our Party talking about preparing for an uprising?"—asks Martynov's loyal comrade-in-arms, or disciple, in that article, waging war on the "utopians"<sup>1</sup>). But if the situation is ripe for a popular uprising, in view of the fact that the revolution in social relationships *has already taken place*, and if we have prepared for it, we can order an uprising. We shall try to make this clear to the new *Iskra*-ists by a simple example. Is it possible to order the labour movement? No, it is not, for it is composed of thousands of separate acts that grow out of the revolution in social relationships. Is it possible to order a strike? It is possible, in spite of the fact—just imagine. Comrade Martynov—in spite of the fact that every strike is a result of the change in social relationships. When is it possible to order a strike? When the organisation or group that calls the strike has influence among *the masses* of the workers affected and is able accurately to judge the moment when the dissatisfaction and irritation among these masses of workers are rising. Do you understand now what the crux of the matter is, Comrade Martynov and Comrade "leader-writer" of No. 62 of *Iskra*? If you do understand, then please take the trouble to compare an uprising with a people's revolution. "A people's revolution cannot be ordered in advance." An uprising can be so ordered, if those who order it have influence among the masses and can correctly judge the moment for calling it.

Fortunately, the activity of the advanced workers happens

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 297.—*Ed.*

to be far in advance of the *khvostist* philosophy of the new *Iskra*. While the latter hatches theories to prove that an uprising cannot be ordered by those who have been preparing for it by organising the vanguard of the revolutionary class, events show that people who have not prepared may order and are sometimes compelled to order an uprising.

Here is a manifesto sent to us by a St. Petersburg comrade. It was set up, printed and distributed in more than 10,000 copies by the workers themselves, who seized a legal printing plant in St. Petersburg on January 23 (10).

**"WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE!"**

"Citizens! Yesterday you witnessed the brutality of the autocratic government! You saw blood flowing in the streets! You saw hundreds of fighters for labour's cause lying dead; you saw death, you heard the groans of wounded women and defenceless children! The blood and brains of workers bespattered the paving stones that they had laid with their own hands. Who directed the troops, the guns and the bullets against the workers' breasts?—The tsar, the grand dukes, the ministers, the generals and the scoundrels at court.

*"They are the murderers! Death to them! To arms, comrades, seize the arsenals, the munition depots and armourers' shops. Smash the prisons, comrades, and release the fighters for freedom. Smash all the gendarme and police stations and all government institutions. We shall overthrow the tsar's government and establish our own. Long live the revolution! Long live the Constituent Assembly of People's Representatives!—Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party."\**

The call to insurrection issued by this handful of advanced workers with initiative proved unsuccessful. We would not be surprised or discouraged by several unsuccessful calls for insurrection, or by several unsuccessful "orders" for an insurrection. We leave it to the new *Iskra* to open a tirade on this account about the necessity of a "revolution in social relationships" and grandiloquently to condemn the "utopianism" of the workers who exclaimed: "We shall establish our own government!" Only hopeless pedants and muddleheads would regard the call to establish a government as the central point in this proclamation. What is important for us to note and emphasise is the remarkable, bold and practical manner in which the problem that is now squarely confronting us is tackled.

The call of the St. Petersburg workers did not succeed and

could not succeed as quickly as they desired. This call will be repeated more than once, and the attempts at an uprising may result in failure more than once. But the very fact that the task has been set by the workers themselves is of enormous significance. The gain to the labour movement is that it has realised the practical necessity for this task and the need of bringing it to the front whenever there is a state of popular unrest—this gain can never be taken away from the proletariat.

The Social-Democrats advanced the slogan of preparing for an uprising on general grounds three years ago. The activity of the proletariat led them to this same slogan as a result of the lessons taught by the civil war. There are two kinds of activity. There is the activity of the proletariat that is possessed of revolutionary initiative, and there is the activity of the proletariat that is undeveloped and is held in leading strings; there is activity that is consciously Social-Democratic, and there is activity of the Zubatov type. And there are Social-Democrats who to this very day revere precisely this second kind of activity, who believe that they can evade a direct reply to the pressing questions of the day by repeating the word "class" an innumerable number of times. Take No. 84 of *Iskra*.<sup>\*</sup> "Why," asks its "leader-writer" triumphantly, "why was it not the narrow organisation of professional revolutionaries, but the Workers' Assembly<sup>1</sup> that set this avalanche in motion (January 22 [9])? *Because this Assembly really [listen] was a broad organisation based on the activity of the masses of the workers themselves.*" If the author of this classical phrase had not been an admirer of Martynov, perhaps he would have understood that the Assembly rendered a service to the movement of the revolutionary proletariat only when and to the extent that it passed from Zubatov activity to Social-Democratic activity (after which it immediately ceased to exist as a legal Assembly).

If the new *Iskra*-ists or the followers of the new *Rabocheye Dyelo* were not *khvostists*, they would realise that it is precisely January 22 (9) that justified the forecast of those who said:

<sup>1</sup> The St. Petersburg Assembly of Russian Factory Workers organised by Father Gapon.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

"...in the long run the legalisation of the labour movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs." (*What Is To Be Done?*) It was precisely January 22 (9) that proved again and again the importance of the task formulated in the same pamphlet: "...we must prepare reapers, not only to cut down the tares of today" (i.e., paralyse today's corrupting influence of Zubatovism) "but also to reap the wheat of tomorrow" (i.e., lead in a revolutionary manner the movement that has advanced a step with the aid of legalisation). The Simple Simons of the new *Iskra*, however, refer to the bountiful harvest of wheat in order to minimise the significance of a strong organisation of revolutionary reapers!

"It would be criminal," the same new *Iskra* "leader-writer" continues, "to attack the revolution from the rear." Just what this sentence means Allah alone knows. The connection it has with the general opportunist features of *Iskra* we shall probably point out on another occasion. At present it will be sufficient to indicate that there is but one true political meaning to this sentence, namely: the author cringes in the rear of the revolution and disdainfully turns up his nose at the "narrow" and "Jacobin" vanguard of the revolution.

The more the new *Iskra* displays its Martynovist zeal, the clearer becomes the contrast between the *khvostist* tactics and the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy. We have already pointed out in No. 1 of *Vperyod* that insurrection must attach itself to one of the spontaneous movements. Consequently, we do not in the least forget the importance of "safeguarding the rear," to use a military term. In No. 4 of *Vperyod* we referred to the correct tactics of the St. Petersburg Committee members, who from the very outset directed all their efforts towards supporting and developing the revolutionary elements in the spontaneous movement while at the same time maintaining an attitude of reserved distrust towards the dark, Zubatov rear of this spontaneous movement. We shall conclude now with a piece of advice, which no doubt we shall have to repeat more than once to the new *Iskra*-ists: do not minimise the tasks of the vanguard of the revolution, do not forget our obligation to support this

vanguard by our *organised* activity. Fewer phrases about the development of the activity of the workers—the workers reveal an immense amount of revolutionary activity which you do not observe!—but see to it rather that you do not corrupt undeveloped workers by your own *khvostism*.

February 1905.

## THE STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE SERVILITY OF THE BOURGEOISIE \*

AN uprising and armed barricade fighting in Lodz—free fights in Ivanovo-Voznesensk—general strikes and shooting of workers in Warsaw and Odessa \*\*—the disgraceful ending of the comedy of the Zemstvo delegation—these are the principal political events of the past week. If to this we add the news reported in today's (June 28 [15]) Geneva papers about peasant riots in the Lebedin Uyezd of the Kharkov Gubernia, about the pillaging of five estates and the dispatch of troops to these places, we see reflected in the events of a single week the character of all the basic social forces that are now so openly and clearly revealing themselves in the course of the revolution.

The proletariat has been in a constant state of unrest, particularly since January 22; it is not giving the enemy a moment's rest; it is keeping up the offensive, principally in the form of strikes, while abstaining from direct collisions with the armed forces of tsarism and training its forces for the great and decisive battle. In the more industrially developed districts, where the workers are most politically prepared, and where national oppression is added to the economic and general political yoke, the tsarist police and troops are behaving in an exceptionally arrogant manner and are deliberately trying to provoke the workers. And the workers, even those untrained for the struggle, even those who at first merely defended themselves, are not only setting a new standard of revolutionary enthusiasm and heroism, but are also showing examples of superior forms of struggle, for instance the proletariat of Lodz. Their armament is still very poor, extremely poor, and their uprising is, as hitherto, still partial, still unconnected with the general movement; nevertheless they are advancing, they are covering the city

streets with dozens of barricades with extraordinary swiftness, they are inflicting serious losses on the tsarist troops, they are defending themselves desperately in separate houses. The armed uprising is becoming deeper and wider. The new sacrifices to the tsar's executioners—nearly 2,000 people were killed and wounded in Lodz—are inflaming tens and hundreds of thousands of citizens with bitter hatred for the accursed autocracy. The recent armed conflicts demonstrate with increasing clarity that a decisive armed struggle of the people against the armed forces of tsarism is inevitable. Amidst the isolated outbursts the spectacle of a blazing all-Russian conflagration is becoming increasingly discernible. The proletarian struggle is spreading to new, even to the most backward districts; and the tsar's henchmen are zealously working for the benefit of the revolution, are converting economic conflicts into political conflicts, are everywhere making plain to the workers, by the fate they are meting out to them, the absolute necessity of overthrowing the autocracy, and they are thus training them to become future heroes and fighters in the popular uprising.

An armed uprising of the people! It is to this slogan, so resolutely put forward by the party of the proletariat as represented by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., that events themselves, the elemental process of the expanding and increasingly acute revolutionary movement, are leading more and more closely. Away, then, with all doubts and vacillations. Everyone must quickly realise how absurd and unworthy now are excuses for evading the urgent task of preparing in the most energetic manner for an armed uprising, how dangerous is delay, how urgent the need of bringing about the unity and co-ordination of the partial uprisings that are breaking out all over the country. Isolated, these outbursts are impotent. The organised force of the tsarist government will crush the insurgents group by group if the movement continues to spread as slowly and sporadically from town to town and from district to district as it has been doing up to now. But united, these outbursts can converge into a mighty torrent of revolutionary flame which no power on earth will be able to withstand. And this unity is ap-

proaching, approaching by thousands of ways we do not know or even suspect. These separate outbursts and encounters are teaching the people what revolution is, and it is our business, therefore, never to lag behind the tasks of the moment, to be able to point to the next, the higher stage of the struggle, to derive experience and lessons from the past and the present, more boldly and widely to urge the workers and peasants to advance still further forward to the complete victory of the people, to the complete destruction of the autocratic gang which is now fighting with the desperation of the doomed.

How often have we found among Social-Democrats, particularly among intellectuals, people who degraded the tasks of the movement, who faint-heartedly lost faith in the revolutionary energy of the working class? Even now some think that because the democratic revolution is bourgeois in its social and economic character, the proletariat must not strive to play the leading role in the revolution, to take a most energetic part in it and to put forward the advanced slogans of overthrowing the tsarist rule and setting up a provisional revolutionary government. Events are teaching even these backward people. Events are confirming the militant conclusions of the revolutionary theory of Marxism. The bourgeois character of the democratic revolution does not signify that it can be advantageous only to the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it is most of all advantageous and most of all necessary to the proletariat and peasantry. Events are making it increasingly clear that only the proletariat is capable of waging a determined struggle for complete liberty, for a republic, notwithstanding the unreliability and instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat can become the leader of the whole of the people and win over to its side the peasantry, which can expect nothing but oppression and violence from the autocracy and nothing but betrayal and treachery from the bourgeois friends of the people. Owing to its very class position in modern society, the proletariat is better able than any other class to understand that, in the final analysis, great historical problems are solved only by force, that freedom cannot be won without the greatest sacrifices, that the armed resistance of tsar-

ism must be broken and crushed with an armed hand. Otherwise we shall never achieve liberty, otherwise Russia will meet the fate of Turkey: protracted and painful downfall and decay, particularly painful for all the toiling and exploited masses of the people. Let the bourgeoisie abase itself and cringe, let it bargain and beg for sops, for a wretched parody of liberty. The proletariat will fight and will make the peasantry, which is being torn by the vilest and most intolerable serfdom and humiliation, follow suit; it will march towards complete liberty, which can be made safe only by an armed people relying on a revolutionary government.

Social-Democracy did not advance the slogan of insurrection in a rash moment. It has always fought, and will continue to fight, against revolutionary phrase-mongering, it will always demand a sober estimation of forces and an analysis of the given situation. Social-Democracy has been talking about preparing for an uprising ever since 1902, and has never confused this work of preparation with the senseless fomenting of riots which, if brought about artificially, would merely result in a waste of forces. And only now, after January 22 (9), has the slogan of an uprising been advanced by the workers' party as an immediate slogan, has the necessity for an uprising and the necessity of the task of preparing for it been recognised. The autocracy itself has made this slogan the practical slogan of the labour movement. The autocracy has given the first wide and mass lessons in civil war. This war has begun and is being conducted on a wider and wider front and in an increasingly intensified form. We have only to generalise its lessons, to explain the great significance of the words "civil war," to draw the practical precepts from the separate encounters in this war, to organise our forces and prepare directly and immediately all that is necessary for a real war.

Social-Democracy is not afraid to face the truth. It knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie. It knows that liberty will bring the workers not tranquillity and peace, but a new and greater struggle for socialism, a struggle against the present bourgeois friends of liberty. But in spite of this—in fact, be-

cause of this—liberty is indispensable to the workers; liberty is more necessary to them than to anybody else. Only the workers are capable of fighting at the head of the people for complete liberty, for a democratic republic. And they will fight for it to the end.

Needless to say, ignorance and wretchedness are still widespread among the people; much work has yet to be done to develop the class consciousness of the workers, not to mention the peasantry. But see how quickly the slave of yesterday unbends his back, how the spark of liberty glints in his dimmed eyes. Look at the peasant movement. It lacks unity, it is unconscious; we know only crumbs of truth about its scope and character. But we know for certain that the class conscious worker and the peasant who is rising for the struggle will understand each other without many words, that every ray of light will bring them closer together for the fight for liberty, that then they will not surrender to the contemptibly cowardly and greedy bourgeois and landlords *their own* revolution, the democratic revolution which can give them land and liberty and all that is conceivable in bourgeois society for alleviating the conditions of life of the toilers for the further struggle for socialism. Look at the central industrial region. Not so long ago it seemed to us to be fast asleep. Not so long ago only a partial, fragmentary, petty, trade union movement was considered possible there. And now a general strike is flaring up there! Tens and hundreds of thousands have risen and are still rising. Political agitation has swelled to extraordinary proportions. To be sure, the workers there still lag far behind the heroic proletariat of heroic Poland, but the tsarist government is rapidly educating them, is forcing their pace to "catch up with Poland."

No, an armed uprising of the whole of the people is not a dream. The complete victory of the proletariat and peasantry in this democratic revolution is not an idle thought. And what great perspectives such a victory opens up before the European proletariat, which for so many years has been artificially checked in its striving after happiness by militarist and landlord reaction! A victory of the democratic revolution in Russia will be the

signal for the beginning of the socialist revolution, for a fresh victory of our brothers, the class conscious proletarians of all countries.

Compared with the mighty and heroic struggle of the proletariat how revoltingly trivial was the exhibition of loyalty displayed by the Zemstvo councillors and *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists at the famous reception given by Nicholas II. The comedians got the punishment they deserved. Before the ink with which they wrote their sycophantically rapturous reports of the gracious words uttered by the tsar had dried, the true meaning of those words became revealed to all in new deeds. The censorship is more severe than ever. The newspaper *Russ* has been suspended only because it published a very, very moderate address.\* The dictatorship of the police, with Trepov at its head, is in full swing. The tsar's words are officially interpreted in the sense that he promised an *advisory* assembly of representatives of the people subject to the inviolability of the ancient and "native" autocracy.

The opinion of the reception given to the delegation, written by Prince Meshchersky in *Grazhdanin*,\*\* proved to be right. Nicholas knew how to *donner le change* to the Zemstvo members and liberals, he wrote. Nicholas knew how to *lead them by the nose!*

Sacred truth! The leaders of the Zemstvo councillors and the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists have been led by the nose. It serves them right. They got their deserts for their servile speeches, for concealing their true decisions and thoughts about a constitution, for their ignominious silence in reply to the Jesuitical speech made by the tsar. They have been haggling and are still haggling in order to obtain a parody of liberty that will be "safe" for the bourgeoisie. Shipov is haggling with Bulygin, Trubetskoy is haggling with Shipov, Petrunkevich and Rodichev are haggling with Trubetskoy, Struve is haggling with Petrunkevich and Rodichev. They are haggling and agreeing "temporarily" to the purely Shipovist programme of the Zemstvo delegation. These hucksters got the reply they deserved . . . a kick from a military jackboot.

Will not even this disgrace of the leaders of Russian bourgeois "emancipation" mark the beginning of the end? Will not those who can be sincere and honest *democrats* now turn away from that notorious Constitutional-Democratic Party? Will they never understand that they are hopelessly disgracing themselves and are betraying the cause of the revolution by supporting a "party," the "Zemstvo fraction" of which crawls on its belly before the autocracy while the "Emancipation League" crawls on its belly before the Zemstvo fraction?

We welcome the *finale* of the Zemstvo delegation. The mask is off. Choose, gentlemen of the landowning classes and of the bourgeoisie! Choose, gentlemen of the educated classes and members of all kinds of "leagues"! For revolution or for counter-revolution? For liberty or against liberty? Those who want to be democrats in deed must fight, must break with the reptiles and traitors, must create an honest party that will have respect for itself and for its convictions; they must take their stand resolutely and irrevocably on the side of armed uprising. As for those who want to continue the game of diplomacy, the game of half-truths, to bargain and cringe, to issue wordy threats which nobody believes and to rejoice at the promise of a marshal's<sup>1</sup> post from the beloved sovereign—these must be publicly treated with the unanimous contempt of all believers in liberty.

Down with the bourgeois betrayers of liberty!

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! Long live the armed uprising for complete liberty, for a republic, for the most urgent and immediate interests of the proletariat and the peasantry!

July 1905.

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, the post of Marshal of the Nobility.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

## THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT \*

THE uprising in Odessa and the siding of the battleship "Potemkin" with the revolution mark a new and important step forward in the development of the revolutionary movement against the autocracy. Events have with striking swiftness confirmed the expediency of the calls for an armed uprising and for forming a provisional revolutionary government—of the calls addressed to the people by the class conscious representatives of the proletariat as represented by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.\*\* The new outbreak of the revolutionary conflagration throws light on the practical significance of these appeals and compels us to define more precisely the tasks of the revolutionary fighters in the present situation in Russia.

The armed uprising of the whole of the people is maturing and becoming organised before our very eyes under the influence of the spontaneous course of events. Not so long ago the only manifestation of the people's struggle against the autocracy was *riots, i.e.,* unconscious, unorganised, elemental, sometimes wild outbursts. But the labour movement, as the movement of the most advanced class, the proletariat, rapidly outgrew this initial stage. The class conscious propaganda and agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats had their effect. Riots gave way to organised strike struggles and to *political demonstrations* against the autocracy. The savage military reprisals of the past few years have "educated" the proletariat and the common people of the towns, and prepared them for higher forms of revolutionary struggle. The criminal and shameful war \*\*\* into which the autocracy has plunged the people filled the cup of the people's endurance to overflowing. The crowds began to offer armed resistance to the tsarist troops. Real, popular street fighting

against the troops, *barricade fighting* began. Only very recently we saw examples of proletarian heroism and popular enthusiasm in the Caucasus, Lodz, Odessa and Libau. The struggle developed into insurrection. The shameful role of the executioners of freedom, the role of henchmen of the police could not fail gradually to open the eyes of even the tsar's troops. The army began to waver. At first isolated cases of insubordination, outbreaks among the reservists, protests of the officers, agitation among the soldiers, refusal of certain companies or regiments to shoot at their own brothers, the workers. Then *the passing of certain units of the army to the side of the uprising.*

The tremendous importance of the latest events in Odessa lies precisely in the fact that for the first time an important unit of the armed force of tsarism—a battleship—has openly gone over to the side of the revolution. The government made frantic efforts and resorted to all possible tricks to conceal this event from the people, to nip the mutiny of the sailors in the bud. But all their efforts were in vain. The warships sent against the revolutionary battleship "Potemkin" *refused to fight* their comrades. By spreading the report throughout Europe that the "Potemkin" had surrendered and that the tsar had ordered the sinking of the revolutionary battleship, the autocratic government only completed its disgrace before the entire world. The squadron has returned to Sevastopol, and the government is hastening to disband the sailors, to disarm the warships; reports are current of wholesale resignations of the officers of the Black Sea fleet; on the battleship "St. George the Conqueror," which had surrendered, a fresh mutiny has broken out. In Libau and Kronstadt the sailors are also rising; encounters with the troops are becoming more frequent; sailors and workers in Libau are fighting on the barricades against the troops. The foreign press reports mutinies on a number of other warships ("Minin," "Alexander II," etc.). The tsarist government proved to be *without a navy*. The most it has been able to achieve has been to hold back the navy from actively going over to the side of the revolution. Meanwhile, the battleship "Potemkin" still remains the unconquered territory of the revolution, and whatever its fate may

be, we are witnessing here an undoubted and remarkable fact: an attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*.

No amount of reprisals, no partial victories over the revolution will destroy the importance of this event. The first step has been taken. The Rubicon has been crossed. The siding of the army with the revolution has been recorded and sealed before the whole of Russia and the entire world. New and still more energetic attempts to form a revolutionary army will inevitably follow the events in the Black Sea fleet. Our task now is to give the utmost support to these attempts, to explain to the widest masses of the proletariat and peasantry the national importance of a revolutionary army in the fight for liberty, to assist separate sections of this army to unfurl the popular *banner of liberty*, capable of attracting the masses and of consolidating the forces which shall crush the tsarist autocracy.

Riots—demonstrations—street battles—detachments of a revolutionary army—such are the stages in the development of the popular uprising. We have at last reached the final stage. This does not mean, of course, that the whole movement in its entirety has advanced to this new and higher stage. No, the movement still contains a great deal that is backward; in the Odessa events there are unmistakable features of the former rioting. But it does mean that the forward waves of the elemental flood have already reached the very threshold of the autocratic “stronghold.” It does mean that the forward representatives of the masses of the people themselves have advanced, not as a result of theoretical reasoning, but under the pressure of the growing movement, to new and higher tasks of the struggle, to the final struggle against the enemy of the Russian people. The autocracy has done *everything* to prepare this struggle. For years it has been provoking the people to an armed struggle with its troops, and now it is reaping what it sowed. The units of the revolutionary army are springing up out of the army itself.

The task of these units is to proclaim insurrection: to give the masses the *military leadership*, as necessary in civil war as in any other war; to create *points d'appui* for an open struggle of the whole of the people; to start uprisings in neighbouring dis-

tricts; to safeguard complete political liberty, if only in a small part of the territory of the state at first; to start the revolutionary reconstruction of the decayed autocratic system; to develop to its farthest limit the revolutionary creative activity of the masses who take but a small part in this activity in time of peace, but who come to the forefront in revolutionary epochs. Only by carrying out these new tasks, only by putting them forward boldly and broadly, will the units of the revolutionary army be able to win complete victory, to serve as the support for a *revolutionary government*. And a revolutionary government is as essential and necessary at the present stage of the popular uprising as a revolutionary army. The revolutionary army is required for the military struggle and the military leadership of the masses of the people against the remnants of the military forces of the autocracy. The revolutionary army is needed because great historical questions can be solved only by *violence*, and the *organisation of violence* in the modern struggle is a military organisation. And besides the remnants of the military forces of the autocracy there are also the military forces of the neighbouring states for whose support the tottering Russian government is already begging, as we shall relate further on.

A revolutionary government is required for the political leadership of the masses of the people, at first in that part of the territory which has already been recaptured from tsarism by the revolutionary army, and later in the whole of the country. A revolutionary government is required for the purpose of introducing immediately the political reforms for which the revolution is proceeding—for establishing revolutionary-democratic local government, for convening a really national and a really constituent assembly, for introducing those "liberties" without which the true expression of the will of the people is impossible. A revolutionary government is necessary for the purpose of politically uniting the section of the people that has risen in rebellion and has actually and finally broken away from the autocracy, for organising that section politically. Of course, this organisation can only be provisional, just as the revolutionary government, which has taken power in the name of the people in

order to secure the will of the people, and to act through the instrumentality of the people, can only be provisional. But this work of organisation must commence *immediately*, and be indissolubly bound up with every successful step of the uprising, for the political consolidation and political leadership cannot be delayed for a single moment. The immediate exercise of political leadership of the insurgent people is no less essential for the complete victory of the people over tsarism than the military leadership of its forces.

The ultimate issue of the struggle between the supporters of the autocracy and the masses of the people cannot be in doubt to anyone who has preserved his reasoning capacity to any degree. But we must not shut our eyes to the fact that the serious struggle is only beginning, that there are great trials in store for us. Both the revolutionary army and the revolutionary government represent an "organism" of so high a type, demand institutions so complicated, a civic consciousness so developed, that it would be a mistake to expect a simple, immediate, proper fulfilment of these tasks from the outset. No, we do not expect this to happen; we know how to appreciate the importance of the tenacious, slow and frequently unseen work of political education which has always been and will always be conducted by Social-Democrats. But we must not permit what is still more dangerous in the present circumstances, namely, lack of faith in the powers of the people; we must remember what a tremendous educational and organising power the revolution has, when mighty historical events forcibly drag the common people from their remote corners, garrets and basements and compel them to become *citizens*. Months of revolution sometimes educate citizens more swiftly and completely than decades of political stagnation. The task of the class conscious leaders of the revolutionary class is always to march ahead of the class, to educate it, to explain to it the meaning of the new tasks, and to urge it forward to our great, ultimate goal. The failures which are inevitably in store for us in the further attempts to form a revolutionary army and to establish a provisional revolutionary government will serve to teach us the *practical* solution of these problems,

will serve to draw the new and fresh forces of the people, which are now lying dormant, to the work of solving them.

Take the military aspect. No Social-Democrat at all familiar with history, who has studied Engels, the great expert on this matter, ever doubted the tremendous importance of military knowledge, the tremendous importance of military technique and military organisation as an instrument in the hands of the masses of the people and classes of the people for deciding the issue of great historical conflicts. Social-Democracy never stooped to the game of military conspiracies, it never advanced military questions to the forefront until the conditions of incipient civil war had arisen.<sup>1</sup> But *now* all Social-Democrats have advanced military questions, if not to the very first, at least to one of the first places, and are now making it their business to study these questions and to popularise them among the masses of the people. The revolutionary army must employ military knowledge and military weapons in deciding the fate of the Russian people and in deciding the first and most urgent question of all, the question of liberty.

And the problem of establishing the revolutionary government is as new, as difficult and as complicated as the problem of the military organisation of the forces of the revolution. But this problem, too, can and must be solved by the people. In this matter, too, every partial failure will lead to an improvement in methods and means, to the consolidation and extension of the results. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. indicated in its resolution the general conditions for solving this new problem; it is now time to take up the consideration and preparation of the practical conditions for its solution. Our Party has a minimum programme, a complete programme of the changes which are immediately achievable within the framework of the democratic (*i.e.*, bourgeois) revolution, and which are necessary for the proletariat in order to wage its struggles for the socialist

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *The Tasks of Russian Social-Democrats* on the untimeliness (in 1897) of the question of the methods of a decisive attack against tsarism. (This article will be found in *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 495-515.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*)

revolution. But this programme contains fundamental demands, and also partial demands which follow from the fundamental demands or are taken for granted. It is particularly important to advance the fundamental demands with every attempt to establish a provisional revolutionary government in order to show to the whole of the people, even to the most ignorant masses, in brief formulæ, in clear and sharp outlines, the aims of this government and its national tasks.

In our opinion, it is possible to point to six such basic points which must become the political banner and the immediate programme of any revolutionary government, which must enlist the sympathies of the people for the government, and upon which the whole revolutionary energy of the people must be concentrated as upon its most urgent task.

The six points are these: 1) a national constituent assembly, 2) arming of the people, 3) political liberty, 4) complete freedom for the oppressed and disfranchised nationalities, 5) an eight-hour working day, and 6) peasant revolutionary committees. Of course, this is only an approximate list, only *titles*, designations of a whole series of changes that are required immediately in order to achieve the democratic republic. We do not claim that the list is complete. We merely want to explain clearly what we think of the importance of certain basic tasks. The revolutionary government must strive to rely on the support of the masses of the people, on the masses of the working class and peasantry; unless it does this it will not be able to maintain itself; without the revolutionary activity of the people it will be nil, worse than nil. It is our business to forewarn the people against the adventurous character of high-sounding but absurd promises (like immediate "socialisation," which those who talk about it do not understand themselves<sup>1</sup>), while at the same time we must advocate changes that can really be made at the moment and that are really necessary for strengthening the cause of the revolution. The revolutionary government must arouse the "people" and *organise* the people's revolutionary activity. Complete freedom for oppressed nationalities, *i.e.*, the recognition

<sup>1</sup> Lenin refers to the Socialist-Revolutionaries.—*Ed.*

not only of their cultural but also of their right to political self-determination; the introduction of urgent measures for the protection of the working class (an eight-hour day as the first in the series of these measures), and lastly, the guarantee of serious measures, uninfluenced by considerations for the landlords' greed, in favour of the masses of the peasantry—such, in our opinion, are the chief points which must be especially emphasised by every revolutionary government. We shall not discuss the first three points; they are too obvious to require comment. We shall not discuss the necessity for bringing about reforms even in a small territory, for instance, recaptured from tsarism; the practical fulfilment is a thousand times more important than manifestoes, and, of course, a thousand times more difficult. We merely want to call attention to the fact that it is necessary now and immediately to spread by every possible means a correct idea of our national and imminent tasks. It is necessary to know how to approach the people—in the true sense of the word—not only with a general call to fight (this is sufficient in a period before the formation of the revolutionary government), but also with a direct call for the immediate fulfilment of the main democratic reforms to be immediately and independently carried out.

A revolutionary army and a revolutionary government are two sides of the same medal. They are two institutions equally necessary for the success of the uprising and for the consolidation of its results. They are two slogans which must be advanced and explained as the only consistent revolutionary slogans. There are many people today who regard themselves as democrats. But many are called and few are chosen. There are many who prattle about the "Constitutional-Democratic Party," but in so-called "society" and among the would-be democratic Zemstvos there are few *true* democrats, *i.e.*, people who are sincerely in favour of the complete sovereignty of the people, who are capable of engaging in a life and death struggle against the enemies of the people's sovereignty, the defenders of the tsarist autocracy to the end.

The working class is free of the cowardice, the hypocritical

half-heartedness which is characteristic of the bourgeoisie as a class. The working class can and must be fully and consistently democratic. The working class has proved its right to the role of vanguard in the democratic revolution by the blood it has shed on the streets of St. Petersburg, Riga, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Odessa, Baku and innumerable other towns. It must prove equal to this great role at the present decisive moment as well. While never for a moment forgetting their socialist goal, their class and Party independence, the class conscious representatives of the proletariat, members of the R.S.D.L.P., must come forward before the whole of the people with advanced democratic slogans. For us, for the proletariat, the democratic revolution is only the first step on the road to the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation, to the great socialist goal. All the more quickly, therefore, must we pass this first step; all the more decisively must we settle accounts with the enemies of the people's liberty; all the louder must we proclaim the slogans of consistent democracy: a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government.

July 1905.

## THE BOYCOTT OF THE BULYGIN DUMA AND THE INSURRECTION \*

THE political situation in Russia at the present time is as follows: The Bulygin Duma, *i.e.*, an advisory assembly of representatives of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie, elected under the supervision and with the aid of the lackeys of the absolutist government on the basis of an electoral system so indirect, with so many reactionary rank and property qualifications, that it is a downright mockery of the idea of popular representation—this assembly may soon be convened. What should our attitude towards this Duma be? Liberal democrats give two replies to this question. Its Left wing, represented by the Union of Unions,<sup>1</sup> *i.e.*, principally the representatives of the bourgeois intelligentsia, is in favour of boycotting the Duma, of abstaining from the elections, and of taking advantage of the opportunity created by the elections for carrying on strong agitation for a democratic constitution on the basis of universal suffrage. Its Right wing, however, as represented by the July Congress of Zemstvo and municipal councillors,\*\* or, to be more correct, by a certain section of that Congress, is opposed to the boycott and favours taking part in the elections and of getting as large a number of candidates as possible elected to the Duma. It is true that the Congress did not pass a definite resolution on this question, but postponed it to the next Congress, which is to be convened by telegraph immediately the Bulygin “constitution” is proclaimed; but the opinion of the Right wing of liberal democracy has become sufficiently clearly defined.

Revolutionary democracy, *i.e.*, principally the proletariat and its conscious expression, Social-Democracy, is, on the whole, unreservedly in favour of insurrection. This difference in tactics is properly appreciated in the last issue (No. 74) of *Osvo-*

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 340.—*Ed.*

*bozhdeniye*, the organ of the liberal-monarchist bourgeoisie, which, on the one hand, condemns the "open advocacy of armed insurrection" as "mad and criminal," and, on the other hand, criticises the boycott as "fruitless practically," and expresses the conviction that both the Zemstvo fraction of the Constitutional-"Democratic" (read: Monarchist) Party and the Union of Unions will "pass their political examination," *i.e.*, abandon the idea of a boycott.

The question arises, what should be the attitude of the party of the class conscious proletariat towards the idea of a boycott, and what tactical slogan should it bring to the forefront before the masses of the people? In order to reply to this question it is necessary first of all to bear in mind the nature and fundamental significance of the Bulygin "constitution." It is the result of a bargain struck between tsarism and the landlords and big bourgeois, by which the latter, in return for innocent, sham constitutional sops, absolutely innocuous to the autocracy, are to be gradually divorced from the revolution, *i.e.*, from the fighting people, and reconciled with the autocracy. As the whole of the Constitutional-"Democratic" Party keenly desires to preserve the monarchy and the upper chamber (*i.e.*, to guarantee beforehand the political privileges and political domination of the "upper ten thousand," of the moneybags in the political system of the country), such a deal is not at all improbable. More than that, such a deal, at least with a section of the bourgeoisie, is inevitable, sooner or later, in one form or another, for it is prescribed by the very class position which the bourgeoisie occupy in the capitalist system. The only question is: when and in what manner will this deal be arranged? And the whole task of the party of the proletariat is to prevent this deal from being made for as long as possible, to split the bourgeoisie up as much as possible, to secure the greatest possible advantage for the revolution from the temporary appeals of the bourgeoisie to the people, and in the meantime to prepare the forces of the revolutionary people (the proletariat and the peasantry) for the violent overthrow of the autocracy and for the isolation and neutralisation of the treacherous bourgeoisie.

In fact, as we have frequently pointed out already, the essence of the political position of the bourgeoisie is that it stands between the tsar and the people; it desires to play the part of honest broker and sneak into power behind the backs of the fighting people. That is why the bourgeoisie appeals to the tsar one day, to the people another, makes "serious" and "business-like" proposals for a political deal to the former and addresses high-sounding phrases about liberty (Petrunkevich's speeches at the July Congress) to the latter. It is to our advantage for the bourgeoisie to appeal to the people, for, by doing so, it provides material for politically rousing and enlightening backward and wide masses whom it would be utopian to attempt to reach at present by Social-Democratic agitation. Let the bourgeoisie stir up the more backward, let them break up the soil here and there; we shall untiringly sow Social-Democratic seeds in that soil. Everywhere in the West the bourgeoisie in its fight against the autocracy was compelled to rouse the political consciousness of the people while striving at the same time to sow the seeds of bourgeois theory among the working class. Our business is to take advantage of the destructive work carried on by the bourgeoisie against the autocracy and systematically to explain to the working class what its socialist tasks are and also the irreconcilable antagonism between its interests and those of the bourgeoisie.

Hence, it is clear that our tactics at the present time should be primarily to support the idea of a boycott. The question of the boycott is in itself a question of internal bourgeois democracy. The working class is not directly interested in it; but it is certainly interested in supporting the more revolutionary section of bourgeois democracy; it is interested in extending and intensifying political agitation. The call to boycott the Duma is a stronger appeal by the bourgeoisie to the people, a development of its agitation, and it provides increased opportunities for our agitation and for intensifying the political crisis, *i.e.*, the source of the revolutionary movement. The participation of the liberal bourgeoisie in the Duma will mean the weakening of their agitation at the present time, their appeal more

to the tsar than to the people, the acceleration of a counter-revolutionary deal between the tsar and the bourgeoisie.

Needless to say, even if it is not "broken up," the Bulygin Duma will inevitably give rise to political conflicts of which the proletariat must take advantage; but this is a matter for the future. It would be ridiculous to "pledge ourselves" not to utilise this bourgeois, bureaucratic Duma for the purposes of agitation and struggle; but this is not the point at the moment. At the present time the Left wing of bourgeois democracy itself has advanced the question of a direct and immediate fight with the Duma by means of a boycott, and we must exert all our efforts to support this more determined attack. We must take the bourgeois democrats and the "*Osvobozhdeniye*-ists" at their word; we must give the widest circulation to their "Petrunkevich" phrases\* about appealing to the people, we must expose them to the people and show that the first and smallest test of these phrases was precisely the question of whether to boycott the Duma, *i.e.*, to turn to the people in protest, or to accept the Duma, *i.e.*, to abstain from protesting, to appeal to the tsar once more, and accept this mockery of popular representation.

Secondly, we must exert all efforts to make the boycott actually serve to extend and intensify agitation and prevent it from becoming mere passive abstention from voting. If we are not mistaken, this idea is already fairly widespread among the comrades working in Russia, who express it in the words "*active boycott*." As against the mere passive abstention active boycott should imply increasing agitation tenfold, organising meetings everywhere, taking advantage of election meetings, even going to the length of securing admission by force, organising demonstrations, political strikes, etc. It goes without saying that in order to advance this agitation and struggle it will be particularly expedient to come to temporary agreements with various groups of revolutionary bourgeois democracy, as is permitted generally by a number of our Party resolutions. But in doing so we must, on the one hand, steadily preserve the class distinction of the party of the proletariat and not for a single moment cease our Social-Democratic criticism of our bourgeois allies,

and, on the other hand, we would be failing in our duty as the party of the advanced class if, in our agitation, we failed to advance the principal revolutionary slogan at the present stage of the democratic revolution.

This is our third, direct and immediate political task. As we have already said, "active boycott" means agitation, recruiting, organising the revolutionary forces on an enlarged scale with redoubled energy and threefold pressure. But such work is impossible without a distinct, exact and direct slogan. Such a slogan can only be that of armed insurrection. The fact that the government is convening this crudely faked "people's" assembly provides us with an excellent opportunity for carrying on agitation for a real people's assembly, for explaining to the broadest masses of the people that at present (after the deception practised by the tsar and his mockery of the people) the only body that can convene this real assembly of the people is a provisional revolutionary government, and that to secure this the victory of the armed uprising and the actual overthrow of the tsarist rule is necessary. We could not wish for a better opportunity to agitate widely for insurrection, and in order to carry on such agitation we must be perfectly clear in our minds with regard to the programme of the provisional revolutionary government. This programme should consist of the six points which we have already drawn up (see *Proletary*, No. 7, "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government"<sup>1</sup>): 1) convocation of a national constituent assembly; 2) arming of the people; 3) political liberty—the immediate repeal of all laws infringing this; 4) complete cultural and political liberty for all the oppressed and disfranchised nationalities—the Russian people cannot win liberty for itself unless it fights for the liberty of the other nationalities; 5) an eight-hour working day; 6) the setting up of peasant committees for the support and carrying out of all democratic reforms including agrarian reforms, right up to the confiscation of the land of the landlords.

Thus: support the idea of the boycott most energetically, expose the Right wing of bourgeois democracy, which rejects

<sup>1</sup> See preceding article in this volume.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the boycott, as traitors; convert the boycott into an active boycott, *i.e.*, develop the widest possible agitation; advocate armed insurrection and call for the immediate organisation of groups and detachments of the revolutionary army for the overthrow of the autocracy and the setting up of a provisional revolutionary government; spread and explain the fundamental and absolutely obligatory programme of this provisional revolutionary government, the programme which is to serve as the standard bearer of the uprising and as a model for all the forthcoming repetitions of the Odessa events.

Such should be the tactics of the party of the class conscious proletariat. In order to make these tactics perfectly clear and to achieve unity, we must deal also with the tactics of *Iskra*. They are explained in No. 106 of that paper, in an article entitled *Defence or Attack*. Without touching on the minor and partial differences, which will disappear immediately we begin to act, we shall deal only with the fundamental disagreements. Quite justly condemning passive boycott, *Iskra* puts forward in opposition to it the idea of the immediate "organisation of revolutionary local government" as a "possible prologue to an uprising." According to *Iskra* we must "seize the right to carry on the electoral campaign by establishing workers' agitation committees." These committees "must aim at organising the election by the people of their revolutionary deputies outside the 'legal' limits established in Ministerial Bills," we must "cover the country with a network of organs of revolutionary local government."

Such a slogan is worthless. From the point of view of the political tasks generally, it represents a confusion of ideas, and from the point of view of the immediate political situation it brings grist to the mill of *Osvobozhdeniye*. The organisation of revolutionary local government, the election of deputies by the people is not the *prologue* to, but the *epilogue* of the uprising. To attempt to bring about this organisation now, before the insurrection, and apart from insurrection, means striving for absurd aims and causing confusion in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat. It is necessary first of all to be victorious in the uprising (if only in a single city) and establish a pro-

visional revolutionary government, and then the latter, as the organ of the uprising, and the recognised leader of the revolutionary people, may set to work to organise revolutionary local government. To attempt to obscure the slogan of insurrection by the slogan of organising revolutionary local government, or even to push the former into the background, is like advising us first to catch the fly and then to stick it on the flypaper. If in the celebrated Odessa days our Odessa comrades had been advised to organise, not a revolutionary army, but the election of deputies by the people of Odessa as a prologue to the uprising, those comrades would have laughed such advice to scorn. *Iskra* repeats the mistake made by the Economists, who thought that the "fight for rights" was a prologue to the fight against the autocracy. *Iskra* is reverting to the unfortunate "plan of the Zemstvo campaign" which obscured the slogan of insurrection by the theory of a "higher type of demonstration."

This is not the place to investigate the origin of *Iskra's* tactical blunder. We refer the reader who is interested in this question to the pamphlet by N. Lenin entitled *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*.<sup>1</sup> It is more important here to point out how the new *Iskra* slogan merges into an *Osvobozhdeniye* slogan. In practice, an attempt to organise the election of deputies by the people before the uprising would only play into the hands of *Osvobozhdeniye* and would result in the Social-Democrats trailing in the rear of them. As long as it is not replaced by a provisional revolutionary government the autocracy will not permit the workers and the people to organise any elections at all deserving the name of popular elections (and Social-Democrats will not be content with a comedy of "popular" elections under the autocracy); but the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists, the Zemstvo and town councillors will go on with the elections and unceremoniously pronounce them to be popular elections and an expression of revolutionary local government. All the efforts of the liberal monarchist bourgeoisie are now concentrated upon averting the uprising, upon compelling the autocracy to recognise the Zemstvo elections as popular elections without a victory

<sup>1</sup> See chapter IX of the pamphlet in this volume, pp. 88-91.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

of the people over tsarism, and upon converting the Zemstvo and urban local government bodies into organs of "revolutionary" (in the Petrunkevich sense) "local government," without a real revolution having taken place. This attitude is excellently portrayed in No. 74 of *Osvobozhdeniye*. It is difficult to conceive of anything more repulsive than this philosopher of the cowardly bourgeoisie asserting that the advocacy of insurrection "demoralises" both the army and the people! And this is said at a time when even the blind can see that only by means of insurrection can the ordinary Russian citizen and soldier save themselves from utter demoralisation and vindicate their rights of citizenship! The bourgeois Manilov<sup>1</sup> pictures to himself arcadian idylls in which the mere pressure of "public opinion will compel the government to make concession after concession, until finally it has no further escape and is compelled to hand over the power to a constituent assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret ballot, as is demanded by society . . ." (with an upper chamber?). "There is nothing at all improbable in this peaceful [!] transition of power from the present government to the national constituent assembly, which will organise state and political power on a new basis." And this brilliant philosophy of a reptile bourgeoisie is supplemented by the advice: to win over to our side the army, particularly the officers, to establish a people's militia, "without waiting for permission," and to organise local government bodies (read: of landlords and capitalists) as "elements of the future provisional government."

There is method in *this* muddle. The very thing the bourgeoisie desires is that power should be transferred to their hands "peacefully," *without a popular uprising*, which may perhaps be victorious, win a republic and real liberties, arm the proletariat and rouse the millions of the peasantry. The very thing the treacherous bourgeoisie requires in order to be able to come to an understanding with the tsar (a monarchy with an upper chamber), as *against* the "mob," is to obscure the slogan of

<sup>1</sup> Manilov—a character from Gogol's *Dead Souls* representing a sentimental dreamer.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

insurrection, to dissuade themselves and dissuade others from it and to advise, by way of a "prologue," the immediate setting up of organs of local government (accessible only to the Trubetskoy, Petrunkevich, Fedorovs and Co.). Consequently, the liberal Manilovs express the innermost thoughts of the moneybags and their most profound interests.

The Social-Democratic Manilovs of *Iskra* merely express the half-baked thoughts of a section of the Social-Democrats and their deviation from the only revolutionary tactics of the proletariat, viz., the ruthless exposure of the bourgeois opportunist illusion that peaceful concessions can be expected from tsarism, that local government can be established without overthrowing the autocracy and that the people can elect their deputies as a prologue to the insurrection. No, we must clearly and resolutely point out the necessity for an uprising in the present state of affairs; we must directly call for insurrection (without, of course, fixing the date beforehand), and call for the immediate organisation of a revolutionary army. Only a very bold and wide organisation of such an army can serve as a prologue to the insurrection. Only insurrection can guarantee the victory of the revolution and, of course, those who know the local conditions will always warn against attempts at premature insurrection. The real organisation of real, popular, local government can take place only as the epilogue of a victorious insurrection.

August 1905.

## THE CLIMAX IS APPROACHING\*

THE forces have become evenly balanced—we wrote a fortnight ago, when the first news of the all-Russian political strike was received and it was beginning to be seen that the government does not dare make immediate use of its military forces.

The forces have become evenly balanced, we repeated a week ago when the Manifesto of October 30 (17) came through as the “last word” in political news, signalling to the whole people and to the whole world the indecision of tsarism and its retreat.

But the balance of forces does not in any way preclude a struggle; on the contrary it renders it particularly acute. As we have already said, the only purpose of the government’s retreat is to enable it to select a more favourable battlefield for itself. The proclamation of “liberties,” which adorn the scrap of paper, called the Manifesto of October 30 (17) is only an attempt to prepare the moral conditions for a struggle against the revolution—while Trepov, at the head of the all-Russian Black Hundreds, is preparing the material conditions for this struggle.

The climax is approaching. The new political situation is becoming outlined with the astonishing rapidity that is peculiar only to revolutionary epochs. The government began to yield in words and immediately began to prepare an attack in deeds. The promises of a constitution were followed by the most savage and disgraceful acts of violence as if especially designed to give people a still more striking object lesson of the real significance of the real power of the autocracy. The contradiction between the promises, words, scraps of paper, and reality has become infinitely more palpable. Events have begun to provide magnificent confirmation of the truth which we proclaimed to our readers long ago and which we shall repeat over and over again, *viz.*, that as long as the actual power of tsarism has not

been overthrown, all its concessions, up to and including even the constituent assembly, are a mere phantom, a mirage, a deception.

The revolutionary workers of St. Petersburg expressed this with remarkable clarity in one of their daily bulletins, which have not yet reached us, but to which the foreign papers, astounded and frightened by the might displayed by the proletariat, are referring with ever-increasing frequency. "We were granted the freedom of assembly" wrote the strike committee (we are re-translating from the English back into the Russian. Hence certain inaccuracies are, of course, inevitable) "but our meetings are surrounded by troops. We were granted the freedom of the press, but the censorship continues to exist. The freedom of science has been promised, but the university is occupied by soldiers. Inviolability of the person has been granted, but the prisons are crammed with people who have been arrested. Witte has been granted, but Trepov still remains. A constitution has been granted, but the autocracy continues to exist. We have been granted everything, yet we have nothing."\*

The "Manifesto" has been held up by Trepov. The constitution has been held up by Trepov. The true significance of the liberties has been explained by the same Trepov. Amnesty has been mutilated by Trepov.

And who is this Trepov? Some extraordinary personality, whom it is particularly necessary to remove? Nothing of the kind. He is just an ordinary policeman, who is performing the ordinary everyday work of the autocracy with the military and the police at his disposal.

Why has this ordinary policeman and his everyday "work" suddenly acquired such immensely great importance? Because the revolution has made immense progress and has brought the real climax nearer. The people, led by the proletariat, are becoming more politically mature every day, nay every hour, or if you like, not by the year but by the week. When they were politically asleep the people regarded Trepov as just an ordinary policeman, but since they have become conscious of their political power they realise that he has become impossible, because

he personifies all the brutality, criminality and absurdity of tsarism.

Revolution teaches. It gives excellent object lessons to all classes of the people and to all the nations of Russia on the subject of the *nature of a constitution*. Revolution teaches by bringing to the front the immediate, urgent tasks of politics in their most obvious, most tangible forms; it compels the masses of the people to appreciate them, it makes the very existence of the people impossible unless these tasks are fulfilled, it glaringly exposes the futility of all and sundry pretexts, evasions, promises and acknowledgements. "We have been granted everything, yet we have nothing." For we were "granted" only promises, for we have no real power. We have come close to liberty; we have compelled absolutely everybody, even the tsar, to recognise the need for liberty. But what we require is not the recognition of liberty, but real liberty. What we want is not a scrap of paper, promising legislative rights to the representatives of the people. What we want is the real sovereignty of the people. The nearer we approached it, the more intolerable became its absence. The more alluring the tsar's manifestoes, the more impossible is the tsar's rule.

The struggle is approaching its climax, the settlement of the question of whether real power is to remain in the hands of the tsar's government. As to the recognition of the revolution, it has now been recognised by all. It was recognised rather a long time ago by Mr. Struve and the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists, it is now recognised by Mr. Witte, it is recognised by Nicholas Romanov. I promise you anything you like—says the tsar—only let me retain power, let *me* fulfil my promises. This is the gist of the tsar's Manifesto, and it is obvious that it could not but give an impetus to the decisive struggle. I grant everything, except power—declares tsarism. Everything is a phantom except power—answer the revolutionary people.

The real meaning of the seeming absurdity to which affairs in Russia have been reduced is the desire of tsarism to deceive. to outflank the revolution by striking a bargain with the bourgeoisie. The tsar is promising more and more to the bourgeoisie

in the hope that the propertied classes will at last turn *en masse* towards "law and order." However, as long as this "order" is exemplified by the excesses of Trepov and his Black Hundreds, the tsar's appeal is likely to remain a voice crying in the wilderness. The tsar needs both Witte and Trepov: Witte to attract some, Trepov to restrain others; Witte for promises, Trepov for deeds; Witte for the bourgeoisie, Trepov for the proletariat. And we are now witnessing, only on an incomparably higher stage of development, the same scene that we witnessed at the beginning of the Moscow strikes: the liberals are negotiating, the workers are fighting.

Trepov understands his role and his real vocation excellently. Perhaps he was rather too precipitate for the diplomatic Witte—but then he was afraid he might be late, seeing how rapidly the revolution was progressing. Trepov had to make haste, for he realised that the forces at his disposal were on the decrease.

Simultaneously with the Constitutional Manifesto of the autocracy began the autocratic warnings of a constitution. The Black Hundreds began to work in a way unprecedented in Russia. News of massacres, pogroms, unheard of brutalities, are simply streaming in from all corners of Russia. White terror is raging. Wherever possible the police are rousing and organising the dregs of capitalist society for plunder and violence, serving out liquor to the scum of the town population, organising pogroms against the Jews, inciting to violence against the "students" and rebels and helping to "teach" the Zemstvo members. Counter-revolution is working for all it is worth. Trepov is "making good." Machine-guns are being fired (Odessa), eyes are being put out (Kiev), people are being thrown onto the pavements from the fourth story, whole houses are being taken by storm and delivered to be sacked and plundered, houses are being set on fire and no one is allowed to extinguish the flames, those who dare to resist the Black Hundreds are shot down. From Poland to Siberia, from the shores of the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Black Sea—the same tale is heard.

But simultaneously with this riot of Black Hundred brutality, this orgy of autocracy, these last convulsions of the mon-

ster tsarism, new onslaughts are being made by the proletariat, which only seems to become pacified after each upsurge of the movement; as a matter of fact, it is only gathering its forces and preparing to deal a decisive blow. For the reasons stated above, police atrocities in Russia have now acquired a different character from what they have had hitherto. Simultaneously with the outbursts of Cossack vengeance and Trepov's *revanche*, the disintegration of the tsar's power is proceeding apace. This is seen in the provinces, in Finland, in St. Petersburg; it is apparent in places where the people are most downtrodden and where they are politically least developed, in the border lands with an alien population, as well as in the capital which promises to be the scene of the greatest drama of the revolution.

Indeed, compare the following two telegrams which we quote from a Vienna bourgeois liberal newspaper.<sup>1</sup>

"*Tver*. The mob, in the presence of Governor Sleptsov, attacked the premises of the Zemstvo. The mob besieged the house and afterwards set fire to it. The firemen refused to extinguish the flames. The troops stood by without taking any measures against the ruffians." (Of course, we cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy of this particular item of news, but it is an undeniable fact that similar and a hundred times worse things are being perpetrated everywhere.)

"*Kazan*. The people have disarmed the police. The arms taken from the latter have been distributed among the population. A people's militia has been organised. Perfect order prevails."

Is not the contrast between the two pictures edifying? Vengeance, atrocities, pogroms. The overthrow of the tsar's rule and the organisation of a victorious uprising.

Finland presents the same picture on an incomparably larger scale. The tsar's viceroy has been driven out. The lackey-senators have been removed by the people. The Russian gendarmes are being kicked out. They try to retaliate (telegram from Haparanda of November 4) by damaging railway communications. Detachments of the people's armed militia are then sent out to arrest the disorderly gendarmes. At a meeting of citizens in Tornio it was decided to organise the importation of weapons and of free literature. Thousands and tens of thousands in towns and villages are enlisting in the Finnish militia. It is reported that the

<sup>1</sup> *I.e., Neue Freie Presse.—Ed.*

Russian garrison of a strong fortress (Sveaborg) expressed its sympathy with the insurgents and surrendered the fortress to the people's militia. Finland is rejoicing. The tsar is making concessions, he is prepared to summon the Diet, he has repealed the illegal Manifesto of February 15 (3), 1899,\* he accepts the "resignation" of the senators driven out by the people. And at the same time *Novoye Vremya* advises the government to blockade all the Finnish ports and to suppress the uprising by armed force.\*\* According to the telegrams in the foreign press, numerous Russian troops are quartered in Helsingfors (it is unknown to what extent they can be used for the suppression of the uprising). It is alleged that Russian ships have entered the inner harbour of Helsingfors.

St. Petersburg. Trepov is taking vengeance for the rejoicings of the revolutionary people (over the concession wrested from the tsar). The Cossacks are committing atrocities. Massacres are increasing. The police are openly organising the Black Hundreds. The workers planned to organise a gigantic demonstration on Sunday, November 5 (October 23). They wanted to render public honour to their comrades and heroes who fell in the struggle for liberty. The government, on its part, prepared a gigantic bloodbath. It prepared for St. Petersburg what had taken place on a small scale in Moscow (the massacre at the funeral of Bauman, the workers' leader). Trepov wanted to take advantage of the situation when his forces had not yet been split up by the dispatch of a portion of them to Finland and when the workers were preparing to demonstrate, not to fight.

The St. Petersburg workers saw through the designs of the enemy. The demonstration was called off. The workers' committee decided to organise the last battle not at the time Trepov deigned to choose. The workers' committee was right in judging that for a number of reasons (the uprising in Finland among others) a delay in the struggle was disadvantageous for Trepov and advantageous for us. Meanwhile, the arming of the people is proceeding intensely. Propaganda is meeting with remarkable success in the army. It is reported that 150 sailors of the 14th and 18th naval companies have been arrested, that 92 com-

plaints have been lodged during the last week and a half against officers for sympathising with the revolutionaries. Manifestoes calling on the army to come over to the side of the people are being distributed even to the patrols "guarding" St. Petersburg. The freedom of the press, which was promised within the limits permitted by Trepov, is being stretched by the mighty arm of the revolutionary proletariat to a somewhat wider extent. According to information in the foreign newspapers, on Saturday, November 4 (October 22), only those St. Petersburg papers appeared which accepted the demand of the workers to ignore the censorship. Two German papers in St. Petersburg which wished to remain "loyal" (servile) were unable to appear. The "legal" papers, from the moment the scope of legality began to be determined not by Trepov, but by the St. Petersburg strikers' union, began to talk in unusually bold language:

"The strike is only temporarily suspended," reports a telegram to the *Neue Freie Presse* of November 5 (October 23). "It is reported that the strike will be resumed when the time comes to deal a final blow to the old order. The concessions no longer make any impression on the proletariat. The situation is very dangerous. Revolutionary ideas are increasingly affecting the broad masses. The working class regards itself as master of the situation. Those afraid of the impending catastrophe are already beginning to leave this city" (St. Petersburg).

The climax is approaching. The victory of the people's uprising is already near. The slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy are being carried into effect with unexpected rapidity. Let Trepov continue to rush from revolutionary Finland to revolutionary St. Petersburg, from the revolutionary border lands to the revolutionary provinces. Let him try to find a single safe corner for unhampered military operations. Let the tsar's Manifesto circulate more widely, let the news of the events in the revolutionary centres become more widespread—this will win new supporters for us and carry vacillation and disintegration into the dwindling ranks of the tsar's adherents.

The all-Russian political strike has excellently performed its task by furthering the uprising, by inflicting terrible wounds on tsarism, by breaking up the abominable comedy of the abominable State Duma.\* The general rehearsal is over. All

things go to show that we are now on the eve of the drama itself. Witte is wallowing in torrents of words, Trepov is wallowing in torrents of blood. The tsar has not many more promises to make. Trepov has too few Black Hundred troops left to send to the final battle. And the ranks of the revolutionary army are growing all the time, their forces are being tempered in separate encounters, the red flag is rising higher and higher over new Russia.

November 1905.

## THE ARMY AND THE REVOLUTION\*

THE mutiny in Sevastopol continues to spread. Things are coming to a head. The soldiers and sailors who are fighting for freedom are removing their officers. Excellent order is being maintained. The government is unable to repeat its dastardly Kronstadt trick, it is unable to provoke pogroms. The squadron refused to put to sea and threatens to bombard the town if any attempt is made to suppress the rebels. The command of the "Ochakov" has been taken over by Lieutenant Schmidt (retired), who had been dismissed from the service for making an "impertinent" speech about the armed defence of the liberties promised by the Manifesto of October 30 (17). According to the information in *Russ*, the period in which the sailors were summoned to surrender expires today, the 28th (15).

Hence, we are on the eve of the decisive moment. The next few days—perhaps hours—will show whether the rebels will be completely victorious, whether they will be defeated, or whether some sort of bargain will be struck. In any case the Sevastopol events signify the entire collapse of the old slave regime in the army, a regime which transformed soldiers into armed machines, made them the instruments for the suppression of the slightest striving after freedom.

The times when the Russian army could be sent abroad to suppress a revolution—as was the case in 1849\*\*—are gone for ever. Now, the army has irretrievably dropped away from the autocracy. The army has not yet entirely become revolutionary. The political consciousness of the soldiers and sailors is still on a very low level. But the important thing is that this consciousness has already awakened, that the soldiers have started a movement of *their own*, that the spirit of liberty has everywhere penetrated into the barracks. Military barracks in Russia were very often worse than any prison; nowhere was individu-

ality so suppressed and oppressed as in the barracks; nowhere else was torture, the striking of men by officers and the degradation of human beings so rife as in these barracks. And these barracks are becoming hotbeds of revolution.

The Sevastopol events are neither isolated nor accidental. We shall not speak of former attempts at direct rebellion in the army or in the navy. Let us compare the St. Petersburg sparks with the Sevastopol conflagration. Let us recall the soldiers' demands which are now being put forward in the various military units of St. Petersburg (they were printed in yesterday's issue of our paper). What a remarkable document this list of demands is! How clearly it shows that the army of slaves is being transformed into a revolutionary army. And what power on earth can now prevent the spread of such demands in the whole of the navy, in the whole of the army?

The St. Petersburg soldiers want better food, better clothing, better living quarters, better pay, the reduction of the period of military service and of the daily exercises. But other demands, which can only be presented by a citizen-soldier, occupy a still more important place on the list. The right to attend in uniform all meetings "the same as other citizens," the right to read and keep in the barracks *all* newspapers, freedom of conscience, equal rights for all nationalities, complete abolition of saluting outside of barracks, the abolition of officers' orderlies, the abolition of courts-martial, all military law-cases to be tried by the civil courts, the right to present collective complaints, the right to defend oneself against the slightest attempt of a superior to strike a blow. Such are the principal demands of the St. Petersburg soldiers.

These demands show that an enormous part of the army is already at one with the men of Sevastopol who have risen for liberty.

These demands show that the hypocritical speeches of the henchmen of autocracy on the neutrality of the army, on the necessity of keeping the army away from politics, etc.—that all such speeches cannot count on evoking the slightest sympathy from the soldiers.

The army cannot and must not be neutral. Do not drag the army into politics—is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and of tsarism, which in fact always dragged the army into reactionary politics, turned the Russian soldiers into henchmen of the Black Hundreds and accomplices of the police. It is impossible to keep aloof from the nation-wide struggle for liberty. Whoever shows indifference to this struggle is supporting the atrocities of the police government, which promised freedom only to mock at it.

The demands of the citizen-soldiers are the demands of Social-Democracy, the demands of all the revolutionary parties, the demands of the class conscious workers. If the soldiers join the ranks of the supporters of liberty and come over to the side of the people, they will secure victory for the cause of freedom and the satisfaction of their demands.

But in order to secure the complete and lasting satisfaction of these demands, it is necessary to take another little step forward. All the separate wishes of the soldiers who are tortured in these prison-like barracks must be joined together, reduced to a single whole. And when that is done these demands will read: the abolition of the standing army and its substitution by the universal arming of the people.

Everywhere, in all countries, the standing army is used, not so much against the external enemy as against the internal enemy. Everywhere the standing army has become the weapon of reaction, the servant of capital in its struggle against labour, the executioner of the people's liberty. Let us not, therefore, in our great liberating revolution, dwell only on partial demands. Let us eradicate the evil root and branch. Let us entirely destroy the standing army. Let the army merge with the armed people, let the soldiers bring to the people their knowledge of military affairs, let the barracks disappear and their place be taken by a free military school. No power on earth will dare make an attempt upon free Russia if the bulwark of its liberty is an armed people which has destroyed the military caste, which has made all soldiers citizens and all citizens capable of bearing arms—soldiers.

The experience of Western Europe has proved how utterly reactionary a standing army is. Military science has proved that a people's militia is quite practicable, that it can fully master the military tasks both of defence and attack. Let the hypocritical or the sentimental bourgeoisie dream of disarmament. So long as there are oppressed and exploited people in the world—we must strive, not for disarmament, but for the universal arming of the people. It alone will fully safeguard liberty. It alone will entirely overthrow reaction. Only when this reform is carried out will millions of toilers, instead of a mere handful of exploiters, really reap the fruits of liberty.

November 1905.

## THE LIBERAL UNIONS AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY \*

WHAT significance for the proletariat have the "professional" unions of the intelligentsia? Should we Social-Democrats join them for the purpose of fighting against the obscuring of the class consciousness of the workers?

The "professional" unions of the intelligentsia and the "Union of Unions" are political organisations. Virtually, they are *liberal* unions. On the whole, these unions form the nucleus of the so-called Constitutional-Democratic, *i.e.*, bourgeois liberal, Party. A most serious duty now devolves upon us: to exert every effort to advance the *Party* education of the proletariat, to consolidate its vanguard into a real political party absolutely *independent* of all other parties, into a party absolutely free and independent. We are therefore obliged to exercise extreme caution in taking any step that is likely to create confusion in the clear and definite party relations. The whole of the liberal bourgeoisie is now doing its utmost to prevent the formation of an entirely independent class party of the proletariat; it is striving to "unite" and "merge" the *whole* of the "emancipation" movement in one stream of democracy for the purpose of covering up the *bourgeois* character of this democracy.

Under these circumstances it would be a great mistake for members of the Social-Democratic Party to join the liberal unions. It would place them in the extremely false position of being members of two different and mutually hostile parties. One cannot serve two gods. One cannot belong to two parties. Owing to the absence of political liberty in our country and the gloom spread by the autocratic regime, it is very easy to confuse the parties, and the interests of the bourgeois *demand* that confusion be created. The interests of the proletariat demand a precise and clear demarcation of parties. And it is impossible at

the present time to obtain genuine, not merely verbal, guarantees that groups of Social-Democrats joining the "professional" unions of the intellectuals would preserve complete independence and would be members only of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of no other party, that they would give the most minute account of every step in their activity to *their* party organisation. The chances are ninety-nine to one that those members will not be able to preserve their independence, that they will be forced to resort to "stratagems" which are useless as regards results and harmful as regards the corruption of the still young *Party consciousness* of the workers.

September 1905.

## SOCIALISM AND ANARCHISM \*

THE Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies decided yesterday, December 6 (November 23), to reject the application of the anarchists for representation on the Executive Committee and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The Executive Committee gave the following reasons for this decision: "1) In the whole of international practice anarchists have no representation in congresses and socialist conferences because they do not recognise the political struggle as a means for the achievement of their ideals; 2) only parties can be represented, and the anarchists do not represent a party."

We consider the decision of the Executive Committee to be in the highest degree correct and of enormous importance from the point of view of principle and of practical politics. If we were to regard the Soviet of Workers' Deputies as a parliament of labour, or as a sort of proletarian organ of self-government, then, of course, it would have been wrong to reject the application of the anarchists. However insignificant (fortunately), the influence of the anarchists among the workers may be, nevertheless, a number of workers undoubtedly support them. The question of whether the anarchists represent a party, an organisation, a group, or a voluntary association of people holding the same ideas, is a formal question, which is of no importance from the point of view of principle. Finally, if the anarchists, while rejecting the political struggle, apply for representation in an institution which is conducting that struggle, it is a glaring inconsistency which merely shows how weak are the philosophy and tactics of the anarchists. But, of course, inconsistency is no reason for excluding them from a "parliament," or an "organ of self-government."

We regard the decision of the Executive Committee as

absolutely correct and in no way contradicting the functions, the character and the composition of this body. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies is not a parliament of labour and not an organ of proletarian self-government. It is not an organ of government at all, but a fighting organisation for the achievement of definite aims.

This fighting organisation includes, on the basis of a provisional, undefined, fighting agreement, representatives of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (the party of proletarian socialism), of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (the representatives of petty-bourgeois socialism, or the extreme Left wing of revolutionary bourgeois democracy), and finally many "non-party" workers. The latter are not non-party in the general sense of the term, they are non-party revolutionaries, because their sympathies are entirely on the side of the revolution, for the victory of which they are fighting with devoted enthusiasm, energy and self-sacrifice. For that reason it will be quite natural to include also representatives of the revolutionary peasantry on the Executive Committee.

As a matter of fact, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies represents an undefined, broad, fighting alliance of socialists and revolutionary democrats; of course, the term "non-party revolutionary" represents various shades, ranging from the former to the latter. Such an organisation is obviously necessary for the purpose of conducting political strikes and other more active forms of struggle for the immediate democratic demands which have been accepted and approved by the overwhelming majority of the population. To have anarchists in an organisation like this will not be an advantage, but a disadvantage: they will simply introduce disruption into it, and thus weaken the force of the general assault; they may still "want to argue" whether political reform is urgent and important. The exclusion of anarchists from a fighting alliance, which is carrying out our democratic revolution, as it were, is quite necessary from the point of view and in the interests of this revolution. There can be place in a fighting alliance only for those who fight for the aims of the alliance. If, for example, the "Cadets," or the "Party

of Law and Order" \* managed to recruit several hundred workers in their St. Petersburg organisation, the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies would hardly open its doors to the representatives of such organisations for that reason.

In explaining the reason for adopting its decision the Executive Committee refers to the practice of international socialist congresses. We warmly welcome this statement, this recognition on the part of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies of the ideological leadership of international Social-Democracy. The Russian revolution has already acquired international significance. The opponents of the revolution in Russia are already conspiring with Wilhelm II \*\* and all other obscurantists, tyrants, militarists and exploiters in Europe against free Russia. Nor shall we forget that the complete victory of our revolution demands an alliance of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia with the socialist workers of all countries.

It is not for nothing that international socialist congresses have decided not to admit anarchists. A wide gulf separates socialism from anarchism, and it is in vain that the *agents-provocateurs* of the secret police and the servile literary hacks of reactionary governments try to make it appear that this gulf does not exist. The philosophy of the anarchists is bourgeois philosophy turned inside out. Their individualistic theories and their individualistic ideals are the very antithesis of socialism. Their views express, not the future of bourgeois society, which is irresistibly being driven towards the socialisation of labour, but the present and even the past of that society, the domination of blind chance over the scattered, isolated small producer. Their tactics, which amount to the negation of the political struggle, serve to disunite the proletarians and, in fact, to convert them into passive participants of one or another set of bourgeois politics; because it is impossible for the workers really to detach themselves from politics.

In the present Russian revolution, the task of organising, politically educating, training and rallying the forces of the working class comes to the forefront more than at any other time. The more outrageous the conduct of the Black Hundred

government, the more zealously its *agents-provocateurs* strive to rouse sordid passions among the ignorant masses, the more desperately the defenders of the decaying autocracy clutch at every opportunity to discredit the revolution by organising robberies, pogroms, assassinations and by intoxicating the rabble, the more important is the task of organisation that devolves primarily upon the party of the socialist proletariat. And we shall therefore resort to every means of ideological struggle to keep the influence of the anarchists over the Russian workers within its present insignificant limits.

December 1905.

## THE LESSONS OF THE MOSCOW UPRISING \*

THE publication of the book, *Moscow in December 1905* (Moscow, 1906), could not have been more opportune. It is an essential task of the workers' party to assimilate the lessons of the December uprising. Unfortunately, this book is like a barrel of honey spoiled by a spoonful of tar. The material is most interesting, although incomplete, but the conclusions are drawn in a slovenly manner and are incredibly flat. We shall deal with these conclusions on another occasion; at present we shall turn our attention to the burning political question of the day, to the lessons of the Moscow uprising.

The principal form of the December movement in Moscow was the peaceful strike and demonstrations. The overwhelming majority of the working masses actively participated only in these forms of struggle. But the December action in Moscow proved clearly that the general strike has become obsolete as an independent and principal form of struggle, that the movement is breaking through these narrow boundaries with elemental and irresistible force and is giving rise to a higher form of struggle, the uprising.

In declaring the strike, all the revolutionary parties, all the Moscow unions, sensed and even realised that it must inevitably grow into an uprising. On December 19 (6) the Soviet of Workers' Deputies resolved to "strive to transform the strike into an armed uprising." As a matter of fact, however, none of the organisations were prepared for this. Even the Coalition Council of Fighting Units \*\* (*on December 22 [9]!*) referred to an uprising as something very remote. It is quite clear that it had no hand in or control of the street fighting that took place. The organisations did not keep pace with the growth and sweep of the movement.

The strike grew into an uprising, first and foremost, under the pressure of objective conditions created after October. The government could no longer be taken by surprise by a general strike: it had already organised the counter-revolution which was ready for military action. The general course of the Russian revolution after October, and the sequence of events in Moscow in the December days, have supplied striking proof of one of the most profound postulates of Marx: revolution progresses by creating a compact and strong counter-revolution, *i.e.*, it compels the enemy to resort to more and more extreme measures of defence and in this way devises more powerful means of attack.\*

December 20 (7) and 21 (8): a peaceful strike, peaceful mass demonstrations. Evening of the 21st: the siege of the Aquarium. The morning of the 22nd: the crowd on Strastnaya Square is attacked by the dragoons. Evening: the house of Fiedler is wrecked. Temper rises. The unorganised street crowds, absolutely spontaneously, but hesitatingly, set up the first barricades.

The 23rd (10): artillery fire is opened on the barricades and on the crowds in the streets. Barricades are set up more deliberately, and no longer singly but on a really mass scale. The whole population is in the streets; all the principal centres of the city are covered by a network of barricades. For several days stubborn guerilla fighting proceeds between the insurgent detachments and the troops. The troops become exhausted and Dubasov<sup>1</sup> is obliged to beg for reinforcements. Only on December 28 (15) did the government forces acquire complete superiority and on December 30 (17) the Semenov regiment stormed the Presnya district, the last stronghold of the uprising.

From strike and demonstrations to isolated barricades. From isolated barricades to the mass erection of barricades and street fighting against the troops. Over the heads of the organisations, the mass proletarian struggle passed from a strike to an uprising. This is the greatest historical achievement of the Russian revolution, and like all previous achievements, it was obtained at the price of enormous sacrifices. The movement was raised from a general political strike to a higher level. It compelled reaction

<sup>1</sup> The Military Governor-General of Moscow.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

to go to *extremes* in its resistance and so brought nearer the moment when the revolution will also go to extremes in the application of methods of attack. The reaction *cannot do more* than bombard barricades, houses and street crowds. But the revolution can go ever so much further than the Moscow fighting units went, it can grow ever so much wider and deeper. And the revolution has made great progress since December. The base of the revolutionary crisis has become immeasurably broader—the blade must now be sharpened to a keener edge.

The proletariat sensed the change in the objective conditions of the struggle and the need for a transition from the strike to an uprising sooner than its leaders. As is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory. A peaceful strike and demonstrations immediately ceased to satisfy the workers; they asked: what is to be done next? And they demanded more resolute action. The instructions to set up barricades reached the districts exceedingly late, when barricades were already being erected in the centre. The masses of the workers set to work, *but were not satisfied even with this*; they demanded to know: what is to be done next?—they demanded active measures. In December 1905, we, the leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, behaved like a commander-in-chief who had arranged the disposition of his troops in such an absurd way that most of them remained out of action. The masses of the workers demanded but failed to obtain instructions for resolute mass action.

Thus, nothing could be more short-sighted than Plekhanov's view, which is seized upon by all the opportunists, that the strike was inopportune and should not have been started and that they "should not have taken to arms."\* On the contrary, they should have taken to arms more resolutely, energetically and aggressively; it should have been explained to the masses that peaceful strikes by themselves are useless, and that fearless and ruthless armed fighting was required. The time has come when we must at last openly and publicly admit that political strikes are insufficient; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talk about "preliminary stages," or by

throwing a veil over it. To conceal from the masses the necessity for a desperate, sanguinary war of extermination as the immediate task of future revolutionary action means deceiving both ourselves and the people.

This is the first lesson of the December events. The other lesson refers to the character of the uprising, the methods by which it is carried out and the conditions under which the troops come over to the side of the people. An extremely one-sided view prevails on this matter in the Right wing of our Party. It is alleged that it is impossible to fight modern troops, that the troops must first become revolutionary. Of course, unless the revolution assumes a mass character and also affects the troops, serious fighting is out of the question. Work among the troops is, of course, necessary. But we must not imagine that the troops will come over to our side at one stroke, as it were, as a result of persuasion, or their own convictions. The Moscow uprising clearly demonstrated how stereotyped and lifeless this view is. As a matter of fact, the wavering of the troops, which is inevitable in every really popular movement, leads to a real *fight for the troops* whenever the revolutionary struggle becomes more acute. The Moscow uprising presented an example of the desperate, frantic struggle for the troops that takes place between the reaction and the revolution. Dubasov himself declared that only five thousand out of the fifteen thousand men of the Moscow garrison were reliable. The government restrained the waverers by the most varied and most desperate measures: they appealed to them, flattered them, bribed them, presented them with watches, money, etc.; they intoxicated them with vodka, they lied to them, threatened them, confined them to barracks and disarmed them; and those soldiers who were suspected of being least reliable were removed by treachery and violence. We must have the courage to confess openly and unreservedly that in this respect we lagged behind the government. We failed to utilise the forces at our disposal to wage an active, bold, enterprising and aggressive fight for the wavering troops, like that successfully waged by the government. We have carried on work in the army, and we will redouble our efforts in the future to "con-

vert" the army ideologically. But we shall prove to be miserable pedants if we forget that at the moment of the uprising a physical fight for the army is also necessary.

In the December days the Moscow proletariat taught us magnificent lessons in the art of ideologically "converting" the troops, as, for example, on December 21 (8) on Strastnaya Square, when the crowd surrounded the Cossacks, mingled and fraternised with them and persuaded them to go away. Or on December 23 (10) in the Presnya district, when two working girls, carrying a red flag in a crowd of 10,000 people, rushed towards the Cossacks and cried: "Kill us! We shall not surrender this flag as long as we are alive." And the Cossacks were disconcerted and galloped away followed by the shouts of the crowd: "Long live the Cossacks!" Such instances of courage and heroism must live forever in the memory of the proletariat.

But here are some instances of how we lagged behind Dubasov. On December 22, some soldiers were marching down Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street to join the insurgents singing the *Marseillaise*. The workers sent delegates to meet them. Malakhov<sup>1</sup> himself galloped at break-neck speed towards them. The workers were too late, Malakhov reached them first. He delivered a passionate speech, shook the resolution of the soldiers, surrounded them with dragoons, marched them off to the barracks and locked them in. Malakhov reached the soldiers, we did not, although two days after, 150,000 men rose at our call and these could and should have organised the patrolling of the streets. Malakhov surrounded the soldiers with dragoons, whereas we failed to surround the Malakhovs with bomb-throwers. We could and should have done this; and long ago the Social-Democratic press (the old *Iskra*\*) pointed out that it is our duty in time of an uprising to exterminate ruthlessly all the chiefs of the civil and military authorities. What took place on the Bolshaya Serpukhovskaya Street was repeated apparently in front of the Nesvizhsky barracks and Krutitsky barracks, and when attempts were made by the workers to "call out" the Ekaterinoslav regiment, and when delegates were sent to the sap-

<sup>1</sup> Chief of Staff of the Moscow military area.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

pers in Alexandrov, and when the Rostov artillery on its way to Moscow was turned back, and when the sappers were disarmed in Kolomna, etc. At the moment of the uprising we were not equal to our task in the fight for the wavering troops.

December confirmed another of Marx's profound postulates, which the opportunists have forgotten, namely, that rebellion is an art, and that the principal rule of this art is that a desperately bold and irrevocably determined offensive must be waged. We have not sufficiently assimilated this truth. We have not sufficiently learned, nor have we taught the masses this art and this rule of attacking at all costs. We must make up for this with all our energy. It is not enough to take sides in the question of political slogans; we must take sides also in the question of an armed uprising. Those who are opposed to armed uprising, those who do not prepare for it, must be ruthlessly cast out of the ranks of the supporters of the revolution and sent back to the ranks of its enemies, of the traitors or cowards; for the day is approaching when the force of events and conditions of the struggle will compel us to separate enemies from friends according to this principle. We must not preach passivity, nor advocate "waiting" until the troops "come over." No! We must proclaim from the housetops the need for a bold offensive and armed attack, the necessity at such times of exterminating the persons in command of the enemy and of a most energetic fight for the wavering troops.

The third great lesson taught by Moscow concerns tactics and the organisation of forces for the uprising. Military tactics are determined by the level of military technique. This plain truth was dinned into the ears of the Marxists by Engels.\* Military technique today is not what it was in the middle of the nineteenth century. It would be folly for crowds to contend against artillery and defend barricades with revolvers. Kautsky was right when he wrote that it is high time now, after Moscow, to revise Engels' conclusions, and that Moscow had inaugurated "*new barricade tactics.*"\*\* These tactics are the tactics of guerilla warfare. The organisation required for such tactics is that of mobile and exceedingly small units, units of ten, three or even two persons.

We often meet Social-Democrats who snicker whenever five-men and three-men units are mentioned. But snickering is only a cheap way of ignoring the *new* question of tactics and organisation called forth by street fighting under the conditions imposed by modern military technique. Study carefully the story of the Moscow uprising, gentlemen, and you will understand what connection exists between "five-men units" and the question of "new barricade tactics."

Moscow advanced these tactics but failed to develop them far enough, to apply them to any considerable extent, to a really mass extent. There were few units, the slogan of bold attack was not issued to the masses of the workers and they did not apply it; the guerilla detachments were too varied in character, their arms and methods were inadequate, their ability to lead the crowd was practically undeveloped. We must make up for all this and we shall do so by learning from the experience of Moscow, by spreading this experience among the masses and by rousing their creative efforts for the further development of that experience. And the guerilla warfare and mass terror which has been going on in Russia everywhere and almost continuously since December will undoubtedly help the masses to learn the correct tactics to be applied during an uprising. Social-Democracy must recognise and incorporate this mass terror into its tactics, organising and controlling it, of course, subordinating it to the interests and conditions of the labour movement and the general revolutionary struggle, while eliminating and ruthlessly lopping off the "*bosyak*"<sup>1</sup> perversion of this guerilla warfare which was so magnificently and ruthlessly suppressed by our Moscow comrades in the days of the uprising and by the Letts in the days of the notorious Lettish republics.\*

Military technique has made new progress recently. The Japanese war produced the hand grenade. The small arms factories have placed automatic rifles on the market. Both these weapons are already being successfully used in the Russian revolution, but to an inadequate extent. We can and must take advantage of improvements in technique, teach the workers' units to make

<sup>1</sup> Tramp, or slum elements.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

bombs in large quantities, help them and our fighting units to obtain supplies of explosives, fuses and automatic rifles. If the masses of the workers take part in uprisings in the towns, if mass attacks are made upon the enemy, if a determined and skilful fight is waged for the troops, who after the Duma, after Sveaborg and Kronstadt, are wavering still more—and the participation of the rural districts in the general struggle is secured—victory will be ours in the next all-Russian armed uprising.

Let us then more extensively develop our work and more boldly set our tasks, while assimilating the lessons of the great days of the Russian revolution. The basis of our work is the correct estimate of the class interests and the requirements of national development at the present time. Around the slogan: overthrow of the tsarist government and convocation of the constituent assembly by a revolutionary government, we are rallying and shall continue to rally an increasingly large section of the proletariat, the peasantry and the army. The development of the consciousness of the masses remains, as hitherto, the basis and the principal content of our work. But let us not forget that in addition to this general, constant and fundamental task, times like the present in Russia impose other and special tasks upon us. Let us not become pedants and philistines, let us not evade these special tasks of the moment, these special tasks of the given forms of struggle, by meaningless references to our permanent duties, which are immutable, irrespective of time and circumstances.

Let us remember that the great mass struggle is approaching. This will be an armed uprising. It must, as far as possible, be simultaneous. The masses must know that they are entering upon an armed, sanguinary and desperate struggle. Contempt for death must spread among the masses and thus secure victory. The offensive against the enemy must be most energetic; attack and not defence must become the slogan of the masses; the ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task; the organisation of the struggle will become mobile and flexible; the wavering elements of the troops will be drawn into the active struggle. The party of the class conscious proletariat must do its duty in this great struggle.

September 1906.



**PART IV**

**THE FIGHT AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS  
(1906-1907)**



## THE WORKERS' PARTY AND ITS TASKS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION \*

THE general tasks of students in the Russian liberation movement have been explained more than once in the Social-Democratic press and we shall not dwell on them in the present article. There is no need to explain to student Social-Democrats the leading role of the labour movement, the immense importance of the peasant movement, or the importance of rendering assistance to both by intellectuals who have mastered Marxism, who have come over to the side of the proletariat and who are prepared to train themselves to become real members of the workers' party.

We propose to dwell, though briefly, on another question which is now of paramount practical importance.

What is the special feature of the present state of the great Russian revolution?

It is that events have fully exposed the illusory nature of the Manifesto of October 30 (17). Constitutional illusions have been dispersed. Reaction is rampant all along the line. The autocracy has been fully restored and even "intensified" by the dictatorial powers granted to the local satraps, from Dubasov down to the lowest police ranks.

Civil war is raging. The political strike, as such, is beginning to exhaust itself, is becoming a thing of the past, an obsolete form of the movement. In St. Petersburg, for instance, the wearied and exhausted workers were not able to carry out the December strike. On the other hand, the movement as a whole, though hard pressed by the reaction, has undoubtedly risen to a much higher plane.

The heroic proletariat of Moscow has shown that it is possible to wage an active struggle, and has drawn into this struggle masses of people from such strata of the urban population

as have hitherto been regarded as politically indifferent, if not reactionary. And yet the Moscow events were merely a very striking expression of a "tendency," which is breaking out in every part of Russia. The new form of action was confronted with gigantic problems which, of course, could not be solved all at once. But these problems are now confronting the whole of the people in a clear and definite way; the movement has now been raised to a higher level, has become consolidated and tempered. No power on earth can wrest these gains from the revolution.

Dubasov's guns have revolutionised new masses of the people on an unprecedented scale. The somewhat renovated caricature of a Duma was greeted in advance with far greater hostility by the advanced fighters, and with incomparably greater scepticism by the bourgeoisie, than the old Bulygin Duma.<sup>1</sup>

What now?

Let us look realities squarely in the face. We are now confronted with the new task of assimilating and studying the experience of the latest forms of struggle, with the task of training and organising forces in the most important centres of the movement.

It would be greatly to the advantage of the government to suppress isolated actions of the proletarians as it has been doing. The government would like to challenge the workers of St. Petersburg to go into battle at once under circumstances that would be most unfavourable for them. But the workers will not allow themselves to be provoked and will be able to continue their path of independent preparation for the next all-Russian action.

Forces for such an action are available: they are growing faster than ever. Only a small part of these forces was drawn into the vortex of the December events. The movement has not by any means developed to its full breadth and depth.

It is enough to glance at the moderate bourgeois and Black Hundred press. No one, not even *Novoye Vremya*, believes the government's boast that it is able to nip in the bud any new active manifestation of the movement. No one doubts that the gigantic mass of combustible matter—the peasantry—will flare

<sup>1</sup> See article *The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma* in this volume.—Ed.

up properly only towards the spring. No one believes that the government is sincerely anxious to convene the Duma, or that it is able to do so under the old system of repressions, red tape, bureaucracy, absence of civic rights and ignorance.

It is not the unfounded optimism of revolutionaries, which is extremely dangerous in a question like that of decisive action, but obvious facts, acknowledged even by the opponents of the revolution, which indicate that the government gained a "victory" in Moscow which rendered its position even more desperate than it was prior to October.

The peasant uprising is growing. Financial collapse is drawing near. The gold currency is declining. The deficit of half a billion rubles cannot be made good in spite of the readiness of the reactionary bourgeoisie of Europe to come to the aid of the autocracy. All the troops fit to fight against the revolution have been brought into action and still the "pacification" of the Caucasus and Siberia \* is delayed. The ferment in the army and navy, which became so marked after October 30, will certainly not be allayed by resort to violence against the champions of liberty all over Russia. The return of the war prisoners and the Manchurian army means an intensification of that ferment. The mobilisation of new army units against the internal enemy creates new dangers for the autocracy. The crisis is not solved; on the contrary, it has been extended and made more acute by the Moscow "victory."

Let the party of the workers clearly realise its tasks. Down with constitutional illusions! We must gather the new forces which are siding with the proletariat. We must "gather the experience" of the two great months (November and December) of the revolution. We must adapt ourselves again to the restored autocracy, and be able wherever necessary to go underground once more. We must present the colossal tasks of a new action in a more definite and practical way, prepare ourselves for them in a more sustained, systematic and persistent fashion, and in doing so, husband as far as possible the strength of the proletariat which has become exhausted by the strike struggle.

Wave follows on wave. After the capital—the provinces. After

the border lands—the very heart of Russia. After the proletariat—the urban petty bourgeoisie. After the cities—the villages. The efforts of the reactionary government to carry out its vast task are inevitably doomed to failure. The outcome of the first phase of the Great Russian Revolution will largely depend on our preparation for the spring of 1906.

January 1906.

## SHOULD WE BOYCOTT THE STATE DUMA? \*

### THE PLATFORM OF THE "MAJORITY"

THE party of the working class, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, is becoming united. Its two halves are merging and are preparing for a Unity Congress \*\* the convening of which has already been announced.

But there is still disagreement between the two sections of the Party on the attitude to be adopted towards the State Duma. All Party members must be clear on this question in order to make an intelligent choice of delegates for the joint congress, in order to settle the dispute in accordance with the wishes of all members of the Party, and not only with those of its present central and local institutions.

Bolsheviks and Mensheviks are agreed that the present Duma is a miserable travesty of popular representation, that it is necessary to fight against this deception and to prepare for an armed uprising for the convocation of a constituent assembly freely elected by the whole of the people.

The dispute is only about the tactics to be adopted towards the Duma. The Mensheviks say: our Party must take part in the election of delegates and electors.<sup>1</sup> The Bolsheviks advocate an active boycott of the Duma. In this leaflet we shall expound the views of the Bolsheviks, who at the recent conference of representatives of twenty-six organisations of the R.S.D.L.P.\*\*\* passed a resolution against participation in the elections.

What does an active boycott of the Duma mean? Boycott means refusal to take part in the elections. We do not wish to elect either Duma deputies, electors or delegates. Active boycott

<sup>1</sup> Elections to this Duma were indirect and carried out in several stages. The voters voted for delegates, who elected "electors," who finally elected the Duma deputies.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

does not merely mean abstaining from voting; it means also making extensive use of election meetings for Social-Democratic agitation and organisation. To make use of these meetings means gaining entry to them both legally (by registering in the voters' lists) and illegally, in order to state the whole programme and all the views of the socialists, to expose the Duma as a fraud and humbug and to call for a struggle for the constituent assembly.

Why do we refuse to take part in the elections?

Because by taking part in the elections we would involuntarily foster faith in the Duma among the people and weaken the effectiveness of our struggle against this perversion of popular representation. The Duma is not a parliament, it is the autocracy's subterfuge for one. We must prevent this subterfuge by refusing to take any part in the elections.

Because if we recognised the admissibility of taking part in the elections, we would have to be logical and elect deputies to the Duma. The bourgeois democrats, Khodsky, in *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo*,\* for example, advise us to make election bargains with the Cadets for that purpose. But all Social-Democrats, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, reject such proposals because they realise that the Duma is not a parliament, but a new police fraud.

Because we cannot now derive any advantage from the elections. There is no freedom of agitation. The party of the working class is outlawed; its representatives are arrested and imprisoned without trial; its newspapers are suppressed; its meetings are prohibited. The Party cannot legally unfurl its banner at the elections, it cannot publicly put forward its delegates without betraying them to the police. Under such conditions our work of agitation and organisation is far better served by our making revolutionary use of meetings without elections than by taking part in meetings for legal elections.

The Mensheviks reject the election of deputies to the Duma, but wish to elect delegates and electors. What for? Is it in order to form them into a People's Duma, or a free, illegal, representative assembly, something like an All-Russian Soviet of Workers' (and also Peasants') Deputies?

To this we rejoin: if free representatives are needed, why pay any attention to the Duma when electing them? Why supply the police with the lists of our representatives? And why set up new Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and in a new way, when the old Soviet of Workers' Deputies still exists (e.g., in St. Petersburg)? This would be useless and even harmful, for it might give rise to utopian illusions that the decadent and disintegrating Soviets can be revived by new elections instead of by making new preparations for and extending the uprising. And it would simply be ridiculous to appoint legal elections within lawfully fixed periods for the purpose of an uprising.

The Mensheviks argue that Social-Democrats of all countries take part in parliaments, even in bad parliaments. This argument is wrong. We too will take full part in a parliament. But the Mensheviks themselves realise that the Duma is not a parliament, they themselves refuse to go into it. They say that the masses of the workers are weary and wish to take a rest by participating in legal elections. But the Party cannot and must not base its tactics on the temporary weariness of certain centres. To do this would be tantamount to destroying the Party, for weary workers would elect non-Party electors who would only discredit the Party. We must persistently and patiently pursue our work while husbanding the strength of the proletariat; but we must not cease believing that this depression is only temporary, that the workers will rise still more powerfully and more boldly than they did in Moscow, that they will sweep away the tsar's Duma. Let the unenlightened and ignorant go into the Duma—the Party will not bind its fate with them. The Party will say to them: your own experience will confirm our political forecasts. Your own experience will reveal to you what an utter fraud the Duma is, and you will then return to the Party, having realised the correctness of its counsel.

The tactics of the Mensheviks are self-contradictory and inconsistent (to take part in the elections, but not to elect deputies to the Duma). They are unsuitable for a mass party, for instead of a simple and clear solution it supplies one that is involved and ambiguous. They are not practical, for if the lists of dele.

gates fall into the hands of the police, the Party will suffer a heavy loss. Finally, these tactics are impractical, because if the Mensheviks appear at the meetings with our programme, the inevitable result will be that instead of having legal elections they will have the illegal utilisation of meetings without elections. The police-created conditions will transform the participation of the Mensheviks at meetings from Menshevik participation in elections to Bolshevik revolutionary utilisation of meetings.

Down with the Duma! Down with the new police deception! Citizens! Honour the memory of the fallen Moscow heroes with fresh preparations for an armed uprising! Long live the freely elected national constituent assembly!

Such is our fighting slogan; and this slogan is compatible only with the tactics of an active boycott.

January 1906.

## THE DISSOLUTION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT \*

THE dissolution of the Duma confronts the workers' party with a number of questions of great importance. Let us note the most important of these: 1) general estimation of the importance of this political event in the course of our revolution; 2) definition of the content of the future struggle and of the slogans under which it must be carried on; 3) definition of the forms of this future struggle; 4) choice of the moment for the struggle, or, to be more correct, estimation of the conditions which would assist in the choice of the moment.

We shall deal briefly with these questions.

### I

The dissolution of the Duma has most clearly and strikingly confirmed the views of those who uttered a warning against being deceived by the "constitutional" appearance of the Duma and, if one may express it so, by the constitutional surface of Russian politics during the second quarter of 1906. Experience has completely exposed the hollowness of the "high-sounding words" poured forth by our Cadets (and Cadetophiles) before the Duma, about the Duma and in connection with the Duma.

Note this interesting fact: the Duma has been dissolved on *strictly constitutional grounds*. It was not "dispersed." There has been no infringement of the law. On the contrary, it has been done strictly in accordance with the law, as under any "constitutional monarchy." The supreme power has dissolved the Chamber on the basis of the "constitution." On the basis of such and such an article the present "Chamber" has been dissolved, and by the same ukase (rejoice, you legalists!) new elections, or the date of summoning a new Duma, has been fixed.

But all this merely reveals the deceptive character of the Russian constitution, the fiction of our "native" parliamentarism—repeatedly pointed out during the whole of the first half of 1906 by the Left-wing Social-Democrats. And now the special character of the Russian constitution has been admitted not by the "narrow-minded and fanatical" "Bolsheviks," but by the most peaceful legalist-liberals, and they have admitted this by *their own conduct*. The Cadets have admitted this by replying to the dissolution of the Duma by a mass "flight abroad," to Vyborg, and by a manifesto, which infringes the law,\* by replying and continuing to reply in articles in the most moderate *Rech*, which is forced to admit that *as a matter of fact* the question at issue is the restoration of the autocracy, that Suvorin inadvertently blurted out the truth when he wrote that it was hardly likely that he would live long enough to see the next "Duma." All the hopes of the Cadets have now been suddenly transferred from "constitution" to revolution, and all this as a result of a single, strictly constitutional act of the supreme power. And only yesterday the Cadets boasted in the Duma that they were the "shield of the dynasty" and adherents of strict constitutionalism.

The logic of life is stronger than the logic of textbooks on constitutional law. Revolution teaches.

Everything the "Bolshevik" Social-Democrats have written about the Cadet victories has been strikingly confirmed. (Cf. the pamphlet, *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*, by N. Lenin.\*\*\*) All the one-sidedness and short-sightedness of the Cadets have become obvious. Constitutional illusions—the bogey by which the obstinate Bolsheviks were recognised—now rise up before everyone as nothing but illusions, a phantom, a deceptive vision.

"There is no Duma!" *Moskovskiy Vyedomosti* and *Grazhdanin* \*\*\* cry out in a wild frenzy of rejoicing. "There is no constitution!" sadly repeat the Cadets, the fine connoisseurs of our constitution, who used to quote it so cleverly, to gloat so over its clauses. The Social-Democrats will neither exult (we made some use even of the Duma) nor lose heart. They will

say that the people have gained by losing one of their illusions.

Yes, in the person of the Cadet Party, the whole of the Russian people is learning its lessons, learning not from books, but from its own revolution, which it is itself creating. On one occasion we said that in the person of the Cadets the people is ridding itself of its first bourgeois emancipation illusions and that in the person of the Trudoviki it is freeing itself of its last bourgeois emancipation illusions.\* The Cadets dreamed of liberation from serfdom, from tyranny, from arrogance, Asiatic despotism, autocracy, *without* the overthrow of the old government. The limited aspirations of the Cadets have already suffered bankruptcy. The Trudoviki dream of freeing the masses from poverty, of putting an end to the exploitation of man by man *without* destroying the system of commodity production; they have still to suffer bankruptcy, and in the very near future too, if our revolution leads to the complete victory of our revolutionary peasants.

The rapid rise of the Cadet Party, their intoxicating victories at the elections, their triumph in the Cadet Duma, their sudden collapse, with a single stroke of the pen of the "beloved monarch" (who, one might say, spat in Rodichev's<sup>1</sup> face in spite of the latter's protestations of love)—all these are events of serious political consequence; they all mark stages in the revolutionary development of the *people*. In 1906 the people, *i.e.*, the great mass of the population, had not yet, as a whole, grown up to be consciously revolutionary. The consciousness that the autocracy is unbearable had become general, and so also had the consciousness of the utter worthlessness of the government of bureaucrats and of the need for popular representation. But the people could not yet understand and realise that the continued existence of the old government and popular representation *with power* were incompatible. It transpired that special experience, the experience of the Cadet Duma, was required for this.

During its short span of life the Cadet Duma strikingly demonstrated to the people the difference between popular representa-

<sup>1</sup> One of the Cadet leaders.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

tion *without power* and popular representation *with power*. Our slogan, the constituent assembly (*i.e.*, popular representation with *full power*), has proved to be a thousand times right, but life, *i.e.*, the revolution, has led towards it by a longer and more circuitous road than we were able to foresee.

Cast a general glance at the main stages of the great Russian revolution and you will see how, *through experience*, the people, step by step, approached the slogan of the constituent assembly. First we have the epoch of "confidence" at the end of 1904.\* The Cadets are exultant. They occupy the entire foreground. Some not very steadfast Social-Democrats even speak of the existence of *two* main forces at that time, the liberals and the government. And the *people* become permeated with the idea of "confidence." On January 22 (9) the people go "confidently" to the Winter Palace. The epoch of "confidence" gives rise to a third force, the proletariat, and engenders the greatest *mistrust* of the people toward the autocratic government. The epoch of "confidence" ends by the people refusing to believe the government's *words* about "confidence."

The next stage. The Bulygin Duma is promised.<sup>1</sup> Confidence is confirmed by action. The people's representatives are to be summoned. The liberals are exultant and call for participation in the elections. The liberal professors, as befits these "ideological" lackeys of the bourgeoisie, call upon the students to concern themselves with their studies and not to meddle with the revolution. Some not very steadfast Social-Democrats succumb to the arguments of the liberals. The people appear on the scene. By the October strike the proletariat sweeps away the Bulygin Duma and seizes liberty, wins the manifesto, a manifesto quite constitutional in form and content. The people learn by experience that it is not enough to obtain a promise of liberty, that one must also *have the strength to seize liberty*.

Next. In December the government withdraws the liberties won. The proletariat rises. The first uprising is crushed. But the stubborn and desperate armed fighting in the streets of Mos-

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 12.—*Ed.*

cow makes the summoning of the Duma unavoidable. The boycott of the proletariat does not succeed. The proletariat is not strong enough to overthrow the Witte Duma.<sup>1</sup> The Cadets enter the Duma in force. Representation of the people is an accomplished fact. The Cadets are exultant. Their cries of joy are boundless. The proletariat waits sceptically.

The Duma begins to work. The people make ten times more use of the slight extension of liberties than the Cadets. In spirit and determination the Cadet Duma proves to *lag behind* the people. The epoch of the Cadet Duma (May and June 1906) proves to be the epoch of the greatest successes for the parties to the *Left* of the Cadets: the Trudoviki overtake the Cadets in the Duma; at public meetings the Cadets are censured for their lack of courage; the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary press gains ground; the revolutionary peasants' movement gathers force; the army is in a ferment; the proletariat, exhausted by the December events, revives. The epoch of Cadet constitutionalism proves to be the epoch, not of a Cadet and constitutional movement, but of a revolutionary movement.

*This movement compels* the government to dissolve the Duma. Experience confirms the fact that the Cadets are merely "froth." Their strength is derived from the strength of the revolution. And to the revolution the government replies by the dissolution of the Duma, an act revolutionary in substance, though constitutional in form.

The people are convinced *by experience* that popular representation is naught if it is not vested with full power, if it is summoned by the old government, if the old government remains intact side by side with it. The objective course of events puts on the order of the day, not the question of how the laws or the constitution are worded, but that of *power*, of real power. Laws, deputies are *naught* if they are not possessed of power. This is what the Cadet Duma has *taught* the people. Let us then sing to the eternal memory of the deceased, and let us take full advantage of the lesson it taught.

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 13.\*—*Ed.*

## II

This brings us to the second question, *viz.*, the historically dictated, objective content of the coming struggle and of the slogans which we must provide for it.

The not very steadfast Social-Democrats, the Mensheviks, have in this instance also managed to display vacillation. Their first slogan was: fight for the *resumption of the Duma sessions* for the purpose of summoning the constituent assembly. The St. Petersburg Committee protests against this. The absurdity of such a slogan is too manifest. It is not even opportunism, it is sheer nonsense. The Central Committee makes a slight advance with the slogan: *fight against the government in defence of the Duma for the purpose of summoning the constituent assembly.*\* This, of course, is better. It is not far removed from the slogan: fight for the *overthrow* of the autocratic government in order to summon the constituent assembly in a revolutionary way. The dissolution of the Duma undoubtedly provides an opportunity for a nation-wide struggle for popular representation *with power*; in this sense the slogan "in defence of the Duma" is not entirely unacceptable. But the point is that *in this sense* this slogan is already implied in the fact that we have accepted the dissolution of the Duma as the *grounds* for the struggle. The formula "in defence of the Duma" without *this* special interpretation of it (*i.e.*, in the sense just stated) remains obscure and is liable to create misunderstanding, is liable to carry us back to the old, to what is to a certain extent obsolete, to the *Cadet* Duma. In short, this formula gives rise to a number of incorrect and harmful "retrogressive" ideas. What is correct in this formula is wholly and entirely embodied in the *reasons* for our decision to fight, in the *explanation* of why the dissolution of the Duma is a sufficiently important ground for fighting.

A Marxist must under no circumstances forget that the slogan of the *imminent* fight cannot be deduced simply and directly from the *general* slogan of a certain programme. It is not sufficient to refer to our programme (see last part: "The Overthrow of the Autocracy and the Constituent Assembly," etc.)

to determine the slogan of the struggle that is *now* impending, in the summer or autumn of 1906. For this purpose the *concrete* historical situation must be examined, the whole development and the whole consecutive march of the revolution must be traced; our tasks must be deduced not only from the principles of the programme, but also from the *preceding* steps and stages of the movement. Only such an analysis will be a truly historical analysis, binding for a dialectical materialist.

And precisely such an analysis shows us that the objective political situation has now *brought forward* the question, not of whether popular representation exists, but whether this popular representation possesses *power*.

The objective cause for the downfall of the Cadet Duma was not that it was unable to express the needs of the people, but that it was unable to cope with the *revolutionary* task of fighting for *power*. The Cadet Duma regarded itself as a constitutional organ, but in actual fact it *was* a revolutionary organ (the Cadets abused us for regarding the Duma as a stage and an instrument of the revolution, but life has fully confirmed *our view*). The Cadet Duma considered itself to be an organ of struggle against the *Ministry*, but in actual fact it was an organ of struggle for the complete *overthrow* of the old government. This is what it became in actual fact, because this is what the given economic situation demanded. And for *this* struggle, an organ like the Cadet Duma *proved to be* "useless."

The thought that is now hammering itself into the head of even the most ignorant muzhik is: the Duma is of no use, no Duma is of any use, *if the people have no power*. But how to get power? By *overthrowing* the old government and establishing a new, popular, free and elected government. *Either* overthrow the old government, *or* admit that the tasks of the revolution in the scope presented by the peasantry and proletariat cannot be fulfilled.

This is how *life itself* has put the question. This is how 1906 has put the question. And this is how it has been put by the dissolution of the Cadet Duma.

We cannot, of course, guarantee that the revolution will solve

the problem at one stroke, that the struggle will be an easy and simple one, that victory is completely and absolutely certain. No one can ever give such guarantees on the eve of the struggle. A slogan is not a guarantee of simple and easy victory. A slogan is but an indication of the *aim* to be achieved in order to fulfil *certain* tasks. In the past, immediate tasks were to create (or summon) popular, representative institutions. Now the task is to secure *power* for the popular representative institutions. This means the removal, the destruction, the *overthrow* of the old government, the overthrow of the autocratic government.

Unless this problem is *fully* solved, popular representation *cannot* have full power; hence, there cannot be adequate guarantees that the new, popular, representative institution will not meet with the same fate as the Cadet Duma.

The objective state of affairs at the present time is giving rise to a fight, not for popular representation, but for the creation of such conditions as will render the dispersion, or the dissolution, of the popular representative institution impossible, as will make it impossible for it to be reduced to a farce, as was done to the Cadet Duma by Trepov and Co.

### III

The form which the coming struggle will probably take is partly determined by its content and partly by the preceding forms of the revolutionary struggle of the people and of the counter-revolutionary struggle of the autocracy.

As to the content of the struggle, we have already shown that after two years of revolution it has now become concentrated on the overthrow of the old government. The complete achievement of this aim is possible only by means of an armed uprising of the whole of the people.

As to the preceding forms of the struggle, the "last word" of the mass movement of the whole of the people in Russia was the general strike and the uprising. The last quarter of 1905 could not but leave ineffaceable traces in the mind and in the temper of the proletariat, of the peasantry, of the conscious sections

of the army and of the democratic sections of the various professional unions of the intellectuals. It is quite natural, therefore, that after the dissolution of the Duma, the first thought that should enter the minds of the great mass of the elements capable of fighting was: the general strike. No one seemed to entertain any doubt that the reply to the dissolution of the Duma *must* inevitably be an all-Russian strike.

The universal acceptance of this opinion was of some use. Nearly everywhere the revolutionary organisations deliberately and systematically *restrained* the workers from spontaneous and partial outbursts. Information about this is being received from all over Russia. The experience of October-December undoubtedly helped to concentrate everyone's attention to a much greater degree than before on *general and simultaneous* action. Furthermore, another very characteristic fact must be noted: to judge from the information that is coming in from some of the big centres of the workers' movement, for example, from St. Petersburg, the workers not only quickly and easily appreciated the need for general and simultaneous action, but firmly insisted on *militant* and determined action! The hopeless idea of a *demonstration* strike against the dissolution of the Duma (a one-day or three-day strike), which was suggested by several St. Petersburg Mensheviks,\* met with the determined opposition of the workers. The true class instinct and experience of those who had more than once waged a serious struggle at once suggested to them that this was not the time for demonstrations. We shall not demonstrate, said the workers. We shall enter into a desperate, determined fight when the moment for general action arrives. Judging from the available information, this was the general opinion of the St. Petersburg workers. They understood that partial actions, and demonstrations in particular, would be ridiculous after all that Russia had lived through since 1901 (the year in which the widespread demonstration movement began), that the intensification of the political crisis would preclude the possibility of again "starting from the beginning," that peaceful demonstrations would be playing into the hands of the government which had "tasted blood" with satisfaction in De-

ember. Peaceful demonstrations would exhaust the proletariat to no purpose and would merely provide exercise for the police and the soldiers in the hunting and shooting of unarmed people. They would to some extent confirm Stolypin's boast that he had achieved victory over the revolution by dissolving the Duma without intensifying the anti-government movement by it. Now everyone thinks this is an empty boast, for everyone knows and feels that the fight is still ahead. If a "demonstration" were organised it would have been interpreted as a struggle, it would have been converted into a (hopeless) struggle, and the cessation of the demonstration would have been proclaimed throughout the world as another defeat.

The idea of a demonstration strike is only worthy of our Ledru-Rollin of the Cadet Party, who overrated parliamentarism as short-sightedly as did Ledru-Rollin in 1849.\* The proletariat rejected this idea at once and it did well to reject it. The workers, who have always stood face to face with the revolutionary struggle, estimated better than did some intellectuals both the readiness of the enemy to fight and the need for resolute militant action.

Unfortunately, owing to the predominance of Right-wing Social-Democrats in the Russian section of our Party at the present time, the question of militant action has been neglected. The Unity Congress of Russian Social-Democrats was carried off its feet by the Cadet victories, it was incapable of appreciating the revolutionary significance of the present situation, and it shirked the tasks of drawing conclusions from the experience of October-December. But the necessity of taking advantage of this experience confronted the Party much sooner and much more sharply than some devotees of parliamentarism expected. The consternation shown by the central institutions of our Party at the critical moment was the inevitable outcome of this state of affairs.

The combining of a mass political strike with an armed uprising is again dictated by the whole situation. At the same time the weak features of a strike as an independent means of struggle stand out in striking relief. Everyone is convinced that one

extremely important condition for the success of a political strike is suddenness, the possibility of catching the government unawares. At present this is impossible. The government learned in December how to fight a strike, and at the present moment it is very well prepared for such a fight. Everyone is pointing to the very great importance of the railways during a general strike. If the railways stop running—the strike has every chance of becoming general. If that condition does not obtain—the strike is almost certain not to be general. But it is particularly difficult for the railwaymen to declare a strike; punitive trains stand in full readiness, armed detachments of soldiers are located all along the line, at the stations, sometimes even in the trains. A strike under such conditions may mean—in the majority of cases it must mean—direct and immediate conflict with the armed forces. The engine driver, the telegraphist, the switchman, will be faced with the dilemma: either to be shot on the spot (Golutvino, Lubertsi and other stations on the Russian railway system have not acquired revolutionary fame all over Russia for nothing) or to start work and break the strike.

Of course, we are right in expecting great heroism from very many of the railway workers and employees who have proved their devotion to the cause of liberty *in deeds*. Of course, the idea of denying the possibility of a railway strike and its chances of success is remote from our minds. But we have no right to hide the *real* difficulties of the task from ourselves: to gloss over such difficulties would be the worst of all policies. If we face realities, if we do not bury our heads in the sand, it will be clear that a strike must inevitably and immediately develop into an armed uprising. A railway strike *is* an uprising, this cannot be disputed after what happened in December. But without a railway strike, the railways will not stop running, the telegraph will not stop working, the conveyance of letters by rail will not be interrupted and, consequently, a post and telegraph strike on a large scale will also be impossible.

Thus, the inexorable logic of the situation that has developed since December 1905 proves that the strike is subordinate to the uprising. Whether we like it or not, and all “directives” not-

withstanding, the acute revolutionary situation is bound to convert a demonstration into a strike, a protest into a fight, a strike into an uprising. Of course, an uprising can flare up as an armed mass struggle only provided it is actively supported by one or another section of the army. Therefore, a strike of the troops, their refusal to shoot at the people, can undoubtedly in certain cases lead to the victory of a merely peaceful strike. But there is hardly any need to prove that such cases would be but single episodes in an exceptionally successful uprising, and there is only one way to increase the number of such episodes, to make them possible, and that is: successful preparation for an uprising, the display of energy and strength in the first insurgent actions, demoralisation of the troops by desperately daring attacks or by the desertion of a large section of the army, etc.

In short, in the situation as it now exists, at the moment of the dissolution of the Duma, there can be no doubt that an active fight must lead directly and immediately to an uprising. Perhaps the situation will change; in that case it will be necessary to revise this conclusion; but for the time being it is absolutely indisputable. Therefore, to call for an all-Russian strike without calling for an uprising, not to explain the indissoluble connection between a strike and an uprising, would be frivolousness bordering on crime. Therefore, all efforts must be concentrated on explaining, in our agitation, the connection between the various forms of the struggle, on preparing the conditions that will enable the three streams of the struggle to merge into a single torrent: a workers' outbreak, a peasant uprising and an army "revolt." These *three forms* of the really popular, *i.e., mass*, active movement—ininitely remote from a mere conspiracy—*insurrection* which overthrows the autocracy, became clearly defined long ago, in the summer of last year, at the time of the famous mutiny of the "Potemkin."<sup>1</sup> The success of an all-Russian uprising probably depends most of all upon the converging of these three streams. No doubt the dissolution of the Duma will serve as the grounds for a struggle

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 9.—*Ed.*

that will help to make these streams converge, because the most backward section of the peasants (and, consequently, of our army, which mainly consists of peasants) had set great hopes on the Duma.

Hence the conclusion: to make the greatest possible use of the dissolution of the Duma as the basis for concentrated agitation and for an appeal for a general uprising; to explain the connection between a political strike and an uprising; to direct all efforts towards achieving unity and towards bringing about joint action on the part of the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors in an active, armed struggle.

Finally, when speaking of the form of the movement it is necessary to mention the peasants' struggle separately. Here the connection between a strike and an uprising is particularly clear. It is also clear that here the purpose of insurrection must be, not only the complete destruction, or removal, of all local authorities and their replacement by new, by popularly elected authorities (the common aim of all uprisings, whether in towns, villages or the army, etc.), but also the *expulsion of the landlords and the seizure of their lands*. The peasant must undoubtedly aim at the *actual* abolition of the landlord estates pending the decision of the constituent assembly. There is no need to say much about this, because no one, probably, can conceive of a peasant uprising without the peasants settling accounts with the landlords and seizing their lands. It goes without saying that the more conscious and organised such an uprising is, the fewer will be the instances of destruction of buildings, property, livestock, etc. From a military point of view, for achieving certain military ends, destruction—for example, the burning down of buildings and sometimes of property—is quite a legitimate measure and a necessary one in certain cases. Only pedants (or traitors to the people) can lament the fact that the peasants always have recourse to such methods. Nevertheless, we need not conceal from ourselves the fact that the destruction of property is sometimes only the result of lack of organisation, of the inability of the peasants to *take* and retain the property of the enemy instead of destroying it—or it is the result of *weakness, i.e., the*

struggling party *wreaks vengeance* on the enemy because it is not strong enough to *destroy* or to crush him. Of course, in our agitation we must, on the one hand, fully explain to the peasants that it is quite legitimate and necessary to wage a pitiless struggle against the enemy and even to go to the extent of destroying his property, and, on the other hand, we must show that the degree of organisation will determine the possibility of a much more rational and advantageous outcome of the struggle, *i.e.*, the possibility of destroying the enemy (landlords and bureaucrats, the police in particular) and transferring all property to the people, or to the peasants, without damage (or with the least possible damage).

## IV

The question of the form of the struggle is closely bound up with the question of the *organisation* for the struggle.

In this respect, too, the great historical experience of October-December 1905 has left indelible traces on the revolutionary movement of today. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar bodies (Peasants' Committees, Railwaymen's Committees, Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies, etc.) enjoy tremendous and fully deserved prestige. It would not be easy at present to find a Social-Democrat, or a revolutionary belonging to other parties and trends, who would not favour similar organisations generally, and who would not recommend their formation, particularly at the present moment.

It seems to me there is no difference of opinion, or at least no serious difference of opinion, on this point. Hence, there is no need to dwell on this particular question.

But there is one aspect which we must pause to consider with particular attention because it is most often ignored, *viz.*, that the role which the Soviets of Workers' Deputies (for the sake of brevity we shall speak of them as representing the *type* of all organisations of this kind) played in the great October and December days surrounded them with something like a halo, so that sometimes they are treated almost as fetishes. People imagine that these organs are "necessary and sufficient" for a mas

revolutionary movement at all times and in all circumstances. Hence the uncritical attitude towards the choice of the moment for the creation of such bodies, towards the question of what the real conditions are for the success of their activities.

The experience of October-December has provided very instructive guidance on this point. Soviets of Workers' Deputies are organs of *direct mass struggle*. They originated as organs of the *strike struggle*. By force of circumstances they very quickly became the organs of the *general revolutionary struggle* against the government. By the force of events and the transition from strike to uprising, they *irresistibly* became transferred *into organs of insurrection*. It is an absolutely indisputable fact that this was precisely the role that was played in December by quite a number of "soviets" and "committees." Events proved in the most striking and convincing manner that the strength and importance of such organs in time of action depend *entirely* upon the strength and success of the insurrection.

It was not some theory, not somebody's appeals or tactics devised by somebody, it was not party doctrine, but the force of circumstances that caused these non-party mass organs to realise the need for insurrection and transformed them into organs of the insurrection.

To form such organs in the present circumstances means creating organs of insurrection; to call for the creation of such organs means calling for insurrection. To forget this, or to slur over it before the great masses of the population, would be unpardonable short-sightedness and politics of the worst sort.

This being the case—and undoubtedly it is the case—the conclusion to be drawn is quite clear, *viz.*, that "soviets" and similar mass institutions are not *sufficient* for the purpose of organising the insurrection. They are necessary for welding the masses together, for creating unity in the struggle, for passing on party slogans (or slogans advanced by agreement between parties) of political leadership, for awakening the interest of, rousing and attracting the masses. But they are not sufficient for the purpose of organising the *fighting forces proper, for organising the insurrection* in the most literal sense of the word.

A slight illustration. Not infrequently the Soviets of Workers' Deputies have been called the parliaments of the working class. But no worker would consent to summon a workers' parliament for the purpose of handing it over to the police. All workers would admit that it is necessary immediately to *organise forces*, to set up a *military* organisation to protect their "parliament," an organisation consisting of detachments of armed workers.

Now that the government has learned very well by experience what "soviets" lead to and what kind of institutions they are, now that the government has armed itself from head to foot and is waiting for such institutions to be formed in order to attack the enemy without giving him a chance to look around and develop his activities, it is especially incumbent upon us to explain in our agitation the need for a sober view of things, the need for a *military organisation*, in addition to the organisation of soviets, for the defence of the soviets, for carrying through the uprising without which soviets, or any person elected by the masses, will remain powerless.

These "military organisations," if one may so call them, must strive to rally the masses not through the medium of elected persons, but to rally the masses who directly participate in street fighting and the civil war. The nuclei of such organisations should be very small, voluntary units of tens, fives, perhaps even of threes. We must most emphatically proclaim that a battle is approaching in which it will be the duty of *every* honest citizen to be ready to sacrifice himself and fight against the oppressors of the people. Less formality, less red tape, more simplicity in organisation which must be as mobile and as flexible as possible. All those who wish to adhere to the side of liberty must at once come together in fighting "fives"—voluntary associations of persons of one trade, of one factory, or of people connected by ties of comradeship, or by party ties, or finally by proximity of residence (living in one village, in one house, in one town, or in one flat). These associations must be party and non-party, bound together by the single, immediate, revolutionary task: to bring about an uprising against the government. Such associations must be formed on the widest possible scale *even before*

arms are obtained, *irrespective* of whether arms can be obtained or not.

No party organisation will "arm" the masses. Just the reverse, the organisation of the masses into light, mobile, small fighting units will, at the moment of the uprising, render a very great service in the work of procuring arms.

Voluntary fighting associations, associations of *druzhinniki*,<sup>1</sup> if we adopt the name made so honourable by the great December days in Moscow, will be of tremendous value at the moment of the outbreak. A detachment that can shoot will be able to disarm a policeman, suddenly attack a patrol and thus procure arms. A detachment which cannot shoot, or which has no arms, will assist in building barricades, in reconnoitring, organising *liaisons*, setting ambushes for the enemy, burning down the houses where the enemy has taken up his position, occupying apartments to serve as bases for the insurgents—in a word, thousands of the most diverse functions can be performed by free associations of people who are determined to fight to the last gasp, who know the locality well, who are most closely in contact with the population.

Let an appeal be made at each factory, in each trade union and in each village for the formation of such voluntary, fighting detachments. People who are well known to each other will form them in advance. People who do not know each other will form detachments of fives and tens on the day of the fight, on the spot where the fighting is going on, if the idea of forming such detachments is widely spread among and adopted by the masses.

At the present time, when the dissolution of the Duma has stirred up a great many new strata among the population, one frequently hears the most revolutionary responses and declarations from the rank and file representatives of the least organised sections of the common town population, even of those who are most "Black Hundred"-like in appearance. Let us then make sure that they all know of the decision of the vanguard of the workers and peasants soon to start a fight for land and liberty,

<sup>1</sup> Members of the fighting detachments, called *druzhini* in Russian.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

that they are all aware of the need of forming detachments of fighters, that they are all convinced of the inevitability of an uprising and of its mass character. If we do this—and this is not at all utopian—there will be in each large town, not hundreds of *druzhinniki*, as in Moscow in December, but thousands and thousands of them. And then, *no machine-guns will be able to hold out*, as people used to say in Moscow when arguing that the fighting detachments there were not sufficiently of a mass character and were not sufficiently close to the people in type and composition.

Thus: the organisation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies, of peasants' committees and of similar bodies everywhere, and simultaneously the most widespread propaganda and agitation for a simultaneous uprising, for setting to work at once to prepare forces for this and for organising voluntary mass detachments of *druzhinniki*.

\* \* \*

P. S. This chapter was already written when we learned of a new "turn" in the slogans of our Central Committee: for the Duma as an *organ for summoning* the constituent assembly.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the question of organisation is supplemented by the question of organising a provisional revolutionary government, because such indeed would be a body really capable of convening a constituent assembly. But one must not forget, as our Cadetophiles are pleased to do, that a provisional government is first of all an *organ of insurrection*. Does the late Duma wish to become an organ of insurrection? Do the Cadets wish to be an organ of insurrection? By all means, gentlemen! In the *struggle* we welcome all allies among the bourgeois-democrats. Even if your alliance—pardon me!—were the same thing for us as the alliance with France is for Russia (*i.e.*, a source of money<sup>2</sup>), even then we should be very pleased; we are practical politicians, gentlemen. But if the participation of the Cadets in the uprising is a mere, empty Menshevik dream, all we can say

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 370.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> See note to page 16.—*Ed.*

is: what petty dreams you have, comrade Mensheviks! Take care you do not die of "unrequited love" for the Cadets who will be unable to return your passion. . . .

The question of a provisional government has been theoretically discussed more than once. That Social-Democrats may take part in a provisional government has been proved.<sup>1</sup> But now another aspect of the question, the *practical* presentation of this question by the October-December events, is of greater interest. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies, etc., were *in fact* the embryo of a provisional government; power would *inevitably* have passed to them had the uprising been victorious. Emphasis must now be laid on studying these historically given embryonic organs of a new government, on studying the conditions for their work and *their success*. This is of greater importance at the present time, this is more interesting than guess-work on the subject of a provisional revolutionary government "in general."

## v

It remains for us to consider the question of the moment to be chosen for an uprising. The tender love displayed by Right-wing Social-Democrats for the Cadet Duma caused the former to demand immediate action. This idea ended in a solemn fiasco. The attitude taken up by the masses of the working class and of the urban population shows that the gravity of the situation is appreciated or apprehended. Of course, it is expected that the struggle will be not for the Duma, but for the overthrow of the old government. The delay is due to the general mood prevailing, to the desire to prepare for a really decisive and desperate struggle, the desire to achieve co-ordinated action.

It is possible, and perhaps most probable, that the new struggle will break out in the same elemental way, and just as unexpectedly, as the previous ones have done, as a result of a rise in temper and of one of the inevitable explosions. If things

<sup>1</sup> See article *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government* in this volume.—Ed.

take that turn, if it becomes evident that such a course of development is inevitable, we shall not have to decide the question of the time for action; our task will then be to increase our agitation tenfold and to organise work on the lines already indicated.

However, events may demand that we, the leaders, also appoint the time for action. If that be the case we shall counsel an all-Russian action, a strike and an uprising at the end of the summer, or at the beginning of the autumn, by the middle or the end of August. The important thing would be to take advantage of the building season in the towns and of the time when the summer work on the land comes to an end. If it were possible to secure agreement among *all* the influential revolutionary organisations and unions as to the time for action, the possibility of carrying it out at the time stated would not be precluded. The simultaneous beginning of the struggle over the whole of Russia would be a great advantage. Even if the government learned the time fixed for the strike it would in all probability have no harmful effect, because it would not be a plot or a military attack which must be made suddenly. The army all over Russia would probably be most demoralised if it were kept in suspense for weeks and weeks in expectation of the imminent outbreak of the struggle, if the troops were kept under arms, and if agitation were carried on with increasing vigour simultaneously by all organisations and the mass of "non-party" revolutionaries. The influential members of the *Dumra* among the Social-Democrats and *Trudoviki* could also help to make simultaneous action successful.

Isolated and absolutely useless outbreaks, like "revolts" of soldiers and hopeless uprisings of peasants, could, perhaps, be restrained if the whole of revolutionary Russia were convinced that the great general fight is inevitable.

We repeat, however, that this is possible only if complete agreement is reached among *all* the influential organisations. Otherwise, only the old way of the spontaneous rise of temper is left to us.

## VI

To sum up briefly.

The dissolution of the Duma marks a complete turn towards absolutism. The possibility of simultaneous action on the part of the whole of Russia is increasing. The probability of all the partial insurrections merging into one is increasing. The inevitability of a political strike and of an uprising, as a fight for power, is felt, as never before, by large strata of the population.

It is our duty to develop the widest possible agitation in favour of an all-Russian uprising, to explain its political tasks and the tasks of its organisation, to exert every effort to make everyone realise that it is inevitable, to make everyone realise the possibility of general action, to have the people join in, not for a "riot," not for a "demonstration," not for simple strikes and wrecking of property, but for a fight for power, a fight for the purpose of overthrowing the government.

The whole situation favours the fulfilment of this task.

The proletariat is preparing to place itself at the head of the fight. A responsible and difficult, but a great and thankful task confronts revolutionary Social-Democracy, *viz.*, to assist the working class as the vanguard of the all-Russian uprising.

This uprising will overthrow the autocracy and will create a popular representative body with real power, *i.e.*, the constituent assembly.

\* \* \*

P. S. This article was written *before* the Sveaborg mutiny began.\*

July 1906.

## BEFORE THE STORM <sup>1</sup>

A MONTH has passed since the State Duma was dissolved. The first wave of military mutinies and of strikes by which attempts were made to support the rebels has passed.\* In some places the zeal of the authorities, who have been employing "emergency" and "special emergency" measures for the defence of the government against the people, is beginning to subside. The importance of the past stage of the revolution is becoming more and more apparent. A new wave is approaching nearer and nearer.

The Russian revolution is proceeding along a hard and difficult road. Every upsurge, every partial success is followed by defeat, bloodshed and outrage committed by the autocracy against the champions of freedom. But after every "defeat" the movement spreads, the struggle becomes more intense, more and more people are drawn into the fight, more classes and groups of people participate in it. Every onslaught of the revolution, every step forward in the direction of organising militant democracy is followed by a positively frantic attack by the reaction, by a step forward in the organisation of the "Black Hundred" elements of the people, and by the increased arrogance of the counter-revolution, which is desperately fighting for its very existence. But in spite of all these efforts, the forces of reaction are steadily declining. More and more workers, peasants, soldiers, who hitherto have remained indifferent or who even sided with the Black Hundreds, are now passing over to the side of the revolution. The illusions and prejudices which made the Russian people confiding, patient, simple-minded, obedient, all-enduring and all-forgiving, are being gradually destroyed.

Many wounds have been inflicted on the autocracy, but it is not dead yet. The autocracy is all covered over with bandages

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 365.\*—Ed.

and plasters, but it is still holding out, it is still creaking along, and is even becoming more ferocious as its strength oozes out. The revolutionary classes of the people, led by the proletariat, take advantage of every lull to gather new forces, to strike a fresh blow at the enemy, to root out the cursed canker of Asiatic barbarism and serfdom which is poisoning Russia.

There is no better way of overcoming pusillanimity and of refuting the narrow, one-sided, petty and cowardly views on the future of our revolution than by casting a general glance at its past. The history of the Russian revolution is still of recent date, but it has sufficiently proved and shown to us that the forces of the revolutionary classes and the wealth of their historical, creative power are far greater than they seem in quiet times. Every rising wave of the revolution has revealed an unobserved and unobtrusive relative accumulation of forces for the solution of the new and greater problems, and every time the short-sighted and pusillanimous appraisals of political slogans were refuted by the outburst of these accumulated forces.

Three main stages of our revolution have become clearly discernible. The first stage was the period of "confidence,"<sup>1</sup> the period of mass petitions, demands and declarations concerning the need for a constitution. The second stage was the period of constitutional manifestoes, acts and laws. The third stage was the beginning of the application of constitutionalism, the period of the State Duma. At first the tsar was begged to grant a constitution. Later on the solemn recognition of the constitution was forcibly wrenched from the tsar. Now . . . now, after the dissolution of the Duma, experience teaches us that the constitution granted by the tsar, acknowledged by the laws of the tsar, and carried out by the tsarist officials, is not worth a brass farthing.

During each of these epochs we see the forefront occupied by the liberal bourgeoisie, noisy, bragging, full of narrow, petty-bourgeois prejudices and conceit, cocksure of its "right of inheritance," patronisingly teaching its "younger brother" the ways of peaceful struggle, of loyal opposition, of harmonising the

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 368.—*Ed.*

liberty of the people with the tsarist regime. And on every occasion the liberal bourgeoisie succeeded in confusing some of the Social-Democrats (of the Right wing), in winning them over to its political slogans and subjecting them to its political leadership. But in reality, in the midst of the din created by the political game of the liberals, the revolutionary forces grew and matured among the masses. In reality, the *solution* of the political problem which history had brought to the forefront was undertaken each time by the proletarians, who attracted the advanced peasants to their side and came out into the streets, threw off all old laws and conventions and enriched the world with new forms, methods and combinations of means of direct revolutionary struggle.

Remember January 22 (9)! To everybody's surprise the heroic deeds of the workers put an end to the period of the tsar's "confidence" in the people and the people's "confidence" in the tsar. At one stroke they raised the movement to a new and higher plane! And yet, in outward appearance, January 22 (9) was a complete defeat. Thousands of proletarians killed and wounded, an orgy of repression, the dark cloud of the Trepov regime overhanging Russia.

The liberals again came to the fore. They organised brilliant congresses, showy deputations to the tsar. They clung tenaciously to the sop which was thrown to them, the Bulygin Duma. They began to growl at the revolution like dogs who had been shown a choice piece of meat, and appealed to the students to go on with their studies and not to meddle in politics. And the faint-hearted among the adherents of the revolution began to say: let us enter the Duma. After the "Potemkin" affair an armed uprising is a hopeless venture; now that peace<sup>1</sup> has been concluded, militant mass action is not to be expected.

The real solution of the next historical problem was again supplied by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. The manifesto granting a constitution was wrung from the tsar by the all-Russian strike in October. The peasants and the soldiers came to life and turned towards liberty and light in the wake

<sup>1</sup> The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War.—Ed.

of the workers. Short weeks of liberty arrived, succeeded by weeks of "pogroms." Black Hundred brutality, a terrible sharpening of the struggle, the punishment, unprecedented in its ferocity, of all those who had taken up arms in defence of the liberties wrenched from the tsar.

The movement was again lifted to a higher stage and yet, in outward appearance, the proletariat had again suffered complete defeat. Frantic repressions, prisons packed full, endless executions, the despicable howling of the liberals dissociating themselves from the uprising and the revolution.

The philistines of loyal liberalism are again in the forefront. They make capital out of the last remaining prejudices of the peasants who trust the tsar. They assert that the victory of democracy at the elections will cause the walls of Jericho to fall. They are predominant in the Duma and again behave as well-fed watch-dogs behave towards "beggars"—the proletariat and revolutionary peasantry.

The dissolution of the Duma marks the end of the liberal hegemony, which was retarding and degrading the revolution. The peasants have learned more from the Duma than anyone else. Their gain is that they have lost their most baneful illusions. Now, after the experience of the Duma, the whole of the people is emerging different from what it was before. As a result of the suffering caused by the failure of the popular representative body, in which so many people had placed all their hopes, the task ahead is more concretely realised. The Duma has enabled them to gauge the forces more precisely; it concentrated, at any rate, some of the elements of the popular movement, it showed in reality how the different parties act, it revealed more strikingly, to even wider masses of the people, the true political features of the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry.

The unmasking of the Cadets, the consolidation of the Trudoviki—such are some of the most important gains of the Duma period. The pseudo-democracy of the Cadets has been branded in the Duma itself scores of times, and by men who were prepared to trust them. The drab Russian peasant has ceased to be a political sphinx. In spite of the mutilations of the freedom of the

elections, he managed to reveal himself, and he created a new political type, the Trudovik. Henceforth, in addition to the signatures of organisations and parties which were built up in the course of decades, revolutionary manifestoes will bear the signatures of the Trudovik group\* which was formed in the course of a few weeks. The ranks of revolutionary democracy have been reinforced by a new organisation which, of course, shares a good many of the illusions that are characteristic of the small producer, but which in the present revolution undoubtedly expresses the trend toward a ruthless mass struggle against the Asiatic autocracy and feudal landlordism.

After the experience of the Duma the revolutionary classes are emerging more united, more closely bound to each other, more capable of undertaking a general attack. Another wound has been inflicted upon the autocracy. It has become still more isolated. It is still more helpless in the face of the problems which it is altogether incapable of solving. And starvation and unemployment are becoming more acute. Peasant uprisings are breaking out more frequently.

Sveaborg and Kronstadt<sup>1</sup> have revealed the spirit of the army and navy. The mutinies have been suppressed, but mutiny lives, is spreading and becoming stronger. Many Black Hundred elements joined the strike that was called in support of the mutineers. The advanced workers stopped this strike, and they were right in doing so, because the strike began to develop into a demonstration, whereas the task was to organise a great and decisive struggle.

The advanced workers were right in their estimate of the situation. They quickly corrected the wrong strategical movement and husbanded their forces for the impending battle. They instinctively understood the inevitability of a strike insurrection and the harmfulness of a strike-demonstration.

All evidence goes to show that temper is rising. An explosion is inevitable and may be near at hand. The executions in Sveaborg and Kronstadt, the punishments inflicted on the peasants, the persecution of the Trudovik members of the Duma—

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 385.—*Ed*

all this serves only to intensify the hatred, to spread determination and concentrated readiness for battle. More audacity, comrades! More confidence in the strength of the revolutionary classes, especially the proletariat, reinforced as they now are by new experience; more independent initiative! All the signs indicate that we are on the eve of a great struggle. All efforts must be directed towards making it simultaneous, concentrated, full of that heroism of the masses with which all the great stages of the great Russian revolution have been marked. Let the liberals make cowardly hints at the impending fight only for the purpose of threatening the government, let these narrow-minded petty bourgeoisie concentrate the whole force of their "mind and sentiments" on the expectation of a new election—the proletariat is preparing for the struggle, it is unitedly and boldly marching to meet the storm, eager to plunge into the thick of the fray. We have had enough of the hegemony of the cowardly Cadets, those "stupid penguins" who "timidly conceal their fat bodies behind the rocks."

"Let the storm rage louder!"<sup>1</sup>

September 1906.

<sup>1</sup> The words in quotation marks in the last two sentences are taken from a well-known poem by M. Gorky, *The Song of the Stormy Petrel*, written in 1901.—Ed.

## THE BOYCOTT\*

THE Left-wing Social-Democrats must review the question of boycotting the State Duma. It should be borne in mind that we always discussed this question in a concrete form and in connection with a definite political situation. For instance, *Proletary* [Geneva] wrote that "it would be ridiculous for us to pledge ourselves not to make use even of the Bulygin Duma"<sup>1</sup>—if it could be established. And in referring to the Witte Duma in the pamphlet *The State Duma and Social-Democracy*, 1906 (by N. Lenin and F. Dan), N. Lenin wrote: "We must once again, in a business-like manner, discuss the question of tactics.... The situation today is not what it was at the time of the Bulygin Duma." \*\*

The principal difference between revolutionary Social-Democracy and opportunist Social-Democracy on the question of boycott is as follows: the opportunists in all circumstances confine themselves to applying the stereotyped method copied from a special period of German socialism.\*\*\* We must utilise representative institutions; the Duma is a representative institution; therefore, the boycott is anarchism, and we must go into the Duma. All the arguments used by our Mensheviks, and especially Plekhanov, on this topic, could be reduced to this childishly simple syllogism. The Menshevik resolution on the importance of representative institutions in a revolutionary epoch (see *Partiynye Izvestiya*, No. 2\*\*\*\*) strikingly reveals the stereotyped and anti-historical nature of their arguments.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats, on the contrary, shift the centre of gravity of the question to the necessity of carefully calculating the concrete political situation. It is impossible to cope with the tasks of the Russian revolutionary epoch by copying stereotyped German formulæ taken one-sidedly from a recent period and entirely forgetting the lessons of 1847-48.\*\*\*\*\*

<sup>1</sup> See article, *The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection* in this volume.—Ed.

The progress of our revolution will be altogether unintelligible if we confine ourselves to making bare contrasts between "anarchist" boycott and Social-Democratic participation in elections. Learn from the history of the Russian revolution, gentlemen!

This history has *proved* that boycotting the Bulygin Duma were the only tactics which were correct at that time and which were entirely justified by events. Whoever forgets this and argues about the boycott without taking the lessons of the Bulygin Duma into account (as the Mensheviks have always done) is certifying to his own poverty of thought, his inability to explain and estimate one of the most important and eventful periods of the Russian revolution. The tactics of boycotting the Bulygin Duma quite properly took into account the temper of the revolutionary workers and the objective features of the moment, which made an immediate general outbreak inevitable.

Let us pass on to the *second* lesson of history—to the Witte, Cadet Duma. Nowadays we often hear Social-Democratic intellectuals making contrite speeches about the boycott of that Duma. The fact that it did assemble and undoubtedly rendered indirect service to the revolution is considered to be sufficient reason for regarding the boycott of the Witte Duma as having been a mistake.

Such a view, however, is extremely one-sided and short-sighted. It fails to take into consideration a number of very important facts of the period prior to the Witte Duma, the period of its existence and the period after its dissolution. Remember that the election law for that Duma was promulgated on December 24 (11), at a time when the insurgents were waging an armed fight for a constituent assembly. Remember that even the Menshevik *Nachalo*<sup>1</sup> wrote at the time: "The proletariat will sweep away the Witte Duma, even as it swept away the Bulygin Duma." Under such circumstances the proletariat could not and should not have surrendered the power to convene the first representative assembly in Russia to the tsar without a fight. The proletariat had to fight against the strengthening of the autocracy by means of loans obtained on the security

<sup>1</sup> *Beginning.—Ed. Eng. ed.*

of the Witte Duma. The proletariat had to combat constitutional illusions on which, in the spring of 1906, the election campaign of the Cadets and the elections among the peasantry were *entirely* based. At that time, when the importance of the Duma was being immeasurably exaggerated, the only way of fighting such illusions was by means of the boycott. The degree to which the *widespread* constitutional illusions were connected with participation in the election campaign and in the elections in the spring of 1906 is strikingly revealed by the attitude taken by our Mensheviks. Suffice it to mention that in the resolution of the Fourth (Unity) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, the Duma was referred to as a "power" in spite of the warnings of the Bolsheviks! \* Another instance: with complete self-assurance, Plekhanov wrote: "The government will *fall* into the abyss when it disperses the Duma."\*\* In reply to him it was said at that time: we must prepare to *throw* the enemy into the abyss and not, like the Cadets, place any hopes on its "falling" into the abyss by itself. And how soon the words then uttered were proved correct!

It was the duty of the proletariat to exert every effort to preserve the independence of its tactics in our revolution, namely: together with the conscious peasantry against the vacillating and treacherous liberal and monarchist bourgeoisie. But it was *impossible* to employ these tactics during the elections to the Witte Duma owing to a number of circumstances, both objective and subjective, which, in the overwhelming majority of localities in Russia, would have made participation in the elections tantamount to the workers' party tacitly supporting the Cadets. The proletariat could not and should not have adopted the half-hearted and artificial tactics, based on "cunning" and called forth by consternation, of elections for an unknown purpose—to the Duma but not for the Duma. And yet it is a historical fact, which the silence, subterfuges and evasions of the Mensheviks cannot remove, *viz.*, that *not one of them*, not even Plekhanov, *dared* advocate in the press that we enter the Duma. It is a fact that *not one* call was issued in the press to enter the Duma. It is a fact that the Mensheviks them-

selves. in the leaflet issued by the Joint Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., officially recognised the boycott and confined the dispute *only* to the question of the stage at which the boycott was to be started.\*

It is a fact that the Mensheviks laid emphasis, not on the *Duma* elections but on the *elections as such*, and even on the election campaign as a means *for* organising an uprising and *for* sweeping away the *Duma*. Events proved, however, that while it was impossible to carry on mass agitation during the elections, there were limited opportunities for carrying on agitation among the masses from within the *Duma* itself.

Whoever really tries to take into consideration and weigh all these complicated facts, both objective and subjective, will see that the Caucasus was but an exception which proved the general rule.\*\* He will then see that contrite speeches and explaining away the boycott as a piece of "youthful impetuosity" merely represent an extremely narrow, superficial and short-sighted estimation of events.

The dissolution of the *Duma* has now clearly demonstrated that in the conditions prevailing in the spring of 1906 the boycott, on the whole, was the right tactics and proved useful. Under the conditions which *then* prevailed, *only* by means of the boycott could Social-Democracy fulfil its duty of giving the people the necessary warning against the tsar's constitution and supplying the necessary criticism of the chicanery of the Cadets during the elections; and both (warning and criticism) were strikingly substantiated by the dissolution of the *Duma*.

Here is a small instance to illustrate the above. In the spring of 1906, Mr. Vodovozov, who is half-Cadet and half-Menshevik, was wholeheartedly in favour of participating in the elections and supporting the Cadets. Yesterday (August 24 [11]) he wrote in *Tovarishch*\*\*\* that the Cadets "wanted to be a parliamentary party in a country that has no parliament and a constitutional party in a country that has no constitution"; that "the whole character of the Cadet Party has been determined by the essential contradiction that exists between a radical programme and very unradical tactics."

The Bolsheviks could not desire a greater triumph than this admission on the part of a Left Cadet or a Right-wing Plekhanovist.

However, while absolutely rejecting the faint-hearted and short-sighted speeches of repentance as well as the silly explanation of the boycott by "youthful impetuosity," we do not by any means reject the *new* lessons of the Cadet Duma. It would be mere pedantry to hesitate openly to admit these new lessons and take them into account. History has shown that when the Duma assembles opportunities arise for carrying on useful agitation both from within the Duma and around it—that the tactics of joining with the revolutionary peasantry against the Cadets can be applied in the Duma. This may seem paradoxical, but such undoubtedly is the irony of history: it is precisely the Cadet Duma that has clearly demonstrated to the masses the correctness of what we might briefly describe as "anti-Cadet" tactics. History has ruthlessly refuted all constitutional illusions and all "faith in the Duma," but history has undoubtedly proved that that institution is, to a certain limited extent, useful to the cause of the revolution as a tribune for agitation, for exposing the true "inside" of the political parties, etc.

Hence the conclusion: it would be ridiculous to shut our eyes to realities. The time has now come when the revolutionary Social-Democrats must cease to be boycottists. We shall not refuse to go into the Second Duma when (or "if") it is convened. We shall not refuse to utilise this arena of the struggle, without in the least, however, exaggerating its modest significance; on the contrary, on the basis of the experience already supplied by history, we shall subordinate it to another form of struggle, namely, strikes, uprisings, etc. We will call the Fifth Congress of the Party and there resolve that *in the event of elections taking place*, it will be necessary to enter into an election agreement, for a few weeks, with the Trudoviki (without the convocation of the Fifth Party Congress it will not be possible to conduct a united election campaign, and "blocs with other parties" are certainly prohibited by the resolutions of the Fourth Congress). And then we shall utterly rout the Cadets.

This conclusion, however, does not by any means exhaust the complex tasks that confront us. We deliberately emphasised the words: "*in the event of elections taking place,*" etc. We do not know yet whether the Second Duma will be convened, when the elections will take place, what the electoral laws will be like, what the situation will be at that time. Hence, our conclusion suffers from being extremely general: this conclusion is necessary in order to sum up past experience, to take note of the lessons of the past, to put the forthcoming questions of tactics on a proper basis; but it is totally inadequate for solving the concrete problems of immediate tactics.

Only Cadets and the "Cadet-like" can content themselves at the present time with conclusions like these, can create for themselves "slogans" out of yearnings for a new Duma, and try to persuade the government of the desirability of convening it as soon as possible, etc. Only conscious or unconscious traitors to the revolution would *at the present time* exert their efforts to divert the imminent and inevitable new tide of temper and excitement into the channel of an election and not into that of a fight waged by means of a general strike and an uprising.

This brings us to the crux of the question of present-day Social-Democratic tactics. The issue now is not whether we should take part in the elections. To say "yes" or "no" in this case means saying nothing at all about the fundamental problem of the moment. Outwardly the political situation in August 1906 is similar to that in August 1905, but enormous progress has been made during this period: the forces fighting on the one side and the other, the forms of the struggle, as well as the time required for carrying out this or that strategical movement—if we may so express it—have become more exactly defined.

The plan of the government is clear. It is absolutely right in its calculations when it fixes the date of the convocation of the Duma and does not fix—*contrary to the law*—the date of the elections. The government does not want to tie its hands or show its cards. In the first place it is gaining time in which to consider the amendment of the election law. Secondly—and this is more important—it is keeping the date of the elections in re-

serve, as it were, in order to be able to gauge the character and intensity of the new rise of temper. The government wishes to fix the date of the elections at the particular time (and perhaps in the particular form, *i.e.*, the form of elections) when it *can split and paralyse the incipient uprising*. The government's reasoning is correct: if things remain quiet perhaps we shall not convene the Duma at all, or revert to the Bulygin laws. If, however, a strong movement arises, then perhaps we shall try to split it by fixing a provisional date for the elections and in this way decoy certain cowards and simpletons away from the direct revolutionary struggle.

Liberal blockheads (see *Tovarishch* and *Rech*) so utterly fail to understand the situation that they crawl of their own accord into the net set by the government. They try with might and main "to prove" the need for the Duma and the *desirability* of concentrating the rising tide on the elections. But even they cannot deny that the question of the form the next struggle will assume is still an open one. Today's issue of *Rech* (August 25 [12]) admits:

"It is unknown as yet what the peasants will say in the autumn.... It is difficult to make any general forecasts until September-October, when the temper of the peasantry becomes definitely revealed." \*

The liberal bourgeoisie remains true to its nature. It does not desire to take an active part in helping to select the form of the struggle and to mould the temper of the peasants one way or another, nor is it capable of doing so. The interests of the bourgeoisie demand, not the overthrow of the old government, but merely that it be weakened and that a liberal cabinet be formed.

The interests of the proletariat demand the complete overthrow of the old tsarist government and the convocation of a constituent assembly with full power. Its interests demand the most active intervention in the moulding of the temper of the peasants, in the selection of the most resolute forms of the struggle, as well as choosing the best moment for it. We must on no account withdraw, or obscure the slogan: the convocation of the constituent assembly by revolutionary methods, *i.e.*,

through the medium of a provisional revolutionary government. We must exert every effort to explain the conditions of the uprising—combine it with the strike movement, rally and prepare all the revolutionary forces for this purpose, etc. We must resolutely take the path that was indicated in the well-known manifestoes, "To the Army and Navy" and "To All the Peasants," which were signed by a *bloc* of all the revolutionary organisations, including the Trudovik group.<sup>1</sup> Finally, we must particularly see to it that the government does not under any circumstances succeed in splitting, stopping or weakening the incipient uprising by ordering elections. In this respect the lessons of the Cadet Duma must be absolutely binding for us, *viz.*, the lessons that the Duma campaign is a subordinate and secondary form of struggle and that, owing to the objective conditions of the moment, the direct revolutionary movement of the masses of the people still remains the principal form of struggle.

Of course, the tactics of subordinating the Duma campaign to the main struggle, of assigning a secondary role to that campaign to be kept for the contingency of an unfavourable result of the battle, or of its postponement until after the experience of the Second Duma—such tactics may, if you like, be described as the old boycottist tactics. On formal grounds this description might be justified, because, apart from the work of agitation and propaganda, which is always obligatory, "preparing for elections" consists of minute technical preparations, which can very rarely be made a long time before the elections. We do not want to argue about words, however; in actual fact, these tactics are the logical *development* of the old tactics, but not their *repetition*; they are a deduction drawn from the former boycott, but not the former boycott itself.

To sum up. We must take into account the experience of the Cadet Duma and spread its lessons among the masses. We must go on proving that the Duma is "unfit," that the constituent assembly is essential, that the Cadets are wavering; we must demand that the Trudoviki throw off the yoke of the Cadets, and we must support the former against the latter. We must recognise

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 390.—*Ed.*

at once the need for an election agreement between the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviki in the event of new elections taking place. We must exert all our efforts to counteract the plan of the government to split the uprising by ordering elections. While supporting our tried revolutionary slogans with greater energy than ever, Social-Democrats must exert all efforts to rally all the revolutionary elements more closely in order to convert the upsurge which is very probable in the near future into an armed uprising of the whole of the people against the tsarist government.

September 1906.

## “BLOCS” WITH THE CADETS \*

AT the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P the Mensheviks supported by the Bundists adopted a decision to the effect that *blocs* with the Cadets were permissible. The Cadet press is jubilant and is conveying the happy tidings to every corner of the world, slightly pushing the Mensheviks one step lower down, one step further to the Right. Elsewhere the reader will find the decisions of the Conference, the dissenting opinion of the revolutionary Social-Democrats and their draft manifesto to the electors. Here we shall attempt to define the general and fundamental political significance of *blocs* with the Cadets.

No. 6 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* provides good material for such a definition. especially the editorial entitled “The *Bloc* of the Extreme Left.” We shall start with one of the most characteristic passages in the article:

“We are told,” writes *Sotsial-Demokrat*, “that the Mensheviks, who made it their object to push the whole Duma onto the revolutionary path, abandoned their position after the dispersal of the Duma and formed a *bloc* with the revolutionary parties and groups, as expressed, first, in the issue of two joint manifestoes—to the army and to the peasantry—and, secondly, in the formation of a committee for co-ordinating action in view of the coming strike. This reference to a precedent is based on a great misunderstanding. In the instance quoted our Party formed, with the other revolutionary parties, not a *political bloc* but a *fighting* agreement which we have always considered expedient and necessary.”

The italics are those of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.

. . . *Not a political bloc*, but a *fighting* agreement. . . Have you no fear of God in your hearts, Menshevik comrades? This is not only senseless, it is positively illiterate. One of two things: either you imply that *bloc* means only parliamentary agreements, or that it means not only parliamentary agreements. If you accept the first meaning—then a *bloc* is a fighting agreement for a parliamentary fight. If you accept the second—then a fight-

ing agreement is a political *bloc*, because a "fight" which has no political importance is not a fight, but just a scuffle.

Comrades of the Central Committee! Watch your editors! You really must, because they are making us feel ashamed of Social-Democracy.

But perhaps this nonsense presented to the reader by the organ of the Central Committee is a mere slip of the pen, an awkward expression?

Not at all. The mistake of *Sotsial-Demokrat* is not that it committed a "howler"; the howler is due to the fact that there is a basic error underlying the whole of its argument and the whole of its position. The meaningless combination of words "not a political *bloc* but a fighting agreement"<sup>1</sup> is not casual, it followed necessarily and inevitably from that basic "nonsense" of Menshevism which is its failure to understand that the parliamentary fight in Russia today is entirely subordinated, and in a most direct way, to the conditions and character of the extra-parliamentary fight. In other words: a single logical blunder expresses the Mensheviks' general lack of understanding of the role and importance of the Duma in the present revolutionary situation.

We shall certainly not try to imitate the methods of the Mensheviks, and in particular their leader, Plekhanov, in their polemics against us on the question of "fighting" and "politics." We shall not reproach them with the fact that they, the leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat, are capable of entering into a non-political fighting agreement.

We draw attention to the following questions: *why* did our Mensheviks, after the dispersal of the Duma, have to form a *bloc only* with the *revolutionary parties* and groups? Certainly not because this was for a long time advocated (exclusively out of hatred for the Mensheviks) by some anarcho-Blanquist named Lenin. The objective conditions compelled the Mensheviks, in spite of all their theories, to form precisely such a

<sup>1</sup> And as luck would have it, the curious situation has come about that the Mensheviks, who always reproached us with contrasting "fighting" with "politics" *themselves* based *their own arguments* on this absurd contrast.

revolutionary anti-Cadet *bloc*. Irrespective of the will and even of the *consciousness* of the Mensheviks, the objective conditions brought it about that the dialectical development of the peaceful parliamentary fight in the first Duma transformed this fight in the course of a *few days* into a fight that was altogether unpeaceful and extra-parliamentary. The informal *political bloc* of which the Mensheviks were not aware (because of the disputes that went on among the Cadets before their very eyes), and which expressed common aspirations, common immediate political aims and common methods of struggle for immediate political objects—this unwitting "political *bloc*" was, *by the very force of circumstances*, transformed into a "fighting agreement." And our wiseacres were so dumbfounded by this unexpected turn of events unforeseen in Plekhanov's letters of the 'period of the first Duma' that they exclaimed: "This is *not* a political *bloc*, but a fighting agreement!"

The reason your policy is useless, dear comrades, is that you have in mind an agreement in respect to a "*fight*" that is unreal, fictitious and bereft of decisive significance, whereas you overlook the conditions of *the "fight"* which is being irresistibly brought to the fore by the whole course of the Russian revolution, which arises from conditions which at first sight seem to be the most peaceful, parliamentary and constitutional in the world, and even from such conditions as the Rodichevs of the Duma praised in their laudatory speeches about the dearly-beloved, non-responsible monarch.

You are committing the very error that you accused the Bolsheviks of committing. Your policy is not a fighting policy. Your fight is not a genuine political fight, but a toy constitutional one, it is parliamentary cretinism. You have *one* line of agreements for the "*fight*" that may be called forth by events of tomorrow, and *another* line of agreements for "*politics*." That is why you are unfit either for "*fight*s" or for "*politics*," and fit only to act as understudies for the Cadets.

<sup>1</sup> The author refers to Plekhanov's letters, *On Tactics and Tactlessness*, published in the Menshevik paper, *Courier*. See note to page 394.\*—Ed.

Considerable discussion is going on in our Party at the present time as to the meaning of the term *blocs*. Some maintain that a *bloc* means putting up a joint list of candidates; others deny this and say that it means a common platform. All these disputes are silly and scholastic. The essence of the matter is not altered a whit whether you call the narrower or the wider agreements *blocs*. The essence of the matter is not at all whether agreements of a narrower or wider nature may be concluded. Whoever thinks so is caught in the meshes of the petty and trivial parliamentary system and forgets the *political essence* that underlies that system. The essence of the dispute is the question of the *right line* to be pursued by the socialist proletariat when entering into agreements with the bourgeoisie, such agreements being, generally speaking, inevitable in the course of a bourgeois revolution. The Bolsheviks may differ in regard to details as for example: whether election agreements are necessary with this or that party of the revolutionary bourgeoisie; but that is not the issue between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The issue remains the same: should the socialist proletariat in a bourgeois revolution follow in the rear of the liberal, monarchist bourgeoisie, or march in front of the revolutionary democratic bourgeoisie.

The article *The "Bloc" of the Extreme Left* gives numerous instances of how the ideas of the Mensheviks are sidetracked from the political issue of the disagreements to insignificant trifles. The author of the article himself describes (p. 2, col. 3) both a common platform and a joint list of candidates as *bloc* tactics. At the same time he asserts that we are advocating a *bloc* with the Trudoviki and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and that the Mensheviks advocate, not a *bloc* but only "partial agreements" with the Cadets. But this is childishness, my dear comrades, and not argument at all!

Compare the Menshevik resolution, adopted by the All-Russian Conference, with that adopted by the Bolsheviks. The latter imposes stricter conditions for agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionaries than the former for agreements with the Cadets. This is indisputable, for, in the first place, the Bolsheviks permit

agreements only with parties which are fighting for a republic and which admit the need for an armed uprising, whereas the Mensheviks permit agreements with the "parties of the democratic opposition" generally. Consequently, the Bolsheviks defined the term "revolutionary bourgeoisie" by clear *political* characteristics, whereas the Mensheviks, instead of giving a *political* definition, presented a mere *technical parliamentary* term. Republic and armed uprising are definite political categories. Opposition is a purely parliamentary term. This term is so vague that it can include the Octobrists and the Party of Peaceful Regeneration and, in fact, all who are dissatisfied with the government. True, the addition "democratic" introduces a political element, but it is indefinite. It is supposed to refer to the Cadets, but this is exactly where it is wrong. To apply the term "democratic" to a *monarchist* party, a party which accepts an upper chamber, which proposes draconic laws against public meetings and the press, which deleted from the Duma's address in reply to the throne the demand for direct, equal suffrage and secret ballot, a party which opposed the formation of land committees to be elected by the whole of the people—means *deceiving the people*. This is a very strong expression, but it is just. The Mensheviks deceive the people in regard to the democracy of the Cadets.

Secondly, the Bolsheviks permit agreement with the bourgeois republicans only as an "exception." The Mensheviks do not demand that the *blocs* with the Cadets be only an exception.

Thirdly, the Bolsheviks absolutely forbid agreements in the workers' electoral curiæ ("with no other party"). The Mensheviks permit *blocs* in the workers' electoral curiæ as well, for they only forbid agreements with groups and parties which "do not adopt the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle." This did not happen by chance, for there were some Mensheviks at the Conference with proletarian class intuition who opposed this absurd formula, but they were defeated by the Menshevik majority. Something very indefinite and nebulous came out of it all, leaving plenty of scope for all sorts of hazardous moves. Moreover, an idea altogether wrong for a Marxist emerged to the effect that another party, other than the Social-Democratic

Party, *may* be recognised as "adopting the standpoint of the proletarian class struggle."

After this, how can we refrain from describing as childish, at least, the attempts to prove that the Bolsheviks permit a *closer bloc* with the republican bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, than the Mensheviks permit with the monarchist bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, the Cadets?

The absolutely insincere discussion about whether *blocs* should be more or less close serves to obscure the political question: *with whom and for what purpose* are *blocs* permissible. Take the "draft electoral platform" published in No. 6 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*.<sup>\*</sup> This document is one of the mass of documents defining Menshevik policy which prove the existence of an *ideological bloc* between the Mensheviks and the Cadets. The resolution of the Conference on the need for "amendments" to this draft electoral platform clearly demonstrates this.<sup>\*\*</sup> Just think: a conference of Social-Democrats had to remind its own Central Committee that it must not omit the slogan of a republic from an illegal publication, that it must not be content with vague and nebulous platitudes about petitions and a struggle, but that it must correctly characterise and define all other parties from the proletarian standpoint, that it must point out the need for an uprising, and emphasise the class character of Social-Democracy! Only something utterly anomalous, some fundamental error in the views held by the Central Committee could have made it necessary to remind the Central Committee of a Social-Democratic Party that it must emphasise its class character in its *first* election manifesto.

It is not yet known whether we shall enter into any agreements with the Cadets, and what the scope of such agreements will be if we do enter into them. But an ideological agreement, an ideological *bloc*, already exists, *i.e.*, the obscuring, in the draft election programme, of the difference between the standpoint of the proletariat and that of the liberal, monarchist bourgeoisie.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This is not the first time the Mensheviks have made this mistake. They made this mistake in the famous Duma declaration of the R.S.D.L.P.<sup>\*\*\*</sup> They accused the Bolsheviks of Socialist-Revolutionary tendencies and they

In the Bolshevick draft manifesto to the electors, however, we find not only an indication of that difference, but also of the difference in the viewpoint of the proletariat and that of the class of petty proprietors.

These principles and ideas must be brought to the fore precisely in the question of election *blocs*. All the Mensheviks' attempts to justify themselves are in vain; they say: we shall be independent during the whole of the election campaign, we shall in no way curtail it, and we shall put our candidates in the list of the Cadets only at the last minute!

*This is not true.* We are sure, of course, that the best of the Mensheviks sincerely want this. But it is not a question of their desires; the matter will be determined by the objective conditions of the present-day political struggle. And these conditions are such that *every step* the Mensheviks take in their election campaign is *already polluted* by Cadetism and is already characterised by the confusion of the Social-Democratic point of view. We have proved this by the example of the draft election programme and will prove it presently by a number of other documents and arguments.

The main argument of the Mensheviks is the Black Hundred danger. The first and fundamental falsity of this argument is that it is impossible to fight against the Black Hundred danger by means of Cadet tactics and Cadet policy. The essence of this policy is—*conciliation* with tsarism, i.e., with the Black Hundred danger. The first Duma proved sufficiently that the Cadet is not fighting against the Black Hundred danger, but is making incredibly despicable speeches about the innocence and non-responsibility of the monarch, the *known leader of the Black Hundreds*. Therefore, by helping to elect Cadets to the Duma the Mensheviks are not only not fighting the Black Hundred danger, but on the contrary, they are hoodwinking the people, are

themselves obliterated the differences in the views held by the Social-Democrats and the Trudoviki to such an extent that the Socialist-Revolutionary newspapers of the Duma period called the Duma declaration of the Social-Democrats a plagiarism of the Socialist-Revolutionary ideas. In our counter-draft of the Duma declaration the difference between us and the petty bourgeois was clearly shown,

obscuring the actual significance of the Black Hundred danger. To fight the Black Hundred danger by helping to elect the Cadets to the Duma is like fighting pogroms by means of speeches delivered by the lackey, Rodichev: "It is impertinence to regard the monarch as being responsible for the pogroms."

The second fault in the current argument is that the Social-Democrats tacitly concede the hegemony in the democratic struggle to the Cadets. In the event of a split vote that secures the victory of the Black Hundreds, why should *we* be blamed for not having voted for the Cadets and not the *Cadets* be blamed for not having voted for us?

"We are in a minority," answer the Mensheviks, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Christian humility. "The Cadets are more numerous. Surely the Cadets cannot be expected to declare themselves revolutionaries."

Yes! But that is no reason why Social-Democrats should declare themselves Cadets! Nowhere in the world has there been a case in an indecisive outcome of a bourgeois revolution when the Social-Democrats have been in a majority against the bourgeois-democrats; nor could this happen. But *everywhere*, in all countries, the *first* independent entry of the Social-Democrats in election campaigns was met by the howling and barking of the liberals *who accused the Socialists of letting the Black Hundreds in*. We are, therefore, quite undisturbed by the usual Menshevik cries that the Bolsheviks are letting the Black Hundreds in. *All* the liberals have always shouted this to *all* the Socialists. By refusing to fight the Cadets you are leaving masses of proletarian and semi-proletarian elements capable of following the Social-Democrats under the ideological influence of the Cadets.<sup>1</sup> Sooner or later, unless you cease to be Socialists, you will have to fight your own battle in spite of the Black Hundred danger. And it is easier and more necessary to take the right step today than it would be to take it tomorrow. In the Third Duma (if it

<sup>1</sup> The Cadets themselves are beginning to confess that they are being threatened at elections by the *danger from the Left*. (These are the exact words used by *Rech* in the report of the St. Petersburg Gubernia.\*) By their outcry against the Black Hundred danger, the Cadets are hoodwinking the Mensheviks, in order to avoid the danger from the Left!!

is called after the Second) it will be even more difficult for you to dissolve the *bloc* with the Cadets, you will be still more entangled in the unnatural relations with the betrayers of the revolution. And the *real* Black Hundred danger, let me repeat, lies not in Black Hundred deputies being elected to the Duma, but in pogroms and courts-martial; and you are making it more difficult for the people to fight this real danger by forcing Cadet blinkers upon them.

The third falsity in the current argument is that it is based on an inaccurate estimate of the Duma and of its role. In that delightful article *The "Bloc" of the Extreme Left*, the Mensheviks had to acknowledge, in refutation of all their own usual assertions, that the real importance does not lie in technical agreements, but precisely in the radical difference between the two tactics.

In this article we read the following:

"The '*bloc*' tactics are consciously or unconsciously directed towards the formation in the next Duma of a compact revolutionary minority of a faded Social-Democratic hue, a minority which would wage a systematic war on the Duma majority as well as on the government, and which, at a certain moment, would overthrow the Duma and proclaim itself the provisional government. The tactics of partial agreements are directed towards making use, as far as possible, of the Duma as a whole, *i.e.*, the Duma majority, for the purpose of fighting the autocratic regime while remaining all the time in the Duma in the extreme position of an independent, Social-Democratic, parliamentary fraction."

As regards the "faded hue" we have already shown that it is precisely the Mensheviks who are guilty of this—in the election in the workers' *curiæ*, in the more liberal practice of *blocs*, and the ideological substitution of Cadetism for Social-Democracy. As regards the "proclamation" of a provisional government, the Mensheviks' assertion is equally ridiculous, for they forget that the essence of the matter lies not in the proclamation, but in the whole course and the success of the *uprising*. A provisional government which is not an organ of insurrection is an empty phrase, or a senseless adventure.

But the Mensheviks inadvertently blurted out the sacred truth on the essence of the question in the above-quoted passage.

It is quite true that the whole point can be summed up as follows: shall we *or shall we not sacrifice the independence* of the Social-Democratic election campaign for the sake of a "solid" liberal Duma ("the Duma as a whole")? It is true that the Bolsheviks regard complete independence in the election campaign and the complete Social-Democratic character of our policy and of our Duma fraction as being more important. The Mensheviks regard a solid Cadet Duma with a large number of Social-Democrats in it who have been elected as semi-Cadets as being more important! Let us compare two types of Duma: 200 Blacks, 280 Cadets and 20 Social-Democrats, or 400 Cadets and 100 Social-Democrats. We prefer the first type, and we think it childish to imagine that we shall avert the Black danger by eliminating the Blacks from the Duma.

We pursue a single policy everywhere: in the electoral fights, in the fight in the Duma, and in the fight in the streets; and that policy is—with arms in our hands. Everywhere our policy is: Social-Democracy with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against the treacherous Cadets. The Mensheviks, however, wage their "Duma" fight in alliance with the Cadets (support the Duma as a whole and the Cadet Cabinet), but in case of an uprising they change their policy and form "*not a political bloc, but a fighting agreement.*" Therefore, the Bolshevik who made the following remark at the Conference: "by supporting *blocs* with the Cadets, the Bundists have smuggled in support for the Cadet Cabinet," was quite right.

The above quotation excellently confirms the fact that *blocs* with the Cadets convert into empty phrases all the beautiful words in the Menshevik resolution on the slogans to be issued in the election campaign, for example: "to organise the forces of the revolution in the Duma" (is it not rather to organise an appendage to the Cadets by disorganising the actual forces of the revolution?), "to reveal the impotence of the Duma" (is it not rather to conceal from the masses the impotence of the Cadets?), "to explain to the masses that hopes of a peaceful issue of the struggle are illusory" (is it not rather to

strengthen among the masses the influence of the Cadet party which is propagating illusions?).

And the Cadet press has perfectly understood the *political* importance of Menshevik-Cadet *blocs*. We said above: either in the rear of the liberals or in front of the revolutionaries. In support of this we shall refer to our political press.

Is there any serious or mass confirmation of the assertion that the Bolsheviks follow in the rear of the bourgeois revolutionaries and are dependent on them? It is ridiculous even to mention such a thing. The whole of the Russian press clearly shows that it is precisely the Bolsheviks who are pursuing their own independent political line, attracting to their side separate groups and the best elements of the bourgeois revolutionaries.

And what about the bourgeois opportunists? They own a press ten times larger than that of the Social-Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionaries put together. And it is precisely they who pursue their own independent political line and force the Mensheviks and Narodni-Socialists to act as their understudies.

The only parts of the Menshevik resolutions quoted in the *whole* of the Cadet press are the passages referring to the *blocs*, but they *omit* the reference to the "impotence of the Duma," "the organisation of the forces of the revolution in the Duma" and similar passages. The Cadets not only omit such things, they simply abuse them, referring either to "phrases" or to the "inconsistency" of the Mensheviks or to the "inconsequent nature of the Menshevik slogans" or to "the baneful influence of the Bolsheviks" over the Mensheviks.

What does all this mean? It means that whether we like it or not, that in spite of the wishes of the best of the Mensheviks, political life absorbs their *Cadet deeds* and rejects their *revolutionary phrases*.

The Cadet coolly accepts the help of the Mensheviks, slaps Plekhanov on the back for his advocacy of *blocs* and at the same time shouts contemptuously and coarsely, like a merchant who has grown fat on ill-gotten gains: not enough, my dear Mensheviks! We must also have an ideological *rapprochement!*

(See the article in *Tovarishch* on Plekhanov's letter.\*) Not enough, my dear Mensheviks, you must also stop, or at any rate change your polemics! (See the leading article in the *Left Cadet Vyek*\*\* dealing with the resolutions of our Conference.) Not to mention *Rech* which is cutting short all the Menshevik yearnings towards the Cadets by bluntly declaring: "We shall enter the Duma in order to *legislate*, not in order to make a revolution."\*\*\*

Poor Mensheviks, poor Plekhanov! Their love letters to the Cadets were read with satisfaction, but so far they are not being admitted further than the ante-chamber.

Read Plekhanov's letter in *Tovarishch*—the bourgeois-Cadet newspaper. He was met with rejoicing by Mr. Prokopovich and Madame E. Kuskova, the very same people whom Plekhanov in 1900 drove from the Social-Democratic Party for attempting to expose it to bourgeois corruption. Now Plekhanov accepts the tactics of the famous *Credo*<sup>1</sup> of Prokopovich and Kuskova, and the followers of Bernstein are impudently blowing kisses to him and shouting: *we bourgeois-democrats* have always said this!

And in order to be admitted to the ante-chamber of the Cadets, Plekhanov had to renounce before the whole of the people *his own previous statements*.

Here are the facts.

In *Dnevnik*,<sup>2</sup> No. 6 of July 1906, after the dispersal of the Duma, Plekhanov wrote that the parties which are *participating* in the movement must come to an agreement. In order to strike together, it is first necessary to come to *an agreement*.

"*The parties hostile to our old regime must . . . come to an understanding in regard to the main idea of this propaganda. After the dispersal of the Duma the only idea that can be held is that of the constituent assembly. . . .*"

"*Only*" the idea of a constituent assembly. Such was the plan for a political *bloc* and for a fighting agreement in July 1906.

Five months after, in November 1906, Plekhanov changes his line of agreement. Why? Has there been any change since

<sup>1</sup> See Lenin, *Selected Works*, Volume I, pp. 516-27, "A Protest by Russian Social-Democrats."—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

then in the relations between the parties which demand a constituent assembly and those which do not?

It is generally admitted that since then the Cadets have gone still further to the Right. And Plekhanov goes to the Cadet press and *hushes up* the constituent assembly; for mention of the constituent assembly is forbidden in Cadet ante-chambers.

Is it not clear that this Social-Democrat has made a slip?

But this is not all. In the same No. 6 of *Dnevnik* he referred *directly* to the Cadets. Then (that was very long ago!) Plekhanov explained the selfish class character of the Cadets' distrust of the idea of a constituent assembly. Plekhanov then wrote about the Cadets literally as follows:

"Whoever renounces the propaganda of this idea [the constituent assembly] on whatever pretext—will clearly indicate that he is really not seeking a worthy answer to the actions of Stolypin and Co., that he, though reluctantly, *is becoming reconciled to these actions*, that he is rebelling against them *only in words, only for the sake of appearances.*" (Italics ours.)

Having gone to a Cadet paper Plekhanov now starts his advocacy of an election *bloc* by establishing an ideological *bloc*. In the Cadet paper Plekhanov did not want to tell the people that the Cadets are *becoming reconciled* with the Stolypin gang, that they are rebelling *only for the sake of appearances*.

Why did not Plekhanov in November 1906 repeat what he stated in July 1906?

\* \* \*

This, then, is what "technical" *blocs* with the Cadets mean, and that is why we are waging ruthless war on the Social-Democrats who allow such *blocs*.

Is not your joy premature, gentlemen of the Cadet Party? Social-Democrats will be elected without *blocs* in the Caucasus, in the Urals, in Poland, in the Lettish region, in the Moscow Central region and probably in St. Petersburg.

No *blocs* with the Cadets! No reconciliation with those who are becoming reconciled with the Stolypin gang!

## AGAINST THE BOYCOTT\*

*From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist*<sup>1</sup>

### V

THE boycott is one of the best revolutionary traditions of the most heroic and eventful period of the Russian revolution. Above we said that one of our tasks is to preserve these traditions with great care, to cultivate them and to purge them of liberal (and opportunist) parasites. We must stop a moment to analyse this task in order properly to define its content and eliminate all misinterpretations and misunderstandings that might easily arise.

Marxism differs from all other socialist theories in that it represents a remarkable combination of complete scientific soundness in the analysis of the objective conditions of things and of the objective course of evolution and the very definite recognition of the significance of the revolutionary energy, the revolutionary creative genius and the revolutionary initiative of the masses—and also, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations and parties which are able to discover and establish contact with these classes. The high estimation of revolutionary periods in the development of humanity follows logically from the sum total of Marx's historical views, *viz.*, that it is precisely in such periods that the numerous contradictions slowly accumulating in periods of so-called peaceful development find their solution. It is precisely in such periods that the direct role of the various classes in the determination of the forms of social life manifests itself with the greatest force, and the foundations are created for the political "superstructure" which for a long

<sup>1</sup> Only chapters v, vi and vii of this pamphlet are included in this volume.—*Ed.*

time after rests upon the new productive relationships. Unlike the liberal bourgeois theoreticians, Marx regarded these periods, not as a deviation from the "normal" path, a manifestation of a "social disease," the sad result of extremes and mistakes, but as the most vital, important, essential and decisive moments in the history of human society. In the activities of Marx and Engels, the period of their participation in the mass revolutionary struggle of 1848-49 stands out as a central point. This served as their starting point in determining the destiny of the labour movement and of democracy in different countries. They always returned to this point in order to determine the internal nature of the various classes and their tendencies in the most striking and purest form. It was from the point of view of the revolutionary epoch of that time that they always evaluated the later, smaller political formations and organisations, political tasks and political conflicts. It is not for nothing that the ideological leaders of liberalism, such as Sombart, wholeheartedly hate this feature in the activities and literary works of Marx, and ascribe it to the work of a "disgruntled exile." It is so like the bugs of police-bourgeois university science to ascribe that which represents the most inseparable, constituent part of the whole of the revolutionary philosophy of Marx and Engels to personal bitterness, to discomforts of life in exile.

In one of his letters, I think to Kugelmann, Marx in passing drops a most characteristic and particularly interesting remark from the point of view of the question we are discussing. He says that reaction in Germany had almost succeeded in eradicating from the minds of the people the memories and traditions of the revolutionary epoch of 1848.\* In this remark, the tasks of reaction and those of the party of the proletariat in relation to the revolutionary traditions of a given country are strikingly contrasted. The task of reaction is to eradicate these traditions, to represent the revolution as "spontaneous madness"—Struve's translation of the German "*das tolle Jahr*" ("the mad year"—the expression used by the German police-bourgeois historians, or rather, by German, professorial-university historiography on 1848). The task of reaction is to make

the population forget those forms of struggle, forms of organisation, those ideas and slogans to which the revolutionary epoch gave birth in such profusion and variety. Just as the Webbs, those stupid apologists of English philistinism, try to represent Chartism, the revolutionary epoch of the English labour movement, as pure childishness, as the "sowing of wild oats," as naiveté, as an accidental and abnormal deviation not deserving serious attention, so the German bourgeois historians treat the year 1848 in Germany. Similar also is the attitude of reaction towards the Great French Revolution, which to this day reveals the vitality and strength of its influence on humanity by the fact that even now it rouses most savage hatred. And so, too, do our heroes of counter-revolution, particularly the quondam "democrats" Struve, Milyukov, Kizevetter, and "*tutti quanti*," vie with one another in pouring their vile slander upon the revolutionary traditions of the Russian revolution. Barely two years have passed since the direct mass struggle of the proletariat won the particle of freedom which the liberal lackeys of the old regime admire so much, and already a strong trend has arisen in our publicist literature which calls itself *liberal* (!!), which is fostered in the Cadet press and the sole mission of which appears to be to present our revolution, the revolutionary methods of struggle, the revolutionary slogans and revolutionary traditions, as something base, primitive, naive, spontaneous, mad, etc. . . . and criminal as well . . . *il n'y a qu'un pas!*<sup>1</sup> from Milyukov to Kamishansky. On the other hand, the successes of reaction, which drove the people first from the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies to the Dubasov-Stolypin Duma, and now to the Octobrist Duma,<sup>2</sup> these successes appear to the heroes of Russian liberalism as "the process of the growth of *constitutional* consciousness in Russia."

It is undoubtedly the duty of Russian Social-Democrats to study our revolution very carefully and thoroughly, to spread among the masses a knowledge of its forms of struggle, or

<sup>1</sup> There is but one step.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> *I.e.*, to the Third Duma in which, as Lenin foresaw, the monarchist and counter-revolutionary party of the powerful trading and financial bourgeoisie—the Octobrists—were actually in the majority.—*Ed.*

organisation, etc., to strengthen the revolutionary traditions among the people, to instil in the masses the conviction that only through the revolutionary struggle can really serious and lasting improvements be achieved, systematically to expose the utter baseness of the smug liberals who pollute the social atmosphere with the fumes of "constitutional" servility, treachery and Molchalinism.<sup>1</sup> A single day of the October strike, or the December uprising, was, and is, a hundred times more significant in the history of the struggle for liberty than months of servile Cadet speeches in the Duma on the non-responsible monarch and the monarchic-constitutional order. We must see to it—for if we do not no one else will—that the people know about those virile, significant, magnificent, portentous days more fully, in greater detail and much more thoroughly than they know about those months of "constitutional" suffocation and Balalaikin-Molchalin\* progress which, with the benevolent acquiescence of Stolypin and his retinue of censors and gendarmes, the organs of our liberal party and non-party "democratic" (ugh!) press laud so zealously.

No doubt in many cases sympathy for the boycott is created by the praiseworthy efforts of revolutionaries to foster the tradition of the best revolutionary past, to vitalise the desolate swamp of the present-day, drab, everyday life by a tiny spark of bold, open, resolute struggle. But it is precisely because we prize this concern for revolutionary tradition that we must strongly protest against the view that the application of one of the slogans of a particular historical epoch can help to restore the essential conditions of that epoch. It is one thing to preserve the traditions of the revolution, to know how to make use of them for constant propaganda and agitation, to inform the masses of the conditions of direct and aggressive struggle against the old society; but it is another thing to repeat a slogan torn from the sum total of conditions which gave rise to it and guaranteed its success and to apply it to fundamentally different conditions.

Marx, who placed such a high value on revolutionary tradi-

<sup>1</sup> See note to this page.—*Ed.*

tions, unmercifully castigated a renegade or philistine attitude towards them and at the same time demanded that revolutionaries should learn to *think*, learn to *analyse* the conditions for the application of old methods of struggle, and not simply to repeat certain slogans. The "national souvenirs of 1792" in France will, perhaps, remain for ever a *model* of certain revolutionary methods of struggle, but this did not prevent Marx in 1870, in the famous "Address" of the International, from warning the French proletariat against wrongly transferring those traditions to the conditions of a different epoch.\*

The same is true in Russia. We must study the conditions for the application of the boycott. We must instil in the masses the idea that the boycott is an entirely legitimate and sometimes essential method during moments of revolutionary upsurge (whatever the pedants who take the name of Marx in vain may say). But whether there is really an upsurge—that fundamental condition for proclaiming a boycott—is a question which one must be able to put independently and decide on the basis of a serious analysis of the facts. Our duty is to prepare, as far as it is within our power, the advent of such an upsurge and not to pledge ourselves beforehand that we will not resort to the boycott at the appropriate moment; but to regard the slogan of the boycott as being generally applicable to every bad, or very bad, representative institution would certainly be a mistake.

Take the arguments that were used in defence of the boycott in the "days of freedom," and you will immediately see the impossibility of simply applying these arguments to present-day conditions.

When advocating the boycott in 1905 and in the beginning of 1906 we argued that participation in the elections would subdue the temper of the masses, surrender the position to the enemy, lead the revolutionary people astray, facilitate an agreement between tsarism and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, etc. What was the main premise for these arguments, a premise that was not always expressed, but always taken for granted *at that time*? This premise was the rich revolutionary energy of the masses, seeking and finding a *direct* outlet out-

side of "constitutional" channels. This premise was that the revolution would maintain a permanent *offensive* against reaction, an offensive which it would have been criminal to weaken by occupying and defending a position deliberately presented by the enemy in order to weaken the general onslaught. Try to repeat these arguments *outside* the conditions of that fundamental premise and you will immediately sense the disharmony of your "music," the discord of your chief note.

An attempt to justify the boycott by distinguishing between the Second and Third Dumas would be equally hopeless. To regard the difference between the Cadets (who in the Second Duma utterly betrayed the people into the hands of the Black Hundreds) and the Octobrists as serious and fundamental, to attach any real significance to the notorious constitution that was torn up by the *coup d'état* of June 16 (3)<sup>1</sup>—all this would generally correspond much more to the spirit of vulgar democracy than to revolutionary Social-Democracy. We have always maintained, reiterated and repeated that the "constitution" of the First and Second Dumas was only a phantom, that the Cadets' chatter was only a manœuvre to conceal their Octobrist nature, that the Duma was a totally unsuitable means for satisfying the demands of the proletariat and the peasantry. In our opinion, June 16 (3), 1907, is the natural and inevitable result of the December defeat of 1905. We were never "captivated" by the charms of the "Duma" constitution and we cannot be disappointed very much with the change from reaction embellished with Rodichev's phrases to naked, open and brutal reaction. Perhaps the latter is a much better means with which to sober the boorish liberal simpletons, or those groups of the population which are led astray by them.

Compare the Menshevik Stockholm resolution with the Bolshevik London resolution on the State Duma. You will see that the first is bombastic, florid, full of high-flown phrases about the significance of the Duma and puffed up with the consciousness of the greatness of the work of the Duma. The second is simple, sparing, sober and modest. The first resolution is filled

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 242.\*\*\*—Ed.

with philistine rejoicing over the union of Social-Democracy with constitutionalism ("the new power out of the womb of the people," etc., etc., in the same spirit of official falsehood). The second can be paraphrased approximately as follows: since the cursed counter-revolution has driven us into this cursed pigsty, let us work there also for the benefit of the revolution, without whining, but also without boasting.

In defending the Duma from the boycott when we were still in the period of direct revolutionary struggle, the Mensheviks gave their pledge to the nation, so to speak, that the Duma would be something in the nature of a weapon of the revolution; but they solemnly collapsed over this pledge. We, Bolsheviks, however, if we gave any pledges at all, it was that we insisted that the Duma was the progeny of counter-revolution and that no real good could be expected from it. Our point of view has been excellently borne out so far, and it can be asserted with confidence that future events will confirm it still more. Unless the October-December strategy is "corrected" and repeated on the basis of the new data, freedom will not come to Russia.

Therefore, when I am told that the Third Duma cannot be used as the second one was, that we cannot explain to the masses that it is necessary to take part in it, I want to answer: If by "use" is meant something in the nature of Menshevik bombast like "weapons of the revolution," etc., then it certainly cannot be done. But, then, even the first two Dumas proved in fact to be steps to the Octobrist Duma and yet we used them for a simple and modest<sup>1</sup> purpose (propaganda and agitation, criticism and explaining what was taking place to the masses), for which we shall always be able to use the worst representative institutions. A speech in the Duma will not call forth "revolu-

<sup>1</sup> See article in *Proletary* (Geneva), 1905, *The Boycott of the Bulgin Duma* [in the present volume—Ed.], where we pointed out that we do not renounce the use of the boycott generally, but that we were solving another problem with which we were then faced, i.e., the task of fighting for a direct revolutionary path. See also the article in *Proletary* (Russian), 1906, No. 1, *On the Boycott* [in the present volume—Ed.], where the modest benefits to be derived from work in the Duma is emphasised.

tion," and propaganda *in connection with the Duma* has no particular distinguishing qualities, but the advantage that Social-Democracy derives from the first or the second is not less, and sometimes even greater than it derives from a printed speech or a speech delivered at some other gathering.

And we must explain our participation in the Octobrist Duma to the masses in an equally simple manner. Owing to the defeat of December 1905 and the failure of the attempts of 1906-07 to "repair" this defeat, reaction inevitably drove us and *will continue to drive* us into worse and worse quasi-constitutional institutions. No matter where we are we shall always defend our convictions, present our views and reiterate that no good can be expected as long as the old regime remains, as long as it is not uprooted. Let us prepare the conditions for a new upsurge, and until it takes place and in order that it may take place, let us work more persistently and refrain from advancing slogans which have meaning only under conditions of an upsurge.

It would be equally wrong to regard the boycott as a *line of tactics* which sets the proletariat and part of revolutionary bourgeois democracy in opposition to liberalism and reaction. The boycott is not a line of tactics, but a special means of struggle suitable under special conditions. To confuse Bolshevism with "boycottism" would be as great a mistake as to confuse it with "boyeivism." The difference between the Bolshevik and Menshevik *line of tactics* has already become fully revealed and has taken shape in the fundamentally different resolutions adopted in the spring of 1905 at the Bolshevik Third Congress in London and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva. There was no talk then, nor could there be, of the boycott or of "boyeivism." As everyone knows, our *line of tactics* differed very decidedly from the Menshevik line both during the elections to the Second Duma, when we were not boycottists, and in the Second Duma. Our *lines of tactics* diverge in all methods of struggle, on every field of the struggle, without any special methods of struggle peculiar to any line being created. And if the boycott of the Third Duma had been justified or called for by the

collapse of *revolutionary* expectations concerning the *First* or the *Second Duma*, by the collapse of the "lawful," "powerful," "durable," and "genuine" constitution, it would have been Menshevism of the worst kind.

## VI

We have left the strongest and the only Marxian arguments in favour of the boycott for the end. An active boycott has no sense outside of a wide revolutionary upsurge. This is granted. But the wide upsurge develops from a narrow one. The symptoms of such an upsurge are to be observed now. We must advance the slogan of the boycott because this slogan supports, develops and widens the upsurge that has begun.

Such, I think, is the *basic* argument which defines more or less clearly the boycottist trend in Social-Democratic circles. Moreover, the comrades who are in closest touch with immediate proletarian work proceed, not from arguments "built" according to a certain type, but from a number of impressions obtained from coming into contact with the masses of the workers.

One of the few questions on which, apparently, there is not, or has not been until now, any disagreement between the two factions of Social-Democrats is the question of the cause of the protracted lull in the development of our revolution. "The proletariat has not recuperated"—that is the cause. Indeed, the burden of the October-December struggle was borne almost entirely by the proletariat; it was the proletariat alone who fought systematically, in an organised way and incessantly for the whole nation. It is not surprising, therefore, that in a country in which the proletariat represents the smallest (compared with Europe) percentage of the population, the proletariat should be extremely exhausted by such a struggle. In addition, after December right up to the present time the combined force of the government and bourgeois reaction has been hurled incessantly against the proletariat. During the past eighteen months, police persecution and executions have decimated the ranks of the proletariat, while the systematic lockouts, beginning with the "punitive" closing of the state factories and end-

ing with the capitalists' plots against the workers, have increased the misery of the working masses to a degree hitherto unknown. And now, say some Social-Democratic workers, there are some signs of a revival in the spirit of the masses, of an accumulation of strength by the proletariat. This not fully defined and not fully perceptible impression is supplemented by a stronger argument: a business revival has undoubtedly set in in some branches of industry. The increased demand for workers must inevitably strengthen the strike movement. The workers will have to try to obtain at least some compensation for the tremendous loss they suffered in the epoch of repression and lock-outs. Finally, the third and strongest argument is the reference, not to a problematic and generally expected strike movement, but to a great strike that has been called already by the workers' organisations. In the beginning of 1907, representatives of 10,000 textile workers discussed their situation and outlined the steps to be taken to strengthen the trade unions in this branch of industry. A second meeting was held at which representatives of 20,000 workers were present and it was decided to call a *general strike* of textile workers in July 1907. This movement may involve as many as 400,000 workers. It originated in the Moscow region, *i.e.*, the largest centre of the labour movement and the largest commercial and industrial centre in Russia. It is in Moscow and only in Moscow that the mass labour movement can most readily assume the character of a wide popular movement of decisive political significance. And among the general mass of workers, the textile workers are the worst paid, least developed, have least of all participated in the preceding movements, and are most closely bound with the peasantry. The initiative shown by workers of this type indicates that the movement may involve incomparably wider strata of the proletariat than has been the case formerly, and the connection between the strike movement and the revolutionary upsurge among the masses has been repeatedly demonstrated in the history of the Russian revolution.

It is the bounden duty of Social-Democracy to concentrate tremendous attention and extra effort on this movement.

Work in this field must acquire prime significance as compared with the elections to the Octobrist Duma. The masses must be convinced of the necessity of transforming this strike movement into a general and wide attack on the autocracy, and the slogan of the boycott signifies that attention must be transferred from the Duma to the immediate mass struggle. The slogan of the boycott means infusing a political and revolutionary content into the movement.

Such, approximately, is the train of thought which causes certain Social-Democrats to be convinced of the necessity of boycotting the Third Duma. This argument in favour of the boycott is undoubtedly a Marxian one and has nothing in common with the bald repetition of slogans torn from their connection with special historical conditions.

But strong as this argument is, it is, I think, insufficient to induce us to accept the slogan of the boycott *at the present time*. This argument emphasises that which, in general, should cause no doubt in the mind of the Russian Social-Democrat who has thought over the lessons taught by our revolution, *viz.*, that we must not pledge ourselves never to resort to the boycott, that we must be ready to advance this slogan at the appropriate time, that our presentation of the question of the boycott has nothing in common with the liberal, wretchedly philistine presentation of the question which lacks all revolutionary content, *viz.*, to evade or not to evade?<sup>1</sup>

Let us accept as proved and completely corresponding to reality all that the adherents of the boycott among the Social-Democrats say regarding the change in the spirit of the workers, of the industrial revival, and of the July textile workers' strike.

What then? We are confronted with the beginnings of a partial upsurge which has some revolutionary significance.<sup>2</sup> Are we bound to exert every effort to support and develop it and

<sup>1</sup> See, in *Tovarishch*, a sample of liberal reasoning presented by L. Martov, formerly contributor to Social-Democratic publications, now contributor to liberal papers.

<sup>2</sup> The opinion is expressed that the textile strike is a new type of movement, differentiating the trade union movement from the revolutionary one. But we ignore this view, first because to interpret all the

strive to transform it into a general revolutionary upsurge and then into a movement of an aggressive type? Undoubtedly. There can be no two opinions about this among Social-Democrats (except, perhaps, among contributors to *Tovarishch*). But is the slogan of the boycott necessary at the *present moment*, at the beginning of this partial revival, before it is finally transformed into a general one; is it necessary for the development of the movement? Is this slogan able to assist the development of the present movement? That is another question, and one which in my opinion must be answered in the negative.

The general upsurge can and must be developed from the partial one with straight and direct arguments and slogans, irrespective of the Third Duma. The whole course of events after December completely confirms the Social-Democratic view of the role of the monarchist constitution, of the need for an immediate struggle. Citizens! we shall say, if you do not want the work of democracy in Russia to decline as steadily and as rapidly as it did after December 1905 when Messieurs the Cadets had the hegemony in the democratic movement, if you do not want this—then support the incipient, rising tide of the workers' movement, support the direct mass struggle. Outside of this there can be no guarantee of freedom in Russia.

Such agitation will undoubtedly be thoroughly consistent, revolutionary, Social-Democratic agitation. But is it absolutely necessary to add: do not believe in the Third Duma, citizens; and look at us, the Social-Democrats, who are boycotting it as the sign of our protest?

Not only is it unnecessary to add this under the present conditions, the very suggestion sounds strange; it sounds almost like a sneer. Even without this no one believes in the Third Duma, that is to say, those sections of the population which are able to foster the democratic movement have not and cannot

symptoms of a complex phenomenon pessimistically is a dangerous thing generally and frequently misleads many Social-Democrats "who are not seated firmly in the saddle." Secondly, if the above features were present in the textile strike, we Social-Democrats would undoubtedly have to combat them most energetically. If our struggle were successful the question would then be exactly as we are putting it,

have that enthusiasm for the constitutional institution, the Third Duma, which was undoubtedly widespread for the First Duma, for the *first* attempts to create in Russia any institutions as long as they were *constitutional* institutions.

The attention of wide circles of the population in 1905 and the beginning of 1906 was concentrated on obtaining the *first* representative institution, even if it was based on a monarchic constitution. This is a fact. The Social-Democrats had to fight and to demonstrate against this in the most striking manner.

Now the conditions are different. The characteristic feature of the present movement is not enthusiasm for the *first* "parliament," not belief in the Duma, but *disbelief in the upsurge*.

Under these circumstances, we do not strengthen the movement a bit, we do not remove the real obstacles to this movement by prematurely advancing the slogan of the boycott. Moreover, by doing so we even take the risk of weakening the force of our agitation, because the boycott is a slogan which accompanies a definite upsurge, and the trouble now is that wide circles of the population do not believe in the upsurge, do not appreciate its strength.

First of all we must see to it that the strength of this upsurge is *actually* proved, and then there will be plenty of time to advance the slogan which indirectly reflects this strength. And even then it is doubtful whether an aggressive revolutionary movement will require a special slogan to *divert* attention from the Third Duma. Perhaps it will not be required. In order to avoid something that is important and really capable of attracting an inexperienced crowd which has not yet seen a parliament, it may be necessary, perhaps, to *boycott* the thing which has to be avoided. But in order to avoid an institution that cannot possibly attract the modern democratic or semi-democratic crowd, it is not absolutely necessary to proclaim a boycott. The essential thing today is not the boycott, but direct and immediate efforts to transform the partial upsurge into a general one, to transform the trade union movement into a revolutionary movement, to pass from defence against lockouts to attack against reaction.

## VII

To sum up. The slogan of the boycott arose out of a special historical period. In 1905 and in the beginning of 1906, the objective state of affairs confronted the combatant social forces with the problem of choosing the immediate path: a direct revolutionary path, or a monarchist-constitutional change. At that time, the fight against constitutional illusions represented the main content of the boycott agitation. The condition for the boycott movement then was the wide, general, rapid and powerful revolutionary upsurge.

In all these respects, the state of affairs now, in the autumn of 1907, does not call for such a slogan and does not justify it.

While continuing our daily work of preparing for the elections, and while not pledging ourselves beforehand not to participate even in the most reactionary representative institution, we must concentrate all our propaganda and agitation upon explaining to the people the connection that exists between the December defeat and the curtailment of freedom and abuse of the constitution that followed. We must instil in the masses the firm belief that unless there is a direct mass struggle, such abuse is inevitable and will continue and grow stronger.

Without renouncing the application of the slogan of the boycott in times of an upsurge, when the need for such a slogan may seriously arise, we must direct all our efforts towards the aim of transforming by direct influence every upsurge in the labour movement into a general, wide, revolutionary attack against reaction as a whole, against its very foundations.

1907.



**PART V**

**THE PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION  
OF 1905-1907**



## NEW TASKS AND NEW FORCES\*

THE development of a mass labour movement in Russia in connection with the development of Social-Democracy is characterised by three remarkable transitions. The first was the transition from narrow propagandist circles to wide economic agitation among the masses; the second was the transition to political agitation on a large scale and to open street demonstrations; the third was the transition to actual civil war, to insurrection. Each of these transitions was prepared, on the one hand, by the influence of socialist ideas, mainly in one direction, and on the other hand, by the profound changes that took place in the conditions of life and the whole mentality of the working class and by the fact that wider and wider strata of the working class were roused to more conscious and active struggle. Sometimes these changes took place imperceptibly; the gathering of the forces of the proletariat took place behind the scenes, unobserved, and often the intellectuals despaired of the mass movement ever becoming lasting and virile. Then a sudden change would occur, and the whole revolutionary movement would, at one stroke, as it were, rise to a higher stage. The proletariat and its vanguard, Social-Democracy, would then be confronted with new *practical* problems, and for the solution of these problems, new forces would spring up, out of the ground, as it seemed, the existence of which no one suspected on the eve of the change. But all this did not occur all at once, without vacillation, without a struggle of tendencies within Social-Democracy, without reversion to views that had long seemed obsolete and buried.

Our Party is once again passing through one of these periods of vacillation. In order to adapt our tactics and organisation to the new tasks, we are forced to overcome the resistance of opportunist theories about "a higher type of demon-

stration" (the plan of the Zemstvo campaign), or about the "organisation-process"; we are forced to combat the reactionary fear of "ordering" a revolt, or of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

There is not the slightest doubt that in its onward march the movement will once again sweep aside these survivals of obsolete and lifeless views. This sweeping, however, should not consist of the mere rejection of old mistakes, but rather of incomparably greater and more positive revolutionary work for the practical solution of new problems, of attracting into our Party and making use of the new forces that are now being brought into the revolutionary field in such large masses. It is precisely these questions of positive revolutionary work that should mainly engage the attention of the forthcoming Third Congress; and it is precisely on these questions that all the thoughts of all our Party members should be concentrated in their local and general work. Of the nature of the new tasks that confront us we have spoken in general terms more than once. These are: to extend our agitation to new strata of the urban and rural poor; to create a broader, more flexible and stronger organisation, to prepare for the uprising and to arm the people, and for these purposes to conclude agreements with revolutionary democracy. That new forces have arisen for the fulfilment of these tasks is eloquently testified to by the news about general strikes throughout Russia, about the strikes and the revolutionary spirit of the youth, of the democratic intelligentsia generally, and even of many circles of the bourgeoisie. The existence of these tremendous fresh forces, particularly among the working class and among the peasantry, is a sufficient guarantee that the new tasks can be and will be fulfilled. The practical question before us now is, first of all, *how* to utilise, to direct, to unite, to organise these new forces; *how* to concentrate Social-Democratic work chiefly on the newer, higher tasks that are presented by the present moment without forgetting for an instant the old, everyday tasks that confront us, and will continue to confront us, so long as the world of capitalist exploitation continues to exist.

In order to indicate several methods for the solution of this practical question we shall begin with an individual, but to our mind very characteristic, instance. A short time ago, on the very eve of the beginning of the revolution, the liberal bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye* (No. 63) referred to the question of the organisational work of Social-Democracy. Closely following the struggle between the two tendencies in Social-Democracy, *Osvobozhdeniye* did not fail once again to take advantage of the new *Iskra's* reversion to Economism and to emphasise (in connection with the demagogic pamphlet by "A Worker"\*) its profound sympathy with the principles of Economism. This liberal organ correctly pointed out that the logical conclusion to be drawn from this pamphlet (see No. 2 of *Vperyod* in connection with it<sup>1</sup>) was the inevitable negation, or belittling, of the role of revolutionary Social-Democracy. And in reference to "A Worker's" absolutely incorrect assertion that since the victory of the orthodox Marxists, the economic struggle has been ignored *Osvobozhdeniye* says:

"The illusion of present-day Russian Social-Democracy lies in its fear of educational work, of legal ways, of Economism, of so-called non-political forms of the labour movement, and in its failure to understand that only educational work, legal and non-political forms can create a sufficiently firm and sufficiently broad foundation for such a working class movement as will really deserve to be called revolutionary."

And *Osvobozhdeniye* advises the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists "to take upon themselves the initiative of creating a trade union labour movement," not in opposition to Social-Democracy, but in conjunction with it; and it draws a parallel between this situation and the situation in the German labour movement during the time of the operation of the Anti-Socialist Law.\*"

This is not the place to speak of this parallel, which is absolutely wrong. First of all, it is necessary to establish the truth about the attitude of Social-Democracy toward the legal forms of the labour movement. "The legalisation of the non-socialist and non-political labour unions in Russia has already

<sup>1</sup> Lenin refers to an article he himself wrote in reply to the pamphlet.—Ed.

begun," we wrote in 1902 in *What Is To Be Done?*<sup>1</sup> "Henceforth we must reckon with this tendency." How shall we reckon with it?—is the question put in that pamphlet and it is answered by the reference to the need of exposing, not only the Zubatov theories, but also all liberal speeches about harmony and "class collaboration." (By inviting the collaboration of Social-Democracy, *Osvobozhdeniye* fully recognises the first task and ignores the second.) "While doing . . . this," the pamphlet goes on to say, "we must not forget that in the long run the legalisation of the working class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs." By exposing Zubatovism\* and liberalism at legal meetings we separate the tares from the wheat. "By the wheat, we mean attracting the attention of still larger and more backward sections of the workers to social and political questions, and freeing ourselves, the revolutionaries, from functions which are essentially legal (the distribution of legal books, mutual aid, etc.), the development of which will inevitably provide us with an increasing quantity of material for agitation."

Hence it follows clearly that on the question of "*fearing*" the legal forms of the movement it was *Osvobozhdeniye* that entirely fell a victim to an "*illusion*." Revolutionary Social-Democrats not only do not fear these forms, but they clearly point to the existence of tares and wheat in these forms. By its arguments, therefore, *Osvobozhdeniye* only covers up the liberal's real (and justifiable) *fear* that revolutionary Social-Democracy will expose the *class essence of liberalism*.

But what interests us particularly from the point of view of present-day tasks is the question of relieving the revolutionaries of a part of their functions. The very fact that we are now passing through the period of the beginning of the revolution makes this a particularly topical and widely significant question. "The more energetically we conduct the revolutionary struggle, the more will the government be forced to legalise part of the trade union work and thus relieve us of part of our burden," we said in *What Is To Be Done?*. But an energetic

<sup>1</sup> See *Selected Works*, Volume II, p. 129.—Ed. Eng. ed.

revolutionary struggle relieves us of "part of our burden," not only in this way, but also in many other ways. The present situation has not merely "legalised" much of what was formerly prohibited. It has widened the movement to such an extent that, independently of the government's legalisation, many things have become a practice, become customary and available to the masses which previously were considered available and were really available only for revolutionaries. The whole course of the historical development of the Social-Democratic movement is characterised by the fact that regardless of all obstacles it has won for itself more and more freedom of action, in spite of tsarist laws and police measures. The revolutionary proletariat, as it were, surrounds itself with a certain atmosphere, inaccessible to the government, of sympathy and support, both within the working class, and within other classes too (which, of course, agree with only a small part of the demands of labour democracy). At the beginning of the movement a Social-Democrat had to do a great deal of educational work, or concentrate his efforts almost exclusively on economic agitation. But, now, these functions, one after another, are passing into the hands of new forces, of wider masses who are being attracted to the movement. The revolutionary organisations are concentrating more and more on the work of actual *political* leadership, the work of indicating the *Social-Democratic* conclusions to be drawn from the manifestations of labour protest and of popular discontent. In the beginning we had to teach the workers the alphabet, both in the literal and in the figurative sense. Now the level of political literacy has risen so enormously that it is possible, and it is our duty, to concentrate all our efforts on the more direct Social-Democratic aims of giving organised leadership to the revolutionary torrent. Now the liberals and the legal press are doing a great deal of the "preparatory" work upon which we have had to spend a great deal of effort up to now. Now the open advocacy of democratic ideas and demands, without being persecuted by a weakened government, has spread so widely that we must adapt ourselves to an entirely new sweep of the movement. Of course, in this preparatory work there are both tares

and wheat! Of course, Social-Democrats will have to pay greater attention to the struggle against the influence of bourgeois democracy on the workers. But this very work will have much more real Social-Democratic content than our former activity, which was directed mainly toward rousing the politically unconscious masses.

The more the popular movement spreads, the more the true nature of the different classes becomes revealed and the more pressing is the task of *the Party* to lead the class, to be its organiser, and not to drag at the tail of events. The more all kinds of revolutionary activity develop everywhere, the more obvious become the emptiness and the inanity of *Rabocheye Dyelo* catchwords about activity in general, which are so readily taken up by the new *Iskra*-ists, the more apparent becomes the meaning of *Social-Democratic* activity, and the greater are the demands which events present to our *revolutionary initiative*. The wider the new streams of the social movement become, the more important is it to have a strong Social-Democratic organisation which is capable of creating new channels for those streams. The more the democratic agitation and propaganda, which is going on independently of us, works to our advantage, the more necessary does organised Social-Democratic leadership become in order to preserve the independence of the working class from bourgeois democracy.

A revolutionary epoch is to Social-Democracy what wartime is to an army. We must extend the ranks of our army, transfer it from a peace to a war strength, mobilise the reservists, call up all those on furlough, organise new auxiliary corps, units and services. We must not forget that in war it is inevitable and necessary to fill the ranks with less trained recruits, very often to put rank-and-file soldiers in the place of officers, and to speed up and simplify the promotion of soldiers to the rank of officers.

Speaking without metaphor: we must greatly increase the membership of all Party and kindred organisations in order to be able to keep in step with the stream of popular revolutionary energy that has increased a hundredfold. This, of course, does not mean that the consistent training and systematic instruction

in the Marxian truths must be left in the shade. No, but we must remember that of far greater importance in the work of training and education at the present time are military operations, which *teach* the untrained precisely and entirely in *our* way. We must remember that our "doctrinaire" faithfulness to Marxism is now supported by the fact that the march of revolutionary events everywhere gives *object lessons to the masses* and all these lessons corroborate precisely our dogma. Hence, we do not say that we must renounce our dogma, or that we must abate our distrust and suspicion toward the wishy-washy intellectuals and the revolutionary impostors. Quite the contrary. We say that we must adopt new methods of teaching the dogma, which no Social-Democrat must ever forget. We say that it is important now to use the object lessons of the great revolutionary events in order to teach—not circles, as we have done in the past, but the masses—our old, "dogmatic" lesson that, for example, it is necessary really to link terrorist acts with the uprising of the masses, or the lesson that behind the liberalism of educated Russian society one must be able to discern the class interests of our bourgeoisie. (See our polemics with the Socialist-Revolutionaries on this question in No. 3 of *Vperyod*.\*)

Thus, it is not a question of diminishing our Social-Democratic punctiliousness and our irreconcilable orthodoxy, but of strengthening both in *new* ways, by new methods of training. In wartime, recruits must be trained directly during military operations. Therefore, comrades, adopt the new methods of training more boldly! Organise more boldly more and more new units, send them into battle, recruit more of the working youth, extend the usual framework of all Party organisations, from committees to factory groups, trade unions and students' circles! Remember that every moment of delay in this task will play into the hands of the enemies of Social-Democracy; for the new streams are seeking immediate outlets and if they do not find Social-Democratic channels they will rush into non-Social-Democratic channels. Remember that every practical step in the revolutionary movement will inevitably and unavoidably teach the young recruits Social-Democratic science, for this

science is based on an objectively correct estimation of the forces and tendencies of various classes; for revolution is nothing more nor less than the break-up of old superstructures, and the independent action of different classes, each striving to erect the new superstructure in its own way. But take care not to degrade our revolutionary science to the level of mere book dogma, do not vulgarise it by despicable phrases about the tactics-process, organisation-process, by phrases that condone confusion, vacillation and lack of initiative. Give more scope to every variety of enterprise by the greatest number of groups and circles of all kinds, and bear in mind that, apart from our counsel and regardless of our counsel, the relentless march of revolutionary events will keep them to the correct course. It was said long ago that in politics one often has to learn from the enemy. And in revolutionary movements the enemy always compels us to draw correct conclusions in a particularly instructive and speedy manner.

The slogan "organise!" which the adherents of the majority wanted to issue in a definitely formulated form at the Second Congress must now be put into effect immediately. If we fail to take the initiative and boldly form new organisations, we shall have to give up all claims to the role of vanguard. If we stop helplessly at the limits, forms and the framework of the committees, groups, meetings and circles that we have already reached, we shall thereby prove our incompetence. Thousands of circles are now springing up everywhere without our aid, without any definite programme or purpose, simply under the influence of events. The Social-Democrats must strive to establish and maintain direct contact with the greatest possible number of these circles, to assist them, to enlighten them from their own store of knowledge and experience, to animate them with their revolutionary initiative. Let all such circles, except the consciously non-Social-Democratic ones, either directly join the Party or *become associated with the Party*. In the latter case we must not demand that they accept our programme, or that they enter into obligatory organisational relations with us; the revolutionary sentiment alone, the mere desire to help in the struggle

against the autocracy, is sufficient—if Social-Democrats go to them and energetically present our views—to transform these circles, under pressure of events, at first into democratic assistants of the Social-Democratic Labour Party and then into staunch members of it.

There are plenty of people, and yet we are short of people—this contradictory formula has long defined the contradictions in the organisational life and organisational requirements of Social-Democracy. And now this contradiction stands out with particular force; from all sides we often hear passionate appeals for new forces, complaints of the shortage of people in the organisations, and equally often and everywhere we have enormous offers of service, a growth of young forces, particularly in the working class. The practical organiser who complains of a shortage of people under such circumstances becomes the victim of the illusion from which Madame Roland suffered, during the period of the highest stage of development of the Great French Revolution, when she said in 1793: there are no men in France, we are surrounded by pigmies. Those who talk like this fail to see the wood for the trees; they confess that they are blinded by events; that it is not they, the revolutionaries, who control events in mind and activity, but that events control them and have overwhelmed them. Such organisers had better *retire* and leave the field clear for younger forces whose zeal may often compensate for lack of experience.

There are plenty of people; never has revolutionary Russia had such large numbers of people available as now. Never has a revolutionary class enjoyed such unusually favourable circumstances, as far as provisional allies, staunch friends, and involuntary abettors are concerned, as the Russian proletariat enjoys today. There are plenty of people; all we need do is throw overboard all *khvostist* ideas and teachings, give full scope to initiative, enterprise, to “plans” and “undertakings,” and then we shall become worthy representatives of a great revolutionary class; then the proletariat of Russia will *complete the great Russian revolution as heroically as it commenced it*.

March (February) 1905.

## THE THIRD CONGRESS\*

THE long and stubborn struggle in the R.S.D.L.P. for the convening of a Party Congress has at last come to an end. The Third Congress has been held. It will be possible to give a detailed estimation of all its labours only after the minutes of the Congress have been published. For the time being we propose only to indicate, on the basis of the "Announcement"<sup>1</sup> which has been published and the impressions of those who took part in the Congress, the main landmarks of Party development which were moulded into the decisions of the Third Congress.

Three main questions confronted the party of the class conscious proletariat in Russia on the eve of the Third Congress. First, the question of the Party crisis. Second, the more important question of the form of organisation of the Party in general. Third, the main question, *viz.*, our tactics in the present revolutionary situation. We shall examine the manner in which these questions were solved, passing from the minor to the more essential matters.

The Party crisis was solved automatically, by the mere fact that the Congress was held. It is common knowledge that the crisis had its roots in the stubborn refusal of the minority of the Second Congress to submit to the majority. The painful and protracted character of this crisis was due to the delay in convening the Third Congress, to the existence of an actual split in the Party, a split that was kept hidden and secret, while an outward and fictitious unity was hypocritically observed, and the majority made desperate efforts to hasten the escape from the impossible situation. The Congress provided the way of

<sup>1</sup> The "Announcement About the Third Congress," written by Lenin.—*Ed.*

escape by confronting the minority point-blank with the question of recognising the decisions of the majority, *i.e.*, either the actual restoration or the complete and formal rupture of Party unity. The minority decided this question in the latter sense; they preferred a split. As has already been stated in the "Announcement," the refusal of the Council<sup>1</sup> to take part in the Congress, notwithstanding the clearly expressed desire of the majority of the qualified organisations of the Party as well as the refusal of the entire minority to appear at the Congress, was the final step toward the split. We shall not dwell here on the formal legality of the Congress, which was fully proved in the "Announcement." The argument that a Congress not convened by the Council, *i.e.*, not in accordance with the Party rules, is *ultra vires*, can hardly be taken seriously, bearing in mind the entire history of the Party conflict. It must be clear to anyone who understands the principles of Party organisation in general that discipline in relation to the lower bodies is determined by the discipline in relation to the higher bodies, that is, discipline in relation to the Council is determined by the submission of the Council to its constituents, *i.e.*, to the committees and the whole body of the Party as represented by the Party Congress. Those who disagree with these elementary principles must inevitably draw the absurd conclusion that delegates are not responsible and accountable to their constituents, but *vice versa*. But, let us repeat, it is not worth while dwelling too long on this question, not only because it can be misunderstood only by those who do not want to understand it, but also for the further reason that from the moment the split took place all arguments on points of formality between the sections that have split became particularly dry and purposeless scholasticism.

The minority has now severed itself from the Party; this is an accomplished fact. One section of it will probably become convinced by the decisions adopted, and still more so by the minutes of the Congress, of the artlessness of the fables that have been spread about mechanical suppression, etc., it will

<sup>1</sup> The Party Council.—*Ed.*

become convinced that the new rules completely guarantee the rights of the minority in general, that the split is harmful, and it will rejoin the Party. The other section may persist for some time in refusing to recognise the Party Congress. With regard to this section, all we can do is to express the wish that it organise itself as quickly as possible into a united organisation with its own tactics and its own rules. The sooner this happens the easier will it be for everybody, for the large mass of Party workers, to understand the causes and the significance of the split, the easier will it be to conclude practical agreements between the Party and the seceded organisations according to the local requirements of work, and the sooner will the way be indicated to the inevitable future restoration of Party unity.

Let us now pass to the second question, to the general organisational principles of the Party. The Third Congress rather materially revised these principles in revising the Party rules as a whole. This revision affected three main points: a) amendment of point 1 of the rules; b) precise definition of the rights of the Central Committee and of the autonomy of the committees, with an extension of the said autonomy; c) creation of a single centre. As regards the famous question of point 1 of the rules,\* this has already been explained sufficiently in Party literature. The fallacy of the defence of the principles underlying Martov's vague formula has been fully proved. Kautsky's attempt to defend this formula not on the grounds of principle, but on the grounds of expediency in view of the underground conditions in Russia, was not and could not be successful.\*\* Those who have worked in Russia know perfectly well that no grounds for such considerations of expediency exist. We must now wait for the first results of collective Party work in carrying out the new point 1 of the rules. We emphasise that a great deal of work has still to be done in order to carry it out. It requires no effort to join the Party "under the control of one of the Party organisations"—for this formula is an empty phrase, and always has been from the Second to the Third Congress. But to create a wide-spread network

of a variety of Party organisations, from exclusive and secret organisations to the widest and most public possible—for this, persistent, prolonged and intelligent organisational work is required; and this is the work that now devolves upon our Central Committee and even more so upon the local committees. It will be the committees who will have to confirm the affiliation to the Party of the largest number of organisations, and in doing this they will have to avoid all unnecessary red tape and captiousness, they will have always and incessantly to urge upon the workers the necessity of creating as large a number of the most diverse labour organisations to affiliate to our Party as possible. We cannot deal with this interesting question at greater length now. We would like to observe, however, that the revolutionary epoch particularly calls for the drawing of a sharp line of demarcation between Social-Democracy and all and sundry democratic parties. But this cannot be done unless continuous efforts are made to increase the number of Party organisations and to strengthen the ties among them. The object of strengthening the ties among Party organisations will be served, among other things, by the fortnightly reports which the Congress decided should be issued. Let us hope that this will not be a mere paper decision, that it will not conjure up in the minds of the practical workers a horrible picture of red tape and bureaucracy in connection with this work, that they will train themselves at first to something small, perhaps simply to reporting the number of members in their respective Party organisation, however small and however remote from the centre the latter may be. "Everything is hard at first," says the proverb. Later on it will be seen how enormously important it is to acquire the habit of maintaining regular organisational communication.

We shall not dwell at length on the question of having a single centre. The Third Congress rejected "bicentrism"\* by as large a majority as *adopted* it at the Second Congress. The reason for this will be easily understood by all who have attentively followed the history of the Party. Congresses do not so much create something new as confirm the results already

accomplished. At the time of the Second Congress the basis of stability was, and was recognised to be, the editorial board of *Iskra*—it was given a preponderating position. The preponderance of the comrades in Russia over those abroad still seemed problematic at that stage of the Party's development. After the Second Congress it was the editorial board that proved to be unstable, while the Party grew up, grew up unquestionably and considerably, and above all in Russia. Under these circumstances, the appointment of an editorial board of the central organ by the Central Committee of the Party could not but be received with sympathy by the mass of the Party workers.

Finally, the attempts to define more precisely the rights of the Central Committee and of the local committees, the ideological struggle and the disruptive wrangling, were also an inevitable result of the whole course of events after the Second Congress. Here we have a consecutive and systematic "accumulation of Party experience." Plekhanov's and Lenin's letter to the dissatisfied editors, dated October 19 (6), 1903, was an effort to separate the elements of irritation and disagreement. The ultimatum of the Central Committee of December 9 (November 26), 1903, was a similar effort in the form of a proposal formulated by a literary group. The declaration made by the representatives of the Central Committee on the Council in the beginning of February (end of January) 1904 was an attempt to appeal to the entire Party to separate the ideological forms of the struggle from the boycott<sup>1</sup> and the like. Lenin's letter to the members of the Central Committee in Russia, dated June 6 (May 26), 1904, was an admission of the necessity of providing formal guarantees of the rights of the minority. The well-known "declaration of the 22" (autumn 1904) represented a similar admission in a more distinct, detailed and categorical form.\* Quite naturally, the Third Congress pursued the same path and "finally dispelled, dispelled by formal decisions, the mirage of the state of siege."<sup>2</sup> We shall not enumerate these

<sup>1</sup>The "boycott" of the central institution of the Party resorted to by the Mensheviks after the Second Congress.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup>An allusion to a pamphlet by Martov on the state of siege in the Party, alleged to have been instituted by Lenin.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

formal decisions, *i.e.*, the changes in the Party rules here, for these may be seen in the rules and in the "Announcement." We shall mention only two things: first, it is permissible to hope that the guarantee of the right of publishing literature and the safeguarding of the committees against being "cashiered" will facilitate the return to the Party of the national Social-Democratic organisations which have seceded from it. Second, the institution of the inviolability of the membership of the committees created the need for providing for the contingency of this inviolability being abused, *i.e.*, of the dismissal of an absolutely unsuitable committee becoming impossible on the plea of "inviolability." That is how point 9 of the new Party rules came into being, which establishes that a committee may be dissolved when this is demanded by two-thirds of the local workers who belong to the Party organisation. Experience will show to what extent this rule is practical.

Finally, in passing to the last and most important subject of the labours of the Congress, the formulation of the Party's policy, we must state that this is not the place to enumerate individual resolutions and analyse their content in detail. Possibly we shall have to do this in special articles dealing with the principal resolutions.<sup>1</sup> Here it is necessary to outline the general political situation which the Congress had to examine. Two alternative courses and outcomes are possible for the Russian revolution which has started. It is possible that the tsarist government will succeed in extricating itself from the vise in which it is now caught, with the help of trivial concessions and a "Shipov" constitution. Such an outcome is hardly probable, but if the international position of the autocracy improves, in the event, for instance, of a comparatively successful peace being concluded,<sup>2</sup> if the treachery of the bourgeoisie to the cause of liberty should be quickly consummated by a bargain struck with the powers-that-be, if the inevitable revolutionary explosion, or explosions, should end in the defeat of the people, then

<sup>1</sup> Lenin did this in his pamphlet *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, in this volume.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> To the Russo-Japanese war, which was then proceeding.—Ed. Eng. ed.

this would be the outcome. In that case the future has in store for us, Social-Democrats, and for the whole of the class-conscious proletariat, long, drab, humdrum days of fierce pseudo-constitutional class rule of the bourgeoisie, all manner of suppression of the political activity of the workers and slow economic progress under the new conditions. We shall not lose heart, of course, whatever the outcome of the revolution may be; we shall take advantage of every change in conditions in order to widen and fortify the independent organisation of the workers' party, to give the proletariat political education for a new struggle. The Congress took this task, among others, into account in its resolution on the open action of the R.S.D.L.P.

The other outcome of the revolution, *i.e.*, the "complete victory of democracy with the working class at its head," to which the "Announcement" refers, is also possible, and even more probable. It goes without saying that we shall do whatever lies in our power to achieve this result, to remove the conditions permitting the first outcome. The objective historical conditions are shaping themselves favourably for the Russian revolution. The senseless and shameful war is tightening the noose around the neck of the tsarist government and is creating an unusually favourable situation for the revolutionary destruction of militarism, for the widespread propaganda of the arming of the people as a substitute for standing armies, for the speedy carrying out of this with the support of the masses of the population. The long and undivided rule of the autocracy has caused the accumulation of an enormous amount of revolutionary energy among the people to a degree perhaps unprecedented in history: simultaneously with the vast labour movement the peasant revolt is spreading and growing, and petty-bourgeois democracy, personified chiefly by the representatives of the liberal professions, is closing its ranks. The irony of history has punished the autocracy in that even the social forces which are friendly toward it, as, for instance, clericalism, are obliged to organise themselves to some extent against it, thus breaking, or widening the boundaries of the police bureaucracy. The ferment

among the clergy, its striving after new forms of life, the emergence of clericals as a separate group, the appearance of Christian Socialists and Christian Democrats, the indignation of the "infidels," sectarians, etc., all this excellently plays into the hands of the revolution and creates very favourable grounds for the popular advocacy of the complete separation of the church from the state.\* Willing or unwilling, conscious or unconscious allies of the revolution are growing and multiplying hour by hour. The probability of the people's victory over autocracy is becoming greater.

This victory will be possible only as a result of the heroic exertion of effort by the proletariat. It puts demands upon Social-Democracy that history has never before put upon a workers' party during a democratic revolution. We are not now facing the well trodden paths of slow preparatory work; we are faced with the great tasks of organising an uprising, of concentrating the revolutionary forces of the proletariat, of combining them with the forces of the whole of the revolutionary people, of an armed attack, of establishing a provisional revolutionary government. In the resolutions which have now been published for general information, the Third Congress has attempted to define these new tasks and to give all the directions it could to the organisations of the class conscious proletarians.

Russia is nearing the end of the age-long struggle of all the progressive, popular forces against the autocracy. No one can now have any doubt that the most energetic part in this struggle will be taken by the proletariat and that it is its participation in the struggle that will decide the outcome of the revolution in Russia. We Social-Democrats now have to prove ourselves worthy representatives and leaders of the most revolutionary class, to assist it in achieving the widest liberty, which is the guarantee of the victorious march to socialism.

May 1905.

TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
SOCIALIST BUREAU, BRUSSELS\*

July 24, 1905

DEAR COMRADES!

A few days ago we received your letter of July 9 (June 28), and also some interesting documents (letters of Comrades Bebel and Plekhanov), but being extremely busy, we were unable to answer you immediately.

I. As regards Comrade Plekhanov's letter,\*\* we are obliged to make the following observations:

1) Comrade Plekhanov's assertion that after the Second Congress of our Party (August 1903) we differed only on organisational questions is not quite in accordance with facts. The "minority" at the Second Congress (headed by Comrades Axelrod, V. Zasulich and Martov) actually split the Party immediately after the Congress by declaring a boycott of the central bodies elected by the Congress and setting up a secret "minority" organisation which was dissolved only in the autumn of 1904. Comrade Plekhanov himself, who sided with us at the Second Congress of the Party and at the Congress of the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad (October 1903), obviously held a somewhat different opinion concerning our differences when he publicly announced in *Iskra*, No. 52 (November 1903), that we must skilfully make concessions to the "revisionists" (Plekhanov's expression) in order to avoid a split in the Party.\*\*\*

2) The assertion that the Third Congress of the Party was convened "quite arbitrarily" also does not correspond to the facts. In accordance with the Party rules, the Council is obliged to call a Congress if a demand for one is made by fifty per cent of the committees. The Council, as you know from the

resolutions of the Third Congress, which have been translated into the French, ignored the rules of the Party. The Party committees and the "Bureau of the Committees of the Majority" which they elected were morally and formally obliged to convene the Congress, even in opposition to the will of the Council, which refused to convene the Congress.

3) You know from the same resolutions of the Third Congress that it is not true that "something like half of the qualified organisations" were represented at the Congress, but that a considerable majority of the biggest committees were represented.

4) It is true that there are comrades in our Party who are facetiously referred to as the "Marsh." During the controversies in our Party, members of this "Marsh" constantly passed from one side to the other. The first of these deserters was Comrade Plekhanov, who went over from the "majority" to the "minority" as far back as November 1903 and again left the "minority" in May of this year and resigned from the editorial board of *Iskra*. We do not in the least approve of such twists and turns, but we think that we should not be blamed for the fact that after endless combinations comrades of the "Marsh" decide to join us.

5) In his letter to the Bureau (June 16 [3], 1905), Comrade Plekhanov most inappropriately forgot to mention his letter of June 11 (May 29), 1905, published in *Iskra* (No. 101), a complete and exact translation of which we have already forwarded to you.\*

6) In referring to the other *Iskra* faction in the Party, Comrade Plekhanov again forgot to add that the "minority" conference (May 1905) annulled the rules drawn up at the Second Congress and did not set up a new central organ.\*\* We are of the opinion that the International Socialist Bureau should have a complete translation of all the resolutions of that conference. If *Iskra* refuses to send them to the Bureau, we are prepared to undertake this task ourselves.

7) Comrade Plekhanov states that only the two remaining members of the Central Committee declared themselves in fav-

our of convening the Third Congress (the others were arrested). Comrade Plekhanov's letter is dated June 16 (3), 1905. On the next day No. 1 of *Proletary*, the central organ of the Party that was established by the Third Congress, published the following declaration: "After reading the Central Committee's Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov, the chairman of the Party Council, and being in full agreement with the Central Committee, we consider it necessary—for reasons which comrades who are acquainted with the state of affairs in the Party will understand—publicly to declare our solidarity with the Central Committee." The signatures are pseudonyms: Ma, Behm, Vladimir, Innokenty, Andrey, Voron. We may inform you in confidence that these are the pseudonyms of the arrested members of the Central Committee.\* Hence, the moment the members of the Central Committee learned of the conflict between the Central Committee and Comrade Plekhanov (and, therefore, also the Council) over the question of the convocation of the Congress, the majority of them at once declared in favour of the Central Committee and against Comrade Plekhanov. We earnestly ask the International Secretariat to inform us whether Comrade Plekhanov deemed it necessary to inform the Bureau of this important declaration made by the arrested members of the Central Committee, which entirely refutes the assertion contained in Comrade Plekhanov's letter of June 16 (3).

8) Comrade Plekhanov is mistaken when he says that both factions asked him to remain the representative of the Party on the International Bureau. So far the Central Committee of our Party has not made any such request. As we informed you a few days ago, this question has not yet been finally decided, although it is to come up for consideration.

9) Comrade Plekhanov thinks that he can easily remain impartial on the question of our differences. Considering what has been stated above, we believe that this would be rather difficult for him, and at the present moment, at any rate, next to impossible.

II. I pass on to Comrade Bebel's proposal concerning this question.

Here I must make the following observations:

1) I am only one of the members of the Central Committee and the responsible editor of *Proletary*, the central organ of the Party. I can act on behalf of the whole of the Central Committee only in regard to foreign affairs and certain other matters specially entrusted to me. In any case, all my decisions may be annulled by a general meeting of the Central Committee. I am therefore not in a position to decide on the question of the Bureau's intervention in the affairs of our Party. But immediately on receiving them, I sent your letter, as well as the letters of Comrades Bebel and Plekhanov, to Russia, to all the members of the Central Committee.

2) In order to accelerate the reply of the Central Committee it would be very useful to obtain certain necessary explanations from the Bureau: a) should the term "intervention" be taken to mean only conciliatory mediation and advice having merely moral and not binding force; b) or does the Bureau mean an arbitration court, the decision of which is to be binding; c) does the Executive Committee of the Bureau propose to submit our differences for final decision to the General Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau without the right of appeal?

3) I on my part consider it my duty to inform the Bureau that some time before the Third Congress Comrade Bebel made a similar proposal\* to my friends and me and offered his services, or the services of the entire German Party Council (*Partei Vorstand*), in the capacity of arbitrator in the dispute between the "majority" and the "minority."

I replied that the Party Congress would take place soon and that I personally could not decide for the Party or in its name.

The Bureau of the Committees of the Majority rejected Bebel's offer. The Third Congress did not pass any resolution on this offer and thereby tacitly endorsed the reply of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority.

4) Since the International Bureau considers it fair to obtain its information from "certain German newspapers" I am

compelled to state that nearly all the German socialist papers, especially *Die Neue Zeit* and *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, are entirely on the side of the "minority" and present our cases in a one-sided and inaccurate manner. Kautsky, for instance, also calls himself impartial, and yet he goes so far as to refuse to publish in *Die Neue Zeit* a reply to an article by Rosa Luxemburg, in which she defended disruption in the Party.\* In the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* Kautsky urged that the German translation of the resolutions of the Third Congress should not be distributed!! After this it is easy to understand why many comrades in Russia are inclined to regard German Social-Democracy as being partial and extremely prejudiced on the question of the split in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy.

Accept, dear comrades, our fraternal greeting.

VL. ULYANOV (N. LENIN).

## A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY\*

October 3, 1905

DEAR FRIENDS!

I have received a heap of documents and heard a detailed account from Delta.<sup>1</sup> I hasten to answer all the points raised.

1) I shall not be able to come on the appointed date because it is impossible to abandon the paper at present. Voinov<sup>2</sup> is stranded in Italy, Orlovsky<sup>3</sup> had to be sent on a business errand. There is no one to leave it to. Therefore, the matter must be postponed until the Russian October, as you have fixed it.

2) I repeat a very urgent request: send a formal reply to the International Socialist Bureau: whether you are sending anyone to the Conference abroad<sup>4</sup>; whom and when. Also state precisely whether you are appointing anyone. Otherwise, you are injuring yourselves to an incredible extent in the eyes of the International Socialist Bureau.

3) Also about Plekhanov—formally and finally: yes or no? Who is to be appointed? Delay in this question is very dangerous.\*\*

4) As regards a legal publishing house, settle this matter as soon as possible by a formal decision. I have not done you the slightest damage with the draft agreement with Malykh—for it is only a draft. I only repeat that Malykh has provided employment for a crowd of people here, whom the Party has no means of maintaining. Don't forget this. I would advise

<sup>1</sup> Comrade Helene Stassova, then secretary of the Central Committee.—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> A. V. Lunacharsky.—*Ed.*

<sup>3</sup> V. V. Vorovsky.—*Ed.*

<sup>4</sup> See note to page 448.—*Ed.*

you to conclude an agreement with Malykh and also to continue to do business with others in the spirit of Schmidt.

5) In regard to the opposition of almost all the agents to the Central Committee I say the following: first, the co-operation of Insarov and Lyubich,\* which I unreservedly welcome, will probably improve matters greatly. Secondly, apparently the agents are exaggerating to a certain extent. Thirdly, would it not be advisable to put some of the agents on the committees and put them in charge of the whole area of two or three neighbouring committees? The importance of uniformity of tactics must not be exaggerated: a certain variety in the actions and plans of the committees would not do any harm.

6) I think it very important to make preparations for the Fourth Congress. It is time. In all probability, it will be at least half a year late, perhaps more. Still it is time. In my opinion, we are somewhat to blame for giving too much license to the committees and allowing them to ignore the decisions of the Third Congress with regard to the conditions of admission of Mensheviks. If these committees, who simultaneously recognise and do not recognise the Third Congress, do not make their position clear before the Fourth Congress, chaos will result. Some of them will not attend the Fourth Congress. This will give rise to a fresh scandal. Some will come to the Congress and desert to the other side. We must not confuse the policy of uniting the *two* sections with just *joining* the two sections together. We agree to unite the two sections; but we shall never agree to just joining them. First separate clearly, we must demand of the committees, then have two Congresses, and then unity. Two Congresses at one and the same time, at the same place, and they will discuss and adopt a previously prepared project of unity.

For the time being we must *fight* most determinedly against just *joining* the two sections of the Party. My advice would be to give such a slogan to the agents in the most definite manner and instruct them to carry it out.

If this is not done, a terrible mix-up will result. All confusion is to the advantage of the Mensheviks, and they will do their utmost to create it. It "will not be worse" for them (for

nothing can be worse than their disorganisation), but we value our organisation, though it may be an embryonic one, and will defend it tooth and nail. It is to the advantage of the Mensheviks to confuse everything and create another scandal at the Fourth Congress, for they are not even thinking of calling a Congress of *their own*. We, however, must concentrate all our efforts and all our thoughts upon consolidating and improving the organisation of *our* section of the Party. Such tactics may appear "egoistic" but they are the only sensible tactics. If we are properly welded and fully organised, if we remove all the faint-hearted and deserters from our midst, our solid core, small as it is, will lead the whole horde of "organisational amorphousness." And unless we have a core, the Mensheviks, having disorganised themselves, will disorganise us as well. If we have a strong core, we shall soon force them to unite with us. If we do not have one, it will not be another core that will triumph (there is no other) but the *confusion mongers*, and then, I assure you, there will be another squabble, another inevitable split, and bitterness a hundred times worse than before.

Let us prepare real unity by increasing *our* strength and working out *clear* proposals for norms of rules and tactics. As to the empty-headed prattlers about unity who are *confusing* the relations between the sections of the Party, they, in my opinion, ought to be ruthlessly eliminated from our midst.

Accept my handshake,

N. LENIN.

## THE REORGANISATION OF THE PARTY \*

### I

THE conditions of activity of our Party are undergoing a radical change. Freedom of assembly, of association and of the press has been seized. Of course, these rights are extremely transient, and it would be folly, if not a crime, to rely on the present liberties. The decisive struggle is yet to come, and preparation for this struggle must take first place. The secret apparatus of the Party must be preserved. But at the same time, it is absolutely necessary to take the widest possible advantage of the present, relatively wide scope of liberty. In addition to the secret apparatus it is absolutely necessary to create many new, public and semi-public Party organisations (and organisations affiliated to the Party). Unless we do this it will be impossible to adapt our activity to the new conditions; we shall not be in a position to cope with the new tasks . . . .

In order to put the organisation on a new basis, another Party Congress must be called. According to the rules the Party Congress should meet once a year and the next Congress should be held in May 1906; but now it is necessary to expedite this Congress. If we do not seize this opportunity, we shall lose it, that is to say, the need for organisation which the workers are feeling so acutely at the present time will assume abnormal, dangerous forms, and will strengthen the "Independents," etc.\*\* We must hasten to organise in a new way, we must submit new methods for general discussion, we must boldly and resolutely determine the "new line."

The appeal to the Party published in this issue and signed by the Central Committee of our Party,\*\*\* defines that new line, I am profoundly convinced, quite correctly. We, the represent-

atives of revolutionary Social-Democracy, and supporters of the "majority," have repeatedly stated that the complete democratisation of the Party was impossible under conditions of secret work, and that under such conditions the "elective principle" was a mere phrase. And life has confirmed our statement. It has been repeatedly stated in literature by the former adherents of the minority (see the pamphlet by "A Worker" with a preface by Axelrod,<sup>1</sup> the letter "A Worker, One of Many" in *Iskra*, and the pamphlet *The Workers on the Party Split*) that in fact it has proved impossible to apply real democratic methods and the elective principle. But we Bolsheviks have always admitted that when conditions changed, when political liberties were acquired, it would be necessary to adopt the elective principle; the minutes of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. prove this most conclusively, if any proof is required.

Thus, the task is clear: to preserve the secret apparatus for the time being and to develop a new public organisation. As applied to the Congress this task (the concrete fulfilment of which demands, of course, practical ability and a knowledge of all the conditions of the given time and place) can be formulated as follows: to convene the Fourth Congress on the basis of the Party rules and at the same time to begin immediately, at once, to apply the elective principle. The Central Committee has solved this problem: committee members,<sup>2</sup> formally as representatives of fully qualified organisations, and in fact as the representatives of Party continuity, are to attend the Congress with a right to vote. Delegates elected by *all* Party members, and consequently by the masses of workers belonging to the Party, *are invited* by the Central Committee, in virtue of its right, to attend the Congress with a consultative vote.<sup>3</sup> But the Central Committee has declared further that it will at once propose to the Congress to convert these

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 433.\*—*Ed.*

<sup>2</sup> By this term Lenin means delegates from the committees, *i.e.*, delegates appointed by a small leading circle and not elected by the majority of the Party members.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>3</sup> *I.e.*, the right to speak but not to vote.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

consultative votes into the right to vote. Will the fully qualified delegates of the committees agree to this?

The Central Committee declares that in its opinion they will unquestionably agree to it. Personally, I am profoundly convinced they will. It is impossible not to agree to it. It is inconceivable that the majority of the leaders of the Social-Democratic proletariat will not agree to it. We are sure that the opinion of Party workers, as most carefully registered by *Novaya Zhizn*,<sup>1</sup> will very soon prove the correctness of our views; even if a struggle takes place over this step (to convert the consultative votes into the right to vote), the issue is a foregone conclusion.

Look at this question from another angle—not from the formal point of view, but as regards the essence of the question. Is Social-Democracy endangered by the plan we propose?

It might be thought dangerous for a large number of non-Social-Democrats to join the Party suddenly. If that occurred the Party would become dissolved among the masses, it would cease to be a class conscious vanguard of the class, its role would be reduced to that of a tail. That would be a very deplorable thing indeed. And this danger would undoubtedly become a *very serious* one if we manifested any inclination towards demagogy, if we lacked Party principles (programme, tactical rules, organisational experience), or if those principles were weak and vacillating. But the fact is that there are no such "ifs." We Bolsheviks betray no inclinations towards demagogy; on the contrary, we have always fought determinedly, openly and straightforwardly against the least attempt at demagogy; we have demanded class consciousness from those joining the Party, we have insisted on the immense importance of continuity in Party development and have preached discipline and the necessity for *every* Party member being trained in one or other of the Party organisations. We have a firmly established Party programme which is officially recognised by all Social-Democrats, the fundamental postulates of which have not given rise to any criticism (the criticism of single points and formula-

<sup>1</sup> *New Life*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

tions is quite legitimate and necessary in every live Party). We have tactical resolutions which were consistently and systematically framed at the Second and Third Congresses and in the course of many years' work in the Social-Democratic press. We also have some organisational experience and an actual organisation, which has played an educational role and doubtless has borne fruit, which, though not immediately apparent, can be denied only by the blind.

No, comrades, let us not exaggerate this danger. Social-Democracy has established a name for itself, has created a trend and has created cadres of Social-Democratic workers. And at the present time, when the heroic proletariat has proved by deeds its readiness and ability to fight unitedly and consistently for clearly understood aims, to fight in a purely Social-Democratic spirit—at such a moment it would be simply ridiculous to doubt whether the workers who are members of our Party and who will join it tomorrow at the invitation of the Central Committee, will be Social-Democrats in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. The working class is instinctively, spontaneously Social-Democratic and the more than ten years of work put in by Social-Democracy has done a great deal to transform this spontaneity into class consciousness. Do not invent bogies, comrades! Do not forget that there will always be elements of instability, vacillation, wavering in every live and growing party. But these elements are subject to and will submit to the influence brought to bear upon them by the steadfast, solid core of Social-Democrats.

Our Party has stagnated in its underground condition. As a delegate at the Third Congress rightly expressed it, it has been suffocating underground during the last few years. The "underground" is breaking up. Forward then, boldly, take up the new weapon, distribute it among new people, extend your strongholds, rally all the Social-Democratic workers around yourselves, incorporate them in the ranks of Party organisations by the hundreds and thousands! Let their delegates revive the ranks of our centres, let them breathe the new spirit of young, revolutionary Russia into them. So far the revolu-

tion has justified all the basic theoretical propositions of Marxism, all the essential slogans of Social-Democracy. And the revolution has also justified *our* Social-Democratic work, has justified our hope and confidence in the true revolutionary spirit of the proletariat. Let us therefore throw aside all pettiness in bringing about the necessary reform of the Party; let us at once strike a new path. This will not deprive us of our old secret apparatus (there is no doubt that the Social-Democratic workers have recognised and sanctioned it; the experience of life and the course of the revolution have proved this a hundred times more convincingly than it could have been proved by decisions and resolutions). This will give us fresh young forces that will emerge from the very depths of the only genuinely and consistently revolutionary class, which has won semi-liberty for Russia and which will win complete liberty for her and lead her through liberty to socialism!

## II

The decision of the Central Committee of our Party to convene the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., published in *Novaya Zhizn*, No. 9, is a decisive step towards the complete achievement of the democratic principle in Party organisation. The election of delegates to the Congress (who will come there first with a consultative vote and then, undoubtedly, receive the right to vote) must be carried through within a month. All Party organisations must, therefore, as soon as possible, begin to discuss the candidates and the tasks of the Congress. It is absolutely necessary to reckon with the possibility of new attempts on the part of the expiring autocracy to withdraw the promised liberties, to attack the revolutionary workers and especially their leaders. Therefore, it would hardly be advisable (except in special cases) to publish the real names of the candidates. It is not yet time, so long as the Black Hundreds are in power, to discard the assumed names to which the epoch of political slavery has accustomed us, and it is also advisable to elect, as of old, substitute delegates, "in case of arrests." However, we shall not dwell on

all these precautions for secrecy, since the comrades acquainted with the local conditions of work will easily overcome all the difficulties that may arise in this connection. Comrades who have experience of revolutionary work under conditions of autocracy must help and advise all those who are starting Social-Democratic work under the new and "free" conditions (free in quotation marks as yet). It goes without saying that in doing this our committee members must display great tact: former, formal prerogatives inevitably lose their significance at the present time, and it will be necessary in very many cases to start "from the beginning" to *prove* to wide sections of new Party comrades the importance of a consistent Social-Democratic programme, Social-Democratic tactics and organisation. We must not forget that hitherto we have had to deal too often only with revolutionaries who emerged from a given social stratum and that now we shall have to deal with the typical representatives of the masses. This change not only calls for a change in the methods of propaganda and agitation (more simplicity, ability to lead up to a question, to explain the basic truths of socialism in the simplest, clearest and really convincing manner), but also in organisation.

In the present article I would like to dwell on one feature of the new organisational tasks. The Central Committee, in its decision, invites all Party organisations to send delegates to the Congress and calls upon *all* Social-Democratic workers to join such organisations. In order that this desire may really be fulfilled, the mere "invitation" of the workers is not sufficient, nor is it sufficient merely to increase the number of organisations of the old type. No, for this purpose it is necessary that all comrades, by their independent, creative, joint efforts, devise *new* forms of organisation. It is impossible to lay down any predetermined norms for this, for we are working in an entirely new field: the knowledge of local conditions and above all the initiative of *all* Party members must be brought into play. Certainly, the new form of organisation, or rather the new form of the basic organisational nucleus of the workers' party, must be much broader than were the old circles. Apart

from this, the new nucleus will have to be a less rigid, more "free," more "loose" organisation. Under a regime of complete freedom of association and the full guarantee of the civil liberties of the people we should, of course, organise Social-Democratic associations (not only trade unions, but political and Party associations) everywhere. Under the present conditions we must strive to approach that aim by all means and methods at our disposal.

We must immediately rouse the initiative of all Party workers and of all workers who sympathise with Social-Democracy. We must arrange at once, everywhere, lectures, talks, meetings and secret gatherings, at which the convening of the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. should be announced, the tasks of this Congress should be explained in a most popular and intelligible way, the new form of organisation of the Congress should be pointed out, and at which an appeal should be made to all Social-Democrats to take part in building up a genuinely proletarian Social-Democratic Party on new lines. Such work will supply us with much information based on experience; it will, in the course of two or three weeks (if we act energetically), produce new Social-Democratic forces from among the workers, will revive among far wider sections an interest in the Social-Democratic Party which we have now decided to reconstruct on new lines in conjunction with all the worker comrades. At all the meetings the question will immediately be raised about the creation of unions, organisations, Party groups. Each union, organisation and group will immediately elect its bureau, or board, or management committee—in other words, a central and permanent body for conducting the affairs of the organisation, for establishing connections with the local bodies of the Party, for receiving and circulating Party literature, for collecting subscriptions for Party work, for arranging meetings and lectures, and, finally, for preparing the election of delegates to the Party Congress. The Party committees will, of course, take care to render assistance to each of these organisations, to supply them all with material, inform them what the R.S.D.L.P. is, its history and its present great tasks.

It is time, moreover, to take steps to create local economic strongholds, so to speak, of the workers' Social-Democratic organisations in the shape of dining rooms, tea rooms, beer houses, libraries, reading rooms, shooting galleries,<sup>1</sup> etc. We must not forget that apart from being persecuted by the "autocratic" police, the Social-Democratic workers will also be persecuted by their "autocratic" employers, who will dismiss the agitators. Therefore, it is highly important to organise bases which shall be as independent as possible of the tyranny of the employers.

Generally speaking, we Social-Democrats must take every possible advantage of the present extension of freedom of action, and the more this freedom is guaranteed the more energetically shall we advance the slogan: "To the people!" The initiative of the workers themselves will now display itself on a scale that we, the conspirators and "circle-ists" of yesterday, did not even dare dream of. The influence of socialist ideas on the masses of the proletariat is now proceeding and will continue to proceed along paths that we very often will be altogether unable to trace. It will be necessary, therefore, to distribute the Social-Democratic intelligentsia in a more rational way to correspond to these conditions,<sup>2</sup> so that they shall not kick their heels aimlessly in those places where the movement

<sup>1</sup> I do not know the corresponding Russian word; by "tir" [Lenin uses the French word—*Ed. Eng. ed.*] I mean a place where firing at a target takes place, where there is a supply of all kinds of weapons and everyone may, for a small fee, fire at a target with a revolver or rifle. In Russia the freedom of assembly and association has been proclaimed. Citizens have a right to assemble to learn how to shoot; this can present no danger to anyone. In any big European city you will find such shooting galleries open to all, situated in cellars, sometimes outside the towns, etc. It is very necessary for the workers to learn how to shoot and how to handle arms. Of course, we shall only be able to engage in this work seriously and extensively when the right of association is guaranteed and when we are able to prosecute the police rascals who dare to close such institutions.

<sup>2</sup> At the Third Congress of the Party I expressed the wish that the Party committees be formed in the proportion of about eight workers to two intellectuals. How obsolete this wish appears at the present time!

Now we must wish for the new Party organisations to have one Social-Democratic intellectual to several hundred Social-Democratic workers.

can already stand on its own feet and can, so to speak, shift for itself, but that they should go to the "lower strata" where work is harder, where the conditions are more difficult, where the need for experienced and well-informed people is greater, where the sources of light are fewer, and where the pulse of political life is weaker. We must now go "to the people" where elections will take place in which the entire population, even of the most remote places, will take part—and (this is still more important) where there will be an open struggle, in order to paralyse the reactionary tendencies of a provincial Vendée, to spread the slogans issued from the big centres all over the country and among all the proletarian masses.

Of course, it is always had to run to extremes: in order to organise the work on the most durable and "model" lines possible, we shall often have to concentrate our best forces even now in this or that important centre. Experience will show what proportion should be adhered to in this respect. Our task now is not so much to invent norms for the new organisations as to develop the most far-reaching and boldest work which will enable us at the Fourth Congress to sum up and formulate the data obtained from the experience of the Party.

### III

In the first two essays we dealt with the general importance of the elective principle in the Party and the need for new organisational nuclei and organisational forms. We shall now examine another extremely important question, namely, the question of Party unity.

It is no secret to anyone that the enormous majority of Social-Democratic workers are exceedingly dissatisfied with the split in the Party and demand unity. It is an open secret that the split has caused the Social-Democratic workers (or those about to become Social-Democrats) to become somewhat estranged from the Social-Democratic Party.

The workers have lost almost all hope that the Party "chiefs" will unite. The need for unity was officially recognised by the

Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.<sup>1</sup> and by the Menshevik Conference held in May of this year.\* Half a year has passed since then, and the cause of unity has made hardly any progress. No wonder the workers are beginning to show signs of impatience. No wonder "A Worker, One of Many," who wrote on unity in *Iskra* and in a pamphlet published by the "majority" (*Workers on the Party Split*, published by the Central Committee, Geneva, 1905), has at last threatened the Social-Democratic intelligentsia with a "fist from below." Some Social-Democrats (the Mensheviks) did not like that threat at the time, others (the Bolsheviks) thought it legitimate and, in essence, fully justified.

It seems to me that the time has now come when the *class conscious* Social-Democratic workers can and must carry out their intention (I will not say "threat," because this word smacks of accusation, demagoguery, and we must do our utmost to avoid both). Indeed, the time has come, or in any case, is coming when the elective principle can be applied in the Party organisation not in words, but in deeds, not as a fine-sounding but empty phrase, but as a really new principle which really renovates, widens and strengthens Party ties. The "majority," represented by the Central Committee, has directly appealed for the immediate application and introduction of the elective principle. The minority is following the same path. And the Social-Democratic workers represent the enormous, overwhelming majority in all the Social-Democratic organisations, institutions, gatherings, meetings, etc.

Hence, it is now possible not only to *urge* unity, not only to *promise* to unite, but to unite in reality, by the majority of organised workers in both factions simply deciding to do so. There will be no forcing of one's opinion on others, since, in principle, the need for unity has been recognised by all, and the workers will only have to decide in practice a question which has already been decided in principle.

The relation between the functions of the intellectuals and of the proletariat (workers) in the Social-Democratic labour movement can, perhaps, be fairly precisely expressed by the

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 453.\*—*Ed.*

following general formula: the intelligentsia can very well solve problems of "principle," draw up good schemes, reason very well about the need for doing certain things . . . but the workers act; they transform drab theory into vital life.

And I shall not in the least slip into demagoguery, nor in the least debase the great role played by consciousness in the labour movement, nor shall I in the least belittle the importance of Marxian theory and Marxian principles if I say now: both at the Congress and at the Conference we created the "drab theory" of Party unity. Comrades and workers, help us to transform this drab theory into vital life! Join the Party organisations in huge numbers! Transform our Fourth Congress and the Second Menshevik Conference into a grand and imposing Congress of Social-Democratic workers! Join with us in studying this practical question of fusion, let this question be the exception (the exception which proves the opposite rule!) in which we shall have one-tenth theory and nine-tenths practice. Such a wish is surely legitimate, historically necessary and psychologically comprehensible. We have "theorised" for so long (sometimes, we must frankly confess, in a futile way) in an *émigré* atmosphere, that, by God, it will do no harm if we now "bend the bow" slightly, a little, just a little "the other way" and put a little more practice in the forefront. This would certainly be appropriate in regard to the question of unity, about which, owing to the causes of the split, we have wasted such a lot of ink and so many reams of paper. We political exiles in particular are longing for practical work. Moreover, we have already written a very good and comprehensive programme of the whole democratic revolution. Let us then unite also to make this revolution!

November 1905.

## AN APPEAL TO THE PARTY BY DELEGATES AT THE UNITY CONGRESS WHO BELONGED TO THE LATE "BOLSHEVIK" FACTION\*

COMRADES!

The Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. has been held. The split no longer exists. Not only have the former "Bolshevik" and "Menshevik" factions completely amalgamated organisationally, but unity has been achieved between the R.S.D.L.P. and Polish Social-Democracy, a unity agreement has been signed with the Lettish Social-Democrats, and unity has been assured with Jewish Social-Democracy, *i.e.*, the Bund. The political significance of these events would have been important under any circumstances, but it is truly enormous in the historical period through which we are now passing.

Apparently, the fate of the great Russian revolution is to be determined in the near future. From the very beginning of the movement to this day, the proletariat has been marching at the head of the revolution, leading the broad masses of the urban and rural poor in its train. In view of the coming formidable, decisive events in the people's struggle, it is all the more essential to attain the practical unity of the class conscious proletariat of the whole of Russia and of all its nationalities. In a revolutionary epoch like the present, all theoretical errors and tactical deviations of the Party are most ruthlessly criticised by life itself, which enlightens and educates the working class with unprecedented rapidity. At such a time, it is the duty of every Social-Democrat to strive to bring about a state of affairs in which the ideological struggle within the Party on questions of theory and tactics will be conducted as openly, as widely and as freely as possible, but under no circumstances should it disturb or hamper the unity of revolutionary action of the Social-Democratic proletariat.

The great Russian revolution is now on the eve of its turning point. The struggle waged by all classes of bourgeois Russia against the autocracy brought into being a paper constitution. A section of the bourgeoisie is completely satisfied with this and has turned its back on the revolution. Another section, wishing to go further, deludes itself with hopes of a "constitutional" path of struggle and is ready to regard the election victory of the vacillating and hypocritical Cadet Party as an important victory for the people's freedom.

The broad masses of the peasants, fighting bravely against old, feudal Russia, against the omnipotence of the officials and against enslavement by the landlords, remain on the side of the revolution, but they are far from being fully conscious. The revolutionary-democratic section of the urban petty bourgeoisie also shows but little consciousness. Only the proletariat, which heroically fought for freedom in October and took up arms in defence of freedom in December—only the proletariat remains, as before, a consistently revolutionary class, which is gathering fresh forces and is now consciously preparing for a new and still greater battle.

With cynical frankness, the tsarist government is now playing its constitutional game. It retains its old power, it continues and intensifies the persecution of the fighters for liberty, its obvious intention is to transform the Duma into a futile talking shop, a screen for the autocracy, and instrument for deceiving the people. The very near future will determine whether these tactics will be crowned with success or not: that question will be decided by the outcome of the new revolutionary explosion which is now coming to a head.

If the proletariat of the whole of Russia closes its ranks, if it succeeds in rousing all the genuinely revolutionary sections of the people, all those who want to fight and not to strike a bargain, if it trains itself well for the conflict and selects the proper moment for the final battle for freedom, then victory will be ours. Then the tsar's cynical, constitutional game will fail; then the bourgeoisie will not succeed in striking a bargain with the autocracy; then the Russian revolution

will not turn out to be incomplete, half-hearted, and three-fourths fruitless for the interests of the working class and the peasants as were the revolutions of the nineteenth century in Western Europe. Then it will really be a great revolution—a complete victory of the people's uprising will free bourgeois Russia of all the old fetters, and will perhaps inaugurate the epoch of socialist revolution in the West.

While striving for a complete democratic revolution, Social-Democracy must in all its work reckon with the inevitability of a new revolutionary explosion. We must ruthlessly expose the constitutional illusions fostered both by the government and by the bourgeoisie as represented by its liberal party—the Cadets; we must call upon the revolutionary peasantry to close its ranks for the sake of the complete victory of the peasant uprising; we must explain to the broad masses the great importance of the first December uprising and the inevitability of a new uprising, which alone will be able to wrest power from the tsar's autocracy and really transfer it to the people. Such must be the basic tasks of our tactics at the present historical moment.

We cannot and must not ignore the fact that, as we are firmly convinced, the Unity Congress did not quite correctly appreciate these tasks. The three most important resolutions of the Congress clearly reveal the erroneous views of the former "Menshevik" faction, which numerically was predominant at the Congress.

The Congress accepted the principle of "municipalisation" in its agrarian programme. Municipalisation means peasant ownership of allotment land and the leasing to the peasants of the landlord estates that are to be transferred to the Zemstvos. This, in essence, is something midway between real agrarian revolution and Cadet agrarian reform. The peasants will not accept such a plan. They will either demand the simple division of the land<sup>1</sup> or its complete transfer to the people. Municipal-

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion of the agrarian programme see *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*, in this volume.—Ed. Eng. ed.

isation would be a serious democratic reform only in the event of a complete democratic revolution, if a republican regime were established and if government officials were elected by the people. We proposed to the Congress that it should at least link municipalisation with these conditions, but the Congress rejected our proposals. And without these conditions municipalisation, as a liberal bureaucratic reform, will give the peasants something very different from what they require, and at the same time it will give new strength, new influence to the bourgeois anti-proletarian elements which dominate the Zemstvos, for it puts the distribution of the land fund practically into their hands. We must explain this point to the broad masses of the workers and peasants.

In its resolution on the State Duma the Congress recognised the desirability of creating a Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction in this Duma. The Congress refused to reckon with the fact that nine-tenths of the class conscious workers of Russia, including all the Polish, Lettish and Jewish Social-Democratic proletarians, boycotted the Duma. The Congress rejected the proposal to make participation in the elections dependent upon whether it would be possible to conduct really wide agitation among the masses. It rejected the proposal that only those who stood as candidates of workers' organisations should be eligible for membership in the Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction. The Congress, therefore, embarked on the path of parliamentarism without providing the safeguards for the Party which in this connection have been devised by the experience of revolutionary Social-Democracy in Europe.

As Social-Democrats we, of course, in principle, recognised the obligation of using parliamentarism as a weapon of the proletarian struggle; but the whole point is: is it admissible for Social-Democracy to take part in a "parliament" like our Duma under present conditions? Is it admissible to establish a parliamentary fraction without Social-Democratic members of parliament elected by labour organisations? Our opinion is that it is not.

The Congress rejected the proposal to make it one of the

tasks of the Party to combat playing at constitutionalism, to combat constitutional illusions. The Congress made no pronouncement on the dual nature of the Cadet party, which is predominant in the Duma, and which displays such a great inclination to strike a bargain with the autocracy, to blunt and extinguish the revolution. The Congress allowed itself to be too greatly impressed by the fleeting and tinsel success of the party of bourgeois compromisers between the autocracy and the people's freedom.

Nor in its resolutions on the armed uprising did the Congress give what was necessary, *viz.*, direct criticism of the mistakes of the proletariat, a clear estimate of the experience of October-December 1905, or even an attempt to study the interrelation between strikes and uprising. Instead of all this a sort of timid evasion of the armed uprising predominates in the resolutions. The Congress did not openly and clearly tell the working class that the December uprising was a mistake; but in a covert way it condemned that uprising.\* We think that this is more likely to confuse the political class consciousness of the proletariat than to enlighten it.

We must and shall fight ideologically against those decisions of the Congress which we regard as erroneous. But at the same time we declare to the whole Party that we are opposed to a split of any kind. We stand for submission to the decisions of the Congress. Rejecting the boycott of the Central Committee and valuing joint work, we agreed to our adherents going on the Central Committee, although they will comprise a negligible minority in it. We are profoundly convinced that the workers' Social-Democratic organisations must be united, but in these united organisations there must be wide and free discussion of Party questions, and free comradely criticism and estimates of events in Party life.

On the organisational question we differed only as regards the rights of the editorial board of the central organ. We insisted on the right of the Central Committee to appoint and dismiss the editors of the central organ. We were all agreed on the principle of democratic centralism, on the guarantee of the

rights of all minorities and all loyal opposition, on the autonomy of every Party organisation, on the recognition that all Party officials must be elected, accountable to the Party and liable to be dismissed by it. We are of the opinion that the observance of these principles of organisation, their sincere and consistent application, will serve as a safeguard against splits, a guarantee that the ideological struggle in the Party can and must prove fully consistent with strict organisational unity, with the subordination of all to the decisions of the Joint Congress.

We call upon all our adherents to submit to such subordination and to take part in such an ideological struggle: we invite all the members of the Party carefully to evaluate the resolutions of the Congress. Revolution teaches, and we believe that the practical unity of the struggle of the Social-Democratic proletariat of the whole of Russia will guard our Party against fatal errors during the climax of the impending political crisis. At the outset of the fight, events themselves will teach the working masses the right tactics to adopt. Let us exert every effort to make our estimate of these tactics contribute to the achievement of the tasks of revolutionary Social-Democracy, to prevent the workers' party from deviating from the consistent proletarian path for the sake of hunting after some fleeting tinsel success, so that the socialist proletariat may perform to the end its great role of vanguard fighter for liberty.

May (April) 1906.

## THE PLATFORM OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY\*

### I

As is well known, the Party Congress will meet in a few weeks' time. We must very energetically begin to make preparations for the Congress and discuss the main tactical problems which the Party will have to solve there.

The Central Committee of our Party has already drawn up the Congress agenda, and it has been published in the newspapers. The main points on that agenda are: 1) the immediate political tasks, 2) the State Duma. The necessity for the second point is obvious and can give rise to no objections. The first point is also necessary in our opinion, but it should be formulated differently, or, to be more correct, it should be given a somewhat different content.

In order to start an immediate all-Party discussion on the tasks of the Congress and the tactical problems it will have to settle, a conference of delegates of our Party organisations in both capitals and of the editorial board of *Proletary* drew up on the eve of the opening of the Second Duma the draft resolution printed below.<sup>1</sup> We intend to outline here *how* the conference understood its tasks, *why* it placed the particular questions in the forefront in the draft resolutions, and the *main ideas* that were embodied in these resolutions.

The first question: "the immediate political tasks."

In our opinion, the question should not be put before the Congress of the Party in *this* way in the epoch through which we are now passing. This is a revolutionary epoch. All Social-Democrats are agreed on that, irrespective of the faction they

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 484-85. Only one of these draft resolutions (on non-Party workers' organisations) is included in this volume. Lenin deals with the main points of all the resolutions in this article.—Ed.

belong to. It is sufficient to read the preamble of the resolution passed by the Mensheviks and Bundists at the All-Russian Conference of the Party in November 1906 to convince oneself of the accuracy of our statement.

And in a revolutionary epoch we *cannot* confine ourselves to a definition of the *immediate* political tasks for two reasons. In the first place, unlike epochs of "peaceful" and petty constitutional work, the *fundamental* tasks of the Social-Democratic movement are brought to the forefront and require detailed analysis. In the second place, in such an epoch it is *impossible* to determine the *immediate* political tasks, for the distinguishing feature of revolution is that sweeping changes, rapid turns, unexpected situations, sharp outbursts become possible and inevitable. It is sufficient to point to the possibility and probability of the dispersion of the Left Duma and of the electoral law being amended in a Black Hundred spirit in order to appreciate all this.

It was all very well for the Austrians, for instance, to define their "immediate" task as "the struggle for universal suffrage" when all signs pointed to a continuation of the epoch of more or less peaceful consecutive and continuous constitutional development.\* In our case, however, do not even the Mensheviks in the above-mentioned resolution speak of the impossibility of a *peaceful* path, and of the necessity of electing to the Duma not pleaders but fighters? Do they not recognise the need for a struggle for the constituent assembly? Picture to yourselves a European country with a settled constitutional regime that is likely to last for some time, in which the slogan "constituent assembly" and the contrasting of a "pleader" to a "fighter" in parliament could be discussed, and you will understand why it is *impossible* under such conditions to define the "immediate" tasks in the way they are defined in Western Europe. The more successful the work of the Social-Democrats and the revolutionary bourgeois-democrats in the Duma will be, the more probable is it that a non-Duma struggle will break out which will confront us with immediate tasks of quite a special nature.

No. It is not so much the immediate tasks that we must discuss at the Party Congress as the *fundamental* tasks of the proletariat in the present period of bourgeois revolution. Otherwise, we shall find ourselves in the position of those who become helpless and filled with consternation at every turn of events (as repeatedly happened during 1906). In any case we cannot determine the "immediate" tasks any more than we can foretell whether the Second Duma and the electoral law of December 24 (11), 1905, will last a week, a month or six months.<sup>1</sup> And so far the Party as a whole has not yet defined the basic tasks of the Social-Democratic proletariat in our revolution. Unless this is done we cannot have a consistent policy based on principles, the quest for definite "immediate" tasks cannot be successful.

The Unity Congress did not pass a resolution appraising the situation and the tasks of the proletariat in the revolution; it did not do so notwithstanding the fact that draft resolutions on this subject *were* submitted by both trends in the Social-Democratic Party, notwithstanding the fact that the question of appraising the situation was on the agenda and *was discussed* at the Congress. Thus, *everybody* regarded these questions as important, but the majority at the Stockholm Congress was of the opinion that they had not been made sufficiently clear. The discussion on these questions must be resumed. We must consider, first, what is the nature of the present revolutionary situation judged by the main tendencies of social-economic and political evolution? Secondly, what is the political grouping of classes (and parties) in present-day Russia? And thirdly, what are the main tasks of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in the *present* situation, with the *present* political grouping of social forces?

Of course, we do not shut our eyes to the fact that some Mensheviks (and perhaps the Central Committee as well) understood the question of the immediate political tasks to mean simply the question of supporting the demand for a Duma, *i.e.*, a Cadet ministry.

<sup>1</sup> See note to page 13.\*—*Ed.*

With his customary and highly praiseworthy, of course, impetuosity in pushing the Mensheviks to the Right, Plekhanov has already come out in defence of this demand in *Russkaya Zhizn* of March 8 (February 23).\*

We think this is an important, but a *subsidiary* question, and that Marxists cannot put it separately, without an appraisal of the present state of our revolution, without an appraisal of the class content of the Cadet Party and of the political role it is playing at the present time. To reduce this question to pure politics, to the "principle" of the cabinet being responsible to the chamber under a constitutional regime, in general, would mean the complete abandonment of the standpoint of the class struggle and the adoption of the standpoint of a liberal.

That is why our conference linked the question of a Cadet cabinet with the appraisal of the present state of the revolution.

In the preamble to the resolution dealing with the subject we begin first of all with the question which all Marxists regard as a fundamental one, namely, that of the economic crisis and the economic situation of the masses. The conference formulated this as follows: the crisis "does not reveal any signs of speedy liquidation." This formula errs, perhaps, on the side of excessive caution. But the important thing for a Social-Democratic Party, of course, is to establish the undisputed facts, to indicate the main lines; the scientific treatment of the question can be left to Party literature.

On the basis of the crisis (second point of our preamble) we point to an intensification of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (this is an undisputed fact and the manifestations of this intensification are a matter of common knowledge) and then to the sharpening of the social struggle in the rural districts. Strikingly obvious events such as lockouts are not observed in the rural districts, but even such government measures as the November agrarian laws ("bribing the peasant bourgeoisie") prove that the struggle is becoming more acute, that the landlords are forced to exert all their efforts to split the peasantry in order to weaken the general peasant onslaught,

We do not know where these efforts will lead in the end. All "uncompleted" (Marx's expression) bourgeois revolutions "ended" with the well-to-do peasantry passing over to the side of order. In any case Social-Democracy must do its utmost to develop the consciousness of the broadest strata of the peasantry, to make them understand the class struggle that is taking place in the countryside.

Further on, point 3, registers the main fact in the political history of Russia during the past year, *viz.*, "the swing to the Right of the upper classes" and "the swing to the Left of the lower classes." We were of the opinion that particularly in revolutionary epochs, Social-Democracy must at its congresses *sum up* the periods of social development, *apply* to them its Marxian methods of investigation, *teach* the other classes to review the past and treat political events from the point of view of *principles* and not from the point of view of the interests of the moment or of a few days' success, as is done by the bourgeoisie, which in fact treats all theories with contempt and shrinks from making any class analysis of present events.

The strengthening of the extremes means a weakening of the centre. The centre is not the Octobrists, as some Social-Democrats (including Martov) mistakenly suppose, but the Cadets. What is the *objective* historical task of that Party? Marxists must answer that question if they want to remain true to their doctrines. The resolution answers: "*to put an end to the revolution by accepting concessions to which the Black Hundred landlords and the autocracy [for the Cadets stand for voluntary agreements] would agree.*" In his well-known work *The Social Revolution*, Karl Kautsky very well explained that the difference between reform and revolution is that the former leaves power in the hands of the oppressing class which suppresses the uprising of the oppressed by means of concessions to which the oppressors *can agree* without *destroying* their power.\*

This is precisely the objective task of the liberal bourgeoisie in a bourgeois-democratic revolution, *viz.*, to preserve the

monarchy and the landlord class at the price of "reasonable" concessions.

Can this task be carried out? That depends on circumstances. A Marxist cannot say that this task cannot be carried out under any circumstances. But if the bourgeois revolution does end in *this* way it will mean: 1) that the productive forces of bourgeois society will have the least freedom for development (the economic progress of Russia will be incomparably quicker if the landlord estates are broken up in a revolutionary way than if they are reformed in accordance with the Cadet plan); 2) that the chief needs of the masses of the people will not be satisfied, and 3) that it will be necessary to suppress the masses *by force*. If the masses are not forcibly suppressed, Cadet "peaceful," constitutional evolution *will not be possible*. We must firmly bear this in mind and instil it in the minds of the masses. Cadet "social peace" means peace for the landlord and the manufacturer, it means "peace" that will come after the peasants' and workers' uprising *is suppressed*.

Stolypin's court-martial repression and Cadet reforms are the two hands of one and the same oppressor.

## II

Only eight days have passed since our first article on this subject was published, and political life has already given rise to a number of important events which have confirmed the statements we made then and which as an "accomplished fact" (or as a fact that is becoming accomplished?) have shed a glaring light on the urgent questions to which we then referred.

The Cadets' turn to the Right is already marked in the Duma. Rodichev's support of Stolypin in his advocacy of moderation, caution, legality, pacification and of not inciting the people, and Stolypin's support, the famous "whole-hearted" support of Rodichev, have become accomplished facts.\*

This fact has brilliantly confirmed the correctness of the analysis of the present political situation which we made, prior

to the opening of the Second Duma, in the draft resolutions that were drawn up between February 28 (15) and March 3 (February 18). We refused to follow the advice of the Central Committee to discuss the "immediate political tasks." We pointed out that in a revolutionary epoch such a proposal was altogether out of place. For this question of a policy for the moment we substituted the question of the fundamentals of socialist policy in a bourgeois revolution.

And a week of revolutionary development has fully confirmed our anticipations.

Last time we analysed the preamble of our draft resolution. The central point of that preamble was the statement that the weakened party of the "centre," i.e., the liberal-bourgeois Cadet Party, is striving to put an end to the revolution by accepting concessions that the Black Hundred landlords and the autocracy can agree to.

It was only yesterday, as it were, that Plekhanov and his adherents in the Right wing of the R.S.D.L.P. declared that the Bolshevik idea, which we persistently advocated during the whole of 1906 (and even earlier, since 1905, since the publication of the pamphlet *Two Tactics*), was a semi-phantastic hypothesis, begotten by a rebel point of view of the role of the bourgeoisie, or at any rate an untimely warning, etc.

Today *everybody* realises that we were right. The "efforts" of the Cadets are *beginning* to materialise, and even a newspaper like *Tovarishch*, which probably hates Bolshevism for its ruthless exposure of the Cadets more than anyone else, says in connection with the rumours<sup>1</sup> which *Rech* denies, about

<sup>1</sup> These lines were already written when we read the following in the leading article in *Rech* of March 26 (13): "When the exact data about the notorious negotiations between the Cadets and the government in June of last year are made public, the country will know that if the Cadets are to be blamed at all for these negotiations 'behind the back of the people' it can only be for the unyielding attitude to which *Rossiya* has referred." That's just it: "When the data are made public!" And in the meantime, in spite of this challenge, the Cadets do not publish "the exact data" concerning the negotiations in June 1906, or the negotiations in January 1907 (Milyukov's visit to Stolypin on January 28 [15]) or the negotiations in March 1907. But the fact remains that they have conducted negotiations *behind the back of the people*.

the negotiations between the Cadets and the Black Hundred government, that "there is no smoke without fire."\*

We can only welcome this revival of "Bolshevik week" in *Tovarishch*. We need only note that *history has confirmed all our warnings and slogans*, history has exposed the utter levity (levity, to say the least) of those "democrats," and unfortunately of certain Social-Democrats as well, who waved aside our criticism of the Cadets.

Who said at the time of the First Duma that the Cadets were bargaining with the government behind the scene? It was the Bolsheviks. It transpired subsequently that even a man like Trepov was in favour of a Cadet cabinet.

Who were the most energetic in conducting a campaign of exposure in connection with Milyukov's visit to Stolypin on January 28 (15), in the heat of the election struggle (alleged struggle) which the party of alleged people's freedom was waging against the government? It was the Bolsheviks.

Who, at election meetings in St. Petersburg, and in the first days of the Second Duma (see the newspaper *Novy Luch\*\**), called attention to the fact that the two-million franc loan of 1906 was practically given to Messrs. Dubasov and Co. with the indirect assistance of the Cadets who rejected Clemenceau's formal offer<sup>1</sup> to oppose the loan openly in the name of his party? It was the Bolsheviks.

Who *on the eve* of the Second Duma made the cornerstone of the policy of consistent (*i.e.*, proletarian) democracy the exposure of the "*treacherous nature* of the Cadet policy"? It was the Bolsheviks.

A very slight breeze was enough to blow away like a feather all talk about supporting the demand for a Duma ministry, for a responsible ministry, and for subordinating the executive to the legislature. Plekhanov's dreams of making this slogan a signal for the decisive battle, or a means for enlightening the masses, turned out to be the dreams of a well-meaning philistine. No one now would even venture to support such

<sup>1</sup> Clemenceau was then leader of the Radical Party in the French Chamber.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

slogans seriously. Life has proved, or to be more exact, has begun to prove that, in fact, the issue here is not the "principle" of more completely or more consistently carrying out "constitutional principles," but the fact that *the Cadets are striking a bargain with reaction*. Life has shown that those were right who, behind the liberal exterior of alleged progressive general principles, perceived and exposed the narrow class interests of a frightened liberal who gives nice names to vile and filthy deeds.

The correctness of the conclusion drawn by our first resolution has thus been confirmed much sooner than we could have expected and much better too: not by logic, but by history; not in words, but in deeds; not by resolutions passed by Social-Democrats, but by the events of the revolution.

The first conclusion to be drawn is: "The political crisis that is growing before our eyes is not a constitutional, but a revolutionary crisis, which is leading to a direct struggle of the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry against the autocracy."

The second conclusion, the corollary of the first is: "The coming Duma campaign must therefore be regarded and utilised only as an episode in the people's revolutionary struggle for power."

What, in essence, is the difference between a constitutional crisis and a revolutionary crisis? It is that the former can be settled on the basis of the existing fundamental laws and system of state, whereas the latter demands the break-up of these laws and of the feudal system. Hitherto, the idea expressed in our conclusions was shared by all Russian Social-Democrats, irrespective of faction.

Quite recently, however, a trend has arisen among the Mensheviks which is inclined towards the diametrically opposite view, namely, that we must abandon all thought of a revolutionary struggle, but abide by the existing "constitution," acting on its basis. The following are the significant points in the draft resolution on the attitude towards the State Duma, drawn up by "Comrades Dan, Koltsov, Martynov, Martov, Ne-

gorev and others with the participation of a group of practical workers" and published in No. 47 of *Russkaya Zhizn* (it is also published as a separate leaflet):

"... 2) The task, which is now taking central place in the Russian revolution, of an immediate struggle for power reduces itself [?] under the existing relation of social forces [?] mainly to the question [?] of the struggle for [?] popular representation.

"... 3) The elections to the Second Duma, which resulted in a considerable number of consistent [?] supporters of the revolution being elected, showed that a consciousness of the need for such a [?] struggle for power is maturing in the minds of the masses of the people."

Confused and evasive as the expressions contained in these points may be, their tendency is clearly revealed: instead of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and peasantry for power—*reduce* the tasks of the workers' party to a *liberal* struggle for the *present* system of popular representation, or on the basis of the latter. We must wait and see whether really all the Mensheviks will endorse such a presentation of the question now, or at the Fifth Congress of the Party.

In any case, the Cadets' turn to the Right and Stolypin's "whole-hearted" approval of them will soon force the Right wing of our Party to make up their minds definitely: either to continue the policy of supporting the Cadets, and thus finally to take the path of opportunism, or to break completely with the policy of supporting the Cadets and adopt the policy of the socialist independence of the proletariat and of a struggle for freeing the democratic petty bourgeoisie from the influence and hegemony of the Cadets.

The third conclusion to be drawn from our resolution reads: "Social-Democracy, as the party of the advanced class, can under no circumstances at the present time support the Cadet policy in general, or a Cadet ministry in particular. Social-Democracy must exert every effort to expose the treacherous nature of that policy to the masses: to explain to them the revolutionary tasks confronting them; to prove to them that only if they display a high degree of consciousness and are firmly organised can the concessions which the autocracy is likely to make be converted from instruments of deception

and corruption into a means for advancing the progress of the revolution."

Generally speaking, we do not deny that partial concessions can be obtained; nor do we pledge ourselves beforehand not to make use of them. The wording of the resolution leaves no doubt on that score. It is possible also that a Cadet ministry may, in one respect or another, come under the category of "concessions made by the autocracy." But while not refusing to take "payment in instalments" (to use Engels' expression\*), the working class party must under no circumstances forget another particularly important feature which liberals and opportunists often lose sight of, namely, the part played by "concessions" as *an instrument of deception and corruption*.

No Social-Democrat, unless he wishes to become a bourgeois reformist, must forget this side of the question. The Mensheviks unpardonably forget this when in the above-mentioned resolution they say: ". . . Social-Democracy will support *all the efforts* made by the Duma to subordinate the executive to itself." The efforts of the State Duma mean the efforts of the majority of the Duma. Experience has shown that the majority may consist of the Rights and the Cadets as *against* the Lefts. The "efforts" of such a majority may *subordinate* the "executive" to itself in *such* a way as to make the position of the people still worse, or to obviously deceive the people.

Let us hope that in this instance the Mensheviks simply displayed an excess of zeal, that they will not support *all* the efforts of the majority of the present Duma in the above-stated direction. But what is characteristic, of course, is that prominent leaders of the Mensheviks *could* accept such a formula.

As a matter of fact, the Cadets' turn to the Right compels *all* Social-Democrats, irrespective of faction, to adopt a policy of refusing to support the Cadets, a policy of exposing their treachery, a policy of an independent and consistent, revolutionary, working class party.

March-April 1907.

EXTRACT FROM DRAFT RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED  
TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE R. S. D. L. P.\*

ON NON-PARTY LABOUR ORGANISATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE ANARCHO-SYNDICALIST TREND AMONG THE PROLETARIAT

TAKING into consideration:

1) That in connection with Comrade Axelrod's agitation for a non-Party Labour Congress, a trend (represented by Larin, Shcheglo, El, Ivanovsky, Mirov and the Odessa edition of *Osvobozhdeniye Truda*) is observed in the ranks of the R.S.D.L.P., the aim of which is to destroy the Social-Democratic Labour Party and set up in its place a non-Party, political, proletarian organisation;

2) That in addition to this, outside of and actually against the Party, anarcho-syndicalist agitation is being carried on among the proletariat in favour of this very slogan of a non-Party Labour Congress and of non-Party organisations (*Soyuznoye Dyelo*<sup>1</sup> and its group in Moscow, the anarchist press in Odessa, etc.);

3) That notwithstanding the resolutions passed by the November All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. a series of disruptive actions has been observed in our Party, the object of which is to create non-Party organisations;

4) That, on the other hand, the R.S.D.L.P. has never renounced its intention of making use of definite non-Party organisations, like the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, in periods of revolutionary upsurge, high or low, in order to extend the influence of Social-Democrats in the working class and to strengthen the Social-Democratic labour movement (see the September resolutions of the St. Petersburg Committee and

<sup>1</sup> *The Union's Cause*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

the Moscow Committee on the Labour Congress, in *Proletary*, Nos. 3 and 4);

5) That the incipient revival creates the opportunity to organise or utilise non-Party, representative, working class institutions, such as the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, Soviets of Workers' Delegates, etc., for the purpose of developing Social-Democracy, while at the same time the Social-Democratic Party organisations must bear in mind that if Social-Democratic work among the masses is properly and widely organised such institutions may actually become superfluous.

Taking all this into consideration the Conference declares:

1. That a determined struggle on the basis of principles must be waged against the anarcho-syndicalist movement among the proletariat and against Axelrod's and Larin's ideas among the Social-Democrats;

2. That a determined struggle must be waged against all disruptive and demagogical attempts to weaken the R.S.D.L.P. from within or to utilise it for the purpose of substituting non-Party, political, proletarian organisations for Social-Democracy;

3. That it is permissible for Social-Democratic Party organisations, in case of necessity, to participate in inter-Party Councils of Workers' Delegates, in Soviets of Workers' Deputies, and in congresses of representatives of these organisations, as well as to organise such institutions, provided this is done on strict Party lines for the purpose of developing and strengthening the Social-Democratic Labour Party;

4. That for the purpose of extending and strengthening the influence of Social-Democracy among the masses of the proletariat, it is necessary, on the one hand, to increase the work of organising trade unions and Social-Democratic propaganda and agitation within them, and, on the other hand, to attract still larger strata of the working class to activity in the various Party organisations.

March 1907.

LENIN'S SPEECH FOR THE DEFENCE (OR FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE MENSHEVIK SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE) DELIVERED AT THE PARTY TRIAL\*

COMRADE JUDGES!

The Central Committee has charged me with *conduct* (in the press) *which is impermissible for a Party member*. So runs the decision of the Central Committee setting up the Party court. I shall start right from the substance of the case: I shall read out in full the "declaration" which the Central Committee "submits to the consideration of the court."

"The Central Committee declares that the pamphlet, *The St. Petersburg Elections and the Hypocrisy of the Thirty-One Mensheviks*, signed by Comrade Lenin, directly charges the thirty-one members of the St. Petersburg organisation with having entered into negotiations with the Cadet Party 'for the purpose of selling workers' votes to the Cadets' and the Mensheviks with having 'bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma in spite of the workers and with the aid of the Cadets.'

"The Central Committee declares that the appearance of such an accusation in the press, especially on the eve of the elections, must cause confusion in the ranks of the proletariat, cast suspicion upon the political integrity of Party members, and will be utilised by the enemies of the proletariat in their fight against Social-Democracy.

"Being of the opinion that such conduct is impermissible for Party members, the Central Committee submits Lenin's conduct to the consideration of the Party court."

Such is the full text of the indictment. First of all I will observe that there is an important *error* of fact, which I shall ask the court to correct on the basis of the *text* of the pamphlet with the writing of which I am charged. Namely: in the pamphlet it is stated plainly and definitely that I accuse not only the thirty-one Mensheviks, *but also Comrade Dan, i.e., a member of the Central Committee*. In drawing up its decision the Central Committee *could not but know* that Comrade Dan

is a member of the Central Committee (he may even have taken part in the discussions of the question, or in the decision to prosecute me before the court for accusing Dan?), and that I accuse not only the thirty-one, but Dan as well. It appears, therefore, that the Central Committee *deliberately* excluded *its own member* from those whom I accused. Here, in addition to the error of fact, the indictment contains something worse, something intolerable, and later on I shall make a detailed appraisal of *this* aspect of the case and try to explain *precisely this aspect* with the aid of all of the material that comes before the court in the course of the trial.

I now pass on to the substance of the charge.

The Central Committee quotes two passages from my pamphlet and I must analyse each of them as fully as possible. I am aware, of course, that the question at issue is the *whole* of the above-mentioned pamphlet, and not only these passages. But, like the Central Committee, I take these as the main and principal parts.

The first passage is taken from the very beginning of the pamphlet. I shall take the liberty of reading a whole page to show the context of this passage.

"The newspaper *Tovarishch published today*" (Feb. 2 [Jan. 20])—I want to remind you that this took place five days before the formation of the Left *bloc* in St. Petersburg and *sixteen days* before the elections to the State Duma in the city of St. Petersburg—"long quotations from the manifesto issued by the thirty-one Mensheviks who seceded from the socialist organisation on the eve of the elections in St. Petersburg."

I emphasise that the very first sentence in the pamphlet brings to the fore the fundamental fact of the *split* in St. Petersburg on the eve of the elections. I lay stress on this circumstance, because I shall have to refer to its importance many times later on.

I continue the quotation:

"Let us first recall in a few words the actual history of the conduct of the Mensheviks who seceded from the Social-Democrats after they left the conference."

A few days before the pamphlet we are now discussing was published, I published another pamphlet entitled *Social-*

*Democracy and the Elections in St. Petersburg*,\* and also a pamphlet *When You Hear the Judgment of a Fool*<sup>1</sup> (*From the Notes of a Social-Democratic Publicist*).\*\* Almost the whole issue of the last pamphlet was confiscated by the police. Only a few copies were saved and I refer to it in order that the court may study the picture of the events of those days in their entirety, and not by considering mere fragments.

"1) Having broken with the Social-Democratic workers, they formed a *bloc* with the petty bourgeoisie (the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the Trudoviki and the Narodni-Socialists) for the purpose of jointly bargaining for seats with the Cadets. The written agreement under which the seceded Social-Democrats joined the petty-bourgeois *bloc* was concealed from the workers and from the public.

"However we have not ceased to hope that this agreement will be published and the secret exposed."

I draw the attention of the court to the fact that in the pamphlet in which I accuse Dan and the thirty-one Mensheviks, I emphasise from the very first the fact that the written agreement was concealed from the workers.

Let us proceed further:

"2) As a constituent part of the petty-bourgeois *bloc* (incorrectly styled the '*Left bloc*' by the newspapers) the seceded Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets about having three seats out of six assigned to this *bloc*. The Cadets offered two seats. They could not come to terms. The meeting between the petty-bourgeois 'conference' (this expression is not ours—we borrow it from the newspapers) and the Cadets took place on *January 31 (18)*. It was reported in *Rech* and in *Tovarishch*. *Rech* announces today that an agreement was not arrived at (although we must, of course, be prepared to hear that the negotiations are still being conducted behind the scenes).

"So far, the Mensheviks have made no announcement in the press concerning this '*action*' for the sale of workers' votes to the Cadets."

That is the position regarding the first passage. I wrote these words against the Mensheviks on the very day that I learned for the first time from the newspapers that the attempt of the Mensheviks and the Narodni-Socialists to form a *bloc* with the Cadets against the majority of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisations had failed; but I at once made the reservation that I could not regard the agreement as having been finally abandoned and that it was necessary to be prepared

<sup>1</sup> A line from a poem by Pushkin.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

for *worse*: the continuation of the negotiations "*behind the scenes*." Why did I consider then (and I still think that the view I held then was correct) that it was necessary to be prepared for the worst? Because the concealment from the public of a written agreement between the Mensheviks and the petty-bourgeois *bloc* was a wrong step, unworthy of a Socialist, and inevitably gave rise to *the worst suspicions*.

What was meant by the "sale" of workers' votes to the Cadets? Some wags told me that they understood me to mean *sale for money*. This jest is not devoid of wit. But a literate person, who had seriously perused the whole of the pamphlet and not disjointed passages of it, would, of course, have seen at once from the context, from all the preceding and subsequent passages, that what is referred to is not a *sale for money, but for seats in the Duma*. The "bargaining" and "sale" imply, of course, a barter of political, not economic equivalents, of *seats for votes, not of money for votes*.

The question arises: was it worth while dealing with such a clear and obvious circumstance?

I am profoundly convinced that it was worth while, for this point brings us squarely to the elucidation of the question presented by the Central Committee, namely: of permissible and impermissible statements in the press.

If the passage in the pamphlet we are examining had read: the thirty-one were selling workers' votes to the Cadets for money—it would have been an imputation of shameful and criminal deeds to an opponent. Anyone making such an imputation would deserve to be tried, and certainly not for "carrying confusion into the ranks of the proletariat," but for *libel*. This is perfectly clear.

On the other hand, if the passage in question had stated: the thirty-one spoke in favour of adding workers' votes to Cadet votes on the condition that seats in the Duma were assured to the Social-Democrats—this would be an example of loyal, correct polemics, permissible to Party members.

What is the difference between *this* last quoted formulation and the one I chose? The difference is in the tone, the tone

that makes the whole music. Exactly. The latter formulation is calculated to evoke in the reader hatred, aversion and contempt for people who commit such deeds. Such a formulation is calculated not to convince, but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct the mistake of the opponent, but to destroy him, to wipe his organisation off the face of the earth. This formulation is indeed of such a nature as to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent and indeed, as contrasted with the formulation that convinces and corrects, it "carries confusion into the ranks of the proletariat."

I may be asked—well, do you admit that such formulations are *impermissible*? I shall answer: yes, certainly, *but only with the following little proviso*: impermissible among members of a *united party*. This proviso represents the whole crux of the question. The accusation which the Central Committee advances against me is wrong. I shall say more, it is dishonest, precisely because the Central Committee *remains silent* about the fact that at the time the pamphlet was written a united party *did not exist* in the organisation from which it (not formally, but in essence) emanated, the aims of which it served. It is dishonest to advance a charge of publishing statements in the press "impermissible for a Party member" at a time when a *split* had taken place in the Party.

A split means the rupture of all organisational ties, the shifting of the struggle of ideas from the ground of influencing the organisation from within to that of influencing it from without, from the ground of correcting and persuading comrades to that of destroying their organisation, to the ground of inciting the masses of the workers (and the masses of the people generally) against the seceded organisation.

What is impermissible among members of a united party is permissible and obligatory for the parts of a party that has been split. It is wrong to write about Party comrades in a language that systematically spreads among the working masses hatred, aversion, contempt, etc., for those who hold different opinions. But *one may and must write* in that strain about a seceded organisation.

Why must one? Because when a split has taken place it is one's duty to *wrest* the masses from the leadership of the seceded section. I am told: you carried confusion into the ranks of the proletariat. My answer is: I purposely and deliberately carried confusion into the ranks of the section of the St. Petersburg proletariat which followed the Mensheviks, who had seceded on the eve of the elections, and *I shall always* act in that way *whenever a split occurs*.

By my sharp offensive attacks on the Mensheviks on the eve of the elections in St. Petersburg I actually succeeded in causing the ranks of the section of the proletariat *which trusts and follows the Mensheviks* to waver. That was my aim. That was my duty as a member of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation which was conducting the campaign of the *Left bloc*; because *after the split*, in order to conduct that campaign, *it was necessary* to break up the ranks of the Mensheviks who were leading the proletariat in the footsteps of the Cadets, it was necessary to carry confusion into their ranks, it was necessary to arouse among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for these people who had *ceased* to be members of a united party, who had become political enemies, who were trying to put a spoke in the wheel of our Social-Democratic organisation in its election campaign. Against *such* political enemies I then conducted—and in the event of a repetition and development of a split *shall always* conduct—a fight of extermination.

If, after the split, which the Mensheviks engineered in St. Petersburg, we had not carried confusion into the ranks of the section of the proletariat which *followed the lead of the Mensheviks*, we would have been unable to carry on our *Left bloc* election campaign. My only regret is that, being away from St. Petersburg, I did not *sufficiently* contribute to this cause of *wresting* the masses from the influence of the seceded Mensheviks; for given a more zealous and rapid execution of this task, the *Left bloc* would have gained the victory in St. Petersburg. The statistics of the election results prove this.

The fundamental logical (and, of course, not only logical)

mistake in the accusation is precisely that the question of the split is cunningly avoided, the fact of the split is hushed up, and attempts are made to apply a demand which is legitimate from the standpoint of party unity, to conditions when there is *no* unity, when there is *not* a united party and what is more—I shall prove this later on—when all this is due to the fault of the accusing Central Committee itself which organised and covered up the split.

If anyone were to apply the measure of the permissible internal Party struggle to the struggle based on a split, a struggle directed against the Party from without or (in case of a local split) against the given Party organisation, such a person would have to be regarded either as being childishly naive, or as a hypocrite. From the organisational point of view, a split signifies a rupture of *all* organisational ties, *i.e.*, the transition from a struggle to convince comrades within the organisation to a struggle *to destroy* the hostile organisation, to destroy its influence over the masses of the proletariat. From the psychological standpoint it is perfectly obvious that the severance of all organisational ties between comrades *already* signifies an *extreme degree* of mutual bitterness and hostility, which has grown into hatred.

Moreover, in the St. Petersburg split there were two special circumstances which intensified the acuteness and the ruthlessness of the struggle tenfold.

The first circumstance is the role of the Central Committee of the Party. According to the Party rules its duty is to unite, and in the event of a local split, its duty is not to allow it to develop into a struggle on the basis of a split, but to have a complaint addressed to the Central Committee or, to put it in a broader way, to secure an appeal to the Central Committee to help re-establish unity. *In reality*, on the eve of the elections in St. Petersburg, the Central Committee acted as the initiator of and participant in the split. It is precisely this circumstance, worked out in detail and supported by documentary evidence in the preamble to the decision of the Conference to present a counter-charge, that compels us to regard

the St. Petersburg split as a *dishonest* split. I shall refer to this separately later on, and I shall insist that the court take up questions which follow from the juridical nature of this charge brought by the accused against the accuser.

The second circumstance is the election campaign in St. Petersburg at the time of the split. If a split occurs at a time when there is no immediate, open, mass, political action, or when the Party generally is not engaged in some political action, it may not always be necessary to wage an *immediate*, merciless war of extermination. But if such mass action is in progress, for instance, elections, if it is necessary at all costs to intervene immediately in the elections and conduct them in one way or another, a split must immediately call forth a war of extermination, a war to determine *who* is to conduct the elections: the local Social-Democratic organisation or the group that has seceded from it. Given such a split, it is impossible even for a moment to postpone the task of wresting the masses from the influence of the secessionists, of smashing their organisation, of politically reducing them to naught. And it is only thanks to the ruthless energy of the Bolshevik attack on the Mensheviks *after* the latter had seceded, on January 19 (6), that we got an election campaign in the capital that was relatively united, conducted more or less on Party lines and which bore some semblance, at least, to a Social-Democratic campaign.

They say—fight, but not with a poisoned weapon. This is a very fine and striking expression, to be sure. But it is either a fine, empty phrase, or else it expresses in a vague and nebulous fashion the very same idea of struggle, of spreading among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for the opponents—of a struggle that is impermissible in a united party, but inevitable and necessary when a split has occurred because of the very nature of the split, *i.e.*, the idea which I expounded at the beginning of my speech. However much you twist this phrase, or this metaphor, you will not be able to squeeze a grain of real sense out of it except this difference between the loyal and correct method of fighting by means of argument within the organisation and the method of fight-

ing by means of a split, i.e., by destroying the enemy organisation, by rousing among the masses hatred, aversion and contempt for this organisation. The poisoned weapons are dishonest splits and not the war of extermination which results from a split that has already taken place.

Are there any limits to permissible struggle based on a split? There are no limits to such a struggle set by any Party standards, nor can there be such, for a split implies the cessation of the existence of the Party. The very idea that it is possible to fight against the methods of struggle that arise out of a split in the Party by Party methods, by means of Party decisions, etc., is ridiculous. The limits of the struggle based on a split are not Party limits, but general political limits, or rather general civil limits, the limits set by criminal law and nothing else. If you have seceded from me you cannot demand more from me than you demand from the Cadet, the Socialist-Revolutionary, or any man in the street, etc.

I shall further illustrate my idea by a striking example. The next issue of *Proletary* will contain a report of the elections in the city of Kovno sent by a local correspondent. The correspondent is very much dissatisfied with the *bloc* the Bund concluded with the *Dostizhentsi* against the Lithuanian Social-Democrats\* and sharply criticises the Bund. What sort of criticism is permissible for members of a united party? The dissatisfaction should have been expressed somewhat as follows: the Bundists acted incorrectly by forming a *bloc* with the Jewish bourgeoisie against the Socialists of another nation; this behaviour reveals the influence of petty-bourgeois nationalist ideas, etc. As long as we belong to the same party as the Bund, a pamphlet directed against them and distributed in large quantities on the eve of an election and describing the Bundists as traitors to the proletariat would be absolutely impermissible. But what if the case of 1903 were repeated—generally speaking history does not repeat itself, and I am only taking a hypothetical case—and the Bund were to secede from the Party. Could anyone then seriously raise the question of the impermissibility of pamphlets calculated to instil in the

Bundist working masses hatred, aversion and contempt for their leaders and describing those leaders as bourgeois in disguise, as those who had sold themselves to the Jewish bourgeoisie and were trying to get their men into the Duma through the latter's assistance, etc.? Anyone who raised such a complaint would be ridiculed to his face: do not cause splits, do not use the "poisoned weapon" of a split; but if you do, then do not complain if he who raises the poisoned sword perishes by the poisoned sword!

After all that has been said above there is no need to dwell at length on the second passage quoted. It reads: "The Mensheviks bargained with the Cadets to get their man into the Duma in spite of the workers and with the aid of the Cadets—such is the simple solution of the riddle of the journey from the Social-Democrats to the petty-bourgeois *bloc*, from the petty-bourgeois *bloc* to the Cadets." If you analyse this passage formally and externally, superficially, from the standpoint of a *united* party you will certainly say: in referring to Party members you should have said "conducting negotiations" and not "bargaining," "to secure the election of" instead of "get," a "Social-Democratic deputy" instead of "their man," and so on. But would such an "analysis" of the quotation, or such a "judgment" on the method of expression evoke anything but a smile? Is it not clear that the employment of the most offensive and contemptuous mode of expression, which puts everything in the worst and not in the best light, is a method of fighting on the basis of a split, of fighting *for the extermination* of the organisation which *disrupts* the political campaign of the local Social-Democratic proletariat? To complain about the offensive, insulting, and insidious character of the expressions used would be the same as if a *strike-breaker* were to complain of the bitterness displayed towards him by strikers. To discuss complaints or accusations on this plane would be the same as if we were to condemn the word "strike-breaker" as being impermissible without going into the *essence* of the question of whether the behaviour of the person concerned was actually that of a strike-breaker or not.

There are splits and splits. I have repeatedly used the term "dishonest" split. I shall now dwell on this aspect of the case. The Central Committee states in its indictment that I cast suspicion on the political integrity of Party members. This is put too mildly and is wrongly applied to the above quotations. I not only "cast suspicion on the political integrity" of the thirty-one and Dan; by the whole content of my election pamphlets I *accuse* them of causing a split which is *politically dishonest* or *dishonest from a Party standpoint*. And I insist on this accusation. All attempts to shift the weight of this accusation from the general, basic and root question of the organisers of the split to petty, particular and subsidiary questions will be of no avail.

Every split is a great crime against the Party, for it destroys the Party and breaks up Party ties. But there are splits and splits. The expression "dishonest split" that I have used on several occasions may not be applied to every split. I shall quote an example to illustrate this.

Let us assume that two trends have been contending for a long time in the Party, one of which, let us say, is in favour of supporting the policy of the Cadets and the other is opposed to this. A big political event occurs which accentuates the Cadet tendencies and brings nearer a deal between the Cadets and reaction. Those in favour of supporting the Cadets break with those who are opposed to such support being given. Such a split, like any other split, will inevitably give rise to a very acute and bitter struggle, which will rouse hatred, etc.; but we cannot regard such a split as being dishonest, for there is nothing else behind such a split than the sharpening of differences in regard to principles.

Now imagine another split. Let us assume that the two trends in the Party have agreed to apply various tactics in various localities. If this general agreement is broken in one of the localities, broken in a secret, underhand fashion, by acting treacherously towards comrades—then everyone will certainly agree that such a split is a *dishonest* split.

In St. Petersburg, the Mensheviks, on the eve of the elec-

tions, engineered precisely such a split. In the first place, at the All-Russian Conference\* both trends solemnly promised to submit to the local tactics of the local organisations during the elections. The St. Petersburg Mensheviks were the only ones in the whole of Russia who broke that promise. This is dishonest. It is treachery towards the Party.

Secondly, instead of uniting the Party the Central Committee pursued a factional policy to such a degree that it positively assisted the Menshevik split, and Dan, a member of the Central Committee, took a most active part in this. This is dishonest. It is tantamount to using the power delegated by the Party against the Party. It is tantamount to stealthily striking a poisoned knife into the back of the Party while at the same time professing to be a defender of Party unity.

These are the *two* main facts which compelled me to describe the thirty-one and Dan as being politically dishonest. The *whole* of my pamphlet is permeated with the spirit of contempt for these people.

And I have upheld this accusation before this court. I have directed all my efforts to making the proceedings reveal to the judges all the attendant circumstances of the St. Petersburg split, enabling them to decide with complete conviction the question of whether this split was an honest split or not, whether it was those who engineered the split who used "poisoned weapons," or whether it was those who waged a ruthless war of extermination against the organisers of the split.

The clearing up of this question to the full, *to its very depth and core*, the clearing up of this question by the delegates of the national Social-Democratic Parties, who for the first time have become *really* affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P., may have enormous effect in establishing real Party relations in our Party instead of a thinly disguised split.

The subject before the present court is not of a formal or strictly juridical nature. Surely the crux of the matter is not whether in a united party one should write, bargain or conduct negotiations, elect or place deputies, sell votes for seats or give votes on condition of obtaining seats, etc., such

a conception of the question can, of course, only call forth a smile. The crux of the matter is whether we attach any real value to the unity of our Party, or whether we are to become reconciled to splits and dismiss these sores, explaining them away by means of formal subterfuges. Comrade judges, your judgment will determine, will determine to no small degree, perhaps, whether the St. Petersburg split will be the last one, a really last echo of the past epoch of the general Party split, or . . . whether it will be the beginning of a new split and, consequently, of a new, general struggle with poisoned weapons.

Your judgment will determine whether the shaken unity of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party will be weakened or strengthened.

## THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF THE INTERNAL PARTY STRUGGLE IN RUSSIA\*

THE subject indicated in the above title is dealt with in articles by Trotsky and Martov in Nos. 50 and 51 of *Die Neue Zeit*. Martov expounds the ideas of Menshevism. Trotsky follows in the wake of the Mensheviks and camouflages himself with particularly sonorous phrases. Martov sums up the "Russian experience" by saying: "Blanquist and anarchist lack of culture was victorious over Marxian culture" (read: Bolshevism over Menshevism). "Russian Social-Democracy spoke too zealously in *Russian*" in contradistinction to "*general European*" methods of tactics. Trotsky's "philosophy of history" is the same. The cause of the struggle is the "adaptation of the Marxian intelligentsia to the class movement of the proletariat." "Sectarianism, intellectual individualism, ideological fetishism" are advanced to the forefront. The whole point is "*the struggle for influence over the politically immature proletariat.*"

### I

The theory that the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism is the struggle for influence over an immature proletariat is not a new one. It has been expounded since 1905 (if not since 1903) in innumerable books, pamphlets and articles published by the *liberal* press. Martov and Trotsky are presenting to the German comrades *liberal views*, painted up to look like Marxian views.

Of course, the Russian proletariat is politically far less mature than the proletariat in Western Europe. But of all classes of Russian society, it was precisely the proletariat that in 1905-07 displayed the *greatest* political maturity. The Russian liberal bourgeoisie, which behaved in as vile, cowardly, stupid

and treacherous a manner as the German bourgeoisie behaved in 1848, hates the Russian proletariat *precisely because* in 1905 it proved sufficiently mature politically to wrest the *leadership* of the movement from this bourgeoisie and to ruthlessly expose the treachery of the liberals.

Trotsky declares: "It is an 'illusion' to imagine that Menshevism and Bolshevism have struck deep roots in the depths of the proletariat."

This is a specimen of the sonorous but empty phrases of which our Trotsky is master. The *roots* of the divergence between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks lie, not in the "depths of the proletariat," but in the *economic content* of the Russian revolution. By ignoring this content, Martov and Trotsky deprived themselves of the possibility of understanding the historical meaning of the internal Party struggle in Russia. The crux of the matter is not whether the theoretical formulation of differences have penetrated "*deep*" into this or that stratum of the proletariat, but the fact that the economic conditions of the Revolution of 1905 *brought* the proletariat into hostile relations with the liberal bourgeoisie—not only over the question of improving the conditions of life of the workers, but also over the agrarian question, over all the political questions of the revolution, etc. To speak of the struggle of trends in the Russian revolution and to distribute labels, such as "sectarianism," "lack of culture," etc., and not to utter a word about the fundamental, economic interests of the proletariat, of the liberal bourgeoisie and of the democratic peasantry—is tantamount to stooping to the level of vulgar journalists.

Here is an example. Martov writes:

"All over Western Europe the peasant masses are considered to be fit for an alliance [with the proletariat] only to the extent that they learn to understand the grave consequences of the capitalist revolution in agriculture; in Russia, on the other hand, a picture has been drawn of a numerically weak proletariat combining with 100 million peasants, who have not yet undergone, or have hardly undergone, the 'educational' effect of capitalism, and therefore, have not yet attended the school of the capitalist bourgeoisie."

This is not a slip of the pen on the part of Martov. It is the central point of *all* the ideas of Menshevism. These ideas

permeate the opportunist history of the Russian revolution which is being published in Russia under the editorship of Potresov, Martov and Maslov. (*The Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century.*) The Menshevik Maslov expressed these ideas still more strikingly when he stated in the article which sums up this "work": "The dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry *would run counter to the whole course of economic development.*" It is precisely here that the roots of the divergencies between Bolshevism and Menshevism must be sought.

Martov has *substituted* the school of the *capitalist bourgeoisie* for the school of *capitalism*. (It should be stated in parenthesis that there is no such thing as a bourgeoisie that is not a capitalist bourgeoisie.) What is this school of capitalism? It is that which drags the peasants out of the idiocy of the village, rouses them and *stimulates them to fight*. What is the school of the "capitalist bourgeoisie"? The fact that "in 1848 the German bourgeoisie without the least compunction betrays the peasants, its most natural allies, without whom it is powerless against the nobility." (Karl Marx in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of August 10, 1848.) It is the fact that the Russian liberal bourgeoisie in 1905-06 systematically and persistently betrayed the peasants, in fact it deserted to the side of the landlords and tsarism against the struggling peasants and put direct obstacles in the path of the development of the peasant struggle.

Under the cover of "Marxian" catchwords like "educating" the peasants by capitalism, Martov is advocating "educating" the peasants (*who fought the nobles in a revolutionary fashion*) with the aid of the liberals (*who betrayed the peasants to the nobles*).

This is precisely substituting liberalism for Marxism. This is *precisely* liberalism painted with Marxian phrases. What Bebel said in Magdeburg about there being National-Liberals among the Social-Democrats is true not only of Germany.\*

It is also necessary to observe that most of the ideological leaders of Russian liberalism were brought up on German

literature and are deliberately transplanting to Russia the Brentano and Sombart brand of "Marxism,"\* which recognises the "school of capitalism," but rejects the school of the revolutionary class struggle. All the counter-revolutionary liberals in Russia like Struve, Bulgakov, Frank, Izgoyev and Co., are flaunting similar "Marxian" phrases.

Martov compares Russia of the epoch of peasant uprisings against feudalism with "Western Europe," which put an end to feudalism long ago. This is a stupendous distortion of the historical perspective. Are there any Socialists anywhere in the "whole of Western Europe" whose programme contains the demand: "to support the revolutionary actions of the peasantry even to the extent of *confiscating the landlords' estates*"?

No. There are none. The Socialists in the "whole of Western Europe" do not support the small proprietors in their fight for land against the big owners. What is the difference? The difference is that "all over Western Europe" the bourgeois system and, in particular, bourgeois agrarian relations were established and took definite shape long ago. Whereas in Russia a revolution is taking place at this very moment—to *determine how* this bourgeois system is to be established. Martov repeats the threadbare method of the liberals who always contrast the period of revolutionary conflicts over a given question with periods in which there are no such revolutionary conflicts because the question itself has been solved long ago.

The tragi-comedy of Menshevism lies precisely in the fact that at the time of the revolution it *had* to accept theses which were incompatible with liberalism. If we support the struggle of the "peasantry" for the *confiscation* of the land, it means that we admit that victory is possible and economically and politically advantageous for the working class and the whole of the people. And the victory of the "peasantry" led by the proletariat in the struggle for the *confiscation* of the landlords' estates is precisely the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry*.\*\* (Let us recall what Marx said in 1848 about the need for a dictatorship in a revolution and the deserved ridicule which Mehring directed against those who accused

Marx of wishing to achieve democracy by setting up a dictatorship.\*)

The idea that the dictatorship of these classes "runs counter to the whole course of economic development" is radically wrong. The very opposite is the case. *Only* such a dictatorship can make a clean sweep of the remnants of feudalism and secure the speediest development of the productive forces. The policy of the liberals, on the contrary, surrenders the whole task to the Russian *Junkers*, who are *retarding* "the course of the economic development" of Russia a hundredfold.

In 1905-07 the antagonism between the liberal bourgeoisie and the peasantry became fully revealed. In the spring and autumn of 1905, as well as in the spring of 1906, from one-third to one-half of the uyezds of Central Russia were affected by peasant revolts. The peasants destroyed up to 2000 landlord mansions (unfortunately this is not more than one fifteenth of what should have been destroyed). The proletariat *alone* wholeheartedly supported this revolutionary struggle, directed it in every way, guided it and reinforced it by its mass strikes. The liberal bourgeoisie *never, not even once*, helped this revolutionary struggle; they preferred to "pacify" the peasants and "reconcile" them with the landlords and the tsar. The same thing was repeated in the parliamentary arena in the first two Dumas (1906 and 1907). *During the whole period* the liberals hampered the struggle of the peasants and betrayed them; and it was only the *workers' deputies* who directed and supported the peasants *in opposition to the liberals*. The *entire* history of the First and Second Dumas is the history of the struggle which the liberals waged against the peasants and the Social-Democrats. The struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism is *inseparably* bound up with that history; it is a struggle over the question of supporting the liberals, over the question of overthrowing the hegemony of the liberals over the peasantry. Therefore, to attribute our splits to the influence of the intelligentsia, to the immaturity of the proletariat, etc., is a childish-ly naive repetition of liberal fairy tales.

For the same reason, Trotsky's argument that splits in in-

ternational Social-Democracy are caused by the "process of adaptation of the social revolutionary class to the limited (narrow) conditions of parliamentarism," etc., and that in Russian Social-Democracy they are caused by the adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat, is radically wrong.

Trotsky writes: "While the real political content of this process of adaptation was limited (narrow) from the standpoint of the final aim of socialism, its forms were unrestrained, and the ideological shadow cast by this process was great."

This truly "unrestrained" phrase-mongering is merely the "ideological shadow" of liberalism. Both Martov and Trotsky mix up different historical periods and compare Russia, which is going through its bourgeois revolution, with Europe, where these revolutions were completed long ago. In Europe the real political content of Social-Democratic work is the training of the proletariat for the struggle for power against the bourgeoisie, which already enjoys complete mastery in the state. In Russia, it is still *only a question of creating* a modern bourgeois state, which will be similar either to a *Junker* monarchy (in the event of tsarism being victorious over democracy) or to a peasant bourgeois-democratic republic (in the event of democracy being victorious over tsarism). And the victory of democracy in modern Russia is possible only if the peasant masses follow the lead of the revolutionary proletariat and not that of treacherous liberalism. History has not yet decided this question. The bourgeois revolutions are not yet completed in Russia and *within these limits, i.e., within the limits of the struggle for the form of the bourgeois regime in Russia, "the real political content" of the work of Russian Social-Democrats is less "limited"* than in countries where there is no struggle for the confiscation of the landlords' estates by the peasants, where the bourgeois revolutions have been completed long ago.

It is easy to understand why the class interests of the bourgeoisie compel the liberals to persuade the workers to believe that their role in the revolution is "limited," that the struggle of trends is caused by the intelligentsia, and not by deep economic contradictions, that the workers' party must be "not the

leader in the struggle for emancipation, *but* a class party." This is the formula that the liquidator *Golos*-ites advanced quite recently (Levitsky in *Nasha Zarya*\*) and which the liberals have approved. They use the term "class party" in a Brentano-Sombart sense: concern yourself only with your own class and abandon the "Blanquist dreams" of leading all the revolutionary elements of the people in the struggle against tsarism and treacherous liberalism.

## II

Martov's arguments on the Russian revolution and Trotsky's arguments on the present state of Russian Social-Democracy definitely confirm the incorrectness of their fundamental views.

We shall start with the boycott. Martov argues that the boycott is "abstention from politics," the method adopted by "anarchists and syndicalists," and he *only* refers to 1906. Trotsky says that the "boycottist tendency runs through the whole history of Bolshevism—the boycott of the trade unions, of the State Duma, of the local government bodies, etc.," that this is the "result of the sectarian fear of being swamped by the masses, the radicalism of irreconcilable abstention," etc. As regards the boycott of the trade unions and the local government bodies, what Trotsky says is *positively untrue*. It is equally untrue to say that boycottism runs through the whole history of Bolshevism; Bolshevism as a tendency took definite shape in the spring and summer of 1905, *before* the question of the boycott first came up. In *August 1906*, in the official organ of the faction Bolshevism declared that the historical causes which called forth the necessity of the boycott had passed.<sup>1</sup>

Trotsky distorts Bolshevism, because he has never been able to form any definite views on the role of the proletariat in the Russian bourgeois revolution.

But far worse is the distortion of the history of this revolution. If we are to speak of the boycott we must start from the beginning, not from the end. The first (and only) victory in

<sup>1</sup> See the article *The Boycott* in this volume.—*Ed.*

the revolution was wrested by the mass movement, which proceeded under the slogan of the boycott.<sup>1</sup> It is only to the advantage of the liberals to forget this.

The law of August 19 (6), 1905, created the Bulygin Duma as an advisory body. The liberals, even the most radical of them, decided to go into this Duma. Social-Democracy, by an enormous majority (against the Mensheviks), decided to boycott it and to call upon the masses to make a direct attack on tsarism, to declare a mass strike and to rise in rebellion. Hence, the question of the boycott was not a question that concerned Social-Democracy alone. It was a question of the struggle between *liberalism and the proletariat*. The entire liberal press of those days showed that the liberals feared the development of the revolution and directed all their efforts towards reaching an "agreement" with tsarism.

What were the objective conditions for an immediate mass struggle? The best answer to this is supplied by the statistics of strikes (subdivided into economic and political strikes) and of the peasant movement. We cite here the principal data, which will serve to illustrate the whole of the subsequent presentation of our case.

NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN STRIKES PER QUARTER<sup>2</sup>  
(in thousands)

	1905				1906				1907			
	<u>I</u>	II	III	<u>IV</u>	I	<u>II</u>	III	IV	I	<u>II</u>	III	IV
Total . . . . .	810	481	294	1,277	269	479	296	63	146	323	77	193
Economic strikes . . . . .	411	190	143	275	73	222	125	37	52	52	66	30
Political strikes . . . . .	<u>399</u>	291	151	<u>1,002</u>	196	<u>257</u>	171	26	94	<u>271</u>	11	163
% of uyezds affected by the peasant movement		14.2%	36.9%		49.2%	21.1%						

<sup>1</sup> See the article *The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection* in this volume.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> The periods which are of special importance are underlined: 1905, I, Jan. 22 (9); 1905, IV, the climax of the revolution October and

These figures reveal what enormous energy the proletariat is capable of displaying during a revolution. During the entire decade before the revolution, the number of strikers in Russia was only 431,000, i.e., an average of 43,000 a year, while in 1905, the total number of strikers was 2,863,000—at a time when the total number of factory workers was only 1,661,000! The world has never witnessed a strike movement like it. In the third quarter of 1905, when the question of the boycott came up for the first time, we observe a transition to a new and much more powerful wave of the strike (and, following it, of a peasant) movement. The *real historical content* of the problem of the boycott was whether to help the development of this revolutionary wave and direct it towards the overthrow of tsarism, or whether to allow tsarism to divert the attention of the masses by playing with an advisory Duma. Hence, we can judge how vulgar and what blockheaded liberalism it is to attempt to link the boycott in the history of the Russian revolution with “abstention from politics,” “sectarianism,” etc. Under the slogan of the boycott adopted *against* the liberals a movement arose which increased the number of political strikers from 151,000 during the third quarter of 1905 to *one million* during the fourth quarter of 1905.

Martov declares that the “principal cause” of the success of the strikes in 1905 was “the growing opposition current in *wide bourgeois circles*.” “The influence of these wide strata of the bourgeoisie extended so far that they, on the one hand, positively instigated the workers to political strikes,” and, on the other, urged the manufacturers “*to pay the workers for the period they were on strike*.” (Martov’s italics.)

We shall compare this sweet praise of the “influence” of the bourgeoisie with dry statistics. In 1905, strikes more frequently ended in favour of the workers than in 1907. Here are the figures for that year: 1,438,610 strikers presented economic

December; 1906, II, First Duma; 1907, II, Second Duma. The figures are quoted from the official statistics of strikes, which I am working out in detail for an outline of the history of the Russian revolution that I am preparing for press.

demands; 369,304 workers won the fight, 671,590 agreed to a compromise and 397,716 *lost*. Such *in fact* (and not according to liberal fables) was the "influence" of the bourgeoisie. Martov in a truly liberal fashion distorts the actual relation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The workers did not win (in "economics" and in politics) because the bourgeoisie, on rare occasions, paid for the strikes, or spoke in opposition to the government; the bourgeoisie acted as a Fronde and paid *because* the workers won. The *force* of the class attack, the force of the strikes in which millions took part, the force of the peasant riots and of the military uprisings are the cause, the "principal cause," my dear Martov; the "sympathy" of the bourgeoisie is the effect. Martov writes:

"October 30 (17), when the prospects of elections to the Duma were opened and when it became possible to hold meetings, to form workers' unions and to publish Social-Democratic papers, indicated the direction along which it was necessary to conduct the work."

But the trouble was that the "idea" of the possibility of employing the "strategy of attrition" did not enter anybody's head. The entire movement was artificially pushed towards a "serious and decisive encounter," *i.e.*, towards the December strike and the December "sanguinary defeat."

Kautsky disputed with R. Luxemburg whether in Germany the spring of 1910 was the moment for the transition from the "strategy of attrition" to the "overthrow strategy,"\* and Kautsky stated plainly and definitely that this transition would be *inevitable* if the political crisis developed further. But A. Martov, clinging to Kautsky's skirts as it were, retrospectively advocates the "strategy of attrition" at a time when the revolution has reached its highest intensity. No, my dear Martov, you are merely repeating liberal speeches. The 30th of October did not "open up" the "prospects" of a peaceful constitution, that is only a liberal fairy tale; it opened up the prospects of *civil war*. This was prepared, not by the subjective will of parties or groups, but by the whole course of events since January 1905. The October Manifesto signified, not the cessation of the struggle, but the equilibrium of the contending forces: tsarism

was *no longer* in a position to govern, the revolution was *not yet* in a position to overthrow it. The inevitable, objective consequence of this situation was a decisive struggle. Both in October and in November civil war was a fact (and the peaceful "prospects" were a liberal lie); this war found expression not only in pogroms, but also in the struggle by armed force against the insubordinate units of the army, against the peasants in one-third of Russia and against the border regions. Those who under such circumstances regard the December armed uprising and mass strike as "*artificial*" can only *artificially* be placed in the category of Social-Democrats. The *natural* party for such people is the liberal party.

In 1848 and in 1871 Marx said that there are moments in a revolution when the surrender of a position to the enemy without a struggle has a more demoralising effect on the masses than defeat in battle.\* December 1905 was not only such a moment in the history of the Russian revolution. December was the natural and inevitable consummation of the *mass* encounters and battles which had been maturing in all parts of the country during the preceding twelve months. *Even* dry statistics bear witness to this fact. The number of persons who took part in *purely* political strikes (*i.e.*, those who did not present any economic demands) was: in January 1905, 123,000; in October, 328,000; in December, 372,000. And yet there are people who want us to believe that this growth was "artificial"! We are treated to a fairy tale to the effect that *such* a growth of the mass political struggle *in addition* to the mutinies in the army is *possible* without the inevitable development of them into an armed uprising! No, this is not the history of the revolution, it is a liberal libel on the revolution.

### III

Concerning the October strike, Martov writes:

"Just at that time, the time when general excitement reigned among the working masses . . . an attempt is made to merge the struggle for political liberty and the economic struggle into a single struggle. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg's opinion notwithstanding, this revealed, not the strong, but the weak side of the movement." The attempt to introduce an eight-

hour day in a revolutionary way resulted in failure and "disorganised" the workers. "The general strike of the postal and telegraphic employees in November 1905 ended in the same way."

This is the way Martov writes history.

A glance at the statistics given above is sufficient to prove the falsity of this history. Throughout the *three* years of the revolution we observe that *every time* the political crisis becomes acute there is an upsurge, not only of the political, but also of the economic strike struggle. The combination of the political and economic strike revealed, not the weakness, but the *strength* of the movement. The opposite view is the view of the liberal bourgeois, for the very thing he wants is that the workers should take part in politics, without, however, drawing the broad masses into the revolution and into the struggle against the bourgeoisie. It was precisely after October 30 that the liberal Zemstvo movement finally split; the landowners and manufacturers formed the avowedly counter-revolutionary "Octobrist" Party which turned the whole weight of repressions against the strikers (while the "Left" liberals, the Cadets, accused the workers in the press of being "mad"). Martov, following in the footsteps of the Octobrists and the Cadets, is of the opinion that the workers revealed their "weakness" by trying at that very moment to make the economic struggle still more aggressive. In our opinion the weakness of the workers (and still more of the peasants) was revealed in the fact that they did not resolutely, widely and quickly enough pass to the aggressive economic and armed political struggle which was the *inevitable* consequence of the *whole* course of development of events, and not of the subjective desires of separate groups or parties. A wide gulf separates our view from that of Martov, and in spite of Trotsky's opinion, this gulf between the views of "intellectuals" reflects the gulf which in *fact* existed at the end of 1905 between the classes, namely, between the revolutionary, fighting proletariat and the treacherous bourgeoisie.

We must add that the defeats of the workers in the strike struggle are characteristic, not only of the end of 1905, which

Martov picked out, but to a still greater extent of 1906 and 1907. The statistics show that for the ten years 1895-1904, the employers won 51.6 per cent of the strikes (according to the number of strikers involved); in 1905, 29.4 per cent; in 1906, 35.5 per cent; in 1907, 57.6 per cent; in 1908, 68.8 per cent. Does this mean that the economic strikes of 1906-07 were "mad" and "inopportune," and that they revealed the "weak side of the movement"? No. It means that as the onslaught of the revolutionary struggle of the masses was insufficiently strong in 1905, defeat (both in politics and in "economics") was inevitable and that if the proletariat had not been able at that very time to rise at least *twice* for a *new* attack against the enemy (*a quarter of a million persons involved in political strikes alone during the second quarter of 1906 and also 1907*), the defeat would have been *still greater*; *the coup d'état* would have taken place not in June 1907, but a year, or even more than a year, *earlier*, and the workers would have been deprived of the economic gains of 1905 *sooner* than they were.

It is precisely this significance of the mass revolutionary struggle that Martov fails to understand. Echoing the liberals, he says, in reference to the boycott at the beginning of 1906, that, "for a time, Social-Democracy remained *outside of the political line of battle*." From a purely theoretical standpoint such a presentation of the question of the boycott of 1906 is an incredible simplification and vulgarisation of a very complex problem. What was the *real* "line of battle" during the second quarter of 1906—was it parliamentary or extra-parliamentary? Look at the statistics: the number of persons involved in "economic" strikes rose from 73,000 to 222,000, the number of those involved in political strikes rose from 196,000 to 257,000. The percentage of uyezds affected by the peasant movement rose from 36.9 per cent to 49.2 per cent. It is known that mutinies in the armed forces also greatly increased and became more frequent during the second quarter of 1906 as compared with the first. It is known further that the First Duma was the most revolutionary parliament in the world (at the beginning of the twentieth century), yet at the same time it was

the most impotent: not a single one of its decisions was carried out.

Such are the objective facts. In the estimation of the liberals and Martov, these facts show that the Duma was the real "*line of battle*," whereas the uprising, political strikes and the unrest among the peasants and soldiers were a trifling affair of "revolutionary romanticists." And the profound Trotsky imagines that the factional differences that arose on this ground represented an "intellectual" "struggle for influence over an immature proletariat." We believe the objective data prove that in the spring of 1906 there was such a serious upsurge of a real revolutionary mass struggle that the Social-Democratic Party *was obliged* to regard precisely that struggle as the principal struggle and exert every effort to support and develop it. We believe that the peculiar political situation of that period—when the tsar's government received a loan of two billion on the security, as it were, of the convocation of the Duma and when the tsar's government was hastily promulgating laws against the boycott of the Duma—fully justified the attempt made by the proletariat to wrest the convocation of the first parliament in Russia out of the hands of the tsar. We believe that it was not the Social-Democrats, but the *liberals*, who "*remained outside of the political line of battle*" at that time. Those constitutional illusions, on the spread of which among the masses the career of the liberals in the revolution was based, were most strikingly refuted by the history of the First Duma.

In both the first two Dumas the liberals (Cadets) had a majority and occupied the political foreground with great pomp. But it is these very liberal "victories" that have clearly shown that the liberals have all the time remained "outside of the political line of battle," that they have been political comedians who deeply corrupted the democratic consciousness of the masses. And if Martov and his friends, echoing the liberals, point to the heavy defeats of the revolution as an object lesson of "*what should not be done*," our answer to them will be, first, that the only real victory gained by the revolution was

the victory of the proletariat, which rejected the liberal counsels to enter the Bulygin Duma and led the peasant masses to an uprising. Secondly, by the heroic struggle it waged during the course of three years (1905-07) the Russian proletariat won for itself and for the Russian people gains that took other nations decades to win. It won the *emancipation* of the working masses *from the influence* of treacherous and contemptibly impotent *liberalism*. It won for *itself* the *hegemony* in the struggle for freedom and democracy as a prerequisite for the struggle for socialism. It won for all the oppressed and exploited classes of Russia the *ability* to conduct the revolutionary mass struggle, without which nothing of importance in the progress of mankind has been achieved anywhere in the world.

*These* gains cannot be filched from the Russian proletariat by any reaction, or by the hatred, abuse and malice of the liberals, or by the vacillation, short-sightedness or lack of faith of the socialist opportunists.

## IV

The development of factions in Russian Social-Democracy since the revolution is also to be explained, not by the "adaptation of the intelligentsia to the proletariat," but by the change in the relations between the classes. The Revolution of 1905-07 sharpened, revealed and placed on the order of the day the antagonism between the peasants and the liberal bourgeoisie over the question of the *form* the bourgeois regime is to take in Russia. The politically mature proletariat could not but take a most energetic part in this struggle, and its relation to the various classes of the new society were reflected in the struggle between Bolshevism and Menshevism.

The triennium 1908-10 is characterised by the victory of the counter-revolution, by the restoration of the autocracy and by the Third Duma, the Duma of the Black Hundreds and the Octobrists. The struggle between the bourgeois parties for the form of the new regime is no longer in the forefront. The task that has come up on the order of the day for the proletariat is the *elementary* task of preserving its proletarian party, which

is hostile both to the reaction and to counter-revolutionary liberalism. This task is not an easy one, because the whole weight of economic and political persecution and the wrath of the liberals at having lost the leadership of the masses to the Social-Democrats fall upon the proletariat.

The crisis in the Social-Democratic Party is very grave. The organisations are shattered. A large number of the old leaders (especially the intellectuals) have been arrested. A new type of Social-Democratic worker, who is taking the affairs of the Party in hand, has already appeared, but he has to overcome extraordinary difficulties. Under such conditions the Social-Democratic Party is losing many of its "fellow-travellers." It is natural that the petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" should have joined the Socialists during a bourgeois revolution. But now they are falling away from Marxism and from Social-Democracy. This process is observed in both factions: among the Bolsheviks in the shape of the otzovist<sup>1</sup> tendency which arose in the spring of 1908, was at once defeated at the Moscow Conference and after a long struggle was rejected by the official centre of the faction and formed a *separate faction* abroad known as the "*Vperyod* faction." The peculiarity of the period of decadence was expressed in the fact that this faction united the Machists,<sup>2</sup> who introduced into their *platform* the struggle against Marxism (under the guise of the defence of "proletarian philosophy"), the ultimatumists,<sup>3</sup> these bashful otzovists and the various types of "days of freedom Social-Democrats" who were carried away by the "brilliancy" of slogans and learned them off by rote, but who failed to *understand* the fundamentals of Marxism.

<sup>1</sup> From the Russian word "*otzvat*" meaning "to recall." The name given to a small group of Bolsheviks who demanded that the Social-Democratic deputies be recalled from the Duma.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>2</sup> The followers of the philosophic views of Mach and Avenarius.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

<sup>3</sup> Ultimatumists—a tiny group of the otzovists, so called because they advocated that the Party should present the Social-Democratic Duma deputies with an ultimatum calling upon them to pursue the line of the Party in the Duma and call upon them to resign if they refused to accept.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Among the Mensheviks the same process of the falling away of petty-bourgeois "fellow-travellers" was expressed in the liquidationist tendency, which has now been fully formulated in Potresov's journal *Nasha Zarya*,<sup>1</sup> in *Vozrozhdeniye*<sup>2</sup> and in *Zhizn*,<sup>3</sup> in the position of "the sixteen" and of "the trio" (Mikhail, Roman, Yuri). At the same time *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*,<sup>4</sup> published abroad, assumed the role of *servant* to the Russian liquidators and that of their diplomatic shields to screen them from the Party membership.

Failing to understand the historical-economic significance of this split in the epoch of the counter-revolution, of this *falling away* of *non-Social-Democratic* elements from the Social-Democratic Labour Party, Trotsky tells the German readers that *both* factions are "falling to pieces," that the Party is "falling to pieces," that the Party is becoming "disintegrated."

This is not true. And this untruth expresses, first of all, Trotsky's utter lack of theoretical understanding. Trotsky absolutely fails to understand "why the Plenum described *both* liquidationism *and* otzovism as the manifestaion of bourgeois influence over the proletariat." Just think: is the severance from the Party of trends which have been condemned by the Party and which express the *bourgeois* influence over the proletariat, the collapse of the Party, the disintegration of the Party, or is it the strengthening and purging of the Party?

Secondly, in practice, this untruth expresses the *advertising* policy of Trotsky's faction. That Trotsky's venture is an attempt to create a faction\* is obvious to all now, after Trotsky has removed the representative of the Central Committee from *Pravda*. In advertising his faction Trotsky does not hesitate to tell the Germans that the Party is "falling to pieces," that *both* factions are falling to pieces and that he alone, Trotsky, is saving the situation. In fact, we all see now—and the latest resolution adopted by the Trotskyists (in the name of the Vienna

<sup>1</sup> *Our Dawn*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

<sup>2</sup> *Regeneration*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

<sup>3</sup> *Life*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

<sup>4</sup> *The Voice of the Social-Democrat*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

club on December 9 [Nov. 26], 1910) proves this in a particularly striking fashion—that Trotsky enjoys the *confidence exclusively* of the liquidators and the *Vperyod*-ists.

The lengths to which Trotsky will go in degrading the Party and exalting himself before the Germans is shown, incidentally, by the following instance. Trotsky writes that the working masses in Russia consider the “Social-Democratic Party to be *outside*” (Trotsky’s italics) “their circle” and he talks of “Social-Democrats without Social-Democracy.”

How could Potresov and his friends resist the impulse to kiss Trotsky for such speeches?

But such speeches are refuted not only by the *entire* history of the revolution, but even by the results of the elections to the Third Duma in the workers’ electoral colleges.

Trotsky writes: “Owing to their former ideological and organisational condition, the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions proved altogether incapable of working in legal organisations”; work was done by “separate groups of Social-Democrats, but all this took place outside the factions, outside their organisational influence.” “Even the most important legal organisation, in which the Mensheviks predominate, works altogether independently of the control of the Menshevik faction.” This is what Trotsky writes. But the facts are as follows: from the very beginning of the existence of the Social-Democratic fraction in the Third Duma, the Bolshevik faction, through its representatives authorised by the Central Committee of the Party, has all the time assisted, aided, advised and supervised the work of the Social-Democrats in the Duma. The same is done by the editors of the central organ of the Party, which consists of representatives of the factions (which disbanded as factions in January 1910).

When Trotsky gives the German comrades a detailed account of the stupidity of otzovism and describes this movement as the “crystallisation” of boycottism, characteristic of Bolshevism as a whole, and then mentions in a couple of words that Bolshevism “did not allow itself to be overpowered” by otzovism, but attacked it resolutely or rather in an unbridled fash-

ion"—the German reader certainly gets no idea of how much refined treachery there lurks in such an exposition. Trotsky makes a Jesuitical "reservation" by omitting a small, quite a trifling "detail." He forgot to mention that at an official meeting of its representatives held as far back as the spring of 1909, the Bolshevik faction repudiated and expelled the otzovists. But it is just this "trifle" that is inconvenient for Trotsky who wants to talk of the "*falling to pieces*" of the Bolshevik faction (and then of the Party) and not of the *falling away* of the non-Social-Democratic elements!

We now regard Martov as one of the leaders of liquidationism, who is the more dangerous, the more "cleverly" he defends the liquidators by quasi-Marxian phrases. But Martov openly expounds views which have put their impress upon whole tendencies in the mass labour movement of 1903-10. Trotsky, on the other hand, represents only his own personal vacillations and nothing more. In 1903 he was a Menshevik; he abandoned Menshevism in 1904, returned to the Mensheviks in 1905 and merely flaunted ultra-revolutionary phrases; in 1906 he left them again; at the end of 1906 he advocated electoral agreements with the Cadets (*i.e.*, was virtually once more with the Mensheviks); and in the spring of 1907, at the London Congress he said that he differed from Rosa Luxemburg on "individual shades of ideas rather than on political tendencies." Trotsky one day plagiarises the ideological stock-in-trade of one faction; next day he plagiarises that of another, and therefore declares himself to be standing *above* both factions. In theory Trotsky is in *no respect* in agreement with either the liquidators or the otzovists, but *in actual practice he is in entire agreement* with both the *Golos*-ites and the *Vperyod*-ists.

Therefore, when Trotsky tells the German comrades that he represents the "general Party tendency," I am obliged to declare that Trotsky represents only *his own* faction and enjoys a certain amount of confidence *exclusively* among the otzovists and the liquidators. The following are the facts which prove the correctness of my statement. In January 1910, the Central Committee of our Party established close ties with Trotsky's news-

paper *Pravda* and appointed a representative of the Central Committee as one of the editors. In September 1910 the central organ of the Party announced a *rupture* between the representative of the Central Committee and Trotsky owing to Trotsky's anti-Party policy. In Copenhagen,<sup>1</sup> Plekhanov, as the representative of the Party Mensheviks and the delegate of the editors of the central organ, together with the present writer, as the representative of the Bolsheviks, and the Polish comrade, entered an emphatic protest against the way Trotsky represents our Party affairs in the German press.

Let the readers now judge for themselves whether Trotsky represents a "general Party," or a "general *anti-Party*" trend in Russian Social-Democracy.

End of 1910.

<sup>1</sup> The International Socialist Congress, Copenhagen, 1910.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

## **EXPLANATORY NOTES**



## EXPLANATORY NOTES

PAGE 1.\* *Lecture on the 1905 Revolution.* This lecture was delivered in German on January 22 (January 9, old style) at a meeting of young workers held in the People's House in Zürich, Switzerland, where Lenin lived at that time. It gives in brief outline a picture of the events and significance of the first revolution in Russia. For that reason it is put first in this volume of the works of Lenin devoted to the 1905 Revolution.

PAGE 1.\*\* "Bloody Sunday," January 22, was the direct result of the policy of "Gaponism," which was the second attempt on the part of the autocracy ("Zubatovism" was the first, regarding which see note to page 434) to bring the labour movement under police control, in this case with the aid of the priest Gapon. At the beginning of 1904 Gapon organised the "Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg" which by the end of the year already had eleven branches in various working class districts of the city. In January 1905, Gapon used this organisation to gain control of the strike movement which began at the Putilov works and rapidly spread to all the big factories of St. Petersburg (affecting about 150,000 workers). The strike broke out in support of economic demands, but very soon the strikers put forward political demands. Gapon commenced widespread agitation in favour of organising a procession to march to the Winter Palace to deliver a petition to the tsar. At that time neither the Menshevik groups nor the Bolshevik Committee in St. Petersburg had good contacts with the working masses. The Mensheviks did not take up a clearly defined attitude towards Gaponism; in fact, some of them were inclined to the opinion that it could be used in the interests of the labour movement. However, while the petition was being prepared, they, now and again, came out in opposition to it. On a number of occasions the Bolsheviks went to the meetings called by Gapon and spoke in opposition to the petition and procession. Moreover, the Bolshevik Committee issued three leaflets calling for revolutionary methods of fighting the tsarist autocracy, one of which, issued on the eve of January 22, was specifically directed against Gapon's scheme. But it was already too late to divert the workers from the procession to the tsar. The result was "Bloody Sunday," which, however, contrary to the wishes and expectations of its authors, became the starting point of the first Russian revolution.

PAGE 2.\* Lenin refers to the socialists who during the World War supported the slogan "Fight for Peace," without advocating the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, and who opposed the Bolshevik slogan "Transform

the Imperialist War into Civil War." They declared that it was impossible to wage the class struggle during wartime and, like Kautsky, for instance, declared that the International was only an instrument to be used in times of peace. In this way they fostered the hope in the minds of the working class that a democratic peace could be secured without having to overthrow the bourgeoisie and they helped to continue the war in the interests of the capitalists and the governments of the respective belligerent countries.

PAGE 2.\*\* Lenin here refers to the journal *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*), published by the former "legal Marxist," Peter Struve, in Stuttgart, Germany. This journal was the organ of the bourgeois liberals who were united in an organisation known as the Emancipation League, which had a number of committees in Russia.

PAGE 3.\* Lenin wrote a number of articles on the outstanding importance of strikes in the Russian revolution, on types of strikes (economic and political) and on the development of the strike movement in the period from 1895 to 1906. The most complete summary of the experience of the revolution is contained in the article entitled *Statistics of Strikes in Russia*, written in December-January, 1910-11. In this article Lenin carefully traced the main features of the process of drawing the masses into the revolutionary struggle: 1) at the principal stages of the revolution (rise of the revolutionary tide, upsurge and decline); 2) according to area; 3) according to trades; 4) types of strikes (economic and political) and the relations between the two types, and 5) results of the strikes, i.e., victory, defeat or compromise.

Contrary to the opinion of the Mensheviks that the bourgeoisie helped the proletariat in its struggles, Lenin showed by these statistics that it was not "the atmosphere of sympathy," alleged to have been created by the bourgeoisie, that played the decisive role in the economic struggle, but "the force of attack" of the workers.

At the Third Congress of the Party held in April 1905, a resolution was adopted on the question of armed insurrection and already in that resolution the "role of mass political strikes, which may be of great political significance at the beginning and in the very course of the insurrection," was emphasised.

In 1905, in an article entitled *The Political Strike and Street Fighting in Moscow*, Lenin wrote: "A definite form of the movement has emerged, the political strike, which is developing into insurrection before our very eyes."

In an article written in the same period entitled *The All-Russian Political Strike*, Lenin wrote: "Our forecasts of the great significance of the political mass strike in the armed uprising have been brilliantly confirmed. The insurrection is approaching; it is emerging out of the All-Russian political strike before our very eyes."

PAGE 4.\* The Great French Revolution passed through several phases in the course of its development. In its first phase, political power was assumed by the big commercial and financial bourgeoisie, which not only failed to solve the main problem of the revolution—the agrarian and peasant problem—but even failed to put an end to the monarchy. In the second phase—the period 1792-93, to which Lenin here refers—power was first assumed by the moderate, revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie, represented by the Girondists, and later by the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, represented by the Jacobins. The revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, led by the Jacobins, in the main completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution in France, and did what the big commercial and financial bourgeoisie could not do and what the moderate revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie did not dare do.

PAGE 7.\* Serfdom, which was introduced in Russia at the end of the sixteenth century, was formally abolished by the Manifesto of Alexander II on March 3 (February 19), 1861, after a long and stubborn struggle of the peasantry for its emancipation. The best portions of the land were turned over to the landlords (these lands were known as "otrezki," literally "cut off," because they were cut off from the allotments which the peasants formerly occupied), while the remainder had to be purchased by the peasants at a price one and a half times greater than its actual value, and for many years the peasants were burdened by an enormous debt to the landlords. The Reform, as it was called, did not by any means put an end to the dependence of the peasants on the landlords. The "otrezki," i.e., the lands which the landlords took, formed deep wedges in the peasant lands, and in order to be able to cultivate their own lands, the peasants were obliged to rent the intervening plots of land from the landlord at exorbitant rents. According to the Emancipation Manifesto, the whole village was held jointly responsible for the prompt and regular payment of the land indemnity payments. This was a fetter which bound the peasant to the village. The organisation of so-called peasant "self-government" under the supervision of government officials drawn from the nobility was only another form of keeping the peasants enslaved. It is not surprising, therefore, that the "emancipation" of the peasants was followed by mass uprisings. In 1861 alone, the very year of the promulgation of the Manifesto, there were 784 peasant uprisings, which affected 2,034 villages. These were crushed by military force.

PAGE 7.\*\* Lenin refers to the "Decembrists" who organised secret societies in the early part of the nineteenth century and who rose in armed rebellion against the tsar in December 1825 (hence the name). The Decembrists were drawn almost exclusively from the class of land-owning nobles, but among them were some who had become impoverished and lived on their personal earnings. Their activities were directed toward two important aims: the abolition of serfdom and the overthrow of the

autocracy. But on neither question was there unanimity among them. There were two main tendencies among them, each grouped respectively around what were known as the Northern and the Southern Societies. Subsequently the Southern Society was joined by a group known as the United Slav Society.

The Northern Society advocated a constitutional monarchy and the abolition of serfdom, but the majority of its members pictured the future Russia as a country of large landlord estates. Thus, according to the constitution drawn up by Muravyev, "the land of the landlords is to remain in their possession." The peasants were to be almost deprived of land, only two dessiatins (about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  acres) being allowed to each peasant household. This scheme would have tied the peasant to his village and provided the landlords with cheap labour power. The landlord estates were to be developed at the expense of the peasants who would have been utterly ruined.

The Southern Society was headed by Col. P. Pestel, whose draft programme provided for the abolition of serfdom, and who proposed to crush the resistance of the landlords by revolutionary means; the whole of the land was to be divided into two parts, one of which was to be divided up equally among all the peasant households, the other was to be put at the disposal of the state, which might rent or sell it. The autocracy was to be utterly extirpated; the members of the tsar's family were to be executed. A revolutionary dictatorship was to be set up which would eventually establish a democratic republic in which all citizens were to enjoy equal rights.

The most revolutionary group was the United Slav Society, which went further than the Northerners and the Southerners in the matter of drawing the masses into the active struggle. It advocated a popular revolution and carried on agitation to this end among the soldiers and the peasantry.

The signal for the uprising was furnished by the sudden death of Alexander I, the interregnum created by the abdication of Constantine, the tsar's elder brother, and, to a certain extent, the news that the conspiracy had been discovered by the government. In spite of complete lack of preparation, the Northern Society decided to start the insurrection and on December 26, 1825, they led several armed regiments to the Senate Square in St. Petersburg. The crowds of the poor sections of the population which had hurried to the Square were patently in sympathy with the insurgents and greeted the appearance of Nicholas I with sticks and stones. But the leaders of the uprising displayed extreme indecision at the most decisive moment, i.e., when Nicholas and his generals had not yet been able to rally sufficient forces against the insurgents, and could not make up their minds to assume the offensive. This fatal indecision was taken advantage of and the insurrection was suppressed with grape-shot.

A more vigorous and persistent fight was put up by the Slav and Southern Societies with the help of the Chernigov Regiment, but lacking the support of other sections of the army and of the population generally, this insurrection was also suppressed.

The suppression of the insurrection was followed by mass arrests. Five leaders of the movement were hanged, Kokhovsky, Pestel, Sergey Muravyev-Apostol, Bestuzhev-Riumin and Ryleyev, and others were exiled or degraded to the ranks. The treatment of the common soldiers was particularly severe.

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PAGE 8.\* Alexander II was condemned to death by the Executive Committee of the secret society known as the *Narodnaya Volya* (*The People's Will*), a revolutionary Narodnik, terrorist Party. He was assassinated on March 13 (1), 1881.

PAGE 8.\*\* For an explanation of the social and economic basis of the peasant movement see article *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*, in this volume, particularly chap. I, part 2.

The first peasant movement of importance to arise after the suppression of the peasant uprisings following the "emancipation" in 1861 (*cf.* note to page 7\*) began in the first years of the present century in the wake of the labour movement in the towns. In five years, 1900-04, there were 670 uprisings, of which 441 were directed against the landlords, 12 against the priests, 21 against the kulaks, as the capitalist farmers and usurers were called, and 196 against the government authorities. These uprisings were crushed in the most brutal fashion. In 1905 there were over 3,000 mass peasant uprisings, during which over 2,000 landlords' mansions were destroyed. The movement assumed a most distinct revolutionary character in Latvia and Georgia (see note to page 14\*\*).

PAGE 9.\* Mutinies in the army and navy played an important role in the Revolution of 1905-07 and formed an integral part of the revolution. The revolutionary movements in the army and navy commenced in June 1905, and reached their climax in October-December of that year.

The movement began in the most proletarian section of the armed forces, the sailors. The mutiny on the cruiser "Potemkin," to which Lenin refers in this speech, suddenly broke out in June 1905, as a result of the high-handed and provocative conduct of the officers who threatened to shoot down the sailors when the latter refused to eat the putrid meat served out to them. The mutineers, headed by the sailor Matyushenko (a Social-Democrat), disarmed and slew the officers and then issued a manifesto addressed *To the Civilised World* which contained the slogans "Down with the Autocracy!" "Long Live the Constituent Assembly!" For a time the "Potemkin" was supported by the cruiser "Georgii Pobedonosetz," the destroyer "267" and the "Vega." Thus a revolutionary flotilla

was formed which made its way to Odessa "to protect the revolutionary people." Arriving at Odessa at the time of a strike, the crew of the "Potemkin" established contact with the workers and the local revolutionary organisations, but it was very indecisive in its actions. After the arrival of the Sevastopol Squadron and the treachery of the "Georgii Pobedonosetz," the "Potemkin" left Odessa and after cruising the Black Sea for seven days it was forced by lack of coal, fresh water and provisions, and by dissension among the sailors, to surrender to the Rumanian government. The destroyer "267" and part of the less enlightened crew of the "Potemkin" returned to Sevastopol to throw themselves upon the "mercy" of the authorities. Seventy-five were tried by court-martial, three were sentenced to death, nineteen to penal servitude and thirty-three to imprisonment.

Other important revolutionary movements among the armed forces were the mutiny of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in November and the mutiny in Kronstadt. During the latter, the town was in the hands of the insurgent garrison for three days. (Cf. article, *The Army and the Revolution*, in this volume and note to page 336.\*) The mutinies in the Sveaborg and Kronstadt fortresses in July 1906 (cf. note to page 385) were of a more organised character.

PAGE 11.\* The lessons of the Paris Commune were later described by Lenin in a speech delivered at an international meeting in Geneva on March 18, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Commune, as follows: "Two mistakes destroyed the fruits of a splendid victory. The proletariat stopped half-way: instead of proceeding to 'expropriate the expropriators,' it allowed itself to be diverted by dreams of instituting supreme justice in a country united by a national purpose; institutions, like the banks, were not seized. . . . The second error was an excess of magnanimity on the part of the proletariat: it should have exterminated its enemies, but instead it endeavoured to exert moral influence on them; it ignored the importance of pure military action in a civil war, and instead of proceeding to advance vigorously on Versailles and thus to crown the victory gained in Paris, it temporised and thus permitted the Versailles government to rally its sinister forces and make preparations for the bloody events of the May week."

PAGE 12.\* The ukase of the tsar summoning the Bulygin Duma was promulgated on August 19 (6). The Duma was intended to be an advisory body made up of representatives of the big landlords and the upper bourgeoisie. The workers were completely excluded from the suffrage, and the peasants were to be carefully weeded out by means of a three stage system of election. It was proposed to create a state assembly, or lower chamber, and a state council, or upper chamber.

These "chambers" of landlords, big capitalists and officials were to discuss only such legislation as the tsar's government might deem fit to submit to them. The upper chamber was to consist of sixty members elected by the nobility and of an equal number of officials and generals appointed by the tsar, for a term of three years. The lower chamber was to consist of 643 elected members. The revolutionary storm that broke out in October swept this Duma away before it had really come into existence. For the attitude of the Party to the Bulygin Duma, see the article, *The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection*, in the present volume.

PAGE 13.\* The Bulygin Duma was succeeded by the Witte Duma. Witte was appointed Prime Minister during the October general strike and was the author of the tsar's Manifesto of October 30 (17). Among other things, the Manifesto contained the promises: 1) to extend the franchise "as far as practicable" to those "classes of the population" which had not been granted it under the Bulygin Duma Act; and 2) that the Duma itself would be granted not merely advisory, but actual legislative powers. The extension of the franchise was effected by the Act of December 24 (11), which, while it retained the electoral system upon which the Bulygin Duma was based, conferred a restricted suffrage on industrial workers. According to this law, the workers were formed into so-called "workers' *curiæ*," or electoral colleges, and only workers who were engaged in enterprises employing not less than fifty male workers could participate in the elections. The elections were indirect and based on a three stage system. The workers at the factories and workshops elected their delegates to a gubernia college of workers' delegates, the rate of representation being one delegate to every thousand workers. The gubernia college nominated electors to the gubernia electoral assembly, composed of electors chosen by the various sections of the population, and this electoral assembly finally elected the deputies to the State Duma.

PAGE 13.\*\* Lenin refers to the political general strike in October 1905. It began on October 20 (7) with a strike in Moscow of the workers on the Moscow-Kazan railway which broke out when rumours spread of the arrest of the delegates to the Railwaymen's Congress sitting in St. Petersburg. At this Congress demands had been put forward for a constituent assembly, political rights, the eight-hour day, an amnesty, autonomy for national minorities, a people's militia, etc. Although the rumours of the arrests were refuted by the delegates themselves, the railwaymen persisted in the strike and thus broke the dam that held up the tense feeling of expectation of the masses. The strikers demonstrated in the streets of Moscow, there were collisions with the troops and a number were killed and wounded. The strike rapidly spread to other railways. By October 24 (11), the public life of Moscow had come to a standstill: schools, factories,

shops and business houses, the banks and many government institutions were closed down. Telegraphic and telephonic communication was interrupted. Within a week the strike had spread to every railway in the country, affecting 750,000 workers and clerical employees and had brought the public services and industrial and business activity to a standstill in practically every city. The strike bore a distinctly political character and was directed against the government. The strikers demanded the summoning of a constituent assembly, to be elected by universal, direct, equal suffrage, secret ballot, etc.

With the promulgation of the tsar's Manifesto of October 30, promising political "liberty," extension of the franchise and the summoning of a State Duma with "legislative" functions, the strike was called off. The Moscow Strike Committee resolved "to call off the strike temporarily" on November 1 (October 19), and the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies called off the strike on November 3 (October 21).

PAGE 13.\*\*\* Lenin refers to the armed insurrection which broke out in December in a number of places, particularly in Moscow.

When the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies was arrested on December 16 (3), the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies together with the Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Socialist-Revolutionaries decided, on December 19 (6), to call a general political strike the next day, which was subsequently to develop into an armed insurrection. A similar decision was made by a conference of delegates of twenty-nine railways that was in session in Moscow at that time and also by the Congress of Postal and Telegraphic Workers. On December 20 (7), 100,000 workers stopped work. The following day the number of strikers rose to 150,000; the strike assumed a general character and began to spread to the factories on the outskirts of Moscow.

On December 22 (9), an armed struggle began. Collisions with the troops occurred and the dragoons fired on the crowd. Barricades were thrown up, the struggle became embittered, the government brought machine guns and artillery into action. Until December 28 (15), an equilibrium of forces was maintained between the insurgents and the government. The insurgents, operating in units of twenty to thirty men, waged guerilla warfare against the government. Backed by the sympathy of the population, these revolutionary units inflicted enormous losses on the government forces, while they themselves remained invulnerable. The government forces declined to enter into battle with an elusive enemy the strength of whose forces they exaggerated. The Moscow garrison consisted of from seven hundred to eight hundred men, but the commander-in-chief, General Dubasov, considered them largely unreliable and demanded reinforcements; otherwise he declared, he could not answer for "the integrity of the autocracy." Troops were moved in from St. Petersburg and Warsaw and Dubasov became master of the situation. The guerilla units continued the fight, especially in the Krasnaya Presnya

district of the town, but they were exhausted by their superhuman efforts, and the fighting spirit of the workers began to decline. Realising the hopelessness of the position, the Soviet and the Social-Democratic Party called off the strike on January 1 (December 19). The armed insurrection, which had lasted nine days, was suppressed. The actual number of fighters was small: about 2,000 were armed out of a total number of 8,000, who, according to Lenin, took active part in the struggle (armed and unarmed). Nevertheless, the Moscow insurrection bore a mass character; the people did not remain passive spectators, they helped the fighting units in every way they could. The hospitals registered 885 cases of wounded and 174 killed or died from wounds during the period of the armed uprising. During the same period the burial authorities reported the burial of 454 persons who had been found killed, or who died from wounds. The number of victims and casualties was undoubtedly greater.

The Moscow insurrection was followed by uprisings in various parts of the country: Sormovo, Rostov-on-Don, the Donets Basin, Kharkov, Krasnoyarsk and other cities.

PAGE 13.\*\*\*\* Of the three Social-Democratic papers here referred to by Lenin, two, *Nachalo (Beginning)* and *Russkaya Gazeta*, belonged to the Mensheviks and the third, *Novaya Zhizn (New Life)*, belonged to the Bolsheviks.

PAGE 14.\* The first Soviets of Workers' Deputies arose as strike-leading bodies out of the strike movement in the industrial centres before the general strike of October 1905. In June, a Soviet was formed in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, in July another was formed in Kostroma, while in September several Soviets of Deputies in various trades sprang up in Moscow (printers, tobacco workers, etc.). On October 26 (13), during the height of the October general strike, the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed. From the very first it worked in the very closest contact with the revolutionary parties, particularly with the Social-Democrats, and very soon ceased to be a mere "strike committee," as it was called in the foreign press. It enjoyed great popularity and prestige among the workers. On October 30 (17), it assumed definite organisational form and elected an executive committee.

The St. Petersburg Soviet lasted fifty days, from October 26 (13) to December 16 (3), 1905. The most important political incidents during its history are the following: it took charge of the October political general strike; on November 1 (October 19), it proclaimed the freedom of the press; on November 13 (October 31), it proclaimed the eight-hour day and called upon the workers to carry it into effect by refusing to work longer hours; it organised the November strike in defence of the arrested Kronstadt sailors and of revolutionary Poland, where martial law had been declared; it supported the postal and telegraph strike; it greatly

assisted the creation of trade unions; it took the initiative in organising support for the unemployed and, finally, on December 14 (1), it issued the famous Finance Manifesto, in which it called upon the workers, and the population in general, to refrain from paying taxes, to demand gold or full-weight silver coin when receiving payments from state institutions and also warned the foreign capitalists that in the event of the triumph of the revolution all foreign debts of the tsarist government would be repudiated. But these measures could not be permanently enforced except by the seizure of power. The Mensheviks who were the dominant faction on the executive committee were the least capable of utilising the Soviet as a means for preparing for insurrection.

The first chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet was Zborovsky, a Menshevik; he was followed by a non-Party man, Khrustalev-Nosar. When the latter was arrested on December 9 (November 26), he was succeeded by L. D. Trotsky, who was then a Left-wing Menshevik. The Bolsheviks were represented in the Soviet by A. A. Bogdanov, D. S. Postolovsky, P. A. Krasikov and B. Knunyantz.

The Soviets by their very nature could and should have been organs of insurrection, and, in the event of the revolution being victorious, organs of revolutionary government. By refraining from assuming the offensive against tsarism, the St. Petersburg Soviet courted destruction. And that was the fate it met with. Taking advantage of the passivity displayed by the Soviet in the organisation of armed forces, the government arrested the chairman of the Soviet, Khrustalev, on December 9 (November 26). This trial step having succeeded, a few days later all the members of the Soviet and the executive committee were arrested. Of these, fifteen were subsequently sentenced to exile and two to imprisonment in a fortress.

In addition to the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Soviets sprang up at all points where the widely developed working class struggle had reached the verge of insurrection. Just prior to the Moscow armed uprising in December, a Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed in Moscow, which played a very important part in that uprising. Soviets were also formed in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Nikolayev, Ekaterinoslav, Rostov-on-Don, Vladikavkaz, Reval, Saratov, Chita, Irkutsk, Novorossisk, Krasnoyarsk and many other towns. These Soviets played a very important part in the struggle against the autocracy. In many places armed uprisings took place and in some the Soviets seized power. For example, on December 20 (7), the Executive Committee of the Krasnoyarsk Soviet (revolutionary committee), with the aid of soldiers of the Railway Battalion, seized power in the town and proclaimed the Republic of Krasnoyarsk, which lasted for twenty-eight days. The insurrection was suppressed by a government punitive expedition commanded by General Meller-Zakomelsky. On December 22 (9), the Novorossisk Republic was proclaimed, which lasted for about two weeks.

After the arrest of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the suppression of the Moscow uprising, the provincial Soviets were soon crushed under the blows of the reaction.

For Lenin's views on the Soviets and on Party leadership in them, which were in striking contrast to the views then held by the Mensheviks, including Trotsky, see article *Socialism and Anarchism* and also note to page 342 in this volume.

PAGE 14.\*\* The general tide of revolution in 1905-07 was joined by a wave of liberation movements among the oppressed nationalities in the Russian Empire. The tsarist government adopted extreme measures of precaution in order to prevent uprisings among these national minorities. Thus, Poland was occupied by not less than 400,000 Russian troops. Consequently the working class struggle against the autocracy encountered great difficulties in Poland. Notwithstanding this, the Polish proletariat took the offensive on a number of occasions, as for example, the general strike in January 1905, which was called in protest against the shooting down of the St. Petersburg workers, and the armed uprising of the workers of Lodz in June in retaliation to the firing on a workers' demonstration by Cossacks. Moreover, terrorism was widely practised against the representatives and agents of the tsarist government and even against the police.

In Latvia, which adjoins Poland, there was a particularly strong movement among the agricultural labourers and poor farmers. The movement was directed against tsarism, against the landowning barons and against the capitalist farmers, the kulaks, and swept over the whole of the country. In a number of places the barons were forcibly driven from their castles, the local government was overthrown and new organs of local government were set up, *viz.*, volost and rural executive committees. In the towns where large numbers of troops were concentrated, the revolutionary movement did not reach the same degree of development as in the rural districts. The government sent numerous punitive expeditions into the rural districts and suppressed the uprisings with great cruelty. Similar uprisings occurred in the adjoining region of Esthonia, and there they were suppressed with the same ferocity as in Latvia.

In the Caucasus the revolutionary movement was led by Georgia. In the spring and autumn of 1905 the Georgian peasantry, under the leadership of the Social-Democrats, drove out all the tsarist officials, prefects and police and set up a new type of local government. Owing to the natural features of mountainous Georgia the tsarist government found it no easy task to combat the revolutionary movement there and it was only after the arrival of large military forces from the centre of Russia that the movement was crushed at the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906.

In Finland the revolutionary movement was a struggle for national emancipation more vigorous than anywhere else. Owing to the peculiar in-

ternal position of Finland, the Finns were able, in October 1905, to win national autonomy without resorting to armed insurrection and to set up a Seim elected by universal suffrage. The victory, however, was short-lived. After crushing the revolution in Russia proper, the autocracy soon deprived the Finns of nearly all the liberties that had previously been "granted" to them. (See also note to page 359.)

PAGE 15.\* This book is divided into two parts: Part I, entitled *Social Reform and Social Revolution*, and Part II, *The Morrow of the Social Revolution*. Part I deals with the proletarian struggle for power and Part II deals with the organisation of society by the proletariat in power. This book was written when, as Lenin says here, Kautsky "was still a revolutionary Marxist." But even in this book, as well as in his polemics with Bernstein, then the leader of the German opportunists, Kautsky (in his book *Anti-Bernstein*), as Lenin says, "left himself a loophole" to reformism on a very important point in the proletarian revolution, *viz.*, the state and the proletarian dictatorship. As Lenin says in his notes, *Marxism on the State*, Kautsky in his book, *The Social Revolution*, speaks about "the struggle to capture political power," about the "effort to capture the apparatus of state," but he does not say a word about the necessity for the proletariat, as Marx pointed out, to smash the bourgeois apparatus of state, and, in the transition period, to set up its own state of a new type, *viz.*, the proletarian dictatorship. In his book, *Anti-Bernstein*, Kautsky declares that "we can quite safely leave the solution of the problem of the proletarian dictatorship to the future." Commenting on this in his *State and Revolution*, Lenin says: "This is not a polemic against Bernstein, but really a concession to him, a surrender to opportunism." It is through these and similar "loopholes" that Kautsky, even before the war, first "half-way" (1910) and then completely (1912) "slipped into reformism."

PAGE 15.\*\* Tsarism was absolutely unscrupulous in its methods of fighting the revolutionary movement and did not hesitate to resort to the massacre of Jews, including the aged, women and children. These pogroms were organised on many occasions, but they assumed a particularly widespread character in October 1905. Compelled to retreat in the face of the onslaught of the revolutionary masses of the workers and the rebellious peasantry, the tsarist government, through the medium of its police, officials and priests, organised the League of the Russian People, the League of Michael the Archangel and similar organisations all over the country for the purpose of perpetrating pogroms against the Jews. These "Black Hundreds," as they were called, were led by a high tsarist dignitary, the Governor General of St. Petersburg, Trepov, who achieved dubious fame by his curt order to the police in the October days of 1905: "Spare no bullets."

PAGE 16.\* In its struggle with the revolution during the years 1905-07, the tsarist government received considerable financial support from the bourgeoisie of Western Europe, particularly from the French, who in 1906 granted the tsarist government a loan of 2,250 million francs. Since its credit abroad was considerably shaken, the tsarist autocracy, in order to create favourable publicity for itself, resorted to subsidising the French press, in return for which the latter was to paint the autocracy favourably in the eyes of potential purchasers of Russian bonds, or at least remain silent about the true state of affairs in Russia. The Minister of Finance, Kokovtsov, who went to France to conduct the negotiations for the loan, wrote on this subject: "Hence, in view of the unfavourable comments on Russia which appeared in the French press under the influence of the news received from the theatre of war [Russo-Japanese War], it was considered expedient to extend the subsidies to the press, and new credits to the amount of 537,700 francs were assigned for this purpose in the autumn of 1904 and in February 1905. Toward the end of February of the present year . . . a new credit of 700,000 francs was assigned for subsidising the press for three months, and in June and July an additional 235,000 francs per month were assigned. As on previous occasions, the distribution of the subsidies was entrusted to M. Lenoir. Thus, in all, 2,000,000 francs were spent in 1904 and 1905 in subsidising the French press."

PAGE 17.\* The December armed insurrection marked the culminating point in the development of the 1905 Revolution. In an article entitled *Revolution and Counter-Revolution (Collected Works, Vol. XII)*, Lenin described the change which took place after the insurrection, as follows: "The turn in the course of the struggle began with the defeat of the December insurrection.

"Step by step, as the mass struggle grew more feeble, the counter-revolution assumed the offensive. During the epoch of the First Duma this struggle was still very effectively expressed in the growth of the peasant movement, in the widespread destruction of the manors of the feudal landlords and in a number of mutinies among the soldiers. At that time the reaction advanced cautiously, not daring to effect a *coup d'état* immediately. It was only after the mutinies in Sveaborg and Kronstadt were crushed in July 1906, that it became bolder, introduced martial law, began to withdraw electoral rights one by one and finally besieged the Second Duma with police and completely overthrew the notorious constitution."

PAGE 18.\* In Austria, under the direct influence of the triumph of the October general strike in Russia, huge and turbulent demonstrations took place and on the day of the opening of parliament (November 28), a demonstration strike was organised as a result of which universal suffrage was won. A number of big economic and political strikes took place also in other countries. Thus, in Italy, the workers of Milan and Turin declared a general strike in protest against the murder of workers by gendarmes.

In France, the movement for the eight-hour day led to a strike in May 1906, involving 140,000 workers. In Bulgaria, in the beginning of 1907, a general strike of railwaymen broke out in protest against a bill which proposed to limit their rights, and after forty-two hours of struggle ended in a brilliant victory. In Germany, in a number of cities, it was proposed to organise a general strike to mark the anniversary of Bloody Sunday (January 22 [9]), and the German government, in the Russian manner, had already taken "extraordinary measures" of precaution, including the concentration of armed forces. However, the reformist tactics of the German Social-Democratic leaders counteracted the general strike movement and the only result was a successful half-day general strike and a huge demonstration in Hamburg.

PAGE 20.\* The article, *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government*, was published in Nos. 13-14 of the Bolshevik organ *Vperyod* (*Forward*), dated March 23 and 30 (April 5 and 12, new style), 1905. In this article Lenin attacks the position of the Mensheviks on the question of the provisional government taken up by Martynov in his pamphlet *Two Dictatorships*, and he also attacks the position taken up by the "Left" variety of Menshevism that existed at that time, represented by Parvus and Trotsky. Like the other Mensheviks, Martynov, in his pamphlet, left out of account the revolutionary role of the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia and ascribed the hegemony in the revolution to the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, in ascribing to the proletariat the role, not of leading the revolution, but merely that of pushing the bourgeoisie into power, he tried to prove that the proletariat and its party could not, and should not, take part in the provisional revolutionary government. Like all the Mensheviks, he denied the possibility and the necessity of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Parvus, in his preface to Trotsky's pamphlet, *Before the Ninth of January*, also, like Martynov, left out of account the role of the peasantry in the Russian democratic revolution; but he also denied the revolutionary role of the bourgeoisie and so came to the conclusion that "only the proletariat can bring about the revolutionary change in Russia" and that "the provisional government will represent the dictatorship of the proletariat alone." These views expressed the "utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution (a monstrous distortion of the Marxian scheme of revolution), which was completely imbued with the Menshevik repudiation of the policy of alliance with the peasantry . . ." and which, as Comrade Stalin says, was "'invented' in 1905 and opposed . . . to the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," not only by Parvus, but also by Rosa Luxemburg, who at that time was the leader of the German Left wing and at the same time associated herself with the Mensheviks in their opposition to the Bolsheviks. "Later, this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent revolution was picked up by Trotsky (in part by Martov) and

turned into a weapon of struggle against Leninism." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, *Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism*, pp. 397-98.)

In the present article, Lenin, while directing his blows mainly against the opportunist, Martynovist point of view that prevailed in the ranks of the Mensheviks, at the same time strikes at the semi-Menshevik scheme of the "Lefts." While rejecting the Right Menshevik method of separating the democratic revolution from the proletarian revolution and indicating the prospect of the former growing into the latter (see end of chapter III of the present article), he at the same time opposes the Trotsky-Parvus scheme of the immediate "dictatorship of the proletariat alone" and proves that while it is necessary to pass through the stage of democratic revolution, it is also necessary for the proletariat to win the support of the urban and rural poor in order to win and make secure the dictatorship of the proletariat.

PAGE 20.\*\* Lenin refers to the so-called "Economists," against whom he and the old *Iskra* fought from the end of 1900 to the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Economism arose in the early stages of the Social-Democratic movement in Russia. It strove to confine the Russian labour movement, on the model of the British trade union movement, to economic questions and to keep it away from politics. Lenin deals exhaustively with these erroneous views in his famous pamphlet, *What Is To Be Done?*, which is published in Volume II of *Selected Works*.

PAGE 21.\* *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists—the adherents of the journal *Rabocheye Dyelo* (*The Workers' Cause*) (1900-03) which acted as the spokesman of the Economists.

New *Iskra*-ists. In 1903 Lenin decided to resign from the editorial board of *Iskra*, and the paper then became the organ of the Mensheviks. From that time Lenin always referred to the paper as the "new" *Iskra*. Lenin deals with the circumstances which led him to resign from the editorial board of *Iskra*, and why the new *Iskra*-ists repeated the old opportunist mistakes of the Economists, in the articles entitled *Why I Resigned from the Editorial Board of "Iskra," One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* and *The Zemstvo Campaign and the "Iskra" Plan*. See Volume II of *Selected Works*.

PAGE 21.\*\* *Osvobozhdeniye* (*Emancipation*), published by P. Struve in Stuttgart in 1902-05, the organ of the moderate liberals who belonged to the Emancipation League. They advocated a constitutional monarchy and were opposed to revolutionary methods of struggle. Under pressure of the revolutionary movement of 1904-05, however, the League introduced in its programme the demand for a constituent assembly and for the "compulsory alienation of land," but these remained only pious wishes, since they were not accompanied by the advocacy of the overthrow of

the autocracy and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government.

PAGE 22.\* Lenin, comparing the Girondists in the Great French Revolution with the Russian Mensheviks, wrote: "If Martynov and Co. would reflect on these questions, they would understand the intricate (oh! how very intricate!) idea suggested by the old *Iskra* regarding the resemblance of the relationship between the Jacobins and the Girondists to the relationship between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists. (If we are not mistaken, this idea was first advanced in an editorial in No. 2 of *Iskra* written by Plekhanov.) Were the Girondists traitors to the cause of the Great French Revolution? No. But they were inconsistent, irresolute, opportunist defenders of that cause. That is why the Jacobins fought them. The Jacobins defended the interests of the advanced class of the eighteenth century as consistently as the revolutionary Social-Democrats are defending the interests of the advanced class of the twentieth century. And that is why the Girondists found support and protection from the attacks of the Jacobins among the direct betrayers of the cause of the revolution, *i.e.*, the monarchists, the Constitutionalists, priests, etc. Are you not beginning to understand something now, highly respected Girondist Martynov? Not yet? Well, let us try to explain it further. Are the new *Iskra*-ists betrayers of the cause of the proletariat? No. But they are inconsistent, irresolute and opportunist defenders of that cause (and of the principles of organisations and tactics which enlighten that cause). That is why the revolutionary Social-Democrats fight the position that they take up (some openly and directly and some secretly, behind the closed doors of editorial rooms, by subterfuges and evasions). And that is why the new *Iskra*-ists are ideologically supported and protected by the *direct betrayers* of the cause of the proletariat, the *Osvobozhdeniye*-ists."

PAGE 23.\* Lenin refers to the assurance expressed in 1879, in the newspaper *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*), the organ of the party of that name. The aim of the party, as set forth in its programme, was to achieve, by means of terrorism, such a state of panic and disorganisation in the ranks of the government and such a state of unrest and sympathy among the masses as would enable the party, by a conspiracy, to seize power, set up a provisional government and summon a constituent assembly of "representatives of the true interests of the people." The constituent assembly was to carry into effect the programme of the party which advocated 1) the setting up of a *democratic order* (with universal suffrage, freedom of assembly, free speech, free press, etc.) and 2) "the ownership of the land by the people and the handing over of the workshops and factories to the workers." This was to serve as the beginning and foundation of a "social" revolution out of which "socialism" was to grow. The socialism of *Narodnaya Volya* was petty-bourgeois, utopian socialism. Their social revolution was not founded on the class struggle and the dictatorship

of the proletariat, but was merely the expression of the desire of the peasantry to overthrow the landlords and seize and divide their estates. The *Narodnaya Volya*-ists were essentially revolutionary democrats and not socialists, although they dreamed of socialism and "confused, or rather fused, the conditions and aims of a *real* democratic revolution with an *imaginary* socialist revolution." (Lenin.)

PAGE 24.\* The Bolsheviks regarded a *democratic republic* as the best form of state, under which the proletariat could continue the class struggle for the socialist revolution until the working class movement succeeded in setting up a new and higher form, the Soviet form of democracy, which would represent the state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. As early as 1905 Lenin described the Soviets as organs of revolutionary power. In April 1917 he raised the question of the necessity of making a corresponding change in the programme of the Party in connection with the question of the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution.

PAGE 26.\* In 1899, one of the French socialist leaders, Millerand, accepted the post of Minister of Commerce in the "Ministry of the Republican Union," in which the post of Minister of War was held by the executioner of the Paris Commune, General Galliffet. The question of whether Socialists could accept posts in bourgeois governments was the subject of considerable controversy in the International. The opportunists in all countries (in France they were headed by Jaurès) argued that it was permissible; the revolutionary Marxists, on the other hand, regarded it as a betrayal of the fundamental principles of socialism and demanded that Millerand and his followers be expelled from the Party. The International Socialist Congress held in 1900 adopted an elastic, centrist resolution on the subject, proposed by Kautsky, rebuking Millerand for entering a bourgeois government, but at the same time declaring that it was permissible for Socialists to join bourgeois governments "provided the socialist minister remained the delegate of his Party."

PAGE 30.\* The programme of the R.S.D.L.P. adopted at the Second Congress consisted of two parts: a maximum programme setting forth the ultimate aims (the dictatorship of the proletariat and the building up of socialism) and a minimum programme, containing the immediate demands of the proletariat, which could be carried into effect even under capitalism and the purpose of which was to destroy the relics of feudalism and to remove the obstacles to the development of the class struggle of the proletariat. The minimum programme contained such demands as the overthrow of the autocracy, a democratic republic, universal, direct and equal suffrage, secret ballot, freedom of person, free speech, free press and freedom of assembly, the right of nations to self-determination, the eight-hour day, labour protection laws, etc. The division of the Party programme into a

maximum and a minimum was discontinued after the proletariat had seized power in Russia and no such division was, of course, made in the new programme of the Russian Communist Party adopted at the Eighth Party Congress (1918).

PAGE 33.\* Lenin refers to the Menshevik views on organisation as expressed in a number of articles in *Iskra* by Axelrod and Rosa Luxemburg (the latter was at that time associated with the Mensheviks). At one time the Economists, in opposition to Lenin's tactics plan, advocated a "tactics-process," i.e., they believed that the tactics should develop spontaneously out of the process of the struggle, in other words, the tactics of tailists, not of leaders. (See chapter II of *What Is To Be Done?* in Vol. II of *Selected Works*.) Similarly, Axelrod and Luxemburg, in opposition to Lenin's organisation plan, argued that the organisational form of the Party should be shaped by the process of the struggle, and not be constructed according to a definite plan. This is what Lenin means by "the 'organisation-process' theory," which he regarded as an expression of tailism and opportunism in matters of organisation just as Economism expressed this in matters of tactics.

PAGE 33.\*\* The reference is to a caricature by P. Lepeshinsky entitled *The Labour of Sisyphus: A Modern Sisyphus*, representing the Menshevik "Marsh" with its inhabitants, while Plekhanov, whose nakedness is covered by the smallest of figleaves, labelled "dialectics," is performing the Sisyphian (i.e., hopeless, fruitless) task of trying to pull Martov out of the marsh by the ears. The term "marsh" is applied to the "stagnant" groups between the Right and the Left, who waver between the two and try to reconcile them.

PAGE 34.\* L. Nadezhdin, leader of the Revolutionary Socialist group *Svoboda* (*Freedom*), a small group which enjoyed a brief existence in the period of the old *Iskra*. The ideas of the members of this group were extremely confused. Lenin, in *What Is To Be Done?*, chapter III (see *Selected Works*, Vol. II) says that this group "was formed with the object of giving all possible assistance to the labour movement, but . . . included in its programme terror and emancipation, so to speak, from Social-Democracy. . . ."

PAGE 35.\* Lenin here compares the French Revolution of 1789-93, which swept away the remnants of feudalism in a truly plebeian manner with the help of the Jacobin dictatorship, with the German Revolution of 1848, which ended in a shameful compromise between the liberal bourgeoisie and the reactionaries.

PAGE 37.\* The pamphlet, *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, was written immediately after the Bolshevik Third

Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Menshevik Geneva Conference, both of which were held in the spring of 1905.

The resolutions of the Third Congress definitely formulated the strategy and tactics of Bolshevism in the revolution which, prior to the Congress, had been expounded by Lenin and his adherents in the newspaper *Vperyod*.

The resolutions of the Geneva Conference, however, embodied the opportunist views which were advocated in the new *Iskra* and in Martynov's pamphlet, *Two Dictatorships*.

A fundamental disagreement was revealed on "the estimation of the whole of the bourgeois revolution from the point of view of the tasks of the proletariat," as Lenin put it. In his *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (see *Selected Works*, Vol. II) Lenin, in 1904, summed up the first stage of the split with the Mensheviks, when the struggle raged mainly around the question of the type of Party organisation to be set up. In this pamphlet, Lenin, in 1905, in comparing the resolutions of the Third Congress with those of the Geneva Conference, systematically elucidated the fundamental disagreements with the Mensheviks on the question of *tactics*, which, as has already been explained in note to page 20,\* arose out of differing conceptions of the character and driving forces of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, of the role of the proletariat in this revolution and the prospects in view of the role the proletariat was to play in it. In analysing these differences, Lenin, in this pamphlet, as in other of his writings in 1905, brings to the forefront the questions connected with the provisional government as the government of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, also those connected with the armed uprising as the way to this dictatorship. In dealing with these questions, he reveals the main features of the position adopted by the Mensheviks in the 1905 Revolution—the fact that they lined up with the liberal bourgeoisie and subordinated the interests of the proletariat in the revolution to the interests of the bourgeoisie. And just as in his article, *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government*, so in this pamphlet, in connection with the question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, he depicts the path of transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the proletarian revolution, precisely through this dictatorship, as a transition stage to the proletarian dictatorship. (See chapters X and XII of the pamphlet.)

In the present volume the pamphlet is given in a slightly abbreviated form. Chapters VII, VIII and XI are omitted, as also are the first two parts of the Postscript. The parts omitted consist mainly of material to illustrate the arguments expounded by the author in the main parts of the pamphlet that are given here. In part III of the Postscript, Lenin shows that during the revolution in Germany in 1848, Marx also was of the opinion that a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship ("and an energetic dictatorship at that") of the proletariat and peasantry was necessary, and

that he contrasted these two revolutionary forces with the "resisting reaction and the treacherous bourgeoisie."

The complete text of this pamphlet and the Postscript will be found in Volume VIII of the *Collected Works*. It is also published as a separate pamphlet in the *Little Lenin Library*.

PAGE 39.\* Lenin here refers to the views on the armed uprising advocated by the Mensheviks, and particularly by Martynov in his pamphlet, *Two Dictatorships*. The Mensheviks denied the need for organisational and technical preparations for the uprising on the grounds that an uprising must occur spontaneously in the process of development of the struggle and of the revolution, and could not be ordered in advance, just as the revolution itself could not be ordered in advance. Their attitude on this question was therefore a repetition of the attitude of the Economists on the question of "tactics" and of their own attitude on the question of Party "organisation." The "tactics-process" and "organisation-process" theories were joined by the similarly tailist theory of "uprising-process."

When speaking of the temporary deviation of the new *Iskra*-ists from this position, Lenin refers to a leaflet issued by *Iskra* in connection with the mutiny on the cruiser "Potemkin," which, as Lenin observes in his article *Revolution Teaches*, contained "a vigorous, open and clear call for an armed uprising of the people." (See *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII.)

PAGE 41.\* This refers principally to an article by P. B. Axelrod in *Iskra*. In this article Axelrod argued that the Social-Democratic Party consisted mainly of intellectuals and that it did not have firm contacts with the mass labour movement. From this he arrived at the conclusion that the Party could not set itself the aim of leading the proletariat in the revolution and of fighting for the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution.

PAGE 41.\*\* This refers to an article entitled *The Split in Russian Social-Democracy*, signed N—ch, in No. 72 of *Osvobozhdeniye*, in which the author, in dealing with the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Menshevik Conference in Geneva, expresses indignation with the Bolsheviks because, as he put it, they were "completely permeated with narrow revolutionism" and "on principle" rejected "all forms of practical and useful compromises with other opposition trends." He, however, commended the Mensheviks for their "sober-mindedness" and "clear appreciation of the concrete conditions and tasks of the struggle."

PAGE 42.\* The reference is to the article, *The Black Sea Mutiny*, by L. Martov printed in No. 104 of *Iskra*, in which the author stated that "when the sudden outbreak of the uprising placed a powerful fighting weapon in the hands of the Social-Democrats, they were faced with the task of organising revolution." At the same time, however, he was opposed to the preparatory work of the Social-Democrats in organising a national

uprising. "In this uprising," he wrote, "the still prevalent hopes of a universal uprising 'according to plan' proved futile!"

PAGE 44.\* This refers to the preparations the tsarist government was making to pass a law establishing the Bulygin Duma. (See note to page 12.)

PAGE 52.\* Lenin has in mind the Socialist-Revolutionaries who denied the bourgeois character of the 1905 Revolution, and also Trotsky and Parvus, who held the view that after the overthrow of the autocracy a "labour democratic government, a Social-Democratic government" would come into power.

PAGE 54.\* In an article entitled *The Russian Revolution and Peace—An Open Letter to J. Jaurès*, which appeared in *Osvobozhdeniye* in June 1905, Struve wrote:

"Speaking theoretically and abstractly, the revolution in Russia may become a government in the most peaceful manner in the world, just as peacefully and simply as a change of ministries takes place in parliamentary countries. . . . Let, for instance, a congress of Zemstvo delegates, such as was held in Moscow on May 6 and the following days, meet in Moscow for the space of only two hours. This congress would recommend to Nicholas II the persons needed for a *strong* government, persons who enjoy confidence and prestige in the eyes of the country. And after adopting the programme of these persons, let Nicholas II hand over power to them. For Russia now needs not only freedom, but also an organisation of power that will be able to protect freedom and order."

PAGE 57.\* The Frankfort Parliament. "The Frankfort Talking Shop"—the national assembly summoned during the German Revolution of 1848, of which Engels in 1852 in his *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany* wrote as follows:

"This assembly of old women was, from the first day of its existence, more frightened of the least popular movement than of all the reactionary plots of all the German governments put together. . . . Instead of asserting its own sovereignty, it studiously avoided the discussion of any such dangerous question. Instead of surrounding itself by a popular force, it passed to the order of the day over all the violent encroachments of the governments. . . . Thus we had the strange spectacle of an Assembly pretending to be the only legal representative of a great and sovereign nation, and yet never possessing either the will or the force to make its claims recognised."

This assembly, continues Engels, "carried away by unequalled cowardice, only restored to their former solidity the foundations upon which the present counter-revolutionary system is built."

PAGE 58.\* In addition to this resolution, the Third Congress adopted two other resolutions, not for publication, on the attitude toward the Mensheviks. The resolution read as follows:

1. "The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. authorises the Central Committee to take all necessary measures for preparing and drawing up the conditions for fusion with the seceded section of the R.S.D.L.P., these conditions to be submitted for final approval to the new Party Congress."

2. "In view of the possibility that certain of the Menshevik organisations may refuse to accept the decisions of the Third Congress, the Congress instructs the Central Committee to dissolve such organisations and to approve as committees such parallel organisations as submit to the Congress, but only after it shall have been fully established by careful investigation that the Menshevik organisations and committees refuse to submit to Party discipline."

PAGE 60.\* The main theses in the article of the Georgian Mensheviks, *The Zemsky Sobor and Our Tactics*, are quoted by Lenin in chapter VII of *The Two Tactics, etc.*, which is omitted from this volume. In the article in question, the Georgian Mensheviks, on the assumption that "the present revolution is a bourgeois revolution," declare that "it is in our interest that the government remain without allies, that it should not be in a position to divide the opposition, that it should not secure the adherence of the bourgeoisie and should not leave the proletariat isolated." Hence the conclusion arrived at in the article that the Social-Democrats should "make the Zemsky Sobor the centre of our activities."

PAGE 62.\* Lenin refers to the demand put forward in the summer of 1905 by the Right wing of the liberal bourgeoisie, headed by D. N. Shipov, for a constitution which, in effect, approximated very closely to the plan for a Bulygin Duma (see note to page 12), for it did not demand universal suffrage, provided for a two chamber system and offered a number of political privileges to the landlords and the bourgeoisie.

PAGE 67.\* This was true of the German and Italian Revolutions of 1848-49. The abolition of the most antiquated relics of feudalism and the attainment of national unity in Germany and Italy, which were the chief aims of these revolutions, were, in fact, carried out by the Bismarck government in Germany and by Cavour in Italy after the revolutionary movements had been crushed.

PAGE 70.\* These reproaches were formulated most fully by Martynov in his *Two Dictatorships* and by Axelrod in his articles in the new *Iskra*. For example, in the article entitled *The Unity of Russian Social-Democracy and Our Tasks* in *Iskra*, No. 55, Axelrod asserts that the Bolsheviks "merely serve as the representatives of bourgeois ideology in the liberation movement in Russia against absolutism."

PAGE 72.\* The "peasant slogans" of the Menshevik Conference are formulated in the resolution, "Work among the Peasants," as follows:

"Social-Democrats consider it necessary...to agitate for: a) an open declaration of political demands at village and town meetings; b) universal arming for the purpose of self-defence against the violence of the government; c) refusal to pay duties or perform compulsory services; d) refusal to supply recruits, appear for military training or rally to the colours when reserves are called up; e) refusal to recognise all government bodies appointed or selected under pressure of the government; f) the free election of officials—and hence g) revolutionary local government in the villages and a revolutionary league of village self-governing societies, which are to organise the uprising of the peasants against tsarism."

PAGE 77.\* The names are those of a number of liberal papers of various shades, whose political policy Lenin described in 1905 in his article, *The Democratic Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat*, as follows:

"As we all know, an extensive liberal party is rapidly being formed in Russia, to which belong the Emancipation League (*Osvobozhdeniye*) and a large number of Zemstvos, and such newspapers as *Nasha Zhizn* [*Our Life*], *Nashi Dni* [*Our Days*], *Syn Otechestva* [*Son of the Fatherland*], *Russkiye Vedomosti* [*Russian News*], etc. This liberal bourgeois party likes to be known as the Constitutional Democratic Party. As a matter of fact, as may be seen from the programme of the illegal *Osvobozhdeniye*, this party is a monarchist party. It does not want a republic. It does not want a single chamber, and in respect of the upper chamber demands indirect and, in effect, non-universal suffrage (residential qualification). It does not by any means desire the transfer of *the whole* of the supreme power of the state to the people (although, for the sake of appearances, it loves to talk of the transfer of power to the people!). It does not want to *overthrow* the autocracy. All it wants is the division of power among 1) the monarchy, 2) the upper chamber (where the landlords and the capitalists will predominate) and 3) a lower chamber, which *alone* will be constituted on democratic principles."

PAGE 78.\* The demand for an upper chamber, to consist solely of representatives of the bourgeoisie, the landlords and the intellectuals, as distinct from a lower chamber elected by universal suffrage, formed an integral part of the programme of the liberal bourgeoisie and the liberal landlords in 1905. The object of the upper chamber was to serve as a check upon the lower chamber, as is the case in England, for example, with the House of Lords, and the Senate in the United States. After 1905, the lower chamber in Russia was represented by the State Duma and the upper chamber by the State Council, which consisted of representatives of the big landlords and government officials.

PAGE 78.\* This footnote read as follows: "Of course, we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the fact that our peasants, as many persons

have informed me recently, very readily change from naive monarchism to an equally naive republicanism and use arguments to the effect that: the tsar is a fool; he should be kicked out and in the future the tsar should be elected every three years, etc.”

PAGE 84.\* Lenin quotes from Marx's article, *The Balance Sheet of the Prussian Revolution*.

PAGE 85.\* These are the various names by which the Bolsheviks were known in 1905: *Vperyod*-ists, from the Bolshevik paper *Vperyod* (*Forward*), which appeared in Geneva from about the end of 1904 to the time of the Third Party Congress; Congress-ists, as distinct from the Mensheviks, who were followers of the Geneva Conference; *Proletary*-ists, from *Proletary*, which was the central organ of the Party after the Third Congress.

PAGE 89.\* Martynov's pamphlet, *Two Dictatorships*, was directed against the slogan of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry and against the proletarian party taking any part in the provisional revolutionary government. Lenin criticises Martynov's pamphlet in his article, *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government*, in this volume.

PAGE 95.\* The reference is to the following passage in Engels' article *The Programme of the Blanquist Communards*:

“During every revolution many stupid things are done just as at any other time, and when people have at last cooled down sufficiently to adopt a critical attitude towards events they are bound to come to the following conclusion: we did many things that would have been better left undone, and left undone much that should have been done, and that is why things went wrong.

“What a lack of criticism is displayed by those who positively make an idol of the Commune and regard it as infallible, declaring that every building it set fire to deserved to be burnt down and that every hostage it shot deserved to be shot! Is that not equivalent to declaring that during the May Week the people shot exactly those individuals who should have been shot, and no others; that only such buildings were burnt down as should have been burnt down, and no others? Is that not equivalent to asserting, as was asserted of the first French Revolution, that every individual who was executed in the course of that revolution deserved his fate—from those whom Robespierre executed, to Robespierre himself? To such depths of folly can individuals descend who are really absolutely innocuous, but want themselves at all costs to be regarded as terrible.”

PAGE 95.\*\* Lenin does not here give a complete appraisal of the Paris Commune, to which he attributed the greatest importance and the

history of which he profoundly studied. Of the services it performed he wrote on another occasion as follows:

"But with all its errors, the Commune is the greatest example of the greatest proletarian movement of the nineteenth century. Marx valued very highly the historical importance of the Commune: if, during the treacherous raid of the Versailles gang on the arms of the Paris proletariat, the workers had given them up without a fight, the disastrous effect of the demoralisation which such weakness would have brought into the proletarian movement would have been much more serious than the injury from the losses suffered by the working class in the fight while defending its arms. Great as were the sacrifices of the Commune, they are redeemed by its importance for the general proletarian struggle: it stirred up the socialist movement throughout Europe, it demonstrated the value of civil war, it dispersed patriotic illusions and shattered the naive faith in the common national aspirations of the bourgeoisie. The Commune has taught the European proletariat to deal concretely with the problems of the socialist revolution." (Lenin, *The Paris Commune*, *Little Lenin Library*, p. 19.)

PAGE 101.\* The Erfurt Programme is the programme of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany adopted at the Congress of that Party in the town of Erfurt in 1891. The programme was drafted and edited by Karl Kautsky, Engels' comments on the draft programme, to which Lenin refers, were made in a letter to Kautsky dated June 29, 1891, but published only in 1901, in *Die Neue Zeit*, the theoretical organ of the Social-Democratic Party, under the heading, *A Contribution to the Criticism of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme*. Lenin dealt in detail with Engels' letter in his *State and Revolution* and attached considerable importance to it as "criticism . . ." of ". . . the opportunist views of Social-Democracy regarding questions of state organisation." (Lenin's italics.) ". . . And when we remember," says Lenin in this book, "what importance the Erfurt Programme has acquired in international Social-Democracy, how it has become the model for the whole of the Second International, it may, without exaggeration, be said that Engels thereby criticises the opportunism of the whole Second International." (*State and Revolution*, chap. IV, part 4, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Book II, pp. 203 and 204; also published separately in *Little Lenin Library*.)

In the present instance, Lenin refers to Engels' reference to the importance of the democratic republic for the struggle of the proletariat for its dictatorship when he said: "Now, it seems not to be feasible legally to put the demand for a republic into the programme, although that was as possible even under Louis Philippe in France as in Italy today. But the fact that one cannot even draw up an openly republican party programme in Germany proves how colossal is the illusion that the republic can be established in an amiable, peaceful fashion, and not only the republic but communist society as well. None the less, it is possible, if need be, to squeeze by the republic. But what must and can be put in, in my opin-

ion, is the demand for the concentration of all political power in the hands of the people's representatives. And that would be sufficient for the present, if one cannot go any further."

PAGE 101.\*\* Engels' letter to Turatti, dated January 26, 1894, was published in 1895, soon after Engels' death, in No. 3 of *Critica Sociale*, Milan. The letter was written in connection with the discussion which went on within the Italian Socialist Party on the so-called "hunger riot" of the peasants in Sicily. It contained a general estimate of the internal situation in Italy and also the author's view on the character of the approaching revolution and the tactics which the revolutionary Marxian party ought to pursue.

PAGE 117.\* Lenin here refers to the controversy between Kautsky and Bernstein at the end of the nineties of the last century. Replying to Bernstein's assertion that Social-Democracy is prematurely striving for political power and that it should remain an opposition party for an indefinitely long period, Kautsky, in his book *Anti-Bernstein*, puts the question: "Dare we win?" And he replies: "The party that wants to exist must fight, and to fight means trying to win. And those who try to win must always reckon with the possibility that they will be the victors. If we want to guarantee ourselves against power falling into our hands prematurely, the only thing we can do is to go to sleep." Nevertheless, in this very book, Kautsky depicts the victory of the Party, its accession to power, in an *opportunist manner*. He depicts it, not as the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie, but as a peaceful victory at the polls. On this point also, as on the fundamental question of the revolution, *i.e.*, the dictatorship of the proletariat (see note to page 15\*), Kautsky, in his polemics with Bernstein, "surrenders the position to opportunism."

PAGE 118.\* This refers to Kautsky's article, *The Split in Russian Social-Democracy*, published in the new (Menshevik) *Iskra* of June 28 (15), 1905. Even before this period, in the period between the Second and Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., Kautsky, like all the centrist leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany and of the Second International, supported the Mensheviks against Lenin and the Bolsheviks on the question of the split. In the article mentioned, Kautsky pursues the same anti-Bolshevik line, and on the main theoretical point of difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, *viz.*, the provisional revolutionary government, he writes the following: ". . . A foreign observer must exert great effort to discover any difference between the two factions. The principal question that divides them at the present time is, whether or not members of the Party should take part in the future revolutionary government. But surely, it is possible to discuss how the skin of the bear that has not been killed yet is to be divided in a peaceful manner within a single

party; moreover, the whole controversy is futile as long as absolutely nothing is known of what the revolutionary government in which we are to take part will look like."

PAGE 134.\* Lenin wrote these theses either at the end of 1905 or the beginning of 1906 but they were first published in 1926. These theses are particularly valuable because, after briefly outlining the stages through which the revolution had already passed at the end of 1905, they forecast its possible further development and the prospects, in the event of it being completely victorious, of its growing into a socialist revolution. Long before 1905, from the time he wrote his first important work, *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight Against the Social-Democrats* (see Vol. I of *Selected Works*), Lenin, in speaking of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, pointed out that the overthrow of tsarism should be regarded as the first stage in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat which was to be followed by the next stage, viz., the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Hence, the tactics of the proletariat and its party in the bourgeois-democratic revolution should be directed towards preparing for this next stage, and particularly towards preparing for the replacement of the alliance between the proletariat and the whole of the peasantry in the fight against tsarism by the alliance between the proletariat and the rural poor for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. (See particularly *To The Rural Poor* in Vol. II of *Selected Works*.) Lenin developed the theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into the socialist revolution in connection with the 1905 Revolution in a number of articles he wrote that year. It may be said without the slightest exaggeration that everything Lenin wrote in that period is permeated with this idea. In parts III and IV of *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government* and in chapter X of *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (included in this volume), the reader will find precise and definite references to the prospects of the 1905 Revolution growing into a socialist revolution, to the relation of class forces that was necessary for this transition, i.e., an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry and the neutralisation of the middle peasants, and to the tactics which the Party should pursue in order to bring this about.

In part II (last section) of the Postscript to *The Two Tactics, etc.* (omitted from this volume), Lenin says:

"A complete victory of the present revolution will mark the end of the democratic revolution and the beginning of a decisive struggle for the socialist revolution. The achievement of the demands of the present-day peasantry, the complete rout of the reaction, the conquest of a democratic republic, will mark the end of the revolutionariness of the bourgeoisie and even of the petty bourgeoisie—it will be the beginning of a real proletarian struggle for socialism. The more complete the democratic revolution is, the sooner, the wider, the purer and the more resolutely will this new struggle develop. The slogan, 'democratic' dictatorship, expresses

precisely the historically limited character of the present revolution and the need for a new struggle on the basis of a new order for the complete emancipation of the working class from all oppression and all exploitation. In other words: when the democratic bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie ascend another step, when not only the revolution, but the complete victory of the revolution will have become a fact, we shall 'replace' (perhaps amidst the terrible wailing of some future Martynov) the slogan, the democratic dictatorship, by the slogan, the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the complete socialist revolution."

In another article, *The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement*, written in September 1905, Lenin deals with this question in connection with the agrarian programme and the tactics of the Party regarding the peasantry in the period of the first Russian revolution and says:

"... from the democratic revolution we shall at once, according to the degree of our strength, the strength of the class conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half way." (Italics ours.—Ed.)  
 "... Without indulging in any adventurism or betraying our scientific conscience, without striving after cheap popularity, we can and do say only one thing: we shall with all our might help the whole of the peasantry to make the democratic revolution in order that it may be easier for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on, as quickly as possible, to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution." (Lenin's italics; see pp. 145-46 of this volume.)

Thus, the present theses, and the passages from the works of Lenin referred to and quoted here, show clearly that in 1905 Lenin was of the opinion that the first Russian revolution contained all the prerequisites necessary, in the event of decisive victory, to enable the Party, immediately after this victory, to lead the proletariat to the socialist revolution.

Quoting the passage given above from Lenin's article, *The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement*, Comrade Stalin, in his *Problems of Leninism*, written as early as 1925, pointed out how mistaken those comrades were "who still continue to assert that Lenin only arrived at the idea of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into the socialist revolution, the idea of permanent revolution, after the outbreak of the imperialist war, somewhere about the year 1916." (See Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 266.) It is well known, and Comrade Stalin has pointed this out also, that Trotsky has for a long time falsely declared that Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not, in 1905, adhere to the view that the bourgeois-democratic revolution would pass over into the socialist revolution, and that it was only in the spring of 1917 that they advanced this idea after having "re-equipped themselves with Trotsky's weapons in the spirit of his 'theory of permanent revolution.'"

Nevertheless, in spite of Comrade Stalin's warning, certain persons managed to smuggle Trotskyist propaganda into Party literature, for ex-

ample, Volosevich and certain members of the group engaged in writing a *History of the C.P.S.U.* under the editorship of Comrade Yaroslavsky; these tried to argue, ostensibly "according to Lenin," that the necessary conditions did not exist in Russia in 1905 for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to develop into the socialist revolution and that, therefore, this development was impossible in the period of 1905-07, or at all events, impossible unless a socialist revolution first occurred in the West. Other writers, for example, N. Popov, while admitting that Lenin did not regard the socialist revolution in the West as being an essential condition precedent to the transition to the socialist revolution, nevertheless, so confused this absolutely clear question, so obscured the significance of the internal forces of the revolution in Russia, and so opportunistically ignored the role of the leadership of the Party and its Leninist tactics in this transition, that their writings only served as grist to the mill of the Trotskyist smugglers. Comrade Stalin exposed these Trotskyist smugglers in his letters to *Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya*, published under the heading *Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism*. In this letter he says that these people "try to prove that Lenin in the pre-war period did not understand the necessity for the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into the socialist revolution," thus "leading the inexperienced reader to surmise that Lenin was not at that time a real Bolshevik, that he grasped the necessity for such a transition only after the war, after he had been 're-equipped' with Trotsky's help." After describing Volosevich as a "typical representative of this sort of smuggler," Comrade Stalin again calls attention to the passages quoted from Lenin's article, *The Attitude of Social-Democracy Towards the Peasant Movement*, and says:

"...a very great number of facts and documents of an analogous sort could be found in the works of Lenin, but what concern have people like Volosevich for the facts from the life and activity of Lenin? People like Volosevich write in order, by camouflaging themselves in Bolshevik colours, to drag in their anti-Leninist contraband, to lie against the Bolsheviks, and falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, p. 405.)

The Trotskyist smugglers continued the work of Trotsky, who, as is well known, and as Lenin in his day and later on Comrade Stalin exposed, was engaged in falsifying the history of the Bolshevik Party and the ideas of Lenin.

Since 1905, Trotsky has opposed Lenin's views on the prospects of the first Russian revolution, and has opposed to Lenin's doctrine of the bourgeois-democratic revolution developing into a socialist revolution his own "theory of permanent revolution." This theory had its origin in the semi-Menshevik theories advanced by Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus (see parts III and IV of the article *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government*, in this volume), according to which the bourgeois revolu-

tion could immediately put the proletariat in power without first establishing the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. This semi-Menshevik theory did not prevent, but helped Trotsky to fulfill the role of Menshevik agent in the 1905 Revolution, particularly when he became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies after Khrustalev-Nosar had been arrested. (See note to page 342.) This theory served as a "Left" screen for his desertion to the camp of the liquidators in the years of reaction and of the new revival and similarly as a screen for his concealed Kautskyian social-chauvinism in the years of the imperialist war. Finally, it was under the mask of this theory that Trotsky and the Trotskyists deserted from the Communist camp to the camp of the counter-revolution in the period of 1925-28. Trotsky opposed his theory of permanent revolution to Lenin's views from 1905 on; but since his desertion to the camp of the counter-revolution, where he and his adherents are acting as the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, he, in order to conceal his treachery to communism by *deception*, claims that precisely from 1905 on this theory "in all decisive circumstances coincided with Lenin's theory." Trotsky asserts this in the pamphlet he published in Berlin in 1930, entitled *Permanent Revolution and Lenin's Line*. The theses given here and the passages from other works of Lenin quoted above are sufficient to prove that Trotsky's assertion is false, and they expose his Menshevik attempt to paint Leninism in the colours of Trotskyism.

In 1922, in the Foreword to his book *1905*, Trotsky expounded his theory of permanent revolution in the following manner:

"It was during the interval between January 9 and the general strike of October 1905 that the views on the character of the revolutionary development of Russia, which came to be known as the theory of the 'permanent revolution,' gradually crystallised in the author's mind. This somewhat complicated term represented a rather simple idea; though the immediate objectives of the Russian revolution were bourgeois in nature, the revolution upon achieving its objectives would not stop there. The revolution would not be able to solve its immediate bourgeois problems except by placing the proletariat in power. And the latter, upon assuming power, would not be able to limit itself to the bourgeois framework of the revolution. On the contrary, precisely in order to secure its victory, the proletarian vanguard would be forced in the very early stages of its rule to make deep inroads not only into feudal property but into capitalist property as well. In this the proletariat will come into hostile collision not only with the bourgeois groupings which supported the proletariat during the first stages of the revolutionary struggle, but also with the broad masses of the peasants who were instrumental in bringing it into power. The contradictions in the situation of the workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelming majority of peasants can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution."

Lenin repeatedly, in 1905, in the period of reaction and of the new revival, as well as in the period of the imperialist war, opposed this

"absurdly 'Left,'" "queer" theory, as he described it, and warned comrades not to follow it, as it was anti-Marxian. In reply to the question of why Lenin "warred" against this theory, Comrade Stalin, in 1924, in his lectures *Foundations of Leninism*, said:

"Because Lenin proposed that the revolutionary capacities of the peasantry be utilised 'to the utmost' and that full use be made of their revolutionary energy for the complete liquidation of tsarism and the transition to the proletarian revolution; whereas the adherents of 'permanent revolution' did not understand the important role of the peasantry in the Russian revolution, underestimated the revolutionary energy of the peasantry, underestimated the strength and capacity of the Russian proletariat to lead the peasantry, and so hampered the work of emancipating the peasantry from the influence of the bourgeoisie, the work of rallying the peasantry around the proletariat.

"Because Lenin proposed to *crown* the revolution with the coming into power of the proletariat, while the adherents of 'permanent' revolution wanted to *begin* at once by establishing the power of the proletariat, not realising that by so doing they were closing their eyes to such 'trifles' as the existence of survivals of serfdom and overlooking, in their calculations, so important a force as the Russian peasantry; nor did they realise that this policy would retard the winning over of the peasantry to the side of the proletariat.

"Lenin, then, fought the adherents of 'permanent' revolution not over the question of 'uninterruptedness,' because he himself held the point of view of uninterrupted revolution, but because they underestimated the role of the peasantry, the proletariat's greatest reserve power, and because they failed to grasp the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, pp. 37-38.)

But this was not the only danger and harm of the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution against which Lenin fought and which in fact served the interests not of the proletarian revolution, but of its enemies. Comparing the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution as expounded by Trotsky himself in the passage quoted above, Comrade Stalin somewhat later, in December 1924, in an article entitled *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, says that this comparison reveals "the gulf that separates the Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat from Comrade Trotsky's<sup>1</sup> theory of 'permanent revolution.'" And Comrade Stalin goes on to say:

"Lenin speaks of the *alliance* of the proletariat and the toiling strata of the peasantry as the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Trotsky we find the '*hostile collision*' 'of the proletarian vanguard' with 'the broad masses of peasants.'

"Lenin speaks of the *leadership* of the toiling and exploited masses by the proletariat. In Trotsky we find '*contradictions* in the situation of the workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelming majority of peasants.'

<sup>1</sup> Trotsky was then a member of the Party.—*Ed.*

"According to Lenin, the revolution draws its forces chiefly from among the workers and peasants of Russia itself. According to Trotsky, the necessary forces can be found *only* 'in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.'" (Stalin, *The October Revolution*, pp. 102-03.)

After pointing out that these features of Trotsky's "theory of permanent revolution" are incompatible with Leninism, Comrade Stalin goes on to say:

"What is the dictatorship of the proletariat, according to Lenin?

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is the power which relies on the alliance between the proletariat and the toiling masses of the peasantry for 'the complete overthrow of capital' and 'the final establishment and consolidation of socialism.'

"What is the dictatorship of the proletariat according to Trotsky?

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a power which enters 'into hostile collision . . . with the broad masses of the peasants' and seeks the solution of its 'contradictions' *merely* 'in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.'

"In what respect does this 'theory of the permanent revolution' differ from the well-known theory of Menshevism which repudiates the concept: dictatorship of the proletariat?

"In substance there is no difference.

"There can be no doubt about it. 'Permanent revolution' is not a mere underestimation of the revolutionary possibilities inherent in the peasant movement. 'Permanent revolution' is an underestimation of the peasant movement which leads to the *rejection* of Lenin's theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"Comrade Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' is another variety of Menshevism." (*Ibid.*, p. 103.)

While repudiating the Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" simultaneously repudiates the possibility of a permanent victory of the proletarian revolution and of the victory of socialism in a single country, which is one of the cornerstones of the Leninist theory of proletarian revolution. This is evident from the part of the above-quoted passage from Trotsky's book in which he says: "the contradictions in the situation of the workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelming majority of peasants can be solved only on an international scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution." In an article, entitled *A Review and Some Perspectives*, written in 1906, Trotsky in developing his theory of permanent revolution expressed this idea more definitely. He said: "Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia cannot maintain itself in power and transform its temporary rule into a durable socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant."

Quoting this passage, Comrade Stalin, in his article: *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*, asks:

"What does this quotation say?" And he replies: "It says that the victory of socialism in a single country, in this case Russia, is impos-

sible *without* 'direct state support from the European proletariat'. . .

"What is there in common between this 'theory' and Lenin's formula about the possibility of the victory of socialism 'in one single capitalist country?'"

"It is evident that there is nothing in common." (*Ibid.*, p. 106.)

Comrade Stalin then goes on to point out that the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution is inseparable from the Trotskyist repudiation of the possibility of the victory of socialism, not only in Russia, but in any single country taken separately, and declares: 1) that Trotsky's theory of "permanent revolution" is the repudiation of the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution, and on the other hand, 2) that the "subsoil" of the theory of "permanent revolution" is lack of confidence in the strength and abilities of the Russian proletariat, 3) that, in substance, this "theory" in no way differs from the ordinary Menshevik theory that the victory of socialism is impossible in a single country, still less in a backward country and, therefore, 4) even from this aspect, the theory of permanent revolution is a variety of Menshevism.

Being a variety of Menshevism, and expressing lack of confidence in the revolutionary possibilities of the peasant movement and lack of confidence in the abilities of the proletariat, repudiating the alliance between the proletariat and the main masses of the peasantry (particularly with the masses of the middle peasants), and by that repudiating the Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and, finally, by repudiating the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution and its doctrine of the possibility of the victory of socialism in a single country—Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution could only lead him and the Trotskyists to the place to which Menshevism led, *viz.*, the camp of the counter-revolution. Trotsky's recent assertions that his theory "in all decisive circumstances coincided with the Leninist theory" is only a fable fit for political infants who are incapable of distinguishing Leninism from a variety of Menshevism, and for the smugglers and counterfeiters of Leninism who serve contemporary counter-revolutionary Trotskyism.

PAGE 139.\* This article was written in the autumn of 1905 and published in *Proletary*, No. 16 of September 14 (1), 1905. It explains the resolution on the peasant question adopted by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and, as Lenin says, the "urgent tasks of the Party generally." The need for such an explanation was called forth by the surprise and doubts about this resolution that existed among certain Party organizations and individual comrades. In his reply to the debate on his report at the Fifteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U., Comrade Stalin, exposing Kamenev's Trotskyist falsification of Lenin's views, mentioned this article and another of Lenin's articles, entitled "The Two Lines of the Revolution," and said: "You see that in 1905 as in 1915, Lenin took

as his starting point the premise that the bourgeois revolution in Russia must grow into a socialist revolution, that the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia is the first stage of the Russian revolution, a necessary stage to enable it to pass immediately to the next stage, to the socialist revolution." Kamenev never understood this. He did not understand it in 1917 when, at the head of an insignificant group of Right opportunists, he waged an unsuccessful struggle against the Leninist line, nor did he understand it when, in conjunction with Zinoviev, he waged an equally unsuccessful struggle against the Party, first at the head of the Leningrad opposition, and then in the front ranks of the Trotskyist bloc under the leadership of Trotsky. Falsifying Leninism at the Fifteenth Party Conference, Kamenev and Zinoviev, hand in hand with Trotsky, openly spread the Trotskyist slander about the alleged "re-equipment" of Bolshevism in 1917, i.e., the slander that Bolshevism changed its whole line in 1917. After this slander had been exposed by Comrade Stalin at the Fifteenth Party Conference and after Trotskyism had been utterly routed at the Fifteenth Party Congress, this slander was smuggled into the literature on the history of the Party by Volosevich and other Trotskyist smugglers. In his well-known letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, entitled *Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism*, Comrade Stalin again quotes a passage from the present article showing that Lenin conceived of the democratic revolution growing into the socialist revolution as early as 1905, and he goes on to say: "It is true, a very great number of facts and documents of an analogous sort could be found in the works of Lenin, but what concern have people like Volosevich for the facts from the life and activity of Lenin? People like Volosevich write in order, by camouflaging themselves in Bolshevik colours, to drag in their anti-Leninist contraband, to lie against the Bolsheviks and falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party. You see, the Voloseviches are worthy of the Slutskys." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, page 405.)

PAGE 139.\*\* This original draft of the resolution on the attitude to be taken towards the peasant movement was published in *Vperyod*, No. 11, March 1905, in an article by Lenin entitled *The Proletariat and the Peasantry*, and was written in opposition to the opportunist postulate advanced by Kautsky at that time that "the revolutionary urban movement" (i.e., the proletariat and its party—*Ed.*) "must remain neutral in the question of the relations between the peasantry and the landlords." In opposition to this postulate, Lenin enunciates the Bolshevik attitude towards the peasant movement, and at the end of this article quotes the resolution he had drawn up on this question for the Third Congress of the Party. This draft, in a more condensed form and worded somewhat differently, formulates the same fundamental postulates that are formulated in the resolution that was ultimately adopted by the Third Congress, i.e., support for the peasant movement, including the confiscation of landlords',

church, monastery, state and appanage lands, the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees, and the independent organisation of the rural proletariat.

PAGE 139.\*\*\* This refers to the resolution adopted by the Menshevik Conference in Geneva, which was held simultaneously with the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., in 1905. In regard to the agrarian demands of the peasantry the resolution vaguely stated that "Social-Democracy must support every attempt on the part of the peasantry to seize the land by force" and added that such support must be accompanied by an explanation "to the peasantry that its gains in the struggle against the landlords can be guaranteed only by a free and national constituent assembly." In contrast to the "practical slogan" issued by the Bolsheviks for the "immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees for the purpose of carrying out all the revolutionary-democratic changes in the rural districts," the Menshevik resolution spoke in liberal terms about the necessity of "demanding that the constituent assembly set up, on democratic principles, special committees (peasant committees) which shall finally remove the old conditions in the rural districts which are so burdensome for the peasantry."

PAGE 140.\* This refers to the All-Russian Peasant Union organised in 1905 and operating till the end of 1906. See also note to page 203.

PAGE 145.\* Lenin here refers to the agrarian programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which called for the abolition of private property in land, the conversion of all the land into public property, and the distribution of the land among the peasantry on an equal basis, that is to say, to give each family as much land as would satisfy its needs and as it was able to cultivate without the employment of outside labour. This they called "the socialisation of the land." In their opinion this system of distributing the land would have enabled the rural districts, through the medium of co-operative societies, to introduce socialism even under capitalism without the conquest of power by the proletariat, without the dictatorship of the proletariat and without the leadership of the peasant masses by the proletariat. For Lenin's criticism of this programme, see Lenin's articles *Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism* and *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*, in this volume, and the article *Peasants and Workers in Selected Works*, Vol. VI. Lenin always pointed out that the abolition of private property in land and its conversion into "public property," as contained in the Socialist-Revolutionary programme, expressed the revolutionary strivings of the peasantry to abolish landlordism and the remnants of feudalism; he described the dream of achieving socialism by means of equal land tenure and the development of co-operation under capitalism, without the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership

of the masses of the peasants by the proletariat, as "petty-bourgeois socialism." This Socialist-Revolutionary socialism expressed the strivings of the rural small proprietors, not for socialism, but for the consolidation, growth and perpetuation of individual farming and in practice would have served the purpose of consolidating and developing the rural bourgeoisie at the expense of the peasant masses. Indeed, it was under the cloak of "socialising the land" that the Socialist-Revolutionaries desired to strengthen the position of the kulaks in 1917, that the majority of them became open champions of the interests of the kulaks and the urban bourgeoisie in opposition to the proletariat and the toiling masses of the countryside. (For further details, see Lenin's articles *How and Why the Peasants Were Deceived*, *Peasants and Workers* and *Another Deception of the Peasants by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party*, in *Selected Works*, Vol. VI.) In 1917, the masses of the peasants in the 242 instructions they gave to their representatives at the First Congress of Peasant Deputies expressed the demand for the abolition of private property in land, the transference of the land to the whole of the people and its equal distribution among the peasants. When the proletariat, led by Lenin's party, took power in its hands, Lenin and the Party secured the adoption, at the Second Congress of Soviets, of a decree which embodied all the demands of the peasantry on the agrarian question; in order to strengthen the alliance between the proletariat and the rural poor and to neutralise the middle peasants, they conceded to the masses of the peasantry on the question of equal land tenure. The abolition of private property in land and the conversion of the land into public property was equivalent to the nationalisation of the land, which was essential for the proletariat as one of the bases of socialist construction and as a step towards socialism. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the working class and its party, the poor peasantry and the middle peasants would become convinced by their own experience of the barrenness of so-called equal land tenure. This was the line Lenin took, and things turned out as he had predicted. This is proved by the tremendous success of the collectivisation of agriculture and the liquidation of the kulaks as a class in the Soviet Union. For further details concerning the concession made to the masses of the peasants on the question of equal land tenure and concerning the significance of the decree adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets embodying the 242 instructions of the peasants to their deputies, see Lenin's *Report on the Land Question* in *Selected Works*, Vol. VI, and the pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, included in *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, chap. entitled "Servility Towards the Bourgeoisie in the Guise of Economic Analysis."

PAGE 148.\* Both in the period of the old *Iskra* and in the period of the first Russian revolution, Lenin not only fought against the opportunist tendencies of Social-Democracy but also against the Narodniki, as represented

by the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. In 1905 the Socialist-Revolutionaries enjoyed great popularity among the petty-bourgeois intellectuals in town and country. They conducted a certain amount of work among the masses, but it is noteworthy that their influence was evident only in the regions where there were mass movements of the peasantry, while it was inconsiderable among the workers. They had some influence among the workers mainly in those places where the Social-Democratic organisation, and particularly its revolutionary Bolshevik wing, was weak. While the Mensheviks strove to subordinate the working class movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie and in fact were objectively the agents of the bourgeoisie within the working class, the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to submerge the working class movement in the peasant movement and to undermine the hegemony of the proletariat over the peasantry. Thus, objectively, they tried to subordinate the peasant movement to the leadership of the bourgeoisie, for, deprived of the leadership of the proletariat, the peasant movement was bound to go over to the bourgeoisie. Hence, in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for the leadership of the peasantry, to which Lenin attached tremendous importance, the Socialist-Revolutionaries acted as the agents of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, although a typical, petty-bourgeois, democratic party in a peasant country, the Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to invest their petty-bourgeois democracy with the attributes of socialism, a socialism robbed of all class and proletarian content. For the working class they substituted the "toiling people" and the "toiling class" in general, in which they included without distinction the workers, the "toiling peasantry" and the "toiling intellectuals." Having no clear conception of the class content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and of the socialist revolution, they confused the one with the other, and during the first Russian revolution, they regarded the bourgeois-democratic peasant movement and the labour movement as being equally socialist movements. They strove to transform the peasant struggle for land and for the re-division of the land into a movement for declaring the land "national property" and for its *equal distribution* among the "toilers"; and this they called "the socialisation of the land." The chief aim of Lenin's struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionaries was to expose to the working class the petty-bourgeois nature of their "socialism." At the same time, he pointed out that since this petty-bourgeois democracy, which was concealed beneath socialist phrases, was directed against the landlords and the landlord autocracy, it was of positive revolutionary value.

In 1905, Lenin wrote a number of articles on the Socialist-Revolutionaries, one of the most important of which is the present article, *Petty-Bourgeois and Proletarian Socialism*. In this article he draws a very clear and precise distinction between a proletarian and genuinely socialist party and a petty-bourgeois democratic party which conceals its true character by means of socialist phraseology. This article was first published in the ille-

gal organ of the Party, *Proletary* (No. 24, Nov. 7 [Oct. 25], 1905), and later in *Novaya Zhizn* (No. 9, Nov. 23 [10], 1905), i.e., at the very height of the mass revolutionary struggle, when the Party openly came before vast masses and when it was particularly necessary to dissociate proletarian socialism from petty-bourgeois socialist phraseology.

PAGE 149.\* In 1902, a wave of revolutionary peasant uprisings swept over Russia, particularly in the South, where the already bad conditions of the peasants were made desperate by a severe failure of the crops. There were 340 separate uprisings in the spring of that year and over one hundred estates were destroyed in the Kharkov and Poltava gubernias alone.

PAGE 154.\* V. V. (V. P. Vorontsov) and N—on (N. F. Danielson) were prominent Narodnik writers of the 'eighties and 'nineties. *The Destiny of Capitalism in Russia* appeared in 1882 and the *Outlines of Post-Reform Economy in Russia* in 1893. In spite of the long interval that elapsed between the appearance of these works and certain differences in their points of view, the purpose of both was to prove that capitalism in Russia had no future.

PAGE 157.\* *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-07*, was written in 1907 under the title, *The Agrarian Question in the First Russian Revolution*, but was confiscated by the government while still in the press. It appeared again in 1917 under the title now given. It gives the fullest exposition made by Lenin of his views on what should be the agrarian programme of the proletarian party in a bourgeois-democratic revolution and the theoretical and political justification of the demand for the nationalisation of the land as the fundamental programme of demands for that revolution in Russia. The Leninist programme of land nationalisation was clearly linked up with the strategy and tactics of the armed uprising, the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a revolutionary government, the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry and the transition of the bourgeois revolution to socialist revolution. Even the Mensheviks fully understood the close connection that existed between the Bolsheviks' agrarian programme and their tactics. At the Fourth Party Congress in Stockholm, Plekhanov declared that Lenin's idea of land nationalisation was closely bound up with his idea of "seizure of power." (This is how Plekhanov described the slogan, "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.") In Lenin's opinion, the demand for land nationalisation, like all the other slogans of the proletarian party that he proposed for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, was to serve but one basic aim: to clear the path for the proletarian class struggle for its final goal.

By completely destroying the vestiges of feudalism in the rural districts, by destroying the semi-feudal landlord—the common foe of all the social groups in the countryside—by unmasking the capitalist exploitation

of the countryside by the bourgeoisie in general and by the rural bourgeoisie in particular, and by bringing the rural poor face to face with the bourgeoisie, land nationalisation would clear the path for the widest possible development of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie in the rural districts. In this way it would help to unite the rural poor with the proletariat and, consequently, would facilitate the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, the transformation of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry into the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the process of this transformation, land nationalisation would become transformed from a condition for the decisive victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a condition for the victory of the socialist revolution. In a postscript to the 1917 edition of *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution*, written on the eve of the October Revolution, when the transition from a bourgeois-democratic to a socialist revolution was placed on the order of the day, Lenin wrote: "Under such conditions, land nationalisation must also inevitably be presented in a new way in the agrarian programme. Nationalisation of the land is not only the 'last word' of a bourgeois revolution, but it is a step towards socialism." (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Book I, p. 269.)

This work is not given in full in the present volume. Chapters III and V have been omitted. Chapter III, "The Theoretical Foundations of Nationalisation and Municipalisation," contains, in the main, an exposition of the theoretical and economic grounds for land nationalisation, and in particular, a criticism of the Menshevik P. Maslov's "theory" of rent, which served as the foundation for the Menshevik municipalisation programme and was one of the various forms of the revision of the Marxian theory on the agrarian question. Lenin's criticism of revisionism in Russia as well as in Western Europe will be found in a number of articles included in Volume XII in *Selected Works*, which also contains chapter III of *The Agrarian Programme, etc.*, here omitted. Chapter V of this work, "Classes and Parties in the Debates in the Second Duma on the Agrarian Question," omitted here owing to lack of space, is a valuable piece of historical research work in which, using the debates in the Duma, a description of the position taken by the various parties on the peasant question is given.

PAGE 166.\* The figures quoted by Lenin in the preceding pages show that the predominant form of landed property in tsarist Russia was the large estate. But in a number of regions it was not the capitalist form of agriculture (cultivation by means of wage labour) that prevailed on the large estates, but semi-feudal, bondage forms, based on labour rent. The landlords' estates were cultivated by the peasants who used their own implements. The peasants performed this work in part payment for the land they rented from the landlords and also in payment for the use of pastures, the repayment of loans, etc. This system prevailed in seventeen

gubernias, while in seven more gubernias it existed side by side with pure capitalist forms, the latter predominating in nineteen gubernias. Lenin calls this system of farming the "otrabotochni" system, from the word "otrabotki," meaning to pay in work, and he maintains that it is a survival of the system that prevailed under serfdom known as "barshchina," or the *corvée* system, which Marx termed labour rent. (See *Capital*, Vol. III, chap. XLVII, "The Genesis of Capitalist Ground-Rent." Lenin deals more fully with this in *The Agrarian Question in Russia*, etc. and in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, in Vol. I of *Selected Works*.)

PAGE 167.\* The agrarian programme of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (commonly known as Cadets) advocated enlarging the peasants' holdings at the expense of lands belonging to the state, the monasteries and also the large landlords, "by compensating the present holders at a fair (not at market) price." In other words, it favoured a repetition of the Reform of 1861.

Lenin described the class nature of this programme in the following words:

"The Cadet agrarian programme is, in essence, a landlord's programme. The Cadets' 'compulsory alienation' of land means that the landlords will compel the peasants to purchase their land at a ruinous price because the amount of compensation and taxation will be determined by the landlords: in the localities the landlords, together with the officials, will predominate in the 'land committees' (in the first Duma the Cadets objected to these committees being elected by universal suffrage), while in the central, all-Russian legislature they will control the State Council, etc. The 'liberalism' of the Cadets is the liberalism of the bourgeois lawyer, who makes peace between the peasant and the landlord, the peace being in favour of the landlord."

On another occasion, Lenin explains the kind of landlord he had in view when describing the Cadet agrarian programme as a landlord's programme. "The agrarian bill introduced by the Cadets is, in essence, the plan of the capitalist landlord," who wishes to preserve landlordism "by divesting it of some of its feudal features, by ruining the peasant through compensation payments and placing him in bondage to the officials."

PAGE 174.\* *Bez Zaglaviya* (*Without a Title*), the name of a weekly magazine published by a group of writers who regarded themselves as "critical socialists," i.e., opportunists. In fact they were more Right than the European revisionists and akin to the Cadets. S. Prokopovich and E. Kuskova (authors of the notorious *Credo*) were the leaders of this group. Their daily paper was *Tovarishch*, which was a mere echo of the Cadet organ *Rech* (*Speech*).

PAGE 175.\* By grouping all private landed estates of over fifty dessiatins in one category, as Prokopovich did, the whole question of the two types of

large estates—capitalist and feudal—was confused and the main question of the revolution, namely, the eradication of the relics of feudalism, the basis for which was the large estates run on feudal lines, was evaded. (See note to page 166.)

PAGE 176.\* The speeches of the peasant deputies in the three Dumas completely confirmed the correctness of Lenin's agrarian programme. When the liberal, Cadet deputies spoke on the agrarian question they tried to defend landlordism, but the peasant deputies, even those who belonged to the Right in their political views, spoke in the language of revolutionaries whenever the question of land was discussed. Thus, the Right peasant deputy, Petrochenko, began his speech by declaring that he would "defend the tsar and the 'fatherland' to the last drop of his blood," but wound up by stating that "the land will have to be handed over to us." A number of deputies even declared outright that they were opposed to private property in land, that the land should be common property. They said that the peasants would willingly pool their lands in a common fund, since, if the estates of the large landlords were confiscated, the peasants were bound to receive more and better land when it was re-distributed.

PAGE 177.\* G. A. Alexinsky, member of the Second Duma, at that time a Bolshevik, subsequently became a monarchist counter-revolutionary. In the speech referred to, the outline of which was drawn up by Lenin, he cited figures demonstrating that the government was primarily an instrument of the landlords for the oppression of the peasants and that, furthermore, the bulk of the expenditure on administration went into the pockets of the big landlords. He pointed out that twenty-eight high dignitaries, members of the State Council, received among them one million rubles annually in various forms such as travelling expenses, grants, etc.

PAGE 177.\*\* Allotment lands were lands belonging to the village commune and apportioned out by them for use among the members of the commune. This form of land tenure was a survival of serfdom when "attaching the toiler to the land, allotting land to him, served as a means of exploitation." (Lenin.) At that time, the right of allotting land belonged to the landlord and permitted the exaction by him of dues in labour and kind (forced labour, labour rent, etc.). In this respect the position of the peasants improved very little after the Reform of 1861, since the allotment of land was combined with the whole village commune being made jointly responsible for the compensation payments due to the landlords for the land they had "received" when they were "emancipated," for the payment of taxes and dues to the state, *i.e.*, it again served the purposes of bondage and exploitation. Non-allotment land, to which Lenin refers, comprised land that was acquired as private property, or rented, mainly by the rich peasants and kulaks. This form of landownership marked the development of capitalist forms in agriculture and led to the gradual decrease in the

importance of the allotment land and to the increase of the importance of non-allotment land in the development of agriculture.

PAGE 180.\* The bourgeois development of agriculture in Prussia in many respects resembled that in pre-revolutionary Russia. The abolition of the feudal system in Prussia was the direct result of the French Revolution. Just as in Russia in 1861, so in Prussia, the "emancipation" of the serfs was effected from above and was the work of the landlords themselves, who extorted huge sums from the peasants in return for release from the multifarious feudal dues and impositions. As a result, the peasants, with the exception of a few rich members of that class, were left impoverished and landless. The plundering of the peasants, the forcible seizure of their lands, the vast compensation payments exacted, accompanied by the creation of a supply of cheap free labour, furnished the stimulus for the transformation of the large estates from feudal into capitalist enterprises, although pre-capitalist forms of exploitation in the form of labour rent continued to exist.

In America, however, the capitalist development of agriculture assumed a different form. The starting point of this development in America was peasant farming unimpeded by the yoke of landlordism, and agriculture, as a result, developed into free, capitalist farming. This is due to the fact that America did not pass through the serf period of the feudal landlord and serf peasant. It must be observed, however, that the development was not identical in all parts of America. The North, for example, developed early and there was a complete absence of landlordism, with the result that agriculture assumed capitalist features sooner than in other parts of the country. In the South, great estates and plantations grew up on the basis of slave labour. But slavery was inimical to the development of capitalism, which demands a supply of free labour, and the defeat of the South by the North in the Civil War resulted in the abolition of slavery and the division of the large plantations into small units. The West was a vast unsettled territory. The Homestead Act of 1862 offered free land to settlers with the object of accelerating the opening up of the West.

These three circumstances—the absence of feudal landlord farming, the abolition of slavery and the Homestead Act—furnished a powerful stimulus to the development of capitalist forms of agriculture in America.

PAGE 184.\* The Stolypin programme consisted of a series of enactments issued in the period from August to November 1906, after the Duma had been dispersed. (Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws permitted the government to issue enactments without the sanction of the Duma, if the latter were not in session.) These enactments provided for: 1) the transfer of part of the lands belonging to the imperial family to the Peasants' Bank for the purpose of re-sale to the peasants; 2) the transfer of part of the state lands for the same purpose; 3) the release of certain peasants from

dependence on the village communes; the peasants were given the right to leave the communes, acquire their allotment lands as their own private property and to dispose of the same at their own discretion; 4) the granting of loans by the Peasants' Bank on the security of such lands. The political purpose of these laws was to create a strong class of rich, property-owning kulaks as a bulwark against the revolutionary tendencies in the countryside.

PAGE 185.\* This refers to the following clause in the Agrarian Reform Bill introduced in the First Duma by the Cadets: "The alienated land is to be placed in the state land reserve fund. The principles upon which these lands are to be distributed to those of the population in need of them shall be determined in accordance with the special features of landownership and land tenure in the various Duma regions of Russia." In the bill the Cadets introduced in the Second Duma, this clause was omitted.

PAGE 187.\* In the article, *Grants, Not Compensation*, the Trudovik, Glebov, opposed the payment of compensation for the land on the grounds that there could be no property right in land. He wrote: "There can be no right of property in land and so it is of no use talking about paying compensation for the land." But Glebov did not logically apply his views to all landlords, for he went on to say that those who would "suffer" as a result of the alienation of the land should be "pitied" and a "small sum ought to be paid them." But this, in his opinion, would not be compensation, but relief, "such as is given to the victims of famine, fire or earthquake," and this relief was not to be given to those "who had millions in the bank."

PAGE 192.\* Gurko and Lidval methods, *i.e.*, embezzlement of state funds. Gurko was Vice-Minister for Home Affairs under Stolypin; Lidval was a capitalist. Both were involved in a shady affair connected with the distribution of supplies.

PAGE 197.\* Lenin's pamphlet, *A Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*, appeared on the eve of the Fourth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (spring of 1906). It contains a review of the basic problems of the agrarian programme that were to be discussed at the Fourth Congress. It briefly analyses the agrarian programme of the "Emancipation of Labour" group of 1885, deals with the shortcomings of the agrarian programme adopted by the Second Party Congress, criticises the municipalisation of the land proposed by the Mensheviks and advocates the programme submitted by Lenin to the Fourth Congress. (See note to page 200.\*) This pamphlet formed in substance the speech Lenin delivered at the Stockholm Congress. The speech was, therefore, not recorded in the minutes of the Congress, which merely contain a note to the effect that Lenin advocated the point of view set

forth in his pamphlet, *A Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party*.

PAGE 197.\*\* The abstract and detached nature of this programme is shown by the fact that it contains no reference to the class antagonisms in the countryside. "By an agrarian programme," says Lenin, "we mean the laying down of the guiding principles for a Social-Democratic policy in the agrarian question, i.e., in relation to agriculture and the various classes, strata and groups of the rural population." Nothing of that was contained in the programme of the "Emancipation of Labour" group. The only concrete demand in that programme—the right of the peasant to surrender his allotted land and to leave the village commune—was actually put into practice by the Stolypin government. The programme was also unsatisfactory in the part which demanded a radical revision of agrarian relations, since by this term it meant merely a revision "of the conditions of buying out land and allotting it to the peasant communes." Similar demands were to be found in the agrarian programmes of the Russian liberals and even of the Cadets.

PAGE 198.\* The chief author of that agrarian programme of 1903 was Lenin.

PAGE 200.\* The agrarian programme adopted by the Stockholm "Unity" Congress was a Menshevik programme. Its main demand was the confiscation of the lands belonging to the landlords, the monasteries and to the imperial family, and their transfer, together with the state lands, to the control of local government authorities of large territorial units embracing urban and rural districts. There was, however, no unity or consistency in this programme of municipalisation. For instance, in addition to the general demand for municipalisation, it also contained a demand for the nationalisation of "the land reserved for colonisation, as well as of forests and waters of national importance," but the lands belonging to the peasants were to be neither municipalised nor nationalised. It finally provided, if worst came to worst ("in the event of unfavourable circumstances"), for the dividing up among the peasants of the estates of the landlords on which small-scale farming was actually being conducted, or such meadow land, grass land and forest land as was required for the carrying on of small-scale farming. The programme wound up with a clause on tactics, taken in its entirety from Lenin's draft, which read: "the Party, in all circumstances and whatever the state of the democratic agrarian reforms may be, strives to secure the independent class organisation of the rural proletariat, and to explain to the latter the irreconcilable antagonism of interests between itself and the peasant bourgeoisie, to warn it against being deluded by the system of small-scale economy, which under the commodity system of production is never able to abolish the poverty of the masses and, finally, to point to the need for a complete socialist revolution, as the only means of abolishing all poverty and all exploitation."

The agrarian reform advocated by Lenin at the Unity Congress also demanded, as a first step toward the agrarian revolution, the confiscation of all lands belonging to the landlords, the church, the monasteries and the imperial family, but instead of the municipalisation programme of the Mensheviks, it demanded: 1) the establishment of peasant committees which were to abolish all relics of the power and privilege of the landlords and were actually to administer all confiscated lands until such time as a national constituent assembly should introduce new land legislation, and 2) that, in the event of a decisive triumph of the revolution in Russia which would secure the complete sovereignty of the people, the Party should work for the nationalisation of the whole of the land. This last demand was alternately expressed in the formulations: 1) "the Party will work for the abolition of private property in land and the transfer of all lands to the common ownership of all the people"; 2) "the Party will support all the efforts of the revolutionary peasantry to secure the abolition of private property in land and will strive for the transfer of all land to state ownership." By this second formula, Lenin wanted to emphasise that his programme did not force nationalisation upon the peasantry against their will.

PAGE 200.\*\* Lenin refers to the following passage in Plekhanov's speech at the Fourth Congress of the Party in the debate on the agrarian programme:

"Many of our comrades supported the point about the *otrezki* [i.e., about returning the *otrezki* to the peasants—Ed.], because they feared the peasant agrarian revolution. It would have put a stop to the development of capitalism in Russia. The mistake we made was that, even at that time, our programme did not go as far in its demands as the peasantry. Even in the summer of 1903, at the time of the Second Congress, Obolensky in the South of Russia tortured the peasants because they advanced a radical agrarian programme. Now we must understand that we must not be afraid of the radicalism of the peasants on the agrarian question."

PAGE 202.\* Vendée, the uprising of the peasants in the province of Vendée against the revolutionary government during the French Revolution of 1789-93. Vendée was one of the most backward provinces of France with practically no industrial development whatever. The overwhelming majority of the population consisted of small peasant proprietors and tenant farmers. There were very few large estates, even the estates of most of the nobles were relatively small, so that the distinction between the peasants and the nobles was not extreme and the relics of feudalism were not so marked as in other districts. The revolution had therefore very little to offer to the peasants, while great hardships were laid on them by the increased taxation, the heavy drafting of recruits into the army, the buying up by the city bourgeoisie of confiscated church lands,

etc. The discontent caused by these burdens was fanned into revolt by the priests and refugee nobles from other provinces. The uprising flared up in March 1793, and for a time was successful; a number of towns were captured by the counter-revolutionaries and they advanced on Paris with the definite purpose of restoring the monarchy. However, the rebellion was crushed in December of that year; but the last remnants of the movement were finally crushed only in 1796.

PAGE 202.\*\* Lenin refers to the first draft of an agrarian programme drawn up by Maslov on the eve of the Second Congress and signed "X." His second draft, the full municipalisation programme, was published before the Fourth Congress. The first programme stated that the Social-Democratic Party "strives to secure in the near future that a part of the privately owned lands (the large estates) and, if possible, the whole of the land, be placed under the control of large, local government bodies (Zemstvos)." The second programme omitted the words "and, if possible, the whole of the land" and the word "Zemstvos."

PAGE 203.\* The All-Russian Peasant Union was organised in 1905, as a counter-move to an attempt by some Black Hundred landlords in the Moscow Gubernia to rouse "public opinion" among the peasants in favour of the autocracy. With the aid of the priests and the police, the landlords tried to compel the peasants at their village meetings to pass resolutions asserting the "immutability of the foundations" of the system of society based on the rule of the landlords and police. These attempts having failed, a group of peasants brought forward the idea of forming a peasant union as a counter-move. The inaugural meeting of the union took place in August 1905, and was attended by over a hundred peasants from twenty-two gubernias and twenty-five representatives of the intelligentsia. The overwhelming majority of the members were small proprietors, and this, as well as the type of leaders that led the movement, left its mark of petty-bourgeois vacillation and indecision on all the actions of the Union. It advanced a number of political demands, such as freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom to strike, etc., political amnesty and the convocation of a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot, but its main attention was concentrated on the land problem. For the solution of the latter it advocated: 1) the abolition of private property in land and 2) the transfer to the peasants, without compensation, of all the lands of the monasteries, imperial family and the state. In November 1905, the Union called upon its members and upon the peasantry generally: 1) not to buy or lease land from the landlords; 2) to organise agricultural strikes by withdrawing labour from the large estates; 3) to refuse to pay taxes, and 4) as an extreme measure, a general popular uprising. The Union also insisted on the boycott of the Bulygin Duma, declared those who took part in the elections to that Duma to be enemies of the people, and an-

nounced that when it came into power, the people would repudiate all loans contracted by the government after November 1905. Nevertheless, these demands were put forward in a half-hearted manner and later the Union resolved that only part of the landlords' lands should be confiscated without compensation and that compensation should be paid for the other part. At its congresses speeches were made to the effect that the landlords could not be doomed to die of starvation. It is characteristic also that the Union paid no attention to the condition of the agricultural labourers.

By the end of 1906 the influence of the Peasant Union had declined and its place was taken by the Trudovik group. Most of the members of the leading bodies of the Union were arrested in November 1905. Although reflecting the petty-bourgeois illusions and vacillations of the peasants, the Union was nevertheless a mass organisation which tried to give form to the fight of the peasants against the feudal nobility.

PAGE 205.\* Maslov here refers to the support given by the majority of the French peasantry to Louis Napoleon, who after the Revolution of 1848 was, with their support, elected President of the French Republic and later became Emperor of France. But like all Menshevik citations from history brought against Lenin's programme of land nationalisation, Maslov's citation is beside the mark, for he leaves out of account the profound difference between the position of the French peasantry in 1848 and that of the Russian peasantry in 1905-07. In Russia, the predominant form of land-ownership was that of the big landlord estates, while in France, the predominant form was small peasant ownership. In Russia, the peasants suffered from, and were fighting to throw off the yoke of the semi-feudal landlords and to destroy the survivals of serfdom. In France, the vestiges of feudalism were swept away, in the main, as early as 1789-93 and the place of the semi-feudal landlords and their yoke over the countryside was taken by the yoke of capital, of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state. Lacking connection with the proletariat and its leadership, the small peasantry could not yet seek emancipation in the common fight with the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. And the majority of that peasantry (unlike the minority, which went against Napoleon) looked for emancipation in a Napoleonic monarchy, not suspecting that this monarchy was nothing but the worst form of bourgeois rule. For the bourgeoisie had placed Napoleon in power in order to strangle the proletariat which in the Revolution of 1848 had made a first attempt to seize political power. Of course, the peasants who had placed their hopes in Napoleon were cruelly deceived.

A classic description of the situation in France after the Revolution of 1848, of the Napoleonic monarchy, of the relation of the class forces in that period and the attitude of the peasantry towards Napoleon is given by Karl Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*,

PAGE 206.\* The Land Bill introduced into the First Duma by the Trudoviki in June 1906, and backed by 104 deputies, may be summed up as follows: the whole of the land must belong to the people and be placed in a national land fund consisting of the lands of the monasteries, the imperial family and the state, as well as of the landlords' estates and other privately owned lands if the size of the property exceeded a certain "labour" scale, i.e., a scale not exceeding an area capable of being worked by the peasant and his family. The allotment lands, i.e., lands that were allotted to the peasants at the time of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, and all privately owned land below the above scale, were to remain in the possession of their present holders, but the accumulation of landed property in single hands exceeding that scale was not to be allowed. Compensation to the landowners, when land was taken, was to be paid by the state. The Bill did not propose the abolition of private property in land; it aimed at the destruction of the large landed estates. The carrying out of the reform and the determination of the amount of compensation to be paid to the owners was to be entrusted to local land committees to be elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot. The same bill was introduced in the Second Duma by ninety-nine Trudoviki, but the last point was deleted.

PAGE 212.\* The Bill of the "33" was introduced in the First Duma by thirty-three members of the Trudovik group. In this bill it was definitely stated that all private property in land was to be abolished. It, moreover, made no provision for the payment of compensation for the large estates which were to be taken over by the state. It showed its distrust of the Duma by declaring that the land laws could be enacted only by a fully competent Duma elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, under conditions of complete freedom of elections and after the reform had been discussed all over the country under similar conditions of freedom. One of the main points in this bill was the demand for the equal distribution of the land with the aim of "abolishing" the distinction between rich and poor.

"This is a socialist aim," said Lenin. "All Socialists want this. But there are different kinds of socialism. There is even such a thing as clerical socialism, there is petty-bourgeois socialism and there is proletarian socialism. Petty-bourgeois socialism represents the dreams of the small proprietor about abolishing the distinction between rich and poor! Petty-bourgeois socialism assumes that it is possible to make all people equal property owners, so that there will be neither rich nor poor. Petty-bourgeois socialism drafts bills providing for the universal, equal use of the land. But as a matter of fact, it is impossible to abolish the distinction between poor and rich in the way in which the small proprietor wishes to do. There can be no equal use of the land as long as the power of money, the power of capital exists. No law on earth can abolish inequality and exploitation as long as production for the market, the power of money, the power of capital exists. Only the organisation of large-scale, social, planned production and the transfer of all the land, the factories

and tools to the working class can put an end to all exploitation. Proletarian socialism (Marxism), therefore, exposes all the unfounded hopes of petty-bourgeois socialism: that 'equal' small-scale economy, or that even the survival of small-scale economy is possible under capitalism. The class conscious proletariat exerts every effort to support the peasant struggle for the whole of the land and for complete liberty, but it warns the peasants against all illusory hopes." (*The Land Question and the Struggle for Liberty, Collected Works, Russian ed., Vol. IX.*)

PAGE 216.\* The English Enclosure Acts of the eighteenth century played an exceptional role in driving the English peasants from the land. These acts permitted the lord of the manor to seize and enclose the common lands for his own use. But these acts only "legalised" a process that had been going on ever since the thirteenth century, and particularly since the fifteenth century, when the growing woollen textile industry stimulated the demand for wool and the landlords simply seized the common lands and enclosed them for sheep pastures. After the passing of the Enclosure Acts, this plundering of the peasant assumed especially large proportions. Large numbers of peasants, evicted from their land, were doomed to starvation. A detailed description of this expropriation of the land of the rural population in England is given by Marx in *Capital*, Vol. I, Part VIII, chap. XXVII, Sonnenschein ed.

PAGE 217.\* The Anti-Rent movement in the U.S.A. during the forties of the last century, fostered by the so-called "National Reformers," demanded that all land be declared the property of the nation and its sale and purchase prohibited and, furthermore, that the land be allotted to farmers in equal areas of 160 acres. Hermann Kriege, once a colleague of Marx and who later emigrated to America, wrote a series of articles on this subject in the *People's Tribune*, which he founded. But he not only failed to expose the bourgeois character of the solution of the agrarian problem proposed by the "National Reformers," but even lauded it as a means which "will put an end to poverty in America at one stroke." (See article by Lenin, *Marx on the American "Black Redistribution"* in *Marx-Engels-Marxism.*)

PAGE 219.\* The Peasant Land Bank was formed in 1882. The Bank acquired exceptional importance after the 1905 Revolution in connection with Stolypin's agrarian reform. (See note to page 184.) Stolypin's policy was to set up a class of well-to-do peasant proprietors to serve as a bulwark for the autocracy against the revolutionary tendencies of the poor peasants. This was facilitated by the activities of the Bank. The Bank: 1) bought the land from the landlords and sold it in small lots to the peasants; 2) granted credits to the peasants for the purchase of land direct from the landlords, and 3) opened credits on the security of the purchased land, as well as on the security of allotment land, which under Stolypin's enactment could be sold and mortgaged. In accordance

with the function it was to perform, the Bank granted more favourable terms to peasants who withdrew from the village communes and set up as individual owners, as compared with the terms granted to the village communes which desired to purchase land collectively for peasants who formed associations for this purpose. The manner in which the Bank served the interests of the landlords and not those of the peasants can be seen from the following: when purchasing land from the peasants it paid them 64 rubles per dessiatin as against 121 rubles per dessiatin when purchasing land from the landlords. When selling land to the peasants it demanded 172 rubles per dessiatin, whereas the same land could be bought in the open market at 132 rubles per dessiatin.

PAGE 222.\* Lenin employs this word in order to bring out more strongly the manner in which the commune allotment lands served to confine the peasant to his village commune, just as the Jews were confined to the ghetto. In Europe in the Middle Ages the Jews were permitted to reside only in a certain quarter of the town. In Russia, right up to the February Revolution, the Jews were permitted to reside only in the border countries, Poland, Lithuania and certain parts of the Ukraine. This was called the "pale of settlement" or "ghetto." Certain exemptions from this law were given to rich Jews and those who had a university education.

PAGE 229.\* This refers to a group of Bolsheviks who, particularly at the Fourth Congress, as opposed to the Menshevik programme of municipalisation of the land and the Leninist programme of nationalisation, advocated that the land should be divided up as the private property of the peasants, with the exception of forests, mines, etc., which were to remain in the possession of the democratic state, and of lands which could be employed for public purposes by local government bodies. At the Fourth Congress Lenin declared that dividing up the land "is a mistake, but not a harmful one" and he and his supporters voted for that policy in order not to split the vote against municipalisation. The decisive thing for Lenin was that the advocates of division of the land thrust upon the peasantry the slogan of private property in land when as a matter of fact the peasants themselves were inclined towards the nationalisation of the land. He urged that the sympathies of the peasantry for nationalisation should be utilised for the purpose of transforming the slogan of nationalisation into a fighting slogan in order to secure a decisive victory of the revolution, i.e., for the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Even during the first revolution Lenin regarded the nationalisation of the land not only as the consummation of the bourgeois revolution, but also as the first blow at private property, something that "whets the appetite" of the proletariat and the semi-proletarian groups for the "socialisation of the whole of social production," and thus, in conjunction with the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the

proletariat, would assist in developing the class struggle so that the bourgeois-democratic revolution would grow into a socialist revolution.

Lenin reverts to the question of division of the land in chapter III of this work, which is omitted from this volume but which is included in Volume XII of *Selected Works*. In this chapter Lenin raises the question of what the attitude of the proletariat and its party should be towards the demand for the division of the land as private property if, after the bourgeois-democratic revolution has been achieved and after the land has been nationalised, such a demand is advanced by the "farmers" who will have emerged from the former revolutionary peasantry and who will have "renovated the whole system of agriculture." On this, Lenin says:

"The proletariat can and must support the militant bourgeoisie when the latter is conducting a really revolutionary fight against feudalism. But it is not the business of the proletariat to support the bourgeoisie when it is settling down. While it is beyond doubt that a victorious bourgeois revolution in Russia is impossible without the nationalisation of the land, it is still more beyond doubt that a subsequent turn towards 'division' is impossible without some 'restoration,' without a turn of the peasantry (or rather, of the future farmers) to the side of the counter-revolution. The proletariat will uphold revolutionary traditions against all such strivings and will not assist them."

PAGE 229.\*\* This refers to the series of Land Acts for Ireland passed by the British government at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. As a result of the frequent agrarian revolts that had broken out, the Gladstone government, in 1881, passed the Land Act by which tribunals were set up to fix rents for a period of fifteen years during which the tenant could not be evicted. This Land Act was followed by the Land Purchase Acts of 1885, 1891 and 1902, which authorised the granting of loans to tenants to enable them to purchase their holdings. The sums advanced were raised by means of public loans on which the purchaser of the land paid a fixed annual sum, known as annuities, in interest and repayment of principal. In this way £124,000,000 were raised, which went into the pockets of the landlords. Of course, these laws did not appease the land hunger of the Irish peasants or prevent them from sinking into poverty. Similar measures were passed after the suppression of the Irish Rebellion in 1921 which subsequently gave rise to the movement against the payment of the annuities initiated by De Valera.

PAGE 236.\* The principal argument advanced by Plekhanov at the Fourth Congress against the nationalisation of the land was "the absence of guarantees against restoration," i.e., restoration of the autocracy. He said: "The key to my position is that I draw attention to the possibility of restoration." He outlined his position in the following manner:

History shows that every revolution is followed by restoration. "The same may happen in our country, and our programme must be such that, if applied, may reduce the harm likely to accrue from restoration to a

minimum. Our programme must eliminate the economic foundation of tsarism; but land nationalisation carried out during the revolutionary period does not eliminate this foundation. The demand for nationalisation is, therefore, in my opinion, an anti-revolutionary demand. Lenin argues on the assumption that when the republic for which he is striving is established it will last forever, and that is exactly where he is mistaken."

Plekhanov categorically declared that the nationalisation of the land was harmful and that "in order to render nationalisation innocuous it is necessary to find guarantees against restoration; but no such guarantees exist."

Lenin replied to Plekhanov in the following manner:

"If we are to speak of a real, fully effective, economic guarantee against restoration, i.e., a guarantee that would create such economic conditions as would make restoration out of the question, we must say that the only guarantee is a socialist revolution in the West; there can be no other guarantee in the real and full sense of the word at the present time.... If, however, we put the question of guarantees against restoration on another basis, if we are to speak of relative and conventional guarantees against restoration, we must say the following: the only conventional and relative guarantee against restoration we can have is to carry out the revolution in the most determined manner possible, that it be carried out directly by the revolutionary class, with the least possible participation of intermediaries, compromisers and sundry reconcilers, really to carry out this revolution to the end."

In a speech he delivered on the Unity Congress, Lenin, referring to this subject, said:

"Our 'guarantee against restoration,' I said, was to carry out the revolution to the end, and no compromise with reaction. And this is all my agrarian programme says; for it is entirely the programme of peasant revolt and the complete achievement of the bourgeois-democratic revolution."

In regarding the socialist revolution in the West as the only absolute guarantee against restoration, which would make restoration absolutely impossible, Lenin was of the opinion that, by carrying the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in 1905-07 to the very end, an impetus would be given to the socialist revolution in the West. In the section of the agrarian programme here referred to, Lenin adds to the arguments he used against Plekhanov new arguments based on the experience of events in the revolution that occurred after the Fourth Congress.

PAGE 238.\* Tseretelli, a Menshevik deputy in the Second Duma. In a speech which he delivered in the Duma on the agrarian question, he sharply opposed the demand put forward by the Socialist-Revolutionaries for the abolition of private property in land and frankly stated that his position was close to that taken by the Cadets on this question. Just as Plekhanov

and Maslov tried, at the Fourth Congress of the Party, to frighten the Bolsheviks with the spectre of restoration, so Tseretelli tried to frighten the Socialist-Revolutionaries with the bogey that the abolition of private property in land would give rise to "a frightful counter-revolutionary movement, to fratricidal war among the peasantry, a war of all against all," etc., etc. He also said that nationalisation of the land was alien to the Social-Democratic fraction. He said: "We refuse to place in the hands of the state this frightful power, this economic power over the whole of the population, the more so that, in the event of restoration, in the event of the representatives of the old order seizing political power in one form or another, we will, by this, have placed in the hands of the enemy of the people, who is striving to take from the people all the liberties it has won, a weapon with which to vanquish the people." He then went on to sing the praises of the municipalisation of the land, but in doing so he, in an un-Marxian way, spoke of the municipal bodies as if they were non-class bodies that would be able to pursue a policy in the interests of the whole of the people and would be "able to resist any attempt to restore the old order."

PAGE 242.\* "*Seryachok*," the "drab peasant," was the term applied by the representatives of the ruling classes to the peasantry. Lenin evidently refers to an article entitled *The "Seryachok" in the Duma*, published in the reactionary evening newspaper, *Russkoye Gosudarstvo (The Russian State)*, on March 31, 1906. In this article the author expressed satisfaction at the fact that a large number of peasants had been elected to the Duma and the wish that there had been fewer professors and lawyers, by which he meant the Cadets. He was sure that the *seryachok* would serve as a bulwark of the landlord system, that he was, above all, a "person with common sense, the brightest mind of rural life," and that "Russian society would not have to blush for him."

PAGE 242.\*\* The Law of December 24 (11), 1905, was the electoral law for the State Duma which was promulgated at the very time the Moscow uprising was at its height, in place of the electoral law on the basis of which the so-called Bulygin Duma was to have been elected. For details of these laws see notes to pages 12 and 13.\*

PAGE 242.\*\*\* The Electoral Law of June 16 (3), 1907, was promulgated by the Stolypin government simultaneously with the dissolution of the Second Duma. Stolypin presented the Duma with a demand for the expulsion of fifty-five members of the Social-Democratic fraction of the Duma and the arrest of sixteen of them. Without waiting for the Duma's reply, he proceeded to dissolve the latter and to arrest all the Social-Democratic deputies who happened to be in St. Petersburg. At the same time he promulgated a new electoral law, far more reactionary than its predecessor.

The new law curtailed the franchise of the peasants and workers and aimed at securing the predominance of the landlords and the bourgeoisie in the Duma; the representation of some of the borderlands (Poland, the Caucasus) was considerably reduced, while a large part of Asiatic Russia was altogether excluded. As a result, the Third Duma, which met in November of that year, consisted largely of Black Hundreds and Octobrists (the representatives of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie), and acted in accord with the government, which after the Revolution of 1905-07 pursued the policy of alliance between the autocracy, the landlords and the big bourgeoisie against the proletariat and the peasantry. This policy, in fact, was the class essence of the "*coup d'état* of June 3," as the promulgation of the new electoral law and the dissolution of the Duma was frequently called, particularly by Lenin.

The arrested Social-Democratic deputies were tried on the evidence of an *agent-provocateur* on the charge of forming an illegal military organisation and preparing for an armed uprising. Eight of the deputies were sentenced to five years' penal servitude, ten to four years, and ten to exile to Siberia.

PAGE 243.\* *The Man in the Muffler*, the title of a story by Chekhov, depicting a certain Belikov, a high school teacher of Greek, a timid, narrow-minded person who always wore a thick muffler, overcoat and overshoes in all weathers, warm or cold. Whenever anything of a liberal nature was permitted, he used to say: "That's all very well in its way, but I do hope it doesn't lead to trouble." Lenin applied this withering appellation, "man in the muffler," to Plekhanov, Maslov and other Mensheviks, who, like this teacher of Greek, used to repeat: "a peasant agrarian revolution is all very well in its way, of course, but I do hope it doesn't lead to trouble."

PAGE 249.\* Bimetallism, a monetary system in which gold and silver are concurrently used at a fixed ratio to each other as legal tender. By "agrarian bimetalism" Lenin means the ambiguity of the agrarian programme adopted by the Fourth Congress which permitted the simultaneous existence of two systems: private property for certain lands (that of the peasants) and municipal land, *i.e.*, public property, for other lands (those of the landlords, the monasteries, etc., that were to be municipalised).

PAGE 250.\* Lenin refers chiefly to the anti-Semitism of the Christian Socialists of Austria, Germany, etc., who were led by the landlords and the priests. While pretending to be Socialists, they in fact engaged in Jew-baiting and threw the blame for all the evils of capitalism upon the Jews. Thus they directly served the cause of capitalism by striving to divert the masses of the petty bourgeoisie and the backward strata of the proletariat from the struggle against capitalism.

PAGE 257.\* This is a passage from Chernyshevsky's *Outlines of the Gogol Period of Russian Literature* in which he pours ridicule on the cheap criticism employed by the literary critic Senkovsky. The point of the joke is that Chi! Chi! suggests the Russian transliteration of the sound of sneezing.

PAGE 258.\* This refers to the concluding part of the agrarian programme—dealing with tactics—that was adopted by the Stockholm Congress, which was taken in its entirety from Lenin's draft. (See note to page 200\* in which this passage is quoted in full.)

PAGE 264.\* Kautsky's article, *The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian Revolution*, appeared in *Die Neue Zeit*, the theoretical organ of the German Social-Democratic Party in issue No. 9-10 at the end of December 1906. In addition to the preface to the Russian edition of this article referred to here, Lenin, somewhat earlier, wrote a review of it entitled *The Proletariat and its Allies in the Russian Revolution*. In the preface and review, as well as in the present work on the agrarian programme, Lenin took advantage of Kautsky's temporary inclination towards the Bolshevik conception of the first Russian revolution, its driving forces and its prospects, in order to strike a blow at the Mensheviks, represented by Plekhanov. In his preface to the Russian edition of Kautsky's article, Lenin points out that Kautsky's article was a reply to an inquiry instituted by Plekhanov in which he put the following three points: 1) the general character of the Russian revolution; 2) the attitude of Social-Democracy towards bourgeois democracy, and 3) whether the Social-Democratic Party should support the opposition parties in the Duma elections, and Lenin goes on to say:

"In effect, Kautsky replied to Plekhanov by *rejecting* his method of presenting the question! Kautsky replied to Plekhanov by *correcting* his presentation of the question. . . . Kautsky writes that 'we must become accustomed to the idea that we are moving towards new situations and problems for which not a single one of the old stereotypes are suitable.' This is a very 'bull's-eye' at Plekhanov's question of whether our revolution is a bourgeois or a socialist revolution in character. This is the old stereotype, says Kautsky. The question cannot be put in this way; it is not the Marxian way. The revolution in Russia is not a bourgeois revolution, because the bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the present revolutionary movement in Russia. And the revolution in Russia is not a socialist revolution, because it *cannot under any circumstances* put the proletariat into *sole* power, or dictatorship. Social-Democracy can be victorious in the Russian revolution, and it *must* strive for victory. But the victory of the present revolution cannot be the victory of the proletariat alone without the aid of other classes. Which class, in view of the objective conditions of the present revolution, is the ally of the proletariat? The *peasantry*: a lasting community of interests during

the whole period of the revolutionary struggle exists only between the proletariat and the peasantry."

This brief but very distinct summary of the contents of Kautsky's article shows to what extent, under the influence of the events of the first Russian revolution and the Bolshevik appraisal of it, Kautsky approximated to the Bolshevik position at that time, although this was only temporary. The Bolshevik appraisal of the first Russian revolution was that it was a bourgeois-peasant revolution in social and economic content, but led by the proletariat; it was a proletarian revolution in the methods of struggle adopted, and in the event of its achieving a decisive victory under the leadership of the proletariat and its party, it would develop into a socialist revolution. Kautsky defined it as being "neither bourgeois nor socialist," and thus came very close to the Bolshevik appraisal of the driving forces of the revolution and of the significance of the agrarian peasant problem in the revolution. Lenin emphasised this and took advantage of it in the struggle against the Mensheviks, the more so that, not long before that time, in 1905, Kautsky had advised the Russian Social-Democrats and the Russian proletariat not to interfere in the struggle between the peasants and the landlords, to which Lenin had made a sharp reply in his article, *The Proletariat and the Peasantry* (March 1905). The fact that in 1906-07 Kautsky inclined towards the Bolshevik position on the question of the appraisal of the driving forces of the Russian revolution did not prevent him, in later years, during the period of reaction and the subsequent revival of the movement, from taking the side of the Mensheviks in the struggle for the new type of party that Lenin and the Bolsheviks waged. Kautsky's inclinations in 1906-07 were merely the oscillations of a centrist who, from leaving himself opportunist loopholes in his debates with Bernstein in the 'nineties, continuously moved forward into the marsh of reformism even before the imperialist war. (See Lenin's *State and Revolution*, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Book II and *Little Lenin Library*, chap. VI, part 2.)

PAGE 265.\* In his pamphlet, *The Social Revolution and the Morrow of the Social Revolution* (see note to page 15\*), which was written before experience had been gained from the 1905 Revolution and the December armed uprising in Moscow, Kautsky wrote: "We have no reason to suppose that *armed uprising*, barricade fighting and similar military episodes can play a decisive role now." But in 1906, in his preface to the second German edition of this pamphlet, written after the experience of the armed uprising in Moscow in December 1905, he wrote: "I cannot now assert with the assurance that I did formerly that armed uprising and barricade fighting will not play a decisive role in the coming revolution." He then goes on to say that the armed uprising in Moscow might have brought victory had the revolutionary movement been successful in other towns, because the population of Moscow strongly sup-

ported the revolutionaries, and the troops were completely demoralised, and he asks: "Who can say with certainty that the same thing will not happen in Western Europe?" And this hesitant approach to the position of the Bolsheviks on the question of armed uprising, of which Lenin took advantage in his fight against the Mensheviks, was only a centrist oscillation on the part of Kautsky who, as early as the nineties of the last century, surrendered the position to the opportunists on the question of violence and revolution, as well as on the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

PAGE 269.\* In a letter to Sorge, a German Socialist who had emigrated to America after the revolution in Germany in 1848, dated January 18, 1893, Engels refers to the Municipal Socialists, i.e., the members of the Fabian Society, as a "crew of careerists," and goes on to say that "their socialism is municipal socialism; not the nation but the *municipality* is to become the owner of the means of production, at any rate for the time being. This socialism of theirs is then represented as an extreme but inevitable consequence of bourgeois liberalism, and hence follow their tactics of not decisively fighting the liberals as adversaries but of pushing them on towards socialist conclusions and therefore of intriguing with them, of *permeating liberalism with socialism*, of not putting up socialist candidates against the liberals but of fastening them on to the liberals, forcing them upon them, or deceiving them into taking them. That in the course of this process they are either lied to and deceived themselves or else misrepresent socialism, they do not of course realise."

PAGE 277.\* *Pravda*, a magazine published in the period 1904-06. In 1905 it became the organ of the Mensheviks, edited by Maslov. In the February issue, 1905, Maslov published a letter by Kautsky in which he replied to the Mensheviks' request to express his attitude towards the question of the municipalisation of the land. The editor of the magazine prefaced Kautsky's letter with an editorial comment in which he stated: "Kautsky is of the opinion that municipalisation is the best form of landownership in Russia for the immediate future." This is what Lenin refers to when he speaks of the "Mensheviks indulging in self-advertisement at the expense of Kautsky," because, as can be seen from the passages from this letter and from the letter he wrote to Shanin, Kautsky expressed himself in favour of municipalisation conditionally—if the peasants agreed—and by municipalisation he did not mean what the Mensheviks meant. Kautsky did not have any definite opinion about the agrarian programme of the proletarian party in the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. As for nationalisation of the land, in his book *The Agrarian Problem*, published in 1899, he decidedly departs from Marxism, opposes the demand for the nationalisation of the land under capitalism and fails to understand the revolutionary significance of this demand as a first

blow against private property. This is the way the question was presented by Marx and later developed by Lenin.

PAGE 285.\* The magazine, *Zarya (The Dawn)*, No. 1, contained a satirical poem by Martov signed "Narcissus Tuporilov" (literally Narcissus Stupid Mug) and entitled *The Hymn of the Modern Russian Socialist*, which was a biting satire on the "tailism" of the Economists. The refrain of this "hymn" ran approximately as follows:

"With slow paces  
and shy zigzags  
march slowly forward  
workers!"

PAGE 289.\* This is the first of a series of articles written by Lenin on the situation in Russia immediately following Bloody Sunday (January 22 [9], 1905). The events of Bloody Sunday had an enormous effect in revolutionising the masses of the workers and brought the advanced sections close to the idea of armed revolution. In this and in subsequent articles, Lenin insistently pointed out that the preparation for an uprising and the arming of the people had become one of the most urgent tasks of the Social-Democrats. This slogan was kept to the fore by the Bolsheviks during the whole of 1905-06.

PAGE 293.\* The article, *Two Tactics*, deals with the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks on the fundamental question of the tactics to be adopted in the impending revolution, i.e., on the question of preparing and organising for an armed uprising. The Mensheviks having definitely rejected the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and subordinating the revolutionary struggle to the interests of the bourgeoisie, argued that if an armed uprising were to take place, it could take place only spontaneously and that preparation and arming were superfluous. On these grounds Lenin argued that, as a matter of fact, the Mensheviks were continuing, in the new conditions, the opportunist line of the "legal Marxists" and the "Economists."

PAGE 294.\* The theory of "a higher type of demonstration" was invented by the Menshevik *Iskra* and was set forth in a letter written in November 1904 to the Party organisation containing the "plan for a Zemstvo campaign," or, as Lenin described it, "a plan to influence our liberal Zemstvo members who are pleading for a constitution." Lenin subjected this plan to annihilating criticism in the pamphlet, *The Zemstvo Campaign and "Iskra's" Plan* (see Vol. II of *Selected Works*), to which *Iskra* replied with a second letter defending its plan and attacking Lenin. Bloody Sunday and the strike wave that succeeded it definitely put an end to this plan.

PAGE 297.\* Lenin has in mind an article entitled *Is This the Way We Shall Prepare?* in which Martov attacked the idea of preparing for insurrection. He puts the question: "What is the use of our Party talking about 'preparing for insurrection'?" And he replies: "We must regretfully state that purely utopian ideas are beginning to spread among our comrades on this question, and they threaten to take us very far from the groove of the proletarian class struggle. There is talk of 'preparing for insurrection,' in the sense of a *conspiracy*, of a fabricated, 'strictly secret insurrection,' similar to those fabricated by the French revolutionaries in the forties and sixties of the last century."

PAGE 299.\* This manifesto was printed in the name of the Party by workers of the Vasilyostrov district of St. Petersburg, who had seized a printing plant on the day after Bloody Sunday for this purpose.

PAGE 300.\* This refers to an article by F. Dan entitled *The Beginning of the Revolution* published in *Iskra*, No. 84, January 31 (18), 1905, unsigned. In this article Dan, like the Economists previously, on the pretext of fighting for the "purity" and "class" character of the labour movement, advocated the rejection of the task of organising and leading the incipient, open, revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. He put forward the very things that revealed the weakness and inadequacy of the Party leadership in the events of Bloody Sunday, as the strong points of the movement and urged these as arguments to prove that it was impossible to organise such a leadership properly. He wrote: "What a lesson this is to those utopians who believe in 'conspirative' organisations [meaning the Bolsheviks—*Ed.*], who think it possible in the name of habit and obedience, in the name of formal organisational 'discipline,' by means of the mechanical lever of 'agents,' to move a vast army of workers just as they please."

PAGE 303.\* The article, *The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie*, appeared in *Proletary*, No. 6, July 1905. It was written prior to *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* and roughly deals with the same subject, namely, the driving forces and prospects of the revolution. The particular act of servility which evoked the article was the delegation sent by the Conference of Municipal and Zemstvo Councillors to present a petition to the tsar (June 1905). The petition, extremely moderate in tone and full of expressions of loyalty to "the throne and the fatherland," implored the tsar "while it is not too late to save Russia and to establish order and internal peace, to convene the people's representatives." It was kept secret at home and published only abroad. For home consumption, a resolution framed in more radical terms was drawn up and published. It demanded: "1) the immediate convocation of a freely elected, popular, representative assembly, which shall,

jointly with the monarch, decide questions of war and peace and the constitution of the state; 2) the immediate abolition of laws, institutions, decrees and regulations which run counter to the principles of the freedom of person, free speech, freedom of the press and right of assembly, and the declaration of a political amnesty; 3) the immediate renovation of the personnel of the administration by calling to the work of central administration persons who are sincerely loyal to political reforms and who enjoy the confidence of society." Lenin explained the reasons for this double game as follows: one petition was to assuage and comfort the radicals; the other to serve as a material basis for striking a bargain with tsarism.

Needless to say, the delegation was a pitiful failure. In fact it was farcical. Brought face to face with the tsar, it even forgot to present its own petition.

PAGE 303.\*\* The events enumerated occurred in June 1905, immediately prior to the mutiny on the "Potemkin." (See note to page 9.)

In Odessa, on the very eve of the arrival of the "Potemkin," a general strike broke out accompanied by collisions with the police, beating up of the workers by Cossacks, barricade fighting and the shooting down of workers. In Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the general strike lasted from May 25 to August 7, and the shooting down of workers was almost a daily occurrence. In Warsaw, demonstrations, firing on the workers and barricade fighting took place on June 26, simultaneously with the events in Odessa and on the eve of the suppression of the uprising in Lodz. The latter uprising was the most important of the events enumerated and was the culmination of a series of demonstrations and strikes which had proceeded in Lodz almost uninterruptedly since January. The First of May demonstration, which was fired upon by the troops, gave a further impetus to the movement. The strikes spread from one factory to another. Mass meetings were held outside the town and one such meeting culminated in a demonstration and a collision with the militia. The funeral of the victims of this shooting developed into a huge demonstration in which about 50,000 workers took part, and which was also fired upon by the dragoons. Next day the uprising began with attacks on spies, the police and the Cossacks, and the erection of barricades. During the next few days fighting went on around these barricades; but the workers were poorly armed, and the uprising was crushed with great loss of life. Lenin points to the lack of arms and, hence, to the lack of preparedness for insurrection, in order once again to call upon the Party to be active in arming and preparing the proletariat for armed insurrection, which every mass strike and every demonstration in the industrial centres was making urgent.

PAGE 308.\* *Russ*, an extremely moderate liberal paper, was closed down for a month merely for printing the petition the delegation of the Congress of Zemstvo and Municipal Councillors were to present to the tsar. (See note to page 303.\*)

PAGE 308.\*\* Lenin quotes from Meshchersky's *Dnevnik (Diary)*, No. 45, June 22 (9), 1905, published by the newspaper *Grazhdanin (The Citizen)*. Meshchersky was one of the leading lights of the Black Hundreds. In this article the writer literally says the following: "His Majesty did what the French call *donner le change* and did it in a masterful manner."

PAGE 310.\* *The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government* was published in *Proletary*, No. 7, July 1905, and was written in connection with the mutiny of the "Potemkin." (See note to page 9.) The historical importance of this article is that it clearly defines the conditions giving rise to a provisional government and outlines the programme of action of the latter.

PAGE 310.\*\* This refers to the resolutions "The Armed Uprising" and "The Provisional Revolutionary Government" adopted at the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. The resolution "The Armed Uprising" called for the taking of "most energetic measures to arm the proletariat and also to draw up a plan for an armed uprising and for the direct leadership of it."

PAGE 310.\*\*\* The Russo-Japanese war (February 1904 to September 1905) arose from the imperialist policy of tsarism in the Far East which led to the seizure of Manchuria (in 1900) and part of Korea. This conflicted with the interests of the bourgeoisie of England, the U.S.A. and Japan. The latter waged the war with the financial assistance of the two former powers. The Russian armies suffered defeat after defeat and lost 400,000 men in killed and wounded. In addition, practically the whole of the Russian fleet was destroyed during the battle of Tsushima. The war was brought to an end by the Treaty of Portsmouth concluded between Japan and Russia, through the mediation of Roosevelt, then President of the U. S. A., as a result of which Russia surrendered the Laotung Peninsula, Port Arthur, Dalny—now called Dairen—and the Southern half of the island of Sakhalin.

PAGE 319.\* This article (printed in *Proletary*, No. 12, August 1905) was written in connection with the promulgation of the decree on the Bulygin Duma. (See note to page 12.) In this connection a violent dispute arose between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Mensheviks advocated the formation of "popular agitation committees" in order "to exert pressure" on the electors, i.e., the landlords and capitalists, to induce them to elect "supporters of democratic government." They also advocated the organisation, parallel to the official elections, of elections ordered, as it were, by the people and based on universal suffrage; the representatives elected by these were to declare themselves "a revolutionary self-govern-

ment" and at an appointed moment were to assemble in a given city and proclaim themselves the constituent assembly. This, according to *Iskra*, would bring about the fall of the autocracy.

This Menshevik plan was rejected by a national conference of the central bodies of all Social-Democratic organisations, at which the Bolshevik proposal to boycott the Duma was adopted against the solitary vote of the representative of the Menshevik organisation commission (the Menshevik centre). Like the Menshevik Zemstvo campaign, this plan was swept away by the revolutionary events, together with the Bulygin Duma which gave rise to it.

PAGE 319.\*\* This Congress took place in July 1905 in Moscow, and was attended by over 200 delegates. Although the police were present, they did not seriously interfere with the Congress, which quite obviously showed that the authorities had nothing to fear from it. The Congress discussed the attitude to be taken towards the Bulygin Duma, but it was decided to leave the question open until the regulations concerning the election of the Duma were issued and then to convene another congress. In an article, *The Proletariat Fights; the Bourgeoisie Steals Into Power*, Lenin wrote about this Congress as follows:

"The liberal bourgeoisie goes to the people. This is true. It is forced to go to the people, because without the people it is powerless to fight the autocracy. But it is afraid of the revolutionary people, and goes to it not as a representative of its interests, not as a new passionate comrade-in-arms, but as a dealer, a broker, running from one belligerent to the other."

PAGE 322.\* The reference is to a speech delivered by the Cadet, Petrunkevich, at the Congress of the Zemstvo and Municipal Councillors, in which he said:

"When we went to Peterhof on June 19 (see note to page 303\*), we still hoped that the tsar would realise the danger of the situation and would do something to avert it. All hope in this direction must now be abandoned. Hitherto, we placed our faith in reform from above, henceforth, our only hope is—the people. We must tell the people the truth in plain and simple words."

The glaring hypocrisy of this speech is evident from the fact that Petrunkevich at this very Congress abstained from voting on a resolution of protest against the brutalities of the Cossacks in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and that he was highly complimented by the reactionary press.

PAGE 328.\* This article was first printed in *Proletary*, No. 25, November 1905, and gives an estimate of the situation which arose immediately after the October general strike and the tsar's Manifesto of October 30 (17), promising "liberties" and popular government. The article emphasises the tactical position occupied by Lenin during the whole of 1905: the question

of the victory of the revolution can be solved only by an armed uprising and each new stage of the movement brings it nearer to this inevitable climax. From this point of view, the "immensely great step forward" made by the revolution in October merely marks its entry into the stage when uprising becomes the immediate order of the day. In his article, *The All-Russian General Strike*, written during the October strike, Lenin emphasised the point that "the uprising is approaching, it is growing before our eyes out of the Russian political strike." Four days later, on October 30, although the tsar's Manifesto had not yet reached Geneva, where Lenin then lived, and only the "rumour that a constitution has been decreed" had been heard, Lenin in a rough draft of an article wrote: "Tsarism is no longer able to win out in the revolution," and warned the proletariat and "the consistent revolutionary democrats" that "unless we rise to a still higher stage, unless we break up the forces of tsarism and destroy its actual power, the revolution will remain unfinished, the bourgeoisie will lead the workers by the nose." On November 1, when the tsar's Manifesto became known in Europe, Lenin, in an article entitled *The First Victory of the Revolution* wrote that the "enemy has retreated to new positions in order to gather and consolidate its forces" and that the proletariat "must succeed in winning the army over to the side of the people." A week later, when the enemy was again trying to assume the offensive, Lenin wrote the present article in which he calls for the only possible reply, the organisation of the uprising.

In those days of the first victories, and the approach of the climax, Lenin, in other articles, emphasised also the international importance of a victory over tsarism. "Workers and peasants of the whole of Russia, you are not alone!" he wrote. "If you succeed in overthrowing, defeating and destroying the tyrants of feudal, police, landlord and tsarist Russia, your victory will become the signal for a world fight against the tyranny of capital, a fight for the complete, not only political, but also economic, emancipation of the toilers, a fight for the delivery of humanity from misery and for the achievement of socialism."

PAGE 329.\* The words quoted were reported in the English newspapers from an unsigned article by Trotsky, which appeared in No. 3 of "*Isvestiya*" of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The latter was the official organ of the Soviet. Ten numbers appeared in all. It was published by a group of members of the Printers' Trade Union under the supervision of a member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, Simanovsky. In order to print each issue of the paper, the group forcibly seized the printing plants of a number of large bourgeois newspapers in turn.

PAGE 333.\* Finland was annexed by Russia in 1809 during the war with Sweden. In order to win over the Finns, Alexander I promised to preserve the old constitution of Finland, which provided that no law could be enacted or repealed without the consent of the Finnish Diet, or parliament,

In 1899 the constitution was practically annulled by the tsar's Manifesto, to which Lenin refers. Lenin deals in detail with the violent suppression of the Finnish constitution in an article entitled *The Protest of the Finnish People*. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. IV.)

PAGE 333.\*\* Lenin refers to an article entitled *Revolution in Finland* in the reactionary *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*) of November 5 (October 23), 1905, which, commenting on a telegram from Berlin published in the same issue, to the effect that Finland, Poland and the Caucasus were striving to secede from Russia, called for the suppression of the revolution in these borderlands, and particularly in Finland, in order to save the "unity" of Russia.

PAGE 334.\* This refers to the general strike in October 1905, which prevented the convening of the Bulygin Duma. (See article, *The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection*, in this volume, and also note to page 12.)

PAGE 336.\* This article was first published in *Novaya Zhizn* (the legal Bolshevik daily, which appeared for one month in St. Petersburg), December 12 (Nov. 29), 1905. It deals with the significance of the army in the revolution and the demands that should have been put forward by the army in its revolutionary actions. The mutiny in Sevastopol broke out on November 24, when an order was issued forbidding the sailors of the fleet to hold meetings. Lenin relates the particulars in his *Lecture on the 1905 Revolution* (in this volume). The sailors demanded the release of soldiers and sailors arrested for political reasons, more respectful treatment of the rank and file, improved economic conditions, the summoning of a constituent assembly, an eight-hour working day, etc. The workers in the port of Sevastopol came out in support of the mutiny. The movement spread to eleven vessels of the Black Sea Fleet. The leadership of the mutiny was assumed by Lieutenant Schmidt, who hoisted the red flag together with the admiral's flag on the cruiser "Ochakov" and spread the signal: "I assume command of the fleet, Schmidt." A telegram was sent to the tsar saying: "The gallant Black Sea Fleet, sacredly preserving loyalty to the people, demands from you, Sir, the immediate convocation of a constituent assembly and ceases to obey your ministers. Commander of the Fleet, Citizen Schmidt." Government troops poured into Sevastopol. On November 28, the rebel warships were defeated in a naval engagement, which was soon followed by the defeat of the rebels in the naval barracks. Lieutenant Schmidt and his chief assistants were court-martialled and shot.

PAGE 336.\*\* The reference is to the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49, with the aid of Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal Paskevich.

PAGE 340.\* The fragment, *The Liberal Unions and Social-Democracy*, is an insertion, written in Lenin's hand, in an article of the same title by V. V. Vorovsky and published in *Proletary*, No. 18, September 26 (13), 1905. It is given here before the article *Socialism and Anarchism*, which also deals with non-Party organisations, but of another type, viz., the Soviet of Workers' Deputies as the fighting organs of the revolution.

As the revolution spread over the country, the liberals and Socialist-Revolutionaries made great efforts to organise the intellectuals of the official class and members of the free professions in non-Party unions. These unions were not intended for the protection of the economic interests of their members, but interested themselves solely in legal and political questions from the liberal standpoint. They were headed by the Union of Unions which was organised on January 22, 1905, first as the Central Bureau of the union of intellectuals, and then at a congress in May of the same year, when it took the name of Union of Unions. The latter tried to secure influence also over the workers and peasants, in which it succeeded to a certain extent, inasmuch as among the organisations affiliated were the Railwaymen's Union and the Peasant Union. Some time later, in December 1905, Lenin wrote another article to expose the non-Party screen behind which the liberal bourgeoisie desire to conceal their real political opinions. In this article, *The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionariness* (*Collected Works*, Vol. VIII), he wrote: "To be non-Party in a bourgeois society is sheer hypocrisy, a mask, a passive expression of affiliation to the party of the well fed, to the party of the ruling class, to the party of the exploiters. To be non-Party is a bourgeois idea. To be Party is a socialist idea." Lenin vigorously opposed any association with the alleged "non-Party" liberal political organisations, but at the same time he considered it expedient and advisable, "especially during the epoch of democratic revolution," to take part in non-Party political mass organisations of a genuinely democratic type. In the above-mentioned article, he wrote:

"Such participation may be necessary, for example, in order to preach socialism to a vaguely democratic audience and also for the purpose of uniting the forces of the Socialists and the revolutionary democrats in the fight against counter-revolution. In the first case, it will be a means of presenting socialist ideas, and in the second case, it will be a fighting alliance for the achievement of definite revolutionary aims. In either case, this participation can only be temporary." And he adds: "in either case, such participation is permissible only on the condition that the complete independence of the workers' party is preserved and that the individual, and groups of, Party members who are 'delegated' to these non-Party organisations work under the supervision and guidance of the whole Party."

It is obvious that the guiding principle in the attitude Lenin took on this question is his general principle regarding the question of alliances

and agreements between classes and parties in the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution: not alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is striving to compromise with tsarism, but a "fighting agreement" with "revolutionary democracy," with the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and primarily with the peasantry; not merging in an alliance or agreement, but the preservation of the proletarian class line in order to lead these organisations; the preservation of the hegemony of the proletariat, and of its party, in the revolution.

PAGE 342.\* The article *Socialism and Anarchism* was published in *Novaya Zhizn*, of December 8 (November 25), 1905. Dealing with the refusal of the St. Petersburg Soviet to admit representatives of anarchist groups, it contains also a definition of the correct relations between the workers' party and the soviets. Characteristic is the idea that Lenin expresses that the soviets of 1905 were "not a government of any kind, but a fighting organisation for the achievement of definite aims." These aims were the aims of the revolution, the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. "In pursuing these aims," said Lenin, "the soviets, as 'fighting organisations,' must themselves become transformed into organs of insurrection and of the new revolutionary government." The soviets, according to Lenin, were also organs of the fighting agreement between the proletariat and revolutionary democracy, between the proletarian Socialists and the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats for these "definite aims." In all cases he emphasises that the independence of the proletarian party must be preserved. (See note above.)

On the question of the attitude to the soviets, the role of the Party within the soviets and the character of the soviets, there were acute differences of opinion between Lenin and the Bolsheviks on one side, and the Mensheviks on the other. The Mensheviks, in the resolutions adopted at the Fourth (Unity) Party Congress, declared the soviets to be organs of the revolutionary struggle and a revolutionary self-government, whereas the Bolsheviks, in the draft resolutions they submitted to that Congress declared that the soviets in 1905 "were in fact the embryos of a new revolutionary government." Similar differences manifested themselves also on the question of the role of the Party in the soviets. The concept of the Party as the vanguard of the proletariat and of the proletariat as the vanguard of the revolution was, in general, foreign to the Mensheviks, and in practice they merged the Party with the soviets. The "Left" Menshevik, Trotsky, who became the chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet after the arrest of Khrustalev, declared at that time that the Party was only "an organisation within the proletariat"; whereas the soviet was "an organisation of the proletariat." In their attitude to the soviets, the Mensheviks revealed their submission to the non-Party idea. Hence, they promoted and supported the election of Khrustalev—a "near-

Party" Menshevik—to the chairmanship of the soviet, to replace the first chairman, the Menshevik Zubrovsky. And it is characteristic that when Trotsky took Khrustalev's place after the latter's arrest on December 9, Parvus, a close collaborator of Trotsky, wrote: "Khrustalev was non-Party not in his political views but in his conduct of the affairs of the Soviet of Deputies. The same non-Party spirit will no doubt be displayed also by Comrade Yanovsky" (the alias of Trotsky).

More particulars about the soviets in St. Petersburg and other towns will be found in note to page 14.\*

PAGE 344.\* The Party of Law and Order was formed in October 1905, during the height of the revolution, and consisted of big landlords, capitalists and high government officials. The chief items in its programme were: 1) "a united and indivisible Russia," implying the oppression of all non-Russian speaking nationalities comprising the Russian Empire, and 2) "a strong government" by which was implied an autocratic monarchy. The party broke up in 1907, part of its members joining the Black Hundred organisations.

PAGE 344.\*\* On a previous occasion, in the article *The First Victory of the Revolution*, Lenin had written regarding this conspiracy as follows: "The rulers of the military states of Europe contemplate lending military aid to the tsar. Wilhelm has already sent several cruisers and two destroyer flotillas to establish direct relations between the German war lords and Peterhof. European counter-revolution is extending a hand to the Russian counter-revolution." As the revolution spread in Poland, Germany began to concentrate its armies on the Polish frontier, naturally not without the knowledge of the Russian government. This fact prompted the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organisation Commission to address a joint letter to the International Socialist Bureau, in which, after describing the measures taken by the autocracy in order to strangle the movement in Poland, they said: "Wilhelm is concentrating his troops on the western frontiers of Russia, and there are serious grounds for believing that these troops will be sent into Russia to suppress the Polish people. The cause of the Russian revolution, which is the cause of the whole of humanity, is in serious danger. The Russian proletariat expresses its sympathy with its Polish brethren and strongly protests against the violence to which they are subjected. We ask you, dear comrades, to state what fighting measures you contemplate undertaking in order to remove that danger and render assistance to the Russian people."

PAGE 346.\* *The Lessons of the Moscow Uprising* was published in *Proletary*, No. 2, September 11 (August 29), 1906. In 1906, a book entitled *Moscow in December 1905* was published, compiled by a group of Mensheviks on the basis of personal experience as well as of the observations of participants in the uprising, of individuals and of representatives of organisa-

tions. It was in reply to this book that Lenin wrote the above-mentioned article. While, on the whole, the book gave a fairly true account of the street fighting, it distorted the whole significance of the uprising and regarded its suppression as the failure of Bolshevik tactics. After Plekhanov's well-known phrase, "they should not have taken to arms" (see note to page 348), the Mensheviks and those associated with them began to oppose insurrection in general. Lenin, in this article, replies to this opposition and at the same time draws an estimate of the lessons of the uprising for the future.

PAGE 346.\*\* The Coalition Council of Fighting Units was formed in Moscow in November 1905, originally in order to avert the menace of pogroms by the Black Hundreds. It consisted of representatives of the fighting units of the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the university students, as well as of several other organisations. In the first month it concentrated its efforts on preventing pogroms which were then expected. In the leadership of the December uprisings, however, it did not prove to be as resourceful as in the fight against the Black Hundreds, chiefly owing to the lack of trained military workers and the lack of unity on the question of tactics.

PAGE 347.\* The reference is to the following passage in *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-50*, by Karl Marx:

"With the exception of a few short chapters, every important part of the annals of the revolution from 1848 to 1849 carries the heading: *Defeat of the revolution!*

"But what succumbed in these defeats was not the revolution. It was the pre-revolutionary traditional appendages, results of social relationships, which had not yet come to the point of sharp class antagonisms—persons, illusions, conceptions, projects, from which the revolutionary party before the February Revolution was not free, from which it could be freed, not by the *victory of February*, but only by a series of *defeats*.

"In a word: revolutionary advance made headway not by its immediate tragi-comic achievements, but on the contrary by the creation of a powerful, united counter-revolution, by the creation of an opponent, by fighting whom the party of revolt first ripened into a real revolutionary party." (Marx, *The Class Struggles in France*, English ed., p. 33.)

Referring to this passage, Lenin argues that it was not the slogan of armed insurrection that was defeated, as the Mensheviks argued, but the mistakes and blunders inherited from the past that were committed by the leaders of the working class.

PAGE 348.\* The phrase occurs in an article by Plekhanov, *Once Again On Our Situation*, published in *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata (Social-Democratic Diary)*, No. 4, December 1905, immediately after the December uprising in Moscow. The passage is as follows:

"A prematurely called political strike led to armed uprisings in Moscow, Sormova, Bakhmut and other places. In these uprisings our proletariat displayed strength, courage and self-sacrifice. Yet, its forces were not strong enough for the achievement of victory. This could have been easily foreseen. And, therefore, they should not have taken to arms."

PAGE 350.\* The reference is to a statement in the article *Questions of the Day* (*Iskra*, No. 4, May 1901), which ran as follows:

"And so, when Social-Democracy has gained a position for itself in which it will give the signal for a general attack on tsarism, having assumed the leadership of all the discontented elements in society, it will then, in choosing the means for that attack, be guided solely by considerations of expediency and, if it finds it necessary, it will resort to armed uprisings. . . . In such circumstances, systematic terrorism, applied in a moment of revolutionary crisis, will be a sign of the achievement of the highest tension of the revolutionary energy of the social movement, the leadership of which the Social-Democrats have managed to assume."

PAGE 351.\* In a number of his works on military matters, Engels referred to the dependence of military tactics on the level of military technique and of military technique on the level of industrial technique. He deals with this question in his famous book, *Anti-Dühring*, in chapter III of part II (*The Theory of Force*). After reviewing the history of military tactics and technique he arrives at the conclusion that "the whole organisation and method of fighting of armies, and along with these victory or defeat, proves to be dependent on material, that is, economic conditions; on the human material, and the armaments material, and therefore on the quality and quantity of the population and on technical development." (Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, p. 195.)

PAGE 351.\*\* Soon after the Moscow December uprising, Kautsky in an article in *Vorwärts* referred to the necessity of revising Engels' views on barricade tactics. He said: "Here we perceive another difference between the June battle in Paris [1848—*Ed.*] and the December battle in Moscow: both were barricade struggles; but the former marked the collapse, the end of the old barricade tactics, whereas the latter marked the inauguration of the new barricade tactics. In this connection we must revise the opinion of Frederick Engels, as expounded in his preface to Marx's *The Class Struggles in France*, to the effect that now the time of barricade fighting is over. It is only the time of the old barricade tactics that is over. This was shown by the Moscow uprising, where a handful of insurgents managed to hold out for two weeks against troops exceeding them in number and equipped with modern artillery."

Kautsky, however, greatly distorted Engels' opinion. Engels did not say that the "time of barricade fighting is over." What he said in his preface to Marx's *The Class Struggles in France*, 1848-50, was merely that

with the level of military technique attained at the end of the nineteenth century (Engels wrote this in 1895), the chances of victory of the government troops had increased and those of the barricade fighters had diminished. Therefore his conclusion was that "rebellion in the old style, the street fight with barricades, which up to 1848 gave everywhere the final decision, was to a considerable extent obsolete." (*Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 21.) However, even this conclusion was accompanied by the following reservation: "Does that mean that in the future the street fight will play no further role? Certainly not. It only means that the conditions since 1848 have become far more unfavourable for civil fights, far more favourable for the military. A future street fight can therefore only be victorious when this unfavourable situation is compensated by other factors. Accordingly, it will occur more seldom in the beginning of a great revolution than in its further progress, and will have to be undertaken with greater forces. These, however, may then well prefer, as in the whole Great French Revolution or on September 4 and October 31, 1870, in Paris, the open attack to the passive barricade tactics." (*Ibid.*, p. 25.) This and a number of other passages of Engels' preface were omitted from the edition published by the General Council of the German Social-Democratic Party and were discovered only in 1924 by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow in Engels' manuscript.

PAGE 352.\* Strictly speaking there were no "Lettish republics" in the Baltic regions at the time of the Revolution of 1905. The peculiar feature of the revolutionary movement in Latvia was that the Lettish rural proletariat and the land-hungry peasantry, led by the urban proletariat, achieved a complete revolution in the rural districts, and drove out the local authorities and the barons—the owners of the big estates. The whole of Latvia was covered with a dense network of "revolutionary volost executive committees" which seized power and organised an administration on revolutionary lines. However, in the cities things took a different turn: the Lettish proletariat was nowhere able to seize power completely. Isolated from the urban centres of administration and separated from each other, the rural districts which had overthrown the local police authorities were in those days styled "republics."

PAGE 357.\* The article, *The Workers' Party and Its Tasks in the Present Situation*, appeared in the Social-Democratic university students' journal, *Young Russia*, on January 17 (4), 1906. At that time, having suppressed the Moscow proletariat, the autocracy, with one hand as it were, continued to put down the sporadic armed uprisings throughout the country, and with the other strove to divert the masses from the revolutionary path by "luring the people with a police-monarchist constitution" (Lenin), by announcing the elections to the new "Witte" State Duma. (See note to page 13.\*) The liberal bourgeoisie, completely frightened by the uprisings of the proletariat and the peasantry, now opposed

the revolution with malicious frankness and also proceeded along the line of "luring the people" with a constitution. In this the bourgeoisie was followed by the Mensheviks, headed by Plekhanov. (See note to page 346.\*\*\*) In this article, the first of Lenin's public utterances after the defeat of the December uprising, at a time when civil war was still raging, Lenin still urged the need for an armed struggle against the tsar's government. The scattered proletarian rebellion was suffering defeat—the task of the proletariat and its party was to prepare for the next all-Russian rebellion. The tsarist government was striving to divert the masses from the revolution by means of a spurious constitution—the task of the party of the proletariat was to combat constitutional illusions, *i.e.*, the illusive hopes of solving the problems of the revolution by peaceful, "constitutional methods." These two principles underlying the present article determined the basic tactical line of the Bolsheviks for that period. Their corollary was also the tactics of boycotting the first ("Witte") Duma.

PAGE 359.\* By the "pacification" of the Caucasus and of Siberia, Lenin meant the "pacification" of the peasants in Georgia (see note to page 14\*\*\*) and of the workers in Siberia. Two punitive expeditions were at that time operating in Siberia: one, commanded by General Rennenkampf, which marched from the Far East, the other—by General Mellér-Zakomyelsky—which marched from the West. In December 1905, the railway line and such cities as Krasnoyarsk and Chita in Eastern Siberia were in the hands of the workers led by the soviets and the committees of the R.S.D.L.P. The task of both punitive expeditions was identical: to wrest the Siberian railway from the revolution by suppressing the workers' movement and destroying the revolutionary and Party organisations. They fulfilled that task; the railway line in Eastern Siberia was bestrewn with the dead bodies of the workers, the Trans-Baikal railway was lined with gallows; the prisons were packed full and the old regime was restored.

PAGE 361.\* By the time the article, *Should We Boycott the State Duma?*, appeared in the press, measures had already been taken to unite the two sections of the Party—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—and a Joint Central Committee was formed in order to convene the Unity Congress. That is why this article was published in the sheet issued by the Joint Central Committee which also contained an article by the Menshevik, F. Dan, *Why We Are Opposed to Boycotting the Elections*. The articles reflected the differences of opinion that existed between the "majority" and the "minority" on the first (Witte) State Duma. Whereas the Bolshevik organisations were in favour of an active boycott, the position of the Mensheviks was devoid of logic and consistency. According to Martov, "there were two shades" among the Mensheviks; one revived the old plan, which was to take part in the "legal" elections, to withdraw at the first or second stage and then proceed to convene a "People's Duma." The other, anticipating Plekhanov, was more inclined to speculate on a temporary de-

cline of the revolution and go on with the "legal" elections to the end. In order to overcome the "boycottists" (i.e., the Bolsheviks) all agreed to support the first platform because it was more popular among those workers who supported the Mensheviks.

In view of the impossibility of obtaining tactical unity between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks on this question, the Joint Central Committee invited the Party organisations, pending the convocation of the Unity Congress, to follow locally one of two tactics: either the Bolshevik tactics, that of an active boycott, or the Menshevik tactics, that of participation in all stages of the elections, except the last, and abstaining from putting up candidates for the Duma itself.

The discussion on the question of participating in the elections and the boycott took place during January and February 1906. As a result, the enormous majority of Party organisations (including St. Petersburg) declared in favour of the Bolshevik tactics of boycott and rejected the inconsistent and contradictory tactics of the Mensheviks.

PAGE 361.\*\* Concerning the negotiations for this Congress see notes to pages 453,\* 456\*\*\* and 465.)

PAGE 361.\*\*\* The conference of twenty-six organisations, or the Tammerfors Conference, took place December 24-30 (11-17), 1905, instead of the (Fourth) Party Congress which was planned for December 1905 and which did not take place on account of the railway strike, the Moscow armed uprising and other events. The assembled delegates organised a "conference of the majority." This conference adopted resolutions: 1) on the fusion of the centres—the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organisation Commission—and of the local organisations, 2) on the convocation of a Unity Congress, 3) on the reorganisation of the Party (on principles of democratic centralism), 4) on the agrarian question—revision of the agrarian programme of the Second Congress, with the elimination of the clause dealing with the "otrezki" and the substitution of a statement supporting the "revolutionary measures of the peasantry" including the confiscation of all the land belonging to the state, to the churches, to the monasteries, to the imperial family and to private owners, and 5) on the State Duma.

The last resolution, which Lenin deals with in the present article, reads as follows:

"The Conference is of the opinion that Social-Democracy must strive to thwart this police Duma by refusing to take any part in it. The Conference advises the Party organisations to make wide use of the election meetings, not in order to elect deputies to the State Duma subject to police restrictions, but in order to widen the revolutionary organisation of the proletariat and to agitate among all sections of the people in favour of an armed uprising. The uprising must be immediately prepared and organised everywhere, for only its victory will make

it possible to convene a genuine people's assembly, i.e., a freely elected constituent assembly on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage and secret ballot."

PAGE 362.\* The newspaper *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo (National Economy)*, edited by the Professor of Economics, Khodsky, was published during 1906 to take the place of *Nasha Zhizn* of which Khodsky had been the editor and which had been suppressed by the government. Both newspapers were typically bourgeois, but pretended to be radically inclined and even tried to be the Left of the Cadets.

PAGE 365.\* The pamphlet, *The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, was written in July-August 1906 and published in August of that year, but it was immediately seized by the police and criminal proceedings were instituted against the author.

The autocracy used the Duma as a lightning conductor to divert the revolutionary energy with which the country was charged. Its task was to smash the united front of the revolution, to wrest from the latter the wide masses of the petty bourgeoisie and to divert the attention of the peasants from the revolutionary solution of the agrarian problem. However, things turned out otherwise than the government expected. The revolutionary movement among the masses, somewhat weakened after the December uprising, again began to grow in strength precisely in the period of the First Duma. In May and June 1906, the peasant movement became even more widespread than in 1905. The Duma could not ignore the growing peasant movement and was obliged to deal with the agrarian question, the more so that the representatives of the peasants, the Trudoviki, had been elected to the Duma. Hence, the autocracy saw no advantage in continuing the existence of the Duma. On the contrary, it began to regard it as dangerous and decided to dissolve it. The immediate cause of the dissolution of the Duma was the *Manifesto To The People*, which it issued on the land question. On July 3, the government published a *communiqué* in which it categorically declared that no land would be taken from the landlords. In reply to this, the Duma decided to address a special manifesto to the people. The Social-Democratic fraction decided to endorse the manifesto on the condition that it embodied the principle of the compulsory alienation of privately owned lands. The Cadets, on the other hand, introduced a draft manifesto in which they strongly emphasised the necessity of establishing order in the country and the admissibility of compulsory alienation of land only in accordance with the law. This manifesto turned out to be so tame that at the final voting the Social-Democrats voted against it (101 Trudoviki abstained from voting), and the manifesto was adopted by 124 votes cast by the Cadets. Thereupon, on the night of July 21, the government dissolved the Duma and announced that it would reassemble on March 5, 1907.

Obviously the attitude of the two sections of the R.S.D.L.P. which was united at that time (after the Fourth Congress) towards the dissolution of the Duma could not be identical. Even at that time the Mensheviks had begun to advocate a mere struggle for reforms. In the resolutions they submitted to the Fourth Unity Congress they, while uttering phrases about the possibility of a new upsurge of the revolution, advocated the liberal slogan of a struggle for "further winning and widening the political and civil rights of the people." Accordingly, the Central Committee, which after the Unity Congress was a Menshevik Committee, appealed for a struggle for the restoration of the Duma, for the "defence of the Duma," attaching to these liberal-Cadet slogans the phrase "for the purpose of convening the constituent assembly." Lenin in his article, *The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat*, opposed the position of the Menshevik Central Committee on the basis of the same fundamental tactical line that he had followed in his previous articles, *The Workers' Party and Its Tasks in the Present Situation* and *Should We Boycott the State Duma?* Proceeding from the proposition that the dissolution of the Duma by the tsar's government finally revealed to the broadest masses the total bankruptcy of "constitutional illusions," he appeals for a genuinely revolutionary utilisation of this conflict between the Duma and the tsarist autocracy in order to create a fresh upsurge of the smouldering revolutionary movement of the proletarians and the peasants and in order to direct it towards a nation-wide armed uprising for the overthrow of tsarism.

A month later, after the Sveaborg and Kronstadt mutinies (see note to page 385), Lenin reverted to this question in the article *Before the Storm*, and once again addressed the same appeals to the Party and to the proletariat.

PAGE 366.\* This refers to the so-called "Vyborg Manifesto" issued in the name of the "people's representatives," i.e., the members of the State Duma, in reply to the dissolution of the latter. The conference which passed this manifesto was held in the city of Vyborg (Finland) on the day following the dissolution of the Duma. The appeal was drafted and proposed by the Cadets and it called on the masses not to give any money to the government and to refuse to perform military service. When the manifesto was discussed by the Social-Democratic fraction, the Bolsheviks demanded that it be issued in the name of the Duma as such, and not in the name of the "people's representatives," and that it put forward the demand for a constituent assembly. The Mensheviks rejected these amendments declaring that it was possible to advance only such demands as would be acceptable to all other members of the Duma. The Vyborg Conference adopted the Cadet version with a few minor amendments. The Cadets themselves, at their party congress, held in October 1906, virtually renounced even this tame appeal. The deputies who signed the appeal were prosecuted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

PAGE 366.\*\* The pamphlet, *The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*, was written by Lenin in March 1906. The jubilation of the petty-bourgeois press over the Cadet victory at the elections and the hopes they placed in the Duma confronted revolutionary Social-Democracy with the task of exposing to the broad masses the true features of the Duma and of the Cadets as the party guiding the Duma. This task was performed by Lenin in the above pamphlet.

PAGE 366.\*\*\* *Moskovskiy Vvedomosti (Moscow News)* was a Black Hundred newspaper representing the interests of the feudal landlords. It began to appear under the auspices of the Moscow University in 1756, and became the spokesman for the worst reactionaries of the sixties of the last century, preserving this role right up to the October Revolution, which put an end to its existence. *Grazhdanin (The Citizen)* was also a Black Hundred newspaper published by the rabid reactionary, Prince Meshchersky.

PAGE 367.\* These words were uttered by Lenin in an article entitled *Cadets, Trudoviki and the Workers' Party*, published in *Volna (The Wave)*, No. 25, June 6 (May 24), 1906, in which he describes the Cadets and the Trudoviki and the attitude of the workers' party towards them.

PAGE 368.\* By the second half of 1904 the patriotic intoxication of the first month of the Russo-Japanese war began to wear off; the enormous defeats at the front and the intensified economic crisis at home not only strengthened the revolutionary movement among the workers and peasants, but also increased the discontent among the bourgeoisie. After the assassination of the Minister of the Interior, Plehve, by the Socialist-Revolutionaries in July 1904, the government began to court the liberals. Svyatopolk-Mirsky was appointed Minister of the Interior in place of Plehve, and he ushered in a period known as the "Spring of Svyatopolk-Mirsky," or the "epoch of confidence." In his first speech, Svyatopolk-Mirsky announced that the government intended to pursue a "policy of sincere benevolence and sincere confidence towards social and estate institutions and towards the population in general." This gave rise to the "exultation" in liberal circles, to which Lenin refers, which manifested itself at a series of political banquets at which liberal speeches were delivered on political reform and on the necessity of a constitution being granted from above. On November 19-22 (6-9), the Zemstvo leaders assembled at a congress and after the usual bombastic speech-making put forward a series of "demands" of a very moderate nature. Neither the agrarian question nor the labour question was dealt with; the liberal landlords who assembled at the congress were exclusively concerned with the question of a constitution and proclaimed the necessity of the "representatives of the people" being granted a *decisive* voice in the legislation. Of course, they had no intention of giving the workers and peasants the same electoral rights as the landlords and capitalists.

PAGE 370.\* This refers to the vacillation displayed by the Menshevik majority on the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party after the dispersal of the First Duma. The Central Committee elected at the Fourth Congress consisted of seven Mensheviks and three Bolsheviks. As soon as the news of the dissolution of the Duma became known, the Bolshevik section of the Central Committee proposed that a manifesto to the workers be issued immediately, explaining the need for a nation-wide uprising for a constituent assembly. The Central Committee rejected this proposal and instead turned its attention toward the Vyborg Conference. (See note to page 366.\*) After the termination of the latter, and under the influence of events, the Central Committee decided to call on the workers to prepare for a general political strike with the first of the Menshevik slogans quoted by Lenin as its object. The Bolshevik members of the Central Committee strongly protested against this proposal. This protest was endorsed by the St. Petersburg Party Committee, which consisted mainly of Bolsheviks, and at its next meeting the Central Committee decided to drop the appeal for preparations for a strike in favour of an appeal for an immediate strike, having as its aim the second slogan quoted by Lenin. After this, a meeting of representatives of the Left parties and organisations (the Social-Democrats, the Bund, the Trudoviki, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Peasant Union) was held, to whom this appeal was submitted for endorsement. The conference, however, refused to support the appeal for an immediate strike on the grounds that it was premature and did not have much chance of success, especially with the slogan of "defence of the Duma." The Central Committee altered its resolution for the third time and issued the following tactical slogan: "for a Duma as an organ of government which will convene the constituent assembly." The Bolshevik members of the Central Committee protested against this essentially Cadet slogan, but to no avail.

PAGE 373.\* At a meeting of the Central Committee, one of the Menshevik members proposed that a three-day demonstration strike be called as a protest against the dispersal of the Duma, with the slogan "for the Duma, against the Camarilla." He was supported by several Mensheviks, but the Central Committee did not accept this proposal, recommending instead that "partial, mass demonstrations of protest be organised among all strata of the population against the dissolution of the Duma."

PAGE 374.\* This refers to the position of the petty-bourgeois Radical Party and its leader Ledru-Rollin after the revolution in France in 1848. This revolution, which began in February 1848 with an insurrection of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie, overthrew the rule of the financial aristocracy represented by the monarchy of Louis Philippe and proclaimed a republic. As Marx said, "every party construed it [the republic] in its own sense. Having been won by the proletariat by force of arms,

the proletariat... proclaimed it to be a *social republic*." The proletariat hoped that the republic would achieve its as yet vague strivings for socialism. The petty bourgeoisie, which in the beginning of the revolution marched with the workers, did not share these strivings of the proletariat. And when the bourgeoisie in the Constituent Assembly, which opened on May 4, 1848, set out to "reduce the results of the revolution to the bourgeois scale" and the republic won by the proletariat to the level of a bourgeois republic in which the whole of the bourgeoisie were to rule in the place of the deposed financial aristocracy, the proletariat retaliated by an attempt on May 15 to disperse the Constituent Assembly. The petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats, however, took the side of the bourgeoisie against the workers. When in June 1848 the proletariat made an attempt, which Marx described as "the most colossal event in the history of European civil wars," to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois democrats took an active part in the sanguinary suppression of the workers' insurrection. Very soon, however, the petty-bourgeois democrats were convinced that the defeat of the workers was their own defeat also, because, after the defeat of the workers, the big bourgeoisie, whose programme did not go beyond the extension of the franchise, turned against the petty-bourgeois democrats. Force of events drove the petty-bourgeois democrats into the camp of the opposition, but they confined themselves exclusively to a programme of legal parliamentary opposition. The elections to the Legislative Assembly resulted in the election of a large group of the petty-bourgeois opposition, reinforced by a large number of moderate bourgeois republicans who had gone over to their side; but the majority in the Chamber was secured by the big financial, commercial, industrial and landed bourgeoisie represented by the so-called "Party of Order." Here, too, the petty-bourgeois democrats remained true to their own nature and kept within the limits of a parliamentary opposition. On the role of the petty bourgeoisie and of the petty-bourgeois democrats, see Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*, and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

PAGE 385.\* The Sveaborg and Kronstadt mutinies took place on July 30-August 2 (July 17:20), 1906, a few days after the dissolution of the First State Duma. The mutiny in Sveaborg broke out quite spontaneously, but later on the leadership of it was assumed by Second Lieutenants A. Emelianov and E. Kokhansky who were members of the military organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The events that took place were as follows: on July 30 (17), the mine-layers refused to carry out the order to mine the approaches to the fortress and were arrested. They were then supported by the fortress artillery and by evening the rebels took possession of almost the entire fortress, arrested the officers and opened fire on the neighbouring islands, which were held by the commander of

the fortress with some loyal infantry troops. On July 31 (18), the rebels cut off communications between Sveaborg and Helsingfors in order to prevent the arrival of government reinforcements. At the same time a general strike broke out in Helsingfors and the Finnish Red Guards forcibly stopped the railway communications between the cities of Abo, Helsingfors and Vyborg. However, on August 1 (July 19), the situation suddenly changed for the worse. The fire of the batteries of the loyal troops blew up the principal powder magazine on Mikhailovsky Island. Emelyanov was wounded by the explosion. On the same day Kokhansky was arrested while going out to meet the squadron from Reval, which he mistook for revolutionary ships. The ships which arrived began to bombard Mikhailovsky Island with long-range guns. The explosion of the powder magazine, the food shortage, the treachery of the fleet, and finally the lack of experienced leaders sealed the fate of the mutiny. Towards evening the rebels surrendered. Some of them managed to escape on boats to Sweden, others were caught by government troops and shot.

The Sveaborg mutiny was followed by that in Kronstadt, where the St. Petersburg military organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was working. On the night of August 1 (July 19), a mutiny broke out among some of the crews under the leadership of the sailor Egorov (Social-Democrat). The rebels seized Fort Constantine but failed to rouse the entire garrison. The suppression of the Sveaborg mutiny forced the Kronstadt rebels to surrender. Next day the principal participants in the mutiny were court-martialled and sentenced to be shot.

PAGE 386.\* This refers to the Sveaborg and Kronstadt mutinies in July 1906 (see preceding note), and the strike in support of the latter which took place in St. Petersburg and in a number of other cities.

These strikes were called by a decision of a conference of representatives of revolutionary organisations and parties (the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the Social-Democratic fraction of the Duma, the Central Committee of the Bund, the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, the Executive Committee of the Trudovik group, the Socialist-Revolutionary fraction of the Duma and the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party). The conference was convened on the initiative of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. on the night of August 2 (July 20), i.e., on the second day of the Kronstadt mutiny, and it decided to call a general (all-Russian) strike.

The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., consisting mainly of Mensheviks, failed to issue clear tactical slogans and regarded the strike (and consequently the mutiny itself) as a link in the "partial mass demonstration of protest" against the dissolution of the Duma and in defence of the Duma. The Bolshevik St. Petersburg Committee of the Party, and the Bolsheviks generally, regarded the strike, not merely as a demonstration, but as a means for deepening and extending the revolution. Being of the opinion that the revolutionary tide of that period was rising again, the

St. Petersburg Committee of the Party adhered to the slogan: "The convocation of the constituent assembly by means of an armed uprising."

The strike began on August 3 (July 21), and involved about 80,000 men. However, on August 4, it began to subside.

PAGE 390.\* This refers to three manifestoes issued in connection with the dissolution of the Duma: 1) *A Manifesto to the Army and Navy*, signed by the Social-Democratic fraction and the Trudovik group in the Duma; 2) *A Manifesto to the Whole of the Peasantry of Russia*, signed by the Social-Democratic fraction and the Trudovik group in the Duma, the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, as well as by the All-Russian Peasant Union, the Railwaymen's Union and Teachers' Union, and 3) *To the Whole of the People*, signed by the previously mentioned organisations, except the unions, and also by the Polish Socialist Party and the Bund. The manifestoes called for an armed uprising, for the seizure of power by the people, the overthrow of the local authorities and the establishment of elected local government bodies. The revolutionary character of these manifestoes was in sharp contrast to the so-called Vyborg Manifesto that was drawn up and issued by the Cadets at the same time. (See note to page 366.\*)

PAGE 392.\* The article *The Boycott* appeared in *Proletary*, No. 1, of September 3 (August 21), 1906, simultaneously with the preceding article, *Before the Storm*. The political situation at that time was such that a new upsurge of the revolution and of a new struggle "by means of a general strike and an uprising" could have been expected in the near future. Nevertheless Lenin foresaw another contingency also for the immediate future—"an unfavourable issue of the battle and its postponement until the experiment of the Second Duma." He therefore raised the question, in the event of the latter happening, of substituting the tactics of participating in the elections and in the Duma in place of the boycott tactics. Lenin compares the situation both before and after the First Duma, defines the difference between the two and from an evaluation of the lessons of the First Duma comes to the conclusion that it is possible to make even participation in the Duma (and consequently in the elections to it) serve the purpose of preparing for a struggle by means of a general strike and an uprising.

This article is a model of the application of Marxian-Leninist dialectics to the question of tactics, and marks the turning point in the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the State Duma. It also gives the first indication as to how the revolutionary proletarian party can and should utilise even such a "pigsty" as the Duma. In this article Lenin also expounds the idea that even in its Duma tactics, the proletarian party must pursue the task of securing the union of the proletariat, as the leader of the revolution, with the peasantry, against the autocracy and against the liberal bourgeoisie. The corollary of this idea is a *bloc* with the Trudoviki in the Duma elections. The same idea runs through another article in the present

volume, "*Blocs with the Cadets*, in which Lenin criticises the Menshevik tactics of making an alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie and once more advances the tactics of a *bloc* with the representatives of the revolutionary peasantry.

PAGE 392.\*\* The pamphlet cited by Lenin was published during the existence of the Joint Central Committee (see note to page 361\*) and therefore contained both Lenin's article and an article by the Menshevik, Dan, each of the authors advocating his views on the subject.

PAGE 392.\*\*\* Lenin refers here to the parliamentary activity of the German Social-Democratic Party which never boycotted the German parliament. At the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties of the last century, an opposition group arose in the Party known as the "young men," which, while fighting against the opportunist traits in the parliamentary activities of the Party, slipped into the anarchist rejection of all parliamentary action. The German Social-Democrats condemned these views. This was used by the Mensheviks as an argument against the Bolshevik tactics of boycotting the First Duma. But they totally ignored the fact that the conditions in Germany at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century were entirely different from those which existed in Russia in the first half of 1906 when the Bolsheviks boycotted the First Duma.

PAGE 392.\*\*\*\* *Partinije Izvestiya (Party News)* was published before the Fourth Unity Congress by the Joint Central Committee. No. 2 contained the draft resolutions for the Congress drawn up by a "group of Mensheviks with the participation of the editors of *Iskra*." Among these resolutions was the one, *The Importance of Representative Institutions during a Revolutionary Epoch*, to which Lenin refers here as revealing the "stereotyped and anti-historical nature of their arguments."

PAGE 392.\*\*\*\*\* This refers to the German revolution of 1848-49 and its "representative institutions," i.e., the Prussian Constituent Assembly in Berlin, and the National Assembly in Frankfort. In their joint work, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany*, Marx and Engels use the experience of these assemblies to show what "constitutional illusions," worshipping parliamentary methods of struggle and the non-revolutionary utilisation of representative institutions lead to during revolution; and they show how such representative institutions should be utilised in a revolutionary manner. Both in the Berlin and the Frankfort Assemblies the bourgeois liberals were in the majority. Out of fear of the revolutionary people they utilised both Assemblies for the purpose of betraying the revolution and of striking a bargain with the counter-revolution against the workers and peasants. The minority in these Assemblies consisted of the petty-bourgeois democrats, who, like the Russian Mensheviks in 1905-07, were thoroughly imbued with constitutional illusions. In May 1849,

after the liberals and reactionaries had struck a bargain with each other and had left the Frankfort Assembly, the petty-bourgeois democrats were in the majority. In the country, a number of workers' and peasants' insurrections against the reaction broke out. Even then, when the petty-bourgeois democrats had money, arms, soldiers and military supplies at their command, they still remained captive to their constitutional illusions. Marx and Engels wrote that under these circumstances the duty of the petty-bourgeois democrats was "to publicly recognise all the insurrections that had already broken out and to call the people to take up arms everywhere in defence of the national representation . . . to create a strong active unscrupulous Executive . . . and spread the insurrection." Instead of doing this, "they went on talking, protesting, proclaiming, pronouncing, but never had the courage or the sense to act." And the authors go on to say: "Their rule, if rule can be named, where no one obeyed, was a still more ridiculous affair than even the rule of their predecessors . . . But the politicians who led on this class were not more clear-sighted than the host of petty tradesmen which followed them. They proved even to be more infatuated, more ardently attached to delusions voluntarily kept up, more credulous, more incapable of resolutely dealing with facts than the liberals. . . ." More than that, "these worthies went so far as to suppress by their opposition all insurrectionary movements which were preparing. As a result, the workers and peasants who had risen in defence of the Frankfort Assembly, left to themselves, ceased to care any more for it; and when, at last, it came to a shameful end, it died without anybody taking any notice of its unhonoured exit." (*Revolution and Counter-Revolution*, chap. XVII.)

PAGE 394.\* This refers to point 5 in the Menshevik resolution on the State Duma. This point stated: "...in the present revolutionary atmosphere, a conflict between the State Duma and the government would have a disruptive and revolutionary effect, *inter alia*, also upon the army, whose loyalty to the throne will be shaken when it for the first time sees on Russian soil a *new power* which has arisen out of the womb of the nation, which speaks in the name of the nation and which is trampled underfoot by tsarism." This recognition of the State Duma as a "new" power and, still more, as one which had "arisen out of the womb of the nation" was expressed in still more liberal Cadet terms in the first draft of the Menshevik resolution, in which the Duma was described as "a new power called into life by the tsar himself, and recognised by law."

PAGE 394.\*\* The passage quoted is taken from a series of letters to workers written by Plekhanov and published in the Menshevik paper, *The Courier*, in the beginning of June (end of May) under the heading *Tactics and Tactlessness*, in which Plekhanov defended the Menshevik tactics of supporting the Duma, and even went so far as to adopt the Cadet appeal to save the Duma.

Lenin replied to Plekhanov's letters in an article entitled *How Plekhanov Argues About the Tactics of Social-Democracy*, which he has in mind here when he refers to the "words then uttered" against Plekhanov.

PAGE 395.\* As has been stated in preceding notes, for the purpose of convening the Fourth, Unity Congress of the Party, a Joint Central Committee was formed consisting of an equal number of representatives of both factions. In the beginning of 1906 the Joint Central Committee issued a leaflet entitled *To The Party*, in which it stated that the main task of the Joint Central Committee was to convene the Unity Congress which was to pass obligatory directives on all disputed questions of tactics. "Among these questions," stated the Central Committee in the leaflet, "one of the first is the question of the attitude to be adopted toward the Duma.... The discussion on this question that took place at the joint meeting of the Joint Central Committee and the editorial board of the central organ showed that, in the main, the representatives of both factions are agreed in their opinions on the Duma.... According to this opinion, the Party's participation in the last stage of the election, i.e., the election of deputies to the Duma, is impermissible under present circumstances. Difference of opinion" (between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.—*Ed.*) "exists only on the question of whether the Party should take part in the first stages of the election, i.e., the election of delegates to the electoral college and electors." (It should be remembered that the elections to the Duma were based on the indirect system—the constituents elected delegates, the delegate meeting elected electors to the electoral college and the latter elected the deputies to the Duma.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*)

PAGE 395.\*\* In the Caucasus the elections to the First Duma took place after the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. which cancelled the boycott and decided that the Party participate in the elections where that was still possible. The Caucasian Social-Democrats were thus able to take part in the elections and, particularly in Georgia, obtained a victory. Referring to these elections, Lenin wrote: "Let us not be carried away by the Tiflis victory.... At a time like the present in Russia, the fact that the Social-Democrats took part in the elections does not in itself mean that the masses really grow strong in the process of the election campaign.... Opinions on the boycott tactics in Russia as a whole pronounced merely on the basis of the Tiflis elections would be premature and superficial." The Mensheviks on the other hand regarded the victory in the Caucasus as the triumph of Menshevik tactics.

PAGE 395.\*\*\* This refers to an article by V. Vodovozov, entitled *The Party of Peaceful Regeneration*, published in *Tovarishch*, Nos. 31-32 of August 23 (10) and 24 (11), in which the author examines the contra-

diction between the programme and tactics of the party of "peaceful regeneration," and quotes as an example a similar contradiction between the programme and practical activities of the Cadets. The party of "peaceful regeneration" was formed in the Duma in 1906 and consisted of a small group of liberals who were even more moderate than the Cadets.

PAGE 398.\* Lenin quotes from the leading article in the Cadet newspaper *Rech*, No. 136, of August 25 (12), 1906, protesting against the political persecutions of the Cadets and demanding the speedy convocation of the Duma. The leading article said: "The peasantry represents three-fourths of the population of Russia and no system can be established against its will. Temporary vacillations and deviations are possible, but in the last resort, things will turn out as the peasantry want it. This is what the history of revolutions in Europe teaches us." Of course, this was sheer liberal hypocrisy.

PAGE 401.\* The article "*Blocs*" with the Cadets, printed in *Proletary*, No. 8, of December 6 (November 23), 1906, deals with the Menshevik tactics during the elections to the Second Duma. The All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., to which Lenin refers at the beginning of the article, took place in Finland on November 16-20 (3-7), 1906, and was attended by 32 delegates, of whom 18 were Mensheviks and 14 Bolsheviks. The Conference discussed mainly the question of the elections to the Second Duma and decided that except in the workers' *curiæ*, Social-Democrats were to be permitted to enter into election agreements both with the revolutionary and the opposition democratic parties, meaning by the latter term the Cadets. In opposition to this Menshevik resolution Lenin, in the name of the Social-Democratic delegates from Poland, the Lettish region, St. Petersburg, Moscow, the central industrial region and the Volga region, introduced a "dissenting opinion" to the effect that only in exceptional cases may agreements with other parties be permitted at the first stage of the elections in other than workers' *curiæ* and only with parties . . . which "acknowledge the need for an armed uprising and which are fighting for a democratic republic." This resolution rejected agreements with the Cadets. In the present article, Lenin advocates his electoral tactics as set out in this "dissenting opinion" against the Menshevik tactics. (It should be explained that according to the electoral law, for the purpose of the election, the voters were divided into classes or "*curiæ*" according to property qualification. Each *curia* elected its delegates to the electoral college which finally elected the deputy to the Duma. The factory workers had separate *curiæ*.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*)

At the beginning of the article Lenin mentions also a draft appeal to the constituents. This draft appeal, written by Lenin himself with the simplicity, clearness and forcefulness which characterises all his addresses to the masses, gives an outline of the aims and immediate tasks of the

proletariat and its party, lays stress on the armed uprising as the path towards the achievement of these immediate tasks, draws a sharp line between the party of the proletariat and the other parties, among which he singles out the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviki as parties nearest to the proletariat because of their democratic aims and revolutionary character, stresses the role of the proletariat as the leader of the revolution and calls on the electors to vote for the candidates put up by the R.S.D.L.P.

PAGE 406.\* The draft electoral platform of the Central Committee to which Lenin refers was discussed at the November Conference of 1906 (see preceding note) and is a very characteristic Menshevik document. Although it was supposed to be a platform of the *Socialist Workers' Party* it did not once mention the word socialism, and did not contain a single word addressed to the working class directly, but was addressed to the "Citizens of Russia" in general. Although speaking in the name of the party of the working class it did not say a word about the contrast between the working class and the bourgeoisie, neither did it describe the parties of other classes. While recognising that Russia continues to remain an autocratic state it appealed to the people to strive by "all possible means," not for the overthrow, but for the "repeal" of the autocracy, not to win, but to "secure the introduction" of political liberty. It did not say a word about an armed uprising and even refrained from advancing the slogan of a "democratic republic." While calling for a fight for the "convocation of a constituent assembly" it did not say anything about a provisional revolutionary government, which could convene the constituent assembly after a successful uprising. While recognising that the Duma "by itself is unable to do anything to satisfy the needs of the people," that the Duma is "altogether powerless," that it is only a "screen for the autocratic government," the draft platform at the same time regarded the future Duma as the "general headquarters of a national army leading the fight" and invited all those who wish to possess such general headquarters in the Duma to support the Social-Democratic candidates.

This is a typical election appeal not of a proletarian party, but of a party of petty-bourgeois democrats, which conceals itself behind the name working class, and which is ready to compromise with the liberal bourgeoisie.

PAGE 406.\*\* The Bolsheviks at the Conference proposed a number of amendments to this Menshevik draft, demanding in effect its complete rewording, its replacement by another—a Bolshevik platform. The amendments insisted on the necessity of mentioning the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the final goal of the proletarian movement, of mentioning the republic, and of pointing to a national uprising and the seizure of power by the people as the means of convening the constituent assembly. They also declared it necessary "to point out precise-

ly and unequivocally the basic difference between the point of view of Social-Democracy and that of all other parties taking part in the Duma election campaign, to point out precisely the class content of the various parties and to mention them by name, *i.e.*, Cadets, Trudoviki, etc.

PAGE 406.\*\*\* The declaration of the Duma fraction of the R.S.D.L.P. in the Second Duma in the main coincided with the Menshevik draft electoral platform (see preceding note). The Bolshevik draft of the Duma declaration, which was rejected by the Duma fraction (the Mensheviks were in a majority in this fraction), was drafted by Lenin. In this declaration attention was called to the fact that the struggle had to be waged mainly outside of the Duma and it advanced as the main task the organisation of a mass popular movement, in which the peasantry was to act as the principal ally of the proletariat which was to lead the movement. Moreover, the Bolshevik draft advanced a series of concrete demands, repeating in the main the minimum programme of the Party. Among these demands were: the demand for a constituent assembly, the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy and the establishment of a democratic republic.

PAGE 408.\* *Rech*, No. 216, of November 27 (14), 1906, contained a report of a meeting of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Party of Popular Liberty in which a member of the committee is reported to have said: "The general temper in the localities is oppositional; the people are terrorised and cowed, but they will not hesitate to express their discontent at the elections by voting for the opposition candidates. If there is any danger in any district, that danger is more likely to come from the Left."

PAGE 412.\* *Tovarishch*, No. 101, of November 14 (1), 1906, commenting on a letter by Plekhanov that had appeared in that paper the previous day, said: "Plekhanov convincingly proves to Social-Democrats that it is their elementary duty at the present moment to support all the opposition parties, including the Cadets, and the passionate tone in which he writes is quite justified by the danger which confronts them: the danger that Social-Democrats will not understand the need for this. . . . The whole of Russian democracy must close its ranks for the sake of the struggle against the approaching barbarous reaction. . . . And having closed its ranks, it must not be disturbed by its internal differences, however great they may be." In the same issue, Kuskova, the author of the famous *Credo*, wrote: "There is no need to speak of the great joy with which we read this [Plekhanov's] letter. Why, it invites us to do the very thing that we 'bourgeois-democrats' invited the Social-Democrats to do at the very beginning of the movement."

PAGE 412.\*\* *Vyck (The Age)*, a Left-wing Cadet newspaper published in Moscow. A leading article in that paper of November 28 (15), 1906, com-

menting on the resolutions passed at the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., said: "It goes without saying that the Social-Democrats ought to confine their criticism of other Left-wing parties within the limits of conscientious polemics and should not hurl such charges of treachery to the people against them, for this only closes the path to agreement."

PAGE 412.\*\*\* *Rech*, No. 217, of November 28 (15), 1906, wrote: "We must come to a final understanding and cease to harbour illusions. We must establish once and for all that the Social-Democrats will not succeed in pushing 'bourgeois democracy' and the Duma anywhere. 'Bourgeois democracy' is going into the Duma in order to *legislate*, in order to make an attempt by parliamentary means to secure the necessary conditions for civic life . . . and not in order to make a revolution in the Duma."

PAGE 414.\* The article, *Against the Boycott*, was written by Lenin on July 9, 1907. In the same year it was published in the pamphlet, *On the Boycott of the Third Duma*, issued illegally in St. Petersburg. In addition to Lenin's article this pamphlet contained L. B. Kamenev's article *For the Boycott*. By the decision of the St. Petersburg High Court the pamphlet was condemned to be destroyed.

Only the last three chapters of this article, V, VI and VII, are included in this volume. The first four chapters describe the causes which prompted the boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the First (Witte) Duma (see in the present volume the articles, *The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection* and *Should We Boycott the State Duma?*). From chapter V on the article deals with the elections to the Third Duma which took place under conditions of the Stolypin police regime and under the new electoral law of June 16, 1907. (See note to page 242.\*\*\*)

Serious differences of opinion arose among the Bolsheviks on the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the Third Duma. A section of the Bolsheviks was in favour of boycotting the Third Duma, because in their opinion, the conditions were ripe for immediate mass action and therefore the forms of revolutionary struggle must remain the same as those during the upsurge of the revolution in 1905.

The boycottists wrongly estimated the conditions of that period and indulged in revolutionary phrases; they advocated tactics which were correct in the period when the revolutionary upsurge was at its height, but which were inapplicable at a time when there was no such upsurge, and when the revolutionary movement had to be revived by every possible means, including the Duma.

PAGE 415.\* This refers to the following passage in Marx's letter to Kugelman of March 3, 1869: "A very interesting movement is going on in France. The Parisians are making a regular study of their recent revolu-

tionary past, in order to prepare themselves for the new revolution. First *the origin of the Empire*—then the *coup d'état of December*. This had been forgotten just as the reaction in Germany succeeded in stamping out the memory of 1848-49." (Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, p. 88.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*) Marx then reviews the French literary-historical works that were devoted to this "study of the revolutionary past."

PAGE 417.\* Balalaikin, one of the characters in the satirical works of Saltykov-Shchedrin, a type of unprincipled liberal chatter-box. Molchalin, one of the characters in Griboyedov's comedy, *The Misfortune of Being Wisc*, a type of cringing flunkey. The term "Balalaikin-Molchalin progress" is used by Lenin to describe the activity of the Cadets in the Second Duma.

PAGE 418.\* In speaking of the "national souvenirs of 1792" in France, Lenin has in mind the war that revolutionary France waged against the reactionary feudal-monarchist states of Europe in defence of the gains of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1789-93. This war gave a number of models of "revolutionary methods of struggle" against the external enemies of the revolution. The old French army, which until then consisted of mercenaries, was completely reorganised on the basis of universal military service. The old officers were replaced by democratic elements, which were under the control of military commissars appointed by the central revolutionary government. In order to finance the army, a graduated income tax was introduced; in addition a system of requisitions of property was introduced and the property of counter-revolutionaries in the enemy regions was confiscated when these regions were occupied by the revolutionary army. Political work in the army was widely developed, in particular the supply of newspapers was well kept up. Revolutionary agitation was developed in the rear of the armies of the monarchist states. By a special decree of November 19, 1792, it was declared that the French nation "will lend its assistance . . . to all nations who want to restore their freedom." Another decree of December 15, 1792, ordered the French army staff, when entering enemy countries, to depose the old governments, to replace them by popular assemblies, to restrict the political rights of the agents of the old governments, to confiscate the property of the nobility, the clericals and the monarchists, and to abolish the feudal services imposed on the peasants. All these, as well as a number of other revolutionary measures within the country, in particular the terror against the internal counter-revolution, enabled the revolutionary dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie (represented by the Jacobins), which was then ruling France, to organise successful resistance in 1793-94 to the alliance of an overwhelming majority of European powers against revolutionary France.

In 1870, i.e., after France had experienced two more bourgeois revolu-

tions (1830 and 1848) and after the Revolution of 1848, during which the working class made another attempt to seize power (the June uprising of 1848), the French bourgeoisie called to power Napoleon III who became emperor of France. In order to save the monarchy from the growing revolution, this royal adventurer undertook a war against Prussia. In this war he suffered defeat after defeat, and he, together with practically the whole of the French army, was taken prisoner; so that instead of saving the monarchy, the war precipitated the uprising in Paris. Dealing with this rebellion Marx wrote: "On the 4th of September, 1870 . . . the working men of Paris proclaimed the Republic, which was almost instantaneously acclaimed throughout France, without a single voice of dissent." However, as a result of this revolution a bourgeois government assumed power, consisting partly of bourgeois republicans and partly even of monarchists who were hostile to Napoleon III. A situation arose in which the bourgeois-democrats, appealing to the "national souvenirs of 1792," i.e., the memory of the defence of the revolution against the feudal-monarchist states of Europe, could deceive the working class and secure its support in organising a war against Prussia, which had defeated Napoleon III. Since a war of that type would not be a revolutionary war, but on the contrary, would only deliver the workers as captives to bourgeois patriotism and sidetrack the working class from the task of organising its forces for a struggle against the bourgeoisie, Marx, in his *Second Address* of the General Council of the First International on the Franco-Prussian war, warned the workers against being deluded by the "national souvenirs of 1792." The following is the passage of this address issued almost on the eve of the Paris Commune:

"The French working class moves, therefore, under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Any attempt at upsetting the new government in the present crisis, when the enemy is almost knocking at the doors of Paris, would be a desperate folly. The French workmen must perform their duties as citizens; but, at the same time, they must not allow themselves to be swayed by the national *souvenirs* of 1792, as the French peasants allowed themselves to be deluded by the national *souvenirs* of the First Empire. They have not to recapitulate the past, but to build up the future. Let them calmly and resolutely improve the opportunities of republican liberty, for the work of their own class organisation. It will gift them with fresh herculean powers for the regeneration of France, and our common task—the emancipation of labour. Upon their energies and wisdom hinges the fate of the republic." (Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France, Second Address*, p. 77.)

PAGE 431.\* The article, *New Tasks and New Forces*, was published in *Vperyod* (*Forward*), No. 9, of March 8 (February 29), 1905. The title of the article expresses the new treatment of the organisation question as formulated by Lenin at that time in view of the changed methods and forms of work demanded in the conditions of the incipient Revolution of

1905. For the first time new strata of people were being drawn into active political life: millions of workers, of the city poor, of the intelligentsia and of the peasantry. In this connection the question inevitably arose of how to reconstruct the organisation of the Party in order to extend its leadership to all these masses. Two different solutions of the problem were advocated by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks respectively. The isolation of the Party from the masses in the January days, the obvious inadequacy of the old underground forms and methods of work, the success of the legal activity of the liberals, all raised a panic among the Mensheviks and induced them to clamour for a revision of the organisational structure of the Party and the complete abolition of the organisation principle of the old, Leninist *Iskra*. The resolutions and the rules adopted by the Menshevik Geneva Conference of 1905 represented a tremendous step backward in this respect. They embodied in effect the abolition of the principle of centralism in the structure of the Party. Instead of a strong Party centre, the Mensheviks set up a so-called Organisation Commission with very vague and limited powers. (See note to page 449.\*\*\*) Local committees were dissolved in an amorphous "leading collective." The anarchist principle of a referendum was adopted, i.e., the members of the local organisation were each asked to express their opinion upon every decision of the local committee before it was put into force. The result was what Plekhanov termed "organisational vagueness." Instead of strengthening the Party organisation, the attention of the Conference was wholly taken up with discussions on non-Party labour organisations, which, in the opinion of the Mensheviks, had become the starting point of the political consolidation of the proletariat.

Some of the most consistent Mensheviks went so far as to talk of liquidating the underground organisation. Subsequently, in October, the platform of liquidating the underground organisation and the virtual replacement of the Party organisation by non-Party labour clubs, i.e., the platform of opportunism, became the platform of the leading centre of the Mensheviks headed by Martov and Axelrod.

Lenin, in his letters and articles written before the Congress, as well as in this article, *New Tasks and New Forces*, advocated a totally different plan of Party reorganisation. He urged that the underground organisations must be preserved and strengthened, but that wide use should be made of all the possibilities for legal work. It was necessary, he said, to draw into Party work new, young, revolutionary cadres, to organise in a manner that suited the new situation; but the principles of the Party had to be kept intact and above all the old, illegal Party had to be strengthened.

PAGE 433.\* The pamphlet, *The Workers and the Intellectuals in Our Organisation*, signed by "Rabochy" ("A Worker") with a preface by P. Axelrod, was published in 1904 in Geneva. The author of the pamphlet, an ad-

herent of the Mensheviks, very strongly criticised the overwhelming influence which the intellectuals exercised in the Party organisation, and their irresponsible leadership. In this he criticised both the leaders of the majority and the leaders of the minority, and urged that the working men in the Party take a more active part in Party life. Incidentally, the author of the pamphlet also criticised the Bolshevik organisational plan, but criticised it in a manner that was so un-Menshevik that Axelrod was forced in the preface to the pamphlet to "correct" it, and the corrections were such that nothing remained of the ideas of the author. In an article entitled *Nightingales Are Not Fed on Fables*, Lenin deals with this pamphlet and with the main question of organisation, and in the course of this he says: "*Rabochy* is right a thousand times over when he declares that without guarantees, without equal rights, i.e., without election of officers, fine words about non-bureaucratic centralism remain mere phrases . . . either the election of officers or mere advice to put workers on the committees. If election of officers, then let us have formal guarantees, guarantees in the rules, equal rights in the rules. The workers will see that the new *Iskra*-ists are twisting around this question like devils before matins. If advice to put workers on the committees is desirable, if the old *Iskra* was right when it considered that democracy, i.e., the general application of the principle of elections in *Russian* secret organisations, is incompatible with the autocratic police system, then nowhere will you find such direct and edifying advice to put workers on the committees as was given by the majority."

PAGE 433.\*\* The Anti-Socialist Law was enacted in Germany by Bismarck in 1878 and was directed against the German Social-Democratic Labour Party. The pretext for passing this law was the attempts on the life of Wilhelm I by Hedel and Nobiling, who had nothing to do with Social-Democracy. The law prohibited assemblies, unions and literary works which advocated socialist views; it empowered the authorities to declare a state of siege and deport Socialists by administrative order. The law was passed for two and a half years, but was renewed until 1890, when the Reichstag refused to extend it. During the operation of the Anti-Socialist Law the Party increased its membership threefold.

PAGE 434.\* Zubatovism was an attempt by the tsar's government to divert the working class from the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy and to subordinate the economic struggle of the workers to the guidance of the police. The initiator and inspirer of this police socialism was the Chief of the Moscow Secret Police, S. V. Zubatov. Under his unofficial auspices a Mechanical Workers' Mutual Aid Society was organised in Moscow in 1901. Almost simultaneously he founded a Jewish Independent Workers' Party in Minsk which conducted a bitter struggle against the Bund, the Jewish Social-Democratic Party. At the end of 1902, Zubatov labour org-

anisations were also founded in the South of Russia, mainly in Odessa. Of course, Zubatovism was unable to retard the growth of the labour movement and its attack upon the capitalists and the autocracy. The workers who joined the Zubatov organisations quickly saw through the police trap. Very soon the Zubatov movement became a dangerous game for tsarism to play with the labour movement. Moreover it caused dissatisfaction among the employers. When the Zubatov organisations intervened in the relations between workers and their employers they were compelled, by the pressure of the workers, to support the latter's demands and organise strikes, and the employers began to petition the government to disband these organisations. In 1903 Zubatov was removed from his post and the Zubatov organisations were dissolved.

PAGE 437.\* This refers to the article, *From Narodism to Marxism*, in *Vper-yod*, No. 3, of January 24 (11), 1905, in which Lenin wrote: "The other day one of the legal papers expressed the opinion that this is not the time to point to the antagonisms of interests of the various classes which are opposed to the autocracy. This opinion is not new. We find it in the columns of *Osvobozhdeniye* and *Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya* with certain reservations, of course. It is natural that such views should be predominant among the representatives of bourgeois democracy. As regards the Social-Democrats, there cannot be two opinions among them on this point. The joint struggle of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie against the autocracy should not and cannot make the proletariat forget the sharp antagonism of interests between itself and the propertied classes. And in explaining this antagonism it is necessary to explain the wide difference in the standpoints of the various tendencies. It does not follow, of course, that we must reject these temporary agreements with the adherents of other tendencies, with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the liberals, which the Second Congress of our Party recognised as permissible for Social-Democrats."

PAGE 440.\* The article, *The Third Congress*, was published in *Proletary*, No. 1, of May 27 (14), 1905. It deals with the principal decisions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The question of convening the Third Congress was raised by Lenin in the Council of the Party (see note to page 443) as early as January 1904. The convocation of a new congress was the only way out of the situation in the Party which arose as a result of the disruptive activities pursued by the Mensheviks and of the internal Party struggle after the Second Congress. However, the Council which consisted of Lenin and Lengnik representing the Bolsheviks, and of Plekhanov, Axelrod and Martov representing the Mensheviks, rejected Lenin's motion. Lenin and his adherents then commenced a campaign against the Council and for the convocation of the Congress. According to the rules of the Party, the Congress could only be convened by the Council of the Party, but the

Council was obliged to convene a Congress if it were demanded by Party organisations representing half the votes in the Congress. The struggle for the Congress began under very difficult conditions. The majority of the Central Committee was in a conciliatory mood. The Committee had been enlarged after the Second Congress by the addition of new members and by five votes to four it brought a vote of censure against Lenin for raising the question of convening the Congress in the Council. Lenin had no other alternative than to appeal for support to the local Party organisations, to call on them to demand that the Council immediately convene the Congress. The Central Committee did everything it could to hamper his activities and even went to the length of threatening to dissolve any local organisation that demanded the convening of the Party Congress. The members of the Central Committee, Krassin, Noskov and Lyubimov presented an ultimatum to Lenin: either to cease agitating for a Congress or to leave the Central Committee. However, one by one the Party committees adopted Lenin's position. Soon afterwards, the majority of committees in Russia declared in favour of the immediate convocation of the Congress, but they were met by a new refusal on the part of the Party Council. It was then that the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority was formed, which took the initiative in convening the Third Party Congress independently of the Party Council and of the Central Committee. The latter continued to oppose the convocation and gave its consent only in March 1905.

The Congress was convened and opened in London on April 25, 1905. The Party Council did not attend as a body, although some members of it attended as representatives of the Central Committee. Twenty-one organisations were represented which, together with the representatives of the Central Committee, mustered 46 votes out of a total of 71 votes belonging to all the Party organisations. Many delegates attended the Congress as representatives of their organisations with a so-called consultative vote, i.e., with the right to speak, but not to vote. Thus the validity of the Congress according to the rules of the Party was beyond doubt. The Menshevik delegates elected to the Congress did not go to London but to Geneva where a Menshevik conference organised by the editors of *Iskra* was held. This conference took place simultaneously with the Third Congress, which then became the first Bolshevik Congress.

Lenin discusses the significance of the Third Congress and the resolutions it adopted in his pamphlet, *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, in this volume.

PAGE 442.\* Point I of the rules of the R.S.D.L.P. was adopted at the Second Congress in 1903. Two formulations of this clause were proposed to the Congress: that of Lenin and that of Martov. The Lenin draft read: "A member of the R.S.D.L.P. is one who recognises its programme and supports the Party materially as well as by personal participation in one

of the organisations of the Party." Martov's draft was framed as follows: "A member of the R.S.D.L.P. is one who recognises its programme and supports the Party materially as well as by working under the control and guidance of one of the organisations of the Party." The Second Congress adopted Martov's wording of rule 1. The Third Congress repealed that decision and passed Lenin's formula.

PAGE 442.\*\* The reference is to an article published in *Iskra*, No. 66, of May 28 (15), 1904, under the heading, *Kautsky On Our Party Disagreements*. In this article Kautsky in effect fully endorsed the Menshevik views on organisational questions. He asserted that Lenin's formulation of point 1 of the Party rules could only be adopted in free countries whereas in Russian conditions Martov's formula was the most expedient. He asserted furthermore that centralism was suitable when the Party existed legally, whereas the Menshevik system of decentralisation and local autonomy was more suitable for the police-autocratic conditions that prevailed in Russia. In order to justify Martov's position, Kautsky, like the Mensheviks, began to attack the organisational principles of Bolshevism. Referring to the point of disagreement he, like the Mensheviks, tried to prove that, generally speaking, organisational questions were not of great importance. He condemned the struggle within the R.S.D.L.P. and regarded it only as a struggle between leaders and, strangely enough, turned the point of his accusation only against Lenin. Kautsky, like the Mensheviks, argued that Lenin was to blame for the split in the Party. *Iskra*, of course, enthusiastically advertised Kautsky's letter in order to strengthen its own position.

Kautsky's attitude toward the split in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party expressed not only his personal point of view, but also that of the Second International towards the internal Party struggle within the R.S.D.L.P. (See note to page 448.\*)

PAGE 443.\* In accordance with the rules of the R.S.D.L.P., as adopted by the Second Congress, both the Central Committee and the editorial board of the central organ of the Party were elected at the Congress and were independent of each other. The functions of the Central Committee were to give practical and, especially, organisational leadership to the Party while the central organ was concerned with its ideological leadership. The work of both was co-ordinated by the Party Council, the chairman of which was elected by the Congress and the members nominated (two each) by the Central Committee and the central organ. The Third Party Congress adopted new rules which abolished this "bicentrism." Under the new rules the responsible editor of the central organ was appointed by the Central Committee, and the Party Council was abolished altogether.

PAGE 444.\* The documents enumerated by Lenin, which, with the exception of the ultimatum of the Central Committee of December 9 (Novem-

ber 26), 1903, were written by Lenin himself, describe Lenin's attitude to the Menshevik leaders, J. O. Martov, P. B. Axelrod, V. I. Zasulich and A. N. Potresov who after the Second Congress started a boycott of the central Party organs and disrupted the Party work.

PAGE 447.\* In tsarist Russia the church was the Established Church of the State. The state religion—Orthodox Greek Church—was upheld by the entire machinery of the state and teaching it was obligatory in all schools. The minimum programme of the Social-Democratic Party included the demand for the separation of the church from the state and the schools from the church. This demand was completely carried out only after the October Revolution—by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of February 3, 1918.

PAGE 448.\* This letter was written by Lenin in answer to an offer by the Secretariat of the International Socialist Bureau (of the Second International) to act as mediator between the factions in the R.S.D.L.P. and to effect their unification at a conference of representatives of both sides to be called by the Bureau. As is seen from Lenin's letter a similar offer was received prior to the Third Congress from Bebel, one of the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party (see note to page 451), who for the same purpose offered the services of the General Council of the German Social-Democratic Party. However, the attitude of both the Council of the German S.D.P. and the Secretariat of the I.S.B. to the split in the R.S.D.L.P. and to the Bolsheviks was substantially the same. Both were obviously inclined to sympathise with the Mensheviks and derived their information about the split, its causes and perpetrators from such alleged impartial witnesses as the Mensheviks, and in particular Plekhanov, whose letter Lenin proceeds to examine. In view of this, Lenin in the name of "many comrades in Russia" objected to such arbitrators as the General Council of the German Social-Democratic Party and thereby, in fact, also objected to the intervention of the International Socialist Bureau.

All the attempts of the leaders of the Second International to unite the R.S.D.L.P. were in reality attempts to subject the majority to the opportunist minority. This was the natural corollary of their centrist opportunist attitude towards the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Particularly characteristic was the attitude of Kautsky, who adopted the Menshevik point of view not only on questions of organisation (see note to page 442\*\*), but on a number of important tactical questions of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, also took up an anti-Bolshevik position and declared the differences of opinion between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks to be quite unimportant. Thus, on the basic question of the 1905 Revolution, *viz.*, the peasant question, Kautsky advised the Social-Democrats to be "neutral" in the struggle between the landlords and the peasants. This induced Lenin to write a special article

in reply, *The Proletariat and the Peasantry*. Kautsky's general attitude towards the differences of opinion between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks on tactical questions can be judged by the excerpt from his article, *The Split in the Russian Social-Democratic Party* (quoted in note to page 118). In the same article, dealing with the resolutions of the Third Bolshevik Congress and the Menshevik Conference in 1905, Kautsky wrote: "The resolutions represent the differences of opinion in the Russian Social-Democratic Party to be more considerable than they really are. . . . Foreigners, once they interfere in these matters at all, have every reason to be concerned not to give publicity to these resolutions, thereby stimulating the struggle anew, but to do their best to cause these resolutions with the whole history that preceded them to be forgotten."

To what extent Kautsky was really impartial in this struggle even in regard to publishing the articles sent in by the Bolsheviks, Lenin shows in his letter to the Secretariat of the I. S. B. Hence, he could not but object to such judges, and this he does in the present letter. However, when Huysmans, the secretary of the International Socialist Bureau declared that it was intended to bring only "moral influence" to bear on the factions in the R.S.D.L.P. in order to bring them together, Lenin, after consulting the Central Committee, agreed to the International Socialist Bureau calling a conference of representatives of both factions. This conference did not take place however; it became superfluous owing to the direct negotiations for unity between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks that were started in July 1905. (See note to page 453.\*)

PAGE 448.\*\* This refers to Plekhanov's letter, written under the following circumstances. Lenin wrote informing the International Socialist Bureau of the Bolshevik Congress which had just taken place and added that the Central Committee had appointed Lenin to be the representative of the Party on the International Socialist Bureau.

The latter sent a letter of enquiry to G. V. Plekhanov, and the letter cited by Lenin is Plekhanov's reply to this enquiry.

PAGE 448.\*\*\* A reference to an article by Plekhanov entitled *What Should Not Be Done*, in *Iskra*, No. 52, in which Plekhanov, supporting the Mensheviks, says that "in fighting revisionism, we must not always fight the revisionists." By refusing to support Lenin Plekhanov sided with the opportunists. In a subsequent article in *Iskra*, No. 54, entitled *Something About "Economism" and the "Economists,"* he criticised Lenin and wrote in sympathetic terms about the Economists.

PAGE 449.\* Lenin refers to a letter Plekhanov wrote to the Menshevik *Iskra* after the Geneva Conference (see next note), in which he said: "Comrades! The decisions of the Conference have dealt a mortal blow to the central institutions of our Party. They force me therefore to resign

my post as editor of the central organ and as fifth Member of the Council (elected by the Second, legal Congress). G. Plekhanov.

"P.S. I take this opportunity publicly to ask that section of the Party which regards the decisions of the 'Third Congress' as binding whether it wants me to continue to represent this Party—which alas is torn asunder—at the International Socialist Bureau. I can continue to act as representative of the R.S.D.L.P. *only if both factions wish it.*"

PAGE 449.\*\* The minority conference organised by the Mensheviks in Geneva simultaneously with the Third Party Congress consisted of the delegates who had seceded from the Congress and of the League of Russian Social-Democrats Abroad. Among other decisions it adopted "Organisational Rules" in accordance with which the functions of the Central Committee were turned over to "regular conferences" of a special "Executive Committee" and representatives of the regional committees. At the same time, in order "to assist the Party, which has been deprived of its official, practical centre in the organisation of its forces" it set up an "Organisation Commission" of six. This Organisation Commission (O.C.) virtually acted as the Menshevik Central Committee.

PAGE 450.\* The pseudonyms given are those of the members of the Central Committee, who were the "conciliators": Ma—V. A. Noskov; Bohm—M. A. Silvin; Vladimir—L. Y. Karpov; Innokenty—I. F. Dubrovinsky; Andrey—A. A. Kvyatkovsky; Voron—L. E. Halperin. All of these, as well as the three Mensheviks who had been co-opted to the Central Committee, N. V. Krokmal, E. M. Alexandrova and V. N. Rozanov, were arrested at the meeting of the Central Committee held in Moscow on February 22 (9), 1905, in the apartment of the well-known writer, L. N. Andreyev.

PAGE 451.\* A reference to Bebel's letter, dated February 16, 1905, in which on behalf of the General Council of the German Social-Democratic Party he proposed arbitration as a means of settling the "dispute," and at the same time stated that the Council had instructed him to preside at such a court of arbitration.

The editors of *Iskra* received a similar proposal and published it in *Iskra*, No. 86, of February 16 (3). In the same issue the Menshevik Party Council stated that it accepted Bebel's offer, and that it appointed K. Kautsky and Clara Zetkin as its arbitrators. Lenin sent his reply to Bebel on February 20, 1905.

In addition to Lenin's reply, the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority also sent a reply to Bebel in which it stated that the struggle in the ranks of Russian Social-Democracy was not of a "personal or even a group nature" but was the "clash of political ideas" and that therefore this question could only be settled by a Party Congress, and not by a court.

*Iskra*, No. 91, published a resolution adopted by the Menshevik Council which was in the nature of an "appeal to the members of the Third Party Congress, convened by the Bureau in Russia, which calls upon the Congress to accept the mediation of the German Party and of Bebel in order to restore Party unity, and expresses agreement to send two representatives of the Council to the Congress to open negotiations on this matter."

There was no special report on Bebel's proposal at the Congress, although *Vperyod*, No. 8, had urged that the matter be officially raised there. The letter was discussed in the course of the debate and the delegates who referred to it supported the point of view expressed in the letter of the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority.

PAGE 452.\* This refers to an article by Rosa Luxemburg published simultaneously in *Iskra*, No. 69, of July 23 (10), 1904, and in *Die Neue Zeit*, entitled *Organisational Problems of Russian Social-Democracy*, in which she opposed Lenin's views on organisation and supported those of the Mensheviks.

PAGE 453.\* The main point in this letter is unity with the Mensheviks. This was not the first letter on this subject. Negotiations on Party unity were started much earlier by the Central Committee elected at the Third Party Congress. In July the Central Committee wrote an open letter to the Menshevik centre (the Organisation Commission) inviting it "to fix a precise date and elect representatives to conduct negotiations." In these negotiations the Central Committee had to act in accordance with two resolutions passed by the Third Congress: 1) an unpublished resolution in which unity was made conditional on subsequent ratification by a new Congress (see note to page 58), and 2) a published resolution *On the Seceded Section of the Party*, which after briefly describing Menshevism of that period, continued as follows: "The Congress invites all Party members to conduct an energetic ideological struggle everywhere against such partial deviations from the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy; at the same time it is of the opinion that persons who share such views to a greater or lesser extent may participate in Party organisations provided they recognise Party congresses and the Party rules and wholly submit to Party discipline." (Our italics.—Ed.) Thus the main conditions for unity with the Mensheviks was the recognition of the Third Congress and of its decisions, and that unity itself was to be achieved on the basis of these decisions, in particular on the basis of the Party rules passed by the Congress. This meant that unity had to be established in a manner that would prevent the Bolshevik section of the Party from becoming merged in the seceded, opportunist sections.

From the very beginning of the negotiations the Central Committee deviated from all these conditions and adopted a pronounced *conciliatory*

position. This was revealed even in the open letter referred to above, which was written by Bogdanov and Krassin. In this letter they said: "What disunites us? Tactical disagreements? But are they so serious that it was worth while splitting the ranks of Social-Democracy into two parties? The difference between the practical resolutions adopted at the Third Congress and those adopted at your first conference are so insignificant that an onlooker would find it hard to distinguish them at first. Differences on organisational forms? But with a common programme and almost identical tactics can disagreements on organisation serve as sufficient reason for the separate existence of two parties? That would be permissible, perhaps, if our organisational forms suppressed the ideological freedom and the practical initiative of Party organisations and individual Party members."

This letter is characteristic of the manner in which the conciliators obscured the questions of principle that divided the revolutionary and opportunist sections of the Party, and this also affected the organisational aspect of the question of unity. As a result, an agreement was reached with the following two principal points: 1) Unity must proceed from below by means of agreements between the local and not the central organisations, and 2) not only agreement but fusion must be achieved *without either the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks calling their own congresses*. These terms entirely disregarded the stipulations for unity laid down by the Third Congress and the rules, and did not even provide for their ratification by a new Congress. Lenin sharply protested against this in two letters he wrote to the Central Committee, on August 14 (1) and September 15 (2), 1905. In the first letter he said that "nothing can do more to prejudice the cause of future Party unity than an agreement of this sort," and that it "will only inevitably lead to a new rupture and far greater bitterness." In the second letter he said: "the fact remains that you forgot about the secret resolution . . . about it being *obligatory* for the terms of fusion to be ratified by the Fourth Congress. What has actually happened is that you have annulled this resolution. That this was a mistake and that it must be rectified is indisputable. . . . You write that it was a question of fusion on the basis of the Third Congress. But, gentlemen! Why deceive yourselves? Why weaken one's correct position by obvious hypocrisy? Fusion on the basis of the Third Congress was rejected. It was proposed here to Plekhanov and to the Organisation Commission, but was rejected. . . . In my opinion it would be better to declare to the Party straightforwardly: unfortunately they have rejected fusion on the basis of the Third Congress, let us prepare the Fourth Congress in such a way that two congresses should meet at the same time and place. Let us prepare a plan for fusion."

Lenin's letter to the Central Committee of October 3 (September 20), 1905, was written in a milder tone because by that time, owing to the insistence of Lenin, the Central Committee had begun to display great

er firmness in its negotiations with the Mensheviks. At the third conference with the Mensheviks the representatives of the Central Committee declared that if the Mensheviks finally rejected unity on the basis of the decisions of the Third Party Congress, a Unity Congress would be the only possible method of amalgamating both sections.

On the future course of the unity negotiations see notes to pages 456 \*\*\* and 465.)

PAGE 453.\*\* This refers to the Party representation on the International Socialist Bureau. (See note to page 449.\*) The Central Committee had appointed Plekhanov to be the Party's representative.

Comrade Stassova informed Lenin of this decision and also of the decision to appoint Plekhanov editor of the scientific organ of the Party. In her letter Comrade Stassova said: "These two decisions have not yet been communicated to the committees and they will be communicated only if, on conditions which are best known to you, you are of the opinion that they are proper and should be published."

Lenin strongly protested against this appointment, and asked: "Have we the right to appoint as the representative of the Party a man who refuses to join the Party and recognise the Third Congress?" He suggested the appointment of V. V. Vorovsky. In the end Plekhanov was not appointed. After considerable vacillation among the "conciliatory" members of the Central Committee, they appointed Lenin.

PAGE 454.\* This refers to the co-optation of Insarov (I. H. Lalayants) and Lyubich (I. A. Sammer) to the Central Committee of the Party in the capacity of agents.

PAGE 456.\* The article, *The Reorganisation of the Party*, published in *Novaya Zhizn*, Nos. 9, 13 and 14, of November 23, 28 and 29 (10, 15 and 16), 1905, was the first article written by Lenin on his return from abroad referring to the necessity of reconstructing the Party in conformity with the new conditions, viz., the "freedom of assembly, of association and of the press" which the working class had practically seized, and the mass working class organisations which had arisen in the form of Soviets of Workers' Deputies and trade unions which the Party had to lead in the course of the revolutionary development. The main principles of this article were later embodied in the resolution of the Tammersfors Bolshevik Conference in December 1905. This resolution stated: "1. Recognising as indisputable the principles of democratic centralism, the Conference is of the opinion that it is necessary to introduce wide electoral principles and to give the elected centres complete power in regard to ideological and practical leadership; at the same time these centres may be removed and their activities must be given wide publicity and be subjected to strict supervision; 2. For the purpose of co-ordinating and reviving the work in the localities, the Conference recommends that regional conferences and

alliances with the regional organs be arranged; 3. The Conference instructs all Party organisations to set to work immediately and energetically to reorganise the local organisations on an electoral basis; in doing so there is no need to strive to achieve uniformity in all the systems of elected bodies, but the departure from complete democracy (two-stage elections, etc.) is permissible only in the event of insuperable obstacles standing in the way of applying complete democracy."

PAGE 456.\*\* The "Independents," i.e., the Independent Labour Party, formed in St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1905 by the worker M. A. Ushakov with the direct assistance of the secret police for the purpose of diverting the workers from the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy. Organisations of a trade union type, the Central Labour Union and Women's Labour Union, were also set up, and a weekly journal *Russky Rabochy* (*The Russian Worker*) was issued, which appeared from October 14, 1905, to January 6, 1906, edited by I. A. Safonov, the funds for this being provided by the government. The practical work of the Independents consisted mainly in fighting revolutionary Social-Democracy, but they had no influence among the workers and the organisation disappeared entirely by the beginning of 1907.

PAGE 456.\*\*\* This refers to *An Appeal To All Party Organisations and to All Workers and Social-Democrats*, issued on the convocation of the Fourth Congress of the Party. It was stated in the document that it had been "adopted unanimously, all members of the Central Committee being present." By this it was emphasised that Lenin had taken part in drafting it. It announced that the Congress was to open on December 23 (10), 1905. However, the Congress did not open on that date; instead, a conference of Bolsheviks was held at Tammerfors. (See note to page 361.\*\*\*) The appeal gave the following instructions in regard to the elections of delegates to the Congress: "We are convening the Fourth Ordinary Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. on the basis of the rules adopted at the Third Congress, and, in virtue of the powers vested in us by those rules, we invite the periphery, i.e., all organisations affiliated to the Party, to send representatives to the Congress with consultative votes at the rate of one representative for every 300 organised comrades (or for a smaller number in those centres where the total number of organised workers is less than 300). We invite all Social-Democratic workers who have not yet joined the Party to join a Party organisation immediately in order to take part in the election of delegates. As soon as the Congress assembles we shall propose to the representatives of the committees who according to the rules have decisive votes to grant decisive votes to all those who have been invited to attend with consultative votes."

PAGE 465.\* The conference of the Mensheviks held simultaneously with the Third Congress discussed the question of amalgamating with the Bolsheviks

and passed the following resolution: "In spite of existing differences of opinion on questions of tactics and organisation, Party unity is quite possible and therefore necessary. The Conference instructs the elected Organisation Commission, as soon as it is formed, to enter into negotiations in the name of the organisations which endorse the decisions of the Conference, with the central bodies of the other side concerning the terms of agreement between the two sections of the Party."

PAGE 467.\* This *Appeal to the Party* was written by Lenin immediately after the Unity Congress and was adopted at a meeting of the Bolshevik delegates of this Congress held at that time. The Unity Congress met after protracted negotiations between the Central Committee and the Menshevik Organisation Commission (see note to page 453\*) and after a Joint Central Committee had been set up, which, in January and February 1906, published two appeals to the Party announcing the date of the Congress, the agenda, rate of representation, the list of organisations having the right to be represented, method of electing delegates, etc. Later the tactical platform of the "majority" and "minority" were published in No. 2 of *Party News*.

The Congress took place in Stockholm and lasted 15 days, April 23-May 8, 1906. There were 62 Mensheviks and 46 Bolsheviks present. This proportion of votes predetermined the character of the work of the Congress. On all questions Menshevik resolutions were passed, and the central organs elected at the Congress were also composed of Mensheviks. The following were elected editors of the central organ: I. O. Martov, A. S. Martynov, P. Maslov, F. I. Dan, A. N. Potresov. To the Central Committee 7 Mensheviks and only 3 Bolsheviks were elected, *viz.*, V. A. Desnitsky, L. B. Krassin and A. I. Rykov, who was subsequently replaced by A. A. Bogdanov. Moreover, representatives from the national Social-Democratic Parties which became affiliated to the R.S.D.L.P. were added to the Central Committee, namely, the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the Bund, and the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Latvia.

PAGE 471.\* This refers to the Menshevik resolution on the armed uprising. Speaking on this resolution at the Congress, Lenin said: "Take the resolution of the 'Mensheviks.' Instead of calm discussion, instead of a weighing of experience, instead of a study of the relation between strikes and rebellion, you see a masked—masked in a petty way—renunciation of the December uprising. Plekhanov's view, 'they should not have taken to arms,' runs like a thread through the whole of your resolution (although the majority of the Russian 'Mensheviks' have declared that they do not agree with Plekhanov). In his speech, Comrade Cherevanin betrayed himself in the most unparalleled fashion when, in order to defend the resolution of the 'Mensheviks,' he was obliged to depict the December uprising as a hopeless manifestation of 'despair,' as an uprising which did not in the least prove the possibility of armed struggle."

PAGE 473.\* *The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy*, published in *Proletary*, Nos. 14 and 15, of March 17 (4), and April 7 (March 25), 1907, sets forth the ideas which were embodied in Lenin's draft resolutions on the most important tactical questions submitted to the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.: 1) On the Present Period of the Democratic Revolution; 2) On the Attitude Towards the Bourgeois Parties; 3) On the Class Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Period of the Democratic Revolution; 4) On the Tactics of the Social-Democrats in the State Duma; 5) On the Intensification of Mass Economic Poverty and of the Economic Struggle; 6) On the Non-Party Labour Organisations in Connection with the Anarcho-Syndicalist Trend among the Proletariat.

These draft resolutions were discussed at a meeting of representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee, Moscow Committee, the Moscow Regional Committee and the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region, which took place February 28-March 3. The resolutions were adopted as material for a Party discussion prior to the Congress.

At the Fifth Congress the Bolsheviks, on the whole, gained the day. True, the Mensheviks, with the help of the vacillating elements of the Congress and of the "Marsh" led by Trotsky, succeeded in removing the first of the above resolutions from the agenda and in nullifying the Bolshevik appraisal of the work and errors of the Social-Democratic fraction in the Second Duma when the fraction submitted its report. But on a number of questions such as the tactics of the Social-Democrats in the Duma, the attitude to non-proletarian parties, the labour congress and on questions of organisation, the Mensheviks suffered defeat after defeat. Elections to the Central Committee also resulted in a Bolshevik majority: out of a total of 15 members of the Central Committee, 5 Bolsheviks and 4 Mensheviks were elected; the remaining 6 seats were reserved for the representatives of national parties, to be nominated by the Bund and the Polish and Lettish Parties after the Congress.

The Bolsheviks emerged victorious at the Fifth Congress in spite of the fact that they had only a slight numerical preponderance over the Mensheviks. The Congress consisted of 90 Bolsheviks, 85 Mensheviks, 45 Poles, 56 Bundists and 26 Letts. The national delegations represented the "Marsh" (i.e., vacillating centre) between the revolutionary and opportunist wings of the Russian section of the Party—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. The Polish delegation, the so-called Left centre, followed the Bolsheviks on questions of principle; the Bundists—the Right centre—followed the Mensheviks. The Letts often split among themselves, but the majority of that delegation supported the Bolsheviks. The leading role in the "Marsh" was played by Trotsky who, from the avowed and arrant Menshevik of 1903-04 had become transformed into the Russian centrist who concealed his Menshevik nature by what Lenin called his "absurdly 'Left' theory of "permanent revolution." He advocated this theory at the Fifth Congress and on a number of questions he supported the Mensheviks.

PAGE 474.\* Lenin refers to the tactics of the Austrian Social-Democrats in 1905-06 in the struggle of the working class for universal suffrage. The October strike in Russia gave an impetus to that struggle and intensified it; on December 11, 1905, over 100,000 Viennese workers came out into the streets demanding universal suffrage. The struggle went on and resulted in victory in January 1907. See also Lenin's *Lecture on the 1905 Revolution* in this volume.

PAGE 476.\* This refers to an article by Plekhanov in *Russkaya Zhizn* (*Russian Life*), No. 46, of March 8 (February 23), 1907. This paper was at first a Left-Cadet paper but later was taken over by the Mensheviks. In the article referred to Plekhanov attacks the Bolsheviks and argues that if the revolution delivered an open blow against the government at that moment it would prove fatal to the revolution, because, he says: "The forces of the revolution are growing day by day; the forces of the government are declining. In view of that a 'frontal attack' now would only be to the advantage of the reactionaries." He recommended the tactics of "frying the bureaucracy on the slow fire of national agitation." Calling for caution, Plekhanov added: "Revolutionaries must do all that lies in their power to bring it about that if the government does decide to make a 'frontal attack' it shall not have any justification whatever, even on the surface, it shall not be able to say to the country: 'we were compelled to do this by the extreme Left.'" In this article Plekhanov also supported the Cadet demand for a "responsible Ministry" and called upon the Party to put the whole weight of its authority and influence behind this demand.

PAGE 477.\* This refers to the following passage in Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Social Revolution*: "The measures intended for the purpose of changing the juridical and political superstructure of society in conformity with the changed economic conditions are *reforms* if they are undertaken by the classes which hitherto have been the economic and political rulers of society—they are reforms even if they are not granted voluntarily, but are forced upon the ruling classes by the pressure of the oppressed classes, or by the force of circumstances. On the other hand, such measures are deeds of *revolution* if they are undertaken by the class which hitherto had been politically and economically oppressed and has now won political power and must necessarily, in its own interest, use this power in order, more or less quickly, to change the whole of the juridical and political superstructure and create new forms of social co-operation.

PAGE 478.\* The Social-Democratic fraction in the Second Duma proposed that a Duma Commission be set up to investigate on the spot the measures taken by the government to administer relief to the famine-stricken areas. The Cadet leader, Rodichev, opposed this proposal and declared that the "sending of itinerary inspectors by the Duma is not statesman-like,"

and that the work of the Commission must be confined to verifying the report of the ministry in St. Petersburg. Stolypin on his part declared that the "government wholly and unreservedly endorses Rodichev's proposal."

PAGE 480.\* Lenin here refers to a leading article in *Tovarishch*, No. 213, of March 24 (11), 1905, entitled *Rumours*. Lenin returned to this subject on another occasion when he wrote: "First of all, Stolypin, as a candidate for the Ministry was 'proposed' to the 'public men,' i.e., to the leaders of the bourgeoisie, and later, when he had become a Minister, Stolypin, through the whole of his career, made 'proposals' to the Muromtsevs, Heydens, and the Guchkovs, Stolypin's career came to an end (it is well known that Stolypin's resignation was already predetermined) when the whole circle of parties and shades of the bourgeoisie to whom 'proposals' could be made had become *exhausted*." And then he goes on to say: "The important thing is not whether Carp or Sidor behaved worse, but, first, that the old landlord class could no longer rule without making 'proposals' to the leaders of the bourgeoisie and, secondly, that *common ground* has been found for negotiations between the savage landlord and the bourgeois, and that common ground is *counter-revolution*."

PAGE 480.\*\* *Novy Luch (New Ray)*, a Bolshevik political and literary daily, which began to appear on March 5 (February 20), 1907, in St. Petersburg. Only 7 issues appeared in all and the paper was suppressed.

PAGE 483.\* This refers to Engels' pamphlet, *The Housing Question*, in which, replying to the Proudhonists, he wrote: "In general, the question is not whether the proletariat when it comes to power will simply seize by force the tools of production, the raw materials and means of subsistence, whether it will pay immediate compensation for them, or whether it will redeem property therein by instalments spread over a long period. To attempt to answer such a question in advance and for all cases would be utopia-making, and I prefer to leave this to others."

PAGE 484.\* Of all the resolutions drafted by Lenin for the Fifth Party Congress only one is given here, viz., the one directed against the Menshevik attempt to liquidate the Party as the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat by means of the so-called "Labour Congress." The substance of the other draft resolutions is given in the preceding article, *The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy*. The idea of convening a Labour Congress was suggested for the first time by P. B. Axelrod in 1905 in two of his letters to a comrade published by *Iskra* in a special pamphlet, *The People's Duma and the Labour Congress* (Geneva, 1905.)

By means of a Labour Congress Axelrod wished to create a labour organisation through which it would be possible to exercise influence over the bourgeoisie. He wrote: "We must try to call to life a broad labour

organisation with a central club at the head of it . . . the object of which would be to weld together the local proletariat and to create a solid revolutionary atmosphere controlling and dictating to both the State Duma and the People's Duma."

Axelrod's proposal did not make much headway in 1905 and the subsequent upsurge of the revolution consigned it to oblivion. But he revived it in 1906 after the Fourth Party Congress and the dissolution of the First Duma. The Menshevik Central Committee at first opposed the proposal, but after the Bolsheviks demanded the convocation of a special Party congress, it decided to oppose the agitation for a Party congress by starting an agitation for a Labour Congress. In the discussion that ensued the Mensheviks pushed this proposal for calling a Labour Congress more and more to the front as a means of solving the Party crisis and of creating a new All-Russian Labour Party in place of the R.S.D.L.P.

The obviously anti-Party character of the agitation for a Labour Congress was caught up by the liberals, the anarcho-syndicalists and even by Black Hundred elements such as the Independents of the Ushakov brand. (See note to page 456.\*\*\*) Consequently, the All-Russian Party Conference held in November 1906, in spite of its Menshevik majority, was obliged to prohibit the taking of practical measures for the convocation of the Labour Congress and allowed the discussion on this topic to be conducted exclusively on Party lines. At the Fifth Party Congress the Mensheviks again came forward with a scheme for a Labour Congress, but were defeated. The Congress declared that "the agitation for a non-Party Labour Congress is harmful to the class development of the proletariat."

A peculiar resurrection of the Axelrod idea of a Labour Congress occurred in 1925 within the ranks of the opposition in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when the Leningrad organisation advanced the slogan that 90 per cent of the Party membership must henceforth consist of workers from the bench, i.e., the immediate enrolment of some five million workers into the Party. This slogan meant nothing more nor less than the merging of the Party, the vanguard of the working class, with the working masses, whose political consciousness had not yet been finally formed, i.e., it was equivalent to what the Mensheviks proposed to do with the Party in 1905-07.

PAGE 486.\* Lenin wrote this speech in February 1907. In May of the same year it was published in pamphlet form under the title *Report to the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. Concerning the Split in St. Petersburg and the Institution of a Party Court in Connection with the Split.*

In this volume the introductory part describing the character of the Party court and the procedure adopted at it, and the concluding chapter entitled *A Brief Summary of the Actual History of the Split in St. Petersburg*, are omitted. The history of the split is as follows: A conference of the St. Petersburg organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., which had

a Bolshevik majority, on January 19, 1907, decided not to enter into any *bloc* with the Cadets, but to invite the Trudoviki and the Socialist-Revolutionaries to enter into an election agreement. Foreseeing the result of the conference, the Central Committee, consisting mainly of Mensheviks, categorically demanded that the Conference divide into two and sit separately as a city and gubernia conference so as to give the Mensheviks predominance at least in the gubernia conference. This the conference refused to do, whereupon the minority of the conference, consisting of 31 Mensheviks, withdrew. Following that, the St. Petersburg Mensheviks elected their own executive organ and with the assistance of several members of the Central Committee started an independent election campaign. Independently of the Bolsheviks they entered into an agreement with the Narodnik parties for the purpose of concluding a joint agreement with the Cadets. The Mensheviks who left the conference sent a declaration to the Central Committee (which was Menshevik at that time and which gave its blessing to the secessionists), which was subsequently published in pamphlet form under the title *Why We Were Forced To Leave the Conference*, and which gave a very distorted account of the events. Lenin refuted this declaration in his pamphlet *The Elections in St. Petersburg and the Hypocrisy of the 31 Mensheviks*. It was this pamphlet, the contents of which can be gathered from Lenin's speech, that caused the Menshevik Central Committee to institute Party proceedings against Lenin.

The court consisted of three judges representing the 31 Mensheviks who had brought the charge against Lenin, three representing Lenin and three judges appointed by the Central Committees of the Lettish and Polish Social-Democrats and the Bund. At the opening of the trial Lenin demanded that the court should also try the 31 Mensheviks and the leader of the Menshevik group, F. Dan, on counter-charges he had formulated. However, the court considered this to be beyond its competence and referred the matter to the Central Committee, which decided that the given court was instituted to consider Lenin's case only and that a new prosecution of other persons depended entirely on the Central Committee. The court was able to hold only two sittings, presided over by the Bundist, R. Abramovich, and to examine only three witnesses out of the several dozen who were to be called. Lenin read his speech at the first sitting of the court. After the second sitting the trial was interrupted owing to the opening of the Fifth Party Congress. The speech printed in pamphlet form was distributed to the members of the Congress.

Both the trial and the conditions under which it arose show how deep, even at that time, were the differences of opinion between the two sections of the "united" Party and how fundamentally different the Bolsheviks' approach to questions of internal Party differences, Party discipline and Party unity was from that of the Mensheviks. Lenin in his speech raised a question of great importance, namely, that of the difference between the antagonism of views within a united party and

the struggle against secessionists and secessionist groups, which, by violating Party discipline and Party unity, place themselves in the position of enemies against whom a ruthless struggle must be conducted. In this respect the speech was, and still is to this day, of enormous importance in point of principle.

PAGE 488.\* The pamphlet, *Social-Democracy and the Elections in St. Petersburg*, was written by Lenin on January 28, 1907, and contains an analysis of the conditions under which the conference of the St. Petersburg organisation was convened and of the behaviour of the Mensheviks who left the conference.

PAGE 488.\*\* The pamphlet, *When You Hear the Judgment of a Fool*, was written by Lenin in January 1907, and is a refutation of the attacks of the Left bourgeois and Narodnik papers on the decision of the St. Petersburg conference not to enter into *blocs* with the Cadets during the elections to the Second Duma. The principal argument of the opponents of this decision was that there was the danger that the Black Hundreds would win the election. To this Lenin replied: "The talk about the danger of the Black Hundreds winning the elections is intended to deceive the people. . . . The fable about *this* Black Hundred danger *really* serves the interests of the Cadets."

PAGE 494.\* *Proletary* of February 24 (11), 1907, published a report on the election campaign in Kovno, where the Bundists, having formed a *bloc* with the Jewish section of the liberal bourgeoisie, the so-called *Dostizhentsi* (a party which demanded equal rights for Jews and Gentiles), opposed the Lithuanian Social-Democrats; as a result, both the Bund and the Lithuanian Social-Democrats failed to return a single elector to the electoral college. Out of 7 electors, 6 were *Dostizhentsi* elected by the votes of the Bundists.

PAGE 497.\* Lenin refers to the resolution *The United Election Campaign in the Provinces*, passed by the Tammerfors Conference in November 1906, which was as follows: "The Conference expresses the conviction that within the limits of one organisation, it is obligatory for all members to carry out all decisions concerning the election campaign adopted by the competent organs of the local organisations within the scope of the general directions of the Central Committee. The Central Committee may prohibit the local organisations from putting up lists of candidates that are not purely Social-Democratic, but may not force them to put up not purely Social-Democratic lists of candidates."

PAGE 499.\* The article, *The Historical Meaning of the Internal Party Struggle in Russia*, was written by Lenin at the end of 1910, as a reply

to two articles, *The Prussian Discussion and the Russian Answer*, by Martov, and *The Tendencies of Development of Russian Social-Democracy*, by Trotsky, published in the German Social-Democratic theoretical organ *Die Neue Zeit*. In a letter to the Polish Social-Democrat, Y. Marchlewski, who at that time was a regular contributor to *Die Neue Zeit*, Lenin called Martov's and Trotsky's articles "vulgar and despicable" and went on to say: "It is outrageous that Martov and Trotsky lie and write libels with impunity under the guise of scientific articles!" Kautsky and Wurm, the editors of *Die Neue Zeit*, who accepted the articles of Martov and Trotsky against the Bolsheviki, at the same time refused to publish an article in reply by Lenin. Marchlewski therefore replied in an article which Lenin saw before it was published.

Lenin still hoped that *Die Neue Zeit* would publish an article by him, if only in reply to Trotsky. This explains the belated appearance of his reply to Martov and Trotsky in the Russian *Discussionny Listok* (*Discussion Sheet*). He published his reply in this manner only when it had become perfectly plain that *Die Neue Zeit* would not publish it.

Lenin's article dwells mainly on the struggle against Menshevism on all the main questions concerning the Revolution of 1905-07: the character of the driving force of this revolution, the significance of the proletarian struggle and the experience of this struggle. Lenin regarded the internal Party struggle as a struggle of Bolshevism for a *proletarian* policy in the bourgeois-democratic revolution against the liberal policy of Menshevism. He also regarded the internal Party struggle in the period of 1908-10, *i.e.*, the period of reaction, as a continuation of the struggle in the period of revolution.

Thus the present article can serve as a postscript to his articles of 1905-07; therefore, it has been included in the present volume, although it was written at the end of 1910.

PAGE 501.\* The Magdeburg Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party discussed the action of the Social-Democrats in the Baden Landtag in voting for the state budget. Rightly regarding such a vote as the manifestation of extreme opportunism Bebel declared: "I believe that we are a party of Social-Democrats and if there are any National-Liberal Party men among us they ought to leave the Party." (The National-Liberal Party was the party of the German bourgeoisie.)

PAGE 502.\* At the end of the nineteenth century a number of bourgeois professors and writers, while criticising the revolutionary theory of Marx, at the same time hypocritically professed to be adherents of Marxism. In Russia in the middle of the 'nineties, this role was played by the "legal Marxists." In Western Europe a similar role was played by the German professors, Sombart and Brentano, who preached class harmony and the possibility of solving the social problem by reconciling the interests of the capitalists and the workers.

PAGE 502.\*\* In another article, written in 1909 (*The Aim of the Struggle of the Proletariat in Our Revolution*), Lenin, summing up the experiences of the Russian revolution, wrote the following:

"The experience of the end of 1905 has undoubtedly established that the 'general revolutionary upsurge in the country' gives rise to special 'organisations of the revolutionary struggle of the people' (according to the Menshevik formula; the 'embryonic organs of a new revolutionary government' according to the Bolshevik formula). It is equally indisputable that in the course of the history of the Russian bourgeois revolution these organs were created in the first place by the proletariat, in the second place by the 'other elements of revolutionary democracy,' and a mere glance at the composition of the population in Russia in general, and in Great Russia in particular, will show the enormous preponderance of the peasants over these other elements. The historical tendency on the part of these local organs, or organisations, to unite, is no less indisputable. These indisputable facts inevitably lead to the conclusion that a victorious revolution in present-day Russia cannot be anything but a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and of the peasantry."

On the slogan of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry see the article, *Social-Democracy and the Provisional Revolutionary Government*, and chapter X of the pamphlet, *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, both in this volume.

PAGE 503.\* Marx expressed these ideas in his article, *The Berlin Counter-Revolution*, published in *Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of September 12, 1848. Lenin deals in detail with the views of Marx and Engels on the need for a revolutionary dictatorship in a bourgeois-democratic revolution in part III of the Postscript to his pamphlet, *The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. (See pp. 125-33; also notes to pages 37 and 392.\*\*\*\*\*) The articles of Marx and Engels for the period of the German Revolution 1848-49 were republished in Germany in 1902 by F. Mehring, who also wrote commentaries and an instructive preface to them. It is to this preface that Lenin refers when he says that Mehring ridiculed the critics of Marx.

PAGE 505.\* Lenin quotes from an article by V. Levitsky, entitled *A Topical Question: Liquidation or Regeneration*, published in *Nasha Zarya (Our Dawn)*, No. 7, 1910, in which the writer argues that the Social-Democrats should concentrate all their efforts on legal work and liquidate the underground organisation, on the grounds that not only was an underground Party unnecessary but that it was harmful for the every-day proletarian class struggle. The existence of the underground Party, he said, was only due to the attempts of the Bolsheviks to force the hegemony in the revolution upon the proletariat. Lenin calls Levitsky a liquidator-Golos-ite

because he was one of the Menshevik liquidators who were grouped around the Menshevik journal *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*The Voice of the Social-Democrat*).

PAGE 508.\* This refers to the controversy in *Die Neue Zeit* in April-August, 1910, between K. Kautsky and R. Luxemburg on the question of the general strike. Quoting the experience of the Russian revolution and the growth of the strike movement in Germany as a result of the crisis, Rosa Luxemburg argued that the strike movement could and should have been diverted to political channels and transformed into a general strike. Kautsky on the other hand opposed this "overthrow strategy" and proposed that for the time being the struggle be confined to the economic field and that the "strategy of attrition" be adopted. He was of the opinion, however, that it would be necessary to adopt the "overthrow strategy if the political crisis continues to develop."

PAGE 509.\* Lenin refers mainly to Marx's letter to Kugelmann of April 17, 1871, which dealt with the Paris Commune. In this letter Marx wrote: "... the bourgeois *canaille* of Versailles ... presented the Parisians with the alternative of taking up the fight or succumbing without a struggle. In the latter case, the demoralisation of the working class would have been a far greater misfortune than the fall of any number of 'leaders.'" (Karl Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann*, p. 125.)

PAGE 515.\* By Trotsky's "venture" Lenin means the publication of the factional newspaper, *Pravda*, which at first appeared in Lvov and later on in Vienna from October 1908 to May 1912.

