

A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA 8

E. H. CARR

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

— 1924-1926 —

VOLUME THREE-II



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IN ONE COUNTRY
1924-1926

BY
E. H. CARR
Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge

VOLUME THREE—PART II

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B: *The Soviet Union and the East*

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CHAPTER 37

POLICY IN THE EAST

THE first phase of the eastern policy of the Soviet Government and of Comintern found its characteristic expression in the Baku congress of September 1920. It centred primarily on the Near and Middle East, and was directed mainly against the British Empire and British imperialism. Such success as it achieved had been gained by 1921; and, after the Anglo-Soviet agreement had been concluded in March 1921, the first wave of revolutionary enthusiasm for the eastern peoples may be said to have subsided. The third congress of Comintern in June-July 1921 almost entirely ignored the eastern question.¹ Up to this time the Far East had played only a minor and intermittent rôle in the calculations of the Bolshevik leaders. At the moment of the Baku congress, the idea was mooted in IKKI of a similar congress of Far Eastern peoples.² But the time was not yet ripe; and it was not till the spring of 1921, at the height of the campaign against Ungern-Sternberg in Outer Mongolia,³ that a Far Eastern bureau or secretariat of Comintern was set up in Irkutsk under the direction of Shumyatsky, an official of the Siberian bureau of the party central committee situated at Omsk.⁴ In July 1921, after the third congress of Comintern had ended, and when the Red

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 387-389.

² See *ibid.* Vol. 3, p. 525.

³ See *ibid.* Vol. 3, pp. 514-515.

⁴ The Irkutsk secretariat, described as "a special department of the Far Eastern secretariat of Comintern", was set up by the Siberian bureau of the party (*Severnaya Aziya*, No. 2 (20), 1928, p. 81, which specifically connects it with work among the Mongols). Shumyatsky later gave an account of the arrival in Irkutsk of Chang T'ai-lei and another Chinese communist to organize a Chinese section of the secretariat; Chang proceeded to Moscow to attend the third congress of Comintern in June-July 1921 (*Revolutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 4-5, 1928, pp. 213-216). *Periodicheskaya Pechat' SSSR, 1917-1949: Bibliograficheskii Ukazatel'*, i (1958), lists 7 monthly numbers of *Byulleten' Dalnevostochnogo Sekretariata Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* published in Irkutsk in 1921, and 2 numbers for 1922; none of them has been available. For one of the rare contemporary references to this short-lived secretariat see p. 607 below.

Army had completed its successful operation against Ungern-Sternberg in Outer Mongolia, IKKI instructed Radek, Popov and Trilisser to make arrangements with representatives of Far Eastern countries to convene a congress of Far Eastern peoples under the name of the Congress of Toilers of the Far East.¹ The original decision was to hold the congress in Irkutsk in November 1921. But it was transferred to Moscow, where it met in January 21, 1922.² The Far Eastern counterpart of the Baku congress proved only a pale reflexion of its predecessor, and led to no immediate increase of interest in Moscow in Far Eastern affairs. The transfer of the congress to Moscow was apparently followed by the liquidation of the Irkutsk secretariat which, sharing the fate of the European secretariats of Comintern, ceased to exist early in 1922.³

The conception of opening a new window for Soviet policy and revolutionary activity in the east penetrated slowly in Moscow. Safarov, on the eve of the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922, boasted of the formation of communist parties in all eastern countries, though they were all obliged to work illegally.⁴ Zinoviev, in his main report to the congress, indulged in some routine expressions of optimism.⁵ But Bukharin, in his long speech on the draft programme of Comintern, dismissed the colonial question in one brief paragraph with the conventional comment that far more attention than hitherto should be paid to it; and Radek cynically answered those delegates from the east who complained of lack of interest in their work with the remark that "interest is aroused by deeds".⁶ The congress adopted a long analytical resolution of an eclectic character on the "eastern question", but gave no clear call for revolutionary action.⁷ On

¹ *Deyatel'nost Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Prezidiuma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1922), pp. 13-14.

² For the congress see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 525-528; Chang T'ai-lei was evidently one of the organizers.

³ The approximate date is indicated by the fact that only two further numbers of its bulletin appeared in 1922 (see p. 605, note 4 above); no mention of it has been traced from the beginning of 1922 onwards.

⁴ *Novyi Vostok*, ii (1922), 71.

⁵ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 478-479.

⁶ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 419, 634.

⁷ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 481-483.

the other hand it provided in its resolution on organization for the creation of an eastern department — the first geographical department to be set up in the headquarters of Comintern.¹ The immediately following third congress of KIM set up a "small commission" for eastern and colonial countries; but except in China and Outer Mongolia it found no activities to report. For colonial countries it had "no material, only projects".²

In this early period, the meagre activities of Comintern in the Far East were eclipsed by those of Profintern. Since Profintern had not enjoyed in Europe even the limited successes, or illusions of success, achieved by Comintern, and since IFTU, which opposed an impregnable barrier to the advance of Profintern in Europe, had never paid much attention to the workers of eastern countries, it was natural that the efforts of Profintern should have been the more easily turned in this direction. Before the foundation of Profintern in July 1921, Mezhsovprof had divided its work between five geographical sections, one of them being for "the eastern countries", and established a bureau in the Far Eastern secretariat of Comintern in Irkutsk; but its contacts with the Far East were admitted to be slender.³ On the occasion of the founding congress of Profintern Lozovsky issued a warning that the workers' movement in the east, if too closely associated with the national liberation movement, would take on chauvinist traits, and appealed for a movement on an unequivocal class basis;⁴ and the congress passed a rather perfunctory general resolution on "The Trade Union Movement in the Near and Far East and in the Colonies".⁵ During the Congress of Toilers of

¹ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 994-997. For the first report of this department see *Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale, 15. Dezember 1922 bis 15. Mai 1923* (1923), p. 9; it was said to be divided into Near, Middle and Far Eastern sections, and was mainly concerned with the collection of information.

² *Bericht vom 3. Kongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 220-221; the general resolution on work in the east (*ibid.* pp. 279-283) confirmed this conclusion.

³ *Compte-rendu du Conseil International des Syndicats Rouges pour la période du 15 juillet 1920 à juillet 1921* (1921), pp. 26, 66-67.

⁴ Speech of Lozovsky at a meeting in Moscow on June 22, 1921, printed as an introduction to the official record of the congress (*17^{er} Mezhdunarodnyi Kongress Revolyutsionnykh Professional'nykh i Proizvodstvennykh Soyuzov* (n.d. [1921]), p. 10).

⁵ *Resolutionen, Statuten, Manifeste und Aufrufe des Ersten Internationalen Kongresses der Roten Fach- und Industrie-Verbände* (Bremen, n.d. [1921]), pp. 79-80.

the Far East in Moscow in January 1922, the executive bureau of Profintern set up a special section to deal with the trade union movement in eastern countries. The commission appears to have worked independently of the congress, and was not mentioned in the record of the proceedings. But it continued to sit for three days. Lozovsky addressed it for two hours on the importance of the trade union movement, and some of the delegates reported on the position of trade unions in their respective countries. The report was followed by a debate in which delegates of Chinese, Indonesian, Korean and Japanese trade unions participated. The importance of the occasion was clearly the first establishment of contact between Profintern and the incipient trade union movement in the Far East.¹ Early in March 1922 the second session of the central council of Profintern decided that, in view of the increasing industrialization of the Far East, a special bureau should be established by Profintern to direct agitation among Far Eastern workers; Reinstein and Katayama were placed in charge of this work, and Semaun was appointed to represent Profintern in Indonesia.² On March 2, 1922, while the council was in session, the transport workers' International Propaganda Committee³ convened a conference of transport workers of the Far East which was attended by delegates of the Indonesian railway workers and of maritime workers from Japan, China and India: one of the delegates was instructed to undertake work among Japanese seamen.⁴

At this moment an initiative came from a different quarter. In June 1922, the Australian trade union congress — also no doubt inspired by the example of the diplomatic conference in Washington — decided to summon in Sydney in June 1923 a

¹ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 2 (13), February 1, 1922, pp. 147-148; No. 3 (14), March 1922, pp. 214-216. Lozovsky claimed that "the significance of the congress of Far Eastern peoples and of the special trade union section which functioned at that congress has been very great in terms of a *rapprochement* between Profintern and the workers' organizations of the Far East" (*Trud*, February 22, 1922).

² *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 3 (14), March 1922, p. 231; No. 4 (15), April 1922, pp. 318-319. A few months later a certain Ma Mo-to [*sic*] was appointed to represent Profintern in eastern countries (*ibid.* No. 12 (23), December 1922, p. 903).

³ For this IPC see p. 532 above.

⁴ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 10 (21), October 1922, p. 674; 3^{re} *Mezhdunarodnaya Konferentsiya Revolyutsionnykh Transportnikov* (1923), pp. 13-14.

conference of trade unions of Pacific countries: Japan, China, Australia, India, Java, the United States, Canada and the Philippines were the countries mentioned.¹ Though nothing came of this proposal, it may be surmised that such an invitation was not welcome in Moscow, especially since Soviet Russia was apparently excluded from it. The fourth congress of Comintern in November–December 1922 attempted to trump the Australian lead by proposing, in its resolution on the eastern question, that “representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of the Pacific countries should convene a Pacific conference in order to work out the correct tactics and find the corresponding form of organization for a real union of the proletariat of all races in the Pacific”.² Thus prompted, the immediately following second congress of Profintern took up the running. Its main resolution, in a section devoted to the IPCs, drew attention to the need to organize “the transport workers in general, and the transport workers of countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean in particular”, and to create “port bureaus which will serve as a link between the revolutionary seamen of the whole world”.³ A special resolution devoted to “trade unions in the east and in colonial and semi-colonial countries” concluded with a decision “to convene simultaneously with the next congress of Profintern the broadest possible conference of revolutionary trade organizations of colonial and semi-colonial countries of the whole world”. Meanwhile the establishment of port bureaus in the principal ports would serve as a link between east and west: this was to be the task of “a special conference of transport workers with the participation of Profintern”.⁴ A conference of the transport workers’ IPC was held at the same time as the congress, delegates of the Chinese seamen’s union and Chinese and Indonesian railway unions appearing for the first time as members of the committee;⁵ and in June 1923 the central council of Profintern drew up a further instruction to

¹ *Byulleten’ II Kongressa Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (n.d.), p. 148.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 324; the German text in *Thesen und Resolutionen des IV. Weltkongresses der KI* (1923), p. 51, speaks of “convening” a conference, the Russian text of “meeting at” it.

³ *Desyat’ Let Profinterna v Resolyutsiyakh* (1930), p. 103.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 114.

⁵ 3rd *Mezhdunarodnaya Konferentsiya Revolyutsionnykh Transportnikov* (1923), p. 7; *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 12 (23), December 1922, p. 889.

the transport workers' IPC on the work of the port bureaux.¹ This was evidently the most promising approach yet found to the eastern worker.

The attitude of the workers in countries having colonial possessions, or profiting by the exploitation of colonial or semi-colonial territories, raised a particularly delicate problem. At the second congress of Comintern in 1920, when the eastern question had first been seriously discussed, British delegates had confessed that a majority of British workers would be hostile to "a revolutionary struggle of colonial peoples against British imperialism".² But the implications of this belief, both for the communist parties and for the trade unions of the imperialist countries, were ignored or neglected in Moscow. Nor were the communist parties concerned eager to grasp the nettle. A "committee for colonial studies" was set up in the PCF — partly perhaps owing to the pertinacity of the young Annamite Nguyen Ai-quoc³ — and even issued an appeal "to the natives of the colonies".⁴ But this was a rare exception. At the fourth congress of Comintern in November–December 1922 a Tunisian delegate reproached the PCF with its indifference to the liberation of the colonies, and cited the resolution of an Algerian section of the party which argued that liberation could come only as the result of revolution in France, thus condemning the native populations to a passive rôle.⁵ The

¹ *Desyat' Let Profintern v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), pp. 117–118.

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, p. 256, note 2.

³ For an outline of Nguyen Ai-quoc's early career see G. Walter, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français* (1948), p. 379; D. Lancaster, *The Emancipation of French Indo-China* (1961), pp. 79–80. He is said to have been born in Annam in 1890, and settled in France on the eve of the first world war. In 1919 he became a propagandist for the liberation of Indo-China and joined the French Socialist Party; he was present at the Tours congress of 1920, and was an original member of the PCF. He appeared prominently at the first and second congresses of the PCF in 1921 and 1922, where he pleaded the not very popular cause of colonial emancipation (*L'Humanité*, December 30, 1921; October 17, 1922). In 1923 he went to Moscow as a student at the Communist University of Toilers of the East, and was a delegate at the founding congress of the Peasant International in October of that year (see *The Interregnum, 1923–1924*, pp. 198–199). About this time he published in Paris a pamphlet entitled *Le Procès de la Colonisation Française : Mœurs Coloniales*, devoted to the abuses and cruelties of French colonial administration; the pamphlet is undated, but internal evidence suggests that it was written in the latter part of 1923.

⁴ *L'Humanité*, October 17, 1922.

⁵ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 605–606.

congress for the first time included in its resolution on the eastern question a chapter on the "tasks of metropolitan parties in the colonies". Communist parties in countries having colonies were instructed to give systematic support to "the workers' and revolutionary movement in the colonies", and to establish "standing colonial commissions" in order to "explain unceasingly to the broad masses of the workers the full importance of the struggle with imperialist domination in the backward countries".¹ The second congress of Profintern in December 1922 in its main resolution outlined a new approach to trade union work in the Far East :

Since the centre of gravity of world politics has shifted to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, the creation of revolutionary trade unions and the establishment of contact with Profintern in the countries on the Pacific Ocean acquires particular importance. The main work must devolve on the revolutionary unions of the imperialist Powers, which should establish close and continuous contact with the trade unions of the colonial countries for a common struggle against the oppression and exploitation of the backward and weak peoples.²

The special resolution on trade unions in eastern countries further elaborated the point :

Revolutionary national organizations and minorities in countries possessing colonies . . . should establish a separate organ to maintain the link with the trade union movement of the colonies. A particularly large rôle falls to the lot of Japan which is in the immediate vicinity of its colonies and semi-colonies (Korea, China, etc.).³

When, however, the central council of Profintern met six months later, in June 1923, it was constrained to record that nothing had been done to carry out the Far Eastern directives of the second congress ; and the French CGTU, as the strongest trade union organization affiliated to Profintern in any country with large colonial possessions, came under fire for the inadequacy of its work among the colonial peoples.⁴ It is clear that, up to this time,

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 324-325.

² *Desyat' Let Profinterna v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), p. 102.

³ *Ibid.* p. 114.

⁴ *Bericht über die 3. Session des Zentralrats der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (1923), pp. 82-83.

little or no support had been forthcoming from British or French communist parties or trade unions for the encouragement of national liberation and proletarian revolution in territories under British or French sovereignty.

Significant changes marked the year 1923. Lenin in *Better Less but Better*, the last of his published articles, noted that the east "has entered finally into the revolutionary movement . . . and been finally drawn into the horizon of the world revolutionary movement", and reflected that "Russia, India, China, etc. constitute a gigantic majority of the population of the world"; and he revived at the same time in the new revolutionary context the familiar historical theme of Russia as the bridge between west and east :

Russia, standing on the frontier between civilized countries and countries drawn into civilization for the first time by the war, the countries of the whole east, the non-European countries, . . . could exhibit, and was bound to exhibit, certain peculiarities which lay, of course, on the general line of world development, but which distinguished her revolution from all preceding western European countries [*sic*], and introduced into it certain peculiarities by way of transition to the eastern countries.¹

A few weeks later Stalin expressed himself at the twelfth party congress of April 1923 with exemplary caution :

Either we shall shake to its foundations the deep rearguard of imperialism — the eastern colonial and semi-colonial countries — revolutionize them, and thus hasten the downfall of imperialism, or we shall fail, and thus strengthen imperialism and weaken the force of our own movement. That is the question.²

But the change was not confined to an increased consciousness among the Soviet leaders of the vital significance of the eastern question. The eastern question itself changed its shape with the shift in emphasis from Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia, which had provided the focus of the question between 1917 and 1921, to the Far East, which first came into the picture with the Washington conference and the Congress of Toilers of the Far East in January 1922, and became a major field of interest with the Joffe mission of 1922-1923. In the summer

¹ Lenin, *Sochineniya*, xxvii, 399.

² Stalin, *Sochineniya*, v, 237.

of 1923 an authoritative article, apparently written by Chicherin, under the title *We and the East* had dealt at length with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey, but devoted only three lines to China and ignored Japan.¹ The arrival of Karakhan in Peking in September 1923 and of Borodin in Canton in the following month² opened a long period in which the Far East became an important concern of Soviet and Comintern policy, and China the major factor in the Far East. The eclipse of Japan due to the earthquake of September 1923 proved temporary. But Japan never returned to the position which she had occupied in the first years of the revolution as the most important and most promising field for Soviet action in the Far East. Another significant change occurred at the same time. When Lenin wrote *Better Less but Better* in February or the first days of March 1923, he coupled Germany with the east as the two outstanding features in the revolutionary landscape. The German failure of October 1923 in effect removed Germany from the picture. Stalin's diagnosis of April 1923 — either the east or nothing — began to seem more plausible. The rise of Kuomintang and the failure of the German revolution combined to impart new dimensions to the eastern question in the eyes of Moscow. In the nineteenth century the directors of Russian foreign policy had more than once turned to Asia in search of compensation for defeats in Europe; and Russian writers of many schools had proclaimed that Russia's destiny lay in the east. It was not surprising to find the same patterns repeated, in a rather different guise, in the policies of the Soviet Government and of Comintern.

From 1923 onwards the eastern question not only began to assume an outstanding rôle in Soviet external relations, but absorbed into itself all the old ambiguities of the "national and colonial question" with which it became identified.³ These

¹ *Kommunisticheskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 13-14 (52-53), July 15-August 1, 1923, pp. 23-28; the signature "Politicus" was generally supposed to be the pen-name of Chicherin.

² See pp. 677-678, 693 below.

³ At the end of 1921 the first issue of the journal *Novyi Vostok* (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 269) had already offered the following definition: "The east is not only the oppressed Asian continent; the east also means the whole colonial world, the world of the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and South America, i.e. of that sector of the world by the exploitation of which the capitalist society of Europe and the United States maintains its power" (*Novyi Vostok*, I (1921), 9).

ambiguities were rooted in the doctrine of Marx, who contemplated a stage in which the proletariat "must rise to be the leading class of the nation; must constitute itself *the* nation", followed by a stage in which the proletariat would overcome the fetich of nationalism and create the true international society.¹ The two stages corresponded to the two great stages of revolution in the Marxist scheme — the bourgeois or capitalist revolution, and the proletarian or socialist revolution; and the national issue thus became involved in the moot question of the possibility, canvassed by Marx himself in the context of the Russian peasant commune,² that less advanced countries might profit by the victory of the proletarian revolution in more advanced countries in order themselves to by-pass the capitalist stage of revolutionary development. Lenin in the debate on the national and colonial question at the second congress of Comintern in 1920 had first applied the argument to the problem of nationalism, pointing to the possibility that backward countries might, with the aid of the "victorious revolutionary proletariat", be able to "make the transition to the Soviet order, and thence through definite stages of development to communism, avoiding the capitalist stage of development".³ And Stalin, in his speech at the tenth Russian party congress in March 1921, attempted to translate the principle into policy for the peoples with whom he was primarily concerned at the time :

The point is that a large number of nationalities, mainly Turkic — there are about 25 millions of them — have not passed, have not had the chance to pass, through the period of industrial capitalism, do not therefore have any, or scarcely any, industrial proletariat, and in consequence of this have to make the transition from primitive forms of economy to the stage of a Soviet economy, avoiding industrial capitalism. In order to carry out this arduous, but by no means impossible, operation, it is necessary to take account of all the peculiarities of the economic condition, and even of the historical past, of the way of life and of the culture, of these nationalities.⁴

The tactical issue which lay behind these theoretical discussions was the question, debated by Lenin and Roy at the second con-

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, pp. 410-412.

² See *ibid.* Vol. 2, pp. 388-390.

³ See *ibid.* Vol. 3, p. 255.

⁴ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, v, 40-41.

gress of Comintern, of the extent of the support to be given respectively to bourgeois-democratic national movements and to proletarian or communist movements in the eastern countries. But the ambiguity of a policy directed alternately to support bourgeois-democratic and proletarian-revolutionary movements was less apparent in the east than in the west. In the east, as in the Russia of 1905, both these movements were movements of opposition to the existing order and potentially revolutionary, and pursued the same immediate ends. By the same token, the distinction between the functions of Narkomindel and Comintern, familiar in the west, had little relevance in the east.

Our policy [wrote Chicherin] has been directed to facilitate the process of the emergence and self-consciousness of the bourgeoisie in the countries of the east, as a force capable of building up a powerful barrier against the imperialist ambitions of British and other capital.¹

The foundation of the Peasant International in October 1923 helped to clear up another ambiguity in eastern policy and to establish another link between Soviet Russia and the peasant world of the east. The founding congress itself issued an appeal to "the peasant toilers of the colonial countries";² and the first issue of its journal in April 1924 carried articles by Katayama and Nguyen Ai-quoc on the peasant movements in their respective countries.³

Ambiguities also occurred in the attitude of the eastern countries to the Soviet Union. The first revolutionary leaders of the east derived their initial inspiration from the west, and were at first more conscious of a continuity between the revolutionary tradition of the west and that of Russia than of the rift between them. Hence these leaders tended to temporize as long as possible between the west and the Soviet Union and to manoeuvre between them rather than come down decisively on one side or the other. On the other hand, in those eastern countries where the revolutionary movement had come into existence after 1917, it had no strong western roots, and was more likely to

¹ *Kommunisticheskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 13-14 (52-53), July 15-August 1, 1923, p. 26; for this article see p. 613, note 1 above.

² For this congress see *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, pp. 198-199.

³ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 1, April 1924, pp. 85-97.

accept Soviet leadership without qualification. Turkey, Persia, India, Japan and, more doubtfully, China fell into the first category, Indonesia and the other countries of south-eastern Asia, Egypt and most of the Arab countries, into the second. But even in countries of the first category, the western Powers, and notably Great Britain, were exposed to a handicap from which the Soviet Union was immune. Past history had cast on these Powers the slur of "imperialism", which they could not rebut so long as they retained the vestiges of their privileged position in eastern countries and of their traditional belief in the inherent superiority of "European" and "white" nations and individuals over "Asiatic" and "coloured". As the power of the Soviet Union gradually increased, this factor gave it a decisive advantage over the western countries, and enabled it steadily to increase its influence and prestige throughout Asia at their expense. The revolution in the east aimed not simply at national liberation, but at social and economic advancement through industrialization. In this sense, it continued, and did not contradict, a process which had begun under the impulse of the imperialist Powers. But this continuity was realized in a form, and in conditions, which inevitably turned the cutting edge of the new revolution against the west.

The fifth congress of Comintern met in June 1924 at a moment when the Soviet star in the east was in the ascendant. The signature of the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924, bringing with it the official recognition of the Soviet Government by China, had inspired an article in *Pravda* by Chicherin, who described China as following in the footsteps of Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, and hailed the treaty as "a great step on the road to the liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples".¹ The firm alliance established with Sun Yat-sen in Canton seemed to assure to Moscow a powerful influence in the Chinese nationalist movement. On the other hand, the rôle of the French and British communist parties in the colonial question was still mainly passive. A resolution of the Lyons congress of the PCF in January 1924 spoke of "the fraternal proletariat of the colonies",

¹ *Pravda*, June 1, 1924; for the treaty see pp. 684-685 below.

while proclaiming at the same time that the PCF should support "any nationalist group struggling for emancipation from European tutelage". But it did not face the potential discrepancy between the two attitudes, and refrained from openly and directly demanding the independence of the colonies.¹ The report of IKKI to the fifth congress of Comintern in 1924 admitted that the eastern department of IKKI had no contacts with French North Africa, and described the activity of the PCF as "inadequate".² And shortly before the congress a well-known British trade union leader told a Soviet journalist that "the English trade unions have no opinion on colonial policy".³

In these circumstances, the congress struck an uncertain note on the eastern question. Lozovsky, in his speech of welcome to the congress on behalf of Profintern, ironically recalled Hilferding's slighting reference at the Halle congress of 1920 to "the revolutionary romanticism of the east", and rhetorically concluded that "there is no other way out for mankind, no other way out for the exploited, no other way out for the peoples of the east, than world revolution".⁴ When the congress at the end of its first meeting decided to address a formal proclamation "to the workers of the world", Nguyen Ai-quoi rose to propose the addition to the title of the words "and to the colonial peoples".⁵ But Zinoviev mentioned the eastern question neither in his main report nor in his concluding speech on the debate; the references to it in the debate took the form of complaints that it had been neglected.⁶ Treint, faced by Nguyen Ai-quoc's indictment of the lukewarm colonial policy of the PCF, boldly proclaimed that "the struggles for the national independence of the colonies must be linked with the class movement of the proletariat of the motherland".⁷ The formal resolution on the report of IKKI contained a significant passage demanding both "a strengthening of the immediate link of the executive committee [i.e. IKKI] with the national liberation movements of the east" and "a closer

¹ 3^e Congrès National : *Adresses et Résolutions* (1924), pp. 66-73.

² *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 97.

³ *Protokoll : Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), i, 15.

⁴ *Ibid.* i, 15-16.

⁵ *Ibid.* i, 29.

⁶ *Ibid.* i, 150-151 (Roy), 237 (Nguyen Ai-quoc), 379-381 (Katayama), 384-385 (Semaun).

⁷ *Ibid.* ii, 694.

link of the parties of the imperialist countries with the colonies of these countries"; the struggle in these countries against the "imperialist colonial policy of the bourgeoisie" was admitted to be "still very weak". The main resolution of the congress on tactics had the briefest of sections headed "West and East", which pronounced it "essential to devote far greater attention than hitherto to the east in the broadest sense of the word", and to "support the movement of all oppressed nationalities directed against imperialism".¹

The eastern question, however, once more raised its head in the later debate on Manuilsky's report on the national and colonial question, which spoke in general terms of the obligation to support bourgeois national movements in colonial countries.² Roy replied to Manuilsky in a major speech. He had not raised this issue in his short speech in the general debate, which had been devoted mainly to criticism of the CPGB.³ But he now explained that he had attempted without success in the drafting commission to secure an amendment of the passage in the resolution on the report of IKKI prescribing a closer link with "the national liberation movements of the east", which he regarded as contrary to the decisions of the second congress in 1920. The link with the national liberation movements of the east had hitherto yielded no result, except in so far as it might have encouraged friendly relations between a national government and the Soviet state. National liberation movements could not be supported without regard to the question what class was leading them:

If we recognize the right of self-determination of nationalities and not of the masses of producers, we do not thereby necessarily recognize the right of self-determination of the bourgeoisie or of the dominant class to the exclusion of the masses of producers.

He dwelt especially on the recent strike in the Bombay textile industry, which was an expression of the class struggle of the Indian proletariat against Indian national capitalism: native capitalism was more highly developed in India than anywhere

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 396, 410-411.

² For Manuilsky's report see p. 88 above.

³ See p. 76 above.

else in Asia. "The rising in the colonies", Roy concluded, "will perhaps play a decisive rôle in the problem of world revolution."¹ Nguyen Ai-quoc, who had already spoken in the main debate, now quoted statistics of the population of the colonial countries, pressed in general terms for greater attention to them, and in particular denounced the neglect of the question by the PCF ("what our parties have done in this respect is just about equal to nothing") and in the columns of *L'Humanité*.² A delegate of the CPGB thought that Roy "rates too high the significance of the awakening of the Indian proletariat", and refused to believe that the Indian nationalist movement "is really in so rapid a process of decay as he alleges". In general, he excused the British party's weakness in colonial work on the score of its small numbers.³ Manuïlsky in his reply to the debate made no serious attempt to deal with Roy's arguments. But he referred to Roy's standpoint as a "deviation", accused him of "exaggerating the social movement in the colonies at the expense of the national movement" — a repetition of his dispute with Lenin at the second congress — and described his attitude as "a reflexion of Rosa Luxemburg's nihilism".⁴ It was perhaps partly owing to the difficulty of reconciling these discordant views that the intended resolution on the colonial question in the east never saw the light.⁵ Comintern was still interested in the national question primarily as it affected Europe; and the only decision taken on the eastern question was to set up a standing commission, of which nothing more was ever heard.⁶ Among the proclamations issued, though apparently not discussed, by the congress was one to the "Fraternal Peoples of Eastern Countries and Colonies". This addressed itself to "the many-million masses inhabiting the immense expanses of the Near, Middle and Far East", and sent greetings in the name of Comintern to communist and other associated parties of the region, including Kuomintang and the

¹ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 638-641.

² *Ibid.* ii, 685-689.

³ *Ibid.* ii, 690-691; at the immediately following third congress of Profintern it was noted that "the work of adherents of Profintern [in Great Britain] is at present limited mainly to the European territory of England" (*Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), pp. 384-385).

⁴ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 1000-1002.

⁵ See p. 89 above.

⁶ See p. 90 above.

Mongolian People's Party.¹ The fourth congress of KIM which followed the Comintern congress drew a sharp distinction between the two categories of colonial countries, i.e. those where bourgeois movements of national liberation were still in the ascendant, and those where native proletarian movements had begun to develop. Its resolution on the eastern countries contained a strongly worded section on the necessity of work on eastern and colonial questions in the imperialist countries.²

The approach to the east through Profintern and the trade unions still offered at this time brighter prospects than the approach through Comintern and the communist parties. But what was done was the result of local initiative rather than of direction from Moscow. The report of the executive bureau to the third congress of Profintern in July 1924 on its activities between the second and third congresses was vague and equivocal on the organization of work in eastern countries. Profintern, it declared, "relies chiefly on the communist parties and local groups", and its work was often combined with that of Comintern. It was difficult to find qualified officials who knew the necessary languages or to recruit permanent representatives for these countries; moreover, governments adopted repressive measures against local workers and representatives of Profintern. It was none the less claimed that representatives of Profintern had managed to "penetrate wherever it is useful", and had issued "financial and organizational directives".³ No progress towards the convening of a conference of Pacific workers was made during 1923.⁴ But in February 1924 the executive bureau of

¹ *Pravda*, June 18, 1924; *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 1048-1050. The text in *Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 214-216, erroneously combines this proclamation with a protest of the congress against the execution of Chinese trade union leaders in Hankow (see p. 703 below), originally published in *Pravda*, June 25, 1924.

² *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1924), pp. 64-69.

³ *L'Activité de l'ISR: Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 131-132. At the time of the third congress the eastern department of Profintern consisted of three officials, including the head; by the time of the fourth congress in 1928 the number had risen to eight (*L'ISR au Travail, 1924-1928* (1928), p. 84).

⁴ The delay was explained at the third congress of Profintern in July 1924 on the not very convincing ground that the Japanese earthquake temporarily reduced the danger of war in the Pacific (*Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), p. 306).

Profintern, having discussed the work of the port bureaus under the auspices of the transport workers' IPC, went on to consider "a report on the revolutionary movement among the transport workers of the Pacific". The report recorded that the transport workers of China, Japan and Indonesia "have established the largest organizations in the Far East", and especially welcomed the "proletarian standpoint" of the railway workers in China and Java. Encouraged by these symptoms, the executive bureau "decided to convene in June of this year a conference of transport workers of China, Japan, the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines".¹ This was a more practicable and manageable form of the original proposal for a pan-Pacific conference; and the place of meeting was once more left open. The next stage in the preparations is wrapped in obscurity.² But in the last week of June 1924, while the fifth congress of Comintern was sitting in Moscow, a conference of transport workers of the Pacific met in Canton — the only large city of the Far East where a demonstration of this kind was secure against police interference. It lasted for six days and was attended by delegates (23 or 25 in all) from north and south China, from Indonesia and from the Philippines; Japanese delegates failed to arrive. Though the manifesto of the conference³ attributed the initiative in summoning it to Profintern, no representative of Profintern is known to have attended; Voitinsky was apparently present — no doubt as the representative of Comintern.⁴

¹ *Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 9 (55), March 1, 1924, p. 15.

² Lozovsky's claim that the organization of the Canton conference represented "a colossal effort" on the part of Profintern (*Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), p. 32) is difficult to reconcile with his total silence on the subject in the brief passages on the "colonial countries" in his main report to the fifth congress of Comintern (*Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 856), and in the article written by him in advance of the third congress of Profintern (*Bol'shevik*, No. 5-6, June 20, 1924, p. 33). The absence of any record of such preparations, and the lack of knowledge in Moscow of the proceedings of the conference till it was actually over, suggest that the organization was mainly local. The report of the executive bureau to the third congress of Profintern admitted that the preparations for the conference "revealed the serious obstacles which confront Profintern in its work of organization in the Near and Far East" (*L'Activité de l'ISR: Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), p. 133).

³ See p. 622 below.

⁴ Information about the conference is derived from accounts by Heller at the third congress of Profintern on July 21, 1924; by Heller in *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 7-8 (42-43), July-August 1924, pp. 53-54;

Apart from questions of organization, the main topic of the conference was the formation of a united front against Chinese militarists and foreign imperialists ; as Voitinsky put it, the anti-imperialist front was " the soul of the conference ". A representative of Kuomintang uttered a warning note, and insisted that " the time has not yet come when a proletarian revolutionary party can by itself lead the toiling masses in the struggle against imperialism and capitalism ". The delegates of the Philippines¹ and the seamen's delegates from Hong Kong formed the Right wing of the conference and supported the alliance with Kuomintang ; the delegates of the Chinese and Javanese railway unions formed the Left wing and were hostile to Kuomintang as being not sufficiently revolutionary. The principal document emanating from the conference was a manifesto addressed to the toiling masses of the east and to the workers of Europe and America. It pilloried General Dwyer of Amritsar and Wu Pei-fu for shooting down the workers ; and the sufferings of Java, and of the Philippines " under the heel of ' democratic ' America ", were not forgotten. Denunciation of the imperialist Powers, as well as of " native feudalists, militarists and capitalists who compromise with the imperialists ", was followed by a call to the masses of the east to organize themselves in trade unions and peasant unions, and to the transport workers to combine their existing unions and to affiliate to " the revolutionary transport workers of the world ".²

and by Voitinsky in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 116, September 5, 1924, pp. 1509-1510, and *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 7 (36), September 1924, pp. 207-214. Heller cannot have been at the conference ; the journey from Canton to Moscow took 4 or 5 weeks in 1924. Voitinsky's account shows greater knowledge of detail, and he visited Canton in June 1924 (see p. 704 below) ; his presence at the conference may therefore be reasonably inferred, though direct evidence is lacking.

¹ Their appearance at the conference was somewhat surprising since the Philippines at this time attracted little attention in Moscow ; even united front tactics were not practicable there, since, owing to the capitalist development and prevailing capitalist mentality imparted by the United States, cooperation of a workers' party with the nationalist parties would have been out of the question. No communist party existed (*Novyi Vostok*, xii, 89-104). On the other hand, Katayama at the fifth congress of Comintern described the Philippines as " a favourable field of activity for communist propaganda ", and congratulated the American party on undertaking such work (*Protokoll : Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 654).

² The text of the manifesto was annexed to Voitinsky's article (see p. 621, note 4 above).

A message of greeting, addressed jointly to Zinoviev and Lozovsky, was sent to the fifth congress of Comintern, then in session in Moscow, and the impending congress of Profintern, which were hailed as "the staff of the world revolution".¹ The conference decided to set up a bureau at Canton, with five secretaries, one each for China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and India, for work among transport workers — primarily, no doubt, seamen.² The third congress of Profintern welcomed this decision without undue enthusiasm (perhaps through lack of detailed information):

The bureau founded in Canton should serve as an organizational link for the countries of the east between those countries on the one hand and Profintern on the other. But this is not enough. Profintern must in the near future create new support-points in the principal eastern ports.

And the resolution looked forward to "periodical conferences, summoned by Profintern, of the countries of the Near and Far East".³ Whatever the origins of the Canton conference of June 1924, and whatever reservations may have been felt about it in Moscow, it appeared to have served as a useful landmark in encouraging the development of the labour movement in the Far East and of turning the thoughts of Profintern in this direction. The Canton bureau, said Lozovsky, was "bound to play a tremendous political rôle in the years to come", and it was "necessary for us to take charge of this important branch of labour — sea transport".⁴

A further factor which stimulated Soviet interest in the Far East at this time was the American Immigration law of 1924,

¹ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 624.

² *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), p. 310.

³ *Desyat' Let Profinterna v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), p. 141; the wording of the resolution suggests that the Canton bureau was not set up as an organ of Profintern or of the transport workers' IPC. Heller called it "the eastern bureau of the transport workers" (*Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 7-8 (42-43), July-August 1924, p. 54); but this was not its official title or status.

⁴ *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), p. 32. Two years later Heller confessed that these hopes had not been fulfilled: "the matter has not really progressed, mainly because the national base in individual countries was not strong enough" (*IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), p. 85).

which was approved at the end of May and came into effect on July 1, 1924: one of its most important, and indeed avowed, purposes was to limit immigration to the United States from Asiatic countries, and especially from China and Japan. Pavlovich, director of the Scientific Society of Russian Orientalists and editor of *Novyi Vostok*, wrote with satisfaction of "the future Japanese-American war", probably to be fought by the United States "in alliance with Great Britain, Australia and Holland";¹ and Radek noted the fulfilment of Marx's prediction in 1851 of a shift in the world centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.² But what more than anything turned Soviet eyes eastward was the rapid deterioration in the latter part of 1924 of relations with western Europe. The bleakness of the international scene as pictured by Chicherin at the session of TsIK in October 1924 was relieved only by a reassuring prospect in the east, where "a gradual strengthening of colonial and semi-colonial peoples" had cemented "the close bonds which have linked the Soviet Government with the peoples of the east from the beginning of its existence";³ and the resolution of the session on foreign policy spoke, with reference to the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924, of "the regularization of relations of the USSR with the Chinese people" and "the development and deepening of its friendship with the peoples of the east".⁴ With the defeat of the British Labour government and the affair of the Zinoviev letter, British hostility to the Soviet Union became frank and undisguised; and any motive which the Soviet Government or Comintern might have had for concealing or restraining anti-British propaganda in Asia or Africa vanished. National movements raised their head in Egypt and in Morocco, culminating in the one case in the assassination of a British governor-general and in the other in organized warfare against the Spanish and French authorities. These movements enjoyed the full sympathy and support of the Soviet Union. Lozovsky at the sixth congress of the Soviet trade unions in November 1924, in the presence of

¹ M. Veltman (Pavlovich), *Pered Ugrozoi Budushchikh Voin* (2nd ed. 1924), pp. 64-65; the first edition has not been traced.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 97, July 29, 1924, p. 1252.

³ *SSSR: Tsentral'nyi Iсполnitel'nyi Komitet 2 Sozyva: 2 Sessiya* (1924), p. 64; for the speech see p. 248 above.

⁴ *Postanovleniya TsIK Soyuzov SSR* (1924), pp. 3-4.

the visiting British delegation and at the height of the campaign for trade union unity,¹ complained that "the European workers in general have for many years felt themselves rather like superior beings in relation to the Near, Middle and Far East, the colonial and semi-colonial countries", and that no genuine trade union International could exist which did not include the unions of China, Japan, India and other countries.² Roy, returning to his favourite theme in an article entitled *Europe is not the World*, argued that the errors of revisionism, such as rejection of Marx's doctrine of progressive "impoverishment", were due to failure to take account of what happened outside Europe.³

In January 1925 the Soviet-Japanese treaty, involving *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Union by Japan, further strengthened the Soviet position in the Far East.⁴ It inspired a cartoon in *Pravda* of Chicherin standing beside a compass with the caption: "the needle turns to the East".⁵ Steklov, the editor of *Izvestiya*, picked up a slogan which had just become current in Comintern circles,⁶ and wrote a leader entitled *The "Bolshevization" of Asia*. Of course, wrote Steklov, "the spectacle of the Soviet Union, that only hope of all oppressed peoples, getting a more and more solid foothold in Asia cannot particularly rejoice the imperialist robbers". But "it is the imperialist governments themselves which by their policy of violence are 'bolshevizing' Asia".⁷ Rykov told TsIK at its session of March 1925 that "our weight, our influence all over the east is steadily increasing, while the influence of the bourgeois states progressively declines", and that "the eastern peoples find in the Soviet Union their friend, their ally";⁸ and the general resolution of the session noted "the increasingly rapid growth in the influence of the USSR in the east, which sees ever more clearly what a deep gulf divides our policy of fraternal relations with the toilers from the policy of colonial oppression".⁹ Chicherin's report at the third Union Congress of Soviets two months later was noteworthy for its new

¹ For this congress see pp. 570-571 above.

² *Shestoi S"ezd Professional'nykh Soyuzov SSSR* (1925), p. 388.

³ *International Press Correspondence*, No. 90, Dec. 31, 1924, p. 1045; the article did not appear in the German edition.

⁴ For this treaty see pp. 875-876 below. ⁵ *Pravda*, January 30, 1925.

⁶ See p. 294 above.

⁷ *Izvestiya*, February 4, 1925.

⁸ *SSSR: Tsentral'nyi Iсполnitel'nyi Komitet 2 Sozyva: 3 Sessiya* (1925), p. 10.

⁹ *Id.*: *Postanovleniya* (1925), p. 6.

emphasis on China, that "elder among the nations" which "is now proving itself to be a young man"; and he went on to analyse the strength of the Soviet position in the east:

Our strength consists in the fact that everyone knows, all the peoples of the east know, that we do not seek any domination or any influence, open or concealed, explicit or disguised, political or economic. We do not strive to exploit in any way the economically more backward eastern peoples. This is the root of our real influence in the east, which has nothing in common with what the capitalist states call influence.¹

Slowly, somewhat reluctantly, the leaders of Comintern set to work to readjust policy and doctrine to the new situation. The fifth enlarged IKKI in the latter part of March 1925 produced some rather bewildered thinking aloud on the subject. Zinoviev in his main report said that many Marxists had been surprised that the proletarian revolution had begun in Russia. Since 1917 they had assumed that it would spread through Germany to Europe. Now it might be necessary to reconsider this verdict:

Only now does the question insistently arise whether this view of the further advance of the proletarian revolution as the only possible path, the only possible geographical extension, was correct. . . . It is possible that the further itinerary may not necessarily pass through Germany, that Germany may not be its next stage. We must take into account the other possibilities.

Zinoviev then cautiously veered away from the subject, but returned to it indirectly later in the speech, remarking that "the eastern problem is ripening with a rapidity which we could not formerly have imagined", and that the establishment of a common frontier between the USSR and China was "an event of world historical importance", and quoting Lenin's *obiter dicta* of 1911 and 1923 on the importance of Asia in the revolution.² Bukharin cunningly wove the eastern theme into his report on "the peasant question", thus connecting the new orientation in Comintern with the favourable turn towards the peasant in Soviet policy.

¹ *Tretii S'ezd Sovetov SSSR* (1925), p. 98.

² *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 33-34, 44-45; for Lenin's pronouncements see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 230, and p. 612 above.

He pointed out that a vast majority of the population of the world were peasants, and that this was overwhelmingly true both of the Soviet Union and of Asia. Thus "in the process of proletarian world revolution the colonial question plays a very large rôle"; in particular, Bukharin looked forward to "a possible revolt of the Chinese peasants against foreign finance capital".¹ No further light was thrown on the question in the subsequent discussions, though Gallacher, the British delegate, observed that Kipling, "a stupid, patriotic, imperialist British poet", had reckoned without Comintern, and that "under the banner of the Communist International east and west have met".² Except for one or two conventional references, the main resolutions of the session ignored the colonial question altogether. The agrarian aspect of the eastern question was suitably emphasized at the session of the International Peasant Council which followed the enlarged IKKI in April 1925. The Council issued an "Appeal to the Peasantry of Eastern and Colonial Countries" and a special appeal to the peasants of China.³ Kamenev invoked the eastern prospect as a corrective to the current Comintern theme of stabilization when he described "the rising dawn of the revolutionary blaze of the colonial peoples of the east in China, India and Persia" as "one of the factors which are undermining the stabilization of capitalism";⁴ and Stalin, with his impeccable sense of timing, addressed to the Communist University of Toilers of the East a survey which embraced the eastern peoples of the Soviet Union as well as those beyond the frontier.⁵ Even the annual conference of the ILO at Geneva in May-June 1925, conscious of the changing climate, adopted a resolution on the motion of an Indian delegate instructing the organization "to

¹ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 305-307.

² *Exécutif Élargi de l'Internationale Communiste* (1925), p. 228; the remark did not appear in the Russian version.

³ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1925, pp. 168-170 (subsequent issues of this journal included a section headed "The East and Colonies"); *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 100, June 26, 1925, pp. 1358-1359.

⁴ L. Kamenev, *Stat'i i Rechi*, xii (1926), 137-138.

⁵ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vii, 133-152; throughout the speech Stalin ignored the official name of the university, and referred to it as "the university of the peoples of the east", thus emphasizing its national rather than its social purposes.

collect and publish all available information regarding conditions of labour in Asiatic countries".¹

The two events which in the summer of 1925 forced the attention of the Soviet leaders on the "colonial" question in Asia and Africa were the war in Morocco, which broke out early in May, and the wave of unrest in China which began with the shooting incident in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. At first the former seemed the more important. Under the capable leadership of Abd-el-Krim the Moroccan insurgents scored some striking victories over French troops which made an extraordinary impression in Moscow.² But the spread of anti-foreign disturbances and agitation in China soon made Asia the focus of interest. On July 1, 1925, a group of Chinese, Indian and Annamite revolutionaries met in Canton, and founded an International Association of Oppressed Peoples, which held two conferences.³ At the end of June 1925 Zinoviev in his much quoted article *The Epoch of Wars and Revolutions*⁴ promoted China to the first place, and significantly recalled the slogan of the Baku congress of 1920: "Proletarians of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!" Stalin, in an interview with a Japanese correspondent early in July 1925, noted "the strengthening of the revolutionary movement in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other eastern countries", and inferred that "the time is near when the western Powers will bury themselves in the pit which they have dug for themselves in the east".⁵ Kamenëv revived the old idea of Russia as the mediator of European culture to Asia when, at a reception given by the Moscow Soviet to foreign visitors to the jubilee celebrations of the Academy of Sciences in September 1925, he referred to Moscow

¹ *Conférence Internationale du Travail: Septième Session* (Geneva, 1925), ii, 837.

² Frunze devoted a lengthy study to the military aspects of the war in Morocco (M. Frunze, *Sobranie Sochinenii*, ii (1926), 203-282); Zinoviev in a speech of June 11, 1925, quoted events in Morocco and China (in that order) as evidence that "a genuine world revolution, and not merely a European revolution, is being kindled before our eyes" (*Izvestiya*, June 16, 1925, where the headline ran: "Morocco and China. Rehearsals of Coming Struggles").

³ *Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 1 (42), January 7, 1926, pp. 12-13; *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 6-7, June-July 1925, pp. 47-53 had an article on *The National-Revolutionary Movement in China and its Influence on the Masses of Asia*. For the Peking League against Imperialism and the Moscow "Hands off China" society founded in the previous year see pp. 686, 708 below.

⁴ See p. 490 above.

⁵ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vii, 231.

as "this junction between Europe and Asia, this point through which the initiation of hundreds of millions of new peoples into the achievements of scientific thought will undoubtedly take place".¹ In October 1925, in an article on the international situation, Zinoviev put "the movement in China" first among the outstanding events of the past summer.² Two months later, at the fourteenth Russian party congress, he hailed "the events of the present year in Shanghai" as "without any exaggeration the most important events of the year in world history".³ Tret'yakov's famous play *Roar, China!*, which Bukharin called "a powerful step on the road to the creation of a truly revolutionary theatre",⁴ was produced in Moscow in January 1926. Throughout the winter 1925-1926 the fear, inspired by the Locarno treaties, of a western world embattled against the Soviet Union turned every ray of light from the east into a beacon of hope.

When the enlarged IKKI met again in Moscow in February-March 1926, no fresh decision of policy or outlook had been taken: the leaders had been too preoccupied in recent months by their internal feuds to turn their attention to any issue which was not forced on them. But the proceedings reflected something of the new orientation. At the opening session the presence of "*numerous delegations from the east*" was especially conspicuous;⁵ and ceremonial speeches were delivered by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, of Kuomintang and of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.⁶ Zinoviev began his main report on conventional lines, and described the prospective itinerary of the revolution as passing first through Europe, then through the east, and finally to America: it was perhaps significant that the priority of Europe could no longer be taken for granted and had to be explicitly asserted. Later in the speech, Zinoviev poked fun at the alleged suggestion of a British trade union leader that the world should be divided between two trade union

¹ L. Kamenev, *Stat'i i Rechi*, xii (1926), 343.

² *Pravda*, October 18, 1925; the article was dated October 1, 1925, and also appeared in *Kommunisticheskii International*, No. 10 (47), October 1925, pp. 7-13 (the next issue of this journal (No. 11 (48), November 1925) contained a 100-page section headed "The East and Colonies").

³ *XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)* (1926), p. 651.

⁴ *Pravda*, February 2, 1926.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 30, February 25, 1926, p. 437.

⁶ For the CCP and Kuomintang speeches see p. 764 below.

Internationals — one at Amsterdam for Europe, the other at Moscow for Asia.¹ But the suggestion contained an uncomfortable element of realism: the boast was now often heard that, though Amsterdam might still dominate Europe, the rising trade union movement of Asia turned infallibly to Profintern. Lozovsky declared the new revolutionary manifestations of the Chinese proletariat to be “*the most important event since the October revolution*”.² The main resolution, though still heavily weighted in favour of Europe, contained a significant paragraph on the eastern question:

The awakening of the national liberation movement in the east and the strengthening there of the workers' movement represent a new fact of first-rate importance. To fix the attention of the workers of Europe and America on this fact, to explain to them the whole importance of this movement in the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat, to accustom the workers of the west and of America to the idea of the necessity of helping and collaborating with the east is one of the most important tasks of our time.

A warning note was added on recent efforts of the Second International, supported by the ILO, to “subject to reformist influence the workers' movement in Japan, India and China” in the interests of the “imperialist bourgeoisie”. The resolution on the trade union movement claimed that the movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries had in the past year “begun to play an exceedingly large rôle in the struggle for national liberation”, and named the Indian and Chinese trade unions as “especially important” in this respect.³ An eastern commission was set up under the presidency of Roy, and worked in five sub-commissions, all of which drafted resolutions. But here trouble evidently arose. Though Zinoviev had originally expected the commission to produce “a series of resolutions — on China, on Japan, on India, etc.”, the only one of these resolutions formally endorsed by the plenary session and published in the records was the resolution relating to China.⁴ The resolution

¹ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 14.

² *Ibid.* p. 279.

³ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 551-552, 558-559.

⁴ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 462, 509; according to the version in *Internationale Presse-Korre-*

on "the reorganization of the work of IKKI" laid it down that "the problems of the eastern peoples should in future occupy a far larger place than hitherto, corresponding to their new great importance, in the work of the executive". Here, however, aspiration outran performance. The combined forces of inertia, vested interest and lack of suitable eastern personnel resisted any notable change. When the business of reorganizing IKKI was undertaken after the session, no representative of Asia was appointed either to the Orgburo or to the secretariat; and of the eleven sections into which, by a resolution of the presidium, the work of IKKI was divided, one sufficed to deal with "the Far and Near East (China, Korea, Mongolia, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine)".¹ It was a long time before these shortcomings were rectified. Nor did Comintern as an institution ever play so important or so independent a rôle in Asia as it had played in Europe in the first years of its existence. But, by the spring of 1926, the world as viewed from Moscow was beginning to take on a new shape. Soviet eyes were no longer fixed primarily on Europe, and no longer regarded Asia and the "colonial" peoples as a convenient tool or incidental adjunct of policy in Europe. The new world of Asia would be the source of as many embarrassments, mistakes and disillusionments as the old world of Europe. But after 1926 it would not cease to occupy a major place in Soviet calculations.

Foreign trade played a significant, though minor, part in Soviet policy in the east. In 1913 trade across Asiatic frontiers accounted for less than ten per cent of Russian foreign trade. Of exports, only 8.7 per cent went to Asiatic countries, excluding Japan (mainly textiles and other manufactured goods, sugar and oil products); of imports, 11.1 per cent came from the same countries (mainly furs, hides, tea and rice).² Here, as elsewhere,

spondenz, No. 52, April 6, 1926, p. 735, Roy proposed that "the resolutions on the other colonial countries be referred to the presidium for more precise formulation"; if this is correct, the presidium evidently did not see fit to issue them. For the resolution on China see pp. 765-766 below.

¹ For the resolution on the reorganization of IKKI and the subsequent resolution of the presidium, see pp. 907-909 below.

² The percentages are calculated in A. Baykov, *Soviet Foreign Trade* (Princeton, 1946), p. 68, from tables in *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 20 Let, 1917-1937*, ed. S. Bakulin and D. Mishustin (1939), pp. 19-31.

organized foreign trade was brought to an end by the revolution and its sequel. Something survived in the form of local trade across Asiatic frontiers which was beyond the control of the central authorities and was, for that reason, if for no other, tolerated by them; and this toleration continued even after the monopoly of foreign trade had become effective elsewhere.¹ But foreign trade in the first years of the régime meant trade with western countries. The first Soviet customs tariff introduced in February 1922 was exclusively a "customs tariff for European trade".² The official figures of foreign trade from 1918 down to September 1923 (i.e. to the end of the nine-month accounting period January to September 1923) related exclusively to trade over western or maritime frontiers.³

It was in 1923 that serious attention began to be given to trade with the east as an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. Even in matters of commerce the Soviet Union and the eastern countries felt themselves exposed to a common danger of exploitation by the more powerful capitalist countries of the west. At the Genoa conference and elsewhere Soviet Russia had been sensitive to the desire of western bankers and governments to impose on her a "semi-colonial" status. If trade with the economically weak countries of the east had less to offer, it at any rate carried no threat; and these countries had likewise no reason to fear domination by the struggling Soviet economy. Towards the end of 1922 it was decided to establish in Moscow a Russian-Eastern Chamber of Commerce, which opened its doors in February 1923.⁴ Up to this time, though frontier trade had in fact escaped control, trade with eastern countries had, like other foreign trade, been nominally subject to the normal procedures of Vneshtorg. On March 29, 1923, Vneshtorg issued an order freeing trade with

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 473, note 1.

² *Sobranie Uzakonenii*, 1922, No. 24, art. 259; the tariff was extended with some modifications to the Far Eastern region, but not to other Asiatic frontiers, in September 1923 (*Sobranie Uzakonenii*, 1923, No. 83, art. 803).

³ *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 20 Let, 1917-1937*, ed. S. Bakulin and D. Mishustin (1939), p. 6.

⁴ For the date see p. 634, note 3 below. *The Times*, January 1, 1923, published an alleged decision of the Politburo of November 25, 1922, to set up the chamber; though the document is a palpable forgery, it shows that the decision was taken before the end of 1922. For the early history of the chamber see *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 1-2, January-February 1926, pp. 4-6 (this was the official journal of the chamber).

Persia from licensing formalities ; and this precedent was gradually extended to other Asian countries.¹ Among decrees of this period was one exempting from customs duties trade in grain and hay across the frontiers of Manchuria and Mongolia, and another granting a rebate of taxation on exports of cotton yarns to Persia.² The first recognition in an international instrument of the special status of Soviet trade with Asia came in a trade agreement of April 23, 1923, between the RSFSR and Denmark, in which it was expressly stipulated that privileges accorded by the RSFSR to countries bordering on Russia in Asia, or by Denmark to other Scandinavian countries, should not be regarded as contravening the most-favoured-nation principle :³ and a similar reservation appeared in the trade agreement of the USSR with Sweden of March 15, 1924.⁴ Thereafter this became a regular feature of Soviet trade agreements. In 1923 a Soviet-German mixed company was formed under the name Rustransit to handle trade between Germany and Persia, and presumably other eastern countries, passing in transit through the Soviet Union.⁵ But the company was short-lived ; and the Soviet Government was never anxious to facilitate trade between its rivals in Europe and the countries of Asia.⁶

In January 1924 a conference of representatives of Vneshtorg for trade with eastern countries drew up a set of theses which emphasized the differences between these countries and the countries of the capitalist world. In the Asian countries, the Soviet power feared no competition and hoped to find allies ; it could afford to pursue policies of " economic cooperation and active support in increasing their productive power ". Hence it would be the aim of Soviet policy to encourage eastern merchants to cross the frontier for trading purposes, " not to insist on a favourable balance of trade in transactions with eastern countries ", to facilitate the issue of licences or to dispense with them altogether, and, in general, to introduce a " régime of ' licensed

¹ *Ibid.* No. 5-6, May-June 1926, p. 5.

² *Sobranie Uzakonenii*, 1923, No. 88, art. 861 ; No. 101, art. 1016.

³ *SSSR : Sbornik Deistviuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, i-ii (1928), No. 14, pp. 20-26.

⁴ For this agreement see p. 25, note 3 above.

⁵ G. Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml* (1955), pp. 175-176.

⁶ For the question of German trade with Outer Mongolia see p. 856 below.

liberalism' " in trade over Asiatic frontiers.¹ In the same month the situation was regularized by the issue of a preferential tariff for trade across Asiatic land frontiers, thus marking the difference of principle between eastern and overseas trade.² A solemn session of the Russian-Eastern Chamber of Commerce on February 15, 1924, celebrated the first anniversary of the institution. It was presided over by Lezhava, the People's Commissar for Internal Trade, and addressed, among others, by Chicherin, by Frumkin (the deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade in Krasin's absence abroad), and by the diplomatic representatives of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Outer Mongolia. "We are interested", explained Chicherin, "that the east should not be economically enslaved by world capital, just as the eastern countries are interested in our independence of world capital." The representative of Vesenkha, while recognizing that the immediate need of eastern countries was for "the products of our industry", looked forward to future help "in the form of the equipment and development of industry, of the building of new factories and workshops" in the east, and pointed out that trade with the east could be conducted in more liberal conditions than trade with the west, since it brought with it no fear of "exploitation by foreign capital".³ The attempt was made to circumvent financial obstacles to eastern trade either by direct credits from Gosbank or Vneshtorgbank, or by setting up in eastern countries banks with mixed capital for the development of trade with the Soviet Union.⁴

The character of Soviet trade with Asian countries over land frontiers was indicated by the importance assumed by the annual fairs at Baku and Nizhny Novgorod. The Baku fair, which was devoted exclusively to eastern trade, was instituted in 1922, and

¹ *Entsiklopediya Sovetskogo Eksporta* (Berlin, 1924), i. 29; see also *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 473. L. B. Krasin, *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR* (1924), pp. 26-29, also expounds these principles, adding, however, that one difficulty of applying them openly was that capitalist countries would claim equal privileges on grounds of most-favoured-nation treatment.

² *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1924, No. 10, arts. 100, 101; trade with Persia's Caspian ports also benefited from this tariff.

³ *Rossiisko-Vostochnaya Torgovaya Palata: God Raboty* (1924), *passim*; Chicherin's speech was also reported in *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), March 1, 1924, p. 28.

⁴ *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 8-10, October-December 1925, p. 4.

the turnover of trade effected there rose from $1\frac{1}{2}$ million rubles in that year to 16 millions in 1925.¹ Of this total, foreign trade accounted for nearly 9 million rubles, more than 8 millions representing trade with Persia. Turkish merchants appeared at the fair for the first time in 1925; and a decree was issued according to Turkish goods sent to the fair by sea the same exemptions as were accorded to overland trade with Asian countries.² The fair at Nizhny Novgorod accounted in 1925 for trade with eastern countries to a value of $13\frac{1}{2}$ million rubles, the countries ranking in the following order: Persia, Sinkiang, Afghanistan, Turkey and Outer Mongolia.³ A fair at Sverdlovsk also apparently attracted some eastern trade.⁴ Wool, cotton and hides were the main imports from eastern countries brought to the fairs, sugar, textiles and light manufactures the principal exports.⁵ The traditions of caravan trade, and exemption from tariff and other restrictions, made the fairs important points of contact with countries where the long distances, the lack of any but the most primitive transport, and the total absence of credit facilities or means of payment rendered trade in ordinary conditions difficult.⁶ In 1925 22 per cent of all Soviet trade with eastern countries, and 24 per cent of Soviet trade with Persia, was done at the Baku and Nizhny Novgorod fairs.⁷

Statistics of Soviet trade with eastern countries conducted in these conditions are unlikely to have been complete or accurate.⁸

¹ *Ibid.* No. 3-4, March-April 1926, pp. 7-8.

² *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 210, 221; *Sbornik Dekretov, Postanovlenii, Rasporyazhenii i Prikazov po Narodnomu Khozyaistvu*, No. 21 (42), June 1925, p. 30.

³ *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 5-6, May-June 1926, pp. 1-2. *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 211, gives a total of 16 million rubles for foreign trade at Nizhny Novgorod in 1925, of which 11 millions represented trade with Persia; Iraqi merchants are said to have appeared for the first time at this fair (*ibid.* xiii-xiv, 214).

⁴ *Ibid.* xiii-xiv, 211.

⁵ *Ibid.* xiii-xiv, 212-214.

⁶ *Ibid.* xiii-xiv, 214-215, 218.

⁷ *Ibid.* xiii-xiv, 211.

⁸ According to a volume published by Narkomvnutorg in 1925 and reviewed in *Vestnik Finansov*, No. 11-12, November-December 1925, p. 287, contraband goods to the value of 8.6 million rubles were seized on various frontiers in the year 1923-1924; on a current estimate that the total of contraband trade was ten times the total seized, this meant that contraband trade amounted to 16 per cent of legal foreign trade. Trotsky in an article of September 1925 spoke of a contraband trade in small articles, "which is at present draining the country of millions of rubles of gold currency" (*Pravda*, September 22, 1925;

But customs statistics showed that throughout the middle nineteen-twenties the Soviet trade balance was passive with all Asian countries except Turkey and Japan (where it was strongly active), and that in 1924-1925 and 1925-1926 it was passive for all Asian countries taken together :

	1923-1924 (in millions of rubles at 1913 prices)		1924-1925 (in millions of chervonets rubles)		1925-1926 (in millions of chervonets rubles)	
	Exports from USSR	Imports to USSR	Exports from USSR	Imports to USSR	Exports from USSR	Imports to USSR
Turkey	24.2	0.9	10.0	3.7	17.7	9.8
Persia	7.5	22.3	28.6	50.7	35.2	43.6
Afghanistan	0.07	1.3	0.5	1.6	2.5	3.2
Mongolia (including Tannu-Tuva)	1.7	2.1	Mongolia 2.8 Tannu-Tuva 0.4	3.6	3.6	3.7
China (including Sinkiang)	5.2	11.1	China 9.0 Sinkiang 2.6	16.9	16.8	30.8
Japan	13.7	1.9	12.6	1.2	6.0	10.3
Totals	52.3	39.6	66.5	82.4	91.7	104.0 ¹

The statistics purported to show that by 1924-1925 Soviet trade with eastern countries, excluding Japan, already accounted for a slightly higher percentage of all Soviet foreign trade than before the war (9.1 per cent of exports and 10.7 per cent of imports), and that this percentage further increased in succeeding years.² By the end of 1925, however, the passive balance of Soviet trade with Asian countries other than Turkey and Japan began to preoccupy the authorities.

for this article see Vol. 1, p. 505, note 2 above). If these conditions prevailed on frontiers where strict control was supposed to exist, it is scarcely likely that effective statistical control was exercised on other frontiers.

¹ *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 5-7, July-September, 1925, p. 16 (figures for 1923-24); October-December, 1926, pp. 35-42 (figures for 1924-1925 and 1925-1926). An obviously erroneous figure for imports from Mongolia in 1924-1925, due to a misreading of tons for rubles, together with the resulting total, have been corrected by checking with the tables in *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 210, 216.

² The percentages are calculated in A. Baykov, *Soviet Foreign Trade* (Princeton, 1946), p. 68 from the source cited p. 631, note 2 above; *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 8-10, October-December 1925, p. 3, gives higher estimates of trade turnover — 13 per cent for 1913 and 15 per cent for 1924-1925.

An order of Vneshtorg of October 23, 1925, permitted import from Afghanistan without licence of rice, dried fruits, cattle and horses, feathers, grain, meat, dairy products and carpets, and the export to Afghanistan without licence of all products of Soviet industry except sugar, oil, feathers, carpets and articles of which export was in general prohibited.¹ But the purpose was apparently no longer to remove restrictions, but to impose a minimum of regulation on trade which had hitherto been altogether free. On January 30, 1926, Vneshtorg issued an order re-imposing a licensing system for all goods imported into the Soviet Union from Persia except cotton.² In the following month, a further order extended the same restriction to trade across other Asiatic frontiers.³ These steps were perhaps inspired by the growing importance of eastern markets in the Soviet economy. But they were also signs of growing economic power; and it was significant that the aim of Soviet trade with the east should now have been defined in terms which no longer stressed the theme of equality, but drew attention to Soviet industrial preponderance. Soviet trade with the east now sought to effect, in the words of a semi-official journal, "a real linking of the Soviet factory and workshop with eastern raw materials, of the Soviet consumer with the products of the peasant labour of the countries of the east, of the consumer of the eastern countries with socialist manufactures".⁴ A later article explained that the east stood "at the crossroads between two political systems" based on two conflicting conceptions of world economy, and that it was "impossible for the east to organize its national economy and at the same time retain its political independence unless it aligns its national economy with the economy of the Soviet republics"; it was for Soviet

¹ *Byulleten' Finansovogo i Khozyaistvennogo Zakonodatel'stva*, No. 26, November 20, 1925, p. 32.

² *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 1-2, January-February 1926, p. 49; later in the year licences were issued for the importation of Persian goods for the Baku fair on the understanding that Persian merchants would purchase Soviet goods of equal value to those imported (*ibid.* No. 3-4, March-April, 1926, p. 8).

³ N. Arkhipov, *SSSR po Raionam: Sredne-Aziatskie Respubliki* (1927), pp. 133-134; see also *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 5-6, May-June, 1926, p. 1, which refers to "rations of so-called consumer goods", and *ibid.* October-December 1926, p. 6, where this is described as the "third period" of Soviet trade with eastern countries — the period of "balanced trade".

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 1-2, January-February 1926, p. 3.

trade institutions to "assist the eastern countries to by-pass the capitalist stage of economic development".¹ But Soviet trade with the east continued in this period to escape from the full measure of regulation and organization which was applied to trade with the west. After the failure of the Soviet-Persian commercial agreement of July 3, 1924, to secure ratification,² no further such agreement was concluded with any eastern country before 1927; and it appears to have been only about 1930 that the monopoly of foreign trade was made fully effective in this direction.

¹ *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, October-December 1926, p. 4.

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 473.

CHAPTER 38

THE MIDDLE EAST

(a) *Turkey*

THE year 1923 was one of increasing uneasiness in Soviet-Turkish relations. The Lausanne conference revealed the unwillingness of the Turkish Government in the Straits question to range itself unconditionally on the side of Soviet Russia and against the western Powers ;¹ and a renewed wave of persecution of Turkish communists revived one of the chronic embarrassments of dealing with the Kemal régime.² But the policy announced in a press interview given by the newly-appointed Soviet *polpred* to Turkey, Surits, in December 1923 was firm and unequivocal :

Mutual relations between the USSR and Turkey are defined at the present time by the struggle for national independence which is still being waged by Turkey, and cannot yet be regarded as completed.³

The Soviet expert on eastern affairs, Gurko-Kryazhin, described Kemal's supporters as "a potential bourgeoisie, carrying out primitive accumulation through the agency of the state apparatus".⁴ In 1923 a Turkish republic was proclaimed, and the capital transferred to Ankara. On March 3, 1924, the caliphate was abolished, and on April 20, 1924, a secular republican constitution formally approved. Economically and politically, it was difficult to contest the credentials of the Kemalist régime as a revolutionary and progressive, though bourgeois, phenomenon. But the fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924 showed once more how hard was the path of Turkish communists. A

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 487-489.

² *Ibid.* Vol. 3, pp. 476, 479.

³ *Izvestiya*, December 25, 1923.

⁴ Quoted in *Novyi Vostok*, xvi-xvii (1927), 123.

decision of IKKI in March 1924 to set up a Turkish commission¹ seemed to promise a more active policy; and the few pronouncements about Turkey made at the congress indicated that the turn to the Left was also intended to apply there. Some Turkish comrades, impressed with the obligation to support Kemal as a champion of national liberation, had, according to Manuisky, proposed to "support the development of internal capital against foreign capital"—a policy which Manuisky branded as "Struvisism"—and "in practice adopted the standpoint of the class community of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie". A Turkish delegate attempted to rebut this charge by comparing the position in Turkey with that in China. He pleaded for clear directives from the programme commission, and argued that "the proletariat must participate in the struggle against imperialism and reaction".² At the ensuing third congress of Profintern two delegates from the opposing camps in the Turkish party clashed on this issue, one playing down the proletarian element in party policy and insisting on support for Kemal so long as he fought "against imperialism and the remnants of the feudal system", the other stressing the importance of the proletarian movement and the need to organize the workers "against the bourgeoisie"; and, though no formal verdict seems to have been delivered, it was the supporter of Kemal who was denounced by another delegate for "a deviation towards the Right".³ But the lesson to be drawn from the proceedings by Turkish communists was far from clear. During 1924, the Turkish party was said to have made the mistake of "over-estimating Kemalist liberties" and of placing most of its organs on a semi-legal basis which was tolerated at the time, but exposed it to subsequent reprisals.⁴

By the autumn of 1924 the international situation had changed once more with the clash between Great Britain and Turkey for the possession of the oil-bearing region of Mosul. In October

¹ *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress (1924)*, p. 58.

² *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 625, 633, 708.

³ *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), pp. 299-301.

⁴ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress (1928)*, p. 432.

1924 Chicherin was able to assure VTsIK that "the conflict between Turkey and England over Mosul has taken the form of open military measures" and that reference to the League of Nations was unlikely to provide a "stable solution".¹ Throughout 1925 mounting tension with Great Britain drew the Turkish Government nearer to the Soviet Union in the diplomatic field. The tightening bonds of Soviet-Turkish cooperation, and the less belligerent line adopted by the fifth enlarged IKKI of March 1925 (which had nothing to say about Turkey), gave Kemal the assurance of a free hand with Turkish communists. On March 5, 1925 two communist newspapers were suppressed, and party activities once more driven underground. Two months later arrests of communist leaders began. A mass trial took place during the summer at which, on August 13, 1925, 17 communist leaders, four of them *in absentia*, received sentences of imprisonment totalling 159 years.² The severity of these reprisals came as a disagreeable shock in Moscow. But British pressure on Turkey, and Soviet sympathy for the victim of British imperialism, grew steadily. Under cover of the public preoccupation with Locarno and its consequences, negotiations between the two countries proceeded behind the scenes; and on December 17, 1925, the day on which the League of Nations pronounced its decision to transfer Mosul to the British-mandated territory of Iraq, Chicherin and Tewfik, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, signed in Paris a Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship and neutrality.

The significance of the treaty was emphasized by the secrecy with which it had been concluded: its signature was announced only five days after the event.³ Its contents reflected Soviet fears engendered by Locarno. Each of the two countries undertook to refrain not only from any act of aggression against the other, but from participation in any alliance, agreement or hostile action against the other, including financial or economic action, initiated

¹ SSSR : *Tsentral'nyi Ispolnitel'nyi Komitet 2 Sozyva : 2 Sessiya* (1924), p. 74.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 6 (64), October 22, 1926, pp. 44-48; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 129, September 8, 1925, p. 1882; the count was later increased to 18 defendants and 177 years (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 432).

³ The announcement and the text of the treaty appeared in *Izvestiya*, December 23, 1925.

by one or more other Powers. In the event of military action against one party, the other explicitly undertook to maintain neutrality.¹ Litvinov in a statement made to the press before Chicherin's return to Moscow expected the treaty to "dispel any fears or doubts about the firmness of Soviet-Turkish friendship among the people of both countries". But he also described it as "a step in the consolidation of peace in general", and announced the willingness of the Soviet Government to conclude similar treaties with all other countries with which it maintained normal relations.² *Izvestiya*, in a leading article headed *Anti-Locarno*, called the treaty "an anti-Locarno pact in the sense that it was signed for the purpose of peace and not of war", and depicted it as an example of the way in which "without having recourse to the League of Nations . . . the peoples of the USSR and of the east, inspired by exclusively peaceful intentions and alien to all plans of aggression, will in the future regulate their relations in the interests of culture and progress".³ The Soviet-Turkish treaty was afterwards to be hailed in Moscow as the foundation-stone of a Soviet system of security free from the objectionable features of the Geneva system. Its immediate function in Soviet-Turkish relations was to register and stabilize an existing situation, in which Turkey re-insured herself in Moscow against western pressure. An optimistic examination of the Turkish economy in the semi-official journal *Novyi Vostok* led up to the conclusion that, "from a former semi-colony of foreign imperialism without an economic policy of her own, Turkey is moving through Lausanne towards an independent economic position and towards the revival of an economy which has been backward for centuries".⁴

Nevertheless, Soviet-Turkish friendship remained anxious and precarious. Within a few weeks of the signature of the treaty, fears were being felt in Moscow that face-saving concessions by

¹ For the text see *SSSR : Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, iii (1932), No. 129, pp. 5-6 ; *League of Nations : Treaty Series*, clvii (1935), 354-357 (the treaty was registered with the League only on February 15, 1935).

² *Pravda*, December 24, 1925 ; an article by Irandust (i.e. Rotshtein) in the same issue emphasized the willingness of the Soviet Government to conclude such treaties with other countries.

³ *Izvestiya*, December 24, 1925.

⁴ *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 153-168.

Great Britain might woo Turkey from a Soviet orientation.¹ These fears were for the moment unjustified ; and the conclusion on April 22, 1926, of a Turkish-Persian neutrality treaty on similar lines to the Soviet-Turkish treaty was applauded as " a logical continuation and development of the recently concluded treaty between the Soviet Union and Turkey " and " one of the latest examples of the new system of pacific international treaties which the USSR has opposed to the notorious spirit of Locarno, which has as its aim the preparation of new wars ".² Demonstrations of Soviet-Turkish friendship, however, were, as usual, not accompanied on the Turkish side by any relaxation of the campaign against Turkish communism. Early in 1926 it was reported that Kemal had successfully weaned the Turkish trade unions from their original communist sponsors, and placed them firmly under national leadership.³ A year later, a speaker in IKKI referred to " the dialectical contradictions of the historical process " in virtue of which " Kemal conducted in parallel form the struggle against the remnants of feudalism and against imperialism, while he simultaneously strangled the communist movement at home and persecuted the workers and peasants ".⁴ The Turkish revolution, said Stalin about the same time, " got stranded at the ' first step ', the first stage of its development, at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic movement, without even attempting to make the transition to the second stage of its development, the stage of the agrarian revolution ".⁵

(b) Persia

In no country of the Middle East was Soviet policy in the nineteen-twenties so ambivalent as in Persia, where the personality

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 29, February 23, 1926, pp. 419-421 ; a congratulatory leading article in *Izvestiya*, March 16, 1926, was devoted to the fifth anniversary of the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921 (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 303).

² *Pravda*, May 14, 1926 ; the article was signed Irandust (Rotshtein) ; for the text of the Turkish-Persian treaty of April 22, 1926, see *League of Nations: Treaty Series*, cvi (1930-1931), 248-267.

³ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 355-356.

⁴ *Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), p. 45.

⁵ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, x, 15-16.

of Riza Khan provided a baffling problem. During the first year of Riza's rise to power (he had become Minister for War in February 1921), it had seemed natural to hail him as a progressive champion of reform and of national liberation from British imperialism.¹ But a long historical tradition created in Persia a stronger sense of national identity, and of a national ruling class, than in any other Middle Eastern country except Turkey. Riza quickly displayed impatience of anything like Soviet tutelage; and, after he became Prime Minister and dictator of the country at the end of October 1923, he was self-assured enough to occupy an independent bargaining position between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Soviet efforts at this time were devoted to the development of Soviet-Persian trade,² and the Curzon ultimatum probably led to a temporary lull in propaganda against British imperialism.³ Riza continued, however, to enjoy sympathy and support in Moscow. A strong point in his favour was that he was ready to use his military power to build up a powerful national state, and to crush the decentralizing ambitions of the local feudal sheiks who enjoyed British patronage. *Through Military Dictatorship to a National State* was the title of one of several eulogistic articles which greeted his rise to power in the Soviet press.⁴ Insurrections in southern Persia early in 1924 were said to be instigated by "British imperialism masquerading under the flag of the Second International"; and Riza was "the leader of the Persian national-revolutionary movement, the man who succeeded in securing Persia's independence".⁵ Riza's personal antipathy to the Shah was taken as evidence of enlightened hostility to

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 469-470.

² *Ibid.* Vol. 3, pp. 472-473; Soviet trade with Persia was at this period larger than with any other Asian country (for statistics see p. 636 above).

³ For the ultimatum see *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, pp. 168-169; the activities of Shumyatsky, Soviet *polpred* in Teheran, figured conspicuously in it.

⁴ *Novyi Vostok*, v (1924), 101-103.

⁵ *Ibid.* vi (1924), p. xv; Shumyatsky in an interview in October 1924 described the struggle against the "feudal borderlands" in the south as the most important factor in the situation (*Izvestiya*, October 21, 1924). In contrast with the centralizing policy of a progressive government, the decentralizing tendencies of "a feudal landed aristocracy" fitted in with imperialist aims: "to support the borderlands against the centre, the feudalists against the genuine supporters of centralization and bourgeois democratic progress, the nationalists — such is the programme of the English" (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 105).

monarchy as an institution. When in April 1924 Riza was temporarily compelled by his opponents to relinquish the post of Prime Minister, Shumyatsky the *polpred* in Teheran, in an interview with the press in Moscow, described Riza's withdrawal as "simply an episode in the struggle of the progressive elements with the forces of disintegration and of radical-feudalistic anarchy".¹ When in July 1924, after the murder of an American consul, the diplomatic corps protested to Riza and demanded stronger government (which was assumed to mean the return to power of the Shah), Shumyatsky refused to participate in the *démarche*.²

Meanwhile the Persian Communist Party remained too weak and insignificant to present a serious embarrassment. Industrial development was entirely dependent on foreign capital. Private industry working with native capital still scarcely existed; the small but growing Persian proletariat consisted of unskilled labourers in foreign enterprises — mainly the great oil companies — or in state or municipal undertakings. Older forms of organization of labour were described as resembling mediaeval guilds rather than trade unions: they were now "utterly obsolete" and "passing through a period of disintegration". A trade union movement was in its early stages. Ten trade unions with a total membership of 8250 were recorded in Teheran in 1922; they included teachers and postal workers as well as manual labourers.³ These do not appear to have been specifically communist; the dependence of the Persian economy on foreign capital meant that any movement directed against capitalist exploitation took on an anti-foreign and nationalist colour. The report of IKKI to the fifth congress of Comintern in June 1924 claimed that the Persian Communist Party had taken an active part in "the intensification of the struggle of national democratic elements against feudalism and its backer, British imperialism". It admitted, however, that the party was "weak and numerically insignificant", that it was confined to Teheran, Tabriz and a few other cities, and that "attempts of the party to establish connexions with the south Persian oil districts (where over 50,000

¹ *Izvestiya*, April 11, 1924.

² *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 2, 1926, p. 26.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, i (1922), 153; ii (1922), 568-574.

workers are employed) have so far always miscarried".¹ When KIM, in a resolution on the national question adopted by its fourth congress in July 1924, drew a distinction between colonial and semi-colonial countries having "a relatively developed industrial proletariat with growing class consciousness" and those in which "an absolute majority of the population is interested above all in political liberation from the yoke of foreign imperialism", it unhesitatingly put Persia in the second category.²

Riza's rising personal authority continued to present a problem to Moscow. On the one hand, his antipathy to the quasi-independent feudal sheiks and to the Shah himself, and his desire to modernize the state machinery, marked him out as a progressive reformer of the bourgeois national stamp. On the other hand, he showed no inclination at all to commit himself to the Soviet camp and was evidently prepared for a deal with the British on his own terms. For the moment no safe alternative offered to a policy of sympathy and support.³ When in October 1925 he finally overthrew the Shah and took the trappings, as well as the reality, of power into his own hands, a moment of apprehension was felt in Moscow.⁴ The journal of Comintern, writing of Riza as a "claimant" to the throne, attributed his dynastic ambitions to the inspiration of the British, who believed that Riza, seated on the Persian throne with their assistance, would be less formidable to them than Riza as a president resting his power on popular support. The article concluded with the confident hope that Riza, by proclaiming himself president of a Persian republic, would place himself at the head of a "national-revolutionary movement".⁵ When, however, instead of proclaiming the

¹ *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 59.

² *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der KPI* (1924), p. 66.

³ According to a circumstantial story in G. Agabekov, *OGPU: the Russian Secret Terror* (1931), p. 75, a rising in Khorasan against the central government in 1925 was supported by the local OGPU agent in Ashkabad; but this policy was obstructed — though apparently not formally vetoed — in Moscow.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, November 3, 1925, announced the overthrow of the monarchy and Riza's appointment as "temporary head of state".

⁵ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, pp. 105-115; the statement in L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 729-730 that Rotshtein warned Riza against seeking the throne is difficult to place, since this question could hardly have arisen at the time when Rotshtein was *polpred* in Teheran.

expected republic, Riza decided to mount the throne, and on December 16, 1925, was installed as Shah and founder of a new dynasty, this *volte-face* did not bring about an immediate withdrawal of the favour of Moscow. A leading article in *Izvestiya* on the day of the installation gave the new dynasty in Persia a cautiously favourable reception. The Comintern journal, disappointed of its hopes of a republic, none the less struck a complacent note :

There is nothing surprising in the fact that Riza Khan, in preparing to proclaim himself Shah, fell first of all on the small communist party and destroyed its semi-legal existence.¹

Another article in the Comintern press explained Riza's success by the absence of any sufficient basis for a bourgeois republican movement ; Riza's stand for an anti-feudal centralized modern state could find a solid backing only in military power.² Yurenev, who had succeeded Shumyatsky as Soviet *polpred* in Teheran in June 1925, presented his credentials as " envoy extraordinary " to the new Shah on December 27, 1925.³ Early in 1926 the hope could still be expressed in an IKKI report that the national bourgeoisie in Persia would prove strong enough to give a democratic content to Riza's " Caesarist " rule.⁴ Relations between the Soviet Union and Persia appeared to have taken a turn for the better. On February 20, 1926, an elaborate convention was concluded for the regulation and common use of waterways on the Soviet-Persian frontier ;⁵ and a month later the approval of a Soviet-Persian consular convention was announced in Moscow.⁶

It was about the same time that the Soviet eastern expert, Gurko-Kryazhin, undertook the defence of Riza in a major article

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 12 (49), December 1925, p. 26. *Pravda*, October 31, 1925, reported the arrest of 20 Persian communists, and called it " grist for the mill of Persian reaction " ; according to *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1925), p. 439, the Persian Communist Party was " broken up " in the winter of 1925-1926.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 167, December 22, 1925, pp. 2496-2497.

³ *Izvestiya*, June 16, 1925 ; *Pravda*, December 29, 1925.

⁴ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 358.

⁵ *SSSR : Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, iii (1927), No. 136, pp. 50-55.

⁶ *Pravda*, March 23, 1926 ; no evidence has been found of the signature of the convention.

in the semi-official *Novyi Vostok*. The three years of Riza's effective rule were said to have witnessed not only the formation of a regular army of 50,000 men, which had transformed Persia into a centralized state, but the growth of a Persian bourgeoisie with "Persian commercial capital". This "strengthening of commercial capital" had gone on side by side with a "politico-economic weakening of the landlord class". The "new Persian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia" was explicitly compared with the Turkish; Riza was, by implication, the Persian Kemal. The article recognized the existence of "a military grouping" based on the regular army as "a completely new social factor", but argued that "the drift of the Persian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to dictatorship" was justified by the need to counter the reaction of the landlord class under British patronage. Riza had, in short, established "a Bonapartist monarchy which satisfies the demand of the bourgeoisie, and particularly of the militarists, for a military dictatorship", and which was supported by "the democratic elements, even the most radical".¹ This note of enthusiastic approval could not, however, be maintained. Not only did Riza prove uncompromisingly hostile to communists, trade unions and Left political groups, but he was evidently willing to bargain and temporize with British imperialism. A report of IKKI in February 1926 described Riza's accession to the throne as "only a stage on the road to the transformation of Persia into a bourgeois-democratic republic", and considered that "the national liberation movement cannot halt at this stage".² A critical article in *Novyi Vostok* in the latter part of 1926 denounced Gurko-Kryazhin as a liberal, and pointed out that Bonapartism rested on a basis of small peasant ownership, whereas Riza's monarchy "represents the landlords".³ The more judicious Rotshtein, seeking to reconcile the new position with his previous championship of Riza, attempted to mediate between these conflicting extremes. Riza was the representative of "commercial capital in the form of landowners engaged in trade and merchants"; the Right wing of the old feudal régime, based on a natural economy, had been isolated. The new régime could not be called

¹ *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), pp. xxii-lv.

² *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 358.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 1-16.

a "bourgeois monarchy", but it was "the first serious step in the capitalist development of Persia". The basic problem now was whether Persia could skip "the stage of the slow ripening of capitalism and the period of absolute monarchy", and pass over direct "to a democracy of its toiling classes".¹ But the development of Riza's power during the next few months or years did little to justify an optimistic answer to this question, and the problem of the attitude to be adopted to Riza's government was bequeathed to the succeeding period.

(c) *The Arab World*

The Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East attracted comparatively little attention in Moscow in the nineteen-twenties. This sector of the world was divided by the peace settlement into British and French spheres of influence with the lion's share falling to Great Britain; and the Soviet attitude to it was governed primarily by the contribution which it might make to the struggle against British and French imperialism. Egypt stood apart from the other Arabic-speaking countries in virtue both of its greater wealth and of its active struggle against British domination, which continued with renewed intensity after the conditional recognition of Egyptian independence at the end of 1922. Palestine was in a special position, and presented unique problems as the scene of a Jewish National Home under British mandate. Syria brought France into an already complicated picture of western imperialism, sometimes as an accomplice, sometimes as a rival, of Great Britain. The other Arab countries came in only for occasional and fitful notice.

The admission of the Egyptian Communist Party to Comintern after the fourth congress at the end of 1922² raised the

¹ *Ibid.* xv, 35-63; for other articles by him at this time see *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 2, 1926, pp. 3-51; *Mirovoe Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, No. 2, 1926, pp. 59-87).

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 478. No reliable information exists about the early membership of the party, which must have been extremely small: according to a Comintern emissary who worked in Egypt at this time, the members were mainly foreigners (*Revolutsionnyi Vostok*, No. 6, 1934, p. 65).

question of its relations to the Egyptian nationalist movement, whose outstanding figure was Zaglul, the leader of the Wafd. While Zaglul was still regarded by many in Moscow as a prospective nationalist champion against British exploitation, a counterpart of Kemal in Turkey, Roy attacked him as the leader of a "centrist party", who wanted nothing better than a "*modus vivendi* with British imperialism".¹ The issue did not come to a head till, after a Wafd victory at the elections, Zaglul formed a government and became Prime Minister in January 1924. When strikes broke out in Cairo in the spring of 1924, Zaglul emulated Kemal by suppressing and persecuting the communists. But this did not prevent Comintern from following the same line as in Turkey: Egyptian communists were to "expose" Zaglul's equivocations, but at the same time be prepared to support him in promoting a bourgeois national liberation movement to free Egypt from British domination.² Stalin put the point still more categorically:

The struggle of the Egyptian merchants and bourgeois intelligentsia for the independence of Egypt is . . . an objectively *revolutionary* struggle in spite of the bourgeois origin and bourgeois status of the leaders of the Egyptian national movement, in spite of the fact that they are against socialism.³

At the fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924 Roy protested that Zaglul had come to power by exploiting the nationalist aspirations of the masses and, far from giving them anything in return, was brutally ill-treating them: the whole central committee of the Egyptian Communist Party was in prison.⁴ Manuïlsky grappled unconvincingly with the paradox that Zaglul's rise to power had taken place with the consent of the British Govern-

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 13, January 17, 1923, pp. 87-89.

² *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress (1924)*, pp. 59-60. The date 1923 is evidently a misprint for 1924, but is copied in *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress (1928)*, p. 453, where 1923 appears as the date of the suppression of the party; the correct date is given in *Programmye Dokumenty Kommunisticheskikh Partii Vostoka*, ed. P. Mif (1934), p. 159.

³ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vi, 144; a year later, in May 1925, Stalin said that "in countries like Egypt or China", where the bourgeoisie was already split, communists must aim at "a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie" (*ibid.* vii, 146-147); but the words had little meaning for Egypt.

⁴ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale (n.d.)*, ii, 649.

ment, and was yet a progressive event ; ¹ and the congress passed no resolution on the subject.

The embarrassment of the attitude to be adopted to Zaglul was increased by the dramatic events which marked British-Egyptian relations in the autumn of 1924. On September 25, 1924, Zaglul arrived in London for negotiations with the British Government. The negotiations failed, and Zaglul left for Cairo on October 8, 1924. At this point the proceedings were interrupted by the fall of the British Labour government. Zaglul's failure was felt in Moscow to prove "the complete pointlessness and hopelessness of the struggle with English imperialism on a legal-juridical footing", and the need for an Egyptian revolutionary movement on "a broad social basis".² On November 19, 1924, with the Conservative government now firmly installed in London, an Egyptian killed Lee Stack, the British governor of the Sudan. Three days later Allenby, the commander of the British troops, sent an ultimatum to the Egyptian Government, which included a demand for the withdrawal of all Egyptian forces from the Sudan. On November 24, 1924, Zaglul resigned, and his compliant successor Ziwar accepted the British terms. These events did not stand alone. While Zaglul was in London, eleven communists were on trial in Cairo, and received sentences ranging from 6 months' to 3 years' imprisonment. This had provoked an address from IKKI to the imprisoned communists, which noted that Zaglul's "national" government "in no way falls short of its predecessors, the direct hirelings and agents of British imperialism, in its incessant reprisals".³ But the march of events soon called for another orientation. On November 28, 1924, a meeting was held in Baku to protest against the British ultimatum. It was addressed by the Turkish consul, as well as by representatives of Turkestan, Dagestan and Persia, and founded a "Hands off Egypt" society (of which nothing further seems to have been heard).⁴ About the same time, the Far Eastern [*sic*] bureau of Comintern issued a protest against the British ultimatum

¹ *Ibid.* ii, 625.

² *Novyi Vostok*, vii (1925), 76.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 137, October 21, 1924, pp. 1812-1813 ; No. 152, November 25, 1924, p. 2068. For a further letter from IKKI to the Egyptian Communist Party see *Pravda*, November 22, 1924.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 159, December 9, 1924, pp. 2169-2170.

and "the undignified behaviour of the Egyptian Government".¹ Zaglul, once more in opposition, was on the way to become a martyr of the national cause. But in other respects Ziwar faithfully followed the line laid down by Zaglul. During this year 18 leading communists were arrested and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.² Prospects of revolution in Egypt were disconcertingly slender. Even a national congress of opposition groups summoned in November 1925 to protest against the Ziwar régime listened respectfully to an appeal from Zaglul to remain within the limits of constitutional procedures.³ Nevertheless hopes of action to break the *status quo* in Egypt clearly depended on the bourgeois nationalism of the Wafd rather than on the proletarian socialism of Moscow; and, when Zaglul died in 1927, he received an indulgent obituary article in a Soviet journal as a fighter in the struggle against imperialism.⁴

The fortunes of communism, and the shape of Soviet policy, in Palestine were influenced from the first by the strong antipathy to Zionism prevalent among Russian Social-Democrats — in part, a legacy from the Jewish Bund. At the second congress of Comintern in 1920, a delegate named Mereshin introduced a resolution on Zionism, which attempted to distinguish between bourgeois and socialist Zionism, and claimed the latter as progressive and revolutionary. But this view was strongly contested by other delegates, and the resolution was not adopted. The main resolution of the congress on the national and colonial questions contained a paragraph vigorously condemning "the Zionist enterprise in Palestine, and Zionism in general", which, "in the guise of a Jewish state in Palestine, in practice hands over the Arab population of Palestine, where Jewish workers form only an insignificant minority, as victims to English exploitation".⁵ In the same year a "Jewish Communist Party" was founded in

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 165, December 19, 1924, pp. 2261-2262.

² *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 453.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 41, March 12, 1926, pp. 561-562.

⁴ *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 6, 1927, pp. 175-178.

⁵ *Der Zweite Kongress der Kommunist. Internationale* (1921), pp. 198, 204, 210-211; *Kommunistisches Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 129. Mereshin's resolution does not appear to have been published.

Palestine, but was affiliated to the Jewish organization Poale Zion; it was not till 1924 that it established its independence, admitted an Arab for the first time to membership, and joined Comintern under the name of the Palestine Communist Party.¹ In the meanwhile the Zionist trade union organization Histadruth had affiliated in 1922 to IFTU; and this had prompted a small Left-wing minority of Jewish unions to affiliate to Profintern. Early in 1924 Profintern issued an appeal to "the Arab workers of Palestine" to organize against "the alliance of English-Zionist capital"; and this may have provoked the decision of the Histadruth, taken shortly afterwards, to expel the minority unions as "enemies of the Jewish people and of the Jewish working class".² As the Jewish proletariat grew in numbers and influence, Histadruth became of necessity increasingly concerned with the protection of the Jewish workers against the competition of cheap Arab labour.

Communist policy in Palestine continued to revolve round two related themes: denunciation of the British mandate as an expression of British imperialism and of bourgeois Zionism as its tool,³ and the attempt to associate Jewish and Arab workers in the same cause and the same organizations. Intermittent support was given to Arab nationalist demands, which were said to comprise the repeal of the Balfour declaration, an amnesty for political prisoners and the establishment of a great Arab federation.⁴ In 1925 the insurrection in Syria, coupled with the war in Morocco, kindled a fresh spark of interest in Arab nationalism. Some apprehension was felt that the replacement of Samuel by Plumer in July 1925 as British High Commissioner in Palestine might portend a turn of British policy towards the Arabs, and thus

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 94, July 23, 1924, p. 1212.

² *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 2-3 (37-38), February-March 1924, pp. 166-167; No. 10 (57), October 1925, pp. 237-238; *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 447. Communists were said in 1924 to control a railway workers' union of 3000 members, which, unlike all other unions, included Arabs as well as Jews (*Kommunistischeski Internatsional*, No. 4, 1924, p. 423).

³ On the occasion of Balfour's visit to Palestine in the spring of 1925, the central committee of the Palestine party issued a declaration describing Balfour as a symbol of the "imperialist swindle" and the Balfour declaration as a reward for services rendered by "Jewish financial magnates" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 59, April 15, 1925, pp. 799-800).

⁴ *Kommunistischeski Internatsional*, No. 4, 1924, pp. 416-417.

undermine the Soviet position. But it was pointed out with satisfaction that Plumer continued to ban Arab demonstrations, and that Jewish immigration continued unabated.¹ On May 1, 1926, Arabs as well as Jews participated for the first time in the workers' processions, some of them being railway workers on strike.² But, in spite of occasional demonstrations, neither Soviet policy nor communist propaganda secured any real foothold in Palestine during this period.

Soviet policy-makers and propagandists had paid little attention to Syria before the revolt of 1925. France was denounced for attempting to drive a wedge between Syria and other Arab countries, including Egypt, by resisting the pan-Arab tendencies of the Syrian intelligentsia.³ In May 1924 IKKI issued a manifesto against French imperialism in Syria; but this seems to have been related to an attempt to galvanize the PCF into a more active colonial policy rather than to anything happening in Syria itself.⁴ In the summer of 1925 widespread revolts against the French administration occurred throughout Syria, culminating in the bombardment of Damascus by French troops on October 19-20, 1925. These events produced a number of protests and proclamations from the PCF.⁵ But little direct information about the situation in Syria appears to have reached Moscow; and the Syrian revolt was treated mainly as an adjunct to the war in Morocco and as a further blow in the struggle against French imperialism. A Syrian Communist Party which was represented for the first time at the sixth congress of Comintern in 1928 was said to have been founded as an illegal party in 1925.⁶

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 35, March 5, 1926, pp. 482-483; the belief that British policy in Palestine in 1925 was moving away from its pro-Jewish orientation and becoming more favourable to the Arabs was expressed in an article in *Mezhdunarodnaya Letopis'*, No. 10-11, 1925, pp. 117-119, and in a report of IKKI of February 1926 (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 359).

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 76, May 21, 1926, pp. 1216-1217.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, i (1922), 67-78.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 57, May 23, 1924, p. 692.

⁵ See p. 358 above.

⁶ A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominterna* (1929), pp. 147, 359.

But no trace of its activities in Syria has been found in the nineteen-twenties.

Of the Arab rulers who had enjoyed British patronage and subsidies as leaders of the revolt against Turkey during the war the most successful and important was Hussein, King of the Hejaz. Ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd, was a lesser potentate, who had been in receipt of British munificence on a smaller scale. It was an embarrassment to British policy when in the winter of 1924-1925 Ibn Saud waged successful war against Hussein, compelled him to abandon his throne, and proclaimed himself king of the united kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd, later to be renamed Saudi Arabia. But what was unwelcome in London was automatically hailed with satisfaction in Moscow.¹ Though "economic and political relations" had been established with the Hejaz in August 1924,² Soviet emissaries had been unable to weaken the preponderant British influence at the court of King Hussein. On the other hand, British attempts to win over Ibn Saud were watched with suspicion and were thought to have failed.³ In February 1926 an exchange of notes between the Soviet Government and Ibn Saud provided for mutual diplomatic recognition;⁴ and Ibn Saud was for a time eulogized in the Soviet press, like Kemal and Amanullah, as a progressive ruler and a liberator of his nation. But the situation in the Arab world was too fluctuating, and the Soviet interest there too precarious, for any serious or long-term commitments to be undertaken.

(d) *Afghanistan*

Afghanistan was the only country of the Middle East where Soviet policy was uncomplicated by the existence even of an embryonic workers' movement or of a national communist party; and King Amanullah could receive unconditional support as a

¹ *Novyi Vostok*, vii (1925), 49-76.

² *Istoriya Diplomatii*, ed. V. Potemkin, iii (1945), 301.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 158, November 27, 1925, p. 2372.

⁴ *SSSR : Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, iv (1928), No. 156, pp. 14-15.

champion of national liberation from the encroachments of British imperialism. Spectacular measures were not called for or attempted. But the traditional British policy of treating the country as a British zone of influence provided ample opportunities for Soviet diplomacy to depict the Soviet Union as the friend of a small and oppressed people. In December 1923 the activities of the British Minister were denounced as an example of British "provocation".¹ Two months later the arrival of a new Afghan representative in Moscow, coinciding with celebrations of the sixth anniversary of Afghan independence, provided the occasion for assurances of Soviet sympathy in the struggle for the liberation of Afghanistan from the imperialist yoke.² In the spring of 1924 the Soviet Government offered its support to "the progressive government" of Amanullah against revolting tribesmen who were suspected or alleged to enjoy surreptitious British support.³ On this occasion Soviet aeroplanes with Soviet pilots, having helped to suppress the revolt, remained in Afghanistan in the service of the Afghan Government, and negotiations were opened for the construction of a telegraph line, a radio station and roads.⁴ This attention to the improvement of communications no doubt served to strengthen the links between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union by facilitating intercourse and exchanges between them; and the comparative proximity of the Soviet railway system to the Soviet-Afghan frontier was a favourable factor.⁵ In 1926 the Afghan air force was said to have consisted of 12 planes, all supplied without payment by the Soviet Government, and 30 pilots, most of them Russians.⁶ Soviet-Afghan trade

¹ *Izvestiya*, December 20, 1923; interviews in the same sense with Raskolnikov, former Soviet *polpred* in Kabul, and with the Afghan representative in Moscow, appeared *ibid.* December 23, 25, 1923. ² *Ibid.* March 6, 1924.

³ For a brief account of this revolt, in which the Indian Government, according to the official version, "had not only preserved a scrupulously correct neutrality, but had gone out of its way to assist the Afghan Government in surmounting its internal crisis", see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, ed. A. J. Toynbee, i (1927), 567-568.

⁴ *Godovoi Otchet Narodnogo Komissariata po Inostrannym Delam za 1924 g. k III S"ezdu Sovetov SSSR* (1925), p. 94.

⁵ *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 218.

⁶ Information from the contemporary press in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, ed. A. J. Toynbee, i (1927), 546; in 1924 the Afghan Government had possessed two planes purchased from the Indian Government and manned by German pilots (*ibid.* i, 569).

negotiations were reported to have opened in Kabul in January 1925 ;¹ but no formal agreement appears to have been concluded. A frontier dispute over the possession of an island in the Amu-Darya, formerly owned by Bokhara, annexed by Afghanistan and recently occupied by Soviet troops, was settled by a diplomatic agreement of February 28, 1926, when a ceremonial meeting of Soviet and Afghan detachments took place on the island, and the Soviet forces withdrew.²

¹ *Izvestiya*, January 17, 1925.

² Klyuchnikov i Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika*, iii, i (1928), 339-340.

CHAPTER 39

SOUTHERN ASIA

(a) India

IN the calculations of those who framed the eastern policies of the Soviet Government and of Comintern in the first years of the revolution, India occupied a larger place than the sequel was to justify. An early Soviet publicist wrote in 1918 that, "if Russia is justly considered the citadel of world revolution, India can definitely be called the citadel of revolution in the east";¹ and the manifesto drafted by Trotsky for the first congress of Comintern in March 1919 mentioned India and the countries of the Middle East, but not China.² In the theses submitted to the third congress of Comintern in 1921 Lenin wrote of the colonial and semi-colonial countries where the masses, under the impetus of the world war and the Russian revolution, had become "an active factor in world politics and in the revolutionary overthrow of imperialism", and went on:

British India stands at the head of these countries, and there the revolution is growing in proportion, on the one hand, to the rise in the industrial and railway workers' proletariat and, on the other, to the increase in the bestial terror of the British.³

In Lenin's writings of this period, where India and China were linked as potential assets of the revolution in Asia, India always came first;⁴ and in the theses of the fourth congress of Comintern on the eastern question India headed a list of countries which included (in that order) Mesopotamia, Egypt, Morocco, China and Korea.⁵

The importance attached to India in these early pronouncements was due partly to the fact that it appeared to be the Achilles'

¹ K. Troyanovsky, *Vostok i Revolyutsiya* (1918), p. 29.

² For this manifesto see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 235.

³ Lenin, *Sochineniya*, xxvi, 428.

⁴ *Ibid.* xxvii, 293, 415, 416.

⁵ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 317.

heel of the most powerful capitalist country, but partly also to profounder causes. India was the colonial country where native capital, stimulated by European example and European tuition, had advanced furthest in the process of industrial development. It was no accident that Lenin's thesis of an alliance of communism with bourgeois-nationalist movements in backward countries should have been challenged at the second congress of Comintern in 1920 by a spokesman of India. The controversy between Lenin and Roy about the communist attitude to the national movements, which flared up at the congress and was not fully composed there,¹ remained a perennial bone of contention in the rise of Indian communism; for Roy was never tired of insisting, often to the point of exaggeration, that the economic structure of India was no longer feudal, and that a strong national Indian bourgeoisie had vested interests in the maintenance of capitalist society.² From the personal point of view it seemed paradoxical that Roy, who came to communism through nationalism, and was a newly fledged Marxist when he first arrived in Moscow in 1920, should have so energetically contested the claims of nationalism in Asia in the name of a pure and undefiled communism. But in India this was a living political issue. The Indian National Congress, originally founded in 1885, had built up a long tradition of mild and democratic nationalism. Before he fled from India in 1915, Roy's masterful and impatient mind was in revolt against this policy of moderation; and a lack of sympathy prevailed between Roy and most of the congress leaders and spokesmen in Europe. If, as a result of the adoption of Lenin's theses, Comintern were to make the Indian National Congress the focus of its policy for India, Roy would no longer find a place in the counsels of Comintern. At one point negotiations were in fact opened with the congress representatives in Berlin, who visited Moscow in the spring of 1921 and were received by Lenin and Radek, but failed to make any lasting impression.³ Roy continued to speak in the

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 252-257.

² This was the theme of M. N. Roy, *India in Transition* (Geneva [really Berlin], 1922), and was the basis of the theory of "decolonization" which was vehemently attacked at the sixth congress of Comintern in 1928.

³ For this episode, for which no published Soviet sources appear to exist, see G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), pp. 33-34, 36-37.

name of Indian communism in Moscow, though, as the proceedings of the third and fourth congresses of Comintern revealed, his views never won complete acceptance,¹ and his failure to create a serious Indian Communist Party, inside or outside India, must have weakened his prestige. It was a tribute to Roy's personality, or to the lack of available alternatives, that he retained his position for so long.

The winter of 1920-1921 was spent by Roy in Tashkent, where he had been appointed a member of the Central Asian bureau of Comintern. The few score of Indians in Tashkent were divided, according to Roy's own account into two, or possibly three, quarrelling groups. The first Indian Communist Party was formed there on the spot out of this unpromising material, but evidently did not survive long.² In India itself, an attempt had been made in 1920 to organize a feeble and dispersed trade union movement by creating an All-Indian Trade Union Congress (AITUC); the president, Lajpat Rai, had been an associate of Roy in New York in 1917, but was a nationalist, and no extremist in social policy.³ No contacts with this movement seem to have been made in Moscow before November 1921, when the announcement of a second congress of the AITUC brought a long appeal to the Indian workers from the executive bureau of Profintern. Penned in the first months of the existence of Profintern, the appeal showed little inclination to compromise with nationalism. It denounced "British imperialism", but also referred in terms of contempt to "your nationalist leaders", and specifically attacked "nationalist leaders like, for example, Lajpat Rai, who strive to utilize your revolutionary enthusiasm in the interests of their national struggle". Such leaders must be supported up to a point; but "you must strictly prohibit their entry into your proletarian organizations" — a cryptic phrase which was not further elucidated.⁴ The appeal contained no invitation to affiliate to Profintern. Even at this early date, the first aim of Profin-

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 389, 480.

² Quoted from Roy's memoirs in G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), pp. 34-35.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 37, 367-369.

⁴ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 8, November 15, 1921, pp. 86-88; nothing in the text of the appeal justifies the statement quoted in G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 368, from an Indian source that it invited the AITUC "to join the new great world movement of international solidarity".

tern policy was to establish revolutionary outposts in "reformist" unions and to split them against their leaders. The only result produced by the appeal was a resolution of sympathy from the congress for Soviet Russia, and a reference in the secretary's speech to a prospect of "the coming of Bolshevism to India" if labour conditions did not improve there.¹ The fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922 sent a message to the All-Indian Trade Union Congress, then in session at Lahore, promising "sympathy" and "utmost support", but adding that "the economic emancipation of Indian workers and peasants depends on the political freedom of the nation".²

Meanwhile Roy, after the third congress of Comintern, had established himself in Berlin; and here in March 1922 he launched a journal called the *Vanguard of Indian Independence* (the name was shortly changed to *Advance Guard* and later to *Masses of India*), many copies of which were smuggled into India. At this time Roy appears to have reconciled himself, at any rate ostensibly, to the Comintern policy of attempting to penetrate the Indian National Congress. In a letter to one of his few reliable supporters in India in the autumn of 1922 he wrote in terms of a legal and non-communist mass party of the Left, to constitute an opposition bloc within the congress, and an illegal communist party providing the motive force behind the scenes.³ Roy prepared, and published in *Advance Guard*, a "programme for the Indian National Congress" in preparation for its annual congress which was to take place at Gaya on December 26, 1922. This was an advanced radical, but not specifically communist, programme with "complete national independence" placed in the forefront of its demands. When the Gaya congress met, the main debate was between Gandhi, who desired to boycott the elections to the new legislative councils proposed under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and the mildly liberal Das, who desired to participate in them. But both sides firmly rejected a policy of violence, and

¹ For an optimistic account of the congress by Evelyn Roy see *Labour Monthly*, ii, No. 2, February 1922, pp. 354-355.

² *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 531-532.

³ The letter which was intercepted by the police is quoted in G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 46; the conception of combining a legal and an illegal party was borrowed from current practice in the United States.

Roy's programme was ignored and discredited. An appeal to the congress from the secretariat of Comintern to recognize the necessity of "violent means, without which the foreign domination based upon violence cannot be ended", suffered the same fate.¹ Roy afterwards admitted that "we sought to strengthen the hand of the Left, but succeeded only in frightening it", but found consolation in the reflexion, popular in Comintern circles at this time, that these tactics had served to show up the non-revolutionary character of the congress leaders.² The moral of this period in the history of Indian communism was drawn six years later at the sixth congress of Comintern :

The first great anti-imperialist movement (1919-1922) ended in the betrayal by the Indian bourgeoisie of the cause of the national revolution, due chiefly to fear of the mounting wave of peasant unrest, and also to strikes of workers against native employers.³

Roy now set to work in earnest to create a communist party. On February 15, 1923, the *Vanguard of Indian Independence* (the original name had been restored) for the first time displayed beneath its title the words "Central Organ Communist Party of India". A leading article declared that "the organization of a party of the workers and peasants has become an indispensable necessity", though it also proclaimed that "we would fight as part of the National Congress". Roy's attitude to congress, and especially to its liberal and "progressive" wings, revealed the same ambivalence as the attitude of Comintern to the British Labour Party. On the one hand, he described Das as "a sentimentalist and not a revolutionary", whose ideas were as harmful as those of Gandhi; on the other hand, he hailed Das's group as "the beginnings of the revolutionary mass party which is the crying need of the day, and which will alone save the congress".⁴ In March 1923 IKKI and the central council of Profintern issued a joint protest against the trial and condemnation of 172 Indians found guilty of leading a riot which had led to the killing of a

¹ For the documents relating to this episode see *ibid.* pp. 48-50, 53-58; Roy's account of the congress appeared in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 39, March 2, 1923, pp. 281-282.

² *International Press Correspondence*, No. 8, March 1, 1923, pp. 126-127.

³ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 834.

⁴ G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 60.

number of policemen.¹ In June 1923 Roy was in Moscow for the session of the third enlarged IKKI. No discussion of colonial issues took place, and no resolution dealing with them was put forward. But Roy, speaking in the general debate, hammered in his usual point from a slightly different angle. He discerned a change in the tactics of "British imperialism" in colonial countries. It had "thought it profitable to itself to enter into a compromise with the bourgeoisie of these countries" in order to defeat "the influence of the Russian revolution". The entry of British capital into India "coincides with the interests of the Indian bourgeoisie", which no longer had any reason to fight against imperialism.² But all eyes in Moscow were now strained on the impending crisis in Europe, and little attention was paid to Roy's remarks. It was presumably at Roy's instigation that IKKI on June 14, 1923, despatched a letter to the projected conference in India which was to create a legal workers' and peasants' party. This declared that the workers and peasants could "no longer remain an adjunct to bourgeois nationalism", but must "come forward as an independent political force and take up the leadership". The Indian bourgeoisie must, however, be recognized as "a revolutionary factor":

In leading this movement the political party of the workers and peasants must act in cooperation with, and give fullest support to, the bourgeois parties in so far as they struggle against imperialism in some way or other.³

This formula, so far as Roy at any rate was concerned, was a matter of tactics. Nothing had occurred to convince him of the revolutionary character of the Indian bourgeoisie, or to shake his belief in the need for an illegal and conspiratorial communist party.

Such ambitions were, however, far from realization. Even the proposed conference was never held. The British intelligence service decided to intervene, and several of Roy's agents and contacts were arrested in the summer of 1923. In February 1924,

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 48, March 14, 1923, p. 378.

² *Rasshirenniyi Plenum Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskogo Internationala* (1923), pp. 130-131; the report of the speech was evidently abbreviated.

³ G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 65.

eight men, including Roy himself *in absentia*, were indicted for "conspiracy to establish throughout India a branch of a revolutionary organization known as the Communist International". That this should have happened within a few weeks of the advent to power of the first Labour government in Great Britain inspired a flaming letter of protest from Roy, in the name of the Indian Communist Party, to "Ramsay MacDonald, Olivier, the Labour government and the British working class".¹ In April 1924 four of the accused were put on trial in Cawnpore, and, after a long hearing in the course of which a large volume of intercepted correspondence — much of it from Roy — was produced, sentenced to four years' imprisonment. It was about the same time that Stalin voiced the hopes still based in Moscow on an alliance between the Indian revolution and Indian nationalism :

It is not precluded that the chain [of imperialism] may break, say, in India. Why? Because that country has a young, militant revolutionary proletariat, which has such an ally as the national liberation movement.²

Meanwhile Roy himself was expelled in January 1924 from Berlin — probably at the request of the British Government, reinforced by growing hostility of the German Government to communism after the abortive *coup* of October 1923. He moved, taking the *Vanguard of Indian Independence* with him, first to Switzerland, and later in 1924 to France.

This was the situation when the fifth congress of Comintern assembled in Moscow in June 1924. The report of IKKI to the congress, which contained a highly optimistic estimate of the rôle of "communist groups" in India, recommended the Indian Communist Party to aim at a "restoration of the national liberation movement on a revolutionary basis", and the establishment both of a "national people's party" and of a "proletarian class party".³ Manuilsky, in his report to the congress on the national question, referred in passing to the recent strike of textile workers in Bombay which "ended with a blood-bath", and called Reading,

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 13, March 29, 1924, pp. 260-261; the date of the "open letter" was March 21, 1924. For a further open letter from Roy to MacDonald see *ibid.* No. 68, June 13, 1924, pp. 836-838.

² Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vi, 98.

³ *Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Kongress (1924)*, pp. 61-62.

the viceroy, "the well-known hangman of British India".¹ He did not discuss Comintern policy for India. But it might have been inferred, from the analogy of relations with Kuomintang in China, that Comintern supported cooperation with the Indian National Congress; and fear of such a conclusion evidently accounted for the sharp tone of some passages in Roy's long contribution to the debate. Roy based his implicit criticism of the policy of cooperation with the Indian National Congress on a penetrating analysis of the Bombay strike, which he described as a social, not a national, phenomenon. The strike had been directed against native Indian capitalists and exploiters of labour, and had demonstrated the essentially counter-revolutionary position of the Indian national bourgeoisie. Manuilsky's firm rebuttal of Roy's attitude, and his reference to the dispute between Lenin and Roy at the second congress, made it clear that, even in the absence of a formal resolution, Roy had sustained defeat.² The failure to plant any serious communist movement in India must by this time have begun to cast doubts on Roy's credentials; and in the Moscow of 1924 it was already a blot on the record to have engaged in controversy against Lenin. At the fifth congress of Comintern, Roy's prestige was visibly on the wane.

In India, where the Cawnpore trial had broken all Roy's contacts, an attempt was made in the autumn of 1924 to create a legal Indian Communist Party which, by abstaining from the advocacy of violence and from adhesion to Comintern, might remain within the limits of official toleration. But its membership was insignificant, and nothing seems to have been heard of it in Europe for nearly a year.³ In January 1925, the French Government, sensitive to the promptings of the British Government to

¹ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 620, 632.

² For this debate see pp. 618-619 above.

³ The first authentic information about its formation came from a "programme" dated Cawnpore, June 17, 1925, and signed by its secretary, Satya Bakhta, which was published in the French party journal *Cahiers du Bolchevisme*, No. 26, September 1, 1925, pp. 1749-1751, prefaced by an editorial note making "all reserves on points of doctrine raised by our young brother party". The party at this time claimed only 250 members: the most interesting passage in its "programme" was the statement that proposals had been made to affiliate to the Third International and send delegates to Moscow, but that "the Indian Government is hostile to the Third International and has sentenced several communists for having been in relations with it".

take a stronger line against communism,¹ expelled Roy from Paris. This, according to Roy's own admission, "dislocated our business", and finally also disrupted his marriage, since his wife remained in Paris to edit the journal which was the sole living symbol of his Indian Communist Party in exile;² its name was changed at this time to *Masses of India*. Roy did not attend the fifth enlarged IKKI in Moscow in March-April 1925, and no debate took place on the colonial question. But a colonial commission was appointed, and drafted a resolution on India, which seems, from the summary of it given to the plenary session by Foster, the president of the commission, to have tilted the balance against Roy's well-known views:

The commission is of the opinion that it is now necessary for the communists to continue their activity in the national congress and in the Left wing of the Swaraj party. All nationalist organizations should be welded together into a revolutionary mass party and an all-Indian anti-imperialist bloc. The slogan of a national party, the principal points of whose programme are liberation from the empire, a democratic republic, universal suffrage and the abolition of feudalism — watchwords which are proclaimed and popularized by Indian communists — is correct.³

An article by Voitinsky in the journal of Comintern, which also quoted from the Indian resolution, noted that, while deviations from the correct line might occur both to the Right and to the Left, "the latest deviations" in this question had been to the Left.⁴ This was a summing up against Roy.

Meanwhile a fresh complication had arisen in the affairs of Roy's Indian Communist Party and in Roy's relations with Comintern. The resolution of the fifth Congress had called not only for direct contact between IKKI and national liberation movements, but also for "very close contact between the sections in the imperialist countries and the colonies of those countries". The injunction had no specific reference to India; it was designed to counter the prevalent suspicion that the British, French and

¹ See p. 42 above.

² G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 74.

³ For this resolution, which was not published, and for Foster's speech, see p. 310, note 5 above.

⁴ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (41), April 1925, pp. 64-66.

Netherlands communist parties had a lukewarm interest in the liberation of the peoples ruled by their respective countries. But of British possessions, India was at this time the most vocal in her demands for independence or self-government, and was subject to the most severe repression. At the sixth annual congress of the CPGB in May 1924 Bell protested against "the trial of comrade Roy and of the Indian workers of Cawnpore", though no resolution was passed.¹ The resolution of the fifth congress of Comintern helped to awaken the CPGB to its obligations. It had already created a colonial bureau. It is said to have begun during 1924 to carry on work among Indian seamen from ships in British ports.² Early in 1925 it dispatched an emissary, Glading by name, to investigate the progress of the communist movement in India. Glading returned three months later with a report that "no Indian communist party existed at all".³ Undeterred by this disappointment, the CPGB tried a fresh approach. Three Indian trade union leaders, sufficiently moderate in their views to be permitted or encouraged by the government to represent the Indian workers at the annual conference of the ILO in May-June 1925, visited London on their way back from Geneva; and representatives of the CPGB discussed with them a project for an "oriental conference" to be held, presumably in London, in September 1925, to which spokesmen of national movements in Asia would be invited.⁴ Roy had been apprised neither of Glading's mission nor of the project for a conference. It may be presumed that he lodged a complaint in Moscow; and the danger of crossed lines was obvious. The situation was complicated by the presence of two Indians in influential positions in the CPGB — Saklatvala, the one British communist MP, and Palme Dutt, who was rapidly becoming the leading party theorist;⁵ neither of these was a friend of Roy. On July 11-12, 1925, a conference was held on neutral soil at Amsterdam in an attempt to straighten out the difficulties. It was attended by two representatives of the CPGB,

¹ *Speeches and Documents : Sixth Conference of the CPGB* (1924), p. 21.

² G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), pp. 368-369.

³ *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 84, 96.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 77-78; among those whom it was proposed to approach was Suzuki from Japan (see p. 889 below).

⁵ See p. 121 above; Dutt was of Eurasian origin.

by Roy and his wife and by some Indians of different groups. Maring presided over the proceedings on behalf of Comintern. Roy attacked Glading's report, declaring that he had "documentary evidence" of communist groups in India, denounced the idea of an "oriental conference" as futile, and thought that the claim of the CPGB to control party work in India "smacks of imperialism". A minor subject of recrimination was the status of an Indian national bureau in London, the head of which was regarded by Saklatvala as a "spy" — a suspicion not shared by other members of the CPGB and vigorously rebutted by Roy. The conference appears to have reached no decision, and was probably not qualified to take any. But it marked a stage in the transfer of authority, as the recognized agent and intermediary of Comintern in dealing with the Indian movement, from Roy to the CPGB.¹ Roy's position was further weakened when his wife returned shortly afterwards to the United States.² By this time Roy's popularity was beginning to wane in India as well as in Moscow: complaints were heard that he lived in luxury in Europe while the movement in India was starved for funds.

The CPGB was thrown into confusion by the arrest and imprisonment of its leaders in October, 1925; and nothing is heard of its work among Indians during the ensuing winter. Roy and his group continued to publish the *Masses of India* and to issue pronouncements from time to time in the name of the Indian Communist Party.³ In the autumn of 1925 a lock-out in the

¹ A fairly full report on the conference by one of the CPGB representatives is in *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 80-89. According to a much later unconfirmed report (quoted in G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 76) "a resolution was passed that the task of forming the party in India should be taken over by the British Communist Party": this was its result, but probably not a formal conclusion. A letter of September 25, 1925, to the CPGB, in which the colonial bureau of Comintern is said to have defined Roy's future position in the Indian movement (see *ibid.* p. 76), has not been traced. But on September 26, 1926, Krestintern wrote to MacManus of the CPGB informing him that a section had been set up to promote work among Indian peasants, and asking for the names of leading men in the Hindu agrarian movement who might be invited to work in the International Agrarian Institute (*Communist Papers*, Cmd 2682 (1926), p. 104); this suggests that the CPGB was now recognized in Moscow as the proper channel of communication on Indian affairs.

² G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), p. 80.

³ See, for example, an *Appeal to the British Workers*, which was in effect an attack on the British Labour Party, in *Cahiers du Bolchevisme*, No. 27,

Bombay textile industry designed to force a reduction in wages lasted for ten weeks ; the resistance of the workers was apparently successful and provided a fresh impetus to the formation of trade unions. It gave Roy occasion to drive home once again his favourite thesis of the power and reactionary influence of native Indian capitalism.¹ In December 1925 the legal Indian Communist Party² held its first congress in Cawnpore, which was attended by some of Roy's former adherents. But its cautious definition of its relation to Comintern as one merely of "sympathy and mental affinity", and its insistence that "Indian communism is not Bolshevism", encouraged a suspicion in Moscow that it owed its existence to "the inventive genius of the Indian secret police";³ and Roy denounced the proceedings as "childish". A split in the Swaraj party which produced a "Labour Swaraj Party" was more warmly welcomed,⁴ though Roy took the occasion to write yet another article in the journal of Comintern entitled *The New Economic Policy of British Imperialism*, concluding with the remark that "the Indian bourgeoisie has become convinced that its economic development is fully possible within the framework of British imperialism".⁵ The sixth annual congress of the AITUC, which opened in Madras on January 9, 1926, received the usual message from Profintern, as well as a telegram of greeting from the central council of the Soviet trade unions.⁶ But, in spite of the fillip provided by the Bombay lock-out, it took up a very moderate position, putting forward such demands as self-government within the empire and arbitration of industrial

September 15, 1925, pp. 1817-1823 ; a similar, though not identical, manifesto in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 132, September 18, 1925, pp. 1932-1933 ; and a further manifesto of the same kind, *ibid.* No. 17, January 22, 1926, pp. 238-239.

¹ *Ibid.* No. 130, September 11, 1925, pp. 1905-1906 ; No. 27, February 19, 1926, pp. 393-394.

² See p. 665 above.

³ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 347 ; the suspicion is not entirely dispelled by an account of it in an official publication of the Indian Bureau of Public Information, *India in 1925-1926* (1926), pp. 196-197. A later IKKI report called it a "pseudo-communist party" formed by "very dubious elements" (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 535).

⁴ G. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India* (1959), pp. 77-79.

⁵ *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 1 (50), January 1926, p. 191.

⁶ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 1 (60), January 1926, pp. 71-72 ; *Mezhdunarodnaya Solidarnost' Trudyashchikhsya, 1924-1927* (1959), pp. 171-173.

disputes, and rejecting affiliation either to Amsterdam or to Profintern.¹ In February 1926 Roy presided over the "eastern commission" of the sixth enlarged IKKI, which drafted an important resolution on Chinese affairs.² It was Roy's first appearance in Moscow as a spokesman on the Chinese question; and this, combined with the transfer of authority over India to the CPGB, marked the effective end of the long period in which Roy had been accepted in Moscow as the leader of the Indian communist movement. During the next three years India was to be completely eclipsed by China in the preoccupations of Comintern and of the Soviet Government. Throughout the nineteen-twenties Indian nationalism grew apace, and was beginning to take on revolutionary forms which would automatically drive it in the direction of Moscow. But the potentially revolutionary forces in India were still for the most part absorbed in Gandhi's non-violent campaign and ideology which were basically opposed to communism; and a specifically communist movement in India was still in its infancy.

(b) Indonesia

The years 1923 and 1924 were years of increasing tension in Indonesia and increasing activity for the small Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). After the inconclusive discussions of the fourth congress of Comintern in Moscow,³ a breach occurred in the uneasy relation between the PKI and the nationalist Sarekat Islam. In February 1923 Sarekat Islam itself split; the dissidents under communist inspiration formed a new organization called the Red Sarekat Islam, which professed a secular nationalism, and was accused of seeking to destroy the Muslim religion.⁴ A conference at Bandoeng in April 1924 between representatives of the PKI and of this organization, at which the former were evidently the dominant force, worked out a system of future relations between the two parties, which was confirmed at a congress of the PKI at Batavia in June 1924. The Red Sarekat Islam,

¹ For an account of it by Roy see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 27, February 19, 1926, pp. 394-395.

² For the commission see p. 630 above; for the resolution pp. 765-766 below.

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 480-481.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 10, January 13, 1925, p. 114.

now re-named Sarekat Rayat (or People's Union), was to serve as a mass organization of sympathizers subordinate to the narrow, disciplined élite leadership of the PKI.¹ This scheme, which recalled the rôle assigned to the Chinese Communist Party in Kuomintang and, more remotely, to western parties in the trade union movement, had the advantage of reconciling the need for mass support with the claims of doctrinal orthodoxy and discipline. The Batavia congress, which in Semaun's absence in Moscow was dominated by Darsono,² struck a militant note, demanding revolutionary action to destroy capitalism and the formation of Soviets in factories and villages.³ One of the Sarekat Rayat leaders, Hadji Misbach, who seems to have combined religious with anarchist inclinations, engaged in terrorist activities, which further compromised the party; he was arrested at the end of June 1924, and deported to New Guinea.⁴ The fifth congress of Comintern, which met while these events were in progress, paid little attention to the PKI, though Semaun reproached the Dutch party with failure to give it practical support.⁵ But here, as elsewhere, the congress appeared to have sounded a call to action. In the absence of native capital and a native bourgeoisie, the development of bourgeois nationalism could not proceed far; in Semaun's words, "any national movement with a non-proletarian programme and tactic (like Sarekat Islam) invariably suffered defeat".⁶

The moral drawn in the summer of 1924 from the Batavia congress of the PKI, and by implication from the fifth congress of Comintern, appeared therefore to favour direct and independent action by the PKI. During the latter part of the year emphasis was laid on the creation of youth organizations (including "Red boy scouts"), of Sarekat Rayat party schools and of party cells or "groups of ten" in state institutions, factories and associations

¹ J. T. Blumberger, *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises* (French transl. from Dutch, 1929), pp. 42-43; for the numbers of the PKI and of Sarekat Rayat, see p. 674, note 2 below.

² For Darsono, who represented the PKI at the third congress of Comintern in 1921, see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 251, note 1.

³ J. T. Blumberger, *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises* (French transl. from Dutch, 1929), pp. 42-45.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 46; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 10, January 13, 1925, p. 114.

⁵ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), i, 384-385.

⁶ *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 144.

of all kinds. At the same time the campaign against Sarekat Islam was intensified.¹ A further party congress at Jogjakarta in December 1924 was the occasion of much fiery oratory: direct incitements to terrorism are said to have occurred.² The most contentious issue appears to have been that of the status of Sarekat Rayat; this involved the relation of the party to the peasantry, which formed 75 per cent of the membership of Sarekat Rayat, the remainder being mainly traders and artisans. A majority of the party central committee, regarding Sarekat Rayat as a petty bourgeois party, proposed to dissolve it and to reorganize the peasants in cooperatives. This radical proposal was resisted by Darsono and others, who defended Sarekat Rayat as an essential basis of mass support for a communist party. The debate ended in a compromise, which left Sarekat Rayat in being, but aimed at draining off its non-peasant elements into the party and then reorganizing the purely peasant Sarekat Rayat in cooperatives. This meant, as a critical commentator observed, that "Sarekat Rayat would die a natural death",³ and could be interpreted, in terms of current Comintern thinking, either as a laudable turn to the Left or as an underestimate of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasantry.

Among the decisions taken at the Jogjakarta congress was one to "work and agitate" among the working class through the medium of the trade unions.⁴ The railway workers' trade union in Java already had a revolutionary tradition. In October 1921 a "revolutionary trade union centre" in Java, composed mainly of railway workers, had announced its adhesion to Profintern;⁵ and the railway workers' union had been represented in December 1922 at the third conference in Moscow of the transport workers'

¹ J. T. Blumberger, *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises* (French transl. from Dutch, 1929), p. 47.

² *Ibid.* pp. 66-68; this work contains much useful information, but reflects Dutch official attitudes.

³ The above account comes from S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, n.d. [1926]), p. 43. The writer, who in spite of his pen-name is said to have been an Indonesian, was clearly influenced by the Bukharin school of thought in Comintern which in 1925 identified the turn against the ultra-Left with support for the peasant (see p. 309 above); the pamphlet was published by Krestintern.

⁴ *Kommunistischeski Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 146.

⁵ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 2 (13), February 1, 1922, p. 149.

IPC.¹ A strike of railway workers in Java in May 1923 was said to have been provoked by the arrest of Semaun, who was president of the union.² The conference of Pacific transport workers held in Canton in June 1924, at which the Indonesian union was also represented,³ gave a further impetus to the development of the trade union movement in Indonesia, resulting in the establishment at Sourabaya, the main industrial centre in Java, of a Red trade union secretariat for Indonesia, affiliated to the newly created Pacific secretariat in Canton, and through it to Profintern.⁴ A congress said to represent 5000 Indonesian port workers and seamen was held at Sourabaya in December 1924, and formed a national union of transport workers, seamen and dockers. The leaders were all members of the PKI. An attempt was made to establish a common organization with a union of Indonesian workers in Dutch ships, some 1300 strong, founded by Semaun in the Netherlands.⁵ An embryonic union of workers on the sugar plantations is also heard of at this time.⁶ The transport workers' union and 70 per cent of other unions were said to be entirely in communist hands. In December 1924 25,000 Indonesian workers were affiliated to Profintern, and the total had risen to 35,000 in August 1925; these figures included communists and communist sympathizers in non-communist unions.⁷

Events in Indonesia aroused at this time little interest in Moscow. The fifth enlarged IKKI of February–March 1925 passed a resolution designed to maintain the united front with the peasants by ensuring the independence of Sarekat Rayat. The PKI was criticized for standing too far to the Left and ignoring the need for a united anti-imperialist front.

The arguments of some leading comrades [ran the resolution] who assert that, so long as no national bourgeoisie exists

¹ See p. 609 above.

² S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, n.d. [1926]), p. 40.

³ See p. 621 above.

⁴ Official report of the Netherlands Government (1927) quoted in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, ed. A. J. Toynbee (1928), pp. 452–453.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 27, February 20, 1925, p. 393; J. T. Blumberger, *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises* (French transl. from Dutch, 1929), pp. 56–57; the official report quoted in the preceding note calls the congress a conference of the KPI.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 57; for trade unions in other industries see *ibid.* p. 63.

⁷ *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 146.

in Java, a national liberation movement cannot develop, are incorrect.

Doubts were expressed about the close relation of PKI to the Sarekat Rayat, whose organizations "have begun to fuse with the communist party", and the PKI was instructed to "strengthen its class proletarian base" as well as to "define its relation to the revolutionary movement as a whole".¹ The PKI had at this time no more than 2500 members, and claimed through this small number to "lead" the 70,000 members of Sarekat Rayat.² But in 1925 these issues faded into insignificance as the revolutionary omens became more favourable for the "colonial" peoples. Even Sarekat Islam was reported to have derived encouragement from Abd-el-Krim's revolt in Morocco.³ Far more important was the influence of events in China — especially after the Shanghai shootings of May 30, 1925. The mounting tide of revolutionary unrest in China had already made itself felt in Indonesia, where 800,000 Chinese already worked, most of them as contract-labourers.⁴ In the latter half of 1925 a wave of strikes began to spread from Java to Sumatra, and thence to the smaller islands,⁵ and provoked a series of repressive measures by the government. Early in 1925 Comintern had already issued a protest against the "white terror" in Indonesia.⁶ In August 1925 Darsono was arrested together with other leaders of the trade union movement; this provoked a loud protest from Profin-

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (41), April 1925, pp. 66-67; S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, n.d. [1926]), p. 44; the full text of the resolution was not published (see p. 310, note 5 above).

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 5 (42), May 1925, p. 164; the official report quoted p. 673, note 4 above gives the total membership of the PKI at the end of 1924 as 1,140 and of Sarekat Rayat as 31,124. According to S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, n.d. [1926]), p. 40, Sarekat Rayat "at the height of its development" in the first half of 1925, had 100,000 members; but this source is biased in favour of Sarekat Rayat.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 170, December 29, 1925, pp. 2527-2528.

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 135, September 25, 1925, p. 1975.

⁵ For sporadic information about these events see *ibid.* No. 139, October 6, 1925, p. 2035; No. 23, February 5, 1926, pp. 336-337.

⁶ *Ibid.* No. 38, March 20, 1925, pp. 582-583; as a result of disorders in January and February 1925, about 30 were said to have been killed, 130 injured and 300 imprisoned (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 145).

tern.¹ The significance of the development of the trade union and strike movement in Indonesia was that it seemed to provide an eventual basis for revolutionary action by the proletariat which would compensate for the failure of a bourgeois national movement to make itself effective. In this respect, Indonesia was theoretically the most advanced of all the Asian countries. Nevertheless anxiety continued to be felt in Moscow, where the Indonesian party was reproved for not working to draw the peasantry into the national movement, and warned that failure to carry out the instructions of the fifth IKKI would isolate the party from the masses.² About the end of 1925 a decision in favour of armed insurrection and of the immediate formation of a Soviet Government was reported to have been taken by the leaders of the PKI at a conference in Solo, though apparently not without opposition from some sections of the party.³ But this was roundly condemned in Moscow as "the crassest example" of a Left deviation, and attributed to an underestimate of the importance of the peasantry.⁴

¹ *Pravda*, October 31, 1925; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 150, November 3, 1925, pp. 2225-2226. J. T. Blumberger, *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises* (French transl. from Dutch, 1929), p. 61, gives December 17, 1925, as the date of the "official order"; but the arrests clearly took place earlier. For other repressive measures see *ibid.* pp. 61-64, and S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, n.d. [1926]), pp. 44-46; in the years between 1923 and 1926, 3000 persons were said to have been imprisoned for participation in labour unrest (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 541) — not an exorbitant estimate.

² *Kommunistischesii Internatsional*, No. 12 (49), December 1925, p. 39.

³ Official report quoted p. 673, note 4 above; S. Dingley, *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Berlin, n.d. [1926], p. 57), reports not only a "Left-wing deviation", but "strong anarchist deviations" on the part of comrades who "read the works of Bakunin instead of those of Marx".

⁴ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 333.

CHAPTER 40

CHINA IN REVOLUTION

(a) *Peking and Canton*

THE year 1923 had been one of growing anarchy in China, though the main divisions of military power remained unchanged. In the central provinces, Wu Pei-fu was the dominant war-lord, and exerted an intermittent, but over-riding, authority over the Peking government, which continued in name, though only in name, to speak for a united China. In the north Chang Tso-lin was the quasi-autonomous vassal of Japan. In the south, Canton was the centre of a separate territorial unit, within which a precarious struggle for supremacy was waged between Sun Yat-sen's party, the Kuomintang, and a succession of independent military leaders. Throughout this year, which was the year of Joffe's mission to the Far East,¹ Soviet policy in China was still faltering and undefined. In Peking Joffe's efforts ended in deadlock; and, when in February 1923 Wu Pei-fu reacted to the growing menace of the trade union movement in China by shooting down a body of striking workers on the Peking-Hangkow railway, this was felt as a serious set-back to the cause of revolution in China, and induced a mood of pessimism in communist circles, both in China and in Moscow.² Later in the year, Joffe's soundings in Japan suggested the hope that the Soviet Government might one day be in a position to turn Chang Tso-lin's flank by a direct agreement with his principals on the régime in Manchuria. Meanwhile, Joffe's agreement with Sun Yat-sen of January 1923, vague and tentative though it seemed, was the most concrete achievement of his tour; and, when in the following month the authority of Sun Yat-sen and of Kuomintang was

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 536-546.

² See p. 690, note 2 below; an article by Vilensky sympathetic to Wu Pei-fu appeared in *Izvestiya* as late as November 28, 1923.

re-established at Canton at the expense of local war-lords, a firm foothold had been established for Soviet influence. In so far as Sun Yat-sen was now committed to a Soviet orientation, Soviet policy was committed to support Sun Yat-sen.

It would, however, be premature to assume any conscious or exclusive commitment to Sun Yat-sen on the part of the Soviet leaders at this time. How ready they were to keep all approaches open was shown by the dual appointment, on the termination of Joffe's mission, of Karakhan as diplomatic representative to the Chinese Government in Peking and of Borodin as representative and adviser to Sun Yat-sen.¹ Two days after Karakhan set out from Moscow on August 2, 1923, an article on his mission appeared in *Izvestiya* entitled "With Whom Shall We Negotiate?" The conclusion drawn was that negotiations should be conducted with any Chinese authority which had power to carry an agreement into effect.² Karakhan's first stop was at Harbin, where he was met by Afanasiev, a former "white" general, now director-general of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). Thence he proceeded without undue haste to Mukden, Chang Tso-lin's headquarters, which he reached on August 18, 1923. This was significant. On the eve of Karakhan's departure from Moscow Chang Tso-lin had announced his intention of taking over the land office of the CER. Karakhan, in an interview published while he was in transit, reasserted all Soviet rights over the railway pending the conclusion of a new agreement, and put the blame for any infractions on the "criminal actions" of "white guard" elements.³ Karakhan was well received in Mukden, where he presented Chang Tso-lin with a jewelled sword. For the present he seems to have been content to establish contacts which stood him in good stead later.⁴ He went on to Peking, where the first week in September was occupied with interviews, speeches and

¹ For these appointments see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 547-548.

² Karakhan's departure was reported, together with an interview on the tasks of his mission, in *Izvestiya*, August 3, 1923; the article appeared on the following day.

³ *Ibid.* August 5, 10, 1923.

⁴ For Karakhan's stops in Harbin and Mukden, see *ibid.* August 17, 25, 1923; *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), August 25, 1923, p. 446. For the jewelled sword see N. Ustryalov, *Pod Znakom Revolyutsii* (2nd ed. 1927), p. 160.

receptions. In a statement to the press on his arrival, he contrasted the policy of the Soviet Union with that of "all other states without exception". The European Powers desired a weak and disunited China; the Soviet Union wanted to see China "strong and united, carrying out her own national policy".¹ But Karakhan had no intention of restricting his mission to official dealings with the Peking government. Having made it clear by his visit to Mukden that relations with Chang Tso-lin fell within the scope of his mission, he now also addressed a letter to Sun Yat-sen in Canton:

I count on your support, Dr. Sun, old friend of new Russia, in my responsible task of establishing close contact between our two peoples.²

Sun Yat-sen replied to the greeting in a cordial telegram, in which he caustically referred to the Peking government as "a political group . . . wholly unrepresentative of the Chinese people" and "guided more by the wishes and desires of certain foreign Powers than by the vital interests of China as an independent and sovereign state".³ He followed this up with a confidential letter of September 17, 1923, informing Karakhan that one of the purposes of General Chiang Kai-shek's mission to Moscow was "to take up with your government and military experts a proposal for military action by my forces in and about the regions lying to the north-west of Peking and beyond" — an open avowal of the nationalist project of a military expedition against the north. At this moment Borodin arrived in Peking on the way to take up his appointment as adviser to Sun Yat-sen, and proceeded on his way with a letter of introduction dated September 23, 1923, from Karakhan to Sun.⁴

¹ *Izvestiya*, September 7, 1924.

² L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 634. The letter was dated September 8, 1923, and the original was in English; for a Russian translation from the Soviet archives see *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1957* (1959), p. 66. Copies of Karakhan's correspondence with Sun Yat-sen were placed at Fischer's disposal by Karakhan and are now in Yale University library, together with copies of letters of Chicherin.

³ *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 1320; extracts from a Russian version of the letter appeared in *Novyi Vostok*, vi (1924), p. xxx.

⁴ The letters of Sun and Karakhan are quoted from the Fischer archives in A. S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (1954), pp. 243-244; for Chiang's mission to Moscow see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 547.

While, however, Karakhan was evidently anxious to stake out his claim as senior Soviet representative for the whole of China, his immediate concern was the establishment of regular relations with the Peking government. On September 7, 1923 he fired the first shot in his campaign in Peking in the form of a demand to the Chinese Government for *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government as a condition precedent for negotiations on concrete questions. Wellington Koo, who still hoped to sell recognition for more tangible concessions, rejected the request and proposed that negotiations should proceed simultaneously on all outstanding issues.¹ For the moment Karakhan tacitly gave way. The two major obstacles which had hitherto stood in the way of a Sino-Soviet agreement were the Chinese Eastern Railway and Outer Mongolia.² In the interview published in *Izvestiya* at the moment of his departure from Moscow, Karakhan had named "the settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question" as the first task of his mission, and had failed to mention Outer Mongolia at all.³ C. T. Wang, who had been appointed Chinese delegate for these negotiations, showed himself ready to accept the implied order of precedence. Throughout the rest of the year discussions in Peking turned mainly on the problems of Manchuria. They began hopefully with the creation of a mixed commission to deal with frontier incidents.⁴ But this did not prevent a constant bombardment of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs with notes of protest from Karakhan about alleged attacks on Soviet citizens or property in Manchuria.⁵ By way of injecting a fresh element of discord, the directors of several major Chinese educational institutions wrote to Karakhan, asking that the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity renounced by the Soviet Government should be used, like the shares of some of the other Powers, for the support of Chinese education. Karakhan, while repeating that the Soviet Government made no claim to these funds, now alleged that the Chinese Government had no right to dispose of

¹ *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 866.

² For the previous history of these questions see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 531, 539-540.

³ For this interview see p. 677, note 2 above.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, September 25, 1923.

⁵ *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 866-867; *Izvestiya*, October 24, 31, November 11, 13, 14, 1923, January 10, 1924.

them unilaterally, and protested against their use for the benefit of "white guards or former Tsarist officials".¹

But, while this hard bargaining continued, hints were not lacking of a willingness on the Soviet side to compromise on the central question of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In a note of November 30, 1923, Karakhan summed up his position :

On the assumption that rights of property on the railway as a commercial enterprise belong to the [Soviet] Union, I am willing to discuss at the conference any proposition of yours, including the proposition that all the rights of the line should pass over to China, on conditions to be discussed and decided at the conference. But even now I can confirm what was said four years ago that the sovereignty of China in the territory of the railway is fully recognized by us, and that we shall not insist on any one of these privileges which the Tsarist government had, and which the other foreign Powers still have today, in the railway zone.²

What happened next behind the scenes is unknown, though it is certain that the western Powers used their influence with the Chinese Government to prevent an agreement. Wang's reply to Karakhan's note was not delivered till January 9, 1924, and was couched in terms amounting to a complete *non-possumus*. It recalled the contested passage in the Soviet declaration of July 1919 about the CER ; it met Karakhan's protestations of the "complete friendliness" of the USSR towards China with the sharp retort that "this friendliness still leaves something to be desired, since the troops of your government are still stationed in Chinese territory, namely in Outer Mongolia"; and it once more refused to establish "normal relations" through *de jure* recognition "while outstanding questions are to be kept for settlement at a future date".³ The raising of the bugbear of

¹ For this correspondence see A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 123-130 ; *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1957* (1959), pp. 67-73.

² A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 115-116 ; *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 876. An article in the journal of Narkomindel emphasized that "the USSR does not lay claim to political rights in the railway zone", and that what was at stake was "the utilization of the economic advantage of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is equally necessary for Russia and for China" (*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 1, 1924, p. 33).

³ A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 115-117 ; *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 877-878.

Outer Mongolia was a sure symptom that a rupture of negotiations was contemplated ; for it was inconceivable that the Soviet Union would abandon its sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia. But even here Soviet diplomacy was clearly anxious to propitiate Chinese *amour-propre* by formal concessions. Karakhan rejoined on January 17, 1924, in a long and argumentative note that the Soviet Union considered Mongolia to be " a part of China ", and that " we are ready to withdraw the detachment of the Red Army stationed at Urga as soon as the Chinese Government gives the necessary guarantee for the security of our frontiers " ; the note ended with a renewal of the demand for a resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries.¹ The month of January 1924 saw the first establishment of regular diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic ; and Vasiliev, the newly appointed Soviet *polpred* in Urga, went out of his way to deprecate hostile gestures towards China, and dwelt on the fact that " present conditions do not permit of our speaking of or referring to the ' independence ' of Mongolia ", and that the status of the country was " autonomy ".² But such hints seemed unlikely to affect the situation in Peking, where the harassed and impotent Chinese Government still hesitated to take so drastic a step as recognition of the Soviet Government.

During February 1924, while little or nothing transpired in public about the negotiations, the climate in Peking underwent a noteworthy change, due partly, perhaps, to the example of British recognition of the Soviet Government,³ but mainly to unwillingness in Peking to allow Sun Yat-sen to enjoy a monopoly of the support of Moscow.⁴ Karakhan sensed the change, and reopened negotiations with a note much stiffer in tone than any of its predecessors. It was devoted almost entirely to the CER, and warned the Chinese Government against any infringement of Soviet rights, since " the most insignificant changes might have the most serious consequences for China ".⁵ This was followed by a violent

¹ A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 117-122 ; *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1957* (1959), pp. 73-77.

² See p. 806 below.

³ The effect of this on the Soviet position in the Far East was discussed in optimistic terms in an article in *Izvestiya*, February 10, 1924.

⁴ For the first congress of Kuomintang in Canton in January 1924, at which the extent of the Soviet-Kuomintang alliance was first clearly disclosed, see pp. 608-701 below.

⁵ *Izvestiya*, February 29, 1924.

article in *Izvestiya* entitled "Chinese Aggressiveness" expatiating on "the hostile actions of the Chinese administration in relation to Russian citizens and the interests of Soviet Russia in the Far East". It ended by demanding that, if "the present rulers of China" wanted friendship with the Soviet Union, they should "renounce their anti-Soviet policy in Manchuria"; if they proposed "to continue this aggressive policy", they should say so openly.¹ These shock tactics were rewarded. In spite of a protest from the French minister in Peking, who claimed to protect French interests in the Russo-Asiatic Bank, the principal shareholder in the CER,² a far-reaching Sino-Soviet treaty was signed by Karakhan and Wang on March 14, 1924.

The treaty aimed at providing a comprehensive settlement of differences and a firm foundation for future Sino-Soviet relations. The first, and from the Soviet standpoint most essential, article provided for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations and the return of legation and consular buildings formerly belonging to the Tsarist government. The second article provided for the holding within one month of the signature of the treaty of a conference to settle detailed arrangements for the carrying out of the principles laid down in the subsequent articles. The enunciation of these "principles" formed the main body of the treaty. China agreed to renounce all agreements with third parties affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union made a similar renunciation in respect of agreements concluded by the Tsarist government. The Soviet Union recognized Outer Mongolia as an "integral part" of China, and undertook to withdraw its troops as soon as the necessary conditions had been negotiated at the projected conference. The CER was recognized as a "purely commercial enterprise" subject, except in regard to "business operations", to Chinese administration; the railway was eventually to be redeemed by the Chinese Government with Chinese capital in conditions to be subsequently laid down. But the future of the railway was to be determined by agreement between China and the Soviet Union "to the exclusion of any third party or parties". The remaining articles recorded

¹ *Izvestiya*, March 1, 1924; the article was signed by Vilensky.

² *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), March 22, 1924, p. 126; *Izvestiya*, March 16, April 13, 1924.

the Soviet renunciation of special rights and concessions in China, of extra-territoriality and of the Boxer indemnity. The treaty ended with a provision bringing it into force from the date of signature.¹

The signature of the treaty of March 14, 1924, which was greeted with enthusiasm in Moscow,² came as a blow to the western diplomats in Peking and to Chinese official circles associated with them. The cabinet, on the advice of Wellington Koo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, decided to disavow the treaty, alleging that Wang had exceeded his authority in signing a document not subject to ratification.³ On March 16, 1924, Karakhan sent a curt ultimatum to Wang demanding ratification of the treaty within three days. On March 18, 1924, Wang communicated to Karakhan in reply a statement of the Chinese cabinet of ministers. This ignored the signed documents of March 14, which it referred to as drafts, and, while professing eager desire to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government, called for further negotiations on unspecified points raised by the Chinese Government. On March 19, 1924, Karakhan replied to Wang in a long and argumentative note, the concluding paragraph of which repeated the ultimatum of March 16.⁴ On the same day, Koo, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed a note to Karakhan repudiating both the treaty and the ultimatum.⁵ In the sequel, it was Koo rather than Karakhan who turned out to have overplayed his hand. Koo now substituted himself for Wang as Chinese negotiator, and, in a note of April 1, 1924, demanded a modification of the treaty on three points — the renunciation by the Soviet Union of its agreements with Outer Mongolia (the

¹ *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 880-883.

² *Izvestiya*, March 16, 1924.

³ Koo's account of this episode given 15 years later is recorded in A. K. Wu, *China and the Soviet Union* (1949), pp. 152-155, but must be accepted with caution; according to K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 210, Koo's jealousy of Wang was the main factor. The most plausible explanation is foreign pressure, which was applied by the American and Japanese Governments, as well as by the French (R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (N.Y. 1933), p. 186).

⁴ For the three notes see A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 131-136; the ultimatum of March 16, 1924, and Wang's reply were reported in *Izvestiya*, March 18, 25, 1924, Chicherin's protest to the Chinese representative in Moscow *ibid.* March 21, 1924.

⁵ *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 880.

treaty renounced only agreements concluded by the Tsarist government), immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia and limitation of the transfer of former Russian official property.¹ At this point silence descended on the negotiations for two full months. A sidelight is thrown on pressures exerted behind the scenes by a note of May 3, 1924, from the United States minister to Koo, reasserting the rights of shareholders and creditors of the CER, which had been reserved in a resolution of the Washington conference of 1922; the note added that the United States Government "has no desire to prevent the conclusion of a Sino-Russian agreement", but merely wished to forestall future difficulties by reminding the Chinese Government of the rights and interests which it was under an obligation to respect.² This time, however, foreign objections were circumvented by secrecy. As Chicherin remarked, "the diplomacy of the Great Powers blocked our first agreement with China, and would have blocked this one if we had not succeeded in concealing its preparation".³ On May 31, 1924, without any preliminary announcement, the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed by Karakhan and Koo.

The text of the treaty, with a few minor variations, repeated the abortive version of March 14, 1924. But it was accompanied by seven declarations, the more important of which were explicitly stated to have the same validity as the clauses of the treaty. One of these provided that former land or buildings of the Russian Orthodox Church, though now transferred to the Soviet Government, should be vested in Chinese individuals or organizations in accordance with Chinese law. The clause in the treaty under which the Soviet Government renounced agreements concluded by the Tsarist government remained intact. But a declaration was now appended to the treaty by which the Chinese Government refused to recognize as valid "any treaty, agreement, etc. concluded between Russia since the Tsarist régime and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights and interests of the

¹ *China Year Book, 1924-5* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 885-887.

² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1924*, i (1939), 487-488; it was issued to the press in Peking with an explanatory *communiqué* (*Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1933* (1934), pp. 54-55). A press interview with Karakhan protesting against American and French interference appeared in *Izvestiya*, May 15, 1924.

³ *Pravda*, June 1, 1924.

republic of China". Yet another declaration provided that the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity renounced by the Soviet Union should be devoted to "the promotion of education among the Chinese people". Finally, the annexes were completed by an exchange of notes in which the Chinese Government undertook to "discontinue the services of all subjects of the former Russian Empire now employed in the Chinese army and police force". A separate agreement signed simultaneously with the treaty provided for the "provisional administration" of the CER pending its eventual redemption by the Chinese Government. The line was to be administered by a board of ten, five of whom were to be appointed by the Chinese, and five by the Soviet Government. The senior Chinese member of the board was to be director-general of the CER; but a chief manager was to be appointed of Soviet nationality. The treaty of May 31, 1924, with its annexes came into force, like the abortive treaty of March 14, 1924, from the date of signature.¹

The conclusion of the treaty was accompanied by a separate exchange of notes recording that, "beginning from today, normal diplomatic relations are renewed between the Soviet Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic".² On June 17, 1924, Karakhan addressed a note to Koo explaining that the existing status of foreign diplomatic representatives in Peking as ministers betokened a desire to treat China as an "unequal Power" and proposing that the Soviet Union should be represented in Peking and China in Moscow by ambassadors. Koo replied assenting to the proposal;³ and on July 31, 1924, Karakhan duly presented his credentials as Soviet Ambassador to the Chinese President, Ts'ao Kun.⁴ This arrangement automatically made Karakhan the *doyen* of the diplomatic corps in Peking, since other foreign representatives continued to hold only the rank of minister. The pill was not sweetened for the foreign

¹ The full text of the treaty with all the declarations and the agreement on the CER is in *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1925, No. 18, art. 131; No. 19, art. 132; *League of Nations: Treaty Series*, xxxvii (1925), 175-201.

² *Izvestiya*, June 1, 1924; *Russian Review* (Washington), July 1, 1924, pp. 16-17.

³ Karakhan's note is printed from the archives in *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1957* (1959), p. 93; Koo's reply appeared without indication of date in *Izvestiya*, July 16, 1924.

⁴ *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), August 9, 1924, p. 344.

Powers by the marked stimulus to anti-foreign feeling in China resulting from the signature of the treaty with the Soviet Union. A League against Imperialism was launched by a large number of Chinese deputies and senators and of representatives of Left organizations at a public meeting in Peking on July 13, 1924.¹ Among other declarations, it issued an appeal to all the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa to join in a struggle against Great Britain, France, Japan and America, which were "the principal imperialist Powers";² and protests were sent to the foreign Powers concerned against the unequal treaties imposed on China.³

After prolonged argument, due to the hostility not of the Chinese Government but of the diplomatic corps, Karakhan officially took possession of the premises of the former Tsarist legation in Peking on September 12, 1924.⁴ The Soviet Government had obtained its main objectives from the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924. The Chinese objectives, on the other hand, were dependent for their realization on the proposed Sino-Soviet conference, the meeting of which, owing to the disturbed state of the country and the lack of authority of the Peking government, was postponed for many months.⁵ About the same time another move was made to consolidate the Soviet position. Since the writ of the Peking government did not run in Manchuria, the agreement of May 31, 1924, about the CER had little practical value. The good relations with Chang Tso-lin which Karakhan had established a year earlier⁶ now bore fruit. On September 20, 1924, the Soviet Government concluded with "the autonomous

¹ *Izvestiya*, July 17, 1924; for a more detailed account see K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), pp. 274-276.

² For the text see A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 142-143; *Novyi Vostok*, vi (1924), 16-18.

³ *Izvestiya*, July 24, 26, 1924; other activities of the league were reported *ibid.* July 30, 1924. *Pravda*, August 23, 1924, published a message from the league to Trotsky who had expressed indignation in a speech at the arrest and condemnation of a Chinese soldier at the instance of the British minister in Peking.

⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1924, i (1939), 462.

⁵ The delegations for the conference were named at the beginning of July 1924; the announcement of its indefinite postponement came a fortnight later (*China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), July 5, 1924, p. 166; July 19, 1924, p. 238).

⁶ See p. 677 above.

government of the three eastern provinces " an agreement for the management of the CER in similar terms to the agreement signed in Peking on May 31, 1924, but containing some new clauses, the most important of which reduced the term of the Russian concession for the line from 80 years, the period fixed in the original agreement of 1896, to 60 years.¹ The pragmatic readiness of the Soviet Government to deal with any authority exercising effective power in any part of China was once more plainly demonstrated.²

The achievements of the first year of Karakhan's mission in Peking were matched by the still more spectacular success of Borodin's mission in the south. The arrival of Borodin in Canton early in October 1923 was the starting-point of an episode which was decisive for the policy of the Soviet Government in China for the next four years and had widespread repercussions. At the time of his arrival, the authority of the nationalist government was precariously established in the city itself; in the provinces of Kwantung and Kwangsi its writ ran on sufferance from the local military leaders. The position of Kuomintang as a political party was equally tenuous. Kuomintang was a large, amorphous movement held together almost entirely by Sun Yat-sen's personality and prestige. It had never held a delegate congress; it had no official programme; and its organization was embryonic. The "three principles" first enunciated by Sun Yat-sen in 1905 and later adopted as the ideological basis of Kuomintang were

¹ SSSR: *Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, v (1930), No. 214, 118-123; the original English text is in *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1927, ii, No. 32, art. 172. Replying on October 5, 1924, to a protest of the Chinese Government against the conclusion of this separate agreement with Chang Tso-lin, Karakhan stated that he had informed Koo on June 13, 1924, that, if the Peking government was not in a position to execute the agreement which it had signed, he would be obliged to negotiate direct with Chang, and had repeated this warning on August 10, 1924 (*Russian Review* (Washington), November 1, 1924, p. 176).

² This policy, which was in line with earlier attempts to deal with Wu Pei-fu (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 516-517), did not imply any fundamental change in attitude towards the Chinese war-lords; the fifth congress of Comintern in June 1924, in its proclamation to the "Fraternal Peoples of Eastern Countries and Colonies" (see p. 619 above), had bracketed Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin as "imperialist agents".

sometimes translated "nationality" (or "people's rule"), "democracy" (or "people's rights"), and "socialism" (or "people's livelihood").¹ But Sun Yat-sen's "democracy" had little or nothing in common with western bourgeois democracy, or his "socialism" with Marxism. The only one of his principles which was clearly comprehensible both to western and to Soviet observers was nationality; and this seemed to form the core of his programme. Kuomintang was a party dedicated to the expulsion of the privileged foreigner from China, and the overthrow of all those Chinese authorities which bowed down to him. As such it commanded the full sympathy and support of Moscow: and an alliance in some form between Kuomintang and Moscow was likely to be cemented as soon as communications could be established between them.

The place of the minute Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in this alliance was a subordinate, but ticklish, problem. Before 1925 the CCP was a group of intellectuals having few or no contacts with workers and was, in the words of a later IKKI report, "basically a propaganda organization".² Its beginnings coincided, however, with the rise of a Chinese trade union movement. An All-China Labour Secretariat was established in Shanghai in August 1921 with branches in Peking, Hankow and Canton, for the purpose of building up and unifying trade unions among Chinese workers: communists are said to have participated in the organization of this secretariat.³ The Hong Kong strike of 1922⁴ gave a fresh impetus to the labour movement, and led to

¹ These ideas in their final form were embodied by Sun Yat-sen in a series of lectures delivered in Canton in the last year of his life. From January 27 to April 26, 1924, he gave 12 lectures on "Nationality" and "Democracy" and, in August 1924, four on "People's Livelihood" (this series remained unfinished); for translation see *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, ed. L. S. Hsu (Los Angeles, 1933), pp. 163-491, or *Sun Min Chu I* (Engl. transl. Shanghai, 1927). For a well documented article on "The Influence of the Canton-Moscow Entente on Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy" see *Chinese Social and Political Science Review* (Peking), xviii (1934), 96-145, 177-209, 341-388.

² *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), 476; for Radek's description of the CCP in November 1922 see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 535.

³ *Pervyi S"ezd Revolyutsionnykh Organizatsii Dal'nego Vostoka* (1922), p. 181; for some further details see *Istoriĭ-Marksist*, No. 5-6, 1939, p. 157.

⁴ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 531.

the formation of a powerful seamen's trade union, which by the following year had 45,000 members.¹ On May 1, 1922, a first All-China Congress of Trade Unions met in Canton, and passed a number of resolutions on the programme and organization of a trade union movement.² The congress does not seem to have succeeded in creating an effective permanent organization; and the labour secretariat set up in Shanghai in the previous August is said to have been transferred to Peking.³ In December 1922, delegates of the Peking union of railway workers and of the Canton seamen's unions took part in the third conference of revolutionary transport workers in Moscow.⁴ But evidence of direct communist participation in the workers' movement at this period is scanty. The main development of the CCP took a different direction. The suggestion that members of the CCP should individually join Kuomintang seems to have emanated from Sun Yat-sen, and to have been imposed on Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the other leaders of the CCP in August 1922 through the influence of Maring, the emissary of Comintern. But this expedient devised on the spot was at first regarded without enthusiasm in Moscow.⁵ One sequel of the decision was the foundation by the CCP of a weekly party journal, *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* (Guide Weekly), which began to appear in Shanghai in September 1922. A resolution of IKKI of January 12, 1923, noted that Kuomintang was the only serious national revolutionary group in China, and that the Chinese working class was not yet strong enough to become an independent social force, and justified on these grounds the policy of "coordinating" the activities of Kuomintang and of the CCP and of encouraging members of the CCP to remain "within Kuomintang". The CCP was to carry on independently the task of organizing the workers and creating trade unions "as a basis for a mass communist party". But it must also support

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 28, June 7, 1923, cols. 7073-7074.

² *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 1 (24), January 1923, p. 71; Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China* (Columbia University: East Asian Institute, 1960), p. 79.

³ *Ocherki Istorii Kitaya v Noveishee Vremya* (1959), p. 81.

⁴ 3rd *Mezhdunarodnaya Konferentsiya Revolyutsionnykh Transportnikov* (1923), pp. 7, 21; for this conference see p. 609 above.

⁵ For these events, and for the hesitations in the Russian party see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 533-535.

Kuomintang in "the struggle against European, American and Japanese imperialists".¹

Within a few weeks this picture of the orderly development of a workers' movement was shattered by a violent interlude. A sporadic and ill-organized strike broke out on the Peking-Hankow railway. On February 7, 1923, Wu Pei-fu called out his troops, arrested and shot a number of ringleaders and broke the strike by a display of mass intimidation. Though the ultimate result of these brutal reprisals was to stimulate the growth of the Chinese trade union movement, their immediate effect, according to contemporary evidence, was to spread a mood of depression and pessimism in the ranks of the CCP: it seemed vain to suppose that the party would ever be strong enough to create and lead an effective Chinese proletarian movement.² This episode may account for a certain change of emphasis in the "directive" issued by IKKI in May 1923 for the forthcoming congress of the CCP. The peasant question was now described as the cardinal issue in China. The CCP must seek to promote "an alliance of workers and peasants", while maintaining the leadership of the working

¹ *Strategiya i Taktika Komintern*, ed. G. Kara-Murza and P. Mif (1934), p. 112. That no exaggerated hopes of the Chinese workers' movement were entertained in Moscow at this time was shown by an article in the journal of Profintern: "The workers' movement in China is still young and cannot therefore be regarded seriously as a proletarian factor; nevertheless, it has great prospects of development" (*Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 1 (24), January 1923, p. 74); a pamphlet of the same period described the Chinese proletariat as "far weaker comparatively than that of India" (L. Heller, *Profsoyuzy na Vostoke* (1923), p. 18). An article in the Profintern journal in February 1923 denounced Sun Yat-sen's policy as encouraging illusions among the workers (*Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 2 (25), February 1923, pp. 164-166); but this attack was out of step with the current line, and was not repeated.

² *A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party*, apparently written in Russian from Chinese sources in 1926, emphatically described the February 7, 1923, incident as a "defeat" and source of "confusion" for the CCP (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 65, 70; for the origin and character of this history see *ibid.* pp. 38-40). After Ch'en Tu-hsiu had been expelled from the party, his "Menshevik deviation", due to loss of faith in the proletariat, was traced back to this incident (*ibid.* p. 87, note 36). The incident was also cited in the indictment of the CCP by members of Kuomintang in December 1923 (see p. 697 below) to explain why the CCP, being conscious of its own weakness, sought to utilize Kuomintang to carry out its policies. A later diagnosis referred to it as "the first symptom of a serious political struggle of the Chinese working class" (*Problemy Kitaya*, I (1929), 4).

class : this could only be achieved on the basis of "the slogans of the agrarian revolution", including the confiscation of landlords' lands, the confiscation of monastery and church lands and their free distribution to the peasants. Communists must strive "to strengthen the communist party by converting it into a mass party of the proletariat", and "to muster the forces of the working class in the trade unions". Turning to relations with Kuomintang, IKKI announced support for Sun Yat-sen in his war against "the northern militarists", but demanded from Kuomintang "systematic propaganda and agitation" for "the independence, unification and democratization of the country", and also instructed the CCP "to push the Kuomintang party in the direction of agrarian revolution". This emphasis on the major social problem was reinforced by the warning that "we must struggle within Kuomintang against military combinations of Sun Yat-sen with the militarists", which "threaten a degeneration of the Kuomintang movement into a movement of one militarist grouping against others". With this danger in view, the CCP should press for the convening of an early congress of Kuomintang in order to bring about "the creation of a broad national-democratic movement". The reference to working "within Kuomintang" hinted at the policy of the entry of party members into Kuomintang, which was not otherwise mentioned in the resolution — a further symptom of lukewarmness or divided opinions in Moscow.¹

The third congress of the CCP to which this directive was addressed met in Canton in June 1923. It endorsed, apparently without difficulty, the decision of the party central committee in the preceding August on the entry of members of the party into Kuomintang. The adoption of this form of alliance between two parties of such different character was probably helped partly by the extremely weak formal organization of Kuomintang, and partly by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party, at this time still only a tiny sect, had no more than a handful of members in Canton, the headquarters of Kuomintang. The most controversial issue, reflecting lack of confidence in the party after the incident of February 7, 1923, was apparently whether the policy

¹ *Strategiya i Taktika Komintern*, ed. G. Kara-Murza and P. Mif (1934), pp. 114-116; the directive does not seem to have been published at the time.

of the CCP should be to organize the working masses inside Kuomintang or to organize them independently of Kuomintang.¹ The former alternative was adopted; the resolution declared the aim of the CCP to be to strengthen the influence of Kuomintang among the masses of workers and peasants, and 'to promote its reorganization into an effective political party. In a public manifesto issued by the congress it pronounced that Kuomintang "should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume the leadership of it", though it also condemned the two main shortcomings of Kuomintang — its inclination to rely on foreign help (other than that of the Soviet Union) and to concentrate on military action, "neglecting propaganda work among the people".² Whether from indifference to the peasantry in the CCP itself, or from fear of antagonizing powerful elements in Kuomintang, the congress failed to carry out the directive of IKKI to put forward the slogans of agrarian revolution and the confiscation of land;³ this question was to remain a source of embarrassment to the CCP in all its relations with Kuomintang.

In China, as elsewhere, the youth movement was conspicuous in the first years of the revolution, and tended to occupy a position on the Left of the communist party. A Chinese Socialist Youth League was founded in November 1921, and voted to join the Communist Youth International at a congress in May 1922.⁴ A year after its foundation, it claimed a membership of 4000 and published a fortnightly journal. Though composed mainly of students, it was more actively engaged than the CCP in propa-

¹ See *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 86-87. Ch'en Tu-hsiu is said to have advocated the first course, possibly at the instigation of Maring, who was apparently present as delegate of Comintern, Chang Kuo-t'ao the second course; but the sources, which include an oral communication from Chang Kuo-t'ao more than 30 years after the event, are somewhat dubious.

² The manifesto of the congress is translated in C. Brandt, B. I. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952), pp. 71-72, from *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, No. 30, June 20, 1923, p. 228; an account of the congress is given in the *Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party* written in 1926 (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 66-69).

³ P. Mif, *Heroic China* (N.Y. 1937), p. 23, recalls this failure in his indictment of the CCP.

⁴ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 492, note 17; it changed its name to Chinese Communist Youth League only in February 1925 (*ibid.* p. 495, note 58).

ganda among workers and peasants, and could therefore be said to have more contact with the masses.¹ What formal link existed at this time between the youth league and the CCP is uncertain. But the decision on the entry of members of the CCP into Kuomintang applied equally to members of the league. In endorsing this decision at its second congress in August 1923, the league emphasized both its subordination to the directives of the CCP and its determination to preserve its own "strict and independent organization".² Though the total membership of the CCP and the youth league in 1922-1923 was still insignificant, the league appears to have grown more rapidly than the party, and exceeded it in numbers by two to one.³

These were the conditions when Borodin reached Canton on October 6, 1923.⁴ The functions of his mission were ill defined,

¹ *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 124-125, 220; the statement that 50 per cent of the league were students is certainly an underestimate. The third congress of KIM in December 1922 adopted a resolution which urged the Chinese league to transform itself into a popular mass organization (*ibid.* pp. 279-280); an issue of *Die Jugend-Internationale* is said to have appeared in Chinese in 1923 or 1924 (*From Third to Fourth: A Report on the Activities of the YCI* (1924), p. 83).

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 88; the quotation is from a hostile source, but is presumably authentic.

³ *Ibid.* p. 64; the first precise figures are for January 1925, when the party had 994 members and the youth league 2365 (*ibid.* p. 90). Ch'en Tu-hsiu admitted in 1922 that the youth league was more influential than the party (*Pravda*, October 31, 1922). For later figures see pp. 728-729 below.

⁴ The date rests on the authority of N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Tientsin, n.d. [? 1927]), p. 130, and raises the question of the authenticity of the documents alleged to have been seized in the Soviet Embassy in Peking in April 1927. The originals have disappeared; a few facsimiles were published; but most of the Russian documents have to be judged on the basis of Chinese (or sometimes Japanese) translations. Some of the Russian documents are generally admitted to be forgeries; others may be authentic documents with forged additions. On the other hand, it is known that a mass of documents fell into the hands of the raiders. It is inconceivable that anyone should have had the skill or patience to forge the large number of documents eventually published, especially since many of them did not contribute to the purpose of the forgers, i.e. to convict the Soviet Union of espionage and subversion directed against the western Powers; and many of them confirm, or supplement in a plausible manner, information available elsewhere. Greater suspicion attaches to the Russian documents, whether available in original or only in translation, than to the Chinese documents; the greatest suspicion of all attaches to those published soon after the raid in English in collections under

but seem to have been threefold. In the first place, it was a semi-official diplomatic mission corresponding to Karakhan's mission to the Chinese Government in Peking; when Karakhan, in the letter of introduction to Sun Yat-sen which he gave to Borodin, begged Sun Yat-sen to treat the new envoy "not only as a representative of the government, but likewise as my personal representative", the latter description may have been inspired by Karakhan's personal vanity, but the former was only technically inaccurate.¹ Secondly, it was a military mission, the counterpart of Chiang Kai-shek's mission to Moscow, the purpose of which was to obtain Soviet weapons and Soviet technical advice for Sun Yat-sen's army, and thus transform what had hitherto been no more than a popular mass movement into a serious fighting force; the Soviet interest in this transformation was shown by the presence in Borodin's mission of a high-ranking Soviet general Blyukher, who appeared in Canton under the *nom de guerre* of Galen, with a considerable staff of officers. Thirdly, Borodin's function was to further the reorganization of Kuomintang and settle the vexed question of its future relation to the CCP and to the communist movement throughout the world; and, since party organization remained in Bolshevik eyes an essential part of the preparation for revolutionary action, and since Borodin's

sensational titles, and to those obviously calculated to discredit or embarrass the Soviet Government. The latest and most balanced assessment of the authenticity of the documents is in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 8-37, which presents, perhaps, a somewhat too lenient verdict. The documents used in the following pages appear, on any reasonable test, to show a high probability of authenticity.

¹ For the letter see p. 678, note 4 above. The distinction between party and government functions was less clear cut than it afterwards became, especially in regions remote from the centre; Sun Yat-sen is said to have sent a telegram to Moscow "thanking the friendly Moscow government and party" for sending Borodin (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 148). But the fact that no public announcement of his status was ever made strongly suggests that it was formally a party appointment; and other accounts treat it as such. On one occasion at least Borodin was apparently described as "a delegate of Comintern" (see p. 800 below). Nor was Borodin subordinate to Karakhan; if any such intention originally existed, Borodin quickly asserted his independence. The statement in *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 1321, that Sun Yat-sen "wrote to Karakhan in Peking requesting him to send a representative" is erroneous; Borodin's appointment antedated Karakhan's arrival in Peking — and perhaps Karakhan's own appointment.

own career had been made as an official of Comintern, it is not surprising that this third function loomed at first largest in Borodin's mind. But Borodin's first conversation with Sun Yat-sen revealed the military character of the latter's main preoccupations. Sun Yat-sen harped on his ambition to reunite China by the conquest of the north, and spoke of Mongolia, backing on Soviet territory, as a good base for operations. Borodin appears to have discounted these extreme projects and to have urged the need for building up a strong nationalist army in Kwantung, in which Sun Yat-sen concurred. It was evident that the Kuomintang leader was primarily concerned to secure military aid and supplies from the Soviet Union.¹

Borodin now set out to strengthen Kuomintang on Bolshevik party lines by providing it with a regular programme and a regular organization. On October 25, 1923, Sun Yat-sen set up a committee of nine members of Kuomintang, including one CCP member, T'an P'ing-shan, to draft plans of reorganization.² Borodin, though not a member of the committee, was clearly the moving spirit behind it. The major clash occurred on issues of economic policy — Sun Yat-sen's principle of "people's livelihood" — which became a battleground between Right and Left groups in Kuomintang. On November 13, 1923, Borodin put forward to the executive committee of Kuomintang proposals for

¹ N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Tientsin, n.d. [1927]), pp. 130-131; the main part of the report is probably authentic, though it may have been tampered with in translation. L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, p. 636, confirms that Sun Yat-sen's main ambition, when Borodin arrived in Canton, was "to carry out the northern expedition to 'punish Wu Pei-fu'". These apprehensions evidently inspired Chicherin's letter to Sun Yat-sen of December 4, 1923: "The whole Chinese nation must see the difference between the Kuomintang, a popularly organized mass party, and the military dictatorship of the various parties of China. The fraternal nations such as the Mongolian people, the Tibetans, the various races of western China, must clearly understand that the Kuomintang supports their right of self-determination. Their territories cannot therefore be used for your armed forces" (Fischer archives quoted by A. S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (1954), p. 246). Early in January 1924, a decision by Sun Yat-sen "to mobilize his troops for a northern expedition" was announced, provoking in the English-language press the ironical comment that "the Canton army (on paper) is marching upon Peking (on paper)" (*China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), January 12, 1924, p. 252; January 19, 1924, p. 268).

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 144-145; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), p. 163.

the confiscation of land from the landlords and its distribution to peasant communities, and for the establishment of an eight-hour day and a minimum wage in factories.¹ Three days later Borodin appealed direct to Sun Yat-sen who, while accepting the rest of the programme, was persuaded by stubborn Right-wing opposition in Kuomintang to reject the proposal for the confiscation of land. A compromise was found on the basis of a plan to reduce land rents by 25 per cent and to establish peasant unions.² It was probably at this time that Sun Yat-sen decided to establish a "peasant section" of the central executive committee of Kuomintang.³ Little difficulty was experienced on the further issue of the need for Kuomintang to establish a strong party organization as a prelude to military preparations. This point was driven home by Chicherin in a letter to Sun Yat-sen of December 4, 1923 :

We think that the fundamental aim of the Kuomintang party is to build up a great powerful movement of the Chinese people, and that therefore propaganda and organization on the biggest scale are its first necessities. Our example was significant : and military activities were successful because a long series of years had elapsed during which we organized and instructed our followers, building up in this way a great organized party throughout the whole land, a party capable of vanquishing all its adversaries. The whole Chinese nation must see the difference between the Kuomintang, a popular organized mass party, and the military dictators of the various parts of China.⁴

Borodin seems quickly to have established an ascendancy over Sun Yat-sen, who became convinced of a substantial identity of

¹ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 636-637 ; N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Tientsin, n.d. [1927]) pp. 137-138, mis-dates the speech November 13, 1924.

² L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 636-638, gives a perhaps somewhat over-dramatized account of these discussions, derived from Borodin himself (for the circumstances in which Borodin told the story of his experiences in China see L. Fischer, *Men and Politics* (1941), p. 135) ; Karakhan in a letter to Sun Yat-sen shortly before the congress (it was dated January 7, 1924) attached "paramount importance to your decision to carry out the land decree" (L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 635-636).

³ *Novyi Vostok*, viii (1927), 26, does not date the decision precisely, but states that it was taken at the same time as the decision to reorganize the party.

⁴ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 635.

aim between Kuomintang and the Russian Communist party.¹ When at the beginning of December 1923 Sun received from eleven members of the Kwantung branch of Kuomintang a "petition to impeach the communist party" on the ground of the insubordinate attitude of the party and the youth league, he annotated the document with comments making it clear that he found essentially "no difference between the principle of people's livelihood and communism", and thought that the Bolsheviks, after six years in power, had "discovered that the question of nationalism really required the utmost effort and attention". He excused "the bigotry and excessive admiration for the Russian revolution on the part of the young Chinese students", and sagely concluded that, "if Russia wants to cooperate with China, she must cooperate with our party and not with Ch'en Tu-hsiu". If "the youngsters" refused to submit to discipline they would be disavowed; "if Ch'en Tu-hsiu disobeys our party, he will be ousted".² On December 13, 1923, Borodin was officially appointed adviser to Kuomintang.³ Accounts of the drafting of the constitution and manifesto submitted to the first congress of Kuomintang in January 1924 vary in detail. But all agree that Borodin, with the full backing of Sun Yat-sen, played a leading part. His active collaborator was Wang Ching-wei, who became prominent at this time as the leader of the Left wing of Kuomintang, and the most ardent supporter of collaboration with the communists.⁴ Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who had originally opposed the

¹ In a speech of December 1, 1923, Sun was reported as saying that "if we want to achieve in our revolution we must learn the Russian method, organization and training", and that he had invited Borodin, in view of his experience in these matters "to be the educator of our party to train our comrades" (*Chinese Social and Political Science Review* (Peking), xx (1936), 102).

² Sun Yat-sen's comments are translated in C. Brandt, B. I. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952), pp. 72-73; for the "petition" see *ibid.* p. 494.

³ Quoted from Chiang Kai-shek's diary in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 148.

⁴ Sun Yat-sen stated that the constitution "was prepared by Borodin at my request" and "checked by myself"; that "the original was in English and was translated into Chinese by Liao Chung-k'ai"; and that "Ch'en Tu-hsiu has no part in this" (C. Brandt, B. I. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952), p. 72). The manifesto was said by Borodin a few years later to have been drafted by a committee consisting of himself and four representatives of Kuomintang, including Wang Ching-wei for the Left wing of the party and Hu Han-min for the Right (L. Fischer, *The*

plan of entering Kuomintang,¹ also accepted the new policy, though he afterwards sourly remarked that Borodin's success was due to the promises of substantial military aid which he brought with him.²

The first congress of Kuomintang opened in Canton on January 20, 1924, with an introductory speech by Sun Yat-sen, of which the most significant passage referred to the need for strict party discipline and for the sacrifice by members of Kuomintang of their individual freedom.³ Of 200 delegates 40 are said to have been communists.⁴ The first task of the congress was to approve the draft manifesto, which was in effect the party programme or platform. In its final form it represented an adjustment of Sun Yat-sen's three principles to Bolshevik ideologies. The principle of nationality was firmly identified with the struggle against foreign imperialism: "the meaning of nationality is none other than the elimination of imperialist aggression; . . . the objective in the struggle for national liberation is none other than anti-imperialism". The manifesto demanded the abolition of the unequal treaties, the foreign concessions, extra-territorial rights for foreigners, and foreign control of the customs. The principle of democracy took on a Bolshevik colouring. The manifesto recognized the direct exercise of sovereignty by the people. It denounced "the modern system of popular govern-

Soviets in World Affairs (1930), ii, 640. According to T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), p. 166, note 1, the manifesto was drafted by Wang Ching-wei and submitted by him to Borodin, who endeavoured in vain to secure the inclusion of "the doctrine of the class struggle and the principle of confiscation without compensation"; but this source habitually exalts Wang's rôle. For a statement by Wang that "the reorganization of our party" was carried out "at the suggestion of Borodin" see B. I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Harvard, 1951), p. 50.

¹ See p. 689 above.

² Ch'en Tu-hsiu, *Kao Ch'üan-tang t'ung-chih shu* (1929), p. 3; a translation of this "open letter" of December 10, 1929, to members of the CCP appeared in *The Militant* (N.Y.), iii, No. 33, November 15, 1930; No. 34, December 1, 1930; iv, No. 1, January 1, 1931; No. 2, January 15, 1931; No. 3, February 1, 1931. The version in *The Militant* is not stated to be abbreviated, but does not contain some passages quoted from the original letter in *Byulleten' Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 15-16, September-October 1930, pp. 20-23.

³ The proceedings and documents of the congress are available in Chinese; see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 575-576, and for a summary, *ibid.* pp. 145-149.

⁴ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 702.

ment" as an instrument for the oppression of the common people, and limited the enjoyment of rights to "truly anti-imperialist individuals and organizations", excluding as traitors to their country those who "owe allegiance to imperialists and militarists". The social and agrarian clauses of the manifesto, though they dilated on the sufferings of "destitute peasants and exploited workers", reflected the opposition to Borodin's original demands, and remained blurred and equivocal. "Equalization of land" and "control of capital" were announced as objectives, but the means of achieving them were veiled in the language of judicious compromise. Finally, the manifesto proclaimed Kuomintang to be "the central organ for the control of political power", appealed to peasants and workers to rally round it in the revolutionary struggle for national liberation, and declared that it enjoyed the support of the four traditional Chinese classes — intellectuals, workers, peasants and merchants.¹

After the approval of the manifesto by an overwhelming majority, the party constitution was adopted without opposition. It was modelled closely on the structure of the Russian Communist Party with its hierarchy of local, district, county, provincial and national congresses and executive committees. The national party congress was to meet every two years; the central executive committee was to exercise supreme authority between congress sessions, and was in turn to appoint "a standing committee of from five to nine members, which shall perform the functions of the committee when the latter is not in session, and be responsible to it" — the counterpart of the Russian Politburo. The regulations on party discipline had a familiar ring. The unique provision of the constitution was one creating Sun Yat-sen permanent president of the party, of the national congress and of the central executive committee.² These decisions, as a delegate of the CCP later reported to Comintern, were "the result of the common exertions of our comrades and of the 'Left'

¹ For an English translation see *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, ed. L. S. Hsu (Los Angeles, 1933), pp. 120-141; the translation in T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (1928), pp. 258-269, omits some passages.

² The translation in A. N. Holcombe, *The Chinese Revolution* (Harvard, 1930), pp. 356-370, was made from the text of 1929; the only amendments appear, however, to have been those consequent on the death of Sun Yat-sen.

wing".¹ The group in Kuomintang which had already protested against the admission of CCP members to Kuomintang renewed its objections, but was overruled. Li Ta-chao, co-founder with Ch'en Tu-hsiu of the CCP, made a conciliatory statement in which he explained that members of the CCP joined Kuomintang "not jointly as a party, but separately as individuals", and recognized a dual responsibility arising from their status as ordinary members of Kuomintang and from the alliance between Kuomintang and the world revolutionary movement.² Of the 24 members elected by the congress to the first central executive committee of Kuomintang, three — T'an P'ing-shan, Yü Shu-tei and Li Ta-chao — were communists; six communists, one of whom was Mao Tse-tung, were among the 17 candidate members. Communists also obtained control of a key position when T'an P'ing-shan was appointed head of the organization department of Kuomintang.³ Mao Tse-tung, who since the congress of the CCP in June 1923 had been a member of the party central committee in Shanghai, now became member of the executive bureau of Kuomintang in Shanghai together with Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min.⁴ In the concluding stages of the congress a telegram of congratulation on the proceedings was received from Karakhan in Peking; this was duly acknowledged by Sun Yat-sen in a telegram of January 24, 1924.⁵ After the congress was over, Sun Yat-sen replied at leisure to Chicherin's letter of December 4, 1923, confirming the view that "the fundamental aim" of Kuomintang was to build up "a powerful movement, at once revolutionary and constructive", and that "organization and propaganda" were essential for the realization of this purpose. Therefore "we want and look to you and other comrades for counsel and assistance".⁶ The significance of the congress, as

¹ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 702.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 149; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), pp. 178-179.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 149.

⁴ E. Snow, *Red Star over China* (1937), p. 156.

⁵ Karakhan's telegram does not appear to be extant; for Sun's reply see *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1957* (1959), p. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 78-79; for Chicherin's letter see p. 696 above.

optimistically seen by the communists, was that it marked a turning away, on the part of the Kuomintang leaders, from a conception of the conquest of power by military might to a conception of winning the support of the masses in conjunction with the CCP.¹

In spite, however, of this change of emphasis, which was in any case confined to the Kuomintang Left, the most important sequel of the first congress of Kuomintang occurred in the sphere not of political, but of military organization. Chiang Kai-shek had returned to Canton in December 1923 from his mission to Moscow,² where he had discussed the affairs of China with all the principal Soviet leaders. On January 24, 1924, while the Kuomintang congress was still in session, Chiang Kai-shek was appointed by Sun Yat-sen president of a commission of seven to organize what was called a "party academy", though the choice made it clear that the aim was military. While no Russian, and no member of the CCP, was a member of the commission, the discussion of a military establishment could not proceed far without reference to Borodin and his military advisers. Friction soon occurred. Chiang Kai-shek later recorded an occasion, on February 21, 1924, when he offered his resignation, presumably by way of putting pressure on Sun Yat-sen to support him against Borodin; and a letter said to have been written by him to Liao Chung-k'ai on March 14, 1924, denounced the Russian Communist Party, expressed doubt about the prospects of lasting cooperation between Kuomintang and the CCP, and described the Russian watchwords of internationalism and world revolution

¹ This diagnosis was elaborated by the Chinese delegate to the fifth congress of Comintern six months later (*Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 702); Voitinsky, in an optimistic article on the congress, thought that it had revealed a division in Kuomintang between a Right, composed mainly of merchants who wanted protection against the north, and a Left, "at the head of which stand our communist comrades", which wanted a "truly national-revolutionary party" based on workers and peasants: Sun Yat-sen had thrown his decisive weight on the side of the Left (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 117, September 9, 1924, pp. 1523-1524).

² For the mission see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 547. Two passages from Chiang Kai-shek's published diaries recording unfavourable impressions are quoted in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 498-499, note 29; further examination of the diaries would be required to show whether these entries were characteristic or exceptional. For the story of an unfavourable report made after his return see p. 702, note 1 below.

as synonyms for "imperialism".¹ Notwithstanding these difficulties, the work proceeded; and on June 16, 1924, Sun Yat-sen opened a new Military Academy at Whampoa, in the suburbs of Canton, for the training of an officer corps for the new armies of Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek was appointed commandant, and Liao Chung-k'ai as representative of Kuomintang with powers similar to those of political commissars in the Red Army of the Soviet Union. Blyukher, under the name of Galen, became chief of staff to the commandant, and the military instruction was conducted mainly by the Soviet military advisers; among those chosen to give political instruction were Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. The first enrolment comprised 460 cadets, and strict military discipline was inculcated.² Dependence not only on Soviet military technique, but on Soviet finance, was complete. The Soviet Government is said to have contributed 3,000,000 rubles to the initial cost of the academy.³ Borodin, having equipped Kuomintang with an efficient party organization, was now setting out to turn it into a military power.

Occasions for friction were not lacking in the anomalous arrangements for Soviet-Chinese cooperation in Canton in the summer of 1924. The year was one of increasing social tensions arising out of the growth of an organized Chinese workers' movement. In February 1924, on the anniversary of the shootings on the Peking-Hankow railway,⁴ a congress of railway workers in

¹ The source for these events is the large collection of Chiang Kai-shek's diaries and papers down to the end of 1926 published in or about 1936 (see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 150-151, 571). Omissions are known to have been made in this collection; the alleged letter of March 14, 1924, suggests the doubt whether interpolations or misdatings may not also have occurred, since such outspoken language seems scarcely likely at this date in a letter to a prominent member of the Kuomintang Left and a known supporter of the Soviet alliance. Excerpts from this letter appear in translation in H. K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek* (2nd ed. 1953), pp. 544-545, where a report by Chiang to Sun Yat-sen unfavourable to the Soviet Union is alleged to have been stolen by the communists: none of this material appeared in the first edition of the work published in 1937.

² The sources are quoted in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 150; see also H. K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek* (Shanghai, 1937), i, 77.

³ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 640.

⁴ See p. 676 above.

Peking founded an All-China Federation of Railway Workers. A manifesto was issued calling for a united front of workers throughout China and for "close ties with other trade unions and with international workers' organizations"; the federation declared its adhesion to the International Federation of Transport Workers.¹ On May 1, 1924, demonstrations of railway workers were held in the main centres. The demonstration in Hankow commemorated the leaders shot in February 1923. Five of its organizers, including three communists, were arrested and imprisoned by Wu Pei-fu on the charge of belonging to a secret organization; the secretary-general of the railway workers' union was said to have been flogged. These proceedings provoked sharp protests at the congresses of Comintern and Profintern in Moscow in June-July 1924.² The Chinese railway workers were conspicuous at the Canton conference of June 1924.³ These events marked the transition from a period of successful repression of the Chinese workers' movement to a period of agitation and revolt.⁴ Though the CCP does not seem to have participated actively in the movement at this stage, the incipient rise of a Chinese class-conscious proletariat was clearly calculated to change the character of the party and to complicate its relations with the essentially bourgeois and nationalist Kuomintang.⁵

Diplomatic issues provided another potential source of discord. The vexed question of Outer Mongolia appeared to have been settled by the joint declaration of January 26, 1923, in which Joffe renounced on behalf of the Soviet Government any intention to make Outer Mongolia secede from China, and Sun Yat-sen any

¹ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 8 (41), June 1924, pp. 418-420. The international federation was affiliated to IFTU and had broken off relations with Profintern in June 1923 (see p. 549 above); no evidence has been found of contact between the international federation and the Chinese federation of railway workers.

² *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 703 (the text of the protest appeared in *Pravda*, June 25, 1924; see also p. 620, note 1 above); *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), p. 308.

³ See pp. 621-623 above.

⁴ An article in the journal of Comintern described the Canton conference as standing on the "border-line" between the two periods (*Kommunistischesii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 98).

⁵ For the similar beginnings of a peasant movement see pp. 722-724 below.

desire for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops.¹ But it was apparently reopened at the third congress of the CCP in June 1923, since a commentator noted on that occasion that the CCP recognized the "independence" of Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan, whereas Kuomintang did not.² The official relations so patiently maintained by Moscow with the Peking government were a more serious stumbling-block. On February 2, 1924, Sun Yat-sen wrote to Karakhan expressing the view that the Soviet Government no longer needed to maintain relations with "the non-representative, anti-nationalistic and pro-foreign body" in Peking, and should instead establish formal relations with Canton.³ But feelings were evidently mixed; and the Peking branch of Kuomintang organized a demonstration to protest against the rejection by the Peking government of the original Sino-Soviet treaty of March 14, 1924.⁴ When Voitinsky, the head of the eastern bureau of Comintern, came to Canton in the summer of 1924, shortly after the signature in Peking of the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924, he was made aware that some members of Kuomintang regarded it as "a not altogether loyal act" towards the Canton government: "Canton is in hostile relations with Peking, and we have concluded a treaty with Peking". On the other hand Sun Yat-sen, whom Voitinsky visited in company with Liao Chung-k'ai, politely refrained from any reproaches, and showed that he "had a profound understanding of the significance of the treaty concluded by the USSR with the Chinese Government, and of its importance for the interests of the Chinese people".⁵ Sun Yat-sen was more

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 541.

² Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China* (Columbia University: East Asian Institute, 1960), p. 100. The second congress of the CCP in 1921 recognized the "autonomy" of the three territories and expressed the desire to "re-unite" them into a "united republic of China based on the principle of federation" (*ibid.* pp. 121, 126); but a change had occurred by September 1922, when the party journal came out against "the subordination of Mongolia to China", and made an appeal for "a strengthening of the freedom of the Mongolian people" (*Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, September 27, 1922, quoted in B. Shirendyub, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 111).

³ L. Fischer archives quoted in A. S. Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (1954), p. 247; Karakhan's reply does not appear to be extant.

⁴ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 703.

⁵ This account was given by Voitinsky in an obituary article on Sun Yat-sen in *Pravda*, March 15, 1925.

impressed than some of his followers by the value of the alliance with Moscow ; and it was no doubt through his influence that Kuomintang in July 1924 issued a manifesto welcoming the Sino-Soviet treaty, though it also took the occasion to denounce the Peking government which " considers important national affairs only from the point of view of its own self-seeking interests ".¹

In this atmosphere, mutual recriminations between the two incompatible partners could hardly be avoided. In December 1923 Sun Yat-sen had already rebutted a protest by the Kwantung branch of Kuomintang against the activities of the CCP and the Socialist Youth League.² On June 18, 1924, three members of the supervisory committee of Kuomintang addressed another formal protest to the central executive committee against the misdemeanours of communist members of Kuomintang. Individual membership was said to be a fiction ; members of the CCP entered Kuomintang and other organizations as a group, formed fractions to pursue communist policies and were totally alien to the spirit of Kuomintang.³ Borodin, to whom the protest was referred, did not deny the existence of fractions or of party directives, but stated that all members of the CCP, as well as of the youth league, had been instructed to join Kuomintang and to work for its aims.⁴ Provocations from the communist side were, however, not lacking. At the moment when Borodin was defending the attitude of the CCP in Canton, Manuilsky, speaking at the fifth congress of Comintern in Moscow, ruefully admitted that at the last session of the central committee of the CCP, in spite of the official policy, " sharp criticism was directed against the activity of comrades participating in Kuomintang ".⁵ The official weekly journal of the CCP indulged freely in criticisms of Kuomintang ;⁶ and Voitinsky, in the organ of Comintern,

¹ The manifesto was quoted in V. Vilensky, *Gde Kornī Predatel'stva Chan Kai-shi* (1927), pp. 49-51 ; it appeared in full in a Kuomintang publication *Chung-Kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung Yao Hsüan Yen Hui Pien* (1929), pp. 295-298.

² See p. 697 above.

³ For the sources for the letter of protest see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 90, note 49.

⁴ See *ibid.* p. 89, note 48 ; p. 90, note 56.

⁵ *Protokoll : Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 624.

⁶ This was emphasized in the account in *Problemy Kitaya*, i (1929), 5, as evidence of the independence of the CCP.

accused Sun Yat-sen and the Left wing of Kuomintang of approaching the problem of revolution "idealistically" in terms of the liberation of the Chinese "people", ignoring class divisions in Kuomintang, and thus blinding themselves to the machinations of the Right.¹

In this precarious situation, the security of the partnership rested almost entirely on the undiminished power and prestige of Sun Yat-sen, who showed no sign of relinquishing his personal control of the Kuomintang organization. On July 11, 1924, Sun, apparently ignoring the central executive committee and its standing committee provided for in the newly adopted constitution, appointed, on his own authority and under his own presidency, a political council whose functions were so defined as to take over most of those of the central executive committee and the standing committee.² So long as Sun Yat-sen lived, Kuomintang remained his personal creation. Relations between Kuomintang and the CCP were reviewed at a session of the central executive committee of Kuomintang which opened on August 15, 1924, and passed a resolution which represented a complete vindication of the communist position. Quoting the constitution of Kuomintang, it declared anyone eligible for membership who accepted the principles of the party and executed its decisions.

If members should violate the principles [it went on], or fail to participate in the revolutionary movement based on the three principles, or if they neither oppose militarism nor support the working masses, they will be disciplined irrespective of the category to which they belong.

This pronouncement might easily have seemed to carry a greater threat for the Right wing of Kuomintang than for the communists. The resolution described the CCP as a product of "the class struggle of the industrial proletariat just developing in China" and, as such, "a part of the political organization of the world

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 7 (36), September 1924, col. 196.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 152. T'ang Leang-li, *Foundations of Modern China* (1928), p. 169, states that the council originally consisted of 9 members and 3 deputies; *id.* *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), p. 184, names 7 members including one communist, T'an P'ing-shan. The statement in T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (1928), pp. 103-104, that it consisted of the 9 members of the standing committee and 6 others co-opted by it, may relate to the period after Sun Yat-sen's death.

proletariat". Even if it were destroyed, the Chinese proletariat could not be destroyed, and would organize again.¹ This resolution marked the high point of the CCP-Kuomintang alliance. Never before or after were its implications so whole-heartedly accepted.²

The growing effectiveness of the alliance between Canton and Moscow aroused apprehension and anger in quarters more powerful than the Right wing of Kuomintang. During the spring and summer of 1924, a so-called Merchant Corps had been formed for the protection of property, foreign and Chinese, in Canton, and went under the nickname of "the paper tigers".³ It was organized by the chief *comprador* of the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank, and enjoyed thinly veiled British support from Hong Kong: estimates of its strength, probably exaggerated, went up to 50,000. On August 10, 1924, a consignment of 10,000 rifles for the corps arrived by sea. It was first allowed to go through, then seized by the authorities, and then apparently released. But relations had now reached breaking-point, and the corps began to occupy a section of the city and set up barricades. Sun Yat-sen then issued a warning that it would be fired on if it refused to disperse.⁴ This produced on August 29, 1924, an ultimatum from the British consul-general in the name of the consular corps threatening naval reprisals if fire were opened on any part of the city. On September 1, 1924, Sun Yat-sen issued a "Manifesto to Foreign Countries" declaring that the Merchant Corps was in open rebellion with British support, and expressing dismay that the British Labour government should seek to overthrow the nationalist government of Canton. On September 10, 1924, he followed this up with a direct telegram of protest to "the government of MacDonald" in London.⁵ Meanwhile, the League against

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 152, note 71.

² M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-revolution in China* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 382, does not mention the session of August 15, 1924, but gives a highly coloured account of strikes and demonstrations in Canton "towards the end of August 1924" for and against the communists, after which Sun Fo (Sun Yat-sen's son) and other members of the Kuomintang left for Shanghai.

³ *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), June 21, 1924, pp. 82, 100.

⁴ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 154; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of The Chinese Revolution* (1930), pp. 185-186.

⁵ For the text of all three documents see A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 137-140; see also *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 120,

Imperialism in Peking entered the fray, despatching telegrams to MacDonald demanding a withdrawal of the Canton ultimatum and non-interference in Chinese affairs, and to Sun Yat-sen wishing him victory in his struggle.¹ The first week in September 1924 was proclaimed in Peking as "anti-imperialist week", with September 7, the anniversary of Japan's "21 demands" of 1915, as a "day of national humiliation". The week was to be marked by a boycott of foreign goods and of commercial dealings with foreigners.²

The growing tension was quickly reflected in Moscow, where on September 4, 1924, IKKI issued a proclamation, and MacManus, Treint and Amter despatched a telegram to Sun Yat-sen in the name of the British, French and American communist parties denouncing "the contemptible conspiracy of Anglo-French-American imperialism".³ The presidium of the central council of trade unions, meeting on September 5, 1924, decided to form a "Hands off China" society which was to serve as a model for similar societies elsewhere. Appeals were drafted to the workers of the Soviet Union and to the workers of all countries, and a telegram was sent to Tomskey, then attending the British trade union congress in Hull,⁴ proposing to launch a joint campaign of Soviet and British workers "for the independence and autonomy of the toilers of China".⁵ No response appears to have been forthcoming from the British side. But the Moscow society was duly brought into being⁶ and organized a large student demonstration, which was addressed by Voitinsky, on September 21, 1924, and a meeting in the Bol'shoi theatre on the following day, at which Radek and several foreign communists spoke.⁷ A

September 16, 1924, p. 1585. According to a subsequent protest to the League of Nations (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 127, September 30, p. 1688), the telegram to MacDonald was not answered.

¹ *Izvestiya*, September 3, 4, 1924; A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 140-141. For the League against Imperialism see p. 686 above.

² *Pravda*, August 29, 1924; K. Füse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), pp. 279-280.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 117, September 9, 1924, pp. 1526, 1538.

⁴ See p. 135 above.

⁵ *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, September 6, 1924.

⁶ A meeting on September 17, 1924, set up a provisional bureau, and decided to send a representative to China (*Pravda*, September 18, 1924); a permanent committee was appointed a few days later (*ibid.* October 1, 1924).

⁷ *Izvestiya*, September 23, 1924; *Pravda*, September 29, 1924.

circular letter from Profintern to its supporters in the principal European countries and in the United States appealed to them to support the work of the "Hands off China" society, and to create similar societies in their own countries;¹ and an appeal was issued by Krestintern.² Nor was assistance confined to eloquent words. On October 7, 1924, a cargo of munitions — apparently the first — for the nationalist government arrived in Canton in a Soviet warship from Vladivostok.³ Thus encouraged, the Canton authorities plucked up courage to grapple with the Merchant Corps and to defy the foreign veto. On the night of October 14, 1924, a force composed of troops under Chiang Kai-shek's command, of other troops loyal to the government, and of Whampoa cadets, attacked the headquarters of the corps in Canton and, after some resistance, were completely victorious: the defeated leaders of the corps fled to Hong Kong. This incident consolidated the power of the nationalist government, and perhaps enhanced the personal prestige of Chiang Kai-shek.⁴ It also marked the first step in the intensification of British hostility to Canton, as well as to Moscow, which reached its climax after the downfall of the Labour government.

The year 1924 had seen a striking advance in Soviet prestige and influence throughout China. In the north, recognition and a

¹ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 9-10 (44-45), September-October 1924, p. 144.

² *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 7-9, September-October 1924, pp. 158-159.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 154, note 76; L. Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (1934), p. 300, describes the visit of a Soviet "fleet" bearing a gift of costly furs. Sun Yat-sen sent a telegram to the crew of the ship, in which he spoke of the "very close" links between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic, and declared that he was "carrying on the struggle for the revolution in China and in the whole world" (*Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniya, 1917-1957* (1959), p. 99).

⁴ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 155-156. Chiang Kai-shek claimed exclusive credit for the success, representing Sun Yat-sen as absorbed in preparations for the northern expedition and reluctant to allow troops to be used in Canton; others assign to Chiang a less glorious rôle. Borodin's report of the meeting on October 14, 1924, of the revolutionary committee which planned the attack (*ibid.* pp. 171-173) is probably authentic; the most interesting point which emerges is Borodin's complete confidence in Chiang.

full resumption of diplomatic relations had been secured from the government in Peking, which, ineffective though it was, was still recognized by all the Great Powers as the Chinese Government; and an independent agreement on the all-important Chinese Eastern Railway had been concluded with Chang Tso-lin. In the south, an alliance had been formed with the rising power of Kuomintang — a power which leaned heavily on Soviet military aid and political counsel. A Chinese trade union movement, centring on the railway workers and the seamen, was beginning to take effective shape under the patronage of Moscow. Above all, anti-foreign, anti-imperialist feeling was gathering strength in all classes; and, as it became more vocal, it found a rallying-point in the Soviet Union. The new China began to attract eager and solicitous attention in Moscow, and to eclipse India as the main beacon of revolutionary hope on the eastern horizon. Trotsky, in a speech at the University of Toilers of the East on April 21, 1924, wondered whether India or China was the "more typical" colony.¹ Voitinsky expressed the conviction that "the Chinese people are beginning to understand the duel which is being fought out on the territory of China between our Red diplomacy and world imperialism";² and another Soviet publicist predicted that the question of the victory of socialism or the survival of capitalism would be "answered by Asia, and first and foremost by China, in the process of its development during the next decade".³ From this time China moved gradually into the centre of the picture, and became the main preoccupation both of the Soviet Government and of Comintern in Asia. The solid successes of 1924 paved the way for the more dramatic and spectacular events of 1925.

(b) *The Ferment at Work*

In the autumn of 1924, when Karakhan was established as Soviet Ambassador in Peking, and the prestige of Sun Yat-sen and the diplomacy of Borodin had firmly cemented the alliance between Kuomintang and the Soviet Union in Canton, a major change came over the kaleidoscopic Chinese political scene. For

¹ L. Trotsky, *Zapad i Vostok* (1924), p. 30.

² *Novyi Vostok*, vi (1924), pp. xiv-xv.

³ A. Ivin, *Kitai i Sovetskii Soyuz* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 29-30.

three years the military supremacy of Wu Pei-fu in central China had upheld the fiction of a Chinese Government in Peking, where since 1923 Tsao K'un, a puppet of Wu Pei-fu, had functioned as president. But this authority, though it enjoyed the backing of Great Britain and of the United States, rested on precarious foundations. The power and ambition of Wu Pei-fu now united against him his two strongest enemies — Chang Tso-lin, whose Japanese patrons also disliked the supremacy of a British and American *protégé*, and Sun Yat-sen who, always moved by a greater antipathy to Great Britain and the United States than to Japan, regarded Wu Pei-fu as the chief symbol of Chinese militarism and foreign imperialism.¹ On September 18, 1924, two days after hostilities had broken out between Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, Sun Yat-sen issued in the name of Kuomintang a manifesto (afterwards referred to as "the manifesto on the northern punitive expedition"), in which he proclaimed that "our allied armies in Chekiang have declared war against Tsao K'un and Wu Pei-fu", that "Mukden" (the name of Chang Tso-lin was avoided) was taking "concurrent action", and that the war was directed not only against militarism, but "against imperialism whose support made the existence of militarism possible".² It was perhaps a coincidence that, at this very moment, agreement should have been reached between Karakhan and Chang Tso-lin on the administration of the CER.³ In the event, the military forces of the nationalists were not engaged, and the war in the north was of brief duration. What decided the issue was the desertion of Wu Pei-fu's principal lieutenant in the north, the so-called Christian general, Feng Yü-hsiang, who for the next year and a half was to occupy an enigmatic position in Chinese affairs. Relations with him are said to have been established by Joffe

¹ In 1923, when Wu Pei-fu had installed Tsao K'un as president of the Chinese Republic in Peking, and before the arrival of Borodin in China, Sun Yat-sen had said in a press interview: "General Chang and I have the same enemy and I will take him — and anybody else who will help me — into the combination to overthrow Peking" (*New York Times*, July 22, 1923, quoted in L. Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (N.Y. 1934), p. 252). Contact was established at least as early as March 1924, when C. C. Wu and Quo T'ai-chi, described as "Sun's secretary and assistant secretary of foreign affairs", visited Mukden (*China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), April 5, 1924, p. 201).

² For the text see *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, ed. L. S. Hsü (Los Angeles, 1934), pp. 142-145.

³ See pp. 686-687 above.

during his mission to China in 1922-1923, and to have been maintained or resumed by Karakhan.¹ It is possible that at this time he was already in receipt of financial support from Moscow, and that this encouraged his abandonment of Wu Pei-fu. But for the moment, though professing to act independently, he appeared to have gone over to the camp of Chang Tso-lin.² On October 23, 1924, he seized Peking on his own account, and reorganized his forces under the name of Kuominchün, or National or People's Army, which advertised his sympathy with the national cause.³ But a few weeks later he installed in Peking as head of a provisional government Tuan Ch'i-jui, a member of the discredited "Anfu clique", which had ruled in Peking before being ousted by Wu Pei-fu in the autumn of 1920,⁴ and a known friend of Japan and of Chang Tso-lin. This turn of events evidently produced some bewilderment in Moscow. In an article in the press, Joffe speculated that Feng Yü-hsiang, having "30,000 excellently organized, well armed and disciplined soldiers" at his disposal, desired to play an independent rôle, but that for this purpose he needed "the Anfuists, Chang Tso-lin, even more Sun Yat-sen, and first and foremost perhaps the support of the Soviet Union".⁵ A certain doubt of the reliability of Feng Yü-hsiang as an ally could be read between the lines.

The defeat of Wu Pei-fu and the rise of Feng Yü-hsiang was received with enthusiasm by Sun Yat-sen, who now, presumably with the encouragement or concurrence of Borodin, decided to

¹ K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), pp. 199-201 — an unsystematic, but often well-informed, Japanese source; the writer speaks delicately of Soviet relations with Feng having "taken a tangible form some time before or after the *coup d'état* in October 1924" (*ibid.* p. 322). Another authority states that he was in receipt of Soviet funds "since his Peking *coup* in October 1924" (L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 650).

² An observer disposed in favour of Feng Yü-hsiang by his professed Christian beliefs was none the less impelled by his career "to recall the cynical definition of an independent as a man who cannot be depended upon" (A. N. Holcombe, *The Spirit of the Chinese Revolution* (N.Y., 1930), p. 95); for a more sympathetic portrait see T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), pp. 342-344.

³ For a contemporary journalistic account of Feng's taking over of Peking, with the text of the proclamation issued by him, see *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), November 22, 1924, pp. 362-371.

⁴ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 508, 511.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 145, November 7, 1924, p. 1953.

proceed to the north to take stock of the new situation.¹ It was the first time since 1911 that Sun had been able to visit Peking, and that he could hope to be received there, not as a rebel, but as a national leader. Before leaving Canton, he issued on November 10, 1924, a manifesto, which, reaffirming the hostility of Kuomintang to "militarism" and "imperialism", made the formal proposal of a people's (or national) conference "to devise means of unifying and reconstructing China": arrangements for this conference were to be made at a preliminary conference consisting of representatives of all groups, parties and armies opposed to Tsao K'un and Wu Pei-fu.² Sun Yat-sen travelled by ship via Kobe, where he delivered a speech indicative of his standpoint at this time:

Russia symbolizes and practises a "live and let live" policy. Other Powers aim at dominating the so-called weak nations. We Asiatics must emancipate Asia and the down-trodden states of Europe and America from European and American oppression. Japan and China must join hands and harmoniously lead the Asiatics to fight for a greater Asiaticism, thus expediting world peace.³

Arriving at Tientsin early in December 1924, he succumbed to the symptoms of a disease soon to be diagnosed as cancer of the liver. He finally reached Peking on the last day of the year, and shortly afterwards entered a hospital which he did not again leave. During this period Borodin also travelled to the north, apparently for the purpose of establishing relations with Feng Yü-hsiang —

¹ The statement (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 319) that Sun Yat-sen received an invitation from "the leaders of the Kuominchün and Tuan Ch'i-jui" must be treated with caution; the source is unreliable, and Tuan was not installed till later in November 1924.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 156, December 2, 1924, p. 2114; *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, ed. H. L. Hsü (Los Angeles, 1933), pp. 146-152.

³ *New York Times*, December 1, 1924, quoted in L. Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (1934), p. 304; the speech, which was an exposition of Sun Yat-sen's Japanophile "great Asia doctrine", was reprinted in Chinese in *Collected Works of the President*, ed. Hu Han-min (Shanghai, 1930), ii, 539-549. Sun was criticized in the CCP for his visit to Japan at this time and for having "proclaimed the theory of an alliance with Japan" (*Problemy Kitaya*, i (1929), 6). A Russian communist writer regarded Sun's visit as "a result of the policy of the Japanese Government which attempts to utilize every conceivable support in China against the Anglo-American imperialists" (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925), p. 92).

though it is not certain whether he did so on instructions from Moscow or at the prompting of Sun Yat-sen. Meanwhile, the elusive Feng had withdrawn in December 1924 to the hill country west of Peking, and then, having been appointed by Tuan Ch'ih-jui governor of the north-western provinces, to Kalgan. Whether these moves were symptoms of some far-reaching design, or simply of weakness and indecision, the record fails to show.¹ Having at first evaded a meeting with Borodin, he received him in Kalgan — probably in January or February 1925. After stubborn negotiations, which apparently turned in part on the incompatibility of Christianity with nationalism, Feng Yü-hsiang rejected any formal association with Kuomintang, but promised to admit Kuomintang agents to his army to agitate in favour of the nationalist cause.² It is probable that the bargain was sweetened by some financial aid, or promise of financial aid, from Moscow.

These proceedings, and especially the apparent readiness of Sun Yat-sen and Borodin to negotiate with militarists like Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang, aroused keen mistrust among those members of the CCP who already disliked the connexion with Kuomintang.³ The policy of compromise being pursued in the north intensified the suspicion that the independence and interests of the party were being sacrificed.⁴ But to disown Sun Yat-sen

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 320-321; Feng Yü-hsiang's subsequent statements, and his untrustworthy autobiography published twenty years later, are the most detailed sources.

² L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 649-650, the only authority for Borodin's approach to Feng at this time, states that it took place at the wish of Sun Yat-sen and that the letter proposing the meeting was written to the general by Wang Ching-wei.

³ Views implicitly hostile to continued participation in Kuomintang were expounded in an article written in the latter part of 1924 by P'eng Shu-chih, later one of the leaders of the Right wing of the CCP: he argued that almost all sectors of the Chinese bourgeoisie were already counter-revolutionary, and that only the proletariat could take the lead in the revolution, even in its present "national" phase (quoted in B. I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Harvard, 1951), pp. 61-62).

⁴ The adverse attitude of the CCP towards Sun Yat-sen's journey to the north was afterwards criticized by an official spokesman of the party as one of the "contradictions" in its policy (*Puti Mirovoi Revolyutsii* (1927), i, 419). Some years later, Ts'ai Ho-shen, one of the principal critics, defended his attitude as "unduly obstinate, but in essence completely right" (*Problemy Kitaya*, i (1929), 6); the opposition was strongest, or most vocal, in the party central committee in Shanghai.

would have meant the effective end of the alliance with Kuomintang; and this was unthinkable, both because Kuomintang was the only firm ally of the Soviet Union and of Comintern in China, and because a united front with other parties was an essential feature of Comintern policy at this time. At the moment of Sun Yat-sen's departure for the north the CCP issued a manifesto which, though betraying signs of uneasiness, formally endorsed Sun's policy. It began by remarking that "the political changes in Peking simply reflect, as in the past, conflicts between the Mukden and Chihli cliques, and between Anglo-American and Japanese imperialism" — a warning against any appeasement of Tuan Ch'i-jui or of Japan. But it endorsed Sun Yat-sen's call for a national conference, and hoped to obtain "the support of all classes, as well as of the military forces which have no definite ties with the imperialists" — evidently a reference to Feng Yü-hsiang. It offered to support a provisional national government, "even if this should not become a government of the Left", provided it gave political freedom to the masses and suppressed counter-revolutionary military activities. The manifesto ended with a long list of party demands, in which social and national demands were cleverly blended.¹ But in January 1925, with Sun Yat-sen and Borodin both absent in the north, the CCP held its fourth congress in Canton, and adopted a resolution in which the voice of the critics was much more plainly heard.

The organizations of the workers [it declared] must be built up on the basis of the economic class struggle, and not only be independent of Kuomintang, but also not admit any other organizations into their own ranks in order not to create confusion in the consciousness of the working class. This is important because the working class after the completion of the national revolution also has its own goal — the proletarian revolution. Therefore the organizations of the working class must remain independent in the national movement, and always

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 577, using an apparently reliable Chinese source, dates the manifesto November 1924. In the translation from a Japanese version in C. Brandt, B. I. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952), pp. 74-77, it is assigned to the fourth congress of the CCP in January 1925; the mistake probably arose from its description in the original Chinese source as "the fourth manifesto of the CCP on the current situation".

be prepared for the second step in the struggle, for the proletarian revolution.

Our party is a proletarian party. We must not only win the revolutionary elements for our party, but must also bring the workers' movement as a whole under the leadership of our party. We must strive to bring under our leadership those unions which have attached themselves to Kuomintang in order to transform them into class organizations, and under our leadership to win them for participation in the national revolution.

The resolution continued :

In making propaganda for the national revolution among the workers we must start from the standpoint of the interests of the working class and preach communism ; we must not make propaganda for the doctrine of Kuomintang. We shall say to them : China with the national revolution will advance on the path of the proletarian revolution.¹

This resolution was evidently intended as a vindication against the charge of subordinating the CCP to the purposes of Kuomintang. But it was, in essence, an expression of the philosophy of those members of the party who rejected the alliance with Kuomintang altogether.

Before the success or failure of the northern policy could become apparent, Sun Yat-sen died in Peking on March 12, 1925. He left behind him two documents signed by him during the last days of his life. The first, said to have been written from his dictation by his faithful lieutenant Wang Ching-wei, and described as his " will ", was a brief farewell message to Kuomintang, which was exhorted to carry on the work of revolution and reconstruction and, in particular, to strive for the convocation of the people's conference and for the abolition of the unequal treaties.² The second and longer document, probably not drafted by Sun Yat-sen himself, but accurately reflecting his sentiments, was a letter of farewell addressed to the central executive committee of Soviets of the USSR. It referred to the Soviet Union as " the heritage left to the oppressed peoples of the world by the

¹ *Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), pp. 48-49 ; apart from this no doubt carefully chosen quotation, the resolutions of the congress do not appear to be available.

² *Sun Yat-sen : His Political and Social Ideals*, ed. L. S. Hsü (Los Angeles, 1933), p. 43.

immortal Lenin "; it proclaimed the conviction that Kuomintang " will be bound up with you in the historic work of the final liberation of China and other exploited countries from the yoke of imperialism "; and it concluded by expressing " the hope that the day will soon come when the USSR will welcome a friend and ally in a mighty, free China, and that in the great struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world both those allies will go forward to victory hand in hand ".¹ On the day of Sun Yat-sen's death a telegram from the central executive committee of Kuomintang to " comrades Zinoviev and Stalin " (representing respectively Comintern and the Russian party) expressed the conviction that " you, as true disciples of Lenin, will share with us the heritage of Sun Yat-sen ";² and the central executive committee of the CCP, not to be outdone, assured the central executive committee of Kuomintang of the continued support of the CCP, of the Chinese workers and peasants, of the proletariat of the world, and of the other parties associated in Comintern.³ Replies signed by Stalin as secretary-general of the central committee of the Russian party, and by Zinoviev as president of IKKI, as well as proclamations addressed by IKKI to " the masses of the Chinese people " and to " the workers of all countries ",⁴ left no doubt of the importance attached in Moscow to the Kuomintang alliance. Zinoviev's message ended by expressing the conviction that " the communist party of China, which is cooperating with the Kuomintang party, will also prove equal to the great historical tasks before it ". At the fifth enlarged IKKI, which opened ten days after Sun Yat-sen's death, Zinoviev described the dead leader as, though not a communist, " an honourable ally of the revolutionary proletariat "; and in his main report he spoke of events in China " developing especially fast ", of the establishment by the Soviet Union of " a common front with China ", and of the importance to Comintern of the rise of Kuomintang, " which sympathizes with us up to a certain

¹ *Izvestiya*, March 14, 1925; it was also published in *New York Times*, May 24, 1925.

² *Pravda*, March 14, 1925.

³ Quoted in *Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 159, from *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, No. 107, March 21, 1925, p. 890.

⁴ *Pravda*, March 14, 1925; Stalin's telegram also appeared in *Stalin, Sochineniya*, vii, 50-51.

point".¹ Kamenev, presiding a month later at the opening session of the fourteenth Russian party conference, took up the same theme, hailing Sun Yat-sen as a leader of the colonial peoples, who "understood that the struggle against imperialism is possible only in alliance with communism, only in continuous collaboration with the first proletarian state in the world".² The official account of the situation as seen in Moscow was given in general terms by Stalin in his address of May 18, 1925, to the Communist University of Toilers of the East.³ In China the bourgeoisie was split on the national issue, a part of it having gone over to the imperialists; a united front of the workers and the bourgeoisie was therefore impossible. The working alternative was "a revolutionary bloc of workers and petty bourgeoisie". This bloc would constitute (since the identity of petty bourgeoisie and peasantry was taken for granted) a "worker-peasant party", though such a "two-sided party" could succeed only if it facilitated "the practical leadership of the revolutionary movement by the communist party".⁴ But this diagnosis threw little light on the situation in China, where Kuomintang contained more merchants and intellectuals than peasants, and the CCP more students than workers.

On May 18, 1925, the central executive committee of Kuomintang met at Sun Yat-sen's temporary tomb in Peking to do honour to his memory. Manifestos were issued proclaiming the fidelity of Kuomintang to the policies laid down in the dead leader's will and in his farewell letter to VTsIK on the alliance with the Soviet Union. It made a further pronouncement in support of the admission of communists to Kuomintang, proclaiming the im-

¹ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 5, 44.

² *Chetyrnadtsataya Konferentsiya Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov)* (1925), p. 3.

³ See p. 725 below.

⁴ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vii, 146-147; the original text as published in *Pravda*, May 22, 1925, read "a worker-peasant party such as Kuomintang", but the specific reference to Kuomintang was later eliminated. Stalin was more interested at this time in the conciliation of the Russian peasant (see Vol. 1, pp. 242-248) than in anything that happened in China, and his language may have reflected this preoccupation. But the illusion about the character of Kuomintang was not confined to Stalin; Trotsky in a memorandum of June 9, 1927, preserved in the Trotsky archives (T 3055), compared Kuomintang to the Russian SRs who, before the time was ripe for the dictatorship of the proletariat, could remain "our party" for the peasants.

portance of centralizing all revolutionary forces in Kuomintang, and boldly associating the Chinese revolution with world revolution. Finally it expelled several Right-wing leaders on grounds of party discipline.¹ The illusion that the memory of Sun Yat-sen would suffice to cement the alliance between the CCP and Kuomintang seems to have been shared by all. After performing these rites, the central executive committee adjourned to Canton, where more critical decisions would soon confront it.

The death of Sun Yat-sen opened the way to fresh alignments, and brought to the surface those hidden resentments between the Right and Left wings in Kuomintang, and between Kuomintang and the CCP, which he and Borodin had worked together to curb. But, before anything decisive happened in Canton, an epoch-making event occurred in Shanghai. In the first months of 1925 strikes had become a familiar phenomenon in factories throughout China; ² since the larger factories were almost all directly or indirectly in foreign ownership, this was an anti-foreign as well as an anti-capitalist movement. On May 30, 1925, a mass demonstration of students marching in protest against the arrest of some of their comrades, who had been supporting a strike in a Japanese-owned cotton mill, was fired on by the Shanghai municipal police under British command. Twelve of the demonstrators were killed. A general strike was declared in Shanghai; and the "May 30 movement" ignited a train of strikes and disorders which spread to most of the treaty ports. Detachments were landed from foreign warships to keep order. It was everywhere quickly realized that something decisive had happened. On June 19, 1925, a general strike was declared in Canton; and four days later British troops fired on a demonstration of workers, students and cadets from the Whampoa academy in the British concession of Shameen, causing a large number of casualties. A strike of Chinese workers in Hong Kong was proclaimed as a reprisal for

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 158-160; according to a later account, 124 members of the Right were expelled from Kuomintang at this time (*China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 1324-1325).

² For a Soviet account of this movement see *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 103-110.

the "Shameen massacre", and soon outdid the boycott of 1922 in extent and importance.¹

The significance of the May 30 movement was that, for the first time on any large scale, nationalists in revolt against foreign domination joined hands with workers on strike against conditions of labour in foreign-owned capitalist enterprises. The year 1924 had been one of rapid growth in the Chinese labour movement, centred especially on the seamen of Canton and the railway workers in the north.² On May 1, 1925, a second All-China Congress of Trade Unions had been held at Canton. It mustered over 200 delegates claiming to represent 570,000 workers,³ and was the recipient of an address from Profintern proclaiming the solidarity of the revolutionary workers' movement.⁴ One of the aims of the congress was to unify the trade union organization; 200 separate unions in Canton were said to be split at this time into three groups.⁵ But it was Shanghai and the cities of the Yangtze basin, not the predominantly mercantile and petty bourgeois Canton, which were the centres of Chinese industry and of the nascent Chinese proletariat; and the spread of the movement to Shanghai and to new categories of workers imparted to it for the first time a specifically social and proletarian character. Significantly, the movement in Canton took the form primarily of a commercial boycott, in Shanghai of an industrial strike. The Canton movement, in the words of a Soviet commentator, had "an exclusively political character, being a pure expression of the

¹ For an account of the shooting and the boycott see *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 278-292; 100,000 Chinese workers were reported to have left Hong Kong during the strike (*China Year Book*, 1928 (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 1328).

² See pp. 621-623, 703 above.

³ H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 74. According to a calculation made at this time, of 5 million Chinese who could be classified as "workers", about 1½ million were employed in factories, in transport or in mines, and could be organized: of these 300,000 or more were employed in the textile industry, 120,000 in the tobacco industry, 100,000-120,000 on the railways, 200,000-300,000 in mines and 200,000 in heavy industry (*Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 17-19).

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 85, May 22, 1925, pp. 1166-1167; for the first congress in 1922 see p. 689 above. It is uncertain whether any effective permanent organization had been left by the first congress; according to Heller, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions was a creation of the second congress (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 100).

⁵ *IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), p. 89.

struggle for national liberation, conducted by the revolutionary methods of the proletariat".¹ The movement in Shanghai was a proletarian upheaval, a distinctively class revolt. Significantly also, the CCP was from the first moment closely associated with the revolt. Ts'ai Ho-shen, a member of the party central committee and editor of its weekly journal, is credited not only with the suggestion which led to the demonstration of May 30, but with the appointment by the party central committee on the same evening of an "action committee" which organized a general strike in Shanghai, and with the formation on May 31, 1925, of a Shanghai General Labour Union under CCP leadership, which claimed to represent 200,000 organized workers. Li Li-san, a young CCP member who became president of the trade union and leader of the strike, was destined for high promotion in the party.² During the critical period of the strike, common hostility to foreign imperialism united the masses of the workers with the petty bourgeoisie and the "revolutionary intelligentsia" in a programme which included such democratic demands as Chinese representatives on the municipal council and the abolition of the mixed courts. Side by side with the general trade union council, a "joint committee", in which workers, students and petty bourgeois all participated, conducted the "struggle against imperialism". Troops sent to keep order in the city fraternized with the workers, and communist students held propaganda meetings among the soldiers. Chinese chambers of commerce and student organizations contributed to the strikers' funds; and even Tuan Ch'i-jui from Peking donated 100,000 dollars to the general trade union council. This honeymoon period of collaboration between the workers and the bourgeois national movement in Shanghai lasted throughout June and July 1925.³

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 100.

² The account in *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 1326-1327, describes Li as "a Moscow-trained labour leader", and states that this task was "assigned" to him by Borodin; according to C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China* (Harvard, 1958), p. 37, he was one of the minority at the third party congress in June 1923 which wished the CCP to organize the workers independently of Kuomintang (see pp. 691-692 above). Some of these details rest on uncertain evidence.

³ For a description of this period see *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, pp. 87-90; the account in *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, No. 2, 1960, pp. 91-104, uses Chinese sources, but is evidently somewhat idealized.

An unexpected and important concomitant of the industrial ferment of the summer of 1925 was the spread of the current turbulence to the peasantry. The organization of a peasant movement in the eastern districts of Kwantung dated back to 1922, and was the work of one P'eng Pai, the son of a local landowner, said to have been a member of the CCP since 1920 and a prominent member of the Socialist Youth League.¹ The second congress of the CCP in the summer of 1922 had noted that 95 per cent of the Chinese peasantry lived in abject poverty, and had drawn the appropriate conclusion :

If these poor peasants hope to escape from this miserable environment, there is only one way for them — revolution.

And it is to be believed that the Chinese revolution will quickly succeed when the majority of the peasants ally with the workers.²

The peasant section of Kuomintang may not itself have been very effective, though it is said to have organized a conference of peasants from the vicinity of Canton which was addressed by Sun Yat-sen on July 28, 1924.³ But enthusiastic members of the CCP and, above all, of the Socialist Youth League, who were also members of Kuomintang, carried on effective propaganda among the peasants. In the summer of 1925 it was anxiously reported in the English-language press that graduates of the Whampoa academy "have been distributed all over Kwantung to preach Bolshevism and organize what they call peasant leagues among farmers of all ages, and drill young men for the farmers' corps in the Red Army".⁴ Peasant disturbances and repressive action by landowners and by local militia were endemic in the

¹ H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 72 ; C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China* (Harvard, 1958), p. 62. For an autobiographical fragment by P'eng Pai see *International Literature* (Moscow), No. 2-3, 1932, pp. 88-103, translated from a Chinese periodical and containing a graphic account of early struggles. P'eng Pai, dismissed from the education department of the Haifeng district for participating in demonstrations on May 1, 1921, set to work to organize a Haifeng peasant union ; by September 1922 the union had 200 members, and grew rapidly. Landowners set up a counter-organization in the form of a "tax-payers' union".

² Translated from Chinese sources in Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China* (Columbia University : East Asian Institute, 1960), p. 120 ; the version of the manifesto in C. Brandt, B. I. Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (1952), pp. 63-65, is translated from Japanese and much abbreviated.

³ *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), August 9, 1924, p. 338.

⁴ *Ibid.* May 5, 1925, p. 205.

Kwantung province throughout 1924 and 1925; murders of peasant leaders were recorded in December 1924 and January 1925.¹ At the time when the second All-China Labour Congress met in Canton on May 1, 1925,² 117 peasant delegates claiming to represent 210,000 peasants of Kwantung province met separately, and decided to found a peasant union covering the peasants of the whole province.³ The Kwantung peasant union inaugurated its career at a congress which passed a resolution supporting the Canton revolutionary government, but demanding that it should effectively combat counter-revolution, as well as resolutions proposing affiliation with Kuomintang and with the International Peasant Council in Moscow.⁴ Mao Tse-tung had resigned his membership of the central executive committee of Kuomintang at the end of 1924 and returned to his native Hunan, where the peasants "became very militant" after the events of May 30, 1925, and began to form peasant unions.⁵ Armed peasant detachments known as "Red Spears" were first heard of at this time.⁶ The slogan "Join Krestintern" was said to have appeared on placards in Chinese villages; and the International Peasant Council issued an appeal to "the peasant men and women of China".⁷ In July 1925 three members of Kuomintang, of whom one was a former governor of Hunan, and another was described as a recent graduate of Oxford University, visited Krestintern headquarters in Moscow to discuss measures to be taken by Kuomintang to promote a mass movement of the Chinese peasantry.⁸ In the autumn of 1925 the peasants were again reported to be "openly warring against the landlords" in six or seven districts of Kwantung province.⁹ Outside the territory under nationalist control organization of the peasantry made slower progress. It was not till the spring of 1926 that a first

¹ *Novyi Vostok*, xviii, 30-31; *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1926, p. 171.

² See p. 720 above.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, xviii (1927), 27; *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 1-2, January-February 1926, p. 114.

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 3-5, March-May 1926, pp. 171-172.

⁵ E. Snow, *Red Star over China* (1937), p. 157; Mao himself remained in Hunan for only a few months and then escaped to Canton.

⁶ A. Ivin, *Krasnye Piki* (2nd ed. 1927).

⁷ *Pravda*, June 18, 21, 1925.

⁸ *Ibid.* July 31, 1925.

⁹ Report quoted in H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 93.

peasant conference was held in Shantung and adopted a resolution to join Krestintern.¹

The immediate sequel of the May 30 movement in Shanghai was a deterioration in Soviet relations with the west, and especially with Great Britain, where anti-Soviet feelings rose to fever heat in the last days of June 1925.² On the other hand, the Soviet leaders, disillusioned by fading prospects in Europe and encouraged by the new revolutionary wave in Asia and Africa, redoubled their interest in the prospects of a nationalist revolt against the imperialist Powers in China. In a world where the Soviet Union had few allies, it was more and more imperative to attack the enemy at his most vulnerable point. On June 5, 1925, a manifesto issued jointly in the name of IKKI, of the executive bureau of Profintern and of the executive committee of KIM, compared the shootings of May 30 in Shanghai with the famous shooting down of Russian workers in Petersburg on January 9, 1905, and pilloried Japanese militarism and Anglo-American imperialism as the culprits.³ On June 10, 1925, the "Hands off China" society organized in Moscow its first demonstration against the Shanghai "blood-bath";⁴ and thereafter *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* published regular reports of subscriptions from Soviet and foreign trade unions to aid the Chinese strikers. In July 1925 a conference of communist youth leagues in Berlin called on all youth leagues to "give every support to the national revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people", and to "link this campaign with the events in Morocco under the combined slogan 'Against the danger of an imperialist war'".⁵ During the latter half of 1925 a constant flow of propaganda directed against the rôle of the imperialist Powers in China, and enthusiastically endorsing nationalist demands for the abolition of the unequal treaties, poured from the offices of Comintern, Profintern and

¹ *Pravda*, April 21, 1926; this conference was also mentioned in an open letter addressed to Kuomintang and to its peasant section by Krestintern on April 30, 1926 (*Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1926, p. 181).

² See p. 417 above.

³ *Pravda*, June 7, 1925; this was presumably the manifesto decided on by the presidium of IKKI on June 5, 1925, when an appeal was also sent to all communist parties to launch a vigorous propaganda campaign against "imperialist oppression in China" (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 12-13).

⁴ *Izvestiya*, June 12, 1925.

⁵ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 5, January 1927, p. 29.

Krestintern. Non-party support was even more valuable than party support. The institution known as MRP or International Workers' Aid was impelled by the Shanghai and Canton shootings to send an organizer to China, who set up branches of MRP in most of the large cities and a central committee in Peking. Intellectuals, students and trade unionists participated in the movement; a mass demonstration in Peking on July 30, 1925, was attended by 200,000 workers, and addressed by speakers from India, Japan, China and Formosa.¹ The Berlin headquarters of MRP collected a million gold marks in aid of the Chinese strikers, and organized a large public meeting in Berlin on August 16, 1925, in support of the "Hands off China" movement.² The British annual trade union congress meeting at Scarborough in September 1925 passed a resolution of protest against "the murderous crimes being perpetrated against our working class Chinese comrades".³ Meanwhile the decision had been taken to establish in Moscow, in honour of the dead Kuomintang leader, a Sun Yat-sen University of Toilers of China. Unlike the Communist University of Toilers of the East, which had been established in 1921,⁴ and now bore Stalin's name, the Sun Yat-sen university was designed for Chinese non-party students, and especially for young members of Kuomintang, who would learn there to associate the nationalist cause with the support of the Soviet Union. The first president of the new university, which opened its enrolment on September 1, 1925, was Radek — a token of the diplomatic rather than party character of the institution. In the spring of 1926 it already had 280 students (46 of them women), a majority of whom had previously studied in Chinese, German or French universities. Students were housed in dormitories, and a two-year course was offered, lectures being delivered in Russian, German, French and English.⁵

Community of interest in resistance to British imperialism also cemented the alliance on the side of Kuomintang. Pronouncements by Chiang Kai-shek left no room for doubt that he

¹ W. Münzenberg, *Solidarität* (1931), pp. 458-461; for the MRP see pp. 944-949 below.

² See p. 946 below.

³ *Report of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Trades Union Congress* (1925), pp. 487-489, 570.

⁴ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 268-269.

⁵ *Pravda*, March 11, 1926.

regarded British imperialism as the principal enemy. A letter written by him at this time expressed the belief that, "besides employing peaceful means of struggle (such as a boycott of British goods), our party should start military preparations, to be completed within half a year, for a long period of struggle against the British".¹ On June 14, 1925, the political council confirmed the powers conferred on it a year earlier by the dead leader,² and decided to organize the national government "on the committee system" — presumably in professed imitation of the Soviets. The national government was formally inaugurated on July 1, 1925, and issued a number of proclamations proper to the occasion.³ Wang Ching-wei was head of the government, and Hu Han-min⁴ Minister for Foreign Affairs; as leading representatives of the Left and of the Right respectively, they reflected the balance between the two wings in Kuomintang. At the same time a military council was appointed as the highest military organ of the nationalist army, the counterpart of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Union. But fear and jealousy of military authority was still strongly felt, and the formal subordination

¹ This letter exists in two versions. In the first it was published in a Chinese translation from a Russian text in the collection of documents seized in 1927 (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 176, and in English in N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Peking n.d. [? 1927]), p. 162); in this version it was a letter addressed to Galen (i.e. Blyukher) and dated June 26, 1925. In the second version it was published in a collection of Chiang Kai-shek's papers in 1936 (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 27, 176); in this version it was a letter addressed to the military council of Kuomintang and dated July 1, 1925. The only substantial divergence between the two texts is that the former contains a sentence which is absent from the latter about the need to appoint "a large number of Russian advisers". Chiang Kai-shek may have written two letters on different days to Galen and to the military council, identical except for this one sentence; or only the second version may be genuine, and those responsible for publication in 1927 may have garbled the text for propaganda purposes by substituting the name of Galen as the addressee and inserting the reference to the "large number of Russian advisers".
² See p. 706 above.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 163; an article in *International Press Correspondence*, No. 21, March 18, 1926, pp. 329-330 (not published in the German edition), described it as "closely resembling the Soviet system".

⁴ Before leaving for the North in November 1924, Sun Yat-sen had designated Hu Han-min to the post hitherto held by himself of generalissimo of the nationalist forces (though Hu, like Sun, was not a military man); Hu retained this honorific title and status.

of the military to the political council was clearly marked.¹ Wang Ching-wei, the president of the political council, was also president of the military council; of the eight original members, a majority were civilians and all, except Chiang Kai-shek, were also members of the political council.²

It need not be doubted that the influence of Borodin and the Soviet military advisers played an important part in this reconstruction of political and military authority in Canton in the summer of 1925, though reliable information is scarce. Later reports that Borodin secured the appointment of Wang Ching-wei as president of the political and military council, and head of the government, not only against the Right candidate Hu Han-min, but against the alternative Left candidate, Liao Chung-k'ai, who was thought to be less amenable to communist pressure than Wang,³ may reflect subsequent attempts to discredit Wang as a communist tool. The influence of the military advisers was more apparent, since the Kuomintang army was dependent on them both for technical military skills and for munitions and military supplies from the Soviet Union. Military training seems from the outset to have been conducted or supervised by Soviet officers, who also participated in military operations. A document of July 1925 shows Rogachev, who had apparently taken charge of the military mission on Galen's departure, functioning as *ex officio* member of the military council, chief of the general staff and supervisor of naval and aviation affairs.⁴ A report from Kisanko, who arrived to take charge of the mission at the end of October 1925, dwelt on the shortage of advisers, who were unable

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 205.

² The seven members of the military council listed *ibid.* pp. 183-184 were also members of the political council; Chiang Kai-shek, who was apparently also a member of the military council, was not at this time a member of the political council. Rogachev is listed, but evidently as an adviser, not a member. According to a list in J. C. Huston, *Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang, and the Russian-Chinese Political Alliance* (typed ms. in Hoover Library, Stanford (n.d.)), p. 96, the two members of the political council not included in the military council were Sun Fo and T. V. Soong. But these lists must be treated with some caution.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 208, and sources there cited.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 183-184; the element of suspicion attaching to all documents from this collection applies with particular force to those which emphasize the rôle of the Soviet advisers.

to fill all the posts open to them in the armies and the military schools, and on the total lack of competent interpreters which hampered communication. Among the specific desiderata recorded by him were increased political work in the army, a centralized military academy to replace the four existing army training schools, and an effective general staff which could curb the independent power of the generals.¹ Partly, no doubt, as a result of Soviet pressure, the functions of the political commissars in the army and of the department controlling them were re-defined, and the Whampoa academy reorganized as a central military and political academy.² By the beginning of 1926, the "national-revolutionary army" (the name bestowed on it by Chiang Kai-shek)³ had been transformed, thanks mainly to Soviet advice and aid, into an efficiently officered and organized fighting force.

The events of the summer of 1925, by strengthening the dependence of Kuomintang both on the communist group in its own ranks and on the external alliance between Canton and Moscow, paved the way for a rift between its Left and Right wings, which were deeply divided in their attitude to these developments. The May 30 movement had given a sharp impetus to recruitment in the CCP. The membership of the party, which had not reached a thousand in January 1925,⁴ rose after the events of May 30 to 4,000; membership of the youth league rose to 9,000.⁵ The increase in numbers also involved a change in character and composition. The party which had entered Kuomintang in 1923

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 197-199. No information from Soviet sources has been found about Kisanko, which was probably a pseudonym; the identification with Bubnov in F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China* (Princeton, 1956), p. 23, is, however, mythical. For Bubnov see p. 778, note 2 below.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 200-204.

³ *Ibid.* p. 181.

⁴ See p. 693, note 3 above.

⁵ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 334; these official figures are to be preferred to the statement in the *Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party* (see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 74) that membership of the CCP rose from 1000 to 10,000, and of the youth league from 2000 to 10,000, in the six months from May 1925. The circulation of the weekly journal of the CCP, which before May 1925 printed only 5000 copies, rose to 20,000, and it was reprinted in Haifeng and Hankow (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 93).

was a small group consisting predominantly of intellectuals. The new recruits who joined it after May 30, 1925, were workers; and the CCP began for the first time to take on a proletarian hue. Precise figures for 1925 are lacking, though by September 1925 the percentage of students in the membership of the Communist Youth League, which before May 30, 1925, stood as high as 90, was said to have fallen to 49.¹ At the fifth congress of the CCP in April 1927 membership of the party was registered at 57,967, with 35,000 members of the Communist Youth League; a total of 9,720,000 organized peasants was claimed, and the party weekly printed 50,000 copies. Of the members of the CCP at this time 53·8 per cent were described as workers, 18·7 per cent as peasants, 19·1 per cent as intellectuals, the rest falling into other categories.² These rapid changes did not amount to the creation of a mass communist party.³ But they did mean the entry into the CCP for the first time of a substantial number of workers and a direct link with the rising trade union movement; and, since a majority of the new recruits came from Shanghai, the preponderance of Shanghai in the party organization was increased,⁴ and the friction which occurred between the policies of the CCP and the policies of Kuomintang was aggravated by territorial jealousies between Shanghai and Canton. At the same time the exigencies of the struggle against imperialism, by drawing closer the bonds which united Canton and Moscow, drove Kuomintang and its policies, unconsciously but inexorably, towards the Left. The most striking illustration of this process was the Hong Kong strike. The strike was organized not by Kuomintang, but by a workers' committee in which the influence of communists was, or quickly

¹ *Protokoll des 6. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1928), i, 80.

² P. Mif, *Kitaiskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Kriticheskie Dni* (1928), pp. 53-54.

³ An early party historian drew attention to the negative aspects of this phenomenon, and thought that "no good will result if the party continues growing at the same rapid speed, since the work of direction definitely will not be able to keep pace with such growth" (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 74-75).

⁴ The "real kernel" of the party remained in Shanghai. One of the rare territorial breakdowns of party membership gives (for some unspecified date — evidently early — in 1925) 1200 members of the party and 1500 of the youth league in Shanghai; Canton counted 600 party members, Peking 300 (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 334).

became, paramount. It proved by far the most effective weapon wielded by the nationalists in their struggle against British imperialism; and Kuomintang could hardly do other than applaud and support it. A resolution of the political council of Kuomintang in July 1925 to "continue the strike" was followed by a decision of the military council instructing the general staff to take steps to enforce the blockade of Hong Kong, though it added a warning to "avoid precipitating any conflict with British forces".¹ Yet the strike was profoundly distasteful, both in its immediate consequences and in its more far-reaching implications, to prosperous Chinese traders and employers. Thus the increased prominence of Left tendencies in Kuomintang, accompanied and stimulated by the growing influence of Borodin and of the CCP, caused acute misgivings in the powerful Right wing which represented the propertied interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie. At the moment when the tactful and conciliatory leadership of Sun Yat-sen had been withdrawn, the success and extension of the May 30 movement, which found in proletarian unrest a fresh source of resistance to foreign imperialism, also intensified the struggle between Left and Right in the ranks of Kuomintang. In July 1925, Sun Fo, who had returned to Canton after his father's death, once more took his departure; and with him went Norman, the American adviser to the Canton government, whose ill-defined functions had been eclipsed and rendered nugatory by Borodin's rising star.² This was probably the period of the most active influence of the CCP in Kuomintang. Mao Tse-tung, arriving in Canton from Hunan, where he had been fanning peasant discontent,³ was appointed head of the Agitprop department of Kuomintang and editor of its journal; two other communists, T'an P'ing-shan and Lin Pai-ch'u, were heads respectively of the worker and peasant departments.⁴

The latent crisis came to a head with the murder on August 20, 1925, of Liao Chung-k'ai, Minister of Finance and political

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 184-185.

² *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 1329. The report that Borodin would "succeed to the advisership" rested on a misapprehension; Borodin's appointment dated back to December 1923 (see p. 697 above).

³ See p. 723 above.

⁴ E. Snow, *Red Star Over China* (1937), p. 157.

commissar of the Whampoa military academy, the leader of the Kuomintang Left, the man on whom more than on anyone else, the political mantle of Sun Yat-sen had fallen.¹ A special committee of three, consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Hsü Ch'ung-chih, the Minister of War, and Chiang Kai-shek, was set up to investigate the crime. The murder was *prima facie* the work of the Right. The committee claimed to have proof that the perpetrators had received British money from Hong Kong (Wang Ching-wei subsequently named a sum of 2,000,000 dollars), and that it was part of a plot to overthrow the existing nationalist government; this view was shared by Soviet observers and commentators. Both Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek hastened to make speeches proclaiming that the murder raised no issue for or against communism, but only for or against imperialism.² Some suspects were arrested; others fled. But suspicion finally came to rest on Hu Han-min, whose brother was directly implicated. Chiang Kai-shek, who had convinced Borodin of Hu Han-min's guilt,³ now carried out two important *coups*, which could be represented as blows against the Right, though the end which they ultimately served was that of personal ambition. First, Hsü Ch'ung-chih was accused of complicity with anti-Kuomintang military forces still active in Kwantung; the army immediately

¹ For Liao Chung-k'ai see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 542.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 165-166, cf. *ibid.* p. 187, where Kisanko treats it as a reprisal for support given to the Hong Kong strike; an article in the press by the head of the eastern section of Profintern described the murder as "a link in the chain of . . . preparatory measures for imperialist intervention" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 126, August 30, 1925, p. 1825); for the 2,000,000 dollars see *Novyi Vostok*, xviii (1927), 21.

³ It is assumed in L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, pp. 645-646, which may, as usual, be taken to represent Borodin's version; according to a report by a former American consular officer (J. C. Huston, *Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang, and the Russian-Chinese Political Alliance* (typewritten ms. in Hoover Library, Stanford (n.d.)), pp. 94-95), which reflects contemporary gossip, Hu Han-min had a particular grudge against Liao Chung-k'ai, who (no doubt, in his capacity as Minister of Finance) had proposed to abolish the post of generalissimo. The official version given by Wang Ching-wei to the second congress of Kuomintang in January 1925 explicitly declared that the rumours against Hu Han-min had "proved false and devoid of foundation"; but a footnote appended to a Russian translation of Wang's speech added that this view was not shared by other workers in Kuomintang (*Novyi Vostok*, xviii (1927), 21).

under his command was disarmed, and he was allowed to retire to Shanghai. Secondly, Hu Han-min, evidently with the approval of Borodin, was despatched on an honorific mission to Moscow, which removed him from the scene for a lengthy period.¹ Wang Ching-wei, Sun Yat-sen's close disciple, succeeded the murdered Liao Chung-k'ai as political commissar at Whampoa, and T. V. Soong, an ostensibly non-political banker with an American education, as Minister of Finance. The principal beneficiary of these events was Chiang Kai-shek. The removal of Hsü Ch'ung-chih made him effective commander-in-chief, though still in name only commander of the first army. The removal of Hu Han-min made him the strong man of the party, second only to the weak and unpractical Wang Ching-wei. In September 1925 Chiang Kai-shek launched a campaign against Ch'en Ch'iung-ming, the war-lord who had driven Sun Yat-sen from Canton in 1922, and who still exercised independent rule in eastern Kwantung. The campaign, fully supported by the Soviet advisers, was brilliantly successful, and established the uncontested authority of the Canton government throughout Kwantung.² It also raised Chiang Kai-shek's personal prestige and power to a new height. Henceforth his position in Kuomintang was impregnable. It remained to be seen how he would use it.

While the spectacular events of the summer of 1925 had transformed the situation in Shanghai, in Canton and throughout southern China, important military changes had occurred in the north. These centred in part round the enigmatic personality and position of Feng Yü-hsiang. In October 1924 Feng had dealt a crushing blow to Wu Pei-fu by changing sides at the critical moment of his struggle with Chang Tso-lin; and, since

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 165; K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 335, does not speculate on Hu's responsibility for Liao's murder, but says that "Chiang Kai-shek contrived to drive away Hu Han-min to Russia". Hu arrived in Vladivostok on October 1, 1925 (*Pravda*, October 2, 1925), and in Moscow on October 18, 1925; on the following day he was received by Karakhan, then on leave from his post in Peking (*ibid.* October 20, 1925).

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 170.

Tuan Ch'i-jui had been installed in Peking, the Kuominchün, or National Army, movement had grown apace.¹ In the spring of 1925, an indeterminate territory between the domains of Wu Pei-fu, who still held the central provinces, and of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, was controlled by three or four independent "national" armies, whose commanders, in seeking to maintain their independence of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, the great militarists and *protégés* of the imperialist Powers, were naturally drawn towards Kuomintang, and towards the Soviet Union, both by ideological sympathies and by need of practical support. The most important of these armies were the first Kuominchün under Feng Yü-hsiang, based on the north-western provinces, the second under Hu Ching-yi, which held Honan, and the third under Sun Yueh, stationed in Chihli. The Kuominchün armies at the height of their strength amounted to some 300,000 men; but only the first army under Feng Yü-hsiang was thoroughly organized. The Kuominchün movement had no unified organization, and no formal political platform; in the words of a Soviet commentator they "do not stand firmly on the platform of Kuomintang, but in the objective march of events they form a common front with the revolutionary movement".² The Kuominchün leaders were sometimes spoken of in communist circles as "Left militarists".³ But the realities were more complex. Though the lower, and even many of the higher, officers in the Kuominchün armies were of humble, often of peasant, origin, they had become imbued with the traditions and habits of Chinese militarism; and their "popular" or "national" leanings were intermittent. The Kuominchün generals, though eager to assert their power against the great war-lords, were by inclination opposed to social and political innovation. Feng Yü-hsiang alone had an acuter perception of likely sources of support, and was impelled by interest rather than by conviction to proclaim "Leftist" affiliations. But he was sensitive to any attempt to conduct political propaganda in his own army, and is said to have closed a military intelligence school attached to his army for fear that it would become "a

¹ See pp. 711-712 above.

² *Novyi Vostok*, x-xi (1925), p. xlviii; for a balanced account of these armies see *Bol'shevik*, No. 4, February 28, 1926, pp. 54-57.

³ M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 403.

birthplace of propagandists".¹ None of the Kuominchün armies effectively cultivated popular support in the territories ruled by them. In the winter of 1925-1926, Wu Pei-fu was actually able to utilize the peasant "Red Spears" against the second Kuominchün in Honan, the commander of which had attempted to suppress peasant organizations.²

In spite of Borodin's inconclusive experience with Feng Yü-hsiang in the winter of 1924-1925, the Kuominchün movement continued to attract the close attention and interest of the Soviet Government. Early in April 1925 a Soviet military mission, comparable in composition to that attached to Borodin, arrived in Peking, headed by an officer who can be identified only by the Chinese form of his name as Jen Te-chiang.³ The original intention was to despatch the mission in the first place to the second Kuominchün in Honan, at that time apparently the largest and most active of these units. But the inopportune death of its commander, Hu Ching-yi, on April 10, 1925, and uncertainty about his successor, caused a change of plan; and ten days later the mission arrived at Feng Yü-hsiang's headquarters in Kalgan. About the same time a substantial consignment of arms and ammunition was reported to have arrived in Kalgan from the Soviet Union.⁴ Borodin had come from Canton to take part in the initial discussions with Feng, nominally as representative of the Canton Government; Jen Te-chiang's mission was formally

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 365-366 (a brief but convincing analysis). The Politburo commission in its report of March 1926 (see p. 769 below), referring to these armies, recommended "general political-educational and organizational work (Kuomintang, Communist Party) in order to transform them into a real bulwark of the national-revolutionary movement, independent of personal influences".

² *Ibid.* p. 519, note 69; *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (62), October 8, 1926, p. 19. For the Red Spears see p. 723 above.

³ Information about this mission is derived exclusively from the Chinese originals, or Chinese versions of missing Russian originals, of documents seized in 1927, and from Feng Yü-hsiang's diaries published in 1930 and his autobiography published in 1944 (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 321-323, 336-359). All details recorded from these sources are open to question; but the main outline of what happened can probably be accepted as reliable.

⁴ See a circumstantial report dated May 5, 1925, in *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), May 16, 1925, pp. 299-300; foreigners were said to have been kept off the road from Ulan-Bator to Kalgan while the consignment went through.

responsible to Frunze, People's Commissar for War, and to Karakhan, Soviet Ambassador in Peking. After the initial discussions, Borodin took his departure.¹ Later in the year Jen Te-chiang returned to the Soviet Union, apparently as the result of a quarrel with Feng Yü-hsiang; and his place was taken by a Soviet adviser using the name of Henry A. Lin. But Feng's refusal to receive a Soviet political adviser prevented Lin from exercising at Kalgan the same functions of general political supervision as Borodin performed at Canton.

The main embarrassment confronting the Soviet group was uncertainty about Feng Yü-hsiang's character and intentions. He refused to join Kuomintang; and his professions of loyalty to the national movement rang hollow. He was eager to receive Soviet military aid, and to welcome the presence of Soviet military advisers: these were well treated, and were allowed to wear Chinese uniform as an integral part of the Kuominchün forces. On the other hand he showed reluctance to accept a Soviet political adviser, and evaded any political commitments. It was noted that he remained on friendly terms with "American missionaries", and that a Japanese official described as an "adviser" also appeared openly in Kalgan.² Much argument evidently turned on the admission of emissaries of Kuomintang to conduct propaganda in the army and in the area controlled by it. This was stubbornly resisted by Feng; but his resistance was eventually overcome. After the May 30 movement in Shanghai, Kuomintang agents, who were also as a rule members of the CCP, were active in the Kuominchün armies and among the peasants of these regions. Relations at this time between Feng Yü-hsiang, on the one hand, and the complex represented by Kuomintang,

¹ The Japanese press later reported an alleged secret agreement signed in Peking by Borodin and Feng Yü-hsiang on March 11, 1925, providing *inter alia* for a monthly subsidy to Feng of 100,000 gold rubles (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 3, 1925, p. 714); it is not clear why such an agreement, if it existed, should have been signed by Borodin.

² Another report referred to "the infiltration of Japanese capital" into the territories under Feng's control, and the establishment of a branch of the Sino-Japanese Bank at Kalgan; this "affected the Kuominchün's policies" (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 366). A little later, Feng was reported to be sending 15 Chinese officers for training in the military academy in Tokyo (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), September 10, 1925, p. 309).

the CCP and Soviet military power, on the other, present a picture of continuous and extensive cooperation tempered by keen mutual mistrust. In a puzzled report to Frunze of May 1925, Jen Te-chiang cogently argued that the basic questions "whether Feng is actually our comrade in the national liberation movement, how much he can be trusted, and whether he is an irreconcilable enemy of Chang and will fight him to the end" must be solved "before we begin our work."¹ Unfortunately it was compatible neither with Feng's situation nor with his character to return a clear-cut answer to such questions.

While all China was in ferment, Peking remained throughout 1925 an oasis of stagnation; president and government continued to exercise formal functions completely divorced from the realities of power. It was in these conditions that the Sino-Soviet conference provided for in the treaty of May 31, 1924, was at last opened on August 26, 1925;² but, since Karakhan was on the eve of departure on a visit to Moscow, it was readily agreed to adjourn the business proceedings of the conference till his return. When Karakhan, after two years' uninterrupted residence in Peking, left for Moscow on August 27, 1925, Chinese affairs, though still in the highest degree unstable and confused, had taken a turn not unfavourable to Soviet hopes, and provided a welcome counterweight to the decline of Soviet security and prestige in Europe. The alliance with Kuomintang had given the Soviet authorities a firm foothold in southern China; the May 30 movement in Shanghai had revealed a strong potential core of resistance to foreign imperialism, and of sympathy for the Soviet Union, in the new proletariat of China's rapidly developing industries. No immediate revolutionary prospects were believed to exist either in Canton or in Shanghai. But a solid foundation of Soviet friendship and influence seemed to have been laid for the future. In northern China, a military power had appeared for the first time, in the form of the Kuominchün movement,

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 338; for a foreign estimate of Soviet attempts at this time to bolster up Feng's position against Chang see *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), June 6, 1925, pp. 4-5.

² *China Year Book, 1926-7* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 1098-1099.

which was independent both of Great Britain and the United States and of Japan, and was therefore potentially friendly to the Soviet Union and hostile to the imperialist Powers. The course which now presented itself was to woo this new power, and to link it with the existing base of Soviet influence in the south — Kuomintang and the nationalist government. Since the decline of Wu Pei-fu's authority in central China, the most serious obstacle to the spread of Soviet influence in China, and to the realization of Soviet designs, was the power of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria; Chang's strong arm dominated the precarious and fluctuating situation in and around Peking, and made itself felt as far south as Shanghai.¹ This now seemed the vulnerable point in Soviet policy towards China.

(c) *The Forces of Reaction*

The next stage in the revolutionary movement in China — the driving of a wedge between the national and social aspects of the revolution, and the loosening of relations between Kuomintang and communism (whether in the form of the structural link with the CCP or of the alliance with Moscow) — was set in motion primarily by developments in Shanghai. In the wave of enthusiasm generated by the May 30 movement, the central committees of the CCP and the youth league issued on July 10, 1925, a manifesto denouncing the Chinese bourgeoisie — and by implication the Right wing of Kuomintang — for treason to the cause of the national revolution.² The charge, though perhaps premature, was not altogether unfounded. By August 1925 the May 30 movement in Shanghai had passed its peak, and the wave of strikes began to ebb.³ The decisive moment occurred when the strikes, fostered by the trade union council and the CCP, spread from the many foreign to the few Chinese-owned factories. This antagonized the Chinese bourgeoisie, divided Kuomintang and even led to "a certain split among the students"; and no attempt

¹ See p. 739 below.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 91.

³ *Kommunisticheskii International*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 87, put the "culminating point" of movement in "the last days of July and the beginning of August".

was apparently made to bring the peasantry into the movement.¹ The visit of a Soviet trade union delegation to Shanghai and Canton in August–September 1925² fanned the enthusiasm of the extremists for the Soviet union, but did not arrest the decline of the movement as a whole. The Chinese — no less than the foreign — merchants and industrialists had been alienated; and further provocation by the Left might invite military intervention by one of the war-lords. It was at this juncture that Comintern headquarters in Moscow took alarm, and decided to apply a restraining hand.³ The moment was one when Comintern was turning everywhere against the “ultra-Left” and against revolutionary projects of direct action.⁴ The situation in Shanghai was fitted into this pattern; while the “backward” section of the workers were ready to return to the factories on any terms, “Left tendencies” revealed themselves in an eagerness to “force events”, to “seek a ‘noble’, a ‘revolutionary’ way out from an intolerable and complex situation”. These ultra-Left counsels of despair could have led only to disaster, and had to be counteracted by firm guidance.⁵ This episode was recalled by Zinoviev at the fourteenth Russian party congress in December 1925:

There was a time when the Chinese Communist Party, which has recently grown up and now plays a big rôle in the movement, was confronted by the question to what further goal it should lead the revolutionary masses. The Chinese party received a directive proposing a certain putting on of brakes. There were moments when the young Chinese Communist Party and the leaders of the Shanghai trade unions put forward a thesis in favour of sharpening the conflict to the point of armed insurrection. . . . Comintern gave a directive

¹ *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 7-12.

² For the report of Lepse, the leader of the delegation, see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 143, October 20, 1925, pp. 2098-2099; it left for Japan in the middle of September (see p. 891 below).

³ It is reasonable to guess that the decision was taken on advice from Borodin, who may have been subject to pressure from Kuomintang; but no evidence has come to light on this point.

⁴ See p. 290 above; for the situation in regard to Morocco, which was frequently bracketed at this time with China, see pp. 353-355 above.

⁵ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, pp. 88-89; that this article (which mentions the intervention of the CCP, but not of Comintern) represents the diagnosis on which Comintern acted is shown by the repetition of several phrases from it in Zinoviev's speech (see following note).

against these moods, recommending the party to execute a gradual putting on of brakes. We said that the issue was not at this moment, when the chances of success were very small, to carry the movement to the point of armed insurrection, but rather to retreat in good time in order that the movement might gain time, in order that the experience of the movement might begin to be digested by the proletariat, no longer by hundreds of thousands, but by millions, of the masses of the people.¹

Thus schooled, the CCP sounded a retreat, which was frankly justified by a cautious desire not to antagonize the petty bourgeoisie and to risk smashing the labour movement: the workers were encouraged to restrict their agitation to minimum economic demands, and put the revolutionary programme in cold storage.² By this time the ebb had set in. A report of August 30, 1925, from the Shanghai General Labour Union to the Soviet trade unions described the revolutionary elements in China as consisting of workers and peasants and a section of the students and small traders. But it admitted that "the strike of traders ended in failure" and that "the student movement is dying away".³ The army made tentative attempts to suppress some of the trade unions and the "joint committee" for the struggle against imperialism. The Chinese railway workers' union protested to Profintern and to the Transport Workers' International against "a cruel blood-bath in Shanghai" on September 7, 1925.⁴ Finally, on September 18, 1925, on the orders of Chang Tso-lin, troops intervened actively against the workers, broke up the General Labour Union instituted after May 30 or drove it underground, and arrested Li Li-san.⁵

¹ XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B) (1926), pp. 651-652.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 91-92.

³ *Mezhdunarodnaya Solidarnost' Trudyashchikhsya, 1924-1927* (1959), pp. 125-127; the letter does not appear to have been published at the time.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 135, September 25, 1925, p. 1978.

⁵ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 324; the account in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, pp. 89-90, did not mention the arrest of Li Li-san and claimed, not very plausibly, that the coup did not affect the movement. An appeal by the central council of Profintern to the workers of the world on behalf of the Chinese proletariat accused Chang Tso-lin of having acted as "the hireling of foreign imperialism" and "evidently not without the agreement of the Peking government" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 136, September 29, 1925, pp. 1988-1989).

The May 30 movement in Shanghai raised in their sharpest form the social issues which divided Kuomintang, and which excited the continued hostility of its Right wing to the alliance with the CCP. Much attention was attracted at this time in Kuomintang circles by the publication of a series of pamphlets by Tai Chi-t'ao, a leading Kuomintang theorist and former member of the CCP.¹ Tai Chi-t'ao applied Marxist terminology to the liberation of oppressed nations, but emptied it of its social content: the national revolution became the only real revolution. Sun Yat-sen's three principles were the one doctrine, and Kuomintang the one party, necessary for salvation. Tai supported the alliance with the Soviet Union, and even with the CCP as a separate organization. But, if communists did not accept the national revolution as the real objective, they were not loyal to the principles of Sun Yat-sen and had no place within Kuomintang. What Tai proposed was, in effect, the expulsion of communists from Kuomintang preparatory to the conclusion of an "external" alliance between the two parties. This campaign was important, both because it voiced the wishes of a large part of the members of Kuomintang, and because Tai Chi-t'ao was known as a friend of Chiang Kai-shek, whose devotion throughout this period to the task of strengthening his personal position and his control of the army encouraged him to refrain from showing his hand politically. Tai Chi-t'ao crystallized the opinion of the Right wing in Kuomintang, which desired to pursue nationalist aims without becoming involved in radical social policies, and therefore resented the entangling alliance with the CCP. It was significant that, at the time these essays were written, Tai Chi-t'ao was working at Kuomintang headquarters in Shanghai: outside Canton the Kuomintang-CCP alliance made little sense for either party. In an open letter of August 30, 1925, published in the CCP journal on September 18, 1925, Ch'en Tu-hsiu warned Tai Chi-t'ao that his writings could only serve the purposes of the

¹ The first of those publications appeared in July 1925 under the title *The National Revolution and the Kuomintang of China (Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China)*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 206; Tai Chi-t'ao is said to have been one of the original members of the CCP, but to have left it almost at once "under the pressure of a stinging rebuke from Sun Yat-sen", and "later became the chief bourgeois ideologist of the Kuomintang" (H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 60).

reactionaries. They remained for some time a significant index of the deep-rooted divisions in Kuomintang and of their exacerbation by the events of the summer of 1925.¹

At the beginning of October 1925 a session of the enlarged central committee of the CCP was held in Peking in an uneasy atmosphere. Exactly what passed remains in part conjectural. Evidently nobody liked the party's existing relation to Kuomintang, or believed that it could continue for long. Opinion was divided between those who wished to withdraw at once, and those who proposed to make preparations for withdrawal at some indefinite date in the future; but perhaps nobody seriously thought the break possible in existing conditions. The influence of Comintern would certainly have been exercised against any action pointing to a rift in the alliance. The resolution of the committee on this question does not appear to have been published. But it probably did little more than illustrate the dissatisfaction endemic in the CCP at the dependent rôle assigned to it in the grand alliance between Kuomintang and Moscow.² Other

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 207. The CCP delegate in his report to the seventh enlarged IKKI in Moscow in November 1926 called Tai Chi-t'ao "the initiator of the March action [of 1926], whereas Chiang Kai-shek acted merely as his tool", and discussed Tai's theories in detail (*Puti Mirovoi Revolyutsii* (1927), i, 405-406); a resolution was passed recommending "a systematic and determined struggle with the Right wing of Kuomintang and with the ideology of Tai Chi-t'ao" (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 677). Ch'en Tu-hsiu in his open letter of December 10, 1929 (see p. 698 note 2 above), described Tai's pamphlets as "not accidental, but an indication that the bourgeoisie was attempting to strengthen its power, for the purpose of curbing the proletariat and going over to counter-revolution"; the *coup* of March 1926 (see pp. 778-779 below) was "made to carry out Tai's principles".

² The first summary account of the proceedings merely recorded a decision "to maintain a close connexion with the Left wing [of Kuomintang] and at the same time to wage an energetic fight against the Right wing of this party, which has become part of a reactionary grouping" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 145, October 23, 1925, p. 2156). According to the official report to the sixth enlarged IKKI in Moscow in February 1926, the committee "decided everywhere to carry out a clear organizational division between the CCP and Kuomintang, and defined the relations of the party to Kuomintang as a political bloc instead of a close alliance, as hitherto" (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 334-335); if the decision taken was as definite as this, it was judiciously blurred in later accounts. The next session of the enlarged central committee of the CCP in July 1926 summarized the decisions of October 1925 as being to "stay within Kuomintang and oppose the Right, but avoid taking the place of the Left ourselves" and to "try to achieve more political independence for our own party", but cautiously added that "we still recognized the development

resolutions adopted at the session once more enjoined the CCP "to set up a platform on the basis of which the working class and its allies — the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie of the towns, and the revolutionary intelligentsia — can advance on the road to the establishment of national revolutionary power, on the way to the unity of all China, to the struggle for the independence of the country against the imperialists"; to transform the CCP into a mass party; and to recognize the importance of work among the peasants.¹ The peasant commission set up during the session, greatly daring, registered the view that "it is time for the party to begin to popularize the idea of the confiscation of the land"; but the central committee itself in plenary session was

of Kuomintang and our participation in directing Kuomintang's work as prerequisites to a victorious Chinese revolution" (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 279). According to the account given by Ch'en Tu-hsiu at the fifth congress of the CCP in April 1927, the resolution proposed by him (he admitted it to have been an error), and adopted by the enlarged central committee in October 1925, declared that the CCP should struggle against the theories of Tai Chi-t'ao, unite with the Kuomintang Left in order to resist the Right, and at the same time prepare for the separation of Kuomintang from the party, this cryptic phrase being evidently designed to suggest that the responsibility for the split would rest on Kuomintang (*Bol'shevik*, No. 23-24, December 31, 1927, pp. 100-101 — a summary of Ch'en's report by a hostile critic, later reprinted in P. Mif, *Kitaishkaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Kriticheskie Dni* (1928); the much briefer summary in *Pravda*, May 15, 1927, avoids the contentious issues). In his open letter of December 10, 1929 (see p. 698, note 2 above), Ch'en claimed that in October 1925 he was in favour of immediate withdrawal, but was overruled by the Comintern representative (according to the paraphrase of Ch'en's letter in *Byulleten' Opozitsii* (Paris), No. 15-16, September-October 1930, p. 20, the representative was Borodin). This is the only mention of the presence of a Comintern representative and may conceivably relate to something that happened behind the scenes; but these belated attempts at self-justification can seldom be relied on. The document translated in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 234-237, and conjecturally assigned by the editors to this session, though probably authentic, reads more like theses submitted on this or some other occasion than like a finished resolution; it does not propose withdrawal from Kuomintang, but suggests that, unless absolutely necessary, "new members of the CCP should not join it or engage in its work".

¹ The only authentic record of these resolutions consists of long extracts (no doubt, carefully selected) read from them at the eighth enlarged IKKI in Moscow in May 1927 (*Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), pp. 49-50). See also *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 100-103, 122-124, for undated resolutions on party organization and party propaganda conjecturally assigned by the editors to the session of October 1925.

unwilling to go beyond the negative conclusion that the partial demands now being put forward on behalf of the peasants were insufficient "effectively to draw the peasantry on to the side of the revolution and make it a bulwark of revolutionary-democratic power".¹ At the end of the session, on October 10, 1925, the central committee issued a "letter to the peasantry", in which it denounced the ambivalent attitude of the nationalist government to the peasants of the Kwantung province, and invited the peasants to struggle, with communist support, for the formation of peasant unions and armed units for self-defence.² A "peasant section" of the party central committee was created, and a Kuomintang Peasant Training Institute for Propagandists established in Canton.³ Mao Tse-tung was put in charge of this work.⁴ It was significant that disappointment with the apparent collapse of the workers' movement in Shanghai should have been followed by increased emphasis on the rôle of the peasant; this also fitted in with current attitudes in Moscow.

But much of the attention of the committee was devoted to a totally different topic which, meeting in Peking, it was under no temptation to ignore: the military situation in northern and central China. Throughout the summer of 1925 Feng Yü-hsiang managed to hold the balance between his increasingly close relations with Kuomintang and with the Soviet Union and his alliance with Chang Tso-lin in Mukden and with Chang's nominee, Tuan Ch'i-jui, in Peking. The precarious balance was upset by the intervention of Chang Tso-lin's troops in Shanghai which had finally crushed the strikes and brought the May 30 movement to an orderly end.⁵ This action, whether prompted by Chang's Japanese patrons or by his own fears of a spread of the May 30 movement to the north, seemed to range him, not only against the Chinese communists, but against Kuomintang and the Soviet Union, on the side of the imperialist Powers. It faced Feng

¹ *Kommunistischesii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 94; the passages cited do not appear to be direct quotations.

² A. Ivin, *Krasnye Piki* (2nd ed. 1927), pp. 135-142; this is presumably the letter listed from a Chinese source in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 569, and there dated October 10, 1925.

³ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 335.

⁴ E. Snow, *Red Star Over China* (1937), p. 157.

⁵ See p. 739 above.

Yü-hsiang, under constant Soviet and Kuomintang pressure to declare himself, with a difficult choice. He could no longer afford to dispense with Soviet aid. Already in June or July 1925 he is said to have sent a telegram to Chang Tso-lin "in connexion with the Shanghai events", which was interpreted as a move against Chang and won him the congratulations of Karakhan.¹ In the middle of October 1925 a delegation from Feng Yü-hsiang, consisting of his chief of staff and other officers, arrived in Moscow and was received with suitable honours, Feng himself being described as "commander-in-chief of the Chinese national armies". The delegation — perhaps significantly — visited Sokolnikov, the People's Commissar for Finance, and "had a conversation with him on financial questions".² But Feng, with characteristic indecision and cunning, refused to come out openly against Chang Tso-lin, and preferred to intrigue behind the scenes with subordinate generals who were known to be preparing a revolt against him.³

The impending outbreak of hostilities against Chang Tso-lin was common knowledge when the enlarged central committee of the CCP met at the beginning of October 1925. The committee in its "political theses" treated the rise of the Kuominchün armies and the impending war against Chang Tso-lin as symptoms of a sharpening of the contradiction between the imperialist Powers, and noted hopefully that these armies were "drawing towards the national-revolutionary movement as that movement develops and deepens". The task of Kuomintang and of the CCP was "to drive them along the line of the national-revolu-

¹ See an alleged letter of Karakhan of July 11, 1925, in N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Tientsin, n.d. [1927]), p. 158.

² *Pravda*, October 17, 1925; the report was accompanied by a photograph of Feng, said to have been given by him to a correspondent of *Pravda* in Kalgan for presentation to Ulyanova, Lenin's sister.

³ According to the source translated in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 352, Feng had been in contact with the two most important of these generals, Sun Ch'uan-fang and Kuo Sung-lin, though, when the former went into action, it took Feng by surprise. Another source reported that Feng came out on the side of the national movement and "denounced the imperialists and their hangers-on" at a time when the commanders of the second and third Kuominchün showed more caution and restraint (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 101); but this was written at a moment when high hopes of Feng were still entertained in Moscow.

tionary movement without regard to the contradictions that may arise from time to time between the Kuominchün armies and the workers' movement in the country".¹ The committee issued a rhetorical appeal to "workers, peasants, students and soldiers", attacking Chang Tso-lin and "all his Mukden clique" as "hirelings of the imperialists". The Kuominchün armies were said to enjoy the support of the working masses. But the leaders of these armies must "form a genuine common front against the enemy" and "announce to the people their political programme". What was needed was a national revolutionary government to "complete the revolution of 1911". The defeat of the Mukden imperialists should be followed by the summoning of an All-China National Assembly. It was, all in all, a nationalist, and not a communist, pronouncement, and carried no hint of a break with Kuomintang.² The struggle against the imperialists, of whom Chang Tso-lin now seemed the most powerful and most conspicuous Chinese adjutant, still took precedence over all other aspects of Chinese policy in the calculations of Moscow.

The first open move was made by Sun Ch'uan-fang, who on October 14, 1925, declaring his independence of Chang Tso-lin, took over without difficulty the garrisons in Shanghai and Nanking and then, with the approval of Wu Pei-fu, moved into Hankow. On October 20, 1925, the central committees of the CCP and of the Communist Youth League published a joint "manifesto on the anti-Mukden war" demanding mass support for the war against Chang Tso-lin in order to transform it into a war of national liberation; and Kuomintang issued a similar proclamation supporting the Kuominchün forces and denouncing Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Ch'i-jui. A few days later Kuo Sung-lin — perhaps not without Soviet encouragement — defected from Chang and announced his allegiance to Feng.³ Thus goaded into taking a

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 90-93; the text of the resolution has not been published, and the phrases cited do not appear to be textual quotations.

² The quotations are from *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 13-14; the full text has not been available.

³ An alleged report of the Soviet military attaché in Peking (N. Mitarevsky, *World Wide Soviet Plots* (Peking, n.d. [1927]), p. 31) refers to "our successful

public stand, Feng Yü-hsiang at length, on October 25, 1925, sent out a circular telegram to all concerned calling for Chang's retirement.¹ The immediate effect of this move was to win for Feng the lasting enmity of Chang Tso-lin as well as of Wu Pei-fu, both of whom he had deserted in turn,² and to complete his own dependence on the Soviet Government — henceforth his one potential paymaster and source of supplies. But the attitude of Moscow was also not free from desire to make the best of both worlds. At a meeting of the "Hands off China" society in Moscow on November 11, 1925, Hu Han-min, having denounced Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin as "enemies of the revolution and oppressors of the working class", spoke with equal mistrust of Feng Yü-hsiang, "our friend today", since "we do not know what he will be tomorrow".³ Three days later Karakhan left Moscow to return to Peking. On November 25, 1925, he halted in Mukden and was received by Chang Tso-lin, though he was careful in a press interview to disclaim any political significance for the visit, and spoke only of Soviet friendship with Japan.⁴ Meanwhile Feng Yü-hsiang's position became increasingly equivocal. On November 28, 1925, a large-scale demonstration was held in Peking. It was said to have been organized by Left-wing leaders of Kuomintang: and its purpose was to overthrow the rule of Tuan Ch'i-jui and to substitute a system of government by committee — here, as in Canton, conceived as the Chinese equivalent of Soviets. The press in Moscow announced the

negotiations with Kuo Sung-lin", and proves, if authentic, that Kuo's defection had been encouraged by Soviet agents; according to another document from the same source, Feng Yü-hsiang "discussed the movement of Kuo Sung-lin" with his Soviet adviser ten days before it occurred (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 352); for the manifesto of October 20, 1925, see *ibid.* p. 25, note 93. *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 15, depicts Kuo as simply a mutinous general ambitious to replace Chang; but this judgment was passed after his downfall.

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 325.

² According to K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 315, Wu Pei-fu seized this moment to telegraph to Chang Tso-lin what was in effect an offer of reconciliation in face of the new common enemy; the English-language press indulged in some wishful speculation on a probable "come-back" by Wu Pei-fu (*China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), November 14, 1925, p. 252; November 28, 1925, pp. 315-316).

³ *Pravda*, November 13, 1925.

⁴ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 3, 1925, p. 717.

collapse of the Peking government and the retirement of Tuan Ch'i-jui, pending some indication of "the intentions of Feng Yü-hsiang".¹ Pressing appeals to Feng from many quarters were, however, unavailing. After some minor destruction of property, the troops at Tuan Ch'i-jui's disposal sufficed to restore order. While both the CCP and Kuomintang issued manifestos applauding the rising and demanding the overthrow of Tuan, Feng at first took refuge in neutrality, and then came out in support of Tuan. The final result of this ill-conceived and ill-planned affair was to strengthen the position of Tuan Ch'i-jui, and of his patron Chang Tso-lin, and to damage Feng Yü-hsiang's prestige; if Feng seriously aimed at power, it was incumbent on him either to prevent the rising or to ensure its success.² The failure of the Peking demonstration led to a renewed campaign against the communists and against Karakhan, who was suspected, though without evidence, of having instigated the rising in an attempt to "Bolshevize China".

For some weeks the "anti-Mukden" war pursued a chequered course. Early in December 1925 Chang Tso-lin had his back to the wall and was driven by the insurgents from his capital. The news was hailed with delight in Moscow. "The Mukden adventurer", declared *Pravda*, had ended his career; and Radek diagnosed Chang's downfall as "the beginning of the complete defeat of Japan in the Far East".³ Karakhan, undeterred by his recent visit to Mukden, gave an interview in the Japanese press expressing satisfaction at the downfall of "the leader of a corrupt

¹ *Pravda*, December 2, 1925.

² K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), pp. 218-219; Voitinsky in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 34, March 2, 1926, p. 472; T'ang Sheng-chih, *ibid.* No. 17, January 22, 1926, p. 237. For evidence of Feng Yü-hsiang's attitude see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 326-327; both Voitinsky and T'ang Sheng-chih blamed Feng Yü-hsiang's "hesitation" and "too cautious attitude" in failing to support nationalist demands for the eviction of Tuan Ch'i-jui. In a further article Voitinsky weakly defended Feng for postponing the overthrow of Tuan Ch'i-jui and the announcement of a political programme until he had defeated Chang, but admitted that his attitude had been interpreted by the imperialists as "a cunning political move", and had spread dismay among his supporters (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (53), April 1926, pp. 19-21).

³ *Pravda*, December 8, 1925; *Izvestiya*, December 9, 10, 1925; an article in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 12 (49), December 1925, p. 28, spoke of "the collapse of the 'Mukden' counter-revolutionary clique".

military party" and enemy of Soviet-Japanese friendship; he also denied that any special relations existed between the Soviet Government and Feng Yü-hsiang.¹ But these premature celebrations were quickly followed by reports, which proved well-founded, of the despatch of Japanese reinforcements to Mukden.² An equally sharp reversal of fortune occurred elsewhere. On December 22, 1925, Kuominchün forces, after an engagement in which Soviet military advisers participated, occupied Tientsin.³ But two days later Kuo Sung-ling suffered defeat at the hands of a Mukden army, and was himself captured and executed. Japanese power had intervened in the nick of time to ward off the threat to Chang's unstable régime. Feng Yü-hsiang, more than ever unwilling to commit himself in these hazardous waters, provisionally handed over the command of the first Kuominchün army to a subordinate general, and withdrew from the scene to the remote western province of Suiyuan.⁴

At the end of 1925 such attention as was paid in Moscow to the affairs of China was concentrated on the puzzling and potentially disquieting situation in the north, where Chang Tso-lin's authority constituted a threat to Soviet interests in Manchuria and an embarrassment to Soviet-Japanese relations. No great anxiety was felt about the situation in Canton, where the strike against Hong Kong was still effectively prosecuted, no new developments were in prospect, and even the endemic friction between Kuomintang and the CCP seemed to follow a predictable course. When Karakhan arrived in Moscow early in September 1925, he spoke in a press interview of the split in Kuomintang under pressure of recent events, but complacently observed that "the splitting off of Right elements" was proceeding "at a very rapid tempo".⁵

¹ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 17, 1925, p. 793; Stalin in his speech to the fourteenth Russian party congress on December 18, 1925 (see p. 881 below) also assumed the defeat of Chang Tso-lin.

² *Izvestiya*, December 12, 13, 1925; according to one account "Japanese soldiers poured into Chang Tso-lin's army" (*Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 16).

³ *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, December 24, 1925.

⁴ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 328.

⁵ *Izvestiya*, September 10, 1925.

The journal of Comintern found a simple criterion for the policy of the CCP :

The policy of the USSR has already converted the first stage of the proletarian dictatorship into a political ally of the Chinese liberation movement by giving to China powerful support in her struggle. The CCP should accordingly strive to take eventual account of the position of the USSR by bringing its tactics into line with the tactics of the RKP.

And this led up to a defence of the participation of the CCP in Kuomintang and in its "directing organs" and of the formation of "a single national democratic army".¹ But these hopes were based on a certain wilful blindness to the strength of other forces. Throughout the autumn of 1925, the Right wing of Kuomintang, which disliked the association with the CCP, became increasingly belligerent. It was an ominous sign when the cadets of the Whampoa academy split into two sharply opposed factions — one calling itself the Sun Yat-sen Society and purporting to defend the true principles of Kuomintang against communist infiltration and subversion, the other the League of Military Youth, which united members of the CCP and their sympathizers of the Kuomintang Left. Open clashes occurred between the two groups; and an occasion was remembered on which Chiang Kai-shek, at a banquet in October 1925, "pounded the table and scolded them" for their quarrels.² Nor was the trouble confined to hot-headed young men. On November 23, 1925, 15 Right-wing dissidents — all of them said to be members either of the central executive committee or of the central supervisory committee of Kuomintang — met at Sun Yat-sen's tomb in the Western Hills outside Peking, declared themselves a properly constituted quorum of the central executive committee, and proceeded to take decisions in its name; Tai Chi-t'ao was among their number. On the day of its meeting, the conference issued a proclamation annulling the membership of all communists in Kuomintang, but declaring that, so long as

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 12 (49), December 1925, pp. 30-31.

² H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), pp. 90-91, quoting Li Chih-lung's pamphlet (see p. 779, note 1 below); according to T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), pp. 213-214, "the conflict was carried over to the different armies". F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 22-23, describes the friction, but dates it too late.

the Soviet Union pursued an anti-imperialist policy, cooperation with it in the common interests of the revolution was possible.¹ Two days later, a counter-statement was drawn up, apparently by the Peking committee of the CCP. It denounced the growth of anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda, the seizure of the Peking headquarters of Kuomintang by the dissidents, and the popularity of "Taichit'aoism" as evidence of the growing power of the reactionaries. This was concentrated in the north, where "strong and organized proletarian masses" were lacking: Peking was "the national centre of political reaction". The struggle in Kuomintang was not a struggle between communism and anti-communism, but between revolution and counter-revolution. Communists in Kuomintang were called on to support the Left against the Right, and so create "a strong Left wing of the broad masses in alliance with the communists".² The Western Hills conference, which lasted till December 5, 1925, passed during its concluding stages a series of drastic resolutions, expelling the CCP members and candidate members of the central executive committee, terminating Borodin's contract as adviser to Kuomintang, dissolving the political council, and depriving Wang Ching-wei of membership of Kuomintang for six months. Meanwhile, the central executive committee of Kuomintang in Canton, on December 12, 1925, issued a circular addressed to all members of Kuomintang denouncing the leaders of the Western Hills conference, and summoning a second national congress of Kuomintang to meet in Canton in January 1926.³ Chiang Kai-shek had just consolidated both his military power in Kwantung and his personal authority over the other Kuomintang leaders, and was still grateful for the loyal support which had enabled him to achieve these results. At a banquet held on December 11, 1925,

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 210.

² *Ibid.* pp. 238-244; if the date on the document — November 25, 1925 — is correct, its conjectural attribution to the Peking committee must also be correct, since there could have been no time to consult Shanghai or Canton. No evidence is forthcoming that the statement was published; but the party journal *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* of December 3, 1925, carried an article by Ch'en Tu-hsiu entitled "What are the Right and Left Wings of Kuomintang?", which followed a similar line.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 211-212.

to celebrate the victory over Ch'en Ch'iung-Ming,¹ Chiang attributed it to Sun Yat-sen's wisdom in seeking the Soviet alliance, praised the rôle of the Soviet military advisers, which he oddly compared with the allied command under Foch in the first world war, and recalled a remark of Sun Yat-sen that Borodin's views coincided with his own.² On December 25, 1925, in a further circular letter denouncing the Western Hills group, he explicitly defended the policy of admitting communists, and praised Borodin and the Soviet advisers for their sincere devotion to Kuomintang.³ The whole of the Kwantung and Kwangsi provinces were now firmly held by the nationalist government, and that government was becoming more powerful and more efficient. The unleashing of the war in the north against Chang Tso-lin by the Kuominchün forces seemed in itself to constitute a fresh victory for the nationalist cause, and to bring liberation and unity nearer. The struggle, and the hopes which it engendered, eclipsed the minor frictions between Kuomintang and the CCP, and amity once more reigned. The only serious problem on the horizon was to restrain and discipline the dissidents of the Western Hills group who had openly defied the party.

The second congress of Kuomintang opened in Canton in this confident atmosphere on January 2, 1926. The total number of members of Kuomintang at this time was reported to be 400,000 including 87,000 overseas Chinese;⁴ they were represented at the congress by 256 delegates, of whom 90 were communists headed by T'an P'ing-shan and Chang Kuo-t'ao.⁵ Wang Ching-wei opened the proceedings with a political report which was a

¹ See p. 732 above.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 212; the tribute to Borodin, which appeared in the first version of the speech published in 1926, was expurgated from later versions.

³ *Ibid.* p. 214; K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 338, quotes a speech of Chiang Kai-shek at the military academy on January 6, 1926, in which he described communism as an essential part of Sun Yat-sen's three principles (what appears to be the same text is quoted in T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), pp. 232-233, where, however, it is described as an article in the journal of the academy, and dated December 5, 1925).

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 25, February 12, 1926, pp. 360-361.

⁵ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 213; for particulars of the communist fraction see *ibid.* p. 507, note 25. According to another count, out of 278 delegates, 168

factual summary of events since the previous congress of January 1924. It did not mention the CCP, and made no proposals.¹ Social issues once more proved the most delicate. During the congress, on January 6, 1926, the Kwantung provincial peasant union convened a meeting of congress delegates to discuss the peasant question. P'eng P'ai presided, and a delegate of the union gave an account of the experiences and grievances of the peasantry over the past two years. He concluded with a warning :

*There are people who say that there is no need for the peasants to fight and struggle against the landowners, that the landowners, living in peace with the peasants, can give them certain benefits. But all the Kwantung peasants, who by this time have some practical experience, will never believe this.*²

Wang Ching-wei reported at length to the congress on the peasant question, claiming a total membership of 720,000 for the Kwantung peasant union.³ His report formed the basis of a resolution which repeated in more emphatic terms the thesis of the first congress that the national revolution was "essentially a peasant revolution", and could be victorious only if it based itself on the peasantry. A list of detailed desiderata was drawn up — political, economic and educational. The armed organizations used to oppress the peasantry should be dissolved, and the peasants given the means of self-protection. Exorbitant interest should be prohibited, maximum rents fixed and organizations for mutual self-help established. One demand only was conspicuously absent from the programme : the confiscation and redistribution of land.⁴ A corresponding resolution on the industrial workers spoke of the need for Kuomintang to establish a solid base in the labour movement. It called for a government labour code, an eight-hour belonged to "the Left and communist wing", 65 to the centre and 45 to the Right : it was estimated that out of 250,000 members of Kuomintang, 150,000 belonged to "the Left wing and the communists", and that nine-tenths of the local organizations were under their combined leadership (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 8 (82), February 25, 1927, pp. 9-10).

¹ *Novyi Vostok*, xviii (n.d. [1927]), 4-26 ; full records of the congress were published in Chinese.

² The meeting is reported in *Krestyanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1926, pp. 169-173.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, xviii (n.d. [1927]), pp. 26-39.

⁴ For a Russian translation of the resolution see A. Ivin, *Krasnye Piki* (2nd ed. 1927), pp. 144-147 ; for an abbreviated English translation, T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (1928), pp. 194-195.

day, protection of labour and other provisions familiar in the labour legislation of advanced capitalist countries. Demands for the nationalization of industry or for workers' control were lacking.¹ A separate resolution dealt with the rise of the organized labour movement. Since May 30, 1925, the movement was said to have passed over from the purely economic to the political struggle. Kuomintang would seize this opportunity for revolutionary propaganda among workers by helping to develop the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and by supporting the workers against "the imperialists and their tools, the militarists, the big merchants and the *compradors*".² The failure of the congress to endorse any specifically socialist demand in agrarian or in labour policy might have seemed equivocal. But in general the resolutions marked a step towards the Left, and were hailed with satisfaction by communist observers.

In its specifically political decisions the congress spoke with a clearer and less uncertain voice. It received a telegram of greeting from the fourteenth congress of the Russian Communist Party which had just completed its session; the message, significantly omitting any reference to the CCP, greeted "the many-million people of China", and expressed the conviction that Kuomintang, provided it could consolidate the alliance of workers and peasants for the struggle, would successfully discharge "the same rôle in the east" as the Russian party had performed in Russia.³ The response apparently took the form of a telegram to the Soviet Government — in Canton the distinction between party and government had little meaning — which hailed the Soviet Union as "the vanguard and protector of oppressed nations", and promised to "carry through to the end the national revolution for the liberation of the oppressed peoples".⁴ The congress issued a manifesto declaring that the Chinese revolution was a part of the world revolution, and that its aim was the overthrow of imperialism and all its tools. It also addressed a message to the oppressed peoples of the world, proclaiming its intention to advance together with all oppressed peoples and classes to the goal of national

¹ The resolution is quoted (in a poor translation) and summarized *ibid.* pp. 196-198.

² *Ibid.* pp. 199-200.

³ XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B) (1926), pp. 579-580.

⁴ *Bol'shevik*, No. 4, February 28, 1926, pp. 58-59.

revolution, world revolution and world peace ;¹ and it addressed a separate appeal to the Japanese people expressing hope for collaboration in " the common task of overthrowing imperialism " and protesting against the action of the Japanese Government in giving military protection to Chang Tso-lin, " the enemy of our land ".² The congress reaffirmed " the policy of the dead leader in admitting the members of the CCP to Kuomintang for the common task ". Disputes should be settled by open discussion between the two parties, and nobody should be allowed to indulge in " calumny " which might " endanger the fundamental policy of concentration of the revolutionary forces ".³ Spokesmen of the CCP reaffirmed their loyalty to Kuomintang and to the national revolution.⁴ Wang Ching-wei, according to a communist source, reciprocated by declaring that " if we wish to fight against the imperialists we must not turn against the communists ", and that " if we are against the communists we cannot at the same time describe ourselves as antagonists of imperialism ".⁵ The rebels of the Western Hills group were dealt with in detail. Chou Lu and Hsieh Ch'ih, identified as leaders of the group, were expelled from Kuomintang. Tai Chi-t'ao, who was also one of the original conveners of the conference, escaped with a reprimand on the plea that he had left the conference before it reached its conclusion ; twelve other participants were threatened with expulsion if they continued to violate party discipline.⁶ These decisions suggested that the Left wing of Kuomintang, supported and encouraged by the CCP representatives, was well in the ascendant. But the elections to the central executive committee (whose number was increased from 24 to 36) and to its standing committee of nine revealed that the desire for compromise

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 213.

² *Pravda*, January 26, 1926 ; for Japanese action in Manchuria see p. 748 above.

³ T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (1928), p. 170.

⁴ The authority for the attitude of the communists is a report by Chang Kuo-t'ao in *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, February 20, 1926, cited in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 213.

⁵ *International Press Correspondence*, No. 21, March 18, 1926, p. 330.

⁶ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 214.

had not disappeared. Seven communists were elected to the central committee and three to the standing committee. Wang Ching-wei remained the president of both; Chiang Kai-shek was for the first time elected to both. Other choices were less reassuring. The election of Sun Fo to the central committee, in spite of his declared association with the Right, might be explained as a pious tribute to his father's memory; but that of Tai Chi-t'ao could be attributed only to the personal friendship of Chiang Kai-shek or to a strong desire to propitiate the Right.¹ Hu Han-min was re-elected in spite of his recent disgrace and his absence in Moscow.

The second congress of Kuomintang, viewed from Moscow, appeared to justify undiluted optimism. The congress was generally interpreted as a defeat for the Right; the number of advocates of an "equivocal and compromising position" was pronounced to be "extremely insignificant". One commentator even greeted the appearance of a Right wing in Kuomintang as "evidence of *the rising tempo of social differentiation* in Chinese public life". The congress was felt to have "strengthened the links of the party with the working class and with the broad masses of the peasantry". The CCP and Kuomintang were told that the main task for the present was "*the development and strengthening of social and labour organizations as well as propaganda and organization among the peasantry*": this may have been a cautious warning against growing pressure in Kuomintang for military action. The two parties were invited to "promote the slogan of a people's government and a national assembly", and to establish an "anti-imperialist united front" as the answer to "the counter-revolution now organizing itself and to aggressive imperialism".² Immediate revolutionary action was neither

¹ *Ibid.* According to a later source (cited *ibid.* p. 507, note 33), Tai owed his election to Chiang's support; in his diary, published in 1936, Chiang Kai-shek recorded a conversation with Sun Fo on January 11, 1926, in which he, Chiang, admitted that he would have preferred to postpone a decision on the expulsion of members of the Western Hills group (*ibid.* p. 215; see, however, p. 751 above for utterances of Chiang at this time favourable to the communists). M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Calcutta, 1946), p. 394, gives a list of the seven members of the standing committee (which he calls the Politburo), of whom only one (T'an P'ing-shan) was a communist; but this source is often unreliable in detail.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 25, February 12, 1926, pp. 360-361; *Bol'shevik*, No. 4, February 28, 1926, pp. 57-60.

expected nor demanded. But the rapidly increasing numbers of Kuomintang and the CCP, and the rising tide of revolution all over China, seemed to show that the movement was advancing on the right lines. During the weeks which followed the second congress of Kuomintang, Comintern headquarters continued to be dominated by these favourable impressions ; and the confidence felt in Moscow in the Kuomintang alliance reached its highest point. Voitinsky in an optimistic article enumerated six favourable factors in the situation in southern China : the growth of Kuomintang as a "revolutionary people's party" ; the firm territorial basis of the liberation movement in Canton and Kwantung ; the rise of national armies and their association with Kuomintang ; the growing rôle of the proletariat and of the trade unions ; the growing influence of the CCP among the industrial workers ; increasing sympathy among the workers for the Soviet Union. The key to future policy both for the CCP and for Kuomintang was a united front against imperialism.¹ The danger signals of a rift in the ranks of Kuomintang or between Kuomintang and the CCP seemed of minor significance, and were cheerfully ignored.

(d) The Two Revolutions

In the months that followed the second congress of Kuomintang in January 1926, China was on the eve of startling changes, which in the next two years would transform the face of the country and set in motion a new and unprecedented train of events. Knowledge of the sequel makes it difficult to reconstruct the mood, and explain the policies, of the Soviet Government at a time when these events were unforeseen by anyone ; and its policies inevitably appear in retrospect to have been distorted by a gross error of perspective. The sense of security inspired in Moscow in the new year of 1926 by the situation in Canton was outweighed by acute anxieties about developments in northern China. The result of the events of 1925 in China had been to sharpen the differences between the Chinese nationalist and the western imperialist camps, and to produce a greater measure of concentration in both. If the nationalist movement had strengthened itself in the south and gained new adherents in the north,

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 34, March 2, 1926, pp. 471-473.

the western imperialist Powers had also intensified their activities, and were consciously doing everything to bolster up both Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu in their opposition to the nationalist cause and to the Soviet Union. The greatest danger lay in the north : it was mainly to this point that the eyes of the Soviet leaders and of Soviet publicists were directed.¹ In Peking the Sino-Soviet conference, which had been formally opened before Karakhan's departure for Moscow in August 1925,² was resumed on December 1, 1925, after his return. But, though negotiations proceeded on such matters as mutual financial claims, the rights of Soviet nationals in Chinese territory, frontier regulations and the status of the CER,³ the discussions were quickly revealed as meaningless in the absence of any effective authority exercised by the Chinese negotiators. The position of the Kuominchün armies sandwiched between the forces of Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, and now confronted with the open hostility of the foreign Powers, was precarious. Feng Yü-hsiang's public announcement, at the beginning of January 1926, that he intended to retire from active life and make a journey to Moscow, excited widespread speculation in the foreign press,⁴ but was on the whole correctly interpreted as a confession that his challenge to the military power of Chang Tso-lin had failed. A Chinese communist observer painted a gloomy picture of Feng's predicament. He had missed his opportunities at the decisive moment in the previous autumn. In spite of his success in occupying Tientsin, his generals were quarrelling with one another, and he had become a target of the " anti-Red " campaign.⁵ The attempt to create a third force with Soviet backing in northern China as a counterweight to the Anglo-American

¹ This emphasis was apparent in a well-informed and balanced article in *Bol'shevik*, No. 4, February 28, 1926, pp. 49-63 ; an article by Voitinsky on policy in China in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (53), April 1926, pp. 5-23, probably written in January or February 1926, scarcely mentioned Canton, and obviously did not regard it as a factor of prime importance. Of 18 articles or items about China in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz* for the first three months of 1926, nine were devoted to relations with Chang Tso-lin and only two to relations with Canton.

² See p. 736 above.

³ *China Year Book, 1926-7* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 1099-1101 ; R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (N.Y. 1933), pp. 198-204.

⁴ *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), January 9, 1926, pp. 174-175 ; *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), January 14, 1926, p. 40.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 17, January 22, 1926, p. 237 ; see also p. 747, note 2 above.

protégé Wu Pei-fu and the Japanese *protégé* Chang Tso-lin had petered out.

The power of Chang Tso-lin, who from his headquarters in Mukden dominated the scene in northern China, touched the Soviet Union at one of its most vulnerable points. The status of the CER had been provisionally settled by the direct agreement with Chang Tso-lin of September 20, 1924.¹ The year 1925 was relatively quiet on this front. When Karakhan returned to Moscow from Peking early in September 1925, he told the press that the railway was technically in excellent order: "the line has not been in such a good state at any time since 1917 as it is now". On the other hand, the Soviet or former Russian nationals employed by the Chinese Government in Manchuria in the administration, in the police and in the schools attached to the railway, were almost all "hostile to the Soviet régime, white guards who try to injure the Soviet Union in any way they can".² At the beginning of 1926 acute trouble broke out as the result of a demand for payment for the transportation of Chang Tso-lin's soldiers, who had hitherto generally been carried on unlimited credit. The fact that this demand coincided with the revolt against Chang of subordinate generals enjoying Soviet encouragement or support was certainly not overlooked in Mukden. On the other hand, Soviet opinion attributed the incident to provocation from Chang Tso-lin, who, conscious of the growth of anti-Soviet feeling among the foreign Powers and willing to propitiate them, chose the moment to adopt a stiffer attitude towards Soviet claims.³ The dispute led to clashes and disturbances between the troops and railway officials. At one moment the Soviet consul in Harbin was threatened with arrest.⁴ On January 19, 1926,

¹ See p. 687 above.

² *Izvestiya*, September 8, 10, 1925. For the controversy provoked by an order of Ivanov, the general manager of the CER, of April 9, 1925, dismissing all workers or employees not possessing either Chinese or Soviet nationality, see R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931* (N.Y., 1933), p. 199; *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), May 30, 1925, p. 374.

³ Radek diagnosed the occurrence as a symptom of the sharpening of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the imperialist Powers since the May 30 incident, and thought that Great Britain was working to bring about a *rapprochement* between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu (*Pravda*, January 30, 1926).

⁴ On January 13, 1926, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Berlin asked the German Government for the help of the German consul in Harbin in resisting this threat (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 1841/419227-8).

protests against "the arbitrary actions of the Mukden military authorities" were addressed by Karakhan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking (which was notoriously helpless in the matter) and direct to Chang Tso-lin; and the Soviet consul-general at Harbin was instructed to resist any attempt by the Harbin consular corps to interfere in an issue concerning China and the Soviet Union alone.¹ The affair culminated in the arrest of Ivanov and several other Soviet officials, on January 21, 1926, by order of Chang Tso-lin. On the following day, Chicherin telegraphed to Peking a note of protest which just fell short of being an ultimatum. It demanded that "within three days order on the railway shall be completely re-established, the agreement observed and Ivanov released"; failing this, "the Soviet Government requests the Chinese Government to permit the USSR to use its own forces to secure the operation of the agreement and to defend the mutual interests of China and the USSR in the Chinese Eastern Railway".² A violent leading article in *Pravda* accused Chang Tso-lin of shooting down Chinese workers and strangling their leaders; a further article declared that, foiled in his ambitions to conquer the whole of China, he was attempting to strengthen his hold on Manchuria by ignoring the agreements with Moscow on the administration of the railway.³ This sharp reaction rather unexpectedly produced the desired effect on Chang Tso-lin, whose prompt retreat suggested that he had received a strong hint from his patrons in Tokyo not to pursue the quarrel.⁴ On January 24, 1926, the Soviet consul-general in Harbin and "the head of the central diplomatic administration in the three eastern provinces" signed an agreement providing for the release of Ivanov and all others arrested on the occasion of the incident, for the resumption of normal working on the railway and for the transportation of troops on the basis of existing agreements. Questions of responsibility and compensation were reserved for a further settlement. The announcement

¹ *Izvestiya*, January 22, 1926; *China Year Book*, 1926-7 (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 1102-1103.

² Klyuchnikov i Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika*, ii, i (1928), 336-337; it was originally published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, January 24, 1926. Karakhan communicated it on January 23, 1926, both to the Peking government and to Chang Tso-lin (*China Year Book*, 1926-7 (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 1104-1105).

³ *Pravda*, January 24, 1926.

⁴ See pp. 881-882 below.

in *Izvestiya* of this agreement added that Ivanov had already been released and that other releases were in progress.¹ That events may have proceeded less smoothly on the spot is suggested by a further note of Karakhan to the Chinese Government on January 28, 1926, requesting it to instruct the Manchurian authorities "to put an end to the insults, arrests and torture of Soviet citizens".² But for the moment victory appeared to have gone to the Soviet Government. The foreign press, chagrined by Chang Tso-lin's quick surrender to Soviet pressure, and anxious to miss no opportunity of discrediting the Soviet Union in Chinese eyes, spoke caustically of the harshness of Chicherin's ultimatum and of a return to the aggressive methods of Tsarist diplomacy. The Soviet Government showed itself sensitive to these attacks. *Pravda* wrote angrily of "idiotic fairy tales" to the effect that Chicherin's note had been an attack on China's "unrestricted sovereignty";³ and a few days later Chicherin gave a long interview to the press explaining that the only rights which the Soviet Union claimed in the CER derived from a treaty freely negotiated with the Chinese Government, that the trouble had arisen only because "enemies of the USSR" had incited local Chinese military authorities to commit illegal acts, and that Soviet solicitude for Chinese sovereignty and Chinese interests was unimpaired.⁴

The prompt termination of this incident restored the *status quo* in Manchuria, but did nothing to stabilize the uneasy balance of power on which it depended. A few days after the settlement of the Soviet quarrel with Chang Tso-lin over the CER, Borodin left Canton on a visit to the north. Accompanied by Ch'en Yu-jei, a Chinese of British West Indian birth, commonly known in the west as Eugene Chen, now employed in the foreign affairs depart-

¹ *Izvestiya*, January 27, 1926.

² *Ibid.* January 30, 1926; still more belatedly, on February 4, 1926, the executive bureau of Profintern sent out a protest to the workers of the world against Chang Tso-lin, "the Chinese Kolchak", for his attacks on the trade unions and on the CER (*Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 5, 1926, p. 24).

³ *Pravda*, January 29, 1926.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, February 5, 1926; the "Hands off China" society also issued a statement denouncing the "calumnies" of the imperialist Powers against the Soviet Union in connexion with the CER (*Pravda*, February 11, 1926).

ment of the Canton government, he travelled incognito via Tientsin to Peking.¹ Throughout northern and central China the Kuominchün forces were in a precarious position, being exposed to a joint attack from the newly cemented alliance of Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu; on February 7, 1926, the central committees of the CCP and of the Communist Youth League issued a statement on "the alliance between Wu Pei-fu and Mukden against the Kuominchün", appealing for support for the Kuominchün forces in Honan.² It may be presumed that these events were the principal topics of a conference which took place at the Soviet Embassy in Peking in the second half of February 1926. Karakhan presided; and the principal participants appear to have been Kubyak, secretary of the Far Eastern bureau of the Russian party, and Lepse, the trade union leader, who came from Moscow, Gamarnik, president of the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee of the party, who came from Khabarovsk, and Borodin, who came from Canton.³ No conclusions of the conference are on record; and it was evidently barren of achievement. It may have inspired a demonstration of workers and students which was held in Peking on February 27, 1926, to denounce the action of the British in Canton and to urge the people of Peking to resist

¹ L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 648-650; *China Year Book*, 1928 (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 1336.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 480, note 94.

³ The most circumstantial account, naming the participants, is in K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), pp. 219-220; the conference was referred to in the Japanese press (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), April 15, 1926, p. 442, where it is vaguely dated "March"). Eugene Chen told an American consular official that "Borodin went to Peking in order to meet a committee of 17 members of the Third International who had come out from Moscow in order to see what the realities of the Chinese situation actually were" (J. C. Huston, *Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang, and the Russian-Chinese Political Alliance* (typed MS in the Hoover Library, Stanford, n.d.), pp. 132-133); but the number 17 must be either a slip or an exaggeration, and Comintern is unlikely to have been concerned. The approximate date is fixed by Kubyak's subsequent journey to Shanghai and Canton: he arrived in Canton on March 13, 1926 (see p. 778 below). It was not the first such conference. A message from Khabarovsk in *Izvestiya*, April 28, 1925, records that Kubyak and Gamarnik had returned there on the previous day from a visit to Peking, "where they discussed with Karakhan matters of common interest to the Far Eastern region and to Manchuria", and to Mukden, where they had called on Chang Tso-lin: this provides further evidence of the close attention devoted by the party to the affairs of northern China.

Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.¹ The conference over, Kubyak and Lepse went on to Shanghai and Canton ; Gamarnik returned to Khabarovsk to preside at the first congress of Soviets of the newly constituted Far Eastern region which opened on March 15, 1926 ;² and Borodin proceeded to Suiyuan to seek out Feng Yü-hsiang, whose attitude was worse than equivocal. The purpose of the journey was presumably to cement relations between Feng, Kuomintang and the Soviet Government, to discuss further Soviet subsidies to the general and to galvanize him into action. The mission was a complete failure. Feng Yü-hsiang was in no mood to take the offensive, or to assume dangerous commitments to Kuomintang or to the Soviet Government, and was eager only to escape without loss of face from the impending defeat of the Kuominchün forces. On March 9, 1926, he was reported to have refused an offer from Tuan Ch'i-jui to appoint him plenipotentiary for the pacification of the provinces of Chihli, Shansi and Honan.³ The moment had come to execute the intention announced by him in January to make a pilgrimage to Moscow⁴ — the logical result of his now exclusive dependence on Soviet subsidies. On March 20, 1926, he left Chinese territory with his family and retainers, and reached Ulan-Bator on March 22, 1926.⁵

During this period, while Borodin was absent in the north, nothing occurred in southern China to portend any decisive change. The Hong Kong strike was maintained ; the rule of the nationalist government was consolidated throughout Kwantung ; in Hunan, an organized peasant movement, professing no definite political programme but using nationalist slogans, swept the countryside.⁶ Never had the alliance between the Soviet Government and Kuomintang seemed more secure or more effective. Throughout the winter of 1925-1926, Hu Han-min, whose

¹ *Pravda*, March 2, 1926 ; a poor photograph of the demonstration is reproduced in K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 369. For the British blockade of Canton, see p. 764, note 6 below.

² See Vol. 2, p. 292.

³ *Pravda*, March 11, 1926.

⁴ See p. 757 above.

⁵ *Izvestiya*, March 24, 1926 ; *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 330.

⁶ *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 1-16 ; "the development of the peasant movement in Shantung, Hunan and Kwantung provinces", wrote Radek at this time, "showed what immense reserves the national movement has" (*Pravda*, May 30, 1926).

election at the second congress to the central executive committee of Kuomintang showed him to be still in good standing in Canton, continued to enjoy the status of an honoured guest in Moscow, where he ingratiated himself by the assiduity with which he "cursed Kautsky and talked about world revolution".¹ He attended the fifth anniversary celebration of the Institute of Oriental Studies in November 1925, and was made an honorary member of its Chinese section.² In the following month he brought the greetings of Kuomintang to the fourteenth congress of the Russian party.³ On February 10, 1926, a "Chinese delegation headed by Hu Han-min" was received by representatives of Krestintern and of the International Agrarian Institute,⁴ where he was greeted as "a senior member of Kuomintang, who has given much study to the peasant question". Peasant representatives from a number of eastern countries were present and expressed the hope of bringing about "*a united peasant revolutionary front from Peking to Madras and from Madras to Constantinople and Morocco*". On February 15, 1926, a further meeting took place at which Hu Han-min was appointed a member of the presidium of the International Peasant Council — the executive organ of Krestintern. The meeting expressed the view that work among the Chinese peasantry should be extended from the southern provinces to the north, and brought into "*close contact with the peasant movement in India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Japan and Korea*" in the interest of the common "*struggle of the peasants against imperialism*".⁵

Two days later, Hu Han-min appeared, this time in military uniform, at the opening session of the sixth enlarged IKKI, being described as a member of the central committee of Kuomintang "and leader of the army of the Canton government".

¹ Radek, who took charge of him in Moscow, remembered these details in a letter of July 8-12, 1928 (Trotsky archives, T 1887); *Pravda*, November 19, 1925, published an article by Hu Han-min which maintained that "the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution, since particular members are inseparable from the whole body".

² *Ibid.* November 22, 1925; *Novyi Vostok*, x-xi (1925), 367-369. For this institute see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 268.

³ *Pravda*, January 1, 1926.

⁴ For the institute see p. 956 below.

⁵ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 1-2, January-February 1926, pp. 122-123; for a photograph of the meeting of the presidium on February 15, 1926, with Hu Han-min seated on Dombal's right, see *ibid.* No. 3-5, March-May 1926, p. 170.

Zinoviev, in the formal speech opening the session, having mentioned that "the Chinese Communist Party works in close collaboration with the national revolutionary Kuomintang party", referred by a slip of the tongue (or a slip in the official record) to "these two relatively young communist parties" — a description which earned him the taunts of Bukharin a year later.¹ A flamboyant speech by Hu Han-min, which unreservedly identified the Chinese revolution with world revolution, and the aims of Kuomintang with those of Comintern, was vociferously applauded, and evidently quite eclipsed the modest and conventional greeting of the delegate of the CCP.² After this ceremonial opening, however, the plenary session devoted little attention to the Chinese question. Zinoviev, in his speculations on the "route" of revolution, continued to place the east behind Europe in the revolutionary order of march.³ He described "the Chinese movement" as "concealing within itself many surprises", but did not elaborate on this optimistic understatement.⁴ He made no reference to Kuomintang in either of his major speeches; and any note of anxiety about China related not to Canton, but to the situation in the north.⁵ A protest against the British blockade of Canton and the attempts of the British Government to put pressure on the nationalist government to end the boycott of Hong Kong was adopted by acclamation.⁶ Lozovsky, speaking on the trade unions,

¹ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 2; for Bukharin's remarks see *Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), pp. 8-9.

² *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 8; emphasis is placed on Hu Han-min's enthusiastic reception in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 31, February 26, 1926, pp. 437, 440-441. Hu also spoke at a meeting in Moscow organized by the "Hands off China" society on the first anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, March 12, 1926, which was presided over by Joffe and also addressed by Trotsky, Radek and others; he concluded his speech: "Long live the alliance of the Chinese people with the working masses of the world! Long live the world revolution!" (*Pravda*, March 14, 1926).

³ See p. 629 above.

⁴ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 13-14.

⁵ See p. 767 below.

⁶ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 186-188; the text of the protest is also in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 37, March 8, 1926, p. 516. The so-called "blockade" was instituted on February 21, 1926, when the ports of Canton and Whampoa were closed by the customs authorities as a reprisal for the seizure of cargoes by the strike committee: it ended four days later with the release of the cargoes (*Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, ed. A. J. Toynbee (1928), p. 287).

briefly taunted the Amsterdam International with its failure to support the revolutionary movement in China.¹

The preparation of an extensive resolution on "the Chinese Question" — the first major pronouncement of Comintern specifically devoted to China — was entrusted to an "eastern commission" presided over by Roy. The resolution was presented by him to the plenary session without comment, and adopted unanimously without discussion.² Beginning with a reference to "the Shanghai and Hong Kong political strikes of workers", it noted that "the political *activity* of the proletariat has given a mighty impulse to the further development and strengthening of all revolutionary-democratic organizations in the country, and first and foremost of the national-revolutionary party of Kuomintang and of the revolutionary government in Canton". It contained a description of Kuomintang which was introduced without special emphasis, but was afterwards frequently quoted as authoritative by supporters and critics :

The party of Kuomintang, the fundamental core of which acts in alliance with the Chinese communists, represents a revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, intelligentsia and urban democracy on the basis of a community of class interests of these strata in the struggle against foreign imperialists and the whole military-feudal order for the independence of the country and for a single revolutionary-democratic government.³

The resolution admitted the existence of a Right wing in Kuomintang, representing "individual strata of the Chinese big bourgeoisie", which wanted to expel the communists, but welcomed "the condemnation of this Right wing" at the second congress. It denounced "the military-feudal cliques of Mukden and

¹ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 280-281.

² *Ibid.* p. 509. Roy was the president of the commission, and Brown and Voitinsky its secretaries; the commission set up sub-commissions on the French colonies and on China (*Pravda*, February 19, 20, 1926); no record appears to exist of the other members of the commission or of the members of the China sub-commission (which presumably drafted the resolution).

³ This was the first appearance in Comintern literature of the famous four-fold classification of Kuomintang (for which see p. 699 above). It followed the traditional four-fold division of Chinese society into scholars (shih), peasants (nung), merchants (shang) and artisans (kung); it paid more attention to realities than Stalin's identification of Kuomintang as the peasant element in the alliance (see p. 718 above), but less to Marxist orthodoxy — the ground on which the opposition afterwards attacked it.

Chihli", and feared that the foreign imperialists might utilize the present "breathing-space" in the development of the national liberation movement for "a new aggression against China". The CCP and Kuomintang must counter this by "the broadest political work" among the masses, and by utilizing "the inner contradictions in the camp of the imperialists". The struggle should be conducted "under the slogan of 'Hands off China', of the recognition of the complete independence of China, of the abolition of all unequal treaties and of the evacuation from China of all troops of imperialist governments". The CCP was warned both against "*Right-wing liquidationism*", which would have merged the party in the national-democratic movement, and against "*ultra-Left moods*", which sought to advance immediately to proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, ignoring the fundamental and decisive factor of the peasantry.¹ The resolution contained no hint of military action, impending or in contemplation. Relations with Kuomintang were regarded with confidence and with a measured optimism. But no striking developments were foreseen in the immediate future.²

The central council of Profintern which held its session immediately after the sixth IKKI was equally indifferent to political developments in Canton. It received a report on the trade union situation in China, and passed a resolution demanding the legalization of trade unions, social legislation and introduction of the eight-hour day and a minimum wage.³ On March 25,

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 619-623.

² Reference is made in later literature to a decision at this time to admit Kuomintang to Comintern as a "sympathizing party". Bukharin alleged that Zinoviev had been in favour of such action at the time of the sixth enlarged IKKI (*Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), p. 138); Trotsky, evidently placing the episode after the *coup* of March 20, 1926, stated that a decision to admit Kuomintang to Comintern had been taken by the Politburo against his single dissentient vote (*Byulleten Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 15-16, September-October 1930, p. 8). But, if the decision was taken, it was apparently not carried out. Neither Hu Han-min's speech of greeting to the sixth enlarged IKKI in February 1926 (see p. 764 above), nor the similar speech of the Kuomintang delegate at the seventh enlarged IKKI in November 1926 (*Puti Mirovoi Revolyutsii* (1927), i, 4), implied Kuomintang membership of Comintern; a rhetorical remark of the Kuomintang delegate that "Kuomintang will fulfil its historical rôle under the leadership of Comintern" (*ibid.* i, 459) could hardly be stretched to bear that meaning.

³ *IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), pp. 87-90, 136-140.

1926, the executive bureau of Profintern dealt sympathetically with an appeal for help from the Canton-Hong Kong strike committee. The appeal, which is undated in the records and was probably some days or weeks old, pointed out that 150,000 workers had been on strike for eight months, and protested against the blockade of Canton and the murder of strike leaders by "hired assassins" at the instigation of "the British colonial government of Hong Kong". The executive bureau decided to send 10,000 rubles immediately and to appeal to the Russian trade unions for further help.¹ It is clear that the bureau had no inkling of the untoward events which had occurred five days earlier in Canton.²

While the sixth enlarged IKKI and the central council of Profintern were in session in Moscow, the armies of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin massed around Peking. The fighting was fiercest in the neighbourhood of Tientsin, where the Taku forts, which commanded the port, were a Kuominchün stronghold. But the issue was hardly in doubt. It was of these discouraging developments that Zinoviev spoke when he replied to the general debate in the sixth enlarged IKKI on March 8, 1926 :

The position of the national armies in China has somewhat deteriorated in the last few days. The whole imperialist press is full of triumph on this account, and hopes that the national armies will be destroyed. The position in China has more than once been critical, but the great national-revolutionary movement has each time revealed new and ever new strength. In this consists the world-historical significance of events in China.

And again, in winding up the session exactly a week later :

The strategic situation of the Chinese revolution has been recently deteriorating. The national armies have suffered something of a defeat. The pressure of hostile forces is strengthening and the enemy becoming more arrogant.³

¹ *Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 13, 1926, p. 17 ; *Mezhdunarodnaya Solidarnost' Trudyashchikhsya*, 1924-1927 (1959), p. 186.

² See pp. 778-779 below.

³ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 462, 597. The date March 24, 1926, assigned to the second speech in *China Year Book*, 1928 (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 1341, was the date on which it was published in *Pravda* ; it had no reference to events in Canton.

The occupation of the Taku forts embroiled the Kuominchün with the diplomatic corps, which on March 10, 1926, protested to the Peking government against the interruption of communications. Finally on March 16, 1926, an ultimatum was presented to the Chinese government and to the commanders on the spot requiring them to withdraw from the forts and to cease interference with foreign shipping. On the following day a Soviet ship carrying arms from Vladivostok for the Kuominchün force was intercepted by Chinese warships owing allegiance to Chang Tso-lin. On March 18, 1926, the ultimatum was accepted and the evacuation of Tientsin by the Kuominchün begun.¹ On the same day, before the decision to surrender was publicly known, a procession of demonstrators who had marched to Tuan Ch'i-jui's residence in Peking to protest against the ultimatum was fired on by the police, and about 50 persons killed.² The slaughter was greeted with satisfaction in the foreign community, and with consternation in Moscow; by both it was interpreted as proof of the determination of Chang Tso-lin to take decisive action against the "Reds". Feng Yü-hsiang attempted to exculpate himself from responsibility for the events in Peking on the plea that he was far away at the time, and knew nothing of the shooting till long after it had happened.³ But the first Kuominchün army was within easy striking distance of Peking; and it was difficult to resist the later conclusion of T'an P'ing-shan that the army "not only permitted this action, but even directly supported it".⁴ On the day after the shooting, Tuan Ch'i-jui arrested several Kuomintang members in Peking, as well as Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the CCP, and four other communists.⁵ These proceedings marked the effective end of the hopes placed in the

¹ For a summary narrative of these events from the contemporary press see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, ed. A. J. Toynbee (1928), pp. 253-254.

² *Izvestiya*, March 21, 1926.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 330; no authority is quoted for the statement in *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926, ed. A. J. Toynbee (1928), p. 254, that a telegram of protest from Feng was received in Peking on March 20, 1926.

⁴ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (62), October 8, 1926, p. 17.

⁵ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 329, 363-364 (this is a protest of the Peking committee of the CCP breaking off relations with the first Kuominchün); a recent history based on Chinese sources names Li as the organizer of the March 18 demonstration (*Ocherki Istorii Kitaya v Noveishee Vremya* (1959), p. 144).

Kuominchün movement as a revolutionary force. *Izvestiya* on March 24 and 25, 1926, wrote openly of the "retreat" of the Kuominchün armies; this was now a serious preoccupation in Moscow, where the whole Soviet position in northern China and in Manchuria seemed in imminent danger. On March 25, 1926, the Chinese situation was discussed at length in the Politburo.

In February or March 1926 — perhaps soon after the dispute with Chang Tso-lin over the CER — the anxieties of the Politburo led it to set up a special commission to report on Far Eastern policy. The questions at issue had not hitherto been a matter of special concern to the party or a source of controversy in it. They had never been raised in the debates with Trotsky, and were not mentioned in the rift between Stalin and Zinoviev which culminated at the fourteenth party congress in December 1925. The composition of the new commission was a sure proof that the subject was regarded, from the party standpoint, as non-controversial and only of diplomatic or technical importance. Its president was Trotsky, and its other members Chicherin, Voroshilov and Dzerzhinsky. Its main report was debated in the Politburo, at the height of the Peking crisis, on March 25, 1926; and on the same occasion, or a few days later, it presented a special resolution, which was also adopted by the Politburo, on the CER.¹ The report opened with a conventional recognition of the progressive development of "the internal forces of the Chinese revolution". But its main preoccupation was with measures to be taken to prevent the threatened "formation of an imperialist front against China". The solution was sought at the point where the potential "front" seemed least solid, and where Soviet interests were most directly menaced — in Manchuria. Japan must be conciliated by recognizing *de facto* Japanese control over South Manchuria "for the immediate future". The autonomy of Manchuria under Chang Tso-lin, though it could not be recognized in theory, must be accepted in practice in return for an agreement by him not to move against the south. Agreement

¹ The report and a record of the discussion of March 25, 1926, in the Politburo are in the Trotsky archives, T 870. An article by Trotsky in *Byulleten' Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 3-4, September 1929, pp. 1-5, quoted at length from the resolution on the CER, which it described as having been "worked out" by this commission and confirmed by the Politburo in April 1926; this may be merely a misdating of the meeting of March 25.

with Chang Tso-lin implied the maintenance by him not only of "good and firm relations with Japan", but also of "firm and friendly relations with us", which in turn would give him "a certain independence in regard to Tokyo". Soviet diplomatic headquarters in Manchuria should be transferred from Harbin to Mukden to facilitate direct dealings with Chang Tso-lin. A strictly business policy should be pursued in the question of the CER: a joint Chinese-Japanese-Soviet conference on railway affairs would be desirable. The special resolution on the status of the railway declared that it must remain in Soviet hands "till the victory of the Chinese revolution" in order to guarantee it against "seizure by the imperialists". But "cultural-political measures" were required to establish the Chinese character of the line: administration should be bilingual, and Chinese schools should be set up for Chinese workers. Chinese support of "white" Russian employees of the railway was indicated as one of the current sources of trouble.

Other incidental recommendations were made in the main report. Soviet departments must avoid "inadmissible 'Great Power' traits which compromise the Soviet Government and create an impression of imperialism on its part",¹ and were advised "to show the greatest attention to the rights of China, to emphasize her sovereignty, etc."; any idea of Soviet military intervention should be discarded. Trotsky proposed that the Soviet Government should repeat its previous assurance, given at the time of the signature of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of May 31, 1924, that, "once the Chinese people sets up its own democratic and unified government, we will freely and joyfully hand over the railway to it on favourable conditions". But the Politburo thought that such a declaration at this moment might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and postponed consideration of it.²

¹ The resolution on the CER also noted that "certain departments" had been guilty of "inadmissible Great Power traits"; preoccupation with this question evidently reflected the bad impression created by the Chicherin "ultimatum" of January 22, 1926 (see pp. 759-760 above).

² Recriminations about this proposal were exchanged between Trotsky and Bukharin at the eighth enlarged IKKI in May 1927. Trotsky referred to "frivolous and absurd allegations" that he had proposed to surrender the CER; Bukharin asserted that Trotsky's proposal had not been confined to repetition of an old formula, and that he had wished to get rid of the CER as an awkward encumbrance. It was admitted that the proposal had been made

The report added that no concessions made to Japan must be allowed to create the impression in China of "a division into spheres of influence with our participation". Finally, if Wu Pei-fu continued to gain ground, it might be desirable to seek agreement with him "in order to weaken his dependence on England" — a futile harking back to a long discarded policy,¹ which revealed the acute current apprehension of British designs. An additional paragraph inserted in the Politburo referred to the demand of "reactionary China, incited by imperialism" for the expulsion of Karakhan,² and recommended propaganda to counteract it.

The most interesting feature of the report in the light of subsequent developments was what was said, and what was left unsaid, about Kuomintang and the Canton government, and the complete ignorance in the Politburo of startling events which had happened in Canton five days earlier.³ The only reference in the main body of the report to the situation in the south was the proviso that the policy of concessions to Japan, prompted by the need of a "breathing-space" for the Chinese revolution, should be agreed with the CCP and Kuomintang, and that there should be no abatement of "revolutionary and anti-imperialist" propaganda. But a special paragraph, which underwent several amendments in the Politburo, argued that Canton and its dependent provinces should be treated not merely as "a temporary revolutionary *place d'armes*", but as "a large country with a population of 37 million souls". Rakovsky was to be asked his view of the prospect of a *modus vivendi* with France if a Cantonese representative were sent to Paris. This evidently aimed at the recognition of a *de facto* autonomy for Canton in the south corresponding to Chang Tso-lin's *de facto* autonomy in the north. The hope of a reunion of China under the national-revolutionary banner of

and rejected informally in the Politburo, and was not recorded in the documents (*Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), pp. 40, 142).

¹ For the earlier wooing of Wu Pei-fu see *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 1917-1923, Vol. 3, pp. 516-517.

² Karakhan had been accused of fomenting the disturbances in Peking in November 1925 (see p. 747 above); and this charge was repeated more insistently when the disturbances were renewed in February and March 1926. *Pravda*, April 4, 1925, and *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 53, April 5, 1926, pp. 738-739, reported from Peking on the press campaign against Karakhan.

³ See pp. 778-779 below.

Kuomintang was not so much discarded as ignored. It was only Stalin who, possessed of greater prescience or greater caution than his colleagues, showed himself alive to the real quality of Chiang Kai-shek's ambition and to one, at any rate, of the dangers inherent in it. On Stalin's motion, a further clause was added to this section of the report :

The Canton government should in the present period decisively reject the thought of military expeditions of an offensive character, and, in general, of any such proceedings as may encourage the imperialists to embark on military action.

The contingency of a plan by Chiang Kai-shek to embark on a military offensive was thus considered by the Politburo, and firm exception taken to it. The contingency of a defiance by Chiang Kai-shek of Soviet advice, or of a rift in the alliance, was apparently not raised at all.

The diagnosis of the Chinese situation represented by the conclusions of the sixth enlarged IKKI in the middle of March 1926 and by the debate in the Politburo on March 25, 1926, was rudely shattered by Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* of March 20, 1926, in Canton, and by the course of events set in motion by it. The major, though hitherto unrecognized, change in the situation in Canton in the two months following the second congress of Kuomintang in January 1926 was the firm decision of Chiang Kai-shek to launch the long-awaited "northern expedition". The conception of a northern expedition which would "punish Wu Pei-fu", overthrow the militarist leaders who enjoyed the backing of the imperialist Powers, and thus establish the authority of Kuomintang and of the nationalist government over a re-united China, had lain at the root of Sun Yat-sen's political ambitions, and was an integral part of the programme of Kuomintang. The strengthening of the Kuomintang position in the south, due both to reorganization of the government in the summer of 1925, and to its increased military power fostered and sustained by Soviet aid, brought this aim for the first time within the range of practical planning. On July 18, 1925, the military council, following a resolution of the political council, registered a decision, first to proceed with a clearing up of eastern Kwantung and Kwangsi, and

then, having firmly established its home base, to embark on the northern expedition.¹ When the clearing-up operations were successfully completed in December 1925,² preparations for the northern expedition were the logical sequel. Everything goes to show that the northern expedition was near to Chiang Kai-shek's heart — the goal of his military ambitions; and it is reasonable to conjecture that his favourable, even flattering, attitude towards the Soviet advisers and to the communists both before and during the second congress of Kuomintang³ was dictated by his desire to ensure their support for this capital enterprise. Resolutions said to have been adopted on January 27 and February 1, 1926, to regroup the armies in preparation for the northern expedition and to appoint Chiang Kai-shek "inspector-general" to place them on a war footing, were evidently necessary preliminaries to the launching of the expedition rather than a decision to launch it.⁴ When Borodin left Canton on February 4, 1926, to attend the conference with Karakhan and the newly arrived Soviet mission in Peking, he can scarcely have been aware that drastic action was contemplated in the near future.⁵

The imminent approach of the northern expedition led unexpectedly, but by a logical process, to sharp friction between Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet advisers. On the one hand, Chiang had now attained the summit of authority, looked forward

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 184.

² See pp. 732, 751 above.

³ See pp. 751-754 above.

⁴ H. K. Tong, *Chiang Kai-shek* (1937), i, 88-89 — the sole source for these resolutions.

⁵ For Borodin's journey see pp. 760-761 above. Chiang Kai-shek's diary noted a meeting with Borodin on the eve of his departure (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 508, note 40), but not the topic of conversation; this suggests that no major change of policy was discussed. The view taken in L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 648-650, that Borodin had already been converted to the northern expedition, and went north in order to persuade Feng Yü-hsiang to support it, seems untenable. Of the three reasons given by Borodin for his conversion (see p. 793 below), the first began to operate only in April 1926, and the third was far more cogent and plausible in April than in January. A graver difficulty is that the earlier date requires the assumption that Borodin worked actively and secretly for three months for a policy known to be unacceptable to Moscow. This was not in Borodin's character; and, though he was afterwards denounced, no such charge was ever brought against him. A foreign journalist in Canton at the time dated Borodin's change of front after his return in April (G. Sokolsky, *The Tinder Box of Asia* (1932), p. 336).

with confidence to the moment when he could embark on the great adventure, and, though still conscious of the need for material support from the Soviet Union, was less willing than of old to be kept in leading-strings. On the other hand, Kisanko, the senior Soviet military adviser, who had been in Canton only since the end of October 1925, was less experienced than Borodin, and evidently had less skill in smoothing over difficulties and in flattering the susceptibilities of the increasingly self-important Chinese general: neither Kisanko nor Rogachev, his principal deputy, enjoyed Chiang's personal confidence, or could successfully replace the absent Borodin.¹ There were, however, more serious reasons for the rift. Though the drawing of Asia into the vast design of world revolution had been constantly spoken of by the Bolsheviks from Lenin onwards, the prospect of an early and successful revolution in China — even a bourgeois-nationalist revolution — was not taken very seriously in Moscow as a goal of policy. When Borodin first came to Canton in the autumn of 1923, at a time when many Bolsheviks still believed in imminent revolution in Europe, he is said to have reckoned that "it would take fully five years to build up a revolutionary base in Kwantung province".² Since that time, the leaders of Comintern had witnessed the rise of Fascism, and the abject failure of revolutionary outbreaks in Germany, in Bulgaria, in Estonia, where conditions had appeared far more promising than in China. In 1925 Comintern, following in the wake of Soviet foreign policy, had gone over to the defensive, and had begun everywhere to condemn "ultra-Left" inclinations for revolutionary adventure. To have believed in these conditions that China was ripe for revolution would have seemed visionary and fantastic — a flagrant example of irresponsible revolutionary adventure. Even when in 1925, and especially after the May 30 incident in Shanghai, more serious attention began to be paid in Moscow to events in China,

¹ During Borodin's absence, according to a Left Kuomintang source, "his subordinate advisers in the military council . . . were . . . openly favouring the Chinese communists, with the result that relations became strained between them and Chiang" (T'ang Leng-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), p. 242); the suggestion that Borodin withdrew from Canton because his close relations with Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei embarrassed the Chinese communists is, however, scarcely plausible.

² J. C. Huston, *Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang and the Russian-Chinese Political Alliance* (typed MS in the Hoover Library, Stanford (n.d.)), p. 114.

and it became a commonplace to assert that revolution was on the march there, none of the Soviet leaders foresaw immediate revolutionary changes. What was hoped for, and what the policies of Comintern and the Soviet Government were designed to encourage, was a strengthening of the nationalist forces, both in Canton and in the north, to a point where they would provide an effective counterweight to the power of the imperialist countries, or, more specifically, of Great Britain and Japan. The Hong Kong strike and the rise of Feng Yü-hsiang and the Kuominchün movement seemed excellent examples of the way in which British and Japanese power might be curbed and thwarted. But when Chiang Kai-shek seriously proposed military action starting from Canton to spread the nationalist revolution to the north, to reunite China under Kuomintang leadership, and to drive the foreigner out of the country, it seemed to Soviet observers that this ambitious and far-flung project was doomed to fail and, by provoking the intervention of the imperialist Powers, would merely destroy the limited and practical policies which were already being successfully pursued. Vilensky, the spokesman of Narkomindel, was frankly sceptical :

We remember the results of the so-called "punitive northern expeditions" of Sun Yat-sen, and have little faith in the viability of the "strategic" plans drawn up by certain enthusiastic Kuomintang supporters who overestimate their strength.¹

And Borodin, some years later, recalled the current view that an eastern revolution, for instance in China, would be an added responsibility for Moscow.² Throughout the mission of Borodin and the Soviet advisers in Canton, every mention by Kuomintang leaders of this ultimate objective met with a sceptical and discouraging response. Now, when Chiang Kai-shek had become seriously determined to embark on it, the same response was bound to produce open friction.

But another reason for the rift lay, perhaps, even deeper.

¹ *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), p. lviii; this echoed a common view taken of the project in the foreign community in China at this time: "The northern expedition has been in the mouth of everybody since the government came into power. It was part of Sun Yat-sen's general scheme of uniting China and has become a slogan of the party. But, unless the Kuomintang executives are extremely impractical, they will be wise enough not to undertake it" (*China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), April 3, 1926, p. 120).

² L. Fischer, *Men and Politics* (1941), p. 136.

So long as revolutionary action remained a remote prospect, the incompatibility between the national revolution envisaged by Kuomintang and the socialist revolution which was the ultimate aim of the CCP and of Comintern could be masked in affable ambiguity. This was the period of what was afterwards called the "co-existence" of bourgeois and proletarian "tendencies" in the Chinese revolution.¹ When action was imminent, the hollowness of the verbal compromise came embarrassingly to light. Or, if the same problem was looked at from another angle, the decision to take action made it practically imperative to choose between a revolution which, remaining strictly within national limits, would overthrow the foreign intruder and install the national bourgeoisie in power, and a revolution which, while pursuing the same national purpose, would combine it with the social revolt of proletariat and peasantry against both foreign and national bourgeois supremacy. The Right wing of Kuomintang stood unequivocally for the first of these policies. The Left wing stood hesitantly and waveringly for the second. But it lacked cohesion, and appeared to follow this course only in so far as it was necessary to maintain the Soviet and communist alliance. Hence, when the choice was forced by Chiang Kai-shek's decision to open hostilities against the north, the Left wing of Kuomintang tended to melt away, or was confined to a small number of leaders. The real issue lay between a predominantly bourgeois Kuomintang and the communists, whose potential support among the workers and peasants was large, but whose organization was weak; and dislike among the Kuomintang military leaders of Soviet tutelage was reinforced by hostility to communism among those who were most influential in shaping Kuomintang opinion. It is doubtful whether Chiang Kai-shek, whose ambitions and outlook were primarily military, himself consciously planned a political move to the Right. But the situation resulting from his decision drove him automatically in that direction.²

¹ P. Mif, *Kitaiskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Kriticheskie Dni* (1928), p. 13.

² Since the departure of Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, thanks to the support of the Left and of the CCP, had become the most prominent leader in Kuomintang; personal ambition and jealousy of Wang Ching-wei (illustrated by an incident quoted in H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 104) also led Chiang Kai-shek to seek support on the Right.

It was at this time that Chiang Kai-shek's diary begins to reveal impatience with the attitude of the Soviet advisers. On January 19, 1926, the last day of the second congress of Kuomintang, he wrote angrily that it was impossible to work with Kisanko and Rogachev, who met his "sincerity" with "deceit".¹ On February 7, 1926, Kisanko had "ridiculed" him — perhaps by expressing scepticism of his military plans; and four days later the Soviet advisers showed themselves "suspicious and envious". On February 22, 1926, the advisers were pressing Chiang Kai-shek to "go slow" on plans for the northern expedition — the first mention of an open clash on the subject; two days later, Chiang was once more demanding an early decision to march, this time on the plea that it was necessary to come to the rescue of Feng Yü-hsiang's defeated Kuominchün forces. On February 27, 1926, Chiang complained once more of Kisanko's "dictatorial and contradictory" behaviour, and next day dismissed a Chinese general who was said to have been conspiring with the Soviet advisers. Early in March Chiang wrote of propaganda being conducted against him, apparently within the ranks of Kuomintang, and complained to Wang Ching-wei that the revolutionary power was falling into the hands of foreigners to the detriment of the independence of Kuomintang.² On March 12, 1926, Chiang once more clashed with Kisanko on the desirability of the northern expedition.³ All the evidence suggests that the latter part of

¹ The background of this charge may be a statement in H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 112, that some of the advisers "incurred Chiang's displeasure because they wanted to distribute their advice and material aid equally among all the armies instead of exclusively through Chiang". According to Stepanov (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 258), Chiang "reprimanded Kisanko for lending assistance to Yunnan and Kwangsi": this had been done secretly and led to suspicion that Kisanko was "opposing the northern expedition".

² For references to the entries in Chiang Kai-shek's diary, which was published in 1936, see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 215-217. A document purporting to emanate from a Soviet agent at this time (*ibid.* pp. 245-247) cannot be the work of Kisanko, since the writer was certainly not a military man. It is couched in vague and general terms, dwells on compromising points which Soviet reporters normally avoided (the predominant rôle of the Soviet advisers, the dependence of Kuomintang and the nationalist government on "our political leadership", "our guidance", etc.), and bears all the internal marks of a forgery: it was originally published in one of the propaganda pamphlets issued in English in 1927.

³ *Ibid.* p. 220.

February and the first days of March 1926 brought a marked and irreversible turn for the worse in Chiang's relations with the Soviet advisers, with the communists and with Left-wing leaders in Kuomintang, and that it was at this moment, whether formally or not, that the final decision was taken to embark, in the course of the year 1926, on the northern expedition. The long-standing antipathy of large sections of Kuomintang to the communist alliance was never far beneath the surface, and in the new conditions found a champion in Chiang Kai-shek.

On March 13, 1926, Kubyak, accompanied by other members of the mission from Moscow which had attended the conference in Peking in the previous month,¹ arrived in Canton and was received by Chiang Kai-shek.² What passed at the interview is unknown, but it may be assumed that Kubyak followed the line hitherto pursued by Comintern and by the Soviet advisers, and resisted the proposal for the northern expedition. Friction is therefore likely to have occurred, and may have hastened the next move in the game.³ In the early hours of March 20, 1926,

¹ See p. 761 above.

² The arrival was reported in Chiang Kai-shek's diary quoted in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 509, note 76; the diary for March 10, 1926, had already recorded preparations for the visit, which was evidently regarded as important. No names were mentioned other than that of Kubyak, who was clearly the head of the mission. A statement by Trotsky in *Byulleten' Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 15-16, September-October 1930, p. 8 (cf. *ibid.* p. 20) that Bubnov paid a visit to Canton which "coincided with the March coup of Chiang Kai-shek" has led to the supposition that Bubnov was a member of this mission. This is impossible; Bubnov was a member of the party central committee and head of PUR (see Vol. 2, pp. 395-396), and, if present, would have outranked Kubyak. Roy later recalled that Bubnov, "after a short visit to China", returned to Moscow with a recommendation to support the northern expedition (R. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 1953), p. 90); and Trotsky, in the passage quoted above, alleged that Bubnov had "made the communists submit and to keep quiet". The most plausible conjecture is that Bubnov visited Canton after the news of the March 20 coup had reached Moscow, and after the April meeting of the Politburo (see p. 783 below), i.e. in May or June 1926, when the start of the northern expedition was imminent.

³ A Kuomintang source cited in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 509, note 76, blamed Kubyak for having instigated the March 20 incident. This is in itself absurd; but it may conceivably be true that this new evidence of opposition from Moscow to his cherished plan was the last straw which provoked Chiang Kai-shek to take action. A somewhat similar story appears, on the authority of Eugene Chen, in J. C. Huston, *Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang, and the Russian-Chinese Political Alliance* (typed MS in the Hoover Library, Stanford (n.d.)), pp. 132-133.

Chiang Kai-shek struck a sudden and unexpected blow. Twenty-four hours earlier, a nationalist gun-boat, whose commander, Li Chih-lung by name, was a member of the CCP and head of the naval bureau of the nationalist government,¹ moved up to Chiang's headquarters at Whampoa. On the communist side, it was stated that orders to move the ship had purported to come from Chiang himself; Chiang later mentioned rumours, which he did not "completely believe", of a plot to kidnap him and convey him on the gun-boat to Vladivostok. Though the ship was immediately withdrawn, Chiang treated the incident as an excuse for counter-action which had evidently been thoroughly planned and prepared. The first step was the arrest of the political commissars attached to the army, most of whom were members of the CCP, and the confinement of the Soviet military advisers to their quarters. This was followed by the arrest of Li Chih-lung and other communists holding prominent positions, including the members of the Hong Kong strike committee. Since June 1925 the strike of Chinese workers organized and supported from Canton had paralysed the economy of the British colony; and the arrest and dissolution of the strike committee (which was virtually an organ of the CCP) proved in the long run one of the most important consequences of the March 20 *coup*. After a few hours, the guards were withdrawn from the houses of the Soviet advisers. Some minor Chinese military and political figures called on the advisers to present excuses for what had happened; and, when Kisanko sent one of his officers to Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang is said to have "apologized profusely" for what had happened. It was not, however, till March 22, 1926, two days after the incident, that serious discussions took place between Chiang Kai-shek and Soloviev, counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, who had probably accompanied the Kubyak mission on its journey to the south; Wang Ching-wei was present at the discussions.² Chiang

¹ Li Chih-lung, though treated as responsible for the whole incident, was not personally victimized, and wrote an account of it entitled "The Causes and Consequences of the Resignation of Wang Ching-wei", which clearly implied that the incident was deliberately engineered by Chiang to provide an excuse for the *coup*; this pamphlet is cited in H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 106, and a copy is preserved in the Hoover Library, Stanford.

² The sources for the events of these days are some entries in Chiang Kai-shek's diaries (cited in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 220-224), and two reports

Kai-shek assured Soloviev that his action against the Soviet advisers had been prompted by hostility not to the Soviet Union, but to certain of the advisers personally — notably to Kisanko and Rogachev. Soloviev undertook that about ten of the advisers should be withdrawn, including the two named. Chiang Kai-shek, having received this assurance, set to work to minimize the incident. Addressing the cadets of the Whampoa academy on the same day, he explained that Li Chih-lung's guilt was not clear, but that, if he were guilty, it was a personal matter not involving the CCP as a whole. Next day he attributed the trouble to an outbreak of enmity between the Sun Yat-sen Society and the League of Military Youth — the Kuomintang and communist student societies in the Whampoa academy. On March 24, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek attended a farewell party for the departing advisers, and some of them left Canton the same night.¹ The prompt and complete success of the *coup* had left Chiang absolute master in Canton.

The line pursued by Chiang Kai-shek, though tortuous and sometimes contradictory, can be easily unravelled. He had hitherto counted in Kuomintang as a man of the Left. But he lacked political convictions. His sole purpose was to establish his undisputed political authority in Canton (military power was already in his hands) in preparation for the northern expedition; and, since those who sought to share and contest his authority were the Soviet advisers and their supporters in the CCP and in the Kuomintang Left, it was against these that he struck. For a few days after March 20, 1926, the issue may still have seemed in doubt. The Right applauded; but the Left, momentarily disconcerted and disorganized, might regroup for resistance. What the *coup* revealed, however, was the inherent weakness of the Left, once its Soviet support had been struck away. Its weakness was typified in the behaviour of Wang Ching-wei, who first denounced Chiang Kai-shek as a counter-revolutionary,² then some days or weeks later by Stepanov, a Soviet general and presumably the senior adviser after the withdrawal of Kisanko and Rogachev (*ibid.* pp. 248-265): these appear to be authentic. The negotiations with Soloviev are reported by both sources.

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, pp. 220-221.

² An alleged report of the Soviet military attaché in Peking, dated June 3, 1926, seized in 1927, and available only in a Japanese translation, mentions a

withdrew on pretext of illness, reappeared for the meeting with Soloviev on March 22, 1926, and on the following day declared himself ill and disappeared for good. On March 25, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek enacted a graceful comedy. He wrote to Wang Ching-wei, as head of the government, asking for leave of absence, and informed the other Kuomintang leaders of his intention to retire. On the same evening T. V. Soong called on Chiang to beg him, in the name of the leaders, to remain; and the request was acceded to. It was not till the middle of April that official note was taken of the vacuum created by Wang Ching-wei's disappearance (he had in the meanwhile fled to Shanghai). On April 16, 1926, T'an Yen-k'ai was created president of the political council in his place, and Chiang Kai-shek president of the military council.¹

In retrospect, the most remarkable feature of Chiang Kai-shek's *coup* of March 20, 1926, was the blanket of secrecy in which it was veiled from the outside world. The blow fell with such stunning force on the Soviet group in Canton that for several days—perhaps even for two or three weeks—no report of it reached Moscow either from the Soviet military advisers or from Kubyak's party mission. This disorganization, or lack of organization, in communications may be partly attributed to the absence of Borodin, but seems to have been a common feature of relations between Moscow and the Far East at this time.² Nor did the

plan of Wang Ching-wei immediately after March 20, 1926, to "form an anti-Chiang alliance and, by the pressure of this alliance, force Chiang not to yield to the demands of the anti-communist faction in Kuomintang", but adds that "we" thought this "inappropriate" (*ibid.* pp. 267-268). The mysterious remark that "comrade Kuibyshev supports this theory" looks like a blunder on the part of a translator who had heard of Kuibyshev, but not of Kubyak; but the hypothesis of a plan of Wang Ching-wei, at first supported by Kubyak, but ultimately rejected on Soviet advice, rests on slender evidence.

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 223-224; T'an Yen-k'ai is described in T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), p. 334, as having, like Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong, "no distinct political colour".

² *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 805. One of Kisanko's reports to the military attaché in Peking in the winter of 1925-1926 complained of the lack of regular couriers and of a military code: the only secret code, which was not really secret, was in Borodin's office, and Borodin's coding clerk "often piles up telegrams without transmitting them" (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 199).

press, Chinese or foreign, carry either prompt or accurate information of what had happened.¹ It was almost a week after the event when vague but triumphant reports began to appear in the press of the world of a successful *coup* directed against the communists in Canton. On March 28, 1926, the *Rote Fahne* published in Berlin an article by the Chinese communist T'ang Sheng-chih denying reports in the British and Japanese press that Feng Yü-hsiang had left Kalgan for Ulan-Bator by air (what was happening in the north still took precedence), and that Chiang Kai-shek had carried out a *coup d'état* against the Russians in Canton.² The first mention of the *coup* in the Soviet press occurred in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* on March 30, 1926, in the form of a Tass message from Peking of March 27 reporting "rumours" circulated by Reuters in the foreign press of an alleged anti-communist *coup* in Canton: these rumours were "completely unfounded", and were evidently designed "to enhance the impression created by the advancing reaction in northern China". A leader in *Izvestiya* on the following day connected the reports with the attack on Peking. Nothing further appeared in the Moscow press

Ordinary communications in China were seriously disrupted by the fighting throughout the winter of 1925-1926; *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), March 27, 1926, p. 105, recorded a complaint that "nearly five months have now elapsed since it was possible for the post office to send mail between Shanghai and Tientsin by rail". The position of Canton was particularly bad: as the result of the Hong Kong strike, "we do not even enjoy facilities for free telegraphic communication with the rest of the country and other parts of the world, because telegrams passing through Hong Kong are subjected to censorship and detention" (*ibid.* August 15, 1925, p. 210).

¹ *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai) first mentioned the *coup* in its issue of April 3, 1926, p. 126 in a message from Canton of March 24, 1926, which asserted that Chiang Kai-shek had "succeeded in ridding Canton of all anti-Reds"; another article in the same issue, however, under the heading "Brighter Outlook in Canton", reported the arrest and dismissal of "the Russians attached to the Kuomintang government" (*ibid.* p. 131); the issue of April 10, 1926, gave the first coherent account of what had happened in a message from a Chinese correspondent in Canton of April 1, 1926. *The Times*, March 24, 1926, reported from Hong Kong that the Canton government had "boldly attempted to bring the extremists under control for the purpose of hastening a settlement of the boycott of Hong Kong", but gave no details; a leading article of the same date on *Confused China* remarked darkly that "recent events in Canton . . . may also indicate a dislike of the control of Russian communist adventurers", but was concerned mainly with the military situation in the north.

² The article was reprinted in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 53, April 5, 1926, pp. 737-738.

till April 4, 1926, when *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* published a report from a Kuomintang spokesman in Shanghai that "on March 20 the Canton government declared martial law and surrounded the premises of the strike committee with troops". But rumours of a conflict between Kuomintang and the communists were once more declared to be groundless, and the story of the deportation of Soviet advisers was attributed to the departure from Canton of a Soviet trade delegation — evidently the cover for the Kubyak mission — which had completed its work. By the time the magnitude of the *coup* began to be realized in Moscow, and the dismissed advisers had no doubt told their side of the story, a compromise had been worked out in Canton, and both sides eagerly fostered the illusion that nothing serious had happened. Chiang Kai-shek, in an interview in the Kuomintang press, denounced reports of his hostility to Russians or communists as an invention of "the running dogs of the imperialists".¹ The affair vanished altogether from the Soviet press and from public discussion in Moscow² — to reappear more than a year later in the controversial debate about subsequent developments.

Even in official quarters in Moscow the reaction was less sharp than might have been expected. Some time during the first part of April the matter was discussed — presumably in the Politburo — on a report by Bubnov, who, as head of PUR,³ may have been responsible for the officers attached to Borodin's mission. Trotsky, according to his own account, had already made to the Politburo "a formal proposal that the CCP should leave Kuomintang". Zinoviev, who at the sixth enlarged IKKI a month earlier had been an enthusiastic supporter of Kuomintang, now associated himself with the proposal for withdrawal. But this, though in form a gesture of protest, was in effect, as Stalin said later (and may have pointed out at the time), "a policy of adjustment to Chiang Kai-shek's demands" and a proposal "to withdraw the communists from the interplay of revolutionary forces in China". It does not seem to have been strongly pressed, and the committee confined itself to an apparently unanimous decision

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 223.

² It was, for example, not mentioned in the long resolution on the Chinese question adopted by the seventh enlarged IKKI in November 1926.

³ See p. 778, note 2 above.

to warn the CCP that policy should be directed "to the point of the exodus or exclusion of the Rightists from Kuomintang"; this decision was conveyed to the party in the form of a directive from Comintern. Since no means, other than reliance on Chiang Kai-shek's good will, were available to curb or to expel the Right, some justification existed for Trotsky's subsequent comment that Comintern had "in fact ratified Chiang Kai-shek's first *coup d'état*".¹ The old formulas were repeated. The CCP was not to withdraw from Kuomintang; the Left wing in Kuomintang was to be supported in order to defeat and destroy the Right. The assumption was that nothing substantial had changed. An open letter of April 30, 1926, from the presidium of Krestintern, addressed to Kuomintang and its peasant section, expressed unabated confidence in Kuomintang and in Canton as "the centre which rallies, unites and organizes all the revolutionary

¹ The main sources for the April 1926 discussions are two later references by Stalin (*Sochineniya*, x, 20-21, 24, 155). On the first occasion the proposal to withdraw from Kuomintang was attributed to Zinoviev, on the second to "the opposition"; Trotsky was not mentioned. Trotsky recorded the appearance of Bubnov, but said nothing of his own participation (*Byulleten' Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 15-16, September-October 1930, p. 20). Elsewhere he recalled that he had presented his proposal for withdrawal "in 1925 [sic] simultaneously with the theses on the CER" (L. Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (N.Y., 1932), p. 19); these theses were presented to the Politburo on or shortly after March 25, 1926 (see p. 769 above). The paucity of subsequent references to this discussion, and Bukharin's remark at the eighth enlarged IKKI of May 1927 that, after the *coup* of March 20, 1926, "comrades Zinoviev and Trotsky sat in the Politburo and were as much responsible as any of the rest of us for the decisions taken at that time" (*Die Chinesische Frage auf dem 8. Plenum* (1928), p. 10), suggest that the issue was not very seriously contested. It was not till after Chiang Kai-shek's "betrayal" of the communists in the summer of 1927 that the opposition, and especially Trotsky, became anxious to claim credit for having consistently opposed the Kuomintang alliance. Some members of the party initially disliked the entry of members of the CCP into Kuomintang (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 535), and either Trotsky or Zinoviev may have been among them; but the policy was not formally opposed, and any objections to it were forgotten during the next three years. Trotsky was inconsistent in his recollections. In an unpublished memorandum of September 27, 1926, in the Trotsky archives (T 3008), he described the participation of CCP in Kuomintang as "perfectly correct" for the period before 1925, when it was "still only preparing itself for independent political activity"; in a letter of December 10, 1930, he declared that "from the very beginning, that is, from 1923", he had been resolutely opposed to participation (L. Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (N.Y., 1932), p. 19; cf. *Byulleten' Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 19, March 1931, p. 27, where this attitude is attributed to "the opposition of 1923, except for Radek and some of his friends").

forces against the pressure of the reactionaries and imperialists " and as " the unassailable citadel of the Chinese revolution ".¹

It was therefore with this limited and unhelpful guidance from Moscow, and apparently without any single responsible authority on the spot, that the Soviet group in Canton hammered out its decision on the course to be pursued. Any attitude involving a denunciation of the Kuomintang alliance and a withdrawal from Canton was ruled out from the start. This would have been directly contrary to the line consistently laid down in Moscow since 1923. From the moment of Soloviev's interview with Chiang Kai-shek and the agreement to recall Kisanko and Rogachev on personal grounds, it was clear that the *status quo* could be maintained — no doubt at some cost ; and when Chiang Kai-shek submitted his demands to the central executive committee of Kuomintang on April 3, 1926, the cost did not look unreasonably high. Chiang still needed Soviet military aid, and could afford to show forbearance in the hour of victory. He proposed the convening of the central executive committee of Kuomintang to investigate and pronounce on issues of discipline. The requirements were that CCP members of Kuomintang should refrain from criticism of Sun Yat-sen's three principles, and that the CCP should inform Kuomintang of instructions issued by it, and communicate to Kuomintang a list of its members ; further, not more than one-third of the members of the central executive committee of Kuomintang should be communists. A joint conference of Kuomintang and the CCP would deal with disputed questions.² Towards the middle of April Stepanov, now presumably senior Soviet adviser and acting head of the mission, presented a report to the Soviet group, which was followed by a discussion.³ He admitted that errors had been committed in attempting to seize control of too many key positions in the army (the same evidently applied to positions in Kuomintang and in the govern-

¹ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1926, pp. 179-183.

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 221-222.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 254-265 ; it carries no date, but preceded the taking over of Peking from the Kuominchün by Chang Tso-lin on April 15, 1926 (see p. 788 below), and could be precisely dated by reference to the Canton press, since it mentions a report " in to-day's newspapers ". For an earlier report by Stepanov, apparently about the end of March 1926, see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 248-253.

ment) and thus flouting Chinese susceptibilities. It was decided to withdraw all party representatives, including communist political commissars, from the first army: the withdrawal was said to be voluntary, but was evidently made in response to Chiang Kai-shek's explicit or implicit demand. It was also proposed to dissolve the League of Military Youth in the Whampoa academy. The existence of the league had not only engendered friction, but had tended to produce a concentration of Right elements in the Sun Yat-sen Society; it was hoped that the society would either follow the example of the league and dissolve, or become more amenable to penetration by the Left. What made conciliation easier was Chiang Kai-shek's affable attitude, once Kisanko, Rogachev and the others had been removed, to the remaining military advisers: he explicitly disclaimed any desire to modify their status or functions. In Canton, it was impossible to work against Chiang Kai-shek. Whether or not one believed in his sincerity, concluded Stepanov, "our basic policy is to cooperate with Chiang to the limit of the possible", and "do our utmost to alienate him from the Right wing and persuade him to join the work of the Kuomintang Left". The conclusion was accepted in the absence of any practical alternative. But Stepanov, at any rate, was conscious of the loss of prestige suffered by the advisers, as well as by the Chinese communists, after the March 20 *coup*, and quoted T'an Yen-k'ai as saying that, "even if we advisers were to resume our former relations with top leaders, the effect of the incident will always remain in the minds of the people".¹ And Nilov, another of the advisers, commented sharply on the instruction from Moscow to organize and strengthen the Kuomintang Left:

At the moment the Kuomintang Left is absolutely empty. Not only has it no leaders, it has no masses. It is difficult to say how the central committee's instructions can be carried out.²

On the surface nothing much seemed to have happened. But the underlying relations had been radically altered.

The decisive factor in the change, though not yet clearly recognized as such, was the imminence of the northern expedition.

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956) p. 261.

² *Ibid.* p. 259.

Behind Chiang Kai-shek's manœuvres, and dominating them all, the plans for the expedition were gradually taking shape. Detailed proposals were submitted by Chiang to the central executive committee of Kuomintang, at the same time as the proposals for dealing with the CCP, on April 3, 1926.¹ Throughout April the subject was intensively discussed in Kuomintang and army circles: it was the one point on which all factions could agree. The Soviet military advisers, especially now that they were set on the course of appeasing Chiang, could not long resist this pressure. Whereas Kisanko and Rogachev, faithful to the Moscow line, had continued resolutely to oppose and discourage the expedition, Stepanov, at the meeting which discussed relations with Kuomintang, seems already to have taken it for granted. "In two or three months", he said, "we may expect to move north", and added that "the Chinese generals appear unanimously in favour of the expedition". The conception remained fluid. In reply to a question, Stepanov explained that "to the Chinese, Peking represents the highest objective of the northern expedition, and the temporary occupation of Hupei the lowest, depending much on circumstances".² By the middle of April 1926, though no fresh instructions had been obtained — or perhaps even sought — from Moscow, Chiang Kai-shek's decision to launch an expedition of undefined, but potentially far-reaching, scope seems to have been generally accepted as inevitable, if not desirable, by the Soviet group in Canton; and this acquiescence was the direct, though unforeseen, product of the *coup* of March 20, 1926.

These baffling and ambiguous developments in southern China were matched by a progressive deterioration, from the standpoint of Soviet hopes and interests, of the situation in the north. The protracted crisis over Peking was moving to its conclusion. During the first days of April 1926, Chang Tso-lin's aeroplanes dropped several bombs on Peking, apparently in order to enforce the evacuation of the capital by Kuominchün troops still stationed there.³ As a last desperate throw, the local Kuominchün commander arrested Tuan Ch'i-jui, released Ts'ao Kun,

¹ *Ibid.* p. 220.

² *Ibid.* pp. 257-258, 261; for the meeting see p. 785 above.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 53, April 8, 1926, pp. 738.

Wu Pei-fu's puppet president who had been in prison since his deposition in October 1924, and appealed to Wu Pei-fu to enter Peking.¹ The calculation that Wu's rooted antipathy to Chang Tso-lin had not been overcome by their recognition of a common enemy in Feng Yü-hsiang and the Kuominchün movement was probably correct.² But Wu Pei-fu, perhaps through lack of power rather than of will, rejected the overture, and preferred to seize the moment to move south into the no-man's-land which still divided his authority from that of Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek.³ On April 15, 1926, Peking was evacuated by the last Kuominchün forces and abandoned to Chang Tso-lin.⁴

Chang Tso-lin's victory over the Kuominchün strengthened his position in Manchuria at the expense of the Soviet Union. The campaign against Karakhan as an agent of Bolshevism in China⁵ was taken up by the press in Harbin; and on the eve of the fall of Peking, Chang addressed a note to the Soviet consul-general in Harbin requesting the Soviet Government to withdraw Karakhan and disclaiming responsibility for his safety when Chang's forces entered the capital.⁶ The Soviet Government was evidently anxious to relieve the tension. By a fortunate coincidence, Serebryakov, the deputy People's Commissar for Communications, had just arrived in Harbin on a mission to discuss the railway situation in Manchuria.⁷ On April 18, 1926, the

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 333; *Izvestiya*, April 11, 1926, reported the overthrow of Tuan under the caption "Bloodless Revolution in Peking".

² See *ibid.* April 22, 1926, for an alleged letter from Wu to Chang stating that Feng Yü-hsiang "is a traitor and is in close relations with the Russians"; but according to an article by T'an P'ing-shan in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 4 (62), October 8, 1926, p. 18, Wu and Chang failed to reach an agreement because neither would compromise over Peking.

³ Hints of an intention by Wu Pei-fu to move south are said to have appeared in the Chinese press as early as February 1926, British instigation being suspected (*Bol'shevik*, No. 4, February 28, 1926, p. 60); but the first movements into Honan took place early in April.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, April 16, 1926.

⁵ See p. 771 above.

⁶ R. T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1919-1931* (N.Y., 1932), p. 204; the correspondence does not appear to have been published, but notes of the consul-general of April 9 and 11 and of Chang's foreign affairs department of April 12, 1926, were specified in the agreement with Serebryakov (see p. 789, note 2 below).

⁷ *Izvestiya*, April 10, 1926, in a message from Harbin, reported an interview with Serebryakov on April 6 — probably the date of his arrival — and his cordial reception by Chang Tso-lin on April 8.

resignation of Ivanov, the manager of the CER, who had caused the trouble in the previous January, was announced in Moscow : this was interpreted, no doubt correctly, as a gesture to appease Chang Tso-lin.¹ Two days later, as the result of a further meeting between Chang and Serebryakov, a statement was issued withdrawing the acrimonious notes exchanged between the Soviet consul-general and the foreign affairs department.² Serebryakov then went on to Tokyo.³ The attack on Karakhan had been staved off, and a momentary truce patched up with Chang Tso-lin. But it was recognized that good relations with Chang, now more than ever necessary to the Soviet Government, were mainly dependent on the maintenance of good relations with Japan.

While these events were in progress, Borodin, hitherto a key figure in Soviet policy in China, was completely removed from the scene of action. On April 3, 1926, he arrived in Ulan-Bator with a party of 30, consisting of Chinese communists and members of Kuomintang, who, having been cut off by recent events in Peking and Tientsin, were travelling by this roundabout route to return to Canton through Vladivostok. Feng Yü-hsiang, bound for Moscow, was already in the Mongolian capital.⁴ During his stay there, his convictions developed rapidly along the lines marked out by his present total dependence on Soviet support. He took Russian lessons, and engaged in political and ideological discussion with the Mongolian leaders, with the Soviet *polpred* and with his own Soviet adviser, Henry A. Lin. On April 1, 1926, he gave an interview to a Soviet reporter denouncing Japan and Great Britain, and praising Kuomintang, which "marches at the head of the national liberation movement".⁵ When two days later Borodin reached Ulan-Bator, conversations were resumed between him and Feng on the theme of collaboration between Kuominchün and Kuomintang : these led to nothing. Then, on April 7, 1926, Borodin and his companions went on their way, leaving Feng to the care of Henry A. Lin, in whose

¹ *Ibid.* April 18, 1926 ; *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), April 15, 1926, p. 442 ; K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 374.

² The statement was summarized in *Izvestiya*, April 24, 1926, and read on the same day by Litvinov in his speech to VTsIK (SSSR : *Tsentral'nyi Ispolnitel'nyi Komitet 3 Sozyva* : 2 *Sessiya* (1926), pp. 1064-1065).

³ See p. 882 below.

⁴ See p. 762 above.

⁵ *Izvestiya*, April 3, 1926.

company he finally departed for the Soviet Union on April 27, 1926.¹ Feng arrived on May 9, 1926, in Moscow, where he was received by the chief of staff of the Red Army and other Soviet officials, and declared himself "glad to see in your young Russia the pattern of the future China".² Meanwhile, Borodin, continuing his circuitous journey, encountered in Vladivostok Hu Han-min, who, his mission to Moscow terminated, was on his way back to Canton.³ The two men arrived in Canton together on April 29, 1926.⁴

When Borodin returned to Canton after almost three months' absence, he and Chiang Kai-shek appear to have fallen into each other's arms, their mutual confidence unimpaired by what had happened. The two men had been close collaborators for almost two years. This collaboration had helped Chiang Kai-shek to build up an impregnable position in the south and to aspire to the rôle of liberator of his country; it had enabled Borodin to carry out the cardinal purpose of his mission — the establishment of the alliance with Kuomintang and the dramatic advancement of the revolutionary movement for national liberation. Neither man wanted to break the bond; and, when Borodin returned to Canton at the end of April 1926, the ground for a reconciliation had been well prepared. For Chiang Kai-shek, it was apparent after the *coup* of March 20 that no danger any longer threatened him from the Left. The only potential obstacles to his absolute power were his new friends of the Right. He was reported to be in close contact with Sun Fo and Wu Ch'ao-shu (commonly known in the west as C. C. Wu), the acting mayor of Canton and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the nationalist government, and to see Wu almost every day.⁵ But Chiang Kai-shek no more wanted to be

¹ For the sources for these movements see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 330-331; Borodin's journey via Ulan-Bator is also recorded in L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 651-652.

² *Pravda*, May 11, 1926.

³ Hu Han-min, having taken part in a meeting on the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, on March 12, 1926 (see p. 764, note 2 above), left Moscow on the next day and arrived in Vladivostok on March 25, 1926 (*Pravda*, March 26, 1926).

⁴ The date is fixed by Chiang Kai-shek's diary cited in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 227.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 262.

the prisoner of the Right than of the Left; he could afford to relax his hostility to the Left, and even to appease the Left by adopting towards the Right a sterner attitude which would proclaim his independence in that quarter. This delicate manœuvre occupied the month of April 1926. A statement issued in the name of the central executive committee of Kuomintang on the occasion of a meeting of the "Western Hills" group in Shanghai took note, in the light of adverse developments in northern China, of "a revival of the reactionary wing of Kuomintang which was excluded from the party last year": this group had taken advantage of the absence of Wang Ching-wei through "serious illness" to "spread all sorts of groundless rumours". The statement confirmed the intention of Kuomintang to "maintain Sun Yat-sen's policy in the workers' and peasants' question", and promised "punitive measures against renegades and counter-revolutionaries who spread provocative rumours".¹ Chiang continued to make speeches attacking the Right, and towards the end of the month dismissed several Right-wing leaders from their posts.² Borodin, back from an unbroken series of disappointments and perplexities in the north, found himself once more on the revolutionary soil of Canton, and saw no reason to doubt the sincerity of Chiang's revolutionary professions. Chiang, who had passed through a harassing period of friction and misunderstandings with Soviet military advisers and visitors from Moscow, was relieved to find himself face to face once more with the one Russian who turned a sympathetic ear to his needs and policies, and whom he did not suspect of trying to get the better of him. In appearance, therefore, relations could be taken up again at the point where they had been interrupted. Only the

¹ *Pravda*, April 30, 1926; it is not clear whether this document, attributed by *Pravda* to the "Politburo" of Kuomintang, is identical with the "circular telegram" denouncing the "Western Hills" meeting in Shanghai issued by Chiang Kai-shek, and dated — apparently on the evidence of his diary — April 4, 1926 (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 223).

² L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, 652, refers to these dismissals as "the second coup of April 25" — an exaggeration doubtless derived from Borodin; Chiang Kai-shek's turn against the Right was afterwards attributed to "excitement among workers and peasants and discontent in the best sections of the army" as a result of the March 20 coup (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (85), March 18, 1927, p. 5), but no evidence was quoted for this view.

balance had radically changed. Whatever Borodin's initial reactions to the March 20 *coup* had been,¹ the question of a voluntary withdrawal of communists from Kuomintang no longer arose. The contingency which had emerged on the horizon after March 20, and which the Soviet group had since that time been anxiously working to avert, was the expulsion of communists by decision of Kuomintang. It was already clear that Chiang Kai-shek, who still needed Soviet aid, did not intend to push the issue to that point: but the fact that the question could arise in that form was a symptom of changed relations. Chiang Kai-shek, and not Borodin, would now set the pace.

Not only had the balance shifted, but a new factor had been injected into the debate — the decision to start the northern expedition within the next two or three months. This was embarrassing for Borodin; for, whereas the injunction to work with Kuomintang had been maintained by Comintern for the past three years, every authority in Moscow had consistently treated the northern expedition as a dream of the future, and discouraged any hint of its early realization as unwarrantably hazardous. Nevertheless, by the time Borodin returned to Canton, the Soviet military advisers, led by Stepanov, had evidently begun to take it for granted. Negotiations between Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek began on the day after Borodin's arrival, and went on continuously till May 15, 1926, the day on which the central executive committee of Kuomintang met for an important session.² The aims of the two negotiators were transparently plain: on Chiang's side, to win Borodin's support for the northern expedition; on Borodin's side, to keep the communist alliance with Kuomintang in being and to weaken the influence of

¹ The statement of three members of the Russian party central committee who visited China early in 1927 that Borodin after the *coup* of March 20, 1926, was in favour of withdrawing from Kuomintang (L. Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1932), pp. 406-407; for a similar statement about Voitinsky see *ibid.* p. 454) almost certainly rested on a misunderstanding. What Borodin wanted was to "apply the tactics of the offensive" by strengthening the alliance with the Kuomintang Left in order to counter-attack the Right: "We must make our own March 20" (Ch'en Tu-hsiu's report to the fifth party congress quoted in P. Mif, *Kitaiskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Kriticheskie Dni* (1928), p. 37). Chiang's attitude created the illusion that this was a workable policy.

² Entries in Chiang's diary cited in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 227.

the Kuomintang Right which opposed the alliance. Soviet support for the northern expedition was a powerful card in Borodin's hand; but it was the only card he had, and he was therefore driven to play it, whatever view might be taken in Moscow. Three arguments were subsequently put forward by Borodin in justification of his conversion to Chiang Kai-shek's ambitious project: the threat of an impending aggression by Wu Pei-fu from the north; the conviction that indirect action such as the Hong Kong strike, which had been maintained with increasing difficulty for nine months, would not suffice by itself to overthrow foreign domination in China; and the fear that, if Chiang were thwarted and action further delayed, an open split would occur between the CCP, with its Left supporters in Kuomintang, and the increasingly powerful Right wing of Kuomintang, which would mean a rift between the national and social revolutions with disastrous consequences to both.¹ The most powerful argument was, however, presumably Chiang Kai-shek's confidence in the new army built up by him with Soviet aid and advice, and in its ability to overcome the armies of central and northern China. The previous objections of Moscow had been based on the hypothesis that the venture could not hope to succeed. Once Borodin could be induced to share Chiang's confidence, the argument was easy. On May 1, 1926, two days after Borodin's return, Chiang still recorded in his diary his disagreement with Borodin on the northern expedition.² Thereafter no more is heard of Borodin's objections. The logic of the situation had convinced him as it had already convinced the remaining Soviet advisers. It was the only basis on which the alliance with Kuomintang could be maintained.

The essence of the agreement reached between Borodin and Chiang Kai-shek consisted of an undertaking by Borodin to furnish Soviet support for the northern expedition and by Chiang to maintain his ban on the Kuomintang Right and to uphold the communist alliance. But Chiang was also able to impose his

¹ These were the reasons subsequently given by Borodin to Fischer for his conversion (L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, p. 648); it is reasonable to suppose that they were the arguments which swayed him at the time. Karakhan is also said to have "counselled against a break with Chiang" (*ibid.* ii, 653).

² *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 230.

terms for retaining the alliance. At an extraordinary session of the central executive committee of Kuomintang which opened on May 15, 1926, a resolution was submitted "on the adjustment of party affairs", which redefined the status of members of the CCP in Kuomintang. In addition to the two main conditions already laid down by Chiang Kai-shek in his memorandum of April 3, 1926¹ — loyalty to the principles of Sun Yat-sen, and the communication to Kuomintang of a list of CCP members — it was stipulated that members of Kuomintang (including, of course, CCP members) should be prohibited from convening any party conference without the consent of Kuomintang, and that all instructions and policy pronouncements of the CCP or of Comintern should be submitted for approval to the joint Kuomintang-CCP council; this proposal had the effect of marking the complete subordination of the CCP to the senior partner in the alliance. Members of the CCP were not to be eligible for posts as heads of departments in the Kuomintang organization. When this resolution was approved by the central executive committee on May 17, 1926, it was further tightened up on one point: CCP members were not to form more than one-third of the membership of central, district or local executive committees.² Another resolution provided for the election of a permanent president of the central executive committee to hold office till the next congress: the purpose was evidently to invest this new presidium with similar functions to those exercised by the presidium of IKKI. After the end of the session, Chang Ching-chiang was appointed to the post: he was a close adherent and confidant of Chiang Kai-shek, and was reputed a strong anti-communist. Several leading communists lost their posts at Kuomintang headquarters, including T'an P'ing-shan as head of the organization department and Mao Tse-tung as deputy head of the propaganda department.³

¹ See p. 785 above.

² For the sources for this session see *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 228-229. The resolution was first published a year later; the translation in T. C. Woo, *The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution* (1928), pp. 175-177, prefaces it with a brief general resolution on the principles of relations between the parties.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 229, 512, note 102.

Having achieved so much, Chiang Kai-shek could afford to propitiate Borodin, and promote his own interests, by some further moves against the Right. Chiang was now in a strong enough personal position to brook no rivals in Kuomintang, whether on the Right or on the Left. Hu Han-min, encouraged by a triumphal reception prepared for him on his return, began busily to negotiate with Sun Fo, C. C. Wu and other Right leaders, and is said to have made a proposal to Chiang to arrest Borodin (and presumably to expel the communists). This was quite at variance with Chiang's intentions, and he decided to get rid of Hu. On May 9, 1926, Hu Han-min left for Hong Kong *en route* for Shanghai. But his departure was balanced by the departure of the timid and unpopular Wang Ching-wei, who, after a fleeting reappearance in Canton, had decided to make a journey to Paris.¹ On May 25, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek made a speech to a meeting of Kuomintang officials reaffirming his faith in the communist alliance; both Kuomintang and the CCP were engaged in fighting against imperialism, and each was necessary to the other.² Two days later Chiang Kai-shek's diary recorded a conference with Borodin on the liquidation of the reactionaries. C. C. Wu was relieved of his post and withdrew to Shanghai.³ He was succeeded as nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs by the versatile Eugene Chen; since Chen was an associate of Borodin, and had been one of the group which accompanied him on the recent journey to the north, Borodin's hand may reasonably be suspected in this appointment. Other leaders of the Right were arrested; and a plan was canvassed, though not eventually carried out, to send Sun Fo on a mission to Moscow.⁴ On the other hand Tai Chi-t'ao, the theorist of the Right, remained in favour; and this, together with the appointment of Chang Ching-chiang as president of the central executive committee of Kuomintang, suggested that the qualification for honours was not so much loyalty to the political principles of the Left as

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 230, 266-267, 512, note 106; T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (1930), p. 247 records that Hu Han-min "turned to the Right again" immediately after his return from Moscow.

² Quoted from the contemporary press in C. Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China* (1958), p. 82.

³ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 229-230.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 268.

devotion to the person of the leader. On June 4, 1926, an extraordinary session of the central executive committee took a formal decision to launch the northern expedition, and named Chiang Kai-shek commander-in-chief. At the same time the military council was abolished.¹ The military dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek was to all intents and purposes absolute. At the same time the hand of Moscow had been forced. As the military advisers and Borodin had seen on the spot, no option was really open once Chiang Kai-shek had taken a firm decision to start the expedition. To refuse participation would have meant to abandon the alliance with Kuomintang and, in Stalin's words, to "withdraw the communists from the interplay of revolutionary forces in China".² So far as the records go, the Politburo took refuge in silence. Not only was no public pronouncement made on behalf of the Russian party, of the Soviet Government or of Comintern, but the attitude of opposition to the northern expedition never appears to have been formally reversed.³

The only group which obtained no compensation at all for indignities suffered by it on March 20, 1926, and afterwards, was the CCP. Six weeks elapsed between the *coup* of March 20 and Borodin's return to Canton; and during this interval the only guidance received from Moscow was the impracticable instruction to strengthen the Kuomintang Left and to prepare the ground for the "exodus or exclusion" of the Right.⁴ All accounts agree in depicting the party as divided and bewildered. According to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, many of the rank-and-file party members, including "our party workers in Kwantung", demanded some counter-stroke; but the majority of the party central committee in Shanghai thought it impossible to attack Chiang Kai-shek, who had "not yet openly shown his counter-revolutionary face",

¹ *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 230.

² Stalin, *Sochineniya*, x, 155; for this comment by Stalin see p. 783 above.

³ As late as August 4, 1926, an alleged report of the Chinese commission of IKKI (quoted in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 512, note 108) rehearsed the objections to the expedition; but the authenticity of the document is uncertain.

⁴ See p. 784 above.

and "a tactic of retreat, of concessions" was approved.¹ Whatever private misgivings may have been felt, two documents attest the conciliatory attitude adopted by the CCP before the return of Borodin. On April 23, 1926, Ch'en published an article in the party journal in which he denounced the Kuomintang Right, sharply distinguishing it from the Left, refuted charges that communists had been involved in a conspiracy to overthrow Chiang on March 20, and emphasized the desire of the CCP for continued cooperation with Kuomintang.² About the same time the Kwantung party organization sent an open letter to the executive committee of Kuomintang proclaiming its "unconditional support" for the united front against militarists and imperialists, and recognizing "the leadership of Kuomintang in the national revolutionary movement".³

On the eve of the May session of the central executive committee of Kuomintang, which revealed the full extent of the surrender of independence imposed on the CCP, a brief debate

¹ *Bol'shevik*, No. 23-24, December 21, 1927, p. 101. Ch'en Tu-hsiu gave two later accounts of these events — the first, quoted in the text, in his report to the fifth congress of the CCP in June 1927 (see p. 741, note 2 above); the second in his letter of December 10, 1929, after he had left the party (see p. 698, note 2 above). In the second account Ch'en claimed that at some unspecified date after March 20, 1926, he wrote to Comintern expressing the personal view that the CCP should abandon membership of Kuomintang and substitute an external alliance, and that Bukharin thereupon published an article in *Pravda* severely criticizing this view. No such article has been traced; but *Pravda*, June 12, 1926, printed a resolution adopted by the Leningrad party organization on a report by Bukharin (and probably drafted by him), declaring that, in view of "the temporary hitch" in the development of the Chinese revolution, the CCP "should increase its efforts tenfold in preparing the masses for a new revolutionary uprising, while maintaining organizational links with Kuomintang". According to Stepanov's report in the first half of April 1926 (see pp. 785-786 above), Ch'en at that time accepted the policy of conciliation, and the party central committee had passed a resolution to the effect that "Chiang must be utilized by all means"; but the representative of the central committee in Canton still thought that, "if Chiang should be opposed by the communists and the Kuomintang Left wing at Canton, he would be alienated and isolated" (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), pp. 255, 264). It was alleged much later that the Kwantung party organization had advocated the dismissal of Chiang Kai-shek, the seizure of the leadership of Kuomintang by the communists and the expulsion of the Right (*ibid.* pp. 225-226). All sorts of wild schemes may well have been canvassed; but the sources are dubious.

² *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* (Guide-Weekly), April 23, 1926, pp. 1413-1415, cited in *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 221.

³ *Pravda*, April 30, 1926.

on the same issue took place in the Politburo in Moscow. It was introduced by Voitinsky, who was about to leave for China, and evidently asked for instructions. The issue of the northern expedition does not appear to have been raised. The discussion revolved round the future of the relation of the CCP to Kuomintang. The problem was less embarrassing in Moscow than in Shanghai or in Canton; and recommendations put forward by Voitinsky seem to have been accepted without much difficulty. It was decided that the CCP should be prepared "in case of absolute necessity" to discuss "the possibility of a certain separation of functions" between it and Kuomintang; to remove well-known communists from Kuomintang institutions, but to leave in these institutions for the present communists "not yet known to Kuomintang" (this implied an evasion of the Kuomintang demand for a list of party members); and that "the possible separation" of the two parties should be considered only "in case of emergency". It was specifically added that the withdrawal of the CCP from Kuomintang was to be regarded as undesirable.¹ These decisions rested on an over-estimate of the power either of the CCP or of the Politburo to decide the question of relations with Kuomintang: it was Chiang Kai-shek who would settle this in his own good time. But, given the restiveness of the CCP and the need to avoid a crisis on the eve of the northern expedition, it is difficult to see what else could have been done. It may have been under pressure from Moscow that the central committee of the CCP, in a letter of June 4, 1926, informed the central executive committee of Kuomintang of its acceptance of the May resolutions, which were interpreted as an expression of the desire of Kuomintang to eliminate causes of friction or suspicion in the common cause: the hope was expressed that the purge of reactionaries would be energetically pursued. On the same date Ch'en Tu-hsiu addressed to Chiang an open letter replying to a speech in which Chiang had obliquely

¹ The only record of the decision is in a statement made by Zinoviev to the session of the party central committee and central control commission on July 19, 1926, and preserved under the title *Zayavlenie k Stenogramme Ob"edinennogo Plenuma TsK i TsKK* in the Trotsky archives (T 886); made within a few weeks of the event, and in conditions where any inaccuracy would have exposed its author to immediate contradiction, it is likely to be correct. It contains no indication of individual views expressed at the meeting; Trotsky was absent in Berlin.

accused the CCP of responsibility for the *coup* of March 20. The tone of the reply was apologetic and self-exculpatory. Ch'en disclaimed any immediate desire to set up a workers' and peasants' government, and concluded that the overthrow of Chiang could benefit only Great Britain, Japan and the Chinese war-lords. Both letters appeared in the party journal on June 9, 1926.¹

The central executive committee of Kuomintang, at its session of May 15-17, 1926, was mainly concerned with the attitude of Kuomintang to the CCP and with personal appointments, and did not discuss social policy. But this did not imply that social issues had disappeared from view. The decision to launch the northern expedition made them all the more urgent and delicate. A strike in the Canton arsenal in May 1926 raised the question of labour in its most acute form, and inspired demands for the suppression of the right to strike and the imposition of compulsory arbitration — a situation full of embarrassment for the CCP, some members of which supported these demands and later incurred the imputation of a Right deviation.² A similar dilemma presented itself in regard to the party attitude towards the peasants. After the *coup* of March 20, 1926, "Chiang Kai-shek's armies, together with the landowners, began to put strong pressure on the peasant population of the countryside and on the peasant unions";³ and according to a later report the silence of the central executive committee of Kuomintang at its session of May 1926 on social issues was interpreted by "unprincipled landlords" and avaricious officials as a directive to dissolve the fractious peasant unions, and as a token that Kuomintang had abandoned its "worker and peasant" orientation.⁴ It must have been about this time that Ch'en Tu-hsiu sent P'eng Shu-chih to Canton from Shanghai as representative of the central committee

¹ *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, June 9, 1926, pp. 1525-1526, 1526-1532. The quotation from Ch'en's letter in H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), pp. 114-115, is a not very close paraphrase; the reference in L. Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia* (1928), p. 150, to Ch'en's letter of July [sic] 4, 1926, as recognizing "Sun Yat-senism as the 'common belief' of the workers and the bourgeoisie in the national movement" is not even a paraphrase.

² *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 8 (82), February 25, 1927, pp. 11-12; apparently no labour laws were in force in Canton, and trade unions were still theoretically illegal (*ibid.* No. 11 (85), March 18, 1927, p. 4).

³ *Problemy Kitaya*, i (1929), 10.

⁴ H. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938), p. 121.

of the CCP to ask that 5000 rifles from the Soviet shipments to Canton be put at the disposal of the Kwangtung peasant union — apparently as the nucleus of an independent fighting force to strengthen the hand of the communists against Chiang Kai-shek. Borodin — if it was he who received the emissary¹ — flatly refused the request. At the moment of the launching of the northern expedition, a diversion of arms to peasants whose loyalty to Kuomintang was ambivalent, and whose constant pressure for agrarian reform was a thorn in the side of the Kuomintang Right, would have been treated by Chiang Kai-shek as an unfriendly action. Borodin embroidered his refusal by telling P'eng Shu-chih, in a phrase which evidently rankled, that the business of communists at the present juncture was to “do coolie service” for Kuomintang. The occurrence was one more example of the way in which acceptance of the Kuomintang alliance and of the northern expedition had fettered the freedom of action of the CCP.

Another outstanding embarrassment had to be cleared up before the northern expedition could start: the Hong Kong strike. The dissolution and arrest of the Canton strike committee, which was a by-product of the *coup* of March 20, 1926, and more unequivocally than anything else marked the character of that incident as a turn to the Right, paved the way for the negotiations which the Hong Kong government had long desired. On April 9, 1926, the first meeting took place between C. C. Wu, the acting foreign minister of the Canton government, and a Hong Kong official.² The negotiations thus set on foot did not end with Wu's dismissal at the end of May 1926.³ It is not certain whether the issue of the Hong Kong strike was ever

¹ Ch'en recorded this episode in his letter of December 10, 1929 (see p. 698, note 2 above); “the delegate of the International” referred to is not named. But it cannot have been Voitinsky who is mentioned separately in the next paragraph of the letter (under the disguise of Wu Ting-kong) as head of the Far Eastern bureau of Comintern, and the identification with Borodin is virtually certain; Borodin is also called “the representative of the International” with reference to this period in *Byulleten' Oppozitsii* (Paris), No. 15-16, September-October, 1930, p. 20).

² *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), April 24, 1926, p. 210.

³ See p. 795 above; the rumour circulated at this time that Wu had been in negotiation with Hong Kong for a loan of \$10,000,000 to be used against the nationalist government (*Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China*, ed. Wilbur and How (1956), p. 512, note 106).

debated in Moscow.¹ But Borodin came out strongly in favour of a settlement; in his words, "it became necessary to terminate the battle in this corner in order to start out with greater vigour to fight imperialism throughout China — on a wider base".² Negotiations with Hong Kong continued during the summer; and the strike, after lasting for 16 months, was officially brought to an end on October 10, 1926. It was a logical step, as Borodin pointed out, to abandon this subsidiary and peripheral struggle in the interest of the major campaign for the reunification and liberation of China. But the agreement with Hong Kong was also the prelude to a hitherto unforeseen and undreamt of consummation — the attainment of Chiang Kai-shek's ambition with the consent and connivance of the imperialist Powers.

The launching of the northern expedition revealed in glaring colours the inherent weakness of the CCP and the hollowness of the assumptions on which the alliance with Kuomintang rested. It might have been difficult to relate the activities of the CCP to those of Kuomintang and to reconcile the tactics of social and of national revolution without the intervention of Comintern and of the Soviet Government. But the problem would then scarcely have existed; for Kuomintang could have afforded to ignore a CCP unsupported from Moscow. Even the appeal which the CCP could make to the Chinese worker or peasant was partly due to the belief that it spoke with the voice of Moscow and of Lenin, the great liberator. The difficulty about the position of the CCP at this time was that it was an intrusive *tertium quid*, sometimes convenient, sometimes superfluous, in relations

¹ Hilger, who was probably more intimate than any other foreigner with officials of Narkomindel, reports a clash between Chicherin, who wished to "further and deepen" the revolution in China, and Litvinov, who was prepared to "sell China to England" (G. Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml* (1955), p. 112). If this story is authentic — and the homely Russian proverb in which Litvinov justified his policy is quoted in the English version (G. Hilger and A. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies* (N.Y., 1953), p. 112) — it could be placed at any time in 1926 or 1927; but the only occasion during that period on which a specific understanding with Great Britain was sought at the expense of the Chinese revolution was the calling-off of the Hong Kong strike.

² L. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930), ii, p. 645; among the documents alleged to have been found at the Soviet embassy in Peking in 1927 was a report of a Chinese commission of the Russian Politburo of August 4, 1926, recommending *inter alia* a settlement of the Hong Kong strike (*China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 805).

between Moscow and Kuomintang. The peculiar arrangement by which it existed within Kuomintang, and exercised an influence of varying weight on Kuomintang policy, was entirely the product and reflexion of Soviet influence in Canton. The policies of the CCP were dictated by these relations ; and, since it would be torn in pieces if these relations broke down, it was compelled, quite apart from any formal question of Comintern discipline, to follow the course which kept the alliance between Moscow and Canton in being. When, after the first successes of the northern expedition, the claims of the national revolution clashed openly with those of social revolution, and the Chinese nationalist bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kai-shek found an orientation towards the west more congenial than an orientation towards Moscow, the position of the CCP was hopeless ; and it became the scapegoat for the failure of policies imposed not so much by order from Moscow as by the whole conception of temporary but friendly collaboration between Kuomintang and Comintern, between the national and the social revolutions. Lenin had originally preached such collaboration in conditions, and in countries, where the social revolution was supposedly on the way to overtake an uncompleted bourgeois-democratic revolution on a national basis. In China of the middle nineteen-twenties these conditions had scarcely begun to exist.

CHAPTER 41

OUTER MONGOLIA

THE provisional régime established in Outer Mongolia by the agreement of November 5, 1921,¹ had some analogies with the status at the same period of Bokhara and Khorezm in Central Asia.² The presence of Soviet troops assured the predominance of Soviet authority, and the territory was organized in the form of a Soviet, but not yet socialist, republic. The retention in Outer Mongolia of the Bogdo Gegen as the theocratic head of the state, though without actual political power, was a tribute to the old tradition, which a rising generation of young Mongols, with active Soviet backing, sought steadily to undermine. But, whereas in Bokhara and Khorezm, which had been under Tsarist sovereignty, the course was set from the first for eventual incorporation in the USSR, in Outer Mongolia, which had never been Russian territory, this solution was not seriously desired or contemplated either by Tsarist or by Soviet Russia, whose aim was to create "a *neutral zone* of sufficient dimensions to provide a guarantee against sudden attacks from whatever quarter".³ Any more ambitious design would have been rendered hazardous and inconvenient by the interest long displayed in the territory by two important adjacent Powers — China and Japan. Japan, since her forced retirement from Siberia in 1922, and since the earthquake of September 1923, had abated her former activities in Outer Mongolia, and remained only as a bugbear on the distant horizon. But China, though disunited and impotent, showed no signs of abandoning the ancient Chinese claim to sovereignty over the whole of Mongolia, Outer as well as Inner; and nobody doubted that this claim would be promptly reasserted by any powerful military authority which might re-establish itself

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 520.

² See *ibid.* Vol. 1, pp. 335-336.

³ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 331.

in China. The danger was increased in Soviet eyes by the large predominance of Chinese over Russian residents in Outer Mongolia, by the close traditional contacts of the territory with China, and by the predominant importance of Chinese trade in its economy. The execution of Bodo and other Outer Mongolian leaders in 1922 had been based on charges, probably well founded, of complicity in Chinese designs on the country.¹ Fear of such designs was in the background of all Mongolian policy, and of Soviet policy in Mongolia, in the nineteen-twenties.

The year 1923 witnessed the first concerted efforts to create a viable modern state in Outer Mongolia. A decree was issued laying the foundations of local government in the form of local assemblies to elect local officials and representatives to higher assemblies.² "Hundreds of meetings of *arats*"³ were held, at which the law was explained and elections took place; and the aim was to extend the removal from power of "feudal lords and lamas", which had begun at the centre in 1921, to the outlying regions.⁴ Owing to lack of sufficient organization from the centre, the experiment failed. In three provinces, "feudal and ecclesiastical lords and their supporters" were elected "almost everywhere"; and the results in other provinces seem to have been little better. The government annulled the elections — to resume the attempt with greater success in the following year.⁵ In April 1923, Rinchino, the president of the military council, a Buryat-Mongol who had previously served as an intermediary between the Mongolian party leaders and the Soviet authorities, visited Moscow to solicit arms and Soviet military instructors;

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 522.

² *Revolutsionnyi Vostok*, iv-v (1928), 361; this may be identical with the "law" described in A. Kallinikov, *Revolutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), p. 78.

³ The word *arat* or *arad* in Mongolian implies no more than "people" or "common people", and is used in compounds to form the equivalents of such western terms as "democracy". The Mongolian *arats* were so called to distinguish them from princes and lamas. Most of them were occupied as herdsmen, though this was not implicit in the term. In Russian works, the Mongolian *arats* are treated as the counterpart of the Russian peasants, and are often classified as poor, middle and well-to-do *arats*.

⁴ I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 189.

⁵ The report in 3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 49 spoke of three provinces; but, according to the report of the Minister for Internal Affairs (*ibid.* p. 67), the failure was general. For the elections of 1924 see p. 823 below.

and the creation of an effective Mongolian army began at the end of that year.¹

When in the autumn of 1923 Soviet policy in China was reviewed in Moscow in the light of the despatch of Karakhan to Peking and of Borodin to Canton, Outer Mongolia cannot have been omitted from the picture. Since the principal aims of the Soviet Government were to win sympathy and support in China and to secure *de jure* recognition from the Chinese Government, cautious restraint was required in handling the Mongolian question. The discussions between Karakhan and Wellington Koo in Peking in the autumn of 1923 at once revealed it as a burning issue, which Karakhan sought in vain to avoid;² and Tseren-Dorji, the newly-appointed Mongolian Prime Minister, was reported as declaring that "Mongolia will strive to obtain independence, and, if China henceforth wishes to enslave Mongolia, we will fight".³ But Kalinin's speech of welcome to the Mongolian diplomatic representative who presented his credentials on January 10, 1924, avoided the vexed issue of independence and spoke only of Soviet support for "the strengthening of the principle of popular rule and the raising of the economic well-being of the country".⁴ When a new Soviet representative, Vasiliev, arrived in Urga on January 3, 1924, he cryptically declared, in presenting his credentials, that a country surrounded, like the Soviet Union, by "reactionary states", was sometimes obliged "to fall back on the second line of defence". This was apparently an attempt to excuse the willingness of the Soviet

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 90-91; for a further reference to the need for Soviet military instructors see *ibid.* p. 96. According to Rinchino's own statements at the third party congress in August 1924, he had originally travelled to Moscow in 1920 with the first Mongolian delegation (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 512), worked in the Mongolian-Tibetan section of the Comintern secretariat at Irkutsk, and later returned to Outer Mongolia on instructions from Comintern (3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 17-18, 201-211). For an abortive attempt to organize a Mongolian military unit with Russian instructors in 1913-1914 see G. M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), pp. 92-93.

² For these discussions see pp. 679-681 above.

³ *Izvestiya*, November 2, 1923. The appointment of Tseren-Dorji, an old official who had served many régimes and quarrelled with none, was discussed in detail *ibid.* November 28, 1923; his principal rival was Danzan, formerly Minister of Finance and now commander-in-chief (see p. 815 below).

⁴ *Ibid.* January 12, 1924.

Government in its negotiations with China to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. Vasiliev announced Soviet approval of schemes for a Russian-Mongolian bank and a Russian-Mongolian telegraph agreement. He described these as "the first steps to a prosperous future which would be to the mutual advantage" of both countries, and firmly announced that nothing would be done "without the permission and authority of the Mongolian Government".¹ When, a few days later, at a banquet given in his honour, a Mongolian general tactlessly referred to the need for "an armed blow to the aggressive intentions of the Chinese", Vasiliev explained that the Soviet Union was opposed to anything which would exacerbate relations between China and Mongolia, and was "in principle against sabre-rattling".² In a statement to the press Vasiliev put the issue much more frankly :

I will say definitely that present conditions do not permit of our speaking of or referring to the "independence" of Mongolia ; the only thing mentioned is "autonomy" for your country. . . . What should be considered are the actual conditions under which you live, and, if you make the necessary preparations, you can live much more freely . . . with autonomy than with independence.³

The instructions brought by Vasiliev to Urga were characteristic of Soviet policy. The Soviet Government at this time was willing to concede the Chinese claim to formal sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, and concentrated on creating material conditions for *de facto* Mongolian independence of China. The recognition, in the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924, of Outer Mongolia as "an integral part of the Chinese Republic"⁴ accorded with this policy. Meanwhile the Bogdo Gegen⁵ died on May 24, 1924 ; and his death, within a few months of the arrival of Vasiliev, paved the way for the complete secularization of the Outer Mongolian state. Since 1922 a commission had been nominally working on the preparation of a constitution. But it had numbered "enemies of the people" among its members, and had got

¹ *China Year Book*, 1924-5 (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 582.

² *Izvestiya*, January 19, 1924.

³ *North China Herald* (Shanghai), March 15, 1924, quoted in G. M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), p. 127.

⁴ See pp. 682-684 above.

⁵ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 512-515.

no further than translating into Mongolian as models "the constitutions of various capitalist states".¹ The government, in conjunction with the central committee of the Mongolian People's Party, now issued a decree "to transfer the seal of the Bogdo Gegen to the government for safe keeping", and "to establish in the country a republican régime without a president as head of state, transferring supreme power to the Great People's Assembly (Khural) and to the government elected by it". Another clause of the decree, which had both a practical and a symbolical importance, related to the substitution of the secular for the religious calendar.² The foundations of a modern secular state had been laid.

The stark reality behind every project of reform and modernization of the Mongolian state was the economic, political and cultural backwardness of virtually the whole population. Outer Mongolia was a large tract of mountainous and plateau country on the confines of Russia and China. Much of it was unsuited to settled agriculture; and its population in the nineteen-twenties consisted primarily of nomadic herdsmen and breeders of livestock — camels, horses, cattle, sheep and goats — with furs and timber as subsidiary sources of wealth. According to a census of 1918, the native Mongol population amounted to 542,504; this total did not include some 100,000 Chinese mainly occupied in trade and petty industry, and about 5000 Russians.³ Of the herds

¹ B. Shirendyub, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 140; one of the documents presented to the commission was a "text of the English constitution".

² The text was recited in the constitution adopted in November 1924 (*Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 239-240); see also A. Kallinikov, *Revolutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), pp. 77-78, where the decree is described as having "converted Mongolia from a theocratic monarchy into a democratic republic", and is said to have met with no opposition from the population. *Urginskaya Gazeta*, May 28, 1924, reported the transfer of the seal; the decision to set up a republic is said to have been taken by the bureau of the party central committee on June 3, 1924, subject to confirmation by the central committee (*ibid.* June 4, 1924); it was confirmed by the central committee on June 7, 1924, embodied in a formal decree of the central committee and of the government of June 16, 1924, and published on June 25, 1924 (B. Shirendyub, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), pp. 115-116).

³ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 16 (the figures for one province, as well as for the Chinese and Russians, were based on estimates, no census having been taken). Of the 100,000 Chinese, only some 5000

which constituted the main wealth of the country, a considerable part — between 20 and 25 per cent of horses, cattle, sheep and goats and 18 per cent of camels — belonged to a small number of secular nobles and a large number of monasteries.¹ The nomad herdsmen who tended the animals were either serfs tied to the nobles or to the monasteries or nominally free men who hired the cattle from the monasteries for their use.² The monasteries were the home of large colonies of priests or lamas — a term which covered a wide variety of individuals ranging from wealthy dignitaries to humble menials whose ecclesiastical status scarcely sufficed to distinguish them from the less indigent *arats*. Lamas constituted in the early nineteen-twenties nearly half the male population.³ They owed their importance in the building of the new Mongolian republic to their status as the only educated or semi-educated group in an overwhelmingly illiterate population. Many lamas were, indeed, literate in Tibetan and not in Mongolian; and a few secular Mongols had received some training in the provincial administrations of the princes. But a majority of literate Mongols available for the administrative services of the Mongolian People's Republic were perforce lamas, or former lamas, who constituted "the real *intelligentsia* of the country".⁴

were engaged in agriculture and settled in the country; about 75,000 were merchants, who were not permanent settlers and normally returned to China after a number of years. Of the 5000 Russians, most of whom had arrived since 1911, 4000 were merchants, coming mainly from Biisk or Kyakhta with the intention to settle (I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 70-72, 88). Of the urban population, 64 per cent was Chinese or Russian (*ibid.* p. 108). By 1925 the Mongol population was said to have increased to 615,978 (*Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1926, p. 97); and at the end of the nineteen-twenties the population was estimated at 840,000, comprising 760,000 Mongols, 50,000 Chinese and 30,000 Russians (*Sibir'skaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, iii (1932), 512).

¹ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 121-122, using the census of 1918; the statement in I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istarii Mongolii* (1957), p. 204, that the "feudal-ecclesiastical dignitaries" owned nearly one-quarter of the cattle in the country, though said to relate to 1926, appears to be based on these figures.

² In 1924 12,000 *arat* households rented cattle from the monasteries (*ibid.* pp. 209-210).

³ The following percentages relating only to male population were recorded by the census of 1918: lamas and monks 44.6, free *arats* 26.2, former serfs 16.5, nobles 5.6, princes 0.1, other 7 (I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 29); in 1928 the percentage of lamas in the male population was said to have fallen to 36 (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 493).

⁴ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 310.

In these conditions, hopes of progress in Outer Mongolia turned primarily on economic development and on the spread of education which, taken together, could alone overcome the prevailing backwardness; and the source for both of these could only be the Soviet Union. But both the national and the social implications of the change were vital. Chinese predominance in Mongolia had carried with it the maintenance, not only of the primitive forms of a nomadic pre-industrial economy, but of the authority of the peculiar feudal-ecclesiastical order which provided the social and political framework of this economy. Hence the wealthy monasteries owning large herds of cattle, and the lamas congregated in and around them, were naturally oriented towards dependence on China, and were the conscious or unconscious symbols and instruments of Chinese suzerainty. When Tsarist Russia after 1911 set out to break Chinese power in Outer Mongolia, the conception of Russia as the traditional bearer of European civilization to primitive Asian peoples was certainly present to the minds of those responsible for the operation. But no specific social consequences were envisaged. When, however, Soviet Russia stepped into the shoes of the Tsars, the liberation of Outer Mongolia from Chinese rule assumed the broader dimension of a social revolution, which would overthrow not only Chinese predominance, but the predominance of the feudal-ecclesiastical group in Mongol society; and such a revolution called in turn for a reconstitution of the economy which would destroy the monopoly of wealth and economic power hitherto concentrated in the hands of this group and of the large Chinese trading concerns, whose agents, scattered all over the country, catered for the primitive needs of the population. This was the essence of the revolution which set in with the coming of Soviet power to Outer Mongolia in 1921, and achieved formal recognition in 1924.

The first task was to infuse some life into the Mongolian People's Party, and to integrate its activities with those of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, which in the early years formed the spearhead and main driving force of the revolutionary movement. The party had come into existence with

the founding of the republic in March 1921 ;¹ and a few months later 30 young Mongols who had been educated abroad and had broken with the feudal and religious traditions of lamaism founded a Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. An appeal of August 10, 1921, invited young Mongol workers to join the league in order to set up an order of society in which no difference would exist between nobles and working people, and "the whole youth of Mongolia" would be protected against domestic and foreign exploiters.² Before the end of 1921 the youth league was reported to be publishing a journal, and to have proclaimed three principal aims — education, the emancipation of women, and the emancipation of men from Buddhist influence by inducing them to cut off their pigtails.³ Both the Mongolian party and the youth league were represented at the Congress of Toilers of the Far East in Moscow in January 1922, and the league was also represented at the immediately following youth congress of the Far East ; at both congresses Mongols from Outer Mongolia and Buryat-Mongols from the autonomous region of the RSFSR seem to have been combined into one delegation.⁴ At the youth congress, the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League, though, like the party, it did not purport to be communist, announced its intention to affiliate to the Communist Youth International (KIM).⁵ Among the tasks assigned in the resolution of the congress to the Mongolian youth league was "educational work on a large scale, not only among the masses of the youth, but among the Mongol population as a whole", and "a campaign to abolish illiteracy among young people".⁶ A year later educational work was again described as "the major task of the league".⁷

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 514.

² *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 9, May 1923, p. 285 ; No. 3, November-December 1925, pp. 35-36.

³ *Internationale Jugend-Korrespondenz*, No. 37, November 30, 1921, pp. 4-5.

⁴ *Pervyi S"ezd Revolyutsionnykh Organizatsii Dal'nego Vostoka* (1922), p. 290 ; *Pravda*, January 31, 1922 (where the membership of the youth league is put at 300).

⁵ *Pravda*, February 5, 1922.

⁶ *Pervyi S"ezd Revolyutsionnykh Organizatsii Dal'nego Vostoka* (1922), p. 305 ; four of the Mongol delegates to the congress were illiterate (*ibid.* p. 293).

⁷ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 9, May 1923, p. 286 ; an unexpected tribute was paid to the youth league a few years later by a Chinese traveller, who attributed to it the increase among young Mongols of literacy, national consciousness, knowledge and initiative (Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), pp. 107-108).

From the beginning of 1922 onwards the youth league proclaimed itself "the most revolutionary wing of Mongolian society".¹ In the obscure conflicts which preceded and followed the deposition and execution of Bodo in May 1922, it took up a position on the extreme Left and clashed with the policies of compromise accepted by the party.² In June-July 1922, by which time its numbers had reached 800, it held its first congress, took a formal decision to affiliate to KIM,³ and adopted its first programme which pledged it to struggle not only for the independence of the country from "foreign capitalist oppression", but also for the emancipation of the people from the domination of the "feudal classes". It also proclaimed its "complete independence of the party both in an organizational and in a political sense".⁴ At the third congress of KIM in December 1922, the *rapporteur* declared that "our league in Mongolia plays a rôle like that of no other league in KIM", and that, though numbering only 1500 members, it led "the whole constructive work of the country". The resolution of the congress praised it as "the only organization which really unites the working-class elements in the Mongol population and stands for their interests".⁵ At its second congress in July 1923, the Mongolian Youth League, evidently not without encouragement from KIM, carried its gesture of defiance of the party a stage further by amending the relevant article of the programme to read that "assistance will be given by the youth league in the work of the party and government according to circumstances, i.e. in so far as the league finds it necessary to render such assistance".⁶ The journal of the league argued that the

¹ It was so described in the resolution of the Far Eastern youth congress (see p. 810, note 6 above).

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 522-523.

³ The Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League remained throughout the nineteen-twenties, not a full member of KIM, but a "sympathizing organization", being described as the only non-communist youth organization in the ranks of KIM (*Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 7, March 1927, p. 38; No. 12, August 1927, p. 40).

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 9, May 1923, p. 286; A. Kallinikov, *Revolutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), pp. 88-90.

⁵ *Bericht vom 3. Kongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 221, 281.

⁶ The text of the programme has not been available in either form; the above passage was quoted in *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 16. For the attitude of KIM see the article published on the eve of the congress in *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 9, May 1923, pp. 285-286.

party had become reactionary, and that the league could support and recognize it "only in so far as"; and the rule that members of the league on reaching the age of 25 should be transferred to the party was said to have been constantly ignored.¹ The league conducted a purge by expelling all nobles from its ranks, though with the right to apply for readmission, and challenged the party to follow its example.² This arrogant attitude led to chronic friction between party and league. In spite of the purge, the membership of the league had risen to 4000 at the time of the fourth congress of KIM in July 1924.³

Meanwhile the Mongolian People's Party, though it grew in numbers, showed few signs of active political life. It was created in 1921 as a party of national liberation. The party, it was afterwards said, "was obliged at the beginning to set its course so as to draw into its ranks loyal representatives of the feudal-theocratic world, in order to secure a united national front against the common enemy".⁴ It was a coalition between the toiling masses and "the most honourable and perceptive *anti-Chinese* groups among the privileged strata of Mongolia".⁵ In the party could be found "at one pole, well-to-do people, and even convinced theocrats, at the other pole, people with few possessions and in individual cases semi-proletarians": what united these socially disparate elements was "the presence of a common enemy (the Chinese exploiters) and the monopoly position of the People's Party which exercises the dictatorship".⁶ Its original platform drawn up at the founding congress of the party had spoken of "the firm foundations of revolutionary socialism" as the guiding principle of the party. But the phrase seems to have lacked authority.⁷ A Mongolian spokesman at the Far

¹ 3^e *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 30, 33.

² *Ibid.* p. 37.

³ *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der KJI* (1924), p. 64.

⁴ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 72.

⁵ *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 186.

⁶ 3^e *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. xviii.

⁷ It was quoted *ibid.* p. xvi, where it was said to have represented "the personal opinions of one of the authors of the platform rather than the point of view of the broad mass of members of the Mongolian People's Party"; the full text of the platform has not been traced, and it is not known whether it was drafted in Russian or Mongolian.

Eastern congress in Moscow in January 1922 defined the position as follows :

The Mongolian People's Party is not only not a communist, but not even a socialist, party. Its task is the final liberation of Mongolia from the economic and political persecution of foreign oppressors and the emancipation of the masses of the people from feudal-ecclesiastical exploitation, the establishment of popular government, the development of the productive forces of the country, of popular education, etc. Thus the party in its programme comes under the rubric of *radical-democratic parties*.¹

Though Sukhebaator and Choibalsan, two of the leading founders of the party, were of humble origin, and feeling against princes and lamas ran high, the party lacked any specific class character, and its composition reflected the backwardness of Mongolian society. A majority of its members at this time were probably officials and small cattle-owners. The president of its central committee, Yapon-Danzan, was a former lama.² The party held its second congress in June 1923 in highly irregular conditions. Yapon-Danzan had been absent. The secretary of the central committee, Damba-Dorji, described as "a young telegraphist trained in Russia",³ though he afterwards denied that he had "forced" the congress, admitted that he had "directed" it. The list of members for election to the central committee had been drawn up by the committee itself, and accepted by the congress without discussion. The resolutions of the congress were said to have been simply drawn up by Damba, Buin-Nemkhu, a representative of the Youth League, and Starkov, a representative of KIM.⁴

Hitherto the party's one formal link with Moscow, and the one indication of its revolutionary character, had been its membership of Comintern in the capacity of a "sympathizing party".⁵ But

¹ Quoted *ibid.* pp. xvi-xvii.

² *Ibid.* p. 32.

³ *Severnaya Aziya*, No. 2, 1928, p. 84.

⁴ *3^e S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 33-34; for Yapon-Danzan's denunciation of the irregularities of the second congress see *ibid.* pp. 54-55.

⁵ The decision to admit the Mongolian party as a sympathizing party does not appear to be on record, but it was recognized as such at the third congress of Comintern in June-July 1921, when its two delegates were given "consultative" status side by side with those of Turkestan, Khorezm and Bokhara

little had been done to make the link effective. The arrival of Vasiliev at the beginning of 1924 was the signal for a new drive to secularize and modernize the Mongolian social, as well as political, order. A report made by the party in advance of the fifth congress of Comintern in June 1924 set forth the new official attitude :

Up to this time the work and the struggle of our party have been conducted under the banner of a struggle against the feudal-theocratic system. In the present year a new, and class, factor can be noted in our work. The class bent of our party will undoubtedly provoke resistance from our fellow-travellers, the well-to-do elements. The possibility of such resistance is already visible.

The party asked Comintern for "appropriate directives" ; and the report concluded by declaring that "the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party will continue its revolutionary work of the regeneration of the country, and finally will secure that the toiling masses of Mongolia, together with other oppressed and backward peoples of the east, will render real support in the development of world proletarian revolution". The fifth congress, in a resolution on this report, offered its appraisal of the situation in the party :

Within the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party a strengthening of the Left revolutionary wing, based on the worker and herdsman sections of the population, has been recently observed. Therefore the fundamental task of all revolutionary elements in Mongolia is to support this Left wing

(*Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1921), pp. 148, 1070). Its two delegates were also elected to IKKI at the end of the congress, but failed to attend the first meeting on July 13, 1921 (*Deyatel'nost' Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Prezidiuma KI* (1922), pp. 5-8) ; on this occasion it was erroneously referred to as the "Mongolian Communist Party". At the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922 the only Mongolian delegate was again given consultative status on the ground that the party was "not yet affiliated to the Communist International" (*Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), p. 367). The records of the fifth congress in June-July 1924 contain contradictory statements about the status of the Mongolian delegates (*Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 246, 282) ; but it was presumably consultative, since the Mongolian party was still only a sympathizing party (*ibid.* ii, 299). A Mongolian delegate was appointed to the commission on the national and colonial question (*ibid.* ii, 252).

in order to ensure the emancipation of the working masses of the country from all remnants of feudal-serf dependence.¹

The radical reforms which followed the death of the Bogdo Gegen prepared the way for the new revolutionary line, which was to find expression both in party and in governmental policies.

The third congress of the Mongolian People's Party, which met in Urga on August 4, 1924, ten weeks after the death of the Bogdo Gegen, was evidently planned as an important occasion. Statements of the total number of delegates vary from 108 to 130. They were said to have included 88 *arats*, 14 nobles and 18 lamas : 38 were fully literate in Mongolian, and 17 were employed in government service.² The proceedings were conducted in Mongolian, but were taken down and eventually published in Russian.³ After Yapon-Danzan, president of the central committee of the party had opened the proceedings, Danzan the commander-in-chief, who was also a member of the party central committee, was elected president of the congress. He ended his brief opening speech with a tactful reference to Comintern :

The beams of this Communist International have fallen comparatively early on our Mongolia. It is thanks to the leadership of Comintern that our party and our free Mongolia exists and is developing.⁴

Rinchino, a member of the party central committee, who appeared at the congress as the informal spokesman of Comintern,⁵ extended to the congress the greetings of the Mongolian army and of the military council, of which he was president ; Vasiliev, the *polpred*, who described himself as " an old party worker ", brought the greetings of the Russian Communist Party. Vasiliev, describing

¹ Both these documents are quoted in *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 15-16 ; neither has been traced in the published records of Comintern. The conclusion of the report, omitted from this version, is quoted in *Novyi Vostok*, x-xi (1925), 205-206 (where " Revolutionary " in the title of the party is an anachronism).

² *3' S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 1-2.

³ *Ibid.* Preface : the printing-press attached to the Soviet mission was at this time the only good printing establishment in Urga (*ibid.* p. 51), though a decision to set up a state printing-press had been taken as early as July 1921 (B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 98).

⁴ *3' S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 2-3.

⁵ For Rinchino see p. 805, note 1 above. He helped to compile the official record of the congress (*3' S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), Preface) ; this may partly account for the prominence given to his speeches.

the congress as "the most authoritative assembly in Mongolia", dwelt on the friendship between the Soviet Union and Mongolia and the prospects of Soviet aid: "the stronger the USSR, the stronger you too will be".¹ The solidarity of party and army was then displayed by the congress leaving the hall to attend a military parade, in the course of which Danzan, in his dual capacity as president of the congress and commander-in-chief, assured his audience that, from the days of Genghis Khan, Mongolia had never had so powerful an army as at present.² Throughout the proceedings stress was laid on the close relations between party and army. Of the 4000 party members organized in 120 cells at the time of the congress, 1445 belonged to 11 cells in military units.³

After these demonstrations, the congress proceeded to serious business, and quickly became a battle-ground for opposing views. Rinchino, as a member of the central committee, made the principal report on current affairs. He reminded the congress that membership of Comintern, which guaranteed to the country "the aid and support of the world proletariat and of the revolutionary peasantry", also carried with it the obligation "to become a genuinely revolutionary party".⁴ At an early stage in the proceedings he distributed to the delegates a pamphlet entitled *The Prospects of the Mongolian Revolution* setting forth the six points of a radical programme, which he now briefly summarized: (1) Outer Mongolia was at present passing through the stage of the overthrow of the feudal-theocratic order and its replacement by a government of the people. (2) In this stage the party was supported by officials, men of learning and the lower grades of lamas, as well as by the mass of *arats*, and was therefore fundamentally divided on the alternative of bourgeois democracy or the Soviet road to socialism. This split threatened the existence of the party; and decisive action was required to reduce officials and lamas to "a secondary rôle". (3) The weak point of the party was the absence of a proletariat; it was necessary to create a national industry, though the organization of handicraft workers and artisans should in the meanwhile not be neglected. (4) Political work in the army was particularly important. (5) Economic

¹ 3^d *S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 3-7.

² *Ibid.* p. 8.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 27-28.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 38.

development should take place on the basis of "state-cooperative" trade and industry in order to prevent the growth of bourgeois capitalism: "in these conditions our native bourgeoisie, which is still in the condition of a chrysalis or a cocoon, will completely expire, and access to our country will be denied to the foreign bourgeoisie". (6) The party should continue to exercise a dictatorship in the name of the masses of *arats*; the formation of other parties, even so-called Left parties, should be forbidden.¹

The records of the congress throw a fitful light on what followed. The mass of delegates evidently had little or no comprehension of the issues involved: Rinchino had already complained of the absence of "discussions of principle".² The question which could be relied on to arouse spontaneous feeling was the position of the lamas, who were still powerful in local government and were immune from military service and other obligations.³ On the other hand, sharp divisions on the major issue soon appeared among the leaders. The report of Damba, the secretary of the central committee, who evidently wished to appear as a radical and progressive, was full of sly criticisms of the obstructiveness of Yapon-Danzan, the president of the committee, who was defended by Danzan, the commander-in-chief. At a later stage, Damba and Yapon-Danzan once more clashed on the question of the purge in the party demanded by Damba, and Rinchino came to the support of Damba's view of the necessity of the purge.⁴ It soon became clear that the major clash was between commander-in-chief Danzan and Rinchino. When Danzan spoke against a proposal to repeat a resolution of the previous party congress on the strengthening of friendship with the Russian party and the Soviet Union, describing this as an unnecessary piece of flattery, Rinchino sharply protested and was angrily answered by Danzan. "We need not pass through all the

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 39-46, where Rinchino summarized the six points: for another summary, which may, however, have been made from Rinchino's summary, see A. Kallinikov, *Revolyutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), p. 86. The original pamphlet has not been available: there is nothing to show whether it appeared in Russian or in Mongolian.

² *3^e S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 36. The record is unusually frank about the defects of the proceedings; at one point the recorder gives up altogether: "The session proceeds very drearily, many speakers repeat themselves, the debates take on a trivial character" (*ibid.* p. 56).

³ *Ibid.* pp. 31-32, 46-48.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 34-35, 51-56.

stages of capitalism", exclaimed Rinchino at one point; "better make the transition at once to the Soviet order." When Rinchino spoke of the transition to socialism and the limitation of private property, Danzan retorted contemptuously that the proposal had "no practical significance". When Rinchino wanted to bring about "the final abolition of the feudal system" by destroying the power of the nobles in local government, Danzan asked why it was necessary "specially to abolish something which is breaking up of itself", and protested that there were other more important things to be done.¹ A minor issue, on which the party central committee was said to have been divided, was the disposal of the large domains of the Bogdo Gegen. A Right group, which included Tseren-Dorji and Amor, wished to hand them over intact to the religious authorities; a Left group wished to confiscate them to the state. A compromise was sponsored by Choibalsan, who proposed that they should be divided into three equal parts — one to be devoted to religious purposes, one to education and one to public health; and this was adopted.²

The mounting tension soon spread to the ticklish relations between the party and the youth league.³ When Gombozhap, a member of the central committee of the youth league and, like Rinchino, a Buryat, supported Damba's proposal for a purge in the party, he self-righteously recalled the example of the youth league which had conducted its purge in the previous year.⁴ Buin-Nemkhu, president of the central committee of the league,⁵

¹ For these incidents see *3⁴ S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 60-62, 73-74.

² *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 188; the domains of the Bogdo Gegen were not included in the departments or banners (see p. 823, note 3 below) subject to princely rule, but formed a separate administration — the so-called *shabi* administration (I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 271).

³ In 1924 the league claimed 4000 members, of whom 90 per cent were *arats*, and including 300 women (A. Kallinikov, *Revolutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), pp. 88-90). *Urginskaya Gazeta*, May 28, 1924, reported a lecture to the league by Erenburg on May 24 on the origins of capitalism: 45 persons were present. Erenburg was a Russian "instructor" sent from Moscow to take charge of the organization department of the party: he was "edged out" later in the year (*3⁴ S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 28).

⁴ *3⁴ S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 37; Gombozhap was described as "having just returned from Moscow, where he had completed a course at the University of Toilers of the East" (*ibid.* p. 8).

⁵ Buin-Nemkhu had spoken as a Mongolian delegate, not specifically concerned with the affairs of the youth league, at the Moscow Congress of Toilers

who had just returned from attending the fourth congress of KIM in Moscow, and appeared to have learned some measure of discretion, brought the greetings of the league to the party congress. League and party, he declared, were "a single organization with a single goal and a single purpose".¹ At a joint open-air demonstration designed to proclaim this unity, Buin-Nemkhu delivered a further address to the congress describing the league as "your sons, your younger brothers", but artfully hinting that the decision now taken by the party to become truly revolutionary had been taken by the league a year earlier.² What happened behind the scenes is not clear. But long-standing antipathy to the party leaders, notably to Rinchino,³ surprisingly led some of the leaders of the league to find common ground with Danzan; and Bavasan, a member of the league central committee, who was also secretary of the Mongolian Sovnarkom, openly supported Danzan at the congress in resisting Rinchino's proposal to curtail the powers of the nobles in local government.⁴ On the eve of the eighteenth sitting of the congress,⁵ hostilities broke out — at whose instigation can only be guessed — between the Urga city organization of the youth league, of which Bavasan was a member, and the central committee of the league. The city organization, on what was evidently a frivolous charge, called in the political police, the Mongolian counterpart of the OGPU,⁶ to arrest Bavasan. The central committee protested against this irregular proceeding, and declared the city organization of the league dissolved. But the only result of this act of defiance was the arrest of Buin-Nemkhu and two other members of the central committee.⁷

of the Far East in January 1922 (*The First Congress of Toilers of the Far East* (Hamburg, 1922), pp. 150-151); he appears with members of the central committee of the Mongolian party in an undated photograph in *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), p. 191.

¹ 3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 107-108; Buin-Nemkhu was said to have previously "stood for the separation of the league as a special Left party" (*ibid.* p. 195).

² *Ibid.* pp. 112-114.

³ According to a later account, the league became impatient with Rinchino's "zigzag tactics" (*Severnaya Aziya*, No. 2, 1928, p. 90).

⁴ 3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 74.

⁵ The congress held 23 sittings between August 4 and 31, 1924; sittings are numbered, but not dated, in the record.

⁶ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 522.

⁷ 3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 164, 167-170; the facts have to be pieced together from statements made at the party congress.

At this point Danzan, rightly judging his own position to be threatened, took fright. When the time came to open the eighteenth sitting, he failed to appear for three hours. He then arrived to announce that the congress would not sit on that day, adding that "harmful agitation" was going on among members of the congress, and that he was with the army. Thereupon he departed, subsequently sending a message in which he justified his absence on the ground that armed men were present at the congress. Danzan's evasive action threw the delegates into tumult and confusion. Damba voiced a protest, which was widely shared, against this high-handed behaviour and proposed to continue the sitting. Vasiliev, the *polpred*, was apparently sent for, but did not respond; and Rinchino, unwilling to force the issue at this juncture, wished to adjourn till the next day. The militants of the youth league, however, successfully demanded that the sitting continue; and a report was read denouncing the actions of Bavasan and Buin-Nemkhu. The proceedings were interrupted at one point by the sending of three emissaries to Danzan with a plea for his return. He duly received them, and this time explained his unwillingness to return on the plea that the unauthorized arrest of Bavasan had deprived the congress of its rights. When this was reported back, rumours that Danzan was a traitor and should be arrested began to circulate among the delegates; and, while Tseren-Dorji, the president of Sovnarkom, sought to temporize, Rinchino now judged that the time for caution was past and launched into a violent diatribe against Danzan. The grave sickness of the party, he declared, was the work of Danzan, who had "taken the path of treason to our party ideas, taken the path of the dissolution of our party, the path of the destruction of its revolutionary and state work". He accused Danzan of "close collaboration with Chinese money-lenders" and of various forms of financial and commercial trickery. He recalled an occasion on which Danzan had denounced him as "a Russian trouble-maker, a counter-revolutionary and a dictator", and complained that "Rinchino is sitting on my head". Rinchino eloquently offered his audience the choice: "*either* to follow Danzan to the Right into the black sink of popular misery, disgrace and national collapse, *or* to turn to the Left, to liberty and the sun of genuine people's rights". Finally — almost as an

afterthought — Rinchino alleged that Danzan had corresponded with the Chinese authorities about the opening of negotiations for the union of Mongolia with China, and damagingly compared Danzan with Chinese war-lords like Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu and Ts'ao Kun. Rinchino's speech did its work. The decision to arrest Danzan was taken unanimously, confirmed by Tseren-Dorji and handed to the chief of the political police to be carried out. This was the moment for the arrival of Vasiliev who, speaking not as *polpred*, but as "an old revolutionary", briefly referred to Danzan as "a captain who leaves his ship in stormy weather.", and congratulated the youth of the congress on the "good omen" of what had happened. Choibalsan was chosen to replace Danzan as acting commander-in-chief, Natsok-Dorji to replace Bavasan as acting secretary of Sovnarkom: it was significant that both were prominent members of the youth league. The congress remained in session till 1 a.m., when the chief of the political police returned to report the arrest of Danzan.¹

The remainder of the proceedings was a foregone conclusion. At another night sitting, apparently on the following night, at which representatives of the government were also present, the newly elected president of the congress presented a preliminary indictment of Danzan in twelve points, said to have been derived from Rinchino's speech; Rinchino made another speech, devoted mainly to Danzan's complicity with the Chinese; and a commission was appointed with full powers "to investigate the whole affair, to pass sentence and to carry it out".² On August 30, 1924, Danzan and Bavasan were executed, and Buin-Nemkhu and two other members of the central committee of the youth league condemned to 30 days' imprisonment. These decisions were reported to the final sitting of the congress on August 31, 1924. Vasiliev appeared to wind up the proceedings with a consoling moral:

Do not be afraid of what has taken place. This has happened not only in Mongolia but also in Russia. You have acted very correctly. . . . I think that what you have done will be advantageous and will help to strengthen the union of Mongolia and the USSR.³

¹ The eventful eighteenth sitting was reported, more fully than any other sitting of the congress, in 3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 159-194.

² *Ibid.* pp. 208-213.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 222-225.

The execution of Danzan carried on the process which had begun with the execution of Bodo two-and-a-half years earlier. The political revolution was to be completed by a social revolution. Such power as had rested with the Mongol nobles under former Chinese sovereignty would not be allowed to pass to the petty Mongolian intelligentsia of lamas, officials (mainly former lamas) and traders, who could be fitted, with some straining, into the bourgeois-democratic category. It would pass to new groups claiming to speak for workers and herdsmen who, under Russian sponsorship and again with some straining of analogies, could appear as protagonists of a socialist revolution. Danzan was afterwards officially described as "the expression of the interests of those capitalist elements which came into existence in Mongolia in connexion with the liberation from serfdom of a private cattle-rearing economy" and as the spokesman of "the rising national bourgeoisie".¹ The Mongolian People's Party now changed its name — apparently after the third congress — to Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.² Though the word socialist was still officially avoided, socialism now became the recognized goal. The congress decided that the country should not "once more travel the road along which other nations of the world had formerly passed — the road of suffering under cruel capitalist oppression".³ Outer Mongolia took its place among those countries which were striving to avoid the stage of industrial capitalism and to make a direct transition from a pre-capitalist society to a Soviet, and thence to a socialist, society. But such a transition, according to the accepted doctrine, could be effected only with the support of the "victorious revolutionary proletariat" of a more advanced country.⁴ The quest for socialism in Mongolian conditions could mean only a more implicit reliance on Soviet guidance and Soviet aid. These changes were the keynote of the critical third party congress of August 1924.⁵ Mean-

¹ I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 191.

² No formal record of the decision has been traced; but the change of name in official records occurs after the third congress.

³ Quoted in B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 124, from an official collection of documents; the resolution from which the passage is taken is not included in 3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.).

⁴ See p. 614 above.

⁵ The significance of the third congress was officially summed up a year later as follows: "Last year it became clear that the ranks of our party con-

while, the execution of Bavasan and the downfall of Buin-Nemkhu put an end to the strife between the party and the youth league. Now that the party had turned to the Left and committed itself to a revolutionary course, the case for an independent youth league standing to the Left of the party and agitating against it disappeared. The normal pattern of relations between party and Komsomol could be maintained. On September 14, 1924, a fortnight after the end of the party congress, the youth league also held its third congress. Speeches of greeting were delivered by Starkov, Vasiliev and others; and Rinchino, in a speech which was said to have been received with loud applause, declared that, whereas party and league had hitherto worked separately, and sometimes in conflict with each other, the time had now come to combine them "into a single mighty stream".¹

The realization of the new course laid down at the third party congress required governmental action in the political and in the economic sphere. The fiasco of the cancelled local elections of 1923² was not repeated. In 1924, thanks to "instruction" given by a further draft of trained party members, fresh elections were held in all the local departments,³ and passed off "very successfully"; 90 per cent of "property-owing princes" were eliminated. This paved the way for the convening of provincial congresses, which, on the analogy of the pyramid of Soviets, would send delegates to the Great Khural, the supreme assembly

tained elements which stood for the revival of capitalism on the basis of private property. The leader of such a movement was Danzan. The result of this was to split the party into Right and Left. At the third congress the Rightists were headed by Danzan, but the victorious Left group decided to set a class course, and orientate itself exclusively towards the mass of middle and poor *arats*" (*Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 14).

¹ For reports of the congress see *Urginskaya Gazeta*, September 13 (*sic*, *leg.* 16), 19, 1924; later issues presumably containing further reports have not been available.

² See p. 804 above.

³ *Novaya Mongoliya*: *Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 181, enumerates the administrative units into which the republic was divided: the province (*aimak*); the department (*khoshun*, traditionally translated "banner" — formerly the fief of a prince); the district (*somon*; according to I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 271, this was originally a military unit); the "village" (*baga*) or unit of 50 households (*urts*); and a sub-unit of 10 households.

of the Mongolian republic.¹ A statute of the Great Khural was issued on September 19, 1924;² and the first session was held from November 8 to 28, 1924. Of 77 delegates elected by the lower organs, 71 were *arats*, and only 6 nobles. The delegates included 9 lamas; 13 delegates were non-party, the remainder belonged either to the party or to the youth league or to both.³ The list of honorary presidents indicated the distinguished patronage under which the assembly was meeting: Zinoviev, Kalinin, Chicherin, the *polpred* Vasiliev, Ryskulov, Erbanov, president of the Sovnarkom of the Buryat-Mongol Republic, and Damba-Dorji, president of the central committee of the Mongolian People's Party.⁴ Ryskulov, who arrived in Urga in October 1924 as delegate of Comintern,⁵ together with Rinchino, played a prominent part throughout the congress, and helped to make up for the inexperience and timidity of most of the delegates. Both were ardent supporters of the turn to the Left in Mongolian affairs. Yudin, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in the absence of Vasiliev, brought to the congress the greetings of the people and government of the Soviet Union,⁶ but took no other part in the proceedings.

The main constitutional issue had been settled by the proclamation of the republic on the death of the Bogdo Gegen, and gave no serious trouble. At the session of the Great Khural, Tseren-Dorji on behalf of the government submitted a draft

¹ 3' *S''ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 67-68; Rinchino described the result as "a 90 per cent defeat for the feudalists" (*ibid.* p. 73). Damba in his report to the third party congress gave a more detailed account of these proceedings: "We could have tackled these elections long ago, and gradually carried them out in a proper way: but for reasons of economy we waited in the hope that they would work out somehow. Nothing came of this. We had to cancel the whole business and start over again; in addition, we had to recruit from all sides another 50-60 instructors" (*ibid.* p. 35). In fact, the "instructors" were students enrolled for a course in the party school (*ibid.* p. 29).

² B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 128.

³ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 3.

⁵ *Chetvertyi S''ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 19; *Urginskaya Gazeta*, Nov. 7, 1924, an anniversary number, featured an article by Ryskulov on *The October Revolution and the Peoples of the East*.

⁶ *Chetvertyi S''ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 16-18; A. Kallinikov, *Revolutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), pp. 95-96, quotes a message from the congress expressing gratitude for the "fraternal support of the USSR".

constitution inspired, no longer by capitalist, but by Soviet, example.¹ It began by rehearsing and confirming the decree issued on the death of the Bogdo Gegen setting up the republic.² This was followed by a Declaration of Rights of the Toiling People of Mongolia. Though closely modelled on the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People prefixed to the first constitution of the RSFSR, the Mongolian declaration was wider in scope, covering also the same ground as the "general propositions" which formed the second section of that constitution.³ The Great Khural was proclaimed as the organ through which "the people exercise their supreme authority"; and the "first aim" of the republic was declared to be "the abolition of the remnants of the feudal-theocratic order and the strengthening of the foundations of the new republican order on the basis of the complete democratization of state administration". A later clause purporting to deal with the foreign relations of the republic indirectly and tentatively pointed the way to the eventual transition to socialism :

Considering that the toilers of the whole world are striving for the radical abolition of capitalism and the attainment of socialism (communism), the People's Republic of Toilers must conduct its foreign policy in conformity with the interests and fundamental tasks of the oppressed masses of the peoples and the revolutionary toilers of the whole world.

The same ambivalence could be traced in other parts of the declaration. While the political clauses were concerned with such bourgeois-democratic principles as religious liberty and the separation of church and state, freedom of assembly and free universal education, the economic clauses made land and all natural resources "the property of the whole people", and sought "to concentrate in the hands of the state a unified economic policy for the country and to introduce a state monopoly of foreign trade". All titles were abolished, and those holding

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 239-249; for an English translation of the constitution as finally adopted see *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), pp. 381-386. B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 141, notes that the draft constitution had been "repeatedly examined and discussed in the central committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party".

² See p. 807 above.

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, p. 125.

them, together with lamas living in monasteries (as opposed to those leading a secular life), as well as all who lived by exploiting the labour of others, were disfranchised. The remainder of the constitution provided for sessions of the Great Khural once a year ; for a Small Khural to perform its functions in the intervals between sessions, and to appoint a presidium to act on its behalf in intervals between its own sessions ; and finally for a government appointed by the Small Khural. The system of local government with provincial, departmental, district and village assemblies (khurals) was an equally familiar copy of the Soviet model.

The discussion of the constitution in the Great Khural turned mainly on minor points, though some delegates questioned " the necessity of declaring land, forests, etc., the possession of the whole people ". The more important questions were answered not by Tseren-Dorji, but by Rinchino or Ryskulov, who were revealed as the main authors or inspirers of the constitution. Keen interest was shown in proposals to change the name of Urga, the capital. It was eventually decided to rename it Ulan-Bator-Khoto (Red Hero City) or Ulan-Bator for short. The transition to the " European " calendar as from January 1, 1925, was confirmed " by an overwhelming majority ". The constitution was then solemnly adopted by a unanimous vote.¹ The Great Khural elected a Small Khural of 30, which, after the adjournment of the Great Khural, in turn elected a presidium of 5 and a government of 12 members : Tseren-Dorji remained Prime Minister and Choibalsan commander-in-chief.² A sequel to the session of the Great Khural and the adoption of the constitution was the formal renunciation by Tseren-Dorji and by other leading ministers and officials of their princely titles. A number of high government officials cut off their pigtails, and many lamas abandoned their titles and privileges and applied for admission to the party.³ Another symptom of the consolidation of the new order was an exchange of notes between the Soviet and Mongolian Governments in January 1925 providing for the withdrawal of the remaining Soviet troops from Outer Mongolia, thus com-

¹ For the discussion and vote see *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 249-260.

² B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 139.

³ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. xiv.

pleting the process begun in August 1922.¹ This step was evidence both of the degree of willing acceptance in Outer Mongolia of Soviet aid and tutelage and of the disappearance of any serious military threat from any other quarter.²

During the winter of 1924-1925 the party leaders were engaged in consolidating the victories won at the third party congress and the first session of the Great Khural. A purge of "reactionary elements" in the party was set in motion by an instruction of the party central committee of January 10, 1925. Its aim was defined as the improvement of the quality of party membership by facilitating the admission of poor and middle *arats* and workers in handicraft industries, and by cleansing the party of former white-guardists, officials of the old order, former landowners, speculators and careerists.³ Of 5,500 members, 1,700 were expelled and 650 reduced to the rank of candidate, leaving 3,200 full members at the time of the fourth congress in September 1925.⁴ The purge was declared to have made the party for the first time "really *arat* in composition", thus bringing it "nearer to the realization of the class principle".⁵ A session of the party central committee which opened on March 7, 1925, was occupied mainly with the drafting of a party programme and statute. The programme was divided into three chapters: the first on the development of capitalism and the need for a revolutionary struggle against imperialism; the second on the colonial policies of imperialism; the third on practical party questions. It

¹ *Izvestiya*, March 12, 1925. For the text of the notes see *Tikhii Okean*, No. 3 (9), 1936, pp. 73-74; they were originally published in *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, March 15, 1925. On March 6, 1925, Karakhan officially notified the Peking government that the evacuation of Outer Mongolia had been completed (*Russian Review* (Washington), May 1, 1925, p. 198). For the earlier withdrawal of troops see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 523.

² What appears to be a deliberate note of caution was sounded in a small book apparently written soon after the adoption of the constitution of November 1924: "It is scarcely possible to assert that the present situation of Mongolia is stable, and that the Chinese militarists will not attempt anew to penetrate Mongolian territory and raise anew the question of its subordination to China" (V. Vilensky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (1925), p. iv).

³ B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 125: it was publicly announced in *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, February 8, 1925.

⁴ This seems to be the correct reading of a confused passage in *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 185.

⁵ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 22, 35.

proclaimed the determination of the Mongolian people to "orientate itself on Comintern and on the USSR as the only revolutionary centres which really come to the help of the oppressed peoples of the east", and it denounced the "Chinese bourgeoisie and usurers". A special article was devoted to a condemnation of "the pan-Mongolian movement" which arose in 1919 with the support of Japanese imperialism and as a cloak for its annexationist designs. But this did not prevent the appearance of a reference to "other Mongolian tribes" beyond the frontiers of the republic suffering "the intolerable oppression of Chinese colonizing power and usurious capital", and of an undertaking to support the struggle for their liberation, both from the alien yoke and from their own "feudal lords and theocrats". On the ideological plane, the programme prepared the way for the transition to socialism by requiring the party to educate its members "in the spirit of the Marxist view of the world".¹ The programme was provisionally adopted by the committee for consideration by IKKI and by the lower party organs in advance of the next party congress, to which it would be submitted for final approval. The session of the party central committee was followed on April 3, 1925, by a session of the central committee of the youth league. The new central committee appointed at the congress of September 1924² blamed its predecessor for "a series of mistakes", censured the old leaders as "too subjectively devoted to the interests of the Mongolian working people", and amended the original programme defining the relations of the league to the party.³ The comparatively mild terms of this resolution suggest that opposition in the youth league was less easily overcome than in the party.

The attempt to lay the foundations of a Mongolian trade union movement was a step in the same direction. The first Great Khural had decided to create a Union of Toiling *Arats*. Damba-Dorji, who introduced the proposal, pointed out that the

¹ The full text of the programme has not been available; for quotations from it see *Novyi Vostok*, x-xi (1925), 207-210; *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 46. Rinchino is said to have defended the pan-Mongolian movement of 1919, in which he had himself participated, as "democratic".

² See p. 823 above.

³ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 20-21; for the original programme see p. 811 above).

possession of freedom and membership of the People's Party would be "empty sounds" if nothing was done to improve the material position of the masses. The aim of the proposed union was, however, not purely economic, but cultural and political — "to unite the masses of our people, to develop education among them, to promote their independence". This could be achieved only by "overcoming their isolation". "Only the organized *arat* will be able to help himself, to help the state, to help the party."¹ Rinchino spoke of the need to strengthen the "channels" that linked the party and state machine with the working masses. At present four such channels existed — party organs, the youth league, the cooperatives and organs of local self-government; the proposed union would constitute a fifth channel, and, since it could deal with "everyday tasks, the improvement of daily life, and so forth", it would be particularly useful in maintaining contact with the non-party masses.² The resolution of the Great Khural followed these lines. It described the projected Union of Toiling *Arats* as "a semi-trade union organization, pursuing in the first place the aim of the economic and cultural interests of the whole union and of its individual members, and also the aim of organized participation in the work of state construction, of cooperation of all kinds in governmental measures and of the defence, above all, of general state interests". The same resolution demanded that serious attention should be paid "to the trade union movement and to the concentration in trade unions of workers in industrial enterprises and institutions".³ Shortly after the adjournment of the Great Khural an announcement appeared that a Union of Toiling *Arats* had come into being in order "to protect the members of the union and to draw them into participation in state construction".⁴ Some progress was also made towards the establishment of industrial trade unions,

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 266-268.

² *Ibid.* p. 269; Rinchino precisely anticipated the five "leads" or "levers" enumerated by Stalin in 1926 through which the dictatorship of the proletariat made itself effective: trade unions, Soviets, cooperatives, youth league and party (Stalin, *Sochineniya*, viii, 32-35. The idea was not new; Stalin in 1923 had postulated seven "transmission belts" from the party to the working class (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, p. 231).

³ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 270-272.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, December 19, 1924.

which held their first conference on June 17-18, 1925.¹ Unfortunately this step also showed up the weakness of the Mongol proletariat; for several years a majority of trade unionists were Chinese.²

When the fourth party congress met, rather more than a year after the third, on September 23, 1925, the atmosphere in the party had changed from crisis to routine. Amagaev spoke as Comintern delegate, explaining that this was the first occasion on which a representative of Comintern had appeared at the congress. Nikiforov, the *polpred*, speaking on behalf of the Russian party, stressed the links of the Mongolian party with Comintern and with the international revolutionary movement, and celebrated the memory of Sukhebaator.³ A feature of the opening speeches was the attention given to the national liberation movement in the east — in China, in India and even in Morocco. A new significance could now be claimed for Outer Mongolia:

The world imperialists are afraid lest the oppressed peoples of the east should follow in the steps of Mongolia and understand the meaning of the policy of the Soviet Union in supporting the national liberation movement in the east.⁴

The keynote of the congress was a combination of two related themes — the need to produce trained and educated party workers, and the need to improve local administration. Much self-congratulation was heard on the overcoming of past deviations and on the new course set by the third congress. Damba-Dorji, now president of the party central committee, quoted an old congress resolution recognizing as "indispensable and opportune" the study of Marxism by members of the party and the youth league; and a central-party school with 100 students had opened its doors in June 1925.⁵ But this was an ambitious programme. The purge had revealed, as Damba-Dorji admitted in his report, that "a majority of the members of the party, with few exceptions", were at a "very low political level". In replying to the

¹ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, June 23, 1925.

² Of a total of 5527 members of trade unions in 1928, 3458 were Chinese and 335 Russian (*Skhidnii Svit*, No. 3 (9), 1929, p. 104); a special Russian section is mentioned in *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, February 23, 1926.

³ *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 2-4 (cf. *ibid.* p. 102), 5-6.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 13, 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 23-24.

debate, he confined himself to the modest demand that "members of the party who hold the rudder of the state in their hands should one and all be literate"; and the congress resolution on the report included the decision "to take decisive measures for the liquidation of elementary illiteracy among members of the party".¹ The weakness of the party in outlying districts was notorious. "The decisions of the first Great Khural", declared Tseren-Dorji, the head of the government, "have not been carried into effect in the localities." The special resolution on work in rural areas called for "a strengthening of the local party organizations".² Amagaev attributed local weaknesses to inactivity on the part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which "made no attempt to guide the work of local organs of government, gave them no directions, kept up no lively contact and sent no instructors".³ Of the programme provisionally approved by the party central committee in the preceding March,⁴ the two first sections had incurred criticism from Comintern; and it was now decided to postpone the programme for further consideration and adoption by a later congress.⁵ At the same time attempts were made to build up the party machine. A few weeks after the congress it was announced that the party central committee had set up three sections: a section on party organization; an Agitprop section, which was engaged on "the liquidation of technical and political illiteracy"; and a section for work among women.⁶

The fourth congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was followed by the fourth congress of the youth league, which met on October 17, 1925. At the opening session Ja-Damba, on behalf of the party central committee, testified that correct relations had now been established with the party and the "Right deviations" overcome. Nikiforov, the *polpred*,

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 22, 34, 41.

² *Ibid.* pp. 56, 73.

³ *Ibid.* p. 85.

⁴ See pp. 827-828 above.

⁵ *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 44-53. The "first draft programmes" of the Mongolian and Tannu Tuva parties were said to have been approved by the eastern department of IKKI (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 333); but it is not clear to what stage this refers.

⁶ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, December 5, 1925; a first "all-Mongolian women's conference" was held at the end of the year (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 68).

greeted the congress in the name of the Russian party, Amagaev on behalf of Comintern, and Natsov for KIM; Natsov harked back to the old traditions of the league when he included among its functions "the struggle against pan-Mongolism and against spiritual-reactionary tendencies".¹ The main concern of the congress seems to have been with the conditions of admission to the league. Nobody contested the view that the core of the league should consist of poor *arats*. An extreme proposal to exclude former lamas, nobles and well-to-do elements altogether was rejected: such persons were, however, required to produce two sponsors, and to serve a probationary period of a year before admission as full members. Like the party congress, the congress of the youth league had before it a draft programme, which it decided to adjourn to the next congress.² Past insubordination had been quelled, and the relations of the league to the party were correct and uneventful.³ An old grievance was removed when in 1926 2000 members of the league — having, no doubt, reached the age limit — were transferred to the party, the league thus assuming its proper rôle as a reservoir and recruiting-ground for the party.⁴ The league continued to grow, and by the beginning of 1928 possessed 6980 members, of whom 6690 were *arats* and 6053 poor *arats*, but of whom only 932 were fully literate.⁵

The orderly structure of party and state which appeared to emerge from the third congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the first session of the Great Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic in the latter half of 1924 was in some measure illusory. In the first place, the formal distinction

¹ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, October 20, 1925; further reports from this source have not been available.

² *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 6, February-March 1926, p. 47.

³ The formula expressing the relation evolved gradually. After the congress Natsov wrote in the journal of KIM that "the league conducts its work in ideological-political contact with the party" (*ibid.* No. 3, November-December 1925, p. 37); the same article insisted on democratic centralism and strict discipline as guiding principles of organization in the league. Rather more than a year later, according to the same journal, "the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League works under the political leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party" (*ibid.* No. 7, March 1927, p. 38).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 505.

between party and state which had been established at an early stage of the history of Soviet Russia had little meaning in Mongolian politics. The discussion of public affairs, and of the records and policies of different departments of state, at the party congress in August 1924 did not differ perceptibly in tone from the discussion in the Great Khural three months later. The proceedings of the Great Khural were published under the authority of the president of the party central committee; the people's party, the youth league and the people's army were described as the three supports without which the Mongolian state would not exist.¹ Secondly, the impressiveness of the structure, based on Russian Soviet models, masked the paucity of the human forces available to man it. In the army, it was pointed out, "there are very few well-trained officers in Mongolia, it is very difficult to train them, and it cannot be done quickly". The first aim of the political department of the army was to teach elementary literacy to recruits, most of whom were said to return home literate after three years' service.² The high incidence of illiteracy, even among the party élite,³ was symptomatic of the extreme shortage of usable manpower throughout the administration. The newly-constituted Ministry of Justice at the end of 1924 was manned by 9 officials, 2 translators, an interpreter and 12 clerks; the Urga city administration had 12 employees.⁴ Trained specialists in any field did not exist. Russian advisers were confined to important supervisory posts.⁵ In ordinary

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. v, 8-9.

² *Ibid.* pp. 93, 98; an article in *Novyi Vostok* gave a vivid picture of the transformation effected by the "educational and political organs" of the Mongolian People's Army: "The young Mongol, clumsy and full of prejudices, with a pigtail on his head and an amulet round his neck, when he enters the army, returns home a completely new man, literate and conscious, with a widened horizon and a reforming zeal" (*Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 185).

³ See pp. 815, 831 above.

⁴ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 163, 200. I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 276, gives the following figures of total personnel of all grades in ministries under the Bogdo Gegen in 1920: Ministry of Justice 57; of Finance 43; of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs 41 each; of War 40. The whole central governmental apparatus employed some 200-300 persons.

⁵ At the end of 1926 Russians were still apparently employed at the headquarters of the secret police (Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), p. 68).

administrative work the gap was filled either by former lamas, whose loyalty to the régime might be questionable, but who were the only literate section of the population (these probably formed a majority of all officials at this time),¹ or by immigrant Buryat-Mongols.

The Buryats, though of Mongol stock and speech, had, under Russian rule, shed the nomadic habits and religious trappings of Mongolian society and become partly Russified. They had begun to filter into Outer Mongolia in considerable numbers after the proclamation of Mongolian autonomy under the Russian aegis in 1911, occupying, in virtue of their language qualification, more or less responsible posts in the administrative machine, or earning their living as craftsmen or skilled workers among the more primitive Mongols. The resulting reactions were summed up ten years later by a Russian observer :

The Mongols feel the cultural superiority of the Buryats, and are aware that they cannot do without them ; but they do not like the Buryats, regarding them in some sense as traitors to the historical " traditions " of the Mongol race, who have fallen a prey to foreign influences.²

When Soviet Russia sought to transform Outer Mongolia into a modern state, the existence of a small Russian-educated Mongolian-speaking Buryat intelligentsia was of enormous value ; and its members soon acquired an influence out of all proportion to their number. From 1922 onwards local Buryat departments were organized, where the population was mainly or exclusively Buryat. By 1924, 4360 Buryat households, or 16,093 individuals, had acquired Mongolian nationality.³ A year later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was begging the Ministry of Internal Affairs to give these households an allocation of land.⁴ Precise informa-

¹ For this situation see I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 210 ; at the first session of the Great Khural in November 1924 it was reported from one province that " the princes and lamas of our province adopt a favourable attitude to the government, and loyally carry out all the obligations that fall on them " (*Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 189).

² I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 93-94 ; for the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, p. 359.

³ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 205-207.

⁴ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 78.

tion about the number of Buryats employed in official positions in party and state is not available, since they were not separately classified ; but the number was certainly large. Rinchino, who was in all but name the delegate of Comintern at the third party congress in August 1924, and was one of the authors of the constitution of the Mongolian republic, was a Buryat.¹ Amagaev, who succeeded Rinchino as the most active spokesman of Moscow in Mongolian party and state affairs, had been president of the TsIK of the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic, and first visited Urga in May 1924 in that capacity.² Six months later he was elected, clearly on Soviet instigation, to the Small Khural of the Mongolian republic,³ and became president of the newly-formed economic council.⁴ In September 1925 he was delegate of Comintern to the fourth Mongolian party congress.⁵ In the summer of 1925 the decision was taken, in agreement with the Soviet Government, to recruit Buryat-Mongols into the Mongolian army — no doubt by way of stiffening.⁶

Through this combination of expedients, and by using Russian advisers, lamas and Buryats to fill the gaps till a new secular Mongol bureaucracy had been trained, progress in different branches of administration certainly occurred. But it was often arduous and slow, and the paucity of records makes it difficult to assess. The introduction of higher secular education, hitherto unknown in Mongolia, dated from 1923, when the first middle school and a Mongolian People's University were established in Urga.⁷ In the following year the section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in charge of education was transformed into a Ministry of Education ;⁸ and in 1925 the Small Khural voted a

¹ Rinchino was conscious of the prejudice which might be felt against him as a Buryat (*3⁴ S''ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 209) ; for Rinchino's part in the drafting of the constitution see p. 826 above.

² *Urginskaya Gazeta*, May 31, 1924.

³ When his name was put forward, a delegate remarked that " nobody has seen Amagaev, but evidently all know who he is . . . and it is therefore necessary to confirm his candidature " (*Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 275).

⁴ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, February 8, 1925.

⁵ See p. 832 above.

⁶ I. Korostovets, *Von Cinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik* (1926), p. 342.

⁷ A. Kallinikov, *Revolyutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), p. 80 ; the first state elementary school in Urga had been opened in October 1921 (B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 98).

⁸ *3⁴ S''ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 69.

special property tax on owners of cattle to finance education.¹ But in 1926 the republic still possessed only one university, one middle school and 13 elementary schools, besides several special or short-term schools. In addition 100 young Mongols were reported to be receiving education in Moscow, Leningrad and Verkhneudinsk; and "some dozens" had been sent to France, Germany and the Soviet Union for specialized training.²

The two most backward and primitive branches of administration were justice and health. A decree of 1923 prohibited the use of torture by the courts: up to this time torture, mainly in the form of beatings of varying severity, had been regularly applied to the accused, to witnesses and sometimes even to the complainant.³ But cases of torture were reported after that date. At the fourth party congress in September 1925 Amagaev alleged that the Ministry of Justice had done nothing in the past year to carry out the judicial reform; that "obsolete Manchu laws" and "tortures that had been abolished long ago" were still applied; and that no people's courts had been created, or "revolutionary laws" promulgated.⁴ Comments were frequently made on the shocking conditions in what appears to have been the one prison in Ulan-Bator.⁵ In February 1926 an advertisement appeared of a lottery to raise funds for "the prison committee attached to the Ministry of Justice to give help in providing amenities in prison life".⁶

Health services grew still more slowly, since here "European medicine" had to face the competition of the traditional "Tibetan medicine". The third party congress in August 1924 listened

¹ *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 80.

² *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 185; xv (1926), 176.

³ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 164; the reform is said to have been prompted by a campaign in the Russian language newspaper *Urginskaya Gazeta*.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 186; *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 86.

⁵ A prayer-service held by a lama in the prison provided the occasion for some crude, but revealing, anti-religious propaganda in the Russian-language newspaper: "The prisoners hope that the praying will appease *the evil spirit of the prison building* . . . so that they will be warm without stoves, light without windows, and well-fed without bread. Of course the spirit who guards the prison will not bring himself to exterminate living creatures — the bugs and fleas; but, after the praying, these will probably abate their appetites" (*Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, October 14, 1925).

⁶ *Ibid.* February 23, 1926.

with astonishment and admiration to an account of "the wonders of European medicine".¹ The first preoccupation was with the health of recruits in the army, among whom venereal disease was said to be almost universal. In 1924 a Russian doctor organized a military hospital in Urga, to which poor civilians were also admitted; and a government dispensary was established.² But the Ministry of Internal Affairs still refused to accept responsibility for health services on the ground that these were the business of the Ministry of War.³ Early in 1925 it was announced on the authority of the Great Khural that the "Tibetan lazaret" had been closed, and that all medical work would henceforth be conducted on the basis of "European medicine".⁴ In September 1923 a veterinary administration — a vital service in a cattle-raising country — was established in Urga "with the help of the USSR", and branches set up in provincial centres; veterinary courses were also instituted.⁵ In the following year a veterinary section was attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and made a report to the Great Khural in November 1924.⁶

The development of the Mongolian economy with Soviet aid, which was a prerequisite of a successful social and political revolution, faced at the outset a major obstacle: a virtual Chinese monopoly of economic organization. The primitive mechanisms of trade and finance were exclusively under Chinese control. "The whole trade of the country", ran a Soviet report of the period, "is in the hands of the Chinese. The Mongol turns to the Chinese for every trifle."⁷ A few direct intrusions of Russian state enterprise after 1911 had done little to change the shape of

¹ 3⁴ *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 111.

² *Ibid.* p. 95; a decision to establish a military hospital had been taken in August 1921 (B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 100), but does not seem to have been carried out.

³ 3⁴ *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 103-104.

⁴ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, February 1, 1925.

⁵ B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 93.

⁶ 3⁴ *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 69; *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 62-67.

⁷ *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 234. The ubiquitous Chinese merchant was usually an agent, not a principal; in 1919 twelve large Chinese trading concerns operated in Outer Mongolia with an annual turnover of 10 million rubles (I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 169).

the economy, and had for the most part been effaced by the end of the decade. When the new régime was set up in Outer Mongolia under the Soviet aegis, two steps were taken to break the Chinese stranglehold : a decree was issued annulling outstanding loans and debts to Chinese traders and money-lenders ;¹ and a Soviet state trading organization was set up in Urga to develop trade between Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia.² Neither of these measures touched more than the surface of the problem. According to one account, the order of annulment was deliberately published in a garbled and incomprehensible form.³ In any case, official decrees had little force outside the capital, and government writ was often less potent than the pressure of the ubiquitous and indispensable Chinese merchant. This state of affairs was avowed by a speaker at the third party congress in August 1924 :

The old debts owing to Chinese firms, usurious debts, which were annulled by our government in the first days of its existence, are still being exacted from the population (secretly, of course) with the active support of some of our party officials and organs.⁴

The diagnosis of a combination of bribery and intimidation as the method by which Chinese economic predominance was maintained does not lack plausibility. In fact, the country could not do without the Chinese trader and moneylender so long as there was nothing to put in his place. The Soviet *gostorg* was no substitute. After two years of Soviet state trading Soviet Russia took only 13·7 per cent of Mongolian exports, and provided only 13·5 per cent of Mongolian imports, almost the whole balance of

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 154 ; " hundreds of thousands of dollars " were said to have been advanced by Chinese moneylenders to " Mongol aristocrats " on the security of the whole population of the department, which was held collectively responsible (*Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 187).

² *Ibid.*, xiii-xiv (1926), 465 ; B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 96. The organization, which was a branch of Dal'gostorg, began to function in the autumn of 1923.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 187.

⁴ *3^e S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 11 ; it was officially stated in September 1924, that in one province debts to the value of 260,000 lams, or nearly half the outstanding debts of the province, had been collected by a single Chinese firm (B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 123). A provision once more annulling the debts was inserted in the constitution.

Mongolian foreign trade being carried on with China ;¹ China was the dominant factor in the foreign, as well as in the domestic, operations of the primitive Mongolian economy.

From this point of view, a more significant step was taken when the Mongolian People's Central Cooperative (Montsenkop) was founded in 1921. Its purposes, as defined in an announcement of the Ministry of Finance, were to struggle against the oppression of foreign capitalists, to purchase goods for its members, to sell local raw materials direct to buyers, and to organize enterprises to work up local materials : it was also to concern itself with the organization of popular education and the training of clerical workers.² This step was beyond doubt due to Russian inspiration and guidance. Maisky, who headed the first important Soviet mission to Outer Mongolia in 1919, came as representative of the Irkutsk office of Tsentsosyuz.³ Montsenkop had at the outset no more than 70 members, and its turnover in the first year of working did not exceed 14,000 dollars in native products and 15,000 dollars in imported goods.⁴ Its credentials and affiliations were, moreover, dubious. Like the Russian cooperatives in the first stage of the revolution, Montsenkop could become an instrument of capitalism just as easily as of socialism. Three years after its foundation, it was alleged to be the preserve of " 10 or 12 rich men " and a cover for " Chinese firms which remained in the background " ; and resolutions adopted by the party and the youth league at their congresses in 1923 to " take the cooperative into their hands " had remained ineffective.⁵ The weakness of the cooperative as a popular institution was that it was " not understood by the nomad and the shepherd ". A more serious drawback was probably the shortage of capital ; the complaint

¹ I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 201. In 1923-1924 Soviet exports to Outer Mongolia were valued at 1,500,000 rubles, Soviet imports from Outer Mongolia at 1,970,000 ; the corresponding figures for 1924-1925 were 2,769,000 and 3,583,000 (*Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 465).

² *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 218.

³ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), was the report of this mission.

⁴ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (Ulan Bator, 1925), p. 82 ; *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May, 1926, p. 103.

⁵ *3' S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 9.

was made that Chinese traders sold goods on credit and the cooperative did not.¹

From 1923 onwards the major part of the capital of Montsenkop came not from the deposits of members but from government funds; in the year 1924 it received a million lams from the Ministry of Finance "to strengthen its resources".² Indeed, as a candid commentator observed at the third party congress, "it includes in its character that of a state trading institution". The most serious complaint was, however, the inability of the cooperative to recruit staff. Experienced workers had to be imported from Soviet Russia; and not enough literate Mongols could be found, even for clerical work.³ The third party congress in August 1924, after a debate in which the shortcomings of the cooperative were extensively canvassed, and odious comparisons made with the efficiency of Chinese traders, passed a resolution declaring that it was desirable for all party members to join the cooperative; that the cooperative should have power to recruit, compulsorily, literate Mongols "equally with other governmental institutions"; that the social status of members of the cooperative should be examined; and that where branches of the cooperative existed, Chinese traders should be excluded from the trading booths.⁴ The debate on the cooperatives in the Great Khural three months later drew attention to the same difficulties. As one critic complained, "when raw material is delivered to the cooperative, it does not give the equivalent value in goods, so that the population sells the raw material to the foreigners". The employment of Buryats and Russians was defended on the ground of the impossibility of finding qualified Mongols: of the staff of Montsenkop, 20 per cent were said to be Buryats, 45 per cent Russians and 35 per cent Mongols.⁵ A section of the general economic resolution of the first session of the Great Khural in November 1924 was devoted to Montsenkop. It expressed the desire to develop the institution on the lines of "purely coopera-

¹ *3' S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 31, 91.

² *Ibid.* p. 117.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 198-201; 15 out of 200 Mongols who applied for employment were said to be "barely literate".

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 202-207.

⁵ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 185, 219, 222; in 1926, a staff of 786 consisted of 361 Russians, 257 Mongols, 95 Buryat-Mongols and 73 others (*Foreign Affairs* (N.Y.), ix, No. 3, April 1931, p. 512).

tive principles rather than of state subsidies", stressed the importance of dealing direct with producers and manufacturers in order to eliminate "the intervention of private firms and merchants", and finally dwelt on the need to train cooperative workers and "to send young people to the USSR and other countries to learn cooperative work".¹ At the end of 1924 Montsenkop had representatives in Moscow, Tientsin, Kalgan and Hailar.² Among the causes which impeded the growth and efficient working of Montsenkop, as of other Mongolian institutions, the dearth of trained, or even literate, Mongol personnel ranked high. At the time of the fourth party congress in September 1925 the Montsenkop school was said to have 75 pupils, though another speaker reckoned only 30, of whom 24 were Buryats.³

The year 1925 was one of rapid development for Montsenkop. At the fourth party congress in September 1925 it was reported that Montsenkop had received a subvention of 3 million dollars for 1925, that its turnover in native products and imported goods had amounted in 1924 to 1,029,000 dollars and 1,080,000 dollars, and that it was planned to raise these figures in 1925 to 7,128,000 and 4,275,000 dollars respectively.⁴ The complaint was made that Montsenkop failed to supply the rural population with goods of "prime necessity".⁵ Thereafter progress appears to have been more rapid. By 1926 Montsenkop had 26 branches;⁶ its membership amounted to 6687 in 1926 and 10,366 in 1927.⁷ A Chinese observer in the winter of 1926-1927 reported that Montsenkop had adopted a "policy of selling all kinds of goods at low

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 236-237.

² *Ibid.* pp. 218-219.

³ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 83, 94; a German visitor in 1927-1928 reported that Montsenkop was at that time headed by "a former Buryat Cossack officer", and staffed mainly by Russians and Buryats, though Mongols were beginning to replace the Russians (*Ost-Europa*, iv, No. 3, December 1928, p. 161).

⁴ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 80, 82; *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1926, p. 103, gives a figure of 16 million dollars as the "general turnover" of Montsenkop in 1924 with 533,876 dollars as "net profit"; in 1925, according to the same source, Soviet trading organs accounted for 7 per cent, and Montsenkop for 27 per cent, of Mongolian trade, the remainder falling to the private (and predominantly Chinese) sector.

⁵ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 88.

⁶ I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 201.

⁷ *Shkhidnii Svit*, No. 3 (9), 1929, p. 104.

fixed prices" and was doing "a thriving trade" — thanks in part to its privileged fiscal status and to the requisitioning of booths and warehouses originally established by Chinese traders.¹ "Some dozens" of Chinese firms were reported to have been liquidated.² But Chinese resistance was tough. Figures purporting to show the relative share of Chinese and Russians in Mongolian trade gave percentages of 85.7 and 14.3 respectively for 1924; by 1926 the gap had narrowed only to 68.7 and 31.3.³ More success was, however, enjoyed in the procurement of Mongolian raw materials for the Soviet market, the proportion taken by the Soviet Union rising from 24.7 per cent in 1924-1925 to 59 per cent in 1927-1928. The most important of these raw materials was wool, of which the Soviet Union took only 13 per cent in 1924-1925 and 93 per cent in 1927-1928. What lay behind these figures was summed up in the remark that "the share of the Soviet Union in the wholesale wool buying business of Mongolia has increased enormously year by year at the cost of squeezing China out of the Mongolian market".⁴ In 1928-1929 it was claimed that the Soviet Union, though it still supplied only 48 per cent of Mongolian imports, absorbed 85.5 per cent of Mongolian exports.⁵ Much of this success was due to Montsenkop, which was described by an official commentator as "the biggest factor in Mongolia's foreign trade" and "the instrument of government monopoly".⁶

Since shortage of capital was, next to shortage of personnel, the principal handicap, it is unlikely that Montsenkop would have achieved even this limited advance unless something had been done to break the monopoly of the small Chinese capitalist. Of the economic projects which Vasiliev brought with him from Moscow on his arrival in Urga in January 1924 the most important was the foundation of a bank under the name of the Mongolian Bank for Industry and Trade. A Mongolian National Bank,

¹ Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), p. 75.

² *Novyi Vostok*, xii-xiii (1926), 465.

³ Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), p. 76.

⁴ *Sovetskaya Aziya*, No. 3-4, 1931, p. 160.

⁵ I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istarii Mongolii* (1957), p. 201; besides wool, the main Mongolian exports were hides and furs, the main imports tea, textiles and metal goods.

⁶ *Foreign Affairs* (N.Y.), ix, No. 3, April 1931, p. 515.

which worked with Russian capital and was a subsidiary of the Siberian Commercial Bank, had been established in Urga in 1915. But this came to an end in 1918; and an attempt in 1919 to set up a Chinese bank in Outer Mongolia was even less successful.¹ The new bank opened its doors on June 2, 1924.² One half of its founding capital of 250,000 gold rubles was vested in the Mongolian republic, the other half jointly in the Soviet Gosbank and in Narkomfin. In practice, as was unavoidable at the outset, the working capital was provided from Soviet sources, and the management and staff were predominantly Russian.³ An initial balance of 214,000 dollars was reported to have risen to 3½ million dollars a year later.⁴

One of the immediate purposes of the bank was to issue and support a Mongolian currency. Down to 1924 the silver lan, a measure of weight,⁵ served as a unit of account. But no Mongolian currency existed, and Chinese (Mexican) and American dollars and Russian rubles all circulated. A provision in the Russian-Mongolian agreement of November 5, 1921, that an issue of Mongolian paper currency should be guaranteed by a loan of a million rubles from the RSFSR⁶ was not carried into effect. In 1923 the Mongolian Government had issued Mexican dollar notes, apparently without backing, to a value of 3½ million dollars, but a proposal to mint silver dollars broke down owing to the prohibitive cost of the necessary machinery.⁷ The first Great

¹ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 177-180, 209-211.

² The announcement was made in *Urginskaya Gazeta*, May 31, 1924.

³ *Ost-Europa*, iv, No. 3, December, 1928, pp. 154-156; *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 234-236. The amount of the original capital was recorded in *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 141; I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 200, speaks of the necessity of "organizational and financial aid" from the Soviet Union.

⁴ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, June 4, 1925.

⁵ *Lan* is the Mongolian or Russian equivalent of the Chinese *liang*, an ounce (=approximately 1½ English ounces): this was conveniently used, like that alternative word *tael*, to indicate an ounce of silver, having at this time a value of about 1.45 dollars. In Russian currency it was equivalent to 1.43 gold rubles (*Novyi Vostok*, i (1922), 177).

⁶ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 142; for the agreement of 1921 see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 520.

⁷ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 142-143; machinery was subsequently ordered from Germany (*ibid.* p. 145).

Khural in November 1924 declared that the bank should "become the fundamental basis for establishing a state monetary system and for the issue of currency", and pointed wistfully to the hope of "receiving foreign loans on appropriate conditions".¹ It was no doubt owing to further financial aid from the Soviet Union that the Mongolian Government was able to issue a decree on February 22, 1925, establishing a Mongolian currency the unit of which was the tugrik: the tugrik was a silver coin equivalent to 0.88 Mexican dollars or 1.31 rubles. The bank now began to keep its accounts in tugriks (the government seems to have made the transition somewhat later), and on December 7, 1925, "after extensive agitation and propaganda, by word of mouth and in the press, about the importance of the monetary reform", issued the first tugrik notes.² The notes, and the coinage which followed them, were printed and minted in Moscow. A resolution of the fourth party congress in September 1925 gave its emphatic blessing to the monetary reform.³ The bank encouraged the use of the new currency by making reduced charges for transactions in tugriks, and Soviet organizations undertook a campaign to popularize it throughout the country. But even after the introduction of tugrik coinage, the familiar Mexican dollar remained legal currency.⁴

The ultimate aim of the bank, as its name indicated, was the promotion of trade and industry; and this meant, in Mongolian conditions, their regulation and development by the state. At the session of the Great Khural of November 1924 the naïve complaint was heard that the bank did not help the poor man, since it made loans only on the security of assets far exceeding the value of the loan; the resolution spoke of "the concentration of all credit policy in the hands of the state" and of the need to "increase the founding capital and work out a correct plan for its

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 158.

² *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 235; I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), pp. 200-201. The first issue of notes was announced in *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, December 9, 1925; for the text of the decree authorizing the issue and fixing the official parity see *ibid.* December 16, 1925.

³ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 96.

⁴ *Novyi Vostok*, xiii-xiv (1926), 235-236.

operations".¹ By the middle of 1926 the bank had six branches.² A contemporary account of the establishment in the autumn of 1925 of a branch in the remote western Kobdo province reveals something of the nature of the problems and the functions which the bank was called on to perform. In the Kobdo province all organizations "were and are in need of ready cash". Transactions had hitherto been mainly in kind: "money takes a long time to reach here and little of it is sent". The bank was expected to keep the accounts of the customs and postal authorities, of the local army administration, of the ecclesiastical administration, of the state sowing fund, and of the veterinary department. On the other hand, few private accounts would be handled; and, owing to distance and cost of transport, high rates would have to be charged for advances. Chinese merchants were not expected to use the bank, but it might be used by a few traders from Biisk in Soviet territory.³ The introduction of a banking system illustrated what was being attempted in these years in every sector of the Mongolian economy. Everywhere a direct transition was being made, in face of almost insuperable difficulties, from the primitive natural economy of a nomadic people to a modern industrial economy, by-passing the intermediate step represented in Mongolia by the Chinese small trader and moneylender.

The establishment of the bank and of a Mongolian currency paved the way for the introduction of order into public finance. The first regular Mongolian state budget was for the year 1923 and ostensibly balanced at 3·7 million Mexican dollars.⁴ Down to 1922, at any rate, taxation in kind was levied through the delivery of cattle to the state.⁵ Of the state revenues in 1924, 80 per cent,

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 141-142, 157-158; the desire "to come to the help of the population which needed cheap credit" had been optimistically mentioned at the third party congress three months earlier as one of the purposes of the bank (*3' S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 117).

² I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1959), p. 201.

³ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, December 5, 1925.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, June 5, 1927; *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 143 admits that before 1923 no estimates of state revenue and expenditure were drawn up; according to *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 170, the budget had "no practical significance" before 1925.

⁵ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 142; a law of November 9, 1923, prescribed severe penalties for concealment of cattle (B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 93).

or 2,400,000 lams, were derived from customs dues, including dues levied on internal trade.¹ In 1924 a state wine and spirit monopoly was instituted and was estimated to yield about 100,000 lam a year.² A resolution of the first Great Khural of November 1924 recorded with satisfaction that the budget had increased from 3 million lam in the previous year to 5 million lam, and that "in spite of an enormous reduction of the tax burden and without any foreign loans".³ But the limiting factor continued to be the lack of qualified personnel. This deficiency weighed especially heavily on the customs service. No rewards were paid to informers. A school to train young customs officials had been a failure; and the older officials "behave very badly to Mongols, particularly to the poor and to the country people" — the implication being that well-to-do Chinese traders could bribe their way through.⁴ In November 1924 the Minister for Finance once again reported to the Great Khural "an insufficiency of intelligent workers and translators": the result was that "thanks to the impossibility of obtaining suitable staff, many important projects have made no progress up to the present time".⁵ In 1924 the department of State Control, which had been set up on the Soviet model two years earlier to check abuses in administration, instituted courses for the training of book-keepers.⁶

During the next few months, thanks largely to Soviet aid and example, substantial advances took place on the economic and financial front. In July 1923, in preparation for the second party congress, the party central committee had drawn up some "principles of economic policy" and proposed the establishment of an

¹ 3^e *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 122, 138; according to these figures nearly one-third of customs revenue came from internal trade. The customs service dated from the establishment of Mongolian autonomy in 1911.

² *Ibid.* p. 118; *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 214.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 45-46.

⁴ 3^e *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 128-129; a few years later a Chinese traveller made the opposite complaint that Chinese traders were victimized (Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949, pp. 19-20).

⁵ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 137.

⁶ B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 97; courses in book-keeping at the Ministry of Finance are mentioned in *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 177.

economic council.¹ But nothing had been done to carry out this proposal. Up to the end of 1924 the Ministry of Finance was the only department of state concerned with economic affairs. The Great Khural decided in November 1924 "to separate off from the Ministry of Finance a special economic ministry to direct commercial and industrial affairs, and also to attach to the government an economic council for the general direction of the economic policy of the country".² The Minister for Finance in his report noted two main desiderata of economic policy :

(a) the development of industry in Mongolia, (b) the organization in the towns and provinces of governmental and public undertakings on cooperative principles, by inviting foreign instructors and Mongol workers : the latter can be recruited compulsorily on the spot.

The financial and economic resolution of the Great Khural declared that the republic must "stand for the development of state capitalism (concessions, leases, cooperatives, etc.), which alone offers the possibility to develop the productive forces of the country under the direction of state power, and at the same time to prevent the exploitation of Mongolia by international capitalists". It called for the development of industry, as a "complement to a cattle-raising economy", on the basis of working up the natural resources of the country. In its section on trade the resolution concluded that the development of the economy depended "on state regulation of the prices of products and goods and on the gradual weakening of the rôle of private trading and money-lending capital", and demanded "a policy of the general development of state (and cooperative) trade at the expense of private trade".³ Among the economic projects canvassed at this time were a state monopoly of the soft coal industry, hitherto in the hands of the Chinese, a plan for working deposits of hard coal, a statute for the conservation of forests, and the building of a new

¹ B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 101.

² *Ibid.* p. 153 ; the Minister for Finance explained that his ministry had "hitherto discharged the functions of a ministry of national economy". ³ *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 126, shows that the economic council was originally projected under the title of "Gosplan (Supreme Economic and Financial Council)".

³ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 217, 227-228, 230, 234.

electricity station.¹ Foreign non-Soviet aid which would have been necessary to develop deposits of gold and other minerals had not been forthcoming: "foreign capitalists took up a waiting attitude in regard to the present political status of Mongolia".²

The years from 1924 to 1926 witnessed a rapid expansion not only of the national economy, but of state finances. The budget increased from 3.7 million Mexican dollars in 1923 to 11.5 millions in 1926.³ It was noted that direct taxes were paid almost exclusively by foreigners entering the country to trade or work.⁴ The estimated customs revenue of 2,400,000 lams for 1924 had been exceeded by 100,000 lams. The customs revenue for 1925 was estimated at 3,150,000 lams, and steps were taken to abolish internal customs levies.⁵ Local budgets, based partly on independent self-taxation, but mainly on deduction from state taxes, largely escaped central control.⁶ The principal aims of fiscal policy at this time were said to have been the abolition of local taxes and uniformity of taxation throughout the country; the substitution of monetary taxation for taxation in kind; and the introduction of a progressive tax on incomes.⁷ On the expenditure side, the proportion of the budget devoted to industrial construction and to aid for cattle-breeding rose from 10.69

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 118, 120; the electricity station was to provide light for the city of Urga, and was almost completed in the autumn of 1925 (*Chetvertiy S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 81).

² *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 210.

³ *Izvestiya*, June 5, 1927; the most detailed figures available are quoted in Mexican dollars in *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 172 (the figures for 1926 are called "preliminary"):

	1923	1924	1925	1926
Income	3,671,000	6,625,000	8,298,000	12,380,000
Expenditure	3,594,000	5,957,000	7,437,000	11,057,000

⁴ *Ibid.* xv, 174.

⁵ *Chetvertiy S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 80; in 1926 customs receipts accounted for only 37 per cent of the revenue, but were still the largest single item, being followed by receipts from monopolies (mainly the spirit monopoly) and receipts from state trade and industry, including profits on the state capital invested in Montsenkop (*Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 173).

⁶ *Ibid.* xv, 171.

⁷ I. Zlatkin, *Ocherki Novoi i Noveishei Istorii Mongolii* (1957), p. 203; after 1926 herdsmen owning less than 5 *bodos* or units of cattle (a *bodo* was equivalent to 1 ox, cow or horse, 7 sheep, 14 goats or $\frac{1}{2}$ a camel) were exempt from the cattle tax (*ibid.* p. 204).

per cent in 1924 to 20.27 per cent in 1926; the allocation for education rose from 3.22 to 5.59 per cent; and the allocation for health from 0.5 per cent in 1925 (the first year on which any such allocation was made) to 2.7 per cent in 1926.¹

Among the attempts to modernize the Mongolian economy, more symbolical than practical importance attached to the attempts to introduce agriculture. Few sectors of Outer Mongolia had a soil and climate suitable for the cultivation of grain crops, at any rate without extensive irrigation.² Such agriculture as existed had been brought to Outer Mongolia by Chinese military colonists planted in the Kobdo province in the west and on the northern frontier in the 18th century; some descendants of these still cultivated the soil in the same regions. A further considerable influx of Chinese settlers had occurred in the northern plain round Kyakhta in the second half of the 19th century, land being made available to the settlers at a nominal annual rent.³ Market gardening in the neighbourhood of Urga was conducted "exclusively by Chinese".⁴ The gradual decline in the Chinese population which set in after 1911 had as a result a reduction in the area of land under cultivation, which fell from an estimated total of 60,000-70,000 desyatins before that year to 50,000 desyatins ten years later.⁵ An attempt by the Bogdo Gegen in 1917 to encourage agriculture encountered religious objections;⁶ later the government was said to have made the development of agriculture difficult by refusing to lease land for more than one year.⁷ On the other hand, Russian and Soviet policy had always been associated in Asia with the attempt to substitute settled agriculture for nomadic ways of life;⁸ and such a transition, if it could be effected, would clearly facilitate the creation of a modern economy and modern system of government in Mongolia.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 205.

² I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 228-230, reported that "notwithstanding the severity of the climate and the dryness of the soil", fairly favourable results might be achieved by artificial irrigation, but concluded with emphasis that Outer Mongolia had "no agricultural future" (cf. *ibid.* p. 232).

³ *Ibid.* p. 227.

⁴ *Novaya Mongoliya: Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 201.

⁵ I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 226-227.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 229.

⁷ *Ost-Europa*, iv, No. 3, December 1928, p. 159.

⁸ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, pp. 316-317, 327.

A state fund was created for the provision of seed ; and land for cultivation was placed at the disposal of Mongols without payment "in order to encourage Mongols to engage in agriculture".¹ In one region workers were said to be cultivating 800 desyatins of land "under the direction of the Ministry of Finance".² But reports made to the Great Khural in November 1924 revealed the trivial and isolated character of these efforts. In one province "the population gets seeds and sows a little grain" without state aid ; in two others, "the population in some places engages in agriculture on a small scale". In a department of Kobdo province wheat and barley had been sown in 1923 and again in 1924 on orders from the Ministry of Finance ; but in both cases the harvest was a failure, and the department petitioned for release from the obligation to cultivate.³ Early in 1925 an agricultural instructor from Moscow gave an interview to the press in which he expressed the view that the importation of tractors would be premature : in Mongolian conditions ploughing with horses was still three times as cheap. But he seems to have remained silent on the general question of the prospects of agriculture in Outer Mongolia.⁴ State farms were afterwards said to have been introduced in 1925 ;⁵ but no record of them has been found at the time. Ten years later, after persistent efforts to encourage agriculture, not more than one-third of the limited demand of the population for grain was met out of local production.⁶

The development of communications was an important factor in the creation of a modern state machine in Mongolia, as well as in the policy of substituting Russian for Chinese influence. The fact that the distance from Urga, the capital, to the Russian frontier was only one-third of the distance to Kalgan on the frontier of Inner Mongolia worked powerfully for the Russian cause. No regular system of communications existed in the period of Chinese supremacy. Goods moved in caravans with

¹ 3⁴ *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 118-119.

² *Ibid.* p. 125.

³ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 183, 189, 191, 196-197 ; the revenue from agriculture in Kobdo province in 1924 was, however, estimated at 100,250 lan (*ibid.* p. 212).

⁴ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, January 29, 1925.

⁵ *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, No. 6, 1936, p. 176.

⁶ *Ibid.* No. 6, 1936, p. 181.

draught or pack animals — oxen, yaks, camels and horses. Government services were maintained by placing on local dignitaries the obligation to provide relays of horses over fixed distances for government officials and messengers — the *urton* system. As late as 1924, the third party congress was told that “there is absolutely no post in Mongolia”, and that “newspapers and packets are often held up for months and are lost en route”.¹ One of the first concerns of the Russian Government after the establishment of Mongolian autonomy in 1911 had been to negotiate an agreement for the construction of telegraph lines;² and a telegraph agreement was the second of the two projects brought to Urga by the Soviet *polpred* Vasiliev in January 1924. Some time was evidently required to settle practical details. On October 3, 1924, Vasiliev signed with the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs a telegraph agreement providing for telegraphic communications between Urga, Kyakhta and Irkutsk, and thence to the outside world.³ Other lines connecting Outer Mongolia with the USSR were to be constructed in the near future, the Soviet Government undertaking to give assistance to the Mongolian Government for the purchase of the necessary equipment. A school to train telegraphists was set up, but in the autumn of 1924 still lacked both premises and instructors.⁴ Since no telegraph lines ran from Urga southwards, telegrams to China were also routed through the USSR. The most interesting clauses of the agreement were those fixing the tariff. Telegrams from Outer Mongolia to the USSR cost 10 kopeks a word, to

¹ 3⁴ *S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 31. This was modified by the statement elsewhere that a postal service existed only between Urga and Altan-Bulak, the Mongolian frontier town across the river from Kyakhta (*ibid.* p. 88); according to I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 172, some form of postal service existed in 1919–1920 between several of towns. The first Great Khural of November 1924 attempted to provide for the improvement of the *urton* service (*Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), pp. 71–72).

² G. M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949), pp. 88–89. According to I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), p. 172, three telegraph lines, built by the Russians in face of Mongolian obstruction, existed in Outer Mongolia in 1919–1920, including the line Kyakhta-Urga-Kalgan; but it is uncertain whether these lines were still in operation in 1924.

³ *Sobranie Zakonov, 1925*, No. 20, art. 135; *SSSR : Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, i–ii (1928), No. 97, pp. 283–285.

⁴ 3⁴ *S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 88.

other destinations (except China) 10 gold kopeks a word, and to China 19 gold kopeks a word. At the end of 1926, when regular postal services had been developed within Outer Mongolia, and between Ulan-Bator and the Soviet frontier, no postal service existed between Outer Mongolia and China: letters from Outer Mongolia to Chinese destinations were despatched via the Soviet Union, and had to be re-stamped on the Soviet-Chinese frontier.¹ Thus, while Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia was still formally asserted, the provision in Outer Mongolia of such elementary and essential facilities of the modern state as postal and telegraphic communications served to make Outer Mongolia dependent on Soviet friendship, to forge closer links between the two countries, and to detach Outer Mongolia from her former dependence on China; and they were, beyond doubt, consciously used for this purpose.

Road-building was an urgent but arduous task. Significantly, a start was made on the road from Ulan-Bator to Altan-Bulak; in 1925 it was announced that road works, including the construction of bridges, would shortly begin on this route. But, though post offices had been set up in Altan-Bulak and elsewhere, packets were at this time still carried by *urton* service, with resulting delays and irregularities.² It was many years before any railway was built in Outer Mongolia.³ More promising was the prospect of the development of communications by air. At dawn on one of the last days of May 1925 the first aeroplane to be seen in Ulan-Bator descended from the sky. The "steel bird" made an "extraordinary impression" on the inhabitants. It was a Junkers plane ordered by the Mongolian Government, and had made the flight from Troitskosavsk on the frontier in five hours;

¹ Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), p. 70.

² *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 81, 90.

³ Ambitious schemes were frequently canvassed (see, for example, an article in *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 1, 1923, pp. 23-27); a note attached to the Politburo report of March 25, 1926 (see p. 769 above) in the Trotsky archives (T 870) included the item: "Have in mind to proceed to the construction at the first opportunity of a railway line from Verkhneudinsk to Urga and Kalgan". But an alleged Soviet-Mongolian railway agreement of September 1925 widely reported at the time (for details see *China Year Book*, 1926-7 (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 800) was certainly a forgery. The first Mongolian railway was built after 1945.

three more planes were expected.¹ Early in July 1925 a further six aeroplanes arrived from Irkutsk.² In the latter part of the year a branch of Aviakhim was established in Ulan-Bator, and frequent appeals on its behalf were evidently designed to make the population air-conscious.³ According to the testimony of a Chinese observer, "the Russians have seized control of communications" and "the Mongols have no power whatsoever to assist themselves in this sphere".⁴ Though this charge cannot be substantiated, it is true that the development of communications in and with Outer Mongolia could take place only with Soviet aid, and was used for the practical purpose of strengthening links with the Soviet Union.

The foreign relations of Outer Mongolia were virtually limited in this period to the cultivation of a close connexion with the Soviet Union; and no encouragement was given to probe the apparent incompatibility between the Soviet-Mongolian treaty of November 5, 1921, which treated Outer Mongolia as a formally independent state, and the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924, which recognized it as part of China. At the third Mongolian party congress in August 1924 Rinchino defended the Sino-Soviet treaty as designed "to set the Chinese people in opposition to the imperialists", but also contrived to refer to "Mongolian independence". Amor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, set out the full list of Mongolian demands on China: recognition of Mongolian independence; reparations for damage done in 1912 and 1920; self-government for Inner Mongolia; the presence of Soviet representatives at Mongolian-Chinese negotiations; and the holding of these negotiations in Urga. Amor crowned

¹ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, May 31, 1925; 10 Junkers planes had been ordered by the Mongolian Government in Leningrad (I. Korostovets, *Von Cinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik* (1926), p. 342). The first flight from Moscow to Peking via Mongolia was announced in advance by the presidium of VTsIK on June 1, 1925, and its successive stages reported in *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1925, and following days.

² *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, July 4, 1925.

³ Appeals appeared in *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto* throughout December 1925; for Aviakhim see Vol. 2, p. 419.

⁴ Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), p. 139.

this unrealistic programme with the bare statement that the Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia was recognized in the Sino-Soviet treaty ; and, if the records can be believed, no discussion followed.¹ The resolution of the congress on the report of the central committee spoke of the necessity of " a link between the Mongolian People's Party with other revolutionary and communist parties of the Far East ",² but apparently did not mention state relations. Nor did any debate on foreign relations take place three months later at the first session of the Great Khural, which adopted a constitution declaring Outer Mongolia " an independent People's Republic ". The clearest pronouncement of this period on the international status of the Mongolian republic was made by Chicherin at VTsIK in March 1925 :

We recognize the Mongolian People's Republic as part of the Chinese Republic, but we also recognize its autonomy in so far-reaching a sense that we consider it not only as independent of China in its internal life, but as capable of pursuing its foreign policy independently.³

This formula did not appear to preclude relations between the People's Republic and countries other than the Soviet Union, or with China in particular ; and the Mongolian Government replied shortly afterwards to a note of protest from the Chinese Government by complaining that the delay in settling relations between China and Mongolia was due to " the continued civil war in China and the tardy recognition of this government by China ".⁴ The clause of the constitution relating to the need to conduct foreign policy in conformity with the interests of the revolutionary workers was followed by a wistful note in the following terms :

None the less, the possibility is not excluded, in accordance with the requirements of the conditions of this or that state of

¹ 3¹ *S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 20-21, 83-84.

² Quoted in B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 112 ; the text of this resolution did not appear in 3¹ *S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.).

³ *SSSR : Tsentral'nyi Iсполnitel'nyi Komitet 2 Sozyva : 3 Sessiya* (1925), p. 55.

⁴ Quoted from the local press in *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 380. The date of the note is not stated ; the Chinese note, of which the text is not quoted, was dated March 28, 1925.

affairs, of establishing friendly relations with one foreign Power or another, while at the same time opposing a decisive resistance in all circumstances to any who attack the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.¹

And at the fourth party congress in September 1925 it was reported, not without a hint of satisfaction at China's troubles, that "foreign relations with China have hitherto not been established owing to the internal disturbances prevailing there".² In the following month, when the Soviet-German commercial agreement of October 12, 1925, named Outer Mongolia and other Asian states as countries to which the Soviet Union was entitled to extend tariff concessions without incurring most-favoured-nation obligations towards Germany, the Chinese Government maintained its legal position by protesting to the German Government against this treatment of Outer Mongolia as an independent entity, and received in return the hollow assurance that this was "a *de facto* solution, without prejudice to legal rights".³

Notwithstanding lack of official encouragement from Moscow, some of the Mongol leaders were evidently eager to establish direct contacts between the Mongolian republic and other countries. In the early days of the régime attempts were made by British, American and German firms to enter the Mongolian market as buyers or sellers. The number of American and British firms interested is said to have increased from 5 in 1920 to 62 in 1924 — the numbers being presumably those of trading licences taken out. American firms made themselves unpopular by refusing to accept silver lams in payment for goods and insisting on the use of American dollars. A visit from the German commercial attaché in Peking to Urga is reported in 1922;⁴ and an American consul also came from Kalgan. At the third Mongolian party congress in August 1924 Rinchino was asked whether the Mongolian Government would seek agreements "with imperialist Powers" or "only with people's governments like the Labour

¹ *Novaya Mongoliya : Protokoly Pervogo Velikogo Khuruldana* (1925), p. 243; for the clause in question see p. 825 above.

² *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 77.

³ *China Year Book, 1928* (Tientsin, n.d.), p. 379.

⁴ B. Shirendyb, *Narodnaya Revolyutsiya v Mongolii* (1956), p. 109.

government of England". His reply cautiously distinguished between political and economic agreements :

There is a whole series of questions (commercial, economic, etc.) which do not touch on politics : on these questions we are of course ready to come to an agreement with anyone, provided it is in our interests. . . . In future it will be possible to come to an agreement with England (she now buys from us cattle and raw material), with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan : we ought long ago to have come to an agreement with them. Similarly it will be very profitable for us to enter into official relations with Germany : we could receive from there technical and other products — the more so since Germany sent trade representatives to us and invited our representatives to Germany.

The sending of Mongolian representatives and in general relations with the governments named were delayed exclusively by the lack of Mongols trained for such work.¹

On November 19, 1924, Yapon-Danzan presented his credentials to Kalinin as Mongolian representative in Moscow ; in May 1925 he brought the greetings of the Mongolian People's Republic to the third Union Congress of Soviets.² Later in the year it was announced that " specialists " had been sent to the Soviet Union and Germany to order factory equipment.³ In the latter part of 1925 a Mongolian trade delegation consisting of the Russian-speaking Sampilon, who had come to Moscow with Yapon-Danzan in November 1924, and an English-speaking secretary, arrived in Berlin and remained till August 1926. German and Swedish machinery, tools and equipment were ordered ; and some German engineers, as well as a Swedish engineer, were engaged to work in Mongolia. Consignments for Mongolia were handled by the Soviet-German transport organization Derutра, and Soviet transit licences were required.⁴ If the Mongolian trade delegation was given no diplomatic recognition, this was

¹ 3' *S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 24-25.

² *Izvestiya*, November 20, 1924 ; *Tretii S'ezd Sovetov SSSR* (1925), p. 25.

³ *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 80 ; the announcement was made to the fourth party congress in the report of the Ministry of National Economy, not of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ The delegation received little publicity, and the main source for its activities is the account given by S. M. Wolff, a Russian resident in Berlin who was employed by it as interpreter and factotum (*Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, xxxii (1945), 289-298). Correspondence of May 1926 in the

apparently not the fault of the German Government. An official of the eastern division of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested to Sampilon that Germany might be willing to recognize Outer Mongolia *de jure* as well as *de facto* as an independent state in return for preferential treatment for German trade. The cautious Sampilon was proof against this somewhat crude approach. He explained that Outer Mongolia could not afford to keep diplomatic missions in all European countries, and it was therefore better to maintain permanent relations only with the Soviet Union.¹ In February 1926, while Sampilon was in Berlin, what was evidently intended to be a more important economic mission, headed by Amor, now Minister for National Economy, and Ja-Damba, president of the revolutionary military council, arrived in Moscow for trade negotiations with the Soviet Government.²

The most thorny issue was, however, that of relations between Outer Mongolia and China, which in any shape or form remained suspect and unwelcome to Moscow. So long as China was represented by the Peking government, which unconditionally refused to have any dealings with an independent Mongolian republic, it was easy to invoke the precedents of Bodo and Danzan and to treat any approach from the Mongolian side as treason. But it was more difficult to discourage relations with Kuomintang and the Canton government, or with the Kuominchün movement and Feng Yü-hsiang, since these enjoyed the sympathy and support of the Soviet Government. Rinchino, in reply to specific questions at the third party congress in August 1924 about relations with China, had said that "it will be necessary to come to an agreement with the south, with the democratic Canton government", and added that Yapon-Danzan had already been on a mission to Canton in the previous year.³ Records of subsequent

German archives relates to these transactions; Sampilon was said at that time to intend to purchase further German goods to the value of 20,000 dollars, but the Russians were trying to persuade the Mongols to buy Russian goods which they did not want rather than German goods which they did want (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 4829/242310-314, 242320). A mainly factual article by Sampilon about Outer Mongolia (referred to as "northern Mongolia") appeared in *Ost-Europa*, i (1925-1926), No. 2, pp. 392-410.

¹ *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, xxxii (1945), pp. 295-296.

² *Izvestiya*, February 17, 1926; *Pravda*, February 18, 1926.

³ *3^e S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), pp. 24-25.

contacts are few. But on April 6, 1926, the central committee of the Mongolian People's Party presented a red banner to members of the central committee of Kuomintang who were passing through Ulan-Bator on their way back from the session of the sixth enlarged IKKI in Moscow.¹ It is reasonable to assume that some of the Mongol leaders, especially those who were most steeped in the old traditions and found it most difficult to adapt themselves to the new Soviet-sponsored order, would have welcomed a strengthening of any Chinese connexion as a counterweight to growing Soviet influence and predominance.² But no such movement was allowed to take concrete form.

The position of Inner Mongolia added a minor complication to the ambiguous relations between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and China. Unlike Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia had been subject to a long process of colonization by Chinese settlers. It had remained firmly embedded in the loose structure of the Chinese dominions. It had not shared with Outer Mongolia the experience of "autonomy" under Russian patronage since 1911. The feudal and ecclesiastical order of society had not been shaken. Events in Outer Mongolia must, however, have had their repercussions across the frontier. A People's Party of Inner Mongolia was said to date from 1923, and to have held a conference at Peking "in the winter of 1924".³ The ruling groups in Inner Mongolia, both Mongol and Chinese, were apprehensive of what might follow if the Soviet advance in Outer Mongolia were not held in check. In 1923 a conference of "princes" of Inner Mongolia was held in Peking — no doubt, under the patronage of the Peking government — and petitioned the government for intervention to deliver Outer Mongolia from

¹ *Izvestiya*, April 10, 1926; for the Kuomintang delegation at the sixth IKKI see p. 629 above.

² This is specifically asserted in Ma Ho-t'ien, *Chinese Agent in Mongolia* (Engl. transl., Baltimore, 1949), p. 115, where "most of the leaders of the Mongolian People's Party", including Damba-Dorji, president of the central committee, were said to be "Rightists" and to "advocate union with China" or, more specifically, with Kuomintang, "in order to reduce the power of the Russians"; the same author draws attention to the prestige enjoyed by Kuomintang and by Feng Yü-hsiang among the Mongols (*ibid.* pp. 45, 69). This source perhaps exaggerates the strength of a movement which, however, undoubtedly existed.

³ *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 191.

"the Reds".¹ In August 1924 the Japanese press reported the arrival in Mukden of a delegation from Inner Mongolia which begged Chang Tso-lin to take up with the Soviet representatives the Mongolian question, including the evacuation of Outer Mongolia by Soviet troops; and in the following month a Japanese scientific expedition was sent to investigate "the mineral wealth of the country and its geological formation" — a suspected cover for political espionage.² In 1925 Chang Tso-lin, with the help of Japanese officers, was reported to have organized "conferences of princes" in Inner Mongolia, to have attempted to recruit an Inner Mongolian army of 30,000 men and to have founded a Japanese bank with a capital of 5 million dollars in Kalgan, its most important city. A Soviet commentator conjured up visions of Inner Mongolia as "a second Korea".³ In the latter part of 1925 a party of 13 Japanese purporting to represent the South Manchurian Railway entered Outer Mongolia, and were sent back "under escort" from Ulan-Bator to Kalgan.⁴

Even apart from fear of allowing Inner Mongolia to become a focus of Chinese intrigue for the recovery of Outer Mongolia or of designs to extend Japan's sphere of influence, it was natural that some leaders of the Mongolian People's Republic should have dreamed of eventually annexing to the republic the Mongolian territory beyond the frontier still subject to the dwindling authority of the Peking government. But such ambitious projects never had much substance. At the fourth congress of the Mongolian party in September 1925 Amagaev issued a warning that "Outer Mongolia cannot cast herself for the rôle of sole assembly-point for the Mongolian lands and peoples", and that "the problem of the union of the Mongolian peoples is a matter for a future voluntary agreement between the toilers themselves".⁵ In any

¹ *Revolyutsionnyi Vostok*, ii (1927), 59; A. Kallinikov, *Revolyutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), p. 90, speaks of Peking as "the centre of the Mongolian reaction", and refers to the presence there of former landowners and "princes" — presumably from Outer as well as Inner Mongolia.

² *Novyi Vostok*, viii-ix (1925), 201-202, 204.

³ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, November 18, 1925; *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 190.

⁴ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 24, 1925, p. 840.

⁵ *Chetvertyi S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), p. 47; the congress was attended by a delegate of the Inner Mongolian party *ibid.*

event, the Soviet Government was clearly unwilling to countenance a further encroachment which would have incurred the unconditional hostility of every party and group in China, as well as of any Japanese Government. In 1925 Inner Mongolia was overrun by the Kuominchün armies of Feng Yü-hsiang. It was "with the knowledge and approval of Feng Yü-hsiang" that an announcement appeared in Ulan-Bator in October 1925 that the first congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia would meet in the following month at Kalgan, and that Damba-Dorji would represent the Outer Mongolian party at the congress. The announcement, however, specifically dissociated the Inner Mongolian party from any pan-Mongolian movement, and stressed its orientation towards Kuomintang and the revolutionary movement in China.¹ The congress met at Kalgan early in November 1925. The Inner Mongolian party, which was said to have been founded in the preceding year, claimed to have enrolled 300 members and 3000 candidates, and to have sent envoys to Ulan-Bator and to Moscow. The congress was formally greeted by a representative of Feng Yü-hsiang, and was attended by delegates of Kuomintang as well as of the Outer Mongolian party. It issued a manifesto attacking the Mongol feudal lords and Chinese colonizers of Inner Mongolia, and drew up a programme for the movement.² The manifesto alleged that Great Britain, Japan and the United States were in league to keep China disunited in order that they might take the country into their own hands: only the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia were true friends of "oppressed China". The Mongol lords were hand in glove with Chinese militarists. The People's Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia was ready to lead a struggle for national liberation, for the abolition of the power and privileges of the princes and for self-government.³ The manifesto avoided any hint of pan-Mongolian aspirations, and contained no demand for independence from China. Whatever ambitions may have been entertained in Ulan-Bator, Soviet policy in Inner Mongolia, as distinct from Outer Mongolia, would continue

p. 9), and, according to I. Korostovetz, *Von Cingghis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik* (1926), p. 343, by a delegate of Feng Yü-hsiang.

¹ *Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, October 14, 1925.

² *Ibid.* November 18, 1925; *Novyi Vostok*, xii (1926), 191-192.

³ For the text of the manifesto see *ibid.* xii, 192-195.

to be subordinated to the Soviet alliance with the Chinese nationalist movement.

The fortunes of the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva continued to be linked with those of Outer Mongolia. A Tannu Tuva People's Party had held its first congress on February 28–March 1, 1922, and elected a central committee; by this time the People's Republic of Tannu Tuva already had a government, and enjoyed the recognition of Soviet Russia as an independent republic.¹ But both party and government seem down to the middle of 1923 to have existed mainly on paper. Early in June 1923 the party central committee was dissolved, and a commission set up to arrange for the summoning of another party congress. On June 14, 1923, the commission issued an appeal to "the working people of Tannu Tuva" to enter the ranks of a national revolutionary party "for the defence of its interests and of those of the oppressed nations of the world under the leadership of the staff of world revolution in the Communist International". A congress for the reorganization of the party — henceforth known as the second party congress — was convened in Kyzyl-Khoto (Red City, the former Belotsarsk) on July 6, 1923.² The congress is said to have brought together 568 *arat* delegates, not all of them hitherto members of the party. In view of the "absolute inactivity" of the former central committee, it was decided to make a fresh start by constituting a new party and electing a new central committee. Representatives of the government reported to the congress, which passed resolutions in favour of universal education, the introduction of medical aid, the suppression of drunkenness, an equitable system of taxation and the abolition of rank and privilege.³ By 1925, the party counted 1071 members, of whom

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, p. 520.

² A. N. Shoizhelov, *Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika* (1930), pp. 42–43.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 43–46; the author cites records of the congress in the Mongolian language preserved in the party archives. It seems at first sight odd that, while the proceedings of the congresses of the Mongolian party were recorded in Russian, those of the Tannu Tuva party were recorded in Mongolian. A majority of the population of Tannu Tuva spoke a Turkic dialect, and had no written language; but a substantial minority was Mongolian-speaking, and 2 per cent of the population were said to be literate in Mongolian. When in 1925 a Soviet adviser to the Tannu Tuva Government inserted in the local

578 ranked as poor *arats*, 478 as middle *arats* and 15 as well-to-do.¹ It was regarded, like the Mongolian People's Party, not as socialist, but as "a bourgeois-democratic organization" working "under the conditions of a pre-capitalist stage of development".²

The total population of Tannu Tuva at this time amounted to about 70,000, of whom 12,000 were Russian settlers, most of them dating from the latter part of the 19th century.³ In October 1923 the first people's assembly of Tannu Tuva adopted "the foundations of a constitution".⁴ The decision to constitute Tannu Tuva as an independent republic separate from the Mongolian People's Republic had been the occasion for an immediate protest from the Mongolian Government.⁵ It was contested not only from the Mongolian side, but from that of Tannu Tuva. The lamas and former lamas, who, as in Outer Mongolia, played a conspicuous part in the affairs of the territory, spoke Mongolian and were conscious of cultural and religious ties which bound them to the Mongolian republic; and the population in the south and east included a substantial Mongol or Mongolian-speaking element. It was mainly, though perhaps not only, from this group that the demand emanated for union with Outer Mongolia. In 1924 serious disorders occurred in the Kamchuk district — one of the five districts into which Tannu Tuva was divided. The Mongolian version attributed them to persecution by the Russian colonists and to oppressive taxation, and declared that troops had taken "the severest reprisals on the peaceful inhabitants", who ran away in order to escape complete destruction; refugees from Tannu Tuva had come to the Mongolian authorities in Kobdo asking for protection and for the union of their country with Mongolia.⁶ A later Soviet version

Russian language newspaper *Krasnyi Pakhar* a notice in the Tuvian language in Russian script, this was hailed as the first occasion on which the language had ever appeared in written form (*Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, June 8, 1925).

¹ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 512.

² *Pravda*, July 22, 1927.

³ *Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, viii (1930), 986; for the original influx of Russians see *Novyi Vostok*, xxiii-xxiv (1928), pp. 155-167; *Revolutsionnyi Vostok*, iii (1928), 292.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, June 14, 1925.

⁵ *3⁴ S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 84.

⁶ The statement was made by the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the third Mongolian party congress in August 1924 (*ibid.* pp. 84-85); a note appended to the record described it as "absolutely one-sided and incorrect".

represented the disturbances as having been provoked by feudal lords and by the rich, but agreed that they were connected with a demand for union with Mongolia.¹

In June 1924 the representatives of the Soviet Union and Mongolia reached an agreement to send a joint commission to Tannu Tuva to investigate the situation.² The commission was active in Kyzyl-Khoto while the third congress of the Mongolian party was sitting in Urga. On August 15, 1924, it issued an appeal to the people of Tannu Tuva to occupy themselves in "internal work to raise the general level of well-being", promised advice and instruction from the Soviet and Mongolian Governments to this end, and declared that "at the necessary moment" these governments would take a final decision on the status of Tannu Tuva, "having regard to the will of the population itself".³ Three days later the third congress of the Tannu Tuva People's Party met. But, apart from approving measures of party discipline already applied by the central committee to some errant party leaders, its only recorded decision, taken by a majority, was to subject lamas who had married and engaged in secular occupations to all normal state obligations and taxation: this implied a continued toleration, indicative of the persistence of religious feelings and prejudices, of the privileged position of lamas still engaged in the practice of religion.⁴ On October 28, 1924, the second people's assembly of the Tannu Tuva People's Republic adopted a constitution in which its independent status was clearly affirmed.⁵

¹ A. Kallinikov, *Revolyutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), p. 94.

² This was presumably the "decision" mentioned *ibid.* p. 94. The despatch of the commission was announced by the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the third Mongolian party congress (3^d *S"ezd Mongol'skoi Narodnoi Partii* (n.d.), p. 85); it was also referred to by Vasiliev in his speech of greeting (*ibid.* p. 6). The account in *Izvestiya*, June 14, 1925, referred not to a joint commission, but to Soviet and Mongolian delegations.

³ A. Kallinikov, *Revolyutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), pp. 94-95; *Skhidnii Svit*, No. 3 (9), 1929, p. 101, cited August 15, 1924, as the date of the "recognition" of Tannu Tuva by Mongolia.

⁴ N. Shoizhelov, *Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika* (1930), p. 46; it may be significant that the records of this congress, unlike those of the second, fourth and fifth, were apparently not available to this author, or were not used by him, since it seems inconceivable that the congress should have avoided altogether so burning and topical an issue as the status of Tannu Tuva *vis-à-vis* the Mongolian republic.

⁵ *Izvestiya*, June 14, 1925; A. Kallinikov, *Revolyutsionnaya Mongoliya* (n.d. [1925]), p. 95.

This did not, however, finally end the agitation. The campaign for union with Outer Mongolia continued to find expression in "Mongolophil petitions sent by feudal and official elements sitting in the offices of party organizations and local organs of self-government".¹ In 1925 negotiations were inaugurated in Moscow under Soviet auspices between representatives of the Mongolian and Tannu Tuva republics. They appear to have been prolonged, and were still in progress when the fourth Mongolian party congress met in September 1925. Discussion of the issue was avoided at the congress. But Amagaev, while admitting that the question was "not finally decided", asked rhetorically whether Mongolia, having suffered in the past from foreign oppression and achieved "national independence", could now exercise "any kind of pressure" on the inhabitants of Tannu Tuva in order to unite them to Mongolia "against their wish".² On November 16, 1925, the Great Khural of Outer Mongolia addressed a declaration to the people and government of Tannu Tuva, stating that "it not only does not oppose the national liberation of the people of Tannu Tuva, but . . . strives for the establishment of friendly relations directed to the political, economic and cultural *rapprochement* of the two peoples".³ On the other hand, Outer Mongolia secured the cession of Darkhat, a large but sparsely populated tract of territory on the eastern frontier of Tannu Tuva; and on that basis a treaty regulating their mutual relations was finally signed between the two republics on August 16, 1926.⁴

The recognition of the independence of the Tannu Tuva People's Republic, the quelling of the disturbances of 1924, the

¹ N. Shoizhelov, *Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika* (1930), pp. 87-88, quoting letters of January 1, 1925, from Donduk, president of a regional party committee, a former lama, and former president of the government, "one of the leaders of the Right"; of February 21, 1925, from Dalkhasurin, a former prince and president of a local administration; and of February 19, 1925, from two other local officials. Donduk's origins and attitude did not prevent his regular re-election to the party central committee for several years to come, or his subsequent reappointment as president of the government.

² *Chetvertyi S'ezd Mongol'skoi Narodno-Revolyutsionnoi Partii* (1925), pp. 47-48, 77.

³ *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 4, 1926, p. 80.

⁴ The treaty, which was concluded in Mongolian, is briefly summarized in *Skhidnii Svit*, No. 3 (9), 1929, p. 114; for a reference to the negotiations in Moscow in 1925 see G. Cleinow, *Neu-Sibirien* (1928), p. 98.

establishment of political order and perhaps a rise in economic prosperity, now made it possible to regularize and formalize the position of party and government. This was done at the fourth party congress which met from October 14 to 17, 1925. A draft party programme and statute were submitted to the congress and adopted for consideration.¹ On September 15, 1925, the presidium of Krestintern had addressed to the Tannu Tuva party what was no doubt a circular letter inviting it to send "in the form of a popular brochure" an account of the position of the peasantry in Tannu Tuva. The letter was interpreted as an invitation to accede to the organization. On a report by Donduk, the congress decided to join Krestintern; and a letter was written in answer to the circular apologizing on the ground of lack of "literary resources and translators" for failure to make a full reply, but supplying summary information on the position of the "peasantry" of Tannu Tuva. Formalities in Moscow took some time; and it was not till June 1, 1926, that Krestintern, in a letter emphasizing the primary need to raise the economic and cultural level of the population, informed the Tannu Tuva People's Revolutionary Party of the decision to admit it to the organization.² The fourth party congress also decided to organize a League of Revolutionary Youth, the first steps towards which are said to have been taken in the previous year. Its first congress took place on December 1925, and it held regular annual congresses for some years. Unlike its Mongolian counterpart, the Tannu Tuva youth league was not an independent creation, and played no part in the early history of the party. It was founded by the party as a subsidiary organ, and remained a docile instrument of party policy, though a few years later, when the party executed a turn to the Left, it served as the convenient spearhead of a Leftist movement.³

A minute, primitive, scattered and racially and linguistically divided population made any pretence of national independence

¹ N. Shoizhelov, *Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika* (1930), pp. 46-49, quoting the official records of the congress; a party journal, presumably in Mongolian, is first heard of at this time (*ibid.* p. 65, note 1).

² *Ibid.* pp. 61-65; the full text of the party letter to Krestintern of the autumn of 1925 is in *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 1-2, January-February 1926, pp. 123-125. The Great Khural of Tannu Tuva was also reported to have sent greetings to Krestintern in October 1925 (*Pravda*, October 31, 1925).

³ N. Shoizhelov, *Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika* (1930), pp. 66-77.

for Tannu Tuva unreal. Control from without was from the first an elementary necessity. But, while the Soviet authorities pursued virtually identical policies in Outer Mongolia and in Tannu Tuva, the situation in Tannu Tuva was in some respects less favourable to them. In the first place, the population was even poorer, more dispersed and more primitive, so that the introduction of the elements of European civilization, and the creation of an organized economic and political order, was an even more arduous task. Secondly, the literate elements in the country, which, even more than in Outer Mongolia, were confined to lamas and former lamas,¹ were separated by linguistic and national affiliations from the Turki-speaking majority of the population, and were less easily recruited than in Outer Mongolia as leaders and spokesmen of a national movement, which would serve as the basis of an independent republic. Thirdly, contacts with the outside world, which in Outer Mongolia had taken the form mainly of infiltration of Chinese traders and moneylenders, had come to Tannu Tuva mainly from Russian settlers, whose claims to land for cultivation impinged on the grazing-grounds of native herdsmen. Since Tannu Tuva lent itself far better than Outer Mongolia to the development of crop cultivation, the introduction of Russian agricultural settlements was more likely to accord with the general aims of Soviet policy. Resentment against the unpopular foreigner, which in Outer Mongolia had worked in favour of Soviet intervention, produced an opposite effect in Tannu Tuva, where Russians were more feared and disliked than Mongols or Chinese.

After the disturbances of 1924, the country settled down. But positive progress was slow. A list of some of the subjects dealt with at the fourth party congress in October 1925 was an index of the main preoccupations of the time. A resolution was passed on the importance of guaranteeing to women "rights of participation in the public, economic and political life of the country on equal terms with men". Another demanded the introduction of "European medicine":

We all see that Asiatic (Tibetan) medicine is obsolete and has outlived its time. It brings no benefit whatever to the

¹ Only four schools with 60 students were said to have existed in Tannu Tuva in 1924-1925 (*Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, IV (1947), 115).

people, which continues down to the present day to be wiped out by syphilis. European medicine has revealed its benefits to the civilized world. An example is provided by the USSR, where mortality from every possible kind of disease is diminishing every day.

To encourage trade, 50,000 rubles was to be advanced to the Tannu Tuva central cooperative, and relations established with the *Gostorg* of the USSR and other Soviet trading organizations. A resolution dealing with agriculture noted that cattle-raising in Tannu Tuva followed obsolete methods; the cultivation of hay crops, the use of machines, the introduction of a veterinary service and the establishment of model farms were all commended. In spite, however, of Soviet prejudices in favour of settled agriculture, and the fact that the soil of Tannu Tuva was more suited to cultivation than the Outer Mongolian steppe, no direct attack was made on the nomadic way of life still followed over large parts of the country.¹ The fifth party congress in September 1926 added to the list of desiderata "the improvement of the financial position and the strengthening of the work of local organs of government" and "the elimination of political and general illiteracy among members of the party".² Finally, on November 24, 1926, the fourth people's assembly of the Tannu Tuva People's Republic³ adopted a constitution of the republic.⁴ It was closely modelled on the 1924 constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic,⁵ with some minor but significant divergencies in the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling People and in the qualifications laid down for voting in elections. In the declaration, the statements that "all power belongs to the toiling people", that "private property is not permitted", that "titles and class distinctions . . . are abrogated" and that "the toiling masses of the whole world struggle to eradicate capitalism and to attain socialism (communism)" — all of which appeared in the

¹ N. Shoizhelov, *Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika* (1930), pp. 47-49. Friction was reported between the Tannu Tuva cooperatives and the principal Soviet trading organizations — Sibgostorg and the Torgovo-Promyshlennyyi Bank; but all three continued active, and Russian cooperatives serving the Russian population were said to serve as a model for the Tuvian cooperatives (*Novyi Vostok*, xxiii-xxiv (1928), pp. 170-172). ² *Ibid.* p. 50.

³ These assemblies had met annually since 1923, but no detailed records of them are known to exist.

⁴ For the text see *ibid.* pp. 95-100.

⁵ See pp. 824-826 above.

Mongolian document — were omitted. Nor did it contain the passage referring to the abolition of capitalism and the attainment of socialism. Lamas living permanently in monasteries were disqualified under both constitutions from voting. But the disqualification under the Mongolian constitution of “persons earning their living exclusively through the exploitation of others with the obvious aim of enrichment” and of “traders and usurers living on the labour of others or on interest from capital or other revenues” was not repeated in the Tannu Tuva constitution.¹ A concession made at this time, though not embodied in the constitution, accorded autonomous rights to Russian agricultural settlements in Tannu Tuva. These settlements were organized in “a Russian workers’ colony with self-government”, possessing its own congress of Soviets and executive committee and its special representation in the Tuviniian congress.²

¹ These changes were due partly to the different situations in the two republics, but mainly perhaps to the changes in Soviet domestic policy in 1925 which had set in with the appeasement of the well-to-do peasant and the refusal to press the issue of class war in the countryside.

² *Skhidnii Svit*, No. 3 (9), 1929, p. 112; one of the functions of the Soviet delegation which visited Tannu Tuva in the summer of 1924 (see p. 863 above) had been to study the problem of the 12,000 settlers (*Izvestiya*, June 14, 1925). *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 568 refers to the Russians as members of “the Russian workers’ self-governing colony”. Under the régime of the Bogdo Gegen in Outer Mongolia before 1921 the Chinese settlements in the principal cities had their own police and courts, and the Russian colony in Urga was also self-governing (I. Maisky, *Sovremennaya Mongoliya* (Irkutsk, 1921), pp. 75, 94); later the Russians continued to enjoy some autonomous rights.

CHAPTER 42

JAPAN AND KOREA

THE failure of the Joffe mission to Japan in the summer of 1923 and the great earthquake of September 1923 made the winter of 1923-1924 an unfruitful period in Soviet-Japanese relations. On September 22, 1923, a few days after the earthquake, Karakhan in Peking enquired of his Japanese colleague whether the Japanese Government was ready to open negotiations with the Soviet Government, justifying a preference for official negotiations by the failure of the informal conversations with Joffe.¹ In view of conditions in Japan, it is not surprising that this *démarche* remained without an answer for several months. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government, conscious of the weakened international position of Japan, kept up a series of protests and pinpricks, doubtless designed to force a resumption of negotiations. On October 27, 1923, Karakhan addressed a note to Yoshizawa protesting against attacks by Japanese warships on Soviet fishing vessels.² At the same time Chicherin sent a note to the British, French and United States Governments drawing attention to military acts of aggression by Japan in the Far East.³ Publicity was given to complaints about the oppressive behaviour of the Japanese occupying authorities in northern Sakhalin.⁴ In February 1924 the Japanese acting consul in Vladivostok was informed that his status and that of other Japanese officials in Siberia would no longer be recognized; the Japanese post office was notified that Japanese mail could no longer be routed via Siberia; Japanese correspondents were expelled from Moscow, and the representative of the official Soviet telegraph agency in Tokyo announced

¹ *Gaimusho Oa-Kyoku : Ni-Sso Koshoshi* (1942), p. 86; this volume was originally printed as a confidential document for official use, being based on the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

² *Novyi Vostok*, iv (1923), p. xxv.

³ *Ibid.* iv, p. xxvi; *Izvestiya*, October 28, 1923.

⁴ *Russian Review* (Washington), February 1, 1924, p. 221.

his impending departure.¹ At the height of these incidents, Matsui, the newly appointed Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a statement to the effect that Japan saw no reason for an immediate recognition of the Soviet Union : this provoked a sharp rejoinder from Karakhan on February 18, 1924.²

By this time the new Japanese Government had decided to respond to the Soviet approach of the previous September. Discussions between Yoshizawa and Karakhan opened in Peking on February 24, 1924 ;³ and Yoshizawa received instructions to protest against the hostile attitude adopted towards Japanese officials and Japanese mail.⁴ A conversation between the two ministers on March 1, 1924, was noted with satisfaction in the Soviet press, and was followed by further meetings.⁵ On March 22, 1924, Yoshizawa at length presented to Karakhan a detailed statement of the conditions on which Japan was willing to recognize the Soviet Union and to withdraw the Japanese forces from northern Sakhalin. These included an indemnity for the Nikolaevsk incident, and a settlement of public and private debts owed to the Japanese Government and to Japanese nationals. But a strong hint was conveyed that Japan would not prove intransigent on these demands if the Soviet Government offered remunerative long-term concessions in northern Sakhalin and other areas. Proposals were also made for a commercial treaty guaranteeing most-favoured-nation treatment to Japan, and for an agreement by both parties to refrain from hostile propaganda against the other.⁶ A basis of common interest soon began to emerge from the discussions. A Japanese correspondent in Moscow, who had obtained an interview with Trotsky, suggested three reasons for a *rapprochement* between the Soviet Union and Japan : both were opposed to discrimination on grounds of colour ; both desired the liberation of Asia from European and

¹ *China Weekly Review*, March 8, 1924, p. 39 ; for the note of February 13, 1924, on the status of Japanese officials see *Russian Review* (Washington), April 1, 1924, p. 301.

² *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), February 28, 1924, p. 297.

³ *Gaimusho Oa-Kyoku : Ni-Sso Koshoshi* (1942), p. 87.

⁴ The text of the instructions was published ; see *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), February 28, 1924, p. 296.

⁵ *Izvestiya*, March 2, 1924 ; *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), March 8, 1924, p. 60.

⁶ *Gaimusho Oa-Kyoku : Ni-Sso Koshoshi* (1942), pp. 87-88.

American imperialism ; and both felt the need for a common policy in regard to China, the neighbour of both. Trotsky cautiously assented.¹

Progress in the negotiations was now steady, but leisurely. Early in May 1924 Karakhan and Yoshizawa exchanged full powers authorizing them to negotiate a treaty ; and on May 15, 1924, Karakhan produced a draft based in essentials on the Japanese statement of March 22. The draft provided for mutual recognition, the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, an immediate Japanese withdrawal from northern Sakhalin and the conclusion of a commercial treaty and a fisheries agreement. On the all-important point, the Soviet Government expressed willingness to grant mineral and timber concessions to Japanese citizens and corporations, especially in northern Sakhalin and eastern Siberia. The question of claims was to be dealt with in subsequent agreements.² On June 7, 1924, shortly after the negotiations had begun, a change of government occurred in Japan, and a coalition cabinet took office in which the post of Prime Minister was held by Kato, the president of the Kenseikai party.³ Shidehara succeeded Matsui as foreign minister. Karakhan welcomed the new government with a firm statement to a Japanese correspondent of the Soviet conditions for an agreement. Mutual recognition must be unconditional, and not be treated as something accorded to the Soviet Union in return for compensation ; economic concessions could be granted to Japan not as compensation for recognition, but only on the basis of common economic interests ; and Japan could not expect more favourable terms than Great Britain and Italy, which had already recognized the Soviet Union.⁴

Whether or not the change of government facilitated the progress of negotiations on the Japanese side (the eccentric Goto, Joffe's former host,⁵ was still the only public figure in Japan who openly advocated normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet

¹ *Izvestiya*, April 24, 1924.

² *Gaimusho Oa-Kyoku : Ni-Sso Koshoshi* (1942), pp. 88-89.

³ The Seiyukai party, which had held the main posts in the previous government, had the support of the Mitsui group of industrial companies, the Kenseikai of the Mitsubishi group ; but attempts to distinguish between the foreign policies pursued respectively by the two parties are speculative.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, June 12, 1924.

⁵ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 542-543.

Union), the arguments in favour of an agreement grew steadily more compelling. Japan's chronic economic difficulties and adverse trade balance had been aggravated by the earthquake disaster. Supplies from Soviet sources of oil, minerals, timber and fish played an important part in the Japanese economy. Throughout 1924 the principal European countries vied with one another to recognize the Soviet Union: where others entered, it seemed disadvantageous to Japan to remain outside. Nor did Anglo-American chilliness towards Japan, or Japan's sense of isolation in the Pacific, show any signs of abating. The construction of the British base at Singapore, begun in 1923 and suspended when the Labour government took office at the beginning of 1924, was resumed in November 1924 when that government fell. The year 1924 was the year of the American law to curb Japanese immigration. In China the prestige of Great Britain, still the leading imperialist Power, was declining, that of the Soviet Union was in the ascendant; the defeat of Wu Pei-fu in the autumn of 1924 and the rising tide of the nationalist movement were symptoms of this shift in power. It may be surmised that the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty of May 31, 1924, and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China, was felt in Tokyo as an additional argument for forestalling a potential Soviet-Chinese *rapprochement* to the exclusion of Japan. Japan did not wish to be exclusively committed in China to a pro-British or anti-Soviet line; the welcome given to Sun Yat-sen in Japan on his way to Peking at the end of 1924 was a significant occasion in this context.¹ It became clear that Japan, as well as the Soviet Union, had an interest in settling the outstanding differences between the two countries.

The major issue, as in the talks with Joffe, was still the question of northern Sakhalin. Japan was dependent on foreign imports for more than half her requirements in oil. If the rich oil deposits of northern Sakhalin could be exploited for her benefit, this would be, both economically and politically, the most desirable source of supply, and would relieve her of an embarrassing dependence on American oil. The coal resources of Sakhalin (though here Manchuria offered an alternative source of supply)

¹ The point was made in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 92; for Sun Yat-sen's visit to Japan see p. 713 above.

were also an important asset. Military occupation as a means of securing these advantages was no longer a convenient or practicable policy. The Japanese Government had now accepted the principle of evacuation, but wished to secure as handsome a *quid pro quo* as possible in the form of concessions to exploit the natural resources of the island. Next came the perennial issue of fishery rights off the Russian coast — an issue which had been formerly regulated in a Russo-Japanese convention of 1907.¹ On March 2, 1923, the Soviet Government had issued a decree giving preferential treatment in the enjoyment of such rights to countries with which it was in treaty relations ; ² and during the summer of 1923 a mixed Soviet-Japanese commission was engaged in assessing the sum due to the Soviet Government in respect of Japanese fishing rights.³ The third issue, which was the least amenable to regulation by treaty, was the long-standing rivalry between the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway, which was in effect a rivalry between Vladivostok and the Japanese port of Dairen.⁴ Japan, who, through her *protégé* Chang Tso-lin, exercised virtually uncontested authority in Manchuria in defiance of the helpless Peking government, could always hope, by using her superiority in capital resources to build new railways, to divert a larger share of trade to Dairen — a step which provoked constant, but ineffectual, Soviet and Chinese protests. The construction of four new lines was said to have been sanctioned in 1924, and of a further line in January 1925.⁵ In June 1924, the People's Commissar for Communications, Rudzutak, made an unusually frank statement to the press on the possible use of the Ussuri railway, the longer route to Vladivostok running exclusively on Soviet territory, as an alternative to the CER. He noted that "the activity of the Japanese South Manchurian Railway depends to a considerable extent on

¹ For the text see V. Conolly, *Soviet Trade from the Pacific to the Levant* (1935), pp. 133-137.

² *Sobranie Uzakonenii*, 1923, No. 36, art. 378.

³ *Russian Review* (Washington), October 1, 1923, p. 56.

⁴ *Torgovlya Rossii s Vostokom*, No. 1, 1923, pp. 4-6.

⁵ *Novyi Vostok*, x-xi (1925), 288-289, where the construction of the last of these lines, from Taonanfu to Tsitsihar, was said to constitute "obviously unfair competition" with the CER; see also K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 368. For a general review of this question see *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, ii, ed. C. A. Macartney (1928), 350-356.

the continued routing of freight via the CER", and went on to deliver what read like an ultimatum :

In view of the unsettled state of Russian relations with Japan, we shall no doubt route the whole bulk of our freight over the Ussuri Railway to Vladivostok, completely avoiding the Japanese lines.

"Normal" traffic, he concluded, could be resumed on the establishment of "normal" relations.¹

Whatever hidden pressures may have been exerted behind the scenes, however, it was on the question of northern Sakhalin that the fate of the negotiations turned. In the latter part of June 1924 Yoshizawa visited Tokyo — evidently for fresh instructions ;² and he was despatched on a visit to the oilfields of northern Sakhalin to survey the situation on the spot.³ A brief lull followed in Peking. On July 31, 1924, Karakhan in a statement to the Japanese press on a recent pronouncement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Kato, again deprecated the view that Japanese recognition of the Soviet Union would constitute a "tremendous concession". Japan could claim no "monopolies or exclusive rights" in Sakhalin, and it was a *sine qua non* of any negotiations that Japan should agree to evacuation "within a fixed period"; the only question at issue was the time-limit.⁴ When on August 3, 1924, Yoshizawa returned to Peking from his journey to resume discussions with Karakhan,⁵ it was assumed that agreement was in sight. The presentation by Yoshizawa of detailed Japanese demands opened what was to be the last stage of the negotiations.⁶ On August 29, 1924, Yoshizawa handed to Karakhan a memorandum of the present extent of Japanese operations for the

¹ *Russian Review* (Washington), July 15, 1924, p. 37.

² *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), June 26, 1924, pp. 893, 917.

³ K. Yoshizawa, *Gaiho Roku-Junen* (1958), p. 74.

⁴ *Russian Review* (Washington), September 1, 1924, p. 95; the statement produced a conciliatory answer from the Japanese Government disclaiming any demand for "special and exclusive preferential rights" (*ibid.* September 15, 1924, p. 113).

⁵ *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), August 9, 1924, pp. 343-344; August 16, p. 382; *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), August 7, 1924, p. 192.

⁶ *Ibid.* August 14, 1924, pp. 240-241; Kamenev told a party meeting in Moscow on August 22, 1924, that negotiations had "already reached a point where the only outstanding question is that of the terms of concessions on Sakhalin" (L. Kamenev, *Stat'i i Rechi*, xi (1929), 13).

extraction of oil and coal in northern Sakhalin,¹ and evidently indicated that concessions were desired for the same areas. Not much is known of the further course of the discussions. In a press interview early in October 1924 Karakhan once more said that they had "entered their final and decisive stage". All the points originally in dispute had been settled. But Japan had "unexpectedly linked the issue of the negotiations with the question of Sakhalin oil".² Chicherin, in his speech at the session of VTsIK on October 18, 1924, explained that "the only question which divides us concerns the quantity of coal and oil which Japan is to obtain in northern Sakhalin after its evacuation", and that it was "impossible to cede to Japan all the natural wealth of that region".³ The Japanese Government injected a fresh element of delay into the proceedings by claiming that climatic conditions did not permit the evacuation of northern Sakhalin in winter; and Karakhan, in a note to Yoshizawa of October 22, 1924, enquired on what date, in the view of the Japanese Government, conditions would permit of evacuation.⁴ A leading article in *Izvestiya* of November 16, 1924, headed *Time to Conclude*, complained of Japan's dilatory tactics; according to a speech by Rykov a few days later, the differences had been narrowed down to a point where the Japanese negotiators demanded concessions over 60 per cent of the area occupied by them, and the Soviet negotiators were willing to concede 40 per cent.⁵ Hagglng over the extent and conditions of the concessions to be obtained by Japan in Sakhalin continued for some weeks longer. It was not till December 27, 1924, when negotiations were resumed after a brief recess, that Shidehara, in a press interview which also referred to the American immigration law and to the British Singapore base, announced that a successful conclusion might shortly be expected.⁶

Finally, on January 20, 1925, the Soviet-Japanese treaty was

¹ The memorandum appeared as an annex to the treaty of January 20, 1925 (see p. 876 below).

² *Pravda*, October 10, 1924.

³ *SSSR : Tsentral'nyi Ispolnitel'nyi Komitet 2 Sozyva : 2 Sessiya* (1924), p. 76.

⁴ *Russian Review* (Washington), December 15, 1924, pp. 232-233.

⁵ A. I. Rykov, *Stat'i i Rechi*, iii (1929), 336.

⁶ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), January 1, 1925, p. 12.

signed by Karakhan and Yoshizawa in Peking.¹ It provided for the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations, and recognized the treaty of Portsmouth which ended the Russo-Japanese war as being "in full force", thus precluding any Soviet challenge to the Japanese possession of southern Sakhalin or of Dairen; for greater security the Portsmouth treaty was reproduced in an annex. The continued validity of other treaties was to be discussed at a forthcoming conference. The fishery convention of 1907 was to be revised; but, pending a fresh agreement, fishing rights were to be maintained on their existing basis. It was laid down that neither party would support or tolerate in its territory activities directed against the sovereignty or security of the other. The Soviet Government declared itself ready to grant concessions to Japanese nationals and companies for the exploitation of minerals, forests and other natural resources anywhere in the territory of the USSR. Two protocols were attached to the treaty. The first provided for the complete evacuation of northern Sakhalin by May 15, 1925, and for the settlement of all debts and claims by subsequent negotiation. This protocol also contained a mutual assurance that neither the Soviet Union nor Japan was a party to any military alliance or secret agreement directed against the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of the other. The second protocol contained details of concessions for oil and coal to be granted by the Soviet Union in Sakhalin; the concessions were to extend to 40 or 50 years and to cover one-half of the area of the oil-fields named in Yoshizawa's memorandum of August 29, 1924. An undertaking was given that the products exported should be exempt from export duty. Several notes were also attached to the treaty. One of these dissociated the Soviet Government from responsibility for the treaty of Portsmouth.² Another conveyed the apologies of the Soviet Government for the Nikolaevsk affair of 1920, thus liquidating a long outstanding dispute.³

¹ For the text of the treaty see *SSSR: Sbornik Deistvuyushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii*, iii (1932), No. 130, pp. 7-18; *League of Nations: Treaty Series*, xxxiv (1925), 32-53.

² This declaration was evidently an attempt to appease Chinese resentment at the implied Soviet recognition of the right of imperialist Powers to dispose of Chinese territory (*Novyi Vostok*, vii (1926), 45).

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, pp. 356-357; Vol. 3, p. 534.

The signature of the treaty was received in Moscow with particular satisfaction as a counter-weight to the deterioration of relations with the west. Interviews in the Soviet press with Chicherin and Karakhan hailed the treaty as a further advance on the road to recognition of the international status of the Soviet Union, and a first step to the re-establishment of Soviet power in the Far East. The treaty was described as having caused "alarm" in the imperialist countries, and especially in the American press.¹ Two days after the signature, it was announced to the Japanese diet in correct, but non-committal terms by the Foreign Minister, Shidehara, who spoke of the importance of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring countries and of the improvement of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.² Some more contentious opinions were, however, heard even from the Japanese side. On February 1, 1925, *Pravda* published a letter from a member of the Japanese house of peers transmitting a resolution of protest, passed by a meeting in Tokyo on January 21, 1925, against American fleet manœuvres in the Pacific. Goto, still an enthusiastic advocate of Japanese-Soviet friendship, made statements to the press in which he hailed the Soviet-Japanese agreement as "the mainstay of a European-Asian alliance" and a "guarantee of world peace", and looked forward to rivalry between a European-Asian alliance, consisting of Japan, the Soviet Union and Germany, on the one hand, and the Americas on the other, "for the markets of Asia, particularly those of China, and for the hegemony of the Pacific".³ Such views, though they were shared by no responsible Japanese statesman or party, may have attracted some passing attention in Moscow. Frunze, in a speech of February 4, 1925, remarked with satisfaction that "Japanese militarism does not face at present towards our frontier in the Far East, it faces in the opposite direction — towards the United States and China".⁴ Radek in an article of this

¹ *Izvestiya*, January 22, 25, 27, 1925; for Steklov's article on the "Bolshevization of Asia" see p. 625 above.

² *Nihon Gaiko Nempyo narabi ni Shuyo Monjo* (1955), ii, 70-71; *Izvestiya*, February 18, 1925, reported on official celebrations in Tokyo.

³ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), March 5, 1925, p. 296; *China Weekly Review* (Shanghai), April 4, 1925, pp. 121-122. In April 1924 Goto toured Manchuria, and gave an interview to the Rosta agency in Harbin in similar terms (*Izvestiya Ulan-Bator-Khoto*, May 7, 1925).

⁴ M. Frunze, *Sobranie Sochinenii*, iii (1927), 48.

period coupled the Soviet-Japanese treaty with the defeat of Wu Pei-fu and the rise of Kuomintang as factors in the decline of Anglo-American power in China.¹

The first months were, as commonly happens, the honeymoon period of the agreement. The Japanese consulate in Vladivostok, closed since February 1924, was reopened on April 6, 1925.² The evacuation of Sakhalin was carried out according to plan in the following month;³ and it was noted that the authority of the Soviet Government had now been established over all territories claimed by it with the exception of Bessarabia.⁴ Negotiations for the desired concessions for the mineral resources of the island proceeded slowly, but favourably, these involving the cancellation of the concession originally granted to the American Sinclair Exploration Company.⁵ Kopp, formerly Soviet representative in Berlin, and more recently active in Narkomindel, arrived in Tokyo at the end of April 1925 as first Soviet *polpred* to Japan.⁶ But he apparently failed to ingratiate himself with the Japanese Government.⁷ Renewed tension in Soviet-Japanese relations in the latter part of 1925 was the product of events in China. The May 30 incident in Shanghai⁸ sharpened all the issues, and made it more difficult to avoid open commitment either to the "nationalist" or to the "imperialist" camp. The nationalist feelings excited by the incident were directed primarily against Great Britain. The immediate effect of the popular

¹ *Mirovaya Politika v 1924 godu*, ed. F. Rotshtein (1925), pp. 23-24.

² *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), April 9, 1925, p. 476.

³ For a detailed account of the evacuation see *Severnaya Aziya*, No. 4, 1927, pp. 44-54; the last Japanese troops left on May 14, 1925.

⁴ *Novyi Vostok*, vii (1926), 44.

⁵ For this concession and its annulment see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 353; *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, pp. 245-246.

⁶ Kopp reached Harbin and gave an interview to the press there on April 17, 1925; he presented his credentials in Tokyo on May 6, 1925 (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), April 23, 1925, p. 532; May 14, 1925, p. 609). Tanaka, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, did not reach his post till July 14, 1925 (*ibid.* July 23, 1925, p. 121).

⁷ According to a report circulating in Tokyo, Kopp had told a party meeting in Harbin that the Soviet-Japanese treaty was only a scrap of paper (*Gaimusho Oa-Kyoku: Ni-Sso Koshoshi* (1942), p. 102). He was suspected, rightly or wrongly, of reporting to Moscow that Japan since the earthquake no longer counted as a Great Power (K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 371); this was a sensitive point in Japanese official circles at the time.

⁸ See pp. 719-720 above.

boycott on British goods was to increase Japanese trade with China.¹ But Japan was a subsidiary target of the Chinese nationalists; it was unrest in a Japanese-owned cotton mill which had provoked the original trouble. In the long run the material interests of Japan in China ran parallel to those of Great Britain. It was these interests which the nationalists in Canton, ardently supported by Soviet advisers, sought to attack. Since the defeat of Wu Pei-fu, Great Britain had shown an increasing readiness to turn to Chang Tso-lin, the *protégé* of Japan, as the most effective defender of "order" in northern China. In the summer of 1925, when British hostility to the Soviet Union, further exacerbated by events in China, seemed to have reached its highest point,² apprehensions of an Anglo-Japanese agreement at the expense of the Soviet Union were keenly felt in Moscow.³

Events in Manchuria provided a more direct and immediate cause of mistrust. Before Kopp's arrival Karakhan had protested to Yoshizawa against the formal inauguration by Chang Tso-lin of the construction of the proposed Taonanfu-Tsitsihar railway.⁴ Yoshizawa had formally declined responsibility. But everyone knew that Japan was Chang Tso-lin's patron and paymaster; and, when an emissary of Chang appeared in Tokyo in May 1925, it was assumed, in face of all denials, that among the subjects discussed were the provision of funds for railway construction and Chang's relations with Feng Yü-hsiang, the powerful Kuominchün general.⁵ The strength of Chang Tso-lin grew visibly in northern China throughout 1925. Ever since the victory of the Kuominchün armies led unexpectedly to the restoration to power in Peking of a member of the old pro-Japanese Anfu party,⁶ Japanese influence seemed to be dangerously in the ascendant, and to constitute a major obstacle to the advance of the Kuomintang and Kuominchün forces supported by the Soviet Union.

¹ Figures are given in *Novyi Vostok*, xv (1926), 284.

² See p. 417 above.

³ According to a Japanese observer in Moscow at the time "the report of Britain and Japan re-entering into an alliance was persistently circulated" (K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 367).

⁴ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), May 21, 1925, p. 655; for this railway see p. 873 above.

⁵ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), May 28, 1925, pp. 672-673; for Feng Yü-hsiang and his relations to the Soviet Union see pp. 734-736 above.

⁶ See p. 712 above.

The supposition that the re-examination of the Far Eastern policies of the Soviet Government which took place when Karakhan visited Moscow in September 1925 turned partly on increasing apprehension of the attitude of Japan is, to say the least, plausible.¹ Support given by Soviet agents in northern China in the autumn of 1925 to Kuominchün forces hostile to Japan and to Chang Tso-lin excited natural concern in Tokyo. Complaints appeared in the Japanese press of an "aggressive" Soviet policy in Manchuria.² A Soviet-Japanese railway conference in Moscow in October 1925³ was evidently an attempt to remove a perennial cause of friction; but its results do not appear to be on record. The covert Soviet support given to Chang Tso-lin's mutinous general Kuo Sung-ling, and the rejoicing in Moscow at the premature news of Chang's downfall,⁴ were hardly calculated to propitiate the Japanese Government.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union could not afford to undo the work of the Soviet-Japanese treaty and drive Japan into the arms of Great Britain, thus rendering impregnable the position of the imperialist bloc in China; and appeasement was the order of the day. On December 14, 1925, the contracts were finally signed in Moscow between the Soviet authorities and the Japanese concerns to which concessions had been granted in northern Sakhalin.⁵ On the same occasion, and no doubt as a part of the same transaction, Kopp handed to Shidehara a declaration in the following terms:

Recently the Japanese public has been suspicious of the peaceful policy of the USSR, and rumours calculated to hamper the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan are in circulation. Taking this state of affairs into consideration, the ambassador has the honour to declare in the name of his government that the Soviet Union has no aggressive

¹ K. Fuse, *Soviet Policy in the Orient* (Peking, 1927), p. 368.

² *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), September 17, 1925, p. 367; the visit of the Soviet trade union delegation to Japan in September 1925 (see p. 891 below) was another occasion of mutual irritation.

³ *Izvestiya*, October 13, 1925.

⁴ See pp. 747-748 above.

⁵ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 17, 1925, p. 803; the Soviet signatories were Dzerzhinsky and Litvinov. A fortnight later a Soviet-Japanese fisheries conference opened in Moscow (*ibid.* January 7, 1926, p. 23); this was another sensitive spot in Soviet-Japanese relations.

designs in the Far East and no intention to encroach on Japanese interests.¹

The words were carefully chosen, and the concluding phrase was wide enough to cover Japanese interests throughout China. This was the moment when reports of the defeat and flight of Chang Tso-lin were still current in Moscow ;² and Stalin, in his major speech at the fourteenth Russian party congress a few days later, seemed particularly anxious to convince Japanese opinion of the friendliness of Soviet intentions towards Japan :

Japan will understand that she has to take account of the growing force of the nationalist movement in China which is advancing and sweeping before it everything that lies in its path. Chang Tso-lin is coming to grief precisely because he did not understand this. But he is coming to grief also because he built his whole policy on dissension, on a deterioration of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

No power could survive in Manchuria which was not based on friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

We have no interests [concluded Stalin] that point to a worsening of our relations with Japan. Our interests move along the line of a *rapprochement* of our country with Japan.³

This cautious policy reaped a prompt reward when, in January 1926, an open clash occurred at what now remained the most dangerous point in Soviet-Japanese relations — Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway — between the Soviet authorities on the railway and a restored and strengthened Chang Tso-lin.⁴ Shidehara now intervened to lower the tension. In a speech on foreign affairs in the Japanese diet on January 21, 1926, he spoke with satisfaction of the recent "steady progress" in Soviet-Japanese relations, and of the "sentiments of good neighbourhood uniting the two nations". Japan sought "no exclusive friendship with any nation" — an assurance which cut both ways. Borrowing, no doubt deliberately, the language of Kopp's declaration of December 14, 1925 (though he made no mention of it), Shidehara spoke of "rumours" recently circulating of Soviet aggressive

¹ *Nihon Gaiko Nempyo narabi ni Shuyo Monjo* (1955), ii, 83 ; a *communiqué* on Kopp's statement was issued to the Japanese press (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 24, 1925, p. 815).

² See pp. 747-748 above.

³ Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vii, 294.

⁴ See pp. 758-759 above.

designs in northern Manchuria, and stated emphatically that he had found "no ground for attaching any credence to such reports".¹ The speech was followed by a *communiqué* from the Japanese Government, explaining that it regarded the dispute as an affair between the Soviet Union and China, and hoped for a peaceful settlement.² The statement, and the haste with which Chang Tso-lin abandoned his intransigent attitude, strongly suggested that pressure had been applied to Chang from Tokyo to come to terms.³

From this point appeasement of Chang Tso-lin and of Japan became a keynote of Soviet policy in the Far East, and found frank expression in the report to the Politburo of March 24, 1926.⁴ The passages relating to Japan in Litvinov's report of April 24, 1926, to VTsIK on foreign policy were notably warm. He recognized "the political and economic interests of Japan" in Manchuria and was ready to "meet them halfway". Negotiations were in progress on all questions at issue with Japan—railways, timber concessions and fisheries; and he hoped that they would be settled "on such a broad basis as to place our friendly relations with that country on a firm and enduring foundation".⁵ Serebryakov, having successfully concluded his mission to Chang Tso-lin,⁶ proceeded to Tokyo. He visited the Japanese Minister for Railways on May 14, 1926; and, when he left Tokyo on May 23, 1926, *Pravda* announced that "a satisfactory agreement" had been reached "on the principles to be maintained by both governments in the question of the economic development of Manchuria" as well as on technical railway questions.⁷ About the same time Kopp, who seems to have been

¹ *Survey of International Affairs, 1926*, ed. A. J. Toynbee (1928), p. 503; the Japanese text of Shidehara's speech is in *Nihon Gaiko Nempyo narabi ni Shuyo Monjo* (1955), ii, 83-88.

² *The Times*, January 25, 1926.

³ According to a report from the German Ambassador in Tokyo of January 28, 1926, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs assured Kopp, the Soviet representative, that the Japanese Government disapproved of Chang Tso-lin's actions and had taken steps to curb him: Kopp was still afraid that the Japanese military authorities (presumably more deeply committed to Chang Tso-lin) would take things into their own hands, but was less pessimistic about the situation than Karakhan in Peking (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 2860/556678-9).

⁴ See pp. 769-770 above.

⁵ *SSSR: Tsentral'nyi Ispolnitel'nyi Komitet 3 Sozyva: 2 Sessiya* (1926), p. 1065.

⁶ See pp. 788-789 above.

⁷ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), May 20, 1926, p. 584; *Pravda*, May 26, 1926.

opposed to the policy of conciliation, was replaced as chargé d'affaires by Bessedovsky, whose instructions were "at all costs to prevent a joint Anglo-Japanese intervention in China in the event of the further development of the Chinese revolution".¹ The bugbear of a revived Anglo-Japanese alliance as the kernel of an imperialist anti-Soviet coalition in the Far East continued to haunt Soviet diplomacy.

Commercial relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, other than the acquisition by Japan of concessions in Sakhalin, were not important in this period, and were not immediately affected by the conclusion of the treaty of January 20, 1925. For each of the years 1924-1925 and 1925-1926 exports from the Soviet Union to Japan as recorded in Soviet statistics amounted to about 55 million rubles; but most of this must have been accounted for by exports of coal and oil from Sakhalin. Imports to the Soviet Union from Japan reached a value of only 11 million rubles.² On the appointment of Yanson as trade representative in the Soviet mission to Tokyo in July 1925, Krasin in a press interview rebutted the suggestion that the monopoly of foreign trade was a barrier to the development of Soviet trade with Japan, and held out hopes for concessions for Japanese capital to develop "the natural wealth of Siberia and the maritime provinces" and for the creation of mixed companies. This was described as "an incomparably more important branch of work than the development of purely commercial relations".³

During this phase of Soviet-Japanese relations communist activity in Japan was virtually at a standstill. The formal dissolution of the Japanese Communist Party took place in March

¹ G. Besedovsky, *Na Putyakh k Termidoru* (Paris, 1931), ii, 18-19. According to this account the instructions were given personally by Stalin, and were embroidered with some sensational remarks which may or may not be authentic; the sense of the instructions was based on the Politburo report of March 24, 1926.

² See A. Baykov, *Soviet Foreign Trade* (Princeton, 1946), Appendix, Table VII.

³ *Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn'*, July 2, 1925, reprinted in L. Krasin, *Voprosy Vneshnei Torgovli* (1928), pp. 340-343.

1924,¹ at the moment when negotiations between Karakhan and Yoshizawa were beginning in Peking, though no connexion can be plausibly established between these events. No official cognizance of the dissolution seems to have been taken in Moscow. On May 6, 1924, IKKI issued a proclamation to the "urban and rural workers" of Japan, denouncing the ruling class, "the landlords, the militarists, the bureaucrats and the capitalist monopolists", and calling for the formation of a workers' and peasants' party. The party was to be "independent of the bourgeois radicals". But the programme recommended for it was essentially bourgeois-democratic: democratic government, universal suffrage, freedom of speech, press and assembly, and freedom for the workers to organize and to strike.² The report of IKKI to the fifth congress of Comintern, in its section on Japan, referred guardedly to the persecution of the party and to the "great losses" sustained by it after the earthquake; Comintern had advised it "to use every legal possibility and to do everything to found a legal party".³ At the congress itself Katayama also did not mention the dissolution of the party, and spoke only of a legal workers' and peasants' party as having just been organized.⁴ A Japanese commission was set up by the congress, but apparently did nothing; after the congress, IKKI formally remitted the Japanese question to the presidium.⁵ The policy now proclaimed carried an implied comparison with the Russia of 1905, when Lenin had demanded "a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", and had called

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 547.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 61, June 3, 1924, pp. 735-736. At the enlarged IKKI in June 1923 Zinoviev had called for the creation of a legal Japanese workers' and peasants' party (on the model of the American Workers' Party) to replace the illegal communist party; but the proposal was resisted by Arahata, the Japanese delegate, on the ground that this would require the support of "active elements of the working class", whereas "these elements were indifferent to politics and were inexperienced, and their political horizon was extremely limited" (*Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1923), pp. 30-31, 82). The resolution on the Japanese question adopted at the session merely protested against the persecution of communists, and appealed to Japanese workers not to be misled by the government (*ibid.* pp. 316-317).

³ *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutiv der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), pp. 65-66.

⁴ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 653.

⁵ *Ibid.* ii, 1029, 1063.

on the proletariat to "carry through to completion the democratic revolution by uniting to itself the mass of the peasantry".¹ It came to be accepted doctrine that the first Japanese Communist Party had come to grief because its supporters had fallen into one of two heresies: the Menshevik heresy of believing that the bourgeois-democratic revolution could be carried through under bourgeois leadership, and the anarchist heresy of supposing that the bourgeois-democratic phase of the revolution could be skipped altogether, and a direct transition made to socialism.² Zinoviev at the fifth enlarged IKKI in March 1925 was content once again to invoke the precedent of 1905, and declared that "the bourgeois revolution is knocking at the door in Japan".³

It accorded both with this policy and with developments in Japan that increased attention now began to be paid to the Japanese trade union movement. Trade unions had hitherto played no great rôle in Japan. Of 16 million Japanese workers more than half were employed in agriculture, and only 3½ millions in factory industry: of these only 250,000-350,000 were in 1925 organized in trade unions.⁴ The trade union federation, the Rodo Sodomei, founded in 1921, had at first been regarded as an organization of the Left. But at its congress in February 1924, held under the shadow of the earthquake disaster of the previous autumn and the ensuing persecution of the Left, it took a marked turn to the Right. It renounced the theory of the class struggle, made overtures to the Geneva ILO and soon began to expel dissentient Left-wing unions.⁵ In April 1924, it was announced that a Japanese workers' delegation would for the first time attend the

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, p. 55.

² This diagnosis was developed at length in an article in *Sovremennaya Yaponiya*, ed. P. Mif and G. Voitinsky (1934), pp. 94-151.

³ *Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), p. 44.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 153, November 10, 1925, pp. 2291-2292; Lozovsky in the following year gave a figure of 240,000 trade unionists out of 4½ million industrial workers (*IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), p. 96). These figures were confirmed in a statement of the Sodomei of October 1925, which added that even the majority of trade unionists "are under the spell of the specious name of the 'harmony' principle" (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), October 22, 1925, p. 525).

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 51, March 30, 1926, pp. 706-707; an article in *Sovremennaya Yaponiya*, ed. P. Mif and G. Voitinsky (1934), i, 113, and Kh. Eidus, *Yaponiya ot Pervoi do Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny* (1946),

annual ILO conference, and that Suzuki, the president of the Sodomei, would be the principal workers' delegate.¹ The formation in June 1924 of a coalition government under Kenseikai leadership promised a certain liberalization of the régime, including a limited official tolerance for the moderate sector of the trade union movement. Suzuki imbibed in the west the fashionable idea of the political organization of labour, and returned to Japan at the end of October 1924 with ambitions to found a workers' party on the model of the British Labour Party or the SPD.² At the end of the year overtures were reported to have been made to the amorphous Japanese Peasants' Union for a joint worker-peasant party.³ Meanwhile friction had occurred between Right and Left wings in the Sodomei itself. At a congress of the eastern region in October 1924, 60 delegates of the Left were reported to have left the congress; the congress nevertheless recorded demands for the organization of a workers' party and for the establishment of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.⁴ In December 1924 a few unions in Tokyo apparently seceded from the Sodomei, and began to issue an independent newspaper.⁵

At this point the issue of communism reappeared as a disturbing factor. In January 1925 a group of former party leaders — Sano, Arahata and Tokuda — and a communist trade union leader named Watanabe, who had been opposed to the dissolution of the party and desired to revive it, met Voitinsky and Heller, the heads of the Far Eastern departments of Comintern and Profinintern respectively, in Shanghai.⁶ Theses drawn up at this meeting declared it to be the immediate task of Japanese communists to "reorganize the communist party": past errors of the leaders

p. 106, attribute the collaboration at this time between "reformist" socialists and the bourgeoisie to the results of the earthquake.

¹ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), May 1, 1924, pp. 296-297; Suzuki made a speech at the conference complaining of Japanese legislation which limited freedom of association for the workers, and submitted a resolution, which was criticized by the Japanese Government delegate, and on which no action was taken (*Conférence Internationale du Travail: Sixième Session* (Geneva, 1924), i, 151-152; ii, 540-543).

² *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), October 23, 1924, p. 573.

³ *Ibid.* December 25, 1924, p. 856.

⁴ *Pravda*, October 8, 1924.

⁵ R. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), p. 327.

⁶ Yamamoto Katsunosuke and Arita Mitsuo, *Nihon Kyosanshugi Undo Shi* (1950), p. 73; R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Harvard, 1952), p. 21.

were condemned.¹ The Shanghai theses seem to have had no immediate sequel.² But, whether as the result of a revival of communist activities, or of apprehensions caused by the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of January 20, 1925, anti-communist feeling was much in evidence in Japan throughout the year. On February 18, 1925, the trial of 29 communists originally indicted in 1923 at length began.³ Negotiations for the projected workers' party led to friction within the Sodomei between Suzuki and a small communist group led by Tsuji, which was alleged to have 5000 supporters in the unions.⁴ The issue came to a head at a congress of the Sodomei held at Kobe on March 15-17, 1925; and at a subsequent meeting of the executive committee on March 27, 1925, an open split occurred. On April 13, 1925, the minority, though not formally expelled, organized an opposition faction under the name Kakushin Domei.⁵ In May 1925 a further meeting with Profintern representatives took place in Shanghai,⁶ and drew up a further set of theses relating no longer to the revival of the party, but to the situation in the trade unions. The operative paragraph ran :

Therefore it becomes our urgent duty to organize the vast and as yet unorganized masses of the people, especially the Left-wing elements, into the trade unions; to unify the trade

¹ For a translation of this text from the Japanese see X. Eudin and R. North, *Soviet Russia and the East* (Stanford, 1957), pp. 334-335.

² According to an account in *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 464, a "communist group" was founded in January 1925 which represented the "revolutionary part" of the workers' movement, but none the less developed a "sectarian character", seeking to promote the separation of trade unions from political parties: this may refer either to the Shanghai meeting or to some independent action in Japan.

³ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), February 26, 1925, p. 261.

⁴ *Ibid.* April 2, 1925, p. 217.

⁵ *Gendai Rono Undoshi Nempyo* (1961) (Chronology of the Contemporary Labour Movement); *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), April 2, 1925, p. 448.

⁶ There is no evidence to show whether the Japanese representatives were the same who had attended the January meeting. Sano is said to have been present at the sessions of IKKI, of Profintern and of KIM in Moscow in June 1925 (Yamamoto Katunosuke and Arita Mitsuo, *Nihon Kyosanshugi Undo Shi* (1950), p. 76); but no such sessions took place, and 1925 is probably an error for 1924, when Sano was certainly in Moscow for the fifth congress of Comintern (Y. Noguchi, *Musan Undo Sotoshi Den* (1931), pp. 136-137). No source is quoted for the statement in R. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), pp. 335-336 that Sano was in Moscow at the time of the split between the Sodomei and the Hyogikai (i.e. May 1925).

union movement by hastening the formation of a united national federation ; to support local trade union councils in their independent activities ; to stimulate the activities of the factory committees ; and thus to contribute to the struggle against the Right-wing leaders, and to strengthen the trade unions in general.

At the same time, a warning was issued that " the Left wing of the Japanese Federation of Labour should not split off from the federation, but should persistently fight and destroy the Right-wing forces from within, as well as attempt to unify all Left-wing forces".¹

The injunction against splitting, which accorded with the current Comintern line,² came too late. On May 16, 1925, the executive committee of the Sodomei voted to expel the Kakushin Domei faction ; and at a congress on May 24-27, 1925, the expelled minority formed a dissident trade union council, the Rodo Hyogikai, with headquarters in Osaka.³ The Hyogikai immediately held an inaugural congress and issued a statement of policy. Its aim was to organize the working masses in trade unions based on the principle of the class struggle : political as well as economic action was declared necessary. It sought collaboration with peasant unions, and emphatically proclaimed the unity, national and international, of the trade union movement. It was prepared to adopt " reformist " tactics, but " only on the basis of the class struggle ". It proposed to organize a league of unemployed (here the British precedent of the NUWM was clearly in mind) and a workers' party.⁴ A statement in the Comintern press followed the usual line of attributing the split to a Right wing under the influence of IFTU :

It is admitted that the Japanese trade unions have been split. By the communists, of course. By whom else ? But on

¹ X. Eudin and R. North, *Soviet Russia and the East* (Stanford, 1957), p. 335 ; the translation has been modified in one place in order to make the sense clearer.

² See p. 575 above.

³ *Gendai Rono Undoshi Nempyo* (1961) ; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 113, July 28, 1925, p. 1568 ; No. 51, March 30, 1926, pp. 706-707 ; Kh. Eidus, *Yaponiya ot Pervoi do Vtoroi Mirovoi Voyny* (1946), pp. 106-107.

⁴ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 11 (58), November, 1925, pp. 293-294 ; a mass meeting was held in Tokyo on July 18, 1925, to found a national league of unemployed. Some attempt was apparently made to play down the extremism of the Hyogikai ; its platform was said in the press to be " practically the same " as that of the Sodomei and to include such items as " the recognition of parliamentarianism " and " the organization of a proletarian party " (*Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), July 30, 1925, p. 144).

the other hand IFTU assures us that the communists have no influence whatever, and were besides thrown out of the unions "in good time". This announcement makes it clear that the split in the Japanese trade unions is either the work of Japanese Government agents or that it has been carried out at the instigation of such obscurantists as Oudegeest, Sassenbach, Albert Thomas, etc., in order to prevent the formation of a united trade union International based on class warfare.¹

After the split, the Sodomei retained some 35 unions with a membership of about 20,000; the Hyogikai claimed 32 unions with 12,500 members.² But these represented only a small proportion of Japanese workers, of whom the vast majority were entirely unorganized or belonged to unions affiliated to neither federation.³

While these developments were in progress in Japan, Suzuki again journeyed to Geneva to attend the annual conference of the ILO, which opened on May 19, 1925, as Japanese workers' delegate.⁴ Thence he proceeded to Amsterdam, where he discussed with the officials of IFTU a project to convene a pan-Asian trade union congress to be held under the auspices of IFTU — apparently somewhere in Europe.⁵ Whether he halted in Moscow on his way back to Japan, is not recorded. But Nishio, his secretary, remained in Moscow long enough to visit Lozovsky, whom he assured that he sympathized with Profintern, and was "at heart a communist", but dared not expose the Japanese proletariat to police persecution by professing these views. The dividing line between communist and non-communist, between revolutionary and reformist Left, which had become increasingly

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 113, July 28, 1925, p. 1568.

² R. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), p. 327; slightly lower figures are quoted for both in the autumn of 1925 in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, p. 136.

³ See p. 885, note 4 above.

⁴ *Conférence Internationale du Travail : Septième Session* (Geneva, 1925), i, p. lxiv.

⁵ The report in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 113, July 28, 1925, pp. 1567-1568, does not disclose the name of the "member of the presidium of the Japanese trade union council"; but it can have been nobody other than Suzuki. An article in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 11 (48), November 1925, pp. 175-177, quoted a description of Suzuki from the Japanese press as "the Japanese Gompers", and described his alleged plan for a pan-Asian labour conference and an Asian International as a labour version of "the old Japanese slogan 'Asia for the Asians'".

rigid in the west, still seemed fluid and uncertain in the Japanese labour movement. Both trends were variations on the same western theme. The Hyogikai, for all its revolutionary pretensions, voted at its congress of January 1926 in favour of sending a delegation to the ILO conference at Geneva — a decision not unnaturally deplored by Profintern.¹

Some gestures of conciliation towards the moderate reformers marked the course of Japanese politics in 1925. In April the Kenseikai government passed a law extending the franchise, which had the effect of raising the number of voters from 3 to 12 millions. But that this well-advertised measure of liberalism did not betoken any increased tolerance of the extreme Left was shown by the adoption at the same time of a "peace preservation" law directed against "the spread and infusion of dangerous thoughts", which imposed heavy penalties on membership of any organization seeking to alter the constitution or "repudiate the system of private property".² On August 27, 1925, the mass trial of communists which had been in progress since February ended in the conviction and imprisonment of 24 of the accused. On the other hand, the events in Shanghai following the incident of May 30, 1925, could not fail to have repercussions in Japan.³ In August 1925 a group of former party leaders, including Arahata, together with Watanabe, the communist trade union leader, met in secret to survey the prospect.⁴ The policy now adopted was to create a legal workers' and peasants' party, in accordance with the views of Comintern, as a cover for communist activities.⁵ In September

¹ *IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soyuz Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), pp. 94, 97-99; the prestige enjoyed by the ILO among Japanese workers is admitted *ibid.* p. 101.

² R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Harvard, 1952), p. 21.

³ A report drawn up at the session of the executive bureau of Profintern in March-April 1926 contained the following passage: "During the Shanghai events, which evoked a vivid response in the workers' movement of all Pacific countries, closer relations were established with the Japanese revolutionary trade union movement represented by the Hyogikai" (*Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 11-12 (52-53), March 25, 1926, p. 21).

⁴ R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Harvard, 1952), pp. 21-22.

⁵ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 12, records four meetings of the presidium of IKKI between August and December 1925, at which the split in the Japanese trade unions and the formation of a labour party were discussed.

1925 the communists regained control of the Society for the Study of Political Problems (Seiji Mondai Kenkyukai), a Marxist study group originally founded in 1923, which after the dissolution of the communist party had passed into the hands of moderates. At the height of its influence in 1925 it had some 50 branch organizations and a total of 3000 members, and campaigned actively for the formation of a workers' party. But it remained a group of intellectuals without influence in the trade unions or appeal to the masses.¹ Meanwhile on August 10, 1925, a conference of 56 delegates representing a number of Left-wing organizations, including both the Sodomei and the Hyogikai, the Nomin Kumiai (peasant union) and the Seiji Mondai Kenkyukai, met at Osaka to prepare for the foundation of a workers' party, and issued a platform consisting of miscellaneous political, social and economic demands.² It was apparently on the occasion of this conference that an invitation was sent to the Soviet trade union delegation which was touring China to visit Japan.³ The delegation, which consisted of Lepse and three other trade unionists, arrived in Japan on September 20, 1925, and, travelling via Kobe, reached Tokyo two days later. It was greeted with so much enthusiasm — apparently by members of Sodomei as well as of Hyogikai unions — that the police took alarm. Japanese trade union leaders were arrested;⁴ and the Soviet delegates, who were shadowed everywhere by the police, were unable to meet them. The delegation hastily left Japan after issuing a protest against this reception.⁵ After its departure Kopp made an official protest against its treatment, and was reported to have

¹ *Sovremennaya Yaponiya*, ed. P. Mif and G. Voitinsky (1934), p. 115; R. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), p. 326.

² *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 11 (58), November 1925, pp. 295-296.

³ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), September 24, 1925; *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 6 (65), June 1926, pp. 446-449. For the delegation in China see p. 738, note 2 above.

⁴ Watanabe Masanosuke, *Sayuko Rodo Kumiai no Soshiki to Seisaku* (1931), p. 428, records that he was kept in prison for nine days till the delegation left.

⁵ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), October 1, 1925, pp. 428-430; *Izvestiya*, September 27, 29, 1925; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 136, September 29, 1925, p. 2000; No. 143, October 20, 1925, p. 2099; for the text of the protest, see *ibid.* No. 138, October 2, 1925, p. 2023.

received an apology.¹ In November 1925 a delegation of the Japanese metal workers' union paid a return visit to Moscow.² In the autumn of 1925 an illegal journal *Musansha Shimbun* (Proletarian Newspaper), financed by Comintern and probably printed in Shanghai, began to make intermittent appearances in Japan till the police intervened: its theme was the creation of a mass workers' party under communist leadership.³

Before the end of 1925 these diverse pressures converged on a single end: the formation of a legal workers' party. In view of the jealousy prevailing between the Sodomei and the Hyogikai, the initiative was incongruously taken by the peasant union, which invited both factions to a conference on December 1, 1925. Both accepted. But at a preliminary meeting on November 29, 1925, the Sodomei protested against the participation of the Hyogikai and other extremist groups, and when its protest was overruled withdrew its delegates.⁴ The rump of the conference thereupon announced the creation of a Peasants' and Workers' Party (Nomin Rodoto). The declaration and programme issued in the name of the new party were studiously moderate; they avoided any revolutionary or communist phraseology and confined themselves to a mild bourgeois radicalism. But this did not remove the suspicions of the police; and an order suppressing it was issued three hours after its foundation.⁵ The Sodomei issued a statement explaining its withdrawal on the ground that "it is impossible for us to remain within one and the same political party with the Hyogikai".⁶ But the attempt persisted after this fiasco. The Hyogikai announced that it remained loyal to the cause of a proletarian party, but would not participate in any further conference convened by the peasant union.⁷ One stum-

¹ *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), October 29, 1925, p. 567.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 158, November 27, 1925, p. 2380.

³ R. Swearingen and P. Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Harvard, 1952), p. 23.

⁴ R. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), p. 330.

⁵ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 9 (58), September 1926, p. 121; Kh. Eidus, *Yaponiya ot Pervoi do Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny* (1946), pp. 107-108. For the declaration and programme see *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), December 10, 1925, pp. 742-743.

⁶ *Ibid.* December 10, 1925, p. 743.

⁷ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 6 (65), June 1926, p. 447.

bling-block having thus been removed, a fresh conference met at Osaka early in March 1926, from which the Hyogikai this time abstained; and a Workers' and Peasants' Party (Rodo Nominto or Ronoto) came into being under the joint auspices of the peasant union, the Sodomei and some other unions, and escaped the legal ban. Its programme, in putting forward demands on behalf of the workers, remained within the limits of bourgeois democracy.¹ Lozovsky treated it with contempt as a reformist organization, whose executive committee included one "Fabian professor" and two Christian socialists.² At the same time a proposal by the Sodomei to exclude communists and members of Hyogikai from the party was defeated; and this enabled the Comintern press to depict the conference as a defeat for the Sodomei.³ Meanwhile the sixth enlarged IKKI in Moscow in February-March 1926 registered apprehension at the revival of the project to summon a pan-Asian labour conference, the purpose of which would be to "subject to reformist influence the workers' movement in Japan, India and China".⁴ Notwithstanding these alarms, the Hyogikai held its second congress in April 1926 in an optimistic mood. It sent a message of greeting to the new Workers' and Peasant's Party, but called for the formation of a genuine proletarian party. It condemned the rejection by the Amsterdam International of the proposals of Profintern for trade union unity, and praised the work of the Anglo-Russian joint council. The reports of its proceedings received in Moscow seemed to justify the picture of a powerful trade union minority movement firmly anchored to the policies

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 9 (58), September 1926, pp. 124-125; according to *Japan Chronicle* (Kobe), March 11, 1926, p. 296, the new party proclaimed its loyalty to parliamentary methods, and declared its respect for "the thousand-year history and qualities of the Japanese nation" and its revulsion from "theories and activities current abroad".

² *IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), pp. 96-97.

³ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 9 (58), September 1926, pp. 123-124.

⁴ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 552; *Mirovoe Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, No. 3, 1926, pp. 30-31. According to Heller, the similar project in the previous year (see p. 889 above) had failed owing to Chinese opposition (*IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), pp. 83-84). Suzuki was once more suspected of a design to create a "pan-Asian International" (*Trud*, April 24, 1926).

of Profintern.¹ This was some consolation for the lack of a communist party.

After the Korean disturbances of 1919 and the official foundation of a Korean Communist Party in 1920,² the movement in Korea itself was totally suppressed. In 1924 the party was said to be divided between two factions — one in Irkutsk, enjoying the support of Comintern, the other in Shanghai;³ neither appears to have had any vitality. The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty of January 20, 1925, prompted an organization of Korean *émigrés* in Peking to issue a proclamation denouncing the Soviet Union as being in collusion with the Japanese oppressor.⁴ But about this time, owing perhaps to the partial liberalization of the régime in Japan, a certain revival of political activity occurred in Korea itself. In March 1924 an optimistic reporter detected "indications of the gradual appearance of an organized national liberation movement in Korea, taking the form of the creation of a worker-peasant party".⁵ A few months later, the fourth congress of KIM reported the foundation in Korea of "a number of new local communist organizations, . . . which are in process of forming a unified organization".⁶ Early in the following year movements were in train to convene a Korean workers' and peasants' congress in Seoul in April 1925. The congress claimed to enjoy the patronage both of the Sodomei and of the Marxist society Seiji Mondai Kenkyukai. Its agenda covered a wide range of social, political and international problems (the last category included the Dawes plan, the strengthening of Soviet power, the Labour government in Great Britain, and the suffrage law in Japan), but carefully avoided any suggestion of revolutionary action or of the national liberation of Korea from Japanese rule. This attempt to keep within the law proved,

¹ *Pravda*, April 27, 1926; *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 6 (65), June 1926, pp. 446-449.

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, pp. 495-496.

³ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 654.

⁴ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 6-7, June-July 1926, p. 103.

⁵ *Pravda*, March 2, 1924.

⁶ *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1924), p. 64.

however, of no avail. The "spirit of Moscow" was detected in the preparations. On the eve of the date fixed for the congress, April 20, 1925, the police informed the organizers that it was banned; and, when the delegates none the less assembled, they were dispersed and some of them arrested. The statement issued by the authorities mentioned "the presence of foreign representatives of the 'most extreme opinions'" (this was thought to refer to Japanese communists, since no Russians were present) and "the dangerous tendencies of the congress". Its dispersal seems to have passed off without incident.¹ In the same year, a new Korean Communist Party was formed, and received the recognition of Comintern in 1926.² But nothing is heard of its achievements at this time.³

¹ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 6-7, June-July 1925, pp. 98-103.

² *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), pp. 520-523.

³ The statement in G. Besedovsky, *Na Putyakh k Termidoru* (Paris, 1931), ii, 20, that Korea had more communist cells than "the whole of Japan with Formosa included" probably reflects the excited apprehensions of the Japanese police; Besedovsky was Soviet chargé d'affaires in Tokyo (see p. 883 above).

C : *The Structure of Comintern*

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CHAPTER 43

ORGANIZATION

THE years 1924-1926 saw much attention given to the organization of Comintern and of the relations of its central organs to the constituent parties. This was a natural development in an institution which had outlived the confusion and spontaneous enthusiasm of its first years, and settled down to a regular, matter-of-fact routine. So long as world revolution seemed certain and imminent, nothing about Comintern could be thought of as permanent: the Bolshevik leaders themselves had confidently predicted the time when the headquarters would no longer be in Moscow.¹ But, now that the revolution in the west was indefinitely postponed, and Comintern was forced to look forward to a lengthy period of existence in more or less its present form, the need to organize it on an efficient and durable basis became apparent to all. Nor could any doubt arise what that basis would be. The victory of the Bolsheviks was matched by the stigma of defeat resting since October 1923 on the KPD, the strongest of the foreign parties: no other party had even made the attempt. The Russian party must take the lead in questions of organization, as in all other questions. It must not only occupy the central place in Comintern, but its forms of organization must provide the model for those of other parties. This was the keynote, implicit at first, but soon openly and emphatically expressed, of all Comintern discussions on organization. The emphasis on questions of organization was part of the broader campaign for "the Bolshevization of the sections of the Communist International" proclaimed at the fifth congress.² It reflected a complex and precarious world situation in which the prospect of world revolution was too remote to provide a clear political directive or rallying-cry, and the primary need was to

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 124.

² See pp. 92-94 above.

retain the allegiance of foreign communist parties to the cause of the Soviet Union, isolated and threatened with attack from a hostile capitalist world.

(a) *The Central Apparatus*

The statute of Comintern adopted by its second congress in 1920¹ was a simple document. An introduction describing Comintern as the successor of the First International and as "one communist party on a world scale" was followed by 17 brief operative clauses. The third and fourth congresses, while they did not formally amend the statute, adopted several provisions indirectly affecting the organization of Comintern, and some directly changing the procedure laid down in the statute, especially in regard to the composition and functions of IKKI;² and the fourth congress, at the end of its resolution on the re-organization of IKKI, instructed IKKI to prepare an amended statute which would take account of all changes in organization up to date, and at the same time to set up an eastern department, an organization department (Orgburo), an agitation and propaganda department, and a statistics and information department.³ After the congress Kolarov was elected as secretary-general of IKKI with Pyatnitsky and Stöcker as secretaries, and Kuusinen and Rakosi as candidates.⁴ The four departments were duly established.⁵ But no progress appears to have been made towards the amendment of the statute till the eve of the fifth congress in June 1924, when a draft amended text was duly published.⁶

The draft statute was referred by the congress to an organiza-

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 197.

² See *ibid.* Vol. 3, pp. 392-394, 448-450.

³ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 995-997.

⁴ *Pravda*, December 7, 1922.

⁵ Reports on their work were included in the report of IKKI to the fifth congress (*Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), pp. 96-100).

⁶ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 23, June 2, 1924, pp. 520-521. The introductory article of the original statute was omitted from this draft, presumably on the assumption that the adoption of a programme by the congress would render it superfluous; when the adoption of a programme was postponed, the introductory article was restored to its place in the statute.

tion commission, of which Geschke was president and Pyatnitsky secretary.¹ Pyatnitsky, having piloted the statute through the commission with few changes, reported on it at one of the last plenary sittings of the congress. The Italian delegates, led this time by Rossi, had once more been the trouble-makers in the commission, but were voted down on all points by a well-disciplined majority. The most serious point of contention was an Italian proposal to insert a clause prohibiting the formation of fractions in communist parties: this, according to a statement by Rossi in the plenary session, was designed to prevent IKKI from pursuing disorganizing tactics by the creation "from above" of dissident fractions favourable to it, and was rejected by the majority on that account — an imputation which Pyatnitsky stoutly denied. After a short discussion the statute was unanimously adopted by the congress.² It was much longer and fuller than the statute of 1920, running to 35 articles arranged in six chapters. The International was described in article 1 no longer as "a union of workers for the organization of the common actions of the proletarians of different countries", but as "a union of the communist parties of different countries in a world party". The new statute left no doubt of the fidelity with which Bolshevik and Soviet models had been followed. It retained the world congress meeting "at least once every two years" as the supreme and sovereign organ. It authorized IKKI to create a presidium to work as a standing organ with full powers to act in its name in the intervals between sessions. The president of IKKI and of its presidium, elected by the congress, was "the president of the Communist International" — a title hitherto officially lacking. The provision adopted at the fourth congress that parties should hold their congresses after a world congress of Comintern was abandoned in favour of a stipulation that party congresses should be convened "only with the consent of

¹ None of the proceedings of the commission were published except the discussion on cell organization (see p. 921 below), which was reported in *How to Organize the Communist Party* (CPGB, n.d.) together with a list of members of the commission, more than 50 in all: according to a later statement by Pyatnitsky (*Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 106), the commission consisted of "almost 100" members and was too large for effective work.

² *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 982-989; for "Rossi" see p. 164 above.

IKKI".¹ A presidium of some 30 members, in which Zinoviev, Bukharin and Stalin represented the Russian party (with Kamenev, Rykov and Sokolnikov as candidates) and Manuilsky the Ukrainian party (with Frunze as candidate), was elected at a meeting of IKKI on July 8, 1924.² Pyatnitsky emerged as the chief Comintern expert in organization and manager of its administrative affairs. At the fifth congress he was elected a candidate member of IKKI, and at the immediately following session of IKKI was appointed to the secretariat and to the Orgburo.³ The adoption of the new statute marked the completion of the evolution of Comintern on the lines already followed by Russian party and by Soviet institutions.⁴ The congress, the supreme organ, met more and more rarely, its function having passed to the enlarged IKKI; and the authority of IKKI was in turn supplanted by that of its presidium. Even within the presidium effective power soon passed to a smaller and informal group whose composition varied with changes in the Soviet political scene. During and after the fifth congress, the ultimate authority in Comintern was exercised by a triumvirate consisting of Zinoviev, Bukharin and Stalin (Kamenev had never concerned himself in Comintern affairs); Pyatnitsky was in charge of organization and finance; Bela Kun, the Hungarian, and Kuusinen, the Finn, were high officials whose presence lent an international colour to the directing body.

The most important consequence of the new statute was to systematize and strengthen the organization of IKKI on the lines already laid down by the fourth congress, but not yet fully applied. The Orgburo was clearly the most important of the new organs provided for in the resolution of the fourth congress: the choice of this title suggested the analogy of the powerful Orgburo of the Russian party. Its functions had been vaguely defined by Eberlein, the *rapporteur* at the fourth congress, as the improve-

¹ For the text see *Thesen und Resolutionen des V. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924), pp. 81-88; *Pyatyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 87-93. The text in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 46-51, incorporates further amendments adopted at the sixth congress in 1928.

² *Pravda*, July 9, 1924.

³ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 1021; *Pravda*, July 9, 1924.

⁴ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, pp. 191-195, 214-216.

ment of the organization of communist parties and the supervision of illegal activities.¹ Its initial stages are obscure.² At the outset the Orgburo had merely been the name given to the organization department of IKKI. But at some time during 1923 a separation was effected, the Orgburo remaining responsible for decisions of policy, while the organization department handled routine matters and relations with communist parties.³ The statute adopted by the fifth congress provided for the election by IKKI of an Orgburo to "discuss and decide all organizational and financial questions of IKKI". Appeals could be made to the presidium of IKKI against its decisions; but they remained valid pending reversal by that body. The key position of the Orgburo was further symbolized by the provision of the statute attaching to it the secretariat, described in the statute as "the executive organ of IKKI, the presidium and the Orgburo": members of the secretariat were *ex officio* members of the Orgburo. This provision also clearly owed something to the analogy of the Russian party, where the link between Orgburo and secretariat was particularly close.⁴ At the close of the congress IKKI appointed five members of the secretariat: Kuusinen, Pyatnitsky, Humbert-Droz (all three Comintern officials), Geschke and Treint. These five, with nine other members selected to ensure representation of all the major parties, formed the Orgburo.⁵

¹ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), p. 808; the report to the third enlarged IKKI in June 1923 called it the "organization commission", and added that "for obvious reasons the commission can report in detail only to the presidium of IKKI" (*Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale*, 15. Dezember 1922-15. Mai 1923 (1923), p. 10) — an allusion to its concern with illegal work.

² The Orgburo as appointed by IKKI on December 6, 1922, consisted of the 5 members of the secretariat (see below) together with Neurath, Hörnle, Schüller and Safarov (*Pravda*, December 7, 1922); according to A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominterna* (1929), p. 316, the Orgburo after the fourth congress consisted of 7 members: Kolarov, Pyatnitsky, Kuusinen, MacManus, Terracini, Schüller and Souvarine.

³ The first evidence of the separation is a chart attached to the report of IKKI to the third enlarged plenum of June 1923 (*Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale*, 15. Dezember 1922-15. Mai 1923 (1923)), which shows both Orgburo and organization department; according, however, to *Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 98, the department was actually set up "only in December 1923".

⁴ See Vol. 2, p. 197.

⁵ *Pravda*, July 9, 1924; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 57, August 12, 1924, p. 614 (where June 8 is a misprint for July 8). The Orgburo

Pronouncements of policy made in the name of Comintern issued from the presidium of IKKI, and had the ultimate authority of the Politburo of the Russian party. But instructions to the parties, not only on questions of organization and finance, but on the conduct of current campaigns and on the innumerable subsidiary activities of Comintern and its auxiliary agencies, proceeded from the Orgburo or the secretariat.¹ Pyatnitsky, as the only Russian member of the secretariat, though he never seems to have intervened in major political decisions, became the most conspicuous and influential permanent official of the Comintern organization.

The four departments of IKKI envisaged in the decision of the fourth congress² were duly provided for in the statute. Of these the organization department proved the most important, mainly because of the prominence assumed by questions of organization of the communist parties in the period 1924-1926. Pyatnitsky, in an article published on the eve of the fifth congress in July 1924, urged that the organization department should be reinforced by members drawn from the principal parties, and should exercise the function of supervising the execution by the parties of decisions on organization taken at congresses or by IKKI:³ this was to become an important part of the process

elected at the fifth and sixth enlarged IKKIs in April 1925 and March 1926 was reduced in numbers to 12 (A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominternu* (1929), p. 328).

¹ The following figures (*ibid.* pp. 293, 308, 317, 329) showing frequency of meetings of the Comintern organs roughly indicate the degree of their activity; changes in relative frequency mark the shifting balance between them. (Enlarged sessions of IKKI, which were in fact minor congresses, are not included.) Between the second and third congresses IKKI met 34 times, the "inner bureau" (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 393-394) 39 times. Between the third and fourth congresses IKKI met 28 times, the presidium (replacing the "inner bureau") 81 times. Between the fourth and fifth congresses, IKKI met 17 times, the presidium 58 times, the secretariat 143 times, the Orgburo 36 times. Between the fifth and sixth congresses, IKKI met 16 times, the presidium 118 times; between the fifth congress and December 1926 (when secretariat and Orgburo were abolished and merged in the "political secretariat"), the secretariat met 71 times, the Orgburo 35 times.

² See p. 898 above.

³ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 5-6, May-June, 1924, col. 162. Neither the precise functions of the Orgburo and the organization department of IKKI nor the line of demarcation between them were ever defined in any published document, but some light is thrown on the question by the model statute for communist parties drawn up in 1926. This provided for a party

of Bolshevization. Special conferences on organization, arranged by the organization department of IKKI and attended by officials of the parties in charge of such questions, were held in Moscow simultaneously with the fifth and sixth plenums of the enlarged IKKI on March 16-21, 1925, and February 10-17, 1926.¹

Scarcely less important was the so-called Agitprop, the department concerned with agitation and propaganda. The fifth congress, in a resolution on propaganda activities, deplored the fact that "theoretical work" was "virtually at a standstill in almost all sections of the Communist International", and expressed the view that "Bolshevization in this context means the final ideological victory of Marxism-Leninism". It was necessary for IKKI "to organize and expand the agitation and propaganda department", and for the largest and "most developed mass communist parties" to treat these activities as "a special branch of the party apparatus", i.e. to set up a party Agitprop. The same resolution proposed the establishment of Marxist-Leninist courses in Moscow for foreign party workers, and party schools and courses in each country.² The new director of Agitprop was Bela Kun, and its statute was published shortly after the end of the fifth congress.³ Its affairs were placed under the management of a small collegium consisting of representatives of other interested bodies (including the Agitprop of the Russian party), and an enlarged collegium which was to meet twice a year and included representatives of the Agitprop departments of the other principal parties. Agitprop worked in four sections — for mass agitation, for "propaganda", i.e. party education (this section was to keep in touch with the Marx-Engels Institute, the Lenin

Orgburo empowered to lay down policies and issue directives on matters of organization, being responsible only to the party central committee, and for an organization department competent to deal with local party organizations and fractions and to ensure the execution of decisions of the Orgburo, reporting to the secretariat of the party central committee (*Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), pp. 108-114); some, but not all, parties possessed both organs, and had a clear conception of the differences of function between them.

¹ For these conferences see pp. 925-928, 932-934 below.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 428-438; for the development of "Lenin schools" in Moscow and under the national parties see Note B, pp. 1018-1021 below.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 107, August 15, 1924, pp. 1381-1382.

Institute, the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors), for press and publications, and for collecting information on the experiences of the parties. All circulars of Agitprop were to be approved before issue by IKKI or by the secretariat ; important documents, or documents of a political character, were to bear the signature of a member of the secretariat.

Of the other two departments established by the statute of IKKI, the department on information and statistics seems to have remained technical ;¹ and the eastern department was of minor importance before 1926. Now or shortly afterwards, women's, trade union and cooperative departments were added to the number ;² their statutes apparently did not differ in practice from that of other departments.³

The statute of IKKI adopted by the fifth congress also made provision for the establishment of an important new organ : the international control commission, organized on the close analogy of the central control commission of the Russian party.⁴ A plan to create a " provisional " international control commission had been put forward at the third congress of Comintern in July 1921.⁵ But nothing came of this. According to a later statement by Pyatnitsky,⁶ the fourth congress in November 1922 charged the French and German delegations with the task of constituting a commission ; but, if constituted, it never appears to have met. By 1923 the following functions had been assigned to it :

- (a) to deal with complaints against organs of IKKI and to make recommendations to IKKI thereon ;

¹ A conference convened by the information department during the session of the fifth enlarged IKKI in March 1925 insisted on the creation of information sections in all parties (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), pp. 56-57).

² *Ibid.* pp. 11-14.

³ Periodical changes took place in the organization of these departments. A decision of the presidium of March 24, 1926 (*Pravda*, April 4, 1926), mentions Agitprop, organization, publications and communications departments of IKKI, as well as the cooperative section and the international women's secretariat ; the trade union section was not mentioned, and may have been superseded by the " standing trade union commission " (see p. 594 above).

⁴ For the genesis of this body see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, p. 196.

⁵ *Protokoll des III. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1921), p. 1044.

⁶ *Protokoll : Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 985.

- (b) to deal with "complaints of individuals or whole organizations against disciplinary measures applied to them by sections of the International" [i.e. by communist parties] and to make recommendations thereon to IKKI;
- (c) to supervise the finances of IKKI;
- (d) to supervise the finances of parties on a decision of IKKI.¹

In the draft statute of Comintern submitted to the fifth congress,² the functions of the permanent international control commission were defined in the same terms. No record exists of any discussion of this part of the statute in the organization commission of the congress. When Pyatnitsky reported to the plenary session, the only amendment mentioned by him in the section relating to the international control commission was that the commission, on the analogy of the Russian party control commission, should be appointed not by IKKI, but by the congress itself;³ and the definition of the four functions of the commission remained unchanged.⁴ The international control commission, duly elected by the congress at its concluding session, consisted of 17 members chosen from all the principal parties: the Russian members were Solts, the president of the central control commission of the Russian party, and Stuchka.⁵

The commission never in fact operated on the lines intended. As regards the first of its functions, no complaints against departments of IKKI were ever referred to it. Serious complaints against IKKI were handled by IKKI itself or by commissions specially appointed by it;⁶ and the first function of the control commission, having never been exercised, was silently abrogated

¹ *Deyatelnost' Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Prezidiuma I.K. Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1923), pp. 14-15.

² See p. 898 above.

³ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 985.

⁴ For the Russian text see *Pravda*, July 25, 1924 and *Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 92. The German text in *Thesen und Resolutionen des V. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924), p. 87 and in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 119, September 16, 1924, p. 1571, omitted the first function (consideration of complaints against organs of IKKI); that this function, which was later dropped, was retained in the statute adopted by the fifth congress is confirmed in *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 85.

⁵ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 1022.

⁶ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), pp. 85-86.

by the sixth congress of Comintern in 1928. Its second function (consideration of complaints against "sections of the International") gave some trouble. The only complaints received under this head were complaints against the Russian party by members of the opposition; and on April 9, 1925, the international control commission extricated itself from an embarrassing position by deciding to consider complaints from individual members of parties "only in so far as they have a political basis or are referred to it by the secretariat or presidium of IKKI".¹ The commission thus became primarily a disciplinary instrument in the hands of IKKI for use against dissidents and trouble-makers in the constituent parties, its functions corresponding precisely to those of the control commission in the Russian party. It is significant that the foreign communist parties were discouraged from setting up control commissions of their own, such commissions being pronounced unnecessary in parties "not exercising state power": some parties, however, in fact established them.²

In addition to these functional departments, the need was soon felt for an organization of the secretariat on national or geographical lines to take care of the affairs of national parties or groups of parties. The original plan of devolution when Comintern was founded seems to have contemplated the creation of "bureaus" in different centres. But the experiment of a western European bureau or secretariat, first in Amsterdam, then in Berlin,³ did not survive the earliest years; and Scandinavian, Balkan, Central European and Far and Near Eastern bureaus mentioned in a report of IKKI to the second congress in 1920⁴ seem to have been equally short-lived or unsubstantial. A "Latin secretariat", which apparently consisted of a single Comintern official in charge of the affairs of Latin countries, also had a shadowy existence throughout the nineteen-twenties.⁵

¹ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 86.

² *Ibid.* pp. 31-32.

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 135-136, 169-170, 184.

⁴ *Bericht des Exekutivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1920), p. 31.

⁵ For Humbert-Droz, the head of this secretariat, see p. 139, note 1 above; in March 1926 the Latin secretariat was split into two (see p. 909 below), but Humbert-Droz may have been at the head of both sections.

Under a decision of the fourth congress of Comintern,¹ the presidium of IKKI appointed a *rapporteur* for each important individual country or group of countries, whose function it was to keep IKKI informed of the progress of work in the countries concerned. The intention was that the *rapporteurs* should as a rule be natives of the countries on which they reported, that they should be members of IKKI and that they should be resident in Moscow: substitutes were also appointed, who were members of the information department of IKKI.² In the conditions of life and work in Moscow, however, few qualified members of foreign parties were eager or willing to assume such functions; ³ and demands for increased foreign participation in the work of IKKI and of its central organs found expression chiefly in complaints from dissident groups. The campaign for the Bolshevization of the parties made the development of this form of contact especially urgent. The fourteenth Russian party congress of December 1925 included in its resolution on Comintern a recommendation to work for "increasing the influence of foreign communist parties in the leadership of the Communist International".⁴ The report to the sixth enlarged IKKI in February 1926 registered a complaint of the failure of foreign party members to contribute to the journal of Comintern.⁵ Whatever complications such a policy might eventually have entailed, it represented at the time a sincere desire of the Comintern leaders to draw more foreign communists into the work of the central organs.

It was not till the meeting of the sixth enlarged IKKI in February 1926 that an attempt was made to regularize the system. A detailed resolution on the reorganization of IKKI called for

¹ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), p. 995.

² *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 101 lists all those who functioned in this capacity between the fourth and fifth congresses: the large number suggests that the arrangement was never very stable. By far the largest number of reports (123) was made on Germany: Radek, Hörnle and, later Zetkin, together with two substitutes, acted as German *rapporteurs*.

³ At the sixth enlarged IKKI in March 1926, Zinoviev complained that the foreign parties had sent nobody except "people like Katz" to work in Moscow (*Shestoi Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 53-54); for Katz see pp. 338-339 above.

⁴ For this resolution see p. 304 above.

⁵ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 78.

closer contact between IKKI and the parties, referring back to previous resolutions — and in particular to the resolution of the fourteenth Russian party congress — which had demanded a larger measure of foreign participation in the leadership of Comintern. The parties were to “place more reliance on their own resources”, and this “especially in the question of the election of leading party organs” — an oblique criticism of the intervention of IKKI in such matters. The German, French, Czechoslovak and Italian parties were each to send two representatives, and the smaller parties one representative, to work for at least six months every year at Comintern headquarters. In an attempt to revive the activity and prestige of IKKI, it was proposed that (apart from the occasional “enlarged” sessions) a meeting should be held every month of those members of IKKI who were in Moscow, and a full meeting every three months.¹ The presidium, the Orgburo and the secretariat were to be enlarged; and the secretariat was to be made more representative by organizing it “on the basis of the national secretariats”.² The intention of the last provision was evidently to make the secretariat of IKKI in Moscow in some sense representative of the secretariats of the national parties. When, however, on March 17, 1926, after the session of the enlarged IKKI had come to an end, the presidium met to give effect to these arrangements, a different conception prevailed. A resolution was adopted which spoke of “the organization of so-called national secretariats”, and defined their status in the following terms:

These national secretariats are organs of the secretariat of IKKI and work under its direction and supervision. Each secretariat is under an obligation systematically to study and analyse the position of the countries and communist parties in

¹ Skrypnyk had complained at the fourteenth Russian party congress that, while the presidium of IKKI met frequently and the enlarged IKKI from time to time, ordinary meetings of IKKI had fallen out of use (*XIV S'ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)* (1926), p. 685).

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 68, May 5, 1926, p. 1071; the Russian text is in *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 653-655. The German term *Ländersekretariate* is rendered in the Russian version as “sectional secretariats”, the parties being commonly referred to as sections of Comintern; later, however, the German term was in common use, appearing in Russian transliteration in A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominterna* (1929), p. 365.

its domain, to prepare questions for all the executive organs of Comintern, to execute the decisions of these organs and to supervise the execution of these decisions by the corresponding sections of Comintern.

A week later, on March 24, 1926, the following 11 "national secretariats" were created as, in effect, departments of the secretariat of IKKI:

1. France, French colonies, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland.
2. Germany.
3. Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary.
4. England, Ireland, Holland, Australia, South Africa, British India and Dutch Indies.
5. USA, Canada, Japan.
6. Spain, Portugal, Mexico and South American states.
7. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland.
8. Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
9. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania and Greece.
10. USSR.
11. Near and Far East (China, Korea, Mongolia, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine).¹

Evidence is lacking to show how many of these secretariats effectively functioned. Nor is precise information available about the composition of the central bureaucracy of Comintern by which these departments were staffed. According to one observer, the secretariat at the time of the fifth congress in 1924 employed about 400 persons, half of them foreigners.²

An important but unpublicized department of IKKI was the so-called Section of International Communication (Otdelenie Mezhdunarodnoi Svyazi or OMS). Article 3 of the 21 conditions of 1920 placed on all parties the duty of setting up an illegal underground organization to prepare for civil war;³ even at that

¹ The decisions of the presidium of March 17 and 24, 1926, were both published in *Pravda*, April 4, 1926, and in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 55, April 9, 1926, p. 794; the standing trade union commission of IKKI (see p. 594 above) was set up on the same occasion.

² P. Scheffer, *7 Years in Soviet Russia* (Engl. transl., 1931), p. 219; in 1926, the organization department consisted of 11 responsible officials and 5 instructors, and the eastern department included "two dozen workers from eight eastern countries" (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 36, 331).

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 193.

time many communist parties were already outlawed. The resolution of the third congress of Comintern a year later insisted on the obligation even of legal parties to prepare "for revolutionary insurrection, for armed struggle and, in general, for illegal struggle"; and the supervision of illegal activities was entrusted to the "inner bureau" of IKKI created on that occasion.¹ When the fourth congress of Comintern in November–December 1922 established an Orgburo, control of illegal activities was transferred from the presidium (the current name for the "inner bureau") to the new organ.² It was probably at this time that the OMS was constituted. It figured in the reports made to the enlarged IKKI in June 1923 and to the fifth congress of Comintern in June–July 1924. Its field of activity was said to "extend to the organization and maintenance of connexions with all sections of the Communist International and the supply of literature to the sections"; but only the work of its sub-section for literature was described in detail.³ Thereafter no further mention of the OMS occurs in official publications.⁴ From other sources it seems clear that the OMS was responsible for all secret activities of Comintern, including the financing of foreign parties, though not for direct military or terrorist operations such as those undertaken in Germany in 1923, in Bulgaria in 1925 and perhaps in other countries.⁵ Such operations appear to have been conducted by the foreign section of the OGPU, and were little in evidence after 1925.

No public statements were normally made about the finances

¹ *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, p. 393; *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 223; *Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (Hamburg, 1921), p. 1045.

² For the responsibility of the Orgburo for illegal activities see p. 901, note 1 above; the decision was naturally not published.

³ *Bericht der Exekutive der KI, 15. Dezember, 1922–15. Mai, 1923* (1923), pp. 8–9; *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 107.

⁴ From 1926 onwards the same initials occasionally denote the "Organization for the Maintenance of Supplies" — a British organization to counter strike action which achieved prominence in the general strike of May 1926 (see p. 346 above); Geschke used the initials in this sense at the sixth enlarged IKKI of February 1926 (*Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 491).

⁵ For Germany see *The Interregnum, 1923–1924*, pp. 209–212; for Bulgaria see pp. 396–397 above; the cases of Estonia (see p. 285, note 1 above) and Poland (see p. 200, 381 above) are doubtful.

of Comintern. A budget commission was appointed by IKKI after the third congress in July 1921 consisting of Heckert, Bela Kun, Walecki, Rakosi and Popov.¹ According to one of the rare published accounts of its functions, it "fixes the amount of the membership contributions of the communist parties to Comintern, and divides the sums received between individual parties for different necessary requirements (electoral campaigns, publishing establishments, central apparatus, etc.)" and "supervises the financial side of the activity of individual parties" in order to ensure that the sums were expended on the purposes for which they had been assigned.² After the fifth congress in July 1924 the budget commission, now appointed by the presidium of IKKI, consisted of Pyatnitsky, Kuusinen, Geschke, Treint, MacManus, one Czech and one Italian, with the Pole Bogucki as a candidate.³ But no proceedings or reports of the commission were ever published, and even routine announcements of its membership seem to have been discontinued after 1924. Nothing was ever published about the financial aid given by Comintern to the parties; and such information as is available is sporadic and not always reliable. From about 1921 onwards a Comintern official, Mirov-Abramov, resident in Berlin, was responsible for the disbursement of Comintern funds, apparently throughout Europe.⁴ At the outset it was assumed that at any rate the stronger parties would finance themselves; and down to 1924 payments seem as a rule to have been small or designed to meet special needs. The KPD had difficulties in defraying the expenses of its delegates to Moscow for the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922, and met, or attempted to meet, them by selling "world congress marks" carrying portraits of Lenin and Zinoviev;⁵ thereafter

¹ *Deyatel'nost' Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Prezidiuma I.K. Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1923), p. 15.

² *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), pp. 106-107; the commission held 34 meetings between the fourth and fifth congresses.

³ *International Press Correspondence*, No. 57, August 12, 1924, p. 614; this item did not appear in the German edition.

⁴ R. Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Harvard, 1948), p. 442; a statement *ibid.* p. 505, that in the middle or later nineteen-twenties "almost one-twelfth of the party membership was in direct Russian pay" must be a wild exaggeration.

⁵ *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des III. (8) Parteitags der KPD* (1923), p. 65.

it became customary for Comintern to pay the expenses of delegations to congresses and conferences in Moscow. The Portuguese party received an allocation of £32 : 10 : 0, or 5072 French francs, for the year 1923 ; in April 1924 Humbert-Droz asked for an increase to 100 dollars a month.¹ In February 1924 50,000 lire were advanced to launch an Italian party newspaper, *Unità*, in Milan.² According to a letter written by Souvarine some years later, payments from Moscow to the PCF before his expulsion in 1924 were confined to covering the expenses of French delegations to party congresses or conferences in other countries and the costs of publication of the *Bibliothèque Communiste* ; the French Communist Youth League also received at this time "modest and certainly unconditional" subsidies. On the other hand *L'Humanité* not only paid its way, but financed provincial party journals. Later both the PCF and *L'Humanité* regularly solicited and obtained aid from Moscow on a large scale. Indeed, the party was said to be kept alive by "the 'oxygen bags' of the Soviet state".³ In 1925 the CPGB had a budget of £16,000 from Comintern, of which £14,600 had been received by October of that year.⁴ Figures of annual subsidies of \$100,000 for the American Workers' Party, together with \$25,000 for the TUEL, and

¹ Humbert-Droz archives, 0143, 0423.

² *Ibid.* 0013 ; the "M" through whom these funds were drawn was presumably Mirov-Abramov, who is again mentioned as a source of funds *ibid.* 0074. On February 1, 1924 (*ibid.* 0419), in addition to 50,000 lire for the journal, 30,000 were asked for to finance the Terzini, and 370,000 for the expenses of the election (see pp. 162-163, 167 above).

³ The letter dated "Paris, December 1927" is in the Trotsky archives (T 1059) without indication of address other than the opening "chers camarades" : it was presumably addressed to the Trotskyite opposition. Some exaggeration may be allowed for ; but circumstantial evidence points to a change in financial, as well as in other, relations between Comintern and the parties about the time of the fifth congress in 1924. The international control commission, first appointed by this congress, was said to have put the finances of Comintern in order, substituting a comprehensive budget for the separate budgets hitherto maintained by some of the departments (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), pp. 99-100).

⁴ Among the party papers seized in the police raid on CPGB headquarters in October 1925 (see p. 345 above) was a draft letter to Bennett, the Comintern representative, pleading for prompt payment of the balance due : "we have been compelled to engage in difficult activities which involve expenditure which was not originally budgeted for" (*Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 61-63). A letter from the British bureau of Profintern to Lozovsky in January 1924 complained of the inadequacy of its budget (*ibid.* pp. 55-56).

of \$120,000 for the Japanese party to include work in Korea, rest on less reliable evidence,¹ but are not improbable. It may be assumed that, from the middle nineteen-twenties onwards, all foreign parties of any account were in receipt of regular subsidies from Comintern, though the forms and amounts of the payments naturally varied from party to party. The main income of Comintern came beyond question from Russian party funds.

(b) *The Constituent Parties*

The adoption at the fifth congress of Comintern in 1924 of a detailed statute for Comintern, itself modelled in broad outline on the statute of the Russian party, presupposed that other parties would sooner or later adopt statutes on similar lines. No formal steps to this end appear to have been taken before January 1925, when, as part of the campaign for Bolshevization, a draft model statute for communist parties drafted by the organization department of IKKI was circulated to the parties and published.² It was submitted to the conference on organization held in Moscow under the auspices of the organization department of IKKI in March 1925.³ Under a resolution of this conference, every party was to have its Zentrale or central committee "of 25 or more members, together with some candidates"; in the larger parties the central committee was to elect a Politburo with full powers, an Orgburo and a secretariat.⁴ Several other instructions to parties were issued at the same time, as well as the draft model statute.⁵ During the next two or three years, the principal European parties succeeded, with varying degrees of difficulty, in adapting their statutes to the terms of the model statute in a manner satisfactory to the Comintern authorities.⁶ An Agitprop conference, also held simultaneously with the fifth enlarged IKKI in March 1925, and attended by representatives of most of the foreign parties, adopted a set of rules requiring every party to set up a small Agitprop department attached to its central committee, and to organize

¹ G. Besedovsky, *Na Putyakh k Termidoru* (Paris, 1931), i, 241; ii, 20.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 17, January 29, 1925, pp. 212-215.

³ See pp. 925-928 below.

⁴ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 121.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-143.

⁶ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 30.

its work on the lines laid down by the Agitprop department of IKKI.¹ A few days later a similar conference was arranged by the information department of IKKI, and passed a resolution proposing that every party should set up an information department, or at least appoint an information officer, to maintain contact with the information department of IKKI, which would thus be enabled to "coordinate and centralize" the work.² Nothing was omitted which could contribute to uniformity of organization among the parties or to their acceptance of the central authority of Comintern and its organs; and a substantial advance was made towards the conception of Comintern as a world-wide communist party comprising a number of partially autonomous units.

Far greater difficulties arose on issues of the basis of party membership and of the way in which individual members should be organized and deployed for action. The resolution of the third congress of Comintern in 1921 had prescribed that every party member should be enrolled in a smaller working group such as "a committee, commission, collegium, group, fraction or cell"; and a later passage in the same resolution referred to communist cells, fractions and working groups as the normal units of party organization.³ These somewhat vague injunctions, which seem to have made little immediate impression on the foreign parties, were later crystallized in two analogous, but not identical, demands. The first was that, wherever several communists were members of the same non-party institution — an organ of central or local government, a trade union or any non-political organization — the communists should form a fraction, meeting regularly to prepare and organize themselves for joint action in the interest of the party on any issue arising within the institution to which they belonged. The second demand was that communist cells in factories or other places of work should be the basis of party

¹ For the text of the rules see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 34, March 12, 1925, pp. 514-516; the fifth enlarged IKKI passed a resolution approving the conclusions of the Agitprop conference, and emphasizing the duties of the parties in carrying on this work (*Kommunistischesii International v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 521-523).

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 69, April 27, 1925, p. 934.

³ This was the resolution which Lenin criticized as "almost entirely Russian, i.e. everything taken from Russian conditions" (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 392-393).

membership, i.e. that all party members should be enrolled as members of the communist cells in the enterprises in which they worked.

The first demand — the formation of communist fractions — encountered no objections of principle in foreign parties. It was obviously reasonable and desirable that communists finding themselves in a minority in a non-communist institution should regularly consult and act together in pursuit of the common purposes of the party. But practical difficulties occurred in organizing the fractions in a formal and uniform manner, and in setting up machinery to ensure that they received and executed directives from the party authorities. When united front tactics became a cardinal point of Comintern policy, the fractions began to assume great importance, since it was through them that the approach to non-communists would largely be carried out. On February 4, 1924, after the session which pronounced judgment on the German disaster of the previous October,¹ the presidium of IKKI issued a detailed "Instruction for Communist Fractions in Workers' Mass Organizations and Organs outside the Party". Fractions were to be formed in all "organizations and bodies of workers and peasants" (trade unions, cooperatives, sports clubs, congresses and conferences, municipal councils and parliaments were among the examples quoted) where not less than three communists were engaged; every fraction was to elect its bureau or presidium in agreement with the higher party authorities to which it was responsible; a higher party official was to be present at all meetings of the fraction where political issues were discussed; and, once a decision had been taken, every member of the fraction must actively support it on pain of disciplinary action.² In theory these arrangements were everywhere accepted as appropriate and desirable. In practice, communist parties were nowhere — except in Germany, Czechoslovakia and perhaps France — strong enough to build up any significant number of sizeable fractions in non-communist bodies, or to create the elaborate machinery foreseen in the instruction; and in these three countries communists were, for special reasons, reluctant

¹ See *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, pp. 236-240.

² *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 150-153.

to work in non-communist trade unions,¹ which were by far the most important organizations concerned. For some time, therefore, the instruction remained in most places a dead letter.

The second demand — the proposal that all party membership should be organized on the basis of factory cells — met with stubborn and vocal opposition, since it involved the abandonment of a traditional democratic form of organization by districts and regions. It corresponded to the Bolshevik conception of the party as an entity composed of workers in factories or other units of production and organized on the basis of such units, but not to the normal western conception of a party based on local organizations. Territorial organization treated the workers as citizens, and suited the requirements of an electoral machine based on universal suffrage. Organization by factory cells treated the workers as members of the proletariat, and facilitated enrolment and training for revolutionary action: the Red Guard of 1917 in Petrograd could not have been mustered on any other basis than that of factories. This was a difference of principle comparable to the difference between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the original Russian party. A further practical difference was that the factory cells were secret organs, whose members did not disclose their existence to the outside world: this was a precaution against the persecution to which they were subjected from employers as well as a corollary of their function.² The fact that the SPD clung to the territorial system showed that it was not a revolutionary party. Some time elapsed, however, before an attempt was made to impose the change on foreign communist parties. The resolution of the third congress of Comintern in June–July 1921 on organization,³ while it described “communist cells” as “fundamental nuclei carrying out communist work in factories and workshops, in trade unions, in workers’ *artels*, in military units, etc.”, bracketed “the cell, the fraction and the working group” as indispensable instruments for conducting party work, and made no suggestion of a transition from territorial

¹ See pp. 535–537, 555–556 above.

² For discussions of these differences see *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 100; *Tridtsat' Let Zhizni i Bor'by Ital'yanskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii* (Russian transl. from Italian, 1953), pp. 239–240.

³ See p. 914 above.

to cell organization.¹ It was the Communist Youth International (KIM), at its second congress immediately following the third congress of Comintern,² which first raised the issue in a categorical form. In the face of strong opposition from the German delegation, which wished to maintain the territorial principle in organization, and to carry on work in the factories through communist youth fractions, the congress passed a resolution requiring communist youth leagues to make "a transition from the current exclusively territorial organization of communist youth to the formation of communist league cells".³ This injunction evidently produced little or no effect, and did not penetrate higher party circles. Fifteen months later, the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922 was content to reiterate that "no communist party can be considered a serious and solidly organized mass communist party, unless it possesses firm communist cells in factories, workshops, mines, railways, etc."⁴ The introduction of factory cells as the basis of party organization had been one of the items in the scheme for the reorganization of the CPGB adopted under Comintern guidance in October 1922, and in principle aroused no opposition.⁵ But the importance attached to these organizational questions by the Russian leaders was as yet little understood in the foreign parties, and no great attention was paid to them.

It was once again KIM which took the lead. Its third congress met in Moscow in December 1922 immediately after the fourth congress of Comintern. Private discussions in advance of the congress had revealed that some delegations were still hostile to the whole scheme.⁶ The German delegation was divided and hesitant, but four out of the six delegates were eventually induced to support the cell system.⁷ At the congress itself Reussner, the

¹ *Kommunistischesii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 204-207.

² For this congress see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 403.

³ R. Schüller *et al.*, *Geschichte der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale*, ii (1929), 247; for the alternative German resolution which was rejected see *ibid.* iii (1930), 35-36.

⁴ *Kommunistischesii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 302.

⁵ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 422.

⁶ *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), p. 76.

⁷ R. Schüller *et al.*, *Geschichte der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale*, iii (1930), 34.

German member of the executive committee, was tactful and cautious. The factory cell must be the basic unit. But the immediate transformation of territorial units into factory units exceeded "the practical possibilities of fulfilment"; it was necessary first to "create the conditions for the cell". A German delegate spoke out openly against the change. The Czechoslovak delegate, while ready to concede that cell organization was "an ideal principle", thought that territorial organization was "an inevitable transitional stage", and was plainly in no hurry to dispense with it.¹ But, in spite of this lack of enthusiasm, the leaders successfully persisted in their design. In its general resolution the congress noted indulgently that "the tasks put before the leagues by the second congress were, either wholly or in part, new to all of them, and a considerable time was necessary for an internal orientation and understanding of them". But it repeated with emphasis that "*the fundamental unit of organization of the youth league is the factory cell*";² and it now also adopted a special resolution embodying the most detailed scheme of cell organization yet formulated. The motive of contact with the masses was strongly stressed. Every member of a youth league was to be enrolled in a "cell" in his factory or place of work; cells were to elect a secretary and hold weekly meetings. Cells were to be combined in a "local group", which was, however, to be carefully distinguished from the old territorial group based not on place of employment, but on place of residence. The resolution admitted the continued existence of the territorial organization as a provisional measure and for certain purposes, e.g. for the enrolment of unemployed members. But the transition to the new system of local factory groups was to be effected as rapidly as possible.³ A further attack on the question was made at the session of the enlarged bureau of KIM in July 1923. Here it was surprisingly recorded that the German youth league was the only league which had achieved "an excellent and promising beginning" in the work of reorganization;⁴ and a long resolution on cell organization noted that, in spite of "a weak opposition"

¹ *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 94, 97, 105-110.

² *Ibid.* pp. 252, 255.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 256-259.

⁴ *Resolutions and Theses Adopted by the Fourth Bureau Session of the YCI* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 43-44.

in some parties, "in most cases the membership welcomes heartily the new organizational form".¹ The bureau also instructed the central committees of youth leagues to organize international contacts between cells of different leagues, and especially with those of the Russian Komsomol.²

Hitherto few signs had appeared of any eagerness to apply the new principle in Comintern or to foreign communist parties. But in this respect, as in others, the German disaster of October 1923 proved a turning-point. It was no longer easy to resist the argument in Moscow that the German party had failed because it had not organized itself on approved Russian lines. The new Zentrale of the KPD tacitly accepted the argument when as early as December 1923 it issued an instruction to establish a system of cells;³ and the moral of the German failure was pointed in an article in the German party journal.⁴ The session of the presidium of IKKI of January 1924⁵ passed a resolution which, recalling the importance attached by the third congress of Comintern to the work of factory cells, prescribed elaborate rules for party organization from top to bottom on these lines. The KPD was summoned in a supplementary instruction to complete this reorganization in two months.⁶ The fact that the SPD clung to the principle of organization by localities, and not by factory cells, proved that it was at heart a parliamentary, not a revolutionary, party. The moral was reiterated at the ninth congress of the KPD in March 1924. In the absence of factory cells it had been impossible to organize the workers and take advantage of the favourable moment for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; and underground work had been hampered at a time when the party was under a legal prohibition.⁷ Where party cells had existed

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 45-50.

² *Ibid.* p. 52.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 24, February 21, 1924, pp. 265-268.

⁴ *Die Internationale*, vi, No. 19, December 31, 1923, pp. 548-553.

⁵ See p. 915, note 1 above.

⁶ *Die Lehren der Deutschen Ereignisse* (1924), pp. 114-119; the members of the KPD Left, including Maslow, Ruth Fischer and Thälmann, at first voted against the two-month clause, but later accepted the resolution and instruction as a whole (*ibid.* p. 82). The text published in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 24, February 21, 1924, pp. 261-262, omitted the last few paragraphs of the resolution and the whole of the instruction — presumably through accident or lack of space; and this curtailed version was reprinted in *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 144-147.

⁷ *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des IX. Parteitags der KPD* (1924), pp. 37, 56.

in the trade unions under Brandler, they had been non-political and had concerned themselves only with trade union matters.¹ Other countries were not forgotten. In France the first party pronouncement in favour of factory cells was said to date from May 1923.² The third congress of the PCF at Lyons in January 1924 proclaimed it necessary to "hasten the formation of factory cells";³ and in April 1924 the faithful Treint proclaimed in an article in the *Bulletin Communiste* that "to Bolshevize the party means above all at this moment to root it in the factories".⁴ The Czechoslovak party professed to accept the obligation to set up factory cells, but continued to prefer the system of party fractions among factory workers, and insisted on maintaining the old organization pending the establishment of the new: much was heard of the difficulty of creating 10,000 factory cells — the number said to be required.⁵ In Great Britain also, promise outran achievement. At the sixth congress of the CPGB in May 1924, the party executive committee admitted that the scheme for the reorganization of the party on a cell basis had pre-supposed a party of 40,000 or 50,000, and could not be fully implemented in a party of one-tenth that size. It was nevertheless claimed that more than eighteen months' experience had fully justified the measures taken to transform the party;⁶ and when Bennett, as delegate of Comintern, addressed the congress, he continued to plead for the organization of the party in factory groups in order to awaken workers who were still "asleep".⁷ About this time, the executive committee of KIM claimed credit for having promoted the extension of cell organization in communist parties "particularly in Germany, Czechoslovakia, France and Great Britain";⁸ and the fifth congress of Comintern in its message to KIM confirmed that the youth leagues and KIM were the "pioneers in this work" and had "rendered important help to

¹ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 63.

² *Ibid.* p. 24.

³ *Congrès National : Adresses et Résolutions* (1924), p. 32.

⁴ *Bulletin Communiste*, No. 14, April 4, 1924, pp. 337-339.

⁵ *How to Organize the Communist Party* (CPGB, n.d.), pp. 15, 29-30.

⁶ *Speeches and Documents : Sixth Conference of the CPGB* (1924), pp. 44-45.

⁷ *Communist Review*, v, No. 2, June 1924, pp. 54-55; for this speech see pp. 128-129 above.

⁸ *From Third to Fourth : a Report on the Activities of the YCI* (Stockholm, 1924), p. 25.

communist parties and to Comintern, and collected valuable experience".¹ But, except perhaps in Germany, few concrete steps had been taken before the summer of 1924 to reorganize the parties on this basis.

The fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924 was the occasion of the first serious attempt by Comintern headquarters to galvanize the parties into action. The commission on organization set up to prepare the new statute of Comintern² appointed a sub-commission which drafted a special resolution on cell organization for submission to the congress. When this sub-commission reported to the main commission on July 1, 1924, Pyatnitsky inaugurated a general discussion on cell organization. Factory cells had, he admitted, been formed in Germany, France and Czechoslovakia; but they had merely been added to the existing organization. Russian experience had shown that the system worked effectively only when "the party decisions are made in the factory cells". The system was of particular value in countries where parties were illegal, since underground work could be detected less easily if it were conducted in the factories where workers normally assembled. The main opposition in the sub-commission had evidently come from the Czechoslovak delegation; and in the commission Muna, a member of the Czechoslovak party Right, while accepting cell organization in principle, dwelt on the danger of destroying existing local organizations. But nobody contested the proposed texts; and Pyatnitsky wound up the debate with the reassuring conclusion that "we are all agreed upon the main points".³

The work of the commission was endorsed without further discussion by the congress. The statute of Comintern adopted by the congress was categorical on the principle of cell organization:

The basic organization of a communist party is the cell in the enterprise (in the workshop, factory, pit, office, shop, estate, etc.) which unites all members of the party working in the enterprise in question.⁴

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 454.

² See pp. 898-899 above.

³ The discussion is reported in *How to Organize the Communist Party* (CPGB, n.d.), pp. 9-43; a French version was published under the title *Les Questions d'Organisation au V^e Congrès de l'I.C.* (1925), but no corresponding publication in German or Russian has been traced.

⁴ For the statute see p. 900, note 1 above.

Special attention was drawn to this clause by Pyatnitsky in his report to the congress.¹ Schüller, the representative of the Communist Youth International, pointed out that the Youth International had been actively promoting cell organization since the end of 1922, and made a passionate appeal to the congress "to begin the Bolshevization of the party in the field of organization in real earnest, to rid ourselves of the social-democratic heritage, and to develop a real communist party";² his choice as principal speaker on this topic was itself significant. The congress, having noted with disapproval in its general resolution that "the vast majority of European communist parties retain to this day the old principles of organizational structure of the party borrowed from the social-democrats", gathered up all these threads in the special resolution drafted by the sub-commission on "The Reconstruction of the Party on the Basis of Production Cells". "The social composition of the party mass", declared the resolution, "must be changed and improved" by admitting more industrial workers (it was the period of the Lenin enrolment in the Russian party). This would facilitate organization in factory cells. A concession was made to existing realities in the German and other parties by admitting that "street cells" organized on the basis of place of residence of members might still be permitted as "auxiliary" organizations; but these were to be regarded as a provisional expedient in no way equal to the factory cells "in function or significance".³ On the other hand no attempt was made in the resolutions of the fifth congress to link factory cell organization with the new slogan of Bolshevization: this became characteristic of a later period. The congress resolution on KIM contained an emphatic stipulation that factory cells formed by the communist youth leagues must be "independent of those formed by the parties".⁴ The organization department of IKKI improved the occasion by adopting "in consultation with the

¹ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 984.

² *Ibid.* ii, 989-997.

³ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 404, 426-428; a later statement that the delegation of KIM at the fifth congress of Comintern opposed the admission of street cells (*Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 9, May-June 1926, p. 21) cannot be substantiated from the records of the congress.

⁴ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 457; the passage was omitted in the German version of the resolution, (see p. 991, note 1 below).

Italian delegation" a resolution instructing the PCI to complete its reorganization on a cell basis by January 1, 1925; and similar injunctions were issued to other parties.¹ KIM, at its immediately following fourth congress, claimed to have taken energetic measures since its previous congress "to create factory cells and reorganize the leagues", and passed a new and still more detailed resolution on "the continuation of the reorganization of the leagues".² Subsequent developments suggest, however, that the gap between theory and practice in this field was unusually wide.³

The hesitation shown by communist parties in the adoption of cell organization was, no doubt, partly due to reluctance to exchange familiar for unfamiliar procedures. It was later argued that, "in countries where social-democracy has had no firm basis of organizational tradition" (France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States were quoted as examples), cell organization would prove easier than in countries like Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, the Netherlands or Switzerland, where active social-democratic parties had formerly been organized on a residential basis.⁴ But the difficulty of cell organization could also be explained by the numerical weakness (except in the German, Czechoslovak and French parties) of the proletarian element — a situation which meant that the party cell in any one industrial enterprise would be insignificantly small. Many of the lesser parties were not predominantly proletarian.⁵ The KPD claimed

¹ *How to Organize the Communist Party* (CPGB, n.d.), pp. 114-117; the letter published *ibid.* pp. 109-113 was presumably addressed to the CPGB. A similar resolution was adopted for the PCF (*Les Questions d'Organisation au V^e Congrès de l'I.C.* (1925), pp. 89-92).

² *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1924), pp. 7, 13-20; the *rapporteur* in his speech described the adoption of cell organization by Comintern as "a major achievement of the Communist Youth International" (*Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 11-12, July-August, 1924, pp. 341-342).

³ Almost a year later the executive bureau of KIM confessed that "the activity of the cells and of the local organizations built on them is everywhere rather weak and undeveloped" (*Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 154-156).

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 117, August 4, 1925, p. 1628; for this resolution of the Orgburo of IKKI of July 14, 1925, see p. 928 below.

⁵ An official historian of the Greek Communist Party records that "the reorganization of the party on the basis of cells proceeded with great difficulty since the party had few links with factory workers" (Kh. Kabakchiev *et al.*, *Kommunisticheskie Partii Balkanskikh Stran* (1930), p. 186); not all party spokesmen were so frank.

to have made a serious effort to introduce the new organization in October 1924, though mass unemployment among party members proved an obstacle.¹ A report of October 1924 claimed that the transition in the PCI to a cell basis was "being accomplished everywhere", though the evidence quoted seemed to be confined to Turin.² The authorities of the PCF issued an instruction to the party to complete the reorganization on a cell basis by December 31, 1924.³ Pyatnitsky answered the British protests of the impracticability of organizing the CPGB in factory cells by once more pointing to this procedure as a means of contact with the masses and the only way to avoid the German errors of October 1923.⁴ At a meeting of the Orgburo of IKKI on December 15, 1924, Pyatnitsky presented a report on the work of the organization section for the past six months, and a model statute for the organization of communist parties on the cell basis was drawn up. While Pyatnitsky's self-assured confidence in Bolshevik methods was undimmed, it is clear that the transition to factory cell organization was at this time sceptically regarded, and lethargically applied, by all the principal foreign parties. As regards the organization of party fractions, Pyatnitsky took a gloomy view: "absolutely nothing has been done in this direction". The Czechoslovak party had failed even to organize its parliamentary fraction; the claims of the PCF were exaggerated. Only the KPD had achieved something, and even here work in the trade unions was weak.⁵ A report of the organization section

¹ *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des X. Parteitags der KPD* (1925), pp. 120-123.

² Humbert-Droz archives, 0064.

³ *Bulletin Communiste*, No. 39, September 26, 1924, pp. 924-927; the columns of this journal during the winter of 1924-1925 were full of reports from local secretaries on the progress of reorganization in their districts. At the Orgburo conference in Moscow in December 1924 the French delegate gave an enthusiastic account of the system at work in Paris factories, with cells meeting weekly or monthly and their bureaux "almost daily" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 17, January 29, 1925, pp. 202-203). The instruction to "complete" the reorganization was repeated in a resolution of the fourth congress of the PCF in January 1925, but the final date was moved forward to April 1, 1925 (*ibid.* No. 19, January 30, 1925, pp. 254-255).

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 169, December 30, 1924, pp. 2324-2325; the occasion was a meeting with Pollitt and Bennett as representatives of the Orgburo of the CPGB (*ibid.* No. 20, February 3, 1925, pp. 265-267).

⁵ A hortatory article by Pyatnitsky, his speech to the Orgburo, the report of the organization section and the model statute all appear in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 17, January 29, 1925, pp. 197-200, 205-215.

to the presidium of IKKI a few days later concluded that "a majority of communist parties are only now beginning their reorganization on the basis of factory cells".¹

The renewed drive for the standardization and subordination of foreign communist parties, of which Zinoviev's letter of January 1925 on "the Bolshevization of the parties" was the signal, made it certain that the question of organization would not be left in abeyance. Indeed the complaint would sometimes be heard in the coming months that Bolshevization was being treated as equivalent to reorganization on the factory cell basis and nothing more; and it became necessary to insist that organization and policy were both essential parts of a single whole.² On March 15, 1925, on the occasion of the fifth plenum of the enlarged IKKI, the organization department of IKKI convened an "organization conference of the sections of the Communist International and the Communist Youth International", composed of delegates representing the organization departments or organization officers of the parties. One of the purposes of the conference was to read a lesson to the parties on the defects of their organization. Pyatnitsky in his opening speech reproached the British and French parties with having no full-time paid officials to run the organization: the excuse of lack of funds was unworthy of a serious party. On the other hand, the German and Czechoslovak parties left too much in the hands of these officials, so that ordinary party members were not consulted and did not know what was going on. In general, the creation of efficient organization departments in the parties to maintain regular contact with the organization department of IKKI was a crying need.³ Pyatnitsky also touched on the need for party fractions in representative institutions, in mass organizations and,

¹ *Pravda*, January 6, 1925.

² Zinoviev made this complaint at the fifth enlarged IKKI in March 1925 (*Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), p. 62; the executive committee of the CPGB at its sixth party congress in May 1924 had already alleged that "over-concentration on the scheme of organization" had led to a "deterioration in the political quality of the party" (*Speeches and Documents: Sixth Conference of the CPGB* (1924), p. 45).

³ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 17-20, 23-24. This small volume contains a brief record of the conference and the text of its resolutions; for a somewhat fuller account of the proceedings see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 40, March 25, 1925, pp. 597-607; No. 45, April 1, 1925, pp. 645-658.

above all, in the trade unions : here also the parties had done little or nothing.¹ But the main emphasis was on the transition to cell organization. Pyatnitsky struck the keynote of the conference without beating about the bush :

Our form of organization in Russia has proved that it was possible through it to win the masses of workers, to struggle with the masses, to lead the masses in the struggle, to gain victory with them and not only to gain it, but to consolidate it. The question now arises : Can the same form of organization be applied in other countries ? Or will our communist parties in other countries with their old form of organization find it possible to lead the struggle, to win over the working class and to gain the victory ?

The answer did not seem open to doubt. Having quoted reports both of legal parties (the French and the German) and of illegal parties (the Bulgarian and the Rumanian) to demonstrate the greater effectiveness of the new cell organization, Pyatnitsky concluded with emphasis :

*All these examples prove that the Russian method, the Russian form of party organization, can be applied with good success in other countries as well.*²

A spokesman of KIM claimed that the youth league had " gone over far more quickly than Comintern to organization on the basis of factory cells ".³ But this was countered by a confession that the Berlin organization of the German Communist Youth League, having attempted to reorganize itself on a cell basis in six weeks, had lost 40 per cent of its members in the process.⁴ By a glaring and significant oversight, the Russian party was not represented at the conference ; it was silently assumed that Pyatnitsky, who took charge of the proceedings throughout, spoke equally with the voice of the organization section of IKKI and with the voice of the Russian party, between which no distinction could be drawn. When a German delegate deplored the absence of any report on cell organization in the Russian party, Pyatnitsky

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 45, April 1, 1925, pp. 21-23 ; for the discussion on fractions in trade unions see pp. 574-575 above.

² *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 10-11.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 45-46.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 48, 50 ; a delegate of the KPD also complained of the " impetuosity " of the German youth league (*ibid.* p. 34).

replied a little awkwardly that this had not been thought necessary, since "really the whole form of organization, of the building of the party on factory cells, came from Russia".¹ The Russian party, through the organization department of IKKI, was conferring on the other member parties of Comintern the fruits of its unique and successful experience in organization.

The main themes of the general resolution unanimously adopted by the conference were the reorganization of parties on the basis of cells (this was the most important), the formation of party fractions in non-communist institutions (this was important and controversial mainly in the trade unions), and the relations between the organization department of IKKI and the organization departments of the parties.² At the same time — whether at the conference itself or immediately afterwards, is not clear — a more detailed resolution on the structure of the parties was drafted and approved by the Orgburo of IKKI. Unlike the general resolution, this document recognized territorial units, in the form of "street cells", as continuing to exist side by side with factory cells, though in no way replacing or superseding the latter. Elaborate provisions were made for the functioning of factory and street cells, and of party fractions in non-party institutions, with periodical meetings and regularly elected leaders responsible to higher party authorities.³ None of the foreign delegates in Moscow ventured openly to oppose these conclusions. But few of them — and fewer still of those party members who had not made the journey to Moscow — shared the confidence of Pyatnitsky and of his colleagues in the organization department of IKKI that forms of organization created by and for the Russian party were well adapted to the parties of western European countries. A spokesman of the department at the conference

¹ *Ibid.* p. 70.

² *Ibid.* pp. 111-113, where the resolution is said to have been approved by the session of the enlarged IKKI. No trace of it appears, however, in the published records of the enlarged IKKI; and the French version of the proceedings of the organization conference (*La Réorganisation des Partis Communistes : Rapports et Discussions de la Conférence d'Organisation de l'I.C.* (1925)) merely states that it was approved by the Orgburo of IKKI on May 4, 1925 (with the other resolutions of the conference).

³ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 113-124, where this resolution is stated to have been confirmed by the Orgburo on May 4, 1925, but no indication is given of its origin: it evidently contained concessions to objections raised by foreign delegations at the conference.

admitted that "many parties, and some party organizations in different countries, if they do not directly oppose the transformation, have continued to maintain a fairly passive attitude", and attributed this attitude to "organizational conservatism".¹ A session of the Orgburo on July 14, 1925, heard a further report from Pyatnitsky on the progress of cell organization, and passed another resolution on the "tasks of organization".²

The apathy prevailing in all the principal parties on the transition to cell organization makes any assessment of real achievements unusually difficult. What proportion of the factory cells reported as existing in fact existed, and what proportion of those that existed functioned effectively in accordance with the instructions, cannot be guessed with any approach to accuracy. In France the transformation was said at last to be on the way to completion in the spring of 1925.³ In the Paris region "local organizations of the old type have completely disappeared"; and the same was true of the industrial region of the north and of the Lyons region.⁴ In Germany, the KPD was unable to emulate the "tempestuous tempo" of the French reorganization, since old social-democratic traditions were too strong.⁵ On the eve of the tenth party congress in July 1925, 2500 factory cells were said to exist, of which 600 collected party dues (and were thus in the full sense working units).⁶ But it was admitted that progress during the past year had been slow; and the congress adopted a new party statute which declared the factory cell "the basis of the party organization, its very foundation".⁷ The party claimed by the spring of 1926 to have made the transition everywhere to factory and street cells.⁸ The Czechoslovak party also had to

¹ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 98.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 117, August 4, 1925, pp. 1627-1632; the rest of this issue (pp. 1633-1670) was filled with reports, articles and other material submitted to the Orgburo on the question.

³ For the date April 1, 1925, see p. 924, note 3 above.

⁴ *Rasshirenyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala*, (1925), p. 107; this favourable account was confirmed a year later (*Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), p. 9). But the peak was apparently reached with 2500 cells on March 1, 1925; after this the enthusiasm waned and numbers fell away (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 16).

⁵ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 34.

⁶ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 90.

⁷ *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des X. Parteitags der KPD* (1925), pp. 120-123.

⁸ *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), p. 8.

overcome the social-democratic tradition of the Czechoslovak workers ; Zapotocky stated that 778 factory cells had been formed before January 1, 1925, but confessed that this was only "apparently satisfactory".¹ Six months later 1300 factory cells had been formed, though without diminishing the number of territorial units.²

In Italy quicker progress was made, since the tradition of factory cells went back to the stormy period of 1919 and 1920, and the quasi-illegal status of the party ruled out any open form of organization. Resistance came from the ultra-Left section of the party headed by Bordiga ; but the third party congress at Lyons in January 1926 emphatically declared that to reject cell organization was "to open the way to the paralysing influence of other classes".³ The transition to cell organization in the PCI was said to have been completed in the period from 1924 to 1926.⁴ In the Polish party the statute adopted by the second party congress in August 1923 prescribed cell organization as the basis of membership.⁵ The third congress in March 1925 returned to the theme in a resolution on the Bolshevization of the party, demanding the creation of cells in every field where party members worked — "factory, workshop, landed estate, village" — as well as in the Communist Youth League ; and rules of organization for the cells were laid down by the fourth conference in December 1925.⁶ By the spring of 1925 factory cells already predominated in the KPP.⁷ These successes were no coincidence : in Italy and Poland the party worked in underground conditions having some

¹ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 41 ; all the Czechoslovak delegates at the conference of March 1925 insisted on the strength of social-democratic traditions as an obstacle to cell-building (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 40, March 25, 1925, pp. 602-603, 606-607). For figures for the years 1925-1927 (1922 in the first column is evidently a misprint for 1925) see *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 252.

² *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 19, 160.

³ *Tridtsat' Let Zhizni i Bor'by Ital'yanskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii* (Russian transl. from Italian, 1953), pp. 239-240.

⁴ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 45 ; *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 185.

⁵ *KPP : Uchwały i Rozstrzygnięcia*, i (1953), 256-257.

⁶ *Ibid.* ii (1955), 126, 328-329.

⁷ *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 57 ; this is confirmed in *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 177-178, which remarked, however, on the weakness of work in the countryside.

analogy with the Russian conditions for which the organization was first devised.

In Great Britain the small numbers of the CPGB — it had not yet reached a membership of 5000 — were the principal obstacle. The formation of factory cells only began in earnest at the end of 1924, and a total of 68 was claimed in March 1925.¹ The principal aim of factory cells here was to improve party recruitment in the factories; as a method of organization it earned little more than lip-service. In the United States the situation was still more anomalous. The delegate of the American party at the organization conference of March 1925 explained that of the 19,000 members of the party only 2200 were English-speaking; though half of the remainder spoke enough English to take part in party work, they clung to the federal structure of the party and opposed a passive resistance to its reorganization.² Pyatnitsky, nonplussed by conditions of which he was plainly ignorant, could only express the hope that the American comrades would allow themselves to be convinced of the necessity of a "centralized party structure".³ After the fourth congress of the American Workers' Party in August 1925, a detailed plan was issued for the reorganization of the party on a cell basis;⁴ and organization conferences of the American party were held in Chicago in December 1925 and in February 1926 as a token of compliance with Comintern behests.⁵ It was stated in Moscow shortly afterwards that 70 per cent of the members of the American party were organized in 500 factory and street cells.⁶ But the attempted reorganization had a catastrophic effect on party membership.⁷ An instruction of the Orgburo of July 14, 1925, requiring the organization department to cooperate with the eastern department in building up cell organization in the eastern

¹ *Report of the Seventh Congress of the CPGB* (n.d.), pp. 148-149, 201; the figure of 68 had already been claimed in Moscow (*Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 54). A letter of instruction of April 22, 1925, from the Orgburo of IKKI to the Orgburo of the CPGB on cell organization was published in *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 5-8.

² *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 54-55.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 81-82.

⁴ *Daily Worker* (Chicago), September 19, 1925.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 23, February 5, 1926, pp. 340-341; No. 56, April 13, 1926, p. 806.

⁶ *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), p. 10.

⁷ See p. 411 above.

countries,¹ is one of the few mentions of this question in an eastern context.

These meagre results did not warrant any relaxation of effort by the central authorities. The "open letter" from IKKI to the members of the KPD of August 1925, condemning the faults of the existing leadership,² was followed by the issue of detailed instructions by the party Zentrale for the reorganization of the party in accordance with the new statute adopted by the party at its congress in the previous July;³ and a similar letter was despatched by the executive committee of KIM to the German youth league.⁴ In France the decline in the membership of the PCF, which appeared to be due to the intransigent attitude of the party in the Moroccan war,⁵ was afterwards officially attributed in part to the losses due to the introduction of cell organization;⁶ and one of the specific demands in the letter of the 250 malcontents of October 1925 was for an abandonment of the cells and a return to the territorial system of organization.⁷ A report to the third congress of the Czechoslovak party in September 1925 described the rate of the transition of the party organization to factory cells as "hitherto insufficient", and alleged that the so-called street and village cells established under the scheme were often only new names for the old local organizations. Part of these shortcomings was attributed to the fact that the party central committee had no Orgburo; and the congress decided to institute one.⁸ In Great Britain, as the result of a "Red Week" organized by the CPGB, 52 new cells were added to an existing total of 125, mainly in the mining districts.⁹ But before the end

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 117, August 4, 1925, p. 1628; for this resolution see p. 928 above.

² See pp. 328-329 above.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 4, January 8, 1926, pp. 50-51 for an earlier communication of IKKI immediately after the congress see *ibid.* No. 128, September 4, 1925, pp. 1871-1873.

⁴ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 2, October-November 1925, pp. 1-10.

⁵ See p. 358 above.

⁶ *V^e Congrès National du Parti Communiste Français* (1927), p. 11.

⁷ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 50, 79. For the letter of the 250 see p. 359 above; the relevant passage is quoted textually in A. Ferrat, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français* (1931), p. 175.

⁸ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 159, December 1, 1925, pp. 2397-2398.

⁹ *Ibid.* No. 4, January 8, 1926, pp. 62-64; *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 22.

of 1925 opposition and obstruction in the parties had begun to tell. In an article of November 1925, Ulbricht, at this time a spokesman of the organization department of IKKI, carefully held the balance between factory and street cells, pointing out that only party members not enrolled in factory cells should be admitted to street cells, but that at the same time street cells were essential to the conduct of electoral campaigns.¹ In the latter part of 1925, with the campaign for trade union unity at its height, the attention of Comintern headquarters was concentrated rather on strengthening party fractions in the trade unions than on the organization of party cells. At the session of the Orgburo on July 14, 1925, Pyatnitsky said that "the position with the fractions is even worse than with the cells", and stressed the importance of fractions "not only in the trade unions, but in all non-party organizations". The resolution adopted at the session equated fractions in the trade unions with factory cells as the two main preoccupations of the organization department of IKKI.² A meeting of the Orgburo of IKKI in December 1925, to which delegates of foreign parties were invited, had as its principal business "the building and development of fractions especially in the trade unions", though the need to form fractions in the cooperatives was also not ignored.³

On February 10, 1926, in advance of the sixth enlarged plenum of IKKI, a second organization conference was convened in Moscow by the organization section of IKKI, and sat for a whole week. This time the delegates were drawn only from the seven major parties; the countries represented were Germany, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, Norway and the Soviet Union. The mistake made at the first conference of omitting the Russian party was not repeated. The zeal of the party was displayed in a special decision of the central committee authorizing the establishment of machinery to maintain contact, by "a regular exchange of letters", between cells of the Russian party

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 153, November 10, 1925, pp. 2300-2302.

² *Ibid.* No. 117, August 4, 1925, pp. 1628, 1632; for this session of the Orgburo see p. 928 above.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 165, December 17, 1925, pp. 2472, 2483-2484; for the pronouncement of the meeting on fractions in the cooperatives see p. 975, note 1 below.

and those of other parties.¹ Representatives of some other parties attended to give reports to the conference. Three commissions were set up to deal with the three items of the agenda: the work of factory cells, the central apparatus of the parties, and communist fractions in trade unions and other non-party bodies. Draft resolutions for all three commissions were prepared by the organization section.²

The discussion of cell organization seems to have amounted to little more than an enumeration of the achievements and shortcomings of the different parties. In Germany and Czechoslovakia the conference had to be satisfied with a rather unconvincing claim that progress was being made. In Sweden, where the party now had almost 10,000 members, it had succeeded in forming 335 factory cells, 62 street cells and 17 village cells. In Great Britain, 1000 out of 6000 members were organized in 183 factory cells — eloquent proof of the insignificant scale of the whole enterprise.³ Pyatnitsky, though he contrived to find these

¹ *Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta VKP(B)*, No. 5 (126), February 8, 1927, p. 4; by way of example, a letter from the party cell in the Putilov factory in Leningrad to the cell in a Krupp factory in Berlin was published in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 4, January 8, 1926, pp. 66-68.

² *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), pp. 5-7; this pamphlet contains a brief account of the conference by Pyatnitsky and the resolutions adopted by it. The conference was briefly reported in *Pravda*, February 18, 1926, and more fully in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 60, April 19, 1926, pp. 845-876; No. 65, April 29, 1926, pp. 945-991.

³ *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), pp. 8-9; in a later report in *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 147, the British figures were reduced to 847 members in 161 cells. According to a report of Ulbricht in December 1925 to the Orgburo of IKKI, the CPGB had never really grasped the difference between cells, which were basic party organs and were concerned with all party questions, and fractions, which simply carried out party policy in the non-party organizations in which they worked, and were concerned only with questions affecting those organizations (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 165, December 17, 1925, p. 2464). The confusion between "cells" and "fractions" was of long standing, and was explained at the third congress of KIM in December 1922: "When the term 'cell' was first publicly used, it appeared almost exclusively in connexion with the idea of communist action-groups in enemy organizations. The first cells were cells in trade unions, cooperatives and sport organizations. This conception is quite different, and must be distinguished from our idea of the factory cell. The first type should only be called a 'fraction' " (*Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), p. 77); but one of the German delegates retorted that the question whether the unit was to be called a fraction or a cell was "not so important" (*ibid.* p. 97). The difference between cells and fractions was again stressed at the organization conference

developments "fairly satisfactory", had many criticisms to make. Cells frequently failed to set up bureaus, and were run by a single secretary. In Germany, party members working in a factory preferred to enrol not in the factory cell, but in a street cell, since here the danger of reprisals was less: everywhere street cells tended to slip back into the pattern of the old local organizations.¹ But the resolution of the conference marked an unavowed retreat. Street cells were now admitted, side by side with factory cells, not merely as transitional or subsidiary forms of organization, but in their own right:

It is imperative to form street cells in party organizations where they have not yet been created, relieving factory-workshop cells of the excess of members who ought not to belong to the factory cells, but to be organized in street cells. On the other hand, those party members who ought not to be in the street cells (such categories as building and transport workers, unemployed, etc.) should be transferred from the street cells to the factory cells.

The resolution was followed by a lengthy "instruction" setting forth in minute detail the structure and functions of factory and street cells and the duties of their members.² On the central apparatus of the parties little emerged that was new. The Italian and German parties were said to draw too sharp a line between political and organizational work. In some unnamed parties the central committee was alleged to usurp too much power at the expense of local organizations, and a warning was given to reduce the size of the central party administration. The resolution of the previous session on the structure of the parties³ was repeated with a few minor amendments, but was now followed by long and detailed instructions, in which particular importance was attached to the trade union sections of the central committees.⁴

The sixth enlarged plenum of IKKI recorded in its general resolution the conviction that "the system of reorganization of of March 1925 (*Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), pp. 96-97); see also the letter from the organization department of September 26, 1925, in *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 18-19 (where the cells are, as often, called "nuclei").

¹ *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), pp. 8, 16-17.

² *Ibid.* pp. 33-76; the resolution is also in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 572-577.

³ See p. 927 above.

⁴ *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), pp. 91-119.

the parties on the basis of factory-workshop cells has entirely justified itself".¹ But it also confirmed the resolution of the organization conference, which sanctioned the dual system of cell and street organization on an apparently equal footing. In view of the lead taken by KIM in the question of cell organization, the conclusions of the session of IKKIM which immediately followed the enlarged IKKI in March 1926 were significant. A resolution was adopted formally endorsing the decisions of the two organization conferences of IKKI of March 1925 and February 1926. But the resolution on organization sounded a muted note of regret :

The present status of cell work and of reorganization must be described as critical. The reorganization which was begun in almost all countries after the fourth congress, and which more or less reached its climax at the time of the last session of the enlarged IKKIM, has come to a halt everywhere and to a large extent regressed. At present individual leagues have only isolated cells which lead a weak existence side by side with the old territorial organizations.

France, Italy, China and Bulgaria were named as countries "in which *partial* reorganization has been achieved". The resolution went on to enunciate a principle :

It is wrong to regard street cells as an evil to be avoided as far as possible. It can now be positively stated that no league can afford to dispense with street cells. . . . From the formal point of view the street cell is of course on a par with the factory cell, since our organization cannot have second-class members. . . . Nevertheless, the centre of our work must lie in the factory cells.²

The last note of consolation scarcely masked the character of the resolution as an epitaph on the bold claims of the factory cell as the unique unit of organization.

In Comintern, where the campaign for cell organization had never been conducted so whole-heartedly or pressed so far as in

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 554 ; Bordiga alone openly attacked the principle of cell organization on the ground that it separated the workers from the intellectuals (*Shestoi Rasshjrennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 112).

² *Beschlüsse und Resolutionen des Plenums des Exekutiv-Komitees der KJl, März 1926* (1926), pp. 10-12.

KIM, the retreat was more gradual and attended by fewer regrets. But, after March 1926, the attempt to "Bolshevize" the parties by substituting factory for territorial units of organization faded away ; and, while factory cells existed and continued to exist, in none of the major parties had the territorial basis been broken up. The attempt of Comintern, in western Europe and in the United States, to insist on forms of organization suitable for underground parties in revolutionary conditions had been a direct challenge to democratic and parliamentary traditions which were deeply rooted in these countries, even among the workers. It was also difficult to reconcile with the policy simultaneously inculcated by Comintern on these parties of the peaceful infiltration of other Left-wing parties, of the formation of united fronts with them and of the utilization of democratic and parliamentary procedures to further their aims. The type of organization which fitted underground revolutionary tactics was fatal to the tactics of parliamentary democracy. But behind this incompatibility of methods was concealed a still more embarrassing incompatibility of aims : to promote world revolution and to rally to the defence of the Soviet Union in a hostile capitalist environment. This unconfessed incompatibility of both aims and procedures led — in the matter of cell organization, as in many others — to paper solutions which could not be realized in practice, and ended in mutual frustration and in political sterility.

CHAPTER 44

AUXILIARY BODIES

THE period 1924-1926, which was the culminating point in the campaign for the united front in Comintern and in the trade unions, also called for particular attention to the auxiliary organizations formed on a non-party basis, but directly or indirectly under Comintern auspices. The third congress of Comintern in 1921, which first proclaimed the slogan "To the Masses", noted the inadequacy in most of the legal communist parties of "the day-to-day party work" of party members; and it was suggested that "consumer cooperatives, organizations of victims of the war, educational leagues, scientific groups, sports clubs, dramatic clubs, etc." might serve as "conductors" of party influence.¹ It was now emphasized that "day-to-day" work designed to reach the masses could not consist simply of party work or of the recruitment of workers into the party. Work on a broader front was required.

Auxiliary organizations [said Zinoviev at the fourteenth Russian party congress in December 1925] sometimes play, in comparison with other organizations working directly and openly for the goal set by us, an enormous positive rôle as organizations of an auxiliary, subordinate character in our great struggle. All our tactics in the present period come back to this.²

In his speech at the sixth enlarged IKKI in the following March Zinoviev noted that "in recent years we have been able to rely on a number of non-party organizations which have yielded substantial advantage to the international workers' movement", and thought that this work should be extended.³ Kuusinen, who

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 203, 210.

² *XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)* (1926), p. 678.

³ *Shestoi Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 439.

introduced a resolution on work among the masses, spoke of creating "a whole solar system of organizations and minor committees round the communist party — of minor committees which would be under the effective influence of the party, but not under its mechanical leadership";¹ and the resolution laid down the general principles for such organizations:

A very important form of organization for strengthening communist influence over the masses are *mass organizations* of sympathizers, created for the fulfilment of special tasks. These organizations may occupy a position of autonomous dependence, or be independent. In respect of these organizations the most elastic forms of organization should be chosen: side by side with individual membership, collective membership should as a rule also be permitted.²

Of these organizations Profintern — the only one of them which was distinctively proletarian — was the largest and most independent, and sometimes seemed to rival Comintern itself in importance. The other auxiliary bodies were composed, to a greater or lesser degree, of non-proletarian elements; some of them were ostensibly non-political. But all served the common purpose of drawing the masses of non-party workers, and sympathizers from other social strata, into the orbit of Comintern on a broad platform of support for the Soviet Union.

(a) *The Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern)*

The Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern) was in the nineteen-twenties by far the most powerful and important of the auxiliary organizations which gravitated round Comintern. It was, indeed, the only one which could claim some independence, and was more than a mere subsidiary organ. This independence was due partly to the fact that the Russian national organ which constituted the Russian section of Profintern — the trade union central council — was too weak to impose its will on the Russian delegates responsible for directing the international institution, who, like those responsible for Comintern policy, took their

¹ *Shestoi Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 486.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v. Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 571.

instructions direct from the party and from its Politburo. It was due partly to the large organization of Profintern, and its extensive representation abroad, in which it far surpassed any other of the auxiliaries. It was due partly to the accidental circumstance which obliged it, little more than a year after its foundation, to proclaim, under French pressure, its formal dissociation from Comintern. It was due, most of all, to the predominant part necessarily played by the international trade union movement in the grand design of a world-wide proletarian revolution, especially when the success of this revolution was seen to depend not on a single victorious coup, but on the gradual wooing and winning over of the organized working class. In all these respects Profintern was unique among the auxiliary organizations of Comintern. Under the statute adopted by the first congress in July 1921,¹ the sovereign body of Profintern was the congress, to which trade unions affiliated to Profintern sent delegates in a fixed ratio to the number of their members. Between sessions of congresses, provision was made for meetings of a "central council" (the counterpart of the enlarged IKKI in Comintern), which differed in practice from congresses only in the smaller number of delegates and lower ratio of delegates to trade union membership.² The effective organ of Profintern was the executive bureau. The executive bureau of Mezhsovprof as constituted in 1920³ consisted of seven members, and was taken over in this form in article 5 of the first statute of Profintern. The revised statute adopted at the second congress in 1922 provided for an executive bureau of 15, though only 13 were in fact elected,⁴ and of these only five or

¹ For the text see *Resolutionen, Manifeste, Statuten und Aufrufe des ersten Kongresses der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), pp. 70-76; the text of the statute in *Desyat' Let Profinterna v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), pp. 272-276, includes amendments adopted at the second congress in 1922, though not later changes, which were apparently not treated as formal amendments.

² The ratios both for the congress and for the central council were fixed in arts. 4 and 5 of the revised statute approved by the second congress in 1922 (*Beschlüsse und Resolutionen des 2. Internationalen Kongresses der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (1923), p. 47).

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 207.

⁴ *Beschlüsse und Resolutionen des 2. Internationalen Kongresses der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (1923), pp. 47-48; Russia had three seats, and Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, Scandinavia, Poland, Australia, the Balkans, Czechoslovakia, Spain and the East one each. For the list of the 13 elected see *Byulleten' II Kongressa Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1922), p. 157.

six remained in Moscow and regularly attended its meetings.¹ The third congress in July 1924 increased the membership of the executive bureau to 25 with 31 candidates,² thus converting it, like the full IKKI or like the central committee of the Russian party, from an executive organ into a deliberative assembly. The day-to-day affairs of the organization were in the hands of a secretariat headed, after the first congress of 1921, by Lozovsky, Kalnin and Nin.³ At the second congress in December 1922, Kalnin was replaced by Tomsky.⁴

The anomalous status of Profintern made its relations with Comintern a point of particular interest. Article 10 of the original statute of 1921 prescribed that, "for the purpose of establishing a close and uninterrupted connexion" between the two organizations, Profintern was to designate three representatives to IKKI, hold joint sessions with IKKI on questions of common concern and issue joint appeals with Comintern as circumstances might demand. After the decision of the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922 to sever this formal link between them,⁵ the revised statute of December 1922 abandoned the three-man representation of Profintern in IKKI, and provided that, "for the purpose of coordinating the struggle of all the revolutionary organizations", the executive bureau of Profintern might, "if circumstances require", hold joint sessions with IKKI, issue joint appeals and appoint action committees *ad hoc* to carry out joint decisions.⁶ Except for the insignificant distinction that these activities were now optional and not mandatory, no change of

¹ *L'Activité de l'ISR : Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 380-381.

² *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), p. 333.

³ *L'Activité de l'ISR : Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), p. 381; Tomsky was at this time in disgrace (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 2, pp. 324-325).

⁴ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 12 (23), December 1922, p. 903; for information about the departments into which the secretariat was divided see *ibid.* No. 4 (15), April 1922, p. 318; *L'Activité de l'ISR : Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), p. 381.

⁵ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 460-461.

⁶ For the statutes of 1921 and 1922 see p. 939, note 1 above. The text of the revised statute in *Desyat' Let Profintern v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), pp. 272-276, cites the original version in a footnote — perhaps as an indication that the change was made reluctantly under CGTU pressure; this is the only case where the original version is cited as a footnote to the amended text.

substance had been made. A standing action committee consisting of three representatives of Comintern and three of Profintern was at once set up, and held 20 meetings in the eighteen months between the second and third congresses of Profintern.¹ By way of counterpart, the third enlarged IKKI in June 1923 laid it down that "the work of communists in trade unions must proceed in complete conformity with the resolutions and decisions of the Red International of Trade Unions", and that communist parties must ensure that "the proletariat, organized in trade unions, should unite under the banner of the Red International of Trade Unions".² At the third congress in July 1924 Lozovsky attempted to reply to the charge that the amendments to the statute had been an empty formality, that "wool was pulled over the eyes of the French delegation, and everything remained as before". He dismissed the charge as "pettiness" and "idle talk"; but his real defence was that no change had been possible. The communist parties provided the ideological leadership of the revolutionary trade unions, and this made the inter-dependence of Profintern and Comintern inevitable. The anarcho-syndicalists, he added, would never "drive a wedge" between the two organizations.³ At the sixth enlarged IKKI of February-March 1926 Lozovsky maintained that anarcho-syndicalist opposition to collaboration between Profintern and Comintern had been overcome, declaring such collaboration to be necessary "in the interests of the working class".⁴ Though no formal link existed between IKKI and the executive bureau of Profintern, Lozovsky was elected a candidate member of IKKI at the fifth congress of Comintern in 1924, and was a member of the presidium of IKKI after the sixth enlarged plenum of February-March 1926.⁵ On the other hand some traces of the formal divorce remained. Whereas the Communist Youth International sent full voting delegates to congresses of Comintern, the delegates of Profintern,

¹ *L'Activité de l'ISR : Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 119-120.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 379.

³ *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), pp. 26-28.

⁴ *Shestoi Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 217.

⁵ A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominterna* (1929), pp. 111, 145.

like those of the lesser auxiliary organizations, appeared only in a consultative capacity.¹

The representation of Profintern abroad was organized through four bureaus or secretariats — the Central European bureau, the British bureau, the Balkan (or Balkan and Danubian) secretariat, and the Latin bureau — to which was later added an eastern bureau.² The first, and most elaborate, of these organizations was the Central European bureau established in Berlin, which seems to have existed since the earliest days of Profintern. On February 8, 1922, the executive bureau in Moscow decided to limit the membership of the Berlin bureau to three, and to ask the trade union department of the KPD (which evidently appointed at least one of these members) to replace Walcher by another nominee.³ Apart from maintaining liaison between Profintern and the trade union department of the KPD, the principal function of the bureau was to superintend the publication and distribution of the large volume of Profintern literature in German, as well as of the bulletins of the International Propaganda Committees: it also issued a monthly bulletin of its own.⁴ In 1925, the activities of the Central European bureau were said to embrace, in addition to Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary.⁵ The British bureau in London apparently took the place of spontaneously organized local groups in 1922, but was abolished in 1924, being merged in the machinery of the NMM.⁶ The Balkan bureau, after an initial period of activity, was taken over by the Bulgarian party and ceased to have any independent existence. The decision to set up a Latin bureau in Paris, to cover activities in France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Latin America, was apparently taken at the second congress of Profintern in December 1922.⁷ In 1923 it was largely concerned in the crisis in the affairs of the CGTU and of its relations with

¹ See, for example, the records of the fifth congress in *Pyaty Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 259-260.

² For the eastern bureau see pp. 607-608 above.

³ *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 4 (15), April 1922, p. 315.

⁴ *L'Activité de l'ISR: Rapport pour III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 403-406.

⁵ *Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 15, July 2, 1925, p. 22.

⁶ See p. 133, note 3 above.

⁷ The fullest account of this bureau is in *L'Activité de l'ISR: Rapport pour le III^e Congrès* (n.d. [1924]), pp. 398-403.

the PCF.¹ Among other routine functions, the Latin bureau was charged with supervising the publication and distribution of Profintern literature in French. This, though a good deal was published, was less copious than the material in German; and in 1926 France was named as the most backward of the principal countries in the matter of Profintern publications.² Outside France, Belgium was the most important field for the activities of the Latin bureau. Here, with the assistance of the CGTU, an action committee was set up to coordinate the work of independent trade unions or of Left-wing minorities in unions affiliated to the Belgian Labour Party, and of the trade union department of the Belgian Communist Party.³

The foreign bureaus of Profintern functioned for the most part as semi-clandestine bodies (in some cases, this was a necessary precaution), and no public reports on their activities were issued. The resolution of the third session of the central council in June 1923 emphasized the supreme rôle of the executive bureau in Moscow, and the subordination of the foreign bureaus to it :

The executive bureau shall determine the composition and the extent of the competence of these bureaus, and ensure that these organs do not exceed the prescribed limits in propaganda, agitation, liaison and information. Each bureau shall perform its work under the direct control of the executive bureau and in conformity with the directions of the latter; it may expand the field of its work only if the executive bureau deems it necessary.⁴

On the other hand care was taken to insist on the limited character of their functions. The Profintern bureau in a foreign country, said Lozovsky at the same session, was "an organ for propaganda, for the settlement of conflicts", but "the organ which carries on the struggle must arise organically within the given country".⁵ Friction between the bureaus and the trade union sections of the

¹ See p. 140, note 3 above.

² *IV Sessiya Tsentral'nogo Soveta Krasnogo Internatsionala Profsoyuzov* (1926), p. 15.

³ *Mezhdunarodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie*, No. 31, September 8, 1923, p. 4; No. 9 (55), March 1, 1924, p. 9; for the affiliation of the Belgian Knights of Labour to Profintern in October 1923 see p. 540 above.

⁴ *Bericht über die 3. Session des Zentralrats der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (1923), p. 81 (for the instructions issued at this time to the British bureau see p. 122 above).

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 65.

parties or the party cells in trade unions was an obvious danger. To steer a middle course between dictation from Moscow on the one hand and toleration of erroneous policies on the other was an always delicate task.

(b) *International Workers' Aid (MRP)*

The institution called the International Workers' Aid (Mezh-rabpom or MRP, known in German as Internationale Arbeiter-hilfe (IAH), or in English as Workers' International Relief) had its beginning in an organization founded in Berlin in September 1921 for the purpose of bringing relief to famine-stricken Russia.¹ The resolution of the fourth congress of Comintern in November–December 1922 distinguished between the political and economic aspects of “proletarian aid to Soviet Russia”:

The best support for Soviet Russia in the economic struggle is the revolutionary political struggle of the workers, their intensified pressure on the government of every single country, pressure accompanied by the demand to recognize the Soviet Government and establish favourable commercial relations with Soviet Russia. In view, however, of the significance which Soviet Russia has for every worker, it is important, apart from political power, to mobilize also the whole economic power of the world proletariat in support of Soviet Russia.

The same resolution, referring to the need to create for this purpose “special societies and committees . . . like those set up by the Workers' Aid”, declared that these should be “brought under the control of the Communist International”.² But, while the formal recognition of MRP as an auxiliary of Comintern was eventually achieved, its success in collecting extensive funds in many countries, its propaganda appeal to wide circles both of workers and of intellectuals, its efficiency in organizing practical relief, the multifarious activities in which it engaged and the administrative and diplomatic skill of Münzenberg, its director, combined to give it a unique status of independence. Almost alone among the auxiliary organizations, it retained its head-

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 404–405.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 327–328.

quarters abroad, and escaped the day-to-day control of the Comintern bureaucracy; its executive committee and general secretariat were located in Berlin.

An important landmark in the development of MRP was a congress held in Berlin in June 1923, at which it received its formal name and its organization as a federation of societies, committees or branches in different countries. How widely the net had been cast was shown by the simultaneous presence at the congress of Krestinsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, Löbe, the president of the German Reichstag, and Ruth Fry, the representative of the British Society of Friends. The moment was propitious. The French occupation of the Ruhr had disposed even German social-democrats to turn a more favourable eye eastward: and the proceedings passed off in an atmosphere of harmony and good will. Nevertheless, this seems to have been the first occasion on which MRP incurred the suspicion of being an organ of Bolshevik propaganda: the German Minister for the Interior is said to have refused visas to certain would-be delegates on this ground.¹ The Japanese earthquake of September 1923 gave MRP an opportunity to render aid in another natural calamity comparable with the Russian famine, and to extend its growing influence to the Far East.² The next significant step was the organization of relief to German workers and their families in the winter of hunger and hardship 1923-1924 — the sequel of the Ruhr strike, of the inflation and of the disturbances of the autumn of 1923. But this campaign had, almost inevitably, a more outspokenly political character than its predecessors. The conference which launched it in Berlin in December 1923 was the last at which social-democrats participated in the work of MRP, and was the occasion of widespread attacks in the press.³

The fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924 continued to describe MRP as "a non-political, non-party, proletarian relief organization", and denounced the German social-democrats who had sought "to cast suspicion on it and to sabotage it".⁴

¹ W. Münzenberg, *Solidarität* (1931), pp. 164-166, 194.

² *Ibid.* pp. 235-238.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 167-169; for the details of the relief see *ibid.* pp. 238-266.

⁴ *Thesen und Resolutionen des V. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924), pp. 158-159.

But the third congress of Profintern a few days later referred to MRP and MOPR as "auxiliary organizations" created by the working class in its struggle against capitalism.¹ The congress of MRP in October 1924, though not yet exclusively communist, took a turn to the political Left: greetings from Purcell, Lansbury and Cook in Great Britain suggested an association with the minority movement in the British trade unions. Münzenberg in his speech to the congress said that, whereas the policy had hitherto been to bring relief to everyone who was hungry, "the support of the economically struggling workers has, during the past half year, come more and more into the foreground", and that this would be the test for "many of our friends" and for their relation to MRP. The British delegate was reported as stressing "the significance of MRP in the process of transforming the consciousness of the English workers into a class ideology".² The same character marked the campaign for aid to China, launched after the shootings in Shanghai on May 30, 1925, and culminating in a mass meeting in Berlin on August 16, 1925, presided over by the veteran USPD leader, Ledebour. In advance of the meeting, the central committee of MRP announced that a million gold marks had been collected to aid Chinese strikers, out of which 800,000 came from the USSR.³ The meeting, in addition to publicizing the need for aid to the persecuted Chinese workers, discussed such questions as "the significance of the Chinese struggle for the world political and world economic situation" and "the sabotage of the Amsterdammers" (who had returned the standard refusal to a proposal of joint action), and ended with the slogan, addressed to the imperialist governments, "Hands Off China". The meeting was commonly referred to in the literature on the subject as "the 'Hands off China' congress". When Cook delivered an impassioned speech in support of trade union unity, somebody objected that this had "nothing to do with the tasks of MRP"; but the objection was probably based not so much on grounds of principle as

¹ *Desyat' Let Profintern v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), p. 139; for MOPR see pp. 949-952 below.

² W. Münzenberg, *Solidarität* (1931), pp. 169-173.

³ The *communiqué* of July 27, 1925, giving this information is reprinted in *Mezhdunarodnaya Solidarnost' Trudyashchikhsya, 1924-1927* (1959), pp. 107-108.

on the dislike of many Germans for this particular cause.¹

By this time MRP was a highly organized and well managed enterprise engaged in an extensive range of humanitarian, political, economic and cultural activities. In 1924 it had acquired a statute which established it as an international union of national organizations for aid to the workers, with a world congress meeting annually, a central committee and a general secretary. Though the statute made no mention of Comintern or of communist parties, it contained a clause recognizing that, "since Russia as the first workers' state is the strongest support of the workers of the whole world", MRP had a special obligation to accord "the most far-reaching support to the economic development of Soviet Russia".² A programme dating from the autumn of 1925 described MRP as "firmly united and intimately linked with Soviet Russia".³ Formal separation was, however, the rule. Communist parties were instructed not to set up special sections under their central committees for work in MRP and MOPR and not to attempt to replace the managements of these organizations: influence over them should be exercised only through the party fractions in them.⁴ But the extent of communist influence in MRP was difficult to disguise; a German police circular which came into the hands of the *Rote Fahne* described it as "a cloak for the illegal activity of the German Communist Party".⁵ Official persecution was reinforced by the hostility of socialists and social-democrats. The secretariat of the revised Second International, in its report to the Marseilles congress of the organization in August 1925, warned its members against both MRP and MOPR, describing MRP as a "branch office" of Comintern.⁶ The Belgian social-democrats prohibited members of the party or of social-democratic trade unions from belonging

¹ Numerous documents of the campaign and reports of the congress are in W. Münzenberg, *Fünf Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe* (1926), pp. 104-120; *id. Solidarität* (1931), pp. 173-183, 269-270; for Cook's intervention see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 129, September 8, 1925, pp. 1890-1891. For some contemporary sidelights see also *ibid.* No. 136, September 29, 1925, p. 1989.

² For the programme and statute see W. Münzenberg, *Fünf Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe* (1926), pp. 20-22, 31-33.

³ *Zweite Organisationskonferenz des EKKI* (1926), p. 106.

⁴ *Izvestiya*, October 30, 1924.

⁵ *Second Congress of the Labour and Socialist International* (n.d. [1925]), p.

to either organization.¹ In the summer of 1926, Münzenberg claimed that MRP had sections in all the countries of Europe and North America, as well as in Argentina, Australia, South Africa, India, China and Japan, with a total membership of 15 millions, and had collected not less than 40 million gold marks in five years.²

The expansion of membership had brought a corresponding extension of activities. The operations of MRP in the Soviet Union had developed from the initial purpose of famine relief in its most direct forms — supplies of food and drugs, soup kitchens, children's homes — into the establishment of model farms with imported tractors and of colonies of workers come from abroad to settle in the workers' state and contribute to its productive resources.³ The appeal to the intellectuals had always had a prominent place in Münzenberg's programme; and much attention was given to cultural activities of all kinds. Propaganda through the cinema was highly developed. In the spring of 1923 an institution called Proletkino was founded in Moscow by Russian trade unions and workers' organizations "with the help of the Communist International and Profintern". It began by making films for distribution in the Soviet Union, but by the end of 1923 it established foreign contacts, and in the first half of 1924 sent seven films to North America, the Scandinavian countries and China.⁴ Münzenberg threw himself with his usual energy and enterprise into this work. In 1925 he published a widely circulated pamphlet under the title *Conquer the Film*. Proletkino was at this time partially operated by MRP, and was said to have produced twenty films which had been shown in Europe and in the United

¹ *Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress* (1928), p. 196.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 110, August 31, 1926, pp. 1862-1863.

³ In August 1925 a delegation of "the British section of the Workers' International Relief" visited the Soviet Union and inspected a number of enterprises ranging from a children's home in Kazan to farms in the Urals managed by a concern known as Traktor-Mezhrabpom; its arrival was featured in *Pravda*, August 14, 1925, and its report issued as a pamphlet (*The Work of the Workers' International Relief in the USSR* (1925)). For Fritz Platten's account of his arrival in 1924 with 20 Swiss families to take possession of a Sovkhoz of 6000 desyatins in Siberia with aid from MRP, see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 92, June 9, 1925, pp. 1253-1254.

⁴ *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 106.

States.¹ It would be difficult to assess the relative weight of the various motives animating those who worked for MRP and gave it their support. Sympathy and enthusiasm for the Soviet Union, and indignation at the hostile attitude of western governments and of other political parties towards it, were the link between them. In the nineteen-twenties these feelings were sincere and widespread in many countries ; and of the institutions which provided forms of collective expression for them MRP was for a long period the most active and most successful.

(c) *International Red Aid (MOPR)*

The International Organization for Aid to Revolutionaries (MOPR), more commonly known abroad as the Rote Hilfe or International Red Aid, owed its origin to a Polish initiative. On August 23, 1922, the *Trybuna Komunistyczna*, the organ of the Polish bureau of the central committee of the Russian party, published an appeal on behalf of victims of the bourgeois terror in Poland. Markhlevsky seems to have been the moving spirit and became president of a committee set up to collect donations. Among other Poles prominent in the Russian party who signed the appeal were Dzerzhinsky, Ganetsky, Kon and Unshlikht. Presently the help of the Society of Old Bolsheviks was enlisted. A joint organization was set up, and donations were collected in the RSFSR and in the Ukrainian and White Russian republics.² These efforts received the endorsement of the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922, which decided on the establishment of a permanent organization.³ Immediately after the congress, a central bureau was established consisting of representatives of the Society of Old Bolsheviks and of Kolarov, representing the secretariat of Comintern ; and this was quickly expanded, by the addition of delegates of Germany, France, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland and Lithuania, into an enlarged bureau, which held its first meeting on December 17, 1922. The enlarged bureau laid down a programme of which the principal

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 128, September 4, 1925, p. 1874.

² This account comes from an article in *Pravda*, March 17, 1926.

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 405. The name International Class War Prisoners' Aid was confined to Great Britain ; in the United States it was known as the Council for the Defence of Labor ; in Poland, by an odd anomaly, as the Polish Political Red Cross.

items were the launching of an appeal for funds in Soviet Russia, the establishment of contact with the operations of MRP abroad and the care of political refugees coming to Soviet Russia.¹ Its first appeal for funds, dated December 29, 1922, was addressed to party and trade union organs and to individuals in the Soviet Union. In the following month, it began to appeal to Red Aid organizations throughout the world, naming March 18, the anniversary of the Paris commune, as a special day for relief collections.² Its organization was completed by the setting up of an executive committee on March 2, 1923, with Markhlevsky as president and Kolarov as representative of IKKI.³

The first comprehensive operation undertaken by MOPR was apparently an appeal made in October 1923 on behalf of the victims of the "white terror" which followed the abortive Bulgarian rising of the previous month;⁴ and, as time went on, such campaigns were multiplied in frequency and in intensity. The first all-union conference of MOPR, which was attended by 50 delegates from different parts of the Soviet Union, and was addressed by Zinoviev, met in Moscow on January 30, 1924.⁵ The fifth congress of Comintern, referring to MOPR as a "non-party organization", instructed communist parties to give it every kind of support and to promote the formation of sections in their respective countries.⁶ On July 14-16, 1924, following the Comintern congress, MOPR held its first international conference. It was attended by 108 delegates, two-thirds of them from sections outside the Soviet Union. It issued a declaration promising aid "in this period of gloomy capitalist reaction" to "imprisoned and persecuted fighters for the revolution"; passed resolutions on work among the peasants, and among women, and on aid to political refugees; and laid down the outlines of its own organization, based on the usual pattern of congress, executive committee and presidium, with the central committees of national

¹ *Pravda*, December 16, 19, 1922.

² *Ten Years of International Red Aid* (Moscow, n.d. [1932]), pp. 13-15, 100-102.

³ *Pravda*, March 17, 1926.

⁴ *Ten Years of International Red Aid* (Moscow, n.d. [1932]), p. 112.

⁵ *Pravda*, February 2, 1924.

⁶ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933); pp. 460-462; for a report on its progress up to this time see *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), pp. 89-93.

sections reporting to the executive committee.¹ A meeting of the presidium was held immediately after the conference to appoint a secretariat.²

The year 1925, which witnessed a broad development of the policy of winning sympathy for the Soviet cause through mass organizations of a non-party character, was a period of rapid expansion of the activities of MOPR. It was also marked by a shift in emphasis from the humanitarian to the political aspects of MOPR (though the latter had never been absent). At the sixth Soviet trade union congress in November 1924, a delegate of MOPR described it as being "not a philanthropic organization, not a neutral organization like your trade unions, but a political organization".³ In December 1924, a "MOPR week" was organized in Moscow to protest against the "white terror" and to organize help for its victims.⁴ At the fifth enlarged IKKI in March-April 1925 Marty invited communist parties to make use of MOPR "to excite the hatred of the workers against capitalist governments employing methods of repression, with the advantage also of defending our comrades whom they are in process of murdering"; and the resolution spoke of MOPR as "an important factor in winning over to the movement the largest possible number of non-party workers in order to educate them in the spirit of proletarian solidarity".⁵ A conference of MOPR, held simultaneously with the enlarged IKKI, noted that its sections were subjected to government repression in Yugoslavia, Poland and Austria.⁶ Later in the same month, the conference of the International Peasant Council adopted a resolution which, claiming that MOPR already had more than five million members, exhorted "the peasants of the whole world, following the example of the peasant men and women of the USSR, to join in their masses the ranks of MOPR".⁷ In May 1925, Zinoviev addressed

¹ For accounts of the conference see *Pravda*, July 15, 16, 18, 1924; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 97, July 29, 1924, pp. 1260-1261; for the resolutions, *Ten Years of International Red Aid* (Moscow, n.d. [1932]), pp. 15-16, 34-36, 56-59, 156-157.

² *Pravda*, July 19, 1924.

³ *Shestoi S"ezd Professional'nykh Soyuzov SSSR* (1925), p. 421.

⁴ *Pravda*, December 2, 1924.

⁵ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 445-446, 578-579.

⁶ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 73, May 5, p. 983.

⁷ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1925, p. 167.

the first all-union congress (the session of January 1924 had only been a conference) of the Soviet section of MOPR in Moscow. He contrasted "the former Red Cross" with MOPR, which was a "communist organization":

MOPR is not a philanthropical organization, not a charitable institution; it must look upon itself as one of the links in the international proletarian movement. The executive committee of Comintern regards MOPR as one of its links and, moreover, as one of its most important links.¹

At the trial in Berlin in February 1925 of OGPU agents, MOPR was said to fabricate false papers for persons wanted on political charges to enable them to escape arrest.² Among the papers seized by the British police in the raid on CPGB headquarters in the autumn of 1925 was a letter from the secretariat of MOPR to the central committee of the CPGB of September 14, 1925, defining the functions of the organization:

The MOPR [ran the letter] is not established merely to assist prisoners and their families, but has definite political objectives:

- (1) the increasing of the class-consciousness of the masses;
- (2) the "internationalization" of the masses;
- (3) the creation of a wide non-party organization which shall draw into its ranks large masses of workers united on a *political* objective — the defeat of the white terror — i.e. the overthrow of capitalism.³

MOPR had not yet reached the dimensions and scope attained by it in later years. But its main lines of its activity were well established in this period.

(d) *The Peasant International (Krestintern)*

The Peasant International (Krestintern) was founded in October 1923 at a moment when the Bulgarian fiasco had revealed the importance of seeking the cooperation of peasant parties in countries where they enjoyed actual or potential political influence. Its organization and its journal *Krest'yanskii Internatsional* dated

¹ *Pravda*, May 19, 1925; the same issue also reported a meeting of the German section of MOPR in Berlin, attended by 250 delegates of whom 129 were members of the KPD.

² A. Brandt, *Der Tscheka-Prozess* (1925), p. 56; for this trial see p. 268 above.

³ *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), p. 107.

only from the following spring; and its most conspicuous, though short-lived, success was the recruiting to its ranks of Radič and the Croat Peasant Party in June 1924.¹ A resolution of the fifth congress of Comintern a few days later² had given it official support. But the defection of Radič weakened its prestige; no other peasant party was tempted to join it; and Krestintern visibly languished. Early in 1925 its journal, after a silence of three months, published a manifesto explaining or excusing the difficulties which had prevented the convening of a second congress, and announcing a session of its executive organ, the International Peasant Council, in the near future.³ But, before this could happen, the fifth enlarged IKKI held its session in March–April 1925, and illustrated the small regard felt for Krestintern even in Comintern circles which were preoccupied with the problem of the peasant. Bukharin, in his exhaustive report on the measures taken throughout the world to organize the peasantry in the interests of the bourgeois ruling class and the counter-measures necessary to convert it to the revolutionary cause, found no occasion to mention Krestintern:⁴ neither Bela Kun nor Varga, nor Dombal, its acting head, referred to it. Boškovič, the Yugoslav delegate, himself a worker in Krestintern, spoke in passing of the attempt in the Balkans to create “fighting organizations affiliated to the International Peasant Council”, but made no claim that these attempts had met with success. He attributed the weakness of Krestintern to the fact that (unlike most of the other auxiliary organizations of Comintern) it had no corresponding sections or departments attached to the apparatus of communist parties.⁵ It was left for a Russian delegate, Meshcheryakov, to complain openly of the neglect shown

¹ See *The Interregnum, 1923–1924*, pp. 198–199.

² See p. 87 above.

³ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 1–2, January–February 1925, pp. 3–6. In subsequent literature the founding congress of October 1923 is usually referred to as a “conference”, and the International Peasant Council rather than the Peasant International itself is named as the substantive body (in A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Komintern* (1929), p. 368, it is listed as *Mezhdunarodnyi Krest'yanskii Sovet* (Krest'yanskii Internatsional)); this terminological revision indicated a deflation of initially exaggerated ambitions.

⁴ For this report see p. 309 above.

⁵ Peasant sections had been formed in communist youth organizations in France, Italy and Mexico (*Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 1–2, January–February 1926, pp. 91–96).

both for the non-party peasant and for the International Peasant Council.¹ Thanks perhaps to these mild protests, the resolution on the peasant question, which in other respects loosely followed the lines of Bukharin's report, contained a clause inviting communist parties to encourage the adhesion of peasant organizations to the International Peasant Council and to promote its growth and development.²

Three days after the adjournment of the enlarged IKKI, on April 9, 1925, what was variously described as the second plenum of Krestintern, or the second enlarged plenum of the International Peasant Council, opened its session with speeches from Kalinin and Dombal, and sat for more than a week. In all, 78 delegates from 39 countries attended, including 49 of the 52 regular members of the council. Its main resolution defined the "fundamental task" of its supporters as being to assist "the liberation of the toiling peasantry from the influence and leadership of the landowners, the *kulaks* and the bourgeoisie". Taking its cue from the tactics now employed in the reformist trade unions, it recommended its adherents to enter existing peasant organizations and attempt to win them over to the platform of Krestintern, forming separate organizations only "if reactionary elements render a split inevitable". Of the delegates present seven came from Asian countries; Egypt and Algeria were also represented. Whereas the council had hitherto felt itself too weak to work in colonial countries, it now embarked on a more ambitious programme, and addressed an appeal "to the peasants of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Algeria, Palestine, India, China, Korea and Japan, to the negroes of America and Africa and to the peasants and toilers of all countries of the east and of capitalist colonies" to unite against their oppressors.³ It was evidently at this time that the council established contact with the eastern department of IKKI.⁴

¹ *Rasshirennii Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 336-337, 342-343.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 505.

³ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 3-5, March-May 1925, published a brief account of the session (pp. 5-14), the two principal reports (pp. 15-66), and the resolutions (pp. 160-171); the proceedings were also reported in *Pravda*, April 10-12, 14, 18, 1925, and in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 72, May 1, 1925, pp. 967-968; No. 102, June 30, 1925, pp. 1394-1395.

⁴ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 331.

Throughout the autumn of 1925 the presidium of the council remained particularly active, and issued pronouncements from time to time on current questions — against the war in Morocco, in support of the cooperatives, against the danger of war.¹ Floods in Korea in the summer of 1925 were an occasion for Krestintern to organize a campaign for relief, which is said to have inspired friendly articles in the Korean press.² In August 1925 a telegram was sent to the congress of the Second International in Marseilles enquiring whether it would support the struggle of the peoples of the east and of the colonies for liberation, and of eastern workers and peasants against their imperialist oppressors, and whether it would demand the cessation of war in Syria and Morocco and the withdrawal of British and other foreign forces from China.³ These incursions into the general political field suggested that little progress had been made towards realizing the original purposes of Krestintern; Boškovič in an article in *Pravda* stressed the importance of Krestintern in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat for the control of the peasant.⁴ Appeals to the Rumanian Peasant Party and the Rumanian peasants, and a letter of protest to the Hungarian Minister for Agriculture, who was also president of the agrarian party, secured some momentary publicity.⁵ Signs of Left-wing movements among Sardinian or Bavarian peasants were eagerly noted and encouraged.⁶ Zinoviev in his main report to the sixth enlarged IKKI in February 1926 claimed “some achievements — still, it is true, small ones —” for Krestintern, which had “actually succeeded in establishing contact with the peasant movement in various countries”. He instanced the German, Czechoslovak, Swedish, Norwegian, Italian and Polish parties as parties which had begun to “work among the peasantry”.⁷ But the vagueness of these claims did not inspire confidence. When shortly afterwards Dombal, the acting head of Krestintern, wrote an

¹ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 6-7, June-July 1925, pp. 120-122, 127-133; No. 8-9, August-September 1925, pp. 5-9.

² *Pravda*, October 9, 1925.

³ *Ibid.* August 27, 1925; the enquiries presumably remained without an answer.

⁴ *Ibid.* September 27, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.* October 1, 3, 7, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.* October 7, 1925; March 14, 1926.

⁷ *Shestoi Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 53.

account of it for a Comintern handbook, the only foreign organizations enumerated as belonging to it were Mexican and Mongolian peasant leagues, the peasant organization of Kuomintang, small Italian, German and French peasant unions and the Canadian Farmers' Party of Saskatchewan.¹ After 1925 no further formal sessions of the council were held, and interest in Krestintern seems to have been everywhere on the wane.²

The one effective and durable creation of Krestintern was the International Agrarian Institute in Moscow for the study of agrarian problems throughout the world. This had been projected by the founding congress of Krestintern in 1923.³ In the summer of 1925 an appeal was sent out by the presidium for help in realizing this enterprise; the necessity of counteracting the activities of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, founded in 1905 and now collaborating closely with the League of Nations, was cited as a motive.⁴ Whatever the response to this appeal, an announcement of the early opening of the institute and the text of its statute were published in October 1925.⁵ Its opening ceremony took place on March 8, 1926, during the session of the sixth enlarged IKKI. Dombal, on behalf of the presidium of Krestintern, hailed the institute as "a counterweight to the Rome International Institute of Agriculture, whose fundamental task is to assist in strengthening the power of landlords and capitalists"; its work would be based on the principles of "scientific Marxism", and would aim at supporting "the daily struggle of the toilers for liberation". Others who delivered speeches of welcome were Katayama, Roy and a delegate

¹ *Komintern : Khozyaistvo, Politika i Rabochee Dvizhenie, 1924-27* (1928), pp. 59-60; the core of the organization was said to be formed by the Selskosoyuz of the USSR with 18-20 million members, and the Selskii Gospodar of the Ukraine with 2 millions.

² A paragraph was devoted to it in the report of IKKI to the fifth congress of Comintern in June 1924 (*Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), pp. 94-95); it was not mentioned in the corresponding reports of IKKI in February and November 1926. At the fifteenth Soviet party conference in October-November 1926 Skrypnik observed that Krestintern had "hitherto played a very small rôle, and engaged only to a certain extent in independent activities" (*XV Konferentsiya Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)* (1927), p. 85).

³ See *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, p. 200.

⁴ *Prauda*, August 26, 1925.

⁵ *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 10, October 1925, pp. 92-96.

of China, spokesmen of the Italian and Rumanian peasants and of the Negroes of Africa and America, a professor of Columbia University in New York, and Varga, Lyashchenko and Kondratiev on behalf of various Soviet economic institutions.¹ Varga became director of the new institute, which continued to flourish, and to publish its monthly journal *Agrarnye Problemy*, for nearly ten years.

(e) *The Red Sport International (Sportintern)*

The Red Sport International (KSI or Sportintern) was founded at a conference held in Moscow during the third congress of Comintern in July 1921. At the second congress of Comintern a year earlier, Podvoisky, one of the military specialists of the Russian party, had discussed with some foreign delegates the organization of physical training in Soviet Russia, which was closely associated with Vsevobuch, the system of compulsory physical training of youths in advance of their call-up for military service;² and the idea had been mooted of an international proletarian sport organization as a counterpart to existing bourgeois or social-democratic sport organizations. This plan was realized at the conference of July 1921, which was, however, composed not of representatives of national sport organizations, but of delegates who had come to Moscow for the Comintern congress. The conference issued a manifesto announcing the foundation of a Red Sport International, and elected an executive committee consisting of representatives of Soviet Russia, Germany, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, France, Alsace-Lorraine and Italy, with Podvoisky as president.³ A certain dualism was present from the outset in Sportintern. The declared Soviet membership of five millions was simply the number of those liable for compulsory physical training under the rules of Vsevobuch; no independent

¹ *Agrarnye Problemy*, No. 1, 1927, pp. 174-178; a briefer account of the ceremony appeared in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 73, May 14, 1926, p. 1166.

² For Vsevobuch see Vol. 2, p. 400; for Podvoisky see *ibid.* pp. 381-382.

³ The origins of Sportintern were summarized by Podvoisky in an article in *Pravda*, October 15, 1924; for the proceedings of the conference of July 1921 see *Internationale Jugend-Korrespondenz*, No. 7, April 1, 1922, p. 11.

Soviet sport organizations existed at this time.¹ In other countries, Sportintern was conceived as a nucleus for hitherto non-existent communist sport organizations. In Germany, Czechoslovakia and France workers' sport organizations had grown up under social-democratic or socialist party auspices in opposition to bourgeois sport organizations; and an international body had been created — the so-called Lucerne International — to co-ordinate these activities. But even the French organizations, though said to belong to the Lucerne International, were not yet officially affiliated to it; and in 1922 it represented, in the words of a jealous Czechoslovak delegate, "nothing but the German Workers' Sport Union declaring itself an international organization".²

Formed at a time when united front tactics had already been adopted by Comintern, Sportintern from the first disclaimed any desire to split workers' sport organizations, or to set up a rival centre to the Lucerne International. The second conference or congress of Sportintern, held in Berlin in July 1922,³ resolved to seek close ties with Comintern, KIM and Profintern; and on the occasion of the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922, IKKI decided to appoint a representative to the executive committee of Sportintern. It was reiterated on this occasion that Sportintern was an "independent" organization, admitting all "revolutionary" athletes of whatever political party, though this did not alter the character of Sportintern as a proletarian organization standing on the basis of the class struggle.⁴ But work proceeded slowly. Apparently the only non-Soviet organization to join Sportintern in 1922 was the Czechoslovak Federation of Workers' Gymnastic Leagues, said to represent 100,000 athletes.⁵

Nothing had hitherto been settled about relations between Sportintern and KIM; and this issue gave rise to a sharp controversy at the third congress of KIM which followed the fourth

¹ *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 204-205.

² *Ibid.* p. 196.

³ This was afterwards referred to as the occasion of its "real foundation" (*ibid.* p. 204).

⁴ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 7, March 1923, p. 216; *Bericht der Exekutive der K.I.* 15. Dezember 1922-15. Mai 1923 (1923), p. 17.

⁵ *Malaya Entsiklopediya po Mezhdunarodnomu Profdvizheniyu* (1927), col. 676, which dates the Czechoslovak accession October 1922.

congress of Comintern in December 1922.¹ The *rapporteur* to the congress on workers' sport and gymnastic organizations was the Czechoslovak delegate, Michaleč, whose report² incurred the emphatic disapproval of the Soviet, and of most other, delegates. In the first place, Michaleč sought to extend the functions of Sportintern and of the national organizations composing it to "cultural" as well as to sporting and gymnastic activities, the phrase "physical and intellectual culture" serving to bridge any gap between them; such organizations as workers' temperance societies, or workers' societies of free-thinkers or Esperantists should be encouraged and brought under the aegis of Sportintern.³ Secondly, communist activities were divided by Michaleč into three categories — political, economic and cultural (including sport) — conducted by national party, trade union and cultural organs, united respectively under the aegis of Comintern, Profinintern and Sportintern.⁴ Thirdly, this view was invoked to uphold the doctrine of the independence of cultural and sport organizations, and of Sportintern in particular. In Soviet Russia, as the demobilization of the army clipped the wings of Vseobuch, the Komsomol had stepped into the breach and begun to organize sport and physical training. Separate sport organizations were not created. Michaleč maintained that this precedent had no application outside Soviet Russia, and that it was not the business of the youth leagues elsewhere to encroach on the functions of the

¹ For this congress see pp. 988-989 below.

² *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 191-206.

³ Michaleč in his reply to the debate claimed that the second conference of Sportintern had approved these ideas, and that Podvoisky had raised no objection (*ibid.* p. 216); at the third congress of KIM, Podvoisky rebutted Michaleč's proposals, but in far milder terms than other Soviet delegates (*ibid.* pp. 214-215). The second congress of Comintern in 1920 passed a resolution in support of Esperanto (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 1000), and a World Union of Proletarian Esperantists continued to flourish for some years (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 28, September 4, 1925, pp. 1873-1874). An International of Proletarian Freethinkers came into existence in 1925 (*ibid.* No. 160, December 4, 1925, p. 2411; No. 2, January 5, 1926, pp. 22-23), admitted non-communists to membership (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 159), and for some time had its headquarters in Vienna (A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominterna* (1929), p. 372).

⁴ This conception clearly reflected the view of Proletkult maintained in Soviet Russia by Bogdanov, and pronounced heretical in October 1920 (see vol. 1, pp. 49-51); this must have made it all the more suspect to the Soviet delegates.

sport organizations ; he admitted that " very many cases have occurred in which it has come to a competitive struggle between the two organizations ".¹ The question of the relation of Sportintern to KIM was not specifically raised. A passage in Michaleč's report on which no comment was made by his critics recalled the military associations of the early days of Sportintern. In Czechoslovak sport organizations, he explained, " our comrades have not only to work ideologically, but to perform special tasks for the class struggle by carrying out a systematic preparation for the Red Army, a systematic military preparation of the members " ; and he put forward the view that " communist-directed gymnastic and sport organizations are quite well qualified to introduce into their activities a systematic military preparation of their members ".² Michaleč was evidently aware that his main argument would not win acceptance ; for he ended his report with the proposal that the congress should not attempt to draw up final theses on the subject, but should be content with a resolution referring the question for consideration to the next session of the bureau.³ The speakers who denounced Michaleč's views implicitly acquiesced in this proposal. The resolution adopted by the congress declared it to be the duty of youth leagues to persuade workers now organized in bourgeois sport organizations to abandon these organizations and form themselves into sections of Sportintern, and to form fractions in social-democratic workers' sport organizations for the purpose of winning a majority in them and bringing about their adhesion to Sportintern. Meanwhile the " contentious questions " which had arisen in the discussion were referred to the forthcoming session of the bureau.⁴

When the fourth session of the bureau of KIM met in July 1923, it was content to recommend in general terms support for Sportintern, and for organizations affiliated to it, as " a proletarian class instrument ", but did not raise the contentious issue of the relations with KIM.⁵ The year 1923 was one of great activity for Sportintern. In February 1923 the executive committee, meeting in Moscow, decided to establish a western

¹ *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), p. 204.

² *Ibid.* pp. 198-199.

³ *Ibid.* p. 205.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 277-279.

⁵ *Resolutions and Theses Adopted by the Fourth Bureau Session of the YCI* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 83-95.

European bureau in Berlin in the hope of improving contacts with sport organizations in the west.¹ From this time Sportintern began to make an impact in some western countries. In 1923 the French *Fédération Sportive du Travail* split, and 80 per cent of the clubs affiliated to it joined Sportintern.² Moreover, like Profintern, Sportintern counted among its adherents not only members of national organizations affiliated to it, but minorities in other workers' sport organizations, in which communists had been instructed to remain in pursuance of united front and anti-splitting tactics: outside the Soviet Union the second category was probably larger than the first. At a conference of the Lucerne International held in Zürich in August 1923 a proposal was made to invite Sportintern to send representatives to a conference at Frankfurt in the following spring to organize a "workers' Olympiad". The proposal met with opposition; and a final decision on the invitation was left to a referendum of organizations affiliated to the Lucerne International. When the conference met at Frankfurt in April 1924, Sportintern had not been invited. It transpired that on a count of individual members of sport organizations a large majority supported the admission of Sportintern, but that when the vote had been taken by countries (one country, one vote), the proposal was rejected by a majority of five countries to four.³ An acrimonious correspondence between the Lucerne International and Sportintern, running parallel to the correspondence between IFTU and the Russian trade unions, seems to have been the only outcome of this approach.

The fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924 did not discuss Sportintern in plenary session. But the immediately following session of IKKI approved without debate, and issued in its name, a resolution on the tasks of communist parties in the field of physical culture and sport.⁴ Parties were instructed, "in contact with the communist youth leagues and the Red trade unions, to devote special attention to sport and physical culture,

¹ *Malaya Entsiklopediya po Mezhdunarodnomu Profdvoizheniyu* (1927), col. 626: *Shest' Let Kominternu*, ed. E. Shelagino (1925), p. 73.

² *V^e Congrès National du Parti Communiste Français* (1927), p. 576.

³ The only available source for these proceedings is an account in *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 1, September 1924, pp. 20-22, which must be accepted with some reserve.

⁴ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 1030.

utilizing them for revolutionary aims". In countries where no workers' sport organizations existed, their creation must be supported; in countries where they existed, communist fractions must be formed in them in order to counteract reformist influence; even where Red sport organizations existed, communist fractions must be formed in them "in order to ensure the steady influence of revolutionary elements". The aim was to draw the organizations into the revolutionary struggle, and to reinforce the struggle against Fascism and militarism: sport organizations were recognized as "an excellent means for military training and discipline" and "an effective support for revolutionary combat units". The relations of Sportintern to the Lucerne International were described in terms clearly borrowed from the experience of Profintern:

The struggle of revolutionary elements against the reformist policy of the Lucerne Workers' Sport International should be encouraged, and support given to Sportintern. At the same time any tendency towards splitting or the setting up of purely communist organizations should be combated.¹

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the claim of KIM to exercise a major share of control over the work of Sportintern and the national sport organizations may have been a bone of contention behind the scenes. The German version published by KIM of the theses adopted by IKKI on the tasks of KIM contained a paragraph, which did not appear in the Russian version, prescribing "a regular and intensive struggle against bourgeois sport organizations and for the creation of workers' sport unions". The paragraph continued:

Where no workers' physical culture and sport unions yet exist, the communist youth leagues should work to create them. In existing workers' sport organizations they should initiate a lively propaganda for the Red Sport International.²

The fourth congress of KIM, which immediately followed the fifth of Comintern, set up a commission on sport and physical

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 459-460.

² *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1924), p. 80; the Russian version of the resolution is in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 453-459. For other divergences between the German and Russian texts of this resolution see p. 922, note 4 above and p. 991, note 1 below.

culture, and adopted an extensive resolution on the subject. Having observed that communist youth leagues had hitherto occupied themselves little with questions of sport, it laid down an ambitious programme of action :

The Communist Youth International and its sections work through fractions within Sportintern and its national leagues. Since an overwhelming majority of members of Sportintern are young workers, KIM is particularly interested in the work of Sportintern. To coordinate the work and support the political activity of Sportintern, the executive committee of KIM sends a representative to the executive committee of Sportintern who works regularly in it. This work is carried on under the direct leadership of the executive committee of KIM and in agreement with Comintern. . . .

Communist youth leagues through their fractions exercise influence on the work of the national sections of Sportintern in such a way as to make them a focus of the class struggle, and to induce them to participate vigorously in the struggle against Fascism, bourgeois militarism and reaction.¹

In October 1924 Sportintern held its third congress in Moscow,² enlarging its executive committee to include four representatives of the executive committee of KIM — a decision which suggests that the offensive of KIM had been, at any rate in part, successful ; Podvoisky remained the president of the committee. The congress laid down the principle that " the means of physical training must be consciously utilized by the working class and must serve the aims of the proletariat " ; it rejected as inopportune the proposed link with cultural organizations ; and it proclaimed that Sportintern was " open to all proletarian elements which recognize the class struggle " and was not specifically communist.³ At this time organizations affiliated to Sportintern existed in the Soviet Union (2,000,000 members), Czechoslovakia (120,000 members), France, Norway, Italy, the United States and Uruguay : except in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia numbers were

¹ *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der KJI* (1924), p. 73.

² *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 93, in announcing this congress for September 1924, added that it would be " the first real world congress " of Sportintern.

³ *Pravda*, October 15, 23, 1924 ; *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 2, October 1924, p. 51 ; No. 3, November 1924, p. 90 ; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 151, November 21, 1924, pp. 2046-2047.

insignificant. Organizations in Estonia and Bulgaria had been suppressed by the police. In addition to these Red sport organizations, "sympathizing" organizations, which retained membership of the Lucerne International, were listed in Alsace-Lorraine, Finland and Italy; and communist fractions had been formed in workers' sport organizations of Germany, Switzerland, Austria, German Czechoslovakia, Alsace-Lorraine, Finland and Italy. Contacts were said to have been established, and propaganda conducted, in many other countries.¹

Links between Sportintern and Profintern were also strengthened at this time. It had been remarked at an early stage that sections of Sportintern should develop more easily where Red trade unions were strong;² and this prognostication was confirmed by its relative success in Czechoslovakia and France, and its failure in Germany.³ The third congress of Profintern, meeting immediately after the fifth of Comintern, observed that "sporting clubs can provide basic cadres and many fighting units in all decisive clashes between labour and capital", and that it was the duty of trade unionists, "without splitting the workers' sport movement, to support the Red Sportintern in its struggle to revolutionize the international workers' sport movement".⁴ In a special resolution on Sportintern, it attempted to apply to Sportintern precedents drawn from Profintern policy in the trade unions, and denounced the Lucerne International for its refusal to "form a united front of workers' sport organizations".⁵ The need for a link between Sportintern and the factory was increased both by the growing habit in large-scale industry of organizing sport for factory workers and by the current insistence of

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 97, July 29, 1924, pp. 1258-1259; *ibid.* No. 151, November 21, 1924, pp. 2046-2047; *Pravda*, October 11, 1924. In 1928 the only sections claimed were in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Norway, France, Argentina, Sweden and Uruguay (A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Kominterna* (1929), p. 368).

² *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 7, March 1923, p. 216.

³ No sections of Sportintern were formed in Germany; in April 1925 Podvoisky claimed 300,000 supporters of Sportintern in German workers' organizations affiliated to the Lucerne International (the total membership of which was 1½ millions), and "over half a million supporters throughout the world" (*Beilage zur Jugend-Internationale*, No. 8-9, April-May 1925, p. 5).

⁴ *Desyat' Let Profinterna v Rezolyutsiyakh* (1930), p. 138.

⁵ *Protokoll über den Dritten Kongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale* (n.d.), pp. 375-377.

Comintern on the factory as the basis of party membership and activities.

The year 1925 was marked by two crises in the affairs of Sportintern. The first was a heightening of the tension between it and the Lucerne International, the second an unexpected turn in the struggle of KIM for mastery in Sportintern. At the enlarged IKKI of March–April 1925 Podvoisky gave a lengthy account of the organization — the only occasion on which so much attention was accorded to it at a Comintern gathering. He declared that 30 million young people — of whom 10 million were workers and 20 million petty bourgeois and bourgeois — were united in sporting and gymnastic organizations, and that these were organized by the bourgeoisie as “a weapon of counter-revolution”. It was the task of Sportintern to meet this challenge. Its motto should be :

Convert sport and gymnastics into a weapon of the class revolutionary struggle, concentrate the attention of workers and peasants on sport and gymnastics as one of the best instruments, methods and weapons for their class organization and struggle.

The boycott of Sportintern by the Lucerne International, like the boycott of Red trade unions by IFTU, was denounced as an example of “the splitting tactics of the reformists”. As part of the struggle for the united front, communist parties, youth organizations and trade unions throughout the world were invited to support the campaign of Sportintern, first of all, to secure invitations to the workers’ sport Olympiad, which was to be held in July 1925 at Frankfurt under the auspices of the Lucerne International, and secondly, failing this, to organize an “Oktyabryad” of Red sport organizations of all countries for 1927, the tenth anniversary year of the October revolution. The speaker ended by proposing an addition in this sense to the main resolution proposed by Zinoviev on the Bolshevization of the parties.¹ This proposal appears to have encountered neither opposition nor support: no other delegates commented on the affairs of Sportintern, and no mention of them occurred in the resolutions of the session — perhaps an indication that Comintern preferred to leave it to KIM to handle this question. At the session of the

¹ *Rasshirenniyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 211–225.

executive committee of KIM which followed the fifth enlarged IKKI Podvoisky delivered another speech in which he defined the major functions of Sportintern as being "to create a Red sport movement in the factories, to propagate a united front of the international gymnastics and sport movement, and to fuse this into a general united front of the working class". He appealed to KIM "to give active support to the work of Sportintern and of its sections in the various countries", and did not apparently dwell on relations between KIM and Sportintern.¹ But this did nothing to further the cause of participation in the Frankfurt Olympiad.

At this point a new element of friction was injected into an already confused situation. The All-Union Supreme Council of Physical Culture (VSFK), presided over by Semashko, the People's Commissar for Health, had acquired supervisory functions over physical culture and sport in the Soviet Union, and seemed clearly marked out as the non-military successor of Vsevoluch. In this capacity it claimed to act as the constituent Soviet unit of Sportintern, and apparently secured some recognition of its claim, which cut directly across the aspirations of KIM. In so far as this was more than a struggle between different authorities for jurisdiction, it appears to have reflected a clash between the political view, taken by KIM, of sport as an instrument for the direct promotion of the class struggle, and the non-political view taken by the People's Commissariat of Health, which regarded sport primarily as an element in physical culture, and had already accepted the principle of cooperation with the capitalist world in matters of health.² Taking its cue from the Soviet trade union central council, which had substituted itself by agreement for Profintern in negotiations with IFTU, VSFK on June 3, 1925, addressed a letter to the Lucerne International expressing its

¹ *Beilage zur Jugend-Internationale*, No. 8-9, April-May, 1925, pp. 5-6; Podvoisky's speech was, however, very briefly reported in this account, and was omitted altogether from the report of the proceedings in *Pravda*. At a joint conference of the KPD and the German Communist Youth League on July 18, 1925, it was agreed that the workers' sport organizations should be "influenced mainly by the youth league" (*Bericht über die Verhandlungen des X. Parteitags der KPD* (1926), p. 742); this delegation of authority from party to youth league seems to have been accepted in the major parties concerned.

² For Soviet participation in the Health Committee of the League of Nations see pp. 450, 454 above.

desire to participate in the Frankfurt Olympiad in the following month. But everything that had happened in the trade union question was here reversed. The Lucerne International, refusing to enter into direct relations with VSFK, left its letter unanswered, and informed Sportintern that it was willing not only to invite sections of Sportintern to the Olympiad, but to enter into negotiations for common action with Sportintern on the class struggle and the danger of war, provided all sections affiliated to Sportintern would join the Lucerne International.¹ This fiasco can hardly have failed to weaken the position of VSFK, whose initiative seems to have been resented equally by KIM and by Sportintern, and to strengthen the claims of KIM. Lominadze told the seventh congress of the Soviet Komsomol in March 1926 that Comintern had "entrusted sport activities to KIM", and that "political responsibility for this work devolves mainly on us together with the officials of Sportintern". He went on to blame the dispute between Sportintern and VSFK, between Podvoisky and Semashko, for the fact that "not one Russian team, not one Russian representative" took part in the workers' Olympiad at Frankfurt. But, when another delegate suggested that it was the business of KIM to "improve its leadership of Sportintern", Lominadze retorted that the dispute had already defied the attempts of the highest party organs, the central control commission and the Politburo, to settle it.² If a formal decision placing Sportintern under the aegis of KIM was ever taken, it was not published.

Meanwhile relations with the Lucerne International followed a predictable course. At the beginning of November 1925, the Lucerne International held its regular congress in Paris. Sportintern, in advance of the congress, issued its usual appeal for a conference to discuss the question of unity and for the authorization of sporting contests between organizations belonging to the two Internationals.³ Its application to be represented at the congress was rejected. But, on the plea that the answer had not

¹ *Pravda*, July 10, 1925; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 113, July 28, 1925, pp. 1572-1573.

² *VII S"ezd Vsesoyuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soyuza Molodezhi* (1926), pp. 291-293, 313, 326-327.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 150, November 3, 1925, pp. 2235-2236.

reached Moscow in time, a delegation arrived in Paris and presented itself to the congress. After an unseemly wrangle, it was agreed by a majority of 13 to 8 to admit a single representative of Sportintern to address the congress for half an hour. Fritz Reussner, the German secretary of Sportintern, took the floor and once more put the case for direct negotiations between the two Internationals to establish unity and, as a provisional measure, for the joint participation of organizations belonging to both Internationals in sporting events. The speech evidently made some impression. All the national organizations represented at the congress, except those of Czechoslovakia and France, where independent Red sport organizations affiliated to Sportintern were relatively strong, expressed their willingness to meet the Sportintern organizations in sporting contests. But direct negotiations between the Internationals were ruled out for the present, and the question of unity was adjourned to the next congress meeting in two years' time.¹ Zinoviev, in his report on the affairs of Comintern at the fourteenth congress of the Russian party in December 1925, found time for a passing mention of Sportintern, which was important because the sporting organizations of Czechoslovakia, Germany and "a number of other countries" were "the future cells of a Red Guard".²

A further clash now occurred owing to the willingness of Soviet teams to compete, outside the framework of Sportintern, not only against workers' teams from other countries, but against national teams recruited without regard to class. The first breach in proletarian orthodoxy seems to have occurred at an international chess tournament organized by the Soviet trade unions. But thereafter Soviet teams were alleged to have competed at various sports with national teams from Great Britain, France, Turkey, Czechoslovakia and Sweden. Retribution for this lapse was meted out from an unexpected quarter. On May 16, 1926, an enlarged executive committee of Sportintern opened its session in Moscow. One of its tasks was to lay down rules on "relations with bourgeois sport organizations". Matches with such organizations were declared to be admissible "for

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 161, December 8, 1925, pp. 2423-2424.

² *XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)* (1926), p. 678.

countries where the proletariat does not possess a sport organization of its own " and " for eastern countries (such as Turkey and China) where the bourgeoisie still plays objectively a revolutionary rôle ". The committee also despatched a telegram inviting the executive committee of the Lucerne International, which was to meet a few days later in Amsterdam, to put the question of unity on its agenda, and proposing a joint conference to discuss the fusion of the two Internationals.¹ The reply of the Lucerne International was prompt and uncompromising. It noted that sport organizations affiliated to Sportintern had taken part in a number of contests with bourgeois organizations, and that this, as well as " other differences of opinion which still prevail ", made " a closer link between the two Internationals . . . quite out of the question ".² This rebuff seems to have brought to an end the persistent efforts to penetrate the citadel of the Lucerne International.

The organization of sport on a political basis to serve political ends was not specifically Bolshevik. The Czechs of the Habsburg empire had used it as an instrument of their national movement ; the social-democrats of Germany and of other European countries had assumed that sport, like other social activities, should be organized on a class basis. The conception of international proletarian sport serving the international proletarian revolution arose naturally enough in the first years of the Soviet régime. But, as immediate revolutionary goals receded, and the Soviet Union conformed to the pattern of a world divided among nations, the conception of Soviet national sport gradually displaced that of international proletarian sport, and the foundations of Sportintern began to crumble. Sportintern survived for several years, but with diminishing membership and influence. Before the end of the nineteen-twenties it was a moribund institution, though no announcement of its demise ever seems to have been made.

(f) *The International Cooperative Movement*

Communist activity in the cooperatives ran on parallel lines to activity in the trade unions except in one important respect :

¹ *Pravda*, May 25, 1926.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 81, June 4, 1926, pp. 1300-1301.

no attempt was made to establish "Red" cooperatives outside the Soviet Union, or to set up a Red international organization to rival the existing International Cooperative Alliance (ICA). This restraint was practised partly, no doubt, because the cooperatives, unlike the trade unions, were not regarded as suitable for a militant revolutionary rôle, but partly also because activity in the cooperatives was first planned not, like activity in the trade unions, in the early fervour of revolutionary enthusiasm, but at a moment when enthusiasm had begun to give way to calculation and circumspection. The initiative was taken at the third congress of Comintern in July 1921 when Meshcheryakov put forward a series of theses making it the duty of communists everywhere to work for "the transformation of the cooperatives into organs of the revolutionary class struggle, but without splitting off separate cooperatives from the central organ". The theses were adopted without debate, together with a resolution instructing IKKI to set up a cooperative section with a vague mandate to conduct propaganda "for the principles and methods of revolutionary cooperatives" and to support proletarian cooperatives in general.¹ A month later, in August 1921, the congress of the ICA at Basel, by a narrow majority, unseated the "white" delegates who had hitherto represented the Russian cooperatives, and admitted Soviet representatives, appointing two of them to the central committee of the alliance.² In the same year an International Cooperative Women's Guild was established, its founding congress at Ghent being attended by delegates of communist cooperatives of Soviet Russia, Germany, Great Britain and Czechoslovakia.³

It was not till the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922 that a serious attempt was made to organize communist work in the cooperatives on an international scale. Before the congress, an international conference of communist cooperatives was held in Moscow. It was attended by delegates of twenty

¹ *Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1921), pp. 951-955; the resolution and theses in their final form are in *Beschlüsse und Resolutionen des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1921), pp. 87-92.

² E. Var'yash, *Die Internationale Genossenschaftsbewegung und das Sowet-genossenschaftswesen* (German transl. from Russian, Moscow, 1929), pp. 36-37.

³ *Komintern: Khozyaistvo, Politika i Rabochee Dvizhenie, 1924-27* (1928), p. 117.

countries, including the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and other Soviet republics : most of the European countries were represented. The conference proposed the organization of a cooperative section of Comintern and of cooperative sections of all parties. The communist aim was to struggle against the principle of political neutrality in the international cooperative movement ; to form communist fractions in the cooperatives ; and to avoid a split in the movement and work for affiliation to the ICA.¹ The fourth congress of Comintern endorsed the proceedings of the conference, repeated the injunction to work in the cooperatives, and added that every member of a communist party should be a member of a cooperative.² These proceedings did not pass unnoticed in western Europe. During the peace conference at The Hague in December 1922,³ negotiations for collaboration on matters of common interest had been set on foot between the leaders of IFTU and of the ICA ; and suspicion in Moscow that the meeting was concerned with the question of common defence against communist infiltration was at any rate plausible.⁴

From this time, the friction endemic in the trade union movement spread, though in a much less acute form, to the cooperatives. In March 1923 encouragement was derived in Moscow from the success of the Frankfurt conference⁵ in popularizing united front tactics on a wider scale. The session of the enlarged IKKI in June 1923 passed a long resolution on the cooperatives. It opened with a section on Fascism, which had shown up " the dangerous illusion . . . that the cooperatives can be made independent of the results of the class struggle " ; it claimed that the ICA had forfeited its neutrality by forming a bloc with the Amsterdam International ; it again instructed every party to set up a cooperative section to keep in touch with the cooperative

¹ Meshcheryakov reported on the conference to the fourth congress of Comintern (*Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 704-709) ; the text of the resolution does not appear to have been published.

² See *ibid.* pp. 709-712 for the draft resolution presented to the congress : it was presumably adopted, though the final text has not been traced.

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 462.

⁴ E. Var'yash, *Die Internationale Genossenschaftsbewegung und das Sowet-genossenschaftswesen* (German transl. from Russian, Moscow, 1929), pp. 41-42 ; *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 9-10 (44-45), September-October 1924, pp. 93-94.

⁵ See p. 547 above.

section of IKKI, and called, on the trade union analogy, for "the organization of the broadest masses of cooperators with revolutionary inclinations round communist cells".¹ But once again activity died down when the session was over, to revive only as the time came round for the fifth congress of Comintern a year later. On the eve of the congress, from June 11 to 17, 1924, a second international conference of communist cooperatives took place, and passed a resolution which explicitly cited the precedent of work in the trade unions, and exhorted communists to "enter the cooperatives in order to turn them into weapons of the class struggle".² The congress itself found no time to debate the question, but adopted a resolution reaffirming the decisions of previous congresses and introducing two new points: insistence on the cooperatives as a way of approach to the peasant (a reflexion of increasing attention to the peasantry and of the foundation of Krestintern), and a proposal that the ICA should be moved to "take on itself the initiative of summoning a new international congress with the participation of all workers' organizations that support the class struggle" (a somewhat pointless counterpart of the proposal for a congress to discuss the fusion of the two trade union Internationals).³ On July 5, 1924, while the congress was actually in session, the Soviet cooperatives joined in celebrating the annual International Cooperative Day proclaimed by the ICA; a large demonstration in the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow was addressed by Kalinin, Bukharin and Khinchuk, the president of Tsentsosyuz.⁴

These proceedings were a prelude to the appearance of a substantial Soviet delegation at the international cooperative congress at Ghent on September 1-5, 1924.⁵ Under the system of proportional representation prevailing at the congress, 32 Soviet delegates cast 158 votes out of a total number of 450

¹ *Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskogo Internationala* (1923), pp. 292-296.

² *Bulletin du V^e Congrès de l'Internationale Communiste* (Moscow), No. 21, July 9, 1924, p. 4; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 78, July 1, 1924, pp. 961-962; No. 84, July 9, 1924, p. 1063.

³ *Thesen und Resolutionen des V. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924), pp. 137-139.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 90, July 17, 1924, pp. 1133-1134.

⁵ Participation had been decided on by the cooperative section of IKKI on July 17, 1924, and a bureau set up to organize it (*Pravda*, July 19, 1924).

delegates and 650 votes. The Soviet standpoint was supported by a few communists in the British, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian delegations. French, Italian and German communists were said to have been prevented from attending the conference; presumably they were excluded by their own delegations. The major issues were the relation of the ICA to the trade union Internationals and the question of political neutrality. On the former, the British delegation stood for the extreme Right or anti-Soviet view, and proposed a motion adjourning *sine die* the question of relations with Profintern: this was defeated by 332 votes to 222. A Soviet proposal to establish a formal link with Profintern was defeated by 424 votes to 174. A confused compromise resolution agreeing to "the continuation of common activity with the trade union Internationals on special questions" was then adopted. The debate on neutrality raised more interesting questions of principle, the Soviet delegation arguing with conviction that no half-way house was possible between the conception of the class struggle and the conception of a community of interest between classes. A Soviet delegate contrived to deliver in German a speech on this theme, calling for common action by the workers against imperialism and the danger of war. But this was ruled out of order by the president as being political, and was not translated into other languages. A Soviet resolution which would have committed the ICA to support of the class struggle was rejected by 397 votes to 183.¹

The Ghent congress set the pattern of communist activity in the cooperatives for several years. On October 31, 1924, the Orgburo of IKKI issued a circular to the communist parties urging them to give full support to the cooperatives.² Both nationally and internationally, communists began to make them-

¹ For contemporary Soviet accounts of the congress see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 121, September 18, 1924, pp. 1603-1610; *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 9-10 (44-45), September-October 1924, pp. 92-96; No. 12 (59), December 1925, pp. 348-349; *Krest'yanskii Internatsional*, No. 7-9, September-October 1924, pp. 154-158.

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 163, December 16, 1924, pp. 2237-2238; among the papers seized by the British police at CPGB headquarters in 1925 were an eleven-page circular from the cooperative section of IKKI of May 1925, on work in the cooperatives, and an instruction of May 8, 1925, to participate in current cooperative conferences (*Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 42-45).

selves felt in cooperative organizations. In France, out of about 4000 delegates at the national cooperative conferences of 1924 and 1925, 230 were communists or communist sympathizers in 1924, and 272 in 1925; in Germany, out of about 800 delegates, there were 60 communists in 1924 and 33 in 1925.¹ Of the 45 members of the central committee of the ICA elected by the Ghent congress 13 were communists, 12 from the Soviet Union and one from Czechoslovakia.² In July 1925 the Soviet cooperatives again participated actively in the International Cooperative Day with slogans which included protests against Fascism and the danger of war and against the political neutrality of the cooperatives. In Great Britain, in particular, this was ill received by the orthodox officials of the movement.³

When the central committee met in Paris in October 1925, renewed attempts by the Soviet delegates to commit the cooperatives to a political programme were again defeated or shelved. The same clash of opinion on relations with the two trade union Internationals occurred, and the same confusing result ensued, as at the Ghent congress. By this time much bad feeling had evidently been generated. Charges of introducing politics into the cooperatives and of using them as a forum for the propaganda of Comintern were levelled at the communist bloc. The German delegation took the lead in proposals to expel the Soviet cooperatives from the alliance; and the British delegation sought to reduce the number of their representatives on the central committee on the ground that the USSR was now one country and separate representation of the republics was no longer justified.⁴

¹ It was recorded at this time that members of the KPD "work rather unwillingly in the cooperatives" and formed few fractions in them, since "the central direction of the cooperatives has strictly forbidden the conduct of communist propaganda in the cooperatives" (*Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen Partei* (1925), p. 89); British and French communists were apparently more ready to submit to this prohibition, though the French National Federation of Revolutionary Cooperatives appealed to the National Federation of Consumer Cooperatives to participate in a campaign against the war in Morocco (*L'Humanité*, July 5, 1925).

² *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 73-74.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 39, 74.

⁴ For Soviet accounts of the session see *Pravda*, October 8, 9, 1925; *Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale*, No. 12 (59), December 1925, pp. 349-351; E. Var'yash, *Die Internationale Genossenschaftsbewegung und das Sowjetgenossenschaftswesen* (German transl. from Russian, Moscow, 1929), pp. 67-68.

These attacks were defeated, perhaps because communist activities in the cooperatives had been more conspicuous in theory than in practice ;¹ and at the beginning of 1926 the boast could still be made that " *the cooperative International is the only great proletarian world organization which maintains its unity intact in spite of all attempts to exclude the Russian cooperatives*".² At the beginning of 1926 the periodical bulletin of the cooperative section of IKKI was replaced by a monthly journal, *Mezhdunarodnaya Kooperatsiya*.³

These persistent efforts were, however, crowned with limited success. Repeated attempts to mobilize the ICA in the campaign for trade union unity were frustrated by the traditional conservatism of the British cooperatives and the terror of revolution prevailing in the German organization.⁴ On March 4-6, 1926, on the occasion of the sixth enlarged plenum of IKKI, another international conference of communist cooperatives was convened in Moscow under the auspices of the cooperative section, and adopted a set of theses which were endorsed on April 10, 1926, by the Orgburo of IKKI.⁵ Emphasis was again placed on the duty of party members to join the cooperatives, to form communist fractions in them, to support practical activities such as campaigns against the cost of living, and to establish relations between the cooperatives and other non-party organizations sympathetic to the Soviet cause. But the next meeting of the central committee of the ICA, which took place in Antwerp at the end of April 1926, continued to uphold the principle of political neutrality, and on this plea rejected all proposals put forward by the Soviet delegation, though Khinchuk, the leader

¹ At a meeting of the organization section of IKKI in December 1925, a cooperative spokesman complained that, in spite of the directives of Comintern, too few party members enrolled in the cooperatives, too few communist fractions were formed in them and the party paid too little attention to them: "The political line is lacking in cooperative work" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 165, December 17, 1925, p. 2472).

² *Ibid.* No. 11, January 15, 1926, p. 141.

³ A German edition also appeared under the title *Die Genossenschaft im Klassenkampf*.

⁴ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 17, January 22, 1926, pp. 242-243.

⁵ The record of the conference is in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 58, April 16, 1926, pp. 821-832; the theses *ibid.* No. 73, May 14, 1926, pp. 1167-1168.

of the delegation, claimed that a larger measure of support for these proposals had been forthcoming from other delegations than ever before.¹

(g) *The International Women's Secretariat*

Like the Second International, the Communist International based itself on the doctrines of the perfect equality of the sexes and of non-discrimination between them, and this precluded the idea of a separate women's International. On the other hand, some special organization seemed to be required for work by, and among, women. A first international conference of communist women was held in Moscow from July 30 to August 2, 1920, during the second congress of Comintern. It regarded itself as a successor of the women's socialist conference of 1915 in Berne (as Comintern at its founding congress had regarded itself as the heir of Zimmerwald).² Of the veterans of Berne, Kollontai and Klara Zetkin were not present at the Moscow conference, which sent greetings to both of them ;³ and the conference was dominated by Inessa Armand, another of the Berne leaders. Inessa Armand explained at length the methods employed by the Russian party for propaganda among women workers. In November 1918 an all-Russian conference of women workers, held under the auspices of the Russian party, had recommended for propaganda among non-party women a system of so-called " delegates' meetings ". Women delegates, elected in factories and in villages, were to be given an opportunity to participate in Soviet administrative work ; and meetings with them were to serve as centres for attracting the masses of women workers to the party and the Soviets. A similar system seemed suitable for work among women in other countries. Inessa Armand described the delegates' meetings as " a means for the communist education of the delegates, and a channel through which the influence of communist parties can spread to the broad masses of women workers and

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 78, May 28, 1926, p. 1246.

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 564 ; for documents of the women's socialist conference in 1915 see O. H. Gankin and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolsheviks and the World War* (Stanford, 1940), pp. 286-301.

³ *Otchet Pervoi Mezhdunarodnoi Konferentsii Kommunistok* (1921), pp. 17, 21-22.

peasants".¹ Theses presented by the Russian delegates to the conference were referred, with some proposed amendments, to a drafting committee to be headed by the absent Zetkin for final editing and submission to the congress of Comintern.²

Since Zetkin does not appear to have visited Moscow at this time, the drafting committee probably met in Berlin. In any case, the result of its labours was not ready in time for submission to the Comintern congress, and the theses were eventually approved by IKKI.³ They defined the position of women within the framework of the communist parties and of Comintern. Women would not have their own organization, but would belong to the general party organizations; they would enjoy their full share of rights and duties. But parties would be required to set up a special apparatus for agitation among women, and for their training and organization in the communist spirit. The system of delegates' meetings was specially recommended; each party central committee would be required to have its women's secretariat to take charge of work among women. It was also proposed to create an International Women's Secretariat, which would be elected by the international conference of communist women and confirmed by Comintern. All resolutions adopted by this secretariat and measures introduced by it would be subject to approval by IKKI. One representative of the secretariat would take part in all meetings of IKKI with a consultative status in matters of a general nature and with a right of vote in matters pertaining to the women's movement.⁴ After the Moscow conference of

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 90-93; an article on party work among women in the Russian party between 1919 and 1925 refers to "delegates' meetings" as "one of the most common forms of work among women", and quotes an instruction of the party central committee describing them as "a conductor of the influence of the RKP(B) to the broad masses of women workers, peasant women and women toilers of the east" (*Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1961, pp. 179-180).

² *Otchet Pervoi Mezhdunarodnoi Konferentsii Kommunistok* (1921), pp. 95-96; *Pravda*, August 7, 1920, recorded the appointment of the drafting commission at the end of the conference, but did not mention Zetkin.

³ *Vtoroi Kongress Komintern* (1934), pp. xiv, 451.

⁴ The first publication of the theses which has been traced was in *Kommunisticheskie International*, No. 15, December 20, 1920, cols. 3453-3472: this is the version reproduced in *Vtoroi Kongress Komintern* (1934), pp. 673-686. Another Russian version, similar in substance but inferior in style, appeared in *Otchet Pervoi Mezhdunarodnoi Konferentsii Kommunistok* (1921), pp. 99-123 (the preparation of this volume was handicapped, as was explained in the preface, by the death of Inessa Armand). If the drafting commission worked in

July–August 1920, the International Women's Secretariat seems to have fallen into two halves — a section in Moscow directed by Kollontai, who was the representative of the secretariat in IKKI, and a section in Berlin directed by Klara Zetkin ; and this division, aggravated by the bad state of communications in this period, was made the excuse for the failure of the secretariat to carry out any systematic work during the first year of its activity. Subsequently, according to Kollontai's account, the Berlin secretariat was called to order, and became an auxiliary and purely executive section of the international secretariat in Moscow.¹ But the Berlin section appears to have been the more active. A monthly journal *Die Kommunistische Fraueninternationale* (the title misleadingly suggested the existence of a women's International), edited by Klara Zetkin, started publication in Berlin in April 1921 and continued for four years : it never had a Russian counterpart.

A second international conference of communist women met in Moscow from June 9 to 14, 1921, in advance of the third congress of Comintern.² As against the 25 delegates from 19 countries who had attended the first conference in 1920, it mustered 82 delegates from 28 countries. It passed a number of resolutions, and appointed March 8 as an annual "international women's day". The most important result of the conference was an attempt to set up an effective organization for the International Women's Secretariat. It was to consist of six secretaries — Kollontai and Lilina, who were to be responsible for work in Soviet Russia, in northern Europe and in the English-speaking countries, Kasparova, who was to undertake work in the east, and Zetkin and Hertha Sturm from Germany, and Colliard from France, who were to take control of work in central and western Europe ; one secretary, apparently not yet designated, was to be attached to Profintern for work among women trade unionists.³

German, these were probably different Russian translations of a German text, which has not been found.

¹ These particulars come from a report by Kollontai to the second international conference in June 1921 (*Pravda*, June 12, 1921) and a subsequent article by her in the journal of Comintern (*Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 19, December 17, 1921, cols. 5097-5100).

² It was reported in *Pravda*, June 11-17, 1921.

³ See Kollontai's article in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 19, December 17, 1921, cols. 5097-5100.

Zetkin reported on the question to the third congress of Comintern, emphasizing that "there is no separate communist women's organization, but merely a movement, merely an organization, of women within the communist party side by side with communist men".¹ The congress reaffirmed this principle in a resolution endorsing the resolution of the women's conference "on forms and methods of communist work among women" and in a set of theses which contained the most elaborate pronouncement ever made by Comintern on its attitude to the women's movement.²

The prestige of the International Women's Secretariat in Moscow probably suffered from Kollontai's participation in the workers' opposition and subsequent disgrace;³ and her association with the secretariat came to an end shortly afterwards.⁴ No international women's conference was held in connexion with the fourth congress of Comintern in November 1922; and the congress passed an unusually sharp resolution on the work of the secretariat, expressing regret that some party organizations had fallen short of their duty and "either not taken steps to organize communist women in the party or not created the party apparatus necessary for work among the masses of women or for making contact with them".⁵ These complaints clearly pointed to the need for reorganization. Zetkin was at this time at the height of her prestige in Moscow. The resolution provided for the appointment by IKKI of a single "women's secretary", who was apparently to have discretion to appoint other members of the secretariat; and Zetkin was appointed by IKKI to this post.⁶

¹ *Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1921), pp. 916-917.

² For the theses and the resolution see *Kommunisticheskii International v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 242-256. After the congress, IKKI on July 13, 1921, confirmed the appointment of five of the six secretaries proposed by the preceding women's conference; the sixth, Lilina, was attached to the secretariat by a later decision of the presidium of IKKI of September 20, 1921, pending the approval of the central committee of the Russian party (*Deyatelnost' Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Prezidiuma I.K. Kommunisticheskogo Internationala* (1922), pp. 11, 220).

³ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 1, pp. 197, 209-210.

⁴ Her last recorded appearance as spokesman of the women's secretariat was at the enlarged IKKI of February 1922 (*Pravda*, February 25, 1922).

⁵ *Thesen und Resolutionen des IV. Welthongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 64-65.

⁶ *Pravda*, December 7, 1922.

This decision implied the intention to make Berlin the headquarters for the work of the International Women's Secretariat in western countries. The eastern department, in charge of the Near, Middle and Far East, remained in Moscow, and was instructed by a decision of the Orgburo of January 2, 1923, to maintain close contact with the eastern department of IKKI.¹

This arrangement did not prevent a recrudescence of friction between Moscow and Berlin. Nothing had been heard of the proposed organization of "delegates' meetings" since it had been originally approved in 1920; and such organization of women as was attempted by the German or other western parties seems to have been mainly directed not to women factory workers, but to groups of sympathizers with the communist cause drawn from bourgeois or petty bourgeois strata. Early in 1923 the Orgburo revived the proposal for "delegates' meetings", and pressed it on the reluctant secretariat in Berlin.² It encountered stubborn German opposition. Hertha Sturm, the most active member of the secretariat in Berlin, attacked it in articles in *Die Kommunistische Fraueninternationale*.³ The third enlarged IKKI in June 1923 set up a commission to deal with the problems of the women's movement. But Zetkin, who was chosen as *rapporteur*, pursued delaying tactics and reported that the commission had been unable to finish its work in time, so that no resolution was passed.⁴

By the time the fifth congress of Comintern met in June 1924, the campaign for Bolshevization had strengthened the drive for "delegates' meetings", and opposition had abated. The report on the work of IKKI to the congress claimed that the strikes of 1923 had put new life into the women's movement in Germany and that "the women's secretariat had gone over to a policy of

¹ *Bericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale*, 15. Dezember, 1922-15. Mai, 1923 (1923), p. 15.

² This was stated by Kuusinen at the sixth enlarged IKKI of February-March 1926 (*Shestoi Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), p. 503); Kuusinen, ignoring the decision of 1920, treated this as the first occasion on which the proposal was made.

³ This also was stated by Kuusinen on the same occasion (see previous note): a complete file of the journal has not been available.

⁴ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1923), p. 207.

winning the women workers in the factories".¹ The main controversy now revolved round the issue of participation by women communists in non-party committees or groups dealing with matters of interest to women: this was favoured by the international secretariat in Berlin, and mistrusted by Comintern as likely to dilute the party character of work among women by associating it with bourgeois groups and activities. The congress resolution was vague and diffuse. It more than once cited the decision to organize the party on a basis of factory cells: this not only applied to women workers (the important thing was now "to win factory women for the party"), but "work among the wives of workers must necessarily be carried on by linking them with the enterprises in which the husbands work". On the other hand, it was desirable "to strengthen the work of women communists in unions of tenants, etc., which unite masses of proletarian and petty bourgeois women". On the question of principle the resolution firmly declared that "the institution of special organs for work among women has as its purpose the unification of this party work".² A significant change was, however, made in the constitution of the International Women's Secretariat: under article 22 of the new statute of IKKI adopted by the congress, the secretariat was to be appointed, no longer, as hitherto, by the international women's conference, but by IKKI.³ Its subordinate status was thus clearly marked. After the congress the presidium of IKKI re-elected Zetkin and Sturm to the secretariat, together with Nikolaeva and a representative of the eastern department of Comintern.⁴ It also took the decision, which was apparently not published, to re-transfer the headquarters of the secretariat from Berlin to Moscow.⁵

The third international women's conference, which, unlike its two predecessors, met not before, but after, the corresponding

¹ *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), p. 86; work among women in other parties was admitted to be weak.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 449-453; the resolution was not debated by the congress, and no record appears to exist of discussions in the organization commission which drafted it.

³ For the statute see pp. 894-900 above.

⁴ *Pravda*, July 9, 1924; in 1924 the eastern section of the women's secretariat sent an organizer to China (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 68).

⁵ See p. 982 note 3 below.

congress of Comintern, had little to do but accept with a good grace the rules laid down by the congress and the removal of the secretariat to Moscow.¹ A resolution "On the Forms and Methods of the Work of Communist Parties among Women Workers" accepted to the full the Russian thesis of delegates' meetings:

The experience gained by the Russian Communist Party after the October revolution has demonstrated that extraordinary importance must be attached to the organization of delegates' meetings as an instrument for the establishment of permanent relations between the party and the broad strata of working women and for the extension and deepening of the influence of the party upon these strata. These delegates' meetings consist of women representatives elected for a certain period by women factory hands, workers' wives, domestic servants, women clerks in commercial and state offices in towns and by women agricultural workers, women peasants of different social classes, small-holders and medium farmers, and the wives and widows of mobilized soldiers in villages.²

Hertha Sturm at the conference repeated the case for the opposition, invoking the argument, familiar in other contexts, against a "mechanical transfer" to western countries of methods appropriate to the land of the proletarian dictatorship. What rôle Zetkin played at the conference is not clear. She was evidently unwilling to face an open quarrel with Comintern. But in a subsequent article she expressed her agreement with the opposition, sourly remarking that delegates' meetings were "not the only way to win over and Bolshevize proletarian women".³

The transfer of the headquarters to Moscow and the campaign for Bolshevization made little immediate impact on the work of the women's secretariat. Neither the fifth enlarged IKKI of March-April 1925 nor the organization conference which took

¹ *Pravda*, July 11, 1924, the day of the opening of the conference, carried articles by Zetkin, Sturm and Nikolaeva, and briefly reported the conference in its issues of July 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 1924; for fuller reports see three special numbers of *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 106, August 14, 1924; No. 109, August 20, 1924; No. 110, August 21, 1924.

² *Ibid.* No. 110, August 21, 1924, p. 1419; *How to organize the Communist Party* (CPGB, n.d.), pp. 121-130. This resolution was not included in the issue of the *Die Kommunistische Fraueninternationale* devoted to the proceedings of the conference (see following footnote).

³ *Die Kommunistische Fraueninternationale*, iv, No. 7, July 1924, pp. 9, 14-15; for the decision to move the secretariat to Moscow see *ibid.* p. 32.

place at the same time touched on the question. But on April 5-6, 1925, as the session of the enlarged IKKI closed, a conference on women's work, arranged jointly by the women's and organization departments of the secretariat, was held. Klara Zetkin, as general secretary of the International Women's Secretariat, opened the proceedings with a speech in which, avoiding the topics of acute controversy, she pointed to two opposite current errors: an attempt to create independent women's communist organizations side by side with the parties (this reflected the old conception of a separate women's International), and a denial of the need for any special organs for work among women. In her peroration she called on the women's organizations to declare:

In this sphere we too are Bolsheviks, understanding pupils of the master, ready to convert good revolutionary theory into good revolutionary practice.

Nikolaeva, the head of the women's section of the central committee of the Russian party, gave an account of Russian party work among women; and, after desultory comments by delegates from Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, the Scandinavian countries and the United States, a resolution was approved in principle, referred to a drafting committee and later confirmed by the Orgburo of IKKI. It called for the Bolshevization of the women's sections of parties "on the basis of the experience of the RKP". This required that women's sections headed by a responsible women's organizer (who might be either a man or a woman) should be attached to party central committees and all directing party organs; that these organizers should be responsible to the party as a whole, not merely to women members of the party; that the system of delegates' meetings should become "a veritable school for the class-conscious organization, education and activity of women workers"; that women's fractions should be created in women's organizations in the trade unions, but should be subordinate to the general party fraction in the union; and that women working at home must be reached through the delegate system and brought into contact with delegates elected by women in factories.¹ But the influence of this initiative from

¹ For an account of the proceedings and the text of the resolution see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 101, June 29, 1925, pp. 1371-1383. The resolution is also in *Der Organisatorische Aufbau der Kommunistischen*

Moscow on party work among women in western Europe seems to have been small. Hertha Sturm ingeniously utilized an article celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Russian party women's journal *Kommunistka* to emphasize the unique character of Russian conditions. *Kommunistka* did not need to be "an organ for agitation and propaganda, as the women's journals of communist parties in the west are or should be"; it could concern itself with general policies and how the "broad masses of women" could be led to support them, and only secondarily with "women's questions".¹ A few weeks later Sturm gave the Orgburo of IKKI a gloomy report on the state of the women's movement. Women nowhere accounted for more than 25 per cent of party membership; in some parties the proportion of women was as low as 6 or 2 per cent, and a majority of this small number consisted of housewives, not women workers.²

The controversy finally came to a head at the sixth enlarged IKKI of February-March 1926. The section on the International Women's Secretariat in the report of IKKI prepared for this session enumerated women's non-party organizations founded with the participation of women communists in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, France, the Scandinavian countries and the United States. It claimed that Comintern had not yet reached a decision of principle on these organizations, and that the decision must be taken at the enlarged IKKI.³ During the session, on the initiative of the secretariat, a two-day conference took place on March 8-9, 1926, on work among women. The first point on the agenda was to prepare for a full international conference on the question to be held in Moscow at the end of May: this gave rise to no difficulty. But the main discussion once more revolved round the issue of non-party women's organizations and of the extension to this field of the tactics of the united front, the German delegates again appearing as stubborn supporters of this policy.⁴

Partei (1925), pp. 139-143; it was formally approved by the Orgburo on May 4, 1925. A separate conference on work among women of the east was opened by a report of Nikolaeva (*Pravda*, April 14, 1925).

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 100, June 26, 1925, p. 1368.

² *International Press Correspondence*, No. 63, August 6, 1925, pp. 883-885.

³ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1925), p. 65.

⁴ A full account of this meeting was published in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 74, May 15, 1926, pp. 1169-1184; for a further article by Hertha Sturm see *ibid.* No. 75, May 18, 1926, pp. 1200-1202.

The result was inconclusive ; and when at the plenary session of the enlarged IKKI Kuusinen introduced his report on work among the masses, he devoted the greater part of it to the women's movement — a most unusual distribution of emphasis. He once more commended the system of " delegates' meetings " as the foundation for all women's work, and complained that "*party leaders still do not take work among women workers seriously*". He cited the resolution of the fifth congress which had authorized the formation of " special organs for work among women ", but only in so far as these promoted the " unification " of party work : the general non-party women's organizations favoured by western communist parties did not fulfil this condition. He was prepared to admit that " certain timid attempts " at applying the method of delegates' meetings had been made in England and Germany, but " not by a long chalk were they true delegates' meetings ". Geschke, speaking on behalf of the KPD, conceded that " not a single section of the Communist International except the Russian section has made meetings of women delegates a fixed part of its apparatus ", but thought that this was compensated for in some parties by " more or less well developed non-party women's organizations ". Sturm again led the opposition ; she attacked " delegates' meetings " as not resting " on a solid foundation " and having been brought into existence without adequate preparation, but skirted cautiously round the controversial question of women's non-party organizations. Kasparova, head of the eastern division of the secretariat, came to the support of Kuusinen, putting once more the argument for delegates' meetings, " in which women workers should in all cases predominate ". Women's organizations united on non-party objectives and including petty bourgeois elements did not meet the essential demand : these " intermediate " strata should be dealt with by organizations such as MRP, MOPR or Friends of Soviet Russia. The foremost task of the International Women's Secretariat was " to work among the women workers, to organize both the organized and the unorganized [i.e. those both inside and outside the trade unions] around the party ". The atmosphere of the debate was, however, hostile to the official line, and Kuusinen in his reply found himself on the defensive. He once more explained that no objection was raised to "*the formation*

of women's organizations for special purposes ", but only to general purpose organizations of this character. He appeared to recognize the weight of opinion was against him on this point, and suggested darkly that, if his views were rejected, a division of work might be necessary : the International Women's Secretariat might take over the control of the women's organizations, leaving the secretariat of IKKI to organize the women's delegations.¹ In the resolution as finally adopted the controversial issue was avoided altogether, and the problem of work among women was dismissed in a single sentence :

In order to draw the most active forces of the female proletariat into regular revolutionary work, it is necessary to apply everywhere with full energy in appropriate conditions the method of meetings of women's delegates.²

But the most important decision was taken, after the enlarged IKKI had dispersed, by the presidium. It was time to establish discipline over this recalcitrant organ of Comintern. In April 1926 the International Women's Secretariat was abolished and replaced by a women's department of IKKI.³

¹ For Kuusinen's report, the discussion and Kuusinen's concluding remarks, see *Shestoi Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1927), pp. 485-504.

² *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1938), p. 571.

³ *Tätigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale, Februar-November 1926* (1926), p. 32.

CHAPTER 45

THE COMMUNIST YOUTH INTERNATIONAL (KIM)

AFTER the second congress of the Communist Youth International (KIM) in July 1921,¹ past struggles and controversies over its independent status gradually faded away. Its formal relation to Comintern was vaguely and not always consistently defined.² But in practice it became subordinate to Comintern in matters of doctrine and policy, and retained only faint vestiges of an earlier ambition to act as spearhead and inspiration of the whole movement. The fourth congress of Comintern in November–December 1922 passed a resolution welcoming the transformation of the youth leagues from “closed, purely political élite organizations” into “broad mass organizations of young workers”. On the other hand it noted that “the offensive of capital”, in the form of unemployment, lower wages and increased government repression, had borne especially heavily on the young, reducing the membership of the youth

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 402–403.

² The resolution of the third congress of Comintern in 1921 had called KIM “a part of the Communist International” (see *ibid.* Vol. 3, p. 403). In the report of IKKI to the fifth congress in June 1924, KIM was listed with MRP, MOPR, Krestintern, etc., as an auxiliary international organization (*Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale vom IV. bis V. Weltkongress* (1924), pp. 79–83); in the report to the sixth enlarged IKKI of February 1926, which did not include the auxiliary organizations, KIM was listed with the foreign parties in the chapter headed “Sections of the Communist International in the Capitalist Countries” (*Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 319–328, 370). In the report of IKKI to the sixth congress in 1928 (*Die Komintern vor dem 6. Weltkongress*), it was not mentioned; but it described itself in its statute adopted in 1928 as “a section of the Communist International” (*The Young Communist International: Between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses* (1928), p. 233), and was listed as such, separately from the auxiliary organizations, in A. Tivel and M. Kheimo, *10 Let Komintern* (1929), p. 345. On the other hand, the index to *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz* regularly classified it among the auxiliary organizations.

leagues and driving some of them underground.¹ It was in these somewhat discouraging conditions that the third congress of KIM met, immediately after the fourth congress of Comintern, in December 1922, being attended by 93 voting delegates of 38 youth leagues affiliated to KIM. Though more than half the delegates were registered as workers, the weakness of many of the youth leagues was officially attributed to the preponderance in them of "apprentices, clerks, and young workers in small workshops".² The need to appeal to the masses of young factory workers was a constant theme in the history of the leagues.

The change effected by the second congress in the relation of the youth leagues to the parties had left its aftermath of difficulties, which continued to preoccupy the third congress. In Czechoslovakia a crisis in the youth league had necessitated direct intervention by the party, which had been obliged to depose the central committee of the league and substitute a temporary commission. In Great Britain KIM had several times had to draw the attention of the CPGB to the importance of youth organizations; and in Germany the *Rote Fahne* was blamed for not giving space to the affairs of the youth league.³ The period since the second congress had everywhere been one of waning revolutionary enthusiasm and political interest. Nevertheless the question of the relation of the leagues to the parties was said to have found a rapid solution.⁴ It was afterwards admitted that the subordination of the leagues to the parties and of KIM to Comintern had encountered stubborn resistance in Norway and in Germany.⁵ Shatskin, who introduced a new draft programme,

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 333-334.

² *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 76, 184; a table, *ibid.* p. 289, puts the total number of delegates at 91 (41 workers, 7 peasants, 15 employees and 29 intellectuals, making 92 in all). R. Schüller *et al.*, *Geschichte der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale*, iii (1930), 29-30, cites a total of 54 communist youth leagues at this time with 750,000 members, but considers this figure "highly exaggerated"; the figure for 1920 had been 800,000 (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 402).

³ *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 68-70.

⁵ R. Schüller *et al.*, *Geschichte der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale*, iii (1930), 12; at the third congress of KIM the Norwegian delegate defended the insistence of the Norwegian youth league, in defiance of the orders of Moscow, on remaining neutral in the dispute in the Norwegian party (*Bericht*

devoted much of his speech to the contrast between the communist youth leagues and socialist youth organizations. The latter concentrated on cultural tasks and tried to steer clear of politics; the communist leagues were directly concerned with preparation for the political and economic struggle. This led to a different conception of organization and discipline:

We are a closely knit international centralized organization, which recognizes no autonomy of national sections, but only the need to adapt the execution of international directives to the concrete conditions of particular countries, and accepts international decisions as the supreme law.¹

One issue on which KIM retained an independent initiative, and occupied a position in advance of Comintern, was the transition from the territorial unit to the factory cell as the basis of organization. Here too opinion was divided and hesitant; but the congress succeeded in passing a unanimous resolution.² A commission presided over by Doriot presented a resolution on the struggle against militarism which was unanimously approved.³ Finally, on the last day of the congress, Zinoviev appeared to deliver a report on the work of the fourth congress of Comintern. The keynote of his speech was the picture of Comintern as a single unified world party, of which KIM was a part:

The patriotism of one's own party, of federalism, is for us communists an atavistic feeling from the period of the Second International. . . . Everything that smacks of local patriotism must be rooted out; we must awaken in the rising generation a new feeling, the feeling of a new patriotism, the patriotism of the International.⁴

The congress elected 18 members of the executive including a Chinese delegate, and reserved one place among the 6 candidate members for a representative (still to be found) of the Near East.⁵ It was noted with pride that the executive committee of KIM (IKKIM) had always been elected by the congress: this procedure had just been adopted for the first time by Comintern

vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale (1923), pp. 24, 34, 229).

¹ *Ibid.* p. 174.

² See pp. 917-918 above.

³ *Bericht vom. 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugendinternationale* (1923), pp. 264-270.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 240.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 229-230.

for the election of IKKI at its fourth congress.¹

The months following the third congress were marked by the faithful cooperation of KIM in united front campaigns organized by Comintern and Profintern — the campaigns against militarism and the danger of war arising out of the Ruhr crisis, and against imperialism and Fascism.² A delegation of KIM was refused admission to the congress in Hamburg in May 1923 at which the fusion of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals was effected, but seized the occasion to win over some recruits from the social-democratic youth leagues.³ The German Communist Youth League, the most important section of KIM outside the Soviet Union, advanced in numbers and in organization during the first three quarters of 1923, and was somewhat prematurely congratulated on its assiduity in adopting the factory cell system.⁴ But the German youth league, like the German party, suffered heavily in prestige and in numbers from the disaster of October 1923,⁵ and discipline also sagged. Its congress at Leipzig on May 10–11, 1924, revealed a large and vocal Left opposition. A resolution approving the decisions of the Frankfurt congress of the KPD was carried by the comparatively narrow majority of 62 to 42; and, when the official delegation from KIM headquarters in Moscow presented a long resolution on the tasks of the league, the clauses prescribing united front tactics were rejected by 56 votes to 45.⁶ But, in spite of this symptom of restiveness, the

¹ *Pravda*, December 20, 1922; for the change in Comintern see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, p. 449.

² *From Third to Fourth: a Report on the Activities of the YCI* (1924), p. 39.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 70–72; for the fusion of the two Internationals see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 3, p. 412.

⁴ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 9, May 1923, pp. 278–279; No. 2, October 1923, pp. 51–52; see also p. 918 above. It was later admitted that no real progress in reorganization of the league on a cell basis was made till after the fourth congress of KIM in July 1924 (*Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 10, June 25, pp. 233–235).

⁵ Membership declined between October 1923 and July 1924 from 70,000 to 40,000 (*From Third to Fourth: a Report on the Activities of the YCI* (1924), p. 39); the number of cells fell from 500 in October 1923 to 150 in mid-1924, though 300 were still claimed at the fourth congress of KIM in July 1924 (*Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 11–12, July–August 1924, pp. 341, 343). The decline in membership continued down to the end of 1924 (*Bericht über die Verhandlungen des X. Parteitags der KPD* (1926), pp. 80–81); in 1925 it was only about 25,000 (*Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 10, June 1925, pp. 232–233).

⁶ *Ibid.* No. 10, June 1924, pp. 312–313; this article by Schüller plays down the seriousness of the dispute.

fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924, in reviewing the work of KIM, was able to record "great progress", and once again praised KIM for having taken "real steps on the way to transform the communist youth leagues *into a mass organization of young workers*". A long section on the tasks of KIM, which followed well-worn lines, contained a paragraph on "*the immediate struggle for power*". This referred to the experiences in Bulgaria and Germany in the preceding autumn, and pointed to the need for preparatory work "under the leadership of the communist party" in the youth leagues: "especially necessary is the systematic military education and training of the membership of the communist youth league under the leadership of the communist party".¹ Though, however, the establishment of closer links between national parties and national youth leagues was one of the aims which KIM sought to promote, this purpose was partly nullified by the increasing authority of KIM itself. Since the chain of authority from Comintern to youth leagues passed through KIM rather than through the national parties, and since this authority was freely used to prescribe the attitude to be adopted by youth leagues in controversies within the corresponding national parties, jealousies between party and league arising out of interventions by KIM sometimes outweighed exhortations to close collaboration.

When the fourth congress of KIM met immediately after the fifth congress of Comintern in July 1924, it held its first meeting jointly with the sixth congress of the Russian Komsomol which was sitting at the same time.² Its delegates purported to speak

¹ The Russian and German texts of this resolution (*Kommunistischesii International v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 452-459; *Thesen und Resolutionen des V. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924), pp. 146-153), like those of the trade union resolution (see p. 559 above), show some odd discrepancies. The 11 numbered sections of the Russian text are reduced to 9 in the German text by the omission of the Russian section (5), which contains the passage recording the progress of KIM quoted above, and by the conversion of the paragraph about "the immediate struggle for power", which figures as a separate section (9) in the Russian text, into a sub-section ((7) (d)) of the German text; the phrase about "military education and training" quoted above appears, however, only in the German and not in the Russian text. For other discrepancies see p. 922 above (cell organization) and p. 962 above (sport). Plausible explanations might be suggested for some of these discrepancies; but others seem purely accidental.

² The congress of KIM lasted from July 15 to 25, 1924 and was regularly reported in *Pravda*, as well as in *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 11-12, July-August 1924, pp. 335-353; for the Komsomol congress see Vol. 2, p. 94.

for a million members from 52 countries divided between all five continents.¹ Zinoviev sent a letter apologizing for his absence and reminding the congress that the danger of war was a topic of primary interest to youth.² Manuilsky, who appeared as principal representative of Comintern, praised the decisions of the fifth congress which had laid down lines of policy for KIM to follow.³ Schüller, on behalf of IKKIM, claimed that all communist youth leagues, with the exception of the Italian league, which had been led astray by Bordiga's ultra-Left deviation, had loyally followed the policies of Comintern. In oblique reference to the recent troubles in the German league, he declared that collaboration recently established between the Russian and German leagues must be strengthened still further, and that the French league must also be drawn into it, so that Bolshevization might proceed on an international scale.⁴ A resolution approving the work of IKKIM since the previous congress was jointly sponsored by the Russian, German and French delegations.⁵ It referred particularly to "the sharp and relentless struggle" waged by KIM "against opportunist deviations and survivals of social democracy in Comintern", naming France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia as the countries in which this struggle had been acute: it noted that "in the Russian question KIM and the Russian youth league placed themselves decisively on the side of the Bolshevik old guard, of the overwhelming majority of the party, and against the opposition".⁶ But it also condemned "so-called *ultra-Left deviations*", specifically mentioning "the erroneous political and theoretical conceptions which even today are found in the Italian youth league, though the league in its practical activity is in complete agreement with

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 7, September 1924, cols. 41-43.

² *Pravda*, July 15, 1924.

³ *Ibid.* July 16, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.* July 19, 1924; *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 11-12, July-August 1924, p. 340.

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 11-12, p. 353; the text of the resolution is in *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der KJfI* (1924), pp. 5-10.

⁶ In a circular letter of March 20, 1924, to all youth leagues affiliated to KIM, IKKIM expounded the issues which had arisen in the Russian party and called for support for the "Bolshevik old guard"; *Pravda*, in summarizing this letter in its issue of April 1, 1924, reported that the central committees of the principal European youth leagues had already rallied to the views of IKKIM and of the Russian party central committee. For the text of the letter see *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 7, March 1924, pp. 212-214.

the directions of KIM". This condemnation of the ultra-Left provoked the dissent of a majority of the Italian delegation.¹ The other resolutions of the congress were carried unanimously. They included resolutions on "the propaganda of Leninism", against "bourgeois militarism and the danger of new imperialist wars", on work among the peasants, and on the colonial question.² The proceedings of the fourth congress of KIM were not unfairly summed up by one of its leaders, the Yugoslav delegate, Vujović, when he wrote that it had "declared its complete solidarity with the fifth congress of Comintern".³ Fidelity to the senior organization had become the hall-mark of KIM.

When the fifth enlarged IKKI met in March 1925, the campaign for Bolshevization was in full swing; and Vujović, as spokesman of KIM, eagerly proclaimed its application to the youth leagues. The period of the capitalist offensive and the partial stabilization of capitalism was, however, unpropitious to youth work. Vujović explained that the history of the organization up to the present had fallen into two periods — before and after the foundation of Comintern. In the first period, it had been mainly engaged in a struggle against social-democratic parties; in the second, "the chief content of the work of the leagues has been to assist in the foundation of communist parties in all countries". Only after the communist parties had gained strength had it been possible for the youth leagues to recruit the masses of young workers; and even now very few of the leagues had in their membership a majority of workers from the bench. Vujović complained of neglect of the youth leagues which, "especially in the last few years, have had pretty poor experiences with some parties".⁴ The session of IKKI was followed in April 1925 by a corresponding session of IKKIM, attended by

¹ *Pravda*, July 26, 1924.

² *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der KJI* (1924), pp. 11-12, 35-46, 47-58, 64-69; for other resolutions see p. 923 above (cells), and pp. 962-963 above (sport).

³ *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 7 (36), September 1924, col. 45. Schüller wrote in similar terms, and added that the congress had "set before KIM the definite task of Bolshevization" (*Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 115, September 2, 1924, pp. 1499-1500); but the word "Bolshevization" was not yet widely enough current to be used in the resolutions of the congress.

⁴ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 145-147, 151.

24 voting delegates from 15 countries and 21 consultative delegates.¹ Bukharin addressed the session on Marxism-Leninism, and Vujović made a report on Bolshevization, which emphasized in stronger terms than hitherto the dependence of the youth leagues on the parties. The theses unanimously adopted provided that "all officials and a considerable number of members" of every youth league should also be members of the party, and declared that "only a strong party core trained in the spirit of party discipline can ensure the necessary relations between league and party".²

Attempts elsewhere to breathe fresh life into the leagues were only moderately successful. The German Communist Youth League once more gave trouble. As in 1924, when united front policies were at stake, it threw up a substantial opposition from the Left,³ so now, on the issue of Bolshevization, an ultra-Left minority appeared in the League. At a conference in May 1925, at which Ruth Fischer spoke for the KPD, the party line was approved by a majority of 39 to 8, of whom 7 were ultra-Leftists.⁴ When the tenth congress of the KPD met in Berlin in July 1925, the central committee of the league was said to have come completely into line.⁵ On July 18, 1925, immediately after the congress, a joint conference of the KPD and of the German youth league was convened on the initiative of IKKIM. But the KPD was too much concerned with its own internal difficulties⁶ to show any lively interest in the junior organization. Half the delegates nominated by the party to attend the conference, and two of those from the youth league, did not appear. Recriminations on familiar lines were exchanged between the two organizations; and the conference would have been a complete failure but for the presence of a representative of IKKIM from Moscow, who secured the adoption of theses on the Bolshevization of the KPD and on its obligation to work among the youth, and of a resolution on

¹ The session lasted from April 9 to 13, 1925, and was briefly reported in *Pravda* and more fully in *Beilage zur Jugend-Internationale*, No. 8-9, April-May 1925.

² For the text see R. Schüller *et al.*, *Geschichte der Kommunistischen Jugend-Internationale*, iii (1930), 190.

³ See p. 990 above.

⁴ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 10, June 1925, pp. 232-233.

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 11-12, July-August 1925, pp. 268-271.

⁶ See pp. 325-326 above.

collaboration between the party and the youth league.¹

A few days later, on July 21–22, 1925, delegates of the communist youth organizations of European countries met in conference in Berlin. The conference not only issued manifestos on the danger of war, and on events in China and Morocco, but made pronouncements on current controversies in the European communist parties, being specially concerned to issue warnings against ultra-Left deviations in Germany and Poland.² It also addressed to the “Anglo-Russian committee for trade union unity” a letter which must have made an odd impression on the British members of that body. After mentioning events in Morocco and China, it denounced British policy in Europe as displayed in the forthcoming guarantee treaty, in “the attempt to draw Germany into a military anti-Soviet alliance”, and in the Baltic states. It spoke eloquently of the danger of war (“there is a smell of powder and blood”), exhorted the committee to raise its voice, which would constitute “a serious warning for the international bourgeoisie”, and concluded with the conviction that “the Anglo-Russian committee will do its international duty”.³ Every year since 1915 a day in the first week in September had been proclaimed as “international youth day”; and, since the tradition of opposition to imperialist wars had been inherited by KIM from the youth organization formed to protest against the war of 1914, it was appropriate that September 6, 1925 — the tenth anniversary of the first “international youth day” — should be used for proclamations and demonstrations against war.⁴ In December 1925 the Communist Youth International announced an “international trade union week”, which coincided with the visit of an international delegation of “young workers” to the Soviet Union, and served as the occasion for

¹ For the proceedings and for the text of the theses and resolution see *Bericht über die Verhandlungen des X. Parteitags der KPD* (1926), pp. 719–744. This virtually ended the ultra-Left opposition in the German league; in October 1925 the congress of the league voted approval of the Comintern line (see p. 332 above).

² *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 125, August 27, 1925, pp. 1809–1818; *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 11–12, July–August 1925, pp. 266–268; *The Young Communist International: Between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses* (1928), p. 63.

³ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 128, September 4, 1925, p. 1863.

⁴ For the proclamation of IKKIM see *ibid.* No. 125, August 27, 1925, pp. 1799–1800.

eloquent appeals for trade union unity and for support of the Anglo-Russian joint council.¹

In spite, however, of these stereotyped manifestations, the period was unpropitious to revolutionary enthusiasm, and the youthful fervour of the earlier years could no longer be kindled. The report of IKKI to the sixth session of the enlarged IKKI in February–March 1926 spoke in emphatic terms of the deterioration in the material position of young workers.² The proceedings of the session of IKKIM which immediately followed the sixth enlarged IKKI were couched in a minor key. Vujović, who made the main report, admitted the failure of the leagues to increase their membership, and attributed it to the weakness of relations between communist parties and youth leagues: in most countries the party core in the league was still “insignificant”, and party discipline was lacking.³ Other delegates faithfully echoed the proceedings of the senior organization in such matters as the campaign against war and the attention now paid to the colonial countries in general, and to the Far East in particular. A German delegate attempted to defend the point of view of Ruth Fischer — the last stirring of an open opposition — and was warned against attempting to “transfer to the German youth league the discussion in the communist party of the Soviet Union”.⁴ The main resolution of the session criticized the failure of the leagues to create a party core in their leadership and to improve relations with the national parties: they were accused of attempting to assume “the character of little parties”.⁵ Even in the question of cell organization, in which KIM had once taken the initiative and pioneered the way for Comintern, the youth leagues now lagged behind.⁶ Youth movements were everywhere in decline; and the decline was reflected in the weakness of the international

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 162, December 10, 1925, pp. 2425–2432.

² *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 319.

³ Vujović's report was printed under the title *Die Lage der Arbeiterjugend und die nächsten Aufgaben der KJY* as *Beilage zur Jugend-Internationale*, No. 9, May–June 1926.

⁴ For brief reports of this session see *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 32, February 26, 1926, p. 454; No. 50, March 26, 1926, p. 700; No. 51, March 30, 1926, pp. 710–711.

⁵ *Beschlüsse und Resolutionen des Plenums des Exekutiv-Komitees der KJY* (1926), p. 6.

⁶ For the resolution of the session on cell organization see p. 935 above.

organization. Lominadze's testimony on this point, at the seventh congress of the Russian Komsomol in Moscow in March 1926, was frank and unqualified :

Masses of the youth began to abandon the political struggle as the wave of the revolutionary movement receded, and this, comrades, proved an objective obstacle to the development of the Communist Youth International.

The decline was depicted as one of the specific consequences of the stabilization of capitalism in 1924 and 1925 and of the growth of " bourgeois counter-revolution " :

*The workers' movement fell off, and with it fell off in the same, or perhaps even larger, measure the revolutionary youth movement.*¹

It is difficult to guess how far the loss by the leagues of any real independence, which was virtually complete in 1926, was a contributory cause of the decline in membership and the waning of enthusiasm. But the fitting of the leagues into the framework of KIM and, through the national parties, into that of Comintern made them part of a unified apparatus at the cost of sapping much of their initial vitality.

¹ VII S'ezd Vsesoyuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soyuzu Molodezhi (1926), pp. 263-264.

CHAPTER 46

THE PROGRAMME OF COMINTERN

IT had always been assumed that Comintern itself, as well as its constituent parties, must sooner or later have a programme expounding the principles on which it was based and the policies which it sought to promote. But the question did not arise in concrete form till the summer of 1922, when on June 11 the second enlarged IKKI appointed a commission of 33 to draw up the programme of Comintern and to collaborate in the drafting of programmes of the parties: the delegates constituting this commission were to be drawn from the Soviet Union, Germany, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Japan, one Scandinavian and one Balkan country. The IKKI resolution also called on the parties to appoint commissions for the purpose of drafting their programmes without further delay.¹ When the commission met on June 28, 1922, a radical division of opinion at once arose on the character of the programme. Radek, supported by Klara Zetkin, argued that what was required was "a programme of transitional demands to serve as a lever for action leading to the victory of the proletariat", sufficiently broad to take account of the varying conditions of different countries. The theoretically minded Bukharin retorted that these were questions of tactics which had no proper place in the programme at all. The programme should deal with the theory of capitalism and of imperialism; the maximum programme of communism; the "essential demands of the period of the political dictatorship"; and, perhaps, relations between communist parties and other parties. This general part of the programme would be common to all parties; in addition, each party could have a specific part dealing with Radek's tactical questions. Zinoviev hedged, expressing doubts of the possibility of establishing a

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 49, June 16, 1922, p. 365.

common programme, but concluding that something should be done to generalize the experience of Soviet Russia and of world revolution up to the present time.¹

If further sessions of the commission were held, they did not resolve this deadlock ; and when the fourth congress of Comintern met in November 1922, it had before it not an agreed recommendation for a programme, but three tentative draft programmes from the pens of Bukharin, Varga and Thalheimer,² of which the two latter diverged sharply from the first on the main issue how far the programme was to be restricted to the fundamental aims and principles of world revolution, and how much space, if any, should be devoted to demands characteristic of the transitional period to socialism and to "partial" demands imposed by the day-to-day practice of parties affiliated with the Comintern. In addition to the three draft programmes, the congress had also received a tentative programme drafted by the Bulgarian Communist Party ; and articles had appeared on the subject by Varga, Rudas, Rappaport and Šmeral.³ The proceedings of the commission had also provoked a reply from the central committee of the Italian party, which rejected the inclusion of tactical issues on the ground that each party must settle them for itself.⁴

The immediate fate of these diverse documents was settled by Lenin's speech at the congress.⁵ Much of the speech was devoted to an analysis of NEP — a subject intimately connected

¹ The report of the session of June 28, 1922, was circulated on July 4, 1922, to the parties, and is preserved in the Humbert-Droz archives, 0359 : no reports of later sessions have been found.

² Bukharin's draft is in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 222 November 21, 1922, pp. 1581-1588 (or in Russian in N. Bukharin, *Ataka* (1924), pp. 285-303), Varga's and Thalheimer's in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 22, November 4, 1922, cols. 6141-6162 ; this issue contained also a tentative programme of the KPD which was drafted by the programme commission of the party on the basis of Thalheimer's outline.

³ These articles were published in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 22, November 4, 1922, cols. 5867-5904.

⁴ This reply, which was apparently not published, was mentioned by Bukharin in his speech at the congress (*Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), p. 422 ; it is not clear whether the "report" mentioned in the same passage as having been sent to the parties was an unpublished report of the commission or merely the record of its proceedings).

⁵ For this speech see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 444-445.

with the controversy on the place of transitional policies in the Comintern programme. In the course of his discussion of NEP as a "retreat", Lenin spoke in passing of the draft programmes :

I personally think that it would be correct if we discussed all the programmes only in a preliminary way, so to speak, in first reading, and sent them to be printed, but took no final decision now, in the present year. . . . We have not yet thought out with any degree of completeness the question of a possible retreat and how to make that retreat secure.¹

Lenin's personal opinion was at this time mandatory ; and, when Bukharin made his report on the programme a few days later, it was already accepted that no decision would be taken by the congress and that the field was open to discussion. Bukharin's draft programme was divided into four main chapters ; (1) capitalist society, (2) the liberation of labour, and communist society, (3) the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the struggle for communism, and (4) the road to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Bukharin devoted the major part of his speech to an analysis of the first chapter, urging in particular that NEP, which had restored "economic rationality" after the upheavals of war communism, was a necessary stage on the road to socialism. In speaking of what he called "general tactical" problems, Bukharin made his much criticized statement on the propriety of forming "military blocs with bourgeois states" and on the duty of communists in a bourgeois state allied to a proletarian state to contribute to the victory of the "two allies".² He then turned more briefly to the alternative proposals, sharply dissenting from those (he named Radek, Šmeral and Varga, but not Thalheimer, who shared the same view) who wanted to introduce into the programme such immediate tactical demands as the united front, the workers' and peasants' government and so forth. Varga had said that it would be cowardice to exclude these questions ; but Varga's courage was an "opportunist courage". Three times during his speech Bukharin applied the opprobrious epithet "opportunist" to the demand for the inclusion of tactical issues : this, he said, could mean changing the programme every two weeks. He criticized the German draft programme (once more

¹ Lenin, *Sochineniya*, xxvii, 344.

² See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 447.

without naming Thalheimer) as too concrete, too "European" and too long, and more briefly dismissed the Bulgarian draft.¹ By the end of the speech it was clear that future discussions would have to proceed on the basis of Bukharin's draft. Thalheimer in his reply accentuated his points of difference with Bukharin. He embarked on an analysis of imperialism which revealed him as a staunch adherent of Rosa Luxemburg's theory of capitalist accumulation;² this theory, though still at this time treated as an open question in the Russian party, had been criticized by Lenin and was rejected by Bukharin. Thalheimer argued strongly against Bukharin for the inclusion of transitional demands, and thought that without them the programme would be "of little practical value to the western parties". The most piquant passage in Thalheimer's speech was a long quotation from Lenin, who had argued in the autumn of 1917 for the retention of "minimum" demands in the Russian party programme against Bukharin and V. Smirnov, who sought to restrict the programme to the unique issue of the transition to socialism.³ Finally, he maintained that NEP, though a progressive measure in Russian economic conditions, would represent in western conditions a process of retrogression, and that its utility there was highly doubtful.⁴ After Kabakchiev had attempted to defend the Bulgarian draft, the German delegation formally proposed to postpone the consideration of the programme to the next

¹ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 404-424.

² Rosa Luxemburg, in her work *The Accumulation of Capital*, argued that Marx's demonstration of the collapse of capitalism, being based on the hypothesis of a totally capitalist world, was incomplete, since capitalism could continue to maintain itself so long as non-capitalist sectors of the world were still open for exploitation; when these disappeared, then the collapse would be inevitable. Bukharin, at the session of the enlarged IKKI in June 1923, attacked Luxemburgism as the view "that the scientific proof of the collapse of capitalism is possible only with the help of this theory" (*Rasshirenniy Plenum Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1923), p. 244); the orthodox Bolshevik criticism of it was that it was fatalistic, and therefore potentially Menshevik, since it presupposed the inevitability of the collapse, and failed to take into account the rôle of the proletariat and the party and the need for a working alliance with the peasantry and with the colonial peoples.

³ The passage quoted by Thalheimer is in Lenin, *Sochineniya*, xxi, 311-312.

⁴ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 427-440; for this argument see pp. 1006-1007 below.

congress, and the Russian delegation asked for a twenty-four hour adjournment to consider its position.¹

When the debate on the programme was resumed two days later, it was clear that detailed discussions had taken place in the Russian delegation, not on the issue of postponement to the next congress, which was a foregone conclusion, but on the attitude to be adopted to the "tactical" or "transitional" demands. Bukharin's insistence on the opportunist character of the proposal to include these demands in the programme had evidently rankled; and the decision was now taken to abandon the stand taken by Bukharin in his first speech, and to agree to their inclusion.² A declaration was read to the congress explaining that the controversy about transitional demands had aroused the incorrect impression of an "opposition of principle", and that the appearance of such demands in the programmes of national parties, or the defence of them in the general section of a programme, was not to be treated as "opportunism": the declaration was signed on behalf of the Russian delegation by Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek and Bukharin — an imposing constellation.³ Zinoviev, on behalf of the presidium, now put forward a resolution requesting all parties which had not yet submitted draft programmes to do so not less than three months before the date of the next congress. The resolution laid it down that the general part of the programmes must provide "the theoretical foundation for all transitional and partial demands", and condemned attempts to treat the introduction of such demands into the programme as "opportunism". Bordiga obstinately declared that the Italian delegation had agreed with Bukharin's speech and would have liked to proceed at once to adopt the programme. But this objection was brushed aside; and, after Zinoviev had explained that a thorough examination of these issues at the present congress was impracticable, and that a short discussion

¹ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), pp. 441-448.

² According to a later statement of Souvarine (*Bulletin Communiste*, No. 8, December 11, 1925, p. 118) Bukharin was overruled by Lenin, who may have been moved partly by his own attitude of October 1917, and partly by his desire to take account of the views of foreign delegations, which was strong at this moment (see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 453).

³ *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1923), p. 542.

would have been not only pointless but harmful, the resolution was unanimously carried.¹

The question of the programme appeared again on the agenda of the third enlarged IKKI, which met in June 1923. The only new documents received during the past six months were draft programmes submitted by the Japanese and British parties; these were not taken very seriously.² Bukharin, who made the only speech on the subject, declined, in Thalheimer's absence, to resume the controversy about Rosa Luxemburg's theory of accumulation. On the other hand, he mentioned three new topics which had become prominent since the last congress and should find their place in the programme; the attitude towards religion, the attitude towards nationality (among the subjects discussed at this session were Hoeglund's deviation about religion, and the "Schlageter campaign"³), and the attitude towards so-called "Red imperialism". This last issue arose out of Bukharin's own statement in the programme debate at the fourth congress on the conclusion of "military blocs with bourgeois states". Bukharin defended himself by citing Soviet support for Turkey at the Lausanne conference and for Sun Yat-sen in China; this illustrated "the possibility of different combinations which can all be treated under the general standpoint of the strategy of the proletarian states". He took issue with the phrase "workers' imperialism" coined by Treint in a laudatory sense: such terminology was highly misleading and confusing. After this brief speech, Bukharin proposed a resolution to the effect that these topics should be dealt with in the programme, that the parties should be invited to submit further information and proposals, and that IKKI should appoint a small commission to keep in touch with the parties and prepare a final draft for the

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 542-543.

² The Japanese programme embarrassingly repeated Bukharin's rejected draft and added to it a series of specific "transitional" demands of the Japanese party (*Materialen zur Frage des Programms der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924), pp. 274-278); it is not clear whether the British programme approved at the sixth congress of the CPGB in May 1924 (*Speeches and Documents: Sixth Conference of the CPGB* (1924), pp. 35-41) and published in *Communist Review*, v, No. 2 (June 1924), pp. 79-103, was the programme submitted in 1923, or represented a later attempt.

³ For Hoeglund see pp. 232-233 above; for the Schlageter campaign see *The Interregnum, 1923-1924*, pp. 179-183.

consideration of the fifth congress of Comintern in the following year. This resolution was adopted without further debate.¹

Once the delegates had dispersed, interest in the programme remained at a low ebb,² and revived only with the approach of the fifth Comintern congress in June 1924. Collections of documents on the programme were published in preparation for the congress ; but the fact that almost all the documents dated from the period of the fourth congress in November 1922 showed how little progress had been made in the interval.³ Early in June 1924 the programme commission held several meetings, attended by Bukharin, Varga, Thalheimer, Klara Zetkin and others, at which the old arguments were re-hashed without any apparent change of position. Varga tried to turn the tables on Bukharin by accusing him, in his references to the contradictions of capitalism, of fatalism "à la Rosa Luxemburg", and reverted to the thesis of super-imperialism which Bukharin had once held :

It is theoretically possible that finally, after several imperialist wars, a single imperialist state may remain which will dominate all the others and, in so doing, swallow up all these contradictions.

Bukharin now called this "a purely academic prognostication" which had no place in the programme. Thalheimer reasserted the claim of the transitional demands, which Bukharin, bound by the decision taken at the fourth congress, could no longer resist. The first meeting ended with a promise from Bukharin to prepare a revised draft of the programme for the congress. At the same, or another, meeting the discussion turned once more on the

¹ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1923), pp. 243-248, 317 ; Treint's article on "workers' imperialism" is in *Bulletin Communiste*, No. 15, April 12, 1923, p. 155.

² According to a note in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 1, "the discussion proceeded very weakly (except in Russia)". Even of the Russian leaders, only Bukharin showed concern for the Comintern programme ; Ryazanov taunted the fourteenth party congress in December 1925 with indifference to it : "Not one of you has heard of it, not one of you knows it" (*XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B)* (1926), p. 690).

³ *Materialen zur Frage des Programms der Kommunistischen Internationale* (1924) ; *Le Programme de l'Internationale Communiste : Projets présentés à la Discussion du V^e Congrès Mondial* (1924) ; a corresponding Russian volume has not been traced. The volume *Ataka* in which Bukharin republished his 1922 draft (see p. 999, note 2 above) has a preface dated May 1924.

applicability of NEP to other countries, which was stoutly defended by Bukharin :

The opinion prevails abroad that NEP was introduced in order to preserve power ; and so indeed it was. But later we became convinced that NEP was more than a simple manœuvre.¹

When Bukharin made his report on the programme to the fifth congress, the major controversies of the fourth congress had largely disappeared. Agreement had been reached not to pursue the discussion of Rosa Luxemburg's theory, which was not essential to the programme ; and the demand to include transitional demands had been conceded. The proposal had been made, and accepted by the commission, that Bukharin and Thalheimer should in the course of the congress agree on a draft which would then be circulated to the parties for their views : the final adoption of the programme would once more be postponed until the next congress.² Having announced these arrangements to the congress, Bukharin need have said no more. But a diversion had been created on the eve of the fifth congress by a " discussion article " in the German party journal from the pen of the young party intellectual of Russian origin who, under the name of Boris,³ denounced Bukharin's views on the peasantry (failure to distinguish between the different class affiliations of different categories of peasant) and on nationalism (support for bourgeois nationalist parties and for the bourgeois doctrine of national self-determination), and protested against Bukharin's assertion of " the complete admissibility in principle of blocs between proletarian states and some bourgeois states against other bourgeois states ", which might commit proletarian parties to support national defence even in capitalist countries. Varga's draft was denounced as a re-hash of Hilferding and Thalheimer's as purely " reformist ".⁴ Boris was not a figure of any great importance or influence. But he represented the incipient " ultra-Left " trend in the KPD,

¹ *Bulletin du V^e Congrès de l'Internationale Communiste*, No. 2, June 15, 1924, pp. 2-3 ; No. 5, June 20, 1924, p. 2. No other record of these meetings has been traced ; the reports are obviously fragmentary, and other meetings were probably held.

² *Protokoll : Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 511-512.

³ See p. 102 above.

⁴ *Die Internationale*, vii, No. 10-11, June 2, 1924, pp. 328-348.

a movement of protest in the name of Marxist principles against the "opportunism" of Moscow, which had began to excite both indignation and apprehension among the Comintern leaders;¹ and the appearance of his article in the German party journal, whose editor Korsch was himself suspect as an ultra-Leftist, lent it additional significance. Bukharin devoted a large part of his speech to a refutation of Boris. He argued that Comintern could not remain satisfied with the simple, would-be radical, diagnosis of a final crisis of capitalism. Within the final catastrophic stage on which capitalism had entered, minor crises and recoveries might still occur. Account must be taken of these, and "partial demands" were inevitable. Bukharin embarked on an elaborate defence of NEP. It was not, as most foreign communists had been inclined to suppose, something for which the Russian party had to apologize — a political concession made out of sheer necessity to the petty bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it was "the only correct economic policy of the proletariat", the policy which "ensures the growth of productive forces". It was war communism which had been a political move, dictated by the needs of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie. Complete socialization at one stroke was impossible, both for technical and for political reasons. War communism had done nothing to help production: it had been nothing more than "the rational consumption of existing stocks". It had arisen out of "conflicts between economic rationality, i.e. the necessity of an economic policy, and the necessities and purposes of the direct political struggle". A planned economy must grow organically: "We are in a position to operate a planned economy only in so far as the material basis for a planned economy is present". Thus NEP in Bukharin's eyes (though he did not say so explicitly) remained the only road to planning.² Thalheimer agreed in the main with Bukharin, but thought it necessary to "defend" war communism: without the preliminary stage of war communism NEP in Russia would have been impossible, "since the resistance of the bourgeoisie had to be broken, radically broken, before it

¹ See p. 110 above.

² *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d), ii, 512-530; Bukharin's argument on the nature of NEP anticipated the controversy with Zinoviev in the following year (see Vol. 2, pp. 68-75).

was prepared to adapt itself to the leadership of the working class".¹

After these speeches no further discussion of the programme took place in plenary session, and the question was referred back to the commission. Here Bukharin presented the promised revised draft.² This was discussed in detail in the commission, and more than 50 amendments adopted. The amended draft was submitted to the last plenary session of the congress. Bukharin explained that two passages which had figured in earlier drafts were now omitted. The first related to "the right of Red intervention" to support revolution in other countries (this, he observed, was omitted "not out of theoretical considerations"); the other was "a more extensive discussion of the tactics of the united front and of the slogan of the worker-peasant government". These were both questions on which divisions of opinion were likely to have occurred. Bukharin proposed that a small drafting committee consisting of himself, Thalheimer and another member of the German delegation, should complete the necessary "technical-literary" work (the programme was to be drafted simultaneously in Russian and German and then translated into other languages), and that IKKI should then publish and circulate the draft and carry on discussions with the parties in preparation for its eventual adoption by the next congress. A resolution to this effect was adopted without discussion.³

The draft programme which emerged from the fifth congress, and was included among its resolutions,⁴ adhered in the main lines to Bukharin's draft of 1922. The first chapter remained unchanged. The second was merely brought up to date by the

¹ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 576.

² This was not published, but what appears to be a mimeographed copy of it is preserved (with the last page missing) in the New York Public Library.

³ *Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* (n.d.), ii, 1007-1008; the resolution is also in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 119, September 16, 1924, p. 1569, and in *Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 66. No record of the discussions in the commission was published: some of them were evidently reflected in an article by Thalheimer dated June 30, 1924, which appeared in *Bol'shevik*, No. 7-8, July 15, 1924, pp. 14-20, and in *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 99, August 1, 1924, pp. 1276-1278.

⁴ For the text see *ibid.* No. 136, October 18, 1924, pp. 1796-1810; *Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), ii, 66-86.

insertion of passing references to "pacifist illusions" and to Fascism. In the third chapter, which dealt with the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the transition to socialism, new subsections were inserted on "war communism", "the struggle between economic forms" and "the economic bloc of workers and peasants"; the two last contained an analysis of NEP, which was, however, not mentioned by name. The question of the universal applicability of NEP appeared to be left open: it was admitted that, "the stronger the influence of small-scale private property, the greater will be the specific gravity of purely market relations with all the consequences flowing from them". The greatest changes were made in the last chapter on ways and means of attaining the "dictatorship of the proletariat". A new section was added on strategy and tactics covering the vexed question of "partial" demands. "Refusal to advance partial demands and transitional slogans", it declared, "is incompatible with the tactical principles of communism, for it actually dooms the party to inactivity and divides it from the masses." It was admitted that each party must formulate its own "transitional slogans" in accordance with particular circumstances. But "the tactics of the united front and the slogan of the worker-peasant government" were described as "a most important constituent part of the tactics of communist parties for the whole revolutionary period". By passing lightly over controversial issues, substantial agreement seemed at last to be in sight.¹ In the four years' interval between the fifth and sixth congresses, however, many changes occurred, and the draft programme was to be fundamentally recast before its final adoption in 1928.²

Discussions of the programme of KIM proceeded simultaneously and on parallel lines with those on the Comintern programme, complicated only by the fact that KIM already possessed

¹ See, however, a further article by Thalheimer in *Bol'shevik*, No. 10, September 5, 1924, pp. 12-18, criticizing the draft and complaining that only the Russian and German parties had contributed to the discussion.

² The resolution on the reorganization of IKKI adopted at the sixth enlarged IKKI of February-March 1926 (see pp. 907-908 above) included a decision to set up "an authoritative standing commission" to supervise discussions of the programme in preparation for the sixth congress, which was at that time expected to meet in February-March 1927.

a programme adopted at its first congress in Berlin in 1919,¹ but now recognized as obsolete. At the third congress of KIM in December 1922, the executive committee presented a draft programme, which redefined the relations of KIM to Comintern, and introduced new topics not included in the earlier programme, notably the necessity to work in colonial and semi-colonial countries.² Since, however, the discussion of the programme of Comintern had been adjourned, at Lenin's instigation, to a later congress, a similar procedure was followed by KIM. The draft programme prepared by the executive committee was provisionally adopted for discussion by the youth leagues, and left for further consideration at the next session of the bureau, which would "decide on the programme in its final form".³ When the fourth session of the bureau of KIM was held in June 1923, immediately after the session of the enlarged IKKI, it was once again content to follow the lead of the senior organization, merely deciding, as IKKI had done, on the introduction of further items into the programme.⁴ A year later the position was still the same. The fourth congress of KIM was no more able than the fifth congress of Comintern to reach a final conclusion on its programme, and passed a brief resolution approving in principle the draft programme in its latest form and inviting its executive committee and the youth leagues to discuss it "regularly and intensively in the press".⁵

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, pp. 401-402.

² *Bericht vom 3. Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Jugend-Internationale* (1923), p. 168.

³ *Ibid.* p. 270.

⁴ *Resolutions and Theses Adopted by the Fourth Bureau Session of the YCI* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 17-18; for the discussion in the enlarged IKKI see pp. 1003-1004 above.

⁵ *Die Beschlüsse des IV. Kongresses der KJI* (1924), p. 63.

NOTE A

SOVIET-GERMAN MILITARY COLLABORATION

THROUGHOUT this period, the secret military agreements formed the hard kernel of Soviet-German relations. Since only those immediately concerned were initiated into the details of this collaboration, and the records, at any rate on the German side, were systematically destroyed, information about it is intermittent and imperfect. Collaboration in aeronautical matters is the best documented, and was probably the most important.

Early in 1924 a crisis occurred in the affairs of the Junkers aircraft factory at Fili, operated under a concession agreement from the Soviet Government.¹ The Reichswehr demanded a large expansion of the Fili enterprise and the association with Junkers of another firm specializing in the manufacture of aircraft engines (apparently the Bayerische Motorenwerke) — a project which from the outset encountered strong opposition from Junkers.² As a result of negotiations a new agreement was signed on May 5, 1924, between Sondergruppe R. of the Reichswehr Ministry, the Junkers firm and the Soviet authorities. Under this agreement, or on the occasion of it, the Reichswehr promised to Junkers a further subvention of eight million gold marks, in addition to four millions already advanced, for the extension of the factory at Fili; the Soviet authorities promised to place a large order for aircraft for the Red Fleet.³ The shortage of Soviet orders for Fili was one of a list of grievances put forward by Brockdorff-Rantzau in an interview with Trotsky a month later.⁴ But the question of the supply of aeroplane engines remained acute; and in June 1924 Rozenkolts was trying

¹ See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 436.

² Letters of February 29, 1924, from Junkers to the military authorities were published in *Die Pfälzische Post*, October 11, 1928; aircraft engines were at this time being purchased by the Soviet Union in Germany (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 9524/671391-2).

³ The agreement was first disclosed in a Social-Democratic Party pamphlet of March 1927 *Sowjetgranaten*, translated in C. F. Melville, *The Russian Face of Germany* (1932), pp. 178-204. (This book, while journalistic in style, and sometimes vague and inaccurate in detail, was the first serious attempt to collect and publish comprehensive information about Soviet-German military collaboration.) Details of the agreement are taken from Seeckt's letter of August 18, 1924 (see p. 1011, note 2 below; for a later statement of Seeckt in April 1926 see *Auswärtiges Amt*, 6698/105414-6).

⁴ For the report of this conversation see p. 61, note 1 above.

to persuade Bayerische Motorenwerke to set up a factory to produce them in the Soviet Union.¹ Relations between the Reichswehr and Junkers also continued to be difficult, and provoked an angry letter from Seeckt to Professor Junkers, the head of the firm, on August 18, 1924 :

The march of events in Russia [wrote Seeckt] has proved that only a concentration of all industries interested in air armaments can satisfy the needs of the Reich. It is only on a broad financial basis that it is possible to keep alive in Russia a branch of industry which can serve our rearmament. It would be a fatal error on your part to imagine that the Sondergruppe will continue to invest substantial sums in a purely economic enterprise. A complete modification of the methods of work adopted in Russia is inevitable and urgent.²

Whatever the immediate results of this letter, friction continued. By the beginning of 1925 the factory, which in the previous year had employed 1000 workers, German and Russian, was said to have been "almost at a standstill". On the other side complaints were made that the Soviet Government had failed to carry out its promise to provide living quarters for the German workers.³ In May 1925 the Soviet authorities proposed that they should take over the factory at Fili, Junkers undertaking to supply in future only technical help and advice; and Junkers and Fischer, the representative of the German Ministry of War who was then in Moscow, were inclined to agree.⁴ But the German Government evidently rejected the plan. In the spring of 1926 the Junkers firm, unable to obtain satisfaction of its claims against the German Government or, in view of the peculiar status of the enterprise, to take legal action, circulated a memorandum of its grievances to Reichstag deputies and other prominent persons.⁵ Thereafter the affair was hushed up. The factory continued to operate, though it does not appear that the difficulty of manufacturing engines there was ever solved.⁶ The Reichswehr gradually became less

¹ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/162746.

² Seeckt's letter was published in *Vorwärts*, October 12, 1928.

³ *Pravda*, March 23, 1926 — one of the rare published Soviet sources for these transactions.

⁴ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/162784, 162796-7.

⁵ Much detailed information about this affair not directly relevant to German-Soviet relations will be found in the archives (see especially a memorandum by Seeckt in *Auswärtiges Amt*, 6698/105414-6); for references to it see also C. F. Melville, *The Russian Face of Germany* (1932), pp. 71-73. It appears to have been one of the bases of the revelations in the Reichstag in December 1926, which will be discussed in a subsequent volume.

⁶ For a statement by Hilger to this effect see *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, Vol. 3, p. 436, note 5; G. Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml* (1955), p. 196, speaks of "the not unjustified reproof that his firm [i.e. Junkers] had been guilty of a breach of contract through having failed, contrary to the obligation

dependent on its products, and it was eventually sold to the Soviet Government.¹

Meanwhile in 1924 the business of building aeroplanes was supplemented by a new and more promising development. A large airfield was placed at the disposal of the German air arm at Lipetsk in central Russia north of Voronezh. This had two functions: the training of German pilots in military aviation, and testing of modern military planes — neither of these things being possible on German soil under the restrictions of the Versailles treaty. A certain amount of minor manufacture and repair work was apparently also undertaken. The establishment was an entirely German creation. The Russians, according to the German account of the matter, contributed nothing but the building materials — timber and stone; everything else was transported from Germany. Training began in 1925, and was in full swing by 1926. The permanent staff of the establishment amounted to about 60. In the summer flying season, about 50 pilots and from 70 to 100 technicians came from Germany for training. Secrecy was maintained without great difficulty. The major part of the material was transported by sea from Stettin to Leningrad in order to avoid the embarrassment of customs inspection on intervening frontiers. The personnel travelled as tourists.² The part played by these arrangements in the development of German military aviation is evident. But the advantages on the Soviet side were also substantial. At first, the Russians had everything to learn. The establishment at Lipetsk remained purely German, and no Soviet aviators were ever trained there. But elsewhere, in Soviet flying schools, "with the knowledge and approval of the German Government, former officers, sometimes removed from the active list specifically for this purpose, acted as instructors with the Red air force".³

undertaken by it, to put in operation the manufacture of aeroplane engines". According to *Pravda*, March 23, 1926, the factory "almost entirely failed to equip itself for the production of engines".

¹ According to C. F. Melville, *The Russian Face of Germany* (1932), p. 77, it "became the property of the Soviet Government" at some unspecified date — apparently not later than 1926; Köstring, in an oral statement of 1948, gave the date of the sale as 1929 (*Les Relations Germano-Soviétiques*, ed. J.-B. Duroselle (1954), p. 197). F. L. Carsten in *Survey*, No. 44-45, October 1962, p. 122, quoting the Seeckt archives, states that it was "closed down" in 1927.

² An article by General Helm Speidel in *Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart), i (1953), 17-45, gives a full account of Lipetsk; Speidel was closely associated with the training of flying officers. He does not mention the Junkers' factory, and was less familiar with other aspects of German-Soviet military collaboration; some statements about them in the article are inaccurate. But his account of Lipetsk is probably reliable.

³ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/163630; for the beginning of the Soviet air force see Vol. 2, pp. 419-420.

Of the other aspects of military collaboration less can be recorded. The manufacture of shells for the Reichswehr in Soviet factories continued, and caused a scandal when it came to light in December 1926. A German factory in Moscow manufactured 30-mm. guns for the Reichswehr and presumably also for the Red Army.¹ The factory for tanks at Kazan was supplemented by the establishment of a tank training school on the river Kama (which gave its name to the establishment) to the east of Kazan.² It was apparently modelled on Lipetsk except in one respect: at Kama Soviet officers went through the courses side by side with the Germans.³ The work on the equipment of a poison gas factory at Trotsk in the province of Samara was subject to constant delays and interruptions. Rumours of Soviet-German collaboration in preparing for chemical warfare reached the Polish authorities and found their way into a semi-official Polish publication; and Trotsky, in a speech of May 19, 1924, combined a specious denial of them with a reference to the German raid on the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin.⁴ In July 1924 the equipment, according to a confidential note by Krasin, "has in part been despatched from Germany, and in part is there awaiting despatch". But the only Russian representatives in Berlin who were cognisant of the business were either ill or absent in Moscow, and nobody was available to supervise despatch or maintain contact with the German authorities.⁵ The factory had not reached the stage of production by the end of 1925, when apparently crucial negotiations took place in Berlin. In the middle of December 1925 the Soviet representatives rejected a "draft understanding"

¹ Oral statement of Köstring in 1948 recorded by G. Castellan in *Les Relations Germano-Soviétiques*, ed. J.-B. Duroselle (1954), pp. 157-158.

² According to a German Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum of July 12, 1926, "the establishment of a tank school at Kazan... is in course of preparation"; and a further memorandum of February 9, 1927, referred to it as being already in existence on the same footing as Lipetsk (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/163631, 163486). A report by Blomberg in 1928 described it as "almost completed" (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 9480/276186).

³ *Les Relations Germano-Soviétiques*, ed. J.-B. Duroselle (1954), pp. 180-182; the information comes from a later Polish intelligence report, but was confirmed by Köstring, who added that German officers at Kama wore Soviet uniforms.

⁴ Trotsky said: "As to German aid, I must confess that we should not have refused it (laughter). But we know well that the German Government prefers to wage chemical warfare against our trade delegation rather than to unite German technique with the material resources of the USSR, and so to enrich the German people and help us to climb rapidly on the ladder of economic construction" (*Pravda*, May 20, 1924); the speech is mentioned in V. N. Ipatieff, *The Life of a Chemist* (Stanford, 1946), p. 397. For the raid on the trade delegation see pp. 57-58 above.

⁵ Krasin's pencilled note to Trotsky of July 12, 1924, is in the Trotsky archives, T 829.

about Bersol (the mixed company formed for the purpose), and proposed to revert to the basis of discussions which had been adopted "before December 4". This in turn was rejected by the Germans, who were prepared to pursue the negotiations, "but, for psychological reasons, not on the basis hitherto proposed by the Russians".¹ Available records do not explain the point at issue. But during the first months of 1926 they reveal continued activity in this field, material and samples being secretly forwarded, and tests made. A "Russian-German commission on the production of poisonous gases" presided over by Markhlevsky (who, however, died in 1925) was still in existence at this time.² Then in May 1926 a serious flood damaged the factory at Trotsk;³ and it is not clear that further progress was ever made. But by this time the emphasis had shifted from the manufacture of material to the training of personnel. Just as Fili was supplanted and eventually superseded by Lipetsk, and Kazan by Kama, so the place of the Trotsk factory was taken by a training school for gas warfare near Saratov, which had the code name of Tomka, where a small number of German and Soviet officers worked side by side.⁴

Further changes in the organization of this work on the German side took place early in 1926. GEFU, the ostensibly commercial concern which covered transactions in war material with the Soviet Union, was involved, not only in the Junkers scandal, but in a further scandal with Stolzenberg over the gas factory at Trotsk.⁵ In December 1925 Dirksen, the head of the Russian section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote a memorandum in which he alleged that GEFU "enjoys no great popularity on either the Russian or the German side" and raised the question of replacing it by some other organ. This proposal was heartily endorsed by Brockdorff-Rantzau in two memoranda of the following month.⁶ In the spring of 1926 GEFU was wound up, and a new organization set up in its place called Wirtschaftskontor

¹ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/162858-9. This appears to be the best available source for this episode; but much remains obscure.

² C. F. Melville, *The Russian Face of Germany* (1932), pp. 180-185.

³ V. N. Ipatieff, *The Life of a Chemist* (Stanford, 1946), p. 423.

⁴ Tomka began to function at the beginning of the summer of 1928 (Blomberg's report in *Auswärtiges Amt*, 9480/276186); according to Köstring, not more than four or five German officers went to Tomka each year (*Les Relations Germano-Soviétiques*, ed. J.-B. Duroselle (1954), p. 187).

⁵ This was alluded to in the SPD pamphlet *Sowjetgranaten* (1927) (see C. F. Melville, *The Russian Face of Germany* (1932), p. 184).

⁶ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/162663, 162667-75; the Seeckt archives contain notes of a meeting at the Soviet embassy in Berlin on January 30, 1926, which discussed the future of GEFU (*Survey*, No. 44-45, October 1962, p. 122, note 26).

(WIKO).¹ Towards the end of March 1926, with the negotiations for a Soviet-German treaty at their culminating point,² Unshlikht, the deputy People's Commissar for War, came to Berlin by arrangement with the Reichswehr ostensibly to discuss current business. On March 30, 1926, Krestinsky gave a luncheon in his honour, which was attended by Luther, the German Chancellor, Stresemann, Seeckt and other officials. Unshlikht seized the occasion to put forward extensive proposals for the expansion of production of forbidden weapons, including heavy artillery and gas, in the Soviet Union, and of training facilities for German officers, the whole being dependent on further financial support from Germany. The Chancellor spoke in reply of German readiness to collaborate with the Soviet Union in the cause of peace, but did not refer to Unshlikht's proposals. "The Russians kept talking about armaments", ran the subsequent German report of the conversation, "and we kept talking about other things." When Unshlikht claimed that his proposals had already been discussed with the Reichswehr and only awaited governmental approval, Seeckt remained obstinately silent, thereby confirming the impression that the Reichswehr was privy to this attempt to put pressure on the German Government. The meeting ended inconclusively, and the proposals do not appear to have been pursued, at any rate in the form in which they were first put forward.³

More important perhaps than any of these particular enterprises was the personal interchange of information and experience between military officers and technicians of the two countries. For some time the procedure is said to have been purely unilateral: Red Army officers from the first attended such military exercises and manœuvres as were held in Germany, and even participated in "secret general staff training" in the Ministry in Berlin. From 1925 onwards Reichswehr officers in civilian dress, and sometimes disguised as "German communist workers' delegations", began to be invited to the more important military exercises in the Soviet Union.⁴ In July 1925,

¹ C. F. Melville, *The Russian Face of Germany* (1932), pp. 191-192; a letter from the Reichswehr Ministry relating to the change was published in *Die Pfälzische Post*, October 16, 1928.

² See pp. 435-436 above.

³ For the record of the meeting see *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4564/162694-9; Schubert, reporting on it to Brockdorff-Rantzau, argued that, while Unshlikht's proposals had many potential advantages, the damage done by any disclosure of Soviet-German cooperation on these lines would be very great (*ibid.* 4564/162703-8). Brockdorff-Rantzau's reply has not been traced, but he is likely to have resented this further attempt of the Reichswehr to negotiate behind his back. G. Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml* (1955), p. 195, notes the absence of any result from Unshlikht's overture.

⁴ *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart), i (1953), 35-36.

Brockdorff-Rantzau was informed from Berlin that a group of German officers in mufti would attend the Red Army manœuvres in the following month, and that Soviet officers, disguised as Bulgarians, would attend the Reichswehr manœuvres in the autumn. Brockdorff-Rantzau, in an autograph letter to Schubert, expressed apprehension of a breach of secrecy, but agreed that the exchange of visits might "help the political relations between the two countries", though he added, with his customary absorption in the Polish question, that it would do nothing to further "the often mentioned 'common war aim'".¹ The German visitors afterwards reported that they had received "the greatest assistance in every respect, unhampered access to all installations and operations".² A more common German complaint was that German officers obtained far less insight into the work of the Red Army than Soviet officers into that of the Reichswehr.³ But it may not have been purely national German prejudice which assumed that, in these matters and at this time, the Russians had almost everything to learn and the Germans almost everything to teach. A German participant has left a one-sided, but not wholly false, picture of the hesitations and embarrassments inherent in the Soviet-German relationship :

It is a matter of experience that international agreements, however carefully their items are formulated, remain open to interpretation. We soon discovered that the Soviet Russian avoids breaking them *de jure*, but is inclined to withdraw *de facto* from his obligations so far as he can, while at the same time insisting strictly on their fulfilment by the other side. This discovery was made early and was confirmed again and again in the course of years.

Thus the Russian conducted all negotiations with a certain mental reservation. In addition to this, the fact that defeated Germany was the victor over his own country presented a psychological obstacle. Recognition of the — in the Soviet view, temporary — cultural and technical backwardness of the east in comparison with the west created another source of national resentment. And finally the latent fear remained alive in the Russian that he would not be treated on a basis of equal rights and mutual equality, and therefore in the end would be "cheated".⁴

These difficulties precluded anything like a wholehearted relation of friendship. Both sides had political as well as personal reservations ;

¹ *Auswärtiges Amt*, 4562/155661, 155702-4.

² *Ibid.* 4564/162821.

³ *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart), i (1953), 36.

⁴ *Ibid.* i, 34-35 ; Köstring also spoke of exorbitant Russian demands and of the constant suspicion of the Russians that "their partners were concealing from them the most up-to-date results of their work" (*Les Relations Germano-Soviétiques*, ed. J.-B. Duroselle (1954), p. 189).

both sides were conscious from time to time of the possible alternative of *rapprochement* with the west. But the practical advantages of military collaboration were never forgotten on either side ; and the part played by it throughout the nineteen-twenties in the building up both of the Reichswehr and of the Red Army was a sufficient justification of the policy. To this overriding purpose much else had, if necessary, to be sacrificed.

NOTE B

THE LENIN SCHOOLS

THE fifth congress of Comintern in June-July 1924, in a resolution based on the axiom that the death of Lenin had imposed on Comintern the obligation "to broaden and deepen the propaganda of the theory of Marxism-Leninism", proposed that a number of members of the principal parties should be brought to Moscow for extended periods "to devote themselves exclusively to the study of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice", and that every party should create in its own country both a "central party school" and "elementary party courses on the broadest scale".¹ A three-tier system of communist education was thus envisaged: a central school for nationals of all countries in Moscow, a central school for each party at the national centre (both these were thought of mainly as training-grounds for future leaders) and local elementary courses for rank-and-file members.²

The plan for international courses in Marxism-Leninism in Moscow matured slowly. In December 1924 a preliminary announcement was made by the Agitprop of IKKI to the principal parties with an indication of the number of students which each would be expected to furnish: at this time a total of 40 students was projected — 6 each from Great Britain and France, 7 from Germany, 5 each from Italy, Czechoslovakia and the United States, and 3 each from India and Egypt.³ At the fifth enlarged IKKI in March-April 1925 Bela Kun spoke of courses for 50-70 students in Moscow; and a resolution on propaganda approved the plan to set up international party courses in Moscow in the coming autumn.⁴ A detailed description of the plan was given to the seventh congress of the CPGB two months later by Bell, one of the British delegates to IKKI. The projected "Leninist University

¹ *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), pp. 428-438.

² The idea of party schools was, of course, not new. For Russian party schools, see Vol. 2, pp. 186-189; and the KPP had proposed in 1922 to set up a party school (*KPP: Uchwaly i Resolucje*, i (1953), 175). But this was the first attempt to systematize the practice in Comintern; for a summary treatment of the question see *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), pp. 45-49.

³ The communication to the CPGB was published in *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 22-23.

⁴ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), p. 172; *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (1933), p. 522.

in Moscow" (the term must have been in current use, though it does not appear at this time in official documents, which refer either to a "school" or to "courses") was to receive 50-60 students from the leading communist parties for training in party leadership: the courses were to last for 18 months and it was hoped to make a beginning in October 1925.¹ These ambitious projects encountered, as usual, greater difficulties than had been foreseen. It was impossible to find at short notice for the courses in Moscow sufficient teachers in the three "world languages" who had had a thorough training in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. In August 1925 it was announced that, owing to unavoidable delays in "the selection of suitable teachers and the preparation of study material", the opening of the courses had had to be postponed; and the sixth IKKI in February-March 1926 could do no more than approve "the measures taken by IKKI to open international Lenin courses".² The courses were said to have opened in May 1926.³ But some of the enrolled students failed to arrive in time, others were found to be not properly qualified, and no programme of instruction had been worked out. Instruction eventually began on October 1, 1926, when one Russian, one English, one French and two German groups were formed, though the whole enterprise was evidently still in a tentative and provisional state.⁴

At the next level of party central schools, the PCF was first in the field, announcing the opening of courses at Bobigny, a suburb of Paris, to last from November 20, 1924 to January 20, 1925: this was a full-time school with three sessions a day devoted to theoretical and practical work.⁵ Indoctrination on current issues was evidently not neglected; it was announced at an early stage that the school had taken a firm stand against Monatte, Rosmer and Delagarde.⁶ Unfortunately the school at Bobigny had opened its doors at the moment of a sharp

¹ *Report of the Seventh Congress of the CPGB* (n.d.), pp. 124-128; a letter from Agitprop to the CPGB of June 25, 1925, raised the number of proposed British participants to 5 from Great Britain and 3 from the Dominions, and gave an assurance that "the budget for this school has now been finally endorsed here" (*Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2862 (1926), p. 29).

² *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 49; *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), p. 31; *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 68, May 5, 1926, p. 1071.

³ *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 37 (111), September 16, 1927, p. 25.

⁴ *Tätigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale, Februar-November 1926* (1926), p. 30; according to R. Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Harvard, 1948), pp. 509-510, a secret annex was set up outside Moscow for training in illegal work.

⁵ *L'Humanité*, November 15, 1924.

⁶ *Ibid.* December 2, 1924; for the expulsion of these three dissidents from the party see pp. 149-150 above.

campaign against communism in France — a campaign believed to have received encouragement from Austen Chamberlain's visit to Herriot on December 5, 1924.¹ On December 6, the school was raided by the police; the six foreign members and a number of Frenchmen without identification papers were taken into custody, and books and papers seized. The school was, however, able to resume work two days later with 54 students out of its original complement of 72; and the course was duly completed.² This experiment remained for the moment unique. At the fifth enlarged IKKI in March 1925, Bela Kun, the head of Agitprop, reported that instructions had been given to the British, German, Italian, American and Czechoslovak parties to set up similar schools within one year.³ But the national party schools at this time shared the difficulties of the Lenin school in Moscow in finding sufficient instructors with the right training; they also suffered from the additional handicaps of intermittent police interference, and shortage of funds. In May 1925 Agitprop announced that national party schools would not be financed by Comintern and must be supported out of party funds; and, although this attitude was afterwards modified, financial stringency remained a limiting factor in the development of the schools.⁴

Information about other party central schools is scarce and vague. The Czechoslovak party had boldly decided at its second congress in the autumn of 1924 to create four party schools, one in Czech and Slovak, another in German, at Prague, a third in Magyar, at Kosiče, and a fourth in Russian, at Uzhorod. The first two were said to have come into existence, but were troubled by lack of staff: the third had opened, but had been closed by the police.⁵ But this report appears to have been unduly optimistic, since the first Czechoslovak party central school later announced its opening, after many delays, for March 1926.⁶ At the seventh congress of the CPGB in May 1925 Bell spoke of a proposal to open a British party central school with 20 students, which was, however, still "in abeyance".⁷ In October 1925 its foundation

¹ For this visit see pp. 42-43 above.

² *L'Humanité*, December 7, 8, 10, 1924; *Cahiers du Bolchevisme*, No. 9, January 16, 1925, pp. 620-621; No. 29, October 15, 1925, pp. 1961-1967 (the fullest available account); *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 34, March 12, 1925, pp. 502-504.

³ *Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolkoma Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* (1925), pp. 171-172.

⁴ *Communist Papers*, Cmd. 2682 (1926), pp. 27, 30, 63.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 66, April 30, 1926, pp. 1004-1005.

⁶ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 46; a report on party central schools in *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 6 (64), October 22, 1926, pp. 49-53, lists only one Czechoslovak school.

⁷ *Report of the Seventh Congress of the CPGB* (n.d.), pp. 125, 128.

was recorded with satisfaction in Moscow.¹ But it may have been disrupted by the arrests of party leaders ; for in February 1926 it was apparently still in the future.² Another central party school was organized by the PCF from November 9, 1925 to January 1, 1926. Held at Clichy, it was smaller than the Bobigny school of the previous winter, mustering only 38 students, but was said to be superior in matter and methods of instruction.³ A Norwegian party central school of six weeks' duration for higher party officials was reported in the winter of 1925-1926.⁴ The KPD surprisingly made no attempt during this period to set up a party school, and was content with two central "Lenin circles" which "did not in the least come up to the requirements of a central school".⁵ On the other hand, the German Communist Youth League organized a Lenin school of five weeks' duration in September 1925 which was attended by 31 students and was considered a success ;⁶ a second school with 35 students was held early in 1926.⁷

At the lowest level of elementary local party schools even less can be recorded. Simultaneously with its first central party school in November 1924, the PCF announced a night school organized by the party federation of the Seine ;⁸ but further schools of this kind, if they were held, were not publicized. The party with the best record in this respect was the CPGB, which claimed to have 90 schools with a total of 800 students in February 1926 : these were predominantly night schools. Similar schools existed in France, the United States, Norway, Holland and Austria, but the large German and Czechoslovak parties were reported to "lag far behind in this field".⁹ The Italian party attempted to evade police persecution by instituting correspondence courses in Leninism.¹⁰ Lack of financial resources and, still more, lack of qualified teachers were the main obstacles to any widespread development in this period of party schools under the aegis of Comintern.

¹ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 156, November 20, 1925, pp. 2351-2352.

² *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 47 ; for the arrests see p. 345 above.

³ *Cahiers du Bolchevisme*, No. 41, February 25, 1926, p. 558 ; *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 46 ; *Kommunistisches Internatsional*, No. 6 (64), October 22, 1926, p. 50.

⁴ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 46.

⁵ *Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz*, No. 156, November 20, 1925, p. 2352 ; *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 46.

⁶ *Die Jugend-Internationale*, No. 4, December 1925-January 1926, pp. 40-44.

⁷ *Ibid.* No. 6, February 1926, pp. 37-38.

⁸ *L'Humanité*, November 15, December 6, 1924.

⁹ *Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf* (1926), p. 47.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 147.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(Supplementary to the Lists in Vol. 1, pp. 537-539, and Vol. 2, p. 473)

ADGB	= Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (General German Trade Union Federation).
A.F. of L.	= American Federation of Labor.
AITUC	= All-Indian Trade Union Congress.
BKP	= Bulgarskata Kommunisticheska Partia (Bulgarian Communist Party).
CCP	= Chinese Communist Party.
CER	= Chinese Eastern Railway.
CGT	= Confédération du Travail.
CGTU	= Confédération du Travail Unitaire.
CPGB	= Communist Party of Great Britain.
GEFU	= Gesellschaft zur Förderung Gewerblicher Unternehmungen (Company for the Promotion of Industrial Undertakings).
ICA	= International Cooperative Alliance.
IFTU	= International Federation of Trade Unions.
IKKI	= Ispolnitel'nyi Komitet Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala (Executive Committee of the Communist International).
IKKIM	= Ispolnitel'nyi Komitet Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala Molodezhi (Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International).
IMRO	= Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.
IPC	= International Propaganda Committee.
IWW	= Industrial Workers of the World.
KIM	= Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezhi (Communist Youth International).
KPJ	= Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Communist Party).
KPP	= Komunistyczna Partja Polski (Polish Communist Party).
KPZB	= Komunistycznaja Partja Zachodniej Bialorusi (Western White Russian Communist Party).
KPZU	= Komunisticheska Partiya Zakhidnei Ukraini (Western Ukrainian Communist Party).
Krestintern	= Krest'yanskii Internatsional (Peasant International).

KRPP	= Komunistyczna Robotnicza Partja Polski (Polish Communist Workers' Party).
MOS	= Mezhnatsional'nyi Obshcheprofessional'nyi Soyuz (Multi-national General Trade Union Federation).
MRP	= Mezhdunarodnaya Rabochaya Pomoshch' (International Workers' Aid).
NAS	= Nationaal Arbeider Syndikat (National Workers' Trade Union).
NMM	= National Minority Movement.
NRPJ	= Nezavisna Radnička Partija Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Independent Workers' Party).
NUWM	= National Unemployed Workers' Movement.
PCF	= Parti Communiste Français.
PCI	= Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party).
PKI	= Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).
PPS	= Polska Partja Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party).
Profintern	= Krasnyi Internatsional Professional'nykh Soyuzov (Red International of Trade Unions).
PSI	= Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party).
SKOJ	= Savez Komunističke Omladine Jugoslavije (Communist Youth League of Yugoslavia).
SPD	= Sozial-Demokratische Partei-Deutschlands (German Social-Democratic Party).
Sportintern (KSI)	= Krasnyi Sportintern (Red Sport International).
SROJ	= Savez Radničke Omladine Jugoslavije (Workers' Youth League of Yugoslavia).
TUC	= Trades Union Congress.
TUEL	= Trade Union Educational League.
VSFK	= Vysshii Sovet Fizicheskoi Kul'tury (Supreme Council of Physical Culture).

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