Key Lessons from Recent Translations on Mao’s Directives from the Final Years of the GPCR

There is a good deal of material available to comrades to aid in understanding the experience of revolutionary China and the two-line struggle waged in the party against the Capitalist Roaders. However, the importance of the late Cultural Revolution is often under-studied and little understood.

Importantly, a key political struggle was waged from 1974-76 against the right that clarified the danger and nature of imminent capitalist restoration in China. Recently a few important documents from Mao and others in the left have been translated, providing unique clarity in exposing the capitalist roaders in their various forms. These include 1) A Few Opinions of Mine (August 31, 1970), 2) Chairman Mao’s Talk with Members of the Politburo who Were in Beijing (May 3, 1975), 3) Chairman Mao’s Primary Directives (March 3, 1976), and 4) A Summary of Views on the Problem of the Inner-Party Bourgeoisie (July 8, 1976).¹

This material presented a threat to the rightist regime that overtook China following the 1976 counterrevolutionary coup. As a result, these documents were suppressed following 1976, have not been widely available, and were only recently translated into English. The lessons provided in these materials are important not just for navigating the path towards communism in future socialist societies, but also for explaining the lessons of the socialist experience to the masses today as they desperately search for an alternative to a world increasingly plunged into crisis and chaos. An examination of these documents can be helpful for revolutionaries seeking to achieve a solid understanding of the Cultural Revolution and of the nature of the socialist state in particular.

The documents we are focusing on deserve to be studied in great depth. In these notes we address a few key issues covered in the material, aided by several discussions on the material conducted by various comrades.²

Internal Struggle Requires Clarity Over Revolutionary Strategy

Of profound importance is the relationship between identifying those promoting the capitalist road within the workers' movement and the need for proletarian leaders to formulate a theory, line, and strategy to bring about the proletariat’s victory over the bourgeoisie. One cannot do the former without doing the latter, one cannot accomplish the latter without the former. The result of a series of mass-forums held in Beijing, A Summary of Views on the Problem of the Inner-Party Bourgeoisie distills some of the leading insights of the Chinese revolutionary movement in the late-GPCR period. On this question, it states:

In the course of leading the struggle of the proletariat and the laboring people against the bourgeoisie, the guides of the proletarian revolution constantly smash all kinds of strange theories put forward by opportunists and revisionists that provide cover for the bourgeoisie. They constantly resolve questions on how to identify the bourgeoisie, and where to find the bourgeoisie. They do so in every important historical stage, according to new changes in class relations, and according to the new characteristics of the class struggle. They formulate a theory, line and strategy for the proletariat’s victory over the bourgeoisie.

In the Chinese example alone, after the foundation of the New People’s Republic, many activists inside and outside the party who had previously supported the New Democratic Revolution broke ranks during the shift to the tasks of the Socialist Revolution, in particular around the questions of mass supervision of officials, the cooperativization of agriculture, and the restriction of bourgeois right. Various erroneous articulations, such as the genius theory supported by Lin Biao and Chen Boda (the idea that individual leaders can promote ideas thousands of times more insightful than those of the masses) or the promotion of “stability and unity as the key link,” by Deng Xiaoping in 1975 as part of his overall support for the counterrevolutionary idea of productive forces determinism, reflected the two-line struggle within the party, the struggle of an emerging bourgeoisie in various forms to achieve its goal of capitalist restoration.

As the Summary of Views document argues, there is a relationship between the revisionists that worm their way into the workers' movement before the revolution, and those who do so afterwards.

In capitalist society, through infiltration, corruption and bribery by the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie’s ranks are found within the workers' moment and within the Communist Party. However, the bourgeoisie’s core, its primary force, and its primary ranks are found outside the workers' movement and outside the Communist Party. At this time [before the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat—Ed. of translation], the bourgeois headquarters was a bourgeois state machine controlled and manipulated by a small group of the big bourgeoisie. When analyzing the relationship between right opportunist factions and the bourgeoisie, the authors of the classics of Marxism-Leninism always pointed out their common class essence while also heavily emphasizing the dependence and subordination of these factions within the working class movement and within the Communist Party to the bourgeoisie in society. Marx and Engels said opportunists are vassals, tails, and children of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. Lenin said that revisionists are tools, lackeys, and agents of the monopoly bourgeoisie. In capitalist society, if the proletariat is to defeat the bourgeoisie, it must firstly destroy the bourgeois headquarters, immediately smash the bourgeois state machine and replace the bourgeois dictatorship with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This has profound importance for revolutionaries aspiring to build the proletarian headquarters at present. Opportunists within the working class movement present major obstacles to our efforts. However, while combating and struggling against alien class elements within the proletariat’s ranks, the central goal of revolution must be very clear—smashing the bourgeois headquarters and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without this framework, combat against forms of opportunism internal to our ranks becomes highly subjective without a clear orientation towards what the struggle is about in the first place—revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Rather than struggle serving unity, such struggle risks being plagued by deviations that tend to weaken and isolate the proletariat and its allies. In particular this often manifests in articulations of localism and variations on the old anarchist-revisionist theme of so-called autonomy.

In related fashion, the success of the Cultural Revolution was anchored by the dual and interrelated tasks of identifying the capitalist roaders in the party at the same time as mapping out a plan of attack to destroy the new bourgeois headquarters. By the time that the GPCR commenced, Mao had identified that the bourgeois headquarters was found within the party itself. During the first salvo of the Cultural Revolution, Mao and his allies sparked a rebellion against the revisionist elements in the party, bombarding the bourgeois headquarters and then consolidating new forms of revolutionary government with mass oversight. The movement faced a deep setback however with the defection of Lin Biao, who had been a bulwark of left mobilization in the army and who Mao relied on despite his misgivings about Lin’s theory and methods, particularly his promotion of genius theory. Following the left’s breakthroughs against the party’s leading capitalist-roaders in the early Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao was promoted as Mao’s “closest comrade-in-arms and successor.” Despite the movement’s successes in opening the floodgates for mass rebellion, creativity and revolutionary successors, Lin Biao’s politics and accolades—left in form, right in essence—then became a new reservoir of political reaction, culminating in their failed 1971 coup, including a plotted assassination attempt against Mao. Turning failure into the mother of success, the setback was used by the left to mount a new offensive against the deeper politics that Lin represented in the form of the Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius campaign.

Assessing the Gang of Four, Assessing Middle Forces in the Party

Much of Mao’s work during the later GPCR (‘74-76) was focused on the need to direct attacks of the party on the primary enemies of the revolution and to forge a broad unity around this, in order to prevent a line of attack that aimed to “overthrow all” (i.e. anarchism). Mao worked to win over middle forces such as Chen Yonggui and Wu Guixian who were at odds with the “gang of four.” The document Chairman Mao’s Talk with Members of the Politburo who Were in Beijing clarifies a key question in the ICM—what was Mao’s assessment of the “gang?” Did Mao call them a gang of four? In fact, in the document, Mao does refer to Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen as a “gang of four.” He implores them “Don’t function as a gang of four, don’t do it any more, why do you still do it? Why not unite with the more than two hundred members of the Central Committee? Functioning as a minority is no good, it is bad at all times.” The footnote to the document provided by the editors states:

Chairman Mao’s mention of “gang of four” here became the so-called source of Hua Guofeng’s accusation against the gang of four. The remark here has nearly universally been understood as directed against Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen. While there is no clarifying note in the transcript to whom this remark replies, we can conclude that it refers to these four revolutionaries based on Zhang Chunqiao’s note found in the “Third Materials on the Criminal Deeds of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao edited by Hua Guofeng” 《材料之三》: “Regarding the Chairman’s instructions to not form a gang of four, this certainly was resolutely followed, as this most likely could lead to the successful task of achieving unity. Although not [words crossed out by Zhang Chunqiao] in the least [we] did not add to the burden on the Chairman.”

http://bannedthought.net/China/MaoEra/GPCR/Chinese/RegardingProofOfTheCrimesOfG4-CCP-CC-1976-12-10.pdf. Chairman Mao elsewhere also criticized Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and Li Xian’nian as a “gang of three.” Hua never dared mention this point. Chairman Mao also criticized Hua’s Hunan gang (including Zhang Huaping and others) and Ye Jianying’s Guangdong gang later in this talk.

Chen Yonggui, a peasant leader and revolutionary, was an example of the middle forces who supported aspects of the revolutionary line. Chen made tremendous contributions towards the promotion of collectivization in agriculture and self reliance (for which his home village of Dazhai became a national model). But he, like others in this camp, by the later GPCR/mid-1970s were not convinced about the need to struggle anew against rightists such as Deng Xiaoping. This stand was related to dismissing positive aspects of the mass mobilizations in the early GPCR by focusing instead on the shortcomings of the students and the wider movement.³ These views were also related to limitations in understanding the complex nationwide maneuver that was the Cultural Revolution. However, individuals like Chen were not hopeless either. Mao saw such middle forces as potential and important allies of the revolution who could be won over.

On the Relationship and Link Between Dogmatist and Empiricist Deviations

Mao urged the Four to unify with those who could remold in the course of struggle. He contrasted the relatively malleable views of the party’s empiricist trend with the hopeless rigidity of the dogmatists, as exemplified by Wang Ming and the 28 ½ Bolsheviks. Mao stated, “I think as for the problems that are not big, don’t make minor issues major, but if there is a problem, one must be clear. If it cannot be solved in the first half of the year, let it be solved in the second half of the year; if it cannot be solved this year, let it be solved next year; if it cannot be solved next year, let it be solved in the year after next … As I see it, those who criticize empiricism are themselves empiricists, they do not have much Marxism-Leninism, they may have some but not so much, about the same as me.” Earlier in the talk Mao defended Jiang Qing, stating, “As I see it, Jiang Qing is a small empiricist, and is far from being a dogmatist. She is not like Wang Ming who wrote an article called ‘Further Bolshevization,’ and she will not act like Zhang Wentian, writing an article about opportunist vacillation.”

In opposition to the approach of “overthrow-all”⁴ which would have preferred to oust the middle forces in the party altogether, Mao emphasized the three lines: “Practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism. Unite, and don’t split. Be above-board and open, don’t intrigue and conspire.” Despite the rise of anarchist “overthrow-all” approach among privileged students the first years of the GPCR, by 1976, in Chairman Mao’s Primary Directives, Mao pointed out the rising consciousness of the masses, including among those in the universities, and the ability and need to advance a front line struggle there against Deng and his clique.⁵ Related to the subject of “unite and don’t split,” in the 1975 Talk with Members of the Politburo, Mao argued the thrust of the mass struggle should concentrate on the Criticize Lin [Biao] Criticize Confucius campaign, and not on less targeted offenses, such as an attack on all forms of pulling-strings by officials, as was being proposed by some on the left. In his elaboration of the rationale for the focus on Lin and Confucius, he raised the historical nature of Lin Biao’s dogmatist line, including referring back to Lin’s dogmatist essay written during the period in which the 28 ½ Bolsheviks were in power in the party, On a Short and Swift Assault, in which Lin had praised the disastrous advice of Comintern representative to the CCP, Otto Braun. Mao explained how the empiricists in the party during this time were essential to the aims of the dogmatists.

As the summary introduction to the Chairman Mao’s Talk with Members of the Politburo translation states on this question (quoting from the 1945 Resolutions on Certain Historical Questions by the Communist Party of China):

Even though the points of departures of empiricism and dogmatism are different, they share unity in the essence of their method of thought. They all separate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism from the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution; they all go against dialectical materialism and historical materialism, exaggerating partial, relative truths as universal, absolute truths; their thoughts do not match the real situation. Because of this, they have many common erroneous understandings of Chinese society and Chinese Revolution (for instance, the erroneous city-centric view, the view that work in the white-areas is primary, the view of “conventional” warfare detached from real situations, etc). This is the ideological root which allows these two groups of comrades to work along together. As the experiences of the empiricists are partial and narrow, the majority of empiricists often lack independent, clear, and complete opinions on comprehensive matters. Therefore, when they are connected with dogmatists, they often present themselves as the accessory of the latter; But the history of the party proves that dogmatists find it difficult to “disseminate poisons” among the whole party without collaboration from empiricists. After dogmatism is overcome, empiricism then becomes the major obstacle to the development of Marxism-Leninism within the party. Thus, we should not only overcome subjectivist dogmatism but also subjectivist empiricism.

The historical mutual-development of empiricism and dogmatism—a problem still not resolved at present—adds to the significance of the struggle against revisionism by the revolutionaries in the party and forms the backdrop to the 1975 Talk.

Following Lin Biao’s coup attempt, Mao and his allies argued that Lin Biao did not represent a failure of leftist overreach. Instead, they showed how Lin Biao and his collaborators were a symptom of a bourgeois intent on restoration, bent on converting the public socialist ownership into private ownership. The association of Lin Biao with leftist overreach was promoted by Zhou Enlai, who following the Lin Biao affair attacked “Lin Biao’s Ultra-left Anarchism” in the People’s Daily, suggesting that the whole party was exercising an ultra-left line (in contrast, according to Chairman Mao, Lin Biao represented an ultra-right line). Zhou Enlai had been a representative of the empiricist trend in the 1930s, which Mao had argued abetted the Wang Ming dogmatists. As the appendix to the document states,

But the history of the party proves that dogmatists find it difficult to ‘disseminate poisons’ among the whole party without collaboration from empiricists … Chairman Mao believed that the empiricist errors could be considered a problem belonging to the category of contradictions among the people. According to the proletarian policy of ‘curing the disease to save the patient,’ there was thus an attempt to rectify such conciliatory and empiricist mistakes through political education. Consequently, Zhou, Peng [Dehuai] and Zhang [Wentian] later admitted their mistakes and joined the struggle against the Wang Ming dogmatist line.

Against Lin Biaoism and Tendencies Towards Empty Sloganeering

In Yao Wenyuan’s article On the Social Basis of the Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique,⁶ Lin is criticized for his tendency to belittle the contributions of the red guards, accusing them of simply being hoodwinked and used. Time and time again, Lin Biao betrayed a skepticism for mass initiative and development. To clarify the deeper issues that supported the rise of Lin’s reactionary camp, a mass struggle was waged against the root servility towards authority pushed by Lin and buttressed by several thousand years of Confucian ideology in China. This was done at the same time that overtures were made to middle forces such as Zhou Enlai in an attempt to break the isolation of the left. These attempts were half-successful at best, as evidenced by the ability of Deng and his allies to maneuver widely to suppress the left from July to October 1975 as part of Deng’s program of “stability and unity.” Deng then contributed to the April 5 counterrevolutionary incident in Tiananmen Square, resulting in his dismissal from all official posts in April, 1976. Following Mao’s death in 1976 the left found itself isolated with the desertion of key allies to the rightist camp. Despite Mao’s efforts to win over the middle forces, the surviving representatives of the trend, including Chen Xilian, Su Zhenhua, Chen Yonggui, Wu De, and Wu Guixian all supported Hua Guofeng, and did not object to the coup against the leftist leadership and against the revolutionary line.

Both the debacle of Lin Biao’s coup plan in 1971 and the coup in 1976 demonstrate the severe challenges posed to a DoP given the changing contours of struggle in a revolutionary society. As A Summary of Views on the Problem of the Inner-Party Bourgeoisie states, opportunists use the changing form of the opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under socialism to sabotage the masses and the larger struggle:

At the same time as the economic basis for their existence remains unchanged, the forms of the non-monopoly, monopoly, and socialist period inner-party bourgeoisie are in fact constantly changing. Although the class opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has not changed, the specific form of this opposition is constantly changing. Opportunists and revisionists take advantage of these non-intrinsic changes to engage in political opportunism. They constantly concoct falsehoods claiming that the bourgeoisie is disappearing on its own, or that it has already been eliminated. They thus endeavor to prevent the proletariat and the laboring people from seeing clearly where the bourgeoisie is, and provide cover for the bourgeoisie in its attacks on the proletariat.

Following the victories in the early Cultural Revolution, there was a need to transform mass enthusiasm and participation in the movement into new revolutionary forms, including the revolutionary committees throughout the country. While the initial salvos of the GPCR were launched on the basis of careful work by the party left, a mass movement was then triggered throughout society. Without further direction and consolidation then from revolutionaries, the masses’ enthusiasm that had emerged risked being dispersed and led astray. Promotion of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line needed to be deepened, in particular through a grounding in the actual works of Marx, Lenin and Mao. During the buildup to the GPCR, Lin Biao promoted the study of Mao’s work through the “Little Red Book,” a practice was taken up on a mass level during the first few years of the GPCR. This helped rally the masses to the cause of the revolution, both in China and to a degree abroad as well—the Red Book for instance was studied by groups including the Black Panthers (after initially being used as a fundraising tool). However, the Lin Biao trend and related politics sought to treat Mao’s words in a religious manner that harmed the ability of the masses to objectively further the struggle. This led Mao and others to issue directives to stop practices such as routinized morning and nightly readings from the Quotations and other such rituals.⁷ Ultimately, Lin Biao attempted to form a new bourgeois headquarters in the party in the aftermath of the defeat of Liu Shaoqi and his allied capitalist-roaders during the early GPCR. His empty sloganeering based on selective use of Mao’s words served to disarm the masses. As a worker in a Shanghai Generator Factory stated circa 1973, referring to Lin Biao’s deeds in words but not name:

For many years I have been active in the revolution. I am familiar with revolutionary theory. Thanks to the Cultural Revolution, and thanks to the bitter struggle between the two political lines, I’ve learned that it’s not enough to have working class solidarity and a desire to work hard for the revolution. One must read Marx and Lenin to learn revolutionary theory. I had read a little and I told myself it was enough instead of really trying to understand. Then the companions of Liu Shaoqi advised us to take a shortcut in the study of Marx and Lenin, so I stopped studying those works. They took advantage of our enthusiasm for Mao Zedong’s work, and invented fancy slogans like Mao’s thought is the ultimate in contemporary Marxism-Leninism, or one word of Mao’s is worth 10,000 others. They disguised themselves as the true authorities on Mao’s thought. They said there are so many works by Marx and Lenin that they cannot all be read. By claiming to take a shortcut, they tried to separate Mao Zedong’s thought from Marxism-Leninism.⁸

At present, similar attempts to pigeon-hole MLM and revolutionary theory in general proliferate. In the U.S., a morass of new poisonous weeds, largely informed by bourgeois academics have obscured basic revolutionary principles, and have circulated through social media format in the forms of memes that reduce the scientific revolutionary line of MLM to reductionist frameworks, memes, and half-truths that serve to divert the energies of activists away from the key task of building proletarian organization among the masses. Despite the new forms and mediums that such trends circulate within, they serve the same aim as that promoted by Lin Biao and similar sorts, the dilution of the coherent and rich arsenal of revolutionary experience in service of opportunism and revisionism. By studying the line struggle of the late GPCR, we can better understand the roots of such outlooks and deviations, and carefully pull them out by the roots.