


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
"Peace is the issue that affects everyone at this moment. It is in everyone's vital interests to act in a way that ensures that the Geneva talks are fruitful."

Gus Hall



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On the Road to Geneva

GUS HALL

The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to start new negotiations for a nuclear disarmament treaty adds a new dimension to the struggle for peace.

How to take advantage of this new development, how to influence the outcome, emerges as a most critical question of the moment.

While the mass media and columnists like James Reston push the idea that "there is not much optimism . . . about next month's U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva," all the polls show that the U.S. majority peace sentiment is at the highest level ever. And, thus, the U.S. people have very high expectations for the new Geneva talks. Millions who believed Reagan's election campaign peace rhetoric now expect results from the Geneva talks.

Like the mass media, the administration is doing everything possible to stifle the people's expectations through negative, pessimistic or cynical statements and articles. Thus, the new negotiating team and the White House are cautioning against "too much optimism."

For instance, Reagan recently boasted, "I told our arms control negotiators, if they don't have a good agreement get up from the table and come on home."

Whenever the people demonstrate their desire for an end to the arms race, for better relations with the Soviet Union, this heightened peace mood is followed by the Administration's heightening of cold war rhetoric and anti-Soviet propaganda.

Now that expectations are the highest ever, there is once again a barrage of all-out anti-Sovietism—subtle, insidious and blatant—coming from many quarters. It is a crude attempt to put a damper on the people's expectations and to resurrect the cold war.

However, this means the people's democratic, progressive and peace forces have an

even bigger responsibility in the coming months to publish articles, distribute leaflets, organize demonstrations, meetings, seminars and forums on the new possibilities that are opening and the need to intensify the pressure on the Administration. Any argument that there is no hope, any idea that nothing will come of the new disarmament talks, must be rejected.

History tells us that even under the most difficult and complex circumstances alliances can be forged. For instance, in building the World War II alliance, it seemed almost impossible to bring Churchill and even Roosevelt, representing two big imperialist powers, to the conclusion that an alliance was a necessity. But regardless of the contradictions, obstacles, maneuvers and setbacks, the alliance succeeded.

Thus, despite tremendous obstacles, Reagan's history of vicious anti-Sovietism, and Reaganite maneuvering and manipulations, developments have proven that progress, and even a peace treaty, are possible—and as far as the people of the U.S. and the world are concerned—absolutely necessary.

If the peace forces have the opposite viewpoint, a hopeless attitude that the Reagan Administration and the negotiating team are only pretending while the Pentagon-military-industrial complex and Weinberger get their way in building up the nuclear first strike, it will be playing right into their hands and relieve the pressure on the Administration to negotiate seriously.

It would be a mistake to view monopoly capital or the Reagan Administration as a monolithic entities. The political balance of forces is such that developments can go either way.

The Soviet Union is ready and willing to meet the highest expectations. Therefore, the possibilities for positive results exist.

How to use the higher expectations to move people into action is the big tactical challenge. We have to project slogans that will move

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millions into action, the millions who have high expectations for a peace treaty. We must also think how to reach smaller groups who are cynical and have no expectations.

Organizations like the U.S. Peace Council obviously have an important role to play. It is important to put emphasis on the peace movements.

An important ingredient leading to higher expectations for peace is the public shift in attitudes towards the Soviet Union. The public belief in a "Soviet military threat" has declined. The "Soviet military threat" concept is no longer the main problem.

This does not mean that there is no longer any anti-Sovietism. But that aspect of it has diminished.

It is also true that when the government moves toward a cold-war posture, when the anti-Soviet lie factory goes on double shift, there is an immediate reaction in broad liberal circles. And when there are even the first signs that the government is changing its policy, these same forces move very quickly to seek new relationships. The upcoming Geneva talks are having this effect. There are some signs of a thaw in cold war mass thought patterns.

It is in this framework that we have to see the April Spring Peace Offensive, especially the April 20th demonstration in Washington, D.C. Reliance on spontaneity or wait-and-see approaches will be counterproductive.

Many peace groups do not understand the questions and they issue slogans that are not productive or helpful.

For instance, when the negotiating team was appointed, there were a lot of negative feelings and expressions. The negotiating team can be seen in two ways. True, the personalities selected are primarily known for their anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and even anti-negotiation positions. On the other hand, they are also personalities who can be effective in convincing the Senate and the public to approve and ratify a negotiated arms agreement.

However, the only way to guarantee that people's expectations will be turned into reality is to channel these high expectations into ac-

tions for peace and disarmament, like the April Spring Offensive, starting with the April 20th demonstration in Washington, D.C.

The Reagan Administration has created several obstacles that must be overcome in order for there to be serious negotiations resulting in agreement:

1 • The Reagan policy of "*Star Wars*," the *nuclearization of outer space*. The basic position of the Reagan Administration is laid out in the well-publicized article in the Sunday, January 27, 1985, *New York Times Magazine* by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Jastrow and Max M. Kampelman.

There are many misleading statements and some outright lies in this article. But it does not spell out the basic ideological positions and outlook.

What is new in the article is that the Administration is planning and working on two levels, both of them going in the direction of achieving preventive anti-missile missiles.

One argument for the policy is that it is "only research," and that research is permissible and necessary at all times, and has nothing to do with deployment and is therefore not part of a nuclear arms buildup. This will be a position of the negotiating team.

The main line of attack on this should be that at today's level of technology, research and deployment are one; you can not separate research from deployment. The lead time is so short that as soon as the research is done, deployment follows almost immediately.

The other argument is that this system of defense is non-nuclear—that it is a defense against nuclear missiles, but is not itself nuclear. Therefore, it is not dangerous and does not escalate the arms race. This would be the first stage of the Strategic Defense Initiative—the process of finding the ultimate defense against missiles.

This is a clever cover for Star Wars. It is also a cover for the continuation of building the means of nuclear superiority and first-strike capability. As Kampelman and Brzezinski say, "We must not abandon nuclear deterrence until

we are convinced that a better means is at hand . . . the acquisition of increasingly efficient nuclear weapons."

About these ultimate weapons: most scientists, on both sides, are convinced that this is an absolutely impossible task, that it can not be achieved with the present level of technology. Those who are working on it, as well as people in the Administration pushing it, know it is not achievable. The first stage is, but not the final stage.

2 • The other idea being pushed, which is really the basis of the *Times Magazine* article, is that "Soviet nuclear capability is all first strike." This is a new tack. It is simply another lie in the arsenal of the Big Lie. If you accept this lie, then almost anything is acceptable.

The truth is, much of the Soviet nuclear capability is not strategic because the U.S. is so far away from Soviet launching bases.

On the other hand, all U.S. nuclear capability is strategic because the bases are so close to the Soviet Union. This is true of nuclear subs, nuclear bombers and the Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe.

3 • The U.S. use of the verification argument. This is thrown in although it becomes more and more obvious it is not a serious question. Verification has lost all meaning because of the new technology. In fact the "secret" shuttle satellite that now flies and spies over the Soviet Union should put to rest this argument.

4 • The charge that the Soviet Union has violated past treaties and therefore is not a reliable treaty partner. This is another big lie that is being dragged into the spotlight now to throw more mud at the talks.

The charge is always made, using phrases like "possible violations," or "we must investigate whether there are violations," or "it could be a violation."

There exists a joint U.S.-Soviet commission, where all such questions have been discussed and settled. The Reagan Administration, however, does not present such charges to the commission but, instead, makes public these charges, charges that settle nothing, but become a part of the anti-Soviet propaganda.

5 • The U.S. contention, used as an argument for extending the arms race into outer space, that the Soviets returned to the negotiating table because the U.S. was continuing to build up its nuclear arsenal; that if the military budget is cut back, if planned weapons systems are cancelled, if Star Wars is rejected, the Soviets will see this as a weakening in U.S. resolve. This is the "peace through strength" argument. It is nonsense. But we have failed to find popular ways of arguing against it.

The truth is that the Soviet Union has placed on the table concrete proposals for nuclear arms agreements during the administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Reagan.

Another obstacle is an argument the peace forces sometimes fall for: Since only a few nuclear missiles are needed to destroy the world, and although it is true the U.S. keeps raising the level of nuclear missiles, why does the USSR have to keep responding? The Soviet Union has never responded on the basis of missile for missile. What the Soviet Union has responded to is new nuclear systems that would have given the U.S. nuclear superiority. In other words, the Soviet Union has been forced to respond to a qualitative increase in nuclear weapons, and has always been forced to respond to the forerunner, the U.S.

One of the reasons the Reagan Administration has agreed to negotiate is the "electoral mandate for peace." One of the reasons Reagan was re-elected was his "peace platform," his promise to negotiate with the Soviet Union. It is also a response to the split in the Reagan Administration, a split on policy, on the military budget. It is a response to the pressure of the peace majority, whose expectations are now higher than ever.

We should keep in mind that the House of Representatives and 34 senators are up for reelection in 1986. Their attitude toward the Geneva talks is influenced by their constituencies. They are very aware of and sensitive to the peace sentiment and the expectations they will have to deal with in 1986.

The U.S. policy of aggression in Central America continues to escalate. The cutoff of diplomatic talks by the Reagan Administration could be preparation for direct military action. But the opposition, both public and congressional, is also growing.

What is new and important is the growing resistance to the U.S. efforts at nuclearization and militarization of the world. Such countries as Greece, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, Honduras, Spain and Puerto Rico are all demonstrating in different ways their rejection of U.S. policy and the plans to nuclearize their countries.

The *New York Times* calls this "a spreading aversion among Western allies to almost any kind of involvement with nuclear weapons." It is being tagged a growing "nuclear allergy."

There are moments when it becomes possible to move all groups and organizations around one issue or development. Peace is the issue that affects everyone at this moment. It is in everyone's vital interest to act in a way that

ensures the Geneva talks are fruitful. We must encourage people not to rely on Reagan and his negotiating team. Reagan is already saying that he told his negotiating team that "if they can't come to an agreement, they can come home without one."

Every peace organization, the 26 trade unions that have endorsed the freeze—all that make up the U.S. peace majority—have a common interest in fighting for peace and moving full speed ahead for the nationwide mass peace actions on April 20.

What is needed is to translate the peace expectations of the U.S. people into demands for peace and disarmament that the people can rally and mobilize around.

Our focus in the coming period of the Geneva talks must be to galvanize all the peace and progressive forces, the independent and people's movements, around the question of war and peace, each hitching their own goals to the star of peace, disarmament, detente and peaceful coexistence. □

Pierre Curie and Vladimir Vernadsky On Nuclear Omnicide

INAR MOCHALOV

The peril of omnicide, i.e. universal slaughter—the total destruction of mankind as a result of the unprecedented race in conventional and particularly nuclear arms unleashed by imperialism—is becoming ever more imminent. Meanwhile, awareness of this danger has not caught up with its actual proportions and accelerating growth rate. Preventing nuclear omnicide is the overriding issue of the day. Yet vast numbers of people remain blind to the threat. What's more, many of those who claim that they are aware of the danger do not believe that it could really happen.

In this connection, establishing how the more farsighted scientists first became aware of the menace of nuclear omnicide, and warned humanity against it, is today of more than historical interest. An outstanding role in this was played by two scientists from France and Russia, Pierre Curie (1859-1906) and Vladimir Vernadsky (1863-1945).

In 1896 and during the next few years, the foundations for the teaching of radioactivity were laid, mainly in the works of Becquerl, the Curies (husband and wife), Rutherford and certain other scientists.

Throughout that period Vernadsky closely followed French and other foreign studies of radioactivity and met some of these scientists on his regular trips abroad. This found reflection in his works, diaries; letters, notebooks and notes. He was able to grasp the significance of the breakthroughs in the field because he approached them not only as a naturalist, a contemporary of his foreign colleagues, but as a competent *historian of science* who evaluated the results both in historical retrospective and—perhaps even more important—in the relatively distant historical perspective.

Vernadsky was among the first to take up the history and prehistory of radioactivity the-

ory and assess its role in the creation of a modern scientific picture of the universe. "The consequences of Becquerl's discovery," he wrote, "affected the whole life of mankind, its philosophical thought, the entire world scientific outlook."

Pierre Curie, together with Becquerl and Marie Curie, shared the credit for the latest scientific revolution, stressed Vernadsky:

He is one of the founders of our conception of this basic phenomenon of nature, the first who enunciated a basic understanding of the general significance of radioactive phenomena. [His work was the kind that] changes mankind's very conception of the universe.

Vernadsky believed that Pierre Curie contributed to the world outlook of mankind not only in the field of natural sciences but also in shaping the view of the world taken by the social and historical sciences and the *humanities*. This universal relevance to diverse concepts of our planet which could not be totally equated with one another was, in his opinion, part of the greatness and lasting importance of Curie's scientific achievement. In the humanitarian sense, Curie's studies of the biological effects of radioactivity proved to be decisive.

Of course, as Vernadsky was well aware, Curie was not alone in making this the subject of his research. The biological impact of radium radiation was being simultaneously intensively studied at the turn of the 20th century in several countries (Germany, France, Russia). The therapeutic effects of radioactive radiation were demonstrated in the treatment of skin diseases (lupus) and certain (surface) cancers. Thus radiotherapy, or Curie-therapy, as it was then called, came into being.

But even before that, the negative ("horrible," to use Vernadsky's own word) consequences of radium radiation were already manifest. Becquerl as well as both the Curies were

badly burned. Guinea pigs and frogs exposed to radiation in experiments died. The pioneer researchers could not help having mixed feelings about the source of what they were studying.

All feelings aside, the known and indisputable facts suggested inevitable and equally indisputable *conclusions* which introduced some essential changes into the humanitarian picture of the world. Becquerl hesitated to make these conclusions, at least publicly, although he undoubtedly thought them over and probably discussed them with his colleagues and friends, the Curies among them.

In the Nobel Prize acceptance speech he made in December 1908 (he shared the Nobel Prize in physics with the Curies), Becquerl, while discussing the physiological effects of radium rays, clearly emphasized their *negative* impact on living organisms. Radium rays, he noted,

most often affect only the epidermis; but they also deeply affect the skin. The effect at first produces no sensation whatever and only develops after a few weeks. More or less deep adhesions are formed which sometime take months to heal and can leave scars. Nevertheless, at present, attempts are being made to use this effect in the treatment of lupus and cancers. Radium rays actively affect nerve centers and may cause paralysis and death; apparently their effect is particularly strong on living tissue in a state of evolution.

A more balanced approach is found in the Nobel speech of Pierre Curie (delivered in June 1905, i.e., eighteen months after Becquerl's speech). Curie felt that the positive and negative physiological effects of radium rays were more or less balanced. Some questions, he said, remained open, and only the future could pronounce judgement on them. But the future, he stressed, had already begun and it was desirable, and even necessary, to take certain precautionary measures in working with radium.

Curie said:

In the *biological sciences* the rays of radium and its emanations produce interesting effects which are currently being studied. Radium rays have been used to treat certain diseases (lupus, cancer and nervous dis-

orders). In certain cases their effect can be dangerous. If one were to forget in one's pocket a wooden or cardboard box with a tiny ampule containing a few centigrams of radium salt, one would feel absolutely nothing. But after a couple of weeks there would be red areas on the skin and then a wound that is very hard to cure. More prolonged exposure might cause paralysis and death. Radium must always be carried in a thick lead case.

Curie boldly invades the humanitarian aspects of the scientific picture of the future. He serves a clear and unequivocal warning about the calamities that the callous use of new scientific discoveries for military purposes could visit on mankind. Herein lies his lasting service to the present and future generations.

Concluding his Nobel speech, Curie said:

It is easy to see that in criminal hands radium could present a grave danger and the question thus arises: does mankind stand to gain from knowing the secrets of nature, is it mature enough to profit by them, or will that knowledge be turned against it? A characteristic example is offered by Nobel's own discoveries: powerful explosives have enabled man to do wonders, but they have also become a fearsome means of destruction in the hands of great criminals pushing nations into war. I happen to be among those who think, as did Nobel, that humanity will derive more benefits than harm from the discoveries.

To quote Vernadsky, Curie looked to radium with a mixture of "hope and apprehension," i.e., in a balanced way. It would be no exaggeration to say that the concluding words of Pierre's Nobel speech shortly before his tragic death provided the whole Curie family—the Nobel scientists Marie Sklodowska-Curie (Pierre's wife), Irne Joliot Curie (the daughter of Pierre and Marie) and Frédéric Joliot-Curie (their son-in-law)—with the moral imperative for all their scientific and public activity and a program for that activity.

Marie Curie fully shared the views expressed in her husband's Nobel speech. "These words," Irne Joliot Curie wrote much later, "which today seem to us astonishingly prophetic but also optimistic, equally conveyed the idea of Marie Curie: she attached such signifi-

cance to them that she used them as an epigraph to her short biography of Pierre Curie." Like her husband, Marie Curie believed that mankind would derive more good than harm from radium rays.

From a scientist who shrank from politics (Pierre Curie), to an active member of the Resistance Movement in World War II, a dedicated Communist and leader of the World Peace Movement (Frédéric Joliot-Curie)—such is that family's remarkable evolution.

In Vernadsky's life, the years 1907-10 were decisive in involving him theoretically, as well as practically, in problems of radioactivity. In 1907 he and his students embarked on a systematic study of radioactive minerals on Russian territory and subsequently the study of the phenomena of radioactivity.

In August 1908, Vernadsky took part in the Congress of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, in Dublin, at which a brilliant paper was presented by I. Jolly, Professor of Physics and Mineralogy at Dublin University, who developed Pierre Curie's idea about radioactive fission as a standard of geological time. Vernadsky was greatly impressed by Jolly's speech and subsequently in laying the foundations of radiology, he, like Jolly, repeatedly referred to Curie's legacy.

That same year a volume of Curie's works, published in France, enabled Vernadsky to assess the full value of the great scientist's heritage for the future as well as the present. Vernadsky wrote:

Pierre Curie was noted for writing unusually well-thought-out and concise papers. Before writing anything down he would think through the results to the end, then express them in a singularly clear-cut way. A full collection of his writings after a lifetime of 47 years is contained in a single volume.

In December 1910, Vernadsky made a major speech before the General Assembly of the (Russian) Academy of Sciences. Entitled "The Tasks of the Day in the Field of Radium." The speech summed up the scientist's thoughts on basic philosophical, historic-scientific and socio-historical questions that so deeply engaged his mind in connection with the problem of radium.

In intonation, meaning and motivation it carries clear echoes of Curie's Nobel speech.

Vernadsky puts the problem of radium in an all-embracing, truly global social and philosophical context. However, his view of the future is not as alarming:

Sources of energy have been opened up which for power and significance make the force of steam, electricity and chemical explosives seem pale. We, the children of the 19th century, have become used to the steam and electric power which we encounter at every step, and we know how profoundly they have changed and continue to change the whole fabric of human societies; moreover, how profoundly they change the daily environment of the individual, affecting ingrained habits and ways—habits and ways that have lasted without change over whole historic epochs. And now the phenomena of radioactivity have revealed atomic energy sources that are millions of times greater than any energy sources man's imagination has ever pictured before.

It is with awe and anticipation that we regard the new force presented to the human mind. What does its future development hold in store for us?

From a distance we can get only glimpses of the future's picture. As always when new forces are discovered, human thoughts turn to them as remedies for suffering and disease. So in the field of radium we look for new forces to protect us and combat the evils that afflict us. We regard our new protector and ally with hope but also with apprehension.

In January 1911, Vernadsky made a brief visit to Paris, where he met Marie Curie, familiarized himself with the work of the Radium Institute which she headed and discussed plans for marking maps of radioactive materials in the earth's crust. His ideas met with her approval. The support of so world-famous a scientist was very important for Vernadsky. Soon afterwards she wrote him that she thought the study of radioactive materials could be of great benefit to science and that she was prepared to help in his research.

In 1912 Vernadsky set up a permanent Radium Expedition at the Academy of Sciences which coordinated all of the Academy's radium expeditions and research.

In 1914 World War I broke out; the time had

come to appraise, and to some extent reappraise, the immediate future applications of scientific discoveries (including those in the field of radioactivity) in the military sphere. Vernadsky did this with his characteristic realism, sobriety, objectivity and vision, looking far ahead. Pain, sorrow, annoyance, regret and anger—his feelings about imperialist war ran the whole gamut of emotions. From a distance we can merely glimpse pictures of the future, as Vernadsky said. And for the first time—in connection with the latest scientific discoveries and their military applications—Vernadsky warns mankind about the terrible threat of self-destruction looming over it.

He wrote:

In this war we see as never before the use of scientific techniques for military purposes. The dispassionate character of the exact sciences shows itself in the way they were made to serve military destruction. The new element in this war is not only the organization that has made it possible to involve unheard-of, millions-strong armies but also the unprecedented scale of the use of scientific knowledge. War in the air with help of airplanes, zeppelins and hydroplanes, new artillery weapons of unprecedented power and accuracy, various uses of electrical waves or electric current, new explosives all do their gruesome job. No doubt—in spite of the bloody and painful consequences—all this stimulates scientific creativity and directs the forces and the thought of researchers into new areas of inquiry. It is not to be denied, however, that if we compare the results already obtained with the development of destructive military activity deemed possible by scientists, we see we are at only the beginning of achievable scientific applications in military art. The natural forces already being probed by scientific thought, whose conquest we have started and will undoubtedly continue to pursue to the end, are beginning to show themselves in this war and are holding in store still greater disasters unless they are limited by the forces of the human spirit and a more perfect social organization.

The development of science could not stop wars, which are consequences of many causes beyond the scientists' control. One should not entertain any illusions. The war unleashed today is not going to last: it will stimulate human creativity toward further

improvements in that direction. And because this creativity coincides with the era of unprecedented flowering of the exact sciences and the surging boldness of scientific endeavor, a sense of power to achieve the impossible, it is fair to assume that the application of exact science in military matters will expand in the years following the war, and a new war will see weapons and means of destruction that will leave far behind the disaster cause by the war in 1914-15.

And, Vernadsky concludes, it is necessary "to prevent humanity from destroying itself and . . . to prevent future wars.

Then followed years were filled with epoch-making revolutionary events. In the autumn of 1921, upon returning to Petrograd from the Crimea, Vernadsky set about realizing his long-term plan of creating a Radium Institute whose chief purpose would be to harness atomic energy. From January 1, 1922, on the new Institute became a separate body within the Academy of Science, with Vernadsky heading it.

As earlier in his 1910 speech and his 1915 article, "War and the Progress of Science," Vernadsky again warns against possible destructive consequences of the use of atomic energy, but now he stresses with great force and uncanny foresight the enormous moral and social responsibility which the scientist bears. He dwelt on that question at some length in his brilliant speech at the meeting of the Institute's Council in February 1922:

The scientist is not a machine nor a soldier carrying out orders without thinking or understanding why they are given and what they will lead to . . . In working with atomic energy, there must be a realization of the responsibility the scientist bears for his findings. I would wish this moral element to be perceived in atomic research, which seemingly is so remote from spiritual considerations.

And so, proceeding logically and drawing on its technical applications (including military ones) and on his own experience as a scientist and a citizen, Vernadsky formulated the principle results of his hopeful and disturbing thoughts on the future. On February 11, 1922, he prefaced his *Essays and Speeches* with the following words:

We are approaching a great revolution in the life of mankind, one not to be compared with anything previously experienced. The time is not distant when man will have at his disposal atomic energy as a power source that will enable him to mold a life to his liking. This may happen in just a few years or a hundred years hence. But happen it must.

Will man be able to utilize that power and direct it to his benefit and not to self-destruction? Has he reached the stage where he will be able to use the force with which science will inevitably provide him?

Scientists must not shut their eyes to the possible consequences of their own research and of all scientific progress. They must feel responsible for the full consequences of their discoveries. They must link their work with better organization of the whole of humanity.

Thought and attention must be given to these questions. For there is nothing mightier than the free scientific mind.

One can not help noticing the profound continuity between this statement of Vernadsky and the warning of Pierre Curie in 1905, and Vernadsky's own warnings dating back to 1910 and 1915. The later statement, however, reveals some basically new elements, notably: 1) the danger of mankind's *destroying itself* quite directly tied in with the destructive use of *atomic energy*; 2) Vernadsky stresses that mankind will inevitably harness this mighty new force, thus making the danger of self-destruction all the more *real*; 3) the *responsibility* scientists bear for *all* the consequences of their discoveries is stated in a highly categorical form; 4) also *for the first time* the scientists' responsibility is directly related to their participation in the struggle for *social progress*, for the better organization of the whole of mankind; 5) finally, Vernadsky stresses the *great importance* of the questions he raised and the need to bring them to the attention of the scientific community.

All this makes it clear why this warning against the threat of nuclear omnicide is considered to be classic. The course of events has given it a new relevance that is far greater today than it was 62 years ago.

In 1929, after the famous discovery by Hahn and Straussman, who bombarded ura-

nium nuclei with neutrons to obtain the release of large amounts of energy, Vernadsky was stimulated by the prospects of a peaceful use of atomic energy. "I believe," he wrote, "that recent discoveries hold forth a great future for mankind, i.e., the use of atomic energy which for intensity and capacity leave steam and electricity way behind."

The creation of the noosphere, Vernadsky believed, was intimately connected with the search for new sources of energy. And the first to come to man's aid was the energy of the atomic nucleus. Vernadsky described the harnessing of atomic energy as "a colossal step in the creation of the noosphere."

Only a few months after Vernadsky's death, the Americans dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Judging by all his statements, one can well imagine how the barbaric action would have outraged him.

On the whole, however, Vernadsky's view of the future was optimistic. In the 1930s and particularly the 1940s, he believed that the time was approaching when war would have to disappear from the life of society; in the end, reason and the popular masses which play an ever increasing role in the historical process and also suffer most in all wars, will gain the upper hand and make war impossible. "Apparently," stressed Vernadsky, "there can be no war (i.e., mass murder) in the noosphere, and more sensible ways must be created for settling misunderstandings."²² Today the prophetic predictions and warnings of Pierre Curie and Vladimir Vernadsky are more relevant than ever before.

Nuclear warfare, in which any point on the planet can be hit, must inevitably lead to a world holocaust unless mankind invinces the intelligence and will to give up the use of nuclear weapons, reduce and eventually destroy their stocks while observing equal security, and abandons the solving of differences among nations by force, in favor of "the practice of resolving all problems through negotiations and cooperation, i.e., in the only way worthy of those who think of themselves as *Homo sapiens*." (A.P. Alexandrov, "Science, Peace, Cooperation," *Peace and Disarmament*, Moscow, 1982.)

Orwell: Inside the Myth

PHILLIP BONOSKY

Inside the Myth, Orwell: Views from the Left, edited by Christopher Norris, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1984, £4.95 pbk., £12.50 cloth; distr. by Salem House, Salem NH.

At a commemorative meeting (Jan. 30, 1985) to honor Norman Podhoretz, for 25 years editor of *Commentary*, a magazine that started out championing reaction all over the world, Secretary of State George P. Schultz, on a sabbatical from Bechtel Corporation, told the assembled guests that Norman Podhoretz should be classified with George Orwell as one of those sterling characters of principle who had fought the good fight of conscience and truth and won.

Schultz made this apparently unlikely symbiotic connection of Orwell with Podhoretz to a group of other "fighters of conscience": Henry Kissinger, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan and—not least—the mayor of New York, Edward Koch.

All presumably agreed with this belated benediction, even sharing in the reflected glory of it, and the only thing that the moment lacked was the finalizing passage of hands to seal it forever in the cosmogony of the great cultural events of the century.

This benediction occurred during the week when George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* returned in its filmic incarnation to a number of New York movie houses, to less enthusiastic critical reviews than expected, though a few were dutifully cranked out.

The year 1984 has come and gone, however. According to the book of the same title, 1984 was destined to be the year in which Orwell's hypnagogic vision of the future (as seen from 1948) climaxed in the triumph of Big Brother, double-think and the rest of it, the very language already incorporated in much of the antisocialist rhetoric of the double-thinkers of the Right. (Read the *New York Times'* rationalization of the invasion and occupation of little Grenada for a vintage example of current double-think and -speak.)

Orwell's two satires, *Animal Farm* and

Nineteen Eighty-Four, have been published and republished all over the capitalist world (as well as in Yugoslavia) and his lesser works have also been exhumed, and he himself has been elevated, not to say canonized, as an anti-Communist saint, prophet, and withal, great satirist on the level of Swift and Juvenal and whoever. Being crowned by Schultz, who dreams of planets with tamed "proles," and more and more TVs showing the grinning Reagan, and bank statements you can take home and sleep with, leaves very little left to be said, it's supposed.

Nevertheless this book sets out to say a bit more. In fact, its aim is to take apart if not completely destroy the Orwell myth, starting from the very beginning and the place where it began: England!

The beginning shows us a lower middle-class English boy, named Eric Blair, whose father served his undistinguished career for his King in the Opium Department of colonial India. The family lived in genteel middle-class poverty, or Dickensian "straightened circumstances," and the boy Eric got to St. Cyprian (the private school), and later Eton, on a scholarship, where, according to his testimony, he passed a miserable childhood and early adolescence.

After school, Eric Blair volunteered to work in Burma as a policeman and it was there, he maintained later, he came to see British imperialism up close, and apparently turned against it. His bohemian period, part of it passed in Paris, culminated in his going to Spain during the Civil War for six months, only two of them in any kind of activity, got wounded by a sniper, and left hurriedly in fear that the "Stalinists" (the Spanish government) would arrest him.

In Spain he was part of the POUM, which was the Trotskyist organization, headed by a one-time secretary to Trotsky himself, and whose political and military policies directly opposed the policies of the People's Front govern-

ment then so sorely pressed by Franco backed by big guns from Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy and the "benevolent neutrality" of Blum's France, Roosevelt's USA and Chamberlain's England.

While the government was exerting every effort to defeat the enemy in front of it, it had to contend at the same time with the enemy in its rear—Franco's "fifth column," which included not only calculated traitors on the fascist side but members of the POUM as well. For the POUM wanted to create a civil war within a civil war—to set up a "workers' government" under the hail of bullets from international fascism.

Although Eric Blair is pictured as vacillating on POUM policy from time to time, in his *Homage to Catalonia*, which was published soon after the war, he denounced in the most vitriolic terms the whole policy of the government, which he characterized as dominated by the "Stalinists," which meant the Communist Party of Spain and the Soviet Union. That the Soviet Union had been (beside Mexico) the only country to send arms and supplies (and had also sent several hundred of its people to join the international volunteers) to the hard beset country was proof, to Blair, not of its internationalism, but of its thirst for power, the end of which could only be the betrayal of pure socialism.

Back in London after his sojourn in Spain (not to fight but to get material for writing), he joined (for a short while) the British division of Trotskyism. Later during the war (WWII), while the end of it was still in doubt, Eric Blair felt that no problem was more pressing on his conscience than to expose "totalitarianism" on the Left—already called (by the Trotskyites) "Stalinism" (a label that could be taken over and added to in the years to come by a whole motley of anti-socialists ranging from the puff-ball Left to the death-squad Right of El Salvador.)

He wrote *Animal Farm*. Just about the same time, also while the outcome of the war was still in doubt, another "hater of Stalinism" in the USSR itself was circulating anti-Soviet literature and his name was Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

In any case, *Animal Farm* found it hard going at first. Dial Press in America rejected it

because "it's impossible to sell animal stories in the U.S.A." T.S. Eliot, then reading for Faber and Faber Publishers, and no liberal ("a Royalist in politics, a classicist in literature, and an Anglo-Saxon in religion") had enough sense of the unfavorable climate to reject the book, saying, "we have no conviction . . . that this is the right point of view from which to criticize the political situation at this time."

The book, however, after three rejections, fell into the hands of the publisher Frederic Warburg, who immediately saw its possibilities. The war was still on, the Tory government headed by Churchill was soon to be swept out of power and a labor government installed, and the climate did not appear propitious for it. "Some of my staff," Warburg wrote later, "didn't want to publish . . . [because it] is a bitter satirical attack on our ally the USSR when . . . its armies were rolling back the German forces . . ."

Nevertheless, he himself was for its publication and saw in its appearance at that time that "It is worth a cool million votes for the Conservative Party . . ."

So it was published and initially did not do too well. The times were still not quite ripe for it. Nevertheless, it was not too long after (1948) that the book, followed by *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and with the Cold War in full cry, turned out to be not merely a vote-getter for the British Conservative Party but the ideological bible for Western imperialism and the jewel in its anti-Soviet, anti-Communist propaganda crown.

And its importance to reaction has increased ever since, even though by 1984 it was not the "proles" who had been ground down into helpless automatons of mechanized social responses, but the prophets of the destruction of socialism who have been brought to the edge of despair as they watched country after country opt for people's power.

So this is, more or less, the way it looks for us on this side of the Atlantic, and we find it very difficult to join in any crusade to "save" Orwell from his supposed captors. There are those who maintain that there *is* a pro-so-

cialist Orwell lost among the briars of his "anti-Stalinism," and that this Orwell (once Schultz and company have used him up) is worth salvaging. "But," as the editor of this volume indicates early enough, "the fact that his writings are subject to such gross appropriations is evidence of their deeper complicity with those who would so use them."

And the "complicity" is not so obscure at that, though it is this "complicity" which essentially undermines the thesis, espoused by some who contribute to this symposium on Orwell, that there's an Orwell the Left can live with if only one digs for him deeply enough.

There isn't and the notion that there might be is what vitiates the impact of this book, for what it gives to us with its left hand, it takes away immediately with its right!

These essays by a group of 13 critics, academics and others, cover Orwell's life, his influences, his psychology, analyze his literary style, expose his obvious nakedness to anyone small-boy enough to see it, but—except in a few cases—can not really make up their minds just *what* one should think of Orwell. There are attempts to separate the chaff from the wheat. But one feels behind most of these essays the embers of a political fire still burning in England on such questions as whether or not the principles of Marxism-Leninism apply to England, what is the role of literature in politics, whether the Soviet Union is truly socialist or not. The "Left" represented here is so "wide" that it's possible for a reader to enter it from one end as a confirmed socialist and exit from the other as an anti-socialist.

For instance, Alaric Jacob, who knew Orwell from childhood, and who had been a journalist reporting the USSR under attack, sums up his reactions to Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* thusly: "For me [it] is one of the most disgusting books ever written—a book smelling of fear, hatred, lies and self-disgust by comparison with which the works of Marquis de Sade are no more than a bad dream of a sick mind."

For some of the contributors to this symposium that opinion would represent an extreme. To, say, Stephen Seedly, it would undoubtedly

be. For the only serious reservation he can bring against Orwell (in this case *Animal Farm*) is that "it does nothing to cast light on what for any socialist is the real question: what has gone wrong [with the living socialist world—P.B.] and why? If anything it has tended to fix the left in its own errors by aversion."

His lament is that Orwell doesn't expose Soviet socialism more plausibly. Here is how Stuart Hall sums up:

Orwell has also had a very independent political formation as a *socialist* [his italics—P.B.] which distinguished him from the majority of intellectuals who turned to the left in the 1930s. For whereas they fell under the orbit of the Communist Party and the Popular Front [obviously the wrong thing to do—P.B.] Orwell's formation was mainly in the orbit of the I.L.P. [the Trotskyite group—P.B.], an independent Party of the left, opposed to the statism of both the Labour Party and Stalinism.

And more:

Nineteen Eighty-Four owed a great deal to Orwell's instinctive libertarianism.

Which is why, I suppose, Schultz finds him so admirable as he schemes for newer ways of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government!

Orwell's qualifications as a judge of real socialism, and in his day, this meant only the Soviet Union, rests on nothing firmer than his experiences in Spain and what he had read about the Soviet Union. In fact, he confessed at one point: "I have never visited Russia and my knowledge of it consists only of what can be learned reading books and newspapers."

Well, that's not good enough. Books and newspapers, on the whole, reflected at that time hardly more than the hopes of one side and the prejudices of the other—a polarization between a utopian concept of the USSR and the "opposite" but just as "utopian" view that it was a living hell. (Exception: *Soviet Communism: a New Civilization?* by Beatrice and Sydney Webb. A later edition dropped the question mark.)

It was from the second end of the polarization that Orwell took his lead. His misanthropic sculpting tools owed nothing to objectivity and

everything to petty-bourgeois prejudice, "sharpened" by Trotskyism.

No wonder American and British (and other) reaction has taken Orwell to their bosom and painted a golden nimbus around his head. Orwell, the "socialist" who had even risked his life in Spain for "socialism," had become duly disillusioned with Soviet socialism, and from the moral height of a true believer, now happily undeceived, aimed his withering barbs of denunciation at the love he once embraced with all his youthful idealism.

Pictured as a "good man," a man of principle (in fact a saint), his "disillusionment" is stressed against the need to present any objective facts others can judge. Good people don't like bad things. Ergo, what they dislike is bad. Q.E.D.

Critics of socialism "from the Left" who beg publishers of their works to remember to tell the folks that despite the reactionary company they find themselves in, their hearts still beat for "socialism" and the day it makes its appearance on the earth (all so far have been frauds) is the day they will come out all-out with bugles blowing and flags flying. Such lookers-after-socialism, scanning the dim horizons, never manage to see the fighters for socialism in Indonesia and Chile and little Grenada, who, "Stalinists" all, in any case failed to rise to their austere standards of ideal socialism, and thus, in a way, deserved their fates.

Trotskyism has supplied bourgeois reaction with a vocabulary and even a "revolutionary" thesis. It is the Trotskyite Orwell which the hard-bitten imperialist Schultz takes to his bosom. He, too, separates the rhetorical "revolutionary" chaff in Orwell from the wheat: his anti-Communism, his anti-Sovietism. The rest the wind can blow away.

Idiocy doesn't cancel itself out automatically in a context of class insanity. Idiocy cancels out sanity. This book suffers from the fact that what's "sane" in it is cancelled out, more or less, by what's not sane. As long as there is a power that can decide which ideas are to be saddled and ridden out to battle and which are to be left at the post munching on

consumer oats, then anyone in a bourgeois society who strikes the pose of "positive criticism" of living socialism will find soon enough that this formula guarantees only that the "criticism" will be put to work and the "positive" just won't show up at all.

Plagued by the delusion that "pluralism" means that every political dog, no matter what kind of a cur it is, must have its day at the expense of the working class, no positive idea emerges from this book uncoupled from its negation, and so no firm force can be mounted effectively to do battle with the Orwell myth. How do you know he's not right (at least in part)?—one hears naggingly behind the critical formulas. Finally, as still another assertion is neutralized by its "correction," one feels like reacting the way that reactionary curmudgeon, Samuel Johnson, did when he was similarly harassed by the agnostics of his day who denied the substantiality of the real world. He kicked a stone and cried: "I refute it thus!"

I refute Orwell's "socialism" thus: by pointing to the use made of him by anti-socialism, headed by the most ruthless political gangsters since Hitler. At a certain point agnosticism clearly abets complicity.

A further weakness of this book is the fact that so many of the writers sharpen their ideological axes on the Orwellian stone. Feminists (Beatrix Campbell, Deidre Beddoe) find that Orwell's greatest sin was his male supremacist attitudes toward all women, implying—at least allowing it to be inferred—that if he had corrected this defect the rest of him might have been acceptable. Even agreement on his role in Spain can not be reached: a firm assertion by one writer (Bill Alexander) exposing the myth of Orwell as a true supporter of Spanish democracy is subtly undermined by another (Robert Stradling).

It is, however, useful to be reminded (Andy Croft) that Orwell's "original" ideas of a mechanized society were not original with him. In fact, they were commonplace during the 1930s, the only difference being that then they were used to describe *fascism*. Orwell simply hijacked them and made them serve an opposite

purpose.

It is also useful to show (Alan Brown) how a truly Orwellian situation exists in Britain's schools and involves the study of Orwell himself. British school children are obliged to study his works and how they do on their final exams is based on how well they've absorbed him. If anyone piped up and said the King was naked—he'd fail. The *assumption* that Orwell's works are the works of a great genius is given to them and they are not encouraged to question it.

All this is helpful in dismantling the myth. But nobody in this book manages to explain why a thesis, which in its anti-Sovietism is readily refutable on the level of fact, is nevertheless widely acceptable on the level of fiction.

If *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are meant to be factually based on existing socialism—primarily the USSR—then they can be dismissed as simply untrue.

But they are not presented as *literal* accounts. They are presented as fables. Fables have very little to do with facts, and thus any potential critic finds himself disarmed if his aim is to disprove the facts. There are no facts.

So what is there? What there is is something more subtle and far more difficult to seize upon with critical tools. For the only "fact" upon which Orwell builds is—*fear*. He takes the undeniable fear which lurks in most people that a "totalitarian" government might be imposed on them and under circumstances they are helpless to prevent. This possibility is imminent in every bourgeois society. Aspects of such a dictatorship are already all around us: the tyranny of the secret police; the computer system of universal classification and surveillance; the use of drugs to alter consciousness (already a CIA practice); the prevalence of spying (human and electronic); the uniformity in the press; the control of information in fewer and fewer hands; the manipulation of public opinion; the continued reduction of human beings to mathematical symbols, treated as symbols; and on and on. All that is needed is to lock it all into a

single political will—and who doubts that this is the dream of Reagan and company?

Of course all this has already occurred—in Italy, Germany, Spain, Japan—and other places. In each instance, "totalitarian" (and this word is important) dictatorships are imposed on the people in the service of a single class—capitalism in its imperialist stage.

This is known. And it is this fear, with roots in real life, which Orwell exploits. He builds on it, always confirming his "fiction" with what one knows is real, already experienced—and then, and here is his criminality, he labels it—or allows the inference to be drawn that this is—"socialism," or more precisely Soviet socialism.

If he manages to get away with this sleight-of-hand, it's because his readers most likely have no first-hand knowledge of real socialism, as he himself did not ("All I know is what I read in the papers") and thus have no way of correcting the projected image. But they do have first-hand knowledge of capitalism.

What Orwell does—and what most bourgeois anti-socialist propaganda does—is simply substitute the known image of capitalism with all its evils for the unknown reality of socialism. In fact for 65 years now bourgeois propaganda has been pounding away at the idea that socialism is nothing but rotten capitalism—that is, with all of capitalism's vices (without identifying them as capitalist) and none of its virtues. And no socialist virtues are admitted at all!

They go further. They equate socialism with fascism and the formula by which these opposites are made to appear similar or the same is the magic word "totalitarianism." This vague, unscientific formula stresses similarities (some of which, as with Hitler, are adopted to mislead or camouflage, like the name of his party, "National Socialist Workers Party"—it was not nationalist, socialist, workers nor even a party) and leads the naive to deduce "logically" that things that look alike must be alike.

Those who use this term are either quite unable or unwilling to penetrate beneath even ostensible appearances to substance. The USSR is pictured as being equally "totalitarian" as was the German Hitlerite state since both states abo-

lished certain bourgeois forms. The forms are taken to be tantamount to the content. The one state—socialism, whose content is workers' power, is the negation of the other state, fascism, whose content is bourgeois power—is of course not only not pointed out but carefully concealed. The result was that in practical politics those who condemned "both sides" in actual fact helped only fascism.

This is what Orwell does. This is what the POUM in Spain did. In writing his book condemning socialism while fascism was still on the march he obviously aided only fascism.

Such a line, such a book, only disarms the reader. Instead of helping him to recognize the symptoms of what is his real enemy—the threat of fascism pursuing its "crusade" against the Soviet Union—he's told that since both actual socialism and fascism are the same "totalitarianism," and that "democracy" is opposed to

both, one must be opposed to "both," i.e., in practice, to real socialism. Nowhere is he told that fascism is the outgrowth of capitalism and is implicit in it even in its democratic dress.

Some of the writers in this book are hung up on this "dilemma." Real socialism has been transformed, in their eyes, to "Stalinism," that is "totalitarianism," and they sigh for a way between the Charybdis of "Stalinism" and the Scylla of imperialism, and mark time until events themselves force them to make a choice.

This, however, does not apply to a number of other writers in the book who really do know the difference between fascism and socialism, and know that in the apparent evasion of neutrality, or "equal distance," there is already concealed a choice.

It is they who give this book the value it has. But they are forced to oppose others who claim to be on the same side. □

Headed for Mass Popular Disobedience

Hugo Fazio

"We inform the workers and the people that a National Conference of the Communist Party of Chile, the first meeting of this nature to be held under the fascist dictatorship, has taken place." These are the opening words of a communique circulated in Santiago last June. It concerned a vastly important event in the lives of Chile's Communists that had a wide echo among the country's democrats. A party persecuted by fascism, which had promised to do away with it, showed its viability by ensuring that a forum, equal to a congress in significance, was attended by all the CC members living in Chile and the secretaries of many regional organizations. CC members in exile and the secretaries of a score of coordinating committees grouping Communists according to the country of residence met at the same time. The two meetings, which amounted together to a conference, were a victory for the CPC and the people and a telling blow to the hated dictatorship.

The National Conference, the highest expression of inner-party democracy in conditions of illegality, was preceded at all levels by a lively discussion of present tasks of the Party and the people. From beginning to end, it deliberated under the slogan "Democracy Now, Down with Pinochet." This was also the title of the report submitted to the Party for consideration two months earlier. Discussion centered on how to muster popular forces in resolutely using diverse forms of struggle to overthrow fascism.

The Conference reaffirmed the policy of mass popular disobedience. "The people's exercise of the right to resist arbitrariness and despotism," the Final Communique says, "has raised the fighting morale of the masses and contributed to the unity in struggle." Large sec-

tions of the population supported the ideas of this policy. They became a concrete force that brought about qualitative changes in the anti-dictatorial struggle.

The revolutionary upsurge did not come spontaneously. It was a result of the fact that the policy of mass popular disobedience evolved and adapted by the Party had taken root among the population; a result of organization, planning and the Communists' links with the people. The National Protest Days begun in May 1983 took place in the wake of mass actions organized by the Party; they showed the real possibility of taking to the streets. Large social sectors, including members of diverse parties, backed these initiatives, thereby giving specific expression to their dissatisfaction with the regime. It follows that the people's major actions were neither accidental nor spontaneous. Afterwards the rapid expansion of the mass movement induced the most diverse population groups to join it. Otherwise it would not have assumed such vast proportions.

The Conference described the overall situation as favorable to overthrowing the tyranny. It stressed, however, that this situation can be used only if the different forces opposing the regime unite more closely and at a higher level of popular struggle. At the moment broad-based unity manifests itself in the course of certain campaigns but it does not apply that a definitive consensus has been achieved on the ways and means of abolishing the dictatorship, let alone on the subsequent advancement of the country. Besides, protest actions have shown that notwithstanding their considerable scope, they are not enough in themselves to defeat the regime, which will not step down, even if the majority of the population comes out against it. The dictatorship must be brought down. "Fascism will not listen to reason," the Report says, "and therefore it is necessary to back the peo-

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ple's arguments by the people's force, bringing it to bear in a thousand ways and on all fronts."

Numerous major contradictions imperatively demanding a solution have accumulated in Chile. Fascism, however, is not easing them but aggravating them still further. The structural crisis of Chilean society is by no means a new phenomenon; it has been known for years. The Allende government tried to end it by effecting revolutionary changes, which the counterevolution broke off. Fascism, too, grappled with the crisis, doing so in its own way, recklessly promoting state monopoly capitalism, increasing the country's dependence in collaboration with imperialist capital and strengthening the domination of the more powerful groups of the financial oligarchy. To attain these aims fascism adapted an ultra-reactionary policy based on the monetarist theories of the Chicago School and resorted extensively to extra-economic levers and the most unrestrained coercion.

The result proved very different from what the regime had expected. True, state monopoly capitalism gained stronger positions and centralization and concentration of finance assumed unprecedented proportions, but then dependence increased too and this made the structural crisis worse. The domination of imperialism and the financial oligarchy entered a crucial phase. Imperialist plunder and finance capital's profiteering went so far that the point at issue today is the need to overcome the irreconcilable contradiction between the power of these small groups and the interests of the country, of the vast majority of its people.

Pinochet's policies hit a wide range of social sectors and classes from the workers to a substantial part of the bourgeoisie. Chilean fascism is a terroristic dictatorship of domestic and foreign finance capital. Terror has enabled it to rule the country by applying the most reactionary concepts in their most outspoken form. The result is untold hardships for a whole people. In 1983 per capita national income was no higher than in 1960. The cyclical crisis which began in 1981 struck the Chilean economy with uncommon force. The 1982-83 period saw its gross pro-

duct fall by 15 per cent. The failure of fascist monetarist policy in Chile is an experience whose significance goes beyond national boundaries.

The nation's economic policy is dictated from New York and Washington. The measures adopted by the dictatorship conform strictly to the terms set by the IMF and to the loan requirements fixed in talks on a revision of the foreign debt. These loans are intended first and foremost to pay interest on the debt and hence are mere remittance transactions by transnational banks which increase Chile's debt.

For the big imperialist powers, particularly the United States, foreign trade is another instrument of plunder. According to statistics released by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, conditions for Chilean trade have deteriorated to such an extent that in 1983 Chile had to export three times more to pay for imports equalling, in volume, those of 1970.

The coup was followed by rapid development of domestic finance capital. The main economic groups linked with imperialism by a variety of ties brought a considerable part of the nation's economic activity under their control. Many decisions of national significance were made in their offices. Today, however, the two most powerful associations of employers, one of which is headed by Javier Vial and the other by Manuel Cruzat and Fernando Larraín, are experiencing a bad decline. This is due to the nature of the mechanisms of expansion used by them. Their domination in the financial system has been assured by the fascist state. They used the opportunities offered them to plunder those who took bank credits at usurious interest rates ranging from 30 to 50 per cent a year.

This situation persisted till the beginning of the latest cyclical crisis, when numerous debtors broke off payments because they could no longer make them. Leading private banks declared themselves insolvent. Their debts were paid out of injections from the Central Bank exceeding the assets and reserves of the banks concerned several times over. The dictatorship had to assume control of five banks in order to save them from bankruptcy. Today, when the assets of the Central Bank have been capital-

ized, it intends to restore them to private business. A notable part of the financial system is now under government control, which is used for further transfers of funds to private economic groups. And while earlier this was done to further their growth, today the aim is to save them from disaster and pay off the enormous debt owed chiefly to foreign creditors.

The country finds itself in a peculiar position created by the crisis. Domestic finance capital has been weakened. Economic groups have lost control of the banks. Large groups of enterprises, in which economic clans hit by the crisis own most of the shares, are controlled indirectly by the fascist state and subsist on funds granted by the Central Bank. A protracted and difficult process of recomposition of finance capital is believed to be imminent, for the crisis is very deep.

Furthermore, imperialist capital, which earlier used to export substantial funds to the country, has checked this flow of resources. The credits granted in the 1983-84 period were indispensable to regularly service the foreign debt.

U.S. imperialism is faced with the following dilemma: Pinochet guarantees it further maximum exploitation and plunder of the country. However, the imperialists realize that the dictatorship's further existence is bound to be most uncertain; they fear that social conflicts may intensify. Hence, imperialism's maneuvers. While backing Pinochet, it is at the same time searching feverishly for a way out. Its efforts are aimed at bringing about a process of transition that would preserve the forms of the imposed domination and help achieve the main goal, which is to paralyze popular actions, frustrate mutual understanding within the opposition and to isolate the Communists and the Peoples' Democratic Movement (PDM) so as to prevent their active participation in the effort to end the crisis.

The marked worsening of the conditions of most Chileans is a further symptom of the present situation. Unemployment, which affects one-third of the nation's work force, is no longer the exclusive lot of the poorest but encompasses numerous intellectuals and various sections of the middle strata; it is assuming a

structural character. There are hundreds of thousands of Chileans to whom fascism can not give jobs. Superexploitation has kept at a high rate throughout the years of dictatorial rule. Since August 1981, when pay adjustments to the rising cost of living were stopped, real wages have declined again. The agreements signed by the regime with the IMF stipulate that no wage increases shall be paid to those working in the private sector and that workers and other employees engaged in the public sector shall be granted lower nominal increases. In either case there are to be new cuts in terms of real incomes. The middle strata, too, are affected by a drastic reduction in the standard of living. Many small and medium businessmen were mercilessly expropriated and had greatly to reduce their economic activity.

Thus the situation in Chile is explosive and this is admitted even by the Minister of Finance, Luis Escobar Cerda. Speaking to employers grouped in the Association of Factory Development, he confirmed the fact that "there is hunger" in the areas inhabited by the common people. The state, he added, "can not continue functioning with unemployment at the present level." He pointed out that Chile "is in a very serious social situation which may become a political problem." (*El Mercurio*, June 5, 1984.) Indeed, the worsened condition of the vast majority of the population is a manifestation of the general economic, political, social and moral crisis enveloping the country.

The Conference noted that growing discontent must translate into vigorous actions with every passing day and in increasing measure. The miserable condition of millions can not itself lead to change. The chief task is, therefore, to use it as a spur for organization and struggle at a higher level.

The forces opposed to the dictatorship cover a wide spectrum. Politically, they range between the PDM, which groups the more consistent fighters committed to an explicitly anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic orientation, including Communists and several Rightist parties plus the other Left groups and all Centrist trends. These heterogeneous forces

have come to terms on carrying out various social actions. Joint actions are a powerful factor in the fight against the dictatorship; they have shown possibilities of a unity that does not merely rally us together but adds to our strength. This is not enough, however. The need is for something more than consensus on social actions. It is important to arrive at a common stand on the forms of advancing to the removal of the dictatorship and to decide at least the main lines of activity after it has fallen.

The PDM has repeatedly proposed a broad national accord. No mutual understanding has been reached on this yet because certain opposition groups, while taking a resolute stand against the regime, are afraid of the people. This prompts them to operate from positions ruling out the participation of the more consistent Left forces in a joint struggle and, often, to put forward formulations directed against the Communists and the PDM. "Such concessions," the Conference noted, "are a reflection of pressure from imperialism and home reaction, of their intention to go on controlling developments and prevent the working class and the parties representing it from imparting a progressive trend to events."

The main prerequisites for a broad agreement are there. The views of the opposition coincide in general on key issues, such as Pinochet's exit, the need to form a provisional government, the convening of a Constituent Assembly to decide on the foundations of the future system, the abrogation of the fascist constitution and the framing of an emergency policy to solve the most acute problems of the population and adopt effective measures for economic rehabilitation.

This broad opposition to the dictatorship represents diverse class interests and it is necessary, in seeking unity, to take account of their variety. Inside the opposition movement there is a contest for leadership and debate about the future development of the nation. These divergences must be overcome in joint actions against the fascist dictatorship, and not be reduced to a squabble that would play into the regime's hands and prevent the opposition from taking advantage of its growing difficulties.

The most effective way to work for unity is to mobilize the masses. The level of mobilization was particularly high in the national protest days and during mammoth actions, such as this year's May Day rally, the biggest in national history, or the November 1983 rally in Santiago. Both actions drew hundreds of thousands. Mutual understanding is gaining ground among the working people, for operating among them are, as a rule, unitary trade union organizations.

Attempts to split the trade union movement according to ideological trends have fallen through despite active support from international non-class trade union centers. On the initiative of workers and other employees, representative unitary bodies spring up in which trade union democracy finds an expression. The National Council of Workers, which groups all trade union organizations of the country, is winning respect and prestige among both working people and broad democratic forces.

In the countryside, too, a single body of diverse peasant associations has been set up. But its activity does not yet influence the rural working people sufficiently. They have so far taken little part in national protest days although currently they are tending towards greater activity. Speaking generally, the mass movement in the countryside has been lagging behind. This makes it an important task to strengthen the worker-peasant alliance and help the peasants organize themselves and join in the struggle. Cohesion of the workers and peasants as well as the numerous urban middle strata is decisive in the struggle for an end to the dictatorship and for the victory of the progressive forces.

The student movement and many universities have called a halt to the antidemocratic practices encouraged by the authorities and have formed unitary organizations. At Santiago's Chilean University, the biggest institution of higher learning, the overwhelming majority of students voted for the restoration of their previous elective body, the Federation of Students of Chile. As for the puppet organization imposed by the dictatorship, it disbanded itself after losing support in the majority of educational institutions.

Politically, the Conference stressed the need to build up the PDM. It called for greater mutual understanding with the Socialist Bloc (the bloc sprang up in 1983 and groups some of the forces previously affiliated to Popular Unity) with a view to resuming eventually joint actions and re-establishing unity of Left organizations. Naturally, we consider it important to seek perseveringly agreement within the entire opposition.

Unity is a pressing requirement of the anti-dictatorial struggle and when the dictatorship has fallen it will be the main condition for bringing the country out of its present prostration. It will take efforts by the whole nation to overcome the dislocation caused by fascist rule.

The Conference took place three-plus years after the appeal of CPC General Secretary Luis Corvalan to go over to popular disobedience. The Party has always held it necessary to remove the dictatorship. The call for a new form of struggle was made when the conditions for this had matured, hopes for the regime's "self-improvement" had proved groundless and the people were demanding to be shown the road to freedom for which they were longing. "The Communist policy of disobedience," the report points out, "is no armchair invention. It generalizes and synthesizes the experience of the masses and equips the struggle with new methods without rejecting those used before. It encourages creative effort. It is a policy of deep-going renewal, opening new paths and prospects. It takes account of the changes that have occurred in the thinking of the masses under fascism and of the past experience of our people and other peoples, which shows that freedom must be won and that one must be ready to give one's very life for this sacred goal if necessary."

The policy of disobedience to the dictatorship has taken deep root among masses; it has raised the people's morale, given them new rich forms of self-expression and shown that the repressive apparatus is vulnerable and the people are in a position to destabilize the regime. The pursuit of this policy has refuted the

arguments trotted out at the time of its announcement by certain opponents of the dictatorship, who alleged it would cause a split in the opposition camp and frighten away the section rejecting violent methods of struggle.

Unity is much nearer now than before. When a policy is correct and takes hold of the masses it becomes a factor for unity. The policy of disobedience admits of any form of action against the dictatorship; consequently, far from rejecting nonviolent protest and civil disobedience, it constitutes a single whole with them. The masses come to realize its correctness in the course of anti-dictatorial actions. Every manifestation of opposition brings on repression. Thus popular disobedience to the regime expresses itself in peaceful and violent, legal and illegal action. Whether one form dominates another will depend on the actual conditions and the experience gained.

The people, above all, their advanced contingents, must master every form of struggle. A shoot of the new are the mass self-defense organizations which sprang up in 1983 and largely owe their rise to Communist initiative. They now involve thousands, including members of various parties, and are daily becoming more organized and taking more and more complex forms. Self-defense organizations, particularly strong in large communities, are already equal to holding their own against the regime's repressive machinery in some cases and even to striking it in others. Acts of sabotage are multiplying; originally they were carried out by special groups but afterwards they became a manifestation of the initiative of the masses. As a general rule, various services of vital importance are stopped on antifascist protest days.

The extent of violence in overthrowing the dictatorship will largely depend on the processes going on among the armed forces, which (especially the army) generally remain the mainstay of the tyranny despite clear signs of differences between diverse armed services and controversies among the military over the attitude to the crisis. This position is delaying inevitable changes and is ultimately bound to lead to greater violence. "It is only the broadest and most comprehensive mobilization of the Chil-

ean nation and a new attitude of the armed forces," the Report says, "that can provide conditions for a less painful outcome . . . Every delay in effecting or facilitating the democratic solution demanded by the country would serve only to prolong the people's suffering, aggravate the situation, make the contest harder and add to the responsibility of the backers of the tyranny rather than reducing it."

The Communist Party proposes to form—after the dictatorship has fallen—a dynamic and efficient government by agreement among all democratic forces and with their support. The Conference defined the nature of this government and the fundamental measures to be adopted. It rejected the concept of a transitional cabinet, ruling till a permanent government is elected. Such a government would merely waste valuable time and be unable to function with due regard to the acuteness of the problems awaiting solution or to prevent a revival of fascist forces.

To end the nation's crisis, it is necessary, in addition to removing Pinochet from the scene, which is accepted by the whole opposition, to take resolute steps to eradicate fascism and rule out the possibility of its reanimation.

The structural crisis, which has deepened under the dictatorship, is due to the domination of imperialist capital and the domestic financial oligarchy. There is no overcoming it without removing at least its main levers and the contradictions engendered by the crisis itself. Measures like the suspension of payments on foreign debts, the abrogation of agreements and treaties with the IMF and credit banks, a ban on the free import of foreign capital and goods, the nationalization of banks and major enterprises owned by economic groups and operating at public expense are pressing demands at the moment. The nation's problems can not be solved without abolishing rapacious and shackling terms that hamper the normal growth of the productive forces.

It is also essential to effect fundamental changes in the institutions which are in crisis under fascism, such as the armed forces or judi-

ciary. As far as the former are concerned, the task is to democratize them thoroughly and replace the doctrine of "national security" imposed by the Pentagon with a concept of meeting national interests. Unless these changes come about democracy will be in permanent danger. Conversely, democratic armed forces will have to become an important factor and participant in the renaissance of the country. This also applies to the judiciary.

The opposition has several political projects. We, the Communists, and the PDM advocate real people's rule. Others propose a gradual and smooth return to bourgeois democracy. "These two main lines," the Report notes, "meet the interests of diverse classes and the two main orientations co-existing within the opposition. Historically, there is no avoiding a decision except that it should emerge, sooner or later, in the course of a joint struggle against fascism, of uniting all forces around a common project which puts pressing social and political problems of the country and the people first, and on which it is imperative to come to terms."

Advance to the most progressive way out, leading to the complete eradication of fascism, will depend on a set of factors, above all on the balance of forces. Everything will be decided by the strength and scope of the mass movement, the degree of trade union unity and involvement of the working class, the level of understanding between the working class and other classes and population groups, primarily the peasants and urban middle strata, the prestige of the PDM and the results of restoring Left unity and building up our Party's influence.

Communist participation and policy are a decisive factor at the important stage which the antifascist struggle has already passed. The task of overthrowing the tyranny and destroying fascism requires a Party stronger in every respect, a Party having durable ties with the masses and represented in the major communities more heavily than before. This Party must be able to operate successfully irrespective of the forms taken by the struggle against the dictatorship, must steadily raise the level of mass popular disobedience. □

Nazi War Criminals and the Cold War

HERBERT APTHEKER

In 1980—thirty-five years late—Washington finally established the Office of Special Investigation (OSI), under the Justice Department, with the specific responsibility to investigate Nazi war criminals in the United States. Placed in charge was a young attorney, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., who had been law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Byron White. OSI was not only belatedly appointed, it was grudgingly appointed and its appropriation amounted to one-tenth of one per cent of the Department's total.

Ryan remained Director of OSI until early in 1983; in addition, from March to July 1983, he investigated the case of Klaus Barbie. It was as a result of his recommendation that the State Department in August 1983 conveyed its "deep regrets to the Government of France" for protecting the Nazi mass murderer and torturer—the "Butcher of Lyon"—Barbie, and preventing his delivery to the authorities in Paris. Thereafter, Ryan returned to private practice.

Ryan tells the story of his years as OSI director and his months unearthing the Barbie story in a revealing—but faulted—volume: *Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America*, by John Loftus,¹ Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1984.

First is the fact, exposed here, that when the fighting ceased on the Western Front, "Nazi war criminals came here by the thousands, through the openly deliberated public policy of this country, formulated by Congress and administered by accountable officials." (P. 5.)

These thousands "came through the front door, with all their papers in order." They were admitted as a result of the Displaced Persons Act (1948), which was carefully drafted to favor Baltic fascists and reactionaries as well as the so-called *Volksdeutsche*, i.e., Germans selected by the Nazis for settlement in the Eastern occupied territories.

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The legislation was knowingly profascist and explicitly anti-Semitic. It kept the victims of Nazism out—especially the Jewish survivors. To Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, then Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, two of the senators helping pass the legislation stated it was important to keep out "rats"—a code word for Jews; or in the more direct language of Senator William Revercomb of West Virginia, needed was legislation which "would keep out the Jews" (pp. 17 and 18).

The immigrants admitted under this legislation came to 200,000; many were mere sympathizers with Hitler. But included were at least ten thousand war criminals. They, the author makes clear, were "not merely 'ex-Nazis' or Nazi sympathizers or Nazi collaborators," but rather actual war criminals, that is—as Ryan defines it—those "who had personally, and quite willingly, taken part in the persecution of millions of innocent men, women and children" (p. 5).

Many observers at the time warned that the Act could have the result it did have, but, writes the author, "by then America was far more concerned with the new enemy of Communism than with the old enemy of Nazism" (pp. 5 and 6). This convenient, all-encompassing and therefore meaningless word, "America," will not do. It was not "America" that had come to terms with Nazism; it was the Truman Administration (and successors) which had repudiated the meaning of World War II, started the Cold War as part of a calculated and orchestrated anti-Soviet and anti-Communist policy. Anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, repression at home and Cold War abroad, was the *policy* pursued; it was sustained by a propaganda campaign which took its content and method from Goebbels and it was conducted secretly so that the vast majority of the people of the United States were both misinformed and uninformed. The actual content of Ryan's book

shows this to have been true; in fact, this is the point of that content.

Ryan asks (p. 28): "How did Nazi war criminals come to the United States?" And he answers: "We invited them in." He adds (p. 29): "Surely no enemy in American history was forgotten so soon after defeat as the Nazis." Here he is wrong. Ryan forgets (or does not know) how quickly the robber barons and monopolists forgave the former slave-holding class for its four-year war aimed at overthrowing the government of the United States. There, as in the case of the Nazis, however, it was more than "forgiveness"; it was *collaboration*. That is to say, just as the former slaveowners became partners of the ascendant industrial bourgeoisie in policies of economic and political reaction and intensified racism serving that reaction, so the U.S. ruling class, emerging as part of a triumphant coalition against Nazism, sought in pursuit of domestic reaction and global domination, the use of those Nazis for their common purposes.

The bulk of Ryan's book is devoted to detailed descriptions of efforts—beginning in earnest only in 1980—to deport a handful of ruthless mass murderers; that is, the most notorious among the thousands admitted into the United States. This is significant, exposing as it does the anti-Semitism of the State Department and the reactionary essence of the Department of Justice (especially under Reagan's William French Smith) which made even so limited a task very difficult and only partially successful.

Of the thousands of Nazi war criminals in the U.S., the OSI as of July 1984 (the book goes no further) had filed a total of forty eight cases. Twenty-four verdicts had been handed down; of these, OSI won twenty-one. As of the book's final date only six criminals had been deported. In December 1984, Feodor Fedorenko, an official of the Treblinka death camp, was finally deported. Of Ukrainian nationality, he was actually sent back to the Soviet Union, a reversal of a persistent Justice Department policy rejecting such deportation.

Some of those tried died of natural causes, a few—being convicted—committed suicide. In

other cases, deportation has been evaded, often with the support of the Justice Department. Thus, Andrija Artukovic was Croatia's Himmler. In May 1951, after proof of false entry was established as well as his major role as a mass murderer, Peyton Ford, then Assistant Attorney General, ordered his deportation, but *not* to Yugoslavia. Wrote Mr. Ford (pp. 155-6):

Unless it can be established that he was responsible for the death of any Americans, I think that deportation should be to some non-communist country that will give him asylum. In fact, *if his only crime was against communists, I think he should be given asylum in the United States.* (Italics added—H.A.)

As of this book's conclusion, Artukovic's case was still tied up in litigation, but an A.P. dispatch, dated Los Angeles, January 30, 1985, stated that a Federal court ruled that he—now 85 years old—was competent to participate in extradition proceedings looking towards his return to Yugoslavia. The dispatch added that Artukovic was involved in the murders of 770,000 Serbs, Jews and Gypsies.²

A chapter is devoted to the case of John Demjanjuk, of Cleveland, who had been in charge of gas chambers at Treblinka, and was known to the camp's inmates as "Ivan the Terrible." Entry through perjury was proven in his case as was perjury in his citizenship proceedings. Ryan notes that Demjanjuk's "defense" was one long anti-Communist and anti-Soviet blast and that hundreds of Kluxers, Birchites and Nazis regularly picketed his hearing, demanding his release. The latest news on this monster was a two-inch item deep in the *New York Times* (December 18, 1984), stating that Demjanjuk was demanding his extradition trial be moved from a Federal court to a military one, since his acts were committed in wartime!

Ryan also discusses the case of Edgars Laipenieks, a Latvian, who served as a kind of warden for the Riga prison under Nazi occupation and helped in "interrogation" and extermination. He had been a participant in the 1936 Olympics. After the defeat of the Nazis, he made his way to Chile, where he became coach

for its track teams in the 1952 and 1956 Olympics, and for the Mexican team in 1964.

He came to the United States early in 1960, gaining entry, Ryan writes, "as a CIA informer and anti-Communist." He was also employed as a coach by various California schools. His special duty for the CIA was "to ferret out information on Eastern European nationals who visited the United States." Until at least the end of the 1970s he was a CIA agent.

Only in 1980 were proceedings brought against Laipenieks. In January 1985, an Appeals Court in San Francisco rejected extradition efforts, declaring that while the practices in the Riga prison were not to be condoned, the government had failed to prove that the conduct was aimed at "persons because of their political beliefs." This distinguished retired "sportsman" and CIA agent now works as a "security guard" in La Jolla, California.

Ryan makes clear that it was only increasing public demands for action on Nazi war criminals, including the persistent urgings of then Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman of Brooklyn, that forced a reluctant Justice Department to establish the OSI.

Ryan observes that, in fact, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Justice Department was not interested in crimes committed in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. He writes, however, that "INS's failure to pursue Nazi investigations vigorously was a matter of neglect, not corruption or conspiracy" (p. 44n). But "corruption and conspiracy" are not in question; the point is—and Ryan's *data*, if not his analysis confirms this—that anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism (which quickly merges into pro-Nazi sympathy) dominated Washington and its agencies. That is why prosecution of Nazi war criminals came so very late, was so badly understaffed and never did have and does not now have the urgent or serious attention of Federal authorities.

A part of this attitude and policy was the rejection by INS and State of any data from the USSR or any offer therefrom of assistance. Kissinger, in particular, turned down any suggestion of collaborating with the Soviet Union on

this question.

But pressure can produce results—as we have seen—and late in the 1970s such pressure induced a reluctant Kissinger to authorize inquiries to Moscow. A result is detailed in a fascinating chapter, "The Moscow Agreement: Old Allies, New Realities." When Ryan and others—afflicted, as his writing shows, with all the Cold War paranoia—came to Moscow, they were warmly greeted and briefed by Roman A. Rudenko, the Procurator of the USSR, who had been the Soviet prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials.

The very extensive investigative work of the USSR was turned over to Ryan and arrangements were made for witnesses to be examined and cross-examined under oath and with television cameras recording everything (for the use of U.S. courts). All this was done though the USSR could not help expressing wonder at the delays out of Washington. The evidence thus obtained was decisive, Ryan writes, in what successes the OSI achieved. In his words (p. 90):

There is no doubt in my mind that the agreement we forged in Moscow in January, 1980, and, more importantly, the testimony that resulted from it, has made an enormous contribution to getting the truth about Nazi criminals in America.

Ryan adds that full co-operation was offered him also by the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

One must take serious exception to two points made by Ryan. He reiterates the idea that the Nazis not only sought the extermination of Jews as such, but that "no other religion or political belief or category of people was so marked" (p. 247n). His own data show this to be wrong insofar as the *policy* of slaughtering Croats and Gypsies⁴ is concerned. He is wrong also because, as is well known, Communists, Socialists and pacifists were executed as a matter of principle by the Nazis; furthermore, Hitler aimed at the annihilation of large components of Slavic peoples and the enslavement of survivors. The Hitlerites also executed tens of thousands of homosex-

uals—another “category of people” destined for extermination by them.

Ryan is in error, too, when he excuses the U.S. employment, for several years after the war, of Hitler’s chief of intelligence on the Eastern front, General Gehlen. Ryan describes Gehlen as “an expert on Soviet strategy for the Nazi high command” and thinks such activity is quite separate from that of a war criminal (p. 328n). On the contrary, Nuremburg defined war criminality as launching and participating in, on high levels, aggressive warmaking. Gehlen was very high up indeed among those who planned and carried out the murderous military interventions of Hitler.

This Gehlen—first brought to the U.S. for debriefing disguised in a U.S. general’s uniform!—was employed together with his entire staff in his former headquarters in his dastardly intelligence gathering and sabotage activity. This was done because Washington’s anti-Soviet policy was an extension of Hitler’s. (Incidentally, Ryan himself states that Gehlen employed Otto von Botschwing—one of the war criminals he sought, without success, to prosecute—and that this von Botschwing was in U.S. employ from 1949 through 1954.)

The chapter on Klaus Barbie (pp. 273-323) details the facts on the employment by the U.S. of the “Butcher of Lyon” for five years after the war. He was used to spy on the French and German Left and as a provocateur against the German CP. This was done while U.S. officials lied to France and to elements within the U.S. command. Finally, when exposure and scandal impended, U.S. officials smuggled Barbie to South America through the purchased aid of a Croa-

tian fascist priest. Barbie now awaits trial in France.

The great significance of this volume is the light it sheds on the reactionary and, indeed, the profascist policy of Washington in the postwar generation. It shows that this policy encompassed not only permitting escape and providing havens for thousands of Nazi war criminals; this policy also included *Washington’s employment of these Nazi monsters in Western European Left organizations, in East European societies and, particularly, in anti-Soviet activities.*

It is the latter reality which is most illuminating of postwar history and present conditions; therefore that reality is exactly what is minimized or concealed by the commercial media in the United States. That reality should be mastered by Left and democratic forces here and they should undertake to get this information disseminated as widely as possible.

Understanding this past will make one better able to comprehend present Washington policy of subsidizing fascistic murderers in Central America, in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and in South Africa.

What is needed is not only active pursuit and prosecution of Nazi war criminals but also clear exposure of and prosecution of those U.S. officials responsible for coddling Nazi murderers and employing them, after World War II, in their filthy activities. Here is a task for a congressional investigating committee: this could help prevent Reagan’s drive to produce a Birch Society-like system at home and military interventions abroad. □

Notes

1. John Loftus, a trial attorney for OSI, was in charge of investigating Belorussian war criminals; his book, *The Belarus Secret*, was discussed in *Political Affairs*, November 1984. In that essay brief note also was taken of Brendan Murphy’s study of the Barbie case, *The Butcher of Lyon*, Empire Books, New York, 1983.
2. A Los Angeles A.P. dispatch, March 5, 1985, declared that a U.S. magistrate had ordered Artukovic’s deportation to Yugoslavia.

In agreeing to extradition, the magistrate, Volney Brown, added that he anticipated that Secretary of State Schultz, who has the final word, would consider, “whe-

ther it is fair to surrender him [Artukovic] some 42 to 45 years after the events.” The magistrate seems to suggest a statute of limitations for the crime of slaughtering hundreds of thousands of men, women and children!—*New York Times*, March 5, 1985.

3. Information in this paragraph comes from a dispatch by Kevin Freeman in the *Jewish Sentinel*, Chicago, January 24, 1985. Here one learns that Laipeniak’s special duty for the CIA was “to get Soviet athletes to defect.”
4. Throughout the book *Gypsy* is printed in lower case—an instance of blatant chauvinism.

Soviet Urbanization And Urban Planning

MORRIS ZEITLIN

Creation of the Soviet socialist economy and national planning made possible changing the random growth of cities into a planned, rational process. The morrow of the socialist revolution, however, posed the question of "how?" Inherited knowledge offered scant answers. The new society had to evolve new theory and methods for solving its unprecedented urban problems out of its own experience.

That experience has had rough going in the conditions of a society continually threatened with war. Socialism made rational planning possible, yes; but could its planners rationally plan? Their numbers, organization, professional skills and ability at Marxist analysis were obviously no small matters to the planning process.

In the 1960s, a critical view of by Soviet planners of their urban planning experience became possible and essential to elaborating theory for the future development of their settlement system. Such theory has been unfolding in a prodigious literature examining the past and the present, and laying guidelines for the decades ahead. This article merely sketches its salient features.

The Search for Optimum Size

At first there was a wide gap between socialist urban goals and the ability of the backward, war-torn economy to achieve them. And there was a lack of planners, planning data, skills and vision on how to go about closing the gap. Early urban planners tended to build utopian theoretical constructs. Learning to plan rationally, it appears, had to be gained by trial and error starting with the little knowledge on hand. The old society's art and science of city planning consisted mostly of abstract ideas and data gathered in the course of capitalist and semifeudal

development. The new society's planning principles had to be drawn from solutions to its own problems by intensive search and debate.

The new problems were quick in coming. They followed in droves, hard on the heels of the country's rapid industrialization. Extensive Soviet industrial growth started a massive population movement from the countryside to urban production centers. Between 1920 and 1960, therefore, city planning practice and theory were busy selecting industrial sites, developing urban infrastructures and regulating urban growth.

This, however, oriented planning mainly on particulars. City planning theory failed to anticipate and cope with the rapid growth of big cities. For example: Moscow's 1935 master plan fixed its ultimate population at five million. But the city soon exceeded that limit, reaching eight million by 1970. The master plans of Leningrad, Kiev and other major cities suffered a similar fate.

The view once rigidly held by most city planners that an optimum population and physical size could be found for socialist cities crumbled in critical public debate. This began in the 1960s when some Soviet economists revealed the efficiencies produced by high concentrations of economic activities in the biggest cities and argued against restraining their growth. In cities of over 1,000,000 labor productivity rose 35 per cent above that in 100,000-200,000 class cities and living and cultural standard were invariably higher.¹ Others argued that the optimum size proposition was based on utopian notions. Witness the fact that its advocates kept changing ideal standards—from 50,000-60,000 in the 1930s to 500,000 in the 1960s. Furthermore, they argued, two cities of similar size often have radically different production and living conditions, proving that city size, by itself, has little meaning.

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The critics did not deny the desirability of optimizing urban growth, only the ability of city planning then to achieve it, for they still lacked "rigorous, soundly based organizing theory that could be used for planning all aspects of city development."² Until such theory evolved, they argued, city planning must give the highest priority to laying the economic base for a city's development. The point, therefore, is not to seek an ideal city size

but to set desirable limits for cities of different functional types and, above all, to assure that their infrastructures keep up with their industrial potential. If industrial development moves ahead of the infrastructure . . . it is desirable to constrain further growth . . . When the development of the infrastructure catches up with the industrial development, the constraints may be eased and the economies of scale inherent in large cities can again come into play.

Learning that the biggest cities produced the highest labor productivity and the most favorable conditions swung some planners to the opposite extreme of advocating unrestrained "open growth" for big cities and gradual atrophy of small ones. But the "open growth" idea ignored serious social costs. Rather, optimal urban growth demands respect for both production and human needs.³ Moreover, the "open growth" idea ignores the reality of the existing settlement system. Most Soviet cities are small and their number increases with further industrialization. Although many of them tend to grow into middle and big cities, most remain small. For the foreseeable future, this trend can not be halted. It can only be regulated.⁴

Industrial Priorities

Another aspect of early Soviet urbanization was poor coordination between industrialization and urban development. The overriding need to speed the country's defense ability compelled the Soviet state to empower industrial ministries to locate new production enterprises and use urban infrastructures as needed under reduced city-soviet control. The consequent divided authority within cities often violated the integrity of city master plans and weakened mu-

nicipal management. To carry out their mandate, industrial ministries tended to expand in big cities where in-place production forces made industrial expansion easier. Coordinating production with the cities' social reproduction lay outside their chief assignment. Yet they, rather than city soviets, received most funds for urban capital construction.⁵

This government policy lasted until the March 1971 decision of the CPSU Central Committee, "On Measures for Further Improvement in the Work of Regional and City Soviets," and the corresponding decrees of the Supreme Soviet. Since then, local Soviets have been gaining greater control over activities of industrial ministries within their jurisdictions, with telling improvement in the development of cities.

By the 1960s, along with Soviet progress in production, planning and management, the applied social sciences matured. Notions of an "optimal city size" and proposals for "open growth" gave way to scientific urban studies. Cities and other forms of settlement were examined as an aspect of socio-economic evolution.

Soviet urbanologists recognize that the growth of big cities has been caused by revolutionary advances in science and technology, specialization in production and proliferation of linked economic activities concentrating within growing production centers.⁶ Indeed, irresistible growth had been "swallowing" neighboring suburbs, towns and cities. Developing earlier in advanced capitalist countries, this process has produced sprawling metropolises. But while haphazard urban growth is almost uncontrollable under capitalism, it is amenable to rational guidance under socialism. The thing to do was to search for ways to guide it toward yielding the most social good.

Many studies of cities led to realization that recent urbanization developed through three stages. Its earliest stage was influenced mainly by the interaction between handicraft production and commerce; the second, by the industrial revolution and the interaction between heavy industry and mechanical transportation; and, in the current stage of the science-technology revolution, increasingly by the interaction

between material production and services. In all three stages, the need to cut frictional losses of distance concentrated economic activities and people in cities. The more an economy advanced, the more increasing division of labor produced growing cities where the interdependent specialized enterprises could supply one another, share markets and draw on large pools of skilled specialized workers.

From Cities to Urban Agglomerations

Industrialization and the science-technology revolution similarly affected Soviet urbanization. Indeed, industrialization largely influences settlement formation in newly developing regions, while the science-technology revolution increasingly affects changes in the older parts of the country. Advanced branches of the Soviet economy rely ever more on science and technology, synthetics and service industries. The decreasing weight of extractive industries has been reducing emphasis on new settlements at raw material sources and increasing concentration of technically advancing production in large urban centers.

The largest of these are not just big cities but qualitatively new forms of settlement that shape the urban physical and social structure in new ways. Proliferation of specialized branches of the economy in and around the big cities has turned them into huge versatile complexes. Automation, mass communication and education raise the skill and productivity of workers; transportation widens spatial mobility; and new conservation technology improves the living environment. Concentration of modern industries and skilled workers stimulates social development since it requires, and makes possible, consumer facilities and services. The economies of scale⁷ which lend big urban centers their high economic efficiency apply also to the use of social facilities. The more intensively they are used, the more economical it is to provide them in quantity, variety and quality. This widens personal choices in skills, jobs, access to a variety of goods, services, education, information, health care, recreation and association. These combine to expand big cities into urban systems

integrating neighboring urban and rural settlements to form the modern *agglomeration*—a qualitatively new form of settlement that is neither city nor country but a synthesis of both. The new form of settlement negates the old historically developed “point,” “node” and “nucleus” forms of city, town and village. This moves Soviet urban planning to deal not only, and not so much, with the growth of individual cities as with spatial and social organization of urban life in developing agglomerations.⁸

Some Soviet scholars anticipate the negation of this negation as agglomerations grow into a still newer, more versatile form—the urbanized region. Urbanized regions will integrate agglomerations with the economic and social activities of cities, towns and villages lying beyond their areas to form huge regional urbanized entities laced together by rapid transit networks, giving even more people access to a still greater variety of economic, cultural, service and recreational opportunities. This urbanized region, they think, will at last completely erase the inherited contradiction between city and country. Development of some of the largest agglomerations, like Moscow, suggests the inception of such urbanized regions today. Their trends, advantages and problems are being closely watched studied.

Scholarly attention, however, focuses mainly on the developing agglomerations. Urban planning tries to maximize their benefits and minimize their malefits by methodical deconcentration, rapid transit development and greening. It keeps improving the physical and social infrastructures of peripheral cities and settlements and locating in them economic activities least needing central attention. This reduces congestion, decreases home-to-job movement and integrates urban and rural activities. Extending and improving rapid transit unites the agglomeration and opens the central facilities to the whole population.

Peripheral urban growth, however, is carefully guarded against fusion of built-up areas into the kind of hyperurbanized megalopolises capitalist planlessness produces. It is methodically stopped at environment-preserving green

zones. "In contrast to the United States," wrote a visiting American urban scholar in 1976, "there has been relative little merging of built-up areas. Indeed, one of the striking visual features of Soviet cities is the sharp edge which divides the built-up from the surrounding or intervening countryside."⁹

How does the development of agglomerations affect the country's development?

Over half the urban and much of the rural population live in agglomerations of different size.¹⁰ In densely populated regions, agglomerations comprise groups of big cities and millions of people. In less populated ones they may combine two or more smaller cities with a population of about half a million or more and growing industries sprouting specialized branches that generate new urban growth.¹¹ Agglomerations speed urbanization and at the same time slow the growth of central cities. Most of the 3,200 new industrial plants built in the last decade, for example, are in small and middle cities of urban agglomerations. This slowed the growth rate of central cities to the rate of natural population growth (1.7 per cent).¹² The population from the modernizing countryside no longer overcrowds the big central cities; it tends to settle in the underused peripheries of agglomerations instead. The country's past disproportional urban development is apparently being corrected as planned.

Social Reproduction & Agglomeration

Soviet theorists compare the dynamics of the agglomeration with those of its historical antecedent, the city. Differences between the two appear to stem from the influences of the industrial and the science technology revolutions on human settlement. During the industrial revolution, raw materials, labor and markets were more or less equally important determinants of industrial location and, hence, urbanization. But in the current science-technology revolution, decreasing dependence on natural materials and increasing importance of skilled labor alter the locational choices of new economic activities and the form of settlement. Market factors, too, are changing. Both modern indus-

tries and their highly trained workers "consume" increasing volumes of scientific and technical information and a variety of cultural services. Production of these non-material goods, in turn, demands its own large numbers of skilled workers; and its products, though widely exchanged, are consumed mostly near their points of production. The science-technology revolution thus turns skilled labor into the dominant factor in production. And production tends to locate close to the source of its chief input. Increasing the efficiency of labor by providing the best possible living, learning and working conditions thus becomes not only a socialist ideal but an economic necessity.

Studies of agglomerations—the countries leading production centers—have shown that imbalances between satisfaction of social needs and economic growth brakes socialist development. It is now becoming evident, wrote a Soviet academician in 1981,

[that a] contradiction has emerged between two aspects of production . . . An underestimation of industries producing consumer goods is obviously at odds with Marxist-Leninist theory of expanded socialist reproduction. Without expanded production of consumer goods there can be no expanded reproduction in general, including that of the means of production.¹⁴

Such perceptions have become the stuff from which locational decisions are made. The very approach to location of work places has changed. No longer does the presence of material, technological and labor resources alone suffice in the choice of a new industrial site. Good social reproduction conditions—the presence or creation of adequate housing, shopping, health, child care, education and recreation facilities—looms as importantly. Increasingly, too, Soviet managers voice demands for good access to recreation facilities.

All this presents Soviet planners with difficult problems, the likes of which planners in capitalism seldom face. The difficulty lies in measuring social values, for economic planning must necessarily weigh, relate and balance tangible quantities. While that is easily done with

economic indices and material quantities, the economic benefits of expenditures on intangible social-reproduction values present problems. How, for example, to measure the effectiveness of investment in education, or medical services, or recreation or nature preservation? Soviet planners and scholars write volumes in search of workable answers.

There is also the problem of defining agglomerations as administrative, or at least statistical, entities. At present, urban scholars and planners must deduce the extent of agglomeration from statistics designed to serve economic planning and existing boundaries of cities and villages. This reduces accuracy and wastes much time and labor.¹⁵ Successful planning requires conformity between administrative and planning boundaries. Otherwise, planning urban agglomerations necessitates complicated inter-soviet coordination. Public debate increasingly calls for revision of obsolete administrative boundaries.¹⁶

Urban progress demands resolution of other related problems. One is that city planning within large central urban planning institutes, needed when planning cadres were scarce, continues today. Although still needed by cities too small to support planning staffs, urban agglomerations can, and must, be planned by resident staffs familiar with their unique and changing conditions. Another is that much urban planning still falls within the province of various branches of industry under only partial local-Soviet control—a method made necessary where large-scale industrial development was more than local soviets could cope with. But industrial managements can not well coordinate their planning with other enterprises or local Soviets. The modern agglomeration clearly needs its own comprehensive plan to harmonize progress in all aspects of life and the initiatives of the many enterprises functioning in its territory.¹⁷

Urban-Group-Systems

Soviet urbanology has sought to provide a theoretical base for short and long-range planning of settlement. Studies of how agglomera-

tions develop have led to the concept of *urban group systems*.

As their designation suggests, urban group systems compose groups of agglomerations and cities with growing socio-economic linkages and increasing division of labor. Like agglomerations, urban-group-systems tend to expand. Their industries tend to locate new branches around outlying communities, activating their labor reserves and modernizing their social and physical infrastructures. Inegration within the system expands modern production, transportation, communication and service networks and introduces urban socio-cultural standards to ever larger areas, drawing small settlements into the progress toward communism. Urban group systems may stretch to 125 miles between the center and the farthest communities.¹⁸

Planned development of urban group systems offers immediate advantages. It permits solution of the problems of growing population and building densities in the centers of current agglomerations. The far greater areas of urban group systems permit "decanting" crowded central activities over more spacious industrial, commercial, residential and recreational zones and thus obtaining higher efficiencies. Natural preservation in urban areas, which has become a necessity, can be accomplished. This assures that the contradiction between urban growth and the natural environment will begin to disappear.¹⁹

Just as neighboring settlements form interacting and interdependent systems within a region, so these systems interact and depend on like systems throughout the country. The Soviet Union, in fact, comprises a system of settlement systems. The way this overall system functions had to be understood to put its planning and regulation on as sound a basis as possible.

Out of study of interactions between systems over the territory of the USSR emerged the idea of the *Unified Settlement System*,²⁰ currently the subject of research and debate throughout the socialist world. Its postulates are being examined with the aid of advanced scientific analytical methods, especially the systems approach.²¹

Soviet city planning strives to overcome the problems earlier urbanization created and resolve incipient new ones. It traced the origins of excessive growth and consequent overcrowding of some big cities to the contradiction that had developed between people's motivations in choosing a place to live and the old settlement system's uneven development. Migration tended to flow to cities with a wide choice of jobs and amenities. Had it been possible then to create comparable living and working environments wherever new industries settled, the contradictions could have been controlled. Its elimination obviously requires reforming the settlement system to achieve a process of nearly even development.

While efforts continue toward achieving balanced urban development, Soviet cities still differ considerably. Some have reached high economic, social and cultural levels. In others, tenacious old views and traditions have slowed progress. In still others, as in some big-city suburbs, disproportions appeared between the population's high levels of education, skill and income and the settlement's low level of economic activity and underutilization of the local labor force. The inequalities are many. Fully overcoming them may take many years.

Nor does the present settlement network use well the country's economic-geographic potential. Most urban settlements and almost all the big cities lie within a belt covering about one-third of the country. Over the rest of the USSR, the urban network is quite thin.²² In the 1960s, new planning guides, aiming to spur the economies of middle and small cities, slow big-city growth and concentrate the populations of scattered homesteads and villages helped in many ways. But they fell short of correcting the basic flaws in the settlement network. In 1974, B. Belousov, head of a research institute working on principles of urban development, listed the defects of the Soviet settlement network that had yet to be overcome.²³

Urbanologists traced most of these defects to continued poor coordination between the development plans of industrial ministries and city master plans. That and other failings in tra-

ditional city planning procedures led to a consensus that, in the increasing complex modern Soviet economy, better coordination demands applying the systems approach in a comprehensive study of the country's whole settlement system. Such a study, in fact, was done by the Gosplan (State Planning Committee of the USSR) in cooperation with the Sociology and Geography Institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Central Research and Design Institute for Urban Planning. Years of work, experiment and wide debate produced a document, in 1975, titled "Basic Theses of a General Scheme of Settlement on the Territory of the USSR."

The General Scheme, as it is called, set the methodological principles and guidelines for developing group settlement systems for settlements having close, or growing, functional ties. It fixed two major goals: to lay the framework for rational distribution of the country's expanding production forces, and to create in all settlements favorable conditions for all-around personality development. These goals can be advanced, it maintained, by merging small settlements into larger units for more efficient production, distributing production evenly over the whole country and preserving farm and open land, all of which can best be accomplished by forming various group settlement systems linked with large economic complexes. The idea of group settlement systems is not an arbitrary one, it declared; it accords with the main trends in the spatial organization of economic and social life in the era of the science-technology revolution. Witness the attraction of industry toward centers of skilled labor and science in urban systems rather than isolated cities; the growth of industrial combines with division of labor in specialized branch plants; and the growing mobility of workers and their claims to greater choice of jobs, skills, services and leisure activities.

Since the late 1970s, experimental urban group systems have been extending division of labor over their areas. Their settlements have tended to specialize, losing some of the functions they performed in their former isolation to

other settlements and assuming new functions they perform best. Because the science-technology revolution conditions efficiency on specialization in all activities, the future fully developed group settlement systems will comprise a network of specialized complexes of industry, agriculture, transportation, science, education, health care, sports, recreation and culture. The General Scheme proposed a strategy to help this process along by developing large, medium and small urban group systems throughout the USSR. It is also proposed to expand settlement to the country's undeveloped areas, especially Siberia and the Far East, by creating a series of large regional cities to serve as cores for the future urban group systems (see the accompanying map).²⁴

Thus, according to the General Scheme, the territory of the USSR will eventually be orga-

nized as a unified system of regional urban systems, and the regions as systems of urban group systems.

Summary

In the Soviet Union's early years, primary concern with building the country's industrial base relegated rebuilding its settlement system to secondary importance. Not fully integrated with national economic planning, city planning tended to lose touch with reality and develop utopian notions.

Despite difficulties, however, Soviet city planning made remarkable progress toward solving the housing problem, controlling air and water pollution and developing public sanitation, transportation and urban park systems.²⁵ It began to increase accessibility to jobs, goods and services by evenly distributing work places



Legends

- Cities — centers of group-settlement-systems
- Basic towns — cores of future group-settlement-systems
- Main roads
- Boundaries of group-settlement-systems
- Boundaries of areas of influence of the basic towns

and socio-cultural facilities; separated residential from other uses with green belts to improve living environments; and defined the administrative and cultural functions of the city center. Thus, it raised the art of city planning to new heights.

Marxist urban theory established that in the current intensive stage of socialist economic development, the urban agglomeration transforms and negates the city and, in turn, is being transformed and negated by a more complex form of settlement—the urbanized region. Soviet planners try to enlarge the advantages of urban agglomerations by integrating cities with their outer urban and rural communities, and reduce their disadvantages by slowing growth in their centers and speeding it along their peripheries.

This should gradually decrease central-city congestion, expand recreation in the natural environment and resolve the contradiction between urban growth and ecology.

Gosplan's 1975 General Scheme of Settlement is the Soviet Union's present long-range strategy for leading its future urbanization into an integrated *Unified Settlement System* composed of a network of regional urban group systems each orbiting around a central city. The Unified Settlement System, one might expect, would be adaptable. New urban systems might join and link with it to expand human cooperation over the face of the globe. It excites new visions of possible forms of socio-spatial organizations in a future global communist society and the evolution of communist man. □

NOTES

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3. Z.N. Iargina, *Some Social Aspects of Prospective Settlement* (in Russian), Moscow, 1975, pp. 17-21.
4. Agafonov et al., op. cit., p. 59.
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19. Iargina, op. cit., pp. 29-31.
20. Articulated by Soviet economic-geographer B.S. Khorev in his *Problems of Cities: Economic-Geographic Studies of Urban Settlement in the USSR*, Moscow, 1971 and *Problems of Cities: Urbanization and a Unified Settlement System in the USSR*, Moscow, 1975 (both in Russian).
21. The systems approach defines a system as an integrated set of elements and processes whose effect is greater than the sum of its parts. A living organism is an example of a system, a city is another.
22. Borshchevskii et al., op. cit., pp. 30-32.
23. B. Belousov, "Basic Problems in Perfecting the Settlement System," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, No. 3, 1974, pp. 3-12, as quoted in Jiri Musil, op. cit., p. 66.
24. Musil, op. cit., pp. 68-71.
25. The extent of land use for city streets and parks is a significant index of life and health safety in cities. Soviet cities in the over 250,000 class use an average of 20.2 per cent of land for streets compared to 28.9 per cent in the U.S. and 20.3 per cent for parks against 9.9 per cent in the U.S. The differences are even greater for smaller cities. See R.A. French and F.E. Hamilton, eds., *The Socialist City: Spatial Structure and Urban Policy*, New York, 1979, Table 3.1.

Shop Papers—Catalysts for Action

RAP LEWIS

Over the past three years, the Washington State District of the Communist Party has accumulated a modest store of experience in the writing, production and use of Party shop papers. In this article, we sum up some of that experience in the hope that others may find it useful.

We had talked for years about issuing shop papers, but an article in *Party Organizer* telling about *Bulls Eye*, the Party shop paper for workers at the Olin-Winchester plant in New Haven, Connecticut, was an important catalyst in transposing talk into action. Here was a Party organization that had actually published a shop paper for eight years! "Communists are Communists," we told each other bravely. "What others have done, we can do."

We are a long way from having eight years under our belts, and we are struggling for regularity on what shop papers we have. But we have launched *Flightline* for workers at the Boeing Company's Seattle-area plants, followed by *Loadline*, for longshore and other maritime workers, and *Lifeline* for hospital workers at the Harborview Medical Center. A fourth shop paper (as yet unnamed), for workers in the retail trades, is in the works. (Some of us are twisting the comrades' arms to get it called *Check-out Line*, thus far without success.)

Each of these shop papers is the work of a Party club. These are industrial clubs whose fundamental goal is to build shop clubs. They see the shop paper as the single most effective way (although certainly not the only way) to reach, influence and build connections with workers in each club's area of concentration. Issuing a good Party shop paper is pure Party-building.

Rap Lewis is a veteran trade union activist.

In addition, we have found that the work of planning, writing, producing and distributing a shop paper can transform the life of a club, give it a new vitality and purpose, and make its meetings meaningful and exciting.

The shop paper's starting point is not the working class in general, but the particular struggles and problems of a specific group of workers. This requires having in the shop one or more Party members or militant non-Party activists who are sensitive to events, moods and trends. The last thing workers need is still another outside force, agitating and preaching at them from on high.

When the shop paper discusses shop problems, the material must be written "from inside the shop" if it is to find acceptance. The job is to pick up on what the workers are already feeling and experiencing, but don't see expressed anywhere else.

In *Lifeline*, for example, a regular signed feature is devoted to comment on actual working conditions and problems at Harborview Medical Center. This popular feature is called "Paging Doctor Red," after the hospital's phone code for a fire drill, and each column is signed, "Dr. Red."

An article in a recent issue comments on the "relentlessly cheerful tone" of management's publications for the hospital workers. "To read them, you'd think there are no problems," says Dr. Red. "Now I like to be cheerful, but only an idiot would work here more than a couple of weeks and not see problems: more and more use of agency nurses, short staffing, poor pay for many classified staff—the list could go on and on. Why not admit that along with [the hospital's] national reputation, there are inequalities? We can solve the problems better if

we admit they exist."

The positive feedback from this article proved that "Dr. Red" had indeed had his finger on the workers' collective pulse. The prestige of the Party as an organization that "tells it like it is" is built on such accurate assessments of worker sentiment.

Or take the recent issue of *Flightline* that brought out into the open Boeing's "Directive 210," ordering a single machinist to set up and be responsible for two NC (numerically-controlled) machines. *Flightline* accurately reported the resistance in the shop to this flagrantly hazardous directive, drew conclusions about the validity of theories of "labor-management partnership," and put the heat on the union leadership to organize "an overall fighting strategy" against the company.

In the next issue of the union newspaper, the union president's column was practically a rewrite of *Flightline* on this issue.

Of course we don't always ring the bell, but our respect for the workers we are addressing, our confidence in their strength and good judgement and our strong organizational identification with their thoughts and feelings can be expressed in one way or another in every issue of every shop paper.

Two tough problems stand in the way of publishing a shop paper: First, getting started. Second, establishing and maintaining regularity and continuity. Clubs that don't solve the first problem won't get to tackle the second, so let's look first at getting started.

Our experience suggests that getting started will take longer than expected. You will want to choose an appropriate name (we have no copyright on the use of the word "Line,") an attractive logo and a suitable format. You will need agreement on the contents (articles, cartoons, etc.) for the first issue. There will have to be a planned division of labor involving everybody in the club: Who will draft which articles, find the cartoons, lay out the pages and do the actual production by mimeo or copy machine?

Then there's distribution: Who will do it, on what day or days, at what gate or gates, and, what are the best shift-change hours? For concentration industries, the shop or industrial club

should be able to draw on the whole Party for distribution crews as needed.

Face-to-face plant gate distribution is best, of course, because it presents to the workers the living, honest, cheerful working-class face of the Party. But in some industries mailings may be either a useful supplement to or an unavoidable substitute for shop-gate distributions. More and more modern plants are deliberately designed to be proof against distributions other than by helicopter. Other possibilities are at union meetings (especially effective during contract struggles) at hiring halls or on picketlines.

Finally, there should be advance agreement on frequency of publication. Once a month or every other month are realistic alternatives. All this advance organizing will demand hours and hours of individual and collective work. It's worth it. When that first carefully-prepared, cleanly-printed issue is handed out to that first honest worker at the gate, the whole thing becomes worthwhile.

Subsequent issues will be easier to get out. And yet sustaining publication demands stamina of a very high order. We in Washington State are still struggling to achieve this. We feel that how regularly the shop paper comes out is an accurate measure of the club's (and the Party's) commitment to industrial concentration. If publication keeps being deferred, if other things are allowed to butt in and come first, something is wrong with the political priorities.

And that will happen. Real problems, unexpected crises, will occur. People will be sick or exhausted. Weaknesses of procrastination will surface. Even the staunchest spirits may flag from time to time.

No doubt all these problems—and a few more—plagued the German Communist Party during the Hitler era. And yet, operating from deep underground, at the sacrifice of many lives, the German Communists continued to publish shop papers and to smuggle them into the factories to speed the destruction of fascism.

We can take inspiration from this rich history. And we can learn from the current practice of the German Party (of the Federal Republic). It organizes nuts-and-bolts seminars and courses

(continued on p. 40)

A Comment on Pomeroy

DAVID WYLLIE

I am greatly concerned that William Pomeroy's article, "The Crisis of Neo-Colonialism in the Philippines," in the January issue of *Political Affairs* may have left many readers with an incorrect (and unintended, I am sure) assessment of the current situation in the Philippines. Specifically, my areas of concern are these:

1. By repeatedly placing the name "New People's Army" in quotation marks, and referring to the NPA as a "Maoist faction," Comrade Pomeroy may have left readers with the impression that this characterization, which was certainly true in the early '70s, continues to be true today.

In fact, the NPA today is made up of a broad cross-section of revolutionary forces, including supporters of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP). The role of the "Maoists" within the leadership has been reduced through struggle to a minority position. As Pomeroy alluded to in his article, there are, of course political and theoretical differences between the many forces making up the NPA (just as there are, for example, within the FMLN/FDR), but these differences have not prevented significant unity of action.

The NPA today is active in 56 of the 73 provinces of the Philippines, has over 10,000 fighters under arms, and has become a major force in the rising revolutionary movement. To leave

readers with the impression that it is nothing but a Maoist faction is erroneous.

I was also concerned by what seemed to me to be Pomeroy's denigration of the participation of elements of the Catholic Church in the armed challenge to the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. The participation of Roman Catholic clerics in the struggle is, in fact, of tremendous revolutionary significance, especially in a country that is 80 per cent Catholic.

In its "Suggested Program Toward National Unity and Reconciliation" (March 1984), the PKP correctly stated, "This is no time for petty rivalries, name calling, fault-finding, personal insults, sectarianism." It is an admonition that all of us who are concerned with the future of the Philippines need to continuously reflect upon.

2. In tracing the development of the PKP's line towards the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, Pomeroy left the reader with the following assessment: "The PKP became increasingly critical of the government's policies and called for an anti-imperialist, national democratic alternative. *This did not signify a swing to an anti-Marcos position.*" (Emphasis, D.W.)

Because Comrade Pomeroy did not carry his analysis up to the present time, I fear that some readers may have been left with the erroneous impression that the PKP is not a participant in the

movement to replace the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. The truth is, of course, that the PKP is playing an increasingly important role in this struggle.

3. Comrade Pomeroy's class analysis of the mass demonstrations that have occurred in the Philippines since the assassination of "Ninoy" Aquino is, frankly, incorrect. His statement that, "Demonstrations were made up of middle-class elements" is true only in the case of those demonstrations that occurred in the Makati district of Manila (that city's commercial and banking center). While these received considerable media attention, they were minuscule when compared to the mass demonstrations of millions of Filipinos, not only in Manila but throughout the provinces. These demonstrations have been primarily carried out by the working poor, peasants, unemployed youth and students. Though no longer the media events they once were, demonstrations are continuing on an almost daily basis throughout the Philippines (a fact I can attest to from personal observation as recently as December).

Pomeroy is also incorrect in saying that the PKP has not participated in these demonstrations. In fact, because of its rising importance to, and prestige among, the working class the PKP has become a major force in mobilizing the masses for these demonstrations.

4. Comrade Pomeroy's comment that "The lifting of martial law marked the start of a transition to a

new regime," is at the very least debatable. An equally valid observation would be that the lifting of martial law was a tactical maneuver by a master politician that helped maintain the Marcos dictatorship in power.

One thing is certain, however: The impending death of Marcos will unleash a political upheaval the short-term consequences of which

A Rejoinder

The letter of Comrade Wyllie is very welcome. Much needed on the U.S. Left and in progressive circles, I feel, is a thorough airing and discussion of what is really happening in the Philippines.

A number of comments are required on Comrade Wyllie's letter, including his use of quotations from my article (which was written, incidently, in May 1984).

1. I did not refer to the New People's Army as a "Maoist faction." The only time I used that term was to refer, correctly I believe, to the small handful of Peking-backed PKP members led by Jose Sison which sought by coup tactics to seize control of the PKP in 1967 and which was expelled as a consequence.
2. Half of a sentence of mine is quoted to claim that my class analysis of demonstrations in the wake of the Aquino assassination is incorrect because it stresses their mainly middle-class complexion. The actual statement I made read as follows: "Demonstrations were made up mainly of middle-class elements *but also drew workers and peasants.*" In the past year, since my article was written,

are impossible to predict.

In my opinion, the revolutionary events that are unfolding today in the Philippines are potentially the most significant occurrence in Southeast Asia since the reunification of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The ramifications for U.S. imperialism are obvious, and they could lead to a major shift in the balance of forces in that part of the world. □

WILLIAM POMEROY
greater involvement of urban workers and of peasants in protests against government policies has occurred, as IMF prescriptions for the Philippine debt crisis have increased unemployment and eroded living standards, but I would maintain that the mobilizing impetus for anti-Marcos demonstrations as such comes from bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors.

3. Comrade Wyllie is misinformed in claiming that the PKP has been participating in the *anti-Marcos* demonstrations. There are varied demonstrations and demands occurring in the Philippines. The PKP and the mass organizations it guides certainly participate, as they always have, in demonstrations of their own making and in unity with others wherever possible. However, in the present situation the PKP does not support one bourgeois political grouping against another. Its demonstrations or demonstrating contingents do not project anti-Marcos slogans or calls for the replacement of Marcos by opposition parties.

The PKP position was clearly stated in the election for the National Assembly in May 1984 (which the CPP-NPA boycotted): its statement, "The National

Assembly Elections and the Communists' Tasks," issued March 20, 1984, declared that "the forces of imperialism, together with their local partners, are once again manipulating the forthcoming election with funds, agents and all forms of political influence wielded by their local allies who are in both the present administration as well as in the opposition groups."

Said this statement, "the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas will assist in every way possible the candidacy of proven patriotic and anti-imperialist personalities." Individual candidates supported were in both the government and opposition parties.

When the PKP and its masses demonstrate, it is invariably on anti-imperialist issues, in protest against policies that harm the interests of workers and peasants, or to demand measures to alleviate or improve the people's welfare.

PKP-influenced mass organizations, in pursuit of anti-imperialist united front aims, have sought unity participation in demonstrations with other working-class organizations, such as Kilusang Mayo Uno (May 1st Movement) which has radical Catholic-CPP connections. The conditions the KMU and similar organizations have been laying down (which indicate their attitude toward broad unity) are: PKP masses can participate in their demonstrations but no PKP people can speak and none of their banners or placards can be used. PKP forces reject such conditions and have held their own demonstrations.

4. I disagree with the formulation "U.S.-Marcos dictatorship," which is a CPP-NPA term. Considering the comparatively wide latitude today in the Philippines for

political, trade union and other activity and for press and other media liberties, the term "dictatorship" is hardly applicable. This does not mean that Marcos is not guilty of authoritarian, undemocratic acts, which are condemned by the PKP. To link U.S. imperialism only with Marcos is highly misleading. U.S. imperialism is not only extremely active in virtually all opposition groups, but there is abundant evidence that it would be pleased to have Marcos replaced by some other protege.

5. There is a rather mystifying remark by Comrade Wyllic charging me with "denigration" of Catholic Church elements who are participating in armed struggle against Marcos, a phenomenon which he sees as of "tremendous revolutionary significance." No denigrating inferences are in my article, which actually says: "There are genuinely anti-imperialist and national-democratic forces . . . in the ranks of the Maoist and radical Catholic groups."

A proper assessment of the role of the Catholic Church in the Philippines at present would require extensive analysis, for which there is no space here. Let me say in brief that there are three distinct trends in the Church: the traditional or very conservative that is strongly pro-imperialist and against social change; the moderate that takes a flexible line on political activity and alignment; and, the radical.

All of these, to one degree or another, are critical of or openly opposed to the Marcos government. The conservatives and the moderates who comprise the vast majority in the Church are aroused by Marcos' moves to tax Church property, nationalize

Church schools, promote family planning programs and propose divorce legislation. These are reactionary reasons for opposing Marcos. The radicals, who are a relatively small minority, raise socio-economic issues on human rights, violation of civil liberties, capitalist exploitation and landgrabbing, imperialist domination and government corruption. Church radicals "side with the poor," which is revolutionary in itself in the Philippines, but among them are widely varying outlooks, ranging from liberal to semi-Marxist, to acceptance of Maoism; some are anarchistic, some say they believe in "Marxism without the Leninism" (i.e., anti-PKP).

An influx of priests, nuns and other Catholic elements occurred in the CPP and NPA when the original Maoist core group was decimated in the armed struggle, a trend evidenced in the National Democratic Front (NDF) set up in 1973. It is quite likely, as Comrade Wyllic says, that the Maoists have been reduced to a minority in the process, but contrary to this impression neither the NDP nor NDF "are made up of a broad cross-section of revolutionary forces." It is a tightly controlled CPP-radical Catholic movement.

The PKP had praised the development of radical Catholics toward militant and anti-imperialist positions. However, one must also be aware of the use by the CIA and other imperialist agencies of Catholic and other religious orders. In the Philippines, these have been active for many years, since the PKP-led HUK struggle of the 1940s-50s, in building trade unions and peasant unions, student movements and others as bulwarks against Communist influence, above all against the PKP.

Conservative Catholic sectors and the allegedly moderate Cardinal Jaime Sin come out against "liberation theology" but at the same time defend radical priests who are arrested or captured in the field. The radical Catholics can feel free to work in the CPP and NPA today because of the general anti-Marcos stance of the Church. The questions is, what would happen to the armed struggle if the Church gains the accommodation and protection of its interests it desires in the regime that succeeds Marcos? In that case, the NPA, useful to destabilize Marcos today, would become expendable. How many of the radical Catholics who are in no dilemma in joining the CPP, NPA or NDF at a time the conservative and moderate sectors of the Church are in opposition to the government, would defy their superiors when the Church makes that accommodation?

6. I would fully agree with Comrade Wyllic about the necessity for broad unity of the Filipino revolutionary forces. Unfortunately, this has yet to be achieved. Comrade Wyllic seems to have the impression that such unity must take the form of PKP support for the NPA. That is not the case. The NPA is but one facet of the liberation struggle, which is taking many forms. Support must be for an anti-imperialist national democratic front and program.

I don't know where Comrade Wyllic gets the idea that "the NPA today is made up of a broad cross-sections of revolutionary forces, including supporters of the PKP." This is untrue. No PKP member or supporter either belongs to or gives backing to the NPA. Indeed, although the PKP has long called on all Left and nationalist groups for dialogue and unity, the CPP-

NPA reject this.

The fact is, the CPP was set up in the heyday of the Mao Tse-Tung hegemony drive, with a deluge of slander against the PKP. This has abated somewhat in time, as the original CPP group has been decimated and as newer elements have come into the party, but hostility toward the PKP still continues. Nevertheless, the PKP has said: "Despite its bitter experience with the CPP, the PKP is willing to conduct a frank discussion with the sincere elements and leaders of the CPP on issues which will lead to the strengthening of the anti-imperialist movement in the country." (PKP 8th Congress Resolution, 1980.)

Reciprocation has not come from the CPP. Some radical Catholics who have thrown their lot in with the Maoists go along with the anti-sectarianism. The Catholic Church-financed press, which has proliferated in the recent period, regularly projects Jose Sison, the most dogmatic and anti-PKP Maoist leader, as the foremost mentor of the CPP-NPA-NDF. [A similar treatment is accorded by the

U.S. press; e.g., "Threat to Manila," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 1985, p. 1.—PA Editors.] One such paper, *Malaya*, carried an interview with Sison on December 26, 1984, in which "he ruled out any possible CPP coalition or reunification with the Moscow-backed PKP," calling the PKP a "self-destructive and moribund group."

The ominous aspect of this attitude, which obstructs unity of Left and nationalist forces, is that it coincides with a U.S. imperialist campaign to promote divisions in the Left. In the September-October 1984 issue of the CIA-backed journal *Problems of Communism*, an article, "Communism in the Philippine," plays up the PKP-CPP rift—from the CPP standpoint. It makes use of a thesis by an expelled PKP member, Francisco Nemenzo, written for a project financed by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. Nemenzo's thesis is a compendium of lies and outrageous distortions about the PKP. It tries to discredit the PKP as a "pro-Soviet" tool and as a "failed" movement "in decline," and it glorifies the CPP. *Problems of Communism*, quoting

this as "authentic"—imperialist agencies first set up their own "authentic" sources and then quote them—proceeds to make the astonishing assertion that the CPP, in contrast, is a wholly "indigenous" Philippine party, claiming that it arose out of "local issues," had no foreign assistance (the Chinese Maoists backed it all the way), and was not the product of the "Sino-Soviet split," asserting that the Sison group introduced the issue at a later date. This is blatant disregard of fact.

Such treatment, in a journal reflecting U.S. imperialist policy lines, is aimed at discrediting and isolating the PKP, while projecting the "indigenous CPP, engaged in a popular insurgency," as "being well-prepared to survive," and, by inference, acceptable. It is a forecast of the strategic line to be pursued by U.S. imperialism in regard to the Left in the Philippines.

The struggle to overcome the divisions in the anti-imperialist forces is an overriding need in the Philippines, but the PKP must be careful and scrutinizing in the choice of allies in this struggle if imperialism is to be defeated. □

(continued from p. 36)

to assist Party groups in preparing and publishing shop papers. A "Guide for Factory Newspapers" has been issued by the GCP board. Special monthly bulletins are printed to furnish Party groups with information they would have difficulty digging out on their own: economic data, arguments for polemics, sample layouts, cartoons and drawings. *Unsere Zeit*, the Party's newspaper, carries as a permanent feature the best articles from the shop papers.

Today workers are deluged during virtually every waking hour by mind-manipulating propaganda from the media and from the boss. But there is a vital weakness in bourgeois information strategy: From all the mouthpieces of the ruling class, workers can learn almost nothing about what is actually happening on the job, or

about the worker's actual needs, feelings, thoughts and dreams.

It is here, from this starting point, that the information strategy of the Communist shop paper begins. Without putting any one single Communist on the spot, the shop paper makes the Party visible and its class program a living reality. It enables Party trade unionists to rise above "good trade union work" to project Communist trade unionism into the work site. And as Communist shop papers multiply and become established, the Party's essential leadership role will be exercised ever more decisively in one industry after another.

Don't underestimate the social and political power that can be packed into the one or two pages of a Party shop paper. □

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